The main question of this thesis originated from the following observation: during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909) - especially after the 1880s - the German armament firms (GAFs) obtained a monopoly position in the Ottoman military market and maintained their position for decades. Based upon this observation the question of this thesis is: How did the Germans manage to get this status and protect it for decades, in particular, in a quite competitive market, where the American, British, and the French firms had been dominant for years? This thesis, which has fundamentally relied on multi-national archival research, does not seek the answer with reference to the ordinary theory of supply and demand but in the realm of the inter-personal relations and the personal influence of some influential personalities/statesmen who somehow intervened themselves into the war business from both sides (i.e. the Ottoman Empire and Germany). In the line with this argument, the principal aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of the non-commercial factors of the arms trade on the GAFs’ successful war business in the Ottoman military market. For that purpose throughout the dissertation the acts and doings of Bismarck; Kaiser Wilhelm II; Von der Goltz Pasha and the other German military advisors who were employed in the Ottoman Army; Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Ottoman bureaucrats/officers will be discussed within the context of their contribution to the German armament firms’ successful war business in the Ottoman market.