

**ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE CASE
OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION
IN THAILAND**

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ABSTRACT

This research investigated the relationship between organizational culture and public sector performance management. The research was based on a study of the promotion of good governance in the Thai public sector through the implementation of the performance agreement (PA) scheme, using Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The scheme had faced numerous challenges, perceived to be influenced by organizational culture. It had been assumed that a transformational shift in the organizational culture of the civil service, in the direction of market-based or new public management (NPM) values, was required in order to secure improved performance. The research aimed to explore how organizational culture influences civil service performance and identify other organizational factors that may also influence civil service performance in the provincial administration of Thailand.

The research used a mixed methods approach of questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews, based on the Competing Values Framework (CVF). Questionnaire surveys were carried out with 480 civil servants within 16 provinces. Semi-structured interviews – in-depth and focus group – were conducted within four provinces. A distinction was made between the low and high KPI scoring provinces.

The findings of the research suggest that there was no dominant type of culture in the low and high KPI scoring provinces. Instead, a strong culture was found to be important in gaining high KPI scores, supported by participative leadership and appropriate management. Leadership style appeared to influence whether the public services performed to a high level, which seemed to be achieved through a balance between task focussed and people focussed. Therefore, a transformational cultural shift may not be required, but instead more effective leadership and management.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this to my mother and father;

Aura & Pong Yosinta

Who love, support and pray everyday for me
and make me able to achieve my study and have honour

Along with all respected

Teachers

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis, which I submit to the University of Birmingham in consideration of the award for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, is my original research work. No portion of the thesis has been submitted to other Universities or institutions.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Definitions
CNS	Council for National Security
CVF	Competing values framework
E-SAR	Electronic self assessment report
GG	Good governance
H	High KPI scoring provinces
HR	Human resource
HRM	Human resource management
IDV	Individual index values
KPIs	Key performance indicators
L	Low KPI scoring provinces
LTO	Long-term orientation index
MAS	Masculinity index
NPM	New public management
NCPO	National Council for Peace and Order
OCAI	Organizational culture assessment instrument
OPDC	Office of the Public Sector Development Commission
PA	Performance agreement
PDC	Public Sector Development Commission
PM	Performance management
PMS	Performance management system
PRP	Performance-related pay
UAI	Uncertainty avoidance index

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research problem

Public sector reform is closely associated with attempts to improve governance (Fukuyama, 2013). Since the early 1980s, the terms ‘governance’ and ‘good governance’ have gained significant attention in development discourse (Weiss, 2000), particularly in public administration. The problems of poor governance such as corruption, waste, abuse of power and the exploitation of public means for private ends (Jreisat 2004 cited in Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012; Leftwich, 1993; OECD, 2001) in aid recipient countries have been a concern for aid donors, particularly international organizations such as the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2001; UNDP, 1997; UNESCAP, 2009). Consequently, the concept of ‘good governance’ has become an initial aid condition and approach to reform programmes demanded by many donors (Arkadie, 2012; Smith, 2007), especially programmes related to performance measurement for delivering good governance.

Several developing countries (e.g. Argentina, Indonesia and Thailand) and developed countries (e.g. the USA, Netherlands and the UK) have attempted to apply performance measurement programmes to public sector reform and introduce good governance (Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Hood, 2007; Painter, 2012). However, the implementation of public reform or good governance is not simple in practice.

Achieving public sector reform needs an understanding of organizational culture, such as which culture or values are important (Talbot, 2010). Increased understanding of public sector organizational culture may help to describe the outcomes of the reform process in terms of appropriateness and inappropriateness between organizational culture and the objectives of reform (Parker and Bradley, 2000). A number of scholars (e.g. Andrews, 2013; Grindle, 1997; Wiratchaniphawan, 2004) suggest that culture, such as values and attitudes, is an important determinant influencing public sector reform and good governance. For example, resistance to change appears to occur when change is not compatible with the strong values of organizations (Yukl, 2010). Organizational culture is considered an informal authority shaping the assumptions, values, attitudes and behaviour of an organization's members (Andrews, 2013; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Robbins, 2005; Schwartz and Davis, 1981), and an 'invisible hand' in public sector management (Rong and Hongwei, 2012, p. 47). Therefore, culture is perceived to be something that influences performance (Armstrong and Baron, 1998), enabling and inhibiting attempts to improve the performance of organizations, particularly the performance of public organizations – the results of an act such as efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness (Boyne et al., 2006). The implication is that organizational culture might influence the performance (management) of the civil service in the specific context of new public management and the promotion of good governance.

There are a number of empirical studies that have investigated the relationship between organizational culture and public sector reform in several countries, for example in Qatar (Al-Kuwari, 2002), the USA (New York) (Moon, 2000), Ghana (Owusu, 2012),

India (Quirk, 2002), and Thailand (Jingjit, 2008). There has been relatively little examination of how organizational culture influences good governance and the performance of the civil service. Previous studies have tended to focus on organizational culture and on some components of good governance, such as effectiveness, but this study investigates a wider range of components of good governance and incorporates an element of management and leadership as well as culture, whereas previous studies have tended to ignore this distinction.

Studying Thailand, the provincial administration in particular, brings out new evidence about the relationship between organizational culture and good governance. Thailand is an interesting case because the Thai public sector reform has promoted good governance through a performance measurement programme known as the performance agreement (PA). After a major reform of the Thai public sector in 2002, legislation and several plans were promulgated for encouraging good governance in the public sector, particularly the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance B.E. 2546 (2003). The Decree ordered that all government agencies must be committed to PA from the fiscal year B.E. 2547 (2004) onwards. Regarding PA at the provincial administration level, 75 provinces¹ in four regions have committed to PA.

However, promoting good governance through the PA scheme with Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in the Thai public sector has been no simple task. The promotion of this scheme has struggled with the existing embedded traditional culture of bureaucracy,

¹ The study focuses on only 75 provinces into 18 provincial clusters in four regions that engaged PA between 2007 and 2011, while the 76th province established in 2011, Bueng Kan, is not included.

which could be an obstacle to driving good governance (Sirisamphan, 2009). This can apparently be observed through the promotion of the PA scheme from fiscal year B.E. 2547 (2004) to date². Some scholars claim that there are various challenges for the PA scheme, particularly at a provincial level, with relevance to culture, such as values on rewards (Sathornkich, 2013), and a control system forcing implementation of the KPIs (Srimai, 2015). The government agencies at the provincial administration level, who have a close connection to the citizens in the area, appear to have a significant impact on improving citizens' quality of life and responding to their needs (Sathornkich, 2010). Thus, the provincial level plays a significant part in the reform mechanism. There are some studies on the civil service's culture at a similar level, such as Moon (2000), the city government agencies were studied about motivation and organizational commitment. However, there are not many studies on the civil service's culture at the provincial level because research has tended to focus on other levels such as state, organizations, ministries, departments and projects (Al-Kuwari, 2002; Owusu, 2012; Parker and Bradley, 2000; Quirk, 2002).

Many studies of the Thai public sector's culture (e.g. Jingjit, 2008; Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Phookpan, 2012; Pimpa, 2012) focus on the central government agencies (e.g. ministries, departments, agencies) rather than provincial agencies. Although a few studies (e.g. Sathornkich, 2010; Srimai, 2015; Srimai, Damsaman and Bangchokdee, 2011) examine, for instance, performance management system (PMS) and PA at the provincial level, they do not highlight the correlation between organizational culture and

² The performance agreement (PA) has been promoted in the Thai civil service from fiscal year 2004 to the present.

good governance. Therefore, the current study examines the civil service's culture at the provincial administration level in terms of the relationship between organizational culture and good governance, both whether and how organizational culture influences the attainment of good governance as measured by PMS in the Thai public sector.

1.2 Why Thailand?

There are many countries that have employed the concept of good governance in the public sector through performance measurement as stated in Section 1.1. Thailand may be one of the most interesting cases, particularly among developing countries. This is for three main reasons. Firstly, Thailand has a long experience of public sector reform and since 2002 the programme is recognized as the largest public sector reform in the history of Thailand. This is the initiative to promote good governance through PA. Since the fiscal year B.E. 2547 (2004), the Thai civil service has been committed to PA; hence, many government officials have long experience of PA and can share information about performance measurement.

Secondly, Thailand has a unique culture that is different from other countries, especially Southeast Asian countries in that Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that was never colonized by a European power (CountryWatch, 2016). Therefore, the country has a self-contained cultural uniqueness free from external pressure (Shor, 1960). Moreover, the nation's cultural uniqueness is derived from the influence of Buddhism and from a mixture of cultural influences from several countries such as India, China, and Cambodia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2013).

Thirdly, the study of the Thai public sector presents an opportunity to explore the relationship between organizational culture (e.g. attitudes, values and assumptions) and the achievement of good governance in the civil service. In this respect, the case of Thailand may be a learning opportunity for other countries, particularly developing countries, in terms of raising awareness of the relationship between organizational culture and performance (good governance) in the public sector.

1.3 Aims and objectives of the study

Much literature and many studies on organizational culture and performance have suggested that organizational culture is an important factor inhibiting or enabling the performance of organizations, especially in the public sector. This research aims to investigate whether and how organizational culture influences the attainment of good governance as viewed through PMS in the Thai public sector.

To achieve the research aims, there are three main objectives of the research:

- (1) Examine whether there is a relationship between organizational culture and good governance

The relationship between organizational culture and good governance used in this research was considered through the four types of culture based on the CVF model and the nine key components of good governance in terms of how each type of culture influences performance and delivers each key component of good governance.

- (2) Examine the organizational culture of the civil service at the level of provincial administration to ascertain any cultural differences between high and low KPI scoring provinces

Organizational cultures of the low and high KPI scoring provinces were compared by developing organizational culture profiles based on the OCAI and statistical analysis acquired from the questionnaire survey. The qualitative data acquired from semi-structured interviews were also compared between both provincial groups. The overall cultural differences between the provincial groups was considered, based on the comparison of the results from the questionnaire surveys and the semi-structured interviews.

- (3) Examine civil servants' perceptions of their experience relating to the PA scheme, and give officials opportunities to voice their views.

The interviews were carried out with the senior managers and practitioners. Participants were able to express their experiences, opinions, feelings and knowledge (Patton, 1990) on the PA scheme. The use of semi-structured interviews enabled a flexible interview environment because participants could share their views without controlled orientation.

1.4 Research questions

To achieve the research objectives stated above, two main research questions are employed as follows:

- (1) How does organizational culture influence civil service performance?
- (2) What other organizational factors influence civil service performance?

1.5 Theoretical underpinnings

Several studies have explored the relationship between organizational culture and a variety of other factors (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). Different scholars have used different theoretical models to study organizational culture. However, this study used the Competing Values Framework (CVF), of which the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) is the main instrument (Cameron and Quinn, 2011) – the CVF was originally developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983). The CVF has been used because of four main reasons. Firstly, the CVF allows the measurement of organizational culture in terms of different dimensions but has broad implications compared to other models because it can integrate most organizational culture dimensions, particularly value dimension related to effectiveness (Yu and Wu, 2009). This can facilitate a comparison of the four types of culture between the provincial cases such as between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, and between the senior managers and practitioners in each group.

Secondly, the CVF provides empirical validity and reliability due to the standard questions in the OCAI (Cameron and Quinn, 2011), which has been used by many empirical studies (e.g. Howard, 1998; Ralston et al., 2006). Thirdly, the CVF allows researchers to use multiple methods in a single study, which can be seen from many empirical studies (e.g. Jingjit, 2008; Parker and Bradley, 2000; Phookpan, 2012). This enables triangulation, where the weaknesses of one method are offset by the strengths of another method (Jick, 1979). Finally, the CVF is considered to be an appropriate model to explore the culture of the public sector and to study cross-cultural research. Jingjit and Fotaki (2010) emphasize that the CVF is appropriate to investigate the extent

of bureaucratic culture or hierarchy model. The CVF has been used to study cross-cultural research in various countries, for instance Asian countries such as China, Hong Kong, Japan, Vietnam and Thailand (Kwan and Walker, 2004; Yu and Wu, 2009). The CVF is, therefore, used to measure the Thai public sector with regards to which types of culture influence the performance of the civil service. The discussion of the advantages of the CVF can be found in Chapter Two (Section 2.4.3).

1.6 Research method, design and methodology

1.6.1 Research method

This study employed mixed methods – quantitative methods (questionnaire survey) and qualitative methods (semi-structured interview). Using mixed methods not only helps to seek clarification of the research findings (Darlington and Scott, 2002; Hesse-Biber, 2010), but also helps to overcome the misinterpretation of data from a single method in studying organizational culture. A quantitative method (questionnaire survey) was employed to examine the existing and preferred culture in the civil service. Its findings were also used as the basis for follow-up interviews. A qualitative method (semi-structured interview) was used to elicit in-depth and detailed information about the officials' perspectives on the PA scheme.

1.6.2 Research design and methodology

The study carried out a questionnaire survey of 16 provinces and semi-structured interviews based on the case studies of four provinces. There are a total of 75 provinces in Thailand (over the period 2007-2011) and 35 provincial agencies per province. Thus, the selection of cases was conducted through a combination of sampling techniques –

multi-stage, stratified and purposive samplings – which were employed for selecting the appropriate samples for the surveys and interviews. The case study design is discussed in detail in Chapter Four.

The study also used a comparative study design for comparing organizational culture between the 16 provinces and between the low and high KPI scoring provinces. A comparative study allows the researcher to distinguish between two or more cases which reflects theories about contrasting findings (Bryman, 2012). In this study, it is not only employed to compare the similarities and differences of each finding – the survey and interview findings – but also used to compare between both sources of findings for seeking convergence and clarification of the overall result.

1.7 Summary

1.7.1 Key findings and implications

The key findings and implications are illustrated based on the research questions: 1) ‘How does organizational culture influence civil service performance?’ and 2) ‘What other organizational factors influence civil service performance?’

The findings of this study were acquired from the questionnaire surveys with 307 participants and from the semi-structured interviews with 33 participants. The findings suggest that strong culture is the key determinant influencing civil service performance and good governance rather than a particular type of culture. The quantitative data analysis revealed that with regard to the four types of culture (clan, market, hierarchy, and adhocracy) there were statistically significant differences between the low and high

KPI scoring provinces, although not in terms of the different types of culture but rather in terms of the strength of each type – higher performing cases were stronger on hierarchy, clan, market and adhocracy cultures rather than being skewed towards one. The small difference between the four types of culture may derive from two reasons. Firstly, the officials had performed the KPIs under the same work environment (the PA scheme). Alvesson and Sveningsson (2016) state that organizational climate is one of the indicators affecting the management initiative or results and outcomes of organizations. Secondly, there was the deep rooted culture in the Thai public sector acquired from the national culture because national culture is a source of organizational culture (Brown, 1998). It is important to note that changing views of the ideal model of public organizations are that a new public management (NPM) perspective might have predicted a shift toward market culture on the part of the higher performing cases, while lower performing cases would be expected to be more hierarchical (see Parker and Bradley, 2000, p. 131).

The qualitative data analysis appeared to confirm that differences in performance could be accounted for by strong culture (see the definition of strong culture in Chapter Two, section 2.4.2). There were different typical characteristics between the low and high KPI scoring provinces in order to generate a different degree of strong culture, including leadership, individuals' characteristics, reward systems and others such as task and goal-orientation, trust of the team of the Provincial Governor's Office, and meetings with the executives (see typical characteristics of the low and high KPI scoring provinces in Chapter Seven, section 7.4). In this respect, the existence of a strong culture matters for generating high performance – the 'strong culture equals high performance' equation

(Brown, 1998, p. 229) – and delivers on good governance, particularly effectiveness, participation, efficiency, accountability and responsiveness (see cross-cutting themes in Chapter Seven, section 7.3).

Besides strong culture, there were other organizational factors influencing performance in the civil service, particularly leadership (strategies and style) and management arrangements. The role of the leaders was to introduce clear policies to staff members, generate commitment among individuals and encourage the officials to pursue goals in the same direction. These characteristics of participative leadership are important for the creation of stability of operation, job satisfaction and a flexible working environment in order to create efficiency and effectiveness of work, participation and accountability of the officials. Therefore, leadership plays a significant role in the development of effective culture and the effective management of the organizations, especially in the public sector (Kim, 2014; Parry and Proctor-Thomson, 2003), particularly a participative leadership style. The data also suggested that the leaders' managerial ways in terms of task management, human resource management (HRM) and reward management played a crucial role in determining achievement in high scores of performance evaluation and good governance. Reward management seems to be one of the most important elements of concern to many officials, for which fairness and equity of reward allocation by leaders are anticipated for generating participation and accountability. Participative leadership could enable the staff to perceive fairness from their superiors (Huang et al., 2010).

The findings of previous studies (e.g. Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Parker and Bradley, 2000; Selaratana, 2009) have suggested that organizational culture is an important factor in either facilitating or hindering attempts to improve the performance or effectiveness of organizations, particularly in public organizations. However, the findings of this study suggest that there should be a distinction between culture types and strength of culture, and that leadership and management strategies (e.g. regarding task management, human resources and reward systems) explain such variations and that this may be a key factor in determining performance. This suggests that the style of leadership and management may be more important in securing reform objectives than a change from one type of culture to another – the public sector may remain hierarchical but hierarchy can be managed participatively.

In addition, the findings of this study suggest that performance can be improved through immediate managerial or leadership actions and may not depend on underlying cultural characteristics that, by definition, can only be altered in the long term, if at all. Changing the way the civil service is managed may be more effective than seeking to change the civil service culture as a whole. This is consistent with the idea proposed by many scholars (e.g. Brown, 1998; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Fernandez and Rainey, 2006; Kim, 2014; Lorsch, 1986; Nica, 2013; Schraeder, Tears and Jordan, 2005) who stated that organizational culture can be changed by leadership (top managers) and management (top management). Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008) pointed out that organizational culture is very difficult to change, but it is possible to manage by top management (e.g. using sufficient skills and resources) and by senior managers' actions (e.g. influencing some values and meanings under a certain environment).

1.7.2 Limitations

A number of challenges were encountered regarding data reliability and validity, which can be viewed in three major dimensions: surveys, interviews and overall. The surveys face some challenges, such as using a five-point scale on the OCAI questionnaire may have led to a small range of scores for the researcher to compare between the four types of culture. However, the use of the five-point scale on the Likert scales provides validity and reliability regarding the correlation between scale score in the same quadrant, obtaining information about attitudes and assumptions; and facilitating respondents for answering a simple scale rather than 100 points (Quinn and Spreitzer, 1991; Vanderstoep and Johnson, 2009; De Vaus, 2002). The other challenge was the non-completion of questionnaires. Some participants did not answer some of the questions in the questionnaire. This may derive from a difficulty in getting access to the senior managers due to sending the questionnaires by post. The researcher had no opportunity to provide an explanation of the questionnaires or to encourage completion. Another problem was the partial lack of attentiveness when answering the questionnaires by some respondents because they might not have recognized the benefits of the research. For example, some participants left a note on their questionnaire, saying that they did not see any results of research brought to adaptation in practice.

The interview challenges consist of at least three aspects: retrospective data and translation problems. This study viewed good governance through the lens of the PA scheme, in which the participants were asked to look back on PA in previous years. Consequently, gathering data was viewed as a retrospective study. Culture is something that has been accumulated for a long time and it is difficult to change (Hofstede et al.,

1990; Rong and Hongwei, 2012; Schein, 2004). In terms of the problem of translation, the interviews were conducted in the Thai language because the interviewees were Thais. Thus, it was time-consuming for translation from Thai to English.

Regarding the overall limitations, the researcher is one of the officials of the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), which is the central agency responsible for the PA scheme. Some respondents may have been cautious by answering the questions in ways that would favour the interests of the OPDC, while they might conceal some genuine information. Contrary to this, the researcher could obtain access to the provincial agencies and secure cooperation from many provincial agencies.

In addition, the other limitation is that this study was a piece of research on the relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the particular context of the Thai public sector. The findings are not representative of the relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the public sectors of other countries. This is because each country has a particular context. For example, the same management actions in the civil service of a neighbouring country to Thailand with a different civil service culture might attain different results.

1.8 Structure of the thesis

This study consists of eight chapters, which are structured as follows:

Chapter One provides an overview of the study. It includes eight sections: research problem; why Thailand; aims and objectives of the study; research questions; theoretical underpinnings; research method, design and methodology; summary and structure of the thesis.

Chapter Two sets out the conceptual framework for guiding the design of the data collection and analysis and answering the research questions. It focuses on three main aspects: pursuing good governance, determinants of performance, and organizational culture. The chapter presents the development of the theoretical framework based on the concepts of good governance, the major determinants of performance, and organizational culture in order to set a basis for the data analysis and discussion in particular in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

Chapter Three presents the background, culture and values, development of good governance in Thailand, and provincial administration and performance agreement (PA). After providing general information on Thailand and its politics, the Thai culture and values that influence the civil service's implementation of public sector reform, particularly the promotion of good governance, are offered. Regarding good governance in Thailand, special focus is put on the development of good governance and its promotion through PA. In the section on provincial administration and PA, it offers information about the provinces and important provincial agencies relevant to PA.

Chapter Four presents the research design and methodology. It describes in detail the research philosophy, research design, research methodology, research approach, data collection, data analysis and interpretation, and research ethics. These give an insight into the application of the conceptual and analytical frameworks for data collection and data analysis.

Chapter Five presents the research findings of the quantitative data analysis of the results from the questionnaire surveys. It sets out three major aspects: the overall organizational culture profiles of the 16 provinces; comparison of the organizational culture profiles between the low and high KPI scoring provinces; and the description of job satisfaction based on the provincial cases.

Chapter Six presents the empirical findings of the qualitative data analysis acquired from the semi-structured interviews, including in-depth interviews with the senior managers and focus group interviews with the practitioners. The chapter demonstrates the key factors of performance that deliver good governance categorized into three groups: leadership; human resources (HR) and reward; and performance, outputs, and outcomes.

Chapter Seven discusses the empirical findings acquired from the quantitative and qualitative data analysis. All the results are compared and combined together to summarize the overall findings of the study. The discussion of this chapter is based on three main aspects: cultural determinants of performance, cross-cutting themes and typical characteristics of the low and high KPI scoring provinces.

Chapter Eight summarises the key findings of the study. The important issues are presented, including conclusions and implications, contributions to theory, reflection on the research, policy implications and recommendations, and limitations of the research. Finally, recommendations for further research are made.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the existing literature on good governance, performance and organizational culture in the public sector (see Figure 1). The purpose of the chapter is to develop an analytical framework for guiding the design of the data collection and analysis, and answering the research questions.




Figure 1 An illustration to approach the literature review structure

2.2 Pursuing good governance

2.2.1 Initiatives in pursuing good governance

The concept of good governance has received significantly increased attention from many countries around the world since 1989 when the World Bank published the report on *'Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth'* (World Bank, 1989). This report raised the issue of a crisis of governance in Africa, namely a lack of good governance (e.g. accountability, transparency and rule of law). In other words, poor governance is apparent when 'the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development' (World Bank, 1994, p. xiv) is not carried out properly. Mazower (2013, p. 370) stated that (bad) government is considered as 'the chief enemy of (good) governance' and the concept of governance is used in the context of de-emphasising the State, namely prevalent intervention by international agencies in the public administration of countries around the world. Consequently, the quality of governance in aid recipient countries has been a concern for aid donors such as international organizations. This can be observed through efforts in promoting good governance by several international organizations such as the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2001; UNDP, 1997; UNESCAP, 2009). The idea behind good governance is to oppose 'bad governance' such as corruption, waste, abuse of power and exploitation of public means for private ends (Jreisat 2004 cited in Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012; Leftwich, 1993; OECD, 2001). Attempts at introducing good governance are also seen as implementation of the

‘rules of the game’, i.e. the effectiveness of the State is in setting up the rules and ensuring their transparent and predictable application (Arkadie, 2012, p. 54) .

The concept of good governance has become an initial aid condition and approach to reform programmes of many donors (Smith, 2007). An obvious example is the economic crisis in Southeast Asian countries³ in 1997, which led to the introduction of substantial governance reforms (Arkadie, 2012; Wijayati, Hermes and Holzhacker, 2015). Bowornwathana (2000) claimed that the economic crisis in the Asian region could be an opportunity to compel Asian countries to undertake administrative reform based on good governance.

2.2.2 Interpretation of good governance

One of the foremost challenges is the difficulty of the interpretation of good governance, as it was simply not clear what ‘good governance’ means (Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012). This is consistent with the idea of ‘good enough governance’ proposed by Grindle (2004, 2007), who argues that ‘good governance’ provides little guidance about what/when/how things need to be done in the real world in practice. This shows that implementing good governance requires an understanding of the concept and how it is accomplished in practice (Grindle, 2010).

In the administrative sense, a number of scholars tend to suggest that good governance refers to the principle or the concept of public management or public service reform or

³ The economic crises affected the East Asian countries, including Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Taiwan (Shabbir and Rehman, 2016).

the new public management (NPM) paradigm based on at least nine key components: effectiveness, efficiency, participation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, equity, rule of law and consensus oriented (Agere, 2000; World Bank, 1992; OECD, 2001; Rhodes, 1996; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; UN, 2006, 2015; UNESCAP, 2009). Here good governance is seen as a means approach, whilst it becomes an end in itself when its key components are addressed satisfactorily (Agere, 2000). For example, achieving the key components of good governance contributes to the corrective roles of the government organizations, such as increasing efficient and accountable management; raising transparency of the policy framework; enhancing the participation of all sectors in society; and obtaining elite public services (World Bank, 1992; Cheema and Popovski, 2010; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010). The next section discusses the key components of good governance in the context of public sector management and reform. The detailed definitions of governance and good governance are shown in Appendix 1.

Key components of good governance

Many international organizations and scholars define different meanings of the key components of good governance (see Appendix 2). Table 1 summarizes the definitions of the nine key components of good governance in the sense of the public sector, which can be considered in three crucial points overarching the definitions or components. Firstly, the main purposes of efficiency and effectiveness appear to be congruent, namely producing results that meet the needs of society with the best use of resources. Secondly, accountability is considered as a cornerstone of good governance by several scholars (e.g. McNeil and Malena, 2010; UNDP, 1997). This is because it focuses on

the government organizations' responsibilities for their activities and decisions that impact on stakeholders. Moreover, the four elements of good governance – transparency, participation, rule of law and equity – emphasize the rights of stakeholders in society.

Table 1 Definitions of the nine key components of good governance

Component	Definition
Efficiency	Processes and institutions produce results or management efficiency that meet the needs of society while making the best use of the resources at their disposal. It also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the environment. (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 3)
Effectiveness	Processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources. (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 3)
Accountability	Accountability is the heart/prerequisite/key requirement of good governance. The governmental institutions, private sector and civil society organizations have to be responsible and answerable for their actions, activities and decisions to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. (World Bank, 1994, p. 12; UN, 2006, p. 10; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 3)
Transparency	Transparency is built on there being accessible information, such as public knowledge, policies, and strategies of government, which all citizens who are concerned with them can access with enough information to understand and monitor them. (Agere, 2000, p. 7; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010, p. 12; UNDP, 1994a, p. 5)
Participation	Participation is generated based upon a recognition that people, both men and women, should have a voice in decision making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives, such as taking decisions on public policy and sharing control over resources and institutions that affect their lives. (Agere, 2000, p. 9; UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 2)
Rule of law	Rule of law signifies a legal framework that is fair and enforced impartially, such as full protection of human rights, which the clear or uniform laws are required to apply through objective, and independent judiciary. (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 2)
Equity	All members in a society (all genders, classes, races, educational qualifications, religious and political beliefs) have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being. They have a stake in it and are not excluded from the mainstream of society. (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 3)
Responsiveness	Responsiveness refers to institutions and processes trying to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe. (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 2)
Consensus oriented	Consensus oriented is associated with many viewpoints of actors in a given society. Good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interests of the whole community, where possible and how this can achieve the goals of such development. (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 3)

Good governance and performance

As good governance became more closely associated with administrative reform and new public management (NPM) in the 1990s (see Greiling, 2005), so it came to be seen increasingly in terms of performance. Performance measurement came to be seen as an essential component of good governance and a means of bringing it about (see Mimba, Helden and Tillema, 2007). Greiling (2005) argued that performance measurement was an important instrument for enhancing the accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of public service, the reason being its ability to influence the behaviour of employees (Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015).

2.2.3 Implementation of good governance through performance measurement

Performance measurement has featured in many internationally-supported good governance programmes (World Bank, 1994; 2002; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2008), for example in Latin America (e.g. Bolivia, Chile and Argentina), Southern Africa (e.g. Zimbabwe) and Southeast Asia (e.g. Indonesia, China, Vietnam and Thailand) (Barbarie, 1998; Brushett, 1998; Marcel, 1998; OPDC, 2003a; Painter, 2012). Developed countries have also used performance measurement for public service reform, for instance the USA, Germany, France, Norway and the UK (Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Hood, 2007; Peters and Savoie, 1995).

However, the implementation of performance measurement programmes is not a panacea for achieving good governance in practice, which can be held back by societal or institutional factors such as a lack of desire for reforms or consensus orientation on change; difficulty in getting access to public information; lack of participation by civil

society (e.g. NGOs, and consumer groups); and inefficient judicial processes (e.g. reluctance to punish corrupt officials) (Charoenserbakul and Sombatpeam, 2014; Nikomborirak, 2007; Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012). In other words, there may be a vicious circle whereby a lack of good governance makes it difficult to implement good governance.

2.3 Determinants of performance

2.3.1 Performance management system (PMS)

Having established that performance measurement is a key component or key condition of good governance. In practice, it is necessary to consider the ambiguity of the term ‘performance’. The term ‘performance’ can portray both an act and the result of an act (Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006). Many scholars (e.g. Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006; Kearney and Berman, 1999; Williams, 1998) agree that performance is an act, which refers to the programme, strategy, management, activity and action of organizations in order to achieve the outcomes of activities or programmes or something intended; and to change or improve individuals’ contributions and organizations’ overall success (see definitions of performance in Appendix 3: 3.1). Meanwhile, performance is the result of an act, which focuses on ‘productivity’ or ‘effectiveness’ (Kearney and Berman, 1999; Talbot, 2010).

In the public sector, performance refers to outputs (quantity and quality of services); efficiency (cost per unit of outputs); effectiveness (achievement of formal objectives); responsiveness (measures of satisfaction); and democratic outcomes (Boyne et al., 2006). Therefore, the citizens’ expectations regarding the performance measurement

and reporting outputs of the government's activities are increased (Halachmi, 2005; Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006; Kearney and Berman, 1999).

Purpose of performance management system (PMS)

Performance management (PM) is considered as the strategy, approach, system, method, range of practices, and processes applied in order to deliver success, create a shared vision of, or connect the organization's aims amongst people, enhance a target person or group's performance, and generate performance information for making decisions (e.g. Armstrong and Baron, 1998; Fletcher, 1993; Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006; Moores, 1994; Moynihan, 2008) (see definitions of performance management (PM) in Appendix 3: 3.2). PM is considered by some to be a central element of NPM (Gianakis, 2002 cited in Greiling, 2005) in order to improve performance in the public sector.

Several scholars (e.g. Cooke, 2003; Moores, 1994; Moynihan, 2008; Williams, 1933; Williams, 1998) suggest that there are two main objectives of PM: improving organizational performance (tasks or activities) and improving human resources. Firstly, PM facilitates the improvement of performance in terms of setting goals, increasing integrated management, and providing performance information (e.g. feedback). Goal setting can facilitate accountability and participation (e.g. the employees' commitment) to the organizations (Improvement and Development Agency, 2002; Moynihan, 2008; Varma, Budhwar and DeNisi, 2008; Wood and Locke, 1990 cited in Williams, 1998).

In terms of improving human resources, PM enables the improvement of employee communication (e.g. communicating the organizations' objectives to the members), generates employees' commitment (e.g. brings involvement and organizational commitment as well as job satisfaction), and identifies the required training (Armstrong and Baron, 1998; Fletcher, 1993; Moores, 1994). It is seen that participation and job satisfaction can be generated by PM.

Performance measurement

Performance measurement is defined as an instrument of control, a spur of appropriate action, and a form of output steering (Brignall, 1993; Bruijn, 2007; Jackson, 1995) (see Appendix 3: 3.3). It is not only an essential component of PM (Julnes, 2006 cited in Julnes et al., 2007), but can also have a beneficial effect on public organizations (Bruijn, 2007). Performance measurement is a source of performance information used in order to improve organizational performance (e.g. setting work goals, determining performance standards, assigning and evaluating work, providing feedback) and improving individual performance (e.g. determining training and development needs, distributing rewards) (Varma, Budhwar and DeNisi, 2008, Fletcher, 1993). In this respect, performance measurement or performance assessment can identify any potential problems and facilitate possible change (Osborne et al., 1993). Phusavat et al. (2009) stated that performance measurement is an instrument of management used in order to deliver good governance, such as accountability and transparency.

However, there are various challenges of performance measurement such as the difficulty of measuring performance in terms of outputs and outcomes, and a problem

of receiving genuine information. One of the most important challenges of performance measurement in the public sector appears to be a complexity of measuring outputs and a difficulty of preventing undesirable outcomes produced by the application of performance measures (Jackson, 1989). Other scholars (e.g. Bruijn, 2007; Glaser, 2007; Halachmi, 2005; Kotler and Lee, 2007) argue that the public sector's performance can be measured in the same way as that of the private sector, namely products and services (e.g. unit costs of services delivered, and certain quality or standards of services), viewed as outputs in the form of quantitative and qualitative factors that can be measured. Meanwhile, the performance of public organizations can be measured by outcomes such as goal achievement and response to citizens (e.g. citizens' satisfaction with service delivery) (Glaser, 2007, Kotler and Lee, 2007).

The public sector reforms need to use information acquired from performance (indicators) measurement or performance appraisal for making improvements (Jackson, 1989; Hatry, 1996 cited in Julnes, 2007; Moynihan, 2008). Therefore, measuring performance requires people to tell the truth about their activities and tasks. The likelihood of useless, false information may be influenced by the design of the control system (focus on measures rather than performance, for example); a lack of coherence between the measured value and the real value; unknown importance of the underlying phenomenon; too many indicators; and the reward system of the organization (Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Neely, 1998 cited in Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006; Murphy and Denisi, 2008). A solution to this problem may be understanding the nature of performance management in the public sector.

2.3.2 Nature of performance management in the public sector

The difficulty of performance management in the public sector in delivering good governance can be considered in relation to two aspects: 1) the differences between public and private organizations; and 2) the complicated performance management of the public organizations themselves.

The differences between public and private organizations

Performance management in the public sector appears to be more problematic than in the private sector. This is because the nature of the public sector has multiple objectives, diversity of stakeholders, emphasis on policy, administration or leadership, and socio-political environments (Behn, 1991; Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Jackson, 1995; Mimba, Helden and Tillema, 2007). The prime purpose of public organizations is to serve the citizens' needs and deliver actual value or public value, whilst the prime purpose of private companies is to meet customers' needs in terms of value and satisfaction in order to make profits for the owners of the business (Alford, 2001; Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012; Kotler and Lee, 2007). Public service management is, therefore, a complex area of management activity (Harrow and Willcocks, 1990).

The complicated performance management of the public organizations themselves

There have been attempts to introduce new public management (NPM) for public sector management and reforms, for example increasing the focus on organizational objectives and goals, enhancing the efficiency of government, stretching effectiveness of scarce public resources, and increasing the responsiveness of government to citizens (Eakin, Eriksen and Eikeland, 2011; Harrow and Willcocks, 1990; Hughes, 1998; Parker and

Bradley, 2000). In other words, bureaucratic organizations have been encouraged to shift from control mechanisms (hierarchical structures) to market-based mechanisms such as performance indicators and greater flexibility (Parker and Bradley, 2000). However, public sector management seems to retain the features of traditional public administration (hierarchical model) such as determining by top-down performance management, having a high degree of centralization, and highlighting bureaucratic processes (Bratton et al., 2007; Hughes, 1998, 2007; Moynihan and Pandey, 2005; Talbot, 2010). Armstrong and Baron (1998b) stated that control orientation may inhibit performance rather than enhance performance. Other scholars (e.g. Holmes and Shad, 1995 cited in Hughes, 2007) claimed that using control or authority may facilitate the managers in terms of building support in the broader community, matching authority and responsibility to improved performance and increased accountability and transparency through the need to report on results. Although performance management is associated with NPM and with a flattening of organizational structures in the public sector, it may also be facilitated by traditional hierarchical public administration due to its focus on accountability. Good governance and hierarchy are not necessarily contradictory principles.

2.3.3 Determinants affecting performance

A number of scholars (e.g. Armstrong and Baron, 1998; Bazeley and Richards, 2000; Boyne, 2003 cited in Moynihan and Pandey, 2005; Campbell et al., 1993 cited in Williams, 1998) have suggested that there are at least seven determinants influencing organizational performance: personnel factors, motivation factors, leadership factors, management styles and strategic management, team factors, system factors, and

contextual (situational) factors. This study focuses on three key elements – job satisfaction, motivation and leadership – that play a crucial role in performance in the specific context of performance measurement delivering good governance.

1) Job satisfaction

Job satisfaction is generally defined as an individual's affective reactions to a job based upon a range of expectations and preferences associated with the individuals' feelings about intrinsic and extrinsic job elements (Fields, 2002). A number of scholars (e.g. Cranny, Smith and Stone, 1992; Fields, 2002; Greenberg and Baron, 2003) have suggested that there are several key aspects to measuring job satisfaction such as pay, promotion, supervision, co-workers, and the work itself. These elements are under the rubric of two major elements: intrinsic and extrinsic. Job satisfaction is, therefore, important in affecting organizational performance. It is associated with the individual's positive or negative attitudes towards their work, which attitudes are related to organizational behaviour, job performance, and voluntary turnover (Greenberg and Baron, 2003).

A number of empirical studies on job satisfaction tend to suggest that the staff members' job satisfaction is associated with leadership (see Ashraf, Farooq and Din, 2014; Wong and Laschinger, 2012) and motivation or pay (see Green and Heywood, 2008; Judge et al., 2010; Stringer, Didham and Theivananthampillai, 2011). For example, Ashraf, Farooq and Din (2014) explored the correlation between leadership culture and job satisfaction and work commitment, which revealed that job satisfaction and work commitment facilitate organizations in accomplishing their goals, in which leadership

styles can influence employee performance and job satisfaction. In particular participative leadership, rather than directive leadership, increases job satisfaction and work commitment. Regarding the relationship between job satisfaction and pay, Green and Heywood (2008) studied performance-related pay (PRP) and stated that PRP is associated with enhanced pay satisfaction, but it seems to negatively affect job satisfaction. Stringer, Didham and Theivananthampillai (2011) argued that extrinsic motivation is not associated with pay satisfaction and negatively associated with job satisfaction, but intrinsic motivation is positively associated with both pay and job satisfaction. This is because extrinsic motivation makes some employees concerned about fairness, particularly the employees who often make comparisons with others or feel that pay does not reflect their effort. In this respect, pay or extrinsic motivation could be negatively or positively associated with the individuals' satisfaction, whereas it seems to negatively affect job satisfaction. However, intrinsic motivation appears to be positively associated with pay and job satisfaction.

2) Motivation

Motivation is a key element in increasing productivity and job satisfaction (Wilson, 2010). In particular, intrinsic motivation appears to have a more significant impact on performance than extrinsic motivation (Armstrong, 1990; McKenna and Beech, 2002). Intrinsic motivation refers to several elements such as giving greater recognition, additional job flexibility, opportunities to gain more responsibility, higher exposure to senior management, a sense of fulfilment (e.g. the individuals pride in achievement), satisfaction of social needs, and opportunities to increase skills (Armstrong, 1990; Fletcher, 1993; Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue, 2003; McKenna and Beech, 2002).

Intrinsic motivation has a significant impact on the individuals' job dissatisfaction as well as on withdrawal and turnover (Greenberg and Baron, 2003). Extrinsic motivation refers to elements such as working conditions, opportunities for promotion and enhanced status, and performance-related pay (PRP) (Armstrong, 1990; McKenna and Beech, 2002).

Using a financial reward seems to be more popular in practice than a non-monetary reward, although intrinsic motivation is the more significant element affecting performance than extrinsic motivation. This can be seen in the context of PMS, in which performance-related pay (PRP) is the most famous of the motivational approaches (Hatry, 2007). The use of financial reward may bring significant motivational power as it symbolizes several intangible goals, although it may have no intrinsic meaning (Armstrong, 1990). PRP has many merits, such as motivating the existing staff for greater performance, attracting and maintaining high performers, and achieving cost effectiveness (Fletcher, 1993; Gerhart and Trevor, 2008). Moreover, motivation can lead to being market oriented in terms of reward based achievement (Zammuto and Krakower, 1991). Similarly, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) pointed out that motivation is important to shaping organizational culture (informal institutions) and pursuing goal achievement. This implies that management of motivation can shape organizational culture.

There are a variety of challenges to using PRP within the appraisal system, for example disappointment (e.g. people receive fewer benefits on PRP than they anticipated); a problem of equity (e.g. people are concerned about unfair discrimination and equal

opportunities); distortion of appraisal consequences; and different reward preferences amongst employees of different ages (e.g. one incentive system is applied to all people) (Fletcher, 1993; Murphy and Denisi, 2008). Although such motivation, especially financial reward, has both negative and positive effects, at least it motivates and helps to retain employees, particularly high performing human capital (Moynihan and Pandey, 2005; Price, 2011).

However, using money is only partly an incentive (Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue, 2003; Moores, 1994); correlation between PRP and high levels of organizational performance cannot be proved. Therefore, organizations should decide which forms of incentive (monetary or non-monetary rewards) are appropriate. If organizations consider using PRP, they need to recognize when the appropriate pay format is used and the staff are impartially rewarded (Pfeffer, 1998 cited in Price, 2011). This is because the nature of the incentives employed needs to be considered due to this complexity (Leroch, 2014). In particular, whenever money comes into the phenomenon, anxiety appears to follow (Hatry, 2007).

In conclusion, motivation is vital to performance in terms of enhancing effectiveness (increasing productivity and pursuing goal achievement), accountability (increasing responsibility), equity (fairness of reward), and rule of law (appropriate form of reward).

3) Leadership

Leadership is one of the most important determinants affecting organizational performance, particularly leadership style and strategic management. The existing

literature (e.g. Improvement and Development Agency, 2002; Armstrong and Baron, 2005; Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Gill, 2006) suggested that leadership styles should be a driver of organizations; provide resources and resolve problems; motivate employees; shape culture; and respond to change. This is compatible with the idea proposed by Cameron and Quinn (2011) that leadership style in four types of culture should express the following characteristics (see more detail in section 2.4.3):

- Clan culture: facilitator, mentor, team builder, and parent-figure
- Adhocracy culture: innovator, entrepreneur, risk taker and visionary
- Market culture: hard driver, competitor, and producer
- Hierarchy culture: coordinator, monitor, and organizer

The leaders who are drivers can make decisions, set direction (the organizations' mission, vision and values), provide guidance and communicate these to the organizations' members (Improvement and Development Agency, 2002, Dooren et al., 2015). Similarly, the characteristics of leaders that are desired by the employees consist, for example, of paying attention to tasks, providing a clear and attractive mission, and communicating vision and values, which facilitate better performance of tasks (Gill, 2006; Moynihan and Pandey, 2005). Kultahti, Edinger and Brandt (2013) stated that young people, in particular Generation Y who were born between 1981-2000, seem to expect more from their leaders than the older generations.

The team building style of leadership is seen as crucial for performance in terms of generating commitment; creating teamwork and managing teams by meetings; motivating employees and shaping culture. When generating commitment, the

employees need the managers to use managerial authority and power for issuing commands in order to gain involvement (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006). This is compatible with the idea that generating coordination needs to be promoted by the leader designing the structures and standards (Mintzberg and Westley, 1992; Thompson, Zald and Scott, 2007).

In terms of motivating the employees and shaping culture, the managers can motivate the employees by stimulating and inspiring them to perform their tasks, for instance by explaining about goals and the importance of work in order to persuade staff to achieve goals (Gill, 2006; Williams, 1998). Huang et al. (2010) stated that the intrinsic motivation of individuals is associated with participative leadership. Effective leadership can shape their organization's culture, such as by promoting desired values through strategies and programme goals and combining the messages, actions, and attitudes deliver to people around the leader themselves (Improvement and Development Agency, 2002; Kearney and Berman, 1999). Bratton et al. (2007) argued that achieving transformation relies 70 - 90 percent on leadership and only 10 - 30 percent on management. Therefore, poor leadership (e.g. lack of capacity to manage and having outdated policies of HRM) may lead to many problems (e.g. lack of trust, high rate of staff turnover, deficient morale) (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010).

Leadership style may thus have a significant influence on motivation and performance. There are diverse types of leadership styles defined by many scholars (e.g. Armstrong and Baron, 1998; Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012; Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Williams and Huber, 1986), from which two predominant types of management style

are found: authoritarian (control) style and participative style. These styles focus on different purposes and have different levels of difficulty for change.

The control management style involves authority, rules and regulations (Armstrong and Baron, 1998; Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015). The managers who have an authoritarian style appear to have a highly centralized management approach, which may take longer to shift and therefore improve performance in the context of performance measurement (Jackson, 1989). Contrary to this, the participative style focuses on the employees, which is seen through much evidence, for instance a greater concern with the employees' needs; a greater confidence in staff willingness and responsibility; a greater extent of people's involvement in organizational planning and decision making (Williams and Huber, 1986). These derive from the process of discussing, analysing problems, and consulting between the managers and staff, through which their suggestions and opinions are taken into account in the consensus on what to do and how it is to be achieved (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006). Gill (2006) found that the participative style was not confined to Western managers but could also be found among Southeast Asian managers.

Many scholars (e.g. Bratton et al., 2007; Jackson, 1989; Williams and Huber, 1986) tend to agree that the participative style is more effective than the authoritarian style in terms of improving a managers' ability for making decisions; facilitating change by participation due to enhancing people's voices on a policy or course of action; empowering people through a positive relationship (e.g. satisfaction, motivation, and participation); and receiving a high level of achievement by the acknowledgement of

people's goals and reduction of turnover. On the other hand, authoritarian style may be threatened by various challenges and may fail to deliver on the potential advantages for enhancing performance (Jackson, 1989). Moynihan (2008) claimed that an authoritarian style can contribute to meeting requirements and enforcement, although the managers may not generate the positive outcomes that the central government or elected officials or policymakers anticipate from reform.

In summary, leadership is one of the most significant determinants influencing the performance of the public organizations in delivering good governance, particularly in terms of the leaders being a driver, team builder, and organizer or coordinator. These determinants can influence performance as well as good governance, such as by generating participation (creating team and involvement), being consensus oriented (open to the employees' opinions), effectiveness (being a driver), and efficiency (managing resources). Moreover, the existing literature suggests that leadership is related to shaping culture such as securing resources and related elements (hierarchy culture), solving problems (hierarchy and adhocracy cultures), and coaching (clan culture). A participative leadership style, rather than an authoritarian leadership style, seems to be positively associated with performance.

2.4 Organizational culture

2.4.1 Definition of organizational culture

Defining the term 'organizational culture' is a difficult task because it requires the definition of the terms 'organization' and 'culture' (Brown, 1998). According to some opinions in the literature, the definitions of culture may be classified into two broad

directions: objective entity or a variable and metaphor (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008; Brown, 1998; Cameron and Quinn, 2011; Senior and Fleming, 2006). Schein (1990, p. 111; 2004, p. 17), on the other hand, uses three levels to describe culture, including observable artefacts, values and basic underlying assumptions. Deal and Kennedy (1988, p. 107-108) describe four cultural types, including the work-hard and play-hard culture; the process culture; the bet-your company culture; and the tough-guy and macho culture. Culture is defined as ‘the integrated pattern of human behaviour that includes thought, speech, action, and artefacts and depends on man’s capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations’ (Deal and Kennedy, 1988, p. 4).

It can be concluded that culture is a property of a human group or a system of shared meaning held by an organization’s members which significantly differs from other organizations (Robbins, 2005; Schein, 1991; Senior and Fleming, 2006). Others (Eldridge, 1973; Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Schwartz and Davis, 1981) have suggested that culture refers to a pattern of beliefs, values, attitudes, assumptions, expectations, and ways of behaving shared among members of an organization. There are many definitions of culture that broadly follow this approach, which are set out in Appendix 4: 4.1.

The formulation of Hofstede et al. (1990) serves to integrate the various dimensions of organizational culture as follows:

‘The organizational/corporate culture construct: it is (1) holistic, (2) historically determined, (3) related to anthropological concepts, (4) socially constructed, (5) soft, and (6) difficult to change.’ (Hofstede et al., 1990, p. 286)

This definition reflects various dimensions of organizational culture that are of relevance to other scholars’ opinions (see Appendix 4:4.2). Firstly, culture can reflect the overall picture of an organization in terms of a sense of identity of the organization’s members (Robbins, 2005). Secondly, the culture of an organization is formed by long-term historical heritage viewed as an ‘invisible hand’⁴ in public management (Rong and Hongwei, 2012, p. 47). Culture is, thus, difficult to change; Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p. 732) stated that culture is viewed as an informal institution and change would be an ‘extremely lengthy’ process.

Thirdly, culture is related to both social and anthropological areas, which can be interpreted as ‘organizations have cultures’ or ‘organizations are cultures’ (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). Fourthly, culture can be understood as soft attributes that can affect organizational performance (Hofstede et al., 1990). Many studies (e.g. Adenan et al., 2013; Parker and Bradley, 2000; Yetano and Matsuo, 2015) suggest that the implication of organizational culture does not only influence individuals’ attitudes, norms and behaviour, but also performance. Finally, organizational culture is difficult to change because there is a diversity of values and meanings dominating the group and group members value stability (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008; Schein, 2004). Here it is

⁴ Culture comprises both invisible elements (e.g. beliefs, values, attitudes, norms, and assumptions) and visible elements (e.g. annual report, products, technology, symbols, and systems) (Brown, 1998, Dick and Ellis, 2006, McEwan, 2001, Schein, 1990).

important to note that the issue of cultural change seems to be controversial and is continually debated among scholars. Some scholars (e.g. Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Schein, 2004; Schwartz and Davis, 1981) pointed out that an organization's culture is difficult to understand, and hard to change. Other scholars (e.g. Brown, 1998; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Fernandez and Rainey, 2006; Lorsch, 1986; Nica, 2013; Schraeder, Tears and Jordan, 2005) argued that leadership (top managers) and management (top management) can facilitate the change of organizational culture. For example, Schraeder, Tears and Jordan (2005) stated that although changing the organizational culture of the public sector organizations is a long-term endeavour, it is possible to change it by leaders' recognition of issues related to employees, i.e. training and leading by example to guide officials through complicated dynamics. The difficulties of changing organizational culture in the public sector may derive from several aspects. Conflict between the culture of the public sector and NPM – NPM requires the public sector to achieve greater outcomes, efficiency and flexibility, but the values of bureaucratic or hierarchical culture continue to remain – is one of difficulties for changing the culture of the public sector organizations (Parker and Bradley, 2000). Moreover, the constraints of the personal system in the public sector are more prevalent than in the private sector, namely the inability to punish poorly performing managers and to reward good managers (Nica, 2013).

Nature of organizational culture in the public sector

In terms of the framework developed by Cameron and Quinn (2011), the organizational culture of the public sector tends to be closer to hierarchy and clan than to market and adhocracy cultures. Hierarchy is seen as intrinsic to bureaucratic culture (Handman,

1993). This is because, by their nature, public organizations exist in the context of written rules and regulations for accountability (the external conduct code) and unwritten ethics and habits of the organizational system (inner thinking characteristics such as morals and values) (Rong and Hongwei, 2012). This means that, in the public sector, leadership has a particular significance as an important element in determining public organizations' culture, such as norms and values in terms of decision making (Christensen et al., 2007). In bureaucracies, legal authority and appointments to positions are the keys to success and power (Dick and Ellis, 2006). Thus, the hierarchy culture seems to be embedded in the public sector and seems to be difficult to change, for example the cultures of several government agencies are often affected by the norms and values of the parent ministries (Christensen et al., 2007). The hierarchy culture may be a challenge to public sector reform, for example reform requires power redistribution (Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015) and political decentralization is important in attempting public sector reform in developing countries (Polidano and Hulme, 1999). Edwards (1999) argues that bureaucratic hierarchy provides advantages in order to attain good governance such as transparency, accountability and equity. Ashraf, Farooq and Din (2014) suggest that leadership culture (hierarchy culture) provides both positive and negative effects on employees' performance and job satisfaction, i.e. participative leadership positively affects the group and cultural development department while directive leadership negatively affects employees' behaviour.

Clan culture may also, by its nature, tend to be associated with the public sector. It refers to the degree of employee cohesion and commitment (Cameron and Quinn, 2011).

A degree of commitment is seen as strong culture⁵ in order to enhance an organization's success (Luhman and Cunliffe, 2013). Clan culture (human resource) positively correlates to the performance of organizations in terms of the outcomes (Eisend, Evanschitzky and Gilliland, 2016) and job satisfaction (Lovas, 2007). Thus, Rong and Hongwei (2012, p. 48) suggest that the public sector in modern society should establish a 'people-oriented' management such as legitimate individual interests and personal capabilities. This raises the question of whether there is a general civil service culture. To this extent why some organizations operate well and why and how such organizations defy norms (Owusu, 2012). Understanding organizational culture provides many advantages, such as encouraging effectiveness of the public services, developing effective strategies in increasing job satisfaction, and generating policy proposals (e.g. clear reward system, management development and change) in the public services (Harrow and Willcocks, 1990; Westhuizen, Pacheco and Webber, 2012).

By contrast, the market and adhocracy cultures appear to be less characteristic of public organizations, although there have been many efforts to create these cultures in the public sector through NPM and, specifically, performance measurement, performance-related pay (PRP), and flexible organizational culture (seen as adhocracy culture) (Whorton and Worthley, 1981). Generating the market and adhocracy cultures in public organizations is not a simple task. For example, Jingjit (2008) explored organizational culture in the Thai public sector and suggested that there has been a modest shift towards the market and adhocracy cultures and away from the hierarchy and clan cultures during the period of public sector reform, and Phookpan (2012) has argued that in the Thai

⁵ Strong culture is discussed later in section 2.4.2.

public sector the market and adhocracy cultures can be generated by external forces and through integration reform. Although the market culture is based on private sector techniques and values (Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015), Moriarty and Kennedy (2002 cited in Radnor and McGuire, 2004) suggest that performance measurement can be used as a surrogate for market pressure (given that government organizations perform their tasks without market competition).

2.4.2 Correlation between strong culture and performance

While organizational cultures may be classified according to different types, there is also the question of the strength which the culture's values are adhered to. Some claim that a strong culture enables organizations to achieve performance (e.g. Brown, 1998; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Robbins, 2005), such that 'strong cultures cause strong performance...strong performance can help to create strong cultures' (Kotter and Heskett, 1992, p. 18) and 'good performance is a strong culture' (Kandula, 2006 cited in Ehtesham, Muhammad and Muhammad, 2011, p. 79). The term 'strong culture' is broadly defined by scholars, as in the following examples:

'Strong culture is frequently employed to refer to companies in which beliefs and values are shared relatively consistently throughout an organization' (Brown, 1998, p. 226)

'...the existence of a strong culture implies a commonly understood perspective on how organizational life should happen, with most organizational members subscribing to it' (Senior and Fleming, 2006, p. 177)

‘...organizations can be presumed to have strong culture because of a long shared history or because they have shared important intense experiences’ (Schein, 1990, p. 111)

‘In strong culture, the organization’s core values are both intensely held and widely shared’ (Robbins, 2005, p. 488)

These definitions imply that strong culture refers to shared values, beliefs and history throughout an organization. Here a high degree of sharing can contribute to a greater commitment and be the glue which holds the organization together (Robbins, 2005; Senior and Fleming, 2006). On the other hand, weak culture refers to having no dominant pervasive culture and the presence of several different cultures existing (Senior and Fleming, 2006). It may influence performance through conflict between the different cultures and the reduced motivation of employees (Ehtesham, Muhammad and Muhammad, 2011; Senior and Fleming, 2006).

A strong culture may play a key role in at least three ways. Firstly, strong culture facilitates goal alignment, in which people share the organization’s core values and share the same basic assumptions (Brown, 1998; Robbins, 2005). A clear goal leads people to pursue the same direction, to generate initiative, energy and enthusiasm (Brown, 1998). These attributes can contribute to greater results of organizational performance due to a high degree of collaboration (e.g. people know the goals of the corporation), and a high level of effective and quick communication (Brown, 1998; Deal and Kennedy, 1982). A strong culture facilitates the process of commitment and control, which ensures that the employees’ values and beliefs are consolidated (Senior and Fleming, 2006). Christensen et al. (2007) claimed, however, that over strong cultures

may be inflexible and too self-focused in public organizations, which may lead to resistance against democratic control and low levels of adaptation to the environment; such culture is seen to be associated with strong authoritarian leaders and it is often negative for both the internal and external environment.

Secondly, strong cultures appear to have merits in relation to human resources in terms of enhancing the level of employee motivation, reducing the rate of employee turnover, and increasing behavioural consistency (Brown, 1998; Christensen et al., 2007; Robbins, 2005). Strong cultures generate high levels of employee motivation and make people feel part of an organization (e.g. sharing their view on how the organization should work, and participating in decision making) (Brown, 1998; Christensen et al., 2007). Therefore, strong cultures can reduce employee turnover levels and increase behavioural consistency among the members of an organization (Robbins, 2005). Finally, a strong culture enables the employees to learn from the organizations' past, for instance interpreting issues and events from past experience, making decisions on new challenges based on precedents, and promoting self-understanding and social cohesion through shared knowledge of the past (Brown, 1998).

In this context, strong cultures can facilitate the creation of the market culture (pursuing goals) and clan culture (having strong loyalty and low turnover), both of which can be considered as a source of delivering good governance through effectiveness and participation. On the other hand, a strong culture could be a significant barrier to any effort when people pay insufficient attention to diverse strengths and the backgrounds that people can bring to the organization (McKenna and Beech, 2002). Similarly, Rainey

(1996) claimed that a strong culture, particularly one promoting bad values and assumptions, can contribute to making it hard to change. Brown (1998) argued that strong cultures may be suitable for a particular organization, but they may take other organizations in the wrong direction. This is because there is no one best culture, while different cultures will be suitable in different competitive circumstances and for different strategies. However, a strong culture enables strong performance, while strong performance can support building strong cultures (Kotter and Heskett, 1992). This leads to the question of how to manage organizational culture as a strong culture.

Some scholars suggest that a strong culture can be created by, for example, shaping values (e.g. establishing standards of achievement within the organization) (Deal and Kennedy, 1982); leadership at all levels in the organization (e.g. inspiring ideas of corporate culture, guiding beliefs, paying attention to the stakeholders' needs) (Brown, 1998; Davis, 1984; Kotter and Heskett, 1992); and management (e.g. developing formal rules and regulations to guide people's behaviour) (Robbins, 2005). It can be observed that leadership, management and strategy are crucial elements for generating strong culture in organizations. The relationships between these elements are noticed, for instance top managers have to make decisions on strategy and agree with purposefully managing an organization's culture (Davis, 1984; Lorsch, 1986).

However, strong cultures in an organization are not simply created because an organization generally has a subculture that can affect the behaviour of the organizations' members (Robbins, 2005). Furthermore, shifting organizational culture is difficult, takes time, and is very expensive, as is an attempt to affect organizational

change as a whole (Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Kotter and Heskett, 1992). Alternatively, management can change organizational culture through top management and senior managers' actions (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008). This implies that strong cultures may be generated by management and leadership – styles and strategies. These may take shorter periods of time than efforts to change organizational culture because culture is difficult to change (Hofstede et al., 1990; Schwartz and Davis, 1981) and it can be stable over time (Kotter and Heskett, 1992).

2.4.3 Theories and empirical studies of organizational culture

There have been many efforts to understand organizational culture through several concepts and models, such as the organizational iceberg (Andrews, 2013, p. 44; French and Bell, 1990, 1999 cited in Senior and Fleming, 2006, p. 138-139); the levels models (Schein, 1990; 2004); seven characteristics of organizational culture (Robbins, 2005); and Denison's organizational culture model and the Competing Values Framework (CVF) (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). In particular, the CVF appears to be one of the most widely used models for studying organizational culture. It has attracted considerable attention in many empirical studies (e.g. Al-Kuwari, 2002; Grabowski et al., 2015; Jingjit, 2008; Parker and Bradley, 2001; Phookpan, 2012). It has proved useful as a significant approach to organizational effectiveness compared with other models. The current study focuses on the CVF models, although other studies on organizational culture in the public sector (e.g. Claver et al., 1999; Moon, 2000; Quirk, 2002) used other concepts and models. The reasons why the CVF is selected for investigating organizational culture and good governance in the current study are discussed through the next topic regarding what is the CVF; comparison of the CVF/OCAI to other crucial

organizational culture models; and identified gaps in the literature and the analytical framework of this study.

What is the CVF?

The Competing Values Framework (CVF) was initially developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) as a consequence of research conducted on the key indicators of effective organizations. Since its development, the CVF has been broadly used in the field of organizational culture studies to diagnose and facilitate change in organizational culture (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). The CVF comprises a set of organizational effectiveness indicators. Figure 2 illustrates two core dimensions: control versus flexibility, and an internal versus external orientation (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). From these two dimensions, four core categories of culture can be sorted: clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy models. Alternatively, Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) represent the CVF through three value dimensions: organizational focus (internal versus external emphasis), organizational structure (control versus flexibility emphasis), and organizational means and ends (process versus outcomes).

The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) is probably the most often employed instrument for assessing organizational culture based on the CVF. The OCAI allows researchers to diagnose culture through the assessment of ‘core values, shared assumptions, and common approaches to work’ (Heritage, Pollock and Roberts, 2014, p. 1).




Figure 2 The relationship between the values in the Competing Values Framework (CVF)
Source: Cameron and Quinn (2011, p. 39) Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983, p. 369)

The OCAI comprises four core culture types and orientation of the organization based on the four core culture types as follows:

- *The hierarchy (control) culture:* The hierarchy culture is a characteristic of bureaucracy in order to create stable, efficient, highly consistent products and services (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). This is because hierarchy culture has a clear organizational structure, standardized rules and procedures, strict control, and well defined responsibilities (Yu and Wu, 2009). This implies that the hierarchy culture can deliver efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and rule of law (criteria of performance-related pay).
- *The market (compete) culture:* The market culture focuses on transactions with external constituencies such as suppliers, customers, and regulators, in which competitive focus, task focus, and result focus are created within the organizations (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). This reflects that the market culture

can lead to effectiveness and responsiveness (customer preferences of public services).

- *The clan (collaborate) culture*: The clan culture is to share values and goals, cohesion, participation, individuality, and a sense of 'we-ness', in which the organizations' success is generated by the internal climate and employee (e.g. teamwork, participation, and consensus) (Cameron and Quinn, 2011, p. 46, 48). The clan culture tends to increase participation, consensus orientation, accountability, transparency (the clear criteria of reward allocation), and equity (fairness of reward allocation).
- *The adhocracy (create culture)*: The adhocracy culture is ad hoc in that it refers to something temporary, specialized, and dynamic, of which the main goal is to foster adaptability, flexibility, and creativity in an uncertain atmosphere (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). Cameron and Quinn also state that this culture can produce effectiveness.

These four culture types are organized into six key dimensions of the OCAI: 1) dominant characteristics, 2) organizational leadership, 3) management of employees, 4) organization glue, 5) strategic emphases and 6) criteria of success. Each dimension consists of four alternatives (A, B, C and D) that reflect the four culture types (clan, adhocracy, market and hierarchy cultures respectively) (see Appendix 5: 5.1). In each dimension, the participants are asked to distribute 100 points among the four alternatives, depending on how similar the alternative is to their organization by giving the higher number of points to the alternative that is the most similar to their organization. Meanwhile, in these dimensions, they are required to provide answers in

the ‘Now’ column in the first time (an organization’s current culture) and in the second time complete the ‘Preferred column’ (culture that should be developed for the future) (see Appendix 5:5.1). After the OCAI is completed by the participants, the OCAI worksheet is used for scoring the OCAI (see Appendix 5:5.2).

Tachateerapreda (2009) claimed that using a five-point Likert scale for the OCAI can facilitate the respondents, decreasing confusion caused by a variety of scales. The validity and reliability of using the Likert scale for assessing organizational culture are asserted by Quinn and Spreitzer (1991). They stated that the Likert scale leads to establishing convergent validity because a significant correlation between the scale scores from the same quadrant were seen. Furthermore, several scholars agree that the use of the five-point Likert scales provide many benefits, for example creating reliability by multi-items indicators (De Vaus, 2002); being appropriate for attitude questions by providing adequate response alternatives (Vanderstoep and Johnson, 2009); and generating willingness by the respondents due to the easy items (the five-point Likert scale) rather than the hard ones (100 points) (Babbie, 1990).

Figure 3 shows how the scores of now and preferred cultures acquired from the OCAI are used to construct an organizational profile. This reflects the overall picture of the organization’s culture through the four quadrants, in which the higher scores reflect the stronger culture that forms the core aspects of the organization’s culture.




Figure 3 Organizational Culture Profile
Source: Cameron and Quinn (2011)




Figure 4 The Competing Values Framework of Organizational Culture (CVF)
Source: Adapted from Zammuto and Krakower (1991)

Figure 4 demonstrates how the interpretation of the organization's culture is supported by the four major culture types of the CVF (Cameron and Quinn, 2011), considered by important elements in each quadrant. The individuals' perspectives on phenomena are

interpreted to understand the attainment of good governance, such as a high cooperation level reflecting participation of members of an organization.

Comparison of the CVF/OCAI to other crucial organizational culture models

There are diverse types of models measuring organizational culture developed by scholars as stated earlier. Among these models, Denison's organizational culture model seems to be the most similar to the CVF, which includes four traits of organizational cultures: involvement, consistency, adaptability, and mission (Denison and Mishra, 1995). The four traits of the Denison model appear to be more complex than the CVF and its sub-dimensions have been challenged by some researchers (e.g. Wang et al., 2006 cited in Yu and Wu, 2009).

However, the CVF and OCAI are criticized in terms of scale, for example Yu and Wu (2009) claimed that using only two or three dimensions of the CVF is insufficient to measure organizational culture. Other models seem to contain more items for measuring organizational culture, for example the Organizational Culture Profile, includes 54 questions in nine dimensions (O'Reilly, Chatman and Caldwell, 1991); the Multidimensional Model of Organizational Culture, includes 135 questions in six dimensions (Hofstede et al., 1990); and the organizational Culture Inventory, includes 120 items in three dimensions (Cooke and Rousseau, 1988). Furthermore, the OCAI appears to focus on limited evidence of psychometric suitability and has a weak criterion validity when it is employed to assess ideal culture (Heritage, Pollock and Roberts, 2014).

However, the CVF and OCAI have various merits compared with the above models. Firstly, the CVF and OCAI allow the organizations measuring organizational culture to enhance organizational effectiveness and identify the existing and preferred organizational cultures in order to promote cultural change (Cameron and Quinn, 2011; Heritage, Pollock and Roberts, 2014; Rojas, 2000). This is because the CVF can integrate most organizational culture dimensions, particularly the value dimension relevant to effectiveness (Yu and Wu, 2009). Secondly, the CVF and OCAI have few dimensions for measuring organizational culture but broad implications compared to other models. In other words, the CVF and OCAI are likely to be less complex, but the benefits are broader through interpretation. Thirdly, the CVF and OCAI provide empirical validity and reliability in terms of the standard questions in the OCAI (Cameron and Quinn, 2011), which has been used for much empirical research (e.g. Howard, 1998; Ralston et al., 2006).

Fourthly, the CVF and OCAI allow the researchers to use multiple methods in a single study, as seen from several empirical studies (Jingjit, 2008). Fifthly, the CVF is considered an appropriate method for examining the extent of bureaucratic culture (hierarchy model) within the public sector (Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Parker and Bradley, 2001). This is consistent with the idea of Rojas (2000) that the CVF can provide benefits for research in the non-profit sector. Finally, the OCAI is one of the most extensively employed as an appropriate instrument in cross-cultural research in many countries, particular Asian countries such as China, Hong Kong, Japan, Vietnam and Thailand (Kwan and Walker, 2004; Yu and Wu, 2009).

Identified gap in the literature and developed analytical framework of the study

Although the extensively used OCAI has proven beneficial as an approach to studying the effectiveness of organizations, particularly in the public sector, the six key dimensions of the OCAI seem to allow the researcher to learn little about the employees' job satisfaction and the feature of reward. This is for two main reasons.

Firstly, the items of reward and job satisfaction matter in a particular context such as the programme of performance evaluation that is focused on the current study. At a minimum, some association between culture and motivation is inevitable (Pheysey, 1993) as well as between culture and job satisfaction (Lovas, 2007; Lund, 2003). The correlations between reward and job satisfaction are equally significant and should be considered. Reward is crucial in terms of enhancing the job satisfaction level and organizational commitment, and promoting organizational effectiveness, particularly financial reward (Moon, 2000). Rewarding achievement is often seen as one of the purposes of a programme of performance management (Moore, 1994). Regarding job satisfaction, it is important to measure how employees feel about working conditions, such as how interesting their work is, reasonable workload, and pay and promotion (Lam, 1994). Such a programme of performance evaluation, viewed as a control system, may affect people's job satisfaction. Here it is important to note that the employees' satisfaction is significantly stronger in conditions of a high level of autonomy (Jong, 2016) and measuring job satisfaction is different from organizational culture, namely organizational culture is descriptive, while job satisfaction is evaluative (Robbins, 2005).

Secondly, the OCAI is viewed as a standard instrument for assessing organizational culture, but it does not show what works or what is more effective. This is consistent with the idea proposed by Talbot (2010) that the CVF model was not a multidimensional performance model at all. Similarly, Jingjit and Fotaki (2010) state that the complexity of organizational culture means that is not simple to cover all aspects in a single study. Therefore, the six key dimensions of the OCAI do not sufficiently accommodate the aspects of reward and job satisfaction. Although Heritage, Pollock and Roberts (2014) claimed that the OCAI demonstrates a significant relationship with job satisfaction in voluntary organizations, this may not hold for other types of organization where intrinsic motivation plays less of a role than in the voluntary sector. Jingjit and Fotaki (2010) and Parker and Bradley (2001) used the item of organizational reward in the form of promotion, based on the idea of Zammuto and Krakower (1991), whilst Parker and Bradley (2001) used the item of job satisfaction for the questionnaire.

According to the reasons as stated above, the analytical framework of the current study was developed. Figure 5 illustrates the analytical framework of the study that combines the six key dimensions of the OCAI based on the CVF (Cameron and Quinn, 2011) – the CVF was originally developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) – and the items of organizational reward in the form of promotion and job satisfaction (Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Parker and Bradley, 2001; Zammuto and Krakower, 1991). The eight key dimensions can be used to conduct questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews in the context of PA. These may elicit information regarding implementing good governance through the lens of PA.




Figure 5 The analytical framework of the study
Source: Author's construct

Although the CVF has been used to measure the organizational culture of the public sector in many countries (e.g. Al-Kuwari, 2002; Lovas, 2007; Parker and Bradley, 2001) and also the Thai public sector (e.g. Jingjit, 2008; Phookpan, 2012), a combination of the six key dimensions of the OCAI and the aspects of reward and job satisfaction has not so far been used to study organizational culture in the context of performance measurement as well as good governance. Although there are similar empirical research studies by Sathornkich (2010), Srimai (2015) and Srimai, Damsaman and Bangchokdee (2011), they investigated the implication of the PMS and PA at the provincial level in Thailand. In contrast to the latter, the current study focused on the relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the provincial administration through using mixed methods and a combination of the OCAI and the aspects of reward and job satisfaction. Therefore, the findings of the current study may differ from the previous

study. Receiving quantitative data allows the researcher to compare values that affect performance based good governance by the OCAI based on the CVF. The quantitative data may be more valid or reliable (Goddard, Mannion and Smith, 1999) due to being based on a structured approach. Furthermore, the study obtained qualitative data through in-depth and focused group interviews. These results are compared and combined in order to assess the validity of the findings.

2.4.4 Development of analytical framework

The theoretical and conceptual frameworks are important in order to contribute practical and analytical frameworks – how to collect data and analyze collected data. There are three main phases to develop analytical frameworks: review of literature; assessment of theoretical and conceptual approaches; and practical and analytical framework, as demonstrated in Figure 6.

The first phase was a review of the literature on three key features: good governance, performance and organizational culture focused on the context of public administration. The existing literature suggested that the concept of good governance is considered to be a condition of aid donors, especially international organizations, in order to encourage performance management in the public sector. Performance management is not simple in practice because there is an organizational culture, which is viewed as a key determinant that can both enable and inhibit its success.




Figure 6 Development process of analytical framework

The second phase was an assessment of theoretical and conceptual approaches on good governance, performance and organizational culture. The evidence suggested that good governance is viewed as a concept for public management and reform. In addition, the concept of performance is related to PMS. Particularly, the stage of performance review included performance measurement, performance assessment, performance evaluation, and performance appraisal. The CVF developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) is considered to be one of the most important models for analysing organizational culture, and for enhancing organizational effectiveness and facilitating change.

These theoretical and conceptual approaches led to the development of practical and analytical frameworks in the third phase. The principle of good governance consists of at least nine key components, and the components can be used as a means or an end for public management and reform. Regarding PMS as focused on performance measurement, determinants of performance are identified in three main categories, and these can lead to a consideration of what determinants affect performance that delivers good governance. In terms of organizational culture, the OCAI is a crucial instrument based on the CVF model, and comprises six key dimensions: dominant characteristics of the organization, leadership style, management of employees, organizational cohesion, organizational strategic emphasis, and organizational success criteria (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). The six key dimensions were combined with the dimensions of reward in the form of promotion and job satisfaction (Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Parker and Bradley, 2000; Zammuto and Krakower, 1991). This is because these attributes are important in the context of performance evaluation. Therefore, the total number of key dimensions used for the surveys and the interviews was eight.

2.5 Summary

This chapter has aimed to develop the analytical framework for the study of the relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the civil service. Constructing the analytical framework required understanding of three main topics: pursuing good governance, determinants of performance, and organizational culture.

The concept of good governance in the public administrative sense comprises at least nine key components. There are few empirical studies that have investigated comprehensive components of good governance in a single study, particularly the relationship between organizational culture and performance related to good governance. In contrast, this research focuses on all components of good governance through the PA scheme. In addition, some empirical studies used the OCAI with the aspect of reward or job satisfaction, but this research integrated both reward and job satisfaction in a single study.

CHAPTER 3

CULTURE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THAILAND

3.1 Introduction

Having considered the impact of organizational culture on performance in the previous chapter, the present chapter considers the national cultural context and its influence on good governance and civil service performance. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss Thai culture and values, and the development of good governance in Thailand. It begins with a background (section 3.2), which sets out general information on Thailand, its politics and provincial administration. This is followed by section 3.3, which considers Thai culture and values (drawing on the framework of Hofstede), and the values of the Thai public sector. Section 3.4 considers good governance in Thailand, including civil service reforms before and after 2002. Section 3.5 focuses on the performance agreement (PA) in provincial administration. This comprises the structure of provincial administration and the government agencies relevant to PA, monetary incentive, creating PA, and challenges of PA. The chapter ends with an attempt to draw these strands together to provide an overview of good governance and civil service reform in the Thai political and cultural context.

3.2 Background

3.2.1 General information on Thailand

Thailand is situated in Southeast Asia and is bordered by Myanmar (Burma), Laos People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia and Malaysia. Thailand was formerly known as 'Siam' and was renamed 'Thailand' in 1939 (NESDB, 2006). It consists of four regions, North, Central plain, Northeast and South and is divided into 76 provinces and the capital Bangkok, which is a special administrative area. The total population of Thailand is around 65.73 million people⁶ (Department of Provincial Administration, 2015). The major ethnic group is Thais, who make up about 80 percent of the population (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2013). The second largest ethnic group is Chinese, which is about 10 percent. The vast majority of Thais are Buddhist, about 90 percent of the population, and the remaining 10 percent comprises, for example, Muslim, Christian, and Hindu (National Statistical Office, 2010).

Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that was never colonized by European powers such as Great Britain and France (CountryWatch, 2016). As a result it has a self-contained political system and a high degree of cultural uniqueness (Shor, 1960). Stability has been assisted by the country's relative homogeneity and, perhaps, the pacifying role of the Monarchy. Democratization is seen as being based on good governance, the rule of law, human rights, transparency, and accountability (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2013).

⁶ The statistical population of Thailand on the 31st December 2015 was given by Department of Provincial Administration's promulgation on the 4th February 2016.

3.2.2 Politics

Thailand was ruled by an absolute monarchy before the country's politics were transformed to a constitutional monarchy by a bloodless coup in 1932⁷ (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014; CountryWatch, 2016; Hewison, 1997a). Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, in which sovereign power belongs to the Thai people and the King rules as the head of state in relation to the country's Constitution (Royal Thai Consulate-General, 2016). The country's administration is conducted by a prime minister as head of a parliamentary government and the cabinet that the prime minister forms, which is relatively similar to the United Kingdom (Royal Thai Consulate-General, 2016; Tourism Authority of Thailand, 2016). The Thai government is based on a parliamentary system headed by the prime minister, who is elected through an open vote by members of the House of Representatives. Thailand's political system has been dominated by several significant factors, particularly the monarchy, military, constitution, business groups and religion (Hewison, 1997a; McCargo, 2012; Selaratana, 2009).

The institution of the monarchy was established in Thailand in the 13th century. Although Thailand's politics have been based on the constitutional monarchy since 1932, the institution of the monarchy appears to play a significant role in Thai politics, as observed from the following evidence:

⁷ Revolution converts absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy on 24th June 1932 (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014).

‘...The Thais view the King as sacred and as a spiritual leader who serves as a symbol of unity...Because of this, the monarch remains above all conflicting political groups. Support of the monarchy remains an indispensable-source of political legitimacy. A political leader or regime, even a popularly elected government, would not be truly legitimized without the King’s blessing’ (Surin, 1992 cited in Hewison, 1997b, p. 61).

Likewise, Hewison (1997b) emphasizes that the monarchy’s influence on Thai politics is ‘crucial to political stability’ and ‘the sole source of unity and strength’ in the nation. The social and political crises were often solved by the monarch’s intervention (Maisrikrod, 1999). Maisrikrod also stated that the monarchy is important as a primary source of Thai values and culture.

Regarding the military, Thailand’s politics are inevitable in relevance to a history of military interventions. Chai-Anan Samudavniya (1997 cited in Maisrikrod, 1999) claimed that political power under military regimes should be replaced by a strong civil society. Nevertheless, the power of the military has not been diluted in Thai politics. The dominance of military coups was portrayed between 1947 and 1992, namely this was a period characterized by coups, attempted coups and various protests (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014; CountryWatch, 2016). Thereafter, there were various military coups, for example in September 2006 by the Council for National Security (CNS) – the government of Thaksin Shinawatra was overthrown by a coup (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014; CountryWatch, 2016). In 2014, a coup was launched by National Council for

Peace and Order (NCPO)⁸ led by Prayut Chan-o-cha, the Prime Minister from 2014 to date (The Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 2016). The reason for the junta provided by NCPO was the prolonged political deadlock and protests, various violent situations, and the ineffective performance of the caretaker government of Yingluck Shinawatra⁹ (Royal Thai Government, 2014). It is important to note that the drafting of successive constitutions of the Kingdom of Thailand often occurs after a military coup.

Since the peaceful transformation in 1932, Thailand has had a total number of 19 existing constitutions of the Kingdom of Thailand (The Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 2016), including the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Interim) Act B.E. 2557 (2014) that has been in use so far. However, the latest draft Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2559 (2016) was approved through a constitution referendum on 7th August 2016 by 61.35 percent ¹⁰ (Office of The Election Commission of Thailand, 2016).

The other factor that has influenced Thailand's politics is business groups, the power of private sector capitalists¹¹ (Handley, 1997). Christensen (1993 cited in Hewison, 1997a) stated that several business groups, such as organized business, industrialists, urban

⁸ The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) took control of the national administration on the 22nd May 2014 promulgated on the 24th May 2014, which was led by Prayut Chan-o-cha, head of NCPO. (The Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 2016)

⁹ Yingluck Shinawatra was the first female prime minister of Thailand and Thaksin's sister, viewed as a puppet of her older brother. (from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13723451> Accessed: 28 March 2016)

¹⁰ The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2559 was carried on by the government of Prayut Chan-o-cha.

¹¹ Wealth became a central determinant of policy and political position...For example, post-Prem government period, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)- the participation of a huge number of middle- and upper-class investors- was a strong determinant of political behaviour (Handley, 1997, p. 94, 113).

bankers, provincial elites and the rural majority, have sought opportunities from political systems for their own benefits. The most distinct example is the case of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra who possessed the biggest telecommunications empire in Thailand. Moreover, businessmen at the local level are likely to influence local politics. They are not only rich but also powerful and attempt to participate in local politics, where some of them use their power position for their own benefits in order to use money in the political system in rural areas, such as using money for obtaining votes (Selaratana, 2009). In Thailand, the interaction between businessmen and politicians can contribute to purchasing opportunities and favours. The same is true for many Southeast Asian countries where the relationship between big businesses and public servants can also be linked to political control (Mutebi, 2008).

In addition, the correlation between Thailand's politics and the sangha¹² has been described as a 'continuous dialogue' because the sangha is considered as an instrument of state power and legitimation (McCargo, 2012). For example, a few hundred pro-Thaksin 'redshirt' monks participated in the protests in 2010. By contrast, there was a movement of monks (e.g. the Santi Asoke, V. Vajiramedhi) to the other political side called the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a 'yellowshirt' royalist grouping. The monks' involvement in politics plays a significant role because the majority of Thais (over 90 percent) are Buddhists (Royal Thai Consulate-General, 2016). The Thai people's character and personality is therefore shaped by their belief in Buddhism such as politeness, modesty and tolerance (Kusy, 1991).

¹² Sangha refers to a community of monks, including Theravada (or Hinayana or lesser vehicle) and Mahayana (or greater vehicle) (Kusy, 1991).

The development of Thailand's politics has been very volatile because of the interactions of the factors highlighted earlier. It can therefore be observed that there is a linkage between the political system and the bureaucratic system. Politics appears to play a significant role in the civil service reform in Thailand. This point is emphasized by the research findings of Chula Unisearch (2005) who argued that the attitudes and behaviours of politicians, government officers, and related persons in bureaucracy have a strong impact on the characteristics of the responses to the context of change of the Thai civil service. Politics is not the only crucial factor affecting civil service implementation, however, there is also the influence of the culture and values of Thais discussed in section 3.3.

3.2.3 Provincial administration

The state administration of Thailand is divided into three levels: central administration, provincial administration, and local administration, in accordance with the State Administration Act B.E. 2534 (1991) (Office of the Council of State, 1991). At the provincial level, a province is administered by a Governor who is a permanent civil servant and appointed by the Ministry of Interior (Sopchokchai, 2001). The Governor performs their duties in collaboration with 2-3 Vice Governors (Mektrairat, 2007). Administration at the provincial level, the policies and primary executions, are based on the regional offices of ministries and departments, whose authority and certain decision-making responsibilities are authorized to the agencies in a province (Sopchokchai, 2001; UN, 1997).

Provincial administration comprises 75 provinces with Bangkok Metropolitan Area and was increased to 76 provinces in 2011 when the 76th province, Bueng Kan, was established¹³ (The Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 2011). Provincial administration is important because the government agencies are relatively close to the citizens in the area in terms of increasing citizens' well-being and responding to citizens' needs and problems (Sathornkich, 2010). The provinces' performance has a significant impact on the citizens in the provinces (Srimai, 2015).

3.3 Culture and values

The characteristics of Thai national culture and values appear to influence the reforms of Thai public organizations (Pimpa, 2012). This section discusses Thai national culture and values acquired from the existing literature and many empirical studies and also discusses the culture of the Thai public sector.

3.3.1 Thai national culture and values

The construction of Thai national culture is significantly correlated with geographic, economic, demographic and political national indicators (Hofstede, 1981), including historical reasons, religion and monarchy. Several Asian countries such as India, China, and Cambodia have dominated the foundation of Thai culture (Thailand, 2013). In particular, India influenced Thai culture in terms of religion (Charnnarong, 2013). The dominant role of Buddhism is a consequence of religious movement seen as Theravada

¹³ Bueng Kan is the 76th province of Thailand, in accordance with the Act establishing Changwat Bueng Kan B.E. 2554 (2011) promulgated on 11th March B.E. 2554 (2011) (The Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 2011). Thus, Bueng Kan was not included for performance agreement between 2007 and 2011 used for this study.

Buddhist society, which has a significant impact on Thais' folklore and identifies the national culture in Thailand (Evans, 1998; Reynolds, 2006). Moreover, the monarchy has influenced Thai culture because the King is believed to be 'Saksit' (metaphysically powerful) (Evans, 1998). This can be observed through the statement 'the Monarchy is an institution of worship. Any transgression to the Monarchy either openly or secretly is a misdemeanor according to the Constitution' (Ministry of Culture, 2013, p. 1).

Understanding a nation's culture and values is necessary because these can contribute to grasping the values and behaviour of the people in that country. Such a statement is emphasized by some scholars (e.g. Hofstede, 2001; Rokeach, 1970) who argue that the national culture¹⁴ can shape the value systems of the main group of the population and stabilize over long periods in history. Likewise, Komin (1990) stated that a system of values becomes a guide to people's behaviour found in every culture. Here the discussion of Thai culture and values is considered by Hofstede's national cultural dimensions, with particular studies related to Thai culture and values.

Relevance of Hofstede and particular studies on Thai culture and values

Hofstede (2001, p. 1) proposed five cultural dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and collectivism, masculinity and femininity, and long-term and short-term orientation. Alternatively, Komin (1990) proposed that the Thai national characteristics comprise nine value orientations: the ego, grateful relationship, smooth interpersonal relationship, flexibility and adjustment, religio-psychical orientation,

¹⁴ The pattern of national culture is known as 'national character' or 'social factor' (Hofstede, 2001, Rokeach, 1970).

education and competence, interdependence, fun-pleasure, and achievement-task. Regarding national values, Hofstede et al. (2010) stated that a country's values are strong and not easily changed because they are related to the structure and functioning of its institutions – the basic elements of society such as the family, the school, and the community. Komin (1990) claimed that values may change or become stable to constitute national characteristics.

However, other scholars (e.g. Chevrier, 2003; Pimpa, 2012) have criticized Hofstede's interpretation of culture. Chevrier (2003) claimed that Hofstede employed a quantitative study based on North American values, which might not be useful in a cross-cultural project involving members of different cultural backgrounds, such as Asian and European. Pimpa (2012) also argued that Hofstede's cultural dimensions may lack validity in a society where subculture is strong, such as religion and belief, race and ethnicity, and geopolitical factors. Meanwhile, Hofstede's cultural dimensions are used by many empirical studies (e.g. Pimpa, 2012; Selaratana, 2009). The five cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1991) can be explained as follows:

(1) Power distance

Power distance refers to the distribution of interpersonal influence in a culture and the degree of inequality in power between a more powerful individual and a less powerful one (Hofstede, 2001). According to Hofstede's exploring of power distance differences in 50 countries, power distance in Thailand is categorized in the group of high power distance value countries. Country power distance index values in Thailand are 64, from a range of between 104 for Malaysia and 11 for Australia, meaning inequality in Thai

society is normal. Komin (1990) argued that existential inequality among Thai employees can be accepted, which is different from American culture that has smaller power distance (a higher degree of equality among its people). In Thailand, inequality has been seen in different dimensions of society, for example, gender, education, economics, social status and opportunities (Selaratana, 2009).

Moreover, inequality in Thai society may be derived from other values such as '*Bunghun*' (goodness or usefulness) and hierarchy. '*Bunghun*' builds on personal motivations, and on affiliation and security (Mulder, 1994). Hierarchy in Thai society is based on a folk-Buddhist conception of karma, incarnation and ranking according to accumulated merit (Hanks, 1962). Hierarchy in Thailand is also based on age and gender. Thai people usually use the prefixes '*phii*' (meaning elder) and '*nong*' (meaning younger) when they speak to others (Sparkes, 1998). The age hierarchy is also expressed through the common belief that '*roojak thee soong thee tam*' (knowing your place and liking it), which means that Thai people have to place themselves in a proper hierarchy (Maisrikrod, 1999, p. 404). For gender hierarchy, according to Buddhist scripture and practice, men are able to become monks and accumulate merit more than women who are associated with the mundane and materialism. Women in Thai society are associated with being duty-bound to be responsible for their parents and family, although this has faded in modern Thai society (Benedict, 1943 cited in Pimpa, 2012; Sparkes, 1998). Such features reflect why hierarchical systems are relatively strong in Thai society, and that Thai bureaucrats frequently accept existential inequality, which places a strong value on relationships, and accept authority and special privileges (Komin, 1990).

(2) Individualism and collectivism

From Hofstede's study on individual index values (IDV) for 76 countries, individualism in Thailand is ranked between 58th and 63rd, which is classified as a low level individualism and tends to be a collectivistic society. Thailand is characterized as a collectivistic country, in which 'people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty' (Hofstede, 1991, p. 51). Thus, Thailand is a strong relationship society with cohesive in-groups (Hofstede, 1984). Hofstede pointed out that IDV scores in almost all wealthy countries were high, while almost all poor countries had low scores. However, Thai society has been shifting from collectivism to more individualism in recent years as the country's economy became wealthier (Hofstede, 1999).

Many scholars (e.g. Benedict, 1943 cited in P. H. C., 1953; Embree, 1950; Klausner, 1997; Phillips, 1965) agree that Thais are characterized as individualistic, which is different from the first research of Hofstede in the 1980s. However, his research findings during the following decades found that Thais were individualistic. Thais are individualistic, self-centred, highly independent from others, and prefer working alone and lack social groups, which is different from other countries, such as those in Western Europe, America and Japan (Embree, 1950; Phillips, 1965; Wiratchaniphawan, 1987). The current generation of Thais tend to accept other cultures, in particular those of Western countries, and deviate from traditional culture (NESDB, 2013), which contributes to more individualistic behaviour among younger generations in the Thai public sector (Pimpa, 2012).

Moreover, Thais' individualism may be derived from other factors such as type of family (extended family or nuclear family), the circumstances of the case, and belief in Buddhism. Children from a nuclear family may learn to think of themselves as '*I*' which reflects their individual characteristics (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010). For the circumstances of the case, Komin (1998) illuminated that individuals' behaviour is motivated by '*I*' and '*me*', namely '*I*' and '*Bunkhun*' (grateful relationship) will demonstrate sincere, honest, reliable, stable and predictable behavior. Contrary to this, is '*me*' motivated behaviour, seen as selfish, opportunistic, unreliable, irresponsible, and unpredictable. Regarding Buddhism, it is an important part in influencing individualism in Thai society (Pipat, 2013a). For example, it focuses on attainment of enlightenment only through an individual's effort (Podhisita, 1998). This sense is based on the law of '*karma*' through the proverb '*do good, receive good; do evil, receive evil*' or '*Tham bun*' (merit-making), which demonstrates that '*karma*' and '*Tham bun*' depend on individuals (Pipat, 2013a).

Individualism may lead to many disadvantages, such as regularity (rules and regulations ignored) and patronage systems (individuals' benefits focused). Lack of rules and regulations may occur when people choose to ignore them as a consequence of a low social sanction (Klausner, 1997; Vichit-Vadakan, 2012). It has been recognized that Thai relationships are built on patronage systems, which reflects through the concept of '*Phu Num - Phu Tam*' (leader-follower), '*Luk Phii - Luk Nong*' (boss-subordinate) and '*Phu Yai - Phu Noi*' (elder-younger) and may be based on reciprocal benefits in order to facilitate corruption (Wiratchaniphawan, 1987). This may affect the relationships between boss and employees in the work-place in terms of work behaviour and

progression of position level in an organization. Moreover, patronage systems may lead to the relationship orientation in the pattern of '*Kraeng cai*' (to be considerate, to feel reluctant) (Komin, 1990) in order to reluctant to argue with superiors when staff have different views from their superiors (Wiratchaniphawan, 1987). This situation in Thai social life may be called '*Choei-choei*' (indifferent, stable) (Pipat, 2013a).

(3) Masculinity and femininity

Differences between the sexes is a dimension of societal culture in which behaviours are considered in terms of '*masculinity*' and '*femininity*' (Hofstede, 1991, p. 80-81). The findings of Hofstede's study on masculinity in 50 countries suggested that Thailand is classified as a feminine country where people in society are supposed to be modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life (Hofstede, 1991). Thailand scores 34 on the masculinity index (MAS) values (rank 44th), which is the lowest rank of masculinity among the Asian countries, compared to the Asia average of 53 and the world average of 50. Hofstede explains that masculinity is unlike individualism and is unrelated to the degree of economic development of a country, and can be found in both rich and poor countries. Hofstede also states that feminine cultures may provide more opportunities for mutual help and social contacts in the work-place.

In the context of Thailand, masculinity was dominated by Buddhism, for example, women are born because of bad karma and cannot attain enlightenment as men can (Pipat, 2013b). Furthermore, there is a traditional Thai concept that a man is '*Chang Tao Na*' (the front legs of the elephant, leader) and the woman is '*Chang Tao Lung*' (the rear legs of the elephant, follower) (Pimpa, 2012). This may be an obstruction to the

development of women as well as to acceptance in Thai society. However, this idea has slightly faded away in modern Thai organizations. Meanwhile, Thai men, as in many other societies, are expected to be the leader in most circumstances, nonetheless some men will be recognized as '*Toot*' (unmanly men) (Pimpa, 2012).

(4) Uncertainty avoidance

The dimension of uncertainty avoidance describes the extent to how people in one society feel about uncertain or unknown situations (Hofstede, 1991). Hofstede stated that it is the cultural heritage of societies that is transferred through basic institutions such as family, school and state, which reflects the collectively held values of the members in a particular society in terms of tolerance of ambiguity and acceptance of risks. In the results of Hofstede's study on the uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) value for 50 countries, Thailand is indicated in the middle score with about 64 and ranked 30th (Hofstede, 2001). This implies that Thai society may have a low level of tolerance for uncertainty.

It is reasonable that Thais make an effort to minimize the level of uncertainty, such as with strict rules, regulations, laws and policies for adaptation and implementation (Pimpa, 2012). Komin (1990) claimed that Thailand is not a law-oriented country, but one where practice, principles and laws are ever-adjustable to suit people and existing situations. For instance, Thai government officials might be lenient on law infringement that relates to individuals of good connection or money in order to generate a problem of corruption, this characteristic being referred to as 'flexibility and adjustment', and demonstrates how Thais may be unpredictable, non-committal, irresponsible and

opportunistic. In addition, Thai organizations attempt to control and eliminate the unexpected in achieving their ultimate goal (Pimpa, 2012). Pimpa pointed out that this perspective is expressed through one of the traditional concepts in Thailand '*Cha Cha Dai Pla Lem Ngam*' (Do thing slowly and make sure you get a beautiful big knife). This concept reflects the Thai way of management, that Thais will not take risk in any activities, if the quality and practices are uncertain. The implication is that Thai society seems to be high in uncertainty avoidance and may infrequently accept change and be risk averse.

(5) Long-term and short-term orientation

The fifth dimension is based on the teaching of Confucius, which describes cultures on long-term and short-term orientations (Hofstede, 2001). Short-term orientation includes respect for tradition, personal stability, saving face and reciprocation of greeting, while long-term orientation comprises respect for persistence, thrift, having a sense of shame and ordering relationship by status (Hofstede, 1991). Thailand has long-term orientation (LTO) index values of 56 and is ranked 8th of 23 countries (Hofstede, 2001). Hofstede maintained that East Asian countries seem to be more oriented towards traditions and saving face than are Western countries.

Long-term results are often predicted by the development of economies, societies and politics. For example, the government and departments rarely had any long-term planning before the economic crisis in 1997 but this situation changed after public sector reform in 2002. All Thai government agencies are expected to not only do strategic planning in the long-term period (four years), but also in the short-term period (one year),

which emphasizes responsiveness to change. This implies that Confucian values are associated with economic growth, as argued by Hofstede. Furthermore, the concept of long-term orientation in Thailand is associated with Buddhism, especially the law of karma. Thais believe in '*Tham bun*' (merit-making) such as religious activities (e.g. giving food and offerings to monks, supporting temples, etc.) and social activities (e.g. taking care of aged parents, helping the poor, etc.) that can bring about a better life in the future or incarnation (Pipat, 2013a). Here, implications of belief in the result of activities and being felt in the next life are influential for long-term aspirations.

3.3.2 Values of the Thai public sector

A review of the literature on politics and organizational culture in the Thai public sector (e.g. Mutebi, 2008; Selaratana, 2009) suggests that there is a linkage between political culture and bureaucratic culture in Thailand. The development of Thai bureaucracy is considered to be based upon a self-developed bureaucracy because it was not shaped by Western ideas as a colony (Shor, 1960). This reflects the uniqueness of Thai bureaucracy and a correlation with politics. In the nineteenth century, the dominant feature of the political structure was bureaucratic nobility (Wyatt, 1968). This reflects how the hierarchical nature of bureaucracy contributes to the importance of only a small group of people at the top (Rig, 1966 cited in Ockey, 2004).

The relationship between the bureaucracy and the three branches of power is inevitable. Ockey (2004) illuminated that the law-making process involves bureaucrats when the parliament leaves bureaucrats to develop bills relating to specific procedures and regulations. Regarding the administrative branch, Ockey explained that the politicians'

plans may be hindered without the active encouragement of bureaucrats. However, the relationship between the bureaucrats and politicians may lead to opportunities for patronage. Thai bureaucracy always respects the judicial branch, particularly elected politicians, who were elected to check the activities under the 1997 constitution.

Wiratchaniphawan (2004) explained the development of government officials' values from 1932 to 2003 through a categorization of four periods: values of '*king*' (Sukhothai to Ayutthaya), values of '*phraya*'¹⁵ (Rattanakosin before 1932), values of '*phraya*' (1932 - 1957), and values of 'businessmen' (1958 - 2003). This suggests a legacy of tension between monarchical and bourgeois concepts of the state that may be reflected in the bureaucracy, and which also explains the latter's close identification with the King. The original word for civil servant in Thai is '*kharatchakan*', in which '*kha*' signifies servant and '*ratchakan*' means affairs of the King (Jingjit, 2008, p. 67). Wiratchaniphawan also proposed several characteristics of civil servants that influence the development of the Thai public sector, particularly public sector reform. He stated that the Thai government's values that affect national development consist of internal and external systems. The internal system derives from the officials themselves or human nature related to negative sides, including illegal use of authority, values like a boss, individualism and conservatism.

¹⁵ A collection of genealogies of major noble families begun by Phraya Rattanakun in 1920, the official genealogy of the royal family, and the genealogies of the families of the mothers of the Bangkok kings. (Neher, 1979, p. 43)

The external system refers to environment factors such as economics, social, politics, administration, and family, which lead to patronage systems, favourite convenience and laziness, and favourite adulation. In particular, the patronage system seems to be deep-rooted in the Thai bureaucracy. Almost 41% of people who become Thai civil servants have always been the elite, who have relationship with civil servants, military, police and other government officials (Tjiptoherijanto, 2012). However, patron-client, superior-subordinate relations, have been found not only in Thailand but in other Southeast Asian countries (Pye, 1999). Many scholars (e.g. Charoenserbsakul and Sombatpeam, 2014; Wiratchaniphawan, 2004) agree that the officials' values are crucial elements that determine the success or otherwise of Thai public sector reform. The next section discusses Thai public sector reform through many efforts, particularly introducing good governance.

3.4 Development of good governance in Thailand

The debate on governance development in Thailand needs to be traced back to the story of the Thai civil service reform before and after 2002. There was much legislation and many plans issued as part of the reform even prior to 2002, as well as after, as shown in Figure 7. The next section discusses how good governance has been developed in the Thai civil service both before and after 2002.




Figure 7 Overall development of good governance in Thailand based on the legislation and plans
Source: Author's construct adapted from Sathornkich (2010), Tamronglak (2014) and OPDC (2012)

3.4.1 Civil service reform before 2002

A review of literature on the Thai civil service and good governance (e.g. Nikomborirak, 2007; OPDC, 2012; Sathornkich, 2010; Suthapreda, 2013) suggests that the Thai civil service reform was a consequence of the economic crisis of 1997, called '*Tom Yam Goong Crisis*'¹⁶ (Niratpattanasai, 1999). Thai authorities sought the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) help to rescue the economy (Bullard, Bello and Mallhotra, 1998; IMF, 1997-1999). Conditionality appears to have been a key driver for introducing reform programmes in the Thai public sector, including the civil service reform (see Thailand Letter of Intent 1997-1999) (IMF, 1997-1999). However the rationale was not only imposed externally. Many public agencies in Thailand have

¹⁶ The 1997 Asian crisis is called by some people '*Tom Yam Goong*', sour & spicy prawn soup - Thai style (Niratpattanasai, 1999).

increasingly paid attention to good governance and performance because they anticipate that it can contribute to solving problems of inefficiency, corruption, and nepotism (Nikomborirak, 2007; OPDC, 2012).

The Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC)¹⁷ was the main central agency that propelled the implementation of the reform (Chula Unisearch, 2005; OCSC, 2016). This is because OCSC has the authority to make proposals and advise the Council of Ministers on civil service management systems, public personnel administration, and improvement of administrative procedures and processes under Section 8 of the Civil Service Act of 1992. Many reform programmes were therefore launched by the OCSC to introduce, for example, performance measurement (1994), the project of Administrative Renewal (AR) (1998-1999) and the Public Sector Efficiency and Effectiveness Enhancement Scheme¹⁸ (2001) (Sathornkich, 2010). The main objectives of the programmes were to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of the civil service, and financial incentives were made available to achieve these.

However, implementation of the programmes has faced several challenges, such as resistance from government officials for whom Western concepts such as the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), were not simple to comprehend; some civil servants seemed to lack knowledge about how to develop KPIs and performance targets and performance

¹⁷ The OCSC is a central government agency under the Prime Minister's Office which has roles and responsibilities to advise the public sectors (e.g. managing human resources, protecting the civil service's merit system practices), and evaluate environment and quality of life for government officials based on the principle of good governance in order to benefit the people and the nation's sustainable development (OCSC, 2016).

¹⁸ The cabinet approved the Public Sector Efficiency and Effectiveness Enhancement Scheme on the 3rd April 2001 (Sathornkich, 2010).

analysis skills; and reward systems seemed to be controversial in terms of the eligibility of individuals to receive rewards, fairness of reward allocation in an organization, and limited budgeting processes and allocation of rewards (Sathornkich, 2010).

3.4.2 Civil service reform after 2002

For Thai civil service reform the period after 2002 may be considered as a golden age of good governance. Many key pieces of legislation and plans were enacted to promote the principles of good governance: Thai Constitution B.E. 2550 (2007); State Administration Act (Volume 5) B.E. 2545 (2002) Section 3/1; Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance B.E. 2546 (2003); the National Economic and Social Development Plans: 9th B.E. 2545 - B.E. 2549 (2002 - 2006), 10th B.E. 2550 - B.E. 2554 (2007 - 2011), and 11th B.E. 2555 - B.E. 2559 (2012 - 2016); and Public Sector Development Strategic plan: B.E. 2546 - B.E. 2550 (2003 - 2007), B.E. 2551 - B.E. 2555 (2008 - 2012) and B.E. 2556 - B.E. 2561 (2013 - 2018) (shown earlier in Figure 7). These have been continuously improved in order to promote the principles of good governance in the country. In this era, the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC)¹⁹ was the main host organization (OPDC, 2003a). Its main roles and responsibilities were, for example, to serve the Public Sector Development Commission (PDC); analyze policy issues as assigned; monitor and evaluate the implementation of the structural reform plans of ministries and departments; and provide advice and suggestions to other government agencies aiming to meet the goals

¹⁹ The Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC) is a non-departmental government agency under the Office of the Prime Minister established on 3rd October 2002, in accordance with Section 71/9 of the State Administration Act (Volume 5) B.E. 2545 (2002) (OPDC, 2003a).

of bureaucratic reform, namely the greatest benefit for people through ensuring effective public outcomes and worthiness of government functions (OPDC, 2003a).




Figure 8 The major legislation and plans following the civil service reform in 2002 for delivering good governance in Thailand

Source: Author's construct adapted from Sathornkich (2013) and Suthapreda (2013)

The OPDC has played a significant role in encouraging good governance in the Thai civil service since 2002 through the PA scheme based upon three main legislations and plans: the State Administration Act (Volume 5) B.E. 2545 (2002) Section 3/1, the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance, B.E. 2546 (2003), and Public Sector Development Strategic Plans (5 year plan). Figure 8 depicts the legislation and plans after the civil service reform in 2002 for promoting good governance in Thailand. These contribute to PA of government agencies: central and provincial administrative agencies and academic institutions. This study however focuses on only the provincial administrative agencies. The importance of each legislation or plan can be described as follows:

State Administration Act (Volume 5) of 2002 Section 3/1

The Public Administration Act of 2002 states two main objectives (OPDC, 2003b). Firstly, public administration must undertake the greatest public benefit by achieving results-based implementation, efficiency, value-for-money, work process and cycle time reduction, rightsizing and decentralization. Secondly, all government agencies must implement their duties based on the principles of good governance such as ensuring budget allocation in relation to the principles of increasing public participation, disclosing information, and monitoring and evaluating performance. These contribute to creating the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedure for Good Governance B.E. 2546 (2003) as a guideline on public administration, directives and administrative procedures and government officers' practices (OPDC, 2008b).

Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance, B.E. 2546 (2003)

The Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance B.E. 2546 (2003) consists of nine major parts that prescribe the criteria and procedures for good governance (OPDC, 2003b). The first part is good governance, which refers to the administration required to meet seven targets: (1) responsiveness; (2) results-based management; (3) effectiveness and value for money; (4) lessening unnecessary steps of work; (5) reviewing missions to meet changing situations; (6) providing convenient and favourable services; and (7) regular evaluation. Furthermore, the eighth part in the Decree identifies the target concerning performance evaluation, for example the government agencies must 'establish, under the rules, procedures and period as specified by PDC, an independent inspection committee in order to evaluate the performance of duties of the government agency related to the result of the mission,

quality of service, pleasure of customers, and value for money’ (OPDC, 2003b, p. 12). This is a vital reason leading all government agencies to performance evaluation, which has been managed by the OPDC from 2003 to date.

Public Sector Development Strategic Plans

The OPDC has created the public sector development strategic plans (5-year plan). There have been three plans from B.E. 2545 (2002) to the present, including B.E. 2546 - B.E. 2550 (2003 - 2007), B.E. 2551 - B.E. 2555 (2008 - 2012), and B.E. 2556 - B.E. 2561 (2013-2018) (OPDC, 2003a, 2008a, 2015). The public sector development strategic plan B.E. 2546 - B.E. 2550 (2003 - 2007)²⁰ gave priority to the four key goals: ‘service quality improvement, rightsizing, a high performance management relevant to the national budget, international standard work capacity and responsiveness to the democratic government’ (OPDC, 2008b, p. 16). Seven major strategies were identified to accomplish these goals: (1) re-engineer work processes; (2) restructure the framework and administration of public organizations; (3) reform financial and budgetary systems; (4) review the human resource management and compensation systems; (5) change management paradigms, culture and values; (6) modernize the public sector through e-government system development; and (7) enlist public participation in the work of the government systems (OPDC, 2003a, p. 85).

The public sector development strategic plan B.E. 2551 - B.E. 2555 (2008-2012) states that ‘the Thai public sector system will strive to ensure the well-being of the citizens

²⁰ The public sector development strategic plan B.E. 2546 - B.E. 2550 (2003-2007) was approved by the cabinet resolution of 19th May 2003 (OPDC, 2008b).

and to maintain the national interest through high capability on the part of its officials, who will have the capacity to learn and to adjust and respond to change, while at the same time exhibiting strong ethical values and operating under the principle of good governance' (OPDC, 2008a, p. 3). It is comprised of four key strategies: (1) leveraging service and performance to respond to the sophisticated, diverse, and changing expectations and needs of citizens; (2) re-engineering work processes to achieve an integrated approach that generates coordination, networking, and public participation; (3) moving towards a high capability organization with professional manpower ready to learn, to innovate, and to adjust to shifting situations; and (4) creating an effective self-monitoring system to ensure transparency, confidence, and cognizance of accountability. In the provincial administrative agencies, the assessment framework between 2008 and 2012 included four main dimensions: (1) effectiveness of mission, (2) quality of service, (3) efficiency of performance, and (4) organizational development.

The current public sector development strategic plan B.E. 2556 - B.E. 2561 (2013-2018) emphasizes alignment in accordance with the strategy of the country (OPDC, 2013b). The seven strategies of the current public sector development plan broadly fall under three pillars, to include organizational excellence (service excellence, high performance organization, public value, and integration); sustainable development (collaboration and integrity); and moving towards becoming international (readiness for ASEAN B.E. 2558) (Charoensuk, 2014; OPDC, 2013b). The performance evaluation framework from 2004 to 2011 comprised four dimensions: effectiveness of mission, quality of service, efficiency of performance and organizational development. The purpose of each dimension are explained in Table 2.

Table 2 The purpose of the four dimensions of the performance evaluation framework at the provincial administration from 2004 to 2011

Dimension 1 Effectiveness of mission	Dimension 2 Quality of service
Focused on the end results to be delivered by provinces and provincial clusters. Each one had to specify its strategic plan and targets, giving primary importance to the greatest benefits to the public, to the needs and interests of the people, and to economic and social prosperity.	Focused on the findings that had to be taken into account of citizen surveys on the quality of public sector service delivery. Each province had to improve the quality of its services, emphasizing responsiveness to citizens' interests, public participation, prevention of corruption, and an increased level of transparency.
Dimension 3 Efficiency of performance	Dimension 4 Organizational development
Focused on the standardization of process improvement. For example, each province was expected to improve the efficiency of its budget management process, reduce costs, and maximize the usage of energy.	Focused on human resource development, quality management, information technology management, and regulatory management. The emphasis in this dimension was on internal development, which was the key enabling factor for the achievement of ministry strategies.

Source: Adapted from OPDC (2008a, p. 2-53 - 2-54)

The assessment framework of the provincial administration was changed in 2012, so that four dimensions are categorized into two main perspectives: external and internal perspectives (Sathornkich, 2013). The external perspective consists of dimensions of effectiveness and service quality, while the internal perspective comprises dimensions of efficiency and organizational development.

Table 3 The assessment framework of the provincial administration

Perspectives	Dimensions	Fiscal Year			
		B.E. 2556 (2013)	B.E. 2557 (2014)	B.E. 2558 (2015)	B.E. 2559 (2016)
External	Effectiveness	60%	60%	65%	70%
	Service quality	10%	10%	10%	10%
Internal	Efficiency	15%	10%	10%	10%
	Organizational development	15%	20%	15%	10%
Total (%)		100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: OPDC (2012, 2014, 2015) and Mangkarothai (2016)

Table 3 reflects that the percentage of each dimension varies in each fiscal year. PA of the fiscal year B.E. 2559 (2016) focuses on dimensions of effectiveness of over 70%. The KPIs within each dimension have been changed in each fiscal year. The reasons are based on the government's important policies and consistency between the strategy of the country and of provincial clusters ²¹ and provincial development plans (Mangkarothai, 2016; OPDC, 2015). The guidelines of PA for the provincial administration in the current fiscal years are set out in the next section. However, although the performance evaluation framework was changed in 2012, it has been used to date. The four dimensions and the key concept of delivering good governance have been maintained.

²¹ Provincial cluster refers to 18 provincial clusters (included total 75 provinces) created based on the area-based approach (e.g. potential, development requirement, and benefit of that area) and participatory governance approach (e.g. consultation and public hearing process for provincial development planning), in accordance with the State Administration Act 2007 and the Integrated Provincial Planning and Clustering Decree 2008 (promulgated on 25 December 2008) (Ministry of Interior, 2010, OPDC, 2008b).

Figure 9 shows the relationship between the four dimensions of the performance evaluation framework and the key components of good governance, with each dimension including many KPIs that reflect the key components of good governance. For example, dimension 1 includes a menu of KPIs such as quality of tourism and preparation for good agricultural practice (GAP) for the provincial clusters and provinces. They can make the decision to choose some of the KPIs, around 1-5, based on their action plans.




Figure 9 The four dimensions of the performance evaluation framework in relation to the key components of good governance

Source: Author's construct adapted from OPDC (2008b, 2015)

The provincial members of the clusters need to cooperate to achieve the KPIs as part of the overall result of the provinces. Meanwhile, the provinces have to perform their own chosen KPIs. From dimensions 2 to 4, they consist of compulsory indicators for all provinces. Each dimension comprises the KPIs as follows: dimension 2, e.g. satisfaction of services and prevention of corruption; dimension 3, e.g. expenditure of

budget and reduction of process time of services; and dimension 4, e.g. quality of public management (see detail of the KPIs in Appendix 6).

3.5 Performance agreement (PA) in provincial administration

There are 75 provinces that committed to PA between B.E. 2547 (2004) and B.E. 2554 (2011). The total number of provinces that engaged with PA has been 76 since 2012. It is important to note that the study considered information on PA of 75 provinces into 18 provincial clusters between B.E. 2550 (2007) and B.E. 2554 (2011) for sampling appropriate provinces for the study (see Appendix 7: 7.1). This is because the results of PA represent the most up-to-date information at the time of carrying out the current study. Moreover, the information solicited was based on the same performance evaluation framework.

Figure 10 depicts that there are three main types of government agencies at provincial administration level with relevance to PA: the central government agencies, provincial agencies and local government agencies. The current study focuses on the agencies that are related to PA at the provincial level: the central government agencies at provincial administration level and the provincial agencies (see Appendix 7: 7.2).




Figure 10 The structure of provincial administration

Source: OPDC (2013a, 2010) and Mektrairat (2007)

Note: The structure focuses on the agencies in relevance to PA as the KPI host

The number of central government agencies at provincial administration differs and depends on the size of the provinces (Mektrairat, 2007). Meanwhile, the provincial agencies are established in all provinces, except for the Provincial Office of Tourism and Sport (31 provinces and provincial cluster) and the Provincial Prison (50 provinces) (OPDC, 2013a). The total number of key agencies who are often appointed to be KPI hosts in a province comprise at least 35 provincial agencies as illustrated in Figure 10. The Provincial Governor's Office is the main provincial agency established in every province and that is responsible as a secretariat of the Governor and a coordinator among the agencies within a province.

The provincial agencies are not the only crucial part in implementing PA in the province, but also the central government agencies at provincial administration level. The variety of agencies in a province appears to contribute to several challenges for implementing PA. For example, the officers of the central agencies at provincial administration level are appointed, promoted and relocated by their parent ministries or departments (Sathornkich, 2010). Consequently, the provincial Governor frequently copes with various challenges of integrated collaboration in the provinces such as a lack of efficiency and a deficient unity (The Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 2015).

The provincial agencies in each province are required to perform the provincial KPIs as main or second KPI host agencies, while they are allocated responsibilities depending on the correlation between their main tasks and the KPIs. In each KPI host agency, the chief of agencies or managers of departments are viewed as the KPI director (senior managers), whilst the agencies' members who are responsible for the KPIs are viewed

as data collectors (practitioners). The KPI host agencies are required to monitor and assess their performance and generate self-assessment reports (SAR) at the ends of the sixth, ninth and twelfth months depending upon agreement. These reports are required to be delivered to the OPDC by official document and online report called electronic self-assessment report (e-SAR). At the end of the fiscal year, provincial performance is evaluated by the team of the OPDC and outsourced to dependent inspectors at sites in terms of the correlation between their self-assessment report and their genuine performance. Then the results of PA of all provinces are offered to the Public Sector Development Commission (PDC) for approval.

Monetary incentive

Allocations of monetary reward to the provinces are based on the organization's PA results (or scores) and the total salary paid to officials within an organization (OPDC, 2009; Sathornkich, 2013). It is a one-time payment, and is not included in salary-based pay and will not be forwarded to the retirement pension plan (Sathornkich, 2013). The eligible organizations are those that achieve performance scores of more than 3.00 from total scores of 5.00, while the eligible individuals are those who contribute to the achievements in their respective organizations.

Creating performance agreement (PA) in provincial administration

The procedures for creating performance agreement (PA) in the Thai public sector and in the provincial administration are described in this section. Figure 11 demonstrates the process of creating PA in the Thai public sector.




Figure 11 The process of creating performance agreement (PA) in the Thai public sector
Source: Sathornkich (2013)

The process of PA consists of three main steps: strategy formulation, performance agreement implementation, and performance measurement. In the current study, this process is seen as PA or performance evaluation or performance measurement because such terms as 'performance assessment', 'performance evaluation', 'performance review', 'performance management', and 'performance appraisal' refer to the process where the work performance of an employee is assessed (Vallance and Fellow, 1999).




Figure 12 The guideline of creating performance agreement (PA) in the provincial administration
Source: OPDC (2015)

Regarding the particular process of creating PA in the provincial administration, which is set out in Figure 12, this shows that the OPDC bears responsibility, as the main host, for carrying out the procedures from the identifying assessment framework, producing KPIs, negotiating and producing PA, monitoring and evaluating an organization's performance, and allocating financial reward²² to the provinces.

²² Financial rewards have been allocated in the Thai public sector since fiscal year B.E. 2547 (2004) (OPDC, 2009).

Challenges of PA in provincial administration

This section sets out the challenges of PA in the provincial administration. Some scholars (e.g. Sathornkich, 2013; Srimai, 2015) revealed that there are problems in the context of PA at the provincial level in Thailand. Figure 13 shows the constraints in the process of PA in the Thai public sector. This is the result of research on the impacts of PA and incentives for improving work efficiency proposed by the National Institute of Development Administration (2008 cited in Sathornkich, 2013). It can be seen that there are two major categories of PA constraints, personnel factors and environment and system factors, at play. Personnel factors may include inappropriate skills, issues about pay (lack of trust in reward management) and transparency. Regarding environment and system factors, these refer to characteristics such as inefficient work coordination, insufficient budget/resources and inaccurate performance evaluation.

Furthermore, Srimai (2015) suggested that two main problems occur in implementing PA at the provincial level. Firstly, PA are seen as a control system and have contributed to the provinces' view that they were being forced to be accountable for the KPIs and targets that are uncontrolled. Meanwhile, using control systems was affected by a lack of available data and management information system (MIS). Secondly, PA and its KPIs and its targets are considered to produce several problems, for instance some KPIs were difficult to understand and were unachievable.




Figure 13 Summary of the constraints in the process of PA in the Thai public sector
 Source: National Institute of Development Administration (2008 cited in Sathornkich, 2013)

3.6 Summary

Thailand presents a very specific configuration of politics, national culture and values, which differs from other Southeast Asian countries, perhaps as a result of never having been colonized. A diverse range of determinants have influenced its culture, including monarchy, religion (Buddhism), and a mixed-culture acquired from neighbouring countries (India, China, and Cambodia). As stated earlier, a review of literature suggested that the public sector culture may be based on a balance between three factors: political culture, national culture, and bureaucratic culture (e.g. the civil service culture) as shown in Figure 14.




Figure 14 Public sector culture in Thailand based on a balance between bureaucratic culture, political culture, and national culture
Source: Author's construct

Political culture can influence the national culture (Hofstede, 1981) and bureaucratic culture – political influence can dominate the civil service (Nikomborirak, 2007). Meanwhile, the national culture has a strong impact on the civil service bureaucratic culture, such as shaping the value systems and behaviour of a major groups of the population, and officials (Hofstede, 2001; Komin, 1990; Rokeach, 1970). Thus, bureaucracy is viewed as the heart of a nation's state machinery (Nikomborirak, 2007).

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present the research design and methodology underpinning this study, which includes the collection and analysis of data to answer the research questions. The chapter is structured into eight sections. It starts with research philosophy in section 4.2, and then discusses research design in section 4.3. There follows research methodology in section 4.4, including a discussion on quantitative research, qualitative research, and mixed-methods, and sampling cases. The research approach is discussed in section 4.5 and then data collection in section 4.6. It moves on to data analysis and interpretation in section 4.7, regarding quantitative and qualitative data analysis. The next section (4.8) discusses research ethics. The final section (4.9) provides a conclusion to the chapter.

4.2 Research philosophy

This study aimed to examine the relationship between organizational culture and good governance that is viewed through the lens of the PA scheme. The study is therefore concerned with organizational culture, which can be viewed as ‘objective reality’ (Denscombe, 2010b, p. 119) and ‘objective social entities’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 32, 34). Organizational culture is viewed as objective reality, i.e. ‘something an institution is’ (Christiansen et al., 2007, p. 43). Meanwhile, organizational culture is also considered as objective entity in that it has cognitive (to do with thinking), affective (to do with feeling) and behavioural characteristics (Senior and Fleming, 2006, p. 141). The

implication is that organizational culture – the pattern of, for example, beliefs, values, and behaviour identified by theorists (Brown, 1998) – can be understood by postpositivist and constructivist (interpretivist) approaches. A postpositivist approach allows a researcher to start with a theory, then gather data that either refutes or supports the theory; the postpositivist assumption holds true more for quantitative research than for qualitative research (Creswell, 2014). Phillips and Burbules (2000) stated that postpositivism demonstrates the thinking after positivism. Positivism is based on ontological assumptions about the nature of social reality and epistemological assumptions about how best to create knowledge about social reality (Denscombe, 2010b).

In contrast, an interpretivist approach – known as constructivism (Gray, 2004), is often applied in qualitative research. Interpretivist or constructivist approaches enable researchers to understand meanings of the world from the participants' perspectives and through their experiences of the situation being studied (Creswell, 2014). For example, qualitative research can use open-ended questions to elicit opinions from the participants (Crotty, 1998 cited in Creswell, 2014). Creswell (2014) also states that constructivist researchers typically address the specific context in studying culture and they attempt to understand the meanings of phenomena by their interpretation rather than by starting with a theory.

In the study of organizational culture, it is valid and useful to employ a dual approach, combining postpositivist and interpretivist approaches. A philosophical underpinning for the current study seems to be closest to the pragmatic approach, which focuses on

mixed methods to understand the problem (Creswell, 2014; Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner, 2007; Mertens and Hesse-Biber, 2012). This philosophy leads the current study to both deductive and inductive approaches. The deductive process starts with theories and is usually associated with quantitative research, whilst the inductive process contributes to developing theories and is usually associated with qualitative research (Bryman, 2012).

The deductive approach is represented through an analytical framework, in Chapter Two section 2.4.3, which draws on the CVF or the OCAI and previous studies to guide the collection of data using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The theoretical approach also enables the analysis of data, namely analyzing quantitative data based on the CVF or the OCAI and analyzing qualitative data based on theory. The inductive approach is employed in analyzing qualitative data by coding based on data. The mixed methods research is discussed in section 4.4.1.

4.3 Research design

Research design is a prior stage before identifying any specific method. Its function is ‘to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible’ (De Vaus, 2001, p. 9). Gorard (2013) emphasizes that the generated evidence should be based on the research questions. Therefore, the selection of an appropriate research design for this study was based on the research questions and cautiously considered the advantages of each type of research design. There are diverse types of research design provided by scholars. This section focuses on five dominant

research designs, comprising experimental, cross-sectional, longitudinal, case study and comparative designs (Bryman, 2012, p. 45).

Experimental design

Experimental design is concerned with establishing a causal relationship between variables (Shuttleworth, 2008). Two variables are focused on: the independent variable (the cause/intervention) and the dependent variable (outcome) (De Vaus, 2001). The research questions or hypotheses are tested (Gray, 2004). The context within the experiment being conducted means it should be possible to assign subjects to conditions, which is important for the rigour of the experimental design (Gray, 2004; De Vaus, 2001). The experimental design is perhaps not appropriate for examining organizational culture – underlying assumptions (Schein, 1990) – as it is complex and also due to the diverse opinions of people in a phenomenon being studied.

Cross-sectional design

Cross-sectional designs are probably the most broadly employed designs in social research (De Vaus, 2001), as they are often seen as survey designs (Bryman, 2012). They emphasize a snapshot of a population at a single point in time, establish more than one case, provide quantitative data and examine relationships between variables (Bryman, 2012). Such cross-sectional designs are useful to describe changes over time (Gorard, 2013). A cross-sectional design allows participants to recall details about a past situation that is being studied, which is consistent with this study in that it requires participant recall about the PA scheme between 2007 and 2011. However, its feature is not based on random allocation (De Vaus, 2001), but it is a snapshot sample that is

established at a fixed point in chronological time (Kaplan, 1997). This is perhaps not applicable to this study, as it requires selection of potential participants in each level – province, agency, and individual – by a combination of multi-stage, stratified and purposive sampling relevant to the research questions.

Longitudinal design

Longitudinal design is slightly different from cross-sectional design (Bryman, 2012), namely because cross-sectional design data is gathered in a single time period whilst longitudinal design data is collected for two or more time periods (Menard, 2008). It refers to the study of change and development over time (Gray, 2004) by the comparison of the difference between samples over a long period. However, this research does not focus on distinguishing organizational culture over a long period of time but on the comparison of organizational culture between two different groups – the low and high KPI scoring provinces – in a single period of time. Therefore, longitudinal design is perhaps far from the answer for the research questions in this study.

Case study design

Case study design contributes to generating knowledge of an individual, group, and organization and to understand complex social phenomena, in particular the nature of the case in question (Bryman, 2012; Yin, 2002). The case study can help to answer ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions (Yin, 2002). This is compatible with the research question of this study. Case study design has been extensively used in empirical studies of organizational culture, for example Phookpan (2012), and Adenan et al. (2013). Many features of case study design are close to examining the relationship between

organizational culture and performance (good governance) of public organizations. Firstly, case study is a useful design for studying organizations, particularly public organizations (Hakim, 1987). Secondly, case study design can elicit information on various issues of an organization (e.g. organizational performance, policy analysis, and relationships between different organizations) (Bryman, 1989; Gray, 2004; Geertz, 1973 cited in Stark and Torrance, 2005), and provide in-depth and detailed information of a case and of causal relationships between subjects and issues (Brewerton and Millward, 2001; Gray, 2004; Kumar, 2011; Patton, 1990).

Thirdly, case study design allows researchers to employ multiple methods and data sources to collect data within a single study (Bryman, 1989; Hakim, 1987; Kumar, 2011; Stark and Torrance, 2005). Here the case study approach is associated with a variety of evidence such as documents, interviews and observations (Yin, 2002). This may make it difficult to interpret data because it produces a massive amount of evidence (a volume of documentation), which makes data analysis time-consuming and difficult (Brewerton and Millward, 2001; Gray, 2004; Yin, 2002). Moreover, the case study design has been criticized by scholars in terms of a lack of rigour and a difficulty in providing scientific generalization (Yin, 2002). A lack of rigour in the case study is concerning because it does not follow systematic procedures and may influence the direction of the findings and conclusions (De Vaus, 2001; Yin, 2002). In challenging the scope for scientific generalization, the case study design is not statistical, instead it is analytical (Johansson, 2003). This may make it hard to accept that a single case can be representative of the wider population. However, Bryman (1989) and Yin (2002) argued that using multiple case studies can enhance the range of cases of the same issue or phenomenon.

Comparative design

Comparative design is established based on a systematic process, to explore similarities and differences between two or more cases at the same time (Berg-Schlosser, 2001; Bryman, 2012; Dixon, Bouma and Atkinson, 1987; May, 2010; Warwick and Osherson, 1973). This is consistent with the purpose of this study, which requires comparison of organizational culture, particularly between the high and low KPI scoring provinces. Comparative design is not only used to compare the characteristics of two or more cases, but allows the use of more or less identical methods such as case studies and statistical analysis (Berg-Schlosser, 2001; Bryman, 2012). This may lead to theories about contrasting findings (Bryman, 2012).

In the context of cultural study, comparative design is widely used to describe and understand culture because it can explain, for example, people's relations, cultural impediments to implementing policy and how good the results are (Hantrais, 2009; May, 2010). Although comparative design provides several advantages, such as facilitating the comparison of two or more cases, generating theory, and allowing researchers to use multiple methods, some scholars (e.g. Dyer and Wilkins, 1991 cited in Bryman, 2012; May, 2010; Warwick and Osherson, 1973) claim that comparative study in cross-cultural research is concerned with meaning-equivalence (e.g. a specific concept for a particular culture, a result of a questionnaire's validity, and problems of translation) and losing the researchers' attention of the specific context.

Selection of research design

Each type of research design has different purposes and advantages. I cautiously considered which types of research designs are suitable for answering the research questions of this study. A review of the literature on research design suggests that case study and comparative designs are closest for enabling the examination of the relationship between organizational culture and performance in the Thai civil service. The case study design was chosen based on three main reasons. Firstly, it is appropriate to study the performance of the public organizations. This can be observed through a number of empirical studies on organizational culture that used the case study approach, including in particular case studies of the Thai public sector (e.g. Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Pimpa, 2012). Secondly, it allows researchers to elicit the views of people in a particular phenomenon being studied in breadth (by surveys) and in-depth and in detail (by interviews). For example, surveys through multiple cases provide an important alternative to random sampling and facilitate generalization (Hakim, 1987); and provide a basis for a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches (Bryman, 1988; Darlington and Scott, 2002). Thirdly, it permits triangulation and greater validity of research findings.

Comparative design has been selected for three main reasons. Firstly, it facilitates analysis of many cases in a single study - in this case cultural determinants of performance could only be assessed through the study of low and high KPI scoring provinces. Secondly, it can help researchers to understand the culture of an organization through in-depth measurement at the individual level in different places against a common framework, which is useful for a topic such as culture where all values are

relative (Hantrais, 2009). Thirdly, the comparative study enables researchers to compare the findings obtained from both quantitative and qualitative sources for an overall conclusion (Harkness, Vijver and Mohler, 2003).

4.4 Research methodology

4.4.1 Selection of research method

A research method is a technique for collecting data with relevance to a specific instrument, such as a self-completion questionnaire and a semi-structured interview schedule (Bryman, 2001). There are three main categories of data collection method: quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods. Selecting research methods should be determined by the hypotheses or research questions (Matthews and Ross, 2010), which means researchers can use more than one data collection method in a single study. This section discusses the appropriate choice of methods employed for collecting data to address the research questions.

Quantitative methods

Quantitative methods refer to collecting data based on systematic and standardized designs (Kumar, 2011). Quantitative methods provide quantifiable data, such as numerical data and name codes (Blaikie, 2000; Kumar, 2011; Matthews and Ross, 2010). Using quantitative methods provides advantages in three main aspects: collection of data, analysis of data and reliability of data.

For collecting data, it allows researchers to measure the responses of a large number of people and to generalize based on the findings (Patton, 1990). It follows conventional

standards of reliability and validity, which is different from qualitative research as this is often focused on a single context (Burns, 2000). Bryman (2001) claimed that quantitative research draws on the view of positivism that a standard device based on the principles of the scientific methods can apply to all phenomena, but in fact phenomena in the investigation is different in the real world in practice because of different contexts. Bryman also argued that quantitative research emphasizes administering research instruments to subjects or controlling situations to determine their effects. For instance, survey respondents may answer questions by using their knowledge, sense of similarity and importance in their everyday life. Collecting data in the context of a cultural and behavioural study appears to be a controversial issue.

A critical theorist, Jurgen Habermas, claimed that social research based on the scientific model is inappropriate to study the behaviour of people (Hall and Hall, 1996). Likewise, Hakim (1987) stated that qualitative research is more appropriate to study individuals' attitudes, motivations and behaviour than quantitative research, because it provides descriptive reports of individuals' perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, views and feelings. Although many scholars have criticized the use of quantitative research for studying culture and behaviour, many empirical studies (e.g. Jingjit, 2008; Parker and Bradley, 2000) used quantitative methods, particularly questionnaire surveys, whilst qualitative methods (interview) were perhaps used to eliminate the weaknesses of the questionnaire surveys.

Regarding analyzing data, quantitative research is based on standardized measures in order to facilitate the analysis of data in the form of statistical analysis, for example answering research questions or testing hypotheses by comparison and statistical aggregation of the data (Matthews and Ross, 2010; Patton, 1990).

The most commonly employed quantitative method is surveys. There are two main types of survey research: self-completion questionnaire (supervised, postal, and internet) and structured interview (face to face and telephone) (Bryman, 2012). The questionnaire is probably one of the most broadly used methods in surveys (Gray, 2004; Matthews and Ross, 2010). A questionnaire is a written list of questions where respondents provide answers based on their interpretation (Kumar, 2011), which produces many types of data, such as behavioural and attitudinal data (Brewerton and Millward, 2001). This confirms that questionnaire surveys may be used for studying culture.

There are four types of questionnaires: self-completion (no researcher present), self-completion in a group (with researcher present), interview (face to face), and interview by telephone (Hall and Hall, 1996). Self-completion questionnaires are perhaps appropriate for examining organizational culture in terms of eliminating interviewer effects (e.g. bias from the interviewer asking questions in different ways); facilitating respondents to complete a questionnaire as the respondents wish; and being cheaper and quicker than interviews (Bryman, 1989, 2012). Moreover, self-completion questionnaires enable researchers to collect data from potential respondents over a wide geographical area (Kumar, 2011). It is therefore appropriate for the current study, which requires data to be collected from many public organizations in four regions of Thailand.

Qualitative methods

Qualitative research differs from quantitative research in many aspects, such as the construction of method, research strategy, and data analysis. Qualitative research tends to rely on little theory and, as a result, it permits the researcher to employ unstructured and non-sequential conduct with little usage of theory and no hypotheses (Bryman, 1989; Kumar, 2011). Qualitative research frequently starts with defining very general concepts, in contrast with quantitative research that begins with theories and concepts (Brannen, 1992; Bryman, 1988). Qualitative research is flexible regarding research strategy because it allows researchers to use different types of data collection approaches, methodologies and philosophies (McQueen and Knussen, 2002). For data analysis, qualitative research does not rely on statistics, but rather on context and the interpretation of observations involving individuals' perception of situations in order to capture individual definitions, descriptions, and meaning of events (Bryman, 1989; Burns, 2000). Thus, qualitative methods are appropriate to explore meanings of people in a phenomenon being studied in various aspects such as stories, accounts, and individual's values, attitudes, beliefs, feelings, perceptions and behaviour (Blaikie, 2000; Burns, 2000; Hakim, 1987; Kumar, 2011; Matthews and Ross, 2010).

Qualitative research has many merits. For example, it can help researchers to increasingly understand participants' perspectives or processes of social life through investigating in-depth and in detail within a small number of people and cases (Hakim, 1987; McQueen and Knussen, 2002; Patton, 1990). Although qualitative methods decrease generalizability (Patton, 1990), they can explain contexts and inform more structured or quantitative studies (Hakim, 1987; McQueen and Knussen, 2002).

However, qualitative methods have been criticized in terms of reliability and validity. Qualitative research relies on the researchers' skills and abilities, which is not acknowledged in quantitative research (McQueen and Knussen, 2002). The researchers can carry out research based on their own cultural assumptions and data (Brannen, 1992) because it is possible that the flexibility and lack of control in qualitative studies makes it difficult to check the researchers' bias (Kumar, 2011). Nevertheless, scholars have proposed various ways to ensure the reliability and validity of qualitative methods, such as enhancing the skill, competence, sensitivity, integrity and rigour of the researcher doing fieldwork. Bryman (2012) suggests that qualitative research can be conducted based on criteria to assess research in a similar way to quantitative research. For example, using several strategies can contribute to external reliability (e.g. using more than one observer and integrating identification). Moreover, qualitative methods may be combined with quantitative methods. Using several methods can enable checking of result, or triangulation – combining more than one method, data source, or observer in the study of social phenomena (Bryman, 2012; Patton, 1990; 2002).

Among the three sources, interviewing is a major instrument in qualitative research. Interviewing allows researchers to elicit information, opinions, feelings, values, attitudes and the meanings that underpin people's lives and behaviours by asking questions on the issues being studied (Bryman, 1989; Corbetta, 2003; Gray, 2004; Matthews and Ross, 2010; Patton, 1987). Hence, interviewing is appropriate for studying organizational culture. Other advantages of interviewing are that it may lead to predictions of change through oral history, talking and respondents' suggestions (Hall

and Hall, 1996); and it can be combined with other approaches in a multi-method design, such as questionnaires and observation (Brewerton and Millward, 2001).

There are three major forms of interview: structured, unstructured and semi-structured (Burns, 2000). Firstly, structured interviews involve a prescribed set of questions, which an interviewer asks in the same wording and order of questions as specified in the interview schedule (Brewerton and Millward, 2001; Bryman, 2012; Kumar, 2011). Therefore, structured interviews provide uniform information that facilitates the comparability of data (Kumar, 2011). Participants tend to be controlled more than in unstructured interviews, where they are free to tell their story in their own way (Matthews and Ross, 2010, p. 220). Structured interviews may be inflexible to elicit perspectives of people in the project being studied and may be far from getting information to answer the research questions of the current study.

Secondly, unstructured interviews focus on a wide area of discussions and enable participants to answer questions within their own frame of reference (Matthews and Ross, 2010; May, 2010). Therefore, unstructured interviews allow flexibility for researchers to order content, structure and questions as they wish (Kumar, 2011). The researchers may be challenged, for example by getting deviating data from the interviewees' perspective or their understanding of the topic (Bryman, 1988); leading to a chance of losing the desired issues; being time-consuming due to interviewees' being free to give answers; and requiring high level of interviewing skill of researchers (Brewerton and Millward, 2001).

Thirdly, semi-structured interviews incorporate elements of both quantifiable and qualifiable, fixed-choice responding and the facility in describing in greater detail (Kumar, 2011). This helps the researcher to explore, and probe in more depth information by asking additional questions to solicit greater detail and understanding of the interviewees' point of view (Brewerton and Millward, 2001; Bryman, 2001; Gray, 2004). Using semi-structured interviews provides many merits, such as being flexible and having a more natural conversation than with a structured interview (Hall and Hall, 1996); seeking elaboration and clarification on the data provided (May, 2010); and ensuring validity due to the use of open-questions to receive the respondents' real perception (Burns, 2000). Therefore, semi-structured interviews are the closest for receiving a variety of perspectives from respondents on the PA scheme, because interview circumstances may be flexible and they can share their experiences without controlled orientation.

There are two main forms of interviewing: in-depth and focus group interviews. In-depth interviews provide an understanding of the interviewee's underlying point of view by using open-ended questions, listening to and recording the answers, which provides in-depth detail of the interviewees' values, attitudes, perception of their environment and their experience (Burns, 2000). Using in-depth interviews facilitates the collection of information from people who are experts on their own experience (Hall and Hall, 1996). This seems to be close to the intent of the current study, which focuses on senior managers who have a lot of experience of bureaucracy and performance evaluation schemes, such as the chief of the agencies. Focus group interviews enable researchers to understand 'why people feel the way they do' (Bryman, 2001, p. 338) by exploring

people's opinions, beliefs, values, attitudes, discourses and understandings of issues as being valid in their own right (Brewerton and Millward, 2001). Focus group interviews should be neither too large nor too small (eight to ten people) (Kumar, 2011). Using focus groups may be a useful tool for identifying issues regarding how practitioners think and how they perform the PA scheme.

Mixed methods

Mixed methods research focuses on collecting, analyzing and mixing both qualitative and quantitative methods in a single study, known as a research design (Creswell and Clark, 2007). The combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches in a single study provides a range of different types of data by using different methods in order to generate a well-integrated picture of what is happening in the area of interest and to get a better understanding of the research questions than could be acquired from either approach alone (Creswell and Clark, 2007; Matthews and Ross, 2010).

Darlington and Scott (2002) state that there are five main purposes of using mixed methods: triangulation, complementarity, development, initiation and expansion. In particular, triangulation is often seen in a number of pieces of literature on mixed methods. Triangulation is to compare and integrate data collected from using more than one method in a single study by seeking convergence of results in order to understand the research problem and enhance the credibility of the research findings (Creswell and Clark, 2007; Darlington and Scott, 2002; Hesse-Biber, 2010; Patton, 2002). However, using triangulation has various challenges, such as a high requirement of effort and expertise, difficulty in integrating evidence produced and contradiction between

quantitative and qualitative results (Brannen, 1992; Creswell and Clark, 2007; Darlington and Scott, 2002). The different data generated by both quantitative and qualitative approaches should not be considered as a problem, but needs further work that may provide a better understanding of what is happening. Brannen (1992) also suggested that differences in findings are not expected to be consistent but they are seen to be complementary.

Some scholars (e.g. Bryman, 1988; Darlington and Scott, 2002) propose that there are at least three types of mixed methods: (1) qualitative then quantitative – qualitative methods produce hypotheses to test quantitatively or to develop research instruments; (2) quantitative then qualitative – quantitative methods provide statistically representative data that provides a basis for the sampling of cases and comparison groups that form the intensive study and are then followed up by more in-depth analysis using qualitative methods; and (3) qualitative and quantitative concurrently – both approaches are given equal emphasis, which results in two separate but linked studies and integrates the methods in the one study. This is done by using triangulation, complementarity, combination of qualitative and quantitative.

Among the three types of mixed methods, quantitative then qualitative appears to be the most appropriate approach to the current study, which is related to a large number of cases or people. Using a quantitative approach can also facilitate the selection of the interesting cases for the interview approach, which can be called quantitative then qualitative.

Selection of research method

As stated earlier, a review of the literature on research methods suggests that the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in the same study allows access to different levels of reality (Bryman, 1989; Patton, 1990), particularly in ethnographic studies of organizational culture. In this area, qualitative methods are not the only approach employed, but quantitative methods can also be used in mixed-methods. Thus, it can be observed that many organizational culture studies have used mixed-methods, for example Zammuto and Krakower (1991), Ehtesham et al. (2011), Hofstede (1990), Parker and Bradley (2000), Al-Kuwari (2002), and Jingjit and Fotaki (2010). This research focuses on investigating organizational culture and civil service performance of the provincial administration in Thailand. The use of quantitative methods is considered to be appropriate for a wide geographical area and collected data can be analyzed by statistical methods and compared. Meanwhile, using qualitative methods enable the eliciting of underlying assumption, by definition, of life. Here the strength of one method offsets the weakness in the other method (Blaikie, 2010). Thus, a mixed methods approach is closest for answering the research questions.

Using a self-completion questionnaire survey, known as a major instrument of the quantitative method, provides many benefits for this study. Firstly, it permits the researcher to measure the reactions of a large number of people or to collect data over a wide geographical area by using a limited set of questions in order to attain a generalizable set of findings (Kumar, 2011; Patton, 2001). This facilitates the study of organizational culture among civil servants across 75 provinces in four regions of Thailand. The self-completion questionnaires (post) can eliminate interviewer effects,

such as biases and pressure from the interviewer (Bryman, 2012). Secondly, the standard questions of the OCAI have been extensively used by many empirical studies on organizational culture (e.g. Howard, 1998; Ralston et al., 2006). Thirdly, quantitative findings can be replicated and retested (Kumar, 2011) due to being based on structured features. Finally, the quantitative method can be used to develop the qualitative phase, which helps to identify groups of particular interest in order to undertake in-depth analysis using qualitative methods (Darlington and Scott, 2002).

Regarding qualitative methods, a semi-structured interview is considered suitable for the current study for three main reasons. Firstly, it elicits information in order to understand several issues in-depth and in detail with a small number of people and cases (Patton, 2002), for example, feelings, beliefs, values, attitudes, perceptions and experiences (Kumar, 2011). Secondly, it is a flexible approach that permits the participants to talk about topics or a set of questions in their own way (Matthews and Ross, 2010). Moreover, it can be used in conjunction with other research techniques, such as surveys, to follow up issues (Gray, 2004), in particular important sources of required information. This facilitates a combination between the semi-structured interview and questionnaire survey in this study.

4.4.2 Sampling cases

Sampling is an important procedure because it determines representative samples of a wider population about which generalizations will be made (Bryman, 2012; Gray, 2004; Warwick and Osherson, 1973). The objective of this study was to generate findings of relevance to the civil servants (senior managers and practitioners) in the provincial

administration of Thailand as a whole. The findings of this research would represent the overall picture of the relationship between organizational culture and performance in delivering good governance within the PA scheme, particularly at the provincial level in Thailand.

There are two main techniques of sampling: probability or random sampling and non-probability or non-random or purposive sampling (Denscombe, 2010a; Gray, 2004; Kemper, Stringfield and Teddie, 2003). Probability sampling is primarily employed in quantitative research and is associated with representative samples (a cross-section of the population) (Denscombe, 2010a; Teddlie and Yu, 2007). Meanwhile purposive sampling is primarily used in qualitative research and is associated with exploratory samples (a way to the discovery of new ideas or theories). By using mixed methods several sampling techniques can be used or it can combine probability and purposive sampling together according to the research question being studied (Kemper, Stringfield and Teddie, 2003).

This study requires sampling at several levels – province, agency and individual. However, each level requires the use of different approaches, which can be seen as a case for using mixed methods (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). Therefore, a combination of probability and purposive samplings was the closest technique of sampling for this study. Three techniques of sampling were used in this study, including multi-stage sampling, stratified sampling and purposive sampling. Multi-stage sampling involves selecting samples in a sequence of stages, which allows researchers to reduce the sample by selecting a random sample from the previously selected cluster (Denscombe, 2010a;

Kemper, Stringfield and Teddie, 2003). In the multi-stage sampling, stratified random and purposive samplings were used. There are two reasons for using stratified sampling: (1) this study has clear information on the population and sampling frame and (2) this study has performance evaluation scores that enables the researcher to select the samples. Denscombe (2010a) states that stratified random sampling can be used when there is a known population, a sampling frame (a list of all items in the population) and a process of random selection. In addition, using stratified sampling provides many advantages. For example, it can ensure that the results of the sample are distributed based on the same stratifying criterion, removing the risk of inadequate representation of the sample, increasing precision by reducing sampling error, saving fieldwork costs by reducing sample size and allowing the researcher to use various stratifying criteria (Bryman, 2012; Sapsford and Jupp, 2006).

In summary, the multi-stage technique was used in this study, in which each stage in this technique was used in different type of sampling. Collecting data for this study started with a questionnaire survey and then used the survey findings for selecting interview samples known as quantitative then qualitative methods. Thus, the description of sampling starts with sampling for the questionnaire survey and then sampling for the interview.

Sampling for the questionnaire survey

A purpose of sampling in quantitative research is to represent a generalization of a population (Creswell and Clark, 2007). Thus, this study cautiously considered the samples for the questionnaire survey. Figure 15 shows a sampling diagram for


questionnaire survey, which uses a combination of techniques – multi-stage, stratified and purposive samplings were used. The sampling frames – information about the research population (Denscombe, 2010a) – are necessary for sampling at each level. In summary, the intended samples of this study involved:

- Provincial level: of 75 provinces in four regions at the provincial administration level in Thailand that engaged with the PA scheme between 2007 and 2011.
- Agency level: of 35 provincial agencies who were KPI host agencies in each province.
- Individual level: officials in each KPI host agency who were responsible for KPI(s) between 2007 and 2011 (at least one year of experience), including chiefs of agencies, viewed as director of KPIs or senior managers and other officials viewed as data collectors or practitioners.

Provincial level

The population of this study was from 75 provinces in four regions of Thailand from which the samples were selected by purposive sampling. The provinces were selected based on using performance evaluation scores or KPI scores in five fiscal years between 2007 and 2011 approved by the PDC, using stratified random sampling. According to the distribution of the KPI scores, it was not a normal distribution, namely left skewness²³ – the score is clustered at the high end (right-hand side of a graph) (Pallant, 2010, p. 57). Therefore, a median was used as the cut-off point to divide the sample into two groups (Pallant, 2010, p. 89), the low and high KPI scoring provinces. There are two main steps in using the median to select the low and high KPI scoring provinces to be representatives of each region.

²³ The skewness value provides an indication of the symmetry of the distribution (Pallant, 2010, p. 57).



Step 1: Defining values of low, median and high in each fiscal year is shown in Table 4. These values were used as the criteria to determine the representatives of the low and high KPI scoring provinces in each region.

Table 4 Range of scores for determining the provinces for further study

Range of score	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Low	4.1935	4.2218	3.7955	4.0370	3.6503
Median	4.3545	4.3438	3.9966	4.3185	3.8820
High	4.5117	4.4712	4.1356	4.4978	4.1126

Step 2: Defining which provinces were in the low and high KPI scoring groups by comparing among provinces within their own region. Table 5 shows that the two lowest and two highest KPI scoring provinces were selected as representatives of each region. Therefore, the total number of provinces per region was four and the total number of provinces in four regions was 16.

Table 5 Selection of provinces for survey

Regions	Low	High	Total (provinces)
Northern	N1, N2	N3, N4	4
Central	C1, C2	C3, C4	4
North-eastern	NE1, NE2	NE3, NE4	4
Southern	S2, S2	S3, S4	4
Total (provinces)	8	8	16

Note: Low and High mean the low and high KPI scoring provinces respectively

Agency level

After the 16 provinces were selected, the agencies in each province were selected for the samples of agencies by stratified sampling. There were 35 provincial agencies that were related to the KPIs as the main or second KPI host agencies (see Chapter Three: Section 3.5, Figure 10 or Appendix 7:7.2). According to a comparison of the KPIs in

five fiscal years and in the 16 provinces, there were 10 main KPI host agencies that were often responsible for the KPIs over five years (see the list of KPI host agencies in Appendix 6). Table 6 shows a list of the 10 provincial agencies that were selected and the total number of participants for the survey in each province.

Table 6 List of the 10 provincial agencies selected and the proportion of participants for the surveys

No.	Provincial agencies	Director of KPIs	Data collector
		(Senior manager)	(Practitioner)
1	Provincial Governor's Office	1	2
2	Provincial Administration Office	1	2
3	Provincial Agricultural Extension Office	1	2
4	Provincial Livestock Office	1	2
5	Provincial Community Development Office	1	2
6	Provincial Natural Resources and Environment Office	1	2
7	Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation	1	2
8	Provincial Office of the Controller General	1	2
9	Provincial Employment Service Office	1	2
10	Provincial Public Health Office	1	2
		10	20
Total		30	

Note: The list of the 10 agencies were used to collect data in the 16 provinces.

Individual level

Two types of officials were related to KPIs in an agency. Firstly, officials who were responsible as KPI director and were often assigned as chiefs of agencies or heads of department were considered as senior managers. The other officials who were responsible as KPI data collectors were considered as practitioners within their own agency. The senior managers were important figures because they had been involved with KPIs for a long time. Meanwhile, the practitioners were crucial in the practice of

the KPIs because the KPIs were related to their tasks and they also directly delivered services to citizens in the provinces. In each agency, there were at least one senior manager and two practitioners who were responsible for an agency's KPI. Therefore, the proposed participants were three per agency, including one senior manager and two practitioners (see Table 6) and were selected by stratified sampling from the selected agencies.

In summary, the samples for the questionnaire survey comprised 16 provinces and each province consisted of 10 provincial agencies. The participants in each agency included one senior manager and two practitioners, with 30 participants per province. The total number of proposed participants for the survey was 480 (see Table 7).

Table 7 Summary of the samples for the questionnaire survey

Regions	Code of provinces	Type of group	No. of agencies	No. of participants per agency		Total (10 agencies x 3 participants)
				Senior managers	Practitioners	
Northern	N1	L	10	1x10	2x10	30
	N2	L	10	1x10	2x10	30
	N3	H	10	1x10	2x10	30
	N4	H	10	1x10	2x10	30
Central	C1	L	10	1x10	2x10	30
	C2	L	10	1x10	2x10	30
	C3	H	10	1x10	2x10	30
	C4	H	10	1x10	2x10	30
North-Eastern	NE1	L	10	1x10	2x10	30
	NE2	L	10	1x10	2x10	30
	NE3	H	10	1x10	2x10	30
	NE4	H	10	1x10	2x10	30
Southern	S1	L	10	1x10	2x10	30
	S2	L	10	1x10	2x10	30
	S3	H	10	1x10	2x10	30
	S4	H	10	1x10	2x10	30
Total (No.)	16	16	160	160	320	480

Note: 1) Table 7 shows the proposed number of participants.

2) L and H mean the low and high KPI scoring provinces respectively.

Sampling for interviews

The main purpose of sampling in qualitative research is to select individuals or sites that can provide the necessary information (Creswell and Clark, 2007). Before a discussion on interview samples and sampling size, it is important to note that the survey findings were used for considering the interview samples through purposive sampling. Figure 16 shows a sampling diagram for interview, where a combination of techniques was used in the same way as the sampling for the survey. The characteristics of the interview samples in each level included:

- **Provincial level:** The provinces that were selected as the interview sample were acquired from the data analysis from the 16 provinces where the questionnaire survey was carried out. The criteria for selecting the provinces included. Firstly, the provinces had to have a survey response from the Provincial Governor's Office. Secondly, they were not the non-variant provinces, such as a special area identified as having insurgency or unique geography (e.g. a lot of high mountains resulting in difficult transportation).
- **Agency level:** The agencies that were considered for selection as the interview sample were required to be within the 10 provincial agencies in the provinces selected for interview. The agencies were different in each province and depended on the survey findings. The results of the survey provided the criteria for selecting the agencies included. Firstly, the mean scores of the 10 agencies were compared in their own provinces based on the results of the statistically significant differences of the four culture types. Secondly, the agencies that were considered for the sample had to undertake three complete questionnaires from one senior manager and two practitioners.

- Individual level: Two types of officials were selected as participants of the interview, including senior manager and practitioner. The proposed characteristics of the participants comprised (1) senior managers who were KPI directors and had experience with KPI(s) and (2) practitioners who were responsible for KPIs with at least one year of experience. They were considered whether they had completed the questionnaire survey or not.

Provincial level

The survey findings were analyzed with SPSS (Independent-Sample *t*-Test), the statistically significant differences of four culture types between the high and low KPI scoring provinces, and were used to select the interview samples. The survey findings revealed that four types of culture between both groups had significant differences, namely clan and market, hierarchy and adhocracy respectively. Thus, eight provinces in each group, low and high groups, were compared by the mean score within their group based on the four culture types as stated earlier. The four provinces were selected for interviews by stratified sampling, including two low and two high KPI scoring provinces (see Figure 16).




Figure 16 Sampling diagram for interview

Key: Grey boxes mean purposive sampling; White boxes mean stratified sampling.

Note: 1) Provincial level: PL and PH mean the low and high KPI scoring provinces selected based on the survey findings; 2) Agency level: There were three agencies per province, e.g. province PL1 included three agencies: PL1.1, PL1.2 and PL1.3; 3) Individual level: Each agency comprised at least one senior manager and one to two practitioners.

Agency level

In the four provinces selected for interviews, there were three agencies per province selected from the 10 agencies by stratified sampling. The mean scores of the 10 agencies were compared based on the statistically significant differences of the four types of culture within their province. For example, province PH2 revealed statistical significance on market, hierarchy, adhocracy and clan cultures respectively. Then the mean scores of the 10 agencies in province PH2 were compared, based on the order of four types of culture as stated earlier. Only the agencies that had three completed questionnaires from one senior manager and two practitioners were selected as the interview samples. The Provincial Governor's Office was required to be selected as one of the three agencies in the selected province.

Table 8 Summary of provinces, agencies and participants for the interviews

Code of Interview	Code of Agencies	Agencies	Senior Managers	Practitioners	Total
PL1	PL1.1	1. Provincial Governor's Office	1	1-2	3
	PL1.2	2. Provincial Livestock Office	1	1-2	3
	PL1.3	3. Provincial Public Health Office	1	1-2	3
PL2	PL2.1	1. Provincial Governor's Office	1	1-2	3
	PL2.2	2. Provincial Community Development Office	1	1-2	3
	PL2.3	3. Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation	1	1-2	3
PH1	PH1.1	1. Provincial Governor's Office	1	1-2	3
	PH1.2	2. Provincial Administration Office	1	1-2	3
	PH1.3	3. Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation	1	1-2	3
PH2	PH2.1	1. Provincial Governor's Office	1	1-2	3
	PH2.2	2. Provincial Livestock Office	1	1-2	3
	PH2.3	3. Provincial Employment Service Office	1	1-2	3
Total no.			12	12-24	36

In conclusion, three agencies per province were selected by stratified sampling to be representatives of the 10 agencies in their provinces. The total number of agencies were 12. The list of agencies in each province is shown in Table 8.

Individual level

Two types of officials were selected for the interviews by stratified sampling, including at least one senior manager and one to two practitioners. The selection of senior managers and practitioners was considered based on the criteria as stated earlier. The proportion of senior manager and practitioners per agency was one and one to two respectively. Thus, the total number of proposed participants was 36 in the four provinces (see Table 8). In-depth and focus group interviews were carried out with senior managers and practitioners respectively.

In summary, sampling for the interviews combined three techniques, multi-stage, stratified and purposive sampling together, the same as the sampling for the survey questionnaire. Sampling for the interviews was based on the survey findings and required representatives from the low and high KPI scoring provinces, thus this stage was viewed as purposive sampling. However, stratified sampling was used at the level of province, agency and individual. The total number of provinces selected for the interviews was four provinces, including two low and two high KPI scoring provinces. In each province, three agencies were selected, one of them being the Provincial Governor's Office. The total number of agencies was 12, with one senior manager and one to two practitioners per each agency. Thus, the total number of proposed participants for the interviews was up to 36.

4.5 Research approach

According to the discussions of research design and methodology in section 4.3 and 4.4 respectively, the overall research approach was summarized as shown in Figure 17.

There are six steps as follows:




Figure 17 Summary of the overall research design and methodology
Source: Author's construct

Step 1 Development of research approach: This phase focuses on the literature on research design and methodology. The literature suggests that case study and comparative designs are relatively associated with this kind of study, whilst mixed methods are closest for answering the research questions.

Step 2 Self-completion questionnaire survey: In the 16 provinces that were selected from a total number of 75 provinces in four regions, data was collected from senior managers and practitioners by post. The provinces included eight low and eight high KPI scoring provinces.

Step 3 Survey data analysis: The data collected from the questionnaire surveys was analyzed in Excel and SPSS (Version 21). The data was compared and contrasted between the low and high KPI scoring provinces based on the organizational culture profile. The survey findings were used to consider which provinces should be selected for the interview samples as discussed in section 4.4.2.

Step 4 Semi-structured interviews based on survey findings: The semi-structured interviews were carried out with the four provinces selected based on the survey findings. In-depth and focus group interviews were conducted with senior managers and practitioners respectively.

Step 5 Interview data analysis: The interview data was compared and contrasted between low and high KPI scoring provinces, such as between senior managers and practitioners, between senior managers in both groups, and between practitioners in both groups.

Step 6 Overall conclusion: Triangulation and complementarity were used. The findings obtained from the surveys and interviews were compared and contrasted with the theory

and literature to summarize convergence, divergence and clarification of the overall results.

4.6 Data collection

This study was carried out by collecting data from both primary and secondary sources as demonstrated in Table 9.

Table 9 Types of data used in the study

	Primary sources	Secondary sources
Quantitative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Self-completion questionnaire surveys by post 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance evaluation scores of provincial administration between 2007 and 2011
Qualitative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with civil servants, including senior managers and practitioners at sites 	-

Performance evaluation scores of provincial administration between 2007 and 2011, sourced from the OPDC, were the secondary quantitative data sources that were used as a prior step to sampling for the questionnaire surveys. The main sources of this study were primary quantitative and qualitative data that were collected in the field, at the provincial level of Thailand. The primary quantitative data source was collected from questionnaire surveys by post, whilst the primary qualitative data source was collected with senior managers and practitioners by semi-structured interviews at sites.

Getting access to data collection

I am a staff member of the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), a central government agency. I have been responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of performance in the provincial administration for five years. Therefore, the OPDC connection and my personal connections through my coordinating work helped me to get access to the provinces selected for the study. Moreover, I have colleagues, including the OPDC staff who are appointed to take responsibility for the provincial administration, who enabled the data collection in terms of providing relevant information (e.g. contact details of the provinces' coordinators) and suggestions (e.g. how to approach the provinces).

Getting access to questionnaire surveys

Quantitative data was created by using self-completion questionnaire surveys (see questionnaire in Appendix 8:8.1). The surveys were carried out in three main steps as shown in Figure 18. *The first step* was selecting 16 provinces as stated earlier in section 4.4.2. *The second step* was informal contact with two groups: the OPDC staff and the provincial coordinators. Brief information on the research was provided to the OPDC staff face to face because the staff were responsible for the selected provinces. They gave me contact details of provincial coordinators and suggestions about the provinces. Then, provincial coordinators were contacted by phone to explain about the research before the formal contact was processed.




Figure 18 Process of getting access to the surveys

The final step was formal contact. The official letters with 10 sets of questionnaires were sent by post to the selected provinces. The provinces' Governors were asked to agree, and if they did then the Governors would appoint the Provincial Governor's Office to distribute the 10 sets of questionnaires to the 10 agencies on the list attached. Attached to each set of questionnaires was an envelope with stamp to help the agency send the completed questionnaires back to me. In an agency, one senior manager and two practitioners were asked to answer questionnaires and the total number of questionnaires per agency was three. The proposed number of questionnaires per province was 30. It is important to note that all questionnaires were coded before distribution in order to facilitate data analysis.

Getting access to semi-structured interviews

Qualitative data was generated by using semi-structured interviews (see guideline of interviews in Appendix 8:8.2). The procedure of getting access to interviews was conducted at the same time as the surveys in terms of issuing the official letter for the Governors to agree to me interviewing some provinces among the survey provinces. Getting access to respondents for interviews was therefore conducted in three main steps as shown in Figure 19.




Figure 19 Process of getting access to the interviews

The first step was informal contact with the selected provinces acquired from the survey findings. I contacted the provincial coordinators, the Provincial Governor's Office, who were the main agency contacting the other two agencies in their province regarding the interviews. At the same time, the list of interview questions was sent to the provinces. The informal contact was very important for obtaining appointments for the interviews with the three agencies in a province.

The second step was making appointments with the provinces, and they were contacted through the provincial coordinators from the Provincial Governor's Office. The date and the venue for the interviews were discussed with the province in order to obtain a time schedule for the interviews of the three agencies.

The final step was to visit the site for the interviews, and in-depth interviews were conducted with senior managers in each agency, one by one. Meanwhile, focus group interviews were conducted once per province with practitioners, ranging from three to six persons, who were representatives from each agency and were responsible for KPI(s) with at least one year's experience. The duration for visiting each province was around one to two days.

4.7 Data analysis and Interpretation

The analysis of the data was undertaken based on the research approach, namely quantitative and qualitative research.

4.7.1 Quantitative data analysis

Quantitative data was analyzed with SPSS because it allows researchers to generate descriptive statistics (e.g. percentages and frequencies) and to test for significant differences (May, 2010; De Vaus, 2002). The quantitative data acquired from the questionnaire surveys in this study was not only analyzed with SPSS (Version 21), but also the organizational culture profiles of the OCAI and Excel. These instruments were used together to increase the validity of the analysis. There are three main steps to the analysis. They are as follows:

Step 1: This step was to prepare the data for analysis. The 374 complete questionnaires were classified for data analysis, in which incomplete questionnaires – questionnaires with more than 20% (38) questions not answered – were eliminated (8.13%). The selected questionnaires were analyzed by compiling data in the worksheet of Excel for scoring the OCAI (see Appendix 5:5.2). The A, B, C, and D scores in each question was entered into the excel file in the ‘Now’ and ‘Preferred’ columns.

Step 2: This step was to analyze the data from step 1, which was divided into two types: organizational culture profiles and SPSS analysis. Firstly, the average scores in step 1 were constructed for an organizational culture profile (see Figure 3 in Chapter Two) (Cameron and Quinn, 2011) as per the following stages:

- 1) The ‘Now’ column was used as a prior step. The average scores for each alternative (A, B, C, and D) were plotted on the organizational culture profile in which each quadrant within the profile shows four culture types: clan, adhocracy, hierarchy, and market cultures.
- 2) The points in each quadrant were connected to form a four-sided figure in a kite-like shape. This profile creates a current picture of your organizational culture.
- 3) The ‘Preferred’ column was plotted on the same form. The points used a dot line for comparison between preferred and current cultures.

Excel was used to calculate the score and plot the graph of the organizational culture profiles. Secondly, the data was analyzed with SPSS, and the analyses included descriptive statistics, Independent-Sample *t*-Test, and One-way ANOVA. The analyses were chosen by considering the purpose of the analyses.

Step 3: This step was to analyze the last section of the questionnaire, the assessment of job satisfaction, which was separated from the previous steps. The quantitative data obtained from this section was analyzed with SPSS, and in particular, generating descriptive statistics and Independent-Sample *t*-Test.

4.7.2 Qualitative data analysis

Analysis of qualitative data generally begins with coding. Coding is an analytical process of organizing raw data, creating and assigning categories to selected relevant data (Dey, 1993; Neuman, 2013). There are several forms of coding, including with themes, topics, concepts and meanings, and they help researchers to focus on the essential issues of the research (Burns, 2000; Creswell and Clark, 2007). Boyatzis (1998) suggested that there are three main ways to develop themes and codes, including theory-driven, prior data or prior research driven, and inductive or data-driven. Burns (2000) also suggested that huge amounts of qualitative data, such as interview transcripts and field notes, have to be managed and organized, and software can provide advantages. In the current study, the interview data was analyzed by coding based on using theory-driven and inductive or data-driven approaches, and NVivo (version 10) was used to this end. NVivo is a software package, which is a tool to help the researcher with recording, linking ideas in several dimensions, and searching for the patterns in the data. It also helps with generating ideas and with creating and exploring documents and nodes where the data is coded, browsed, and linked in order to eliminate rigid divisions between data and interpretation (Richards, 1999).

The analysis of the interview data in this study was divided into three main steps: transcription, coding by using a theory-driven approach and coding by using a data-driven approach (see Appendix 8: 8.3). These steps are explained below:

Step 1 Transcription: The recorded verbal communications were transcribed. The interviews were carried out in the Thai language because the interviewees were Thais. Thus, the transcription was conducted in the Thai language and analyzed with NVivo. It is important to note that the summary of the interview data was sent to the interviewees for confirmation of validity before the coding of the qualitative data proceeded.

Step 2 Coding using a theory-driven approach: Coding was based on the following eight key themes of organizational culture: dominant characteristics of the organization, leadership style, management of employees, organizational cohesion, organizational strategic emphasis, organizational success criteria, organizational motivation, job satisfaction and others.

Step 3 Coding using a data-driven approach: This step involves scanning the entire raw data or field-notes to create categories and subcategories called ‘open coding’ (Strauss, 1987). The categories can be guided by the research questions (Neuman, 2013) or found in the initial or emerging research questions, which may have to be redefined and reformulated at the final stage of the qualitative data analysis (Dey, 1993). In this study, creating categories, thus, was undertaken based on the actual interview data focused on the interview questions within each theme. The additional codes or new ideas for the categories emerged from the participants’ perspectives on implementing PA for

delivering good governance. Axial coding is used in this step, which is when the researcher codes more intensively around a single category (Strauss, 1987).

4.8 Research ethics

Ethical considerations matter in the conduct of social research and are focused on the protection of the participants and the integrity of the inquiry (May, 2010). Therefore, this research is concerned with ethical issues throughout the process. This section discusses the ethical issues of the research based on pragmatic issues.

Approval for ethical review

Ethical clearance was approved by the Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee before this research was carried out in the field. This ensured that the research design, methodology and instruments used in the research, such as questionnaires, interview guides and consent forms were reviewed in accordance with the ethical review procedure of the University of Birmingham.

Being a civil servant of the central agency

I am a staff member of the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), which is the main central government agency responsible for the PA scheme. I used the OPDC connection to get access to the provinces selected. This may be a sensitive issue for some officials, for example they might feel under pressure from leaders (e.g. the Provincial Governor and chief of agencies) to take part in the process of collecting data. I explained participants that the provided information would be presented in the overall picture and their personal information were anonymous, which might increase their

willingness to be interviewed. At the provincial level, permission to undertake the research is sought from the Provincial Governor and then cascaded to chief of agencies within a province, following the official procedure of bureaucracy. This permission will provide authorisation to undertake research in the province but will not come with any guarantees or pressure for officials in provincial agencies to participate in the research. Sending and collecting questionnaires by post, where the envelope and stamp were provided for the participants to send their questionnaires back to me, is not only to preserve the anonymity of the respondents, but also to reduce the perceived risk of pressure on the respondents from their leaders. The targeted participants in the agencies in each province are independent and have the right to make a decision on whether to participate even though their leaders have agreed that the research can take place in the province.

Informed consent of research participants

The rationale, purpose and methods of the research were informed to all participants. The official letters were issued by the OPDC and sent to the Provincial Governor for agreement to access data sources by questionnaire surveys and interviews. The letter would be cascaded to related agencies and individuals. Questionnaire surveys were one-page for research information (in Thai language). Respondents had the right to decide whether to participate or not in the surveys because the questionnaires were sent by post. Regarding interviews, all the participants were also provided with a consent form (see Appendix 9). A summary of the interview findings (in Thai language) was sent to the participants by electronic mail (email) to ensure the validity of the data that they provided. If the participants needed to give any feedback for more accuracy and

balance of the research findings, they would be able to do that by sending their feedback to the researcher within two weeks from the date the email was sent by the researcher. Then, the approved interview data was analyzed.

Confidentiality and anonymity

The issues of confidentiality and anonymity were relevant to this research. Thus, the identities of all provinces, organizations and participants were protected. Questionnaire surveys were coded by using numbers and variable codes such as N1 and N2, and only the researcher and my supervisors know about the code. Regarding the interviews, the participants were informed that note taking and audio recordings were used during interviews. However, note taking and recordings did not identify the contributors by name. The interviews used numbers and variable codes in the same way as the questionnaires. Using numbers and variable codes for the questionnaires and the interviews was not only to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of all the data provided by the participants, but was also useful for the process of data analysis. Moreover, all the participants were clearly informed about the publishing of the research findings through the consent form and no outputs included any list of provinces agencies and participants' names.

4.9 Summary

The objectives of this study are to investigate the relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the provincial administration of Thailand. This was explored through civil servants' perspectives on implementing the PA scheme. To achieve these objectives, a combination of case study and comparative designs were used. Mixed methods, quantitative and qualitative methods, were employed in order to use self-completion questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews (in-depth and focus group interviews).

Using mixed methods for this study involved multi-techniques of sampling in both surveys and interviews, namely multi-stage, stratified and purposive samplings. The surveys were carried out with the 16 provinces selected from 75 provinces, and they include 10 provincial agencies with 30 participants per province. The total number of proposed participants for the surveys was 480. Meanwhile, the interviews were carried out with four provinces selected from the survey findings, and comprised three agencies with around nine participants per province. The total number of proposed participants of the interviews was 36. In terms of data analysis and interpretation, the survey data was analyzed by using three instruments: organizational culture profiles, Excel, and SPSS. The interview data was analyzed using NVivo.

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH FINDINGS: QUANTITATIVE DATA

5.1 Introduction

This chapter reports the empirical findings from the analysis of the quantitative data acquired from the questionnaire surveys based on the 16 provinces. The questionnaire surveys were analyzed through the organizational culture profile of the OCAI and using Excel and SPSS (Version 21). The purpose of the analysis was to examine the relationship between organizational culture and good governance, as defined in the Thai civil service performance agreement (PA).

The chapter is structured into four main sections. Section 5.2 reports the respondents' responses to the questionnaire surveys. Section 5.3 focuses on the overall organizational culture profile of the provincial cases. Section 5.4 provides a comparison of the organizational culture profiles between the low and high KPI scoring provinces. A description of job satisfaction based on the provincial cases is presented in Section 5.5. The final section (5.6) is the conclusion of the chapter.

It is important to note that the questionnaire survey findings as presented here have been translated from Thai to English – the translation procedures were based on literature on the OCAI (translated in Thai)²⁴ and professional translation in both Thai and English.

²⁴ There are some PhD theses that used the OCAI by translation from English to Thai such as Jingjit (2008) and Tachateerapreda (2009).

That coding was used to ensure anonymity. The coding information of the surveys is shown in Appendix 10: 10.1.

5.2 Respondents to the questionnaire survey

The questionnaire survey was conducted with a good response rate of 72.29 % –347 officials from the proposed respondents of 480 (100%) took part in the survey. From the 347 completed questionnaires²⁵, 308 (88.76%) were analysed. General information about the respondents was categorized by sex, age, position, organization, experience of KPI host, position on KPI host and consent for interview (if needed) and is presented in Table 10.

Respondents were evenly divided by gender, with men and women both around 50%. The majority of the respondents were over 30 years old – almost 50% were aged 51 or over. In terms of their position level, over 50% of the respondents were at a professional level²⁶. A small proportion (3.06%) came from low level ‘employees’ positions. Regarding the provincial agencies, six agencies out of ten responded with over 10% (10.71% - 11.36%), while the other four agencies’ percentages varied between 6.82% and 9.42%.

²⁵ Only fully completed questionnaires were considered for quantitative analysis. Those with unanswered sections were excluded as were those where multiple questionnaires appeared to have been filled in by the same hand.

²⁶ Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) classifies position of officials into four main categories: executive, managerial, knowledge worker, and general. Knowledge worker positions include practitioner, professional, senior professional, expert, and advisory level (www.ocsc.go.th). Moreover, position of government employees (e.g. government permanent employees) are under the responsibility of the OCSC.

Table 10 Total number and percentage of respondents in the questionnaire surveys

General information		Total	Percent (%)
Sex	Female	151	49.83
	Male	152	50.17
	Total	303*	100.00
Age	30 or under	15	4.93
	31-40	65	21.38
	41-50	93	30.59
	51 or over	131	43.09
	Total	304*	100.00
Position	Chief of the...(office, group, subdivision)...	52	17.69
	Senior Professional Level	34	11.56
	Professional Level	170	57.82
	Practitioner Level	29	9.86
	Others (e.g. employee)	9	3.06
	Total	294*	100.00
Organization	Provincial Governor's Office	29	9.42
	Provincial Administration Office	21	6.82
	Provincial Agricultural Extension Office	34	11.04
	Provincial Livestock Office	34	11.04
	Provincial Community Development Office	34	11.04
	Provincial Natural Resources and Environment Office	33	10.71
	Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation	34	11.04
	Provincial Office of Comptroller General	35	11.36
	Provincial Employment Service Office	26	8.44
	Provincial Public Health Office	28	9.09
	Total	308*	100.00
Experience of KPIs host	1-5 years	259	93.50
	6-10 years	18	6.50
	Total	277*	100.00
Position on KPIs host	Senior manager	68	23.37
	Practitioner	223	76.63
	Total	291*	100.00
Consent for interview (If needed)	Permit	124	48.06
	No permit	134	51.94
	Total	258*	100.00

Note: * These totals do not include those that did not reply to the question.

These agencies were viewed as the most significant provincial-level agencies in that they had been KPI ‘hosts’ in the PA scheme for at least five years. Thus, not only could their officials provide details of PA, but they could also reflect on the overall picture of the province’s organizational culture in implementing PA. The majority of respondents in these agencies – 93.5% – defined themselves as the KPI host with experience of between 1-5 years.

5.3 Overall organizational culture profile of the provincial cases

The characteristics of overall organizational culture in the provincial cases were analysed by using an organizational culture profile of the OCAI (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). The four culture types, clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy were presented in terms of the perceived ‘now’ and ‘preferred’ organizational culture profiles.

5.3.1 Overall organizational culture profile of 16 provinces

The analysis of the quantitative data revealed that, in the current cultures of 16 provinces, the current overall organizational culture profile has a strong tendency towards the hierarchy and market cultures, with a slightly lower score for the clan culture and a significantly lower score for the adhocracy culture, as shown in Figures 20 and 21.




Figure 20 Overall organizational culture profile of the 16 provinces




Figure 21 Comparison of the now and preferred culture mean score of the 16 provinces

Table 11 Comparison of mean scores between the now and preferred organizational culture in 16 provinces

Cultures	Now	Preferred	Different mean scores
Clan	3.59	4.48	0.89
Adhocracy	3.45	4.41	0.96
Market	3.64	4.49	0.85
Hierarchy	3.64	4.46	0.82

Table 11 shows that the hierarchy culture has the lowest different mean score between the now and preferred cultures, while the adhocracy culture has the highest different mean score between the now and preferred cultures, suggesting that the officials would prefer greater flexibility and a more external focus. The organizational culture profiles of the 16 provinces can be seen in Appendix 11.

Table 12 Mean scores of now and preferred cultural types in the 16 provinces

No.	Province (Coded)	No. of questionnaire	Now				Preferred			
			Clan	Adhc.	Market	Hier.	Clan	Adhc.	Market	Hier.
1.	N1	14	3.74	3.59	3.81	3.74	4.60	4.52	4.60	4.59
2.	N2	23	3.35	3.31	3.48	3.40	4.61	4.48	4.58	4.55
3.	N3	15	3.84	3.65	3.93	4.01	4.53	4.40	4.52	4.50
4.	N4	20	3.50	3.51	3.60	3.65	4.45	4.39	4.41	4.44
5.	C1	21	3.56	3.40	3.63	3.67	4.24	4.25	4.31	4.19
6.	C2	22	3.42	3.18	3.36	3.45	4.24	4.20	4.31	4.27
7.	C3	13	3.79	3.57	3.78	3.76	4.34	4.20	4.31	4.23
8.	C4	26	3.66	3.48	3.76	3.74	4.66	4.58	4.60	4.62
9.	NE1	19	3.47	3.33	3.47	3.57	4.45	4.41	4.40	4.48
10.	NE2	22	3.65	3.47	3.70	3.78	4.60	4.55	4.68	4.62
11.	NE3	23	4.02	3.83	4.02	3.98	4.69	4.60	4.70	4.68
12.	NE4	11	3.55	3.47	3.62	3.56	4.56	4.44	4.49	4.49
13.	S1	19	3.41	3.29	3.43	3.35	4.44	4.40	4.39	4.40
14.	S2	20	3.35	3.34	3.46	3.42	4.41	4.35	4.44	4.42
15.	S3	24	3.69	3.50	3.72	3.75	4.42	4.40	4.46	4.43
16.	S4	16	3.52	3.46	3.61	3.47	4.43	4.31	4.46	4.38
Total		308	3.59	3.45	3.64	3.64	4.48	4.41	4.49	4.46

Note: 1) The 16 provinces were coded (see chapter four for coding explanation).

2) Adhc. means adhocracy and Hier. means hierarchy

Table 12 shows the mean scores of now and preferred organizational culture in the 16 provinces. The provinces of N3 and NE3 present the highest mean score, whilst the lowest scores are those of provinces N2, C2, NE1, S1, and S2. It is important to note that C2 did not receive the questionnaire responses from the Provincial Governor's Office and S2 is a particular province that is located in a special area marked by insurgency. Therefore, these may be seen as exceptional compared to other provinces and they might also have presented problems in terms of getting access to targeted respondents. Consequently, the provinces N2 and NE1 were selected to represent the low KPI scoring provinces, whilst N3 and NE3 were selected to represent the high KPI scoring provinces for the interviews.

Table 13 Statistical significance of organizational cultures in 16 provinces

	Culture types	F	Sig.
Now	Clan	2.019*	0.014
	Adhocracy	1.388	0.152
	Market	1.852*	0.028
	Hierarchy	2.086*	0.011
Preferred	Clan	1.298	0.202
	Adhocracy	0.927	0.534
	Market	1.038	0.416
	Hierarchy	1.358	0.167

Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at $p < 0.05$ ²⁷

Table 13 demonstrates an F ratio²⁸ and statistical significance (sig.) differences of four types of culture between 16 provinces. The four culture types of the 16 provinces were analyzed with SPSS by using One-way ANOVA - comparing the mean scores of more than two groups (the 16 provinces). For example, the mean scores of the clan culture of all 16 provinces were compared; the F ratio represents the variance between the provinces. The data revealed that, in the existing culture, three culture types had significant differences, including hierarchy (Sig.= 0.011), clan (Sig.= 0.014), and market (Sig.= 0.028) respectively. In contrast the adhocracy culture did not show significant differences (Sig.= 0.152). This result reflects that the provinces perform PA in different working environments such as the flexible or control system (hierarchy), receiving or non-receiving cooperation (clan), and pursuit or surrender of goal (market).

²⁷ $p < 0.05$ refers to a risk level (called the alpha level) at 0.05, which means that five times out of every 100 you would find a statistically significant difference even if there was none (Robert et al., 2002, p. 118).

²⁸ F ratio presents the variance between the groups divided by the variance within the groups (Pallant, 2010, p. 249).

The significant difference of the hierarchy culture between 16 provinces implies that there are different degrees of flexibility in implementing PA among the provinces. The significant difference of the clan culture reflects that there are perhaps differences in some aspects such as cooperation, participation, teamwork, interpersonal relationships, and horizontal communication.

Regarding the significant differences of the market culture, it seems to be the case that the provinces have different characteristics, for example competition, orientation of tasks and goal achievement, and emphasis on reward based accomplishment. Meanwhile, the adhocracy culture does not vary across provinces, which reflects the degree to which the provinces tend to focus on internal orientation rather than external orientation. This may derive from the influence of the hierarchy culture that tends to create a structured environment, such as detailed instructions and close supervision. Consequently, the subordinates are likely to have working limitations such as on making their own decisions and generating their ideas, including having no resistance for change. In terms of the preferred organizational culture, it was found that all four culture types were not statistically significant, namely hierarchy (Sig.= 0.167), clan (Sig.= 0.202), market (Sig.= 0.416), and adhocracy (Sig.= 0.534).

5.3.2 Organizational culture profile of senior managers and practitioners

The overall organizational culture profiles, the current and preferred cultures, of the senior managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces are shown in Figures 22 and 23. The senior managers and practitioners tend to perform based on control focus in both orientations, namely internal focus (hierarchy culture) and external focus (market culture). This implies

that the officials have slightly shifted their culture from the hierarchy culture to the market culture, although the hierarchy culture is still embedded in the public sector. In other words, the market culture can be created in the context of PA.




Figure 22 Overall organizational culture profile of the *senior managers* in the 16 provinces




Figure 23 Overall organizational culture profile of the *practitioners* in the 16 provinces

Table 14 shows the different organizational culture between the senior managers and practitioners in the now and preferred cultures. The four culture types of both senior managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces were analyzed with SPSS by using Independent-Samples *t*-Test - comparing the mean scores between two different groups (senior managers and practitioners). For example, the mean scores of the clan culture of the senior managers and of the practitioners in the 16 provinces were compared; the *t*-value represents the variance between the senior managers and practitioners. The mean scores of the now and preferred cultures of the senior managers were higher than for the practitioners in all four types of culture. The hierarchy culture is the most different in the now culture. This implies that the senior managers emphasised a control focus such as policy, regulation, and monitoring the progress of tasks, to a greater extent than did the

practitioners. Regarding the statistically significant differences of the existing and preferred cultures between the senior managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces, the data revealed that only the hierarchy culture had a significant difference (Sig.= 0.028), while the other culture types – market (Sig.= 0.071), adhocracy (Sig.= 0.108), and clan (Sig.= 0.126) – were not significant.

Table 14 Comparison organizational culture between *the senior managers and practitioners in 16 provinces*

	Cultures	Senior managers	Practitioners	Different mean scores	t	Sig. (2-tailed)
Now	Clan	3.68	3.55	0.13	1.534	0.126
	Adhocracy	3.55	3.41	0.14	1.611	0.108
	Market	3.76	3.60	0.16	1.611	0.071
	Hierarchy	3.78	3.59	0.19	2.203*	0.028
Preferred	Clan	4.62	4.44	0.18	2.297*	0.022
	Adhocracy	4.54	4.36	0.18	2.729*	0.007
	Market	4.61	4.44	0.17	2.834*	0.005
	Hierarchy	4.59	4.42	0.17	2.778*	0.006

Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at $p < 0.05$

The officials in higher positions (senior managers) – mostly older people – tend to support a more bureaucratic culture than other officials (practitioners) – younger people (see section 5.3.3 where this is discussed in detail). In the preferred cultures, it was revealed that all four culture types were significantly different – adhocracy (Sig.= 0.007), hierarchy (Sig.= 0.006), market (Sig.= 0.005), and clan (Sig.= 0.022) respectively. It is possible that there are different desires for change in the working environment, such as practitioners may prefer more flexibility while senior managers may require monitoring of progress.

The comparison of organizational culture profiles between the senior managers and practitioners revealed that the mean scores of four culture types of the senior managers were higher than those of the practitioners in both the current and preferred cultures. Figures 24 and 25 reveal that, in the current culture, the hierarchy culture had the biggest difference between the senior managers and practitioners. This implies that the senior managers were more likely to focus on control systems involving giving commands and requiring monitoring of progress; in contrast the practitioners were more likely to focus on greater flexibility.




Figure 24 Comparison of the *current* culture profiles of the *senior managers and practitioners* in the *16 provinces*




Figure 25 Comparison of the *current* culture mean scores of the *senior managers and practitioners* in the *16 provinces*




Figure 26 Comparison of the *preferred* culture profiles of the *senior managers and practitioners* in the *16 provinces*




Figure 27 Comparison of the *preferred* mean scores of the *senior managers and practitioners* in the *16 provinces*

In the preferred culture, the clan and market cultures are not greatly different between both groups as shown in Figures 26 and 27. Furthermore, the adhocracy culture, in the preferred culture, showed the highest difference between both groups (see Figures 26 and 27), which is consistent with the statistical significant differences in Table 14.

5.3.3 Organizational culture profiles by sex, age and organizations

This section reports the organizational culture profiles by comparison of sex, age and organizations. As a consequence, the section is divided into three topics. The detail of sex, age and organizations are demonstrated earlier in Table 10.

Comparison of organizational culture profiles by sex

The comparison of the organizational culture profiles revealed that males have higher mean scores than females in four culture types in both the current and preferred cultures, as shown in Figures 28 and 29. In particular, the hierarchy culture, in the current culture, was the only culture type that has significant differences between male and female (Sig.= 0.0382) as demonstrated in Table 15. This implies that male officials tend to focus on control orientation (e.g. policy, regulation, seniority and command) more so than female officials. Here we should note that the senior managers tended to be older men, who might be expected to adhere to a bureaucratic culture. Regarding the preferred culture, it was found that the clan and market cultures had the highest mean scores in both the male and female groups (see Figure 29).




Figure 28 Comparison of the *current* culture profile between the *sexes* in the *16 provinces*




Figure 29 Comparison of the *preferred* culture profile between the *sexes* in the *16 provinces*

Table 15 Comparison of mean scores and statistical significance of organizational culture by *sex* in 16 provinces

	Culture	Mean scores by sex		t	Sig. (2-tailed)
		Female	Male		
Now	Clan	3.55	3.63	-1.1164	0.2652
	Adhocracy	3.42	3.50	-1.1521	0.2502
	Market	3.60	3.69	-1.2596	0.2088
	Hierarchy	3.58	3.72	-2.0822*	0.0382
Preferred	Clan	4.46	4.52	-0.9067	0.3654
	Adhocracy	4.39	4.45	-1.0163	0.3103
	Market	4.46	4.52	-1.0652	0.2878
	Hierarchy	4.43	4.51	-1.3245	0.1865

Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at $p < 0.05$

Comparison of organizational culture profiles by age

The comparison of the organizational culture profiles by age found that all four culture types, in the current culture, were significantly different by age, namely adhocracy (Sig.= 0.0048), hierarchy (Sig.= 0.0040), market (Sig.= 0.0105) and clan (Sig.= 0.0130)

respectively (see Table 16). On the contrary, the four culture types in the preferred culture were not significantly different between the ages.

Table 16 Comparison of mean scores and statistical significance of organizational culture by *age* in 16 provinces

	Culture	30 or under	31-40	41-50	51 or over	F	Sig.
Now	Clan	3.42	3.42	3.57	3.71	3.6526*	0.0130
	Adhocracy	3.31	3.27	3.42	3.58	4.3937*	0.0048
	Market	3.56	3.48	3.60	3.77	3.8096*	0.0105
	Hierarchy	3.45	3.46	3.63	3.77	4.5249*	0.0040
Preferred	Clan	4.46	4.42	4.48	4.53	0.5145	0.6726
	Adhocracy	4.36	4.35	4.39	4.47	0.7837	0.5038
	Market	4.45	4.43	4.49	4.52	0.4112	0.7451
	Hierarchy	4.44	4.40	4.46	4.50	0.6100	0.6090

Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at $p < 0.05$

Table 17 Comparison of organizational culture between the ages by Multiple Comparisons test

Culture	Age	30 or under	31-40	41-50	51 or over
Clan	30 or under	-	- 0.00513	- 0.15238	- 0.28870
	31-40	0.00513	-	- 0.14725	- 0.28357*
	41-50		0.14725	-	- 0.13631
	51 or over			0.13631	-
Adhocracy	30 or under			- 0.10814	- 0.26914
	31-40			- 0.15430	- 0.31529*
	41-50			-	-0.16100
	51 or over				-
Market	30 or under				- 0.21236
	31-40				- 0.29734*
	41-50				- 0.17672*
	51 or over				-
Hierarchy	30 or under				- 0.32337
	31-40				- 0.31385*
	41-50				-0.14119
	51 or over				-

Note: (1) The results in Table 18 are based on the current culture analysed
(2) * refers to the pairwise test at $p = 0.05$

This reflects that the officials in the different age ranges tend to operate in different culture styles when implementing PA. This was emphasized by the SPSS analysis, multiple comparison test as shown in Table 17. It revealed that there were differences in all the culture types between officials in the older generation – age 51 years old or over – and the younger generation – between age of 31-40 years old. In particular, the market culture was different between the age of 51 or over and the two age ranges – 31-40 and 41-50.

Comparison of organizational culture profiles by organizations

The comparison of organizational culture at the organizational level revealed an interesting finding, which was that only the clan culture showed significant differences in the current culture as shown in Table 18. On the other hand, all four culture types in the preferred culture were significantly different, namely clan (Sig.= 0.0019), market (Sig.= 0.0047), adhocracy (Sig.= 0.0056) and hierarchy (Sig.= 0.005) respectively.

Table 18 Statistical significance of organizational culture between 10 *organizations* in 16 provinces

	Culture	F	Sig.
Now	Clan	1.960*	0.0437
	Adhocracy	1.776	0.0722
	Market	1.124	0.3456
	Hierarchy	1.018	0.4257
Preferred	Clan	3.001	0.0019
	Adhocracy	2.658	0.0056
	Market	2.715	0.0047
	Hierarchy	2.697	0.0050

Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at $p < 0.05$

In terms of the mean scores seen in Table 19, the differences of the clan culture between 10 provincial agencies reflect that factors such as commitment, participation, and teamwork are different in each organization. This may be a crucial element leading to different results of PA in each level of agency and the overall result of a province, as well as the attainment of delivering good governance.

Table 19 Comparison of mean scores of organizational culture by organizations in 16 provinces

Organizations	Now				Preferred			
	Clan	Adhc.	Market	Hier.	Clan	Adhc.	Market	Hier.
1. Provincial Governor's Office	3.52	3.40	3.65	3.67	4.59	4.51	4.63	4.55
2. Provincial Administration Office	3.38	3.24	3.46	3.55	4.09	4.05	4.10	4.10
3. Provincial Agricultural Extension Office	3.62	3.39	3.65	3.72	4.55	4.39	4.56	4.55
4. Provincial Livestock Office	3.61	3.45	3.70	3.65	4.26	4.16	4.29	4.27
5. Provincial Community Development Office	3.85	3.68	3.78	3.78	4.68	4.60	4.63	4.60
6. Provincial Natural Resources and Environment Office	3.50	3.37	3.51	3.57	4.47	4.43	4.47	4.48
7. Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation	3.61	3.58	3.75	3.74	4.55	4.56	4.60	4.63
8. Provincial Office of Comptroller General	3.63	3.44	3.64	3.66	4.62	4.50	4.60	4.56
9. Provincial Employment Service Office	3.75	3.65	3.78	3.64	4.41	4.38	4.37	4.35
10. Provincial Public Health Office	3.32	3.26	3.45	3.38	4.46	4.41	4.46	4.36

Note: Adhc. means adhocracy and Hier. means hierarchy

5.4 Comparison of organizational culture profiles between the low and high KPI scoring provinces

5.4.1 Comparison of organizational culture profiles between the low and high KPI scoring provinces

The comparison of the organizational culture profiles between the low and high KPI scoring provinces revealed that the mean scores of four culture types of the high KPI scoring provinces were all higher than those the low KPI scoring provinces, as shown in Figures 30 and 31.




Figure 30 Comparison of the *current* culture profiles between the *low and high* KPI scoring provinces




Figure 31 Comparison of the *preferred* culture profiles between the *low and high* KPI scoring provinces

Figure 30 demonstrates that the market and clan cultures had the most different mean scores of the current culture between the low and high KPI scoring provinces. This can also be seen in Table 20. Meanwhile, in the preferred culture, the clan culture has the lowest different mean scores between both provincial groups (see Figure 31). This implies that the market and clan cultures are the most significant factors for achievement in PA recognized by the officials. This finding was emphasized by the SPSS analysis

that four culture types, in the current culture, had statistically significant differences, particularly the clan and market cultures as shown in Table 21.

Table 20 Comparison of *mean scores* of organizational cultures between the *low and high* KPI scoring provinces

	Culture types	Low scoring provinces	High scoring provinces	Different mean scores
Now	Clan	3.48	3.71	0.23
	Adhocracy	3.35	3.56	0.21
	Market	3.53	3.77	0.24
	Hierarchy	3.54	3.75	0.21
Preferred	Clan	4.45	4.52	0.07
	Adhocracy	4.39	4.44	0.05
	Market	4.46	4.51	0.05
	Hierarchy	4.43	4.49	0.06

Table 21 *Statistical significance* of organizational cultures between *the low and high* KPI scoring provinces

	Culture types	t	Sig. (2-tailed)
Now	Clan	-3.220*	0.001
	Adhocracy	-3.046*	0.003
	Market	-3.382*	0.001
	Hierarchy	-3.063*	0.002
Preferred	Clan	-1.243	0.215
	Adhocracy	-0.749	0.454
	Market	-0.818	0.414
	Hierarchy	-0.893	0.373

Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at $p < 0.05$

Table 21 demonstrates that all types of culture in the current culture were significantly different, namely market and clan (Sig.= 0.001), hierarchy (Sig.= 0.002) and adhocracy (Sig.= 0.003) respectively. This reflects that there are statistically significant differences of organizational culture between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, especially

the clan and market cultures. This suggests that performance rests on a combination of hard and soft factors. Market culture alone cannot deliver performance, it also needs elements of clan culture. Regarding preferred culture, the survey revealed that there were not significant differences between the low and high KPI scoring provinces. This suggests that it is not that there are differences in values between the high and low scoring provinces, but differences in their ability to put those values into practice, suggesting differences in management rather than in the underlying cultural profile.

5.4.2 Comparison of organizational culture profiles between senior managers in the low and high KPI scoring provinces

According to the comparison of the existing cultures between the senior managers in the low and high KPI scoring provinces, it was found that the high KPI scoring provinces had higher mean scores in all culture types than the low KPI scoring provinces. The hierarchy and market cultures had the highest mean scores, whilst the adhocracy culture had the lowest mean scores in both provincial groups as shown in Figures 32 and 33. This implies that the senior managers in both provincial groups implement their work in orientation of control focus, in which internal (hierarchy) and external (market) focuses are emphasized. In this respect, it reflects that the different degrees of the hierarchy and market cultures emphasized by the senior managers may contribute to different results of PA at the levels of agency and province. It is important to note that a high degree of hierarchy does not mean a negative impact on performance because it depends on how the senior managers use their authority, as this might either enable or inhibit performance.




Figure 32 Comparison between the *current* cultural profiles of the *senior managers* in the *low and high* KPI scoring provinces




Figure 33 Comparison of the *current* culture mean scores of the *senior managers* in the *low and high* KPI scoring provinces




Figure 34 Comparison between the *preferred* cultural profiles of the *senior managers* in the *low and high* KPI scoring provinces




Figure 35 Comparison of the *preferred* culture mean scores of the *senior managers* in the *low and high* KPI scoring provinces

The comparison of the preferred culture between the senior managers in both provincial groups, as shown in Figures 34 and 35 revealed that the clan and market cultures of the high KPI scoring provinces were higher than the hierarchy and adhocracy cultures, whilst their adhocracy and hierarchy cultures were lower than low KPI scoring provinces. This implies that the senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces

perhaps place more emphasis on the clan culture (e.g. commitment) and the market culture (e.g. pursuit of goals and competition) rather than in the low KPI scoring provinces.

In summary, it appears that an emphasis on the clan and market cultures by the senior managers is the key factor in achieving the high scores of performance evaluation or the PA scheme.

Table 22 *Statistical significance* of the current and preferred cultures of the *senior managers* between *the low and high KPI scoring provinces*

	Culture types	Low KPI scoring provinces	High KPI scoring provinces	t	Sig. (2-tailed)
Now	Clan	3.57	3.82	-1.692	0.095
	Adhocracy	3.45	3.67	-1.373	0.174
	Market	3.63	3.92	-2.072*	0.042
	Hierarchy	3.68	3.91	-1.709	0.092
Preferred	Clan	4.59	4.65	-0.578	0.565
	Adhocracy	4.55	4.53	0.181	0.857
	Market	4.59	4.64	-0.439	0.662
	Hierarchy	4.59	4.58	0.196	0.845

Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at $p < 0.05$

The SPSS analysis of organizational culture between the senior managers in both provincial groups revealed that only the market culture was significantly different (Sig.= 0.042) as shown in Table 22. In addition, Figures 34 and 35 emphasize that the market culture focused by the senior managers plays a significant role in the achievement of PA in the provinces. The perspectives of the practitioners in both provincial groups are discussed in the next section.

5.4.3 Comparison of organizational culture profiles between practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring groups

The comparison of the organizational culture profiles between the practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces found that all culture types of the high KPI scoring provinces were higher than in the low KPI scoring provinces. In the current culture, the hierarchy and market culture mean scores were higher than the other culture types (see Figures 36 and Figure 37). This is consistent with the senior managers' perspectives, discussed above.




Figure 36 Comparison of the *current* culture profiles of the practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces




Figure 37 Comparison of the *current* culture mean scores of the practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces




Figure 38 Comparison of the *preferred* culture profiles of the practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces




Figure 39 Comparison of the *preferred* culture mean scores of the practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces

Regarding the preferred culture, it was found that the organizational culture profiles of the practitioners in both provincial groups hardly differed from each other. They appear to perform their work with an internal and control system orientation (see Figure 38), in which the clan and market cultures had the highest mean scores (see Figure 39). The practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces appear to work based on the clan culture and the market culture. In particular, the clan culture shows the most different score (0.12) between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, whilst the market culture has not much different score (0.08).

Table 23 *Statistical significance* of the current and preferred cultures of the *practitioners* between the *low and high KPI scoring provinces*

	Culture types	Low scoring group	High scoring group	t	Sig. (2-tailed)
Now	Clan	3.43	3.68	-3.067*	0.002
	Adhocracy	3.29	3.54	-3.055*	0.003
	Market	3.48	3.73	-3.087*	0.002
	Hierarchy	3.48	3.72	-2.922*	0.004
Preferred	Clan	4.38	4.50	-1.558	0.121
	Adhocracy	4.31	4.42	-1.340	0.182
	Market	4.40	4.48	-1.089	0.277
	Hierarchy	4.36	4.47	-1.381	0.169

Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at $p < 0.05$

Table 23 shows that all four culture types in the current culture were significantly different between the practitioners in the two provincial groups, in which the clan and market culture were the same and had the highest values of Sig. 0.002. On the other hand, all four culture types in the preferred culture were not significantly different. This implies that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring group employ greater cooperation, participation, and team work (clan), as well as have a greater goal achievement and competition (market).

Comparison of organizational culture between the senior managers and practitioners in each provincial group

The comparison of organizational culture between the senior managers and practitioners in each provincial group, the low and high KPI scoring provinces (see Table 24), revealed that, in the current culture, there were not statistically significant differences between the senior managers in each group and the practitioners.

Table 24 *Statistical significance* of organizational cultures between *senior managers and practitioners in each provincial group* (the low and high KPI scoring groups)

	Culture types	Low scoring group		High scoring group	
		t	Sig. (2-tailed)	t	Sig. (2-tailed)
Now	Clan	1.163	0.247	1.190	0.236
	Adhocracy	1.298	0.196	1.137	0.257
	Market	1.154	0.250	1.707	0.090
	Hierarchy	1.595	0.113	1.737	0.085
Preferred	Clan	1.913	0.058	1.359	0.176
	Adhocracy	2.126*	0.035	0.988	0.325
	Market	1.785	0.076	1.424	0.157
	Hierarchy	2.109*	0.037	1.005	0.317

Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at $p < 0.05$

For the preferred culture, the four culture types of the high KPI scoring provinces were not significantly different. Contrary to this, there were two types of culture in the low KPI scoring provinces that were significantly different: the adhocracy (Sig.= 0.035) and hierarchy (Sig.= 0.037) cultures respectively. It is possible that the practitioners in the low KPI scoring provinces have different desires, for example a greater flexibility and more external focus. Meanwhile, the high KPI scoring provinces seem to present a unity of perspectives between senior managers and practitioners. In conclusion, both the senior managers and the practitioners in each provincial group tend to perform their

work in similar cultures to each other. In other words, the cultural differences between occupational groups within provinces are less significant than the differences between the organizational cultures of the different provinces.

5.5 Description of job satisfaction based on the provincial cases

The assessment of job satisfaction, the second part of the questionnaire survey, consists of 10 questions with a five-point Likert scale – ratings from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). This part reports overall job satisfaction and the comparison between the low and high KPI scoring provinces in terms of the senior managers and practitioners.

5.5.1 Overall job satisfaction in 16 provinces

From the SPSS analysis, it was found that the overall job satisfaction of the provincial cases was categorized at the level of ‘Agree’ – a mean score between 3.63 and 4.19 (see Table 25). This implies that the officials at the provincial administration level are relatively satisfied with their job in the context of PA and that they are able to express their views on issues affecting their work.

Table 25 Overall job satisfaction in 16 provinces

Questions	Mean	Level of satisfaction
1. You feel committed to the organization and its work, you are not just working for the money.	4.19	Agree
2. Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of working.	3.82	Agree
3. You get a feeling of accomplishment from the work you are doing.	3.98	Agree
4. The amount of responsibility given you is not excessive.	3.63	Agree
5. What you are doing well in the job receives recognition.	3.89	Agree
6. Your supervisor supports your career development.	3.89	Agree
7. You get the attention paid to suggestions you make from your supervisor.	3.94	Agree
8. You get on well with colleagues.	4.07	Agree
9. You have no concerns about the style of management.	3.73	Agree
10. The pursuit of organizational targets does not put you under excessive pressure.	3.82	Agree

Note: Level of job satisfaction

5	Strongly agree	4.21 - 5.00	2	Disagree	1.81 - 2.60
4	Agree	3.41 - 4.20	1	Strongly disagree	1.00 - 1.80
3	Neither agree nor disagree	2.61 - 3.40			

Comparing the job satisfaction between the senior managers and practitioners in 16 provinces, it was found that the mean scores acquired from the senior managers were higher than from the practitioners for all questions (see Table 26). There were two questions, however, that showed significant differences: question 2 (Sig.= 0.042) and question 9 (Sig.= 0.047). The scores for question 2 – ‘Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of working’ – reflects that the officials, especially the practitioners, tend to work in a structured or controlled environment, for example with low flexibility and limited creative possibilities. In other words, they are likely to work in a high hierarchy model/low adhocracy model. Meanwhile, the scores for question 9 – ‘You have no concerns about the style of management’ – implies that the officials,

particularly practitioners, tend to be concerned with leadership styles. The implication was that leadership styles may significantly influence officials' job satisfaction.

Table 26 Mean scores and statistical significance of *job satisfaction* between *the senior managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces*

Questions	Senior manager	Practitioner	t	Sig. (2-tailed)
1. You feel committed to the organization and its work, you are not just working for the money.	4.34	4.15	1.784	0.075
2. Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of working.	3.99	3.79	2.054*	0.042
3. You get a feeling of accomplishment from the work you are doing.	4.10	3.96	1.648	0.100
4. The amount of responsibility given you is not excessive.	3.72	3.62	0.841	0.401
5. What you are doing well in the job receives recognition.	4.00	3.86	1.386	0.167
6. Your supervisor supports your career development.	4.01	3.86	1.395	0.164
7. You get the attention paid to suggestions you make from your supervisor.	4.07	3.91	1.600	0.111
8. You get on well with colleagues.	4.09	4.07	0.176	0.860
9. You have no concerns about the style of management.	3.93	3.69	1.996*	0.047
10. The pursuit of organizational targets does not put you under excessive pressure.	3.94	3.81	1.107	0.269

Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at $p < 0.05$

5.5.2 Comparison of job satisfaction between the low and high KPI scoring provinces

In the comparison of job satisfaction between the low and high KPI scoring groups, it was found that questions 2, 6, and 10 were significantly different (see Table 27).

Question 2 – ‘Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of working’–

reflects that the high KPI scoring group seems to work with greater flexibility than the low KPI scoring group.

Table 27 Mean scores and statistical significance of *job satisfaction* between *low and high KPI scoring provinces*

Questions	Low scoring group	High scoring group	t	Sig. (2-tailed)
1. You feel committed to the organization and its work, you are not just working for the money.	4.17	4.21	-0.453	0.651
2. Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of working.	3.68	3.98	-3.515*	0.001
3. You get a feeling of accomplishment from the work you are doing.	3.93	4.05	-1.658	0.098
4. The amount of responsibility given you is not excessive.	3.54	3.73	-1.906	0.058
5. What you are doing well in the job receives recognition.	3.84	3.95	-1.378	0.169
6. Your supervisor supports your career development.	3.75	4.03	-3.095*	0.002
7. You get the attention paid to suggestions you make from your supervisor.	3.86	4.03	-1.961	0.051
8. You get on well with colleagues.	4.02	4.11	-1.278	0.202
9. You have no concerns about the style of management.	3.66	3.80	-1.524	0.129
10. The pursuit of organizational targets does not put you under excessive pressure.	3.69	3.96	-2.746*	0.006

Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at $p < 0.05$

Question 6 – ‘Your supervisor supports your career development’ – suggests that the leaders are important for promoting the officials’ positions and also allocating rewards, and that the high KPI scoring provinces tend to be satisfied in receiving promotion and rewards. On the other hand, the low KPI scoring provinces may not be satisfied in receiving incentive. Regarding question 10 – ‘The pursuit of organizational targets does

not put you under excessive pressure’ – it illustrates that the high KPI scoring group is likely to be more enthusiastic to pursue tasks and goal achievement than the low KPI scoring provinces.

5.5.3 Comparison of job satisfaction between senior managers in the low and high KPI scoring provinces

The views of senior managers’ job satisfaction in both the low and high KPI scoring groups were found not to be significantly different (see Table 28). It can be observed that questions 4 and 10, where the low KPI scoring group provided a higher mean score than the high one, present the t value – t indicates the difference of the mean score between two groups of variables – with positive values.

Table 28 Mean scores and statistical significance of *job satisfaction between the senior managers in the low and high KPI scoring provinces*

Questions	Low scoring group	High scoring group	t	Sig. (2-tailed)
1. You feel committed to the organization and its work, you are not just working for the money.	4.30	4.39	-0.598	0.552
2. Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of working.	3.86	4.13	-1.671	0.099
3. You get a feeling of accomplishment from the work you are doing.	4.05	4.17	-0.922	0.360
4. The amount of responsibility given you is not excessive.*	3.78	3.65	0.645	0.521
5. What you are doing well in the job receives recognition.	3.97	4.03	-0.350	0.727
6. Your supervisor supports your career development.	3.97	4.06	-0.467	0.642
7. You get the attention paid to suggestions you make from your supervisor.	4.03	4.13	-0.638	0.526
8. You get on well with colleagues.	4.03	4.16	-0.859	0.393

Questions	Low scoring group	High scoring group	t	Sig. (2-tailed)
9. You have no concerns about the style of management.	3.92	3.94	-0.079	0.937
10. The pursuit of organizational targets does not put you under excessive pressure.*	3.95	3.94	0.049	0.961

Note: * means questions where the mean scores of the low KPI scoring provinces are higher than the other ones.

Question 4 ($t = 0.645$) – ‘*The amount of responsibility given you is not excessive*’ – implies that the senior managers in the low KPI scoring provinces tend not to be concerned about the demands of work. On the contrary, the senior managers in the low KPI scoring provinces may have lower accountability or pay less attention to the PA than in the high KPI scoring provinces. Question 10 ($t = 0.049$) – ‘*The pursuit of organizational targets does not put you under excessive pressure*’ – reflects that the senior managers in the low KPI scoring provinces are likely to be less enthusiastic about PA. This may derive from getting less attention or pressure from higher executives. In this respect, it implies that leadership is important for implementing PA, particularly paying attention.

5.5.4 Comparison of job satisfaction between practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring groups

The comparison of job satisfaction between the practitioners in low and high KPI scoring provinces is demonstrated in Table 29. It revealed that questions 2, 4, 6, and 10 had significant differences. Question 2 (Sig.= 0.002) – ‘Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of working’ – suggests that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces perhaps performs their work in a more flexible environment. Furthermore, they tend to be positive thinking regarding work of relevance to PA, as

expressed through question 4 – ‘The amount of responsibility given you is not excessive’. Question 6 – ‘Your supervisor supports your career development’ – demonstrates the practitioners’ satisfaction in getting promotion or encouragement. It appears that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to be satisfied with promotion and rewards from their leaders more so than in the low KPI scoring provinces. Question 10 – ‘The pursuit of organizational targets does not put you under excessive pressure’ – implies that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces are more enthusiastic about pursuing tasks and goal achievement.

Table 29 Mean scores and statistical significance of job satisfaction between the *practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring groups*

Questions	Low scoring group	High scoring group	t	Sig. (2-tailed)
1. You feel committed to the organization and its work, you are not just working for the money.	4.12	4.17	-0.464	0.643
2. Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of working.	3.63	3.95	-3.134*	0.002
3. You get a feeling of accomplishment from the work you are doing.	3.89	4.02	-1.351	0.178
4. The amount of responsibility given you is not excessive.	3.47	3.77	-2.591*	0.010
5. What you are doing well in the job receives recognition.	3.78	3.94	-1.528	0.128
6. Your supervisor supports your career development.	3.68	4.04	-3.242*	0.001
7. You get the attention paid to suggestions you make from your supervisor.	3.82	4.01	-1.903	0.058
8. You get on well with colleagues.	4.04	4.11	-0.831	0.407
9. You have no concerns about the style of management.	3.61	3.78	-1.532	0.127
10. The pursuit of organizational targets does not put you under excessive pressure.	3.64	3.98	-3.000*	0.003

Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at $p < 0.05$

In summary, the assessment of job satisfaction from the practitioners' perspectives revealed that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to perform their work with positive thinking on the demands of work, pursuit of tasks and goal accomplishment and in more flexible circumstances. Moreover, they appear to be satisfied with the allocation of promotion and rewards from the leaders more so than the low KPI scoring provinces. This may contribute to the different results for PA between the high and low KPI scoring provinces.

5.6 Summary

The comparison of organizational culture between the low and high KPI scoring provinces revealed that all four culture types had statistically significant differences – market and clan, hierarchy and adhocracy cultures respectively. This implies that there are different organizational cultures between both provincial groups. In particular, the market culture (e.g. pursuit of goals and competition) and the clan culture (e.g. collaboration, teamwork, the leaders' attention and commitment) were higher in the high KPI scoring provinces. From the perspectives of the senior managers in both groups, the market culture was the only culture type that had significant differences. This suggests that the provinces where the senior managers emphasize the market culture (e.g. stimulating employees to pursue goals) could attain PA. Regarding the perspectives of the practitioners, it was revealed that all four culture types were significantly different. This implies that staff in both groups perform tasks in different cultures in order to achieve different results of PA. The officials in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to implement PA with a greater positive orientation and greater enthusiasm. It is important to note that the senior managers in each group (low or high

KPI scoring provinces) do not have such different cultures as the practitioners, as seen from the results of the comparison of cultures between the senior managers in each group and the practitioners in each group.

The assessment of job satisfaction found that the overall picture of job satisfaction was at the level 'agree'. This suggests that officials are broadly satisfied with implementing the work related to PA. The comparison of job satisfaction between the low and high KPI scoring provinces revealed that the high KPI scoring provinces tended to work by pursuing goal achievement, in a more flexible environment, and with a greater level of satisfaction in promotion and rewards compared with the other provinces. The senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces seem to be more accountable and enthusiastic on tasks and goal accomplishment. Meanwhile, the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces appear to incline towards positive thinking about working, be more flexible, satisfied with reward allocation and promotion, and work with clear goals.

CHAPTER 6

RESEARCH FINDINGS: QUALITATIVE DATA

6.1 Introduction

This chapter reports on the findings of the qualitative data analysis acquired from the in-depth and focus group interviews with Thai civil servants in the provincial cases; two low and two high KPI scoring provinces. The total number of respondents for the interviews was 33; 15 senior managers and 18 practitioners (a detailed list of respondents can be found in Appendix 12). As mentioned in Chapter Two, section 2.4.4, the interview data were collected within eight key themes. According to the analysis of the interview data, the key determinants achieving performance agreement (PA) delivering good governance can be categorized into three groups: leadership; human resources (HR) and reward; and performance, outputs and outcomes.

The chapter is, therefore, structured into four main sections. The first section 6.2 focuses on leadership in terms of the contribution of work or information, the prior support from leaders, the support from leaders during the process, the use of leaders' authority, and leaders' consideration of performance related reward. The second section 6.3 discusses HR and reward, which highlights recruitment of those responsible for the KPIs, assumptions on PA, characteristics of the team of Provincial Governor's Office, training and meetings, rotation of personnel, demand of work, performance-related pay, and recommendations to improve the criteria of incentive allocation. The third section 6.4 concerns performance, outputs and outcomes, including capabilities of individuals and teams, promulgation of PA in each fiscal year, factors influencing performance,

advantages and disadvantages of achieving high and low KPI scores, outputs and outcomes of PA, and recommendations for PA. The final section 6.5 provides conclusions for the chapter. Section 6.2 - 6.4 set out the perspectives of the civil servants on what determines attainment of PA in the provincial administration. The officials' perspectives on PA between the low and high KPI scoring provinces are also compared.

The respondents' information is included in brackets after each quote indicating the level of the officials (senior manager or practitioner), position (the particular senior manager), date of interview and interview code respectively as shown in Figure 40. The respondents were not identified by name to ensure anonymity. The interview data were analysed by using computer software – NVivo version 10.




Figure 40 The respondents' information illustrated in brackets after each quote

6.2 Leadership

Leadership appears to be one of the most significant determinants influencing performance of the provinces, judging from the terms extensively mentioned by many respondents; for example: leaders' attention, support and use of authority. To structure these responses it is useful to consider leadership in terms of which stage of the process it is applied. Three main stages may be identified: input (contribution to the actual task of work or information and prior support); processes (support from leaders during the

process, and the use of leaders' authority); and outputs or outcomes (the leaders' consideration of performance-related reward). These stages are shown in Figure 41.




Figure 41 Leadership influence in the system of performance agreement (PA)

6.2.1 The contribution of work or information

The majority of the respondents perceived that leadership was one of the most crucial elements influencing the process of PA. The executives' style, particularly the Governor or Vice Governor, was viewed as a priority in achieving the KPIs. One of the interviewees explained that the leaders' style reflected their background, whether they were career officials or politicians. These attributes were associated with paying attention to performing well in the KPIs. An example of this idea is:

“Different Governors give different levels of attentiveness. If we had the Governor from the field of politics, he might not pay much attention to the KPIs. On the other hand, the Governor from the field of bureaucracy perhaps paid more attention to the KPIs due to pressure from the leaders.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

The executives who came from a bureaucratic background tended to give more attention to the KPIs in order for the provinces to achieve a high score in PA, resulting in clear policies related to the KPIs. This can be seen from some practitioners’ views that:

“Having a clear policy enabled us to do our job properly.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“Policies should be introduced to the officials in order to create mutual understandings, which will make the officials perform the KPIs in the same direction.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“The chiefs of the agencies were the main people who introduced the clear policy to the subordinates. For example, the leaders required the subordinates to compete the KPI results with others agencies.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

The practitioners’ preference for clear policies from above may derive from a basic assumption of Thais. As discussed in Chapter three they generally prefer to avoid

uncertainty and value security and therefore they tend to perform their work based on directions or commands from superiors rather than making decisions by themselves. It can be observed that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces seem to be more concerned with clear policies than the low KPI scoring provinces. Conversely, the executives in the low KPI scoring provinces appeared to not pay much attention to the KPIs. It can be seen from the perspective of one of the interviewees that:

“In the year that the leaders did not pay attention and support the subordinates for performing the KPIs, the overall KPI scores at the provincial level might be low. However, the KPI scores of the provinces were still maintained because the middle managers were the main responsible persons driving the KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

This reflects how the leaders – Governors – in the low KPI scoring provinces tend to be less attentive to the KPIs. It also implies that the front line managers are important in achieving PA in the provinces. In this respect, implementation of PA in the low KPI scoring provinces is perhaps more of a challenge in achieving high KPI scores than for the high KPI scoring provinces, particularly in the fiscal year where their leaders in both levels of province and agency do not pay attention to KPIs.

6.2.2 Prior support from leaders

According to respondents those leaders who pay attention to the KPIs also tend to provide support with resources such as budget, materials and equipment for the agencies in the provinces, initiated through meetings:

“In the meetings, the Governor or Vice Governor played an important role. If they paid attention to the KPIs, they could support the team, drive the resource requirements, and solve the problems. Most importantly, the meetings must take place regularly.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

The respondents argued that the problems of limited resources could be resolved by the executives as indicated by the following statement:

“I think that leadership was important in terms of management of the limited resources such as human, materials, equipment. The Governor’s authority assisted partnership work and resource sharing between agencies.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

Where such support (especially budgetary support) was lacking, the executives, particularly the Governor or Vice Governor, were criticized by the officials. One of the senior managers claimed that a significant challenge in determining achievement in the KPIs was such deficiency, as stated below:

“Our problem was a lack of resources, materials and equipment. For example, we often used our own cars to do off site tasks. We did not receive budget in accordance with the amount of jobs assigned. Sometimes, we had to pay in advance before we could claim the expenses.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

This reflects the degree to which resource management of a province is based on centralization by the Governor. With regard to the KPI host agency chiefs, on the contrary, they argued that they provided many resources for their employees. One of the senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces pointed out that he provided several resources for the staff such as budget, materials and equipment as stated below:

“I supported the subordinates by allocating the resources (budget, materials, and equipment) for them. For example, they received travel expenses and daily subsistence allowance.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

Here it is possible that the chiefs of agencies in the high KPI scoring provinces may provide more support for their employees than the low scoring provinces. Here leadership is important in terms of being a facilitator, a leadership style in the clan culture, for achieving the KPIs in the context of PA.

6.2.3 Support from leaders during the process

Much of the evidence suggested that the low KPI scoring provinces received less encouragement from their leaders. Senior managers claimed that the executive provided little support for achieving the KPIs. They also asked for increasing participation by the Governor, for instance openness to the officials' opinions, and decentralization to the level of the practitioners as the following statement indicates:

“The support we required from the Governor was an opportunity to share ideas. If he ran the office solely by his own opinion and he did not listen to anyone, his subordinates might be scared to share ideas.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2)

“Efficiency to perform the KPIs was generated when the officials had an opportunity to give an opinion on the tasks and to participate in determining on methods of work... The support we wanted was decentralization at practitioner level... delegation of work or a clear devolution.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 29 July 2014: PL1)

These statements confirm that leadership matters in terms of mutual respect and empowering employees. This attribute can be observed as limited in some provinces in the low KPI scoring provinces. However, one of the senior managers in the low KPI scoring provinces argued that there were various opportunities to share ideas between the practitioners and their superiors, but some practitioners were perhaps lacking in

confidence in sharing opinions with the executives as indicated in the following statement:

“In the meetings between several KPI host agencies...the practitioners discussed the problems related to KPIs which led to solving problems. On the other hand, it was found that in the meeting with the executives, practitioners did not feel comfortable raising the problems or sharing ideas.” (Senior Manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2)

This implies that Thai civil servants are hesitant about providing negative feedback to their superiors. It may be a pattern of Thais' values called '*Kraeng cai*', meaning to be considerate and to feel reluctant. This value may be a barrier to improving performance in public service by generating a patronage system as the officials may neglect to give different opinions, for example, when they found the leaders' decisions to be wrong.

The patronage system is seen to survive in Thai bureaucracy, despite 'New Public Management' (NPM) having been introduced through the PA scheme. However, a respondent who raised the issue of the patronage system perceived that the KPIs could contribute to greater effectiveness and transparency in public service as stated below:

“The patronage system was still deep-rooted in Thai bureaucracy. It was essential in some situations. However, it was viewed as a barrier of using the Western's concept promoted by the OPDC. We recognized that the concepts such as organized-working

procedure could create transparency.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

In addition, the respondents revealed that moral support from leaders, particularly chief of the Provincial Governor’s Office and the chief of the main KPI host agencies, was important to attain PA, for example being a coordinator, being a team builder (e.g. generating collaboration), being a hard driver (e.g. stimulating enthusiasm) and being a mentor (e.g. creating accountability). Being a coordinator between the agencies was a leadership style found in the provinces as shown in the following example:

“I worked as a secretary of the team driving the KPIs, the team of the Provincial Governor’s Office. My main role was to coordinate between the agency chiefs and the chief of group/division/subdivision/section. I liaised with them through both formal and informal communications. Informal communications help cut back the red tape. A good relationship with other agencies is required.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

The senior managers of the Provincial Governor’s Office appear to be the key feature communicating with other agencies through formal and informal contact, with the Provincial Governor’s Office in the low KPI scoring provinces perhaps preferring informal communication. It is important to note that being a coordinator is considered as a leadership style in the hierarchy culture.

Moreover, a team builder was a leadership style mentioned by the respondents. They revealed that the chiefs of the agencies, particularly in the high KPI scoring provinces, tend to generate collaboration and accountability among officials through meetings. This idea is illustrated by the following account:

“I informed the subordinates by the monthly meetings that we had to collaborate to work towards the KPIs. Monitoring the progress of the KPIs was required through the meetings. If the result of the KPIs was not close to the targets, we had to accelerate our team performance.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2)

The implication of regular meetings between the senior managers and the practitioners is important because the leaders play many roles such as team builder (clan culture), monitor (hierarchy culture), and hard driver (market culture) in the single stage. The leader can create cooperation and participation among the individuals when considered as team builder. Meanwhile, the leaders can stimulate enthusiasm and accountability through monitoring the progress of the KPIs, viewed as monitor and hard driver at the same time. It is important to note that there is a linkage between the clan, hierarchy and market cultures in the context of PA, which implies there is a positive correlation in accomplishing the high KPI scores. In addition, being a mentor seemed to be a crucial leadership style in order to achieve PA, particularly for the chiefs of the agencies. They played a significant role in recommending and creating accountability among the employees as stated below:

“I would give recommendation and create accountability among the officials If there were any complaints from the public or service users, I could transfer my staff to a more appropriate position.” (Senior manager, Deputy Governor, Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

In conclusion, in the process of PA, leadership is not only important in terms of concrete support as stated in the earlier section, but also abstract support such as opening opportunities for sharing opinions; as well as being coordinator, team builder, hard driver, and mentor. This support would contribute towards generating, for example, consensus orientation, participation, accountability and effectiveness in the public agencies. The evidence suggests that the senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to be good team builders, hard drivers and mentors rather than in the low KPI scoring provinces.

6.2.4 The use of the leaders’ authority

The respondents perceived that using the Governor’s authority was essential for a smooth operation, monitoring progress of the KPIs, and solving problems related to KPIs. These features are elucidated by the following accounts:

“If the leaders, the Governor or Vice Governor, paid attention and monitored the KPIs, meetings might not be needed as the leaders could give orders to their subordinates directly and the agencies’ progress in the KPIs could be generated by an informal conversation between the leaders and the chiefs of the agencies. When the chiefs of the agencies paid great attention and follow-up on the progress, it created respect and good

cooperation.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“We had to use the Governor’s authority because he is as the key figure who gave orders to all agencies and then the provincial agencies had to participate.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014, PL2)

“The most important factor was the leaders, Governor or Vice governor, who understood and saw KPIs as priorities. The leaders were the main person who managed all agencies such as monitoring the progress of the tasks. They, in turn, would have to pay attention to their work because a bureaucratic culture depends on the leader.”(Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“Using the Governor’s authority across the province could help solving problems for the officials. Although the jobs were not perfectly finished, but at least the jobs were done.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

The data suggest that using position power – top-down authority – is strong in both the low and high KPI scoring provinces. The executives’ authority seems to be a significant element determining commitment to the KPIs, namely generating collaboration, participation and accountability in achieving the KPIs among the agencies.

However, the ways in which authority was used seem different. In the low KPI scoring provinces, the leaders tend to use authority based on command – a more authoritarian leadership style. The respondents commonly mention how ‘the leaders gave orders to the agencies or the subordinates’ for creating cooperation and participation. On the other hand, the leaders in the high KPI scoring provinces appear to use authority based more on understanding and attentiveness – a more participative leadership style. Statements such as ‘the leaders understood, gave priority to the KPIs, resolved the problems’ are often voiced by respondents in the high KPI scoring provinces.

6.2.5 The leaders’ consideration of performance-related reward

The annual reward budget of a province is linked with the overall result it attains in PA. The respondents perceived that leadership involved consideration of incentive allocation. The Governor and chiefs of agencies had a certain authority to decide people’s reward-based performance because the reward was cascaded from the provinces to agencies and individuals respectively. The data suggested that individuals expected incentive allocation by the leaders to be fair. Many respondents perceived that the incentive was a potential motivator:

“The leaders should ensure fairness of allocation of rewards to subordinates such as bonus and credit claiming. This could motivate the officials to achieve in the KPI goals, especially at practitioner level.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2)

“The officials who worked hard and had greater workload should be considered for more rewards than others. I disagreed with dividing the reward evenly between all eligible employees.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2)

“An important support from the leaders to help the officials perform the KPIs was incentive for the subordinates, the system which entitled them to rewards.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

In summary, the data suggest that the senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to recognize impartiality, rule of law (e.g. clear criteria of the incentive allocation), and equity for reward allocation among the officials.

6.3 Human resources and reward

The majority of respondents perceived that human resources were a significant element influencing attainment of PA whilst reward was also a crucial factor reinforcing peoples' performance in terms of motivation in achieving the high KPI scores. This section addresses the influence of human resources and rewards on the system of PA as shown in Figure 42. It is divided into three stages: inputs (e.g. recruitment, assumptions²⁹ on PA, and characteristics of the team of Provincial Governor's Office); processes (e.g. training and meetings, rotation and demand of work); and outputs/outcomes

²⁹ Assumptions refers to 'the unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings that are the ultimate source of values and actions' (Senior and Fleming, 2006, p. 144).

(e.g. performance-related pay and recommendations to improve the criteria of incentive allocation).




Figure 42 Human resources and reward influence to the system of PA

6.3.1 Recruitment of the responsible persons for the KPIs

According to the senior managers, selection of appropriate individuals who were responsible for the KPIs was viewed as the first priority in achieving the KPIs. They suggested that there were at least three criteria for recruiting personnel, including: (1) the current tasks or duties related to the KPIs; (2) knowledge and skills such as an understanding of the standard of the KPIs, and having skills of coordination and experience related to the KPIs such as being a KPI data collector, and writing reports; and 3) accountability.

Firstly, the primary qualification of those responsible was to have the existing tasks or duties related to the KPIs, as one of the interviewees stated that:

“Recruitment of responsible persons for the KPIs was considered by their duties related to KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Secondly, the staff responsible were required to have knowledge, skills and experience related to the KPIs, particularly an understanding of the standard of the KPIs and having coordination ability. These were essential in terms of building trust, introducing knowledge and communicating with related agencies and people. These points are illustrated by the following comments:

“In the Provincial Governor’s Office, the appropriate responsible persons had to have skills in coordination, using both formal and informal communications. Moreover, they had to have knowledge and understanding of the KPIs they had been assigned for.” (Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“Understanding and knowledge of the KPIs were necessary because it involved the reliability in introducing the KPIs to other officials. Furthermore, experience of working on the KPIs was also considered.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Community Development Office, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

It appeared that the low KPI scoring provinces were more challenged in terms of inter-agency communication, as indicated by the following quote:

“Working on the KPIs required officials who had a specific skill of coordination. In fact, a number of officials did not like to liaise with other people. So, they did not feel comfortable performing the KPIs and preferred to do easier jobs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

Accomplishing PA requires coordination and participation – collectivism – among the agencies in the provinces, especially the Provincial Governor’s Office and main KPI host agencies and individualist officials were less able to deliver this.

A number of respondents revealed that recruitment of appropriate staff performing the KPIs was problematic due to a limited number of personnel. This challenge was extensively mentioned by the senior managers as follows:

“The agencies that had a large number of the officials were able to recruit appropriate responsible persons of the KPIs while other agencies were not able to due to the limited number of personnel. As a result, they had to recruit the general service officers to do the jobs. For example, the Provincial Governor’s Office assigned government employees to perform the KPIs, while the officials had little involvement.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“We did not have the right to recruit the responsible people for the KPIs because we were able to recruit only the existing personnel.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Administration Office, Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“Our organization is a small one, so I did not have right to recruit the responsible personnel.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2)

Both the low and high KPI scoring provinces appeared to have a lack of personnel. This problem may lead some agencies in the provinces to use temporary employees for performing the KPIs, when in fact it should be the duty of genuine officials.

Thirdly, the data suggested that accountability was the other crucial qualification of the responsible staff for PA. It was found that achieving PA was related to the officials who were devoted in working to achieve the KPIs, which determined individual accountability as one of the respondents stated that:

“When budget was not allocated to help achieve the KPIs, we could still succeed by working in partnership between agencies, with our devoted team of staff to do the best we could.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

This implies that accomplishment of PA requires a combination of accountability of the staff and collaboration between agencies in the provinces. It also reflects the situation

that although the high KPI scoring provinces did not always get support from the superiors in terms of budget, they could achieve high KPI scores due to a better combination of staff accountability and agency participation.

6.3.2 Assumptions on PA

The data suggested that individuals' assumptions such as negative or positive beliefs influenced the officials' behaviour and performance in accomplishing PA. The senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces revealed that there were some officials who believed that the KPIs were not their actual tasks or responsibilities as illustrated below:

“I thought that the KPIs were not our main responsibility....We recognized that working on the KPIs was sometimes enforced by the executives...On the contrary, the accomplishment of the KPIs might derive from the officials' conscience.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor's Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“A number of officials believed that the province meant the Provincial Governor's Office, not including the other 33 agencies in the province. Thus, they thought that the KPIs of the province had to be responsible by the Provincial Governor's Office.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor's Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“The commencement of the KPIs was believed by several officials that was the OPDC's KPIs and was not the province's tasks or their own tasks. Consequently, they did not

see a connection between the KPIs and their line of work. Moreover, they thought that the result of the KPIs did not affect their routine jobs, so they could choose to do or not depending on themselves.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Although the PA scheme has been promoted for over a decade, some people seem to have questions about it such as who is the owner of the KPIs (e.g. OPDC or Provincial Governor’s Office), and whether the KPIs are really linked with their routine tasks or provincial strategies. The implication is that some officials perform the KPIs simply because they are instructed or required to do so, but without any willingness on their own part.

Employees’ assumptions about the KPIs appeared to influence performance in terms of commitment, accountability, participation and collaboration. This is further illustrated by the following quotes:

“Personnel had to believe that the KPIs were a part of their tasks. If they did not have positive attitudes to do the jobs, it might lead to getting the low KPI scores.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2)

“We could achieve high KPI scores if our personnel paid great attention, had careful planning and cooperation, and worked well with each other.” (Senior manager, Chief

of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor's Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

"Fortunately, the officials in our province had work ethics and carried out their responsibility to achieve the KPIs." (Senior manager, Deputy Governor, Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

The implication of the individuals' assumptions such as conscientious, positive attitudes and responsibility are important for the success of PA, particularly accountability. However, some respondents claimed that thought had to be given to how individual accountability was generated. One of the interviewees explained that:

"Personnel's awareness and accountability on KPIs were a crucial factor.... However, the official's accountability could be categorized into two aspects. The first was they might be pressured by their superiors into achieving high KPI scores. The other was their conscience, which sometimes goes against Thais' free thinking nature. In other words, they do not like enforcement." (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor's Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

Here the accountability of people appears to be created by the leaders' authority and the officials' own conscience. The data suggests that it would be better if individual accountability were created by the personnel's conscience than by enforcement and hierarchy culture (control-orientation).

In addition, individuals' assumptions regarding collaboration and teamwork at the level of provinces and agencies were also referred to as necessary for high scores. The respondents stated that:

"We thought that participation and teamwork between the agencies were the most important factors obtaining achievement of the KPIs." (Practitioner, Provincial Governor's Office and Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

"Collaboration of the officials in the internal and external organizations contributed to our province's accomplishment in the KPIs. If we communicated with each other and we were in agreement about KPIs, we could resolve the problems and also monitor the jobs." (Practitioner, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

6.3.3 Characteristics of team of Provincial Governor's Office

A number of officials perceived that the characteristics of the team of Provincial Governor's Office were a key factor in determining achievement in the KPIs. This team was important not only as a facilitator of the process of PA, but also as a mentor for the agencies in their provinces. The interviewees elucidated that:

"Fortunately, our province had a competent team of Provincial Governor's Office as a good coach. We could contact the coordinator at the Provincial Governor's Office whenever we had problems related to the KPIs." (Practitioner, Provincial Governor's Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“One of the crucial roles that engaged the KPIs was being a mentor for the agencies because a few problems occurred when the responsible persons for the KPIs, internal and external agency, were changed and the standard of the KPIs were changed. As a coordinator in the central agency, we had to support them.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014, PH1)

6.3.4 Training and meetings

The majority of respondents perceived that they did not have much training relevant to the KPIs, but they had had meetings instead of training. There were at least four types of meetings that were commonly mentioned by the interviewees: (1) central government meetings; (2) provincial meetings, for example on the introduction of the KPIs and allocation of responsibilities, and monitoring progress of the KPIs over the period of 6, 9, and 12 months; (3) external meetings between the main and second KPI host agencies; and (4) the internal meetings of the KPI host agencies. These are illustrated in the following statements:

“We did not have the actual trainings related to the KPIs, but we had various kinds of the meetings such as introduction of standard of the KPIs, the meetings of the central government by the OPDC, and the meetings for monitoring progress of the KPIs in the period of 6, 9, and 12 months. So, we had the total number of the provincial meetings about 3-4 times per fiscal year.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“Although we did not have much training of the KPIs, we had several patterns of the meetings. For example, the meetings to report the progress of the KPIs to the Governor which could stimulate the KPI host agencies to be enthusiastic. The meetings of the central government through the VDO conferences were organized by the OPDC. The provincial meetings between the KPI host agencies for monitoring progression of the KPIs (3-4 times per year were organized by the Provincial Governor’s Office.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

The meetings are a significant element in the system of PA in terms of introducing policies and standards of the KPIs for the officials, allocation of responsibilities, integrating collaboration among the agencies and monitoring progress of the KPIs. The implication is that provinces that had regular meetings tended to achieve in the KPIs.

Nevertheless, there were several challenges to the training based on internal and external factors. An internal factor was the individuals themselves such as participants’ attentiveness during training:

“The officials sometimes did not pay attention to the whole meeting, the introduction of standard of the KPIs through the VDO conferences by the OPDC. They would concentrate mainly on their own KPIs and might leave the meeting after it moved on to the next KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“I think that nobody wanted to attend the training of the KPIs. The responsible persons themselves did not want to be trained. As a result, the training was useless. Hence, the leaders should assign the appropriate persons to attend the training.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

External factors such as the lack of introductory knowledge received from the training to others, and the limited budget were likely to be important barriers to getting training as illustrated by the followings examples:

“I thought that the training sessions reflected the weakness of the bureaucracy. There was not much training available. We wanted our organization’s members to be more knowledgeable.... The persons who attended the training courses might not cascade their knowledge to others. They saw the training as their own personal development rather than being a representative of the agency.” (Senior manager, Deputy Governor, Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“We were deficient in budget for the training related to the KPIs for the personnel, so we could organize only the meetings within our organization.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“We needed the training, but we did not have a budget. If the OPDC allocated the budget in the training, it would help us. Actually, we would like to invite the professional of the OPDC to introduce knowledge of the KPIs, but we had a problem with the budget.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

The respondents also suggested that the training should be relevant to the KPIs in terms of topics and accessible language:

“The topic of the training should depend on the type of KPIs....The OPDC should organize the regional training at a province which is the centre of the region where the other provinces in the region could attend.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“It was important that the training courses of the KPIs should be delivered in simple language, easy to understand, by real professionals such as university lecturers.” (Practitioner, Provincial Public Health Office, 22 July 2014: PL1)

“The trainings, such as a day workshop at least once a year, would be more useful than attending several meetings.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

6.3.5 Rotation of personnel

As stated earlier, training was necessary to perform the KPIs, particularly in the provinces where responsible persons for the KPIs were frequently relocated. Rotation of personnel caused problems in terms of the need for the new people to understand the system, and the need to reprocess the data and write new reports:

“If the staff members who were responsible for the KPIs were rotated frequently, the new ones had to spend a lot of time trying to figure out the existing KPI system.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“Rotation of the responsible persons for the KPIs was a problem that we were frequently confronted with. We had to restart the whole process with the replaced personnel.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“The previous personnel responsible for the KPIs did not leave the documents behind when he moved to another workplace, resulting in lost documents during the transfer. So, the new one had to review the jobs again and the team of Provincial Governor’s Office had to support them.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

High KPI scoring provinces seem to have not found rotation to be much of a problem, apparently due to staff not being interested in relocation (which suggests that problems with rotation were a symptom of lower motivation in the low KPI scoring provinces):

“Some officials who were placed in an office far away from their hometown might not want to devote to their tasks and spent more efforts in finding a way to be relocated in their hometown. However, the officials in this province were different from others because they did not want to relocate. Therefore, they paid attention to their work.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“Fortunately, the officials within our province do not relocate very often. They had been here for a long time, so they had a good relationship to each other. Consequently, our province had good collaboration.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Agencies in the high KPI scoring provinces appear to have a higher degree of collaboration on the KPIs than the low KPI scoring provinces and may also have a lower rate of rotation of people.

6.3.6 Pressure of work

The overwhelming pressure of work was viewed as an important challenge in performing the KPIs, particularly at the level of practitioners. They elucidated that workload within the tight timeframe perhaps influenced quality of work and introduction of knowledge to other people. These features are illustrated by the followings statements:

“The proportion of jobs influenced the performance on KPIs. I had an experience working in a province where the workload was manageable. Thus, I had time to refine my work. In this province, in contrast, I was responsible for a lot of workload with tight deadlines which had affected the quality of my work.” (Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“It was difficult to perform jobs within the tight timeframe because we were overwhelmed. Consequently, we could not finish the jobs on time and they could have

low quality. It looked like we could achieve the outputs, but we were not sure about the outcomes. ” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“I had a lot of work to do, so I did not have much time to cascade my knowledge of the KPIs to the new responsible persons while the new ones did not have time for studying.” (Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

These data imply that several practitioners were struggling with overwhelming pressure of work on tight deadlines in the context of PA. Thus, the organizational skill of officials was important in getting jobs done as well as maintaining work-life balance. The evidence suggests that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to finish their tasks on the tight deadline although they are likely pressured by the strict timeframe. Moreover, ability to cope with pressure of work is likely to be associated with the officials’ job satisfaction performing the KPIs.

There were at least three causes of overwhelming pressure of work, which were commonly mentioned by the interviewees: (1) assignment of tasks by the leaders or additional tasks from their own routine jobs; (2) non-dispersive work (work that could not be delegated); and (3) limited number of personnel.

“A cause of the officials’ bias to perform the KPIs might start from the leaders, for example, the leaders’ decision in selecting certain people whose work dealt with the KPIs resulted in unequal workload distribution in the organization while the reward

was spread evenly.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“Some agencies had to do a lot of jobs related to the KPIs because the KPIs were sometimes not dispersed to others.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2)

“The Provincial Governor’s Office had a limited number of officials to work with the KPIs. We had to be responsible for every task of the province issued from the central government. We were the central agency of the province and we worked as the secretary of the Governor. Thus, we had a lot of jobs to do and work towards tight deadlines.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“Our organization had a limitation on number of officials. There were only 10 officials while the rest of the staff were temporary employees. Some employees were not very motivated and dedicated as they wanted to seek a better job elsewhere.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

It may be noted that the leaders played a key role in distribution of responsibilities. In other words, the individuals’ workload could be increased or reduced by management decisions. An overwhelming work burden could become a cause of job dissatisfaction

among officials. This may be part of a more general trend whereby officials' attitudes on performing the KPIs may be shaped by the managers:

“A number of officials might have bias doing the KPIs. I would explain to them in the initial step that everyone was important in working on the KPIs and that we had to work as a team.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

It has been noted that the managers in the high KPI scoring provinces appear to emphasise what employees viewed as a participative leadership style, whereas the leaders in the low KPI scoring provinces less so. This is emphasized by one of the practitioners in a low KPI scoring province:

“I had to work on KPI alongside my main job description. It was assigned by the leaders and I had to do it no matter how tight the deadlines were. Some officials might not be willing to do it. It was a burden. It was a duty....It was important for the leaders to make sure that the officials had an understanding about the importance of the KPIs and how to delegate the duties appropriately.” (Practitioner, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

This statement reflects that the subordinates in the low KPI scoring provinces tend to have job dissatisfaction. This is because leaders may not focus on the staff by ensuring understanding and allocating appropriate responsibilities. Also, people in the low KPI

scoring provinces tend to work based on the leaders' directives (authoritarian leadership style) without being motivated beyond this.

Other officials appeared to be neither satisfied nor dissatisfied about demand of work related to the KPIs. They perceived that they could cope with their workload because some KPIs were continuously performed for several fiscal years. Thus, these KPIs were viewed as their routine jobs. Furthermore, they could do their jobs following on the standard of the KPIs as elucidated by one of the practitioners that:

“Performing tasks related to the KPIs was not too overwhelming for me. Working with KPIs had become a routine to me because I have worked on the KPIs for several years.... The new responsible one for the KPIs might find it difficult to hit the ground running.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

The implication of some KPIs is perhaps viewed by the practitioners as their routine job. This assumption may contribute to a lack of enthusiasm achieving goals of the KPIs (market culture). They may perhaps focus on how to please their superiors rather than on high quality of public service and how to find techniques in getting high KPI scores.

6.3.7 Performance-related pay (PRP)

There were a variety of perspectives on performance-related pay (PRP) focused on the criteria of incentive allocation. The data suggested that the respondents' options on the

criteria of incentive allocation can be divided into three aspects: agree, disagree, and neither agrees nor disagrees, including suggestions on reward.

Agreement with the criteria of incentive allocation

The officials perceived that financial reward was a motivational tool for performing the KPIs. Many interviewees seemed to agree with the criteria of the incentive allocation in terms of enhancing motivation, stating that:

“I agreed to maintain the criteria of reward based on result of the KPIs because the financial incentive was a motivation for people. However, the criteria should be adjusted to be more appropriate for the officials.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“The financial reward was a motivation for the officials in working on the KPIs. Although they were not rewarded, they still performed their tasks. However, it was better to provide the reward.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“I agreed with the criteria of incentive allocation because it was at the heart of working between the superiors and subordinates. If we did not have the incentive, the officials’ morale for working might be decreased and they might perform the tasks with unhappiness. For instance, the leaders might get only the jobs done, but the subordinates might not put their heart and soul into it.” (Senior manager, Chief of

Provincial Community Development Office, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

A number of the respondents agreed that the criteria of reward allocation, particularly financial reward, can engender enthusiasm of the practitioners. Thus, they agreed that the criteria of the incentive allocation should be maintained, but that improvements were needed. It was noticeable that people in the low KPI scoring provinces tended to be more concerned about financial rewards than the high KPI scoring provinces. The motivation of some officials in the low KPI scoring provinces might even be dependent on reward allocation. On the contrary, people in the high KPI scoring provinces are likely to focus on the tasks more than reward.

Disagreement with the criteria of incentive allocation

On the other hand, some respondents disagreed with the criteria of incentive allocation, particularly at the level of the provinces. There are four main reasons that people disagree with the criteria of incentive allocation: (1) the limitation of people related to the KPIs; (2) unfairness of reward allocation; (3) a small amount of reward; and (4) fabrication of evidence in order to attain high KPI scores.

Firstly, selection of the tasks and people related to the KPIs appeared to be limited. It was also viewed as a cause of argument and disharmony in the level of the provinces and agencies as stated below:

“I disagreed with the criteria of incentive allocation in the level of provinces.... In fact, there were various tasks of the provinces, but some tasks were selected as the KPIs. Hence, the other officials whose tasks were not associated with the KPIs might get less reward than others.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“The money issue usually causes an argument... When the responsible persons of the KPIs were eligible for the reward allocation, some agencies might want to be in charge disregarding the nature of their work which was not relevant to that specific KPI. The amount of rewards for each agency might vary resulting in the officials’ morale being undermined. This also affected the unity of the organisation.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“The criteria of incentive allocation by the OPDC indicated that only the officials involved with the KPIs could receive the reward. Actually, the provinces had several tasks that were not evaluated as the KPIs. So, it was not fair for various officials who worked on other tasks... It was sometimes found that the responsible persons for the KPIs did not perform the tasks of the KPIs because they gained the same rate of reward as others.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

Secondly, the criteria of incentive allocation were a concern for officials in terms of unfairness of reward allocation such as the Provincial Governor’s Office getting a higher reward; the challenge of inter-personnel reward allocation; the different numbers of

officials in the provinces and agencies; the limitation on the central government staff at the provincial administration getting rewards:

“From my experience working for several provinces, the fairness in allocating the reward was quite a challenge. For example, there were several provinces that the Provincial Governor’s Office claimed for more incentive allocation than others... Although there were the standard criteria of reward allocation by the OPDC, The Governor’s Office made a decision on the proportion of reward for all agencies involved.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2)

“Generally, the Provincial Governor’s Office managed the reward allocation for all agencies in the province. Consequently, the Governor’s office was likely to be criticised about transparency of reward allocation.” (Senior manager, Chief Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

This implies that the Provincial Governor’s Office appears to influence allocation of reward in the provinces. Many provinces tend to have a problem of transparency regarding reward allocation by the Provincial Governor’s Office. This may lead to a lack of trust regarding the team of the Provincial Governor’s Office, which may be a problem performing the KPIs in the provinces.

If the criteria of the incentive allocation were not clear, a different reward allocation could be found at the inter-personnel level such as between responsible and non-responsible ones and between the superiors and the employees as explained below:

“A problem of reward allocation was that the officials who were not responsible for the KPIs as their tasks did not directly involve with the KPIs felt they gained less incentive than the responsible ones. This might lead to disagreement among the staff.”
(Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“A problem of incentive allocation was the leaders. If the leader gained much more reward than the subordinates, it might bring disharmony in the agency.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Public Health Office, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“Difference in getting a financial reward between the officials might lead to a loss of trust in each other.” (Senior manager, Chief Provincial Administration Office, Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Moreover, the different number of officials in the level of provinces and agencies appeared to be a challenge of the reward allocation in a province, and could lead to perceptions of unfairness:

“When I worked in a small province with less staff members, the reward was distributed among a small group of officials. Consequently, the proportion of the reward was much

bigger. In my current job, it is a bigger province with more staff members, the proportion of the reward, as a result, is very small. ” (Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“The reward distribution system is not fair. For example, the agencies with a large number of officials worked hard, but each one gained a little reward because it had to be divided between so many people. Meanwhile, the others with a small number of officials had a smaller workload, but each one received a bigger portion.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Public Health Office, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“There were three levels of the officials: chief executive, middle managers, and first-line officers. Some agencies had a large number of middle managers and a small number of first-line officers. When the reward was divided evenly according to the number of officials, the officials in middle management positions might receive even less reward than those first-line officers. Thus, the criteria should be revised. The current criteria might be the cause of disharmony, and jealousy among the officials which would affect cooperation in the future.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

In addition, a problem of perceptions of unfairness of reward allocation was found among the central government agencies working alongside the provincial administration. This seems to derive from the criteria of incentive allocation indicated by the OPDC, namely

the central agencies at the provincial administration had to receive reward from their parent ministries or departments. This idea is illustrated by one of the officials stating:

“The provinces could achieve in the KPIs by cooperation of the central government agencies in the region. However, these agencies could not get the incentive from the provinces as the OPDC indicated. They had to get the incentive from the central government.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

As stated earlier, unfairness of the criteria of reward allocation may lead to a discrepancy between the amount of rewards in the levels of provinces, agencies and individuals, which may undermine the workforce’s morale in performing the KPIs, losing trust between the agencies, and decreasing collaboration among the agencies. It is important to note that the senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces seem to show concern regarding equity of the incentive allocation, which indicates a good signal in terms of the reward management.

Thirdly, a small amount of the financial reward played a significant effect on performance in terms of people’s motivation. These points are set out below:

“These days, the reward was less. Therefore, the officials were less motivated.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Community Development Office, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

“We had less incentive in comparison with the local government agencies. Their annual reward was 4-5 times of their salary. In contrast, the provincial agencies received much less reward.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

This implies that people in the low KPI scoring provinces tend to focus on amount of the financial reward more than the high KPI scoring provinces. The lower KPI scoring provinces perhaps demonstrate a higher degree of individualism and consequently a greater focus on extrinsic motivation, such as money.

Fourthly, some officials mentioned that the possibility of sanctions or high incentives could lead to attempts to fabricate performance data in order to receive high scores in some agencies or provinces. One of the respondents suggested:

“The result of performance evaluation might provide either strong punishment or high incentive. These might lead the officials in attempting to fabricate the evidence.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Public Health Office, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

Not all respondents were concerned with the criteria of incentive allocation:

“Some officials were likely to pay little attention to how much financial reward was allocated for them.” (Practitioner, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

6.3.8 Recommendations to improve the criteria of incentive allocation

In terms of recommendations for improvement of the criteria of the incentive allocation, officials suggested that reward should be improved in terms of (1) providing for the clearer criteria of the reward allocation; (2) increasing the amount of the financial reward; (3) generating new forms of incentive; (4) other suggestions and cancellation of reward. These features are explained as follows.

Firstly, the majority of interviewees suggested that the criteria of incentive allocation should be changed to provide clearer criteria. Particularly, it should be clear about the different amount of reward between responsible and non-responsible persons for the KPIs; the different number of officials in the level of provinces and agencies; the different amount of reward between the main and second KPI host agencies; and the different amount of reward between the senior managers and practitioners, including other related suggestions. These ideas are illustrated below:

“The criteria of reward allocation should be clearer between the officials involved and not involved with the KPIs. Some kinds of tasks were not selected as the KPIs, but the tasks were, perhaps, the important tasks of the provinces. Hence, the officials who performed these tasks should be considered for the incentive as well as the responsible ones for the KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“The criteria of incentive allocation should be considered in terms of the number of officials in each KPI host agency because it might lead to complaints about different

rewards among the agencies.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“I think the main KPI host agencies deserved to have more reward than the secondary host agencies because they worked harder.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“The criteria of reward between the senior managers and practitioners should be improved. It should not be much different.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Community Development Office, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

The senior managers in the low KPI scoring provinces appear to be more dissatisfied with the criteria of reward allocation than the high KPI scoring provinces, perhaps because their motivation is more dependent on extrinsic rewards. Some senior managers claimed that they should receive the same rate or higher rate of reward than the practitioners as indicated in the following statements:

“I think the criteria of incentive allocation were not fair for the leaders. In the past, the leaders received more financial reward than the subordinates. These days the subordinates received much more than the leaders. In fact, the KPIs would not have been achieved without the support from the leaders. Hence, reward allocation should be at least the same proportion between the leaders and practitioners.” (Senior

manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“I agree with the criteria of reward by the OPDC, but I think the reward for the leaders—Governor, Vice Governor, and chiefs of the agencies – seemed to be less than the practitioners. As a result, the leaders’ morale might be decreased. Thus, the reward allocation for the leaders should be increased.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

The perceived inequity of the reward allocation between the senior managers and practitioners could affect leaders’ motivation regarding the KPIs and have knock-on effects in terms of their staff’s motivation.

Some officials offered recommendations for improving the criteria of reward allocation. For example, dispersion of the KPIs for more agencies and individuals, and using other forms of the criteria of reward allocation. The respondents suggested that:

“Working in the KPIs should be dispersed for more officials. Exactly, there were only a few officials doing the KPIs in the agency... The criteria of reward should be improved and clearer.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“The money reward should be divided into two parts. The first part provided to the agencies for developing their work. The other part was allocated based on the OPDC’s

criteria such as proportion of 30:70 or 50:50. The first proportion, 30 or 50 percent, was allocated to every official in the province as a gift of participation. The second proportion, 70 or 50, was allocated to only the officials who were responsible for the KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Secondly, several respondents revealed that the current financial reward seemed to be not much for the motivation of people. They suggested that one of the ways of improving rewards was to increase the amount of money. The officials elucidated that:

“The only change that I needed was to increase amount of the financial reward. It would be more of a motivation for the officials to do their jobs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

“The amount of the reward should be increased more than the present.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“We needed more incentive by the central government... The leaders – Governor, Vice Governor, and chiefs of the agencies – had to be responsible for the KPI failure by, for example, being transferred if they failed to achieve the KPI targets.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Administration Office, Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Thirdly, some respondents suggested that new forms of incentives should be considered such as promoting to a higher position, increasing salary, receiving training, learning from best practices at home or abroad:

“The characteristics of the reward should be varied such as being promoted to a higher position, getting training, having official visits to other organisations in the country or overseas. The reward criteria have to be clear. Like the pay rise system, the percentage of the reward allocation must be clearly stated.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

“I disagreed with the financial reward because it was not much. The feature of the reward should be changed from the financial reward to better resources for agencies such as a government agency vehicle or equipment for working.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“The new forms of the reward should be created when the officials could achieve the KPIs, for example, providing 4-5 times of the salary reward, giving better welfare, and promoting to a higher position... Without the right motivation, the officials might refuse to work on KPIs in the future.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group and Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

These ideas reflect that a number of the officials seem to require the central government, the OPDC, to review the financial reward and consider new forms of the reward. It might

contribute to more motivation in implementing the KPIs, although, as noted above, high performing provinces were not primarily concerned with rewards. This does not mean that increasing rewards might not positively impact on the motivation of lower performing provinces.

Finally, the interviewees recommended other issues suggesting that the leaders' explanation regarding reward allocation was required. This may enhance understanding between the employees and may prevent disharmony about monetary reward. One of the practitioners stated that:

“In our province, 3-5 meetings were organised to come up with the best criteria for reward allocation. The leaders proposed different formulas to the officials to consider and voted for the best one. The officials took part in the process.” (Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

In addition, there were a few suggestions about whether the financial reward should be cancelled altogether because of the complicated allocation of the reward, especially in the level of provinces and agencies:

“The financial reward should not be abolished. We know there have been problems with the reward allocation criteria. We should aim to resolve the issue and create a better system.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“We created several formulas for payment calculation of financial reward to the agencies...It was difficult and complicated and it might be better without the money reward. The officials who were responsible for the KPIs sometimes received the same reward as those who were not responsible. As a result, their morale to do the tasks was destroyed. Then, I had to call for a meeting to explain how the reward was allocated. I think it’s probably better to abolish the reward system.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

However, one of the respondents argued that cancellation of the reward might contribute to a lack of enthusiasm in performing the KPIs in the civil servants. He recommended that new improved alternatives for the reward allocation should be considered as follows:

“Abolition of the reward allocation might lead to lack of motivation and enthusiasm among the officials to do the jobs. The OPDC had to develop new criteria for incentive allocation based on the KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

6.4 Performance, outputs and outcomes

This section reports on the data related to performance, outputs and outcomes in the process of PA. There are three stages of the system of PA as shown in Figure 43, including inputs (capabilities of individuals and teams, and promulgation of PA in each fiscal year); processes (factors to influence performance); and outputs and outcomes

(advantages and disadvantages in getting high and low KPI scores, opinions on outputs and outcomes of PA, and recommendations for PA).




Figure 43 Performance, outputs and outcomes in the system of PA

6.4.1 Capabilities of individuals and teams

The officials' competencies were a significant element in achieving the KPIs, including collaboration, teamwork, potential of the team of the Provincial Governor's Office, and potential of the KPI host agencies. It was found that collaboration between the agencies and officials plays a crucial impact on attainment of the KPIs as stated below:

"We could achieve KPI goals, if we receive cooperation from the officials within our agency. A meeting concerning the announcement of policy was important in creating recognition and corrective performance among the officials, particularly the level of the practitioners." (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014, PH2)

“We could not get collaboration from some agencies, particularly the central government in provinces because they did not receive benefits and believed that they were overwhelmed by their routine jobs.” (Senior manager, Chief Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

This implies that achieving PA is found in the provinces with a high degree of cohesion or participation – characterized by collectivism or strong clan culture. In the low KPI scoring provinces, there appears to be a low level of collaboration between the agencies, particularly the central government agencies at the provincial administration – and a leaning towards individualism. The data suggested that the officials in the low KPI scoring provinces tended to focus on their routine jobs rather than the KPIs. On the other hand, people in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to be conscientious because the chiefs of agencies introduced clear policies and created recognition of the tasks among the staff as the first priority.

Many respondents referred to teamwork, which was viewed in terms of integrated collaboration in the provinces – achieving the KPIs in each agency leading the overall PA result of the provinces. One of the respondents elucidated that:

“The crucial factors for success are working as a team or integrated agencies as the OPDC suggested. Establishment of stages for discussion, communication, and monitoring through meetings was important to accomplish KPI targets.” (Senior

manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor's Office, 22 July 2014, PL2)

Here it suggests that teamwork can be created by good communication, discussion, and monitoring progress of the KPIs. PA probably serves to strengthen partnership or collectivism in terms of pursuing achievement in the overall PA result of the provinces.

The officials also commonly mentioned the significant role of the team of Provincial Governor's Office, which directly affects the officials' performance implementing the KPIs. The practitioners illustrated that the Governor's Office team was viewed as a mentor for the agencies regarding the KPIs and was sometimes responsible for performing the KPIs when some KPI host agencies did not take responsibilities for their KPIs:

"Fortunately, the agencies in our province trusted the team of Provincial Governor's Office in terms of our professionalism and transparency." (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor's Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

"I had experience working in three provinces. If the key figure from the Provincial Governor's Office was not competent, assigning work to other agencies without any guidelines, the agencies could not do a good job." (Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“We received low KPI scores because when we assigned the KPIs to some agencies, they claimed they did not have a responsible person. We, the Provincial Governor’s Office, then had to be accountable for those assigned KPIs. We had to do everything ourselves.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

The data suggested that the Governor’s Office team in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to perform better than the low KPI scoring provinces. This can be observed in the lower level of inter-agency collaboration in the low KPI scoring provinces.

“All KPI host agencies had to be conscientious of their own KPIs when the Governor paid attention to the KPIs. They were expected to report the progress of the KPIs with the Governor through the meetings.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“The KPI host agencies might raise their problems of the KPIs in the meetings. If the other agencies had any information and recommendations, the problems might be resolved.” (Senior Manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“The persons involved with the KPIs were invited to attend the meetings and share with us the problems they were facing, for example, why we could not reach the targets of the KPIs. This discussion might lead to resolving problems and achieving the goals of

the KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Community Development Office, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

The meetings seem to be a significant element shaping the KPI host agencies’ performance in approaching the goals of the KPIs such as monitoring progress of the KPIs, sharing ideas, and solving the problems. The senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces appear to highlight the communication between the officials more than those in the low KPI scoring provinces. This can be observed through having formal meetings with the Governor and solving the problems together.

6.4.2 Promulgation of PA in each fiscal year

Some respondents revealed that the delay of the promulgation of PA in each fiscal year could have an impact on civil servants’ performance on the KPIs. For example, a delay during introduction of the KPI lists perhaps led to various challenges such as a delay in planning tasks and a delay in collecting data, especially the KPIs based on the processes of the tasks. One of the interviewees stated that:

“In the past, an announcement of the list of KPIs was made quite early on, so we could plan the tasks at the beginning of the fiscal year and could achieve over 50% of the total number of KPIs in six months. On the other hand, at present, we could not perform the tasks on time because the delay in an announcement of the list of KPIs, particularly the KPIs which emphasised on the process of the jobs. This might lead to output fabrication to achieve the targets of KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

The implication of the promulgation of performance evaluation significantly influences performance on the KPIs. The data suggest that the delay in introducing PA perhaps contributes to fabrication of the outputs.

6.4.3 Factors influencing performance

This section summarises the factors influencing performance under five categories:

(1) understanding the standard of the KPIs, (2) transparency to perform the KPIs, (3) experience from previous years, (4) meetings-related performance, and (5) attributes of the provinces.

(1) Understanding the standard of the KPIs

The officials responsible for the KPIs require understanding of the standards of the KPIs viewed as a prior element to performing the KPIs. The officials illustrated that:

“A clear standard of the KPIs could contribute to the practitioners’ satisfaction. The KPIs were viewed as a plan for working.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 29 July 2014: PL1)

“We found that our staff had a problem of the understanding of the standard of KPIs. The practitioners sometimes could not understand what they were expected to do through the KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

A clear standard in the KPIs was seen to be essential, particularly for the practitioners. The data suggested that an unclear standard of the KPIs led to diversity of interpretation

among people. The attributes of the KPIs perceived by the individuals influenced attainment of the KPIs. For example, over-challenging targets may contribute to operational problems, lower motivation and fabrication of evidence:

“The targets of KPIs were sometimes too challenging and not achievable. If we could not get the highest score at 5, we might be blamed by the leaders. So, we had to find any possible ways to achieve high KPI scores.” (Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

This suggests that setting targets of the KPIs that are too challenging can influence performance of people and use of techniques in achieving high KPI scores. However, there were some officials who argued that performing the KPIs did not seem to be difficult, especially some KPIs implemented for many fiscal years as the following account:

“When working with the same KPIs for several years, the problems have been resolved. The KPIs for food safety, for example, have been done for many years and it is not too difficult anymore.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Public Health Office, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

(2) Transparency to perform the KPIs

The data suggested that using the same standard of the KPIs – changing only KPI targets – for several fiscal years might contribute to resolving some problems with public services. On the contrary, the practitioners may learn to employ techniques in achieving

high scores from these KPIs. This may create a challenge to transparency as the following statement suggests:

“There were several methods approaching maximum score at 5... Some KPIs were not much different from the previous year. The responsible persons have learned the techniques of how to achieve high scores.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2)

Transparency performing the KPIs is perhaps a challenge of PA in the provinces. Some respondents revealed that the problem of transparency could be seen throughout the process of PA such as selection of the tasks to assess as KPIs, collecting data and evidences for the KPIs, and reporting information to the assessors. These issues are illustrated by the following accounts:

“A number of provinces selected only tasks they knew they could achieve the high scores of KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“It was possible that some provinces chose not to include certain information if it made the scores lower.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2)

“Some provinces hired consultants, the educational institutions, to do the KPIs because they had the budget to do so.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“We learned from the other provinces how they received high scores of the KPIs and also studied the standard of the KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

The officials in the low KPI scoring provinces seem to provide much evidence regarding the problem of transparency performing the KPIs. It implies that the officials in the low KPI scoring provinces perhaps attempt to use some shortcut techniques to achieving high KPI scores, but not with success.

(3) Experience from previous years

Some provinces claimed that they achieved the high KPI scores by drawing on experience from previous years. They pointed out that they learned information regarding the KPIs in the previous fiscal year, especially the problems of the KPIs and the targets of the KPIs. The respondents stated that:

“We used last year’s information to compare and improve our performance. We used the KPI to improve our agency and our team.” (Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“The targets of the KPIs in the last year were compared with the present one.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“Reviewing the result of performance and then the plans were designed for working of the KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“We reviewed information of the KPIs by documents and discussion. The team of responsible persons and chiefs of the agencies would be invited to participate through the meetings.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

(4) Meetings-related performance

The meetings appear to be an important opportunity for discussing and planning the targets of the KPIs in the current year. The respondents perceived that achieving the KPIs derived from the meetings because it was a stage for exchanging ideas and monitoring progress of the KPIs, enabling understanding, and generating participation and accountability. Furthermore, the meetings were an opportunity to strengthen morale by informing the result of performance appraisal of the provinces. These factors are elucidated below:

“The meetings could enhance understanding, accountability, and participation for the officials in order to achieve the KPIs.” (Senior Manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 29 July 2014: PL1)

“An advantage of the meetings was to emphasise the officials’ duties to the KPIs. The responsibilities would be created and then they had to perform their best.” (Senior

Manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“The Provincial Governor’s Office hosted regular meetings to exchange ideas. The results of the meetings could encourage the officials to improve and solve problems related to the KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“The meetings were important in terms of monitoring the progress of the KPIs in the period of 6, 9, and 12 months.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“We would report the result of performance evaluation of the province by the monthly meetings. The KPI host agencies were recognized.” (Senior Manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

(5) Attributes of the provinces

A number of respondents revealed that the attributes of the provinces such as size of area and number of districts were significant in determining performance of the agencies:

“One of the factors contributing to getting a high score in the provinces was the size of provincial area. It was easier and quicker to collect data in smaller provinces.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“It might be easier to achieve KPIs in smaller provinces. However, if a smaller amount of budget was allocated to those provinces, they might not be able to do a good job.”
(Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“Each province has a different characteristic.... A large province consists of 25 districts while a small one consists of 8 districts. It might be more difficult for the large province.” *(Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)*

These statements imply that a small provincial area and a small number of districts may be advantages in terms of time management such as quicker data collection and saving time in communication between the agencies. On the contrary, it can be noticed that the larger provinces probably receive a higher rate of budget allocation than the smaller provinces.

Moreover, the respondents declared that specific characteristics of the provinces such as tourist and non-tourist provinces, diversity of cultures for working and diversity of demography might influence performance in the KPIs. These ideas are illustrated by the KPI host agencies responsible for reducing the number of accidents on the roads as follows:

“Some provinces with less tourist attractions could achieve high KPI scores without having to do anything much as the number of accidents was low anyway. On the contrary, a province with many tourist attractions would have a higher number of accidents, especially during the holidays.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“The culture of working in each province was different. I had the experience working in a province where I had an add-on task to organize the meetings, welcome the guests, and look after important delegates. So, I did not have much time to generate the new ideas about how to improve the jobs. In the current province, I had more time to create my jobs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

In addition, the interviewees revealed that they had to confront external factors such as the government’s policies and a delayed budget allocation from the central government. For example, the government provided the policy of buying the first new car with the government’s support in taxes. This conflicted with the target of the KPI that required reducing the number of accidents on the roads. These ideas are illustrated by the following examples:

“The allocation of the budget from the central government was sometimes delayed. It might affect the provinces to do the jobs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Administration Office, Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“In 2011-2012, the number of accidents was increased due to the policy of the first new car...The government policy conversed with practice and also decreasing budget.” (Practitioner and senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

6.4.4 Advantages and disadvantages in achieving high and low KPI scores

The respondents perceived that achieving high or low KPI scores had advantages and disadvantages to the officials at three levels: provinces, agencies and individuals. These results tended to lead to various effects in terms of feeling, reward and effectiveness of tasks. Meanwhile, some argued that these scores did not have any influence.

Advantages in achieving high KPI scores

The majority of interviewees declared that achieving high KPI scores seemed to bring many benefits for them such as a good feeling (e.g. self-esteem, proud, trust and prestige), and a high level of reward. The effective upon the individuals' feelings was commonly mentioned by the respondents, particularly self-esteem as follows:

“The agencies gained trust between each other. The practitioners gained self-esteem and were proud to maintain the targets of the KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of

Provincial Community Development Office, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

“Admittedly, we compared our results of the KPIs with other provinces’ performance. We were held in high esteem when we managed to achieve higher scores.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“The province was developed due to the KPIs, I was proud of working for the KPIs because this province was my hometown. Furthermore, the team of Provincial Governor’s Office also created an environment of collaboration.” (Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“I don’t think receiving a financial reward is the main focus these days, but getting high scores seemed to acquire prestige from other provinces because it reflected the result of collaboration in the provinces.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Some officials were intrinsically motivated regarding the KPIs. While others might be motivated by the financial reward linked to the result of the KPI scores:

“The financial reward was calculated based on the KPI scores of the provinces. If we got the high scores, we could get a large amount of money.” (Senior manager, Chief of

Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2)

“When the annual bonus budget from the central government was cut, the officials lost their interest in performing KPIs as they were not motivated by the incentive.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2)

Disadvantages in getting low KPI scores

Achieving a low KPI score was reported by officials as having an emotional impact (disappointment, self-respect), a financial impact (loss of anticipated reward) and (for senior managers) loss of professional reputation.

“If the agency gained the low score, it might be viewed that the agency did not pay attention to the KPIs. This could lead to a loss of reputation of the agency, reduction of collaboration between the agencies.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Community Development Office, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

“Getting the low score could influence the feeling of the staff and the allocation of the financial reward because amount of reward was linked with the scores of the KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“If we received a low score, it reflected the competency of the organization’s executive. It implied that the leaders could not manage the subordinates.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Public Health Office, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

“Getting the low score could reflect several aspects of the organization such as teamwork, the actual problems on the tasks, and competency of solving the problems. The organization might be closely scrutinised.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

Achieving low KPI scores seemed to reflect the degree of collaboration and teamwork (participation) and competencies of HRM and solving the problems (effectiveness). The respondents also revealed that achieving low KPI scores could produce both positive and negative effects as indicated in the following statement:

“Getting the low score could have two effects. Firstly, it could stimulate the officials’ enthusiasm to work. Secondly, moral support of the officials could be decreased.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

Meanwhile, there were some respondents that tended to believe that getting high or low KPI scores was not likely to affect them:

“I think that getting a low score did not affect the agency.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“If we gained a low score of the KPIs, there was no punishment. So, it was only the recognition of getting a low score.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Administration Office, Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Such lack of concern might reflect weak promotion of the KPIs by management or may just be a symptom of traditional bureaucratic culture in which work is done only because policy, command or the possibility of sanction requires it, or both.

6.4.5 Outputs and outcomes of PA

Agreement with outputs and outcomes of PA

The majority of respondents perceived that having the KPIs contributed to performance by setting targets, encouraging collaboration between agencies or individuals, encouraging readiness for change, and responding to citizens’ needs, all of which meant that work was different from before:

“Performance evaluation and KPIs were very useful. In the past, we did not have any targets or objectives. The KPIs helped us set a clear focus in our work.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“In the past, each agency worked independently. Now, several agencies are accountable for the same KPIs. Thus, we learned to collaborate.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“There were a lot of changes in the public service from 2003 when we had the principle of good governance. The officials were to respond to the changes and the needs of the public more quickly.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

As stated earlier, the respondents appear to agree that PA can contribute several advantages, for example pursuing targets of achievement (market culture), generating collaboration (clan culture), and responding to needs of citizens (adhocracy culture), and in particular, improvement of many agencies who directly deliver public services to citizens. One of the respondents explained as follows:

“There were several types of public services that distinctly improved. For example, services of land transport office, revenue office, and public health hospitals.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

A number of interviewees revealed that one advantage of PA appeared to be its use of a concrete and transparent criteria of performance measurement:

“The use of KPI scores was concrete, transparent, and fair to measure the performance and outcomes.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

Furthermore, high KPI scores seemed to confirm that the administration was achieving development objectives:

“The high score could reflect that the tasks were well done. If the tasks were efficient, our province would be developed although we might not gain the reward.”
(Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“Basically, getting high scores reflected that we could perform the tasks with efficiency and effectiveness. This might contribute to better allocation of budget for development of the provinces, solving problems, and responding to the local citizens’ needs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

Disagreement with outputs and outcomes of PA

On the contrary, others disagreed with outputs and outcomes of PA. They argued that the results of the KPIs might not accurately reflect the performance or efficiency of the civil service. For example, not all the tasks of the provinces were selected to be the KPIs which meant there were some officials not related to the KPIs. Meanwhile, the result of any assessment had to consider the process of achieving scores and transparency as illustrated below:

“I believed that the KPIs demonstrated around 5-10% of the actual performance because the rest of the performance indicated in the KPI report was fabricated to get

high scores.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“The tasks selected for the KPIs did not reflect all the mission statements of the province.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

One of these officials nonetheless accepted that the KPI score could reflect the outputs and outcomes of performance:

“The KPI score might reflect efficiency of work. Although we primarily did it to keep ourselves in the job, the work we did was based on the actual tasks.” (Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

Another official provided additional information, that PA may reflect outputs and outcomes of performance if there were standards of assessment:

“The performance evaluation could reflect the efficiency of the organisation if the information obtained in the evaluation was correct.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

6.4.6 Recommendations for PA

Respondents suggested that PA should be improved in terms of the service provide by the central government, specially the OPDC, particularly in terms of setting the KPIs and the criteria of incentive allocation:

“The performance evaluation should be prepared at least a year in advance to be in accordance with the budget proposal.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

This may decrease pressure on the provinces regarding the timeframe for performance of the KPIs. Furthermore, the OPDC was likely required to provide opportunities for sharing ideas and more supporting factors (e.g. manual books of the KPIs) as follows:

“There should be a face-to-face discussion between host agencies and the OPDC instead of the existing time consuming telephone or memo correspondence.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“I would like to have more manuals on how to do the KPIs. There is a lot of information and I don’t think I have a great depth of understanding yet.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

Significantly, a number of officials indicated that the pattern of setting the KPIs should shift from top-down to bottom-up:

“The KPIs were established in a top-down manner. Consequently, the KPIs were not viewed as a part of the officials’ tasks. Thus, these KPIs should be characterised in a bottom-up process and linked with the provincial developing plan.”(Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Here, the officials appear to perceive that they work in a controlled system or chain of command. They tend to require change from hierarchy (e.g. policies, and commands) to participation (e.g. a voice to generate the KPIs). In addition, some officials suggested that the PA scheme should be abolished. This idea is elucidated below:

“The reason why performance evaluation should be abolished was that the officials were required to comply with government policies as well as the superiors’ command. They were not likely to have freedom of thought.”(Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2)

This implies that some officials disagreed with performing the KPIs because it involved excessive control. Other officials argued that PA scheme should be maintained further, but that the methods should be revised as follows:

“Performance evaluation should be maintained, but a new method is required. The KPIs need to be in accordance with the regular tasks. It should be better than working without any KPIs at all.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1)

6.5 Summary

This chapter reports the results of the qualitative data analysis divided into three categories: (1) leadership; (2) human resources and reward; and (3) performance, outputs and outcomes.

The data suggested that leadership was one of the most significant elements influencing the system of PA. The attentiveness of the leaders to the KPIs tended to bring clear policy and supports, including the use of the executives' authority encouraging the employees. The leaders in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to pay more attention to the KPIs as well as more support for the practitioners than the low KPI scoring provinces. The evidence suggested that the ways in which the executives use authority are different between the high and low KPI scoring provinces. The participative leadership style – people focused – was found in the high KPI scoring provinces, whilst the authoritarian leadership style – control focused – was seen in the low KPI scoring provinces. Regarding leadership-related reward allocation, the leaders in the high KPI scoring provinces appeared to be concerned with fairness of reward (equity) and clear criteria of the incentive allocation (rule of law) rather than the low KPI scoring provinces. In this respect, it is possible that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to have greater job satisfaction and more flexibility. The mixed cultures can be observed in the context of PA, such as a combination of hierarchy and clan culture, and a combination of hierarchy and market culture. It can be noted that some leaders, particularly in the high KPI scoring provinces, tend to slightly shift management style from the hierarchy culture to the market or clan culture.

Human resources and reward were viewed as significant determinants influencing attainment of PA. The characteristics of personnel who were responsible for the KPIs played a crucial impact on performance. The appropriate characteristics required were good knowledge and skills, experience and accountability, including positive attitudes to the KPIs and participation. Reward is a crucial element that can enable or inhibit success in achieving the KPIs. This appeared to be more characteristic in the low KPI scoring provinces where people tended to focus on receiving a reward more than those in the high KPI scoring provinces. This implies that intrinsic motivation among officials in the low KPI scoring provinces appears to be lower than the high KPI scoring provinces.

In terms of performance, outputs and outcomes, the evidence suggested that collaboration among agencies and individuals is a key determinant in achieving high KPI scores. It seemed that the low KPI scoring provinces had a lower level of cooperation than the high KPI scoring provinces or a higher degree of individualism. This reflects that collectivism or a clan culture is required for accomplishing PA. For outputs and outcomes of PA, a diversity of opinion was found among the officials. The majority of people agreed that performing the KPIs contributed to focusing on goal achievement (efficiency and effectiveness), generated integrated collaboration (participation), and delivered concrete results of performance (transparency), although there were some doubts about design and assessment in practice.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

7.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the empirical findings acquired from the results of the quantitative data (Chapter 5) and the qualitative data (Chapter 6). The chapter is structured into four main sections. The first section is cultural determinants of performance, for which the variables (e.g. behaviour, attitudes, knowledge and practice of the civil servants) in the system of performance agreement (PA) are viewed through four cultural types – hierarchy, clan, market, and adhocracy cultures. The discussion of each culture type is based around three aspects: key themes of the culture types from the CVF, different attributes of performance between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, and relevant components of good governance. The second section focuses on crosscutting themes as stated in the previous topic, namely what are the important features that make differences between the low and high KPI scoring provinces. The third section draws the different sets of findings together to highlight typical characteristics of the low and high KPI scoring provinces.

7.2 Cultural determinants of performance

Whilst the quantitative data, based on theOCAI provided a profile of the organizational culture of the Thai civil service, the differences in the cultural profiles of high and low KPI scoring provinces were not so different as to make theOCAI profile a reliable predictor of performance in PA. The qualitative data has, therefore, been used to

illuminate important variables in the PA system in-depth and in detail. The discussion of this section is considered based on four culture types: hierarchy, clan, market, and adhocracy respectively. In each case it emerges that it is not the degree to which an organization is characterised by the attributes of each of these cultural types that determines performance, but how it enacts these cultural types.

7.2.1 The hierarchy culture




Figure 44 The hierarchy culture and performance delivering good governance
 Note: 1) L and H mean the low and high KPI scoring provinces respectively
 2) GG means good governance

Figure 44 shows the hierarchy culture, similar and different attributes of performance between the low and high KPI scoring provinces in the PA scheme. That is to say, both high and low KPI scoring provinces demonstrated hierarchical culture, but in different ways – a hierarchical culture does not preclude promotion of good governance, such as

participation, efficiency and effectiveness through the PA scheme. The implication is that within a given culture there is still managerial discretion as to how that culture will be enacted in terms of management style.

Formalization (Rules and formal policies)

The data suggested that the civil servants at the provincial level tended to perform their work based upon formal policies and the superiors' command, particularly the Governor or Vice Governor and the chiefs of the agencies. This is because the Governor is the top executive in the provinces with centralized power, which this power is viewed as the leaders' position power to control over policy and rules (Williams and Huber, 1986).

The findings of the quantitative and qualitative data analysis suggested that formalization was differently applied in high and low KPI scoring provinces. The quantitative data showed that of the four culture types, the hierarchy culture has the highest mean score in all 16 provinces but was significantly different between both provincial groups in relation to management style and the importance given to the KPIs. The background of the leaders significantly determines characteristics of leadership, especially attention to the KPIs. For example, one of respondents indicated that:

“Different Governors give different levels of attentiveness. If we had the Governor from the field of politics, he might not pay much attention to the KPIs. On the other hand, the Governor from the field of bureaucracy perhaps paid more attention to the KPIs due to pressure from the leaders.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor's Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

This implies that a Governor from the political sphere was seen to pay less attention to the KPIs than those from a background as career officials, reflecting the degree to which the relationship between politics and bureaucracy, politics and political environment are crucial dilemmas for public sector management (Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue, 2003), i.e. influence in relocation and promotion of the executives of the provinces, as explained in Chapter 3.

The practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces seemed to focus on the policy rather than the low KPI scoring provinces. People in the high KPI scoring provinces frequently mentioned term '*clear policy*' from Governor, as the following example:

"Having a clear policy enabled us to do our job properly." (Practitioner, Provincial Governor's Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

This reflects that the degree to which Thai civil servants tend towards uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2001) as noted in Chapter Three, and therefore appropriate clear instructions, rules and policies from their superiors, aligning with what Cameron and Quinn (2011) refer to as a control orientation, focusing on efficiency. The difference between the low and high KPI scoring provinces regarding control appears to lie not in any difference in policies or underlying values but in the degree to which individual senior managers chose to focus on control and efficiency as well as individual practitioners.

Stability of operation (organizational maintenance)

Although the results of quantitative data analysis revealed that the hierarchy culture in the high KPI scoring provinces was higher than the low KPI scoring provinces. This might have been expected to negatively affect performance, whereas the reverse has occurred. The previous section has emphasised that hierarchical culture in the form of clear directives from above may be suited to the Thai administrative culture of high uncertainty avoidance. However the data also shows that hierarchical culture may be enacted via different leadership styles.

The qualitative data suggested that there were different leadership styles between the low and high KPI scoring provinces. The leadership style in the high KPI scoring province seemed to be characterised by participative style. This can be observed through regularly attending meetings and paying more attention of leaders – meetings are seen as the opportunities to aligning support and discussing problems between leaders and staff. One of senior managers in the high KPI scoring province stated that:

“In the meetings, the Governor or Vice Governor played an important role. If they paid attention to the KPIs, they could support the team, drive the resource requirements, and solve the problems. Most importantly, the meetings must take place regularly.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

On the other hand, a more authoritarian style was found in the low KPI scoring provinces, where the attributes of sharing ideas between leaders and staff appeared to be limited. This can be seen from one of senior managers indicated that:

“The support we required from the Governor was an opportunity to share ideas. If he ran the office solely by his own opinion and he did not listen to anyone, his subordinates might be scared to share ideas.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2)

In this respect, leaders in the hierarchy culture can influence organizational performance through using participative and authoritarian ways. The different leadership styles contribute to different results of performance. A participative style that is people-focused can bring social stability to the organization through staff motivation and willingness to take responsibility; reduces turnover; and delivers a high level of achievement (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006; Williams and Huber, 1986). Participative leadership is associated with improved performance through both motivational (e.g. increasing intrinsic motivation) and exchanged-based (e.g. treating fairness for employees) mechanisms (Huang et al., 2010). The idea that attributes of good governance such as accountability, participation, efficiency and effectiveness are generated by a participative style is not necessarily new, for example Bratton et al. (2007) and Jackson (1989) agree that a participative style is more effective than the authoritarian style. The authoritarian style – task focused – relies on authority, rules, regulations, command and centralization (Armstrong and Baron, 1998; Dooren,

Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Jackson, 1989) that usually assign tasks while neglecting the needs of staff in order to create controlling and centralized orientation (Williams and Huber, 1986). People in the low KPI scoring provinces tended to work in a less flexible organizational.

The findings suggested that some executives, particularly the leaders in the high KPI scoring provinces, were able to move from directive style – asking the staff members to follow rules and procedures (Francesco and Gold, 1998) – to participative style – making decisions based on discussion and collective analysis of problems between the managers and staff (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006). This is despite the more usual view, for example, that of Gill (2006) that managers in Southeast Asian incline towards a directive style³⁰ rather than participative style.

The importance of leadership style for performance may be seen in the survey responses regarding job satisfaction (question 9: You have no concerns about the style of management) suggested that the practitioners in the 16 provinces tended to be concerned with leadership style. For example, one of respondents stated that:

“I think that leadership was important in terms of management of the limited resources such as human, materials, equipment. The Governor’s authority assisted partnership work and resource sharing between agencies.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

³⁰ Directive style refers to managers provide specific guidance, set deadlines for completion of work, and ask staff to follow rule and procedure (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006).

Rewards based on rank

One priority for provinces implementing PA was to provide financial incentives to those directly responsible for attaining the KPI outputs, seen as rewards based on performance rather than rewards based on rank (seniority). In the context of PA, rewarding in the hierarchy culture is associated with leaders' management of rewards and the criteria of reward allocation.

The qualitative data showed that senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to put more effort into the management of reward than did their equivalents in the low KPI scoring provinces, for example, generating understanding about the criteria of reward and voting for the appropriate criteria of reward. These ideas are indicated by respondents that:

"...I had to call for a meeting to explain how the reward was allocated..." (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

"... The leaders proposed different formulas to the officials to consider and voted for the best one. The officials took part in the process." (Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

Although rewards are important for motivation towards achieving goals (Gill, 2006; Williams and Huber, 1986), the leaders' management of the reward system has a greater motivational significance than the actual reward itself. Besides the importance of leader

for rewarding, the criterion of reward is crucial in determining performance of civil servants, which should be under the rule of law. As it was, the majority of respondents appeared to be in favour of reconsideration of the criteria of reward allocation. This is because, for example, a strong monetary reward may incentivise distortion of evidence (transparency) about the attainment of high KPI scores while a weak monetary reward may lead to a low level of motivation (participation).

7.2.2 The clan culture

The findings from both quantitative and qualitative data suggested that the clan culture has a significant impact on the civil service's performance. The quantitative data revealed that the clan and market cultures were where the most significant differences between the low and high KPI scoring provinces were located. This is compatible with the qualitative data that there are three major elements of clan culture – personnel issues, cohesion and teamwork, and equity of rewards that influenced performance of the provinces. Figure 45 shows the relationship between the clan culture and performance, similar and different attributes of performance between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, and performance in terms of KPIs (good governance).




Figure 45 The clan culture and performance delivering good governance

Note: 1) L means the low KPI scoring provinces and H means the high KPI scoring provinces

2) GG means good governance

Personnel issues

Many respondents mentioned human resource (HR) issues as a factor that influenced performance in getting high KPI score at the levels of the provinces and agencies. This is because the clan culture comprises cohesion, commitment and capability of the employees (Zammuto and Krakower, 1991) that enable high performance in the PA system. However, there were several challenges relevant to individuals' performance, particularly the senior managers' concern in the individuals' assumptions about the KPIs, relocation of the responsible persons for the KPIs, and trust in the team of Provincial Governor's Office.

For the individuals' assumptions regarding the KPIs, the data suggested that the leaders in the high KPI scoring provinces referred extensively to staff's views about the KPIs and about their communication about this with staff. This reflects how the managers in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to be participative or people focused in style – which may lead to have a greater confidence in staff motivation, responsibility and involvement and a reduced rate of turnover (Williams and Huber, 1986). This is consistent with the views of a respondent in the high KPI scoring provinces who said that:

“Fortunately, the officials within our province do not relocate very often. They had been here for a long time, so they had a good relationship to each other. Consequently, our province had good collaboration.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Such characteristics as a low rate of staff turnover, high commitment, and high loyalty of the employees are associated with organizations that have a strong culture (Gay, 1997 and Legge, 1989 cited in McKenna and Beech, 2002, p.16; Robbins, 2005). Overall it seems reasonable to conclude that a strong culture was found in the high KPI scoring provinces rather than the low KPI scoring provinces and that it was attributed to better leadership.

Another personnel-related issue was degree of trust in the team of Provincial Governor's Office. The data suggested that the team of the Provincial Governor's Office in the high KPI scoring provinces appeared to gain more trust by the agencies and staff in the provinces than the low KPI scoring provinces through, for example, taking responsibility, demonstrating professionalism (e.g. having and introducing knowledge

of the KPIs) and transparency of reward allocation. The team of Governor's Office is the central agency in the provinces who leads other agencies, viewed as group leadership (Parry and Proctor-Thomson, 2003). A lack of trust in this team may lead to loss of collaboration in the provinces. The individuals' trust is the basis of developing an organizational culture (Price, 2011) such the clan culture.

There were other personal issues such as limitation of number of the officials, over pressure of work, relocation of the responsible persons for the KPIs, and a lack of training. The issue of pressure of work seems to be a particular concern of many respondents. The result of assessment of job satisfaction (question 4: The amount of responsibility given you is not excessive) acquired from the quantitative data analysis showed that there were not significantly different views on pressure of work between senior managers in the low and high KPI scoring provinces. However, it was clearly observed that the low KPI scoring provinces had higher mean scores than the high KPI scoring provinces. It is possible that senior managers in the low KPI scoring provinces tended not to be concerned with pressure of work or they perhaps did not pay so much attention to the KPI. On the other hand, there were significantly different views on pressure of work between practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces (Sig.= 0.010). The qualitative data suggested that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to perform their work with commitment, even though they had to cope with overwhelming work in a tight timeframe or pressure from superiors. It is possible that a higher commitment of the practitioners contributes to achieving higher KPI scores in an agency and in a province respectively. Here, the clan culture may derive from

internal accountability – accountability of bureaucrats to superiors who have assigned jobs for them (Drüke, 2007; Moynihan, 2008) or the hierarchy culture.

The data suggested that several problems relevant to HR were perhaps resolved by the ways senior managers played their role. For example, overwhelming work pressure and declining the problems can be resolved by managers through the allocation of appropriate responsibilities or through strengthening the culture (e.g. inspiring and building teams).

Cohesion and teamwork

The overall achievement in PA of the provinces derives from various sectors, particularly the KPI host agencies in the provinces and their staff members. The majority of respondents perceived that collaboration or teamwork is a crucial factor in achieving high KPI scores. This can be seen from many respondents who broadly mentioned terms '*collaboration*', '*teamwork*', and '*potential of team of Provincial Governor's Office*'.

The quantitative data suggested that the high KPI scoring provinces had a higher mean score of the clan culture than the other ones. In other words, a higher commitment, that is a characteristic of stronger clan culture (Deal and Kennedy, 1988), appeared to be seen in the high KPI scoring province than the low KPI scoring provinces. The different degree of strength of the clan culture seemed to derive from meetings with the leaders, with the meetings perhaps glue that held the organizations together.

Furthermore, the individuals' positive assumptions on the KPIs or the PA scheme were a key indicator in determining a degree of collaboration or strong (clan) culture in the

provinces. Brown (1998) and Davis (1984) state that strong or shared beliefs and values among staff of an organization make for strong cultures. This implies that individuals' assumptions are important for creating strong culture in order to generate high performance (Brown, 1998). The qualitative data suggested that people in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to have more positive assumptions performing the KPIs than the low KPI scoring provinces. They perceived the advantages of the KPIs, for example in enhancing the integrated coordination between the agencies in the provinces. Similarly, the research finding of Sathornkich (2010) revealed that coordination among the agencies and participation among the executives at the provincial level in Thailand have been enhanced in the PA system. By contrast, some officials in the low KPI scoring provinces appeared to have negative attitudes in implementing the KPIs.

Thus, in the context of PA, the clan culture (collaboration and teamwork) is perhaps a key element in achieving high KPI scores because high collaboration can contribute to strong culture – sharing the same basic assumptions e.g. goal alignment (Brown, 1998). This is perhaps surprising given that many scholars (e.g. Benedict, 1943; Embree, 1950; Klausner, 1997; Phillips, 1966) argue that Thais are characterized as individualistic, for example they seem to prefer working alone.

Equity of the rewards

Equity of the reward focuses on individuals' views on rewards in terms of fairness and impartiality. The qualitative data suggested that respondents in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to perceive a higher degree of fairness in the KPI-related reward allocation than the low KPI scoring provinces. This is consistent with the quantitative

data acquired from assessment of job satisfaction (question 6: Your supervisor supports your career development), which revealed that the staff in the high KPI scoring provinces had a higher mean score of job satisfaction in terms of promotion and reward allocation than the low KPI scoring provinces. People in the high KPI scoring provinces may be more satisfied in benefiting from the reward scheme rather than people in the low KPI scoring provinces.

The qualitative data showed that less reward satisfaction among people in the low KPI scoring provinces may derive from emphasizing more on external motivator such as financial reward more than being task focused. This can be seen from a senior manager in a low KPI scoring province who stated that:

“...If we did not have the incentive, the officials’ morale for working might be decreased and they might perform the tasks with unhappiness... These days, the reward was less. Therefore, the officials were less motivated.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Community Development Office, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

This reflects that people in the low KPI scoring provinces tend to focus on their own benefits, known as individualism, than being task focused. People are concerned with external motivation, which may lead to lose motivation for working when they do not receive rewards. Here, it is consistent with Stringer, Didham and Theivananthampillai (2011) who found that extrinsic motivators are negatively associated with job satisfaction, especially some people who are concerned with fairness and who often

compare their rewards with others or feel that their pay is not appropriate for their attempt. This can be seen below:

“We had less incentive in comparison with the local government agencies... In contrast, the provincial agencies received much less reward.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

On the other hand, people in the high KPI scoring provinces appeared to be more task focused and people focused, as stated by the senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces that:

“The financial reward was a motivation for the officials in working on the KPIs. Although they were not rewarded, they still performed their tasks...” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

“The provinces could achieve in the KPIs by cooperation of the central government agencies in the region. However, these agencies could not get the incentive from the provinces as the OPDC indicated...” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

This reflects that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to focus on task achievement even though they do not receive the rewards, whilst the practitioners in the low KPI scoring provinces tended to lose their motivation for working in the year

without annual bonus. The senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to be concerned with fairness among the eligible persons and the practitioners' motivation performing the KPIs.

As stated earlier, the data suggest at least three main aspects. Firstly, fairness of rewards is associated with individuals' job satisfaction, but not motivation. Unfairness of reward allocation between those responsible for the KPIs might generate disharmony at the level of provinces, agencies, and individuals. Price (2011) stated that high commitment of people occurs when they feel that they are impartially rewarded (equity). Secondly, extrinsic motivation appears to be negatively associated with people's performance, for example, people may lose morale when they are rewarded less than their expectation; it may lead to a problem of equity, and distortion of appraisal results or the objective of overall performance (Fletcher, 1993; Murphy and Denisi, 2008). As a result of monetary reward being a sensitive issue (Price, 2011), many scholars (e.g. Armstrong, 1990; McKenna and Beech, 2002; Moon, 2000) suggest that intrinsic motivation factors provide a greater positive impact on performance than extrinsic motivation. Hence, using intrinsic reward seems to be a more sustainable source of motivation than extrinsic reward because it is associated with individuals' feeling, such as pride, satisfaction of social needs and opportunities to increase skills (Armstrong, 1990; Fletcher, 1993; Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue, 2003; McKenna and Beech, 2002). Thirdly, leadership is important to manage reward in terms of fairness because leaders are associated with reward power to motivate people for achieving goals as well as punishments (Armstrong, 1990; Gill, 2006; Williams and Huber, 1986).

7.2.3 The market culture

The quantitative data suggested that the market culture was the most significantly different between the high and low KPI scoring provinces at the same level as clan culture. The high KPI scoring provinces tended to have a greater mean score than the low KPI scoring provinces. The qualitative data revealed that there are three different characteristics of the market-oriented value between both groups: pursuit of goals, competition and achievement, and rewards based on achievement as shown in Figure 46.




Figure 46 The market culture and performance delivering good governance

Note: 1) L means the low KPI scoring provinces and H means the high KPI scoring provinces
2) GG means good governance

Pursuit of goals

The qualitative data suggested that the market culture in the provinces was generated through three key elements: pursuit of the KPI targets by the meetings, pressure from the superiors, and the individuals' consciousness. The high KPI scoring provinces tended to have a higher degree of pursuing the KPI targets than the low KPI scoring provinces. One practitioner in a high KPI scoring province stated that:

“The meetings were important in terms of monitoring the progress of the KPIs in the period of 6, 9, and 12 months.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Many respondents perceived that the meetings with the executives were important opportunities to monitor progress of the KPIs whether at the level of provinces or agencies. Some provinces and agencies attempted to compare their results with others, while other provinces and agencies attempted to pursue goal achievement. In addition, the KPIs appeared to improve several types of public service, particularly a quick response to the needs of citizens. This corresponds to the idea that the market culture can bring customer focused orientation (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). These data reflect that responsiveness and efficiency can be generated in the context of PA. In other words, PA or performance management can contribute to being focused on outputs and outcomes focused.

Some respondents took the view that there was excessive pressure from superiors to pursue the goals and objectives of the KPIs. The quantitative data – question 10 ‘The pursuit of organizational targets does not put you under excessive pressure’ – revealed a wide variation between the low and high KPI scoring provinces (Sig.= 0.006). The high KPI scoring provinces had higher mean score than the low KPI scoring provinces. The implication is that people in the high KPI scoring provinces perhaps worked in a more flexible environment than did in the low KPI scoring provinces, perhaps reflecting the more participative or people focused leadership style found in the higher scoring provinces.

Regarding individuals' conscientiousness, the qualitative data revealed that the senior managers and practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to perform their work with more conscientiousness than the low KPI scoring provinces. For instance, one senior manager in a high KPI scoring province stated that:

"...the accomplishment of the KPIs might derive from the officials' conscience." (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor's Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

Competition and achievement

The quantitative data revealed that the market culture between the low and high KPI scoring provinces were significantly different (Sig.= 0.001) with the highest different mean scores (0.24). Only the market culture had significant differences between the senior manager in both groups (Sig.= 0.042), whilst the market culture was the most significantly different (Sig.= 0.002) between the practitioners in both groups as well as the clan culture. This is compatible with the qualitative data that a tendency of competitive-orientated model seemed to characterise the high KPI scoring provinces. One of the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces stated that:

"The chiefs of the agencies were the main people who introduced the clear policy to the subordinates. For example, the leaders required the subordinates to compete the KPI results with others agencies." (Practitioner, Provincial Governor's Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Here the practitioners perceived that leaders are important in generating the market culture through decisions and management practices. In this context, the leaders are viewed as competitive and hard drivers (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). The senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to do more than the others to ‘accelerate’ staff enthusiasm. One senior manager in the high KPI scoring provinces stated that:

“I informed the subordinates by the monthly meetings... If the result of the KPIs was not close to the targets, we had to accelerate our team performance.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2)

It is possible that people in the high ones tended to perform their work based on competitive-oriented models in order to receive efficiency and effectiveness. The implication is that the PA scheme can generate a market culture in public organizations. This is consistent with the view of Kennedy (2000 cited in Radnor and McGuire, 2004) that public organizations perform their tasks without market competition, therefore performance measurement is often employed as a substitute for market pressures. However, it is important to note that the market culture in the context of PA is supported by hierarchy culture. In other words, strength of the market culture seems to be generated by leadership, although a degree of the market culture between the low and high KPI scoring provinces are not much different in the PA scheme. Similarly, the results of previous studies on organizational culture in the Thai public sector revealed

that the market culture is slightly increased in overview of post-reform in the Thai public sector (Jingjit, 2008; Phookpan, 2012).

Rewards based on achievement

The results of PA are linked with the annual bonus allocation from the central government. This criteria is compatible with the principle of the market culture that reward is based on achievement or payment by result (McKenna and Beech, 2002; Zammuto and Krakower, 1991). McKenna and Beech (2002) state that the reward system is used as a change mechanism to generate a more pronounced performance-oriented culture. However, the findings of this study appeared to show little influence of result-based rewards. This can be seen from different views of people on performance-related pay (PRP) in the PA scheme.

Some officials agreed with PRP due to enhancing motivation of staff in performing the KPIs. This can be observed through views of some respondents in the high KPI scoring provinces indicated that:

“I agreed to maintain the criteria of reward based on result of the KPIs because the financial incentive was a motivation for people...” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

“The financial reward was a motivation for the officials in working on the KPIs...” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

This implies that monetary reward can contribute to motivation; Helmke and Levitsky (2004) state that motivation is crucial to shape organizational culture to pursue their goal accomplishment. On the contrary, other officials disagreed with PRP, for example, the limited number of people related to the KPIs, small amount of financial reward, and distortion of evidence in achieving high KPI score, as the following example:

“I disagreed with the criteria of incentive allocation...there were various tasks of the provinces, but some tasks were selected as the KPIs...” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

In this respect, providing financial rewards based on achievement in high performance evaluation appears to remain ambiguous either in the high or low KPI scoring provinces. Using financial reward or PRP in the context of PMS remains a controversial issue as the relationship between PRP and high organizational performance cannot be proved (Bevan and Thompson, 1991 cited in Fletcher, 1993; Institute of Personnel Management, 1992). Although Fletcher (1993) and Murphy and Denisi (2008) claim that there are several challenges of PRP, Moynihan and Pandey (2005) and Price (2011) point out that at least it motivates and retains high performing people. Armstrong (1990) suggests that the incentives can lead to achieving performance when the pay system provides appropriate incentives and the value of the rewards is consistent with the individuals' needs. It is possible that the appropriate incentive with relevance to the officials' needs may lead to enhanced performance such as in participation and accountability of the individuals performing the KPIs as well as the appropriate ways of management of reward by the leaders.

7.2.4 The adhocracy culture

The quantitative data suggests that the adhocracy culture was significantly different between the low and high KPI scoring provinces (Sig.= 0.003) although it had not much different comparing with other culture types. Similarly, the results of assessment of job satisfaction (question 2 ‘Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of working’) revealed that the adhocracy culture between the 16 provinces had significant differences (Sig.= 0.042). The presence of the characteristics of adhocracy culture were not reflected in the qualitative data analysis. However, they can be observed through three main aspects: dynamic (response to external change), risk taker (decision of solving problem-related the KPIs), and the reward individual initiative issue as shown in Figure 47.




Figure 47 The adhocracy culture and performance delivering good governance

Note: 1) L means the low KPI scoring provinces and H means the high KPI scoring provinces
2) GG means good governance

Dynamic (Response to external change)

The provinces appeared to be confronted by several external changes from the central government such as changing standard of the KPIs, announcing the government policy with contradictory criteria of some KPIs, and variant allocation of the budget for the financial reward by the government. These suggest that PA can enhance a characteristic of response to external change among people. Some respondents perceived that implementing the KPIs could lead to quicker responses to citizens' needs, as some officials stated that:

“There were a lot of changes in the public service from 2003 when we had the principle of good governance. The officials were to respond to the changes and the needs of the public more quickly.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor's Office, 22 July 2014: PL2)

“There were several types of public services that distinctly improved. For example, services of land transport office, revenue office, and public health hospitals.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor's Office, 13 August 2014: PH1)

Reducing time in delivering public services to citizens implies that the KPIs of the PA scheme can increase responsiveness – a quick response for the needs of the citizens within reasonable timeframe (UNESCAP, 2003). Moreover, enhancing the attribute of response to external change can be observed through strategic planning in short-term period (one year), which all government agencies have to indicate after the public sector

reform in 2002 as well as the scheme of PA. These data suggest that the attribute of responsiveness to external change can be generated through the PA scheme. This may lead the civil service to have greater efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of public service delivery. However, the previous studies investigated about organizational culture of the Thai public sector revealed that the adhocracy culture has been slightly increased after the public sector reform in Thailand (Jingjit, 2008; Phookpan, 2012). A weak attribute of the adhocracy culture may derive from traditional concepts in Thailand ‘*Cha Cha Dai Pla Lem Ngam*’ (Do things slowly and make sure you get a beautiful big knife) (Pimpa, 2012, p. 37). This national culture probably determines leadership style and individuals’ characteristics in the Thai public sector. Furthermore, the limited number of civil servants coming from younger generation who are familiar with the concept of organizational change (Pimpa, 2012) may contribute to a low level of the adhocracy culture in the Thai civil service.

However, some leaders appear to shift their style and management from administration to management on variety of unexpected challenges related to the KPIs. Likewise, the research findings discovered by Sathornkich (2010) revealed that the PMS creates a shift in working culture of the executives at the provincial level from bureaucratic administration to managerial one. Nevertheless, Hofstede (2001) claimed that the characteristics of response to external change or taking risks are not much observed among Thais due to their characteristic of uncertainty avoidance. This feature is reasonable in that Thais held the limited values of tolerance of ambiguity and acceptance of risk in order to minimize uncertainty by strict rules, regulations, laws and policies for implementation (Pimpa, 2012).

Risk taker (Decision of solving problem-related the KPIs)

Although the attribute of risk taker is not widely seen in Thai society, the qualitative data suggested that the PA scheme seemed to generate the characteristic of risk taker in the Thai public organizations. Particularly, the chiefs of the agencies and the front line managers had to take action as a risk taker for solving problems related to the KPIs such as relocation of the responsible persons for the KPIs. The data suggested that the senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to express a higher degree of response to the problems relevant to the KPIs than the low KPI scoring provinces. The implication is that PA probably changes the leadership style from traditional bureaucracy to business sector such as a risk taker. Although the characteristic of risk taker – advice and problem-solving – is important for maintaining smooth operations and organizational maintenance through advice and problem-solving.

Reward individual initiative issue

Some may consider that it is difficult to find the attribute of innovation in the public sector, because it is a characteristic found in the private sector (Kimberly and Pouvoueville, 1993 cited in Talbot, 2010). The quantitative data suggested a factor that influenced creativity of people is a control focus, namely a lack of flexibility for working. The result of assessment of job satisfaction obtained from the quantitative data analysis – question 2 ‘Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of working’ – suggested that there was significant difference between the low and high KPI scoring provinces (Sig.= 0.001). The high KPI scoring provinces had higher mean score than the low KPI scoring provinces. This implies that people in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to have more flexible circumstances for performing the KPIs. This is

consistent with the qualitative data that leaders in the high KPI scoring provinces incline towards participative style; in contrast leaders in the low KPI scoring provinces appear to have an authoritarian style. It is therefore possible that people in the low ones tend to have a lower degree of creativity, whilst staff in the high KPI scoring provinces perhaps have more of a climate of creativity. McKenna and Beech (2002) point out that a climate of creativity is one aspect of organizational functioning derived from a strong culture. The PA scheme probably helps to increase innovation in the public organization because performance measurement can encourage innovation in the public sector (Williams, 1933; Williams, 1998).

7.3 Crosscutting themes

According to the previous section, ‘effectiveness’ was the most extensively mentioned characteristic by respondents who performed the KPIs and then ‘participation’, ‘efficiency’ and ‘accountability and responsiveness’ respectively. These views seem to be consistent with Greiling (2005) that performance measurement is a crucial instrument increasing effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of the public organizations. Moreover, it is also consistent with the purpose indicated in the performance evaluation framework for the fiscal year 2007-2011 in four key dimensions: effectiveness of mission, service quality, efficiency of performance and organizational development.

(1) Effectiveness

The performance evaluation framework stated that the aspect of effectiveness is the main purpose of PA, the highest weight (%) of 50 comparing with the other three dimensions. It was stated as the first dimension of the performance evaluation

framework (see Table 3 in Chapter Three) – the effective mission, namely the goal of achieving in the KPIs relevant to the action plans of the agencies. The qualitative data suggested that effectiveness was generated from implementing the KPIs or performance evaluation. There were four major factors influencing effectiveness in the Thai civil service: the reward system, leadership, the individuals' characteristics and the meetings.

The reward system

In the context of PMS, performance-related pay (PRP) has a significant impact on the motivation of individuals (Hatry, 2007). As stated earlier, PRP may influence performance of some people in pursuing goals of the KPIs. Measurement of goal achievement is one of the indicators to present effectiveness (Osborne et al., 1993). This implies that the reward system may influence effectiveness. However, using rewards for generating effectiveness of performance is concerned with misinterpretation on the incentives' objectives by officials. Some officials tend to focus on making benefit as a business rather than producing outputs and outcomes of the public services. In other words, people being measured tend to manage the measure rather than the performance, viewed as 'measurement dysfunction' (Neely, 1998 cited in Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006, p. 27). Thus, the reconsideration of the incentive system in the PA scheme was recommended by a number of respondents, particularly pay format and fairness of reward. Peters and Savoie (1995) stated that effectiveness can be created when a clear set of reward is identified and satisfactory to civil servants.

Leadership

Leadership is a key feature influencing high performance in order to achieve effectiveness in the organizations. The evidence suggested that three main dimensions related to leadership were involved: task management, HRM and reward management. The executives who led the organizations by a participative leadership style tended to focus on people in order to achieve tasks. The managers who focused on task management tended to manage organizations based on task and goal-oriented achievement and solving problems related to the KPIs. Here, Blake and Mouton (1981) state that leadership style as either ‘concern for people’ or ‘concern for task’ can be simultaneously interrelated. For HRM, the leaders played a crucial role on the issues of HR, such as solving problems of staff members’ relocation and being concerned with people’s morale. Poor leadership may contribute to many problems such as lack of trust, high rate of staff turnover and deficient morale (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010). Moreover, the leaders who could produce effectiveness in the organizations tended to have strategies for reward management and enable fairness and equity of the reward allocation among the officials. In this respect, it implies that management style and approach (e.g. task, human resource, and reward) are important for achieving effectiveness.

The individuals’ characteristics

The data suggested that the effectiveness of civil service is perhaps dominated by individuals’ characteristics, for instance assumptions, coordination, competitive-orientation, response to external change and initiative. Particularly, the individuals’ assumptions seemed to be a crucial element leading to effectiveness, including assumptions on the KPIs and on the rewards. People who had positive attitudes or beliefs

in performing the KPIs tended to express conscientiousness and attention to the tasks related to the KPIs in order to create strong culture. On the other hand, wrong assumptions, such as beliefs that the KPIs are not their responsibility, of the staff members can lead to an inappropriate culture (weak culture) that negatively affects performance (Armstrong, 1990).

The meetings

The meetings seemed to be the other essential factor that significantly influenced the staff members' performance (effectiveness). Performance review meetings with leaders can build effective team and manage the team (Moore, 1994; Platt, 1999). The findings suggested that the communication between the executives and officials through the meetings had a significant impact on, for example, aligning provincial orientation, enhancing understanding related to the KPIs, generating collaboration, encouraging resources, monitoring progress of the KPIs, pursuing goals and increasing morale. Here, it suggests that a meeting is an important technique to manage team (Moore, 1994), particularly formal meetings with the executives, and teamwork enables people to accomplish tasks together (Armstrong and Baron, 1998).

2) Participation

Participation was extensively mentioned by the respondents as the second aspect of good governance. The attribute of participation is one of the important elements under the second dimension of performance evaluation framework – the quality of public sector service delivery, which it is concerned with improvement of public service delivery as well as public participation. The evidence suggested that three main

categories led to participation in the provinces: leadership and reward system, loyalty or warm and caring, and the individuals' characteristics.

Leadership and reward system

Leadership is a major force to create commitment to and involvement with productivity of organizations (Blake and Mouton, 1981). A team builder is a leadership type in the clan culture (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). Building a team is viewed as generating participation through sharing their ideas for the formulation of a policy or course of action (Williams and Huber, 1986). Thus, participative leadership style tend to generate participation. Besides leadership style, rewarding is a technique from the private sector that is used to create participation in the public sector (Peters and Savoie, 1995). However, rewards appear to be a sensitive issue for maintaining organizational performance when fairness is not assured as stated earlier sections. This is because motivation of the officials, particularly in performance appraisal, may be destroyed due to unfair discrimination (Fletcher, 1993; Ryan and Pointon, 2007).

Loyalty or warm and caring

A high level of participation appears to be created when organizations (the provinces) encourage loyalty or warmth and caring of staff (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). In the context of PA, loyalty of officials in a province is viewed through rate of relocation. As stated earlier that the high KPI scoring provinces tend to have a higher degree of loyalty as a result of the low rate of relocation. The high rate of turnover not only derives from the officials themselves, such as moving to their hometown, but also from leadership. A cause of high rate of staff turnover and lack of trust may derive from poor leadership

(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010), in the PA scheme, either the executives or the team of Provincial Governor' Office.

The data suggest that some people still work in a province because it is their hometown, as a practitioner indicated that:

“The province was developed due to the KPIs, I was proud of working for the KPIs because this province was my hometown...” (Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2)

In addition, the KPIs perhaps generate sense of unity in the provinces regarding integrated collaboration in the provinces for achieving the overall result of PA, as one of senior managers stated that:

“In the past, each agency worked independently. Now, several agencies are accountable for the same KPIs. Thus, we learned to collaborate.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1)

In this context, it implies that the PA scheme can generate sense of ownership among the agencies within a province or participation. Participation (e.g. sharing opinions and making decision) can be created when people feel part of an organization, which is viewed as an important element of strong culture (Brown, 1998; Christensen et al., 2007).

The individuals' characteristics

The findings of this study also suggested that participation in the provinces seemed to be generated by the individuals' attentiveness and conscientiousness in implementing the KPIs. This implies that participation in the provinces is generated by the individuals' characteristics. On the contrary, participation of people in the provinces is probably created by the process of PA itself as stated earlier.

3) Efficiency

Efficiency of public organizations was often referred to through the evidence with reference to leadership and control system, reward system and other factors (e.g. the meetings, competitive-oriented, and response to external change). Efficiency of performance was under the third dimension of performance evaluation framework focused on the standardization of process improvement. For example, the agencies are anticipated to improve budget management process, reduce costs, maximize the usage of energy, and achieve a reducing process time of services.

Leadership and control system

Bratton et al. (2007) suggest that a participative leadership style is more effective than an autocratic leadership style. Participative leadership tends to be people focused and encourage participation among people, which may lead to improvement in efficiency because officials at lower levels have greater participation, viewed as decentralization (World Bank, 1992). Regarding control system, it is seen as hierarchical and market orientations in the CVF. Although Cameron and Quinn (2011) state that the leaders who focus on hierarchical values are often to be a monitor in order to generate efficiency,

Armstrong and Baron (1998) claim that control orientation may inhibit performance rather than facilitate performance. For market values, leaders are viewed as a hard driver in order to generate productivity and efficiency of organizations (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). In this respect, it implies that participative and authoritarian styles can be simultaneously created for achieving high performance.

The reward system

The majority of respondents perceived that fairness of reward allocation can lead to efficiency of performance regarding job satisfaction, but in terms of motivation there are different views between officials. Although the use of rewards system is ambiguous about can financial reward motivate people in performing the KPIs, some respondents stated that receiving financial reward contributed to morale for achieving the KPIs such as reducing process time of services. This may lead to achieve good services reflects that efficiency is generated (Jackson, 1995).

Other factors

Efficiency of performance appears to be generated through the meetings because they provide the opportunities to accelerate staff in pursuing goal achievement. The competitive-orientation is sometimes emphasized by some executives, in fact, the purpose of the PA scheme emphasizes on target achievement rather than competitive-orientation. This is because each province has different provincial strategies in order to have different the KPIs in the first dimension, although other dimensions are compulsory (see Chapter Three, section 3.4.2). Thus, the overall result of PA of each province cannot be compared, but some provinces seem to desire comparison with other provinces. In the

context of PA, the market culture regarding goal achievement is perhaps generated in order to create efficiency of the Thai civil service, as in the idea of Cameron and Quinn (2011) that efficiency is the end of the market culture.

4) Accountability and Responsiveness

Accountability – a sense of responsibility on the part of staff – in the context of PA was often mentioned in relation to internal accountability such as responsibilities on job assigned by the leaders (e.g. being the responsible persons as the KPI host), and on the results anticipated (e.g. achieving goals of the KPIs). Internal accountability is important for responsibilities of a certain job and for achieving results desired (Ryan and Pointon, 2007). Meanwhile, responsiveness was found in the agencies who deliver public services in terms of responding to needs of the citizens within reasonable timeframe (UNESCAP, 2009). Moreover, low level of responsiveness was found when the leaders tend to lack a characteristic of taking action on the problems related to the KPIs. This can be seen as a lack of response to vital need of stakeholders (Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015) such as staff, other agencies and the citizens.

7.4 Typical characteristics of the low and high KPI scoring provinces

This section discusses the typical characteristics of the low and high KPI scoring provinces. As stated earlier, the typical characteristics of each provincial group can be divided into four categories: leadership, individuals' characteristics, reward system and others (e.g. task and goal-oriented, trust of the team of Provincial Governor's Office, and meetings with the executives). Table 30 demonstrates the comparison of the typical characteristics between the low and high KPI scoring provinces as in the following explanation.

Table 30 Comparison of the typical characteristics between the low and high KPI scoring provinces

Typical characteristics	Low KPI scoring provinces	High KPI scoring provinces
1. Leadership	Authoritarian leadership style	Participative leadership style
2. Individuals' characteristics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Negative assumptions to the KPIs ▪ Low collaboration ▪ Slow response to external change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Positive assumptions to the KPIs ▪ High collaboration ▪ Quick response to external change
3. Reward system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Extrinsic motivation ▪ Management of rewards based individualistic view 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Intrinsic motivation ▪ Management of rewards based collective view
4. Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Low degree of the market-oriented cultural model ▪ Low trust of the team of Provincial Governor's Office ▪ Informal meetings without the executives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ High degree of the market-oriented cultural model ▪ High trust of the team of Provincial Governor's Office ▪ Formal meetings with the executives

1) Leadership

Leadership styles significantly dominate performance of the civil service in different ways, particularly participative and authoritarian styles. Participative style was found in the high KPI scoring provinces, whilst authoritarian style was found in the low KPI scoring provinces. Participative style seemed to lead to high performance rather than the authoritarian style because of greater concern with the individuals' needs, greater willingness and responsibility, and greater involvement in planning and making decisions (Williams and Huber, 1986). Many scholars (e.g. Bratton et al., 2007; Jackson, 1989) appear to agree that participative style is more effective than authoritarian style. This implies that participative leadership style (people focused) can lead to higher performance. It is possible that the employees in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to have higher job satisfaction and more flexible circumstances. These characteristics refer

to strong culture in terms of high consistency and employees' motivation (Brown, 1998; Christensen et al., 2007).

On the one hand, people in the low KPI scoring provinces who performed tasks under the authoritarian style tended to have less flexibility because they worked based on the executives' command and policies. The implication of high performance would be generated when the control system – the hierarchical-oriented value – is perhaps shifted to greater flexibility or external focus such as clan or adhocracy or market orientations. Brown (1998, p. 229) suggests that 'strong culture equals high performance'.

2) The individuals' characteristics

Three typical characteristics of the individuals in the low and high KPI scoring provinces were different: assumptions, collaboration and response to external change. The data suggested that the staff members in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to have positive assumptions performing the KPIs in order to work based on attentiveness and conscientiousness. Meanwhile, people in the low KPI scoring provinces seemed to have negative attitudes to the KPIs. This may lead to a different level of collaboration between both groups. In other words, negative or weak culture may demotivate staff to perform their work (Ehtesham, Muhammad and Muhammad, 2011). Therefore, higher collaboration between the agencies and officials was found in the high KPI scoring provinces. This reflects that the high KPI scoring provinces have stronger culture than the low KPI scoring provinces because a high degree of staff members commitment is seen in strong culture (Luhman and Cunliffe, 2013; Robbins, 2005). Moreover, strong culture in the high KPI scoring provinces may derive from high cohesion or good

relationship due to less relocation among the officials, viewed as high loyalty. These imply that strong culture has a significant impact on high performance to deliver good governance because strong culture ensures greater commitment, increases behavioural consistency, and ensures people point to the same direction (Robbins, 2005; Senior and Fleming, 2006). This is different from the idea proposed by some scholars (e.g. Klausner, 1997; Hofstede, 1999; Phillips, 1966) that Thais are characterized as being individualistic.

In addition, the data suggested that the high KPI scoring provinces tended to have quicker response to change such as solving problems related to the KPIs than the low ones. This reflects that the high ones demonstrate higher degree of the adhocracy culture. However, the adhocracy culture seems to be limited in the Thai civil service. This may derive from the national culture such as low level of tolerance for uncertainty, attempt to control and eliminate the unexpected achievement (Hofstede, 2001; Pimpa, 2012). Moreover, the limited presence of the younger generation, who tend to appreciate the Western concepts such as organizational change and management (Pimpa, 2012), in the Thai public sector is perhaps a significant impact for the limited adhocracy culture. It is possible that limited adhocracy culture is a challenge for change, for example resistance to the public reform such PA in promoting good governance in the Thai public sector.

3) The reward system

The findings of this study suggested that two major issues of the reward system were different between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, including extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, and management of reward based collective view or individualistic

view. The extrinsic motivation seemed to have a significant effect on performance of people in the low KPI scoring provinces, particularly perceptions of fairness. Meanwhile, the officials in the high KPI scoring provinces appeared to be motivated by the intrinsic motivator such as attentiveness and conscientiousness. This reflects a strong culture existing in the high KPI scoring provinces rather than the low KPI scoring provinces. Furthermore, such intrinsic motivation does not only have a crucial impact on performance (Armstrong, 1990; McKenna and Beech, 2002), but also does not create the problems related to PRP or merit pay (Fletcher, 1993).

Regarding the management of rewards, the leaders in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to manage rewards based on a collective approach, namely involving all eligible persons, and being concern with fairness and equity. On the other hand, the leaders in the low KPI scoring provinces appeared to be concerned with their own benefits as was the team of the Provincial Governor's Office that seemed to be criticised by other agencies in the provinces about transparency of the reward allocation. These reflect the management of rewards in the low KPI scoring provinces tending to be based on an individualistic approach or their own benefits. In this context, the sustainability of high performance of the public organization requires an increase in strong culture – behavioral consistency (Robbins, 2005) – such as conscientiousness of people, rather than an appeal to individual self-interest, contrary to the argument made by Gill (2006).

4) Others (e.g. Task and goal-oriented, trust of the team of the Provincial Governor's Office, and the meetings with the executives)

Besides characteristics stated earlier, there were other characteristics that were different between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, including degree of market-oriented cultural model, trust in the team of the Provincial Governor's Office, and the formal meetings with the executives. People in the high ones tended to have higher degree of task and goal achievement, viewed as the attribute of the market-oriented value as well as strong culture – the employees held values and beliefs together and pointed in the same orientation (Robbins, 2005; Senior and Fleming, 2006). On the other hands, the officials in the low KPI scoring provinces appeared to have a lower degree of the market model or weak culture – no dominant pervasive culture (Senior and Fleming, 2006). The leaders seemed to be a key feature stimulating the agencies and the employees approaching to the market culture or a strong culture in the context of PA.

Furthermore, it was found that the team of the Provincial Governor's Office in the high KPI scoring provinces seemed to have a higher degree of trust, especially transparency, among the other agencies in the provinces than did the low KPI scoring provinces. Regarding the meetings with the executives, the high KPI scoring provinces tended to have formal meetings with the executives, whilst the low KPI scoring provinces broadly mentioned informal contact and informal meetings without the executives. The formal meetings with the executives seemed to have a significant effect on civil service performance because the meetings are the opportunities for pursuing the KPI targets, getting support, and solving problems related to the KPIs.

7.5 Summary

The findings acquired from the quantitative and qualitative data analysis suggested that organizational culture is perhaps not the key variable dominating performance in the provincial administration. However, leadership (e.g. attentiveness to the KPIs, leadership style) and management (e.g. tasks, human resources and reward) were the key determinants in influencing performance. The findings of the quantitative data analysis suggested that the existence of hierarchy, clan, market and adhocracy cultures in the 16 provinces does not differ significantly in terms of organizational culture profiles. The qualitative data analysis revealed that organizational culture – underlying assumptions of people to the KPIs or the PA scheme – influenced high performance at the provincial level. These were demonstrated through three key determinants: leadership style, individuals' characteristics, and reward system.

The participative leadership style (people focused) appeared to play a significant role in high performance. This tended to ensure willingness to perform the KPIs, low rate of relocation of the employees, and high commitment because they have opportunities for participation such as sharing ideas, discussing plans and making decisions with superiors. For the individuals' characteristics, the positive assumptions (e.g. attitudes and beliefs) of people to the KPIs seemed to have a significant impact in performing the KPIs because they tend to work based on high degree of attentiveness, conscientiousness, and collaboration. Regarding the reward system, there are two major aspects concerned by the officials: the clear criteria of reward allocation and management of reward, particularly the issues related to fairness and equity of reward allocation. The evidence suggested that leadership and management approaches were important to manage these

challenges in order to achieve high performance to deliver good governance at the provincial level, especially effectiveness, participation, efficiency and accountability and responsiveness.

Achieving high scores of performance evaluation at the provincial level seemed to derive from differences between provinces in terms of the strength of culture. The indicators were seen through differences of the typical characteristics between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, including leadership, individuals' characteristics and reward system. Although the four culture types acquired from the quantitative data analysis were significantly different between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, they were not much different and seemed to be relatively uniform in terms of culture types based on assumptions implementing PA. The differences of four culture types between both groups appeared to express the differences of strong culture rather than the culture types themselves.

In summary, the types of organizational culture are perhaps not the key variable influencing attainment of PA in delivering good governance, but leadership style and the ways of management appear to be the significant factors to influence performance of the Thai civil service and do so in a way that encourages a stronger culture, rather than a culture of a different type (the findings do not, for example, show a shift from hierarchical to market culture). The implication is that the CVF is a neutral (i.e. non-evaluative) device for the study of organizational culture, but it does not bring out the characteristics of high as opposed to low performance.

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

This chapter draws conclusions and sets out the implications of the overall results found in the study. The chapter is organized into seven sections. It begins with Section 8.2, conclusions and implications, which focuses on the conclusions of the research, and the implications of attainment of good governance in the provincial administration. It follows with Section 8.3, contributions to theory, of which there are three aspects: analytical framework, particularity of study focus and conclusions of theoretical contribution. Section 8.4, reflections on the research, is concerned with the development of the analytical framework and research design and methods. In section 8.5, policy implications and recommendations are offered, including the recommendations for the incentive scheme and for the overall implementation of PA. Then it moves on to Section 8.6, limitations of the research. There follow recommendations for future research, which are provided in Section 8.7. Finally, the conclusion of the chapter is presented in Section 8.8.

8.2 Conclusions and implications

8.2.1 Conclusions of the research

The conclusions of this study are set out based on the research questions of ‘how does organizational culture influence civil service performance’ and ‘what other organizational factors influence civil service performance’. To answer these questions, the results of the quantitative data analysis (Chapter Five) and the qualitative data analysis (Chapter Six) are compared for the conclusion of the overall result of the study.

How does organizational culture influence civil service performance?

This study considers performance in two aspects: an action and the result of an act of organizations (Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006), namely the civil service implementation of the PA scheme (an action) and the outcomes of the programme or achieving good governance (the result of an act). Regarding organizational culture, it is viewed through the four types of culture (hierarchy, clan, market and adhocracy cultures) based on the CVF. As stated in Chapter Five, the quantitative data revealed that there was a significant difference in the culture scores between the low and high KPI scoring provinces. However, there was not much difference in terms of culture types between both groups, rather in terms of the strength of each component of the culture. This may derive from the fact that the officials had performed the KPIs under the same environment (the PA scheme). Furthermore, the embedded root of culture in the Thai public sector was acquired from the national culture, because national culture is a source of organizational culture (Brown, 1998). It was not so much that the high and low scoring provinces had different types of culture, but that the culture was enacted by management in different ways.

For example, there are several characteristics in the hierarchy culture that give the provinces different degrees of strong culture, including introducing clear policies by the leaders, leadership style, and the leaders' management of the reward system. The higher level of strong culture is perhaps seen more in the high KPI scoring provinces than in the low KPI scoring provinces. Many officials in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to focus on introducing clear policies by leaders to ensure that they work properly. This leads to a strong culture where people share the same assumptions and

agree what goals to pursue (Brown, 1998). This also reflects that Thais attempt to minimize uncertainty by strict rules, regulations and policies (Pimpa, 2012). It may derive from Thai value called ‘uncertainty avoidance’ (Hofstede, 2001). Moreover, leadership style was one of the most important elements in generating a strong culture in terms of a high degree of employee commitment (Luhman and Cunliffe, 2013; Robbins, 2005). The data suggested that the participative style was found in the high KPI scoring provinces more so than in the low KPI scoring provinces. In particular, participative style appeared to positively affect performance by ensuring the individuals’ participation in such areas as sharing ideas, discussing problems and making decisions (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006; Williams and Huber, 1986).

In addition, the data demonstrated that the leaders’ management of the reward system had a significant impact on performance in terms of fairness and equity. Reward is important to motivate the staff members to achieve goals (Gill, 2006; Williams and Huber, 1986). It is possible that the satisfaction of reward allocation leads to increased level of loyalty and reduced rate of turnover, which means a strong culture (Rainey, 1996). In this respect, a strong hierarchy culture may provide positive effects on promoting good governance such as efficiency, effectiveness (achievement of goals), participation (high official commitment), accountability, equity (reward allocation to eligible officials), being consensus oriented (making decisions based on staff opinions) and rule of law (criteria of reward allocation).

Regarding the clan culture, the qualitative data suggested that the positive assumptions of the staff performing the KPIs, low rate of relocation of the officials and high

commitment of the agencies and people in the provinces tended to influence the attainment of high KPI scores. These characteristics are seen as a strong culture, and are found in the high KPI scoring provinces rather than the low KPI scoring provinces. This is consistent with the quantitative data, which showed that characteristics of a clan culture were the most significantly different between the low and high KPI scoring provinces. A strong clan culture is perhaps needed in order to achieve high results of performance evaluation and deliver good governance such as participation (low rate of staff turnover leading to high involvement), accountability (responsibilities based on positive assumptions), effectiveness (high commitment), and transparency and equity (reward allocation).

The market culture, such as the pursuit of goals and rewards based achievement, is important to generate strong culture in the provinces. This is because the achievement of goals and level of staff motivation are important elements in order to generate a strong culture (Brown, 1998). The data revealed that the characteristics of pursuing goals and reward based achievement were based on leaders' management and conscientiousness of staff. In the high KPI scoring provinces, people tended to have a higher propensity of pursuing KPI targets by meeting with superiors, and because of the individuals' conscientiousness. This contributes to enhanced efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness in the provinces. On the other hand, staff in the low KPI scoring provinces tended to have more pressure from leaders to pursue goals, which meant greater inflexibility for working. Regarding reward based achievement, the officials in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to focus on task achievement rather than reward, in contrast with the low KPI scoring provinces. Satisfaction of reward is associated with the participation

and accountability of officials to perform the KPIs because the staff feel a greater sense of attainment by being rewarded based on their performance (Peters and Pierre, 2007). However, Armstrong and Baron (1998) and Bevan and Thompson (1991 cited in Fletcher, 1993) argue that performance-related pay (PRP) is not a guaranteed motivator associated with the high performance of organizations. Organizational effectiveness could be improved without PRP (Institution of Personnel Management, 1992). In summary, a strong market culture could lead the provinces to achieve good governance such as efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness (by pursuing goals); participation and accountability (by satisfaction of fair reward).

Although the adhocracy culture is less observed in the context of PA, the data suggested that it could be seen through the characteristics of response to external change, decision making when solving problems related to the KPIs, and the issue of rewarding individual initiative. The evidence demonstrated that people in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to have positive assumptions about the KPIs in order to attempt to cope with problems related to KPIs and give a quicker response to the needs of the citizens. The data also suggested that the PA scheme contributed to a shift of leadership style from administration to management (e.g. risk taker and visionary leadership). Moreover, the indicator suggested that reward could lead to a reduction of the individuals' initiatives for new products and services, particularly issues of flexibility of working environment. In this respect, a strong adhocracy culture could contribute to efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness.

In summary, strong culture is important in order to achieve high performance in the civil service and deliver good governance because of the '*strong culture equals high performance*' equation (Brown, 1998, p. 229). In the context of the PA scheme, strong culture of the four culture types seems to positively impact on the performance of the civil service and the delivery of good governance, such as efficiency and effectiveness of performance, participation of the agencies and officials, accountability of the employees, and responsiveness for delivering public services. However, the data suggested that the civil service's culture was not the key variable influencing performance delivering good governance. Beyond a strong culture, leadership and the ways of management appear to be the most important key elements in determining achievement in the PA scheme and good governance in the provinces. In particular, a participative leadership style and the ways of management such as tasks, human resources, and rewards, are important. These factors are described in the answer to the next research question.

What other organizational factors influence civil service performance?

Existing literature (e.g. Armstrong and Baron, 1998; Bazeley and Richards, 2000; Boyne, 2003 cited in Moynihan and Pandey, 2005; Campbell et al., 1993 cited in Williams, 1998) suggests that the performance of organizations is dominated by at least seven factors, including personnel, motivated, leadership, management styles and strategic management, team, system, and contextual (situational) and organizational culture. According to the findings of this study, the individuals' characteristics (assumptions and motivation) and leadership (style and management) are major determinants influencing the performance of the civil service. Leadership style,

particularly participative style, played a crucial role in the employees' assumptions and behaviour. This is because a participative style focuses on people's participation, such as offering opinions, discussing issues between the managers and staff, planning and making decisions (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006; Williams and Huber, 1986). Thus, a participative leadership style may lead to stability of operation, job satisfaction and a flexible working environment in order to generate efficiency and effectiveness of work, participation and the accountability of the officials. The participative leadership style is associated with enhancing performance (Huang et al., 2010). However, Gill (2006) argued that Southeast Asian countries have a directive leadership style rather than a participative style. This implies that authoritarian style is a certain element influencing the performance of the civil service, namely a high degree of centralization and difficulty for change in the context of performance measurement (Jackson, 1989).

Regarding the ways of management, the way a leader managed things such as tasks, human resources and rewards were important in determining achievement in high scores of performance evaluation and good governance. The evidence suggested that task management, such as monitoring progress of the KPIs and solving problems, was a crucial element in order to accomplish tasks and goals. This can lead to efficiency and effectiveness of performance. In terms of HRM, the managers' decisions appeared to be the key feature to shape the individuals' assumptions and motivation regarding the KPIs, by maintaining satisfaction and raising morale. Leadership is associated with shaping the organizational culture needed for achieving effectiveness in the public sector (Parry and Proctor-Thomson, 2003). The issue of rewards appeared to concern various officials, particularly fairness and equity of reward allocation. The managers were,

therefore, expected to reward the eligible staff with impartiality and equity through the clear criteria of reward allocation and management of reward. Participative leadership helped to reassure staff regarding fairness (Huang et al., 2010). HRM and reward management can lead to the attainment of good governance such as participation and accountability. Achieving the good performance of organizations is associated with the capacity for managing incentive for their employees (Grindle, 1997).

For the individuals' characteristics, there were different typical characteristics for the officials in the low and high KPI scoring provinces, including the officials' assumptions (e.g. attitudes and beliefs) to the KPIs, a degree of collaboration between agencies and officials in the provinces, and response to external change. In addition, the data suggested that other factors could influence the performance of the civil service such as market-oriented value, trust of the team of the Provincial Governor's Office and meetings with executives.

8.2.2 Implications of attainment of good governance at the provincial administration

Good governance in this study is viewed through the lens of the PA scheme in the provincial cases. The findings suggested that attainment in good governance requires changing leadership (e.g. attentiveness and style) and management actions (e.g. tasks, human resources and rewards) with the aim of generating and maintaining a strong culture.

The evidence showed that a participative leadership style tended to encourage the performance of the civil service at the provincial level. A participative style was more

often found in the high KPI scoring provinces than the low KPI scoring provinces. In addition, an authoritarian leadership style was found in the low KPI scoring provinces. This result is consistent with the idea that a participative leadership style is more effective than an authoritarian style (Bratton et al., 2007; Jackson, 1989; Williams and Huber, 1986). For example, a participative style contributes to improving a managers' ability (e.g. making decisions); facilitating change by participation (e.g. enhancing people's voices on a policy or course of action); and emphasizing the employees' involvement (e.g. planning and decision making). As a consequence, a participative style can bring about high performance of the civil service because it enhances the confidence of the individuals' with regards to willingness and responsibility (Williams and Huber, 1986). Therefore, the leaders of the government agencies should consider shifting leadership style from an authoritarian style to a participative style. This may contribute to a high performance that delivers good governance in the civil service, particularly in the provincial administration.

The findings also suggested that management actions were important for dominating the performance of the public organizations in the context of the PA, especially HRM and reward allocation. For HRM, recruitment of people who were responsible for the KPIs was essential for achieving PA. The appropriate responsible officials were required to have such qualities as knowledge and skills, experience, accountability and positive assumptions to the KPIs. Regarding reward, the evidence showed that monetary reward did little in terms of effective motivation but that perceived unfairness in rewards was a strong de-motivator.

In conclusion, the findings of this study suggested that performance can be improved through immediate leadership or managerial actions. Performance may not depend on underlying cultural characteristics that, by definition, can only be altered in the long term. Changing the ways the civil service is managed may be more effective than seeking to change the civil service culture as a whole.

8.3 Contributions to theory

This research was based on the assumption that a fundamental cultural change would be needed in the civil service in order to attain high performance on KPIs and deliver the government's good governance objectives. Accordingly it was assumed that those provinces which had scored high on KPIs would have a different cultural profile from those with low scores. This was part of the rationale for adopting the OCAI as a research instrument, in order to measure the anticipated cultural difference between high and low scoring provinces.

In terms of the OCAI, and in line with the NPM perspective on which much contemporary performance management thinking is based, it was assumed or expected that the quantitative results would show that high scoring provinces had a less hierarchical and more market-oriented culture than the low-scoring provinces. This would then confirm the prevailing assumption that in the public sector hierarchical thinking is the old and market thinking is the new.

In practice, the results presented a different picture. Although there were variations between the OCAI cultural profiles of high and low scoring provinces, the overall

profiles of each group, in terms of the relative proportions of the four cultures, was strikingly similar. The scoring on the OCAI was not on a zero-sum basis and this may have meant that differences were understated. However, it was significant that high scoring provinces came out higher than low scoring provinces on all four quadrants. Therefore, it was true that high scoring provinces had a high score also for market culture, but they also scored higher on hierarchy and clan as well.

These results suggest that it was not a transformational cultural shift that was required but more effective leadership or management within the culture concerned – engaging with and using elements of all four cultural types. This has been referred to as strong culture, by which is meant a culture which has been more effectively mobilised or one in which the leadership or management style is working through, rather than in spite of, the organizational culture. The qualitative data brought out the differences between high and low scoring provinces in terms of management or leadership style. It was not so much whether the culture was hierarchical or clan or market oriented but how the leaders or managers engaged with and balanced these characteristics. Thus the high KPI scoring provinces were hierarchical in terms of making clear top-down decisions about the approach to be adopted, but then followed this up with participatory implementation with considerable investment of management effort, so that employees felt involved. This tends to reject the implied contradiction between hierarchy and participation and suggested that, in Thai public sector culture, a combination of these was more effective. By contrast, the low KPI scoring provinces tended to be characterised by laissez-faire leadership that relied on a combination of targets and financial incentives, the latter made ineffective through perceived unfairness of distribution.

To some extent the findings confirmed the Blake and Mouton (1981) distinction between concern for the task and concern for people – in the high KPI scoring provinces the two were balanced whereas in the low KPI scoring provinces the people aspect was neglected. Overall the findings suggest that high performing public services are likely to be attained through a balanced approach that draws on different elements of the culture in a way that is personalised and responsive to staff expectations, rather than a wholesale transformation towards a culture exclusively focused on outputs.




Figure 48 Summary of the research contribution
Source: The author's construct

Therefore, this study has offered new knowledge on the relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the public sector, particularly in the provincial administration in Thailand. It provides contributions to theory in the areas of

organizational culture, performance and governance, which is divided into three major dimensions: analytical framework, particularity of study focus, and conclusions of theoretical contribution (see Figure 48).

8.3.1 Analytical framework

A review of the literature suggests that many empirical studies (e.g. Howard, 1998; Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Parker and Bradley, 2000; Ralston et al., 2006) used the standard questions of the OCAI. Some of these studies used the OCAI and including the issue of reward (Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010) or the OCAI and job satisfaction (Parker and Bradley, 2000, 2001). There are not many studies that integrate all the attributes of organizational culture together in the questionnaire surveys, including the six key dimensions of the OCAI, reward and job satisfaction in a single study. However, the analytical framework of this study used a combination of these attributes in both questionnaire surveys and also adapted them for interviews. The comprehensive multi-dimension of organizational culture for the study is not only a potential tool for gathering more potential information and answering the research questions, but also for creating a new analytical framework for studying organizational culture. The results of this study may provide new knowledge and a greater understanding of the relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the public sector.

8.3.2 Particularity of study focus

There are two particular aspects of this study. Firstly, many studies explored the relationship between organizational culture and various variables such as performance, effectiveness and management (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). Nevertheless, there are not many empirical studies which examine the relationship between organizational

culture and good governance. The previous studies tend to examine organizational culture and some components of good governance, such as effectiveness, but not all components of good governance. In contrast, this study not only investigates the relationship between organizational culture and good governance, but also focuses on the comprehensive components of good governance.

Secondly, several empirical studies on organizational culture in the Thai public sector (e.g. Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Phookpan, 2012) focused on the central government agencies rather than the provincial administration. There are a few studies (e.g. Sathornkich, 2010; Srimai, 2015; Srimai, Damsaman and Bangchokdee, 2011) that highlighted the provincial administration in Thailand, but they explored other aspects such as PMS and PA. Therefore, the findings of this study may offer a new knowledge on theories and concepts relevant to organizational culture, performance and governance. The findings of this study propose new knowledge on the relationship between organizational culture and good governance, particularly in the public sector in a developing country.

8.3.3 Conclusions of theoretical contribution

The findings of this study suggested that organizational culture was not the key variable influencing performance delivering good governance in the civil service, but leadership and the ways of management. This is different from the implication of the previous studies' findings (e.g. Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Parker and Bradley, 2000) that organizational culture can either enable or inhibit the possibility of improving the performance or effectiveness of the organizations, especially the public organizations.

Moreover, the findings of the study offer an answer to the existing debate regarding '*can organizational culture be managed and changed?*' (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008, p. 40). There are a number of scholars (e.g. Kotter and Heskett, 1992; McKenna and Beech, 2002; Schein, 2004; Schwartz and Davis, 1981) who have suggested that organizational culture is difficult to change. Contrary to this, other scholars (e.g. Brown, 1998; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Lorsch, 1986) seem to agree that top management can change organizational culture, namely by the backing of the top managers in the organizations. Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008) stated that cultural change is very difficult, but cultural change can be accomplished by a combination of many ingredients such as leadership and performance appraisal, particularly top management (e.g. planning, allocating resources, making decisions, and paying attention). In this context, the findings of this study suggested that achieving high performance and delivering good governance may not depend on change in organizational culture as a whole, because it may be difficult to change and take a long time for change to occur. In fact, organizational culture can be improved by an immediate change of leadership style and the ways of management, which may take time for change in the short term.

In addition, many scholars (e.g. Brown, 1998; Christensen et al., 2007; Robbins, 2005) seem to agree that strong culture has a significant impact on the performance of organizations. Nevertheless, there are not many existing studies that make suggestions about the relationship between strong cultures in the particular context of PA (good governance) in the public sector. The findings of this study may provide new evidence about the correlation between strong culture and good governance that is viewed through PA. The results of the study suggested that strong culture was influential in getting high

KPI scores as well as delivering good governance. The evidence also revealed that strong culture was generated under appropriated leadership style and ways of management. Thus, leadership style and the style or strategies of management were the key factors to creating strong culture in the organizations. In summary, strong culture can influence high performance delivering good governance, and the creation and maintenance of a strong culture requires continual support in terms of leadership style and managerial decisions.

8.4 Reflections on the research

This section discusses the reflections of the study. Reflection refers to *‘the process of internally examining and exploring an issues of concern, triggered by an experience, which creates and clarifies meaning in terms of self, and which results in a changed conceptual perspective’* (Boyd and Fales, 1983, p.100). Therefore, the reflections in this section focus on the processes and issues that the study is concerned with, particularly development of analytical framework, research design and methods.

8.4.1 Development of analytical framework

At the start the research topic focused on only two key variables: organizational culture and good governance. After reviewing the existing literature on performance management, ‘performance’ was added as the other crucial variable. In particular, performance measurement system (PMS) was focused on because good governance in this study was viewed through the lens of PA, which is based on PMS. A review of the literature on ‘performance’ refers to many concepts such as performance appraisal, performance assessment, performance evaluation, and performance management

(Vallance and Fellow, 1999). These terms may be used as synonyms in this research, in particular performance evaluation is often used for PA.

I began with developing an understanding of the term ‘good governance’, regarding definition, components of good governance and research on good governance. After a review of the literature, I found that the extent of good governance should be addressed through the topic of ‘pursuing good governance’, including initiative, interpretation and importance of good governance. Regarding the variables of performance, my intention was to focus on three aspects of performance: definition of performance management system (PMS); nature of performance management; and determinants affecting performance in delivering good governance. In terms of organizational culture, this step was complicated because it was related to seeking a theory for developing the theoretical framework of the study.

Identification of a theory on organizational culture was not straightforward. I spent a lot of time looking at matching theories, i.e. Competing Values Framework (CVF) and Denison’s organizational culture model, and then attempted to develop a theoretical framework for the study. However, a combination of theories appeared to be too complex and not suitable for answering the research questions. Thereafter, each theory was cautiously considered by comparing its advantages and disadvantages, which is in accordance with the supervisors’ recommendations. Finally, the CVF was selected because it provided many advantages, as discussed in Chapter Two.

In summary, developing the analytical framework of the study was carefully viewed throughout the process based upon self-directed academic research (e.g. a review of literature and analytical thinking), learning from practice (e.g. comparing and matching theories), and facilitating professionals (e.g. suggestions of the researchers' supervisors). I am, therefore, confident that the development of the analytical framework of the study based on the three key aspects can contribute to answering the research questions with validity and reliability of the research findings.

8.4.2 Research design and methods

Regarding research design, I started with only a case study approach. This is because I viewed Thailand as a case study, which may help to identify appropriate cases for the sample in the levels of provinces, agencies, and individuals. After an in-depth review of the literature on comparative study, I recognized that a comparative study was necessary for examining the differences of organizational culture between the high and low KPI scoring provinces. Consequently, the research design of the study employed a combination of the case study and comparative study, as explained in detail in Chapter Four.

When developing the research methods of this study, I began with a review of the existing literature, including quantitative methods, qualitative methods, mixed methods, triangulation and previous studies with relevance to the relationships between organizational culture and a variety of factors. As a consequence of a review of the literature, I had a clear opinion on research methods (see details in Chapter Four). This contributed to the use of mixed methods in the study, for two main reasons. Firstly, each

method has strengths and weaknesses in itself. Secondly, examining organizational culture is viewed as a study of the underlying assumptions of staff members in the organizations. Thus, qualitative methods such as interviews are required because they can provide in-depth details of social life, such as values, beliefs and perceptions (Kumar, 2011). Meanwhile, using quantitative method such as questionnaire surveys can facilitate the study of the wider population (Gill and Johnson, 2002), which is suitable for this study as it studied a wide geographical area.

Working with research design and methods in this study was not simple because of using multiple research designs and mixed methods. Therefore, I attempted to explain research design and methodology through flowcharts with descriptions, as showed in Chapter Four. The most difficult area of research design and methods seemed to be the use of the findings acquired from the quantitative data analysis for selecting the potential cases for the interviews. The researcher had to analyze the data collected from the questionnaire surveys in the field immediately after it was gathered³¹. The selection of cases for the interviews was carried out after the results of the questionnaire survey were completed.

8.5 Policy implication and recommendations

The findings of the study suggested two major aspects for policy implication and recommendations: recommendations for the incentive scheme and recommendations for the overall implementation of PA.

³¹ The analysis of questionnaire survey in the fieldwork was concerned about validity. Thus, the results of data analysis was approved by the professional of statistics such SPSS for recommendations.

8.5.1 Recommendations for the incentive scheme

The majority of respondents extensively mentioned about the criteria of incentive allocation. Many challenges were found in the linkage between PA results and reward, such as fairness and equity of reward allocation; limited amounts of monetary reward; limitations of the central government in the regions in getting rewards; and different numbers of officials in the provinces and agencies leading to inequity of reward allocation. Improvements to the criteria of the incentive allocation were suggested by some respondents as follows:

- 1) Reconsidering the criteria of reward allocation by the central government to improve it and make it clearer
- 2) Increasing the amount of the financial reward
- 3) Generating new forms of incentive
- 4) Other suggestions such as cancellation of the monetary reward system and maintaining the reward system

Monetary reward, which is recognized as performance-related pay (PRP), is the most popular of motivational approaches (Hatry, 2007). However, PRP has various limitations, such as disappointment, a problem of equity and fabrication of appraisal evidence (Fletcher, 1993; Murphy and Denisi, 2008). In this respect, the policy maker, both at the level of central government and in the provinces, should be concerned with how to use appropriate incentive allocation for reaching the ultimate goals of performance.

8.5.2 Recommendations for the overall implementation of the PA scheme

The respondents also recommended how to improve many aspects of the PA scheme, such as suggestions for the OPDC, setting the KPIs, and other suggestions. These can be explained as follows:

- 1) The OPDC seemed to be expected by the civil servants to do such things as revising the policy and time frame of PA, opening communication for sharing ideas, choosing a team of advisers for the KPIs from the OPDC staff, and building an assessment team from the OPDC staff. This reflects the view that the central government is seen as the policy maker and needs to be concerned about making clear policies, being open for participation, and consulting.
- 2) Some respondents suggested that pattern of setting the KPIs should be changed from top-down to bottom-up management. This implies that the officials' participation – taking part in making decisions on setting criteria of the KPIs with the OPDC – is required in the process of setting KPIs.
- 3) Other recommendations on PA were found, for example some officials suggested that the PA scheme should be cancelled because it seemed to be a control system based on command and policy. However, other people claimed that the PA scheme should be maintained further but the management needed reconsideration.

In summary, there are a variety of perspectives on the overall picture of the PA scheme. However, the evidence suggested that a significant number of civil servants tended to require reconsideration of the PA scheme. Thus, the recommendations as stated earlier should be considered because these might influence the attainment of performance in

delivering good governance in the civil service, especially at the provincial administration.

8.6 Limitations of the research

There are some challenges in this study regarding the effect on reliability and validity.

It can be considered in three dimensions: surveys, interviews and overall.

8.6.1 Survey limitations

The use of questionnaire surveys in this study found two major challenges. Firstly, using the five-point scale of the OCAI questionnaire may lead to a difficulty of interpretation by the researcher regarding a close range of scores of the four culture types. However, using the five-point scale of the Likert scales provides validity and reliability as follows:

- 1) Having validity in terms of generating a significant correlation of the scale scores from the same quadrant rather than hundred-scale (Quinn and Spreitzer, 1991)
- 2) Offering information about opinions, attitudes, and assumptions within a set of questions and providing reliable indicators (Vanderstoep and Johnson, 2009; De Vaus, 2002)
- 3) Facilitating respondents in answering questions due to it being easier than hundred-scale (Vanderstoep and Johnson, 2009).

Secondly, the other challenge is answering the questionnaire, which comprises two crucial problems as follows:

- 1) Getting access to the proposed respondents is difficult, especially senior managers who may make decisions by passing on the questionnaires for completion (Gray, 2004)
- 2) Inadequate attention may have been paid by some in answering the questionnaires, for example questions on some questionnaires were found to be in the same hand writing and seemed to be written by only one individual (e.g. continuously ticked on the same scale in many questions by using the single pen); and some questions on a questionnaire had missing data (e.g. did not tick on the questions in the section of assessment of organization). The number of such questionnaires and action take were discussed in Section 4.7.1.

A lack of attention to answering the questionnaires may derive from an idea that the respondents might not recognize the benefits of the research. For example, some participants put a note on the questionnaire, saying that they did not see any results of research brought to adaptation in practice. This may lead to getting incomplete questionnaires. Nevertheless, the incomplete questionnaires were carefully considered for the potential quantitative data analysis. For example, the incomplete answers of the questions in the assessment of organizational culture section were cautiously considered.

8.6.2 Interview limitations

The limitations of the interviews comprise two main challenges. Firstly, the study aimed to investigate the relationship between organizational culture and good governance at the provincial level, which is viewed through the PA scheme between 2007 and 2011.

It was not a longitudinal study that was examined over this period. The participants were, therefore, asked to recall their experiences of PA in previous years. This is seen as retrospective study and may influence the recall process of the respondents about the details of implementing PA. However, the culture is something that has accumulated for a long time based on the history and traditions of the organization (McKenna and Beech, 2002). It is also difficult to change (Hofstede et al., 1990; Rong and Hongwei, 2012; Schein, 2004). Moreover, the PA scheme was ongoing during the field work process (2014) and to the present day. Thus, the civil servants are familiar with implementing PA and could answer the questions.

Secondly, a limitation of translation, which was time-consuming. The interviews were conducted in the Thai language because the interviewees were Thais. Thus, it took a lot of time for the process of translation, although only some important sections were translated. For accuracy of translation from Thai to English, it was cautiously undertaken to ensure validity of the findings. Therefore, the interview data was summarized in Thai and then sent to the participants for confirmation or correction. Moreover, translation of the interview data – particularly the important information in quotations in Chapter Six – was reviewed by a professional in both Thai and English in order to ensure the validity of the translation.

8.6.3 Overall limitations

The overall study consisted of three challenges. Firstly, during the process of the study, there was a nation-wide political movement³², which provided some problems for the study. For example, it was difficult to process correspondence, namely the OPDC who issued the official letters changed their workplace. The other problem was getting limited attentiveness from some officials when answering questionnaires and participating in the interviews. For example, some provincial agencies had to have a meeting with the new government. This may have had an effect on getting responses to the questionnaires, although this was helped by using a technique suggested by Vanderstoep and Johnson (2009) of putting a specific date in bold for when to return the questionnaire survey. As well as the surveys, the responses of the interviews also seemed to be affected.

Secondly, the other limitation was the researcher. The researcher is one of the staff members of the OPDC, which is the central government agency and responsible for the PA scheme. Some participants may have been careful to provide information that could cause either favour or disfavour from the OPDC. Contrary to this, being a staff member of the OPDC may be of merit in getting access to the information sources.

Thirdly, the study was a piece of research focused on the relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the particular context of the Thai public sector. Therefore, the findings are not representative of the relationship between

³² The study processed collecting data in the fieldwork in the same time of the political movement, The Thai military coup declared a coup on 24 May 2014.

organizational culture and good governance in all countries. The culture of public sectors in each country has a particular context. For example, the same management actions in the civil service of a neighbouring country to Thailand with a different civil service culture might attain different results.

8.7 Recommendations for future research

1) Replication of research with other provincial case studies and study on central government agencies

The provincial cases of this study were selected by stratified sampling based on the scores of PA between 2007 and 2011. This is because this information was complete and updated during the period of study (2014). After this period, the performance evaluation frame and number of provinces were changed. It is possible that some variables were changed in the context of PA. This would be interesting for future studies in replicating research.

Moreover, this study does not interview central government agencies that have been committed to PA due to the focus on the provincial agencies. It would be interesting to study the central agencies' perspectives. This may lead to receiving more understanding on the relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the Thai civil service.

2) The relationship between leadership style and/or management and strong culture

According to the findings of this study, the evidence suggested that leadership style and management actions were the key variables to influencing performance delivering good

governance in the Thai civil service. Furthermore, a strong culture was the other important element dominating high performance, which was encouraged by leadership and management. For further research, it would be interesting to examine the relationship between leadership style and/or management and strong culture.

3) Incentive scheme: how to improve incentives to be more appropriate?

From the findings, it was obviously observed that many civil servants were concerned with monetary incentive, especially the fairness of reward allocation. Therefore, there would be opportunities for future studies to build upon the research results. The future research may examine how to improve incentives in a more appropriate manner. This may provide many merits such as getting a greater understanding of the officials' needs; getting information about which kinds of motivations should be used – intrinsic or extrinsic motivators; and achieving good governance in the civil service.

4) Study corporate governance in the private sector

This study focused on good governance in the public sector, which does not highlight good corporate governance in the private sector. However, a study on good corporate governance in the private sector would be interesting for future research. For example, the issues are related to regulations of institutions, the framework of laws and relevant conditions required by the corporate sector (World Bank, 1994). This is because the private sector is important to the nation's affairs, such as implementation of the public sector.

5) Impacts and consequences of implementing good governance on the national citizens

This study focused on the organizational culture of the civil service as a consequence of the civil services' perspectives on PA or good governance. The study appears to explore only the dimensions of the public sector that deliver services to citizens. However, it does not study the results of implementing good governance in the civil service. It would be interesting for future research to study the impacts and consequences of implementing good governance. In this respect, the citizens' perspectives may lead to more understanding on the outcomes or actual results of PA or implementing performance based good governance. This would not only improve or find more appropriate policies related to good governance, but also help to meet the ultimate goals of citizens' needs.

8.8 Summary

This study aimed to examine the relationship between organizational culture and performance or good governance in the provincial administration in Thailand. There were two research questions: how does organizational culture influence civil service performance; and what other organizational factors influence civil service performance. In the study, performance or good governance was viewed through perspectives of the civil service' implementation of the PA scheme and attainment of good governance. Meanwhile, organizational culture was considered through eight key themes: 1) Dominant characteristic of the organization, 2) Leadership style, 3) Management of employees, 4) Organizational cohesion (glue), 5) Organizational strategic emphasis, 6) Organizational success criteria, 7) Organizational reward in the form of promotion, and 8) Job satisfaction. These are viewed through perspectives of the civil servants who have committed PA between 2007 and 2011 with at least one year of experience. These

perspectives are interpreted through the CVF, including the four types of culture – hierarchy, clan, market and adhocracy.

The findings of the study suggest that there are not much different types of culture between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, but different strength of culture types. A strong culture is generated by participative leadership style and management approach. Therefore, leadership and the ways of management are the key variable influencing performance in order to achieve good governance. This is different from the previous studies showing that organizational culture is a crucial factor in facilitating or obstructing attempts to improve organizational effectiveness or performance. However, the findings of the study are from just one piece of work, which examined in particular the public sector in the provincial administration of Thailand. It is, therefore, not representative of the relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the public sector of all countries. This is because each country has its own particular context of the public sector's culture along with other different factors.

Appendix 1: The definitions of governance and good governance

Administrative

Economic

Political

Social

Organizational

Other contexts

1.1 Definitions of Governance

Organizations

Organizations	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
World Bank (1989)	‘Governance is meant the exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs.’ (p.60)	- Political	- Accountability	- Management of public affairs
World Bank (1992)	Governance is defined as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development.’ (p.3)	- Economic - Social	- Accountability	- Management of a country’s economic and social resources for development
World Bank (1994)	‘Epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policymaking; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law’ (p.vii)	- Political - Economic - Social	- Accountability - Participation - Rule of law	- Management of a country’s political, economic and social resources for development

Organizations	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
	Governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s political, economic and social resources for development.’ (p.xiv)			
United Nation (UN, 2006)	‘Governance is an organizing concept that guides administrators as administrative practices shift from the bureaucratic State to what is called the “hollow State”.’ (p. 2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organizational - Administrative 		Shifting public administration for development
United Nation (UN, 2015)	‘...governance is considered “good” and “democratic” to the degree in which a country’s institutions and processes are transparent...’ (website, p.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organizational 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Transparency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Democracy - Transparency of a country’s institutions and processes
United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 1994b)	‘Governance can be seen as ‘the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes, and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic - Political - Administrative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rule of law - Accountability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Management of a country’s affairs

Organizations	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
	legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences.’ (p.2-3)			
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1997)	‘UNDP believes that building the capacity for governance is central to sustainable human development . We aim to be an impartial partner to governments, to civil society and to the private sector - creating opportunities for interacting to find people - centered solutions for the long term.’ (website, p.1)	- Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Participation - Transparency - Accountability - Effectiveness - Equity - Rule of law 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sustainable human development - Partiality of partners
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2005)	‘Governance as ‘the collective policies and oversight mechanisms in place to establish and maintain sustainable and accountable organizations that achieve their missions while demonstrating stewardship over resources.’(p.11)	- Organizational	- Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Collective policies - Oversight mechanisms - Sustainable and accountable organizations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, 2009)	‘The process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). Governance can be used in several contexts such as corporate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Corporate governance - International governance 	- Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Process of decision-making - Process of implementation

Organizations	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
	governance, international governance, national governance and local governance.’ (p.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National governance (Administrative) - Local governance 		
Institute On Governance (Canada) (2015)	‘Governance determines who has power, who makes decisions, how other players make their voice heard and how account is rendered....Governance in the public sector needs to take into account legal and constitutional accountability and responsibilities.’ (p.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administrative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accountability - Rule of law 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Who has power - Who make decisions - How other players make their voice heard - How account is rendered - Taking account legal - Constituting accountability and responsibility
The Commission on Global Governance (cited in Weiss, 2000)	‘Governance as the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs.’ (The Commission on Global Governance cited in Weiss, 2000, p.795-6)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organizational - Individual - Public (Administrative) - Private 		Management of affairs of individual, institutions, public, and private

Organizations	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
Commonwealth Secretariat (2010)	‘Governance as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels.’ (p.12)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political, - Economic - Administrative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accountability 	Management of a country’s affairs.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2001)	‘...governance has become a central component in any explanation of economic and social development...sometime used in a wider sense to cover steering and control activities in different spheres of society... it refers principally to the exercise of authority in government and the political arena..’ (OECD, 2001, p.28)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic - Social - Administrative - Political 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Steering and controlling activities in different spheres of society - Exercise of authority in government and political arena
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2010)	‘Good corporate governance is at the core of the EBRD’s activities. All operations, programmes, strategies and policies are scrutinised by independent evaluation, which ensures accountability and allows lessons to be learned.’ (EBRD, 2010, p.64)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Private - Organizational 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accountability - Transparency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Integrity and transparency of business’ conduct - Strengthen key policies and mechanism - High level of accountability

Organizations	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
	‘The EBRD is committed to achieving the highest standards of governance, integrity and transparency in the conduct of its business and continues to strengthen key policies and mechanism in support of these goals. ..ensure a high level of accountability of staff and management of the Bank. ’ (EBRD, 2010, p.65)			
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB, 2010)	‘...five institutional priorities to sharpen our effectiveness as a development partner in the region: (1) Social Policy for equity and Productivity, (2) Infrastructure for Competitiveness and Social Welfare, (3) Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare, (4) Competitive Regional and Global International Integration, and (5) Protecting the Environment,...’ (IADB, 2010, p.xxv)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social - Organizational - Regional, Global, and International 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Effectiveness - Equity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social Policy for equity and Productivity - Infrastructure for Competitiveness and Social Welfare - Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare - Competitive Regional and Global International Integration, - Protecting the Environment

Scholars

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003b)	‘Governance is the interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are taken, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say. ’ (p.2-3)	- Administrative	- Accountability - Participation	Structure, processes and traditions of <u>using power</u> , making decisions, and hearing stakeholders’ voice
Rhodes (1997)	‘The term ‘governance’ refers to a change in the meaning of government referring to a new process of governing....contribute to the analysis of change in British government...Governance refers to self-organizing, inter-organizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange,	-Administrative - Organizational - Inter-organizational network - Social		A new process of <u>governing</u>

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
	<p>rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state.' (Rhodes, 1997, p.15)</p> <p>‘Governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed.’ (p.46)</p>			
Stoker (1998)	<p>‘Governance is ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action.’ (Stoker, 1998, p.17)</p>	- Administrative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rule of law - Participation 	Creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action
Pierre and Peters (2000)	<p>‘Governance as structure and process....four common governance arrangements that have existed historically as well as at present:</p>	- Administrative	-Participation	- Structure and process of <u>steering</u> and coordination

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
	hierarchies, markets, networks and communities....governance as the process of steering and coordination ...' (p.14)			- Arrangement of hierarchies, markets, networks and communities
Hulme, Savoia and Sen (2015)	'Governance is the effectiveness of rules, policies and the functioning of public bodies that affect the lives of the members of a community.' (p.86)	- Administrative	- Effectiveness	The effectiveness of rules, policies and the functioning of public bodies
Frederickson and Smith. (2003)	'Governance refers to the lateral and inter-institutional relations in administration in the context of the decline of sovereignty, the decreasing importance of jurisdictional borders and a general institutional fragmentation.' (p.222)	- Organizational - Administrative		The lateral and inter-institutional relations in administration
Fukuyama (2013)	'Governance is about the performance of agents in carrying out the wishes of	- Administrative		The performance of agents

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
	principals, and not about the goals that principals set.’ (Fukuyama ,2013, p.350)			
Kjær (2004)	‘Governance is the act or manner of governing; the office or function of governingto govern is ‘to rule or control with authority....to be government (p.3).....In the field of public administration and public policy, it involves the public sector functioned best when it was apolitical, structured as a hierarchy, and based on a system of merit-recruitment and promotion (p.4)...Governance refers to something broader than government and it is about steering and the rules of the game.’ (p.7)	- Administrative		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Manner of governing - Function of governing (structure, recruitment, promotion)

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
Kooiman (2003)	Governance can be seen as the totality of theoretical conceptions on governing. (p.4)	- Academic		Theories and concept
Hirst (2000 cited in UN, 2006, p.4)	‘Governance can be generally defined as the means by which an activity or ensemble of activities is controlled or directed, such that it delivers an acceptable range of outcomes according to some established standard.’ (p.4)	- Administrative		Controlling activities for acceptable outcomes
Lee (2003)	‘Governance refers to changes in the role, structure and operation process of the government, or the way social problems are resolved (p.3).... Governance as a mechanism for resolving common problems... Governance as a mechanism for resolving public problems, and	- Administrative		Changes in the role, structure and operation process of the government for resolving public problems

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
	governance as the new governance...' (p.5-8)			
Ahrens, Caspers and Weingarth (2011)	<p>'The quality of a country's governance structure is a key determinant of its ability to pursue sustainable economic and social development (p.5).....Public governance is frequently limited to public sector management....Governance is not a synonym for government</p> <p>Governance focuses on quality of public policy and its impact on economic performance.' (p.7)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic - Social - Administrative 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pursuing sustainable development in economic and social - Public sector management - Quality of public policy
Weiss (2000)	<p>'Governance for the latter refers to characteristics that are generally associated with a system of national administration.....Analysis of</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administrative 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A system of national administration - Analysis of international relations and

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
	international relations and international civil servants, in contrast, now use the term almost exclusively to describe phenomena that go beyond a synonym for ‘government’ and the legal authority with which such polities are vested.’ (p.795)			international civil servants
McNeil and Malena (2010)	‘Governance, broadly defined, is the means by which the state acquires and exercise authority to provide for citizens (p. 13).....Important governance benefits, social accountability mechanisms have led to concrete improvements in government policies, programme, service and development....Enhanced development...better-designed policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administrative - Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accountability - Equity - Efficiency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Exercising authority with accountability - Enhancing development

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
	budget and plan...increased resources...more equitable public spending and services...greater efficiency, less waste...better development result.’ (p. 16)			
Zhenglai and Guo (2002)	‘In political science, ‘governance’ refers to the activity and process of public authority for the realization of public interest.... Government focuses on itself, while governance focuses on society as a whole.... Governance could also have good governance and bad governance.’ (p.16)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political - Administrative - Social 		The activity and process of public authority for the realization of public interest
Cheema and Popovski (2010)	‘Governance is the process of interaction between three sets of actors – the state , civil society , and the private sector - in making political ,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administrative - Political - Economic - Social 		The process of interaction between three sets of actors – the state, civil

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components	Focus
	administrative, economic, and social decisions that affect citizens.’ (p. 8)	- Private sector		society, and the private sector
Chaudhry et al. (2009)	‘Governance is the instrument of political, economic and administrative authorities to manage a nation's affairs.’ (p.338)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political - Economic - Administrative 		The instrument of management for politics, economic, and administration
Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2000)	‘Governance generally refers to the means for achieving direction, control, and coordination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals or organizations on behalf of interests to which they jointly contribute.’ (p. 235)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic - Public sector - Social - Administrative 		The means for achieving direction, control, and coordination

1.2 Definitions of Good Governance

Organizations

Organizations	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components
World Bank (1992)	‘Good governance is an essential complement to sound economic policies. Efficient and accountable management by the public sector and a predictable and transparent policy framework are critical to the efficiency of markets and governments, and hence to economic development.’ (p.v)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic - Administration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accountable - Transparency - Efficiency
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1997)	‘Good governance has many attributes. It is participatory, transparent and accountable. It is effective in making the best use of resources and is equitable. And it promotes the rule of law.’ (website, p.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administrative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Participation - Transparency - Accountability - Effectiveness - Equity - Rule of law
United Nation (UN, 2006)	‘According to the World Bank, good governance entails sound public sector management (efficiency, effectiveness and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administrative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Efficiency - Effectiveness - Accountability

Organizations	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components
	economy), accountability, exchange and free flow of information (transparency), and a legal framework for development (justice, respect for human rights and liberties).’ (p. 4)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Transparency - Rule of law
United Nation (UN, 2015)	‘Good governance promotes equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability and the rule of law, in a manner that is effective, efficient and enduring... The greatest threats to good governance come from corruption, violence and poverty, all of which undermine transparency, security, participation and fundamental freedoms.’ (website, p.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administrative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Equity - Participation - Transparency - Accountability - Rule of law - Effectiveness - efficiency
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, 2009)	‘Good governance has 8 major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social - Administration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Participation - Consensus oriented - Accountability - Transparency - Responsiveness

Organizations	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components
	assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.’ (p.1)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Effectiveness - Efficiency - Equity - Rule of law
Commonwealth Secretariat (2010)	‘Good governance enables the development of public value by promoting the principles of accountability, transparency, predictability, capacity and participation throughout the institutions and processes that regulate the public realm.’ (p. 12)	- Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accountability - Transparency - Participation
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2001)	‘Good governance remains a requisite for many different forms of growth, whereas the various features of bad governance – corruption, waste, abuse of power and exploitation of public means for private ends – tend to drive	- Administration	

Organizations	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components
	<p>unfortunate nations into vicious spirals of decline, disruption and destruction.’ (p.40)</p> <p>‘Specifically, one of the most important ancient features of good governance to be nurtured is judgement. For the fears and worries about technological risks that lie behind major social and political conflicts over technology present major challenges to judgement as well as opportunities for its exercise.’ (p.70)</p>		
Asian Development Bank (AsDB) (1995)	<p>‘The Bank’s concept of good governance focuses essentially on the ingredients for effective management... good governance is required to ensure that those policies have their desired effect...it concerns norms of behavior that help ensure that governments actually deliver to their citizens what they say they will deliver.’ (AsDB, 1995, p.4)</p>	- Administration	- Effectiveness

Organizations	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components
African Development Bank (AfDB) (2008)	<p>‘Good governance is crucial for inclusive and sustained economic growth and its promotion is a key element in the Bank Group’s strategy to alleviate poverty in regional member countries (RMCs).’ (AfDB, 2008, p.15)</p> <p>‘The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) identifies good governance as a requirement for peace, security and sustainable growth and development’ (AfDB, 2008, p.19)</p>	- Economic	
Commission of the European Communities (2001)	<p>‘Five principles underpin good governance and the change proposed in this White Paper: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. Each principle is important for establishing more democratic governance.’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2001, p.10)</p>	- Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Participation - Accountability - Effectiveness

Scholars

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components
Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003)	‘Good governance principles warrant elaboration. First, these principles represent an ideal that no society has fully attained or realized. Supporters attribute economic success and social stability to their governance policies.’ (p.7)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic - Social - Administrative 	
Rhodes (1997)	‘Good governance’ marries the NPM to the advocacy of liberal democracy.’ (p.50)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administration - Political 	
Leftwich (1993)	‘An efficient public service, an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds; an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure, and a free press.’ (p.610)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administrative - Institution (organizational) - Systematic - Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rule of law - Accountability

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components
	<p>Leftwich identifies three main levels of good governance; (p. 611)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Systematic: The systematic use of governance is broader than government, covering the distribution of both internal and external political and economic power 2. Political: The political use of governance refers to a state enjoying both legitimacy and authority, derive from a democratic mandate. 3. Administrative: The administrative use refers to ‘an efficient open accountable and audited public service which has the bureaucratic competence to help design and implement appropriate policies and manage whatever public sector there is.’ 		
Munshi and Abraham (2004)	<p>‘Good governance signifies a participative manner of governing that functions in a responsible, accountable and transparent manner based on the principles of efficiency, legitimacy and consensus</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administrative - Political - Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accountability - Transparency - Efficiency - Rule of law

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components
	for the purpose of promoting the rights of individual citizens and the public interest, thus indicating the exercise of political will for ensuring the material welfare of society and sustainable development with social justice.’ (p.51-52)		-Consensus oriented -Participation
Hirst (2000 cited in UN, 2006, p.4)	‘Good governance means creating an effective political framework conducive to private economic action: stable regimes, the rule of law, efficient State administration adapted to the roles that Governments can actually perform and a strong civil society independent of the State.’ (p.4)	- Political - Economic - Administration - Social	-Effectiveness -Rule of law -Efficiency
Grindle (2010)	“....good governance agenda as a condition necessary for development....Good governance, in fact, may even be a consequence of development. ’ (p.13)	- Political - Economic	
Chaudhry et al. (2009)	Good governance can be defined with the following features: (Chaudhry et al., 2009, p.339)	- Administrative - Social	- Participation - Transparency

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good governance is mutually supportive and cooperative relationships between government, society, and the private sector. - Good governance is defined as control of all, or some combination of, the following elements: contribution, transparency of decision-making, accountability, rule of law, predictability. - Good governance is normative in origin. The values that provide the foundation for governance are the values postulated by the defining characters and institutions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Private sector - Institutional (organizational) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accountability - Rule of law
Bowornwathana (2000)	‘The objective of good governance is to strengthen the institutions of civil society, and to transform government into more open, responsive, accountable, and democratic system.’ (p. 401)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Institutional (organizational) - Social - Administration - Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Responsiveness - Accountability
Lartey and Sastry (2010)	‘Good governance as Anti-corruption tool.’ (p.2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administrative 	

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components
Ahrens et al. (2011)	‘Good governance has played a key role regarding the success cases in economic transition and development, whereas bad governance has often been responsible for failure.’ (p.4)	- Economic	
Agere (2000)	‘The concept of good governance is very much interlinked with institutionalised values such as democracy, observance of human rights, accountability, transparency, and greater efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector (p. v).....Good governance is used both as a means and as an end in itself....Good governance as a concept will be used in this context of the public service reform or NPM paradigm....The concept contributes to economic growth, human development and social justice....Good governance is the highest state of development and management of a nation’s affairs.’ (p. 5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political - Administrative - Economic - Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rule of law - Accountability - Transparency - Efficiency - Effectiveness

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components
Zhenglai and Guo (2002)	‘Good governance is the management process that maximizes public interest...The essential characteristics of good governance are the cooperative management of public life by both government and citizens, and the new relationship between political state and civil society, and the best political situation involving public and private actors and governmental and civil organizations’ (p.17)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administrative - Political - Social 	
Smith, B. C. (2007)	‘Good governance agenda is assessed for its contribution to development and the cost to society of bad governance (p. x)...The three political attributes of good governance that occur in the governance agenda of international and agencies require changes in political action and organization.’ (p. xi)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social - Political - Organizational 	

Scholars	Definition	Context	Relevant to good governance components
Weiss (2000)	‘...actions to foster good governance concentrate on attenuating two undesirable characteristics that had been prevalent earlier: the unrepresentative character of governments and the inefficiency of non-market systems.’ (p.801)	- Administrative	- Efficiency
Sundaram and Chowdhury (2012)	‘... the good governance agenda has defined policy reform goals for developing countries that are widely supported in many developing countries and, especially, internationally.’ (p. 9)	- Administrative	

Appendix 2: The definitions of nine key components of good governance

Sources	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Accountability	Transparency	Participation	Rule of law	Equity	Responsiveness	Consensus oriented
World Bank (1994, p.12,29,42)			‘Accountability is at the heart of good governance and has to do with holding governments responsible for their actions.’ (p.12)	‘Transparency is important for specific public programs, such as the divestiture of state-owned enterprises, which will quickly forfeit public confidence if privatization is not seen as an open process.’ (p.29)	‘Participation is intrinsic to good governance.... Measures at the national level to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of government have direct parallels at the micro level as well. Transparency enables people affected by development plans to know the options available to them.’ (p.42)				

Sources	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Accountability	Transparency	Participation	Rule of law	Equity	Responsiveness	Consensus oriented
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5)	‘Processes and institutions produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources.’ (p. 5)		‘Decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organisations are accountable to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. This accountability differs depending on the organisation and whether the decision is internal or external to an organisation.’ (p. 5)	‘Transparency is built on the free flow of information. Processes, institutions and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to understand and monitor them.’ (p. 5)	‘All men and women should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively.’ (p. 5)	‘Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly the laws on human rights.’ (p. 5)	‘All men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.’ (p. 5)	‘Institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders.’ (p. 5)	‘Good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interests of the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures.’ (p. 5)
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, 2009, p. 2-3)	‘Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural		‘Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. Not only governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society organizations must		‘Participation by both men and women is a key cornerstone of good governance. Participation could be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. It is	‘Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. It	‘A society’s well being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do	‘Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable	‘There are several actors and as many view points in a given society. Good governance

Sources	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Accountability	Transparency	Participation	Rule of law	Equity	Responsiveness	Consensus oriented
	resources and the protection of the environment.’ (p.3)	be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Who is accountable to whom varies depending on whether decisions or actions taken are internal or external to an organization or institution. In general an organization or an institution is accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law.’ (p.3)			important to point out that representative democracy does not necessarily mean that the concerns of the most vulnerable in society would be taken into consideration in decision making. Participation needs to be informed and organized. This means freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organized civil society on the other hand.’ (p.2)	also requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force.’ (p.2)	not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups, but particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well being.’ (p.3)	timeframe.’ (p.2)	requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainable human

Sources	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Accountability	Transparency	Participation	Rule of law	Equity	Responsiveness	Consensus oriented
									development and how to achieve the goals of such development. This can only result from an understanding of the historical, cultural and social contexts of a given society or community.’ (p.3)
United Nation (UN, 2006, p.10)			‘Accountability is one of the prerequisites of democratic or good governance. It entails holding elected or appointed officials charged	‘...transparency, that is, unfettered access to timely and reliable information on decisions and performance,...’ (p. 10)					

Sources	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Accountability	Transparency	Participation	Rule of law	Equity	Responsiveness	Consensus oriented
			with a public mandate responsible and answerable for their actions, activities and decisions.’ (p. 10)						
Commonwealth Secretariat (2010, p. 12)			‘Accountability is the ability of citizens to hold elected and appointed officials responsible for specific actions, activities or decisions.’ (p. 12)	‘Transparency is the public access to knowledge of the rules, policies and strategies of government.’ (p. 12)	‘Participation- recognizes that people are at the heart of development, and therefore participation is a key principle for good governance.’ (p. 12)				
Zhenglai and Guo (2011, p. 17-18)	‘Efficiency, which mainly refers to management efficiency that makes the best use of resources		‘Accountability, which mainly means that governmental and non-governmental organizations are accountable to the public or to those whose interests may	‘Transparency, that is, information is accessible to all citizens.’ (p. 18)	‘Participation, which refers to political participation but also civic participation in other areas of social life.’ (p. 17)	‘That is, the belief that the law is the highest authority in public and political management, everyone is	‘Fairness, which refers to equality with regard to political rights and economic rights for citizens of		

Sources	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Accountability	Transparency	Participation	Rule of law	Equity	Responsiveness	Consensus oriented
	for public interests.’ (p. 18)		be affected by their decisions.’ (p. 18)			equal before the law, and enforcement of laws should be impartial.’ (p. 17)	different genders, class, races, educational qualifications, and religious and political beliefs.’ (p. 18)		
Agere (2000, p. 7,109)	Good and services have been delivered on time with limited cost...expenditures have been reduced...clients have been satisfied with the service...the quality of service has improved and objectives have been achieved at less cost. (p. 109)		‘Accountability is defined as holding responsible elected or appointed individuals and organizations charged with a public mandate to account for specific actions, activities or decisions to the public from whom they derive their authority.’ (p.7)	‘Transparency is broadly defined as public knowledge of the policies of government and confidence in its intentions.’ (p.7)	‘Participation is defined as a process whereby stockholders exercise influence over public policy decisions, and share control over resources and institutions that affect their lives, thereby providing a check on power of government.’ (p.9)	‘The rule of law ensures that all institutions of the nation are subjected to the laws of the country, strict code of conduct, accountability and transparent procedures...It calls for a nation to have			

Sources	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Accountability	Transparency	Participation	Rule of law	Equity	Responsiveness	Consensus oriented
						clearly define laws, starting particularly with the constitution which defines the powers of government and the elimination of any form of abuse of power' (p.95)			

Appendix 3: The definitions of performance, performance management and performance measurement

3.1 Definitions of Performance

Performance = Means and Performance = End

Sources	Definition	Interpretation
Dooren et al. (2015)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Performance as a concept: Performance is conceptualized with attention to both the quality of actions and the quality of achievements, it may be typified as sustainable results... refers to the productive organization, that is, an organization that has the capacity to perform and converts this capacity into results- outputs and outcomes. ...performance indicators may cover the whole value chain from inputs over outputs to outcomes.' (p.3-4) • 'Performance as an agenda: The term 'performance' expresses a programme of change and improvement, which is promoted by a group of like-minded actors that is usually only loosely coupled...these group of actors sharing a performance agenda are called performance movement... Measuring performance is systematically collecting data by observing and registering performance-related issues for some performance purpose.' (p.5,7) 	<p>Quality of actions and achievement</p> <p>Programme of change and improvement</p>

Sources	Definition	Interpretation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Performance as outputs and outcomes of activities: Performance is thus about maximizing profit for society...A complex and dynamic system of political representation, fuelled by interests, power, ideology and political judgment, determines what society values... Alternatively, performance is seen as the realization of public values. Values and performance are distinct concepts, and all public values can lead to performance. Beside efficiency and effectiveness, successful practices of for instance participation or innovation could also be seen as dimensions of performance.’ (p. 22,23,29) 	Maximizing profit for society or public values
Kearney and Berman (1999)	‘Performance in this context is defined as managing public programs for outcomes. Managers use public resources and mandates to ensure that their programs meet public objectives and expectations. The meaning of the term performance is similar to that of the term productivity... However, performance is broader than some narrow meanings of productivity (efficiency, for example).’ (p. 1-2)	Management for achievement/outcomes
Institute of Personnel Management (1992)	‘...the cult of ‘performance’ characterised by the search for strategies to improve the contribution of individuals to the overall success of organizations.’ (p.1)	Strategies for improvement of individuals’ contribution and the organizations’ overall success

Sources	Definition	Interpretation
Houldsworth and Jirasinghe (2006)	'...an act and the result of an act. In recent years, the term has also evolved in the direction of referring to an accomplishment of something that is desired or intended.' (p. 16)	An act and the result of an act, and accomplishment of something that is desired or intended
Williams (1998)	'Performance is defined as: The record of outcomes produced on a specified job function or activity during a specified time period.' (Bernadin et al., 1995, p. 470-1 cited in Williams, 1998, p.75)	Outcomes of job or activities produced
Lebas (1995)	'Performance is about capability and the future.' (p. 26) 'Performance is about deploying and managing well the components of the causal model(s) that lead to the timely attainment of stated objectives within constraints specific to the firm and to the situation. Performance is therefore case specific and decision-maker specific.' (p. 29)	Capability and the future Deploying and managing components of the causal model(s)
Bernardin (1993)	'Performance is defined as the record of outcomes produced on a specified job function or activity during a specified time period.' (p. 379)	The record of outcomes

3.2 Definitions of Performance management (PM)

Performance = Means and Performance = End

Sources	Definition	Interpretation
Armstrong and Baron (1998)	‘Performance management is a strategic and integrated approach to delivering sustained success to organizations by improving the performance of the people who work in them and by developing the capabilities of teams and individual contributors.’ (p. 7)	A strategic and integrated approach to delivering sustained success by improving people’s performance and developing teams and individual’s capabilities
Fletcher (1993)	‘...an approach to creating a shared vision of the purpose and aims of the organization, helping each individual employees to understand and recognise their part in contributing to them, and thereby managing and enhancing the performance of both individuals and the organization.’ (Fletcher and Williams in IPM, 1992 cited in Fletcher, 1993, p. 35)	An approach to creating a shared vision of the purpose and aims of the organization
Varma, Budhwar and DeNisi (2008)	‘Performance management is usually described as the system through which organizations set work goals, determine performance standards, assign and evaluate work, provide performance feedback, determine training and development needs, and distribute rewards.’ (p.15)	A system to set goals, determine performance, evaluate work, provide feedback, determine development needs
Pritchard and Diazgranados (2008)	‘Performance management is defined as a range of practices an organization engages in to enhance the performance of a target person or	A range of practices an organization engages in to enhance a target person or group’s performance

Sources	Definition	Interpretation
	group with the ultimate purpose of improving organizational performance’ (DeNisi, 2000 cited in Pritchard and Diazgranados, 2008, p.40)	
Improvement and Development Agency (2002)	‘...what an organization does to realise its aspirations draws together the dual community leadership and service delivery roles of local government....A narrow definition....that performance management is what you do to improve and maintain good performance.’ (p.11)	Improvement and maintain good performance
Moore (1994)	‘...a method of connecting your organization’s objectives to the people who are there to carry them out. It makes use of the procedures and communication drills you already have, take into account your own culture, and establish the key link between individual staff development and corporate goals.’ (p.5)	A method of connecting organization’s objectives to the people
Houldsworth and Jirasinghe (2006)	‘A process for establishing a shared understanding about what is to be achieved, and how it is to be achieved; an approach to managing people which increases the probability of achieving job-related success.’ (Weiss and Hartle, 1997 cited in Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006, p. 6)	A process for sharing understanding, and an approach to managing people for achieving jobs
Moynihan (2008)	‘Performance management as a system that generates performance information through strategic planning and performance measurement routines and that connects this information to decision venues, where, ideally, the information influences a range of possible decisions.’ (p.5)	A system that generates performance information for making decisions

Sources	Definition	Interpretation
Williams (1998)	‘Performance management is no single thing...focuses on the individual and which, for the most part, is essentially an evolutionary extension of traditional appraisal practice...’ (p.1)	Focusing on individual and appraisal
Cooke (2003)	‘... perspectives on PM: as a system of managing organizational performance, as a system of employee performance, and as a system of integrating the two.’ (p.90)	A system of managing organizational performance and a system of employee performance
Buchner (2007)	<p>‘PM has been defined as management’s systematic application of processes aimed at optimizing human performance in an organization.’ (Warren, 1982 cited in Buchner, 2007, p. 61)</p> <p>‘A process for establishing a shared understanding about what is to be achieved, and how it is to be achieved, and an approach to managing people that increases the probability of achieving success.’ (Weiss and Hartle, 1997, p. 3 cited in Buchner, 2007, p. 61)</p>	<p>A management through systematic application</p> <p>A process for establishing a shared understanding</p>
Holloway (1999)	‘PM can be defined as the managerial work needed to ensure that the organization’s top-level aims (sometimes expressed as ‘Vision’ and ‘Mission’ statements) and objectives are attained.’ (p. 240)	The managerial work to ensure attainment of the organization’s aims and objectives
Osborne et al. (1993)	‘Performance management- the process of ensuring that:	The process of ensuring process and result of performance assessment

Sources	Definition	Interpretation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - performance assessment is an integral part of any programme from its outset; - its component parts are understandable to those gathering the data on performance and to those analysing and using it; - the results of performance assessment are used to inform all levels of programme planning and implementation; and - the performance assessment process is oriented toward enabling and improving performance in the future.’ (p. 4) 	
Busi and Bititci (2006)	<p>‘Performance management is defined as the use of performance measurement information to effect positive change in organizational culture, systems and processes, by helping to set agreed-upon performance goals, allocating and prioritising resources, informing managers to either confirm or change current policy or programme directions to meet those goals, and sharing results of performance in pursuing those goals.’</p> <p>(Amaratunga and Baldry, 2002 cited in Busi and Bititci, 2006, p. 14)</p>	<p>The use of performance measurement information to meet goals</p>

3.3 Definitions of Performance Measurement/Performance Appraisal/ Performance Evaluation

Sources	Definition	Interpretation
Williams, (1933)	‘Performance appraisal is an aspect of working relationships that emphasizes for both bosses and subordinates their managerial accountabilities.’ (p.8)	An aspect of working relationships
Osborne et al. (1993)	<p>‘Performance assessment is the evaluative process by which a view is reached about the performance of a set of activities against the achievement of specified objectives.’ (p. 3)</p> <p>‘Performance appraisal- the major assessment of the degree to which proposed activities are likely to achieve their objectives, and the formulation of indicators and targets by which the performance of the activity or programme can be monitored and evaluated in the future.’ (p. 3)</p> <p>‘Performance (ex-post) evaluation – the retrospective evaluation of a programme against its objectives.’ (p. 4)</p>	<p>The evaluative process</p> <p>The assessment of achieving objectives</p> <p>The retrospective evaluation of a programme</p>
Brown (1998)	‘Performance appraisal is a formal, structured system of measuring, evaluating and influencing employees in the conduct of their work.’ (p. 170)	A formal, structured system of measuring, evaluating and influencing employees in the conduct of their work

Sources	Definition	Interpretation
Vallance and Fellow (1999)	‘Performance appraisal refers to the process by which an individual’s work performance is assessed.’ (p. 79)	The process of assessment of individual’ s work performance
Bruijn (2007)	‘Performance measurement is a form of output steering and is desirable, because input and throughput steering are a disincentive for performance.’ (p.10)	A form of output
Jackson (1995)	‘Performance measurement are seen as an instrument of control.’ (p.2)	An instrument of control
Brignall (1993)	‘Performance measurement is the spur to appropriate action at the right organizational level and stage of the decision-making process- action being the link between feedforward and feedback control...’ (Fitzgerald et al., 1991 cited in Brignall, 1993, p. 41)	The spur to appropriate action

Appendix 4: The definitions of organizational culture

4.1 Definitions of Culture

Scholars	Definitions	Interpretation
Schein (1990)	‘Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) intended, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.’ (p. 111)	Aa pattern of basic assumptions
Schein (2004)	‘The culture of a group can now be defined as a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.’ (p.17)	A pattern of shared basic assumptions
Hofstede (1984)	‘...culture as ‘the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from another.’ (p. 21)	The programme of mind

Scholars	Definitions	Interpretation
Brown (1998)	‘Culture is most appropriately regarded as a metaphor for understanding organizations...’ (p.8)	A metaphor for understanding organizations
Jaques (1952)	‘The culture of the factory is its customary and traditional way of thinking and of doing things, which is shared to a greater or lesser degree by all its members, and which new members must learn, and at least partially accept, in order to be accepted into service in the firm. Culture in this sense covers a wide range of behaviour: the methods of production; job skills and technical knowledge; attitudes towards discipline and punishment; the customs and habits of managerial behaviour; the objectives of the concern; its way of doing business; the methods of payment; the values placed on different types of work; beliefs in democratic living and joint consultation; and the less conscious conventions and taboos.’ (p.251)	A way of thinking and of doing things sharing among an organization’s members
Eldridge (1973)	‘The culture of an organization refers to the unique configuration of norms, values, beliefs, ways of behaving and so on that characterize the manner in which groups and individuals combine to get things done. The distinctiveness of a particular organization is intimately bound up with its history and the character-building effects of past decisions and past leaders. It is manifested in the folkways, mores, and the ideology to which members	The unique configuration of norms, values, beliefs, ways of behaving

Scholars	Definitions	Interpretation
	defer, as well as in the strategic choices made by the organizations as a whole.’ (p.89)	
Schwartz and Davis (1981)	‘Culture....is a pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by the organizations’ members. These beliefs and expectations produce norms that powerfully shape the behavior of individuals and groups in the organization.’ (p.33)	A pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by the organizations’ members
Lorsch (1986)	‘By culture I mean the shared beliefs top managers in a company have about how they should manage themselves and other employees, and how they should conduct their business(es). These beliefs are often invisible to the top managers but have a major impact on their thoughts and actions.’ (p.95)	The shared beliefs top managers in a company
Pheysey (1993)	‘A culture is thus a way of seeing that is common to many people (Usually there are sub-cultures, or ways of seeing by minorities also.) Culture itself is subject to transformation. Managers may deliberately seek to change it.’ (p. 3)	A way of seeing that is common to many people
Pheysey (1993)	An organizational culture includes commonly held values, but also common beliefs and attitudes. It prescribes ‘the way we do things here’. However, it is possible to change the prescription... methods of cultural transformation are described as well as types of culture. (p. xiii)	Common values, beliefs and attitudes

Scholars	Definitions	Interpretation
Christensen et al. (2007)	‘Culture is something an institution is.’ (p.43)	Something an institution is
Dick and Ellis (2006)	‘Culture is therefore concerned with the symbolic aspects of life—that is, it is concerned with understanding how certain events and visible signs are invested with meaning... Culture is a collective phenomenon, because it is shared by people who live in the same social environment.’ (p.185).	The symbolic aspects of life and a collective phenomenon
Ellis and Dick (2003)	‘Culture takes as its focus those shared aspects of behaviour and thinking that bind the members of an organization together.’ (p.175)	Aspects of behaviour and thinking binding an organization’s members together
McEwan (2001)	‘Culture is defined as an integrated system of learned behaviour patterns, characteristic of the members of any given society.’ (p.324)	An integrated system of learned behaviour patterns and characteristic of the members of any given society
Morgan (1943)	Shared values, shared beliefs, shared meaning, shared understanding, and shared sense making are all different ways of describing culture. (p.138)	Sharing beliefs , meaning, understanding, and sense making
Deal and Kennedy (1982)	‘Culture, as Weber’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines it, is the integrated pattern of human behaviour that includes thought, speech, action, and artefacts and depends on man’s capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations.’ (p.4)	The integrated pattern of human behaviour through speech, action, and artefacts

Scholars	Definitions	Interpretation
Kotter and Heskett (1992)	‘At deeper and less visible level, culture refers to values that are shared by the people in a group and that tend to persist over time even when group membership changes... At more visible level, culture represents the behaviour patterns or style of an organization that new employees are automatically encouraged to follow by their fellow employees.’ (p. 4)	Values sharing among people and behaviour patterns or style of an organization
Kotter and Heskett (1992)	‘Culture represents an interdependent set of values and ways of behaving that are common in a community and that tend to perpetuate themselves, sometimes over long periods of time.’ (p. 141)	An interdependent set of values and ways of behaving in an organization
McKenna and Beech (2002)	‘Culture is a central and important topic HRM. It is concerned with the values, attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, actions and procedures that people adopt in organizational life. It encompasses the range of thought and action as they are reinforced in the corporate setting, and so underlies many of the specific issues of people management. It provides the social framework for the relationship between managers and employees and as such is an influencing factor on the psychological contract, employees’ willingness to accept change and the ability of the organization to be open about, and learn from, its experience.’ (p.88)	The values, attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, actions and procedures

4.2 Definitions of Organizational Culture

Scholars	Definitions	Interpretation
Brown (1998)	‘Organizational culture refers to the pattern of beliefs, values and learned ways of coping with experience that have developed during the course of an organization’s history, and which tend to be manifested in its material arrangements and in the behaviours of its members.’ (p.9).	The pattern of beliefs, values and learned ways
Robbins (2005)	‘Organizational culture refers to a system of shared meaning held by members that distinguishes the organization from other organizations. This system of shared meaning is a set of key characteristics that the organization values.’ (p. 485)	A system of shared meaning by the organization’s members
Elsmore (2001)	‘Those patterns of behaviour, which some or all organization members have in common.’ (p. 8)	Patterns of behaviour
Hofstede et al. (1990)	‘The organizational/corporate culture construct: it is (1) holistic, (2) historically determined, (3) related to anthropological concepts, (4) socially constructed, (5) soft, and (6) difficult to change. ’ (p. 286)	

Appendix 6: The KPIs within each dimension of performance evaluation framework between fiscal year B.E. 2550 (2007) and B.E. 2554 (2011) and KPI host agencies

	B.E. 2550 (2007)	B.E. 2551 (2008)	B.E. 2552 (2009)	B.E. 2553 (2010)	B.E. 2554 (2011)	KPI host agencies
Dimension 1 Effectiveness of Mission	1. Action plans (Cluster) (select 1-5 KPIs from menu e.g. quality of tourism, and preparation for good agricultural practice)	1. Action plans (Cluster) (select 1-5 KPIs from menu e.g. quality of tourism, and preparation for good agricultural practice)	1. Action plans (Cluster) (select 1-5 KPIs from menu e.g. quality of tourism, and preparation for good agricultural practice)	1. Action plans (Cluster) (select 1-5 KPIs from menu e.g. quality of tourism, and preparation for good agricultural practice)	1. Action plans (Cluster) (select 1-5 KPIs from menu e.g. quality of tourism, and preparation for good agricultural practice)	1) Provincial Agricultural and Cooperatives Office 2) Provincial Livestock Office 3) Provincial Fisheries Office
	2. Action plans (Province) 2.1 Gross Provincial Product (GPP)	2. Emergency policies 2.1 Participation of villages	2. Emergency policies 2.1 Participation of villages	2. Emergency policies 2.1 Participation of villages	2. Emergency policies 2.1 Participation of villages	1) Provincial Community Development Office 2) Provincial Administration Office

	B.E. 2550 (2007)	B.E. 2551 (2008)	B.E. 2552 (2009)	B.E. 2553 (2010)	B.E. 2554 (2011)	KPI host agencies
	2.2 Alleviation of poverty 2.3 Project on provincial strategies	2.2 Community empowerment 2.3 Management of wellbeing 2.4 Quality of wellbeing plan 2.5 Expenditure of wellbeing project 2.6 Alleviation of poverty	2.2 Monitor emergency policies	2.2 Monitor emergency policies	2.2 Monitor emergency policies	
	3. Management of natural resources and environment 3.1 Problem of drug	3. Management of natural resources and environment 3.1 Problem of drug	3. Management of natural resources and environment 3.1 Alleviation of poverty	3. Management of natural resources and environment 3.1 Alleviation of poverty	3. Management of natural resources and environment 3.1 Alleviation of poverty	1) Provincial Natural Resources and Environment Office 2) Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation

	B.E. 2550 (2007)	B.E. 2551 (2008)	B.E. 2552 (2009)	B.E. 2553 (2010)	B.E. 2554 (2011)	KPI host agencies
	3.2 Accomplishment of prosecution 3.3 Plan of security 3.4 Management of natural resources and environment 3.5 Food safety 3.6 Reduction of traffic accidents	3.2 Accomplishment of prosecution 3.3 Management of natural resources and environment 3.4 Reduction of traffic accidents 3.5 Plan of security	3.2 Problem of drug 3.3 Accomplishment of prosecution 3.4 Management of natural resources and environment 3.5 Reduction of traffic accidents 3.6 Plan of security	3.2 Problem of drug 3.3 Accomplishment of prosecution 3.4 Management of natural resources and environment 3.5 Reduction of traffic accidents 3.6 Plan of security	3.2 Problem of drug 3.3 Accomplishment of prosecution 3.4 Management of natural resources and environment 3.5 Reduction of traffic accidents 3.6 Plan of security	
Dimension 2 Quality of Service	4.1 Satisfaction of services 4.2 Single service center	4. Satisfaction of services 5. Counter service	4. Satisfaction of services 5. Counter service	4. Satisfaction of services 5. Satisfaction of provincial management	4. Satisfaction of services 5. Satisfaction of policy maker	1) Provincial Governor's Office 2) Provincial Administration Office

	B.E. 2550 (2007)	B.E. 2551 (2008)	B.E. 2552 (2009)	B.E. 2553 (2010)	B.E. 2554 (2011)	KPI host agencies
	5. Participation for opinion 6.1 Information services 6.2 Prevention of corruption	6. Participation for opinion 7. Information services 8. Prevention of corruption	6. Participation 7. Prevention of corruption 8. Information services	6. Counter service 7. Satisfaction of policy maker 8. Prevention of corruption 9. Citizens' complaint	6. Counter service 7. Prevention of corruption	
Dimension 3 Efficiency of Performance	7. Expenditure of budget 8. Energy save	9. Energy save 10. Reduction of process time of services	9. Internal audit 10. Energy save	10. Reduction of process time of services 11. Expenditure of budget	8. Reduction of process time of services 9. Expenditure of budget	1) Provincial Public Health Office 2) Provincial Employment Service Office 3) Provincial Land Office 4) Provincial

	B.E. 2550 (2007)	B.E. 2551 (2008)	B.E. 2552 (2009)	B.E. 2553 (2010)	B.E. 2554 (2011)	KPI host agencies
	9.1 Reduction of process time of services 9.2 Change of procedure of work		11. Reduction of process time of services	12. Energy save 13. Internal control 14. Internal audit	10. Internal control	Public Health Office 5) Provincial Office of the Controller General 6) Provincial Office of Energy
Dimension 4 Organizational Development	10. Knowledge management 11.1 Development of HR management 11.2 Change of HR 11.3 Organizational KPI to individual KPI 12. Management of IT data base 13. Quality of public management 14. Risk management	11. Quality of public management	12. Quality of public management	15. Quality of public management	11. Quality of public management	Provincial Governor's Office
Total number of KPIs (Main)	14	11	12	15	11	10

Note: 10 KPI host agencies highlighted were the main KPI host agencies in the 16 provinces

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