Surging: The tale of two bloody bailouts a comparative study between the outcomes of the American Surges in Iraq (2006-2009) and in Afghanistan (2009-2013)

Diliberto, Jacob J (2016). Surging: The tale of two bloody bailouts a comparative study between the outcomes of the American Surges in Iraq (2006-2009) and in Afghanistan (2009-2013). University of Birmingham. Ph.D.

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Abstract

During the years from 2006-2009 and 2009-2013, both Iraq and then Afghanistan were under extreme duress, succumbing to the pressures from violent armed non-state groups. This occurred while both cases were already under US occupation. In order to resolve the growing instabilities posed by these non-state groups, the US escalated its initial military efforts first in Iraq and then in Afghanistan. The escalation of military efforts was conceived as a “Surge” strategy. The Iraq Surge was implemented first, starting in 2006. By 2009, the situation in Iraq dramatically changed because there was a significant reduction in the direct violence experienced by Iraqis. Furthermore, the new Iraq government gained political momentum and for a short period, it was able to centralize the states political authority and gain more legitimacy amongst the Iraqi people. Much of the conventional wisdom amongst policy experts and some academics is that the Iraq Surge worked, and the premise for this is the reduction of violence and the growing strength of the Iraqi government from 2006-2009. In light of the success in the Iraq Surge, another Surge was employed in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Surge started in late 2009 and carried on through 2012.
The Afghanistan Surge was conceived using the same political plan, and the same military manuals and tactics deployed during the Iraq Surge. However, Afghanistan did not experience the same radical decline in direct violence that was seen in Iraq.

Type of Work:

Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.)

Award Type:

Doctorates > Ph.D.

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