

Khomeinism, the Islamic Revolution and Anti Americanism

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Abstract

The 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran was based and formed upon the concept of Khomeinism, the religious, political, and social ideas of Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini. While the Iranian revolution was carried out with the slogans of independence, freedom, and Islamic Republic, Khomeini's framework gave it a specific impetus for the unity of people, religious culture, and leadership. Khomeinism was not just an effort, on a religious basis, to alter a national system. It included and was dependent upon the projection of a clash beyond a “national” struggle, including was a clash of ideology with that associated with the United States.

Analysing the Iran-US relationship over the past century and Khomeini's interpretation of it, this thesis attempts to show how the Ayatullah projected "America" versus Iranian national freedom and religious pride. This projection used national interest and the religious and social culture of Iranians to mobilise the masses to overthrow a secular and pro-American political system, replacing it with an Islamic, anti-American system.

However, while anti-Americanism was an essential part of Khomeinism, it was a conditional and impermanent concept. As the historical investigation shows, hostility between Iranian and American communities has been exceptional for much of the period since 1850. That recognition, as well as the critique of Khomeinism, offers possibilities for improvement in future relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the West, especially the US.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The 1979 Islamic Revolution of the Iranian nation was carried out under the slogan of independence, freedom and Islamic Republic (*Esteghlaal, Azadi, Jomhooriye Eslami*). On one level, this independence and freedom were sought from the perceived tyranny of a monarchy that had claimed 2500 years of ruling legitimacy. On another level it was from external powers, both the dominance of a super-power to the West and the supposed shelter offered by a super-power to the East (Aghighi Bakhshyeshi, 2014) (Alexander and Nanes, 1980) (Campbell, et al., 1990, p.196).

This revolution was led and advanced by Ayatullah Imam Roohullah Khomeini, a cleric who for more than 50 years had combined study and propagation of an Islamic law (Fiqh) with a belief in the importance of an independent Iran as the embodiment of that Fiqh in political and cultural practice¹. Khomeini is characterised inside and outside Iran as the Father of the Revolution (Abrahamian, 1993) who replaced the old Iranian monarchy with the construction of a religious, political, and social system which sought to be both a stable platform for Iran's development and also an example for other nations and people to emulate in confronting US policy by religious principles (Jabbari and Olson, 1981) (Khosravi, 2001) (Rouhani, 1979, p144).

The significance of Ayatullah Khomeini is not only that he proposed a new model for a Revolution but also he posed a direct response to the "International Hegemony" identified by him as Americanisation. Consequently for many Iranians, Islamic Republic (as a new model of state) not only indicated the form and content of government but also represented freedom and independence

¹ Ayatullah Khamenei, the present supreme leader of Iran stated that "the art of Imam Khomeini was that it provided the revolution with a frame work by which it was prevented from falling into the hands of eastern or western powers and this is the essence of the meaning of the slogan, 'neither East nor West but Islamic Republic', and which was taught by Imam Khomeini to the people." Hadis-e- Velayat 4/6/2002

from the US influence which had dominated and corrupted Iran for the previous 30 years. This would unite the different elements of support for the Islamic Republic, not just devout Muslims, but other religious and secular groups, in agreement on the problem of America in Iran (Motahari, 1993, p87). The extent of this belief was such that during the Islamic revolution this belief also became that of the non-Islamic minorities and parties. That representation was marked by the 98.2% vote of all Iranians for the establishment of an Islamic State, Islamic Republic, proposed by Khomeini¹.

The result of this referendum was more than twenty million votes in favour and more than more than three hundred and sixty thousand against, out of twenty point five million eligible to vote. Of the secular parties only the National Democratic Front and of the Marxist groups only Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas abstained, citing ambiguity in the definition of the Islamic Republic. Other parties such as the National Front, Iran freedom Movement party and Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) supported Ayatullah Khomeini's idea of establishment of the Islamic Republic (Shahr-e- Qanoon, 2014).

Two years later, a number of Marxist and leftist groups gradually turned to opposition and even started an armed struggle against the Islamic Republic. However, the general public maintained support of the Republic and Khomeini's position against America, a belief that was strongly held throughout the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq and even after the death of the Ayatullah (Keddie and Richard, 2006) (Barnes and Bigham, 2006).

¹ The election was held free and neither the temporary government nor influential characters threaten anyone. Imam did not also issue a religious duty or a fatwa imposing people to participate. But people participated vulnerary and casted their votes on their free will." Bazargan, M. (1983). The Iranian Revolution in Two Mmotions. Tehran: Nehzat Azahi Iran, p.176.

Khomeini's message is still promoted today, for example, in the words of the current Supreme Leader, Ayatullah Khamenei:

“The Islamic Republic of Iran gave the world a new model and the Muslims in the east and west are under its influence and they love the Islamic republic and abhor the oppressors especially America” (Khamenei, 2003).

The US also has acknowledged this distinction, albeit in less-than-favourable terms. Almost 30 years after the Revolution, the 2006 National Security Strategy cited the Islamic Republic as the fundamental opponent of America after the Cold War, “We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran” (Rice, 2015).

The Place of Khomeinism in Iran

Ayatullah Khomeini’s stature as one of the most important religious figures of the 20th century has led many scholars of politics, sociology, and theology to cite a Khomeinist Revolution in Iran and the Islamic World as a corrective to previous theories with establishment of a new model of the State and its rule (Motahari, 1993, p. 87) (Abrahamian, 1993) (Foran, 1994, p. 51).

For his supporters, Khomeini's influence came from his engagement both the weaknesses and strengths of Iranian history, culture, and society (Khamenei, 1990). His leadership rested on the capability for dialogue with the people, using their language and expressing their needs to create a new social system out of a revolution (Foran, 1993) (Sedighi Oraii, 1998). He pursued this system, against challenges both from inside and outside Iran, for almost 30 years.

More than 25 years after his death, his ideas and views are still the foundation of the Islamic Republic (Keddie and Richard, 2006) (Milani, 1988) (Khamenei, 1990). Present-day Iran's leadership and executive body are run by his students and his followers, including Khamenei,

Rafsanjani, Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani, and his articulations are still the text for political, economic, and social laws¹ and clerical fatwas.² Therefore even 25 years after his death, Khomeinism is still alive in Iran.

The continuing place of Khomeinism in Iran can be evaluated through three frameworks:

1. Khomeini's exploitation of Iranian history and culture to justify and explain his ideas and thoughts.
2. The privileged and authoritative position of the Marjaiyat in the history and culture of Shia Islam, and Khomeini's use of his status as a Marja.
3. Khomeini's conception of the future plan to provide definitive, clear, and organised answers to important questions.

Iran is one of the four cradles of human culture and civilisation, from thousands of years before Christ. Elam's government (3200 BC) was the first power centralised in Iran, the first official administrative system and Parliament was established during Arsacid Empire (250 BC), and one of the first human right acts was issued by Cyrus (Cyrus cylinder of 539 BC). During the Sassanid Empire, religious belief and values in political institutions were consolidated and propagated by development of religious courts alongside a judiciary. These systems promulgated the notions of independence in political thought, freedom in social activity, and adherence to religion in culture.

¹ Even Green Movement leaders, i.e. Mir Hussain Musavi and Mahdi Karrubi criticised government using Ayatullah Khomeini's thoughts.

² Such as the permissibility of music on the TV and radio, mortgage and interest in the banking system, women right to divorce, and dozens of other examples.

Religious culture was reinforced by the expansion of Islam in Iran and its acceptance as the official religion in the 6th century AD, followed by the migration of the eighth Shi'a Imam (Reza) to Iran as the successor of Caliph in the 9th century. Iran was transformed to a Shi'a state during the Safavid Dynasty, with the monarchy officially recognised as Shi'a from the 16th century. Marjaiyat¹ (religious leadership) and a network of Shia clergy were formed. Values such as justice, hatred of oppression, and reform and the notion of the Ideal State were promoted as the teachings of Ali, the first Shi'a Imam, and of Hussein, the third Imam, who rose against the oppressive ruler Yazid, as well as the belief in the return of their 12th Imam, Mahdi².

Through his presentation of these values in this history and culture, Khomeini both criticised the 20th-century Iranian system and promoted the idea of an Islamic Revolution.

“We want the Islamic justice and law to prevail in this country. In the Islamic state, no one is superior to anyone else... and a state in which there is no injustice... like the Imam Ali (a.s) state... which does not allow oppression against a Jewish woman who is under the protection of Islamic state... (and) in which the head of state is (treated) like everyone else.” (Sahife Nour Vol 9, 1990, p. 424)

From the 16th century, the Marjaiyat was considered by the people as the divine and democratic parallel to the Government and monarchy. The authority of the Marjaiyat within Iranian society grew from the 19th century, especially after the Tobacco (tambako) Movement and the Constitutional (*mashrutiyyat*) Revolution. Khomeini built on this to establish himself as a

¹ The institution of the religious leadership, marja (religious leader) is the soul spiritual head having a status of pope in Christianity.

² According to the Twelvers Shia, the 12th shia Imam had two occultation, minor and major. Minor was one in which he had 4 representatives and they produced historical evidence that the 12th Imam was in contact with them. The major occultation is the one in which he has no contact till he returns and he is still in his major occultation .

knowledgeable and wise cleric, seen by many as a social reformer as well as a religious leader interpreting Islamic teachings.

After the Constitutional Revolution and with execution of Ayatullah Sheikh Fadlullah Nouri¹ by the Government, many Iranians began to question their system. Did the monarchy respect deep national and fundamental values such as independence, freedom, and justice? Could a dynamic, productive relationship be formed between politics and religion through institutions? Should the Government remain under a Constitutional monarchy? The weakness of government institutions and the monarchy in Iran --- especially during World War II, occupation of Iran by foreign powers, and the 1953 coup --- strengthened the belief that the political institutions were not only indifferent towards religion and religious values but in cases were against them.

Khomeini's intervention in this system was that the political and religious must not be separated because politics on its own could not ensure independence, justice, freedom, reform, and rights.

Criticising Constitutional revolution, Khomeini believed that Iran needed further change:

“Although in the constitutional movement led by people, they managed to change the authoritarian regime to a constitutional system, yet they failed to fully implement constitutional (Sahife Nour Vol 8, 1990, p 179). The same autocrats later came and took the constitutional movement and deviate it from its path (Sahife Nour Vol 18, 1990, pp 135,137) This means it was called constitutional but in fact it was dictatorship, a dictatorship worse than before, and certainly worse than the former ones” (Sahife Nour Vol 15, 1990, p 202).

Khomeini not only had a clear plan for the success of the revolution but also for the governance of a State under the principle of Velayat Faqih, first articulated in his work ‘Kashf al Asrar’, 35 years

¹ Shaikh Fazlullah Nouri, a Shia Marja, was one of the leaders of Tobacco Movement in Tehran. He was against constitutional monarchy and believed in the deviation constitutional culture. He also believed that the constitution and domestic laws of the country must be consistent with Islamic laws; which was not the case with constitutional monarchy. Khomeini has mentioned and praised Ayatullah Nouri in many of his speeches.

before the Revolution. In Khomeini's view an ideal government system is a system that is under the supervision and leadership of jurists of Islamic law (Faqih) and based on the majority vote of the people (Sahife Nour Vol 5, 1990, p. 240).

We are seeking (to establish) the Islamic Republic. Republic because it depends on majority vote of the people. And Islamic because its laws are based on Islamic laws and is supervised by the Velayat Faqih (Sahife Nour Vol 4, 1990, p.22)

The Fundamentals of Khomeinism

Ayatullah Khomeini's distinctive interpretation of four basic elements is the basis of Khomeinism:

1. Islam as the best guide and ideology for running society and establishing a state

Khomeini begins with the view that the Shia senior *jurisprudent* (*Marja*) is the best leader and ideologue for the Islamic state. Society and the government should operate according to Islamic laws and Shia jurisprudence. In the system of Velayat Faqih, the state should be supervised and guided by senior scholars. The Supreme Leader should be the person with the most knowledgeable and expertise to address and solve issues in political, cultural, and economic sphere through the use of religion.

It was not sufficient for Khomeini to say political Islam is the responsibility of clerics. He had to provide his vision of that religious-political system.

2. Law as the source for social and international relationships

Islamic rules define the content, form, and legitimacy of the law, enforcement should be based on these rules. Leaders must adhere to those rules and law or be replaced.

Khomeini believed that the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, breaking both religious laws and violating the Constitution. He warned the Shah several occasions that he was trespassing both shariyah and the Iranian constitutional system¹. When these warnings were ignored, a revolution against a non-religious and illegitimate leader became necessary.

3. Fulfilment of the people by empowering them

For Khomeini, people are the sole basis for the establishment of Islamic Republic, where they choose the type of government, President and Parliament they want. They can even choose and/or remove the Supreme Leader through the Assembly of Experts.

This government, at all levels, rely on the votes of the people and will be open to public supervision and criticism (Sahife Nour Vol 4, 1990, p. 160) .

These has been emphasised on in Khomeinism and constitution even though in practice it might face obstacles and uncertainties.

This notion was projected in the early Islamic Republic by key political events, such as the election and subsequent impeachment of Abolhassan Bani Sadr, the first President. Khomeini was opposed to the approach of Bani Sadr to the Revolution, but said that he respected Bani Sadr's position as the choice of the people in an election. Only when Parliament, a representative body of the people, impeached Bani Sadr did Khomeini express his opposition. During the third Parliamentary election, when the Guardian Council tried to cancel Tehran's votes because reformists had won,

¹ The last speech of Shah prior fleeing Iran was he promised to act according to the constitution of Iran but it was too late.

Khomeini issued an announcement preventing the cancellation because “the criterion is the vote of the people”.

4. International hegemony¹ as the most important obstacle to freedom and independence in the Islamic world, especially in Iran

Khomeini believed that puppet regimes had always prevented people from creating and forming a government and political structure of their own. He argued that Iranians required space to independently function to express and implement their social, economic and political ideas, a space which was deprived them during the past century by an international hegemony which had supported a false leadership.

The Position of the US in Khomeinism

In Khomeinism, international hegemony is primarily represented, by the United States, due to American policies towards Iran after the 1953 coup and particularly after 1965. Events such as the Khordad (June 5) Uprising in 1963 over the US demands for capitulation legislation led Khomeini to conclude that the Shah, returned to power by the 1953 US-led coup, could only maintain his regime with the support of the Americans. The Shah had no choice but to follow the US policies and plans for Iran, and opposition to the monarch was meaningless without opposition to Washington. The US as a coloniser was the main obstacle for a free Islamic Iran and for his Islamic model.

¹ Hegemony: is the dominance of one group over other groups, with or without the threat of force to the extent that, for instance, the dominant party can dictate the terms of trade to its advantage; more broadly, cultural perspectives become skewed to favour the dominant group. The analyst has used this term to describe United States since the end of the Cold War, Holsti K. 1985, the dividing discipline. Boston: Allen & Unwin.

“The USA as the most powerful state in the world does its up most to devour, with increasing voracity, the financial resources of the dominated countries. The USA is the number one enemy of the deprived and poor people of the world. It does not avoid any crime in its political, economic, cultural, and military dominance over the subjugated countries (Sashife Nour Vol 13, 1990, p.84)

Khomeini titled America as the ‘Great Satan’, man’s biggest enemy according to all Abrahamic religions, as the challenge for people around the world as well as for the Iranian people.

From Khomeini’s point of view, the United States did not only plunder Iran’s resources from 1950 through the Pahlavi regime (Stempel, 1981, p. 114). After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the U.S. continued to create difficulties and hurdles, which deprived or delayed opportunities for development and progress of the Iranian nation, seized property and finances, and enforced economic sanctions. Also US supported political parties such as “terrorist” groups the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MKO) and foreign countries like Iraq with its eight-year war on Iran¹.

Khomeinism portrayed itself as a defensive ideology against US International hegemony². In Khomeini’s view anti Americanism did not mean hatred toward American people or threatening the existence and identity of a county. Instead, it was opposition to interference and colonising policies in Middle East and specially Iran. While the US government continued its hostility toward Tehran, the Iran-US relationship would be a relationship of animosity.

“We have a friendly relation with the people of America but will establish a relation with the US government that ensures the interests of the Iranian nation” (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p.17).

¹ For more information one could look into: Vaezi, H. (1997), Iran and America, Study of America's policy in Iran, 2nd. Ed, Tehran, Soroush; Peymani, H. (2004); Iran and America, The emergence of Zone grouping in the western Asia, Tehran, Ayatullah Khomeini centre of Educational and research publication.

² In Ayatullah’s Khomeini’s view, executions and rough attitude towards those against revolution, after their trials and convictions was for people’s security. He believed all those punished were guilty.

“If the US continues to treat Iranian nation as it is now, our reaction will be hostile and if US respects Iranians then we will do the same” (Sahife Nour Vol 3, 1990, p.33).

Resistance to the US government became an effective catalyst for the definition and expansion of the Khomeinist Revolution; however, this “anti–Americanism” did not mean a complete cutting of ties with “America”. Khomeini’s view of resistance meant opposition but not separation, with the Islamic Republic maintaining relations except with the “fake regime of Israel and the apartheid regime of South Africa” (Sahife Nour Vol 4, 1990, p.134).

Khomeinism and the historical approach

History and in particular the contemporary history of Iran and its results and consequences have a special position in Khomeinism. It underpins the Ayatullah's approach to politics and political struggle, beginning with his personal experience --- his father was an activist who was killed in a fight against the rulers of the Qajar dynasty¹ while Khomeini later recalled, “I used to attend parliamentary meetings during the Reza Khan Era and gatherings just as a viewer and so it would keep me updated with the current affairs and issues and I was very anxious about them” (Sahife Nour Vol 12, 1990, p.115).

For Khomeini, the past (history) is not disconnected from the present and the future. Instead, “history and what happens to the nation has to be (seen as) a lesson, the history is the teacher of humans” (Seeking the way from the words of Imam Vol 16, 1983, p.40). He recalled an example from his advice to Ayatullah Khashani during political turmoil in 1953:

¹The martyrdom of his father, Sayed Mostafa, was four months and 22 days after the birth of Ayatullah Khomeini when he was shot by the robber barons while travelling between the path of Khomein and Arak.

“I wrote to Kashani that it is necessary that he pays attention to the religious (Islamic) aspect of the (nationalist) movement (i.e. making the movement a religious one). However, instead of boosting the religious aspect of the movement and making it dominate over the political aspect, he (Kashani) acted contrariwise to the extent that he became the head of the national parliament/council and this was wrong!” (Seeking the way from the words of Imam Vol 16, 1983, p.84).

Responding to a question by an Italian journalist in 1979 about the factors that led to the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini said:

“On one hand, one of the inherent characteristics of Shia Islam is to stand up and fight against dictatorship and oppression which is evident throughout the history of Shia Islam; and on the other hand, in the past 100 years a number events took place, each of which had an impact on today’s movement of the Iranian nation. The Constitutional Revolution, the Tobacco Movement, the British coup of Reza Khan (Reza Shah), the oil nationalisation movement, the 1953 coup, and many others played an important role. The establishment of the seminary school more than a half-century ago in Qom and its effect inside and outside of Iran as well as the efforts of religious intellectuals in universities and the June 5th (1963) uprising under the leadership of Islamic scholars, which continues to this day: all are factors that influenced the formation of the Islamic Revolution and made Shia Islam famous at the global level” (Seeking the way from the words of Imam Vol 16, 1983, p.37).

Khomeini considered the impacts of historical experiences so vital for understanding the Islamic Revolution that he frequently asked people to learn Iran’s history of the last century and its influence (Sahife Nour Vol 12, 1990, p.177). In 1979, he said, “These are stories that history must record so that later on (people) know what the situation in Iran was” (Seeking the way from the words of Imam Vol 16, 1983, p.359). After the victory of the Revolution, Khomeini asked Ayatullah Khamenei, then the President and head of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, to establish a foundation to supervise what was written in the history books (Sahife Nour Vol 12, 1990, p.102).

According to Khomeini, the 5 June uprising was the most important event of the contemporary history of Iran and the beginning of the Islamic Revolution:

“June the 5th must be kept alive so that the evilness of Shah is not forgotten and the future generations learn about the crimes of bloodthirsty kings. Iranian nation should not forget June the 5th; this nation must learn about the event and learn what the aim of this uprising was.” (Seeking the way from the words of Imam Vol 16, 1983, pp.122-3, 129).

Understanding of Khomeini's analysis, views, and leadership is meaningless and incomplete without comprehension of the historical events in the context of which Khomeinism was formed.

Aims & Objectives

The overall aim of this research is to use Khomeinism and anti-Americanism to explain the causes and approaches which directly or indirectly influenced the formation of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, with a secular, seemingly powerful, and pro-American political system replaced by one which is Islamic and anti-American.

This work is informed by theory but does not begin with theory as the explanation for this change. Instead, it tries to analyse in historical context the political, cultural and social values of Iran, its interaction with United States of America, and the response to American policies in Iran¹. Understanding historical context of Iran-US relationship and its influence on Ayatullah Khomeini's ideology and the resulting revolution is not only important for gaining a more realistic understanding of the 1979 revolution; it is crucial to understand and predicting any possible future changes in the Iran-US relationship.

This thesis attempts to introduce neutral and unbiased insight into the issues of Islamic Revolution, Khomeinism and Iran-US relationship, which have rarely been analysed without ideological biases and prejudice in Iran or the West. Because of these prejudices, although it has been more than 35 years since the breaking of Iran-US ties, no defined plan or strategy for improvement of Iran-US relationship has been suggested.

¹ From 1978, the author not only was an eyewitness of the events of the revolution but he was present in the events and has closely experienced and observed many incidents prior, during and after the Islamic revolution. Furthermore, the author was teaching the subject of "Sociology of Islamic revolution" over many years in Tehran University. He also has published a book on social thoughts of Imam Khomeini which is currently being taught as a course book in Tehran University.

This research aims to discuss and shed light on a number of fundamental concepts including:

1. The role of historical roots and ways of Americanization and anti- Americanism in Iran for both Iranians and Americans.
2. The role of Khomeinism and the Islamic Revolution in putting an end to American agendas in Iran
3. Khomeinism as the criteria for the evaluation of current domestic and foreign policies of Islamic the Republic

This work is not attempting to investigate whether Ayatullah Khomeini's view of the US and its role in Iran, and his views on culture, religion, and politics, were right or wrong. Instead, it inspects how he understood these views and used them to justify and propagate a revolution. The author is not trying to critique the process of Americanization or anti-Americanism, but is examining how Iranians, often influenced by Ayatullah Khomeini, defined their relationship and attitude towards America through ideas of and responses to Americanization.

This dissertation first analyses the history of the Iran-US relationship over the 100 years, with changes in US actions over political developments of Iran, especially after the 1953 coup, transforming the opinions of Iranians about America. Secondly, it analyses the role of Ayatullah Khomeini in the evolution of events in Iran over the 50 years preceding the Islamic Revolution, and especially after 1963, and the effects of Khomeinism on the political views of Iranians.

In doing so, this thesis discusses the position of Anti-Americanism within Khomeinism and hence the eventual goal of this research is to offer guidance for the future path of the relationship between

the Islamic Republic of Iran and the West, and in particular the US, by using the rich history of the Iran-US relationship.

Research Method

Analysing and investigating revolutions, its roots, causes and motives are difficult tasks due to a number of reasons most important of which is their rarity and uniqueness. Revolutions are rare historical events that may only be witnessed once in a life time and they are usually very unique and specific to the time, place and the society in which they occur. Therefore, generalisation of causes of a revolution and other rare historical events are almost impossible and a mistake.

The most advantageous method for analysis of such events is contextual analysis. Using contextual analysis, one can bring together and investigate the historical and social settings specific to the society in which a revolution occurs and use that to analyse the unique nature of that revolution. This method utilises analytical, historical, descriptive and interpretive techniques to analyse and understand the causes of a revolution.

Therefore, the contextual analysis method would be very useful in understanding the revolution's ideologies, the related documents and messages and the speeches of the leader of the revolution all in the specific context of the society in which the revolution has occurred.

Using the contextual analysis, this research will be analysing the speeches, rhetoric, ideas and system of belief of Ayatullah Khomeini in order to thoroughly investigate and understand Khomeinism, the roots and causes of the Islamic Revolution and the role of United States in the formation of the revolution as understood and presented by Khomeinism.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Approaches to the Islamic Revolution

The Islamic Revolution not only transformed the political and governing regime; it also challenged theories in political and social sciences, with prominent scholars modifying their approaches.

In 'The Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution', Theda Skocpol (1982, pp. 265-283) wrote:

"The recent fall of Shah of Iran and emergence of the revolution of Iran between 1977 and 1979 surprised the foreign spectators taken from the American friends of Shah, journalists and politicians to socialists such as me who am a specialist in issues of revolution. All of us have considered these events with interest and astonishment. A number of us were leaded to study the political social events of Iran beyond these events. Such a research was inevitable for me, mostly because the revolution of Iran has impressed me from its various unusual aspects. This revolution has certainly got the qualifications of a social one. However, its emergence especially its causing the fall of Shah brought my expectations about the reasons of revolutions - which I have comparatively studied about the French, Russian and American revolutions, under question."

John Foran (1994) assessed the vast change that takes over Iran thoroughly in 1978, astonished all from spectators, journalists, and diplomats to Iranian thinkers and theorists of social changes of the third world". He continued with the fundamental question, "Should the Islamic republic of Iran be considered as a unique event different from other revolutions or the reason of revolutions should be reconsidered with regard to the experiment of Iran?"

In "The Government of God, Iran's Islamic Republic" Benard and Khalilzad (1984) wrote that Islamic revolution not only surprised the politicians all over the world, but also wondered academics, politicians and researchers of western social issues and caused their hypothesis to lose validity.

Robert Looney, in "Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution", contends that the Islamic Revolution cannot be analysed and discussed through the common methodologies of the West:

“Islamic revolution seems to be complicated and mysterious, and it asks for equality but at the same time is not socialist or democratic. It is radical and at the same time traditional. It is not xenophile and not introverts either. Also, it neither does nor represents the French, Russian or American revolutions. Theories of social sciences regarding renovation whether Marxist or liberal capitalist could not foresight it and could not even give a contending justification for it. Only in the heart of the Islamic history accompanies by austere revolts at any time, one may find meaning for such a great movement that takes over all over the world of Islam.... The history of Islam has got a model of recurrent birth and decline and is always looking to achieve a method of thought. Islamic Revolution looks for a new beginning, a new establishment, a new recreation and activating the Islamic measures of Prophet Mohammad which were inspired by God's word, Quran” (Looney, 1982, p. 213).

Amid conflicting opinions on the causes and motives of the revolution, both local and foreign theorists failed to achieve a thorough and commonly accepted analysis. Western theorists were hindered by the lack of accurate understanding of religious, cultural, and social contexts of Iranian society. Local theorists failed to carry out in-depth analysis, and many suffered from ideological biases.

The approaches to study Islamic Revolution can be divided into main groups as explained below.

Group 1: Non-scientific and Journalistic approaches:

Politicians, military officers, diplomats, and journalists have all contributed accounts of the Revolution. Some of these have a biographical aspect, with the writer's memories of life before, during, and after the Revolution. Other works present a series of possible causes of the Revolution, without much theoretical support.

Among the memoirs of Western politicians and foreign officials are the accounts of British Ambassador Anthony Parsons, US Ambassador William Sullivan, and US General Robert Huyser¹.

¹ See for example: Sullivan, W. (1981) Mission to Iran. New York: Norton

Sullivan, who lived in Tehran during 1977-79, describes economic conditions; the situation of military, police and security forces; and the social structure and the role of Shi'ism in Iranian society. However, he admits his unfamiliarity with Iran before his tenure as ambassador from 1977-1979 and makes no effort to explain the background of these events¹.

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, after his fall, used his *Answer to History* to blame the Revolution's emergence and his subsequent demise on the machinations of western governments' conspiracy (Pahlavi, 1980). The memoir is rooted in "conspiracy theory" with the absolute power of the West, and especially the US and Britain. Other political and military figures linked to the Pahlavi regime --- Fereidoon Hoveyda, Hossain Fardoost, Abbas Ghareh Baghi, and Parviz Raji, --- adopt the same analysis of the Revolution. Evidence is rarely given; instead, these writings are best viewed as psychological projection.²

Journalists and foreign writers have also offered personal experiences and narratives (Hooglund, 1980, p 485). For example, David Albert, in a collection of analysis and essays, has tried to provide an insight into the historical background of Iran, its relationship with the West, social circumstances of Pahlavi era and the events during the revolution and the first few years after the victory of the revolution (Albert, 1980).

Sepehr Zabih has two books on the Iranian revolution. In the half of his first book, he has looked at the events during the revolution and then use that base to analyse the inability of Shah to attract

¹Ibid.

² Ref. to Hoveyda, F. (1986) *The Fall of Shah*, translated by Mehran, Tehran, Ettelaat,; and Fardoost, H. (1988), *The Emergence and Fall of Pahlavi's Ridership*, Tehran, Ettelaat,; and Ghareh Baghi, A. (1987) *The General Confessions*, Tehran, Nei Publication,; and Raji, P. (1985) *Takht-E-Tavoos's Servant*, translated by Mehran. Tehran, Ettelaat.

people participations in the Political domain. In his second book, he looks at the events after the revolution until 1982 (Zabih, 1982).

John Stempel is an expert in Middle East affairs from the US Foreign service who came to Iran, with his family, in 1975 and was responsible to investigate Iran internal changes during those years. He dedicates two third of his book to describe the events between 1978 and 1979 and tries to give a thoughtful description of the events of the revolution. He believes the separation of shah regime from the Islamic roots of the Iranians and his overemphasis on modernisation caused people to mobilise against him (Stempel, 1981).

Robin Carlson book is his travel logbook with which he describes his own understanding of the revolution from the time he spent travelling in Iran (Carlsen, 1982). Furthermore, Mohammed Heikal in his book tries to provide a convincing evaluation of the political turmoil of Iran which led to the revolution. However, his book does not provide a strong analysis (Haykal, 1982).

Amin Saikal also studies Iranian revolution; however he mostly focuses on regional and international policies of the Shah regime and only discusses internal policies when it was related to the international policies (Saikal, 1980).

William Forbis (1980) book does not involve a central framework and does not discuss the political issues which led to the overthrow of Shah. In his book, he provides an unfair judgement or rather prejudgement of Iranian culture to explain the revolution.

Michael Ledeen and William Louise in their books point out to the displacement of population, inadequacy of social services, Growth of the middle class population, religious feelings being hurt,

increase in the role of Bazar and high level of income for the foreigners in Iran as the underlying reasons for the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution (Ledeen and Lewis, 1981).

From a more religious angle, Dilp Hiro¹ reviews the Islamic tradition and the formation of Shi'ism and the relationship between Shias, Shia theologians and the government. In analysing the events of the Pahlavi era, he refers to the two cultures that resulted from Reza Shah's fast-paced reforms. The two cultures are traditional culture among theologians and business class, and the westernized culture among the modernist and upper classes. In Mohammad Reza Shah's time, Hiro points out the course of changes which resulted in the Shah's absolute power, accompanied by the suppression of opposition and his working to weaken the religious leaders and isolate Ayatullah Khomeini.

Hiro brings in the growth of dissatisfaction from inflation and lack of freedom, and explains that considering the existence of organizational weakness among the opposition and suppression of organizations and groups, only the religious leaders remained in a position to lead a protest movement. This came in the context wherein the Shah, in agreement with Washington, had opened society somewhat and the objections from traditional and newly constituted constituencies were being aired in different ways.

As we can see, all the aforesaid studies do not rely on a clear theoretical framework. Instead, when describing a phenomenon like the Islamic Revolution, they collect data from different spheres, place very distant historic factors next to recent events, present structural elements along with characteristic ones -- without establishing a logical connection between these different phenomena

¹ However, Hiro's book is not exclusively limited to the Islamic Revolution's analysis and the major part of this book is attributed to the post revolution event. Bui in the first three chapters of the book, which makes a complete section, he reviews the Islamic Revolution's triggering factors and its forming process. Ret. to: Dilp Hiro. (1987) *Iran Under the Ayatullahs*, London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

at different levels. This is in sharp contrast to an approach that relies on a theoretical structure that could lead us to causal explanation of the phenomena, provide the possibility for comparison, and clear the path for anticipating similar phenomena in similar conditions in other societies.

Group 2: Scientific and Theoretical Approaches

The scientific approaches to study the Islamic Revolution can be divided into six groups as follows.

1. Psychological Approach

This is further categorised into two groups: One sub-approach focuses on individual factors and the psychology of personality. The other sub-approach is based on social factors and social psychology.

1.1 Individual psychology approach

Considering the individualistic character of the government and the determining effect of the Shah's personal decisions, his characteristic psychology has also been considered for rooting Iran's revolution. Marvin Zonis (1991, p. 72) in the book, *Majestic Failure*, holds that the victory of Iran's revolution was not an inevitable task and if before the start of the revolution, the Shah had undertaken some democratic reforms, and during or even after the revolution, he was capable of suppressing it, he could have kept his throne. But his personal traits, carried over from childhood and youth, made him consistently hesitant and doubtful. Thus he acted tardily and inefficiently and this opened the way for his fall (Zonis, 1991).

Although, the pivotal role of the Shah's character necessitates attention to his personal features, it is also important to notice the social, political, and cultural factors allowing the growth of such a government, the long term structural factors which came together at a certain historic point and also the opposition's ability to mobilize sources at a certain historic point, in order to explain the emergence and also victory of the Islamic movement. There have been many characters similar to the Shah in the history of many societies, but they have not been overthrown by a revolutionary movement, therefore, attention should be given to other factors as well.

1.2. Socio-psychological approach

This approach focuses on physiological factors in and of the society (hence the word sociopsychology) and claims that this family of factors are the main cause of the revolution in Iran (Zonis, 1991, p. 72) (Bashiriyeh, 2011) (Moshiri, 1985). The theorists who follow this approach, for example, look at the collective physiological challenges of Iranian society of the time and use the Davis and Garr's socio-psychological framework to explain the Iranian revolution as the result of sudden decline in social and economic growth (in middle of 1970s) after a period of steady progress (1960s) in Iran (Malakootian, 1998, pp85-185).

This approach would therefore claims that this sudden gap between social expectations and the fulfilment of those expectations heavily disturbed the masses of the Iranian society resulting in the serious of revolts leading to the eventual revolution.

This approach by itself cannot confidently explain the Islamic revolution since it fails to justify how individual socio-psychological expectations or expectations within a certain class of the society can be generalised to the whole society. Societies are in fact constantly faced with such

psychological upheaval and expectation gaps but they don't usually end in a revolution. Thus this approach has many methodological and theoretical problems. The argument depends completely on the assumption that all people experience an individual deprivation in the same manner. It is the illusion of deprivation that causes revolutionary anger. A theorist, who assumes this relationship exists in the real world, will relate this cause to the players. But, it could never be affirmed that it is the ultimate cause.

The leap from an individual deprivation to a collective one has not been sufficiently observed. Are there any intermediate agents in the process through which the individual's deprivation would restore itself at the group level? Relative deprivation of other groups could not be deduced from the clergy's deprivation.

2. Political Approach

In this approach, the common belief is that a lack of stable political institutions at the time of significance changes in social classes within the society was the main cause of the Islamic revolution (Moshirzadeh, 1996, pp 27-46) (Abrahamian, 1980, p.21). In other words, the fast socio-economic changes carried out by shah led to the expansion of middle class population and creation of industrial labour force which are the active and demanding components of the society. This change was, however, not accompanied by appropriate political institutions which could encompass this class of the society. The resulting gap between the rapidity of modernisation and lack of political establishment led to the formation of Islamic Revolution (Moshirzadeh, 1996, pp. 27-46). The majority of the theorists who follow this approach, directly or indirectly use Parsonsian

functionalism as their theoretical framework with most focus on Huntington and/or Charles Tilly's narration of functionalism.

Although functional analysis can, to some extent, explain the ground necessary for the revolution and describe the accelerators of the revolt; however it fails to introduce a concrete and structured system for identifying the reasons and fundamental causes of the revolution.

Abrahamian, the main proponent of this line of thinking, writes that the revolution took place because the Shah undertook modernization at the socio-economic level, thereby, expands the middle class and the industrial labour class. But he could not achieve development at the political level. This failure widened the gap between the government and social structure, closed the linking channels between the political system and the whole population, and increased the rift between the ruling party and new social forces. More importantly, this process shattered the few bridges that had been built in the past between political organizations and the traditional social forces, particularly the Bazaar and the religious authorities (Abrahamian, 1980, p. 21).

Functional analysis, in general, leads to this tautology and thus, cannot make a distinction between the systems characteristics and causal mechanisms. Consequently, this line of argument attributes the sole potentiality of the revolution's emergence to events that occurred after the fact. In addition, the major mobilization of the lower class masses in Iran's revolution requires observation of ideology and organization as independent variables. The functional theory gives little weight to these variables, and therefore, cannot explain why and how the masses follow a particular leader or a certain group in the revolution, and not others.

By putting together the political approach and the socio-physiological approach, theorists have come up with two distinct theories:

a) Dictatorship theory

This theory states that the reason for the people revolt against Shah was the absolute dictatorship and totalitarian ruling system of the Shah. Sadegh ZibaKalam is among the supporters of this theory. He believes that the different uprisings, riots and protests in the decades prior to the victory of revolution are all parts of a chain that was a struggle against the dictatorship of the Shah. This chain of struggle started in early 1950s and continued until 1979 (Zibakalam, 1989). Although shah dictatorship and lack of political freedom prepared the ground for the revolution but dictatorship cannot, by itself, explain the 1979 revolution for various reasons. For example if people struggle was purely because of dictatorship and the totalitarian system, then surely the era of Reza Khan was accompanied with more suppression and political repression but no revolution took place then. Furthermore, there are and were countries such as Arab states in which there were absolute dictatorship but due to the high standard of welfare, people preferred to go after their own life and there was no uprising.

b) Modernisation Theory

This theory is popular among western theorists who believed that Shah's progressive plans for moving towards modernisation were ill-planned and too hurried. For the traditional and conservative society of Iran, these transformations were seen as an attack on their culture and led to an identity crisis (Dorman and Omeed, 1979, p. 27) (Halliday, 1979) (Forbis, 1980) (Lotfi, 2000 p.157). This theory is also immature since the opposition to the Shah regime existed

before modernisation became mature. Furthermore, it ignores the economic and more importantly the political motives of the uprisings and it assumes no fault (apart from ill-planned reforms) on the side of the Shah. In fact this theory could be seen as giving psychological and political sympathy towards the Shah. In this theory, Shah is seen as a ruler who is trying hard to take his country forward toward progression and development but he faces with reactionary responses from his traditional and heavily conservative people. This is why, the Shah, himself, supports this theory in his writings:

“I have to admit that undoubtedly my biggest mistake was my attempt in taking the traditional people towards Independence, prosperity, culture and high standard of welfare”(Pahlavi, 1980, p.65).

3. Economic Approach

The theorists who favour this approach (among whom are the majority of Marxists) place the emphasis on the economic problems and weak economic policies of Shah were the main causes of the revolution. They believe that the sudden increase in the oil price meant a significant income for the country. This initially led to an improvement in people welfare however, this initial improvement was followed by weak economic plan by the Shah Regime as well as relative decrease in the oil price and hence the people income. This shock to the economy eventually turned into a political chaos and confrontation. (Pahlavi, 1980) (Bakhash, 1984) (Skocpol, 1982, pp. 265-283) (Cottam, 1979). In short, Inflation, poor economy policies and the resulting economic and social injustice led to the dissatisfaction of the masses within the society and the attempt by the masses to tackle this economic injustice resulted in the revolution (Skocpol, 1982, pp. 265-283) (Katouzian, 1981) (Looney, 1982). Furthermore, factors such as the destruction of agriculture

(through land reforms), the excessive economic dependence of Iran on foreigners and excessive royal squandering have been noted among other economic factors causing the revolution.

One of the works explaining Iran's revolution by considering economic factors is the *Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution* by Robert Looney. By analysing the strategy of development, Looney concludes that the execution of this scheme, with regard to the lack of fundamental reforms, could not succeed; and the government was not able to recognize the scope of the dissatisfaction resulting from injustice and short term social displacements inherent in the economic programs based on development models.

In the economic development programs, no attention was given to the relationship between development goals and programs and the problems resulting from the current policy makings which could only be created by combining the program and policies of development and stability.

Inflation was considered a short term and solvable problem but when predicaments reached a high pitch, shock therapy were applied, which was naturally against stability. The government, instead of adopting a solid and systematic effort of broad development, took the short term management approach toward the crisis.

At this point, the relationship between the economic transformation and the decline of the supporting regime revealed themselves and the unequal distribution of income fuelled the outburst of dissatisfaction. A mere economic dealing with the revolution's emergence could not achieve a definite end. Not considering the government's vulnerability, social structure, and the role of ideology and leadership is evident in this approach. Many governments in similar economic conditions, could stop the riots from turning to revolution, because of the structural nature in

political and social systems and by relying on a legitimizing ideology; but the economic approach pays no attention to such matters (Looney, 1982).

This approach is also well trusted in the book, *The Political Economy of Iran*, by Homayoon Katouzian. He, while analysing Iran from the 19th century until the revolution, refers to the era 1961 to 1979 as the years of oil dictatorship which was accompanied by what he refers to as western pseudo-modernism forced on the traditional society of Iran (Katouzian, 1981).

Economic problems and injustice, as proposed by the theorists favouring this approach, cannot be accepted as the sole or main reasons behind the 1979 revolution. This is because, firstly, while there were economic problems, the people welfare condition had relatively improved and not worsened in the years immediate before revolution (Zibakalam, 1980, pp. 100-102) (Lakzaee, and Mir Ahmad, 1998, p.159) (Sadeghi, 2002, pp.24-5). Secondly, if people revolted because of economic situation, then you would expect to see the poor people mostly, but history witnesses that people from all classes of the society took part in the revolution. Thirdly, the history admits that there have been many other countries with similar economy regimes (i.e. heavy dependence on oil) and in similar economic turmoil but they did not end up in a revolution and in case of possible social unrests their governments which could stop the protests from turning into a revolution (Farhi, 1988, pp. 231-256). The weakness of solely using economic factors to explain the revolution is also admitted in the writings of Theda Skocpol who, herself, is in favour of economic factors approach. In her book, *Rentier state and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution*, while analysing the causes of the Islamic revolution, Skocpol emphasis on religious leadership and Shi'a-Islam culture of the Iranians as the important aspects as playing important roles in the formation and victory of the Islamic revolution (Skocpol, 1982). Therefore, to understand the 1979

revolution, the economic factors are not enough and one need to consider other factors such as leadership and ideology, social forces and the government vulnerabilities. For example, one need to see what was the role of clergy and the leaders of the revolution in mobilising people? Can it not be observed, by contextual analysis, that people's slogans and the messages sent by the revolution's leaders were not centred on the axis of economic problems?

4. Religious and Cultural Approach

In this approach, the vast majority of focus is on ideological and religious background and culture of the Iranian society. Theorists who favour this approach believe that it is the particular religious-cultural norms and values of Iran and in particular Shia ideology which was the strongest driving force for the revolution. In this approach, economic, psychological or other factors play little or no role in the formation of the revolution. This strong emphasis on religious culture is clearly evident in the writings of people who adopt this approach regardless of their ideological orientation or biases (Davani, 1979) (Algar, 1983) (Hussain, 1983) (Forh, 1983).

Ali Davani in his books, *Iran's Clergy Movement*, tries to show that the reason for shah's fall needs to be looked for in Islam and the ability of the clergy sect in mobilising the masses of the society through the use of Islamic spirit¹. Similarly, in his book, *The Roots of Iranian Revolution*, Hamid Algar refers to Shi'ism as the fundamental reason for the revolution (Algar, 1983). Furthermore, Asaf Hussain in his book, *Islamic Iran: Revolution and Counter Revolution*, invites researchers' attention to the elements of ideology (Hussain, 1983).

¹ See: Davani, A. (1979). *The Clergy movement of Iran Vol 1-10*. Tehran: charity and cultural association of Imam Reza.

Apart from the authors who are sympathetic towards the Islamic Revolution, some of the analysts with more critical opinions towards the revolution, too, give weights to the shia religious ideology. For example, Said Amir Arjomand in his book 'The Turban for the Crown', strongly refers to shia religious authority structure, in addition to modernisation factor even though as we will see, his approach is of the multi-causal kind (Arjomand, 1988).

Similarly, Hassan-ol-Zein in his book, Iran's Revolution, in Social and Ideological Dimension, has considered religion as the most important element in the victory of the Islamic Revolution, though implicitly in his explanations of the events, he refers to leadership factor too.

Hamid Algar has book consisting of the collection of four of his speeches in the Islamic institute of London. In his first speech, titled Iran and Shi'ism, Algar tries to prove that the revolution is tightly linked to the Shi'ism school of thought. He links the roots of revolution to the principle of Imamate in Shi'ism and the importance of the concept of Martyrdom from the Shia point of view and its effect in various stages of Iran history (Algar, 1983).

Theda Skocpol also refers to the important role of religious culture in the Iranian Revolution and believes that a great emphasis need to be placed on the belief systems and the cultural roots in forming the political moves in relation to the 1979 revolution. She believes simple dissatisfaction among the Iranian people or the fast social modernisation undertaken by shah, cannot, by itself, causes such a strong mobilisation against the regime. Instead it is the culture of Shia Islam and the changes in the religious beliefs in regards to politics and society is what that has caused the revolution (Skocpol, 1982, pp 265.283).

She continues to mention the role of clerics and other religious people, numerous lines of people saying prayers, religious rituals in certain religious days and its basic myth of martyrdom of Imam Hussein, and finally Ayatullah Khomeini's speeches introducing shah as the anti-Islamic agent and servant of foreign imperialism. Emphasizing the role of Shia creed in Iranian revolution, she says:

"In short, the Shiite Islam has got a crucial role in creating the Iranian revolution whether from the view point of organisation or culture" (Skocpol, 1982, pp 265.283).

Simultaneously John Foran in *Fragile Resistance*, he analyses the revolution of Iran regarding the role of religion and Ayatullah Khomeini in Islamic revolution. With emphasis on the role of fundamentalist Islam in this revolution, he writes,

"Among various opposing cultures in 1970s, Islam could win the governmental power. Ayatullah Khomeini rank the first because of his long-term irreconcilable position against Shah, his personal attraction, explicitness and honesty as well as his views on important political issues, and so could present a humane Islam which was acceptable and attractive for different social groups. Although he was primarily accepted by scholars, clerics, businessmen and tradesmen, he poses acceptance among secular intellectuals, the left wing, and the proletariats. Besides that, his religious speeches penetrate among the peripheral parts of rural and urban areas among whom he called the oppressed" (Foran, 1993, p.120).

French historian, Christian Delanno in his book *SAVAK (intelligence and Security Organisation)*, emphasizes and declares religious element to be the main reason for invalidity of most analysis. He says, with the intervention of religious factor in what was happening in Iran, all analysis as well as powerful spying systems become nullified and futile. Regarding the role of clerics in fighting against religion removing plans of Shah, he contends, referring to the inabilities of SAVAK in fore-sighting incidents happening after January 1978, he says,

"No security forces even the most powerful one could not foresight the radical wave of Islamists and sudden culmination of their anonymous leader, Ayatullah Khomeini" (Foran, 1993, p. 246).

Similarly, James Bill, in his article, refers to the important role of religion in the Iranian revolution. He emphasises that it is the organisational structure of religious institutes and their runners, i.e. Islamic scholars, that plays the most fundamental role in Iran. He concludes that after 1970 the relationship between Shah and the Islamic scholars were teared apart (Bill, 1982, pp.22-47). Furthermore, Nikki Keddie, while providing a background into the expansion of Shia jurisprudence, believes that transformation in the political thoughts of Shia Islam is the reason for the revolution (Keddie, 1981, p.25).

In the eyes of the theorists following this approach it is this strong cultural and religious beliefs that stands up against the process of the de-Islamisation undertaken by shah leading to the revolution (Zanjani, 1991, pp. 572-3) (Mohammadi, 1986, p. 88) (Enayat, 1983). The Shia culture of Iranians means that standing against injustice and the oppressive rule, if not obligatory, is at least very much desired and praised (Cole and Keddie, 1986). For example, while pointing out to other factors influencing the revolution, Theda Skocpol states that for the revolution to become active and victorious it needed a driving force and that was the Shia Islam culture of Iranians. Skocpol refers to the story of Imam Hussain as the most fundamental example and motivation for the Iranians to stand against the Shah. (Imam) Hussain, the grandson of Prophet Mohammad, with his very small army, stood against the corrupt ruler of his time, Yazid and his thousands of soldiers (Skocpol, 1982, pp. 265-283). Hussain, his family and companions were happy to be brutally killed and beheaded by the Yazid Army but not pay allegiance to the corrupt ruler.

Although strong Islamic and Shia culture of Iranians are surely among the motives and fuels for the success of revolution, however, this approach also fails to consider the influence of other social or ideological groups or factors within the society of the time. Furthermore, if religion or the religious leadership was the sole reason for the revolution, then why the significant movement of June the 5th of 1963 (15 Khordad) which had a strong Islamic motives did not result in the overthrow of the shah but in 1979 the movement ended in victory? Furthermore, the Iranian people were much more religious in the 1950s and 60s than in the 1970s. In other words, the development and reform process, coming closer to the West and its culture, importation of goods from the West, the presence of an increasing number of foreign forces in the guise of military advisors and the like, and airing on television and in the cinema programs full of western cultural manifestations, all indicate that, as our society moved towards the end of the 1970s, it increasingly lost its cultural, traditional, and religious nobility. The Islamic Revolution of Iran occurred in an era when people's sense of religion was decreasing and was increasingly being substituted by imitation of westerners, a cultural void and identity crisis. This claim can easily be proved by a field study or using a contextual analysis method. The numbers of junk and corruptive movies in the cinemas and on television, places of perversion, travelling abroad, the degree of inclination towards religious symbols -- like mourning, prayers, fasting, and so on -- in the period between 1960 and 1979 can approximately be measured and evaluated. Also, this theory, just like the other ones, does not present the Islamic Revolution in the context of Iran's contemporary political, social, and religious transitions. In general, no specific methodology guides this theory which could lead the researchers from the beginning of the argument to its end. Finally, this theory makes no distinction between the two phases of the monarchy's fading legitimacy and victory of the revolution. It may be necessary to separate the most important factor in each of these phases.

5. Conspiracy Approach

This is perhaps the weakest of the theories which is rejected by most well-known thinkers. This theory sees the Islamic revolution as a pre-planned plot by the foreign powers to get rid of the Shah. Shah himself, his family and most of the senior officials of the Shah regime would favourably support this theory. In justifying this theory, the supports of this theory suggest various possibilities. Some claims that the west was becoming increasingly concerned with the military power of Iran particularly as this power could have been a potential threat to Israel. Others say that Britain was behind the revolution for taking revenge on Shah for his close ties with US (Malakootian, 2000, p.144). There is almost no trustworthy evidence supporting this theory and in contrary what we see is that the Islamic Republic has, ever since its formation, been in strong opposition to western superpowers and always has been considered a threat to Israel. Therefore, it does not make sense to believe that western power initiated or causes the revolution. Furthermore, in case we assume that the Shah was a potential threat to the West, still it does not make sense for them to transform Iranian ruling system from a potential threat to an active and actual threat.

6. Multi-causal approach

The above discussion shows that in order to thoroughly study the process of formation and victory of the Islamic revolution of 1979, one need to consider the above approaches simultaneously as there were various factors affecting the formation of the Islamic revolution, though each had a different level of impact. In other word, any single approach or family of causes fail to explain the unique nature of this revolution.

Various thinkers have point out to this multi-level and multi-causal nature of the Islamic revolution (Halliday, 1982, pp. 437-444) (Enayat, 1983) (Fischer, 1980) (Keddie, 1981) (Foran, 1994). But they, each, choose a different combination of factors to explain the causes of the revolution. For example, Micheal Fischer believes that the religious culture of Iran of the time was the backbone for the formation of the revolution, however he also believes that at the time of revolution, it was the political and economic factors which highly influenced the victory of the Islamic revolution (Fischer, 1980). On the other hand, Nikki Keddie believes that the hasty reform plans of the Shah as well as the Shia ideology of the Iranians were the causes of the revolution (Keddie, 1981). Other thinkers have come up with slightly different combination of factors.

Fred Halliday in his article titled "The Iranian Revolution: Uneven Development and Religious Populism" searches for the main causes of the emergence of Iran's revolution in the simultaneity of the appearance of contradiction and conflict in developing capitalism and "the existence of reactionary institutions and persevering popular resistance against the transition process". He recognizes five main elements for Iran's revolution, which are: uneven and rapid development of capitalistic economy in Iran, political weakness of the monarchical regime, vast coalition of the opposition forces, the role of Islam in mobilizing forces and the changing and uncertain ground for international environment (Halliday, 1982).

However, they all believe that various factors worked collaboratively causing the revolution with majority of the thinkers taking particular religious culture of Iranians to be as one of the most important factors. What is important to understand is that the multi-causal approach is potentially prone to ambiguity and too much of abstraction or rather generalities. Solely, saying that there are many factors affecting the revolution without knowing which factors and how exactly they have

impacted the revolution, would lead us to being unable to truly understand the causes of revolution and study the unique nature of this incident. Therefore, one should identify and hence clearly understand which factors, when, where, in which order and to what extent have been involved in the formation and success of the Islamic revolution of Iran. More importantly, how these factors interacted with one another and in which framework to bring about the revolution.

The Proposed Theory: Role of Religious Leadership and his Ideology

The approaches to the Islamic Revolution offer the potential, when considered together, of multiple factors influencing the formation and victory of the revolution. However, a multi-causal framework should distinguish between main causes of the revolution and catalytic factors.

In particular, current theories do not draw a clear line between the elements that brought down the monarchical system and those that produced the victory of the Islamic Revolution. The question of the deconstruction of the Shah's system must be distinguished from that of the Islamic Revolution's establishment growth.

In that context, Ayatullah Khomeini's leadership and his ideology, "Khomeinism", become a prevalent cause, working with and in some case uniting other factors. While significant for the overthrow of the old system, Khomeinism was even more instrumental for the confirmation and development of the new one. This was not just through a religious interpretation of Shia Islam, but through a personalised leadership and identification in the thoughts, writing, and ideology of Khomeini. This linkage of politics, religion, and the individual mobilised the masses to achieve the aims and objectives of the specifics of Khomeinism.

The distinction of Khomeini and Khomeinism was three-fold. Firstly, although Shi'ism is considered by its adherents to be the religion of revolution and standing against injustice that belief had been latent with respect to action (Skocpol, (1982, pp 265-283) (Cole and Keddie, 1986) (Bakhash, 1984) (Keddie, 1983) (Halliday, 1979). As a high-level religious jurist who had studied for years both in Qom and Najaf (Iraq), Khomeini set out the necessity for an active, rather than a passive position, because of the bond between religion and politics. He promoted this years before the 1979 Revolution in a book on the Iranian government. Doing so, he complemented but moved beyond well-known Shia jurists such as Ayatullah Khomeini and Ayatullah Boroujerdi who offered apolitical interpretations of religion.

Second, Khomeini and Khomeinism achieved unprecedented success in the stimulation of uprising against monarchy. After the initial achievements of the Tobacco Movement during the reign of Naser al-Din in the late 19th century, revolutionary and opposition groups stalled because of the lack of a strong, unifying leader. Even in the Constitutional Movement in the early 20th century and the oil nationalisation movement in the late 1940s, changes were limited because of the absence of a leading figure to encapsulate and express demands.

In contrast, for many in the 1979 Revolution, Khomeini and Khomeinism embodied determination, power, and courage, expressed in clear demands not just for reform but for systematic change (Motahari, 1993) (Mohammadi, 1986, pp.85-117) (Akhavi, 1980). The slogans and membership of protests at the start of the movement, just after the 5 June demonstration of 1963, were more of a reformist nature. However, Khomeini was able, in his own travel from reform to revolution, to set up networks and to disseminate messages and an ideology to encourage others to follow that path. He did so not through a projection as a leader only for religious groups in Iranian society, but

as a symbol of national struggle against the western-backed Shah and the imperialism of the US behind the monarchy¹ (Zanjani, 1991, pp. 572-3) (Zibakalam, 1980, pp.64-5) (Keddie, 1983, p. 579).

Thirdly, political revolution was linked to a transformation in the display of religious spirit. Public adherence to Islam had declined in the years just before the revolution. The image of a “Western-influence” culture, seen in movies and theatre performances and projecting a secularism detached from belief, was prevalent in Iranian cities, especially among youth. In this environment, according to theories of religious culture and revolution, no rising should have occurred. However Khomeini managed to motivate people and especially youth religiously and nationalistic by utilising the existing conditions of the society. In doing so he mobilised people for revival of national and religious values against Western culture.

This research therefore aims to investigate the history of specific incidents, events and motives for the Islamic Revolution in a timely-manner order to be able to thoroughly comprehend that why the 1979 revolution of Iran became both Islamic and Anti-American. This investigation will be carried out with the focus of our analysis being on the history of Iran-US relationship from its early days of very unofficial relationships to the days of direct cooperation and heavy influence. This research will investigate interaction between the Americans and the Iranians on various important levels, the American policies towards Iran, the Iranian response to those policies, and most importantly

¹ For further insight into the characteristics and peculiarity of Ayatullah Khomeini, please see the author extensive MPhil Thesis titled “Ayatullah Khomeini’s View on Confronting US policies in Iran”

the interpretation and hence response of Ayatullah Khomeini to those policies; and based on these real or mythical interpretations he mobilised a nation against a pro-American regime.

Chapter 3
Iran-US Non-Governmental
Relationship
1832-1883

The approach of Khomeinism to the United States, and in particular the relationship of the Islamic Republic with the US, rests upon a forceful portrayal of “history” between the two countries. However, the depiction is drawn not as much from the actual events as much as from Khomeini’s wish to portray a long-standing, fundamental American antagonism to Islam and the Iranian people.

In Khomeini’s interpretation, confrontation with the US is a feature of Iranian history, even if there was no ideological difference with the Americans over religion, society and politics. Because of this ambition for hegemony, including domination over Iranian affairs, Washington could never have been considered as a friend or ally by the Iranian people. From the beginning US, like other foreign powers, entered in Iran only to plunder national resources and secure personal interests. According to Khomeini, US policies in dealing with Iran has only been different time to time because of the difference in the status of US in the International hegemonic and its ability of domination. Thus, when transformed into a superpower in the world, US followed the same policies as British and Russian in Iran.

“These are the foreigners who have plundered and are plundering our rich natural resources, have occupied our dear country for long years, have attacked it without any reason and killed our people. In the past, our country was seriously damaged by the British and Russian and their agents and nowadays is by the US and its agents” (Sahife Nour Vol 1, 1990, p. 111).

“World should know that any problems that Iran and Islamic countries have is because of foreigners, Iranians hate foreigners in general and the US in particular. This is the US who violently and worse than that treat the Muslims” (Sahife Nour Vol 1. 1990, p. 14).

According to Khomeini, history of Iran indicates that the super powers are no different to one another on domination and colonialism of Iran.

“Before US had the ability to dominate Iran, the British and the Russians had dominated us. They want to plunder our natural resources, they want to destroy everything, and keep a backward and poor. ” (Sahife Nour Vol 2. 1990, p. 161) ... “US is worse than Britain, Britain worse than US, Soviet worse than all. But today we are dealing with evil US.” (Khomeini, 1964)

Therefore real independence and freedom is the freedom from the domination of the superpowers of East and West.

“We want to free Iran, we want to make the country independent, we want to set ourselves free from the US, Britain and Soviet” (Sahife Nour Vol 2. 1990, p. 208).

Khomeini believed that colonial powers had a detailed long-term plan to implement their goals and the main strategy of them is Orientalism. This means firstly Orientalism not only is a cultural movement but it is a political project. Secondly the missionaries are part of this great political project who have come to Iran to study, research and identify natural and human resources and capabilities.

Therefore his starting point for the relationship was the idea that US missionaries came to Iran in the 19th century to serve American objectives and pursuit of control rather than an interest in a genuine exchange with Iran. Missionaries were US agents and thus in addition to their cultural missions, they bore political missions.

“If you have watched carefully, from three hundred years ago, Westerners came to the East, in the name of tourism and religion. They were political agents who had come to study countries of the East. In Iran, they went through great troubles; riding on camels, they came to study our cities and villages, geographical situation of our country and most importantly to them, to find gold, copper, and oil and gas resources. They carefully studied and noted even the attitude and ethics of the general public and influential people such as clergies. From that time until now we have been under the domination of the US and the Britain, first it was British and now the US has come which is worse than them all.” (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p. 161)

However far from what Khomeini believed, relations not only between American and Iranian people but also between US and Iranian governments had often been warm since the start of their encounter. In contrast to Khomeini's view, many Iranians saw the US as an ally to balance or even to escape the dominance of Britain and Russia over Iranian affairs throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. The American capacity to break away from dependency was accompanied by the image of progress as a possible model for Iran .

This relationship was not an easy one; there would be many fluctuations with tensions as well as perceived benefits. However, the general pattern of Iran-US relationship up to 1945 was of a regular and developing cooperation and collaboration, rather than Khomeini's notion of permanent conflict between the two countries with America's perpetual desire for Iran's subservience.

Background of the US presence in Iran, “The Idea of America”

Iran's relations with the West and Western countries date back to the 16th century in the middle of the Safavid dynasty. At that time, Iran enjoyed a prominent political, economic and cultural position due to its geographical location, the extent of its influence, and its scientific achievements (Nasr, 2003). Seeking to extend this political and geographical position, Iran tried to expand its economic and cultural interaction with other countries. This approach continued up to the Afsharid period of the 18th century¹ but receded in the Qajar era from 1795 to 1925.

The period, while marked by increased contacts, was one in which Iran's relationship with the West moved from a detached equality to one of subservience. The occurrence of two great events, the

¹ Regarding that at the end of Safavid ruling, Afghans had taken the government in their hands, presence of Nader Shah (between the years 1729-1736 i.e. crowning of Nader Shah) returned the power to Iranians and central government was organized.

France Revolution and British Industrial Revolution, not only brought the West and its ideology to the attention of Eastern countries but turned them into political and economic role models. Leaders and intellectuals of Iranian society generally favoured the import of Western ideas, for “progress”.

Calling for this western import, or intervention, Iranian elite opened up the country and exposed its weakness. With bureaucratic problems in central government, the emulation of the West did not strengthen of Tehran because it did not have the necessary resources. Instead, British and Russia pressure increased on Iran, with independence replaced by an effective status as semi-colony. Bearing out Lord Curzon’s description of the Qajar Era as the time when the ownership of Iran’s resources fell into the hands of the British and Russians, the patents of Shahanshahi Bank, Esteqrazi Bank, Caspian Sea fisheries, shipping in Karoun, and monopoly were given to Russian and British interests. (Curzon of Kedleston, 1966) Parts of Iranian territories were ceded to other nations¹ to other nations on the basis of treaties which were not resisted by Qajar kings and their weak central governments.

Facing this encirclement and dominance by the British and Russians, some Iranians began to look for partnership. The US was one possibility, as it was associated with the ability to break away from hegemonic interventions and achieve a true independence. America was the country that established itself by defeating Great Britain in the Revolutionary War, the first successful colonial war of independence. Internal division was also turned into the positive of “freedom”: from the turmoil of the Civil War (1861–1865) came President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation reviving the ideas of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”. Iranians took away the impression that America is a

¹ During this period (ruling period of Naseraddin Shah: 1848-1883) Iran sustained irremediable losses including recognition of Afghanistan’s independence based on Paris treaty in the year 1857. (Yeselson A.; 2004, 2nd, , p 28)

state and society based on the principles of freedom, independence, and democracy, embedded in a Declaration of Independence in which all are created in a nation represented “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”

The belief that the US was not interfering with internal affairs of the countries, a sharp contrast to the perceived intervention of the British and the Russians, (Malek-Mohammadi, 2006, p.22) was complemented by the reports of Iranians who had travelled to the United States on the country’s progress and achievements: “What encouraged Iranian tourists to take the path of the new world was the extraordinary industrial and scientific advancements of America. In most of diaries remaining from the first Iranian tourists to the United States, there are descriptions of industrial exhibitions in Chicago or other cities of America in which generally the tourists praise the scientific and industrial innovations and discoveries.”(Deldam, 1989, p. 42).

For example when Haj Mirza Mohammed Ali Mahallati, known as “Haj Tourist”, returned to Iran after twenty years of travel throughout most of the world, especially impressed by the advancements of the America, he was upset by the chaotic situation in his home country (Deldam, 1989, p. 24).

Iranians established the belief that Americans were present in Iran with non-profit objectives (Navazani, 2004, p. 23) and in the light of the confidence, they believed that most of their problems would or could be solved by this country. “Americans and hundreds of people like them gained fame and good name for America during so many years. Iranians were attracted to Americans who seemed to be capable of becoming powerful allies just with the same scale that they were trying to escape from crushing claws of British and Russians. Because so many Americans living among Iranians had produced enough reasons for them to build up confidence and hope on Americans.

(Bill, 1988).

The challenge to this relationship was not an Iranian will for engagement but the caution of American officials. The US of the mid-19th century was not interested in a presence in Iran. Indeed, it retreated from one, because it did not wish to be in position where it might provoke either Britain or Moscow¹. Therefore, despite the emphasis on State-level relations with the US by Naser Al-Din Shah Qajar (1848-1896), co-operation with the Americans could only be seen at the private level.²

Nature of presence of America in Iran

The first wave of the American presence was that of religion intuitions and missionaries. In 1832 J.L. Merick, sent to Iran to assess the feasibility of starting missionary services in Iran, travelled to Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz with two German missionaries. This was followed by a formal journey by Justin Perkins and Doctor Asahel Grant to Urmia to establish religious links with Assyrians. (Yeselson, 1956, p.29).

The potential for religious tension brought by the entry of the first American missionaries was reduced in part because the residents of the areas were ready to accept the foreign presence³; in part because the areas, suffering from poor health, economic conditions, and cultural deprivation, were in need of assistance; and in part, because the majority of the population were from religious

¹ They had already a brush with confrontations in the “Turkey Contract” (1830) in which, America’s seizure of control of opium exports brought objection from British competitors. (Bondarovski ;G.L. (1979), 1st, p. 10)

² In this period (after America’s independence efforts were also taken to establish political and economic relations. For example, in the year 1850 Amirkabir ordered Haj Mirza Ahmadkhan, protector of Iranian interests in Istanbul to contact George March, ambassador of America in Othman empire to discuss about concluding a contract between two countries. What Amirkabir meant was bring in America as the third superpower and to act as a moderator country between the two governments of Russia and England in Iranian political scene. (Mebadi; H., 2002, p 22).

³ These two missionaries were Smith and Dwight who were sent to evaluate about possibility of these activities in the Middle East. They contacted with Assyrian bishops in Urmia and found them suitable for those activities. (Pasha Saleh, A, (1976), p 14) .

minorities. Perkins was stationed in north-west Iran among the Christian population in the province of Urmia. In the same year of 1832, two other American commissioners, Smith and Dwight, travelled to Iran through Syria and the Ottoman Empire to locate suitable places for evangelical activities (Reza Zadeh Malek, 1971). Perkins turned a room of his house into a school and inaugurated it in January 1836 with seven students (Reza Zadeh Malek, 1971). His work was well-respected and supported financially and morally by the Qajar King, Mohammad Shah. A letter of recommendation through Malik Qasim Mirza, the King's representative, supported the activities of the school (Yeselson, 1956) which soon accepted girls as well as boys .¹

After the death of Mohammad Shah, his son Nasiruddin Shah was optimistic about the US and thus eased restrictions on American businessmen and also missionaries. In 1851, he abolished order 1842 in which religious conversion among Jews had been declared illegal, to allow the "Christianisation of Jews" (Yeselson, 1956). By the 1870s the religious activities extended to conversion. Missionary centres were established in 1871 in Tehran, 1873 in Tabriz, 1881 in Hamedan, and 1885 in Salmas. Perkins published a newspaper called PARTOHAY –E –NOOR ("Rays of Light") despite opposition by some of the cabinet members of the Shah.

Even if this was not their intention, religious activities of missionaries influenced Muslims, some of whom became attracted to Christianity based on the propaganda of the faith. Despite public punishments and other types of scorn, a number of Muslims continued to attend Christian gatherings". The increasing number of schools led to more missionaries and local students.

¹ The Christian missionaries believed that in order to achieve the initial necessities of the advancement of a society, "women and mothers should be blessed by Christianity education, but how could they overcome the negative feelings towards women education among people? The presence of Mrs. Grant, the wife of one of doctor missionaries was the best mean to fight this type of fanaticism."

Table1 : Number of schools and students under the supervision of US missionaries from 1937-1985

Students	School	Year
530	24	1837-47
948	50	1847-57
1096	51	1857-67
1024	58	1867-77
1833	81	1877-87
1410	117	1895

The crowning achievement of the missionaries' efforts was the establishment of the American High School and American College, founded in 1873 by Dr. James Bassett in Tehran. Until 1888, only Christian boys and girls were allowed to enrol at this college; however, on the command of Naser al-Din Shah, Zoroastrians and Jews were then allowed to join. In 1896, Muslims were also given permission. The esteem for the school was such that, when Miss Jane Doolittle, the head of the girls' section of the college for 45 years, asked for permission to stay in Iran upon retirement, her request was granted by Naser al-Din Shah.

Besides educational activities, American groups were effective in solving the welfare and sanitarian problems of Assyrians. The lack of basic health services and sanitation were so severe that the first missionaries entering Iran refused to perform their duties¹; but the welcome by Assyrian bishops and the availability of a fertile religious ground in north-western Iran persuaded the missionary groups to stay and boost their presence in Iran with medical staff. These medical and health care

¹ In 1832 two American missionaries (Smith and Dwight) faced a terrible situation while entering Urmia [Plague was widespread and was killing people in large numbers]. (Reza Zadeh Malek R. History of Iran-US relationship. (1971) Tehran: Tahoori; besides, the USA minister plenipotentiary [F.H.Winston] who had entered Iran in 1886, reported that: "the current condition of Iran and the hopes to have a prosperous country in near future is a fantasy and dream.

services gradually increased, and by the end of the 19th century, hospitals were established in Kermanshah, Hamedan, Tabriz, Rasht, Mashhad, and Urmia. Teams of medical doctors were also sent from the US to assist in Iran's remote areas. After the Iranian Government invited Joseph Cochran and other American doctors to Iran to establish a Medical Science foundation, the first Medical School was established, eventually becoming Urmia Medical College (Yourdshahian et al. 2002, pp 127-128).

Naser al-Din Shah. Shah treated American missionaries working in Iran without prejudice and allowed them to move and execute their plans freely, such as establishments of schools, hospitals, and publication of newspapers, and magazines (Yourdshahian et al. 2002, pp 127-128). He gave permission to the American missionaries to have property under their own name, after the mediation of Truxtun Beale¹.

From History to Myth

Despite this historical record Ayatullah Khomeini, believed that missionaries came to Iran with a political mission set out by the US Government.

He emphasized this point that colonisers including the US through knowing the natural and human resources pave the way for colony over these countries.

In Khomeini's point of view the main strategy of colonisers especially America is Orientalism and study about eastern and Islamic countries and even sometimes doing case studies and sending experts to these countries and acquitting with their cultural, political, and economical aspects. This

¹ He later was appointed as the United State minister to Iran in 1891-92.

is one of the works done by religious missionaries in Iran. Khomeini believes those colonisers and especially the US abuses this cultural frame work for its completely political aims.

Khomeini stated that

“Do not neglect these evils as they are knowledgeable, we have entered the arena newly. They have studies not ten years but during the ages. And not mere simple study, they sent experts to the east and they survey these countries meter by meter. They travel the lands on camels and with caravans and wherever they find anything they make notes of it. They map lands and countries to see what it got in order to dominate us.” (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p.161).

On the other hand he believed that their first and main mission is the cultural and religious penetration policies and propagation of the foreign culture among the oriental and Islamic countries.

"With so much advertisements and propaganda, they made the eastern nations lose their confidence confronting West and super powers They lost themselves, lost their and religion"3. "They implement these policies by substituting elements of national indigenous culture with elements of western and American culture" (Sahife Nour Vol 3, 1990, p.74).

Furthermore he believed that the reason behind this first step is that “culture of each society constitutes the identity and existence of that society” (Sahife Nour Vol 21, 1990, p. 28).

After cultural penetration and the metamorphosis of the Islamic countries, they follow up the political, economic and in some cases army influence without any sense of endanger from these governments and nations. This is why “the main target of colonisers is attacking the culture of the colonised societies” (Sahife Nour Vol 15, 1990, p. 3).

It should be noted that some scholars have followed Khomeini on this approach. Yeselson argues that the missionaries' methods were linked to a quest for US hegemony. He asserts that US

churches, after securing their own position inside the country, along with the expansion of political and economic dominance of America abroad, extended their activities under the pretext of religious activities, they conducted propaganda in favour of United States Government and collected various information through espionage” (Yeselson, 1956, pp96-7).

Navazani offers a similar analysis:

“The presence of American missionaries and their widespread activities in education, health care, and other social domains helped them gain more confidence among Iranians¹ but, the other side of the coin was that, other Americans and especially the government of America were seeking their shares of penetration and dominance in Iran in the chaotic scene, which shouldn’t remain unnoticed”(Navazani, 2004, p.23).

Therefore, due to structural barriers in the relationship between religion and politics in US constitution, one cannot interpret missionaries’ religious approach as political and their religious activity as Orientalism, especially because Yeselson and Navazani offer no evidence to show contact between the missionaries and the churches with Government officials. Instead, the argument of American dominance is asserted as a complement of the supposed Christian dominance or the conversion narrative.

Reports of doctors writing verses of the Bible on their prescriptions, mentioned by some scholars such as Mojani, become “proof” (Mojani, 1996, p. 40).

This ignores the reality that the use of biblical verses, rather than being seen as divisive, could be

¹ An American woman religious missionaries named Jane E. Doolittle, who devoted her life to education and health care of people of Iran (Navazani ; B. 2004,1st , p.22) or lady Johnson who came to help victims after the earthquake of Khorasan at the head of a committee (Pashasaleh ; A. (1976) , 1st , p. 356) or Louise J. Driffus, who helped poor people with his wife during the second world war years (Navazani ; Bahram ,1st , 2004, 23) are only some exemplary samples of America missionaries who helped increase American people’s credibility and buildup Iranians’ confidence toward Americans.

accepted by a community used to the Islamic medical practice of writing a prescription beginning with '*BESMELLAH*' (In the Name of Allah). For an Iranian Christian, the 'sacred verses' of Bible would have an effect in his cure, just as the Quran would assist in the healing of a Muslim.

In particular, the use of biblical verses in the religious and uneducated community of the time was the best and fastest means of communication with people and gaining their trust. This was what missionaries recognised as a method of progression of their work. This consideration for the cultural characteristics of the Iranian society resulted in their popularity and expansion of their activities.

The presence of American medics not only expanded throughout the 19th century but adapted to meet the needs of Islamic society. For example, the staffing of female doctors to treat female patients in a special unit was organized by the American missionaries under the care of Dr Mary Smith, who was sent to Iran in the year 1889. These doctors not only helped improve medical assistance in those areas but also developed the health care system via the training and teaching of Iranian doctors and the transfer of their expertise.

The Purgatory Period of ‘Non-Governmental Relationship

There were resistances from part of the Iranian society to the missionaries and the humanitarian work of Americans.

The freedom and authority for Americans, supported by the Iranian regime, was perceived as a threat by some Iranian religious leaders who believed that the support and caring for Christians was part of a process of Christianisation.

For example “Naser Al-Din shah’s administration was treating Christians, Jews and missionaries who were working in Iran magnanimously and without prejudice. Shah allowed missionaries to even build hospitals, worship temples and schools as well as publishing their own religious books. Americans took the responsibility of the most ambitious missionary activity in Iran. (Yeselson; 2004, p.43).

This influence was not necessarily through conversion but through changing patterns in Iranian society, for example, the migration of Iranians to America. Mojani argues, “The evaluations and analysis of documents show that Iranians who migrated to USA were mainly from north-west part of Iran which was under the influence of US missionaries and preachers. A group of them were Armenian- Assyrian minorities residing in Azerbaijan Region who were leaving Iran either to do business in USA or obtaining its citizenship”(Mojani, 1996, p.56).

Within Iran the educations of American schools produced groups of people who enter Qajar bureaucracy as the children of men with social and administrative positions. Rather than entering these positions with an Islamic identity, these children supposedly had an unsecured religious

identity because of the education of American missionaries (Mojani, 1996, p.38). This belief fed the notion of political and cultural invasion through the structure of churches in the schools.

Protests against the spread of these types of American activities as “imperialism” were seen in an 1876 incident: “Sheikh Murteza Mazandarani wrote ‘the existence and strength of any nation and foundation of any country is not demolished and ruined in any circumstance except when the religious beliefs are not well protected’; in which he points out to a school where Muslim children together with Jewish and Christian are educated with the same religious educations and requests the parliament to take an immediate action to protect Islam” (Mojani, 1996, p.37).

Mirza Ebrahim Mahalati declared that if the missionary work continues, the foundation and continuity of a state and religion is in danger (Wright, 1977, p. 121). Similarly, a great Ayatullah in Fars Province, Sayed Abdul Hussain Laari, opposed the missionaries and in a statement ordered his followers to expel the missionaries.

The tension was compounded by the misunderstanding of some 19th century Iranian scholars who did not distinguish between the missionary work carried out by Europeans, including the British, and that carried out by the Americans. There was no consideration of a British mission in support of colonization and American efforts which did not pursue this objective.

Eventually the controversy over publication of “insulting articles” about Islam in *PARTOHAY –E –NOOR* (Rays of Light) newspaper, the outlet of James Perkins, caused public outrage which forced Naser al-Din Shah to impose a ban. Subsequent negotiations finally reached the agreement by the publishers to stop dissemination of these kinds of articles (Mojani, 1996, p.35).

However, incidents which endangered the lives of American missionaries continued, such as kidnappings and the slaying of a priest by Kurds and Turks in Urmia¹.

Certainly, the anger and dissatisfaction towards Americans cannot only be considered due to their activities. But this feeling was a reaction to Iran's internal systems and its weakness in resolving many existing problems particularly economic problems. In fact, opposition to American activities was an excuse to oppose the monarchy system which was supporting them. Therefore religious leaders interpreted activities of foreigners as Orientalism and linked it to the idea of imperialism. They tried to provide the ground for widespread protests in the Iranian religious community by exaggerating foreigner's activities, in such a way that a few years later these circumstances provided the basis of formation of tobacco movement in Iran.

The Basis for Formation of a Governmental Relationship

Although at first, US government did not enter Iran as part of missionary's project, yet eventually the presence of missionaries, doctors and schools would encourage the entry of the US government. Despite the concerns of some leaders and scholars, this was not a process of dominance pursued by both the private sector and the State but an inevitable outcome of the state carrying out its duties for the protection of American nationals and their interests. With the entrance of US diplomats to Iran, problems of missions were highlighted as solutions were sought to local conflicts. Ambassador Watson Sperry, during his stay in Iran which did not even reach eight months, found out that the objective of the inconveniences that the foreign minister referred to in his letter, were the members of the missions of America, especially in the city Tabriz who used to leave under constant anxiety

¹ a Priest by the name of B.W. Labaree

and stress and were forced to resort to British forces to get help.

The US Government either had to accept the possibility that American missionaries would turn to British colonisers, thus undermining not only the image of American authority but also the image that the Americans stood apart from British dominance, or they had to take a step towards involvement.

Many of the Iranian politicians and elites supported the idea of US government entrance to Iran as they believed US duty toward American citizens could complement a growth of economic relationship and from cultural relations, economic relations can be achieved especially because Iran was facing many economic difficulties.

By the end of the 19th century, Iranian imports from the United States were about \$12 million dollars and exports to the US were \$7 million (Deldam, 1989, p. 55). Naser al-Din Shah declared, “The gates are open for investment and entrance of Americans in the streets and the only thing that country should do is just to tread in and pick the fruits.” In the eyes of the Shah America would be better than Russia and Britain for the benefit of the country because they had no political goals in Iran (Yeselson, 1956).

Chapter 4

The Period of US Presence in Iran 1883-1939

By 1883 the US and Iran had established good but informal relations with the start of trade and commercial exchanges and the work of American missionaries. The evolution of this relationship was not just an expansion of US activity but a change in Iranian society leading up to the Constitutional Revolution and the challenge to British “dominance”.

The establishment and exchange of embassies in 1883 put the relationship on an official level, but the US policy was to stay neutral and avoid interference in Iran’s domestic affairs, limited political involvement and no stands on important events. Even during the Tobacco and Constitutional movements, the relationship between Iran and US was at the level of private rather than governmental or official relations.

In contrast to the optimistic portrayal of this relationship, this period for Ayatullah Khomeini was the start of opposition and protest, under the leadership of clergymen and Islamic scholars, by masses against internal tyranny and external dominance. Despite this doubt and suspicion, Khomeini did object to the relationship as long as it did not undermine and harm Iran’s independence and it assisted Iran’s economic, political, and cultural development.

This is why the Ayatullah did not express any objection towards religious missionaries, Howard Conklin Baskerville's involvement in the Constitutional Revolution, or the management of the Iranian economy by advisors like William Morgan Shuster. More importantly, Khomeini did not tie the legitimacy of the Iranian monarch to the relationship with Washington. In particular, the Ayatullah's description of Reza Shah's era as one of the worst periods for independence and freedom was not tied to the US, with whom the Shah had a poor relationship, but to the illegitimacy of the monarch.

The establishment of American presence in Iran 1883-WWII

The first Iran-US governmental contact was in 1851 during the Qajar era, when Naser al-Din Shah asked the United States to assist Tehran in limiting the expansion of the British Navy in the Persian Gulf. However, despite the desire of Iranian officials, interaction was limited over the next 30 years.

Spurred by the responsibility to protect its citizens and economic opportunity, as well as the policies of Naser al-Din Shah, an American delegation was sent in January 1883 with S.G. Benjamin as Ambassador. Tehran named its own ambassador to the US, Haji Hussain Quli Khan, later known as Haji Washington due to his stay in America. (See Appendix 1, Fig 1)

The willingness of both countries to expand relationships was seen in official correspondence. When Hajji Hussain was sent to the US, Naser al-Din Shah wrote to the US President, Grover Cleveland¹:

“The Iranian government, which is an independent and historical government in the world, has a special message for the prosperous, young and powerful country of America.

Iran is aware of its own suitable condition for any progress and is eager to open the doors of civilization and new advancements through establishing commerce, industry, agriculture and any other way which may ensure prosperity and well-being for the people of our country... but we have two neighbours who, instead of helping us to achieve our sacred goals, always try to obstruct our progress secretly. The fact is that they discourage us from progress and try to conduct important and critical affairs in a way suitable for themselves not on the basis of mutual interests. They want to take part in agreements which are not beneficial or suitable for us just because they are neighbours and we cannot accept their intentions....

If a company from a non-partial country wants to get into an agreement which is suitable for us, [these neighbours] would intervene and postpone or even stop it. It is evident that we do not want you to help us with money or army or lose

¹ Stephen Grover Cleveland was the 22nd and 24th President of the United States.

anything for all sake. But, rather we want to make use of your diplomacy and justice and help us prevent [our neighbours'] actions whenever they want to obstruct our progress. Our second request is to help us with your science and technology and send your companies, traders and factory owners to our country.

Today nothing is more important to Iranian government than founding the new civilization, development of the country and progress of people. At the present time that we have got the honour of establishing friendly relations with a prosperous and peaceful nation, we would like to strengthen our relations with you in order to maintain our security and safety of our country from transgression of powerful neighbouring countries. And I hope that this request is not revealed to anybody else except your highness.”(Yeselson, 1956).

The Tobacco concession

“They (colonisers), their interest had been damaged by the Islamic scholars throughout the history, particularly Britain in Tobacco concession,” Ayatullah Khomeini, 10 January 1981 (Sahife Nour Vol 13, 1990, p.276).

After the 3rd visit of Naser al-Din Shah to Britain, London obtained the patent for tobacco for 50 years through the Regie Company in March 1890. After the agreement, the company’s 200,000 workers were replaced by those from Britain and its colonies, with the “non-Islamic” behaviour of the foreign staff provoking the anger of religious figures and opposition of Iranian people (Browne, 2006, p.45-48).

The opposition was initially led by Sayed Ali Akbar Faal Asiri, one of the prominent scholars of Shiraz and the son-in law of Grand Ayatullah Mirza Shirazi. (See Appendix 2: Fig 1) He was joined by Ayatullah Murtaza Tabrizi in Tabriz, and Ayatullah Agha Najafi Esfahani in Esfahan, who announced that the tobacco produced by the Regie Company is haram (forbidden) and trading in it is religiously prohibited. Some clerics outside Iran, such as Sayed Jamaluddin Asadabadi, supported the position. He expressed his objection to the concession and was expelled from Iran.

In December 1891, Grand Ayatullah Mirza Shirazi issued a fatwa¹ that the use of tobacco was haram and was a battle against the Imam Mahdi (a.s.), the 12th Imam of Shia Islam. This fatwa caused the cancellation of the agreement in January 1892, with Iran paying 50,000 Lira as compensation to the British government. The Russians, involved in production of tobacco in Savoj Bolaq Province, encouraged people in northern Iran to oppose the agreement.

US policy was to stay neutral. Washington neither officially supported the tobacco protests nor the British Regie agreement. However, a number of American missionaries supported the demonstrations, particularly in Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan. This was not without consequences, such as the murder of J.N Wright, the wife of Dr. Wright, an American missionary in 23rd March 1890 (Yeselson, 1956, p. 56). The attacker was arrested, but escaped from prison after a year and was never prosecuted again. When Dr. Wright purchased a property using Naser al-Din Shah's approval, he was threatened with death by unknown people. Similar threats were received by Tigranes J. Malcolm, the representative of USA in Bushehr, a city with a notable British presence (Yeselson, 1956, p. 85). Americans were also suspicious of British involvement in the killing of Benjamin Labaree in Urmia in 1904 (Foreign Relations of the United States, 2015).

The significance of the movement for Ayatullah Khomeini was the start of the establishment of a political formation for the clergymen against internal suppression and tyranny and foreign domination, demonstrating the popularity of religious scholars among the people. Khomeini believed that "foreign enemies" attempted to annihilate this power and remove it from Iranian political society:

¹ A ruling on a point of Islamic law given by a recognized authority.

The incidents of Tobacco at the time of the late Ayatullah Mirza Shirazi made them (the colonisers) understand that with a fatwa it is possible to defeat an empire. The king of the time, despite all his efforts, could not protect this empire and the tobacco agreement. They have realised that they have eradicate this power (the power of clergymen) because as long as this power is alive it does not allow them to do whatever they wish and does not all the (Iranian) governments to be disruptive and ruleless. Hence they did their best of propaganda against the Islamic scholars (Sahife Nour Vol 8, 1990, p. 27).

This movement transformed the political environment of Iran to the extent that soon a cleric by the name of Mirza Reza Kermani, one of the students of Sayed Jamaluddin Asad Abadi, assassinated Naser al-Din Shah Shah. Furthermore, this movement also influenced the formation of the Constitutional Revolution (Keddie, 1966, p.131).

The US and the Constitutional Revolution (1905 – 1911)

“Read the history of Constitutional Revolution and you see what happened during that revolution. The same thing will happen to (Islamic) revolution as it happened to the constitutional revolution if we don’t learn from the events happened just after the constitutional revolution” Ayatullah Khomeini, 10 August 1986 (Sahife Nour Vol 15, 1990, P.86)

Changes in Iranian society during the period of Amir Kabir¹ broadened the intellectual and political views of Iranians. The establishment of Darul ul-Funun as a modern university and the gradual acquaintance with developments in the world bolstered the idea of reform and the necessity of a government based on law rather than autocracy. The tobacco concession and the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah were catalysts for protest, while the publication of views of Shia Scholars about Islam and freedom raised the idea of liberty amongst people.

¹Mirza Taghi Khan Farahani Prime Minister of Naser al-Din Shah. He is considered by some to be "widely respected by liberal nationalist Iranians" as "Iran's first reformer", a modernizer who was "unjustly struck down" attempted to bring "gradual reform" to Iran.

Ayatullah Mohammad Hussain Naeeni Qaravi wrote:

“Freedom and equality that came into attention of constitutional government was one of the main aims of Prophets. Our Prophet never forgot that all people are Free and equal. Leaders of Shia school wanted to free Muslims from slavery and to give their lost rights back” (Naeeni, 1999).

In Ayatullah Khomeini’s view, the cultural basis of the Constitutional revolution was Shia teachings under the leadership of clergy in Iran and Iraq.

“In the Constitutional movement, these scholars were at the top, the foundation of the constitutional was placed by the scholars in Najaf and in Iran. They wanted the constitutional revolution to achieve its goal and create a constitution.” (Seeking The Way from the Words of Imam Vol 16, 1983, pp77).

However, according to Khomeini, the movement was diverted from its path when clerics were removed through a conspiracy with foreign dominance.

“However after the acts of agents of foreign powers... especially England they tried to remove them (clergies). They even tried to stop clergies from involvement in politics by assassinating them. They wanted to hand politics to those who according to them are capable. This means those who had been abroad and are westernised. It was under the name of constitution but in reality it was dictatorship. They didn’t allow the constitutional revolution to achieve its goal; they pushed it out of its path.” (Seeking The Way from the Words of Imam Vol 16, 1983, pp77).

The regime even assassinated or executed a number of religious leaders like Ayatullah Behbehani and Ayatullah Nouri to control the movement.

The revolution began in 1905 and achieved an initial victory with its endorsement by Mozaffareddin Shah on 8 June 1906. However, soon after the death of Mozafferdin, his son and successor Mohammad Ali refused to recognise the national Constitution. With the support of

Russia, he appointed Colonel Vladimir Liakhov¹ to lead a military crackdown, including the shelling of Parliament.

In “the minor tyranny”, a short period of dictatorship arrested and killed reformists and Constitutionalists. Eventually, however, the Constitutionalists regained power in areas of Iran, especially Tabriz, and then triumphed in Tehran. Mohammad Ali Shah sought asylum in the Russian Embassy, from where he fled to Russia. Parliament and the Constitutional system were restored, and the Crown Prince, Ahmad, was put in power at the age of 12.

During the Constitutional movement, the US followed two approaches simultaneously. On the one hand, the US administration did not support the Shah’s regime and upheld its policy of “non-interference”, in contrast to the Russian and British interventions that tried to check the movement. However, Washington also avoided conflict with Britain and Russia. When Iran was partitioned in 1907 between British and Russian spheres of influence (Gasiorowski, 1991), the US did not take any formal stand. (*See Appendix I Fig 2*)

Meanwhile, American missionaries supported the revolutionaries in the spirit of freedom and liberty. Howard Baskerville, a young history teacher in Tabriz, was killed by the Shah’s forces for his role in the movement. In the spring of 1909, after the death of his best friend and colleague Sayed Hassan Sharif Zadeh, Baskerville had led a group of about hundred volunteers to defend the besieged city against Qajar royalist troops. Asked by the US consul in Tabriz, Edward Doty, to

¹ Vladimir Liakhov was originally sent from Russia to Iran as the commander of Russian (Cossack troops) in Iran. He took all his orders directly from the Tsar and was appointed, by Mohammad Ali Shah, as the military governor of Tehran. Liakhov was instructed by Shah and advised by Seraya Shapshal, the Shah Russian personal tutor and advisor as well as Russian ambassador to shell the parliament.

leave the constitutional revolutionists, he gave his passport to the consul, saying, "The only difference between me and these people is my place of birth, and this is not a big difference."

After Baskerville's death, Shaikh Muhammad Khiabani, the great liberal Mujtahid and the leader of the Constitutional movement in Tabriz¹, ordered a large memorial ceremony in his honour. Money raised during the memorial built a tomb for Baskerville and a monument others killed during the movement. Khiabani also asked people to weave a carpet with Baskerville's portrait which was sent to his mother in America (Wratislaw, 1924). Today there is a bust of Baskerville titled "Martyr" in Tabriz's Constitution House. (*See Appendix 1 Fig 3&4*)

These incidents encouraged the US to advise Iranian rulers to accept the Constitutional revolution. The US Ambassador went as far as to pressure Mohammad Ali Shah to accept the demands of the protesters. The Shah refused, but after the victory of the Constitutional revolution, President William Howard Taft expressed his happiness and congratulations.

The new Iranian reformist government decided to employ American advisers to stabilise the country's internal affairs, especially its economy.² Morgan Shuster became Chief Treasurer in 1911. Legislation gave him authority over all taxation. (*See Appendix 1, Fig 5*) With Shuster's changes in the financial system, the government was able to increase the wages of the Army, bolstering their support for Parliament and the Constitutional revolution. When Mohammad Ali Shah attacked

¹ Sheykh Muhammad Khiabani is uncle [the husband of sister of father] of Ayatullah Sayed Ali Khamenei, the current supreme leader of Iran.

² This letter which had been sent by Iran's charge-d'affaires (Mirza Aligholi khan) to US secretary of state contained the request to convey treasurer general in order to regularize Iran's monetary affairs in which, Iran's charge-d'affaires was introduced to the secretary of state for employing treasurer general.

with the support of Russia to regain the crown, he was defeated and forced to return to Russia, as Shuster ordered the confiscation of the Royal Family's estates.

Shuster even took on hegemonic powers, opposing the 1907 Anglo-Russian Entente. It was a step too far: under Russian and British pressure, the government expelled the American in January 1912. He remained as a hero for Iranians. Arif Qazvini, a nationalist and Constitutional poet, wrote an appreciation. The intellectual nationalists of the Punishment Committee released a statement in support of Shuster and threatened the regime and Russian and British interests (Shuster, 1913).

Although Khomeini was pessimistic about the religious missionaries and believed they were agents of colonial powers with political missions. Yet he had no objections regarding their presence and participation in Tobacco movement and especially in Constitutional Revolution and support of Constitutionals. Furthermore even after the victory of Islamic Revolution and in the anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution, Khomeini was not opposed to celebration and honouring Howard Baskerville and others killed in the Constitutional Revolution. Similar view is observed with regards to the presence of American economic advisors in Iran. There is not a single speech in which Khomeini opposes the presence Shuster and his economic team.

World War I and After

During World War I, the US expanded its global reach, evolving from a "State of presence" to the "State of influence" in political, economic, and ideological affairs. In cases such as Iran, with the prospect of a challenge to other foreign states like Russia and British¹. The potential was

¹ The Russians left after the revolution of 1917 and the later due to the fact that the British were expelled from Iran after the 1919. The competitive nations to the US in relation to its presence and influence.

symbolised by events such as the seeking of refuge by the King, Ahmad Shah, in the American Embassy in 1916¹ (Yeselson, 1956, p.190).

The Constitutional Revolution and the role of religious missionaries and America's economic advisors had provided the basis for American popularity among Iranians. With the de facto partition of the country, the nomination of Ahmad Shah as King at a young age, and the weakness of a central government unable to protect its territory from foreign occupation, more Iranians looked to the US as a neutral protector.

That hope was reinforced by economic crisis. Much of Iran's agricultural production was consumed by occupying forces. With the resulting shortages for Iranians, a total of 8 to 10 million Iranians, about 40% of the total population, were estimated to have perished. In 1916, through the efforts of American missionaries, the Persian Relief Committee was founded under the chairmanship of John Caldwell (Majd, 2003). This committee, providing reports on damages and the economic crisis imposed on Iranians as a result of the war, persuaded the Red Cross and US State Department to send aid to Iran.

The US was also prompted to pursue its position in Iran by the Russian Revolution of October 1917. The withdrawal of Russian troops from the country, combined with British financial problems, opened a space for American influence. Trying to exploit the opportunity, Iranian Minister Mehdi Khan Gholi Khan wrote to Washington in December 1917:

“Dear Mr. Secretary of State: the results and consequences of the war and noble tendencies of the United States in having peace based on the international justice

¹ At this time Ahmad Shah requested to shelter himself in USA embassy, but his request was refused. Two months later, the request to unfurl USA flag on top of the shah's palace was denied.” (Yeselson; A, 2002, 2nd, p. 190)

and sovereignty of all nations which was expressed clearly in his Excellency President Wilson's message to the congress has persuaded the government of Iran to urge United States in order to help Iran in gaining the benefits of these divine gifts.

Therefore, the government of Iran has asked this office through a telegraph to officially request from United States to facilitate the presence of Iran in a peace conference which will be held after this massive war. Iran's tendency is to build its independence and sovereignty without interfering with other nations' rights on a firm basis.

... Therefore, this office is requesting United States to utilize all its forces in order to oust foreign forces from Iran. Also, this office is asking United States' government to guarantee Iran's independence and sovereignty by issuing a statement. Performing such favour towards Iran in this current situation, not only would strengthen the values of justice and humanity for all nations which the United States cares for, but also would help the world peace.

Moreover, my personal belief is that considering the recent important incidents in Russia and middle-east, USA response to Iran's request will have a positive and decisive impact on Iran and will include successful results in all aspects (Alexander and Nanes, 1980, p.15).

Iran was hopeful that the letter would bring practical support from the US; however, the American reply was general and vague. Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote Mirza Ali Gholi Khan on 30 January 1918, "I am honoured to inform you that the US government will do its best to improve the unpleasant condition which has been resulted by the War incident" (Yeselson, 1956, p.190).

The Iranian Government, claiming reparations from the war sought help from the US, informed the State Department, "The damages and losses to Iran are a lot more than other neutral countries which were not involved in the war and moreover, Iran's independence and integrity has been violated by Russia, Turkey and Great Britain during the war many times and now, Iran's only hope is United States." While holding back on the request for direct economic assistance, the State Department supported the transformation of the Persian Relief Committee into the American-Persian relief commission in New York under the management of Harry Pratt Judson, Dean of

Colleges at the University of Chicago (Majd, 2003, p.281). The new commission was put in charge of the delivery of drugs and raw materials by the Red Crescent. In addition, the commission provided almost \$2.3 million in aid to Iranian, war victims (United States Department of State, 1918).

Continuing pre-World War I initiatives, Iran requested American advisors not only for financial and economic matters but for security. The US Charge' d'Affaires wrote after a meeting with the Shah and Iran's Foreign Minister, "Both of them were willing to expand the bilateral ties between Iran and the US, with agricultural advisors in addition to financial advisors to operate an Iranian bank. They mentioned an offer of various benefits in oil, railway, and mining industries (and other resources) in return for loans from the US, and they have also invited US experts to explore in Iran." The American diplomat advised, "With the tendency of MPs to support US benefits in Iran, if the US is willing to be present in Iran's economic reform, this opportunity should not be missed" (Alexander and Nanes, 1980, 29).

The Americans' interest was spurred, after the Russian Revolution, by concern over Bolshevik forces. The Minister in Persia, Caldwell, wrote the Acting Secretary of State:

"Situation in the Middle East undoubtedly approaching a grave turning point, with the withdrawal of British forces from north Persia, the Anglo-Persian agreement is impossible to execute and UK representatives are calling it the demise of the Great Britain's profits in Iran except in southern border areas. Considering this fact that the possibility of accessing some of Iran's natural resources will gain considerable profit to Americans, I am suggesting that the current situation has created a unique opportunity.

The most urgent need of Iranian government is a group of officers to substitute for Russians who have been expelled from Iran recently. They [Iranians] are hoping not to employ UK [officers]If it was possible for Iran to promptly sign a private contract to employ 30 military security officers to renew the

organisation and manage Iranian forces, the possibility of internal conflicts and, more important, utilization of Russian artilleries by Iranians would be lessened.

If such an action is not performed, preventing the evanescence of Iran's government evanescence will be tough. The next week' decisions will affect the next generation's destiny in this part of the world. If US is unwilling to participate in economic reform in Iran, there would be no other great opportunity in future to establish the basis of this action” (Alexander and Nanes, 1980, 28-9).

The 1919 treaty¹ between Britain and Iran, entrenching a substantial British military and missionary presence, posed a serious obstacle to US influence. Responding to the 1919 Anglo-Persian Treaty, Secretary of State Robert Lansing informed the American ambassador in Britain:

“The Iranians and Britain agreement had a very unpleasant effect on me and the President. Therefore, we are not asking our Minister Plenipotentiary not to cooperate with the UK Minister Plenipotentiary nor expressing a friendly reaction towards this contract....It is assumed that while I was offering my requests, Great Britain was engaged in secret talks with the minimum goal to dominate Iran's economy. This type of secret action is opposing clear methods of talks and may deteriorate the roots of peace based on friendship. We never encourage these types of secret negotiations and cannot act on a contract which has been formed based on this method” (Alexander and Nanes, 1980, 52-3).

Lansing compared what he saw as British dishonesty and secrecy with a contract between the US and Liberia:

“It has to be mentioned that the US government has shown a tendency towards Liberia based on a republican government and agreement of all Liberians. In fact, Liberia has expressed its complete trust towards American neutrality in whole of Liberia's history and has frequently shown a tendency towards USA's active role in Liberia's affairs....You have to mention this issue that the negotiation process of these two contracts had been totally different. ... As for Liberia, the US was trustworthily careful not to enter into any direct negotiation with Liberia in issues affecting Liberia and UK relations, unless a prior agreement with the UK had been reached (Alexander and Nanes, 1980, 59-60).

¹This contract was signed between Iran and UK and based on that, UK had this opportunity to employ their advisors in all Iranian ministries and organizations. This contract was making Iran as a colony of UK.

For the Iranian opposition, the 1919 treaty was no more than the colonisation of Iran. They accused Prime Minister Wosooghoddole of betrayal and selling off the country to Britain. US officials supported this by trying to prove that Britain was colonising Iran through the money with which it was bribing Iranian officials in contracts and secret arrangements. They sought to persuade Iranians to unite and liaise with America instead of Britain. The US Minister Plenipotentiary in Iran, John L. Caldwell, advised Iranian officials:

“Terminate this contract and reject the British and then contact the US government. I promise they would give you as much money as you need. They also would send you advisors and would administer your finance, military and mines” (Bahar, 1979, p.417).

When the content of this treaty was revealed and understood, internal and external opposition forced its cancellation. However, this only led to further British intervention. Ahmad Shah was forced from Iran, and the central government was weakened, preparing the ground for even more extensive activities by foreign governments and eventually the coup of 1921.

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London's hold on Iranian affairs had been reasserted; however, for political reasons, it could not entirely exclude the US. Washington saw the coup as an opportunity, since it offered a suitable environment for western countries to invest in Iran.

Changing the Monarchy from Qajar to Pahlavi (1920-1923)

When the fourth National Parliament opened in July 1921, requests were sent to the US to assist Iran's economic recovery. Ghavam Olsaltaneh, the new Prime Minister, pursued two simultaneous actions with the consent of the Parliament.

First the Government decided to borrow money from US in order to fund the budget deficit. The money was lent on the condition that the Iranian Ministry of Finance would be under the supervision of the Americans, with all agreements and expenditures needing the consent of the American supervisor. Arthur Millspaugh was appointed as the head of the Ministry of Finance and all the other organisations under the supervision of the ministry in 1921, holding the position until 1927 (DeNovo, 1963, p. 283). The advisor had notable success in some areas. For example, when Millspaugh arrived in Iran, the country had less than 1000 miles of good standard roads. By 1930, it had 14,000 miles, thanks to the efforts of American engineers (Brown, 1936, p.474).

Meanwhile, a new opportunity for the US was emerging. In an agreement with the new Soviet Government in 1921, the previous arrangements for control of oil in northern Iran were cancelled. Tehran could now consider giving rights to a "neutral" country, i.e. the US. After Washington opposed the 1919 Treaty and supported Iran at the Versailles Peace conference, Prime Minister Ghavam began private meetings with Standard Oil over the right to explore oil in five northern states of Iran" (Houshang Mahdavi, 1995, p. 359). Unsurprisingly, the British objected. The Foreign Minister, Lord Curzon¹, wrote his Iranian counterpart, "I found out that his Excellency [Firouz Mirza] is mentioning US Company of Standard Oil. I found out that this hungry animal is seeking

¹ George Nathaniel Curzon was UK Foreign Minister in 1919.

to open up a door for himself in Iran; therefore I clearly stated to his Excellency that I was opposing any plan that enters Standard Oil Company to Iran's market" (Mojani, 1996, p. 109) The British Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, asked: "Why we are not telling Americans that Iran is under our power and this [country] is our private and preserved hunting ground?" Sabahi, 1990, p. 20).

The Soviet Union, looking to regain its lost resources after the October Revolution and unsettled that the Khoshtaria¹ oil exploration rights had been granted to the US, joined the protest against Washington's influence. "Russia's logic was that the right had been granted to a Russian citizen named Khoshtaria and they were claiming that they had given all the previous grants that had been given to Russia back to Iran during the peace agreement in 1921 with the condition of those grants not to be given to another country" (Navazani, 2004, p.210). In 1921 Britain, through Field Marshal William Edmund Ironside, supported the bloodless military coup of the pro-British cleric Sayed Ziauddin Tabatabaee and Reza Khan Mirpanj, soon known as Reza Shah Pahlavi². Kazakh forces under the command of Reza Khan moved from Qazvin to Tehran, entering without any major opposition (Iranicaonline.org, 2015). Ghavam Olsaltaneh's Government was replaced, with Sayed Ziauddin as Prime Minister and Reza Khan as the Secretary of War. The British had bolstered their position with the support of the 1921 coup; however, they also needed the Americans to help them against the expansion of Soviet influence. Two years earlier, British officials had "recommended that the presence of USA will prevent Russia's violations against Iran" (Sabahi, 1990, p 209). The

¹ This grant which was related to exploration of oil in north of Iran had been given to Mohammad Valikhan Tonekaboni by Nasereddin shah in 1896. In 1916, a Russian named Akaki Mededvich Khoshtaria bought this grant from Mohammad vlikhan. After the 1917 Revolution in Russia, this grant had been annulled by Russia and Khoshtaria sold it to IRAN-UK Oil Company.

² Ironside had met several times with Rezakhan prior to Coup d'état and had found him a capable person to perform Coup d'état and had reported this to British Embassy in Tehran.

Foreign Minister, Lord Curzon, wrote, “At least Americans will support us in fighting against Bolsheviks who are the only danger” (Sabahi, 1990, p 210).

Nevertheless, Britain was still not pleased with the presence of the US in Iran. Tensions were stoked when the American Vice Consul¹, Robert Imbrie, was killed in Tehran. The North Oil contract with the US was annulled, while the Deputy Secretary of State wrote the US Minister Plenipotentiary, “It is quite clear to you that the USA has to alter its relationship with Iran immediately after the assassination....This ministry is not willing to see another problem occur in order to prevent this regulated policy” (Alexander, and Nanes, 1980, p. 69). Trying to repair the damage, Iran sought to punish and execute Imbrie’s killers to “express Iran’s eagerness to keep the bilateral relationship”². Iran’s ambassador to the US was instructed in October 1924 to “express to the Secretary of State that the punishment of Sayed Hasan and Ali was revised in order to prove goodwill more than before --- and both of them were hanged”³.

The Iran-US relationship was further complicated as Germany became a preferred partner for Tehran. The ascendancy of Berlin was primarily for political and bureaucratic reasons, with Reza Shah focusing on the consolidation of central government and economic development. His perception was that Germany, which was succeeding in overcoming the damage of World War I and proceeding rapidly with industrialization, was an ideal model.

¹ Different viewpoint has been given on Robert Imbrie’s assassination. George Lenchavski has connected his assassination to North oil grant. But Moustafa Fateh has denied any relation with Imbrie’s assassination and North Oil grant. Fateh M. (1999) 50 years of Iran’s oil. Tehran: Chehr Company; Pp 341-34.

² Documents of Iran Foreign Ministry. (1924). Carton Number 9, Dossier 37.

³ Ibid.

Reza Shah also his charismatic leadership as parallel to that of Adolf Hitler. Germany's need for Iran's oil reserves, Tehran's geopolitical position, and the racist ideological views of Nazi leaders (Rigg, 2004) who viewed Aryans as the master race strengthened the relationship. Iran became one of Germany's biggest business partners and more than 3,000 German experts settled in Iran (Rahmani, 2005).

For a period in the 1930s, relations were almost suspended. Iran's ambassador in the US ¹ was stopped and arrested by American police² (DeNovo, 1963). After the claimed insults to Reza Shah in articles in the New York Daily Mirror newspaper and the Brooklyn Eagle magazine³, the Iranian leader ordered the closure of the Iranian Embassy in the US and summoned the American Minister in Tehran when he did not receive an apology. He ordered the closure of Sinclair Oil, which had begun operations in the Ahmad Shah Era and acquired the right of oil extraction in northern Iran in May 1922 for 50 years.

The Iranian Embassy only reopened in Washington in 1939 when President Roosevelt sent a special representative to officially apologize. Meanwhile, the Iran-US relationship sustained itself instead in the cultural and educational fields. The American College of Tehran, established by a group of American missionaries in 1873, developed with the efforts of Samuel Martin Jordan and Miss Harry

¹ Jalal Ghaffar, 1935.

² He was arrested due to violation of driving regulations. After being released from arrest he goes to Iran's embassy and reports the event in detail to Iran's foreign minister. After observing the telegraph Reza Shah Orders to close the embassy and come to Iran together with the personnel if there has been any insult. On the other hand, since at that time there was a rumours to the effect that Reza Shah obeyed the foreigners, he developed this simple subject and overestimated that as an opposition procedure with the foreigners.

³ This article was confronted with the objection of Soheilzadeh (deputy of Iran's foreign minister).

More, who came to Iran in 1933 and ran a boarding school with an increasing number of students and buildings.

The inter-war Iran-US relationship was thus uneven, with the strength of private links and the American counterweight to Britain and Russia challenged as much by Reza Shah's personal animosity and strategic choices as by the British position. However, for Ayatullah Khomeini – and thus for Khomeinism --- there was a consistency in the illegitimacy of the monarchy. The 1925 coup, the transfer of power from the Qajar monarchy to Pahlavi, and Reza Shah's authoritarian rule was constructed by Khomeini as a regime forced on Iran by colonising powers, especially Britain.

“After Reza Khan established his government, he began to oppose Islam and the clergies. He forbade holding of any religious ceremonies. He brought to power by the British... In it was said by the Radio Delhi, which was then under British control, that Reza Khan brought to power by them (British) and when he had betrayed them, they removed him” (Seeking the way from the words of Imam Vol 16, 1983,p 210).

This criticism laid the platform for Khomeini's ideology and analysis. While there would be further complex political manoeuvres challenging his straightforward view --- including the British-backed overthrow of Reza Shah in 1942, the Ayatullah's vision would be buttressed by the rising presence of the US in Iranian affairs.

Chapter 5

The Period of US Influence in Iran 1939-1953

The period from 1939 to 1953 was catalytic in Iran-US relations. The impact of World War II in Iran and beyond opened the possibility for the US to gradually assume a privileged position and role in the country. At the outset of the war, Washington avoided any official involvement in the political affairs of Iran. Eight years after the end of the war, the US was playing a key and unique role in the determination of political leadership and government.

Economic and humanitarian problems became critical because of Iran's position as a bridge between Russia and Great Britain, America's two most powerful allies, and the weakness of Tehran's government. The US did not seek its expanded presence; instead, the crisis over politics, security, and the economy led to invitations from both Britain and the Iranian leadership to intervene.

After World War II, the development of the Cold War was accompanied by a growing importance for Iran's oil and a nationalist movement seeking control of the resource. A weakened Britain had to turn to the US for assistance --- even as it doubted American motives --- after the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by the Musaddiq Government in 1951. Washington initially tried to act as a broker for a political resolution; however, the advent of the Eisenhower Administration brought discussions with the British about the overthrow of Prime Minister Musaddiq, bolstering the power of the young Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The US had become the more influential power in Iran, but that came at the cost of a positive relationship with many Iranians. No longer had the desired foreign actor to offset Britain and Russia, Washington put itself in the position of an oppressive State carrying out a coup to pursue its interests.

Ayatullah Khomeini always had a pessimistic interpretation of the Iran-US relationship. However, in Khomeinism the concept of US as the main obstacle to Iranian development and welfare was formed after the Second World War.

*“... [After the Second World War] we were under their [Superpowers] dominance. It was first Britain and now it is America which is worse than all”
(Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p.161)*

However, it would be mistake to see the coup as the seminal event in Khomeini's thought. In comparison with other critics, Khomeini's objections to the Americans in 1953 were muted. This is mainly because Ayatullah Boroujerdi was the main political leader of the time thus Khomeini did not want to have separate and possibly contrasting political activities. Khomeini's distrust of the Shah and the Americans was balanced by his dislike for the secular Musaddiq, whom he felt abused his power with moves such as the dissolution of the Majlis.

“One of his mistakes (Musaddiq) was that when he came to power, he did not overthrow the Shah... Instead he dissolved the parliament and thus giving more power to the Shah” (Sahife Nour Vol 4, 1990, pp.371).

Second World War: Beginning of US influence in Iran

After the tension of the 1930s, the outbreak of World War II brought a renewed US involvement in Iran. As Tehran walked a tightrope as a “neutral” country between the demands of Berlin and of powers such as Britain and Russia. Washington could serve as a mediator in that quest before 1941. After its entry into the war, the US could be both a bridge linking Britain and Russia in Iran and a force to offset those two powers.

At the beginning of World War II, Britain warned Reza Shah not to get close to Germany, concerned that a rapprochement could strengthen Berlin and endanger the interests of the Allies in Iran. However, the Iranian monarch predicted that Germany would be victorious. He commanded the newly-installed Government under Prime Minister Matin Daftari to develop better relations with the Germans. Iran’s declaration of neutrality was a gesture of favour towards Berlin, with Reza Shah calculating that he was between two powers long involved in Iran but “failing” and one that was rising but distant from Iranian borders. Among the Shah’s gestures were the release of Iranian soldiers from their garrisons so they would not participate in war in favour of the Allies.

Britain responded by putting Iran under pressure to expel Germans. Balancing between the two sides while trying to maintain his preference for Berlin, Reza Shah made the short-term concession of removing Matin Daftari from office and replacing him with Ali Mansour, (Mansour Almalek) perceived as close to Britain.

The strategy, however, faced a further complication when Germany broke the Nazi-Soviet Pact and attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941. Four days after the German invasion, the British and Soviets, now allied, put even more pressure on Reza Shah for the expulsion of German officials

and advisors from Iran. In response, Reza Shah reiterated that Iran was a neutral country and that Germans' activities were limited to construction and commercial affairs. Another Anglo-Russian notification was given to Iran on July 18 and the common memorandum of the two powers on August 15 was an effective ultimatum. Ten days later, the soldiers of Red Army, moving from the northern borders, and British forces from the southern ports occupied Iran on the pretext of expelling the German advisors.

The developments offered an exceptional opportunity to the US. The economic and humanitarian crises of poverty, hunger, and health made the services of American missionaries even more visible. Although their presence was informal and non-governmental, it strengthened the belief that both the US Government and its citizens were dedicated to outreach in Iran: "In the midst of Second World War (1939-46), the helpless and damaged people of south Tehran became familiar with another charitable feature of American devotees of Iran. The wife of Dreyfus¹, the noble Minister Plenipotentiary of America in Iran, established a clinic in the south of Tehran" (Salih, 1976, p.47). The political instability and social insecurity caused by the presence of British and Russian soldiers², along with the Iranian government's requests for help from the US, reinforced this pro-American attitude: Washington could slowly offset Britain and Russia to Iran's benefit.

¹ Mrs. Louis G. Dreyfus.

² A wave of anarchism and in-determination had clasped the country once Iran had been occupied by the Allies. The security situation was quite inconsistent. Many of the army generals and senior officers had escaped, the remaining soldiers in the garrisons had nothing to eat, no discipline was established in any class of the army, robbery from people's houses and shops had increased and the soldiers also contributed in this pillage. The soldiers stole the weapons from the garrisons and sold them. Even the horses of artillery were traded secretly. Most of the former adoptive regiments had depreciated to one-fourth of its normal power. Writing mottos and slogans had even reached behind the walls of Reza Khan's palace.

However, the US Government did not fulfil these expectations. Even the response to Reza Shah's appeal to intervene against the Anglo-Soviet effort to topple him tipped off Washington's detachment. President Roosevelt waited critical days to reply, only writing on September 2 after the British and Russian occupation and takeover of the railroads, roads, and other infrastructure. He rejected the Shah's plea, even though he stated that the "territorial integrity" of Iran would be respected. Thirteen days later, Reza Shah was overthrown in favour of his son Mohammad Reza; he was soon forced to flee to Mauritius (Pollack, 2004).

The immediate effect of the coup was to expose the weakness of central government and the new Shah, offering more ground for London and Moscow to put Iran under pressure. In February 1942, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Forooghi and the Soviet and British ambassadors signed a treaty in which the Soviet Union and Britain agreed to take their forces out of the country six months after the war, providing that Iran promised to collaborate with them and allowed them to use its transport routes and telecommunication systems. Tehran had also to agree to provide the necessary workforce and resources for British and Soviets operating in Iran.

A renewed opportunity for the Americans came not through the political manoeuvres but through the economic limitations of both Britain and the Soviet Union. The British faced problems moving supplies to the Soviets in the north, because of the size of the country, the poor railway network and roads, and the shortage of ports. Roosevelt agreed with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that the US would handle all transportation of materials and ammunition, an arrangement welcomed by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in December 1942. The US despatched military forces including sending 30000 US soldiers to Iran for the first time for the "Persian Corridor" in an operation labelled "Victory Bridge" (Sheikh Nouri and Valipour, 2006, pp.28-35) (Salih, 1976,

p.337). This was the opportunity for the US to extend their presence to a military form under the pretext of providing safe and secure transportation of military artillery for British and Russians.

The agreement also brought British and Russian acceptance of the return of Arthur Millspaugh to Iran in December 1942 as the Administrator-General of Finances. Matters of transport, food distribution, adjustment of rents, fixing of prices, and other financial and economic issues were given to Millspaugh and 60 colleagues¹ (Alexander and Nanes, 1980, p.125).

The escalation in American involvement was welcomed by Mohammad Reza Shah, who sought more US advisors and contracts.

1. In January 1943, Iran's parliament appointed Harold Gresham as the head of Customs Administration in southern Iran².
2. In April 1943, Iran signed its first economic contract with the US.
3. In August 1943, Iran's Parliament appointed Timmerman as an advisor for the Iranian Police³.
4. In August 1943, Iran's government agreed to exchange official publications between Tehran and the US.
5. In August 1943, Parliament approved purchase of \$1.5 million of military equipment including weapons and ammunitions from the US⁴.

¹Millspaugh's actions were not much welcomed by the people this time round. In fact due to the public pressure, the Iranian parliament on 8th January 1945 took away the extensive power of Millspaugh, government dismissed and then expelled him from Iran."

² Iran's parliament session 123, January 1943, Islamic Republic of Iran's Parliament archive.

³ Iran's parliament session 188, August 1943, Islamic Republic of Iran's Parliament archive.

⁴ Iran's parliament session 194, September 1943, Islamic Republic of Iran's Parliament archive.

6. In September 1943, US supported Iran's accession to the Declaration of the United Nations (Un.org, 2015).
7. In October 1943, Iran's Parliament allowed the employment of a number of US Officers in the Iranian Gendarmerie¹ and Ministry of War. It also permitted the employment of the 60 Americans for the Ministry of Finance².
8. In February 1944, Iran and US agreed to convert Consulates to Embassies in both countries.

The measures encouraged Washington to look more at obtaining an interest in Iranian oilfields. Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote President Roosevelt in 1943, "The presence of Russia and Britain in Iran must be finished. Our interests will be fulfilled once none of the great powers are present against the American oil organisations in Arabia in the Persian Gulf" (Sheikh Nouri and Valipour, 2006, pp.28-35).

Expansion of US Influence: After the Second World War

The developments of World War II laid the foundation for an unprecedented expansion of Iranian-American relations. The growth of the US economy and its role as a global superpower, with its growing desire to use Iran as a security barrier against Soviet Communism, intersected with the economic and social problems and the weakness of the Iranian government and built on the decades of informal American involvement in Iran³.

¹ Iran's parliament session 208, October 1943, Islamic Republic of Iran's Parliament archive.

² Iran's parliament session 209, October 1943, Islamic Republic of Iran's Parliament archive.

³Mohammad Amir Sheikh Nouri and Mohammad Valipour, Iran and America and the Second World War, Iran Revolution Document Center , JUNE 19 , 2006, www.irdc.ir

During World War II, US industrial and agricultural production increased by 80% and 36%, respectively. In 1945, half of the industrial products of the world were manufactured in the US, which also had almost half of the world's shipping. By 1947, more than one-third of global exports were from America (Vaezi, 2000, pp.11-12).

In Iran, the war had a far different range of effects. The presence of foreign armies not only resulted in shortages, hoarding, increasing prices, and a black market, but also it resulted in social, moral, and security consequences which provoked dissatisfaction among Iranians.

Among the Allies countries, Russia not only put Iran under political and economic pressure, but also refused to pull out from north of Iran ¹ after the Potsdam Conference² . By December 1945 just a few months after the end of the war, Russians had managed to establish two pro-Soviet Republics within the Iranian borders (Lenczowski, 1990) the Azerbaijan People's Republic and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad.

¹ The only territorial progress of Russians in the first stages of war in the Middle East was the occupation of north of Iran in 1941. The Russians agreed with the British in this regard and the British occupied the southern and central parts of Iran. ...In this way, they considered Iran as their allied and undertook to pullout their forces from Iran within 6 months after the end of war. Once again Russia ignored these promises, whether during the war or after that, due to much consistency and persistence in its policy and didn't treat with Iran as an allied. Rather it treated with Iran as an occupied country by putting the people under pressure, encroaching foodstuff, expulsion of Iranian bothering employees, using its influence on the election of Iran's council and putting the bourgeois classes under pressure in the areas it had occupied in the north. (Lenchovski; G., 1994, P. 10).

² In Potsdam conference which was held from Jul. 17 to Aug. 2, 1945 in the suburbs of the former capital of Germany between the heads of 3 large countries, i.e., Stalin; the prime minister of Russia, Truman; the new president of America, and Churchill (and then Clement Attlee; the new prime minister of Britain), the issue of pullout of Iran by the alien forces was set forth, but Russians didn't agree with that under the excuse that the war with Japan had not been finished yet. Therefore, it was stated in the last declaration of Potsdam conference as follows: "It was agreed that the Allied's forces pullout from Tehran immediately and the pullout of Iran by the soldiers will be reviewed in the meeting of the foreign ministers of 3 countries which will be held on Sept. 10, 1945 in London.

Documents of the conferences of Tehran, (1981) Yalta, Potsdam, Part publications, Tehran, p. 418.

In spring 1946, through a United Nations Security council resolution, the US forced the Soviet Union to withdraw the Red Army from Iran. Washington then supported the Shah and the Government as they sent the Army to recapture Kurdistan and Azerbaijan in December 1946.

The US also entered into an economic battle with the Russians over oil in northern Iran. The Soviet-Iranian oil agreement in March 1946 gave Moscow a 51% share of the fields. Washington responded with support for Iran to freely determine the use of its natural resources. Encouraged by the backing, the newly-elected Iranian parliament refused to ratify the Soviet agreement in October 1947 (Lenczowski, 1990).

State Department official Loy Henderson saw a long-term purpose for “assisting the reconstruction of Iran as a strong and stable member of the international political councils and as a result, removing a future threat for the unity of allied countries’ interests and international security” (Alexander and Nanes, 1980, p231). American officials pursued the objectives, even though the situation would soon lead to confrontation with the Soviet Union. President Truman wrote in his memoir:

“Iran was our ally during war. It was Russia’s ally. Iran let the free passing of weapons and ammunitions from its territory from Persian Gulf to Caspian Sea which amounted to millions of tons. Without these ammunitions which had been sent by America, Russia would fail ignominiously. Yet, now Russia creates rebellions in this country and keeps his forces in the territory of my friend and ally, Iran....If Russia is not faced with an iron fist and strong word, another war will occur. They understand only one language: “How many legions do you have?”.... “I don’t believe in compromising more than this I have become tired of tolerating the Russians” (Lenczowski, 1990) (Truman, 1955, p.380).

The Truman Doctrine of 1947, “the most revolutionary evolution in US foreign policy from 1823 onward, the year in which Monroe Doctrine was announced”, buttressed Washington's calculations with the ideological call to support “freedom” wherever it was challenged by Communism. The

Marshall Plan, the “other side of the coin”, set a precedent with massive US assistance for economic recovery of allied states. In 1949, aid was extended beyond Western Europe through the Point Four Program.

Bilateral assistance had already been provided to Tehran, beginning in June 1947 with Iran's purchase of \$10 million of military equipment and weapons in the first notable Government-to-Government agreement. This was followed by technical and economic arrangements, including the confirmation in autumn 1948 of the despatch of a US research board to Iran. After four months of research, the American experts recommended a \$250 million loan from the US Export-Import Bank for Iran's seven-year developmental plan of Iran.

In October 1950, after protracted negotiations, a contract was signed between Iranian Prime Minister Ali Razmara and US Ambassador Henry F. Grady for a further American loan. More US experts came to Tehran from America to investigate the economic situation and made recommendations in line with Truman's Point 4 program. Even amid the nationalization crisis, the State Department announced in April 1952 that project-based contracts had been concluded with the Iranian Government on technical cooperation in agriculture, general health, and education, with the US allocating more than \$23 million.¹ Tehran pursued oil contracts with the American

¹The agricultural program consists of some plans including the development of agriculture development services, improvement of animal husbandry methods, irrigation development, preservation of soil and water and factory development.

Health, general health, development of health engineering and nursery programs as well as the training sections of general health in the Ministry of Health in the direction of campaigning against the infectious diseases consider the improvement of health conditions and development of mother cares and children health and other necessary services for the development of general health of rural regions.

The goals of educational program include the development of advanced rural facilities by the standard schools, better education for a more number of teachers and extending the program to the remote regions.

Some agreements have also been executed as an urgent measure in the direction of supplying the local current costs of the program of principle 4, that the Iranian government is not able to pay them at the present time, which will supply the Rial required for the technical cooperation plans up to an amount of 6 million dollars.

companies Morrison Nodson, Standard Oil, and Overseas Consultant, while US advisors worked in industries and mines, construction, roads, railways, communications, agriculture, power, irrigation, and financial affairs (Granovsky et al, 1980, 512-13).

The United States and the 1953 Coup

In the history of Iran-US relations, the control of the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company is one of the turning points. Initial US support for the Government of Mohammad Musaddiq would give way by 1953 to intervention alongside Britain in a coup to replace the Prime Minister and reassert the Shah's authority.

Under a 1933 agreement, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), the second-largest oil producer in the world, had exclusive control over Iranian oil activities. After World War II, it faced pressure to maintain its position with a fairer division of oil revenues with the Government. However, rather than recognizing the need for adjustment, it persisted with what Iranians saw as unfair arrangement, whereas Saudi Arabia received 56 cents per barrel of oil in a renegotiated contract with Aramco in 1950, Iran was given only 18 cents per barrel in the 1951 proposal from the AIOC.

The first one is the urgent contribution plan in the direction of supplying dollars in the United States for earning livelihoods and tuitions of those poor Iranians whose financial resources have been stopped due to the foreign exchange constraints of Iranian government. Based on this program, the required Rial must be supplied by the supervisors of the aforesaid students in Iran before these students receive any dollar in the United States. The relevant Rial will be transferred to the account used by the manager of principle 4 in Iran in the direction of removing monetary needs. The United States has agreed to spend an amount up to one million dollars in this plan.

Based on another program, the United States will supply about 34,000 tons of sugar to an amount of 5 million dollars. The agreement related to the supply of the regulations of sugar purchase was concluded on Mar. 31, 1952 in Tehran. Based on terms and conditions of the agreement of consumer goods (sugar), the Iranian government will sell sugar through the common commercial ways and will transfer its equivalent to an amount of 5 million Rials to a special account and will provide the manager of principle 4 with that account in order to supply the current costs.

The aforesaid sugar will be shipped to the Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf in three separate shipments during the months of June and July. (Alexander; Yunah and Nanez; Allen, first of 1999, PP. 368-372) (For more information about the detailed contents of this declaration, please refer to attachment No. 16).

In 1948 the Iranian National Front, with a national and anti-colonial manifesto, was established under the leadership of Dr. Mohammad Musaddiq.¹ He built his influence in the National Assembly and as chairman of Oil Commission, which prepared a nationalisation plan supported by all parties and secular currents and religious elements, led by Ayatullah Kashani.² It was also supported by Leftist and Marxist parties such as Tudeh and Ranjbaran.

The Shah, with the support of London and Washington, tried to control the rising movement with the installation in June 1950 of General Ali Razmara as Prime Minister, who “must first have anti-communist records; secondly, he must not avoid using force to reach the goal whenever necessary; and thirdly, the Americans must fully know him”. However, Razmara was assassinated on March 8, 1951, by an Islamic opposition party. The next day, the Majlis Oil Commission confirmed nationalisation as a formal act, and the Shah was soon forced to appoint Musaddiq as Prime Minister.

At the beginning of the crisis, US tried to represent itself as neutral, vetoing the British proposal of military action to occupy the oilfields and then pursuing a diplomatic resolution. There were multiple reasons for the policy. The US did not want to weaken its alliance with British, and it was concerned about any stoppage of oil. At the same time, US leaders were against a resorting to

¹ The confrontation of Dr. Musaddiq with Britain at the beginning of 1950s was not a new issue. During his charge of Ministry of foreign affairs in 1923 in Moshirodoleh's cabinet, Musaddiq opposed with what the British recognized as their interests in Iran. But after ReKhan came to power through the British coup, Musaddiq kept aloof from power. After Reza Shah was dismissed from power, Musaddiq's effective reappearance in the political field of Iran became possible. Musaddiq obtained the most votes in Tehran in the first elections after Reza Shah (14th period of National Consultative Assembly, February 1944-1946) and a plan was approved in Majlis through his efforts which would not allow the government to negotiate with the foreigners about oil during occupation.

² Sayed Abul-Qasem Kashani 1882-1962 was a religious leader against Mohammad Reza Shah who played an important role in the overall success and expansion of the oil nationalisation movement. Kashani's support from the Oil Nationalisation and Musaddiq himself brought about the support of other Clergymen such as Ayatullah Khonsari, Ayatullah Mahalati and Ayatullah Shahroudi. He had close bonds with Fada'ian Islam many consider him as the mastermind behind Razmara's assassination.

“warship diplomacy” and feared that a British attack might be a good pretext for Russian intervention¹ (Alexander and Nanes, 1980, pp.333-337) (Bill, 1988, p.105). However, growing concern over nationalism and anti-imperialism in Iran and over the ascent of leftist and Communist parties led the Eisenhower Administration to shift US policy and operations soon after it took office in January 1953. It began development of Operation AJAX, which culminated in the overthrow of Musaddiq in August and the reinforcement of the Shah's authority.

The US was far from being solely responsible for the coup. Musaddiq had weakened his political position with his resignation in July 1952. Although he succeeded in the short term in his power play against the Shah, not only forcing his reinstatement but adding the right to select the Defence Minister, he was blamed for the loss of life and economic damage from clashes between his supporters and Iranian armed forces.² He was further weakened by his failure to put on trial those

¹“In case Iran is put under the control of Russia, the following consequences will occur:

- a. Immediate stop of Iran oil flow and possible stoppage of the entire oil of Middle East together with the next significant and probably intolerable reduction in oil resources;
- b. Display of the power of Russia system and the weak condition of the west world against that and in addition to that;
- c. Development of Russian Empire to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean;
- d. Basic threat regarding the conditions of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India;
- e. Almost undoubtedly downfall of Afghanistan toward communism;
- f. Such a strengthening in Russians condition in the Middle East will make it possible for the military forces of Russia to increase the possibility of their military victory in Middle East or Pakistan or India during the war by storing enough oil in addition to the downfall risk of Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and India toward communism at the time of peace; and
- g. Turkey will be such defenceless from the east and north sides that its military condition will be threatened.

3. In the event that Iran is put under the dominance of Russians during the peace:

- a. Truman will be defeated;
- b. Russia will gain a jumping platform for domination over the whole Middle East including the eastern Mediterranean regions and Suez Channel. Moreover, the development of bases and facilities and reserves of military materials including oil will allow the Russians to consider freely any schedule for military operation in the Middle East or Pakistan or India; and

- c. Russia will gain the possibility of establishing facilities in order to transfer Iran's oil to its own territory.

² Later Musaddiq in his memoir wrote: Now I admit that I committed a great error by resigning. Musaddiq M. Memories and Reflection of Musaddiq. (2002)10th ed. Tehran: Scientific Publication.

who rose against him.¹ Amid growing economic troubles, he lost the support of key constituencies, including the clerics around Ayatullah Kashani, and he forced a confrontation when he dissolved Parliament on August 11, 1953.

However, the Eisenhower Administration was instrumental in Musaddiq's downfall with the six-step plan, working with Britain's intelligence network in Iran, to replace the Prime Minister with General Fazlollah Zahedi. The CIA committed millions of dollars to destabilizing operations, including one million Rials per week to purchase the cooperation of members of Parliament. Deputy Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, who was the Director of the CIA from 1950 to 1953, wrote in May, "Up to this time I have succeeded to assign ten individuals with radio receiver and transmitter systems in different parts of Iran to contact with CIA whenever necessary. Some other individuals are also being trained to join them." Weapons and ammunition were stocked in Libya for movement to Iran, if necessary. When the coup initially faltered in mid-August, US officials bolstered the Shah, and the renewed support of public protests forced Musaddiq's resignation (Wilber, 2000, p. 45). (*See Appendix 1: Fig 6&7*)

Much of the debate around the 1953 coup has polarised between whether it was a US operation, in which Iranians were merely carrying out American orders, or whether it was an intrinsically Iranian matter in which the Americans playing a supporting but limited role. That debate missed the key dynamic, based on decades of American interaction with Iranians. Not only was there the high-level connections with the Shah and with the preferred choice of General Zahedi as Prime Minister; there were also the connections with the "Iranians on the street", be they the paid actors such as

¹ He appointed General Vosouq as the minister of defence.

the Rashidian brothers, known as famous wrestlers in Iran, or with larger, unpaid groups who had their own motivations for opposition to Musaddiq.

Through those networks of acquaintances, including those through the Britain, the Americans could then try to affect Iranian institutions. They could seek to win over the Majlis, not only through their bribery but through non-financial influence. They could pursue a de facto alliance with Ayatullah Kashani and the clergy. They could try to build connections with the intelligentsia of North Tehran. This was the bedrock of the coup behind the headline drama of the well-connected CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt, the relative of two US Presidents, carrying out cloak-and-dagger operations.

The outcome of the 1953 would link the extension of US interests with the building of connections with Iranian networks of power. Formally the US took a 40% stake in the re-constructed AIOC. Beyond this, it was now committed to involvement in Iran, not just through private initiatives but through its involvement in the Government's economic, political, and military measures. Washington had replaced Britain as the leading external actor in Iranian affairs, with its personnel rather than those of London being the first received by Tehran's officials. It also would increasingly be, in the eyes of leading Iranian figures, the primary negative influence on the country and its Islamic nature¹ (Elm, 1994, pp.260-261) (Bill, 1988, p112). That view would intersect with resentment over the Shah's limits on personal freedom and suppression of dissent, with accusations that he was a servant for the extension of the American military presence in the region.

¹ In the course of oil nationalisation and the first period of Musaddiq as a prime minister, which coincided with Truman's presidency in the US, some of US press such as Wall-Street Journal, Philadelphia Inquirer and Washington Post criticized the accompany of US with British and demanded the implicit support of Musaddiq's government.

Chapter 6
The Iran-US New Relationship and
the Foundation for Khomeinism
1953- 1963

The 1953 coup and the strategic approach of the Eisenhower Administration reshaped the Iran-US relationship between 1953 and 1961. Driven by its response to Soviet influence, including in the Near and Middle East, Washington sought a partnership with the Shah, restored in power, and his new Prime Minister Fazlollah Zahedi.¹ With Moscow pushed out after the 1946 crises and Britain's power on the wane following the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the US was now the dominant foreign presence in Iran. Eisenhower's emphasis on security assistance and economic aid would be followed by the Kennedy Administration's attention to "reforms".

Despite the proclamations of the US and the Shah that this was a relationship fostering progress, Ayatullah Khomeini was hostile. Indeed, the relationship was proof, in the evolving conception of Khomeinism, of American "hegemony" over Tehran.

After the Coup

The coup of 1953 was followed by a negotiation between the Shah and the US Government. The monarch adapted his policies and methods to meet the US conception of its interests (Ledeen and Lewis, 1981, p.5). Washington, building the "Northern Tier" defence barrier against the Soviets, declared its backing of the Shah and the Government. Iran gave economic concessions to encourage more cooperation, consolidating the American place in the oil industry. US sales of weapons were accompanied by the despatch of military advisors and the organisation and training of a new

¹ Execution of the plan (the coup d'état during which Musaddiq was removed) required consultation with the King and Roosevelt predicted Major General Fazlollah Zahedi, who was the most loyal follower of King in the army, to be appointed as Prime Minister instead of Musaddiq. The trend of events in Iran was accelerated. On AUG 1, 1953, Roosevelt made his first secret meeting with the King and informed him that Eisenhower would confirm Roosevelt's mission as personal delegate of US president in a lecture he was going to make in San Francisco. In the next secret meeting it was agreed that in case of earlier disclosure of operation plan or any unpredicted difficulty, the king should issue – to present the conditions of country critical – Zahedi's Prime Ministry command and escape to Baghdad. Lenczowski G. American presidents and the Middle East. Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press; 1990.

security and intelligence agency, SAVAK, as well as America's observer status in the Baghdad Pact.

Eisenhower held up the importance of the relationship in his memoir, "I consulted everyday with the authorities of Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence and central information organisation and saw our delegates' reports who actively worked with the Shah's followers." He added, "And in this way, US government did anything it could to support the Shah¹".

Economic assistance

In the run-up to nationalisation of oil industry, and during the crisis, the Iran economy stalled. Shipments of oil, for example to Japan and Italy, were blocked by the refusal of companies to provide tankers for shipment. From 1951 to 1953, Tehran sold three shipment, less than a half-day of production (Lenczowski, 1990).

The scale of the crisis was that, despite a US policy underpinned by economic assistance as "the reward of Iran's cooperation and... confirmation of Iran's political approach" (Bill, 1988, p160). Prime Minister Zahedi said the assistance was "not enough to help the Iranian government solve its economic problems": "Iran...needs economic help in order to be able to execute government's plans for development of agriculture and economy, exploitation of rich mineral resources, improvement of transportation and communication, development of domestic and foreign trades,

¹Such as ensuring the continuation of technical helps (23.4 million dollars) and granting immediate economic helps (45 million dollars).

and improvement of health, cultural and technical levels of Iranians" (Alexander, and Nanes, 1980, p. 381-3).

Eisenhower replied with an allocation of \$45 million in emergency assistance, writing:

There is an urgent need for immediate help in order to resituate a stabilized and fundamentally established condition for more economic development and improvement of living conditions of all Iranian people. It is hoped that Iran's domestic stability increases by our help which in turn will lead to the establishment of a healthy economy which can be facilitated and enhanced by efficient use of Iran's rich resource (Alexander, and Nanes, 1980, p. 381-3).

The allocation was followed by Vice President Richard Nixon's trip to Iran in December 1953 (Bill and Louis, 1988, p164) (*See Appendix 1: Fig 8&9*).

The most visible marker of the US presence was the re-constitution of the Iranian oil industry from 1954, with Deputy Secretary of State Herbert Hoover handling the negotiation of the new international consortium (Navazani, 2004, p.46) (Bill and Louis, 1988, p164). Contracts were signed with the consortium representative, the American Howard Pich, for exploration, exploitation, refining, and sales of oil and gas. Revenue was shared 50-50 between the Iranian Government and the consortium of Britain (40%); Royal Dutch Schell (14%); French Oil Company (6%); and the five American companies of Standard Oil New Jersey, Socony, Standard Oil California, Texaco, and, Gulf (8% each) (Lenczowski, 1990). The Majlis approved the contracts immediately. (Gasiorowski, 2000, p.114).

With the arrangements, an unprecedented number of American technical advisors came to Iran. By October 1953, there were 133, rising to 207 in January 1956. More than 300 staff, including 100

local employees, were involved in the Point 4 program for technical assistance by early 1956 (Navazani, 2004, p.46).

Security assistance

Meanwhile, the US tried to integrate Iran into a defence barrier against the Soviet Union. Washington supported Britain's formation of the Baghdad Pact of Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran in 1955. Although the US did not join the organisation because of political concerns over Israel, its officials were military and political observers. The US military summarized:

In order to achieve US military goals in Middle East, it is necessary that Zagross mountain natural defence barrier remains in the control of the allied forever because if we set aside Turkey, Iran is considered the most important country from geographical viewpoint because of having Zagros Mountains. Iran's presence in the regional defence organisation allows all member countries to enjoy Iran's western defence barrier and take advantage of it in application of logistic tools for the whole zone. If Iran takes part in a regional defence organisation which includes Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan, its relative importance in relation to other countries of the Middle East will increase significantly (Bill and Louis, 1988).

The Shah welcomed Iran's participation in the Pact, and Tehran formally acceded after the approval of the Majlis in October 1955.¹

¹ Baghdad pact consisted of an introduction, two interpretive letters and 8 articles and had been written in Arabic, Istanbul Turkish and English and consisted of the following articles:

- Cooperation of member countries in defence and security affairs.
- Prediction of establishment of executive bodies of covenant contents.
- Commitment for non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.
- Commitment regarding conformity of articles of covenant to international covenants and contracts.
- Permission of possibility of join of other countries to the covenant.
- Prediction of establishment of covenant permanent council with the presence of Ministries of member countries.
- Prediction of a 5-year period for the covenant with the possibility of its extension.
- Method of signing the covenant.

The US complemented the Pact with the expansion of military and security training, begun in the Truman years, inside Iran. The country's Gendarmerie, Police, and intelligence services were re-organised at the end of 1953 under the supervision of General Taymour Bakhtiar. The first mission of the new security apparatus was to guard against the perceived threats of the Tudeh Party, Islamic and national groups, and dissident military officers. US representatives offered full support (Gasiorowski, 2000, p115).

In December 1956, the Shah and his Government embarked on the creation of a national intelligence agency, SAVAK (*Sazmanei- Ittela'aaat va Amniyat-i Kishvar* --- Information and Security Agency of the Nation), which was given special powers by the Majlis. The CIA and the Israeli service Mossad offered guidance and training of officers. General Bakhtiar, now Military Governor of Tehran, was appointed as SAVAK's first head.

The Eisenhower Administration gave a positive answer to the Shah's request for equipping of Iran's armed forces, despite reluctance by the British (Goode, 1999, pp.293-296)¹. As a later National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, wrote, "During Shah's era, Iran was one of the best and most important friends of US and the most loyal government in the world. What seemed necessary was the supply of suitable weapons for Iran to allow it to perform guarding duties in Persian Gulf and generally to safeguard its military strength" (Lenczowski, 1990). The US invested \$240 million in the reconstruction of the Iranian armed forces from 1958 to 1960, including fighters and other aircraft, ships, tanks, trucks, artillery machine guns, communication

¹London hesitated that Iran could retard Russian's progress even when it was strengthened. The British sometimes had a degrading view compared to Americans which was based on their experience with Iranian military forces in 19th century and more recent than that, during the invasion of British and Russians in 1941, when the modern army of Reza Shah was defeated against the invaders. (Good; James F., 2003, p. 201)

and telecommunication equipment, and small weapons, and 30 days of armament for a reserve force. US military assistance increased from \$23 million dollars in 1956 to \$82 million in 1957 and \$104.9 million dollars in 1958. The number of military advisors rose from 403 in 1956 to 704 in 1960, and the number of Iranian trained in US military academies rose from 227 in 1956 to 947 in 1960¹ (Gasiorowski, 2000, p118-119).

Further economic aid was also allocated, with the World Bank approving a loan of \$75 million in January 1957 for number of projects associated with Iran's second seven-year Development Plan including agriculture, the transportation system, and social services. In December 1959, Eisenhower marked the relationship with the first trip to Iran, where he was "warmly welcomed by the Iranian people" in an "assurance of the two countries that their cooperation was useful both for themselves and the world".

The US and Iran in the Kennedy Years

John F. Kennedy's accession to the President in 1961 brought renewed hope for Americans, but for the Shah and the Iranian ruling elite, it brought uncertainty. On the surface, this uncertainty was met by an interaction in which Washington provided funding and political support for the broadest reform programme, the "White Revolution", in Iranian history. However, as the US aid encouraged and sometimes pressured the Shah into changes, the outcome was not a simple extension or strengthening of ties with the Americans; instead, this was a process in which Americanisation

¹ It shall be mentioned that the coup of 1958 in Iraq was one of the main reasons of increase of US military helps to Iran. At this time, what had been approved to be delivered to Iran was transferred with a higher speed and the amount of 28.6 million dollars which was supposed to be delivered to Iran as economic helps changed to military helps. Based on US recommendation, the quantity of Iran military force increased and military personnel increased to 37000 individuals.

occurred alongside the appearance of anti-American rhetoric. The dynamic of political and religious interactions in Iran would bring events associated with anti-Americanism such as the movement of 15th Khordad, the Anti -Capitulation Movement, the exile of Ayatullah Khomeini, and the development of the nascent Islamic Revolution.

Kennedy took office in a rapid period of change in the “developing world” throughout Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Socio-economic changes, the weakness of colonial systems, and socialist and nationalist movements brought independence and new forms of government and hence new challenges for the US relationship and policy towards the Soviet Union and other countries. The Kennedy Administration tried to meet these challenges with the promotion of “modernisation and development” that would improve US ties with emerging countries and deter opposing systems such as Communism (Lenczowski, 1990).

Iran had a central place in this American vision. The country’s post-1945 geopolitical position between the Soviet bloc and western systems had been magnified by its place in the Baghdad Pact and then the Central Treaty Organisation. Far from accepting that Iran was with the “West”, Soviet leader Khrushchev saw the prospect of Tehran joining the East bloc and a Moscow-led group, either through a Communist revolution or through a detente with the Shah. In a conversation with Walter Lippmann (1961, p.16), Khrushchev pointed out the poverty of people and corruption of the Shah’s government had prepared the groundwork for the occurrence of a communist revolution despite the weakness of Communist parties in Iran.

Kennedy's response built on the US guidance of NSC-5821/1 of November 1958:

As a lever, American plans can issue orders to the Shah, execution of which may establish political tranquillity. It is said that these reforming actions led to removal of corruption, establishment of real democratic institutes and decrease of militarism, progress of land reforms, and division of power with Musaddiq's followers (Alexander and Nanes, 1980, p 483).

From 1961 to 1963, there was a constant negotiation in which the Shah would test the limits of Washington's patience, trying to shape the reform programme to fit his interests and support his political base. He had to ensure US pressure did not go too far: Washington had threatened to establish communication with non-Communist opponents of the Shah's regime and support them, even discussing the possibility of an alternative government and regime change in the event of increased opposition by the Shah to the US plan (Alexander and Nanes, 1980, p 476).

Emphasizing military aid as the most important need of Iran, the Shah instructed General Bakhtiar, the head of SAVAK, in March 1961 to deliver a letter to Kennedy proposing discussions between officials. The monarch stressed the Soviet strategic threat and Iran's commitment to CENTO and asked for US military and economic assistance to be tailored to these priorities (Noring, 1995).

Kennedy was not prepared to accept this without amendment. He assured Bakhtiar on 1 March that the US recognised the primary threat of the Soviet Union and was monitoring the situation. However, he wanted Bakhtiar to tell the Shah that the US support would now focus more on social reforms rather than military build-up. The president reinforced this message by sending a special envoy, Averill Harriman, to Iran in mid-March.

The Shah was displeased with the American insistence on reforms and what he believed was their failure to appreciate the strategic position and military threats (Bill, 1988, pp.64-65). However, needing US aid, he could not maintain resistance. In June 1961 he appointed Ali Amini, the former

Iranian Ambassador in the US, as Prime Minister. He ordered study of comprehensive reform in November 1961, and he visited the US, meeting Kennedy and top US officials in April 1962. Still, the Shah maintained some autonomy as he replaced Amini with the monarch's close friend Asadollah Alam. Kennedy expressed his disappointment, but had to watch as the Shah pushed through the “Act of State and Provincial Associations” in October 1962. These associations were institutes established in each province and city to supervise administrative, social, public, and health affairs. The Americans could have their reforms while the Shah would maintain control of the process.

If the long and sometimes tense period of negotiations between Washington and Tehran had ended in an apparent resolution, the outcome had opened up other debates, tensions and challenges. The Shah's decisions and reform programs were not necessarily “pro-American”; instead, they exacerbated political and religious tensions inside Iran. Some religious figures considered the reform programmes and the Shah's actions as a US tactic for imposing Americanisation on Iranian society. They noted that that, in the Act of State and Provincial Associations, the word Islam was omitted from the requirements for administrative appointments and that elected bodies could take an oath on any holy book rather than the Qur'an¹. Moreover, women would be able to vote in Iranian elections.

Trying to reach a deal with the Americans, the Shah may have estimated that he would only meet little resistance or that he could prevent its emergence. Grand Ayatullah Boroujerdi, the senior

¹ These strange changes were made at a time when according to article 12 of the election act, the selected persons (except for religious minorities including Christian, Zoroastrian and Jewish) must be Muslim and must take an oath to the Holy Qur'an as per 11th principle of the constitutional law.

scholar in Iranian Shia Islam society, had opposed the draft legislation but had recently died. The National Council and Senate had been closed by the monarch, cutting off political resistance.

It was in this context of the US-Shah reforms and the resulting opposition that Ayatullah Khomeini emerged as a political and religious challenger. He did so initially from resistance based on Islamic values, but then he widened his challenge to larger political issues, such as the threat of US and Israel, that had penetrated the Iranian system.

The Rise of Khomeini as a Marja Opposing the Shah and the US

After the death of Grand Ayatullah Boroujerdi, who led the Houzah Elmieh Qom for 17 years and was the only Marja of Shia world, the Marjaiat was assigned to some of Boroujerdi's students, including Ayatullah Roohullah Khomeini.

The new Marjaiat positions provided Ayatullah Khomeini the opportunity to take three simultaneous actions.

Firstly, publicise and advertise his approach to Islam as a political religion. Secondly, using his position, pressure the system to both apply Islamic rules and principles to legislations and oppose the foreign control and interference in Iran. Thirdly, encourage people and especially the clergies to supervise and monitor Shah's policies and stated this supervision as their religious duty and responsibility.

Khomeini's approach was reinforced by his perception of Kennedy's reforms as US intervention in the domestic affairs of Iran and of the Shah's acceptance of these reforms as submissiveness. The Ayatullah believed that the reforms only resulted in the removal of Islamic values in place of the

domination of American values. Thus, opposition to the reforms was the religious duty of people, especially the clergy --- the first time that the challenge to the US had been framed in an Islamic context. Khomeini had moved from being an observer to an actor on Iran's political stage.

The catalyst for resistance was the Shah's proclamation of "State and Provincial Associations". Rejecting the "quietism" that had detached Shia clerics from politics, Khomeini called for confrontation of the Associations as the beginning of the gradual omission of Islam as the official religion of Iran and of the dominance of the US over Iranian politics, economy, and culture. He believed the Act would prepare the ground for the influence of foreigners, especially Bahai¹, as "US and Israel agents" upon politics, economy, and culture (Avery et al., 1986, p.305):

"I, based on my Islamic/Sharia duty, warn the Iranian nation and the Muslim world. The Qur'an and Islam are in danger. Independence of the country and its economy is under the control of the US and the Zionists that in Iran have appeared as the Baha'i cult" (Rouhani, 1979, p. 178).

Khomeini believed that the encouragement presence of women in the public arena, including through the right to vote, was trick to bring women out in society and westernise them. He asked, "In a country in which there is no open election anyway and the list of candidates is determined by The Government and SAVAK, how important will be the vote or attendance of women in parliaments?"² (Sahife Nour Vol 1, 1990, p.80). This was an American plan to give the false

¹ It should be mentioned that in the eyes of Islam and from the viewpoints of Iranian Islamic scholars, Bahaei faith is an unaccepted, deviated and politically made religion initially introduced by British and then supported by the Zionist lobby. At the moment, their most powerful base is in Israel.

² "On December the 6th 196, he expresses the reasons for his opposition and says that the clergymen have observed that the government has played with the official religion of the country. The clergymen see that the economic foundations of the country is on the verge of collapsing and the market/Bazaar is about to fall and the agriculture industry is in danger too. Yet with these wretched conditions, the government, rather than looking for solutions has made themselves and the people busy with unimportant issues (at this stage) such as the involvement and participation of the women in the election and other seductive expressions".

impression that the monarch and the government were democratic and popular (Rouhani, 1979, p. 144). He asserted:

“We do not disagree with women progress, we disagree with prostitution. We disagree with such wrong works. Is there any freedom for men in this country to extent it to women? Can women and men’s right be fulfilled by word?” (Sahife Nour Vol 1, 1990, p.80).

Khomeini’s challenge was now not only rhetorical; he was ready to pursue a political strategy of opposition to what he saw as Americanisation of the Iranian Society through clerics. Hence he invited senior Ayatullahs in Qom to assemble in the house of the son of Sheykh Abdolkarim Haeri, the founder of Qom Seminary School to discuss resistance to the Act.

The first step was for each of the Ayatullahs to send a message, to Prime Minister Asadollah Alam. Khomeini’s telegram set out an important principle: Shi’a followers should no longer be “quietist” but should protest over measures contrary to Islamic law, such as the proposed Associations. The Ayatullah personally went further in a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the government, refusing to address Alam as “Prime Minister”.

Ayatullah Khomeini supported the move with lectures, declarations and letters to municipal, political and religious leaders. When Alam condemned Khomeini’s and other religious authorities’ actions as the sabotage of a reactionary movement, Khomeini sent a telegram of objection to the Shah:

“It is obvious that you don’t want to pay any attention to the advices of Islamic scholars who advise people and help them. You think you are able to rise against the holy Qur’an, the constitutional law and public feelings” (Sahife Nour Vol 1, 1990, p.10).

On 13 November 1962, Alam appeared to concede, sending a telegram to three of the Qom Ayatullahs agreeing to their demands over the legislation. However, he returned Khomeini's snub by not including him amongst the recipients. The Ayatullah, contrary to the reaction of some religious scholars who thought the case had been closed and the problem resolved, also held that the government's act could not be revoked by a personal telegram and maintained that its cancellation should be officially declared by the government. Victory seemed to have been won when the act was formally withdrawn in December.

The Battle over Land Reform

The battle over the Associations was only a preliminary skirmish. For all three of the key actors, the Shah and the government, the US, and Khomeini's opposition, the more intense conflict would come over land reform.

For the Kennedy Administration, land reform was a vital component of both economic and social change to bolster a nation and avert the threat of communism. With the wider distribution of land amongst middle and lower classes, a broader political base of support for the ruling system would be established. The Majlis had approved a land reform act in 1960, but some MPs, who happened to be large landowners, altered the legislation to their benefits (*See Appendix 2: Fig 2*). Iranian farmers then protested that the measures were too limited, and implementation was halted as Ayatullah Boroujerdi declared that the reform was not being properly carried out.

After the death of Ayatullah Boroujerdi and one year after the failure of the State and Provincial Act, Agriculture Minister Hassan Arsanjani prepared legislation for the Shah who announced that

he would put forward six principles in regards to the land reforms. A few days later, the measures were approved in a referendum.

The execution of land reform appeared as a strategy by the Kennedy Administration to ensure the prevention of Communist revolutions. However, the reforms did not bring a significant change. Even though there had been a considerable redistribution of land, the amount received by individual farmers was not enough to meet most families' basic needs: "About 75 percent of the peasant owners [however] had less than 7 hectares, an amount generally insufficient for anything but subsistence agriculture" (Country-data.com., 2014). Large landowners were able to retain the best land with the best access to fresh water and irrigation facilities, while "only a small group of rural people experienced improvements in their welfare and poverty remained the lot of the majority" (Amid, 1990). As a consequence of continuing poverty and restricted production, many farmers migrated to the slum areas near cities to build a new life. This further reduced domestic agricultural products, opening space for import and consumption of foreign (i.e. American) agricultural and livestock products, which were made available to the public far more cheaply than the local products.

In the eyes of Khomeini, this reliance and dependency along with assured US economic and political benefit had been planned by the Kennedy Administration. He supported the allegation with a review of the agreement between the Iranian and American Governments for agricultural products:

"Iranian government agrees not to send or deliver to any other country the agricultural products purchased under the conditions of this agreement and to use it only for its domestic consumption unless specifically and officially based on complete and definite approval of American government and guarantees that purchase of such products by

Iran shall not lead to more availability of them or similar products to the countries which are not friends of America. The two governments guarantee that purchase and sales of aforesaid products based on the present agreement shall not unreasonably change worldwide prices of agricultural products and cause any damage to American share in the global market or any disturbance to natural and common patterns of commercial transaction with the countries that are friends to America” (Alexander and Nanes, 1980, p511).

Khomeini’s Position against the White Revolution and the Referendum

The Ayatullah started his open challenge to the regime even before the approval of the land reform plan in a declaration on January 22, 1963. He called the Shah’s referendum “the American, compulsory referendum”, said it was contrary to the Constitutional law and Islamic order, and called for a boycott:

“In my opinion, referendum that has been called as national approval just because of some minor corrections is in disagreement with the opinion of society, the clergy and majority of people. I refer to some of its shortcomings:

- 1. No referendum has been predicted in Iranian laws.*
- 2. It is not clear which authority is competent to hold it and this is an issued which should be determined by law.*
- 3. The six acts are ambiguous and the time between their announcement until establishment of referendum is very short and people have no time to think about it.*
- 4. Majority of Iranian people cannot distinguish these principles.*
- 5. Voting shall be performed in an open environment and it is not possible in Iran.*

At last, it seems that such compulsory referendum is an introduction for removing the materials related to religion. Islamic scientists has felt danger after the previous actions of government regarding the elections of State and Provincial Associations for Islam, Quran and the country and it seems that they intend to execute the same meanings that the enemies of Islam intend to execute through the naive and tricked people” (Madani, 2015,p.13-14).

Khomeini's objection was supported by people through closure of Tehran's bazaar and a number of demonstrations in Qom and in Tehran, particularly by the students of Tehran University. The demonstrations were confronted by police and led to injuries and arrests. In reaction to the Ayatullah's move, the Shah travelled to Qom, two days before the referendum, to convince leading clerics over the issue. He was not appropriately welcomed by the clerics due to Imam Khomeini's boycott, so he openly abused them in his lecture in Qom, accusing them of being affiliates to foreigners¹, especially Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser (Madani, 2015, p.17).

Despite the protests, the referendum on the White Revolution was approved on January 26, 1963.

² Kennedy sent a message of congratulations to the Shah, "It is well evident that this national support has strengthened the trust of Yours Majesty to the correctness of the way you have chosen" (Rouhani, 1979, p. 271). Others were not as welcoming. Former US official Richard Kattem wrote to The New York Times, "The Shah's referendum was neither free nor it is considered a victory for democracy" (Rubin, 1984, p. 96). A French historian wrote:

"The futility of the result of the referendum, 99.9% Yes, became evident when a few months later demonstrations began in the streets and this time a group of clergies took position against the regime. Ayatullah Khomeini led the demonstrations and addressed the Shah directly with a harsh tone from his residence In Qom" (Delannoy, 1991, p. 91).

One day after the referendum, which had been held at the start of Ramadan, Ayatullah Khomeini proposed the closure of Ramadan-specific programs. Although the strike was broken after a few

¹ Gamal Abdel Nasser was the second President of Egypt from 1956 until his death. Along with Muhammad Naguib, the first President, he led the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 which overthrew the monarchy of Egypt and Sudan.

² It should be mentioned that immediately after the referendum, government announced that the Shah's six proposed acts had been approved by people with 5,600,000 Yes votes.

days by some individuals, the closure demonstrated the level of unity and integration of the clergy and people as well as the leadership power of Khomeini (Zanjani, 1991, pp.452-3).

On March 14, 1963, in a lecture at Vahdati Military base in Dezful, the Shah spoke critically about religious authorities and Islamic clerics and warned them of an imminent suppression. On the same day, Ayatullah Khomeini issued a declaration in which he declared Nowruz 1342 (March 1963) as one for public mourning (Zanjani, 1991, pp.452-3). These statements ushered in a wave of new restrictions, torture, prison, and banishment against the clergy throughout the country, which in turn led to more severe confrontations between the Shah and Khomeini.

Chapter 7

The Confrontation with the Shah and the Rise of Khomeinism

1963- 1964

After 1953, Iran-US relationship was very smooth, with having a complex relationship which was positive and close.

For Ayatullah Khomeini, the result of the strategic relations between Iran and the US was nothing but an increase in US hegemony and weakening of Iran's economy, culture and Islamic values. In these years, the series of disappointing incidents that had been happening made it clear that Pahlavi's regime is an illegitimate monarchy supported by the US.

Hence Ayatullah Khomeini position was moved from the status of a simple observer of the incidents and the country's situation towards an actor who is actively engaged with the events encouraging the masses of society to stand against the regime.

This shift began in 1961 with a series of criticism made by Khomeini regarding the White Revolution. But Shah disregard of these criticism and suppression of religious uprising of June the 5th increased the gap between Shah and Ayatullah Khomeini or more accurately the gap between politics and religion. And ultimately the approval of Capitulation and the exile of Ayatullah Khomeini minimised the possibility of reconciliation between politics and religion.

The Uprising of June 5, 1963 (15 Khordad)

For Ayatullah Khomeini, the uprising of 5 June 1963 (15 Khordad) was one of the most important events, both in politics and in symbolism, leading to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It marked the public rise of an opposition movement led by Khomeini, as the state's reaction, with the killing of numerous people and jailing of many others, signalled an escalation in the confrontation between the Shah and the Ayatullah. It changed the nature of the opposition from a small-scale political movement, carried out by intellectuals including Islamic scholars into a widespread religious

opposition embedded within the different layers of the Iranian society and centred on the Islamic clergymen.

For Khomeini, the 5th of June was the beginning of the Revolution. His hope that the Shah would accept criticism and alter his domestic and foreign policies was abandoned; returning to the peaceful and constructive dialogue with the monarch was no longer possible.

With a glance at the collection of declarations of Ayatullah Khomeini which mentioned the June 5th 58 times¹, it can be seen the event provided the political and social grounds and the mental and cultural foundations of revolution rather than reform.

The last couplet of Khomeini's popular sonnet "Waiting" proclaims, "The days pass, the accidents come, I am waiting for Faraj (relief) from the half of Khordad (5th of June)." (*Imam's Poems*, 2009, p.154) The constitutional law of Islamic Republic of Iran (1979) enshrines the event:

"Imam Khomeini's firm objection to the American conspiracy of "White Revolution" which was a step towards stabilization of dictatorship government and strengthening of Iran's political, cultural and economic dependencies towards American global dictatorship led to the united movement of people. Consequently, the great revolution of Islamic people in June 1963, which was the starting point of prosperity of this extensive and splendid rise, stabilised Imam's centrality as an Islamic leader."

The uprising caused four notable shifts in the political- social atmosphere of Iran:

1. The opposition to the Shah expanded from the elite level to the public level while adding added religious motivation to political objections.
2. The opposition to the Shah was embodied as opposition to the US and Israel as well.

¹ Sahifeh-e-Nour software was used for preparation of these statistics.

3. Islamic clergymen led by Ayatullah Khomeini became the centre of the opposition movement against the Shah and the US.
4. Khomeini's approach shifted from reform to revolution.

The Antecedents

The opposition of Ayatullah Khomeini to the Shah's referendum, the announcement of public mourning and boycott of Norouz Feasts, and the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Jafar Sadeqh¹ prompted people throughout Iran to travel to Qom to start the New Year in March 1963 (Rouhani, 1979, p.315). Khomeini issued a new statement about American threats and requesting dismissal of the Government while warning the Shah of consequences of inappropriate actions. Tehran's religious authorities followed Ayatullah Khomeini and announced Norouz as a public mourning in which people should raise black flags in front of their houses and shops (Rouhani, 1979, p.329).

The first signs of serious confrontations between the Shah regime and the people, and in particular the cleric, came on March 22 in a commemoration ceremony for Imam Sadeqh's martyrdom, held by Ayatullah Golpaygani at the Feyziyeh Islamic School. As people protested the Shah and his policies, the school was stormed by security forces, who killed and injured a number of students and burned their books and personal belongings, including Holy Qurans and prayer texts (Madani, 2010, p.24). It was the first time that regime units attacked people gathering in a mosque and a religious school.

¹ Imam Jafar Sadeqh is the 6th Imam of Twelver Shia Muslims. Imam Sadeqh was martyred by the caliph of his time in 25th Shavval 148 A.H (Arabic calendar).

For the first time the Ayatullah's response set out direct opposition to the Shah and at the regime. In a detailed letter to clergymen throughout the country, he invited them to an open campaign against the monarch. He requested them to use the holy month of Muharram to fearlessly disclose the injustices of Shah's regime and America: "I am determined not to stop until I punish this corrupt system. You Islamic scholars be determined (for campaign) and know that you will achieve victory" (Sahife Nour Vol 1, 1990, pp. 82-4). The Ayatullah furthered his political campaign by issuing a second message, this time to the whole nation on the occasion of 40th day of the martyrs of Fayziyeh. He suggested that the Maraje'¹ and the Islamic scholars disclose the wrong actions of the regime by giving lectures in the mourning ceremonies and that people concentrate their most severe rhetoric against the Shah, America, and Israel.

The Shah reacted to Khomeini's message in a lecture on May 18, 1963 in which he threatened to take more severe measures and to arrest all Islamic scholars involved in protest movements. He said, "If it is necessary to smear the great revolution (of Shah and people) with the blood of some innocent people (governmental officers) and some unfortunate and deceived people (protestors), this is something that will be inevitably done" (Rouhani, 2003, p.426). Aware of the specific importance of Muharram², the SAVAK intelligence service attempted to prevent demonstrations by warning some of the religious orators that they must observe three points in their speeches:

¹ A Marja' is a senior Ayatullah with permission to issue religious rulings (fatwas)

² Muharram is the start of the Islamic New Year and the beginning of 2 month mourning period for Shia Muslims. It is the month in which Imam Hussain (the grandson of Prophet Mohammad and the Shia's third Imam) along with his family and companions fought against a large army of Yazid (the caliph of the time) and were brutally killed and beheaded and their women and children were taken captives. For Shia Muslims, The movement and bravery of Imam Hussain and his companions has always been an example of fighting against oppressions. The first 10 days of Moharram is specifically important as there are wide spread commemoration and mourning ceremonies throughout the shia world.

1. Not to say anything against the Shah.
2. Not to say anything about America and Israel or anything related to the relationship between the Shah and them.
3. Not to say that Islam and Quran are in danger and not to consider Shah's Regime as a regime against Islam.

Khomeini replied with a fatwa (religious order): "These obligations (requirements set by SAVAK) have no legal value and the rulers (requesters) are guilty and should be prosecuted. Silence in these days is the same as approving oppressive system and assisting Islam's enemies"(Kawthar Vol I, 2002, p.84).

This provocative fatwa was followed by Khomeini's controversial speech on the religious day of Ashura¹, June 3, 1963, in which he openly challenged the Shah, US, and Israel and referred to them as the enemies of Islam. In his speech at Fayzieh School in the afternoon, Khomeini compared the Shah with the evil Yazid² and the attack of the Shah's forces at Fayziyeh to the massacre at Karbala. He said the Fayzieh tragedy was the result of American and Israeli stimulation, called the Shah's regime a US puppet, and challenged the White Revolution once again:

They don't want Islam to rule over this country. They destructed Fayziyeh School by their agents, they suppress us, they suppress you nation... so that Israel may achieve its interests. Iranian government follows Israel's intentions and plans and has insulted us and is still insulting us (Rouhani, 2003, pp.91-4).

¹Ashura is the tenth of Muharram on which Imam Hussain and his companions were martyred

² Yazid was the corrupt Caliph of the time whose army fought Imam Hussain in Karbala.

He referred to SAVAK's warning to the clergy:

All our problems and differences are lies in these three issues...even if we do not say that Islam is in danger, does it mean that it is not in danger?! Or if we do not say that Shah is so and so, does it mean he is not so...?! Or even if we do not say that America and Israel are dangerous for Islam and Muslims, does it mean they are not dangerous?!(They are dangerous whether we say it or not) And basically, which relationship is there between Shah and Israel that National Security Organisation (SAVAK) orders not to talk about the Shah or Israel? Is Shah an Israeli agent in the eyes of the National Security Organisation? (Rouhani, 2003, pp.426).

He concluded:

"I advise you Sir, Mr. Shah, I advise you. Stop doing such works. You are being fooled. I don't want that if one day they want you to go, everyone thanks God. I hope to God that by black reactionaries you don't mean the (Islamic) scholars, otherwise, our duty becomes heavier and your jobs becomes harder. You won't be able to live. People won't let you live. Don't do that. Accept my advice. Don't do that. Listen to me. Listen to the clergymen. Are Islamic laws reactions? Are they black reactions? Did you make a white revolution? Did you establish a white revolution? Why do you mislead people? I swear by God that America and Israel will not be helpful to you. Quran will be helpful to you (Rouhani, 2003, pp.426).

A day later, the Shah ordered the arrest and imprisonment of the Ayatullah (Mazandi, 2004, pp. 451-58). Commandos and other security forces surrounded the city of Qom on the night of June 5, 1963 and seized Khomeini in the early hours of morning, imprisoning him in Ghasr garrison in Tehran (Iichs.org, 2014). (See Appendix 2: Fig 3)

The imprisonment of Khomeini risked an escalation of opposition. On 4 June, in Masjed Shah, the largest mosque in Tehran and located in the oldest part of the city near the Bazaar, the crowd shouted, "Khomeini, you are Imam Hossein's child" and "We don't want an American Government". Demonstrators then moved towards the British Embassy. The detention of the Ayatullah brought more protests, led by religious groups, in cities such as Tehran, Ghom, Shiraz,

Esfahan, Tabriz, and Varamin (Khalaji, 2002). For the first time, the opposition had expanded beyond Islamic seminaries, universities, and educated sections of Iranian society to all layers and social classes, including national and secular political groups.

During the protests of 5 June, security forces killed farmers of Varamin who had worn shrouding and come to Tehran to support the Ayatullah. Afterwards, 36 religious scholars from Qom and other religious cities cancelled their lessons and travelled to Tehran in protest, issuing a joint statement that declared Khomeini as one of the most important Shia authorities and scholars. The Freedom Movement published a statement titled "Dictator Sheds Blood", written by Ayatullah Taleghani. Not only Shia scholars in Najaf but also some Sunni scholars such as Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltout, the head of Al Azhar University in Egypt, supported Khomeini.

The regime held firm. Prime Minister Asadollah Alam reacted in a newspaper interview on 7 June, in which he threatened to put the Ayatullah and other religious figures on trial in military courts and threatened death sentences. The tough stance of the Prime Minister was supplemented by the Shah's speech two days later where he claimed Khomeini's declarations and people's demonstrations were the result of stimulation and money from foreigners. On 2 August, after two month of detention in a military garrison, Khomeini was transferred to a house in the north of Tehran and put under surveillance. Newspapers claimed:

"According to the official information received from State Information & Security Organisation, since an agreement was reached between security authorities and Mr. Khomeini, Mr. Qomi, and Mr. Mahallati to the effect that they would not interfere in political affairs of the country and it has been fully ensured from this agreement that the mentioned-names would not take any measure against the interests and disciplines of the country. Therefore, they were transferred to private houses (Rajabi, 1998, p. 201).

Claiming that 5 June was merely the act of insurgents rather than a political movement led by Ayatullah Khomeini, the regime tried a group of people who took part in the opposition campaign and executed some of them¹.

Believing that it had quelled the uprising, the regime then claimed an easing of the situation. Khomeini was allowed to return to Qom, provided he was not welcomed by anyone or by any demonstrations. Prime Minister Hassanali Mansour praised Islam as one of the most advanced and outstanding religions of the world and emphasised the Shah's special kindness and affection towards clergymen. Ettelaat newspaper² published an article, "White Revolution of the Shah and America": "It is excellent that now the clergymen in line with the nation are executing the plans for the 'Revolution of Shah and the People'".

Khomeini would not be silenced. Reacting to the Ettelaat article, he said:

"Khomeini will never agree even if he is hanged...I am not like those mullahs to sit in a place and take a rosary in my hands. I am not the Pope to perform a ceremony only on Sundays and to spend the rest of the time as a Shah and don't deal with any other affairs. We should save this country from the problems" (Sahife Nour Vol 1, 1990, pp. 98-101).

The Capitulation Issue and Redefining "Americanisation"

It was Ayatullah Khomeini's position on Capitulation³, leading to his exile that transformed Iranians' campaign against the Shah and the US. While capitulation had a long history in Iran, it

¹ For example two fruit wholesalers of Tehran named Teyeb Haj Rezaei and Haj Esmaeil Rezaei who were the followers of Imam Khomeini (NOV 2, 1963) as the main agents behind the unrest!

²One of the two important Iranian newspapers.

³ The act of judiciary immunity of American Citizens in Iran.

was only in 1963 that a foreign government tried to remove the possibility of prosecution of its forces in the country, establishing a right of immunity for its citizens unilaterally.

In the political culture of Iran, emotional and symbolic causes play a fundamental role in formation of social activism, as in the Tobacco Movement and Constitution Movement. In the case of capitulation, the claim of the Shah's oppression was tied to the domination of American values for weakening and destroying national and Islamic values. Recognising capitulation's symbolic and emotional appeal, Khomeini interpreted it as an act contrary to the independence of Iran, the Constitution, Islamic law, and human rights. By linking capitulation with colonisation, he claimed that the only way to independence and freedom of Iran, saving Islamic values and culture, was to oppose and stand against the Shah, US domination, and American culture and values. From this time onward, Khomeini --- with increasing influence in Iranian society --- the US was defined as the number one enemy of Iran and the Shah was presented as an American puppet.

Capitulation Development in Iran

The record of capitulation¹ in Iran goes back to the Safavid era when specific regulations were observed on an unofficial basis for European businessmen and citizens, and only Muslims subjected to a judgment taken from the nature of the Holy Quran's orders. After the Iranian defeat at the hands of Russia and the conclusion of the Torkamanchai Treaty in 1828, the practice was extended as Moscow imposed oppressive conditions. Most Qajar princes and many Iranian

¹The word Capitulation is rooted in Latin language (Capitulare) which means to stipulate a condition for compromise and surrender, to leave a war zone or to surrender a part of military force to the enemy. In its legal sense, it includes contracts based on which the citizens of a country in the territory of another government are subject to the rules of their own country and enjoy consular judgment right. Formation of capitulation goes back to 4th and 6th centuries. In Byzants, citizens of some of the developed cities the then Italy such as GEN and PIZZA had considered specific privileges.

businessmen changed their citizenship to claimed judiciary and legal immunity of Russian citizens¹. It was only with changes in the international system, as most countries cancelled capitulation, that the concept was challenged.² In Iran, opposition emerged with the formation of a modern legal system³, and the measure was cancelled during Reza Shah's era.⁴

¹The right of consular judgment had a mutual nature between Iran and other governments until the conclusion of Torkamanchai treaty, but the principle of mutual action was omitted by Christian governments after this treaty. Torkamanchai treaty attached a part of Iranian territory to Russian territory while confirming and emphasizing on the articles inserted in Golestan treaty. Iran was deprived of shipping right in the Caspian Sea and Russia obtained the exclusive right of establishment of consulate in the north cities of Iran. it was also decided that in case Russian citizens committed any crime in Iran, the consulate of that country would then determine punishment for the offenders as per rules and customs of his country. This right which was called Capitulation was also granted to other European countries as well as USA in 19th century based on the condition of "Quite Friend Governments". In this way, Iran lost a part of its power.

²The first country that unilaterally cancelled capitulation was Japan in 1899. After that other countries took a similar action. Cancellation of capitulation arose to a high extent from changes in international conditions and system because the 14 principles of Wilson, US president, at the end of First World War, guarantee of security and independence of all ruled countries by America and Russia after the Second World War and formation of independence-see Shah aspects in the ruled countries had caused the continuation of capitulation policy by west governments practically impossible .

³ Since 1923, i.e., since the 5th Majlis, capitulation issue was formed seriously in Iranian political gatherings and in 1927 it was almost cancelled. One of the representatives of Majlis, Mr. Aliakbar Khan Davar, who was a graduate of law from Geneva and was familiar with legal affairs, took important steps towards cancellation of capitulation. To do this, at first he made some negotiations with Shiite religious authorities in Ghom and reminded that one of the reasons of establishment and durability of capitulation in Iran was the existence of modern rules and courts. After an agreement was made between them, it was decided to regulate a set of rules not to be on the contrary to religious law. It was also decided to take an approach to have a relative relation and coordination with legal issues and set of European rules. These measures feel effective so that since 1927 capitulation was practically removed in Iran. (National Consultative Assembly unilaterally cancelled it on May 1927 in Mostoufi Almamalek's cabinet and the particulars were notified to foreign political representations in Iran. This measure faced severe reactions by some of the countries including Spain. France was the first country that accepted Iranian government's decision. Other west governments were gradually forced to accept this decision.)

⁴It shall be mentioned that the order of cancellation was only superficial by relying on the documents that ".... Some notifications were sent by the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs [The ministry of foreign affairs during Reza Shah's era] to some European embassies including Britain, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, etc in which the specific rights and political, economic and judiciary privileges of their countries were esteemed. Such letters and agreements which were prepared and made at the request of plenipotentiary ministers of some of European countries to maintain their credibility as well as judiciary freedoms of their citizens in Iran showed that by announcement of capitulation cancellation Reza Khan's goal was merely to promote his anti-colonization feature in the then Iran through the assistance of the press and media. For example, on MAY 9, 1928 in which all treaties guarantying foreigners' privileges in Iran were announced null and void, Ministry of foreign affairs sent a letter to Robert Henry Clive, the British plenipotentiary minister in Tehran, and assured his government of British citizens' freedom in Iran just as before. This letter was sent for the plenipotentiary minister of that country in Tehran consisting of 18 articles including the commitment of Iranian judiciary system for preservation of rights, authorities and possessions of British citizens (the documents of Iran's mutual treaties with other governments; 3rd Vol.; P. 273, Doc. 108). In the same day, Iranian ministry of foreign affairs sent another letter to British plenipotentiary minister and guaranteed free religious activities of British missionaries as well (the documents of Iran's mutual treaties with other governments; 3rd Vol.; P. 273, Doc. 111). Such letters were sent for US embassy on May 13 & 15 (the documents of Iran's mutual treaties with other

Re-Approving Capitulation

Capitulation had become an issue for the US military with the involvement of its forces in World War II and their stay in countries after the end of the conflict. At the time when US forces were settled in Europe and Asia, “the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) approved the first commitment of peace time for continuous settlement of American military forces outside their continent and subsequently set forth the legal condition of American soldiers outside that country” (Assadullahi, 1994, p.41).

The first group of American forces entered Iran in December 1942 with judicial immunities as a Military Mission during the Prime Ministry of Ghavamolsaltaneh¹. These privileges were limited and small in scope. In a lot of cases they were informal, an informality that was considered inadequate almost 20 years later by American officials. In 1960, Deputy Defence Secretary Benjamin Forman declared in a report that no official agreement was in force over the situation of American advisors in the Iranian armed forces and gendarmerie (Asadullahi, 1994, p.43).

In 1961, soon after the approval of the Land Reform Bill, Kennedy sent a diplomatic note to the Iranian Government requesting action (Muslim Students Follower of the Imam’s line, 1980, p.3).

This was followed by a formal missive from the US Ambassador on 19 March 1962:

“The existing arrangements do not adequately cover the question of the status of the United State Advisory Mission Personnel in Iran. To rectify the problem,

governments; 2nd Vol.; P. 12, Docs. 5 & 9) and for German plenipotentiary minister in Tehran on May 14. In the next steps, other separate treaties were signed with France, Sweden, Denmark and other powerful countries of the then Europe with the goal of re-establishment of capitulation regulations.

¹ Other contracts were also signed during Soheili’s government in the field of employment of American advisors under the pretext of reforming army’s administrative system each of which encompassed specific privileges for the American families and dependents. But the peak of these privileges goes back to the times of Hassanali Mansour and Amir Assadollah Alam’s prime ministry. (website of the institute for political studies and researches, JAN 7, 1970, capitulation article)

it is suggested such personnel shall have the privileges and immunities specified for members of the administrative and technical staff in the Convention of the United Nations Conference on Diplomatic intercourse and Immunities signed at Vienna April 18, 1961”(Asadullahi, 1994, p.47).

There was no answer to this request of US government from the Iranian side until March 1963, after the Shah’s visit America and his replacement of Prime Minister Ali Amini with Amir Asadollah Alam. The Iranian Foreign Ministry stated:

“For high-ranked members of advisory board who have political passports, it is agreed that the mentioned names are provided with a political status so that they may enjoy the concerned immunities and privileges. For the rest of the personnel of US advisory boards, the case is being reviewed so that they may be provided with more facilities and privileges” (Asadullahi, 1994, p.47).

Movement on the issue was suspended during the 5 June 1963 protests, but in October the bill was approved by the Alam Government.

The Shah covered himself with yet another change of Prime Minister, bringing in the pro-American Hassanali Mansour, and overcame some resistance in the Majlis. The bill was approved by the Senate in July 1964 and by the National Assembly in October. Eleven days later, the regime received a \$200 million loan from an American bank, guaranteed by the US Government, for arms purchases (*See Appendix 2: Fig 4*).

Khomeini’s Opposition to Capitulation

In his historical survey, James Bill (1988, p.160) writes:

“Capitulation was a deadly mistake which jeopardized US interests. This inept and ugly action was a sign of the cruel and foolish approach of imperialism. Although capitulation was mostly a deal applicable to US troops serving overseas, the Iranian version of the deal had given exceptional permits to the US Government to apply its own judicial rules in all cases related to its military and

non-military personnel. This form of capitulation deal signed by the Iranian and US officials was something unprecedented among the world countries, except West Germany, as it neutralised and voided any form of Iranian supervision on the increasing number of US groups based in Iran.”

Through 1964, there had been protests by some nationalist and left-leaning parliamentarians, which had brought the withdrawal of the bill for a short time. Political and intellectual elite, including Dr. Mozaffar Baghaili Kermani, the head of a leftist party and former MP¹, called the legislation far more humiliating and degrading than the 1828 Torkmanchaii treaty and a clear indication of the hegemony of imperialism in Iran (Pezeshkazar, 2008, pp.155-157).

However, this opposition failed to mobilise the Iranian public on the issue. A different language and analysis was needed for mass attention. Ayatullah Khomeini met that need with a skilful combination of politics, religion, and society. He managed to bring the opposition from the elite into the masses and changed the rhetoric of campaigns into a religious movement connected with the people. He also shifted the scene of struggle from an anti-Shah campaign to a resistance to the US Government.

A few days after the passage of the bill, Khomeini met leading scholars in Qom and launched his opposition. The Shah sent an envoy to dissuade the Ayatullah, appealing to him not to distract from ceremonies marking the monarch's birthday, “If Ayatullah Khomeini wants to make a speech, he should be careful not to run into conflict with the US Government because this will prompt their immediate and severe reaction” (Rouhani, 1979, p.711).

¹He entered the 15th parliament as an MP representing this party from the city of Kerman (south of Iran) in 1947.

Khomeini not only refused; he delivered a well-crafted speech of resistance. There was an academic structure to the address, with an introduction, exposition, and a conclusion, but there were also emotional themes woven into the speech alongside logical reasoning.¹

At the beginning of his speech, Khomeini recited the Ayat, (انا لله وانا اليه راجعون), delivered usually when someone dies, to show the enormous disaster which befallen the Islamic society. Expressing his heartfelt grief over the issue, Imam Khomeini announced a national mourning. He then noted that Shah's regime has tried to keep the nation in the dark over the “treason”: "In the parliament they said let's not draw the curtains. It's clear that they have hatched plans for us. Is there anything worse? What's worse than captivity? What are they up to?"

After these introductory remarks, Ayatullah Khomeini justified his opposition to the bill with four reasons:

1. Contradiction the Islamic principles:

The bill, bestowing immunity to US soldiers from Iran's judiciary, was a form of capitulation which clearly runs counter to the Islamic laws, especially the principle of Nafye-Sabil (No Way) which had been delineated in verse 141 of Surah Nisa of the Holy Qur'an². The principle had been invoked on several occasions in Iranian history, notably the protests against the Tobacco Concession. Ayatullah Khomeini said, "One of the important political principles clarified in Quran is that Muslims should never be dominated by Non-believers. The God al-mighty has not allowed the

¹ For Full speech, visit: <http://www2.irib.ir/worldservice/imam/speech/16.htm>

²“ And never will Allah give the disbelievers over the believers a way [to overcome them], Quran 4:141.

non-believers' dominance over the Muslims and Muslims should never acquiesce to such a domination” (Sahife Nour Vol 16, 1990, p.37).

2. Contradiction with the Constitution

Khomeini said the bill violated Iran's national constitution since, according to Article Two; Parliament's bills have no validity until they were confirmed by prominent clerics:

“We do not consider this so called law [that has been ratified by the Parliament] as a law. This Majlis has nothing to do with the nation. The Iranian nation has not voted for these parliamentarians who have been working in a Majlis that is illegal and criminal and which has been abandoned by high clergies and sources of jurisprudence. Many high ranking clergies had boycotted the parliamentary elections and the nation followed their suit” (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p. 149-153).

3. Contradiction with National Pride and Dignity

Khomeini argued:

“All the American military advisors and their families, their technicians, their staff workers, their servants and even their cooks are immune to any prosecution for any type of crime that they commit. This means if an American servant or cook kills your source of jurisprudence in the middle of Bazaar in broad day light or runs him over or beats him, the Iranian police have no right to stop that American and the Iranian courts have no right to prosecute him or her. In any likely case, the case of that American must be sent to US courts for the masters [in a reference to the trend of events that had demonstrated the Americans as masters and Iranians as slaves] to decide. They [the lawmakers] have even brought the dignity of Iranians even below an American dog since if somebody runs an American dog over with a car, that person must be prosecuted, even if that person is the Shah himself but if an American cook runs the Shah or the highest Iranian authority over with a car, nobody has the right to approach that cook” (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p. 149-153).

4. Contradiction with National Sovereignty and Independence

Explaining the reasons behind the ratification of the bill despite all the contradictions, Ayatullah Khomeini said the Americans had set the ratification of the bill as a precondition for granting a loan to the Shah's army, furthering the Iranian military's dependence on the United States and undermining Iran's independence and national sovereignty:

“Shamelessly, the government supported this humiliating issue [the ratification of the bill]. Why? Because they wanted a loan to compensate for their military spending and after a few days, they passed a request to the US government for a loan of 200 million dollars and agreed to pay back 300 million dollars in a 10 years time. This means that the US government is getting 100 million dollars worth of profit from the Iranian nation. However, despite all these facts, the [Shah's] government sold itself and Iran's independence for these dollars, brought us on the list of colonized countries and introduced the Muslim Iranian nation as a wild and lagging country to the world. So, please don't sell yourselves to this extend. But of course you [the Shah's Government] will benefit the dollars and the Iranian nation must pay and serve for it” (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p. 149-153).

Addressing the Shah, Ayatullah Khomeini said, “What benefit do the US military advisors have for you? If Iran is under the US occupation, please officially announce it and then throw us out of this country.”

Khomeini had set out that the US was the main enemy of the Iranian nation and the source of all the difficulties this nation is facing. He also had set out that the clergy, as the most important social entity, could secure Iran's freedom and independence and lead the campaign against American hegemony in Iran and the world.

“Is it because we [the Iranian nation] are a weak nation without many dollars that we have to undergo the US' rule? The US President must know that he is among the most hated people before the Iranian nation for oppressing us to this extend. Today the holy Quran and the Iranian nation are against him [the US

president]. The US government must know that it is much hated in Iran. Today, the source of all our problems is the US. Even Israel is part of the US. Our lawmakers are the US agents. Our ministers and cabinet are US agents. If they [the cabinet and lawmakers] are not US agents, then why don't they stand against it and expose it?" (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p. 149-153).

He then invoked the authority of clerics:

"If the clerics had a presence in the Majlis, they would not have allowed the parliament which is an agent of the US to take such an insolent measure. The agents of the US [and the enemies] have clearly understood that if the clergy gains influence, it would not allow for the Iranian nation to become slaves to the US and Britain. They would not allow Israel to control our economy and would not allow Israeli commodities to enter and be sold in Iran. They [the clergy] would have not allowed the government and Majlis to arbitrarily impose such a debt on Iran. They would have not allowed the looting of the public wealth. They would not have allowed the government to do whatever it pleases and would not have allowed an undemocratic parliament be imposed on the nation" (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p. 149-153).

After the speech, Khomeini issued a statement that condemned the Government and Majlis for the ratification of "the document for the slavery of the Iranian nation, a confession to Iran being a colonized country and the worst insult on the Iranian nation by a government that has no dignity".

He continued:

"I hereby announce that this shameful act by the Majlis runs counter to Islamic and Quranic teachings and has no credibility. Their [the lawmakers'] vote has no value before Islam, the holy Quran and the Iranian nation and if the foreigners are seeking to misuse this law, then the Iranian nation would know what to do. It is up to the Iranian nation to rip these chains [of slavery]. It is up to the armed forces not to allow such disgraceful events to occur in this country. It is up to them to bring down this government and discharge those lawmakers that have voted for this shameful bill. It is up to clergy school students and teachers to call on high-ranking clerics to break their silence on this regard. It is up to university students to strongly oppose this disgraceful bill. It is up to the Iranian students studying abroad no to remain silent towards this issue that is

threatening the reputation and religion of the Iranian nation” (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p. 149-153).

Khomeini's speech and statement were widely published and distributed on the night of 27 October, 1964. Many of the flyers were thrown into the houses of Americans residing in Tehran. However, senior religious scholars in Iran and Iraq maintained complete silence until nine days later. They showed no desire for any confrontation with the Shah and a Mansour Government that had announced it was “coming to an understanding with the clergy.

The famed Iranian writer Jalal Ale-Ahmad evaluated, "The indifference and incuriosity of the clergy elite towards Ayatullah Khomeini, the leading cleric of the time, was so harsh that even the main cleric bodies refrained from joining him....It seems that it has always been like this in Iran meaning that every time someone finally rises against the stagnation, indifference and silence that has been dominating the peoples' minds as well as our institutions, that person is executed, banished, and sent into exile” (Ale Ahmad, 1978, p. 57).

Chapter 8

Preparing For a Revolution

By 1964, Khomeinism had replaced the idea of reform with that of revolution. The bases of that approach were the Shah's tyranny, his submission to US policies, and suppression of the opposition, especially religious leaders. However, to develop the idea, Khomeini had to pursue three simultaneous actions.

First, the Ayatullah needs to establish that revolution was based on an ideology of Islamic values, since he believed that a nationalist ideology was not capable of sustaining an uprising.

Second, he had to take advantage of developments, especially the outcomes of the Shah's initiatives based on his strategic relationship with the US, to present long-term negative consequences from the Iranian system. Third and most importantly, he had to establish his leadership, even as he was in exile.

Khomeini in Exile and the “Golden Era” of Iran-US Relations

In 1960s, despite internal tensions, the Shah's Iran had become a vital strategic partner of the US. Its geopolitical position in the Middle East, especially with regards to the Persian Gulf in the south and the Soviet Union in north; events such as the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the Vietnam War (Bill, 1998, p.176); and the rise in the global oil price were the platform for the growth of the Iranian military and helped the Shah to reinforce his status.

The Shah sought a strong international partner to expand and strengthen his rule and influence beyond Iranian borders. On the other side, the US was looking for a relatively strong ally who could guarantee its interests in the region, taking into consideration the threat of the Soviet Union and that of Arab nationalist movements against Israel. These mutual desires elevated the

relationship during the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson, reaching its apogee during the Nixon administration and continuing in the Ford era.

But this strength of the Iran-US relationship was only on the surface. After the fight over capitulation and the exile of Ayatullah Khomeini, Iran was sliding towards a revolution. Khomeini continued to lead the opposition movement from exile, promoting his ideology through political statements, books, and the teaching and organisation of clergymen and religious groups. Meanwhile, the opposition was using the Shah's actions, including his harsh suppression, to develop secretly and to disperse and decentralize its structure and activities. On occasion, that resistance was becoming violent and armed. Islamic and national parties and organisations were reconstructed, and both Islamic and Marxist guerrilla organisations were formed¹.

This was the reality of the Iranian society that, according to Gary Sick, the Shah and the US were unable to see. While the Shah was supportive of US foreign policy and building an alliance with Israel, Khomeini was interpreting the expansion of Iran-US relationship as the means for the American rule and domination of Iran and the Iran-Israeli relationship as the strengthening of the Zionist regime amongst Islamic countries.

The strategic relationship with the US

The strategic relationship between Iran and the US was backed by declared affinity between the leaders of the two countries. President Johnson wrote the US Ambassador to Iran in June 1968,

¹ in such condition reconstruction of Islamic and national parties and organisations such as Islamic Coalition (Motalefeh), Freedom Movement (Nehzat-e-Azadi), National Front and the announcement of new political organisations such as the Islamic nations, Mojahedin-e-Khalgh Organisation (MKO), and even the creation of Marxism organisation known as Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas became possible

“My friendship and solidarity with His Majesty has been one of my pleasures during my time in office”¹. Johnson’s National Security Advisor Walt Rostow and Secretary of Defence Robert Mac Namara declared their support of the Shah as a valued ally. President Nixon also offered praise, albeit tinged with a bit of criticism:

“I first met the Shah in Tehran when I was forty and he was only thirty four years old, I found him intelligent, serene, peaceful and not so stable. He was a good listener and later we met several times and became friends. In 1960s, while I was not in office, I travelled to Tehran four times....

The Shah was one of the most talented Middle Eastern rulers and politicians. He was a competent king. Shah was the key ally of the US in the Middle East and was responsible for stability in this geographical region from the Mediterranean to Afghanistan....

Except for Israel, among the countries in the region, Iran considered friendship with the US as the starting point in its foreign policy. Iran’s influence was always used to support us. Iran’s facilities and aids sometimes even strengthened our facilities and aids in contracts and agreements around the world. Iran was our best and most significant ally in the world” (Nixon, 1980, p.457).

The Shah tried to bolster the links by giving gifts to various politicians and journalists through Ardeshir Zahedi, who served as the Iranian Ambassador to Britain, Foreign Minister, and Ambassador to the US. Henry Kissinger, the US National Security Advisor and Secretary of State from 1969 to 1977, acknowledged getting presents from the Shah on his wedding day (Wright, 1979, p. 323). Allegedly, the Shah also directly or indirectly supported Nixon’s Presidential campaign (Katouzian, 1981).

US foreign policymakers framed the relationship in shared interests rather than gifts. Kissinger said Iran and the US were supportive of one another, with the Shah as a rare leader in the world

¹ President Johnson to Ambassador Armin H.Meyer June 28, 1968. LBJ Library GEN CO 122, Box 41

and a genuine ally, someone whose understanding of the world strengthened the American position (Bill, 1988, p.279). The numerous visits by the Shah and high-ranking Iranian diplomats to the US and vice-versa¹, the widespread presence of American investors and companies in Iran², and the increase in American advisors in Iranian oil and military industries bolstered the unprecedented relationship and the expansion of US influence.

Geostrategic Position against USSR

Iran's position in the Persian Gulf was bolstered by the contrasting weakness of several smaller Arab states in the area, allowing the Shah to present himself to Washington as the vital link for the region. Iran remained a natural barrier in the way of the penetration of the USSR into the Middle East and its oil resources, while providing and protecting 40% of the Free World's oil --- 20 million barrels per day --- through the Straits of Hormuz (Nixon, 1980). Defence against the Soviets included consideration of atomic explosions in Iran to destroy communication and routes, while the country was a base both for electronic surveillance and for potential strikes on the USSR (Gasiorowski, 1991).

Harold Brown, the US Defence Secretary in the late 1970s, said the Soviets' potential advantage from the gain of Iran was equal to that of the whole of Europe (Epstein, 1987). Iranian officials reinforced this argument by presenting the country as a link between the European defence pact of NATO and the Asian defence pact of SEATO. The Shah said, "The United States must reconsider

¹ Only during Johnson, Shah officially visited United States of America three times, and was welcomed by the President. William Averell Harriman, an adviser of the US president, also travelled to Iran four times to meet and negotiate with the Shah during 1965- 1967.

² Investors such as David Liliental, the Rockefeller Brothers (David and John D), Kermit Roosevelt, Walt Rostow, Armin H.Meyer and Mc George Bundy.

its evaluation of the geopolitical significance of Iran and make sure that Iran and other sensitive points in the current Cold War would not be neglected. Iran is relatively more important to the US than Berlin or Africa and if Iran is ensnared by communism, this would endanger the global unity” (Karbaschi, 1992, p.79).

Iran's position was reinforced with the evacuation of British forces from the Persian Gulf region in 1967. The Soviets tried to exploit the situation with the despatch of a fleet, including two rocket launcher warships and logistic escort ships, to the area en route to India. Before returning to its base in Vladivostok, this fleet visited ports in Pakistan, Iraq, and Somalia. Analysts have claimed that, since then, except for a day in 1969, at least one USSR Navy ship has been present in the Indian Ocean (Elahi, 1991, pp.107-8).

Iran could also serve as a counter to an Arab nationalism that challenged Western interests. By 1970-1971, the Soviets had signed friendship and military assistance treaty and contracts with Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq and Yemen. The Shah exploited the spectre, “Iran must be prepared for defence in the Middle East, because [Egyptian President] Gamal Abdel Nasser intends to move his forces from Yemen to the Arabian Peninsula and [Persian] Gulf emirates following evacuation of...British forces” (Karbaschi, 1992, p.267).

Expansionism in Foreign Policy

Led by the Shah, Iran was eager to assume the role of the gendarme of the region and the political and military ruler over its surrounding states. In the Shah’s doctrine Iran was a “small imperialist” under the pretext of the regional monitoring and cooperation (Zonis, 1991, p.72). He said in a Newsweek interview in 1973, “In 1959 and 1960, I thought about this issue and came to the

conclusion that US cannot play the role of an international gendarme for a long time. After the evacuation of British forces from the Persian Gulf region, a vacuum was created. Americans were reluctant to play the role of the gendarme, so we had no choice” (Vasile, 1980, p.144).

Travelling to many parts of the world¹ to promote the importance of his role, the Shah believed that, with the rise in the oil price, he would become one of the five world powers in the future and “the saviour of the third world”.

Relative Domestic Stability

The suppression of the movement of the Iranian people on 5 June 1963; the exile of its clerical leader after the Capitulation law was passed; the suppression of the nationalistic movement and the death of its last leader, Dr. Musaddiq, in 1966; and economic and military aid to Iran seemed to provide relative stability and peace for the Shah’s regime. During this period, Shah reinforced his power by using the combination of security organisations and military forces. The monarch held major ceremonies such as his coronation on October 29, 1967 at Golestan Palace and the 1971 Persepolis ceremony, attended by a great number of world leaders, to show the internal peace and stability of his regime.

¹ Travelling to Eastern Europe including Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and Romania and also travels to Brazil, Argentina, Canada, Austria, England and West Germany and especially to the United States are the example of such a status.

Expansion of the Opposition below the Surface

In the Shah's view, the exile of Khomeini to Turkey had created the perfect environment to prevent him from promoting his political-religious ideologies. Turkey was a country with a secular government which insisted on separation of religion from politics, and its people with almost six centuries of Sunni culture saw themselves in religious and political competition with Shia Iran. Khomeini's activities were controlled by MIT (Turkey National Intelligence Agency) and SAVAK (The Movement of Imam Khomeini as reflected in SAVAK Documents Vol5, 2000, p. 27), to the extent that the Ayatullah was banned from wearing traditional Shia scholar dress and all his communications with Iran were stopped (Rouhani, 2003, p.24).

But, far from isolating the Imam, the strict measures fostered the view among the opposition of Khomeini as the saviour of their dignity. People's awareness of the difficult conditions of Khomeini's exile and the Ayatullah's emphasis that no one should beg or request (The Movement of Imam Khomeini as reflected in SAVAK Documents Vol5, 2000, p. 35) his freedom from Shah and the regime brought more sympathy for him and caused more anger towards the monarchy.

The silence of senior Islamic scholars and religious figures after Khomeini's exile in October 1964, because they were waiting for the end of the birthday celebrations of the Shah and his heir¹, came to an end as the Ayatullah's eldest son Sayed Mustafa, a senior teacher at Huwzah Elmiah Qom, encouraged the main Marjas (scholars) to publish protesting statements, cancel their seminary classes, and persuade the students at the Huwzah to hold public demonstrations². In Tehran,

¹ Shah birthday is on 4th Aban (25th October) and his son's is on 9th Aban (30th October).

² Amongst the Scholars publishing protesting statements were Ayatullah Marashi and Ayatullah Gulpaygani in Qom, Ayatullah Milani in Mashhad and in Tehran Ayatullah Khansary.

Mashhad, and Qom, all religious schools and the Bazaars were closed, the prayer leaders in various cities withheld prayers, and demonstrations were staged.

Senior Muslim scholars in Iran issued statements condemning the regime and reiterating their support of Ayatullah Khomeini and praising his stances and ideas. Ayatullah Najafi Mar'ashi, Sayed Hadi Milani, Sayed Mohamadreza Golpaygani, Sayed Abul Qasim Khuei, Sayed Hassan Qomi were among the Marajes who sent letters and telegrams. Ayatullah Najafi Mar'ashi¹ addressed the Pahlavi regime:

"The ruling body should realize it has committed big crimes, which history will never forget...Isn't it shameful that ally (i.e. US) become immune and Ayatullah Khomeini is exiled and the ally decides his fate?" (Davani, 1979, pp.27-29).

Among these political statements, that of Ayatullah Sayed Hassan Qomi was the strongest. While analysing the reasons behind Khomeini's exile, he pointed to the role of the US policies and plans and invited people to rise against Washington. The Hawzeh of Qom stated:

"We hope that people peacefully and through lawful means would try to annul these unacceptable colonial bills which contradict Iran's Muslim people dignity, independence, freedom and economy. The Iranian Nation should try by all means to accomplish its national and religious duty (Davani, 1979, pp.27-29).

Other scholars looked to the holy month of Ramadan in February 1965 for the challenge. Ayatullah Rabbani Shirazi and Ayatullah Montazeri, two of the most important teachers at Huwzah, wrote on behalf of the seminary to Prime Minister Hoveida: "Don't assume by exiling the Grand Ayatullah Khomeini, the protests of this nation will be silenced. The continuity of his exile anywhere and anyhow will be a source of dissatisfaction and anger for the public" (Davani, 1979,

¹ One of the top four Marja' at the time in Iran.

pp.27-29). Imam Musa Sadr travelled to the Vatican and asked the Pope to take actions to free the Ayatullah from exile.

Counter-Reaction of Regime

The regime tried a number of ways to restrict anti-regime activities, reducing the sense of anti-Americanism and sympathy with Ayatullah Khomeini. Prime Minister Mansour tried to reinterpret the Capitulation bill and link it to the nationalist parties to ease the outrage (Rouhani, 1979, pp. 1095-6). Mansour in his inauguration ceremony had praised Islam as "one of the most important and progressive religious in the world" and underlined "Shah's meticulous affection and benevolence toward religious leaders"; now less than nine months later, he depicted clerics' opposition to Capitulation as that of a bunch of illiterate and jealous men against the progress, growth, prosperity, and development of Iran. He claimed that Capitulation had previously been proposed by nationalist parties. However, only three days later, former Prime Minister Musaddiq sent a letter from exile¹, rejecting most of Mansour's claims (Najmi, 1994, pp.380-1).

The regime sent an envoy to Turkey to ask Ayatullah Khomeini to stop his activities, but the visit only provided an opportunity for Khomeini to learn more about Iran's social and political conditions and to spread his views. SAVAK arrested and jailed some of the most influential clerics.

¹Musaddiq letter reads as follows:

"Mr. Mansour, after 11 year in jail during which I couldn't defend my country's interest, let me defend myself in a couple of lines. Your statements in the parliament session on Tuesday Aban 19th that I had signed a deal concerning political immunity of US military personnel in Iran, made me shocked. As I was the first person who opposed the immunity of aliens in Iran in the early days of the WWI During those days, Turkish government annulled Capitulation regime. I published a declaration "Capitulation & Iran" in 5000 copies, calling annulment of this regime which was contradicted Iran's Freedom and independence."

Dr. Musaddiq, Aban 22, 1343.

¹ The intelligence service instructed police officers to take important mosques under close control to make sure no preachers and clerics delivered speeches about Khomeini, Capitulation, the immunity of US military personnel, or Government policies (Madani, 2010, p.124).

Instead of calming the situation, the regime faced another crisis when Prime Minister Hassanali Mansour was assassinated in front of Parliament by Mohammad Bokharaii, a member of the Islamic Coalition Organisation (Moutalefeh-e Islam) ² in January 1965. According to Savak's archived documents of Bokharaii's confessions, Mansour's assassination was the first of a planned series of assassination of senior officials of the regime. Topping the list of assassination targets was the Shah himself, even though no attempt was made at that point since he was heavily guarded³. Bokharai stated in his confessions that after “Imam Khomeini's Aban 4 (26 October) speech, it was required upon all dutiful Muslims to annihilate the pro-US regime of Shah”⁴. To be assured about the legality of assassination of Mansour and other officials, the Islamic Coalition Organisation sought permission (fatwa) from Sayyed Hadi Milani, a high-ranking Ayatullah⁵.

The regime decided to send Ayatullah Khomeini to exile in Iraq's holy city of Najaf in September 1965, hoping it would moderate his ideological statement amid the “quietist” Shia seminary which separated religion from politics or, alternatively, would eclipse Khomeini because of the presence

¹Top clerics like Ayatullah Montazeri, Meshkini, Rabbani Shirazi and clergies like Sayed Hadi KhosroShahi, Ali Akbar Nategh nouri, Fazlollah Mahallati, Taheri Esfahani

² Motalefa was an Islamic association which was formed after the rise of June 5th by the coalition of a number of religious groups. The main members of this organization were Sadegh Amani, Mohammad Bokharaei, Morteza NikNejad and Reza Saffar Harandi. This association was in contact with Maraja and in particular Ayatullah Khomeini through four top clergies (Beheshti, Motahari, Hashemi Rafsanjani and Anvari). The capitulation, Ayatullah Khomeini's exile and the lack of attention of the regime to the people requests provided the ground of the assassination of Mansoor.

³ Jomhoori Islami, 5th November (1979).number 129.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Keyhan Newspaper, 4 October (1979).

of other exalted Shia scholars. The ploy backfired: Khomeini was warmly welcomed by the people and scholars of the Iraqi city.

Emergence of the Conceptions of Islamic Revolution:

The emergence of the Islamic Revolution was a dialectic process from Khomeini's ideology, the Shah's policies, and Iranian society's circumstances in which the Ayatullah could develop his views and organise his movement. This process was managed by Khomeini himself and founded on the ideology of Khomeinism, but it was partly shaped by the opportunities created for the Ayatullah by the Shah and the US.

As late as 1965, the notion of reform rather than that of revolution dominated the opposition's thoughts. Ayatullah Khomeini's focus was on altering the system and the Shah's policies rather than overthrowing the regime. In his book *Kashf al-Asrar*, his first work on political theology, Khomeini emphasised that the senior cleric (Mojtahid) never opposed the systems or the independence of Muslim countries, even if their systems were contrary to the law of God and even if their governments were oppressive. The clerics believed that having a system is better than chaos and anarchism.

Opposition was to the King rather than the principle of monarchy¹. Khomeini said, "No cleric has ever claimed that he is the king or the monarchy is his right"². His vision was of the establishment of a jurisprudential Parliament to control the political system: "When discussing Velayat faqih, we are not saying that the king or the Prime Minister should be a clergy but we are asking just like

¹ Keyhan Newspaper, 4 October (1979).

² Ibid

Constituent Assembly was formed, another Assembly in which clergy are members or supervisors should be formed”¹.

Khomeini had long sought a system in which the Shah would consult the religious establishment. In December 1962, he wrote, "I advise the king of this country, not to lose this potential (clergies), everyone should consider their advice" (Sahife Nour Vol 1, 1990, p.121). He met and negotiated with the Shah twice as the representative of the Marja, Ayatullah Boroujerdi, and addressed the monarch in May 1963:

“We are not trying to ridicule you or to turn the nation against you. We want to turn you to a man who this nation would accept and answer to his requests; this is the sort of King we want” (Sahife Nour Vol 1, 1990, p.215).

At the peak of the June 1963 protests, he continued:

“Sir, I give you my advice. Mr Shah I advise you to stop what you are doing right now. They are deceiving you, sir. I do not wish to see a day when people would be happy to see that you are gone... God knows when [Reza Khan] Pahlavi left people were happy. I do not want to see you in such situation. Stop!....Listen to my advice, sir! Learn from your dad...The US and Israel, are no use to you. Quran is useful for you” (Sahife Nour Vol 1, 1990, p.245).

However, with the Capitulation conflict and during his exile, as the Shah and the Government refused to heed his suggestions, Khomeini was convinced that the reforms and Velayat Faqih would be fulfilled only by overthrowing the regime. Exile and concurrent events only encouraged Khomeini to expand his thoughts.

¹ Keyhan Newspaper, 4 October (1979).

Unity of Religion and Politics

During his exile in Turkey, Khomeini rewrote and published his Jurisprudential book (Resalah of Fiqh¹), *Tahrirul Wasilah*, in two volumes. This book, especially the second volume, was the first step in conveying Ayatullah Khomeini's social and political ideologies to the general public through religious laws. Rejecting quietism, he stated that Islam is a religion of society and politics and one of the main parts of the Islamic law is political legislation.

Khomeini introduced the system of the leadership and management of clergies in the two-volume *Tahrirul Wasilah*, during the first year of his exile (1965) and in the module of "Government and Politics in Islam" for four years in the highest levels of the Seminary School of Najaf. He presented the teaching material for the general public in another book, *Islamic State and Velayat Faqih*, in 1970 and answered questions and comments in new editions of the books.

In the Fatwas of *Tahrirul Wasilah*, he said, "Islam is the religion of politics and this can clearly be seen by a quick glance at the laws of Islam on the government, politics, economics, and society" (Khomeini, 1986, p.234). With this statement, Khomeini made political and opposition activities the religious duty of all Muslims. He concluded, "The Shariah and the truth mean we cannot allow the government to stay anti-Islamic or un-Islamic....And it is the duty of all Muslims in every Muslim country to work for victory of the Islamic- Political Revolution" (Khomeini, 1979, p.35).

¹ In Shia beliefs, every Shia Muslims are obligated to refer to a Resalah written by his/her chosen Scholar (Marja) in order to find answers to religious questions including personal and social questions and follow the rules and orders given in the Resalah.

Expansion in influence of the ideology

Ayatullah Khomeini not only interpreted Islamic laws in both individual and social aspects but declared adherence as an Islamic duty for those following him. Such laws included the necessity of public opposition to the Shah, the US and Israel; the illegality (haram) of working with SAVAK; illegality of buying Israeli goods; the necessity of helping Palestinian groups; and the illegality of membership of political parties linked to the regime.

Expansion in the aims of the ideology

In his first speech at the Najaf Seminary School in November 1965, on the anniversary of his exile from Iran, Khomeini condemned Capitulation, referred to the Shah's policies as American and anti-Islamic, and invited the public and, in particular, clerics to stand against the US and Israel. This shift extended his appeal and his concerns beyond Shia Iran to the Muslim world.

In February 1970, Ayatullah Khomeini started teaching the module "Islamic Government" or Velayat Faqih. The collections of the lessons' notes were published in form of a book titled Velayat Faqih and distributed in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon and at the Hajj in Saudi Arabia. This was the first time that the plan and the ideology of establishment of a political system based on Islamic teaching and in a revolutionary manner was developed to replace a secular and Western-oriented regime. Khomeini wrote, "Velayat Faqih is the only form of an Islamic government and this (new) system cannot come together with monarchy. Overthrowing the tyrants and illegitimate political system which reigns throughout the Muslim lands is the duty of all of us" (Khomeini, 1979, p.204). Between teaching and publication of the book and the victory of the Islamic Revolution, he introduced the Islamic Republic as the ideal political system.

This book, effectively Ayatullah Khomeini's manifesto, was published in Persian, Arabic, and several other languages. In the introduction of the German version of the book "Islamic State", the translator wrote (Khomeini, 1983):

There were a lot of interests to access the book of Islamic state, a book that is the key document of Islamic Revolution. This interest was not for this book only but in fact the world interests on other works of Ayatullah Khomeini also grew.

Khomeinism from Theoretical to Practical level

On a practical level, Ayatullah Khomeini began organising the clerics into a widespread network, covering public groups both inside and outside Iran to promote the revolutionary ideology:

"Banish your depression and complete the method and plan of your campaigns. Introduce Islam enthusiastically and decide to establish an Islamic government and be the first to step onto this path. When you've succeeded, overthrow the tyrant system. Surely you'll be able to administrate the government and rule the masses of people. The outline for the (new) government and the necessary laws to do so is ready and available. The only remaining plan is the ministerial programs, which can be completed with the contribution of consultants and assistants of professionals in various disciplines in a consultative assembly" (Khomeini, 1979, pp. 89-109).

The duty of the clergy was not only to pursue the "overthrow of the monarchy" but the establishment of "an Islamic State" as an alternative system.

Four points underlay the importance of clerical organisation in the spread and prominence of Khomeini's ideologies in the Iranian society. Firstly, this organisation was a non-governmental institute, which meant it was not financially supported by the Shah's system. Secondly, the government had no supervision or control over this organisation as it was under the administration of the senior scholars. Thirdly, the institute was in contact with both the scholars and with the people, even in the most remote locations of the country, through mosques. Fourthly this was a

direct, face-to-face, and constant contact, not limited to a specific time or location, which was based on the religious beliefs of the people.¹

During the 15 years of Khomeini's exile, the clerical organisation ensured that the struggle did not abate; instead, any attempt by the Shah to show his national and international power could be exploited to build opposition and become a catalyst for more protests.

The fragile conditions of Iran: A Catalyst for Khomeinist Movement

From 1965 to 1975, Iran suffered from simultaneous economic, political, and social crises. These were used by the opposition groups as an effective catalyst to expand both the opposition against the Shah and support of Khomeinism.

Economically, after the land reform and amid the agricultural and industrial dependence of Iran on other powers, a large number of villagers moved to large cities. The presence of these unskilled labours not only increased the unemployment and poverty rates but their settlement on the fringes of the cities made the social gap and the economic injustice even more obvious. This situation did not change despite the increase in oil income in the decade because of bad management and economic corruption. Politically, suppression of the opposition and the use of weapons and other forms of violence against unarmed civilians fed the unpopularity of a regime which had been called illegitimate by the highest religious figures. Socially, the expansion and prevalence of Western values and symbols in Iran, with the presence of American goods and companies, was interpreted

¹For instance Ayatullah Saeedi and Ghaffari in Tehran, , Ayatullah Montazeri and Ayatullah Rabbani in Qom, Ayatullah Hashemi Nejad in Mashhad, Shirazi, , Ayatullah Sadooghi in Yazd and Ayatullah Dastghaib in Shirazi .

as the Shah's dependence on and submission to the US, a humiliation of the Islamic and national values of the Iranians.

After Ayatullah Khomeini's exile, a large number of political and ideological groups and parties with different structures were formed. These groups were involved in promoting anti-regime and anti-American ideologies by holding talks, classes, debates, demonstrations and other type of activities, such as distribution of Khomeini's statements. These groups were links between the intellectual elite, Imam Khomeini, and the mass of the population.

These organisations were generally in three categories:

A) Islamic groups and organisations:

The followers and students of Ayatullah Khomeini organised revolutionary clergymen and set up the communication networks, especially near Qom, Tehran and other cities. The leading Islamic groups had two named factions. One group was learned figures such as Ayatullah Motahari, Ayatullah Beheshti, Ayatullah Montazeri, Ayatullah Meshkini, and Ayatullah Rabbani Shirazi. The seminaries dedicated themselves to presenting the ideology of Ayatullah Khomeini setting out a cultural and intellectual struggle based on the theoretical and ideological foundation of Islamic revolution.

The other fraction worked on the communication networks, especially direct contact with other political organisations. They also set out the guidance for possibilities of armed struggle against the regime. Prominent figures in this group were Ayatullah Taleghani, Ayatullah Anwari, Ayatullah Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Ayatullah Khamenei. They also played a coordinating role

among the groups such as *Motalefeh*, *Fadaiyan-e-Islam*, *Hezb- e Melal –e Islami*, *The Freedom Movement (Nehzate Azadi)*, and *Mojahedin-e-Khalq*.

B) National-Religious organisations

The Freedom Movement (*Nehzate Azadi*) offered a framework for groups who related religious outlook to presentation of national goals. In contrast to the strictly Islamic groups, the Freedom Movement had already established itself working in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Ali Amini as well as in the universities during late 1950's and early 1960's. Well-known members included Ayatullah Taleeqani, Mehdi Bazargan, Yadollah Sahabi, and Dr. Ali Shariati.¹

National religious organisations believed that a fight had to be conducted according to Islamic principles, set out in the work of Ayatullah Taleqani and Dr. Shariati. This fostered a more radical posture of the National Front in the struggle. While the group's leaders (Bazargan, Taleqani, and Sahabi) during the Capitulation dispute were in detention and faced a military trial, they offered open praise of Ayatullah Khomeini through a statement, condemning the regime for his exile. At the same time, the organisation attracted and influenced students inside and outside the country, thus ensuring that Islamic associations in European and American universities were dominated by religious-national forces. The National-Religious Front recognised Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organisation (MKO), formed in March 1966, as an armed student movement.²

¹ The National Front party during the rise of June 5th and its aftermath, refused to issue any statement against the regime or to praise and support the rise and this will lead to internal conflicts within this party.

² Mohammad HanifNejad, Saeed Mohsen and Ali Asghar Badi' Zadegan were three students who were not satisfied enough with the Freedom Movement and hence established an armed organisation/party in early 1966 which later on was referred to as Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO)

C) Marxist Organisations

These political groups, concentrated in universities and in the workplaces, were influenced ideologically by the Tudeh Party and politically by National Front. Unlike the National Front, however, these groups did not link with strictly Islamic work or Ayatullah Khomeini's guidelines and the campaigns for his political followers. Instead they established a presence predominantly through the moves toward armed struggle as early as 1967. Their first guerrilla operation, entitled "Siahkal", ¹ was carried out in 1971. ²

About 200 members who were dissatisfied with the decision made by the party on armed struggle, formed Iran's Revolutionary Communists Organisation in 1971. The Organisation of Iranian People's Fedaii Guerrillas was formed by a coalition of two Marxist groups in April 1972.³ The groups were further distanced from others in the revolutionary movement not just because of ideological differences but because of their preference for links with the Communist powers of China and the Soviet Union.

Evolution of the Struggle Method

While the Marxist and religious groups stood apart from each other, there was a convergence on the necessity of the armed struggle. Many political groups believed that with the creation of the

¹On 8th Feb 1971, in a team of 9 headed by Ali Akbar Safaei Farahani , they attacked the Siahkal police station and killed the army personnel in there.

²In this year, Bijan Jozni (one of the founders of Fadaie Khalq Organization) along with Hasan Zia Zarifi and Abbas Souraki planned the foundation of a Marxist organisation with an armed-oriented approach.

³Team of Bijan Jozni and team of Masood Ahmadzadeh.

security atmosphere by the regime and the crackdown on the opposition, there were no room left for peaceful resistance.¹

The initial wave of the struggle was from groups that were linked to the religious movement. They carried out the assassination of Prime Minister Hosseinali Mansour in February 1965 and the armed attack on the Shah in Marmar Palace in April 1965², followed by the formation of the Islamic Nations Party with the aim of armed uprising in September 1965.³

Increasing Crises for the Regime

The policies and actions of the Shah and deteriorating social conditions of Iran furthered Khomeinism, which increased in popularity as the gap increased between people and the regime. For example, in August 1969, part of the al-Aqsa Mosque was set on fire by a group of Zionists, provoking widespread anger and anti-Zionist feelings in Arab and Islamic countries. The Shah accepted the cost of repair of the mosque, but Ayatullah Khomeini interpreted this as a manipulation of public opinion, with the Shah trying to reduce the hatred of Muslims toward Zionists and to help Israel.

“As long as Palestine remains occupied, Muslims should not rebuild the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Let the crime of Zionist stay embodied in the eyes of Muslims and let it become a source for a movement for Palestinian liberation” (Rouhani, 1979, p.458).

¹During this time, Shah dismissed General Hassan Pakravan who was the head of the Intelligence Service and replaced him with General Ne'matollah Nasiri. During the 1953 coup (Koodeta 28 Mordad) against Musaddiq, Nasiri was in charge for the house arrest of Musaddiq and dismissal him from prime ministry.

² On April 10th 1964, a conscript soldier named Reza Shams Abade who was one of the guards of the Mar-Mar Palace, tried to assassinate the Shah while he was existing his car to go to the place by shooting him. Shah managed to escape into the building, however two of his high ranked bodyguards were shot dead.

³This Islamic association was founded by Islamic clergies such as Mohammad Javad Hojjati Kermani and Mohammad Kazem Bojnoordi.

In January 1968, the British diplomat Frank Roberts¹ came to Tehran to discuss with the Shah the situation around the Persian Gulf and Bahrain's independence. The Shah wanted to introduce himself as a democrat and defender of the rights of minority groups. However, the act was not only interpreted as neglect of national territory and interest but also as a repression of Bahrainis' interests since the newly-formed country was ruled by a Sunni minority over a Shia majority.

Outside Iran, large demonstrations were held outside Iranian Embassies, occupying them in countries like Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Libya. Clergy led protests in Iran in the religious cities of Qom, Mashhad, Shiraz, and Tehran. The students of Tehran University rallied in front of the campus and set a number of buses on fire; some of the demonstrators were killed and injured in clashes with the police. After this, the regime banned any religious and non-religious meetings; however, the protests continued in Tehran under the leadership of Ayatullah Taleghani and in Qom under the leadership of Ayatullah Saeedi, both of whom were subsequently arrested by SAVAK.

Because of the intensity of the protests, the independence of Bahrain was not made public for two years, with the regime leaving the decision to the UN Secretary General. Finally in May 1970, the UN approved the separation of Bahrain. The Shah's congratulations was treated as proof by the opposition that he was not patriotic towards his country or his religion and that he was a puppet working for the policies and interests of foreigners, especially the US.

In May 1970, a group of the wealthiest American capitalists, headed by David Rockefeller, entered Iran and caused uproar among the Iranian opposition. Khomeini reacted to their presence in a

¹Sir Frank Kenyon Roberts, a British diplomat, was also a key player in British diplomacy in the early years of the Cold War, and in developing Anglo-German relations in the 1960s.

message:

“American Experts and capitalists have come to Iran under the name of the greatest foreign investment to enslave the oppressed people of Iran. ... Any contract signed with the American capitalists and other colonisers is against the will of the people and against the Islamic laws” (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p.227).

Thereafter working with Americans became Haram (Islamically illegal). The statement and fatwa were quickly distributed in all mosques in the country, with distribution overseen by Ayatullah Saeedi.

The fatwa was influential through the boycott of American goods in the markets of Iran and Muslim countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. SAVAK arrested Ayatullah Saeedi to avoid further distribution and to extract information about his contacts in the country. He was subsequently sent to Ghezel Ghala Prison where he was brutally tortured for 10 days and eventually killed, the first such death of an Islamic scholar. Khomeini's eulogy for Ayatullah was followed by widespread protests by clerics and the public, leading to more arrests.

In April 1971, when the workers of “Jahan Chit” factory marched for their payment and work problems, they were attacked by the army, who killed and arrested demonstrators. These protests and the harsh reactions of the regime came as the Shah was preparing the country for the “2,500 year celebration of the Persian Empire”¹, an event which caused more anger among opposition and widened the gap between the Shah and the religious society of Iran. Tens of millions of dollars ---

¹ The 2,500 year celebration of the Persian Empire consisted of an elaborate set of festivities that took place on 12–16 October 1971.

some estimated hundreds of millions --- were spent on these celebrations when the majority of Iranian society was living a poor life.

The Shah organised the festival to highlight his authority and to achieve three fundamental objectives. Firstly, he was trying to overshadow the 1400-year history of Islam by advertising the 2500-year history of Iran, diminishing the Islamic culture which had become the culture of opposition. Secondly, he tried to show the nationalism movement as pro-monarchy by introducing a new definition of nationalism called Iranism. Thirdly, he wanted to prove that the secret behind the survival of the nation and dignity of the Iranian people was due to his existence, discouraging people from associating with opposition groups.

The organisation of these celebrations brought great credit for Shah at the international level¹ (see Appendix 1: Fig 10), but it brought another wave of protests in Iran. The opposition denounced monarchical nationalism as loyalty to the king on the throne rather than patriotism. The emphasis on the spirituality and sanctity of the reign of the Shah and the second point brought the humiliation and weakening of the religious value and institutions of the society. In the omnipresent slogan of "God, King, and the Country", "king" was placed over "the country".

Khomeini and religious leaders, referring to the exorbitant costs of more than \$300 million, associated these celebrations with Zionist ideals and goals. They believed that these celebrations followed the footpath of Zionism in July 1961 when Israel celebrated the 2500-year anniversary of

¹ 24 kings and Arab Emirs, 5 queens, 21 princes, 16 presidents, 3 prime ministers, 4 vice presidents, 2 foreign ministers and tens of celebrities and scientific figures from 69 different countries attended these celebrations. The 2,500 year celebration of the Persian Empire narrated by SAVAK and royal court: Bazme- Ahriman, August 1998.

freedom of Jews in Persia and glorified Cyrus.¹ Furthermore the celebrations included un-Islamic acts, such as public drinking, dancing, and inappropriate music, promoted by the Iranian media. In a detailed remark titled “Iran's Kings: Dishonoured Kings in History”, Khomeini described the tyranny and crimes committed by the monarch and said the royal system of dictatorship was against the demands and freedom of the Iranian people. The Ayatullah used a speech to refer to the high cost of the celebrations despite the poverty and unemployment in Iran. He said they were not a national act but a transgression of Islamic laws and governance practices of Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali and thus were haram (Islamically unlawful). He asserted that the Shah’s submission to and obedience of US policies in selling oil to Israel was the reason for the poverty in Iranian society despite the high income from exports, inviting all clergy to protest against the Shah’s policies:

“The crimes of Persian kings are disgraceful. They massacred people, cut their heads, and then built towers using those heads. For such kings we, the nation of Islam should celebrate?”

So what happened to those words you said that everyone in Iran is living in prosperity? All in Iran are in wealth and they have to sell their children out of hunger?! Iran is in wealth and prosperity?! What (kind) of welfare exist in Iran? Shouldn't be there any objection to selling of Muslims' oil to the country which is at war with Muslims? He (Shah) will reply by saying he is a servant, he has to obey. Servant must obey, he has no choice. He said it himself that he was brought to power. He said Allies (US) came here (Iran) and thought it was best that he become in power.

Why is Najaf silent? Are we not responsible? Is our job to only study Islam? Just studying? Should we not help to ease the pain of Muslims? Should we not complain that the oil of Iran and Islam is being sold to a country that is at war with Muslims? Shouldn't there be objection? For which kings should we

¹ The 2,500 year celebration of the Persian Empire narrated by SAVAK and royal court: Bazme- Ahriman, August 1998.

celebrate? What happiness did these kings bring for the people?” (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p.358-73).

Following this speech, a wave of social protests spread in Iran. The Hawzah cancelled its classes and held its opposition meetings in the form of mourning ceremonies. The Bazaar in Tehran and other cities closed their shops and students at various universities held rallies. These protests peaked in Shiraz, the venue for the celebrations, under the supervision of Ayatullah Dastqaib Shirazi, Khomeini's representative in Fars Province. SAVAK arrested Dastghaib, a number of other Scholars, merchants, and members of the city's elites and unofficially announced a curfew.

A few months after the celebrations, when the Iran-Israel relationship was at its height, Khomeini emphasised the necessity of resistance against the Israeli aggressions said that it was compulsory to support Palestinians, spiritually and physically, by sending blood, medicine, weapons, and food to them. In another message, Khomeini stated: “Islamic Ummah will never see peace and prosperity as long as this manifestation of filth (i.e. Israel) exists and Iran will never see freedom until this disgraceful dynasty (i.e. Shah Regime) is overthrown.”

The wave of protests in Iran spread so widely that Prime Minister Hovaida acknowledged them in a speech, but said the reason for the demonstrations was the animosity of Communist countries in the Soviet bloc towards the development and advance of Iran. He called the protestors foreign agents and said they should have no place in Iran or abroad, indirectly licensing the killing of the demonstrators. The clerical network and Islamic groups responded by calling the “Shah's closest, most popular, and powerful government” (Milani, 2000) a Baha'i group and an Israeli agent¹. The

¹ Without deciding whether this claim about Hovaida is correct or not, it is important to say this label stayed with him until his death and was one of his charges/accusations

clergy also lowered the Shah's status by calling him an American puppet and an Israeli puppet and dog.

In 1973, the Shah invited American engineers to assist the development of Radio and TV channels and Hoveida's government gave its employees special discount for buying televisions. The aim was to use the media as a tool for propaganda, advertising the Shah's domestic and foreign policies and introducing him as the most powerful political leader in the world and particularly the Middle East. Khomeini and a number of other scholars tried to block the initiative by prohibiting the use of radio and television.

Meanwhile, the clergy played the role of opposition media in the mosques. Simultaneous publication and explanation of Khomeini's views and opinions across the country by the clerics furthered public criticism of the regime. Ayatullah Hussein Ghaffari, the organiser and coordinator of clerics in Tehran and representative of Khomeini, established the first Combatant Clergy Association in the capital in 1973¹. The clerics also taught at universities, bolstering them as bases for opposition to the Shah.

In March 1975, the Shah announced that Rastakhiz was the only legitimate political party in the country and asked people to make their criticisms and requests through it. He said on television that anyone opposing the monarchical system must either be imprisoned or leave the country (Sahifeh Nour Vol 3, 1990, p.71). Rastakhiz was based on three principles of "believing in the constitution, Imperial Dynasty and White Revolution". In response, Khomeini ruled, "As this party is against Islam and national interest, membership of this party is haram and opposing it is

¹ Ayatullah Mutahari, Mofateh, Taleqani, Mahvadi Kani, Movahedi Kermani and etc .

obligatory for everyone” (Sahifeh Nour Vol 3, 1990, p.71). This fatwa was so powerful that Rastakhiz faced great reluctance, with even government employees withdrawing their membership using the excuse of lack of interest in politics. The party was dissolved 2 1/2 years after its establishment.

In 1975, on the anniversary of the June 5th uprising, pro-revolution Seminary students again demonstrated in Qom. They protested against the Shah with closure of courses and strikes for 3 days inside the Faiziah School. Police surrounded the school and arrested all the protesters, including Ayatullahs such as Ghaffari, Taleqani, Motahari, and Mofateh. Khomeini denounced the Shah and SAVAK and called them American toys. He invited the people to resistance and promised that the victory over Shah and the US was near.

“With all the tragedy, an awakening of the nation brings hope and the opposition of clergies and universities across the country and various social classes despite all the pressures is the forefront to achieve liberation from the colonial powers, particularly the US” (Sahifeh Nour Vol 3, 1990, p.101).

The spread of this message brought further waves of protests in other cities. In Tehran, the office of the Rastakhiz Party was attacked and the State TV station was set on fire. In other large cities, seminary and university students cancelled their classes and held protest meetings. As Iranian students outside the country protested to the Shah, Khomeini sent a message to the Islamic Society in America and Canada:

“The lighting point in the final years of my life is the awareness of the young generation and movement of intellectuals which is growing fast. God willing it will achieve its goal which is the overthrow of the American puppets and the expansion of Islamic justice. You, the youths are required, by any means possible, to raise the awareness of people and unveil the deception of the system” (Sahifeh Nour Vol 3, 1990, p.114).

In December 1975, Ayatullah Hussain Ghaffari, was killed in prison after long days of torture by SAVAK. Clergy held memorial and mourning ceremonies in mosques and informed people about the Shah's tyranny. Three months later, anger was stoked when the regime changed the origin of Iranian calendar from Hijri (immigration of Prophet Muhammad, pbuh, from Mecca to Madina) to the start of the Achaemenid Empire. In reaction to this act, Ayatullah Khomeini issued another fatwa, on Eid al-Fitr, prohibiting the use of this calendar.

“To undermine Islam and wipe out its name, they change the calendar origin, this change is of major crimes done by the filthy hands of this dynasty at this age. It is the duty of the general public to disagree with the use of this calendar. Usage of this calendar is forbidden and support for oppressor is unlawful and in contrary with the just Islam”.

In Khomeini's eyes, the aim of the regime was to promote and spread extreme nationalist feelings around the kingdom, justifying the Shah's status and policies as well as blocking the Islamic-revolutionary current that was expanding day-by-day. He believed the US and Israel were behind all the anti-Islamic policies of Shah, therefore protest against these policies was not only opposition to the Shah but more importantly a stand against the cultural policies of the US and Zionists.

The collection of these events brought the legitimacy of Shah's regime into question as economic tensions rose. Despite the increase in oil revenue, poverty had not decreased, many major roads were not paved, and a large part of the country was denied of electricity and primary health facilities. The Shah fed the anger when he said in a television interview that \$7 billion was given to foreign countries, including France, Britain, and Italy. Iran had also spent \$1.4 million for housing developments in Jordan and \$1.2 billion in Turkey.

Much of the remaining oil revenue was spent on military equipment that, in the eyes of Iranians was not for the protection of the people but to protect US interests in the region. From 1970 to 1977, more than \$26 billion of oil was given to US in exchange for military imports. The Shah had also paid \$12 billion in advance to receive weapons from US in 1980.

By 1977 the main section of Khomeini's plan to change the society of Iran was completed. This was no longer reform but, due to the domestic and international conditions of Iran, a revolution. Its ideology was an Islamic Ideology based on Khomeini's interpretation of political and social Jurisprudence (fiqh), and its main agents were the clerics and then the academics that would use people's potential through their communication networks, especially mosques. The only unknown factor of this revolution was the timing.

The “Rehearsal Era” of the Iranian Revolution

According to Gary Sick “Khomeini's exile was the beginning of the “rehearsal era” of the Iranian revolution, which 15 years later, would be a successful revolution with the overthrow of the Shah. The stand on Capitulation had been a catalyst not only for the Khomeini's popularity and influence but also for structural changes” (Sick, 1985, p.10).

However this period was not just the beginning of the rehearsal era for the Iranian Revolution but the shaping of that Revolution. The rise to prominence of Khomeini propelled the notion of religion --- it was not just the person that was being promoted but the system of religious thought which justified the revolution. Anti-Americanism was important as part of the creation and promotion of that notion, based upon Islamic ideology and religious duty as opposed to a secular, nationalist or a Marxist revolution. Even if the anti-Americanism was not based on history but on

misinterpretation, it still helped create the space to define what Khomeinism was trying to accomplish: an Islamic Iran based on individuals fulfilling their religious duty and a system in which legitimacy resided in the people as oppose to the ruler.

With the conversion of the religious presence into a political movement, the concept of demonstration became a fixed aspect of Iranian society. After the exile of Khomeini, Islam was not only practiced through worship and orders for prayers but also through an explanation of the political aspects which required public display. The Shah was not only challenged in religious grounds but on that of the legitimacy of authority, for example, through comparison to figures such as Yazid¹. The religious obligation to express opposition not only against the Shah but against those who enabled him to rule, made the place of America within Iranian society a central issue and the concept of anti-Americanism a holy and religious concept established upon Islamic ideology rather than a Marxist or nationalist argument.

¹He was the second Caliph of the Umayyad Caliphate who had become in power despite his incapability and ordered to kill Hussain, the grandson of Prophet Mohammad, and his companions.

Chapter 9

The Rise of Islamic Revolution

By 1977, the idea of revolution was well-established in Khomeinism. The Ayatullah had laid the ideological and theological foundation for a system based on Islamic values and structures, rather than the decades of monarchical rule by the Shah. He had built an organization upon this foundation, motivating and developing a network of clerics who in turn had built networks and links with other organizations and communities. He had long dismissed the idea of reform because of the conviction that the Shah and the Iranian elite were beyond redemption.

However, it was only from 1977 that the conditions were established where revolution could be pursued. While the potential had been established by the Ayatullah's instructions and plans, the catalyst was in the actions of a Shah who --- far from responding to criticism and demands for change --- merely entrenched and extended his strategic relationship with the US and his repression of dissent at home. Before the Jaleh Square massacre of 8 September 1978, even as Khomeinism moved from the rehearsal stage for revolution to implementation, the Shah believed that he could quiet opposition movement by sending their leaders into exile, suppressing the protests, and executing small reforms. So he did not consider fundamental changes in his policy to be necessary.

After 8 September, the Shah and his American supporters were increasingly aware of the growing challenge and considered fundamental reforms in governance. However, the understanding was belated, after the massacre had become a catalyst for the Khomeinist revolution. Each political and religious occasion in the Iranian calendar was turned into an opportunity to accelerate the uprising and extend and entrench Khomeinism.

Khomeini divided labour to achieve the revolution, with every group of society having specific roles and duties. His order for expansion of protests and widespread strikes after 8 September,

especially the oil industry stoppage and Bazaar strike, linked Iran's political crisis to the economy. With the emphasis on continuous protests and strikes until the regime was toppled and a new Islamic state established, Khomeini effectively blocked the path of any alternatives until the overthrow of the Shah in February 1979.

Khomeinism and the Paradoxical Cycle of the Regime's Deprivation

With an emphasis on the importance and history of the reign and the advertisement of the slogan “God, the King, and the Homeland”, the Shah tried to represent the monarchy as the most important institution for the protection of religion and the State. At the start of the 1970s, in his 2500-Year celebration in which heads of state and monarchs of 69 countries participated, the Shah called on Cyrus to rest in peace while he protected Iran:

“O Cyrus, the great King, King of Kings, Achaemenian King, King of the land of Iran I, the Shahanshah of Iran, offer thee salutations from myself and from my nation. Rest in peace, for we are awake, and we will always stay awake. ..During these 25 centuries, your country and my country has witnessed the most horrific events a nation has experienced during the history... Now, we have gathered here to say to your honour that after passage of 25 centuries, the flag of Iranian monarchy is victoriously waving, exactly the same as your glorious era. ...Today, the same as your era, Iran in the chaotic world brings the message of freedom and Philanthropy and is the protector of the highest ideals of humanity. ... We will always remain awake to guard your proud heritage.”(IRDC, 2002)¹

Beyond this pride, an illusory image of stability and strength of Iran was created. The Shah believed that control and suppression of opposition and the strengthening of strategic relations with the US would secure his position at home and in the region. Instead, these policies fed the challenging interpretation of Khomeini, promising ongoing unrest and declaring the Shah's illegitimacy. If the Shah persisted with his line, the call for opposition would be bolstered. If he made any reforms,

¹Shah opening speech marking the 2500th anniversary of founding the Persian Empire.

they would be seen as a victory justifying more protest. Meanwhile, US support of the Shah showed the monarch's submission and surrender to Washington.

The Catalyst and Accelerators for the Islamic Revolution

In the US, the Democrat Jimmy Carter defeated his Republican rival Gerald Ford in 1977 to become President. The Shah was concerned over Carter's campaign slogan of democracy and defence of human rights and over the possible restriction of military equipment to Iran ¹(Tirani, 2006, p. 68). In his campaign speeches, the new US President, referring to the statement of the UN Human Rights Committee, had included Iran in a list of several countries as pro-American dictatorships.² Carter had also harshly criticized the unconditional and unrestrained American weapon sales to countries that did not respect human rights.

To maintain his relations with the US, the Shah enacted two special reforms. The first, under the slogan of “open political space” (Nejati, 1992, pp.34-7) was the release of political prisoners and change of Prime Ministers. A group of prisoners were given the royal pardon and, in interviews, said that they had never been tortured in detention (Baqi, 1991, pp.203-4).

Historian Abbas Milani later assessed:

“This situation in Iran gave the impression that Washington's previous policy of unconditional support for the Shah has changed and Carter has placed Shah under pressure to reform the political structure. Regardless of the accuracy of this theory, the release of political prisoners had two essential impacts on strengthening of the revolutionary process. The first was that this raise the spirit in the body of the opposition, strengthened the spirit of resistance among the

¹Shah in an interview with Washington Post had stated that "Iran annual spend \$45 million on strengthening its military capacity and purchasing modern weapons."

² Human Rights Commission in its statement had mentioned Shah as one of the world's greatest human rights violator.

nation and discredited the myth of the invincibility of Shah which had been spread by SAVAK (Milani, 1988).

The release of prisoners empowered the organisation of the opposition. Amongst those freed were Dr. Ali Shariati and Mahdi Bazargan who, as national-religious academics and intellectuals, played a leading role in spreading the ideology of Khomeini¹.

The Shah also returned to his strategy --- used in 1953, the 1963 uprising, and the Capitulation crisis --- of changing the Prime Minister and making slight alterations in the Cabinet. Blaming the Prime Minister and the Government for Iran's problems, the Shah could pardon himself from mistakes and eliminate the possibility of a coup. In DATE, Prime Minister Hoveyda, who had survived for 13 years, was replaced by Jamshid Amouzegar.

The second reform was in the cultural sphere, with the acceleration of the Westernisation of Iranian culture. Doing so, the Shah wanted to represent an image of free Iranian society while marginalising the religious values which had gained political strength.

An example was the Shiraz Arts Festival of music, dance and theatre, held every year under the supervisor of Farah Pahlavi (Daftari and Diba, 2014, p.87). In September 1977, coinciding with Ramadan, dances and shows were seen by many as a denigration of religious values and morals. British Ambassador Anthony Parsons in his memoirs described the event as one of the first sparks of the Iranian Revolution:

¹Although a few months later, in June 1978 Shariati after having no choice but to leave Iran in order to continue his opposition to the regime, Shariati died under 'mysterious circumstances in Southampton, England but his death, brought a new wave of student protests inside and outside of Iran. Revolutionaries believed that he was killed by SAVAK and gave him the title of martyr teacher of revolution. Expansion of public protests in 1977 and direct criticism of Shah was to the extent that Shah was forced to begin the second phase of political reform.

“The Shiraz Festival of 1977 excelled itself in its insults to Iranian moral values. For example according to an eye-witness, a play was enacted which represented, as I was told, the evils of military rule and occupation. The theatre company had booked a shop in the main shopping street of Shiraz for the performance, which was played half inside the shop and half on the pavement outside.

One scene, played on the pavement, involved a rape which was performed in full (no pretence) by a man (either naked or without any trousers, I forget which) on a woman who had her dress ripped off her by her attacker. The denouement of the play, also acted on the pavement, included a scene where one of the characters dropped his trousers and inserted a stage pistol up his backside, presumably in order to add verisimilitude to his suicide.

The effect of this bizarre and disgusting extravaganza on the good citizens of Shiraz, going about their evening shopping, can hardly be imagined. This grotesquerie aroused a storm of protest which reached the press and television. I remember mentioning it to the Shah, adding that, if the same play had been put on, say, in the main street of Winchester (Shiraz is the Iranian equivalent of a cathedral city), the actors and sponsors would have found themselves in trouble. The Shah laughed indulgently” (Parsons, 1984, p.54).

The ensuing protests were so great that State radio and TV mentioned them, while SAVAK warned about the provocation of people’s religious feelings against the regime (Shiraz Arts Festival according to SAVAK documents, 2009). Ayatullah Dastqei and Sheikh Bahuddin Mahalati, the representatives of Ayatullah Khomeini in Shiraz, disseminating Khomeini's message that the regime of Shah was illegitimate regime and that opposition to overthrow this regime was compulsory: “All must join hands, Scholars with engineers, doctors with students, Universities with Schools have to work together to do a job so they can become free of all the pressures loads imposed on them” (Sahife Nour Vol 3, 1990, pp.229-231).

However, the Shah continued to show no concern about the depth of religious and moral beliefs and or the violation of norms, even when footage of him and his wife drinking with President Carter and the First Lady was broadcast on State television a few months later. He said, "No power can

overthrow me. This is because a 700,000 force supports me, all labours and the majority of people are behind me, and I am powerful” (Nejati, 1995, p. 74).

The wave of protests, which now included non-Muslims, grew with the sudden death of Ayatullah Khomeini's son, Sayed Mustafa, in November 1977 at the age of 47. The role of Mustafa as a representative and the link between his father and the opposition after the Ayatullah's exile had resulted in the younger Khomeini facing threats from the security forces and Iranian authorities. Suspicions were further raised because there was no sign of serious illness before his death.

News of his passing caused widespread outrage and protests. Howzas were closed and clerics held ceremonies in mosques nationwide. In Tehran, the Combatant Clergy association held a grand ceremony in Arg Mosque and Hassan Rouhani, who had just returned from exile, called the Shah an American puppet and gave the title of Imam (Leader) to Ayatullah Khomeini. The term had previously only been used for the 12 Shia Imams, and Rouhani also asked people to say the Salawat¹ out of respect every time he used the title.

Sayed Mustafa's death gave his father an opportunity to restate his criticisms of the Shah and the US as part of his response to every sympathy message received, thus making people more determined and hopeful towards the revolution. For example in reply to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's message, he declared:

During 50 years of illegitimate reign of Pahlavi regime, and as confessed by themselves they were foreign agents, we faced many unfortunate events.... One of which was the help of this evil man (Shah) to the Israel (Sahife Nour Vol 3, 1990, p247).

¹ A phrase that Muslims say after uttering or hearing the name of any of the Islamic prophets.

Replying to messages from Iranian public, he said:

“It is impossible for the victims and the oppressed in Iran to reconcile with this dynasty or accept continuation of their reign even for another day. The nation of Iran does not want a dynasty that has left the fate of their country in the hands of foreigners specially US” (Sahife Nour Vol 3, 1990, p249).

And writing to the Students and Muslims outside Iran, he said:

“I give you the tiding of victory... Shah and his regime should know that even if Shah is successful in the meeting with the US president to re-establish his position as an obedient king for the US, but the nation of Iran will not accept him and will continue their struggle until they have avenged the blood of their youth. (Sahife Nour Vol 3, 1990, p249).

The messages showed a change in tone of Ayatullah Khomeini towards the Shah and his regime.

Increasingly bitter, Khomeini called the monarch the focus of intrigue, corruption, and crime.

Some American experts and scholars saw the Iranian regime in danger but CIA and Pentagon officials were optimistic about the situation in Iran and the Shah's ability to deal with these problems (Nejati, 1992, p. 550). Veteran American officials had left the National Security Council and the State Department in 1977, and their replacements believed that the ruler was a thoughtful person who only downside was that he would not take advice from others (Sick, 1985, p. 47). As a report published at the time by the Inspector General of the State Department of State said, “No serious domestic challenges exist to the leadership of the Shah” (Sick, 1985, p. 49).

This optimism enabled Shah to achieve a new agreement with US authorities on buying new weapons. In November 1977 he travelled to the US to sign the contract and visit President Carter for the first time, albeit having to begin his official speech at the State dinner with a wave of coughing and choking, caused by tear gas used by the security forces against students protesting

outside (Sick, 1985, p. 60). Six weeks later, Carter visited Iran on his way to India. In his speech at the State dinner, the US President described Iran as an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world.

An Iranian author later said the US and the Shah were the blades of a scissors aiming to cut the independence, freedom and Islamic values of Iran. Footage of the drinking at the State dinner infuriated the religious society of Iran. In the following days, there were attacks on American cultural and economic centres in Tehran such as the Pepsi factory, Westinghouse, and the language centre of Iran and America.

Attacks on Khomeini

On the evening of 7 January 1978, Etelaat newspaper published an article titled "Iran and the Colonisation of the Red and the Black", in which Ayatullah Khomeini was harshly attacked and insulted, reportedly on the order of the Prime Minister's office ¹ (Houshang Mahdavi, 1993, pp. 204-5). Khomeini was said to have Indian origins and to be dependent on colonial centres (i.e. Britain), and was called egotistical. This article asserted that because Khomeini was unable to gain a position amongst high-ranked clergymen of the country; he was looking for an opportunity to enter the political affairs to establish his name and reputation.

The publication backfired. On 8 January, seminary students closed Howzas in Qom and held protests walking towards the houses of Maraje and chanting slogans in favour of Ayatullah

¹Many Iranian and foreign political and press circles believed this article was prepared by Dariush Homayoun. Of course Homayoun himself in notes published later outside Iran, about the causes of the collapse of the Pahlavi regime, claimed the article was prepared by Shah orders of in the office of Hoveyda and he was unaware of the contents of the article.

Khomeini and against government officials. They shredded Ettelaat newspapers and shouted slogans against the editors and writers. Two days later, clerics and people marched in Qom, the Bazaar was closed; there were clashes between protesters and security forces; and protesters attacked the Rastakhiz Party office. Police fired in the air to disperse the protestors but then directly shot at them, killing fourteen people and injuring many more. Subsequently, many clerics were arrested and sent into exile¹. People in the cities of Tabriz, Isfahan, and Mashhad also held protests resulting in more clashes and killing of demonstrators. A group of religious students and clerics in Iran issued a statement condemned the insulting content of the published articles and massacre of the defenceless people².

Fortieth to Fortieth Strategy

One of the features of Ayatullah Khomeini's leadership was the integration of religious culture with political culture, using Islamic concepts and terms to justify his ideology more simply and comprehensively. In the Shia-Islamic culture it is customary to hold a memorial service in honour and respect 40 days after someone's death. Ayatullah Khomeini used this for widespread and organised protests which were expanded every time in response to the police's attempt to deal with the opposition.

On 18 February, the 40th day after the martyrdom of the Ettalaat protestors, a large demonstration was held in Tabriz, as Ayatullah Shariat Madari and Ayatullah Qadhi in separate statements invited people to stop all other affairs and attend memorial ceremonies. Thousands of people took to the

¹ Keyhan Newspaper, 10th January (1978), 10362.

² Ibid.

streets chanting slogans in favour of Khomeini and against the regime, attacking cinemas, banks, liquor shops, and government buildings as well as several police stations and Rastakhiz party offices. With the escalation in the protests, army tanks came to the scene and many people were killed and injured.

On the occasion of the 40th day of the martyrdom of the Tabriz protestors, Ayatullah Sadoughi, Khomeini's representative in Yazd, announced public mourning. In his statement he asked for the continuation of protests and closure of the Bazaar until the establishment of an Islamic government. The ensuing protests led to clashes between the police and people, with more casualties¹. This trend continued in Isfahan and other cities.

The Shah's regime now mandated tear gas and other means to suppress the rebellion using tear gas and other means, but as the Carter Administration further provoking anger by agreeing to sell tear gas to Iran” (Sick, 1985, p.70), the holy month of Ramadan in summer 1978 created another opportunity for the clergy to organise people in mosques for protests. Ayatullah Khomeini sent a message emphasising the unity of all opposition and calling for the continuation of the uprising until the overthrow of the “tyrannical regime”. He enjoined the armed forces from supporting the regime and asked them to stop killing their fellow Iranians and join the nation (Zanjani, 1991, 509-512).

The regular demonstrations and protests extended were now calling for the overthrow of the monarchy, and many soldiers escaped from their barracks. General Badree, the commander of the Imperial Guard, described the crisis, “In all mosques the speech is about regime change,

¹ The Author was an eyewitness of this protest.

provocation of people for the revolution and a talk about an Islamic state.” General Moghaddam, the deputy commander of SAVAK, considered the situation as a psychological war, “There is a strong correlation between the mullahs and under the religious cover, and they are pursuing a sinister purposes” (We Have Been Caught In a Psychological War: The Proceedings of Military Commanders 15-21 August 1978, 1998, p. 29).

Concerned about the capability of his security services, the Shah removed the director of SAVAK, General Nasiri, but this did not stop the opposition. A cinema fire in Abadan on 19 August, killing 277, expanded the protests as people blamed SAVAK. The Shah was forced to dismiss Prime Minister Amouzegar, appointing Sharif Emami, a cleric's son, with the slogan of "National Reconciliation Government" on 27 August.

Sharif-Emami first visited Ayatullah Shariatmadari and asked for his help to calm society. He promised to give freedom to the media, abandoned the Imperial calendar, and closed casinos. The Prime Minister announced that Khomeini could return to the country without restriction and claimed that he has sent a team to Najaf to negotiate the arrangements. However, Khomeini considered Sharif Emami's prime minister as "Shah's demonic deception" and the suggestion of reconciliation with the clergymen as "empty and deceitful promises". He encouraged people and the clergy to continue resistance.

The prayers of Eid al-Fitr at the end of Ramadan on 3 September ruined all calculations made by Sharif Emami, as they were transformed into large anti-government rallies. The Government prevented the police from clashing with the protestors to represent itself as moderate, but the feeling of safety encouraged people even more. Ayatullah Khomeini asked the population to continue their

struggle without fear until the overthrow of the American regime of the Shah, for the first time referring to the significance of rights of women and religious minorities in the Islamic State (Sahife Nour Vol 3, 1990, p.457):

"Muslim people of Iran, after holding the Eid prayer performed a more valuable act of worship; and that was chanting against the oppressive and predatory system and seeking Islamic justice. For that efforts in this path is of the most valuable worships. Continue your movement and never allow weaknesses to stop you" (Sahife Nour Vol 3, 1990, pp.454-5).

On 6 September, in the largest demonstration to date, about a million people participated with the slogan "Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic". Demonstrators gave flowers and kisses to soldiers and chanted, "Military brothers, why kill fellow brothers?" During the rally, they changed the names of streets through which they passed, including Cyrus the Great to Dr. Shariati, Pahlavi to Mossadeqh, and Reza Shah to the Islamic Revolution. At the end of the rally, they gathered at Shahyad Square and changed its name to Azadi (Freedom) Square. The final resolution demanded the dissolution of SAVAK, release of political prisoners and the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. US Ambassador William Sullivan wrote:

"The order and organisation of the demonstration march, not only surprised and amazement us but also revealed this fact that we have underestimated the organisation and activities of the opposition. Also we do not have the resources necessary among opposition groups especially Clergymen and merchants." (Sullivan, 1981)

Jaleh Square Massacre, the Catalyst for the Islamic Revolution

At 6 a.m. on 8 September, as people gathered in the streets for another mass demonstration, the regime announced a curfew in Tehran and 12 other cities. With many unaware of the curfew, forces attacked in Jaleh Square (now Maidan-e Shohada) in the capital (Sullivan, 1981, pp.514). The

military governor, accused people of protesting with "the money of a foreign plot", said 58 people were killed and 205 were injured (Baqi, 1991, p.256). The opposition claimed that more than 4,000 died, including more than 500 in Jaleh Square¹ (Abrahamian, 1982).

The incident was a turning point in the struggle against the Pahlavi regime, with the violence used by the military destroying the final links between the people and the Shah. Iranians were so shocked that Muslim and Iranian soldiers could attack that rumours spread of involvement of Israeli and American commandos dressed as Iranian troops. The anger was further stoked because the curfew law did not allow soldiers to fire any shots and, in case of resistance, the opposition should have only been arrested (The Movement of Imam Khomeini as reflected in SAVAK Documents Vol 11, 2002, p.71). US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski said:

"Jaleh Square event was so bloody that made the past conflicts between the regime and the opposition to be forgotten. This event was the end of sporadic and periodic riots and the beginning of a real revolution." (Brzezinski, 1983, pp. 27-8)

Vladimir Kuzichkin, the Second Secretary of the Soviet Union in Iran, wrote,

"The aim of the regime was to disperse protesters, but tried eliminate all of those who participated in the protests altogether." (Kuzichkin, 1990, p.241)

Khomeini believed the Shah was directly responsible for the mass killing. On 9 September, the Ayatullah sent a message to Iranians, expressing his sympathy, condemned the regime for the brutal massacre, and announced that the government of national reconciliation was illegitimate. Khomeini said that he wished that he was amongst the protesters and was killed with people while

¹ French philosopher, Michel Foucault, who was in Iran to cover the events of the revolution for an Italian newspaper, claimed that 4,000 people were shot during the day (Baqi, 1991, p.256).

fighting for the sake of God (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, pp.100-1). In another message on 21 September, he sent his condolences to all Muslims around world and the grieving families.

“By God my Mustafa was not only the one who died almost a year ago. But all slaughtered (on September the 8th) were my Mustafa ... such death is great honour and is my greatest desire, but a victory over evil is much closer” (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, p.102).

Great Maraje’ such as Ayatullah Marashi Najafi, Ayatullah Golpayegani, and Ayatullah Shariatmadari in turns condemned the tragedy and supported the Islamic movement and Ayatullah Khomeini (Hussainian, 2006).

Denying the Legitimacy of the Pahlavi regime and Expanding Protests

In the words of Gary Sick, the hate that emerged on 8 September made the continuation of the Pahlavi regime in any form impossible. It also cancelled the peaceful struggle within the framework of the Constitution in order to restore the constitutional system (Sick, 1985, p.97). “Moderate” opposition, previously unsure, joined the revolutionaries (Abrahamian, 1982). Marvin Zonis writes:

Many Iranians joined the opposition of the regime and increased their demands. For the first time moderate religious leaders stated that the massacre Jaleh Square shows that reform of Pahlavi regime is impossible, and the Shah must go (Zonis, 1991).

A day after “Black Friday”, workers at hundreds of Tehran oil refineries went on strikes, with the stoppage soon covering the entire industry. With 20% of OPEC's oil production in 1979, Iran was the second-largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia, with the world's largest oil refinery at Abadan producing around 6 million barrels of crude oil per day. Ayatullah Khomeini supported the strike, insisted on its continuation, and asked people to help the employees (Zanjani, 1991, p.516). He

summarised, “The oil strike is very important. I kiss your hand. Do whatever you can to continue the strike. If the strike is broken the movement shall fall back” (Sahife Nour Vol 2, 1990, pp.52-61). The Ayatullah formed a team, headed by Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mehdi Bazargan, to take leadership of the strike, preventing influence and control by nationalist or Marxist groups. Gradually the stoppage expanded to all ministries and government agencies.

Khomeini in Paris

After the Jaleh Square massacre, the National Reconciliation Government, having failed to secure the cooperation and participation of political and religious opposition groups, demanded that Ayatullah Khomeini desist from anti-regime activities and invoked the 1975 Algiers Treaty between Iran and Iraq to put pressure on Baghdad for his expulsion. The Imam soon immigrated to Paris.

However, the move did not fulfil the regime's expectation of a limit on Khomeini's activities. Instead, the base in France offered opportunity for contact with international press and political circles. In his first interview with French media, Khomeini described the goals of the Islamic Revolution, referred to the massacre of 8 September, and harshly criticised the Carter Doctrine:

“These days, those claiming to advocate human rights are abusers of human rights. Unfortunately, the human rights champion is the one who violate these rights the most and that person is [US President Jimmy] Carter. Recently, Tehran witnessed widespread massacre by the king, but Mr. Carter who made such fuss about a single prisoner in the Soviet Union, after successive killings committed by the Shah, did not hesitate to support the Shah” (Sahife Nour Vol 3, 1990, p.470).

Instability of the Army

The bloody events of Black Friday undermined the solidity of the army, with soldiers disobeying the orders of military commanders. At the beginning of the Jaleh Square massacre a soldier killed his commander and then shot himself; SAVAK later admitted that seven soldiers killed themselves (Pour Yazdan Parast, 2006, 177). General Gharabaghi, the Interior Minister at the time, said:

Finally, we could not understand how and why that pointless bloodshed occurred on that day, Friday 8th of September. Black Friday had an evil and bad effect on the morale of the armed forces and in fact destabilised the army (Tahan, 2015, p.85).

Jaleh Square exposed that troops came from social classes which had risen against the Pahlavi regime, and that there was a large gap between the political views and national and religious tendencies of the commanders and the soldiers. Soon members of the armed forces refused to fire on protesters and even showed friendliness when greeted with flowers (Fardoust, 1992, p.581).

From Jaleh Square to Revolution

On 14 September, less than a week after the killings in Jaleh Square, Carter sent a message of support to the Shah (Sick, 1985, p.91). Meanwhile, the US formed a special team, headed by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, to investigate the situation in Iran. The first result was the cancellation of Tehran's \$2 billion dollar purchase of 70 F-14 aircraft, ordered a few weeks earlier (Bondarevskii, 1981, p.37).

On 4 November 1978, the anniversary of Khomeini's exile, students gathered and protested in Tehran University (*See Appendix 1: Fig 11*), but were attacked and killed. Other students, upset by the event, poured into streets and attacked Western cultural symbols (Sick, 1985, p. 126) such as

banks, liquor stores, theatres, hotels, and many businesses¹. The Shah, in a televised speech, replaced the Emami Government with one led by General Azhari. He confessed to mistakes in previous years and promised that they would not be repeated (Khavaran, 2008). A day later, he imprisoned a number of former government officials such as Prime Ministers Hoveyda and Nasiri.

Khomeini was not appeased. He proclaimed that the Shah must leave, with the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Many soldiers fled their garrisons, as the Ayatullah revolutionaries, “Do not attack the militants, and target their hearts. You should try to find a place in the heart of soldiers; even if they opened fire on you....They are our brothers.” After the message, an estimated 500 soldiers left their units each day (Zanjani, 1991, p. 216).

With the beginning of the holy month of Muharram, the Revolution reached its peak. People shouted Allahu Akbar from the rooftops during the night. On the 9th and 10th days of Muharram, known as Tasua and Ashura, record protests took place in the streets of Tehran towards Shahyad Square (now Azadi Square). Ayatullah Khomeini heralded these demonstrations as the way to give allegiance to Islam and Imam Hussain and interpreted them as a referendum which left no doubt for anyone of the people's wishes (Zanjani, 1991, p. 522).

Hoping to create a gap between religious and national opposition, the Shah changed the government again on 5 January 1979, with Shapour Bakhtiar, a friend of Mohammad Musaddiq and one of the former leaders of the National Front Party, appointed as the Prime Minister. It was an ineffective step: eleven days later, the Shah and his family fled the country. Much of Iran was

¹Author himself was an eyewitness.

unified in joy and celebration, the statues of Shah and his father were pulled down, and flags of “God is Great” were raised in “the spring of freedom”. (*See Appendix 1: Fig 12*)

Khomeini congratulated people and sent five recommendations. Firstly, he asked people, especially the youth, to keep domestic order and security. Secondly, he encouraged the continuation of passionate slogans and protests against the monarchy and Bakhtiar’s government. Thirdly, he invited all religious minorities and political groups, even non-Islamic factions, to join the Islamic Revolution. Fourthly, he asked the army and police to stop supporting the Shah and join the people, as the monarch would not be returning to the country. Finally, for the first time he spoke of the formation of the temporary Revolution Government and urged the Ministers in the Bakhtiar government to resign (Sahife Nour Vol 5, 1990, 486-7). When Bakhtiar refused to quit, Khomeini announced his return to Iran, despite Washington's support of the Prime Minister and injunction to the Imam not to rush his homecoming (Yazdi, 2011). Khomeini also rejected subsequent US proposals for a referendum on selection of either the monarchy or the Islamic Republic.

Facing Ayatullah Khomeini's return on 1 February and the decision to form a Revolutionary government, the US held its line¹ but Washington was overtaken by Khomeini's appointment of Mahdi Bazargan as Prime Minister. On 10 February, following the clashes inside the Air Force camp between the Army Guard and Revolutionary personnel, people rushed to help the revolutionaries and occupied the remaining pro-Shah positions. The Bakhtiar Government departed the next day.

¹ Etelaat Newspaper, 7th February (1979).

By connecting religion with politics and internal affairs with foreign policies, Khomeini had managed to lead the Islamic Revolution to its victory. The revolution provided a new interpretation of Iran-US relations, based on anti-Americanism as an essential part of the struggle against the regime.

The United States failed to defeat Khomeini and stop the revolution for three reasons. First, it had a shortage of information from Iranian society, leading to a misreading by American officials of the exact situation of the Shah's regime and the opposition (Sick, 1985, p.146). In 1978 and 1979 the CIA had only provided two studies on Iran. A month before the Black Friday of Jaleh Square, it said Iran is not in a revolutionary or even pre-revolutionary situation. US officials were trying to analyse developments in Iran based on outdated assumptions, while many social scientists were puzzled, openly admitting that theories were not able to understand and analyse the Islamic Revolution in Iran¹. The result of this weakness was the second problem, the full support for Shah in which any criticism was avoided (Sick, 1985, p.74).

In turn, this blind support reinforced failure in communication with the opposition and especially the clerics. No Western state had a plan to change policies toward Iran and revolutionaries until the end of 1978. The first direct contact of the US with Ibrahim Yazdi, one of the close companions of Khomeini, came a month before the victory of the Revolution. The American moves were far

¹For example, Theda Skocpol in 'The Rentier State and Shi'i Islam in the Iranian Revolution' says: that the Islamic revolution of Iran has made me to review and reconstruct my theory.

Robert Loony in "Islamic Revolution and Genius" says that Islamic revolution has got such a special entity that can NOT be analyzed and discussed in the frame of common methodologies of the West. He begins his book by saying,

"Islamic revolution seems to be complicated and mysterious.

Similar point of view is seen in the work of Kiddie, Gasiorowski, Abrahamian, Shireen Hunter, John Foran and Fred Holliday.

too late, with the depth of disappointment seen in the short message of Colonel Tom Schaefer, the last US military official in Iran: “The army surrendered, Ayatullah Khomeini won, and the current regime is overthrown” (Sick, 1985, p.240) (*See Appendix 1: Fig 13*).

Questions remained unanswered. Could the US have responded constructively to the Islamic Revolution with better understanding of Khomeinism? If anti- Americanism was part of Khomeinism and the ideology of Islamic Revolution, fed by the US foreign policies towards the regime of the Shah, and if Khomeini took advantage of the this relationship for the progress of the Revolution, could the Iran-US relationship improve after the overthrow of the Shah and the victory of Islamic Revolution? If anti-Americanism is not unconditional in Khomeinism, under what circumstances could a cordial relationship be established?

Conclusion

Khomeinism is the system of ideas, judgments, and religious, cultural and political values of Ayatullah Khomeini that is central to the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran. Challenging Western superpowers, and in particular the United States of America, by overthrowing the American-backed monarchy and replacing it with the Islamic Republic, this was a new interpretation of Islam and politics (Abrahamian, 1993) (Skocpol, 1982) (Keddie, 1981). It linked clerics to political actions and fostered the organisation of social masses so they could act upon their beliefs to change the ruling political and economic structures.

Many of the historical analyses of the Islamic Revolution and its aftermath --- including those from inside Iran such as the works of Rouhani (1979), Khamenei (2003), Zanjani (1991), Mohammadi (1986) and Mojani (1996) and those outside Iran such as Abrahamian (1993), Lenczowski (1990), Gasiorowski (1991), Sick (1985), and Carlsen (1982) --- assert that “anti-Americanism”, defined as opposition to US politicians and the political system rather than the American people, is fixed, fundamental, and unconditional within Ayatullah Khomeini’s thoughts and thus within the concepts and the ideologies of the Islamic Revolution.

These assertions should be tested through an interrogation of the concept of Khomeinism in connection with a review of the “long history” of Iran-US relations. Such an interrogation, connecting the ideas of Khomeini to the politics of relations with Washington, during and after his lifetime, offers a different conclusion. “Khomeinism” was linked to anti-Americanism, but through opposition to the US system as a flexible and conditional phenomenon. The interpretations of Khomeinism were in the context of the particular development of the Iran-US relationship, American foreign policy in Iran, the Iranian system of monarchy.

The status of US for the Iranians was not fixed throughout history. Instead, it shifted from a widespread admiration of Americans, including their institutions and values, during the Constitutional Revolution to distrust and hatred of the US Administration in the years leading to and during the Islamic Revolution. The catalyst for the representation of “America” in Khomeinism was the US policies towards Iran after the 1953 coup and particularly after 1965. As Khomeini sought to organize a political reform movement and as he criticized the Shah's regime, events such as Land Reform and the White Revolution, led to the 5 June uprising in 1963 over the US demands for capitulation legislation and then to the Imam's exile. They fed the conclusion that the Shah was returned to power by the American coup of 1953 and could only maintain his regime with the support of the US. The Imam reasoned that the Shah would have no choice but to follow American policies and plans in Iran; thus, opposition to the monarch was meaningless without opposition to Washington. Therefore, over 15 years, Ayatullah Khomeini's development of his thoughts and ideologies, including his “anti-Americanism”, was linked to the development of a movement for protest and change through the clerical network, the strongest and most extensive movement in Iran.

Anti-Americanism was a motivation for the protests of people led by Ayatullah Khomeini against the Monarch, initially for the purpose of reforms and finally for a revolution. This motivation was used by Imam Khomeini to mobilise the masses and then to justify the national rise against the monarch and the establishment of a new system. However, Khomeinism did not assume anti-Americanism as deterministic and permanent. At the height of the Revolution, in reply to a reporter asking about the future relationship of the Islamic State with Washington, Khomeini said: “We have to see how the US will play its role in the future. If the US continues with its current attitude

towards the Iranian nation we will be hostile toward it. And if US respect the Iranian government we will do the same in return and will treat it justly” (Sahife Nour Vol 3, 1990, p.33). In response to the question, "Will you continue your ties with those states that express their repentance for openly supporting the Shah during the revolution in Iran?" he answered, “Yes, with all but Israel” (Sahife Nour Vol 3, 1990, p.26).

This suggests that, had the US policies towards the Shah and people of Iran been different, the historical formations of 1963-1979 might not have occurred. Khomeinism might have been known as an Islamic ideology for reformation, rather than an ideology for a revolution with an anti-American approach. However, this is a counter-factual which cannot produce lasting analysis. Instead, the factual of the developments, including the 1979 Revolution, furthered a new political system based on Khomeinism with two guiding principles in international relations: 1) creating and strengthening relationships with different nations, based on respect; and 2) preventing those relationships from being ones of domination and submission.

In Khomeinism, the challenge to dependency while having relations with great powers defines a "healthy relationship" with the following conditions:

- 1- Mutual respect;
- 2- The principle of self-determination;
- 3- Avoidance of any dominance and hegemony;
- 4- Protection of national interests;
- 5- Justice

None of this pointed to an inflexible anti-Americanism and permanent hostility. Khomeini started with a “blank slate” approach to international affairs which meant a path to a constructive relationship with the US was always possible. He set out the terms for change, "All the hatred towards the US will disappear once Washington stops its supports for Shah and Bakhtiar’s government” (Sahife Nour Vol 4, 1990, p.18). After the Revolution he reiterated, "As long as they have good relations, we will have good relations with them. If the US government stops its support for the Shah and stops interfering in our country, we will have good relationships.” (Sahife Nour Vol 4, 1990, p.197).

Despite this approach, the spirit of Anti-Americanism remained within the Iranian system and Khomeinism after the Islamic Revolution. In the eyes of Ayatullah Khomeini, the US never met the conditions for the restoration of a relationship. Washington’s cutting of diplomatic ties with Iran, the failed US attempt on Iranian soil to rescue the hostages in the American Embassy crisis, support of Saddam Hussein during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war, Washington’s backing of the terrorist organisation MKO, the downing of an Iranian passenger airplane by the USS Vincennes, and the blocking of Iranian assets were all taken as signs of American ill-will and deception. While the attempts by the US to ease the tension were inconsistent and limited, events inside Iran including the hostage crisis reduced the chance of a restored relationship.

After the death of Ayatullah Khomeini, the political developments on both sides hindered any attempt to ease tensions. In Iran, anti-Americanism became a cloak and a ground for competition among Iranian political factions and an excuse to suppress or empower political activities. For example, the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s apology in 2000 for the US role in the 1953 coup was interpreted by conservatives as a trap for the reformist Government of Mohammad

Khatami. In 2002, any hope for formation of a new relationship was destroyed when Iran was named in George W. Bush's "Axis of Evil", undermining Khatami's talk of political reform and dialogue among civilisations.

Today, 25 years after the death of Ayatullah Khomeini, anti-Americanism still exists in the doctrine of the Islamic Republic, in part because of Iranian and American policies towards each other, the region, and the world, but more importantly because there is no fixed and agreed interpretation of Khomeinism among political groups in Iran. What is interpreted in the Iran-US relationship as "anti- Americanism" is contingent on contemporary conditions rather than a view of the historical context of Khomeinism and the US. Khomeinism as the starting point for the analysis of anti-Americanism is fading, even if it is used as a political cloak in internal battles. This can be seen from the different views of Iranian officials such as the Imam's apostles (Ayatullah Khamenei and Ayatullah Hashemi Rafsanjani) and the political parties (Reformists and Principlists) regarding anti-Americanism and the Iran-US relationship. With the Supreme Leader, Ayatullah Khamenei, having the greatest political power, what is often interpreted as Khomeinism is in fact Khameneism.

Although Ayatullah Khamenei is insisting on anti-Americanism and helping ensure that the rhetoric persists, a more positive projection of engagement, both from Washington and Tehran, is also evident. President Rouhani, taking a sustained step towards a new relationship, is trying to overcome the rhetoric of anti-Americanism by gathering support within the Iranian system. He faces political, economic and military factors that continue to drive anti-Americanism but this only hinders rather than shuts down the prospect of change. As Ayatullah Khomeini said:

“We do not want to cut ties; we're seeking to cut the dependence of Iran from foreign governments.We neither are going to cut the oil lines nor shut the doors to this country, but we will not turn the country into the consumer market of West. Our policy is always based on freedom, independence and protection of interests of people and we will never sacrifice (these) for anything” (Sahife Nour Vol 4, 1990, p.229).

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Photos

Courtesy of Iran National Library, Foreign Ministry, The Institute for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies (IICHS)



Figure 1 Mirza Aligholi Khan, Iran first Ambassador to USA, with his wife




Figure 2 The U.S. flag flies over the U.S. consulate near Arg e Tabriz, Iran, during Iran's Constitutional Revolution.



Figure3 Baskerville picture woven on it was made by the carpet weavers of Tabriz Constitution House of Tabriz



Figure 4: Baskerville bust at the museum of the Constitution House of Tabriz



Figure 5 Morgan Shuster, Late general-treasurer of Persia



Figure 6 1953 coup, Supporters of coup attack the residence of Prime Minister Mosaddegh.



Figure7 Demonstrations held by various groups and organisation in support of Mosaddegh



Figure 8 Richard Nixon Interview with Press, Tehran, December 1953



Figure 9 Richard Nixon and Fazlollah Zahedi after 1953 coup in Iran



Figure 10 Shah giving a speech during “2,500 year celebration of the Persian Empire” at the presence of foreign guests.



Figure 11 Security forces enforcing Curfew – 4th November 1978-Tehran University



Figure 12 People celebrating the Shah's leaving the country and awaiting the return of Ayatullah Khomeini



Figure 13 Fortification and armed fights during the final days of revolution

Appendix 2: Documents and Letters

Courtesy of Iran National Library, Foreign Ministry, The Institute for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies (IICHS)




Figure 1 Ayatullah Shirazi's fatwa on forbidding the use of Tobacco.



باميراث خداوند

محمد رضا پسر شاه ایران

ع ۱۳۴۰

نظر اصل بیست و هفتم قانون اساسی مقرر میداریم

ماده اول - لایحه اصلاحی قانون اصلاحات ارضی مصوب نوزدهم دیماه ۱۳۴۰

و ملحقات آن که براساس اصل بیست و ششم قانون اساسی با تصویب ملی استقرار

و قطعیست یافته و منضم این دستخط است بوقع اجرا گذارده شود

ماده دوم - بیست دولت مأمور اجرای این قانون شدند تاریخ نهم بهمن ماه ۱۳۴۱ و حواله شد

Figure 2 Shah's order in regards to land reform program

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* با توجه به لایحه شماره ۱۸ / ۲۲۹۱ / ۲۱۵۷۴ دولت و ضمیمه آن که در تاریخ ۱۳۴۲ / ۱۰ / ۲۵ به مجلس سنا تقدیم شده بدولت اجازه داده میشود که رئیس و ادعای هیئت مستشاری ندایی ایالات متحده آمریکا را در ایران که به موجب موافقتنامه های مربوطه در استخدام دولت شاهنشاهی میباشد از مسئولیت ها و تعهداتی که شامل کارمندان اداری و غیره میباشند در بند ماده اول قرارداد بین مصوب
میباشد بر خوردار نماید *

ماده واحده فوق در جلسه علنی مجلس سنا بتاريخ ششم مرداد ۱۳۴۲ بمصوب

Figure 4: Order for the Capitulation Bill to be in action