Coarse correlated equilibria in duopoly games

Sen Gupta, Sonali (2014). Coarse correlated equilibria in duopoly games. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.

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Abstract

We consider the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) in various contexts; games with quadratic payoff functions (which include Cournot duopoly, public good provision and emission abatement) and a linear duopoly game. For the games with quadratic payoffs we compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE and show that it is achieved by a CCE involving only two strategy profiles. The improvement over and above the Nash equilibrium payoff is substantial in the various economic examples considered for this class of games. In case of the linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric CCE, and any unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.

Type of Work: Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.)
Award Type: Doctorates > Ph.D.
Supervisor(s):
Supervisor(s)EmailORCID
Ray, IndrajitUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Jensen, MartinUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Licence:
College/Faculty: Colleges (2008 onwards) > College of Social Sciences
School or Department: Birmingham Business School, Department of Economics
Funders: None/not applicable
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
URI: http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/5102

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