The Royal Air Force, Combined Operations Doctrine and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942

Mahoney, Ross Wayne (2009). The Royal Air Force, Combined Operations Doctrine and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942. University of Birmingham. M.Phil.

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to examine the use of air power during Operation JUBILEE. In recent revisionist accounts, the role of the Royal Air Force has come in for criticism. Therefore, this thesis seeks to examine why the RAF fought the battle in the manner that it did. It examines both the doctrinal and operational context of the forces involved in JUBILEE and in doing so examines their effectiveness. This thesis contends that Combined Operations doctrine argued that the key role for air power was to maintain air superiority in order to protect assaulting force. It then examines this alongside the development of the offensive use of RAF Fighter Command in the battle for air superiority in the period 1940-1942. In understanding, these twin pillars of doctrine and operations this thesis challenges the perceived failure of the RAF during the raid by arguing that in seeking to battle the Luftwaffe in the manner that it did during JUBILEE it provided the most appropriate protection that it could for the assault forces. The thesis then examines the impact that JUBILEE had upon Fighter Command strategy and various aspects of Combined Operations development in 1943 thesis in order to assess its effectiveness. This thesis argues that while there may not be a direct link to Operation OVERLORD in 1944 operations at Dieppe had an impact during 1943 and needs to be considered as one line of development in parallel with those from other theatres of war.

Type of Work:

Thesis (Masters by Research > M.Phil.)

Award Type:

Masters by Research > M.Phil.

Supervisor(s):