'Red-Green' Coalitions in the Federal Republic of Germany: Models of Formation and Maintenance

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
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Declaration

Some of the material in this thesis has formed the basis of work published elsewhere in the Institute for German Studies working paper series (1995) and Contemporary Political Studies (1996 and 1998). However the bulk of the original research in this thesis is as yet unpublished. Beyond the inevitable exchange of ideas and information with colleagues, all arguments advanced in this thesis are my own.

Abstract

The thesis examines the processes of coalition formation and maintenance involving the SPD and Green party at the sub-national level in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The theoretical component builds upon formal models of coalition formation to posit a New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance which balances office-seeking and policy-oriented Payoffs as a determinant of coalition behaviour. To this end, it uses the 'policy network' idiom of public policy analysis (with an emphasis on environmental policy) as a secondary theoretical framework. The theoretical framework is used in tandem with empirical data on institutional processes, policy outputs and outcomes, party political behaviour and value-orientation within the electorate.

The empirical component centres around the research question: to what extent have the Greens assumed a 'normal' role within the German party system? Such a 'normal' role means that the Greens' strategic behaviour can be interpreted as the rational pursuit of a specific bundle of (office-seeking and policy-oriented) preferences. The thesis argues that this is indeed the case and that these preferences - and the Greens strategic behaviour in pursuit of them - are consistent and predictable. The thesis concludes that the Greens have become increasingly pragmatic over time in pursuit of their preferences, although their strategic options (and those of the SPD) are constrained by the ability of the party's parliamentarians to mobilise the *Basis* in support of their strategic goals.

Part I: Theory

(I) CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW & A NEW MODEL OF COALITION FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1. Arguments and Research Design

1.1.1. Preamble

The thesis examines the processes of coalition formation and maintenance involving the social-democratic SPD and the Green party at the sub-national level in the Federal Republic of Germany. Such coalition arrangements have generally taken place between the SPD and the Greens alone ('Red-Green' coalitions), but have also been formed with the liberal FDP as a third party ('Traffic-Light' coalitions). The research utilises political science theories of (I) coalition formation and maintenance and (II) 'networks' of policy actors (particularly in the field of environmental policy) in order to explain Red-Green coalitions within the context of the wider processes of political change taking place in the Federal Republic.

1.1.2. The Research Question

The Research Question asks to what extent the Greens have assumed a 'normal' political role within the party system? Such a 'normal' role would mean that their strategic behaviour can be predicted as a function of the rational pursuit of a bundle of group-related preferences. These preferences are either instrumental (office-seeking) or ideological (related to policy processes and outcomes). However, it is hard to demonstrate significant differences in policy outcomes between different German *Länder*, regardless of political

'colour', because they are hard to establish empirically and involve counter-factual argument (too many 'what if?' questions). Therefore, the thesis assumes that policy-related payoffs will be as much a function of the *process* of policy-making as of its content. As a subsidiary question, the thesis examines the extent to which the Greens have been able to 'open-up' the policy network to their own client groups and break down established hierarchies within the German regulatory framework. The thesis will concentrate on a number of cases at the *Länder* level.

1.1.3. The Analytical Framework

The thesis will utilise and build upon a number of formal hypothetico-deductive models of coalition behaviour in order to posit a new model of coalition formation. A more comprehensive literature review follows later in the chapter.

The theoretical 'idiom' of analysis - to use Albert Weale's [1992] terminology - can be broadly categorised as being within the rational choice tradition. This means that the focus will fall primarily upon the individual agent or, as is the case when one is studying one or more political parties, a group or groups of agents and the strategies they employ in order to pursue their preferences. However, in its purest theoretical form, rational choice models take no account of the nature of preference *acquisition* and the institutional norms that shape this process. Therefore, if one was to embark upon an essentially theoretical analysis of coalition behaviour, one would be required to ignore a great deal of contextual data in order to achieve some degree of empirical 'fit'. Within what is intended to be an extended body of research into a specific sub-set of the German party system, this would be very much a case of 'the tail wagging the dog'.

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Therefore, those formal models of coalition behaviour that are to be used will be of a more heuristic nature. They will impose form and structure upon the research and provide some common criteria with which to evaluate phenomena across time and space. It remains the intention of the thesis to retain a coherent and *predictive* model of coalition behaviour across multiple cases. However, it must be stressed that there will be a trade-off between a model's assumptions and the empirical reality under study. This means that the specific institutional precedents, norms and processes that have shaped the German party system (and continue to do so) will be taken into account. Thus, not only will the formal models be used to impose order upon the empirical component of my thesis, but will in turn be 'tested' by the research itself.

A large and heterogeneous literature exists relating to coalition behaviour. The field is conceptually diverse and many of the more important models within the genre are to some extent contradictory. Moreover, theorists have often taken different aspects of coalition behaviour as their starting point. For instance, the bulk of the early literature was primarily concerned with the process of coalition formation and paid little attention to the degree to which such coalitions were successfully maintained. One reason for this was that not only did much of the early modelling rely upon a strictly game-theoretical approach, within which the concept of the formation of a given coalition as a 'single-play" game provided considerable theoretical elegance and simplicity, but also that the majority of such models took an 'office-seeking' perspective which either ignored or down-graded the policy dimension as a formation criteria. However, once one questions why some coalitions are more successful than others in maintaining themselves over time, the idea that office-seeking motives are the only decisive criteria within the bargaining process becomes very hard to sustain. For instance, if we assume that office-seeking is the only decisive criteria within the process, it would be reasonable to ask why coalitions break down at all, given that some degree of equilibrium has been established within which all

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agents in the coalition have achieved office. Why would such a coalition not go on in perpetuity rather than break down and allow a rival coalition of agents to gain office? One reply to this would be to point out that agents within the coalition are acting rationally and may actually be maximising their office-seeking utility over the long run. For instance, in terms of legislative mathematics, they may actually be a member of any rival coalition that forms. Alternatively, they may calculate that the rival coalition will not last long and that they have a good chance of returning to office in an enhanced position: either with regard to the rival potential coalition or within the encumbent coalition itself. In both cases, it could be argued that office-seeking is still the dominant criteria.

Nevertheless, such questions highlight the dialectic between office-seeking and ideology within the coalition equation. Although ideology has declined in importance over recent years, historically it has had a relatively important role in European party systems, at least compared with the limited role of ideological conflict in the United States (where the most important theoretical work has been carried out). Thus, it is essential to include a 'policy dimension' within both the bargaining process and in the subsequent process of coalition maintenance. This thesis develops a model that both conceptualises the policy dimension as a form of 'weighting' within the coalition process and defines a common set of criteria in order to assess a given coalition's record of policy implementation. The criteria will apply both across cases and in relation to the record of policy implementation under previous administrations in the same *Land*. The thesis will use environmental policy as its main example of policy implementation. There are two reasons for this. First, it is the policy area most closely identified with the Greens (indeed, it is at the core of their own self-identity and external perceptions of them). Second, it is an area of governance which is of academic interest in its own right, particularly in the Federal Republic, which has established itself as a innovator and world-leader in the field (see Chapter Three).

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The requirement for such a set of criteria raises a number of questions. For instance, how is one to establish that one case was 'successful' in terms of policy implementation whilst another 'failed' without resorting to the opacity of judgmental opinion? Clearly, a transparent set of criteria, based on both qualitative and quantitative data, is needed. Moreover, I would argue that these criteria should not only be applicable to the *outputs and outcomes* of the policy process, but also to the policy-making *structure and process*.

This last point becomes more apparent when one considers the ideological and discursive distance between the parties involved in the coalition process. For instance, given that the agenda of the (German) Greens stretches well beyond 'deep' Green issues and has encompassed a fundamental critique of the entire structure and discourse of the modern capitalist state, it can be argued that changing the process of policy implementation is as important to them as the actual outputs of that process. If this is so, one could envisage certain elements within a locally governing Green party being content to make a short-term trade-off between the optimal implementation of concrete environmental policy initiatives in return for a partial dissolution of the established hierarchies within the German policy-making process.

In order to establish if this is indeed the case, the analysis will contain two distinct elements. First, a comparative analysis of the ideological and discursive profiles of the SPD and Greens, with emphasis upon the role of the 'new politics'. Data will be sourced from manifestos, interviews and official documents. This will be of both a qualitative and quantitative nature (see section on Methods at the end of this chapter).

Second, a clear, descriptive analysis of the actual policy process with some degree of global/comparative applicability. The thesis will use the 'policy networks' idiom as secondary theoretical tool (in order to examine the degree of Green penetration of the

policy-making process). This idiom is particularly attractive. both because much of its inductive base derives from the German experience (see Katzenstein, 1987. for instance) and because its ontological assumptions (a focus upon the actors involved in each sector rather than some over-arching super-system) are compatible with the general approach (see 1.2. Literature Review).

The use of coalition theory as the primary theoretical framework driving the thesis forward, with the policy networks idiom as a secondary structure, is reflected in the fact that the research is divided into two empirical strands. One is a 'party-politics' focus, which relates intra- and inter-party politics to the preconditions and assumptions of the model(s). The other looks in greater depth at the structure. process, outputs and outcomes of policy-making, as part of an assessment of the process of coalition maintenance. This is particularly germane to the New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance which predicates the success of a given coalition (and its chances of future success) upon the perceptions of the parties as to the degree to which they have been able to fulfil their preferences. A longer discussion of these points is developed later in the chapter (see sections on literature review, choice of models and fieldwork methods).

1.1.4. The Choice Of Cases

The empirical element within the thesis will focus on two case studies. An explanation of why the thesis uses case studies is given in 1.4. (Methods). The two cases were chosen with three criteria in mind: First, that they are geographically well dispersed within the Federal Republic and not limited to one particular region and/or political culture. Second. that as a group they span the period before and after German unification and thus encompass the changes that have taken place within the party system as a whole during the last ten years. Third, that they should have been in place for a long enough time for

their record to be objectively assessed by the researcher, thus ruling out recent coalitions (such as in North-Rhine Westphalia). The cases are as follows:

Berlin. The Red-Green coalition of 1989-1990 in West Berlin was relatively short-lived but was in place during the period running up to and including the unification of Germany. Thus, a coalition that formed in what was in many ways a political backwater - and where some degree of political risk-taking was possible - ended in the full glare of national (and even international) publicity as Berlin took centre-stage in world events. Moreover, a coalition that was elected to govern a relatively prosperous West German city of just over two million inhabitants soon became responsible for a socially- and economically-divided city of almost double that number. As a result, the issues that had previously bound the coalition (such as the environment, nuclear and conventional disarmament and other 'quality of life' issues) were superseded by more urgent themes (such as unification, nationalism and the collapse of the economy in eastern Germany). The differing responses of the Berlin *Alternative Liste* (as the local Greens were then called) and the SPD to these themes was to ultimately undermine the coalition. The case has been the subject of relatively little research.

Lower Saxony. The 1990-1994 Red-Green coalition in the state was widely regarded as successful and would probably have been renewed if the electoral arithmetic had demanded following the elections in March of 1994. There is no comparison between the official positions enjoyed by the SPD's Gerhard Schröder - as Minister President of Lower Saxony - and that of Joschka Fischer in Hesse in the 1980's. Schröder's position was far more secure and well-resourced in political terms, in that he was leader of the largest coalition partner and enjoyed the formal institutional power and prestige associated with the post of Minister President. By contrast, Fischer's position had been far more contingent upon factors over which he had little influence (such as internal SPD politicking

and the ongoing 'war of the mullahs' within his own party). Nevertheless, the two men -and to a lesser extent the leader of the Lower Saxony Greens Jürgen Trittin - have come to be regarded as 'Red-Green flag-wavers', who would wield considerable influence in any such coalition in Bonn. Therefore, the Lower Saxony coalition has added significance in terms of providing pointers of the shape and tone of a possible Red-Green coalition at the national level. Moreover, like Berlin, the Lower Saxony coalition has been the subject of little research.

1.1.5. Thesis Structure

This thesis will follow the logic of the preliminary arguments above and will be structured along the same lines. In order to reconcile the general with the particular, the thesis contains an original theoretical and an empirical component. The intention is that the theoretical component will enhance our understanding of events and structure our investigation of them.

The thesis has four sections. Part I (Theory) consists of this chapter only. The rest of this chapter will review those areas of the literature relevant to this thesis and make a choice of both theoretical models to be used and cases to be studied. The intention is to ground my research within the wider literature. The rest of this chapter will be structured as follows:

      1.2.: Literature Review: Coalition Theory and Policy Networks Analysis.

      1.3.: A New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance.

      14.: Theoretical Framework and Fieldwork Methods.

The new model of coalition formation and maintenance builds upon the existing literature and represents original theoretical work.

Part II consists of two Chapters and is designed to establish the institutional context within which the research has been carried out. Chapter Two (The Party System and Policy Environment in the Federal Republic) describes the institutional context - mainly from the perspective of the national level - within which coalition behaviour takes place. The chapter looks at the party system(s) and the electorate, the parties themselves (the SPD and the Greens) and the policy-making framework (in general terms and specifically with regard to environmental policy). Chapter Three (A Short History of Red-Green Coalitions in the Federal Republic) looks at the wider political phenomena of Red-Green coalitions and identifies the recurring themes (inter- and intra-party conflict, staffing of ministries and outside actors such as producer groups) that impact upon them. There is some original research in this chapter, although the material from the two case studies is deliberately omitted at this point, in order to avoid repetition in the subsequent chapters.

Part III consists of the two case studies and comprises the bulk of the original empirical research within the thesis. It is made up of four chapters. Chapters Four and Five (Politics in Berlin; Politics in Lower Saxony) look at the political records of the Berlin and Lower Saxony coalitions, including an overview of the bargaining process leading up to their formation. Chapters Six and Seven (Programmatic and Institutional Innovation in Berlin; Programmatic and Institutional Innovation in Lower Saxony) will look at a selection of such innovations carried out by the two coalitions in their respective states. As already noted, the thesis concentrates upon innovation within the field of environmental policy.

Part IV consists of three chapters. Chapter Eight compares the processes of coalition formation whilst Chapter Nine takes an in-depth look at the two coalitions' respective records of coalition maintenance over time. In terms of coalition formation, the empirical component under study will be previous distributions of party weights within the relevant legislatures, previous bargaining processes and outcomes, party manifestos (past and

present), the campaigns leading up to the coalitions under study. the election outcome (party weightings within the legislature) and the bargaining process and outcome. In terms of coalition maintenance, the empirical component will comprise internal coalition issues (distribution of portfolios and policy processes over time) and external constraints (pressure groups, opinion polls and grass-roots opinion) and the interaction between them. Finally Chapter Ten will pull together the various strands of the thesis and will examine the nature of pay-offs and the balance between office-seeking and policy-based criteria in predicting coalition behaviour. This will comprise a comparative analysis of the conclusions derived from the previous chapters, a review the results of the research and an assessment the degree to which its theoretical and empirical components have answered the research question and furthered academic knowledge of the field.

1.2. Literature Review

1.2.1. Why And What Theory?

As Taylor points out, *'conceptual structures'* or *'theoretical frameworks'*, such as those within what is broadly called coalition theory, *'claim to delimit the area in which scientific enquiry will be fruitful'* [Ryan, (ed.), 1973: 144]. In other words, one's choice of theoretical model will determine which variables will be considered significant and where one's investigation will be focused.

This is not to advocate methodological anarchy. It is merely an acceptance that certain models, in effect, 'suggest themselves' for different modes and areas of inquiry. Nor would one argue that the choice of one's framework precludes all other approaches to the subject. For instance, an historical account of the events in question would yield its own

considerable benefits: particularly in a wealth of contextual detail. However, one could argue that such an account would have limited explanatory value and very little predictive power.

As Weale observes, one's choice of model - or *'idiom of analysis'* as he calls them - is down to the individual analyst in as much as he or she judges it to *'provide a way of talking about, and therefore understanding, political processes'*. Weale goes on to stress that, not only are such idioms not mutually exclusive but that their internal components are often only loosely related to each other. As a result, Weale suggests that the analyst may have to draw upon a quite heterogeneous literature, given that *'there sometimes is no canonical source to which one can go'* [1992: 38].

1.2.2. Coalition Theory

Such caveats are particularly germane to the broad sweep of literature related to coalition theory. As Laver and Schofield observe, there have traditionally been two distinct and divergent 'traditions' within coalition theory which *'are by now so far apart that they have almost nothing to contribute to one another'*. These traditions can be broadly classified as the *'game-theoretical'* (or formal-deductive) and *'European politics'* (primarily inductive) schools [1990: 10-11]. In recent years, scholars such as Laver and Schofield [1990] and Budge and Keman [1990] have attempted to bridge this gulf and incorporate empirical and contextual variables into their theoretical modelling. It is this dialectic between the rigidity of formal deductive modelling and the social scientist's desire to achieve a good empirical 'fit' with the exogenous universe that is at the heart of the development of coalition theory over the last 40 years.

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(I). Office-Seeking Models of Electoral Competition and Coalition Formation

Although not a coalition theory in itself, the early models of coalition formation were to a large degree ontologically predicated upon Anthony Downs' *Economic Theory of Democracy* [1957]. Downs build upon the game-theoretical work of von Neumann and Morgenstern [1947] and Savage [1954] and constructed a formal theory of politics. Central to Down's theory was the *a priori* assumption that office-seeking is the ultimate goal of political strategy, in that '*parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies*' [1957: 28]. Thus, although Downs acknowledged the existence of a policy dimension to political competition, he saw it as contingent upon the parties' main preoccupation with maximising votes in order to win elections and acquire office. In order to do this office-seeking parties compete for the median voter: representing the social choice of the electorate [see Appendix One].

The debt that early coalition theorists owed to Downs' theory is acknowledged by William H. Riker in his seminal *Theory of Political Coalitions*, in which he states that Downs' book is '*one of the half-dozen outstanding works of political theory in this century*' [1962: 33]. Riker builds upon Downs' work to construct a predictive model of coalition formation in which office-seeking is central. The focus of Riker's model lies with the strategies adopted by the parties, who are assumed to be rational actors, as they attempt to gain admission to any coalition that may form. This process takes place within a game-theoretical environment that is both 'constant sum' (limited in size and scope) and 'zero-sum' (one player's gain diminishes the potential utility of all other players). Each player is assigned a 'weight' within the bargaining process and which serves to differentiate between the possible coalitions that may form. These weights are determined by the resources that the players bring to any potential coalition. Given that office-seeking rather than policy is assumed to be the central formation criteria, these resources take the form of votes, parliamentary seats or power. Within this environment, Riker predicts that players will

try to create coalitions that are only as large as they believe will ensure winning. In its pure theoretical form, such a 'minimal winning' coalition would be so small as to maximise the payoffs (which are assumed to be a function of each player's weight) to each coalition member. Thus, with repeated 'plays' of the bargaining game (through which irrelevant alternatives are discarded) there would be a tendency towards the smallest sub-set of potential minimal winning coalitions (in other words, towards a 'minimum winning' coalition of 50% plus one vote). This is Riker's 'size principle' [see Appendix One].

It must be remembered that Riker's model assumes that these payoffs are associated with the acquisition of office rather than the chance to formulate or implement policy[1]. Such assumptions are also central to the related work of William A. Gamson [1961b] and Michael A, Leiserson [1968]. In an article for the *American Sociological Review*, Gamson argues that:

> *When a player must choose among alternative coalition strategies where the total payoff to a winning coalition is constant, he will maximise his payoff by maximising his share. The theory states that he will do this by maximising the ratio of his resources to the total resources of the coalition. Since his resources will be the same regardless of which coalition he joins, the lower the total resources, the greater will be his share. Thus, where the total payoff is held constant, he will favour the 'cheapest winning' coalition.* [1961b: 376]

In terms of practical politics, Gamson's 'cheapest winning coalition' model assumes that each party would prefer to be a big fish in a small (and relatively under-resourced) pond

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[1] This is consistent with Downs' assumption, dealt with earlier, that parties formulate policies in order to win elections rather than the other way round.

than be party to a more equitable distribution of payoffs (even if in reality this meant an identical size of payoff) [see Appendix One].

Leiserson's model is explicitly game-theoretical in nature and is centred around the concept of dominance in 'payoff vectors' (that is, the players' payoff for inclusion in any given coalition). Thus, if all players have perfect information as to the payoff value from each potential coalition and all members of a potential winning coalition are aware that such a coalition will maximise the payoff vector of each member, then that coalition is predicted to form. Leiserson's model assumes that if the coalition game is 'constant sum' and 'simple' (that is, a universally accepted decision rule exists by which any given coalition is either winning or losing), minimal winning coalitions will be decisive. In Leiserson's terminology, only such a minimal winning coalition would comprise the 'solution set'. Moreover, Leiserson attempts to limit the range of possible outcomes through the introduction of two supplementary propositions: a 'maintenance proposition' and a 'bargaining proposition'. The maintenance proposition allows for surplus-majority coalitions to form under conditions where institutional norms restrict the formation of new bargaining sets. For example, if a parliament had a fixed term, the strategic needs of each player may dictate that an interdecision period may be characterised by temporary coalitions, that are larger than numerically necessary, in order to allow parties to be best placed for when the specified time for the formation of a new bargaining set arrives[2]. The bargaining proposition seeks to delineate between minimal winning coalitions with many members and those with a very small number [see Appendix One]. Leiserson states: 'as the number of actors increases, there is a tendency to form.... with as few actors as possible' [1968:775].

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[2]Although less common than the minimal winning thesis, it is not unknown for formal theories of coalition formation to posit the rationality of surplus majority coalitions under certain circumstances. See, for instance, Colomer and Martinez 1995.

The formal nature of Riker, Gamson and Leiserson's three models have attracted much criticism on epistemological grounds. The most commonly cited criticism is that the centrality of office-seeking as the main formation criteria makes these models effectively *'policy blind'* [Laver and Schofield 1990: 90] and therefore unrealistic[3]. One possible riposte to this accusation would be along the lines of Milton Friedman's [1953] argument (with regard to formal - and especially neo-classical - theories used in economics) that it is not the realism of a model's assumptions that are important when judging the adequacy of a theory but rather the degree of concordance between the logical consequences of a given theory and the actual phenomena under study. In other words, Friedman argues that it is the theory's logical consequences and predictive power that is at least as important as simply describing empirical phenomena . A similar argument is made by Riker and Ordeshook, who defend positivism in political science in general by asserting that it is *'just as important to generate and test out new theories as to investigate obvious phenomena'*[1973: xi].

Even if one accepts this premise, the three minimal winning models have a modest record in predicting real outcomes to processes of coalition bargaining. For instance, Eric C. Browne tested all three models against data drawn from thirteen parliamentary democracies covering the period 1945-1970. Browne's test found that both Riker's and Gamson's models correctly predicted only 8% of the overall actual outcomes of coalition bargaining during this period. Moreover, the two models fail to correctly predict any of

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[3]That is not to say that policy considerations did not exist at all with regard to these early models. Building upon Downs' work, there is an implicit assumption that *the electorate* are motivated by policy considerations and that the parties will -as political entrepreneurs- adjust their policy profile accordingly. A more recent model has been formulated by Austen-Smith and Banks [1988]. They assume that, as voters are motivated by the desire to influence policy outcomes, political parties are concerned about policy to the extent that they need to retain credibility with voters in order to secure their utility-flows over the long-run. Austen-Smith and banks also assume that the process of coalition building conforms to a normatively-imposed sequence where the largest party has the first opportunity to try and form a coalition, and then the second largest and so on. The prediction or any distribution of party weights is a coalition involving the largest and smallest parties in the bargaining set.

the outcomes in Austria, Denmark and Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy and Luxembourg. Leiserson's 'solution set' model faired somewhat better: correctly predicting 50.4% of actual outcomes across the entire data, including all nine outcomes from the Austrian subset, twelve out of fourteen for Belgium and ten out of eleven for Luxembourg. The overall prediction rate fell to 37.6% after Leiserson's 'bargaining proposition' (which was designed to add constraints in order to limit the amount of predictions made) was applied, but still remains better than the Riker or Gamson models. Browne counters this evidence by pointing out that, although the three models are only partially predictive in terms of actual outcomes, other tests have supported their underlying assumptions [1973: 17-31].

Laver and Schofield also defend the predictive power of the minimal winning hypothesis, especially Riker's model. With reference to data drawn from European democracies between 1945-1987, they point out that although only 35% of *actual* outcomes were correctly predicted the number of *potential* coalition formations that might have arisen in such multi-party legislatures is exponentially higher. Under such circumstances, to correctly predict the actual outcome once in every three trials is, the authors argue, a quite respectable achievement [1990: 70-93][4].

Laver and Schofield's observation is a reminder that, when testing the predictive power of the three theories against empirical data that has already been gathered, one must remember that in reality these are not predictions at all but rather what Lawrence Dodd has called '*postdictions*' [1976: 21]. In any given specific case, one possesses knowledge of both previous bargaining outcomes and the actual outcome under study. In such circumstances, and by process of inductive reasoning, a given outcome may appear fairly self-evident.

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[4]In his *Coalitions In Parliamentary Government*, Lawrence C. Dodd [1976] also found evidence that minimal-winning governments lasted longer than others. Opinion (and the evidence of data) is obviously divided and inconclusive on this point.

However, if one reasons deductively -and therefore discounts any institutionally-specific information- any process of coalition formation in a multi-party environment is simply an *n*-person game (involving more than two players) which generates exponential outcomes as players are added. Martin Schubik's (1967) general formulation for such games vividly demonstrated how unwieldy they can become as additional players are added.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the pure office-seeking accounts of coalition formation put forward by Riker, Gamson and Leiserson have enjoyed only partial success as predictors of actual outcomes. This has been cited by scholars such as Bogdanor [1983], von Beyme [1984] and Pridham [1986] as evidence that the use of such formal models is misguided, at least as far as their applicability to European party systems is concerned. The gist of their arguments is that not only are pure office-seeking accounts conceptually flawed in their neglect of the policy dimension but such explanatory shortcomings are not made up for by their predictive power. Pure office-seeking models of coalition formation retain their adherents, but the ontological assumptions that underpin them - in particular the neglect of the policy dimension - are essentially contested. It is no surprise that subsequent models of coalition formation attempted to bring in policy as a formation criterion.

(II). The 'Policy Dimension' As A Secondary Formation Criterion

The difficulties apparent in providing a satisfactory empirical 'fit' with pure office-seeking theories of coalition formation was not only noted by scholars who were uncomfortable with the notion of formal *a priori* theorising within the social sciences. It also prompted those who remained convinced of the need for the creation and testing of such theories to attempt to factor in policy considerations into the bargaining process.

Robert Axelrod's *Conflict of Interest* [1970] is one of the most often cited early examples of this approach. Axelrod assumes that, whilst office-seeking remains the central strategic

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goal of all players, the members of the successful coalition will ideally be adjacent to one another along a single Downsian Left-Right ideological dimension. Such 'minimal connected winning' coalitions are assumed to be as large as necessary to secure a majority in the legislature, and as adjacent as possible to minimise the potential for conflicts of interest within the coalition (see Appendix One).

There are three main objections to the assumptions inherent in Axelrod's model. First, as Laver and Schofield point out, although minimal connected winning predictions did better than minimal winning predictions with regard to actual outcomes of cabinet formation in post-war Europe, its success rate was only 20%. This compares badly with the 12% success rate that is achieved by chance [1990: 98]. Second, the underlying assumption that minimal connected winning coalitions have lower levels of conflicts of interest has been empirically challenged by Browne, Gleiber and Mashoba [1984], although they do not question the model's predictive power. Finally, although Axelrod's model assumes ideological adjacency, it has no conception of the ideological *distance* between parties. This raises questions of institutional norms within a given party system that are central to this thesis. For instance, assume such a distribution of party weights in a Right-leaning legislature (in which party Y is a conservative party, party X is a bourgeois/centrist party, yet parties U and T are respectively eco-socialist and Maoist in their ideological profile with a profound hostility to private enterprise). Assume that the minimal connected winning coalition is X, U, T. It is hard to credit a scenario in which the bourgeois/centrist party would go into coalition with parties U and T, purely in order to ensure the optimal distribution of payoffs. Moreover, Axelrod's central assumption that such a coalition would minimise conflicts of interest is hard to credit under such circumstances. In short, one needs to be able to conceptualise and take into account spatial information about ideological distance between parties and across the legislature as a whole.

In *Coalition Theories And Cabinet Formation* [1973], Abram de Swaan elaborated upon Axelrod's work in order to construct what he called the 'closed minimum range' of cabinet formation. De Swaan's theory predicts that the winning set will comprise the minimal connected winning coalition with the smallest ideological range. The policy dimension remains a single Downsian Left-Right axis, running ordinally from progressivism to conservatism. All parties are assumed to have preference orderings of all potential coalitions, based upon their relative proximities to the median or 'Mparty' (of both a given coalition and within the legislature as a whole). De Swaan asserts that:

> *An actor prefers those coalitions in which the* Mparty(k) *[median party] lies closer to him to those in which it lies farther away. Among those coalitions that have the same Mparty, an actor prefers those in which the coalition median lies closer to him, that is, where* U(k) *[total seats of the median party to the Left of the coalition median] or* V(k) *[total seats of the median party to the Right of the coalition median] is smallest depending on whether is Left or Right of the* Mparty(k) *respectively....*[1973: 443]

De Swaan's theory is often referred to as the 'median legislator' (or 'median party') model because it is predicated upon the assumption that the party that controls the median legislator in any potential coalition is decisive because it blocks the axis along which any connected winning coalition must form. If a party is the *Mparty* (median within the legislature) and *Mparty(k)* (controlling the median legislator within a potential coalition) in all cases, then it is dictator within the bargaining set. Theoretically, any such party must be included in the winning set.

Not only do the assumptions that underpin de Swaan's model seem reasonable, but its predictive power is also better than pure office-seeking accounts of coalition formation. For instance, whereas the Riker and Gamson models correctly predicted 8% of actual

outcomes and Leiserson's model correctly predicted 50.4% of actual outcomes, de Swaan's own tests yielded a 69% prediction rate of actual outcomes from data on European coalition processes [cited Browne 1973: 76]. This would appear to represent significant progress towards a formal deductive model of coalition formation that is both explanatory and possesses considerable predictive power. However, using the example of the Right-leaning legislature, the same argument applies to de Swaan's model as to that of Axelrod. To what extent would a bourgeois/centrist party X choose to maintain a minimum connected winning coalition with what they would consider extremist partners rather than form a surplus majority coalition with conservative party Y? Conversely, could one envisage party Y forming a blocking majority with eco-socialist party U and Maoist party T, rather than tolerating a minority government of party Y? As long as the size principle is retained one is confronted with the trade-off between coalition size and ideological range. De Swaan allows us to conceptualise ideological distance (albeit in a one-dimensional form), but makes no assumption as to the institutional/ideological norms that skew the process of coalition formation and act as a variable upon coalition maintenance. In order to conceptualise these norms, one requires a theoretical model that is policy-driven.

(III). Policy-Driven Models Of Coalition Formation And Maintenance
Although they offer plausible explanations for the coalition bargaining process, office-seeking models of coalition formation fail to address the question of how coalitions are maintained and why they break down. The appeal of policy-driven theories of coalition behaviour is that they offer the possibility of explaining the processes of coalition maintenance as well as coalition formation. Moreover, policy-driven accounts can be both rigorously deductive in nature or allow for a more inductive or historical-institutional approach.

Formal deductive policy-driven models of coalition behaviour are generally spatial in their conceptualisation. Moreover, most spatial theories have moved beyond the single Downsian Left-Right dimension and posit the idea of a multi-dimensional policy space. Just as Schubik's formula demonstrates the exponential growth of outcomes in a simple *n*-person game when players are added, so the imposition of one (or even two) additional dimensions exponentially increases the potential outcomes in a given set. The potential for chaos for voting games in a multi-player set is obvious (see Appendix One).

Given this potential for disequilibrium, formal policy-driven models of coalition behaviour have focused upon conceptualising the processes that impose order upon voting games. More often than not, this has involved some variation upon the game-theoretical concept of the 'core' or 'barycenter' [Hanson, 1972; Hanson and Rice, 1972]. In his *Coalition Theories: A Logical And Empirical Critique*, Eric Browne [1973] suggests that core theory could be used to augment De Swaan's 'median legislator' model of coalition formation. Browne considers the process of calculating the mean of points in multi-dimensional space to be analogous to De Swaan's measurement of the distance of potential coalition partners from the median of that potential coalition. A weight is assigned to each party according to their position within a given policy space (as well as the number of seats they hold in the legislature) and the 'barycenter' (as Browne calls it) calculated as the mean of these positions. The predicted coalition will be that which is winning and minimises the policy distance of members from the core.

Core theory is generally highly mathematical in nature and has been more popular with political theorists than empiricists. Nevertheless, Keith Krehbiel's [1988] review of the field in *Legislative Studies Quarterly (3)* provides a good introduction to its application to practical politics. In essence, core theory assumes that a point exists in *n*-dimensional Euclidean space that minimises the preference disagreement of a specific set of players and

thus dominates the utility allocation of all other possible outcomes. Each potential coalition's utility allocation is based upon its members' calculation of the potential damage all players outside the coalition could do to it. Such an allocation is called the coalition's 'security level'. As the core consists of that set of preferences that are not dominated by any other, it is assumed to also be Pareto optimal (in other words, there is no other way of making a particular coalition member better off than they are without making another worse off). A core allocation may even imply a grand coalition of all the players involved, although the payoff allocated to individual members will depend on their ability to form a smaller alternative coalition which could block (but not dominate) the Pareto set. The location of the core is plotted by calculating the mean of a collection of points (representing the policy positions of the parties that comprise the bargaining set) within political space (see Appendix One). The core is bound to exist in one-dimensional space, and finds an analogue in the 'median voter' of Black and Downs or De Swaan's 'median legislator. However, as Krehbiel points out, '*simply expanding the choice space from one to two has profoundly disequilibriating consequences*' [1988: 259-319]. Thus, although the core may exist in two-dimensional space, it will not exist (or will be empty) in a multi-dimensional political space because there will always be an alternative coalition package that can block (if not dominate) any potential winning set [Bacharach, 1976:128].

Core theory has proved attractive to political scientists because it has the potential to allow for the (varying degrees of) stability that are characteristic of democracy. However, it is dogged by the potential for permanent disequilibrium when the policy space is expanded beyond the single Downsian Left-Right dimension. Although the phenomenon of constantly shifting coalitions and allegiances is not unknown in practical politics (consider post-war Italy for instance), it is at odds with the experience of most western democracies, which are characterised by coalitions which manage to maintain themselves

over time. In other words, how does one explain the persistence of such stable institutions?

In an article in the *American Journal of Political Science* Kenneth Shepsle [1979] attempts to factor in the institutional context whilst retaining a formal deductive approach to the problem. Shepsle concentrates upon the role of committees (in particular the US Congressional committee system) and their ability to deliver stability to an otherwise chaotic legislative environment. Shepsle asserts that committees facilitate a 'structure imposed equilibrium' through both control of the legislative agenda and the tendency towards specialisation. Committees control agendas by the selective emphasis of certain topics, through either reporting and making recommendations to the legislature or conversely 'sitting upon' on issues. Moreover, specialisation endows a powerful gate-keeping function upon committees, in that modifications to a bill can only deal with matters that are 'germane' to the committee[5]. Shepsle argues that the committee system effectively re-imposes a one-dimensional policy environment upon the legislative game. Key decisions are taken on one dimension at a time and dimensions cannot be linked to one another through trade-offs. Crucially, this also means that the overall package of policies agreed by the legislature will be the aggregate of the policy position of the median legislator on each separate dimension.

Shepsle's model is of enormous significance because it allows the political theorist to both posit a formal deductive model of coalition formation and allow for the institutional specifics of a given case. Subsequently, other political scientists such as Denzau and Mackay (1987) and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) have looked at the effects on legislative outcomes of other decision rules, such as the amendment procedure. The logic behind all

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[5]And, one might add, the committees' final recommendations carry inordinate normative weight.

these works is that, whilst theorists may posit the existence of general laws of legislative choice, these are contingent upon the constellation of facilitators and constraints in each legislature. The existence of institutionally-specific decision rules shape actual outcomes, and the winners of the coalition game over time are those that most successfully manipulate the dimensions of such institutions. This latter point is succinctly put in the article for the *American Political Science Review* on the 'Implications from the disequelibrium of majority rule for the study of institutions' by William Riker :

> *In the long run, outcomes are the consequences not only of institutions and tastes, but also of the political skills and artistry of those who manipulate agenda, formulate and reformulate questions, generate 'false issues' etc., in order to exploit the disequilibrium of tastes to their own advantage. And just what combination of institutions, tastes and artistry will appear in any given political system is, it seems to me, as unpredictable as poetry. But* <u>*given the short-term structural and cultural restraints*</u> *(my emphasis), there is some stability, some predictability of outcomes, and the function of the science of politics is to identify these 'unstable constants'.*[1980: 445].

Although he is arriving at this argument from the opposite direction to this review, Riker is making the point that an effective explanation of any aspect of political behaviour must encapsulate both the universally-applicable dynamics of the event (the 'unstable constant') and the institutional context within which the event takes place. However, Riker is not advocating an historical-institutional account. He argues that, given the existence of the 'unstable constants' of institutionally-specific decision rules, legislative outcomes *are* predictable in that there are certain universal laws, applicable to voting games, that political scientists can model.

The appeal of Shepsle's model is that it has enabled theorists to factor in the institutional context (as a decision rule), as well as simplifying the concept of policy space. The policy dialectic for a given decision game is seen as one dimensional. This space is not restricted to the classic Downsian Left-Right continuum and can be any form of political dichotomy. The decision space may be between materialist and post-materialist values, between authoritarianism and libertarianism, or between nationalism and internationalism and so on. The appeal of such an approach is that it not only imposes equilibrium on the model, but that it is consistent with empirical evidence.

The reconciliation of deductive reasoning and the institutional context has raised hopes that formal modelling may be more easily applied to the European context, thus bridging the perceived gap between the - on the whole North American - game-theoretical tradition and the more inductive European approach. As mentioned earlier, two of the most important attempts at this have been in work by Laver and Schofield [1990] and Budge and Keman [1990].

Michael Laver and Norman Schofield's *Multiparty Government: The Politics Of Coalition In Europe* [1990] builds upon the 'Protocoalition' model of Bernard Grofman [1982] and Laver's earlier empirical work. With regard to coalition formation, Laver and Schofield suggest that parties initially attempt to form a 'protocoalition' with the party nearest them ideologically. Protocoalitions are assumed to then try and grow sufficiently to ensure a winning position within the legislature. This 'bargaining approach', as Laver and Schofield call it, conceptualises the process of growth as being either hierarchical (as Grofman originally posited), or manifesting itself in a more rapacious and non-hierarchical manner (as Laver suggests), whereby proto-coalitions form and break up only to be replaced by another, until the winning post is reached (see Appendix One). Cabinet stability and

maintenance is assumed by Laver and Schofield to be the function of 'regime attributes'[6].

'coalition attributes'[7], the 'bargaining environment'[8] in which coalitions occur and (in the

spirit of Harold Macmillan) what the authors call 'events'[9].

Ian Budge and Hans Keman's *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and*

Government Functioning In Twenty States [1993] aspires to a more deductive approach

whilst attempting to factor in institutional contexts. The end result is that the distinction

between deductive and inductive modelling is blurred, which creates its own

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[6]They identify seven regime attributes. First, the gross number of parties in the party system. Second. the net, or 'effective number' of parties in the party system (considered to be more important than the gross number). Third, the presence of anti-system parties. Fourth, the extent of ideological polarisation within the system. Fifth, the level of policy influence open to the opposition through committee scrutiny etc. Sixth, the degree to which elections are salient to coalition formation and, finally, the presence (and nature) of a formal investiture requirement. The authors cite work by Kaare Strom [1989], that indicates that, whilst the operation of such variables as party system size are contingent upon specific institutional factors. only the salience of elections and, to a lesser extent, the presence of a formal investiture requirement are independently related to cabinet stability.

[7]Laver and Schofield identify three coalition attributes: its majority status, its minimal winning status and its minimal connected winning status. They produce data to show that these act as independent variables upon cabinet duration, with single-party majority cabinets and minimum-winning cabinets being more durable. Whilst they quote work by David Sanders and Valentine Herman [1977] and Paul Warwick [1988] that fail to identify ideology as a strong independent variable, they conclude that ideologically compact coalitions do appear to last longer.

[8]Turning their attention to the bargaining environment, Laver and Schofield identify three main categories: 'multipolar', 'unipolar' and 'bipolar' systems. Multipolar systems (such as Belgium, Denmark and Italy) are characterised by a complex distribution of party weights and policy positions. As a result, cabinets are susceptible to even small changes in such a distribution and are less stable than in other systems. Unipolar systems are either centred (with the dominant party in the political centre) or off-centre (with the dominant party on either the Left or Right of the political middle ground). Such systems are prone to change. although less so than multipolar systems. Bipolar systems are described as '*simple, clear cut and unchanging*' [1993: 156], in which dramatic shifts in the distribution of party weights or policy profiles are needed to change the underlying bargaining logic of the system (in which almost any two-party coalition is viable). It follows from this that cabinets are relatively stable because there are few incentives to break up one coalition and form another[8]. This is of special relevance to the thesis, as the Federal Republic has traditionally been regarded as a bipolar system. The question remains whether the German party system will become more akin to the multipolar model (with both the Greens and FDP acting as potential junior coalition partners) or remain bipolar (with the Greens assuming the role of third party at the FDP's expense).

[9]With regard to events, Laver and Schofield argue that there is a powerful correlation between the predicted stability of regimes (in terms of attributes and the bargaining environment) and their actual ability to withstand the impact of unforeseen and adverse events. They go on to advocate a model that combines both the 'attributes' and 'events' approach, observing:

While some coalitions are more durable than others, all coalitions, even the most durable, are subject to the potential impact of random events. Those that are more durable, however, are better able than others to withstand the impact of such events and will therefore tend to last longer than those others. Even a very 'durable' government, however, can in practice have quite a short 'duration' if a particularly important event happens to bring down the government early in its potential life. [1993; 162]

epistemological problems. For instance, Budge and Keman describe their book's underlying theory as being '*a priori, semi-deductive*' in nature [1990: 3]. This is a somewhat ambivalent description and could be construed as an elaborate way of saying that the theory is so contextualised as to be essentially inductive[10]. These caveats aside. the appeal of Budge and Keman's model of coalition formation and maintenance is that it is predicated on a small set of assumptions [11] that can be empirically tested.

Budge and Keman's four central assumptions are essentially a set of common-sense rules of thumb that would seem reasonable to most observers. Assumption Three is of particular interest to the thesis, as it neatly encapsulates the salient issues within the SPD-Green coalition debate. For instance, if democratic parties' first priority is to counter threats to the democratic system, then the perception of the Greens as *koalitionsfähig* has been contingent upon their attitude to the political norms of the Bonn republic. As long as this was ambiguous, the Greens were considered at best an unreliable political partner and. more often, beyond the pale. However, once it was accepted that such a threat no longer existed - and the Greens were perceived as a democratic party - residual 'socialist-bourgeois' differences (as the authors call them) become more important. Although this cleavage has become less important in the Federal Republic. it still serves as the primary means of differentiation between the two *Volksparteien*. Therefore, to the extent that the

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[10]In a review of Budge and Keman's book, Laver took the authors to task over this description. stating that '*it is just not possible, on most people's understanding of the words, for an argument to be 'semi-deductive', just as it is not possible for somebody to be semi-pregnant. An argument is either rigorously deductive or it is not*'. [*Party Politics* Vol. 1 No. .2: 290]

[11] 1 In parliamentary democracies the party or combination of parties which can win a legislative vote of confidence forms the government.
2 Parties seek to form that government capable of surviving legislative votes of confidence which will effectively carry through their declared policy preferences under existing conditions.
3 (a) The chief preference of all democratic parties is to counter threats to the..... democratic system:
    (b) Where no such threats exist, but socialist-bourgeois differences are ..... important, the preference of all parties is to carry through policies related to..... these differences;
    (c) where neither of the preceding conditions holds, parties pursue their own ..... group-related preferences.
4 Within parties, and subject to overall policy agreements and disciplinary and procedural constraints. factions seek to transform their own policy preferences into government policy most effectively. [1993: 34]

Greens are a Left-libertarian party, it would follow that political co-operation between them and the SPD would be facilitated along this cleavage. Nevertheless, as the third condition of Assumption Three makes clear, neither the SPD or the Greens are locked into co-operation with the other party for, to the extent that neither of the preceding conditions holds very strongly, both parties are able to pursue their own group-related preferences.

However, it must be remembered that all three conditions are contingent upon the perceived conformity to a system of norms, rather than a transparent set of criteria. The concept of a 'democratic' party may apply across cases, but how it is evaluated as a criteria is dependent upon norms that not only vary across space (between different states or regions) but also time (as local conditions change and the political middle-ground shifts). Budge and Keman make the mistake of using what are essentially value-judgements as would-be predictors of outcomes, with the inevitable consequences. For instance, they confidently predict the persistence of the *pentapartito* in Italy until the end of the 1990's, the continued participation in office of the Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal and, in the Republic of Ireland, the alternation in office of the '*predominant party*' (Fiana Fail) ruling alone and coalitions of the other significant parties [1993: 190]. By 1995 all three of these predictions had been falsified.

No doubt Budge and Keman were unfortunate to make these predictions at the beginning of a period of quite substantial political change in Europe. Nevertheless, the falsification of their predictions does demonstrate the need for political scientists to be circumspect, even when they aspire to be predictive. Theory is necessary if one is to enhance one's understanding of party systems and political behaviour. However, one cannot ignore the specific institutional context or regard the 'political culture' of a given case as static and unchanging. To conclude, the political scientist must remain aware that even the most elegant model can - and probably will - find itself falsified by the dynamics of practical

politics. Given that this is the case, the choice of models of coalition formation and maintenance for the thesis has been made primarily for their heuristic value and with the institutional context of the Federal Republic in mind.

1.2.3. The 'Policy Networks' Literature

There is no doubt that the 'policy networks' idiom has, in the last ten to 15 years, proved highly popular within political science. Indeed, just from the evidence of a simple literature trawl for one recent year, it is evident that researchers have found it useful in explaining subjects as diverse as Aids and HIV-related policy [Altenstetter, 1994]; state-farmer relations in Northern Ireland [Greer, 1994]; the decolonisation of Indonesia [Fennema, 1994] and EU environmental policy in Scotland [Bomberg, 1994].

Given the popularity of the idiom, it is good to remember that, in objective terms, policy networks do not exist. The idiom of a policy 'network' (or 'community') is a subjective classification, used to describe - and ascribe meaning to - the pattern of relations between a group (or groups) of (either individual or collective) agents, linked together by some type of resource dependency (based upon expertise, money or some other source of power). It is best used as a meso-level concept, to describe government - interest group relations [Rhodes and Marsh, 1992: 1], constituting *'a cluster or complex of organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structures of resource dependencies'* [Benson 1982: 148].

This description is only one of many definitions and uses of the term 'policy network'. However, as the word 'network' suggests, they all emphasise a certain continuity in relations between government and interest groups.

Although not associated with policy networks literature *per se*, in his book *The Political Process*, the American political scientist Freeman defined this continuity in terms of the idea of a sub-system which is '*found in an immediate setting formed by an executive bureau and congressional committees, with special interests groups intimately attached*' [1955: 11]. It is the degree of continuity that defines the nature of the network.

The plethora of committees attached to government departments described by Freeman is a phenomenon of modern governance which is not just restricted to the United States. For instance, almost forty years ago an advisory committee on Political and Economic Planning to the United Kingdom Government counted 484 committees attached to central government departments, a quarter of which worked to the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Supply and the Board of Trade alone [PEP, 1960: 193-217].

In the Federal Republic, steeped in the norms of 'co-operative federalism', the growth of such sub-systems is, if anything, even more advanced. It is not surprising, therefore, that much of the work on policy networks has looked at the Federal Republic. For instance, Peter Katzenstein clearly identifies a policy network ideal-type, conceptualised as three 'nodes'. These nodes consist of (i) Political parties, (ii) multi-level governance between the Federal, *Länder* and, to a lesser extent, *Kommune* levels and (iii) the para-public institutions or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, Katzenstein regards this tightly-knit policy network as a block to innovation to the extent that he is pessimistic about the chances of new agents entering the network, as the existing structures constitute '*such a tightly integrated policy network that major changes in policy stand little chance of success*' [1987: 35]. Katzenstein's conclusions do not bode well for the Greens and their client groups as examined in this thesis.

In his study of the German chemical industry, Volker Schneider comes to similar conclusions. Schneider identifies the 'Intermediary Organisations' (NGOs) as the most important element within the network, as they perform the task of mediation between government and the individual whose interests are subordinated to - and represented by - the organisation. According to Schneider, power within the network is asymmetrical, based upon the exchange of resources (*des 'ungleichen Tausches'*). Within this environment, the relative power of an organisation depends upon what it brings to the exchange (*Tauschpotentiale*) [1988: 44]. The actions of individuals are significant only in as far as they are the representatives of organisations. Again, at first sight, this appears to be a relatively constrained set of relations, informed by a corporatist world-view which is antithetical to both the structure and goals of the Green *milieus*.

The work of Pappi [1993] also stresses the idea of networks being the interaction of individuals as agents of organisations, rather than actors in their own right. However, Pappi goes beyond the work of Katzenstein or Schneider, in expanding the use of the term 'network'. Thus, whilst Pappi acknowledges that *'the traditional strength of network analysis as a method is to describe structures'*, he regards the idiom as having the potential for *'yielding convincing results in those areas where social relations are constrained'* [1993: 86-87]. Thus, for Pappi, the type of network can range from a constrained (*eingeschränkte*) network to fully-structured (*Vollstrukturen*) arrangements, in which all participants enjoy bilateral relations (the polar opposite of Schneider's *'ungleichen Tausches'*). Pappi goes on to differentiate between the system to be analysed and the means by which its structure is described. For the former, Pappi opts for the term *'policy domain'*, defined as *'a social system with a structure that can be described as a network'* [1993: 85]. Thus, the term 'network' only applies to the interaction between agents within a given policy domain.

Pappi's distinction between the policy domain and the policy network itself is a useful innovation, in that it makes a clear distinction between *what* is being described and *how* it is being described. However, its two-tier structure, like Katzenstein's 'three nodes' of the policy network, is relatively modest by the standards of the policy networks literature. For, if there is one clear tendency within the literature, it is that of disaggregation. Thus, rather than conceptualising government as a monolithic structure, stress is placed upon the many divisions within it. For instance, Richardson and Jordan state that *'the policy-making map is in reality a series of vertical compartments or segments - each segment inhabited by a different set of organised groups and generally impenetrable by 'unrecognised groups' or the general public'* [1979: 74]. However, the stress upon individuals as agents of organisations is relaxed and within these compartments, informal interpersonal relations are just as, if not more, important as structurally-contingent relationships.

This theme is echoed in the work of probably the most influential British writer on policy networks, R.A.W. Rhodes. The 'Rhodes model', which stresses power dependency between the various agents within the network, arose out of the examination of relations between central and local government through the idiom of 'intergovernmentalism'. Rhodes' research led to his developing five propositions.

- That any organisation is *dependent* upon other organisations for resources
- That, in order to achieve their *goals*, organisations have to exchange resources
- That within constraints of resource dependency, there is a *dominant coalition* which influences the perceived interests of the entire network
- That the dominant coalition regulates the process of exchange, within *the rules of the game*
- That agents have varying *degrees of discretion*, based upon their resources, the rules of the game, the process of exchange and the overall goals

Thus, the policy network is a game, in which each agent (in Rhodes' original work, it is a central-local government dichotomy) deploys their resources. These resources may be of a constitutional-legal, organisational, financial, political, or informational nature [Rhodes. 1981: 98].

How useful one finds the Rhodes model depends to a large degree on one's own research interests. For instance, if one wants to clearly define at which level of analysis (micro- . meso-, or macro-) one's interests are located, the original Rhodes model (which draws upon corporatist theory) is inadequate. As Marsh points out, the problem with corporatist theory is that many authors make no distinction between corporatism as government -interest group relations and corporatism as a theory of the state [1983: 1].

Up to a point, therefore, the tendency towards disaggregation is useful. Building upon the work reviewed so far, one is able to focuses one's research upon a certain policy domain, the networks within the domains, the degree of constraint acting upon the agents within these networks and the importance of informal relationships. This degree of dis-aggregation is useful and complements the ontological base of the models of coalition formation and maintenance used in this thesis, which, broadly-defined, is agent-based (but with allowances for structure).

However, as the idiom is debated and refined, there is a tendency within the literature to take this process of disaggregation to a point where it has limited explanatory value. From the point of view of the thesis, this process can lead to over-categorisation, in which what had been a heuristic model de-generates into a set of lists which, rather than clarify one's understanding of the world, merely add to the clutter.

A good example of this is the work of Jordan and Schubert [1992]. Jordan and Schubert decline to ground their work in either a corporatist or pluralist framework but, rather, use the term 'network' in its most generic sense. Thus, 'policy network' is a descriptive, rather than prescriptive, term that reflects empirical reality rather than any ideal type. The problem with this approach, at least as far as the thesis is concerned, is that - *in extremis* - there is a tendency to have as many different classifications as there are empirically-observable permutations of policy network. For instance, Jordan and Schubert classify government-interest group relations according to three criteria:

- The level of institutionalism (i.e. the stability of the network, ranging from 'Iron Triangles' to 'Issue Networks')
- The focus of the network
- The number of participants [1992: 12-13]

Having established this three dimensional space, they locate within it eleven terms drawn from the literature. These are:

1. 'Pressure Pluralism'. Government policy informed by competing interest groups.

2. 'State Corporatism'. Based upon state discretion and compulsory participation.

3. 'Societal Corporatism'. Based upon voluntary participation.

4. 'Group Subgovernment'. Stable sectorised relations between state bureaucracies and client groups.

5. 'Corporate Pluralism'.

6. 'Iron Triangles'.

7. 'Clientilism'.

8. 'Meso-Corporatism'. Sectoral, between single interest group and the state.

9. 'Issue Networks'.

10. 'Policy Communities'. Limited access.

11. 'Negotiated Economy'. *Ad hoc*, unstable [1992: 25].

This tendency to list is also evident in the work of Franz van Waarden [1992]. Van Waarden follows the same line of thinking as Jordan and Schubert and uses the term policy network in its widest generic sense. For van Waarden, networks are *'proto-organisations'*, which exist as *'an intermediate form between .....contract ('market') and formal organisations'*. Moreover, they *'do not necessarily have a power centre, and hence co-ordination is not by hierarchic authority... but by horizontal bargaining'* [1992: 31]. Having defined policy networks as just about any form of public-private relationship short of a formal organisation, van Waarden classifies them within seven dimensions of policy network:

- Actors (the number and nature of)
- Function
- Structure
- The degree of institutionalism
- Conventions of interaction
- Power relations
- Actor Strategies [1992: 40]

After establishing these seven dimensions, van Waarden locates 11 policy network classifications within them. They are:

1. 'Statism'. No relations between the state and organised interests.

2. 'Captured Statism'.

3. 'Clientilism'.

4. 'Pressure Pluralism'

5. 'Sectoral Corporatism'.

6. 'Macro-Corporatism'.

7. 'State Corporatism'.

8. 'Sponsored Pluralism'. With a large number of interest groups participating in the implementation of public policy.

9. 'Parentala Relations'. Access through party links.

10. 'Iron Triangles'.

11. 'Issue Networks' [1992: 45-49].

Obviously, there are instances when the degree of classification in Jordan and Schubert's or Van Waarden's work is necessary. However, for the purpose of this thesis, it is not essential to discuss whether the relationship between the Greens, their client groups and the policy network constitutes 'clientilism', 'sectoral corporatism' or even some form of 'parentala relations'. The thesis requires something simpler.

At the same time, Marsh's criticisms of the original Rhodes model remain valid. It is necessary to define the level at which the network is located. Rhodes himself appears to have recognised this and consequently revised his model in the light of the debate [1986a; 1986b]. Whilst retaining Benson's concept of 'resource dependency', Rhodes sites five types of network along a continuum from highly integrated 'policy communities' to loosely integrated 'issue networks'. These networks are then distinguished according to the type of membership and the distribution of resources within the network. The five categories are:

- 'Policy Communities'. *Example*: Education. *Features*: Stability of relationships, continuity of highly restricted membership, high vertical interdependence (share service/policy delivery responsibilities), limited horizontal articulation, insulation from other networks and the wider polity and a high degree of integration. Normally based upon functional interests or territorial interests (then better described as a 'territorial community').

- 'Professional Networks'. *Example*: The National Health Service. *Features:* one type of participant, the professions. High degree of vertical interdependence.

- 'Intergovernmental Networks'. *Example*: Representative organisations of local authorities. *Features*: Topocratic membership (exclusion of public sector unions). extensive inclusion of interests, limited vertical interdependence (no service delivery responsibilities), extensive horizontal articulation and penetration of other networks.

- 'Producer Networks'. *Example*: Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA). *Features*: Prominent role of economic interests (private and public sector). fluctuating membership, dependence of the centre on industrial organisations for service delivery. limited interdependence.

- 'Issue Networks'. *Example*: the 'Environmental movement'. *Features*: Large number of participants, limited degree of interdependence, low stability, low continuity. atomised structure [1986a, Ch.. 2].

Rhodes' five categories provide a robust analytical 'tool kit' for the researcher. From the point of view of the thesis, this tool kit is an ideal way operationalising the subsidiary research question (as to the extent to which the Greens have been able to 'open-up' the policy network to their own client groups and break down established hierarchies within the German regulatory framework). In this respect, four questions arising from these categories immediately suggest themselves. First, what were the nature of the Greens own networks prior to the Red-Green coalition? In other words, were they an issue network or, bearing in mind that some members of the Greens' client groups had moved beyond advocacy and were commercial practitioners (for example, with regard to solar energy). did they constitute a producer network? Second, what was the nature of the established network prior to the Red-Green coalition? Third, to what extent had the Greens' client groups already penetrated the network prior to the Red-Green coalition? Finally. did the Greens' client groups succeed in (i) breaking down the established networks *per se* or just (ii) gaining access to heretofore closed networks without actually changing the privileged position of the network?

These questions will be briefly returned to in section 1.4 of this chapter and in Chapters Four to Nine. Chapter Ten (sections 10.3 and 10.4 on games and payoffs) will examine the whole issue more comprehensively in the light of the empirical evidence. However, what is clear is that Rhodes' revised model is a good starting point for the use of the policy networks idiom as a secondary theoretical framework within the thesis.

1.3. A New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance

1.3.1. Introduction

However, the primary theoretical structure that drives the thesis forward is that of coalition theory. The thesis will use a selection of models - in an amended form - drawn from the literature of coalition formation and maintenance. These will be built upon and integrated into a single set of assumptions that is intended to be used as a single model. The purpose of the model is both to direct and structure the research and to predict the outcome of attempts at coalition formation and maintenance between the SPD and the Greens.

The model is divided into three sections. First, it sets out a set of global preconditions to participation in coalition bargaining. Second, it sets out a number of global assumptions about the process of coalition formation. Finally, it sets out a number of global assumptions about the processes of coalition maintenance. With regard to the thesis, it is the assumptions regarding coalition maintenance - and in particular Assumption 3(*f*) - that are of particular importance to the two case studies. This will be explained in greater detail in section 1.3.3 (Notes).

1.3.2. The Model

I. Preconditions to Coalition Bargaining.

(a) The bargaining set is self-selecting and excludes all parties that are perceived not to be normatively-defensible, according to accepted democratic criteria.

(b) All parties possess bundles of preferences, based on a combination of office-seeking and policy-driven criteria.

(c) The policy preferences of all parties are a function of one or more ideological dimensions, such as the Downsian Left-Right and/or the 'materialist/post-materialist' policy dimension[12].

(d) Where policy differences are not salient, office-seeking is normally assumed to be paramount.

(e) Where (d) is not the case, it is assumed that office-seeking has been subordinated to another group-related preference.

(f) All parties within the bargaining set pursue their preferences in a rational and instrumental manner.

II. Assumptions about Coalition Formation.

(a) All parties want to be a member of the potential coalition that is closest to them in policy terms. Such a coalition is assumed to be ideologically 'connected' along one or more policy-dimension.

(b) Parties calculate policy-distance in terms of their relative positions with regard to policy sectors along the Left-Right and/or materialist/post-materialist dimensions. The two dimensions have different relative weights for each party, depending upon their respective ideological profiles.

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[12]The domain of foreign policy is of such a high degree of salience within the Federal Republic that it could almost be counted as an additional dimension around which parties formulate their policy preferences. However, most political science literature would not consider it a discreet ideological dimension in itself. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, foreign policy is regarded as a function of the materialist post-materialist value -orientation; given that this is the best indicator of a party's foreign policy stance.

(c) The party or parties to which a party X is most in agreement, across the (weighted) aggregate of policy sectors, is considered by party X to be the closest to them in policy terms.

(d) If conditions (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied, parties will choose to be a member of the coalition that will maximise office-seeking payoffs. It follows this will be the minimal-connected-winning coalition with the least partners.

(e) If all other conditions are satisfied, it follows that the party that controls the median legislator within the most policy sectors is decisive, as no minimal connected winning coalition can be formed without it. Such a decisive party could be assumed to gain a disproportionate share of the payoffs.

III. Assumptions about Coalition Maintenance.

(a) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to its ideological range.

(b) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the size of its legislative majority.

(c) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of partners within the coalition.

(d) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of alternative coalitions available to members.

(e) Codified coalition arrangements, with a formal investiture procedure, are more stable.

(f) All parties calculate the utility of their continued participation within a coalition on the basis of the degree of correlation between their preferences and their actual and anticipated payoffs.

1.3.3. Notes

The Preconditions to Coalition Bargaining are reasonably straightforward. As touched upon earlier, the degree to which the Greens could be considered *koalitionsfähig* is contingent upon their perceived stance towards the democratic order of the Bonn republic. Whilst this was in serious doubt, the Greens were considered by many to be beyond the pale. This fact is acknowledged in condition 1(*a*), which builds upon condition 3(*a*) of the Budge-Keman criteria. Now that the Greens have by-and-large reconciled themselves to what they had previously considered to be a bourgeois democracy, this condition is fulfilled: at least at the local level, where any remaining doubts - such as the Greens' attitude to NATO - are not so relevant as they would be at national level. Conditions 1(*b*), (*c*) (*d*) and (*e*) acknowledge that parties are motivated by a combination of policy-driven and office-seeking motivations and that, where policy considerations do not exist or have been satisfied, office seeking will normally be paramount. Moreover, within the policy domain, all parties have their own specific preference bundles which are a function of both the Downsian Left-Right and/or 'materialist/post-materialist' policy dimension. The model does not assume that 'socialist-bourgeois' differences alone are predominant and, thus, makes no assumption as to the predisposition of the SPD and Greens to co-operation. Where neither policy considerations nor office-seeking appear to be the motivation for a party's actions, the model assumes that some other group-related preference - such as an internal power struggle or the need to retain party unity - has been the motivating force[13]. Condition 1(*f*) is a formality that allows all events to be interpreted consistently in terms of the other conditions.

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[13]Of course, policy considerations or office-seeking may - and quite probably will - be embedded in these other group-related preferences. However, for the purpose of brevity, no assumptions will normally be made in this respect.

The model's Assumptions about Coalition Formation follow on from its preconditions. Given that all parties possess policy-related preferences, and that all preferences are pursued in a rational and instrumental manner, it is logical that they will desire to be a member of the coalition that is closest to them in policy terms. Ideally, such a coalition will be connected (2(a)) and will have the least ideological range, within which the party will be in the median position along the relevant policy dimension. Parties calculate policy distance by their relative positions along the Downsian Left-Right and 'materialist/post-materialist' dimensions of the policy domain. These positions are the aggregate of each policy sector taken separately (2(b) and (c)). In other words, the model does not assume a multi-dimensional policy space (as in 'barycentre' or core theory), but rather multiple one-dimensional policy sectors. This is in the tradition of Kenneth Shepsle's concept of a 'structure induced equilibrium', except that the gate-keeper for each policy sector is the ministry, rather than the congressional committee. Condition 2(d) is assumed to be self-evident under normal conditions, whilst 2(e) follows logically from the previous conditions. As 2(a) implies, all parties want to be in the median position along a policy dimension in order to minimise the ideological range of the coalition in relation to its preferences. 2(e) demonstrates the additional strategic payoffs for the party that achieves this goal.

The Assumptions about Coalition Maintenance follow on from the Preconditions and Assumptions about Coalition Formation. In addition, they have been augmented by the empirically-based assumptions of Laver and Schofield. 3(a) assumes that the larger a coalition's ideological range, the more potential for disagreement over policy. 3(b) is supported by empirical evidence that large majorities tend to be more unstable than minimal-winning ones. One assumes that this is because either there is a sub-optimal distribution of payoffs or there is insufficient fear of legislative defeat. Either way, this could lead to insufficient use of the 'carrot' or 'stick' in coalition management, which

implies instability. 3(*c*) is based on Axelrod's common-sense proposition that the more partners there are in a coalition, the more potential exists for conflicts of interest. 3(*d*) and (*e*) deals with instrumental and normative factors that determine cabinet stability. The former assumes that a coalition partner is more likely to leave a coalition if viable alternatives exist. The latter assumes that a coalition partner is less likely to leave a coalition within which they have been involved in a formal investiture procedure. On one level, 3(*f*) - like 1(*f*) - is a formality to ensure that all coalition behaviour is an ongoing and dynamic activity rather that a static arrangement. In other words, parties remain in coalitions to pursue their preferences and not out of a sense of altruism.

In fact, Assumption 3(f) is the key to the whole thesis, as it begs the question: what were the parties' preferences and were they successfully pursued? The other preconditions and assumptions are either self-evident, a logical consequence or a counter factual argument to a previous precondition or assumption, or relatively easy to demonstrate through quantitative means (such as counting the number of cabinet portfolios a party won in a given bargaining round). However, when one raises the issues relating to the pursuit of preferences over time (and the nature of the related payoffs), one is moving in game-theoretical terms, from a single-play game to a multiple-play game. It is much harder to model multiple plays of a game over time and, having done so, to operationalise the 'game' in terms of the empirical research.

As already discussed earlier in this chapter, the thesis works from the assumption that, for the Greens, it was just as important to change the structure and process of policy-making as it was to affect the outputs and outcomes. Thus, their 'bundle' of preferences is a composite of these aspirations (regarding structure, process, outputs and outcomes). It would also follow that the Greens continued participation in a given coalition was contingent upon enough of these preferences being fulfilled.

In assessing the extent to which they were fulfilled, the thesis works from the general to the particular. Part II (the Institutional Context) examines structure and process in its most general sense and touches on their effect upon outputs and outcomes. In Part III, Chapters Four and Five (looking at the Politics of the two coalitions) looks at the whole 'bundle' across all of the most salient policy areas whilst Chapters Six and Seven (Programmatic and Institutional Innovation) focuses explicitly on a selection of such innovations from within the environmental policy area. The conclusion (Chapter Ten) will review the results of the research and assess the nature of payoffs, what they indicate about the parties' preferences, and the extent to which they were achieved.

However, in order to do so, one must first assemble one's theoretical 'tool kit'. This is the purpose of the rest of the chapter.

1.4. Theoretical Framework and Fieldwork Methods

1.4.1. Notes on the Nature of Theory and its Use

Why Model Coalition Behaviour?

The thesis is predicated upon the *a priori* assumption that within the generic term 'coalition theory', there is a model (or set of models) that provides both a predictive and explanatory account of coalition behaviour. With regard to coalition formation, the thesis will use three established models from the literature. These are:

- Riker's (1962) *Minimum/Minimal-Winning* Theory
- Axelrod's (1970) *Minimal Connected Winning* Theory
- de Swaan's (1973) *Median Legislator* Model

The models are used to problematise the trade-off between, first, predictive and explanatory modelling and, second, between office-seeking and policy-driven accounts of coalition formation. Then, the thesis will use the empirical data to test:

- The New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance (set out above in section 1.3.2)

Why use Policy Networks Analysis?

Similarly, the thesis assumes that the 'policy networks' idiom will provide a useful secondary theoretical shorthand with which to describe and explain the nature of the policy-making community and the degree to which the Greens and their client groups succeeded in penetrating it. The thesis uses the policy network description in its loosest and most heuristic manner, based upon Rhodes' idea of resource dependency. Because the thesis is as interested in the perception as in the reality of the success of the Greens' client groups in opening up the policy network, the breaks in such resource dependencies are defined by the agents themselves. In other words, unless otherwise stated, the bounds of a given policy network will be set by the formal institutional structure in which it sited. For example, the thesis assumes that the Energy policy network in Berlin is confined to the formal structures (such as the *Energiebeirat* and the *Energieleitstelle*) set up by the Environment Ministry to mediate the policy area (see Chapter Six) or 'domain' [after Budge, 1987; Pappi, 1993].

Obviously, if the thesis was looking exclusively at the structure and content of policy-making in Berlin, for example, more discussion would be given to the exact nature and boundaries of the policy network. However, the thesis uses the concept in a limited sense, in order to examine the perceived payoffs of the coalition partners and their client groups.

In Chapters Four to Nine, the thesis will build upon Katzenstein's [1987] concept of three 'nodes' of the policy network and concentrate upon three sets of agents:

- Political parties
- Tiers of multi-level governance (the *Bund*, *Länder* and *Kommunen*)
- NGOs

Chapter Ten (Conclusion) reviews the research and assesses the nature of the coalition 'game'. In sections 10.3. and 10.4., the thesis will build upon the heuristic idea of the coalition game having six distinct elements, defined by six questions. These are:

- Who are the players?
- What strategies are available to them?
- To what extent are players able to form coalitions?
- What are the payoffs to the players?
- How much information do the players have about the game?
- How much information within the game can be considered to be 'common knowledge' (i.e. an accepted institutional rule or norm understood by all)?

[Hargreaves Heap *et al*, 1992: 95-97]

Having established the parameters of the coalition game, section 10.4 of the thesis will look in more detail at the game's fourth element, that of payoffs. In doing so it will assess the degree to which such payoffs are policy-oriented in nature. As has already been discussed, this is defined by the thesis as being determined as much by the *process* of policy-making as by its content (in other words, for the purposes of the thesis, the degree to which the Greens have been able to 'open-up' the policy network to their own client groups and break down established hierarchies within the German regulatory framework is as important as the actual policy record of the coalition). The assessment of such policy processes will draw upon the work of Rhodes [1981, 1986a, 1986b] and ask:

- What was/were the configuration of the groups associated with the Greens prior to the Red-Green coalition? i.e. did they constitute any of the *Policy Communities. Professional Networks, Intergovenmental Networks, Producer Networks* or *Issue Networks* ideal-types?

- What was/were the nature of the established network(s) prior to the Red-Green coalition? (as above)

- To what extent had the Greens' client groups already penetrated the network(s) prior to the Red-Green coalition?

- Did the Greens' client groups succeed in (i) breaking down the established network(s) *per se* and make them more open and democratic, or (ii) were they just co-opted into what remained a relatively closed and privileged policy elite?

Is the Theoretical Framework Predictive, Realistic and Explanatory?

The thesis does not intend to 're-invent the wheel' in these respects. As already noted in the literature review, the choice of theoretical model will help determine the focus of one's research, which variables will be considered significant and where one's investigation will be focused., in that certain models 'suggest themselves' for different modes and areas of inquiry., as '*a way of talking about, and therefore understanding, political processes*' [Weale, 1992: 38]. Such models are often defended on the grounds that, although not fully explanatory, they have predictive power. In other words, it is not the realism of assumptions that is the salient point, so much as the logical consequences of a model's assumptions are in concord with the *explanandum* [Friedman, 1963: 211-219. cited Ryan. 1973: 130].

The main criticism of this focus upon predictive power is that it neglects the fact that a model's assumptions may be unrealistic. Thus, although the researcher may be predicting a great deal of the what is actually happening, he or she is doing this with what is

essentially the wrong set of methodological tools. If this is the case, the model is not explanatory.

But what is meant by 'unrealistic'? Moreover, when is a model not 'explanatory'? Taking the first question, Ernest Nagel identifies three main senses in which an assumption may be 'unrealistic'. First, if they are selective and not exhaustive. However, Nagel himself points out that this is an overly restrictive point, stating that '*no finitely long statement can possibly formulate the totality of traits embodied in any concretely existing thing*'. Second, if they are either false or improbable on the available evidence. Although there are occasions when this discrepancy is blindingly obvious, such a process of falsification normally only occurs after deducing the logical consequences of an assumption and then comparing it against the available empirical evidence. Third, if they rely too much on 'pure cases' or ideal types [*ibid*: 133-135].

With regard to the question of 'explanation', as Saunders puts it:

> *An explanation is a causal account of the occurrence of some phenomenon or set of phenomena. An explanation of a particular (class of) event (s) consists in the specification of the minimum non-tautological set of antecedent(s) necessary and sufficient conditions required for its (their) occurrence* [1995: 60].

Or, in short, an explanation must yield an intellectually satisfying answer to a 'why'? question (or its equivalent). The amount of intellectual satisfaction derived will depend upon the degree to which the 'event' being explained is sufficiently described and classified, its causes accounted for in a non-tautological manner and its possible re-occurrence predicted on the basis of a set of conditions that hold across time and space.

Taken together, the reader is entitled to ask if the theoretical framework fulfils the following criteria:

- Does the model (or models) correctly predict coalition behaviour in the case studies?
- Are its assumptions realistic?
- Does it yield intellectually satisfactory answers to 'why' questions?

The answers to these questions will be determined by testing the models against the two case studies. However, the whole debate reflects the often ambiguous nature of Political Science, torn as it is between a desire to achieve the empiricism of the natural sciences, yet wishing to retain the values of empathy and context inherent in the idea of *'Geisteswissenschaften'* [Ryan, 1973: 7].

In the research question, the thesis asks to what extent the Greens have assumed a 'normal' political role within the party system, where such a role would mean that their strategic behaviour can be predicted as a function of the rational pursuit of a bundle of group-related preferences. The thesis also argues that a pluralistic approach - between the empiricism of the natural sciences and the idea of *'Geisteswissenschaften'* - is feasible within Political Science. If one accepts this premise then the use of deductive models based upon rational action can be defended, even when applied to such an ideologically charged topic as Red-Green coalitions. Indeed, this is the central theoretical challenge of the thesis.

Such models are already well defended. For instance, Roemer states that *'in seeking to provide micro-foundations for behaviour.......the tools par excellence are rational choice models'* [1986: 192], whilst Dunleavy goes as far as to declare that *'I could not pursue my research without using them'* [1991: xi]. They are indispensable to the thesis and are complemented, as a secondary framework, by the policy networks idiom.

1.4.2. The use of Case Studies

The thesis is built upon a comparison of two case studies, both informed by and testing a theoretical framework. This is intuitively a relatively straightforward idea. However, although the use of case studies would appear to uncontentious, some scholars are keen to point out their limitations, in semantic terms at least. For instance, Sartori somewhat obscurely makes the distinction between case studies as a comparative method *per se* and as a method with some merit within the context of a wider comparative analysis [1994: 23]. Although one must agree with Mackie and Marsh's [1995: 177] opinion that Sartori is indulging in pedantry , one can sympathise with the implicit point that Sartori is making, that case studies alone are a somewhat flimsy method of comparison if not informed by a well-defined and operational theoretical framework. This is echoed by Rose's assertion that it is the presence of such a operational framework - capable of application across cases - that makes a study comparative [1991: 449].

Lijphart divides case studies up into five ideal types. First, interpretative case studies using existing theory. Second, hypothesis-generating case studies. Third, case studies used to interrogate or test a theory. Fourth, those used to confirm a theory. Fifth, deviant studies [1971: 691-3].

This typology generates a number of further points for discussion, much of which is beyond the remit of this thesis. Nevertheless, three points are worth mentioning. First, as Mackie and Marsh [1995] observe, the first of Lijphart's category of case study is not strictly comparative anyway. However, this is not to deny that such case studies do not have their own worth. For instance, Daniel Little's [1989] *Understanding Peasant China* uses case studies to illustrate a number of debates within the social sciences (the 'Moral Economy' debate, the 'Macroregions' debate, the 'Breakthrough' debate and so on) and to demonstrate the use of a selection of idioms of analysis (rational choice theory, Marxism

and historical materialism) in addressing them. The uses of case studies in Little's book provides a solid and consistent focus with which to demonstrate a plurality of idioms. Thus it is essentially the empirical object of study that remains constant, rather than the theoretical framework.

The second point for discussion is that, as Mackie and Marsh point out, the other four of Lijphart's ideal types are not necessarily comparative either and can only be considered so if:

> .....*they use and assess the utility of concepts developed elsewhere (by elsewhere here we mean in another country, or in relation to a different jurisdiction in the same country or in the same country, during a different time period); test some general theory or hypothesis; or generate concepts to be of use elsewhere* [1995: 177]

Third, being ideal types, Lijphart's categories are often not so neatly replicated within the field of comparative research. For instance, the use of case studies in this thesis covers four out of five of the categories (excluding deviant studies). Thus the use of existing models of coalition formation can be regarded as being primarily interpretative rather than comparative, in keeping with Lijpharts first classification. Moreover, the use of the case studies to test the new model of coalition formation and maintenance conforms to both the third ('theory informing') and fourth ('theory confirming') ideal types. The degree to which the case studies conform to the second category - that of 'hypothesis-generating' case studies - will be demonstrated in Chapter 10 (sections 10.3 and 10.4 on games and payoffs).

What is clear is that the use of case studies in this thesis does conform to Mackie and Marsh's criteria of comparability. For instance, in the thesis' examination of policy

outputs and outcomes within the context of multi-level government, the case studies 'use and assess the utility of concepts developed elsewhere', whilst the use of existing coalition models and the New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance means that the thesis does 'test some general theory or hypothesis'. Moreover, it aims to generate concepts to be of use elsewhere.

Finally, the constraints of time, resources, thesis length and subject matter suggested that the focus of the case studies should fall within the formal institutional structure of two German *Länder*. Obviously, one could argue that these parameters are artificial, given that the political and policy-oriented phenomena under examination - for instance post-materialism or environmental policy - are not so neatly constrained by them. Nevertheless, the individual *Land* provides a framework for analysis, given the ease with which functional equivalents (*Land* legislatures, executives and party organisations for instance) can be identified across the cases. It remains for the reader to judge how successfully the thesis achieves this.

1.4.3. Fieldwork Methods

Apart from some secondary data sourced in Hesse, the bulk of the fieldwork was carried out between April and September 1996 in Berlin and Lower Saxony.

The main data is both quantitative and qualitative in nature. The quantitative data consists of opinion poll data (both academic and commercial), election data and *Land*-level official statistics. Apart from some degree of interpretation, the data is used in the form in which it was accessed by the author. No further data processing - such as regression analysis or cross-tabulation - has been undertaken.

The qualitative data has been sourced from official documents (parliamentary protocols, internal policy briefings, minutes and official reports, official publicity material etc.), press archives, party press offices and public libraries, as well as from extensive elite interviews (with local politicians - including ex-ministers - civil servants, and members of NGOs and *Land* government-appointed advisory councils). Although the author has over twenty hours of such material on tape, most of it is not directly attributed to individuals. There are two reasons for this. First, with the exception of a limited number of direct quotes from individuals in Chapter Ten (section 10.4 on payoffs), the material was used as background information, designed to test, confirm and complement data found elsewhere. Second, much of the interview data was obtained in the understanding that it was essentially 'off the record'. This was especially true of civil servants, in the Berlin and Lower Saxony Environment Ministries and elsewhere, who were astonishingly willing to give me access to material and air opinions that were not for public consumption. Having earned their trust, this material has been used discreetly[14]. All interviews were of an 'open' rather than structured nature, allowing the informants to elaborate upon what they considered to be the most salient points of a given issue.

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[14]The tapes are available to examiners, if they wish to verify the interview material.

Part II: The Institutional Context

CHAPTER TWO: THE PARTY SYSTEM AND POLICY ENVIRONMENT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

2.1. Preamble

The purpose of this chapter is to embed the research within its institutional context. Drawing upon secondary literature, it establishes a perspective (mainly from the national level) with which it will be easier to examine and explain the strategic actions of the agents (parties, bureaucracies, NGOs, politicians, civil servants, activists) and their impact upon coalition behaviour in the two case studies. As discussed in Chapter One, in keeping with the empirical research itself, this chapter has two strands: one looking at party politics and the other at policy making.

The chapter has four main sections. First, section 2.2. looks at the party system and the electorate in the Federal Republic and, using the established literature, assesses the degree to which the post-war West German polity has been characterised by continuity or change. It then goes on to examine the impact of unification, in particular the introduction of a significant new electorate displaying quite different patters of voting behaviour to those found in the 'old' *Länder*. The section assesses the impact of these developments in the formation of a 'New' German party system.

Section 2.3. examines the institutional histories of the SPD and the Greens, in order to establish an understanding of some of the historical and ideological dimensions that inform the strategic behaviour of the two parties. Although stress is placed upon their recent

history, the origins of both parties is also looked at, in order to demonstrate that both parties have undergone similar processes of ideological schism between Left and Right, *fundis* and *realos*. The intention is posit the idea that, despite their distinct identities, both the Greens and the SPD have to grapple with similar intra-party debates over the whole issue of Red-Green political co-operation.

Section 2.4 looks at the historical background and institutional norms of the German administrative state, as well as its present structure. Stress is placed upon how German administrative culture has been steeped in the traditions of Roman law, with an emphasis upon the impartial and (crucially to this thesis) expert administrator as the embodiment of a public power. The chapter examines the degree to which public administration in the Federal Republic is characterised by a duality between the two ethoses of the contemporary party-driven *Parteienstaat* and the residual administrator-led *Beamtenstaat*. In terms of the structure of German public administration, the chapter examines the concept of the 'sectorisation' [Bulmer, 1983: 350] of German public policy . Emphasis is placed upon both vertical (between multiple levels of governance) and horizontal (between competing ministries) sectorisation. In keeping with the idea of a 'bundle' of preferences (see Chapter One), the section differentiates between the structure, process, outputs and outcomes of policy-making.

Finally, the chapter applies these ideas to the specific field of environmental policy in the Federal Republic in section 2.5. It assesses the degree to which it is the unique structure of German administration, rather than any cultural factors, that is responsible for Germany's innovative strength within the field of environmental administration. The chapter examines the historical background and institutional norms of German environmental policy making, the structure of German environmental administration and

makes a preliminary assessment of the impact of the Greens upon the policy-making process.

2.2 The Federal Republic's Party System(s)

Like all but one election in the Federal Republic's history, the 1994 Federal election returned the CDU-CSU to the *Bundestag* as its biggest political grouping. As a result, one could be forgiven for assuming that the German electorate is, in essence, as stable and conservative as this fact suggests. Yet, when one 'unpacks' the available data, a far more complex picture emerges. This was partly due to the unprecedented nature of the first all-German elections themselves, in which, as Veen observes, the act of Unification was *'democratically legitimated ex post facto by the entire German nation'* [1993: 47]. However, it was also because the addition of 10 million new voters - from a quite different socio-economic system - served to further complicate an electoral landscape that had displayed signs of instability and change from at least the late 1970's. That this change has been of such interest is primarily due to the fact that the Federal Republic had been for so long the *musterknabe* of electoral participation and stability.

2.2.1 The Party System in the 'Old' Federal Republic

The first thirty years of the Federal Republic was characterised by a concentration of the party system that in many ways reflected the ongoing integration of the electorate into a stable, pragmatic and democratic political system. As Dalton points out, even as recently as the late 1970's, the Federal Republic was *'noted for its growing stability and cohesion'* [1992: 53]. The party system was dominated by the two large *Volksparteien*, competing

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with one another in an attempt to appeal across society to the maximum number of voters. Despite this 'catch-all' strategy, both the CDU-CSU and the SPD mobilised their core support around the dominant cleavages in German society, those of social class and religion. Indeed, one characteristic of the West German polity was the persistence of some degree of group-based voting behaviour; albeit supplemented by psychological ties between the individual voter and his/her party of choice [Padgett, 1993: 41]. As a result. the voter profiles of the two *Volksparteien* are significantly skewed towards specific class and confessional loci, despite the erosion of these traditional social networks.

The CDU-CSU's core support came from the predominantly rural and/or Catholic areas of the Federal Republic, such as Baden-Wurttemberg, Rhineland-Platinate, Lower Saxony and Bavaria. This support was supplemented by that of the 'old' middle-class, the self-employed and the older generational cohorts (especially women). The SPD's support came from the more urban, and/or Protestant areas: such as North Rhine-Westphalia. Hamburg, Bremen and West Berlin. This support was also supplemented by the majority of manual workers (especially those who were members of trade unions). a significant proportion of the 'new' middle class of white-collar workers and the younger generational cohorts within the electorate [see Cerny. (ed.) 1990; Smith and Paterson, (eds.) 1992: Padgett, (ed.) 1993.]. Yet, despite the persistence of these cleavages and their stabilising effect upon voting behaviour, it has been clear for some time that their influence has been declining: especially as a way of mobilising the *Volksparteien* vote. As Klingemann observes, '*the group-anchored character of the voting behaviour of these strata is becoming less and less a guarantee for the continuity of stable social group politics*' [Crewe and Denver, 1985: 252. Cited Padgett, 1993: 26]. Indeed, from the 1970's onwards. it has become clear that the certainties of the first three decades of the Federal Republic are being eroded. This happened first at the margins then, increasingly. at the core of electorate.

The first manifestation of the erosion of party identity amongst the German electorate was the growth in 'split-ticket' voting. Split-ticket voting involves the division of party choice between the *Erststimme* and *Zweitstimme* on the ballot papers and the Federal Republic's two-ballot electoral system, first used in 1953, is ideally suited for this type of behaviour. Nevertheless, it was not until the 1960's that such voting behaviour became significant, at around 10% of votes cast [Dalton, 1992: 54] This was especially common amongst the emergent 'new' middle class and could be interpreted as reflecting their ambiguous social position in relation to the class cleavage [Padgett, 1993: 39]. The main beneficiary of this practice was the FDP, who are reliant upon second votes for their *Liste* in order to maintain their representation in the *Bundestag*. However, in the 1980's, split-ticket voting grew substantially: reaching 14 % in 1987 and 16 % in 1990 [Dalton, 1992: 54]. Interestingly, there is no evidence that this was translated into higher FDP support who, despite the party's excellent performance in the 1990 elections, have since gone into what appears to be terminal decline. This would suggest that much of this voter ambivalence is being diffused across the party system.

One obvious example of growing voter ambivalence has been the decline in the total vote for the *Volksparteien*. There appears to be two main reasons for this decline. First reduced partisan identification, either as a result of the erosion of distinct socio-economic loci and/or because of a loosening of psychological ties between the parties and their voters. Second, the decline in the total level of electoral participation from the high levels of the 1960's and 1970's. These two factors are themselves interlinked and have prompted much debate as to their underlying causes.

The total *Volkspartei* vote has been in decline for over a decade: falling from 82.7 % in 1976, to 77.4 % in 1980 before stabilising at 77.6 % in the 1983 election. However, this would appear to have been a brief respite before resuming its fall to 68.5 % in 1987 and an

unprecedented 62.9 % in 1990 [Padgett, 1993: 35. Table 1.2]. Given that it has been accepted that the CDU-CSU and the SPD constitute one of the stabilising factors within the political system, this 20-point decline in fourteen years raises questions as to its future stability. Moreover, this decline has affected both the government and opposition parties to some extent; with the SPD arguably the biggest loser. Whilst the CDU has seen some erosion of its support amongst its client groups, the SPD has suffered a severe loss of support amongst its electoral core of manual workers, especially Catholics, those in rural areas and those who are not members of a trade union. In 1983, this manifested itself at the margins of SPD support: such as in Baden-Wurttemberg. However, the 1987 and 1990 elections continued the process; with the SPD losing support to both the FDP and CDU in areas such as Nordrhein-Westfalen and to the Far Right in Bremen. At the same time, the Greens have continued to challenge the SPD along the dimension of the 'New Politics'. Ironically, the party's attempts to counter this threat and integrate the 'New Left' agenda has further alienated the typical SPD *Stammwahler*. Thus, whilst the SPD's 'new' middle-class vote has held up in the 1980's, there has been a 19 % reduction in SPD alignment amongst the non-Catholic unionised working-class between 1983 and 1990 [Padgett, 1993: 38]. Yet, despite remaining the biggest party in the Federal Republic, the CDU has not been able to fully exploit this decline in its opponent's fortunes. Indeed, during the early 1990's, the party was itself prone to lose support to both the FDP., the SPD and the Far Right. Moreover, it has never been able to win the allegiance of a majority of the 'new' middle-class to the extent that, for example, the British Conservatives have done until recently.

As previously mentioned, one factor affecting the *Volkspartei* vote has been the decline in the socio-economic groups around which they have mobilised. For instance, in 1957. the SPD received 61 % of the working-class vote and only 24 % of the 'old' middle-class vote: a differential of 37 %. Despite the Bad Godesberg conference and, in the 1970's, a

sustained period in office, this differential remained above 10 % throughout the decade and into the 1980's; with similar differentials along the dimensions of income and education [Dalton, 1992: 58]. Similarly, the CDU has also been embedded within a distinct social clientele. Yet, whilst the 'old' working-class and middle-class cleavage remains, these two groups' size as a proportion of the electorate has declined from approximately three-quarters of the electorate in the 1950's to little more than a half today. At the same time, the 'new' middle-class now constitutes around 46 % of the total electorate. Thus, although the old class cleavage is, arguably, as distinct as ever it is less salient politically, given its decline as a proportion of the electorate. More significant is the emergence of a 'new' class who no longer follow these cues in making their voting decisions [Dalton, 1992: 59]. This process is echoed in the slow decline in the importance of the confessional cleavage as a factor in voting choice. As we have seen, the SPD can no longer rely on the non-Catholic vote; even amongst the working-class. Equally, there has been some erosion of the CDU's traditional support amongst Catholic areas of the Federal Republic. In the 1987 election, CDU support in areas with over 60 % Catholic representation within the electorate fell by 5.2 %, compared with an overall decline of -4.5 % [Padgett, 1993: 38]. However, this was to some extent reversed in 1990; although those sections of the Catholic population engaged in unionised manual occupations continued to show less support for the CDU. Nevertheless, as Padgett points out, this may not be of any great significance given that the CDU's 'advantage has been less pronounced and consistent where Catholicism is counteracted by trade union membership' [Padgett, 1993: 38].

Such social-structural changes are partly responsible for an erosion of the psychological attachment between the *Volksparteien* and their voters. This manifests itself in three ways. Firstly, as we have seen, the continuing decline in the *Volkspartei* vote. Secondly, in increased voter-exchange between the parties and, finally, in a significant increase in the

proportion of non-voters. All the evidence suggests that there has been a real erosion of *'the stable bedrock'* of the German electorate [Padgett, 1993: 25].

Voter exchange is notoriously difficult to measure. The Pederson Index of net/aggregate change is reliable within narrow parameters, but is unable to account for self-cancelling voter exchange between the parties. However, measuring gross change is fraught with methodological problems because of its reliance on survey data, particularly in relation to individual recollections of previous voting choice. These caveats aside, it has been possible to demonstrate that, although net change has been reasonably stable in recent years, there has been an increase in gross change. In other words, whilst the respective shares of the *Volkspartei* vote have remained near previous levels, there has been greater volatility 'below the surface' as individual voters transfer allegiance between elections. Inter-election change (between *Bundestag* elections) has doubled since the 1960's- to around 20 %- whilst intra-election change (between *Landtag* and *Bundestag* elections or vice versa) has increased to an even greater extent. The 1990 Federal elections and subsequent *Land* elections have seen a continuation of this trend.

The third manifestation of growing voter alienation is the increase in non-voting; which has reached significantly high proportions in a society previously noted for high levels of electoral participation. As such high levels of electoral participation were based on the idea of voting being a civic responsibility, any significant decline has implications for the future legitimacy of the party system. Most of this growth has taken place amongst the younger generational cohorts and could be linked to feelings of impotence, dissatisfaction and the perceived lack of alternatives between the parties. However, such perceptions are not necessarily transitory and, if these cohorts are not integrated into the political system, the likelihood of future instability will increase.

Given this sea-change in the German electorate, much speculation has taken place as to the future shape of the German polity, to the extent that some analysts perceive a crisis in the system as a whole. But will such a crisis take place, or will the system return to stability once this period of turbulence has ended? The question hinges upon whether the German polity is undergoing a process of realignment or dealignment [Dalton *et al.* 1988. Ch. 15. Cited Dalton, 1992: 56].

The argument for realignment centres upon the idea that parties are still fundamentally embedded within distinct social, economic and political loci. However, as technical change weakens the old milieus, new social forces and interest coalitions arise to make competing claims that the parties must address. Whilst this process takes place, there are decisive shifts in allegiance between parties and their clienteles. According to the logic of this argument, the 'realigning' election of 1983 was such an event [Padgett, 1993: 27]. Thus, the rise of the 'new' middle-class, the decreasing degree of salience of the 'old' class-confessional cleavages and the 'New Politics' agenda - based around a 'post-materialist' discourse [Inglehart, 1990. cited Dalton, 1992: 56] - are all evidence of such a fundamental realignment.

However, it is clear that the German electorate shows no sign of returning to a stable voting pattern. Indeed, the 1980's appear to have been the precursor to *'an extended period of electoral change'* [Padgett, 1993: 31]. Moreover, although more and more individuals no longer take their electoral cues from the 'old' class-confessional cleavages, their perceptions of the *Volksparteien* as being mobilised around class have actually increased since the 1950's [Dalton, 1992: 59]. It would appear that the *Volksparteien* have not undergone a qualitative change in their electoral appeal: but are still perceived to mobilise around the familiar class-confessional cleavages. One must conclude that it is the individual voter who has become distanced from the mobilisation process.

Such a conclusion is consistent with the dealignment argument put forward by Dalton amongst others. The logic of this argument is that partisan identification has been eroded by both the increasing sophistication and alienation of the individual voter [Raschke, 1982; Dalton, 1988; cited Dalton, 1992: 56]. Voters are increasingly instrumental in their party choice and will favour one party over another depending on the issues of the day. Moreover, those interest coalitions that do arise will tend to be more fragmented than the monolithic socio-economic blocs that had previously shaped politics. Given this fragmentation, the signals given out by the electorate to the office-seeking party become increasingly confused. For example, the 1980's saw the emergence of a post-materialist electoral agenda; to which the SPD felt obliged to respond. Yet, in all three Federal elections, the environment never achieved the same issue-salience with the electorate as did the questions of unemployment or pension provision. Conversely, despite such materialist concerns, a period of unprecedented prosperity did not prevent Helmut Kohl and the CDU being profoundly unpopular in the first half of 1989. Indeed, in the Federal Republic there appears to no longer be a clear link between economic performance and party popularity [Kirchgassner, 1989; cited Padgett, 1993: 43]. Given such ambiguities, it is becoming harder for parties to identify and articulate the interests of the voters. In turn, this increases voter alienation and volatility. Ultimately, such a process has the potential to seriously undermine the legitimacy of the political system.

2.2.2. The Party System in the 'New' *Länder*

By the end of the 1980's, the German electorate was displaying signs of increased volatility and fragmentation. Thus, with the unification of the two Germanys, there seemed little possibility of a return to the stability of the 1950's and 1960's. As Dalton observes, '*Unification.... injected new uncertainty into this already fluid political environment*'; giving the possibility of '*a new wave of partisan change*' [Dalton, 1992: 55].

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Under any circumstances, the addition of 10 million new voters into the political landscape would impose a serious strain on an already brittle polity. However, decades of 'real existing socialism' in the East had atomised any semblance of the civil society that had been the basis of party identification in the West. Indeed, survey data has indicated that only 4% of voters in the 'New' *Länder* admit to 'strong ties' to a particular party [Dalton, 1992: 71]. Given the lack of such a deep-rooted party identification, there was some speculation as to how the individual voter would make his/her electoral choice. Initially, it was thought that, both the predominance of at least nominally Protestant voters and the large proportion of manual workers in the 'New' *Länder* would tip the scales in favour of the SPD. However, this has not been the case. Indeed, if one is to discern a clear pattern of voter choice, it is practically an inversion of that of the 'old' *Länder*. Thus, although social class classifications are somewhat tentative in eastern Germany, it would appear that the CDU enjoys disproportionate support amongst manual workers compared with its overall share of the vote; with 49.8% compared with 41.8 % overall (and 24.8% for the SPD). Moreover, not only is the CDU ahead of the SPD amongst the small Catholic section of the population; it also commands a majority of those voters who claim affinity to the Protestant church [Padgett, 1993: 39-41]. Indeed, it is only amongst those sections of the electorate who claim no religious affiliation that the SPD has made any headway. However, even here the SPD is by no means dominant and must compete with *Bundnis 90*-Greens and the PDS.

As already noted, the Federal Republic's once stable electorate now appears to be increasingly fractious and unpredictable. This has been demonstrated by the falling *Volkspartei* vote, split-ticket voting, increased rates of voter exchange and falling levels of overall electoral participation, particularly amongst the young. Moreover, much of this volatility can be attributed to technical change: which has both eroded the social networks that provided many of the cues for voting behaviour and reduced the psychological

attachment between the individual voter and the party of his/her choice. The results of the 1990 election have demonstrated that these trends have continued. However, many voters are not only indifferent to the major parties but openly contemptuous of them. Such perceptions of *Parteiverdrossenheit* have been aggravated by a number of high-profile political scandals in recent years - such as the Flick and Barschel affairs - and by a widespread perception that the political class is out of touch with the aspirations of the wider public.

However, there is no real evidence that the basis of the Federal Republic's political system is not still sound, despite the slow process of dealignment. Moreover, one must assume that the *Volksparteien* will still exercise a major stabilising role. As Gordon Smith asserts, *'there are several reasons for supposing that they will continue to be the important mainstay of the German party system'* [Mair and Smith, 1990: 159]; and that around a half of the total electorate will continue to vote for them. Nevertheless, they can no longer count on the electorate to the extent that they could even a decade ago and are more vulnerable to sudden shifts of allegiance over specific issues. To conclude, it is ironic that - even as individual voters appear to be increasingly alienated from the political process - understanding and responding to their aspirations and beliefs has become more and more vital to the parties.

It remains to be seen if this pattern of voter instability is now an established feature of the 'New' German party system. However, it does force parties to consider, and even enter into, political alliances over the medium-term, in order to gain office. Moreover, these alliances are often forged in the face of significant intra- and inter- party opposition.

2.3. The Parties

2.3.1. The SPD

The SPD is the oldest political party in the Federal Republic and its origins have been well documented [see Mehring, 1897; Lipinski, 1927-1928; Berlau, 1949; Schorske, 1955; and Hunt, 1964]. Whilst its main competitor, the CDU, is inextricably linked with the post-war settlement and the establishment of the Federal Republic, the SPD's foundation is linked to the failed revolutionary fervour of 1848. Its roots are deeply embedded in the network of workers' clubs that spread throughout the more industrialised regions of Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The emergent party was polarised between two competing socialist groups, the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers. This polarisation manifested itself not only in their political outlook, but also in their formal organisation. The affect of this division between the two groups has persisted until the present. As Hunt observes, the two groups *'left a strange dual heritage to the later party, which helps to explain some of its paradoxes'* [1964: 2].

The SPD has always had an authoritarian streak, dating back to one of its precursors the German General Workers Association (*Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeitervereien* or ADA), founded in the mid-19th Century by Lassalle, who declared in a letter to Bismarck *'that the working classes are instinctively inclined to dictatorship, if they can be justly convinced that this dictatorship is exercised in their interests'* [1964: 4]. As Hunt observes:

> *'from its outset the German labour movement has a dual heritage in organisational as well as in political matters.... two sharply contrasting models of organisation: the one authoritarian, rigidly centralised, efficient, and disciplined; the other ultra-democratic, loosely federalist in structure, and lax in discipline. In the subsequent history of the Social Democratic Party, one can follow*

the interplay of these two clashing concepts of organisation' [1964:

6-7].

The story of the modern SPD begins with the defeat of Hitler in 1945. At first, the SPD

was able to remobilise under the aegis of all the occupying powers. However, following

the *Zwangsvereinigung* in the Russian zone, from the spring of 1946, the SPD's activities

were restricted to the three Western zones of occupation.

Nevertheless, the SPD at this time remained in many respects a Marxist-inspired party of

the non-Communist Left. It took a long time to come to terms with the post-war

settlement, the division of Germany and the 'social market economy' model being

developed by Adenauer and Erhard, with the encouragement of the Americans. The post-

war SPD's early policy pronouncements continued to promise to 'socialise' the production

of coal, iron and steel, energy, chemicals, basic building materials, large banks and insurance

companies. Such a stance set the SPD against the political tide in the western zones, as

demonstrated by its rapidly falling membership in the late 1940s and early 1950s[15]. The

death of Kurt Schumacher in 1952 only served to further demoralise the SPD during this

period.

The electoral unpopularity of its stance was increasingly recognised within the SPD itself

and, slowly, the party began to modernise all aspects of its activities. With the added

impetus of election defeats in 1953 and 1957, the process of adapting to the new political

realities of the Federal Republic culminated in the Bad Godesberg conference of 1959,

where the party adopted a new raft of policies. The 'Bad Godesberg Programme'

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[15]SPD memebrship fell from almost 900,000 in 1946 to under 600,000 by the mid- 1950s [Merkl
(ed.),1980: 37].

disavowed Marxism and attempted to embed the SPD's core principles of democratic socialism within the wider context of Christian ethics, classical philosophy and the tradition of humanism. The programme endorsed the liberal pluralist settlement in the Federal Republic and the centrality of the 'social market' economy to it.

Underlying this change was the need to appeal across class-loyalties in order to enhance the SPD's support. This logic predated Kirchheimer's (1966) model of the *Volkspartei*, which explicitly de-emphasises ideology and class-allegiance as a means of political mobilisation. This, combined with a new professional team led by the charismatic Willy Brandt, led to a ten point rise in SPD support over the period 1957 to 1969. Finally, in 1972, the SPD reached the peak of their popularity: polling 45.8% of the vote and becoming the biggest party in the *Bundestag* [Padgett, 1993: 28].

The SPD's rising support and *Salonfähigkeit* inevitably led to participation in national government, first as junior partner in the Grand Coalition (1966-1969) and then as senior partner in the Social-Liberal Coalition (1969-1982). However, ever since its peak of popularity in 1972, the SPD has been in both an electoral and ideological decline. This decline accelerated in the 1980's, following the collapse of the Social-Liberal coalition.

Once in opposition, the SPD has had to respond to four fundamental threats to its position. First, the decline in the overall *Völkspartei* vote, which has effected both the SPD and CDU and has prompted some observers to forecast growing instability within the Federal Republic's party system. Second, the extraordinary personal appeal and political acumen of Helmut Kohl, who has managed to keep the SPD on the back foot in the fight for the political centre-ground. Third, the growth of the Greens, which has served to put pressure on the SPD along the post-materialist or 'New Politics' dimension. Finally, after 1989, the persistence of the PDS in the new *Länder*, which has contributed

to the SPD's weakness in the east and (with the additional weakness of the Greens and FDP) has severely restricted their coalition options.

The SPD's response took shape at the 1984 Party Conference in Essen. The Executive (*Parteivorstand*) appointed a Programme Commission, chaired by the talismanic Brandt, to work on the principles of a new programme. It produced its first draft in 1986. However, by this point, the internal politics of the SPD began to hamper the development of the new programme: with Hans-Jochen Vogel taking over as Chair of the Programme Commission and the younger and highly ambitious Oskar Lafontaine being appointed on to it.

The new Basic Programme of the SPD was approved in 1989 and is widely accepted to be an uninspired mish-mash, representing an uneasy compromise between the underlying core values of the SPD, as set out at Bad Godesberg, and the 'New Left' and/or post-materialist agenda around which the SPD's Left-wing (only partly in response to the Greens) had mobilised in the 1980's [Müller, 1990: 63-4; von Winter, 1990: 350 -358; Padgett and Paterson, 1991: 58; Potthoff, 1991: 355; Müller-Rommel and Poguntke, 1992: 338; Padgett (ed.), 1993: 174-176]. Moreover, it was a response to the problems of the 1980s and, with unification of Germany, was largely irrelevant to the new political landscape. Once again, the SPD appeared to be swimming against the tide.

Nevertheless, at the *Länder* level, the SPD has continued to thrive as a party of government. Here, the Greens are a party that the SPD can deal with, as demonstrated by the majority 'Red-Green' coalitions (SPD and Greens) in, for example, Hesse (1985-7, 1991-1995 and 1995-), West Berlin (1989-90), Lower Saxony (1990-1994) and North-Rhine Westphalia (1995-) as well as a minority coalition ('tolerated' by the PDS) in Saxony-Anhalt since 1994. In addition there have been 'Traffic-Light' coalitions in

Brandenburg (1990-1994 with *Bündnis 90* and the FDP) and Bremen (1991-1995 with the Greens and the FDP). Slowly, the SPD has recognised the need to address this new competitor to its Left, whilst trying not to alienate its traditional supporters through dealing with what many regarded as an anti-system party. Chapter Three has a more comprehensive account of these coalitions.

Nevertheless, despite evidence that the SPD has had little to regret in its dealings with the Greens, this lesson has not as yet been applied to the party's dealings with the PDS[16]. As the successors of the former ruling Socialist Unity Party of East Germany (SED), the PDS have attracted opprobrium. Labels such as 'ex-Stasi', the 'Eastern League', the 'nostalgic association' or even 'Red Polished Fascists' have been used to attack the party. Ironically, this has apparently helped the PDS as much as hindered them. The success of the PDS in entering the *Bundestag* following the October 1994 elections was evidence that the party had consolidated their status as the 'eastern' party of protest [Lees 1995: 150-154]. Subsequent *Land* elections - especially their spectacular result in the October 1995 Berlin elections (where they became the biggest party in the east of the city with 36.3% of votes cast) have only confirmed this impression. Moreover, the continued social dislocation in the new *Länder* means that the PDS' position is secure for the time being[17].

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[16]There is evidence that this is changing. Within days of replacing Rudolf Scharping as party leader in 1995, Oskar Lafontaine had a highly publicised meeting with his opposite number in the PDS, Gregor Gysi. Naturally, the meeting was vehemently denounced by opposition politicians and sections of the German media!

[17]In programmatic terms, the PDS remains opportunistic and oriented towards the East (it only receives about 0.9% of the vote in the West). The PDS sees itself as part of the reform (as opposed to opposition) movement in the former GDR and has not explicitly rejected the aims of the former regime. It is against what it regards as westernisation and the material and cultural dominance of capital, as represented by the BRD political settlement. As far as the PDS is for concrete policies, these would include decisive social change through both strong parliamentary representation and extra-parliamentary means, open borders for 'people in danger' (asylum seekers),. a 30 hour week with full wage compensation and the dismantlement of NATO. They have 30 MP's in the *Bundestag* (including 9 from the West who are former Greens), and 100,000 members in the east (compared to 25,000 SPD members) and 30,000 in the west. 90% of the PDS membership come from the former SED.

Up until now, the SPD's response to the PDS has been a continuation of the old Communist/Social Democrat schism. This has been formally codified as meaning no co-operation above the local level and absolutely no collaboration in opposition. In a re-run of the party's initial response to the Greens, the SPD wants to integrate the PDS electorate without absorbing the concepts it represents. The SPD has also demanded some form of *mea culpa* on the part of the PDS with regards to socialism and the GDR and the enforced merger between the Communists and SPD in 1946.

The Berlin debacle of 22 October 1995[18] proved to be fatal for party leader Rudolf Scharping, who was replaced by Oskar Lafontaine at the SPD annual conference in November 1995. Indeed, the choice of the mercurial Left-winger Lafontaine over the staid centrist Scharping is indicative of the party's ideological ambivalence. Rudolf Scharping's strategy was based around projecting the SPD's governmental competence at all costs. As a result, he always refused to rule out the possibility of re-entering national government as a junior partner to the CDU. Oskar Lafontaine, on the other hand, promised a more confrontational and explicitly Left-wing stance in opposition. However, as the 1998 *Bundestag* elections approach, the pendulum appears to be swinging away from Lafontaine towards the more centrist, but equally abrasive, Minister President of Lower Saxony, Gerhard Schröder.

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[18]The SPD lost 6.6% overall, with their vote share dropping by 4% in the Western half of the city and a devastating 12.1% in the east. The SPD is no longer the strongest party in any district of the city. In the east, it was the strongest party but now lies behind the PDS and CDU. In the west, it even slumped to 29.8% in its once rock-solid heartland of Wedding and was beaten by the Greens in post-materialist Kreuzberg and Mitte 01. Bearing in mind that, under Willy Brandt in 1963 the Berlin SPD scored 62%, *humiliation* is not too strong a word in describing the SPD's 1995 performance. It was certainly their worst-ever performance in Berlin and provoked speculation as to the SPD's long-term future as a *Volkspartei*. Moreover, it opened up a fresh split within the local party as to its future strategy. On the one hand, the leadership of the party and the traditionalist elements of the rank-and-file were broadly in favour of a renewal of the Grand Coalition after the necessary negotiations. On the other hand, the New Left and a significant proportion of the ordinary membership argued that the Berlin SPD's only chance was to go into opposition and renew itself programmatically. Underlying this argument was the implicit assumption that the party would move back towards the Left and re-build co-operation with the Greens, and even the PDS, through opposition to a minority CDU senate.

2.3.2 The Greens

The origins of the German Greens are well documented [19]and do not require more than a brief résumé.

The proto-Greens emerged out of the 'citizens initiative' groups of the mid- to late 1970's. The early years were characterised by internecine struggle between the ecology movement's 'New Left' and conservative wings. The former saw environmental protest as one aspect of a wider critique of the capitalist system (and were more prepared to resort to violent political protest against it) whilst the latter favoured a more assimilative policy in co-operation with the established political order. As a result, the two wings began to field rival lists at local and *Länder* elections. However, it was clear that such factionalism was preventing either of the ecological groupings from surmounting the Federal Republic's 5% electoral barrier and, in July 1978, the two wings in Bavaria decided to combine and take part in the state's elections in October of that year as *Die Grünen* (The Greens). This arrangement became known as the Bavarian Co-operation Model and was to be the template for future co-operation in other *Länder*. Once inside the same organisation, the conservative elements became progressively marginalised and the proto-party began to assume its familiar Left-libertarian and/or post-materialist character [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 192-7].

The proto-Greens' first opportunities came at the local level: taking advantage of the greater willingness of voters to vote innovatively at local elections (as well as the fact that

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[19]See Scharf, T., 1994, *The German Greens: Challenging The Consensus.* Berg; Markovits, A.S. and Gorski, P.S., 1993, *The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond.* Polity Press; Kleinert, H., 1992, *Aufstieg und fall der Grünen: Analyse einer alternativen Partei.* Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf.; Hülsberg, W.,1988, *The German Greens: A Social And Political Profile.* Verso.; Bickerich, W. (Ed), 1985, *SPD und Grüne: Das neue Bündnis?* Spiegel-Buch; Müller, E-P, 1984, *Die Grünen und das Parteisystem.* Deutscher IInstituts-Verlag,; Papadakis, E. 1983, 'The Green party in contemporary West German politics'. *Political Quarterly.* 54; and Mettke, J.R. (Ed), 1982, *Die Grünen: Regierungspartner von morgen?* Spiegel-Buch; for instance.

many local communes had no 5% electoral barrier). They also campaigned in the 1979 elections to the European Parliament.

Although failing to win seats in the European parliament, the various fractured Green groupings in the Federal Republic did win a respectable 3.2% of the vote. However, although many local Green parties formed during this period, others did not contest local elections until after the formation of the national party in 1980. For instance, with the exception of *Alternative Trier*, no local elections were contested in the Rhineland-Palatinate until 1984 [Scharf, 1994: 64-66]. Thus, the formative experiences of local Green parties did not always follow a set pattern: resulting in quite heterogeneous local political cultures that, to some extent, have persisted into the 1990's.

The big breakthrough for the Greens came in March 1983, when the national party entered the *Bundestag* for the first time, having won 5.6% of the vote in national elections [Padgett, 1993: 28]. Although von Beyme's assertion that *'the 1983 election transformed the Federal Republic from the last refuge of party system immobility into an El Dorado of success for alternative politics*' [von Beyme, 1991: 161] may be over-stating the case a little, it is clear that from that point onwards the German party system was undergoing a process of change and adaptation.

Five factors were at work which served to bring the Greens into the political mainstream. First, following unification, the merger of the more moderate *Bündnis 90* and 'eastern' Greens with the Greens in the west has resulted in an overall moderation of both the Green voters' and membership's ideological profile. Second, as it becomes increasingly evident that the Greens are failing to mobilise the very youngest generational cohort, the cohort from which the movement in the West originally arose has got older and, crucially perhaps, more established and integrated. Third, as the Greens have become more established

within the political system, so their internal structure has become more institutionalised and hierarchical. Ironically, the fact that the Greens are not a mass membership party serves to increase the power of elected politicians vis-à-vis the *Basis*, or grass roots, to the extent that they can be regarded as more of a *Fraktions-* or *Wahlkampfpartei* than as the epitome of *Basisdemokratie*. This has meant that an increasingly pragmatic and, I would argue, office-seeking elite has been able to move the party away from the previously rigid *'Fundi'* position of the 1980's. One result of these developments has been that the demand for an explicitly anti-capitalist or anti-system agenda has been replaced to some extent by one that reflects 'lifestyle' or quality of life issues - including a greater emphasis upon an environmental agenda - that are more pertinent to the local, city or state level of government within which, up until now, the Greens' governmental experience has been limited. A fourth development has been the extent to which the agenda around which the Greens have mobilised has been co-opted by the other parties. On the one hand, this process of *Themenklau* - especially on the part of the SPD - is a danger to the Greens as it serves to lessen the distinctiveness of the party in its attempts to mobilise around the post-materialist vote. On the other hand, not only does this process increase the overall *Koalitionsfahigkeit* of the Greens, but the fact that environmental concerns have become an accepted part of the political agenda is evidence of the diffuse, but very real, power of the discourse. Fifth, with the FDP no longer able to rely on passing the 5% barrier in the *Länder* and increasingly reliant at both the local and national level upon the second-votes of CDU supporters, the viability (and therefore the desirability) of the Greens as a potential coalition partner has increased. Finally, just as the hegemonic position on the Left of the SPD had been eroded by the emergence of the Greens in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the old-Left/New-Left duality of the SPD and Greens that has existed since then has been eroded by the survival and persistence of the PDS. Not only has the resilience of the PDS further fragmented the Left of German politics, but much of the stigma that had previously attached itself to the Greens (especially during the cold war)

has now been transferred to them. Thus, there is less political risk in other parties co-operating with the Greens.

The Greens can now be regarded as a party of the mainstream at the sub-national level. Indeed, one recent headline in the German press stated that the Greens had now taken over the function of 'king maker' previously enjoyed by the FDP [*Handelsblatt:* 16/05/95]. In reality, the notion that the Greens are now the 'king maker' within the German party system is at least premature and probably inappropriate. This is because the FDP was programmatically compatible with both parties, having both an economically and socially liberal component within its ideology which could be emphasised depending on who was its senior coalition partner. For instance, during the 1969-1982 Social-Liberal coalition, the FDP emphasised the 'social' side of its ideology and, after the formation of the coalition with the Union parties in 1982, its economic liberalism became more dominant. This Janus-like quality traditionally lent credibility to the FDP's ultimate threat to any coalition partner: to form a coalition with the opposition.

That the Greens have both stabilised their vote share and become an established feature of the party system may have surprised some observers but is not without precedent. Indeed, the SPD itself underwent the same process earlier this century [see Padgett, 1993; 1994].. However, what is perhaps striking is the speed at which this process has taken place, despite the Greens' lack of a clear social cleavage around which to mobilise. This has led some observers to wonder if a 'post-industrial' cleavage now exists or, alternatively, that cleavage structures are no longer relevant to the modern German party system [see Raschke and Schmidt-Beck in Bürklin *et al*, (eds.) 1993].

It would be rash, however, to deny the persistence of the old materialist social-political divisions or speculate as to their continuing salience in the future. The German party

system has adapted to accommodate the Greens rather than been transformed by them. Conversely, whilst the two big *Volksparteien* have seen some slippage in their vote. they remain the major players within the party system and the Greens have had to deal with this fact.

2.4. The Changing Nature of the German State: from *Beamtenstaat* to *Parteienstaat*

2.4.1 The Historical Background and Institutional Norms

Traditionally, the German state was perceived as transcending partisan rivalry, steeped in the traditions of Roman law, with an emphasis upon the impartial and, crucially, expert administrator, the embodiment of a public power to which parties - especially in Wilhelmine Germany - had often been peripheral. It was this lack of legitimacy surrounding party government in Germany that prevented the emergence of a robust democratic culture and finally undermined the Weimar Republic and led to the *'totalitarian partnership'* between state, society and party that characterised the Third Reich [Broszat 1981: 348].

Given the consequences of this period of German history, it was perhaps inevitable that the post-1945 settlement would involve the integration of political parties into the centre of the governmental/administrative nexus of the new Federal Republic. However, this was not a clean break with the past, given that the administrative culture within the permanent civil service was and remains deeply rationalistic and expert-oriented. Thus, the Federal Republic is characterised by a duality between the two ethoses of the contemporary *Parteienstaat* and the residual administrator-led *Beamtenstaat.*

The central role of political parties in the new Federal Republic was formally codified in Article 21 of the Basic Law, which stated that *'the political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people'*. This represented a significant re-alignment within the German polity, with a new norm of state power: a *Parteienstaat in which the legitimacy of the state is tied up with the legitimacy of the political parties'* [see Paterson in Ware (ed.),1987].

The inter-dependence of the established parties and the administrative structures of the Federal Republic is reflected in their penetration of the civil service. For instance, in 1972 the main political parties had staffed over half the senior posts (state secretaries, heads and departmental heads of division) at the state and federal level of the civil service This interdependence was not just a question of re-staffing a particular department, but was also manifested in discursive terms, with administrative values permeating internal debate within the established parties [Lees, 1995: 9] and reinforcing the existing consensus between them on the substantive issues of state.

2.4.2 The Structure, Process and Outputs of German Public Administration

As already touched upon, the concept such of 'policy style' is essentially contested and depends upon the individual policy sector in question. The 'segmentation' [Dyson, 1982] or 'sectorisation' [Bulmer, 1983: 350] of German public policy is a common theme within the more recent literature. As discussed in Chapter One, Katzenstein uses different terminology and develops the concept of *'three nodes of the policy network'*, that of the consensual party system, the division of competencies between *Bund* and *Land*, and the diverse public and private interests that influence the policy debate [1989: 35-60].

With regard to process, the impact of such parapublic institutions has less to do with inputs (unsolicited policy initiatives) than with their ability to shape outputs (through legal redress etc.). For example, as Paterson [1989: 278-280] points out, the political opportunity structure [Kitschelt, 1986] for environmental groups has generally been limited to the output side of environmental policy, in the form of judicial review [Lees 1995: 11]. This point is crucial to the thesis, as Part III assesses the degree to which Green participation in Red-Green coalitions have enabled environmental groups to influence inputs, by opening up the policy network.

The party system's inherent tendency towards coalition politics enhances the degree of sectorisation within the policy-making apparatus because of the principle of ministerial autonomy laid out in Article 65 of the Basic Law (the *Ressortsprinzip*). The distribution of ministerial seats are central to the processes of coalition formation and maintenance and, given the tendency of parties to staff ministries with their own people, policy-making can become an adjunct to inter-coalition rivalry. 'Junior' partners within coalitions - such as the FDP or Greens - tend to be especially jealous of ministerial autonomy, leading to differences in policy style and content across competing ministries. For instance, Paterson's study of the politics of regulation of the chemical industry in the 1980s describes how, prior to the creation of the Federal Environment Ministry, the FDP-led Economics ministry took a far more 'industry-friendly' approach to regulation than the Interior ministry [1989: 73-89]. By contrast, Friedrich Zimmermann, the CSU Interior Minister, surprised many observers with his imposition of relatively strict environmental regulations within his areas of competence [Weidner, 1995: 13-14].

In addition to the horizontal sectorisation of policy-making between ministries, vertical sectorisation occurs through the division of competencies between *Bund* and *Land*. The *Länder* have not only managed to defend a great deal of their constitutional powers, but

have in recent years actually won new powers. The need to ratify the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty meant that the *Bund* was forced to cede a right of co-decision (*Mitwirkung*) to the *Länder* in the new Article 23 of the Basic Law. Article 23(1) states that any future transfer of sovereignty is subject to the approval of the *Bundesrat* under the conditions of Article 79(3), which protects the Federal nature of the German state. Article 23(5) enhances the role of the *Bundesrat* in the formulation of legislation relating to Europe, whilst Article 23(6) gives the *Bundesrat* the right to nominate a representative to attend the Council of Ministers as the Federal Republic's representative when issues are under consideration that are the sole responsibility of the *Länder* [Paterson, 1996: 178. see also Jeffery, 1994.]. However, even before these changes, the *Länder* have had considerable power influence over policy-making and, quite often, this influence is used for party political purposes. However, all Minister presidents are likely to put more of an emphasis upon their own particular policy-priorities and, as a result, even states governed by the same party can often come into conflict with the *Bund*. The refusal of Kurt Biedenkopf (the CDU Minister President of Saxony) to withdraw sweeteners to VW to locate in his state, despite it being ruled against European Union competition law, is a good example of where the (job-creating) priorities of a particular *Land* is in conflict with the (integrating) priorities of the *Bund*.

Additional horizontal and vertical sectorisation occurs at the *Länder* level. Horizontal sectorisation manifests itself in different ways from state to state[20]. depending on the

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[20]Every one of the *Flächenstaaten* has a Cabinet headed by a Minister-President, with ministers and supporting state secretaries. The *Stadtstaaten*, on the other hand, have a Senate and senators: led in Hamburg and Berlin by a Chief *Bürgermeister*, and in Bremen by a Senate President. For the purpose of this thesis, the terms ministry and ministers will be the standard usage. All *Länder* have ministries of the Interior, Finance, Economy, Transport, Labour and Social Security but, in the tradition of the old Prussian administration, it is Minister of the Interior who is the central figure. The minister is not only in charge of the whole administrative structure of the *Land,* but is also assumed to be responsible for all issues where no other ministerial authority is specified. *Land* ministries also have a number of autonomous units attached to them. In the *Flächenstaaten*, there are lower tiers of government such as the *Kreis* and the *Gemeinde*. In the *Stadtstaaten*, however, the *Land* government doubles as the major local authority as well. As already discussed, the *Land* of Bremen has its own constitutional arrangements. In the larger *Länder*, there are

structure of ministries (see section 2.4. on Environmental policy). Vertical sectorisation occurs because of the heterogeneous nature of administrative structures at the sub-national level. For instance, most *Länder* generally have two administrative tiers below that of the Ministry, that of an intermediate level (e.g. the *Regierungsbezirke*) and a local authority (the *Gemeinde* or *Kreis*). There are some exceptions to this. For instance, Brandenburg, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein and the city-states of Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg have no intermediate level. Moreover, in different states, different levels have different implementation responsibilities [Weidner, 1995: 33] depending on the policy area in question.

2.4.3 The Interplay Between Structure, Process, Outputs and Policy Outcomes

As Goldberger points out with regard to the Foreign Policy domain, Germany's decentralised policy-making apparatus means that her *'deviation from the state-centric model of realism makes unified policy-making and co-ordination more difficult than in its more unitary neighbours'* [1993: 291]. Conversely, where *'detailed tasks require a uniform and agreed co-operation of all the participants'* [Kunze, 1968, cited Bulmer and Paterson, 1987: 187], vertical and horizontal sectorisation have imposed the necessity of consensual policy-formulation (for instance, the *Länder* also provide a great deal of information and expertise to the policy-making process).

The emphasis upon consensus means that the German policy apparatus can be, or at least appear to be, slow to respond effectively to new problems. As Scharpf has complained, although stabilising the German state apparatus, *'our present form of government ... is the*

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government districts, led by a District president, appointed by the Minister-President but under the aegis of the Minister of the Interior. The District President draws together tasks from more than one ministry. He or she is responsible for police activity in the district, for the activities of the local authorities, the schools inspectorate, and funding for schools, roads and housing. The post also functions as an appellate tribunal for local authorities, industry and commerce with the power to issue warnings and impose fines.

least capable of policy innovation [1989: 17]. This echoes Katzenstein's assertion that in *'such a tightly integrated policy network ..... major changes in policy stand little chance of success'* [1987: 35]. Yet, the record of policy outputs and outcomes is more mixed than Scharpf or Katzenstein's comments indicate. On the one hand, the Federal Republic's record in some policy areas, such as environmental policy, is relatively innovative compared with some other European states, whilst, on the other, some aspects of the Federal Republic's regulatory framework appear to some Anglo-Saxon observers as verging on the antediluvian. As Paterson observes with regard to economic policy:

> *While the overall performance ... continues to elicit approval, concerns remain about the impact of unity on German public finances, the competitiveness question - <u>Standort</u> like <u>sterbende Wald</u> seems destined to be received directly into the English language and a tendency to regulation in the notorious <u>Ladenschlußgesetz</u>* [1996: 173].

One must conclude that no overall conclusion about the effectiveness of policy-making (in terms of outputs and outcomes) in the Federal Republic can be drawn, as it appears to vary across policy sectors. However, what is clear is the reliance, within German policy-making, upon a stable set of relationships between a highly restricted expert membership, cut off to certain extent from the wider polity and sharing a common technocratic discourse. Thus, using Rhodes' [1986a] criteria, the policy-making environment in the Federal Republic can be described as a relatively closed *policy community*.

2.5. Environmental Policy

2.5.1. Historical Background and Institutional Norms

German Environmental Policy goes back in one form or another to the 19th Century. Prior to 1871, environmental regulation was carried out by the individual *Länder*, through local ordinances such as the Prussian *Gewerbeordnungen*. These ordinances were embedded in private and public law, such as building regulations, public health and police laws and placed restrictions upon production methods if they were considered to cause an air pollution problem. However, the authorities' interpretation of what constituted a 'problem' was tempered by the *Duldungspflicht* (duty of toleration) set out in the Civil Code of 1873, which stated that individual rights to clean air were contingent upon a duty to tolerate a certain degree of hardship in order to promote social welfare. In a rapidly industrialising state that was governed by the alliance of 'iron and rye' [Paterson and Southern, 1991: 23], social welfare and industrial growth were considered contiguous [Wey, 1982: 109; Weidner, 1995: 1]. Early legislation concentrated upon the immediate vicinity of the emitting premises and, although technical change and democratisation increased the number and scale of legislation, this tendency to focus upon individual emissions remains a key element within the German environmental policy discourse today.

Up until the Great War, it was the *Länder* who remained the main innovators in Environmental Policy. In the case of air pollution, individual pollution control authorities could issue *Technische Anleitungen* (*TA*s, or technical instructions) to emitters and, after 1895, such instructions called upon emitters to take measures commensurate with the *Stand der Technik* (existing state of technology). Water pollution took longer to be regulated because of it was so often of a 'trans-boundary' nature (i.e. it involved spillover across states, through rivers and other waterways, which increased the difficulty in establishing responsibility for individual acts of pollution and enforcing subsequent

measures against emitters). For instance, when, in 1878, the *Deutsche Landwirtschaftsrat* called upon Bismarck to issue guidelines for trans-boundary water pollution across Germany, he replied that it was not for the *Reichskanzlerei* to lay down global guidelines for water cleanliness, but for the individual *Länder* to legislate within their own territory [Wey, 1982: 38]. Despite the establishment of the Royal Prussian Office of Research for Air and Soil Hygiene in 1901, the Reich was limited to technical advice. In 1912. Prussia called for negotiations to begin in order to establish Federal legislation to control water pollution [Skou Andersen, 1994: 124], but these did not take place because of the Great War and trans-boundary co-operation remained limited to *Genossenschaften* (set up to manage individual rivers) established between adjacent *Länder*[21].

After the National Socialists abolished the *Länder* in 1934, a National Water Law was drawn up but, again, the outbreak of war prevented its enactment. Thus, by the end of the 1950's, there was still no Federal legislation and most of the regulatory devices used by the *Länder* to control both air and water pollution had been in place since 1914 [Dyson, 1992: 162; Skou Andersen, 1994: 124]. It was clear that the decentralised and piecemeal approach to environmental legislation was unsustainable. For instance, in 1949, water resources were regulated by over 119 laws, 70 of which applied to the Rhine alone! Ironically, having resisted Federal regulation in the past, it was industry who now applied pressure to harmonise legislation. As one industrialist stated, *'the division and heterogeneity of water legislation have always proved to be a restraint on business life'* [Wey, 1982: 177. translated by Skou Andersen, 1994: 125]. As a result of such sentiments, the first (fairly toothless) items of Federal legislation, the Water Household Act of 1957 and the Clean Air Maintenance Law of 1959, were enacted.

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[21]The first such arrangment was the *Emscher Genossenschaft*, which was established after a major spillage into the Rhine by BASF's Ludwigshafen plant in 1902. This was followed by similar arrangments for the Wuppe, the Lippe and the Ruhr [Dyson, (ed.): 162].

By the early 1960s, it was clear that the *Wirtschaftswunder* had inflicted massive damage to water and air resources in the Federal Republic. This damage was at its most apparent in the highly industrialised Ruhr region, where, for instance, it has been estimated that over 600 000 tons of dust were discharged annually into the air during the 1950's [Dyson, (ed.) 1992: 163]. Not surprisingly, it was here that the first significant legislation of the post-war era was adopted. In 1961, Willy Brandt, the then leader of the SPD and Chancellor-candidate, declared '*the sky over the Ruhr must become blue again*' [Weidner, 95: 1], as part of what has become known as the local SPD's 'Blue skies over the Ruhr' programme [Paterson, 1989: 267-268]. The SPD-led *Land* of North-Rhine Westphalia subsequently enacted a raft of measures, particularly with regard to air pollution, which were to become the models for future Federal legislation [Dreyhaupt, Dierschke, Kropp, Prinz and Schade, 1979]. These Federal *Technische Anleitungen* - issued in 1964 - specified licensing procedures for *Anlagen* (facilities) and set out air quality standards for five major pollutants (dust, chlorine, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and hydrogen sulphide). *Anlagen* were required to tackle their emissions along the lines of *Stand der Technik* [Dyson, (ed.) 1992: 163].

Environmental Policy at the Federal level received an added impetus with the establishment of the SPD-FDP coalition in 1969. This coincided with a world-wide surge of concern about environmental matters, and in the USA in particular (Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* being the most famous of a number of publications at the time). The establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on Environmental Quality (as well as the enactment of the Environmental Protection Act) in the US provided exemplars that the Germans were to follow to a certain extent. Indeed, the very words *Umweltschutz* (environmental protection) and *Umweltpolitik* (environmental policy/politics) are translations of the North American usage [Weidner, 1995: 3], whilst the *Rat der Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen* (Council of Experts on Environmental

Questions), which published its first paper in 1972, was directly modelled on the US Council of Environmental Experts [Dyson, (ed.) 1992: 165].

The Brandt-led period of the social-liberal coalition was so innovative (by the standards of the time) with regard to environmental policy that it has been described as a phase of *'active policy design'* [Müller, 1989: 23]. Central to this, was the establishment of three principles that have become the normative benchmark of Environmental Policy in the Federal Republic: the prevention principle, the 'polluter pays' principle and the co-operation principle. Although Environmental Policy in many other countries set out the last two principles, the emphasis on prevention was unusual in the early 1970's [Skou Andersen, 1994: 125]. However, the period 1971 to 1974 was to prove a false dawn in terms of Environmental Policy. The establishment of the *Umweltbundesamt* (Federal Agency for the Environment) in 1974 was to prove the high-water mark and the combination of a world recession following the 1974/5 oil price rises and the replacement as Chancellor of Brandt with Schmidt led to a period of stagnation[22].

However, the genie was out of the bottle. The late 1970s saw the environmental baton taken up by the 'citizens initiative' groups and the, now well documented, formation of the proto-Green parties at the sub-national level [see Scharf, 1994; Markovits and Gorski, 1993; Kleinert, 1992; Hülsberg, 1988; Bickerich, (ed.), 1985; Müller. 1984; Papadakis, 1983; Mettke, (ed.) 1982].

During this period, significant sections of the populace were well ahead of their political and administrative elites on environmental matters [Weidner, 1995: 13].. In time, and after

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[22]Nevertheless, the Brandt period left a legacy of environmental legislation, such as the Air Traffic Noise Act (1971), the Leaded Petrol Act (1972), the Waste Disposal Act (1972), the DDT Act (1972), the Federal Air Quality Protection Act (1974), as well as administrative directives such as the Technical Instruction for the Maintenance of Air Purity of 1974 [Weidner, 1995: 7].

much civil conflict, the agenda of such groups began to permeate through the wider populace. The creation of the *Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit* (the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Protection and Reactor Safety) was in many ways symbolic of an emerging new consensus on environmental matters in the Federal Republic.

2.5.2. The Structure, Process and Outputs of German Environmental Administration

Given the origins of Environmental Policy in the Federal Republic, it is not surprising that the regulatory structure is highly sectorised. This sectorisation is both horizontal, between ministries at the national level, and vertical, between the *Bund* and the individual *Länder*. Moreover, additional horizontal sectorisation between competing ministries occurs at the *Länder* level, although the precise nature of this sectorisation varies from case to case.

At the Federal level, the extent of horizontal sectorisation has been considerably reduced by the creation of the *Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit* (BMU) in June 1986, following the reactor catastrophe at Chernobyl. Prior to this the structure was more fragmented. Unlike its US antecedent, the *Umweltbundesamt* had no power to create policy, but was rather restricted to research and advice. Policy-making competencies were mainly shared between the *Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen* (Federal Ministry of Health) and *Bundesministerium des Innern* (the Interior Ministry), who took over responsibility for air, noise and water cleanliness from the Health Ministry with the advent of the Brandt administration in 1969 [Weale, 1992b: 165-166]. The environmental competencies of the two ministries were ceded to the BMU in 1986, not just because of public pressure, but also because the environmental protection measures in

place at the time failed to cope adequately with the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster [Weale, O'Riordan and Kramme, 1991: 122-135].

The BMU has since developed into a major ministry of state, which in 1993 had a staff of 850 and a budget of DM 1,262 million [Weidner, 1995: 29]. Its main tasks are the development of technical regulations, to co-ordinate the clean up in the 'New *Länder*', to promote international and supranational co-operation and policy-making and to disseminate information to the general public on environmental issues[23]. Its specific policy competencies include the protection of water bodies and the sea, protection of ground water, waste water treatment, nature conservation and the disposal of nuclear waste. Enforcement functions are carried out by three Federal Agencies. These are:

- *Umweltbundesamt* (the Federal Environment Agency). Based in Berlin. Amongst other aspects of its work, the agency is tasked with the preparation of technical standards, public information, monitoring the North Sea and the enforcement of legislation relating to chemicals, detergents, pesticides and genetic engineering[24].

- *Bundesamt für Naturschutz* (the Federal Agency for Nature Protection). Based in Bonn. The agency promotes and co-ordinates the technical aspects of national and international nature protection and enforces the Federal Nature Conservation Act (protection of designated areas and species, landscape planning etc.).

- *Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz* (the Federal Agency for Radiological Protection). Based in Salzgitter. Implements the Federal Atomic Energy Act and the Act on Preventative

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[23]Incidentally, this 'public relations' function was one area where the previous structures failed miserably. During the Chernobyl disaster, for instance, the task of passing on information to the public was divided between the Health and Interior Ministries, as well as the individual Länder. As a result, the public were supplied with partial and often contradictory information, which no doubt contributed to the state of near panic which gripped some Germans during this crisis.

[24]The presence of the *Umweltbundesamt* in Berlin enhanced the the opportunity structure for ecological groups in the city. Not only did it provide a source of expertise (and employment) within the field, but its relative isolation from the Federal Government in Bonn meant that it has not been under the sort of scrutiny from the CDU-controlled Environment Ministry that would have been the case otherwise. As a result, it was more open to the influence and demands of the Environmental lobby.

Radiological Protection (nuclear safety, transport and disposal of nuclear waste, monitoring etc.).

In addition to devolving enforcement functions to these three agencies, some policy-making competencies still remain with other Federal ministries. For instance, policy on environmental and energy research and development is the task of the Ministry of Research and Technology, whilst energy policy itself is the task of the Economics Ministry. Other tasks remain with, amongst others, the Ministries of Agriculture, Transport and Public Health.

Vertical sectorisation occurs in the many areas of environmental regulation where the Federal tier of government shares policy competencies with the individual *Länder*. Under the terms of the Basic Law, Article 73 only grants exclusive jurisdiction (*ausschließlichen Gesetzgebung*) to the Federal Government in fields that are tangential to environmental protection (such as Federal railways, air traffic, international affairs etc.). Article 74 grants the *Bund* concurrent jurisdiction (*konkurrierenden Gesetzgebung*) with the *Länder* in areas such as the control of noise and air pollution, nuclear energy, coast protection etc., whilst in the areas of nature protection and hunting, regional land use and planning, Article 75 only grants the *Bund* framework jurisdiction (*Rahmenvorschriften*) [1.1. GG. Art. 73-75 in UmweltR. 9. A. 5533: 24-26].

It is impossible to construct a general model of environmental regulation at the *Länder* level because of the heterogeneous nature of the actual structures in place, involving both horizontal and vertical sectorisation. In terms of horizontal sectorisation, all *Länder* have some form of Environment Ministry, but the actual competencies vary from state to state. One of the reasons for this is that the process of coalition formation in individual states often involves trade-offs between parties that affect the structure of ministries. For

example, the need to accommodate the Hessen Greens' demand for the Ministry of Justice means that since 1995, the Environment portfolio has been telescoped together with those of Energy, Health, Youth and the Family [Lees, forthcoming), whilst in Berlin in 1989, the local *Alternative Liste* insisted upon the inclusion of the City-development and Traffic portfolios in their Environmental Ministry, rather than the SPD-staffed Ministry for Construction and Housing [Lees, 1995: 16].

Vertical sectorisation occurs because of the heterogeneous structure of *Länder* administration (three-tier or two-tier depending on the *Land*) and because the level of administration where environmental responsibilities lie vary as well. Most *Länder* have established special units for dealing with Environmental Policy [Weidner, 1995: 33], such as the *Niedersächsiches Landesamt für Ökologie* (Lower Saxony State Office for Ecology).

2.5.3. The Interplay of Structure, Process, Outputs and Environmental Policy Outcomes

In the same way that German engineering has a world-wide reputation for quality, there is a common perception that German environmental expertise is second to none. This impression of environmental competence is partly the result of the ease with which the discourse of environmentalism has permeated the polity of the Federal Republic over the last two decades. The reasons for this are both normative and structural. In terms of norms, there has been a long tradition of 'romantic' environmentalism in Germany, dating back to the last century [Lees, 95: 8], as well as the high levels of 'post materialist' value orientation amongst the younger generational cohorts of the electorate [Inglehart, 1990: 163; see also Padgett, 1993; Smith *et al*, 1992; Paterson and Southern, 1991; Dalton *et al*, 1984].

With regard to structure, the Federal Republic's 'political opportunity structure' - the combination of coercive, normative, remunerative and informational resources available, as well as the nature of institutional rules (such as state financing of parties, electoral laws and those reinforcing interaction between government and interest groups) - has been favourable to environmental mobilisation [Kitschelt, 1986: 57-68]. One possible aspect of this has been that, at the sub-national level (where much of the Federal Republic's environmental regulation is carried out), the Green Party (around which much of the environmental expertise is clustered) has often been decisive within coalition negotiations (and been able to use this leverage to affect policy). However, this does not explain enlightened Environmental Policy in *Länder* where the Greens are not decisive, such as Baden-Württemberg. As Weale observes in comparing the records of environmental regulation in Germany and Britain:

> *Although the simplest model of office seeking politicians in different institutional contexts goes some way to explaining divergent policy developments....it may be said to miss an important dimension of the story, namely how German policy initiatives were legitimised within the relevant policy communities and within society at large. For a complex variety of historical reasons there are elaborate mechanisms of political accountability built into the German system of government........As a result of these historical pressures there is in Germany a striking (to the outsider at least) amount of institutional attention devoted to the detailing and elaboration of policy principles and programmes, and there are firm institutional safeguards to ensure that administrative and political action is underpinned by an account of its rationale [1992a: 74].*

Weale's assertion is that the combination of norms and structure inherent in the German administrative culture is conducive to effective Environmental Policy. The norms of expertise and accountability, combined with the sectorised structure of German administration enables the efficient dissemination of environmental information, expertise and *Praxis*.

The empirical evidence supports this contention. Germany has more low-emission cars than any other European country, has the highest proportional use of lead-free petrol, and some of the most stringent emission limits. In a world-wide context, Germany is in forefront of sewage purification technology (in the former West Germany, 90% of the inhabitants are connected to the sewage mains and 90% of sewage is purified biologically), the setting of limits on dioxin emissions from incineration and ranks alongside the US and Japan in research and development of renewable energy. Politically, Germany has assumed a leadership role in international Environmental Policy, such as at the 1992 UNCED Conference in Rio, the Helsinki and Sofia protocols on long-range air pollution, the Vienna Agreement and Montreal Protocol on protecting the ozone layer, and collaborative measures to protect the North Sea and Baltic [Weidner, 1995: 49-50].

2.5.4. The Impact of the Greens on Environmental Policy

The 1980's and early 1990's did, however, see the Green party and the wider environmental agenda make an impact upon policy-making. This has come about both in discursive terms and as a pragmatic response to the success of the Greens at the ballot box.

In discursive terms, many observers have noted that the Federal Republic's policy-making process did not constitute an absolute block on the Green agenda but rather shaped it and limited its Left/libertarian impact. Indeed, despite the emphasis upon the rational and

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authoritative cipher of the *Beamte*, many would argue that, in comparative terms. German policy-making is well disposed towards its own 'greening'. Albert Weale's [1992a] comparison of the policy-making communities in Germany and UK demonstrates how German policy has entered its *'recovery phase'* [Edda Müller, 1986. cited Weale. 1992a: 68] since the 1970's; to the extent that Weale believes that *'within Europe Germany has earned for itself the title of an environmental leader'* whilst Britain remains a *'laggard'* [Weale, 1992a: 69-70]. Weale sees the reason for this as lying in the two countries contrasting policy styles, stating:

> *The German policy style ... is consistent with the operation of a rigid*
>
> *constitution. Programmatic statement of general principles is seen as an*
>
> *essential prologue to legislation and policy development, a tendency that is*
>
> *probably reinforced by the practice of coalition government in which*
>
> *political parties of different ideological persuasions have to come to some*
>
> *agreement on the running of government. ... the policy community is usually*
>
> *wider in Germany than in the UK. The constitutional formalism of German*
>
> *policy making means that the courts play an important role in the setting of*
>
> *standards* [Weale, 1992a: 81-83].

Thus, Weale identifies the paradox at the heart of the Greens' impact upon the policy-making process. On the one hand, there are centripetal forces within the administrative apparatus, both in terms of the dominance of managerial values (and therefore a cross-partisan consensus) within the mainstream parties and the need for the Greens to find some form of *modus vivendi* with the SPD. These forces have constrained the ability of the Greens to implement a Left-libertarian environmental agenda. Conversely, the fact that the German policy community places such an emphasis upon expert opinion gives it width, with the potential to grant access to new actors if in possession of such expertise.

What is clear from Weale's account is that pressures towards environmental modernisation were being brought to bear upon the policy-making process at a relatively early stage in the development of the environmental movement and from a much wider front than just the Green party. This would imply that the established orthodoxy was not as impermeable as, for instance, Scharpf feared. As Geoffrey Roberts observes, in the Federal Republic, 'where there is a large degree of consensus, it tends not to be a static consensus; it is agreement which adapts, develops, changes, and -most importantly- it is a consensus that the parties shape and modify by their inputs into the policy making process' [1989: 53]. Nevertheless, again one is struck by the reliance upon a highly technocratic and restricted membership, with high vertical interdependence (sharing service/policy delivery responsibilities) and a degree of isolation from the wider polity. In short, in the Federal Republic, even the environmental policy domain is characterised by what Jordan [1986a] would classify as a *Policy Community* (and supports the usage of the term community used by Weale [1992a]).

2.6. Résumé of Chapter Two

This chapter set out to embed the research within its institutional context. It used the available literature, in order to establishes a perspective from which the examination and explanation of agents' strategic actions and their impact upon coalition behaviour can be made without constant reference back to the wider institutional context.

Section 2.2. looked at the party system and the electorate in the Federal Republic and concluded that the party system is undergoing a process of de-concentration as dealignment takes hold amongst the electorate. It is clear that the inverted social profile of

the electorate in the 'New *Länder'* has aggravated this process. Because of this greater voter volatility, parties are having to re-think their strategies in order to win and keep office.

Section 2.3. examined the institutional histories of the SPD and the Greens, in order to better understand some of the historical and ideological dimensions that inform the strategic behaviour of the two parties. It was demonstrated that both parties face similar pressures from Left and Right, *fundis* and *realos*. Despite their distinct identities, both the Greens and the SPD do experience similar intra-party debates over the whole issue of Red-Green political co-operation. Thus, when examining the pressures upon coalition formation and maintenance in the two case studies, one must always bear in mind the fact that such pressures are of an intra-party (as well as an inter-party) nature.

Section 2.4. looked at the historical background and institutional norms of the German administrative state, as well as its present structure and processes and their impact upon policy outputs and outcomes. Stress was placed upon how German administrative culture has been steeped in the traditions of Roman law, with an emphasis upon the impartial and expert administrator as the embodiment of a public power. The duality between the two ethoses of the contemporary party-driven *Parteienstaat* and the residual administrator-led *Beamtenstaat* provides opportunities and constraints upon the parties. The structure of German public administration, in terms of vertical (between multiple levels of governance) and horizontal (between competing ministries) sectorisation, allows parties to enter the policy-making process at various levels, thus providing a relatively benign opportunity structure for new parties. However, because of the nature of coalition government, sectorised policy-making also means that ministries often come into conflict with one another over priorities. Thus, a 'green' agenda at, say the Environment Ministry can be limited by the competencies of other ministries (for instance, an Economics Ministry or

Labour Ministry). Moreover, the technocratic discourse of the *Beamtenstaat* has the potential to constrain the more polemical and/or idealist strain of Green ideology. As a result, the reality of day-to-day policy-making can prove to be very frustrating for the Green *Basis*, who thrive on a more campaigning discursive form. The section concluded that the German policy-making environment is characterised by the features of what Rhodes [1986a] would call a 'policy community'.

This point was demonstrated in the final section (2.5.), which looked at the specific field of environmental policy in the Federal Republic. It assessed the degree to which the unique structure and processes of German administration per se, has informed Germany's innovative strength (in terms of outputs and outcomes) within the field of environmental policy. The chapter examined the historical background and institutional norms of German environmental policy making. as well as the structure and process of German Environmental administration. It concluded that, although the German policy community has the width and potential to grant access to new actors if in possession of policy-related expertise (with which the Green *Milieu* is well -endowed), the centripetal forces within the administrative apparatus (the need for the Greens to find some form of *modus vivendi* with the SPD and the dominance of managerial values within the administration) have constrained the ability of the Greens to implement a Left-libertarian environmental agenda.

To conclude, the combination of intra- and inter- party conflict, the structure and norms of German administration and the role of producer groups and other NGOs are at the heart of the 'story' of Red-Green coalitions. It is this 'story' that is will be told in greater detail in Chapter Three.

CHAPTER THREE: A SHORT HISTORY OF RED-GREEN COALITIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

3.1. Preamble

The purpose of the chapter is to embed the two case studies within an historical account of Red-Green coalitions in the Federal Republic. It provides an overview of such coalitions at the sub-national level of the Federal Republic to date, from the tentative period of political co-operation in the city-state of Hamburg after 1982, through the seminal Hesse coalition of 1985-7, and its successor after 1991, the so-called 'Traffic-Light' coalitions in Brandenburg (1990-1994 with *Bündnis 90* and the FDP) and Bremen (1991-1995 with the Greens and the FDP), the Red-Green coalition in the SPD's heartland of North-Rhine Westphalia (1995-), as well as a minority coalition ('tolerated' by the PDS) in Saxony-Anhalt since 1994. Because the Berlin and Lower Saxony coalitions are examined in detail in Chapters Four to Nine, they are only referred to in passing in this chapter.

In the interests of continuity, these coalitions are often looked at thematically rather than chronologically. Attention is focused on the problems faced by the Greens in such coalitions, in terms of intra-party conflict between the *realos* and *fundis,* inter-party conflict with the SPD, the problems of staffing ministries and the resistance to Green involvement in *Land* government by other political actors, such as producer groups' peak associations.

3.2. The 'Story' of Red-Green Coalitions

Green involvement in sub-national coalitions has become an increasingly common characteristic of the party system in the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition to the West Berlin and Lower Saxony cases, the Greens have participated in a number of coalitions with the SPD, including the coalitions in Hesse from 1985-1987 and from 1991 until 1995. The Hesse coalition was re-elected in 1995 and is still in power at present. There have also been Red-Green coalitions in the eastern German state of Saxony-Anhalt (a minority administration tolerated by the PDS) since 1994, in North-Rhine Westphalia since 1995 and in Schleswig-Holstein since 1996. Finally, the increasing acceptability of the Greens to the centre-Right parties has not only been demonstrated by the two so-called 'Traffic Light' coalitions (with the SPD and FDP) in Brandenburg (1990-1994) and Bremen (1991-1995), but also by the formation of the first 'Black-Green' coalition (with the Christian Democratic CDU) in the Westphalian town of Mülheim. Indeed, some commentators consider it only a matter of time before such a coalition is formed at *Land* level [*Der Spiegel*. Nr.31. 01/08/94].

The history of political co-operation between the SPD and the Greens has been one of trial and error. From the vantage point of the late 1990s, it is easy to forget that the earliest Red-Green experiments often provided a bumpy political ride for all concerned. Since then, it has been a process of learning, with co-operation becoming progressively easier over time. The learning curve became ever steeper as the Greens assumed a more formal and hierarchical party structure. As a result, local Green party organisations have become less particularist and more homogenised, their ideological profile more moderate and their strategic behaviour more predictable.

The first example of Red-Green political co-operation took place in the Hanseatic city-state of Hamburg. The June 1982 elections to the Hamburg *Bürgerschaft* yielded two mathematically feasible coalition outcomes: in both of which the SPD had to be represented. These were, either, a 'Grand Coalition' of the SPD and CDU. or some form of agreement between the SPD and the local *Grüne Alternative Liste* (GAL). At this time, the Hamburg GAL was a stronghold of the *fundi* tendency and, as such, was not altogether well-disposed towards the SPD. However, the local party was put under a great deal of pressure by other local Green parties to come to some sort of *modus operandi* with the Social Democrats. The GAL refused to consider a coalition with the SPD, but agreed to a degree of co-operation on condition that the Social Democrats meet certain key requirements[25]. Although the SPD were split over the GAL's demands. they agreed to enter into dialogue with the Greens in order to secure their political support. After the GAL helped defeat a no confidence motion tabled by the local CDU, the Social Democrats invited them into formal negotiations. This first tentative move by the Hamburg SPD was greeted with dismay by both the national leadership - in the form of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt - and other *Land* leaders, most notably the Minister-President of Hesse Holger Börner who was deeply critical of Hamburg Mayor Klaus von Dohnanyi.

There then followed a period of successive ups and downs in the climate of co-operation between the two parties. At first, the mood lifted as the GAL co-operated in passing a bridging credit authorisation in order to keep the city government functioning. However. the political weather deteriorated following the involvement of a GAL leader in a squatting action, at a time when the Social Democrats were clearing squatted houses. This was followed by the GAL *Fraktion* tabling a proposal to declare Hamburg a nuclear-free zone. With no progress on the original demands of the GAL, the SPD called new elections to try

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[25]These were, first, the enaction of an emergency programme to combat the state's rising unemployment. Second, the reversal of all budgetary austerity measures. Third, the immediate exit from the use of atomic energy (*Kernenergieausstieg*) [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 200].

and break the impasse. At a total of 196 days, it had been the shortest legislative period in the history of the Hamburg *Bürgerschaft*! The new elections yielded an absolute majority to the SPD, although as Markovits and Gorski point out, the Social Democrats' gains were almost entirely at the expanse of the CDU and FDP, rather than the GAL who polled almost 7% of the vote [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 202].

The Hamburg experience highlighted two elements that were to become part of the pattern of Red Green co-operation. First, that the prospect of co-operation exposed the internal divisions within the two parties. In the Hamburg case, the GAL was broadly *fundi* in its outlook and was able to mobilise around a fairly unyielding strategic position, whilst the local SPD was split between the traditional Right, who were opposed to co-operation with the GAL, and the party's New Left tendency, who were often - such as with regard to the proposal to declare Hamburg a nuclear-free zone - more in agreement with the GAL than with their own leadership. In other instances, it was to be the Greens who were split and the SPD who were able to exploit such divisions. The second element was that the strategic decisions taken by the two parties during such a process of co-operation had subsequent electoral consequences. For instance, in the Hamburg case, both parties ultimately took a hard line with the other. This seems to have had the effect of enhancing the SPD's electoral support at the expense of the bourgeois parties whilst, at the same time, limiting that of the GAL (who had expected to improve on their previous showing)

Subsequent examples of SPD-Green co-operation seem to support the impression that, outside of their hard-core milieu, a great deal of the Greens' electoral support is contingent upon them co-operating with the SPD and that an explicitly fundamentalist stance is punished by the voters. On the other hand, the SPD appears to benefit from taking a firm stance with the Greens. Conversely, where the SPD has been seen to tack too far to the Left, it has tended to alienate its blue-collar *Stammwählerschaft*. The SPD's strategic

dilemma - the need to counter political competition from both Left and Right - is a theme that is implicit throughout the thesis, informing many of the strategic decisions taken during the coalition periods covered by the two case studies.

With the SPD majority in the Hamburg *Bürgerschaft* securely ensconced for the legislative period, attention shifted to Hesse. Although not a 'heartland' in the sense of the blue-collar industrial state of North-Rhine Westphalia, Hesse was one of the 'reddest' of the German *Länder*. However, the Left tradition in Hesse was relatively heterogeneous, with Old Left strongholds in the big cities being balanced by a New Left influence in the University towns such as Marburg and in *Hessen-Süd*, the south of the state. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the most salient developments in the Red-Green model of political co-operation took place - and indeed continue to take place - within that state's sub-national party system.

It is easy, of course, to posit such arguments with the benefit of hindsight. Indeed, in the early 1980s, conditions in Hesse were such that the prospects for Red-Green political co-operation were not at all auspicious. Inevitably, the reasons for this were what the the Model refers to as 'group-related'. In other words, the institutional specifics of the Hesse party system presented barriers to SPD co-operation with the Greens, particularly a number of powerful local SPD politicians who had invested substantial political capital in opposing the Red-Green model *per se*. The most important of these was the then Minister-President Holger Börner.

As already mentioned, it was Börner who had publicly opposed Klaus von Dohnanyi's early efforts to forge an alliance with the Hamburg GAL. Not surprisingly, Börner's antipathy extended to the Hesse Greens, despite the fact that they were widely recognised as being one of the more moderate of the Green parties in the *Länder*. That was not to say

that there were no grounds for mistrust between the two parties. In particular. the ongoing *Startbahn West*[26] disorder threw the divide between Old and New Left into sharp relief.

The *Landtag* elections of 26 September 1982 presented the SPD and the Greens with the mathematical possibility of a Red-Green coalition. As a result. Börner found himself presented with a dilemma. Not only was he personally antipathetic to co-operation with the Greens, but he had made promises during the election to that effect. He was now forced to reconsider his position. Within a month of the elections, Börner had recanted enough to ensure Green support for his candidature as 'chief parliamentary executive'. pending planned new elections in the Autumn of 1983. In the meantime, the Hessen Greens supported an SPD initiative to tackle unemployment in the state. This represented the first instance in the history of the federal Republic in which SPD legislation had been passed with the help of the Greens, although this again fell short of a formal coalition arrangement.

However, the new spirit of co-operation soon fell foul of politicking. For their part, the Greens attempted to up the ante and refused to pass the SPD's budget in the form it was presented to the Landtag. With one eye on the recent success of the Hamburg SPD's tough stance in relation to the Greens, Börner called new elections earlier than planned. Subsequently, the SPD's campaign was sharply-worded against the Greens, although - under pressure from the *Hessen-Süd* delegates - the state party refused to rule out the possibility of co-operation with the Greens. This was just as well, as the new parliamentary arithmetic still precluded the SPD's return to office without the assistance of the Greens.

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[26]*Startbahn West* was the planned new western runway of Frankfurt international airport. Throughout the early 1980s, this development was the focus of a bitter campaign of attrition between the state authorities and environmental protesters. These took the shape of a series of set-piece demonstrations in which protesters battled with police, resulting in death and injury on both sides.

Again, the process by which the two parties came to formalise co-operation was difficult. The Greens initially took the initiative, offering *Kontinuierliche Zusammenarbeit* (continual co-operation) with the Social Democrats. This was reciprocated by the SPD, with Börner himself making a speech at the SPD's party congress in which he stated the historical nature of the negotiations with the Greens. With the CDU/CSU and FDP newly elected to government in Bonn, Hessen's Red-Green model would provide a much-needed counter-weight [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 206]. It was agreed that the Greens would support the SPD in passing the 1983 and 1984 budgets.

The euphoria was short-lived, however, as resistance surfaced in both parties. At the beginning of 1984, the Greens informed the SPD that their support in passing that year's budget was contingent upon the SPD agreeing to a new set of demands. This was an attempt to move the political agenda on from what was essentially a holding pattern, designed to keep the CDU out of office, to something nearer the 'new politics' that the Greens wished to promote. Börner gave assurances to the Greens and, in the June of 1984, the Hesse SPD's *Parteitag* approved continued co-operation. Ominously, however, their were growing signs of dissent in the SPD ranks. This dissent was given added momentum in the October of 1984, when a Green *Parteitag* passed a motion that made further co-operation contingent upon the SPD's cancellation of an extension of the local NUKEM nuclear power plant and of an order for weapons-grade plutonium from ALKEM, another plant in the state. The SPD's Right wing were outraged.

To allow these demands to become entrenched as the *sine qua non* of Red-Green co-operation would have meant the end of the experiment. For those within the two parties who remained well-disposed towards further co-operation - mainly the SPD's New left and the *realo* wing of the Greens - it was clear that the process had to be moved onto a more formal footing. In particular, the *realos* had to be able to have something to show as

a result of such co-operation, if they were to counter the criticism from the *fundi* wing. For the committed *fundis,* by definition all co-operation with the SPD was bad *per se.* The crucial battle was for the party's *Basis*, who were amenable to co-operation if it brought results, but anxious that basic Green principles were not sold short. The *Basis* needed to be convinced that working with the SPD would enhance the Greens influence upon events.

Throughout the winter of 1984-5, activists on both sides pushed for a formal coalition agreement to be signed between the two parties and, in May 1985, Börner formally offered such an arrangement. In return for entering into a coalition with the SPD, the Greens would get the Ministry for Environment and Energy. The price would be that the Greens would not be able to further hold the SPD to ransom over passing the budget. Not only would the 1985 budget have to be passed, but also a 'double budget' for 1986-7. The Greens rejected the 'double budget' idea and the fundis demanded two ministries, including a Ministry for Women. The final deal represented a compromise between the two positions. The Greens resisted the commitment to pass the budgets and insisted on two separate budget processes, although the SPD insisted that these processes would last no more than a year. For its part, the SPD resisted the creation of a second Ministry for Women, but the Greens were able to appoint an advisor on Women's issues within the Ministry of Health, Family and Education. The bottom line, however, was control of the Ministry for Environment and Energy. Local Green *realo* Joschka Fischer became the Greens' first *Land* Minister for the Environment and the Greens formally entered sub-national government for the first time.

The subsequent Red-Green coalition of 1985-1987 (and to a lesser extent its successor of 1991-1995, which was re-elected in February 1995) in Hesse is considered by many to be the template for such coalitions: both in other states and to some extent at the national

level. It is certainly the most documented [Scharf 1994; Markovits and Gorski 1993: Padgett (ed.) 1993; Kleinert 1992; Hülsberg 1988; et al]. One reason for this has been Hessen's strong *realo* tradition, which has meant that local politicians such as Joschka Fischer have also been leading figures nationally. Moreover, like most German *Länder*, Hesse's election system has a 5% electoral barrier, making it an analogue of the national system as a whole. This makes extrapolation up to the national level easier. However, the main reason for the importance of the Hessen experience has been threefold. It was the first formed at *Länder* level, it has since been the longest-lasting and is the first to have been re-elected.

The 'red-green experiment' (as it was branded by its critics) of 1985-1987 is best remembered for Joschka Fischer's tenure as the first Green Minister for the Environment[27]. Moreover, this is a good example of both the facilitating and constraining nature of the German policy-making process. As already mentioned, Fischer was firmly on the *realo* wing of the party and this was reflected in his strategy of concentrating on the stricter implementation of existing legislation (*nach Gesetz und Recht*). In this he was quite successful. For instance, with regard to the chemical industry, he forced companies (in particular Hoechst AG) to implement new instrumentation in order to meet lower permitted limits of industrial discharges into the River Main. Given the sheer economic and political clout wielded by the Hoechst concern in the state of Hessen, the success of Fischer's ministry in enforcing these changes had a seismic impact upon future expectations.

Despite this high profile role, Fischer encountered staffing problems within his new ministry and was forced to appeal to the Administrative Court in Wiesbaden in order to be

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[27]Marita Haibach was also appointed Green adviser on women's issues, demonstrating that the German Greens are a Left-libertarian/new politics party rather than 'deep green'.

granted permission to establish a hypothecated personnel advisory board to side-step the existing (SPD-dominated) boards in order to address the problem [Grant, Paterson and Whitson, 1988: 253-5]. The problem of staffing of Green ministries is not a problem that has been confined to the Hesse coalition. As already illustrated in Chapter Two (the Institutional Context), the Federal Republic's policy making environment is characterised by the penetration of the civil service by the mainstream political parties, who were empowered to appoint place-men at all levels of the administration. At the same time, this resulted in the reciprocal effect whereby the political parties' own ideological profile was shaped by the technocratic discourse of the civil service. With regard to the SPD, this resulted in the moderation of what had traditionally been a Marxist -informed ideological stance in favour of a technocratic administrative/welfarist orientation. Moreover, this was particularly the case in those *Länder* - such as North-Rhine Westphalia and Berlin - where the Social Democrats had been the dominant party. Thus, by the 1970s, the SPD - and indeed the trades unions - were dominated by the same growth-oriented, welfarist consensus as the CDU/CSU and the FDP (with the exception of its neo-liberal wing). Moreover, this consensus extended beyond elected politicians to all levels of public administration.

This fusion of *Parteienstaat* and *Beamtestaat* has presented the Greens with a four-fold problem. First, the fusion presents problems to any new political competitor, regardless of ideological profile, to break into what is essentially an 'iron triangle' between parties, administrators and producer/consumer groups, once that iron triangle has achieved a stable equilibrium. In other words, the fusion raises the opportunity costs of entry into the political/policy-making nexus. Second, as an explicitly Left-libertarian and/or post-materialist party, the Greens were particularly hindered by the existence of such a growth-oriented cross-party consensus, operating not only at the political level, but also at the policy-making level. The potential for institutional resistance to explicitly 'green' policies

in such an environment is obvious, especially if the (in)action of civil servants is informed not only by conservatism (with a small c) towards unfamiliar policy objectives, but also by partisan interests. A third problem is that, having identified civil servants who were potentially obstructive, if these civil servants were also members of the SPD they were harder to transfer or retire, because they were, on paper at least, political allies. If the civil servant was high-ranking, such as a State Secretary, the problem was especially acute. Not only would such an administrator have a relatively high status and political profile - making him/her harder to get rid of anyway - but they were also often in a position to protect other resistors lower down the hierarchy of the ministry. Finally, even if all the other problems were overcome, the Greens still needed to find sympathetic administrators of sufficient calibre to take over from the old hands. One solution was to identify such people from within the administration but, given that all organisations are inherently conservative, there were no guarantees that sufficient numbers of such 'free-thinkers' could be found. The alternative was to 'parachute in' expertise from within the ranks of the Greens. The danger with this was that, even if they were brilliant within their field, they might not be familiar with the dark arts of bureaucratic in-fighting, especially if this was against entrenched institutional resistors. Ideally, they needed to find expertise that was sufficiently without the civil service consensus that they were amenable to programmatic innovation. If these people came from a non-civil service background, they needed to be serious people, preferably with some experience of dealing with hierarchies and relatively closed policy networks[28].

Not surprisingly, the Greens' mixed experience in government has made them more suspicious of administrative hierarchy than ever. As a result, the structure of

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[28]Inevitably, it would turn out that a rich source of such expertise was Academia! This was especially the case in Berlin, which not only benefited from a large university community per se, but was also host to numerous environmental consultancies and lobbyists for sources of renewable energy such as solar power. This deep resource base of environmental expertise was enhanced by the presence of the *Umweltbundesamt* (the Federal Environment Agency) in Berlin.

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administration in Hesse has recently undergone *Enthierarchizierung* (quite literally, a process of 'de-hierarchisation'), whilst the Lower Saxony Greens have circulated a discussion document suggesting the same process for Lower Saxony. All of these arguments are dealt with in greater detail later in this thesis.

The Hesse Red-Green coalition was not only faced with problems relating to staffing. There had also been explicit threats of disinvestment in the state from Dr. Joachim Langmann of Merck, then president of the employers' umbrella organisation the BDI. Langmann's threats did not eventually come to much and the period of 1986-1987 - with the Greens polling 10.4% in Hamburg and over 8% in the national elections - seemed to augur well for the coalition. However, the tension between the *realo* and *fundi* wings of the Greens and the Left- and Right-wings of the SPD eventually began to spill over more and more into the workings of the coalition. One of the reasons for this was that many of the more contentious issues that the coalition had to deal with - such as what to do with the NUKEM and ALKEM projects[29] - were put off rather than tackled head-on. Although this bought time for the coalition, by the spring of 1987 it had broken down in bitter recrimination over practically every aspect of their programme. The descent into 'red-green chaos' was exploited by the SPD and Greens' conservative opponents[30].

Nevertheless, the late 1980s was a period of hope for the Greens and those in the SPD who regarded the Red-Green model as a viable option. The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 had pushed the environment to the forefront of the political agenda, resulting in the

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[29] The NUKEM and ALKEM nuclear projects highlighted the problems of reconciling the New-Left agenda with the 'old politics' of growth and production. Originally, the Greens had made the cancellation of funding for these projects the *sine qua non* of any co-operation with the SPD.

[30] Ironically, the 1987 state elections in Hessen did prove to have some relationship with the nature of government at the national level, in that they produced a Bonn-style CDU-FDP coalition [Markovits and Gorski 1993: 191]. Nevertheless, the Hessen experience was the first step towards a normalisation of the Greens' relationship with other parties and, by implication, the German state. Moreover, it spelt the end of the growth-oriented consensus in government.

establishment of the *Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit* (the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Protection and Reactor Safety). The state elections in Lower Saxony in the June of 1986 presented a fresh opportunity. Prior to the elections, the SPD leader, Gerhard Schröder, had declared himself amenable to overtures from the Greens whilst, for their part, the local Greens made an unconditional offer of coalition negotiations to the SPD before a single vote had been cast. If a Red-Green coalition had formed, it was widely expected that this would put the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in Bonn under pressure in the run-up to the Federal elections scheduled for January 25 1987. As it turned out, nothing of the sort was to happen. The CDU-FDP coalition in Hannover was returned with a slim majority and the CDU/CSU-FDP would be returned to Bonn the following year. Nevertheless, the feeling remained that the Red-Green model was an idea whose time was coming.

Ironically, whilst the Chernobyl disaster brought environmental concerns into the political mainstream, within the Greens it enhanced the credibility to the absolutist stance of the *fundi* Left. This led to another bout of internal party feuding, given added bitterness by the collapse of the Hesse coalition, the failures of the Lower Saxony and Federal elections and subsequent set-backs in the elections in Hamburg and the Rhineland-Palatinate in May 1987 and Bremen and Schleswig-Holstein in September 1987.

This bout of internecine blood-letting was to end with the creation of the centrist *Aufbruch* group in the January of 1988, heralding the eventual demise the *fundi* wing. However, the road ahead was still rocky. In March 1988, the Baden-Württemberg Greens scored almost 8% of the vote, but two months later their Schleswig-Holstein colleagues again failed to surmount the 5% barrier. It was not until after the West Berlin elections of January 1989 that the SPD and Greens seized the opportunity to once more co-operate.

The following year, in May 1990, the *Landtag* elections in Lower Saxony coalition made another Red-Green coalition possible and, for a few months, there was once more talk of such an arrangement in Bonn, if the legislative arithmetic allowed. Again, this was not to be, but the same year a variation of the model - the 'Traffic Light coalition' (with the FDP as a third partner) - came to power in the new *Land* of Brandenburg. The following year, electoral reverses for the SPD in Bremen led to the same arrangement there.

By 1995, neither of these coalitions remained in place. The Brandenburg coalition collapsed early in 1994, after defections from the Greens. The Brandenburg experience suggests that the presence of the economically-liberal FDP within such a coalition puts great strain upon the process of coalition maintenance and an even greater strain upon party management within the Greens. This is because the inevitable concessions to economic liberalism associated with such coalitions are just too much for many Greens, especially a significant proportion of the *Basis*. Similarly, the Bremen coalition collapsed in January 1995, forcing the state elections to be brought forward from the Autumn to May 1995. Again, the presence of the FDP proved too much for coalition management. However, the defections in Bremen came primarily from the SPD's Right wing, who objected to the party making too many concessions to the Greens[31].

In 1997, there are four Red-Green coalitions in place at the *Länder* level in the Federal Republic. These are in Hesse, Saxony-Anhalt (tolerated by the PDS), North-Rhine Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein. All four coalitions have, at some point, been lauded as the model for a future coalition in Bonn. However, their records in office have varied somewhat.

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[31]In Brandenburg, the charismatic SPD Minister-President Manfred Stolpe was able to keep the SPD united and recoverto win the subsequent *Landtag* election of October 1994 with an absolute majority. In Bremen, where it was the SPD that split, the Greens increased their vote-share, whilst the the SPD were forced into a Grand Coalition with the CDU. Thus, the pattern appears to be that the electorate punishes intra-party strife.

In Hesse, the SPD and Greens had returned to government following the *Landtag* elections of 1991. The coalition ruled successfully for a full term and was re-elected in February 1995. As such, it was the first Red-Green coalition to be voted back into office. However, within a matter of months, the Hesse Greens suffered a massive collapse in morale. Even though the coalition remains reasonably popular with the voters, the Green *Fraktion* in Wiesbaden is perceived as being out of touch with the *Basis*, bereft of ideas and accident-prone. The problems of the Hesse Greens can, arguably, be directly or indirectly blamed on the decision of local political Godfather Joschka Fischer to move to Bonn and become *Fraktionsvorsitzender*. The move to Bonn meant that the local party was denied his undoubted political skills and there has been no obvious successor. Moreover, the two Green ministers in the coalition are perceived to have frittered away their political advantage. This has led *Der Spiegel*, for instance, to talk about the Greens' current difficulties as a 'mid-life crisis'.

The Hesse Greens' troubles are essentially two-fold. First, they are becoming very much like the other political parties in both style and substance. This has led to disillusionment amongst young voters. As one young academic put it, *'the automatic impulse to vote Green is broken'*. Although the majority of Green voters remain true to the party, the PDS has been able to mobilise support at the margins of what has been the Greens core support. This tendency has not been helped by Fischer's insistence that the Hessen Greens take over a 'classical' ministerial portfolio like that of Justice. This may have made sense in terms of demonstrating the Greens ability to govern, but has not played well with the party's *Basis*. Despite the fact that the Justice portfolio was taken by Rupert von Plottnitz (whose credentials as a former lawyer for the Red Army Fraktion seemed ideal for the job), the ministry is perceived as not being an appropriate area for a Green politician to take an interest. This was despite a commitment in the coalition agreement to undertake a programme of reforms, including the reduction of state surveillance of citizens.

data-protection measures, increased use of non-custodial sentences etc. Second, the trade-off for getting the Justice ministry was that the Greens had to accept the creation of a 'super-ministry' for the Environment, Energy, Health, Youth and the Family. This exposed minister Iris Baul to conflicting political demands that have proved desperately hard to reconcile. On the one hand, the 'post-materialist' agenda of environmental protection places a premium on a critique of existing biases toward production and consumption. On the other, whilst an explicitly Green policy for Health, Youth and the Family can be envisaged, in the short term these policy areas are traditionally the domain of statist and production/consumption-oriented solutions. Emphasis has always been on delivery systems to address specific problems, rather than a holistic approach[32]. Nevertheless, Iris Baul was faced with trying to reconcile these demands. In addition to this strategic problem, Frau Baul never managed to establish a working relationship with her State Secretary. She resigned in September 1995.

However, the record of the Hesse coalition since 1995 has not been all bad. On the plus side of the ledger, internal disputes have been kept to a minimum and the coalition has undertaken a thorough shake-up of the personnel and structure of the *Land* administration. However, taken as a whole, the overwhelming impression has been one of scandals and policy drift. When Minister President Hans Eichel recently cancelled at short notice a press breakfast to commemorate reaching the half-way mark of the current legislative period, this was considered by many journalists to be aptly symbolic of the coalition's record.

The Saxony-Anhalt coalition's inauguration was overshadowed by the so-called 'red socks" scandal. The *Landtag* elections of June 1994 had led to the PDS being the third biggest

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[32]These arguments are dealt with at greater length in Chapter Five on Coalition Maintenance.

party in the legislature, after the CDU (with 34.4% of the vote) and the SPD (just behind with 34.0% of the vote). Although not acceptable as a coalition partner, the PDS 'tolerated' the establishment of a minority SPD-Green coalition in the *Landtag*. Ironically, given the opprobrium that all the 'western' bourgeois parties have attached to the PDS, it was the national leadership of the SPD in Bonn who pressured the reluctant local party into a minority coalition with the Greens. In the context of the run-up to the 1994 *Bundestag* elections, it gave the CDU a clear cut opportunity to play on the fears and prejudices of the voters [Lees, 1995][33]. Despite the scandal, the coalition has been one of the most pragmatic on record. Because the Greens are so weak in the 'New' *Länder*, they have been unwilling to rock the boat. With the PDS's approval, SPD Minister-President Reinhard Höppner has been able to push through measures, such as planning permission for a new autobahn through the Harz mountains, that are distinctly 'ungreen' and growth-oriented in their conception.

For many Social Democrats, the North-Rhine Westphalia coalition is an embarrassment. The state has traditionally been the SPD's heartland throughout the post-war period. Indeed, from 1980 until the state elections of May 1995, they had governed alone. SPD Minister-President Johannes Rau had been in office since 1979 and was entrenched as the state's *Landesvater* and, in the run-up to the elections, all the polls indicated that the SPD would again be returned with an absolute majority.

The results of the 1985 elections were a grave disappointment for the SPD and Rau personally, who had campaigned on a 'strong government' ticket that precluded negotiating with the Greens. The SPD suffered a massive loss of support (almost 500,000 votes compared with the previous election) amongst its core electorate. At the same time, the

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[33]Subsequent *Landtag* elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Thuringen on the 16 October 1994 resulted in the failure of both the FDP and the Greens to pass the 5% electoral barrier. As a result, both state parliaments are now three-party legislatures with the PDS as a significant third party.

Greens made impressive gains, for instance polling almost 30% in one inner-city constituency of Köln [Green, 1995: 155]. Since 1995, Rau and his Green counter-part, Construction Minister Michael Vesper, have governed together with little real enthusiasm for the project. The local SPD is faction-ridden and Rau is the only figure who has sufficient authority to keep the coalition together. Because of this, he was persuaded by the national leadership not to resign from politics, but to try and keep the coalition together until the *Bundestag* elections in 1998 (as of February 1998, the coalition was still intact). For Vesper, the Construction Ministry job is not made any easier by the *fundi* tendency in his own party. A recent scandal over the planned sale of Düsseldorf Airport to a consortium of private financiers was a reminder, if he needed one, that there are still many within the Greens' *Basis* who regard all co-operation with the SPD as undesirable.

In many ways, the current Red-Green coalition which comes nearest to being an ideal-type for a future Bonn government is in Schleswig-Holstein. This ironic, because in the 1980s the local Greens had a reputation for fundamentalism. Nevertheless, the coalition is characterised by a cordial working relationship between SPD Minister-President Heidi Simonis and her Green counterpart, Environment Minister Rainder Steenblok, despite the fact that Simonis was on the record prior to the election as favouring an alliance with the FDP. No doubt some of this harmony can be put down to a honeymoon period (the *Landtag* elections took place in March 1996) and much of it is due to personal chemistry. However, party management has also been important, especially for the Greens, where an attempt by the *fundis* to de-rail the coalition at the beginning of 1997 was given short-shrift by Steenblok. Indeed, even the opposition has paid a grudging tribute to the coalition's record, with CDU *Fraktionsvorsitzender* Martin Kayenburg admitting that, up to then, '*the* (Red-Green) *chaos had not shown itself in government*' [*Focus. 23/06/97*][34].

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[34]*Das Chaos hat sich in der Regierung nicht gezeigt.*

3.3. Résumé of Chapter Three and reflections on the development of Red-Green political co-operation.

The chapter has sought to provide the historical context, within which the two case studies are grounded. An overview of Red-Green coalitions at the sub-national level of the Federal Republic demonstrates that each coalition was subject to the institutional specifics of the particular time and place within which it existed. However, the account also reveals some common threads that run through all the examples of Red-Green political co-operation to date. From the earliest instance of political co-operation in Hamburg after 1982, through the seminal Hesse coalitions of 1985-7, 1991-5 and 1995-, to the minority coalition ('tolerated' by the PDS) in Saxony-Anhalt since 1994 and the most recent Red-Green coalitions in North-Rhine Westphalia since 1995 and Schleswig-Holstein since 1996, one can discern a distinct learning process taking place.

The early years were characterised by a lack of trust and good faith on both sides. On the SPD side, many of the old guard feared and despised the Greens and all they stood for. Moreover, when politicians such as Holger Börner did find themselves forced to deal with the Greens, they regarded it as a necessary evil rather than an exciting new phase of Left-oriented politics. Implicit in this thinking was the assumption that, with time, the Greens would go the way of other Left groupings (such as the *K Gruppen* of the early 1970s) and fade away into political obscurity. Those on the SPD's New Left who were well-disposed towards the Greens were often from the same milieus of the post-1968 student Left and New Social Movements. By and large, they were younger than the SPD's old guard and were not to come into the ascendant within the party until the late 1980s. It is no accident that this was when co-operation with the Greens became more fruitful.

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For their part, the Greens had an even longer way to travel before they became a trustworthy coalition partner. The road has also been more interesting. This was not just due to inexperience of the political world in which they found themselves, although this may have been a contributing factor. Rather, the problem in the early years was both ideological and structural.

In 1988, Werner Hülsberg, who was no stranger to the internecine struggles of the Greens, summed the problem up as follows:

> *The Green party lacks an inner equilibrium. The excitement of an unexpected electoral success is followed by inner-party strife and fierce factional battles. But those fiercely-fought battles are without consequence because everyone is aware of the over-riding need for unity. At the same time the weakly-developed party apparatus is incapable of organising any kind of internal repression. The party, in this sense, is still a kind of electoral pact. This situation will not change overnight. Majorities at party conferences are not an expression of any kind of long-term development but rather the expression of the mood of the moment. The development of political strategy takes place in an empirical manner, under the Damoclean sword of the five percent hurdle, what Joschka Fischer calls 'the pressure of actual circumstances'.*[212]

It is self-evident that the Greens have undergone a profound metamorphosis since these words were written, but less clear as to why this change has come about. In general terms, how are we to define such structural and programmatic changes within parties and why do they take place?

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There is a rich vein of party-system literature addressing this question [see Michels: Lippman 1914; Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1992; for instance]. However, for the purposes of the thesis, Harmel and Janda's [1994] definition of party change is sufficient. Harmel and Janda regard party change as being the function of three factors: external shock (e.g. a bad election performance), leadership change and change in the dominant coalition. Of the three, data from both Germany (excluding the Greens) and Britain between 1950 and 1990 indicate that external shock, whilst important, is the least decisive in bringing about changes in the organisational and issue positions of individual parties [Janda *et al: 172*-3]. Thus, where changes have taken place, they have been more likely to be the result of changes at the very top or within the dominant coalition of the party.

However, Harmel and Janda's model applies only partially to the Greens. Not only do they not have a formal party leader in the style of the more established parties, but pressures from the exogenous world have obviously forced change upon them. That a process of programmatic and structural renewal has taken place has surprised many observers. The unstable majorities of the *Basis* activists at party conventions have tended to produce extreme and often contradictory resolutions about the party's strategy and programme. As a result, many observers had concluded that, in the absence of a fully developed party hierarchy and greater internal discipline, fundamental renewal of the party's programme would be impossible and would only lead to further schism and dissolution on the Left. Instead, there has been a growing institutionalisation of the Greens: both in terms of its internal structures and in its relations with the exogenous party system.

It is accepted that the failure of the 'western' Greens to pass the 5% electoral barrier in the 1990 Federal elections sped up the process of union between them and the 'eastern' Greens. Given that such external shocks have been rare for the Greens at the national

level, this would appear to be fully in line with Harmel and Janda's hypotheses. However, at the sub-national level, the Greens have suffered external shocks that have not only brought about organisational and programmatic change, but have also been central to changes in the dominant coalition itself. For instance, in West Berlin, hostile media coverage of the crises and eventual collapse of the Red-Green coalition led the AL to tone down its policy of transparency in internal debate and adopt a more disciplined approach. At the same time, the practice by which Green ministers had to refer all major decisions back to their *Basis* was phased out. In Hamburg, the uncompromising stance of the GAL led to their vote share dropping from 10% to 7% in the May 1987 elections and fuelled the strategic debate at the national level [Hülsberg, 1988: 213-4]. In Lower Saxony, it is a matter of record that the ambiguity of some elements in the local party towards political violence was regarded as a major factor in the failure of the Left to unseat the CDU-FDP coalition and led to a review of the local party's hard-line approach [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 211-17]. The electoral reward for their moderation came in 1990.

Whilst electoral disappointments at the sub-national level spurred the processes of change within the party, they were not decisive in themselves. Even if such external shocks were avoided, one could argue that such changes were inevitable, given the *'pressure of actual circumstances'* that Fischer described. Petra Kelly's original description of the *'anti-party party'*, for whom *'parliament is not a goal but a strategy'* [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 121] remained a rallying call, but the most mundane day-to-day problems associated with political *praxis* generated solutions that inevitably distanced the Greens from this vision and led to the development of an increasingly recognisable hierarchy within the party.

Harmel and Janda's hypothesis is borne out to the extent that the pressures for change were not just of a diffuse and technical nature but also the direct result of the actions of individuals and coalitions within the party. In this, the example of the *realo-fundi* conflict

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is illuminating. Over time, *ad hoc* divisions of responsibility (and by implication, chains of command) sprung up within both the parliamentary *Fraktion* and in the wider party in response to the power struggle. As personalities, such as Joschka Fischer on the *realo* side or the *fundi* Jutta Ditfurth, became publicly associated with a particular political stance, hierarchies inevitably grew around them to deal with the logistics. In practice, these hierarchies roughly divided between the party's executive (where the *fundis* were in the ascendant) and its *Fraktion* (were the *realos* were stronger), thus exacerbating the division between *Fraktion* and party. These debates became increasingly public and, fired by external shocks such as electoral set-backs, the normal procedures of *Basisdemokratie* broke down and policy often appeared to be made in the media arena rather than via internal debate.

Up until the late 1980s, this made the Greens an often uncomfortable and unreliable coalition partner, confirming the worst suspicions of senior members of the SPD old guard such as Holger Börner. In the late 1980s, however, the *fundis* lost the ascendancy that they had enjoyed in the early and mid-1980's. There appear to be three main reasons for this. First, the technical imperatives associated with the *praxis* of party politics spurred on the growing institutionalisation of the Greens. Second, as the *realo-fundi* debate polarised at the national level between the *Fraktion* and the party executive, the *Fraktion's* superior resource-base (such as access to the media, office facilities and funding) began to exert a decisive influence upon the Greens' external image and internal discourse. Third, in the absence of a mass membership, the party as a whole relied upon state funding for its representatives in order to survive, which in turn strengthened the *realo* position. These three factors were also working at the sub-national level, although at different speeds from state to state. Thus, whilst the *Land* party in Hesse were known as 'super-realos' from quite early on, the Greens in Schleswig-Holstein remained in thrall to the fundis well into the 1990s.

Nevertheless, it was to be the ordinary party membership who finally ended the 'battle among the mullahs' with the emergence of *Aufbruch* in the late 1980's. The alliance between *Aufbruch* and the *realos* at the party's federal convention in December 1988 replaced the incumbent (*fundi* dominated) executive with a more representative committee Silvia, S.J., 1993: 178]. The *realo-fundi* conflict was effectively over and with it the explicitly 'anti-system' phase in the party's development. The Greens were moving from the political margins towards becoming a potential party of government.

All of these developments are evident in the Berlin and Lower Saxony cases, which will be examined next in Part III. The following chapters (Four to Seven) will look sequentially at (i) the relationship between the parties; (ii) a comparison of party programmes; (iii) the process of post-election bargaining; (iv) an account of the political life of the two coalitions over their period in office, and, finally (v) at selected examples of programmatic and institutional innovation. These chapters will build upon themes common to all Red-Green coalitions, such as the problems faced by the Greens, in terms of intra-party conflict between the *realos* and *fundis*, inter-party conflict with the SPD, the problems of staffing ministries and the resistance to Green involvement in *Land* government by other political actors, such as producer groups' peak associations. In both cases, there are similar characteristics. As will be demonstrated, there appears to be a clear pattern to the formation of both coalitions and similar problems associated with their maintenance over time. These problems are related to:

- The day-to-day *Praxis* of party politics (intra- and inter-party conflict management, institutional constraints and NGOs)
- The difficulties associated with both (i) the structure and process and (ii) the outputs and outcomes of policy-making

After examining the case studies from both a party-politics and policy-oriented perspective, Part IV applies the empirical evidence to the theoretical framework. Chapters Eight and Nine undertake a comparative analysis of the processes of coalition formation and maintenance. After reviewing the evidence from these chapters and the rest of thesis, Chapter Ten makes an assessment of the nature of payoffs associated with these coalitions and considers, in the light of the research question, whether the Greens' preferences and strategic behaviour can be predicted.

This chapter demonstrates that, taken in the round, the political record of the Red-Green coalitions to date have been mixed. For reasons of location, history and longevity, the Hesse coalitions have been regarded as the seminal example of the genre. In terms of history and longevity, the Berlin and Lower Saxony coalitions represent the two extremes. The Berlin coalition lasted less than two years and collapsed amongst mutual political recrimination and not a little personal bitterness. By contrast, the Lower Saxony coalition lasted the full term and, the legislative arithmetic notwithstanding, would probably have been re-constituted after the 1994 *Landtag* elections. Yet, to assume that they are completely dissimilar would be wrong. As Part III will demonstrate, an analysis of the politics and policy of both coalitions reveals that many of the themes, strengths and weaknesses of the two coalitions were broadly the same.

Part III: Politics, Policy and Institutional Innovation in Berlin and Lower Saxony

CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICS IN BERLIN

4.1. Preamble

Chapter Four examines the political history of the Red-Green coalition in the city of Berlin from 1989 until 1990. It is part of the 'party politics' strand of the thesis. The chapter is structured sequentially into four sections.

- Section 4.2. looks at the relationship between the parties before the elections to the city legislature in 1989.

- Section 4.3. looks at a comparison of party programmes, both in terms of content and also in terms of discursive form[35].

- Section 4.4. looks at the process of post-election bargaining.

- Section 4.5. gives an account of the political life of the coalition over its period in office.

The first three sections provide a discursive account of their subjects, in order to establish an empirical base with which to apply the models of coalition formation in Chapter Eight.. Section 4.5. provides a fairly substantial account of how the coalition fared politically over its time in office (relevant to Chaper Nine on Coalition Maintenance). The section looks at some of the more salient political themes impacting on the coalition and critically examines their impact upon the process of coalition maintenance. This serves to establish a contextual base from which to look at selected issues of programmatic and institutional

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[35]Discursive form is important to the policy-oriented strand of thesis, because, although the established parties have adopted a technocratic/managerial discourse (possibly from years in office), the Greens have tended to use a more polemical discourse (which often lacked detailed policy proposals). It could be argued that this would make it harder to make the leap to a more administrative discourse if in office.

innovation in Chapter Six (for instance, the *Energiegbeirat*), which are also of specific relevance to Chapter Nine. Where these issues are mentioned in the general accounts of the coalitions, they are introduced only in outline in order to prevent unnecessary repetition.

4.2 The Relationship Between the Parties

4.2.1. The Berlin *Alternative Liste*

The Berlin *Alternative Liste* was one of the more radical local Green parties in the Federal Republic. Not only had it opposed the initial foundation of a Republic-wide Green party, but had maintained a semi-autonomous stance towards it. As Markovits and Gorski point out, the Berlin AL 'were in many respects closer in substance and spirit to the *Fundis* than the *Realos*' [1993: 231].

Because of this record of ideological fundamentalism, not only was co-operation with the CDU out of the question, but even co-operation with the ideologically *adjacent* SPD was the subject of intense in internal discussion. Prior to the 1989 election, the AL portrayed such a strategy as being primarily a means of removing the incumbent CDU-FDP administration rather than as a positive move in itself[36]. Yet, even such a tentative stance towards the SPD was roundly condemned by many within the AL, highlighting the ideological and tactical struggle between the party's fundamentalist executive and relatively pragmatic *Fraktion* [*TAZ.* 19/08/88].

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[36]When the AL announced their candidates for the 1989 elections, they declared the dissolution of the incumbent administration to be their *Wahlziel* (primary electoral goal). In their belief this was only possible in tandem with the SPD and should not be seen to fail because of the AL. [*TAZ.* 04/10/88].

4.2.2. The Berlin SPD

For its part, the Berlin SPD entered the election with a leader, Walter Momper, who represented the younger generation of SPD leaders personified by Oskar Lafontaine, Bjorn Engholm and Gerhard Schröder. The 1980's had not been a success for the Berlin SPD, who had lost two municipal elections in succession and were a long way from recovering their previously strong position in the city. Momper was not regarded as a strong enough candidate to defeat the CDU's charismatic Eberhard Diepgen and opinion prior to the election foresaw another CDU-FDP victory. Thus, prior to the 1989 elections, any possibility of the SPD re-gaining office lay in the possibility of a coalition agreement with the FDP, CDU or AL. Subsequently, as the FDP was not to pass the Federal Republic's 5% electoral barrier, the SPD's potential bargaining set consisted of just the CDU and AL.

4.3 Comparison of Party Programmes

But how close, in policy terms, was the SPD to the other two parties? A typology of all three local party platforms is displayed in **Table 4.3.** (below). As is apparent in this typology, of the seven general 'domains' of policy, only three ('Welfare', 'Fabric Of Society' and 'Social Groups') presented viable dimensions of policy congruence between the SPD and AL. Within the other four domains ('Foreign Affairs', 'Freedom And Democracy', 'Government' and 'Economy'), the SPD was closer to the CDU in both style and substance than it was to the AL. In a direct analogue of the SPD's national programme, the Berlin party's economic policy presented an unconvincing attempt to both re-formulate the SPD's hitherto Keynsian approach to demand mnagement and try and

Table 4.3. A Typology Of Party Programmes Within The Bargaining Set. West Berlin, 1989[37]

Domain	*AL*	*SPD*	*CDU*
(1) Foreign Affairs	(i)Anti-Nato. (ii)Ambivalence Towards Communism. (iii)Pro-Disarmament.	(i)Pro-Nato (ii)Moderate emphasis on 'Western Values'. (iii)Pro-Disarmament.	(i)Pro- Nato. (ii)Strong Emphasis on 'Western Values'. (iii)Pro-Disarmament.
(2) Freedom And Democracy	(i)Ambivalence Towards 'Bourgeois Democracy'. (ii)Autonomy Of Individual.	(i)Acceptance Of 'Bourgeois democracy'. (ii)Moderate Emphasis On Autonomy Of Individual.	(i)Acceptance Of 'Bourgeois Democracy'. (ii)State As Guardian Of Individual Freedoms.
(3) Government	(i)Strongly Ambivalent. (ii)Rejection Of Four-power Status	(i)State-Oriented. (ii)Acceptance Of Four-power Status.	(i)State-Oriented. (ii)Acceptance Of Four-power Status.
(4) Economy	Anti Social-Market Economy.	Pro Social-Market Economy (But Emphasis On Role Of The State).	Pro Social-Market Economy (But Emphasis On Role Of Private Enterprise).
(5) Welfare	(i)Expansion of State Provision And Increased Self-Help. (ii)No Role For The Market	.(i)Expansion Of State Provision. (ii)Limited Role For The Market.	(i)Limited Expansion Of State Provision. (ii)Increased Role For The Market.
(6) Fabric Of Society	(i)Radical/Libertarian (ii)Emphasis On Alternatives To Nuclear Family.	(i)Traditional/ Moderate Libertarian. (ii)Implicit Orientation Towards nuclear Family.	(i)Traditional/ Authoritarian. (ii)Strong Emphasis On Nuclear Family And Gender Roles.
(7) Social Groups	(i)Affirmative Action (Quotas). (ii)Single-Issue Campaigning.	(i)Affirmative Action (Targets). (ii)Emphasis On Broad Civic Rights.	(i)Ambivalence. (ii)Emphasis On broad Civic Rights.
(8) Discursive Form	(i)Non-Administrative. (ii)Little Policy Detail.	(i)Administrative/ Technocratic. (ii)Detailed Policy.	(i)Administrative/ Technocratic. (ii)Detailed Policy.

Sources: SPD Berlin. 1989; AL Berlin. 1989; CDU Berlin. 1988

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[37]The Table uses Budge's seven general 'domains' of policy, as used in his analysis of election programmes in 19 Democracies (1987: 23). To this I have added the category 'Discursive Form', as the two *Volksparteien* produced far more policy-focused documents than the AL. Please note that all data is of a judgmental/qualitative nature, rather than quantitative content analysis (see Chapter One: Methods).

reconcile it with the more post-modernist agenda presented elsewhere in the document[38].

Where the interests of the economy and the environmental policy coincided. the SPD attempted to reconcile the concerns of its New Left supporters with the more materialist demands of its traditional *Wahlkreise*; stating rather clumsily that *'protecting the environment is also a growth industry, protecting the environment creates jobs!'* [SPD. 1990: 7]. This may indeed be true, but differs only in terms of nuance with the stated policy of the CDU. Unlike the AL, at no time does the SPD challenge the economic and political order that underpins modern industrial society. On the contrary. the SPD's instinct for more traditional corporatist solutions was demonstrated by its proposal for setting-up an all-party commission to tackle Berlin's unemployment and environmental problems.

With regard to the domains of 'Foreign Affairs', 'Freedom And Democracy' and 'Government', it is perhaps understandable that the Berlin SPD erred on the side of caution and the maintenance of the status quo. Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Four-Power Agreement endowed a peculiar constitutional status upon the city. Central to this status was the presence in West Berlin of the three Western allies. The privileges that the allies enjoyed as protecting powers was not only formally codified in West Berlin's Basic Law. but, owing to the city's post-war experience, also possessed considerable normative power of its own.

Because the Allied presence was so central to the city's identity and political discourse. attitudes towards it were arguably the litmus test of a party's wider political ideology. Thus, no self-consciously 'constitutional' party could seriously challenge the post-war

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[38]Thus, in the same document, the SPD identified the need for modernising the city's industrial base. reducing the state sector as a percentage of the total economy and improving *Standort Berlin* as an attractive location for investment. At the same time, the party advocated a reduction in working hours with no drop in pay and the expansion of state-run work creation schemes (ABM).

settlement and, perhaps just as importantly, no truly 'anti-party party' could easily accommodate it. Given this context, it is not surprising that, following the elections, Momper demanded clarification of the AL's stance towards this issue as proof of its *Koalitionsfahigkeit*[39]. The fact that the AL did modify their stance, in order to enter government, must be interpreted as a tactical victory for Momper and the SPD.

There was, however, one policy area within these particular domains that did provide opportunities for policy agreement between the SPD and the AL: with regard to internal security. Under the aegis of two successive CDU-FDP coalitions, and originally in response to disorder related to the squatters' movement in the early 1980's, the West Berlin police-force expanded dramatically, accompanied by the introduction of quite draconian operational tactics[40]. These measures proved very popular with a significant proportion of the population, to the extent that the CDU's 1989 manifesto pledged to continue this policing strategy: stating that the police could '*count on the support of the Berlin CDU* ' [CDU, 1989: 21]. For the SPD, although squatters and the like were not popular with their *Stammwahlerkreise*, the issue was contentious. Not only had the use of the police become to some extent a partisan issue, but much of the Left-wing vote that they hoped to garner was highly critical of the CDU's policy and had sympathy for the AL's stance on the issue. Therefore, although they did not go anything like as far as the AL on the issue[41], the SPD did propose a policy of 'de-escalation' that put it much closer to the AL than to the CDU on this issue [SPD, 1990: 22]. Ironically, the policy of de-escalation was not only to hamper the coalition from within weeks of its inception (when

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[39]Yet, the different stances on this issue within the two parties election literature are quite pronounced. The SPD supported the Allied presence (although it adopted a less bellicose attitude towards the Honecker regime than the CDU), whilst the AL wanted it reduced to a '*symbolic remnant*' [AL, 1990:]

[40]One notorious example of such tactics occurred during the World Bank/IMF conference in 1987. Fearing protest demonstrations marching on the venue, the city government ordered the complete sealing-off of the city's Kreuzberg district. During this time, no-one was allowed in or out of the entire SO36 postal district.

[41]Who refused to draw any distinction between criminal- and 'state violence'. As a result they demanded the abolition of the entire criminal code relating to political violence. [AL, 1990: 5-6]

the 'autonomous groups' began to open up new squats in an attempt to embarrass the coalition), but would prove to be the issue that brought it to a close.

As **Table 4.3** indicates , within the domains of 'Welfare', 'Fabric Of Society' and 'Social Groups', the SDP's proposals were closer to the AL than they were to the CDU. This post-materialist stance that underpinned these proposals may have constituted a classic example of *Themenklau* [Papadakis, 1983: 61], but did provide the possibility of policy co-operation between the two parties.

One example of such a policy area related to what could broadly be termed 'women's issues' (although, in the SPD's case, they were often sublimated into other areas such as, for example, employment rights and training). The SPD's proposals were, once again, less radical than the AL's - who demanded a minimum quota of 50% of all work and training places for women - but nevertheless much more progressive than the CDU's stance on the issue[42]. Moreover, Momper made it part of his personal appeal to promote women into his putative cabinet. Along with the AL's commitment to the issue[43], the eventual representation of women in the coalition would, at that time, be the highest ever in a *Land* government[44]

Another area where the SPD and the AL had identical positions was with regard to voting rights for foreigners. The CDU opposed the right of long-term foreign residents to vote in local elections; no doubt for reasons of electoral logic as well as a point of principle.

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[42]The SPD proposed to expand the provision of nursery education by 10,000 places in four years. They also proposed a night-taxi service for women (which was implemented) [ibid. p.13]. The CDU proposed some progressive measures, but made it clear that these were to help women better manage their responsibilities at work and at home! [CDU, 1989: 10]

[43]The AL selected 14 women to help fill the 25 places on their *Liste*. Moreover, they filled eight of the first ten places: thus guaranteeing a high representation.

[44]All three AL portfolios and six of the 11 SPD portfolios. However, cynical observers also pointed out that, for Momper, the positive image of a '*Frauensenate*' diverted attention from any potential '*Rot-Grün chaos*'. [*TAZ* 18/03/89]

However, the SPD, the trades unions and the AL favoured such a right and proposed to lobby the Constitutional Court on the issue. This proposal was highly contested, not least after the election by the 11 Republicans in the legislature, but did provide a normatively powerful topic around which the coalition could mobilise.

One final example of an area where the SPD and AL were programmaticly close was in the field of cultural politics, including the legacy of Germany's past[45]. In the context of Berlin, this debate was particularly fierce; not just because of the city's history also because of the CDU-FDP administration's policies during the 1980's. The outgoing coalition invested a great deal of political as well as monetary capital in a number of prestige projects, designed to re-establish Berlin's reputation as a *Weltmetropol*. The most controversial of these was the planned German Historical Museum, which both the AL and SPD rejected as inappropriate and proposed to scrap. Moreover, both parties rejected the previous concentration upon centralised, capital-intensive projects and planned to introduce a more decentralised and heterogeneous policy, which they regarded as more in keeping with the multi-cultural reality of contemporary Berlin[46].

To conclude, a comparison of party programmes demonstrates that the SPD was only party within the bargaining environment that was able to find common ideological ground with both the other parties. If it chose, it could profile the more socially-conservative and authoritarian side of its ideological profile (in order to bargain with the CDU), or it could

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[45] In a nation where symbols have such resonance, the debate over the nature of German culture is far more politicised than such a debate is in, for example, mainland Britain. This was particularly true on the German Left, many of whom are steeped in what Jurgen Habermas has called *Verfassungpatriotismus* (constitutional patriotism), with its emphasis upon the existing reality of the Federal republic and its rejection of the older symbolism of the German nation [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: .276]

[46] In a sense, these proposals were somewhat parochial and reflected the status and ambitions of Berlin at the time. Since unification, of course, both of these have expanded: as the massive building sites that cover the city demonstrate.

pursue a more post-materialist, new Left-oriented agenda (in order to bargain with the AL).

4.4. Bargaining

The results of the city elections of 29 January 1989 are arranged (with a breakdown of first and second votes) in **Table 4.4. (a)** below.

Table 4.4. (a)   The Municipal Elections Of 29 January 1989 (In Percentages)

Party	*First Vote*	*Second Vote*	*Number Of Seats*
SPD	41.7	37.3	55
CDU	40.2	37.7	55
Alternative Liste	11.1	11.8	17
Republican Party	1.2	7.5[47]	11
FDP	3.5	3.9	0
			Total: 138

Total Vote: 1,220, 423   *Turnout:* 79.6%[48]
Source: Presse- und Informationsamt des Landes Berlin, 1990

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[47]It is interesting to note that the Republican party effectively entered the legislature through the Second Vote: traditionally the domain of the FDP. Moreover, it would appear that this was gained from the electorate of both main *Volksparteien*.

[48]Note that the turnout throughout the period 1981-1989 fell 5.7% overall. This is in keeping with the trend towards increased non-voting noted by Paterson and Southern (1991) amongst others.

The failure of the FDP to pass the Federal Republic's 5% electoral barrier, and its consequent exclusion from the Berlin legislature, meant that the CDU would have to look elsewhere for coalition partners if it was to muster the 70 seats needed for a legislative majority[49]. However, the bargaining set was constrained by the presence of 11 representatives from the Republican party. Although, as Padgett points out, in the past *'...Right wing parties have come and gone without making a permanent impact'* [1993: 92], the legacy of Germany's past has continued to put such parties 'beyond the pale' as potential coalition partners.

Clearly, the Republican party was excluded from the bargaining set on the grounds of ideology and institutional norms. However, the CDU also ruled out any bargaining with the AL [*TAZ.* 01/02/89]. This was clearly due to the ideological distance between the two parties, yet the CDU leadership also tried to invoke institutional norms against the AL - by equating them with the Republicans [*TAZ.* 10/02/89] - in an attempt to narrow the bargaining set to their advantage. To this end, Diepgen adopted a high media profile: giving numerous interviews in which he stressed what he saw as the potential danger to West Berlin of a 'Red-Green' coalition and asserted the CDU's claim to be the strongest political force in the city. Diepgen made it clear what he expected from the SPD, describing any future SPD-AL coalition as *'not very tenable'* and the possibility of a CDU-tolerated SPD minority government as *'not very plausible'*. Moreover, Diepgen re-emphasised what he described as the CDU's *'claim to leadership'* of the Berlin government [*TAZ.* 02/02/89].

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[49]There is a tradition of majority government in the Federal Republic that reflects the consensual ethos of the post-war state [Paterson and Southern, 1991; Padgett, 1993. etc.]. At the federal level, this has enhanced the status of the FDP as a 'pivot party' between the two *Volksparteien* [Pappi, 1977]. However, at the *Land* or city-state level, this role is diminished as it is often possible for a single party to achieve a majority on its own. Moreover, it has been known for a minority executive to be 'tolerated' by an opposition party in the legislature. The current arrangement in Sachsen-Anhalt -where a 'Red - Green' coalition is being tolerated by the PDS- is a controversial example.

Despite Diepgen's efforts, it was apparent at the time that the real initiative lay with the SPD. In electoral terms, the SPD had made substantial gains over the previous election (up 9.3%) and had fulfilled Momper's declared aim of breaking the CDU-FDP hegemony in Berlin [*TAZ* 22/10/88]. Moreover, the high degree of ideological polarisation in the new legislature, and the SPD's ideological location between the other two parties in the bargaining set, virtually assured it of a place in government. However, this polarisation also meant that the SPD would have to exercise political skill if it was to exploit its position to the full without alienating either of its two prospective coalition partners[50]. Thus, whilst asserting that the result of the election signalled a desire on the part of the electorate for a '*new, social, liberal and ecological reform-politics*' [*TAZ.* 01/02/89]. Momper also stressed that he intended to enter into negotiations with both the AL and CDU with no prior preferences [*TAZ.* 02/02/89]. So skilful was Momper's performance during this period of coalition bargaining that an editorial in the *TAZ,* written after the formal codification of the SPD-AL coalition, described it as that of a '*skilful, unscrupulous and power-conscious tactician*' [*TAZ.* 18/02/89].

It could be argued, however, that Momper's task was made easier by tactical *naiveté* on the part of the AL. Not only had the AL made the removal of the incumbent CDU-FDP administration its *Wahziel*, but its spokesperson had even speculated in public about the AL tolerating an SPD minority government for an interim period. This could hardly be described as 'keeping one's powder dry'! One can speculate as to why one of the more fundamentalist Green parties in the Federal Republic chose to embark on such a strategy.

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[50]In this, the Berlin SPD were lucky enough to have been led by Momper; even though prior to the election he had not been particularly highly regarded. Coming from the 'New Left' tendency within the SPD, Momper had a history of support and involvement in Left-wing causes. including protest activity against the Allied presence in West Berlin [Mattox and Bradley Shingleton, (eds.) 1992: 68.]. In this sense he came from the same milieu as many in the AL. At the same time, however, he was a pragmatic politician and had moderated both his policy stance and political style since assuming the SPD leadership. Indeed, his party's campaign manifesto, for which he campaigned vigorously. explicitly recognised the role of the three Allied powers in Berlin [SPD Berlin 1989]. As already mentioned. he consequently made the AL's clarification of their own stance on the issue the *sine qua non* of any coalition agreement.

As already mentioned, where similar tactical dilemmas have arisen elsewhere in Germany, empirical evidence has shown that a strategy of non-co-operation or even confrontation with the SPD can prove counter-productive; with the Greens losing support in the following election [Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 202]. However, this evidence is not conclusive, as other local variables, such as local political personalities, must be taken into account. Nevertheless, although Momper had expressed no interest in new elections, the possibility remained that they might be called in the event of an impasse. Therefore, it was possible that the AL calculated that a strategy of not co-operating with the SPD might place them in a no-win situation, resulting in either a Grand Coalition between the CDU and SPD or new elections, after which the AL's bargaining position could be considerably worse. Beyond such bargaining logic, there was considerable pressure from the *Basis* to negotiate with the SPD on the grounds of policy. There were some policy domains within which there were real possibilities for agreement. On the other hand, there were areas where the two parties held potentially incompatible positions. Moreover, the AL was, arguably, disadvantaged in as much as the SPD could claim a wider mandate: not just numerically but as a 'catch-all' party. As a *TAZ* article ruefully observed, *'the SPD bargained - even if true or not - in the name of the Berliners and in the name of a politicised, mistrustful city; the AL bargained only in the name of its grass-roots'* [*TAZ*. 07/03/89]. Given the residual normative (and numerical) weight of the SPD as a *Volkspartei*, the AL was, perhaps inevitably, at a disadvantage during the bargaining process[51].

After two rounds of negotiations in the first weeks of February, it had become clear that the SPD was not prepared to recognise the CDU's 'claim to leadership'. However, there were still difficulties with regard to the AL. In the context of a deteriorating situation in

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[51]For an exposition of the coercive, normative and informational variables within political institutions see Kitschelt, on Political Opportunity Structures (1986, 1988).

the city's finances, and what almost amounted to panic amongst some elements of the business community at the thought of the AL in government, Momper engaged in widespread consultations with trades unions, employers organisations and other civic groups, during which he spelt out his plans for tackling unemployment and the skills deficit in the city. However, despite these difficulties, Momper was clearly gaining the upper hand in the bargaining process.

One might have expected the AL to be enjoying its pivotal role with regard to the two *Volksparteien*. However, in reality the AL's options were limited, and provoked considerable bitterness towards the SPD as well as internal disagreement. Clearly, any form of co-operation with an establishment party will present both ideological and tactical difficulties for Green parties. For the Berlin AL, these were focused on the fact that the SPD was competing with them along some elements of 'their' policy dimension.

The process of coalition negotiation following the January elections took a number of weeks. Although the rank and file of both parties were overwhelmingly in favour of such a coalition, the AL's *'fundi'* wing were not in favour of parliamentary co-operation *per se*, whilst there remained some elements within the local SPD elite who regarded the AL as a radical Left-wing party and not a suitable coalition partner [Jun, 1994: 218]. Indeed, it has been suggested that local SPD leader Walter Momper was privately less than enthusiastic for such a coalition. Nevertheless, most public disagreement occurred over the division of cabinet posts between the parties. This manifested itself in a long, acrimonious and very public process of bargaining. Indeed, six weeks after the election, an AL spokesperson stated that the party still awaited an *'acceptable offer'* from the SPD and criticised the SPD's *'unfair bargaining style'* [*TAZ.* 10/03/89]. The crucial issue that divided the two parties was the form and allocation of the portfolio for women's issues. The AL

demanded that this portfolio should be a ministerial post in its right and, naturally, that they should be allocated it.

Eventually, a compromise was reached. On the 13 March, the SPD and AL agreed the composition of the city government. The AL did indeed receive the women's issues; albeit sublimated within a wider ministry. The full division of ministerial posts is set out in **Table 4.4. (b)** below.

In purely numerical terms, the AL did not do as well as the SPD in terms of the division of portfolios. The 29 January elections had resulted in the election to the city legislature of 17 AL representatives and 55 from the SPD. However, the AL received only three out of the fourteen cabinet posts on offer: a ratio of legislative seats to cabinet posts of almost six-to-one. By contrast, the SPD ratio was just five-to-one, in addition to which Walter Momper became Governing Mayor. At first glance, this would seem peculiar given that the AL arguably held the balance of power and could be interpreted as an indication of political *naiveté* on their part. Yet, such a narrow interpretation ignores the fact that certain policy sectors, such as the environment held disproportionate weight for the AL. Moreover, the coupling-together of city-development and traffic policy with environmental protection (rather than with construction and housing, for example) was considered a hard-fought and essential victory for the AL in the teeth of SPD opposition. As one member of the former AL city-parliament grouping recently observed: '*we didn't want just a ministry for environmental propaganda. We wanted to make policy*'.

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Table 4.4.(b) Composition Of SPD-Alternative Liste Cabinet. West Berlin, 1989

Ministry	*Minister*	*Party*
Mayor	Ingrid Stahmer	SPD
Construction And Housing	Wolfgang Nagel	SPD
Finance	Dr. Norbert Meisner	SPD
Health And Social Affairs	Ingrid Stahmer[52]	SPD
Interior	Erich Pätzold	SPD
Justice	Prof. Dr. Jutta Limbach	SPD
Culture	Dr. Anke Martiny	SPD
Employment	Horst Wagner	SPD
Economics	Dr. Peter Mitzscherling	SPD
Science And Research	Prof. Dr. Barbara Riedmuller-Seel.	SPD
Federal Affairs	Prof. Dr. Heide Pfarr	SPD
Women, The Family And Youth	Anne Klein	AL
Schools, Training And Sport	Sybille Volkholz	AL
City Development And Environmental Protection	Dr. Michaele Schreyer	AL

Source: Berliner Koalitionsvereinbarung Zwischen SPD Und AL Vom 13. Marz 1989. (SPD Berlin 1989).

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[52]Note that Frau Stahmer held the symbolic post of Mayor in addition to her Health And Social Affairs portfolio.

4.5. The Politics of the Berlin Coalition

The coalition agreement between the SPD and AL was formally codified on 13 March 1989. Three days later, the appointment of West Berlin's new executive was ratified by the city's legislature amid a mood of some optimism. As an article in the Left-wing *Tageszeitung* remarked at the time, the ratification process had passed with an ease that was unprecedented in the recent history of West Berlin's relatively polarised local politics. As to why this was the case, the *TAZ* - despite its often critical attitude towards the Berlin SPD - gave most of the credit to the negotiating skills of the SPD's Walter Momper [*TAZ*. 18/03/89].

For Momper, this was the high-point of his career. Written off by many commentators before the election as a political lightweight, the subsequent bargaining process revealed another side to his character. In doing so, he had established the primacy of the SPD in the coalition, with the AL apparently content to take the role of junior partner. After the vote of ratification, Governing Mayor Momper walked to the podium and prophesied that '*the great unity shown by both governing factions in today's vote is also a sign and signal of the predictability and stability of this coalition*' [Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin. *Plenarprotokollen*. Band i. 1 bis 18. Sitzung. 1991: 37]

At the time, such optimism did not seem misplaced. The coalition had not only drawn up a progressive reform programme, but also boasted the highest percentage of women ministers of any *Land* government in the history of the Federal Republic. With Federal elections due in 1990, and Helmut Kohl and the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition doing badly in the polls, there was some degree of speculation amongst SPD and AL activists at least that successful co-operation between their parties could even provide a model for government in Bonn [*TAZ*. 15/02/89].

Yet, by the time those elections took place, the Berlin Wall had fallen. Germany was unified and a triumphant Kohl returned to the Chancellery in Bonn. Moreover, in Berlin, the coalition had collapsed in disarray and mutual recrimination. The AL, who had left the coalition and tabled a vote of no confidence in Momper, were accused by him of irresponsibility and pursuing a perverse form of 'scorched earth' politics [*TAZ*. 17/11/90]. In reply, the AL's Christian Strobele declared that the real problem lay with the SPD's cautious approach to the reform agenda. However, Strobele also observed that policy disagreements '*were not always the SPD's fault, as they must consider completely different sections of the electorate than we would want to and have to*' [*TAZ*. 17/11/90].

So what went wrong? Gudrun Heinrich has described the Berlin Red-Green coalition as having three distinct phases. The first phase, lasting from the Spring until late Summer of 1989, can be described as the coalition's 'honeymoon period'. The second phase, lasting from the late Summer of 1989 until early 1990, was characterised by a slow break-down in trust between the two parties. The third and final phase, lasting from the beginning of 1990 until its collapse was, in Heinrich's words, characterised by '*two parties governing next to and against each other, with no joint strategy to follow*' [1993: 39]. Obviously, the cataclysmic changes of November 1989 completely transformed the political environment within which the coalition was trying to function and must have put an enormous strain upon the participants. Nevertheless, the break-down in relations between the two parties was striking, and played out in the full view of the wider German polity.

As soon as the coalition was inaugurated, it was put under pressure. Elements from the *autonome Szene*, the so-called 'autonomous groups' who enjoyed links with elements of the AL (arising out of the Berlin squatters movement of the early 1980s), promptly squatted a number of flats in the Kreuzberg area of the city. This was widely regarded as

an explicit act of provocation for a coalition of which the *autonome* disapproved wholeheartedly.

The squatting action presented the AL with a conflict between the priorities of party management and coalition maintenance. Given that the AL had entered into the coalition against the wishes of elements of its own milieu, it was loathe to further antagonise them by moving against the squatters. On the other hand, the SPD Interior Minister Erich Pätzold was determined the hold the line against such an early challenge to his own authority and, by definition, that of the coalition. As a result, Pätzold demanded and obtained the reluctant support of his AL colleagues in clearing the squatters [*TAZ*. 23/03/89].

This first skirmish with the squatters groups highlighted a fundamental tension within the coalition. Like any political party, the AL needed to deliver tangible results for its client groups in order to maintain party unity. At the same time, it needed to give itself a free hand, both in its dealings with the SPD and as a party of government *per se*. However, by its very nature, some elements of the AL's milieu had interests that ran counter to the AL's as a coalition partner. Although the Red-Green coalition enjoyed the support of the majority of the AL's members and voters, the AL's internal structure - or lack of it - allowed vociferous minorities to make their views heard. The AL's system of delegational democracy meant that *Fraktion* members (including coalition ministers) were required to regularly report back to the party caucus. These caucus meetings were often quite heated and, now that the AL was in government, well-reported. As a result, Berliners were now treated to the spectacle of AL ministers being cross-examined by their local caucus on the evening news. Inevitably, there was no shortage of highly-quotable members of the 'counter-culture', ready to play to the prejudices of 'middle-Berlin' (to coin a phrase). Even so early on, it all looked frighteningly like the much-promised 'Red-Green chaos'!

For the AL ministers themselves, and for much of their rank and file, it was soon apparent that the responsibilities of government could be quite uncomfortable. As Heinrich observes, the early days of the coalition demonstrated to the AL that they now '*had to go along with decisions that they had previously opposed* '[1993: 42].

Indeed, the political *Praxis* of the first few months of government saw the AL in the thick of the action and forced into making contentious decisions. The first big row within the coalition concerned the planned extension of the city's *Rudolf-Virchow-Klinikums* (the Rudolf Virchow Clinic), under plans agreed by the previous CDU-FDP administration. The AL opposed the project, on the grounds that it went against the spirit of the principle of decentralisation *per se*, and the enhancement of mobile community-based care facilities in particular. However, in June 1989, the AL ministers eventually gave in and approved the extension plans on the grounds that they were so far underway and alternative plans did not exist. Next, the two coalition parties fell out over a planned border crossing to the GDR at Schichauweg. Although a compromise was eventually reached, the AL's Plenary Session[53] called on its representatives in the legislature to do all they could to stop the border crossing coming about [Heinrich, 1993: 41].

In addition to these internal disagreements, the coalition found itself up against the powerful motorists lobby, following the decision by SPD Minister Wagner to impose a 100 km per hour sped limit on West Berlin's only stretch of Autobahn, the AVUS. Although justifiable on environmental grounds, the AVUS decision was bad politics. Overnight, the motorists association ADAC was gifted with an issue around which to mobilise opposition to the coalition.

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[53]The Plenary Session, or *Mitgliedsvollversammlung* (MVV), was - in the tradition of delegational democracy - the highest decision-making body within the AL.

Both parties seemed aware of the significance of their political co-operation. This was clearly demonstrated by a number of press conferences held in June 1989 to celebrate (and take stock of) the first 100 days of the coalition. For its part, the AL deemed the first phase of the coalition a success, although they felt that the realities of government had eroded any initial euphoria. They now regarded the coalition as a '*high risk and exciting experiment*' in government [AL *Pressestelle*. 26/06/89]. For its part, the SPD was satisfied with the first 100 days, but were beginning to show signs of frustration and impatience at the slow pace of decision-making within the coalition. The blame for this was put squarely at the AL's door, because of their insistence on referring everything back to their local caucus. As Momper observed, the AL had to '*develop (internal) structures that would make the entire coalition more capable of taking decisions*' [Press Statement by Momper. 23/06/89]. The first phase was coming to an end.

No sooner had the 100-day honeymoon period been passed than the coalition entered its first really major crisis. The cause of the crisis was an agreement between *Berliner Elektrizitätswerke* (BEWAG: the local city-owned electricity generator), and *Preussen Electra* and *Intrac* to supply electricity between the GDR and Berlin. The contract had been closed by the previous CDU-FDP administration, but was vehemently opposed by the AL. As a result, the coalition agreement stated that the coalition intended to '*cancel or make adjustments*' to the contract once in power [SPD Berlin 1989: 23]. For many in the AL, this issue was a fundamental test of the coalition's environmental credentials [Heinrich, 1993: 42].

However, the policy area fell within the remit of SPD Economics Minister Peter Mitzscherling, who proposed that the contract should go ahead. Mitzscherling's decision was vehemently opposed by the AL's Michaele Schreyer, whose Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection also had competencies in this field. The AL

ministry also had access to advice from a circle of environmental initiative groups, research centres and individual activists (see Chapter Six on the Energy Advisory Council (*Energiebeirat*)). As a result of this over-lap of powers, both the Economics ministry and the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection undertook a review of the legal basis of the contract.

On the 22 September 1989, the MVV of the AL passed a resolution stating their implacable opposition to the contract going ahead. The plenum issued an imperative mandate to the AL *Fraktion* (including ministers), making the issue the *sine qua non* of continued co-operation with the SPD. Implicit in the AL's critique was what they called their '*dissatisfaction with the timid implementation of certain elements of the coalition agreement*' [Protocol of the AL Plenary session of 22 September 1989. cited Heinrich, 1993: 43].

The final decision on the contract was an exercise in political brinkmanship. However, after the SPD made it clear that any veto of the contract would signal the end of the coalition, in December 1989, the AL ministers reluctantly gave their consent to the agreement.

The next major source of conflict within the coalition began in late November and early December of 1989, with the onset of strike action by care-workers at Berlin's *Kindertagesstäten* (KITAS: children's day-care centres), with the aim of improving pay and working conditions (in particular the achievement of an agreement on a minimum wage or *Tarifvertrag*). The AL, who enjoyed substantial support amongst KITA workers, came out clearly in favour of the demands of the strikers. However, Interior Minister Pätzold rejected the strikers demands, with the support of the rest of the SPD. Again, the AL had found itself in the ambiguous situation of both being in power and advocating a

stance that was implicitly in opposition to the stance adopted by the coalition as a whole. After ten weeks the strike collapsed without success.

At this point, the AL were in an invidious situation. On several occasions they had found themselves in a situation where they were unable to defend the interests of their client groups against the decisions of the city-government as a whole. This prompted the AL's extra-parliamentary organisation to issue a harsh critique of the actions of the coalition and demand, despite the fact that the strike had failed, that negotiations on the subject of the minimum wage should start immediately.

The AL's demands fell on deaf ears and, at the plenum of 24 March 1990, Heidi Bischoff-Pflanz (the chair of the AL's *Fraktion* and a vociferous supporter of the KITA strike) announced her resignation. Frau Bischoff-Pflanz was widely regarded as a representative of the AL's Left-wing. Therefore, her support had been essential in maintaining intra-party peace and support for the coalition. The Red-Green coalition was entering its final phase.

The last phase of the West Berlin Red-Green Coalition coincided with the final stages of the process of German unification. Therefore, it is perhaps fitting that one of the major sources of conflict between the parties in these final months concerned the sale of 61,710 square metres of real estate on the Potsdamer Platz to Daimler-Benz. The initial negotiations between Governing Mayor Momper, Minister for Construction and Housing Wolfgang Nagel and Daimler-Benz had taken place in the summer of 1989. As Heinrich observes, the intervening months had transformed the Potsdamer Platz from waste-ground on the edge of the allied-occupied city to the centre of a re-united Berlin [Heinrich, 1993: 47]. However, by the time that the AL and, indeed the SPD as a whole, were informed the deal had gone through.

The Daimler-Benz deal not only aggravated the already sensitive feelings of the AL. but also significant elements of the SPD itself. At issue was not only the fact that the changed circumstances of the area had rendered the sale price ridiculously low, but also that the sale of what was now prime real estate now raised questions as to the suitability of siting the Daimler Benz building in the centre of a new unified Berlin. The fact that the deal was going ahead, combined with the manner in which it had been arranged and announced, made a mockery of the idea of an integrated and environmentally-sound city-planning concept.

Such a plan was within the remit of the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection, whose Minister Michaele Schreyer was now on the verge of resignation. As a result, by the time that the contract with Daimler Benz was signed in June 1990, relations between the two coalition partners had reached a new low point. The deal went ahead on the strength the votes of the SPD and CDU in the legislature, with the AL voting against. In effect, this meant that the SPD had implicitly sidelined Frau Schreyer and undermined the principle of ministerial autonomy.

The Daimler Benz debacle led the AL to debate their continued participation in the coalition. The debate, which took place on the 15 and 16 June 1990, was given added urgency because, following the first free elections of 6 May 1990, East Berlin was now governed by a Grand Coalition between the SPD and CDU. Indeed, at this point, Momper announced proposals to send West Berlin ministers over to East Berlin in order to take over responsibilities as a precursor to unification of the two city governments [Heinrich, 1993: 48]. The initiative failed in the teeth of the opposition of both the AL and SPD rank-and-file. Nevertheless the rules of the game had changed and the AL had got the message.

By the early Autumn of 1990, the AL *Basis* was in almost open defiance of the coalition. At the local level, the mood amongst the AL's rank-and-file was now openly in favour of ending political co-operation with the SPD. This process precipitated a major crisis of party management for the AL when, in August 1990, 51 leading Left-wingers within the AL declared that they were now *'going into opposition to the majority of the AL'* [Heinrich. 1993: 49]. The rebels even suggested that the AL was in danger of self-destructing over the issue. Clearly, if the AL was going to hold together as a party. it had to find an issue around which it could mobilise.

The next source of conflict between the SPD and AL concerned the future of the Research Reactor at the Hahn-Meitner Research Instititute (HMI). Like the contract between the electricity generators, the AL regarded the cancellation of the reactor project as a test of the coalition's environmental credentials and, again, the SPD appeared to be back-sliding on the issue. As a result, the AL Minister for City Development and Environmental Protection Schreyer found herself in direct conflict with the SPD Minister for Science and Research Barbara Riedmuller-Seel. In May 1990, despite the overlap in competencies between her ministry and that of Schreyer, Riedmuller-Seel had unilaterally given the go ahead to the reactor coming on-line, although the final decision was put back until August. At the beginning of August, at the behest of the SPD, the legislature ordered Schreyer to confirm Riedmuller-Seel's decision within two weeks [*Süddeutsche Zeitung*. 9/08/90]. Citing technical advice, Schreyer refused to comply and resigned.

Clearly, the coalition was falling apart, and only needed a sufficiently emotive issue to kill it off. Indeed, with new all-Berlin elections just around the corner. some observers would argue that it suited both parties to do just that, in order to profile themselves to their supporters and mobilise their full electoral potential [Jun, 1994: 219].

It will be recalled that the Berlin Red-Green coalition's first big test, in the early days of government, involved the squatters' movement. Therefore, it was ironic that it was another squatters' action that precipitated the final collapse of the coalition. On 15 November, SPD Interior Minister Pätzold ordered the eviction of a number of squatted houses in East Berlin's Mainzer Straße. In the aftermath of the evictions, there was a number of serious street disturbances in the city. The AL responded immediately with a press statement in which they declared that they *were no longer prepared ...to share responsibility for these policies'* [Heinrich, 1993: 51]. The Berlin Red-Green coalition was at an end.

4.6. Résumé of Chapter Four

Chapter Four examined the political history of the Red-Green coalition by structuring the events sequentially into four sections. Section 4.2. looked at the relationship between the parties and concluded that the Berlin AL was a relatively *fundi*-oriented party compared with some other Green *Landesverbände*. For its part, the SPD was a party in decline, having lost hegemony that it had enjoyed in first three decades after the Second World War. However, although it had a traditionalist Right-wing, it also had a growing New Left tendency. This - and the fact that it could no longer win a majority of seats on its own - made it fairly receptive to the idea of a Red-Green coalition.

The chapter then compared the party programmes of the three parties that were eventually left in the bargaining set. It concluded that the Berlin CDU were socially-conservative and relatively authoritarian, whilst the AL were profoundly New Left and libertarian in their outlook. The SPD, however, displayed elements of both ideological

stances within its election literature. This meant that it was able to bargain with either party if it so wished. No other party was in that position. Interestingly, the polemical discursive form displayed in the AL's election literature did not dissuade the SPD from entering into negotiations with them. It remains to be seen how this translates in to programmatic and institutional innovation (Chapter Six).

The chapter then described the process of post-election bargaining and demonstrated that it was the SPD that held most of the cards during the bargaining process. This was because of its ideological stance and because of its share of the seats. The SPD's strength was reflected in its share of cabinet portfolios.

Finally, the chapter gave an account of the political life of the coalition over its period in office. It looked at some of the more salient political themes impacting on the coalition and examined their impact upon the process of coalition maintenance. The chapter built upon Gudrun Heinrich's idea of the Berlin Red-Green coalition having three distinct phases. The 'honeymoon period' from the Spring until late Summer of 1989: the second phase, from the late Summer of 1989 until early 1990, with a slow break-down in trust between the two parties and, finally, a third phase, lasting from the beginning of 1990 until its collapse, characterised by '*two parties governing next to and against each other, with no joint strategy to follow*' [1993: 39]. The underlying economic weakness of Berlin (and its impact upon the city's budget) was one reason for the coalition's slow decline, as was the upheaval of November 1989, which transformed the political environment within which the coalition was trying to function and put enormous strains upon the participants. However, much of the coalition's problems stemmed from political manoeuvring by both parties. For the AL, the *Praxis* of everyday government proved hard to maintain, especially as the party's rules meant that every decision had to be referred back to a suspicious *Basis*. For the SPD, the pull to the Left (which led to the Red-Green coalition)

was countered by the resistance of its more authoritarian Right-wing. Moreover. as the 1990 elections came closer. the Right's influence grew as the temptation to tack back towards the centre became overwhelming.

The coalition parties fell out over issues that perfectly encompassed these tensions. These included the influence of big business (the *Preussen Electra* and *Intrac* affair, the *Daimler-Benz* row), fiscal rectitude versus social provision (the KITA strike), 'Green' shibboleths such as nuclear power (the row over the Research Reactor at the Hahn-Meitner Research Instititute), the ever-present ambiguity of many Greens towards private property and the state monopoly on violence (SPD Interior Minister Pätzold's eviction of the squatted houses in Mainzer Straße being the final straw). However, what was clear from the research was that they also fell out because Walter Momper's political style alienated the AL (and many of his own colleagues). He is no longer a major figure in the Berlin SPD.

Taken in combination with the analysis of the institutional environment within which Red-Green coalitions were formed (Chapter Two) and the wider historical context of such coalitions (Chapter Three), the chapter serves to establish a contextual base from which to look at selected issues of programmatic and institutional innovation in Berlin in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER FIVE: POLITICS IN LOWER SAXONY

5.1. Preamble

Chapter Five looks at the political history of the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony between 1990 and 1994. Like Chapter Four, the chapter is part of the 'party politics' strand of the thesis and is structured sequentially into four sections.

- Section 5.2. looks at the relationship between the parties leading up to the 1990 *Landtag* elections.

- Section 5.3. makes a comparison of party programmes, both in content and in terms of discursive form.

- Section 5.4. looks at the process of post-election bargaining and assesses the allocation of portfolios, in the same manner as Chapter Four.

- Section 5.5. gives an account of the political history of the coalition over its full term in office.

Again, the first three sections provide a discursive account of their subject, whilst the fourth section (5.5.) provides a longer account of how the coalition fared politically over its time in office. The section looks at some of the more salient political themes impacting on each coalition and critically examines their impact upon the process of coalition maintenance. This serves to establish a contextual base from which to apply the model of coalition formation and maintenance in Chapters Eight and Nine. Chapter Seven isolates certain topic areas (such as the *Kernenergieausstiegsbeirat*) in order to provide certain tests of programmatic and institutional innovation (relevant to coalition maintenance).

Because of this, these topics are introduced only in outline in the general account of the coalition.

As a final note, Chapter Five is somewhat lengthier than Chapter Four. The relative lengths of the two chapters reflect the relative lengths of the coalitions themselves, rather than any disparity in the comparative importance of the two coalitions within the wider 'story' of such coalitions.

5.2. The Relationship Between the Parties

By the late 1980's, the Lower Saxony polity was in the final phase of the so-called 'Albrecht era', which lasted from 1978 until 1990. These years were characterised by a period of CDU hegemony in which, either alone or with the FDP as junior partner, the Christian Democrats, led by Ernst Albrecht, had run the state and excluded the SPD from power. By 1989, however, the CDU-FDP administration was looking a little ragged at the edges. Opinion polls showed a rise in support for the political extremes, as well as a growth in support for the idea for a Red-Green coalition along the lines of the Berlin coalition that had come to power earlier that year.

Lower Saxony was far more rural and conservative than West Berlin and this was reflected in the conservative value-orientation of the local SPD, which had been far more suspicious of the Greens that their Berlin counterparts. Nevertheless, it was significant that the Lower Saxony SPD refused to rule out the possibility of a coalition with the Greens following the 1990 state elections [*FAZ.* 25/2/89]. For their part, the Lower Saxony Greens had explicitly campaigned for the removal of the '*Skandal-Regierung Albrecht*' and

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its replacement with a Red-Green alternative. This was to seriously hinder their room for manoeuvre after the elections [*Neue Presse*. 18/5/90].

Despite the obvious differences between the two states, the parallel with Berlin stuck in the public mind and the press began to speculate as to whether Albrecht could succeed where Eberhard Diepgen had failed and remain in power. The opinion polls at this time showed the CDU vote dropping, whilst the FDP's support appeared to be around 12% (albeit on the strength of second votes from CDU supporters). If the CDU-FDP administration was to continue in power, it had to make a success of a raft of FDP-inspired reforms. However, perhaps as a result of the debilitating effects of a long period in office or because of the tense pre-election atmosphere, these reforms were becoming increasing contentious within the coalition itself[54]. As a result, Minister President Albrecht and his *Fraktionschef* Gansäuer came under fire for making too many concessions to the FDP. Many CDU colleagues argued that, in the run-up to the state elections, the FDP would need to profile themselves against their coalition partners whatever concessions were made. Ominously, many within the CDU began to publicly compare the actual record of the coalition with the plans that had been drawn-up in the coalition agreement.

For its part, the SPD kept up the pressure on the coalition. The SPD's *Fraktion*-chief Gerhard Schröder, had introduced what had been described as '*a new sharpness into the Landtag*' [*HAZ*. 24/4/90] and the party harried the coalition across a range of issues. Already in the December of 1988, they had unsuccessfully brought a motion of no-

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[54]One example of these reforms was a limited re-organisation of local government in Lower Saxony at the *Gemeinde* level, which was intended to enhance local democracy and increase transparency in spending decisions. However, the reforms (which were a partial reversal of the 1972 shake-up of local government) set local FDP associations against each other, to the extent that even an FDP member of the *Bundesrat* became involved in the row. Another example was the FDP's rejection of the '*Wasserpfennig*' principle, by which CDU environment minister had hoped to link harmonisation payments (*Ausgleichzahlung*) for Agriculture with measures to preserve water through a tax on its use (*Wasserentnahmeentgelt*).

confidence in the coalition's financial management and, in particular, Albrecht's role in the Federal tax reforms (which came into operation in 1989). Albrecht was politically exposed on the issue because, as a member of the national CDU Presidium, he had been involved in the approval of the reforms, even though Lower Saxony had suffered a revenue loss of DM 1.2 billion as a result. Albrecht had managed to partially off-set this loss by securing DM 680 million of structural funds from the Federal government, as befitted the role of *Landesvater* which he endeavoured to cast himself [*FAZ.* 25/2/89].

The SPD responded by campaigning with the slogan '*down with the tax reforms*' and proposed an additional means of aiding the regions. Under the SPD's plan, 50% of *Sozialhilfe* payments from the *Bund* to the *Kommunen* would be held back and used as direct aid to the most disadvantaged of the *Gemeinden*. This tactic was a classic example of Schröder at his most unashamedly populist best. The plan had, prior to the Federal tax reforms, been known as the 'Albrecht Plan': because it had originally been a product of the *Staatskanzlei*. With Albrecht compromised by his federal role, Schröder was free to plunder the CDU's own policies and use them against the coalition.

As the state elections approached, the parties implicitly began to coalesce into two blocs. At a joint press conference a month before the election, the CDU and FDP put their differences aside and praised each other's '*good work under difficult conditions*' across the economic, social, ecological and cultural fields. Albrecht stated that, bearing in mind that it had only enjoyed a majority of one, the CDU-FDP coalition had been '*the best functioning coalition*' in the Federal Republic [*HAZ.* 25/4/90].

The chances of its continuation looked favourable as well. CDU *Fraktion*-chief Gansäuer pointed to an EMNID poll in the run-up to the election that gave the CDU 43.5%, the SPD on 42.5%, with both the FDP and the Greens on 6.5% of the vote. The poll also

indicated that 55% of voters expected a CDU-FDP victory on May 13. Moreover.

Schröder lagged badly behind Albrecht as the popular choice for Minister President[55].

whilst 59% of those polled thought that a Red-Green coalition would be bad for Lower

Saxony. Thus, as the parties went into the state elections, there was little to indicate that

a there would be any change in the governing coalition at the Hannover *Landtag*.

5.3. Comparison of Party Programmes

In the case of Lower Saxony, the comparison of individual party programmes is of limited

explanatory value. This is because, by the end of the Albrecht era, the party system

within the state had polarised into two competing blocs. One bloc consisted of the out-

going government coalition of the CDU and FDP, who were opposed by a *de facto* 'Red-

Green' bloc of the SPD and Greens.

According to Jun, this process of polarisation first became evident in the early 1970s.

Whilst neither of the two *Volksparteien* were able to decisively dominate the party

system, the CDU was able to win a majority of the seats in 1978 and 1982 by taking

advantage of the SPD's problems at the Federal level[56]. However, in 1986, the CDU could

only remain in power with the help of the FDP. Thus, although the CDU and FDP were

ostensibly in some form of electoral competition with one another, they were equally

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[55]The EMNID poll put Albrecht on 55% and Schröder on 36%. Moreover, as one of the most extrovert of
the so-called 'Toscana socialists' within the SPD, Schröder's personal style appeared to aggravate the
traditionally dour citizens of Lower Saxony. For instance, SPD voters polled objected to his 'dramatic'
manner. Moreover, on a 1-5 sympathy rating, Schröder only scored 1.63 amongst SPD supporters.
Bearing in mind that this was only marginally ahead of the 1.56 scored by the CDU's Rita Süssmuth (the
Bundestag speaker and designated successor to Albrecht as Minister-President if the CDU returned to
power), it indicated that Schröder's personality was a political problem.

[56]Jun asserts that these problems were: (i)1978. Mid-term unpopularity of the SPD-FDP coalition in Bonn
and (ii)1982. Inner-party differences, a bad candidate and the feeling of 'fin dé ciecle' in Bonn.

fighting on their joint record in government. Jun argues that the rise of the Greens. and the inability of the SPD to unseat the coalition, had aggravated this process. As a result. voters were in no doubt that they were voting for either a continuation of the existing administration or a Red-Green coalition [1994: 192-3].

The perception of the voters was re-inforced by the pronouncements of the politicians themselves. Although the SPD had made a point of keeping its coalition options open, Schröder was not popular within the FDP *Landesverband*. As a result. FDP *Fraktion*-chief Hildebrandt had already stressed that they were not prepared to enter into coalition with the SPD [*HAZ*. 24/4/90]. Finally, the Greens had no other possible coalition partner than the SPD.

This polarisation is not so evident in the comparison of party programmes set out in **Table 5.3.** (below). For instance, within the domains of 'Foreign Affairs', 'Freedom and Democracy', 'Government', 'Economy' and 'Fabric of Society', the SPD was much closer to the FDP (and, of course, the CDU) than it was to the Greens. In terms of 'Discursive Form', the election literature of the Lower Saxony Greens was nowhere near as polemical as that produced by the Berlin *Alternative Liste*. Nevertheless, the SPD's discursive style had more in common with the FDP and CDU than it did with the Greens.

The areas where there were potential for the selective emphasis of common policy positions between the SPD and the Greens lay within the domains of 'Welfare', 'Fabric of Society' and 'Social Groups'. Obviously, differences remained. For instance, within the domain of 'Fabric of Society', the SPD continued to be far more cautious than the Greens. who took a more libertarian approach. Similarly, with regard to 'Social Groups'. the SPD adopted a more pragmatic and incremental stance than the Greens.

Table 5.3. Typology Of Party Programmes Within the Bargaining Set Lower Saxony 1990.[57]

Domain	Greens	SPD	FDP	CDU
(1) Foreign Affairs[58]	(i)Anti-Nato. (ii) Some Ambivalence Towards Communism. (iii)Pro-Disarmament.	(i)Pro-Nato (ii)Moderate emphasis on 'Western Values'. (iii)Pro-Disarmament.	(i)Pro-Nato (ii)Strong emphasis on'Western values'. (iii)Pro-disamrmament	(i)Pro- Nato. (ii)Strong Emphasis on 'Western Values'. (iii)Pro-Disarmament.
(2) Freedom And Democracy	(i)Ambivalence Towards 'Bourgeois Democracy'. (ii)Autonomy Of Individual.	(i)Acceptance Of 'Bourgeois democracy'. (ii)Moderate Emphasis On Autonomy Of Individual.	(i)Acceptance Of 'Bourgeois democracy'. (ii)Strong Emphasis On Autonomy Of Individual.	(i)Acceptance Of 'Bourgeois Democracy'. (ii)State As Guardian Of Individual Freedoms.
(3) Government	Strongly Ambivalent.	State-Oriented.	Moderrately State-Oriented.	State-Oriented.
(4) Economy	Anti Social-Market Economy.	Pro Social-Market Economy (But Emphasis On Role Of The State).	Pro Social-Market Economy (But Emphasis On Role Of Private Enterprise).	Pro Social-Market Economy (But Emphasis On Role Of Private Enterprise).
(5) Welfare	(i)Expansion of State Provision And Increased Self-Help. (ii)No Role For The Market.	.(i)Expansion Of State Provision. (ii)Limited Role For The Market.	(i)Limited Expansion Of State Provision. (ii)Increased Role For The Market.	(i)Limited Expansion Of State Provision. (ii)Increased Role For The Market.
(6) Fabric Of Society	(i)Radical/Libertarian (ii)Emphasis On Alternatives To Nuclear Family.	(i)Traditional/ Moderate Libertarian. (ii)Implicit Orientation Towards nuclear Family.	(i)Traditional/ Moderate Libertarian. (ii)Some Orientation Towards nuclear Family.	(i)Traditional/ Authoritarian. (ii)Strong Emphasis On Nuclear Family And Gender Roles.
(7) Social Groups	(i)Affirmative Action (Quotas). (ii)Single-Issue Campaigning.	(i)Affirmative Action (Targets). (ii)Emphasis On Broad Civic Rights.	(i)Some Ambivalence. (ii)Emphasis On broad Civic Rights.	(i)Ambivalence. (ii)Emphasis On broad Civic Rights.
(8) Discursive Form	(i)Administrative. (ii)Some Policy Detail.	(i)Administrative/ Technocratic. (ii)Detailed Policy.	(i)Administrative/ Technocratic. (ii)Detailed Policy.	(i)Administrative/ Technocratic. (ii)Detailed Policy.

Sources: Landeswahlprogramme 1990. SPD Niedersachsen; Wahlprogramme '90. CDU Niedersachsen; Landtags-Wahlprogramme '90, Gesamt-Ausgabe. FDP Landesverband Niedersachsen; Die Grünen. Landesverband Niedersachsen. 1990.

[57]See Berlin case for notes.

[58]Compared with the Berlin case, the Domain of 'Foreign Affairs' was of far less salience in local terms. However, the specific historical context of the state elections [i.e. in the run-up to German unification) meant that the general emphasis of foreign affairs was quite pronounced.

These differences notwithstanding, there were areas of broad consensus between the two parties, in similar policy areas as those selectively emphasised in West Berlin a year earlier. Within the area of *Innenpolitik*, both favoured a more socially-proactive and less authoritarian form of government compared with the Albrecht era. For instance, both parties agreed about the need to make a clearer distinction between the work of the police and the *Verfassungsschutzbehörde* (security services), and to enhance parliamentary control over the latter. Both parties were also broadly in agreement on the need to make more of an effort to integrate foreigners into German society (including keeping the right to asylum as it stood prior to its amendment in 1993) and on the de-centralisation of powers to the *Kommunen*. With regard to *Gleichstellungspolitik* (equality, Women's issues etc.), both parties were in favour of setting-up a Women's Ministry, the extension of equal opportunities legislation across the field of education and training, as well as the reduction of working hours for both men and women. Within the area of *Sozialpolitik*, both parties favoured the extension of participation and autonomy for self-help groups, the physically- and mentally-handicapped as well as a proposition that the state of Lower Saxony should guide a *Gesundheitsreformgesetz* (Health Reform Law) through the *Bundesrat*.

However, within the areas of *Wohnungs- und Städtebaupolitik* (Housing and Town Planning), Economic policies and the Environment, there were differences of both style and substance. In particular, the SPD where concerned to strike a balance between the ideals of ecological modernisation and the need to maintain levels of employment and investment, whilst the Greens tended to take a more unyielding stance. This was particularly true of Nuclear power and the disposal of industrial and household waste. At the time, these differences appeared to be of little significance. Nevertheless, as the coalition moved into mid-term, the combination of a deteriorating economic situation and an approaching *Landtag* election would serve to re-profile these issues in the starkest terms.

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5.4. Bargaining

The polls going into the Lower Saxony state elections of 13 May 1990 predicted a narrow victory for the governing CDU-FDP coalition. However, the actual results were quite different. The results are laid out in **Table 5.4 (a)** (below).

Table 5.4. (a) The Lower Saxony State Elections Of 13 May 1990 (In Percentages)

Party	_(Second) Vote_	_Number Of Seats_
SPD	44.2	71
CDU	42.0	67
FDP	6.0	9
Greens	5.5	8
Others	2.3	0
		Total: 155

Turnout: 74.6%; _Source:_ Statistisches Amt Niedersachsens

Table 5.4 (a) demonstrates that, contrary to expectations, the SPD emerged from the state elections as the biggest party, with 44.2% of the vote. This represented a modest gain of 2.1% from the previous state election in 1986. The CDU lost 2.2.% of the vote over the previous election, becoming the second biggest party in the state with 42.0%. The CDU's previous coalition partners, the FDP, maintained their 6.0% vote-share and became the third-biggest party in the legislature. The surprise losers were the Greens, whose vote dropped from 7.1% to 5.5%: making them the smallest party in the 155-seat _Landtag_. The new distribution of seats was: SPD 71, CDU 67, FDP 9 and Greens 8.

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The results of the election raised a number of possibilities for the parties, given that no party had a blocking majority in the legislature. However, it was clear that any coalition that excluded the SPD would be hard to defend, given their gains in the elections. In reality, the only two likely coalitions were an SPD-FDP coalition or a Red-Green coalition. But, as already made clear by the politicians, SPD-FDP co-operation was already effectively ruled-out before the election. This was re-confirmed by Hildebrandt after the election [*FAZ.* 16/5/90]. Therefore, although it could not be ruled out (and, indeed, Schröder did not rule it out), for the SPD, the 'FDP option' was not as attractive or plausible as that of co-operation with the Greens.

Moreover, the attractiveness of the Greens was enhanced as they were in no position to 'call the shots' in any coalition negotiations. The fall in their share of the vote had been a bitter pill for the party to swallow: not just for its own sake but also because it deprived them of any 'king maker' role within the legislature. If the SPD preferred the Greens to the FDP (which it did), it was not out of pure necessity. The Greens' leverage was reduced as a result.

However, whoever the coalition-partner was to be, the SPD were determined to take over power by the 21 June 1990, in time to send their representatives to the *Bundesratssitzung* on the 22 June. For their part, the CDU was determined to prevent this happening. Gansäuer, newly re-elected as the CDU's *Fraktion*-chief, stated that the CDU were determined that the first scheduled *Landtagssitzung*, scheduled for 27 June, would not be brought forward to accommodate the *Bundesrat* session [*FAZ.* 16/5/90]. The reason why the *Bundesratssitzung* was so important was that it was due to debate the *Staatsvertrag,* by which the German Democratic Republic was to become part of the Federal Republic. If the CDU could not prevent the formation of a new coalition before the 22 of June,

Schröder would become Minister-President and the SPD would have a majority in the *Bundesrat* when the *Staatsvertrag* was debated[59].

The SPD and Greens both agreed that coalition negotiations should start immediately. In a press conference immediately after the election results were confirmed, the Greens' *Fraktion*-chief Jürgen Trittin identified a number of areas of potential conflict, as well as stressing those policy domains where agreement was possible. The potential areas of conflict were (i) Ecological issues, in particular the Greens opposition of the incineration of waste and their advocacy of waste prevention and re-cycling (*Vermeidung und Verwertung*); (ii) Women's issues and (iii) Interior politics, civil rights and the rule of law. Potential consensus areas, in Trittin's opinion, (i) Training and schools (including the development and expansion of the Kindergarten network); (ii) Care for the Elderly and other areas of social provision [*FAZ*. 16/5/90]. Trittin demanded that the Greens receive three ministries, assumed at the time to be Environment, Women's Issues and one more within the field of social provision.

In another press conference the following day, Trittin stated that the Greens wanted to negotiate an agreement that would last the full term of government. In Trittin's view, everything was negotiable, '*as long as Schröder does not want to mess us about*' [*HAZ*. 17/5/90]. Inevitably, solid proof of the SPD's good will was demanded.

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[59]In theory, the need to form a coalition before the *Bundesratssitzung* gave the Greens some degree of leverage with the SPD. However, the situation was more complex than it first appeared. Saarland Minister-President Oskar Lafontaine was the SPD's Chancellor-candidate and, under his leadership, the SPD *Fraktion* in the *Bundesrat* had adopted an obstructional stance to the *Staatsvertrag* process. On the one hand, Schröder's victory helped the SPD because they formed the new majority within the *Bundesrat*. However, it was no secret Schröder and Lafontaine were rivals. Therefore, although the Lower Saxony SPD did intend to be present at the *Staaatsvertrag* debate, if for any reason this was not possible and the CDU won the debate, this was not an unmitigated disaster for Schröder's long-term ambitions to lead the SPD. Therefore, Schröder could afford to be sanguine about the timetable for coalition talks.

The areas where the Greens intended to take a hard line were energy policy and waste disposal, where Trittin insisted that the SPD must make it clear that they were not scared of coming into conflict with the Bonn government and, if necessary, fighting them in the courts. For Trittin, the rejection of the principle of Nuclear energy in particular was the *sine qua non* of co-operation.

However, as press commentators observed, the Greens' room for manoeuvre was limited. This was not only because of their poor electoral performance, but also because of the explicit link they had made in the election campaign between voting Green and co-operating with the SPD to remove the Albrecht administration. Trittin's demand for three ministries was *'understandable'*, but two was possibly more realistic. Women's issues was considered to be a certainty, as was one other within the field of social provision. However, it was unlikely that they would get the Environment portfolio. Monika Griefahn (the leader of *Greenpeace* in the Federal Republic and, at that point, not a member of any political party) appeared the most likely choice of Environment Minister, supported by a Green state secretary [*Neue Presse*. 18/5/90; *HAZ*. 18/5/90]. The Greens would have to lower their expectations.

This down-beat mood was reflected in the run-up to the start of negotiations, on the 20 May 1990, when the Greens met for a short conference at Wallenhorst. The membership were on the back-foot, as a result of their poor showing in the elections, and this was reflected in the tone of the speeches. One demoralised member of the executive argued that the party had not been able to convince the electorate that they could actually change anything whilst, at the other extreme, an executive member from Osnabrück stressed the need for the party to come out fighting in order to profile itself anew before the upcoming Federal elections. The post-election gloom was deepened by a general sense of unease at the idea of the Greens not getting the Environment ministry in any coalition agreement.

Indeed, one speaker from the floor demanded that the Greens hold out for the Economics ministry as a quid pro quo for losing 'their' environment portfolio. This was not likely and, in his speech to the conference, Jürgen Trittin stressed that the Greens would have to accept some unpleasant political facts[60]. He paraphrased an old quote from Adenauer and declared that the Greens and the SPD 'were condemned to a positive outcome from the negotiations' [HAZ. 21/5/90].

By contrast, the mood of the Lower Saxony SPD was positively bullish. As the architect of the party's return to power after 14 years in opposition, Schröder's stock within the SPD *Fraktion* was at its height. The 'robuster Schlingel'[61], as CDU *Landeschef* Hasselemann had memorably named him, declared that he wanted immediate 'success-oriented' negotiations with the Greens [HAZ. 18/5/90]. However, it was clear that such negotiations were to be within parameters established by the SPD. Not only had the SPD's vote gone up but, in the 'Green heartlands' such as the university-town of Göttingen, this rise had been at the expense of the Greens. It was argued in the press that the rise in the SPD vote and its distribution seemed to indicate two things. First, the voters wanted a Red-Green coalition. Second, that in the long run Schröder's SPD could make the Greens a superfluous force within the Lower Saxony party system [FAZ. 23/5/90], starting by questioning the Greens' claim on the Environment portfolio.. By arguing before coalition talks had even begun that his choice of Monika Griefahn for Environment Minister was 'non-negotiable', Schröder seemed to agree.

It was agreed beforehand that the negotiations would take place in three 'Gesprächskreise', or discussion circles. First, a daily preliminary meeting of the delegations before the

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[60]Trittin's actual words were: 'Wir werden auch Kröten schlucken müssen'. A quaint phrase which was to become much-quoted over the ensuing years. It translates roughly as 'we too will have to accept some things that are hard to swallow'.

[61] There is no direct translation, but it is a(double-edged) term of approval.

opening of official business. Second, the official bilateral coalition negotiations between the full teams from both parties. Finally, a more focused policy-specific round of talks between the relevant specialists on each team [Jun, U. 1994: 197].

The coalition negotiations began amid high expectations on the part of the SPD and Green membership. Indeed, such was the mood of optimism that both parties made a point of using their press releases to lower the level of expectations amongst their supporters [*FAZ.* 29/5/90]. Nevertheless, from the beginning it was clear that the two themes of Nuclear Energy and Waste Disposal were to be the most salient topics for discussion. Indeed, one of the first joint announcements of the two parties was used to issue a condemnation of the decision of the (SPD-governed) state of North Rhine-Westphalia to allow waste to be disposed of in Industrial incinerators. Whilst the SPD's preferred candidate for the Environment Ministry, Frau Griefahn, was very close to the Greens' position on this theme, there were still differences to reconcile. The SPD's stance was noticeably more pragmatic than that of the Greens and Frau Griefahn refused to completely rule out the possibility of installing high-temperature incinerators in order to burn waste [*HAZ.* 29/5/90]. For the Greens, any form of incineration was undesirable.

Within the domain of social policy, both parties were broadly in agreement and negotiations went well. The shape and allocation of the planned Women's Ministry was agreed (it would go to the Greens), and the coalition agreed that it would be desirable to adopt the German Democratic Republic's relatively liberal laws on the termination of pregnancy if at all possible. In addition, it was intended that the new coalition would become far more proactive in the training and re-training of the unemployed, drug-rehabilitation projects and the promotion of self-help groups. The provision of housing would be enhanced, with 50,000 new housing units planned for 1990, of which 15,000 would be social-housing[*FAZ.* 29/5/90]. Because of Lower Saxony's tight financial

situation, the house building programme would be funded by diverting resources from large infra-structure projects already in the pipeline, such as the extension of the A 26 arterial road into the Emsland, the building of a tunnel under the river Weser and the extension of the port at Cuxhaven. These projects would probably be cancelled [*Neue Presse*. 31/5/90]. Finally, it was intended that the coalition would repeal the *Extremistenbeschluß*, by which individuals who were members or supporters of parties that were considered 'extremist' were banned from the civil service [*HAZ*. 31/5/90]. Obviously, the repeal of the measure would also open the door to members of the extreme Right. Nevertheless, the *Extremistenbeschluß* was an obvious block to the Greens' ability to open-up the policy network.

The coalition negotiations had made such good progress that their success was soon taken for granted by everybody. For instance, by the beginning of June, an article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* referred to '*the forthcoming Red-Green state government of Lower Saxony*' [*FAZ*. 05/6/90]. Nevertheless, as the allocation of seats in the new Red-Green cabinet became evident, many of the Greens' *Basis* became uneasy at what they regarded as the failure of their chief negotiator Jürgen Trittin to secure more than two portfolios. At a meeting of the local party in Hannover, party members demanded a more robust stance by Trittin and his team. At the very least, many regarded the Economics Ministry as the *sine qua non* of participation in the coalition, whilst the more ambitious also coveted the sectors of Transport and Energy. Moreover, the realisation that they were not going to get the Environment portfolio still rankled [*HAZ*. 06/6/90]. As a result, many within the party argued that a second Environmentally-related post should be created because, as one Green put it '*we don't want ourselves to say good-bye to the area of Environment completely*'. It was suggested that the new ministry might also include

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Planning, Traffic and Nature Protection[62] and that it would be filled by Jürgen Trittin himself [*Neue Presse*. 07/6/90].

Finally, on the 7 of June, the negotiations came to an end. The division of posts is laid-out in **Table 5.4. (b)** (below). Contrary to any hopes of the Greens' *Basis*, the party had to be content with just two portfolios, in contrast to the SPD's ten. The Greens did not get the Environment portfolio, let alone the Economics portfolio that some had demanded. Moreover, Jürgen Trittin did not get the proposed Planning, Traffic and Nature Protection portfolio, but rather became Minister for Federal and European Affairs. This was not an environmentally-related post, but possessed a certain degree of status and prestige.

In addition to Trittin's ministry, the Greens also received the newly-created Women's Ministry. Moreover, they would appoint the State Secretary for both the Environment and Social Ministry. However, the 'blue-chip' posts remained in the SPD's hands.

In purely numerical terms, the Greens did better than the SPD in terms of the division of portfolios. The May elections had resulted in the election to the legislature of 8 Green representatives and 71 from the SPD. Moreover, the Greens received only two out of the twelve cabinet posts on offer: a ratio of legislative seats to cabinet posts of four-to-one. By contrast, the SPD ratio was just seven-to-one. At first glance, this would seem peculiar given that the SPD held the political initiative (because of the gains they had made at the state elections). However, such an interpretation ignores the fact that although certain policy sectors, such as the environment, held disproportionate weight for the Greens, they failed to win the portfolio during the bargaining process. The allocation of the state secretary posts, or even well as Federal and European Affairs and Women's '

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[62]*Raumordnung, Verkehr und Naturschutz.*

Table 5.4.(b)   Composition Of SPD-Green Cabinet. Lower Saxony, 1990

Ministry	_Minister_	_Party_
Minister President	Gerhard Schröder	SPD
Interior	Gerhard Glogowski	SPD
Finance	Hinrich Swieter	SPD
Social Ministry	Walter Hiller	SPD
Culture	Rolf Wernstedt	SPD
Science and Art	Helga Schuchart	SPD
Economics, Technology and Transport	Peter Fischer	SPD
Agriculture and Forestry	Karl-Heinz Funke	SPD
Justice	Heidi Alm-Merk	SPD
Environment	Monika Griefahn*	(SPD)
Federal and European Affairs	Jürgen Trittin	Green
Women's Ministry	Waltraud Schoppe	Green

* Frau Griefahn later joined the SPD.

Sources: _HAZ_. 8/6/90; Koalitionsvereinbarung Zwischen SPD Und Die Grünen Vom 19 Juni 1990. SPD Landesverband Niedersachsen 1990.

ministries, could not make up for the loss of what should have been their 'core portfolio. Thus, it was no surprise that the *Neue Presse* [08/6/90] described the outcome of the bargaining process as *'Schröder's success'*, stating that *'the soon-to-be-elected head of Government ...had displayed strength and only permitted the Greens to have competence for two relatively unimportant mini-ministries'*.

5.5. The Politics of the Lower Saxony Coalition

With the coalition agreement finalised, Schröder was elected Minister President on the 21 June 1990 with a majority of three votes in the *Landtag*. His was the only candidature for the post. The newly elected Parliamentary Speaker, Horst Milde (SPD), announced the result to sustained applause from the SPD and Green benches.

Almost immediately, the new coalition was at the centre of controversy over its decision to not attend the *Bundesrat* vote on the *Staatsvertrag* between the Federal Republic and the GDR, due on the 22 June 1990. In retrospect, the decision was a classic example of Schröder's political pragmatism. It allowed his Green coalition partners - who were on the record as opposing the treaty - of the hook, whilst not directly defying the SPD's agreed line on the issue. No doubt it also had the added attraction to Schröder in that it was another tactical move in his long-running rivalry with Oskar Lafontaine, the Minister President of the Saarland and the SPD's Chancellor-candidate for the 1990 *Bundestag* elections. Whatever the thinking behind the decision, it provoked a scathing editorial in the local *Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung*, in which it was claimed that *'the glue that holds the Red and Green together is no more than the enormous appetite for power'* [*HAZ.* 22/6/90].

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However, the *HAZ* journalist's opinion notwithstanding, the new administration appeared to be anything but an empty office-seeking coalition. Across a wide range of policy areas, Schröder's inaugural speech as Minister President signalled the coalition's intention to embark upon a bold and reforming political programme. In particular, Schröder singled out Law and Order, Gender politics, Environmental policy, Education and Training, Economics and Finance as specific areas through which the coalition's record as a whole would be judged [*HAZ.* 28/6/90]. Inevitably, the new CDU and FDP opposition parties condemned the speech.

CDU *Fraktionschef* Jürgen Gansäuer accused Schröder of summoning-up visions of a '*flowery utopia*', of creating a '*paper tiger*' with the coalition's planned policy on nuclear energy, and of planning to turn *Norddeutsche Rundfunk* into '*a propaganda instrument for Red-Green ideology*', whilst the SPD's allies in the communications union *IG Medien* unleashed a '*witch hunt*' against the few journalists openly associated with the CDU within the organisation. Nevertheless, whilst FDP *Fraktionschef* Martin Hildebrandt was equally scathing in his remarks, neither he nor Gansäuer ruled out some degree of co-operation with the new coalition, given that they had a clear mandate from the electorate. Indeed, Hildebrandt signalled that the FDP would tacitly support any measures to reform *Land* legislation on the powers of the police and the *Verfassungsschutz* (the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, in other words the security services) [*Neue Presse.* 29/6/90].

Unlike the Berlin coalition, the Lower Saxony coalition was not immediately beset with problems. In fact, after 100 days of office, opinion polls gave the coalition a 46% approval rating [*HAZ.* 02/10/90]. Nevertheless, it was only a matter of time before the honeymoon ended and the coalition had to make hard choices that would stretch the patience of the Green rank-and-file to the limit.

Inevitably, the source of the coalition's troubles was the parlous state of the *Land* budget. Already in 1990, it was clear that, by mid-term, the coalition would have to deal with a substantial budget deficit. This was estimated as being around DM 2 billion by 1992 [*Neue Presse*. 17/04/90]. As a result, the coalition would have to cut planned expenditure by a similar amount over the period. At the same time, as part of the unification process, Lower Saxony was committed to provide over 4.4. billion Marks of aid to the new *Land* of Saxony-Anhalt over the four years to 1994. Given the ambivalence of the Greens to the whole issue of German unification, the diversion of scarce funds to the east was highly unpopular! This was even more the case given the growing evidence that the social safety net in Lower Saxony was under considerable strain. For instance, a report from the highly respected *Eduard Pestel Instituts für Systemforschung* (ISP) estimated that, in 1989, the state was already short of over 100, 000 housing units and that the deficit was forecast to rise to 190,000 by 1994, mainly because of economic migration into Lower Saxony from elsewhere within the Federal Republic [*HAZ* 16/04/90]. Obviously, much of the projected short-fall was an inevitable result of unification. However, the fact that Lower Saxony was already so short of flats and houses in 1989 was a result of the policies pursued by the outgoing administration. Indeed, even a local FDP politician - Adolf Bannier - admitted that the '*social component*' of CDU-FDP policy had been neglected under Albrecht [*HAZ*: 12/04/90].

Nevertheless, it was the new coalition that had to deal with the situation: even though the means by which they could go about it had been severely restricted for political reasons. For instance, given the scarcity of Federal resources following unification, the bulk of measures to address the housing crisis would have to be self-financing. The most obvious tactic would have been to initiate a steep rise in public sector rent rates. This would have had two effects . First, it would have increased supply in the medium to long term by raising revenue that could have been invested into new housing stock. Second, it would

have restricted demand over the short to medium term, by making public sector housing less attractive. However, the costs of such a strategy would have obviously fallen on the most economically vulnerable sections of society and it was politically difficult for a new Left-of-centre administration to adopt it. So, in the short term, the problem was fudged. Indeed, a rise in public sector rents that had been agreed by the previous administration was subsequently restricted by the new coalition. Moreover, it was decided that any future rent rises would be capped at no more than 30% over the period up to 1995 [*HAZ.* 17/04/90].

It was not just the housing sector that was affected by the new budgetary austerity. The new coalition had also committed itself to providing start-up funds for a programme of construction of hospital facilities throughout Lower Saxony. By 1991, eleven new hospitals under construction with an investment of DM 110 million of state funds were threatened with massive delays or even cancellation because of liquidity problems [*HAZ.* 30/03/91]. As the need to save money became more apparent, it was becoming harder for individual ministries to square the circle of available finances and manifesto commitments.

Inevitably, the debate over the coalition's first budget was bitter, with the opposition parties resisting the coalition's efforts to pin the blame on the previous administration. The centre-piece of the budget was a planned saving of DM 444 million for the following financial year. Not only were the planned cuts politically contestable in general terms, but the *Land* government planned to achieve a significant proportion of these savings by clawing back DM 130 million of public funds normally allocated to the *Kommunen* in order to offset transfers to the new *Länder*. Given that the CDU and FDP were still in power in many of these *Kommunen*, they took a dim view of such methods. Eventually, the CDU *Fraktion* walked out of the session, criticising Schröder's tough stance as '*defamation and dishonest demagoguery*' [*HAZ.* 18/03/91]. However, underlying the

invective the state of Lower Saxony's finances did make depressing reading. The total 1991 budget was DM 34.2 billion, which represented an increase of DM 1.8 billion on the previous year. The budget deficit for 1991 was DM 2.4 billion, which was an increase of DM 500 million over the previous year, which meant that the total *Land* debt was now DM 43.2 billion. The size of the state debt meant that, in 1991 alone, DM 6.2 billion were needed merely to pay the interest on it. This was more than the total budget of any individual ministry [*HAZ.* 16/03/91].

At the same time as the *Land* was trying to off-set some of the state's costs onto the *Kommunen*, its Finance Minister Hinrich Swieter (SPD) was engaged in an increasingly bitter fight with Bonn over Lower Saxony's share of federal structural funds. As already noted, Albrecht had managed to secure an annual DM 680 million of structural funds from the Federal government shortly before being voted out of office [*FAZ.* 25/2/89]. Now, however, Bonn needed to cut back on aid to the western *Länder* in order to fund the increasingly huge transfers to the former GDR. As a result, the DM 2.45 billion of aid ear-marked for Lower Saxony up until 1988 was to be axed with only a one-off 'bridging payment' of 600 million Marks to shore-up the 1250 projects across the state that were dependant on the funding [*HAZ.* 06/09/91]. This led Swieter to accuse Bonn of a '*breach of trust*' [*Neue Presse.* 06/09/91].

A few days later, the opposition FDP came out as unlikely allies of Swieter in his war of words with Bonn. Despite being implicated in the huge mountain of debt that the Albrecht regime had bequested to its successor, the FDP's Lower Saxony *Landesvorstand* issued a sharp critique of Federal Finance Minister Theo Waigel for reneging on the promise of Federal aid. Nevertheless, at the same time the FDP could not resist criticising the SPD and Greens for not getting spending under control [*HAZ.* 09/09/91].

If one looked at the figures, there was some truth to the FDP's criticism. In an article in the *Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung* reviewing the coalition's record after two years in office, it was pointed out that the coalition had enjoyed the highest gross income in the state's history (DM 6.2 billion) and still managed to generate new net debts of DM 6.6 billion. In addition, the coalition had also '*plundered*' DM 1.6 billion out of the state's reserves [*HAZ*. 04/05/92]. This, despite the fact that many of the coalition's manifesto promises remained unfulfilled.

One of the most high-profile of these promises was with regard to education. In the coalition agreement, the SPD and Greens committed themselves to, amongst other things, the creation of 600 new teaching posts, the setting up of a special fund of DM 3 million in order to promote autonomous parent-child groups, and a general expansion of education and training across the sector [*SPD Niedersachsen*. 1990: 30-36]. The scope of the coalition's promises reflected the fact that, as in Berlin (and indeed the Federal Republic as a whole), the Greens were especially well represented within the educational sector and the relevant trades unions. As in Berlin, any perceived failure to deliver within the sector carried with it a heavy political price.

By the summer of 1993, with less than a year before the next *Land* elections, teachers were at the forefront of an increasingly large group of public sector workers who felt aggrieved by the failure of the coalition to improve working conditions. The cause of the conflict was the plan, originally put forward by the Federal government but taken up by the *Land* governments, to increase the working week for teachers by an hour, starting in the academic year 1994/5. The rationale for this was that, given that everyone agreed that more teaching was needed, education authorities were faced with the choice of taking on more teachers or, alternatively, making existing employees work longer to cover any short-fall. Given the relatively large social costs associated with blue- and white-collar workers

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in the Federal Republic, the latter was considered a far more cost-effective option, even when remuneration for the extra hour was taken into account. At the same time, it was proposed by Jürgen Trittin that the status of *Beamten* should be removed from all but a nugatory core of teachers [*Niedersächsiches Ministerium für Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten.* 20/06/93]. Trittin argued that, over the long term, this would prove to be a far more effective method of saving money as it would mean that the *Land* was less exposed to the unsustainable pension commitments associated with *Beamten* status. Under Trittin's plan, most of the *Land*'s teachers would be employed with the status and rights of 'public sector' worker (*Angestellte im Öffentlichen Dienst*).

The teachers' union GEW reacted badly to the plan to increase the working week and threatened strike action in the Autumn of 1993 and in the run-up to the Land elections in 1994 [*HAZ.* 17/06/93]. In this, they were supported by the Greens' *Landesverband*, which issued a statement giving some support to the plan to remove the *Beamten* status, especially if it was accompanied by the introduction of a clearly defined right to strike, but sharply criticising the plan to lengthen the working week. Although a Green himself, Trittin was criticised for failing to block the plan in cabinet, at least until other methods for saving money had been explored [Die Grünen. Landesverband Niedersachsen. *Pressemitteilung* Nr. 42/6/93].

If the actions of the GEW and the Green *Landesverband* could be regarded as throwing down some form of gauntlet to the coalition, Schröder was not slow in rising to the challenge. Although the SPD made a point of setting up a consultation process with teachers' representatives across Lower Saxony, heavy briefing of journalists made it clear that the substance of the proposal was not negotiable: prompting a rash of headlines emphasising the SPD's stand against the Greens' *Landesverband* and their allies in the unions [*HAZ.* 11/09/93; *Oldenburgische Volkszeitung.* 11/09/93; *Achimer Kreiszeitung.*

11/09/93; *Verdener Aller-Zeitung.* 11/09/93. *Nordsee Zeitung* 11/09/93. etc.]. What had started as a technical issue arising out of the inadequate state of the *Land* finances had, in the run-up to the *Landtag* elections in 1994, become a political trial of strength between Minister President Schröder's SPD and their junior partners the Greens in league with their public sector allies.

The profiling of issues as intra-coalition trials of strength is a recurring theme throughout the life of the coalition. These were inevitably within the domains of ecological themes (in particular the incineration of waste, waste prevention and re-cycling) which Trittin had identified as being potentially contentious at the outset of coalition negotiations, as well as with regard to industrial policy (where Schröder's stance was considerably more business friendly than the Greens). This was perhaps aggravated by the fact that budgetary restraints were inhibiting progress within those areas (training and schools, care for the elderly etc.) where Trittin had stated that the SPD and Greens were broadly in agreement [*FAZ.* 16/5/90].

One example of such a conflict was over the decision - taken at the beginning of 1992 - to build an incinerator for poisonous waste in Lower Saxony. On the advice of the Federal government's *Technische Anleitung Abfälle* (TA, the technical directorate for waste disposal), the *Land* was advised that it should build a high-temperature incinerator to dispose of waste. The main advocate of such a strategy within the coalition was SPD *Fraktionvorsitzende* Johann Bruns, who stated he was *'convinced that the coalition will come to an agreement in the first half of this year to build a build a high temperature incineration facility in Lower Saxony'* [*Ostfriesische Nachtrichten.* 10/01/92].

It will be recalled that the subject of incineration was a source of controversy during the process of coalition negotiations, with one of the first joint announcements of the two

parties being a condemnation of the decision of the (SPD-governed) state of North Rhine-Westphalia to allow waste to be burned in industrial incinerators. Not only did the Greens fail to secure the Environment ministry for themselves, but the SPD's candidate Monika Griefahn refused to completely rule out the possibility of installing high-temperature incinerators [*HAZ*. 29/ 5/90].

Given that, for the Greens, any form of incineration was undesirable, Bruns' declaration was greeted with dismay. The thought that Bruns' might have been deliberately provoking the Greens in to some form of over-reaction did not seem to occur to them. The same day, the Green *Landesvorstand* issued a press release condemning Bruns' and stating:

> *The Greens are convinced of the fact that such a decision will not be taken*
>
> *at this time. The coalition agreement clearly anticipates that priority will be*
>
> *given to a programme of waste avoidance, and the Greens will be pushing*
>
> *strongly for this over the next months.*

[Die Grünen Landesverband Niedersachsen. *Pressemitteilung* Nr. 60/1/92].

A more detailed account of the *Vermeidung und Verwertung* programme is given in Chapter Seven. In the context of this chapter, however, the issue illustrates how certain political themes took on a symbolic importance as a litmus test of coalition management. For instance, the dispute over the planned incinerator prompted a revealing comment by Johann Bruns, when he declared that the previous year (1991) had been one of *'political innovation'*, but that now the priority had to be *'consolidation'* [*Ostfriesen Zeitung*. 11/01/92]. In this, the SPD was tacking back towards the political centre.

No doubt, this was partly in response to a sequence of electoral reverses for the SPD in North Germany. For instance, on the 7 October 1991 - just a week after the Bremen SPD

had suffered heavy losses in the state elections - the Lower Saxony SPD suffered a significant loss of support in the mid-term *Kommunalwahl*. The SPD scored 39.7%, a percentage point down on the previous *Kommunalwahl* in 1986 but 5% down on their vote-share in the *Landtag* elections the previous year. By contrast, the Greens polled 6.4%, up a percentage point from 1986 and 1990. Of the opposition parties, the CDU scored 43.9% (still down from their 1986 score but up almost two percentage points on the *Landtagswahl)* and the FDP scored 6.5% (up on 1986 and 1990 and higher than the Greens despite their gains) [*HAZ*. 07/10/91].

For the SPD, the results boded ill for the *Landtagswahl* in 1994. The Social Democrats had lost support to both the CDU and the SPD, whilst the success of the Greens meant that it could not be written off as 'mid-term' blues. It was clear that the party had to regain the political initiative from both the opposition and its political allies in the coalition. Given the nature of the SPD (and Gerhard Schröder's political instincts in particular), the party assumed a more centrist and populist tone.

Another political theme that enabled the SPD to profile itself was the much maligned EXPO 2000, due to take place in Hannover's huge exhibition and conference complex. The original decision to hold the exhibition in the Lower Saxony state capital had been taken in 1989, under the previous Albrecht regime and before the collapse of the GDR. The new coalition had inherited the plan, with all the costs that came with it, but were not at one with regard to how they would proceed. Significant elements within the Greens advocated cancelling the project completely and using the money saved elsewhere.

There was some merit to this argument, given the huge pressure on resources in order to not only finance the coalition's policy commitments but also the massive transfers to the new *Länder*. However, the Greens' objections were not merely pragmatic but also

ideological. As with those projects designed to re-establish Berlin's reputation as a *Weltmetropol* (such as the German Historical Museum) which were opposed by the city's *AL*, the Lower Saxony Greens' objections were also motivated by an atavistic dislike of big capital-intensive prestige projects *per se*. This combination of practical and ideological objections is captured by a press statement released by the Greens' *Landesverband* at the beginning of 1992, which stated *inter alia*:

> *The Lower Saxony Greens agree with their neighbouring state party organisation in Saxony Anhalt, that the urgently important comprehensive ecological development in the five new states is not realisable through prestige projects informed by the 'faster-higher-further ideology'. In short, cancel the EXPO and invest the resources in a programme of ecological structural development in the five new states*

> [Die Grünen Landesverband Niedersachsen. *Pressemitteilung* Nr. 61/1/92.]

Unlike the Greens, the SPD was torn between cancelling or continuing the EXPO. On the one hand, as in Berlin, it saw the attraction of transferring the resources to other (and more immediate) projects. There were economic benefits in going ahead as well (especially with regard to employment prospects within the construction industry), but they were more diffuse and mainly in the medium-term. However, as mainstream politicians, senior Social Democrats also appreciated the popularity and prestige that such projects can bring and saw the advantages in being associated with it in the public mind. Nevertheless, as the originators of the whole EXPO project, the CDU were also keen for EXPO to go ahead. The trick, therefore, was for the SPD to come up with a strategy that distanced itself from its coalition allies, did not allow the CDU to claim a victory either and most importantly, allowed the party to keep its options open.

The answer was a referendum of the citizens of Hannover on the subject of should there or should there not be an EXPO. Under pressure from the SPD - and against the wishes of its *Landesvorstand* - the Greens in the parliamentary *Fraktion* grudgingly accepted the idea of a referendum as a way out of what had become an impasse. The idea had the added attraction for the *Land* government in that it was ostensibly taking place at the *Kommunal* level in the city of Hannover, which allowed them to distance themselves from the process. Given that he was on record as being opposed to such referenda, Gerhard Schröder wasted little time in doing so, declaring that although he was not disturbed by the prospect of such a referendum, it '*was not really his theme, but something for which the communal politicians in Hannover had to be held responsible for*' [*HAZ.* 16/01/92]. The referendum was arranged for some time in the first two weeks of the July of 1992.

The SPD's strategy worked on two levels, in order to shore-up moderate support amongst the voters of Lower Saxony. First, the logistics of the EXPO continued to go ahead, including a promise of financial support form the Federal Government in Bonn, as part of a framework agreement on the exhibition. This was a triumph for Schröder as the state's *Landesvater*, especially as, only the previous December, Finance Minister Theo Waigel had cast doubt on the possibility of an aid package from the *Bund* [*HAZ.* 02/12/91]. Second, it served to distance the SPD from the abstentionist stance of the Greens. In their *Landesparteitag* in Hildesheim at the end of March 1992, the Greens' *Basis* reacted in predictable fashion. A motion from the floor rejecting the whole idea of EXPO 2000, on the grounds of it being contrary to the coalition agreement, was passed unanimously [*Nordsee Zeitung.* 30/03/92]. The conference also rejected Johann Bruns' plan for a high temperature incinerator, which was still a highly contentious issue within the coalition. Indeed, what is noticeable about press reports from this period of the coalition is the degree to which the two issues were linked by the Greens as being evidence of the treachery of the SPD, with calls for a withdrawal form the coalition. This was resisted by

the more realistic members of the Greens, such as Chairperson Thea Dückert, who pleaded that it would be *'foolhardiness'* to focus the entire issue of continuing the coalition on the one issue [*HAZ*. 31/03/92]. Nevertheless, that the issue of continuing the coalition was already so openly discussed was evidence of the process of distancing between the two parties in the second half of the life of the coalition.

Despite the growing tension within the coalition, at the level of national political debate, Minister President Gerhard Schröder was still an enthusiast for the whole concept of 'Red-Green' political co-operation. This was in marked contrast to Walter Momper, whose experiences in Berlin had left him bitter and disillusioned with the Greens. Indeed, Momper went as far as to call the Red-Green coalition an *'exhausted model'*, a phrase that was picked-up by CDU politicians in Lower Saxony such as their candidate for Minister President Christian Wulff [*HAZ*. 05.05/93].

The differences in the two approaches was partly a reflection of the comparatively successful process of coalition maintenance in Lower Saxony. However, Schröder's continuing advocacy of the 'Red-Green' idea *per se* coincided with a period of speculation that he might be adopted as the SPD's chancellor-candidate, following the resignation of Bjorn Engholm in 1993[63]. In this context, the continued success of the coalition was an asset, especially given that it was generally accepted within the SPD that the party had to find new sources of electoral support if it was to have any hope of returning to Bonn as a

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[63]Engholm was the Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein. . He was a member of the *Bundestag* from 1969 to 1982 and Minister for Training (*Bundesbildungsminister*) in the Social-Liberal coalition from 1981 to 1982. In his home state, he became a member of the *Landtag* in 1983 and became leader of the SPD grouping in 1988. In the same year, he became Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein. Following Oskar Lafontaine's failure to unseat Helmut Kohl in the 1990 *Bundestag* elections, Engholm became SPD leader and provisional Chancellor-candidate in 1991. However, following revelations that he had lied over aspects of the 'Barschel affair' in Schleswig-Holstein, Engholm stood down form his post and was replaced by Rudolf Scharping. He is no longer a major figure within the SPD.

(hopefully senior) member of the Federal Government. In an interview with the down-market tabloid *Neue Presse*, Schröder stated:

> *I will give you some idea of how I would imagine the 1994 election*
>
> *campaign: the toppling of the Kohl government. I have made it very clear,*
>
> *that in my opinion this is only possible in a Red-Green constellation.*
>
> [*Neue Presse*. 04/05/93].

It was clear that Schröder was not speaking for the national SPD at the time. However, within a day of Schröder's interview it was apparent that his opinion was not even universally held within his own party in Lower Saxony. *Land* Party Chairperson Johann Bruns issued a press statement criticising any *'commitment'* by Schröder to a Red-Green coalition at the national level, saying that it *'wasn't very helpful'* [*HAZ*. 05/05/93]. Bruns' comments are interesting for two reasons. First, it gives one an insight into the nature of intra-party power relationships within the Lower Saxony SPD. What is clear from this is that Schröder was under pressure from elements within his own party who were not as relaxed about co-operating with the Greens as he was. Second, it casts light on inter-party power relationships within the coalition. In particular, Bruns' provocation of the Greens over the matter of the high temperature reactor and the need to make 1992 'a year of consolidation' begin to appear to be part of a pattern of resistance to both Schröder as a coalition manager and the Greens as coalition partners.

Of course, the Greens had their own share of resistors. At their *Landesparteitag* in June 1993 at Osnabrück, the Greens launched a number of bitter attacks on their coalition partners, particularly Schröder and Monika Griefahn. These attacks were immediately dismissed by the SPD as nothing more than early electoral manoeuvring on behalf of the Greens [*HAZ*. 08/06/93]. Yet this was not really the case, given that the attacks covered a wide range of coalition policies, including the environment. asylum policy and schooling.

and were primarily from the Greens' *Basis* (who were far more concerned with Green shibboleths than with acquiring an early electoral advantage). Indeed, prominent politicians from the Green *Fraktion* were relatively positive about the coalition. For instance, Trittin echoed Schröder's claim that only a Red-Green coalition could topple Kohl's government in Bonn, although he ruled out any co-operation with the FDP at either *Land* or *Bund* level [*HAZ. 07/06/93*].

However, although both sides were still keen to continue the coalition, by the time of the Osnabrück *Landesparteitag*, politicians of every ideological colour were becoming increasingly pre-occupied with the forthcoming elections in 1994. In the Federal Republic, there was going to be a busy year of state and local elections (17 in all), culminating in the European elections in June and the national elections to the *Bundestag* in October. As result, 1994 was already known as *Superwahljahr*, with the more senior Lower Saxony politicians (and especially Schröder) expecting to play a major role in at least three elections. Of course, the first hurdle was the *Landtagswahl* on 13 March and, in consequence, polling of the state's electorate took on a new salience.

It has to be remembered that the 1994 election would be fought under somewhat different economic circumstances than that of 1990. Whilst the 1990 elections were fought at the top of the economic cycle (which the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the GDR had stoked up into a national economic boom), the 1994 elections were to be fought in the midst of a recession. Given the more straightened economic circumstances, the public mood had shifted somewhat away from 'post- materialist' themes such as the environment, towards 'bread and butter issues', such as unemployment. Nevertheless, polling showed that politicians of the Left had to steer a fine line between materialist and post-materialist concerns. For instance, a six-month time series analysis of opinion in Lower Saxony, carried out in the first half of 1993 by a private polling organisation, showed that

unemployment was identified as the biggest problem facing the state, with 17% of those polled citing it. Within the total, it was clear that blue-collar worker (23%) and/or SPD voters (20%) were most likely to identify it as the biggest problem. On the other hand, there seemed to be a clear tendency across almost all social groups towards pessimism when asked if they expected their own economic circumstances to get better or worse over the next year (with a ratio of more than 2:1 amongst blue-collar workers).

However, the next most important issue was still the environment (7%), followed by the economy (6%, but with an upward trend towards the end of the series), the asylum issue and politics in general (5%), the housing crisis (4%), EXPO 2000 and fear of foreigners (3%). Only 2% of those polled cited education, public borrowing or foreigners as problems. However, the most striking thing - and this is highlighted in the executive summary to the report - was the huge number of those polled who said there was no problem that they could think of (39%). Such a large amount of essentially satisfied (or apathetic) voters was also reflected in generally good approval ratings for Schröder and the coalition parties. For instance, Schröder's approval ratings (ranked along a scale from +5 to -5) stayed in the positive throughout the period, with his approval rating double that of his CDU rival Christian Wulff. Finally, the SPD led the CDU by a clear margin (47% to 34%), with the Greens (9%) well ahead of the FDP (5%). Moreover, the SPD's popularity compared with that of the CDU grew over the course of the series [*FORSA. gesellschaft für Sozialforschung und statistiche Analysen mbH.* 1993: 1-14].

Given these polling figures, the coalition appeared to be set fair for the next *Landtag* elections. However, if one was a Green strategist, one might be forgiven for wishing that the SPD was a little less popular. For a politician as shrewd as Schröder could not help but realise that, given a fair wind, 47% or thereabouts of the vote in the next *Landtagswahl* could well deliver the Lower Saxony SPD a working majority in the *Landtag*. This was

because the 5% electoral barrier to representation might, on the strength of these opinion poll figures, deny the FDP any seats in the *Landtag*. This would leave three parties (the SPD, CDU and Greens) in the legislature. Given that a coalition between the CDU and Greens was unlikely to say the least, the SPD might be able to govern alone if the sums added up on election night.

Nevertheless, the election was still a year away and the SPD still had a lot of work to do in order to secure such a majority. Given that it would be hard to imagine the CDU's support being driven down any further and bearing in mind the demographic evidence about the size of Left-leaning support amongst the electorate, any further political capital would quite conceivably have to be won at the expense of the Greens.

Of course, one can only speculate as to what calculations were made by the parties in the run-up to the 1994 elections. However, what is clear is that the last year of the coalition was characterised by a rash of intra-coalition disputes which served to profile those areas of policy which had the potential to be contentious. Moreover, to some extent they all carried an ideological charge, with a (sometimes explicit) trade-off between quality of life issues such as the environment and so-called 'bread and butter' issues (i.e. jobs and investment).

The common approach to environmental policy began to unravel in October 1993, when Schröder officially approved the so-called 'Europipe' project. The project involved the laying of a gas pipeline from the North Sea Oil and Gas fields to the Federal Republic. The project was to be built by the Norwegian Shipping Engineering Company *Statoil*, who planned to invest DM. 3.3. billion into the project. Obviously, such a huge investment would have a beneficial effect on the depressed local economy of the North Sea coast and beyond. However, the project had been resisted by the Greens on ecological grounds, not

least that the pipeline ran through the *Nationalpark Wattenmeer*, a unique and delicate habitat of mud flats. The pipeline was planned to come on-line in October 1995.

Although the actual decision was taken by the local planning office in Claustal-Zellerfeld, no-one doubted that Schröder's hand had been in the decision. As Gila Altmann, the Greens' press spokesperson, put it:

> .... *It has nothing to do with a bureaucratic act by an office, but rather is about the political will of the Minister President - its a black day for environmental politics in Lower Saxony.*
>
> [Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Landesverband Niedersachsen Geschäftsstelle. *Pressemitteilung* Nr: 85/10/93.]

Two other thorns of contention were the 'Eurofighter' debate and the scandal over the Atomic reactor at Stade. The decision of the *Land* to support the policy of securing jobs in the state, through such pump-priming measures as supporting the role of the DASA (the Daimler-Benz aerospace division had a factory in the Lower Saxony town of Lemwerder which was threatened with closure) in the multi-national Eurofighter project enraged the Greens. For the SPD, such high-tech projects were essential in order to maintain Lower Saxony's industrial base, but for many in the Greens, such projects represented the military-industrial complex at its worst. A decision, taken in the same period of time, by Monika Griefahn to cut short the safety audit of the nuclear power station at Stade[64], rather than shut it down as originally envisaged, only served to rub salt into the wound and was taken as a signal that the SPD was deliberately trying to provoke their coalition partners. At the same time, the Greens were aware that the SPD had more coalition

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[64]See Chapter Seven on the *Kernenegieausstiegsbeirat.*

options than they. Nevertheless, attitudes began to harden. In an interview with the magazine *Bild* in November 1993, Andrea Hoops, the Greens' *Spitzenkandidat* for the up-coming elections pointed out that, despite the obvious successes of the coalition (45,000 new nursery places; 60,000 new flats etc.), there was a limit to the party's patience with their Social Democratic allies. *'We are not going to run after the SPD!'*, she declared [*Bild*. 22/11/93].

The Greens' *Landesparteitag* in Aurich that month allowed the *Basis* to voice their displeasure at these projects. The Eurofighter project was particularly resented, with calls for the project to be cancelled and the money spent on developing more environmentally-friendly forms of civil aviation. With regard to the Stade nuclear reactor, delegates pinned the blame for the reversal of policy squarely on Monika Griefahn. Rage at Griefahn now had an added venom, given that she was no longer ostensibly independent from either party, but had joined the SPD. Thus, what the Greens regarded as political disappointments in the environmental field, such as within the fields of nuclear policy and waste disposal, were laid at the door of their Social Democratic allies [*Süddeutsche Zeitung*. 22/11/93; *TAZ*. 22/11/93].

Schröder was not slow in responding in kind to these attacks. The following day, he gave an interview to the broad-sheet *Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung*, in which he declared that Greens *'did not understand how serious the economic crisis was'* and that the SPD was only prepared to co-operate with politicians whose first priority was the preservation of jobs. As a result, Schröder declared, the SPD now regarded the continuation of the coalition after the March elections as the second-best option. For the SPD, the aim was now to win an absolute majority in the *Landtag* [*HAZ*. 23/11/93]. This was taken up by SPD *Landesvorsitzende* Johann Bruns, who said that, in his opinion, the Greens had not been able to reconcile their instinct for fundamentalist opposition, with what he called the

'urge for office and political influence'. Although he saw no alternative to the coalition before the *Landtag* elections, Bruns also stated his preference for an absolute majority for the SPD in the next legislative period [*Braunschweiger Zeitung*. 23/11/93].

The gloves were now off and the Greens found themselves on the receiving end of some sustained criticism. Underlying this debate was the feeling that the Greens were not able to come to terms with the new realities of post-unification Germany, particularly the more straightened economic circumstances. If any future coalition with the Greens was to take place, the SPD demanded a new realism on the part of their partners. In an interview with the *Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung* the following month, Johann Bruns stated that the Greens would have to accept that the preservation and creation of jobs sometimes took precedence over environmental considerations. He pointed to the long litany of projects that the Greens had opposed over the life of the coalition. These included the *Europipe* project, the Mercedes test-track at Papenburg (Schröder had been personally involved in its transfer from Baden-Würrtemberg to Lower Saxony) and the dredging of the Ems in order to make it deep enough for the super-liner *Oriana* to pass through after it was built. Bruns declared that the Greens would have to accept that projects of this type would inevitably take place in the future, because economic policy was going to be the most important task in the next few years and the SPD would only co-operate with those who were prepared to help [*HAZ*. 16/12/93].

Others went further than Bruns was prepared to go. The previous month, an editorial in the same paper had suggested that a Grand Coalition was more desirable than a continuation of the Red-Green option, because Schröder and CDU *Fraktionsvorsitzende* Jürgen Gansäuer understood the need to preserve the state's industrial base. The editorial scorned the antics of the Greens' *Basis* at their conference a few days earlier, stating:

Whoever now ...uses the economic crisis solely in order to politically profile themselves four months before the election is not fit to govern. In this context, the Greens have simply already excluded themselves from the coalition as a serious partner.

[*HAZ.* 25/11/93].

Given the populist instincts of Schröder. the accusation of political opportunism was a little unfair. Nevertheless, the Greens were in trouble politically. As the new year came around, polls still put the SPD on course for a possible majority after the *Landtagswahl*. Moreover, the Greens were doing badly and looked set to lose support. In January 1994, the Greens' *Spitzenkandidaten* Andrea Hoops undertook a series of interviews with the press, in which she defended the Greens' record in government and set out their stall for the elections and beyond. She stated that the presence of the Greens had '*added some backbone and innovation*' to the coalition. For instance, nearly all the legal frameworks which governed such areas as education, nature protection, policing and the security and intelligence services had been modified. However, she professed to be unhappy with the record of Monika Griefahn's Environment Ministry and saw the issuing of that portfolio to the Greens as the *sine qua non* of any future coalition with the SPD. Moreover. Hoops saw the Greens main task for the *Landtagswahl* as preventing the SPD from gaining an absolute majority. This was essential if Schröder was to be prevented from nurturing his '*authoritarian style*' still further over the next four years [*Cellesche Zeitung.* 28/01/94; *Bild.* 02/02/94].

For all her fighting talk, Hoops was not arguing from a position of strength. Not only was her party languishing in the polls, but the *Fraktion* itself was now split between those who wanted to continue co-operating with the SPD and those who wanted to embark on a

more confrontational course. Moreover, even those Greens who had been well-disposed towards the SPD now realised that the SPD had manoeuvred them in to an impossible position. Jürgen Trittin was on record as saying that the Schröder's emphasis on bread and butter issues, which had started the previous Autumn was more than just a political tactic in the run-up to the election. He saw it as a profound change of emphasis, especially on the part of Gerhard Schröder. Trittin had spent much of the last four years defending Schröder, Griefahn and the Red-Green coalition in general against the more paranoid suspicions of the Greens' *Basis*. However, now he said defiantly '*the biggest enemy of the Red-Green Land government is the Minister President*' [*HAZ*. 19/02/94]. For all intents and purposes, the coalition was at an end.

On Sunday the 13 March 1994, the citizens of Lower Saxony went to the polls to elect a new *Landtag*. The SPD polled 44.3% of the vote, giving them 80 of the 159 seats (an overall majority of one). The Greens did better than expected, polling 7.4% (up almost 2% on their 1990 showing). The CDU was down almost six percentage points at 36.4%, whilst the FDP (4.4%) failed to enter the new *Landtag* [*Statistisches Amt Niedersachsens*]. Schröder's instincts had been proved correct.

It was Schröder's triumph and he was now firmly entrenched as the Lower Saxony *Landesvater*. His coalition had survived the full term through some difficult economic circumstances. Moreover, despite intra-party conflicts. both coalition partners had improved their vote share at the expense of their opponents on the Right. Nevertheless, the Greens were now consigned to the opposition benches, having failed in their stated objective of preventing the SPD gaining an absolute majority.

Having endured so much criticism from a Green party that regarded the Environment portfolio as theirs by right, the last word must go to Monika Griefhan. At 18.50 hours on

Sunday 13 March, with the exit polls indicating an SPD victory. she turned to a journalist working for the tabloid *Neue Presse* and declared that '*the SPD can also make very good Green policy without the Greens*' [*Neue Presse*. 14/03/94].

5.6. Résumé of Chapter Five

The chapter examined the political history of the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony between 1990 and 1994, structured sequentially into four sections. The first section (5.2.) looked at the relationship between the parties leading up to the 1990 *Landtag* elections and concluded that there was a *de facto* two-bloc party system in Lower Saxony by the time of the 1990 elections. Moreover, this was understood to be the case by both the parties and the electorate. Although the Lower Saxony Greens' ideological profile had been quite extreme in the 1980s, by 1990 they had moderated their stance a great deal and were relatively pragmatic, compared with many other Green *Landesverbände*. Indeed, instead of showing suspicion of the Social Democrats, they had declared their enthusiasm for co-operation with the SPD before the *Landtag* elections. For its part, many in the Lower Saxony SPD were by inclination suspicious of the Greens. However, Gerhard Schröder was well-disposed towards them and managed to bring his party with him. The fact that the FDP had ruled out defecting from the CDU to the SPD also made undecided Social Democrats more receptive to the idea of a Red-Green coalition.

Section 5.3. then compared the party programmes of the four parties in the bargaining set. As in Berlin, it concluded that the Lower Saxony CDU were socially-conservative and relatively authoritarian, whilst the Greens were New Left and libertarian in their outlook. The FDP was somewhat less authoritarian than the CDU but very pro-market. As in

Berlin, the SPD displayed elements of both ideological stances within its election literature, which meant that it was able to bargain with any party if it so wished. Again, no other party was in that position. In terms of discursive form, the Lower Saxony Greens were far less polemical in their election literature than the Berlin AL. Chapter Eight examines how their election pledges translated into programmatic and institutional innovation.

Section 5.4. described the process of post-election bargaining following the *Landtag* elections. It demonstrated that it was the SPD that held most of the cards during the bargaining process, because of its ideological stance and because of its share of the seats. However, the SPD's strength was not as strongly reflected in its numerical share of cabinet portfolios. The chapter concluded that this was due to the fact that the Greens did better numerically because they were denied the Environment Ministry. In other words, a trade-off was made between policy-oriented and office-seeking payoffs.

Finally, section 5.5. gave an account of the political life of the coalition over its period in office. It looked at some of the more salient political themes impacting on the coalition and examined their impact upon the process of coalition maintenance. Although the coalition lasted a full term, it is possible to discern an analogue of Heinrich's three phases if one so wished.

The 'honeymoon period' lasted longer that in Berlin: arguably until the beginning of 1992, when Bruns floated the idea that the *Land* would build a high temperature solid waste incinerator after all. Certainly, his calls for an end to '*political innovation*' and a period of '*consolidation*' [*Ostfriesen Zeitung*. 11/01/92] must have alarmed the Greens. The second phase, characterised by a slow break-down in trust between the two parties, lasted from early 1992 until mid-1993. Issues like the row over the teachers' working week and EXPO

2000 gradually eroded good will on both sides. The third phase, in which both parties were effectively estranged from one another, lasted from mid-1993 until the *Landtag* elections the following year. However, unlike in Berlin, it is not evident that there were *'two parties governing next to and against each other, with no joint strategy to follow'* [Heinrich, 1993: 39]. On the contrary, from the time that opinion polls indicated that the SPD could achieve an overall majority in the summer of 1993, everything that Schröder did can be explained in terms of forcing the Greens into a corner whilst winning moderate support from the centre. Schröder's re-profiling of himself as a job-creating *Landesvater* was the action of a consummate political strategist. The rows over the *Europipe* project, the Mercedes test-track at Papenburg and the dredging of the Ems for the super-liner *Oriana* were all means to this political end.

As in Berlin, the underlying economic weakness of Lower Saxony (and its impact upon the city's budget) contributed to the coalition's slow decline as did, to a lesser extent, the upheaval of November 1989, which led to resources being transferred away to the 'New' *Länder*. However, as in Berlin the bulk of the coalition's problems were self-inflicted. Again, the disciplines of everyday government clashed with the more utopian views of the Lower Saxony Greens' *Basis*, as demonstrated by the hostile resolutions of their conferences. Similarly, for the SPD, the pull to the Left was countered by the resistance of its more authoritarian Right-wing. As the 1994 elections came closer, the Right's influence grew as the temptation to tack back towards the centre became overwhelming.

Once more, the coalition parties fell out over issues that perfectly encompassed these tensions. This time the influence of big business was flagged by EXPO 2000, the *Europipe* affair and another *Daimler-Benz* row (over the test-track at Papenburg), whilst the tensions between fiscal rectitude and social provision were evident in the row over the teachers' working week. Again, there were the 'Green' shibboleths, this time over high

temperature incinerators and nuclear power (for example Stade, in both instances). However, after the troubles of 1980s, there were no real problems regarding the ambiguity of many Greens towards private property and the state monopoly on violence, with both parties supporting reforms of the security services. Moreover, one cannot compare Gerhard Schröder's handling of the Lower Saxony coalition with Walter Momper's in Berlin. Despite his political manoeuvrings, the author was struck by how popular Schröder remained with many Greens, whilst, within the Lower Saxony SPD, his position was unassailable. Indeed, at the time of writing, he is well placed to be appointed the SPD's Chancellor-candidate for the 1998 *Bundestag* elections.

When combined with the analysis of the institutional environment within which Red-Green coalitions were formed (Chapter Two) and the wider historical context of such coalitions (Chapter Three), the chapter serves to establish a contextual base from which to look at selected issues of programmatic and institutional innovation in Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER SIX: PROGRAMMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION IN BERLIN

6.1. Preamble

The purpose of this chapter (and Chapter Seven) is to examine in greater depth the degree to which Red-Green coalitions were able to break down the established hierarchies within the policy-making process in their respective *Länder*. The need for brevity rules out a comprehensive review of all areas of the policy-making process. Therefore, this chapter examines a selection of programmatic and institutional innovations carried out within the field of environmental policy in Berlin. These are :

- The Berlin Energy Law (*Energiegesetze*) of 2 October 1990
- The Berlin Energy Advisory Council (*Energiebeirat*)
- The Berlin 'Energy Concept' (*Energiekonzept Berlin*)

The two chapters are part of the policy-oriented strand of the thesis. As such, its scope is informed by the 'policy networks' idiom (see Chapter One). Therefore, the chapter will build upon Katzenstein's [1987] 'three nodes' of the policy network and concentrate upon three types of agency:

- Political parties
- Tiers of multi-level governance (the *Bund, Länder* and *Kommunen*)
- NGOs

The three examples of programmatic and institutional innovation are all linked thematically and looked at chronologically. The chapter first looks at the Berlin Energy Law. The introduction to the Energy Law stated its intention to '*promote the most conservationally-minded, rational, socially and environmentally sustainable....production and utilisation of energy....through the ....rational relationship with energy and the engagement of renewable energy*' [Section One, Paragraphs One and Two]. To this end, the coalition set out to create an Energy Advisory Council which would give advice on technical problems and best practice within the field. The end result of such advice would be the codification of a new Energy Concept for Berlin, the aim of which was to provide a holistic approach to sustainable energy provision, consumption and preservation in the city. Apart from describing some of the policy measures introduced, the chapter sets out to determine the nature of the policy network prior to the these innovations, the degree to which this involved the opening-up of the policy network during the life of the coalition and, given its relative brevity, beyond.

However, it first looks at some of the inherent problems associated with policy-implementation in Berlin as they confronted the Red-Green coalition. Three important points are looked at. First, the degree to which West Berlin's unique Geo.-political position at the time impacted upon the city's political economy. Second, the degree to which Berlin's polarised party system constrained policy-implementation by the coalition. In particular, the chapter looks at the AL's ideological profile and discursive form, resistance from producer groups and other NGOs and the attitude of the civil service (including problems of staffing ministries). Third, the chapter assesses the degree to which the coalition's policies represented continuity or change in terms of their use of economic instruments when taken in the round, in preparation for a closer look at some of the specifics of programmatic and institutional innovation.

6.2. Inherent Problems of Policy-Implementation In Berlin

At the time of the January 1989 municipal elections in West Berlin, it was clear that, by any objective criteria, the city was confronted by a number of serious economic and environmental problems. These stemmed from both the peculiar geographical position of Berlin as well as its internal economy and structure.

Since the beginning of the cold war, the city's links with its immediate surroundings had been constrained by the Berlin Wall. This meant that everything from transport and energy provision to waste disposal and pollution control had developed in a somewhat fractured and *ad-hoc* basis. The city was dependent upon the co-operation of the German Democratic Republic yet unintegrated with it (for obvious reasons), whilst politically tied to the Federal Republic, yet geographically distant. The city was subject to (indeed, its own status often aggravated) the prevailing state of inter-German relations, so that such agreements that existed were primarily concerned with trade and travel and operated within quite rigid parameters. Moreover, the German Democratic Republic's own environmental record was appalling and the effects of this, particularly its debilitating reliance upon brown coal, were directly felt in West Berlin in the form of its own forced over-reliance upon brown coal and severe particulate air pollution (manifesting itself in frequent smog alarms during the winter months).

These external constraints contributed to the relative economic weakness of the West Berlin economy and the often poor state of its own environment. The obvious need to ecologically modernise the economy was not only recognised by the *Alternative Liste* but also by the mainstream parties. Thus, although the SPD was still constrained by the traditional materialist discourse and saw the maintenance of jobs as equally important, there was some commonalty with the Greens about the problems the city faced.

With regard to specific problem areas, both parties identified in their election literature the most pressing areas of environmental concern as those of waste disposal, housing, transport and energy policy. However, as would be expected, the AL's proposals were more radical and less concerned with the impact of their policy proposals upon economic growth and employment. Indeed, their election literature carried an implicit rejection of growth as an economic objective *per se*. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Four, all their proposals were embedded in what can be described as a 'non-administrative' discourse that was almost evangelical in style but lacked policy detail[65]. This polemical style provides some contrast with the more measured and specific proposals put forward by the SPD [*SPD Ländesverband Berlin* 1988: 9].

However, three points have to be considered when making this comparison, which apply to the Lower Saxony case as well. First, as the Greens in Germany are not a 'deep green' party but rather a left-libertarian/'New Politics' party (albeit with a strong ecological component within their ideological profile) environmental policy is not dealt with as a discreet self-standing policy area but rather is often subsumed into a more far-reaching discourse about the nature of power within society and between society and the exogenous universe. Second, given that the Greens contain such disparate elements, they have been more effective when playing a 'mobilising' role for 'green' issues than when dealing with specifics. This was not only because gaining office was less of an immediate priority, but also because until recently conflicts between the various strands of party thought soon became apparent when dealing with specifics. In other words, the party agreed more about what it was against than the nature of the society it was actually working towards

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65 For instance, in the AL's main election pamphlet, the party's ecological proposals are summed up within a few lines of polemic: '*Ecology must take precedence over short-term economic interests. We need less consumption of raw materials and energy,* [more] *decontamination, less refuse, less traffic, less noise, less concrete and therefore more public transport, more ecological raw materials, more green, more free-time, more responsibility and more democracy .... money should be spent on proposals that are made with regard to ecological and social criteria.'* [*Alternative Liste Berlin* 1989: 3].

[Scharf, 1994; Hulsberg, 1988; Markovits and Gorski 1993 etc.]. Finally, given the Greens' 'outsider' status and their relatively non-hierarchical structure, they lacked the policy-making resources of the established parties described earlier and had to rely upon outside expertise [see Poguntke, 1989 for instance]. Thus, policy-formulation processes did exist; but in a more decentralised and less visible fashion than within the SPD. In the West Berlin case for instance, the AL were able to harness the rich pool of environmental expertise centred around the city's universities (in particular the Free University). In short, if one was to use Rhodes' [1986a] typology, the Greens only had access to an 'Issue Network' (characterised by a number of participants, a limited degree of interdependence and a relatively atomised structure), albeit a reasonably well established one.

The coalition took office to a mixed reception from West Berlin's intermediary organisations. Opposition from employers' organisations - as in the previous coalition experiment in Hesse - took the form of dire warnings of 'red-green chaos' and a further deterioration in the city's economic circumstances. However, it is interesting to note that the outcry from employers lacked the vitriolic edge that greeted the appointment of Joschka Fischer as Environment Minister in Hesse (see Chapter Three)[66]. One reason why this was less the case in West Berlin was because Langmann's threats had rapidly been exposed as essentially empty and ineffective in Hesse [Grant, Paterson and Whitston, 1988: 253] and perhaps also an early indicator that the Greens were becoming marginally less stigmatised within the German polity. Essentially, the employers took a 'wait and see' attitude, possibly reflecting the wide-spread belief, articulated by CDU leader (and former Governing-Mayor) Eberhard Diepgen, that the coalition would soon collapse under its own internal contradictions [TAZ. 02/02/89].

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[66]In that instance, there had been explicit threats of disinvestment in the state from Dr. Joachim Langmann of Merck, then president of the employers' umbrella organisation the BDI (see Chapter Three).

Equally predictably - but from the SPD's point of view more worrying - was the reaction of the local trades unions to the new coalition. The traditionally right-wing unions, such as the construction workers' union (*IG BSE*), displayed outright hostility to the idea of a Red-Green coalition, whilst the education and science union (*GEW*), which also had quite strong links with the AL (Schools' Minister Sybille Volkholz had been a union official) was far more sympathetic to the idea. As usual, there was a marked correlation between the stance of individual unions, the producer interests they represented and the priority given to certain areas of policy by the new coalition![67]

Amongst the permanent civil service, attitudes towards the new coalition were also mixed. The established political parties staffed a high proportion of civil service posts (see Chapter Two) and, given the eight-year incumbency of the previous administration, it was to be assumed that a significant proportion of the *Beamten* were CDU or FDP placemen. This trend was particularly pronounced amongst the top tier of permanent officials.

Under German law these officials enjoyed security of tenure and could not be sacked; although they could be granted indefinite leave (*Ruhestand*) at the public expense. Whilst it could be expected that some, especially the more senior and/or well-connected officials, would retire or move on, any incoming minister wanting to make major changes was confronted with the cost of keeping superfluous civil servants on the pay-roll and finding men and women of sufficient credibility and expertise to replace them. Traditionally, this would not have been a problem given the degree of consensus inherent in the German policy community but there were fears that, with the entry of the AL into government, this consensus would break down. Thus there was a danger that the new coalition could

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[67] For instance, the coalition was committed to an early expansion of nursery education and crèche facilities, whilst its attitude towards the building sector was more ambiguous.

be hampered by what could best be described as 'implementation drag' on the part of recalcitrant officials[68].

Such implementation drag does not appear to have taken place in the City Development, Environmental Protection and Traffic ministry. There appear to be three reasons for this. First, as the ministry was only set up in 1981, it had not become part of a rigid policy network (based on producer interests) in the manner of some of the more established ministries. Second, it was staffed with younger officials who, as discussed earlier, could be assumed to be inherently well-disposed to ecological modernisation policies and therefore more open to innovation. Third, the ministry had previously been close to the FDP and - as they had failed to pass West Berlin's five percent electoral barrier - they were not represented in the legislature, any latent opposition that did exist amongst permanent officials lacked a parliamentary focus. As a result, the new Environment Minister and her staff were confident they could successfully implement the agreed programme (see **Appendix Five** for a more detailed break-down of the Programme).

The programme placed great emphasis upon greater transparency in what they called the city's 'planning culture'. Other specific commitments included new controls over air emissions and the encouragement of new clean air technologies; removal of lead piping in the city's water provision; imposition of state of the art technology within the water industry; improved river management; imposition of an integrated and coherent waste disposal policy in co-operation with other *Länder*; a freeze on the new development of 'green field' sites; the development and imposition of a 'sparing, rational and socially sustainable' system of energy provision and use (including a new energy tax); modification of existing laws on energy use; modification of pricing system and decentralisation of

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[68] This did appear to be the case in the Schools, Training and Sport ministry where, as one SPD official put it, 'sabotage was mentioned'!

energy production); a long-term plan to completely re-open the city's railway system (S-Bahn), the expansion of public transport through extension of bus-lanes, reduced waiting times, reduced fares including introduction of cheap all-inclusive travel card (*'Umweltkarte'*).

Three main observations can be made about the coalition's proposed programme. First, with the exception of some aspects of transport policy (for instance, the reduction of fares for public transport, introduction of the *Umweltkarte* system and the imposition of traffic controls) most of the programme required implementation over the medium- to long-term. This meant that political costs (such as funding that would have otherwise gone on construction and service provision) were felt immediately, whilst the benefits were of little short-term utility. This was because the political benefits of many of the proposals were either deferred, intangible or counter-factual in nature (in other words the greater costs of non-implementation would not be apparent as they would presumably have been avoided)[69].

Second, as discussed, the policy document is in many ways the product of two distinct and often contradictory discourses. The left-libertarian/post-materialist-oriented linkage between environmental policy and wider societal power structures is plainly evident, for instance in the greater role allocated to local communities in future planning decisions and the opening out of the policy community itself (through more horizontally-structured 'working groups' and the inclusion of non-governmental organisations and self-help groups). At the same time, however, a more statist approach remains evident and arguably could hardly have been avoided, given that the coalition remained reliant upon the

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[69] Indeed, for many Berliners, the coalition's introduction of the *Umweltkarte* remains the coalition's one concrete achievement! This perceived lack of results was a source of frustration for both coalition partners as expectations from both the SPD's supporters and the AL's *Basis* was to prove a constant source of pressure upon the maintenance of the coalition.

Beamtenstaat to, for instance, recodify law, administer increased subsidies to public transport and collect eco-taxes. It is this tension between the two approaches that is at the heart of the 'old left'/'new left' dialectic.

Finally, one is struck by the primary reliance upon bureaucratic instruments (such as judicial review, state regulation and subsidy), with economic instruments (such as eco-taxes and pricing) taking a secondary role (see **Table 6.2.** below). This is especially the case in those sectors that constitute indivisible public goods such as air and water and is in keeping with traditions of public policy in the Federal Republic. This reliance upon bureaucratic instruments represents continuity rather than change in the style, if not the content, of policy. The significance of this is discussed at greater length in the conclusion to the thesis (Chapter Ten).

Table 6.2. Six Environmental Policy Sectors And The Choice Of Regulatory Instruments (Bureaucratic and/or Economic). West Berlin, 1989.

Sector	Instruments
Air	Bureaucratic
Water	Bureaucratic
Waste	Bureaucratic/Economic*
Land	Bureaucratic/Economic*
Energy	Bureaucratic/Economic*
Traffic	Bureaucratic

* The 'Polluter Pays' Principle

Source: *Berliner Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen SPD und AL vom 13. März 1989. (SPD Ländesverband 1989)*

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6.3. The Berlin Energy Law (*Energiegesetze*) of 2 October 1990

In keeping with the coalition agreement, the preamble to the Berlin Energy Law of 2 October 1990 (see **Appendix Six** for a more detailed breakdown of the Energy Law) explicitly stated its intention that the law should:

> *promote the most conservationally-minded, rational, socially and environmentally sustainable, resource-friendly, low risk and - in terms of the wider economy - low cost means as possible for the production and utilisation of energy and, at the same time, secure the long-term provision of energy for the benefit of the citizens of the state of Berlin....through the ... rational relationship with energy and the engagement of renewable energy* [Section One, Paragraphs One and Two).

These objectives would be achieved by the adherence to a number of basic principles of energy use including: the lowest possible consumption of non-renewable energy; the prioritisation of energy sources that minimise damage to the natural environment; that limit demand and consumption of energy (i.e. 'waste heat' and 'heat retrieval' technology); the most efficient use will be made of the inherent energy within 'primary energy' resources; the prioritisation of 'low value-added' energy forms (i.e. waste heat); the formulation of the sparing, rational, social, environmentally sustainable and resource-friendly utilisation of energy as a dutiful task of the state (*Staatsaufgabe*) and its citizenry. In order to further these basic principles, the Berlin senate proposed measures for both the public and private sectors.

In the public sector, the Berlin Senate proposed to introduce guidelines that would be observed by the state in all planning decisions (especially investment and construction-related decisions). These included:

- The promotion of energy-limiting technology, regulating and controlling technology, the use of waste-heat, re-newable energy and heat retrieval installations, the conversion from electrical to non-electrical means of room- and water-heating and the installation of electricity-saving instruments and devices.

- Priority to be given to the conversion of state-owned buildings and installations to municipal heating using combined heat and power (CHP) or the utilisation of waste heat or solar-and/or block-heating, including a ban on the installation of electric heating in new or extended buildings and installations belonging to the state of Berlin.

- The introduction of an *'Energy Pass'* system (Paragraph Seven) which would be required in order to carry out any extensions, modernisation, conversion or any particular changes to buildings belonging to the city of Berlin. The energy pass would require an audit of the energy requirements of a given flat or premises, under guidelines set out by the senate.

- New guidelines for State Procurement of supplies and services, giving priority to the procurement of experimental devices and installations wherever possible. Priority would also be given to the promotion of installations using re-newable energy (such as CHP), in particular: gas-fired heat pumps, heat networks, transfer stations, gas-recovery and related technology.

All such measures were to be predicated upon the Berlin Senate's planned development of an *'Energy Concept'* (Paragraph Six, Article 4). In addition to amending its planning priorities, the Energy Concept would lead to the Berlin Senate implementing an Energy Programme. This would be on a four-yearly basis and would include measures to promote the conservation of energy, as well as restrictions on the growth of energy use and

environmental damage (Paragraph Fifteen). The public would be consulted at all stages of the programme. In addition, the Berlin Senate would present the state parliament with an annual Energy Report.

In the private sector, the Berlin Senate also proposed the a number of measures. These included:

- A move to enforce an immediate ban upon the new installation of electric heaters and night storage heaters for domestic use with a capacity of more than 2 kW and to stipulate the use where possible of municipal or localised heating networks, CHP and/or waste heat retrieval.

- The establishment of maximum levels for the energy needs of buildings; the control the installation of ventilation and air-conditioning systems; a reduction in the unnecessary use of User-energy ; the reduction of User-energy requirements and an improvement in the degree of utilisation of energy for end-use (Paragraph Twenty-Two).

- The appointment of a network of Energy Officials at the local *Bezirke* level (Paragraph Twenty). The Energy Officials would be tasked with: the scrutiny of existing energy requirements for room-heating, household technology and the supply of warm water within the local building stock; the assessment of measures to conserve energy in buildings and installations within the district; the monitoring of energy-consuming installations and the advocacy of measures to improve their effectiveness and the presentation of an annual report to the District Office (*Bezirksamt*) and District Council (*Bezirksverordneten versammlung*). The Energy Official would also be involved in the planning and implementation of energy-saving measures and the issue of Energy Passes in accordance with Paragraph Seven. They would have the authority to refer cases immediately to the District Office and District Council.

To help provide the best expertise to back up the introduction of these measures, the Berlin Senate proposed to convene an '*Energy Advisory Council*' (Paragraph Twenty-One).

The Energy Advisory Council would advise the senate of their judgements upon basic questions of energy-economics and energy policy. It would discuss those matters salient to the provision of energy for Berlin (from a technical, economic and social viewpoint), with the aim of highlighting potential problems and suggesting possible solutions. In particular, the Energy Advisory Council would advise and co-operate in the setting- up and application of the state Energy Programme. The members of the Energy Advisory Council would be chosen from the different areas of the energy sector, consumer and civil interest groups. The number of members on the council would not exceed 25.

6.4. The Berlin Energy Advisory Council (*Energiebeirat*)

Traditionally, the policy-making environment for the energy sector in Berlin was relatively closed, with a very restricted membership, to the extent that it appeared distinctly corporatist in nature. The extent of this closure was demonstrated by the fact that there had been a period in the 1970's when the Chairman of BEWAG (West Berlin's monopoly electricity generator at the time) had also been the leader of what was then the dominant SPD *Fraktion* in the West Berlin Legislature. In terms of Rhodes' [1986a] model, the policy-making establishment displayed all the manifestations of an entrenched 'Policy Community' (characterised by stable relationships between a highly restricted membership, high vertical interdependence and insulation from other networks and the wider polity).

The Energy Advisory Council was set-up in accordance with Paragraph Twenty-One of the Red-Green coalition's new Energy Law, with the task of opening up this tight network and providing a forum for the exchange of technical and economic expertise and the

advocacy of the social dimension of environmental regulation. It was intended that the Energy Advisory Council would be an inclusive body, bringing together individuals and organisations from across the social, political and technological spectrum of the energy debate, who eventually would be able to work-out the details of the Energy Concept, as envisaged in Paragraph Six of the Energy Law.

Ironically, its progenitor, the Red-Green coalition, would not survive long enough to witness the advisory council's deliberations. Nevertheless, the council still reports to Referat 1E, the Energy Executive (*Energieleitstelle, Energie- und Ökologieplanungen*), which is situated in Abteilung 1, responsible for central affairs (*Zentral Angelegenheiten*) within the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection. As such, its institutional location provides the means for the products of its deliberations to be disseminated throughout the policy formulation and planning culture of the ministry. Moreover, its continued existence can be regarded as an achievement for the Red-Green coalition.

The Energy Advisory Council was and remains a heterogeneous body, drawn from the political parties, the permanent administration, as well as producer and consumer groups from both sides of the Green debate (see **Table 6.4** below). Thus, in terms of the policy network literature, it represents all of Katzenstein's [1987] 'three nodes' ideal type. Moreover, the presence of individuals acting 'in a private capacity' is in keeping with Richardson and Jordan's [1979] thinking that informal interpersonal relations within networks are as important as structurally-contingent relationships (and is a long way from Schneider's [1988] corporatist ideal-type), where the actions of individuals are significant only in so far as they are the agents of organisations.

Table 6.4. Composition of the Berlin Energy Advisory Council (*Energiebeirat*), as of 1996.

Agent	*Agency*
1. Herrn Prof. Winje	BEWAG (Monopoly electricity generator and supplier).
2. Herrn A. Reintjes	GASAG (Monopoly gas producer)
3. Herrn Stumpf	Public Service, Transport and Traffic Union (*Gewerkschaft öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr*).
4. Frau B. Bruhl.	In a private capacity.
5. Herrn Dr. L. Metz.	'Energy and Work' (*Energie und Arbeit e.V.*).
6. Herrn Prof. Jänicke.	Research Unit for Environmental Politics (*Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik*) at the Free University Berlin.
7. Herrn Dr. H-J. Ziesing.	In a private capacity.
8. Herrn Dr. K. Raschke.	Siemens AG (*Energieerzeugung*).
9. Herrn F. Matthes.	'Ecological Institute' (*Öko-Institut*)
10. Herrn Prof. Dr. Kreibich.	IZT.
11. Herrn Dr. Bramigk.	'Society for rational energy use' (*Gesellschaft für rationelle Energieverwendung e.V.*)
12. Herrn Prof. Dr. W. Harms.	Institute for Energy Law (*Institut für Energierecht*).
13. Herrn Dr. Römmling.	Institute for the Preservation and Modernisation of Buildings (*Institut für Erhaltung und Modernisierung von Bauwerken e.V.*).
14. Frau Neise.	Representing IHK Berlin.
15. Herrn Dr. Schutt.	Industrial Energy and Power Generation Association (*Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft e.V.*).
16. Herrn H. Böttcher	Architect.
17. Herrn Simon.	Berlin Chamber of Skilled Trades (*Handwerkskammer Berlin*).
18. Frau Schneider. .	*Eurosolar*
19. Herrn Rehberg.	Berlin-Brandenburg Association of Housing Entrepreneurs (*Verband Berlin-Brandenburgischer Wohnungsunternehmen e.V*).
20. Frau Betz.	Berlin-Brandenburg Branch of the German Federation of Trades Unions (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Landesbezirk Berlin-Brandenburg*).
21. Frau Rohde.	B.U.N.D. (*Landesverband Berlin e.V.*).
22. Herrn Palm.	CDU.
23. Herrn Dr. P. Meyer.	SPD.
24. Herrn Berger.	*Bündnis 90/Grünen.*
25. Fau Dr. Müller.	PDS.
26/27/28. Representatives of:	Ministries of Construction, Housing and Traffic; Finance; Economics and Business.

Source: Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz, 1996

Some groups on the Advisory Council are essentially technically-oriented, whilst others regard themselves as advocates for Green solutions in their most broad-brush sense. What was important from the Greens point of view in particular, was that the energy debate was being widened-out and, for the first time, some of what can be regarded as their client groups were being included within the policy network.

The most important producer groups represented on the Advisory Council were the local municipal electricity and gas producers BEWAG[70] and GASAG. The sheer size of both

[70]In the demonology of the Greens, the BEWAG organisation was considered particularly regressive. Set-up in 1899 with two generating-plants as the 'Berliner Elektricitäts Werke' (BEW),the organisation grew rapidly. By 1909, it had established the first city-wide electricity grid on the European continent. However, it was the effect of the Second World War and the subsequent division of Berlin that led to the development of an institutional culture that placed a premium upon the production of as much cheap (subsidised) power as was possible. Within months of the end of the war, the Soviets had dismantled all three of BEWAG's most modern plants: in the Charlottenburg, Spandau and Wilmersdorf districts of the city. All three districts were in what was to become West Berlin; creating a strategic problem for the western allies.
Following the imposition of the Berlin blockade in June 1948, the Soviets banned a number of high-ranking BEWAG officials from East Berlin, set up a separate electricity generator and stopped all supplies of electricity or coal to West Berlin. At the same time, the British Military Authorities stepped-up their support for the re-building of the generating plants in the western sector of the city. To this end, during the 13-month Berlin blockade, over 1500 tons of machine-parts were flown into the city by the air-lift. On the 1 December 1949, Governing-Mayor Ernst Reuter officially opened the new 'Kraftwerke West'. By 1951, Kraftwerke West had a capacity of 208 megawatts and supplied over a third of the city's electricity needs [BEWAG, 1993: 5-6].
Despite a brief return to normality following the Berlin blockade, there would be no reversal of the development of BEWAG as an autarchic and subsidy-hungry generator, whose role was as much political as it was merely a supplier of electricity. On the 4 March 1952, the East Berlin authorities announced that all arrangements for the supply of electricity between the two halves of the city were at an end. From now on West Berliners were to become all too aware that - in terms of electricity - they were now living on an island ('Strominsel'). Although the result of political necessity, there were a number of disadvantages arising form BEWAG's so-called 'Inselbetriebe'. The most obvious problem was that BEWAG no longer had the option of relying upon a wider electricity grid in order to cope with peaks in demand. Therefore, the organisation had to maintain an over-capacity in production facilities. As a result, each generator had to be run at less than its most efficient level, which served to push up costs even further. Moreover, for a combination of political and geological reasons, cheap primary energy sources such as brown coal, nuclear power or hydro-electric power were not available to BEWAG. This meant that the company had to rely upon more expensive primary energy sources, such as premium-quality coal, light- and heavy- grade heating oil and, after the beginning of 1989, natural gas. Given that it was confronted by such unique constraints upon its choice of primary energy sources, the company itself is proud of its record. For instance, it claims that in the ten years form 1982, it reduced emissions of Sulphur Dioxide and Nitrous Oxide by 85% and 95% respectively, whilst increasing electricity generation by 30% over the same period [1993, 8].
By the mid- 1990s, BEWAG was a partially privatised company with 10,215 employees, total capital assets of DM 560 million, profits of DM 78, 400,000 and a share dividend of DM 7 for every DM 50 invested [BEWAG, 1995: 1-92]. By any standards, it is a major player in the energy debate and could be a formidable opponent of any advocates of 'alternative' energy sources within the advisory council, of which it is a permanent member.

organisations, along with their close political links with both the SPD and CDU, meant that BEWAG and GASAG had always enjoyed privileged access to the policy network.

For the Greens and the SPD's New Left, it was just this kind of cosy relationship between politicians and producer groups that prevented radical reform of the energy industry. As such, the setting-up of an Advisory Council with guaranteed access for the 'alternative" energy lobby was a positive move to break down the old closed network between producer groups, politicians and industrial consumers. Because the list of of participants was rotated, the actual composition of the Energy Advisory Council changed with time. However, the dichotomy between 'producer interests' and advocates of 'alternative' forms of energy production has remained a constant factor within the policy network.

At other end of the spectrum were groups such as *Eurosolar*[71], an internationally organised advocate of alternative energy technologies based upon the use of solar power. Traditionally, *Eurosolar* had been excluded from the policy network in Berlin, especially during the *Strominsel* period for the 1950s until the 1980s, when the emphasis was upon West Berlin being as self-sufficient as possible in sources of cheap industrial and domestic

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[71]'*Eurosolar*' was typical of the kind of new members who had become part of the policy network as a result of the setting-up of the Energy Advisory Council. It was set up in 1988 as a Europe-wide association with the aim of promoting the replacement of atomic energy and fossil-fuels by renewable energy sources such as solar energy, bio-mass energy, and various forms of water-generated power (see **Appendix Three**). It is organised as Federation, with branches in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy and Switzerland.
Although not directly linked to any political party, institution or interest group, *Eurosolar*'s interests coincide to a large extent with those of the Greens. Its international membership included Ahedou Ould Abdallah (Special UN Co-ordinator for New and Re-newable Sources of Energy), Donald W. Aitken (Chair of the American Solar Energy Society), Dr. R. K. Pachauri (President of the Solar Energy Society of India) and Sir Norman Foster, whilst its German membership included Dr. Rolf Böhme (Mayor of Freiburg), Beate Weber (Mayor of Heidelburg), Monika Wulf-Mathies (Chair of the ÖTV union), Harald B. Schäfer (Environment Minister for Baden-Württemberg), Dr. Friedbert Pflüger (CDU MdB) and Matthias Engelsberger (former CSU MdB).
At the core of *Eurosolar*'s activities are a number of pilot projects set up by its members across Europe, including the National Gallery in Berlin as well as buildings as diverse as the SAS Building in Stockholm, De Montfort University Campus in Leicester and Farsons Brewery in Malta! [*Eurosolar*, 1995: 56-57]. *Eurosolar* is financed by both individual and group membership and joined the Energy Advisory Council in 1995.

power. With the growth of environmental consciousness during the 1970s and 1980s, groups like *Eurosolar* became increasingly influential. For reasons of principle or self-interests, the stance adopted by *Eurosolar* and BEWAG on most issues of energy policy is diametrically opposed. However, given that *Eurosolar* and groups like it were not just advocates, but also suppliers of solar energy installations, this does beg the question whether, in terms of the policy network literature, they constituted something more established than Rhodes' [1986a] idea of an 'Issue Network', and were more like the 'Producer Network' ideal-type (characterised by the prominent role of economic interests). This point will be returned to in the conclusion (Chapter Ten).

BEWAG and *Eurosolar* represent the two poles, in terms of both objectives and organisation, of the policy network within the Advisory Council. Within this ideological range, the other groups on the council have tended to gravitate towards one pole or the other in their general stance. As one would expect, this divide is more evident with regard to the 'strategic' debate about energy policy than in the more 'tactical' or technical arguments.

On the 'producer interest' side of the debate, BEWAG tends to be supported by GASAG and, to a lesser extent, by industrial and labour interests. For instance, the Industrial Energy and Power Generation Association (*Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft e.V.* or VIK) has, since unification, made a great deal out of the '*Standort Berlin*' argument, stating that measures designed to promote 'greener' energy production, such as eco-taxes, would undermine the long term future of Berlin as an enterprise centre[72]. Nevertheless, VIK has its own agenda which does not always fall inside the

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[72] In a recent report the VIK argued that, compared with her European competitors, German industry is already burdened by high energy prices. According to the report, at 1995 prices, electricity and gas prices per kilowatt-hour in Düsseldorf were far higher (at 13.92 and 3.66 pfennigs respectively) that those in London (9.67 and 2.23), Paris (8.68 and 2.14) or Rotterdam (8.84 and 2.52) [VIK 1996 (1): 6].

BEWAG camp. For instance, apart from resisting eco-taxes on the basis of cost. it has also argued for the opening-up of the Berlin electricity market to competitors such as *PreussenElektra* AG. For their part, whilst the labour unions have not been overtly hostile to environmentalism *per se*, in practice the industrial unions have been resistant to many such initiatives because of fears about their impact upon their members' jobs. Moreover, as already noted in Chapter Four, many trades unionists were by instinct suspicious of the Greens.

The advocacy of a more 'alternative' approach to energy use tended to be centred within a small number of academic research institutes, which can be regarded as part of the Green/New Left milieu. Membership of these groups tends to be very close-knit and often over-lapping, as demonstrated by their published work. For instance, in 1992, Hans-Joachim Ziesing and Felix Christian Matthes (*Öko-Institut*) co-produced a report on Berlin's energy policy for the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection with Günther Borch, a colleague working on the Energy Concept project. The following year, the Ministry co-produced a paper on the energy concept with Prof. Jänicke's Research Unit for Environmental Politics (*Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik*). based at the Free University, which also contained contributions from the *Öko-Institut*'s Felix Christian Matthes and Günther Borch, as well as Klaus Müschen from the *Energieleitstelle*. Similarly, Dr. Ziesing and Herr Müschen's names appear on the Advisory Council of Berlin's International Solar Centre, whose Managing Committee includes Astrid Schneider from *Eurosolar*.

Taken as a whole, this close-knit group represented a formidable resource of environmental expertise which would serve to counter the established producer interests on the Advisory Council as it advised the Ministry in drawing-up Berlin's Energy Concept.

6.5. The Berlin 'Energy Concept' (_Energiekonzept Berlin_)

The Berlin Energy Concept was set-up with the objective of reconciling two potentially contradictory aims. First, the division of Berlin had led to the two sections of the city growing apart, both in physical terms and with regard to the technical standard of the city's infrastructure. As a result, East Berlin's technical standard of energy consumption had to be raised to the same standard as that in West Berlin as well as both sides having to be physically re-integrated with one another. Second, the city authorities intended to make the new united Berlin a model for innovation in the environmental field. This meant ecologically modernising the energy infrastructure in both parts of the city. Obviously, the process of ecological modernisation would have to be achieved concurrently with the process of re-uniting the halves of the city. Given the frail nature of the Berlin economy, if the Energy Concept was to have any chance of reconciling these two objectives it had to have the tacit support of both the 'producer' and 'alternative' lobbies. Moreover, following the decision of the Federal Government on the 11 December 1991 to aim to achieve a 25-30% reduction in CO_2 emissions across Germany by 2005, the Berlin Energy Concept was had assumed something like flag-ship status politically.

In 1992, after a process of consultation with the _Energiebeirat_, the _Energieleitstelle_ of the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection produced the first Berlin Energy Concept[73]. Despite the fact that the Greens were no longer in government, the

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[73]Using 1990 as its base-line year, the Energy Concept presented three alternative scenarios . In the best-case scenario it intended to reduce CO_2 emissions by 50% over the time-period, although there were doubts whether this was achievable. Inevitably, the participants disagreed over how reduced CO_2 emissions could be achieved, depending upon if they fell into the 'producer interest' or the 'alternative' camp. For example, BEWAG argued for a system of price differentials in order to dissuade the use of brown coal, whilst the Association of the German Brown Coal Industry (_Deutscher Braun-Kohlen Industrieverein_) suggested a system of subsidies in order to bring brown coal burning technology up to the highest environmental standard. On the other hand, the 'Alternative' groups were totally opposed to any form of energy generation from brown coal [_Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz_, 1993 (5) 45-47].

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document built upon much of what had been advocated in the *Energiegesetz*, including a number of valuable concessions to the 'alternative' lobby. These included:

- A system of subsidies for developing alternative power sources (especially solar energy); the setting-up of a Berlin Energy Agency and the appointment of 'trouble-shooters' to oversee the ecological modernisation of East Berlin (especially the conversion of homes from brown-coal heating)

- The progressive extension of Combined Heat and Power (CHP) systems and a parallel phasing-out of all forms of domestic electrical heating.

- The promotion of housing associations and other forms of communal living.

- A radical overhaul of legislation affecting the power industry.

- The prioritisation of environmental objectives in all new public housing.

- A radical re-think of existing transport policies and sharper controls over industrial energy use, including emission controls and enhanced least cost planning [*Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz*, 1992: 379].

Reaction to the Energy Concept was predictably mixed, according to the wider interests of those involved. For the government (now a Grand Coalition), the CDU *Fraktion* welcomed the document but were quick to lower expectations about the extent to which environmental policy could be carried out at the city-state or even regional level, whilst the SPD claimed that the Energy Concept was a disappointment, because the existence of three different theoretical scenarios within the document was a *de facto* recognition that the planned reductions in CO_2 emissions would not be achieved.

For the opposition, the Greens unsurprisingly praised the high standard of technical debate within the document, but criticised its failure to question the basic tenets of the capitalist order, in particular the emphasis upon growth. It regarded the planned reduction in CO_2 emissions as almost impossible to achieve under the present economic

arrangements. The FDP praised the document as '*a step in the right direction, but no more than a beginning*'. From the FDP's point of view, the division of the competent ministries between the different coalition partners (the CDU and SPD after 1990) made progress difficult, as did the specialist-oriented nature of the policy network. The PDS took a similar line to that of the Greens, claiming that the Energy Concept was flawed because it did not address the wider questions of economic organisation and state structure.

Of the NGOs, the environmental organisation BUND also pursued this theme, whilst the *Bi Energieplanung und Umweltschutz* organisation stated that it would have been more appropriate had the document been called '*Old Energy Policies for Berlin*'. The ÖTV public service union especially welcomed the extension of CHP systems, but stressed that all changes had to be carried out with a regard for the preservation of jobs, whilst the Berlin Chambers of Commerce (*Industrie- und Handelskammer Berlin* (IHK)) broadly welcomed the document but warned against the drawing-up of environmental 'wish-lists' without taking into account the effect of such reforms upon the local economy [*Grundstift,* March 1993: 11-19].

6.6. Résumé of Chapter Six

The chapter set out to examine in greater depth the degree to which Red-Green coalitions were able to break down the established hierarchies within the policy-making process in their respective *Länder,* by examining three examples of programmatic and institutional innovations carried out within the field of environmental policy in Berlin.

6.6.1. Inherent Problems of Policy-Implementation In Berlin

Section 6.2. of the chapter looked at three of the inherent problems associated with policy-implementation in Berlin as they confronted the Red-Green coalition. First, it concluded that West Berlin's unique geo-political position had a huge impact upon the city's political economy, with the city being confronted by a number of serious economic and environmental problems. The need to reduce dependency upon the German Democratic Republic for the provision or transport of resources. as well as its exposure to the externalities of the GDR's appalling environmental record meant that the city was economically weak, environmentally degraded and lacking a coherent strategy for a sustainable energy policy.

Second, it looked at the degree to which Berlin's polarised party system constrained policy-implementation by the coalition. It concluded that, although the SPD was still constrained by the traditional materialist discourse, there was some areas of agreement with the Greens as to the problems the city faced. However, the AL's solutions were more radical, less concerned with their impact upon economic growth and employment and embedded in a polemical discourse (in contrast to the more measured tone of the SPD's election literature). It concluded that the Greens' 'outsider' status and their relatively non-hierarchical structure meant that they relied upon decentralised policy-formulation processes, for instance by harnessing the environmental expertise centred around the city's universities, conforming to Rhodes [1986a] 'Issue Network' ideal-type.

It went on to examine the degree of resistance from the NGOs and concluded that although there was resistance (from industrialists, some trades unions and elements of the civil service), this was of only limited significance. In terms of the civil service, once the Berlin AL was allocated the Environment ministry, the actual process of staffing the ministry was not a problem. The section identified four reasons for this. First. as the ministry had

not developed the rigid policy networks found in some older ministries. Second, it was staffed with younger officials (relatively well-disposed to programmatic innovation). Third, as the ministry had previously been close to the FDP and they were not represented in the legislature, partisan opposition amongst permanent officials lacked a parliamentary focus. Fourth, as already noted, there was a plentiful source of environmental expertise outside the established policy network that could be brought in to replace recalcitrant civil servants if needed.

Finally, the section looked at the degree to which the coalition's policies represented continuity or change in terms of their use of economic instruments, when taken in the round. It concluded that, although there was evidence of the left-libertarian/post-materialist discourse within the proposals, a traditional reliance upon statist solutions (with the *Beamtenstaat* administering bureaucratic instruments) represented continuity rather than change in the style (if not the content) of policy making.

6.6.2. The Berlin Energy Law (*Energiegesetze*) of 2 October 1990

The chapter then looked at the Berlin Energy Law, which sought to promote the lowest possible consumption of non-renewable energy, the prioritisation of energy sources, the limiting of the demand for and consumption of energy and the utilisation of 'low value-added' energy forms.

The section described how, in order to further these basic principles, the Berlin senate proposed measures for both the public and private sectors. These included an '*Energy Pass*' system, new procurement guidelines and a network of Energy Officials at the local *Bezirke* level. However, the most important innovations were the proposed development of an '*Energy Concept*' through the convening of an '*Energy Advisory Council.*'

6.6.3. The Berlin Energy Advisory Council (*Energiebeirat*)

The chapter then looked at the Energy Advisory Council, set up to discuss the salient issues relating to the state Energy Concept. It concluded that the Energy Advisory Council was quite successful in opening up the policy network to the Greens' client groups.

There were two reasons for this. First, the advisory council's institutional location (reporting to the section for central affairs within the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection) meant that its deliberations were disseminated throughout the policy formulation and planning culture of the ministry. Second, it was a heterogeneous body, drawn from all 'three nodes' of Katzenstein's [1987] policy network ideal type, including producer and consumer groups from both sides of the Green debate. Thus. although producer groups such as BEWAG and GASAG remained highly influential. the advisory council also provided a vehicle for advocates of alternative energy, such as *Eurosolar*. It concluded that BEWAG and *Eurosolar* represented the two poles of opinion within the council, with the other groups on the council gravitating towards one pole or the other. In other words, it was not a consensual body. The section also opened up the discussion as to whether groups like *Eurosolar* were more than an 'Issue Network' and in fact conformed to Rhodes' [1986a] 'Producer Network' ideal-type.

Siding with *Eurosolar* on the advisory council were a small number of academic research institutes, with a very close-knit and often over-lapping membership. These included the *Öko-institut*, the *Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik* (whose published work included contributors from the *Energieleitstelle)* and the Berlin International Solar Centre. The section concluded that this close-knit group represented a formidable resource of environmental expertise which would serve to counter the producer interests on the Advisory Council.

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6.6.4. The Berlin 'Energy Concept' (*Energiekonzept Berlin*)

The chapter then examined the eventual outcome of the work of the advisory council, the Berlin Energy Concept. It identified the two aims of (i) raising East Berlin's technical standard of energy consumption to the same standard as that in West Berlin and physically re-integrating one with other and (ii) making the new united Berlin a model for innovation in the environmental field by ecologically modernising the energy infrastructure in both parts of the city as being potentially contradictory. The section demonstrated that, when the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection produced the first Berlin Energy Concept in 1992, the document built upon much of what had been advocated in the *Energiegesetz*, representing a long term policy-oriented payoff for the AL.

This conclusion was reflected in the AL's reaction to the Energy Concept, in which they praised the high standard of technical debate within the document. As the section pointed out, reaction elsewhere (from parties and NGOs) was more mixed according to their interests.

As for the SPD, it claimed that the Energy Concept was a disappointment (because it was a *de facto* recognition that the planned reductions in CO_2 emissions would not be achieved).. Chapter Ten will go into a wider discussion as to why this should be the case, but the Social Democrats response is interesting given that, on the evidence of this chapter, the coalition's record of institutional and programmatic innovation was (by the criteria set out in this thesis) a relative success.

CHAPTER SEVEN: PROGRAMMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION IN LOWER SAXONY

7.1. Preamble

The purpose of this chapter (like Chapter Six looking at Berlin) is to examine in greater depth the degree to which the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony was able to break down the established hierarchies within the policy-making process in the *Land* administration. Again, the need for brevity rules out a comprehensive review of all areas of the policy-making process. Therefore, the chapter examines a selection of programmatic and institutional innovations carried out within the field of environmental policy in Lower Saxony. These are:

- The Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (*Niedersächsiches Landesamt für Ökologie*)

- Nuclear Policy and the Advisory Council For The Phasing-Out Of Nuclear Power (*Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs*)

- Solid Waste Disposal and the Second Government Commission On Avoidance And Use Of Waste (*Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung*)

Like the previous chapter, Chapter Seven is part of the policy-oriented strand of the thesis and is informed by the 'policy networks' idiom (see Chapter One). The chapter builds upon Katzenstein's [1987] 'three nodes' of the policy network and looks at:

- Political parties

- Tiers of multi-level governance (the *Bund, Länder* and *Kommunen*)

- NGOs

Although they are not looked at chronologically, the three examples are all linked thematically. The Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (*Niedersächsiches Landesamt für Ökologie* or NLÖ) was set up as an umbrella organisation that would profile and co-ordinate environmental policy across the state, by breaking down disciplinary and media-oriented barriers under the buzz-word of *Integrationsgedänke* (integrated thinking). Monika Griefahn declared that the NLÖ would be the *'technical backbone for the environmental policy strategy of the state Government'* [*Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium Pressestelle*, 01/10/92]. The chapter will assess what she meant by this and the extent to which this was achieved.

The chapter then goes on to look at the setting up the *Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs* (or BfK) and the events that precipitated it. It examines the extent to which the Nuclear power policy issue was complicated by the Basic Law, with competencies cutting across *Länder* and *Bund* tiers of government. The section looks at the constraints (legal and political) upon the coalition in moving towards a nuclear-free Lower Saxony and the role of the BfK in mediating contested policy issues and disseminating advice and information about its work.

The next section looks at the operation of the *Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung* (the Second Government Commission), set up to further the coalition's waste-disposal strategy. Although a specialist area of interest, the topic was flagged-up during the bargaining phase and in the coalition agreement as crucial to the Greens. In particular, they vehemently opposed the expansion of incineration as a means of solid waste disposal. The section assesses the coalition's success in avoiding the incineration option, by expanding the state's existing landfills along the lines of *Stand der Technik*, preventing

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the transport of solid wastes out of Lower Saxony and re-shaping solid waste disposal measures according to the 'polluter pays ' principle. It goes on to look at the re-codification of Lower Saxony's laws on waste disposal, and examines the *Land* government's efforts to amend the Federal legislation that constrained their room for manoeuvre.

Again, the chapter begins by looking at some of the inherent problems associated with policy-implementation in Lower Saxony as they confronted the Red-Green coalition when they took office in 1990. First, it looks at the poor economic health of Lower Saxony, due to its reliance upon by agricultural subsidies, the impact of the tax reforms of the late 1980's and de-industrialisation, and assesses its impact upon the state's finances. Second, given these financial constraints, the section examines the difficulties faced by the two parties in formulating a common policy platform within a number of potentially divisive policy domains. The section then goes on to look at the subject of staffing, particularly Gerhard Schröder's designs upon the highest levels of officialdom in the Lower Saxony civil service. Finally, the chapter assesses the degree to which the coalition's policies represented continuity or change in terms of their use of economic instruments when taken in the round, in preparation for a closer look at some of the specifics of programmatic and institutional innovation.

7.2. Inherent Problems of Policy Implementation in Lower Saxony

The most pressing problem facing the incoming coalition was the poor financial status of Lower Saxony. There were two underlying reasons for this. First, the region was dominated by agriculture and heavily reliant upon subsidies for the sector, either from

Bonn or through the CAP. The tax reforms of the late 1980's had hit Lower Saxony hard and structural funds had not made up the short-fall. Second, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the state had undergone a process of partial de-industrialisation as its declining industries (such as ship-building and motor-vehicles) either went to the wall or were rationalised. This meant that Lower Saxony suffered a fall in tax revenue coupled with a rise in demand for welfare.

By the time of the 1990 *Landtag* elections, the out-going Finance Minister announced that, for the year ending 1989, the state's finances were in deficit to the tune of DM 1.4 billion. Moreover, since 1987, measures to reduce spending had only saved DM 140 million, despite the loss of 3000 posts within the *Land* administration and public service. In particular, staffing within the ministries had been cut to the bone. Nevertheless, it was hoped that, by 1993, the state's debts could be brought below DM 1 billion [*FAZ*. 29/5/90]. Thus, any expansion of social provision, such as the housing programme announced during the bargaining phase, would be limited and at the expense of other projects.

Given that there was little scope for expansion of welfare provision, it is perhaps not surprising that the focus of the coalition was more on the issues of civil rights/constitutional protection, atomic energy, waste disposal and transport policy. The problem for the coalition was that these were potentially divisive policy domains, with only limited scope for the selected emphasis of areas of consensus. For instance, it has already been noted that both parties favoured abandoning the plans agreed by the Albrecht administration to use the sites at Gorleben and Schacht Konrad as final storage facilities for nuclear waste (see Chapter Five). However, the SPD took a more cautious stance than the Greens, who were impatient to wind-up these facilities straight away. Similarly, whilst the Greens were hostile to any form of incineration of industrial and household waste,

Monika Greifahn would not rule-out the possibility of developing at least one high-temperature facility.

Nevertheless, these difficulties lay in the future and for the time being both parties stood behind the coalition agreement. The agreement set out a relatively ambitious programme of ecological modernisation, with the an emphasis upon *'energy conservation and efficiency as well as the promotion of alternative energy sources'*. Moreover, the coalition did not regard this as purely the task of one ministry, but rather a fundamental task that cut across all activities of government (in German, a *Querschnittsaufgabe*). As in Berlin, although the programme was often couched in a Left-libertarian or post-materialist discourse (with many references to the freedom of the individual and the *Ausstieg* from the worst excesses of consumer society), when 'unpacked' the programme was still reliant upon a statist/technocratic set of policy instruments. These are set out in **Table 7.2.** (below).

With the coalition's programme agreed, attention turned to the subject of staffing. As the new coalition prepared to take office, it was clear that the SPD (and Schröder in particular) intended to make some significant changes at the highest level of officialdom in the Lower Saxony civil service. Although the CDU had been in power since 1976, a significant raft of SPD members had flourished at all levels within the state civil service[74]. As a result, the SPD at least could draw upon a great deal of in-house expertise if they so wished.

However, this SPD rump within the civil service was indicative of the cosy (and consensual) relationship between the parties, the administration and the NGOs that had

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[74]Although Paragraph 47 of the Landesbeamtengesetzes stated that officials *'jederzeit ohne angabe von Gründen in den einstweiligen Ruhestand versetzt werden können'*, the CDU had not undertaken a wholesale re-staffing of the civil service when it came to power in 1976. One reason for this was undoubtedly the fact that it is estimated that in 1976 80% of the permanent officials were SPD members. This represented a source of expertise that any incoming party would break-up at their peril. The irony was that, having survived 14 years of CDU government, some of these SPD-affiliated officials were on their own party's 'hit-list' of officials to be retired! [*FAZ.* 18/5/90].

developed over successive SPD and CDU-led administrations. Indeed, it conformed very closely to Rhodes [1986a] ideal-type of an entrenched 'Policy Community' (characterised by stable relationships between a highly restricted membership, high vertical interdependence and insulation from other networks and the wider polity). As was to become evident, Schröder was very much a 'new broom', with a profound suspicion of this policy-making establishment. Heads were to roll.

Table 7.2. Six Environmental Policy Sectors And The Choice Of Regulatory Instruments (Bureaucratic and/or Economic). Lower Saxony, 1990.

Sector	Instruments
Air	Bureaucratic
Water	Bureaucratic
Waste	Bureaucratic/Economic*
Land	Bureaucratic/Economic*
Energy	Bureaucratic/Economic*
Traffic	Bureaucratic

* The 'Polluter Pays' Principle.

Source: *Koalitionsvereinbarung vom 19 Juni 1990 zwischen Der Landesverband Niedersachsen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und der Landesverband Die Grünen Niedersachsen, schließen für die 12. Wahlperiode des niedersächsichen Landtages die nachfolgende Verienbarung zur Zusammenarbeit in einer Regierungskoalition* (SPD Ländesverband 1990).

All in all, Schröder made 11 changes to existing senior positions within the civil service. The head of the *Polizeiabteilung*, Mahn, was a CDU placeman and had been on Schröder's 'hit-list' prior to the election. He was replaced. In addition, the SPD made it clear that they intended to replace all of the State Secretaries in the Ministries, regardless of party

membership. For instance, the head of the Lower Saxony Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Bautsch (an SPD member of the old school) was replaced because he opposed the proposed liberalisation of the culture of the Interior Ministry. His successor. Schaper, was his antithesis, having come to prominence as a Data Protection campaigner and firmly on the 'New Left'.

Four of the state's *Regierungspräsidenten* were also to be retired, including CDU members Niemann and Schweer in Braunschweig and Oldenburg respectively, and the FDP's Jakob in Hannover. Other candidates for *Ruhestand* included the *Polizeipräsidenten* of Braunschweig and Hannover, the Head of the Press Office and the head of the *Land* delegation in Bonn. In addition, Schröder wanted to replace the head of the State Radio Authority in Hannover (who was a CDU member) and the head of *Norddeutsche Rundfunk* (NDR)[75].

In addition to servants of the *Ancien Regime* being sacked or 'kicked upstairs', the coalition proposed to create a number of new posts within the *Land* administration. For instance, Schröder had committed himself to expanding the size and role of the *Staatskanzlei.*, with the new State Secretary assuming a co-ordinating role between the Minister President and the ministries. With regard to these ministries, the Environment and Women's ministries were the object of intense intra- and inter-party conflict within the coalition as people jockeyed for position within the emerging new hierarchy. In such a state of flux, no-one was safe. Even the secretary in the Minister President's office, one Frau Petermann. received notice to quit! [*FAZ.* 18/5/90].

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[75]The last two posts were linked to the highly politicised question of media policy, and thus much contested. Moreover, the NDR post was not in Schröder's fiat alone, but relied upon the co-operation of the states of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein.

For the Greens, the problem of finding sufficient staff to fill posts within the administration would put them at a considerable disadvantage during the life of the coalition. Although there a great deal of expertise in the state (particularly in the Universities), it was not on the scale of Berlin (which also benefited from the presence of the *Umweltbundesamt*). In terms of the policy networks literature, it was an example of Rhodes' [1986a] ideal-type of an 'Issue Network', characterised by a number of participants with a limited degree of interdependence (and a more atomised structure than its Berlin equivalent).

7.3. The Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (*Niedersächsiches Landesamt für Ökologie*)

The *Niedersächsiches Landesamt für Ökologie* (from now on to be referred to as the State Environmental Office or NLÖ) was officially founded on 1 October 1992. It has over 500 full-time employees and is currently headed by Horst Wilbrand zur Horst (formerly *Leiter der Abteilung Kernenergie und Strahlenschutz* in the Environment Ministry).

The NLÖ was set up as an umbrella organisation that would profile and co-ordinate environmental policy across the state. In its official publicity, the NLÖ explicitly codified its role as serving to break down disciplinary and media-oriented barriers. Such barriers and, in particular, the concentration upon specific media (air. water. and land) had traditionally prevented pollution being controlled 'in the round' [Weale, 1992a][76] and

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[76]In his *The New Politics of Pollution*, Weale quotes a lengthy passage from a speech delivered by Richard Nixon, on the occasion of the establishment of the US Environmental protection Agency in 1969. which sums up the idea of controlling pollution in the round. Nixon said:
'*Despite its complexity, for pollution control purposes the environment must be perceived as a single interrelated system. Present assignments of departmental responsibilities do not reflect this*

limited the capacity of the planning process to address the problems of environmental degradation at source. The new spirit of *Integrationsgedänke* (integrated thinking) within the environmental policy community led to the coalition's decision to form the NLÖ by bringing existing state offices under one umbrella. These state offices were the *Niedersächsiches Landesamt für Wasser und Abfall* (the Lower Saxony State Office for Water and Waste), the *Niedersächsiches Landesamt für Immissionsschutz* (the Lower Saxony Sate Office for Protection from Emissions) and the *Fachbehörde für Naturschutz* (Technical Agency for Nature Protection).

It was intended that the NLÖ would provide a 'one-stop shop' across all of the polluting media, in addition to institutionally linking these issue areas to the more general and 'de-politicised' theme of nature protection. Although open to all policy actors, the new NLÖ worked primarily to the Environment Ministry, with a mission to provide '*advice, help and direction for policy and administration*' in Lower Saxony. In practice, the NLÖ's work divided into four core tasks. First, the '*investigation and documentation of the state of the environment*'. Second, the '*analysis, development, evaluation of methods and causal inter-relations*' of environmental policy. Third, '*development of goals, environmentally friendly methods and strategies*'. Finally, the '*processing of technical questions within the areas of nature and resource protection, the care of the countryside, water resources and the coast, waste disposal, health and safety and protection against emissions and radiation*' [NLÖ , 1995].

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interrelatedness. Many agency missions, for example, are designed primarily along media lines -air, water, and land. Yet, the sources of air, water, and land pollution are interrelated and sometimes interchangeable.... A far more effective approach to pollution control would: identify pollutants; trace them through the entire ecological chain; .... determine the total expense of man and his environment; examine interactions among forms of pollution; and identify where the ecological chain interdiction would be most appropriate' [cited Weale, 1992: 96].

Although laudable in its objectives, when one examines the structure and functions of the NLÖ, two potential problems are immediately apparent. The first problem is one of organisation. Despite the policy of *Integrationsgedänke* , the NLÖ was still effectively broken up along functional lines. Whilst the central directorate (Abt. 1) and the offices dealing with water and waste management (Abt. 3 and 4.) were in Hildesheim, the rest of the NLÖ was scattered across Lower Saxony. For instance, the office for nature protection (Abt. 2) and the offices for work protection and emission and radiation protection (Abt. 5 and 6) occupied different addresses in Hannover, whilst the *Forschungsstelle Küste* (coastal research centre) was in Norderney in the north of the state. Obviously, some degree of decentralisation is inevitable or even necessary (such as the location of the *Forschungsstelle Küste* on the coast!), but the balkanisation of the NLÖ demonstrated that the ideal model of an integrated one-stop shop is easier in theory than in practice. In reality, despite the best of intentions, it was inevitable that the old disciplinary or media-oriented divisions remained.

The second problem was more political and primarily concerned the Greens. In theory, the principle of *Integrationsgedanke* appealed to the Green ideal of making environmental policy central to the planning process *per se* and tackling it in the round rather than as a secondary or peripheral concern. In practice, however, it meant that there was danger that issues of huge political salience to the Greens would be reduced to a technical or problem-solving discourse. It will be recalled that the Greens opposition to the incineration of waste and their advocacy of waste prevention and re-cycling (*Vermeidung und Verwertung*) [*FAZ.* 16/5/90] and the rejection of nuclear energy were the *sine qua non* of co-operation with the SPD. At the time Jürgen Trittin wanted assurances from Schröder over these issues [*HAZ.* 17/5/90]. Yet, if Schröder did indeed want to 'mess about' (to use Trittin's words) the Greens over these policy issues, the sublimation of the *Niedersächsiches Landesamt für Wasser und Abfall* and, to a lesser extent, the

Niedersächsiches Landesamt für Immissionsschutz into the NLÖ provided the perfect opportunity to bury difficult issues (and indeed personnel) within a large decentralised administrative apparatus.

However, two factors indicated that there was no danger of this happening. First, as the SPD had invested much political capital in securing the Environment portfolio at the expense of their office-seeking payoffs, it was unlikely that they has done so merely in order to bury contentious issues. Second, two years before its official foundation, Monika Griefahn had tasked Horst Wilbrand zur Horst with the task of setting up the NLÖ, of which he would become President. At the time of his appointment, the 52 year-old Herr zur Horst, a Physicist by profession, was *Leiter der Abteilung Kernenergie und Strahlenschutz* within the Environment Ministry, having held the post since the foundation of the Ministry in 1988. He had been at the forefront of the debate over the future of nuclear power in Lower Saxony from 1974 onwards, having served in the *Sozialministeriums* and the *Bundesratsministeriums* [*Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium Pressestelle*, 10/12/90]. Herr zur Horst was obviously a political heavyweight, with technical and administrative clout (the *Abteilung Kernenergie und Strahlenschutz* had over 40 full-time officials). His appointment indicated that the success of the NLÖ was a high priority for both coalition partners.

Despite the political and organisational difficulties discussed above - and the fact that representatives of the Greens' client groups are only modestly represented within it - the NLÖ appears to have been a successful institutional innovation. There is far less criticism of the State Office from the Greens than any other relevant organ of state, and it still enjoys cross-party support. This is partly because of the limited terms of reference enjoyed by the NLÖ. In a speech given at the press party to launch the NLÖ, Monika Griefahn declared that the NLÖ would be the *'technical backbone for the environmental*

policy strategy of the state Government[77] *[Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium Pressestelle*, 01/10/92]. What Griefahn meant when she said that the NLÖ should be a 'technical backbone' was that it would be a source of 'value-free' expertise, rather than a ginger-group. It did not represent a significant 'opening up' of the policy network and enjoyed little or no scope for programmatic innovation.

As the sections looking at the *Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs* and the *Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung* demonstrate, where institutions were set up to explicitly advocate and advise programmatic innovation, they attracted far more criticism.

7.4. Nuclear Policy and the Advisory Council For The Phasing-Out Of Nuclear Power (*Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs*)

The saga of setting up the *Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs* (or BfK), was to become a real problem of coalition management between the SPD and Greens. This was perhaps not a surprise in retrospect, given that whole issue of phasing-out nuclear power was essentially contested and considered a litmus test for political co-operation by the Greens.

The Nuclear power policy issue was additionally complicated because it involves what the Basic Law calls *Auftragsverwaltung* or 'delegated administration'[78]. As such, it cuts across

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[77]*Das Neue Amt ist das fachliche Rückrat für umweltpolitische Strategien der Landesregierung.*

[78]*Delegated and/or Autonomous Administration.* The Basic Law distinguishes between 'delegated administration', known in German as *Auftragsverwaltung, and* 'autonomous administration' or *Verwaltung als eigene Angelegenheit.* In the early period of the Federal Republic, the latter was more common than the former, as it was protected under the Basic Law. Delegated administration takes place where the Federal

Länder and *Bund* competencies. This had obvious consequences in terms of party politics. Given that the Federal Government was comprised of the CDU/CSU and the FDP, they were predisposed to oppose policy initiatives put forward by any the Red-Green coalition, even in the context of the Federal Republic's relatively consensual political culture. In addition, the division of competencies also meant the vertical sectorisation of policy-making, with all the difficulties that entailed (see Chapter Two).

The idea to set up an Advisory Council was not in the coalition agreement of 1990, but its origins lie in the ambitious programme set out in that document. Although (or perhaps because) the Greens did not get the Environment ministry portfolio, they made it very clear that the issue of nuclear power was high on their agenda. This was reflected in the coalition agreement.

According to the coalition agreement, the ultimate aim of the coalition was stated as being nothing less than the ultimate abandonment of nuclear technology as a means of providing energy by the state of Lower Saxony and, by implication, the Federal Republic as a whole. In setting out the goals of the coalition's nuclear policy, the agreement states:

> *The coalition parties share the same opinion that the use of atomic energy*
> *for the provision of energy has recently, after the reactor accident at*
> *Chernobyl with its catastrophic consequences, been shown to be an*
> *irresponsible risk. Moreover, to this day the question of how to process*
> *and store the resulting atomic waste has been unresolved. The disposal that*

Government has sole powers of execution, but, because of its reliance upon the *Länder*, cannot undertake those tasks itself. The *Länder* are then delegated to act as the agent of the Federation. These fields are atomic energy (under Article 87c of the Basic Law), inland waterways (under Article 89(2)), civil defence (Article 87b(2)) and the collection of certain federal taxes (Article 108(4)). Also, the *Länder* have been directly prescribed the delegated administration of federal autobahns under Article 104a(3). In addition, as a rule of thumb, wherever something is administered by the *Länder*, but the Federation provides more than 50% of a given subsidy, the *Länder* are deemed to be acting as agents of the Federation. In all other cases bar the ones just described, the autonomous *Land* administration of Federal law is assumed to prevail, except when Federal law prescribes otherwise.

has been pursued up until now has been shown to be of no use. The coalition partners will use their political mandate to pursue every possibility, within the relevant legal framework, in order to achieve an exit from the atomic sector.

[SPD-Landesverband Niedersachsen, 1990: 16].

There was nothing ambiguous in the wording of the agreement, which went on to list a number of facilities and activities that the coalition would like to see closed-down. At the very least, the coalition intended to use its powers to have such nuclear power-related plants and practices reviewed with a view to closure on health and safety grounds, where the *Länder* had competence under the terms of the *Aufsichtspflicht* (literally, the duty to monitor).

The agreement singled-out ten specific cases which would be subject to Lower Saxony's competence of *Aufsichtspflicht*. These included:

- A review of health and safety permits at the Stade nuclear power station and the introduction of stringent new safety regulations for Stade and other such facilities in Lower Saxony.

- Cancelling the permit review process for the planned long-term disposal facility for nuclear waste at Gorleben (*Endlager Gorleben*) which the coalition regarded as being seriously flawed[79].

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[79]The International Atomic Energy Agency uses five classifications of Nuclear Wasts. High-level nuclear wastes (Class I and II) result form the nuclear fuel process. Fuel production, known as fuel fabrication within the industry, produces significant levels of this kind of watse. The wastes take the form of the hulls or containers for the fuel elements and the storage pond residues. However, the highest levels of waste are produced by the reprocessing of spent fuel. Class I waste is high level and long-lived (in terms of radioactive half-life) and is characterised by high levels of radiotoxicityand high levels of heat output over a long period of time. Class II waste is intermediate level and long-lived. It has a lower radiotoxicity, lower heat output, but still has a long half-life. Like nearly all of the advanced industrial states, the Federal Republic relies upon the deep geological disposal of high level nuclear waste. This involves placing the

- Shelving plans to build a pilot reprocessing plant (*Pilotkonditionierungsanlage* or PKA) for spent fuel rods in Lower Saxony, pending a total review of the state's nuclear waste disposal concept[80]. Even if eventually approved, the PKA was only be situated on the sight of any future *Endlager*. Given that the approval of a future long-term facility was, the coalition hoped, unlikely, so was the PKA.

- A review of conditions at the storage facility already situated at Gorleben. *Transportbehälter-Lager Gorleben* (TBL, for hulls or containers used during transit of nuclear waste). Special attention to be paid to the possible effect of accidents at TBL upon the surrounding area.

- Notwithstanding that the coalition accepted that it had little legal redress to challenge the license for *Faßlager Gorleben* (the storage pond within which active fuel rods are placed), the coalition intended to appoint a team of independent scientists to review the licenses.

- The use of all legal means to prevent the further progress of the licensing of the *Endlager Schacht Konrad* and the *Asse II* facility. In particular, the coalition opposed the storage of *Glaskokillen*, the highly radiotoxic and heat-emitting glassy residue left over from the reprocessing of spent fuel rods.

- Use of the state's agencies empowered with the tasks of granting licenses and monitoring health and safety at work (the *Genehmigungs- und Aufsichtsbehörde*), in order to review the safety of the transport of atomic material and make its findings available to the public.

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waste at depths of 2,000 to 3,000 feet below ground. The medium within which it is deposited is either salt, granite, shale, or basalt. In the Federal Republic, the normal practice is to use salt as the receiving medium [Wells, 1996: 106-115].

[80]Reprocessing uses a variety of chemical and mechanical processes in order to recover fissionable, uranium, plutonium, thorium and other valuable material form nuclear waste. Once reprocessing has taken place, one is left with a highly readiocative and heat-emitting liquid residue. The residue undergoes a process of vitrification, in which it is exposed to great heat in order to solidify it. This leaves a glassy type of material that must be disposed of [Wells, 1996: 113].

- Within the legal framework of *Auftragsverwaltung*, to enter into a dialogue with the Federal Government at the level of state secretary, in order to recodify the whole nuclear waste disposal concept. In particular, the Federal Republic should be encouraged to cancel all contracts for the re-processing of nuclear waste abroad.

- The review and re-organisation of Lower Saxony's *Katastrophenschutz* (civil defence measures) for areas adjacent to the transport and storage of waste. All information would be put in the public domain in order to stress what the coalition regarded as a high level of collective risk relating to such activities.

- An official statement, recording the state of Lower Saxony's unease about the safety of nearby nuclear facilities in the GDR (for instance the 'Bruno Leuschner' power station and the *Endlager Morsleben*) and demanding that all licenses granted to these facilities be annulled and re-submitted as part of the *Staatsvertrag* (to be signed that summer by the GDR and the Federal Republic as a prelude to unification).

The scope of these proposals indicate that, when Gerhard Schröder declared in his inaugural address to the *Landtag* that '*this coalition is on the way to correcting the wrong decisions of atomic policy*', these were not empty words.. However, such a wish-list of commitments presented a multitude of problems which demanded solutions of a political, policy-oriented or legal nature. Moreover, whatever they were, such decisions were not only of environmental importance, but would also involve a great deal of other people's money (be it the tax-payer's or that of private enterprise). At the same time, the political temperature within the coalition regarding the whole nuclear issue was rising and, over the next few years, the words *Gorleben, Schacht Konrad* and *Unterweser* ceased to be the preserve of a small self-referential policy community and entered the mainstream political discourse.

Obviously, the Green parliamentary *Fraktion* was coming under a huge amount of pressure from the party's *Basis* and from the wider environmental movement to get results, but this pressure was not just confined to the Greens. As Environment Minister. Monika Griefhan was also finding it increasingly hard to reconcile the rhetoric of anti-nuclear campaigning with the realities of running an Environment Ministry in a relatively poor *Land*, with limited room for manoeuvre financially (because of the depressed economy and parlous state finances) or constitutionally (because the whole policy area was essentially delegated down to the Lower Saxony as *Auftragsverwaltung* under the Basic Law).

As the coalition moved into mid-term, the much anticipated break-through on phasing out nuclear energy had still not materialised and the relevant government agencies and sub-committees were increasingly bogged down in the minutiae of re-assessing academic evidence, examining individual sites for deep Geological disposal and the relative merits of various proposals for transporting waste to the sites in question. This was all part and parcel of the process of policy making, but reeked of unnecessary prevarication in the opinion of many in the wider environmental movement. For some time, elements within the movement, including Greenpeace, had begun to increase the pressure with a series of high-profile actions at sites that were undergoing review[81]. These actions were occurring with increasing regularity, in a climate of growing public criticism of the nuclear industry.

Given that the public mood that was increasingly hostile to the nuclear industry. Griefahn was under huge political pressure to take advantage of its poor PR profile and make some sort of gesture, regardless of her limited powers. The question was. where she would

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[81]Whilst they had been invaluable to the SPD in denying the Greens the Environment portfolio (see Chapter Three), Griefhan's credentials as a leading member of Greenpeace were less of an advantage now. The connection between Griefahn and Greenpeace did not go unnoticed. either by the Greens (who regarded her as selling out the movement) or the opposition (who sought to portray her as anti-enterprise and in thrall of the eco-Left).

choose to make such a stand. She chose the question of issuing licenses for the interim storage of high-level wastes at Gorleben. To add to the political potency of her decision, it coincided with the arrival of a shipment of waste from Mol in Belgium. As a result, not only did her decision have the potential to antagonise the Federal Government, it also involved a *de facto* intrusion upon the *Bund's* foreign and security policy.

Griefahn made her move on June 14 1991, announcing that she was going to remove the storage permit for Gorleben, thus effectively cancelling the Mol shipment, on the grounds that the shipment's origin was unclear [*HAZ.* 14/06/91]. The containers that were already underway were temporarily stored at police premises in the town of Lüchow. These events coincided with three other major press stories related to nuclear politics in the state. First, the 'Robin Wood' group occupied the winding tower of the Schacht Konrad site in a blizzard of publicity [*HAZ.* 14/06/91]. Second, there was a renewed scare about childhood leukaemia in the Elbe marsh region of Lower Saxony [*HAZ.* 17/06/91] and, finally, the *Öko-institut* leaked documents that appeared to show that the Stade reactor was ageing and unsafe [*HAZ. NWZ. Neue Presse.* 19/06/91]. Although there is no evidence to assume that the emergence of these stories were co-ordinated, Griefhan could not have hoped for a better PR climate in which to make her announcement.

The decision to halt the shipments from Mol brought an instant response from the Federal Government. Within days, Klaus Töpfer (CDU), the Federal Environment Minister, had issued an order reversing Griefahn's decision on the grounds that the issue of origin was of no legal significance. Töpfer gave her a deadline of 1500 hours on the 17 June to inform him that the Lower Saxony *Gewerbeaufsichtsamt* had lifted its ban on the transport and that the containers were on their way from Lüchow to Gorleben [*Neue Presse.* 17/06/91]. Griefahn had no choice but to comply, albeit accompanied by a flurry of press briefings.

Griefahn was pilloried by the press. In an editorial in the tabloid *Neue Presse*, her actions were likened to that of Don Quixote tilting at windmills; an analogy that, given the constitutional balance of power between *Land* and *Bund* laid out in the Basic Law, has its merits. Other hands were also suspected to have played a role in the Mol debacle. As the editorial put it:

> *Is Lower Saxony's head of government deliberately allowing his 'Environment woman' to be provocative so that he can profile himself more powerfully as a politician with a sense of reality and responsibility? Gerhard Schröder seeks to achieve the exit from the policy of nuclear power - well aware that the law of the state does not give much [room for manoeuvre] - through a consensus with the power generators.*
>
> [*Neue Presse*. 17/06/91].

The coalition had set out to achieve an exit from the use of nuclear power, the reprocessing and the storage of high-level wastes. Yet, as the editorial correctly pointed out , the principle of delegated legislation did leave the state government with little room for manoeuvre. The powers of monitoring health and safety could only be used *in extremis* in order to actually cancel a shipment and could in practice be over-ridden by the *Bund*. Multi-level governance represents Katzenstein's [1987] 'second node' of the Nuclear energy policy network and, within this node, the *Land* was seriously constrained by a conservative Federal government that was successfully making common purpose with producer interests amongst the NGOs. At the same time, the *Land* coalition was under increasing pressure from the anti-nuclear NGOs to make solid progress but, because of the Federal government's superior share of (legal and political) resources, was failing to do so. The Lower Saxony government was in a political trap.

In the absence of *Deus ex machina,* the coalition decided to get out of the trap by tried-and-trusted social democratic means. They appointed a committee of the experts! The decision to set up the BfK was taken in cabinet on 24 September 1991, with a planned start date of 16 December 1991. On the 25 October 1991 the setting up of the BfK was made public. The BfK was announced as the body tasked with sign-posting the coalition's way to the *Aussteig,* by mediating conflicting interests and opinions within the policy community and taking the heat out of the issue.

Given its remit, the BfK had the potential to be the decisive player within the policy network. As result, the council's composition and terms of reference were of crucial importance to all concerned. It was to have 13 members, drawn from the energy industry, the natural sciences and Law, many in a private capacity. Like the Berlin *Energiebeirat.* this prevalence of agents working in a private capacity supports Richardson and Jordan's [1979] contention that informal interpersonal relations within networks are as important as structurally-contingent relationships (as opposed to Schneider's [1988] corporatist ideal-type). The BfK was to work mainly (but not exclusively) to the Environment Ministry and have an estimated budget of around DM 450,000 per annum.

The terms of reference of the BfK were as follows. First, the provision of advice to the Environment Ministry regarding technical questions of safety and security of nuclear facilities and the creation of a *Brennstoffkreislaufes* (literally, 'fuel circulation'), an integrated system for the handling of nuclear fuel from first fission through reprocessing to final disposal. Second, to advise on how to protect from the dangerous effects of ionised radiation. Third, the development and implementation of policies relating to the operation of the energy-sector and its political consequences for the aim of an *Ausstieg* from nuclear power. Finally to advise on the coalition's legal position where its policies were subject to existing laws relating to atomic waste, radiation-protection, energy and mining. However.

the BfK's terms of reference did not include any licensing or monitoring function. These tasks were left with the NLÖ. The full membership of the BfK is laid out **Table 7.4.** below. The BfK was to be organised into six committees, covering reactor safety, long-term storage and disposal of high-level wastes, radiation protection and the legal implications for energy sector policy, some of which was were further sub-divided into an umbrella sub-committee and a number of 'project-oriented' sub-committees.

The first committee is a good example of this sub-division. The committee was divided into sub-committees 1(a) *Ausschuß 'Reaktorsicherheit'*, and 1(b) *Projektorientierte Ausschüsse 'Handlungsbedarf auf dem Gebiet der Reaktorsicherheit' und 'Sicherheits forderungen bei Kernkraftwerken'*. Sub-committee 1(a) had a dual function. On the one hand, as its name suggests, it had a general responsibility for reactor safety in the state and was tasked with setting guidelines to best practice. On the other, it was tasked with safety problems relating to specific named facilities, in particular the Stade (KKS) and Unterweser (KKU) nuclear power stations. It would look at the first principles of safety monitoring and regularly re-assess the results of existing safety protocols (for instance, regarding technical standards and fire safety) and re-draft the monitoring protocols as they related to KKU. Sub-committee 1 (b) was divided into project-oriented groups. One was tasked with looking at the terms of reference enjoyed by the BfK in the realm of reactor safety (*Handlungsbedarf auf dem Gebiet der Reaktorsicherheit*), whilst the other was to look at suggested improvements within the field (*Sicherheits forderungen bei Kernkraftwerken*).

Sub-committee 2 *Ausschuß Endlagerung*, was tasked to look at the long-term storage of high-level wastes. This meant direct involvement with the Gorleben and Asse II storage facilities. The sub-committee would set-up a public enquiry into the whole concept of long term storage (in German an *Endlagerhearing*), in which many of the members of the

Table 7.4. The Lower Saxony Advisory Council For The Phasing-Out Of Nuclear Power (*Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs*)

Agent	*Agency*
Permanent Members (*Beiratmitgleider*)	
1. Herrn Dr. Helmut Hirsch.	Hannover Ecology Group (*Gruppe Ökologie Hannover*).
2. Herrn Prof. Dr. Klaus Traube.	In a private capacity.
3. Herrn. Dr. Reiner Geulen.	In a private capacity.
4. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Alexander Roßnagel.	Darmstadt Polytechnic (*Fachhochschule Darmstadt*).
5. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Ströbele.	Oldenburg University.
6. Frau Prof. Dr. Inge Schmitz-Feuerhake.	Bremen University.
7. Herrn Lothar Hahn.	Ecological Institute (*Öko-Institut*) in Darmstadt.
8. Herrn Dr. Detlef Appel.	In a private capacity.
9. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Horst Kuni.	In a private capacity.
10. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Dieter von Ehrenstein.	Bremen University.
11. Frau Dr. Ilse Tweer.	In a private capacity.
12. Herrn Nikolaus Piontek.	In a private capacity.
13. Herrn Prof. Dr. Peter Hennicke.	Darmstadt Polytechnic.
External Members (*Externe Beiratmitglieder*)	
1. Herrn Dr. Rainer Wolf.	In a private capacity.
2. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Karl-Heinz Lux.	In a private capacity.
3. Herrn. Dr. Bernhard Knipping (deceased).	In a private capacity.
4. Frau Prof. Dr. Gertrude Lübbe-Wolf.	In a private capacity.
5. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Gerhard Jentzch.	In a private capacity.
6. Herrn. Dr. Klaus Groth.	In a private capacity.
7. Herrn. Prof. Dr. Klaus Duphorn.	In a private capacity.
8. Herrn Otfried Schumacher.	In a private capacity.
9. Herrn. Detlef Rieck.	In a private capacity.

Source: Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium, 1992.

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sub-committee intended to give evidence. Hearings were scheduled to begin in September 1993.

The third sub-committee was also sub-divided. Sub-committee 3 (a) *Ausschuß* *'Entsorgungskonzept'* would look at the whole question of the disposal of high-level wastes, be it deep geological disposal or reprocessing. The sub-committee would look at the Gorleben pilot re-processing plant, as well as the arrangements for the safe transport and disposal of high-level wastes at *Endlager Schacht Konrad* and would also examine ways to stop spent fuel rods from the Federal Republic being reprocessed abroad. Sub-committee 3 (b) *'Projektorientierte Ausschuß 'Kritieirien und methodische Vorgaben für Entsorgungskonzepte'* was tasked with formulating the abstract criteria and methodological first principles of an integrated disposal concept for high-level wastes, with a focus upon the question of deep geological disposal at Gorleben.

The fourth committee divided into sub-committee 4 (a) *Ausschub 'Strahlenschutz'* and 4 (b) *Projektorientierter Ausschuß 'Dokumentation der Tschernobyl-Folgen'.* 4 (a) was tasked with the practicalities of radiation protection, including the evaluation of a 10 -year study into levels of childhood cancer (including leukaemia clusters in the Elbe region of Lower Saxony) in the vicinity of nuclear installations, undertaken by academics at Mainz University. It was hoped that an official sliding-scale of potential danger. based upon proximity and emissions, would be established by 1994. 4 (b) was planned as a ginger-group with the specific task of investigating and making public all the available information on the Chernobyl disaster (the sub-committee never reported back. as it was abandoned on budgetary grounds).

The fifth committee was also sub-divided, this time into sub-committee 5 (a) *Ausschub 'Energiewirtschaft und -politik'* and 5 (b) *Projektorientierter Ausschuß 'Wirkung eines*

Atomenergieausstiegs auf energiepolitischen Rahmenbedingungen'. 5 (a) concentrated upon the political possibilities and consequences of a move towards a more sustainable system of energy provision. It was to look at a range of initiatives, very much in the same vein as those promoted by the Berlin *Energiegesetz*, including the de-centralisation of energy generation down to the level of the *Kommunen* and the extension of the use of *Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung* (Combined Heat and Power) and wind energy. 5 (b) was meant to look at how the move away from atomic power would impact upon the wider framework of energy policy. However, it was to become a victim of the failure of the SPD and Greens to agree a long term energy policy during the *Energiekonsens-Verhandlungen* (an ongoing set of negotiations between the parties and other policy actors designed to formulate a policy of sustainable energy provision that would enjoy a wide-spread acceptance across the policy community).

Committee 6 (*'Rechtsfragen'*) was tasked with assessing the legal implications of the BfK's findings. Thus, it was at the sharp end of the council's work. In particular, committee 6 had to make sure that the BfK did not find itself infringing upon the legal rights of the private sector and/or the Federal Government.

Finally, there were two more committees, 8. for planning and 9., which was tasked with setting the agenda for the *Energiekonsens-Verhandlungen*. Unlike the other committees, sub-committee 9. worked to the *Staatskanzlei* rather than the Environment Ministry.

A number of criticisms are immediately apparent when examining the BfK's terms of reference and organisation. First, looking at the tasks of these sub-committees in the round, it is clear that the BfK's terms of reference were extremely wide-ranging. Whilst the project-oriented sub-committees are relatively focused, the more generalist sub-committees are not. Moreover, some sub-committees appear very close in their terms of reference

(those sub-committees covering the practicalities of enforcing reactor safety and radiation protection could easily duplicate work between themselves as well as with the legal sub-committee).

Second, not only did the BfK intend to provide the widest possible coverage of all the relevant themes within the policy area, but it touched upon the interests of competencies of the Federal Government. It was inevitable, given the policy area, that these were not just domestic interests, but also involved overseas links (through the reprocessing of spent fuel rods abroad), some of which were of a security-oriented nature.

Third, not only were the BfK's terms of reference wide-ranging and its bureaucracy unwieldy, but it was quite expensive. Although, in absolute terms, an estimated operating budget of DM 450,000 per annum (almost definitely an understatement) is small, it was hard to defend politically. The danger of accusations of 'jobs for the boys' are obvious.

Indeed, this was precisely the response of the CDU when the foundation of the BfK as announced, portraying it as a 'maintenance-club for the Red-Green circle' and 'making a mockery of the tax-payer in Lower Saxony' [HAZ. 26/09/91]. Yet the list of names that were announced by the speaker from the Staatskanzlei was not the same as the eventual list of members of the BfK. Even after making allowances for unforeseen circumstances, it was clear that the membership of the BfK was the subject of much behind the scenes horse trading, some of which was quite bitter[82].

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[82]The author vividly remembers conducting an interview with a particular (SPD) Abteilungsleiter in the Environment Ministry who, when asked about the process of staffing the BfK, was evidently still bitter about the Greens actions over the issue. He criticised the Greens for forcing some personnel onto the Beirat who were, in his opinion, not up to the job. Although there is no way of assessing this claim, the author was left with an impression of wide-spread bad-feeling surrounding the formation of the BfK.

Despite the setting-up of the BfK, the coalition continued to find itself under pressure from the anti-nuclear lobby, yet unable to force through fundamental changes in the face of opposition from the Federal government and the energy industry itself. In February 1992. a conference of Lower Saxony anti-nuclear activists declared that, despite the coalition's professed desire to correct the wrong decisions of nuclear policy, *'no concrete steps in this direction have been undertaken at all'* in the two years since the election [*Frankfurter Rundschau*. 11/02/92]. Although the Environment Ministry immediately issued a statement denying that this was the case, it was a charge which carried some weight. As the *Frankfurter Rundschau* pointed out, since the Red-Green coalition had come to power. building work at the planned *Endlager Gorleben* had made quick progress. despite attempts by the *Land* to slow the process down through stringent monitoring of health and safety standards and the reviewing of existing licenses. Similarly, despite stating that they intended to cancel the project, the licensing process for the Asse II facility (where it was intended to store *Glaskokillen* - the glassy residue arising form the recycling of waste - from the United States nuclear weapons programme) was still underway. Moreover, the Federal government had made it clear that they wanted to see a license for the Schacht Konrad facility granted (and expected it to be so). With the *Bund* making threatening noises, the review procedures of individual plants still underway and the BfK not yet up to speed, the coalition's anti-nuclear policy appeared becalmed.

However, the nuclear issue was about to widen out into a more existential argument, about energy consumption *per se,* that was to again open-up a fundamental fault-line between the SPD and Greens. Ironically, it was to be provoked by non-nuclear policy options.

By early 1992, Gerhard Schröder believed he had found a way to get the *Land* out of the impasse in which it found itself on the nuclear issue. The gist of Schröder's initiative was to build conventional power stations, powered by gas and/or coal. in place of nuclear

power stations at Wilhelmshaven and Stade. Once they heard about this, the Greens' *Landesvorstand* reacted vehemently, claiming that the proposals were not justified by any assessment of the region's energy needs [*Neue Presse.* 07/02/92]. Nevertheless, Schröder went ahead and signed a deal with the firm *PreussenElektra* to build a gas-fired power station at Stade. The power station would generate 700 megawatts of power using North Sea gas and was planned to come on-line in 1994, at the same time as it was planned to take the 20-year old reactor at Stade off-line [*Nord-West Zeitung.* 08/02/92].

The Stade decision temporarily drove a wedge between the Greens' *Landesvorstand* and the parliamentary *Fraktion*. The former condemned the decision, on the basis that the construction of new *Großkraftwerken* (large-scale power stations) ran counter to the thinking behind the coalition's own energy policy (which, like in West Berlin, was committed to the construction of small de-centralised power stations as close as possible to the end-user). The latter were more circumspect, aware that the coalition regarded the closure of the Stade reactor by the time of the next *Landtagswahl* in 1994 as the litmus test of the commitment to the *Ausstieg* from nuclear energy. As a result, the parliamentary *Fraktion*'s spokesperson was forced to posit the Jesuitical argument that the decision to build a new *Großkraftwerke* was actually the exception that proved the rule of the coalitions energy policy.

Such evasion reflected the fact that the Greens' *Fraktion* were in a difficult position. On the one hand, they resented the decision to build a new power station, which was against the spirit, if not the letter, of the coalition agreement. However, they were also committed to the de-commissioning of the nuclear reactor at Stade by the next *Landtagswahl*, for the reasons already discussed. The option of building conventional power stations provided a

pragmatic way out of the impasse or, as Schröder called it, an *'Einstieg in den Ausstieg'*[83] from a reliance upon nuclear power in Lower Saxony and, it was hoped, the Federal Republic [*Nordwest-Zeitung.* 05/12/92]. As the Berlin *Tageszeitung* put it, *'the exit from the use of atomic energy in the Federal Republic begins with an unideological compromise'* [*TAZ.* 05/12/92]. With the initiative being given a cautious welcome by the Bonn government, Schröder had apparently got the coalition off the hook.

However, as 1992 moved into 1993 and the *Landtagswahl* began to assume more importance, opinion hardened within the Greens' *Fraktion. Fraktionsvorsitzende* Thea Dückert declared that, although the Stade compromise was *'a sensible interim solution'*, the Greens were not prepared to accept it as the basis of a long-term energy policy [*Nordwest-Zeitung.* 11/2/93. *HAZ.* 11/02/93]. Schröder's initiative was in trouble.

As the year progressed, relations deteriorated. By October 1993, when Schröder officially approved the much-maligned *Europipe* project (see Chapter Five), the Greens had left the energy consensus talks and were effectively out of the coalition. Somewhat belatedly, they had realised the degree to which Schröder had outmanoeuvred them over the Stade compromise which, as it involved the building of a gas-fired power station, was inextricably linked to the Europipe proposal. As Schröder repositioned himself as a politician whose main concern was jobs, he was happy to be seen getting much closer to big capitalist concerns such as *PreussenElektra* (who were to build Stade) and *Statoil* (the Norwegian Shipping Engineering Company who planned to invest DM. 3.3. billion into the Europipe project). The Greens had become marginalised.

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[83]Translated roughly, *'buying in to the selling out'*.

As for the BfK itself, its record is a mixed one. To date, the *Beirat* is still operative, although its terms of reference have become more modest since it was re-organised at the beginning of 1995 on the ground of cost and efficiency. The number of sub-committees was reduced to five and they are now all project-oriented (eschewing the more normative and all-encompassing briefs that many of the original six sub-committees originally enjoyed).

With the Greens in opposition following the 1994 *Landtag* elections, the re-organisation ensured that nearly all traces of the Greens polemical approach to environmental policy had gone. What remained was a more familiar and technocratic institution, which was to tackle the salient issues of nuclear policy and the wider question of sustainable energy provision as a set of problems to be solved within the framework of the duality of the *Beamtestaat* and the *Partienstaat*.

This is not to say that it has been an institutional failure. The BfK was set up by an SPD-dominated coalition to mediate the ideological and legal/constitutional problems encountered by a *Land* that had over-reached itself politically on the nuclear issue. Moreover, it worked to the Environment Ministry (whose Minister was soon to become an SPD member) and the *Staatskanzlei* (which was essentially Schröder's fiefdom).

Given all of these contributing factors, especially when placed in the context of Schröder's sometimes ruthless style of coalition management, it is not surprising that the Greens quickly found themselves out in the cold.

7.5. Solid Waste Disposal and the Second Government Commission On Avoidance And Use Of Waste (*Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung*)

Given that its was set up in order to find ways of reducing the consumption and waste of resources, it is ironic that the amount of printed material generated by the operation of the *Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung* (from now on to be referred to as the Second Government Commission) is vast! However. this is no surprise. given the relative importance of solid waste disposal[84] as a policy issue within the state of Lower Saxony by the beginning of the 1990s. New and innovative ways of solving the state's waste problem were needed. As Schneider puts it :

> *Lower Saxony is a so-called 'Landfill-state', in which domestic waste is never or hardly ever processed before being stored at the landfill. In 1990. 98.3% of all domestic waste was dumped and only 1.1% went for incineration [Source: Federal Statistics Office. 1994: 70]. The situation was characterised by a threatening state of crisis in the waste disposal system in certain communes because of the impending over-filling of the dumps there. The solution at that time was to extend the landfill or, in exceptional cases. its incineration or transfer to another dump.*

[1996: 73].

Municipal solid waste has traditionally been disposed of by means of disposal. of which there are three methods: landfill, incineration and ocean disposal. Schneider's account begs

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[84]Wells defines three kinds of solid waste. First, municipal waste, including household waste. waste similar to household waste generated from small firms and waste from lawns and gardens. Second. industrial waste, including hazradous waste. Third, SQHW, or small quantity hazardous waste [1996: 128].

the idea that the root cause of Lower Saxony's waste disposal crisis was an imbalance between the landfill option and the incineration[85] or ocean disposal options. But the latter option was out of the question given the Greens' concern about the delicate balance of the North Sea and the adjacent *Wattenmeer* (see Chapter Five). Moreover, given the Greens opposition to incineration, the coalition agreement had made it clear that an extension of its use was also out of the question, stating:

> *The coalition partners will immediately exploit all legal means in order to put a stop to the incineration of household waste. To this end it will be ensured that all current plans and exploratory research into household incineration facilities will be broken off.*
>
> [SPD Landesverband, 1990: 24].

Rather than pursue the incineration option, the coalition proposed the following:

* The expansion of the state's existing landfills and the development of new sites along the lines of the highest possible *Stand der Technik*. These controlled landfills to be subject to strict engineering requirements, relating to climate, topography, surface and groundwater systems (particularly important in Lower Saxony), solid composition and more general land use plans for each locality. More stress to be placed upon leachate

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[85]To say that the state of Lower Saxony made only limited use of incineration is to speak relatively. In reality, even the 1.1% of waste added up to an alarming set of figures. For instance, in Hameln 90,000 tonnes of domestic waste were burnt in 1990, compared with 270,000 tonnes in Bremen, 250,000 tonnes in Emsland, 300,000 tonnes in Oldenburg, 392,000 tonnes in Stade, 500,000 tonnes in Salzgitter and 750,000 tonnes in Hannover. In addition, 10,000 tonnes of toxic waste was burnt in Osnabruck, 35,000 tonnes in Salzgitter, 30,0000 tonnes in Stade and 16,000 tonnes in Stadthagen. Moreover, at the time of the Red-Green coalition coming to power, there were plans to build additional incinerators at Dörpen (80,000 tonnes), Georgsmarienhütte (40,000 tonnes) and Munster (no figures available). [*Grüne Illustrierte*. 1-2, 1990].
The first official tests into incineration in Europe took place in England in 1874. For many years, incineration was regarded as the way forward. However, incineration is now widely regarded as having unacceptable environmental impacts, because of the emissions into the air of criteria pollutants (such as sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons) and the problem of disposal of the resulting ash [Wells, 1996: 136-137).

systems (preventing contamination of groundwater), gas emissions, odours and noise. If Federal funding could not be found for this, the coalition intended to introduce a special toll on waste at the *Land* level.

- The transport of solid wastes out of Lower Saxony to be prevented wherever possible.

- The implementation of measures designed to reduce the production of solid waste by means of greater transparency of costs and an extension of the 'polluter pays ' principle. Measures to be introduced to include a system of charges and strengthened storage rules, the outlawing of dumping any re-cyclable waste, a legally-enforceable waste-return system placing responsibility for the disposal or re-use of dangerous or non-sustainable materials on the producer and the introduction of an *Umweltverträglichkeitsprufung* (environmental impact assessment) system for industrial wastes.

- The re-codification of Lower Saxony's laws on waste disposal. Amongst other things, the re-codification to ensure that the state, private firms and citizens were duty-bound to separate waste, as well as to give priority to re-cycled materials in all procurement decisions, to introduce a toll on every ton of disposable waste (hypothecated for the sanitation of existing landfill sites) and provide advice and information to producers and consumers.

- The introduction of a bill into the *Bundesrat* in order to amend the Federal legislation, in particular the *Gesetz über die Vermeidung und Entsorgung von Abfällen (Abfallgesetz -AbfG)* of 1986, which dealt specifically with the disposal of solid wastes, with the intention of enhancing the priority given to the material (rather than thermal) re-use of waste, the promotion of re-usable packaging (such as *Mehrweg* or deposit bottles), the standardisation of waste classification and the reduction of incineration.

[SPD Landesverband, 1990: 22-26].

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Like the coalition's nuclear policy, this programme was very ambitious. Moreover. in a similar way to the *Kernenergieaustieg* programme, it required the surmounting of a number of obstacles of a legal and party political nature. First, in legal terms, the *Land* was not a sovereign actor within the field, but shared technical competencies with the *Kommunen* and, more importantly, legislative power with the *Bund*. Moreover, competencies are both horizontally and vertically sectorised. This is because Article 79 of the Basic Law states that the policy area is subject to concurrent legislation (*konkurriende Gesetzgebung*)[86] between the *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat* (hence the initiative to amend the Federal law), as well as with the *Länder*. Given that, as already mentioned, the *Land* relies upon the *Kommunen* to carry out waste disposal, this legal division presents a number of institutional blocks on the policy process. Second, although such multi-level governance is meant to be carried out in a spirit of co-operative federalism, it inevitably has party-political overtones. Thus, the Red-Green coalition in Hannover could rely upon a sympathetic SPD majority in the *Bundesrat*, but not in the *Bundestag*. Moreover. it had to expect a number of (CDU- and/or FDP-controlled) *Kommunen* making common cause with their political allies in the Federal government against the *Landesregierung*.

In a similar vein to the BfK, the Second Government Commission was designed to mediate between these conflicting institutional and partisan interests within the policy community. However, unlike the BfK, it was not an *ad hoc* arrangement put together in mid-term.

On the contrary, the *Regierungskommission 'Vermeidung Sonderabfalle'* (the First Government Commission on the subject) had been set up in the Albrecht era. The First Commission had 11 *Arbeitskreise* (working groups), looking at the disposal of sand form

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[86]The Basic Law makes four distinctions between different forms of legislation. First. Exclusive Legislation, on which the *Bundestag* alone can legislate. Second, Concurrent Legislation, on which both the *Bundestag* and the *Länder* can legislate. Third, those areas where the *Bundestag* can issue Framework Legislation. Finally, the sphere of Reserved Legislation, which is the competence of the *Länder*.

spillages, shredded materials, the re-cycling of building material, waste metals, varnishes and paints, halogen etc. However, these were essentially end-of-pipe solutions, rather than ways of amending production processes and patterns of consumption. The coalition agreement stated the new administration's intention to re-scrutinise the findings of the First Commission and extend its brief.

The Second Commission, as it would be called, would also have 5 new *Arbeitskreise*, looking at themes such as the disposal of polyurethane, old electronic equipment, oil polluted metal waste and the re-cycling of aluminium and automobiles. These new working groups marked a shift away from production-oriented waste towards what has been called 'post-consumer' waste.

The Second Commission was officially set up at the beginning of 1991, consisting of 17 members appointed from business and industrialist groups, trades unions, ecology groups, the sciences and the civil service. It was Chaired by Herrn Maximilian Ardelt, a board-member of *Preussag AG*, with Herr Dr. Volker Müller, from the Lower Saxony Institute of Commerce as CEO. Both posts were deputised by senior civil servants from the Farming[87] and Environment Ministries. Of the other 17 permanent members of the commission, six came from industry and commerce, two from the trades unions, two from the sciences, two from the wider ecological movement, and five from the civil service. Of these civil servants, two came from the (effectively SPD-controlled) Environment Ministry, one from the SPD-run Economics Ministry, one from the Schröder-dominated *Staatskanzlei* and, finally, one from the *Umweltbundesamt* (not a cabinet portfolio, but working to the CDU-controlled Environment Ministry at the Federal level). The full list of permanent members is laid out in **Table 7.5.** below.

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[87]Interestingly, Herrn Konrad Keller, the civil servant in question, was from the new *Land* of Saxony Anhalt.

Table 7.5. The Second Government Commission On Avoidance And Use Of Waste (*Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung*), Lower Saxony 1991

Agent	*Agency*
Chair	
Dipl. -Ing. Maximilian Ardelt.	*Preussag AG.*
Deputy-Chair	
Konrad Keller.	*Ministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt.*
CEO.	
Dr. Volker Müller.	*Institut des Niedersächsisches Wirtschaft e. V.*
Deputy-CEO.	
Arno Fricke.	*Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium.*
Permanent Members from	
Industry	
1. Dr. Kurt Eiglmeier.	*Riedel de Haen AG.*
2. Jutta Schwarzer.	*Handwerkskammer Hildesheim.*
3. Walter Blum.	*Preussag AG.*
4. Dr. Werner Loges.	*IHK Lüneburg-Wolfsburg.*
5. Dr. Schulz-Rickmann.	*Nds. Gesellschaft zur Endablagerung.*
6. Herrn Jens Petersen..	*IHK Lüneburg-Wolfsburg*
Permanent Members from	
Trades Unions.	
7. Prof. Dr. Thomas Höpner.	*Institut für Chemie und Biologie des Meeres der Uni Oldenburg.*
8. Bernd Heins.	*IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik.*
Permanent Members from the	
Sciences.	
9. Prof. Dr. Dr. Müfit Bahadir.	*Institut für Ökologische Chemie.*
10. Prof. Dr. Georg Redeker.	*Institut für Qualitätssicherung der Universität Hannover.*
Permanent Members from	
Ecological Groups.	
11. Christoph Ewen.	*Öko -Institut e. V.*
12. Dr Uwe Lahl.	In a private capacity.
Administration.	
13. Dr. Christel Möller.	*Niedersächsisches Staatskanzlei.*
14. Dr. Otto Stumpf.	*Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium.*
15. Dr. Hans Sutter.	*Umweltbundesamt*
16. Dr. A. Tacke.	*Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Verkehr.*
First Secretary.	
17. Heiner Cordes.	*Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium.*

Source: Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium. 1991

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In addition to the permanent members, each *Arbeitskreise* was staffed by a number of specialists in roughly the same proportion as the permanent members. So, for instance, *Arbeitskreise* 12 (*Polyurethanschäume*) had four members seconded from industry, two from the trades unions, four from the sciences, two from the ecology groups, one from the *Kommunen* and was chaired by a senior civil servant from the Environment Ministry. Similarly, *Arbeitskreise* 15 (*Aluminiumreycling*) had four members seconded from industry, one from the trades unions, three from the sciences, three from the ecological groups, one from the *Kommunen* and was again chaired by a senior Environment Ministry official.

The significance of this mix is discussed in greater depth in section on payoffs, but what it obvious is that (unlike in, for example, the Berlin *Energiebeirat*) the Greens only managed to secure a limited amount of access to the Second Commission by their own client groups [*Niedersächsiches Umweltministerium AbschlußRegKom-502*, 1995]. On this evidence, it appears that the topic area of solid waste disposal, particularly industrial waste, presents high opportunity costs to entry (based on expertise and access to the means of production) and is a relatively closed network. This is supported by two other observations. First, even one of the trades union representatives came from a university faculty (Oldenburg), which supports the idea of limited entry to the network based on expertise. Second, there is only one individual on the Commission acting in a private capacity, which supports the idea of limited entry based upon access to the means of production. In terms of the policy network literature, this comes much closer to Schneider's [1988] corporatist ideal-type, than the more informal interpersonal model put forward by Richardson and Jordan [1979].

On the other hand, unlike the energy sector (particularly nuclear power), although the policy network was closed, in general terms the whole issue of recycling and the

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sustainable disposal of solid waste was relatively uncontested. Policy actors might disagree on the minutiae of disposing of metal wastes or the limits to recycling aluminium. but no-one was opposed to the principle of it *per se*. Indeed, the Federal Republic is internationally noted for the degree of consensus around this issue (see Chapter Three). Thus, although the Second Commission was characterised by the limited participation of ecological groups compared with other structures examined in this chapter. in political terms this was only a limited set-back for the Greens.

This explains the good reception given to the planned Second Commission in the Green press, who did not appear overly concerned by the Second Commission's closed network. For instance., an article in the *Grüne Illustrierte* professed faith in the commission and its ability to use the existing structures pragmatically, declaring that '*the state of Lower Saxony can use and develop the existing instruments of economic management in order to support an ecological orientation, which also incorporates the main features of waste prevention*' [1-2, 1990]. Despite the optimism, in the short- to medium-term, Lower Saxony's solid waste disposal crisis, or '*Mullkolllaps*' as it was labelled by the press, continued. By the beginning of 1991, the problem was so acute that Schröder and Griefahn called a special conference in Hannover, inviting all the leaders of the *Landkreise* and *kreisefreien Städte* in Lower Saxony. Given that many of these were CDU or FDP politicians, this was a significant example of 'big tent' politics which aroused the suspicions of many Greens.

In a series of press briefings, Griefahn let it be known that the crisis had reached such proportions that she had informed the cabinet that the coalition might be forced to take emergency measures. In particular, she hinted that the coalition might be forced to temporarily revert to plans drawn up during the Albrecht era. This would mean that 142,000 tonnes of *Sondermüll* would go to landfills, 8500 tonnes be put in short-term

storage and another 180,000 treated chemically. However, it also meant that 90,000 tonnes of waste would have to be incinerated [*Osnabrücker Zeitung.* 08/02/91].

Nevertheless, Griefahn stressed that this was an interim measure and that the coalition remained committed to phasing out incineration. However, this view was challenged by SPD *Fraktionvorsitzende* Johann Bruns who declared in an interview that the *Land* would not be able to avoid building a high temperature incinerator, despite the coalition agreement with the Greens [*Nordsee Zeitung.* 20/03/91].

As was discussed in Chapter Five, Bruns was on the traditional Right of the SPD and was regarded by the Greens as something of a *'Betonkopf'* (literally 'concrete head', someone with an unshakeable faith in the virtues of high-profile prestige building projects). He was also suspicious of the Greens, as demonstrated by his warnings to Schröder over the 'commitment' to a Red-Green coalition at the Federal level. Given these facts, Bruns' behaviour over the next months is a little more explicable, as he appeared to deliberately pick away at the issue (which was obviously of some sensitivity to the coalition, given the way it had been flagged up in the agreement). As already noted, when the Federal government's technical directorate for waste disposal advised the *Land* that it should build a high-temperature incinerator, it was Bruns who was the main advocate of such a strategy within the coalition [*Ostfriesische Nachtrichten.* 10/01/92]. It will also be recalled that Monika Griefahn refused completely to rule out the possibility of installing high-temperature incinerators [*HAZ.* 29/ 5/90]. Nevertheless, it was a provocation to the Greens, as demonstrated by the language used by the Green *Landesvorstand* in their subsequent press releases [*Die Grünen Landesverband Niedersachsen.* Pressemitteilung Nr. 60/1/92]. Eventually, the *Land* decided to go ahead with constructing a high temperature incinerator near the town of Bramsche [*Grüne Zeiten.* 10/92].

Regardless of whether it was deliberate provocation or not, the incinerator decision served to hasten the growing atmosphere of distrust between the two coalition parties in the run-up to the *Landtag* elections. Yet, it was indeed a pragmatic exception to the rule rather than a U-turn in policy. Indeed, one legacy of the Red-Green coalition (and its successor) has been Lower Saxony's pro-active stance in modernising the technical standards and legal framework of solid waste disposal at both the *Land* and Federal level. For instance, the new Lower Saxony Waste Disposal Law (*NAbfAbgG*) came into force on 1 January 1992. In a speech to welcome the new law, Griefahn defended the 'polluter pays' principle, saying that '*economic instruments give economic signals ....to waste producers which encourage them in their own self-interest to develop constructive methods of waste reduction*' [*Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium. Presseinformation.* 11/12/91]. It was calculated that self-interest would lead to the reduction of hazardous waste by 1 million tonnes per annum, so that it would only reach a total of 1.3 million tonnes by 1996/7 [*Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium. Presseinformation.* 109/03/92]. Griefahn also made clear her hope that these principles would be extended to the Federal level.

Federal technical standards and legislation have since been amended, with a much stronger application of the 'polluter pays' principle. The 1993 Technical Instructions on Residential Waste (*TA Siedlungsabfalle*) has introduced amongst other things:

- New requirements on the reduction of harmful substances.
- The promotion of re-use and re-cycling.
- The compulsory preliminary treatment of residential wastes (*Siedlungsabfälle*: domestic waste, bulky waste, household waste-type industrial wastes, building waste and sewage sludge) prior to disposal.
- Incineration facilities, if unavoidable, to be at *Stand der Technik*. with strict requirements on air emissions.

Moreover, the 1994 Federal Act on Waste Management and Product Recycling (*KrW- /AbfG*) codified these technical instructions into law. Building upon the 1986 Waste Management Act (*AbfG*) as Griefahn had wanted, its main features are:

- On the basis of 'comprehensive' responsibility for the product, the transfer of responsibility for the product and wastes arising from its production and consumption from the government to manufacturers, distributors and consumers.

- An obligation upon producers and owners of wastes to:

    -give priority to avoiding wastes (using return systems)

    -to fully recover non-avoidable wastes in a non-damaging way (recycling or energy recovery)

    -to dispose of only non-recoverable wastes in an environmentally-sound manner

    -on Trade and industry themselves to fulfil these directives within the framework f stringent legal requirements.

- The government to remain responsible for waste management if safe waste management cannot be ensured by the producers.

[Federal Environment Ministry. Public Relations Division. 1994. 73-74].

The imprint of the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony is clear on these documents. This is not surprising, given the amount of political capital and financial resources that the coalition had invested in changing the technical and legal framework at *Land* level. The coalition used the experience of Lower Saxony to exert influence on the Federal government through the SPD majority in the *Bundesrat*, backed up by the technical expertise of the Second Commission.

The Second Commission' work continued until September 1996, when it was replaced by the Third Commission (which is to concentrate upon integrated systems of waste

management, as part of the implementation of the 1994 Federal Act on Waste Management and Product Recycling (*KrW- /AbfG*), which came into force in 1996).

As for the question of how successful the Second Commission has been, the record is mixed. Given that the coalition could not avoid building a high temperature incinerator, one could argue that it had failed in political terms. Moreover, as already noted, the relatively closed policy network dealing with solid waste management, especially industrial waste, meant that the Greens' client groups had only limited success in breaking down the established hierarchies. Neither the Commission itself or its individual *Arbeitskreise* had more than a handful of members that were explicitly from the wider ecological movement. Thus, in terms of opening up the policy network, it failed.

Nevertheless, as has already been argued, the Federal Republic is internationally renowned for the high degree of consensus on the basic principles of the solid waste disposal issue. This meant that the under-representation of ecological groups was of less importance in this case. To conclude, the Red-Green coalition's record within this policy field has been a relative success. It is just ironic that the Greens' direct role in this achievement was so limited.

7.6. Résumé of Chapter Seven

The chapter examined in greater depth the degree to which the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony was able to break down the established hierarchies within the policy-making process in the *Land* administration, by examining a selection of programmatic and institutional innovations carried out within the field of environmental policy in Lower Saxony. The three examples are all linked thematically.

7.6.1. Inherent Problems of Policy Implementation in Lower Saxony

The chapter first looked some of the inherent problems associated with policy-implementation in Lower Saxony as they confronted the Red-Green coalition.

It discussed the poor economic health of Lower Saxony and concluded that this had acted as a severe constraint upon the state's finances (and thus, the coalition's room for manoeuvre). As a result, the parties had some difficulty in formulating a common policy platform. This was because a significant expansion of welfare provision (in which both parties had an interest) was not possible. As a result a common alternative platform had be carved out from a number of potentially divisive policy domains.

The subject of staffing was then looked at. It concluded that (compared to Berlin) staffing was much more of an issue in Lower Saxony. Moreover, given that the *Land* policy-network was so closed, concerns about recalcitrant officialdom were shared by the SPD as well as the Greens (including civil servants who were members of the SPD). The chapter gave an account of the early days of the Lower Saxony coalition, marked by the removal or 'kicking upstairs' of many high-profile civil servants. The chapter noted that, for the Greens, the staffing problem was aggravated by the fact that they lacked expertise in depth, did not get the Environment portfolio and had to be content with the post of State Secretary. It noted the fact that within policy areas such as Recycling/Waste Disposal. the policy network was relatively closed, resource- and path-dependent.[88]

The chapter concluded that the coalition's policies represented continuity, rather than change, in terms of their use of economic instruments.

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[88]Thus, the dark arts of the civil service - such as agenda setting and the dissemination of information - were at a premium, which meant that the Greens were outmanoeuvred by the *Staatskanzlei* on issues such as the decision to build a high temperature incinerator.

7.6.2. The Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (*Niedersächsiches Landesamt für Ökologie*)

The chapter looked at the Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (NLÖ) and concluded that the policy of breaking down disciplinary and media-oriented barriers (*Integrationsgedänke*) was only partially successful, given that the actual physical location of its constituent offices remained spread across Lower Saxony. It was noted that such integrated institutional systems are often easier to envisage in theory than put into practice.

The chapter demonstrated that, because of both its size and its terms of reference (Monika Griefahn's declaration that the NLÖ would be the '*technical backbone for the environmental policy strategy of the state Government*' [*Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium Pressestelle*, 01/10/92]) the NLÖ was of little use in pro-actively breaking down the established hierarchies within the policy network. Nevertheless, it speculated whether it was this limited role that had allowed the NLÖ to escape the severe criticism that the *Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs* and the *Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung* attracted.

7.6.3. Nuclear Policy and the Advisory Council For The Phasing-Out Of Nuclear Power (*Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs*)

The chapter then looked at the setting up the ***Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs*** (BfK) and the events that precipitated it. It gave an account of how the Nuclear power policy issue was complicated by the Basic Law, with competencies cutting across *Länder* and *Bund* tiers of government. This led to the *Land* having to 'work around' the Federal government's powers, by using its powers of the *Aufsichtspflicht* (the duty to monitor) to review nuclear power-related plants and practices with an eye to closure on health and

safety grounds. The chapter then used the example of the row between Griefahn and Federal Environment Minister Töpfer to illustrate the limited nature of *Länder* powers in this 'second node' [after Katzenstein, 1987] of the policy network.

The chapter described how the BfK was set-up, as a way of getting the coalition off the hook on this issue. The BfK's structure and terms of reference was then assessed and a number of criticisms made. First, that the BfK's terms of reference were extremely wide-ranging and very close in their terms of reference (with the danger of duplication). Second, that they touched upon the interests of competencies of the Federal Government (including those of a security-oriented nature). Third, that with an estimated operating budget of DM 450,000 per annum it invited the charge of 'jobs for the boys'.

The chapter then described how little of the coalition's nuclear energy policy had been achieved. It was noted that building work at the planned *Endlager Gorleben* and the licensing process for the Asse II facility were still underway, despite the state's *Aufsichtspflicht* powers. Moreover, the Federal government was forcing through a license for the Schacht Konrad facility.

The chapter then described how, since the Greens had left the *Land* government, the BfK's terms of reference had become more modest, with a reduction in the number and terms of reference of the sub-committees (reduced to five project-oriented sub-committees in 1995). It described how nearly all traces of the Greens polemical approach to environmental policy have gone, with a re-emphasis upon technocratic solutions within the framework of the duality between the *Beamtestaat* and the *Partienstaat*. However, the chapter concluded that, in its own terms, the BfK had not been an institutional failure, as it had been set up by an SPD-dominated coalition and worked to the (SPD-ran) Environment Ministry and *Staatskanzlei* (which was essentially Schröder's fiefdom). It concluded that

the Greens never enjoyed enough institutional leverage to make their gains in this field permanent and prevent the reduction of the BfK's role from that of a normative and proselytising force to a mere project-oriented think tank.

7.6.4. Solid Waste Disposal and the Second Government Commission On Avoidance And Use Of Waste (*Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung*)

The chapter then looked at the operation of the *Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung*, set up to further the coalition's waste-disposal strategy, and described how the topic of waste disposal was flagged-up during the bargaining phase and in the coalition agreement. It described the coalition's desire to avoid the incineration option, by expanding the state's existing landfills along the lines of *Stand der Technik*, preventing the transport of solid wastes out of Lower Saxony and re-shaping solid waste disposal measures according to the 'polluter pays ' principle. The chapter described how the coalition was eventually forced to make a political U-turn and build a high temperature incinerator in Lower Saxony, much to the disgust of the Greens' *Vorstand* and *Basis* (the *Fraktion* were forced to accept it).

The chapter leaves open the question open as to whether the decision to build an incinerator was a deliberate provocation of the Greens in the run-up to the 1994 *Landtag* election. It notes that, whilst the decision did have that effect, the overall record of the Red-Green coalition (and its SPD successor) has been relatively successful. The chapter gives a résumé of the Lower Saxony Waste Disposal Law (*NAbfAbgG*) of 1992, and described how it was hoped that it would lead to the reduction of hazardous waste by 1 million tonnes per annum.

The chapter then gave an account of how the relevant Federal technical standards (the 1993 Technical Instructions on Residential Waste) and legislation (the 1994 Federal Act on Waste management and Product Recycling) have also been amended, with a much stronger application of the 'polluter pays' principle. It detected the imprint of the Red-Green coalition (and the Second Commission) on these documents.

The chapter then described how the Second Commission's work continued until September 1996, when it was replaced by a Third Commission (concentrating upon integrated systems of waste management). It concluded that it failed in political terms and that the Greens' client groups had only limited success in breaking down the established hierarchies, because entry into the network was constrained by opportunity costs related to expertise and access to the means of production. As such, it represented a much more corporatist model than the other bodies studies in Chapters Six and Seven. However. the chapter also noted that such an under-representation of ecological groups was of limited importance, given the degree of consensus in the Federal Republic over the basic principles of solid waste management.

In terms of policy outputs, the chapter concluded that the Second Commission was a success. However, it noted the irony of the Greens' limited role in this. Chapter Ten will go into a wider discussion as to what this says about the nature of payoffs.

Section D: Application of the Models and Their Results

CHAPTER EIGHT: COALITION FORMATION

8.1. Preamble

Chapters Eight and Nine represent the most crucial point of the thesis, in that they re-integrate the 'party politics' and policy-oriented strands of the empirical study and test them against the theoretical model. The most significant element of this process is in Chapter Nine, where Assumption 3 (f) on Coalition Maintenance is tested against the two case studies. As already discussed in Chapter One, the modelling of coalition maintenance is the most significant theoretical element within the thesis and determines the scope of the empirical case studies.

The purpose of Chapter Eight is to prepare the ground for Chapter Nine, by testing the theoretical assumptions of a selection of models of coalition *formation* against the empirical evidence in the two case studies. This is divided into three sections. In section 8.2. the two case studies are examined in the light of three established models from the literature. These are:

- Riker's (1962) *Minimum/Minimal-Winning* Theory

- Axelrod's (1970) *Minimal Connected Winning* Theory

- de Swaan's (1973) *Median Legislator* Model

As will be recalled from the literature review (Chapter One), these models represent three of the seminal examples of numerically-driven deductive modelling as they developed from the 'policy-blind' size principle of Riker's model, through the inclusion of ideological

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distance as a secondary formation criteria in Axelrod's model to de Swaan's model of the median legislator, which gives policy a much higher weighting whilst retaining a numerical formation criteria.

The purpose of this section is to problematise the trade-off between, first, predictive and explanatory modelling and, second, between office-seeking and policy-driven accounts of coalition formation. The section will demonstrate that whilst those models that are policy-blind are not very explanatory, they are reasonably good predictors of the actual outcome. It will also demonstrate that, unless some form of numerical formation criteria is retained, models that do include policy as a formation criteria have little or no predictive value.

Having drawn the appropriate conclusions from this section, section 8.3. will use the empirical data to test the new model of coalition formation. In doing this, this second section and the subsequent conclusion will demonstrate that, having accounted for (or discounted) policy-driven formation criteria, a numerical office-seeking formation criteria is essential if the model is to be explanatory and predictive.

8.2. Applying Established Models of Coalition Formation

As was discussed in Chapter One, both office-seeking and policy driven accounts of coalition bargaining make *a priori* assumptions that can be challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds. This is no less the case in the context of the two case studies. For instance, during the 1989 bargaining process in West Berlin, institutional norms - such as the norm of non-co-operation with far-Right parties - and a high degree of ideological

polarisation within the party system presented a more constrained political environment than the US-type legislatures on which much of this modelling has previously been tested. The Lower Saxony case presented a more fluid institutional environment, but even an arch pragmatist such as Gerhard Schröder was constrained, not least by the degree of animosity he had generated between himself and senior members of the FDP.

These constraints, and in particular the exclusion of a party from the bargaining set (as in the Berlin case), skew any 'pure' application of deductive coalition theory, which tends to start from an *a priori* assumption of *Allgemeinekoalitionsfahigkeit* on the part of all parties within a given party system. Such an assumption may give the model a certain theoretical elegance, but makes it harder to apply to the untidy reality of, for example, a sub-national European party system. This is particularly the case when applying office-seeking accounts of coalition formation which, like Riker's, deliberately ignore or neglect ideological variables.

8.2.1. Minimum/Minimal-Winning Coalition Theory.

Berlin. Riker's model pure 'office-seeking' interpretation of coalition bargaining predicts some interesting possibilities when applied to the distribution of party weights in the Berlin case. After ruling out a minority government of some description (usually unacceptable in the context of German political norms), in numerical terms a minimal winning 'Black-Green' coalition between the CDU and AL would be just as likely as one between the SPD and AL. Indeed, one could argue that the 'incumbency factor' reduces the opportunity costs to the CDU in forming a new coalition, which would predict a Black-Green coalition as the most likely outcome. The least likely outcome under any circumstances would be a 'Grand Coalition' between the CDU and SPD.

because this would create an unnecessary 'surplus majority' within which to distribute payoffs.

An obvious riposte to these two predictions is to cite the copious empirical evidence to the contrary. In reality, there was no likelihood of the AL entering into coalition with the CDU because of the ideological distance between them. As to the second logical consequence of Riker's criteria, Grand Coalitions between the CDU and SPD have occurred, not least at the federal level between 1966 and 1969. Indeed, following the all-Berlin municipal elections of 2 December 1990, a Grand Coalition was formed, remained in office for a full-term and was re-elected in 1995.

Lower Saxony. Riker's model predicts the actual outcome of the process of coalition formation. In a legislature of 155 seats, 78 seats gives a majority of one (the minimum-winning-coalition). Barring a minority government, a Red-Green coalition creates a minimal-winning-coalition with a majority of two seats. The other possible outcomes would be a Grand Coalition, a CDU-FDP-Green coalition or a coalition of 'all the talents'. However, they would all provide a surplus majority, with a subsequent sub-optimal distribution of payoffs.

As already noted, the Lower Saxony party system was not as polarised as that in West Berlin. As a result, the opportunity costs of the SPD and the Greens co-operating were arguably lower than in West Berlin (where 'foreign policy' issues, such as the city's 'Four-power' status, encroached onto the sub-national political agenda). Nevertheless, surplus majorities notwithstanding, it is hard to imagine any alternative to the actual outcome other than a Grand Coalition. All of the other outcomes can be discounted on the grounds of them having too great an ideological range. Although getting the actual outcome right, Riker's model would not have taken such factors into account. It is predictive, but not explanatory.

8.2.2. Minimal Connected Winning Theory.

<u>Berlin.</u> Axelrod's minimal connected winning model makes the correct prediction that an SPD-AL coalition would be the most likely outcome of the 1989 bargaining process: given that such a coalition is the smallest ideologically-adjacent winning set.

However, in the context of the Berlin political arena, the implicit Downsian environment, within which parties compete and manoeuvre along a single policy dimension, raises a serious objection as if all the parties were able to manoeuvre in such a way. In 1982, Klaus Harting, editor of the Berlin-based *Die Tageszeitung*, stressed that the '*successes of the Green and Alternative Lists.....(reflects) an awareness among young people....that things are now really serious, that it is really a question of our future survival*' [Papadakis, 1984: 209]. Even if one accepts that the Greens became more pragmatic during the course of the 1980's, such sentiments still carried enormous resonance inside the party and amongst its voters. Thus, the Berlin AL's election manifesto made it clear that co-operation with the SPD would only take place if it included '*concrete steps towards the introduction of an ecological and social form of politics*'[89]. As already noted in Chapter Four. the Berlin SPD was not willing to co-operate with the AL unless the latter clarified their position on political violence and the status of the three Allied powers in West Berlin. Clearly. although the two parties were ideologically adjacent, there was considerable ideological distance between them.

<u>Lower Saxony.</u> Axelrod's minimal connected winning model makes the correct prediction that an SPD-Green coalition would be the most likely outcome of the 1990 bargaining process. Not only is it the smallest winning set, but it is also ideologically-adjacent.

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[89]'...wenn dies mit konkreten Schritten zur Einleitung einer okologischen und sozialen Politik verbunden ist'. [*Das Kurzprogramme der Alternativen Liste*. Berlin, 1989.]

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As discussed in Chapter Six, by the time of the 1990 elections, the ideological distance between the two parties had become small enough for Jun [1994: 192-3] to claim that voters in Lower Saxony were presented with what was effectively a choice between two blocs: a continuation of the CDU-FDP coalition or a Red-Green alternative. However, it had not been always thus. Given different circumstances (a better showing in the previous *Land* election for example) the Lower Saxony Greens might not have moderated their position. If what Markovits and Reich called the local *'wrecking-ball faction'* [1993: 216] had still been decisive in 1990, the SPD would have found it very hard to carry their own people with them into a coalition with the Greens even though they would still be ideologically adjacent. Thus, ideological distance is important and Axelrod's model does not take it into account. Again, the model is predictive but not explanatory.

8.2.3. The Policy-Driven Median Legislator Model.

Berlin. In his account of coalition formation, De Swaan argues that the party that controls the median legislator is decisive within the bargaining set, as it blocks the axis (or axes) along which any connected winning coalition must form. In the context of the 1989 West Berlin elections, this position was enjoyed by the SPD (as **Table 8.2.3 (a)** illustrates).

Within the full legislature, the median legislator sits on the Right of the SPD's parliamentary *Fraktion*, thus giving them a dictatorial role. However, with the exclusion of the Republican party from the bargaining set, the median legislator sits somewhat further to the Left within the *Fraktion*. If one accepts this assumption, the fact that the SPD and AL did in fact eventually form the coalition can be explained on ideological as well as office-seeking grounds. Moreover, it would explain why the SPD

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gained the initiative following the elections (and why the CDU attempted to equate the

AL with the Republicans and thus further constrain the normatively-defensible

bargaining set)[90].

Table 8.2.3. (a) One-Dimensional Account Of the West Berlin Party System, 1989

L-R Axis	_Party_	_Number Of Seats_
L	Alternative Liste	17
	SPD	55
	CDU	55

R	Republican party	11

Lower Saxony. If the median legislator is decisive within the bargaining set, as it blocks

the axis (or axes) along which any connected winning coalition must form. then De

Swaan's model correctly predicts the outcome of the 1990 _Landtag_ elections in Lower

Saxony. This is demonstrated in **Table 8.2.3. (b)** (below).

Again, the median legislator sits on the Right of the SPD's parliamentary _Fraktion_.

thus giving them a dictatorial role but, in this case, no parties are excluded from the

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[90]It is useful to note, however, that the positioning of parties along the Left-Right axis does not assume an elegant continuum as Table 9.2.3. might suggest Opinions differ as to the size of the ideological range between the parties. For instance, at the national level, Castles and Mair (using a Left-Right scale of one to ten) place the SPD within 0.5 of a point of the Greens and 3.4 points distant from the CDU. On the other hand, Laver and Budge (using a Left-Right scale of -50 to +50) place the SPD slightly closer towards the CDU (17 points) than towards the Greens (19 points). [Laver and Schofield,. 1990: .257].

bargaining set. As in the Berlin case, the actual outcome of an SPD-Green coalition can be explained on ideological grounds as well as office-seeking grounds. Moreover, the decisiveness of the SPD within the bargaining-set would account for why the Social Democrats took the initiative following the elections. Not only were the Greens on the Left of the bargaining-set, but the fall in their vote share denied them a 'king-making' role anyway. They had two choices: a coalition with the SPD or opposition.

Table 8.2.3. (b) One-Dimensional Account Of the Lower Saxony Party System, 1990

L-R Axis	Party	Number Of Seats
L	Greens	8
	SPD	71
	FDP	9
R	CDU	67

8.2.4. An Appraisal Of The Established Models As Predictors Of Coalition Formation In West Berlin and Lower Saxony.

The three office-seeking accounts of coalition formation examined in this chapter display some variance of predictive power when applied to the two case studies.

As discussed earlier, the explanatory power of all three models is limited by their neglect of the dynamics of ideological distance, and its affect upon policy disagreements within the bargaining set. However, only Riker's account, which totally ignores policy, even as a

secondary formation criterion, fails to correctly predict the outcome of the bargaining

process in the Berlin cases (and even Riker's model predicts the Lower Saxony outcome).

Table 8.2.4 Accounts And Predictions Of The Actual Outcomes of the Bargaining Process in West Berlin (1989) and Lower Saxony (1990)

Theory	*Payoffs*	*Predicted Winners*
Minimal Winning Coalition (Riker. 1962)	*Office-seeking.* No ideological constraints upon Bargaining Set.	**Berlin:** CDU-AL **Lower Saxony:** SPD-Green
Minimal Connected Winning Coalition (Axelrod. 1970)	*Office-seeking - Policy Driven.* Ideological constraints upon Bargaining Set in order to minimise conflicts of interest.	**Berlin:** SPD-AL **Lower Saxony:** SPD-Green
Median Legislator (De Swaan.1973)	*Policy-Driven.* Party With Median Legislator Is Decisive Within Bargaining Set	**Berlin:** SPD-AL Coalition* **Lower Saxony:** SPD-Green* *assuming secondary minimal-winning formation criteria

The evidence suggests that accounts that contain a policy dimension, such as De Swaan's.

are more explanatory but, if one does not factor in a secondary minimal-winning formation

criterion, the potential for theoretical ambiguity within a multi-dimensional bargaining

space inhibits the model's predictive power. Even in the one-dimensional bargaining

spaces conceptualised in this section, the models are only predictive if some minimal-

winning formation is included. In other words, a numerical formation criteria remains

important in both case-studies. Résumés of all three models' assumptions and predictions are displayed in **Table 8.2.4** (above).

The two cases indicate that a satisfactory model of coalition formation requires the integration of both a policy-based and minimal-winning formation criterion. Which of these two criteria should take precedence depends upon the trade-off between a model's predictive and explanatory power. The debate over such trade-offs are ubiquitous within the social sciences and will be resumed in Chapter Ten (section 10.3 on payoffs). However, if one assumes for now that Friedman is correct in assuming that it is a model's *predictive* power that is important [1966], then only Riker's account fails the test (and then only in the case of West Berlin).

8.3. Applying the New Model of Coalition Formation

8.3.1. Preconditions to Coalition Bargaining.

(a) The bargaining set is self-selecting and excludes all parties that are perceived not to be normatively-defensible, according to accepted democratic criteria.

Berlin. As discussed in Chapter Five, the Berlin *Alternative Liste* was considered to traditionally be one of the most *fundi*-oriented Green parties in the Federal Republic [Markovits and Reich, 1993: 231]. This not only limited the coalition options open to the AL in terms of what was acceptable to their own rank-and-file, but also imposed significant constraints upon any other party when dealing with them. Thus, before the coalition negotiations could begin in earnest, the SPD had to satisfy itself - and the

wider polity - that the AL was normatively defensible, according to accepted democratic criteria. In other words, in the short-run at least, office-seeking preferences were secondary to normative criteria. Inevitably, the precise nature of such normative criteria is contingent upon the institutional context in which they are embedded.

As already mentioned, in West Berlin in the late 1980s, the domain of Foreign Policy had a much higher degree of salience than is normally the case at the sub-national level. In this context, Momper's insistence that the AL accept the principle of the Allied presence represents an attempt to establish the AL's bona fides on the abstract level of democratic acceptability *per se*. The fact that the AL modified its stance can be interpreted as an indication that they understood the significance of Momper's demands.

Lower Saxony. Like the Berlin AL, the Lower Saxony Greens had a 'wild and woolly' past. There had been periods in the 1980s when the so-called 'wrecking-ball' faction in the wider Green/New Left milieus held the party in thrall. In addition to the party's ambivalence towards political violence and rejection of the state's monopoly of force, the local Greens were immersed in the discourse of American 'warmongering' and opposition to NATO. As a result, the 1987 *Landtag* elections had been called a *Richtungswahl*, which would determine the shape of the Federal Republic' political landscape for years to come, by the then CDU General Secretary Heiner Geissler. The Germans had the choice between stability, or *'red-green chaos'* that would bring *'ruin to the nation'* [Markovits and Reich, 1993: 211-3]. Yet, by the 1990 elections, the Greens were relatively *Salonsfähig*, compared with 1987 and also with the Berlin AL.

There appears to be four reasons for this process of moderation, related to place and/or time . First, in the intervening years, the fundi-realo conflict had been effectively won

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by the *realos*. This meant that, although the leadership still had to behave in a manner that was acceptable to their *Basis*, the ascendancy of a more moderate leadership within the Greens imposed less constraints upon any other party when dealing with them. Second, unlike in West Berlin, the relatively parochial institutional context of Lower Saxony meant that the Greens' anti-NATO stance was of less salience. In other words, although this aspect of their ideological profile was the most normatively defensible, it was relatively unimportant and could be discounted. Third, with the collapse of the GDR and the resolution of the Cold War, the entire 'east-west'/Nato-anti-Nato debate had lost its ideological edge. The west had 'won' the battle of ideologies and the bourgeois parties could be more relaxed about the Greens' residual hostility to its defence and security arrangements. Finally, the SPD were led by a politician who, like Momper, had come up through the party's *Juso* youth section and was a quintessential example of the breed of New Left 'tuscany socialists'. Where Gerhard Schröder differed from Momper was in his political skills and pragmatic approach to coalition-building. Where political differences remained salient, Schröder was able to 'reach out' to the Greens and bring them into the political mainstream.

(b) All parties possess bundles of preferences, based on a combination of office-seeking and policy-driven criteria.

Berlin. As shown by the examples above, it is clear that, in entering the coalition bargaining phase, parties embark upon a sophisticated series of calculations about their own bundles of preferences and those of their prospective coalition partners. For the Berlin SPD, it was necessary to risk the office-seeking payoff that would accrue to them as the largest party within a minimum-connected-winning coalition with the least partners, in order to secure the democratic bona fides of the AL. For the AL, they were faced with the choice of either refusing to compromise on the issue of the Allied

presence and forfeiting the payoffs accruing to them as a coalition partner, or compromising on the Allied presence in order to gain access to the office-seeking stage of the negotiations. Both parties must calculate the balance of profit and loss across their complete bundle of preferences, whilst trying to second-guess the other party's response to its own calculations.

However, the parties' calculations are made more complicated because it was not just a one-shot game. For the SPD, the issue of the Allied presence was not only of normative importance *per se*, but also served to secure its office-seeking payoffs in the medium- to long-term, in that if it had failed to secure the AL's democratic bona fides *before* entering into coalition negotiations with them, any short-term utility would have been cancelled-out by the negative reaction of significant sections of its membership and, especially important for a *Volkspartei*, its electorate. For the AL as well, the calculation was not just one of sacrificing a major plank of its 'anti-party party' stance in order secure office. Both options risked negative payoffs in both policy-oriented and office-seeking terms.

Of course, the AL's presence in a coalition government could generate immediate policy-oriented and office-seeking payoffs and, it was hoped, widen their electoral base (breaking down the fear within the electorate of 'Red-Green chaos' by the *Praxis* of stable government). On the other hand, in accepting the principle of the Allied presence, the AL risked alienating its existing membership and electoral base without gaining sufficient new support (because the inevitable internal disputes that would follow such a process of alienation would only serve to confirm the impression of such voters that the AL were not fit for government).

<u>Lower Saxony.</u> Such a sophisticated series of calculations about their own bundles of preferences and those of their prospective coalition partners undoubtedly took place in Lower Saxony as well. However, whilst all of the benefits described above applied to the Lower Saxony case, the risks were less sharply-defined.

For the Lower Saxony SPD, there was little reason to risk the office-seeking payoffs that would accrue to them as the largest party within a minimum-connected-winning coalition with the least partners, in order to secure the democratic bona fides of the Greens. However, whilst the Greens remained relatively extreme in their attitude towards Nato, the time (1990) and the place (provincial Lower Saxony) allowed these difficulties to be discounted. On the other hand, many in the local SPD shared the Greens' passion for reform of the security services and police, the integration of foreigners into society, the de-centralisation of powers to the *Kommunen*, the promotion of women's issues etc. In short, the SPD were not confronted with a stark choice between their office-seeking and policy-driven preferences. For the Greens, the choice was more stark. They were faced with the choice of either refusing to compromise on the issue of the Environment portfolio and forfeiting the payoffs accruing to them as a coalition partner, or compromising in order to gain access to more general office-seeking related payoffs. They had to calculate the balance of profit and loss across their complete bundle of preferences, whilst aware of the fact that they were now the smallest party in the *Landtag* and not decisive within the bargaining game. Whatever decision they made had negative and positive consequences.

On the negative side of the ledger, Schröder had made it clear that his choice of Monika Griefahn was non-negotiable and that the most the Greens could hope for was the post of State Secretary. Given that the Greens regarded the Environment portfolio as almost their political birthright, giving it up would be extremely painful (and very hard

to sell to the *Basis*). On the positive side, as in West Berlin, the Greens' presence in a coalition government could widen their electoral base, by breaking down the fear within the electorate of 'Red-Green chaos' and the 'wrecking-ball' tendency by being seen to deliver stable government. Moreover, there were still policy domains, in the social politics field, that were important to the Greens. The danger was that, in accepting Griefahn's appointment to Environment Minister, the two ministries that the Greens did get, Federal and European Affairs and the Women's Ministry, would not be enough to compensate for alienating its existing membership and electoral base.

(c)   The policy preferences of all parties are a function of one or more ideological dimensions, such as the Downsian Left-Right and/or the 'materialist/post-materialist' policy dimension.

Berlin **Table 4.3.** (Chapter Four) demonstrates that all the salient policy divisions between the three parties within the bargaining set can be adequately conceptualised as a function of one or more ideological dimensions. The SPD's position was unique, in that its ambivalent ideological profile allowed it to positively engage with either of the other parties along either the Downsian Left-Right and/or the materialist/post-materialist dimension. As already stated (and especially with regard to the unique set of institutional norms that characterised the West Berlin polity), the domain of Foreign Affairs can be conceptualised as a function of the materialist/post-materialist policy dimension.

Lower Saxony. As with West Berlin, **Table 5.3.** (Chapter Five) conceptualises all the salient policy divisions between the four parties as a function of one or more ideological dimensions. Again, the SPD's position was unique, in that it was able to positively engage with either of the other parties along either the Downsian Left-Right

and/or the materialist/post-materialist dimension. Unlike West Berlin, however, the domain of Foreign Affairs was not particularly salient (although it can be conceptualised as a function of the materialist/post-materialist policy dimension). Moreover, the discursive form in which the Lower Saxony Greens presented their policies was far more conventional, problem-solving-oriented and less polemical than the Berlin AL's literature.

(d)   Where policy differences are not salient, office-seeking is normally assumed to be paramount.

<u>Berlin.</u> Essentially, this precondition is a counter-factual affirmation of the previous three points. It states that, where policy differences are not salient (or have been resolved), parties' preferences will mainly be of an office-seeking nature. Thus, once the AL passed the test of being seen to conform to accepted democratic criteria (and had satisfied itself that there were policy-oriented utility gains to be made by participating in coalition negotiations), all other calculations were of an office-seeking nature (including the medium- to long-term effect of participation in a given coalition on its membership and electoral support, as well as the short-term utility of gaining ministerial office).

<u>Lower Saxony.</u> Again, where policy differences are not salient (or have been resolved), parties' preferences will mainly be of an office-seeking nature. Obviously, for the Lower Saxony Greens, the failure to secure the Environment portfolio was a blow to their ambitions (especially as sub-national Green parties had come to regard it as 'theirs' by right). However, having accepted the failure to win the portfolio, and that there were still policy-oriented utility gains to be made by participating in coalition

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negotiations (such as with regard to the Women's Ministry portfolio), all calculations can explained by assuming that they were of an office-seeking nature.

(e) Where (d) is not the case, it is assumed that office-seeking has been subordinated to another group-related preference.

Precondition (e) is intended to account for any strategic decision taken by a party which cannot be explained by previous preconditions. Again, it is counter-factual in nature.

Berlin. With regard to the Berlin case, no such decisions were salient at the point of coalition formation. However, hypothetically-speaking, the most obvious potential strategic decision of this kind would have been for the AL to have decided to not take part in coalition negotiations despite evidence that this decision would have no worse than a neutral effect upon its policy-oriented or office-seeking utility.

The following observation is a counter-factual point as the AL did eventually agree to join the SPD in a Red-Green coalition. Nevertheless, if, after all other preconditions and assumptions had been satisfied, it had made such a decision to stay out, it could be explained by the assumption that a group-related preference (such as the desire for party unity as an end in itself) was dominant[91].

Lower Saxony. As above.

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[91]An obvious example where such a group-related preference is highly salient is within the Irish Republican movement, where the maintenance of internal unity is a major objective in itself. This helps to explain what is to many observers a curious ambiguity between those supporters of the political wing of the movement and the 'physical force' tradition. Obviously, this aversion to disunity has its roots in the history of Irish Republicanism (the experience of the Civil War for instance). However, today it has become an end in itself, to the extent that strategic decisions are made that are hard for an outside observer to explain in either policy-oriented or office-seeking terms.

(f) All times parties within the bargaining set pursue their preferences in a rational and instrumental manner.

All the assumptions made about the strategic actions of the parties are predicated upon the precondition that they are always acting in the rational and instrumental pursuit of their preferences.

8.3.2. Assumptions about Coalition Formation

(a) All parties want to be a member of the potential coalition that is closest to them in policy terms. Such a coalition is assumed to be ideologically 'connected' along one or more policy-dimension.

Following on from the observations made about Precondition (c) to Coalition Bargaining. **Tables 4.3. and 5.3.** demonstrate that no ideologically connected minimal-winning coalition could form without the SPD in either case.

<u>Berlin.</u> The CDU had the option of engaging the SPD along the Downsian-esque Left-Right policy dimension, such as the Domains of Foreign Affairs, Freedom and Democracy, Government, the Economy and, to a lesser extent, Welfare, Fabric of Society, Social Groups and Discursive Form (important after the initial process of coalition formation in terms of the detailed drafting of policy).

The AL was initially at odds with the SPD with regard to the Domain of Foreign Affairs until its acceptance of the principle of the Allied presence in West Berlin. However, on the evidence of its election programme, it remained isolated within the domains of Freedom and Democracy (the acceptance of the Allied presence notwithstanding), Government, the Economy and Discursive Form. Only in the

Domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups did the possibility exist for the selective emphasis of policy areas with which it and the SPD could forge some form of *modus operandi*. Moreover, because of the ideological ambivalence of the SPD, even within these domains, the CDU could compete with the AL.

Lower Saxony. Both the CDU and the FDP had the option of engaging the SPD along the Downsian Left-Right policy dimension, such as the Domains of Foreign Affairs, Freedom and Democracy, Government, the Economy and, to a lesser extent, Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups.

However, the issue of Discursive Form (although important in terms of the detailed drafting of policy) was of less salience because the Greens policy proposals were relatively conventional in their formulation. Moreover, the Greens' differences with the SPD with regard to the Domain of Foreign Affairs was also less of an issue. It was also less isolated within the domains of Freedom and Democracy because of the common ground it shared with the Lower Saxony SPD on issues such as reform of the Security Services. Differences remained on issues related to the domains of Government and the Economy. The Domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups provided fertile ground for the selective emphasis of shared policy areas with the SPD. However, because of the ideological ambivalence of the SPD, the SPD still had an authoritarian welfarist side to their ideological profile that would re-appear in the final days of the coalition.

(b) Parties calculate policy-distance in terms of their relative positions with regard to policy sectors along the Left-Right and/or materialist/post-materialist dimensions. The two

dimensions have different relative weights for each party, depending upon their respective

ideological profiles.

Given that, in the broadest theoretical terms, both the CDU and the AL (in the Berlin case) and the CDU, FDP and Greens (in Lower Saxony) could make common cause with the SPD (and vice versa), the actual outcome of the process of coalition formation is contingent upon all parties being able to calculate the degree of common ground between them (conceptualised as policy distance). Assumption (b) about coalition formation therefore requires that all three political parties are reflexive[92]. This means that they can constantly review their strategic decisions and, although they do not enjoy perfect information about either their own policy stance or those of the other two parties, that they can act rationally and instrumentally upon such calculations.

Berlin. As it is fairly evident which issues can be harnessed by either the CDU or the AL in order to positively engage the SPD, the most important calculations in the bargaining process are those that are made by the SPD.

Given that the SPD has a choice of two possible coalition partners, it must make the most complicated calculations. These calculations concern the relative positions of both the CDU and the AL in relation to its own. If engaging the AL, it must calculate the extent to which it can make concessions along the policy-dimensions where it has some competitive advantage without either disproportionately discounting its policy-

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[92]This assumption touches upon Giddens' 'theory of structuration', within which neither the subject (agent) nor the object (structure) has primacy, but are rather interdependent [1982: 8]. With regard to agency, Giddens makes two points. Firstly, he describes 'knowledgeability' as the human feature of practical consciousness. He argues that the lack of this concept in functionalist and structuralist theory makes them weak, as it incorporates the basic praxis of agents - the knowledge they possess on how to behave in society. Second, 'capability' must also be a consideration, as it refers to human consciousness of potential alternatives of action. Giddens believes that the *'possibilities of 'doing otherwise*" are a matter of routine and crucial to any explanation of human behaviour [*ibid*: 9]. Concerning structure, Giddens argues that institutions are *'structured social practices'* which are recognised by the majority of society. His theory is that the structure indicates the 'rules' and 'resources' which manifest themselves, but which have only 'virtual' existence. They must be constantly re-constructed by the *Praxis* of reflexive agents. In short, although their actions are contingent upon institutional norms, Giddens regards actors not as 'cultural dopes' but as practical performers of accomplishment in society.

oriented and/or office-seeking utility. The actual outcome of these calculations is contingent upon the relative importance each party places upon the policy-dimension. For instance, with reference to **Table 4.3.**, the SPD would have to calculate the relative importance of its implicit support for 'Bourgeois democracy' (Freedom and Democracy) and the nuclear family (Fabric of Society) against its support for affirmative action and broad civil rights (Social Groups). Moreover, it would have to calculate the impact of, for example, the AL's different stance on these issues and assess the extent to which a compromise between these differing stances can be reconciled.

Lower Saxony. Again, it is fairly evident which issues can be harnessed by the other parties in order to positively engage the SPD and that the most important calculations in the bargaining process are those that are made by the SPD.

What is clear is that the SPD's actual choice cannot be bested in office-seeking terms. To choose either the CDU or the FDP would result in a surplus majority with a sub-optimal distribution of payoffs. Therefore, its main concern was the relative policy positions of both the CDU, FDP and Greens to its own. As a coalition with the Greens would be the best numerical outcome, the SPD has to calculate the extent to which it can make concessions along the policy-dimensions where it has some competitive advantage without either disproportionately discounting its policy-oriented and/or office-seeking utility. **Table 5.3** shows that the SPD balanced the relative importance of its implicit support for 'Bourgeois democracy' (Freedom and Democracy) and the nuclear family (Fabric of Society) against its support for affirmative action and broad civil rights (Social Groups). Moreover, by securing the Environment portfolio, it neutralised much of the Greens ideological thrust. In short,

the Environment portfolio is the litmus test of the extent to which the SPD was calling the shots during the coalition bargaining process.

(c)   The party or parties to which a party X is most in agreement, across the (weighted) aggregate of policy sectors, is considered by party X to be the closest to them in policy terms.

Assumption (c) about coalition formation assumes that, having made these calculations. the parties make an informed decision as to which party is closest to them in policy terms and acts upon such a decision in a rational and instrumental manner.

Berlin. Therefore, in the Berlin case, the model assumes that the actual outcome was the revealed preference of all three parties. In other words, the SPD calculated that the AL was closer to it than the CDU in policy terms, and that the CDU was unable/unwilling to offer a more attractive alternative to that offered by the AL. In practical terms, this meant that the SPD selectively emphasised those elements within the domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups. On these particular issues (women's issues, multi-culturalism and cultural politics) the AL consistently took a more extreme stance than the SPD. However, both parties evidently felt confident that these differences were ones of emphasis rather than substance.

Lower Saxony. The model assumes that the actual outcome was the revealed preference of all four parties. In other words, the SPD calculated that they were closer to the Greens than either the CDU or FDP, and that none of the other two parties could offer a more attractive alternative. This meant that the SPD selectively emphasised those elements within the domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups where they shared common ground with the Greens. Although, on these particular issues (nuclear energy. waste disposal, women's issues etc.) the Greens consistently took a more extreme

stance than the SPD, the differences were not irreconcilable. As it will be recalled Jürgen Trittin wryly pointed out, the SPD and the Greens were *'condemned to a positive outcome from the negotiations'* [*HAZ.* 21/05/90].

(d) If conditions (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied, parties will choose to be a member of the coalition that will maximise office-seeking payoffs. It follows this will be the minimal-connected-winning coalition with the least partners.

Assumption (d) assumes that, once all the parties had made their calculations with regard to policy distance, all things being equal, numerical criteria will decide the outcome of the coalition formation process. This assumption becomes more important as the number of parties within the bargaining set increases and/or the set's ideological range narrows.

Berlin. In the Berlin case, two things are clear. First, there is only a limited number of parties within the bargaining set and only three possible coalition outcomes:

(i) a single-party minority administration (not unknown in West Berlin - see Appendix Two - but highly unlikely as it would be subject to the 'toleration' of the opposition parties and normally unacceptable according to German political norms).

(ii) a Grand Coalition between the SPD and CDU, which would constitute a surplus majority and a sub-optimal distribution of payoffs.

(iii) a Red-Green coalition with the AL which would constitute a minimal-connected-winning coalition with the best possible distribution of payoffs.

Second, although the ideological range of the bargaining set in West Berlin was relatively wide, the SPD's ideological ambivalence allowed it the possibility of forming a connected-winning coalition with both. Given that policy differences between the SPD and the two other parties were roughly equal, one must assume that, having

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satisfied itself in terms of policy-oriented preferences, the SPD's final decision was motivated by numerical criteria related to office-seeking.

Lower Saxony. Unlike Berlin, the bargaining set is larger, with none excluded on the grounds that they are not normatively-defensible according to democratic criteria (as the *Republikaner* were in Berlin). This means that there are five possible coalition outcomes:

(i) a minority administration of either a variant of the incumbent CDU-FDP administration or the SPD (both highly unlikely).

(ii) a Red-Green coalition, creating a minimal-winning-coalition with a majority of two seats.

(iii) a Grand Coalition.

(iv) a CDU-FDP-Green coalition.

(v)a coalition of 'all the talents'.

However, all except (ii) provide a surplus majority, with a subsequent sub-optimal distribution of payoffs.

Although the ideological range of the bargaining set in Lower Saxony was wide, the SPD's ideological ambivalence allowed it the possibility of forming a connected-winning coalition with any of the three other parties. As in Berlin, one must assume the SPD's final decision was motivated by numerical criteria related to office-seeking.

(e) If all other conditions are satisfied, it follows that the party that controls the median legislator within the most policy sectors is decisive, as no minimal connected winning coalition can be formed without it. Such a decisive party could be assumed to gain a disproportionate share of the payoffs.

Logically, Assumption (c) follows on from the previous assumptions[93], in that any party that performs such a 'gate-keeping' function will have the leverage to extract the best possible deal from a potential coalition partner in return for its participation with it in government.

Berlin. In West Berlin, this was clearly the case. With reference to **Table 8.2.3.(a)**, the SPD is decisive on the Downsian Left-Right dimension. However, in this instance, one could just as easily have used the materialist/postmaterialist dichotomy and generated the same outcome. Therefore, we would expect the SPD to win a disproportionate share of the payoffs.

Table 4.4.(b) demonstrates that the SPD did well out of the distribution of cabinet portfolios. The AL only received three out of fourteen cabinet posts, none of which was a traditional blue-chip portfolio. This represents a ratio of legislative seats to cabinet posts of almost six-to-one. By contrast, the SPD ratio is five-to-one: including all the traditional 'blue-chip' posts . In addition, the Berlin SPD leader Walter Momper became Governing Mayor. Obviously, as already noted, this outcome may have been partly due to the combined impact of the AL's tactical *naiveté* and Momper's political guile during the bargaining process. Nevertheless, the SPD's payoffs at *T2* does not just reflect the skill with which the Berlin SPD played the bargaining game. It is also indicative of the underlying strength of their bargaining position at *T1*. For its part, the AL stood out for and eventually won responsibility for women's issues (albeit

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[93] The model does not require any normative account of the nature of the individuals preferences, only that they are ordered rationally according to the four conditions of Reflexivity, Completeness, Transitivity and Continuity [Hargreaves Heap *et al.* 1992: 5-6], though some scholars use different terminology.
(1) REFLEXIVITY. The *a priori* assumption that a preference (Xi) is always worth it's inherent value. i.e.$Xi \geq Xi$ ($\geq$ = preference or indifference)
(2) COMPLETENESS. Preferences(Xi / Xj) can be cross-compared and ranked. i.e.$Xi \geq Xj$ or $Xj \geq Xi$.
(3) TRANSITIVITY. That preference ranking holds true throughout the ordering. i.e.$Xi \geq Xj$ and $Xj > Xk$ therefore $Xi \geq Xk$.
(4) CONTINUITY. No preference is inherently preferable to another if the marginal utility of the other can be raised so as to make the comparative utility of the two preferences indifferent to the individual.

sublimated within a wider ministry) and Education (an area within much of the AL's client groups existed). Moreover, they had won what was for them the all-important Environment portfolio. The successful maintenance of the new coalition would in many ways be contingent on the AL's stewardship of this portfolio in particular.

Lower Saxony. All four parties in the Lower Saxony legislature were potential members of any coalition (unlike in West Berlin, where the *Republikaner* were excluded). Nevertheless, the SPD remains decisive. **Table 8.2.3.(b)** demonstrates that the SPD is decisive on the Downsian Left-Right dimension. Again, one could just as easily have used the materialist/postmaterialist dichotomy and generated the same outcome, with a similar assumption about payoffs.

Nevertheless, **Table 5.4.(b)** presents a complicated picture. It is true that the Greens had to be content with just two portfolios to the SPD's ten and that they did not get the prized Environment portfolio. However, given that they only had eight representatives in the *Landtag* as opposed to the SPD's 71, they did numerically well out of the division of portfolios, with a ratio of seats to posts of four-to-one, compared with the SPD's ratio of seven-to-one. This is better than the ratio of six-to-one (AL)/five-to-one (SPD) in Berlin. Obviously, the role of the AL's tactical *naiveté* in the Berlin case has been discussed. Yet, the Lower Saxony Greens were not obviously more politically street-wise than their Berlin counter-parts. Moreover, as the smallest party in legislature, their bargaining position at *T1* cannot explain their relatively generous share of the payoffs at *T2*. A more plausible explanation was that the outcome was the result of strategic decisions taken by both the Greens and the SPD during the bargaining process.. For the former, the loss of the policy-related payoffs associated with the Environment portfolio could only be compensated by a greater share of office-seeking related payoffs (albeit less than they demanded). For

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the SPD (and, one suspects, Schröder in particular) the coup of prising the Environment portfolio away from the Greens was worth taking a smaller absolute share of the office-seeking payoffs.

8.4. Résumé of Chapter Eight

Chapter Eight set out to test the theoretical assumptions of a selection of models of coalition formation against the empirical evidence in the two case studies. Section 8.2. examined the two case studies in the light of (i) Riker's (1962) Minimum/Minimal-Winning Theory; (ii) Axelrods (1970) Minimal Connected Winning Theory and (iii) de Swaan's (1973) Median Legislator Model. The three models display some variance of predictive power when applied to the two case studies. As discussed, the explanatory power of all three models is limited by their neglect of the dynamics of ideological distance, and its affect upon policy disagreements, within the bargaining set. However, only Riker's account fails to correctly predict the outcome of the bargaining process (once, in the Berlin case, and it still correctly predicts the Lower Saxony outcome). Accounts that contain a policy dimension, such as De Swaan's, are more explanatory but, the models are only predictive if some minimal-winning formation is included (even in a one-dimensional bargaining space). Thus, in the trade-off between predictive and explanatory power, once the policy-dimension has been accounted for (or discounted), a numerical formation criteria remains important in both case-studies.

Moving on to the new model of coalition formation, section 8.3. applied the new model of coalition formation to the two case studies. From the evidence, the model appears to be both predictive and explanatory in both cases.

In both Berlin and Lower Saxony the Preconditions to Coalition Bargaining stood up against the empirical evidence. As Precondition (*a*) predicted, the bargaining set was self-selecting and excluded all parties that were perceived not to be normatively-defensible. according to accepted democratic criteria. Thus, the Berlin *Alternative Liste* had to satisfy the SPD (and the wider polity) that the AL was normatively defensible. As already noted. the most obvious example of this was the AL's grudging acceptance of the principle of the Allied presence. Similarly, in Lower Saxony the Greens had rejected the 'wrecking-ball' option by 1990.

The assertion in Precondition (*b*) that all parties possess bundles of preferences, based on a combination of office-seeking and policy-driven criteria was also supported by the evidence. In Berlin, for example, the AL were faced with the choice of compromise on the issue of the Allied presence, whilst in Lower Saxony the Greens were faced with the choice of either refusing to compromise on the issue of the Environment portfolio (and forfeiting the payoffs accruing to them as a coalition partner) or compromising in order to gain access to more general office-seeking related payoffs.

The evidence also demonstrates that the policy preferences of all parties are a function of one or more ideological dimensions, such as the Downsian Left-Right and/or the 'materialist/post-materialist' policy dimension (Precondition (*c*)). In both Berlin and Lower Saxony (see **Tables 4.3. and 5.3.** (Chapters Four and Five) all the salient policy divisions between the three parties within the bargaining set can be adequately conceptualised as a function of one or more ideological dimensions. The SPD's Janus-faced ideological profile was unique, and allowed it to positively engage with either of the other parties along either the Downsian Left-Right and/or the materialist/post-materialist dimension.

Having accounted for (or discounted) the salience of policy differences, Precondition (*d*)'s counter-factual assumption that office-seeking is paramount is indeed not contradicted by the evidence. Thus, once the Berlin AL passed the test of being seen to conform to accepted democratic criteria, and had satisfied itself that there were policy-oriented utility gains to be made by participating in coalition negotiations, one can assume that all other calculations were of an office-seeking nature. Similarly, the Lower Saxony Greens got over the 'loss' of the Environment portfolio!

Finally, as both coalitions did eventually take place, there is no evidence to prove or disprove the other counter-factual Precondition (*e*), that where (*d*) is not the case, it is assumed that office-seeking has been subordinated to another group-related preference. Assumption (*f*), that at all times parties within the bargaining set pursue their preferences in a rational and instrumental manner is self-explanatory.

All of the assumptions within the model about Coalition Formation are also well supported by the evidence. Assumption (*a*), that all parties want to be a member of the potential coalition that is closest to them in policy terms and that such a coalition is assumed to be ideologically 'connected' along one or more policy-dimension(s), is fulfilled in both cases. **Tables 4.3.** and **5.3** demonstrate that no ideologically connected minimal-winning coalition could form without the SPD in either case. The CDU (in Berlin) and the CDU and/or FDP (in Lower Saxony) had the option of engaging the SPD along the Downsian Left-Right policy dimension, such as the Domains of Foreign Affairs, Freedom and Democracy, Government, the Economy and, to a lesser extent, Welfare, Fabric of Society, Social Groups and Discursive Form, whilst the Berlin AL and the Lower Saxony Greens were able to selectively emphasise the common ground they shared with the SPD within the Domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups.

The Assumption (*b*), that parties calculate policy-distance in terms of their relative positions with regard to policy sectors along the Left-Right and/or materialist/post-materialist dimensions and that the two dimensions have different relative weights for each party, depending upon their respective ideological profiles, is also supported by the evidence. .In both cases the most important calculations in the bargaining process are those that are made by the SPD. These concerned the relative positions of the other parties to its own. **Tables 4.3.** and **5.3.** demonstrate that the SPD would have to calculate the relative importance of its implicit support for 'Bourgeois democracy' (Freedom and Democracy) and the nuclear family (Fabric of Society) against its support for affirmative action and broad civil rights (Social Groups).

Moving on from this, Assumption *(c)* that the party or parties to which a party X is most in agreement, across the weighted aggregate of policy sectors, is considered by party X to be the closest to them in policy terms conforms to the empirical reality. Therefore, in both cases, the model assumes that the actual outcome was the revealed preference of all parties. In Berlin, the SPD calculated that the AL was closer to it than the CDU in policy terms, and that the CDU was unable/unwilling to offer a more attractive alternative to that offered by the AL. In Lower Saxony, the SPD calculated that they were closer to the Greens than either the CDU or FDP, and that none of the other two parties could offer a more attractive alternative. In both cases, the SPD selectively emphasised those elements within the domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups where they shared common ground with the Greens.

Having accounted for (or discounted) policy-oriented considerations, Assumption (*d*) that parties will choose to be a member of the coalition that will maximise office-seeking payoffs. (the minimal-connected-winning coalition with the least partners) is also supported by the evidence. In Berlin and Lower Saxony, a Red-Green coalition with the

AL which constituted the minimal-connected-winning coalition with the best possible distribution of payoffs.

Interestingly, the evidence form the two case studies does not support Assumption (e), that if all other conditions are satisfied, the party that controls the median legislator within the most policy sectors is decisive, as no minimal connected winning coalition can be formed without it, and that such a decisive party could be assumed to gain a disproportionate share of the payoffs.

Although the SPD performs a 'gate-keeping' function in both cases, there is a numerical variance in its payoffs between the two cases. However, this variance can be explained by the difference in the type of portfolios it wins in either case. For instance. in West Berlin. the AL only received three out of fourteen cabinet posts, none of which was a traditional blue-chip portfolio, representing a ratio of legislative seats to cabinet posts of almost six-to-one. By contrast, the SPD ratio is five-to-one: including all the traditional 'blue-chip' posts (and Berlin SPD leader Walter Momper as Governing Mayor). On the other hand, considering that the Lower Saxony Greens only had eight representatives in the *Landtag* as opposed to the SPD's 71, they did numerically well out of the division of portfolios, with a ratio of seats to posts of four-to-one. compared with the SPD's ratio of seven-to-one.

The explanation that the difference in numerical outcomes between Berlin and Lower Saxony reflected the Lower Saxony Greens' compensation for the loss of the policy-related payoffs associated with the Environment portfolio with a greater share of office-seeking related payoffs is a powerful one.

To conclude, the chapter uses the established models to successfully problematise the trade-off between prediction and explanation, office-seeking and policy-oriented payoffs.

It then goes on to test the new model against the empirical data which, within the confines of the available information, proved to possess considerable predictive and explanatory power.

However, in both cases, it is predicting and explaining a one-off outcome: the formation of a coalition. Such a one-off outcome is easily conceptualised as a single-play game and is relatively easy to model. It is much harder to model multiple plays of a game over time, such as those that would take place in a deductive model of coalition maintenance. The attempt to produce such a model is at the heart of the thesis and is addressed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER NINE: APPLYING THE NEW MODEL OF COALITION MAINTENANCE TO THE TWO CASE STUDIES

9.1. Preamble

As already noted in Chapter Eight, this and the previous chapter are central to the thesis, in that they re-integrate the 'party politics' and policy-oriented strands of the empirical study and test them against the theoretical model. The most significant element of this process is in this chapter, where Assumption 3 (*f*) on Coalition Maintenance is tested against the two case studies.

Assumption 3(f) is the key to the whole thesis, as it posits the question: what were the parties' preferences and were they successfully pursued? As discussed in Chapter One, the other preconditions and assumptions are either self-evident, a logical consequence or a counter factual argument to a previous precondition or assumption, or relatively easy to demonstrate through quantitative means. However, in raising the issue of the pursuit of preferences over time (and the nature of the related payoffs), the model moves in game-theoretical terms, from a single-play game to a multiple-play game. It is much harder to model multiple plays of a game over time and having done so, to operationalise the game in terms of the empirical research. As also discussed in Chapter One, the thesis works from the assumption that the Greens considered it just as important to change the structure and process of policy-making as to affect the outputs and outcomes. Thus, their 'bundle' of preferences is a composite of aspirations regarding structure, process, outputs and

outcomes of the coalition and that their continued participation in a given coalition depended upon enough of these preferences being fulfilled.

The previous chapter prepared the ground for Chapter Nine, by testing a selection of models of coalition formation against the empirical evidence in the two case studies, before moving on to the new model of coalition formation. The chapter successfully problematised the trade-off between prediction and explanation, office-seeking and policy-oriented payoffs and went on to test the new model against the empirical data. This demonstrated that, within the confines of the available information, the new model possessed considerable predictive and explanatory power.

Section 9.2. has two purposes. First, it builds upon the previous chapter and models multiple plays over time, in order to better understand the processes of coalition formation. In doing so, it will extrapolate up from the particular circumstances of each coalition, in order to identify the general phenomena that are taking place in the studies. Second, it will test the model against the actual 'events' of each case study, moving down from the general to the particular, in order to identify any assumptions that may be unrealistic or just plain wrong.

Each assumption is examined sequentially, first against the Berlin case and then against the equivalent events in Lower Saxony. In the interests of brevity, where there is nothing to add from the Lower Saxony case, the chapter will move on to the next assumption.

Section 9.3. will review the evidence and assess its implications for both the case studies and the explanatory value of the model.

9.2. The Model

(a) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to its ideological range.

<u>Berlin.</u> In terms of longevity, the Berlin Red-Green coalition was not a great success. lasting less than two years. Its political life was tempestuous and it dissolved in acrimony prior to the 1990 elections. In short, it was not a relatively stable coalition.

However, its duration spanned the most momentous period of post-war German history, to the extent that the parameters of the political discourse within the city changed profoundly over its period in office. As a result, those elements of the two parties ideological stance that had been selectively emphasised in the coalition agreement had lost their saliency by the end of the coalition period. At the same time. those elements that had the potential to cause problems between the coalition partners had increased in salience under the new political conditions. Thus, in the new all-Berlin polity, the policy domains of Fabric of Society and Social Groups which had been stressed in the coalition's programme were of less importance than those of Foreign Affairs, Freedom and Democracy, Government and the Economy. The social authoritarianism of 'old' SPD thinking had once more become dominant. Moreover. given the accelerating economic dislocation in East Berlin, even in the domain of Welfare there was a return to the old 'social democratic' priorities of 'mopping up' the social costs of capitalist economic organisation, whilst the post-materialist priorities stressed in the coalition agreement became less urgent. The Red-Green coalition was no longer playing to its strengths in ideological terms and in practice. its ideological range had widened.

<u>Lower Saxony.</u> Given that the Lower Saxony coalition lasted a full term. it can be regarded as having been relatively stable in terms of longevity. In terms of 'events'. it was fairly

collegiate by the relative standards of Red-Green coalitions (in particular. the Berlin coalition).

Although steadily deteriorating economic circumstances imposed quite a strain upon the coalition, it was never confronted with an upheaval on the scale of that encountered by the Berlin coalition. The only significant deleterious effect of unification upon Lower Saxony was the transfer of resources away from relatively poor western *Länder* in the 'old' Federal Republic, to the absolutely poor 'New' *Länder*. Austerity aside. the internal conditions of the Lower Saxony polity remained constant (unlike in Berlin). Therefore, it is hard to assess whether the coalition's ideological range was narrow enough to survive a real crisis along the lines of the one that hit the Berlin coalition. In that sense, comparing the two cases directly is like comparing apples and oranges.

Nevertheless, the ideological range was wide enough for Schröder to exploit in the run-up to the *Landtag* elections. The final year of the coalition was marked by the SPD's re-emphasis of 'old' SPD values. However, these did not constitute a socially authoritarian profile (as in Berlin, where the Foreign Affairs, Freedom and Democracy and Government domains were emphasised), but rather, through, for example. the EXPO 2000. *Europipe* and Pappenburg test-track rows, emphasised the domain of the Economy. Nevertheless, they were all issues where the Greens' post-materialist instincts allowed themselves to be marginalised.

(b) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the size of its legislative majority.

Berlin. Although this would appear to be a common-sense assumption, it is hard to find evidence in the Berlin case to support it. Not only was the Red-Green coalition the only minimal-connected-winning coalition within the bargaining set. it was also the

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minimal-winning coalition *per se*. In theory, there was no alternative coalition arrangement to the one that actually formed that better satisfied both the ideological and numerical formation criteria. Therefore, if Proposition *(b)* holds, no alternative coalition arrangement would have lasted as long as the Red-Green coalition.

Although it is a counter-factual argument (and therefore impossible to prove one way or the other), one suspects that, despite constituting a surplus majority and a sub-optimal distribution of payoffs, a Grand Coalition would have made a better fist of confronting the new strategic environment that arose out of the collapse of the GDR. There is some evidence to support this proposition. First, despite having the same fundamental problems to deal with, the subsequent Grand Coalition that formed after the 1990 elections successfully survived a full electoral term and was re-elected in 1995, albeit with a reduced vote-share [Lees, 1996]. Second, from 1950 until 1963, Berlin was governed by three consecutive surplus-majority coalitions (see **Appendix Four**). Indeed, the coalitions formed in 1950 (SPD, CDU and FDP) and 1958 (SPD and CDU) included all the parties represented in the legislature at the time. These coalitions also coincided with periods of relative political upheaval in the city (the 1950 coalition was formed just a year after the lifting of the Berlin blockade) and lasted their full electoral terms. Taken together, the success of these surplus-majority coalitions indicate that, in the Berlin party polity, conditions of political stress (what Laver and Schofield (1990) call 'events') appear to place a premium upon such coalitions[94].

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[94]There are two possible explanations for why a coalition between the two *Volksparteien* might have been more stable (and they are not mutually exclusive). These could be called a *'cohesiveness'* and/or an *'inclusiveness'* argument. (i) *Cohesiveness*. If this is this case, there is actually very little ideological distance between the two *Volksparteien* and certain conditions of political stress make ideological cohesiveness more important than the optimum distribution of payoffs within a coalition. (ii) *Inclusiveness*. Alternatively, that such conditions of political stress place a premium upon the inclusion of as many of the democratic parties as possible, subject to secondary ideological and numerical formation criteria (which will obviously vary across cases). Thus, one could argue that the failure to maintain the Red-Green coalition through such conditions of political stress was a result of either a lack of ideological

<u>Lower Saxony.</u> In Lower Saxony, the Red-Green coalition was the only minimal-connected-winning coalition within the bargaining set as well as the minimal-winning coalition *per se*. Therefore, no other alternative coalition arrangement could have better satisfied both the ideological and numerical formation criteria. If Proposition *(b)* holds, no alternative coalition arrangement would have lasted as long as the Red-Green coalition and as the coalition did last a full term, this assumption is satisfied (with the same caveats about 'events' that apply to the Berlin case).

(c) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of partners within the coalition.

<u>Berlin.</u> In the Berlin case, there were seven <u>numerically</u> possible coalition outcomes: (i) a minority SPD administration (tolerated by the CDU and/or the AL); (ii) a minority CDU administration (tolerated by the SPD and/or - improbably - the AL); (iii) a minimal-connected-winning Red-Green coalition; (iv) a minimal-winning CDU-AL coalition; (v) a surplus-majority Grand Coalition; (vi) a surplus majority CDU-SPD-AL coalition; (vii) an all-inclusive Republican-CDU-SPD-AL coalition.

Option (vii) is excluded because the Republicans were not normatively defensible (see *Precondition 1 (a) to Coalition Bargaining*), whilst options (vi), (iv), (ii) and (i) are all improbable due to a combination of ideological and/or numerical criteria. The two most probable outcomes were (iii) and (v), which would both have two partners. With regard to the respective merits of (iii) and (v), the arguments made with regard to *Assumption 3 (b) about Coalition Maintenance* apply (including the usual caveat about the use of counter-factual argument degenerating into simple speculation).

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cohesiveness out-weighing its office-seeking benefits or because it was insufficiently ideologically inclusive, or a combination of both.

<u>Lower Saxony.</u> As in Berlin, there were multiple possible numerical outcomes. However, unlike in Berlin, there were no parties excluded on the grounds of democratically accepted criteria. Because of the arguments posited above, the most likely outcomes were (i) A Red-Green coalition and (ii) a Grand Coalition. As there was a Red-Green coalition and it lasted a full term, the assumption is satisfied.

(d) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of alternative coalitions available to members.

<u>Berlin.</u> In the Berlin case, the SPD was in the position where it had a choice between two potential coalition partners: the AL and the CDU. Moreover, it enjoyed a degree of congruence in policy terms with both parties. Indeed, it had kept its options open in the opening round of coalition negotiations. The SPD's position of leverage was reflected in its share of the cabinet portfolios, where it is evident that the SPD's bargaining position was enhanced by the availability of an alternative coalition partner. Throughout the period, the SPD appeared confident enough of its decisive position to force concessions from the AL (for instance over its attitude towards the Allied presence) and at the same time pursue policies that appealed to the more socially conservative elements of its (and the CDU's) support (such as the eviction of squatters). As a result, whilst the AL (and in particular the grass-roots membership) felt compromised by its participation in government, the SPD did not have to make any significant concessions. Moreover, following the 1990 elections it remained in government as junior partner to the CDU.

One could argue that the availability of an alternative coalition partner meant that the SPD was not forced to invest all of its political capital in the Red-Green coalition and that this contributed to its demise. Certainly many in the AL suspected that the SPD,

and Walter Momper in particular, was not wholeheartedly committed to the coalition (and, according to many of those involved, would have been happier working with the CDU). However, even if the coalition had not collapsed, the outcome of the 1990 all-Berlin elections made its continuation impossible anyway.

Lower Saxony. In Lower Saxony, the SPD was also in the happy position where it enjoyed a degree of congruence in policy terms with all three other parties. However, it had not kept its options open in the opening round of coalition negotiations to the same extent that had been the case in Berlin. Indeed, as Jun [1994: 192-3] observed, the electorate and the parties went into the election with the understanding that there was a choice between a CDU-FDP or SPD-Green coalition. Jun argues that the rise of the Greens and the failure of the SPD to unseat the incumbent coalition in previous elections had made this inevitable. Another reason must surely be the personality of Gerhard Schröder, with the 'new sharpness' he had brought into the *Landtag* (which had alienated the FDP) and his stated preference for a Red-Green coalition.

However, there is no evidence that the failure to fully exploit the SPD's numerical advantage and ideological leverage was reflected in its share of the cabinet portfolios. It is true that the SPD's numerical ratio of seats per portfolio is worse than in Berlin, but (as already noted) this might be more of a reflection of the fact that the Greens were being compensated for their failure to secure the Environment portfolio.

Moreover, the Greens had no alternative coalition partners. Also, as in Berlin, the Lower Saxony SPD appeared confident enough of its decisive position to force concessions from them (for instance, over the U-turn on high-temperature incinerators) and at the same time pursue policies that appealed to the more socially conservative elements of its (and the CDU's) support (such as 'Eurofighter', EXPO 2000 and

Europipe). Again, whilst the Greens (and in particular, the grass-roots membership) felt compromised by its participation in government, the SPD did not have to make any significant concessions. Finally, following the 1994 elections, it was able to abandon the Greens and govern alone.

There is little evidence to suggest that the SPD did not invest all of its political capital in the Red-Green coalition whilst it lasted, given that it did last a full term. Unlike Walter Momper, Gerhard Schröder would not have been any happier working with another party. However, having the chance to rule alone, he and the SPD seized their opportunity.

(e) Codified coalition arrangements, with a formal investiture procedure, are more stable.
In the Federal Republic, it is normal practice to formally codify coalition arrangements with a coalition agreement, which sets out in some detail the policies that are to be pursued by the coalition. Moreover, such coalitions have to be formally approved by the legislature. Therefore, testing this assumption in either case study would involve counter-factual argument .

(f) All parties calculate the utility of their continued participation within a coalition on the basis of the degree of correlation between their preferences and their actual and anticipated payoffs.

Berlin. By the time the Red-Green coalition had collapsed, both parties had come to the conclusion that continued participation in the coalition was not desirable. For a number of reasons, including frustration with the AL's polemical political discourse, the SPD was already anticipating a coalition with the CDU. One result of this was

that its stance on law and order became increasingly authoritarian prior to the all-Berlin election.

For the Greens, the Red-Green coalition had promised more than it had delivered and anger with the SPD was palpable. The Daimler-Benz debacle and in particular, the Research Reactor at the Hahn-Meitner Research Institute (HMI) had led to the resignation of Environment Minister Michaele Schreyer in August 1990 and the Mainzer Straße evictions of the 15 November (ordered by SPD Interior Minister Erich Pätzold in the run-up to election) were intolerable for many party members.

With hindsight, the two parties' assessments of the payoffs associated with the coalition have become more favourable. Legislation such as the Berlin Energy Law, with its provision for the Energy Advisory Council, has permanently opened-up the energy policy network to the Greens' client groups and has to some degree changed the culture of public administration in the city[95]. Nevertheless, at the time of the coalition's demise, both parties had come to the conclusion that the real and anticipated payoffs associated with the continuance of the Red-Green coalition were not worth the political candle.

Lower Saxony. Unlike the Berlin case, the Red-Green coalition did not collapse and if the distribution of seats had made it possible (rather than allowing the SPD to govern alone) following the 1994 *Landtag* elections, the SPD and Greens would quite probably have continued the coalition. For a number of reasons, including frustration

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[95]This re-assessment was evident in conversations with the author prior to 1995 elections, in which a number of senior Green politicians (including a former minister) expressed a willingness to enter into another coalition with the SPD if the legislative arithmetic allowed (it did not). For many in the SPD, the experience of being a junior partner of the CDU in a Grand Coalition has led to a re-appraisal of the Greens as a potential coalition partner. Indeed, following the 1995 elections many of the SPD's rank-and-file argued that the SPD should go into opposition with the Greens rather than reconstitute the Grand Coalition.

with the Greens' resistance to projects like EXPO 2000, the SPD was keen to govern alone. However, they never anticipated a coalition with the CDU or FDP.

For the Greens, the Red-Green coalition had its frustrations. The rows over the high temperature incinerator, EXPO 2000, 'Eurofighter', *Europipe* and the Pappenburg test-track all had an effect but, despite the rhetoric of their party conferences, the Greens never left the coalition in the manner of the Berlin AL.

Moreover, both parties have always maintained that the payoffs associated with the coalition were favourable. Legislation such as the new Lower Saxony Waste Disposal Law and (indirectly) the new Federal Technical Instructions on Residential Waste and the Federal Act on Waste Management and Product Re-cycling had made a qualitative change to this area of environmental policy. In addition, institutional innovations such as the NLÕ, the BfK and the Second Commission permanently opened-up the energy policy network to the Greens' client groups, at least to the extent that the continuance of the Red-Green coalition would have been worthwhile. The Greens' problem was that the SPD was able to continue the good work without them.

9.3. Résumé of Chapter Nine

The chapter began by noting that, although coalition formation can be easily conceptualised as a single-play game (and therefore, relatively easy to model), it is much harder to model multiple plays of a game over time, such as those that would take place in a model of coalition maintenance. It pointed out that Assumption 3 (f) is of particular significance, in that its stress upon the idea of payoffs provides the focus for the case

studies. The nature of these payoffs is discussed at greater length in the conclusion (Chapter Ten).

In this chapter, the case studies were examined in the light of the complete model of coalition maintenance. In doing so, it extrapolated up from the particular circumstances of each coalition, in order to identify the general phenomena that are taking place in the studies.

What is evident from the two case studies is that, although the specific circumstances differ between Berlin and Lower Saxony, these circumstances can be explained in the light of general principles rather than just as a local 'story'. Thus:

(a) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to its ideological range. The Berlin coalition collapsed in acrimony whilst the Lower Saxony coalition went the full term. Given that there is no evidence that the Lower Saxony coalition had a significantly narrower ideological range, the section speculated as to the importance of 'events' (the collapse of the GDR in particular) in determining coalition stability. Moreover, the section noted the fact that in both cases, the SPD used 'events' to re-orient their own stance away from a post-materialist agenda and towards the traditional 'old' SPD stance in the run-up to the next elections.

(b) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the size of its legislative majority. In both cases, the Red-Green coalition option was the only minimal-connected-winning coalition and the only minimal-winning coalition *per se* in the bargaining set. In theory, there were no alternative coalition arrangements to the ones that actually formed, that better satisfied both the ideological and numerical formation criteria. Therefore, if Proposition *(b)* holds, no alternative coalition arrangements would have lasted as long as the Red-Green coalitions

in either case. To posit an alternative would be to use counter-factual arguments (although, with regard to the Berlin case, the section noted that a Grand Coalition might have been more successful in confronting the new strategic environment that arose out of the collapse of the GDR).

(c) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of partners within the coalition. In both cases, there were a number of <u>numerically</u> possible coalition outcomes. However, Precondition 1 (a) to Coalition Bargaining and Assumption 3 (b) on Coalition Maintenance ruled out the majority of the numerical option, leaving (i) A Red-Green coalition and (ii) a Grand Coalition as the options that would most likely guarantee coalition stability. The observation about a Grand Coalition being more stable in the Berlin case again applies. However, in Lower Saxony, there was a Red-Green coalition and it lasted a full term, thus satisfying the assumption.

(d) Coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of alternative coalitions available to members. This does appear to be borne out by the evidence from the two case studies. In the Berlin case, the SPD had a choice of coalition partners (the AL and the CDU) and its position of leverage was reflected in its share of the cabinet portfolios, where it did well. In the Lower Saxony case, the SPD also enjoyed a degree of congruence in policy terms with all three other parties but for various reasons, it had not kept its options open to the same extent as had been the case in Berlin. Moreover, its numerical share of the portfolios was worse than in the Berlin case. However, there is no evidence that the failure of the Lower Saxony SPD to fully exploit its numerical and ideological leverage was reflected in its share of the cabinet portfolios. The lower numerical share appears to be a reflection of the Greens being compensated for their failure to secure the environment portfolio. As predicted, the Berlin coalition (where the SPD had alternatives) collapsed, whilst the Lower Saxony coalition (where it did not) went the full term.

(e) Codified coalition arrangements, with a formal investiture procedure, are more stable.
As already noted, it is normal practice in the Federal Republic to formally codify coalition arrangements with a coalition agreement, which sets out in some detail the policies that are to be pursued by the coalition.

(f) All parties calculate the utility of their continued participation within a coalition on the basis of the degree of correlation between their preferences and their actual and anticipated payoffs. By the time the Berlin Red-Green coalition had collapsed, both parties had come to conclusion that continued participation in the coalition was not desirable. In Lower Saxony, where it went the full term, both parties professed satisfaction with the coalition's record. This appears to bear out Assumption *(f)*. However, when the respective policy records of the two coalitions are compared, the Berlin coalition was not without its achievements. Indeed, with hindsight, the two parties' assessments of the payoffs associated with the Berlin coalition have become more favourable. This implies that it is the perception as much as the reality of actual and anticipated payoffs that are important. These issues are discussed at greater length in Chapter Ten (sections 10.3. and 10.4 on games and payoffs).

Thus, the chapter demonstrates that the model is predictive. However, one must be satisfied that the model is sound in its assumptions and therefore explanatory. In other words, does the model fulfil the following criteria:

- Does it correctly predict coalition behaviour in the case studies?
- Are its assumptions realistic?
- Does it yield intellectually satisfactory answers to 'why' questions?

As already noted, the first point has been satisfied. As to the 'realism' of the model's assumptions, one must return to Nagel's three criteria [1973: 133-135]. First, are the

assumptions selective and not exhaustive? In one sense, all assumptions are selective to a certain extent, given that it is impossible to include every possible permutation of behaviour within its parameters. However, within the parameters of anticipated behaviour in the two case studies, the model does not neglect any of the variables (such as institutional norms, ideology, office-seeking, group-related preferences etc.) that are salient to the thesis. With regard to the second question of whether they rely too much on 'pure cases' or ideal types, the choice of using case studies within the thesis was intended to counter this criticism. By choosing two discrete cases and analysing all aspects of coalition behaviour within them, conscious selection is kept to a minimum. As to ideal types, by looking at what have until recently been quite irregular and contested coalition agreements, the thesis has 'got its hands dirty'. Obviously, the choice of case study is itself a selective process. The only riposte to this point is for other researchers to use the model on cases of their choice. Finally, as to whether the model is explanatory, the reader must ask if it provides intellectually satisfactory answers to the 'why' questions relating to Red-Green coalitions. This will also be looked at in Chapter Ten.

CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION

1O.1. Preamble

In this chapter, the theoretical framework set out in Chapter One is reviewed in the light of the empirical evidence presented in the thesis as a whole. The chapter will first recap upon the theoretical debate set out in Chapter One, including the research questions, the choice of cases, the literature review and subsequent selection of idioms of analysis (the modelling of coalition behaviour and the use of the policy networks idiom), the structuring of the research around two substantial case studies and the methods used to carry out the research. Because it involves a re-statement of the theoretical framework, the discussion of Chapter One is longer than that for the subsequent chapters.

The chapter will then briefly review the institutional context within which the empirical research is grounded, including that of the party system, the two parties themselves, the structure and norms of German public administration *per se* and that of Environmental policy-making in particular. This in turn prepares the reader for a discussion of Chapter Three, which tells the historical 'story' of Red-Green coalitions in the Federal Republic, from the early experiments in Hamburg and Hesse to the present day, where such coalition arrangements have become commonplace.

The chapter will then review Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven, in which the bulk of the original research is presented. These four chapters are divided along thematic lines ('politics' and 'policy') and the chapter will assess the extent to which this division is both

intellectually tenable and of practical use in structuring what was a great deal of unstructured and occasionally contradictory primary data into a plausible and explanatory account of the two coalitions. It will identify any common political and policy-oriented challenges faced by the two coalitions and assess the degree to which they addressed them, within the context of the wider phenomena of Red-Green coalitions.

The chapter will then review Chapters Eight and Nine, where the empirical data is used to test the models of coalition behaviour, in particular the new model of coalition formation and maintenance. It will assess the degree to which the model(s) can be assumed to be 'realistic' in their assumptions, predictive in the light of the available data and explanatory in their accounts of such data.

As set out in Chapter One, the chapter will then set out the process of coalition formation and maintenance as a formal game [cf. Hargreaves Heap *et al*, 1992: 95-97] and, having established these parameters, the thesis will look at policy-oriented payoffs (determined as much by the *process* of policy-making as by its content and drawing upon the work of Rhodes [1981, 1986a, 1986b]).

Finally, the chapter will use the evidence from the thesis to make two points: one theoretical and the other speculative. First, it will discuss the nature of payoffs (office seeking and/or policy oriented), both in a general sense and in relation to the two case studies. The evidence of the thesis will be assessed in the light of selected material from elite interviews conducted in the Spring and Summer of 1996, with a particular focus upon the disparity (if any) between what can be regarded as the 'revealed preference' of agents' strategic behaviour at the time, and their perceptions of such behaviour in the light of at least two years' *ex post* rationalisation.

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Second, it will assess what light the thesis has thrown upon the phenomena of Red-Green coalitions in particular and speculate as to the possible future of such political co-operation.

10.2. Discussion of the Thesis and its findings

10.2.1. Chapter One

The thesis is predicated upon the research question 'to what extent the Greens have assumed a 'normal' political role within the party system'? In other words, can their strategic behaviour be predicted as a function of the rational pursuit of their preferences, be they instrumental (office-seeking) or ideological (related to policy processes and outcomes). The thesis assumes that policy-related payoffs will be as much a function of the *process* of policy-making as of its content, in other words the extent to which the Greens have been able to break down established hierarchies within the German regulatory framework. The thesis builds upon a number of formal hypothetico-deductive models of coalition behaviour and posits a new model of coalition formation, within the rational choice tradition (with a focus upon agency), in order to impose form and structure upon the research. The thesis includes a 'policy dimension', in order to establish a common set of criteria in order to assess a given coalition's record of policy implementation. Environmental policy provides the primary policy focus, because it is the policy area most closely identified with the Greens (indeed, it is at the core of their own self-identity and external perceptions of them) and of academic interest in its own right.

The analysis contains two distinct elements. First, a comparative analysis of the ideological and discursive profiles of the SPD and Greens, with emphasis upon the role of

the 'new politics' and second, use of the 'policy networks' idiom as a secondary theoretical tool (examining the degree of Green penetration of the policy-making process) in order to structure the data derived form the two case studies in Berlin and Lower Saxony.

Chapter One then reviewed the established literature associated with coalition theory and policy networks. Within the field of coalition theory, the chapter identified two distinct and divergent 'traditions' within coalition theory, broadly classified as the *'game-theoretical'* (or formal-deductive) and *'European politics'* (primarily inductive) schools [Laver and Schofield 1990: 10-11]. It then traced the development of coalition theory. from the early 'office-seeking' models such as Riker's [1962] minimal-winning 'size principle', Gamson's [1961] 'cheapest winning coalition' model and Leiserson's [1968] idea of 'payoff vectors, which have been criticised for being too *'policy blind'* [Laver and Schofield 1990: 90], with only a modest record in predicting real outcomes to processes of coalition bargaining [Browne, 1973: 17-31; see also Bogdanor. 1983; von Beyme, 1984 and Pridham, 1986]. The chapter then looked at a selection of models that used some form of 'policy dimension' as a secondary formation criterion, such as Axelrod's [1970] 'minimal connected winning' model. de Swaan's [1973], 'median legislator' model and noted a trade-off between coalition size and ideological range and certain institutional/ideological norms that skew the process of coalition formation and act as a variable upon coalition maintenance. In order to conceptualise these norms, the chapter argued that a policy-driven model was required, for example 'core' theory [Hanson, 1972; Hanson and Rice. 1972; Browne, 1973; Bacharach, 1976] - which conceptualises n-dimensional Euclidean space - or Shepsle's [1979] concept of 'structure imposed equilibrium', which effectively re-imposes a one-dimensional policy environment upon the legislative game. The chapter noted that Shepsle's model is of enormous significance because it allows the political theorist to both posit a formal deductive model of coalition formation and allow for the institutional specifics of a given case (see also Denzau and Mackay. 1987: and Gilligan and

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Krehbiel, 1987].which act as both facilitators and constraints upon behaviour. This has enabled theorists to factor in the institutional context (as a decision rule), as well as simplifying the concept of policy space (one dimensional, although not restricted to the classic Downsian Left-Right continuum) to that of a dichotomy (such as between materialist and post-materialist values, between authoritarianism and libertarianism, or between nationalism and internationalism), which imposes equilibrium on the model and is consistent with empirical evidence. The chapter then looked at attempts to apply formal modelling to the European context, such as work by Laver and Schofield [1990] and Budge and Keman [1990].

The chapter then reviewed the established policy networks literature [Altenstetter, 1994; Greer, 1994; Fennema, 1994; Bomberg, 1994; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Katzenstein 1987; Schneider, 1988; Pappi, 1993; Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Rhodes, 1981; Marsh, 1983]. The chapter accepted Benson's loosely defined idea of policy networks as a *'cluster or complex of organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structures of resource dependencies'* [1982: 148], but noted that - if too loosely defined - the idiom became little more than a set of lists [see for example Jordan and Schubert, 1992 or van Waarden, 1992], which was built upon by Rhodes, who established five types of network - 'Policy Communities', 'Professional Networks, 'Intergovernmental Networks', 'Producer Networks' and 'Issue Networks'.[1986a, Ch.. 2]. The thesis argued that Rhodes work provided the analytical 'tool kit' in order to operationalise the subsidiary research question (as to the extent to which the Greens have been able to 'open-up' the policy network to their own associated client groups and break down established hierarchies within the German regulatory framework). This generated four further questions for research outlined in section 10.1 (i.e. regarding the nature of: the Greens own associated client groups prior to the Red-Green coalition; the established networks (ditto); the penetration by Greens' client

groups of these established networks; and their success in (i) breaking down the established networks *per se* and/or (ii) gaining access to heretofore closed networks during and after the coalition) These questions were briefly returned to in section 1.4 and in Chapters Four to Nine. Section 10.4 (on payoffs) of this chapter will return to these themes in the light of the empirical evidence.

The chapter then posited the New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance in order both to direct and structure the research. The model and associated notes are set out on pages 37-43 of the thesis. The model is divided into three sections. First, it sets out a set of global preconditions to participation in coalition bargaining. Second, it sets out a number of global assumptions about the process of coalition formation. Finally, it sets out a number of global assumptions about the processes of coalition maintenance. With regard to the thesis, these last assumptions - and in particular Assumption 3(*f*) - are of particular importance to whole thesis. Assumption 3 (*f*) begs the question: what were the parties' preferences and were they successfully pursued? Whilst the other preconditions and assumptions are either self-evident, a logical consequence or a counter factual argument or relatively easy to demonstrate through quantitative means, issues relating to the pursuit of preferences over time (and the nature of the related payoffs) mean one has to model multiple plays of a theoretical game over time and operationalise this game in terms of the empirical research.

The chapter then defended the particular theoretical framework and choice of fieldwork methods used in the thesis, starting first with theory. With regard to Coalition Theory. the thesis starts by using three established models from the literature (Riker's [1962] *Minimum/Minimal-Winning* Theory; Axelrod's [1970] *Minimal Connected Winning* Theory; de Swaan's [1973] *Median Legislator* Model) in order to problematise the trade-off between, first, predictive and explanatory modelling and, second, between office-

seeking and policy-driven accounts of coalition formation before using the empirical data to test the New Model of Coalition Formation and Maintenance. With regards to the 'policy networks' idiom, the thesis uses the policy network description in its loosest and most heuristic manner, which -as already discussed - is based upon Rhodes' idea of resource dependency. The thesis assumes that the these networks are mainly confined to the formal structures (such as the *Energiebeirat* and the *Energieleitstelle* with regard to the Energy policy network in Berlin). In addition the thesis builds upon Katzenstein's [1987] concept of three 'nodes' of the policy network and concentrate upon the three main sets of agents (political parties; tiers of multi-level governance; and the NGOs).

As to whether the theoretical framework is predictive, realistic and explanatory, it was stated that the thesis does not intend to 're-invent the wheel' in these respects. Noting that models are often defended on the grounds of their predictive power alone, the chapter criticises this approach on the grounds that it neglects the fact that a model's assumptions may be unrealistic (using Nagel's [1973] criteria), which means the model is not explanatory [Saunders, 1995: 60]. The chapter concludes the section by stating that, as rule of thumb, an explanation must yield an intellectually satisfying answer to a 'why'? question (or its equivalent), which can only be demonstrated by testing against the empirical data. The chapter notes that the whole debate reflects the often ambiguous nature of Political Science, torn between a desire for the empiricism of the natural sciences and the values of empathy and context inherent in the idea of *'Geisteswissenschaften'* [Ryan, 1973: 7].

The chapter then defended its methodology, noting that there is some debate about the worth of case studies as a comparative method *per se* or merely as a methodological tool within the context of a wider comparative analysis [Sartori, 1994: 23]. The chapter asserts that the use of case studies in this thesis does conform to accepted standards of

comparability [see Mackie and Marsh, 1995 for instance] and that the use of the formal institutional structure of two German *Länder* as the parameters of the case studies was appropriate, given the ease with which functional equivalents can be identified across the cases.

Finally, the chapter describes and defends the fieldwork methods used to undertake the research. It noted that data is both quantitative and qualitative in nature. The quantitative data consists of opinion poll data, election data and *Land*-level official statistics, whilst the qualitative data was sourced from official documents, press archives, party press offices and public libraries and elite interviews. Because of the use of such data in a complementary role to other sources and because reasons of confidentiality, only some of the interview data is directly attributed to individuals.

10.2.2. Chapter Two
Chapter Two looks at the institutional context in which the research is embedded, using the available literature.

First, the chapter looked at the party system and the electorate in the Federal Republic and concluded that the party system is undergoing a process of de-concentration as dealignment takes hold amongst the electorate. It noted that the electorate's inverted social profile in the 'New *Länder*' has aggravated this process, with parties forced to re-think their strategies in order to win and keep office. The institutional histories of the SPD and the Greens were then examined and it was demonstrated that both parties face similar pressures and experience similar intra-party debates over the whole issue of Red-Green political co-operation.

The chapter then looked at the historical background, institutional norms, structure and processes of the German state and their impact upon policy outputs and outcomes. Stress was placed upon the duality between the *Parteienstaat* and the residual administrator-led *Beamtenstaat*. It was noted that this duality acts as both a facilitator and a constraint upon the parties, with the structure of German public administration (in terms of horizontal and vertical sectorisation) providing a benign opportunity structure for new parties. On the other hand, sectorised policy-making also generates conflict between ministries, whilst the technocratic discourse of the *Beamtenstaat* acts as a powerful brake upon the Green agenda. The chapter noted that the German policy-making environment is characterised by the features of what Rhodes [1986a] would call a 'policy community'.

The chapter then built upon this description of the German policy-making environment in general and looked at environmental policy in the Federal Republic. It noted the same facilitating and constraining features (access to new actors if in possession of policy-related expertise against the pressures of party politics and the dominance of managerial values within the administration).

10.2.3. Chapter Three

Chapter Three provided the historical context, within which the two case studies are grounded, through an overview of Red-Green coalitions at the sub-national level of the Federal Republic. Thus, the early years were characterised by a lack of trust and good faith on both sides, with many in the SPD regarding co-operation with the Greens as a necessary evil at best and those on the SPD's New Left who were well-disposed towards the Greens were not to come into the ascendant within the party until the late 1980s. For their part, the Greens had an even longer way to travel, having to overcome substantial

ideological and structural blocks to becoming the 'good' coalition partner that they are today.

The chapter speculated as to what these structural and programmatic changes were and why they took place and concluded that Harmel and Janda's [1994] definition of party change as being the function of three factors - external shock, leadership change and change in the dominant coalition - could be partially applied to the Greens. They were not *sui generis*.

The chapter concluded that, taken in the round, the political record of the Red-Green coalitions to date have been mixed. Whilst the Hesse coalitions have been regarded as the seminal example of the genre, the Berlin and Lower Saxony coalitions represent the two extremes in terms of longevity. Nevertheless, the following chapters demonstrated that many of the themes, strengths and weaknesses of the two coalitions were broadly the same.

10.2.4. Chapter Four

Chapter Four examined the political history of the Red-Green coalition in Berlin. The chapter structured the events sequentially into four sections. After assessing the relationship between the parties, the chapter concluded that the Berlin AL was a relatively *fundi*-oriented party, whilst the local SPD was in decline. The presence of a growing New Left tendency in the SPD, combined with its inability to win a majority of seats on its own, made it fairly receptive to the idea of a Red-Green coalition. Moreover, a comparison of party programmes demonstrated that the SPD's ideological ambivalence allowed it to bargain with the AL as well as the CDU if it so wished. Therefore, during the

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post-election bargaining process, the SPD held most of the cards and this was reflected in its share of cabinet portfolios.

Finally, the chapter gave an account of the political life of the coalition over its period in office and identified a number of salient political themes impacting on coalition maintenance. The chapter built upon Gudrun Heinrich's [1993] idea of the Berlin Red-Green coalition having three distinct phases. The 'honeymoon period' from the Spring until late Summer of 1989; the second phase, from the late Summer of 1989 until early 1990, with a slow break-down in trust between the two parties and, finally, a third phase, lasting from the beginning of 1990 until its collapse. The chapter concluded that the underlying economic weakness of Berlin, the upheaval of November 1989, and political manoeuvring by both parties weakened the coalition. Other institutional factors, such as the AL's referring every decision back to its *Basis* and the resistance of the SPD's authoritarian Right-wing, aggravated the process. In addition the *Basis* in Berlin (as also in Hamburg) had an even more direct and malign impact because of the geographical compactness of the city-state. As a result, *Basis* access to parliamentarians was easy and the latter always felt that the party's activists were 'breathing down their necks'.

The chapter identified a number of political issues that perfectly encompassed these tensions, including the influence of big business (the *Preussen Electra* and *Intrac* affair, the *Daimler-Benz* row), fiscal rectitude versus social provision (the KITA strike), 'Green' shibboleths such as nuclear power (the row over the Research Reactor at the Hahn-Meitner Research Institute), the ever-present ambiguity of many Greens towards private property and the state monopoly on violence (SPD Interior Minister Pätzold's eviction of the squatted houses in Mainzer Straße being the final straw). In addition, the political style of Walter Momper was also identified as a contributing factor.

10.2.5. Chapter Five

Using the same thematic structure as Chapter Four, Chapter Five examined the political history of the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony. It first looked at the relationship between the parties leading up to the 1990 *Landtag* elections and concluded that there was a *de facto* two-bloc party system in Lower Saxony by the time of the 1990 election, which was understood by both the parties and the electorate. Thus, the Lower Saxony Greens had moderated their previously radical stance and were relatively pragmatic, whilst Gerhard Schröder had managed to bring the local SPD around to accept the idea of a Red-Green coalition. Again, a comparison of party programmes concluded that, as in Berlin, the SPD displayed an ideological ambiguity that allowed it to bargain with any party if it so wished. Moreover, the SPD was again decisive within the bargaining set (because of its ideological stance and its share of the seats) but the chapter concluded that this was not as strongly reflected in its numerical share of cabinet portfolios because of a trade-off between policy-oriented and office-seeking payoffs (the SPD denied the Greens the Environment Ministry).

Finally, the chapter examined the political life of the coalition, using an analogue of Heinrich's three phases (as applied to the Berlin case). It concluded that the 'honeymoon period' lasted longer than in Berlin, ending in 1992 when Bruns floated the idea that the *Land* would build a high temperature solid waste incinerator after all. The second phase, characterised by a slow break-down in trust between the two parties, lasted from early 1992 until mid-1993, whilst the third phase, in which both parties were effectively estranged from one another, lasted from mid-1993 until the *Landtag* elections the following year. The chapter demonstrated that, from the summer of 1993, everything that Schröder did can be explained in terms of forcing the Greens into a corner whilst winning moderate support from the centre (by re-profiling himself as a job-creating *Landesvater*).

The chapter concluded that, as in Berlin, the underlying economic weakness of Lower Saxony contributed to the coalition's slow decline but that the bulk of the coalition's problems were self-inflicted. Again, the utopian views of the Lower Saxony Greens' *Basis* and the resistance of the SPD's authoritarian Right-wing were aggravating factors. In terms of political issues, in Lower Saxony the influence of big business was flagged by EXPO 2000, the *Europipe* affair and another *Daimler-Benz* row (over the test-track at Papenburg), the tensions between fiscal rectitude and social provision in the row over the teachers' working week, whilst the 'Green' shibboleths were the issues of high temperature incinerators and nuclear power (Stade, in both instances). Unlike Berlin, however, there were no real problems regarding the ambiguity of many Greens towards private property and the state monopoly on violence and Gerhard Schröder's handling of the Lower Saxony coalition was far superior to that of Walter Momper's in Berlin.

10.2.6. Chapter Six

Chapter Six examined in greater depth the degree to which Red-Green coalitions were able to break down the established hierarchies within the policy-making process in their respective *Länder,* through three examples of programmatic and institutional innovations carried out within the field of environmental policy in Berlin.

First, it looked at three of the inherent problems associated with policy-implementation in Berlin and concluded that West Berlin's unique geo-political position had a huge impact upon the city's political economy, with a need to reduce dependency upon the German Democratic Republic for the provision or transport of resources. The chapter observed that Berlin was economically weak, environmentally degraded and lacking a coherent energy strategy. Second, it looked at the degree to which Berlin's polarised party system constrained policy-implementation and concluded that there were some areas of agreement

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with the Greens, although the AL's solutions were more radical, driven by a decentralised policy-formulation process, based on the environmental expertise centred around the city's universities and the Federal Environment Agency.

It went on to examine the degree of resistance from the NGOs and concluded that there was only limited significance in the resistance of trades unions etc., whilst the process of staffing the Environment Ministry was eased by a lack of rigid policy networks. a young and innovative staff, the failure of the FDP to enter the legislature (thus denying a focus of partisan opposition amongst permanent officials who hankered after the old FDP regime) and a plentiful source of environmental expertise outside the established policy network described above. Finally, the section looked at the degree to which the coalition's policies represented continuity or change in terms of their use of economic instruments and concluded that the traditional reliance upon statist solutions represented continuity rather than change in the style (if not the content) of policy making.

The Berlin Energy Law (Energiegesetze).
The Berlin Energy Law sought to promote a raft of measures such as low energy consumption and the use 'low value-added' energy forms and the chapter described the proposed measures for both the public and private sectors, such as the *'Energy Pass'* system, new procurement guidelines, the Energy Officials initiative and the *'Energy Concept'* (to be drawn up by the proposed *'Energy Advisory Council'*).

The Berlin Energy Advisory Council (Energiebeirat).
The chapter concluded that the Energy Advisory Council was quite successful in opening up the policy network to the Greens' client groups. It identified two reasons for this. First, the advisory council's central institutional location meant that its deliberations were disseminated throughout the policy formulation and planning culture of the ministry and.

second, it was a heterogeneous body, drawn from all 'three nodes' of Katzenstein's [1987] policy network ideal type, including producer and consumer groups from both sides of the Green debate (BEWAG and GASAG versus *Eurosolar* for instance). It concluded that it was not a consensual body. The section also speculated as to whether groups like *Eurosolar* were more a 'Producer Network' than an 'Issue Network' [after Rhodes 1986a] and observed that *Eurosolar* and the other academic research institutes (such as the *Öko-institut*, the *Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik* and the Berlin International Solar Centre) represented a formidable resource of environmental expertise with which to counter the producer interests on the Advisory Council in drawing up the 'Energy Concept'.

The Berlin 'Energy Concept' (Energiekonzept Berlin).

The chapter then examined the Berlin Energy Concept itself. The section concluded that, when the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection produced the first Berlin Energy Concept in 1992 (two years after the AL left government), the document's advocacy of much of what was in the *Energiegesetz* represented a long term policy-oriented payoff for the AL (who in turn praised the high standard of technical debate within the document).

Interestingly, the SPD's reaction was more critical, although it is impossible to isolate why this was the case without going into a much deeper analysis of this aspect of the coalition. Suffice to say that the SPD declared the Energy Concept a disappointment because it recognised that planned reductions in CO_2 emissions would not be achieved. The chapter observed that this reaction was surprising, given that, on the evidence, the coalition's record of institutional and programmatic innovation was (by the criteria set out in this thesis) a relative success.

10.2.7. Chapter Seven

Using the same thematic structure as in Chapter Six, Chapter Seven examined the degree to which the Red-Green coalition in Lower Saxony was able to break down the established hierarchies within the policy-making process in the *Land* administration, through a selection of programmatic and institutional innovations within the field of environmental policy.

First, the chapter looked at the inherent problems associated with policy-implementation in Lower Saxony as they confronted the Red-Green coalition in 1990, such as the state's poor economic health and the problem of staffing. The chapter concluded that (compared to Berlin) staffing was much more of an issue in Lower Saxony, with the SPD and Greens sharing misgivings about the closed nature of the *Land* policy-network. The chapter gave an account of the early days of the Lower Saxony coalition - marked by the removal of many high-profile civil servants - and noted that the Greens lacked expertise in depth. Taken in the round, the chapter concluded that the coalition's policies represented continuity, rather than change, in terms of their use of economic instruments.

The Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (Niedersächsiches Landesamt für Ökologie).

The chapter first looked at the Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (NLÖ) and concluded that the policy of *Integrationsgedänke* was only partially successful and that, because of its size and terms of reference the NLÖ was of little use in breaking down the established hierarchies within the policy network. Nevertheless, it was noted that the NLÖ has escaped the severe criticism that the *Beirats zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs* and the *Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung* have attracted.

Nuclear Policy and the Advisory Council For The Phasing-Out Of Nuclear Power (Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs).

The chapter then looked at the setting up the *Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs* (BfK) and the events that precipitated it (e.g. how the Nuclear power policy issue was complicated by the Basic Law, with competencies shared between *Länder* and *Bund* and the *Land* having to 'work around' the Federal government through its powers of the *Aufsichtspflicht* (the duty to monitor) to review nuclear power-related plants and practices with an eye to closure on health and safety grounds), in particular, the row between Monika Griefahn and Federal Environment Minister Töpfer. It was noted that this illustrated the limited nature of *Länder* powers in this 'second node' [after Katzenstein, 1987] of the policy network.

Having described how the BfK was set-up as a way of getting the coalition off the hook on this issue, the chapter then assessed the BfK's structure and terms of reference. It was noted that the BfK's terms of reference were extremely wide-ranging (and with its constituent committees in danger of duplicating their terms of reference), that they touched upon the interests of the Federal Government (including those of a security-oriented nature) and that the estimated operating budget of DM 450,000 per annum invited the charge of 'jobs for the boys'.

The chapter then described the coalition's poor record in the field of nuclear energy policy (with building work at the planned *Endlager Gorleben* and the licensing process for the Asse II facility still underway and the Federal government able to force through a license for the Schacht Konrad facility).

The chapter then noted that the BfK's terms of reference had become more modest since the Greens have left the *Land* government, with a reduction in the number and terms of

reference of the sub-committees. Moreover, there has been a re-emphasis upon traditional technocratic solutions to policy problems. Nevertheless, the chapter concluded that, in its own terms, the BfK had not been an institutional failure, as it had been set up by an SPD-dominated coalition and worked to the (SPD-run) Environment Ministry and *Staatskanzlei*. As such, the Greens never enjoyed enough institutional leverage over it.

Solid Waste Disposal and the Second Government Commission On Avoidance And Use Of Waste (Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung)

The chapter then looked at the operation of the *Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung*, describing how the topic of waste disposal was flagged-up during the bargaining phase and in the coalition agreement. Much was made of the coalition's desire to avoid the incineration option at nearly all costs, only to eventually be forced into a political U-turn and eventually approving the building of a high temperature incinerator after all. The chapter speculated as to whether this decision was necessary or more an act of deliberate provocation of the Greens in the run-up to the 1994 *Landtag* election.

The chapter then noted that, despite these difficulties, the overall record of the Red-Green coalition (and its SPD successor) was relatively successful. The chapter gave a résumé of the Lower Saxony Waste Disposal Law (*NAbfAbgG*) of 1992, as well as an account of how the relevant Federal technical standards (the 1993 Technical Instructions on Residential Waste) and legislation (the 1994 Federal Act on Waste management and Product Recycling) have also been amended along the same lines, with a much stronger application of the 'polluter pays' principle. The influence of the Red-Green coalition (and the Second Commission) on these documents is clear.

The chapter concluded that the Second Commission failed in political terms and that the Greens' client groups had only limited success in breaking down the established

hierarchies, because entry into the network was constrained by opportunity costs related to expertise and access to the means of production in such a specialised and capital-intensive field. However, even though it represented a much more corporatist model than the other bodies studied in Chapters Six and Seven, the chapter noted that such an under-representation of ecological groups was of limited importance, given the degree of consensus in the Federal Republic over the basic principles of solid waste management. The chapter concluded that the Second Commission was a success, but noted the irony of the Greens' limited role in this.

10.2.8. Chapter Eight

Chapters Eight and Nine test the model(s) against the empirical evidence of the previous four chapters. Chapter Eight first tested established models of coalition formation, starting with Riker's [1962] Minimum/Minimal-Winning Theory before moving on to Axelrods [1970] Minimal Connected Winning Theory and finally de Swaan's [1973] Median Legislator Model. It concluded that the three models display some variance of predictive power when applied to the two case studies, with all three models limited by their neglect of ideological distance. De Swaan's account, which contains a policy dimension, is more explanatory but, in the trade-off between predictive and explanatory power, once the policy-dimension has been accounted for (or discounted), a numerical formation criteria remains important.

Next, the chapter applied the new model of coalition formation to the two case studies and concluded that the model is both predictive and explanatory. In both cases, the Preconditions to Coalition Bargaining stood up against the empirical evidence. The bargaining set was self-selecting and excluded all parties that were perceived not to be normatively-defensible, according to accepted democratic criteria. Thus, the Berlin

Alternative Liste and the Lower Saxony Greens eventually moderated their stance to become more acceptable as potential coalition partners. Moreover, in both instances this represented a trade-off between office-seeking and policy-driven preferences in which they acted like any other conventional office-seeking party. The evidence also supports the idea of policy preferences as a function of one or more ideological dimensions, with the SPD's Janus-faced ideological profile allowing it to positively engage with the other parties along either the Downsian Left-Right and/or the materialist/post-materialist dimension.

The model's main assumptions about Coalition Formation were also well supported by the evidence. Both coalition outcomes were the closest for both parties *in policy terms* (ideologically 'connected' along at least one policy-dimension). Moreover, having fulfilled these policy-oriented criteria, it was demonstrated that the actual outcome was the only possible (ideologically connected) *minimal-winning* coalition in either case. Again, the SPD were decisive: with the CDU (in Berlin) and the CDU and/or FDP (in Lower Saxony) having the option of engaging the SPD along the Downsian-esque Left-Right policy dimension (such as the Domains of Foreign Affairs, Freedom and Democracy, Government, the Economy, Welfare, Fabric of Society, Social Groups and Discursive Form), whilst the Berlin AL and the Lower Saxony Greens were able to selectively emphasise the common post-materialist ground they shared with the SPD (within the Domains of Welfare, Fabric of Society and Social Groups). In turn, the SPD was able to calculate policy-distance in terms of the parties' relative positions along these dimensions, with the actual outcome assumed to be the revealed preference of all parties (with no other party able or willing to offer a more attractive alternative). These revealed preferences fulfilled specific policy-oriented formation criteria, and served to maximise office-seeking payoffs by being the minimal-connected-winning coalition *with the least partners*. However, the assumption (*e*), that if all other conditions are satisfied, the party that controls the median legislator within the most policy sectors is decisive, was not

conclusively demonstrated, with the SPD (who controlled the median legislator) getting a different numerical share of the office-seeking payoffs in the two cases. Nevertheless, the chapter posited the idea that such a variance can be explained by a difference in the type of portfolios in each case (with the Lower Saxony Greens' being given a *numerically* disproportionate share of cabinet portfolios to offset the loss of the *normatively* disproportionate policy-related payoffs associated with the Environment portfolio).

The chapter concluded that the established models of coalition formation successfully problematised the trade-off between prediction and explanation, office-seeking and policy-oriented payoffs and that the new model possessed considerable predictive and explanatory power. However, it was stressed that models of coalition formation only aspire to predict and explain a one-off outcome (easily conceptualised as a single-play game and easy to model) and that it is much harder to model multiple plays of a game over time (those that would take place in a deductive model of coalition maintenance).

10.2.9. Chapter Nine

The chapter began by noting that, as it is much harder to model multiple plays of a game over time, Assumption 3 (f) is of central significance to the thesis because its stress upon the idea of payoffs provides the focus for the case studies and sets up the discussion on the nature of payoffs in sections 10.3. and 10.4. The chapter concluded that the two case studies can be explained in the light of general principles set out in the new model (rather than just as a local 'story'), albeit through their partial falsification.

The assumption (*a*) that coalition stability is in inverse proportion to its ideological range was falsified, given that the Berlin coalition collapsed in acrimony whilst the Lower Saxony coalition went the full term. Notwithstanding the fact that the AL still retained a

robust *fundi* element within its *Basis*, this suggests that - uncomfortably for some political scientists - 'events' (*pace* Harold Macmillan) are as crucial as any predictable variables in determining the success of coalition maintenance. Likewise, the assumption (*b*) that coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the size of its legislative majority was also questionable, given that in both cases, the Red-Green coalition option was the only minimal-connected-winning coalition (and indeed the only minimal-winning coalition *per se*) in the bargaining set. In theory, no alternative coalition arrangements would have lasted as long as the Red-Green coalitions in either case yet the chapter noted that a surplus-majority Grand Coalition in Berlin, for example, might have been more successful in confronting the new strategic environment that arose out of the collapse of the GDR. However, as this is a counter-factual argument, the proposition cannot be said to have been falsified. The proposition (*c*), that coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of partners within the coalition is also challenged by the collapse of the Berlin coalition, but satisfied by the Lower Saxony case, where the coalition lasted the full term. The proposition (*d*) that coalition stability is in inverse proportion to the number of alternative coalitions available to members is also satisfied.. Because of Schröder's hostile attitude towards the CDU and FDP, the SPD did not realistically have a choice of coalition partners in the Lower Saxony case and it lasted the full term (despite the lower numerical share of payoffs, as a result of the Greens being compensated for their failure to secure the environment portfolio). In contrast, the Berlin coalition (where the SPD had alternatives) collapsed. Proposition (*e*), that codified coalition arrangements, with a formal investiture procedure, are more stable is unproved in the German case, given that it is normal practice in the Federal Republic to formally codify coalition arrangements with a coalition agreement, which sets out in some detail the policies that are to be pursued by the coalition.

Given that two of the five propositions examined so far are at least partially falsifiable, much hangs on the proposition (*f*), that all parties calculate the utility of their continued participation within a coalition on the basis of the degree of correlation between their preferences and their actual and anticipated payoffs. It is clear that by the time the Berlin Red-Green coalition had collapsed, both parties had concluded that continued participation in the coalition was not desirable, whilst in Lower Saxony, where it went the full term, both parties professed satisfaction with the coalition's record. This is self-explanatory and appears to bear out the assumption. But when the respective policy records of the two coalitions are compared, the Berlin coalition was not without its achievements (as both parties have belatedly recognised). Clearly, the perception of actual and anticipated payoffs is as important as the reality. These issues are discussed at greater length later in this chapter.

Chapter Nine concluded that the model is predictive and its assumptions realistic [Nagel 1973]. As to whether it is explanatory depends on the extent to which it can be used to explain the nature of the payoffs involved in the two cases and, by implication, in the abstract. This will also be looked at in sections 10.3. and 10.4.

10.3. The Rules of the Game

10.3.1. The idea of Games (and payoffs)

The reader will have noted that the idea of Games (and their payoffs) is central to the theoretical framework that drives this thesis forward. But what does one mean when this imagery is used? As was discussed in Chapter One, coalition games can be regarded as

having six distinct elements, or 'rules of the game', through which coalition behaviour is modelled and there are six questions (formulated here for the simplest form of game. that involving two players) which define those rules [Hargreaves Heap *et al.* 1992: 95].

First, who are the players? In other words, who is making the decisions within the game? This is important, not so much because of what it tells us about the individual player herself, but because it identifies whose actions or 'moves' (on the other side) the player must take into account.

Second, having identified who matters in the game, what are the strategies available to the players? A strategy is a plan of action, based upon knowledge of the permissible sequence of rules within the game. The degree of sophistication of a strategy is defined by (i) the complexity of the game and (ii) the amount of knowledge the player has about it.

Third, to what extent are the players able to form coalitions? If the players are participating in a 'co-operative game', any subset of players is able to form a coalition. In a 'non-co-operative game' players are not able to make the binding agreements with each other that constitute coalitions, but must rather act as independent agents. The process by which a non-co-operative strategy is superseded by one of co-operation is called 'bargaining'.

Fourth, what are the payoffs of the players (assuming payoffs measure the degree to which players are successful in meeting their objectives in the game)? Given that preferences vary, so does the method used to order them. They may be ordered cardinally or, more simply as an ordinal order of preference.

Fifth, how much information do the players have about the game? What do they know about the available strategies and associated payoffs available to themselves and the opposing player? If players have 'complete information', they know all of the rules of the game and the strategies and payoffs available to themselves and their opponent. This does not remove uncertainty, but assumes that each player knows the probability distributions attached to the outcomes of the available strategies. If players are not in possession of such knowledge, then they are considered to be playing a game with 'incomplete information'.

Finally, how much information can be considered 'common knowledge'? Common knowledge is possessed by both players and - crucially - is seen to be so. Therefore, player *A* knows that player *B* knows what player *A* knows and vice versa. This absence of doubt facilitates the solving of games because both players are able to put themselves in other's place, imagine what they would do in that position and act upon that knowledge. However in reality games are reasonably complicated and players are more often than not incapable of (i) possessing all of the relevant knowledge and (ii) making the quick and highly complex computations required to act upon them. In other words, these players actions are informed by 'bounded rationality', in which highly complex problems are truncated into a manageable scenario. How this actually takes place is still something of a mystery to psychologists [*ibid.*: 125]. Essentially, one is in the realm of the imagination.

10.3.2. The Berlin and Lower Saxony Games

So how does the party system in Berlin in the period 1989 to 1990, or that of Lower Saxony in the period 1990 to 1994, fit this analogy of a game, and what were the payoffs involved? For the purposes of the thesis, question 4 (what are the payoffs?) will be dealt with last in section 10.4.

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Who are the players?

It is crucial that each player is able to know who is making the decisions within the game and whose moves must be taken into account. It is perhaps not surprising then that the two parties found themselves unable to anticipate each other's moves. In a formal sense, the coalition agreement in both cases was drawn up by the two parliamentary *Fraktionen* and would be implemented and monitored by them. However, in reality there were other players whose presence disrupted the game and hindered the development of strategies. For instance, the Berlin AL *Fraktion* and its Lower Saxony counterpart had to refer all important decisions back to their *Basis* for approval. Obviously, this undermined the principle of cabinet government because decisions taken in cabinet were constantly being second-guessed by the extra-parliamentary Green movement. This was especially the case in Berlin, where the uniquely vociferous nature of the intra-party discourse within the AL at that time meant that *Fraktion* members had to 'cover their backs' when it came to dealing with the membership. When SPD cabinet members saw their AL colleagues not only giving cabinet decisions a completely different 'spin' but also adopting a more strident (and often anti-SPD) tone to do so, trust was slowly eroded. This process also took place in Lower Saxony, albeit over a longer period of time. Nevertheless, by the summer of 1993, the Greens' *Basis* in Lower Saxony were explicitly denouncing the SPD and all its works, leaving Trittin with little choice but to harden his own stance. Whether by accident or design, this provided the pretext for Schröder and the SPD to move away from their coalition partners towards the political centre in the run-up to the 1994 elections.

On the other hand, for the Berlin AL and the Lower Saxony Greens, it was clear that producer interests such as the trades unions, big business and property speculators were exerting influence upon the SPD at the highest level. They regarded them as additional - and shadowy - players in the game. This assumption was especially potent, given the long history of political corruption within the Berlin SPD. Contentious issues such as the

Preussen Electra and *Intrac* affairs, the row over the Hahn-Meitner Institute Research Reactor and even Interior Minister Patzold's eviction of Mainzer Straße squatters were regarded by many in the AL as symptomatic of the malign influence of such producer interests. By contrast, the Lower Saxony SPD was not so discredited. Nevertheless. Schröder was close to big business and the rows over EXPO 2000, the *Europipe* affair and the Papenburg test-track only served to confirm the Greens' worst suspicions.

What are the strategies available to the players?

As already noted, the ability to draw up a plan of action is based upon knowledge of the permissible sequence of rules within the game. The degree of sophistication of such a strategy is defined by the both the complexity of the game and the amount of knowledge the player has about it. Both of these elements were problematised by the outside influences noted above. There were two reasons for this.

First, in purely numerical terms, the presence of additional players moves the game from being essentially a two-person game to being an n-person game. As discussed in Chapter One (and demonstrated in greater detail in Appendix Two, section 2.5), as players are added to an n-person game, the number of possible outcomes rises exponentially. Thus, the game becomes increasingly more complex and the likelihood that the player has complete knowledge of it becomes increasingly remote. Second, parties are not 'black boxes' and the presence of the particular additional players mentioned above made the task of both internal party management and that of the coalition itself so much harder. For instance, the sight of AL and Green ministers having to refer back to the more 'wild and woolly' elements within the *Basis* was anathema to the SPD's right wing, including the producer interests mentioned above. The right-wing was by temperament anti-AL/Green in its orientation and had to be kept onboard by party managers. This often meant that concessions had to be made to re-assure them that the SPD was not in thrall to 'Red-Green

chaos', which inevitably meant a more robustly right-wing stance than would otherwise have been the case. This had negative consequences for the process of coalition management.

Conversely, the obvious influence of producer interests on the SPD confirmed to the more *fundi*-oriented members of *Basis* that the Greens were supping with the devil in political terms. This served to further polemicise their internal debate and make decisions of the *Basis* even harder to predict than usual. Given that the two local party's internal constitutions at the time required the consent of the *Basis*, it was even more likely as a result that *Fraktion* members had to 'play to the gallery' in order to bring the party with them. In turn, this further aggravated the SPD's right-wing. In other words, there were a combination of institutional factors - in effect a vicious circle - that inhibited the successful formation and implementation of a political strategy of co-operation.

To what extent are the players able to form coalitions?

In a 'co-operative game', any subset of players is able to form a coalition. However, institutional norms within the two party systems (for instance, the marginalisation of the *Republikaner* in Berlin) meant that prior to the election, the environment in which even the democratically-acceptable parties found themselves was one of a 'non-co-operative game', in which players act as independent agents (albeit committed to certain policy positions which constrained their room for manoeuvre). However, once the parties assessed their relative positions within the bargaining environment after the election, they began to undertake the bargaining process by which the original non-co-operative strategy moved to one of co-operation. This was easier in Lower Saxony, where the party system had already concentrated into a *de facto* two-block system. At the heart of this process in both cases were each party's bundle of preferences, be they of an office-seeking or policy-oriented nature.

How much information do the players have about the game?

None of the parties had 'complete information' about the rules of the game and the strategies and payoffs available to themselves and their opponent. On the contrary, there was a great deal of uncertainty; much of which was aggravated by the specific institutional arrangements (such as referring back to the Greens' *Basis*) of the parties involved. In the period around 1990, the learning process between local SPD and Green parties that was described in Chapter Three was still at a relatively unsophisticated stage. Indeed the mistakes that were made in the two case studies have become part of the institutional knowledge of 'Red-Green co-operation', which may be called upon one day at the national level. Because of this early stage in the acquisition of this institutional knowledge, none of the parties had a great deal of information about the probability distributions attached to the outcomes of the available strategies available to them.

How much information available to the parties can be considered 'common knowledge'?

This leads on from the previous question, in that were limits to the amount of knowledge which was possessed by both players and seen to be so. There was a broad common understanding of the institutional norms that underpinned the party system, outlined in the Preconditions to Coalition Bargaining, but even this understanding was only partial (with the Greens still ambivalent at the margins towards acceptance of the state's monopoly of violence). Beyond this broad understanding, there was a great deal of doubt with regard to the 'rules of the game' per se and each player's understanding of them. This persistence of doubt constrained the solving of the political game, precisely because the players were not always able to put themselves in the other's place. There was a degree of mutual incomprehension that made it very hard for either party to imagine what the other would do in a given position and to act upon that knowledge. In terms of 'bounded rationality', the lack of a common knowledge meant that many highly complex political problems were truncated into a what was essentially a 'worst case' scenario, based upon

suspicion and incomprehension. Thus, the more complex the problem, the less able the coalition partners were able to deal with it. The breakdown in relations between the SPD and AL following the events of November 1989 in Berlin and the chill that crept in to relations between the SPD and Greens over the growing jobs crisis in Lower Saxony after 1992 can be seen in this light. In both cases, the parties suspected that the other was more interested in using the situation for their own party political advantage that in finding a solution to the particular problem they faced.

What are the payoffs of the players?

The Berlin coalition collapsed in acrimony, whilst the Lower Saxony coalition was characterised by a slow breakdown in relations between the two parties. At first glance one would be forgiven for thinking that the acrimony surrounding the demise of both coalitions meant that both parties regarded the two coalitions as being relative failures. Payoffs measure the degree to which players are successful in meeting their objectives in the game, so by implication one might assume that the parties' payoff shares failed to live up to expectations. Indeed, one could compile a list of political issues and policy areas in both cases where the two coalitions did indeed fail to deliver either office-seeking or policy oriented payoffs. At the very least, the coalitions records are mixed.

10.4. On the Nature of Payoffs

10.4.1. Office-seeking payoffs at first glance

It is hard to make a snap judgement about the importance of office-seeking payoffs *per se*, or each party's relative share of them, in determining the shape and performance of the coalition. In Berlin, the SPD did far better than the AL in the numerical distribution of

portfolios. The latter's representation within the city legislature of 17 representatives only yielded three out of the fourteen cabinet posts, a ratio of legislative seats to cabinet posts of almost six-to-one. The SPD, on the other hand, had 55 representatives and took all the other portfolios as well as the post of Governing Mayor, a ratio of just five-to-one. As already noted, this disparity was a function of the disproportionate weight the AL attached to the environmental policy sector, especially with the areas of city-development and traffic policy attached. It will be recalled that an AL representative told the author that they '*didn't want just a ministry for environmental propaganda* [but rather] *wanted to make policy*'.

By contrast, the Lower Saxony Greens received just two portfolios - the Ministry for Federal and European Affairs and the Women's Ministry - in contrast to the SPD's ten. Moreover, they did not even get 'their' Environment portfolio, but had to be content with the post of State Secretary within the ministry. In addition, all the 'blue-chip' posts - such as the Economics Ministry - remained in the SPD's hands. Nevertheless in numerical terms the Greens did better than the SPD, with a ratio of legislative seats to cabinet posts of four-to-one compared with the latter's seven-to-one. As was noted this numerical advantage can be regarded as compensation for failing to win what many regarded as the 'core' portfolio.

For the Lower Saxony SPD it was the quality rather than the quantity that counted in this case. It will be recalled that this view was echoed by the tabloid *Neue Presse*, which considered the outcome of the bargaining process to be '*Schröder's success*', given that '*the soon-to-be-elected head of Government ...had displayed strength and only permitted the Greens to have competence for two relatively unimportant mini-ministries*' [08/6/90].

10.4.2. Policy-oriented payoffs at first glance

At first glance the distribution of policy-oriented payoffs in the two cases is equally mixed. In Berlin the coalition were confronted with a great deal of institutional resistance within the traditional ministries by tenured civil servants for whom indefinite leave (*Ruhestand*) at the public expense was normally the only sanction. This was aggravated by the shortage of men and women of sufficient credibility and expertise to replace them. Even where this implementation drag and lack of expertise was less the case. in the City Development, Environmental Protection and Traffic Ministry, with the exception of some aspects of transport policy (for instance, the reduction of fares for public transport. introduction of the *Umweltkarte* system and the imposition of traffic controls) most of the programme required implementation over the medium- to long-term (whilst the political costs were felt immediately). There was little short-term policy-oriented utility and, given the fact that the coalition did not even reach its second anniversary. any long term utility was of a diffuse nature. This was especially the case for the AL who, having ran the ministry during the coalition, were no longer in office. Moreover, as already noted, the coalition's environmental policy was the product of two distinct and often contradictory discourses. Whilst to limited extent, a certain amount of left-libertarian/post-materialist-oriented linkages between environmental policy and wider societal power structures were made, the traditional statist 'top-down' approach to policy making remained evident.

Similarly, in Lower Saxony a deficit in the state's finances of DM 1.4 billion meant that staffing within the ministries had been cut to the bone and any expansion of social provision was to be limited and at the expense of other projects. As a result. the coalition emphasised issues such as civil rights/constitutional protection. atomic energy. waste disposal and transport policy. Given that these were potentially divisive policy domains. with only limited scope for the selected emphasis of areas of consensus. it was vital that the coalition delivered on these issues. Yet by the end of the coalition. the nuclear waste

storage sites at Gorleben and Schacht Konrad were still in use and, despite the Greens' hostility to any form of incineration of industrial and household waste, a high-temperature facility was in the process of being built. Nevertheless, despite Gerhard Schröder's political manoeuvrings, he remains popular with many Greens, who consider the coalition to have been a success.

10.4.3. Between Office Seeking and Policy Making

Obviously, the trade-off between office seeking and policy-oriented payoffs is more complex than first appears. But how is one to express it in terms of the order of preferences? In abstract, game-theoretical terms the numerical representation of a preference ordering is called a 'utility function'. Such a utility function can be represented either in cardinal or ordinal terms [Hargreaves Heap *et al*, 1992: 96].

However, in neither case study can a clear argument be made for the decisiveness of policy-oriented payoffs (defined by the record of policy outcomes alone) over office-seeking payoffs. Neither can the opposite case be made, although the Lower Saxony Greens objectively went further in sacrificing a 'core' portfolio - that of environment - in order to reach a coalition agreement (and by implication to secure office).

Taken in such crude terms (i.e. the ideological distance travelled in order to enter government) the thesis' findings would indicate that, if there is a qualitative difference in the type of payoffs each party valued, it is the Greens who are the more *office seeking* party and not the SPD! Yet this is counter-intuitive in terms of what we know about the Greens in particular and in contradiction to the thesis' assumptions about the behaviour of parties in general. These are set out in the New Model of Coalition Formation condition *II* (d) which states that:

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- it is only *after* conditions *II* (a) (ideological 'connectedness'). *II* (b) (mutual calculation of policy-distance along the Left-Right and/or materialist/post-materialist dimensions) and *II* (c) (identifying the party or parties with which each party *X* is most in agreement, across the weighted aggregate of policy sectors) are satisfied that parties will choose to be a member of the coalition that will maximise office-seeking payoffs (the minimal-connected-winning coalition with the least partners) [page 38].

Moreover, according to the model, even this bounded form of office-seeking rationality is contingent on a constant re-appraisal by the parties of their record in government in the light of their (primarily policy-oriented) preferences. As condition *III* (f) states:

- All parties calculate the utility of their continued participation within a coalition on the basis of the degree of correlation between their preferences and their actual and anticipated payoffs [page 39].

Although there are increasingly elements of truth to the idea of the Greens as a pragmatic office-seeking party, it is an inadequate explanation of this discrepancy between the findings of the case studies and what is known about the Greens (especially during the period covered by the case studies). The alternative explanation is that, in those areas of policy where the coalition's record of policy outcomes was at best mixed, the effect of the Greens participation in government upon the processes - or outputs - of policy making were great enough to offset what one must assume was a great disappointment to the party's *Fraktion*, *Basis* and wider associated networks. Moreover, given that the Lower Saxony Greens were in favour of renewing the coalition despite the traumas of the last year in office, it might be assumed that this (real or perceived) impact upon policy processes was particularly profound (compared with Berlin). In assessing if this was the case, the thesis builds upon the work of Rhodes [1981, 1986a, 1986b] (see Chapter One).

10.4.4. The nature of the configuration of groups associated with the Greens prior to the Red-Green coalition

Using Rhodes' terminology, the thesis asks if the configuration of groups associated with the Greens prior to their participation could be described as Policy Communities. Professional Networks, Intergovenmental Networks, Producer Networks or Issue Networks? As already noted, the networks associated with the Greens in both case studies were loose configurations, which one could not credibly even regard as an Issue Network (a detailed discussion of this point is beyond the scope of the thesis).

Berlin. In the West Berlin case, the AL had access to a resource of environmental expertise centred around the city's universities (in particular the Free University) and the *Umweltbundesamt* (Federal Agency for the Environment), founded in 1974. Thus the configuration of groups in the city was reasonably well-established and characterised by a number of participants with a significant degree of interdependence. as the inter-connectedness of *Eurosolar* and other environmental groups demonstrates (see Chapter Six). Thus, the Berlin AL was able to draw upon a wealth of expertise for advice and. if needed, the staffing of ministries.

Lower Saxony. By contrast, although there a great deal of expertise in Lower Saxony (mainly in the Universities), it was not on the scale of Berlin and it did not benefit from the presence of an equivalent to the *Umweltbundesamt*. The configuration in the state was characterised by a smaller number of participants with a more limited degree of interdependence and a more atomised structure than its Berlin equivalent (on the face of it. this would make staffing ministries harder than in Berlin).

10.4.5. The nature of the established network(s) prior to the Red-Green coalition

Berlin. In Berlin, the established networks presented a mixed picture. Amongst the permanent civil service it could be assumed that a significant proportion of the *Beamten* were long-established party placemen (especially amongst the top tier of permanent officials). As a result, there was a danger of 'implementation drag' on the part of recalcitrant officials. At the same time, the City Development, Environmental Protection and Traffic ministry was only set up in 1981 and had not become part of a rigid policy network in the manner of some of the more established ministries. Although it had previously been close to the FDP (who were not represented in the legislature), it was staffed with younger and less well-entrenched officials.

Amongst the social partners, the local trades unions attitude to the new coalition depended upon their position within the producer networks. The education and science union (*GEW*) were initially sympathetic to the coalition (this changed after the KITA strike), whilst the traditionally right-wing unions, such as the construction workers' union (*IG BSE*), often displayed outright hostility.

Within the energy sector itself, the policy-making environment was traditionally closed, with a very restricted membership and was distinctly corporatist in nature [cf. Schneider 1988]. Building upon Rhodes' model, the policy-making establishment displayed all the manifestations of an entrenched 'Policy Community', characterised by stable relationships between a highly restricted membership, high vertical interdependence and insulation from other networks and the wider polity.

Lower Saxony. If anything, the picture in Lower Saxony was even more unclear than that in Berlin. Within the civil service a significant raft of SPD members had flourished at all levels, despite the fact that the CDU had held power since 1976. This was indicative of

the cosy relationship between the parties, the administration and the NGOs that had developed over successive SPD and CDU-led administrations. Again, it conformed very closely to Rhodes' ideal-type of an entrenched 'Policy Community'. Ironically, the initial force working against this closed network was not the Greens but the SPD itself. As already noted, after coming to power Schröder made 11 changes to existing senior positions within the civil service and created a number of new posts within the *Land* administration (including the expansion of the *Staatskanzlei* which was to become his fiefdom). Schröder has often been described as an outsider, even - some might say especially - within his own party. He obviously did not trust the established networks within the civil service regardless of party affiliation.

Within the field of environmental policy in general, the networks conformed to the same pattern. They were characterised by a stable and highly restricted membership, high vertical interdependence and insulation from other networks. This insulation took the form of disciplinary and media-oriented barriers, preventing policy being made 'in the round' [Weale, 1992a] to tackle environmental degradation at source. Because of this, the coalition was to create the NLÖ in order to introduce a new ethos of integrated thinking (*Integrationsgedänke*).

The network associated with the domain of nuclear policy was additionally complex, given that it involved delegated administration (*Auftragsverwaltung*) passed down from the Federal government. This had profound consequences in terms of party politics, the vertical sectorisation of policy-making and the nature of social partners involved (given the foreign policy/defence-related implications of nuclear power for the *Bund*).

For legal, political and technical reasons, the network within the domain of waste disposal was additionally complex and opaque. Again the *Land* shared technical competencies: this

time with the *Bund* and the *Kommunen* (the *Land* relies upon the *Kommunen* to carry out waste disposal). In addition, Article 79 of the Basic Law made the policy area subject to concurrent legislation (*konkurriende Gesetzgebung*) between the *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat* as well as with the *Länder*. Thus, competencies were both horizontally and vertically sectorised in law. Politically, although multi-level governance in Germany is meant to be carried out in a spirit of co-operative federalism, it inevitably has party-political overtones (the Red-Green coalition in Hannover could rely upon a sympathetic SPD majority in the *Bundesrat*, but not in the *Bundestag* and had to expect a number of (CDU- and/or FDP-controlled) *Kommunen* making common cause with their political allies in the Federal government against the *Landesregierung*). Finally, the domain was made additionally closed, because the topic area of solid waste disposal, particularly industrial waste, presents high opportunity costs to entry (based on technical expertise and access to the means of production). Thus when the new coalition set up the Second Commission to look at the issue, even one of the trades union representatives came from Oldenburg University faculty - supporting the idea of limited entry based on expertise - and there was only one individual on the Commission acting in a private capacity - supporting the idea of limited entry based upon access to the means of production. In fact, like the energy sector network in Berlin, this particular network comes close to Schneider's [1988] corporatist ideal-type (see Chapter One).

10.4.6. The extent to which the Greens' associated client groups had already penetrated the network(s) prior to the Red-Green coalitions

From the evidence of the two case studies (Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven), the Greens' associated client groups had made little or no impact upon the established groups prior to the Red-Green coalitions in either case. Indeed, this is why the setting up of the various advisory councils and their actual membership was of such importance (and why

they are looked at in this thesis). Where some progress had been made, this was more evident in Berlin (where the presence of the *Umweltbundesamt* provided a limited method of entry into the established networks up to and including the Federal level) than in Lower Saxony, where any environmentalists within the established network were politically (and often geographically) isolated.

10.4.7. The extent to which the Greens' associated client groups penetrated the networks during or after the coalition

In other words, to what extent had they (i) succeeded in breaking down the established network(s) *per se* and making them more open and democratic, or (ii) were co-opted into what remained a relatively closed and privileged policy elite?

This is the central question when evaluating the nature of the payoffs accruing to the Greens and their associated client groups and the answer is not a simple one. For instance, it would be perfectly possible for the Greens to ignore the structure of the networks as an issue and concentrate on using the existing state machine to generate the desired policy outcomes (as indeed Social Democratic parties across Europe - including the SPD - had done before them). However, given the Greens' underlying post-materialist'/left-libertarian ideological stance this would in their terms be a failure which would be aggravated by the mixed record of actual policy outcomes in the two case studies. Alternatively, it could be imagined that the Greens might settle for the co-option of their associated client groups into the established policy network regardless of policy outcomes (again, an option that is not wholly unfamiliar to European Social Democratic parties!). Again, however, within the Greens ideological terms of reference, this form of clientilism would be hard to justify. Therefore, we must assume that the Greens at least set out to effect policy outcomes and outputs.

But how is this assumption to be assessed? Moreover, given that the discussion is ultimately about payoffs, one must look at these effects as much in terms of the perceptions of those involved as in hard objective facts. Also, it would be mistake to look at the established network at the aggregate level alone. At that level, the establishment of advisory councils with a large budget, a wide remit and a healthy representation of Greens would appear to constitute a major change in the process of policy making. But essentially it is only of limited impact if the structure state bureaucracy is unchanged. If that is the case, then one must conclude that the Greens associated client groups have merely been co-opted into the existing policy network. To have made a real impact, the Greens have to have affected major changes in at least two out of the following three elements:

- legislation, modes of regulation and enforcement (policy outputs)

- the constitution of interest group representation (policy processes)

- the structure of the state bureaucracy (policy processes). Moreover, they have to have been seen to do so. The extent to which they were is assessed below.

10.4.8. The real and/or perceived impact upon legislation, modes of regulation and enforcement

Berlin. As discussed in Chapter Six, the coalition's legislative programme emphasised the need for greater transparency in the city's planning culture and made specific pledges within the fields of: air emissions and clean air technologies; water technology; waste disposal policy; the development of 'green field' sites; public transport and - crucially for the thesis - impose a 'sparing, rational and socially sustainable' system of energy provision and use (including a new energy tax, modification of existing laws on energy use, modification of pricing system and decentralisation of energy production). With the exception of some aspects of transport policy, most of the programme would be

introduced over the medium- to long-term with a primary reliance upon bureaucratic instruments (such as judicial review, state regulation and subsidy) over economic instruments (such as eco-taxes and pricing). The Berlin Energy Law was the centre-piece of the coalition's energy policy. It sought to promote the lowest possible consumption of non-renewable energy and proposed measures for both the public and private sectors. These included an 'Energy Pass' system, new procurement guidelines and a network of Energy Officials at the local *Bezirke* level. However, the most important innovations were the proposed development of an 'Energy Concept' (through the convening of the 'Energy Advisory Council'). Although this was an innovative raft of legislation, in general it represented continuity rather than change in terms of modes of enforcement and regulation.

Although it was completed in 1992, two years after the coalition's collapse, the Berlin Energy Concept represented the culmination of the coalition's ambitions in the energy sector. It aimed to raise East Berlin's technical standard of energy consumption to the same standard as that in West Berlin and make the new united Berlin a model for innovation in the environmental field The document built upon much of what had been advocated in the *Energiegesetz*, representing a long term policy-oriented payoff for the AL, who naturally praised the high standard of technical debate within the document. Interestingly, although time had changed the AL's perceptions and vindicated the coalition's record within the domain of energy policy, the SPD claimed that the Energy Concept was a disappointment. One can only speculate as to the reason for such differing perceptions, but one explanation is that they were not just *ex post* rationalisations of past events, but were also contingent upon events in 1992. The AL were a party no longer in power, but anxious to be regarded as still a relevant political force with some influence over events. Moreover, it had to reassure its own milieu that the political pain of the coalition had not been in vain. As such, its welcoming of the Energy Concept made a lot of sense. The SPD on the other hand was still in power. However it was now the junior

partner to the CDU in a Grand Coalition, rather than senior partner to the AL in a Red-Green coalition. Moreover, the SPD was highly unpopular with both its own membership and the voters. It made no sense from their point of view to praise a policy document that originated under the auspices of a political arrangement that it had written off for little or no political gain. The orthodoxy was that no good had come of the Red-Green coalition. Any other interpretation would imply that Walter Momper *et al* had made a strategic mistake in dumping the AL.

Lower Saxony. In Lower Saxony the new coalition focused upon the issues of civil rights/constitutional protection, atomic energy, waste disposal and transport policy. These were potentially divisive policy domains, with limited scope for the selected emphasis of areas of consensus. Within the domain of environmental policy, both parties favoured abandoning the plans agreed by the Albrecht administration to use the sites at Gorleben and Schacht Konrad as final storage facilities for nuclear waste, but the SPD was more cautious than the Greens, who were impatient to wind-up these facilities. Similarly, the Greens were hostile to any form of incineration of industrial and household waste, whilst Monika Greifahn would not rule-out developing at least one high-temperature facility. The new programme was not regarded as purely the task of one ministry but rather a *Querschnittsaufgabe,* a task that cut across all activities of government. A number of advisory councils were set up, including the Lower Saxony State Environmental Office (NLÖ), the Advisory Council For The Phasing-Out Of Nuclear Power (BfK) and the Second Government Commission On Avoidance And Use Of Waste. As in Berlin, although the coalition proposed an ambitious raft of legislation, the programme was still reliant upon a statist/technocratic set of policy instruments that represented continuity rather than change in terms of modes of enforcement and regulation.

The coalition did enjoy some success in legislative terms. Even in the last months of the coalition when inter-party relations were at their worst Andrea Hoops (the Greens' *Spitzenkandidat* for the up-coming elections) was still able to point to the coalition's record on civil liberties and social policy and housing (45,000 new nursery places; 60,000 new flats etc.) [*Bild*. 22/11/93]. These were some of reasons why the Greens still valued the coalition.

With regard to environmental policy, on the debit side the coalition had failed to deliver on a number of issues. It had officially approved the so-called *Europipe* project (which was to run through the *Nationalpark Wattenmeer*) as well as the *Eurofighter*. the Atomic reactor at Stade, the Mercedes test-track at Papenburg and the dredging of the Ems in order to allow the super-liner *Oriana* to pass through. It had also failed to bring the Gorleben debacle to an end and had built a high temperature incinerator to deal with the mountain of industrial and household waste in the state. However, on the plus side. Lower Saxony has been at the forefront of modernising the technical standards and legal framework of solid waste disposal at both the *Land* and Federal level, as the Lower Saxony Waste Disposal Law (*NAbfAbgG*) of 1 January 1992, the 1993 Technical Instructions on Residential Waste (*TA Siedlungsabfalle*) and the 1994 Federal Act on Waste Management and Product Recycling (*KrW- /AbfG*) bear witness. Over its four years in office, the coalition had invested huge amount of political capital and financial resources into changing the technical and legal framework at *Land* level and, consequently, exerting influence on the Federal government (via the SPD majority in the *Bundesrat*, backed up by the technical expertise of the Second Commission and its successor the Third Commission). The problem for the Greens is that the SPD has had no incentive to continue with the coalition. given that this good work has evidently been continued since 1994 by the Social Democrats alone. For instance, the Third Commission was convened in 1996. and is tasked to concentrate upon integrated systems of waste management. as part of the implementation of the

aforementioned 1994 Federal Act on Waste Management and Product Recycling, which came into force at the same time. When Monika Griefahn declared that '*the SPD can also make very good Green policy without the Greens*' [*Neue Presse*. 14/03/94], she meant it!

10.4.9. The constitution of interest group representation

Berlin. The main advisory body in set up by the Red-Green coalition in Berlin was the Energy Advisory Council (*Energiebeirat*). By and large, it was quite successful in opening up the policy network to the Greens' client groups, not least because it reported directly to the section for central affairs within the Ministry for City Development and Environmental Protection. It drew on all 'three nodes' of Katzenstein's [1987] policy network ideal type (including producer and consumer groups from both sides of the Green debate) and provided a vehicle for advocates of alternative energy, such as *Eurosolar*, the *Öko-institut*, the *Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik* and the Berlin International Solar Centre. These close-knit groups represented a formidable resource of environmental expertise which served to counter the producer interests on the Advisory Council.

But how was it perceived by those involved? On the environmentalist side of the argument, Prof. Jänicke, an academic from the Berlin Free University's Research Point for Environmental Policy (*Forshungsstelle für Umweltpolitik*) - who sits on the *Energiebeirat* - was ambivalent about the real impact of the *Beirat*. On the one hand, he felt that the *Beirat* had '*loosened up*' the entire policy network within the energy sector. In contrast to the transport sector network (which Jänicke singled out as remaining remarkably closed) the energy network was now relatively '*pluralistic*', at least up to the point '*that the important decisions are taken*'. However, Jänicke was of the opinion that the influence of the big energy producers such as BEWAG was still decisive and that the relationship between them and the city government remained too close for comfort. He

cited what was at the time an ongoing process by which the city planned to sell their share of BEWAG as an example of this closeness. The process, he said, was *'top secret ...involving a very few actors.....a small group of senators will make this decision. The information is not available to the Energiebeirat.'* Moreover, Jänicke did not believe that this was due to the fact that the incumbent Grand Coalition were in power. He felt that it would have made no difference if the Greens were still in government and that the basic structures of decision-making had not changed[96].

Astrid Schneider, a representative of *Eurosolar* on the *Energiebeirat*, was more sanguine about the impact of the body, especially in terms of changing the discourse of policy-making within the energy sector. For Schneider, the *Beirat* had provided an opportunity structure within which her organisation had been able to *'push much harder'* for renewable energy use. Moreover, this opportunity structure was not weakened by the Greens absence from government. She cited the example of a decision made by the Grand Coalition in line with the Energy Concept of 1992, to reduce CO2 emissions in the city by 25% by 2005 and - as part of a wider agreement of European cities - by 50% by 2010. Schneider saw the *Energiebeirat* as central to these changes. *'It had had'* she said *'a very positive effect'* on the style and content of policy making within the energy sector[97].

Schneider's viewpoint was supported by Ulrich von Dewitz, an official at the *Energieleitstelle* (to which the *Energiebeirat* reports), who was convinced that the *Beirat* was a valuable resource in what he called the *'struggle'* to drive up environmental standards. In Herr von Dewitz's opinion, the argument had been won within the Berlin government. Like Schneider, he felt that the *Energiebeirat* was so well entrenched that the

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[96]Interview conducted at the *Forshungsstelle für Umweltpolitik* on 10 June 1996.
[97]Interview conducted on 12 June 1996.

change of government after the 1990 elections was 'only of limited importance' and that the following through of the Energy Concept 'continued... with some degree of success'[98].

In their own way, many of the representatives of producer interests interviewed confirmed this argument. Prof. Winje, a Berlin academic and engineer who represented BEWAG on the *Energiebeirat*, claimed that the *Beirat* no longer functioned as a neutral advisory council but had been captured by the environmentalists - particularly the research groups and lobbyists for renewable energy - who used it 'to pursue their own interests.....for financial gain'. Prof. Winje thought that this would lead to a decline in the importance of the *Energiebeirat*, especially in the light of the pressing economic problems associated with German unification. He saw the role of BEWAG on the Beirat to 'moderate and inform' a debate that he implicitly regarded as immoderate and ill-informed[99].

This theme was taken up even more forcefully by one Dr. Schutt, who represented the Berlin Industrial Energy and Power Generation Sector Association (*Verband der industriellen Energie und Kraftwirtschaft e.V. Berlin*). For Dr Schutt, the constitution of the *Energiebeirat* - with majority voting and an Environment Ministry finding common cause with groups like *Eurosolar* - meant that the whole council was run 'in the interests of the Greens'. For Dr Schutt, the Beirat was moving 'in the direction of absolute environmental protection without any thought for the economic consequences'. The evidence of this was that, four years after the introduction of the Energy Concept. Berlin had 'the most expensive [end-user] electricity in Germany'[100].

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[98]Interview conducted at the *Energieleitstelle* on 13 June 1996.
[99]Interview conducted at BEWAG on 12 June 1996.
[100]Interview conducted at the *Verband der industriellen Energie und Kraftwirtschaft e.V. Berlin* on 10 June 1996.

For many Greens, this could be regarded as a sign of success rather than failure. Notwithstanding differences of opinion between the different actors, all of those interviewed painted a remarkably similar picture of a high-profile advisory council that had quite an impact (be it positive or negative) on the style and content of energy policy making in Berlin. Within certain parameters, the policy network had widened and the Greens associated client groups had - depending on the interviewee's position - either gone some way to redressing the dominance of the big producer interests or skewed the whole debate towards a utopian discourse that was damaging the economic interests of Berlin. Clearly the policy network had been changed.

However, it is less clear if this represented a genuine democratisation of the process. Members of the *Beirat* are still appointed by the Environment Minister and, as Prof. Jänicke pointed out, the important decisions are still taken behind closed doors. Therefore, the whiff of co-option remains. This is confirmed by Prof. Harms, who represents the Berlin Institute for Energy Law (*Institut für Energierecht Berlin*) on the *Beirat*. According to Prof. Harms, *'the Energiebeirat enjoys very little direct competence because only a small percentage of its recommendations are carried out ..... its real function is to take ideas arising within the Environmental Ministry and give them some resonance'*[101]. In other words a talking shop, albeit on the side of the angels.

Lower Saxony. In Lower Saxony, the three examples of institutional innovation had different impacts upon the constitution of interest-representation within the networks. The NLÖ, for example, was only partially successful in its remit of co-ordinating policy across disciplinary and media-oriented boundaries along the lines of *Integrationsgedänke*. It remained broken up along functional lines, with it main offices in Hildesheim and the

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[101] Interview conducted at the *Institut für Energierecht Berlin* on 4 July 1996.

rest scattered across Lower Saxony from Hannover to Norderney. This meant that those elements within the existing network were disparate and isolated and could not represent Green interests in any explicit sense. Moreover, this fragmentation made it hard for new actors to enter the network. This last barrier was aggravated because issues of huge political salience to the Greens were reduced to a technical or problem-solving discourse.

Nevertheless, Monika Griefahn had appointed the noted Physicist Horst Wilbrand zur Horst head of the NLÖ, indicating that the success of the NLÖ was a high priority. Indeed, it has been quite a successful institutional innovation, despite only modest representation of the Greens associated client groups within it. This was reflected in an interview with an official at the NLÖ's main offices in Hildesheim, one Dr. Gorsler. For Gorsler, although the NLÖ 'arose from a political vision', it had no explicitly political function. Rather its role was to harness expertise through the *Querschnittsaufgabe* principle and '*prepare politicians.... for innovative work*'[102]. However, it is unclear that all of the NLÖ's officials regard the present arrangements as an improvement. Another official, one Dr. Kötter, had his doubts. '*They thought that it would make the administration simpler*' he said, '*but that has not happened*'[103]. The traditional structures of decision-making could not be simply 'wished away' by a coalition agreement document.

The *Beirat zu Fragen des Kernenergieausstiegs* has enjoyed a much higher political profile than the NLÖ and attracted far more criticism from both sides of the environmental debate. In its original form it was somewhat unwieldy, with very wide terms of reference and quite expensive. It was no surprise the opposition accused the BfK of being no more than a '*maintenance-club for the Red-Green circle*' which made '*a mockery of the tax-payer in*

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[102]Interview conducted on 16 July 1997 at the Hildesheim offices of the NLÖ.
[103]Interview conducted on 18 July 1997 at the Hannover offices of the NLÖ.

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Lower Saxony' [*HAZ.* 26/09/91]. Yet as already noted, the membership of the BfK was the subject of behind the scenes turf wars.

Despite the fact that the Greens were quite successful in getting 'their' people onto the BfK, it still found itself under pressure from the anti-nuclear lobby, because it was unable to force through fundamental changes in the face of opposition from the Federal government and their allies in the energy and defence industries (the reasons for this failure were examined in the last section of the thesis). Moreover, the BfK served as a political smoke screen in many ways. Schröder was still able to sign a deal with the firm *PreussenElektra* to build a gas-fired power station at Stade and approve the *Europipe* project (which although relating to a different fuel source tied in politically and strategically with the nuclear energy debate). In doing so, he split the Greens between the *Fraktion* (who had to defend these decisions) and the *Vorstand* and drew the sting of many of the groups represented on the BfK (who were compromised by their position on the *Beirat*).

At present, the *Beirat* is still operative, but with its terms of reference much reduced. Nearly all traces of the Greens' polemical approach to environmental policy have now gone and the institution has become far more technocratic and problem-solving. As already noted, this is perhaps no surprise. The BfK was not originally planned in the coalition agreement, but rather was set up to get the coalition out of trouble on the nuclear issue. Moreover, it worked to the Environment Minister (soon to become an SPD member) and the *Staatskanzlei* (Schröder's fiefdom). Thus, unlike the *Energiebeirat* in Berlin, it never worked to a Green-controlled ministry and, once out of power, the Greens no longer had any leverage over personnel involved in the BfK. Rather than achieving a permanent alteration of the style and content of policy making (as was achieved to some extent in Berlin) the Greens associated client groups had only limited impact on the nuclear

debate. If one was being uncharitable, one might say that they had essentially been co-opted into a political face-saving exercise.

This impression was partially borne out by comments made by a senior civil servant within the Environment Ministry. This official W[104] was fairly dismissive of the BfK. As already noted in Chapter Seven, he objected to the manner in which the Greens forced 'their' people onto the *Beirat* (as well as their calibre). However, he also regretted what he regarded as a new shrillness to the debate within the policy network. In the past, he said, *'one could argue with colleagues and still be able to meet up at the end of the day and drink a beer together'*. However, the new influx of Green-associated policy actors were *'differently socialised'* and brought with them what he called *'a culture of conflict'* (*Streitkultur*) that was *'completely alien'* to the established policy discourse. There were exceptions of course - people who quietly immersed themselves in their particular area of specialisation - but in general the official made it clear that he found many of the new policy actors hard to get used to and did not regret their passing.

By contrast to the BfK, the Greens failed to make much impact upon the *Zweite Regierungskommision Vermeidung, Verwertung* in terms of personnel. One reason for this was that the *Regierungskommission 'Vermeidung Sonderabfalle'* (the First Government Commission on the subject) had been set up in the Albrecht era and the Second Commission essentially built on this. Members of the commission were appointed from business and industrialist groups, trades unions, ecology groups, the sciences and the civil service, chaired by a board-member of *Preussag AG* a member of the Lower Saxony Institute of Commerce as CEO (deputised by senior civil servants from the Farming and Environment Ministries). Of the other 17 permanent members of the commission, only

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[104]Official *W* was a member of the SPD and held the post of *Abteilungsleiter* at the time of the interview. For obvious reasons the official will remain nameless. The interview was conducted on 19 July 1996 at the Environment Ministry offices in Hannover's Archivstraße.

two came directly from the ecological movement. In addition. each working group (*Arbeitskreise*) was staffed by specialists in roughly the same proportion as the permanent members.

What is significant about this mix is that - because of the high opportunity costs discussed in the previous section - the Greens only managed to secure a limited amount of access to the Second Commission by their own client groups [*Niedersächsiches Umweltministerium AbschlußRegKom-502*, 1995]. However, unlike the energy sector (particularly nuclear power) the whole issue of recycling and the sustainable disposal of solid waste was relatively uncontested (the Federal Republic is internationally noted for the degree of consensus around this issue). This explains why the Green press were not overly concerned by the Second Commission's closed network, with the *Grüne Illustrierte* hoping that '*the state of Lower Saxony can use and develop the existing instruments of economic management in order to support an ecological orientation*' [1-2, 1990]. As already noted, the state of Lower Saxony was able to do just that in a more orderly - and successful - fashion than in the nuclear sector. As official X^{105} pointed out, since the departure of the Greens from government there was '*less pressure*' on officials even though the broad objectives of policy remained the same under the SPD alone.

10.4.10. The structure of the state bureaucracy (policy processes)

As is evident from the accounts above, the role of permanent civil service is crucial to the success or failure of the Greens in influencing either the form or content of policy making in Berlin and Lower Saxony.

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[105]Official *X* was a Section Leader (*Referatsleiter*) who worked to Official W. The interview took place on the same afternoon as the interview with Official *W* in the Archivstraße.

Berlin. Broadly speaking, within certain parameters the Berlin *Energiebeirat* was quite successful in building a lobby within the civil service which was sympathetic to the objectives of the environmentalist groups. The Berlin Environment Ministry was staffed with younger officials and was allotted within the coalition as an AL portfolio. As already noted, there was less 'implementation drag' than in other ministries.

The *Energiebeirat* reported directly to the section for central affairs within the Ministry and, as all those interviewed attested, had survived the change in government and still exercised considerable influence over the style and content of policy making. At the same time, no doubt because of the short life-span of the coalition in Berlin, the AL had not managed to have any impact upon the actual structure of the civil service. Therefore, they cannot be said to have truly democratised the policy network. As a result, when it came to really important issues - such as the sale of the city's stake in BEWAG - even the *Energiebeirat* was kept in the dark. To sum up, the AL's associated client groups had been co-opted into the existing system, albeit with some beneficial effects on policy outcomes.

Lower Saxony. The Lower Saxony coalition's record is more complicated. Not only is the Greens' impact upon policy outcomes at best mixed and their penetration of the policy network patchy but, given that they were in government for four years, they appear to have had less impact upon the structure of the civil service as well. As the interviews attest, the civil service was generally quite pleased to see the back of the Greens as a governing party following the 1994 elections. Obviously, the Greens now have people permanently in the system within the ministry but they are not an explicit political force. To the extent that they are able to make an impact, this is dependent upon their personal skills as bureaucratic in-fighters.

And the evidence is that even on those terms, the more experienced (and senior) SPD affiliated civil servants now have their measure. In the interview, Official *W* was open about this. 'Quite often' he said '*I know what they are going to say before they speak ....if I offer them three alternatives they will choose the last one*'. Official *W* made it clear that he set the agenda accordingly.

Clearly, the main reason for the lack of Green impact upon the culture of the Environment Ministry was the fact that it was not their portfolio. Schröder made Monika Griefahn Environment Minister and the Greens had to settle for the post of State Secretary within the Ministry. Moreover although this was officially the second most powerful job within any ministry, it has less power than many Greens had assumed. The reasons for this lay partly with the experience of the SPD officials at the level of *Abteilungsleiter* as well as the character of the minister herself (Griefahn is quite a formidable politician). However, even if this was not the case, Schröder had deliberately beefed up the *Staatskanzlei* when coming into office. It was his fief and he used it 'co-ordinate' policy across the government. In this context, the State Secretary was caught in the middle of a powerful hierarchy running all the way up to the Minister President.

However the more thoughtful among the Greens had already come to the conclusion that it was this very hierarchy itself that was as much the problem as the fact that the Greens had not received the Environment portfolio in the first place. This was most obviously clear to those civil servants who were sympathetic to the Greens, one of whom - Official *Y*[106] - handed the author a briefing document prepared by the Greens on the subject. The document called for the '*de-hierarchicalisation* (enthierarchisieren) *of the decision-making process and enable value for money and high quality forms of decision management'*.

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[106]Official *Y* and the author met after the scheduled interviews at Archivstraß. I can only suggest that he sought me out after hearing the subject of my interviews. We spoke for roughly 20 minutes. during which it became clear to me that he was not happy with the present situation.

through a reduction in the number of Departments (and Sections within each department) and the disbanding of certain established regulatory institutions such as the state Offices of Mining (*Bergämter*), which would be replaced by a new over-arching Office of the Environment or *Umweltamt* [Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen. 28/06/96: 1-2]. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to speculate if these reforms would actually do this, but it is clear that they would have most effect in those positions (the Departments and Sections, mostly controlled by SPD affiliated officials) and policy areas (such as mining) where they and their associated client groups are weakest! It remains to be seen whether the Greens will ever have the chance to carry out these changes. What is clear is that they almost definitely have to insist on the Environment portfolio if they are to make them work.

10.4.11. Patterns of policy making in Berlin and Lower Saxony as payoffs

It is not necessary once more to go into the specific details of environmental policy making in Berlin. The overall patterns of environmental policy making in the two cases are laid out in **Table 10.4.11.** below.

Looking at Table 10.4.11. one can discern clear differences in the payoffs accruing to the AL and/or Greens in the two cases. In Berlin, the AL not only 'score' well, but do it consistently

across the three criteria. Given that the Berlin case only looks at the energy sector it would be methodologically unsound to extrapolate to the whole ministry, but in this case at least the AL would appear to benefit from the fact that they 'own' the Environment portfolio. At the very least, it seems to have given them a degree of consistency that is not evident in the Lower Saxony case. Taken in the round, it is clear that the AL did enjoy substantial policy-oriented payoffs as a result of their participation in the Red-Green

Table 10.4.11. Environmental Policy making in Berlin and Lower Saxony as a numerical Payoff to the AL/Greens*

Land	_Portfolio?_	_Policy Area_	_Impact upon legislation, modes of regulation and enforcement_ (0 - 2)	_Constitution of interest representation_ (0 - 2)	_Structure of the state bureaucracy (policy processes)_ (0 - 2)	_Sub-Total as Fraction and %_	_Total as %_
Berlin	Yes	Energy	2	2	1	5/6 —— 84%	84%
Lower Saxony	No	General (NLÖ)	1	1	1	3/6 —— 50%	45%
	No	Nuclear Power	0	2	0	2/6 —— 34%	
	No	Waste	2	1	0	3/6 —— 50%	

*0 = Minimal Impact, 1 = Limited Impact, 2 = Substantial Impact. All numbers. fractions and percentages represent qualitative judgements by the author.

coalition of 1989-1990. However, these payoffs were not altogether evident at the time. Partly this was because many of them were medium-term in nature (often with short-term political costs) and were not realisable within the lifetime of the coalition. However. it was also undoubtedly because those payoffs that were realisable were not great enough to offset the huge political reaction to the two parties' disastrous record of day-to-day coalition management. As already noted, some of the blame for this lay with the AL's unwieldy structure of *Basisdemokratie* whilst a great deal of the problem lay with the personal political style of governing mayor Walter Momper. Both of these problems have since been resolved.

In Lower Saxony not only are the overall 'scores' lower, but the picture is less consistent across the three criteria. If one follows the logic of the Berlin case set out above, then this is almost definitely due to the fact that they did not 'own' the Environment portfolio. As a result, different policy areas were dealt with on an *ad hoc* basis with different results. In terms of institutional reform what one might call the 'NLÖ model' (i.e. low profile technical reforms to bring about a more holistic approach to policy making) was the most successful, at least in as far as it was never a bone of contention within the coalition. Yet it was far too prosaic to be a 'flagship' innovation. Far more high profile was the BfK. which did succeed in bringing many of the Greens' associated client groups into the policy network, at least temporarily. However, rather than breaking down the established hierarchy these groups were co-opted into it for short term political reasons and had no real impact upon policy outcomes. Moreover, the political crisis that this lack of impact had upon the Greens themselves - with the *Fraktion* at loggerheads with the *Vorstand* and the wider movement - indicates that results *were* important. It was not enough just to get 'their' people into the policy network, there had to be some policy-outcome related payoffs to it all. Such payoffs were most obviously evident within the field of waste disposal, where the coalition (and its successor) have been at the forefront of legal and

technical innovation at the *Land* and Federal level. Apart from the row over the high temperature reactor the Greens regard this policy area as one of their successes, despite the fact that - for reasons already discussed - their associated client groups have had minimal input into the policy network. This is more evidence that policy outcomes matter more than patronage.

To sum up, the evidence from the two case studies suggests that the Greens can display a great deal of pragmatism when it comes to assessing policy-oriented payoffs. Indeed, in agreeing not to receive the Environment portfolio in 1990, the Lower Saxony Greens were perhaps too pragmatic, given that most of their subsequent problems arose from this failure. For what is clear in both cases is that the structure of the permanent civil service is crucial to the success of the Green 'project'. If the civil service is to be harnessed to the Green agenda, the structure of the ministry needs to be opened up and democratised. At the very least, the fact that the author has judged it prudent not to name those Lower Saxony officials interviewed would seem to demonstrate this lack of openness (in contrast to the energy sector in Berlin). But to democratise the norms and structures of a ministry requires that one must 'own' the portfolio. Moreover, even if one does own the portfolio, the experience of Hesse - where such reforms are now taking place - is that it is a task for a second or third term in office. In the meantime, both cases demonstrate that the day-to-day process of coalition management has to be carried out and crucial to this process is the need to keep the *Basis* satisfied. What is clear is that they will not always be satisfied with delayed gratification as they wait for medium-term policy-oriented payoffs to be realised. Nor can they be placated with a series of advisory councils of varying potency. The Greens have moderated a great deal, but they are still an idealistic party and they want results.

10.5. The Research Question and the Implications of the Thesis for Future Red-Green Co-operation

10.5.1. The Research Question

In Chapter One of the thesis, the Research Question asked to what extent the Greens have assumed a 'normal' political role within the party system, given that such a 'normal' role would mean that their strategic behaviour could be predicted as a function of the rational pursuit of a bundle of group-related preferences of either an instrumental (office-seeking) or ideological (related to the policy dimension) nature. With regard to the policy dimension, the thesis assumes that policy-related payoffs are as much a function of the *process* of policy-making as of its content. This led on to the subsidiary question of the extent to which the Greens have been able to 'open-up' the policy network to their own client groups and break down established hierarchies within the German regulatory framework.

Without repeating the findings of the thesis, it would appear that - as far as the predictability of their strategic behaviour is concerned - the Greens are assuming an increasingly 'normal' role within the party system. Looking at the Greens parliamentary *Fraktion*, this strategic behaviour seems to be characterised by a degree of pragmatism in the *Praxis* of politics that belies the more bellicose uttering of their *Basis*. Indeed as discussed earlier in this chapter, if a crude measure of office seeking pragmatism is *the ideological distance travelled* in order to secure a coalition agreement, then the Greens are more office seeking than their Social Democratic competitors.

However, this measure is ultimately too crude because just as importantly - and predictably - the policy dimension remains the single most important factor in the maintenance of Red-Green coalitions over time. When the real or perceived gap between

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expectations and achievement becomes too big the Greens' *Fraktion* comes under intense pressure from the *Basis* to dig in their heels, with negative effects for coalition management. In both cases the Greens' *Fraktion* made concessions in order to placate the SPD but ultimately found that their coalition's mixed policy record (in terms of outcomes) and the only partial penetration of the policy network by their associated client groups only served to reinforce the pressure on them and the coalition as a whole. Thus it is clear that there are limits to political pragmatism, beyond which one is storing trouble up for oneself rather than averting it. This is a familiar story within the democratic left in Europe.

10.5.2. Postscript: Is There a Red-Green Route?

The thesis demonstrates that the SPD has tended to be the decisive party within the coalition game rather than the Greens, falsifying purely mathematical models of coalition formation (which stress the importance of the small but decisive party within a given party system). One reason for this is that the SPD is a much bigger and popular party than the Greens and therefore wields more political clout in both normative terms (the norm in the Federal Republic that the biggest party should be in or close to government) and practically (in terms of access to expertise and the ability to bestow patronage). However within the environment of an ideologically-grounded European party system, the thesis demonstrates that the SPD is also decisive because it is closer to the political centre (the 'median legislator' argument). But can one call upon the findings of the thesis to predict how the SPD and (to a lesser extent) the Greens are going to react in the future?

As already discussed in Chapter Two, since the early 1980's, the SPD has had to respond to four threats to its position. First, the decline in the overall *Volkspartei* vote. which has effected both the SPD and CDU and has prompted some observers to forecast growing

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instability within the Federal Republic's party system; second, the extraordinary personal appeal and political acumen of Helmut Kohl, who has managed to keep the SPD on the back foot in the fight for the political centre-ground; third, the growth of the Greens, which has served to put pressure on the SPD along the post-materialist or 'New Politics' dimension; and fourth, the persistence of the PDS in the new *Länder*, which has contributed to the SPD's weakness in the east and (with the additional weakness of the Greens and FDP) has severely restricted their coalition options[107].

Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1998 - a *Bundestag* election year - opinion polls reveal deep dissatisfaction with the incumbent CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. Indeed, the SPD is even ahead in the 'New' *Länder* of the former East Germany [*de-news@LISTSERV.GMD.DE*> 06/01/98]. As a result, many commentators regard the 1998 elections as the best opportunity for over a decade for the SPD to win power and end the 'Kohl era.

However if the SPD does win the 1998 Federal election, it must be assumed that they will have addressed two questions beforehand. First, who do they want to be their candidate for Chancellor[108] and, second, who do they want as a coalition partner after the election?

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[107]These processes are looked at in more detail in C. Lees, 'The Ambivalent Left' in *Contemporary Political Studies* 1996, Vol. 3. pp.1438-1451

[108]The debacle of the Berlin elections of 22 October 1995 was fatal for the party leader at the time Rudolf Scharping. At the SPD annual conference in November 1995, Scharping was replaced as leader by Oskar Lafontaine, who had failed to unseat Kohl in the 1990 *Bundestag* elections. The choice of the mercurial Left-winger Lafontaine over the staid centrist Scharping is indicative of the party's ideological ambivalence. Rudolf Scharping's strategy was based around projecting the SPD's governmental competence at all costs. As a result, he always refused to rule out the possibility of re-entering national government as a junior partner to the CDU. Oskar Lafontaine, securer in his position as Minister President of the state of Saarland. promised a more confrontational and explicitly left-wing stance in opposition. In the two years since then Lafontaine has turned the party around, at least in terms of self-confidence. The 'loosely coupled anarchy' of the late 1980's and early 1990's seems to have been replaced by a steelier approach to the business of opposition. This new self-confidence was evident at the SPD's conference in the north German city of Hannover at the beginning of December 1997. For the first time in years. delegates were clearly sanguine about their chances of returning to government and gave much of the credit to Lafontaine. Lafontaine's position as darling of the conference was never in doubt and his key note speech was greeted with something close to euphoria by the delegates. Moreover, the speech itself was a red-blooded re-affirmation of the Social Democratic project; advocating state intervention to secure social justice. more regulation,

At the time of writing, all of the opinion poll data suggests that the most likely outcome of the 1998 *Bundestag* elections will be a repeat of the Grand Coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD that ruled in Bonn between 1966 and 1969[109]. However, there is a fair chance that this will not be the case and that the SPD considers the Greens as serious enough potential coalition partners at the national level to consider going into coalition with them. If this is the case, it must be assumed that the two parties will have reached a viable *modus operandi* to offset the higher political stakes associated with Federal government.

The evidence of the thesis suggests that in order to do this, the two parties must meet and maintain certain criteria associated with their ideological stance and election programmes, the composition and division of portfolios and the staffing and structure of the civil service

'green' taxes and greater European integration as a bulwark against the forces of globalisation. However there was one other significant speech at the party conference, made by the only politician who could conceivably stop Lafontaine being made the SPD's candidate for Chancellor and take the job, none other than Gerhard Schröder. Despite being on home territory, Schröder was in many ways the outsider at the conference, albeit one whose message cannot be ignored. For where Lafontaine preaches state intervention and regulation, taxes and European integration, Schröder advocates flexibility and de-regulation, trimming social costs and a more sceptical approach to Europe. Aware that for much of his audience this is anathema, Schröder is careful to keep his distance from the Anglo-Saxon model and is increasingly coy about being called a 'moderniser' (in the mould of Tony Blair). Nevertheless it Schröder is popular with the electorate, which is why he is listened to. For despite Lafontaine's obvious political strengths, all of the opinion poll data at the turn of the year indicates that he would fail once more to unseat Kohl or his putative successor Wolfgang Schäuble. Schröder on the other hand evidently could. For instance, an EMNID poll of 1382 respondents on behalf of the magazine *Der Spiegel* - carried out between 9 and 12 December 1997 - reinforced the message that has been clear for at least the whole year. Respondents preferred both Kohl and Schauble to Lafontaine (by 49% to 42% and 53% to 38% respectively). Schröder on the other hand would on the evidence of the poll beat either, beating Kohl by 57% to 33% and Schauble less comfortably by 49% to 44% [*Der Speigel*. 20/12/97]. Schröder's popularity in the country is based upon his centrist stance as moderniser, yet in order to beat Lafontaine to the nomination he cannot afford to create too much ideological distance between himself and the party membership. He has to 'triangulate' between the two positions. At the same time, the lack of an internal competitor on the left means that Lafontaine can afford to edge towards the centre ground. Schröder would then have two strategic options: first to tack further to the centre himself, with the danger that he alienates the party rank-and-file or, second, to resist that temptation but risk losing the quality that makes him popular with the voters (his ideological distance from the SPD apparatchiks). Either option would have its risks. At the time of writing, the party does not have to make a final decision until after the state elections in Lower Saxony on 1 March 1998. Any significant drop in support would leave Schröder's campaign in huge difficulties. On the other hand, a good showing could give him enough momentum to take the nomination.

[109] The *Spiegel* poll found a Grand Coalition option to be the most likely outcome in the opinion of the voters (33%) with a Red-Green option as second most likely outcome (30%).

The thesis demonstrates that the SPD's Janus-like ideological ambivalence allows it to selectively emphasise either its post-materialist and/or libertarian or its materialist and/or authoritarian 'faces' as political circumstances dictate. For instance in Berlin, the SPD was able to move from the broadly social libertarian stance (based around the policy of 'de-escalating' relations between the police and the community in inner-city areas such as Kreuzberg) which marked the coalition agreement of 1989 to a much more authoritarian 'law and order' stance (demonstrated by the eviction of the Mainzer Straße squatters) by the end of 1990. Moreover, this shift was achieved with only a certain (manageable) degree of internal heart-searching within the party.

Similarly the thesis describes how, as the newly elected Minister President of Lower Saxony, Gerhard Schröder undertook the clearing out of the highest echelons of the state's police and security apparatus in order to reform these structures along less authoritarian lines. Nevertheless in his campaign to become the SPD's chancellor candidate for the 1998 elections, Schröder felt able to play the 'law and order' card in a quite shameless fashion (arguing for increased stop and search powers for the police and the compulsory expulsion of foreigners who commit criminal acts in the Federal Republic). This ability to shift ideological 'faces' can be regarded as a tactical resource for the SPD and its leading politicians.

For the Greens the only ideological direction that they are able to - and normally have to - shift is towards the political centre. This puts them at a tactical disadvantage during coalition negotiations because there is no chance (as yet) of playing one potential coalition off against another in order to secure concessions. In short they are forced to move away from 'their' ideological ground towards the SPD's because there is nowhere else for them to go.

The main area where the Greens have had to shift and/or clarify their position is with regard to the nature of 'the state' itself, in particular its monopoly on legitimate force and its dealings with other states, particularly in terms of defence arrangements. As the thesis demonstrates, the Greens have come a long way in accepting the state monopoly on violence and, notwithstanding the occasional 'knee-jerk' reaction to police actions such as the clearing of the Mainzer Straße squatters, the party's 'wrecking ball' tendency seems to be a thing of the past. However coming to terms with the realities of political life within the domain of foreign policy - particularly defence and security - remains a problem that has to be resolved if the Greens are to ever hold power at the Federal level[110].

As for the composition and division of portfolios and the staffing and structure of the civil service, it is hard to make predictions at this stage, with over half a year before the 1998 *Bundestag* elections. However, if the Greens' experiences in Berlin and Lower Saxony are any evidence, the party will insist at the very least that they receive the Environment portfolio for themselves (with no division between the minister's and state secretary's posts along the lines of Lower Saxony in 1990). Moreover, the experiences of the

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[110]The reason why the Greens have been so slow the resolve these issues is because, as they have only held power at the sub-national level, they have never really had to. Apart from when domestic issues were tangentially connected (such as the *Eurofighter* row in Lower Saxony), the only time the foreign policy domain has been explicitly salient was in Berlin in 1989, when SPD leader Walter Momper demanded - and received - the AL's grudging acceptance of the city's 'five power' status (and by implication a *de facto* acceptance of the legitimacy of Germany's involvement in NATO). The Greens' stance on foreign policy is not just a symbolic artefact of a more militant past (along the lines of the Labour Party's long attachment to Clause Four of its constitution) and, as the election approaches, the Greens have been forced to confront it. Moreover, the extent to which the party has not done so in the past has been reflected by the fact that the debate has cut across the party, with the *Fraktion* as divided as the *Basis* over the issue. Thus in October 1997 Jürgen Trittin, who is now the Greens' national spokesperson, announced the party's draft programme - to be voted on by delegates to the Greens' national conference in March 1998 - for the upcoming *Bundestag* elections. Amongst other things, it proposed a national withdrawal from the use of nuclear energy and the disbanding of NATO. As such it drew immediate criticism from both within the Greens itself and from the SPD. Joshka Fischer took the *realo* position that 'unrealistic demands' would hamper any post-election coalition negotiations [*de-news@LISTSERV.GMD.DE>* 14/10/97], whilst the SPD flatly rejected the draft programme as a basis for negotiations [*ibid.* 22/10/97]. After much debate the draft programme was re-drafted and the NATO commitment was down-graded to a long-term goal for Germany and her allies rather than a unilateral act to be taken at once. This left the road clear for the SPD to praise the new draft programme, with Federal Secretary General Meuntefering telling a radio talk-show that the ditching of the anti-NATO stance '*spelled good news for the Social Democrats*' [*ibid.* 16/12 97]. The Greens appear to be positioning themselves for a possible junior coalition role after the *Bundestag* elections.

incumbent Hesse coalition will make them wary of 'super-ministries' - like the Hesse Ministry for Environment, Energy, Health, Youth and the Family - which expose ministers to conflicting and ultimately irreconcilable political pressures.

If possible, they might also look to acquire one 'blue-chip' ministry in order to confirm their position as a serious party rather than a one-issue political grouping. However given the fact that a Red-Green coalition at the Federal level will at least initially be regarded with alarm by industry and the money markets, the Economics and Industry ministries can be regarded as being off limits for the foreseeable future! Nevertheless, they may feel that they have an outside chance of getting the Justice portfolio (as taken by Rupert von Plottnitz in Hesse), although this remains to be seen.

It is not clear how this would impact upon the staffing and structure of the civil service. The evidence of the thesis supports the premise that 'owning' the portfolio is the *sine qua non* of making any impact and - as the Berlin coalition's record suggests - even if a party does own the portfolio there is no guarantee that it can permanently open-up the policy making process to associated client groups. Nevertheless if there is ever going to be a Red-Green coalition at the Federal level in the future it is this issue which will prove crucial in determining its success or failure - and in providing the most fruitful areas for future research.

End Pages

APPENDIX ONE: PRIMARY DATA SOURCES

I I

1.1 West Berlin

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APPENDIX TWO: A RÉSUMÉ OF FORMAL MODELS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND COALITION BEHAVIOUR [cf. Laver and Schofield, 1990]

2.1. Downs' (1957) 'Median Voter' Model

In the Downsian universe, the policy dimension is laid out one-dimensionally along a single left-right spectrum. Voter's preferences are distributed along this spectrum and are assumed to be single-peaked under normal conditions. This means that an individual voter will have one ideal position along the continuum and, the further away any given policy positions are from this point, they display less and less affinity for them. Thus, a left-wing voter will prefer a left-wing position over a centrist position and a centrist position over a right-wing position (and vice versa). Where single-peaked preferences are the norm and are fairly evenly distributed along the left-right continuum, there is a tendency for the aggregate (or social choice) of these preferences to reach an equilibrium (and thus effectively a consensus) somewhere around the median of the distribution. It is around this point, occupied by the 'median voter'[1], that the office-seeking parties will manoeuvre in order to maximise votes. By contrast, where voters' preferences are not single peaked, there is the possibility of extremism as there is less of a definable political centre around which parties will compete.

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[1]The median voter theorem was formulated by Duncan Black [1958]. The gist of the argument is that the median voter, who has an equal number of voters on each side, is in a priveledged position because he/she can vote down alternatives to both the right and the left. The ideal point of the median voter is the equilibrium outcome under majority rule.

2.2. Riker's (1962) 'Size Principle'

The size principle is stated below:

> *In* n-*person, zero-sum games, where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions occur.....*
>
> *In social situations similar to* n-*person, zero-sum games with side-payments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger.* [1962: 32-33].

Table 2.2. Simple Bargaining Set For Minimal Winning Coalition (151 seats In Legislature)

Party	Number Of Seats	Coalition Outcome
W	65	In
X	70	Out
Y	5	Out
Z	11	In

The size principle is demonstrated in **Table 2.2.**. Although party *X* has the largest share of the seats, it is not in the winning coalition because any coalition that forms with it (*X,Z* or *X,W* or *X,W,Y* or *X,W,Z*) will be a surplus majority coalition and will therefore involve a sub-optimal division of payoffs to its members. Party *Y* is not in the coalition because any combination involving it is either not winning (*W,Y* or *X,Y* or *Z,Y*) or involves a surplus majority (*W,X,Y* or *X,Y,Z* or *W,Y,Z*). This leaves the minimal winning coalition (*W,Z*)

reaching the required 76 seats (50 % plus one seat). Moreover, as it is the smallest party whose leaving the coalition would facilitate either a new winning coalition or a blocking minority in the legislature, party Z is decisive within the set.

The outcome of the bargaining set in Table 2.2. conforms to Riker's size principle. Each player is expected to join the potential coalition that will maximise their share of the payoff. A coalition is predicted to form successfully if each member of that coalition is able to maximise their payoff share. This is known as an 'undominated' coalition. Problems arise if their are more than one potential undominated coalition within the bargaining set or, conversely, if there are none. Under such circumstances, at least some of the players will be indifferent to any given rational choice of coalition formation.

2.3. Gamson's (1961) 'Cheapest Winning' Model

Although he conceptualises the players strategic choice slightly differently from Riker, in practical terms the cheapest winning coalition will be that combination of parties that can harness 50% plus one of legislative seats. In other words, Gamson predicts the minimal winning coalition.

Table 2.3. demonstrates that all the parties are potential members of a cheapest winning coalition according to Gamson's formation criteria. Given that the winning post is again 76 seats, the combinations (S,T,V,W,X); (S,U,V,W,X); (T,U,V,W,X); (S,T,Y,Z); (S,U,Y,Z); (T,U,Y,Z) and (V,Z,Y) are all winning sets.

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Table 2.3. Bargaining Set For Cheapest Winning Coalition (151 seats In Legislature)

Party	Number Of Seats	Coalition Outcome
S	1	In or Out
T	1	In or Out
U	1	In or Out
V	2	In or Out
W	3	In or Out
X	69	In or Out
Y	65	In or Out
Z	9	In or Out

2.4. Leiserson's (1968) 'Bargaining Proposition' Model

Table 2..4. Bargaining Set For Solution Set With Bargaining Proposition (151 seats In Legislature)

Party	Number Of Seats	Coalition Outcome
S	1	Out
T	1	Out
U	1	Out
V	2	In
W	3	Out
X	69	Out
Y	65	In
Z	9	In

Leiserson's model significantly limits the number of predictions generated within a bargaining set. Using the same distribution of party weights as used to demonstrate Gamson's cheapest winning model, **Table 2.4.** demonstrates that, over the course of time in a multi-party environment, (S, T, V, W, X); (S, U, V, W, X); (T, U, V, W, X) and then (S, T, Y, Z); (S, U, Y, Z); (T, U, Y, Z) will no longer be members of potential coalition formations on the grounds that these formations contain too many players. The winning set is (V, Z, Y). Other parties will only be potential members of any winning coalition during inter-decision periods, where surplus majorities may be considered strategically rational. To sum up, Leiserson's model predicts minimum winning coalitions to be the rational outcome but allows institutional norms to skew this process. Those minimal winning coalitions that do form will tend to have as few members as possible.

2.5. Schubik's (1967) General Formulation for Simple n-Person Games with Players Added

Table 2.5. Simple n-Person Game With Players Added

Number of Players	Number of Outcomes Possible
2	3
3	7
4	15
5	31
10	1023
20	more than 10$6$

[Schubik, 1967: 249 cited Hinckley, 1981: 24]

Martin Schubik's model vividly demonstrates the problem of predicting coalition outcomes in multi-party systems, even when the rules are very simple. The most simple coalition game is one in which each player must only make a 'yes/no' decision about whether to join with each other player in the bargaining set. Shubik calculated a general formulation for such games as giving $2n - 1$ possible outcomes (see **Table 2.5.**). Thus, even the most simple n-person game quickly becomes unwieldy. Obviously the complicated strategic environment of a real coalition game would make it far more unwieldy.

2.7. Axelrod's (1970) 'Minimal Connected Winning' Model

Table 2.6. One-Dimensional Bargaining Set For Minimal Connected Winning Coalition (151 seats In Legislature)

L - R Axis	Party	Number Of Seats	Coalition Outcome
L	S	1	Out
	T	1	In
	U	1	In
	V	2	In
	W	3	In
	X	69	In
	Y	65	Out
R	Z	9	Out

Axelrod's 'minimal connected winning' model of coalition formation is one of the earliest and well-known attempts to factor-in a secondary policy dimension to the coalition bargaining process. **Table 2.6.** demonstrates that the imposition of a policy dimension as a formation criteria has profound consequences for the predictive power of the model. Using the same distribution of party weights, Gamson's cheapest winning criteria made six predictions (S,T,Y,Z); (S,U,Y,Z); (T,U,Y,Z); (S,T,V,W,X); (S,U,V,W,X) and (T,U,V,W,X)] which Leiserson's solution set with bargaining proposition reduced to three (S,T,Y,Z): (S,U,Y,Z) and (T,U,Y,Z). However, Axelrod's assumption that coalitions will be ideologically adjacent as well as conforming to the Rikerian size principle means that (T,U,V,W,X) is the predicted winning set. Axelrod's model leaves parties S, Y and Z outside the potential coalition on the ideological extremes of the legislature.

2.7. De Swaan's (1973) 'Median Legislator' Model

De Swaan's theory is often referred to as the 'median legislator' (or 'median party') model because it is predicated upon the assumption that the party that controls the median legislator in any potential coalition is decisive because it blocks the axis along which any connected winning coalition must form. If a party is the *Mparty* (median within the legislature) and *Mparty(k)* (controlling the median legislator within a potential coalition) in all cases, then it is dictator within the bargaining set. Theoretically, any such party must be included in the winning set. **Table 2.7.** demonstrates the implications of de Swaan's model for the distribution of party weights. No minimal connected winning coalition is able to form without party X. Therefore X is decisive. Given that the size principle still applies, party Y will not be a member of the winning set as any coalition that included X and Y would entail a surplus majority. If the ideological range is assumed to be evenly

distributed across the legislature, then the *Mparty* median legislator (for the legislature as a whole) can be assumed to be on the right of party X, whilst the *Mparty(k)* median legislator would be on the centre-left of party X.

Table 2.7. One-Dimensional Bargaining Set For Median Party/Median Legislator Solution (151 seats In Legislature)

L - R Axis	Party	Number Of Seats	Coalition Outcome
L	S	1	Out
	T	1	In
	U	1	In
	V	2	In
	W	3	In
	X	69	In (Decisive)
	Y	65	Out
R	Z	9	Out

2.8. Voting Games in Multi-Dimensional Space

Figure 2.8. demonstrates the implications of a second dimension in a spatial voting game. Assume that party *y was* Mparty (with the median legislator) along a Downsian left-right dimension. Under such conditions, party Y was decisive within the set. However, when a second dimension is added party Y's position is no better that the other two parties. In this voting game, any two parties can propose a policy package that is better than any rival proposal at that point. Thus, parties X and Z can propose package (i) which beats

XIV

any alternative that party *Y* may propose. Alternatively, parties *X* and *Y* can propose package (ii) which beats anything party *Z* may propose. However. this majority (x plus Y) can be split by Z's introduction of package (III) that beats any package party *X* can propose.

Figure 2.8. Voting Game In A Two-Dimensional Policy Space

2.9. 'Core' Theory

More often than not, this has involved some variation upon the game-theoretical concept of the 'core' or 'barycenter' [Hanson, 1972; Hanson and Rice, 1972]. In his *Coalition Theories: A Logical And Empirical Critique*, Eric Browne [1973] Browne considers the process of calculating the mean of points in multi-dimensional space to be analogous to De Swaan's measurement of the distance of potential coalition partners from the median

Figure 2.9. In *n*-Dimensional Euclidean Space, The Core |a) Is (i) An Area or (ii) A Point

(i)

(ii)

of that potential coalition. A weight is assigned to each party according to their position within a given policy space (as well as the number of seats they hold in the legislature) and the 'barycenter' (as Browne calls it) calculated as the mean of these positions. The predicted coalition will be that which is winning and minimises the policy distance of members from the core. Core theory assumes that a point exists in *n*-dimensional

Euclidean space that minimises the preference disagreement of a specific set of players and thus dominates the utility allocation of all other possible outcomes. Each potential coalition's utility allocation is based upon its members calculation of the potential damage all players outside the coalition could do to it. Such an allocation is called the coalition's security level. As the core consists of that set of preferences that are not dominated by any other, it is assumed to also be Pareto optimal. A core allocation may even imply a grand coalition of all the players involved, although the payoff allocated to individual members will depend on their ability to form a smaller alternative coalition which could block (but not dominate) the Pareto set. The location of the core is plotted by calculating the mean of a collection of points (representing the policy positions of the parties that comprise the bargaining set) within political space (see **Figure 2.9.**). The core is bound to exist in one-dimensional space, and finds an analogue in the 'median voter' of Black and Downs or De Swaan's 'median legislator'.

2.10. Laver and Schofield's (1990) Model of Coalition Formation

Laver and Schofield's model builds upon the 'Protocoalition' model of Bernard Grofman [1982] and Laver's earlier empirical work. **Figure 2.10.** demonstrates the difference the two options make to the process of coalition formation in a hypothetical five-party system. In the hierarchical option, parties *d* and *e* are the closest ideologically and therefore the first to form an indissoluble protocoalition, followed by *a* and *b*. *ab* and *c* (a majority coalition), and finally *abc* and *de* (forming grand coalition *abcde*). The non-hierarchical option is more fluid, with protocoalition *de* forming and then breaking up . to be replaced by the majority coalition *cd*. which in turn could be replaced by the even larger *abc* and finally grand coalition *abcde*. An hierarchical bargaining process would imply

Figure 2.10. The 'Bargaining Approach'. (i) Hierarchical and (ii) Non-Hierarchical Coalition Building In A Five-Party System (after Laver and Schofield 1990: 139)

(i)

<u>Party and % Seat Share</u>

```
 a     b     c     d     e
30    30    80    30    30
```

(ii)

<u>Party and % Seat Share</u>

a	b	c	d	e	No. of
30	30	80	30	30	Clusters
X	X	X	X	X	5
X	X	X	X——X		4
X——X		X——X	X		3
X——X——X			X——X		2
X——X——X			X——X		1

that parties voluntarily limit their strategic options within the process of coalition formation, thus ruling out winning coalition *cd*. This is to some extent at odds with the assumptions implicit in some of the more formal coalition models. Yet. the evidence suggests that, where the two options yield different predictions, the hierarchical model works better with the empirical evidence [1990:142]. This would imply that parties conform to certain norms of association and trust which skew the bargaining process.

APPENDIX THREE: A BRIEF GLOSSARY OF RELEVANT ENVIRONMENTAL TERMS.

(Courtesy of The National Alternative Fuels Laboratory (NAFL)[2])

3.1. Advanced Power Systems

Advanced power systems aim to provide clean and efficient energy from coal and other

energy sources. Advanced power systems research embraces a wide spectrum of energy

conversion and use technologies. At one end of the spectrum are thousands of existing

facilities that will require retrofitting and upgrading to extend their useful life. At the other

end of the spectrum are the more efficient and environmentally compatible energy

technologies that will see commercial application in the short and long term. Advanced

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[2]The NAFL is funded by the United States Department of Agriculture. Current NAFL work includes an investigation of how the performance and capacity of fuel evaporation canisters are affected by vapors from fuels containing ethanol. The motivation for this work was provided by comparison of NAFL data on evaporative emission compositions with data from other researchers using "SHED" (sealed housing for evaporative determination) test methodology. While the NAFL data showed that the ethanol concentration in an evaporative emission from a 10 volume percent ethanol/90 volume percent base gasoline (E10) blend should be about 13 weight percent (wt%), published SHED test results for ethanol concentration in E10 evaporative emissions were significantly lower. One possible explanation for this difference may involve canister performance with E10 fuels. Other current work includes an investigation of how ethanol (in E10 blends) effects the evaporation of gasoline. The investigation showed that in 2-hour evaporation tests performed under identical environmental conditions, E10 fuels consistently lost more total weight to evaporation than their base fuels, but less gasoline. The increased weight was due to ethanol, which was present in the E10 evaporative emissions at concentrations of about 13 weight percent (wt%). This data indicates that because ethanol displaces a significant portion of gasoline in E10 evaporative emissions, the accuracy of assessing the environmental impact of these emissions could be improved by more understanding of the atmospheric activity and ozone-forming potential of ethanol in relation to the gasoline components it displaces. Other NAFL work includes investigating the effects of different additives and ethanol denaturants including glycerine and ethylene glycol on Reid vapor pressure (RVP). One study found that RVP of E10 blends could be decreased by as much as 0.3 psi by the addition of a small amount of ethylene glycol. The results of a study in which component analysis and RVP measurement were performed on E10 and base gasolines before and after the fuels were transported from a pipeline terminal to a gasoline station, showed that even after a 60-mile transport, the splash blended ethanol was not completely mixed in the E10 fuel. The study also demonstrated the importance of proper sampling to ensure compliance with EPA-recommended RVP limits, by showing how RVP varied by as much as 1.0 psi for several samples obtained from a tanker truck using different sampling techniques.

Power Systems research includes: Fuel Utilisation; Pressurised Combustion; Hot-Gas Cleaning; Advanced Gasification; Particulate Control; Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal; Fluidized-Bed Technologies; Waste Conversion; Waste to Energy: Plastics Recycling

3.2. Atmospheric Emission Control

Atmospheric emission controls for energy and other systems include retrofit acid gas and particulate removal technologies for existing facilities as well as the design of the next generation of equipment needed to control particulate as well as gaseous organic and inorganic emissions from utilities, incinerators, refineries, and other industrial sources. Substances removed with atmospheric emission control technology must be properly utilised or disposed of: for example in mine land settings. Atmospheric Emission Control research includes Air Toxins; Flue Gas Conditioning for Enhanced Particulate Control; Fine Particulate Control; Hot-Gas Cleaning; Acid Gas Emissions Control; Fuel and Sorbent Characterisation; Re-powering; Advanced Power Systems; Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal; Fuel Conditioning;

3.3. Carbon-Based Energy: Biomass

Tremendous amounts of energy are stored within biomass resources. Biomass-Related research includes: Vegetable Oil Diesel Fuel; Liquefaction of Carbon Compounds; Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal; Refuse-Derived Fuels: Combustion and

Environmental Issues; Effects of Biomass on Combustion System Performance: Advanced Combustion Systems

3.4. Carbon-Based Energy: Coal

Coal will continue to play a major role in meeting energy needs. Increasingly, coal can be utilised as cleanly and efficiently as possible in existing facilities as well as with emerging technologies. Coal-Related research includes: Coal Resource Evaluation and Characterisation; Fuel Upgrading; Direct Coal Liquefaction; Indirect Coal Liquefaction; Conventional Gasification; Underground Coal Gasification; Advanced Gasification; Re-powering; Fuel Quality Impacts on Power System Performance; Advanced Power Systems; Atmospheric Emission Controls; Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal; Reclamation of Disturbed Lands; Analytical Methods Development; Ground water; Contaminant Cleanup and Site Remediation; Applied Geology.

3.5. Carbon-Based Energy: Gas

The environmental issues currently facing the gas industry include the production and conditioning of synthetic or substitute natural gas by conventional coal gasification, mild gasification, and underground coal gasification. Gas-Related research includes: Produced-Water Management; Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM); Mercury in Ground water and Atmospheric Emissions; Waste Management (Utilisation and Disposal); Advanced Power Systems; Hot-Gas Cleaning; Advanced High-Temperature

Materials; Atmospheric Emission Controls; Contaminant Cleanup and Site Remediation: Underground Coal Gasification; Conventional Gasification; Advanced Gasification: Mild Gasification; Applied Geology.

3.6. Carbon-Based Energy: Oil

Oil research programmes embrace a variety of issues relevant to the oil industry. Issues include the use of organic liquids and alternative oils such as methyl ether diesel fuel. Oil-Related research includes: Ground water Research; Produced-Water Management; Applied Geology; Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM); Mercury in Ground water and Atmospheric Emissions; Direct Coal Liquefaction; Indirect Coal Liquefaction; Plastics Recycling and Depolymerization; Combustion Testing; Atmospheric Emission Controls; Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal; Petroleum Coke Testing; Contaminant Cleanup and Site Remediation; National Alternative Fuels Laboratory; Vegetable Oil Diesel Fuel.

3.7. Contaminant Clean-up and Site Remediation

Contaminant cleanup and site remediation technologies are essential to restore countless sites world-wide that are contaminated with varying combinations of organic, inorganic, and radioactive materials that pose threats to human health and environmental quality. Activities, including mining, waste disposal, military operations, energy extraction, agriculture, and real estate development, may result in soil and/or ground water

contamination. Contaminant Cleanup and Site Remediation research includes: Remediation Technology Development; Analytical Methods Development for Environmental Contaminants; Ground water Research for the North American Oil and Gas Industry; Impacts of Agricultural Chemicals on Ground water Quality; Environmental Microbiology; Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal; Coal, Uranium, and Metal Mine Reclamation; Applied Geology.

3.8. Fluidised Bed Combustion (FBC)

Fluidised bed combustion (FBC) refers to a method of burning coal in a bed of a granular material, usually consisting of an alkaline lime type substance. This 'Fluidised bed' is kept Fluidised by pumping a gas, usually air, through the bed particles from the bottom. FBC provides an environment where coal is burned in a manner that has the ability to remove acid gases such as sulphur dioxide by reacting with the alkaline bed material. Many of these "advanced" combustion systems rely on the presence of an alkaline material, somewhere in the system, for the uptake of acid gases often referred to as SOx and NOx. These sulphur and nitrogen oxide acid gases are one of the more prominent environmental problems associated with coal combustion. Although the sulphur, which is associated with the coal, can be partially removed from some coals by 'coal cleaning', the nitrogen present in the air presents an entirely different problem. NOx production and/or emissions can be reduced by other means usually involving some sort of absorbent or catalytic system to either remove or change the chemistry of the NOx formation. The gas cleaning technologies work not by preventing the SOx and NOx from forming but by 'cleaning' the flue gas.

3.9. Ground Water

Ground water is the largest available reservoir of fresh water for human use. Issues include the geologic setting, the water flowing through that setting, and ground water quality as the basis for evaluating contaminant occurrence, transport, and fate. Ground water-related activities include: Ground water Research Program for the North American Gas and Oil; the assessment of the impact of Agricultural Chemicals on Ground water Quality; Contaminant Cleanup and Site Remediation; Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal; Wetlands management; Coal, Uranium, and Metal Mine Reclamation; Underground Coal Gasification; Applied Geology.

3.10. Hot Gas Cleaning (HGC)

Hot-gas cleaning refers to the location in the combustion system where the process is carried out. Stack gas is often cleaned after heat removal in the power plant, through steam production and passage through much of the combustion system. The gas can be treated in one of the hot zones however: thus 'hot-gas' cleaning.

3.11. Waste Management: Utilisation and Disposal

Cost-effective, environmentally sound management of our wastes continues to be a volatile issue, the solution for which must integrate science, technology, individual responsibility, and policy. Waste management must address utilisation, the preferred option, and

disposal, the option of last resort. Waste management begins with understanding the complete and detailed physical, chemical, mineralogical, leaching, and biological character of the waste in question. This understanding is critical to successful utilisation or environmentally friendly disposal and enables us to predict what is in a material. how much is there, how it may leach out, and how it will ultimately behave. The understanding developed in waste management research is also valuable in the cleanup of contaminated sites. Waste Management-Related research includes: Materials Characterisation Focused on Process Residuals; Coal Ash Resources Research Consortium (CARRC); Advanced and Conventional Power Systems Research; Waste Utilisation Options; Ground water Research Program for the North American Gas and Oil; Impacts of Agricultural Chemicals on Ground water Quality; Contaminant Cleanup and Site Remediation; Advanced Leaching Procedures; Atmospheric Emission Control; Analytical Methods Development; Coal, Uranium, and Metal Mine Reclamation; Applied Geology.

APPENDIX FOUR: ELECTION RESULTS FOR WEST BERLIN, 1950-1994

Original data courtesy of Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim in co-operation with the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The John Hopkins University 'Elections News' Website (http://www.klipsan.com/elecnews.htm)[3]

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4.4. Governments in Berlin (*Die Regierungen von Berlin*)

4.1. Federal Elections In Berlin since 1990

Table 4.1.a. All-Berlin Results in %.

Year	Turnout	CDU	SPD	FDP	B'90/ GRü	PDS	Other
1990	80.6	39.4	30.6	9.1	7.2	9.7	3.9
1994	78.6	31.4	34.0	5.2	10.2	14.8	4.4

Table 4.1.b. Berlin-West Results in %.

Year	Turnout	CDU	SPD	FDP	B'90/ GRü	PDS	Other
1990	83.4	47.8	30.2	9.9	6.4	1.3	4.4
1994	79.5	38.7	34.6	7.2	12.3	2.6	4.6

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[3]During the compilation of these figures, the author noted that some of the numerical percentage totals do not add up to 100, due to the effect of 'rounding up/down' totals to the nearest tenth of one percent.

Table 4.1.c. Berlin-East Results in %.

Year	Turnout	CDU	SPD	FDP	B'90/ GRü	PDS	Other
1990	76.0	24.3	31.3	7.8	8.8	24.8	3.1
1994	77.2	19.5	33.1	1.9	6.9	34.7	3.7

4.2. State Elections

Table 4..2.a. Berlin-West State Elections 1950-1989

Year	Turnout	CDU	SPD	FDP	B'90/ GRü	REP	PDS	Other
1950	90.4	24.7	44.7	23.1				7.6
1954	91.8	30.4	44.6	12.8				12.2
1958	92.9	37.7	52.6	3.8				5.9
1963	92.9	28.8	61.9	7.9				1.3
1967	86.2	32.9	56.9	7.1				3.1
1971	88.9	38.2	50.4	8.4				3.0
1975	87.8	43.9	42.6	7.1				6.4
1979	85.4	44.4	42.7	8.1	3.7			1.2
1981	85.3	48.0	38.3	5.6	7.2			0.9
1985	83.6	46.4	32.4	8.5	10.6			2.1
1989	79.6	37.7	37.3	3.9	11.8	7.5		1.7

Table 4.2 b. All-Berlin State Elections 1990-1995

Year	Turnout	CDU	SPD	FDP	B'90/ GRü	REP	PDS	Other
1990	80.8	40.4	30.4	7.1	9.3	3.1	9.2	0.5
WEST	83.7	49.0	29.5	7.9	8.2	3.7	1.1	0.6
EAST	76.2	25.0	32.1	5.6	11.4	1.9	23.6	0.4
1995	68.4	37.4	23.6	2.5	13.2	2.7	14.6	5.9
WEST	71.2	45.4	25.5	3.4	15.0	2.6	2.1	6.0
EAST	64.0	23.6	20.2	1.1	10.0	2.9	36.3	5.8

4.3. Distribution of Seats

Table 4.3. Distribution of Seats in Berlin Legislature. 1950-1995

Year	Turnout	CDU	SPD	FDP	B'90/ GRü	REP	PDS	Other
1950	127	34	61	32				
1954	127	44	64	19				
1958	133	55	78					
1963	140	41	89	10				
1967	137	47	81	9				
1971	138	54	73	11				
1975	147	69	67	11				
1979	135	63	61	11				
1981	132	65	51	7	9			
1985	144	69	48	12	15			
1989	138	55	55		17	11		
1990	241	101	76	18	23		23	
1995	206	87	55		30		34	

4.4. Government Composition in Berlin, 1950-1995

1950. After the election of 3 December 1950, a coalition was formed between the SPD. CDU and FDP. The Governing Mayor was Ernst Reuter (SPD). From December 1953. the governing coalition consisted of the CDU and FDP. The Governing Mayor was Walter Schreiber (CDU).

1954. After the election of 5 December 1954, a coalition was formed between the SPD and CDU. The Governing Mayor was Otto Sühr (SPD) and. from October 1957. Willy Brandt (SPD).

1958. After the election of 7 December 1958, a coalition was formed between the SPD and CDU. The Governing Mayor was Willy Brandt (SPD).

1963. After the election of 17 February 1963. a coalition was formed between the SPD and FDP. The Governing Mayor was Willy Brandt (SPD) and. from December 1966. Heinrich Albertz (SPD).

1967. After the election of 12 March 1967. a coalition was formed between the SPD and FDP. The Governing Mayor was Heinrich Albertz (SPD) and. from October 1967. Klaus Schütz (SPD).

1971. After the election of 14 March 1971. the SPD formed a government without coalition partners. The Governing Mayor was Klaus Schütz (SPD).

1975. After the election of 2 March 1975, a coalition was formed between the SPD and FDP. The Governing Mayor was Klaus Schütz (SPD) and, from May 1977, Dietrich Stobbe (SPD).

1979. After the election of 18 March 1979, a coalition was formed between the SPD and FDP. The Governing Mayor was Dietrich Stobbe (SPD).

1981. After the election of 10 May 1981, a minority government was formed by the CDU. The Governing Mayor was Richard von Weizsäcker. From March 1983, a coalition was formed between the CDU and FDP. From February 1984, the Governing Mayor was Eberhardt Diepgen (CDU).

1985. After the election of 10 March 1985, a coalition was formed between the CDU and FDP. The Governing Mayor was Eberhardt Diepgen (CDU).

1989. After the election of 29 January 1989, a coalition was formed between the SPD and the *Berlin Alternative Liste* (Greens). The Governing Mayor was Walter Momper (SPD).

1990. After the election of 2 December 1990, a coalition was formed between the CDU and SPD. The Governing Mayor was Eberhardt Diepgen (CDU).

1995. After the election of 10 March 1985, a coalition was formed between the CDU and SPD. The Governing Mayor was Eberhardt Diepgen (CDU).

APPENDIX FIVE: SYNOPSIS OF THE PROGRAMME PROPOSED BY THE MINISTRY FOR CITY DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND TRAFFIC.

Précis into English.

5.1. The Imposition of a New 'Planning Culture'

Greater transparency on the part of officials during the planning stage of policy; the repeal of measures designed to speed up planning permission and, subject to costing, the prioritisation of ecological and health criteria within public provision.

5.2. Air Pollution

New controls over emissions; encouragement of the development of new clean air technologies; strengthening of smog regulations (traffic restrictions to be imposed at lower levels of pollutant build-up); ban on the use of PVC and asbestos in the public sector and the removal where already in use; earliest possible total ban on CFC's in West Berlin; encouragement of inter-German co-operation to convert East German power station technology.

5.3. Water Pollution

Priority given within the 'Work and the Environment' programme to the removal of lead piping in the city's water provision; imposition of state of the art technology within the water industry; improvement of quality of drinking water; improved river management including more water protection areas and the 're-greening' of river banks etc.; use of ecological criteria in the management of the city's extensive system of lakes and waterways.

5.4. Waste Management

Cancellation of planned second municipal incinerator, reduction of levels of waste sent to the German Democratic Republic for disposal; imposition of an integrated and coherent waste disposal policy in co-operation with other Länder (to include extension of compostisation methods); discouragement of waste production through a system of tariffs imposed on their disposal; promotion of recyclable products; reworking of the legal framework covering waste production and disposal.

5.5. Land Use and Protection

A freeze on the new development of 'green field' sites: including the review and alteration of existing developments to include new minimum standards for provision of public space for small parks, allotments etc.; more forceful measures to prevent this trend: including the

imposition of specific qualitative criteria and specific subsidies to encourage better use of existing sites (including the renovation of old houses); greater control of land use for dumping and land fill (including greater regulation of those on private and corporate property); encouraging the development of a nation-wide approach to the problem: increased consultation with local communities; cancellation of certain existing road-building projects; cancellation of the planned building of the 'German Historical Museum' and imposition of a new programme called 'Work and the Environment'.

5.6. Energy Policy

Development and imposition of a 'sparing, rational and socially sustainable' system of energy provision and use, including a new energy tax; modification of existing laws on energy use; modification of pricing system to make it more flexible and progressive; making West Berlin's monopoly electricity supplier (BEWAG) adopt a more ecologically-friendly approach: including the encouragement of reduced electricity consumption and the greater use of decentralised electricity generation (*Blockheizkraftwerke*); creation of an energy advisory body (with experts from the worlds of science, business, trades unions, consumers' organisations and environmental groups) to make recommendations on future policy; creation of a specialist working group within the ministry to concentrate on energy policy as well as an independent agency to promote better use of existing methods and the development of new technology; encouragement of better energy use in public buildings; the creation of advice centres for tenants, home owners and small businesses; development of 'municipal heating' schemes; coordination of energy use with the German Democratic Republic.

5.7. Atomic Energy

Cancellation of plans for a third reactor in Berlin (BER III); review of safety of research reactor BER II and cancellation of other projects in progress.

5.8. Traffic

Long-term plan to completely re-open the city's railway system (S-Bahn); budget for the expansion of public transport raised from DM.170 million to DM. 380 million per annum; make public transport more attractive through extension of bus-lanes, reduced waiting times, reduced prices including introduction of cheap all-inclusive travel card (*'Umweltkarte'*); reduction of emissions from buses; introduction of 'night-taxi' system for women; more ecologically-friendly road planning; banning of traffic from certain forested areas within the city and introduction of 100 km/h speed limit on part of the motorway network; extension of cycle-lanes; more regulation of air-traffic in and out of the city; upgrading of rail-links to the Federal Republic and re-opening of old stations within the city (especially with regard to freight purposes).

[*SPD Ländesverband Berlin 1989: 79-84*]

APPENDIX SIX: THE BERLIN ENERGY LAW OF 2 OCTOBER 1990

Précis into English.

6.1. General Information

Paragraph One. Purpose of the Law.

To promote the most sparing, rational, socially and environmentally sustainable, resource-friendly, low risk and - in terms of the wider economy - low cost means as possible for the production and utilisation of energy and, at the same time, secure the long-term provision of energy for the benefit of the citizens of the state of Berlin.

Paragraph Two. Basic Principles.

Through the conservationally-minded approach to the use of energy and the engagement of renewable energy, the following principles should be realised.

1. The allocation of energy should made specifically in order to facilitate the smallest possible consumption of non-renewable energy.

2. In securing energy requirements, priority shall be given to those processes:

- (i)That as far as possible take into account those users of non-renewable energy.

- (ii)That cause the least damage to the natural environment.

- (iii)That make the most efficient use of the space available.

- (iv)That involve the smallest risk for people and the environment.

3. Priority will be given to those measures that limit demand and consumption (of energy), such as the utilisation of 'waste heat' and 'heat retrieval', over those that increase the use of primary energy.

4. The most efficient use will be made of the inherent energy within 'primary energy' resources. Waste heat will be utilised where possible.

5. With regard to the provision of energy, priority will be given to 'low value-added' energy forms: such as the use of waste heat and 'environmental energy'.

Paragraph Three. Explanation of Terms.

1. 'Primary Energy' refers to energy sources that undergo a process of conversion before the point of provision. 'End-Energy' is the energy at the point of provision to the consumer. 'User-energy' is the end-energy after conversion to heat, power and light.

2. 'Renewable Energy' refers to solar power, water power, wind power, Geo.-thermal energy and 'environmental energy' (for instance energy from bio-masses).

3. 'Combined Heat and Power' (CHP) refers to the dual production of power and user-heat under the conditions of a wide-ranging prevention of waste heat.

4. 'Installation'/'Establishment'/"Construction'/'Building' is used in the sense as that laid out Article Three, Paragraph Five of the Federal Emissions Law.

Paragraph Four. The Sparing Utilisation of Energy as a Duty.

Sparing, rational, social, environmentally sustainable and resource-friendly utilisation of energy is the dutiful task of the state (*Staatsaufgabe*) and every citizen.

6.2. Measures Proposed By the State of Berlin to Conserve Energy

Paragraph Five. The Binding Aims and Principles of the Law.

The aims and principles of the law shall be observed by the state of Berlin in all planning and measures taken, in particular with respect those involving intended investment and construction. This also applies to those companies owned by the state of Berlin. The principles of economic and sparing budgeting are not affected (and remain in force).

Paragraph Six. Energy Conservation in Buildings and Installations owned by the State of Berlin.

1. In all cases of construction, extension, modernisation or renovation, or especially changes in energy use in buildings and installations belonging to the state of Berlin, measures must be taken that further the aims and principles of this law. With regard to Paragraph One, these would mean specifically:

- (i)Measures regarding building technology that limit energy requirements.
- (ii)Measures regarding the modernisation of heating and building technology, especially regulating and controlling technology.
- (iii)The bringing on-line of heating installations (both on-site or municipal) through CHP or through special use of waste heat.
- (iv)The use of re-newable energy for room-heating, provision of warm water and electrical energy.
- (v)The building of heat retrieval installations.
- (vi)The conversion from electrical to non-electrical means of room- and water-heating.
- (vii)The installation of electricity-saving instruments and devices.

2. Priority will be given to the conversion of state-owned buildings and installations to municipal heating using CHP or the utilisation of waste heat. If this form of heat provision is not possible, priority will be given to the installation of solar-installations

or block-heating. Swimming pools should use solar-installations as a matter of course. If energy provision under these conditions is not possible, a connection to the gas-main should be made. It will no longer be permissible to install electric heating in new or extended buildings and installations belonging to the state of Berlin.

3. Remedial measures shall be carried out in all extended buildings and installations in the spirit of Articles 1. and 2.

4. Measures relevant to Articles 1. and 3. shall be introduced in the form of an Energy Concept, through which the existing conditions of the building, the energy needs for room-heating, household technology and warm water provision are taken into account, so that the achievable conservation of primary energy and the environmentally beneficial and economical effects of these measures can be carried out.

5. Guidelines will be established with regards to details of Articles 1. to 3. These guidelines will be set out by the Berlin senate.

6. The senate will set up a programme in due time, in order to follow through the measures set out in Articles 1. to 3.

Paragraph Seven. The 'Energy Pass' System.

1. An Energy Pass is required in order to carry out any extensions, modernisation, conversion or any particular changes to buildings belonging to the city of Berlin. This also applies to any third party (buyer, tenant or user) in a relationship with the state of Berlin. Any subsequent changes will require a new application for an energy pass.

2. An energy pass requires an audit of the energy requirements of a given flat or premises. The audit will be carried out with regards to the guidelines set out by the senate.

Paragraph Eight. Requirements for the Procurement of Supplies and Services. Invitations for Tenders.

1. The aims and principles of this law will be observed in the procurement of supplies and services.

2. The state of Berlin will also attempt to procure such energy-saving devices and installations that are still in their developmental stages and not yet commercially available.

3. The procurement of such devices and installations will be made with regard to the aims and principles of this law, in so far as this does not lead to significantly higher procurement costs.

4. The same requirements apply to the invitation to tender for the procurement of supplies and services.

5. Paragraph Six, Article 7 applies.

6.3. Measures Furthering the Aims and Principles of the Law

Paragraph Nine. Energy Conservation in Publicly-Resourced Buildings and Installations.

1. The granting of public resources by the state of Berlin for planned construction, extension, modernisation and changes in energy use in buildings and installations will be made with a view to the aims and principles of the law. Any future plans regarding buildings, technical developments or companies will be subject to the guidelines laid down by the senate.

2. The granting of resources as set out in Article 1 is contingent upon the recipient taking the measures necessary in order to gain an energy pass. The recipient is also charged with ensuring that, in the event of changes in use, a new energy pass is acquired by the buyer, tenant or user before the contract is closed.

Paragraph Ten. The Promotion of Energy Saving in Residential Buildings.

1. The state of Berlin will introduce measures to limit, and make pricing structures reflect, the consumption of primary energy in residential buildings, subject to the existing legal framework.

2. Such measures will be especially salient to Paragraph Six, Article 1., line 2.

3. A pre-condition of the aforementioned promotional measures is the development of an Energy Concept, as set out in Paragraph Six, Article 4. The guidelines will anticipate that such an energy concept is proposed.

4. In rented accommodation, the consent of the tenant will be required. Measures will only be taken when the anticipated rise in rent is no greater or not significantly greater than the savings made through reduced energy and operating costs.

5. Promotional resources, as laid out Article 1. and Article 3. line 2.. can be applied for by the owner of tenant.

Paragraph Eleven. Promotion of De-centralised Energy-Use Installations.

1. The state of Berlin will promote the construction of installations that realise the aims and principles of the law, in that such installations are localised in both production and use, or use re-newable energy. Paragraph Ten, Article 1., line 2. applies.

2. Priority will be given to the promotion of installations using re-newable energy, such as CHP. In particular:

- (i)Installations for the use of waste heat, such as gas-fired heat pumps, if they are part of a local heating system.

- (ii)Other forms of local heating systems, such as heat networks, transfer stations, controlling technology etc.

- (iii)Other forms of re-newable energy systems, for example regulatory technology.

- (iv)Decentralised installations for gas-recovery and related technology.

3. Installations as set out in Articles 1. and 2. must fulfil specific environmental benefits and should not exceed certain maximum levels of energy. These benefits and levels are set out in the guidelines in Paragraph 14.

Paragraph 12. Promotion of Research and Development, such as Pilot and Demonstration Installations.

1. The state of Berlin will promote research and development of such pilot and demonstration installations in the area of technology, in so far as they promote the aims and principles of energy conservation as set out in the law.

2. Such promotion of research and development will take place within the framework of a Research Programme, set up by the senate. The results of such research will be made public.

3. Promotion will be made of plans for the development and introduction of methods and products that are anticipated to lead to the conservation of primary energy. the greater use of re-newable energy and the preservation of the environment. Within this promotional framework, priority will be given to those plans that involve technology that is able to be put into operation in a decentralised manner.

4. Priority will be given to planned research and development from applicants located within the state of Berlin. Pilot and demonstration installations are only eligible for promotion if they are to be erected and operated within the state of Berlin.

Paragraph 13. Promotion of Energy Advice.

The state of Berlin will set up an advice centre to advise consumers with regard to the aims and principles of the law.

Paragraph 14. Promotional Guidelines and Programmes.

1. The details laid out in Paragraphs Ten to Thirteen will be set out as guidelines.

2. There is no legal right to such promotional measures.

3. The promotional measures laid out in Paragraphs Ten to Thirteen will be presented by the state of Berlin in an annual promotional programme. The terms of reference of such a programme will be able to encompass more than one calendar year.

6.4. Measures for the Re-Orientation of the Energy Sector in the State of Berlin

Paragraph Fifteen.. A State Energy Programme.

1. Every four years, the state of Berlin will set up an Energy Programme, which will include the aims of the conservation of energy, restrictions on the growth of energy use and environmental damage and measures furthering these aims.

2. The public domain will be involved in the formulation of the State Energy Programme.

Paragraph Sixteen. An Energy Report.

On the basis of the State Energy Programme, the Berlin senate will present the state parliament with an annual Energy Report, dealing with those measures introduced in order to realise the aims and principles of this law and the implementation of the State Energy Programme as set out in Paragraph Fifteen and the results of such measures.

Paragraph Seventeen. Involving the Public Domain.

Those measures proposed under Paragraph Four of the Energy Sector Law, with regard to the planned erection and extension of:

- (i)Power stations and electricity generating plants involving the use of solid, liquid or gaseous fuel, in so far as they exceed the electrical rated power of 5 MW.

- (ii)High energy cables from 110 kV, including transformer stations.

- (iii)Gas storage facilities and those gas works, gas tanks, tanks for petrol, methanol or oil as well as those installations that are connected with the storage of liquid gas, which require permits under the Federal Emissions Law.

- (iv)High pressure pipelines for natural gas.

will be made public. This will include the opportunity to put forward opinions and for the public discussion of proposed plans, in particular with regard to their effects upon the security and pricing of energy provision and upon the realisation of the aims of this law, in so far as this does not effect the rights of third parties. The Berlin senate will use statutory instruments with regard to the details of public involvement.

Paragraph Eighteen. The Energy Service Industry

The Berlin senate will ensure that those firms registered in the state of Berlin who supply others with energy:

1. Will have business aims that are compatible with the aims and principles of this law, in particular that the promotion of energy conservation and the rational use of energy takes precedence over the expansion of the availability of energy.

2. That such services offered are geared towards the aims and principles of this law.

3. At the planning stage of proposals to expand the availability of energy, possible alternatives should be costed, in particular measures designed to conserve energy that would make the expansion of the availability of energy unnecessary.

4. Set tariffs and prices with the goal of economically influencing and reducing the use of energy.

5. That as far as possible they make public their investment and business plans, in particular their price calculations.

6. That they make public any plans of special importance to the energy sector.

Paragraph Nineteen. Licensing Contracts.

1. Contracts agreed by the state of Berlin shall ensure that the partner to the contract is under the obligation to support the state of Berlin in the realisation of the aims and principles of this law. Licensing contracts should implement the aims of Paragraph Eighteen, in so far as this does not affect existing statutory rights.

2. Licensing contracts will ensure that the Berlin senate can suggest an adaptation of existing laws, when this is in the public interest and in furtherance of the aims and principles of this law with regard to energy use.

3. The closing of licensing contracts requires the prior approval of the parliament.

Paragraph Twenty. Energy Officials.

1. In order to promote the aims and principles of the law. Energy Officials will be appointed in the districts (*Bezirken*).

2. The Energy Officials will have the following tasks:

- (i)To investigate the existing condition of buildings and installations within the district, with regard to their energy requirements for room-heating, household t echnology and the supply of warm water.

- (ii)To assess the possibility for measures to conserve energy in buildings and installations within the district, within the parameters set out in Paragraph Six.

- (iii)To present proposals in accordance with Paragraph Six.

- (iv)To monitor energy-consuming installations and to suggest measures in order to improve their effectiveness.

- (v)To monitor the effectiveness of measures in accordance with Paragraph Six and present an annual report to the District Office (*Bezirksamt*) and District Council (*Bezirksverordneten versammlung*).

3. The Energy Official is to be involved in the planning and implementation of measures in accordance with paragraph Six and with any other measures that are of importance to the

energy use of buildings and installations within the district. The official is responsible for the issue of Energy Passes in accordance with Paragraph Seven. They have the authority to refer cases immediately to the District Office and District Council.

Paragraph Twenty-One. The Energy Advisory Council.

The Berlin senate will convene an Energy Advisory Council. The Energy Advisory Council will advise the Berlin Senate of their judgements upon basic questions of energy-economics and energy policy. It will discuss those matters that are salient to the provision of energy for the state of Berlin, from the viewpoint of technical expertise as well as the economic and social aspects, and, in doing this, will highlight problems, provide the basis for judgements and suggest solutions. In particular, the Energy Advisory Council will advise and co-operate in the setting- up and application of the state Energy Programme as set out in Paragraph Fifteen. The members of the Energy Advisory Council will be chosen from the different areas of the energy sector, users groups and those civil interest groups that are affected by the topic of energy provision and science, The number of members on the council will not exceed 25.

6.5. Other Measures for Energy Conservation

Paragraph Twenty-Two. A ban on the new installation of Electrical Heating Appliances.

1. The new installation of electric heaters and night storage heaters for domestic use with a capacity of more than 2 kW is not permissible.

2. Exceptions to Article 1. can be made by the ruling of the Berlin senate, if other forms of heating are not appropriate or economical for use.

Paragraph Twenty-Three. Regulations regarding Installation and Use.

1. The Berlin senate will be empowered to stipulate the use in particular instances of certain methods and techniques in fulfilling energy needs, in particular with regard to municipal or localised heating networks, where this promotes the aims and principles of the law.

2. The rulings will anticipate certain exceptions to such regulations regarding installation and use, in particular those buildings with an especially low energy requirement. They will anticipate reduced regulations on installation and use for particular groups of people, businesses or premises, especially those premises that are to be newly developed. In the enforcement of regulations regarding installation and use upon premises with other heating systems in place, the rulings will anticipate transitional regulations in order to minimise social hardship.

Paragraph Twenty-Four. The Ordering of Heating and Air-conditioning installations, such as Warm Water installations.

1. Where installations for heating or air-conditioning or the supply of warm water are or will be installed, it will be required to use certain technologies (such as CHP or the use of waste heat) in accordance with Paragraph 2. and in order to ensure that these installations do not use more non-renewable primary energy than is necessary.

2. Regulations will establish maximum levels for the energy needs of buildings, where any excess energy requirements will have to be fulfilled through the erection installations using CHP or the use of waste heat. The regulations will make exceptions where these requirements are not attainable on technical or economic grounds.

3. The regulations will ensure that the installation of ventilation and air-conditioning systems in buildings is only permitted when deemed essential.

Paragraph Twenty-Five. Regulations concerning the erection and operation of other types of installation.

1. The Berlin senate is empowered to legislate in order to ensure, as long as this does not contravene Federal legislation, that the erection and operation of other installations with significant energy requirements are in accordance with the furtherance of the aims and principles of the law, to the extent that the type and location of such installations make this possible.

2. Measures in accordance with Article 1. are in particular:

- (i)The reduction of the unnecessary use of User-energy.

- (ii)The reduction of User-energy requirements.

- (iii)The improvement of the degree of energy for end-use.

Paragraph Twenty-Six. Requirements on Declaration.

Businesses are required to declare the level of energy used by them and to what use this energy was put. The results are only to be used for the state Energy Programme, for statistical use and for measures to further this law. The regulations regarding Data Protection apply.

Paragraph Twenty-Seven. Application to Gas for Street Lighting.

The regulations regarding this law do not apply to gas-powered street lighting.

6.6. Regulations Regarding Fines

Paragraph Twenty-Eight. Infringement of Regulations.

1. It is an infringement of regulations for anyone to intentionally or accidentally:

- (i) (In infringement of Paragraph Nine, Article 2) do not present an Energy Pass at the closing of a contract.
- (ii) (In infringement of paragraph Twenty-Two) newly install electrical heating.
- (iii) (In infringement of Article 26) fail to submit a declaration, submit a false declaration, submit an incomplete declaration or a declaration at the wrong time.
- (iv) Defy a ruling in accordance with Paragraphs Twenty-Four and Twenty-Five.

2. Infringements of regulations can incur fines of up to one hundred thousand Deutsche Marks.

6.7. Closing Regulations

Paragraph Twenty-Nine. Amendments to the Berlin Building Regulations.

Paragraph 56, Article 1 of the Berlin Building Regulations of 28 February 1985 (GVBI. S.522), amended by law on 25 September 1990 (GVBI. S.2075), will be amended as follows.

1. The new Number 37 will read:

"37. Solar panels and photosensitive installations in and on roofs and outer wall areas".

2. The former number 37. will become Number 38.

Paragraph Thirty. Coming into Force. This law comes into force one day after its notification in the Berlin legal bulletins.

The above law is hereby announced.

The Governing Mayor: Ingrid Stahmer (Mayor).

APPENDIX SEVEN: ELECTION RESULTS FOR LOWER SAXONY, 1947-1994.

Original data courtesy of Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim in co-operation with the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The John Hopkins University 'Elections News' Website (http://www.klipsan.com/elecnews.htm)[4]

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7.1. Federal Elections In Lower Saxony

Table 7.1. (Second Vote) Results in %.

Year	%Turnout	CDU	SPD	FDP	Grüne	Others[5]
1949[6]*	77.7	17.6	33.4	7.5	___	41.4
1953	88.7	35.2	30.1	6.9		27.8
1957	89.0	39.1	32.8	5.9		22.2
1961	88.5	39.0	38.7	13.2		9.1
1965	87.3	45.8	39.8	10.9		3.5
1969	87.5	45.2	43.8	5.6		5.4
1972	91.4	42.7	48.1	8.5		0.7
1976	91.4	45.7	45.7	7.9		0.7
1980	89.3	39.8	46.9	11.3	1.6	0.4
1983	89.6	45.6	41.3	6.9	5.7	0.4
1987	85.0	41.5	41.4	8.8	7.4	0.8
1990	80.6	44.3	38.4	10.3	4.5	2.6
1994	81.8	41.3	40.6	7.7	7.1	3.4

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[4]During the compilation of these figures, the author noted that some of the numerical percentage totals do not add up to 100, due to the effect of 'rounding up/down' totals to the nearest tenth of one percent.

[5]1949: of which DP 17.8; DRP 8.1; Zentrum 3.4; KPD 3.1; 1953: of which DP 11.9; GB BHE 10.8; DRP 3.5; 1957: of which DP 11.4; GB/BHE 7.6; 1961: of which GDP(DP-BHE) 6.1; 1965: of which NPD 2.5; 1969: of which NPD 4.6; 1990: of which REP 1.0; 1994: dof which REP 1.2; PDS 1.0.

[6]Only one vote per voter in the 1949 election.

7.2. State Elections

Table 7.2. Lower Saxony State Elections 1950-1989

Year	%Turnout	CDU	SPD	FDP	Grüne	Others[7]
1947	65.1	19.9	43.4	8.8		27.9
1951	75.8	23.7	33.7	8.3		34.2
1955	77.5	26.6	35.2	7.9		30.3
1959	78.0	30.8	39.5	5.2		24.5
1963	76.9	37.7	44.9	8.8		8.6
1967	75.8	41.7	43.1	6.9		8.3
1970	76.7	45.7	46.3	4.4		3.6
1974	84.4	48.4	43.1	7.0		1.0
1978	78.5	48.7	42.2	4.2	3.9	1.0
1982	77.7	50.7	36.5	5.9	6.5	0.4
1986	77.3	44.3	42.1	6.0	7.1	0.5
1990	74.6	42.0	44.2	6.0	5.5	2.3
1994	73.8	36.4	44.3	4.4	7.4	7.5

7.3. Distribution of Seats

Table 7.3. Distribution of Seats in Lower Saxony Legislature. 1950-1995

Year	Total Seats	CDU[8]	SPD	FDP	Grüne	Others[9]
1947	149	30	65	13		41
1951	158	35	64	12		47
1955	159	43	59	12		45
1959	157	51	65	8		33
1963	149	62	73	14		
1967	149	63	66	10		10
1970	149	74	75			
1974	155	77	67	11		
1978	155	83	72			
1982	171	87	63	10	11	
1986	155	69	66	9	11	
1990	155	67	71	9	8	
1994	161	67	81		13	

[7]a) 1951: Niederdeutsche Union (DP/CDU); b) 1978: GLU; c) 1947: of which DP 17.9; KPD 5.6; Zentrum 4.1; 1951: of which GB/BHE 14.9; SRP 11.0; Zentrum 3.3; 1955: of which DP 12.4; GB/BHE 11.0; DRP 3.8; 1959: of which DP 12.4; GB/BHE 8.3; DRP 3.6

[8]With the DP.

[9]1947: davon DP 27; KPD 8; Zentrum 6; 1951: davon DRP 3; DSP 1; GB/BHE 21; KPD 2; SRP 16; Zentrum 4; 1955: davon DP 19; GB/BHE 17; DRP 6; Zentrum 1; KPD 2; 1959: davon DP 20; GB BHE 13; 1967: NPD

7.4. Government Composition in Lower Saxony, 1950-1995

1947. Following the elections of 20 April 1947, a coalition was formed consisting of the SPD, CDU, DP, FDP, Zentrum and KPD. The Minister President was Heinrich Wilhelm Kopf (SPD). From February 1948, a coalition consisting of the SPD, CDU, DP, FDP and Zentrum. From June 1948, a coalition of SPD, CDU and Zentrum. From August 1950, a coalition of SPD and Zentrum.

1951. Following the elections of 6 May 1951, a coalition was formed consisting of the SPD, BB/BHE and Zentrum. The Minister President was Heinrich Wilhelm Kopf (SPD). From December 1953, a coalition consisting of the SPD and GB/BHE.

1955. Following the elections of 24 April 1955, a coalition was formed consisting of the CDU, DP, FDP and GB/BHE. The Minister President was Heinrich Hellwege (DP). From November 1957, a coalition consisting of the SPD, CDU and DP.

1959. Following the elections of 19 April 1959, a coalition was formed consisting of the SPD, GB/BHE and FDP. The Minister President was Heinrich Wilhelm Kopf (SPD). From December 1961, the Minister President was Georg Diedrichs (SPD).

1963. Following the elections of 19 May 1963, a coalition was formed consisting of the SPD, and FDP. Minister President was Georg Diedrichs (SPD). From May 1965, coalition of the SPD and CDU.

1967. From 4 June 1967, coalition of the SPD and CDU. Minister President was Georg Diedrichs (SPD).

1970. Following the elections of 14 June 1970, the SPD governed alone. Minister President was Alfred Kubel (SPD).

1974. Following the elections of 9 June 1974, a coalition of the SPD and FDP. Minister President was Alfred Kubel (SPD). From January 1976, the Minister President was Ernst Albrecht (CDU). From Janauary 1977, the CDU governed alone. Minister President was Ernst Albrecht (CDU).

1978. Following the elections of 4 April 1978, the CDU governed alone. Minister President was Ernst Albrecht (CDU).

1982. Following the elections of 21 March 1982, the CDU governed alone. Minister President was Ernst Albrecht (CDU).

1986. Following the elections of 15 June 1986, a coalition of the CDU and FD. Minister President was Ernst Albrecht (CDU).

1990. Following the elections of 13 May 1990, a coalition of SPD and Grünen. Minister President was Gerhard Schröder (SPD).

1994. Following the elections of 13 March 1994, the SPD governed alone. Minister President was Gerhard Schröder (SPD).

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