

HAPPINESS IN PRISON

by

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Abstract

In this thesis I am going to explore the relationship between happiness and imprisonment. I will discuss three theories of happiness – hedonism, life satisfaction theories and emotional states theories. I will argue that the main problem of these theories is that they take happiness to consist only of psychological states.

Because of this, I will turn my attention towards those theories that evaluate happiness in terms of how well life is going for the person who is living it. I will argue that my Aristotelian account is the most plausible way to understand the relationship between happiness and imprisonment. This is because it takes into account both the external circumstances and the psychological and emotional life of prisoners.

Through this thesis, I will show that my account of happiness in prison accomplishes three tasks: i) it solves the problems encountered by the other theories of happiness in the evaluation of prisoners' happiness, ii) it does not suffer from two of the main objections to the other objectivist theories of happiness, and iii) it can help us to investigate the happiness of prisoners empirically more accurately.

**To my beloved mother
who deeply believed in me.
My life without her
will never be the same...**

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Chapter I

Introduction

Happiness seems to be something we all want. We try to be happy ourselves and we wish for others to be happy too. However, when something bad happens in our lives, the pursuit of happiness becomes much more complicated. One such bad event is imprisonment. If you are imprisoned, your perspective on life changes radically: you are no longer free and you cannot plan your life in the same way as before. Your daily life consists in following the prison's rules and routines. In this context, we can ask several questions about happiness: what is happiness for people whose life is so restricted? Are the constituents of happiness for people who are imprisoned the same as for other people?

My thesis on happiness and imprisonment will try to answer these questions properly. In particular, my thesis will address the question of what happiness is for people deprived of their freedom. With this goal in mind, I will evaluate the dominant theories of happiness in the light of prison life and I will show that these views have implausible implications for the evaluation of prisoners' happiness. I will argue that an Aristotelian account is the best way to understand of what the happiness of prisoners consists and what the relationship between happiness and imprisonment is. I will aim to show that happiness in prison is a matter of how well the prisoner's life is going in terms of deliberation, social life and emotions. I will claim that, even if your life is not going so well because you are imprisoned, there are still ways for you to be happy.

This thesis has three parts. Part I consists of Chapter 2. This chapter will briefly describe what prisons are for, how they are organised, and how they affect the prisoners' lives. I will

focus on the prison system in England and Wales. The point of this chapter is to offer a clear and accurate picture of prisons and prison life so that it will be easier to discuss later on how imprisonment impacts the lives and happiness of the prisoners.

Part II of the thesis consists of three chapters. This part examines how the traditional views of happiness – hedonism, life satisfaction views and emotional state theories – would understand the happiness of prisoners. The reason why I decided to discuss these three theories is that, at first glance, all of these theories seem to fit our intuitions about how happy prisoners tend to be. Intuitively, we would expect prisoners to be less happy than other people, which is exactly what the previous three theories of happiness seem to conclude too. These theories also seem to fit the empirical data about prisoners' experiences and what effects imprisonment is thought to have on the prisoners' lives. Finally, these three theories of happiness are furthermore the most popular views in the contemporary debates about the nature of happiness.

Chapter 3 discusses perhaps the best-known account of happiness, hedonism. I will argue that the problem with this view is that happiness in prisons appears to consist of more than merely pleasant feelings and positive attitudes. I will claim that prisoners can be happy even if they are not experiencing any positive feelings and that even if they are having positive feelings of pleasure they may still fail to be happy.

In Chapter 4, I move on to discuss Whole Life Satisfaction Theories of happiness which identify happiness with being satisfied with one's life as a whole. I will reject these views by showing that life satisfaction does not seem to have the significance that happiness has in prisons. I will argue that it is reasonable to believe that prisoners can find ways of being happy even if they are not satisfied with their lives as a whole.

After that, Chapter 5 discusses a more recent theory of happiness: Daniel Haybron's emotional state theory. It takes happiness to consist of positive central affective states and mood

propensities. I argue that, even if this theory correctly claims that emotional states play an important role in prisoners' happiness, it fails to take into account the relation between dispositions to experience moods and the circumstances in which these dispositions are manifested.

After the discussion of the previous traditional theories of happiness, I will spend Part III of this thesis on Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia* and how it can make sense of prisoners' happiness. This part will consist of three chapters. In Chapter 6, I will present a short overview of Aristotle's ethics and develop my own interpretation of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*. In Chapter 7, I will then use Aristotle's theory to offer my account of prisoners' happiness. According to my Aristotelian account of happiness, in order for prisoners to be happy their lives must contain at least one of these three elements: certain kinds of deliberation, sociality and emotions. The aim of this chapter is also to show that at least in principle these elements of happy lives are accessible for prisoners too.

Finally, in Chapter 8, we will see how the outlined Aristotelian account overcomes the problems encountered by the other theories of happiness. This chapter will also try to respond to the most important objections to Aristotelian accounts of happiness, and it will furthermore explain what the advantages of the outlined Aristotelian account of happiness are. The aim of this last chapter will be to evaluate why my Aristotelian account of happiness is the best and most plausible way to understand what happiness consists in in prisons and what the relationship between happiness and imprisonment is.

1.1 Clarifications

Before I explain why I have decided to investigate what the relationship between happiness and imprisonment is and why this question is important, I need to clarify the main topic of this

thesis. First, I need to introduce two different senses of the term ‘happiness’. Despite the general agreement about the fact that we all want to be happy, there are several answers to the question ‘what is happiness?’ and one reason for this is that people use the term ‘happiness’ in different senses. Second, I also need to clarify what kind of research I am conducting and on what kind of sources I will be relying during this project. Let us start with the explanation of the two senses of happiness discussed in this thesis.

In everyday usage, being happy is often taken to amount to merely feeling happy, which itself is a kind of joyful sensation. When we talk about these sensations, we are referring to episodes of happiness in one sense. For example, I feel happy when I am eating an ice cream, I am happy to see you, and I am happy about passing an exam. This kind of happiness is related to particular events and it involves a feeling of joyfulness. However, when we wish for someone to be happy or when we hope that our children are happy, we are not thinking that they should merely have such episodes of happiness. Rather, what we have in mind is happiness in a more profound sense. Happiness in this second sense is usually what philosophers talk about, and likewise, in this thesis, I will mainly be interested only in this one more profound sense of happiness.

There are four main competing theories of happiness in the deeper sense in the philosophical literature. Some philosophers think that being happy in this sense consists of some kind of a psychological condition. Profound happiness in this case is usually identified with pleasure (Hedonist theories), life satisfaction (Whole Life Satisfaction theories), or emotional states (Emotional State theories). According to all these theories of happiness, happiness is more than merely a kind of a joyful feeling. For example, according to the previous theories, when we evaluate how happy a person is, we always need to take into account a longer period of the person’s life. Being happy in this case requires more than just experiencing a positive

feeling.¹ For instance, when we talk about a person having been happy during a certain period of her life, we do not merely mean that the person has had many episodes of joyfulness during that period. In some cases, a person can have felt miserable during a certain period of her life but she can still think of that period as the happiest of her life.² For example, a woman who has a difficult pregnancy has probably many moments of discomfort and anxiety, but she could still consider that period as one of the happiest of her life.

In contrast, there are other philosophers who argue that the deeper kind of happiness consists of not merely of psychological states but also of living well. Such theories of happiness in the deeper sense focus on both a person's mental life and on whether she is living a life that is good for her. What makes a person happy according to this type of theories is what ultimately benefits the person. The defenders of this type of theories often refer back to Aristotle's account of *eudaimonia*.³ Very roughly, being happy consists according to these philosophers of living a certain kind of a good life. The happy life will consist of at least in part of exercising virtues such as kindness, generosity, honesty, justice, and so on. Happiness for *eudaimonic* theories thus appears to require more than states of mind; it concerns the whole character of a person's life.⁴

To sum up, when philosophers investigate about the nature of happiness in the deeper sense, they defend two types of conflicting theories. The first family of theories, which I call the subjective theories, takes happiness to consist of a deep psychological state or a condition

¹ Happiness understood in this way will be discussed in chapter III, IV and V of this thesis.

² For references and examples see Feldman (2002, pp. 604-628; 2008, sec. 6.4); Suikkanen (2011, p. 150).

³ I will discuss Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia* and its possible intuitions about prisoners' happiness in chapter VI, VII and VIII of this thesis.

⁴ In chapters VII and VIII, I will claim that the psychological aspects of *eudaimonia* are not as peripheral as Haybron's states (2000, p. 210). I will show that emotions are a central aspect of Aristotle's theory of happiness. In section 7.1.3, I will argue that, in order to be happy, we need to feel emotions in the appropriate way. In order to be experienced in the right way and at the right times, emotions must not just always be positive but rather they must be appropriate to the circumstances and also lead to virtuous actions. Happiness-constituting emotions will include all the standard emotions of anger, love, hatred, fear, confidence, shame, benevolence, pity, indignation, joy, envy, emulation and so on. All these emotions will be happiness-constituting only insofar as they are guided by reason and lead to successful actions (sec. 7.1.3). I will, therefore, recognise (contra Haybron) that Aristotle did have a theory of happiness (Haybron, 2008, pp. 32-33).

of the subject. For these subjective theories, happiness consists of pleasant feelings or attitudes, life-satisfaction judgments, or emotional states. The second group of theories of happiness, which I call the objective theories, takes happiness to consist of a more comprehensive condition of life – how well the life is going for the person living it.⁵ According to these theories, happiness can be measured by some objective standard.⁶

These two families of theories reflect the fact that people have conflicting intuitions about what is required for being happy. In this thesis, I will try to find a way to reconcile these two ways to understand happiness. I will aim to formulate a theory which takes into account both the subjective psychological states of the subject and the objective facts about the subject's life.

However, my main goal is not only to create a new theory of happiness but to show that psychological happiness is strictly speaking related to how well the life is going for the person who is living it. In my view, subjective happiness and objective happiness are two sides of the same coin. I will show that one of the cases in which my theory of happiness appears to be the most appropriate approach is in the analysis of prisoners' happiness. Imprisonment affects both prisoners' lives and their psychological states and so, if we want to understand what happiness

⁵ Although I have referred to two senses of happiness, I will only aim to discuss happiness in the second one deeper sense. The four theories I will discuss in this thesis are theories of happiness in this second sense. However, I need to acknowledge that there is a third sense in which happiness is sometimes understood in the philosophical literature. Here happiness is a synonym for well-being. I call this third sense of happiness the 'normative' sense as is standard in the literature (Feldman, 2008, p. 219). There are mainly three kinds of theories of happiness/well-being: Hedonistic Theories, Desire-Fulfilment Theories and Objective List Theories. Even though I only wish to formulate a theory of happiness, my account can also be included among the objective list theories of well-being. Later on in chapter 8 section 8.1.1, I will explain why I preferred an Aristotelian account rather than the other two subjectivist accounts. The ambiguity of the term happiness is explained by Feldman (2008, sec. 1; 2010, sec. 1.2), Foot (2001, ch. 6), Haybron (2000, sec. 2.1; 2003, sec. 1; 2008, pp. 5–6, and sec. 2.2), Kraut (1979, p. 168), Nettle (2005, pp. 17–20), Sizer (2010, pp. 133–134), Suikkanen (2011, sec. 1) Tatarkiewicz (1966, p. 1; 1976, pp. 1–6), Telfer (1980, pp. 1–2), Thomas (1968), and von Wright (1963, p. 87). The reason I have decided to focus on the single deeper sense of happiness and to understand all the four theories (hedonism, Whole Life Satisfaction Theory, emotional state theories, and Aristotelian accounts) as competing accounts of what happiness in this sense consists of is that it seems clear to me that these theories disagree about when prisoners are happy. In contrast, if we understood the first three theories to be theories of happiness in the psychological sense and the Aristotelian view to be a theory of happiness in some different normative sense, then these theories would not be disagreeing but rather merely speaking past one another.

⁶ This kind of distinction between subjective and objective theories is also suggested by Sizer in her paper on an affective theory of happiness (2010, pp. 133-63). A similar tension between objective and subjective approaches to happiness can be found in economics (Bruni, 2010, pp. 389-391).

consists of in prisons, we need to take into account both the prisoners' psychological states and also how well their lives are going for them. This can be done by assessing their happiness in terms of *eudaimonia*.

Now that the topic of my thesis is clearer, I will also need to clarify what kind of research methods I will be using and with what sorts of literature I will be engaging. This thesis is distinctly philosophical. My main goal is to consider what happiness in prisons consists in in general and what the relationship between happiness and imprisonment is. For this reason, my research is explicitly not empirical. I will not conduct any empirical research on how things happen to be in any particular case of study. Rather, I will analyse how things happen to generally be in prisons relying on existing empirical literature. My thesis will analyse the nature and essence of happiness and its relationship with imprisonment. In fact, I will not try to determine either what causes prisoners to be happy or whether prisoners are in fact happy. I am only interested in the constituents of happiness in prisons. As a matter of fact, throughout the thesis, I will evaluate what happiness consists of in a deprived life and whether prisoners have the constituents of happiness.

However, I will articulate an approach to happiness in prisons using literature from several academic disciplines. Even though my approach will remain philosophical, I will frequently refer to empirical studies and data from prisons. I will discuss both sociological and psychological studies carried out in prisons and philosophical theories of happiness. I will mainly rely on empirical materials in order to show that our philosophical intuitions match with what really happens in prisons as reported in the empirical studies. I will not present any other empirical findings or conclusions. Rather, I will attempt to be sensitive to empirical facts and the studies conducted in prisons. My aim is to explain why we need philosophical theorizing to address the relationship between happiness and imprisonment and how other disciplines could

benefit from my philosophic analysis too.

Throughout the thesis, I will be using fictional examples to explain just why the traditional theories of happiness fail to offer plausible accounts of happiness in prisons. I will also rely on fictional cases in arguing for the conclusion that my Aristotelian account is the best way to understand the relationship between happiness and deprivation. I rely on fictional examples that are not grounded in any specific actual prison experiences for two reasons.

This use of fictional cases might raise two concerns. So, first of all, one might wonder why we should not rely on actual cases concerning prisons rather than purely fictional hypothetical cases. There are two reasons why I have chosen to rely mainly on the latter type of fictional cases. Firstly, I have formulated many of the examples on the basis of actual stories collected from prisons (such as the contemplative prisoner case, for example). I have only made these cases fictional in order to make them clearer and remove some of the features of the cases that are not relevant. Secondly, it is commonly acknowledged that our philosophical theories about notions such as happiness should not merely fit our intuitions about how happy different actual people are but they should also match with what we would think about merely possible cases. The advantage of this is that, if our theories apply more broadly, we will be able to apply them in the future in the new situations we face.

The second concern one might have is that the points my hypothetical prison case are used to make concerning happiness could also be made by relying on hypothetical cases that do not involve prisoners. There are two possibilities here. Firstly, it could be the case that there is something specific about at least some of the cases I have used, for example, due to the fact that the prisoners in them are isolated and some of their freedoms have been taken away. In this case, the focus on purely hypothetical prison cases would be warranted because these cases help us to understand something about prison happiness that could not be illuminated in any other

way. The second possibility is that we could in fact learn the same lessons about happiness also by considering hypothetical cases that do not concern prisoners. This is something I will want to investigate in the future. If we really could draw the same lessons about happiness and how it is affected by different factors also outside prison by considering analogical cases to the examples I have used, then this would show that the kind of theory of happiness defended in this thesis could also apply in other types of circumstances of deprivation (such as poverty and other types of social disadvantage, refugee camps, serious illness, and so on).

1.2 Benefits of My Research

Even if it is generally important to do philosophical research on happiness, I want to give reasons for why it is important also to consider happiness in prisons more specifically. Firstly and most importantly, from my research on prisoners' happiness we will learn that psychological theories of happiness have failed to take into account an important element in their explanation of what happiness is. These theories do not take into account sufficiently the circumstances in which people live. An Aristotelian account fills this gap by suggesting that, when we evaluate how happy a person is, we should consider the circumstances in which a person is. An Aristotelian account will analyse how well people's lives are going according to some objective standard and in which activities people take part.

In addition to my research having philosophical and theoretical value, it also has three practical merits. I argue that three elements of prisoners' lives - deliberation, sociality and emotions – should be taken into account when assessing how happy prisoners are because these are the basic constituents of happiness. This insight will be useful and relevant for theorists and practitioners from several disciplines who study and work with prisoners. There will be mainly three areas of research which will benefit from my philosophical research.

First of all, my research will suggest a new way in which to think about the function of prisons. An Aristotelian account of happiness can be used to improve rehabilitation in prisons. Trying to become happy in a prison would, on this view, be a way of trying to live a good life in a way that would help prisoners also after their release. My theory suggests that, in order to be happy, prisoners should take part in certain activities which allow them to become virtuous and develop their capacities. Prisons, on my view, will be places where people should have a chance to start to live a good and positive life.

Psychologists, along with those who work with prisoners in rehabilitation programmes, will therefore have an interest in my research. By looking at the constituents of happiness outlined in my approach, they will be able to construct more accurate objective standards for evaluating and understanding whether prisoners are ready to start a new life after their release.

Moreover, my philosophical research on prisoners' happiness will also help policy makers to make judgements about which rehabilitation programmes to fund. My approach will suggest that programmes that focus on prisoners' happiness should have a priority because happy prisoners will also be good citizens after they are released. As we will see, being happy by the Aristotelian standards requires virtues such as honesty, generosity, and justice and also having the right kind of relationships and emotions. This explains why we should fund rehabilitation programmes which aim to make prisoners at the same time both more virtuous and happier.

Second, a focused investigation of prisoners' happiness will help us to take into account all the aspects of a person's life that are affected by imprisonment. This means that, as a result of this type of focused research, empirical studies will be able to explore new objective ways of measuring the effects of imprisonment on prisoners' happiness. Instead of collecting subjective assessments about prisoners' happiness, the type of Aristotelian approach which I

will defend in this thesis would suggest that we should consider whether prisoners deliberate, have a social life and feel the right kind of emotions when we try to evaluate how happy they are. My approach will give to empirical researchers some objective information about prisoners' experiences which can be used to measure prisoners' happiness along with the prisoners' own subjective evaluations of their experiences.

Moreover, by utilising my approach, psychologists will be able to better understand the effects of imprisonment on the emotional lives of the prisoners. In particular, psychologists will be able to formulate more objective ways for evaluating how prisoners react to imprisonment on the basis of my research. In this way, a philosophical investigation of happiness in prisons will help to improve the understanding of what consequences imprisonment has on prisoners' happiness and lives.

Third, another discipline that will be able to benefit from my research is sociology. Many sociological researches on prison life use surveys and questionnaires to analyse prisoners' responses to imprisonment. Sociologists, and other empirical researchers, will benefit from my research because the theory I will defend could be used to construct better methods for analysing how prisoners react to the prison-environment. These methods can be used to compare prison facilities and sentences, and what kind of consequences they have for the happiness of prisoners. I will suggest that we should analyse prisoners' happiness at least in part by evaluating what kind of social lives prisoners have and which activities they take part in.

In conclusion, in this thesis, I will bring together theoretical and practical domains in order to develop an original way of understanding the happiness of prisoners. By referring back to the Aristotelian tradition about happiness, my research will offer a new way of understanding the role of prisons in our society. If we care about prisoners' happiness, if we give the

opportunity to prisoners to be happy in prisons, we will allow to prisoners to find a new way of living in and beyond the prisons. In my project, prisons will be a place for starting a new positive life.

Part I
The Landscape

Chapter II

The Prison

Introduction

In this chapter, I am going to explore what it is like to live in prison and how imprisonment affects the lives of prisoners. I will try to understand how prison lives differ from the ordinary lives lived outside prisons. The aim of this chapter will be to prepare the ground for understanding how living in prison can make a difference to the prisoners' happiness. I will go through several empirical studies of prison life which will help us to understand what areas of prisoners' lives are affected by imprisonment. I will refer back to these materials later on in Part II and III of this thesis.

In the first section of this chapter, I will explain the purpose of prisons in modern societies. Prisons in modern Western societies have four main purposes. They are (i) institutions for punishment, (ii) they have a deterring effect on potential offenders within the society, (iii) they aim at reforming offenders, and (iv) they protect the security of the community by isolating dangerous individuals from the wider population. Even if prisons thus have many purposes, all prisons share one essential feature. Prisons are institutions in which people are forcibly confined for a certain period of time. There are a number of rules and duties to which prisoners are subjected. In this way, prisoners are denied many important freedoms. Prisoners' lives follow a routine which is planned by the prison staff and the prison system.

Section 2.2 will describe the living conditions of prisoners especially within the prison system of England and Wales in order to introduce what the daily routine of prisoners is like. In particular, I will focus my attention on cells, food and health care. Moreover, I will explain how prisoners tend to spend their time and especially make note of the activities in which they

take part.

After a general description of how the life of a prisoner is organised, I will describe the prison population in section 2.3. Prisons are mainly male institutions because the majority of prisoners are adult men. However, a small portion of prison population consists of women and young prisoners. People are imprisoned for different kinds of serious crimes such as murder, rape or violence against other people. However, a large proportion of people is imprisoned for others crimes such theft, handling stolen goods, forgery, burglary, robbery and drug offences (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons annual report 2014-15).

Imprisonment has a significant impact on people's lives. The literature on the effects of imprisonment suggests that incarceration affects both the quality of life and well-being of prisoners (Liebling, 2004). In some cases, imprisonment permanently harms the prisoners' mental health and social life.⁷ The last two sections of this chapter will look at these types of consequences of imprisonment. More specifically, the section 2.4 will analyse how prisoners experience imprisonment whereas the section 2.5 will describe how prisoners adapt to incarceration. These last two sections will naturally lead us to ask how imprisonment affects prisoners' happiness and whether prisoners could be happy. These topics will, however, be discussed in more detail in the following chapters of this thesis.

2.1 The Aims of Imprisonment

I will begin this chapter by introducing prisons and their purpose. Within modern societies, prisons are institutions where citizens are held against their will for different lengths of time. In countries where the death penalty has been abolished, imprisonment is the most severe sentence

⁷ Extensive references on the effects of imprisonment can be found in section 2.4 of this chapter. Literature on the effects of imprisonment includes Sykes (1958), Adams (1992), Aday (1994), Irwin & Owen (2005), Liebling & Maruna (2005), Jewkes (2007), Crewe (2009), Liebling (2004, 2011), Crewe, Liebling & Hulley (2011) and Bülow (2013). A measurement of the well-being of prisoners was made by Van Tongeren & Klebe (2010) Liebling, Crewe, & Hulley, (2011).

that a court can impose on a convicted offender. Imprisonment deprives human beings of their individual liberty; several limitations are imposed on what prisoners can and cannot do. For this reason, imprisonment is usually described as the punishment of last resort and it should be imposed by a court only if no other form of punishment is appropriate.⁸

Recently, the use of imprisonment as a form of punishment has sharply increased within the Western countries. More than 10.35 million people are held in penal institutions throughout the world according to the latest edition of the World Prison Population List (WPPL). About half of these people are imprisoned in just three countries: the United States, China, and Russia. Incarceration rates in England and Wales are some of the highest in Western Europe (Walmsley, 2014). The Ministry of Justice bulletin (2015) on our prison population shows that our incarceration rate has increased significantly during the last twenty years, from 45,817 in 1992 to over 85,000 in 2015. The previous Ministry of Justice bulletin states also that the sentenced population has increased after 1993 in England and Wales because courts have started to sentence more offenders to prison each year both for less serious crime and for longer periods of time.

It seems that the growth of the prison population does not match the increases in the crime rates. The increase of the prison population seems to be more related to the social functions which prisons play in our society, which have changed over the last twenty years. The main purpose of imprisonment is generally to punish the individuals who have committed serious crimes. In fact, some crimes are so serious that the only appropriate way of punishing

⁸ For an extensive discussion of general principles of punishment and the consequences of criminal punishment see Oderberg (2000, pp. 146-156) and Hart (2008). In his paper 'Punishment and Desert', James Rachels discusses the relationship between the Principle of Desert and punishment (2014, pp. 466-473). Wright, Cullen and Beaver discuss punishment and the aims of incarceration (2014, p. 484). For a clarification and assessment of classical and contemporary attempts to give moral justification for the practice of punishment, see Honderich's *Punishment - the Supposed Justification* (1970). A classical discussion of the abolition of corporal punishment and the effect of punishment can be found in Beccaria (1764/1995). A discussion of the Panopticon structure of prisons can be found in Bentham (1789/1969). Finally, an argument for punishment as a form of discipline is made by Foucault in his book *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1977).

for them seems to be to take away the offenders' liberty. As a punishment, imprisonment is mainly used for crimes such as murder and other violent crimes such as rape. However, in England and Wales, more recently also less serious offences have been punished with prison sentences (Coyle, 2005, p. 12).

In addition to punishing people, prisons are also used for three other purposes in Western societies. Firstly, imprisonment is often considered to have a deterrent effect. What we choose to do in our daily lives is affected by the consequences which we think our actions have for our lives. We avoid a certain action, for example, because we think that the action would cause more harm than good. For instance, we may decide not to smoke because we are aware of the risk of cancer.

This line of thinking is used to support the idea of imprisonment having a deterring effect. A person who is thinking of committing a crime can decide against it because he knows that he might have to go to prison as a result of committing that crime.⁹ In this case, the prospect of imprisonment has a deterrent effect on the person who could commit the given crime otherwise. We can distinguish between two forms of deterrence: individual and general. The deterrence is individual when a person decides not to commit a crime because he directly thinks that he would be imprisoned as a result. In contrast, we can speak of general deterrence when a person does not commit a crime because he has seen that other people have been sent to prison for that same crime and he is afraid that this could happen to him. It is controversial whether the empirical evidence based on crime rates in different jurisdictions supports the idea that imprisonment has a deterrent effect (Coyle, 2005, pp. 14-15).¹⁰

⁹ Beccaria proposed that the most effective way to administer punishment is to increase its certainty, swiftness, and severity. The fear of an immediate, certain, and severe sanction will deter people in the communities to commit the crimes (Beccaria, 1764/1995).

¹⁰ An analysis of the consequences of punishment is presented by Gibbs in his book *Crime, Punishment and Deterrence* (1975). Gibbs proposes the formulation of a systematic theory of the deterrence doctrine. In his book *Punishment and Deterrence*, Andenaes argues that the importance of the deterrent effects of punishment may be seriously neglected by those whose main

The third purpose of prisons is to reform offenders. Here prisons are considered to be institutions in which people can become better persons and improve their behaviour. The rehabilitative model assumes that criminals deserve rehabilitation rather than punishment.¹¹ The idea that prisons can have such a positive impact on people's behaviour is attractive. It offers a positive way of thinking about a negative form of punishment. Currently, prisoners do take part in programmes and courses which should help them to change the pattern of their behaviour. There is evidence that appropriate application of behavioural and cognitive programmes can change offenders' behaviour (Andrews et al., 1990, Gendreau & Ross, 1987). However, the empirical evidence also suggests that it is difficult for the prisoners to change their behaviour during the captivity. Some individuals can improve their behaviour in prison, but they are a minority (Coyle, 2005, p. 16).¹² In fact, the Annual Report 2014-15 of HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales suggests that the positive results of offending behaviour programmes are very variable.

The last purpose of prisons is to protect people from those who commit serious crimes. When offenders are imprisoned, they will be unable to commit more crimes during that time. Imprisonment in this case is justified by the fact that offenders are a threat to the public security. This argument for imprisonment is known as the incapacitation justification.¹³ The incapacitation theory is based on the assumption that incarceration is beneficial because the

interest is the rehabilitation of offenders. The deterrence effect of punishment is also discussed by Wright, Cullen and Beaver in their paper 'Does Punishment Work?' (2014, pp. 486-487).

¹¹ Proponents of the rehabilitative theory suggest that criminal behaviours are usually determined by social factors and circumstances, such as poverty and lack of employment opportunities. For this reason, they think that these problems should be eliminated within societies and criminals should be rehabilitated (Lilly, Cullen, and Ball, 2002). For a philosophical and social analysis of the relationship between discipline and punishment, see Foucault (1977).

¹² Prisoners in many cases take part in programmes designed for behavioural changes and self-improvement. Stories of prisoners who have successfully taken part in rehabilitation programmes in prisons are described by Erwin (2003). Zamble and Porporino have investigated rehabilitation in prisons in their papers (1988, 1990). More recently, a study on prisons as enabler of well-being has been conducted by Helliwell (2011). Helliwell's has investigated the positive outcomes of rehabilitation programs in his paper "Institution as enablers of well-being: The Singapore Prison case study (2011, p. 261). Stories of prisoners who have successfully changed their lives through education are reported in Prisoners' Education Trust website Champion (2016). The relationship between rehabilitation and happiness will be discussed in section 8.3.2 of this thesis.

¹³ For discussions of the incapacitation theory, see Bosworth (2005), Levinson (2002), and Zimring and Hawkins (1995).

physical restraint of incarceration prevents further crimes against the society during the duration of the sentence. In some cases, taking away a high-risk criminal from the society for the sake of protecting other people in the society is justified.

In conclusion, prisons are generally thought to serve four purposes which are described in following statement from The Criminal Justice Act 2003:

Any court dealing with an offender in respect of his offence must have regard to the following purposes of sentencing: a) the punishment of offenders; b) the reduction of crime (including the reduction by deterrent); c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders; d) the protection of the public; and e) the making of reparation by offenders to person affected by their offences (Coyle, 2005, p. 19).

Despite the fact that prisons serve many different functions, they all serve those functions in the same way: essentially prisons deny individuals a number of important freedoms. Throughout this thesis, I will try to focus my attention on the analysis of the relationship between happiness and deprivation of freedom. During this inquiry, I will not assume that prisons have any specific purpose, nor will I make an argument for any specific theory of imprisonment or punishment. My thesis will therefore try to be neutral on such issues.

However, by the end of this thesis, I will reach the conclusion that, if we understand happiness in prison with an Aristotelian account, this can improve the way in which we rehabilitate prisoners. Thus, my theory of happiness in prison seems to serve at least one specific purpose of imprisonment, namely rehabilitation, which will allow me to show how my research has a potential benefit for those people who work for prisoners' rehabilitation. Before I get to the explanation of the practical benefits that my account can have (sec. 8.3.2), in the next section I will explore what life without freedom is like.

2.2 Life in Prison

Most people have a fairly clear idea of the purpose of different public institutions in the society and of what happens inside those institutions. For example, people know that providing an education is the main purpose of schools. And, they also know fairly well what happens inside schools. This is not the case with prisons. As the previous section showed, prisons have more than one purpose. Furthermore, few people really know what happens inside prisons as the following example illustrates.

In the media, there are two popular views of what prisons are like. The first idea is that prisons are dangerous institutions in which there is often violence between prisoners themselves and also between prisoners and the prison staff. The other common idea is that prisons are like holiday camps where prisoners can stay in bed if they so want to, where they are well fed and where they can occasionally relax with family and friends. However, it turns out that the reality in England and Wales (and also in many other Western countries) is very different from the previous common views which many members of the public have about the life in prison. Because of this, the aim of this section is to give an idea of what really happens after a judge gives a prison sentence to an offender, who then becomes a prisoner.

2.2.1 Reception and Induction

The first two stages of imprisonment are the reception and the induction. The aims of the reception process are (i) to confirm the prisoner's identity, (ii) to verify the legality of the detention, (iii) to check and record essential information, (iv) to search the prisoner and accompanying property, (v) to medically assess the prisoner, (vi) to assess the risk of suicide and/or self-harm and harm to other prisoners, staff and the public, (vii) to identify and meet any immediate personal needs, (ix) to identify potential Category A prisoners/Restricted Status

young offenders/E List prisoners/potential escapees,¹⁴ and (x) to identify the prisoners who are subject to the Safeguarding Children-Child Contract Intranet based Public Protection Manual and PSO 4400 Chapter 2 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald, 2008, pp. 216-17).

After the reception process, there is an induction. This stage varies on the basis of the individual prisoner's needs. The aim of this process is to identify the prisoner's emotional needs and outside circumstances and to help the prisoner to integrate into the prison. A sentence of imprisonment can be shocking for many people. Thus, a prisoner needs to be informed about the general plans for the sentence and the rules of the prison. Every prisoner is informed within 24 hours about the prison's rules. Moreover, prisoners are entitled to request a copy of the Prisons' Rules Book and Prisoners' Information Book. Life sentenced prisoners have a special Prisoners' Information Book, and they are provided additional information about their sentence. After these two stages, prisoners are accompanied into their accommodation (Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald, 2008, p. 217).

2.2.2 Accommodation and Food

Prison accommodation is regulated by the 1990 Prison Service Order (PSO) 'Certified Prisoner Accommodation', which aims to provide decent living conditions for all prisoners. The PSO does not specify a minimum amount of space that a cell must have for each prisoner. However, it states that decent conditions in each cell must include enough personal space for sleeping comfortably, for dressing and undressing, and also enough space for storing personal items which prisoners may possess. Despite this, the criteria for what counts as decent living

¹⁴ In England and Wales, prisoners are given a category related to age, gender and security. Category A prisoners and Restricted Status young offenders are those whose escape would be highly dangerous to the public or national security. E List prisoners are those who have made attempts to escape from custody (Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald, 2008, pp. 141-173).

conditions are not always made clear or even guaranteed.

The rapid growth of the prison population has led to even more crowded prisons. Frequently two or three prisoners are likely to be detained in a cell originally designed for just one person.¹⁵ The prison system in England and Wales has struggled to maintain adequate living standards due to overcrowding. Each prison now has a ‘certified normal accommodation’ (CNA) standard which limits the number of prisoners who can be held in a cell. However, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT, 2005) has expressed concern about overcrowding in many prisons in the United Kingdom (Coyle, 2005, p. 108).

Prisoners spend most of their time in prison in their cells. Daily life for most prisoners consists of taking part in various activities for a short period of time and then of not having much to do for the rest of the time. Prisons have a daily routine and a fixed timetable, which is determined by the prison staff and when they are on duty. Members of staff come on duty every day at the same time, usually around 7.00am. They begin their work by visually checking all prisoners through the observation window in each cell door.¹⁶ Then, cells are opened and prisoners can have their breakfast. Usually, prisoners collect their breakfast by going into the common area in groups.

Meals are served at the same time every day. The majority of prisoners have their meals in their cells, especially after the riots that took place in the prisons in England and Wales in 1990. The two main meals of the day, lunch and tea, are usually prepared in a common kitchen

¹⁵ Even when two or three prisoners are sharing a cell designed for one, the prison service does not describe this condition as overcrowding (Coyle, 2005, p. 107). The Annual Report 2014-15 reported that overcrowding continued to be a significant problem in most prisons, affecting 63 per cent of those prisons inspected in 2014–15. More than half prisons were more overcrowded than when they were last inspected. Local prisons receiving those new into custody continued to be particularly overcrowded. Seven of the 19 prisons inspected held 50 per cent or more prisoners than they were designed for.

¹⁶ Until the mid-1990s, the unlocking of the cells in the morning was a signal for ‘slopping out.’ Prisoners were locked in their cells for ten or more hours with no access to toilets, forced to use a plastic chamber pot. When the cells were opened, prisoners went to the communal toilet area, where chamber pots were emptied. The Woolf Report (1991) defined the ‘slopping out’ as the symbol of the inhumanity which existed in prisons. Since then, the slopping out has been abolished and prisoners must have access to proper sanitation. However, the sanitary conditions of prisons have not really improved. Nowadays, many prisons have toilets in the cells. This means that one prisoner could eat their meal while the other is in his bed or even on the toilet (Coyle, 2005, p. 106).

by a group of selected prisoners who cook for the other prisoners under the supervision of the catering staff. There is usually a choice of two main courses. Special diets and religious and cultural meals, such as vegetarian or vegan, are available for those prisoners who request them. The quality of prison food has improved recently, but prisoners still complain especially about when meals are served. Lunch is usually served between 11am and 12.30pm, while tea is provided between 4pm and 5.30pm. This means that prisoners have to wait for their next meal for 16 hours, even if snack and hot drinks can be provided before the doors are locked for the night (Coyle, 2005). After the breakfast and between the two main meals prisoners are allowed to take part in some activities such as work, educational courses or exercise in open space. I will describe these activities more in the next section.

2.2.3 Purposeful and Constructive Activities

Prisoners spend almost all day inside the prison buildings. In most cases, there is only limited space for exercise even if prisoners should be allowed to walk and exercise in open air at least for an hour every day (European Prison Rule, 1987). Under the Prison Rule 23, prisoners must be provided with prison clothing that is warm and in good condition. However, this rule does not apply to unconvicted prisoners and woman prisoners who may wear their own clothes. The rules also require that prisoners must be provided with suitable clothing for work.

All convicted prisoners are required to do a maximum of 10 hours of useful work per day. Unconvicted prisoners are not required to work but they can work if they wish. Much of the work done by prisoners consists of producing various goods for the internal use in prisons, such as uniforms for staff and prisoners. Many prisoners also produce goods for other public institutions. For example, prisoners used to make the mailbags for the Post Office. Recently, prisoners have also been trained to do more skilled work in the hope that they could use those

skills to find work after their release.¹⁷

The prison service is now more concerned about the re-settlement of prisoners to the communities. This is because a prisoner who returns to the society with accommodation, work and support is less likely to offend again. Prisoners who are waiting for their trial generally cannot work. This means that a high proportion of prisoners have no access to any daily work.¹⁸ However, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has stated that every prisoner must be allowed to take part in ‘a satisfactory programme of activities’ which is crucial for the prisoners’ well-being.¹⁹ According to the CPT, all prisoners should spend at least few hours a day on purposeful activities. In addition to work, purposeful activities in prison can also include studying and taking part in art courses and skills workshops (Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald, 2008, pp. 257).

Until 1991, prison education was delivered by the Local Education Authority, the adult education services, and Further Education colleges. In 1991, the prison system allowed also other education contractors to offer their services in prisons. Finally, in 2001, the responsibility for prison education was transferred to the Department for Education and Skills. After this, the aim of prison education has been to reduce recidivism through the rehabilitation of prisoners. The main focus of education in prisons is to provide the basic skills of reading, writing and counting in the hope that this enables prisoners to apply for jobs after their release. Moreover, the education programmes in prisons enable prisoners to achieve nationally accredited qualifications, including Open University degrees. Education is voluntary for all adult

¹⁷ See section 8.3.2 about rehabilitation in prisons which gives examples of how purposeful activities can be important for prisoners’ rehabilitation after release.

¹⁸ There is a tendency to think that all prisoners are convicts, and to forget that lots of them are on remand and may be found not guilty. It is worth explaining more the differences in the way that these prisoners are treated because their conditions are in some ways worse than those of convicted prisoners. I will explore the situation of remand prisoners in more details later on in this chapter (sec. 2.4).

¹⁹ The CPT produces two reports: reports on visit to individual state parties and annual reports. The extract about prisoners’ well-being is part of the Second General Report (Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald, 2008, p. 257).

prisoners, but young offenders of compulsory school age must attend courses or vocational training for 15 hours a week. The Prison Service Order declared that all courses should have a number of objectives which include successful social resettlement, employment prospects on release and the improvement of the prisoners' morale and self-respect (Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald, 2008, pp. 233-235).

The idea that prisons should prepare prisoners for their life after the release has led to the introduction of various courses known as 'offending behaviour programmes'. These programmes are based on the assessment of the features of the prisoners' character which trigger offending behaviour. These qualities include anger, different tendencies for violence, and various addictions. The prisoners' behaviour during these programmes can affect decisions about when they are released and about whether they have access to different prison facilities (Coyle, 2005, p. 119).

More generally, good behaviour and especially co-operative behaviour can give prisoners access to different facilities and other privileges. While all prisoners are entitled to a basic level of goods and access to the basic facilities, access to more goods and better facilities can be earned by providing evidence of good behaviour. Prisoners are able to earn six privileges: (i) access to private cash and (ii) extra visits, (iii) eligibility to participate in higher pay work schemes, (iv) access to in-cell television, (v) ability to wear their own clothes, and (vi) time out of their cells. Prisoners are, however, always deprived of many privileges which other citizens have, such as the right to vote and to have more than a very limited amount of personal property in prison. Facilities and privileges can also be withdrawn as a disciplinary punishment.

2.2.4 Healthcare and Drug Abuse

The Prison System has a duty to provide a safe and healthy environment for both the prisoners and the prison staff. Prisoners and prison staff must be protected from physical assaults, harassment, and diseases. The European Court of Human Rights (Article 3) states that a prisoner's detention 'do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him with the requisite medical attention' (Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald, 2008, p. 264). In the U.K., the Prison Act of 1952 also states that each prisoner must have access to medical officers. Prisoners' health care is provided by the National Health Service (NHS). Despite the fact that the NHS should offer its services to all prisoners, the prison service also has its own medical service. Some large prisons have their own full-time doctors, and some prisons even have their own health bays and hospital wards. Specialist doctors are used on a contract basis (for example, psychiatrists).

Prisoners suffer from a significantly high level of health issues. A study made by the Office for National Statistic (1998) showed that 78 per cent of male remand prisoners, 64 per cent of male sentenced prisoners and 50 per cent of female prisoners had a personality disorder or a health problem.²⁰ The circumstances in the prison themselves do not always help prisoners to maintain good health. Many prisons are old and the sanitary conditions are poor. Prisoners frequently spend long periods together in small spaces where contagious diseases can spread easily. Moreover, many prisoners have drug and alcohol problems and around two-third of prisoners have used illegal drugs before their imprisonment. More and more prisons also face

²⁰ A recent paper by Hannah Pickard stated that a very high proportion of convicts have personality disorders (Pickard, 2015).

drug abuse problems amongst their prisoners (Gravett, 2000, Ramsay, 2003).

In order to deal with this issue, prisons in England and Wales have developed many intervention programmes, which include detoxification and drug rehabilitation programmes, drug testing, and health education programmes. The introduction of mandatory drug testing and intervention programmes have three aims: to deal with the individual needs of problematic drug users, to reduce the harm that drug users cause to themselves and others, and to reduce the supply of illicit drugs in prisons (Coyle, 2005, pp. 122-123).

Drug users constitute a large part of the prison population. Over 40 per cent of sentenced prisoners have committed offences that are connected to their drug taking; usually they committed crimes because they needed money to buy drugs. Moreover, many prisoners have general health problems and untreated health conditions. The Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) reported that the proportion of HIV positive individuals was 15 times higher among prisoners. The SEU also found that mental illness is a more common problem among prisoners; 70 per cent of prisoners suffer from a mental disorder. People react to imprisonment in different ways emotionally. For some people prison can be a place of safety, whereas for others it can be a place of high distress which can lead to mental health problems.²¹

2.3 The Prison Population

In England and Wales, at the end of 2014, 88116 people were imprisoned. Of this prison population, 80 per cent were sentenced males aged 18 or older while 13 per cent were prisoners of either sex on remand either awaiting trial or sentencing. Approximately 4.6 per cent of the prison population were women (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons annual report 2014-15).

²¹ Data on Drug use in prisons can be found in HM Chief Inspector of Prisons annual report 2014-15. Recent studies on drug uses have been carried out by the Centre for Social Justice (2015), the Social Exclusion Unit (2004) and the Home Office Research (2003). See also Gravett (2000) and Ramsay (2003). The Prison Reform Trust has recently reported episodes of drugs dealing problems in prison in England (Prison Reform Trust, 2016).

In 2002, the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) investigated the social and educational backgrounds of prisoners in England and Wales. It reported that prisoners are more likely to have been in care as a child than others, more likely to have been regularly absent from school, more likely to have been unemployed, more likely to have a family member who has been convicted of criminal offence and more likely to have been a young father. The SEU analysed also the basic skills of prisoners and discovered that a high portion of prisoners have a low educational profile (Coyle, 2008, pp. 60-61). This means that many prisoners do not have the basic skills needed for living in a modern society, such as the ability to fill a form at the doctor's office or to complete a job application.

The prison population can be divided in five main categories: remand prisoners, convicted prisoners, woman prisoners, children and young prisoners and life sentence prisoners. I will describe these groups briefly next.

Remand prisoners. In 2013, about 13 per cent of prisoners were on remand which means that they were waiting for a trial with a “not guilty” plea (Berman & Dar, 2013). These prisoners remain innocent in the eyes of the law and they should not be treated as offenders until a sentence or a fine has been given for them by a court. About 20 per cent of remand prisoners are found not guilty, while 50 per cent of male remand prisoners and 40 per cent of female remand prisoners receive a prison sentence (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons annual report 2013-14). Because the legal status of remand prisoners is innocent, they should not be treated in the same way as the convicted prisoners.

In addition, they should not have to live together with convicted prisoners and they should not be obligated to work. Because of their situation, remand prisoners cannot have access to many of the facilities designed for the convicted prisoners. This means that they are

frequently forced to spend most of their time in their cells (Coyle, 2005, p. 64). They are escorted by staff wherever they go and their phone calls and correspondences are monitored. The Prison Rules state that remand prisoners can receive as many visits as they wish. However, these visits take place in confined spaces and last only for short periods of time (Coyle, 2005, p. 65).

Convicted prisoners. Convicted prisoners have committed a crime and received a prison sentence for it. They constitute the largest portion of the prison population. The most common offences committed by convicted prisoners are violence against a person (including murder), sexual offences, burglary, robbery, theft and handling of stolen goods, fraud and forgery, and drug offences (Coyle, 2005, p. 67). The daily routine of convicted prisoners was already explained in Section 2.2, while the typical experiences of these prisoners will be outlined in Section 2.5 which is about the prisoners' reactions towards imprisonment.

All convicted prisoners are subjected to a security scheme. In England and Wales, each prisoner is allocated a security category. There are four categories from A to D. The escape of the category A prisoners would be highly dangerous to the community, the police and the State. Category B prisoners are less dangerous but they must still be kept in very secure conditions. Category C prisoners cannot stay in open prisons but they are unlikely to escape. Category D prisoners are eligible for staying in open prisons (Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald, 2008, p. 171).²²

Women prisoners. In Western European countries, around 6 per cent of prisoners are women and in England and Wales 5.9 per cent of convicted prisoners are women. Across the UK, more

²² In the next chapters I will refer many times to convicted prisoners just as "prisoners". All the data and features discussed from now on refer to convicted prisoners.

than 13,500 women are imprisoned each year. The Prison Reform Trust reported that in 1992 there were 1811 women in prisons, compared to 4671 in 2004. Across the UK, more than 13,500 women are imprisoned each year (Prison Reform Trust, 2016). Women are usually in prison for non-violent offences such as shoplifting and drug offences (Coyle, 2005, p. 67). Many women prisoners have been victims of domestic abuse and they have also had mental health problems before their imprisonment. They are more likely to self-harm and even to commit a suicide than male prisoners. The imprisonment of women can have significant consequences for their family members, and especially for their children. The Home Office reported that 66 per cent of imprisoned women have children outside the prison (Coyle, 2005, p. 67).

Children and young people. In England and Wales, children are considered to be criminally responsible when they are 10 years old. In principle, a 10 year old child could therefore be imprisoned. However, the imprisonment of children is avoided whenever possible. The prison system recognizes 21 as the age of majority (Coyle, 2005, pp. 69-70). Young people below that age are not usually held in prisons, but rather most of the time children are detained in reformatory institutions. Although the conditions in these institutions are often poor and quite similar to the ones in prisons, these institutions are not considered to be prisons. During their time in these institutions, young offenders must usually take part in education which gives them basic educational and working skills.

Life sentence prisoners. The increase of life sentenced prisoners in England and Wales can be seen as a consequence of the abolition of the death penalty with the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965. Today, a life sentence is mandatory for murder. However, since 1950 a life sentence can also be imposed for other serious crimes, especially if the convicted prisoner

is considered to be unstable or dangerous. The average age of life sentence prisoners is higher than others prisoners and life sentence prisoners are usually also first-time offenders (Coyle, 2005, pp. 74-75). Many of these prisoners begin their sentence in high security prisons, and then they are moved to medium level security prisons later on. The life sentence is usually divided into two parts. The first part is served in a prison (the tariff) and the second part, which lasts for the rest of prisoners' natural life, is served under a supervised licence in the community (release on parole) (Coyle, 2005, p. 76).

There are three mechanisms for early release of life sentence prisoners. The first one is known as the automatic release (known as remission) where a life sentence prisoner can be released for his good behaviour in prison. The second kind of release is the discretionary release (also called parole), which was introduced as a part of the rehabilitation scheme for long term prisoners. Finally, there is the home detention curfew, which can be offered to a prisoner on the basis of a risk assessment. Very few life sentence prisoners serve the full sentence, and many of them can benefit from an early release (Coyle, 2005, p. 76).

2.4 Prison Experience

In order to understand what the prison experience is like for the prisoners, we need to consider carefully the empirical studies on the effects of imprisonment. Very roughly, imprisonment is often described as an experience of deprivation which can affect the prisoners' emotional and social lives. In particular, I will focus my attention on the consequences which the deprivation of liberty can have on the prisoners' lives. Moreover, I will describe the deterioration model, which states that imprisonment can cause a psychological deterioration on the prisoners' mental health, and the prisonization model, which claims that prisoners adopt criminalised ways of behaviour during incarceration. Recently, studies on the effects of imprisonment have also

focused their attention on how people adapt to imprisonment. These studies will be explored in the next section.

The experience of imprisonment seems to harm prisoners in many ways both during the incarceration and also after the release. Imprisonment excludes individuals from the rest of society. Prisoners usually lose their housing and jobs when they are in prison. They can face financial and health problems and lose contact with their families and friends. Furthermore, imprisonment can affect the mental health of prisoners and their ability to survive outside the prison. For example, self-confidence, self-esteem and personal control of many prisoners is harmed by the prison experience.²³

Many psychologists and sociologists call the effects of imprisonment “the pains of imprisonment” (Christie, 2000). The literature on the effects of imprisonment shows that the quality of life of prisoners and their psychological well-being can be affected by the experience of incarceration. This means that the effects of imprisonment go beyond the experience of imprisonment itself. Imprisonment affects the individuals’ whole lives and their behaviour. This is demonstrated by many of the empirical studies on the effects of imprisonment.²⁴

One of the first and most important studies on the effects of imprisonment was carried out by Gresham Sykes (1958). He conducted his study in maximum security prisons. Sykes described the experience of imprisonment as an experience of deprivation. He focused his attention on four kinds of deprivations experienced by the prisoners: (i) the deprivation of liberty, (ii) the deprivation of goods and services, (iii) the deprivation of heterosexual relationships, and (iv) the deprivation of autonomy (Sykes, 1958, pp. 63-.83). I will focus my

²³ Studies using the self-esteem dimension of personality were carried out by Zamble and Porporino in 1988. These studies showed that the self-esteem of many prisoners decreased after a period of incarceration. There were also some prisoners whose level of self-esteem did not change.

²⁴ For literature on the effects of imprisonment, see Sykes (1958), Irwin and Owen (2005), Liebling and Maruna (2005), Jewkes (2007), Crewe (2009), Liebling (2004, 2011), Liebling, Crewe and Hulley (2011) and Bülow (2013). A measurement of the well-being of prisoners was made by Van Tongeren and Klebe (2010).

attention on the deprivation of liberty because all the others deprivations seem to be related to the loss of liberty.

The loss of liberty is the most severe feature of imprisonment.²⁵ The freedom of movement of prisoners, especially those serving long sentence in maximum security prisons, is highly restricted and regulated by the rules of the prisons. Prisoners spend most of their times in cells and within the prison building. The loss of liberty leads prisoners to experience two kinds of confinement; they are isolated from the rest of the society and they are also isolated within the institutions.²⁶ Isolation tends to cause a sense of hopelessness and frustration in prisoners. In fact, many prisoners describe their confined lives as hopeless lives. For example, a 60-year old male re-offender interviewed in a maximum security prison, where major restrictions on freedom are applied, describes his experience as a ‘culture shock’. He cannot see any hope for his future life:

I’ll be 80 before I can even be considered for release. I have seen old men end up in a wheelchair in prison...I know I will never walk by a river again, taste freedom, walk on a beach with my grandchildren (Liebling, 2011, p. 531).

During the interview this prisoner referred also to a medical problem by saying: ‘I am praying that it is cancerous’ (Liebling, 2011, p. 531). Another prisoner describes his life in prison in the following way:

It’s hellish. I am very limited in the things I can do, and like I am, how could I say robotise, yeah, like they are trying to control me with a joy pad, it would send some people crazy

²⁵ The deprivation of freedom is the punishment to which an offender is subjected when he or she receives a prison sentence. In the section 2.1 of this chapter, we have seen that prison sentences are considered as the most severe sentences because they involve the loss of one the most valuable features of a human life. For this reason, prison sentences should be given only for the most serious crimes (Ruck, 1951, p. 23).

²⁶ Sykes was the first to describe the experience of imprisonment as an experience of isolation at two levels. At the first level, prisoners are isolated from their family and friends. This kind of confinement produces deprivation in terms of emotional relationships, causing loneliness and boredom in many prisoners. The second level of isolation is within the institution. Many prisoners are isolated from their peers and others voluntarily isolate themselves by spending their time in their cells. This kind of isolation, if prolonged for long period, can cause mental health problems (Sykes, 1958; Howard, 1999, Irwin and Owen, 2005).

(Liebling, 2011, p. 20).

These two prisoners, like many others long-term prisoners,²⁷ experience the feeling of not being genuinely alive until their release and they also suffer from the experience of not having personal control over their lives. The lack of control over their life leads frequently many prisoners to have an impulse to commit suicide.²⁸

The loss of liberty deprives prisoners of a large portion of their lives. Offenders are isolated from their families, relatives and friends. Prisoners can have face to face visits, they can receive and send letters and they are allowed to use telephones. However, all of this is controlled and monitored by the prison staff. Thus, prisoners are also deprived of their privacy.²⁹ Deprivation of emotional relationships is confirmed by the following two empirical studies.

In a study of long term prisoners, Sabbath and Cowles (1992) confirm that the two most serious problems for long-term prisoners are the fact that they are far away from their loved ones and the fact that there is no privacy during visits. In an earlier study, Flanagan (1980) also discovered that the five most frequently cited concerns of the prisoners were: missing somebody, missing social life, worrying about the future, feeling that their lives are wasted and feeling sexually frustrated. In describing the most serious problems, many inmates mention damaged personal relationships with family members and friends outside the prison. Many prisoners experience a loss of emotional relationships, especially when they are in solitary confinement. A short period of isolation does not usually have serious repercussions for a

²⁷ Experiences of deprivation caused by imprisonment are described by Erwin (2003), Crewe (2009), Sykes (1958), Sabbath and Cowles (1992) and Flanagan (1980).

²⁸ A recent study on suicide in prison was conducted by Alison Liebling (2007, pp. 423-495). This study shows that suicide rates are high in the prisons of England and Wales. For this reason, a wide range of suicide prevention strategies have been applied. Suicides usually occur at the early stage of incarceration. The prisoners who commit a suicide usually have experienced high levels of anxiety and distress (Zamble & Porporino, 1988, Liebling, 2008), chronic depression and loss of personal control (Borrill et al. 2004; Liebling, 1992). A study on prisoners' loss of personal control has been carried out by Goodstein, Mackenzie and Shotland (1984). Suicide rates are reported by the Howard League for Penal Reform Trust. (2015).

²⁹ See Bülow (2013), Mills and Codd (2007) and Moran (2013) for references to studies on prison visiting and their benefits and harms on prisoners and families. A study on prisoners' experiences and their privacy has been carried out by Kolber (2007).

prisoner's emotions or her mental health, whereas longer periods of confinement can have serious negative effects on the mental health of inmates.³⁰

Both of these two studies and also many others studies on the effects of imprisonments follow Sykes in that they describe incarceration as an experience of deprivation. Overall, most studies on prison experience can be divided into two main categories: the ones that endorse the deterioration³¹ model and the ones that defend the prisonization model.³²

According to the deterioration model, long term incarceration causes both (i) deterioration of the prisoners' personalities and mental health and also (ii) deterioration of their emotional and physical well-being. Studies on psychological deterioration have shown that inmates can suffer from cognitive defects, such as loss of memory and reduced ability to complete cognitive tasks. Inmates can in addition have emotional problems (such as apathy)³³ and problems with relating to others (such as infantile regression).³⁴ Finally, prisoners can even acquire psychotic tendencies (such as obsessions and the loss of a sense of reality). However, studies on the deteriorating effects of imprisonment have shown also that the negative effects of imprisonment are not uniform across all prisoners. For example, there are significant differences especially between long-term and short-term prisoners (Zamble & Porporino, 1988).

In contrast, the prisonization model holds that the longer inmates are incarcerated the more criminalized they become. This means that prisoners adopt the same behaviours, values and standards as the other inmates and by doing so they come to internalize criminal identities

³⁰ Studies on the effects of long period of confinement have been carried out by Cormier and Williams (1966) and Grassian (1983) (cited in Bonta & Gendreau, 1990).

³¹ Studies on the deteriorating effects of imprisonment have been made by Adams (1992), Pishkin and Thorne (1973), Zamble and Porporino (1988, 1992), Irwin and Cressey (1962) and Irwin (1980).

³² References to this model see Clemmer (1940) Zingraff (1975), Thomas (1977), Gaes et al. (2002) and Ramirez (1984).

³³ Apathy can be defined as an absence of emotion, feeling, concern or passion (Fleming, 1857, p. 34).

³⁴ Regression is a defence mechanisms identified by Freud (1991). According to Freud people face with situations that are so anxiety provoking that they can't deal with them. In these situations, people protect themselves by retreating to an earlier stage of development. For example, they usually exhibit very childish behaviours.

(Zingraff, 1975). Some sociologists have argued that prisonization is caused by the prisoners' attitudes and behaviours prior to incarceration.³⁵ Other sociologists have argued that the degree of prisonization can be influenced by factors such as the length of the prison sentence, interpersonal relationships with other criminal prisoners, post-release expectations of the inmate, ability to adapt, and alienation from society (Howard, 1999, pp. 9-10).

2.5 Adaptation in Prison

Recently, psychological and sociological studies have demonstrated that the prisonization model does not explain how prisoners tend to adapt to the imprisonment (Howard, 1999, p.10). Even if some prisoners show prisonized behaviours, many other prisoners adapt to the prison environment in other ways.³⁶ For this reason, in this section, I will explore the prison experience by describing how prisoners adapt to the prison environment. I will describe a recent sociological study by Ben Crewe (2009), which classifies prisoners under four categories. These categories are based on different patterns of reacting to imprisonment. I will focus on this particular study because it gives us a clear sense of the prison life from the prisoners' own perspectives.³⁷

The studies that explore how well prisoners are able to cope in prison examine how individual prisoners adapt to their environment.³⁸ Researchers interested in this question often focus their attention on how personal and environmental factors together influence how well prisoners adapt to the life in prison. For example, in some cases individuals can face similar long sentences in the same institution, live in the same environment, be under the same

³⁵ This position can be found in Irwin (1970), Irwin and Cressey (1962) and Thomas and Petersen (1977).

³⁶ Presumably prisonization is itself a way of adapting to the prison environment.

³⁷ The prisoners' first-personal perspective will be a crucial feature in the discussions of the traditional theories of happiness in chapters four and five.

³⁸ Studies on adaptation have been carried out Crewe (2007, 2009), Adams (1992), Zamble and Porporino (1990, 1992), Leigey (2010) and Kasser (1996).

restrictions and suffer from the same deprivations. However, because they have different individual histories, beliefs, attitudes, and coping skills, they can come to have different reactions to imprisonment. Some people can sink into depression, anxiety and apathy, whereas the others can become aggressive and violent.

One of the most recent sociological studies on prisoners' adaptation was made by Ben Crewe (2009). According to Crewe, studies on adaptation show that there is no general pattern to how well individuals adapt to prison life. The majority of prisoners just want to do their time in prison and get out. Moreover, not all prisoners fit into a single adaptive category over the whole course of their sentence. Despite this, Crewe identifies four styles of adaptation on the basis of earlier studies on how different people cope when they are imprisoned (Crewe, 2009, p. 148-50).³⁹

First, some prisoners withdraw, retreat or regress, which means that they often isolate themselves from their peers. In many cases, this leads to episodes of maladaptation such as self-mutilation or psychosis. It can also lead to obsessive body-building or a serious involvement with arts and educational activities, which can be ways of escaping the prison life.⁴⁰ Second, some prisoners adopt rebelling and resisting behaviours, which can lead to escape attempts and campaigns for improving the circumstances of imprisonment and against the prison's practices and authority.⁴¹ A third kind of adaptation style is used by the prisoners who conform to the prison environment. These prisoners are content and comply with the prison system and they

³⁹ Crewe refers to the work of Merton (1938), Goffman (1961) and Schrag (1944) to find prisoners' style of adaptation. Adaptation in general and prisoners' ability to adapt will also be discussed in the following chapters where others data from prison will be reported. In particular see sections 4.4.2 and 5.5.2.

⁴⁰ Studies on these kinds of adaptation have been made by Clemmer (1949), Cohen and Taylor (1972) and Boyle (1984).

⁴¹ Cohen and Taylor (1972) have reported data about prisoners' campaigns against prisons conditions. Boyle (1977) and McEvoy (2001) have made studies on prisoners' actively rebel who engage in organized resistance. Studies on escape attempts have been carried out by McVicar (1974). The Prison Reform Trust has recently reported prisoners' attempts to escape from prisons in England (Prison Reform Trust, 2016).

usually take part in the programmes designed for behavioural change and self-improvement.⁴² Finally, a fourth group of prisoners is the “innovators” who are described by Crewe as those “who accept the official objectives but reject the institutional means of attainment” (Crewe, 2009, p. 152). They basically reject the official standards and norms.

Crewe carried out a very interesting study on prisoners’ experience at Wellingborough prison. He was able to divide the interviewed prisoners into five main groups which correspond to different adaptation styles. He labelled the prisoners as i) enthusiasts, ii) pragmatists,⁴³ iii) stoics, iv) retreatists, and v) players.

Enthusiasts are prisoners, usually drug addicts or alcoholics, who see incarceration as an opportunity to improve their attitudes. They usually take part in rehabilitation and detoxification programmes. Crewe discusses a case of a prisoner, who was given a six-year sentence for a serious but not a violent crime. This prisoner cared about his opportunity to become a better person after his prison sentence. The prisoner describes himself in the following way:

When I was bad on drugs I don’t suppose I was a very nice person and it did affect my relationship with my family. And this is very important to me. My mum is getting on a bit now, I didn’t want to let my mum see me like that. So when I got this prison sentence, I made a decision to keep away from drugs and pull myself back together (Crewe, 2009, p. 158).

This prisoner’s case shows that enthusiastic prisoners regard imprisonment as a helpful intervention; they accept the incarceration and see prisons as positive institutions. These prisoners have a positive attitude towards prisons because prisons help them to lose their bad

⁴² Merton (1938) and Goffman (1961) have studied these kinds of adaptation style reporting example of prisoners’ conversion or conformation. Irwin (1970) reported a kind of prisoners’ adaptation called ‘gleaners’ as those who take part to programmes for self-improvement.

⁴³ Crewe adds a sub-type to the pragmatists group who are the disengaged (Crewe, 2009, pp. 177-79).

identities, and give them an opportunity to adopt positive attitudes towards the society and their family.

Another enthusiast prisoner described his reaction to a prison sentence in the following words:

When I was on the street and when I was on the heroin, I knew that I was ready, I wanted to go to prison. I know it sounds mad but for me prison is the only place that you can get off the drugs. I'd just had enough. I didn't want to live the way I was living because it wasn't me. So when I got locked up it was sort of a godsend (Crewe, 2009, p. 159).

This prisoner's case also illustrates how many prisoners at the end of their sentences work for the police and schools and as drug counsellors and community workers.⁴⁴ For example, one of the prisoners interviewed by Crewe reported his intention to work together with the police to warn children about the negative consequences of drugs and crimes. About his new experience after the imprisonment, he later said "I was doing something good for the community and people outside" (Crewe, 2009, pp. 157-166). So, generally enthusiast prisoners are those who react positively to imprisonment and who are determined to change. They are frequently motivated by their family, partners and children with whom they want to be reunited as soon as they have become better persons.

The second group described by Crewe are the pragmatists. These prisoners are mainly young, low-level recidivists, who are serving short or medium sentences for violence and drug-related crimes such as burglaries and robberies. Pragmatists cope poorly with imprisonment. They are overwhelmed by anxiety and distress, and they feel ashamed because they have let down their families. One of them described his situation in the following way:

Me coming to jail put a lot of stress on me, and my brother is a smack-head.⁴⁵ Every father's

⁴⁴ Maruna talks about generativity as prisoners' future plans which involves making further amends, and promoting the well-being of the next generation (2001).

⁴⁵ Smack-head is a heroin addict (Crewe, 2009, p. 168).

dream is, you know, they want their kids to make it and that, but me and my brother, we don't seem to be doing anything about it. We just commit crime and shit like that. I'd love to make him proud (Crewe, 2009, p. 168).

Pragmatists usually accept their incarceration and its rules. They accept the prison routine and the authority of prison staff, and they feel a sense of helpless resignation towards the prison life. One prisoner described his attitude towards prison staff by saying that:

I just get on with it. That's all you can do...They are always going to win. They are bosses we are inmates (Crewe, 2009, p. 170).

These prisoners do not pursue personal change like the enthusiasts, because they adopt a passive attitude towards the prison life. The desire to be released is often the main motivation for these prisoners. Moreover, these prisoners' poor ability to cope in some situations leads them to commit infractions. They usually cannot cope well inside the prison, and they tend to be isolated from other prisoners (Crewe, 2009, pp. 168-179).

A similar adaptation style is endorsed by the stoic prisoners. Like pragmatists, the stoics are not concerned about going to prison and they are equally resigned to the prison rules and routines. Whereas the pragmatists consider what they can gain from the prison staff, the stoics focus on what they can lose and how they can achieve their long-term goals. Most stoics cope well with imprisonment, even in circumstances of high deprivation. Crewe defines stoics as those who are not the most damaged members of the prison community and also as those who are not the most deeply resigned. Stoics are quiet prisoners who are mainly worried about coping with the long sentence both inside and outside the prison. Typically, stoics are prisoners sentenced for life (Crewe, 2009, pp. 179-190). One life prisoner describes his circumstances in the following way:

It doesn't really work for me. As a lifer, who's done twenty years, who doesn't get visits, who doesn't receive private cash, there is no incentive within the structure of the incentive

scheme for me to behave, really. My incentive is from within myself, you know, I want to get out, as soon as possible, and that motivation doesn't come from what's going on around me (Crewe, 2009, p. 182).

The fourth group of prisoners are the retreatists. These prisoners are not just resigned to the prison environment but they have also given up on life more generally. Retreatists, like the enthusiasts, often have drug dependences and they also do not blame others for their actions. However, where the enthusiasts are motivated by their desire to show to their families that they have changed, the retreatists have only few contacts with the outside. They receive few visits or none at all. They are not concerned about their future and they are less confident about being able to become better after the imprisonment. One of these prisoners describes his situation like this:

It doesn't matter what I do. Even if I am sweeping up somewhere, I'm not bothered. I can just get myself some furniture and just start to build my life up... I'd be happy with that – just a little place, you know what I mean? As long as the stuff in there's mine and I can open my door and I can walk down the road with a bit of pride (Crewe, 2009, p. 196).

Finally, a large portion of prisoners are so-called players. These prisoners are hostile towards the prison staff and the prison rules. Like the stoics, the players are aware of the fact that authority is exerted on them. However, whereas stoics and pragmatists submit themselves to the power exerted by the prison staff, the players tend to deceive the system. They play their roles both at work and in the wings.⁴⁶ For example, they work at double-speed when officers are present. The relationships between the players and the officers range from hostility to friendship. However, some players develop friendly relationships with the prison staff in order to achieve their goals. These prisoners struggle with their feelings because they must behave docilely and obediently just to obtain what they want. One of the players describe the way he

⁴⁶ Accommodations at the UK prisons are divided in residential units called wings.

educates himself to be kind with the staff to manipulate them. He says:

If I want something off the officers, I know how to act. I've been playing the system for years. I just humour them, say 'have a safe journey home' and 'are you alright?'. And then if I need anything I can say 'do this for me, sort this application out for me' – this job (for example). When they shut my door at night, I'll say 'safe journey home', and just have a joke with them. If it's hot: 'are you having a barbecue this weekend?' Behind it, I couldn't care less if they had a crash on the way home (Crewe, 2009, p. 212).

Most prisoners belong to the groups described in Crewe's study. However, as Crewe points out, individual prisoners do not necessarily fall into one single category. Prisoners follow their individual routes in adapting to the prison environment. They, for example, can be players first and enthusiasts later. In fact, every prisoner has his own personal prison experience as we have learned from the previous examples.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explained how the life in prison is organized and what the prison experience is like for the prisoners. I will refer back to these studies in the rest of the thesis. In the following chapters about theories of happiness, we will see whether the data from prisons discussed in this chapter fits with the intuitions we have about prisoners' happiness.

In this chapter, we have also learned that prisons serve mainly four purposes and that one essential feature of prisons is that they deprive people of their liberty. In order to help us to understand what life without freedom is like, I described the daily routines of prison life and the prison rules in detail. These sections gave a detailed description of life in prison. Thus, the fictional cases presented in the next chapters of this thesis will be based on the actual circumstances of prisons in England and Wales described in these sections.

Furthermore, the last two sections should help us to understand the prison experience.

The studies that have been conducted on the effects of imprisonment (explored in section 2.4) give us an idea of how the experience of imprisonment affects the lives of the prisoners. The last section on adaptation then explained how people react to the prison experience in different ways. Studies on the effects of imprisonment indicate that the prison experience affects the emotional and psychological states of the prisoners. When we consider how happy prisoners are, such states play an important role according to many of the theories of happiness which will be discussed in the following chapters. The final section on adaptation also described some of the most common patterns of behaviour in prison. Moreover, this section illuminated what the life in prison is like from the prisoners' own point of view. These first-personal judgments of prison life will be relevant in the discussions of the happiness of prisoners in chapters four and five.

In the following chapters of this thesis, I will refer back to the information about prisons and prisoners given in this chapter. Using genuine empirical data from prisons will make the following investigation of prisoners' happiness more reliable and consistent with what it is to live a life in prison.

Part II

The Traditional Views of Happiness

Chapter III

Hedonism

Introduction

In the following three chapters of my thesis, I will discuss the three most popular theories of happiness, which understand happiness as either a state of mind or a psychological condition of some kind. These views include hedonism, life satisfaction theories and emotional state theories of happiness. The main aim of this part of the thesis is to show that, if we want to know what happiness in prisons consists in, we should not consider happiness to be merely a psychological condition. Instead, in order to understand what happiness is for prisoners, we need to look at the theories according to which happiness is a function of both a person's psychological condition and their external circumstances, or so I will argue. In this part, I will show that the three theories of happiness - hedonism, whole life satisfaction theories and emotional state theory - fail to reach plausible conclusions of how happy prisoners are in certain cases. I will begin with hedonism, which is the oldest of these theories.

The first section of this chapter will be an overview of hedonism. I will introduce the hedonist accounts of happiness according to which happiness consists of a positive balance of pleasure over displeasure. This view takes a happy life to be a life filled with pleasant experiences. I will also discuss the advantages of hedonism, which have made the view so appealing to many philosophers.

I will introduce a distinction between the two kinds of hedonism: the internalist versions (often referred to as forms of sensory hedonism) and the externalist versions (often called forms of attitudinal hedonism). Section 3.2 on sensory hedonism will first explain the internalist model according to which pleasure is a sensation, a basic feeling. Then, in section 3.3, I will

discuss the relationship between sensory hedonism and prisoners' happiness. After that, I will spend two sections on objections to sensory hedonism. In Section 3.4.1, I will argue that sensory hedonism makes happiness too superficial psychologically speaking. In Section 3.4.2, I will explain Fred Feldman's objection to sensory hedonism, which claims that a person can be happy even if she is feeling more sensory pain than pleasure at that time (Feldman, 2010, pp. 124-126). I will apply this objection to a case concerning prisoners.

In Section 3.5, I will explain the externalist accounts according to which happiness consists of a subject's positive attitude towards facts and/or events. For this view, an experience will count as a pleasant one if and only if the subject has a certain positive attitude or reaction towards it. Of the externalist accounts, I will focus on the attitudinal view of pleasure developed by Feldman (2010). Very roughly, Feldman takes happiness to consist in an individual's positive attitude towards states of affairs; to be happy is to take pleasure in facts that happen in our lives. In Section 3.6 I will argue that attitudinal hedonism is a more plausible theory than sensory hedonism. Section 3.7 will explain the relation between attitudinal hedonism and prisoners' happiness. Finally, in the last three sections, I will argue against attitudinal hedonism. I will present three cases which show that even the attitudinal hedonist theory of happiness fails to make sense of the happiness of prisoners.

3.1 Hedonist Theory of Happiness

This whole section will be about hedonism as a theory of the nature of happiness. In the previous introduction, theories of happiness were divided into objective and subjective ones (sec. 1.1). Objective theories set certain objective standards which one's life must satisfy in order for it to count as a happy one. These views thus identify happiness with living well and having certain things in one's life. In contrast, subjective theories of happiness claim that happiness is a

psychological state. In this case, happiness can be a feeling, an emotion, or a judgment about one's life (Sizer, 2010, pp. 136-139).⁴⁷ Hedonist theories of happiness can be included in the subjective theories of happiness, because they understand happiness in terms of pleasure.⁴⁸

Hedonist theories of happiness are some of the oldest and best-known theories of happiness. Hedonism, from the Greek word ἡδονή (*hēdonē*) for pleasure, takes happiness to consist of both pleasant experiences and absence of pain. On this view, as long as you have more positive, pleasant mental states than negative, painful mental states, you are happy. In terms of life-time happiness, for hedonists, a happy life as whole must then contain on balance many pleasant experiences and relatively few pains.

According to some hedonists, the balance of pleasure and pain is determined by the duration and the intensity of the pleasant experiences.⁴⁹ When a person experiences some pleasure, that pleasure has a certain intensity and duration. Intensity is the measure of how strong and vivid a pleasure is whereas duration is the measure of how long a given experience of pleasure lasts. For each pleasure, we can then assign a value of pleasantness on the basis of how intense and long-lasting the pleasure is. How happy a person is during a certain period of time is then a sum of how much pleasantness all her experiences during that time contain. The more the person has long lasting and intense pleasures the happier she is, and conversely the more she has long lasting and intense experiences of pain the less happy she is.

⁴⁷ As I said in the introduction of this chapter, in the following two chapters, I will discuss two other examples of subjective theories of happiness. In chapter three, I will discuss the whole life satisfaction theory of happiness according to which happiness consists of subjective judgments about one's life. In chapter four, I will explore emotional state theories. These views take happiness to consist of a certain kind of an emotional state.

⁴⁸ I include hedonism among the subjective theories of happiness. However, I understand that certain forms of hedonism can also be understood as objective theories of happiness. Kagan, for example, shows that hedonism can be considered an objective theory depending on the definition of pleasure. He presents two possible accounts: reductionist and nonreductionist approaches. According to Kagan, if we adopt a reductionist approach, we will claim that a mental state is pleasant when it is the object of the subject's desire. Alternatively, if we adopt a nonreductionist approach, we will claim that there is a particular kind of good, namely pleasure, that it is objectively good for the subject to have. Its goodness is not based on the fact that the subject desires it. If this is the case, hedonists seem to endorse a short version of an objective list theory where pleasure is the sole objective good (Kagan, 1992, pp. 172-179).

⁴⁹As I will explain later in this section, according to Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill the balance of pleasure and pain is determined by the duration and the intensity of the pleasant experiences. However, Mill's hedonist account results to be different from Bentham's hedonist account in some aspect.

Hedonism is one of the most widespread theories of happiness. Many philosophers have defended this theory over the centuries. For example, hedonist views of happiness were famously defended in the works of the British 18th and 19th Century philosophers Jeremy Bentham (1789), John Stuart Mill (1867) and Henry Sidgwick (1874). More recently hedonism about happiness has been defended by Fred Feldman (2010) and Richard Brandt (1992).⁵⁰ Some of these theories will be discussed in the following sections.

In this chapter, I will only discuss hedonism as a theory of happiness. The hedonist theories discussed in this chapter should be distinguished from other varieties of hedonism. For instance, *ethical* hedonism (as a theory of value) claims that pleasure is the only thing worth seeking, while *psychological* hedonism (as a theory of motivation) maintains that pleasure is the ultimate and only thing that human beings seek with intentional actions (Sumner, 1996, p. 83). Moreover, hedonism about happiness should not be confused with welfare hedonism which is only interested in how to make sense of well-being.⁵¹

As we will see in this chapter, there are two different hedonist views of happiness. The first group of views is based on sensory views of pleasure (that understand pleasure as a general feeling) and the second group on attitudinal views of pleasure (that understand pleasure as a person's attitude towards certain objects and experiences). However, before we go into those views in more detail, let us first discuss some of the main advantages of the hedonist theories of happiness.

⁵⁰ Philosophers who recently held a hedonist view about happiness are Crisp (2006), Brandt (1959), Campbell (1973), Carson (1978), Davis (1981), Ebenstein (1991), Griffin (1986), Mayerfeld (1996), Sprigge (1987) and Wilson (1968). Hedonist theory has been defended also by psychologists such as Parducci (1995) and Kahneman (1999).

⁵¹ I understand hedonism and the other views discussed in the next chapters as competing accounts of the deeper sense of happiness. In contrast, if one means 'well-being' by the word happiness (the standard normative sense) then hedonist theories of happiness just are theories of well-being (see section 8.1.1). The objections I discuss below (sec. 3.4 and sec. 3.8) apply to hedonists theories of well-being as well. However, we need to acknowledge that usually hedonists do not think of their theory as a theory of well-being. Examples of welfare hedonism include epicurean theory of happiness and many utilitarian theories of well-being (Bentham 1789, Mill 1867, and Sidgwick 1874). The most recent version of welfare hedonism is Wayne Sumner's theory of subjective well-being (Sumner, 1996).

3.1.1 Advantages of Hedonism

The reason why hedonist theories of happiness have been accepted by so many people is that hedonism has many advantages that make it an appealing theory. In this section, I am going to present five possible advantages of hedonism as a theory of happiness. The first advantage is based on the thought that, if we understand happiness in the hedonist way, it will turn out that happiness is something worth pursuing. Second, hedonist theories also support the idea that we have epistemic authority over our own happiness. Hedonist theories can be seen to nicely support the idea that we know best how happy we are. The third advantage is the fact that hedonism is compatible with the idea that there are many different ways of living a happy life. Finally, the last two advantages of hedonism are that it can explain why happiness is an important element of our well-being and it can also make happiness something that can be easily measured.

i) Happiness is something worth pursuing

The first advantage of hedonism as a theory of happiness is that it can offer us an explanation of why happiness is something worth pursuing. The simple hedonist explanation of this fact goes as follows: happiness consists of pleasure; pleasure is worth pursuing; therefore, happiness is worth pursuing. The strength of this argument is that the premises seem intuitively correct. It seems plausible to claim that a happy life contains pleasure and that pleasure is something worth pursuing in life.

In trying to establish what sorts of things have value in life, philosophers have reached different conclusions. They usually begin from the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value. Very roughly, an experience or a fact has intrinsic value when its value comes from its

nature rather than from its ability to generate something good.⁵² For example, health is intrinsically valuable because it is always good to have it. In contrast, vaccinations are merely instrumentally good because, even if they are not good as such on their own they can still protect our health. All of this means that we can discern what is worth pursuing by considering what is intrinsically valuable. The most popular candidates are: pleasure, knowledge, beauty, health and virtue. The view, however, that has attracted the greatest numbers of advocates is hedonism, which claims that pleasure is the sole good worth pursuing for its own sake (Shafer-Landau, 2013, pp. 255-256).

The idea of a life that is filled with pleasure and free from pain seems appealing to most people. After all, whatever pleasures are, be they feelings or attitudes, it is usually better to experience pleasures than pains. For instance, if we had to choose between a life which contains many pleasant experiences and a life of misery and pain, it seems quite obvious that we would choose the first kind of a life. The fact that we all would choose pleasure rather than pain indicates that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and hence worth pursuing for its own sake.⁵³ Moreover, it seems plausible to claim that a happy life is the one which contains pleasure and enjoyment rather than misery and pains.

Now, intuitively, if both pleasures were worth pursuing and happiness consisted of having pleasant experiences as the hedonists claim, then it would obviously follow that happiness would be worth pursuing too. So, one advantage of hedonism seems to be that it can make sense of the idea that happiness is something worth pursuing.⁵⁴

⁵² In contrast, an object has extrinsic value when its goodness comes exclusively from the results it causes.

⁵³ Hedonism is an essential element of the classical utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. He argues that pleasure is intrinsically valuable, and that there are higher and lower pleasures, not all of which are equally valuable (Mill, 2008, p.139). Mill's argument for hedonism will be explained in section 3.2 of this thesis.

⁵⁴ For an extensive discussion of the advantages of hedonism see Shafer-Landau (2011, pp. 21-29) and Feldman (1997a, p. 109).

ii) Personal Authority

The second argument for hedonism is based on the principle of personal authority. According to those who accept this principle, we know better than other people how happy we are. This amounts to thinking that we all have epistemic authority when it comes to our own happiness. Having epistemic authority means that, if I believe that I am not happy, then others are not in a position to disagree with me. Many philosophers have accepted that we all have this sort of authority with respect to how happy we are, even if some philosophers have also denied this basic principle.⁵⁵

In any case, hedonism nicely supports the idea that we have this sort of personal epistemic authority over our own happiness. This is because, according to hedonism, in order to know how happy you are, you only need to know how much pleasure and pain you are experiencing. It seems plausible to say that we all know best whether we are experiencing pleasure or pain.⁵⁶ Therefore, if we all know best whether we are experiencing more pleasures than pains, this means that it is plausible to say that we all know best how happy we are, assuming that hedonism is true.

iii) A variety of happy lives

Many philosophical views of happiness, including the Aristotelian views discussed in chapter six of this thesis, claim that in order to be happy you must necessarily take part in certain

⁵⁵ For a discussion on personal authority see Section 8.2.2 of this thesis. Haybron rejects this principle by arguing that, even if people are often right about their own happiness and well-being, sometimes they can still be mistaken (Haybron, 2008, p. 13, p. 199). Sumner also discusses a similar point in *Welfare, Happiness and Ethics*. He claims that each person has, or should have the authority to determine what will constitute happiness in her own case (Sumner, 1996). Telfer, as a whole life satisfaction theorist, accepts too that we all know best how happy we are (Telfer, 1980). Finally, much of the empirical research of happiness relies on the subjects' own assessments of their own happiness (Myers & Diener, 1996, Diener & Suh, 1997, Diener, Oishi & Lucas, 2003).

⁵⁶ It is worth noting that there can be possible counter-examples to this argument. There may be cases in which we succeed in fooling ourselves about whether an experience is a pleasant one.

specific activities (like doing philosophy or taking part in certain social activities).⁵⁷ In contrast, hedonism rejects this approach and therefore it leaves room for many different ways to live a happy life.

The hedonist idea of happiness seems to be more flexible than other theories of happiness which often tell us how to live a happy life. This is because hedonists recognise that different people get pleasure from different things and so different things will make those people happy. There are a variety of ways to live a happy life and hedonism explains why this is the case. Hedonism accepts the fact that different people have different pathways to happiness. This means that Hedonism does not suffer from the paternalist objection which can be made to those theories who take happiness to consist of a specific kind of life.

As matter of the fact, hedonism also admits exceptional cases. For example, we all probably agree that experiences of physical pain are unpleasant experiences. However, other people, such as some masochists, are delighted by physical pains. So, in this case, pains can enhance the masochists' happiness. Hedonism would accept that physical pain would enhance the happiness of masochist people as far as pains are pleasant experiences for them. Hedonism, therefore, accepts both many different standard sources of happiness and also uncommon sources too.

iv) Happiness is an important element of our well-being

As we have already seen, according to hedonists as long as an experience is pleasant it makes the person who has the experience happy. Furthermore, if one person enjoys his life and finds it pleasant and another one does not, it seems plausible to say that the first person is better off

⁵⁷ As we will see in chapter VI of this thesis, Aristotle considers happiness to consist of virtuous activity, which does not consist only of philosophical reflection. For him, happiness is much more than an experience of enjoyment.

than the second one. It also seems plausible to claim that, if we had to choose between a pleasant life and an unpleasant one, we would probably choose the pleasant one because then we would have a higher quality of life.

These observations suggest that, if we follow the hedonists and understand happiness to consist of pleasure, this helps us to make sense of the fact that happiness is an important element of our well-being. In this case, happiness would understandably be something that would make our lives go better.

v) Happiness is measurable

Finally, according to hedonists, we can figure out how happy people are on the basis of how much pleasure and pain they experience. If we then assume that we can measure how much pleasure and pain people experience perhaps by relying on their own reports, it follows from hedonism that we should also be able to measure how happy people are fairly easily.⁵⁸ Given that it would be useful for many purposes to track how happy people are, it is an important advantage of hedonism that it promises to help us to do so.

In particular, empirical studies on subjective well-being, which are interested in measuring people's happiness, will find hedonist theories of happiness very appealing. Subjective well-being is often characterized by the presence of pleasant mental states such as joy and contentment and the absence of negative affect such as the absence of unpleasant mental states such as fear, anger and sadness.⁵⁹ According to this model, a happy person is thus someone who is frequently cheerful and only occasionally sad (Biswas-Diener, Diener, &

⁵⁸ It is worth noting that it could be argued that measurement of pleasure and pain are not that easy. Consider different pleasures, e.g. the pleasure of eating a chocolate button, the pleasure of working out an equation correctly, the pleasure of seeing one's child grow up healthy. The measurement of these pleasures can raise some question. Are these pleasures commensurable? If not, how are we going to quantify overall 'pleasure'? Maybe pleasure is many things, making overall pleasure something that we cannot measure.

⁵⁹ As we will see on section 4.3 of the next chapter, subjective well-being is also characterized by personal judgments about satisfaction.

Tamir, 2004, p. 19). Moreover, subjective well-being studies look also at the subjects' attitude towards their life. For scientists who study the subjective well-being happiness consists of the reactions which subjects have towards the facts and events that happen in their life.

If subjective well-being scientists rely on the hedonist idea of happiness, they can get a plausible way of measuring people's happiness. Hedonists suggest that happiness consists of subjects' balance of pleasures over pains. Subjects can describe intensity and duration of pleasures and pains. For example, on a scale which asks: "How do you feel about your life as a whole? (From 1, "terrible," to 10, "delighted,") people can evaluate how they feel. Therefore, by evaluating how much pleasure and pain people are feeling, researchers of subjective well-being studies obtain a way to measure how happy people are.

3.2 Sensory Hedonism

According to Wayne Sumner, there are two different types of accounts of the nature of pleasure: *internalist* and *externalist* accounts.⁶⁰ The internalist accounts take pleasures to be a sensation or a feeling. The externalist accounts in contrast take pleasure to consist of the subject's attitude or reaction toward her experiences (or even towards some external states of affairs). The two different accounts of the nature of pleasure and displeasure have generated two different forms of hedonism: sensory hedonism, which is based on the internalist accounts, and attitudinal hedonism, which is based on the externalist accounts (Sumner, 1996, pp. 87-88).⁶¹

In order to see whether these two kinds of hedonism can lead to plausible views of

⁶⁰ Haybron and Feldman follow Sumner's famous distinction between internalist and externalist account. But, Feldman distinguishes between sensory hedonism which includes the internalist views, and attitudinal hedonism that includes the externalist views (Feldman, 2010).

⁶¹ See Bentham (1789/1969) and Mill (1867) for the internalist accounts. See Feldman (2010) for the externalist (or attitudinal, as he call it) account.

happiness in prisons, this chapter will discuss the two kinds of hedonism separately. This section will be on sensory hedonism in the context of prisoners' happiness. Section 3.7 will then be on attitudinal hedonism and the happiness of prisoners. Let us start from Sensory Hedonism.

According to the internalist view, pleasure is a kind of sensation, a basic feeling. For example, it is the joy we feel when we pass an exam or when we win a lottery. Pleasantness is then an intrinsic quality of all these type of experiences. Sensory hedonism is based on this account of pleasure. According to sensory hedonism, all enjoyable experiences have in common a particular quality, being enjoyable, that can be identified by introspection. All pleasant experiences share a kind of feeling tone – they feel the same to the subject from her own perspective. Pleasant experiences can differ in their sources or causes. They can include merely physical pleasures but also other kinds of pleasures such as the pleasures of reading philosophy or listening music. However, what makes an experience pleasant is the intrinsic quality of pleasantness which can be found in different degrees in all of these experiences (Sumner, 1996, p. 87; Crisp, 2004, p. 23).

Jeremy Bentham is considered to be one of the first advocates of hedonism and his view is also a good example of sensory hedonism. Bentham talks about happiness in his book *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Bentham, 1789). In Chapter VII, Bentham claims that “happiness consists of enjoyment of pleasures and security from pains” (Bentham, 1789, p. 61). By pleasures Bentham means not only physical pleasures but all the experiences, such as enjoyment, gratification and fulfilment, which share a positive feeling tone, an intrinsic quality of pleasantness. For Bentham, how much happier a given pleasure makes someone is a matter of the pleasure's intensity and duration (Bentham, 1789, p. 31). The longer and more intense a pleasure is, the happier the person who experiences that pleasure will be. According to Bentham, pleasure and pain can be measured through a hedonic calculus which

includes these two variables (Crisp, 1997, pp. 20-23).⁶²

A similar version of sensory hedonism was also defended by John Stuart Mill. In chapter two of *Utilitarianism*, Mill claims that “by happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure” (Mill, 2008, p. 10). Therefore, according to Mill’s account, a person is happy if and only if she is experiencing pleasure and not experiencing pain. Like Bentham, Mill also claimed that there are both mental and bodily pleasures. However, Mill furthermore famously argued that pleasures have a third dimension (in addition to duration and intensity) on which they vary – their quality.

When replying to those who thought that hedonism is ‘a doctrine worthy only of swine’, Mill famously claimed that this criticism wrongly supposes that human beings are not capable of any other pleasures except those which also swine can have. Mill argued that pleasures can be higher or lower in quality. Some high quality pleasures are more desirable and more valuable than others, and the best pleasures for humans are those which involve the use of intellectual and artistic faculties (Mill, 2008, p.139). For example, listening to your favourite song will be better than scratching an itch. According to Mill, listening to a song involves an intellectual faculty and produces a qualitatively higher pleasure than the pleasure given by scratching an itch.

Mill thought that what makes a pleasure higher in quality than another one is that the higher in quality pleasures will be always preferred by those who have experienced both.⁶³ People who have experienced both physical and intellectual pleasures tend to prefer the intellectual pleasures. For example, the pleasurable sensations of listening to your favourite

⁶² In addition to intensity and duration, Bentham also included other variables in the hedonistic calculus. These are: certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity and purity (Bentham, 1969, pp. 31-32)

⁶³ On the basis of the different approach towards pleasures, Bentham’s account is defined quantitative hedonism, while Mill’s account is defined qualitative hedonism. Mill introduces the difference among pleasures to overcome the famous objection made to utilitarianism which was defined as a philosophy worth only to swine. For discussion on this objection, see Roger Crisp’s book *Mill on Utilitarianism* (Crisp, 1997, pp. 23-25).

song will be preferred to the pleasurable sensations of scratching an itch. Mill thought that the preference test was a good enough way to decide what pleasures are higher in quality and therefore more valuable than others. For Mill, experience and knowledge of an object gives us a way to judge the value of that thing.

Moreover, according to Mill a life full of pleasures higher in quality is happier than a life full of lower pleasure. If we have to choose between a life full of lower pleasures and a life full of high pleasures, we would choose the life of higher pleasure. For example, if we have to choose between a long life of lower pleasure as a sheep or a short and less pleasant life as Mozart, we would prefer Mozart's life. Mill would suggest that already one pleasure experienced by Mozart can be so much higher in quality than the sheep's pleasures that it can make Mozart's life happier overall than the sheep's life. As he puts it himself, better Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied (Mill, 2008, p. 140).⁶⁴

From these two examples of hedonist theories, we can learn that sensory hedonists defend a mental state theory of the nature of happiness. They identify happiness with the balance of pleasure and pain, and they treat pleasure and pain as distinctive states of mind. Therefore, according to sensory hedonists, a person will be happy at a time *t* if and only if she feels more sensory pleasure than pain at that time and unhappy if and only if she feels more pain than pleasure at that time. If a person's balance of pleasure over pain is equal, then a person is neither happy nor unhappy.

3.3 Sensory Hedonism and Prisoners

In this section, I will analyse what sensory hedonists would say about the prisoners' happiness.

⁶⁴ For a discussion of Mill's utilitarianism see Crisp (1997, pp. 23-43). In particular see Crisp's example of Hayden and the Oyster for an explanation of Mill's argument on pleasure (Crisp, 1997, pp. 24-25).

If sensory hedonism about happiness were true, it would follow that prisoners will be happy if and only if they experience more positive pleasures than pains. This means that a person who experiences many pleasures and only few pains in prison would be happier than a person who has fewer pleasant experiences in the same circumstances.

In order to see if sensory hedonism can give a plausible account of what constitutes happiness in prison, let us imagine two prisoners such that one of them experiences more sensory pleasures than the other one. For instance, the first prisoner has a tasty lunch and she listens to music and watches TV. She can thus take part in at least some activities that give her sensory pleasures. In contrast, the second prisoner does not take part in these activities that would give her the same amount of sensory pleasure too. In this situation, according to hedonism, the first prisoner who experiences more sensory pleasure will be happier than the second prisoner.

At first sight, hedonism therefore seems to lead to plausible conclusions about how happy the previous two prisoners are. After all, it seems plausible that, if the first prisoner is having a more pleasant experience in prison, she is likely to be happier than the second prisoner whose experiences are less pleasant. So, in this way, hedonism seems to fit our basic intuitions about how happy different prisoners are.

Similarly, what hedonism tells us about the previous two prisoners' happiness seems to fit with the empirical studies conducted in prisons. Studies on prisoners' experiences have showed that prisoners have many unpleasant experiences when they first go into prison. This is supported by the fact that prisoners' responses to surveys about their feelings at the time when they are first imprisoned are mainly negative (Adams, 1992, p. 292).⁶⁵ However, after a certain

⁶⁵ Studies made in prison rely mainly on interviews and survey methods of measurement for their data collection (Adams, 1992, p. 292). For empirical studies on prisoners' feelings and mental states see Adams (1992), Zamble and Porporino (1988, 1990), Pishkin and Thorne (1973). All these studies will be discussed in the next chapter too (sec. 4.3).

period of time, the prisoners' balance of pleasures over pains turns back to the same level as it was before the imprisonment. This means that, assuming that hedonism is true, the prisoners' level of happiness is usually negative at the beginning and it then increases after a period of time and finally eventually becomes positive. This fits the intuitive idea that most prisoners are unhappy in the beginning of their sentences but then become happier the closer they come to being released. This too supports the idea that we can use hedonism to evaluate how happy prisoners are.

However, in subsection 3.4.1, I will present a fictional case which shows that a prisoner can have on balance more sensory pleasures than pains and yet not be happy. Moreover, in subsection 3.4.2, I will show that there are cases in which a prisoner whose balance of pleasure over pain is negative can still be considered to be happy. For the purposes of this argument, I will use examples of prisoners who are drug addicts. I will use these examples also because drug addiction is a common problem in prisons. As reported by empirical studies, many prisoners tend to use drugs in order to cope with imprisonment (Gravett, 2000).

Drug-taking and the desire to take mood-altering stimulants is common in our society. The everyday use of drugs has become a part of our culture. Coffee, tea, cigarette, alcohol, sleeping pills and tranquillizer are all drugs that can be taken legally. In prison, drug use is restricted to coffee, tea and cigarettes, but the temptation to acquire and misuse unlawful substances and drugs is high. Studies, surveys and drug tests have shown that the percentage of drug addicts amongst inmates and offenders have risen in the last thirty years. Almost as many as 35 per cent of the total prison population could be taking drugs and 85 per cent of prisoners confirm that they could get hold of illicit substances. 20 per cent of respondents reported using drugs such as cocaine and heroin. Finally, 6 per cent of inmates acquired new addictions when

they were in prison (Gravett, 2000).⁶⁶

Data from prisons thus shows that drug-taking is a fairly common habit amongst inmates. Moreover, inmates who have never used drugs before are likely to become addicted in prison. Drug-taking can be seen as a way of attempting to cope with the imprisonment itself. It is known that sometimes people use drugs in difficult situations. For instance, drugs can give sensory pleasures which can help people to cope with stressful situations. Being in prison is one of these difficult situations in which many people can decide to take drugs in order to feel relieved by the stressful circumstances of imprisonment.

3.4 Objections to Sensory Hedonism

In the next two sections, I will argue that sensory hedonism leads to wrong conclusions about how happy certain prisoners are. In Section 3.4.1, I will suggest that a person who has many pleasant experiences in prison and a positive balance of pleasure over pain can still be unhappy. Sensory hedonism, however, would entail that such a prisoner would be happy just because he feels more pleasure than pain. In Section 3.4.2, I will similarly argue that a prisoner whose balance of pleasure over pain is negative can yet be happy despite the fact that sensory hedonism would entail that he would be unhappy because his balance pleasure-pain is negative.⁶⁷

In order to explain these arguments, I want to introduce a fictional case of two prisoners who live in the same circumstances but who experience different balances of pleasure over pain. The first prisoner called Jack has a positive balance of pleasure over pain, whereas the second prisoner, Daniel, has a negative balance of pleasure over pain.

Suppose that Jack and Daniel are two brothers who have been imprisoned for theft and

⁶⁶ Percentages of drug use by prisoners and studies on drug addiction in prisons are reported by the Prison Reform Trust, the Howard League for Penal Reform and the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons annual reports.

⁶⁷ Hedono-doloric balance is the balance of sensory pleasures and pains a person experiences. As we will see in section 3.5.1, Feldman uses this word to identify the balance of pleasure over pain in the measurement of a person's happiness.

they have been sentenced to three years in prison. Jack is an impulsive and passionate person. He experiences pleasure as a result of hazardous things and he prefers immediate pleasures over more distant higher pleasures. In contrast, Daniel is a calm and peaceful person with a lovely family. He has just one main desire in his life: to earn more money to give a better life to his children. For this reason, Daniel decides to take part in a robbery with his brother Jack, but the robbery goes wrong and they are both arrested.

In prison, Jack and Daniel live in the same external circumstances but they have different experiences. Jack is frequently anxious and depressed and because of this he decides to start taking drugs, which seems to help him to cope with his new circumstances. He starts to feel joyful and cheerful because of the drugs. Drugs thus give a lot of pleasant experiences to Jack. Even trivial things like eating a candy now become pleasant for him. Overall, as a consequence Jack enjoys his experience of being in prison: his balance of pleasures over pains is thus now positive. However, whenever Jack is not taking drugs, he feels depressed again. So, even if he is having lots of positive feelings, his overall background mood has not changed.

In contrast, Daniel decides not to follow his brother and, therefore, he does not begin taking drugs. As a result, Daniel is not having many pleasant experiences like his brother. The only thing that Daniel enjoys of his experience is when he meets his family on visit day. Daniel's balance of pleasure over pain is therefore overall negative. This means that, at least *prima facie*, Daniel seems unhappy in his situation whereas Jack seems at least happier than Daniel.

As we know, hedonism claims that happiness consists of a positive balance of pleasure over pain, and so on this view a person is happy if and only if he experiences more pleasure than pain. This means that hedonism seems to lead to the right conclusions about how happy Jack and Daniel are. However, I will show next that, even if Jack is experiencing more pleasure than pain, he is not happy. This means that hedonism must be wrong about his happiness.

3.4.1 Superficial Happiness

In the example, Jack's alleged happiness consists of many pleasant experiences which he has thanks to the drugs he is taking. When Jack does not take drugs, he is quickly depressed again. Fortunately, Jack is depressed only for few moments before he takes more drugs. Overall Jack's balance of pleasure over pain is therefore still positive: he still experiences more pleasant experiences than anxiety. Therefore, if sensory hedonists were to judge Jack's happiness by evaluating the quantity of happiness he experiences during this period, they would have to say that Jack is a happy person.⁶⁸

Intuitively, it might at first seem that we would agree with sensory hedonists. Overall, it seems that Jack is experiencing some sort of 'weak' or 'superficial' happiness. Fred Feldman claims that a person can be plausibly said to experience this kind of happiness, which he calls "fragile happiness." A person is experiencing fragile happiness at a time if she is happy at that time, but is also disposed to lose that happiness, or to lapse into unhappiness (Feldman, 2010, p. 29).⁶⁹ Jack seems to experience this kind of happiness; he experiences a series of positive states of mind which enable him to enjoy his life. These states of mind improve his balance of pleasure over pain, even if he feels anxious and depressed when he does not experience those feelings.

However, even if as Feldman suggests this kind of fragile happiness can be experienced,

⁶⁸ In this case, I suggest that hedonists would say that Jack has more happiness than Daniel during this period, but this doesn't mean that hedonists have to say that he is the happier person, all things considered. If this happy period is likely to lead to less happiness across his whole life, hedonists might agree that there's a sense in which Daniel is the happier person, on hedonist grounds. Daniel's behaviour is more likely to lead to the better balance of pleasure over pain in the long run, so he is wise to endure short-term unhappiness for the sake of longer-term happiness. I will discuss what hedonists would say about Daniel's happiness later on in this chapter (sec. 3.4.2).

⁶⁹ According to Feldman, fragile happiness is possible and it does not show that sensory hedonism is false. (Feldman, 2010, pp. 147-150). In contrast, Haybron argues against sensory hedonism showing that it is false (Haybron, 2008, pp. 63-67).

it can be argued that Jack is not really happy. He admittedly feels happy when he takes drugs because he feels positive sensations and he is not depressed overall. But, it is quite implausible to say that Jack is a happy person overall when he is imprisoned. The most obvious problem with sensory hedonist theories here is that the kind of pleasant experiences that Jack is having seem to have only a small impact on Jack. The pleasant states of mind that Jack is experiencing have not changed him from the inside; they have not touched his internal life. As a matter of fact, when Jack is not experiencing such pleasures, he is still anxious and depressed.

Intuitively, we want to say that anxiety and depression make someone unhappy in a way that is incompatible with their happiness. In fact, we would deny that a depressed person can be happy. Thus, the fact that Jack is still in a depressed background mood shows that the many pleasant experiences he has have not made him really happy. These experiences make Jack feel superficially joyful but they have not made him really happy. The pleasant experiences Jack is having have no constitutive role in determining how happy Jack is. This is because they have not changed his life and psychological state.

What we learn from the example is that sensory hedonists take Jack's alleged happiness to consist only of superficial pleasant states of mind. Jack seems to lack what Daniel Haybron calls a mood propensity which seems like a constitutive element of happiness in the previous case.⁷⁰ A positive mood propensity is a deep and stable disposition to experience positive moods. For example, if I am a calm person, I am disposed not to get angry or impatient. For the same reason, if Jack were a happy person, he should be disposed to experience joy instead of anxiety. He could probably feel less cheerful and joyful on an occasion but he should at least be disposed to experience pleasant experiences when he was not taking drugs.

In conclusion, Jack does not seem to be a happy person and thus the hedonist

⁷⁰ In chapter V, I will show that this dispositional element of Haybron's emotional state theory can be problematic when we apply Haybron's view to prisoners.

conclusions about his happiness seem implausible. From the previous case we can thus learn that, if happiness were merely a matter of positive feelings as sensory hedonists claim, happiness could in some cases turn out to be just a superficial – merely a transient sum of pleasant experiences. These pleasant experiences do not, however, have a lasting impact on our psychological condition. They do not change our internal life or make us disposed to experience positive mood, which is why we should not take them to be happiness-constituting.

3.4.2 Being Happy Overall

We learned from the previous section that Jack seems to experience merely a “fragile” form of happiness that is not sufficient to make him genuinely happy. Let us then consider how happy Daniel is in order to see whether sensory hedonism leads to right conclusions about his happiness.

According to sensory hedonism, we should think that Daniel is unhappy because overall his balance of pleasure over pain is negative. However, even if Daniel might say that his experience in prison is awful, he could also perhaps think that he is pleased with his life overall because he has a lovely family and he is healthy. After all, every Wednesday afternoon, Daniel meets his family and he knows that he will be back at home with his family soon. Moreover, he does not have a drug problem and he is healthier than his brother. This means that, if Daniel were to make a judgment about how happy he is, he would probably judge that despite the fact that he is not having many pleasant experiences in prison he is happy. He would judge his life favourably.⁷¹ His family life and his good health thus seem to have an effect on Daniel’s level

⁷¹ I explained previously (footnote 65) how hedonists might try to account for this sort of phenomenon. I suggested that hedonists would allow that Daniel could be happier overall. However, if hedonists were to judge Daniel’s happiness during this period, they still have to say that he is less happy than Jack on a hedonist ground. Otherwise, they need to admit that Daniel is happier than Jack even if his balance of pleasure over pain is negative.

of happiness in prison.⁷²

According to one popular theory of happiness, the whole life satisfaction theory, Daniel is happy in this case because he is satisfied with his life as a whole.⁷³ Moreover, if we look at empirical studies about happiness in prison, we would intuitively conclude that Daniel is at least happier than his brother. Empirical studies have widely analysed how happy prisoners are by evaluating prisoners' life satisfaction with their lives. These studies often take happiness to consist of a person's cognitive and affective evaluation of his life as a whole.⁷⁴ In the case of Daniel, if we assume the truth of whole life satisfaction theories of happiness and empirical studies, we should claim that even though Daniel is having many unpleasant experiences in prison, he can still be happy with his whole life in terms of life satisfaction.⁷⁵

For all these reasons, it seems intuitively plausible to think that Daniel is not as unhappy as hedonists would claim.⁷⁶ More importantly, Daniel is happy with his life even though his balance of pleasure over pain is negative. If this is the case, we must conclude that sensory hedonism fails to provide the correct estimate of Daniel's happiness.

In Daniel's case, his happiness seems to be at least in part a matter of his attitudes towards the experiences he is having rather than a sum of his pleasant experiences. Daniel's case shows that how happy you are at a time seems to depend more on your attitudes towards the things that are happening to you and less on how much pleasure or pain you are feeling then. This will be what attitudinal hedonists would claim about Daniel's happiness as we will see in the next sections.

⁷² It could be argued that family and health also affect the well-being of Daniel (that is, his happiness in the normative sense) but here I am just interested in whether they affect happiness in the deeper sense (see sec. 1.1). The claim above is that, in addition to his well-being, these factors also affect his happiness in the deeper sense that is not merely synonymous with the level of well-being. These factors affect Daniel's level of happiness and his psychological and emotional states.

⁷³ The next chapter will discuss Whole Life Satisfaction theories of happiness. According to these theories, a person is happy if she is satisfied with her life as a whole. Different versions of these theories will be discussed in sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.

⁷⁴ See section 4.2 and 4.3 of next chapter on empirical studies.

⁷⁵ For reference to empirical studies on life satisfaction in prison see section 4.3 of the next chapter.

⁷⁶ The Whole Life Satisfaction theories of happiness will be discussed in the next chapter.

3.5 Attitudinal Hedonism

As I mentioned above, hedonism comes in two forms, sensory and attitudinal. These forms of hedonism are based on two views about pleasure and pain, the internalist and the externalist models. So far I have discussed the internalist views according to which all pleasant experiences share a particular phenomenal tone, an introspective experiential quality of being enjoyable. The internalist views have been widely criticized over the last twenty years. Philosophers mainly find such views implausible because they cannot identify any intrinsic quality common to all the experiences we enjoy (Feldman, 2010, pp. 27-36).

Because of this, externalist views of pleasure have become more popular. According to them, what all pleasures and pleasurable experiences share is the fact that they are experiences which we like, enjoy, or desire. What all the enjoyable experiences have in common is that they are objects of some attitude of the subject who experiences them, such as a desire. For example, the pleasure of having a tasty lunch and the pleasure of reading a great novel share the feature that they are both desired (or liked, or enjoyed) by the individual who is experiencing them. Thus, any experience can be pleasant or unpleasant depending on how a person reacts to it. And pleasant (or painful) experiences may have nothing else in common than the fact that a person likes (or dislikes) them. Therefore, externalists deny that there is an intrinsic property of pleasures which identifies experiences as pleasures. Rather, they claim that what makes an experience a pleasure is a subject's attitude which is external to the experience (Sumner, 1996, p. 90; Crisp, 2004, p. 23; Haybron, 2008, p. 62).

3.5.1 Feldman's Attitudinal Hedonism

Fred Feldman has recently developed a sophisticated version of the previous type of

externalism. In his book *What Is This Thing Called Happiness?* (2010), he defends a view which he calls the attitudinal model. According to Feldman, a pleasure is a propositional attitude toward a state of affairs.⁷⁷ A person has this attitudinal pleasure when she is pleased about some fact, or when she takes pleasure in some states of affairs. Feldman's view identifies pleasure not with the experience towards which one has an attitude but rather with the propositional attitude itself. And, the object of this attitude is usually a fact or a state of affairs related to one's life. For example, a person might be pleased to live in England. In this case, the object of the person's pleasure is the fact that she lives in England and her pleasure is attitudinal; it does not involve any kind of feeling or sensation. The pleasure, in this case, consists of the fact that the person is pleased about living in England (Feldman, 2010, p. 109; Haybron, 2008, p. 62).

In his book, Feldman gives also an account of happiness which can be classified as an attitudinal hedonist theory of happiness. According to his view, one's happiness consists of episodes of attitudinal pleasure which one has towards either facts or states of affairs of one's life. For example, if a person is pleased about the book she is reading, this episode will be what Feldman calls an "atom of happiness" (Feldman, 2010, p. 110). The more there are things in which a person takes pleasure, the happier the person is. So, a person's level of happiness at a time is the amount of the episodes of attitudinal pleasure that the person takes in things at that time.

Feldman draws a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure. He defines intrinsic attitudinal pleasure as a case in which "a person takes attitudinal pleasure in some state of affairs, p, and there is no other state of affairs, q, such that he takes pleasure in p in virtue of the fact that he takes pleasure in q" (Feldman, 2004, p.58).

⁷⁷ A person experiences this sort of a pleasure when she is pleased about an event or a fact in her life. For example, a person can be pleased about eating an ice cream. In this case, the propositional object of the person's pleasure is explicit – namely that she is eating ice cream. In other cases, the propositional object of pleasure is not explicit. For example, a person can be pleased about the weather. This means that there is some fact about the weather that is the object of this person's pleasure.

According to Feldman, only intrinsic attitudinal pleasures and displeasures are constituents of happiness. Feldman explains his argument for this view with the help of the following case:

When a person takes attitudinal pleasure in some state of affairs, he may take this pleasure in the state of affairs because he thinks it is related to some other state of affairs, and he takes pleasure in that other state of affairs. The most familiar instance of this sort of thing is the instrumental case. I take pleasure in the fact that the waiter is heading for our table. Why? Because I think he is bringing beer and peanuts, and I take pleasure in the fact that I soon will be enjoying them (Feldman, 2004, pp. 57–58.)

In this case, the subject takes pleasure in two facts: (1) he is pleased that the waiter is heading to the table and (2) he is pleased that soon he will be eating peanuts and drinking beer. However, the pleasure the subject is taking in the first fact is extrinsic to the subject's happiness. This means that, according to Feldman's view, the pleasure the subject is taking in the first fact alone does not increase the subject's happiness. That pleasure is only instrumental to the pleasure the subject experiences in fact two. In other words, the subject takes pleasure in the fact that the waiter is heading to the table only because he will bring peanuts and beer. In contrast, the pleasure experienced by the subject in fact two is supposed to be intrinsically valuable where this means that it contributes to the subject's happiness. The pleasure taken in the facts about eating peanuts and drinking beer will increase the subject's happiness because that is the state of affairs toward which the subject has attitudinal pleasure.

Feldman has introduced a scale for measuring the intensity of pleasure and pain (Feldman, 2010, pp. 25-26). The standard units of this scale are called "hedons" and "dolors". Any pleasure has an intensity that can be measured in hedons and any pain has an intensity that can be measured in dolors. So, if you want to know how happy a person is at any particular moment, you need to count how many hedons of pleasure she is feeling and subtract the dolors of pain she is feeling from that number. The result is the person's hedono-doloric balance.

According to Feldman's view, this balance corresponds to the person's level of happiness at that moment. If the hedono-doloric balance is positive, then the person is happy at that moment. The person's happiness in her life as a whole will be the person's happiness for the interval that is the person's whole life (Feldman, 2010, pp. 25-26).

3.6 Attitudinal Hedonism vs Sensory Hedonism

If we return to the case of Jack and Daniel discussed in the section 3.4.2, we will see that attitudinal hedonism leads to more plausible conclusions about the happiness of these two prisoners. As a consequence, attitudinal hedonism can explain why a person can be happy even if her balance of sensory pleasure over pain is negative. Attitudinal hedonism can explain why Daniel, who has a negative balance of sensory pleasure over displeasure, is happy. This is because, according to attitudinal hedonism, a person can be happy even if she is not experiencing any pleasant feelings. To see why this is the case, let us return to Jack and Daniel.

Let's start by recalling the case. Jack and Daniel are two prisoners who live in the same circumstances. Jack uses drugs which give him many pleasant experiences. He feels frequently joyful and euphoric. However, when he is not taking drugs, he is depressed. In contrast, Daniel does not take drugs. He is not having many pleasant sensory experiences and, therefore, Daniel is not feeling joyful in prison. The only thing which gives Daniel pleasure is meeting his lovely family once a week. As a matter of fact, during the meetings with his family, Daniel enjoys talking about his daughter's wedding and about his son's success at work. During those moments, Daniels is delighted and hopeful about his future, and he is pleased about the fact that he will be back at home soon.

According to sensory hedonism, Jack is happy because he is experiencing more sensory pleasure than pain, whereas Daniel is unhappy because his balance of pleasure over pain is

negative. In contrast, attitudinal hedonism would consider Daniel to be happy even if his balance of sensory pleasure over pain is negative. According to attitudinal view, Daniel's meeting with his family can be considered happiness-constituting. Feldman would call Daniel's positive attitude towards a fact of his life: an "atom" of attitudinal happiness. So, at that moment, Daniel is attitudinally pleased about the fact that he can meet his family and also about the fact that he will be at home with them after release. Therefore, according to attitudinal hedonism, Daniel can be considered to be happy at that moment. In this case, attitudinal hedonism seems to lead to the right conclusions about Daniel's level of happiness in prison.

Attitudinal hedonism seems to be a better theory of happiness because according to it happiness is a matter of the subject's attitudes rather than merely a matter of what sensory feelings the subject experiences. Attitudinal hedonism is still a mental state theory like sensory hedonism, but it takes happiness to be a more cognitive mental state rather than merely a sensory pleasure. And, it seems plausible that attitudinal pleasures are more important than sensory pleasures when it comes to how happy a person is.

To show that attitudinal hedonism leads to more plausible conclusions about people's happiness than sensory hedonism, Feldman presents the case of a new mother (Feldman, 2010, pp. 124-126). Let's suppose that a woman is giving birth to her baby. At that moment, the mother's level of sensory pleasure over pain is negative. Thus, sensory hedonists should say that the new mother is unhappy at that moment. This is clearly an incorrect assessment of the new mother's happiness. Intuitively, we would want to say that the new mother is happy when she is giving birth to her child. Although she is feeling more pain than pleasure at that moment, she can also correctly think that giving birth to her baby was the happiest moment of her life. Attitudinal hedonists would argue that the new mother is taking great attitudinal pleasure from her child's birth at that moment even if she is in great pain. For example, she could be pleased

about the fact that her baby is healthy and about the fact that her long pregnancy is coming to an end. She is attitudinally pleased about all these things despite the intense pain she is feeling. Thus, according to attitudinal hedonism, the new mother is happy and this assessment seems to fit with our intuitions about the case.

In conclusion, attitudinal hedonism seems to be a more plausible theory of happiness than sensory hedonism. This is because, according to attitudinal hedonism, a person is happy because she is taking pleasure in events of her life and not because she is feeling pleasant sensations. Hence, a person can be happy even if she is experiencing more sensory pain than pleasure like the cases of the new mother and Daniel show. If attitudinal hedonism is the correct view of happiness, this means that prisoners like Daniel can be happy by experiencing attitudinal pleasures. Let us then consider whether happiness in prison could be understood in terms of attitudinal pleasure and what kind of attitudinal pleasures prisoners could experience.

3.7 Attitudinal Hedonism and Prisoners

According to attitudinal hedonism, in order to be happy prisoners must be pleased about some states of affairs or facts related to their lives in prison. For example, prisoners could be happy about the activities they can take part in (such as working and exercising) during their free time in prison. They could also be happy about the time they can spend with their families. Prisoners could even be happy about their meals, their cells, and cell mates. As a matter of fact, studies done in prisons have widely shown that prisoners find meaning and solace in education, work, football, the gym, music and other similar activities (Liebling, 2011, p. 539). Moreover, social scientists have pointed out that there are benefits from allowing inmates to have social contact with their families (Lippke, 2007). For this reason, it seems like prisoners do have access to attitudinal pleasures. Therefore, attitudinal hedonism seems to entail that prisoners can be happy

because they can experience attitudinal pleasures.

However, overall, imprisonment is not a pleasant experience. Prisoners experience displeasure and absence of respect and fairness due to the restricted facilities available (Liebling, 2011, p. 534). Prisoners are often abandoned by their spouses and friends, they face difficulties in finding and keeping employment, and they sometimes suffer from incurable diseases contracted during incarceration (Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, 2009, pp. 1037-1082). The pains of imprisonment, as Sykes characterized them, consist mainly of the deprivation which inmates routinely experience with regard to goods and services, liberty, relationships, autonomy, and security. Social scientists have studied the harms – physical and psychological – which the punishment inflicts on prisoners. They have also developed techniques for measuring the prisoners' attitudinal displeasure in their studies of subjective well-being (Adams, 1992, p. 283).

Subjective well-being is characterized by two main components: positive affect - the presence of pleasant emotions such as joy and contentment and negative affect - the absence of unpleasant emotion such as fear, anger and sadness.⁷⁸ Subjective well-being consists also of personal judgments about life satisfaction. According to this model, a happy person is thus someone who is frequently cheerful, only occasionally sad, and generally satisfied with his or her life (Biswas-Diener, Diener, & Tamir, 2004, p. 19). Subjective well-being studies look at the subjects' attitude towards their life and so for scientists who study the subjective well-being happiness consists of the reactions which a subject has towards facts and events that happen in her life. For example, a subject can be happy about her life in general or about a specific domain in her life, such as work, marriage and so on. In this respect, many empirical studies about

⁷⁸ Even if I here suggest that there are similarities between attitudinal hedonists and subjective well-being, in chapter IV and V, I will also explain how subjective well-being measures seem more like a combination of sensory hedonism, mood propensities and whole-life satisfaction.

prisoners' happiness seem to assume a view close to attitudinal hedonist theories of happiness.

One of the most interesting findings of the subjective well-being studies conducted in prisons concerns the prisoners' ability to adapt to imprisonment, which has an important effect on their happiness.⁷⁹ Many empirical studies have shown that prisoners follow a pattern in their behaviour and also that the prisoners' alleged level of happiness follows that same pattern. Prisoners' level of subjective well-being drops at the beginning of the incarceration and it remains at that low level for a relatively short period of time. However, after this, the level of happiness gets higher as prisoners adjust to the new environment (Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, 2009, Zamble & Porporino, 1990, Adams, 1992). This means that prisoners experience anxiety and fear during the beginning of their imprisonment. However, they adapt to their condition and their attitudes toward their life become positive again after a period of time.⁸⁰ They start to enjoy their time in prison. For example, they start to be pleased about the fact that they can see their families or about the fact that they can take part in pleasant activities such as playing football or going to the library. This means that prisoners are likely to experience more attitudinal pleasure after the adaptation process. These empirical studies on prisoners' experience and adaptation thus show that prisoners can experience attitudinal pleasure in prison. And so, if prisoners experience attitudinal pleasure, they can be happy according to attitudinal hedonism.

3.8 Objections to Attitudinal Hedonism

In the next three sections, I will show that attitudinal hedonism leads to wrong conclusions about how happy certain prisoners are. In section 3.8.1, I will discuss the first problem of

⁷⁹ See Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bulman (1978) for a study on Hedonic Adaptation. This study will be also discussed in section 5.4.2 of this thesis.

⁸⁰ A similar effect can be observed in response to other negative events like illness and also to 'happy' events like winning the lottery: people tend to revert to their usual levels of happiness after a while (Brickman, Coates & Janoff-Bulman, 1978).

attitudinal hedonism which has to do with the fact that this version of hedonism still entails that all kinds of shallow and trivial pleasures make a difference to how happy a person is. I will argue that, if we accepted attitudinal hedonism, we would need to admit that even eating a cracker can make a difference to our happiness level.

After this, in section 3.8.2, I will present another problem faced by attitudinal hedonist theories. I will explain how attitudinal hedonism deals with people whose happiness is based on false or bizarre beliefs. I will show that attitudinal hedonism has to admit that the subject's attitudes toward those beliefs are happiness-constituting, which will be a problem in the evaluation of prisoners' happiness. Finally, in section 3.8.3, I will show how attitudinal hedonism fails to take into account one of the fundamental constituents of happiness, namely emotions.

3.8.1 Shallow Happiness

The first and most obvious problem with attitudinal hedonism as a theory of happiness is that this view counts all kinds of shallow and trivial pleasures as happiness-constituting. For example, episodes like eating a cake, drinking a cold beer, smoking a cigarette, the colour of the walls, the light in a room and so forth are all experiences towards which we can have the attitudes that according to the attitudinal hedonists are happiness-constituting.

The positive attitudes that a subject can have towards these experiences can be considered to be attitudinal pleasures because the person who has these kinds of experiences is pleased about having them. Therefore, according to attitudinal hedonism, a person who often experiences all these attitudinal pleasures can be considered to be happy. The more attitudinal pleasure the person takes from these experiences, the happier she will be. For example, if a prisoner who is addicted to smoking is allowed to smoke cigarettes, he will presumably be

pleased about this. Furthermore, the fact that he can smoke can have an impact on his prison experience. The prisoner can feel slightly less unhappy about being in prison if he can smoke.

In order to illustrate that shallow attitudinal pleasures do not make a person happy, I will go back to the example of Jack and Daniel. In that example, attitudinal hedonism seemed to entail that both Jack and Daniel are happy. Daniel is pleased about meeting his family because such meetings give him hope about the future. Moreover, he is also looking forward to meeting them again. Whenever he thinks about his family and about the fact that he is meeting them in the future, he is pleased about this. Daniel's episodes of happiness furthermore seem lasting and they even seem to give meaning to his life. Jack too seems to be happy overall according to this view due to the drugs he is taking. Because of these drugs, Jack takes pleasure in all sorts of trivial experiences such as the colour of the walls, eating a candy, scratching an itch, so on and so forth. In this situation, according to attitudinal hedonism, both prisoners would then be happy because they are experiencing a certain amount of attitudinal pleasures.

However, this conclusion about the two prisoners seems mistaken. It is much more plausible to think that Daniel is happier than Jack. After all, Jack takes pleasure in shallow and trivial things and this suggests to us that he is less happy than Daniel. It is true that Feldman, for example, would argue in this situation that a person can be happy even if her happiness is not founded upon anything "deep in human nature" (Feldman, 2010, pp. 147-48). He thus thinks that a person can be happy by having positive attitudes towards trivial things like Jack (sec. 3.4.1). But, this seems implausible. Even if positive attitudes towards shallow and trivial things can be a part of a person's happiness, it seems implausible to say that a person is happy overall just because she is taking pleasure in these kinds of things.

Intuitively the problem is that any one of the trivial attitudinal pleasures seems to be able to have only a slight impact or no impact at all on a person's happiness. For example, a

person who is eating an ice cream is not genuinely happy just because she is having that ice cream and liking the experience. And, if any one trivial instance of attitudinal pleasure is unable to make a person any happier, then it seems implausible to say that a person's happiness could consist of many such experiences. As Haybron puts it, the trouble with these shallow pleasures is that they do not reach "deeply" enough the subject's internal life. Haybron thinks that trivial pleasures do not change our internal life; they do not get to us. It seems that these attitudinal pleasures do not make a person happy. A person who experiences these pleasures does not seem intuitively and authentically happy (Haybron, 2001b, p. 506), which is why attitudinal hedonism seems to lead to wrong conclusions about Jack's happiness.

3.8.2 False and Bizarre Beliefs

In this section, I will discuss how attitudinal hedonism deals with people whose alleged happiness is based on false or bizarre beliefs. I will present a slightly modified version of the case of Jack and Daniel. I will use this new version of the case to argue that attitudinal hedonism leads to implausible conclusions about prisoners who are happy on the basis of bizarre and false beliefs.

Suppose that this time Jack and Daniel are placed in isolation and the only thing they can do is to watch television for an hour every day. After six months of imprisonment, Jack and Daniel adapt to the new environment which means that their level of happiness returns back to the same level as it was before imprisonment; overall they have a positive attitude towards their situation. During this time, Jack starts to take pleasure in bizarre things. For example, he is pleased about the shape of shampoo bottle, he is pleased about Britney Spears' new dress, he is pleased about the fact that Haribo has made a new elephant shaped candy, and so on. In other words, Jack is pleased about lots of bizarre things.

In contrast, Daniel, who loves his family and his life outside the prison, still strongly believes that his family, colleagues and friends love and respect him as they did before his imprisonment. And, he is pleased about the fact that he will be able to soon return to his normal life. However, Daniel cannot see his family and friends because he is in isolation. In the meantime, his wife has abandoned him, his employer has fired him and his friends do not want to see him anymore. Therefore, Daniel's attitudinal pleasures are all based on false beliefs. But, Daniel, being isolated from the real world, will not find out that his real life has changed and so he is pleased about many things that are not real anymore.

In this case, according to attitudinal hedonism, Jack is happy because he takes pleasure in many bizarre things and Daniel is equally happy because he has many attitudinal pleasures that are based on false beliefs. However, intuitively we would not consider Jack and Daniel to be genuinely happy in this case.⁸¹ Jack is pleased about things that are not related to his life at all, and Daniel is pleased about things that are an illusion. The objects of Jack and Daniel's attitudinal pleasures either do not exist or they are unrelated to their actual lives in any meaningful way. And, it seems quite implausible to say that someone would be happy because they take pleasure in things like that.

At this point, Feldman could argue in response to this objection that Jack really should be considered to be happy because it is possible to take pleasure in bizarre facts like the shallow happiness cases show (see section 3.8). Furthermore, in order to avoid the problem of "false beliefs", Feldman has proposed a new version of his theory, the Truth-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism. The basic idea of this modified version is that, if the pleasure is taken in bizarre facts or the contents of false beliefs, the pleasure contributes less to the subject's

⁸¹ However, I also want to suggest that many people would say that Daniel is at the moment happy even though his happiness is based on false beliefs. They will think that he will cease to be happy when he discovers the truth but that so long as he remains ignorant he remains genuinely happy.

happiness than a pleasure taken from a true object (Feldman, 2004, pp. 112-121). This means that, on his view, Daniel would not be very happy which seems intuitively right.

However, the main problem with the attitudinal pleasures based on false beliefs and bizarre objects is that these pleasures are not always sufficiently related to the subject's life whereas happiness must be something that has to do with our own lives. A person can only be happy because of things that change and influence her life in some deeper sense. Philippa Foot has argued, for example, that happiness must be related to what is important in human life. Her examples of things that are important enough in this respect include love and affection for family and friends, desire to have a good job and so on (Foot, 2002, pp. 35-6). She formulates her view in this way:

It seems that great happiness, unlike euphoria or even great pleasure, must come from something related to what is deep in human nature, and fundamental to human life, such as affection for children and friends, the desire to work, and love of freedom and truth.⁸²

Similarly, Rawls suggests that happiness involves rationality and carefully thought out plans of life. In his classic book *A Theory of Justice* he explained his view of happiness in the following way:

We can think of a person as being happy when he is in the way of a successful execution (more or less) of a rational plan of life drawn up under (more or less) favourable conditions, and he is reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through (Rawls, 1971, p. 409).

Finally, Daniel Haybron has recently stated that happiness has a special relation with the self. Happiness is "authentic" when it has to do with deep and important things in our lives. According to him what makes us authentically happy defines who we are, ourselves (Haybron, 2008, p. 178).

⁸² See Foot (2002, pp. 25-26). Feldman has noted that Foot's remark about happiness in this passage can be referred just as "great happiness". Moreover, according to Feldman, Foot in her later works on the topic seemed to change her position. See Foot (2002, p. 97).

In conclusion, as the previous philosophers have pointed out, happiness seems related to important and real things in one's life. Because of this, it seems implausible to claim that a person could be happy on the basis of attitudes which she has towards things that are not related in any way to her life. This means that Jack and Daniel should not be considered happy when their attitudinal pleasures are based on false beliefs or they are towards bizarre contents.⁸³ Attitudinal hedonism again seems to lead to a wrong conclusion about the happiness of those two prisoners. The evaluation of prisoners' happiness through the lens of attitudinal hedonism seems implausible. From this objection we, therefore, can learn that attitudinal hedonism is not the best way to evaluate and understand what happiness consist of in prisons.

3.8.3 A Missing Element

The most common objection to attitudinal hedonism is that happiness in the attitudinal sense is "overly intellectualized".⁸⁴ This objection is based on the fact that, according to attitudinal hedonism, happiness is to be understood in terms of a cognitive propositional attitude. However, happiness seems to involve also something more emotional than that. Happiness also has an affective component, characterised as a "cheery feeling" or "smiley-face feeling".⁸⁵

Basically, the problem is that attitudinal hedonism is leaving out an element which is constitutive of happiness. The missing part is the emotional state of the person who is happy.

⁸³ As I mentioned in the Introduction (p. 6, fn. 5), some philosophers use the word 'happiness' to denote well-being. This is sometimes called the standard normative sense of 'happiness'. Now, even if it is rare, some hedonists might even suggest that attitudinal hedonism is the best theory of happiness in this sense too. My objection above seems to clearly apply to these theories – it would not be plausible to think that someone's life is going well when they are pleased about things that just are not the case or other bizarre things. However, my intention here is not merely to object to attitudinal hedonism as a theory of well-being/happiness in the normative sense. Rather, the objection above should be read as an objection to attitudinal hedonism as a theory of happiness in the ordinary deeper sense in which we talk about how happy we are. The claim is that even happiness in this sense cannot be based merely on pleasant experiences based on false beliefs or beliefs with bizarre contents. However, I have no objections if my reader prefers to see this objection merely as an objection to attitudinal hedonism as a theory of well-being (and I want to emphasise that attitudinal hedonists do not tend to think of their theory as such). In this case, I advise my reader to consider the other objections.

⁸⁴ See Crisp (2006, p. 154); Mason (2007, p. 382); Zimmerman (2007, pp. 426-427); Norcross (2007, p. 390); and Haybron (2008, p. 64).

⁸⁵ As it will be showed in the next two chapters, Whole Life Satisfaction Theories and Emotional State Theories try to overcome this objection in two different ways.

Emotional states are not experiences in which a person takes pleasure but rather reactions to an experience. For example, to be depressed or elated is not to have experiences of a certain kind. Instead, these emotions seem more like general moods of the person towards an experience or event. Haybron suggests that these moods consist of having certain dispositions. This means that, if a person is depressed, she is disposed to be anxious, worried, nervous, and so on (Haybron, 2008).

To see why emotions are happiness-constituting, let's return to the case of Daniel. He is happy according to attitudinal hedonism because he has positive attitudes towards his family and friends. He believes that his family and friends outside the prison love him and he is pleased about this. But this time, let's suppose that, even if Daniel feels pleased about his life outside, he still is frequently depressed and sad, which seems quite plausible in a circumstance such as imprisonment. In this case, intuitively Daniel seems unhappy because he is frequently in a bad mood. Therefore, it seems that what constitutes Daniel's happiness is not only his attitudes of pleasure but also his overall emotional state.

3.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I explained the hedonist accounts of happiness according to which happiness consists of a positive balance of pleasure over displeasure. Such views take a happy life to be a life filled with pleasant experiences. I explored these views to see whether hedonist theories can give us a plausible way to understand what happiness consists of in prison. It was worth spending a chapter on this view because it seems at least initially like hedonist theories can lead to plausible conclusions in the evaluation of prisoners' happiness. Moreover, it seems like hedonist theories can also give us an easy way to measure how happy prisoners are and be compatible with the results of the empirical studies on the effects of imprisonment.

Throughout the chapter I explored two different hedonist views of happiness: sensory hedonism and attitudinal hedonism. I outlined a fictional case of two prisoners who have different balances of pleasure over pain to show that both sensory and attitudinal hedonists fail to correctly evaluate the happiness of these prisoners. I, first, argued against sensory hedonism by showing that prisoners can sometimes be unhappy even if they are experiencing more sensory pleasure than pain. I showed that Jack, who experiences more sensory pleasures than pains, is not happy as the hedonists would have to argue. I claimed that the pleasures he is experiencing are not happiness-constituting because they do not change his overall mood.

After that, I discussed Daniel's case in order to show that sensory hedonism leads to a wrong evaluation of Daniel's happiness too. I argued that Daniel can be happy even if his balance of sensory pleasures over pains is negative because he would still judge his life to be happy overall. From these two cases we can then conclude that, if we evaluate prisoners' happiness through the lenses of sensory hedonism, we will be unable to reach a correct understanding of how happy different prisoners are.

This chapter also has argued that attitudinal hedonists does not fare any better either. I used again Jack and Daniel to show that attitudinal hedonism too leads to implausible evaluations of how happy certain kinds of prisoners are. First, I argued against attitudinal hedonism by showing that this view is committing to counting all kinds of shallow and trivial pleasures as happiness-constituting. This is a problem because trivial attitudinal pleasures seem to be able to have only a slight impact or no impact at all on a prisoner's happiness. Therefore, if any trivial instance of attitudinal pleasure is unable to make a person any happier, then it seems implausible to say that a person's happiness could consist of many such experiences.

Moreover, I discussed how attitudinal hedonism deals with people whose alleged happiness is based on false or bizarre beliefs by presenting a slightly modified version of the

case of Jack and Daniel. I argued that attitudinal hedonism leads to implausible conclusions about prisoners who experience attitudinal pleasure on the basis of bizarre and false beliefs. The main problem with the attitudinal pleasures based on false beliefs and bizarre objects is that these pleasures are not always sufficiently related to the subject's life whereas happiness must be something that has to do with our own lives. It seems plausible to claim that a person can only be happy because of things that change and influence her life in some deeper sense.

Finally, I suggested that the attitudinal forms of hedonism seem to miss an important element of prisoners' life. Such theories fail to take into consideration the emotional states of prisoners. On the basis of these objections, I concluded that attitudinal hedonism too fails to provide a plausible picture of what the happiness of prisoners consists. Therefore, on the basis of this chapter we can conclude that neither sensory hedonism nor attitudinal hedonism gives us a plausible account of happiness in prison.

Chapter IV

Whole Life Satisfaction Theories of Happiness

Introduction

In recent years, one of the most popular theories of happiness has been the Whole Life Satisfaction Theory. In order to understand whether this theory can offer us a plausible way of thinking about prisoners' happiness, I am going to explore the Whole Life Satisfaction Theories (WLS) of happiness in this chapter. The main aim of this chapter will be to show that the WLS theories of happiness will not always lead to plausible conclusions about prisoners' happiness. I will argue that happiness in prisons is not just a matter of life satisfaction.

In the first section 4.1, I will explain why life satisfaction matters. I will introduce the Whole Life Satisfaction Theory of happiness and the main arguments for it. According to this theory, to be happy is mainly to be satisfied with your life as a whole. However, many different versions of this theory have been developed. I have classified these versions into three main groups: Cognitive Whole Life Satisfaction theories, Affective Whole Life Satisfaction theories, and Hybrid Whole Life Satisfaction theories. I will discuss these views in three separate subsections and I will also how they apply to the prisoners' happiness.

After this, I will spend the section 4.2 explaining the subjective well-being (SWB) studies. I will discuss these studies because recently many researchers of SWB have taken life satisfaction to be the main factor in the evaluation of subjective well-being.⁸⁶ Furthermore, for many of these researchers, subjective well-being and happiness amount to one and the same thing. In subsection 4.2.1, I will explain the methods that are often used to measure SWB.

⁸⁶ Researchers of SWB use the Satisfaction with Life Scale to measure people's level of subjective well-being. See Pavot and Diener review on Satisfaction with Life Scale (1993, pp. 165-171) and Veenhoven's study on Life Satisfaction (1996, pp. 11-48). For other references on Life Satisfaction studies in SWB literature see section 4.2 of this chapter.

Then, in section 4.3, I will describe the empirical data concerning how satisfied prisoners are with their lives. I will also examine whether the evaluations of prisoners' happiness through WLS theories fit with the results of empirical studies on prisoners' life satisfaction (Zamble & Porporino, 1990; Diener, Lucas & Oishi, 2002). I will point out that there is a fundamental problem in the way in which empirical studies assess the prisoners' happiness. This problem is mainly related to the reliability of the prisoners' judgments about their whole life. This problem will be explored further in section 4.4. Here, I will argue that the measurements of subjective well-being are not reliable because certain trivial features of prisons can influence the prisoners' assessments of their own happiness in a distorting way.

Finally, I will discuss two objections to WLS theories presenting a prisoners' example in the last two sections. Firstly, in section 4.5.1, I will argue that prisoners can be happy even if they are not making any judgments about their lives as a whole. Then, in section 4.5.2, I will argue that prisoners' judgments about their lives can be influenced and distorted by changes in the perspectives from which they look at their lives. Consequently, I will show that WLS theories of happiness will not lead to right conclusions about the happiness of prisoners.

4.1 Whole Life Satisfaction Theory

Life satisfaction is often considered to be a central aspect of human life. Life satisfaction can be defined as a positive attitude toward one's life as a whole, either at the present moment in time or over a longer period of time. Usually this attitude is seen as embodying a global judgment about one's life taken as a whole: that all things considered, one's life is satisfactory (Haybron, 2007b, pp. 99-101). If we think about happiness in prison in terms of life satisfaction, prisoners will be happy according to this view if they believe that all things considered their lives are going well.

Empirical research on well-being is often based on this idea of life satisfaction. Life satisfaction surveys are in fact the most widespread method of measuring well-being in the scientific studies of subjective well-being. Psychologists and sociologists also often think that subjective well-being and happiness are one and the same thing.⁸⁷ They, therefore, think that life satisfaction is the main factor in the evaluation of one's happiness too. This means that, when empirical researchers measure subjective well-being in their studies, they often think that they can establish how happy people are by measuring their life satisfaction. A typical question used by researchers in the subjective well-being studies is: "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole now? (From 1, "dissatisfied," to 10, "satisfied")."⁸⁸ Another instrument to assess subjective well-being is the Andrews and Withey's Delightful-terrible Scale which asks: "How do you feel about your life as a whole? (From 1, "terrible," to 7, "delighted,")" (Haybron, 2008, p. 82; Andrews & Withey, 1976).

More recently, the idea of life satisfaction has become popular also in philosophical literature. Many philosophers have identified happiness with life satisfaction. According to them, a person is happy when she is satisfied with her life as a whole.⁸⁹ Some philosophers have furthermore maintained that well-being also consists of being satisfied with one's life.⁹⁰

These views of happiness are called Whole Life Satisfaction Theories (WLS). Different formulations of this view of happiness have been developed and I will discuss the different versions in the next sections. Very roughly, satisfaction with one's life can be a state of contentment with either (i) the circumstances of one's life or (ii) with the fulfilment of one's wants and needs. However, life satisfaction can also be thought of as a global subjective

⁸⁷ See Diener and Diener (1996) and Biswas-Diener and Diener (2001) Diener (2000) and Biswas-Diener, Diener and Tamir (2004) studies on subjective well-being.

⁸⁸ See Veenhoven (1997). Another popular instrument is the five-item Satisfaction with Life Scale or SWLS (Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin (1985).

⁸⁹ In various forms, theories of happiness as life satisfaction have been defended, for example, by Benditt (1974), Kekes (1982), Montague (1966), Nozick (1989), Tatarkiewicz (1976), Telfer (1980), Thomas (1968), and von Wright (1963).

⁹⁰ See Brandt (1967) and Sumner (1996) for subjective theories of well-being.

judgment about one's life as a whole: that all things considered, one's life is satisfactory.

As Fred Feldman has suggested, all WLS theories can be subdivided into two main categories. There are versions of the theory which require *actual* satisfaction with one's life as a whole and versions which only require *hypothetical* satisfaction with one's life as a whole. According to the *actualist theories*, a happy person must *actually* make a judgment about his life satisfaction.⁹¹ In contrast, the *hypothetical* versions claim that a happy person must merely be such that she would make such a judgment if she thought about her life (Feldman, 2008, p. 18).⁹² Therefore, if we think about prisoners, according to the *actualist* versions, a prisoner, S, is happy to degree n at a time t if and only if:

- a) S *actually* has lived a certain life up to t and S has a good and clear idea of how her life has been up to t
- b) at t, S *actually* has a life ideal and S has a clear conception of what has emerged in important aspects of her life up to t
- c) and at t, S *actually* judges that important aspects of her life match up to degree n with the life ideal that S has at t.

We can generally say that a prisoner is happy on this view if she *actually* makes a judgment about her life as a whole.

In contrast, according to the *hypothetical* versions of WLS theories, a prisoner, S, is happy to degree n at a time t if and only if:

- a) S were to reflect on her life as a whole at t and if
- b) S were to formulate a life ideal at t, then

⁹¹ Sumner's theory can be included among actualist because he bases his theory of happiness on a real and informed judgment made by the subject involved (Sumner, 1996). See section 4.1.3 of this thesis on Sumner's account. Telfer's theory too can be included in the actualist category. Her emotional version of the view states that: a person can be happy if he is actually pleased about his life as a whole. See section 4.1.2 of this thesis for a discussion of Telfer's account.

⁹² Feldman suggests that Tatarikiewicz chooses a hypothetical version as illustrated by the following quote: "it is enough that he would be satisfied if he were to think of it" (Tatarikiewicz, 1976, p. 10).

c) S would judge that her life as a whole measures up to degree n to her ideal life.

In this case, we can say that a prisoner's happiness level at a time t is determined not by the judgment she *actually* makes at that time but by the judgment she *would make* at that time if she were to make one. As we will see in the next section, there are also many different formulations of these two versions of WLS theory. However, before I discuss these theories, I will try to make clear why WLS theories are so popular among philosophers.

Life satisfaction is considered to be a central aspect of human happiness by WLS theorists mainly for two reasons: life satisfaction is a *holistic* and an *evaluative* concept. Firstly, life satisfaction basically involves making a judgment about one's whole life or at least about everything that takes place in one's life during a certain period of time. It reflects not just the aggregate of moments in one's life, but the global quality of one's life taken as a whole. Secondly, life satisfaction seems to be a central aspect of human happiness because it involves making an evaluation of the quality of one's life. Satisfaction with one's life involves a global judgment about whether our lives are going well for us. In fact, when we evaluate our lives it seems to be important whether our lives are going well by our individual standards.⁹³

This means that one interesting feature of WLS theories is that they take happiness to consist of a mental state.⁹⁴ WLS theories take happiness to be individuals' global and lasting evaluation of their lives as a whole. It thus seems that WLS theorists have developed a more plausible theory of happiness, than attitudinal hedonism, because on their view happiness is something more stable and more linked to our real life than mere attitudinal pleasures.⁹⁵

⁹³ These two aspects are considered by Haybron as advantages of the life satisfaction accounts. However, Haybron considers life satisfaction to be a poor indicator of well-being. See Haybron (2008, p. 83). Moreover, along with these two advantages, WLS accounts also achieve some of the desiderata listed for hedonism: first person authority, for instance, and the thought that what matters in whether I am happy is my own 'take' on the issue (sec. 3.1.1).

⁹⁴ See Nozick (1989) and Sumner (1996) for how the view differs from hedonism and emotional state theories of happiness.

⁹⁵ This feature of WLS theories is interesting because it seems to help these theories to overcome the problem encountered by Hedonism and Emotional State theories of happiness. The problem of these two kinds of theories is that happiness seems not linked to our actual real life. They seem to consider happiness as a mental state rather than an actual life condition (Sumner, 1996; Nozick 1989). Happiness, according to these theories, appears too psychological. As we will see next in sections 5.3 and 5.4, Haybron's theory does not suffer of this problem.

As we can notice, there are certain similarities between attitudinal hedonism and whole life satisfaction theories. According to both theories, happiness consists of a subjective attitude (a belief or a judgment) towards an object. However, even if attitudinal hedonism and whole life satisfaction theories share the same structure (happiness is an attitude towards an object according to both views), they rely on different attitudes and different objects. In the previous chapter, I explained how attitudinal hedonists take happiness to consist of enjoyable experiences. What all these happiness-constituting experiences have in common is that the subject takes pleasure in them. According to attitudinal hedonism an agent is thus happy when she takes pleasure in an experience or a fact. This means that according to attitudinal hedonists, happiness consists of a specific attitude (namely the attitude of taking pleasure in) towards an experience or a fact (where there is no constraint on what these experiences and facts are).

In contrast, from this section we learn that according to the Whole Life Satisfaction theories of happiness an agent is happy when she judges that her life fulfils her ideal life-plan. This means that WLS theories take happiness to consist of being satisfied with one's life. For the defenders of WLS theories, being satisfied with one's life is neither a quality of an experience nor an attitude in the hedonist sense. Life satisfaction is rather a general attitude toward a specific object. This attitude can be either a belief (Cognitive WLS) or an affective state of being pleased (Affective WLS) that is directed toward whether one's life matches to one's life-plan.

Summing up, attitudinal hedonists and WLS theorists both take happiness to consist of an attitude towards an object. However, for attitudinal hedonists happiness consists of a specific attitude, namely 'taking pleasure in', towards any experience or a fact. In contrast, Whole Life Satisfaction theorists think that happiness consists of a global attitude towards a specific object, namely that one's life matches up to one's life-plan.

4.1.1 Cognitive Whole Life Satisfaction Theory

I will now introduce the main varieties of the WLS theories of happiness. I will focus my attention on the three main alternatives: Cognitive WLS theories, Affective WLS theories and Hybrid WLS theories. They all develop in different ways the idea that a person is happy when she is satisfied with her life as a whole. I will begin from the Cognitive Whole Life Satisfaction theories of happiness.

One of the most basic versions of the whole life satisfaction theory is called the Cognitive Whole Life Satisfaction (CWLS) theory of happiness.⁹⁶ It states that being happy consists of being in a cognitive state of a belief that represents how well your actual life matches up to your ideal life-plan. Therefore, on this view, a person cannot be happy without actually believing that her life satisfies her ideal life-plan because according to this view an agent is happy just in case she judges that her life fulfils her ideal life-plan. A version of this view has been defended by John Kekes in his paper “Happiness” (Kekes, 1982, pp. 358-376). Kekes begins from one’s rational life-plan for the satisfaction of one’s first-order wants. He then thinks that every satisfied want is an episode that contributes to the formation of a person’s attitude to his life as a whole that is constitutive of happiness. The pursuit of happiness is thus not just the pursuit of desire-satisfaction, but also the construction of one’s life (Kekes, 1982, p. 364).⁹⁷

The CWLS views seem very straightforward and intuitively plausible at first sight. These views work in the following way: let’s suppose that Tom has had a certain life until now. At this point, Tom has an ideal life-plan for his life and he has also a good and clear idea of how his life has been until now. So, if Tom believes that his life largely fits his life-plan so far,

⁹⁶ The classification of all these versions of WLS theory is based on Suikkanen (2011, pp. 149-166). See also Feldman (2008, 2010)

⁹⁷ For an accurate formulation of Kekes’ view of happiness see ‘Happiness’ by Kekes (1982, pp. 358-376). Other interesting versions of the CWLS view have been defended by Thomas (1968, pp. 104-108), and von Wright (1963, pp. 98-99).

then we should describe Tom as a happy person according to a Cognitive WLS theory.

Let us then consider how this theory would apply to a person who has been imprisoned. Suppose that Tom has had a certain life. He has had a lovely family and a good job. Tom has also an ideal life-plan and he believes that his life-plan matches up with his life. Tom is then arrested for tax fraud and he is sent to prison, which means that Tom cannot live his previous life anymore. As a consequence, he now believes that his actual life does not match up with his life-plan. In this situation, according to the Cognitive WLS theory Tom would be an unhappy person.

4.1.2 Affective Whole Life Satisfaction Theory

Another version of the WLS theory is the so-called Affective Whole Life Satisfaction (AWLS) theory. According to this theory, happiness is a positive affective state based on one's view of one's life. Someone who holds this view thinks that what matters is whether one *feels pleased* with how one is living, rather than what one *believes* about one's life. The relevant affective states must be the result of the agent's assessment of how her life is going overall. Therefore, according to this view, a person is happy if and only if she takes pleasure in the fact that she has lived her life so far in the way that she has (Suikkanen, 2011, p. 152).

Versions of this view have been defended by Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz (1966) and Elisabeth Telfer (1980). According to Tatarkiewicz, happiness is general satisfaction with life as a whole. However, it must be satisfaction not only with that which is but also with that which was and that which will be, not only with the present but also with the past and the future (Tatarkiewicz, 1966, pp. 1). According to Telfer too, happiness is a state of being pleased with one's life as a whole. A happy person does not want anything major in her life to be otherwise. She is pleased with her life and wants to keep what she has got and there is nothing major which

she lacks and which she wants to get (Telfer, 1980, pp. 8-9). These versions of WLS theory understand life satisfaction in a very different way than the previous Cognitive WLS theories. Here satisfaction with one's life does not refer to the perceived satisfaction of one's desires but rather to feeling satisfied - to having a certain sensation.

We can illustrate the AWLS view with the following example. Tom has lived a certain life so far and he takes pleasure in the fact that he has lived that life until now. So, if Tom takes pleasure in the life that he is living, Tom is a happy person according to the Affective WLS theory. But, what if Tom is sent to prison and is, therefore, unlikely to feel satisfaction about the way his life is going? He may not enjoy his time with family and his job while he is imprisoned. This means that Tom is not pleased with his present life anymore. In this circumstance, thus, Tom would not count as a happy person according to the AWLS.

4.1.3 Hybrid Whole Life Satisfaction Theory

Finally, according to the Hybrid Whole Life Satisfaction (HWLS) views, happiness consists of both (i) a cognitive judgment of how one's life matches up with one's life-plan and (ii) a positive affective state based on that judgment (Suikkanen, 2011, p. 152). There are also many different versions of this type of Hybrid theory. One example of a hybrid theory is Wayne Sumner's theory of happiness. It is based on the relation between the concept of happiness and the concept of welfare. Sumner's main aim is to develop a new subjective theory of welfare based on happiness, where happiness is understood in terms of life satisfaction (Haybron 2008, pp. 99-100, Sumner, 1996, pp. 156-158).⁹⁸

For Sumner, the relevant happiness-constituting attitudes are global judgments about

⁹⁸ Sumner proposes his theory of welfare as subjective because in his theory a subject's welfare depends on his own attitudes. The subject measures his welfare by giving a global judgment based on attitudes that are genuinely his own.

one's life taken as a whole. They are judgments that, all things considered, one's life is satisfactory. What makes Sumner's view a version of the HWLS theories here is that according to him the relevant judgments have both a cognitive component and an affective component. The cognitive component is an evaluation that one's life measures up to one's standards and the affective component is that one must find one's life as a consequence rewarding (Sumner, 1996, pp. 144-146).

More generally, Hybrid WLS Theory can be illustrated in the following way. Take again Tom, who has lived a certain life and he has a certain life-plan for his life. He also has a good and clear conception of how his life has been until now. Tom judges that his actual life matches with his ideal life-plan and he takes pleasure in his judgment that his life measures up to his life-plan. Therefore, Tom can be considered to be a happy person according to the Hybrid WLS theory. However, when Tom is sent to prison, he will judge that his actual life does not match with his ideal life-plan and he will no longer feel fulfilled as a result. Consequently, according to the Hybrid version of WLS Theory, in this scenario Tom would no longer be happy.

4.2 The Science of Happiness

As it was explained in chapter I, the word "happiness" is used at least in two different senses in philosophical literature. Firstly, "happiness" can be used as a synonym for well-being and its equivalents flourishing, welfare and *eudaimonia*. Here "happiness" is understood as a normative or evaluative concept that concerns what benefits a person, what is good for him, or what makes his life go well for him. In contrast, more commonly happiness is used in a psychological or descriptive sense. Here "happiness" denotes a lasting aspect of the individual's state of mind. This second use of the word is typical in the subjective well-being literature

(Haybron, 2008, pp. 28-29).⁹⁹ The way in which happiness is understood in the subjective well-being literature seems to fit well the WLS Theories. For this reason, in this section I will focus my attention on subjective well-being studies.

Psychologists look at various behaviours and personality traits when they analyse and measure subjective well-being. For them, subjective well-being consists of experiencing high levels of pleasant emotions such as joy and contentment, low levels of unpleasant emotions such as fear, anger and sadness, and personal judgments about satisfaction. Subjective well-being can be described as a person's cognitive and affective evaluation of his life as a whole. These evaluations can include emotional reactions to events as well as cognitive judgments of satisfaction and fulfilment concerning one's life (Snyder & Lopez, 2009, p. 187).

Satisfaction judgments can be general (when a person is overall satisfied with his life) or specific (when a person is satisfied with his job, for example). These judgments about life, work, marriage, and other domains can be based on past emotional experiences and emotional memories, and they can also involve explicit goals, values and standards of comparison that are used to evaluate one's current life. A happy person is then according to this psychological model someone who is frequently cheerful, only occasionally sad, and generally satisfied with his or her life (Biswas-Diener, Diener, & Tamir, 2004, p. 19).

Psychologists have attempted to measure individuals' qualities such as intelligence with IQ tests, life satisfaction with subjective surveys and so on. The methods used to measure individuals' qualities have been often criticized for their lack of reliability, and the measurement of subjective well-being is not an exception. However, the methods that are used to measure subjective well-being have become more sophisticated and diverse as we will see in the next section.

⁹⁹ As explained in section 1.1 of the introduction chapter, there is also a third sense where happiness means just feeling happy.

4.2.1 Measuring of Subjective Well-Being

The aim of this section is to discuss different methods of measuring subjective well-being. I will spend a section on this because social scientists have used these methods often to measure life satisfaction and quality of life in the studies conducted in prisons.¹⁰⁰ The most common method used by the psychologists and social scientists to measure subjective well-being is the self-report survey. Researchers have developed a number of surveys that ask people how happy or satisfied they are. For example, people may be asked to respond, on a numeric scale from (1) “not happy” to (10) “very happy”, to a question like “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole in these days?” Another sample question is “Taking your life as a whole, would you consider yourself (a) very happy; (b) fairly happy; (c) not happy” (Frank, 1999, p. 69).

In order to evaluate emotional experiences in everyday life, researchers have also developed a technique called “experience sampling”. When this method is used, the participants carry palmtop computers that sound an alarm at random times throughout the day. When the alarm sounds, participants must complete short online surveys about their current emotional states and activities. With these short surveys, researchers can measure emotions throughout the day and assess the subjects’ overall subjective well-being. Biological methods such as those that measure heart rate, startle reflex, hormone levels, and neurological activity have also been often used to measure happiness (Biswas-Diener, Diener, & Tamir, 2004, p. 20).

Finally, in measuring subjective well-being, some researchers use the multi-method approach that involves a variety of assessment techniques. The multi-method approach is a

¹⁰⁰ See studies on prison experience and adaptation discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5 of this thesis. Empirical data from prisons will be discussed in section 4.3 of this chapter and section 5.5 of next chapter.

good way of assessing subjective well-being because it avoids many of the failures related to any single method. Also, the multi-method approach allows scientists to analyse different aspects of happiness at the same time (Biswas-Diener, Diener, & Tamir, 2004, pp. 19-20).

Empirical studies on subjective well-being have been carried out also in prisons. These studies are mainly focused on the measurement of different kinds of reactions to imprisonment – both emotional and attitudinal. For instance, a group of social scientists has developed techniques for measuring the subjective pain – both physical and psychological – which punishment inflicts. This research is a part of a larger body of social science research on subjective well-being. Other recent social scientific studies have also supported the finding that criminals adapt to punishment even if incarceration substantially affects inmates even many years after their release. The studies on adaptation to prison rely on both self-reports and objective measures of well-being (Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, 2009, pp. 1037-1082). Studies on adaptation have been also conducted by Zamble (1992). Almost all studies on adaptation reported that people tend to adapt to imprisonment.¹⁰¹

4.3 Whole Life Satisfaction and Prisoners

In this section, I will consider whether the empirical data from prisons fits with how the WLS theories would evaluate how happy prisoners are. The three previous sections have suggested that many prisoners probably are unhappy because they presumably have life-plans which they cannot fulfil in prison. For example, let's consider Sam, who is a cheerful professor at the University of Birmingham and has a lovely family. Sam believes that his life does match up to his life plan and he feels pleased about this. Sam is satisfied with his life as a whole and so all versions of WLS would consider Sam to be a happy person.

¹⁰¹ The adaptation process has been discussed in section 2.5 of this thesis.

But, suppose that after a while, Sam is sent to prison for some reason and he completely loses his wonderful life. After several months in prison, Sam starts to be even more depressed. He misses his life, his family and his job. He stops planning his life and he starts living his life day by day. In this situation, we would intuitively judge Sam to be unhappy. And, WLS theories seem to confirm this intuition. If we asked Sam how happy he is at this moment, he would probably judge himself to be unhappy. He would say that his life does not match with his ideal life-plan. After all, he is feeling depressed about how his life is going. It, therefore, seems that WLS theories match our intuitions about prisoners' happiness.

As we learnt from previous sections, many empirical studies have been based on the life satisfaction model and these studies also suggest that life satisfaction theories can tell us interesting things about people's happiness. The best results about people's life satisfaction and its relation to people's happiness have been achieved by the social and psychological sciences studying happiness. In particular, many studies about life satisfaction have been developed by researchers who are interested in subjective well-being.

The research conducted by Myers and Diener suggests that people are happier than one might expect and that happiness does not appear to depend significantly on external circumstances (Myer & Diener, 1996, pp. 70-71). In particular, they have observed that three out of every ten Americans surveyed say that they are very happy. Only one in ten chooses the most negative description "not too happy". The majority describe themselves as "pretty happy". The few exceptions to reasonable global happiness include "new inmates" along with hospitalized alcoholics and psychotherapy patients. Furthermore, according to Myers and Diener, four traits characterize happy people: 1) they like themselves, 2) they are optimistic, 3)

they are extroverted,¹⁰² and 4) they feel that they have personal control over their lives. This last feature is interesting because people with little or no control over their lives – such as prisoners – suffer from lower morale and worse health. According to Myers and Diener's results, prisoners are among the less happy people (Myer & Diener, 1996, pp. 70-71).

One of the first life satisfaction studies in prisons was made by Zamble in 1992. Zamble measured behaviour, emotional states and cognitions of long-term inmates longitudinally for more than seven years. He analysed the prisoners' thoughts and feelings and found that the inmates experienced negative emotional states such as depression and anxiety especially during the first part of the imprisonment. However, Zamble's results showed also sizable and systematic decreases in dysphoric moods and negative emotional states over time (Zamble, 1992, p. 416).

In contrast to the changes in emotions over time, Zamble reported that subjects did not see their lives in prison as significantly more desirable or rewarding after several years, nor did they see fewer problems than previously. After a while, a higher proportion of the sample was able to cite some positive aspects of their prison-lives. However, the subjects' assessments of the overall quality of their lives were mostly negative and did not change over the time (Zamble, 1992, p. 418).

Other questions measured specific cognitions about their personal objectives. Although most subjects reported that they lived day by day without much planning, about two-thirds were able to state long-term plans such as educational objectives. This finding is in contrast to Zamble and Porporino's (1988) earlier study which investigated a group of short-term inmates. That study suggested that a majority of the inmates lost their motivation for self-improvement

¹⁰² Although extraverts are generally happier than introverts, Kettle (1991) found that extraverted prisoners were less happy than introverted prisoners. This suggests that the situational features of prison were not congruent with an extraverted disposition (Diener, Ohishi & Lucas, 2003, p. 409).

within a year or so.

Answers to the qualitative questions were also consistent with an increased concern with the future. For example, the subjects' daydreams were often pleasant images of their lives after release. However, there was little evidence of realistic planning for the future even among those for whom release was imminent (Zamble, 1992, p. 418).¹⁰³

In 1973, Pishkin and Thorne (1973) conducted a famous factorial study of the existential state reactions of 193 incarcerated inmates at the Central Prison, Raleigh. They gave to inmates a 200-item questionnaire that measured their reactions to the state of being at any point in life. This questionnaire was used to analyse five factors: demoralization, religious dependency, existential confidence, self-esteem and concern over the human condition. The group of prisoners rated above the average on various factors, but below the average on concern over the human condition factor. The prisoner group also expressed high demoralization. They reported that they do not know what to do with themselves, that life is unbearable, that they are ashamed of their criminal record, that they hate themselves, that they are failures, and that they feel that life is passing them by (Pishkin & Thorne, 1973, pp. 392-402).

Other studies have observed that many inmates experience a high level of stress due to the pain of imprisonments (Adams, 1992). Kenneth Adam refers back to Sykes's (1958) classic study, which was made in a maximum-security prison. As we saw earlier in the second chapter, Sykes reported that inmates routinely experience a sense of deprivation with regard to goods and services, liberty, heterosexual relationships and security (see sec. 2.1). Similarly, inmates often experience a severe loss of autonomy, which can generate feelings of helplessness and

¹⁰³ See Liebling (2004) and Crewe, Liebling and Hulley (2011) for studies on prisoners' quality of life. A cross-sectional healthcare study of the Irish prisoner population examined mental health status and quality of life of female prisoners, the majority of whom are drug-users. This study also compared drug using and non-drug using between male and female prisoners and the general population. While the quality of life profile was closer to drug-using male prisoners than other comparison groups, female prisoners still had significantly poorer physical and psychological quality of life scores (Mooney, Hannon, Barry, Friel & Kelleher, 2002).

dependency. Moreover, both the environmental overstimulation and understimulation can also influence the inmates' state of being. A boring, monotonous prison routine creates additional stress by reinforcing negative feelings such as emptiness and despair. At the time of prison entry, the most frequently cited difficulty is that of being separated from family members and friends (82%). Other reported problems include lack of freedom (44%), missing specific activities (35%), conflicts with other inmates (32%), regret about the past (31%), concern about challenges they will face on release (31%), boredom (25%), cell conditions (18%), medical services (15%), lack of staff support (14%), personal safety (12%), and lack of desired programs or facilities (11%) (Adams, 1992, pp. 282-284).

Moreover, empirical studies in prison have shown that in general subjects do not see their lives in prison as significantly more desirable after several years in prison and prisoners' assessments of the overall quality of their lives in prison do not change over time either (Zamble, 1992, pp. 416-418). In addition, when the inmates are re-interviewed after four months and again after sixteen months, the ranking of problems tend to remain unchanged. Roughly half of the difficulties encountered by inmates in the later interviews represent the continuation of the earlier problems (Adams, 1992, pp. 283-284).

To sum up, certain patterns of behaviour and emotional states emerge from the empirical studies conducted in prisons. Many inmates suffer from emotional distress such as depression and dysphoria even if they suffer from these conditions less after few years. Therefore, the emotional states of prisoners tend to be highly negative and high levels of depression and anxiety have been registered among inmates in the very early period of imprisonment. However, after a certain period of time, inmates' emotional states change and the proportion of negative states decreases. The prisoners' assessments of the overall quality of their lives tend to be mostly negative and they do not change over time. Finally, another characteristic pattern

of behaviour is related to how the prisoners use and organise their time. Very few of them plan ahead at all; for example, 83 % reported living day by day and many others also reported that they are drifting and living almost entirely in a perpetual present (Zamble, 1992, pp. 409-425).

Based on the results from empirical studies, it seems that, when prisoners make judgments about their happiness in terms of satisfaction with their life as a whole, they usually rate themselves to be unhappy. The empirical studies, therefore, suggest that most prisoners are not satisfied with their life overall and their emotional states are mainly negative. On the basis of this data, the WLS theories of happiness would conclude that prisoners tend to be unhappy or, at least, less happy generally than other people. So, it seems that empirical studies on prisoners fit well with WLS theories of happiness.

All the studies that I have cited so far rely heavily on interviews and survey methods. These methods have many advantages. Most importantly, they provide an assessment of the inmates' reactions to imprisonment. These methods also use standardized measures, which is useful for making comparisons with research on the wider population (Adams, 1992, p. 292).

However, these methods have also their problems. In particular, concerns can be raised both about the validity of the inmate responses and about the survey questions. For example, inmates may respond in ways that reflect the perceived expectation of the researchers and the norms of the inmate society, or in ways that capitalize on the presence of a sympathetic listener (Adams, 1992, p. 293). Therefore, inmates' assessments of their lives in prison can be influenced by many distorting factors, or so it will be argued next.

4.4 Subjects' Judgments and Trivial Objects Influence

Basically, there are two main factors that can influence our judgments about life satisfaction: the adaptation process and the influence of trivial objects (Biswas-Diener, Diener, & Tamir,

2004, pp. 21-23). The second factor makes the measurements of life satisfaction less reliable than the researchers would want them to be. Moreover, this factor is very interesting to us because it influences the prisoners' assessment of their own happiness too. In this section, I will first explain how trivial factors can influence our judgments about our life satisfaction. I will also suggest that the WLS theories seem to be vulnerable to this objection too.

Evaluating how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with your life can be very difficult and complicated. Our life satisfaction is related to the judgments we make of our lives as a whole. As we will see, these judgments can be influenced by trivial things such as weather, the colour of the room you are in, or even by the fact that you have found a 'dime'.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, subjective judgments of life satisfaction seem generally to be very unreliable. Let us consider an example which nicely illustrates the instability of the subjective judgments.¹⁰⁵

Let us suppose that Laura is a cheerful person with a lovely family and a good job. Let us also suppose that Laura's life plan was to become a good mother and a powerful woman. Thus, Laura believes that her life largely matches up to her ideal life. As a consequence, Laura is a happy person according to all WLS theories.

However, let now suppose that Laura has trouble at work. She is involved in a fraud and she is sent to prison. Now, if we ask Laura how happy she is, she would probably judge herself to be unhappy because she is dissatisfied with her life. She feels depressed because she is far

¹⁰⁴ In their studies on Subjective Well-Being, Schwarz and Strack suggest that trivial objects can influence subjects' judgments about their life satisfaction. For example, finding a dime is sufficient to increase temporarily one's life satisfaction (1999, p. 61). This means that, despite the fact that SWB measures reflect people's overall evaluation of the quality of their lives from their own perspective, subjective self-reports are not necessarily valid and reliable. However, we should be careful not to exaggerate the contextual effects on life satisfaction judgments. In a recent paper, Lucas, Oishi and Diener suggest that much of the evidences on the unreliability of self-report surveys of well-being are based on studies with extremely small sample. In contrast, more recent investigations, which used a larger number of participants, have found that context effects are weak or non-existent (2016, p. 2). For a discussion about the effects of life events on subjective happiness and life satisfaction see Lucas (2007) and Schwarz and Strack (1999). Lucas (2013) also discusses the effects of weather conditions on life satisfaction judgments.

¹⁰⁵ This argument recalls the liability problem of WLS theory argued by Feldman (2008, pp. 9-10) and Haybron (2007b, pp. 125-126). For a discussion of the instability problem see Tiberius (unpublished). See Alexandrova for a discussion of the instability of Life Satisfaction reports (2008, pp. 574-575).

from her lovely family and she has lost her job. In addition, the most serious problems Laura now faces in prison are the light of the cell and an unbearable cell mate.

Let's now suppose that after six months, Laura has been moved to a brighter cell. She is pleased with her cell light and her new cell mate, she now feels less depressed and she even believes that her life is bearable. Therefore, if we ask Laura again to judge her life, she would probably give a different answer. She would say that now she feels better in her imprisoned condition and that she is satisfied with her life.

However, in this case, Laura does not seem genuinely happier because her judgment about life satisfaction seems to be influenced merely by the change of the light in her cell and the meeting of a new cell mate. It is not a true judgment about her life satisfaction as a whole.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, in this case, the changes of the light in the cell and the new cell mate have influenced Laura's judgment. This means that a person's judgment can be influenced by fairly trivial things like the previous type of small changes in the environment. This means that judgments about life satisfaction are too easily changing to constitute a person's happiness. As a consequence, measurements of subjective well-being in prison are not very reliable because they can be distorted by small changes in the circumstances of imprisonment.

Feldman calls this problem the lability problem (Feldman, 2010, pp. 74-75). According to him, an individual's judgment about whole life satisfaction can be influenced by trivial features of the context in which he is making the judgment. Thus, for example, if a subject is first allowed to have a better cell in prison after months spent in a small and unpleasant cell and he is then asked to make a judgment about whole life satisfaction, he is likely to indicate greater satisfaction than he would if he had not changed cells. Many other contextual factors such as

¹⁰⁶ The influence of cell size and cell mate on prisoners' assessment of their life in prison is supported by results of Wright researches (Wright, 1988). Schwarz and Strack's study (1999) on the influence of trivial objects on subjects' judgments on life satisfaction provides support for the claim that Laura will end up evaluating her whole life positively just because she has been moved to a brighter room.

the weather, the decor of the room, the cell mate and the cell size, or the attractiveness of the questioner are seen to affect life satisfaction judgments.¹⁰⁷ This seems to suggest that subjective judgments fail to track actual levels of life satisfaction.

4.5 Objections to Whole Life Satisfaction Theory

Discussing the influence of trivial objects on subjective well-being judgments we learned that the most common problem of empirical researches is the reliability of subjects' judgments. In the next two sections, I will explain how the unreliability of the subjective judgments is a problem also for the WLS theories of happiness.

In section 4.5.1, I will argue that prisoners can be happy even if they are not making any judgments about their own life. In section 4.5.2, I will explain how the arbitrariness of the subjects' judgments can be problematic for the WLS theories in the evaluation of prisoners' happiness. On the basis of these objections, I will conclude that the WLS theories will be unable to lead to plausible conclusions about prisoners' happiness.

4.5.1 Happiness without Judgment

We have already seen that WLS theories of happiness can be developed in many ways. However, as Feldman suggests, all WLS theories can be subdivided into two main categories. There are versions which require *actual* satisfaction with one's life as a whole and versions which require only *hypothetical* satisfaction with one's life as a whole (Feldman, 2008, p. 18; sec. 4.1 above).

In order to show that both kinds of WLS theories, actualist and hypothetical, have

¹⁰⁷ See Pavot and Diener review on Satisfaction with Life Scale (1993, pp. 165-171) and Veenhoven's study on Life Satisfaction (1996, pp. 11-48).

implausible consequences with regards to prisoners' happiness, I will discuss "the contemplative prisoner" example which I have formulated on the basis of Feldman's argument against the WLS theories (Feldman, 2010, pp. 157-159). This example shows that a person can be happy even if she is not actually making any judgments about her life as a whole or even inclined to make such judgments hypothetically.

Let us suppose that an imprisoned woman is deeply engaged in thinking about her future days outside the prison. Suppose also that she is thinking about the possibility of being free again and meeting her family, and she is planning how she will spend her future days with them. She is so engrossed in her reflection that she is giving no thought to her actual life in prison. She is only planning and imagining her future freedom.

At that moment, she seems pretty happy even if she is not making any judgments about her life as a whole. However, according to the actualist versions of the WLS theories, we should say that she is either happy or unhappy because she has not made any actual judgments about her whole life. This means that these actualist theories draw wrong conclusions about the prisoners' happiness in cases like this.

Moreover, according to the hypothetical versions of the WLS theories too we should conclude that the contemplative prisoner is unhappy because it is the case that, if she were to form a judgment about her life as a whole, she would judge her life to be unsatisfying. This is because, if at a given moment the prisoner were to think about her life as a whole and her ideals, she would report that her life is not matching up very well to her ideals. In this case then, the hypothetical versions too fail to fit the intuition that the contemplative prisoner is happy.

To sum up, the previous case shows that a prisoner can be happy at a time even if she is not actually making any judgments about her whole life at that time. This is a major problem for the actualist versions of the WLS theories. Moreover, a prisoner can be happy even if it is

true that, if she were to form a judgment about her life as a whole, it would not be a favourable judgment. This is a major problem for the hypothetical versions of the WLS theories.¹⁰⁸

4.5.2 Arbitrariness of Subjects' Judgments

The second objection to WLS theories is based on the idea that our judgments about life satisfaction can be influenced by the perspective from which we look at our lives. Whether we are satisfied with our lives depends on how we look at them. This means that it is quite improbable that there is a unique perspective from which we should assess our own lives (Haybron, 2008, pp. 95-99). We all look at our lives from different perspectives and our judgments can be different depending on the perspective we have chosen.

In order to see how this poses a problem for the WLS theories, let us consider an example. Suppose that Sarah is a mother of two girls, who has been imprisoned for theft. She has been sentenced to two years of imprisonment and she must share her cell with two other mothers, Dorothy, a 40 year old woman with a drug problem who is doing a life sentence and Emma, a 41 year old woman with a three-month sentence.

After several months in prison, Sarah realises that her attitude towards life alternates between two extremes. Some days Sarah thinks about her life in relation to her unlucky fellow inmate Dorothy, who has a drug problem and who will serve a life sentence. In this case, Sarah feels lucky and she is satisfied with her life. Even if she is in prison and she cannot see her daughters for two years, she knows that Dorothy will never be free and she also has a serious drug problem. Other times, Sarah compares herself to Emma, who will be soon free. In this case, Sarah considers her next two years in prison away from her daughters and her family. She

¹⁰⁸ This objection is similar to Feldman arguments against actualism and hypotheticalism in the contemplative philosopher example (Feldman, 2010, pp. 157-159).

feels depressed, lonely and deeply dissatisfied and unhappy with her life.

Because Sarah looks at her life from the different perspectives, her attitudes and judgments about her life change all the time. She, therefore, judges herself to be both happy and unhappy depending on the way she is looking at her life. The problem is that whether Sarah is happy cannot change as quickly as the judgments she makes about her life. It is more plausible to think that happiness is a fairly stable and deep state of a person. This is why it does not seem like one's judgments about one's life satisfaction can be happiness-constituting. These judgments just seem to be arbitrary to play that role given how easily they can change depending on the perspectives one adopts.

4.6 Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter was to consider whether Whole Life Satisfaction Theories can help us to understand what happiness consists of in prisons. It was worth spending a whole chapter on these views of happiness because it initially seemed like the WLS theories' conclusions about how happy different prisoners are fit with our general intuitions about the happiness of prisoners: prisoners are often expected to be unhappy or less happy than other people. This fits the way in which all the three different versions of WLS theories suggest that a person in prison is likely to be unhappy.

This view also seems to be supported by the empirical studies done in prisons. Much of the empirical research suggests that prisoners are mostly dissatisfied with their life in prisons. They miss their previous lives and their families, they are highly depressed and anxious, and they stop planning their lives and start living day by day. Therefore, it seemed that subjective well-being researchers and WLS theorists look both at subjects' judgments and feelings to establish how happy people are.

However, we found out that certain trivial features of prisons can influence and distort the subjects' judgment about their own subjective well-being. The concern here is that our judgments about life satisfaction cannot be happiness-constituting because it is not plausible to think that how happy we are could be influenced by equally trivial things. By discussing the WLS theories and the data from empirical studies in prisons we, therefore, learned that the main problem of these theories in assessing prisoners' happiness is the reliability of the prisoner's judgments.

Finally, with the "contemplative prisoner" example, I have shown that a prisoner can be happy overall at a time even if she is not actually making any judgments about her life as a whole at that time. Moreover, a prisoner can even be happy even if it is true that, if she were to form a judgment about her life as a whole at that time, it would not be a favourable judgment. This is why both the actualist and hypotheticalist versions of WLS theories fail.

With Sarah's example, I, in addition, showed that a person can also fail to be happy even if she judges that she is satisfied with her life as a whole. This is because a person can become satisfied with her life by adopting a new perspective even when things in her life are not going well for her. This is why life satisfaction judgments are too arbitrary to be happiness-constituting even from the subjective point of view. Therefore, from these two examples, we learned that life satisfaction theories of happiness fail to lead to plausible conclusions about prisoners' happiness and so they cannot tell us of what happiness in prisons consists.

Chapter V

Emotional State Theory

Introduction

This chapter will explore Daniel Haybron's Emotional State theory of happiness and how it would apply to the happiness of prisoners. The main aim will be to evaluate whether this theory can offer us a more plausible way of thinking about the prisoners' happiness than the previous alternatives. At first sight, Haybron's theory seems to lead to plausible conclusions about prisoners' happiness because the consequences of his view seem to fit well with the results of the empirical studies done in prisons. However, I will show that Haybron's theory also leads to implausible conclusions about the prisoners' happiness in certain cases. I will attempt to argue that the emotional state theory is unlikely to give an accurate account on prisoners' happiness because the dispositional element of Haybron's theory appears to be too problematic in the evaluation of prisoners' happiness.

This chapter will start with section 5.1, which outlines the emotional states theories generally. Section 5.2 will be focused on Haybron's emotional state theory. Very roughly, Haybron believes that being happy is mainly a matter of having both certain emotions which he calls 'central affective states' and dispositions to have certain moods. Because of this, I will spend section 5.2.1 on Haybron's distinction between peripheral affective states, which are not happiness-constituting and central affective states, which are happiness-constituting. I will then also explain in section 5.2.2 how he understands mood propensities in terms of dispositions to experience moods.

Sections 5.3 and 5.4 will briefly compare the emotional state theory with the two theories already discussed in this thesis, namely Hedonism and the Whole Life Satisfaction

Theories of happiness. According to Haybron, these theories of happiness fail to take into account how deeply happiness is ingrained in our psychological make-up whereas he believes that his Emotional State Theory can capture the way in which happiness is a matter of a person's psychological condition as a whole.

Section 5.5 will then look at the results of the empirical studies done in prisons to see how easily the empirical studies and their results can be understood in Haybron's framework. At first sight, it seems that emotional state theory fits well with the data from the relevant empirical studies. We might think that prisoners are likely to be unhappy because their emotional condition tends to be negative overall. Furthermore, if prisoners adapt to their condition and return to their positive emotional states, they are likely to be happier.

However, in the last two sections, I will argue that Haybron's theory leads to wrong conclusions about the evaluation of prisoners' happiness at least in two types of cases. In section 5.6.1, I will argue against Haybron by showing that a prisoner's disposition to experience positive moods must be also manifested for her to be happy. Then, in section 5.6.2, I will explain how prisoners' disposition to experience positive affective states is usually manifested when prisoners take part in certain activities. I will argue that, because of this, in addition to what central affective states and mood propensities we have, also how successfully prisoners take part in certain activities can make a difference to how happy they are. In the end, I will conclude that Haybron is right in giving a fundamental role to emotional states in understanding the happiness of prisoners. I will, therefore, accept the main elements of Haybron's theory of happiness but I will also supplement these elements with an Aristotelian framework. In the next two chapters, I will suggest that happiness in prisons consists of the subject's emotions, sociality and deliberation (chap. VII).

5. 1 Emotional State Theory

Very generally, many psychologists have thought that happiness is an emotion. In their studies, they have found evidence of the fact that many cultures have a category of emotions that corresponds to happiness.¹⁰⁹ On this basis, psychologists often consider happiness and joy to be one of the basic emotions. Other basic emotions include anger, sadness, fear, surprise and the like. So, the idea that happiness is a kind of an emotion or an affective state is widespread, especially among psychologists (Sizer, 2010, pp. 141-144).¹¹⁰

However, philosophers who accept that emotions play an important part in understanding happiness tend to think that happiness is a broad and lasting aspect of the individual state of mind rather than a specific emotion itself. In particular, according to the affective state theory, happiness is a certain positive mood state (or thymic state¹¹¹): a state that is not about anything in particular (Brülde, 2007, p. 18). Happiness in this deeper psychological sense is distinguished from the emotion or mood of feeling happy. Thus, on this view, it is coherent to think that someone is happy even if they are not feeling happy.

As Sumner suggests, happiness in this sense consists of an affective state but this state is not toward an intentional object – it is not about anything. Happiness is rather a “mood of optimism” which gives you a rosy view of your life and of the world in general. This feeling can range from a state of pure contentment to an intense state of euphoria that gives you the conviction that your life is perfect, that things in your life could not be better. A person in this emotional state feels happy about her life in general. The opposites of this mood are feelings of unhappiness or depression. According to the emotional state theories generally then, as long a

¹⁰⁹ See Ekman and Friesen (1971) and Ekman (1994) for studies on emotional categories.

¹¹⁰ See Sizer (2010) for an explanation of “basic emotions.” Sizer’s explanation is based on studies about emotion theory of Ekman (1992a), Ortony and Turner (1990), and Ekman’s reply (1992b).

¹¹¹ Haybron suggests the Greek word thymos to refer to the emotional state which constitutes happiness according to him (Haybron, 2001b).

person's mood is positive she is happy and when the person's mood is negative she is unhappy (Sumner, 1996, p. 144).

5.2 Haybron's Emotional State Theory

The most interesting version of the emotional state theory is Daniel Haybron's recent account. Haybron developed his theory in a series of articles which culminated in the book *The Pursuit of Unhappiness* (Haybron, 2008).¹¹² According to Haybron, a person's happiness is a function of both her emotional states and her mood propensities. More specifically, Haybron's emotional state theory takes a person's level of happiness to consist of her overall psychological condition which has two main elements. First of all, this condition is made up of the core affective states. Some affective states (such as sensory pleasures) are too peripheral and so they do not play any role with respect to how happy we are. However, there are also *central* affective states, such as moods and emotions that can play a happiness-constituting role.

These central affective states contribute to our happiness because of their intensity and centrality. One of the most important features of these states is their dispositionality. Central affective states dispose the individual to respond emotionally to the events of her life in different ways. Haybron calls a person's disposition to respond emotionally to the world *psychic affirmation* (Haybron, 2008, p. 127). Furthermore, according to him, happiness consists of an individual's emotional stance toward her life: to be happy is to respond emotionally to one's life as if it were going well for one.¹¹³ By positive responses, Haybron means stances of attunement, engagement and endorsement. Basically, a person is in a stance of attunement when

¹¹² Haybron's elaborations of his emotional state theory can be found in several texts. For the purposes of this chapter, I have chosen to concentrate on his most recent presentation of it in his manuscript *The Pursuit of Unhappiness* (2008). However, he has also defended the theory in "On Being Happy or Unhappy" (2005) and in many other papers cited in this chapter.

¹¹³ At first sight, Haybron's theory seems very similar to the affective version of WLS. However, I will explain how they differ later on in this chapter.

she feels like “*being at home*” in her life, she is in a stance of engagement when her emotions move from depression to exuberance, and finally the endorsement response has to do with joyful and cheerful feelings. These three aspects of one’s happiness will be explored more in the next subsection.

To sum up, according to Haybron’s account to be happy is (i) to have a positive emotional stance toward life (which involves the stances of attunement, engagement and endorsement), (ii) to have only few negative affective states and (iii) to have positive mood propensities (Haybron, 2008, p. 147). In other words, the emotional state theory does not consider happiness to consist of an emotion or a mood but rather of a psychological condition which has two main elements: positive emotions and a disposition to experience positive moods. In order to better understand Haybron’s theory, these two elements will be explained in the next two subsections.

5.2.1 Central Affective States

According to Haybron, positive affective states are one central constituent of happiness. To establish just which affective states are happiness-constituting, Haybron sets up a crucial distinction between *central* and *peripheral* affective states. This distinction is based on whether a given affective state is an element of one’s emotional condition. Certain affective states, like physical pains and pleasures, do not seem to be emotional in any significant way. This is because they do not make any difference to our emotional condition: *they do not get to us* (Haybron, 2005, p. 299). For example, if I eat a cracker, I will probably be pleased by this. However, the pleasure given by eating a cracker does not make me any happier. If we think about this example in prisons, this means that, if a prisoner was depressed before eating the cracker, she will be still depressed after it even if she feels pleased about it. Therefore, there are

affective states which make no difference to how happy we are.

In contrast, others affective states, such as moods, do seem to modify our emotional condition. According to Haybron, central affective states are more important than the peripheral states as constituents of happiness because they are a deeper element of a person's psychological make-up – they can touch our “soul” or self.¹¹⁴ Central affective states can be distinguished from the peripheral affective states on the basis of five features:

(i) *Central affective states are productive.* The central states are not only things that happen to us, like the peripheral states. This is because they also have an additional important feature which the peripheral states lack. The central affective states are closely connected to our dispositions to experience other affective states.¹¹⁵ They generate other affective states, causing various psychological changes in us. For example, a depressed person can frequently burst into tears, even after a good day. According to Haybron, such a disposition to experience other affective states is one of the main elements of the central affective states (Haybron, 2005, p. 300).

(ii) *Central affective states are persistent.* They remain the same for a while and usually, but not always, for a long time. Someone who is joyful after having heard some good news usually has this attitude for a longer time.

(iii) *Central states are pervasive.* They tend to pervade the whole of our consciousness. They extend throughout our consciousness, colouring the whole as a blue wash can colour the whole

¹¹⁴ Haybron uses also the word Psyche to mean the place in us that central affective state can reach.

¹¹⁵ I will discuss the dispositional element of happiness (mood propensity) in the next sub-section of this chapter.

of a canvas¹¹⁶ (Haybron, 2008, p. 131).

(iv) *Central affective states are profound.* They are somehow deep in us; they seem to reach our soul. The profundity of the central affective states is what we mean when we talk about something “getting to us”. Central affective states can change the person herself; they can “get to you”, “bring you down”, “lift you up” and “move you” (Haybron, 2008, p. 131).

(v) *Central affective states constitute a mood-state.* They can in a way be considered to be moods. According to Haybron, central affective states can also be a central part of personality traits. For instance, being depressed or joyful, exuberant or melancholic, elated or anxious are all examples of central affective mood states. Thus, there are depressive, anxious, serene, cheerful, and happy personalities but not annoyed or amused personalities. Central affective states seem to be able to change who we are as persons (Haybron, 2005, p. 301).

To sum up, Haybron distinguishes between affective states that are *central* or psychologically deep and affective states that are *peripheral* or superficial. Peripheral affective states, due to their psychologically superficial nature, cannot be happiness-constituting, whereas the central affective states, being emotions that can reach our psyche in deep, are happiness-constituting states (Haybron, 2005, pp. 288-290).

The main idea so far has been that when a person reacts to the events in her life with the central affective states she can come to have a positive and lasting psychological condition that is happiness-constituting. Haybron calls this condition the state of *psychic affirmation or flourishing* (Haybron, 2008, pp. 111-112). He then goes on to give a detailed description of the

¹¹⁶ Hurka uses this metaphor (2011, p. 19).

kind of deep positive emotional responses we can have towards the events in our lives. He argues that there are three basic modes of both affirmative and negative responses. For each of the three modes of response, we can identify a corresponding aspect or a dimension of happiness. These modes are: Endorsement, Engagement, and Attunement.

The endorsement aspect of happiness is related to the feeling of happiness and cheerfulness. One example of a positive experience of this kind is the joy we have when we achieve a goal or when we meet a friend we have not seen for a while. The endorsement aspect can be called the “smiley-face” aspect because we tend to wear it on our face, in smile, laugh, frowns, tears and so on. This sort of happiness can be had also by a child (Haybron, 2008, p. 113).

The engagement aspect of happiness refers to the individual’s engagement with her life. Reactions related to this aspect of happiness are exuberance and enthusiasm. For example, a demanding conductor might be exuberant and even happy without being cheerful.¹¹⁷

Finally, Haybron thinks that attunement is the most interesting mode of response. The attunement reflects the tranquillity of a person. It can be identified with the condition of psychologically being at home in one’s life, with being settled. In this condition, an individual feels that he is in the right place, he feels familiar and comfortable with himself. The attunement of a person can be thought to reflect her psychic flourishing. Thus, Haybron suggests that attunement too can be considered to be one of the cores of happiness (Haybron, 2008, pp. 111-122).¹¹⁸

Summing up, Haybron identifies three dimensions of happiness, each reflecting a different emotional response to one’s life. They are the endorsement which varies between joy

¹¹⁷ Haybron gives this example to explain the engagement aspect of happiness (Haybron, 2008, p. 114).

¹¹⁸ For the purpose of this paper I will not examine deeper these aspect of Haybron theory. See Haybron’s references in the bibliography for an extensive study of it.

and sadness, the engagement which goes from exuberance to listlessness, and the attunement which is a state of peace of mind rather than anxiety. Therefore, happiness according to this view is an individual's emotional or psychic stance toward her life. It consists of "being in a good mood", which is the opposite of "being depressed".

5.2.2 Mood Propensities

So far, I have explained how Haybron claims that happiness consists of one's *psychic affirmation* constituted by the central affective states. However, according to him, happiness is a deep psychological condition and it also appears to involve something more stable and continuous than merely being in the central positive affective states at a given time. Because of this, Haybron claims that happiness does not consist merely of being often in a positive mood but rather a happy person must also be *prone* to experience such moods.

This is why, according to Haybron, happiness consists not just of the agent's central affective states at a time but also of her dispositions to experience positive moods in the immediate future. Haybron calls such dispositions *mood propensities*. For example, suppose that a prisoner has a high level of anxiety during the first months of incarceration.¹¹⁹ One day he receives a visit from his daughter who has not seen him for a while. On that day, the prisoner will be probably less anxious. However, he still is in a state of anxiety. Another example of this is a situation in which we see grieving family members laughing with old friends at a funeral. We do not think that their unhappiness has completely lifted because a deeper unhappiness remains here too (Haybron, 2005, pp. 304-305).¹²⁰

Mood propensities have three main features. First of all, mood propensities are distinct

¹¹⁹ We will see that these kinds of bad moods are frequent in prisoners in section 5.4 of this chapter.

¹²⁰ Haybron gives this and other examples to explain mood propensity (Haybron, 2005, pp. 304-05).

from an individual's personality, which has more to do with how the agent emotionally reacts to various circumstances. Personality is also usually called the person's *temperament*, which is more related to the nature of a person than her moods. Instead, mood propensities can vary over time. Second, mood propensities are *generalized*, which means that they are not object-specific. They are not dispositions to experience positive moods only in response to a particular object or event.

Finally, not all mood propensities seem relevant for how happy an agent is. One example of this is according to Haybron a tendency for being irritable brought on by a chronic pain in one's toe (Haybron, 2005, p. 306). This means that happiness does not involve all mood propensities but rather only one's emotional mood propensities. Thus, the mood propensities count only when they reflect one's emotional condition. The happiness-constituting mood propensities must be strictly linked to our emotional states (Haybron, 2005, p. 306).

5.3 Emotion vs. Pleasure

In his book, Haybron argues that his account of happiness based on moods and emotions can overcome the problems of Hedonism and Life Satisfaction theories. In this section and in the next one, I will briefly discuss why he thinks that this is the case. I will begin from the problems of the Hedonists theories of happiness.

At first sight, Haybron's emotional state theory might seem very similar to hedonism. However, Haybron shows that his emotional state theory differs from hedonism at least in two important respects. Firstly, Haybron thinks that Hedonism takes into account only the experiential aspect of our emotional make-up (Haybron, 2001b, pp. 505-506). For hedonists, happiness consists merely of experiences of pleasure, but it is more appealing to think that the emotional condition that is happiness-constituting includes more than merely experiences of

pleasure. For example, the mood of being anxious consists of more than merely having a simple experience of displeasure. To be in an anxious mood is a kind of a disposition. We can be anxious even when we have pleasurable experiences. Our emotional lives are more complicated and richer than their experiential aspects. Because of this, happiness has a depth to it which hedonism fails to capture (Haybron, 2008, pp. 65-69).

Haybron also believes that hedonism is too inclusive: it considers all pleasures and displeasures to be happiness-constituting. He then claims that many pleasures are trivial which is why they make no difference to how happy we are. For example, if a person has a lollypop or a hot chocolate, she has a pleasurable experience, but this pleasurable experience is unlikely to make a difference to how happy that person is (Haybron, 2005, pp. 297-298).¹²¹

To sum up, the emotional state theory differs from hedonism in two aspects. It is more restrictive because it excludes superficial pleasures that are not related to our emotions and it is more expansive because it also includes also the dispositional components of our emotional condition.

5.4 Emotion vs. Life Satisfaction

The Whole Life Satisfaction views identified happiness with a person's global judgment about her own life as a whole (ch. 4). However, these subjective judgments seemed to be too unstable and arbitrary to determine how happy a person is. This objection was very much based on Haybron's work. According to Haybron, the most important source of arbitrariness is the perspectival character of life satisfaction attitude (section 4.4.2). In short, our judgments can change on the basis of the perspective we use for assessing our life and, for this reason, they are arbitrary (Haybron, 2005, pp. 291-297).

¹²¹ For a discussion of this problem encountered by hedonists' theories see sections 3.4.1 and 3.8 of this thesis.

Haybron has argued, however, that emotional state theories do not suffer from the same problem of arbitrariness. Let us return to the earlier example which was first discussed in the section 5.5.2. In this example, Sarah, an imprisoned woman, realises that her attitude towards her life alternates between two extremes. On some days, Sarah thinks about her own life by comparing it to her unlucky fellow inmate Dorothy. In this case, she feels satisfied and happy with her life. But, other times, Sarah thinks of her life by comparing it to Emma's life. Emma will be released soon and for this reason, Sarah feels unhappy and dissatisfied with her life when she thinks about Emma. Because Sarah considers her life from the different perspectives at different moments, her attitudes towards her life and her judgments about her life change frequently. Her judgments are thus unstable.

According to Haybron, the emotional state theory is not vulnerable to this objection. The problem, in this case, is not that Sarah is emotionally volatile but that her judgments are not consistent. If Sarah is sometimes more cheerful when she compares her life to Dorothy's life, this does not necessarily mean that Sarah is happy. Her mood propensities, which are a happiness-constituting element of her psychology, are not affected by her change of perspective. Therefore, when Sarah looks at her life from another perspective, this does not mean that Sarah is not depressed anymore or that her mood propensity has changed. Changes in perspective do not affect our mood propensities, because mood propensities are more stable than judgments.

5.5 Emotional States and Prisoners

In the previous two chapters, I explained how Hedonists and WLS theories of happiness fit the empirical studies conducted in prisons. In the next two subsections sections, I will explain how well Haybron's theory fits with the results of the empirical studies and what conclusions

Haybron's theory will be able to draw about prisoners' happiness on the basis of them.

Happiness is often understood in a psychological way in the empirical literature. As explained in the whole life satisfaction chapter, psychologists and sociologists are interested in studying and measuring people's level of subjective well-being, which they also believe constitutes happiness (see sec. 4.3). In particular, scientists who work on subjective well-being investigate people's behaviours and personality traits when they analyse and measure subjective well-being. They take subjective well-being to consist of experiencing high levels of pleasant emotions and low levels of negative emotions, and of high life satisfaction. As we saw earlier, subjective well-being is often understood in terms of a person's cognitive and affective evaluation of her life as a whole. These evaluations can include emotional reactions to events as well as cognitive judgments of satisfaction and fulfilment of one's life (Snyder & Lopez, 2009, p. 187). Therefore, subjective well-being, as it is understood by many psychologists, seems to fit well with how happiness is understood by the whole life satisfaction theories.

However, there is also reason to believe that subjective well-being, as it is understood by many social scientists and psychologists, has at least some similarities with Haybron's theory of happiness. After all, subjective well-being is claimed at least in part to consist of the balance of positive affect (the presence of pleasant emotions such as joy and contentment) and negative affect (the absence of unpleasant emotion such as fear, anger and sadness). According to many researchers, a happy person is someone who is frequently cheerful, only occasionally sad, and generally satisfied with his or her life (see, for example, Biswas-Diener, Diener, & Tamir, 2004, p. 19). Therefore, some proponents of subjective well-being measures think of well-being in this subjective sense as a mental state (Angner, 2010, p. 363). David Mayer, for example, clearly states that social scientists take subjective well-being to be a state of mind (Myers, 1992, pp. 23-27). Similarly, Ed Diener suggests that in order to measure subjective well-being, it is

appropriate to examine how a person feels about her life relative to her own standards (Diener & Suh, 1997, p. 191).

However, even if SWB scientists take happiness to consist of a balance of positive and negative affects and emotions, happiness in the SWB literature is not identical with what Haybron thinks happiness consists. In his discussion of the SWB measures, Haybron points out that the measures of life satisfaction and the self-reports of affects common in the SWB studies miss out on some important emotional aspects of happiness such as boredom and anxiety. This is because these kind of affective states are more ‘elusive’ than others in the sense that they are difficult to discern with subjective introspection. While many strong emotional reactions are easy to recognise because they are usually intense and related to a specific object, elusive affects have no specific object or location. For example, the feeling of being elated about a new job or the strong pain in a toe are kinds of mental states easy to discern. In contrast, all the mood-related emotions such as feeling uneasy in general, about nothing in particular, are difficult to recall even if they still play a role in our happiness. Thus, it seems that when we make an evaluative judgment about how happy we are, we can easily miss out the elusive affective states. This seems to suggest that our judgments about how happy we are sometimes miss certain elements, namely our moods and mood-like states, which play a role in our happiness (Haybron, 2008, pp. 202-204).¹²²

To sum up, subjective well-being has been understood in three main ways in social sciences. Firstly, there are social scientists who understand subjective well-being in terms of affective states (moods and emotions). According to them, subjective well-being just is a certain kind of a mood or an emotional state. The more hedonistic versions of these theories, in contrast,

¹²² According to Haybron’s theory, moods and mood-like states are an essential part of our happiness. See sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 for why they are essential for happiness. For an extensive discussion about elusive affects see Haybron (2008, pp. 199-224).

consider certain kinds of pleasant experiences, such as pleasant moods, to be important elements of happiness (Brülde, 2007, p. 20). Secondly, there are also scientists who think that subjective well-being consists of cognitive states. They define subjective well-being as an overall evaluation of or a general attitude to one's life. Finally, there are furthermore scientists who appear to adopt hybrid views which argue that subjective well-being consists of a combination of affective and/or cognitive states (Angner, 2010, pp. 363-364, Alexandrova, 2008, pp. 572-574).

5.5.1 Studies and Data from Prisons

Now hereafter, I will explore some empirical studies in prisons. Moreover, I will analyse whether Haybron's theory fits with empirical studies. Also, I will see whether these empirical studies' data support what Haybron would say about prisoners' happiness.

In order to evaluate the quality of life and well-being of prisoners, psychologists and sociologists have frequently analysed and measured prisoners' emotions. The most common methods used to measure prisoners' emotional states are again self-report surveys and questionnaires. Prisoners are usually interviewed and asked about their feelings and affects. To measure their level of anxiety and depression, prisoners are, for example, asked how they feel right now or how often they have felt anxiety in the last week or so. Scientists also observe prisoners' behaviour and how their behaviour changes during their time in prison. They, for instance, analysed how anxiety affects what prisoners do. Moreover, psychologists are often interested in the relation between life events and the prisoners' emotional responses to them during their time in prison, before imprisonment and after release.

One of the most interesting and broad studies on emotions done in prisons was carried out by Zamble and Porporino (Zamble & Porporino, 1990). They analysed prisoners' thoughts

and feelings over many years and in different prisons. After many cross-sectional studies, they came to the conclusion that inmates experienced high levels of negative emotional states such as depression and anxiety, especially during the first period of imprisonment. However, the results showed also sizable and systematic decreases in dysphoric moods and negative emotional states over time (Zamble, 1992, p. 416).¹²³

Many other studies carried out in prisons have reached similar conclusions. For example, the factorial study made by Pishkin and Thorne showed that the analysed group of prisoners showed high demoralization as manifested by affirmations of statements such as “I don’t know what to do with myself”, “life is unbearable”, “I am ashamed of my record”, “I hate myself”, “I am a failure”, and “I feel that life has passed me by” (Pishkin & Thorne, 1973). Adams also showed that prisoners experience high levels of feelings of emptiness and despair (Adams, 1992). The psychological effects of imprisonment have been studied also by Alison Liebling and Shadd Maruna. In a series of articles, these two authors showed that imprisonment causes frustration, anger and a sense of injustice in prisoners, again especially in the very early period of incarceration and after release (Liebling & Maruna, 2005).

From all the previous studies, we learn that prisoners have high levels of negative attitudes and emotional states. Fear, anxiety, demoralization, depression, sadness and loneliness are common especially in the very early period of incarceration. Moreover, all these studies reveal that many psychologists focus on emotions and moods when they investigate imprisonment, which fits nicely with Haybron’s theory.

Now, if we had to state how happy prisoners are likely to be whilst relying on Haybron’s emotional state theory to interpret the empirical data, we should conclude that prisoners tend to be unhappy. Haybron claims that happiness consists of positive core affective states and a

¹²³ See section 4.3 of previous chapter about data and empirical studies on prisoners’ happiness.

positive mood disposition. From the empirical data, we learn that prisoners tend to be generally sad and depressed. Therefore, it seems plausible to conclude that a prisoner will be likely to be unhappy in prison. Many people intuitively share this view. So, if we interpret the data from the empirical studies of prisoners with Haybron's theory of happiness, we seem to get intuitively right results. It is rather implausible to call a person happy if she has a high level of anxiety, sadness and depression like prisoners in the empirical studies and we have seen that all these negative emotional states are common especially in the early period of incarceration.

5.5.2 Adaptation in Prison

In the previous chapter, I described the adaptation process as our ability to adapt to positive and negative circumstances (Biswas-Diener, Diener & Tamir, 2004, pp. 21-22). In particular, prisoners seem to adapt to imprisonment emotionally too over time. Initially, prisoners seem to be overwhelmed by negative emotions and moods but, then, their negative emotional condition seems to improve. This improvement is due to their ability to adapt to the situation (Adams, 1992, pp. 282-284). In this case, prisoners adapt to imprisonment by using various coping mechanism to overcome the new difficult circumstances. For example, prisoners begin to make friends and spend time thinking about their release, their family and their future. So, through the adaptation process, prisoners are able to go back to their previous positive emotional levels.

Consequently, according to many psychologists, most prisoners usually have mainly positive emotions before they go to prison. Then, the prisoners' emotional level sharply drops in prison. After several months, prisoners adapt to the condition of imprisonment and their emotional level goes back up again (Adams, 1992, Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, 2009). So, if we look at the prisoners' happiness again through the lenses of Haybron's theory, we should conclude that prisoners are likely to be happy again after the adaptation process.

5.6 Objections to Emotional State Theory of Happiness

The previous sections have suggested that Haybron's view offers us a plausible account of prisoners' happiness. However, earlier in this chapter, I explained that for Haybron happiness is a psychological condition which consists not only of central affective states but also of mood propensities. These two elements make happiness a stable and deep emotional condition. However, adding the dispositional element to the theory of happiness can be problematic, especially in the context of prisons, or so I will argue next.

First, in the section 5.6.1, I will argue that two prisoners with the same affective states but with different mood dispositions can be equally happy when their mood propensities are not instantiated, which is a serious problem for Haybron's theory. Then, I will show that Haybron's theory faces also two additional problems when we think about the previous kind of cases. First, if we judge the two prisoners not to be equally happy as Haybron's view seems to be forced to do, we would violate the principle according to which happiness makes a difference in our inner life from our first-personal perspective. Second, if Haybron's view were right, this would also mean that people could be easily mistaken about their own happiness, which violates the attractive idea that we all know fairly reliably how happy we are.

After that, in section 5.6.2, I will argue that two prisoners with the same affective states and the same mood dispositions need not be equally happy whereas Haybron's view is committed to that. To show that Haybron's view is wrong, I will argue that a person's disposition to experience moods will usually be instantiated when the person takes part in certain activities. Therefore, if one prisoner is more successful than another in these activities, it is plausible to judge that former prisoner to be happier than the latter even if they have the same central affective states and mood dispositions.

5.6.1 Manifested Dispositions

In this first section, I will argue that in order for a person to be happy, her positive mood propensities must be manifested at least some of the time. This means that, if we take one person who has positive mood propensities and these propensities are not instantiated and another person who just lacks those propensities altogether, it is plausible to judge that these two people are equally happy. In contrast, Haybron's view would suggest that the person with the positive mood propensities would be happier than the other person in this situation.

Typically, a person with positive mood propensities is more likely to experience more positive moods and emotions than a person who lacks them. So, it is plausible to claim that the person with positive mood propensities tends to be happier than a person who lacks such propensities. However, if a person's positive mood propensity is not instantiated because there is nothing that prompts her to experience the positive moods and emotions, it is plausible to judge this person to be as unhappy as a person who lacks this disposition. These two persons can be considered equally happy because their instantiated emotions are exactly the same.

To show that this is the case, I will present a fictional case in which two prisoners are exactly in the same circumstances and in which they also have the very same central affective states. The only difference between these two prisoners is that they have different dispositions to experience moods. One of them will be disposed to experience positive moods, whereas the other lacks this disposition.

As an illustration of this objection to Haybron's emotional state theory, let us consider Ann and Kate, who both have a lovely family and a good job. They share many leisure activities. We can stipulate that they both have the same central affective states and they are exactly in the same situation. However, Ann has the disposition to experience positive moods while Kate

lacks this disposition. For instance, when Ann sees flowers, she experiences a pleasant positive mood. In contrast, Kate does not have the disposition to experience positive moods. When she sees flowers, for example, she does not feel the additional positive feelings which Ann experiences. In this case, according to Haybron's emotional state theory, Ann is happier than Kate. Ann and Kate are in the same positive affective state but Ann has also a mood propensity to experience additional positive moods and, therefore, she is happier than Kate. This much seems to be intuitively plausible. Most of us would agree with Haybron's conclusion in this case.

Suppose now that Ann and Kate are arrested for fraud and they both are sentenced for two years. Ann and Kate go to prison at the same time and they spend their prison sentences in identical circumstances: both, for example, can spend time in the prison library and occasionally meet their families and friends. They both still also share the same central affective states.

However, there is one crucial difference between Ann and Kate: they still have different dispositions to experience positive moods. Ann has still her disposition to experience positive moods but, given the circumstances, this disposition is never manifested in prison. There is nothing in her environment that prompts her to experience the relevant additional positive moods. In contrast, Kate does not even have this disposition. So, when Kate is in the same situations in prison as Ann, she too does not experience positive moods.

In this case, Haybron would have to claim that Ann is at least slightly happier than Kate because Ann still has a disposition to experience positive moods while Kate lacks that disposition. However, they seem intuitively to be equally happy. This is because Ann's disposition to experience positive moods is not instantiated, and for this reason, even though Ann and Kate have different mood propensities, there is no difference between their actual emotional lives in the situation they are in. Consequently, it would be intuitively right to judge

Ann and Kate to be equally happy, rather than to judge Ann happier than Kate as Haybron's view would make us do.

This means that Haybron's view seems to lead to a wrong conclusion in this case. Moreover, in addition to the previous main objection, his theory faces two additional problems in this situation, which both can be illustrated with the previous example.

First additional problem: first-person accessibility

According to Haybron, the notion of happiness plays an important role in our lives and this can be explained by using four functions which happiness serves in our ordinary life (Haybron, 2008, pp. 50-52). First, we tend to think about happiness when we are making choices and important decisions in our lives. We usually choose the options that make us happier. For example, when we have to decide what career we want to pursue, we think about which job will make us happiest. Second, we think about happiness also when we evaluate our own lives or other people's lives and how well they are going.

Third, happiness seems to be a lasting psychological condition. So, a happy person usually stays happy for some time. Happiness does not vanish - it seems to last for a while. For this reason, your happy mood can influence your life in many ways. For example, when you are happy, you react to the events of your life in a different way. Finally, happiness can explain our emotions and behaviours. We can explain a person's joyful behaviour with the fact that she is happy. For example, we could say that a person is smiling because she is just happy. Summing up, according to Haybron, we are interested in happiness because it has an important role when we deliberate, evaluate, predict and explain (Haybron, 2008, pp. 50-52).

Furthermore, Haybron considers happiness to be a lasting and deep state of mind (Haybron, 2008, pp. 29-31). Happiness involves positive mental states like joyfulness, elation,

exuberance, and cheerfulness. In contrast, unhappiness includes negative mental states such as depression, melancholy, anxiety, worries, loneliness, and emptiness.

It then seems clear that Haybron's general description of happiness leads to the following conclusion: if a person is either happy or unhappy, this will make a difference to how her life looks like to her from her own first-personal perspective. For instance, if you are melancholic and sad, you will have a blue vision of your life. In contrast, if you are in a joyful and cheerful mental state, your life will appear positive to you – you will be wearing the metaphorical rose-tinted glasses. So, happiness makes a difference to your inner life and especially to how you experience your life from your own first-personal perspective; it colours your internal life. Happiness makes a difference to what life looks like to you from the inside.

This leads to a problem, which we can again illustrate with the example of Ann and Kate who are in the same central affective states. Let us suppose that while they are in prison they are both equally sad and depressed, they feel miserable and they do not experience any positive moods. There is nothing in this case that can distinguish between the emotional lives of Ann and Kate as they experience them from their own first-personal perspectives. After all, they experience exactly the same emotions and moods. Ann is not any more joyful or cheerful than Kate. Moreover, the prison environment does not trigger any positive moods or emotions in Ann either. Although Ann would potentially experience more positive emotions than Kate in the right kind of situations because she has the disposition to experience positive moods, there is no actual difference in Ann's and Kate's emotions in the situation they are in. They have the same inner life and so their lives look exactly the same to them from the inside.

In this situation, Haybron's theory would lead to the conclusion that Ann is happier than Kate because she has an additional disposition to experience positive moods which makes her happier than Kate according to the theory. But, in this case, this means that Haybron's theory

violates the highly attractive thought explained above: happiness has to make a difference to what life looks like to us from the inside. To put this simply, Haybron's view entails that Ann is happier than Kate even if their lives seem exactly alike from their first-person perspectives. This means that Haybron's theory is committed to an aspect of happiness that doesn't make a difference to what life looks like to us from our own perspectives and yet it just doesn't seem like happiness could have such an aspect.

Given that Haybron himself seems to accept the idea that happiness must make a difference to our lives from our first person perspectives (considering the role which he thinks that happiness plays in our lives), then there is a threat that his view is also inconsistent. He seems to think that happiness makes a difference to what our lives look like from our own perspectives and yet his view is committed to an aspect of happiness which doesn't make such a difference as illustrated by the previous case. In that case, Haybron's view has the consequence that Ann is happier than Kate even if their lives are exactly alike from their own first personal perspectives. This means that Haybron must either give up the idea that happiness makes a difference to what our lives seems like to us from the inside or give up the dispositional element of his view. He can't hold onto both. Because the idea that happiness does make a difference to our lives is so attractive, he should rather drop the idea that mood propensities are a constitutive element of happiness.

Second additional problem: First-person authority

The individuals' epistemic authority over how happy they are is at the base of the view discussed in Mill's *On Liberty* (Mill, 1991). Mill's view on this issue is not only relevant for political thought but it is also important when we consider personal well-being and happiness.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ See, for example, Sumner's welfare hedonism (1996). For a discussion on the relation between hedonism and well-being see section 3.1.3 of this thesis.

Mill argues that individuals know how they are doing and what is good for them better than anyone else (Mill, 1991, p. 84). According to Mill, giving people the freedom to make their own decisions has the best consequences for everyone overall for a variety of reasons. Moreover, Mill also claims that people are the best and most reliable judges of their own feelings, circumstances and happiness (Mill, 1991, p. 84). Many people believe that Mill's view of the individuals' epistemic authority in this context is plausible. It fits with our individual sovereignty and seems to avoid any concerns of paternalism.¹²⁵

A person's own assessment is usually a reliable way of knowing how happy that person is. Now, it may seem like Haybron's theory of happiness too can nicely explain why we have the ability to know how happy we are. After all, individuals are able to detect how they feel; they know what kind of emotions and moods they have. Furthermore, most people are easily able to answer questions about their own feelings and happiness in surveys given that only few people respond "don't know" to the relevant questions. This shows that people are confident that they know how they feel (Layard, 2005, pp. 12-13). If our overall emotional condition is one of the main elements of happiness, then it is easy to see why we can reliably judge how happy we are ourselves.

Individuals' own assessments of their own happiness are the basis of the subjectivist approaches to the assessment of happiness. As a matter of fact, psychological and sociological studies on happiness tend to rely on individuals' own assessments of their happiness (Myers & Diener, 1996 pp. 70-72). For example, the overwhelming majority of work on subjective well-being has been based on self-report assessments of emotional states. One widespread subjective

¹²⁵ For an even better source for first person authority over happiness see Feldman's book *What is This Thing Called Happiness?* (2010, p. 221). Feldman himself is against this principle. See also Telfer (1980, pp. 8-9) and Sumner (1996, p. 123). Haybron discusses (and also rejects) the principle of epistemic authority. Haybron calls it the 'principle of Personal Authority' (Haybron, 2008, p. 13).

well-being measure is Bradburn's Affect Balance Scale (1969) which separately measures "positive" and "negative" affects. The respondent is asked whether, in the past few weeks, she experienced a series of 10 feelings such as being "depressed or very unhappy". According to many scientists, individuals' assessment of their own feelings and emotions is a crucial and seemingly reliable feature in evaluating individuals' affective states (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999, pp. 137-140).

Let us then return to the case of Ann and Kate in the light of the appealing principle explained above according to which we have first personal epistemic authority over how happy we are. Ann and Kate have the same experiences and the same affective states. So, they are in the same situation and their lives look exactly the same from their own first-personal perspectives. Because of this, they would rate themselves at the same level in the Bradburn's Affective Balance Scale. Thus, if Ann and Kate were to consider how happy they are, they would come to the same conclusions. However, Ann's positive mood propensities are not instantiated in this situation, but she still has these dispositions whereas Kate lacks them.

As we saw above, Haybron is committed to saying in this situation that Ann is happier than Kate because of her additional positive mood propensities. This means that, if Ann and Kate in this situation came to the same conclusions about how happy they are as they probably would, one of them would be mistaken about their own happiness. This means that Haybron's theory leads to a problem: it makes certain facts about how happy we are unknowable to us from our own first-personal perspectives. On Haybron's view, mood propensities are an important element of happiness, but the problem is that we have no simple way of knowing what mood propensities we have unless these propensities are instantiated. However, it seems implausible to think that we would not know ourselves how happy we are given that we do know fairly well how we feel and how happy we are. We are reliable judges of our own lives

and we do have the ability to be aware of how happy we are.

In response to the previous objection, Haybron could argue that serious errors in the self-assessment of affective states can be possible. People do make mistakes about their past and present affective states. As a consequence, individuals' ability to assess their happiness and, in particular, their affective states, is less reliable than we think.¹²⁶ In his paper "Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall," Haybron considers "affective ignorance" in a discussion about the reliability of individuals' assessment of their affective states (Haybron, 2007a, p. 396). According to him, there can be two forms of affective ignorance: ignorance about our past affects and ignorance about the present affects. Basically, Haybron thinks that people are not reliable judges of their own affective states and he assumes that people can be mistaken about their affective states because of the influence of affective ignorance on their judgments (Haybron, 2007a, pp. 394-428).

From the response that Haybron could give to the previous objection we learn that, Haybron could say that Ann's assessment of her present affective states is mistaken. Haybron admits that we make this kind of mistake often. In this situation, it would not be a problem for his view that Ann is happier than Kate even if she isn't able to know this. Moreover, Haybron's discussion on affective ignorance confirms the fact that individuals' assessments of their own happiness are not always reliable especially in a condition of imprisonment, as I showed in section 4.4 of the previous chapter.¹²⁷ However, Haybron's suggestion about Ann and Kate's happiness does not seem to fit our first intuition about the two prisoners' happiness. Ann and Kate have the same experiences and the same affective states. If we were to judge how happy

¹²⁶ I showed in chapter four, section 4.4, that methods of measurement of subjective well-being cannot be totally reliable. I also showed that subjects' judgments and assessments can be influenced by trivial objects.

¹²⁷ In the section 4.4 of the previous chapter, I showed that subjects' assessment of their own happiness can be influenced by trivial objects and adaptation in prison. This in turns shows that empirical studies are not so reliable in the circumstances of imprisonment.

they are, we would intuitively say that they are equally happy. From their perspective, Anna and Kate would judge themselves equally happy. Therefore, Anna and Kate intuition match with our intuition about their happiness. This means that affective ignorance does not apply here. Ann and Kate seem to be right when they judge their own happiness by saying that they are equally happy. They have epistemic authority over their own happiness.

In conclusion, on the basis of this objection, we should not accept Haybron's view because of what it entails about the happiness of the two prisoners discussed above. The dispositional element of Haybron's emotional state theory is problematic when we analyse prisoners' happiness; it makes Ann happier than Kate, which just isn't the case. We can thus conclude from this case that, in order to be happiness-constituting, the relevant mood dispositions must be at least some of the time manifested.

5.6.2 Dispositions and Activities

In this section, I will discuss a case of two prisoners who share the same central affective states and the same mood propensities. However, this time, one prisoner's disposition to experience positive moods will be instantiated, while the other prisoner's disposition will not be. In this case, Haybron's theory entails that these individuals would be equally happy because they both have the same central affective states and the same mood propensities. I will argue against this conclusion by claiming that in this case there is a reason to conclude that one of the prisoners is happier than the other. I will argue that two people with the same affective states and the same emotional dispositions are not necessarily equally happy when the relevant mood propensities are manifested differently. Moreover, I will suggest that our disposition to experience affective states tend to be manifested when we take part in certain activities. Therefore, if a person takes part more successfully in the activities that make her mood-

disposition manifested, it is plausible to judge that person to be happier than someone whose positive mood-dispositions are not manifested.

Let us suppose that there are again two prisoners: Tom and John. They share the same cell and they can spend the same amount of time outside their cells and with their families and friends, and so on. Finally, they have the same cheerful and joyful affective states and the same mood-propensities to experience positive moods. Tom and John attend an educational course in prison but John is more successful than Tom. John gets slightly higher marks than Tom. Moreover, when John gets a higher mark, his emotional dispositions become manifested = he enjoys his good results. On these occasions, John experiences joy and pleasure. In contrast, Tom's disposition – the same one which John has – is not manifested because Tom is less successful than John in his studies. However, we are still assuming that Tom has the same core affective states as John and also the same mood-propensities as John to experience positive moods.

Now, in this case, if we must judge how happy Tom and John are, we would say that intuitively Tom is slightly less happy than John. However, if we accepted Haybron's emotional state theory, we should say that Tom and John are equally happy because they have the same emotional dispositions to experience positive moods and also the same core affective states. Their fundamental psychological conditions are thus the same and, therefore, they are equally happy according to Haybron's view. However, it seems intuitively implausible to judge Tom and John to be equally happy in the previous case. So, here too Haybron's view seems to have implausible consequences.

Haybron claims that mood dispositions are closely connected to the circumstances in which a person is (Haybron, 2008, pp. 131-132). A mood disposition is a deep general psychological feature of a person which is not related to any specific object (Haybron, 2010,

pp. 19-31). Moreover, the previous example shows how the manifestation of our mood dispositions is often related to the circumstances we are in. However, the problem in the previous case is that the manifestation of John's mood propensity leads us to judge that John is slightly happier than Tom. The only difference between Tom and John in the previous case is that Tom's disposition to experience positive moods is not instantiated whereas John's is. Tom is less successful than John in the activities which make him feel good. In contrast, John seems to be happier because he is in a situation that allows him to take successfully part in the activities in which his positive mood-propensities are manifested.

According to Haybron, both emotions (central affective states) and dispositions (mood propensities) are happiness-constituting. However, it seems more plausible that, even if happiness consists at least in part of central affective states and mood propensities, the latter dispositions must be manifested at least some of the time. So, it seems that Haybron's view is right in giving a fundamental role to emotions in our happiness but his view misses an important aspect: our taking part in those activities that allow our dispositions to be manifested.

In conclusion, when we analyse prisoners' happiness in terms of their patterns of emotions through the examples of the two previous sub-sections, we should conclude that the emotional state theory is unable to evaluate the happiness of prisoners correctly. However, the emotional state theory is right in saying that happiness is at least in part a matter of emotional states and even dispositions, but we need to also acknowledge that dispositions must be at least on some occasions be manifested in order to be happiness-constituting.

5.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed whether Daniel Haybron's Emotional State Theory can give us a plausible way of understanding how happy prisoners are. Haybron understands happiness as a

deep psychological condition. He identifies happiness with a person's overall emotional condition. However, Haybron does not think that happiness is just an emotion or a mood, but rather it consists in his view of having a favourable response, in emotional terms, to one's life. This psychological condition consists of central affective states and mood propensities.

Haybron's emotional state theory seems very similar to the theory of subjective well-being in the empirical literature and it leads to similar conclusions about prisoners' happiness. If we interpret the data from the empirical studies about the prisoners' emotions through the lenses of Haybron's view, we can reach the conclusion that prisoners are likely to be unhappy in the beginning of their prison sentences and then happier when they adapt to imprisonment. This is because prisoners' emotional condition turns back to positive after the adaptation process.

However, I argued that the dispositional element of Haybron's theory makes his theory vulnerable to two objections. First, I argued that even if emotions (central affective states) and dispositions (mood propensities) are happiness-constituting, the latter dispositions must at least on some occasions be manifested. I have shown that the two prisoners, Ann and Kate, who have the same central affective states but different mood dispositions, would be equally happy when Ann's additional positive mood-disposition is not instantiated in prison. In contrast, Haybron's view would entail that Ann is happier than Kate just because Ann is also disposed to experience positive moods.

Moreover, with Tom and John's example, I showed that John, who is more successful in certain activities where his dispositions to experience positive moods are manifested, can be considered to be happier than Tom. Tom's affective states and mood-dispositions are the same as John's but Tom is less successful in the activities that enable Tom's dispositions to be manifested. In contrast, Haybron's view entails that these two prisoners would need to be

considered to be equally happy because they are in the same psychological condition. So, I argued that two persons with the same affective states and the same mood propensities need not be equally happy if the other person's mood propensity is not manifested.

Furthermore, I suggested that mood propensities are often manifested when we successfully take part in certain activities which make us happy. This suggests that when we evaluate the happiness of prisoners, we should consider not only their emotions but also the relevant activities which enable the relevant positive mood dispositions to be manifested.

I, therefore, conclude that Haybron's view is right in giving a fundamental role to emotions in our happiness but it does not sufficiently recognise how important it is that we take part in those activities that make us happy. Therefore, the most interesting thing we learn from my two examples about prisoners is that mood dispositions and emotions in prisons are related to the circumstances in which a prisoner is. So, in order to say what happiness consists of in prison, it does matter what prisoners are doing in prison.

Part III

Happiness as *Eudaimonia*

Chapter VI

Aristotle's Theory of *Eudaimonia*

Introduction

The previous three chapters have argued that the traditional theories of happiness fail to evaluate prisoners' happiness correctly. If we understand happiness in terms of pleasure, life satisfaction or emotional states, we will end up drawing implausible conclusions about how happy different prisoners are. Happiness for these theories is a matter of feelings, attitudes, judgments and emotions and so these theories fail to take into account the external circumstances of the prisoners in the right way.¹²⁸ Because of this, I decided to turn my attention towards those theories that evaluate happiness in terms of how well life is going for the person who is living it. In particular, I decided to explore one of the oldest theories of happiness: Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*.¹²⁹ This chapter will be entirely about Aristotle's Theory of *Eudaimonia* and its interpretation.

In order to understand Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*, in the first preliminary section, I will give an overview of Aristotle's ethics. I will introduce a rough characterisation of what happiness consists in according to Aristotle. For him, being happy requires exhibiting excellence in the activities that can be considered to be characteristic for human beings as a species.

In section 6.1.1 I will describe Aristotle's view of the human nature and in section 6.1.2

¹²⁸ The theories I discussed so far are clearly aiming at theories of happiness in the psychological sense and not in the well-being sense. Of course hedonists, whole life satisfaction theorists, and emotional theorists do not deny that external circumstances affect how happy people are. However, according to them, the external circumstances affect happiness only indirectly by first affecting the psychological states. The argument I am making here is that the external circumstances, and especially what activities prisoners are able to take part in, should also be considered to affect the happiness of individuals more directly without the mediation of the psychological states.

¹²⁹ *Eudaimonia* is a Greek word commonly translated as "happiness", "well-being" or "human flourishing". When Aristotle talks about *eudaimonia*, he is referring to living well and doing well rather than to a mental state or a feeling. Hereafter, I will use the *eudaimonia* as a synonym for happiness. Elisabeth Anscombe refers for the first time to human flourishing in her paper *Modern Moral Philosophy* (Anscombe, 1958, p. 18).

I will explain the so-called “function argument.” Aristotle claims that men are *by nature political animals*. For him, human beings have to live a life according to their nature by developing their proper function (*ergon*) in their city (*polis*). Very roughly, according to Aristotle, if human beings live a life well by fulfilling their proper function, they will live a good life. Human beings who live the good life will be *eudaimon* (happy). This means that *eudaimonia* (happiness) is directly related to the good life.

For this reason, I will spend the section 6.2 of this chapter on the good life. I will discuss Aristotle’s distinction between the political and theoretical life, which he made in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹³⁰ After this, I will outline the dominant and inclusive interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of *eudaimonia* in section 6.3. According to some commentators, in book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claims that *eudaimonia* consists of only one final good which is theoretical wisdom, and so living well and doing well consists of living a life of contemplation. This view is called the “dominant” interpretation. However, according to those who defend the “inclusive” view, in the book I, Aristotle says that *eudaimonia* consists of a sum of different goods. They think that the good life consists of a practical life that involves all the virtues which are considered to be means to the ultimate good. In particular, I will focus on Richard Kraut’s dominant interpretation in section 6.3.1 and the objections to it in section 6.3.2. I will similarly focus on Ackrill’s inclusive interpretation in section 6.3.3 and the objections to it in section 6.3.4. I will focus my attention on these two philosophers because they are the best representatives of these interpretations. In both cases, I will attempt to argue that these views fail to provide a plausible interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of *eudaimonia*.

Finally, in the last section 6.3.5, I will develop my own interpretation of Aristotle’s

¹³⁰ Aristotle, like all classical philosophers, did not distinguish the social and political spheres of human life. This distinction is typically modern, especially after Machiavelli and Hobbes. I will, therefore, use political and social life hereafter as meaning one and the same thing.

theory of *eudaimonia*. The main aim of this section will be to show that Aristotle puts forward only one theory of *eudaimonia* in his *Nicomachean Ethics* that is between the dominant and inclusive interpretations. I will argue that *eudaimonia* consists of a life that involves the exercise of both practical and theoretical virtues. I will then explain how this interpretation is supported by what Aristotle says in Books I and X of *Nicomachean Ethics* and also why it is independently philosophically plausible too.

6.1 Introduction to Aristotle's Ethics

Aristotle composed many of his works between 335 and 323 BC in Athens. According to many scholars, his writings can be divided into two main groups: the "exoteric" and the "esoteric" Works. Most see this as a distinction between the works which Aristotle intended for the public (*exoteric*), and the more technical works intended to be used at his *lyceum*¹³¹ (*esoteric*) (Barnes, 1995, p. 12).

Due to the influence of his teacher Plato, Aristotle wrote many dialogues but only fragments of these have survived.¹³² The most important works that have survived are in a treatise form and were not, probably, intended for widespread publication. They are generally thought to have been lecture aids for his students. His most important treatises include *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, *Nicomachean Ethics (NE)*, *Eudemian Ethics (EE)*, *Politics (Pol.)*, *De Anima (On the Soul)* and *Poetics*. These books are all included among the esoteric works (Barnes, 1995, p. 12).

Three of these treatises are especially important in the study of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*. These are the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Politics*. There is an

¹³¹ Aristotle called his school Lyceum to distinguish it from Plato's Academia.

¹³² In Aristotle's philosophy is commonly renowned a platonic period, however, as Plato believed, Aristotle's thought become soon original. The autonomy of Aristotle from his teacher can be broadly found in his works on ethics and politics.

interesting connection between the first two books. The *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter ‘*NE*’) contains ten books, and the *Eudemian Ethics* (hereafter ‘*EE*’) eight books, but they share their central books. The books V-VII of *NE* are the same as the books IV-VI of *EE*. The most obvious explanation of these shared books is that the *EE* represents an earlier course on ethics which Aristotle later revised and extended into the *NE* without making many changes to those books (Bostock, 2000, p. 1). These two works investigate the same topics: they begin with a discussion of *eudaimonia* (“happiness” or “flourishing”) and then examine the nature of *aretê* (“virtue” or “excellence”) and the character traits which human beings need in order to live a good life. These books together with *Politics* form the core of the Aristotelian ethics.

Aristotle considers ethics to be a practical rather than a theoretical study. According to him, one must aim at becoming good and doing well rather than just at knowing for its own sake what is good (*NE* 1103b26-36). Ethics must be used for living well and therefore the principal concern of ethics is human well-being. Aristotle, like Socrates and Plato, takes virtues to be central to a well-lived life. But, Aristotle thought that being a good person is more about doing the right actions and not just about knowing which actions are the right ones to do. Aristotle wants to provide an account of how a good person should live, and how the society should be structured in order to make such lives possible (Kraut, 2016).

Therefore, ethics and politics are two interconnected areas of investigation. Aristotle considers ethics to be at least in part a matter of the community (*polis*) to which the individuals belong (like an eye belongs to the human body). The aim of the city is not just to avoid injustice or to ensure economic stability, but rather to enable at least some citizens¹³³ to live a good life and to perform noble acts. About the relation between politics and ethics Aristotle writes that:

¹³³ We should remember that Aristotle does not consider everyone to be citizens. According to him, only free men can be citizens. For example, slaves are not citizens. For Aristotle, if a man is not a citizen, he will not be a man (*Politics*, 1260a 10). For a critical comments about Aristotle’s distinction among men, women and slaves, see for example, J. K. Ward, ‘Aristotle on Physis: Human Nature in the Ethics and Politics’ (2005).

“The end of politics is the best of ends, and the main concern of politics is to engender a certain character in the citizens and to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions” (*NE* 1099b30). This claim is supported by Aristotle’s views about the human nature and its relation to the polis, which I am going to explain in the next section.

6.1.1 Human Nature in Aristotle’s *Ethics* and *Politics*

Aristotle’s explanation of what *eudaimonia* consists of is strictly related to his idea of human nature. To understand Aristotle’s notion of human nature, we need to analyse Aristotle’s distinction between potentiality and actuality. In *Metaphysics Z*, Aristotle discusses the distinction between matter and form. He first applies this distinction to an individual substance at a particular time, and then, he applies this distinction across time.¹³⁴ The distinction between matter and form is based on the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality. Potentiality is what a thing is capable of doing. For example, the seed of a plant in the soil is potentially (*dynamei*) a plant because it will become one. In contrast, the actuality (*entelecheia*) is the end of the potentiality. Referring to the previous example, actuality is when the seed has become a plant that does the activities that plants typically do (*Metaphysics*, 1043a10–30). This is an aspect of Aristotle’s theory of the four causes and specifically of his theory of formal causes (*eidōs*, which Aristotle says is *energeia*) and final causes (*telos*).

In *Physics* II 3 and *Metaphysics* V 2, Aristotle offers his account of the four causes. This account applies to everything in nature that requires an explanation. In the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle claims that we can have knowledge of something only when we have grasped its cause (*APost.* 71b9–11, *APost.* 94a20). Again, in the *Physics*, he states that we do not have knowledge

¹³⁴ The matter of a substance is the material it is composed of; the form is how the material of a substance is put together so that the whole it constitutes can allow to the substance to perform its characteristic functions. For a discussion of Aristotle’s notion of substance see Block (1978), Bostock (1996), Cohen (1984), Fine (1994) and Lewis (2009).

of a thing until we have grasped its why, that is to say, its cause (*Phys.* 194b17–20). Aristotle recognizes four types of causes that can be given in explaining an object. For example, to have knowledge of a table we need to have knowledge of the following four causes:

- (i) the material cause (“that out of which”, e.g., the wood of a table);
- (ii) the formal cause (“the form”, “the account of what-it-is-to-be”, e.g., the shape of a table);
- (iii) the efficient cause (“the primary source of the change or rest”, e.g., the artisan who has art of wood-casting the table, the man who gives advice, the teacher of the scholar); and
- (iv) the final cause (“the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done”, e.g., health is the end of walking, losing weight, purging, drugs, and surgical tools).

As we can see from this last example, Aristotle thinks that an object can be the end of many other things (e.g. health is the end of walking, losing weight, etc.). However, all the four types of causes may come into the explanation of something (*Metaphysics* 983a30-b1, 1013b25-27; *Physics* 198b4-9).

In analysing the account of the four causes, we can see that Aristotle offers a *teleological* explanation of the production of an object. Aristotle thinks that there is *teleology* in nature, which means that everything has got its own purpose or function (*ergon*). At the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says that everything in nature, including men, aims at some good (*NE* 1094a1-7). For instance, people aim to have friends, to experience pleasure, to be healthy, and so on. However, according to Aristotle, there is only one good in people’s life that is pursued for its own sake; it is desirable for itself. This good is *eudaimonia* (happiness). Aristotle claims that *eudaimonia* is the highest good that human beings can achieve with their actions in everyday life (*NE* 1095a14-20). People can achieve *eudaimonia*, according to Aristotle, by fully realizing their natures, by actualizing to the highest degree their human capacities (*NE* 1098a12-18). It is the state in which their potentialities as human beings have

been actualised.

Aristotle made some of the most famous and influential statements about the human nature in his *Politics*. He claimed that human beings are *by nature political animals* (*Pol.* 1253a2-3). By this, he meant that a human being is an animal with an innate propensity to develop communities that are more complex than families. Moreover, human beings must live in a proper society (polis) in order to exercise the activity that is specific to their species. People must live in a polis to be considered a complete human being because only there they can be free to act as a human being by nature. Again, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle wrote “*man is a civic being, one whose nature is to live with others*” (*NE* 1169b16-22) and “*Hence, it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity*” (*Pol.* 1253a2-3). From Aristotle’s words we learn that human actions are determined by nature to produce a disposition to engage socially, culturally, and politically with others in a form of a society. It is only by engaging in social and political activities and relationships that humans achieve their natural development (Annas, 1996, p. 736).¹³⁵

However, the natural development of humans is one in which they achieve virtue that is a matter of developing a disposition to choose and act rightly in the communities by using reason. According to Aristotle, it is part of the human nature that human beings can become virtuous, but they do not do so unless their actions are determined by rational and informed decisions (*NE* 1105a27-1105b5). As a matter of fact, the citizens of Aristotle’s ideal state are individuals who choose and act using their rational ability. Moreover, a state whose citizens act virtuously will be just and will aim at the common good rather than the good of one individual.

¹³⁵ In my interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of *eudaimonia*, I will refer to his idea of humans as civic being to explain how sociality is a fundamental element of happiness. In sections 7.1.2, 7.2.2 and 7.3.2 I will explain how sociality is needed for understanding happiness in prisons.

This means that individuals and communities will aim at the same thing (*Pol.* 1253a2-3).

In determining what *eudaimonia* consists of, Aristotle makes a crucial appeal to human nature and to its capacity to use reason which distinguishes human beings as a species. He thinks that we can identify the proper human function (*ergon*) in terms of reason, which then provides ample grounds for characterizing the happy life as involving centrally the exercise of reason in practical and theoretical domains (*NE* 1097b24-1098a7). Happiness turns out to be an activity of the rational soul, conducted in accordance with virtue or excellence, or, in what comes to the same thing - rational activity executed excellently (*NE* 1098a15–17). This claim is supported and explained by Aristotle's function argument, which I am going to explain in the next section.

6.1.2 The Function Argument

When Aristotle considers what the good life is supposed to be like, he suggests that we can only answer this question by focusing on what human beings are for (or, in other words, what is their function) (*NE* 1097b22–1098a20, Kraut, 2016).¹³⁶ If we do have a purpose as a part of our nature, then surely the good life will be the life in which that purpose is fulfilled to the greatest extent possible. For example, just as being a good flute player will consist of playing the flute well, so being a good human being will consist of doing well whatever human beings are supposed to do and of performing our function well.

According to Aristotle, the purpose of human beings cannot merely be to be alive or to have different sensations. This is because plants and animals too carry out these very same activities. If human beings have a function, it must be uniquely ours. That is, our function must

¹³⁶ See Whiting (1988) and Lawrence (2005) for a recent discussion of Aristotle's function argument. See Bostock (2000, pp. 15-21) and Hughes (2001, pp. 36-37) for a general explanation of the function argument in Aristotle's Ethics

be the performance of an activity that only we can carry out. According to Aristotle, there is only one possible option of what the unique function could be. It must be the use of reason because rationality alone distinguishes us from animal and plants. Humans have “*logos*” which is the ability to use reason and to explain our reasoning in words. The reason (*logos*) is a faculty of a particular part of our psyche (*soul*) (*NE* 1102a26-32).

Aristotle thinks that every living being has a *soul*.¹³⁷ He then draws a distinction between different parts of the soul. The part of the soul which is shared by all kinds of living beings is “the nutritive”, which is correlated with three main activities: being nourished by food, growth and reproduction (*De Anima*, ii 4 415a24–25). The parts of soul that distinguishes animals from plants are called “the perceptive” and “the locomotive” (*De Anima*, ii 2 413b4–7). All animals have at least some kind of perceptions even if some animals have only the most primitive perceptions based on touch and smell, and all animals can move from one place to another. Finally, “the thinking soul” is the part of the soul that only human beings have (*De Anima* ii 3, 414b18; iii 3, 429a6–8).¹³⁸

According to Aristotle, the soul of human beings has two main parts: a rational part and a non-rational one (*NE* 1102a26-32). The rational part is the source of the intellectual faculty. It is that part of the soul which consists of the faculty of reasoning. The rational part is the part of our soul which is entirely responsible for the reasoning we do. It is the mental faculty which enables us to deliberate and choose the right thing to do. The rational part consists of the intellectual virtue (reasoning).

The non-rational part of the soul may be subdivided into two parts; one which contains merely the physical appetites (such as nutrition and the like) and one which has some things in common with reason. The latter part is capable of both opposing reason and obeying it (*NE*

¹³⁷ For Aristotle, living beings include also plants in addition to animals and human beings (*NE* 1102a1103a).

¹³⁸ References to Aristotle’s theory of the soul can be found in Bostock, (2000, p. 18).

1102a13-1103a1). This part contains desires and emotions. Because in human beings these attitudes can obey reason, this part of the soul is also unique to human beings. The virtues of this second subpart are the virtues of character: courage, generosity, and so on. The virtues of character occur through habit. This means that we acquire them by exercising them taking part in certain activities. For example, we become kind by practising acts of kindness. Instead, intellectual virtue is attained by teaching (Crisp, 2000).

Therefore, when Aristotle claims that the function of human beings is to use the rational part of the soul, he includes both parts of the soul under this view – the reason or the thinking soul itself and also the emotions and desires that are sensitive to reason. Thus, if *eudaimonia* is the activity of the rational part of the soul, it will involve both parts of the human soul: the rational part and the sub-part of the non-rational part that can obey reason.¹³⁹

As we can see from this digression, the function argument is very much based on Aristotle's view of the soul. It provides the foundation for the rest of Aristotle's ethics even if its interpretation is quite controversial. The main problem with this argument is based on the contrast between a factual description of the world and a set of claims about good and bad. As Jennifer Whiting famously explains, a description about how things are does not by itself give an account of how things ought to be (Whiting, 1988, pp. 34-36). For instance, we can observe that an action causes pain and suffering. In order to be able to say that such actions are good or bad, we need to explain why pain and suffering would be bad, why they ought not to happen. And yet, it looks like whatever we can observe about the world just gives us factual information rather than knowledge of what is good or bad.

However, according to Aristotle, there is no way to describe how things are without

¹³⁹ The explanation of the soul in Aristotle is crucial for a correct interpretation of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*. In section 6.3.5, I will present my interpretation of Aristotle's view and I will refer to his idea of the soul to explain why emotions and desire are also a fundamental element of *eudaimonia*. See also sections 7.1.3, 7.2.3. and 7.3.3 of next chapter for an analysis of emotions as a constituent of happiness in prisons.

using evaluative concepts like purpose and function. His basic metaphysical concepts already thus imply evaluative judgments. That is to say, factual descriptions of how things are in the world imply evaluative facts in Aristotle's framework. Aristotle thought that saying what a cat is involves saying something about what a good cat would be like and this is true also of us as human beings (Whiting, 1988, pp. 34-36).

Let us then return to the idea that *eudaimonia* consists of activities in which we use our reason – in which we are rational beings. Rationality can be either practical or theoretical. Practical rationality is the ability to confront each situation as it comes and to choose the right course of action in every case. Aristotle also claims that rational and hence virtuous (in the sense of being excellent) action lies always in the middle between two extremes (*NE* 1106a26-b28). Therefore, human beings act virtuously when they react with their desires, emotions and actions to the circumstances they face not too much or too little, but just the right amount. For instance, courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice, generosity is the mean between stinginess and prodigality, and so on. This view of virtue is known as Aristotle's theory of the mean.¹⁴⁰

We can then ask how we can become virtuous human beings. As we have already seen, Aristotle thinks that people who do not live in a society are unable to become virtuous.¹⁴¹ This is ultimately because, according to Aristotle, virtue is achieved by habituation. On this view, virtue requires being able to use reason to perceive the situation you are in correctly so that you can act successfully in it. The difference between the virtuous excellent human beings and the vicious defective human beings is then largely the result of training. The virtuous agents have

¹⁴⁰ See J. O. Urmson for a recent explanation of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean (Urmson, 1980, pp. 157-170).

¹⁴¹ This Aristotelian argument about sociality became interesting when we analyse happiness in prison. The idea that sociality is a fundamental element of happiness in prisons will offer an argument for the necessary engagement of prisoners in social activities in order to enhance their well-being and their chances for rehabilitation. Moreover, the necessity to guarantee a social life in prisons will offer an argument against the harm caused by the deprivation of social life for isolated prisoners.

experience and training that helps them to understand the situation they are in and to react to it appropriately.

The virtuous human being thus chooses the excellent course of actions which is the mean between the extremes as a matter of course, whereas the vicious human being is confused and chooses the wrong things. Virtue is something which allows us to achieve our own personal excellence. This makes virtue worth having because virtue makes us the best human beings we can be. The virtuous life in turn is the best life we can live. This is the main topic throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics* which I am going to discuss more in depth in the next sections.

6.2 The Good Life

As we have seen, Aristotle thinks that the aim of politics is to secure the good of the whole community, whereas the aim of ethics is to determine what counts as a good life for an individual. He thinks that each of us must know how best to organize our own lives and which actions are right or wrong in a good life. This section will be entirely spent on Aristotle's account of the good life. This is because according to Aristotle the good life is the life which allows people to reach happiness. By analysing the different kind of lives that Aristotle discusses in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, this section will introduce the concept of *eudaimonia* in Aristotle's ethics.

Aristotle starts the *Nicomachean Ethics* by claiming that everyone agrees on what the ultimate end is to be called, namely *eudaimonia*, but he observes that people have different opinions of what it consists of (*NE* 1095a17-22). Aristotle begins with the observation that there are three main traditional views of what *eudaimonia* is: namely, (i) the life of pleasure, (ii) the life of politics, and (iii) the life of contemplation (*NE* 1095b14-19). He quickly dismisses the life of pleasure as fit only for animals because it is devoted only to bodily pleasures (*NE*

1095b19-22). He discusses political life in more detail and he also connects the political life with virtues (*arête*). The goal of political life is honour. However, he dismisses this kind of life because honour depends more on those who confer honour than on the person who receives it. In the political life, happiness would therefore depend too much on the opinion of others (*NE* 1095b22-1096a2).

After this, Aristotle introduces the theoretical life of contemplation, which he discusses more thoroughly only in the later parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE* 1096a2-5). In chapters 6-8 of book X, Aristotle returns to the good life. Here he argues that a political life can still be considered to be a contender for what good life consists of but he also introduces in detail the life of contemplation (*theoria*) which appears to constitute the best life for human beings (Bostock, 2000, pp. 11-14, Rorty, 1980, pp. 378-380).

However, in Book I, Aristotle admits that the discussion of the three kinds of lives was a digression and he goes back to his discussion of what *eudaimonia* is. For, in order to understand what the good life is, we first must know what *eudaimonia* consists of. At this point, Aristotle claims that *eudaimonia* is not an external good, nor a good of the body but a good of the soul, which is the highest kind of good (*NE* 1098b12-18). It involves actions and activities of the soul (*NE* 1098b18-20), which bring their own pleasure with them (*NE* 1099a7-21). At the same time, certain external and bodily goods are also necessary requirements for *eudaimonia*. One cannot have *eudaimonia* without some wealth, good looks, a good social status, friends and success in political activities (*NE* 1099a31-b8). Nevertheless, Aristotle says that a person who is *eudaimon* (happy) should not be identified with a person of good fortune because it is more important to cultivate the rational activity of the soul, which is something people can work at (*NE* 1099b18-28). Finally, he states that we have to accept Solon's dictum "*call no man eudaimon until he is dead*" (*NE* 1100a10-1101b9) because when one judges

someone *eudaimon* this is a judgment about his whole life (Bostock, 2000, pp. 11-14).

After this discussion of *eudaimonia*, Aristotle focuses on two further characteristics of *eudaimonia*. He says that there are two features of *eudaimonia* which everyone agrees on: it is the most complete end and it is also a self-sufficient end. With the first statement, he means that *eudaimonia* alone is always sought for its own sake and never for the sake of anything else. With the self-sufficiency, he means that *eudaimonia* is lacking in nothing and that it makes a life the most choiceworthy on its own: not merely good among other lives but such that no addition could make it any better. *Eudaimonia*, claims Aristotle, is then the only good that meets these conditions (*NE* 1097a25-1097b21).

Aristotle's conclusion about the nature of *eudaimonia* is that *eudaimonia* can be identified with *virtuous activity*.¹⁴² Living well consists in those lifelong activities which actualize the virtues of the rational part of the soul. At the same time, Aristotle makes it clear that in order to be happy one must possess other goods as well—such as the goods of friendship, wealth, and power. He claims that one's virtuous activity will be to some extent diminished or defective if one lacks an adequate supply of these other goods (*NE* 1153b17–19). Nonetheless, Aristotle insists that the highest good, virtuous activity, is not something that comes to us by chance. Although we must be fortunate enough to have parents and fellow citizens who help us to become virtuous, we ourselves share much of the responsibility for acquiring and exercising the virtues. All of this means that, for Aristotle, the good life turns out to be a virtuous life. However, Aristotle's discussion of what good life is has led to two quite different lines of interpretation of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*.

¹⁴² All usual versions of virtue ethics agree that living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for *eudaimonia* (Annas, 2006; Anscombe, 1958; Foot, 2001; Hursthouse, 1999; MacIntyre, 2007).

6.3 Interpretations of Aristotle's Theory of *Eudaimonia*

In this section, I will discuss different interpretations of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*. This section will be divided into five sub-sections. In the first section, I will outline the so-called dominant interpretation of Aristotle's theory. Very roughly, dominants think that *eudaimonia* consists of one good (namely, the exercise of one virtue). I will focus on Richard Kraut's dominant interpretation, which I believe to be the best one. He believes that Aristotle is an intellectualist throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics*. As a consequence, Kraut claims that according to Aristotle human good (*eudaimonia*) must consist of theoretical contemplation (Kraut, 1999, pp. 86-90). Kraut presents the most accurate and persuasive argument for this intellectualist view. However, in section 6.3.2 I will argue that his interpretation is not accurate. I will show that his account does not fit Aristotle's views about moral virtue and the role of practical reasoning in human life.

Then, I will discuss the so-called inclusive interpretations in section 6.3.3. Inclusivists, by contrast, believe that *eudaimonia* consists of a sum of many different goods. In this sub-section, I will focus on John L. Ackrill's reading of Aristotle, which is one of the best examples of this line of interpretation. Ackrill believes that *eudaimonia* is constituted by the sum of all human virtues, both moral and intellectual. However, in section 6.3.4 I will argue also against this interpretation by showing that the inclusive interpretation does not fit Aristotle's views about ends and the self-sufficiency of *eudaimonia*.

After this, I will offer my own interpretation in the last section 6.3.5. I will aim to show that Aristotle presents only one theory of *eudaimonia* that is "in between" the dominant and inclusive interpretations. I will argue that *eudaimonia* consists of contemplation and at the same time of practicing all of the virtue of character (practical wisdom). I will claim that the primacy of contemplation (*theōria*) as the highest human good is compatible and necessarily connected

with the practicing of practical wisdom (*phronesis*). Therefore, virtues of character are seen not as means to an end but as a harmonious part, together with the virtue of intellect, of the supreme human end, the *eudaimonia*.

I will then conclude by explaining how moral and intellectual virtues are thus both part of the perfect *eudaimonia*. Thus, the good life turns to be a life that involves many kinds of virtuous activities, both practical and theoretical virtues. This is because, as Aristotle would claim, a good (happy) life for human beings consists of the use of reason in all the human activities with the aim of becoming virtuous citizens of the *polis* (city). I will finally argue that, if we accept this interpretation of *eudaimonia*, then what Aristotle says about *eudaimonia* in Book I will be consistent with what he says about it in Book X of *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Before I get into the detailed discussion of the dominant interpretation, I will give a brief overview of the disagreement between the two interpretations. In order to see what the disagreement between the two different interpretations of Aristotle is, let us return to what Aristotle explicitly writes about *eudaimonia*. In Book I, Aristotle identifies *eudaimonia* with:

“The activity of the soul (*psiche*) in accordance with virtue (*aretē*), and if there is more than one virtue in accordance with the best and most complete (*teleia*)” (*NE* 1098a 15-20).

In Book X, Aristotle states that:

“if *eudaimonia* is activity of virtue, it is reasonable (that it should be) of the most superior (highest) virtue” (*NE* 1177a 12-14).

These statements about *eudaimonia* are at the centre of the debate between the two main interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of *eudaimonia*.

Since William F. R. Hardie published his paper “The Final Good in Aristotle’s Ethics” in 1965, the interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of *eudaimonia* have been classified into two main streams: the dominant and the inclusive (Hardie, 1965, p. 279). Hardie claims that an inclusive interpretation allows that one’s ultimate end may consist of a number of different

things, each pursued for its own sake. *Eudaimonia* thus appears to consist of the pursuit of many different goods. By contrast, a dominant interpretation selects one goal, namely contemplation, as the main goal and it rejects others, except in so far as they are seen as contributing to the main goal (Hardie, 1965, p. 279).¹⁴³

The debate about Aristotle's theory shows that commentators interpret Aristotle's theory of the ultimate end of human life in two ways. According to some interpreters, the reason for this are the inconsistencies between what Aristotle says in Book I and what he says in book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Hardie, 1979, p. 35). However, I think that my interpretation can avoid this apparent inconsistency, or so I will argue later. But, before I explain my own interpretation, I will describe the other two interpretations and show why the dominant and inclusive views are not good enough interpretations of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*.

6.3.1 Dominant Interpretation

Basically, the dominant interpreters think that *eudaimonia* consists exclusively of just one activity which is contemplation. According to their interpretation, Aristotle claims that contemplation is the only virtuous activity that is properly pursued for its own sake alone. In contrast, the ordinary moral virtues are less important - they are seen only as contributing to the main goal. They are in the service of contemplation and, therefore, they are pursued only for the sake of contemplation. Moreover, they are not even necessary for leading a happy life. Dominants think that Aristotle leaves no central role for the moral virtues – a happy life is purely a theoretical life (Liu, 2011, p. 58).

In a dominant interpretation, all the other functions, including the practical use of reason

¹⁴³ Some examples of inclusive interpretation are Ackrill (1980), Keyt (1978), Cooper (1987), Broadie (1991), Irwin (1991), Natali (2001), Liu (2010). Some representatives of dominant interpretation are Cooper (1975), Kenny (1978), Kraut (1989), Yu (2001), and Lear (2004).

in daily life, provide merely support for the highest form of activity. Virtuous activities other than contemplation are therefore not primary components of *eudaimonia*. This is explained by the fact that humans are the most complex species of animals whose unique characteristic is their capacity to transcend themselves and to become like gods in contemplation. Because of this capacity, human beings are capable of *eudaimonia*. In contrast, animals are incapable of *eudaimonia*, children have not achieved it, and even certain adults, such as slaves, are prevented from reaching it (*Pol.*, 1260a10). This is why according to the dominant interpretation *eudaimonia* can only be achieved through the contemplative activity.

Dominant interpreters believe that Aristotle gave the central role to contemplation in *eudaimonia*. This is because he explicitly claims that contemplation is the only activity always sought for its own sake in Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle does also claim that *eudaimonia* is an end always chosen for its own sake (*NE* 1176b1-7).

One of the best examples of the dominant interpretations is Richard Kraut's reading of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (Kraut, 1991, 1999). According to Kraut's reading of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle thought that the ideal life for human beings consists of engaging in theoretical activity on a regular basis (Kraut, 1999, p. 155). The more such activity a life contains, the better the life is. However, Kraut thinks that Aristotle believed that a life must have also many other goods in addition to contemplation. Even though *eudaimonia* consists of contemplation alone, it appears to be the highest of a large set of goods, each of which has their own role in promoting the philosophical life. Finally, according to Kraut, Aristotle suggests that the best a person can do for himself is to pursue each subordinate good to the extent that it contributes to his own perfect *eudaimonia*. This means that contemplation must be pursued without limit and all other goods should be promoted to the extent that they contribute to contemplation (Kraut, 1999, pp. 155-156).

The most interesting element of Kraut's interpretation is that *eudaimonia* consists solely of contemplation and all the other non-*eudaimonic* goods are chosen only to the extent that they instrumentally promote contemplation (Irwin, 1991, p. 384). This interpretation is interesting because it attempts to respond to an objection which is usually made to the dominant interpretation. This objection states that *eudaimonia* cannot be identified with contemplation alone because human beings cannot live a life that consists of solely contemplation. Human beings can indeed engage in contemplation over a period of time but they also must take part in political and social activities. This means that men can live a good life only if they live it in their community. Aristotle writes that "*man is a civic being, one whose nature is to live with others*" (NE 1169b16-22).

Kraut attempts to overcome this problem by saying that non-*eudaimonic* goods are also necessary features of the good life. They are part of the good life because they instrumentally promote contemplation. Kraut argues that such external goods are desirable for the sake of virtuous activity and that they, therefore, lack one characteristic of the highest good which is that the highest good is sought for its own sake only. For this reason, the external goods are imperfect and cannot be elements of *eudaimonia* even if they can be important means to it (Kraut, 1999, p. 83).

Furthermore, according to Kraut, Aristotle identifies *eudaimonia* with only one type of good in Book I, namely virtuous activity, which means that *eudaimonia* consists either of excellent theoretical activity or of excellent practical activity. But, in order to live our lives well, we should make one of these goods our ultimate end and all other goods should be sought for the sake of this highest goal. This idea is confirmed by what Aristotle argues in Book X. In book X 7-8, Aristotle claims that a life lived for the sake of philosophical activity is superior to one devoted to moral activity. Therefore, the best of the happy lives is that of a person who

regularly contemplates and chooses all other goods for the sake of contemplation. In contrast, the second best life is that of a person who regularly engages in political activity and pursues all other goods for the sake of that end (Kraut, 1999, p. 83).

In conclusion, according to Kraut, Aristotle never deviates from the idea that *eudaimonia* consists solely of one type of good: the virtuous activity of the rational soul. However, in Book I, Aristotle leaves unresolved the question of which kind of life is the most desirable. It is only in Book X that he tells us that the contemplative life is the best sort of life and the political life is merely a life worth living. Therefore, contemplation is perfect *eudaimonia* but at the same time, a life in accordance with the other virtues is happy “in a secondary degree” (1178a 7-9). With this interpretation, Kraut suggests that Aristotle claims that both philosophical and political lives are happy and well-lived, but that the philosophical life is the happiest. In other words, the best life that a human being can live is one that has contemplation as its ultimate end (Kraut, 1999, pp. 82-83).

6.3.2 Objection to Kraut’s Dominant Interpretation

In this sub-section, I will explain why Kraut’s interpretation fails and what makes it implausible. The main problem of his interpretation is that he considers the moral goods to be elements of the good life only to the extent that they promote contemplation. If this were true, then moral goods would be merely means to *eudaimonia* and not a constituent part of it. In particular, I will argue that we cannot consider moral virtues just as means to *eudaimonia*, as Kraut suggests. This is because moral virtues are not always pursued for the sake of *eudaimonia* but rather sometimes they are pursued for their own sake. Thus, they have intrinsic value which means that it is good for a person to have such virtues as such. Furthermore, when these goods (virtues) are pursued for their own sake, they should be considered to be a constituent part of our

eudaimonia and not merely a means to it.

Terence Irwin suggests that the difficulties of the dominant view can be explained in the following way (Irwin, 1991, pp. 383-384). Aristotle believed that we choose to do A only insofar as A is the best way to promote *eudaimonia*. So, if Aristotle identified *eudaimonia* with contemplation, it follows that all other goods are chosen only insofar as they promote contemplation, only as instrumental means to it. That is exactly what Kraut suggests. However, Aristotle believed that we choose many other goods (for example, moral virtue) for their own sake too and hence not only insofar as they are instrumental to something else (Irwin, 1991, p. 383). He thought that one's virtuous activity will be to some extent diminished or defective, if one lacks an adequate supply of other goods. For example, benefiting other people is an action pursued for its own sake but at the same time doing so contributes to our own *eudaimonia* because this is a virtuous activity. This example shows that we choose virtues of character, such as generosity, for their own sake. We do not choose this virtue of character because it is instrumental to other things but rather because to act from this character trait is an element of our *eudaimonia* (NE 1153b17–19).

Therefore, Kraut's dominant interpretation conflicts with Aristotle's own theory of virtues. This is because according to Kraut's interpretation all virtues are pursued for the sake of contemplation and not for their own sake. Instead, we should accept Aristotle's own view and think that virtuous activities have their own intrinsic value which is why we should take part in them. Also, it seems intuitively plausible that we ought to help other people for their own sake and not merely because this helps us to contemplate.

6.3.3 Inclusive Interpretation

According to the inclusivists, *eudaimonia* consists of the sum of all the goods which are pursued

for their own sake. As a result, these goods are all parts of the supremely happy life – they are all ingredients of a happy life. Inclusivists claim that, when Aristotle writes that happiness is “*virtuous activity of the soul, and if there are more than one virtue, of the best and most complete virtue*” (NE 1098a15-20), he simply means by “*the best and most complete virtue*” the virtue that is constituted by the sum of all the human virtues, moral and intellectual (Liu, 2011, p. 58).

According to an inclusive view, *eudaimonia* is thus constituted by many different activities. Contemplation is therefore only one of these activities which together make up our ultimate end. *Eudaimonia* involves not only the activity of the theoretical intellect but many different kinds of human actions and goods which are compatible with moral virtue. To sum up, the inclusive interpretation thus claims that one’s ultimate end in one’s life can include a number of different things each pursued for its own sake.

There are many different versions of inclusive interpretations but one of the best examples is J. L. Ackrill’s view on which I am going to focus here (Ackrill, 1980). In his paper “Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*”¹⁴⁴ Ackrill claims that *eudaimonia* consists of a sum of worthwhile things and activities, each of which is desired for its own sake. According to Ackrill, *eudaimonia* is the most desirable sort of life; it is the life that contains all intrinsically worthwhile activities (Ackrill, 1980, pp. 20-21).

Akrill thinks that his interpretation is supported by what Aristotle suggests in the last sentence of chapter one of Book I. In Book I, Aristotle characterises *eudaimonia* as a self-sufficient end which means that *eudaimonia* makes human life desirable and lacking in nothing

¹⁴⁴ For another interesting interpretation see David Keyt and his paper “Intellectualism in Aristotle” (1978). Keyt presents a different inclusive approach partially agreeing with the interpretation given by Ackrill about the expression “most complete” as a combination of all virtues. However, his interpretation differs from Ackrill’s view. He defines his interpretation as the superstructure view which states that one should seek to immortalize oneself (contemplating) but only within the bounds of the practical wisdom or moral virtue. I partially agree with Keyt’s conclusion even if I do not totally follow him in the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory.

(NE 1097b8-12). According to Ackrill, *eudaimonia*, being absolutely final and self-sufficient, is more desirable than anything else because it includes everything desirable in itself. Ackrill gives an example to explain his interpretation. He states that:

eudaimonia is best and better than everything else, not in the way that bacon is better than eggs and tomatoes (and the best of the three to choose), but in the way that bacon, eggs and tomatoes is a better breakfast than either bacon or eggs or tomatoes (Ackrill, 1980, pp. 21-22).

Thus, when Aristotle says that *eudaimonia* is the most final end, he means that it is never sought for the sake of anything else because it includes all final ends in itself.

Finally, according to Ackrill, when Aristotle says that A is for the sake of B, he does not mean that A is a means to B but rather that A contributes as a constituent to B, which is what he means when he says that good actions are done for the sake of *eudaimonia*. Consequently, Aristotle does not argue in Book I that *eudaimonia* consists of a single type of activity, *theoria*, as he does in Book X.

6.3.4 Objection to Ackrill's Inclusive Interpretation

In this section, I will explain why I think that Ackrill's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia* is implausible. My objection to Ackrill's interpretation is based on his reading of the predicate "*the best and most complete*", which I show is incorrect.

As we noticed earlier, Aristotle gives two 'definitions'¹⁴⁵ of what *eudaimonia* consists of in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: one in the Book I, which I quoted above (NE 1098a16-18),¹⁴⁶ and another in Book X, which states that *eudaimonia* is "*an activity of the soul in accordance*

¹⁴⁵ According to Hardie, we cannot call "definition" the statement about *eudaimonia* in Book I of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* because a definition does not usually incorporate disjunctive alternative as this statement does (Hardie, 1979, p. 35).

¹⁴⁶ "The activity of the soul (*psiche*) in accordance with virtue (*aretē*), and if there is more than one virtue in accordance with the best and most complete (*teleia*)" (NE 1098a 15-20).

with the highest virtue” (NE 1177a12-18). The last part of the latter statement is usually considered by the interpreters to be the same as the part “*best and most final virtue*” in the former statement (Hardie, 1979, p. 39).¹⁴⁷ I will now argue that Ackrill’s argument is mainly based on the wrong rejection of this identification.

As we saw above, Ackrill, as an inclusivist, thinks that by the phrase “*the best and most complete virtue*” Aristotle simply means the virtue that is constituted by the sum of all human virtues, moral and intellectual. This interpretation of the phrase is not a natural one. As John M. Cooper points out in his paper “Contemplation and Happiness”, the predicate “best and most complete” clearly refers to one specific virtue (Cooper, 1987, pp.199-200). This specific virtue will be the highest virtue, which is contemplation. It is contemplation because contemplation is the only good which is sought for its own sake and, for this reason, it is the “most complete” (NE 1177a12-18). There are two pieces of textual evidence which explain why Ackrill’s interpretation of this phrase is implausible.

First, as Ackrill rightly notices, the sentence “*most complete*” refers back to Aristotle’s discussion and classification of ends in Book I. There, Aristotle says that *eudaimonia* is the “*most complete*” end in the sense that “*it is the end that is most chosen for its own sake and so least chosen for the sake of anything other than itself*” (NE 1097a25-1097b6). Therefore, “the most complete virtue” will be the virtue chosen for its own sake, which is contemplation. And consequently, *eudaimonia* is a complete end because it contains its own end somehow in itself and not in the sense that is complete because contains all the virtues, as Ackrill suggests.

Second, Aristotle introduces two characteristics of *eudaimonia* which are features of its completeness.¹⁴⁸ He says that *eudaimonia* is a “*self-sufficient end*” which means that it is not lacking in anything (NE 1097b6-16). And, *eudaimonia* is also “*the best and most choiceworthy*

¹⁴⁷ See Hardie (1979) but also Cooper (1987).

¹⁴⁸ See section 6.2 of this chapter.

good” in the sense that the good that someone has in having *eudaimonia* cannot be increased by adding anything else to it (*NE* 1097b16-20). Because *eudaimonia* is the supreme end, it makes those who possess it *eudaimon* (happy persons). This means that, when someone reaches the state of *eudaimonia*, there is nothing that could make his life better.

These two features of completeness show that *eudaimonia* has also a comprehensive connotation in Aristotle’s view. *Eudaimonia* includes contemplation, which is the highest good, but it also includes other goods somehow in it. *Eudaimonia* needs virtuous activities other than contemplation to be self-sufficient and choiceworthy (*NE* 1099b2-8).

However, this does not show that the predicate “*most complete virtue*” means the sum of all goods. On the contrary, Aristotle shows that the predicate “*most complete*” means chosen always for itself alone and never for the sake of anything else. And, in Book X, when Aristotle goes back to his discussion of *eudaimonia*, he clearly argues that only the virtue of philosophical wisdom is chosen for its own sake alone whereas the practical virtues are chosen also for the sake of the further goods which they bring to us (*NE* 1178b28-32). This finally means that *eudaimonia* consists of virtuous activities in accordance with the most complete virtue, which is contemplation, or so I will argue later.

To sum up, Ackrill claimed that Aristotle used the concept of the most complete virtue for the sum of all virtue. Against this, I have argued that the phrase “*in accordance with the best and most complete virtue*” cannot mean anything other than “*in accordance with one virtue*”, the highest virtue. This is supported by two pieces of textual evidence. Firstly, it is supported by Aristotle’s discussion of complete ends. I showed that, when Aristotle says that *eudaimonia* is the “most complete” end, he means that it is the end that is most chosen for its own sake rather than a sum of different virtues, which is why *eudaimonia* is self-sufficient. This is why the “most complete” virtue in Aristotle’s first definition of *eudaimonia* is the one virtue

that is sought for its own sake (contemplation) and not the sum of all virtues.

Secondly, I showed that *eudaimonia* is the best and most choiceworthy good in the sense that, if you have *eudaimonia* in your life, then there is nothing that could be added to your life to make it better. And, I have concluded that this last feature of *eudaimonia* together with self-sufficiency shows that *eudaimonia* is a comprehensive end in the sense that it has already everything in itself, including the best and “most complete” virtue of contemplation.

Thus, Ackrill’s interpretation of the predicate “*most complete virtue*” as a sum of goods is incorrect and inconsistent with what Aristotle says about complete ends and the highest good in Book X of *Nicomachean Ethics*. However, Ackrill’s interpretation turns out to be helpful since it leads us to think about *eudaimonia* as a comprehensive good due to its completeness (self-sufficiency and no additional goods). *Eudaimonia* must be a comprehensive good which includes other goods somehow in it. But, *eudaimonia* cannot just be considered as a heap of unconnected goods each pursued for their own sake, as Ackrill suggests, because all other goods, which constitute *eudaimonia*, must be pursued in conformity with the highest virtue (reasoning). The goods that constitute *eudaimonia* must have something in common with the highest virtue.

6.3.5 My own Interpretation

I will now explain in detail my own interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of *eudaimonia*. I will firstly claim that *eudaimonia* is made of all the virtuous activities guided by reason. This is because the conclusion of the Aristotelian function (*ergon*) argument is that human happiness (*eudaimonia*) consists of the exercise of the activity unique to human beings, which is

reasoning.¹⁴⁹ This activity is specifically human because it is based on the activity of the part of the soul that belongs only to human beings, namely the rational part.¹⁵⁰ I will thus argue that *eudaimonia* consists of both kinds of activities, practical activities and theoretical activities, because both of them are activities of the rational part of the soul (*NE* 1102a-1103a).¹⁵¹

My interpretation will not be a dominant interpretation because I will argue that *eudaimonia* does not consist only of contemplation. I will argue that, according to Aristotle, all others moral virtues have an intrinsic value too. They are not merely means to contemplation but constituent parts of *eudaimonia*. However, this is also not an inclusive interpretation. I will argue that *eudaimonia* is constituted by a harmonious unity of all the virtuous activities that are guided by reason rather than merely a heap of unrelated virtuous activities. My own interpretation of Aristotle's account of *eudaimonia* will be based on the analysis of two Aristotelian concepts: *anima* (soul) and *phronesis* (practical wisdom).

According to Aristotle, our function as human beings is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue (excellence). When Aristotle says that *eudaimonia* is an activity of the soul in “*accordance with virtue*”, I suggest he means that *eudaimonia* is constituted by all virtuous activities that involve reasoning (which is the *ergon* of human beings). Acting virtuously is acting in the way that is characteristic of the nature of human beings. This is what *eudaimonia* consists of.

As I just explained, for Aristotle, the characteristic activity of human beings is reasoning. We use reason, however, in many different activities. For example, we use our ability to reason when we deliberate about what is good for us or what the best thing to do is. There

¹⁴⁹ See section 6.1.2 of this chapter for an explanation of Aristotle's function argument. See Sorabji for a discussion of the role of intellect and *phronesis* in virtues (1980, pp. 201-219).

¹⁵⁰ According to Aristotle, human beings share with plant a life of nutriment and growing and with animal a life of perception. On the contrary, the life of reasoning belongs only to them. This sort of life comes from that part which characterizes them as human being that is the intellect (*nous*). For a discussion of the role of intellect and *phronesis* in virtue see Sorabji (1980, pp. 201-219).

¹⁵¹ See Aristotle's discussion of the soul in the section 6.1.2 of this chapter.

are then two kinds of virtuous activities according to Aristotle: theoretical activities (virtues of intellect) and practical activities (related to moral virtues and virtues of character). I will now explain how these two kinds of activities are related.

According to Aristotle's view of the human soul, the part of the soul which obeys reason guides both kinds of virtuous activities. The theoretical activity (virtue of intellect) of pure reflection is the best and the most perfect among the virtuous activities. This is because theorising is an activity of pure reasoning; it does not involve any practical actions. Also, theoretical activity is the best activity because it is sought for its own sake – it has its end somehow in itself. For example, we are using the virtue of the intellect when we are considering the nature of the reality or explaining things in nature.

However, even if theoretical deliberation is the best activity in which we can take part, it is not the only activity in which reason plays a central role. Furthermore, this activity is connected in certain ways to practical wisdom (*phronesis*).¹⁵² The rational part of our soul that is governed by reason guides also our practical activities in which we can exhibit our moral virtues. Moral virtues, or excellences of character, are those states of the person that can lead to virtuous actions (*NE* 1106a12-13).

Before I explain what practical activities consists of, it is important to understand the connection between moral virtues and the virtue of intellect in Aristotle's theory. In Book VI, Aristotle distinguishes between two intellectual virtues: theoretical wisdom (*Sophia*) and practical wisdom (*Phronesis*). *Sophia* is a combination of *nous* (intellectual ability to discern reality) and *epistēme* (a type of knowledge which is teachable, like scientific knowledge). *Sophia* is the highest intellectual virtue that responds to the rational part of our soul because it investigates more divine and honourable things. *Sophia* is the perfect science because it

¹⁵² See section 6.1.2 about Aristotle's view of the human soul. See Wiggins for a discussion on the relationship between deliberation and practical reason (1980, pp. 221-240).

investigates the best things in the universe. For example, we are using *sophia*, when we deliberate and reflect on what is good for us as human beings. *Sophia*, in other words, involves the investigation of universal truths. Finally, *sophia* has only to do with the virtues of intellect (as a purely theoretical activity, it requires only thinking).

However, Aristotle points out that, although *sophia* is a higher virtue than *phronesis*, the pursuit of *eudaimonia* requires both because *phronesis* puts in practice our intellectual knowledge (*sophia*) (NE 1145a6-11). *Phronesis*, indeed, is the human ability to judge what is good and bad for us, what is desirable and what is to be avoided, and how we should behave in the society. *Phronesis* combines a capacity of rational thinking (which connects it to *sophia*) with a type of knowledge. In one sense, it appears to be imperfect because it is a practical virtue and not one of pure theorizing (NE 1141a18-22). *Phronesis* is concerned with how to act in particular situations. However, *phronesis* is not simply a skill as it involves the ability to decide how to achieve a certain end and also the ability to think about what ends are good. Therefore, those possessing practical wisdom (*phronesis*) have knowledge about how to achieve a specific aim.

For example, even if one knows that one should be honest, one can still be honest in certain situations in a way that offends others. In this case, *phronesis* is our ability to act honestly without causing such harm in the situations we are in. This means that *phronesis* must be based on the experience of how much truth it is appropriate to tell. Aristotle wrote:

Whereas young people become accomplished in geometry and mathematics, and wise within these limits, prudent young people do not seem to be found. The reason is that *phronesis* (prudence) is concerned with particulars as well as universals, and particulars become known from experience, but a young person lacks experience since some length of time is needed to produce it" (NE 1142a).

Finally, Aristotle believed that having *phronesis* is both necessary and sufficient for being

virtuous because it together with *sophia* are activities of the rational part of the soul. *Phronesis* help us in understanding what we should do in order to promote *Eudaimonia* (NE 11459a). The interaction of *phronesis* and *sophia* is explained in the following passage in book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

Moreover, *phronesis* does not control *sophia* or the better part of the soul, just as medical science does not control health. For medical science does not use health, but only aims to bring health into being; hence it prescribes for the sake of health, but does not prescribe to health. Besides, [saying that *phronesis* controls *sophia*] would be like saying that political science rules the gods because it prescribes about everything in the city (NE 1145a6-11).

To sum up, in order to be *eudaimon* (happy), a person must have both virtues: *phronesis* and *sophia*. This means that, in order for a person to be *eudaimon*, she must practice both kinds of virtues, the virtues of intellect and the virtues of character because they are both proper characteristics of the human life. This conclusion explains why, according to Aristotle, a life of pure contemplation, which consists only of the exercise of intellectual virtue (contemplation), is neither possible nor desirable for human beings (NE 1169b16-22). And, for this reason, I think that *eudaimonia* must consist of the two kinds of virtues and a *eudaimon* life will be a combination of both theoretical and practical activity where reason is used in both instances.¹⁵³ It means that we must both investigate things in nature and understand what is good. When we do this, we will be able to put our knowledge about the good in practice. To do so, we must act well in our daily life by choosing the good things. If we do all of this, we will be virtuous and *eudaimon* (happy).

Now, in order to explain my interpretation, we must go back to Aristotle's 'definition' of *eudaimonia* in *Nicomachean Ethics* and we must see whether my interpretation fits that

¹⁵³ Sarah Broadie has suggested a similar solution. According to her, the contemplative life is not a rival of practical life but a certain kind of practical life, i.e. the perfection of it (Broadie, 1991, p. 147).

definition. As we have seen, in Book I, Aristotle gives a preliminary account of *eudaimonia*. After the conclusion of his argument about rational nature of human being, he writes:

if that is so, the human good turns out to be virtuous activity of the soul, and if there are more than one virtue of the best and most complete virtue” (*NE* 1169b16-22).

I want to suggest that what matters in this first ‘definition’ is the first part: “*eudaimonia is virtuous activity of the soul*”. Here, I suggest, Aristotle claims that *eudaimonia* is any virtuous human activity which involves the rational part of our soul. This means that *eudaimonia* is constituted by all human deliberative actions which aim at achieving some good and ultimately at achieving *eudaimonia*.

As a matter of fact, Aristotle introduces the last part “*in accordance with the best and most complete*” to clarify that all human activities that constitute *eudaimonia* must be “*in accordance*” with the best human activity, pure reasoning. At the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, we find out that theoretical wisdom is the best human activity. And, as we saw, the close connection between theoretical and practical activity is created by *phronesis* which links together the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues. When we act with *phronesis*, we are using our reason to deliberate and to choose the good things to do. This is why *eudaimonia* is a perfect and harmonious unity of every rational virtuous human activity that is guided by our reason. These activities include both pure activities of thinking and political and social activities.

To sum up, I disagree with both inclusive and dominant views. I find the dominant interpretation of *eudaimonia* too strict. I do not think that *eudaimonia* consists only of contemplation and that moral virtues are merely done in order to help us to contemplate. Rather, moral virtues have their own value as a constituent element of *eudaimonia*. But, I do not think that *eudaimonia* consists of an unconnected sum of different virtues each of which is pursued for its own sake. Instead, I think that, even though *eudaimonia* is constituted by many activities in different contexts, the activities are all united by the fact that taking part in them requires

using reason. Therefore, *eudaimonia* is using reason in virtuous activities. *Eudaimonia* on my view consists of a perfect and harmonious unity of all human activities guided by reason, of *sophia* and *phronesis*, intellectual virtue and moral virtues, practical life and theoretical life, practical wisdom and contemplation.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that we should understand Aristotle's idea of *eudaimonia* as neither a single activity nor a sum of a large number of them but rather it is constituted by all specifically human virtuous activities in accordance with the best human activity. Morally virtuous actions and excellent contemplation are both activities guided by the human reason (parts of the rational soul) and aspects of the overall Human Good (*eudaimonia*). Therefore, *eudaimonia* on my analysis consists of a perfect and harmonious unity of all human activities guided by reason. Thorough this chapter, I tried to show that Aristotle believed that a happy (*eudaimon*) life consists of the proper use of the reason, which is the function of the human being, in all human activities that enable us to be virtuous citizens of our society.

I suggested that according to Aristotle, we should take part in the political life to reach *eudaimonia*. The political life consists of taking part in all the activities where people can exercise their characteristic function to be happy as human beings such as work, education and various hobbies. We exercise our function by doing morally virtuous actions guided by practical wisdom (*phronesis*). *Eudaimonia* thus requires acting with *phronesis*. Acting with *phronesis* allows to us to choose the right thing to do in every human situation, which is what it is to be a virtuous and a good person. But, at the same time, we should also take part in activities of pure reasoning. Therefore, we should conduct a practical life in order to be virtuous within our society and we should also engage in activities of pure reasoning to reach the perfect

eudaimonia.

I have thus argued that *eudaimonia* consists of all the virtuous human activities which involve the use of reasoning. *Eudaimonia* will be constituted by both pure activities of reasoning (deliberation hereafter) and the practical activities that are guided by reason.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, on this view, living well consists of acting with *phronesis* with the aim of living a good life and reaching the *eudaimonia*.

Aristotle's ethics is sometimes understood as *politike methodos* which means that ethics should give to people not only a comprehension of virtue but also teach people to be virtuous (Giorgini, 2002, p. 158). Aristotle thought that politics must teach people how to use their best part, their intellect (*nous*) every day in all the activities in which they are involved (*EN*, 1099b30). Therefore, Ethics and Politics are two sciences linked together in Aristotle's view, and for this reason, the last words of *Nicomachean Ethics* are an introduction to his *Politics*.

¹⁵⁴ In the next chapter, I will explain that with practical activities I mean practical life broadly speaking. Practical life will include taking part in social relationships and activities.

Chapter VII

Happiness in Prison

Introduction

In this chapter, I will consider whether an Aristotelian theory of happiness could help us to better understand what consequences imprisonment has for the happiness of a person. In particular, I am going to argue that, if we want to understand both (i) the relationship between happiness and imprisonment and (ii) what happiness consists of in prisons, we should adopt an Aristotelian theory of happiness as *eudaimonia*. According to traditional versions of this approach, what counts in terms of happiness is what people actually do and could do. However, the version of the approach I will defend is different from many other *eudaimonic* views because it takes happiness not to consist only of what people actually do and could do but also of what they feel and believe.¹⁵⁵

We should also notice that what people do, feel, and think is in many cases influenced by the external circumstances. Because of this fact, according to my view, there will be a strict connection between happiness and the circumstances in which people are. This means that, when we evaluate how happy prisoners are, the outlined Aristotelian theory of happiness will suggest that we should also take into account how the external circumstances affect the prisoners' lives. In fact, this proposed theory will claim that, when we evaluate how happy prisoners are, we should consider three different elements of prisoners' lives and how these elements are affected by imprisonment. These three elements are the prisoners' deliberation,

¹⁵⁵ The *eudaimonic* views, both ancient and contemporary, take happiness to consist in people's exercise of their function and their interaction within society. The capability approach developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Craven Nussbaum (1993) is the most famous view close to the Aristotelian *eudaimonia*. In psychology, *eudaimonic* views have been developed by Ryan and Deci (2001) and Ryff and Singer (2000). However, as I just explained, my account is different from others *eudaimonic* views. This difference makes my account original and will help my account to respond to the two main objections made to objective-list theories of happiness (see sec. 8.2.1 and 8.2.2).

their social relationships and practical lives, and their ability to feel the right emotions at the right time.

In the first section, by reconsidering my interpretation of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*, I will explain what exactly happiness consists of according to my proposal. This first section will be divided into three subsections. Section 7.1.1 will explain what the relevant kind of happiness-constituting deliberation consists in. Section 7.1.2 will describe what kind of social and practical life is constitutive of happiness. Finally, in section 7.1.3 I will discuss the role of emotions in my account of happiness. The purpose of this whole section is to understand what happiness is in more concrete terms and what exactly people need to have in their lives in order for them to live a happy life.

In order to understand what the consequences of my Aristotelian account of happiness are for the happiness of prisoners, I will then evaluate whether prisoners can have the three elements that constitute happiness on my view. In section 7.2, I will explore a possible argument against the prisoners' ability to be happy. The proponents of this argument would argue that prisons deprive the inmates of the three elements that constitute happiness. So, at first sight, it might seem like, according to my account of happiness, prisons prevent inmates from having what is required for happiness. In section 7.3, I will then give my response to the previous argument. I will argue that, if we *correctly* understand Aristotle's view of moral and intellectual virtues and the relationship between emotions and reason, we should conclude that prisoners can exercise the most important virtues and, therefore, they can have, at least in principle, all the constituent elements of happiness.

7.1 Happiness as *Eudaimonia*

In the previous chapter, I already offered my own interpretation of Aristotle's account of

eudaimonia. Following Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*, I claimed that happiness consists of using the unique faculty of human nature, the capacity of reasoning (sec. 6.3.5).¹⁵⁶ In this section, I will outline what consequences that account has for what the main elements of happiness are in more concrete terms.

My suggestion is that in order to be happy we need to take part successfully in at least some of the various activities and relationships in which we use reason. The elements that will make our lives worth living and ultimately happy will therefore include intellectual pleasures and pursuits, friendships and family life, work and productivity, and emotions. In the following sections, I will show that these elements are important for human beings. This is because, by taking part in them, we can act virtuously by exercising our characteristic function which is to reason well.¹⁵⁷ Reasoning well will, however, not only be a central element of human happiness because it is characteristic of human nature but also because it seems to help us to live our lives well. If this is right and the components of happiness are grounded on the notion of reasoning well, then it turns out that on this account having those components in our lives will make our lives go well for us too.¹⁵⁸

This first section will be divided into three subsections. Throughout all the three sections I will refer back to my interpretation of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia* (sec. 6.3.5). In the first subsection, I will explain what kind of deliberation is happiness-constituting. I will claim that, in order to be happy, human beings need to engage both in theoretical thinking which is the activity of thinking about how things are in the world in general and in practical thinking which is the activity of thinking about what is the right thing to do in specific circumstances. After

¹⁵⁶ See sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 for an explanation of Aristotle's idea of human nature and his function argument.

¹⁵⁷ Here, by acting virtuously I mean to act "successfully" or in an "excellent way". To act successfully, people must use their virtue of character such as generosity, kindness, fairness and so on.

¹⁵⁸ In section 8.3.2, I will explain how prisoners' cases help us to show that having the components of my account make our lives go well for us. As a matter of fact, prisoners who have some of the constitutive element of my account of happiness improve their lives and more successfully rehabilitate.

that, I will explain what kind of social relationships, activities, and emotions are also happiness-constituting. The goal of this first whole section is thus to help us to better understand what happiness consists of and what people need to have in their life in order to be happy.

7.1.1 Deliberation

As I have already explained, according to my account, happiness generally consists of taking part in the activities in which we use our rationality. This means that we then need to understand what these activities are. I will first analyse the activity of pure reasoning, which is called “deliberation”. Very roughly, deliberation consists of the reflection we do in order to make a decision or a choice. There are furthermore two kinds of deliberation: theoretical deliberation and practical deliberation.

Theoretical deliberation consists of the reasoning we do when we want to explain and understand what happens in the world. It often involves thinking about events that have already occurred and asking why they occurred. Not all deliberation is of course focused on the past – we also deliberate theoretically when we attempt to determine what is going to happen in the future. We likewise take part in the activity of theoretical deliberation when we consider general moral questions: when we think about which actions are right and wrong, and what makes them so. Thus, to summarise, whenever we try to explain or understand things more generally, we are engaging in the activity of theoretical deliberation.

In addition to theoretical deliberation, human beings also deliberate in a practical way. Practical deliberation involves thinking about a set of alternative of actions which we could do in a specific situation. It involves considering what one ought to do or what it would be best to do in the situation one is in. Practical deliberation thus involves not just pure reasoning but also choosing a specific course of action in a concrete situation. We engage in practical deliberation

when we choose to do what seems to be the best thing to do from our first personal point of view.

We are usually most aware of doing practical deliberation when we make important decisions. We have all explicitly considered, for example, what career we want to pursue. When we make such decisions, we deliberate practically in a very self-aware, explicit way. However, we also rely on practical reasoning even in simple everyday tasks. Much of such more trivial deliberation is automatic and very quick. In many cases, we might not even notice that we deliberate, so habitual our ways of thinking are. Yet, despite this, it is only through practical deliberation that we can end up choosing to wait for few minutes before we drink very hot tea. To sum up, we engage in two kinds of deliberation. We deliberate theoretically when we make general judgments about how things are in the world. We deliberate practically when we decide what the right course of actions is in the specific circumstance we happen to be in.

Now that it has been explained what deliberation consists of generally, it needs to be emphasised that not all theoretical and practical deliberation are happiness-constituting. There are at least two types of deliberation that are not constitutive elements of happiness. Firstly, according to the Aristotelian theory of happiness, happiness-constituting deliberation cannot be a part of non-virtuous activities. Thus, for example, according to this view a person who spends his time in prison thinking and planning revenge and how to commit more crimes is not deliberating in a way that is happiness-constituting. The kind of deliberation this person is taking part in is not the kind of deliberation that leads to living a virtuous life. Thus, this person is not meeting the suggested criteria for living a happy life - he is just wrong about the kind of life that will make him happy. I will explain why this deliberation is not sufficient for leading a happy life below.

Secondly, the kind of deliberation that is a constitutive element of happiness needs to

be more than just mere brainwork. For example, just thinking about how many cats live in a certain town is not a kind of deliberation that constitutes happiness. The fact that we are just reasoning about something is not enough for making that type of reasoning a constitutive element of happiness. This raises the question of what kind of deliberation then is happiness-constituting. As we know, deliberation can be either theoretical or practical. So, let us consider exactly when these two kinds of deliberation are happiness-constituting.

First of all, happiness-constituting theoretical deliberation must consist of more general reflection concerning things that are important and valuable. Deliberation that is an element of our happiness thus must give us some knowledge – not merely of trivial truths – but also of more important and general truths. It should lead us to acquire more wisdom and learn how things happen to be in the world. For example, we are engaging in happiness-constituting theoretical deliberation when we are considering the nature of the reality, explaining things in nature or when we think about which actions are right and wrong, and what makes them so. Whenever we are involved in this kind of reasoning, this activity will become an element of our happiness.

As we learned from previous explanation, deliberation can also be practical. Practical deliberation is a specific human activity in the sense that it is required in the activities we as humans do. For Aristotle, we use practical deliberation when we successfully take part in the activities in which we interact with other people around us by using our virtues of character (generosity, fairness, goodness, kindness, trust and so on).¹⁵⁹ Thus, practical activities that are happiness-constituting will be work, sport and pleasurable activities, social activities, and various hobbies. Whenever we take part in these activities, we can exercise our virtues of

¹⁵⁹ According to Aristotle, these activities are species-specific happiness-constituting activities. This is because when we take part in these activities we use our characteristic function (see section 6.1.2 on Aristotle's function argument). Moreover, by virtues of character, here, I refer to the character-traits that according to Aristotle enable us to take part in those activities successfully (see section 6.1.2).

character. As we know, by virtues of character Aristotle means the character-traits that enable us to participate in these activities successfully. For example, by interacting with inmates, friends and loved ones, a prisoner can practice the virtues of generosity and kindness and through education, sports and work he can practice how to be fair and honest. Aristotle would claim that when our actions in these activities are guided by these character-traits, we in turn are more successful in them. All of this means that we need to deliberate practically whilst taking part in those social and practical activities successfully and that it is this deliberation that is thereby happiness-constituting.

Summing up, one consequence of the previous explanation of what kind of practical and theoretical deliberation is happiness-constituting is that not all kinds of deliberation are happiness-constituting. In order to be a constitutive element of a happy life, theoretical and practical deliberation must teach and lead us to become virtuous and to act virtuously. It is only when deliberation helps us to live a virtuous life that deliberation will be an element of a happy life. All of this means that my view accepts a virtue constraint - on my view, an activity is happiness-constituting only in so far as it leads us to act virtuously in the society we live in.¹⁶⁰

7.1.2 Sociality

In chapter VI, I claimed that, according to Aristotle, happiness also requires taking part in the more practical aspects of life. To explain this I referred to Aristotle's claim according to which human beings are political animals (*Pol.* 1253a1-7, *NE* 1099b3-6). Aristotle thus thought that we are beings who can only flourish within the context of a civil society. I will take social life to consist of access to a minimally supportive network of social contacts. It includes interpersonal interaction with the other members of such networks and different types of group

¹⁶⁰ See section 8.2.2 for an explanation of how my view accepts a virtue constraint and the paternalistic consequences of this.

recreational activities. This section will analyse further what kind of practical life and what kind of relationships should be considered to be constituents of happiness.

Before I explain what kind of activities and relationships are happiness-constituting, I will briefly return to Aristotle's understanding of virtues of character in order to explain how they are related to social activities. This is because I will claim that only the relationships and activities in which we are able to act virtuously are happiness-constituting. By virtues of character, Aristotle means the character-traits that allow us to think, feel, and act in the right way, to the right degree, and at the right time – to think, feel, and act in conformity with the demands of the situation (*NE* 1106b15-25). They are thus character traits that enable us to be successful. For example, a stranger who helps a cyclist in a road accident is acting virtuously. In contrast, a person who passes by a cyclist who had an accident is not acting virtuously. It seems that if we exercise the virtues of character, in this case kindness, we will end up choosing the best and most appropriate action to do in a specific circumstance.

Acting virtuously therefore generally consists of successfully taking part in the activities in which we interact with other people around us by using our virtues of character (generosity, fairness, goodness, kindness, trust and so on). It thus consists of taking part in practical activities such as work, sport and pleasurable activities, social activities, and various hobbies. Whenever we take part in these activities, we can exercise our virtues of character – the character-traits that enable us to participate in these activities successfully. For example, by interacting with people, friends and loved ones, we can practice the virtues of generosity and kindness and through education, sports and work we can practice how to be fair and honest. And, when our actions in these activities are guided by these character-traits, we in turn are more successful in them.

The reason because taking part in these activities is so important for our happiness can

be explained with the help of Aristotle's view of human nature. Aristotle believed that humans are social animals whose nature is to have social and interpersonal relationships. The involvement of human beings in the social activities and relationships is thus important for human flourishing because it helps us to fulfil our nature (*NE* 1169b16-22).¹⁶¹ When people take part into social and practical activities of their daily lives, they use practical deliberation to choose how they will act in a specific situation. For example, people use practical deliberation when they choose the next book they want to read or when they choose to go to work by train instead of using their cars. This means that human beings use their characteristic function, reasoning, by taking part in everyday activities. Social and practical activities will thus be components of happiness because whenever people take part into one of these activities they deliberate practically about the best thing to do for them in the situation they are in.

However, the fact that social interaction and relationships are an important element of human life can also be explained by the impact that social interaction plays in our lives nowadays. Let us think, for example, how social interaction has changed in the era of new technologies. Networking has become a vital element of our professional lives and friendships. People are ever more connected by social media. However, even if opportunities of social interaction have increased, people tend to be more isolated. We tend to spend most of our time using smartphones and tablets and yet it seems that, despite the increase of communication, genuine human interaction has probably diminished.

If we think about the importance of social media nowadays, we need to recognise that taking part in social relationships is an important element of our lives. However, given how

¹⁶¹ According to Aristotle, people need to live with other in order for them to flourish and be happy. Aristotle indeed claimed that "*man is a civic being, one whose nature is to live with other*" (*NE* 1169b16-22). He also thought that people must spend their days with friends and good men in order to be happy (*NE* 1169b). Martha Nussbaum calls friendship, love and political commitment the three basic relational good in Aristotle's ethics. The relational goods have intrinsic value and are parts of *eudaimonia*. See also Bruni (2010) on the role of friendships and sociality in Aristotle's Ethics. In section 8.3.3 I will discuss some empirical studies on the impact of social relationships and activities on human happiness (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz & Stone, 2004, Bruni, 2010).

the new means of communication have not made us any happier, we should probably try to engage more in the activities and relationships which promote human contact and interactions based on virtue. For example, having good relationships with colleagues at work can have an impact on the quality of our life at work more than just being connected with our colleagues on LinkedIn.¹⁶² For example, the involvement in social relationships, such as sharing hobbies with colleagues, can give us the possibility to engage in activities where we again use our reason and our virtues of character. Moreover, social relationships such as friendship can also give us a chance to experience the kind of emotions we need to be happy. The emotions we experience by having social relationships have the kind of impact in our lives that happiness seems to have, or so I will argue later. So, social relationships are also important because by engaging in them we experience happiness-constituting emotions such as love, trust, gratitude, and so on.

If we follow my Aristotelian account, we should then think that certain kinds of social interaction and participation in certain kinds of social activities are elements of humans' lives that contribute to our happiness. This is because, by taking part in these activities and relationships, we can exercise practical deliberation. Moreover, by taking part in social relationships such as friendship we can experience emotions and exercise virtues which make our lives more connected, less isolated and happier.

7.1.3 Emotions

This section will analyse the third component of happiness, emotions. As we saw in the previous sections, according to the proposed Aristotelian account of happiness, a happy life consists of

¹⁶² The influence of interpersonal relationships on people's happiness has been supported by both social science and psychology. In his paper 'The happiness of sociality. Economics and *eudaimonia*: A necessary encounter', Bruni shows how interpersonal relationships and the involvement in social activities have more impact on human happiness than others material goods. This thesis is supported also by Ryan and Deci (2001), Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz and Stone (2004), Meier and Stutzer (2004), Nezlek (2000), Ryff and Singer (2000).

acting virtuously within a social context and exercising practical and theoretical deliberation. However, the previous chapter also suggested that happy people will not only deliberate well both theoretically and practically but rather they will also feel the appropriate desires and emotions in the situations they are in (see sections 6.1.2 and 6.3.5). In this section, I will argue that, in order to be happy, we need to feel emotions in the appropriate way. In order to be experienced in the right way and at the right times, emotions must not just always be positive but rather they must be appropriate to the circumstances and also lead to virtuous actions.¹⁶³

According to Aristotle, emotions belong to the non-rational part of the soul. However, the intellectual virtue of deliberating about what to do in a specific situation, practical deliberation, is distinguished from the other intellectual virtues in part by its involvement with emotions (*De Anima*, 403a29-b2). This means that Aristotle admits that there is a relationship between emotions and reason. According to him, emotional dispositions constitute the virtues and vices of the non-rational part of the soul by either conforming to or violating the instructions of reason. They do so through their connections to actions. Emotions can both motivate actions and undermine our motivation for them. For example, I can decide to help a friend to study for an exam because I love her. In this case, my emotion of love motivates my action in a way that perhaps conforms to what my reason is guiding me to do. This is why this particular emotional disposition is in this context a virtuous one. I could also decide not to help a friend with her exam because I do not want her to be more successful than I will be. In this case, my sentiment

¹⁶³ The philosophical interest in emotions from the middle of the twentieth century is usually related to an article by Erroll Bedford (1957) and a book by Anthony Kenny (1965) which argued against the assumption that emotions are feelings. Over the past thirty years, academics in several disciplines have recognised that emotions typically involve a cognitive component. For example, Lyons defines emotions as consisting of cognitive, evaluative and appetitive elements. He observes that what differentiate one emotion from another is the evaluative part (1980, p. 70). Other theorists have understood emotions as nothing more than judgments. Lazarus, for example, claims that cognition is a necessary and sufficient condition of emotions (1991, p. 338). Solomon, on the other hand, claims that emotions are judgments (1993, pp. 13-15). For a more recent discussion of the role of emotions in human happiness and their relationship with human cognitive faculties see Martha Nussbaum (2001). Nussbaum has defended an extreme cognitivist interpretation of emotions in her book *Upheavals of Thought* (2001) She describes her view as neo-Stoic to refer to her strictly intellectualist interpretation of emotions. She claims that emotions involve judgments about important things in life. For example, mourning is the awareness that a person whom we love and who has been important in our lives and central for our well-being is dead (2001, p. 330).

of selfishness would undermine my act of kindness towards her.

All of this means that, when emotions are guided by reason, they lead us to make the right choices and actions which can thus be used to evaluate which emotions are happiness-constituting. When emotions lead us to act virtuously, they therefore become part of our happiness. When we try to understand when an emotion is guided by reason, Aristotle suggests that we should follow the rule of the golden mean. An emotion is guided by reason when we feel that specific emotion reliably as a mean between two extremes (*NE* 1109a20-25).¹⁶⁴ For example, let's take appetites and the feelings of anger. Temperate people experience anger only in the appropriate situations. A temperate person will probably be mad when someone accidentally damages her car but she will probably not try to fight with the person who has done so. In contrast, people who are either irascible or lack spirit experience either too little or too much anger which prevents them from acting successfully in the circumstances they are in. An irascible person will probably react badly if someone damages her car.

If we therefore follow Aristotle in understanding the role of emotions in human happiness, we need to admit that emotions have a close connection with our ability to reason. The happy person will not only reason well about what to do in particular situations, but she will feel the appropriate emotions in those situations. The capacity to experience emotions seems to be fundamental to living a rational life over time. In his neurological studies, Antonio Damasio (1994) has suggested that emotions do, indeed, have this sort of function in everyday reasoning. Subjects in his studies, who, because of injuries to the prefrontal and somatosensory cortices of the brain, had a diminished capacity to experience emotions, were unable to make practical decisions. It thus seems that there is a correlation between our ability to feel emotions and our intellectual ability to reason well.

¹⁶⁴ See section 6.1.2 for an explanation of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. See also Urmson (1980).

Now that we have investigated the correlation between emotions and rationality, we need to analyse what kind of emotions are happiness-constituting. One consequence of the previous Aristotelian theory is that happiness-constituting emotions will include all the standard emotions of anger, love, hatred, fear, confidence, shame, benevolence, pity, indignation, joy, envy, emulation and so on. It is just that these emotions will be happiness-constituting only insofar as they are guided by reason and lead to successful actions. As examples of emotions that play a role in our happiness, I have mentioned both positive and negative emotions. This is because, I will argue that there are cases in which negative emotions appear to be appropriate to the circumstances and therefore they too can be sometimes happiness-constituting. To explain how emotions can be appropriate let us return to the case of the mother who is giving birth (see sec. 3.6). During the child-birth, feeling of fear can be considered to be a natural and appropriate response to the situation. However, despite the intense pain and fear, the mother would probably count that intense moment of her life as a happy moment. This case thus shows that negative emotions too can be happiness-constituting whenever they are appropriate to the circumstances.

To sum up this whole section 7.1, if we use an Aristotelian account in the evaluation of prisoners' happiness, we need take into account three different elements of their lives. The first element that prisoners need to have in their lives is deliberation. In order to be happy prisoners need to engage in both practical and theoretical deliberation in the ways described in section 7.1.1. Prisoners also need to engage in the kinds of social relationships and interaction which were explained in section 7.1.2. They need to take part in the activities in which they can develop virtuous relationships, such as true friendships and family contacts. Finally, prisoners need to feel the right emotions at the right time as explained in section 7.1.3. This means that, in order to be happiness-constituting, emotions should lead to right actions and must be

appropriate to the circumstances.

7.2 Prisoners' Unhappiness

In this second section, I will explain how someone might use the outlined Aristotelian view of happiness to argue that prisoners will not be able to be happy. This argument is based on the idea that imprisonment deprives people of the main three constituents of happiness explained above: (i) prisoners will not be able to deliberate, (ii) they will not be able to take part in the relevant social and practical activities and relationships, and they (iii) will not be able to experience the right kind of emotions.

This second section will be also divided in three subsections. Section 7.2.1 will consider how prison rules and other restrictions leave no room for prisoners to deliberate about how to live their lives. The second section 7.2.2 will describe how it is often difficult for prisoners to have the required kinds of social and practical lives. Finally, section 7.2.3 will explore why prisoners may not feel the right kind of emotions.

7.2.1 Deliberation

In this first section, I will explain why you might come to the conclusion that prisoners are unable to deliberate in the happiness-constituting way. This would mean that prisoners would be unable to access the first component of my account of happiness. In the first chapter of this thesis, I explained how prisoners' life is very much entirely organised by the prison staff and rules. I showed that prisoners are forced to follow the set of rules they are given and so they are essentially not able to decide what they want to do during their days. Basically, prisoners cannot decide how to organize their daily life (sec. 2.2).

We have also seen that the imposition of a set of rules to follow has led most prisoners

to live day by day rather than to make long-term plans. Prisoners thus stop caring about their future and in some cases inmates even lose their ability to plan their lives completely. Prisoners are also often bored and just follow their daily routine. They furthermore tend to spend most of their time in their cells (see sec. 2.4). All of this means that daily life for most prisoners consists of spending a short time doing certain basic tasks and then of not having much to do for the rest of the time. It could be suggested that, because of this, prisoners do not exercise their ability to decide what they want to do in their lives.

Moreover, psychological studies in prisons have showed that prisoners experience many kinds of cognitive problems in prisons. Many prisoners suffer from serious mental disorders and depression. Sometimes these problems make inmates unable to deliberate at all about their lives and their deliberation is very limited by their attitudes toward their lives. Studies on psychological deterioration, for example, have showed that inmates can suffer from defective cognitive functions, such as loss of memory and ability to think.¹⁶⁵ Prisoners also frequently lose control over their lives and become unable to make any decision about their lives.¹⁶⁶ Others frequent problems that compromise prisoners' deliberation are related to the use of drugs in prisons as many prisoners do suffer from drug addictions.

All of this means that there is evidence to support the idea that prisoners' deliberation is affected by imprisonment. Prisoners seem to have few possibilities to deliberate about their lives and even when they have the opportunity to deliberate deliberation appears to be limited and not leading to free and voluntary choices. If this is the case, one has reasons to argue that prisoners do not exercise one of the central happiness-constituting activities.

¹⁶⁵ Studies on the deteriorating effects of imprisonment have been made by Adams (1992), Pishkin and Thorne (1973), Zamble and Porporino (1988, 1992), Irwin and Cressey (1962), and Irwin (1980).

¹⁶⁶ See section 2.4 for references to these studies.

7.2.2 Sociality

In this section, I will explore whether prisoners can take part to the relevant social activities and relationships which I claimed to be happiness-constituting (sec. 7.1.2). I will first explain what kind of social interactions and relationships prisoners can have. I will then explain how it could be also argued that prisoners cannot fully take part in the relevant happiness-constituting social and political activities. This would mean that prisoners would not be able to have the second component of a happy life either.

In section 7.1.2, I explained that in order to be happiness-constituting, social relationships and the involvement in social activities should allow people to exercise their virtues of character. To be happiness-constituting social relationships need to be based on trust, loyalty, care, love, fairness, and so on. People should take part in social activities such as work, hobbies and networking activities which allow them to exercise the main virtues of character.

When citizens are sentenced to imprisonment and became prisoners they lose most of their basic rights such freedom of movement and association. Recently, in her research project on sociability, Kimberly Brownlee has defended the human right against social deprivation claiming that the protection of this human right is necessary to guarantee less controversial human rights (Brownlee, 2013). As matter of fact, prisoners, for example, do not have the same right to vote as normal citizens. Prisoners also cannot claim all the same benefits as normal citizens and they cannot apply for jobs (sec. 2.4).

In addition to a limited access to basic rights, prisoners' social contacts and interactions are also restricted. In previous chapters, I frequently referred to the fact that many studies on prison experience suggest that imprisonment affects greatly prisoners' social and practical lives. Sociological studies shown that imprisonment affects several domains of prisoners' lives such

as their jobs, marriages, friendships, health, and so on.¹⁶⁷ Prisoners cannot take part in social and recreational activities like visiting friends or their families whenever they want. They are frequently isolated from their families, relatives and friends. However, in some cases families can have contact with inmates but only during certain hours and only for a period of time which is decided by the prison rules.

Moreover, psychological studies report that prisoners experience displeasure and absence of respect and fairness due to the restricted facilities available. Prisoners are often abandoned by their spouses and friends, they also face difficulties in making friends with other inmates (Liebling, 2011, p. 534). They do not trust their fellows and prison staff. For this reason, they usually tend to avoid making friends and having social interactions (Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald, 2008, p. 257). All of this seems to suggest that imprisonment prevents people from having the kind of relationships needed for being happy that I previously described (sec. 7.1.2). Moreover, even when prisoners take part in the essential human relationships, it seems that their social interactions are not based on the kind of virtues that can make a difference in how happy they are.

Social life and interpersonal relationships seem limited and restricted to minimum interaction. As a matter of fact, the only way for prisoners to have social contacts is by taking part in purposeful activities and interacting with other inmates. They can spend some of their time doing purposeful activities like taking part in educational courses and paid work. However, most prisoners cannot take part in these activities because of the restrictions imposed by the prison rules.¹⁶⁸

At first sight, it may seem clear that people cannot take part in the relevant social and

¹⁶⁷ See sections 2.4 and 2.5 for references to sociological studies on prison experience.

¹⁶⁸ As we know from section 2.3, remand prisoners, who constitute the 13 per cent of prison population, do not live together with convicted prisoners and they are not obligated to work. Because of their situation, remand prisoners cannot have access to many of the facilities designed for convicted prisoners.

practical activities when they are in prison. All these studies show that the involvement of the prisoners in all the central human social activities, which I described in section 7.1.2, is very limited and organised by the prisons' rules. This means that, if happiness even in part consists of taking part in the human social activities as my account claimed, there would be an aspect of happiness which prisoners would not be able to have.

7.2.3 Emotions

Finally, in this section, let us consider whether prisoners can feel the relevant emotions which I argued to be happiness-constituting. I will first explain what kind of emotional states prisoners tend to experience. After this, I will then present a possible argument against prisoners' ability to feel the kind of emotions that are needed for happiness according to my account.

As we saw in the second chapter, long term incarceration causes deterioration of prisoners' personalities and mental health and also of prisoners' emotional and physical well-being (sec. 2.4). Prisoners experience emotional problems such as apathy and problems with relating to others such as infantile regression. Some prisoners can even acquire psychotic characteristics such as obsessions and the loss of a sense of reality. Many inmates also suffer from emotional distress such as depression and dysphoria. Emotional states of prisoners are usually furthermore highly negative in the very early period of imprisonment and high levels of depression, anger and anxiety are registered among inmates at this stage. Some prisoners can become aggressive and violent. Moreover, the environmental overstimulation or understimulation can also influence the inmates' state of being. A boring, monotonous prison routine creates additional stress by reinforcing negative feelings such as desolation and

despair.¹⁶⁹

Furthermore, studies on social inclusion shows that practices of forced social exclusion, isolation and long-term confinement tend to cause persons to suffer acute psychological and physical deterioration.¹⁷⁰ Prisoners and long-term incarcerated offenders often report on their release that they initially experience solitary confinement with despondency and depression, but over time begin to feel themselves disintegrating. Studies report that isolated prisoners sleep over 12 hours a day, forget facts and memories and lack the energy to read, eat or move. Some begin to hallucinate, have panic attacks and mutilate themselves. It seems clear that a person who experiences this kind of emotions cannot flourish or live a happy life.¹⁷¹

This means that prisoners' dispositions to feel situation-appropriate emotions are compromised during the period of incarceration. For example, as we just saw, prisoners often experience high levels of negative emotions. In this situation, it could be argued that the negative emotions lead prisoners to less successful actions – to exercise vices instead of virtues. For example, prisoners who lash out of anger are only likely to be punished further for their aggressive attitudes. This means that one could argue that prisoners' emotions do not conform to reason in the way I explained they should and therefore prisoners fail to experience the emotions that are happiness-constituting.

In conclusion, in the light of the arguments discussed in these three sections, it seems that, according to my standards, prisoners will typically not be able to access any of the three components of happiness. Prisoners are arguably not able to use their intellectual virtues in a

¹⁶⁹ For references to these psychological studies see section 2.4 of the first chapter on Prisons and section 3.3.2 of chapter 3 on Whole Life Satisfaction Theories.

¹⁷⁰ See Lippke (2004, 2007) for a general critique of the use of 'special, maximum-security' prisons in the United States.

¹⁷¹ See Brownlee (2012) for a recent discussion of the relationship between social deprivation and criminal justice. She argues that having minimally adequate access to supportive social inclusion is a necessary condition for a minimally decent human life. In her paper, she mentions socio-neurological studies, such as those conducted by John Cacioppo, which indicate that human beings do not fare well when they either are living solitary lives or perceive themselves to be living in isolation. 'The average person spends about 80% of waking hours in the company of others, and the time with others is preferred to the time spent alone . . . Social isolation, in contrast, is associated with lower subjective well-being' (Brownlee, 2012, p. 220).

proper way because they are not able to deliberate due to the prison rules and other constraints. Prisoners also seem unable to take part in the central human social and political activities and they are furthermore unable to feel the appropriate kinds of emotions.

7.3 Prisoners' Happiness

In this section, I will respond to the previous argument by arguing that actually there are ways in which prisoners are able to access the main components of happy lives. In subsection 7.3.1, I will show that prisoners can in fact exercise theoretical deliberation by taking part in education. They can also exercise practical deliberation by choosing what they want to do, even if their actions are restricted. In subsection 7.3.2, I will show how prisoners can also take part in social activities and relationships which allow them to learn and exercise the virtues of character. Finally, in the last subsection 7.3.3, I will explain how adaptation enables prisoners in addition to experience the appropriate emotions.

Therefore, in these three subsections, I will attempt to argue that my Aristotelian view of happiness correctly entails that some fundamental sources of happiness are accessible for prisoners too. I will also show how the prisoners' case helps us to understand that the constitutive elements of happiness according to my account have the kind of impact on prisoners' lives that happiness should have. Prisoners who successfully take part in the activities and relationships where they use their reason and exercise the virtues are those who successfully improve their quality of life.

7.3.1 Deliberation

In this first section, I will investigate the ways in which prisoners can exercise and develop their intellectual abilities and how these abilities are affected by imprisonment. I will show that

prisoners can actually deliberate even if their deliberation is limited by the prison rules. So, I will argue that prisoners can indeed have the first of the three components of my theory of happiness.

As I explained in section 7.2.1, one of the main consequences of imprisonment is the fact that prisoners lose the freedom to decide how they are to live their lives (Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald, 2008, pp. 216-217). However, the fact that prisoners' deliberation is limited does not mean that prisoners cannot actually deliberate. The two kinds of deliberations that I described in section 7.1.1 seem to be accessible even to people deprived of freedom. After all, people just need to use of their intellectual faculties to engage in deliberation. We know that prisons deprive people of their freedom by locking them up. However, even if prisons deprive people of their freedom of movement, no restriction is imposed to their mind.¹⁷²

The first kind of deliberation that I described was theoretical deliberation. People generally deliberate theoretically at least when they discuss with other people general topics such as what kind of a society would be just or what the consequences of the anthropocentric global climate change are. If that is the case, it might seem less likely that prisoners deliberate theoretically as very few prisoners probably take part in the previous kind of debates in prison. Yet, this should not be taken to mean that prisoners cannot deliberate theoretically at all.

One of the most effective example of how theoretical deliberation is exercised in prisons is the Prison University Project. The Prison University Project is a non-profit organization which has supported the College Program at San Quentin State Prison in California since 2003. It provides twenty courses each semester in Math, English, Science and Social Sciences, as well as an Introduction to Ethics course. Prisoners are encouraged to take part in the Ethics course to develop an understanding of the importance of critical thinking.

¹⁷² In section 7.2.1, I have explained how someone could argue that imprisonment affects prisoners' deliberation and cognitive faculties by causing psychological deterioration.

They take part in discussions about ethical topics with the aim of developing their theoretical ability to deliberate. Stories of prisoners who have successfully improved their lives through education are reported in the Prison University Project website.¹⁷³

In the UK, Swaleside's Open Academic has recently developed a similar project under the supervision of Prisoners' Education Trust. The Governor of Swaleside and the prison staff believe that providing a learning environment is the most effective way to provide opportunities for those who want to change their future while serving their sentences. The Swaleside's Open Academic project aimed to create an environment similar to a College or a University, rather than a prison, where people develop their intellectual skills. The case studies reported by the Prisoners' Education Trust show that prisoners who successfully take part in education have more chances to improve their lives after release.¹⁷⁴

These two case studies and also many other empirical studies show that taking part in educational activities can give prisoners opportunities to deliberate theoretically.¹⁷⁵ Prisoners can learn how to think critically and deliberate well by taking part in education. In particular, courses such as the Introduction to Ethics course can provide prisoners with opportunities to develop proper philosophical skills. This means that education is one of the activities in which prisoners are able to exercise deliberation. Furthermore, The Prison University Project and the case study of Swaleside, along with charities and organizations that promote education in

¹⁷³ Case studies and information about the Prisons University Project are available at <https://prisonuniversityproject.org/>. Case studies are also reported by Prisoners' Education Trust available at <http://www.prisonerseducation.org>.

¹⁷⁴ In section 8.3.2, I will discuss how prisoners benefit from taking part in education by discussing some case studies. Education in prisons is promoted by Prisoners' Education Trust. It is demonstrated that prisoners who successfully take part in education are less likely to reoffend and more likely to rehabilitate. Prisoners' Education Trust has established the Prisoner Learning Alliance which puts together organizations and charities who work to promote education and learning in prisons.

¹⁷⁵ The empirical studies discussed in section 2.4 also support the view that prisoners can actually take part in precisely those intellectual activities where they can exercise a pure activity of reasoning well. Prisoners are encouraged to take part in programmes designed for behavioural changes and self-improvement (Zamble & Porporino, 1990). They can also take part in education and training courses to learn new skills and they have opportunities to work and volunteer. This means that prisoners are encouraged to spend their time by taking part in activities where they need to deliberate (Coyle, 2005, p. 16). Moreover, we learnt from empirical studies discussed in previous chapters that prisoners who take part in these activities have more chances to improve their lives after release. Obviously, not all prisoners take part in these activities. Prisoners can indeed voluntarily decide that they do not want to take part in this kind of activities (Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald, 2008, p. 264).

prison, show that taking part in education is a way to help people to change their lives in a positive way.¹⁷⁶ This seems to suggest that taking part in education has the kind of impact on prisoners' lives that happiness should have in our lives.

In addition to explaining what theoretical deliberation consists of, in section 7.1.1 I explained how people also deliberate practically. People generally engage in practical deliberation by taking part in everyday tasks. In the case of prisoners, deliberation about everyday tasks and activities is clearly restricted due to prison rules, which the prisoners are obliged to follow (sec. 7.2.1). However, this does not mean again that prisoners lose the ability to deliberate or that they are unable to exercise any kind of practical deliberation. For example, they engage in practical deliberation when they decide in what kind of purposeful activities they want to take part or what kind of life they want to pursue after release.

This practical deliberation done by prisoners should remind us of Aristotle's discussion of mixed voluntary actions. In Book III of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle explains the difference between voluntary actions and involuntary actions. In discussing involuntary actions, Aristotle is concerned with two specific cases: actions done due to 'force' and 'through ignorance' (*NE* 1110a4-13). Aristotle classifies as mixed actions certain cases in which it is true that the agent was forced to act in a certain way by a constraint or that she only acted in the relevant way due to her ignorance. However, Aristotle suggests that we should treat the agents in these cases as proper subjects of ethical judgment with respect to their actions. This is because, even though the subjects are forced to act in a certain way, their actions still involve acts of deliberation (Broadie, 1991).

To explain what is going on in the mixed actions' cases, Aristotle uses the example of

¹⁷⁶ Case studies and stories from learner are reported by Safe Ground, Prison Reading group, Prison Arts Charity, Barrier Behind Bars, Holloway's Women's Institute, Eastwood Park Project, Drake Hall's creative writing and many others. References and case studies are available at <http://www.prisonerseducation.org.uk/>.

the sea captain who is forced to throw away the cargo during a storm in order to save the crew. In this case, the captain's action is made under a constraint, the storm. However, the captain has still deliberated about what the best action to do was. This means that there are involuntary actions (like being forced to throw away the cargo) which involve deliberation. Because subjects make decisions in the circumstances they are in, these kinds of actions are more like voluntary actions than involuntary ones (*NE* 1110a4-13).¹⁷⁷

The captain example should help us to understand that, even if deliberation is difficult in certain circumstances due to factors such as prison rules, this is not a problem for my theory of happiness. It seems that the actions in which prisoners exercise practical deliberation within the constraints of the prison rules are like the forced actions of the captain in Aristotle's example. Even if prisoners are forced to do certain actions because of prisons' rules, there is still deliberation going on in their actions. For example, prisoners are forced to have their lunch at a certain time but they can still decide to have their lunch in a certain way.

So, it seems very plausible to claim on the basis of what I discussed in this section that, even if prisoners lose much of their freedom to decide what to do in their own lives, they do not lose their ability to deliberate altogether. Prisoners can use their theoretical deliberation abilities by taking part in educational courses and purposeful activities and they can deliberate practically when they make simple everyday decisions. However, deliberation in prisons is happiness-constituting when it is inherent in certain activities (virtuous activities) which seem to make a difference in how happy we are (see sec. 7.1). So, in principle at least some prisoners are able to access the first essential component of happiness as *eudaimonia*.

¹⁷⁷ In his paper 'Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle', Irwin discusses Aristotle's theory of voluntary actions (Irwin, 1980, pp. 120-145).

7.3.2 Sociality

In this section, I will argue that prisoners can also take part in the happiness-constituting social activities and relationships. I will show that, even if social activities are affected by imprisonment, prisoners can still take part in what Aristotle calls a political life. I will also argue that the social activities and relationships are important elements of the prisoners' lives.

In section 7.1.2, I claimed that in order to make a difference in how happy we are, our social life and our social relationships should involve the exercise of our virtues of character. Social relationships should be based on trust, fairness kindness and so on. Moreover, the social activities in which we take part should allow us to practice these virtues. For example, if we have fair and loyal relationships with our colleagues at work, we could be happier with our lives.

Let us now analyse what kind of social lives prisoners have and whether social interaction and activities have an impact in their happiness. Even if prisoners follow a routine, they do take part in many activities which make their lives in many ways both normal and social. Prisoners are allowed to meet and be in contact in many ways with their families and friends. They can also socialize with other fellow prisoners and the prison staff in a variety of circumstances. Much of this social interaction takes place through purposeful activities such as work, volunteering, and education but it also takes place during recreation as prisoners are sometimes allowed to watch TV, play cards and the like. Moreover, the involvement in social and practical activities along with the contact with families and friends does allow the prisoners to cope with prisons' boredom and routine (Crewe, 2009). For example, there is evidence of the fact that prisoners cope with imprisonment by making friends and spending time thinking

about their release, their family and future, and so forth.¹⁷⁸

One of the best examples of a project that shows the importance of friendships and social relationships and the benefits prisoners get from this is the Prisoners' Penfriend Projects. Prisoners' Penfriends is a small charitable organization that encourages and supervises letter writing between prisoners and volunteers. Researches on the work of Prisoners' Penfriend show the impact on prisoners' well-being and their feelings about life after release from prison.¹⁷⁹ Volunteers show a thoughtful and considered approach to their work – they believe that they genuinely benefit from the work and they also find it satisfying and intellectually interesting and enjoyable. Prisoners who participate in the scheme usually first sign up in order to feel less isolated. The scheme also offers prisoners a welcomed distraction. Prisoners describe the benefits they receive through their relationships with their penfriends in emotional terms. They mention positives such as relief from isolation, positive changes in self-identity, distraction, interest, self-expression, raised hope for the future and happiness (Hodgson & Horne, 2015).

By taking part in schemes such as Prisoners' Penfriend, prisoners get a chance to improve their well-being and raise their chances of successful rehabilitation. The evidences and results reported by the Prisoners' Penfriends Project show that prisoners should be encouraged to have the kind of practical life and relationships which Aristotle thought are constituents of happiness. This is because the kind of social relationships that prisoners have by taking part in these activities lead people to exercise their virtues of character.¹⁸⁰ For example, prisoners who take part in Penfriends Project often report that they have been able to

¹⁷⁸ See Adams (1992, pp. 282-84) for the influence of social relations on prisoners' happiness. See Bruni (2010, pp. 386-406) for reference to the influence of relational good on happiness. References to studies on prison visiting and their benefits and harms on prisoners and families can be found in Moran (2013), Bülow (2013), Mills and Codd (2007).

¹⁷⁹ Prisoners who participate to the scheme are typically male, serving long sentences and many have little contact with anyone else outside the prison. Women prisoners rarely participate to the scheme. Volunteers come from a wide variety of backgrounds and geographical areas; typically they are well-educated female over the age of 50. The views about the project are gathered through telephone interviews with volunteers and through questionnaires for prisoners and volunteers (Hodgson & Horn, 2015).

¹⁸⁰ We know from section 7.1.2 that not all kind of social relationships and activities are happiness constituting. To be parts of a happy life, these activities and relationships must lead to virtues actions. Prisoners need to exercise their virtues of character and their ability to reason well when they take part in these social activities and relationships.

build true friendships based on trust and loyalty (Hodgson & Horn, 2015). Moreover, studies on prison experience show that prisoners who better cope with prisons' environment and who have improved their lives' conditions are i) those who have support from families and friends; ii) those who have good relationships based on trust and fairness with others inmates and prison staff; iii) those who successfully take part in purposeful activities; and finally iv) those who work in prisons (see section 2.4).

The social life inside prisons seems to be possible at least for some prisoners even if it is restricted and influenced by features of the prisons itself. Being one of the most important features of human life, sociality should not only be encouraged but also guaranteed to prisoners for the benefits it gives to prisoners.¹⁸¹ So, at least in principle prisoners can have the second essential component of happiness as *eudaimonia*.

7.3.3 Emotions

This section will return to what kind of emotions prisoners experience and how prisoners' emotions are affected by imprisonment. This is because, as we saw earlier in this chapter, according to Aristotelian accounts of happiness, happiness consists also of experiencing the right kind of emotions in the situations we face. This is because, when emotions are guided by reason, they can guide us to successful and virtuous actions.

I explained in section 7.2.3 how the experience of imprisonment seems to harm prisoners and their emotional lives in many ways both during the incarceration and also after the release. However, we need to note that empirical measures of behaviour, emotional states and cognition show also evidence of improved adaptation to the prison environment after a period of time. Studies on adaptation have shown that the new inmates have higher levels of

¹⁸¹ For a recent argument against social deprivation see Brownlee (2013, pp. 199-222). In her paper A Human Right against Social Deprivation, Kimberly Brownlee defends the human right against social deprivation.

anxiety and depression than longer-serving inmates. This means that, after a while, long-term inmates seem to develop strategies for coping with the prison environment (sec. 2.5 and 5.5.2).

When adaptation occurs in prisons, it affects the prisoners' emotions.¹⁸² The more prisoners adapt to cope with the prison environment, the more they are able to experience emotions in an appropriate way. For example, prisoners who successfully adapt experience less anxiety and anger. Prisoners are, thus, able to feel negative emotions in a more moderate way in prisons after the adaptation process. If prisoners experience emotions moderately, they are more likely to act virtuously.¹⁸³ As a matter of fact, we learnt from section 7.1.3 that for emotions to be happiness constituting they should not only be positive but they have to be experienced in the right way. When emotions are experienced in the right way, they lead us to act in the right way, which is to act virtuously.

As we know from the previous chapters, studies on the effects of imprisonment show that prisoners experience anxiety and fear, especially in the first period of incarceration. These kind of emotions seem to be appropriate to the circumstances in which prisoners are. After all, imprisonment is not a positive experience. However, some case studies report that prisoners, who successfully take part in rehabilitation programmes, consider that period of anxiety and distress in prison as a positive moment because they get a chance to start a new life.¹⁸⁴ The Prisoners' Education Trust (PET) reports stories of prisoners who took part in education courses in prisons and became managers, teachers, and councillors. Many prisoners, whose stories are reported in PET website, strongly believe that education has had a profound impact on their

¹⁸² See section 5.5.2 on adaptation for references to these studies.

¹⁸³ We learnt from section 2.5 on Crewe's study of adaptation in prisons that some prisoners regard imprisonment as a right intervention not just as a consequence of offending. The prison was considered by these prisoners a benign institution that provided them an opportunity to create a new good identity. Many of these prisoners wanted to demonstrate to their families and loved ones that they were fundamentally good people (Crewe, 2009, pp. 157-167).

¹⁸⁴ Studies on the negative effects of imprisonment have been made by Adams (1992), Pishkin and Thorne (1973), Zamble and Porporino (1988, 1992), Irwin and Cressey (1962), and Irwin (1980). The prisoners' Education Trust and the Prison Reform Trust report stories of prisoners who found in prison a chance to start a new life.

lives and it has been both rewarding and challenging.

A Ministry of Justice study showed that 49% of female and 23% of male prisoners suffer from anxiety and depression, as opposed to 19% of women and 12% of men in the UK population (Prison Reform Trust, 2016). However, studies on adaptation suggest that after the adaptation process prisoners are not only able to experience positive emotions but also able to feel the right kinds of emotions. After adaptation, prisoners experience lower levels of distress and anxiety. This means that if imprisoned individuals are able to cope and adapt to prisons, they are very likely to experience emotions in the way Aristotle thinks to be appropriate. For example, people who adapt are very likely to be less violent and aggressive and consequently their actions tend to be more moderate and temperate and thus also more successful and appropriate.¹⁸⁵ This indicates that many prisoners can experience the kind of emotions that according to my Aristotelian account are happiness-constituting because they lead to appropriate actions.

7.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tried to give an overview of my Aristotelian account of happiness as it applies to prisoners. An evaluation of prisoners' happiness through my account suggests that what counts in terms of happiness in prison is what kind of social relationships prisoners have and in which activities they take part along with what they feel or believe. By following my interpretation of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*, I showed that happiness consists of three elements of prisoners' lives: their ability to deliberate, their social relationships and their social lives and their emotions. This is because prisoners exercise their capacity of reasoning well and

¹⁸⁵ I claimed in section 7.1.3 that even if prisoners experience negative emotions, these emotions will be happiness-constituting as far as there are appropriate to the circumstances and lead prisoners to act in the appropriate way. See the examples of the new mother and the prisoners who successfully rehabilitate only if they experience the emotions in a proper way.

their ability to act virtuously by taking part in the activities and relationships that constitute the three elements of a happy life.

At first, it might seem like, according to my account, imprisonment prevents people from taking part in the activities that allow them to have the previous three constituent elements of happiness (see sec. 7.2 above). Prisoners' deliberation about their lives is constrained by the prison rules, and their social life appears to be restricted and their emotions mainly negative and not appropriate to the circumstances.

However, I argued in the last three sections of this chapter that, even if prisoners' life is very restricted in many ways and the prison rules affect prisoners' ability to have the three constituent elements of happiness, prisoners can still exercise their human capacities in a way that is needed for being happy. First, prisoners have the ability to exercise theoretical deliberation by taking part in education. Prisoners can also do practical deliberation by making choices within the prison rules. Second, prisoners can still have social relationships inside prisons with their families, friends and other inmates in which they are able to exercise their virtues of character. Finally, the human ability to adapt to difficult circumstances can allow prisoners to master their emotions and feel them in the appropriate way.

From this chapter we can therefore learn that prisoners do have at least in principle access to the three elements that according to my Aristotelian account constitute happiness. The three elements that constitute happiness according to the proposed account seem to be essential elements of living a decent human life in prisons and also after release. As a matter of fact, studies discussed in these sections suggest that prisoners who have access to the relevant activities and relationships that I consider to be happiness-constituting are more successful in improving their lives both in prison and outside. So, if prisoners have the elements needed for being happy, the experience of imprisonment becomes an opportunity, or so I will argue in the

next chapter.

Chapter VIII

Evaluations of the Aristotelian

Account of Happiness in Prison

Introduction

This last chapter of my thesis will try to explain why we should believe that the outlined Aristotelian account of happiness is the best way to evaluate and understand happiness in prisons. The chapter will be divided in three main parts. In the first part, I will argue that an Aristotelian account is better than the other theories of happiness which I have already discussed in my thesis (see chapters III, IV and V). The second part will evaluate two possible objections to my theory of happiness and finally the third part will present three advantages of evaluating prisoners' happiness with my account.

In the first part, I will argue that my Aristotelian account of happiness can help us to solve the problems which the other theories of happiness face in evaluating how happy prisoners are. This first part 8.1 will be divided in three subsections. The second part of this chapter will explore two possible objections to my account. I will first examine the claim that my account will be unable to evaluate the happiness of isolated prisoners correctly in section 8.2.1. I will then address one of the most common objections to objective theories of happiness according to which such theories can be objectionably paternalistic because they lack of any reference to the internal elements of prisoners' lives in section 8.2.2.

Finally, the third part of this chapter will present three additional reasons for why the Aristotelian account of happiness is a fruitful way to understand the relationship between happiness and imprisonment. In section 8.3.1, I will argue that, if we evaluate and understand prisoners' happiness with my Aristotelian account, this will help us to understand better how

imprisonment affects prisoners' happiness because the constituents of happiness on my account are the very same elements of the prisoners' lives that are affected by the imprisonment itself. In section 8.3.2, I will argue that taking part in the activities that according to my account are happiness-constituting is a way for prisoners' rehabilitation. Finally, in section 8.3.3, I will argue that my account can lead to more reliable ways of measuring happiness in prisons in empirical studies.

8.1 An Aristotelian Theory of Happiness vs Others Theories of Happiness

In the next four subsections, I will argue that my Aristotelian account leads to more plausible conclusions than the alternative views. This will show that my Aristotelian theory of happiness offers a better way to evaluate prisoners' happiness than the others theories. In the first section 8.1.1, I will explain why I choose Aristotle's theory over others theories of well-being. In section 8.1.2, I will show that my theory can help us to avoid the problems encountered by the hedonist theories. In section 8.1.3, I will show that my Aristotelian theory can also help us to solve the problems of WLS theories of happiness and finally in section 8.1.4 I will show that we should prefer my Aristotelian account of happiness over Haybron's theory when we evaluate prisoners' happiness.

8.1.1 Aristotle vs Subjectivist Theories of Well-Being

This section explains why Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia* should be preferred over others, more subjectivist theories of well-being. First, I will explain why, if we discuss when a person is happy in the deeper sense, we should consider the person's level of well-being – how well his life is going for him. Then, I will present the main competitors of Aristotle's theory, namely

hedonism understood as a theory of well-being and the desire-satisfaction accounts. Finally, I will explain why we do not need to consider different forms of hedonism again and what the main objection to the desire-fulfilment theories is. This should be enough to motivate the idea that we should investigate the Aristotelian account of happiness further in the prison context.

When discussing the notion of what makes a life good for the individual living that life, it is preferable to use the term ‘well-being’ instead of ‘happiness’.¹⁸⁶ A person’s well-being is what is ‘good for’ her. Health, for example, is considered to be a constituent of a person’s well-being, but it is not all that matters for the person’s well-being. A similar term used to refer to a person’s well-being is ‘self-interest’ - a person’s self-interest is what is in the interest of the person herself, and not others.

According to a standard classification, there are three main kinds of theories of well-being or theories about self-interest as Derek Parfit calls them (Parfit, 1984, p. 493). The first kind of theories are the Hedonistic accounts. The Hedonistic theories of well-being take well-being, i.e., what makes someone’s life go well, to consist of a positive balance of pleasure and pain. The second type of theories is the Desire-fulfilment theories. According to Desire-fulfilment theorists, well-being consists of the fulfilment of one’s desires. Finally, the third type of theories is the Objective List Theories, according to which well-being consists of having a sufficient amount of different goods from an objective list where what items are on the list does not depend on the subject herself.¹⁸⁷ Aristotelian theories are usually included among the Objective List Theories.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ Of course, as mentioned on page 6 footnote 5, there are some philosophers that use the word ‘happiness’ just to mean well-being (i.e., the standard normative sense). For the sake of consistency, this thesis uses the word ‘happiness’ only in the single deeper sense in which we talk about happy people in ordinary life and reserves the word ‘well-being’ for how well a person’s life is going.

¹⁸⁷ For a discussion on the theories of well-being’s distinction see Arneson (1999), Crisp (2011) and Parfit (1984).

¹⁸⁸ Two different examples of Objective List Theories are Griffin (1986) and Finnis (2011).

Hedonistic theories of well-being will not be discussed in this section further because the objections I made to Hedonism as a theory of happiness apply also to Hedonistic theories of well-being (see sec. 3.4 and 3.8).¹⁸⁹ I will instead briefly explain why I did not choose the Desire-fulfilment theories for my analysis. Let us start from a very brief overview of these theories. The simplest version of the desire-fulfilment theory is the ‘Unrestricted’ theory as Parfit calls it. This version claims that what makes someone’s life go well is what would best fulfil all the desires which a person has at one point or another during her whole life. Another version of the desire theory is the ‘Success’ theory. This theory claims that all of our preferences about our own life need to be fulfilled for our life to go well (Parfit, 1984, pp. 494-495).¹⁹⁰ Finally, a more plausible version of the desire-fulfilment theory is the ‘Summative’ or ‘Comprehensive’ version. According to this theory what matters to a person’s well-being is the overall level of desire-satisfaction in their life as a whole. A summative version of this theory suggests that the more desires we fulfil in a life, the better our life is going for us.¹⁹¹

One of the strongest objections to desire-fulfilment theories was originally presented by Martha Nussbaum in her discussion about the concept of preferences and its defect in standard economic approaches.¹⁹² As I will argue below, this objection also applies in the prison context. Nussbaum begins from Jon Elster’s account of adaptive preference. For Elster, desires count as

¹⁸⁹ For example, section 3.4 suggested that a person who has many pleasant experiences in prison and a positive balance of pleasure over pain can still be unhappy. This was a problem for hedonists theories of happiness. Hedonists theories of well-being would also entail that such a prisoner has a high level of well-being because he feels more pleasure than pain. However, this seems implausible too. Let us remember the example of Jack and Daniel. Daniel, whose balance of pleasure over pain was negative, was said to be better off than his brother Jack. Daniel’s life was going better than his brother’s life because he had a lovely family and he did not have a drug problem. He had in fact a higher level of well-being than his brother Jack. However, if this is the case, hedonists theories of well-being have to admit that a person, like Daniel, who has a negative balance of pleasure over pain can have a higher level of well-being than a person whose balance is positive. So, Hedonist theories of well-being have to say either that Daniel is not better off than his brother, which seems implausible, or give up the idea that a person’s well-being consists of his balance of pleasure over pain. See also section 3.8.2 for an objection to hedonism as a theory of well-being (fn. 83).

¹⁹⁰ For an objection to this version of the desire theory see Crisp (2011) and Parfit (1984).

¹⁹¹ Of the summative version, Crisp presents two kinds of theories: the global version and the informed desire version (Crisp, 2011).

¹⁹² For a discussion of the main objections to Desire-fulfilment theories see Crisp (2011), Parfit (1994), Heathwood (2014) and Nussbaum (2000b).

adaptive when they are adjustments in response to one's circumstances rather than the result of deliberation.¹⁹³ Nussbaum then considers Amartya Sen's illustration of adaptive preferences in a specific context. Sen focuses on the situation of women and other deprived people. According to him, some women do not desire even the most basic human goods because they have long been habituated to deprivation or they have been told that it is not for them to have such good. Nussbaum's main objection to the desire-satisfaction theories then is that, according to these views, the women's lives in the previous situation would have a high-level of well-being. After all, most of their preferences are satisfied. However, given how implausible this is, we should rather reject the desire-satisfaction theories (Nussbaum, 2000b, pp. 136-140).

It seems plausible to suggest likewise that people who adapt to the deprivation of freedom imposed by imprisonment can develop adaptive preferences. This is because, when prisoners cannot get what they want because of the relevant restrictions, they may adapt their preferences to their situation. By doing so they will then be able to get what they want. For example, if an imprisoned mother desires to see her little daughter every day but she knows she can only see her one hour a week, she will in all likelihood adapt her desire to her condition by lowering her expectations. She will thus desire to see her daughter on that hour a week so that she will get a chance to fulfil her desire. The problem with the mother's desire to see her daughter is that in order to fulfil her desire she needs to adapt her preferences to her condition. Adaptive preferences and desires thus seem to be influenced by the circumstances and not be autonomous. Moreover, a person who experiences adaptive desires does not seem to have a high-level of well-being. The imprisoned mother does not seem to experience a high-level of well-being even if her new desire is now fulfilled.

¹⁹³ According to Elster, adaptive desires have a fox-and-grapes structure: the fox who desires the grapes, knowing that he cannot get the grapes, says that grapes are sour (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 136).

As we know from previous chapters, adaptation frequently occurs in prisons. This suggests that prisoners are likely to form adaptive preferences. However, as the previous example shows, it seems unintuitive that the prisoner's life would have a high level of well-being after she adapted her preferences to her condition. This means that if we were to evaluate prisoners' well-being through the desire-fulfilment theory, we could get unreliable conclusions about prisoners' well-being. This problem of desire-fulfilment theories gives us reason to think that objective theories of well-being that do not suffer from the previous problem (such as the Aristotelian account) could be better. The second reason for considering an Aristotelian theory of well-being is the relation between happiness-constituting activities and the exercise of virtue, which Aristotle's theory is able to recognise.¹⁹⁴

8.1.2 Aristotle vs Hedonism

In this section, I am going to argue that an Aristotelian account of happiness solves the problems encountered by Hedonism. I will first explain the role of pleasure in Aristotle's theory of happiness. I will then show that an Aristotelian theory of happiness suggests that, when we evaluate how happy prisoners are, we need to take into consideration the pleasant activities in which prisoners take part even if this will not be the only consideration that determines how happy the prisoners are. This is different from hedonism according to which prisoners' happiness consists only of prisoners' pleasant feelings and positive attitudes.¹⁹⁵

Aristotle refers to the role of pleasure in human life in various parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE* 1099a7–20, 1104b3–1105a16). However, in Book VII (11-14) and X (1-5),

¹⁹⁴ Later on this chapter I will explain how my theory recognises a virtue constraint. On my view, only virtuous activities are happiness-constituting (see sec. 8.2.2 but also 7.1.1). I also explain how understanding happiness as the exercise of virtue could be a way for prisoners to start living a positive good life (see sec. 8.3.2).

¹⁹⁵ Chapter 3 of this thesis explained how hedonists understand happiness in terms of pleasure and pain. Sensory hedonists would say that happiness is a matter of pleasant feelings and sensations. In contrast, attitudinal hedonists think that happiness consists of positive attitudes towards experiences. Hence, according to hedonists, if we want to know how happy prisoners are, we need to understand whether they are experiencing more pleasure than pain.

Aristotle's main concern is to determine what role pleasure plays in a happy life. According to Aristotle, we can distinguish between pleasures of the soul and pleasures of the body (*NE* 17b28-29). The former pleasures are those involved in the activity of thinking while the latter pleasures are those associated with the senses of hearing, touch, taste and smell. For example, we feel pleased when we are listening to our favourite song, and we also find it pleasant to think about our future career.

Aristotle starts his discussion of pleasure in Book VII and initially associates pleasures with an unimpeded activity of natural state (*NE* 1153a7-17).¹⁹⁶ By defining pleasure as an unimpeded activity, Aristotle meant that pleasures are happiness-constituting activities only when they do not interfere with other virtuous activities. Only if a pleasure comes from a virtuous activity, it will be part of *eudaimonia*. For example, the pleasure that comes from helping an elderly person to cross the road is precisely the kind of a pleasure which Aristotle would acknowledge to be a constituent of *eudaimonia*.

This point is further explained in Book X. Here, Aristotle gives a more specific explanation of pleasure. He claims that, even if pleasures last a certain time, this fact is completely accidental to their nature (*NE* 1174a14-b1). This is because pleasure does not take time to be fulfilled. Aristotle believed that we do not need to wait a certain time to get pleasure from an activity in which we take part. For example, when we experience pleasure from listening to a beautiful song, we do not have to wait to enjoy the pleasure given by that song; it is as instantaneous as the listening itself. Aristotle would say that pleasure is present in the moment in which we enjoy that particular activity and it is completely related to the activity itself.

¹⁹⁶ Here with "natural state" Aristotle is probably referring to a well-functioning and health human being. Bostock uses the word "perception" instead of "unimpeded" in his interpretation of Aristotle theory of pleasure. Bostock's interpretation draws a distinction between a pleasure that is perceived and a pleasure that is felt by senses. The activity of perception is different from the sensory activity because it involves the use of mind along with the use of senses (Bostock, 1996).

Moreover, because he believes that pleasure is related to the virtuous activities in which one takes part, Aristotle claims that a pleasant activity is a complete activity in Book X.¹⁹⁷ As we learnt in section 6.3.7, a “complete activity” is, for Aristotle, the activity that makes a life worth living and ultimately happy. This means that Aristotle takes pleasure to be one of the elements of happiness because for him pleasure is present in all complete activities that are happiness-constituting. In fact, in the discussion of what happy life is, Aristotle admits that the hedonists are right in claiming that we all want pleasure (*NE* 1104b34-1105a5; 1153b-1154a).¹⁹⁸

However, according to Aristotle hedonists are wrong in identifying the happy life with the life of pleasure for two reasons. First of all, what hedonists fail to grasp is that the pleasures we desire are always related to the activities in which we take part. Pleasure is not really desirable in itself. Think, for example, of listening to your favourite song again. The pleasure we get from this activity is related to the fact that we are actually listening to that song. We feel pleased because we are listening to that song. Pleasure is part of happiness as a consequence of the fact that we are listening to that song.

Second, Aristotle thought that a happy life is desirable in itself. Because pleasure is not desirable in itself, for Aristotle pleasure cannot be the sole purpose of a happy life.¹⁹⁹ As a matter of fact, according to Aristotle, pleasure can only be a complementary element of the activities in which we take part in order to lead a happy life (*NE* 1174b34-36). Aristotle believed

¹⁹⁷ There are two interpretations of what Aristotle is claiming in Books VII and X of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. One interpretation claims that, according to Aristotle, the fact that a certain activity is pleasurable means that that activity is complete. In contrast, according to the second interpretation, pleasure is an extra fact that is present when the activity is complete (Bostock, 1996, p. 251). I will not try to solve this dispute here because I am only interested in showing that according to Aristotle pleasure is happiness-constituting. Both interpretations admit that Aristotle believes that a complete activity includes always pleasure. See Bostock (1996) for an explanation of the two interpretations.

¹⁹⁸ See Rorty (1974) on the role of pleasure in Aristotle’s ethics. See also Bostock (1988) on the relationships between pleasure and activities in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. See Gonzalez (1991) for a discussion on pleasure and its role in complete activities. See Annas (1980) for a discussion about the relation of pleasure and goodness in Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*. See Rorty (1980) for the relationship between *Akrasia* and Pleasure in Book VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

¹⁹⁹ Aristotle believed that the end of a happy life must be sought for its own sake (*NE* 1097a 30-35).

that people naturally find pleasure in taking part in the human activities which enable us to exercise virtues. For example, people experience pleasure as a consequence of having friends. In this case, the virtues associated with friendship are trust, fairness, love, loyalty and the like.²⁰⁰ So, it seems that pleasure is associated with taking part in virtuous activities and as a consequence pleasure is happiness-constituting. However, following Aristotle's view of pleasure, I will argue that only certain pleasant activities are happiness-constituting.

In section 7.1, I argued that people should exercise their virtues of character in order for an activity to be happiness-constituting. This means that to be happiness-constituting an activity must not only be pleasant but it must also involve virtues. For example, if I am just drinking a cold beer because I am thirsty, I will be pleased as my thirst disappears. But, according to my account, this activity does not make me any happier because I do not take part in a virtuous activity while I am drinking a beer. In contrast, if I am drinking a cold beer while I am meeting a friend, in this case the activity of drinking a beer can be happiness-constituting. This is because the activity of drinking a beer is related here to the exercise of a human activity, friendship, which is also pleasant. The pleasure that comes from me drinking a beer is happiness-constituting because it *enhances* a virtuous activity to which I am taking part. On this point my view of pleasure appears to be in contrast with hedonists theories.

As we know from the third chapter, hedonists think that happiness consists of a pleasant state of mind which is either a feeling or an attitude. They also believe that all pleasant experiences are constituents of happiness.²⁰¹ For example, if I am drinking a cold beer and this gives me a pleasant feeling, this experience is happiness-constituting no matter what the activity in which I take pleasure is. This means that all pleasures, even trivial and shallow ones, are

²⁰⁰ Aristotle believes that friendship is happiness-constituting only when it involves the exercise of certain virtues of character. See Books VIII and IX of the *Nicomachean Ethics* for Aristotle's discussion of friendship. For a recent discussion of the role of friendship in Aristotle's ethics see Annas (1977), Cooper (1977, 1980), and Smith (2003).

²⁰¹ See section 3.4 for the objections to sensory hedonism and 3.8 for the objections to attitudinal hedonism.

happiness-constituting on this view. In the evaluation of prisoners' happiness, this turned out to create a problem for hedonism (sec. 3.4.1 and sec. 3.8.1). However, I will argue next that my account does not suffer of similar problems.

Section 3.4.1 explained how, if a prisoner experiences on balance more sensory pleasure than pain from drug-induced trivial things while imprisoned, then according to sensory hedonism these pleasant experiences are happiness-constituting and make a difference to how happy the prisoner is. However, I showed that this was a problem for sensory hedonists. In contrast, if we follow my account, we would argue that the pleasures that come from trivial experiences are not happiness-constituting because they do not come from taking part in virtuous activities. In this way, these drug-induced experiences of sensory pleasure are similar to the previous example's pleasure of no longer being thirsty after drinking a cold beer. Therefore, if we evaluate the prisoners' happiness with my Aristotelian theory of happiness, we should conclude that not all sensory pleasures make a difference to how happy prisoners are which is why this view can avoid the problems of trivial and shallow pleasures.

The same argument can be used to avoid the problems of attitudinal hedonism. According to attitudinal hedonism, in order to be happy, prisoners must enjoy the experiences in which they take part. Aristotle would disagree with attitudinal hedonists because according to him a pleasant state is happiness-constituting only if it is a part of a complete activity.²⁰² For example, if a prisoner is pleased about the fact that he is eating a cracker this experience constitutes an atom of happiness for attitudinal hedonists.²⁰³ The very fact that the person has a positive attitude toward that experience makes the experience happiness-constituting. In this case, my view again would say that just enjoying an experience is not enough for making that

²⁰² By "complete activity" Aristotle means the activity that makes a life worth living and ultimately happy.

²⁰³ See section 3.8.1 for a discussion of this objection to attitudinal hedonism in a prison case. See also Haybron for general discussion on what kind of pleasures can be considered happiness-constituting (2005, p. 299)

experience happiness-constituting. Rather, the person who is experiencing the pleasure must actually take part in a virtuous activity and use her capacity of reasoning in order for the relevant pleasure to make a difference to how happy that person is. This is why my Aristotelian view can avoid also the problems of shallow pleasures in attitudinal hedonism (sec. 3.8).

8.1.3 Aristotle vs Whole Life Satisfaction Theory

In this section, I am going to argue that my account of happiness in prison also solves the problems encountered by the WLS theories of happiness. I will use the case of the contemplative prisoner (sec. 4.5.1) to show that whereas the WLS theories cannot capture the happiness of this prisoner my Aristotelian theory can do so. My theory of happiness in prison suggests that, when we evaluate how happy prisoners are, we need to take into account the virtuous activities in which the prisoner takes part rather than the prisoner's own judgments about her life as a whole. The aim of this section is therefore to show that there are ways to be happy in prison that do not require making judgments about your life as a whole. I will first return to the problems of the WLS theories and then show how my Aristotelian account can deal with the case of the contemplative prisoner.

In the contemplative prisoner's case, we are supposed to imagine an imprisoned woman who is deeply engaged in thinking about her future days outside the prison. She is engaged in the pure activity of reasoning and thinking about the possibility of being free, meeting her family again and start a new job. She is planning how she will spend her future career and life. We are supposing that she is so engrossed in her reflection that she is giving no thought to her actual life in prison.

The main problem encountered by the WLS theories of happiness is that these theories are unable to correctly evaluate the contemplative prisoner's happiness. In fact, in the

contemplative prisoner's example, our intuition is that the prisoner can be happy even if she is not actually making any judgments about her life as a whole. I showed that this is a major problem for the actualist versions of the WLS theories.²⁰⁴ Moreover, intuitively the prisoner can be happy even if it is true that, if she were to form a judgment about her life as a whole at that time, it would not be a favourable judgment which is a problem for the hypothetical versions of the WLS theories.²⁰⁵

Let us then consider how my Aristotelian theory deals with the contemplative prisoner's happiness. In particular, I will argue that this view leads to plausible conclusions about how happy this prisoner is.

In my interpretation of Aristotle's theory of happiness, I argued that happiness consists of two kinds of activities: practical activities and theoretical activities.²⁰⁶ Practical activities are ones in which people take part in the course of their everyday lives, whereas the theoretical activities are in contrast those activities that involve pure reasoning.²⁰⁷ In the previous example, it is clear that the contemplative prisoner is taking part in the latter type of activities. She is deeply involved in thinking about her future life after release. This means that, according to my account, the contemplative prisoner is involved in an activity which is happiness-constituting and she can therefore be happy on my view whilst she is contemplating. Therefore, my theory of happiness will enable us to evaluate the contemplative prisoner's happiness correctly.

What we learn from this evaluation of the contemplative prisoner's happiness is that my

²⁰⁴ According to the actualist theories, a happy person must actually make a judgment about his life satisfaction. Sumner's theory (1996) and Telfer's theory (1980) are examples of actualist theories.

²⁰⁵ The hypothetical versions claim that a happy person must merely be such that she would make such a judgment, if she thought about her life. Tatarkiewicz's theory (1966) is an example of a hypothetical version of WLS theory.

²⁰⁶ I argued that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle claims that these activities are both guided by reason (*NE* 1102a-1103a). See Aristotle's discussion of the soul in the section 6.1.2 of this thesis where I argued that happiness consists of any activities guided by reason.

²⁰⁷ I explained the kind of deliberation people need to engage in to be happy in sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2. We saw that activities which involve the use of practical deliberation are social and recreational activities. These include work, educational activities, social relationships, and so on. References to Aristotle's discussion of theoretical deliberation can be found in Rorty (1980), Kraut (1991), Reeve (2012), Bartlett and Collins (1999).

Aristotelian theory suggests that, in evaluating prisoners' happiness, we should take into account what prisoners are actually doing rather than merely how prisoners would judge their lives. As long as prisoners are taking part in one of the activities that are happiness-constituting, these prisoners are happy at least to some degree on my view. And, the more the prisoners take part in these activities, the happier they should be considered to be. In contrast, if we take into account only how prisoners would judge their lives while imprisoned, this would lead us to mistaken conclusions about their happiness. The evaluation of the contemplative prisoner's happiness with my Aristotelian theory also suggests that empirical studies on happiness in prisons which rely on subjective judgments about life satisfaction can be unreliable because they measure happiness only on the basis of first-personal judgments. This problem will be discussed below in section 8.3.3.

8.1.4 Aristotle vs Emotional State Theory

In this section, I will argue that my Aristotelian account of happiness can evaluate the happiness of prisoners also more accurately than Haybron's emotional state account of happiness. By considering what kind of emotions prisoners experience after adaptation, I will show that an Aristotelian account of happiness leads to more plausible conclusions about what kind of emotions are happiness-constituting in prisons. My Aristotelian theory suggests that in evaluating prisoners' happiness, we need to take into account all the emotions that prisoners experience, both positive and negative. This is because negative emotions often seem to be appropriate in the circumstances in which prisoners are (see sec. 7.1.3).

In chapter five, I explained that, for Haybron, happiness is a psychological condition which consists of both central affective states and mood propensities. Happiness is on this view a positive emotional state (opposite to depression or anxiety) and a disposition to experience

certain central positive affective mood-related states. Overall, on this view, happiness roughly consists of a favourable orientation toward one's life.²⁰⁸

Haybron's theory makes happiness a stable and deep emotional condition. His theory seemed to overcome the problems of hedonism and WLS theories of happiness. However, I argued that the dispositional element of Haybron's theory of happiness is especially problematic in the context of prisons. The basic problem turned out to be that, if we want to evaluate prisoners' happiness accurately, we need also to take into account the activities in which they take part and not just their emotional states. This is because, by taking part in these activities, the prisoners' dispositions to experience positive moods are manifested. In contrast, if we just take happiness to consist of positive affective states and mood propensities, this will lead to wrong conclusions about prisoners' happiness.²⁰⁹

The chapter on Haybron's emotional state theory taught us two interesting things about the emotions of prisoners. First, emotional states are a very important element of prisoners' lives. If we want to understand what happiness consists of in prison, we do need to look at what kind of central affective states prisoners are in. We also learnt that prisons often affect prisoners' emotional lives in a negative way. Prisoners are very likely to experience fear, anxiety and anger.

The difference between Haybron's theory of happiness and my theory is that emotions play a different role. Haybron thinks that happiness consists of positive emotional states, while my account suggests that happiness consists of appropriate emotional responses. This difference becomes crucial when we evaluate prisoners' happiness and their ability to adapt to the circumstances. In fact, as I will now explain, we should prefer my Aristotelian theory

²⁰⁸ See section 5.2 on Haybron's Emotional State theory. See Haybron (2008) for a full understanding of his theory.

²⁰⁹ See section 5.6 for my objections to Haybron's theory of happiness. See Hill (2009) for an objection to Haybron's mood propensity.

because it can help us to understand better the consequences of adaptation.

As we know, adaptation occurs in prisons. The level of negative emotions that prisoners experience seems to decrease after a period of time because prisoners find ways to cope with the condition of deprivation imposed by imprisonment.²¹⁰ However, even if prisoners are likely to adapt to imprisonment, there are differences between how individual prisoners adapt. Some prisoners start to experience positive emotions after the adaptation process, whereas other prisoners still feel negative emotions after adaptation but become able to control their negative emotions (such as fear, anxiety and the like). My Aristotelian theory and Haybron's theories of happiness will come to different conclusions about how happy these prisoners are and it seems like my view has more plausible consequences.

Let suppose that we have two prisoners, Laura and Paula. Laura experiences positive emotions after adaptation. She improves her relationships with prison staff and with her family and friends. She takes part in an education course and starts planning her future after release. In contrast, Paula still experiences negative emotions at this stage but in a more moderate way. Just as Laura, Paula also improves her life after adaptation. However, Paula's central states are still overall negative. In the case of Laura, both my view and Haybron's view would suggest that Laura's positive emotions are happiness-constituting and so both theories would lead us to draw the same conclusions about how happy Laura is. I would say that the positive emotions have led Laura to react in the right way to the circumstances she is facing and through successful action this leads her to be happy. She seemed in fact to have improved her life after adaptation by taking part in the activities that my Aristotelian account considers happiness-constituting. Haybron would also, in in this case, claim that Laura's central affective states are positive and therefore happiness-constituting. So, my theory and Haybron's theory would evaluate Laura's

²¹⁰ See section 2.5, 4.4.2 and 5.5.2 of this thesis for discussion about adaptation in prisons and its consequences on prisoners' happiness.

happiness exactly in the same plausible way.

In the second case, my Aristotelian view will lead to a different conclusion than Haybron's account. As we know from section 7.1.3, the negative emotions experienced by Paula could be considered to be appropriate in the circumstances in which she is. Paula successfully takes part in the activities that according to the Aristotelian standard are constituents of happiness. I might claim that in this case Paula has learnt to master her negative emotions. So, even if Paula is experiencing negative emotions, she can still be happy because she is reacting in the appropriate way. In contrast, Haybron is committed to claim that Paula must be unhappy because she has negative central affective states.²¹¹ Haybron would say that the fact Paula is experiencing negative emotions shows that she is unhappy.

The analysis of Laura and Paula's case shows that an Aristotelian account offers a more plausible evaluation of their happiness than Haybron's account. Now, I will show how an Aristotelian theory does not suffer from the objection which I made to Haybron's theory earlier. In chapter five, I argued first that two persons with the same affective state but with different mood dispositions can be equally happy when their mood propensities are not instantiated, which was a serious problem for Haybron's theory. I also argued that two prisoners with the same affective states and the same mood dispositions need not always be equally happy whereas Haybron's view is committed to that.

In section 5.6.2, I presented an example with two prisoners, Tom and John, who have the same central affective states and mood dispositions. The only difference between Tom and John was in the way in which the two prisoners' dispositions were manifested. John's dispositions were manifested because he was more successful than Tom in taking part in

²¹¹ Mental states theories define happiness as the presence of positive emotions, the relative absence of negative emotion and a sense of life satisfaction. *Eudaemonic* approaches, on the other hand, take unpleasant feelings as just as crucial as the enjoyable ones in helping you make sense of life's ups and downs. Remember, one of the primary roles of emotions, for Aristotle, is to help us evaluate our experiences of life.

purposeful activities. If we were to judge Tom and John by observing their dispositions, we would come to the conclusion that John is apparently happier than Tom. However, we assumed that the two prisoners still have the same central affective states and same dispositions.

In analysing these two prisoners' happiness, Haybron was forced to judge the two prisoners as equally happy which appeared to be implausible. In contrast, if we evaluate these prisoners' happiness through an Aristotelian account, we will judge John to be happier than Tom. This is because John is more successful in taking part in one of the core activities that according to my view are happiness-constituting. John seems to take part in a virtuous activity (educational course) successfully which is what I suggested a human being needs to do in order to be happy. An Aristotelian analysis would conclude that what matters is whether Tom and John take part in the activities where their dispositions to experience positive moods and their affective states are manifested. This conclusion seems to fit with our intuitions about Tom and John's happiness. John seems happier than Tom. In contrast, Haybron's conclusion remains implausible. An Aristotelian account, thus, seems to be a better way to evaluate prisoners' happiness than an emotional states theory.

8.2 Objections to an Aristotelian Account on Prisoners' Happiness

In the next two sections, I will discuss two possible objections which could be made to my account of prison happiness. In section 8.2.1, I will discuss the first possible objection which is focused on the way my account would evaluate an isolated prisoner's happiness. Someone could argue that my account leads in this case to a conclusion that is in conflict with what we would intuitively say. In section 8.2.2, I will try to reply to those who would accuse my account of paternalism because my account of happiness lacks of a reference to the prisoners' internal life.

8.2.1 Isolation Cases

In this section, I am going to address the first potential objection to my account of happiness as a theory of the happiness in prison. It could be argued that my account leads to wrong conclusions about the happiness of prisoners in isolation. I will do my best to explain why this is not the case. And, I will show that as far as a person is living a virtuous life, my account leaves room for many different ways for a person to be happy in prisons too.

The contemplative prisoner's example, which I have discussed several times in the previous sections, is an adaptation of Feldman's contemplative philosopher example (Feldman, 2010, pp. 157-159). At first sight, my prison version of this example can appear to be implausible. One could think that it will be very unlikely that someone could be deeply engaged in philosophical contemplation in prison. However, my version of the example tried to create a more plausible case by focusing on a prisoner who is deeply engaged in thinking about her own life after release. As a matter of fact, empirical studies have shown that prisoners often tend to focus their thoughts on their lives after release in order to cope with imprisonment.²¹² Moreover, when prisoners are isolated, the only thing they can really do is thinking. So, it seems that the contemplative prisoner's case is not just a fictional case but rather a case that is likely to actually exist. However, the reason why I chose to use this example was that it enables me now to discuss an objection which could be made to my interpretation of Aristotle's theory and its application to prisoners.

Someone could point out that, according to my interpretation of Aristotle's theory of happiness, happiness is not only constituted by pure activities of reasoning but rather it should

²¹² See again Crewe (2006, 2009), Adams (1992), Zamble and Porporino (1990, 1992), Leigey (2010) Kasser (1996) for references to empirical studies on adaptation and coping strategies mentioned in the previous sections of this thesis.

also consist in part of taking part in certain practical and social activities and of feeling certain emotions. It could be suggested that if, for example, a prisoner is in isolation and she is not taking part in social activities, according to my account, she cannot be completely happy. This is because an isolated prisoner will not have one of the three constituent elements of my account of happiness, sociality. In contrast, it could be argued that being in isolation does not always mean being unhappy. Think, for example, someone who sacrifices the social part of her life in order to pursue some solitary artistic or spiritual goal. If this is the case, it seems that my account can hypothetically lead to an implausible conclusion in the evaluation of a prisoner in isolation. However, I will show that this is not a problem for my theory of happiness because my account leaves room for degrees of happiness. I will show that the isolated prisoner can be considered to be happy to a significant degree. To see this, let us return to the contemplative prisoner's example.

Imagine that the contemplative prisoner is a real prisoner who is in isolation for some reason. Because she is in isolation, the contemplative prisoner cannot take part in many of the activities that are in my account constituents of happiness. The only thing that the prisoner can really do is to think about her life after release. The contemplative prisoner is deeply engaged in this activity because thinking about the future is helping her to cope with the condition of imprisonment and isolation. However, being in isolation makes the prisoner also frequently angry. Fortunately, the prisoner has learnt to control her ire and anger because she knows that angry behaviour could delay the day of her release. Moreover, when she is deliberating, she is pleased about this and she enjoys this activity. Let us also suppose that another prisoner is also frequently engaged in theoretical activities but he is not in isolation. He can thus take part in social activities but he is not very successful in exercise the virtue. As matter of fact, this prisoner has also learnt how to master his emotions but sometimes he still manifests his anger

and rage.

Let us then try to evaluate how happy these two prisoners are in order to see whether the suggested Aristotelian account leads to plausible conclusions in these cases. You might have the intuition that the first prisoner, who has learned to cope with imprisonment, is probably happier than the second prisoners who still experiences anger and ire. However, one could also argue that my account is forced to say that the second prisoner is happier than the first one. This is because, according to my account, in order to be happy a person's life should contain the three happiness-constituting elements: deliberation, social life and the right type of emotions. Clearly, the first prisoner does not have a social life at all because she is isolated and so cannot be involved in one of the central activities that, according to my account, make human beings happy. In contrast, the second prisoner's life seems to contain all the three elements at least to some degree. Therefore, it might seem like I should say that the second prisoner is happier than the first one, which you might think is unintuitive. However, I will argue next that my interpretation of Aristotle's intellectual virtue enables my account to reach the plausible conclusions also about the two prisoners' happiness. If we correctly understand my account, we can say that my account accepts that the first prisoner is happy too and probably happier than the second prisoner.

I will try to explain that, if we correctly understand my interpretation of Aristotle's theory of happiness, we should say that my account evaluates the two prisoners' happiness correctly. We know from the example that even though the second prisoner has all the three elements that constitute happiness, he does not take part in these activities successfully. The fact that the second prisoner merely takes part in certain activities is not enough to make him happier than the prisoner who is unable to participate in all those activities. To be happier than the first prisoner, the second prisoner should exercise virtue - he should live a virtuous life by

acting with *phronesis*.

As I have suggested several times, a person acts with *phronesis* when he is able to deliberate well. This means that a person must think about his life and choose the right things to do. Clearly, the first prisoner is more successful in doing so because she is engaged in pure reasoning, which allows her to deliberate well. She has learnt how to master her negative emotions and consequently she acts in the right way and she knows that, if she acts in the wrong way, this could lead to a worst consequence, a delay in her release. In contrast, the second prisoner is less successful in deliberating well. We saw that even if the second prisoner takes part in all the human activities that are elements of a happy life, this prisoner still experiences ire and anger. This means that he does not experience emotions in the way that according to my Aristotelian account is required for living a happy life. His emotions are not moderate.²¹³ The second prisoner has the three elements needed for being happy but he fails to properly take part in the core virtuous activity (reasoning well) that according to me makes human beings happy.

All if this means that, according to my account, the two prisoners experience happiness to a different degree. The first prisoner is successful in taking part in one of the three constituent elements of happiness. The second one has all the three constitutive elements of happiness but he is less successful in being virtuous. The defect in the second prisoner is that sometimes he experiences anger and rage. Compensating for that, he has a much greater range of deliberation and exercise of practical wisdom than the first, he can engage in social activities that the first cannot. However, there is no reason to believe that being in isolation is worse than imperfect control over emotions. We could say that the two prisoners are thus experiencing different degrees of happiness. The fact that the two prisoners have at least one of the three constituent

²¹³ We should bear in mind that, according to my account, emotions to count as constituents of happiness need to be guided by reason and lead to virtuous actions. This means that the person needs to experience emotions in the correct way. The right emotions are those emotions which are experienced as a mean between two extremes. In this case, the prisoners experience anger and ire which do not seem to be happiness-constituting.

elements of happiness allow to my account to admit different way to be happy in prison. As far as a person takes successfully part in one of the activities that constitute happiness in my account, she will have found her own way to be happy.

In conclusion, the discussion of the isolated prisoners shows that, according to my Aristotelian account, a person does not just need to have the three elements of happiness but she must also exercise virtues. From this example we also learn that according to my account a prisoner who is successful in exercising the virtues but do not have all the constituent elements of happiness can be happy at least to some degree. Finally, from this section we learn that in evaluating the two prisoners' happiness, my account also leaves room for different ways of being happy and for different degrees of happiness which are related to how the prisoner lives his life.

8.2.2 Subjective Aspects

The way I suggested we should evaluate prisoners' happiness leads to another possible objection which could be made to my Aristotelian account of happiness. This objection is probably one of the most common objections to Aristotelian and other objective theories of happiness. Some philosophers have suggested that theories of happiness like the one I have defended in this thesis are somehow objectionably paternalistic.²¹⁴ Someone could ask: who am I to say how happy prisoners are? Wouldn't the prisoners themselves know this better? This objection is based on the idea that no one else other than the prisoners themselves are in a position to know how happy they are and what constitutes happiness for them. In contrast, the objective theories of happiness like my theory do not recognise such internal elements as

²¹⁴ See Sumner (1996, p. 123), Feldman (2010, p. 221) and Haybron (2008, p. 180).

constituents of happiness.²¹⁵

In this section, I will attempt to evaluate and respond to this objection. First, I will show that the fact that my account takes prisoners' deliberation to be one of the constituent elements of happiness shows that my account does include a subjective element. Second, I will show that my Aristotelian account of happiness includes an internal element which is the sensation of an internal reward which we have when we exercise virtues. Let us start, however, from the explanation of the principle that seems to pose a problem for my theory.

In several passages of *Welfare, Happiness and Ethics* (1996), Wayne Sumner discusses the preferentist theory of happiness which encapsulates "the liberal spirit of the modern age" (Sumner, 1996, p. 123). He points out that this "liberal spirit" is the modern tendency to see each person as the only one who can shape his own destiny and the only person who knows what it is good for him and what makes him happy.²¹⁶ This idea is also discussed by Haybron in *The Pursuit of Unhappiness* (2008). Haybron discusses "the principle of epistemic authority". This principle, which Haybron ultimately rejects, is the idea that each individual has a special authority over what makes him happy.²¹⁷ Following finally Feldman, we could formulate this principle of personal authority also in the following way: each person has the power to determine what will be the constituents of happiness in his or her own case (Feldman, 2010, p. 222).²¹⁸

The principle of personal authority is clearly in conflict with the basic principles on which Aristotelian and other objective list theories of happiness are based. Objective list theories come in many forms and shapes. However, they all agree that some things can

²¹⁵ By internal elements here I refer to individuals' mental states or sensations.

²¹⁶ Sumner talks about self-direction and self-determination to refer to each person's authority to determine what is good or bad for him (Sumner, 1996).

²¹⁷ Haybron formulates this principle in the following way: 'even though people can make mistakes sometimes, they pretty well know what's good for them and how they are doing, and generally make prudent choices in pursuit of their interests' (Haybron, 2008, p. 13).

²¹⁸ See section 5.6.1 for a discussion on first-person epistemic authority problem.

constitute our happiness, not because we enjoy them or have the right attitude towards them, but rather for some other reasons. Many of these theories are more or less grounded in the Aristotelian notion of *eudaimonia*.²¹⁹ As we know, my own Aristotelian theory claims that happiness in prisons should be understood in terms of rational exercise of virtues. Nevertheless, if the problem of paternalism is a problem for the objective theories of happiness, it will equally be a problem for my view and therefore it is an objection I need to address. In fact, someone could say that my theory is trying to tell the prisoners how they should live their lives in order to be happy and what the constituents of their happiness are.

This is not, however, what I am suggesting. What I have been suggesting in my thesis is that we need an objective way for evaluating how happy prisoners are which can help us to better understand the relationship between happiness and deprivation. The lives of prisoners are an example of a deprived life and this is why I decided to analyse the relation between happiness and imprisonment. As I will argue in section 8.3, there are also at least three additional reasons for why the proposed account is a fruitful way to understand this relationship. However, before we get to those additional reasons, I will now need to explain how my account addresses the paternalistic objection and how my account can recognise at least one subjective internal element as a constituent of prisoners' happiness. I will first show that my account takes prisoners' subjective deliberation about happiness to play an important role with respect to their happiness. This is because deliberation is inherent in any happiness-constituting activity. In order to argue that my theory has this subjective element, I will first return to Aristotle's idea of *phronesis* where *phronesis* is the subject's ability to deliberate well.

In Book VI, Aristotle claimed that, in making judgments, human beings use five capacities – *intelligence*, *episteme*, *sophia*, *techne* and *phronesis*. Aristotle distinguishes

²¹⁹ See Arneson for a defence of Objective List Theory (1999). See Fletcher (2013), Darwall (2002), Nussbaum (2000), Haybron (2008), Alexandrova (2005, 2008) for general discussions of Objective theories of happiness.

theoretical deliberation (*sophia*) from practical deliberation (*phronesis*). The purpose of theoretical wisdom is only to give us understanding of the most important universal truths. In contrast, the purpose of practical wisdom is to lead us to act successfully (*NE* 1139a27-31). As I explained in section 7.1.1, practical wisdom is the human ability to deliberate well in specific circumstances. People with practical wisdom have the capacity to deliberate well about the things that are good for themselves and about the things that are in their interest in the concrete situations they face.²²⁰

Aristotle is thus aware of the fact that practical wisdom does not provide us with a set of rules to follow for living a happy life. Practical wisdom seems to be more a sort of guidance rather than a set of rules. When we use practical wisdom, we think about a certain situation in terms of virtue. We ask whether an action can be kind or courageous or loyal and then we choose what the right thing to do is.²²¹ By referring to practical wisdom, I am trying to show that my Aristotelian account admits a subjective component. People's deliberation about their own lives is one of the main components of the happy life. In order to be happy, according to my account, a person should deliberate well and choose to live the kind of life is good for her.

If the subject's virtuous deliberation is an essential component of happiness, this means that my Aristotelian account will be able to recognise a subjective element. Deliberating about his life, the subject himself decides and chooses what kind of life will make him happy. However, my account would admit the virtue constraint: a happy life will only be a virtuous life. On my view there can be different ways for us to be happy but these ways are all related to how well we deliberate in terms of virtue.²²² This means that we all choose and know what

²²⁰ Aristotle believed that we deliberate and choose the means that lead to the end. In contrast, we wish for the end. For example, we wish for health, but we choose the things through which we are healthy. The same is for happiness. We wish to be happy, but we do not appropriately say that we choose to be happy (*NE* 1140a 25-28).

²²¹ For references to modern virtue ethicists influenced by Aristotle's ethics see Anscombe (1958), MacIntyre (2007), Hursthouse (1999) Philippa Foot (2001).

²²² See, for example, the prisoners' case of the previous section. In that case, the two prisoners had two different kind of deliberation. The first prisoner was engaged in theoretical deliberation, while the second prisoners had more practical

the best way to live a happy life is for us if we live a virtuous life. I will accept the fact that my account could be accused to be paternalistic because of the virtue constraint.²²³

However, according to my account, deliberation seems to be an essential part of happy life and someone could argue that this could be a problem for my view. Take the person who is against deliberation - a spontaneous person who thinks she is happy. She would object that my account is telling her how to live and how to be happy in a way that conflicts with her own views. She might deem this paternalistic.

A spontaneous person clearly lacks one of the crucial elements of a happy life in the Aristotelian sense, she is against deliberation. She thinks that only a spontaneous life is the happy life. It seems that if a person lacks deliberation, my account is forced to admit that she is not happy. However, my account admits different way to be happy. For instance, if a person lacks deliberation but exercises the virtue by taking part in social activities, she can still live a happy life. Moreover, even in the case of a spontaneous person my theory would still admit an internal element. The fact that a happy life in my account has a subjective element is showed by the fact that the exercise of virtue involves an internal reward. The internal reward I am referring to is the sensation we feel, for example, when we do a kind action. Or, the pleasant sensation we feel when we meet a friend. All these internal sensations are related to the fact that we are taking part in the activities that my account consider happiness-constituting.

Moreover, in section 7.1.2, I claimed that happiness is also constituted of social relationships and social activities. A spontaneous person will in any case take part in social activities in her everyday life. This means that she could still be involved in the activities that

deliberation. We know from that section that this is not a problem for my account (see. 8.2.1). I admit that two prisoners experience happiness to a different degree.

²²³ In section 8.1 I will explain why I prefer an Aristotelian account instead of others accounts for understanding what happiness in prisons consists of. Also, in section 8.3.2, I will explain how my account seems to be in line with one of the purposes of prisons. Prisoners should get a chance to start living a good and positive life. On my view a happy life consists of a virtuous life. This means that if we take happiness in prisons to consist of living a virtuous life, our view will be in line with the prisons' purpose.

are happiness-constituting. Even if a person is not deliberating, the feeling and emotions that come with taking part in certain social activities, which are happiness-constituting, will constitute the subjective aspect of my account of happiness. Furthermore, even a spontaneous person, by taking part in happiness-constituting activities, is still using her reason and deliberating about her life. Deliberation in fact is inherent to any happiness-constituting activity. Take for instance social relationships, such as a loyal friendship, a spontaneous person will still deliberate when taking part in this interpersonal relationship. My account again would still admit a subjective element.

In conclusion, my theory addresses the problem of being paternalistic by recognising that happiness is constituted by subjective deliberation about the means needed for being happy. However, my account admits the virtue constraint of deliberation and accepts the paternalistic consequences of this. Moreover, my theory addresses the problem of spontaneous people and replies to the objection of being not related to internal subjective elements. By admitting the importance of the internal feeling of reward that we have and the deliberation involved when we exercise the virtues in interpersonal and social relationships that constitute happiness, my theory admits a subjective element as a constituent of happiness even when a person is against deliberation.

8.3 The Advantages of my Aristotelian Account

In the following three subsections, I am finally going to argue that, in addition to fitting our intuitions about cases better than the other views, there are also three additional reasons for why the outlined Aristotelian account is the best way to understand the relationship between happiness and imprisonment. First, I will argue that, in evaluating prisoners' happiness, my theory of happiness enables us take into account all the central elements of prisoners' lives

which are affected by imprisonment. Second, I will argue that, if prisoners are allowed and encouraged to take part in those happiness-constituting activities, this can help with their rehabilitation. Third, I will suggest that my account could be used to develop more reliable and accurate measures of happiness in prisons than the prisoners' subjective evaluations of their own happiness.

8.3.1 Imprisonment affects Happiness

In this first section, I will argue that, if we evaluate prisoners' happiness with the outlined Aristotelian account, we can get an accurate idea of how imprisonment affects the lives of prisoners. This is because, as I will show, the elements that are happiness-constituting on my view are the main features of the prisoners' lives that are affected by imprisonment.

I have argued earlier that, in order to be happy, a prisoner's life should contain at least one of the three elements (sec. 7.1). First of all, according to my account, prisoners should deliberate well by relying on rational and wise decision processes. Second, prisoners should also take part in social relationships and practical activities such as having friends, meeting their families, studying, working and so on. And finally, they should feel emotions in the right way. The suggestion is that negative and positive emotions count as happiness-constituting when these emotions lead to successful, virtuous actions.

Even if this is mainly a philosophical investigation, this thesis has tried to engage with the empirical studies on the consequences of imprisonment. The evidence from many studies has showed that imprisonment mainly affects three domains of the prisoners' lives. First of all, one of the most interesting differences between a life inside a prison and a life outside a prison is that the life of prisoners is entirely organised by prison rules and staff. This feature of

imprisonment seemed to affect prisoners' ability to deliberate about their lives.²²⁴

I explained how prisoners are essentially not able to decide what they want to do during their days in prison; they are unable to decide how to organize their daily lives (Coyle, 2005, pp. 104-105). Moreover, the imposition of a set of rules to follow also affects the prisoners' time management and often leads most prisoners to avoid making long-term plans. Prisoners thus stop caring about their future and in some cases inmates even lose their ability to plan their lives completely. Prisoners are also often bored and just follow their daily routine. They furthermore tend to spend most of their time in their cells. All of this means that daily life for most prisoners consists of spending a short time doing certain basic tasks, which suggests that they have few possibilities to deliberate about their whole lives.

I explained in section 7.2.1 how it could be suggested that, because of this, prisoners lose the ability to decide what they want to do in their lives. In fact, psychological studies in prisons showed that prisoners experience many kinds of cognitive problems. Many prisoners suffer from serious mental disorders and depression. Sometimes these problems make inmates unable to deliberate at all about their lives and their deliberation is very limited by their attitudes toward their lives.²²⁵ Prisoners also frequently lose control over their lives and become unable to make any decisions about their lives.²²⁶ The Prison Reform Trust reported that 26 per cent of women and 16 per cent of men said they had received treatment for a mental health problem in the year before custody. Personality disorders are also particularly prevalent among people in prisons. 62 per cent of male and 57 per cent of female sentenced prisoners have a personality disorder (Prison Reform Trust, 2016).

²²⁴ See section 2.2 for reference about prison life. See section 7.2.2 for references to the effects of imprisonments on prisoners' deliberation.

²²⁵ Studies on psychological deterioration, for example, have showed that inmates can suffer from defective cognitive functions, such as loss of memory and ability to think. Studies on the deteriorating effects of imprisonment have been made by Adams (1992), Pishkin and Thorne (1973), Zamble and Porporino (1988, 1992), Irwin and Cressey (1962) and Irwin (1980).

²²⁶ See sections 2.2 and 2.4 for extensive references to these studies.

From empirical studies conducted in prisons we thus learn that there is evidence to support the idea that prisoners' deliberation is affected by imprisonment. Prisoners seem to have fewer possibilities to deliberate about their lives and even when they have opportunities of deliberate their deliberation processes appear to be influenced by prison environment.

Second, from studies on prisoners' activities and relationships, we also learn that imprisonment affects greatly prisoners' social and practical lives. Imprisonment affects several domains of prisoners' lives such as their marriages, parenting relationships, friendships, health, jobs and so on. A study conducted by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development reported that ex-offenders are the most disadvantaged of all the labour market. Moreover, prisoners cannot freely take part in social and recreational activities like visiting friends or their families. Relationships between prisoners and their families are difficult and they are frequently isolated from their families, relatives and friends. A study made by Prison Reform Trust and Partners of Prisoners and Families Support charity reported that many prisoners face high levels of social stigma and isolation. The study also shows that families play a key role supporting vulnerable people through the criminal justice system but they lack effective support and accessible information. Prisoners can spend some of their time doing purposeful activities like taking part in educational courses and volunteering but most prisoners cannot take part in these activities because they are waiting for their trial or because they are in maximum security prisons or isolation (Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald, 2008, p. 257).

Because of these constraints, the involvement of the prisoners in all the central human social activities, which I considered to be a central component of a happy life, depends on the prison rules. So it seems very plausible to say that imprisonment affects also the second essential elements of a happy life. It affects the social life of prisoners and their involvement in activities of an ordinary practical life.

Finally, imprisonment affects prisoners' emotional lives too.²²⁷ As we saw in the first section, long term incarceration causes deterioration of prisoners' personalities and mental health but also of prisoners' emotional states. Prisoners experience emotional problems such as apathy and problems with relating to others. Some prisoners can even acquire psychotic characteristics such as obsessions and the loss of a sense of reality. Many inmates also suffer from emotional distress such as depression and dysphoria.

Emotional states of prisoners are usually furthermore highly negative in the very early period of imprisonment and high levels of depression, anger and anxiety are registered among inmates at this stage. Some prisoners can become aggressive and violent. The prison environment can also influence the inmates' emotional states. A boring, monotonous prison routine creates additional stress by reinforcing negative feelings such as emptiness and despair.²²⁸ All of this means that prisoners' dispositions to feel situation-appropriate emotions are affected by incarceration.

It thus emerges from the empirical studies that imprisonment affects many important features of the prisoners' lives along with the three core elements of lives that according to my account are happiness-constituting. This means that what is *ideally* required according to my account of happiness for being happy in prison is what is *actually* affected by imprisonment. Consequently, if we evaluate prisoners' happiness through my account, we will get an accurate idea of the relation between happiness and imprisonment and what happiness consists of in a condition of deprivation such as imprisonment.

²²⁷ However, despite imprisonments affects all these elements of prisoners' lives, I showed in section 7.3 that prisoners can still have all these three elements. Prisoners exercise their deliberation; they have a social life and feel the right kind of emotions.

²²⁸ For references to these psychological studies see section 2.4, 4.2, 5.5.1 and 5.5.2.

8.3.2 Happiness and Rehabilitation

In this section, I am going to argue that, if prisoners take part in the activities that according to my Aristotelian account are happiness-constituting, this can improve their chances to have a better life both during the imprisonment and also after their release. This means that helping prisoners to pursue happiness in prison will also be a way to rehabilitate prisoners. This would mean that my Aristotelian account of prisoners' happiness would be able to help prisons to serve one of their main purposes.

As we saw in the first chapter of this thesis, one of the purposes of prisons is to rehabilitate offenders. Rehabilitation in prisons consists of helping the inmates to become ready for starting a new and better life after imprisonment. Because of this aim, governments have introduced different types of activities in which prisoners can take part.²²⁹ Prisoners are encouraged to participate in workshops focused on providing prisoners with supervision, knowledge and different kinds of skills. For example, some prisoners are taught basic assembly and packaging – for example, basic packing of fruit, greetings cards, breakfast packs, nuts and bolts. Many prisoners are offered a chance to work while they are carrying out their sentence. For example, prisoners are employed to make clothes and furniture and to do electrical engineering. This work is done in prison workshops and it is normally paid work. Prisoners can also work for the prison itself - they can cook and wash laundry, for example, and they can learn skills such as woodwork, engineering and gardening.

London-based charity Switchback has won an award for Prisoner Rehabilitation in 2016. This charity uses catering activities and intensive mentoring as a way to help prisoners into training and employment on release at HMP/YOI Isis in Thamesmead. After training in

²²⁹ This model has been applied in western countries. Moreover, we should also bear in mind two things when we talk about rehabilitation in prisons. First, these programmes and activities are not available to all prisoners. The access to facilities and activities like these is indeed given on the basis of the category to which the prisoners belong. Second, there are prisoners who refuse to take part in these activities.

prisons, trainees start working at one of Switchback's partner training cafés to develop skills for working in kitchen. Ministry of Justice reports that 45 per cent of people reoffend within a year of release from prison in England and Wales. Switchback has a reoffending rate of 12 per cent (Prisoners' Education Trust, 2016).

Education seems to be another way for prisoners to start a new life while imprisoned. Most prisoners get an Individual Learning Plan which lists all the courses and training they are expected to take part in. Courses are normally available to help prisoners to acquire new important life-skills such as reading and writing, using computers and doing basic maths. For example, most courses lead to qualifications that are also recognized by employers outside prison such as GCSEs or NVQs. Prisoners may even be able to do distance learning courses, for example at the Open University. With the aim of rehabilitation, prisoners are also encouraged to take part in programmes designed for behavioural changes and self-improvement.²³⁰

The Prisoners' Education Trust reports stories of prisoners who have found in education a chance to start a new life. A prisoner, for example, describes his distance learning coordinator role gained after attending education in prison. Another prisoner was awarded a Law degree LLB (Hons) via the Open University. He described his experience explaining how he wanted to study law for a number of reasons including an interest in how law affects our everyday lives, understanding his own rights, especially whilst in prison. He explains how he truly believes that education is the route to reducing re-offending as it gives the skills and the self confidence in being able to achieve the goals one sets. Another prisoner who is currently serving her sentence at HMP Holloway writes about the important skills she has been gaining volunteering with the charity Sue Ryder whilst on release on temporary licence (ROTL) under their Prison Volunteer

²³⁰ See Coyle (2005, 2008), Livingstone, Owen and MacDonald (2008) for reference about what kind of activities are available to prisoners.

Programme. The stories of prisoners, who through education, volunteering, working, and families and friends' support have started a new life in prisons, show how the activities that are happiness-constituting because they involve the use of reason and virtuous character-traits play an important role in prisoners' life and rehabilitation.

Empirical studies and charities' cases study have shown that the introduction of these activities in prisons has increased the prisoners' chances of improving their lives after release. These activities have also been found to improve the prisoners' quality of life during the incarceration.²³¹ The previous studies show also that many prisoners do actually take part in these activities and benefit from them. For example, through government programmes, prisoners have enhanced their chances of getting a job after the release and even during the incarceration. Prisoners have also improved their relationships with their families and friends through these programmes.²³² St Giles Trust, a charity that trains men to become Peer Advisors who provide support to their peers whilst in prison with resettlement advice, immigration and maintaining family contact, reports that people who take part in their scheme give support to each other, whatever their culture, nationality, language or religion, building relationship and trust in an environment when often there is mistrust of authority. The scheme also helps Peer Advisors to achieve internationally recognised qualifications that have led to full-time employment on release (Prisoners' Education trust, 2016).

Through this section I explained how prisoners are encouraged to take part in practical activities that help them to rehabilitate and how prisoners benefit from taking part in these activities. Activities that aim at helping prisoners include learning programmes, volunteering activities, jobs, training and so on. Taking part in those activities enable prisoners to exercise

²³¹ See the annual report of the justice inspectorate cited in footnote 146 of this thesis for data on prisoners' participation in purposeful activities and their chances for rehabilitation.

²³² For reference to the benefits of these activities on prisoners' life see Liebling, Crewe and Hulley (2011), Livingstone, Owen and Macdonald (2008), Coyle (2005) Zamble and Porporino (1990).

and develop their virtue of character and practical deliberation which lead them to more successfully actions. All these activities seem to be the kind of activities I claimed to be happiness-constituting. However, I also claimed that one of the most important activities that prisoners should take part in is theoretical deliberation.

In section 7.3.1, I offered just two examples that show how prisoners have been able to exercise theoretical deliberation by studying ethics and critical thinking. Despite the fact that the two prisons that held these courses report high rate of success in prisoners' rehabilitation, the previous type of courses in prisons are rarely organised and they are only offered to those who have access to Higher Education.²³³ By highlighting the importance and the impact that studying ethics and critical thinking can have on the prisoners' lives and on their chances of resettlement, my thesis aims to encourage the introduction of ethics and critical thinking courses in prisons across the UK. I want to suggest that prisoners should be encouraged to take part in group discussions about philosophical topics that are related to the meaning of life, happiness and morality. Philosophy in prisons would give to prisoners a chance to exercise and develop one of main activities of human beings, critical thinking.

In conclusion, it is very plausible to claim, on the basis of empirical evidence and prisoners' stories that prisoners do benefit from taking part in those activities that my Aristotelian account considers to be some of the main constituents of happiness. Moreover, it seems very plausible to claim that if prisoners are encouraged and helped to take part in purposeful and social activities, these activities allow prisoners to find a way to be happy even after their release. So, prisoners should be allowed to take part in the activities which seem to have an impact on prisoners' life and happiness. By taking part in the activities that according to my account are happiness-constituting, prisoners can get a change to improve their lives after

²³³ Education in Prisons consists usually of course in English, Math and Science. Access to other courses is only allowed to those who take part in Open University courses.

release and during incarceration.

8.3.3 Measuring Happiness in Prison

In this last sub-section, I will argue that my Aristotelian approach offers empirical studies a better way to measure happiness in prisons. Instead of asking prisoners about their life-satisfaction or about the pleasantness of their experiences, my approach will evaluate what prisoners are actually able to do and to be.²³⁴ I will show that my theory will help empirical studies to solve the problems encountered in evaluating prisoners' happiness through subjective judgments.

As it was explained in the introduction chapter, the word "happiness" is used at least in two different senses. Being happy is often taken to amount to merely feeling happy or more commonly happiness is used in a deeper psychological or descriptive sense. This second use of the word is typical in many philosophical theories and the subjective well-being literature (Haybron, 2008, pp. 28-29). Subjective well-being studies are scientific analyses of how people evaluate their own lives (sec. 4.2). These self-evaluations include people's own assessments of their emotions, moods, life satisfaction, fulfilment and satisfaction within various domains such as marriage, work and so on.

Psychologists look at behaviours and personality traits when they analyse and measure subjective well-being. For them, subjective well-being consists of experiencing high levels of pleasant emotions, low levels of negative emotions, and high life satisfaction. Subjective well-being can be described as a person's cognitive and affective evaluation of his life as a whole. These evaluations can include emotional reactions to events as well as cognitive judgments of

²³⁴ Martha Nussbaum's capability theory is the most famous example of an approach to measure well-being (Nussbaum, 2000, pp. 70-100). My approach will have some resemblance to her approach.

satisfaction and fulfilment of one's life (Snyder & Lopez, 2009, Diener, Lucas & Oishi, 2002, Diener, Oishi & Lucas, 2003).

Subjective well-being is characterized by three main components: positive affect - the presence of pleasant emotions such as joy and contentment, negative affect - the absence of unpleasant emotion such as fear, anger and sadness, and personal judgments about satisfaction. Satisfaction judgments can be general (when a person is overall satisfied with his life) or specific (when a person is satisfied with his job, for example). These judgments about life, work, marriage, and other domains can be based on past emotional experiences and emotional memories, and they can also involve explicit goals, values and standards of comparison that are used to evaluate one's current life. A happy person is then according to this psychological model someone who is frequently cheerful, only occasionally sad, and generally satisfied with his or her life (Biswas-Diener, Diener & Tamir, 2004, p. 19). Thus, studies of subjective well-being seem to be interested in the study of what philosophers would call happiness.²³⁵

Despite some evidence of reliability and validity, these methods of trying to measure happiness suffer from several serious problems.²³⁶ First of all, subjective judgments can be influenced by trivial things and we should expect that the relevant judgments can be influenced by trivial objects even in the circumstance of deprivation imposed by imprisonment (see section 4.4). This has led us to doubt whether the relevant judgments really are a reliable instrument for the evaluating the prisoners' happiness.

However, if we evaluate prisoners' happiness through the outlined Aristotelian theory and so take into account the three elements of prisoners' lives that are affected by imprisonment, we will be able to create new and more reliable ways of measuring happiness in prisons. In this

²³⁵ General studies of subjective well-being can be found in Argyle (1996), Diener (1984), Diener, Lucas and Oishi (2002), and Kahneman (1999). See also section 4.2 for a discussion of Subjective well-being and Whole Life Satisfaction Theories.

²³⁶ I discussed the various methods and their validity in section 4.4 and 5.5.1 of this thesis.

situation, we would be able to evaluate prisoners' happiness in three ways.

First, we would need to evaluate whether prisoners are able to deliberate well both theoretically and practically. Even if this is difficult to do, there still seems to exist ways in which we could observe and analyse prisoners' ability to make right decisions in attitudinal tests. For example, prisoners could be asked to solve problem cases and they could also be asked how they would act in different circumstances. There is also another way in which we could observe how prisoners deliberate about their lives. I explained how prisoners exercise their deliberation by taking part in education and volunteering activities. We could, therefore, evaluate how successful prisoners are in taking part in those activities, which would then give us some idea of how well they are using their deliberation.²³⁷

Second, we will also need to evaluate what kind of social and practical lives prisoners have. When we do so, we will need to observe different domains of prisoners' lives such as work, social and familiar relationships, education, health, and so on. In this case, we would need to learn whether the prisoners are involved in and interested in having the right kind of virtuous relationships. For example, we could observe whether prisoners' relationships are based on virtues such as trust, kindness and loyalty. We can also rely on external judgments about how well prisoners are doing with their lives by interviewing prisoners' friends, family members and fellow inmates. In this case, we could learn whether prisoners' first-personal reports match the evidence provided by people around them. We could also learn whether prisoners have the right kind of virtuous relationships by analysing prisoners' letters. This would help us to understand whether prisoners' relationships are based again on virtues.²³⁸

²³⁷ The impact of volunteering in people's happiness has been studied by Nezlek (2000). The relationship between happiness and education has been studied by Michalos (2007). The positive impact of education on prisoners' lives is reported by Prisoners' Education trust. I explained in the previous section how education has an impact in prisoners' resettlement and rehabilitation. Measuring how successful prisoners are in taking part in these activities could give us an idea of how well they are doing with their lives in the circumstance they are in.

²³⁸ When we try to assess prisoners' happiness through objective methods based on reading prisoners' letters for example, we need to bear in mind there could be ethical issues concerning prisoners' privacy. So, this should have to be done with the

The relationship between happiness and interpersonal relationships has been measured by both social scientists and psychologists. Kahneman and his colleagues (2004) analysed 15 social activities to which people take part daily. They discovered that people enjoy being alone more than being with others only in one activity: when they are praying, whereas they enjoyed the rest of the 15 investigated activities (such as exercising, resting, working, etc.) more when they were taking part in them together with other people. This experiment was carried out using the DRM methods. The Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) assesses how people spend their time and how they experience various activities and situations. It combines time-budget measurement and experience sampling. Participants reconstruct their activities and experiences of the previous day with procedures that reduce recall biases. Kahneman and his colleagues used this method to measure ‘instant utility’. ‘Instant utility’ is constituted by the feelings the subject is experiencing in a specific moment (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz & Stone, 2004, Alexandrova, 2008).

This method is interesting because it offers a more objective way to measure one of the relevant elements of my account of happiness. I explained that social and practical activities and the relationships we engage in by taking part in these activities are constituent elements of a happy life. Moreover, it seems that this method is trying to develop a way to avoid the problem of lability (see sec. 4.4) by reducing the influence of biases on subjects’ responses to their questionnaires. Respondents are in fact asked to complete their diary before they know the content of the later questions about each episode. The reason why I mentioned this study here and I referred widely to SWB studies previous is that I found measurements of SWB still accurate and valuable. Even if my account of happiness tries to find a more objective way to evaluate happiness in prison, the components of happiness in my account are strictly speaking

consent of the prisoners and voluntarily. However, we know from the Prisoners Penfriends project we analysed in section 7.3.2 that prisons’ rules state that prisoners’ letters and possessions are supervised and checked regularly.

related to the way in which people decide to live their lives. In my account what people think and what people do are all equally important elements of happiness.

Finally, we would also need to evaluate what kind of emotional lives prisoners have in order to understand how the prisoners react to imprisonment emotionally. It is then fortunate that ways to observe and evaluate emotional experiences have already been developed. We learnt from section 4.2.1 that, for example, to evaluate emotional experiences in everyday life, researchers have developed a technique called “experience sampling”. Participants carry palmtop computers that sound an alarm at random times indicating that participants must fill short surveys about their emotional states and activities (Biswas-Diener, Diener & Tamir, 2004, p. 20). An alternative way to measure prisoners’ emotions and their emotional reactions to imprisonment could rely on interviewing prisoners’ relatives and friends instead of surveying prisoners. Measurements of prisoners’ emotions can be also made by using biological methods such as those that measure heart rate, startle reflex, hormone levels, and neurological activity (sec. 4.2.1). These methods’ results could be useful for my approach because of the relationship between emotions and reason I explained in section 7.3.3. I showed how emotional responses can have an influence in people ability to make practical decisions.

All of this means that, in order to be accurate, empirical studies should use more objective ways of measuring prisoners’ happiness. Measurement of prisoners’ happiness through my Aristotelian account of happiness gives a complete framework for evaluating how the life of prisoners is going. It gives an objective point of view which could solve the problem of subjective prisons-related judgements (sec. 4.4). In fact, my Aristotelian approach suggests that empirical studies should evaluate different area of prisoners’ lives in order to determine how happy they are rather than only rely on subjective evaluations that could be influenced by trivial features imposed by the prison environment. By analysing different aspects of prisoners’

life, empirical studies do not suffer the lability problem. The evaluation of what kind of relationships prisoners have and an observation of what prisoners actually do will help to get an impartial and objective idea of how well prisoners are doing with their lives in prisons.

8.4 Conclusion

This chapter has tried to answer three questions: what is the best account to evaluate happiness in prisons? What are the main objections to my Aristotelian account on prisoners' happiness and can they be responded to? And finally, what are the benefits of the outlined philosophical analysis of the relationship between happiness and imprisonment? In response to the first question, I claimed that my Aristotelian account is the best way to evaluate happiness in prison because it solves the problems encountered by the other theories of happiness.

As a response to the second question, I explained the main objections to the outlined Aristotelian account. First, I explained how it could be argued that my account leads to wrong conclusions about the happiness of prisoners in isolation. I addressed this objection by explaining that my account leaves room for many different ways to be happy in prisons too. The case of an isolated prisoner showed that even if a prisoner lacks one of the components of happiness, there are ways for him to be happy at least to some degree. Then, I argued that my account cannot be accused of being objectionably paternalistic. Prisoners' ability to make their own choices and their deliberation are an essential part of my account of happiness. This means that we all deliberate and choose what the best way to live a happy life is for us. I have also shown that even in the case of a spontaneous person who lacks deliberation, my account still admits an subjective constituent element of happiness by referring to the internal sentiment of reward we feel when we take part in virtuous activities that constitute happiness.

Finally, in this chapter, I explained the benefits of the outlined philosophical analysis of

the relationship between happiness and imprisonment. First of all, the analysis of prisoners' happiness through my Aristotelian account gives a clear idea of how imprisonment affects happiness. This is because the aspects of prisoners' lives most affected by the imprisonment turn out to be the very same things that constitute happiness on my account. As a consequence and because of this similarity, empirical studies which will rely on my analysis on prisoners' happiness will be able to measure happiness in prisons in a more reliable way. My account does not suffer from the liability problem which is an issue for those methods of measuring happiness in prisons which are based only on prisoners' own judgments and self-reporting. First-person evaluations can in fact be influenced by trivial features, which make the measurements of happiness based on them unreliable. In contrast, my account suggests more objective ways to understand and evaluate how happy prisoners are.

Finally, my account of the prisoners' happiness also suggests that prisoners who take part in the happiness-constituting rehabilitation activities during their imprisonment can enhance their chances to improve their lives. So, my account on prisoners' happiness seems to suggest that there is a relation between happiness in the Aristotelian sense and rehabilitation in prisons.

Chapter IX

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have argued that an Aristotelian account is the best way to understand what the happiness of prisoners consists in and what the relationship between happiness and imprisonment is. I argued that happiness in prison is a matter of how well the prisoners' lives are going in terms of deliberation, sociality and emotions. According to my Aristotelian account, happiness consists of engaging in theoretical and practical deliberation, taking part in social activities and relationships, and finally feeling the right emotions. In this chapter, I will briefly explain the three main conclusions of my research project. I will then briefly summarise my thesis. Finally, I will consider how my thesis could influence the reform of prisons in the future.

My thesis has three main conclusions. First, I showed that there are reasons to believe that the traditional views of happiness do not offer a plausible account of happiness in the case of prisoners. Traditional theories of happiness - hedonism, whole life satisfaction theories, and emotional state theories - fail to reach the right conclusions in the evaluation of prisoners' happiness in certain cases. The problem of these theories is that they take happiness to consist merely of mental states no matter what prisoners do or can do and in what circumstances prisoners are.

Second, an evaluation of prisoners' happiness in light of my account suggested that we should reconsider the ancient idea of happiness as *eudaimonia*. I offered an accurate and original interpretation of Aristotle's theory of happiness and I adapted Aristotle's ancient view to the contemporary scenarios of prison life. My account takes happiness to consist in living well and virtuously by taking part in the activities and relationships where we use our capacity

of reasoning. I suggested that to evaluate how happy prisoners are, we need to look at what kind of life they live and in which activities they take part. The approach I have defended was different from many other *eudaimonic* views because I claimed that happiness not consists only of what people actually do and could do but also of what they feel and believe. According to my account, everyone can have her own way to live a virtuous and happy life. This means that my theory is not just an objective theory of happiness but it also has a subjective aspect.

Third, I proposed an analysis of happiness in prison which helped us to understand better the relationship between happiness and the circumstance of deprivation people can face in prison. I based my analysis on real prison life and on evidence from empirical studies. I showed that the view I defended is in line with the results of the empirical studies carried out in prisons. Social scientists demonstrate that imprisonment affects social, emotional and psychological life of prisoners in a serious way. My analysis of prisoners' happiness takes into account prisoners' psychological framework (theoretical and practical deliberation), their social relationships and the activities they take part in, and their emotional states. My account of happiness in prisons offers an objective way to measure and understand how imprisonment affects people's happiness which is in line with empirical studies on the effect of imprisonment.

Now that the conclusions of my thesis are clear, I will give a brief summary of my thesis to explain how I reached these conclusions. Throughout this thesis, I examined how the traditional views of happiness – hedonism, life satisfaction views, and emotional state theories – understand the happiness of prisoners. I described the hedonist accounts (sensory and attitudinal hedonism) and their problems. A fictional case of two prisoners showed that hedonism as a theory of happiness fails to offer a plausible account of happiness in prisons. The investigation of the hedonist accounts in light of prison life helped us to understand the important role which pleasure plays in human happiness. Pleasure enhances human experiences

by making them more enjoyable, and yet it is not the only thing that constitutes happiness. As a matter of fact, prisoners who experience many pleasures are not necessarily happier than people who experience less pleasure (see section 3.4). Moreover, hedonist theories wrongly entail that all kinds of shallow and trivial pleasures make a difference to how happy a person is and they also fail to take into account one of the fundamental constituents of happiness, namely emotions (see section 3.8).

I then explained the whole life satisfaction theories of happiness. Such theories understand happiness in prisons in terms of life satisfaction. According to both many empirical studies of Subjective Well-Being and Whole Life Satisfaction theories of happiness subjects are happy if and only if they are satisfied with their lives as a whole. The most common problem of SWB studies and of the WLS theories of happiness is the unreliability of subjects' judgments (section 4.4). WLS theories also provide poor analysis of prisoners' happiness because the prisoners' happiness does not always depend on the self-evaluations of their lives as a whole (section 4.5.1). With another fictional case, I furthermore explained how the arbitrariness of the prisoners' judgments is problematic for the WLS theories in the evaluation of prisoners' happiness. This is because how happy you are with your life depends also from which perspective you evaluate your life (section 4.5.2).

Finally, I explored the emotional state theories of happiness. Such theories correctly emphasize the fact that emotional states too play an important role in human happiness. However, if we were to understand happiness merely in terms of emotions as psychological states, we would again wrongly evaluate prisoners' happiness. I suggested that Haybron's emotional state theory is theoretically valid for a correct evaluation of prisoners' happiness. However, his theory needs to entail that dispositions must be instantiated for us to understand how happy a person is (see section 5.6.1). I have argued that the relevant dispositions are

instantiated when we take part in certain activities that play a role in our happiness (see section 5.6.2). For example, if a person takes part more successfully in the activities that make her mood-disposition manifested, it is plausible to judge that person to be happier than someone whose positive mood-dispositions are not manifested. As a result, even if happiness seems to be at least in part a matter of our psychological states, it is also constituted by the activities in which we take part. The relevant activities may trigger our dispositions to experience positive moods making them manifested. If we correctly understand the relationship between disposition and activities, it becomes clear that happiness is not just a mental state but it is also a matter of how well our life is going and in which activities we take part.

Taken together, the first chapters of my thesis show that the traditional views of happiness fail to provide a plausible understanding of what happiness consists for people deprived of their freedom. Superficiality and triviality of pleasant experiences, unreliability and arbitrariness of subjective judgments, and the relationship between dispositions and activities are three ways in which traditional theories of happiness might fail to provide adequate evaluation of prisoners' happiness. I argued that one of the most important things for us to learn from these lessons is that there is a need to create a theory of happiness that takes happiness to consist also in part of the activities in which we take part together. The circumstances in which we live and the activities in which we are involved play a constitutive role in how happy we are.

I explained that the development of a theory that can capture the previous idea requires an adequate and appropriate understanding of happiness as *eudaimonia*. In Chapter VI, I presented an overview of Aristotle's ethics and my own interpretation of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*. I based my interpretation of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia* on Aristotle's view of the human nature and his function argument. I explained how according to Aristotle human

beings are by nature social animals. For him, human beings have to live a life according to their nature by developing their proper function (reasoning well) in their societies. I argued that, according to Aristotle, if human beings live a life well by fulfilling their proper function, they will live a happy life. I finally concluded that for Aristotle all the activities that involve the use of reasoning are equally constituent parts of a happy life (sec. 6.3.5).

As a consequence, when we evaluate how happy we are, each activity and relationship where our ability to reason well is involved can be counted as an element of our happiness. In section 7.1, I argued that the elements that constitute our happiness are: deliberation, sociality and emotions. I also showed that not every kind of rational activity is happiness-constituting. Instead, I claimed that deliberation should include theoretical deliberation about life in general and practical deliberation about the right thing to do in a certain circumstance. I also explain how sociality means that we should take part in social activities and have interpersonal relationships that allow us to use our virtue of character such as trust, kindness, fairness, and so on. This is because our virtues of character are related to our ability of reasoning well in the circumstance we are in. Finally, to be happiness-constituting, emotions need to be appropriate to the circumstances we are in and should lead us to act virtuously.

After I explained what kinds of activities and relationships constitute happiness, I analysed a possible argument against my view of prisoners' happiness. In section 7.2, I explained how someone might use my Aristotelian view to argue that imprisonment deprives people of the main three constituents of happiness and, therefore, prisoners will not be happy. I responded to this argument in section 7.3 by claiming that my Aristotelian view of happiness correctly entails that some fundamental sources of happiness are accessible for prisoners too. I argued that prisoners do have at least in principle access to the three elements that according to my Aristotelian account constitute happiness. I also showed that the three elements that

constitute happiness according to the proposed account seem to be essential elements of living a decent human life in prisons and also after release.

Of course, objections can also be made to my theory of happiness in prison. The isolation case of section 8.2.1 addresses the objection that my account leads to wrong conclusions concerning isolated prisoners. My interpretation of Aristotle's theory of happiness suggests that happiness is not only constituted by pure activities of reasoning but rather it should also consist in part of taking part in certain practical and social activities and of feeling certain emotions. I explained how it could be suggested that, according to my interpretation, if prisoners are not taking part in these activities, they cannot be completely happy. My discussion of the isolated prisoner case shows, however, that my account leaves room for many different ways to be happy in prisons too. Even if a prisoner does not take part in any practical activities, there is still a way for him to be happy. The case of the contemplative prisoner showed that the pure activity of reasoning is a way to live a happy life even in prisons. We learn from this case that according to my account the isolated prisoner, who is more successful in exercising the virtues, is happier than other prisoners who take part in social relationships but do not exercise the virtues.

After that, I explained how my view can also be accused of being paternalistic. This objection is based on the idea that no one else other than the prisoners themselves are in a position to know how happy they are and what constitutes happiness for them. However, as I explained in section 8.2.2 my theory is not objectionably paternalistic because it recognises that happiness is at least in part constituted of the individual's emotional states and subjective deliberation about the steps one needs to take in order to become happy. Moreover, my theory addressed the problem of being not related to internal subjective elements. I recognised the importance of the internal feeling of reward that we have when we exercise the virtues that

constitute happiness. As a result, my theory admits a subjective element as a constituent of happiness.

In addition to promising an accurate theoretical account of what happiness consists of in prison, my account of happiness also has significant practical advantages. Abstract philosophical theories of prisoners' happiness could be accused of being unrealistic and naive. For this reason, throughout my thesis I tried to rely on a large number of empirical studies and I also considered the impact of my research on empirical sciences. In the last sections of this thesis, I offered reasons for why we should investigate philosophically what happiness in prison is.

Philosophical theories of prison happiness such as the one defended in this thesis can help us to evaluate and measure the impact that imprisonment has on prisoners' happiness in a more objective way. For example, my Aristotelian account of prison happiness suggests that we should not only collect first-person assessments of happiness when we evaluate prisoners' happiness. Instead, in order to measure and evaluate how happy prisoners are, we should (i) analyse how successful prisoners are in taking part in social and purposeful activities, (ii) observe what kind of rational thinking prisoners do, and finally, (iii) assess what kind of emotions prisoners are feeling.

I suggested that we need to observe different domains of prisoners' lives such as work, social and familiar relationships, education, health, and so on. We can rely on external opinions about how well prisoners are doing with their lives by interviewing prisoners' friends, family members and fellows. In this case, we could learn whether prisoners' first-personal reports match with reports from people around them. I also suggested that we could learn whether prisoners have the right kind of virtuous relationships by analysing prisoners' letters to understand whether prisoners' relationships are based on trust and loyalty (sec. 8.3.3). From

my suggestions about how to measure objectively happiness, we learnt that my evaluation of prisoners' happiness does not suffer of the problem of the influence of trivial objects on first-personal reports encountered by empirical analysis.

It may well be that it takes time before philosophical work on prison happiness will influence what happens in prisons. First of all, the idea of encouraging prisoners to take part in the activities that are happiness-constituting needs to be developed further and this will be a challenging project. Secondly, people could think that philosophical accounts of happiness in prison have no concrete impact in real prisons. However, as I explained in section 8.3.2, my analysis of happiness in prison suggests that thinking about the happiness of prisoners can be a way of helping prisoners in their rehabilitation. The involvement of prisoners in the activities that are happiness-constituting gives prisoners an opportunity to engage in the activities that allow them to develop their skills and exercise their capacities.

Philosophical theorizing of happiness in prison can also influence government policies related to the reform of prisons. Over the past years, improving the effectiveness of education, rehabilitation and other programmes aimed at reducing reoffending has been one of main aims of the Prison Reform Trust charity. The Prison Reform Trust believes that the Prison Service should provide constructive regimes, accessible to all prisoners, in decent, safe conditions that ensure the well-being of prisoners and prepare them for resettlement in the community. The same values and principle are pursued by the Howard League for Penal Reform charity. They campaign to reduce the prison population and to change prisons. Along with these two charities many other charities and volunteers too work for the real and concrete change in our understanding of the Prison System.²³⁹

²³⁹ Examples of charities that work for prisoners' rights and rehabilitations include: Prisoners' Education Trust, Safe Ground, Prison Fellowship, Pact, Prisoners' Families and Friends Service, Turn2us, Prince's Trust, Action for Prisoners' and Offenders' Families, Prisoners' Advise Service, Women in Prison, Shannon Trust, and many others.

Furthermore, governments also should guarantee support to all citizens affected by the Criminal Justice System. The reform of the Penal System is currently one of the main concerns of the British government. In his recent speech on Prison reform, Prime Minister David Cameron spoke about the failure of our system today and the need for change (Criminal Justice Reform, 2016). According to him, we should offer both hope and opportunities for change. In a compassionate country, we should help those who've made mistakes to find their way back onto the right path.

The reform of the Penal System and the work of different charities for prisoners show that a change is needed. My research project is in line with the main values and principles of that project. I strongly believe that bringing philosophy to bear on how we understand prisons can make this change happen. Prisons should be a school of life where people think about how to be happy and practice what is good for them and for others, rather than overcrowded institutions where people ever more frequently experience inhumanity and disrespect. I am more than convinced that Aristotle was right in saying that you can only be happy and virtuous if you practice the good. My future work involves making the case for the outlined understanding of prison happiness through articles published in both academic and more general journals and also through involvement with charity work. On the basis of the work done in this thesis, I hope to convince as many people as possible of the fact that people who are affected by the Criminal Justice System deserve just as much assistance and support as everyone else. This is because the motivation behind this thesis is the idea that all human beings, no matter what circumstance they are in or what ethnic or socio-economic group they belong to, deserve to live a good and happy life.



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