

# **THE POLITICS OF PEACE EDUCATION IN CYPRUS**

by

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*“Truth...is forever elusive. You never quite find it but the search for it is compulsive. The **search** is clearly what drives the endeavour. The search is your task. More often than not you stumble upon the truth in the dark, colliding with it or just glimpsing an image or a shape which seems to correspond to the truth, often without realising that you have done so. But the real truth is that **there never is any such thing as one truth** to be found...There are many. These truths challenge each other, recoil from each other, reflect each other, ignore each other, tease each other, are blind to each other. Sometimes you feel you have the truth of a moment in your hand, then it slips through your fingers and is lost.” (Pinter, 2005, p.1)*

*“If we believe that to think radically about the formation of the current situation is to exculpate those who committed acts of violence, we shall freeze our thinking in the name of a questionable morality. But if we paralyze our thinking in this way, we shall fail morality in a different way. We shall fail to take **collective responsibility** for a thorough understanding of the history that brings us to this juncture. We shall thereby deprive ourselves of the very **critical and historical resources we need to imagine and practise another future**, one that will move beyond the current cycle of revenge.” (Butler, 2004, p.10, emphasis mine)*

## ABSTRACT

The focus of this thesis is *resistance to peace education* in the conflict-ridden island of Cyprus. Departing from the premise that education, and in particular antagonistic historical narratives immersed in demonised articulations of the Other, have obstructed the transformation of the conflict, I attempt to uncover what is crippling constructive dialogue and critical thinking when it comes to peace education in the Greek-Cypriot community and bring forward ways to improve this. In particular, I analyse negative hegemonic discourses over potential changes to history textbooks that not only distort the objectives of peace education, but also exacerbate existing fears and insecurities. These nationalist discourses present changes associated with peace education as a betrayal and threat to the nationalist struggle, a process I argue constitutes the *securitization* of peace education. Through the ‘politics of peace education’ framework, I show how within a particular community, institutions and discourses both constitute and are constitutive of, asymmetric power relationships that act as impediments to peace education. I expose and interrogate the conditions of possibility that ensure resistance to peace education is not only reproduced, but is also successful through the exercise of asymmetrical power relations.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKEL	Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού, Progressive Party of Working People
BDH	Peace and Democracy Movement
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CTP	Republican Turkish Party
DIKO	Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα, Democratic Party
DISY	Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός, Democratic Rally
EOKA	Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών, National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
IPRA	International Peace Research Association
KATAK	Turkish Minority Association
MoEC	Ministry of Education and Culture
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PEC	Peace Education Commission
RoC	Republic of Cyprus
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organization
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programmes
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
YBH	Patriotic Union Movement



## INTRODUCTION

*A component of your machine, that is what I am,  
and my son- the spare part,  
He will last for a lifetime, working for you,  
he is made up of excellent material*

*I was born with a 'why',  
hidden deep in my heart  
Which ones am I serving?  
Who have me tuned like clockwork?*

*They brought me and told me  
to never use my voice  
that being born  
was itself a great privilege*

*A component of your machine, that is what I am,  
(Eleni Vitali, song lyrics, 'Ark', transl. by author)*

One would be forgiven for associating Cypriot summers with sparkling blue beaches, mental relaxation and an overdose of sunshine. Yet, there seems to be something about hot summers and tragedy in Cyprus. Ask any Greek Cypriot and they will refer to a number of 'black summers': the Turkish invasion of 1974; the Helios Airways

plane crash in 2005, or more recently, the deadly explosion at the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base in 2011. But one particular ‘black summer’ has remained imprinted in my memory, the killing of Tasos Isaac and Solomos Solomou in August 1996, both unarmed civilians in their mid-twenties.<sup>1</sup> The killings, by the Turkish forces, sent shock waves across the island and widespread fear prevailed as there was talk of the two consecutive murders, and tens of other injured Greek-Cypriots, developing into large-scale violence. Fearing a war, my family, like others, cut our holiday short and returned back to our hometown.

Although I was already immersed in nationalist, anti-Turkish culture from both informal and formal educational influences, and as a very responsible 10-year old student took my patriotic duties seriously, I was not the least prepared for the blatant cruelty of the Turks that was repeatedly shown on all the television channels that summer. The image of the Turks that my teachers presented during class – evil, greedy, immoral barbarians – came alive before my eyes. So was the image of the Greeks to which I was told I had the privilege of belonging to: a peaceful demonstrator Tasos beaten to death,<sup>2</sup> and his heroic, brave cousin, Solomos, who attempted to lower the Turkish flag three days after Taso’s lynching, being shot in the head, stomach and neck by a Turkish officer. The scene of Solomos climbing the flagpole, being shot and then falling down, blood spurting everywhere, merely

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<sup>1</sup> Tasos, who was 24, left behind his pregnant wife. Solomos, 26, in order to demonstrate against his cousin’s (Tasos) murder entered the buffer zone in Dherynia where Taso was murdered and tried to lower the Turkish flag from the mast. Two British peace-keepers were also wounded through shots fired by the Turkish security forces. The European Court of Human Rights issued two rulings against Turkey, given that both victims were unarmed and had not been violent, and because Turkey failed to conduct a proper investigation into the killings.

(<http://www.moa.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/all/8D32488C9CA5FEC4C2257473001D46FF?opendocument&print>). Yet, presenting and treating them as national heroes to this day (for example, Defence Minister Fotis Fotiou referred to them as ‘hero-martyrs’ and as ‘paragons of virtue’ in a commemoration event in 2006, and as many as four songs have been written for Solomos, and one for Tasos’s daughter who was born after his death) is problematic, especially given that entering the buffer zone was risky and calling such acts heroic may encourage their repetition.

<http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moa/Agriculture.nsf/All/817D6FCCA7441B43C22571C0003D46AF?OpenDocument>

<sup>2</sup> The terrorist neo-fascist organisation which lynched Tasos is called Grey Wolves, which in my mind, as a child, quite literally took the form of hybrid creatures, half-men and half-wolves!

confirmed the existing stereotypes. Both of the victims were immediately added to our ‘collective memory’ list; the list that included memory of not only the Missing Persons and the past heroes who lost their lives defending our beautiful island from the Turkish invasion of 1974, but also the memories of the ‘stolen land’- those pictures of the Keryneia harbour as well as of Varosha beaches, the popular tourist destination in Famagusta before it became part of today’s ‘ghost city’. For the younger ones it was simply pictures, since it was only years later, in 2003, that the borders opened and crossing over to the other side was allowed. For the older ones, it was a lifetime of childhood memories. Either way, this picturesque land was still there, and it was expecting us to regain it. To this day, previous inhabitants have a romanticised version of these spaces, and as refugees, being so abruptly displaced from their homes, they often understandably talk about leaving behind ‘a part of their soul’ the day they had to flee.

At school, with the help of images, stories and poems, our teachers talked about the thousands of refugees, the Missing Persons, the destruction of religious sites, some of which had even been converted to museums, stables or nightclubs. These spaces had been elevated to an almost ‘holy land’ status and we, the younger generation, had the duty to remember the struggles of our heroes, and to honour their sacrifices by doing the best we could to fight for justice. After the summer of 1996, I was able to give more substance in my mind to the ‘I do not forget, and I struggle’ (Δεν Ξεχνώ και Αγωνίζομαι) campaign that was inscribed on our state-provided history textbooks and notebooks.<sup>3</sup> It mattered little that we never lived through any of the violence of

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<sup>3</sup> Even though I attended a private school, our ‘Greek’ lessons were taught by teachers who had attended either Greek or Cypriot universities and saw it as their pedagogical duty to keep the past alive so that the ‘struggle’ continues through us. Private schools have to include in their curricula at least six periods of teaching of the Greek language and these are obligatory for students who have at least one Greek-Cypriot parent (MoEC, 2004, p.15). History lessons are often taught during these ‘Greek’ classes.

the invasion and hence we had no living memory of these events; in fact, it seemed that this was exactly why it was imperative to keep the ‘collective memory’ alive. Not doing so would risk the loss of memory and hence, according to the logic of this mantra, lose the momentum and determination to restore justice and regain the lost land. So it was a two-way process: the adults had a duty to teach the young, and the young had a duty to ‘tune in’, unquestionably soaking up the official narrative.

I refer to adults in general, and not just educators, as this campaign was indeed a wider sociological and political process, one that somehow affected almost every aspect of everyday life in Cyprus: from the family unit, to the classroom, the media, the Church, museums, music, theatre, art and poetry. With every chance, the Greek Cypriots took the opportunity to remember and to struggle. Given the violation of human rights, and that the international community and the United Nations (UN) condemned Turkey’s actions, this gave a moral and legal foundation on which to build the case for the reversal of this injustice, the punishment of the perpetrators, and the refugees being allowed to return back to their homes.<sup>4</sup> One such example was the mass demonstration on the 20<sup>th</sup> of May 1992, at the Ledra Palace border crossing. According to the newspaper *Simerini*, thousands of demonstrators shouted ‘No to the Turkification’ of Cyprus through the new ‘Set of Ideas’ of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Boutros-Ghali introduced this framework for negotiations in April 1992 and proposed “a secular, bi-zonal, bi-communal federal republic composed of two politically equal states” which would be submitted for a public referendum to both communities.<sup>5</sup> I was six years old in 1992, making it highly unlikely that I had any idea of what the framework for negotiations consisted of, let alone disagree with

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<sup>4</sup> For a discussion on how Greek Cypriots have used the UN framework (international principles and norms) to construct and strengthen their negotiating position see Richmond, 2002.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/cyprus.php?page=6>



it, yet there I was, once more, participating and fulfilling my duties (see Figure 1.1, p.6). This image shows the type of ‘moulding’ that took place in our hearts and minds from a young age.

I mention this personal story in order to offer a window, into the world of the Greek Cypriots’ upbringing after 1974. The ‘I do not forget’ campaign not only continues today (albeit to a different degree, see Chapter Four), but was in place from as early as 1975. Yet, as the story shows, mourning and trauma are particularly liable to policies and practices of politicisation that aim at nationalising emotions into a larger collective scale (see also Ahmed, 2004; Zembylas 2008; Bekerman and Zembylas, 2012). The same is true for the politicisation of memory, and to be more accurate, selective memory, since choosing which historical events to remember and which to stay silent about, inevitably dooms the latter events to oblivion (Papadakis, 2003, p.254). This story also shows how not only formal education and the wider socialisation into the conflict ethos, but also contemporary events, contribute towards a negative disposition toward the Turks and Turkish Cypriots (besides, the two were, and still are, rarely differentiated both inside and outside the school). In other words, Greek-Cypriots use their existing knowledge and prejudices as a lens through which they ‘witness’ the validity of their arguments, just like I did with the two murders. This story also gives an indication of the categorisation of the Self as the victim that always acts in defence, and the Other as the perpetrator. In this context, it becomes possible to begin to understand the nature of the education system, but also of Greek Cypriots’ attitudes towards the Other.

Figure 1.1. Simerini Newspaper, 21<sup>st</sup> May 1992, 'No to the Turkification'



## **Resistance to Peace Education in Cyprus**

How a group identifies the Other vis-à-vis the Self in a conflict context has a direct impact on the peacebuilding process. It acts as a lens through which one views not only the past and understands the present, but also envisions the future. Lack of empathy, a failure to acknowledge or remaining in denial about the Other's pain and trauma, has prevented the two main communities<sup>6</sup> in Cyprus from working together towards rapprochement, as they talk past each other rather than *to* each other. Attitudes toward a particular peacebuilding framework, therefore, and identity representations are inextricably linked. Constructing a victim identity and discourse is an empowering act that is used for serving particular political and ideological agendas, and through this, resisting others. Identity articulations are used in peacebuilding processes not only in order to pursue restitution claims with social justice in mind (Barkan, 2000) but also 'to score moral and political points in the local and international political arena' (Zembylas, 2013, p.35). The demonstration shown in Figure 1.1. can be seen as an example of citizens resisting a top-down peacebuilding process, in this case the UN-led peace talks.

The focus of this thesis, however, is *resistance to peace education*, peace education being a particular peacebuilding tool and process that does not necessarily involve high-level negotiations, nor is it limited to a particular direction of origin. In Cyprus the role of education vis-à-vis the conflict often forms part of everyday discussions, and negotiation of identity representations in and through education takes place on a

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<sup>6</sup> Although my thesis will refer to the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities as the two main communities of the conflict, we must keep in mind that Cyprus has been and continues to be, the place of other minority groups: Armenians, Maronites, Latins and Roma (see Varnava, 2009).

much broader level (than UN-led talks, for example). Departing from the premise that education, and in particular antagonistic historical narratives immersed in demonised articulations of the Other, have obstructed the transformation of the conflict, I attempt to uncover what is crippling constructive dialogue and critical thinking when it comes to peace education in the Greek-Cypriot community and bring forward ways to improve this. Although the conflict dynamic is at the core of this resistance, and hence, both communities play an important role, this study is an in-depth investigation of Greek-Cypriot resistance to peace education. Through the ‘politics of peace education’ framework, I investigate how, within a particular community, institutions and discourses both constitute and are constitutive of, asymmetric power relationships that act as impediments to peace education. I expose and interrogate the *conditions of possibility* that ensure resistance to peace education is not only reproduced but is also successful.<sup>7</sup> In other words, resistance to peace education has successfully prevented widespread, sustainable, societal change. What makes this resistance possible? What makes it acceptable to those that accept and practise it? Finally, what makes resistance to peace education so successful?

Greek-Cypriots perceive peace education, broadly speaking, in two ways: either as a positive and necessary reconciliation tool, or as a precarious concept that represents a betrayal to the nationalist struggle and hence, should be avoided at all costs. An underlying premise here is that whether something is perceived and constructed as a political problem depends on the narrative in which it is discussed i.e. how one makes sense of his/her situation. Therefore, peace education as a social construct involves more than just one possible meaning and interpretation, and examining the divergent

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<sup>7</sup> Success here is defined as the ability to prevent peace education activities from extending beyond the small community of peace-related NGOs and their limited public outreach.

and competing 'modes of reasoning' (Weldes, 1998) is pertinent if we are to make sense of the struggle over peace education, let alone challenge the established assumptions. These two modes can be traced into the hegemonic negative discourse which is predominantly emanating from the public, the Church, the media and political elites (state machinations), and the marginalised positive discourse which is being reproduced through the 'conflict-transformation discourse' of civil society (Farrington, 2008, p.133).

Existing scholarly approaches either fail to explicitly engage with the failure of peace education in Cyprus, or when doing so take a positivist position, viewing education as an independent variable within a cause-effect model (see for example Sitas, Latif and Loizou, 2007). However, I argue that such approaches are misleading as they overlook the circularity that is an endogenous characteristic of peace education i.e. that the hostile attitudes and ideas that it aims to transform are those preventing its implementation in the first place. Such approaches also do not allow for a deeper understanding of resistance to peace education. They, therefore, ultimately fail to explain how certain educational practices and policies are possible whereas others are not.

How, therefore, can we explain that, forty years after the Turkish invasion, efforts at promoting peace education in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) remain largely unsuccessful, both at a formal and informal level? Given almost four decades of peace negotiations, one would perhaps expect a more positive attitude towards peace education. Do Greek-Cypriots not want peace? What is it that makes them so seemingly averse to education, the aim of which is peace? How can we explain this

resistance, given historical and contemporary (social, cultural and educational) developments and practices? This makes it imperative to examine the ways and extent to which particular operations of *power* make practices of peace education in Cyprus impossible.

Moreover, how is this resistance expressed in the wider discourse? The different meanings attributed to peace education and how these meanings affect the conditions of possibility/success for peace education are key themes of this research. What can we learn from these articulations? In other words, how can an examination of these discourses help us reach a better understanding of what it is that people are afraid of and why?

To a certain extent, given the cyclical nature of peace education, the attitudes, dispositions and arguments are inextricably linked to the wider conflict discourse, and in many ways the educational debate can be seen as a micro site of resistance- a microcosm of the Cyprus conflict. This also explains why, seen from the reverse, peace education forms part of the wider peacebuilding effort. Therefore, as we shall see in the empirical chapters, many of the issues of contention revolve around arguments that are presented as part of the wider resistance to peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus. However, to claim that they are identical would be to disregard the particular characteristics, paradoxes and ambiguities of the educational debate, as well as those public perceptions or assumptions that are specific to (the nature and purpose of) history education, and hence, risk losing useful insights that can help move peace education initiatives forward.

After a brief introduction, it is necessary to offer a more thorough understanding of the nature, objectives and rationale of this thesis. I begin by contextualising peace education within the so-called ‘Cyprus Problem’, before offering a detailed definition of what peace education is. I then provide the rationale for my core research question, showing how it enables me to offer both a conceptual and empirical contribution to the existing literature. Emphasis is then placed on defining the conceptual tools that I will be using in this study. I conclude this chapter by outlining the structure of the thesis.

### **Peace Education and (the problem with) the ‘Cyprus Problem’**

The famous psychiatrist Vamik Volkan describes Cyprus as ‘a splendid “laboratory” for interethnic studies’ (1997, p.94). Indeed, although far from unique (for example Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka and Israel-Palestine are just as interesting cases) Cyprus starkly illustrates how potent resistance to peace education initiatives can be. At the same time Cyprus differs in that, unlike Israel-Palestine, it has enjoyed relative stability and violence-free conditions - what Galtung (1969) has famously called ‘negative peace’. The last time the island experienced large-scale violence was in 1974. Investigating the dynamics, resistance, but also content of peace education varies not least due to the contextual conditions in which these activities are practiced (Harris, 2004, p.6; Haavelsrud & Stenberg 2012, p.66). For example, peace education in an area of ‘hot’ conflict (like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) would work under different circumstances and obstacles, and have different manifestations to the one in Cyprus. Despite the lack of physical violence, ‘positive peace’ however, is lacking from Cyprus; the system of ideas, representations and attitudes that are in place

amount to an absence of ‘positive peace’ (Galtung, 1969), a structural violence that is both a product and productive of, the conflict.

More than five decades after the United Nations first deployed its peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (1964), and after several diplomatic initiatives failed to reach a political settlement, the intractability of the conflict is perhaps one of the few points that both parties agree on.<sup>8</sup> Greek-Cypriots currently control the south of Cyprus, internationally recognized as the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). Turkey is the only country that refuses to recognize the RoC. The north side on the other hand, was self-proclaimed as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983 and is not recognized by any state- apart from Turkey (UN Resolutions No. 541 and 550). Often, Turkey is perceived as the real player in the northern part’s main affairs, not just de facto but also by formal institutions.<sup>9</sup> The acceptance of Cyprus in the EU as a divided country in May 2004 has cemented the gap between the two sides, reinforcing rather than bridging the divisions (Tocci, 2004; Kyris, 2012).<sup>10</sup> Only a few days earlier, the Greek-Cypriots had overwhelmingly (over 75%) rejected a UN proposal – the Annan Plan V- for reuniting the island in an island-wide referendum, whereas the majority of Turkish-Cypriots (almost 65%) voted in favour. The peacebuilding process in Cyprus has become ‘interminably protracted’, involving circular negotiations between political elites that are not always seriously interested in compromising for the interests of peace (Newman and Richmond, 2006, pp.101-102). In addition, failure to include and consult the public in the peacebuilding process which led up to the referendum, meant that despite its strengths, it remained ‘a highly

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<sup>8</sup> Although a detailed historical background of the conflict will form part of the next chapter, it is useful here to give a very brief geo-political description.

<sup>9</sup> This is illustrated by the famous path-setting court case of Titina Loizidou, when the European Court of Justice ruled in favour of the said Greek-Cypriot and ordered Turkey to pay her compensation for her lost property in the north (Diez, 2002, p.2).

<sup>10</sup> Diez warned about this when he argued that if only one state became a member then this would ‘reify the boundaries between self and other in both communities’ self-construction’ (2002, p.11; see also Richmond, 2002).



secretive process of international diplomacy’ (Lordos, 2009, p.162) which certainly did not help put public concerns and fears at ease.

Before addressing the ‘problem’ with the ‘Cyprus Problem’, and given that writing is a political act, it is important to delineate what I ‘do’ and ‘don’t do’ with the terms I use. Concerning the way I use the TRNC acronym in my work, using it as TRNC, and not as ‘TRNC’ (with inverted commas)- as is the common way and the only accepted one by the RoC- is often deemed as an act of treating the north side of Cyprus as a legal entity, thereby not only violating the UN resolutions, but rendering the military invasion and the persistence of the military troops until today as valid and legal.<sup>11</sup> However, I am strongly against both the military invasion (as I am of *any* military invasion of such a scale that causes more deaths than it saves lives) and against recognizing as legal, states which the UN does not recognize. I respect that the UN resolutions are there for a reason (which is why, like the UN, I refer to it as an ‘invasion’ and not a peace operation- see Chapter One), but refuse to be entangled in *discourses of recognition* that both sides have become obsessed with- and popularize in order to serve domestic and international political gains (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2002)- and that neither of them needs. However, what I do recognise, is the right of the Turkish Cypriots to live in Cyprus with their full political and social rights. I recognize ‘that there is such a thing as the TRNC, whether legal or not, and that as all names and symbols, this one, too, is about representation’ (Diez, 2002, p.12). I have therefore, decided to use this acronym as Turks and Turkish Cypriots who live in the TRNC use it, not only out of respect to them but also in order to seriously engage with any related discourses that refer to the TRNC.

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<sup>11</sup> Personally, I would like to see a strong demilitarisation of the whole island.

Unlike the contested TRNC acronym, referring to the Cyprus issue as the ‘Cyprus Problem’ has been the norm in both academic and non-academic discourse. However, doing so objectifies the conflict in a manner that implies that the conflict can actually be ‘solved by rational “problem solvers” from the outside’, underestimating the degree to which both the definition and representation of subject identities are actually part of the problem they purport to solve (Diez, 2002, p.5). It also implies that once a peace settlement is agreed on, then a solution will emerge, overlooking the requirements for long-term self-sustainability of a political agreement. This, of course, underestimates the deep impact the conflict has had on the Cypriots, spanning over a period of at least five decades.

It is telling perhaps that in Greek, the ‘Cyprus Problem’ is described as ‘to Kypriako’- literally translated as ‘the Cypriot’-an adjective, that has taken the form of a substance (a noun), as if it were a pre-existing entity. Interestingly, in everyday conversation, when one is complaining to another for being late, he or she often rhetorically enquires as to the reasons for the delay with some degree of sarcasm: *‘Were you trying to solve the Cyprus Problem?’ (Prospathouses na lyseis to Kypriako?)* This implies that attempting to solve the Cyprus conflict would take an enormous amount of time, resemble a Sisyphean task, and make the person supposedly late.<sup>12</sup> The context and frequency of this comment in everyday conversation is but a reflection of how entrenched into the socio-cultural life of its inhabitants the Cyprus conflict has become.

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<sup>12</sup> See Christodoulou 2008, for an analysis of the reasons that render Cyprus suitable for peace education. This thesis also draws on material presented as part of my two MA dissertations (Christodoulou 2008; 2009).

Therefore, if there is any chance for achieving reconciliation between the two sides, it is important to try and achieve conflict-transformation in the minds of the people. The mainstream approach to conflict-resolution in Cyprus has usually centered on the state, politicians, diplomatic talks and other measures associated with ‘high politics’. Yet, whatever the theoretical or political merits of this approach, the reality in Cyprus (and in other post-conflict societies) is that reliance on this top-down approach has not delivered the expected results throughout the past 40 years. Existing studies have already shown how those who are exposed to peace education are more likely to become conducive towards the Other and towards a peaceful solution than those who are not (Hadjipavlou, 2002; Obdura, 2002; Nevo and Brem 2002; Wesselss, 2005; IPE 2007; Danesh 2011). This makes it all the more important to have peace education but also to understand the intractable attitudes that are part of this conflict. Transformation can only be brought about, and be sustainable, if it involves local practices, structures and organisations, as well as citizens from across civil society. It is after all, these people who currently resist peace education, and who have the potential and power to support or reject a proposed referendum for a solution.

Yet, the mere implementation of peace education is no guarantee for a ‘solution’; although peace education brings with it a potential for change, ultimately, it is but one of the many aspects required for a political solution (other related issues are external powers such as Turkey, Greece, USA, financial, territorial, military issues etc.; see Michael, 2009). I am therefore not offering a blueprint project of how peace education will and can ‘solve’ the Cyprus ‘problem’. As I have already argued, doing so would be misguided, as it is not a problem that can be solved, or whose ‘solution’ can be somehow traced back to its ‘causes’. It is a situation that can and needs to be

transformed, from an exclusionary and negative paradigm to a constructive and pluralist one.<sup>13</sup>

### **What is Peace Education?**

My definition of peace education includes education about peace, but it is much more than (and much more complicated than) merely teaching students the essence and desirability of peace. I view peace education as crucially including education *for* peace i.e. as a specific peacebuilding tool aimed at conflict-ridden societies, with a clear reconciliation objective, rather than a tool for general non-violent attitudes and societal betterment. Unlike other authors, my focus is not on how peace education can help make societies in general less violent, or how the study of peace in schools can enhance the ‘purpose of education’ (Harris, 2002, p.28), but conversely how education can prove conducive to peace. I therefore view peace education as ‘a pedagogical supplement to the political and diplomatic efforts at achieving peace’ (Wintersteiner, 2004, p.90). Within a conflict setting peace education no longer represents a universally agreed force for good that should be taught, but it becomes a highly controversial matter as it dares to ‘invade’ matters that have been almost set in stone for decades. It challenges deeply held convictions about the Self, the Other, the past, the present, and hence, how the future will look like.

Peace education disrupts existing stereotypes, myths and demonization discourses, and through empathy, counter-hegemonic historical narratives, and critical thinking

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<sup>13</sup> It is also in this context that I have preferred to use the term peace education rather than conflict-resolution education. The two are often used interchangeably in the literature, and although there is nothing essentially erroneous about this, I deemed it more appropriate to choose peace education since the phrase conflict-resolution has connotations of something that has a beginning and an end (the end being the ‘solution’) whereas peace education will be used on a long-term, if not permanent, basis, even after a potential political solution.

helps promote reconciliation as well as acknowledgement of the others' pain. Reconciliation involves re-establishing harmony and cooperation between the antagonistic communities which have previously inflicted harm to each other (Fisher 2001, p.326), or in Lederach's terms, it means to 'rebuild positive relationships' (1997, p.26). Peacebuilding is understood as encompassing the full array of activities and processes needed to 'transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships', where relationships are the centrepiece for understanding the system of conflict (Lederach, 1997, p.20). According to Gallagher, peace education was instrumental in making Northern Ireland progress further than Cyprus in its peacebuilding process:

'the educational system of Northern Ireland has been able to pursue many incremental peace education efforts that have helped to move its society along thus far' (2007, p.31, cited in Salomon, 2011, p.52).

Peace education, therefore, should arguably be implemented strategically for achieving and sustaining the transformative process of reconciliation, within a wider peacebuilding context.

A simple explanation of what peace education 'is' or rather what it 'does' can be offered by a personal metaphor. Coming from a nationalist background, peace education for me had similar effects to the act of wearing sight glasses. Anyone who has had to wear glasses due to an eyesight problem, when remembering the first moment they actually wore their new glasses, will probably recall that their reaction was one of surprise and then of empowerment and emancipation: surprise from all the

things that they could see which they could not before; empowered and emancipated in that they could embark on their daily activities without obstructions and limitations. It is not just that one can see things they never noticed were there before, but they can also see things that were blurred and distorted more clearly. More importantly, when looking at one's self in the mirror these glasses help to notice all the imperfections or scars, which the self was previously blissfully oblivious to. Similarly, peace education might be painfully surprising at first, given that one comes into contact with the atrocities of one's own side, and acknowledges the pain and suffering of the other, just as it is empowering and liberating in the sense that 'nationalistic duties' stemming from partisan histories are transformed into a desire for respect of one's shared humanity, rights and dignity.

Although later in the thesis (Chapter Three) I do offer a detailed normative exposition of the form, scope and content of peace education, if it were operationalised in Cyprus, what is more important, in the current environment of educational stagnation, is what it *means* for the people of Cyprus and those who have an interest in the Cyprus conflict. A shift to local perceptions of peace education - viewing peace education as a *discursive construct* - will draw attention to the signifying power and practices associated with peace education.

Discourses act as filters which consciously or unconsciously shape the way we express ourselves and communicate with others, both linguistically and non-linguistically. They are present in our representations, through texts, images, metaphors, behaviours etc. (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p.4). The hegemonic discourse has the 'common sense' framework embedded. The counter- hegemonic

sense has the alternative sense at its core, which is literally *not* so 'common'. This is where the danger lies; when the assumptions held in discourses are so common and internalised that we take them or granted; they are perceived as 'normal' and we therefore never think of questioning them. To the contrary, we only question anything that seems to deviate from this 'structured, relational totality' (Doty, 1996, p.6). This is dangerous because if we are not aware of the assumptions, then how can we ever attempt to reflect on them in a critical manner, let alone change them?

We cannot, therefore, adequately understand the politics of peace education in Cyprus without examining the discursive struggle over peace education. Consistent with a Foucauldian approach (see Chapter Three) I perceive discourses as relatively autonomous, lacking a clear sense of origin, or pre-existing subject. Discourses are historically located, yet contingent systems of representations that affect how people talk, think and construct social realities (Milliken, 1999, p.229). Adopting this so-called 'thick signifier approach' (Geertz, 1973; see for example, Huysmans, 1998) will enable a more sophisticated and contextual understanding than has hitherto been offered by the existing literature on peace education. Emphasis is given to the order of meaning which peace education articulates rather than the ingredients of it. This will improve our understanding of resistance to peace education, but also bring forward ways of improving the already existing supportive discourses.

Nevertheless, explaining what peace education 'is' or what the 'peace education agenda' consists of can be misleading: not only is peace education highly contextual and contingent, but in the particular case of Cyprus it does not even exist on a formal level, and is extremely limited on an informal level. This raises two important issues

that run through the thesis: a methodological and a conceptual one. Firstly, how does one study resistance to something that actually has not really occurred? My ‘conditions of possibility’ approach offers a methodological way out of this problem by showing how embedded power structures have made it difficult for education as an island wide institution to consider the possibilities of peace education. This absence has long historical roots ending up in modern ethnonationalist opposition to educational reconciliation (see Chapter One), which I trace through discourses and institutions (see Chapters Four and Five).

Secondly, the limited application of peace education in Cyprus raises a tension between peace education in theory, and peace education in practice. Although when discussing peace education I theoretically and normatively subscribe to rather radical approaches, empirically a more conservative form of peace education is proposed, that reflects the reality on the ground, and in particular, the state’s control of information, institutions and resources. In other words, the roots of the my conceptual framework draw on critical theorists like John Dewey, Paulo Freire, Betty Reardon and Henry Giroux, who emphasise liberation from oppressive power structures i.e. view peace education as a radical social practice. However, these expectations from peace education are ‘watered down’ when addressing the Cyprus context, and a more conservative (but still direct) form of peace education is proposed which encompasses both the state and society. This does not only reflect the reality on the ground, and the importance of addressing the material power of the state (RoC) and its sovereign claims, but is also in accordance with the overarching purpose of this thesis, which is



to try and find ways which can reduce the distance between those who are for peace education, and those who are against it.<sup>14</sup>

To conclude this section about what peace education means, it is useful to point out that although the public speak of it as if it is an agreed fixed concept, and think that the self and other perceptions of it are the same, they are in many cases talking about different things. This observation is telling in itself, as the fact that they think they disagree on peace education, when they have different visions of what peace education consists of, shows that firstly, there is perhaps room for more optimism than one might expect. Secondly, it highlights the need to move towards some kind of clarification of the aims of peace education in Cyprus. Of course, there are those cases, where the incongruity is deep and real, and there is disagreement on even the most basic ontological issues, e.g. when nationalists exhibit a stubborn refusal to even consider anything associated with any change. What one regards as ‘peace oriented’, is perceived as ‘history betrayal’ by another, but this is part of the struggle that the thesis is trying to uncover. In this context, identifying a conflation or misunderstanding of the goals of peace education, can prove useful, especially for those subject positions which exhibit resistance, when in fact this has been the result of a misrepresentation and securitization of peace education (see Chapter Five).

This is also valid in relation to the particular discussions of potential history textbook changes- with people bringing in mind the ‘burning of heritage’ and other exaggerated understandings. Indeed, I contend that there is an integral relationship

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<sup>14</sup> This tension can also be viewed as related to what Hay has termed the ‘postmodern tension’ which he argues is found in Foucault’s work (which I draw upon in this thesis). This refers to a clear tension between a philosophical position that is sceptical towards claims to objectivity and privileged access to knowledge whilst remaining (Hay, 1994/5; see also Hay, 2002, pp.192-93, 246-247) normatively and politically sympathetic towards a form of ‘emancipatory’ politics.

between history textbooks and peace education. I argue that in addition to conflict-resolution skills and a peace pedagogy, a history curriculum that shows the past as a complex thread of narratives, presenting the atrocities of both sides but through a lens of reconciliation, is a fundamental part of peace education. If peace education will be successful, it needs to be taught not only as a separate subject but also ensure that history education, and history textbooks reflect an ethos of peace and not one of conflict. In my discourse analysis, I am focusing on the discourses over history textbooks as a hook to hang the wider debate on i.e. as an analytical tool of the concept of peace education. History textbooks are sensitive issues that generate a great deal of popular anxiety, which in turn generates public debate. Hence, the discourses of resistance to history textbook changes (as part of peace education initiatives) serve as useful pockets of insight and as an accessible axis within which to make sense of the different representations and arguments.

### **Rationale of the thesis: ‘The Politics of Peace Education’**

Although this thesis supports peace education, it should not be seen merely as a kind of ‘manifesto’ in support of peace education. Rather, the central objective of this thesis is the investigation of institutions and mapping of discourses in order to explain the marginalization of peace education in Cyprus. A better understanding of negative attitudes, dispositions and fears may help us really understand why peace education has failed to be institutionalised in a formal level in the RoC, as a result of which we are confronted only with very limited and informal practices of peace education, mostly under the guidance of NGOs (Non-governmental organizations).

Scholarly approaches to peace education tend to rest on simplistic assumptions about the desirability of peace education. These assumptions, however, do not match the hegemonic conceptualisations of peace education, espoused in this case by the Cypriot state and citizens, the behaviour of which has, and continues to, undermine peace education efforts. This is also valid for the general peace education literature where the ambiguous nature of the concept of peace education is acknowledged, but not the potent struggle that emerges when there are attempts to operationalise it in areas of conflict. Although there has been an overwhelming amount of peace education literature over the past decade or so (Reardon, 2001; Salomon, 2002; Harris, 2004; Page, 2004; Johnson & Johnson, 2005; Danesh 2006; Bajaj 2008; Bartal and Rosen 2009, Brock- Utne 2009; McGlynn et al 2009; Carter 2010; Gallagher 2010; Gur-Ze'ev 2010; Bekerman and Zembylas, 2012; Harris, 2013), much of this otherwise worthy research focuses on the need for peace education, its possible definitions and manifestations, while often overlooking the political conditions and processes that are affecting and are affected by it. Current literature rarely problematises peace education.<sup>15</sup> For example, Salomon (2011), when discussing the challenge to peace education programmes that non-supportive social environments bring, his answer to this challenge arguably reflects a very simplistic view of resistance stemming from the government itself:

‘The solution may well lie in the combination of incremental bottom-up, intra-individual processes generated by peace education and top-down, policy-based governmental promotion of peace processes.’ (p.52).

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<sup>15</sup> At best, some studies do acknowledge the political problems that may arise but in passing (see Zembylas 2010, p.280). This is especially the case when it comes to general literature on peace education which by their nature do not deal with local and historical contexts in great depth.

Furthermore, even though politics and education have been researched from a pedagogical view (Dewey [1916] 2001; Freire 1970; Giroux, 1981, 1997; Popkewitz, 1991; Ball, 1994; Apple, 1995; McLaren, 2003; Mayo, 2004; Reardon, 2009) critical treatments and problematisations of the concept of peace education within the context of political science- of the power of resistance- are prominently absent from the literature.

Therefore, in order to reach a better understanding of these behaviours of resistance we need to problematise these attitudes and situate them in their historical and contemporary political context. I do this by locating this resistance in a power struggle through and over institutions and discourses, what I refer to as the ‘politics of peace education’. The ‘politics of peace education’ locates peace education within a discursive and institutional power struggle to define the meaning and shape the practices of peace education in a conflict-transformation environment. It is this emphasis on peace education/power nexus that illustrates that far more is at stake in contemporary discussions of peace education and history textbooks than is usually attributed in the literature. We need to think more carefully about how we construct peace education, how thinking about peace education constructs the options that are/are not available to us. In other words we need to think about *how* we think about peace education and what this *does*. A serious problematisation of the institutions and discourses that make up social relations of power, I argue, is necessary for an understanding of the educational inertia that has characterised peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus. What does peace education mean for the people of Cyprus, both those who support and those who resist it? And how does the organisation of power

affect the production and reproduction of these meanings? An examination and contextualisation of the order-producing discursive and institutional practice of the hegemonic system can help us shed light on these questions. The aim is to contribute to a revitalised debate on peace education; reconceptualise peace education while situating the contribution in a broader peacebuilding framework; and therefore extend the academic interdisciplinary discourse on peace education by offering insights from political science.

Due to the interdisciplinary nature of peace education research (see Chapter Two), drawing from different disciplines can enrich the project and can show that interdisciplinary work is both plausible and desirable. One of the intended outcomes of this project is to create an opening for the discipline of politics to study peace education from a more politicised perspective, not in order to claim a monopoly or to reify existing disciplinary borders. Rather, the aim is to construct an academic niche from/for political science that is not ignorant to other disciplines, but is arguably missing from the existing literature, hence the ‘politics’ of peace education. It is a missing but important piece, which this thesis hopes to formulate in order to help bring forward peace education in areas of conflict.

By trying to expose the power relations that keep a particular educational hegemony in place, my work assumes a role that goes beyond a ‘problem-driven’ nature, but intends to have a critical impact by challenging the prevailing order: it aims to open up space for alternative articulations of peace education, both theoretically and empirically, in ways which can contribute to the peacebuilding process. I use a critical approach not only to ‘achieve a perspective on perspectives’ but to ‘open up the

possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world' (Cox, 1996, p.88).

The particular order which ensures that peace education is prevented from becoming a possibility is considered hegemonic as it has legitimized its dominance through discourses and institutions. This hegemonic order has been established both through state and non-state structures, hence constituting what is known as a 'historic bloc' in Gramscian thought. Peacebuilding NGOs offer an alternative normative interpretation of peace education, but have failed to establish themselves as a new historic bloc. Understanding the nature of the historic bloc is crucial given that previous studies have approached peace education essentially through traditional state-centric lenses. Literature that treat states as the only central actors within a conflict accentuate the monolithic representations of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, potentially missing opportunities for alternative constructions and for a counter-hegemony to emerge. Such approaches are also problematic in that they ignore the decentralized forms of power that ensure that a particular educational hegemonic order remains in place, and that, therefore, any attempts to overcome resistance to peace education would have to extend well beyond the state. This study thus takes an innovative approach to peace education and in so doing it makes a contribution to the existing literature both on peace education in general and the specific Cyprus literature.

By examining the politics of peace education through discursive and institutional power, and by moving away from the traditional state-centric approach to power, I do not wish to downplay the importance of material power embodied in the state. Although I do maintain that a clear distinction between the state and the public is

problematic, one cannot deny the material power of the state, for example, in terms of its control of the flow of financial, administrative, social, political and human (e.g. teachers) resources. Rather, I contend that these forms of state power and practices can only be understood as part of the constellation of meanings that make them possible i.e. through a framework of discourse (see Foucault, 1991). In particular, state power can be seen to operate through the state-owned media; the state-provided history textbooks; the formulation and implementation of educational policy through the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC)- including, for example, the criteria under which a teacher is deemed ‘qualified’ to teach History-; preference-shaping and practical constraints on citizens’ actions; as well as allocation of financial resources in various processes and institutions that reproduce and consolidate the exclusionary ethnonationalist paradigm. While I discuss these issues in a chapter on institutional power (Chapter Four), I contend that these institutional practices are products and productive of, contingent articulations and belief systems: ‘we are always internal to a world of signifying practices and objects’ (Howard and Stavrakakis, 2000, p.3).<sup>16</sup>

### **Research question and Contribution:**

In order to investigate the obstacles to peace education in Cyprus and address the limitations of the existing literature, I have formulated the following core research question:

*“What are the particular hegemonic institutions and discourses that resist peace education, and what has been the basis of their success?”*

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<sup>16</sup> I view the relationship between the ideational and the material as a constitutive one.

Or, to be more specific: What are the conditions of possibility that ensure the reproduction of a) institutional asymmetries and b) discourses that make possible such a climate of ‘impossibility’ for peace education? In other words, I am investigating power relations in order to expose what makes resistance to peace education not only possible but also hegemonic.

My thesis aims to go beyond the scope of existing literature that treats peace education merely as a necessary and unproblematic tool; uses a positivist linear model of cause and effect; overlooks the decentralized, non-state resistance to peace education; and ignores the crucial importance of power politics. In order to open up the possibility for exploring alternative modes of analysing and overcoming resistance to peace education, I reconceptualise peace education by placing it within a framework of power politics. By addressing the weaknesses of the existing literature on peace education, and through answering the main research question, my thesis offers a twofold contribution:

- a) Conceptual Contribution: constructing a conceptual framework that analyses the politics of peace education and brings forward the concept of ‘peaceagogy’
- b) Empirical Contribution: using this to undertake an empirical analysis of the politics of peace education in the Greek-Cypriot community

My conceptual contribution is theoretically innovative in that it is the first time that concepts such as hegemony, power and security are directly linked to peace education both in Cyprus-specific, but also in the general, peace education literature. It is also



the first time that resistance to peace education is not only explicitly addressed as such, but also located in discourses and institutions within the Greek-Cypriot community.

Theoretical insights from two critical theorists, Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault, are used to inform my conceptual model, which of course impacts on my findings, conclusions, as well as policy recommendations. Choosing a critical theoretical viewpoint is particularly pertinent in conflict studies as it enables the necessary perspective of distance from mainstream or officially established perceptions. Whereas poststructuralist understandings of identity, discourse and power enable me to expose the securitization of peace education that is taking place, insights on hegemony from Gramsci help to not only juxtapose the struggle over the competing meanings of peace education, but are instrumental in explaining how power is constituted and expressed through consent rather than through the use of force. Gramscian thought illustrates how the hegemonic order when it comes to peace education is consensually reproduced on the macro level, through the discourses of institutions such as the media, schools, religious institutions but also makes possible the idea of a ‘counter-hegemonic’ struggle, whereby alternatives to dominant ideas about what is legitimate and ‘common sense’ are advanced.

Poststructuralist approaches - which have until recently remained at the periphery of peace education research – also help reveal the relationship between education and security. Despite the fact that researchers and policymakers alike have largely ignored the nexus between education and security, the findings from this study show that attitudes toward peace education, as part of a wider peacebuilding process, are

inseparable from security concerns (not security in the traditional sense). Drawing from Securitisation Theory (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998) allows for an interesting empirical contribution and exposes problematic assumptions that can prove conducive to an advancement of the peace education project. The ‘securitization’ of peace education amounts to the presentation of peace education, and in particular history textbooks and the ‘traitors’ who advocate them as threats to the national cause vis-à-vis the Cyprus Conflict.

Building on the above theoretical insights, I use the following conceptual tools to enable me to make sense of the research findings: the securitisation of ‘educational identity’, and ‘discursive strategies’. I show how peace education is securitised through hegemonic discourses that present it as a threat to the existence of educational, and by extension, national identity. This approach moves away from the tendency to view peace education as a politically neutral concept, towards a conceptualisation of peace education that disentangles the dynamics of constitutive processes through interrogating the mechanisms of communication that are involved i.e. it captures how different meanings are reproduced and diffused. I refer to these mechanisms as *discursive strategies*, consciously or unconsciously employed by actors within the broader socio-political context. This approach creates a space for the ability to act without necessarily arguing that this always involves a conscious intentionality. As we shall see in Chapter Five, these strategies differ in the particular way that the discourses are mobilised and where the emphasis is placed, though the end result is the same i.e. securitization of peace education. Resistance to peace education is legitimated through the construction of a security discourse which presents potential peace education initiatives as a threat to educational and national

identity, the ‘struggle’ and hence, their (Greek Cypriots) existence. By looking at the conditions or mechanisms that keep one type of structure in place (or strategy in operation), one can better understand the obstacles that an alternative structure or strategy has to deal with. Then, if we are to try and achieve an alteration, this diagnosis will enable us to see how, and under what conditions, a change -or desecuritisation- is possible.

In terms of the empirical contribution, data was collected from an analysis of current and historical policies and developments, from newspapers, circulars, official state texts, documentaries, radio shows, as well as personal interviews with key actors such as teachers, academics, religious leaders, political elites and NGO actors. This was combined with ethnographic methods, with me acting as an ‘observing participant’ (Tedlock, 1991) in local events (e.g. peacebuilding workshops) and everyday discussions, but also as an ‘outsider-insider’: as a Greek-Cypriot whose nationalist exclusionary attitudes radically changed after living ‘outside’ Cyprus over a long period of time. I draw on the data collected in order to explain the (conditions of) ‘impossibility’ of peace education in Cyprus.

Given the conflict context, one must be particularly cautious with the use of terms that can impose certain normative bearings. I do not claim that my work is neutral, value-free or that I hold the absolute truth. In fact, my findings will be discussed within the context of a particular normative lens and position: that which sees peace education as something positive and desirable. The operationalisation of peace education, which I present as part of a ‘peaceagogy’ (discussed below; see also Chapter Three), also has a normative orientation. What I try to avoid, however, is to impart normative

positions on my analytical concepts, procedures and subjects. I therefore, clearly state that when speaking of peace education and nationalist camps, I do not claim implicitly or explicitly that one is peace-oriented and the other is war-oriented, but rather that there are perceived or real incompatibilities between these actors, which stem from their own ontological assumptions and perceptions vis-à-vis the conflict. What is to be included in peace education efforts involves difficult decisions that are neither simple, nor clear-cut, and it is partly inevitable that they will not be perceived as 'fair' by all parties involved. As I argue in the empirical analysis, we need to be cautious when dismissing the hegemonic subject positions, as it does not prove conducive to peacebuilding efforts. Rather, we should strive to understand the reasons why people fear peace education so much, so that the incompatibilities between the two positions can be minimised- a task that lies at the core of my research rationale.

### **Educational Identity and the Cyprus Conflict: moving towards 'peaceagogy'**

Perhaps the most important requirement for a peace settlement in Cyprus that will be sustainable in the long-term is one that involves the transformation of actors' conceptualisations of the conflict from a 'modern' lens, into a 'postmodern' one (see also Diez, 2002, pp.6-7). This involves the transformation from a modern understanding of identities as clear-cut, fixed and exclusionary, to a pluralistic model that embraces difference without presenting it as a necessary border between 'us' and 'them'.

Understandings of identity i.e. representations of the self and the other are at the core of conflict struggles, not only with regards to how the past (narratives) and present (situation) is understood, but crucially involving a constant debate about the future, and how these identities should be constructed. Scholars have long criticised the construction of identity as a positivist unit that can be understood externally and autonomously outside a particular discursive context. They have pointed out not only the impossibility of understanding identity as pre-existing, as independent of the historical, socio-cultural and political context (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Bhabha, 1987; Gee, 1992) but more importantly, the asymmetrical, repressive and exclusionary power relations that give rise to such positivist conceptualisations (Foucault, 1977, 1983; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Butler, 1990; Hall, 1996). As Bekerman and Zembylas argue, identity should not be seen as a 'given' but as a 'product' (2012, pp.48-9); it is produced through human interaction that takes place through discursive and institutional power networks.

Education, both as a subject of discourse and in practice, has not escaped the parameters of modernity that appear to be firmly in place with regards to the Cyprus conflict. Formal education as a pedagogical practice, informal sociological education, as well as discourses about education vis-à-vis the conflict, play a crucial role in Cyprus, as in other conflict-ridden regions. Education is a vehicle through which conflict representations and identities are formed and perpetuated, and hence, it becomes a prime site of contestation. The conflict, in turn, instigates a particular element of 'urgency' to education, as its role is no longer limited to pedagogical and socio-cultural pursuits, but becomes deeply politicised. Discourses about education therefore, are intricately linked to the wider conflict dynamics and conceptualisations.

It is in this context that I propose the term 'educational identity', as a better way to understanding the identity dynamics that are specifically tied with educational concerns. My research shows how educational identity in Cyprus is used as a modernist construct that serves to exclude alternative narratives, 'securitise' and hence resist peace education, by presenting a pluralistic model of historical narratives as a threat to the 'national struggle'.

The thesis also shows the extent to which Cypriots regard the possession of the same collective memory as integral to being a 'proper' Cypriot. This is pursued through the specific lens of education, showing the extent to which the debate about peace education is couched as an issue that was, and is, crucial in establishing a national identity, and in maintaining the strength of the particular national community. Through my research, I am therefore able to show how far different political discourses and structures have 'imposed' a particular understanding of the history textbook controversy that is regarded as normal and normative, as well as show the negative meanings attached to alternative beliefs and dispositions that do not align with the mainstream opinion against peace education, and in particular, history textbook changes. These issues are vital for our practical understanding of how peace education discourses are operating and of their role in the formation of different conceptions of national identity.

The conflict ethos has become a part of daily life and because it is experienced as such, 'contradictions at the system level that produce and sustain them' are masked (English and Sweetman, 2013). This study exposes these power relationships. Given that education is a means and a medium through which the conflict is promoted,

sustained and reproduced, then studying this struggle over education becomes all the more important. The conflict ethos shapes the parameters of the educational struggle while, at the same time, the educational dynamics shape the parameters of the conflict. However, to say that the core objective of my thesis is to understand the nexus between education and conflict would be misleading. I am not looking at how education perpetuates the conflict, although this is related to my thesis (in the sense that it is the education of the people that is partly responsible for resisting peace education changes and perpetuating the existing system). Nor am I exclusively looking at how education can help solve the conflict from a pedagogical point of view, but rather I am looking at how power systems prevent this from taking place, which is a rather different issue.

To attempt to transform these power systems, and go beyond the conflict ethos, I propose the concept of 'peaceagogy'. Peaceagogy involves the transformation from conflict-orientation to peace-orientation through teaching about peace to all citizens. It aims at explaining to the wider public why peace needs to proceed from probability to *necessity*. Why is it important for the future? What do we risk losing if we do not implement it, and alternatively what can we gain from its successful institutionalisation? Peace education is only one form of peaceagogy (others include the teaching of peace through music, theatre, dancing, sports etc.) There is a need to institutionalise peace education, but also articulate a different peace education discourse that is not only less abstract, but also more sensitive to the fears and insecurities of those who have been traditionally opposing it. Peace educators must also not fall in the danger of 'othering' the hegemonic other in this process, as I argue is sometimes the case with NGO attitudes and practices.

## **Structure of the Thesis**

The main body of the thesis is comprised of five chapters. The common thread that weaves the chapters together is the power struggle over peace education within the Greek-Cypriot community. I first begin by offering a historical analysis in Chapter One. I place the thesis in a historical context, thereby exposing the magnitude of the problem of conflicting historical narratives, while analysing the dynamics of important concepts such as identity, history and memory, ‘chosen trauma’, and history textbooks.

In order to clearly situate the conceptual and empirical contribution made by this investigation of the politics of peace education, in Chapter Two I review the existing literature and present a view of the ‘state of the art’ of peace education literature (the cut-off date being December 2013). Starting specifically from peace education in Cyprus, I then broaden the analysis to include a review of the general peace education literature. Engaging with the existing literature is valuable not only as a way of grounding and contextualising the thesis, but also helps to show the originality of this research. The weaknesses and gaps in the existing literature are exposed and this opens up the way for me to construct the conceptual framework which guided the empirical analysis.

In Chapter Three I advance the conceptual framework around which the thesis is structured for the particular case of Cyprus. The role of this chapter is to delineate the terms that are used in this research study and illuminate the conceptual contribution of this work. This is achieved by initially offering a brief assessment of the poor state of



peace education in Cyprus, complemented by a normative proposition in the context of a wider politics of ‘peaceagogy’. This is useful in exposing not only the need for peace education, but also how peace education could look like in the future. I then present an analysis of the conceptual framework used and elucidate its purpose: to reconceptualise peace education, by placing it within a political lens that brings in the role of hegemony and power, institutions and discourse. Theoretical insights from Gramsci and Foucault are used to delineate the institutional and discursive politics that can explain the ‘impossibility’ of peace education in Cyprus.

Before applying the conceptual framework of institutional and discursive power to the context of Cyprus, I offer a detailed discussion of the qualitative methodology I employed in order to answer my research questions. My methodological approach included the analysis of discourses collected from newspapers, websites, documentaries, circulars, official state texts, and interviews with key actors such as teachers, religious leaders, political elites and NGO actors. The data was examined for recurrent patterns and themes using a Foucauldian discourse analysis. The discourse analysis was combined with ethnographic methods with me acting as an ‘observing participant’ (Tedlock, 1991) but also an ‘outsider’-insider. I draw on this collected data in Chapters Four and Five in order to explain the ‘conditions of possibility’ for the successful resistance to peace education in Cyprus.

Chapter Four exposes the institutional power relations upon which educational policies are predicated. In other words, it deepens our understanding of the character of the institutional politics of peace education in Cyprus. It answers the question of how it is possible that certain courses of action- in this case resistance to peace

education- form part of a hegemonic order. By exploring the hegemony exhibited by particular institutions over educational matters, I am able to point towards the historical origins as well as contemporary characteristics and conditions of institutions that, together with a specific discursive landscape (Chapter Five), enable resistance to dominate. In addition, Chapter Four exposes how modernist conceptualisations of educational identity in Cyprus, currently exist in a wider power network whose nature reflects not the typical modernist centralized form of governance, but rather a hybrid system of power that, whilst not being devoid of modernist characteristics, ultimately is able to remain hegemonic through a decentralized form of governmentality (Foucault, 1991). This shows the extent of consensus present in the Greek-Cypriot society emerging (through a network of alliances on a macro-level) from institutions such as the schools (state-run), the Church, the media as well as the wider Cypriot ‘common sense’ (Gramsci, [1971] 1999). Exposing the institutional sites of discourse lays the groundwork for a meaningful analysis of the actual discourses in Chapter Five.

Moving away from the broader system of institutional politics, Chapter Five then zooms in to the actual systems of representation of peace education i.e. an exposition of discursive power. A focus on discursive politics allows us to delve into the power of discourse, both as producing and constituting public opinion. The meanings constructed within different discourses of peace education gain particular importance when the negative articulations are power-laden in such a way as to ensure the marginalisation of positive discourses and a continuation of the educational status quo. To capture the *discursive struggle* over peace education, I juxtapose the two discourses not to prove that one is necessarily ‘right’ and the other is ‘wrong’, but to

expose their inherently political dynamics. I show how peace education is constructed in public discourse and analyse the discursive conditions of possibility that enable the framing of peace education in a particular way, wielding the securitization capabilities that they do. I do this by deconstructing the negative representations of peace education and showing how the ‘securitization of peace education’ makes its marginalisation possible through particular discursive strategies. I also propose that resistance to peace education rests upon problematic assumptions rooted in modernist representations and show how ambiguities, abstractions and misunderstandings allow hegemonic actors to continue resisting peace education and making counter-claims to those of the marginalised peace educators. The second part of this chapter critically analyses the positive peace education discourse emanating primarily from the peacebuilding NGOs, and offers suggestions for improving their practices in ways that enhance the engagement of local grassroots actors, so as to reduce the gap from peace education theory to peace education praxis. I argue that peacebuilding NGOs have largely been unsuccessful in desecuritizing peace education, and that often they themselves are sucked into modernist representations that augment rather than reduce the space between the nationalists and peace educationalists.

I conclude the thesis with a comprehensive discussion of my findings, illustrating how my research has enhanced the current literature on peace education both empirically and conceptually. I emphasise the need for the opening up of institutional and discursive space, which in its current state of confinement within modernist structures has inhibited attempts at operationalising peace education. I also point to some of the questions that the thesis has raised, and the implications of the research at a broader level: in relation to the ‘Other’, to foreign policy, as well as in relation to other

conflicts. Finally, I reflect upon the limitations of the thesis, not only as a demonstration of critical awareness, but as a way of presenting possible avenues for future research.

## **CHAPTER ONE- Historical Encounters**

### **1.1. History Matters**

The aim of this chapter is twofold: firstly, to offer a historical background of the Cyprus conflict and secondly, to introduce the opposing narratives of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots regarding the conflict. Such a contextual chapter is necessary in order to offer the reader a better understanding with regards to the nature of the conflict, but more importantly, to demonstrate the crucial problem of the conflicting ethnic narratives portrayed by the history textbooks of each side within a modernist black or white lens. Hence, it shows exactly what the history controversy entails and why a postmodernisation of the historical narratives through peace education is necessary. In addition, through this historical analysis I am able to reveal the important interplay of identity, history and memory and put forward my argument that in Cyprus there is a dangerous conflation of history and memory that undermines the peacebuilding process. This conflation has an inevitable impact on the prime educational vehicle for reproducing the dominant historical narratives of the state i.e. history textbooks, which present historical narratives as if they hold fixed and unshakeable truths.

Attempting to offer a historical analysis of the conflict here can be just as problematic as what the two communities are doing to each other. History (academic writing) is not value-free and always involves ‘an act of interpretation’ (Jenkins, 1991, p.83), adding a further level of complexity to what is an already highly contested topic. Yet, merely presenting the narratives without additional background information would

not have done justice to the complexity of the conflict. As Jenkins argues, there is nothing inevitably wrong with this act of interpretation: ‘the only choice is between a history that is aware of what it is doing and a history that is not’ (1991, p.82). It can be empowering as long as it is reflexive and the purpose for which the history is written is made clear.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, using both primary and secondary sources, I present a historical facts section where I aim to give the reader a chronological sense of the most important events, trying to be as balanced as possible, without however claiming that this section is part of an objective truth. This information will also enable the reader to better understand the particular colonial conditions that influenced the contemporary state of education in Cyprus, the significance of which I discuss in further detail in Chapter Four.

A second matter that emerges when attempting to construct the two conflicting narratives is the risk of presenting them as being uniform i.e. homogeneous within each community. However, on the contrary, the divisions within each of the two narratives are ample and diverse, and an attempt to reduce the two conflicting narratives in such a way would be misplaced and inaccurate. As is usually the case with political issues, there are different party positions, ideological stances, and divisions within the parties themselves. History, therefore, may be a topic of intense controversy *within* a single society, representing the ‘complexities of its citizens’ struggles’ (Herzfeld, 1991, p. 226-59). Such matters gain further complexity when they pertain to narrative constructions of the past, where history and collective memory and historical memory are often conflated- let alone constructions that involve a long-term conflict. The way I have chosen to deal with this complexity is by

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<sup>17</sup> In a sense, this history chapter can be seen as an exercise that is similar to peace education as both narratives are included and their politics exposed.

presenting the official narratives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, in a sense capturing both ends of the conflict narrative. These official narratives are also reflected in state-produced or state-authorised history textbooks, academic analysis of which I have also consulted. Where appropriate, I have accompanied these with respective official historiographies of the two sides i.e. a history of the official historical narratives. This will enable me to show how the history books differ, to each other and across time (when these have been changed). Insights from history, anthropology and education have been used to complement this contextual chapter.

The chapter first begins by interrogating the concepts of memory and history and their dynamic within a conflict setting, showing the implications of their interplay for Cyprus. I discuss the politics of memory and forgetting and the impact this has had on history textbooks. I then give a background section on the history of the Cyprus conflict, before introducing the conflicting narratives.

## **1.2. Interrogation of Memory<sup>18</sup> and History within a Conflict**

Rebecca Bryant speaks not only of partitions of place in Cyprus but also of partitions of memory (2010). The interplay between memory and history is of relevance to Cyprus as it adds a particular dimension to the conflict; a dynamic that has the ability to perpetuate and dispel ethnic myths. History and memory and historical/collective memory are often conflated, and the intricate relationship between the three leads to

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<sup>18</sup> Memory here refers to collective memory and not individual memory.

further ‘fuzziness’ when the process of the reconstruction of the past involves a long-term conflict.

Memory is not something easy to pin down and indeed there are many ways to view memory as a concept. Here, I conceptualise memory as actively connected to social institutions and cultural forms, and not as something essentially individual (without denying of course the existence of individual memories)<sup>19</sup>. I also choose to focus on how a *reconstruction* of past experiences (autobiographical or not) from a present standpoint affects history thinking and history writing, how we consume and produce history texts. Ultimately, and more importantly I am interested in the implications this memory reconstruction has when talking and researching about the role of peace education in ethnic settings.

Collective memory can be defined as a representation of the past both shared and commemorated by a group, ‘that enacts and gives substance to the group’s identity, its present conditions and its vision of the future’ (Misztal, 2003, p.7). Cubitt argues that we should ‘avoid the excessive reification of collective identities, and the naïve (or perhaps disingenuous) presumption of their continuity’ that have been encouraged by some uses of the term ‘collective memory’ (2007, p.16). According to Cubitt, the continuity of mind that is expected from individuals cannot be found in the wider process of what he refers to as social memory because, firstly, societies are not comprised of the type of mental entity that an individual human being is, and

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<sup>19</sup> Even those who insist on a restriction of memory to personal individual recollection, like Sarah Foot, admit that relived experiences that are retold are often ‘gilded with learned glosses supplied by other witnesses or auditors of earlier unrefined versions’ (Foot, 1999, p.188). Moreover, As Cubitt very aptly notes, when we talk about the need to keep a past event from fading away from memory, or when a monument is inscribed “in memory” of an event or person, then we do not usually specify the individuals that should remember, but instead ‘memory...seems to be disembodied...a diffuse medium in which they [things and events] can persist as objects of consciousness after losing the fuller qualities of concrete actuality’ (Cubitt, 2007, p.10).



secondly due to the inevitable change that a social entity will undergo. I agree that there are inevitable changes of people's conceptions of identity and society but at the same time, the mere fact that later generations are so successful in mitigating these changes and ruptures of continuity gives us an indication as to the magnitude of constant effort and use of hegemonic structures that are in place to ensure this. Hence, depending on the context, an emphasis on the continuity and stability of collective identities might not be so inappropriate.

I disagree with the definition that collective memory explains 'how and why present society came into being' (Innes, 2000, pp.6-7) but instead I would posit that it explains how and why present society *thinks* it came into being. Moreover, the fact that we as researchers point out to a particular collective memory, does not mean we share this perception as a 'substantial entity' and agree with it, or that we 'participate in its ontological transubstantiation from concept into reality' (Olick, 2003, pp.6-7). Whether this concept is true or not, is in fact irrelevant. Researchers are merely pointing out what particular groups claim and think is true, and the implications this thinking has, as well as how these memory claims are used to promote political aims.

As Pierre Nora, the French historian famous for his work on identity and memory, argues, significant *changes* in society warrant greater importance to the study and evocation of memory (1989, p.7). One of the biggest turning points for Cyprus came in July 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus and large population displacements divided the island into two parts. These changes brought about constant reflections of Cypriot memories. This rupture from the past pushed Cypriots from all communities into a pursuit of remembrance- of reconstructing the past, giving a new momentum to

both individual and collective memories: memories of how well, or how badly the two main communities of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots lived together, how they were treated, of events before, during, and after the invasion, of their houses and lands. These ‘sites of memory’ emerge, because ‘real environments of memory’, the settings that make memory a real part of daily experience are no longer there: there is a ‘sense that memory has been torn-but torn in such a way as to pose the problem of the embodiment of memory in certain sites where a sense of historical continuity persists’ (Nora, 1989, p.7). The power of memory has had important repercussions when it relates to the refugees’<sup>20</sup> dreams of returning, where the past life and the homes and lands and community relations that came with it have been elevated to an iconic status.<sup>21</sup> But more importantly for this research topic, it has contributed to the resistance to proposed changes of history textbooks, not only indirectly by perpetuating ethnic myths, but also because such changes are seen as synonymous with ‘interfering’ with this memory. There is a perception that if the negative reconstruction of the past, this momentum, is not sustained as it is, then the likelihood of returning back will be diminished (see Chapter Five).

With regards to the relationship between memory and history, some authors are reluctant to draw too sharp a distinction (see Klein, 2000), others speak of different characteristics that distinguish them (see Novick, 1999), while scholars like Nora argue that the two are in ‘fundamental opposition’ (Nora, 1989, p.8). Nora is critical

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<sup>20</sup> ‘Internally displaced persons’ is a more accurate term, as these people have not crossed the border of another country, but the use of the term ‘refugees’ or ‘πρόσφυγες’ is commonplace in Cyprus.

<sup>21</sup> Bryant’s anthropological work has shown that the dream of return is more than a longing to regain lost ancestral homes, ‘it is really a longing for what those homes represent’ and of the lost social network (2010, p.29). This nostalgia for the past is a complex issue as even if this property is given back, the particular quotidian life that is at the centre of most refugees’ reminiscences will not come back. This has important repercussions on any future settlement concerning refugees’ decisions to ever permanently move back to their original town, after almost four decades of living a different life.

of history, claiming that it ‘is perpetually suspicious of memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it’ (1989, p.9). The reason for this stark difference in claims probably lies in the fact that the relationship between memory and history is indeed a dynamic one that entails all three characteristics; the two speak to each other, have commonalities but also stark differences, and fight with each other. What is necessary in such discussions however, and what these authors often fail to do, is to distinguish between normative and empirical claims. As a result, they confusingly mix arguments on what they think this relationship *should* entail, with contemporary analysis of what it *does* entail.

In the context of Cyprus, the relationship between memory and history (both written and perceived) is the dynamic one that I describe above, with people conflating collective memory with history, and often using the former to replace the latter, and more rarely, using official history to mask marginalised memories that do not concur with the collective memory. In an ideal situation however, my argument would be that memory and history should be as clearly differentiated as possible in order to allow the two to work synergistically, complementing each other where possible, and importantly allowing for a more pluralistic framework of history. Although Wertsch’s observation that ‘it is often quite difficult to categorize an account of the past unequivocally as either memory or history’ (2002, p.20) is a fair warning (for example, official and unofficial histories usually include elements of both memory and history), we must nevertheless strive to achieve this goal as far as possible. Maintaining some kind of distinction is particularly important for scholarly work on ethnic conflict as it provides a useful analytical construct for guiding inquiry and delineating the issues at hand.

One simplistic bifurcation of the two would have memory on the one hand as reflecting direct and passionate experience, and hence not affected by critique, and history (as historiography) on the other, being the product of dispassionate research, involving critique and questioning. Although this distinction is useful, it does not do justice to the structures of social memory, nor to the passion-driven and indeed subjective character of much historical research (Seixas, Fromowitz and Hill, 2005, p.116). Again, this dichotomy is better seen as a normative distinction and not an empirical one. In reality, the intersections between history and memory make it very hard to clearly mark where one stops and the other begins. However, history and memory are far from synonymous. Although one could argue that history-writing can and is sometimes made partly from memories, the two are not identical. It is therefore useful to note some of their different characteristics, in order to move beyond the ways in which they overlap. The historian Peter Novick, sums this distinction aptly:

Collective memory is in crucial senses ahistorical, even anti-historical. To understand something historically is to be aware of its complexity, to have sufficient detachment to see it from multiple perspectives, to accept the ambiguities, including moral ambiguities...Collective memory simplifies; sees events from a single, committed perspective; is impatient with ambiguities of any kind; reduces events to mythic archetype (1999, pp.3-4).

Nora argues that the distance between history and memory has vastly increased in recent times ‘with the growing belief in a right, a capacity, and even a duty to change’ and that memory has been pushed aside by critical history-writing (1989, pp.7-8). I

share this belief in a duty to change, but I contend that Cyprus has been an exception to Nora's argument, where not unlike other conflict-ridden countries, nationalism and the direct or indirect pursuit of an ethnic project have dangerously *reduced* the distance between memory and history. If one thing has been pushed aside, then this is that of critical history by the practices of collective memory. As a result, contrary to what Nora argues, what emerges in Cyprus is often the conflation of memory and history, an inability to distinguish between lived history and the intellectual process that renders the past intelligible i.e. the critical reconstruction of the past.

Official history in Cyprus is not 'an intellectual and secular production' (Nora, 1989, p.9); it is a nebulous mix of individual memories and collective memories, which are vital in a history project, but are inaccurately presented as the whole story. Memory is 'open to the dialectic of *remembering and forgetting*...vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation' and 'only accommodates those facts that suit it' (Nora, 1989, p.8, emphasis added). So when history is equated to memory all these characteristics are conferred upon it as well. In Cyprus, this has resulted in political leaders (themselves shaped by this historical memory) utilising historical memory to pursue their political agendas (Yakinthou, 2009, pp.102-3; p.215).

Maurice Halbwachs in his seminal study, *The Social Frameworks of Memory*, published in 1925, asserts the following with regards to the right of the elderly to reconstruct their past through memories:

In our society an old person is also esteemed because, having lived for a long time, he has much experience and is full of memories. Why should old people

not then be passionately interested in the past, in the common treasure of which they are guardians? (Halbwachs, 1992, p.48).

Elderly people have this right to tell of their past, but the hazard occurs when memory is conflated with history and when within a conflict setting it falls prey to exaggerations, subjectivities, racial and ethnic biases and is abused by societies in order to confirm existing prejudices and pursue nationalist political goals. The past is sometimes thought to contain the best part of one's life and this attraction for the past or the 'nostalgia for the past' results is an effort to recapture an imagined 'golden' lost past (Halbwachs, 1992, p.49).

But in Cyprus, this 'nostalgia for the past' is a thorny issue. Some have a genuine nostalgia for the good and peaceful times of the past, when the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots apparently lived and worked together in harmony. However, Greek Cypriots, as part of their nationalist discourse have a tendency to exaggerate memories of how well the two communities lived, or at least, to mask the problems that existed. As Halbwachs himself admitted, 'every social function tends to have a tendency to become exaggerated' (1992, p.48). This exaggeration however, forms part of a wider absence in the Greek-Cypriot official historical narrative of the details of these troubles. It is not so much a matter of completely denying that there were troubles, but more of an instance of either mentioning the inter-communal troubles in passing, or putting it down to exceptional isolated cases of extremists (illustrative examples of these narratives are presented in later sections of this chapter). This enables the reproduction of a narrative that presents the way the Greek Cypriots treated the Turkish Cypriots as unproblematic, and argues that the invasion of 1974

was purely the result of Turkey's long-term plan to annex part of Cyprus for geopolitical reasons. Not only is memory conflated with history but furthermore, these carefully selected memories are presented as the *whole* history.

The Turkish Cypriots' official narrative, on the other hand, emphasises only the negative aspects of living together and of the inter-communal killings starting from December 1963, ignoring instances where inter-communal villages had lived peacefully for years without any ethnic fighting. This position reinforces the nationalist discourse which justifies, and in fact praises Turkey, for intervening in 1974, in what the TRNC and Turkey have dubbed the 'Happy Peace Operation'. Ultimately, both sides remember and forget according to their perceived needs and national interests.

### **1.3. The Politics of Remembering and Forgetting**

Memory provides the presupposition for the existence of forgetting, and vice versa. As Papadakis explains: 'it is the possibility of forgetting that makes it possible to remember certain things and vice versa' (1993<sup>22</sup>). Therefore, we see that whilst individual experience may affect the content of what we remember and what we forget, expressions of these experiences can and have been used strategically in Cyprus to offer competing interpretations of past events.

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<sup>22</sup> This reference is a chapter from Papadakis's doctoral dissertation available here: <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/papadakis.diss.html>

It is important to keep in mind that what people experience, what they remember as having experienced, and what they express are not always the same. Individuals may not express or invoke all their memories, especially if doing so will come into conflict with the collective and historical memory. This useful distinction between experience and expression has been offered by Bruner and Turner; for them, the anthropology of experience ‘deals with how individuals actually experience’ events that is, ‘how events are received by consciousness’ (1986).<sup>23</sup> The latter is an individual experience, whereas how we express this experience is always problematic as it involves the ‘intersubjective articulation of experience’ (Bruner, 1986, p.6).

This argument is also in line with Halbwach’s claim (discussed earlier) that individuals are able to recall the past in a coherent fashion within a group setting: ‘It is in society that people normally acquire their memories...that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories’ (1992, p. 38). Thus, being a member of a social group provides the materials and (textual) resources for memory, and it urges one into recalling specific events but forgetting others. Of course, s(he) is still free to evoke what s(he) chooses from these resources, but always within the social and structural limits already given. Referring to the American people’s memory of the Watergate affair, Schudson notes that this memory is not the result of individual recollection but to be found in television programmes, films, newspapers, school textbooks, books (1992, p.4). Such materials are publicly disseminated and consumed.

Members of a social group are able to share a representation of the past precisely because they are able to draw on the same textual tools, the same type of knowledge,

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<sup>23</sup> Experience includes cognition, feelings and expectations. The inspiration for their hermeneutic anthropology has derived from the German thinker Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) and his concept of an experience as something that has been ‘lived through’ (Bruner, 1986, pp.3-4).



in order to reconstruct the past. According to Wertsch, memory can have two functions when using the narrative texts as tools: to provide accurate representations of the past and secondly to provide a 'useable past' (2002, pp.32-33). The second function is concerned with the role of memory in rhetorical and political processes that focus on 'identity politics' (Calhoun, 1994, cited in Wertsch, 2002, p.32), and in Cyprus it seems that this type has been the predominant one. Analysts such as Calhoun (1994) and Confino (1997) 'view memory as being sufficiently committed to an identity project that the notion of accuracy may be downplayed or sacrificed in the service of producing a useable past' for political purposes (Wertsch, 2002, p.33).

What is remembered depends greatly on whether or not the particular community considers it to fall within the contours of their collective identity; if it does not help express or preserve the reconstruction process then it is more likely to be attacked, or simply left out, often the one in the form of the other i.e. attacking in the form of forgetting. Novick has argued that once a memory is established as part of a collective identity it comes to define an 'eternal identity' for this group (1999, p.4). He illustrates this by referring to the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and how this has become central to the Serbian collective memory as it 'symbolizes the permanent Muslim intention to dominate them' (Novick, 1999, p.4).

Identity cements the importance of collective memories, but also these memories in turn reinforce the particular identity, so the groups see it as instrumental to their identity to prevent memories that 'attack' their identity from being present in the public arena. This helps us understand why people are so sacredly attached to collective memory and so vehemently against proposed changes, or rather additions,

to this memory through peace education. The commemoration of Turkish- invasion related events (including refugee association events) has cemented the place of the invasion as a central hallmark of Greek-Cypriotness. It is important to keep in mind that however stable and eternal the path of collective memory may seem, it is not inherently of a fixed or stable nature, and recognizing its contingency and malleability allows us to emphasise the continuous reproduction and reconstruction efforts that it is subject to (Huyssen, 1993, p.249).

If the Turkish invasion has become a central symbol of the identity of Greek Cypriots, then this is more so when it comes down to the refugees. In fact in the case of refugees, their whole identity revolves only around this central pivot, the one of internal displacement. This can even be seen as a different sub-identity. You are either a refugee, or you are not (as if those who were not refugees were not affected by the war). Yet, at the same time, if we move up from the sub-identity, the refugee stigma becomes something that one need not experience individually, but is experienced indirectly as part of the collective trauma and collective identity. Therefore, although each refugee's experience of displacement is different, at the structural level, we witness the 'social phenomenon of displacement' (Bryant, 2010, p.108) where the refugee experience gains an impersonal status. The displacement that Bryant describes as a 'social phenomenon' has resulted in national pain and national mourning. Emotions of pain become collective and are given a national dimension (Humphrey, 2000). Personal and collective trauma blends together into a 'trauma culture' with important socio-political implications (Kaplan 2005; see also Edkins 2003; Butler, 2004). How this trauma features in discursive formations, as well as how it is understood, remembered and re-experienced in a conflict context depends

greatly on how it is ‘managed’ by institutional forces. Both sides of Cyprus have epitomized what some academics refer to as the ‘nationalization of mourning’ (Zembylas et al., 2010). This has taken place through national symbols, flags, celebrations, commemorations and other rituals and especially through history textbooks (Zembylas, 2008). Mourning of the Missing Persons<sup>24</sup> is attached to ‘national-collective consciousness’ whereby ‘national values and ideals such as the sacrifice of Greek-Cypriot martyrs to retain their land’ become inextricably linked to national identity (Zembylas et al, 2010, p.568).

For both sides, the Missing Persons have been used both in and outside the classroom as another ‘mirror of the barbarism of the Other’ which adds to the image of victimhood of the Self (Sant Cassia, 2007, p.116). However, whereas the Turkish Cypriots have been encouraged by their political leaders to view the Missing as dead, and hence a closed matter (which the Turkish ‘Peace Operation’ of 1974 helped to end), the Greek Cypriots, have until recently been left to believe that their missing relatives may still be alive, a powerful way of keeping the issue open and the past alive (Sant Cassia, 2007, pp.116-17). Although this has started to change after 2004 (Yakinthou, 2008), and especially after the identification of hundreds of bodies (a process that began on both sides of the island in 2006), for the Greek-Cypriots the issue remains alive until the human remains are returned to their relatives and buried. This approach is in line with the wider need of ‘I do not forget, and I struggle’ (see Introduction) which has a present continuity to it, a need to keep the memory alive in order to assist with the struggle of reversing the past, of undoing the injustices and changing the status quo.

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<sup>24</sup> The Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) in Cyprus was established in 1981 and operates under the auspices of the UN. From a total of 1,508 missing Greek Cypriots, 358 have been identified and their remains returned to their families. From a total of 493 Turkish Cypriots, 124 identified individuals have been returned (CMP, 2014).

In this context, memory for the Greek-Cypriots becomes a tool for linking past predicaments to the present situation and the desired future. It can also be seen as part of a 'spoiling'<sup>25</sup> tactic (see Stedman, 1997) that obstructs the peacebuilding process by contributing to each side's 'devious objectives' (Richmond, 1998). In other words, memory is used to manipulate the peace process in order to earn time (by procrastinating), but also other benefits such as strengthening the legitimacy of their position and hence, their bargaining power. An anthropological study by Sant Cassia shows how the state focused on political gains, with the government harvesting the pain of the relatives in order to prevent closure even when they had information that some of the Missing Persons were actually casualties (2005). This allowed the state to continue using the Missing Persons as another political weapon for their agenda, especially during negotiation talks and at a broader diplomatic level, and to justify why Turkey should be blamed for its present lack of progress in establishing the fate of these people. Moreover, to acknowledge the death of the Missing Persons, or that they cannot return 'would symbolically signal that the occupied territories are also lost forever; an admission that could never be voiced publicly' (Spyrou, 2007, p.130) as this would require acceptance of the status quo, and hence delegitimize the need to continue 'the struggle' for a return to a pre-1974 condition. This shows how particular memories and past events are constructed to serve the perceived interests and political agendas of the state- with the consent of the people (the existence of consent rather than coercion is an important concept that will feature in both the theoretical and empirical chapters that will follow). The insistence of the Republic of Cyprus that those who went missing in 1974 will not be considered dead, even after all those

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<sup>25</sup> Spoilers here are defined broadly, not only as actors who use violence to disrupt the peace process as Stedman (1997) describes them, but to encompass both violent and non-violent 'activities of any actors that are opposed to peaceful settlement for whatever reason' (Newman and Richmond, 2006, p.102).

years, unless there is documented evidence that they are dead, was reinforced by the support of the families of the missing persons (Cassia, 2005), a well-known secret that remains such because it serves various political, financial and emotional agendas (Spyrou, 2007, p.131).<sup>26</sup>

How we remember traumatic events, also depends on past collective memories ‘mixed with fantasies of prior catastrophes’ (Kaplan, 2005, p.1). In Cyprus therefore, we witness a type of pyramid of trauma, where an acute peak is reached after building on layer after layer of memory of mourning; the act of memory instantly becomes an act of mourning. Arguably, in Cyprus the nationalization of mourning has become hegemonic through the ‘nationalization of memory’. The various means of mourning are politicised, as they are harnessed into tools (or ‘devious objectives’) that reproduce collective memory and collective identity. Pain and grief is no longer dependent on whether or not it has been experienced, but whether one regards oneself as part of a particular collective group that expresses and remembers such experience.

Dominant historical narratives have the ability to influence, give structure and even define or illuminate our inner experience (Bruner, 1986, p.6). These dominant socio-politically constructed hegemonic narratives develop and clarify these experiences. But beyond their meaning-conferring role, hegemonic narratives also constitute a political act, as they are able to offer this type of information and have the aforementioned impact in the first place through their power position- a position that

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<sup>26</sup> The families of the Missing Persons receive various financial benefits and privileges such as scholarships and housing benefits, but the missing were treated as ‘legal individuals, through salaries, pensions, and representation of their legal rights as property-holding individuals’ (Sant Cassia, 2005, p.87). Emotionally, it serves the purpose of keeping alive a final hope for the return of a loved one.

takes up the majority of validity space allocated to particular narratives in the public discourse.

This discursive strategy inevitably has negative repercussions on alternative narratives which offer a competing story or meaning; they are left to occupy minimal space in the public discourse, usually in the context of a nonconformist, unofficial discourse, limited to NGO efforts, personal discussions, or new media outlets, such as personal blogs. As we shall see in Chapter Five, there are three ‘silencing’ issues; one is the lack of opportunity to speak, of vocal space; the second is the depletion or (r)ejection of validity space; and the third, consequently, is deterring one from speaking out due to lack of the first issue and fear of the second issue. Even if the first issue is surpassed, and one is allowed to talk, this does not mean that this is by itself effective, especially if there is a set of monist/absolutist mechanisms in place (which view things in black or white) to ensure that the mere presence of one narrative renders the presence of another invalid. In Cyprus, the dominant historical narratives strategically aim to have a meaning-limiting exercise, where the official state narratives are regarded as the truth, and the sole truth. This does not only prevent others from speaking their opinion, but effectively results in the rejection of alternative opinions. In other words, dominant narratives seek to impose limits on meaning, by consciously projecting a desired and monist truth to the wider national and international society.

Although arguably acts of remembering are necessarily political in that they have to inevitably involve acts of inclusion/exclusion, in the particular case of Cyprus, there is an added political layer that is involved. Choosing what to remember about the past conflict constitutes a political act, in that the ‘whole’ story is sacrificed, for the

purpose of serving particular political agendas: in the case of Cyprus, that of the victimisation of the one side and the demonization of the other. Choosing to forget one's own atrocities and misdoings on the other hand, not only serves the former purpose, but is also a result of the denial to come to terms with facts and guilt that will diminish one's self-esteem and normative image. As we shall see shortly, since Cyprus only gained its independence from Britain in August of 1960, this 'image' was at an embryonic stage. After the division of the island in 1974 however, it became crucial for both sides to reconstruct and reflect on their identity. Creating a new identity 'began with the creation of a new history' (Papadakis, 2005, p.27) and the nation-building project had a decisive impact on the nature of the educational arrangements of Cyprus (Hajisoteriou, 2011). Consequently, the issue of identity construction within this nation-building exercise - i.e. a strong nationalistic notion of identity - was crucial if a particular side had to maintain its validity on the expense of the other; negative image nuances could not be tolerated, remembered, or even discussed in such a project. The framework of nationalism requires the construction of only one hegemonic narrative.

Adopting a chosen narrative reinforces a sense of victimization and can be used to justify ethnic aggression (Volkan, 1997, p.78) as well as prevent any feelings of guilt, shame or regret. Justifying one's own community's hostile acts carried out against a rival neighbor is also part of what is often referred to in conflict studies as a 'delegitimization' strategy. Delegitimizing essentially removes the opponent from the human status that the self inhabits, not only in order to blame them and explain why the conflict started, but also as a way to defend and warrant one's own aggressive acts (Bar-Tal, 1998; 2004). Doing so also has wider ramifications that extend, beyond

violence, to invalidating the other's narrative and even existence. Bekerman and Zembylas have discussed how school curricula in Israel and in Cyprus capitalize on mourning in order to 'strengthen the discourse of victimhood and create dehumanized depictions of the other' (2012, p.148; for an earlier in-depth empirical study for Cyprus see Bryant, 2004). Both Turkish- and Greek- Cypriots view themselves as the sole legitimate victim and hence, those whose narrative is the true one (and there can only be *one*).

For the Greek Cypriots the official construction of the past needed to remember these negative events in order to create the preconditions for their reversal in a desirable future i.e. a *change* of the status quo imposed since the 1974 war (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 1998; Bryant 2004). The Greek Cypriots perceived the division as temporary. For the Turkish Cypriots official history had to justify and legitimise the events of 1974, so as to ensure the *continuity* of this division, thereby reconstructing the past in line with the desired future (Papadakis, 2005, p.235).<sup>27</sup> The Turkish-Cypriot side, therefore, saw the changes as permanent. This also is reflected in the way the Turkish Cypriot state treated the new homes they inhabited in the north. Officially, they had to quickly forget about their memories in the south and provide the newly inhabited areas with memories so as to permanently attach the 'homeland' label to these places. As a result, Turkish-Cypriot street names of heroes replaced the Greek-Cypriot ones, Turkish place names were used, and new memorials were built that strengthened the nationalist sentiment (Papadakis, 2005, p.149).

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<sup>27</sup> Papadakis visited various sides of the Dead Zone in Cyprus in the early 1990s, well before the opening of the borders. In between the two checkpoints he commented: 'On the Greek Cypriot side, the Dead Zone was marked by barbed wire that could easily be removed, whereas on the other walls had been built in the middle of the road' (2005, p.137).



The educational implications of this selective memory and selective amnesia can be seen more concretely in the way that history is written in the history textbooks of both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot educational curricula. This involves not just the partial memories of the events that led to the division of the island, but also of the earlier past, which ‘proves’ that Cyprus has historically belonged to the Greeks or Turks. As noted earlier, the development of the educational system in Cyprus, especially post-1974 (but with origins earlier in the twentieth century) was strongly intertwined with the nation-building project. Both inter-communal and intra-communal conflict meant that Greek-Cypriot educational policies have been of a ‘restrictive character’, allowing ‘discriminatory ideologies and discourses’ as well as negative stereotypes to prevail in society (Hajisoteriou, 2011, p.77; see also Bryant, 1998; Hadjipavlou, 2002; Spyrou, 2002; Philippou 2007). As Broome has noted, ‘the past has been distorted beyond recognition by the educational systems and political propaganda of both sides’ (1998, p.57). Each side tries to maximise any available tool or institution to pursue their political goals. The presence of two ‘motherlands’, notorious for their historically antagonistic relations, that of Greece and Turkey, only serves to further deepen this selective remembering and forgetting as they impose an external layer of collective memory and historical narrative. One example of how this ‘motherland’ layer is directly transmitted or exported to the respective ‘child-lands’ is through the free provision of history textbooks.

#### **1.4. The Cyprus Conflict: a historical background**

As we have already seen, in the context of an ethnic power struggle, it is not surprising that the two narratives refer to the same region and the same time period,

yet come up with such contrasting narratives. However, even when the time period is concerned, the politics of selective memory (and forgetting) come into the fore once more. Each side begins its historical narrative from a particular date that will suit its political purpose. Each side takes either the Ottoman Empire (1571) or the Byzantine Empire (330) as their point of departure to prove that the island belongs to the Turks, or to the Greeks, and that the status quo is a result of the 'other' trying to steal from what was (historically) always and already rightfully theirs. The Greek-Cypriot side often even goes as early as ancient times (14<sup>th</sup> century B.C.) in order to prove the early 'Hellenization' of Cyprus, this being consistent with Hayden White's argument of the use of narrative based on a notion of continuity (1990, p.10; Papadakis, 2008b, p.9). Therefore, the differences between narratives concern not just which events the Cypriots select to remember and emphasise, or on what meanings they inscribe to each version of event but also involve 'the starting point' as this helps to give the basis of justification for what information will emerge from the narrative.

As Table 1.1. shows, the two highly antithetical narratives are as simple as they are simplistic. Both sides present half-truths as the whole story; in this sense, 'both histories lie using the truth' (see Papadakis, 2005, p.16). More specifically, when depicting the Cyprus problem, the Greek Cypriot narrative almost always starts from the Turkish invasion in 1974: the mass displacement, death, disaster. The Turkish Cypriot narrative of the Cyprus problem starts from December 1963: fear, inter-communal troubles, the 'Bloody Christmas'. The Greek Cypriot tragedy of the 1974 'Barbaric Turkish invasion' has been the 'Happy Peace Operation' in the Turkish Cypriot narrative. As we shall see shortly, the historical narratives emerging from

each side's history textbooks are not just antagonistic but often mutually exclusive- what is a tragedy for one side, is described as a 'Happy Peace Operation' by the other.

Although a historical section would not be complete without an analysis of both historical narratives,-which I offer in sections 1.5.1. and 1.5.2.- in this section, the reader may notice a more in-depth analysis of Greek Cypriot policies and behaviour when describing the conflict. I consciously do this, as detailed explanations of the Greek-Cypriot perceptions are instrumental for understanding the references and discourses of the empirical chapters. The aim of this section is to give the reader a chronological sense of the most important events or turning points, and although I do not claim to be able to offer a completely 'objective' account of events, I try as far as possible, to cite primary and secondary evidence that has been acknowledged by if not all, at least most of the 'peace -oriented' academics. Due to space constraints I focus on the post- 1960 period and only include a brief description of the 1878-1960 period (a full analysis with supporting primary evidence can be found in the Appendix).

David Hannay, the former British Special Representative for Cyprus from 1996 to 2003, remarked in his book entitled *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*: 'As I learned more about our role there in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, I came to understand better some of the hostility and suspicions towards Britain' (2005, p.239). Indeed Britain's role as a colonial power was arguably a crucial factor in shaping the future of Cyprus, for at least the next five decades. It is often downplayed or emphasized in historical narratives depending on the position of the author, but it is hard to refute that the British employed a strategy of 'divide and rule' until Cyprus was granted its

independence. This strategy, together with the 1960 constitution (that granted Cyprus its independence) and which was perceived as imposed from external powers, also arguably contributed to a rather suspicious Greek-Cypriot public with regards to policy initiatives that are seen as associated with, or originating from abroad. Contemporary interpretations of this history affect current perceptions and attitudes. As we shall see in Chapter Five, resistance to peace education initiatives is often defended by reference to such peace education ideas or concepts being *ksenoferta* (literally translated as foreign-brought) ideas and cultures, that are not organically developed but ‘imposed’ from foreign countries and cultures, and hence, might be serving foreign interests.<sup>28</sup>

#### 1.4.1. 1878-1940: British Changes to the Cypriot socio-political landscape

According to Paul Sant Cassia, an anthropologist who has written extensively on Cyprus, Greek Cypriots are somewhat justified for pointing out that ‘the dominant culture with the greatest continuity since at least the fourth century BC’ has been Greek and hence, Christian (1999, p.24). However, since the island fell under Ottoman rule in 1571, a substantial Turkish minority emerged, mostly descendants of the Ottoman settlers, comprising about 18% of the island.

Through the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Britain was given the administration of Cyprus, in exchange for a guarantee to defend the Ottoman Empire against Russia. Despite being under Ottoman rule for over 300 years, the majority of the population

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<sup>28</sup> This was a prominent argument in discourses of resistance towards the Annan Plan, particularly from the nationalist party DIKO (Democratic Party).

remained Greek. These Greek Cypriots regarded themselves as ‘Greek’ and desired union- in Greek- *enosis*, with Greece. *Enosis* was viewed by the Turkish side as a threat to their existence and influence on the island and hence, would later clash with their own demand for *taksim* (partition of the island). After the First World War there was a gradual increase in Greek-Cypriot nationalist sentiment. Proposals were put forward for at least greater representation of the Greek Cypriots in the Legislative Council but the British turned proposals down, telling the Greek Cypriots that they were considered ‘immature’ for constitutional freedoms (Hill, 1952, p.431). A wave of anti-British feeling was exacerbated by what the Greek Cypriots saw as a lack of formal respect for Christian Orthodoxy, which they were used to under the Ottoman rule. The more the British rejected and dismissed the Greek Cypriots as inferior, the more they became embittered.

The ‘divide and rule’ policy was primarily institutionalized early on through the Legislative Council,<sup>29</sup> where the Turkish-Cypriot minority vote when combined with the British actually equalled those of the Greek-Cypriot, effectively giving the British Governor the casting vote on controversial issues (Orr, 1972, p.106; Faustmann, 2008, p.46). The Greek Cypriots disliked the fact that such power was given to the Turkish Cypriots that could effectively push aside their own views, and vehemently demanded what they saw as a fairer representation, proportional to the population numbers of the two communities.

It is also important to contextualize the Greek Cypriots’ sentiments in relation to events that were occurring outside Cyprus at the time. Firstly, when Greece was

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<sup>29</sup> By this time the Council, although controlled by Britain, became an important platform through which both communities voiced their political demands.

engaged in revolts to gain liberation from the Ottoman rulers, Greek Cypriots joined the Greek army as volunteers. For example, in 1896, 682 volunteers set off from Cyprus to fight on the side of Crete, which was revolting against Ottoman rule (Bose, 2007, p.63). Unsurprisingly this intensified their anti-Turkish feelings, at the same time further igniting their own nationalist desires once they returned back to Cyprus. Moreover, the fact that Crete achieved enosis with Greece in 1913, set a positive precedent for the Greek Cypriots. Related to this, is the second significant contextual factor: the firm establishment of the so-called 'Megali Idea' (meaning Grand Idea) in Cyprus. This 'Idea', arguably the epitome of Greek irredentism, encapsulated and envisaged an enlarged Greek state which would re-unite all the Greeks of the Mediterranean and Balkan world, previously part of the Byzantine Empire.

It was in this catalytic yet conflicting context that Greek Cypriots' struggles for *enosis* gained momentum. Unsurprisingly, Turkish Cypriots complained to the British that the Greek Cypriots 'had adopted a menacing attitude' toward them (Katsiaounis, 1996, p.210-214, cited in Bose, 2007, p.63). Despite the common antipathy of both the Turkish Cypriots and the British towards *enosis*, it would be misleading to argue that the Turkish Cypriots were simply stirred into opposition by the colonial rulers.<sup>30</sup> Instead, the Turkish Cypriots protested against *enosis*, as they perceived it as a threat for the Muslim minority. The following excerpt from a speech made by a Turkish Cypriot member of the Legislative Council, in 1930, evidences this:

We vehemently protest against this [pro-enosis] representation as we have always done in the past. We believe that if Cyprus were annexed to Greece

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<sup>30</sup> This of course, does not nullify the argument that the British used the Turkish Cypriot stance favourably to pursue their own goals. For more information on the October 1931 riots see the Appendix.

there would be no chance of life for the Moslems in Cyprus (cited in Georghallides, 1985, p. 390).

On the other hand some authors (see Hill, 1952; Choisi, 1993; Hadjidemetriou, 2007) argue that the Turkish Cypriots were used as an excuse by the British, who made references to their moral obligation to defend the interests of the minority whenever the two interests concurred, in order to prolong their stronghold in Cyprus and prevent *enosis* from becoming a reality.<sup>31</sup> It is probable that both arguments have some validity as the Turkish Cypriots' resistance towards *enosis* gave the British an added barrier against the *enosis* movement. In addition, the fact that the British bases - a total of 98 square miles (2.7%)- still occupy the small island to this day despite protests against them, testifies to the diachronic geopolitical significance of Cyprus and to the British denial of allowing Cyprus to unite with Greece.

The first organised riots of the Greek-Cypriots against the British took place in 1931. The British reacted with emergency laws, exiles, curfews, abolishment of the Council, as well as a fine of £30,000 imposed only on the 'non-Moslem' population, 'an event that further identified in Greek minds the Turkish community with the colonial rulers (Stavrinides, 1999, p.20).<sup>32</sup> The October 1931 revolt is often seen as a turning point in the period of British rule in Cyprus, after which Britain practiced an almost dictatorial system on all activities of social and political life, at least until the Second World War. Emergency laws aimed at curbing the authority of the Church, political parties were banned, as was the use of the Greek flag, two thousand Cypriots were

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<sup>31</sup> See also Colonial Secretary Sir Charles William James Orr's account in the Appendix.

<sup>32</sup> It is unclear whether or not some Turkish Cypriots participated in the October 1931 revolts against colonial authorities. Some historians (e.g. (Hadjidemetriou, 2007, p.339) mention that both communities fought together and also suffered the consequent punishments, whereas most historians only mention the Greek Cypriot community as protesting in a revolt that was clearly for *enosis* and not simply against the British rule.

imprisoned, and ten communal leaders, including two Bishops were deported. The riots sharpened relations between the Greek Cypriots and the British, set a precedent for the later armed struggle, but also formed ‘a reference point’ as the ‘riots entered the *enosis* lexicon’ of Greek Cypriot nationalist discourse (Michael, 2009, p.17). Moreover, the dynamics of massive repression by the colonial ruler helped generate support for ‘collective overt hostility’ towards the colonial government through the creation of militant organisations (Sant Cassia, 1999, p.49).

#### 1.4.2. 1941-1954: Beginning of the era of mass politics in Cyprus

One of the political parties made illegal as result of the 1931 riots was the Communist Party of Cyprus, which was founded in 1926, reflecting the beginnings of working class consciousness in Cyprus. Only after the beginning of the Second World War were political parties allowed to develop again.<sup>33</sup> The communist party set as its aim the protection of the working class from exploitation as well as the independence of Cyprus (Faustmann, 2010, p.273). The early 1940s saw an institutionalization of the internal politics of the Greek Cypriots and not long after, of the Turkish Cypriots- according to Faustmann this was the beginning of ‘the era of mass politics in Cyprus’ (2010, p.273). In 1941 leading members of the previous communist party helped establish AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People), a left-wing peoples’ party which supported self-government but was ambivalent regarding *enosis*. On the right, the bourgeois class organized the Cyprus Nationalist Party. The Greek Civil War of 1946, and the later emergence of the Cold War, only helped to polarize the internal struggle between the Left and Right even further, allowing for the fermentation of

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<sup>33</sup> Trade unions however, were legalized earlier, in 1936.



political developments that characterize the Greek Cypriot community to this day. The first Turkish Cypriot political party, the Turkish Minority Association (KATAK), was formed much later than the first Greek Cypriot one (1920s), in 1942.

Indeed, it was the Greek Cypriots who first initiated the nationalist movement that resulted in an intense anti-imperialist struggle (that finally led to Cyprus's independence). The Greek Cypriots wanted 'freedom' from British colonial rule in order to unite with what they regarded as the nation they belonged: 'motherland' Greece. The main exponent of the demand for *enosis* with Greece was the Orthodox Church. As we shall see throughout this thesis, the role of the Church as an institution in Cyprus is crucial, both from a historical and contemporary perspective. In January 1950, Archbishop Makarios II, the head of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus led a plebiscite in which 96% of Greek Cypriots supported *enosis* with Greece. He was succeeded by Archbishop Makarios III in September 1950. Until his death in 1977 he was to play a prominent role in the Cypriot political scene as he became the leader of the populist movement for *enosis*, was seen as the leader of the Greek Cypriots, and subsequently became President of the Republic of Cyprus.

The potential of this union stirred up counter-feelings in the Turkish Cypriots which responded with Turkish nationalism. Following the Second World War, the Turkish Cypriots who wanted to prevent union with Greece at all costs started to 'fully back the British' and at the same time their leaders increased their pressures on Turkey to regain control of Cyprus if British colonial rule ended (Faustmann, 2008, p.51). This was the beginning of the emergence of Turkish nationalism as a critical force within the Turkish Cypriot community, which was becoming increasingly secular, identified

less by its religion and more by its ethnicity. In the 1950s, seeing that the possibility of Turkey annexing the whole of Cyprus was meagre, the Turkish Cypriots crystallized their formal desires into fighting for *taksim*. *Taksim* represented the partition of Cyprus into two, giving one part to Turkey and one part to Greece, sometimes referred to as double-*enosis*. Here we can see the roots of difference in nationalist sentiments, but also regarding the desired future of each community.

Whereas the Greek Cypriot community formally articulated its struggle for self-determination in terms of union with Greece as early as 1919 (during a Cyprus mission visit to London),<sup>34</sup> the diametrically opposed Turkish position of *taksim* only formally emerged in the late 1950s. KATAK was formed in 1942 but it was only after the mid 1950s that the level of political organisation in the Turkish Cypriot community improved (Bose, 2007, p.64). During the late 1940s, various political and educational efforts were made to strengthen the ties between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots in an attempt to raise national consciousness. These efforts included the setting up on the island in 1948 of a 'Special Turkish Committee' by Britain; the celebration of national holidays of Turkey in Cyprus; the implementation of Kemal Attaturk's reforms in the Turkish Cypriot community; and crucially the advent of educational resources, including both material (textbooks) and human resources (teachers from mainland Turkey) (Kizilyurek, 2006, p.323; Faustmann, 2008, p.52).

By 1950, 'two fully-fledged nationalist ideologies in the island' (Stavrinides, 1999, p.24) were allowed to flourish under the British system of governance. Britain's main aim was to ensure that neither desired goal was achieved, and that instead 'their

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<sup>34</sup> The idea of *enosis* can be traced earlier during the Ottoman rule, where the idea of freedom was identified with the idea of union with Greece. However, this was not formal and on a more limited scale (Hadjidemetriou, 2007, p.331)

subjects' remained loyal to the British Empire. Nevertheless, British policy during this period was neither clear nor consistent, with representatives oscillating from giving statements of hope for self-determination, to statements that excluded such possibility indefinitely (see Appendix).

1954 was a crucial year during which there was a further polarisation of attitudes not only within Cyprus, but between Britain, Greece and Turkey. During the debate in the House of Commons, Henry Hopkinson, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, issued his infamous 'never' statement with regard to the self-determination of Cyprus. Greece countered<sup>35</sup>, and in July 1954, raised the issue of 'self-determination' of the Cypriots at an international organization, the United Nations (UN) in an attempt to internationalize the issue and put pressure on the British. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots saw this as their only peaceful outlet since their demands were otherwise not acted upon. This attempt however, was defeated by Anglo-Turkish cooperation, with both countries reacting with stark opposition to Greece's action. With hindsight, one can argue that Turkey's stance crystallized as a result of Greece's resort to the UN. Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes also encouraged the formation of a 'Cyprus is Turkish Committee' back in Ankara and it was his government that was responsible for instigating and orchestrating the Istanbul mob attacks against the Greek minority there in September 1955.

This was an orchestrated attempt by Turkey's leaders to ignite nationalist sentiments within the Turkish nation to resist *enosis*, as well as to show to the Greek Cypriots

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<sup>35</sup> Greece had decided to reproduce the idea (Grand Idea) of uniting the Greek-speaking diaspora once more: 'For Greece, the activation of a quiescent, if not actually dormant, claim to Cyprus arose, most profoundly, from the attempt after 1950-1 to build a new "national politics" following the end of the civil war in that country' (Holland, 1995, p.34).

that if Turkish Cypriots were harmed, the Greek minority in Turkey would suffer as well (Güven, 2011). An account of the events put together by the British Consul-General also implied British involvement, referring to language being used in the British Foreign Office -'a few riots. . . will do us nicely' (Holland, 1998, p.75; De Zayas, 2007;).

#### 1.4.3. 1955-59: The creation of the 'Frankenstein Monster': clash of interests

Back in Cyprus after the infamous 'never' British response, and the failed UN route, the Greek Cypriots had decided that they had enough, and took the matter on their own hands- literally. A guerilla war of liberation from the British was launched with bomb explosions on 1 April 1955, led by an armed organization called EOKA, that stood for 'National Organization of Cypriot Fighters' (Ironically, one is left to wonder why they used the 'Cypriot' and not 'Greek' label given the nature of their cause.) EOKA's military leader Georgios Grivas.<sup>36</sup> Although the focus of EOKA was to fight 'for the liberation of Cyprus from the British yoke', and *enosis* was not explicitly mentioned, nevertheless this was understood by all (Bose, 2007, p.66).

For the next four years the EOKA war aggravated the political divide between Left and Right and set the political agenda as people were drawn to either side; even if people supported *enosis*, not everyone supported achieving this via violent methods. Nevertheless, Griva convinced Archbishop Makarios of the potential success of a guerilla war and even though as an initially underground organisation membership

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<sup>36</sup> Grivas was born in Cyprus but spent most of his life in Greece as a military officer where he developed strong links to right-wing political circles-the convictions of which would later have an instrumental role in the direction of the EOKA movement and the future of Cyprus.

was limited, as it was propagated as an anti-colonial ethnic struggle it soon gained popular support. The more people killed by the British, the more united the Greek Cypriots became. The youth, working adults, and elderly, all tried to support the organisation through various ways: even when this did not involve direct fighting, it involved offering shelter and hiding places for the militants in their homes, secretly distributing food to the fighters who were hiding in the mountains, disseminating leaflets, acting as messengers etc. (see Aggelidou, 2011). One such person was Klairi Aggelidou, who much later was to have a direct impact on education policy as she was appointed Minister of Education and Culture in 1993. The idiosyncratic relationship of the EOKA war with the youth, and the important legacy of this for contemporary education is discussed further in Chapter Four.

The British reaction was draconian; once confronted with violent attempts at *enosis* in 1955, Britain realized that she had to take further action. They arrested Archbishop Makarios on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March 1956 and exiled him to the Seychelles, a move later condemned by most British MPs as a major blunder, given he had the overwhelming support and admiration of the Greek Cypriot community, and that violence only escalated after his exile. Numerous unsuccessful attempts at arresting Grivas and his comrades were made but the fighters often received shelter by the monks of Orthodox monasteries, this being another proof of the importance of the Church in the politics of Cyprus.

Another method that the British employed which was both counterproductive and paradoxical was their policy of communal punishment, mass fines and curfews thereby cementing the masses into solidarity with the terrorists. As an MP put it: ‘We

are punishing the whole population and, at the same time, saying to them, "We know that it is nothing to do with you..." (MP Lena Jeger, HC Deb, 19 July 1956, 1504).

The British were clear on the risks that they might have to face if the UN principle of self-determination was applied to Cyprus, both strategic<sup>37</sup> and in relation to their 'friendship' with Turkey. The following is an excerpt from a speech made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) during a House of Commons debate in 1956:

Cyprus remains essential for the maintenance of British interests.... For Turkey, Cyprus is an offshore island covering the approach to its southern ports. The Turks are our staunch friends in N.A.T.O. and in the Bagdad Pact and other alliances...any Government which lightly risks any disagreement between our two countries would be taking a very grave risk indeed (HC Deb, 19 July 1956, 1409).

While it seems clear that Britain did pursue a strategy of 'divide and rule', one must be cautious in not going as far as presenting Turkey as Britain's puppet. According to Baruh and Popescu, historical accounts that depict how Cyprus became such an important aspect of Turkish nationalist discourse 'represent this process as an opportunistic top-down project motivated by Cyprus's geopolitical importance' (2008, p.80). These accounts refer to the impact of the extensive 1950s press campaign in Turkey that began when the newspaper *Hurriyet*, a private newspaper, brought the Turkish War of Independence back to social memory mobilizing youth

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<sup>37</sup> In Egypt, Arab nationalism resulted in the toppling of the monarchy, and after the Suez crisis Cyprus's strategic position became all the more important for Britain who could not afford any more 'withdrawals' from her Empire.

groups and creating the 'Cyprus is Turkish' association (An, 2002; Stefanidis, 1999, cited in Baruh and Popescu, 2008, p.80). Turkey, beyond her need to deflect attention away from her internal economic troubles, had her own powerful strategic considerations, and was adamant not to let Greece unite with an island just off her shores.

British tactics further polarized the two communities. One acute example of this was the recruitment of significant numbers of Turkish Cypriots as auxiliaries who were responsible for torturing Greek Cypriot suspects in order to extract intelligence information from them (Thubron, 1975, p.37, cited in Bose, 2007, p.68). The auxiliary anti-EOKA police was made up of 1,700 Turkish Cypriots, and only 70 Greek Cypriots, while there was another reserve unit made up exclusively of only Turkish Cypriot members (Crawshaw, 1978, p.405). The negative repercussions of such a policy are difficult to exaggerate: not only would the Greek Cypriots perceive the Turkish Cypriots as their enemy (since they appeared on the British side) making it inevitable that Turkish Cypriots would be killed during the anti-colonial struggle, but also as a result, the mourning Turkish Cypriot community would turn directly against the Greek Cypriots.

According to an interview given by the Turkish Cypriot mayor (Kutlay Erk) of northern Nicosia in June 2004, *de facto* formation of separate municipalities even started before the 1974 invasion, as early as 1958, and importantly, that this was facilitated by the British partly 'as a reward for cooperation against Greek Cypriot nationalists and as an incentive to further cooperation' (see Bose, 2007, pp.67-68). Rauf Denktash, a Turkish Cypriot, employed as British crown prosecutor, prosecuted

many of the EOKA members, thus, ‘was directly responsible for the many men who were found guilty and were executed by hanging, or imprisoned’ (Walker, 2005, p.89). Denktash who was also a leading member of the Turkish underground guerilla organisation, was later to become a key political figure for the Turkish Cypriots for over 40 years (as president of the Turkish Communal Chamber in 1960, and later as vice-president and president of the TRNC), earning a controversial reputation for his hardline approach to the Cyprus negotiation talks.

Faustmann argues that ultimately Britain fell victim to her own strategy, as she underestimated Turkey’s determination to make partition a reality (2008, p.53). A British MP argued that ‘a great deal of the trouble which we are now experiencing from the Turks in Cyprus and Turkey itself has been created by the Government who are now confronted with a sort of *Frankenstein monster* with which they do not know what to do’ (MP Lena Jeger, HC Deb, 19 July 1956, 1502, emphasis added). By the time Prime Minister Macmillan finally concluded in 1957 that British interests could be met by two military bases, back in Cyprus things had got out of hand with the two nationalist movements gathering momentum and heading towards their peak.

The Turkish Cypriots responded by setting up their own underground armed organization in 1955, called Volkan, and in 1958 renamed as TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation). TMT’s main goal was to resist *enosis*, and divide the island. Their slogan was ‘partition or death’. It seems that they were convinced early on that Turkey would send military aid to achieve *taksim*, and their posters even ‘showed the island partitioned beneath the figure of a helmeted Turkish soldier’ (Crawshaw, 1978, p. 287).



TMT attacked Greek Cypriots and their property and often provoked violence between the two communities in order to pressurize Turkey to intervene. They did this by attacking their own Turkish Cypriot villages or offices, or even by murdering Turkish Cypriots, in what would seem like EOKA attacks. For example, in 1958 the TMT planted a bomb outside the Turkish Cypriot press office in Nicosia, and as a result of the explosion Turkish Cypriots, thinking that this was the work of Greek Cypriots, attacked the Greek Cypriot quarter in Nicosia and by the time things calmed down 53 Turkish Cypriots and 56 Greek Cypriots had been murdered (Bose, 2007, p.70).

Moreover, both EOKA and TMT attacked members of their own ethnic groups which they deemed as ‘traitors’: EOKA murdered left-wing Greek Cypriots (for example, trade union leaders) who allegedly did not pursue *enosis* or collaborated with the British,<sup>38</sup> and TMT murdered left-wing Turkish Cypriots who agreed with left-wing Greek Cypriots against a union with Greece (Sant Cassia, 1999, p.25). The cause of the EOKA movement was so powerfully articulated that even when EOKA assassinated members of their own community the majority of the population accepted these killings as legitimate and unavoidable (Bose, 2007, p.67). Again, much of these internal divisions define the two political camps even today. Moreover, the label ‘traitor’ has since gained a different momentum in the lexicon of Cypriot public discourse. As we shall see in Chapter Five, peace educationalists are often dubbed as ‘traitors’ by nationalists who resist peace education initiatives.

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<sup>38</sup> A few Greek Cypriots betrayed EOKA’s secret hiding places to the British, usually in exchange for money or personal advancement.

Stavrinides<sup>39</sup>, an expert on the Cyprus conflict and stern critic of the Greek Cypriot side has argued that ‘the Greeks’ did not make any efforts to ‘approach the Turks, to understand their fears and reassure them accordingly’ but instead perceived them ‘as a foreign element, the descendants of the Turkish mainlanders who settled in Cyprus after 1571’ (1999, pp.17-8). The ensuing predominance of Greek nationalism in Cyprus resulted in a dangerous loss of the sense of existence, as well as importance, of both the Muslim minority and neighbouring Turkey (Kitromilides, 1994). The Greek Cypriots saw the matter as an issue of the preference of the majority, and perhaps one could argue, were taking their form of revenge by ignoring the Turkish Cypriots’ views for what they perceived as the earlier Anglo-Turkish front.

It is perhaps an irony that the Cypriots fought about what would happen once independence was given, *before* it was even granted. This happened because the Turkish Cypriots knew that the vast majority of Greek Cypriots wanted *enosis*, so once they were given their independence, they would inevitably have to be united with Greece. Turkish Cypriots feared that if Cyprus became Greek, as a minority they would be oppressed and eventually expelled from the island. Therefore, the Turkish Cypriots initially did not participate in any anti-colonial struggles, but later on once the guerilla war started and independence seemed inevitable they decided that their best option was partition. They could not themselves plausibly argue for total unity with Turkey as they knew this was not feasible, given that they constituted just over 18% of the island (although earlier this was demanded as the preferred alternative to *enosis*). Whereas the Greek Cypriots had a proactive goal of *enosis*, the Turkish-

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<sup>39</sup> Dr. Zenon Stavrinides is himself a Greek Cypriot by birth, has been educated in the UK, and is the founder of the inter-communal association, ‘The Association for Cypriot, Greek and Turkish Affairs’ based in London and aimed at promoting mutual understanding between the said countries by providing a forum for such discussion (ACGTA, 2000, <http://www.peace-cyprus.org/ACGTA/>).

Cypriot community's goals, up until the mid 1950s at least, had been largely defensive (Patrick, 1976, cited in Walker, 2005, pp.89-90).

The following extract from Keith Kyle, a British journalist and historian, written in 1983 for the Minority Rights Group in London, summarises this issue aptly:

The Turkish Cypriots were at the time of independence scattered over the whole island in no single sector of which did they form a numerical majority. Are we confronted here with a problem of minority rights? We have already touched the heart of the controversy: for it is the Turkish population's contention that it is *not a minority but a separate and equal community; hence that the concept of minority rights offers no solution that is of interest to it* (1983, emphasis added).

#### 1.4.4. 1960-63: The Rise and Fall of the Republic of Cyprus

Unsurprisingly, Britain decided to hasten its actions; Harold Macmillan, agreed to hand over sovereignty, given that Britain could retain its bases and Cyprus officially gained its independence in August 1960. Archbishop Makarios agreed to independence, instead of enosis and there was inter-communal ceasefire. Dr Küçük became the first Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, while Archbishop Makarios became the first President.<sup>40</sup> However, the constitution did not bring about what the Cypriots wanted, but what Turkey and Greece had agreed during their 1959

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<sup>40</sup> The President of the Republic would be a Greek-Cypriot and the Vice President a Turkish-Cypriot. A Greek-Cypriot communal chamber of 24 members and a Turkish Cypriot one of 30 members would be elected.

negotiations in Zurich and London. This agreement had to be approved by the British government but no Cypriots were invited. In fact, the 1960 constitution, which declared the independent Republic of Cyprus forbade both *enosis* and *taksim*. In addition, resulting treaties had important constitutional restraints, and were ‘guaranteed’ by these three outside countries, who were directly given the right to interfere in order to restore the *status quo*, if this was changed. Arguably, even from its creation the Republic was never truly *de jure* independent but dependent on its guarantors. So, the emergence of Cyprus as an independent state-actor in international relations was rather ‘reluctant’ (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2002, p.75).

However, although neither community’s political aspirations were fulfilled, it was the Greek Cypriot community that was the most disappointed with the constitution requirements. The Turkish Cypriots welcomed the constitution and Turkey’s role as guarantor. It was a satisfactory outcome for them as it not only prevented *enosis*, but it created a state on the basis of their constitutional equality with the majority, in which they were offered guarantees, protections and representations ‘generous by any standards’ given their population size (Bose, 2007, pp.74-5). However, the Greek Cypriots perceived this imposed independence as ‘treason and national disaster’ not only because of the unrealisation of their long-term goal of *enosis* but also because they perceived the constitution as unfair and as violating the democratic principle of majority rule.<sup>41</sup> According to the constitution, Turkish Cypriots were to be represented in political offices at the rate of 30%, and of 40% in the army, and not in proportion to their population, which led to the alienation of the Greek Cypriots. In general, the Greek Cypriots resented the fact that the powers given to the Turkish

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<sup>41</sup> According to the 1960 Census by Nationality there were 442,521 citizens of Greek nationality in Cyprus i.e. 76.6% of the population, and 104,350 of Turkish i.e. 18.4% of the population (there were also Armenian, Maronite, British and Latin minorities)(Panteli, 2005, p.338).

Cypriots were not of a political minority but that of a co-founder partner. Makarios insisted on a more unified approach, whereas the constitution legitimised the separate ethnic municipalities that started existing *de facto* since 1958.

Although it was not inevitable that the constitution was going to fail, it was largely problematic, both with respect to the context described above and due to inherent problems. It has been accused for example, for exacerbating existing tensions by institutionalising the ethnic differences between the two communities, instead of trying to unify them as Cypriot citizens (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1993, p.72; Hadjidemetriou, 2007, p.356). As Constantinou states, the constitution ‘formalised and normalized bicomunalism’<sup>42</sup> whilst abnormalising any hybridity or ethno-religious syncretism that could have existed- you could only belong to one of the two ‘pure’ groups (2007, p.250). Consequently, a more rigid defensive attitude among the Cypriots emerged, which led to further in-group homogenization whilst cross-ethnic hybridity was to be viewed as implicit or explicit betrayal.

Moreover, after the British had ended their colonial rule of more than eighty years, the constitution that was put in place aimed to create a power-sharing administration between the two main communities.<sup>43</sup> This power sharing largely depended on the goodwill<sup>44</sup> of the people; yet, these were not two peoples that were living peacefully with each other (as was the norm in the earlier parts of the century) but two ethnic

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<sup>42</sup> This is not to suggest that there is anything wrong with a bicomunal framework for settling the Cyprus problem, but rather that at the time it had negative effects in solidifying the differences, as there was no concept of tolerance.

<sup>43</sup> This has been described as an early example of consociationalism and as such Cyprus serves as a case study of the potential problems associated with this form of power-sharing (Diez and Tocci, 2009, p.2). For a more detailed discussion of the constitution and its consociational aspects see Stavrínides, 1999 and Bose, 2007.

<sup>44</sup> Dr Ernst Forsthoﬀ, who became the President of the Constitutional Court of Cyprus publicly stated that it was a workable constitution: ‘If there is good will a constitution can be implemented, and the Constitution [of Cyprus] is capable of being implemented’ (cited in Stavrínides, 1999, pp.52-3).

groups that were literally fighting with each other just months before. There were virtually no shared institutions; there was no common educational system, no Cypriot university, no shared businesses between the Greeks and Turks, and intermarriage was very rare (Kyle, 1983). There was economic, political, social and geographical separation. Trade unions, labour unions, sports associations were also divided and after 1958, Turkish Cypriots established a separate Nicosia municipality, with its own chamber of commerce (Hatay, Mullen and Kalimeri, 2008, p.7).

Different interpretations and beliefs over the constitution and the functioning of the state resulted in deadlock. Apart from the quotas for the public service, contentious issues included the integrated Cyprus army, tax legislation, and separate municipalities. Makarios's policies were vetoed from Kuchuk, and relations between the two communities started to deteriorate again. Against the deadlock, Makarios then drafted proposals for amending the constitution and sent them to Kuchuk for a reply. Instead, he got a rejection of the proposals not from the Turkish Cypriot vice-president but from Turkey's foreign minister (F.K. Erkin). Makarios refused to accept the rejection stating he asked his vice-president to reply and not a foreign government (Panteli, 2005, p.224). It is unsurprising that his proposals were rejected, as the constitution granted the Turkish Cypriots minority guarantees which they were not willing to simply give up.

While there was a formal meeting to discuss the situation, inter-communal violence erupted on 21<sup>st</sup> of December 1963. The possibility of the escalation of violence led to the subsequent dispatch of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in March 1964 (Hampson, 2004, p.85). A UN-monitored buffer line was established. This has

since been called the Green Line, as a green pencil was used by the commander of the peace force (Major-General Peter Young) to draw the line on a map of Nicosia that separated the two communities.

#### 1.4.5. 1964-1974: Intercommunal and Intracommunal violence

Despite neither *taksim* nor *enosis*, both communities continued to pursue these opposite objectives throughout the 1960s, with intercommunal violence at its height in 1963-4 and 1967. Greek Cypriot irregulars attacked Turkish Cypriots, and between December 1963 and August 1964, 191 Turkish Cypriots and 133 Greek Cypriots were killed, considerably large numbers for such a small population size. It is important to note that to this day there is no hard evidence to suggest any formal sanctioning of the violence from the leaders of either side, which gives credibility to the argument made by some authors that the situation on the ground had got out of hand as the leaders were not able to restrain their own dissidents (Panteli, 2005, p.225).

Arguably, the Turkish Cypriots ‘suffered the greater losses’ during the period 1963-68, as about a fifth of their total population was displaced in armed enclaves under their control (Volkan, 1997, p.95; Bekerman and Zembylas, 2012, p.12). There they set up their own administration (starting from a General Committee in 1964), refused to recognise the Republic of Cyprus, to pay taxes to it, and thereafter faced the blockade of Greek Cypriots. It during this time, that the issue of state recognition first came to the surface as the Turkish Cypriots no longer recognised the Republic. (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2002, p.76). ‘For them the constitution was dead’ and

they experienced this period as ‘a time of exclusion and deprivation of their citizens’ rights’ (Hadjipavlou, 2002, p.195). Unsurprisingly, this resulted in a closer relationship-or rather dependence- both socio-political and economic, with ‘motherland’ Turkey.

In 1967 violence broke out once more on an inland Turkish-Cypriot enclave but the situation calmed down after Grivas and other unauthorized Greek troops responsible for attacks against the Turkish Cypriots were repatriated to Greece. As a result, in 1968, Turkish Cypriots moved out of their enclaves (Volkan, 1997, p.96). Nevertheless, the ensued psychological and geographical distancing prevented a common space for dialogue between the two communities, and diminished any opportunities for building a common identity. To make things worse, according to an anthropological study, many Turkish Cypriots reported a desire to leave the enclaves but were discouraged from doing so by ‘their own people, supported by a Turkish government that provided subsidies’ to them (Bryant, 2010, p.121). During this period Turkey made it known that it had plans to intervene by military force to enforce partition if Turkish lives’ were threatened; Bulent Ecevit stated during the intercommunal talks that the only solution they would support would be federation and Denktash emphasised that there is no such thing as a unitary Cypriot state (Michael, 2009, p.31). Problematic relations between the two communities could only strengthen the Turkish Cypriot position at the intercommunal talks, as they had maintained that the ‘Turks could not trust, and work under, the Greek-Cypriot regime’, although, by 1974 10,000 Turkish Cypriots still worked for Greek-Cypriot employers (Stavrinides, 1999, p.83).



Developments in Greece caused a further split in Greek-Cypriot internal politics, giving a further impetus to Makarios to resume intercommunal talks with Turkish-Cypriot leaders (Bose, 2007, p.84). Back in Greece, a group of right-wing colonels organized a coup and imposed a military dictatorship in 1967. According to the junta, Cyprus was a state that was subordinate to Greece and had to obey it. Grivas, as a hardline *enosist*, was alienated with Makarios's conciliatory attitude towards independence, and had moved to Greece, but was giving his orders from there on the creation of a new secret organisation called EOKA B which claimed that Makarios had 'betrayed' the goal of *enosis* (again strengthening the discursive dynamics and historical legacy of the term 'traitors'). On the one hand, there was Makarios, overwhelmingly re-elected to power and trying to pursue non-violent methods within the framework of an independent Cyprus. On the other hand, was EOKA B, a paramilitary extreme right-wing organization supported by the Greek junta that strongly opposed the intercommunal talks and was determined to fight for '*enosis* and only *enosis*'.

According to Sant Cassia, by the late 1960s, discontent amongst those Greek Cypriots who had fought in the original EOKA, and yet as a result of the 1960 constitution, had been 'largely excluded from power and government employment', was exploited by army officers from Greece who were stationed in Cyprus to train the National Guard (1999, p.25). Grivas returned secretly to Cyprus in 1971 to lead and train EOKA B terrorists so as to oust Makarios and achieve its goals. Although Grivas died in January 1974, EOKA B continued its activities directed and financed by the Greek junta, and up until then many unsuccessful attempts had been made to overthrow Makarios. On 3 July 1974, Makarios requested the withdrawal of the Greek Junta's

army officers in Cyprus, accusing them of directing the activities of EOKA B.

On July 15<sup>th</sup> 1974, Greek military dictators in Athens staged a coup d'état in Cyprus, displacing the Greek-Cypriot popular leader Makarios, and later announcing that he was dead. The coup was resisted by the vast majority of Greek Cypriots, who were extremely saddened by the alleged loss of their spiritual and political leader. Large numbers of his Greek Cypriot loyalists were jailed and killed by junta putschists (Bose, 2007, p.85). When his supporters his voice through a broadcasting station, a short while before he escaped to New York, telling them that he is alive, the people cheered with relief and were heartened to continue their resistance. According to Stavrinides, the Greek Cypriots at large, a decade after the constitution had 'abandoned their traditional zeal for *enosis* (1999, pp.86) but instead were willing to follow Makarios, who had by now occupied the position of an 'ethnic martyr' and after 1968 acknowledged that *enosis* was not a realistic option.<sup>45</sup> However, this joy was to be short-lived.

Just a few days later, on July 20<sup>th</sup>, Turkey retaliated by invading Cyprus, sparking violence, losses of lives and human displacement of an unprecedented scale. Only two days after the Turkish invasion, the military dictatorship in Athens collapsed and with it, EOKA-B's seizure of power in Cyprus. Yet, the damage had already been done. By the time of the first cease-fire on July 30<sup>th</sup>, the Turkish army had already established a frontline on the northern coast of Cyprus making up 8% of the island's territory.

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<sup>45</sup> Makarios's attitude was ambivalent, since his public speeches often contradicted his more conciliatory approach, but it seems that this was as a result of the pressures exerted on him from various sides. This is not to deny that he genuinely wanted *enosis* but that once he realized that he had to compromise for independence, his oscillating attitude can be explained from the fact that if he was to retain support from the Church, then he had to 'declare systematically and unequivocally his faith in the Greek ideal', and the same stood for his own *enosis* supporters, in order to prevent them from siding with Grivas. Again, he also had to deal with a treacherous and erratic Greek dictatorship (see Stavrinides, 1999, p.87, footnote 25, and Bose, 2007, p.85)

Although they faced tough resistance from the Greek Cypriots, Britain and Greece, the other two guarantor powers, just stood by.<sup>46</sup> Turkey took that opportunity to finally intervene using the pretext of a guarantor power, in order ‘to protect the Turkish-Cypriots and ostensibly restore constitutional order’ which had already been suspended about ten years earlier (Hatay, Mullen and Kalimeri, 2008, p.8). Turkey announced the invasion as ‘peaceful action’ aimed ‘to restore Cyprus to legitimate order and the situation before the coup’ (Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, 1974, cited in Stavrinides, 1999, p.89).

However, it soon became clear that this was part of a wider ‘operation’ (the word Ecevit used), to forcefully alter the demographic lines in Cyprus so as to de facto partition the island, and in Ecevit’s words lay the ‘foundations...for the new federal state of Cyprus’ (*Newsweek*, August 26, 1974, p.16, cited in Michael, 2009, p.35). Less than a month later, on the 14<sup>th</sup> August, Turkey launched a second military offensive, extending its occupation to over 36% of the island, resulting in even further casualties, atrocities against prisoners, rapes and attacks against unarmed civilians, men, women and children, and the mass fleeing of thousands of terrified Greek Cypriots to the south of the island. There was widespread use of Napalm in bombing by Turkish air force jets. During this period, it was arguably the Greek Cypriots which suffered the greater losses. Instead of restoring order, what ensued was the division of the island. These are the effects of the division as described by a PRIO (Peace Research Institute Oslo), Cyprus report:

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<sup>46</sup> According to a 1976 report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus: “Britain had the legal right, a moral obligation, and the military capacity to intervene in Cyprus during July and August 1974. She did not intervene for reasons which the Government refuses to give...” (cited in Panteli, 2005, p. 277).

“The effect of that division was a social and economic disaster for approximately a third of the Cypriot population, but especially for Greek Cypriots originally from the north. Approximately 162,000 Greek Cypriots fled their homes in the north for safety in the south, while around 65,000 Turkish Cypriots abandoned their homes in the south for refugee in the north” (Hatay, Mullen and Kalimeri, 2008, p.8).

Turkey’s military actions led to what the UN has termed the ‘military invasion’ of Turkey in 1974, but what Turkey sees as a ‘peace operation’ or ‘military intervention’ (Papadakis, 1993, p.151; Demetriou, 2004b, p.6). The use of these different terms is central to the official national discourse of either side that supports or refutes their legitimacy. As I have argued in the Introduction, the terminology that surrounds the Cyprus issue is almost as emotive as the actual conflict itself. Hence, it seems necessary once more to refer to the terminology I use. It might be obvious to the reader by now that I do not concur with Turkey’s use of the term ‘peace operation’ or ‘intervention’, but I use the term ‘invasion’, as this is how I interpret Turkey’s actions. ‘Invasion’ is also the interpretation of 191 Member States of the UN, the European Court of Human Rights, and of British Law Courts. The scale of the invasion, and the sheer atrocities and massive suffering of innocent civilians of both sides, but especially the Greek Cypriots, make it impossible to speak of this in terms of ‘peace’, let alone call it a ‘happy peace operation’. Turkey to this day has justified the invasion using the constitutional treaty of 1960, which the Turkish Cypriot community no longer recognised as valid after 1963- when they were forced to retreat in enclaves, an act which Turkey promoted and supported through its extensive military and financial aid until 1974 (annual grant of £10 million<sup>47</sup>). Moreover, the

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<sup>47</sup> See Stavrinides (1999, p.82). On how Turkish government subsidies discouraged Turkish Cypriots to leave the enclaves see also Bryant (2010, p.121).

constitution, which failed to clearly define the specific conditions of intervention if the status quo was changed, required the consultation of all guarantors before any action, and explicitly forbade *taksim*.<sup>48</sup> It explicitly stated that in the case of an intervention this should be limited to ‘re-establishing the state of affairs’ created in 1960 and not forced violation of territorial integrity and de facto partition. Besides, even if legal arguments can be used to say that initially Turkey ‘intervened’ in Cyprus using its right to restore constitutional order, the events that followed the second offensive and the events that followed meant that the ‘intervention’ had effectively become an ‘invasion’. This is not to mask the earlier suffering of the Turkish Cypriots, but to show that this was far from a purely ‘humanitarian intervention’ and cannot be construed as such. As Sant Cassia put it:

Turkey's aim was to protect Turkish Cypriots, but whereas it had the right to restore the status quo ante, it did not have the right to effectively partition the island, occupy one half, expel its (Greek) inhabitants, and install a puppet regime (1999, p.26).

It would be naïve to argue that Turkey did not have security interests in Cyprus, especially given its geographical proximity. or that it would be willing to allow the Turkish Cypriots to rule their affairs after 1960 without any interference. Even today Turkey shows extreme reluctance to do so, and has fired up internal political debates within the Turkish Cypriot community- the latter insisting that ‘This Country is Ours’ by way of showing their hesitation against Turkey’s interference in domestic affairs

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<sup>48</sup> Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee reads as follows: “In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the UK undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance to those provisions. In so far as common concerted action may not prove possible, each of the guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.” (cited in Panteli, 2005, pp.276-7).

(*Turkish Daily News*, 5-20 July, 2000, cited in Constantinou and Papadakis, 2002, p76). What's more, from 1974 to this day, the Turkish army has still not left and the presence of around 35,000 Turkish troops has been a thorny issue ever since.

The events of 1974 have left the island divided into two separate and hostile regimes within an island of only one million inhabitants (PRIO, Annual Report, 2007, p.10): the northern side (36.3% of the island), which since 1983 has been self-declared, but *not* internationally recognised as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC<sup>49</sup>), and the southern part, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) running about 58% of the island, which is recognised internationally apart from Turkey and the TRNC. This situation of non-recognition has resulted in the description of 'the Cypriot state(s) *in situ*' (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2002). The British Bases constitute around 2.7% of the land, while the remaining 3% is the buffer zone manned by UNFICYP. The Greek Cypriots constitute 80% of the population and Turkish Cypriots 18%, Armenians, Maronites and Latins the remaining 2% (Hadjipavlou, 2002, p.195).<sup>50</sup> The Greek-Cypriot government refers to the TRNC as a '*psevdokratos*' meaning pseudo-state, and the land it controls as '*ta katexomena*' meaning the occupied areas, or more formally call it 'the occupied part of Cyprus'. The Turkish-Cypriot government, on the other hand, refers to the Republic of Cyprus, as 'South Cyprus', or the Greek-Cypriot administration.<sup>51</sup> When one refers to the other using the official name, they both do so in inverted commas i.e. 'TRNC' or 'Republic of Cyprus'.

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<sup>49</sup> For an explanation as to why I do not choose to place the TRNC in inverted commas, see the Introduction.

<sup>50</sup> According to the 2011 Population Census of the Republic of Cyprus (does not include the TRNC), Cypriots constitute 79.4% of the population, whereas Non-Cypriots constitute 20.3%. The term Cypriots here covers both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. (CYSTAT, 2013)  
[http://www.cystat.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/populationcondition\\_22main\\_en/populationcondition\\_22main\\_en?OpenForm&sub=2&sel=2](http://www.cystat.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/populationcondition_22main_en/populationcondition_22main_en?OpenForm&sub=2&sel=2)

<sup>51</sup> For an example of how these terms are used in a written formal document see here:  
[http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting\\_public/0002/contributions/other\\_governments/turkish\\_republic\\_of\\_northern\\_cyprus\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/other_governments/turkish_republic_of_northern_cyprus_en.pdf)

Since 1974, negotiations over the Cyprus issue have taken the form of numerous proposals and UN-sponsored attempts at unification within a new federal framework, none of which have been successful (for a review of the various negotiation talks see Tocci and Kovziridze, 2004 and Michael 2009). Negotiations face issues such as power sharing, sovereignty, the property of refugees, missing persons, the presence of Turkish military and so-called ‘Turkish settlers’ (migrants) on the island. More than 120 UN Security Council resolutions have been issued between 1960-2008 (Michael, 2009, p.1). Until April 2003 (when the borders opened), the line of demarcation had virtually been a closed border impenetrable to traffic and telecommunication (Demetriou, 2007, p.2).<sup>52</sup>

### **1.5. Nationalist Narratives and History Wars**

After offering a historical background to the Cyprus conflict, brief synopses of the two ‘dominant’ narratives will be presented drawing largely from official documents and depictions (including collective memory), and history textbooks used in the schools of each side, as well as academic analyses of these. Although far from uniform, these synopses give an indication of how the conflict is painted by each side thereby exposing the stark differences between these nationalist interpretations (see Table 1.1.). The dominant nationalist views are important, both in portraying their historical role in the conflict, but also because they need to be taken in to consideration when assessing future prospects of a potential settlement.

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<sup>52</sup> Demetriou has done a lot of research concerning the opening of the borders. Demetriou argues that there is an existing lived reunification on the ground, credited not only to the recent opening and the ceaseless crossing of people from one side to the other but also to the development-driven Nicosia Master Plan which, starting with the common administration of the sewage system and culminating in the common renovation of parts of the old city of Nicosia has achieved some form of structural unification (Demetriou, 2007, p.8).

Perceptions of the history of the conflict have affected the peace process – and continue to do so- in a major way. The importance of history to the conflict has been aptly reflected by Christopher Hitchen’s 1984 book title phrase ‘Hostage to history’. The historical narrative of each side reflects how each side officially chooses to describe their experiences and how they use and abuse history for propaganda purposes, but at the same time it would be unrealistic to argue that they bare no resemblance to what people have lived through, especially when dealing with a past that some people can still remember experiencing. Papadakis argues that this resemblance also helps account for the ‘fairly widespread acceptance of the official versions’ (1995). But I find this latter argument somewhat problematic, firstly, as it does not cater for those people whose experiences have fallen far from the official narrative (whether or not they have accepted or rejected it) and lack the ability or opportunity to articulate them, and secondly it underestimates the potential of structures i.e. the social framework of collective memory as put forward by Halbwachs (1992) which may have contributed towards a seemingly agreeable disposition, especially within the context of a ‘struggle’ against an external enemy. Thirdly, the dominant discourse does not in fact bear any relation to what the younger generations really experienced, as they have not experienced the conflict directly, but indirectly through the hegemonic narratives and the memories and imagination of others. Finally, Papadakis’s argument does not give due emphasis to the discursive power embedded in hegemonic institutions (see Chapters Three and Five). Therefore, notwithstanding the importance and usefulness of the dominant narratives, one must be careful not to presuppose widespread acceptance as a given (and not for example,



as a result of both individual and social influences or impositions) or take for granted the possibility of non-passive attitudes from citizens.

The type of collective remembering that is found in Cyprus involves what Wertsch calls 'contested distribution', which involves different perspectives that exist in a system of conflict and contestation and compete with each other (2002, p.24). The Cypriot examples of collective remembering are submerged in processes that involve 'contested distribution' of socially organized memory indicators, with seemingly very little tolerance for ambiguity. And because as we have seen, in Cyprus the distance between memory and history is dangerously small, this has an inevitable impact on the historical narratives of the past- and in particular, as these are portrayed in today's history textbooks which present histories as if they are holding unshakeable and holy truths. The state can permit or restrict what is included in a textbook, and through this strengthen the bonds with its citizens through the production of a national identity (Klerides, 2011, p.53) and collective memory. The history textbook then, becomes a major educational vehicle for reproducing the dominant Greek-Cypriot historical narrative and for excluding marginalised narratives, whether they stem from within the same community, or from the Turkish-Cypriot community. It is to these 'history wars' (Linenthal and Engelhardt, 1996) that we shall now turn.

Narratives from both sides are dominated from securitized representations that depict the other party as an essential threat, not only to their identity but also to their physical existence (Diez, 2002, p.142). What follows is only a snapshot illustration of a series of historical events that have antagonistic meanings and different interpretations, without this being an exhaustive description. As I mentioned in the

introduction, the portrayal of the conflicting narratives is presented not only to offer the historical background as the two sides see it, but also as a vehicle to show the intensity, politicisation, and ‘modernity’ of the educational problem, and hence the need to deconstruct this ‘socialization’ through education (Hadjipavlou, 2002), and reconstruct a more pluralistic, postmodernist and peaceful narrative through peace education.

**Table 1.1. Conflicting Narratives of the Cyprus Conflict**

	Historical Starting Point	Protagonist/ Moral Centre	Archenemy	Plot	End of Narrative	Reference point for Conflict
Greek- Cypriot Narrative	Arrival of Greeks (14 <sup>th</sup> century BC) <i>Hellenisation</i> of Cyprus	Greeks of Cyprus	Turks	A struggle for survival by Cypriot Hellenism against Ottoman and British rulers, and of <i>enosis</i> with Greece	Tragic end: 1974 ‘Barbaric Turkish invasion’  Temporary Changes	Chosen trauma: 1974 invasion
Turkish- Cypriot Narrative	Arrival of Turks (Ottoman rule) <i>Turkification</i> of Cyprus	Turks of Cyprus	Greek Cypriots (referred to as Rums)	A struggle for survival by the Turks of Cyprus against Greek Cypriot aggression	Happy end: 1974 ‘Happy Peace Operation’  Permanent Changes	Chosen trauma: 1963-1974 Inter- communal violence and retreat in enclaves

Source: Author’s adaptation of Papadakis, 2008, p.15 (column headings, categories and some content differ)

### 1.5.1 The Greek-Cypriot Narrative

The dominant historical narrative that exists, and is taught at the school level, is that Cyprus had always been Greek since ancient times, that they were the majority and that they had the right to choose whether or not they would become independent or unite with Greece. The thirst for *enosis* was of course the ‘natural’ option, since the island had always been Greek, and the Greek Cypriots felt as ‘orphans’ for as long as they were not allowed to unite with the ‘motherland’. What at first seems to be the paradoxical geographical distance of Greece from Cyprus, compared with Turkey’s proximity to Cyprus (only 40 miles away) is in reality testimony to how strongly imbued in the Greek Cypriots was the desire for union with Greece.

The harsh measures and suffering endured among the EOKA hardcore members only served to strengthen their sense of solidarity and their bonding together against a common enemy, resulting in thousands of active supporters. They felt that fighting against the ‘foreign yoke’ and all the resulting deaths was part of the Cypriots own contribution to the continued history of the Greek nation: ‘They thought of themselves as living one of the finest hours of the Greek nation, to be compared with national struggles against the Persians, the Turks, the Bulgarians, the Italians, and Germans’ (Stavrinides, 1999, p.27). Young children and students who died during the war are presented as ‘ethnic heroes’ or ‘ethnic martyrs’ and the British presented as ruthless. The fact that the Turkish Cypriots sided with the British, and were the ones that tortured and arrested the EOKA liberation fighters once again confirms the Turk as inherently barbarian in nature and the archenemy of the Greek people. After five years of intense struggle against the British (1955-59) which resulted in the deaths of

young heroes in their quest for ‘freedom’, the external powers chose Cyprus’s fate- and not it’s people i.e. the Greek Cypriots.

In 1960, a constitution was imposed upon them that did not reflect the nationalist aspirations they had been fighting for so long to achieve, nor their historical, cultural, linguistic, identity links with their Greek ‘motherland’. The idea of freedom for them became identified with *enosis*, and hence, independence from the British, never truly liberated them. They were forced into an unfair power-sharing agreement with the Turkish Cypriots, who were upgraded from a minority status to an equal partner. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriots, tried in the best possible way to make the constitution work, and their Archbishop Makarios even presented alternative proposals to by pass the constitutional deadlock but the Turks rejected it. This was because they had always wanted *taksim*, the partition of the island and tried to enforce it, using dubious ways, just like they tried to provoke violence by false information, in Istanbul in 1955, and in Cyprus later on. In the end the Turkish aims for partition of the island were revealed. This was evident in the 1963 inter-communal killings that were initiated by the Turkish and by a few Greek Cypriot extremists. The withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the government, and their total financial dependence on Turkey, again shows firstly, Turkey’s role, and secondly this failure to participate reflected their ultimate aim, which was partition (Panteli, 2005, p.216). Denktash had always believed that partition was the best solution and always argued that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can never live together. After many efforts of the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios to reconcile the two sides and invite them back to the constitution, nothing worked.

According to the Greek-Cypriot narrative the Turkish Cypriots retreated into the enclaves, as a result of Turkey's pressures and especially the TNT's desire for partition. Even the Americans suspected that 'some of the movement' was forced by Turkish extremists (O'Malley and Craig, 2006, p.97). The Greek Cypriots saw this as the beginning of a de facto partition, and as a tool used by the extremists to persuade the Turkish Cypriots that this situation was 'forced' upon them by the Greek Cypriots, to exacerbate animosities, as well as to provoke further violence. Intercommunal violence was usually a result of Turkish-Cypriot insurgency.

Unfortunately, the junta events in Greece occurred, which did not reflect the majority of the population but a handful of Greek colonels and Greek Cypriot EOKA B extremists. Turkey finally found the opportunity it was looking for all these years: it used the coup d'état in Greece as a pretext to invade Cyprus, and achieve its long-term goal of partitioning the island so as to ensure that it does not have a Greek island off its shores. Turkey forced thousands of deaths and refugees, pain and misery, because, it is a barbaric uncivilised country with aggressive aims. Cyprus has been 'raped' by the Turkish eternal enemy, and the Greek Cypriots have been the victims ever since. The argument that Turkey intervened for the security of Turkish Cypriots is just an excuse. The Greek-Cypriot side sees the invasion as a violation of state sovereignty and human rights and as a strategically planned occupation to ensure its permanent influence on the island. Consequently, the Green Line that divides the two communities is seen as a temporary, illegal and illegitimate border, as a result of the Turkish military invasion of 1974 (Bose, 2007, p.291).

The Greek settlements in antiquity are presented as part of the culture of the Republic of Cyprus in the Cyprus Museum in Nicosia, whereas the Ottoman conquest of 1571 is depicted as the part of the narrative of the Turks as invaders, referred to as the ‘first Turkish invasion’ (Diez, 2002, p.143). The epitome of the barbaric character of the Turks however, is reflected in the 1974 war, which is referred to as the ‘second Turkish invasion’. A further sore point regarding the invasion is that according to the Greek-Cypriot government the specific territory occupied represented over three-fifths of the economic potential of Cyprus at the time (MFA, ‘Historical Review’, 2006).<sup>53</sup>

The impact of the events of 1974 on the Greek Cypriot psyche have been so deep that they are the main *reference point* when they try to portray the Cyprus problem to any outsider (see Table 1.1. p.95, and also Chapter Five). The psychological impact of the invasion was exacerbated by comparing it to previous ‘chosen traumas’ (Volkan, 1979, 1997) of the Greeks such as the fall of Constantinople in 1453, or the Asia Minor Catastrophe in 1922, and these references reverberate in securitised nationalist narratives. The magnitude of the threat imposed by Turkey is ‘proven’ by referring to historical examples of Turkish atrocities (see Introduction), and hence emphasising the potential for the repetition of such tragedies.

As Table 1.1. shows, for the Greek-Cypriot narrative presented in history textbooks, history begins with the arrival of ‘Greeks’ in Cyprus who are also presented as the ‘protagonist and moral center of the story from whose perspective events are evaluated’ and the sudden end to this trajectory appears in 1974 with the Turkish

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<sup>53</sup> [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/cyprus01\\_en/cyprus01\\_en?OpenDocument](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/cyprus01_en/cyprus01_en?OpenDocument)

invasion (Papadakis, 2008, p.9). Emphasis is placed on the inherent Hellenism of the island, which again is presented as a continuous and absolutely legitimate ‘transhistorical category informing this historical discourse’ from ancient times to today (Papadakis, 2008, p.9). Another element of continuity within this discourse is the enemy of the Greeks, the barbaric Turks, who always tried to de-hellenicise the island. The period of intercommunal violence from 1963-1974 is described from a Greek Cypriot point of view. This is a crucial example of selective memory, as the narratives often omit the number of Turkish-Cypriot casualties, focusing only on Greek suffering, and completely ignoring the terrible conditions of fear and isolation the Turkish Cypriots had to endure inside the enclaves until 1968.

Certain secondary schoolbooks discussing the Ottoman period even portray the Turkish-Cypriot minority as essentially Greek in identity: the descendants of islamicized Greeks in Cyprus, or the descendants of those Ottomans that came to Cyprus in 1571, who themselves were originally Greek (before the Ottoman Empire). Regardless of whether or not some Greeks did convert, as Papadakis points out, this argument, by essentially presenting racial descent as the determinant of identity, effectively strips out the validity and existence of a Turkish-Cypriot identity as a ‘real’ ethnic group (2008, pp.10-11). This is a crucial argument as it consequently deprives the Turkish Cypriots from any legal or historical right to present any political claims over Cyprus, hence *delegitimising* not only the Turkish-Cypriot narrative, but also their mere right to present themselves as Turkish Cypriot.

With regards to the large number of Turkish settlers that have been encouraged to emigrate to Cyprus after 1974, the Republic of Cyprus sees this as an ‘illegal policy



of colonization', intentionally and systematically pursued by Turkey 'to change the demographic character of the island' (MFA, 'Illegal Demographic Changes', 2013)<sup>54</sup>. Distorting the population balance on the island will not only be used to 'prejudice any future political settlement' but also to shift the balance of political power in the Turkish occupied part of Cyprus in order to ensure that the Turkish Cypriot leaders follow the desires and policies of Turkey (PIO, 'The Settlers', 2010).<sup>55</sup> These Anatolian settlers are said to range from 150,000-160,000, and are causing the economic and political detriment of the Turkish Cypriots, who have become a minority even within the region under their control. Within the collective memory resources of Greek Cypriots, there is a marked presence of Turkey, 'the invader' and a corresponding absence of Turkish Cypriots from the stage of memory. They are either the oppressed victims of Turkey, or have become its puppets, forming 'ghostly figures in a landscape of memory' (Bryant, 2010, p.117).

Another example of selective memory is that whereas Turkish Cypriots, as we will see, repeatedly speak about the atrocities that were committed by the Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots in turn prefer to focus on the atrocities committed by the Turkish army, and cautiously avoid speaking publicly about any misdoings that the Turkish Cypriots committed (Bryant, 2010, p.13). They 'publicly forget' these atrocities and instead, as mentioned earlier, certain Greek Cypriots prefer to focus on Turkish-Cypriot acts of kindness and of peaceful living and working interactions. This paradox emerges, within the context of unification: the dominant argument put

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<sup>54</sup> [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy\\_stockholm.nsf/ecsw17\\_en/ecsw17\\_en?OpenDocument](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy_stockholm.nsf/ecsw17_en/ecsw17_en?OpenDocument)

<sup>55</sup> The Cyprus Press and Information Office website also includes quotes from the Council of Europe's recommendations, to add validity to its narrative: '...The Assembly is convinced that the presence of settlers constitutes a process of hidden colonization and an additional and important obstacle to a peaceful and negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem...' (Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1608 (2003), 24 June 2003, par. 6 and 7) <http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/5ABD64A4C8EEF8F7C2256D6D001F334B?OpenDocument>

forward by Greek Cypriots after 1974 is that both communities have been living peacefully in the past for many years, and the intercommunal violence was instigated by Turkey and Turkish Cypriot extremists. Therefore, a plausible solution to the Cyprus problem, is the removal of Turkish troops and settlers, and the reunification of the island with the two communities living together. This attitude reflects a gradual marginalization of *enosis* discourses after 1974, and a corresponding rise of Cypriot identity discourses, in particular from the political supporters of AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People), and other left-wing ideologically positioned citizens.

The origins of ‘Cypriotist ideology’ can be traced back to the Cyprus Communist Party and to AKEL. However, it was only after 1974 that the Cypriotist ideology gained prominence as a response to EOKA B events, and as a way to disassociate from them. This included preferring to use the Cypriot flag, instead of the Greek one, and emphasizing that ‘the Turks of Turkey are strangers to the Turkish Cypriots’ (Baruh and Popescu, 2008, p.82). Moreover, this distinction became all the more necessary vis-à-vis the Turkish settlers, who the Greek Cypriots perceive almost as ‘byproducts’ of the Turkish invasion. This, even today, is by no means a widespread belief shared by all Greek Cypriots, but it is nevertheless the dominant narrative of the Left, a substantial proportion of the population. (*mention here that a left-wing president was in power from 2008-feb 2013*). There are of course those who endorse such views and support right-wing parties such as DIKO and DISY (Democratic Rally) but these are the exceptions and not the typical right-wing position.

According to the textbook analysis made by Papadakis, this ideological shift has *not* been ‘translated into educational practice’ and references to peaceful conditions or

examples of cooperation are very limited. Instead, the model that was prevalent in Greek Cypriot historians before 1960, highly driven with *enosis* aspirations and seeking to demonstrate its historical legitimacy, is also the historical model followed by most current schoolbooks (Papadakis, 2008, p.12).

Greek-Cypriot historians often cite primary material, which apparently shows how the Turkish-Cypriot members of the Council were always privileged by the British and they sided with them on controversial issues in order to boycott Greek Cypriot aspirations, this resulting in a discrimination against the Greek Cypriots. Other academics, in turn prefer to show how often the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots revolted against the British together- e.g. in October 1931 (see Panteli, 2005; and Hadjidemetriou, 2007) or showing ‘evidence of a long period of peaceful co-existence and harmonious contact between the two communities in Cyprus’ (Panteli, 2005, p. 76). The aforementioned are examples of how attitudes in the RoC vary from people calling the Turkish Cypriots ‘our brothers’, to others using extreme phrases such as ‘a good Turk is a dead Turk’.

Greek Cypriots have also often blamed American interests for failing to prevent the bloody war of 1974, supported by British authors who have argued that EOKA B and the putsch was a Cold War ‘conspiracy’- the result of a longstanding plan funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in order to prevent spying facilities from being taken over by the communists (O’Malley and Craig, 2006).

### 1.5.2 The Turkish-Cypriot Narrative

An excerpt from the TMT fighters' anthem, on display in the Museum of National Struggle, in the TRNC glorifies the 'flame of Turkishness' and declares:

Cyprus can't be Greek.

The Turkish fighters will not stop.

Either Turkish Cyprus will exist

or the fighter won't live.<sup>56</sup>

Victimhood plays a prominent role when the Turkish Cypriots are portraying the conflict. Their discontent, and their arguments that their voice has not been heard, has caused them to come up with extreme titles. Titles of academic history books include: *Negotiating for survival: The Turkish Cypriot exodus to Northern Cyprus* (Oberling Pierre, 1982) and the *The rape of Cyprus* (Halil Kiamran, 1983). Other more recent academic histories include the article 'Cyprus' Forgotten Turks' (Nuray Bamanie, 2002), which is so biased that you would find it hard to distinguish it from political propaganda. This might perhaps be explained by the fact that most of its references are derived from work whose authors are also politicians (for example, Ergün Olgun, who was undersecretary to the president of the TRNC) and from a journal that is published from the government of Ankara. To make things worse, Vehbi Serter, author and co-author of two main history schoolbooks is not only a member of the nationalist right-wing party of the TRNC (National Unity Party, UBO) but was also an active member of TMT.

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<sup>56</sup> Taken from Papadakis, 2005, p.122

The history of Cyprus for the Turkish Cypriots begins much later, with the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, in 1571 (see Table 1.1.). This shows that Cyprus is nothing but Turkish. The geographical proximity of Cyprus to Turkey is another proof and reason why Cyprus is Turkish. Both communities in Cyprus established the 1960 bi-communal Republic ‘through negotiation’ and ‘thanks to the facilitation and active encouragement of Turkey, Greece and Britain’ (Bamanie, 2002, p.448). Before that, the main aim of *enosis* was actually the systematic genocide against the Turks. The Greek Cypriots wanted to deprive the Turkish partners of any rights and thus it was the Greek Cypriots who caused most of the trouble in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots are also to blame as they do not recognize the right of self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turks were merely ‘fighting against Greek ‘terrorists’ who were trying to bring about *enosis* and so make the Turks an impotent and unprotected minority in a State dominated by enemy people’ (see Stavrinides, 1999, p.30).

The period that is the main *reference point* to explaining the Cyprus problem is 1963-1974, during which the Turks of Cyprus were victims of the Greek Cypriots (see Table 1.1.). This period presented in great detail, day by day, village by village citing every incidence of violence against Turkish Cypriots.<sup>57</sup> There is a selective insistence remembering the displacement of around 18,000 Turkish Cypriots for 10 years in the enclaves (even though as we saw the enclave period ended in 1968, not 1974), but there is no reference to the violently forced displacement of 160,000 Greek Cypriots for over 38 years, to this day:

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<sup>57</sup> For an in-depth analysis of history textbooks of the TRNC, including a comparison of the older and newer versions see POST-RI, 2010.

For 11 years after 1963 the Turkish Cypriots were driven from their homes, farms and businesses and squeezed into the defended enclaves that occupied only 3% of the island...The international community has instead pressured the *victims*...the international community refused to understand their situation and to this day maintains an embargo on this *helpless minority*...The systematic genocide against the Turkish community continued up to 1974 when the Greek junta regime decided to implement the Enosis plan as rapidly as it could. In the process between 40,000 and 50,000 Turkish Cypriots in the south fled to the north. In the face of the silence of the international community, Turkey decided to intervene to protect this *small Turkish community* (Bamanie, 2002, p.446, emphasis mine)

Selective memory and forgetting includes total oblivion to the displacement of the Greek Cypriots as a result of the 1974 invasion, and to the fact that the constitution was imposed on the Greek Cypriots and not ‘negotiated’. Moreover, the paradox again emerges of the Turkish community being presented as ‘small’ and ‘helpless’ but one that should be given equal status in power sharing with the majority of the population and not in proportion to their population size. Bamanie insists that the ‘violation of minorities’ can no longer be accepted but at the same time he argues that they should not be treated as a minority (2002, p.447).

The same author uses the term Turks of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots interchangeable as if they mean the same thing. The genocide suffered by the ‘Muslim community’ is referred to and he puts this in the context of a wider genocide against Muslim minorities around the world, whereas most Turkish Cypriots are and were secular in

the late 1960s. The Turkish Cypriots, influenced by Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, were strong proponents of a secular state and hence were (and still are) highly critical of the Greek-Cypriot political structure that was influenced by the Church and whose political leader was an Archbishop (Walker, 2005. p.86).

For the Turkish Cypriots the ‘peace operation’, was a purely defensive action, and was necessary in order to establish partition and guarantee the legitimate rights of the Turkish Cypriots that were suppressed by the larger Greek community. The memory of the ‘chosen trauma’ is used to justify Turkish aggression. They turn a blind eye to the characteristics of the ‘operation’, to the almost imperialist statements made by Turkish officials in 1974, and to the sheer scale of suffering of the Greek Cypriot community. The following excerpt is from an anthropological study of Lapithos, a formerly mixed village with a violent history, in the Kyrenia district:

‘There were songs, sayings, and folk legends that reflected the desire for Turkey’s military intervention. Many older women told me that their constant prayers eventually brought the Turkish army. Folktales from the period commonly describe such prophecies or prophetic signs of Turkey’s arrival.’ (Bryant, 2010, p.122)

Hence, the ‘chosen trauma’ of the Greek Cypriots, emerges as the ‘chosen glory’ (Volkan, 1997) for the Turkish Cypriots, providing a happy end that bolsters the communities self-esteem, while increasing the powerlessness of the other. According to Volkan, the Turkish invasion of 1974 had a healing, even cathartic function for the Turkish Cypriot community. The shared mental representation of the past calamity, in this case the period 1963-74, was reversed into a celebrated victory, i.e. the invasion.

This bonds the individuals within the ethnic group, providing an emancipating/cleansing sensation, and raising the self-esteem of a minority that was suffering from victim mentality (Volkan, 1979, pp.111-9; 1997, pp.46-7).

Moreover, the Turkish ‘Happy Peace Operation’ was legal because it went along with the constitution of 1960, and also the Turkish army legally remains in the TRNC for the same reason. Turkey in fact ‘remains the sole protector of this Republic in the same way as NATO peacekeeping troops operate to preserve peace in Kosovo and Bosnia’ (Bamanie, 2002, p.448).

Papadakis who has conducted a comparative analysis of the history textbooks of both sides has noted that the same model of ethnic nationalism is present in both history narratives. Turkish Cypriots are presented as ‘the protagonist and moral center’ of the particular narrative and are referred to as either ‘Turks’ or ‘Turks of Cyprus’ (Papadakis 2008, p.13). The fact that in primary school, the topic of history was taught as a social science, is indicative of a more positivist model, indicating the existence of one version of the story that is scientifically proven, just as the enemy’s story is falsified. In primary school, the history book cover features Atatürk, then ‘opens with the flags of Turkey and the self-declared TRNC superimposed over the national anthem of Turkey, followed by a photo of Atatürk’, an educational practice the lack of which is illegal (Papadakis, 2008, p.13). Another commonality with the Greek Cypriot textbooks is that the identity of the enemy is denied, in this case, the Greek Cypriots are identified as mere subjects of Ottoman rule, and hence, with no historical connection to Greece. Consequently, their demands for *enosis* were invalid (Papadakis, 2008, pp.14-15).



Although the left-wing Republican Turkish Party (CTP) changed these textbooks and published new ones in 2004, that were supporting unification of the island and had a critical stance towards Turkey, this educational policy change was short-lived and was reversed as soon as a right-wing party came to power again (see POST-RI, 2010). Nevertheless, this change and the election to power of a left-wing party reflects a Cyprio-centric movement that has been gaining prominence in the TRNC in particular over the past two decades. Apart from the CTP, this movement also includes the Patriotic Union Movement (YBH) which emphasises joint sovereignty in a unified Cyprus, as well as the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH) which is pro-solution and pro-European Union (Baruh and Popescu, 2008, p.83).

Turkish Cypriot pupils are taught that November 15, 1983 is a day of celebration, a national day, as on that day they formally acquired their own state (with their own flag, government and parliament) and the only reason that they were forced to declare this state without international recognition is due to the intransigence of the Greek community (Hadjipavlou, 2002, p.200). The Turkish Cypriot narrative emphasises a historical past that must never be allowed to return (Papadakis, 2005; Bryant, 2010).

#### **1.6. Between the two communities: issues of discursive space and time (synchronisation)**

The complexity of the above historical narratives demonstrate that an ethnic group is not a homogeneous entity with identical views, but there are almost always

divergences in opinion at one particular time, within a group but also between the two communities. Intra-communal activities have a direct impact on inter-communal relations. For example, the Greek Cypriots' overall negative vote for the Annan Plan (2004) arguably had a negative repercussion on future attitudes and positions of the Turkish Cypriots, who were greatly demoralised by the overwhelming Greek Cypriot rejection of the plan (see Chaglar, 2007). This rejection was perceived and interpreted in different ways from different people. For example, it had caused a massive disappointment and loss of momentum to grassroots bi-communal organisations involved in peacebuilding, but also specifically the Greek Cypriots felt betrayed from their own Left-wing party which decided, in the last minute, to reject the Annan Plan. Moreover, from the Turkish-Cypriot ethnic group it was also perceived in a predominantly negative way. Later, these negative attitudes featured heavily when Turkish Cypriots started to re-promote and re-construct their own political position internationally to include this depiction of the Greek Cypriots 'as not wanting a solution'.

Peacebuilding is an ongoing process and right timing-synchronisation- is an important issue that may affect the dynamics between the two communities. In certain instances, the two camps do reach the exact same point- whether this has to do with attitudes or policies- but the setback is that this happens at different times. So, when one group, for example, has voted for a left-wing government that promotes reconciliation, the political position of the other group can be seen as shifting towards a right-wing political leader; this is what happened in northern Cyprus at the presidential elections in April 2010, when hopes for a solution between the two left-wing leaders were blown by the victory of Dervis Eroglu, a right-wing 'veteran nationalist leader who

favours independence for the north' (BBC News, 10 April 2010). Therefore, we can see that even though the two sides do reach the same ground, they do this at different points in time, which further perpetuates the process and duration of negotiations. Synchronisation is even more valid for a potential political settlement, where the presence of committed leadership is crucial for a successful conflict resolution (Rotberg 2013). For example, the Greek-Cypriot president Tassos Papadopoulos who appealed to the public to vote 'no' to the referendum in a dramatized TV address played a crucial role in contributing to the failure of a possible consociational settlement (2009, pp.159-60).

Lack of common discursive space revolves largely around differences in the narratives that originate in one way or another around the victim-perpetrator paradigm. 'We' are the victims, therefore we 'the victims' (ascribed identity) are entitled to restorative justice, financial, territorial and emotional compensation, and more importantly, to the primary decision over this. This lack of common ground highlights the need for a *discursive arena* where Cypriots will be able to publicly and freely express alternative ideas and historical narratives than the ones projected by the dominant histories.

Common ground has also been an issue of disagreement and exploration by researchers and policy-makers alike (though less so in a discursive context), not only for the purpose of reaching a solution that will be acceptable to both sides, but also when investigating the different conflict-reconstruction tools that can be adopted before and after such a solution. The fact that some form of common ground exists is undisputed, but the extent of this commonality, and the nature of it, has been the area

of academic, policy and public contention. This, as one can expect, has an impact on the desired and envisaged solution<sup>58</sup>. There are some, as we have seen, who argue that the inter-communal differences are so accentuated that division, rather than unification, is the only feasible option. Historically, it has always been the case that those who argue for a unification of the island, have cited historical examples of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, living peacefully together as an argument that this can also happen again in the future.

Both the issues of synchronisation and common ground have historical dynamics to them that influence not only current and future events and their interpretation of them, but also affect how both Cypriot and non-Cypriots construct their views in the present by referring to their perception of events that took place in the past. Most, if not all, conflicts are inextricably related to historical events and processes, especially in the post-colonial context, and Cyprus bears no exception to this. However, the temporal historicity of the conflict, i.e. that the basis of the present (and for preserving the present) is actually what happened in the past is of particular importance in Cyprus.

## **1.7. Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have not just offered background information, but rather attempted to expose the problem of conflicting historical narratives through a detailed historical analysis of the Cyprus conflict, and of concepts such as identity, history, memory and

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<sup>58</sup> This of course occurs vice versa, as some people have a solution in mind which they desire and then use the arguments for common ground accordingly to further their own argumentative position. For example, someone who wants unification of the island would argue that there is enough common ground, without the latter necessarily being the premise of the argument, but instead a consequence of their perspective on 'common ground' (stemming from ideological, personal, societal or even financial aspects which precede this perspective).

‘chosen trauma’. The exposition of both official narratives is useful in demonstrating the differences between the two sides, but also for providing us with an empirical and operational platform with which one can assess the status quo of the conflicting narratives, through this the status quo of peace education, and hence, underline the need for peace education. This chapter has been a trip to the past in order to inform our understanding of the present.

The process by which the RoC was born as a nation and the dominant signifying practices of collective memory pursued by it, have influenced not just past and present-day nationalism, but also pedagogical instruction and educational arrangements and policies. Representations of memory are often presented as historical facts within a modernist lens. Moreover, the historical role of the Church establishment, of nationalist aspirations, of freedom struggles, and of ensuing violence and displacement has been instrumental in producing the contemporary educational structures. The strong inter-constitutive links between national identity and educational systems has long been argued for, but in Cyprus it is not just the ethnic strife or its colonial past that makes it especially interesting and different but also the external factors of the two motherlands, and the fact that the modern educational development of the island coincided with its birth as an independent nation that by its majority did not want to be independent. History education was both a ‘victim’ of the political events and developments and at the same time a ‘perpetrator’ as it was harnessed to pursue and promote specific political ends on both sides of the island.

As Kitromilides (1994) has argued, the character of British colonial policy laid the groundwork for future ethnic confrontation. By the end of the Second World War, they escalated their 'divide and rule' policy and underestimated the Turkish determination to achieve partition. Once the 'Frankenstein Monster' was created, Britain hastily searched for an exit strategy, without losing the bases it needed for its strategic interests. The selfish attitudes of both Greece and Turkey, as well as the mistakes and extremist attitudes of certain Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, as well as ideological ethnic aspirations heavily imbued in the psyche of the people through formal and informal education and propaganda, led to the contradictory attitudes and antinomies that characterise the Cyprus impasse to this day.

Arguably, although the Turkish Cypriots received their 'catharsis' through the 1974 invasion, the Greek Cypriots have not done so. Although neither community has successfully mourned or resolved past traumas, nor have they modified the negative stereotypes of the other ethnic group, this is even more acute in the Greek-Cypriot community which sees the Cyprus problem as unsolved and wishes to change the status quo. As the empirical chapters will show, the Greek Cypriots have made their shared trauma of the Turkish invasion as a marker of their present day educational identity. This intensifies 'a sense of both victimization and entitlement' and peace education efforts as well as attempts at genuine friendships with present day Turkish Cypriots 'threaten this marker and create anxiety' (Volkan, 1997, p.135).

After offering a historical overview of the nature and dynamics of the conflict, I have grounded the analysis in an examination of the dominant narratives as portrayed through academics, politicians, and history textbooks and the public (anthropological

studies). I have intentionally delved into the deeper socio-political attitudes and discourses so that this chapter forms a sort of historical lexicon of the discourses that will follow. I have also drawn attention to the socio-political internal and external contexts within which these events unfolded, some of which will form the basis of historical arguments that will follow. After drawing out the main narratives and hence ideological underpinnings (belief systems, histories and memories, stereotypic images) of the educational systems of each side, it becomes clear that the paradigms that are being taught are largely exclusionary and conflicting. Cyprus has different national histories depending on who tells the story, as is common with most contested lands. It has also different contested collective memories, depending on the politics of remembering and forgetting that is involved. Events that might contradict the official dominant narrative are blocked out, and official ideology instead largely shapes collective memory. I have hopefully managed to expose the extent of the problem, and to show why peace education is necessary in Cyprus.

Before developing the conceptual framework that will guide the empirical chapters, it is important to contextualise the thesis research puzzle by locating it within the wider academic literature and debates. The aim of Chapter Two, therefore, is to situate my research agenda within the wider peace education research field.

## **CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE MAPS AND GAPS**

*“The frontiers of a book are never clear-cut: beyond the title, the first lines, and the last full stop, beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network.” (Michel Foucault, ‘The Archeology of Knowledge’, 1972, p.23)*

### **2.1. Literature Matters**

This aim of this chapter is to map and review the field of peace education research and therefore locate the contribution of the present thesis within the existing literature. A variety of literature from various disciplines has furthered our understanding of education and peacebuilding. Yet existing approaches to peace education remain limited. There is an absence of debate on the conceptualisation of peace education in conflict areas. It is generally assumed in the literature that peace education is a concept acceptable to all. Yet, as this thesis attempts to show, its acceptance in conflict zones is far from unproblematic. Moreover, there is a tendency to seek ‘causes’ (independent variables) for the failure of peace education, ignoring its cyclical endogenous nature, and the co-constitutive dynamics involved. State-centric approaches also overlook the decentralised resistance to peace education that includes a matrix of power relations that is much more complex than top-down repressive power. In order to transcend the existing limitations, I argue for a reconceptualisation



of peace education that problematises the power politics at stake. I extend the academic interdisciplinary discourse on peace education by offering insights from political science.

The interdisciplinary nature of this thesis made it a formidable task to integrate the literature together and find a common thread, or at least a framework that could capture the themes emerging from various disciplines<sup>59</sup>. However, conducting the literature review also brought to light that there is indeed a literature gap with regard to this topic. The long-term objective is that of forming a meeting point where the different disciplines can talk to each other more directly, in order to jointly navigate the difficult terrain of peace education. In particular, I locate my contribution at the intersection of politics, power and peace education. It is from this academic ‘node within a network’ as Foucault eloquently put it, that I have found a place where I can speak *from*. The key literature that this thesis speaks *to* can be divided into three strands: the Cyprus conflict literature, the peace education literature, and the critical peacebuilding literature.

I start specifically from the literature on peace education in Cyprus, contextualising it within the general Cyprus conflict literature, before widening the discussion out to talk about peace education and peacebuilding in general. From this broader level I outline the various definitions of peace education in existing academic literature. The interdisciplinary nature of peacebuilding mentioned above, and as a consequence of peace education, has meant that this term has ‘as many interpretations as interpreters’

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<sup>59</sup>The multidisciplinary nature of peace education research, and the different approaches also meant that authors sometimes chose to give quite different journal or book titles (e.g. ‘Sorry States’ or ‘Escaping the Circle of Hate’ or ‘Voices of Collective remembering’).

to adapt a phrase by Wertsch (2002, p.1). In addition to ‘peace’, the ‘education’ element of peace education, means a plethora of knowledge and debates flowing from this discipline. However, in accordance with my definition of peace education (see Introduction) as a specific peacebuilding tool aimed at conflict-ridden societies rather than as a tool for non-violent attitudes and societal betterment in general, I only focus on the literature that adopt the former approach i.e. the ultimate purpose is to achieve a ‘positive peace’ (Galtung, 1969).

After locating my contribution at the confluence of these three strands of research, I briefly outline my own approach to peace education: a political approach, that focuses on the discursive and institutional challenges this peacebuilding tool faces in the Cyprus conflict. In order to open up the possibility for exploring alternative modes of analysing and overcoming resistance to peace education, I argue for a reconceptualisation of peace education in Cyprus. In the context of Cyprus, I use the specific debate on history textbooks as a vehicle for my political analysis, for theoretical, and methodological reasons that are discussed in detail in a later section (see also Introduction). Despite the fact that the chosen approach-my own academic standpoint- amounts to a narrowing down of the field of peace education, this chapter is nevertheless, an effort to harness academic perspectives from a broader range of intellectual traditions and schools of thought. This wider overview includes both a review of current state-of-the-art literature, but also situating these in terms of a broader historical context, that can improve our understanding of how peace education evolved and developed over time.

## **2.2. Mapping the Field of Peace Education in Cyprus**

In common with other divided societies, the educational systems of both Greek- and Turkish- Cypriots have been used as legitimisation tools promoting each community's political position (see Chapter One). There is no shortage of studies exploring the education-conflict nexus in the context of Cyprus. There have been anthropological studies investigating the role of education in the conflict (Bryant, 2004; Christou, 2007;) and analyses of the two sides' history textbooks (POST-RI; Papadakis, 2008); social-psychological approaches (Psaltis et al 2011); pedagogical approaches on teaching contested narratives (Makriyianni, Psaltis and Latif, 2011; Bekerman and Zembylas 2012) and on pedagogies of emotion and trauma (Zembylas 2007, 2008, 2010, 2013); as well as studies on educational policy and reforms in Cyprus (Persianis, 1981; Perikleous, 2010). There have also been studies on citizenship education curricula and teachers' understandings of national identity (Philippou, 2010; Zembylas, 2010) as well as teachers' emotional readiness to promote peaceful coexistence (Zembylas, Kendeou and Michaelidou 2011), literature on identity formation in relation to educational discourses in the classroom (Klerides 2009; Zembylas and Ferreira, 2009) as well as ethnographic research on how Greek-Cypriot elementary school children construct 'the Turk' as an enemy (Syrou 2007). All these studies have been very useful in offering empirical evidence of the role of education, and in particular ethnic stereotypes, in the production and reproduction of the Cyprus conflict, in highlighting the various parameters involved, as well as advancing our conceptual understanding of the education-conflict dynamic.

The past decade has seen a slow but steady increase of peace education literature in the particular context of the Cyprus conflict. By presenting the exclusionary ideological positions of the educational systems in each community and exposing the antagonistic images of the other that are transmitted within the school, Hadjipavlou uses her experience in conflict resolution workshops to address the need for peace education in Cyprus and brings forward recommendations for the youth to ‘be educated in a way that respects the other’s cultural identity and prepares them for citizenship in a future, democratic, federal, and multicultural Cyprus’ (2002, p.195). Zembylas, as an educationalist, has explicitly addressed issues of peace education from a pedagogical standpoint, addressing issues such as emotion, empathy, politics of trauma, mourning, and their association with peace education (Zembylas 2007; Bekerman and Zembylas 2012). He has also published a recent study which described an isolated peace education example in practice (Zembylas, 2013). In 2010, the POST Research Institute, an NGO established in 2002 by mostly Turkish-Cypriot members and which lists the creation of ‘an open dialogue on issues of peace education and reconciliation’ as one of its primary objectives<sup>60</sup>, published a book comprised of an analysis of Turkish-Cypriot history textbooks, as part of two peace education projects implemented since 2006. Similarly, the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research, an NGO located in the buffer zone, has recently published an education policy paper called ‘Rethinking Education in Cyprus’ in which it explicitly (unlike its previous publications, see also Chapter Five) proposes a holistic view to education that includes the goals of peace education. They envision an education system that:

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<sup>60</sup> <http://postresearchinstitute.wordpress.com/about/>

“encourages a critical and self-reflexive understanding of the complexity of our history and avoids the tendency to essentialise ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ in monolithic ways, especially in the context of history teaching.” (AHDR, 2013, Section 2.1.)

They go on to suggest the integration of the:

“goals of peace education, human rights education, intercultural education, critical education, and environmental education...in order to prepare school leaders, teachers, parents, children and young people to live in a multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multi-faith society in Cyprus.” (AHDR, 2013, Section 4)

In addition, there have also been studies that touch upon the issue of education in the peacebuilding context, but not explicitly in a peace education framework. In other words, they may touch upon the issues of education, either in a formal school setting, or an informal setting. Some of these look at the role of bi-communal initiatives and conflict-resolution workshops, and discuss how such projects, whether they have a specific youth focus (such as the Fulbright-funded youth camps) or involve a more general active citizen membership have benefited, or have the potential to benefit the peacebuilding process by increasing reconciliation attitudes (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 1993; Broome 1998; Richmond 1998; Loizos 2006; Ungerleider 2006). Most of these studies, however, which do not explicitly discuss peace education, but have a strong relation to the peacebuilding process, directly deal with the issue of history education. That this is not directly or explicitly linked to peace education is arguably a weakness, as it does not open up the possibility for analysing and discussing history education,

and in particular history textbooks, vis-à-vis the Cyprus peacebuilding process, either as a tool for polarization or for peace education and reconciliation.

Indeed, over the past decade there has been an upsurge in publications analysing the role of history textbooks in conflict settings, both of Cyprus and abroad. There has been an emphasis on the teaching of history in schools in both communities and how it can affect reconciliation, and a number of PhDs have recently sought to analyse various aspects of history teaching in the formal context (Association for Historical Dialogue, 2004, cited in Loizos, 2007, p.190) and the formation of national identity through history textbooks (Klerides, 2008). There is a shared conviction amongst many researchers (literary critics, historians, educationalists, discourse analysts) that despite other sources of information ‘school books remain powerful means by which the state shapes forms of perception, of categorization, of interpretation and of memory, that serve to determine personal and national identities’ (Peled-Elhanan, 2012, p.viii). This is especially true for history textbooks (see more in Chapter Three) in nations like Cyprus in which conflict has meant a conflation of history and memory, and their strong intertwinement with national identity. As we saw in Chapter One, the utilisation of memory as a vehicle for pursuing political agendas is a central theme when discussing the need for, and resistance to, peace education.

The particular discourse of history textbooks has been the object of study of an array of researchers, coming from a variety of disciplines, including historians, anthropologists, psychologists, discourse analysts, and to a lesser extent political scientists. History textbook analysts, seek to expose their authoritative character, their stereotypic and demonization discourse(s), their rhetoric and propaganda, and/or the

semiotic means they use to convey their messages. This is the position taken by authors like Papadakis for Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot history textbooks (2008); Peled-Elhanan (2012) for Israeli schoolbooks; Tyack (1999) for a history of textbooks in the United States; Wertsch (2002) for Russian history schoolbooks; Korostelina (2011) for Ukrainian history textbooks; Lassig and Pohl (2009) for German history textbooks; Yoshida (2007) for Japanese ones; Segesten (2012) for Serbian and Romanian ones. According to Tyack (2010), Professor of Education and Professor of History at Stanford University, American history was used to instil patriotism, teaching a master grand narrative that intentionally excluded many truths, and instead acted as the ‘truth police’. Although history textbooks feature prominently in my work, my research focus is not on the actual analysis of these history textbooks, but on the discourses of resistance in relation to rewriting them, as well as the institutional politics of history textbooks.

States have strong motivations for producing official narratives through history textbooks, as they ‘have a strong interest in seeing their version of official history being accepted by citizens in such a way that they become a loyal imagined community’ (Wertsch, 2002, p.85). So when it comes to policy changes it is hard to break this cycle and to penetrate it, outside the mechanisms of the state. This partly explains the lack of NGOs success, but then it is hard for them to get high positions of power in state government jobs in the first place. It is in this context of an *educational inertia* of several decades that peace education failed to find a formal fertile ground, or a substantial informal one. To what extent does this discussion/contestation occur in the public sphere and involve public discussion? (This does not mean that there is open space for real dialogue; alternative voices have failed to gain popularity or enter

mainstream discourse for decades, see Chapter One and Chapter Five). My approach moves away from a state-centric pattern, however, as I see that the NGOs and the public have a role to play and that this is not just a top-down process; there are people who resist peace education, not through coercion, but through consensus.

It is now already well established in educational research that schoolbooks tend to be both ideological and authoritative in nature (Olson 1980; De Castell, Luke and Luke, 1989; Wertsch 2002;). Their content is dictated usually by the state, but sometimes even by other powerful groups. For example, in Sweden, even though the schoolbooks are not under the control of the Ministry of Education, they nevertheless endorse the Zionist narrative for a variety of reasons (Walls, 2010; cited in Peled-Elhanan, 2012, p.240). History textbooks can be seen to be both product and productive of 'social relations of power and domination' (Fairclough, 2003, p.9). Revealing the undertones of ideology and propaganda in these books is important, especially since all students who want to pass their matriculation exams are required to read the textbooks (Peled-Elhanan, 2012, p.45). Many Israeli textbooks not only silence the Palestinian narrative, but also manipulate the past in such a way that the Palestinians are described using negative stereotypes that reduce them to primitive, sub-human groups, hence enabling delegitimization (see Chapter One), both of their physical presence and of their narrative's validity (Bar-Tal, 1989; 2000; Podeh, 2000).

Yet all these studies on history textbooks are predominantly analyses of the role of propaganda and ideology within the textbooks themselves, and not about *discourses* related to history textbook changes (Koulouri 2002; Adwan and Bar-On 2004; Bukh



2007; Janmaat 2007; He 2007; Hadjiyanni 2008; Klerides 2008, 2011; Vural Y. and Özuyanık E. 2008; Papadakis 2008; Korostelina 2010; Peled-Elhanan, 2012). These studies, therefore, not only fall short of discussing the peace education dynamics of these issues but they also fail to delve deeper into the projection of new history textbooks as ‘threats’, and hence are unable to identify, discuss or problematise the security-education nexus (see Section 2.4.1 below).

This characteristic is also present in studies which address the wider education-conflict nexus (Tawil 1997; Salmi 2000; Bush and Sartorelli 2000; UNESCO 2003; Smith and Vaux 2003; Davies 2004; Gallagher 2004; Tawil and Harley 2004; Paulson and Rappleye 2007; Barakat 2008; Lange 2012). Lynn Davies, for example, has argued that there are crucial omissions and contradictions in the curricula of conflict societies, which ‘foster a lifelong predisposition to hostility’ (2004, p.5). She has observed that at best, schools are adaptive, hence, failing to resist dominant conflict patterns, and at worst, serve as ‘amplifying mechanisms’ magnifying ethnic or religious intolerance (p.203). According to Barakat, educational struggles, what he refers to as ‘conflicts within the conflict’, are important to consider even though tensions over education may not be ‘defining’ for a particular conflict (2008, p.16). However, I contend that this argument underestimates the powerful co-constitutive nature of education, identity, and discourse, which can directly impact a particular conflict. Education is bound up with the conflict; it is both product and productive of the wider conflict. Such studies discuss the role of education in promoting or preventing violence, but refrain from discussing these in an explicit peace education context, preferring the education-conflict/education-peacebuilding framework.

In addition, the specific literature that does discuss peace education focuses mostly on formulating and developing pedagogical strategies that teachers might adopt in order to conduct their lessons on conflict and controversial issues in a beneficial manner (Barton and McMully, 2006). In Cyprus, academics have focused mostly on explorations of alternative pedagogical strategies that have the ability to interrupt 'the conflicting ethos that perpetuates ethnic division' (Zembylas, 2008;2009, p.3). And for the moment, the existing initiatives in Cyprus only focus on this aspect of pedagogy, and how to provide more multi-perspective teaching in aspects such as poetry, architecture, cultural issues, especially in identifying differences and similarities between the two communities regarding these 'non-hot', or neutral issues. But I want to explore how political actors, institutions and structures hinder these pedagogical strategies from being formulated, implemented, or even discussed more broadly than the marginalised civil society forums. In other words, I focus not on the pedagogical nature of these processes but on the *political* nature.

A recent study by Zembylas et al, comparing the educational implications of mourning in Cyprus and Israel, argues that there are amidst nationalization forces 'educational openings' for alternative or new interpretations of mourning through pedagogies that promote reconciliation (2009, p.2). The study then goes on to provide possible ways or strategies that educators might use to deal constructively with mourning, so as to evoke reconciliation ideas to the children (p.9) before echoing Barton and McMully (2007) in that a proper supportive environment both from the school and teacher networks is needed. I position my work closely within this strand of research. However, the problem that remains, and which the authors do not explicitly tackle, is that it is the educators themselves in many cases that are part of

the problem. What is not made explicit in this study is that teachers are often the preventive forces themselves. Papadakis (2008) reminds us of the case in the north where there have been certain changes in the textbooks, where the teacher refused to teach using the new textbook, and only used it in order to deconstruct it. What needs to be done in these cases?

The literature focuses on the importance of behavioural rather than attitudinal change, often due to the long-term demands of the latter, but this is not adequate practically. Providing educators with concrete pedagogical ways to promote reconciliation is both integral and desirable, but of what use are they, when the educators themselves refuse to adopt them? The problem that arises then, is how to deal with these educators. And again, this is not just the educators, it is part of the wider socio-political context, it is about parents, teachers, the children themselves, heads of schools, politicians, ministers, journalists etc. The same study very rightly reminds us that it is still very difficult for any educational opportunities for alternative interpretations to be utilised and practiced by teachers in the absence of changes in political structures and without taking into account the socio-political circumstances (Zembylas et al, 2009, p.9). Indeed, this is in accordance with my broader argument of the role of structural political constraints that have an impact on society (and vice-versa as this is a cycle e.g. public pressure on the Minister of Education in 2008<sup>61</sup>), but again, the study does not deal with the matter further. What are these political structural constraints and how exactly do they manage to *prevent* alternative interpretations to be translated into educational practice? What needs to be done to ‘change’ them, and can they be changed? It is important to keep these issues in mind since, as I will argue later,

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<sup>61</sup> The Education Minister, Andreas Demetriou, was forced to apologise for giving a reconciliation statement in the circular to all state schools before the start of the academic year in September 2008 (*Cyprus Weekly*, September 14, 2008).

although the initial impetus and driving force has been the state and political elites, the nature of the conflict both in terms of its intractability and its long duration has meant that it is no longer a simple top-down process but a dialectical one in which the driving force comes from both directions, and a consensus is achieved. Acknowledging the bottom-up pressures is important not only when trying to find ways to reverse the negative forces but also in the diagnosis of the problem itself, as it is sheer evidence of just how re-productive power can be.

Existing studies therefore fail to problematise the *politics* of peace education, or mention the political issues in passing, usually within a predominantly educational (rather than political scientist) lens. A recent study focuses on the politics of intercultural education in Cyprus, but the emphasis is on immigration rather than peacebuilding per se (Hadjisoteriou and Angelides, 2013). Again, often the concept of peace education is not even explicitly mentioned in existing literature. Moreover, there is usually an emphasis on inter-communal dynamics, to the expense of intra-communal debates and struggles. Yet, as Barakat argues, educational struggles can have a powerful influence on a societal level serving 'either as a unifying force or as a cause of violent disagreement' (2008, p.16). It is exactly this resistance, this violent disagreement that I argue needs a closer understanding if we are to reverse the 'impossibility' of peace education. In addition, existing studies that are characterised by predominantly epistemological and methodological approaches are positivist cause-effect analyses (see Salomon and Nevo 2002), which fail to explain the failure of peace education in ways that address the tautological<sup>62</sup> nature of peace education.

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<sup>62</sup> As discussed in the Introduction, I refer to this tautological issue as an endogenous characteristic of peace education, relating back to the co-constitutive nature of education, identity and discourse. The circularity emerges in the fact that peace education is not really being given a chance, exactly because of the attitudes it needs to address in the first place. Positivist studies which employ a cause-effect model fail to recognise this circular

Finally, with the exception of Zembylas, authors on peace education in Cyprus do not explicitly engage with poststructuralist insights and analyses, in order to highlight the productive relations of power in this educational struggle.

These weaknesses are not only limited to Cyprus-specific literature however. Current literature on peace education in general and within specific conflict contexts still exhibit these weaknesses. The aim of the next section is to engage with the general peace education literature.

### **2.3. Mapping the field of Peace Education literature**

It has already been noted that peace education research stems from a variety of disciplines including education, sociology, psychology, anthropology, gender studies and peace studies (see for example the contributors in the volume entitled ‘Peace Education: The Concept, Principles and Practices Around the World’ edited by Salomon and Nevo, 2002). However, as we shall see, the discipline of political science and international relations has lagged behind, despite the crucial link that exists between power and peace education, and the fact that history education, especially in conflict settings, actually involves relations between different countries and communities.

#### **2.3.1. Interrogating links between Peace Education and Political Science/International Studies in the existing literature**

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argument i.e. that the hostile attitudes and ideas that it aims to transform are those *preventing* its implementation in the first place.

With the exception of Hirano's (2009) recent work which purports to investigate the relationship between history education and international relations using the Japanese textbook case study, and a chapter by Ross in the *Handbook on Peace Education* (Salomon and Cairns, 2010) which tries to establish how political science can contribute to peace education, there are no studies which investigate the intersection between power politics and peace education. Hirano's work is a very useful contribution that highlights the interplay between domestic and international dynamics when history textbooks are concerned. According to the book's description 'this is the first in-depth study to examine the implications of history education in the context of international relations (interstate and transnational)'. The author rightly argues that 'despite a widespread recognition that our grasp of history has some relevance to our views and attitudes towards foreign countries and people, ergo ultimately its impact on national policy, there appears to be little coherent discussion of such a significant topic' (Hirano, 2009). There are, nevertheless, differences with my approach in terms of empirical focus- and indeed, the Greek Cypriot history textbook controversy vis-à-vis a wider conflict with Turkey and the TRNC, has different dynamics involved than the internal Japanese controversy. Moreover, where as Hirano focuses on history education and its practical applications in the field of International Relations, my main focus is on how perceptions of the importance of history education in the context of national/foreign policy can act as impediments to peace education efforts.

Ross's work, on the other hand, is the only explicit attempt to forge a link between political science and peace education. However, its weak conclusion which is that 'what political science can most clearly contribute to peace education is the idea that

because of the fragile nature of relationships between groups whose relationships have been negative in the past, it is best not to rely on goodwill or value changes alone to alter behaviours' (2010, p.132) arguably does not go very far, nor very deep. In addition, neither Hirano, nor Ross, explicitly engage with the discursive power that enables certain education policies to become hegemonic, while excluding others.

A similar approach to that of Hirano, can be seen from Jennifer Lind's (2008) book, which takes a much broader approach, examining whether a country's memory –for example its leaders' statements, textbooks, museums- that teaches its citizens about the country's history 'affects how former adversaries view its intentions' (p.4). Although part of her empirical focus is similarly on Japanese relations with South Korea, Australia and China, the aim of her book is to highlight the potential dangers of contrition (for example issuing an apology) and the possibility that it may be counterproductive. Contrition can work against reconciliation, she argues, when/if there is an internal conservative backlash to it, which in turn will be viewed with alarm, suspicion, and anger from the 'victim' country. Such anger can spur nationalistic sentiment, and hence, this hostility will prove detrimental to the reconciliation process (Lind, 2008, p.4). This issue she argues has been neglected in international relations debates regarding international reconciliation. Her book refutes the view that 'international reconciliation requires apologies and other contrite gestures', although she supports claims that 'avoiding denials and glorification of past violence' facilitate reconciliation (Lind, 2008, p.3). The two examples mentioned are, firstly, how even today Britain and France still monitor Germany's way of 'remembering' World War II in order to reassure themselves of the absence of any 'signs of revisionism' and, secondly, how Japan's relations with South Korea, China

and Australia, more than sixty years after the war, are still being poisoned by denials or omissions from either Japanese history textbooks, or from political leaders. Although the main argument of this book, as well as its empirical studies differ from my own research here, what is closely related to my own research and helps inform my own argument is the author's theoretical discussion - the link she tries to make between reconciliation and perceptions of threat. She investigates the impact of the collective memory of one country, on how this country is perceived by the 'other' country. I, in turn, focus on the perceptions of threat and fear, within the Republic of Cyprus, with respect to attempts to change this historical memory, through peace education. Nevertheless, both approaches take as their premise the important link between feelings of security, as these are manifested by sacred attachments to a nation's collective memory, and reconciliation efforts. Another similar aspect of Lind's work with my own research attempt is that we both seek to develop a critical account on peacebuilding tools (she on contrition, me on peace education), by giving importance to domestic polarization.

### 2.3.2. Zooming out to general Peace Education literature as a multidisciplinary field

I locate my work in the rather niche area of 'resistance to peace education', thereby making a contribution that affects peace education literature generally as a multidisciplinary field (Brock-Utne 1985; Gur-Ze'ev 2001; Harris and Morrison 2003; Salomon 2004; Danesh 2005; Smith 2005; Page 2008; McGlynn et al 2009; Shirazi 2011; Bekerman and Zembylas 2012). In a later section, I position this resistance to peace education, to a wider set of literature on 'challenges to peacebuilding', particularly those with a critical outlook that analyse 'resistance to peacebuilding' (for



example, Newman and Richmond 2006b; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2012; and Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). But before looking at this literature in more depth, it is important to map out the main approaches that characterise the field of peace education.

Peace education has come to be understood in many different ways, and the elasticity of its meaning has been exacerbated by the normative and rhetorical uses to which it has been put. Different authors begin their arguments with different sets of implicit assumptions and this makes it harder to delineate their disparities which are crucial nevertheless, as they have a profound effect on how the term ‘peace education’ is used in academic literature, but also on how participants in this discussion (mis)understand each other. As we have already seen, peace education has been viewed from the perspective of two separate functions. On the one hand, it has been viewed as an educational end, with a view to reducing violence in society in general, and on the other hand it is viewed as a specific peacebuilding tool in conflict-ridden areas. The approach that I take deals exclusively with the latter ‘function’ of peace education and therefore, it is with the latter type of literature that I am concerned. This difference is with regards to an external issue, how peace education is viewed: there are also differences that relate to inherent characteristics of peace education.

Peace education has been a concept largely preserved for researchers in the field of education, social psychology, history, anthropology or generally peace studies. Peace education is seen through the lens of normative arguments or educational assessments, and again, the concept is neither interrogated nor problematised. The consequences of this are detrimental, not just to the academic venture but also to the

furthering and materialisation of the project of peace education itself. The concept is taken as a given one, its fundamental assumptions and tenets are rarely questioned, and this lack of a somewhat critical approach reflects an inability to understand or explain the conditions which have not allowed peace education to work, and, hence, leaving academics and practitioners alike unable to comprehend and fully grasp the underlying meanings or strategies both of those who are promoting, and those who are so vehemently fighting it.

### 2.3.3 'The Turn to Peace Education'

Yet, an emerging pattern shows an increasing interest towards peace education, both from the peace/education academic field of inquiry but also from various institutional structures - domestic and international. Recently, one can witness the increasing amount of interest in the question of peace education. Throughout the 1990s, and increasingly during the first decade of the millennium, a debate has slowly emerged which centers upon what peace education is, what it should be, and whether or not it is plausible. This culminated in the creation of the *Journal of Peace Education* in 2004, sponsored by the Peace Education Commission (PEC) of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA). A debate on whether or not it is desirable, i.e. a more critical approach to peace education, has yet to be seen in the academic literature. This is what I term as a dovish positive concept. Although I do not disagree with the argument that peace education is both feasible and desirable, I strongly believe that the tendency to ignore the contentious issues that are associated with peace education has decelerated the cause, but also has widened the gap between

peace education as a theoretical concept and its praxis in a society with an ‘ethos of conflict’ (Bar-Tal 2000).

In 2013, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon dedicated the International Day of Peace (September 21), on peace education, calling on governments to:

support peace education programmes, protect students and teachers from conflict, help rebuild schools destroyed by war, and ensure all girls and boys have access to a quality education that includes learning about resolving and preventing conflicts (UN, 2013).<sup>63</sup>

Nevertheless, when education and peacebuilding are discussed, there is a tendency to focus mostly on access to education in ‘hot’ conflict zones. Besides, until quite recently, while few would have denied that peace education was a central aspect of peacebuilding efforts, few felt that it was the most urgent ingredient on which they should focus. These were mostly policy practitioners from international organisations like UNESCO (see UNESCO, 2001) or UNICEF (see Fountain, 1999), or academics from education or social-psychology departments. It was however in more specific studies that this approach flourished, and not surprisingly as the historical, political and cultural specificities of a conflict made it difficult to speak of peace education in less abstract terms. Things have changed and in the last decade, peace education has become one of the central preoccupations of peacebuilding scholarship, widely defined, even when peace education is not explicitly mentioned. Since the early 2000s, literature on conflict resolution/peacebuilding has reflected a slowly but

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<sup>63</sup> [http://www.un.org/en/events/peaceday/2013/sgmessage\\_countdown.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/events/peaceday/2013/sgmessage_countdown.shtml) [accessed 10 December 2013]

steadily emerging attention towards the role of education in peacebuilding processes. This wider 'turn to Peace Education' as I shall call it, has reached an unprecedented momentum over the past five years.<sup>64</sup>

What then, one might be inclined to ask, can explain this explosion of interest? There are a number of possible factors: the failure of top-down peacebuilding approaches; the rise of social constructivism and the ideational turn towards the possibility of changing attitudes; the post-modernist turn which disagreed with one-sided historical truths; the increasing ability of disciplines to talk to- and not just past- each other; increased educational literature dealing with critical theories and oppressive pedagogies; the methodological turn towards discourse analysis in education that eventually saw history textbooks being used as the primary texts of analysis, and sometimes within a comparative approach; the interest of historians in the representation of the past as an important feature of political ideologies (see Cubitt, 2007); and finally the increase in the number of peacebuilding civil society organisations that deal explicitly with history education and conflict.

There have been several academic attempts at expanding peace education, for example, the creation of the *Journal of Peace Education* or the recent *Conflict and Education* interdisciplinary journal in 2011, (but the latter's promising inaugural issue seems to have unfortunately also been its last, at least until the time of writing). There are also a large number of peace institutes (Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Tuebingen, Oslo,

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<sup>64</sup> When I first started researching the available literature in 2009, I found the absence of literature a problematic issue that made it very difficult to 'locate' my proposed work within a particular field. However, in 2012 only, there were no less than eight books published (and over fifty articles) that were first-order relatives to my family of work, where as up to 2004, i.e. including all the years before that, there were only around six books that could be considered to be directly relevant to peace education, and two of them where published in the 1970s.

Nicosia) which operate either as think tanks/NGOs or as part of university departments (e.g. Teachers College, Columbia University) and an increasing number of new courses on peace education at universities (Brock-Utne 2011; Danesh 2013). Despite these peace education efforts, and the existence of these peace organisations in general, peace education has yet been unable to occupy the status of a key term in the lexicon of conflict-resolution, and much less so in political science or international relations studies.

#### 2.3.4. Peace Education and Peacebuilding Literature: focus on resistance/challenges

A recent approach to peacebuilding literature is one that focuses specifically on the challenges to conflict transformation. Whereas articles published in the 1990s usually dedicated only a few paragraphs on the identification and discussion of challenges, it is now more common to see articles, chapters or even books focusing entirely on how to deal with obstacles to peacebuilding, whether these are ideational or material (Longman, 2004; Newman and Richmond, 2006a and 2006b; Atashi, 2009). The particular resistance (see Scott, 1990) to peacebuilding literature mentioned above is part of a critical approach to peacebuilding that questions the Western assumptions of the liberal peace project. One particular set of actors, (individuals or groups) that resist peace initiatives feature in this literature under the label of ‘spoilers’ (see also Chapter One). The term, originally coined by Stedman (1997) is used to describe those actors that are directly or violently involved in the conflict and act against peace settlements. There is a wider consensus amongst scholars that there is no blueprint approach to managing spoilers, as they can have different characteristics, motivations, and use violent or non-violent tactics (from terrorist groups, to diaspora communities,

to political elites). Yet, resistance to peace education is discursive rather than violent, and my approach focuses on those who resist it *within* a particular community, not across a conflict. Besides, to treat those who resist peace education as ‘spoilers’ is to impose certain normative bearings on what is morally right in a post-conflict society (see Newman and Richmond, 2006, p.106)<sup>65</sup>. Although this is to an extent inevitable - especially if we are serious about peace - we nevertheless should try and understand where these positions ‘are coming from’ in a constructive way.

Scholarly work that seeks to rethink peace and conflict have similarities but also differences when compared to my approach. We are both offering a critical analysis of the peacebuilding norms, of NGO assumptions, being cautious of applying Western norms and ahistorical approaches etc. and identifying these as part of the problem- as part of the reason why peacebuilding has not been embraced by the local people. We are also both interested with how to reconfigure these peacebuilding projects so as to make them more relevant and culturally sensitive to the local communities.

As Atashi has argued, we have very little knowledge of effective strategies to increase the support of ordinary people who live with the realities of a conflict, of what she calls, ‘people on the ground’ or support ‘from the streets’ (2009, pp.45-6). Nor do we have sufficient understandings of the elements or features that are likely to lead them to withdraw their support from peacebuilding processes, or resist specific peace education initiatives. In fact, here lies a significant dilemma: can these ‘people on the

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<sup>65</sup> As they aptly argue: ‘by labelling as spoilers every group that does not conform to such a peace process, we may be making a value judgment about the nature of that society and trying to apply ‘universal’ values. Thus, the concept of ‘spoiling’ can be subjective and alludes to broader normative debates about the ‘best’ way to organize (post-conflict) societies’ (p.106).

ground' be considered as 'spoilers' in the first place if they resist peace education initiatives? If we adhere to Stedman's initial framework which largely ignores their power as civilians, and limits spoilers to those 'leaders and parties' who perceive a negotiated peace settlement as threatening their 'power, worldview and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it' (1997, p.5) then possibly not. But if we extend this definition to include non-violent methods, and the ordinary 'grass roots' or 'the masses' then perhaps we can consider this resistance as an act of 'spoiling'. This ability to disrupt or support a particular peace process, 'gives ordinary people an atypical power, which is often ignored in discourse of the post-agreement period' (Atashi, 2009, p.48) but also of the pre-agreement period.

In my research I locate resistance in those who do not support peace education initiatives in order to explain the hegemonic position that resistance to peace education occupies despite the lack of explicitly coercive power. But the marginalisation of peace education subject positions does not mean that NGOs do not possess power. Indeed, as Foucault (1978) has shown, power is not just oppression- it produces a particular reality, in this context one of resistance. Resistance presupposes power; it is an extension of power. Therefore resistance to peace education can be seen as the counter-reaction to the power of peace education subject positions (which themselves initially resist the hegemonic discourses and practices and try to offer alternative ones). However, what is important to bear in mind is that there still exists a crucial asymmetry between this power, which helps explain why subject positions that see peace education as something positive remain marginalised. This is an unusual approach, as existing peacebuilding literature tend to see only either the state as repressing, or the NGOs as resisting peacebuilding. This opens up the possibility of

viewing the NGOs as participating in a counter-hegemonic struggle, where they are in effect trying to ‘resist the resistance’ to peace education. Hence, it allows for an assessment of their counter-hegemonic re-actions: how they resist and what do they do wrong?

Certain conflict-transformation scholars have acknowledged early on the importance of a wider ‘sustained dialogue’, of a ‘public peace process’ (Saunders, 2001) including all members of society, if this process is to succeed and to be sustainable (Lederach, 1997; Miall et al.1999), of the need to go ‘beyond mediation’ of an external or top-down nature (Jacobsen and Jacobsen, 2002) but also the critical role of public opinion in conflict resolution (Mor, 1997). There is also an emerging consensus that sustainable peacebuilding requires changes in attitudes, perceptions and behaviours, as well as structural inequalities (Abu-Nimer, 2001; Galtung, 2002; Dayton and Kriesberg, 2009). However, as I argue in more detail in Chapter Four, deeper understandings of the expectations and hopes, but also fears and insecurities of people on the ground, will enable researchers and policymakers to reduce the possibility of these people undermining the sustainability of peacebuilding (and in this case peace education), and at the same time, encourage their positive support, as they would feel a sense of involvement in the whole process.

Camilla Orjuela’s work (2003; 2005; 2008) on the identity politics of peacebuilding has been a welcome breath of critical thinking concerning deeper understandings, but also exposing problematic aspects of civil society organisations. As she argues,



“civil society does not only need to be constructed, but also deconstructed, and the amorphous civil society concept analysed critically in its local context. Such a deconstruction reveals that civil society...contains divides along ethnic and political lines, and is an arena where contradictory struggles are waged. People organise to promote peace and democratic values, but also to protest attempts at conflict resolution. Donor funding of peace NGOs feeds into the conflict between pro-peace and hard-line groups and risks accentuating social conflicts” (2005, p.1). Although her work focuses on Sri Lanka, her arguments have important ramifications for Cyprus, In fact, as a political scientist, her work comes very close to the critical approach that I take, albeit for a different topic and country (she focuses on civil society and the general peace process in Sri Lanka) and her analysis of the power struggles involved is similar to my own approach in Cyprus.

A common pattern within the conflict-resolution field is that either peace education is the core topic of the specific piece of literature, or it does not feature at all (the latter being more often the case). Although some research studies would mention peace education in passing (as, for example, a part of a wider peace model, like Galtung’s approach, see Galtung, Jacobsen and Jacobsen, 2002, p.xvii, or Orjuela’s model of the role of civil society in peacebuilding in Sri Lanka (2003, p.208)), they nevertheless do not expand further on the nature and role of peace education, nor do they reference the important literature of this area, contributing further to the non-integration of the peace education academic field.

Several researchers have reviewed the field of conflict research and have observed a ‘political sea of change’ that started with the replacement of the Cold War arms race

with newer interests in interstate warfare or identity conflict (Midlarsky 2000 and Sillanpää and Koivula, 2010, for example). These researchers have found that conflict studies are primarily concerned Democratic Peace Theory, comparing conflict behaviour between democratic and non-democratic states (concentrating on the idea that democracies do not fight against each other), as well as research on long-term rivalries. These studies focus on social, political or economic factors that can promote peace between states. According to Sillanpää and Koivula's bibliometric study of conflict literature, despite this change, the role of the state has remained central in the most-cited conflict research (2010, p.159). More importantly, they have stated that analyses focusing on the individual or group level based on intrastate conflict were 'surprisingly limited', indicating not that they were not being studied as such, but that papers on these studies were not amongst those cited on a wide scale in top journals (as were Beck, 1998; Russett, 200; Jones, 1996; or Waltz, 1979; for example).

Notwithstanding citation numbers, the wider and more recent movement towards studies of 'new wars' initiated by Mary Kaldor's seminal work in 1999, attests towards a change of research focus, from traditional conventional wars to those civil or international wars that in the context of globalization make the distinctions between internal and external, local and global difficult to sustain. According to Kaldor, these 'new wars' no longer use conventional battlefield tactics but rely on terror and guerilla warfare funded from diaspora networks and the focus of the struggle is identity and not territory (1999a). Most contemporary wars therefore, are about the exclusive claim to power based on (usually) ethnic or religious identity, and that because the conflict parties cannot achieve their goals through negotiation- ethnic cleansing and general violence persists. The most that the parties can achieve is

military stalemate or peace enforcement and this is why such conflicts last for so long e.g. Cyprus, Palestine, Ireland, Bosnia (Kaldor, 1999b). Arguably, Cyprus does not empirically fully fit all the criteria and arguments that would constitute it as a 'new war' (for example, disagreements over territory play a crucial role and it was the period up to and before 1974 that mostly fits with her framework e.g. EOKA B and TMT paramilitary groups, and not the contemporary conflict situation), but nevertheless, as Kaldor has very recently argued in defence of 'new wars': the 'new wars' thesis should not be understood as an empirical category but rather as an analytical and integrative framework, with the aim of shedding light on the logic and repercussions of contemporary wars, guiding both research and policy (2013, pp.1-2).

According to Sens, the peacebuilding norm in the UN and its development in the early 1990s was intellectually grounded in academic work on peace and conflict management, such as that of Johan Galtung (2004, p.145). In the 1970s Galtung had already made distinctions between different peace processes, defining peacebuilding as 'the practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development' (Galtung, 1975, cited in Sens, 2004, p.145). Boutros Boutros Ghali's<sup>66</sup> *An Agenda for Peace*, issued in 1992, defined peacebuilding's main aim as supporting and strengthening structures that will help prevent a relapse into conflict, and much of contemporary peacebuilding policy has its origins in themes that had become part of the discourse of UN peace operations through the 1990s. Although, he did not explicitly phrase it as peace education, Boutros-Ghali makes clear references to the importance of education in this process:

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<sup>66</sup> Boutros-Ghali was UN Secretary-General from 1992 to 1996.

In the aftermath of international war, post-conflict peace-building may take the form of...joint programmes through which barriers between nations are brought down by means of freer travel, cultural exchanges and mutually beneficial youth and educational projects. Reducing hostile perceptions through educational exchanges and curriculum reform may be essential to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities. (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para.56)

Some of the basic tenets of peace education are mentioned here: reduction of fear, hatred and prejudice by promoting contact through educational and cultural exchanges; joint educational projects that aim to reduce national tensions and build bridges; a reform of the curriculum as a way to reduce hostile feelings and prevent renewed violence. There is also an implicit reference as to the timing of such efforts, which should ideally be placed 'post-conflict' once some degree of stability and calmness is established in the necessary educational structures.

Discussing the 'menu of strategies and tasks' guiding peacebuilding, that has developed in the UN system over the years, Sens, includes amongst others, the following practices that I regard as relevant to peace education projects:

- Peace/civic education
- Trauma recovery
- Promotion of intergroup recognition and national reconciliation

- Strengthening civil society (promotion of dialogue, conflict management training, dispute resolution mechanisms) (2004, p.146)

Some of these points overlap with other projects: for example, trauma recovery and reconciliation overlaps with other tribunal projects such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, or the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. Moreover, conflict-resolution skills, also overlap with general civil society projects. However, it is important to understand that it is not just expected/accepted that the different tools of peacebuilding might overlap, but that this is more often than not, a necessary requirement for achieving a complete societal transformation, from a 'conflictive ethos' (Bar-Tal, 2000) to a peaceful ethos.

The lack of conceptual clarity in peace education discourse has arguably had both intellectual and practical limitations. We need further evaluation of peace education projects, larger critical assessments that can point out the limitations of existing strategies and illustrate the inherent contestable nature of its core assumptions within a conflict, that may have as a result not only its intense criticism but its outright delegitimization and hence exclusion from peacebuilding efforts. If we do not try to understand those who fight against peace education, we will contribute to the wall-building process, rather than try to find ways to build bridges with those who deny its necessity or legitimacy.

According to Kaldor, cosmopolitan political change is needed to deal with 'new wars' but this is 'a long slow process that has to be undertaken by civil society' (1999b). What Kaldor refers to is of course a global civil society movement with transnational

NGOs, and not merely the local non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Indeed, the role or lack of, civil society in conflict-resolution and peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus has been a major focus of literature on the Cyprus conflict, especially after the early 1990s. This coincided with major funding opportunities poured into Cyprus from American organisations like Fulbright, as well as United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP). Conventional and state- approaches, still remain, and perhaps reached another peak in the period before the Annan Plan negotiations, where various scenarios were put forward that revolved around the much contested concepts of a strong bizonal bicomunal federation, a loose bizonal federation, or the two-state solution.

My own research position however, is that a two-pronged peacebuilding approach to the conflict, that involves *simultaneously* both the state and civil society, as well as the two ethnic groups, is the only one that will have long-term results. Up until now in Cyprus, the norm is that state policies have been out of coordination with peacebuilding civil society efforts, if not in direct opposition to them (as happened for example in 2004 with the referendum for the Annan Plan). In addition, the theoretical division between state and civil society is a distinction that is in practice not always possible to sustain, especially as there are individual citizens that perceive themselves as members of both, or that even work or volunteer for both. It is my contention that a research focus only on either civil society peacebuilding efforts, or state policies, will not offer a comprehensive picture of the complex institutional power dynamics involved in the Cyprus conflict, and hence, this is why I take a holistic approach when investigating the politics of the particular peacebuilding tool of peace education (see more about my approach in Chapters Three and Four).

Admittedly, peace education does not constitute a powerful discursive core of contemporary conflict and conflict-resolution research, but this does not mean that it is not important, or that it should not concern conflict researchers. If describing the field of conflict research is challenging due to its 'unclear boundaries' (Sillanpää and Koivula, 2010, p.148), then the task of reviewing the narrower but embryonic field of peace education is even more so. Instead of systemic foci or paradigms, contemporary peace education research is characterised by its dispersed nature, lack of linguistic tools or an established peace education academic discourse within the context of peacebuilding. Often, despite the interdisciplinary nature of peace education, researchers do not usually cite other works outside their academic discipline. So although essentially the researchers emerge from various disciplines, one can hardly speak of *truly* interdisciplinary research when mapping the field of peace education.

#### **2.4. 'Decluttering' Peace Education : my own contribution**

Peacebuilding is seen as a response to intrastate conflict, demanding 'the restoration of civil order and the prospects for a peaceful future' (Sens, 2004, p.153). In Cyprus, it is the latter goal of peacebuilding that is more relevant i.e. 'the prospects for a peaceful future'. It is within this framework that peace education is trying to operate in Cyprus. Cyprus is described as a 'frozen' conflict zone in the conflict-resolution literature, meaning that it has reached a point where although there is no escalation of violence, efforts at mediation have proven to be unsuccessful, and as result there has been maintenance of the status quo since 1974.

The Cyprus conflict has also been subject to other various epithets: an ‘identity-based conflict’ (Rothman, 1997); an ‘intractable’ conflict (Richmond, 1999; Hampson, 2004) i.e. one that has proven extraordinarily resilient to various mediating efforts or attempts at resolution; one characterized by ‘adversarial impasse’ (Fisher, 2001); and the absence of ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (Zartman, 2001; Hampson, 2004). Unlike the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is an example of an active intractable conflict, with recurrent violence, Cyprus is a dormant intractable conflict (There have been minimal episodes of violence in Cyprus over the years; see Chapter Three) and hence, the absence of a painful stalemate has resulted in lack of high motivations for change and meaningful negotiations.<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, the relevant issue amongst these epithets is that these characteristics and power dynamics also negatively affect the peacebuilding tool that is peace education. The relationship between power and peace, let alone power and peace education, remains elusive in existing studies and this is where I aim to make a conceptual and empirical contribution.

It helps to understand what it is specifically that I am researching, and what differentiates me from the relatively small circle of peace education researchers, by explaining what it is that I do *not* do. Education, it might seem at first, is at the core of my thesis. Indeed, it is my contention that education, both formal and informal, is and can be an effective agent of social change. I also focus, in the context of peacebuilding, explicitly on the role of peace education. Moreover, it is the debate on a particular educational resource, the tool of history textbooks, that I am particularly and empirically concerned with, and finally, (conflict) education is arguably one of

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<sup>67</sup> Various observers have also noted how the ROC entry to the EU without the TRNC has also been another factor that diminished incentives for negotiation.(reference here 2-3 of them)



the main reasons behind negative attitudes towards peace education. However, although education features centrally in my thesis, it is not the core of my thesis. I am not investigating the contribution of education to ethnic violence, as Lange (2012) has very recently done. Furthermore, I am not concerned with peace education, as an educationalist, for the purposes of education, but my ultimate focus is the first part of the phrase- peace and the peacebuilding context. Undeniably, their intersection is at the core of my research project, but my ultimate objective is to understand the political process, and not the educational one. Nor, am I primarily concerned with the actual content of the history books per se, (like Papadakis or Peled-Elhanan for example), which is why I do not perform a discourse or a semiotic analysis on the history textbooks of the Republic of Cyprus. Instead, I am interested in the discourses about these textbooks, that reflect the struggle and competition over education in the Republic of Cyprus. Finally, I am not exploring the role of education in building peace (as is Whitehead, 2003, for example), but the role of discourses on education that prevent peace education from becoming a reality in Cyprus. This is not to say that the above specified issues are not related to my thesis, but that they do not form part of my central research question.

My own research approach, therefore, exposes the discursive struggle between those who support and attack peace education in order to show how it is possible that a negative hegemonic attitude is allowed to exist in Cyprus, thereby bringing about educational stagnation and powerful resistance to peace education efforts. With an emphasis on power, I am attempting to make a contribution to the politics of peace education that fits with the wider critical peacebuilding literature.

#### 2.4.1. 'Peace education: in Search of a Meaning in Securitisation studies

As mentioned earlier, my particular conceptual framework allows me to bring forward the education-security nexus in conflict settings. In particular, my findings point towards a securitisation of peace education in Cyprus, and a strong belief that history textbooks that are in line with peace education goals present a threat to the national interests of the country.

Nurit Peled-Elhanan in her excellent book, published very recently, in 2012, examines how schoolbooks marginalize Palestinians, legitimize Israeli military action against them and reinforce Jewish-Israeli territorial identity. She examines both verbal and visual texts (narratives, images, maps, and specific layout designs), critically analyzing the ideology and propaganda language of governance, of the dominant schema of those who are in the position of power such as politicians, generals and the authors of these books. Although Peled-Elhanan, does not explicitly view her research through the securitisation framework, nor does she refer to it at any point throughout her research, she can be seen to, unknowingly perhaps, contribute to the securitization argument, as she makes the direct link between education and young soldiers. She argues that the critical messages in the school books are crucial for allowing young male and female high school graduates to make the transition from the school to the army at 18 years of age, from students to soldiers, as part of Israel's compulsory military service. Yet, as Weinburg has shown, neither the students nor the teachers do a critical reading into these subtexts, because they do not think that these subtexts might exist in the first place (2001, p.77). These critical messages are what Peled-

Elhanan has successfully exposed, showing through a social semiotic analysis of textbooks, how the educational system primes and prepares its children and young people for carrying out the Israeli policy of occupation i.e. for potentially engaging directly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and using force against Palestinians, by indoctrinating them against Palestinians. In the preface to her book Peled-Elhanan includes an excerpt from one of her students, who had himself fought as a soldier before sinking into depression after witnessing the deaths of his other soldier friends. I include part of it below, as I find it telling of the negative effects of historical narratives:

‘How could I be so gullible and let myself be duped? How can I explain that a man of peace exposes himself to such a morbid experience of his own free will?...What pushes these young Israeli boys to play the role of supreme judges until they lose all judgement?... [T]he ‘Grand Zionist Narrative’ which serves, explicitly as well as implicitly, as a collective conscience to the whole Israeli society...is the system of values that makes us belong to this particular collective’ (quoted in Peled-Elhanan, 2012, p.ix)

Peled-Elhanan’s work offers a critical examination of how this narrative is reproduced in schoolbooks of three disciplines: history, geography and civic studies. She is not a political scientist, but an academic at the Faculty of Education at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I note this, to show that although she is herself an Israeli, and has sadly lost her own girl during the conflict, she is still an active peace educationalist, and an outspoken critic of the Israeli occupation and its negative

effects on both Israelis and Palestinians. Both her and her students should come as proof that experiencing loss, and even participating in force, does not doom peace education, inevitably to failure.

The fact that Peled-Elhanan's welcome but very recent contribution to the scant specific literature on the power politics of education in conflict-regions, emerges again from the education discipline, offers further substantiation to my argument for a lack of contributions to this topic from political scientists. More importantly, this emerging school of thought, investigates how members of the 'other' side- or rather 'the other' as individuals are often categorized and stereotyped as being one and the same thing- are portrayed in school books in order to expose their negative impact as well as the power ridden ideological and propaganda mechanisms behind their production, tuition and consumption. My work here extends this approach, going beyond an analysis of history textbooks, into a political analysis of how these textbooks, and their dominant nationalist schema are allowed to occupy a hegemonic position in the first place, in such a way that prevents their transformation through peace education efforts. This politics of peace education (through history textbooks) approach and my securitization argument form part of my *conceptual contribution* to the academic field. Peled-Elhanan's link of education with soldiers, prepared 'well' enough to be able to defend the country from the 'other', is a vivid example of my securitization argument of how textbooks are given the symbolic status of a 'security tool', that is necessary for the long-term national and defence interests of the country. I *empirically contribute* to this history textbook debate as well as to that of the Cyprus conflict through the specific analysis of the Cypriot efforts both those of preventing, and those of promoting change through peace education.

## **2.5. Conclusion**

This chapter has mapped the field of peace education research and has pointed out some of the state of the art issues. There are evident gaps in the literature, which, although when viewed together they have made significant contributions to our understanding of conflict, peacebuilding, and the role of education, they still nevertheless, remain limited as they cannot explain the vehemence with which peace education is being fought, nor can they account for its arguable failure to be formally adopted in Cyprus (or elsewhere). They have not yet closely problematized the issue, although it is a fast-growing one and the prospects seem very promising, over the past decade (and especially the last five years) with this explosion in both monographs, edited books, journal articles and policy papers.

I have also explored some of the intellectual connections that the ‘peace education-political science’ nexus can prompt us to develop. I have sought to address the relevant issues, not so much with an intention of producing an exclusively political science approach but rather to show an approach that may be helpful to political scientists in conceptualising the issues that peace education poses for their discipline, as well as to show how political science can contribute to the wider interdisciplinary peace education research. Although my research study is specifically on the Republic of Cyprus, my thesis is nevertheless produced in the belief that the issues raised are relevant to other contexts as well.

In turning to peace education, scholars have been turning not just towards an interest in a new type of topic, but towards new ways of organizing, classifying and

describing the education-peacebuilding nexus. If this effort continues peace education scholars will as a result also have offered to their own respective disciplines a new way of conceptualizing the nature of their own discipline and the knowledge it is accustomed to producing. Although, as this literature review has shown there is still a considerable collective scholarly journey to go before peace education reaches that status, this is what peace education as a concept should aspire to become in order for us to start seeing the full impact of its potential, and capacities, and my work here is but a small step forward towards this direction.

As we shall see in the empirical chapters this problem of misinterpretation/misunderstanding features prominently beyond the academic circle, and into the public sphere, this being a core issue of the ensuing analysis. In Cyprus, peace education is more theorized than practiced, and this has exacerbated the fact that it means different things to different people. The next chapter aims at presenting a reconceptualisation of peace education, an evaluation of existing initiatives, as well as a normative definition of what peace education means for Cyprus.

## **CHAPTER THREE – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:**

### **The (Power) Politics of Peace Education in Cyprus**

#### **3.1. Conceptual Matters**

In this chapter, I define and problematise peace education in Cyprus, and situate my perspective in terms of the theoretical insights I am employing, my meta-theoretical assumptions as well as methodological choices. The underlying purpose of this chapter is to bring forward my own conceptual framework through which to analyse ‘the politics of peace education’: one which attempts to deal with the weaknesses of the existing literature reviewed in the previous chapter, both by avoiding a cyclical argument *and* by bridging the gap between peace education and political science. I argue for a *reconceptualisation* of peace education, one that views peace education in conjunction with power relations infused within and between structures. I conceptualise power as discursive and institutional, using these analytical constructs (in my empirical chapters) to expose the institutional frameworks, and discursive strategies/processes in Cyprus, that produce and are productive of a hegemonic status quo that prevents peace education from becoming a reality. These are neither ironclad nor mutually exclusive categories, but analytical distinctions for helping us make sense of the research findings, and in particular illuminating the powerful securitization -forces and practices- of education vis-à-vis the Cyprus conflict.

The role of this chapter is to delineate the terms that are used in this research study and illuminate the conceptual contribution of this work. This is achieved by initially offering a brief assessment of the poor state of peace education in Cyprus,

complemented by a normative proposition in the context of a wider politics of 'peaceagogy'. This is useful in exposing not only the need for peace education, but also how peace education could look like in the future. The final section of this chapter offers a detailed guide explaining the methodological decisions and practices I have adopted.

### **3.2. Defining and Problematising Peace Education in Cyprus**

Bringing forward a conceptual framework to analyse the politics of peace education, necessitates a problematisation of peace education. By problematisation, I mean a survey of the existing facets of this peacebuilding tool, a definition which explains what its aims are, but also what its achievements have been up until now. When applying this to Cyprus, two inter-related limitations become obvious. Firstly, trying to define what the aims of peace education are, when no such formal project or peace education strategy exists in practice, at least not in an organized form of a school curriculum or pedagogy, raises the need to adopt normative definitions i.e. concerning the scope, content and nature/form peace education *should* take rather than *does* take. Unavoidably then, how one identifies and assesses existing peace education will depend on the application of this definition, and it is my contention that peace education initiatives in Cyprus are limited, both in scope and content. In this section I deal with both of these issues, stemming from the lack of a formal operationalisation of peace education in Cyprus, by offering my own normative stance on peace education in Cyprus before surveying its existing forms, albeit that these are informal and limited. Although these informal and disparate practices can be loosely defined as



peace education, using these as the starting point for defining what peace education is, is problematic, not least because of their limited nature, but also because it would imply a more structured, goal-oriented project, that is far from the decentralised and disparate reality on the ground.

### 3.2.1. Normative stance: What form should peace education take in Cyprus?

My normative stance departs from the viewpoint that peace education is both necessary and suitable for Cyprus. We have already seen in Chapter One why it is urgently needed by exposing the problem(s) with the educational system: mainly, the antagonistic historical narratives conflating memory and history. How, however, could it be operationalised, if it was given the opportunity to become *praxis*? What would be its scope and nature, and what sort of content should be included? I discuss these issues in turn below.

#### Scope of peace education

This thesis empirically examines wider societal institutions and discourses, focuses on specific educational aspects, but only as these relate to policies and practices that are mostly youth-related. As will be discussed in more detail below, the reasons for this were not only practical and strategic, but also empirically driven due to the youth-centred nature of the Cyprus education debate itself. It can be said, therefore, that empirically I take a narrow approach as I focus on peace education discourses related to issues of curriculum (i.e. history textbooks) and pedagogy (method and practice of teaching). It is important to make three clarifications here. Firstly, I focus on both

formal (state) and informal (civil society)<sup>68</sup> education discourses and practices. Secondly, this ‘narrow’ empirical approach does not mean that, for example, discourses on pedagogic aspects do not have potential ramifications for wider sociological aspects beyond the pedagogical realm, and nor does it, thirdly, imply that peace education- if it were adopted- *should* be limited to this. In practice, peace education could take forms beyond the school context, but my empirical focus is on Cypriot debates regarding school-related issues.

My normative approach to peace education proposes the adoption of a particular method and practice of teaching, which I describe as ‘peaceagogy’. The underlying assumption of this term is that peacebuilding is most effective when it constitutes the frame for all types of socio-educational activities within a community. Similar arguments have been made by other academics but with a much stronger emphasis on the importance of universal frames of thinking. Danesh for example, posits ‘a unity-based worldview’<sup>69</sup> as a prerequisite for effective peace education arguing that worldview construction is essential for ‘all our life processes’ and that one of the main tasks of education is to help us to formulate our worldview (2006, pp.57-64). However, although education is indeed the crucial vehicle for worldview formation, constituting the latter as a precondition for peace education may not only be adding a further layer to an already complex concept, but also unwillingly reducing the prospects of the realization of peace education projects by ‘setting the bar too high’. As a result, when such all-encompassing approaches are attempted in practice, they often remain ideal aspirations at best, or serve to demoralise peace educators at worst, hence undermining the initial purpose. If academic research is to be taken seriously

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<sup>68</sup> This does not imply that the two are exclusive or independent of each other.

<sup>69</sup> Unity here refers to the ‘oneness of humanity’ in its diverse forms (Danesh, 2006, p.69)

and utilized by practitioners, it is important to be cautious, constructive but also realistic in our propositions.

The frame that I refer to in peaceagogy is not a prerequisite, but a goal that peace education should be working towards. It involves the transformation from conflict-orientation to peace-orientation through teaching about peace. This transformation is what constitutes the agenda for wider educational change. It is only after moving towards this step that we can speak of peace education as an ‘agenda for societal change’ (Bar-Tal, 2002, p.34) and of transformed collective identities and narratives (Salomon, 2004, Bar-Tal and Salomon, 2006). As Bar-Tal acknowledges, the strong social, political and economic implications of the aims of peace education have contributed to its elusiveness (2002, p.34). This vagueness can be ameliorated by delineating concepts and setting clear definitions *without* ignoring the strong links and interconnectedness of social reality.

What differentiates *peaceagogy* from pedagogy is:

- (a) its peace orientation, including conflict transformation content, skills and attitudes;
- (b) its scope, as it extends to include not just child education but also adult education.

When I speak of peaceagogy therefore, I refer to the instructions, strategies and methods of teaching peace to *all* citizens. Obviously, being a teacher does not necessarily mean that one only teaches children. The etymology of the word pedagogy (or pedagogue) itself suggests the focus on children (pedi/παιδί = child in Greek), and this has perhaps contributed to the emphasis on school textbooks and school settings. Another reason may be the fact that adult education is still somewhat

marginalised, so the debate on peace education mostly revolves around youth and school issues. Knowles (1980) refers to the instruction of adults as ‘andragogy’ but again the word ‘andras/άνδρας’ means man in Greek and this is definitely not something exclusive to men! Beyond gender, we should not forget that some of these adults will take up various identity roles at the same time, e.g. some will be parents, others will be teachers, and some will be both. As we will see later on, these multiple identities, but also these different groups of adults, have important repercussions for peace education.

What differentiates peaceagogy from peace education is that peace education is one *form* of peaceagogy. Other forms include the teaching of peace through music, theatre, dancing, film, sports etc. This does not imply that one cannot be ‘educated’ in these areas, but merely differentiates peace education-whose core medium of instruction and focus is education- from the rest of the programmes, in an effort to avoid peace education from becoming too all-encompassing abstract and elusive as a concept. Again, the reasons for avoiding the conflation of peace education with a wider approach are not just conceptual, but also practical, in that peace education becomes more possible to materialise and research when the concept is more concrete and concise. Taking this approach also enables clarity regarding what is- and what is *not* peace education- but is in fact a peace-oriented ‘way of living’, what is often referred to as a *culture of peace* (see Firer, 2002; Danesh, 2005, 2006, 2011). Although a small number of academics have taken this holistic approach, on the ground NGOs usually take a narrower approach that is consistent with the one outlined here. For example, Peace One Day, an NGO, delivering global peace campaigns notes that its work has:

“instigated actions that promote reconciliation and peace-building through sports, dance, *education*, film, music, art and other areas.” (emphasis mine).<sup>70</sup>

Nevertheless, both peace education and peaceagogy are similar in their scope, i.e. they pertain to both adults and children.

### Form(s) of peace education

Peace education can take numerous forms depending on the institution that will promote/include it, but there always should be a strong focus on historical content. The central objective is education about, but also education for, peace. Therefore, there will not only be access to information about the use, importance, and forms of peace but also specific education that will enable peace as part of a social change, in particular through the teaching of empathy and other conflict-resolution skills (dialogue, communication skills, role-playing etc.). With regards to the various forms that peace education can take in Cyprus I propose the following practices/actions which I categorise depending on whether the educational ‘site’ is formal or informal.

#### *Formal Peace Education Sites*

- **School** (adoption of peace education in the curriculum; changes in textbooks, with particular emphasis on history textbooks)

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<sup>70</sup> Peace One Day’s objective is to promote awareness of 21<sup>st</sup> September as Peace Day, fostering it as a day of intercultural cooperation, but more importantly a chance for UN agencies and other NGOs to offer aid (e.g. vaccinations). According to the UN Department of Safety and Security Peace Day 2008 saw a 70% reduction in violent incidents in Afghanistan. <http://peaceoneday.org/global-campaigns/>

- **Pedagogical Institute<sup>71</sup> (PI)** (train and educate teachers about peace education) **Cypriot language centre** (within the PI but courses open to all citizens; teaching Greek and Turkish)
- **Cyprus University** (state or private and bi-communal; promote peace studies)

#### *Informal Peace Education Sites*

- **Peacebuilding NGOs and UN(FICYC) agencies** (act as peace education platform; organise, promote and support above and other initiatives and coordinate activities within the wider peaceagogy and peacebuilding framework)
- **Family** (inform/educate parents/guardians)
- **Media** (promote/portray peace education in films/documentaries/radio programmes/magazines/websites/blogs/projects)
- **Religion** (promote peace education through publications/workshops/youth camps with an education focus)
- **Museums** (adopt peace discourses and inclusive histories in displays, exhibitions, museum texts and labels, flyers etc.)
- **Cypriot publishing house** (publish joint books (Hadjipavlou, 2002, p.204) and disseminate the age-relevant ones to schools)

The crucial institution of the *state* is one that has far-reaching implications for almost all of the above institutions. There are many ways that the state can enable (just as it can prevent) peace education activities, for example, through project creation and authorisation, policy instigation, moral, political and financial support, and in

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<sup>71</sup> The PI was founded in 1972 and provides in-service training of teachers from all levels and offers continuous professional development programs. It is located within the structure of the Ministry of Education and Culture. <http://www.pi.ac.cy>

particular through the Ministry of Education. The particular nature of the above projects would depend on the political nature of Cyprus as a whole at the time of implementation e.g. status quo division; two-state, bizonal federation; functional federation.

The particular content of peace education, has, as we have already seen in the literature review, been the preoccupation of the vast majority of peace education scholars, and will therefore not be explored in detail here. The following section aims at providing an outline of the peace education content that could potentially materialize in the Cypriot context.

### Content of peace education

Peace education is arguably context-dependent, not least due to its historical focus. However, students (children and adults) of peace education also need to acquire and develop a core set of generic peace education skills (conflict resolution education) that apply across diverse conflicts. These skills need to be matched by appropriate peace education knowledge and attitudes. A strong emphasis on history and memory is a crucial criterion for something to be described as peace education, and also acts as a kind of meta-theoretical level informing and contextualising almost all peace education forms. This is particularly important for Cyprus, not only due to the importance that history and memory (like tradition) are attributed in the Cypriot culture and society, but also due to the prominence as we saw in Chapter One of history and memory in contemporary conflict dynamics.

Peace education *skills* refers to the need to develop communication, mediation, negotiation, respect, role-playing and other conflict-resolution skills. It is also crucial to instill critical thinking, using critical skills, in order to empower and equip the students of peace education to acknowledge the power relations, strategies and ideologies/interests that exist and make them aware of marginalization processes. These need to be supplemented by peace education attitudes, which can be developed firstly in theory, and then in practice through training and workshops.

Peace education *attitudes* refer to:

- (a) acknowledgement of the (right to) existence of the other narrative and an awareness of its implications for the other group's attitudes;
- (b) critical examination of one's own group's narrative as well as contemporary and past actions;
- (c) willingness to reconcile including the development of empathy and forgiveness; (Reconciliation and peace education are not separate processes but closely related aspects of conflict transformation that overlap as well as work in parallel.)
- (d) disposition to engagement in nonviolent activities i.e. peace oriented (Salomon, 2002, p.9).<sup>72</sup>

Finally, peace education *knowledge* refers to the actual information that students will be taught. Changes of textbook curricula, include history, geography, literature and citizenship studies. Citizenship studies can focus on democratic beliefs, tolerance toward multiculturalism. An adoption of what Zembylas refers to as the framework of

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<sup>72</sup> The above attitudes have been adapted with some modifications and additions from Salomon (2002, p.9); he describes these as 'goals' of peace education.



‘agonistic democracy’ in citizenship education, can provide a move away from past state-sanctioned initiatives that appeal to and hence, exaggerate essentialist ethnic identities, towards ‘an understanding of community as a contingent achievement of political action’ (2011, p.54). Building on recent work in citizenship education (for example, Arnot and Dillabough, 2000; Richardson and Blades, 2006) and democratic theorizing (Mouffe, 1999), Zembylas argues that difference and conflict should be accepted as part of a democracy that emphasises plurality and contingency, without instilling the need to dehumanize or exclude the Other (2011, p.63). As he puts it:

An agonistic democracy in citizenship education, then, focuses on the development of a mode of critique that comprehends the risks of reconciliation and the pitfalls of blind patriotism, yet it is also concerned with the constitution of new forms of ‘we’ that recognize *all* past violence and trauma. (Zembylas, 2011, pp.63-4)

Religion and language could be used as reconciliation tools, bridging gaps rather than cementing borders. Specific peace studies can not only raise awareness of the impact of conflict education in both Cyprus and other countries as well as of the current obstacles to peacebuilding, but also instill a desire to understand and promote wider peacebuilding activities.

Peace education, peaceagogy and the school-society nexus

As the forms of peace education presented above indicate, peace education goes beyond youth and children, being part of a wider societal-transformative approach. Neither the children, nor the school exist in a vacuum. Both exist as part of a wider society. In terms of the school system: teachers teach in school, history textbook authors write the textbooks, educationalists decide the wider curriculum, headmasters direct the schools (in Cyprus their leverage varies according to whether the school is private or public and authorized by the Ministry of Education), parents often have a direct say in these schools through parents-teachers associations. Moreover, in terms of students, they do not only receive formal education through the school, but also receive informal education through their personal (family and friends) environment but also wider community/social processes. They are part of a collective, and hence are able to participate in shared understandings of both the present and the past, i.e. through museums, commemorative rituals such as national parades, and other institutions such as religion and both traditional and new media. All these mediums offer educational resources, and the children act as mediators between all these forces, in their attempt to make sense of the world.

As a result, the student is often confronted with conflicting pieces of information, and this is why it is important to offer the peace education framework, thereby ensuring that the lens through which the student filters all this information is one of peace, and not war, of tolerance and reconciliation, and not exclusion. In addition, this framework equips the learner with the necessary critical skills in order to be aware of the exclusionary and biased educational strategies, and caution her/him against ideological propaganda. It alerts to and prevents abuses of civil liberties such as suppression of freedom of speech, or social ostracisation.

Therefore, peace education should acknowledge and encompass the wider education forces/institutions that are embedded in society. This is the only way that peace education will prove conducive to a self-sustaining long-term peace. Influence across is important as students are not impervious to external socio-political influences, and so is power 'over'; if you do not change the attitudes of those responsible for authorizing, accepting and implementing peace education (e.g. politicians, teachers, parents) you will not have a change of education policy and practice in the first place (Harris and Morrison, 2003; Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009).

### 3.2.2. Empirical Analysis: What form *does* peace education take?

Surveying the existing forms of peace education in Cyprus, by adopting the definitions offered in the previous section, presents a very gloomy picture indeed. On the formal level, not much has changed. This has come as a disappointing surprise to peace educators in Cyprus who hoped that the left-wing party AKEL- which was in power until February 2013- would use its pro-rapprochement ideology to promote an educational emphasis on shared 'Cypriotness' rather than the dominant 'Hellenocentric' norm. A limited initiative began in August 2008 when the new Minister of Education and Culture, Andreas Demetriou, issued a circular document setting the 'fostering [of] a culture of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and cooperation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots' as the primary educational objective of the school year 2008-9 (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2008, p.1). The circular (analysed in the next chapter) was unprecedented in its

nature, and in fact proposed initiatives that fall in the peace education paradigm proposed here (e.g. changes to the history curriculum). However, it was not unproblematic, as the document itself reiterated, and hence, reinforced ethnic identities, a result of its attempts to appease the ethnonationalist forces (Zembylas, 2011, pp.56-7). More importantly, fierce hostility and public contestation ensued, with the primary school teachers' union even refuse asking its members to defy the education targets set by the Ministry's, and unsurprisingly, most initiatives were not materialized, including visits between schools of each side (ECRI, 2011, parag. 66)

Since the RoC (state) has not initiated any form of formal peace education, what is left to examine is the contribution of civil society to informal peace education initiatives. Most civil society initiatives stem not from faith-based organisations, professional or business associations, but from peacebuilding NGOs and women's organisations. These might not involve all the forms or content of the definition I outlined above, but they nevertheless reflect the status quo of peace education in Cyprus. Moreover, it is important to note the following paradox: in 2013, ten years after the border restrictions were lifted in April 2003, it seems that the peacebuilding and specifically peace education activities led by NGOs have lost the momentum they had before, which as will be argued in the next chapter, exposes the importance of meaningful and not just casual contact with the 'other' in order to achieve an improvement of intergroup relations. Of course the disappointment from the failure of the Annan Plan, and the entrance of divided Cyprus into the EU can partly account for the loss of this morale and momentum. Although there have been occasions where heads of schools have given their consent for peace educators to organise peace education workshops for students in their schools, these have been very limited and

an initiative of NGOs rather than of the schools (Interview with Maria Hadjipavlou, Cypriot academic, peace educator and long-standing peace activist, February, 2014).

#### Brief overview of existing informal peace education initiatives

A more in-depth analysis of the NGOs involved with peace education work (AHDR and POST-RI) will be undertaken in Chapter Four. A review of the current situation in Cyprus reveals certain concrete examples of attempts to implement peace education, but these initiatives are still at an embryonic stage. Where there has definitely been an upsurge is in bi-communal conferences, involving usually academics from the disciplines of political science, sociology, education and history. Increased peace education activity has also taken place under the auspices of EUROCLIO, whose main aim is to promote intercultural dialogue concerning history education, and for the past two years it has been very active in organising conferences and workshops in Cyprus.<sup>73</sup> EUROCLIO's aims through teacher training and material to promote 'critical thinking, multi-perspectivity, mutual respect, and the inclusion of controversial issues' in history education and is therefore in line with the goals of peace education- although it does not explicitly state its work as such.<sup>74</sup>

Many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have brought Turkish- and Greek-Cypriots together in an attempt to improve their relations. These include the Cyprus Friendship Programme; Institute of Historical Research for Peace; Youth Encounters for Peace; Youth Promoting Peace, Free our Children (Human Rights Youth Group); The Bureau of Bicomunal Reconciliation and Strengthening of Civil Societies in Cyprus, KAYAD Toplum Merkezi, (Demosthenous, 2006, p.60), Peace Players, as

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<sup>73</sup> <http://ac2009.euroclio.eu/joomla/index.php>

<sup>74</sup> <http://www.euroclio.eu/new/index.php/about/association-mission-a-aims>

well as Hands Across the Divide. In addition, despite the fact that leaders of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus have often exacerbated the ethno-religious divide (given the influential role the Church has on both the people and the state), the pro-reconciliation Bishop of Kikkou Nikiforos has directed several youth encounters. He has also initiated the establishment of the World Forum of Religions and Cultures in 2001, an NGO which promotes reconciliation among the youth (Demosthenous, 2006, p.61). The theoretical basis is often the religious duty of the Church to follow the New Testament which promotes peace and tolerance; according to the Gospel of St Mathew (5:9) for example, ‘blessed are those who are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God’ (cited in Demosthenous, 2006, pp.59-60).

Also, since 1996, the School for International Training (SIT) in Vermont has organised peacebuilding youth camps for Greek- and Turkish- Cypriot youths of ages 15-17, and until now more than 500 teenagers have participated (Ungerleider, 2006, p.140). The aim is to reconstruct positive relationships in a neutral setting (Vermont). Indeed these camps are well-planned and allow for the exchange of useful information between the participants, especially as concerning the history of each side and in highlighting similarities between the two communities (personal experience). It also engages youths in trust-building activities usually through projects which require cooperation. As the contact hypothesis denotes, interaction between these individuals allows them to work towards a common goal, but also helps reverse de-humanisation processes which may have been taking place, contributing to the reduction of prejudice. Yet, the limitation with these bi-communal initiatives is that they offer change at a personal level (and this is quite limited to a few hundred individuals) but not at the structural level: there is no indigenous formally structured institution to

allow this to have an impact across the society. As a result, when these activities end, teenagers come back to the reality of Cyprus, and although the camp has changed their perceptions, the lack of peace education at a more structural level effectively means “putting” their experience in “quarantine”.

In certain schools in the RoC school counsellors have been introduced with the aim of providing ‘education in peaceful conflict resolution and mediation’ (CYMEDA, 2007). However this initiative has not been government-led, thus there are only limited schools which have these conflict-resolution classes. Whether their aim is to reduce violence in schools or to contribute to peacebuilding activities concerning the Cyprus conflict, or both, is unclear .

### 3.2.3. The failure of peace education in Cyprus? Moving beyond the cyclical impasse

It is difficult to speak of the ‘failure’ of peace education in Cyprus, as that would suggest that it was implemented, but not successful in its efforts. As the above section shows, however, peace education has never been implemented in the first place, at least not on a formal basis. That the initiatives been limited and decentralised, without a formal state approach, essentially means that outside these NGO activities –whose participants are more likely to be peace ‘converted’ and interested in peace education in the first place- the wider educational activities, both within and outside the school exist within the hegemonic conflict ethos. For example, the history curriculum and teaching is practiced within the existing ‘us the victims’ versus ‘them, the perpetrators’ binary. Going back to my definition of what peace education could look like, currently none of the formal, and only one of the informal sites of peace education is at work, and this with very limited success (see Chapter Four). Given my

position that peace education should be assessed from the perspective of how effective it is in promoting reconciliation and positive peace between communities, then regardless of whether one argues that peace education in Cyprus currently exists or not, then the weight falls predominantly on the negative side.

The school- as formal education- is a powerful institution, which can, despite external influences, transform children's informal education into something more conducive to peace. Students often spend more than half of their daytime at school and it is not just the educational experience through the teachers, but also the powerful tool of textual resources i.e. history textbooks (for a discussion of why history textbooks are so important see Chapter Four). I contend that it is much harder to transform deeply entrenched existing attitudes of adults, that have been living a particular way of life, driven by a particular conflict outlook for decades. This collectively held conflict narrative and ethos is not only deeply entrenched but the very core of their political and psychological essence is the delegitimization of the other's position and narrative (Salomon, 2002, p.8). Nevertheless, transforming these attitudes is by no means impossible-there will always be educational openings, ruptures or opportunities- and if one chooses to focus on an individual level, this transformation depends on a variety of aspects such as character traits, extent of critical thinking, experiences-including contact with the 'other', political affiliations, religious beliefs, type of profession and of course their own previous education. It is however, harder to achieve such change, as this would require the painful realization that past beliefs and attitudes were either based on false or at least biased information, or were simply wrong. This, arguably can take place through more radical ruptures in identity, especially through times of personal or social crisis (including financial), where there



is some form of ‘shock’ involved and it is by no means impossible. Although the focus of this study is on the macro- and not the micro-level, nevertheless, the sheer possibility of change forms part of the basic premise on which peace education is built on.

Indeed, the obstacles peace education faces have to do primarily with these adult attitudes and perspectives, as these are the people who have the ability to vote, and exert discursive power and pressure more directly through various institutions and educational policies (see Chapter Four). It is these adult attitudes that have the power to affect whether peace education will be implemented or not and we fall again in the vicious cycle.

Hence, the school institution can only have this transformative impact *if* peace education is implemented in the first place. Nevertheless, even if there are external negative influences towards peace education initially, if there are even limited but powerful and organized groups in society that successfully promote peace education, its prospects of success in the long-term are considerably high. Crucial to being able to ‘win over’ those people who occupy the middle ground, and go beyond the already converted group of people i.e. those who already are passive or active supporters of peacebuilding processes, is to be able to *understand* them better, and this is what is an underlying focus of this thesis. This does not necessarily mean to ‘speak their language’ or to endorse their own discourses- in fact this is a criticism I put forward when discussing civil society initiatives later on and caution against- but instead to reduce the gap and the misunderstandings by trying to reduce anxiety, fear, distortions and exaggerations of the imagination associated with the conflictive ethos, by

identifying, exposing, and reversing these elements. This approach moreover, will enable peace educationalists to cast a critical view on their own assumptions and tactics and see where *they* can change so as to move closer to the materialization of peace education. This line of peace education does not necessarily involve the same dynamics of peace education attitudinal change that will take place at the school level; it involves a more discursive change, aimed less at changing deeply entrenched beliefs but on opening up spaces for alternative dialogues and negotiating the institutional policies that will bring about peace education policies.

### **3.3. Towards a conceptual/analytical framework**

The conceptual model I develop in this section is an attempt to circumvent the cyclical trap of peace education (see Introduction and Chapter Two) by borrowing from, and building on, insights and concepts from political science. I define the political not as the narrow ‘arena of government’ but as the ‘practice or exercise of power’ (see Hay, 2002, p.169). Through the ‘politics of peace education’ model, I argue for a *re-conceptualisation* of peace education, one that views peace education in conjunction with power relations infused within and between educational structures. The politics of peace education here can be seen as being played out in the following overlapping continua:

- a) institutional power over peace education policies and practices
- b) discursive power within and through specific interpretations of peace education

These forms of power are not merely descriptions of the nature of power, but will be used to show how power is exercised and distributed in relation to peace education in Cyprus. On the one hand, a focus on institutions- their historical origins and contemporary processes-will help illuminate the particular conditions that allow negative articulations and policies of education to occupy a hegemonic space in society. On the other hand, an exposition of the specific discursive strategies taking place through these articulations will shed light on the exclusionary securitization practices that are taking place. The latter power of discourse represents a core political struggle, over an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1956; Connolly, 1983), between different meanings and hence ways of constructing reality, where as the former form of power emphasises the struggle between institutions over policies of peace education.

The ontological position adopted here is that institutions have the power to affect specific discourses, as well as affect policies through discourses, just as discourses can affect institutional policies and practices. This position does not entail a distinct categorization between institutions and discourse, as institutions are themselves discursively constructed. Indeed as Yanow points out, the policy process is ‘a struggle for the determination of meanings’ (1996, p.19). However, the fact that institutions do not exist outside discourse, but are given meaning through discursive practices (linguistic and non-linguistic) does not preclude the possibility of institutions affecting *other* discourses, or vice versa. Nor does the presupposition that objects and subjects acquire meaning only through discourse deny or exclude their material existence. As Laclau and Mouffe attest:

“The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has *nothing to do* with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God' depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence” (2001, p.108).

Although I do not view institutions as prior to political action, but as politically constructed themselves, it is worth noting here that institutions have been underemphasized by post-structuralism (see Leggett, 2013, p.311). A focus on the institutional terrain upon which political identities are formed can offer a ‘thicker sense of how social and cultural forms of association are a source of identity’ (Leggett, 2013, p.311).

#### a) Institutional Power

A focus on social, political and educational institutions in Cyprus will not only provide a ‘map of the subject’ (Rhodes, 1995, p.49) of peace education, but also help reveal the ‘stable, recurring pattern[s] of behaviour’ (Goodin, 1996, p.22)<sup>75</sup> that are continually reproduced. In other words, institutional power analysis can enable us to explain how institutions exert their ongoing influence, but also why certain education-

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<sup>75</sup> Goodin borrows this concept from Huntington 1968, p.12

related institutions persist over time- what I refer to as *educational inertia*. This is not to say that institutions remain static over time; indeed, institutions undergo limited discursive changes, but without these necessarily equating to a full-power transformation. Showing how power relations are institutionalised can improve our understanding of why institutional resistance prevails, or why institutional change does not bring the results expected by peace educationalists.

I take a ‘differentiated’ conception of institutions: firstly, they are never fully ‘closed’ (March and Olsen 1989) and secondly, they ‘embody, preserve and impart differential power resources with respect to different individuals and groups’ (Goodin, 1996, p.20). Since institutions mirror patterns of power asymmetry that exist in society (see Lowndes, 2002), they can be utilized to elucidate power struggles over policy, values and meanings in conflict-regions. Institutions are products of norms and values, and hence to some extent are a reflection of them, but they also have the power to ‘produce’. They can therefore affect political outcomes, in terms of change or continuity, by the power they have over the potential actions/practices/possibilities of other actors or institutions through their context-shaping power.<sup>76</sup> As Lowndes puts it: ‘Institutions embody power relations by privileging certain courses of action over others and by including certain actors and excluding others’ (2002, p.100). This is not to argue for a reductionist approach that determines particular effects, but rather for a Gramscian approach that emphasises the influence of these constraints on ‘the horizon of possibilities’ available (Hall, 1996b, p.422).

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<sup>76</sup> This is not identical to Hay’s concept of power as ‘context-shaping’ and ‘conduct-shaping’ (2002, pp.185-87) as I see this dichotomy between direct, visible (actor-based) action and indirect, invisible (structure-based) action/inaction as artificial and potentially misleading.

As the next chapter, which focuses on the educational struggle on an institutional level will show, in the case of Cyprus hegemonic institutions privilege the continuation of nationalist education policies and practices. These practices exclude marginalized institutions/actors from occupying hegemonic space within their institutions, and by extension (due to their power) across society. The resulting continuity is one of conformity and variations often occur so as to ensure continuity i.e. the same things are reproduced in a different way. As we shall see changes in relation to nationalist education were in the majority of cases responses and adaptations to ensure continuity rather than intentional deviations from the status quo design.

Historical institutionalism (see Pierson, 1996) in particular, can shed light on how particular institutional decisions made in the past partly determine the boundaries, limits and at times the direction of education policy. Institutions, just like peace education, are context-dependent, and particularly in the case of Cyprus, they are deeply embedded in the conflictive ethos that characterizes the island. The conflict context is inextricably linked with history (of the conflict) hence, producing what Krasner has termed 'path-dependent' policy-making (1984). Notwithstanding criticisms of path-dependency as prescribing causation in the positivist sense, historical institutionalism is used here to emphasise the inevitable impact that both the past and perceptions of the past has had on contemporary policies and discourses, but also to help explain- and hence understand-the persistence of certain institutional dynamics (e.g. the strong influence of the church over education). Moreover, historical emphasis can help explain the relative power asymmetry between, and not just within institutions i.e. between peacebuilding NGOs and the Church in Cyprus.

Historical institutionalism is used here not in the sense that past choices determine future policy, but in the sense that these past choices provide the context, a thread of continuity, that links current beliefs, and current perceptions of the past, with those past choices, thereby delimiting the capacity of actors to act as if these institutions were created from scratch, or as *tabula rasa*. This is especially true for institutions in Cyprus with a long or powerful history. Historical institutions therefore- just as historical discourses- have the capacity to configure, albeit partly, current meanings and policies. This is not to imply that there exist essentially immutable institutional structures (as structuralists do) but that these structures themselves are products of history, and hence, subject to change.

Institutions are able to affect political outcomes in an unpredictable but highly contingent and yet path-dependent way. Pierson (2000) adds to the concept of path-dependency, which he argues is a social process, the dynamic of ‘increasing returns’. ‘Increasing returns’ can be described as self-reinforcing, or processes which bring positive results (Pierson, 2000, p.251). Indeed, the path-dependence argument, a basic concept for historical institutionalism, points out the high costs of disturbing the status quo, and durable institutions are partly a reflection of the political cost of changing them (Rhodes, Binder and Rockman, 2006, p.xv). Rhodes et al claim that ‘if institutions are about preservation, politics is about manipulation’, so institutions can be used by political leaders to overthrow constraints and to affect political outcomes according to their own interests (2006, p.xv). Although historical conditions do not inhibit large-scale change of institutions, they can help explain their continuity. Historical conditions can enhance the probability of a reoccurrence of a particular

political event in the future (Skocpol and Pierson, 2002, pp.665-6) but they do not determine it, as there is the need for a reproduction process in order for continuity to prevail. Institutions are sites of ‘political battles’; ‘rather than being neutral boxes in which political fights take place, institutions actually structure the political struggle itself’ (Steinmo, 2001, p.2).

Institutional norms and rules determine what constitutes proper or ‘appropriate’ behaviour (March and Olsen, 1984) and as such give us an indication of the potential sanctions alternative voices might be faced with in the event of non-compliance (Knight 1992). Since peace education is an essentially contested topic, then any description of it constitutes a participation in the discursive struggle to achieve a fixation of meaning i.e. a struggle over *discursive power*. This struggle is often played out in institutional contexts such as the school, the media, family, whereby these constitute ‘arenas for contending social forces’ (March and Olsen, 1984, p.738) and hence, a struggle over *institutional power*.

Still, institutions are not autonomous structures, but are discursively constituted by political agents. According to Lowndes institutions may supposedly change or evolve when ‘actors seek to make sense of new or ambiguous situations, ignore or even contravene existing rules’ and that this can happen in unpredictable ways (2002, p.100). How is it then, that actors in Cyprus have been very poor at producing this kind of progressive pattern in educational institutions? This can be explained by the constraining impact that institutions have on actors. Actors impose meaning on discourses but they are only able to do so within the discursive context they are a part of, and hence, do not act as autonomous subjects (see discussion on Foucault below).



This interdependency is an exercise of power relations. Institutions and discourses become the sites of struggle, where conflict over educational hegemony is played out. This discursive conflict involves competition over both the discourses of education and education policy. I use these analytical constructs (in my empirical chapters) to expose the institutional frameworks, and discursive strategies/processes in Cyprus, that produce and are productive of a hegemonic status quo that prevents peace education from becoming a policy reality. Even if matters of consistency (continuity) and extent (dominance) are put aside, an emphasis on linguistically embedded norms reflects ‘the importance in politics of the discursive conditions under which norms arise’ (Buckler, 2002, p.192).

Moreover, if we accept that institutions are ensembles of discursive elements in motion, then it is crucial to understand what drives (and hence, what can disrupt) the ongoing process of discursive reproduction necessary to sustain these processes over time- the actual ‘process of institutionalisation’ (Lowndes, 1996; Lowndes, 2002) *and* the particular -current and historical- conditions of institutionalisation. It is important to remember that it is not history *per se* that determines the current situation, but how history is constructed, used and abused, within present discourse.

Marsh and Rhodes have argued that institutional stability depends on a process of ‘coalition-building’ and consensus among actors (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, p. 196). This consensus is indeed what is largely responsible for driving the process of institutionalisation, and hence, can help explain the persistence of certain institutional arrangements. As we shall see, this is what Gramsci has called ‘common sense’, in other words, the collective knowledge, the values, norms and beliefs that glue society

together and ensure certain stability. However as Marsh and Rhodes note, actors reach consensus through ‘a continuing process of re-negotiation’ (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, p.196).

Peace education is inextricably entangled with educational structures. Therefore it becomes pertinent to investigate the role and power of institutions to affect loyalties through discourses over peace education. Institutions are the product of societal values, but are also productive of them, both being contested and unfixed. The inclusion or exclusion of different education discourses or actors, and the acceptance or rejection of particular education policies, is a reflection of a particular educational ‘governmentality’ (see later section on Foucault) that is not value free but embedded in political values that the institution itself sustains. (see also Pierre, 1999, p.384, p.390)

#### b) Discursive Power

Institutions are discursively constructed, and of particular interest in this study are the specific discourses these institutions exhibit in relation to peace education. I use Hajer’s definition of discourse as ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed into a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities’ (Hajer 1995, p.44). I conceive of ‘peace education discourse’ as an ensemble of intersubjective meanings (see footnote 77) embedded in institutions and practices that actors impose (hence, a force/form of power) on peace education. The various

attempts to articulate peace education in Cyprus are crucial not in their linguistic descriptive sense, but in that these practices form part of the construction of peace education itself as a process of meaning-making with political impacts across society. This discursive power -a political force- has the capacity to affect, enhance, constrain or accelerate policy and political outcomes with regards to education in Cyprus.

I therefore employ a discourse analysis, in an attempt to enhance current understandings of the political processes in relation to education, in the context of the Cyprus conflict. Discourse is of course not simply reducible to linguistic means, and can take the form of non-linguistic means such as signs, symbols, body language, art, etc. but since the struggle over peace education-and indeed its 'securitisation' (Waever 1995; Buzan et al. 1998) is primarily played out using language, I will restrict myself to this form of discourse. Although language can be used to express meaning, this does not necessarily mean that which is spoken is always what an individual means. Still, the meanings that emerge from such 'speech acts' (language/discourse as action) are important in that they do not exist in a vacuum, but reflect wider societal discourses (see discussion on Foucault below).

As Hansen argues, language is 'ontologically significant' and the medium through which all 'things' 'are given meaning and endowed with a particular identity' (2006, p.18). To understand language as a site where particular subjective articulations and identities are produced and reproduced, while others are excluded, is to unveil its political -and hence contestable- nature (Hansen, 2006, pp.18-9). The language employed by policymakers does not merely reflect but 'actively produces' policy issues (Weldes, 1998, p.217). More specifically, exposing the partial fixation of

meaning in the hegemonic articulation of peace education and its proponents (internal Other) in a negative light and as a threat to the survival of the Greek Cypriots (Self), shows how this ‘fixation’ has served to legitimize and institutionalise exclusionary policies with regards to the counter-hegemonic Other. In other words, apart from the external Other as the Turk, or Turkish-Cypriot, the struggle over meaning takes place in a discursive site that projects a divided image of the self, an intra-communal debate, where the Self becomes divided into those who support, and those who resist peace education.

Deconstructing this meaning-making process will allow us to focus on discursive power, which although exclusionary is not inevitably negative or repressive, when it *is* so, it blurs the borders between coercive/non-coercive, and between (non-physical) violent/consensual means. On the one hand, the ‘intersubjective meanings’<sup>77</sup> attached to the Self, have become an almost unifying element in a conflict-environment where contested topics are hotly debated and the sources of division. In other words, as will be shown in the empirical chapters, even when actors would ordinarily diverge on positions regarding the Cyprus conflict, the nationalist exposition of education seems to enjoy relative consensus- enough to allow it to become hegemonic. On the other hand, when one is ‘forced’ to follow a particular path, because there is no other alternative, or because the sanctions of doing so are ultimately too high, then we can arguably no longer speak of pure consensus within this power relation. As Chapter Five will reveal, the consensus of the hegemonic order is highly problematic as it is

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<sup>77</sup>Intersubjective meanings ‘supplement individual subjective meanings by furnishing them with their conditions of possibility, which means...[they] need not be consciously held as beliefs or opinions’ but being embedded in institutions and practices, they ‘provide the ‘raw materials’ or the ‘background content’ through which these ideas are articulated and given meaning (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.58).

both consensual but also coercive, as many voices are silenced, while other practices simply become impossible in the particular hegemonic environment.

### 3.3.1. Theoretical insights from Michel Foucault: power, discourse and governmentality

In order to delineate the politics of peace education, and the power of discourse and institutions, I draw on particular theoretical insights from post-structural discourse theory that supposes a ‘critical’ constructivist ontology (reality is dependent upon our constructions of it). The aim of the following section is to briefly review the theoretical tools that I will be employing in my empirical analysis. The two theorists I primarily draw on are Foucault and Gramsci<sup>78</sup>. I am not trying to amalgamate these two theorists’ perspectives or to dismiss their differences, but rather to use their theoretical tools in a complementary manner to provoke questions and provide answers and new insights that might not otherwise occur- this is after all, arguably the primary aim of theoretical frameworks.

Foucault’s anti-foundationalist approach rejects the possibility of reaching an ‘objective’ truth about a world which is external to us. For him, language is not neutral, and humanity is not inherently or linearly progressive. In contrast, Foucault argues that ‘language is crucial because institutions and actions only acquire a meaning through language’ (Marsh and Furlong, 2002, p.29). Discourses therefore, are relatively autonomous, lacking a clear sense of origin, or pre-existing subject.

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<sup>78</sup> I do this while borrowing from their academic ‘successors’, like Butler’s neo-Foucauldian, and Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Gramscian/post-Marxist, approach.

Discursive practices can only be understood as part of the frameworks of meaning that make them possible (see Bevir and Rhodes, 2002). *Add references from poststructuralist folder* Thus, we can only reach a proper understanding of an individual belief/discourse if we locate it and interpret it within the wider social discourse of which it is a part. Identifying these two main opposing discourses of peace education and the role they play in structuring meaning and practice, is a key task of the Foucauldian approach applied (see Chapter Five for the empirical analysis).

Foucault's conceptualisation of power is useful especially for the discursive face of power. Discourse organizes identity and identity organizes discourse. Hence, discourse analysis exposes the particular relations of power that are enacted and reproduced when meaning is fixed and subject identities are positioned in certain ways while others become unimaginable. By its nature then, discourse analysis entails a rejection of the inevitability of certain systems of representation, which not only opens up the possibility of change, but the interrogation of the existing systems of power and practice. Power conceptualised in Foucauldian terms does not exist in a particular location, but rather 'functions in the form of a chain....exercised through a net-like organisation' (1976, p.98). Every power relation is understood not merely as an effect on the political field of which it is a part of, but also as its *condition of possibility*.

In *Power/Knowledge* ([1972-1977] 1980) and *Discipline and Punish* ([1977] 1991) Foucault emphasises the importance of the relationship between power and knowledge. The following quote summarises the 'power-knowledge relations':

‘power and knowledge directly imply one another;...there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations’ ([1977] 1991, p.27)

Knowledge, what we can know, is the cornerstone of education, hence, understanding access to and dynamics of this knowledge is crucial to operationalising peace education, but most importantly to understanding how power relations have excluded particular fields of (peace) knowledge. Education is a matrix of institutions and knowledge, therefore power also produces education, and there is no education ‘that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations’ (see quote above). The field of discourse draws from a form of knowledge. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the power/knowledge relationship, and its implication for the power/discourse nexus. Similarly, particular authoritative texts establish certain forms of knowledge as appropriate and acceptable and how this acceptable knowledge is constructed as such is an important empirical question (Hansen, 2006, p.8). Power/knowledge practices ‘determine who counts as an expert’ on a particular policy issue and therefore whose voice ‘is heard and valued’, while at the same time this exact legitimation reproduces power relations (Weldes, 1998, p.221). At the same time, the legitimacy accorded to such representations reproduces the power of the state (see below). As Weldes puts it: certain discourses ‘are more powerful than others because they are articulated to, and partake of, institutional power and, in turn, reproduce that power’ (1998, p.221).

Crucially, it is not the practices of the subject of knowledge that ‘produces a corpus of knowledge’ resistant or supportive to power, but ‘*power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.*’ ([1977] 1991, p.28, emphasis added). Power/Knowledge affect identity constructions, even more so when it is with regards to education-which is inextricably linked to knowledge. What is included and excluded through discursive practice, helps to highlight the productive power of discourse in relation to collective identities, and what I refer to as ‘educational identity’<sup>79</sup> (See Chapter Four). It is only through an engagement with the discursive practices that constitute these educational identities as well as with their discursive institutionalisation, that we are able to explain how and why (how it is possible) for them to be produced. This approach, based on Roxanne Doty’s work can allow us to determine the ‘disciplining, repetitive and widely disseminated practices’ (1997, p.387) that constitute and are constitutive of these identities. Taking a poststructuralist position, I treat identity as both constitutive of and a product of education discourse and education policy, and investigate how these identities and practices/policies that resist peace education are articulated.

However, a Foucauldian analytical tool that best captures the institution-discourse power nexus is perhaps the concept of ‘governmentality’. The helpfulness of this concept will be empirically illustrated in Chapter Four and Five, but it is important to explain the theoretical usages here. The usefulness of Foucault’s concept of

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<sup>79</sup> As we shall see in the empirical chapters, these educational identities are constructed as subsets of national identities, in such a way, so that the one who is not adhering or aspiring to the positions of the nationalist camp i.e not *identifying* themselves with the particular ‘common sense’ (see discussion on Gramsci), is excluded from the national identity of the Greek-Cypriot, as a reciprocation, as a punishment, but also as a deterrence tool- a tool to prevent and to punish any deviation.



‘governmentality’ lies on two interrelated levels. Firstly, it allows us to extricate the ‘specificity’ on what it means to ‘govern’ (in this case the educational system) (Foucault, 2004, p. 119)<sup>80</sup>. In particular, it allows us to ascertain the mechanics, the discursive strategies, the institutional apparatus in operation. Secondly, it helps us uncover the type(s) of power effected through these channels of governance, pointing to its multi-dimensional nature that go beyond top-down, state-centric levels of analysis that have prevailed in the existing literature (see Chapter Two). In other words, it allows us to go beyond governance.

Although traditionally governance was associated with the exercise of power of the government, since the 1980s political scientists have been using it to refer to institutions and actors beyond the realm of the state, to include civil society. (Kjaer, 2004, p.1). Governance can be defined as the management of formal and informal political rules. It ‘refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules’ (Hyden, 1999, p.185). Therefore it covers not only which values are allocated, but also how they are institutionalised<sup>81</sup>. According to Kjaer, all governance definitions focus on the importance of networks which are united by the pursuit of a common objective (2004, pp 3-4). However, such a focus on networks may misleadingly underestimate the consensus with regards to a particular goal- if there is such an agreed goal. Not all cases of governance are ones of state-society synergy, and nor is power shared symmetrically across institutions or actors. As Kjaer admits, attention to networks in governance theory tends to be accompanied by an under-emphasis on power, interests

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<sup>80</sup> Translated by Clare O’ Farrell, 2005: <http://www.michel-foucault.com/quote/2005q.html>

<sup>81</sup> Kjaer argues that governance theories have grown out of a focus on institutions and institutional change. She refers to governance using an ‘institutional definition’: ‘the setting of rules, the application of rules, and the enforcement of rules’ and argues that the focus is on the setting of rules as this implies a change of institutional set-up (2004, p.7, p.10, p.195)

and exclusionary tactics (2004, pp.204-5). Besides, this asymmetry in network management, is why certain values are able to dominate over others, an issue which gains further importance in conflict settings where the danger and potential cost of letting certain interests dominate policy-making are relatively acute. This is why, in the case of Cyprus, governance is useful for pointing out the formal and informal political rules with regards to the governance of education, highlighting the state-society synergy over the policy toward (or rather against) peace education.

However, the concept proves less useful a) when it comes to explaining why this particular governance pattern prevails, b) when there is actually tension either between the state-society divide, or between certain elements of it (e.g. when certain elements of society agree and other disagree with the state policy) and c) when exposing the implications of vertical networks which reinforce cleavages and asymmetries through exclusion. Arguably, the concept of ‘governmentality’, put forward by Foucault, can better explain how it is possible that certain ‘mentalities’ ‘govern’ over others, especially in highly contested matters and with due emphasis on issues of power in policy-making and policy-preventing.

Where I do slightly diverge from Foucault’s position is on the matter of history. I perceive history not only as important to understanding the conflict itself, but more crucially as a vital ‘discursive construction of temporal identity’ (Hansen, 2006, p.xx) Foucault rejects the importance of ‘origins’, the forces of history that enable one to better understand a discourse. He ‘replaces’ history with the concept of ‘genealogy’, emphasising that when guided by genealogy the purpose of history becomes the ‘systematic dissociation of identity’ rather than a commitment to discovering ‘the

roots of our identity' (Foucault, 1984 [1971] pp.94-5). However, identity, is a crucial aspect in relation to history, memory, collective nationalist understandings, and power, especially in conflict-settings. Although as mentioned in Chapter One, I also subscribe to the dangers of claiming possession of a 'historical truth', rejecting the importance of origins and their role in discourses prevents us from acknowledging the power of discourse to transcend time and generations.

Furthermore, Foucault seems to conflate normative positions with empirical understandings. In his defence of the concept of 'genealogy' he claims that:

'If genealogy in its own right gives rise to questions concerning our native land, native language, or the laws that govern us, its *intention* is to reveal the heterogeneous systems which, masked by the self, inhibit the formation of any form of identity' (1984, [1971], p.95, emphasis added).

Yet to speak of intentions, and normative outcomes or possibilities, is quite different from using history to 'reveal' those systems that prescribe the formation of identity. Moreover, Foucault defends his position by arguing that 'the subject is a contingent product of a particular discourse' (1982, cited in Bevir and Rhodes, 2002, p.139). However, what this approach fails to recognise is the inclusion in a particular discourse of a given era, of historical memories, and historical discourses. This does not justify an approach of using the present to understand the past, but rather using current dominant understandings of the past to understand their role in present discourses (this is different but not incompatible to using the past to understand the present). As we have seen in Chapter One, dominant understandings of collective

memory have an important role in contemporary articulations and understandings of the Self, the Other, and of education policies in the context of the Cyprus conflict and its history.

### 3.3.2 Theoretical insights from Antonio Gramsci

By presenting a poststructuralist critique of dominant negative understandings of peace education, I aim to examine the discursive construction of educational practice that ensures the marginalization of positive peace education discourse, initiatives, and institutions. Consequently, to understand peace education, within a post-structuralist approach, necessitates not only a study of the concept itself, but of the systems of power/knowledge that produce its construction. As we shall see in the empirical chapters, these include discourses and institutions which operate in a particular historical and cultural context, hence being subject to cultural biases, stereotyping and (mis)understandings.

Gramsci's emphasis on the importance of culture and history therefore, enables a better understanding of institutional power. A focus on institutions; the historical power relationships that were responsible for their production; as well as the relative institutional inertia on matters of education in the context of conflict-resolution; can better be examined through a Gramscian lens. In my theoretical and empirical analysis I draw on Gramsci's concepts, not as a strait-jacket, but as a framework that allows me to explore and deploy this expanded notion of politics.<sup>82</sup> While

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<sup>82</sup> Besides, it is commonly acknowledged that one of Gramsci's work most attractive characteristics is his fertilization of the readers' imagination and his 'tentative, undogmatic approach' (Simon, 1991, p.20). This is also a reflection of the way Gramsci himself used Marx's ideas- not as a framework that constrained his thoughts but which liberated them (see Hall, 1991, p.8)

highlighting the uses of Gramscian thought for peace education research, my approach will also point to certain limitations, especially when applied in a contemporary context, and specifically with regard to the struggle over peace education (e.g. the dominant-subordinate class distinction, see Chapter Four).

Another feature of Gramsci's work in contrast to Foucault, is its seemingly more optimistic and action-based character. Gramsci developed his thesis as 'a tool for understanding society in order to change it' (Simon, 1991, p.23) and this is precisely how I use it in my work. Gramsci's starting point was the failed proletarian uprisings of 1917 and 1920 in Italy, after which he concluded that radical change needed more specific forms of analysis, strategy and of diagnosing 'what went wrong'. The resulting letters, articles and notebooks, before and during his imprisonment offer us 'an expanded conception of 'politics'- the rhythms, forms, antagonisms, transformations' (Hall, 1991, p.8) which explains not only his academic prominence in political science research, but also why his advancing of concepts such as 'war of position'; 'historical bloc'; 'national-popular'; 'common sense' etc. have been flexibly adapted to so many wide topics of investigation, without losing their intellectual and conceptual rigour.

More importantly, his concept of 'hegemony' has allowed a reconceptualization of the notion of power, offering us a 'pluri-centred conception' that exposes 'its molecular operations', 'its investment on many different sites', its 'complex 'conditions of existence' in modern societies' (Hall, 1991, p.9). Hegemony<sup>83</sup>, is used to explain how social relations in modern capitalist society can achieve a dominant

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<sup>83</sup> It is perhaps clear by now that I am not endorsing a neorealist definition of hegemony that emphasises regional powers who enforce their hegemony through military or economic capabilities (see Gilpin, 1981; Keohane 1984).

status through consensus rather than coercion (unlike discursive power which blurs this distinction). The emphasis is on moral, ideological, cultural and intellectual dimensions of power which aptly fits with a discursive approach. Gramsci argued that hegemony is exercised in civil society by:

‘persuading the subordinate classes to accept the *values and ideas* which the dominant class has itself adopted, and by building a *network of alliances* based on these values’ (Simon, 1991, p.18, emphasis added).

In the earlier discussion of institutions, I emphasised the importance of the reproduction of norms, values and everyday practices and understandings. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can offer further analytical power to this process through his notions of consensus and ‘common sense’. I view this ‘common sense’ as sets of discourses composed of collective memories and collective knowledge. The capacity, the means and the power to shape perspectives and attitudes of the masses lies at the core of the Gramscian conception of hegemony. I argue therefore, that introducing *educational hegemony* as a concept allows us to focus on the specific educational attempts to achieve hegemony in Cyprus i.e. to persuade the masses (public) with regards to which education they should support (nationalist/peace) and more specifically which history textbooks to regard as acceptable. Educational hegemony allows us to ascertain and address what the dominant ‘common sense’ involves and through which institutions it is sustained, with regards to these education issues and to the specific peace education efforts vis-à-vis the Cyprus conflict.

Through a Gramscian lens educational hegemony allows us to investigate the interplay between ‘authority, leadership, domination and the ‘education of consent’ (Hall, 1991, p.9) by distinguishing between hegemony and domination. Whereas hegemony is a relation ‘of consent by means of political and ideological leadership’ (Simon, 1991, p.22) domination is an actor-centred use of force. Unlike Marxist emphasis on ideology, hegemony is a more useful critical concept as it acknowledges the ‘active role of subordinate people in the operation of power’ (Jones, 2006, p.41). Although at times Gramsci recognizes that ‘coercion and consent are porous to each other’ and that hegemony is ‘always underpinned by the threat of violence’ his ultimate argument is that an ‘expansive’ hegemony is always one that genuinely and actively enjoys the support of the masses (Jones, 2005, pp.50-2). In other words, it is what Gramsci calls the result of a ‘war of position’ and not a ‘war of manoeuvre’.

Returning to the concept of hegemony and ruling by consent, it is worthwhile to recognise the crucial links between Gramsci’s work and education. As Gramsci himself put it: ‘every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily an educational relationship’ ([1971] 1999, p.666). Educational processes are fundamental to Gramsci’s hegemony since hegemony requires and is the result of consent through ideational, intellectual and moral transformation- a hegemonic pedagogy. Joseph Buttigieg, the well-known Gramsci scholar and translator of his *Prison Notebooks* has argued that education in fact ‘resides at the very core of his concept of hegemony’ (2002, pp.69-70). As Peter Mayo concludes, Gramsci’s ‘entire political project is... an educational project’ (2010, p.22).

Going beyond social divisions of class, I use Gramsci to focus on educational identity as a form of social and political division. Like 'educational identity' is a subset of national identity, 'educational hegemony' is a subset of the wider nationalist hegemon-ising project i.e. an attempt to lead the domestic debate with regards to the Cyprus conflict through non-coercive means. However, its domestic nature does not mean that it does not have external elements, influences or repercussions, not only because of the Cyprus conflict dynamics which place foreign policy at the centre of related debates, but due to the enemy/ies of the Self, whether these are Turkish-Cypriots, Turks etc. that this 'othering' process involves.

### 3.3.3. Re-conceptualisation of peace education

I have argued for a re-conceptualisation of peace education that views it in conjunction with power (discourse + institutions). I conceptualise discursive and institutional power not as mutually exclusive but as inter-constitutive continua, with the aim of shedding light on the nature, logic and repercussions of the conflictive ethos of educational institutions, processes, and discourses of the Greek Cypriot community. In fact, it is impossible to explain this hegemonic status without understanding these institutions and discourses, in the same way that the latter are constitutive of this hegemonic position.

This conceptual model of the politics of peace education reduces the gap between peace education and political science; avoids the pitfalls of the circular argument, and of imposing partial, artificial cause-effect positivist models of this peacebuilding tool,



(that neither reflect the complex inter-related dynamics of the problem, nor improve our deeper, contextual and historical understandings); allows us through a poststructuralist lens of Foucauldian power and post-Gramscian hegemony to delve into these discursive and contextual issues and examine why and how negative articulations of peace education have become hegemonic; thereby improving our understanding of the obstacles to peace education; points to discursive openings that can bring about change therefore reducing the gap between peace education in theory and as a praxis; finally having a more far-reaching and useful impact in both academic and policy environments.

Through and beyond the discursive production of hegemonic orders in the discourses over peace education in Cyprus, my particular approach allows me to:

1. analyse the resulting identities and to bring forward my argument of the construction of a particular sub-identity of education;
2. expose the specific exclusionary practices legitimized through these hegemonic articulations and identity constructions;
3. by revealing the powerful securitization practices of peace education, and putting forward an argument for the consideration of ‘securitisation’ as a theoretical but also a methodological tool in the analysis of peace education

Arguably, the above findings, facilitated by a theoretical model that extends existing knowledge, have been hitherto obscured by the treatment of peace education as an unproblematic but necessary peacebuilding tool.

### **3.4. Methodology guide**

In this section, I discuss the qualitative methodology I employ in order to answer my research questions and hence, address the weaknesses of the existing literature. As discussed in Chapter Two, the current literature does not offer any adequate analysis that can explain the marginalisation of the peace education discourse in Cyprus. This thesis attempts to address the key research questions arising from my critical discussion of the literature by undertaking a discourse analysis of the existing education discourses in Cyprus. In order to answer the research questions, it is important to unravel the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the researcher. Being conscious, clear and honest about these meta-theoretical issues is acquires even greater importance when the topic of analysis is directly related to conflict.

These meta-theoretical positions have a direct impact on the research methodology adopted, and in fact the latter, is sometimes determined by the meta-theoretical positions rather than by the main research question itself (although of course the research question is not independent to these). Although the appropriateness of this is debatable, what is necessary here is to give an illustration of the research methodology adopted, and to show why this is appropriate in the context of this particular study.

My research methodology adopts qualitative research methods in order to conduct a Foucauldian discourse analysis. The following paragraphs will justify why the particular research methodology is appropriate, but will also offer a detailed

description of both the data collection and data analysis processes I went through, and which form the empirical body of my thesis.

It is arguably necessary to undertake this discourse analysis in order to understand and expose the ways in which institutional and discursive sites of power ‘pre/proscribe particular policy realities’ (Shepherd, 2008, p. 384) in relation to peace education. I hope to encourage critical interpretations of and reflections on the policy documents that order the lives of individuals everywhere, employing as they do concepts that, like all concepts, are inherently value-laden.

With regards to the analysis of the texts (including transcribed interviews) I share the view of other discourse analysts who perceive the act of reading and analyzing these texts as ‘meaning-making’, where I am ‘filling elements with content and making sense of these elements’ (Kress, 2003, p.37, cited in Peled-Elhanan, 2011, p.ix). Therefore, the intertextual interpretations are subjective as they are based on my reading as a researcher.

#### 3.4.1. Data Collection: research methods and sources

It is important, before I go into the details of my methodological tools, to note that overall my research has been primarily inductive, although at times iterative in nature. The *inductive* nature between my conceptual framework and the empirical research can be seen in the way that primary emphasis was not placed on testing particular theories of hegemony, or power, but rather on generating theoretical insights that

result from, reflect (Bryman, 2008, pp.11-12) but also help explain the data. This final point alludes to the fact that even this inductive process, involved minimal elements of deduction. Especially in the midst of the research process, there was an oscillation between data collection and analysis (using theory) in order to establish if the particular theoretical framework was suitable, and if it successfully captured the dynamics of the empirical data.

This back and forth iterative process, has also been a result of a conscious attempt to be 'led' by the empirical data, rather than impose pre-determined ideas on the analysis. This can help explain how it was only after extensive secondary research, and the first phase of my interviews that I decided to include institutions such as religion in my analysis, but also to devote a whole chapter on the institutional dynamics, and the historical conditions that can help explain the hegemonic position of negative peace education articulations in Cyprus.

Consequently, the methodology for the first empirical chapter which follows, is rather less straightforwardly the result of discourse analysis, reflecting perhaps the fact that I had not initially envisaged to produce this chapter. The resulting institutional matrix of educational apparatuses in Cyprus is the result of an analysis of my empirical data, especially the data that was collected through interviews, informal discussions, but crucially through participant and non-participant observation. The ethnographic role I adopted here was one of 'participant-as-observer', i.e. 'a fully functioning member of the social setting', with an overt research status (Bryman, 2008, p.410). In trying to understand the complex power dynamics of educational governance in a conflict-setting, an immersion into the local setting, became not only inevitable but essential.

It was only by examining the wider societal institutions, conditions, frameworks, that are deeply embedded in societal norms and values, that I was able to appreciate their link with peace education discourses and policies.

In terms of the data analysis of the second empirical chapter, I conducted it by separating the findings into different discourses. I do not organise my empirical chapter according to actors, since my research objective is not to ‘play the one actor over the other’ and to see the differences between them. In this way I am still able to show whether it was a teacher or a student or a political elite or an NGO representative that was ‘speaking’ without placing them at the centre of the discourse i.e. without losing sense of the core issue which is to identify and analyse the negative and positive discourses. What is at stake is to try to understand what society overall thinks of peace education and of a potential change in history textbooks: to uncover the assumptions, fears, perspectives, affiliations, beliefs and dispositions that may not be so evident from just pointing out to the general conflict trends, but also that might even differ (although not necessarily contradict) in nature and extent from the general conflict positions, attitudes, debates and controversies.

I analysed discourses collected from newspapers, websites, documentaries, circulars, radio shows, official state texts, policy papers, and interviews with key actors such as teachers, religious leaders, political elites and NGO actors. The data was examined for recurrent patterns and themes using a Foucauldian discourse analysis. I examined discursive formations and their historical context ‘with a view to exploring possibilities that are excluded by the exercise of power and systems of domination’ (Howarth, 2000, p.49). All the interviews were conducted ‘face to face’, in the RoC or

in the 'buffer zone'. In total, I conducted 43 interviews: 12 state-school teachers; 8 academics from both public and private higher education institutions; 1 teacher/employee from the Pedagogical Institute; 7 political elites from across the political spectrum; 3 religious actors including two priests; and 12 NGO actors. The majority of these interviews took place during the winter of 2011-2012, with 6 of them taking place later (the final one took place in February 2014). The political elites were identified through their current or previous position in parliament or government, and the representatives of civil society organisations through their professional position. The teachers were chosen through a snow-ball sampling method and were initially contacted by phone or email.

### Methodological Reflections

I referred, earlier, to my 'immersion' into the local setting of Cyprus. After a prolonged immersion in the social setting being studied, ethnographers are usually cautioned against the dangers of 'going native', meaning their loss of sight as researchers, and hence the inability to develop a social scientific angle on either the collection or analysis of data (Bryman, 2008, p.412). I needed not to worry about such a danger materialising, since I was already a 'native', but a native with a particular 'outsider-insider' identity.

To delineate what I mean by my dual identity of an 'outsider-insider' I will offer a short retrospective reflection of my researching journey and researcher status. If part of our identity is predicated on differentiating ourselves from the Other, then perhaps understanding the other can help us understand ourselves better. The period being

outside Cyprus (total of 9 years) offered me the necessarily critical distancing from the world that I had been raised and educated in, and allowed me to ‘re-learn’ Cyprus, in a more critical vein (Freire uses this term when referring to Brazil). As Freire and Faundez (1989) point out, being outside your home country enables you to better appreciate the role of culture, and in my case it led to my cultural alienation- at least on issues regarding the Cyprus conflict, an issue which is deeply embedded in Cypriots’ cultural milieu. According to Barry Hart, a conflict-resolution scholar considering himself an ‘outsider’ working in conflict-regions:

‘no outsider will ever fully understand their history, pain, or worldview, and it is clear that outsider enthusiasm for peace and reconciliation in their country cannot be “transferred” to them’ (2001, p.302).

Although this statement is contestable, it does serve to point out to the well-intentioned naivety of external peacebuilders, who are perhaps too optimistic to begin with, and end up too pessimistic once their project is well under way. This may also be connected to an understandable lack of an insider’s sympathy with those who resist peacebuilding efforts- a case of ‘knowing where they are coming from’. Although being an insider with pro-peace education views, working on a conflict that has affected and is affecting my compatriots for over 50 years, was not an easy journey, socially and emotionally, this insider identity nevertheless, placed me in an ideal position to be able to reduce the gap between the two peace education camps. Being myself part of a large family of right-wing nationalists (DIKO and DISY supporters), and a fierce nationalist as a teenager, before what Freire would call my ‘liberation’ or ‘emancipation’ during my undergraduate years, I was able to better appreciate where

the resistance was coming from, and hence to deeply engage with the negative discourses of peace education.

This ‘liberation’ was paradoxically not a pleasant or easy experience. It was not only painful to realise most of the ‘truths’ I sacredly believed in could well be ‘myths’ or nationalist propaganda, but also angering, when I started to deconstruct and disembody from this ‘common sense’ way of life. It was emotionally awkward to consciously try to detach myself and unlearn that feeling of a sacred link, of ancestral roots and bonds with Greece. It was a process that took more than three years (full-time!) and that I was able to undergo mostly because of the opportunity given to me as an outsider when I left for the UK at the age when I was able to vote. And this materialised because I genuinely and consciously wanted to ‘heal’ myself from all these nationalist teachings. Therefore, it is not hard to imagine the colossal task of changing peoples’ attitudes, when these people do not want to change in the first place! Propaganda imbibed during one’s youth is very hard to de-assimilate, to steam off.

Therefore, it was not so much the distance that made me feel like an outsider but rather that I felt like an outsider, when I was inside Cyprus. If this mind-changing academic journey was painful, it was even more difficult in the long-term (and still is) to be able to openly discuss my views and *thesis* – with both meanings of the word i.e. my political position, and this research project, not only due to the ‘closed’ (even narrow-minded) nature of the Cypriot culture and mentality but also due to the very sensitive nature of the conflict-subject. Nevertheless, this was not only a mind- but a life-changing journey and without being able to partially adopt the ‘outsider’ identity



I would arguably not have been able to reach the necessary critical distance for integrous research methods and data analysis. In conducting research in conflict-settings there is a need to constantly scrutinize ones 'psychological road maps' (Hart, 2002, 302) so as to ensure that strong emotions do not blur the academic integrity of one's work. This was an ongoing process throughout the stages of this thesis and part of an attempt to ensure that deliberate distortion was avoided. However, like most academic research, this study was not without its methodological limitations.

### Methodological Limitations

Firstly, as mentioned above the views of those interviewed, or of those who authored the text may not be fully representative of the views of the entire Greek-Cypriot population. However, given my meta-theoretical position, and the nature of the research question this is neither necessary, nor arguably plausible. What was more pertinent, and useful to addressing my research problem was not to understand what actors had to say, after the required, sampling, distribution, statistical testing, arguably (see Bryman, 2008, p.160) producing hard structured data and a static view of social life, but rather the richer, and deeper meanings involved in natural settings. I focused therefore, on reaching an understanding of the information, attitudes, identities, feelings, positions expressed through discourses.

In addition, another limitation was that I did not interview teacher trade union officials. However, given that I did interview teachers from all three levels of education (primary, secondary and tertiary) it is highly unlikely that such an interview

would provide any subject positions that have not been covered from the rest of the interviews.

### 3.4.2. Data Analysis: methodological tools and analytical strategies

My data analysis was separated into three stages: an initial coding procedure (adapted from Cresswell, 1994, p.155); a secondary coding procedure; development of a discourse taxonomy. During the initial coding procedure I did a preliminary reading of a sample of the transcribed interviews and the written documents (e.g. newspapers, circulars) and started making a list of all the different topics. I then clustered together similar topics. Minor topics were the ones that were unique to particular individuals, and major trends were those that emerged across the data. I abbreviated these topics as codes. I then did a second reading of the whole data whilst writing the codes next to the appropriate segments of the text. This was to confirm that the preliminary organizing scheme fitted the rest of the data and whether new categories and codes emerge. If they did, I made the necessary changes/additions. I also drew lines between categories in order to show interrelationships. I then incorporated useful quotes or snippets that would later form part of the empirical chapters. Finally, I developed a 'discourse taxonomy' which would try to make sense of the discursive strategies involved when securitising peace education. The general taxonomy procedure has been suggested by Spradley (1980) in ethnographic research.

### 3.4.3. Marrying theory and method

Despite my poststructuralist methodology, I nevertheless diverge from epistemological arguments that are usually associated with the poststructuralist tradition, that it is not possible to produce explanations, or give answers to ‘why’ questions. Although I fully subscribe to the impossibility of positivist objective or absolute knowledge claims, I believe explanations *are* possible, without recurring to causal claims. Besides, if the epistemological possibilities of critical post-positivist research are premised-and hence, limited- on their relevance and acceptability to a preconfigured positivist mainstream then this defies the initial critical intention to surpass the latter’s limited perspectives.

The same is true when authors are ‘attempting to persuade an unconvinced-and arguably unconcerned-“mainstream,”’ rationalist orthodoxy to take one’s work seriously and in effect hamper their own critical potential (Shepherd, 2006, p.656). As Shepherd points out, an engagement with such literature is not a futile venture, but we must be cautious in relation to our attempts to prove methodological validity:

‘if the validity of critical research in international relations is premised on its acceptability to a preconfigured “mainstream,” it is unlikely to present the challenges that need to be posed to the limited horizons of that mainstream’ (2006, p.656).

### **3.5. Conclusion**

The first part of this chapter has attempted to reduce the conceptual fluidity and conflation with which peace education has been treated in the current literature. I have endeavoured to produce a more concrete definition and problematisation of peace education in Cyprus. Still, notwithstanding general definitions, I have argued that peace education is highly contextual; it 'is the product of specific historically contingent cultural and socio-political conditions' (Wintersteiner, 2004, p.90). These conditions vary from country to country, and the content covered by peace education varies according to the context in which those activities are practiced (Harris, 2004, p.6). For example, peace education in an area of 'hot' conflict like the Israeli-Palestinian would work under different conditions and have different manifestations to the one in Cyprus. It is these contingent historical cultural and socio-political conditions and institutions that I will be investigating in the next (empirical) chapter.

The second part of this chapter has presented a poststructuralist and Gramscian theorization of the politics of peace education, and has outlined the discourse analytical methodology which I will employ in the following empirical chapters, to provide a detailed analysis of the peace education debate in Cyprus. A conceptual framework has been derived within which to analyse the politics of peace education that argues for the positioning of power at the centre of peace education research in conflict-ridden regions, and specifically in Cyprus. This conceptual framework is not a 'neatly sorted' positivist model that I apply deductively. Rather, it has been inductively formed and includes a dichotomy between institutions and discourse used

primarily only as an ordering device to enable me to answer my initial research question.

After laying the conceptual groundwork with which I will be analyzing peace education politics in the next two chapters (institutions and discourses), I reviewed the primary theoretical contributions which allow me to produce insights and reveal processes, that alternative theoretical frameworks might not have yielded- namely the use of (educational) hegemony and power to reproduce educational identity, and the securitization of peace education through hegemonic discourses that present it as a threat to the existence of educational, and by extension, national identity. The value-added to 'peace education' research by the theoretical exposition and the conceptual framework of the 'politics of peace education' adopted above, arguably transforms our understandings of the topic's underlying dynamics in researchable and research productive ways, that remove us from the circular impasse while pointing out to new research agendas. It is to the empirical findings of this research agenda that we shall now turn to.

## **CHAPTER FOUR – EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION I**

### **Institutional Politics of Peace Education in Cyprus**

*By knowing the character of a problem 'we remove, if not the problem itself, then its secondary, aggravating characteristics: confusion, displacement, surprise' (Alain de Botton, 2000, pp.58-9).*

#### **4.1. Institution(s) Matter(s)**

Institutions have the ability to constrain or allow particular patterns of behaviour and policies. This makes it pertinent to explore the origins, nature and particular characteristics of these institutions, in order to shed light on why they are able to exert this institutional power in the first place. In other words, one engages with the question of 'how it becomes possible' (see Doty 1993) that certain institutions endorse or reject certain courses of action. In this chapter, I explore the hegemony exhibited by particular institutions over educational matters in the context of the Cyprus conflict.

What enables this educational hegemony to take place? The focus on institutions and discourses allows a more contextual and constitutive picture to emerge that does not follow a simplistic (and unrealistic) linear path of causal factors. Therefore, we can better identify, understand and evaluate the contextual forces, as well as the power processes and relationships between different societal elements. This approach, a

complex but worthwhile venture, raises more questions, which dealt with in depth may enable us to come closer to understanding the society of Cyprus and the barriers to peace education.

What renders these institutions crucial, is not their relative position of power over other institutions as such, or that they share a higher position of status in society. For example, what is at stake is not whether religion as an institution is more powerful than particular civil society organisations, but the particular conditions and discourses that allow religion to exert institutional and discursive power over civil society peacebuilding organisations. What is vital to explore is the character of this educational hegemony- not whether certain institutions are inherently hegemonic institutions, but rather, their particular historical tradition and origin; their contemporary importance/effects/links at a wider society level; and the specific discursive landscape (that constructs and is constructive of these institutions), that together enable the prevalence of particular attitudes or courses of action, while excluding others. This chapter focuses on the first two dynamics, the historical and the contemporary structural conditions of institutions, which allow them to exhibit educational hegemony over peace education in Cyprus.<sup>84</sup> A closer look at the institutionalisation of hegemonic discourses can explain why certain educational identities are able to become dominant, while others not enjoying this ‘institutional status’ are marginalised. The aim of this chapter, as aptly put by de Botton’s quote above, is to achieve clarity and understanding of the *character* of the institutional politics of peace education in Cyprus.

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<sup>84</sup> The specific discursive strategies employed will be the subject of empirical analysis in the next chapter, Chapter Five.

In the previous chapter I explained why a re-conceptualisation of peace education is necessary, and gave a theoretical analysis of the conceptual framework that I proposed. I argued that viewing peace education under a political science lens, and specifically by exposing the institutional and discursive power in operation, would better help us comprehend the educational hegemony that prevents peace education from becoming a reality in Cyprus. Whereas Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' enables us to gain a better understanding of institutional power through consensus, it does not fully explain the exclusionary power that is exerted over those who form part of the counter-hegemony. Here, Foucault is instrumental in allowing us to understand the forces of power that not only ensure hegemony, but also prevent and dissipate dissent- ensuring it is constantly marginalised, or preventing it from materialising in the first place. This chapter uses these theoretical insights to conduct an *empirical analysis* of these Cypriot institutional frameworks and power relations.

It is not my intention to furnish an exhaustive survey of institutional barriers or facilitators of peace education, but rather to offer an institutional analysis of what I see as the more crucial elements involved in this struggle. The following sections examine the wider societal institutions, their historical conditions and cultural characteristics, as well as the organising tools that enable this educational hegemony. I also show how it is possible to reconcile Gramscian hegemony with poststructuralist conceptualisations of governmentality, through an empirical analysis of the politics of education in Cyprus.



#### **4.2. Governmentality and Hegemony: ‘organisation of consent’, ‘dispositif’, apparatus, history and culture**

When trying to understand the complex power dynamics of educational governance in a region of conflict, an immersion into the local setting, tradition, culture and history becomes essential. As we saw in the previous chapter, institutions are not only the product of societal norms and values, but also productive of them, hence neither is fixed or uncontested. Institutions operate in a particular historical and cultural context, hence being subject to cultural biases, stereotyping and misunderstandings. The resulting institutional matrix of educational apparatuses in Cyprus can thereby enable us to better appreciate the contested discourses of peace education. The inclusion or exclusion of different education discourses or actors, and the acceptance or rejection of particular education policies, is a reflection of a particular mode of governance that the institution sustains.

Emphasis goes beyond the formal rules and official structures of *government* and organisations to informal rules or norms of behaviour and broader institutional constraints on *governance* both within and outside the state (Lowndes, 2002, p.92). The discursive struggle over what peace education means is often played out in and between institutional contexts such as the school, religion, the media, family, whereby these constitute ‘arenas for contending social forces’ (March and Olsen, 1984, p.738) and hence, an exercise of *institutional power*.

However, this is not to imply that there exist essentially immutable institutional structures (as structuralists do) but that these structures themselves are products of

history, and hence, subject to change. Hegemony can only be sustained if/when the particular order reproduces itself through the consent of society. Achieved through ideological internalization, and cultural embedment through institutionalisation and discourses that legitimate these norms.

### Going beyond Governance

Although traditionally governance was associated with the exercise of power of the government, since the 1980s political scientists have been using it to refer to institutions and actors beyond the realm of the state, to include civil society. (Kjaer, 2004, p.1). Governance can be defined as the management of formal and informal political rules. It 'refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules' (Hyden, 1999, p.185). Therefore it covers not only which values are allocated, but also how they are institutionalised<sup>85</sup>. According to Kjaer, all governance definitions focus on the importance of networks which are united by the pursuit of a common objective (2004, pp 3-4). However, such a focus on networks may misleadingly underestimate the consensus with regards to a particular goal- if there is such an agreed goal. Not all cases of governance are ones of state-society synergy, and nor is power shared symmetrically across institutions or actors. As Kjaer admits, attention to networks in governance theory tends to be accompanied by an under-emphasis on power, interests and exclusionary tactics (2004, pp.204-5). Besides, this asymmetry in network management, is why certain values are able to dominate over others, an issue which

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<sup>85</sup> Kjaer argues that governance theories have grown out of a focus on institutions and institutional change. She refers to governance using an 'institutional definition': 'the setting of rules, the application of rules, and the enforcement of rules' and argues that the focus is on the setting of rules as this implies a change of institutional set-up (2004, p.7, p.10, p.195)

gains further importance in conflict settings where the danger and potential cost of letting certain interests dominate policy-making are relatively acute. This is why, in the case of Cyprus, governance is useful for pointing out the formal and informal political rules with regards to the governance of education, highlighting the state-society synergy over the policy toward (or rather against) peace education. However, the concept proves less useful a) when it comes to explaining why this particular governance pattern prevails, b) when there is actually tension either between the state-society divide, or between certain elements of it (e.g. when certain elements of society agree and other disagree with the state policy) and c) when exposing the implications of vertical networks which reinforce cleavages and asymmetries through exclusion. Arguably, the concept of ‘governmentality’, put forward by Foucault, can better explain how it is possible that certain ‘mentalities’ ‘govern’ over others, especially in highly contested matters and with due emphasis on issues of power in policy-making and policy-preventing. Rather than focusing on actors Foucault’s notion of power as we saw – talk about discourse and institution-discourse power nexus, but also say that the actual discourses will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.

Institutions can exist in the form of written formal rules (e.g. documents, legislation) or could be informal rules, requirements or norms about what is appropriate behaviour- These rules order repeated interdependent relations see Hall and Taylor 1996 . Governance, according to Kjaer, is a theory that is well placed to show how institutions change, ideally by combining agency with rule-structures to explore changes in political practices and their impact on political rules (institutions) and (2004, p.10). Governance helps to identify the rules and norms governing access to power, how they change and the actors who implement the changes (Kjaer, 2004,

p.17). Hence, it is not surprising that it might not be as useful when trying to understand why institutions in Cyprus have to a certain extent failed to change.

Governance is also defined as ‘the steering of society by officials in control of what are organizationally the “commanding heights: of society” (Goodin, 1996, p.13). But governmentality arguably better describes the ‘steering of society’ on this issue, since although it does not deny the powerful position of the political elites and government apparatus, it allows space for an appreciation of the position and role played by wider elements of society beyond a government-centred approach. I am not investigating a clear binary of state-civil society, with the state as the one being hegemonic and civil society as counter-hegemonic. Resistance often emerges from bottom-up approaches as well, and there can never be a clear demarcation between the state and civil society.

#### 4.2.1. Organisation of Consent

According to Gramsci, hegemony is the ‘organisation of consent’ (Simon, 1991, p.22). If we apply this to the context of Cyprus, educational hegemony then, becomes the structure(s) through which consent over the rejection and prevention of peace education (both discourses and practices) becomes organised in society. Arguably, the struggle over educational matters becomes a kind of organising tool, around which society is able to construct its collective history and memory, as well as national identity (see Chapter One), but more importantly its educational identity (see Chapter Three and below). It is specifically this organisation of society on educational matters that can enable us to gain an understanding of educational hegemony, of leading not by force, but through a consensual socio-political relationship. Their power does not

derive from explicit coercion or from relations of production as such but instead ‘is the outcome of a form of *organisation* characteristic of the present society’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1981, p.21, emphasis added)

Educational hegemony in Cyprus therefore exists as a result of a particular ‘organisation of consent’. A focus on the educational struggle on an institutional level in Cyprus shows that hegemonic institutions privilege the continuation of nationalist education policies, and exclude marginalized institutions/actors from occupying a hegemonic space within zone of influence, and by extension (due to their power) within society. Consensus over endorsement of ethno-nationalist and exclusionary educational policies in Cyprus inevitably has a negative impact on peace education efforts which support inclusive pedagogies and curricula.

In particular, the strong resistance to peace education efforts such as changes to history textbooks would not have been possible had it not been for a successful network of alliances, a ‘historical bloc’ that forms an essential part of what Gramsci termed the ‘war of position’. These alliances are not necessarily made up of homogeneous or similar elements. What is essential is that these alliances respect each other ‘so that each of them is able to make its own special contribution towards the new socialist society’ (Simon, 1991, p.46). Moreover, they must unite their own particular ‘popular’ struggles with the main nationalist struggle against the ‘enemy’. Therefore, this historic bloc is both a cultural and political concept (Simon, 1991, p.110).

Gramsci's work provides the theoretical possibility for education to act as an instrument of change. Education, seen through the Gramscian lens, can help achieve a change of consciousness, by reaching the minds of the people, the intellectual capacity that not only permits change but also allows sustains it, through a new cultural order (Mardle, 1977). Gramsci's concept of hegemony is after all, based on the ability to stabilize change, and not merely to activate it. Hegemony however, 'will not simply arise like a phoenix' (Mardle, 1977, p.135); it is achieved through a difficult struggle that needs to be consciously and strongly desired in the first place, strategic, and involve the awakening and re-education of the critical self. The failure of peace education to become hegemonic in Cyprus almost forty years after the 1974 invasion attests to this level of complexity and difficulty. To the contrary, nationalist education has become hegemonic not so much through the coercive power of the state (although its control of education policies can be seen as crossing the borders of non-coercion) than through the consent of the masses to that power, to that form of domination. Mardle, through a Gramscian lens, points out that:

'It is through civil authorities and private organizations such as the media, the church and schools that a 'world view' is created which provides the legitimate authority whereby the state achieves the active consent of the governed...this world view represents the commonsense understanding that the masses have of the nature of reality.' (1977, p.147)

Delving deeper into the existing power relations what are the mechanics of this governmentality, of this organisation of consent? What are the 'organising tools' around which Cypriots make sense of educational governance and educational

policies? I see governmentality as the poststructuralist version of governance. It encompasses governance but also takes it a step further.

#### 4.2.1.1. Organising Tools of Hegemonic Education

##### Educational Identity

Premised on a micro-level of analysis, educational identity refers to representational practices associated with particular educational positions. Practice here takes on a poststructuralist decentered definition, understood as ‘inextricably connected to the production of meaning(s)’ (Doty, 1997, p. 376). Educational positions are prompted by obligatory dominant norms and values to fall into the ethno-nationalist frame. A strictly binary frame is presented which claims to hold the only and absolute true knowledge about all issues related to the conflict. It constructs the subject as having the ‘choice’ to belong to either the nationalist, patriot and true side- adopting a legitimate educational identity-, or subscribe to the narrative of the traitor, the enemy of one’s own country. There is no ‘middle way’, nor can one usually choose to agree with certain elements of either narrative. At worst, being sympathetic or agreeing with the narrative of the ‘other’ is analogous with committing educational suicide, and by extension, to denying one’s deserved citizenship. The contested identities, how these are represented, and how these are (re)constructed lies at the heart of the Cyprus conflict (Diez, 2002, p.1). One’s national identity, or one’s citizenship, is not seen as something internalized, but something that is conferred upon a subject according to societal regulations and subjective norms. One is perceived to be a patriot, if they

abide by the expected regulations. Only then does one ‘deserve’ to be called a patriot, and in fact to feel like one.

Alternatively, failing to recognise one’s true and moral obligation, (s)he will face not only social ostracisation but is liable to experience in the long-term, through institutional and discursive power, the stripping off of their national identity. Therefore the reproduction of the particular hegemonic educational identity is always a negotiation of/with power. Since the particular nationalist educational identity is an absolute condition necessary to be fulfilled for one to be deemed as loving their country, failure to subject one’s self to this identity is not only a sign that something is illegitimate or ‘wrong’ with the particular person, but proof of disrespect at best, and betrayal at worst, of one’s fellow citizens, both the living, the dead, and those to come. Betrayal is deemed to affect not only past national heroes and struggles, present citizens but also the future generation, as it is perceived to have repercussions for future generations. According to the dominant discourse in Cyprus (see Chapter Five), identity is essential for the Greek culture, heritage and tradition, to ‘survive’ in time, hence, it is inextricably linked with visions of the future.

### Educational Norms and Rules

Those who fail to abide by the educational norms and rules are at heightened risk for social harassment, stigmatization, ostracisation, and demonization. This affects not only the private but also the public sphere, reducing the discursive space that one is entitled to have in an open democratic society. The discursive space is there only as a façade and in theory; in reality one either does not want to, or cannot occupy this



discursive space due to the risks associated with doing so, and with being perceived as doing so. The power of institutions therefore, is better illustrated by reference to the diffuse relationships in society. Norms that constitute and are constitutive of these institutions reflect not only the wider relations of hegemony vis-à-vis the Cyprus conflict- hence the broad relations of power- but are also instances of how power operates- how it *produces*. This productive exercise of power is necessary for power to ‘stay in power’ in the first place (Butler, 2009, pp.ii-iii).

Institutions are partly designed to maximize stability, and to ‘minimize conditions of precarity, especially within the nation-state’ (Butler, 2009, p.ii). However, as Butler reminds us, this politically induced restriction is problematic. In the context of Cyprus and peace education, the inflexibility of structures ensures that stability becomes itself the real source of precarity, masking and (mis)representing any positive efforts to induce educational peacebuilding changes as threats to established and intelligible ways of thinking and being.

For these institutions to persist with their hegemonic core values ‘uninfected’ however, these norms, structures and their power relations are in constant need of reproduction, of a Derridian iterability. Yet, the very nature of the re-productive process of educational identity that keeps it going, is the one that opens up the possibility of change, of undoing and redoing the norms, and hence identity discourses, in alternative ways. As Butler puts it: “every act of reproduction risks going awry or adrift, or producing effects that are not fully foreseen” (2009. p.iii).

To enact marginalized educational identities, is to assert the multi-perspective reality of the public and private sphere and to reject those norms that require adoption of dominant educational identity. This counter-hegemonic practice is itself partly a reaction, an act of resistance to the initial resistance against peace education. I say partly, as not doing so ignores the marginalized discourses that have been in existence ever since the dominant ones.

Education then, becomes a mode of exclusion through which the nation itself is able to construct an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1991, p.7)... 'deep, horizontal comradeship', and thereby enforcing (or at least aiming to) its own unity.

Speaking of the gendering of a child, Butler argues that this in essence produces a confusion with regards to whose desire one is referring to. As she puts it:

If what "I" want is only produced in relation to what is wanted from me, then the idea of "my own" desire turns out to be something of a misnomer. I am, in my desire, negotiating what has been wanted of me." (2009, p.xi)

Applying this to the context of the norms and 'mentalities' governing the Greek-Cypriot community: choices are made on the basis of already structured power relations, therefore it is inaccurate to say that we are autonomous subjects, free to choose our desires, as if we lived in a vacuum (include Doty, 1997 notes on agency/structure). Arguably, these education mentalities are embedded in society, and peoples' socialization essentially involves norms that are acting upon them, *before* them, therefore shaping their own actions. This does not necessarily mean that norms

are always reproduced in the same way, but that this reproduction is always ‘in relation to norms that precede us and exceed us’ (Butler, 2009, p.xi).

As Eggleston and Gleeson (1977) have shown, despite attempts at educational changes (including both curriculum and pedagogy) certain educational arrangements are able to persist not least due to the political processes that confirm and legitimize them. These particular conceptions that enjoy a hegemonic status, in the context of Cyprus, are nationalist conceptions deeply convoluted with ideas, attitudes and issues related to the conflict. The ethos of the conflict present in wider social settings, cannot be separated from educational issues, pervading both the formal and informal educational structures and discourses. The acceptance of these norms and conceptions legitimize ‘the consensual and passive transmission of knowledge’ just as they present those who do not accept them as ‘disfunctional phenomena’, as ‘problems’ or ‘crises’ in education (Eggleston and Gleeson, 1977, p.17). Therefore, instead of being perceived and appreciated as attempts to shed a critical light on the taken for granted order of things, such instances are dismissed as problems that need to be resolved, to be eradicated.

Greene (1977) speaks of the need for ‘demystification’ strategies that can lead to a pedagogical liberalization whereby the hegemonic, and taken for granted educational norms and values can be challenged. She suggests that teacher training institutions can act as a venue for such demystification to occur, empowering the teachers to cast their own critical voice on such matters so directly related to their professional and personal identity (p.29, 42)). According to Greene, mystification should be exposed, not only because it paradoxically makes people act in ways that are contrary to their

nature or interests, but also because of the subtle but powerful ways that it prevents resistance or alienation to the dominant narrative from emerging in the first place. The objective of demystification in the peacebuilding context is for peace education to become *praxis*.

Institutions affect social practice through mechanisms which are ‘constitutive and regulative rules’ that can be ‘recognized through recurring patterns of behaviour and through the sanctioning that takes place when the rules are (in the eyes of one of the parties) violated’ (Dessler<sup>86</sup>, 1989, pp.457-58). Constitutive rules define (new) forms of behaviour whereas regulative ones ‘prescribe and proscribe behavior in defined circumstances’ without excluding the possibility of one type of rule having implications on the other type (Dessler, 1989, p.454). In the context of this research, constitutive rules could take the form of ‘supporting peace education counts as treason in the context of the nationalist cause’. By not following constitutive rules one performs a social action ‘incorrectly’ in the sense that their actions fall outside the limits of hegemonic meaning in a particular society. They have the potential to shape and define one’s actions by offering explanations of what counts as what. Regulative rules could take the form of ‘having to study the history textbooks in order to pass the school history examinations at the end of the year’. The penalty for not following this rule involves not passing through the next class year.

Ultimately, I contend that the essential point for this research is not their differences, but the fact that these rules affect patterns of social behaviour. I take a more integrative approach than Dessler, and argue that due to normative forces, what is

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<sup>86</sup> Dessler here takes a causal mechanism stance, whereas I do not believe that there are real and enduring causal mechanisms.

considered as legitimate, i.e. the prescribed behaviour, merely by excluding alternative behaviours, has a defining function of what constitutes 'proper behaviour'. Alternatively, constitutive rules, regulate behaviour just as they define it, as an implication. These rules can be formal; informal; explicit; implicit; verbal; written; unspoken. They also have varying rules of flexibility i.e. the extent to which one can afford to deviate from them, which of course also depends on the nature of the penalty for doing so. This does not assume a rationalist approach (see Keohane ??)

I suggest that it is important to keep these forms in mind when assessing hegemonic orders, as they help problematise hitherto unquestioned institutional and discursive power dynamics. Understanding the context within which policy operates is crucial to understand why the particular policy operates, and not another. Is this context consciously produced? Do states or political elites or other actors consciously attempt to alter the conditions of action in ways that promote their own perceived interests? A definite answer to this question can only be one that includes both affirmation and negation; it is impossible to conclude with a generalisable answer and to speak for all. One could hardly argue that the public is fully conscious of supposed purely top-down strategies of persuasion and power (or else why would they fall prey to them?). Nor on the other hand, does the argument that people are merely duped puppets, unconsciously and naively following orders from above, do justice to the critical capacities of the human mind, not to mention that viewing Cyprus politics as a purely 'top-down' endeavor is only half of the story- and that in its simplified version. Perhaps, the answer lies somewhere in between this continuum, as both arguments are partly valid, and since no single argument can claim to satisfactorily reflect social relations of power. Moreover, even the definition of being 'conscious' does not lend

itself to empirical evidence, let alone the extent of being conscious. Trying to answer such a question depends on too many interrelated ‘variables’ which ultimately are rendered immeasurable. Even if we assume that altering the conditions of actions takes place through the construction of institutions \*see p.473 of Dessler, 1989, it is impossible to trace their production to individuals, who were conscious and knowledgeable of the long-term effects of their actions.

Entrance into the Greek-Cypriot society, assimilation into it requires subscribing into certain educational policies and norms. Beyond the psychological satisfaction gained from belonging ‘into some large narrative structure’ there is organization of institutions acting ‘as both the mobilization and ossification of bias’ (Goodin, 1996, p.4). Collective entities such as the school, the church, the family, the teacher, constitute institutions which shape action by setting the boundaries of preference and possibility (Goodin, 1996, p.7).

#### 4.2.2 Institutions and History

The resulting consensus can be further understood by a closer look at the formal and informal, state and non-state/civil-society apparatuses, through which institutional power is exercised. It is from institutions of society that people absorb what Gramsci refers to as a theoretical consciousness that goes against the transformation project, that has been ‘inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed’ (1971, p. 327). Stories about the past are internalized, and ‘in the telling and retelling’ shape people and their future actions. How and why does the past exert this sort of influence? The

past is understood in light of the present, but the significant theme of the past remains, since the reconstructions are relating to past events.

Again, as we saw in the previous chapter, a Gramscian approach offers constructive insights into the importance of both history and culture of a given society. The consensus, or ‘common sense’ represents the values and ideas that the network of alliances is based on. There is the necessary level of agreement with regards to the past, the importance of the past in the present, which is inextricably linked to the cultural milieu of the people- a culture deeply immersed in history and tradition. Cultural tradition is deeply valued in Cyprus, and as we shall see later there is a strong –and non-accidental- interconnectedness of this tradition with the religion values championed by the Orthodox Church i.e. keeping the Orthodox traditions alive and unaltered.

As we saw in the previous chapter, institutions ‘embody power relations by privileging certain courses of action over others’ (Lowndes, 2002, p.100) and can therefore elucidate power struggles over particular meanings and policies in conflict-regions. A focus on institutions, their historical origins and contemporary processes will help illuminate the particular idiosyncratic conditions that empower and enable negative articulations and policies of (peace) education to occupy a hegemonic space in society, the particular (current and historical) conditions of institutionalisation that sustain their discursive reproduction. In other words, institutional power analysis can enable us to explain how institutions exert their ongoing influence, but also why certain education-related institutions persist over time- what I refer to as *educational inertia*.

#### 4.2.3. Institutions and Culture

The cultural production of consent also takes place through institutions. Stuart Hall has aptly demonstrated that ‘questions of culture . . . are absolutely deadly political questions’ (Hall, 1997, pp. 290, cited in Procter, 2004, p.1). For him culture is ‘a critical site of social action and intervention, where power relations are both established and potentially unsettled’ (Procter, 2001, p.1). Therefore studying the Cypriot culture with regards to education and the Cyprus conflict, can enable us to expose the relations of power that exist in order to consider how marginalized conceptions of peace education ‘might secure or win, however temporarily, cultural space from the dominant group’ (Procter, 2004, p.2). Educational institutions can be seen as places of enculturation, which involves the development of an identity as part of a social group (Pearce, 1994; Ellenbogen, Luke and Dierking, 2004, p.24). Therefore institutions influence educational identity through enculturation.

Institutions have a regulative function in codifying modes of behaviour of political agents. As Scott argues conformity within institutions occurs partly because ‘other types of behavior’ contrary to the usual way of doing things ‘are inconceivable’ (2001, p. 57). So individuals follow the standard way of doing things not because they are forced to but because they just do so without questioning alternative possibilities. Institutions give individuals the opportunity to meet other individuals who share common values, beliefs, characteristics, thus empowering their ability to provoke or inhibit political change, so institutions give voice and power to people to be heard and to have an effect on society. By increasing the role of ideas and ideology in choices, institutions provide a setting that changes the price one pays for expressing but also



acting according to one's ideas (North, 1991, p.68). The price Cypriots who do not champion the (educational) hegemonic position have to pay is: fear, social ostracisation and humiliation, loss of educational identity, dubbed traitors and unpatriots. Moreover, they experience fear linked to the threat of the loss of collective educational identity by securitizing peace education and presenting it as a threat to the national and even physical existence of the people. Therefore, preferences are not exogenous to the political process but are moulded through institutions and the functional experiences they have to offer (March and Olsen, 1984, p.739). Also, political institutions have consequences for peace education outcomes by affecting the existence/distribution of peace education ideas and discourses.

The politicisation of education is a process that offers the means with which attitudes are cultivated, political positions are bred, and the other continued to be demonised. This is a tool for politicians, educators, even society, to continue to pursue and perpetuate past policy. This is not the reason why peace education has failed but why peace education has not been implemented. This is a state of existence bred in the social and political system.

Without ignoring the existence of exceptions, if one was to generalise, then culturally the Cypriot society can be seen as very much an either/or society, relatively close-minded, and very weak at critical thinking and national self-reflection. The conflict position has of course made this situation even more acute, as the politicians see it as their role to defend the reputation of Cyprus abroad, and to show to the international society that the Greek Cypriots are the victims, and Turkey is the perpetrator. This is reflected also in the way that people perceive history. The predominant view is that

history is a series of true facts that needs to be presented to the children, they think of very binary terms, black or white, right or wrong, nationalist or traitor. They think of history in a modern not a postmodern way, and it is that exact thinking that allows something to be securitised in the first place (see Chapter Five).

Many Cypriots refuse to reconsider in the context of recent developments and changes. One possibility is that this is an 'easier' way, as they do not need to critically think about issues that are deeply sensitive and congruent with their victimization identity for so many decades. Past traumas are part of a 'black box' that few people want to open, to deal with, let alone to consciously alter beliefs, narratives and attitudes towards them. Moreover, to do so would not only be perceived as going against the identity conferred upon them (which in turn they eagerly adopt and enact and collectively reproduce), but would equate to going against their own parents, grandparents, political parties and their religion. Of course this does not mean that a particular religion's beliefs for example, does go against peace education, but merely that it is perceived to do so. Ultimately, it is these perceptions that affect behaviour, and whether these links are valid are of secondary importance. A strong 'tradition of traditions', strong family ties, and partisan politics, that affect issues from which political leader to support to which football team to support, run in the family and waiting for the male figure as the 'head of the house' to decide is typical practice. Following the party line is a sign of solidarity, of allegiance and support. Any other action would be deemed as weakness on behalf of the individual to act as a productive force and link within and outside the party, therefore weakening the unified chain of a party. Such people are seen with suspicion and are stigmatised, especially as this is a small society, people remember each other personally, and such actions are kept in

mind when asking for political or more commonly, personal favours, like putting a family member to work, getting promoted etc.

#### 4.2.4. Modern conflict/postmodern society?

Diez describes the European Union as ‘a polity that incorporates many postmodern features’ and the Cyprus conflict ‘as being dominated by predominantly modern struggles’ (2002, p.8). Cypriot society has arguably moved towards a *selectively postmodern* paradigm, that incorporates many postmodern features, but these characteristics are strategic and remain on a limited level, with the modern struggles being prominent. For example, it does not have the same organic characteristics that Cyprus would have if it evolved over time *without* the Cyprus conflict. Instead, the changes are almost artificially selected in order to benefit from the forces of globalisation, while at the same time using these to promote conflict goals that are based on a dominant modernist paradigm. This is where we witness changes that ensure continuity, a clever adaptation of postmodernist influences in order to uphold a conflict discourse and a conflict governmentality that like a chameleon<sup>87</sup>, changes colours but not substance. It is important to keep in mind that despite their hegemonic stability, institutions are never totally fixed, or ‘closed’ (March and Olsen, 1989; Doty, 1997). When ‘new’ institutional rules are produced, they may exist in tandem with ‘old’ ones (Lowndes, 2002, p.101) as actors try to adapt them to favour the hegemonic values.

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<sup>87</sup> The English word chameleon is originally derived from the Greek χαμαιλέον (khamailéōna compound of χαμαί (khamai) "on the ground" and λέων (léōn) "lion, symbolizing ‘a lion on the ground’ (Bambiniotis, 2009, p.1581)

The unquestioning reproduction of a dominant discourse of peace education that has its antecedents in a nationalist historical conflict narrative of a ‘modernised’ system, while drawing discursive power from a seemingly ‘postmodern’ and neoliberal policy discourse effectively prevents reimagining peace education. Representations of peace education that reproduce the hegemonic nationalistic order as the locus of authority limit the imagining of alternative visions of peace education (see also Walker 1990).

### **4.3. Institutional matrix of educational hegemony in Cyprus**

As de Botton suggests, fundamental problems might not be easy to resolve, but shedding light on the character of an issue, by allowing its essential aspects to emerge and making the obstacles involved more explicit, clarity and progress can be achieved. The following section reviews the different institutional obstacles to peace education in Cyprus i.e. the education policies, religion, media, the family. This enables us to understand why peace education has failed to be institutionalised in a formal level in the Republic of Cyprus and, as a result it is mostly informal practices of peace education that we are confronted with, under the guidance of NGOs.

#### **4.3.1. Education in Cyprus**

##### **History of Education in Cyprus**

The aim of this section is to give emphasis to the particular idiosyncratic colonial conditions that influenced the contemporary state of education in Cyprus, by

providing a brief overview of the history of Cypriot education in the context of the Cyprus conflict.

In Chapter one I showed how Cyprus has been shaped by ‘extreme nationalism that has long been dividing its society and characterising its education’ (Philippou, 2005, p.294). Dominant historical narratives promote a ‘dialectic of intolerance’ by legitimising a particular side, and the historical roots of this dialectic of intolerance can be traced back to the ideological beginnings of the educational system (Kitromilides, 1979, Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007, p.50). It is these nationalistic positions that have not only contributed to the emergence of the conflict but also ensure its continuation. Makriyianni and Psaltis have shown how there is an ‘authoritarian and asymmetric source of legitimisation of a particular version of history that makes unwarranted claims of objectivity’ (2007, p.50). Kitromilides has identified three interlocking pressures as a result of which Greek nationalism was ignited, which in turn fuelled Turkish-Cypriot nationalism: the British manipulation tactics of ‘divide and rule’, reactions to the desire of the Greek Cypriots to unite with Greece (*Enosis*), and influence from the Turkish motherland (1979, p.165). These two nationalisms and the ‘dialectic of intolerance’ have been nurtured and propagated through the school system. (Mention map at Greek Cypriot schools and perhaps include it. Also discuss how, when and why education came to be bound up with the growth of Greek and Turkish nationalism.)

Throughout the period of Ottoman rule, the Greek Cypriot schools taught in Greek, and the Turkish Cypriot schools taught in Turkish, and they both had their own educational curriculums. By 1881, according to British statistics of the time, there

were 99 Greek-Cypriot schools (4907 pupils), and 71 Turkish-Cypriot schools 1869 pupils (Hadjidemetriou, 2007, p.327).

During British colonial rule (1878-1960) three periods can be discerned: the first which lasted until 1931 saw a more *laissez faire* policy regarding the nationalist education of the two communities. The second period, starting from 1929 saw a more urgent effort from the British to impose a sense of Cypriot identity, that of ‘Cypriot patriotism’ and to centralise educational administration (Given, 1998, Hadjidemetriou, 2007, p.329) but the Greek Cypriots detested this attempt by the authorities to control their schooling and thereby their ideological orientations, leading to the polarisation (and arguably the first signs of securitisation) of educational actors. The British rulers did this in an effort to counter the Greek-Cypriot nationalists who defined their identity as purely Greek, and belonging to Greece: the latter insisted on Greek language, history and geography (Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007, p.51).

Two nationalist systems of education developed, and no provisions were made in the 1960 constitution to ‘educate the two communities into understanding and collaborating with each other’ (Stavrinides, 1999, p.109). Instead, education was perceived and used as a tool and a conduit for strengthening national consciousness. It is this perception, and association of education with nationalism and national identity that is at the centre of my argument with regards to educational identity.

The Orthodox Church and the schools in Cyprus were closely connected. Church leaders who were historically associated with education voiced their strong discontent

with regards to the elimination of Greek history teaching in primary schools (Myrianthopoulos, 1946, cited in Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007, p.51). The Orthodox Church managed to maintain its political prominence even under the British rule, despite its restricted powers, and to promote its main aim of providing nationalist education. Monastery abbots and bishops were often members of the Legislative Council during that time and the Church paid the wages of the teachers (Hadjidemetriou, 2007, pp.325-328).

The Colonial Government focused its attention mostly on elementary education, by supporting it financially, hence the high schools were able to maintain their independence from the British, and their dependence on the two 'motherlands'. Turkish Cypriot schools took guidelines from Turkey, whereas the Greek Cypriot schools almost completely replicated the Greek educational model, including the history textbooks. Teachers from both Turkey and Greece also visited Cyprus to teach in the respective schools (Hadjidemetriou, 2007, p.330). As Kitromilides aptly writes:

Thus education offered the framework within which the two Cypriot communities became aware of their primary differences and which provided the basis of their psychosocial integration into Greek and Turkish nationalism respectively (1979, p.202).

It is not hard to see also how particular Ministers of Education have had an instrumental role in promoting the nationalist goal of *Enosis*. Spyridakis for example, who was a nationalist headmaster of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, was elected

President of the Greek Communal Chamber in Cyprus (a body which dealt with education, culture and religion) and after the inter-communal troubles of 1963 and the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from the government, he was appointed as the first Minister of Education. Such appointments were not exceptions. Claire Aggelidou, who was Minister of Education and Culture of the Republic of Cyprus, from February 1993 to April 1997 was a prominent EOKA fighter during the 1955-1959 struggle for liberation from colonial rule, and of subsequent unification with Greece. She received her education from Greece, studying at the University of Athens. In her autobiographical book she writes: 'The people could see the repression of colonial rule, the deceitful means it was using to achieve de-Hellenicisation. The schools were the direct way' (translation mine, Aggelidou, 2011, p.27). She then goes on to say that the English language was taught as many hours as the Greek language, in all the schools that had to adhere to the government sponsorship and hence regulations, due to a lack of financial resources, but in fact the more the British tried to suppress them, the more their nationalism grew (2011, p.27). Having nationalist leaders who have directly participated in struggles in order to unite with Greece in such positions of authority, can be problematic in the promotion of a history that promotes plurality of opinions.

#### EOKA and Youth: Legacy for today's education

EOKA seems to have had a special appeal to the young members of the population, and this is often taken for granted by historians of Cyprus. Perhaps this special link was not just a reflection of the typical energy possessed by the youth, nor stemming from their own desire to be 'freed' from the colonial power, but having to do more



with their particular education both social and in the school context and the messages they were receiving as to their 'sacred' goal. Fighting against British rule for unity with Greece was promoted and perceived as one of those goals 'worth both dying and killing to advance' (Kriesberg and Millar, 2009, p.28).

They indeed sacrificed their lives, often taking uncalculated risks- although this tends to happen when you are untrained and only 14 years old. A social psychological explanation as to why young people are attracted to such movements is given by Volkan (1997, pp. 164-65). He emphasises that followers are usually younger than twenty-five, and sometimes even younger than seventeen and as a result of their fear (often induced by the ethnic movement itself) or anxiety, they identify with the powerful association in order to gain a sense of belonging, a sense of security. EOKA offered the young men and boys an escape from the restricted family environment allowing them to seek out a new, more important identity as member of a group that fought for a 'higher' purpose.

It is important here to note the idiosyncrasy of this struggle in its relation to the younger population, and even children. Schools were used as meeting places, young students participated as messengers, or even directly by voluntarily becoming soldiers at ages as young as 13-14. Schoolchildren inspired nationalist pride in their parents and to their villages, towns, through their protest, hence, encouraging acts of resistance through praise (O'Malley and Craig, 2006, p.14). According to Crawshaw's account:

‘Grivas ordered the intensive recruitment of schoolchildren. Their duties were to include demonstrations, the distribution of leaflets and the surveillance of British agents. The most promising and reliable would eventually graduate to the fighter groups, and EOKA would be assured of a constant supply of recruits.’ (1978, p.120)

It is vital to understand the role played by schoolchildren in the EOKA struggle, as these teenagers and children were the soldiers who later fought in the 1974 war, but who are also parents, teachers or politicians today.

The British were ruthless in their attacks, detaining hundreds of people in tiny concentration camps, torturing, executing and hanging people even through false witnesses (e.g. Michael Karaolis) or because they were caught in possession of a firearm (e.g. Evagoras Pallikarides, aged 18). “Many youths...became heroes fighting bravely and dying in the EOKA struggle” writes one Greek Cypriot historian (Hadjidemetriou, 2007, p.347) and the students at school even to this day are often told of their biographies. The role of schoolboys in the anti-colonial struggle was strongly discussed in House of Commons’ debates (see for example, HC Deb 19 July 1956 vol 556 cc1391-532) with some MPs calling for an end to the violence (from whipping to murdering) inflicted upon schoolboys as young as twelve years old. Laurence Durrell, a travel-writer, who lived and worked<sup>88</sup> in Cyprus between 1953-6, and who claims to have ‘seen the unfolding of the Cyprus tragedy both from the village tavern and from Government House’ (1959, p.11) writes about the nationalist sentiment at the time:

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<sup>88</sup> Durrell, a poet and writer, took a job teaching English literature at the Pancyprian Gymnasium in Nicosia, and later also served as an official for the British colonial government in Cyprus (Durrell, 1959).

‘[T]his feeling was kept permanently at the boil by official direction, by the press, by the heady rhetoric of local demagogues and priests...[teachers strove] to keep the young people in a state of ferment’ (Durrell, 1959, p.133).

Such efforts to keep alive the nationalist sentiment are still made by teachers today. In addition to the parades, memorial celebrations, ethno-nationalist history curriculum, the teachers emphasise the legacy and role of school children during the EOKA struggle, praising them as heroes but also victims of the British conqueror (Teacher interviews). This political pedagogical act has the implication of not only inspiring feelings of nationalist pride, of injustice that needs to be rectified and even hatred, but also helps to solidify the division between the two communities in the island, by presenting the Turkish-Cypriots who did not participate in the liberation struggle as the easy-riders who merely observed at best, and traitors of the nationalist cause at worst.<sup>89</sup> Another consequence is that students are raised to unquestionably believe that these past generations of students died highly ‘honorable deaths’, that what they did was the ‘moral’ thing to do. By presenting them as role models teachers are creating a sense of duty to their own pupils, engendering an expectation for them to- if not follow their footsteps- at least ensure that the nationalist cause they died for does not go ‘wasted’. The ball is now in their own hands to ensure that this cause remains alive and that the due respect for their ancestors- without which they would not be ‘free’ today- is paid. Even architecture is used to remind students of their

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<sup>89</sup> On the other extreme, the presence of Turkish-Cypriots is largely ignored during the EOKA struggle, leading to such misplaced understandings as those saying that the referendum organized by the Church in 1950 and the resulting overwhelming support for enosis (95.7%) was voted by all Cypriots, and not just the Greek-Cypriots. See documentary by Danae Stylianou, ‘Sharing an Island’, 2011.

duties: a monument at the entrance of one of Limassol's largest high school (Laniteio Lyceum) consists of a girl and a boy who died as EOKA student fighters.

In 1956 PEKA, (Political Committee of the Cypriot Struggle) was set up as the political wing of EOKA, consisting of respectable intellectuals and other personalities of the time, including teachers and priests. One of its core aims was to promote EOKA's activities to the public through informal education on the struggle, its origin and importance. In 1958, it was led by Tassos Papadopoulos, a barrister in his early twenties, who was later to become leader of DHKO (right-wing) and President of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), (in)famous for leading the Greek-Cypriot community into rejecting the Annan Plan in 2004. When so many of those politically active during both the anti-colonial struggle and in the years before the Turkish invasion, were the same politicians that ruled Cyprus five decades later, the robust strands of political continuity are not surprising.

Certain villages where these heroes came from, or were arrested or executed have been hallmarked with these heroes' names, 'branded' and commemorated proudly and collectively- the 'heroization' of the particular region or village again an example of collective memory.

In Cyprus, it would be considered as treason to say that this anti-imperialist struggle was not worth their lives, as the independence of Cyprus is often attributed, rightly perhaps to their efforts. But whether these efforts were worth risking their lives from such a young age is another matter altogether. Again, the fact that these executions of young people are today taught to students who are often close to their own age before

they died, has an implicit goal (and often effect) of raising not only national consciousness and feelings of revenge but a heavy burden of duty, the moral and patriotic obligation as their successors, to continue this struggle by protecting this freedom that was gained with so many sacrifices. Children are raised to feel that they owe it to their heroes, as it is because of them that they are alive and independent today- independent, but not ‘free’, as of course they will only be truly free and liberated once the Turkish occupation forces are out of the island.

As we have already seen in Chapter One, there was no common Cypriot identity, but the majority of the population identified themselves with the Greek nation, sharing a common descent, a common language, religion and culture. Cyprus was the ‘homeland’, but Greece was the ‘motherland’. Therefore it was imperative historically to try and keep this collective homogeneous memory and identity alive through culture, media, and education. Hence, an important task of Cypriot schoolbooks was to reproduce a narrative that would connect the Cypriot students to their ‘origins’ and their ‘motherland’ in mainland Greece. This was especially so with regards to history textbooks and the historical narrative as it had the largest potential to expose the atrocities of the ‘other’ over a long period of time (see Chapter One and Table 1.1. p.95) on the one hand, and cultivate strong nationalist sentiments on the other. These history textbooks were born through the need for an educated but patriotic citizen that would help preserve and protect the ethnic origins. They reflected the goals of the time as we have seen historically: earlier it was union with Greece, after it was the reversal of the status quo to the pre-1974 invasion and the returning back to the homeland, ‘do not forget’ struggle. Besides, because of these beliefs, importing schoolbooks from Greece to be taught in Cyprus schools was seen as a natural

development and has only very recently been questioned, and attempts have been made to change this policy primarily as a result of the financial crisis rather than out of any political motivations (interview with high school teacher).

### Schools, and the Authority of the Educator in Cyprus

If it is problematic to give a history of the conflict without ignoring the sensitivities and subjectivities that come with it, then it is not hard to see how challenging it is to actually *teach* these histories to school children (see Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007; Bekerman and Zembylas, 2012). In practice, what happens is that not only do schools avoid presenting both sides of the story, they in fact strategically use this opportunity to impose what they present as the ‘true’ and righteous narrative, thereby delegitimising both the existence of the other, and any narrative that may come with it. The ultimate goal and a *raison d’être* given by educators for following this policy, is to pay their ‘patriotic duty to their tortured island’. This, I argue, has resulted in a politicisation of the educational structures in Cyprus, whereby pedagogical tools and processes are used to serve political purposes, in ways that potentially misrepresent the past at best, and abuse the past at worst. The educators which perform such acts, regardless of whether a misrepresentation is done consciously or perceived as one, genuinely believe that this politicisation is the right and moral thing to do, as by doing their patriotic duty they are paying justice to the (perceived) truth and vice versa. Such pedagogical practices become possible as a result of the education apparatus being inherently infused with power asymmetries and hierarchies.

Schools are not merely settings in which meanings are negotiated, but are also 'institutional organizations with political 'overtones' which strongly influence the parameters and outcome of interaction exchanges' (Eggleston and Gleeson, 1977, p.23). Recognising this feature is necessary for comprehending the nature of the limitations for change in educational institutions.

'Educational arrangements help to confirm and legitimate the distribution of power in societies' (Eggleston and Gleeson, 1977, p.15) and it is precisely this power that is responsible for maintaining the educational arrangements. As Bernstein reminds us 'how a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public reflects both distribution of power and the principles of social control' (Bernstein, 1971, cited in Eggleston and Gleeson, 1977, p.15). The school curriculum and its pedagogical functions is a core vehicle for managing and transmitting this knowledge.

The school, seen, as a venue and vehicle for reproducing and creating knowledge, is not something novel. In fact it is this appreciation of the school's functions and powers that can explain the energies poured by the state into reproducing these identities but also in creating forces of resistance, discursive and institutional that can protect and prevent any attempts to reverse, reform, or diverge this line of reproduction. Recognition of the central role of the school as a reproductive mechanism may seem as an obvious point, but is this crucial importance society attributes to the school that can explain this fascination/obsession with 'protecting' the school from perceived threats to change the way it functions vis-à-vis the Cyprus problem.

Teachers need to operate within existing structures, where tensions exist between educational processes, politics, and their occupational arrangement (Gleeson, 1977, p.5). According to Dale (1977), a teacher uses the prevalent pedagogy, the unwritten shared understandings which determine the teachers behaviour, what he refers to as the 'hidden curriculum', not as a direct result of his/her wishes to reproduce society's characteristics in the school, but as a consequence of the lack of alternative tools or choices. Teachers are therefore, left with no other alternative but to (unconsciously) use the hidden curriculum if they wish to survive the system and avoid potentially hostile reactions. Beyond the fact that in Cyprus these shared understandings are far from 'hidden' but clearly and openly flooding shared understandings and guidance information (both formal, informal, written and verbal), Dale's argument raises another issue that warrants further discussion. This concerns the role of the teacher, and the need to clarify between different types of teachers in Cyprus. It would be misleading, to say the least, to suggest that Dale's argument applies to the majority of teachers in Cyprus. In fact, (as my interviews show) teachers who endorse the curriculum and reproduce the wider conflict ethos, not only do it consciously, but see it as their duty. Teachers, who 'fail' to do fulfill this 'obligation' are criticised and frowned upon. On the other side of the spectrum are the exceptions, those teachers who do unequivocally and overtly reject the dominant nationalist narrative and do risk hostile reactions, on both a personal and professional level.

There is however a more 'fuzzy' category which may overlap with both the above groups. Firstly, there are those teachers who reject the nationalist narrative in principle, either partly or wholly, but do not dare go 'against' the prevailing system,



fearing the risks. Fear of the risks (ostracisation, criticism, being sacked) is greater than their ideological affiliations or their determination to support these in the public sphere. Within this group there may be teachers who reject the nationalist narrative but still seek to initiate reform discreetly, through the existing system. Secondly, there are also those teachers who use the curriculum because they have been taught, trained and socialized into doing so, and genuinely are not able to see the clouds of mystification that Greene (1977) refers to. Although all of the teachers fit within the terrains of productive power, both discursive and institutional, it is arguably the two groups within the ‘fuzzy category’ that best exemplify the capacity and impact of this power.

Another point is that in schools in Cyprus where critical thinking is promoted and taught, and mastered, it is often done in a very strategic way: even here the conflict dynamics come into play, and the student is taught how to critically evaluate the information around them but through a dangerously invisible lens of prejudice at best, and racism and distortion at worst. In a sense, what emerges is not so much critical thinking, but thinking which is very suspicious and critical of alternative positions. Indeed, NGOs like the AHDR focus their efforts on the development of critical thinking skills i.e. presenting the issue more as a skills defect rather than as an explicit or strategic prejudice. This necessitates a more serious consideration on behalf of educators of what critical thinking means and how it can also be misused.

Teachers, a substantial proportion of whom are still educated in Greece, (even if they attend the University of Cyprus, the guidelines are based on Greek higher education systems) return to Cyprus and can only teach in state schools if their university degree

is ‘recognised’ from the government’s authorizing institution called KYSATS. If for example, one has a history degree from Greece or Cyprus, they can teach in secondary education schools in Cyprus, and their degrees are automatically authorized, where as someone with a history degree from anywhere in the world, but without having the specific courses instigated by the Greek universities e.g. Ancient Greek or Latin, then their degree is not recognised as equal to the Greek/Cypriot degrees, and their holders cannot teach in state schools, unless they separately enroll and attend these courses. Arguably, it would be safe to say that most intellectuals who support peace education in Cyprus have attended universities outside Cyprus, even if only for postgraduate qualifications. It is not surprising that most of those educators who vehemently support Greek nationalist education policies and are against peace education initiatives in general, or history textbook initiatives in particular have had their tertiary education in Cypriot or Greek universities. This is not to point out a fixed pattern, besides there are academics that support peace education like Charis Psaltis, Yiannis Papadakis and Maria Hadjipavlou at the University of Cyprus and Maria Repoussi at Aristotle University in Greece, but to point out that if the educators themselves are only drawn from the same system that produces resistance to peace education, then this makes it hard for the cycle to be interrupted.

#### 4.3.2. Religion as an institution in Cyprus: Church and Education

As we have seen in the history of Cyprus and the history of education in Cyprus, the demarcation between the state and religion is blurred. ‘Πατρίδα-Θρησκεία-Οικογένεια’ (home/motherland-religion-family) were the three ideals taught and highly valued within the Greek Cypriot community, and even still taught as a life-

motto in schools today, or through informal education processes (family, *catechitika*<sup>90</sup> etc). Hence the Orthodox Church still has a significant impact on state policies over education.

The Greek identity was historically developed in terms of ‘language, social institutions and values, customs and traditions, and their Orthodox Christian religion’ (Stavrinides, 1999, p.10). The Church had already become an official institution of the State since the time of the Byzantine Empire.

Historically, religion and the state in Cyprus were strongly linked: “the political leaders are the religious leaders” in Cyprus according to a House of Commons debate in 1956. (Mr. Desmond Donnelly, HC Deb 19 July 1956 vol. 556, 1486). We have already noted the role of priests in promoting EOKA values through *catechitika* (see also Aggelidou, 2011, p.28). The anti-colonial struggle was represented ‘as a religious crusade to be waged with a bible in one hand and the sword in the other, the rebels as Christian warriors headed by Christ, the new Champion of Liberty’ (Crawshaw, 1978, pp. 278-88). The more disillusioned it became with Greece and its Western allies, the more EOKA and PEKA propaganda emphasised the importance of turning to Jesus Christ for help. Teachers had to put politics before education, foster nationalism and encourage their pupils to protest or else face persecution. The subjects of religion and Greek nationalist history “were prescribed as the perfect curriculum for the education of Greek Cypriot youth” (Crawshaw, 1978, pp.278-88).

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<sup>90</sup> *Catechitika* (Κατηχητικά) is the Greek name for Sunday schools, although they now take place any day of the week. This is usually an hour-long class where volunteers, usually priests or school teachers, teach young people (usually 6-16 years of age) about the Orthodox Christian faith. The word derives from the verb ‘κατηχέω’ which means ‘to teach orally’.

Another interesting example is from Papa Loizos, a Greek-Cypriot priest living in Argaki whose mother and father died as a result of Turks invading the nearby village, and whose 90 year-old friend was gang raped by Turkish soldiers. He said he saw his dead parents as ‘Christian martyrs’ who ‘died the death of martyrs for their religion and for their native land’ (Loizos, 1981, pp.97-98)

It is important to keep in mind the changes brought about by the British administration and the resulting tenuous relations between the British and the Greek Cypriots (see Chapter One). The secular British reforms did not grasp the ‘state-church’ relationship that placed the Archbishop in the position of an ‘ethnarch’, being at the same time both a spiritual head and a leader of the nation. Instead, British changes to the political landscape challenged the established authority of the Church in fundamental ways (Michael, 2009, pp.11-12). Most crucially for our topic, it interfered with the stronghold of the Church over matters of educational governance. Instead of detaching education from the influence of the church however, British policies only served to strengthen Church efforts to promote Greek nationalism. Viewed as a social movement, the struggle for *enosis* can hence be seen as an effort by the traditionally powerful to reassert their authority (Markides, 1974). Since most Cypriots during the EOKA struggle lived in villages, and each village usually had their own Church and priest, the importance of this community unit with its existing network of churches and schools should not be underestimated. As Michael argues, ‘the priest and the teacher were the most important and respected bearers of norms and beliefs’ within the rural community (2009, p.12). In fact, it can be argued that their role was often conflated: traces of this legacy can be even found in contemporary discourse. In July 2013, I was invited for dinner at a friend’s home in

rural Larnaca. A very well-respected and spiritual priest was present, and it was interesting to see that everyone had gathered around him by the end of the night asking him questions about the role of the Orthodox faith, but referring to him as ‘Daskale’ (Δάσκαλε), meaning Teacher, and not with the ‘Father’ prefix that members of the clergy are usually addressed. The churches and the schools were the mediums through which nationalism, and nationalist education was institutionalised.

This historical context offers helpful insights in understanding the force with which the Church advocated *enosis* in the past, as well as contemporary discourses which still include strong elements of securitisation (see Chapter Five). The Church and Greek nationalism are presented by the Archbishop and his officials even today, as always under threat or attack from an ‘outsider’, who threatens to reduce their authority and legitimacy. This helps explain the constant need (and efforts) to reaffirm the importance of the church, through regular interventions in state, and especially education, matters. These are usually made through press articles, interviews with the Archbishop that are broadcast during ‘prime time’ evening news, education circulars, Archbishopric participation in school events, meetings with the youth, offering financial assistance and scholarships etc. Through these mediums reference is often made to the past legacy of the Church’s role and contribution to civil and political matters as a ‘reminder’ of why the Church needs to ‘react’ to perceived threats and why its views and voice deserve to be heard and taken seriously.

A more theological aspect that strengthens the Church’s call for resistance to change is that at the essence of the Orthodox religion is a core theme, that of continuity and of preserving the Orthodox tradition of the holy fathers, passed on from generation to

generation, for over 2000 years. This is something that bishops across the Orthodox world agree on and emphasise in their speeches. Yet, when placed in the context of the Cyprus conflict, this attitude seems to strengthen the rationale behind resisting educational changes that seem to act as a break from this tradition.

It is perhaps no wonder that diaspora communities seem to have been more successful in keeping religious traditions, even if this is done not so much out of a spiritual but of a social need. People cling to religion as a way to keep strong community ties and the cultural traditions alive. Living in a country away from the motherland, hence being threatened from all the other competitive cultures and religions makes it all the more important to be conscious and protective about keeping the heritage and traditions intact and passing them on to the future generations. In fact, it is a common joke in contemporary Cypriot communities to refer to the diaspora communities especially those in the UK, as backward, mocking them for their mixed accents but mostly for their paradoxically close-minded discourses which seem to be ‘frozen’ in time, whilst living a very modern lifestyle, in one of the most modern countries of the world. These diaspora communities are arguably more likely to securitise peace education. It is characteristic to note that during national celebration days, even when these do not fall on a Sunday, are celebrated during the liturgy on a Sunday, together with a fully decorated church with Cypriot, but mostly Greek flags. In fact, upon entering the church on such a day, you are given a small sticker in the shape of a circle bearing both the Cypriot and Greek flags- activities rarely seen in churches in contemporary mainland Cyprus.

Another interesting way in which theological aspects are infused with political ones is that both historical and contemporary discourse relating to Easter, celebrating the Resurrection of Christ, contains wishes for an analogous ‘resurrection of Cyprus’ meaning ‘freedom from the Turkish oppressors’.<sup>91</sup>

#### 4.3.3. The role of the media: Constructing news about peace education

The media in Cyprus have played a crucial role in playing up with existing fears and building on nationalist sentiments- the "Achilles' heel" of the Greek-Cypriot public. With very few exceptions (i.e. articles appearing in the more liberal *Politis* newspaper or the *Cyprus Mail*, an English-language daily), the media distort peace education, manipulate ethnic fears and exaggerate the facts. The media has been notorious for inflaming ethnic hatred. As Wolfsfeld has argued, the media can prove to be ‘destructive agents’ in the peace process, by pointing out to the dangers of giving concessions and by reinforcing existing stereotypic images of the enemy (2004, p.1). When one studies ROC newspapers, he/she will not find a single cartoon promoting the peace process in terms of peace education, not even a single headline.

When looking at the Greek-Cypriot press it soon becomes obvious that peace education discourse is almost non-existent, and when sporadically used it is usually framed in a negative ethnocentric way. Not only is peace education distorted in terms of what it should include but also it is presented as if its only task and potential is the changing of history textbooks, which even here is associated with the burning of our

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<sup>91</sup> Such comments are present in both informal social discourse but also in the formal statements made by the political parties every Easter. This was a common saying even before the invasion, where ‘resurrection’ symbolized liberation from British rule and unification with Greece (see for example, Aggelidou, 2011, p.42).

sacred history, making peace education sound as a dreadful event avoided at all costs. It is presented by the media as an attempt to silence the 'truth' of the past; to de-hellenicise Cyprus and break off its roots with its Greek traditions and history. The Archbishop Chrysostomos quote is remarkably telling: "We will not allow the distortion of history. We shall be totally opposed and will go as far as urging children to throw away such books" (*Cyprus Mail*, November 11, 2008).

Some journalists genuinely believe what they write, but others, are just 'going with the flow'. Newspapers are understandably afraid that they will lose their readers if they say something positive about the enemy. This essentially comes down to the nature of the media. The media reflect but also reinforce public opinion: they need to reflect it in order to please the public, tell them what they *want* to hear in order to keep them as readers, but at the same time they have the capacity to strengthen existing beliefs. They have the ability to change public opinion but only on issues that the reader himself/herself is willing to allow this change to take place. There are some issues that the reader is as closed-minded as a brick wall.

Moreover, another reason making the media and peace education incompatible is that the media demands immediacy and excitement, and this is what violence brings, where as peace is a long process which in Cyprus is not really exciting to hear about because there are not many things going on, and even when peacebuilding events are happening people do not want to hear about them. The majority of the people perceive the peace activists as traitors. It is difficult for the media to reconcile with the needs of peace (and in our case peace education). News media has a natural flair and capacity to promote nationalism and ethnocentrism, and whilst this remark might seem



contrary to the popular assumption that journalists tend to be more liberal in their political doctrines, the reality is that the primary motivation dictating which news are reported is not political (of the journalist) but rather comes down to commercial interests (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.8). As Wolfsfeld (2004) reminds us, it is the media owners, not the journalists who 'make policy', and these media magnates often have established personal links with the political apparatus of the state. This is another example of how in practice, personal values and beliefs do not always translate into political views, let alone political practice (i.e. in terms of writing about the peace process). So although a journalist might support peace education, he or she might not be given a chance to express this in the news reports either because it is not something exciting or because it will be extremely unpopular and seen as an action of betrayal.

It comes as no surprise, in light of the existing political situation, with new information coming out about the massacres and the revelations about the 'ending' the missing persons had and the continuous hostile statements from politicians of both sides, that the media is not enthusiastically embracing the peace process. But by the same token, it can play a vital role in the peace process, and in the general project of peace education by 're-humanizing past enemies, changing stereotypes, and opening the public debate about currently neglected and traumatic issues' (Popadic, 2002, p.13). Documentaries promoting the truth (e.g. crimes committed by both sides, urging both sides to accept responsibility) being broadcast on both sides at the same time can have considerable influence, especially on those non-extremist members of the population.

The media needs to be actively involved in the transformation of the public's perceptions towards the peace process. Before any of this can have any significant impact however, there needs to be a top-down decision by the government officials of both sides, who have a stronghold over the media apparatus. It is obvious that the intractability of the conflict in Cyprus just like with the Israel-Palestine conflict partly stems from the fact that the leaders of both sides have never really promoted the peace process in such a way so as to involve the government structures in this; they feed the education system with the traditional narrative and ensure that the media continues 'business as usual'.

#### 4.3.4. The family as an institution in Cyprus

A patriarchal structure arguably exists in Cyprus, with some women still asking their husbands how to vote in elections. There is a strong reproduction of 'coffee-shop' discourse, with children parroting parent values and party affiliations due to a strong clientelistic culture (Faustmann 2010). People still listen to their party leaders on how to vote, and women and children often to the husband, who is the 'head' of the house and is 'knowledgeable', although this is becoming less common with women of the younger generation.

According to Nora: 'We have seen the end of societies that had long assured the transmission and conservation of collectively remembered values, whether through churches or schools, the family or the state...' (1989, p.7). I argue that this is not the case in Cyprus and that in fact the family, the state, the churches and the schools have

together ensured the transmission of collective memory from one generation to the next. Cyprus suffers from tremendous condensation of historical perception. If as Nora argues, memory is a 'bond' that ties us to the 'eternal present' where as 'history is a representation of the past' (1989,p.8), in Cyprus this past has become the eternal present, historical memory passing down through generations, with all the dangers that this entails.

Podeh notes that 'the fact that school textbooks were in the past prejudiced and thereby contributed to the escalation of the conflict failed to penetrate the consciousness of large sectors of Israeli society' (2002, p.61, cited in Peled-Elhanan, 2012, p.11). The same is true for Cyprus. As we saw the history books were from Greece, and presented the Turkish Cypriots as Turks who were foreign to this land, intruders. But we must not expect that this argument will just 'penetrate the consciousness' of the people without systematic efforts, especially given the cyclical nature of peace education. It is hard as it is to even talk about peace education, let alone convince the majority of the people of its necessity and importance. In depth discourse analysis of history textbooks only started five years ago, and although this has been a growing area of research, there is still a lot of work that needs to be done both in the academic and policy sector, as well as a better communication between the two, and between these and the public sphere. Academics must try to improve their research impact factor, communicating their ideas to a non-technical audience through traditional and new media, but also through civil society organizations such as peacebuilding NGOs. We must not underestimate the ripple effect of such activities, although nor should we limit our efforts to these. There should be more explicit discussions as to what needs to be done to break the barrier and to allow open

discussions to take place in the public sphere without the fear of being castigated, isolated and even the victim of online hate crime.

There is the need to promote more constructive dialogue within and across families, as well as the acceptance that there is not only 'one' truth. This 'modernist' frame can be seen in Cypriot everyday culture and can partly explain why attitudes are so 'impatient with ambiguities' (Novick, 1999, pp.3-4) about different perspectives and interpretations. These issues of respect and tolerance are basic social skills that are still not prevalent in Cyprus (and arguably the conflict dynamics have not allowed these to develop to the same extent as they would if this nationalist framework, this 'conflictive ethos' (Bar-Tal, 2000) was not all-pervasive, not 'a way of life'. Or, these skills do exist but only up to the point just before the conflict line. When the conflict is concerned, it is like the people's Achilles heel is hit, and they suddenly jump up, to wear a completely different persona. This is similar to the change from peace to war conditions, where someone otherwise peaceful and calm turns into a killer because (s)he sees it as necessitated by the conditions in which (s)he operates. The setting is perceived to change and they enter a 'defence' mode in order to protect themselves from possible attack. This is, I would dare argue, a similar process, although not with regards to a violent war, but a rather long-term 'cold war'- time has not had the result of dissipating the dynamics of the conflict but in fact of embedding them even deeper in the social and cultural milieu of Cypriot society. We, therefore, need to desecuritize education and recognise the imminent dangers that are associated with ethnic education.

This is not something unique to Cyprus but is typical of conflictual societies, where ‘questions of collective and individual identities are still ‘passionately’ debated and often become heated arguments and even history wars’ (Zrubabel, 2002, cited in Peled-Elhanan, 2012, p.14). Such is the case of repeated argument which still causes serious controversy in the political arena between Left and Right (see Chapter One). The Left will hold the Cyprus flag, where as members of the Right will exhibit the Greek one. The intense politicisation of this conflict can even be seen in sports, and in particular in football games, where even the teams are usually politically aligned to a particular party and where events have occurred like the burning of the Greek flag for example during football matches between politically opposite teams.

### Resistance to Peace Education Made Possible

It has been my contention throughout the thesis that resisting peace education reduces the prospects of conflict-resolution in Cyprus. Yet, resistance towards peace education initiatives comes with an additional, (social-psychological) cost to Greek Cypriots. Foucault does not fail to warn us of the dangers of preventing the assimilation of the past, with all its conflicts and contradictions, into the present experience of a child. This system of education he argues, increases the distance between childhood and adulthood:

That is to say, by sparing the child conflicts, it exposes him [sic] to a major conflict, to the contradiction between his [sic] childhood and his [sic] real life. (Foucault, [1954] 1987, p. 81).

What we witness in Cyprus, of course, is not the ‘sparing’ of conflict, but the inclusion of only one side of it. As we saw in Chapter One, the historical narrative presented in schoolbooks suffers from selective amnesia with regards to the ‘other’s’ pain, trauma, story. Yet, this education acts as an impediment, when for example, an adult wishes not to meet or engage with a Turkish-Cypriot at all, or as a highly contradicting and confusing element, when an adult meets a Turkish-Cypriot for the first time, and realizes that they are actually ‘human’, and even have their own valid story of trauma.<sup>92</sup> Then he or she is left with many a-porias; puzzled and confused about being left in the ‘dark’ but also at a loss with regards to how to move forward, how to make sense of the new social reality that the added narrative has produced. The latter a-poria, meaning ‘without passage’, is usually followed by the discovery of an alternative marginalized path offered by peacebuilding civil society. The former aporia, can be somewhat alleviated- if not answered- by reference, once more, to Foucault. Foucault deplores the fact that:

“in its educational institutions, a culture does not project its reality directly, with all its conflicts and contradictions, but that it reflects it indirectly through the myths that excuse it, justify it, and idealize it in a chimerical coherence; if one adds that in its education a society dreams of its golden age ...” (1987, p.81)

As Foucault reminds us, each society has its own forms of acceptance and refusal, its own positive and negative valuations, where ‘moral significations are engaged and defenses come into play; barriers are erected and all the rituals of exclusion

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<sup>92</sup> This experience of surprise, anger, disappointment and guilt is well-documented during peace education workshops, documentaries, or other informal ‘enlightening’ experiences which bring one in contact with the other narrative (See for example, Papadakis, 2005; Danae Stylianou, 2011; Chapter Three of this thesis)

organized' (1987, p.78). There are different 'tactics of separation', e.g. geographical separation, social separation, or simply the fear-inducing possibility of separation, and these serve as a framework for the recognition of one as worthy of their educational and hence, national identity. This framework of recognition/non-recognition is based on the lines of cultural valuation mentioned above which dictate how social space is divided, and offer a socially constructed threshold. Although the threshold is always subjective, contingent and as Foucault argues, liable to evolve with the configuration of the particular culture (1987, p.78), its existence not only enables this judgment to be made, but also 'normalizes', legitimizes, and reinforces the tactics of separation, merely by its existence. This framework of recognition/non-recognition is made possible by and implicated in the production of educational institutions and discourses, both formal and informal that constitute the socialization of Greek-Cypriot adults. Resistance to peace education, therefore, becomes a possibility.

#### **4.4. Counter-hegemony: What is the power of the NGOs?**

Gramsci argues that above all you have to change the peoples' ability to control social forces. But how do you do this? You need to change the education system, but to change it you need to be in control, and to be in control you need to change the peoples' minds which are preventing you from getting this power. Mardle brings to the surface two important aspects, that also apply to the Cyprus context, firstly, 'the way in which labels are attached indiscriminately to proponents of alternative views' and secondly, 'the way in which the validity of a particular view is maintained regardless of the type or form of evidence provided to dispute such a position'

(Mardle, 1977, p.141). The former has to do with discourse (analysed in Chapter Five) and the second has to do with the hegemonic structures that prevent people from even considering, alternative views, but also of the NGOs to present this evidence in the first place- discursive space is not given for this.

Does informal peace education have the strength to change things? The answer is arguably, a negative one. Informal efforts cannot provide overarching or substantial changes on their own but their impact is limited to individuals that tend to attend the meetings- who are often the same group of people. Although there are definitely ‘ripple’ effects through these individuals, these efforts ultimately have little impact on the hegemonic institutions which decide on policy.

Earlier, reference was made to those teachers who are both part of NGOs but also work within the system as educators in state schools, trying to bring about change in an indirect way. This brings to the fore ‘the actual nature of the contradictions in which teachers and pupils work’ and how these ‘may provide the conditions through which alternative ‘theory’ and radical consciousness may emerge’ (Eggleston and Gleeson, 1977, p.23). Eggleston and Gleeson rightly probe us to think about all those educators which:

‘seek to initiate reforms through education, whilst working within processes which serve to reproduce and legitimate existing patterns of power and political hierarchy’ (1977, p.23).



Nevertheless, the rather ‘covert’ way that NGOs seem to label these efforts up until the time of writing this thesis (from my interview with the president of an NGO, for example, there was no explicit reference to peace education and they justified this by saying that it is too early for such changes) is not only too slow but it does not take into consideration the sensitive Greek-Cypriot culture that has always had this ‘foreign-imposition’ trauma on them. This is how they felt in the 1950s with the struggle against the British, in the 1960s with the perceived imposed Republic and its constitution, in 1974 with Turkey invading, and this is also another explanation as to why the Annan Plan (2004) was seen as imposed by foreigners who were serving American and Turkish interests. Similarly, Greek Cypriots become suspicious (and even hysterical) when they see that there are other international organisations or foreigners behind certain projects, so they always ask who is funding these projects in order to discern ‘whose interests’ are being served.

Gramsci allows us to point to the particular form of educational hegemony, that is historically contingent upon the resistance (i.e. peace education) which has emerged in opposition to state policies and discourses. This hegemony then assumes its own role as resistance to counter-hegemony, which does not have to occur in reaction to a produced event, but to the prospect of something materialising. For example, there is resistance to the prospect of peace education becoming hegemonic, both as discourse and policy.

#### **4.5. Peace Education as a site of institutional struggle: educational Hegemony as Resistance to counter-hegemony**

One of the obstacles to peace education is that there are no infrastructures with which to legitimise this concept but also with which to galvanize support for it; it lacks permanent bureaucratic structures that can create and manage peace education processes, give authority and validity to them, and offer a public forum for dialogue opportunities. Lack of informed professional staff is another practical issue: when it comes to peace education as we have seen there are very little theoretically informed attempts and not enough efforts to marry theory with practice. Moreover, the fact that the educational system is highly politicised presents a structural constraint to any possibilities of influence which do not align with the politicians' views. Consequently, peace education remains handicapped without any medium with which it can broaden its impact and spread outwards.

We need the establishment of new institutions and the evolution of the existing ones 'whose purpose would be to cater for their constituents above and beyond any interethnic considerations' (Michael, 2009, p.141). Until now these institutions have acted as a catalyst and a powerful force when needed, in order to resist counter-hegemonic initiatives, and dragging the Greek-Cypriot community down into even deeper antagonistic channels. Nationalist attitudes towards peace education are part of a 'social code' (Michael, 2009, p.201) that is shaped, consolidated and reproduced by the institutional and discursive constraints within which the conflict is set. This chapter by shedding light on these exclusionary attitudes, offers a window into the conflict's particular institutional characteristics in relation to educational governance, exposing the underlying historical, social, cultural and political conditions that account for the particular educational hegemony. Power disparities between anti- and

pro-peace education elements will continue to be the defining force in this struggle, unless the balance of consensus and legitimacy changes in favour of peace education policies. Unless current institutions evolve from institutions of conflict with a conflict ethos, to ones that resemble infrastructures conducive to peacebuilding, it is unlikely that the hegemonic order will be destabilised.

As we have already seen, hegemony refers to the processes by which the values of the nationalist educational policies are promulgated through institutions such as the school, the family and the church, thus being internalized by the masses. But is this a matter of the masses simply being duped into a 'false consciousness', believing what the social elite wish them to believe? The answer is yes, with regards to the political elite influencing the masses and ensuring this reproduction, and no for the social elite- perhaps this was the case in the past but not anymore, since it is not a matter of elite and non-elite but a matter of hegemonic and marginalised, as class distinctions arguably do not have a determining role. Besides, in Gramsci's historical writings the state is forced to form historical blocs of classes, alliances that cut across class boundaries. Thus, the values which have become hegemonic 'are not simply those of the ruling class, but are also those of subaltern groups with whom the ruling class has formed political alliances' (Friedman, 1996, p.3). This is concomitant with the idea put forward earlier that there are not just 'spoilers' in Cyprus, but that they also have their 'followers', and their relationship is now dialectical and not a one-sided top-down one. The spoilers are constrained by the need to please and keep their followers, responding to their desires and demands. Yet, these demands have been shaped by discursive practices initiated by spoilers. Therefore, 'the strategies adopted by the

state are the product of social struggles' rather than just existing in opposition to them.

#### **4.6. Conclusion**

This chapter has attempted to highlight the institutional power relations upon which educational policies and their imagined educational communities are predicated. The authorisation of specific educational policies and the refutation of others indexes the power relationships between those who control educational policy and those who do not, but most importantly between those who hold the hegemonic ideology regarding such policies, and those who do not. In some paradoxical sense, the conflict context, and more specifically, the fact that the policies that are allowed are nationalistic and those refused take a more positive approach to the perceived enemy has refracted attention from these power relationships. It is almost as if such positions should be taken for granted amidst a conflict setting, hence masking the unequal vertical power dynamics within the Greek-Cypriot community. This is not to ignore the fact that horizontal issues, related to the Other, are intricately involved in this, but rather to emphasise how the relationships *within* a community are asymmetrical before pointing out the impact this has on relationships between the two communities. The role of education itself in the production and reproduction of unequal power relationships through national identity has also been highlighted when investigating the power relationships that have authorised and safeguarded these education policies in the first place.

Arguably, institutions are the backbone of a hegemonic order that marginalizes peace education. My approach in this chapter has been to analyse those historical and contemporary circumstances and social relations that are infused within a matrix of power asymmetry, exposing the hegemonic order that has impeded the realisation of peace education in Cyprus. I have also looked at those conditions and institutions that have instead, attempted to counter-act this hegemonic order, by facilitating peaceagogy into the Cypriot society. Although complex dynamics produced different possibilities for success, at different times, nevertheless, overall these counter-hegemonic institutions failed to collectively act as peace education catalysts, to overcome the threshold of marginalization and become hegemonic.

Positivistic traditions have tended to ignore the institutional processes through which knowledge is 'constructed and differentiated within social settings', taking their organization as something 'given' rather than 'made' (Gleeson, 1977, p.1). This chapter is an attempt to illustrate that what gives meaning to social settings or problems is not a fixed reality, but an on-going process, an iterative and interactive process, through which a particular social situation is understood, made possible and sustained through institutions such as the church, the school, the media, and the family. Emphasising the processes of socialisation, interaction and interpretation within an institutional setting opens up the possibility of transformation. It helps to avoid a reductionist reification of social structures. This does not mean change is easy- the power of the individual to transcend persisting structural circumstances and constraints should not be exaggerated- but merely that it is not an impossibility.

Behaviour and social practice are productive of the discourses and institutions that also produce them. This does not preclude an exposition of the conditions of possibility, of understanding the possibilities for change which is the essence of critical theory. This is where I contend that problem-solving approaches do not necessarily condemn us to the pessimistic position, but in fact should be used as the starting point for understanding the possibilities of change. This combination of problem-solving (Foucault) and critical theory (Gramsci) is arguably one that sees optimistic horizons of change amidst pessimistic structures of continuity.

While I argue that peace education is a sustainable peacebuilding tool that could prove pivotal to the Cyprus conflict, one needs to keep in mind that in such complex historical and intractable conflicts, setting out clear boundaries for what is right or wrong is inevitably problematic and is certain to arouse strong responses. Moreover, in a postmodern context 'responsibility becomes hard to pin down, and modern concepts of legitimacy are therefore drawn into doubt' (Diez, 2002, p.8).

The over-arching aim of this chapter was to ground the conceptual framework of the 'politics of peace education' into an institutional analysis, therefore moving towards a *progressive politics*. According to Foucault:

'A progressive politics is one which recognises the *historical conditions* and the specified *rules of a practice*, whereas other politics recognize only ideal necessities, univocal determinations, or the free play of individual initiatives' (Foucault, (1996) [1969], p.48, emphasis mine).

An indispensable part of this operation of power is the medium of discourse. Discourse operates as another medium, through which power operates and together with the medium of institutions is able to produce and reproduce an educational hegemonic order. It is not so much that one cannot operate without the other, but rather that the one is part of the other. As mentioned earlier, the two categories are used here not because they are mutually exclusive categories, but for the purpose of emphasising the different aspects, the different sides or faces of resistance.

## **CHAPTER FIVE– EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION II**

### **Discursive Politics of Peace Education in Cyprus**

*“The issue is...whether freedom of opinion has, for large masses of people, any meaning but subjection to the influence of innumerable forms of propaganda directed by vested interests of one kind or another.” (E. H. Carr, [1939] 1945, p. 135)*

*"Power is not simply repressive; it is also productive...Power produces knowledge"*  
*(Foucault quoted in Sheridan, 1980, p.217, p.220)*

#### **5.1. Discourse Matters**

E.H. Carr, in his seminal book *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939), referred to popular education as ‘the oldest, and still perhaps the most powerful’ instrument for ‘moulding and directing’ mass opinion ([1939] 1945, p. 134). The public of Cyprus, and of any other country for that matter, are highly aware of the powers of education. This partly explains the intense discursive struggle that ensues when matters of educational policy are concerned, crucially so in areas of conflict where the moulding of public opinion towards particular directions and vested interests, gains further urgency. Yet, education is but one of the many mediums of a wider power apparatus that can affect public opinion. In the previous empirical chapter I analysed other such instruments-institutions for influencing opinion such as the Church, the media, the cultural ‘common sense’. But going beyond institutional politics, there is a need to



understand what exactly this public opinion entails. How do Cypriots express their ideas, beliefs and emotions towards peace education? A focus on discursive politics allows us to delve into the power of discourse, both as producing and constituting public opinion.

Three questions, therefore, form the backbone of this chapter: How is peace education constructed in public discourse? How is it possible that certain educational identities and discourses have become hegemonic, and why? What are the implications/effects of these constructions? This approach, which combines both a critical and a conventional approach to ‘why’ type questions, allows for the problematisation of the discursive politics of peace education in Cyprus. It opens up space for illuminating ‘the way in which power works to constitute particular modes of subjectivity and interpretive dispositions’ (Doty, 1993, p.299) affecting ‘the way we think and act’ (George, 1994, p.191) i.e. the productive power, as well as the conventional power that is exercised through subjects.

The analysis of discourses points to two main discourses: the *positive* discourse, which is the marginalised one, and which articulates peace education within a discourse of necessity and support for peace; and the *negative* discourse which occupies a position of hegemony, rejects peace education and represents it within a discourse of fear and resistance. To capture the *discursive struggle* over peace education, I juxtapose the two discourses as ‘ideal types’ in the Weberian sense. Each of the two ideal types is formed by ‘one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints’ arranged ‘into a unified analytical construct’ (Weber, ([1904], 1949, p. 90) The aim is not to prove that one is right and the other is wrong, but to expose ‘predominant

interpretations of state practices’ while demonstrating ‘the inherently political nature of official discourses’ (Campbell, 1992; Milliken, 1999) and being sensitive to their ambiguities. These two basic discourses can be viewed as operating within a discursive strategy of *de-securitisation* and *securitisation*. These strategies when viewed under the machinations and effects of discursive power, can help explain how it is possible that certain educational identities and discourses have become hegemonic, where as others have remained marginal.

In terms of the particular effects of the hegemonic articulations, the empirical findings point towards three effects of discursive power, which are referred to as meta-strategies. Meta-strategies, on a higher level of abstractness, offer a theoretical understanding of the properties and effects of strategies. These forms of influence can be analytically separated into the possibility, impossibility, and deterrent effect. These should be thought of as different sides of the same effect i.e. of hegemonisation. All three forms of influence enable the strategy of securitisation, and through this contribute to the educational hegemony.

With regard to the structure of this chapter, one may have expected a separation of discourses according to institutions that were discussed in the previous chapter or their actors. It was, after all, particular individuals that formed the subjects of one of my research methods (interviews). I did not follow this approach because firstly, my aim is not to elucidate differences in discourse between institutions (e.g. between hegemonic media and Church discourses), but between the hegemonic and marginalised discourses. This, power asymmetry then, becomes the starting point for immersing into an analysis of the particular *hegemonic discourses* that sustain and are

sustained by this asymmetry. There is a shift of emphasis from differences between the two camps, two commonalities *within* each camp. Given that the commonalities within each camp (hegemonic and marginalised) are stronger than their divergences, the juxtaposition of hegemonic and marginalised discourses into an ‘ideal type’ division, becomes possible.

Since the overarching purpose of this thesis is to understand resistance to peace education, the majority of this chapter will focus on deconstructing and analysing discursive resistance, rather than discourses that support peace education. This approach allows certain common patterns, themes and strategies to emerge from the empirical analysis, which though may not be shared by all hegemonic discourses and to the same degree, they nevertheless seem to have persisted over time and across policy, regardless of which political party was in power. What is important is not whether the strategies are endorsed unequivocally by hegemonic actors, but that they exist in the first place, and the effect they have on marginalised discourses (including subjects and objects). Before delving into the discourses, it is worth explaining why discourses are so important.

## **5.2. Why do Discourses Matter?**

We cannot adequately understand the politics of peace education in Cyprus without examining the divergent and competing ‘modes of reasoning’ (Weldes, 1998) through which educational struggles are fought. Consistent with a Foucauldian approach (see Chapter Three) I perceive discourses as relatively autonomous, lacking a clear sense

of origin, or pre-existing subject. Discourses are historically located, yet contingent systems of representations that affect how people talk, think and construct social realities (Milliken, 1999, p.229). They matter as they form both the content and the context for social constructions. The level of analysis in this chapter is not the broader system of governance of educational hegemony, but the actual systems of representation of peace education; its existence as a pool of knowledge and its ripple effects.

This pool of knowledge consists of the ‘common sense’, as well as the various social norms, and those of Others. Particular ideas ‘shape group and individual attitudes which, communicated in discourse and determining other social practices, can either facilitate or hinder the achievement of peace’ (Schaffner and Wenden, 1999, p.xx). If we are ever to reduce the distance between peace educationalists and nationalists, then we need to understand what exactly is at the core of this system of interface- the intersubjectivity through which people articulate and make meaning of events and of others. This element has lead to anthropologists describing whole cultures as being ‘guided’ and even ‘determined, by a *core personality*’ (McDermott, 2008, p.118, emphasis mine). Intersubjectivity does not connote the existence of a single perspective, but rather that - despite the existence of different ideas which accommodate, contest and resist one another- the capacity of a particular system of meanings to become the hegemonic frame of understanding denotes the exercise of discursive power. To a large extent this capacity depends on the ability of a text to relate to the public’s experience or their interpretation of it (Hayward, 2011, p.5). In other words, the more the discursive text is able to both reflect and affect the realm of practice and context, the greater the discursive power.

An analysis of discourse exposes the discursive terrain as a site of struggle; a struggle for identity, for meaning, for discourse, for power. Discursive power brings with it access to privileged public space for expressing this discourse. Educational hegemony is achieved when the hegemonic discourse is strong, stable and internalized enough to appear as the norm. Yet, as we shall see, the orchestration of binary oppositions, of exposing the differences, has become as important to the functioning of the hegemonic order as the agreement on a common sense (McDermott, 2008, p.136).

In the context of this study, discourses expose how resistance and resilience to peace education becomes possible. For something to be *possible*, then this presupposes making intelligible/imaginable certain ways of thinking and courses of action (Milliken, 1999, p.229), which in turn requires that certain background knowledge, types of subjects, and social relationships are already in place (Doty, 1993, p. 298), operationalizing a particular truth-regime that excludes through its choice of inclusion (Foucault, 1981). To analyse these conditions of possibility, we must investigate the representation practices and strategies that enable the framing of peace education in a particular way, wielding the securitization capabilities that they do. In order to achieve this empirical analysis, I adopt a post-structuralist discourse methodology to deconstruct the negative representations of peace education, and use Securitization Theory to show how the *securitization* of peace education makes possible its marginalisation.

### 5.3. Discursive Power: How do hegemonic discourses over history textbooks matter?

The overall finding in terms of how peace education is constructed in Cypriot public discourse reveals a highly asymmetrical approach to educational identity construction. This asymmetry does not take the form of a top-down dynamic, in terms of the state and civil society, but rather a horizontal ‘hegemonic-marginalised’ approach. A particular system of power emerges that results in hegemonic behaviour. Educational hegemony in Cyprus is achieved through three effects of discursive power or ‘meta-strategies’. I refer to them as meta-strategies as they offer a theoretical understanding of the particular effects and properties of the securitisation strategy. They can be analytically separated into the possibility, impossibility, and deterrent effect (see Figure 5.1.).

#### 5.3.1. Educational Hegemony through discursive power: Possibility, Impossibility and Deterrence

This section depicts and unpacks the meta-processes involved in the productivity mechanism of hegemonic discourse. It should be noted that these processes should be seen as interconnected and not three different ways of influencing, as one cannot happen without the other two.

a) Defining/Promoting/Enabling effect → **Possibility**

Through the choice of how peace education will be defined, and what intertextual discourses they draw from there is an inevitable act of inclusion. Here influence occurs through, for example, setting the agenda and setting/giving access to the discursive space.

b) Exclusionary/Prohibitory/Disabling effect → **Impossibility**

Through choosing what is enabled or promoted in the above, and by the act of defining, an exclusion is involved. For example, the agenda may be restricted, or the discursive space is restricted, by limiting it to those actors and institutions which subscribe to the hegemonic ideology or 'common sense'. It renders alternative modes of thinking irrational, or otherwise worthy of rejection. Here, what is excluded is already in existence, but is constantly disabled.

c) Indirect Effect → **Deterrence**

Through the legitimization of the hegemonic choice, this has an indirect impact on the future choices of others, and on how it excludes them. Here, alternative modes of thinking are rendered unimaginable. Due to the fear of the potential risks associated with counteracting the hegemonic articulations of the status quo, such as social ostracisation, violation of human rights, humiliation and abuse, impending professional mobility etc. potential counter-hegemonic voices are silenced and actions are prevented.




Figure 5.1. Process cycle of Possibility, Impossibility and Deterrence

By occupying a hegemonic position, discourses that resist peace education, not only enable respective policies and agendas to follow, but also influence the capacity and impact of the counter-hegemonic efforts. Through this position of power they produce and reproduce representations that dictate what is regarded as normal, acceptable and legitimate, as well as identifying what does not fit the ‘common sense’ category, and should therefore be excluded. That is, there is a discursive influence over the ‘mentality’ of governmentality, reproducing the institutional power apparatus, and thereby ensuring that the cycle remains intact. This approach opens up a space for power to produce a particular educational policy and identity that securitizes and resists peace education, and suppress the one that supports peace education. Drastic power changes are aborted and these discursive influences are in operation, through the reconstitution of subject identities, and in this particular case, educational identity.



As we have seen, the power exercised through discourse is productive in that it produces certain possibilities, identities and social relations (Sorensen and Torfing, 1999 {in Danish}, cited in Kjaer, 2005, p.52). Discursive constructs act as regimes of truth (Foucault, 1980) regarding the nature and impact of peace education, producing particular forms of meaning while making certain alternatives impossible, and silencing the potential creation of others.

#### **5.4. Securitization Discourse**

Given that particular interpretations of peace education have become hegemonic, there is an urgent need to account for the discourses that produced this educational order. The following section therefore investigates the possibilities| impossibilities| and deterrents of practice that emerge from an analysis of the hegemonic discourses of peace education. In particular, it uses the frame of securitization in order to make sense of the different discursive strategies that achieve this effect. This will help us answer the question of how it is possible that the educational discourse and identity that resists peace education has become hegemonic and why. The discursive strategies deployed to legitimize the dominant political and cultural order regarding education are: chosen trauma; educational identity; intertextuality; and time.

Not all hegemonic discourses perform these strategies. These may or may not be used in conjunction with each other; they are not however, under any circumstance mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they are mutually reinforcing, and a variation of combinations is possible. The most powerful and effective results come when securitization is achieved through the use of more than one strategy, the one building

on the other in a pyramid-like way. The difference between the strategies is in the particular *way* that the discourses are mobilised and where the *emphasis* is placed, though the effect is the same in all the cases i.e. securitization of peace education.

When analysing these identities it is useful to keep in mind certain textual tools that can help us unpack discursive strategies: Predication, presupposition and subject positioning, can be used as methodological concepts for understanding how subjects and objects are constituted (Doty, 1993, p.306; see also Ahall and Borg, 2013). Discourses are collectively formulated, invoked and reproduced not necessarily consciously, but this should not stir us away from exploring discursive strategies that can enhance our understanding of this invocation, its presuppositions, predications and subject positionings (Doty, 1993). Discursive strategies are particularly useful in informing this discourse analysis as they illustrate the ways in which peace education has become (im)possible through the exercise of discursive power.

#### 5.4.1. What is Securitization?

Before delving into the particular discursive strategies, it is important to elaborate on what exactly Securitization is, as it offers an empirical frame for our findings. The theory of Securitization, is concerned with the process of securitisation. According to this theory, any social entity with adequate authority can position certain ideas, discourses, or problems as ‘existential threats’ in order to facilitate the implementation of extraordinary policy, in the interests of security (Wæver, 1995, p.52). Although Wæver uses ‘speech act’ i.e. the actual utterance of security as responsible for locating a particular issue in the realm of security, securitization is

used here as a wider framework of discourse, that may or may not explicitly utter this phrase. In the Greek language and Cypriot dialect, security is translated as/has the same meaning as safety (asfalia), therefore making it less powerful as a linguistic construct. Nevertheless, the general framing (Goffman 1974; Entman 1991; Ottosen 2005; Kempf and Thiel 2012) of the issue of peace education as a danger to the ‘survival and continuity’ of the Greek-Cypriots, and of new history textbooks as threatening both the educational identity (the referent object is part of the social sector of Securitisation theory) and as undermining the norms and institutions that constitute the state (political sector; see Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998, pp.22-3). Potential changes to history textbooks are seen as ‘invasive or heretical’ and their supporters as ‘existential threats’ (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998, p.23).

Another criterion for securitisation is that the securitizing move must be enacted by an authoritative entity. Securitisation of the educational identity due to peace education has been presented as a threat for survival, by the government, political elites, and priests, including the Head of the Church of Cyprus, Archbishop Chrysostomos II. Furthermore, even ordinary people in Cyprus, link security-even when this is thought of as military safety- with other seemingly de-politicised issues such as that of education. This shows that the public has responded to the securitization move. The ‘securitization of peace education’ amounts to the presentation of peace education, and in particular history textbooks and the ‘traitors’ who advocate them (both indigenous and foreign) as threats to the national cause vis-à-vis the Cyprus Conflict. Securitisation not only legitimizes the radical subject-positioning within hegemonic discourse, and the restriction of discursive space to alternative discourses, but also justifies ‘actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’ (Buzan, Wæver

and de Wilde, 1998, p.24). This includes social ostracisation, verbal abuse, impending of professional mobility, reverting to even more ethno-centric discourses, humiliation and other violations of human rights.

Peace education and potential changes to history textbooks are interpreted as a threat, a danger that society needs to guard against. This has become so familiar a discourse that a significant majority of people seem to have become consensual to this interpretation, without even agreeing on what exactly peace education is/would be. There is not only a common tendency to resist peace education, but also of seeing those who support it as illogical. Securitization theory is useful not only in illustrating and exposing these articulations but also enabling a critical questioning of these processes.

References to the wider conflict discourse serves as the predication of the particular discourse, especially in relation to peace education being perceived as a danger to national interests regarding the conflict. In the process of constructing this identity for the other, the nationalists reinforce and reconstruct their own identities, as ones that are vulnerable, and in danger of being violated.

As we shall see, via a particular discursive strategy, interviewees invoked previous 'chosen traumas' (Volkan, 1979, 1997) of the Greeks such as the fall of Constantinople in 1453, or the Asia Minor Catastrophe in 1922, and these references reverberated in their (securitized) discourses as evidence of the magnitude of the threat imposed by Turkey.

Again, these securitization discourses are ideal-type representations and not fixed classifications that are enforced unambiguously. Reality is more heterogeneous and complex. This is shown by the fact that certain institutional discourses such as that emanating from the Church, for example, can belong to both the hegemonic and the counter-hegemonic discourses, depending on who or what is investigated. The same is true for the media. Yet, ultimately the overarching balance falls towards a particular side, and in the case of these institutions, as in the case of the government and of the school, it is towards a hegemonic order that securitizes peace education, invoking a ‘responsibility to protect’ discourse. This approach offers a useful lens to analyse empirical findings and observations through a general hegemonic/counter-hegemonic binary that insinuates securitizing/desecuritising discourses.

#### 5.4.2. Discursive strategy I: Chosen Trauma and Securitizing the Other

This strategy involves a discourse of fear, and emotions of anxiety with regards to the external Other i.e. the Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Predication bestows a subject, whether this is the ‘self’ or the ‘other’ with particular characteristic traits, or attributes. Using predication as a tool for this discourse, showed an association of the Self i.e. the Greek-Cypriot hegemonic subject, with victimhood and the chosen trauma. The justification for resisting peace education is made through reference to collective memory, presupposing that the chosen trauma of the past is the only real one, and through the subject-positioning of the self as victim being in constant need of protection against the dangerous Turk enemy.

Vamik uses the term chosen trauma ‘to describe the collective memory of a calamity that once befell a group’s ancestors’ (1997, p.48). The chosen trauma is not just a recollection but:

‘a shared mental representation of the event, which includes realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and defenses against unacceptable thoughts’ (Volkan, 1997, p.48).

This quote clearly illustrates the complex mixture of different elements that keep this chosen trauma narrative held together, not only across many people but over time: historical memories, facts and fiction, strong emotions, and finally-and perhaps more importantly for this research study-strong protective barriers against alternative ideas. What Volkan refers to as ‘defenses against unacceptable thoughts’ is a crucial cue for explaining the educational stagnation that one witnesses in Cyprus. Moreover, it is arguably one of the least questioned elements, probably because it seems so obvious that it becomes oblivious. The events have been gelled into ‘stock images, stock forms’ (Kaplan, 2005, p.17) that have not only limited past and present meanings, but have been fixed in such a way that it is rendered unethical, unpatriotic and even criminal to consider alternative meanings, hence limiting future meanings as well. It is these hegemonic mechanisms that are in place- conscious and unconscious, strategic yet contingent- which render certain thoughts and discourses possible, and others impossible and unacceptable.

Rebecca Bryant speaks not only of partitions of place in Cyprus but also of partitions of memory (2010). The interplay between memory and history is of relevance to

Cyprus as it adds a particular dimension to the conflict; a dynamic that has the ability to perpetuate and dispel ethnic myths. As we have seen in Chapter One, history, memory and historical memory are often conflated in Cyprus, and the intricate relationship between the three leads to further ‘fuzziness’ when the process of the reconstruction of the past involves a long-term conflict. The chosen trauma of the Cypriots, fits within a wider collective narrative endorsed by the wider narrative of Hellenism where the Turk is referred to as the archenemy. The fact that the history textbooks come from Greece, and changing them will symbolise a departure from the ‘motherland’ is also prominent in the empirical data. Moreover, the impact of the events of 1974 on the Greek-Cypriot psyche have been so deep that they are the main reference point when asked about peace education and changes of perceptions in relation to the Other. When Greek Cypriots narrate the events, this often sounds like a replica of official discourses as presented in the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Press and Information Office. The argument brought forward is that ‘we should be very cautious’ in endorsing any change, referring back to the 1974 invasion, as a kind of ‘reminder’ to reinforce their point. But beyond this link lies an important predication in that security is linked to keeping the history narrative unchanged. This forms a core part of securitisation discourse. Moreover, it also brings forward elements of collective trauma, passed down through generations. The psychological impact of the invasion is still very prominent, even from those interviewees who did not experience the conflict (the majority of my interviewees were either too young to remember direct experiences or were born after 1974).

In the Easter of 2012, I was in Limassol, at a family gathering, present in a conversation between two other distant family members, a female (Maria) and a male

one (Christos) in their mid-30s. Both had two young children, and the female one was also a primary school children. Somehow we started talking about the opening of the borders, and Maria being ignorant of my topic of research brought about the issue of history textbook changes. It was unimaginable for them to even think of a person wanting to support such a policy, and empathising with this, I remained silent and waited to see what the nature of the conversation would be. I was surprised when Maria made a laughing remark about the ex-Minister of Education, Andreas Demetriou sending a circular out that promoted friendship and interaction between the students of both sides. She proudly said that both her and her colleagues just ignored it, and that she was relieved he was forced to resign. Then Christos added to this, half-smiling, with an ironic remark:

*“yeah right, as if we are going to send our children in the mouth of the wolf! What sort of parent do they think I am? What sort of parent would not be afraid to **risk** such a thing?”* Maria nodded in agreement.

A male teacher interviewee argued that the patriarchal state of Cypriot society meant that great emphasis was legitimately given to portray the national heroes, and to ensure that our male children are inspired by these men. In case of a war, they had to be prepared to act heroically as well, with an elevated nationalist morale and passion to fight. It is important he argued, ‘to teach the students of the heroic activities of their forefathers so that the students can follow their example in case of a war’. This further illustrates the link between security and history education that is constructed in representations of peace education.



One other female teacher (also a parent) in her mid 50s said that it was important to ‘tell the history as it was’ and ‘not to tamper with the history textbooks in the name of peace’, in order to ‘protect’ the younger generation. When I asked her what she meant by protection, she replied:

*‘to expose what the Turks are **capable** of doing, in order to **prevent** the Greek-Cypriots from ever trusting them and falling victims of another tragedy for the **second time**’.*

Again, the issue of protection is directly linked to security. Since the history textbooks offer a layer of protection, then removing or altering this layer supposedly jeopardises the future security of the future generations. The change of history textbooks is equated with an act of ‘putting at risk’ the survival of the Greek-Cypriots in the case of a war, both in preventing them from falling prey to a war, but also from reacting heroically to it. The Turk is again, presented as a subject with essential characteristics, and an innate ‘capacity’ to commit atrocities.

As teachers, they argued, they could not have it in their consciousness to do such a thing, to change the way the history has been taught for so many years. It is like acknowledging to themselves that not only what they were teaching in the past, but also what they had been themselves taught throughout their education and teacher training, had been partly, at least, wrong. This, they claimed, was difficult emotionally and psychologically, but also undesirable. They would feel guilty that they would be putting at risk the intensity, fortitude and prowess of the Greek-Cypriots’ struggle against the Turks. They saw it as a constant struggle that they must

not rest from, lest the other side wins. It was because of this ‘state of exception’ that Cyprus was in, the ‘everyday, imminent danger’, that as victims Greek-Cypriots had to live in and with, that justified strict measures when it came to protecting the historical narrative and preventing the legitimization of alternative histories.

It was interesting to see comments in online discussions regarding the history textbook controversy. One comment, urging for resistance to peace education stated:

*‘Make sure, those of you there in Cyprus, not to show **resistance**...They will grab the other half [of your island] as well...’ (HellasXG, 5 February 2012)*

When probing as to the differences between Turks and Turkish Cypriots, it was interesting to note that the hegemonic discourses reflected mistrust and suspicion of both, even though they were eager to point out that the blame for 1974 fell on Turkey and not the Turkish Cypriots.

#### 5.4.3. Discursive strategy II – Construction of an Educational Identity

This discursive strategy results in the discourse of protection/tradition, the creation of educational norms through which citizens are constituted as nationally identified. This involves strong resistance to those ideas that are perceived to run counter to traditional cultural, religious, and the wider nation-state building interests vis-à-vis the Cyprus Conflict. An underlying assumption regarding the teaching of history in Cyprus that emerged from the teacher interviews is that it is important to learn

history, Greek Cypriots need to know about the previous ‘struggles’ in order to honour the sacrifices of their forebears.

Educational identity is not a static variable, but rather a discursive site of constant political struggle. Educational matters are presented as core to the existence and understanding of the self. If you do not share the same ‘educational identity’, you are not entitled to have the national one either. In fact, you pose a menace to its existence. The strategy of educational identity leads to the ‘intensification rather than the desecuritisation of conflicts’ (Diez and Pia, 2010).

Presupposition, is a textual mechanism that allows us to expose background knowledge and assumptions that are accepted as true and hold to be right and moral. What is communicated through my empirical data is that there is no other option than the truth, to follow peace education is to endorse lies, damaging the production and transmission of knowledge to the youth, while endangering one’s country’s interests.

Fear of change is somewhat understandable when one recognises that this version of history is the one that Greek-Cypriots have grown up with. Daring to question this version, is like daring to question the educational identity that they have internalised and that forms part of their core personhood.

What also appears to be predominant is the fear of being cut off from Greece, and therefore risk being ‘incomplete’. The desire for Enosis stemmed partly from a socio-historical belief that Cypriots are somehow incomplete, or are missing out, without Greece. This argument is no longer held, as Greece is often perceived as much more

backward and fraught with lack of organisation, widespread corruption and prevalent partisan attitudes. Yet, the core of this argument's 'de-Hellenicisation' dynamic still forms the basis of discourses about belonging to a Greek nation, or at least having origins from Greece. The following extract from a circular sent out by Archbishop of Cyprus, Chrysostomos II, on the 5th of February 2012 is illustrative of this strategy:

*'Education is a very important factor in the life of a people, and for their survival...The Orthodox Church has always been the protector of our **ethnic education**. ... we can acknowledge that Greek education acted as the real 'raft' of our life. Without its torchlight, we would not have been able to **survive**. The **isolation from the rest of the Greek body**, the persecution, slavery, enslavement, would have **wiped us out**...it is a constitutionally guaranteed right of the Greek community of Cyprus to have its own Greek education'.*

Using predication as a tool in this discourse showed an association of the Self i.e. the Greek-Cypriot hegemonic subject, with a certain cultural, moral and political superiority 'because they are Greek'. As we saw in Chapter One and Chapter Four, historically, religious teachings in Cyprus were inextricably linked with ethno-nationalist teachings of what it meant to be a 'true Greek' (see Stavrinides, 1999). Although the system of education in operation today has undoubtedly undergone changes (not least due to the various secularizing and left-wing ideologies), what persists is the underlying aim of education to instill an unswerving nationalism, somewhat masked with calls to 'protecting' national identity and religious identity. As the former Minister of Education and Culture noted during our interview:

*“There is a vocal group of people who are strongly against any change in how the past is presented to young in this place. In fact, I don’t think that this is a problem in Cyprus, it’s a problem in the nature of Greek space in general. Education in Greece, which is not very different from here, was based on a certain set of myths about national identity, its enemies, especially the Turks, so it’s not easy to change that” (Interview with Minister of Education and Culture, 2008-2011, Andreas Demetriou, age 62).*

If one does not wholly assimilate these ideas and feelings then they cannot be called a ‘true Greek’, and in fact not even a ‘true Cypriot’ as the latter inextricably involves elements of the Greek identity. Ethno-nationalist ideals offer not only a sense of belonging, but also one of significance, of a duty to protect this inherited significance, and fight through ‘perpetual resistance to the traditional enemy, the Turks’ (Moran, 1999, p.x). To dare question this set of beliefs, required, and still does, ‘a person of strong character’ who will be able ‘to take the risks (and endure the penalties) of social ostracism or worse’ (Moran, 1999, p. x). This is especially illuminating when it comes to understanding why resisting peace education policies is so prevalent in Cyprus. In fact, the legitimization of this resistance is taken for granted, is perceived as the ‘norm’ to such an extent that many do not even contemplate the alternative. It seems paranoid to do so, not only because ‘you shouldn’t’ but also because ‘you can’t’(achieve anything) given the sensitivity, the sacredness and the hegemonic position of the whole dogma.

It helps to understand and further expose the predications and presuppositions of hegemonic discourses if we are able to gather even a vague idea of what would be the

ideal education for the hegemonic subjects according to the hegemonising subjects. Thinking counter-factually, and in particular, with reference to the aforementioned circular by Archbishop Chrysostomos, what transpires is a negative attitude towards peace education that is predicated on the assumption that the goal of education is *to produce, and control the production of, nationalistic Hellenic subjects*. These Hellenic subjects unquestioningly reproduce the narratives of previous generations (just like they are taught to do so in the Orthodox tradition- see discursive strategies below) in an almost robotic manner, or else risk breaking the strong link that bonds (and has always bonded) the Greeks together. Therefore, since peace education, with its emphasis on critical thinking, and pluralistic narratives, goes against this recycling of knowledge and ‘banking’ education where the student passively receives ‘deposits’ of education (Freire, 1972), then it poses a threat to the ideal system of education visualized by the nationalists.

The loss of educational identity is also articulated as having foreign policy repercussions that extend beyond domestic educational policies, or the Turkish other. It is seen as directly related to the reputation of Greek Cypriots in the international community. Foreign perceptions of and positions on Cyprus are perceived as of crucial significance, not least due to the admittance that the Cyprus Problem due to its Cyprus’s geopolitical location has always been an important issue, where external powers have been directly and indirectly involved. Therefore, foreign impressions feature in public discourse Cyprus. In particular, it is important for the Greek Cypriots to be seen as the victim and not the perpetrator, lest bargaining power is reduced and pressure is put on the Greek Cypriots by the international community. For example, the impact of the rejection of the Annan Plan on foreign perceptions of the Greek

Cypriots enjoys frequent references in public discourse. Similarly, history textbooks which embrace a peace education outlook, pose the risk of endangering the foreign perception of Greek Cypriots as the victims, and are therefore against the national struggle.

Education is also securitized as a social value, which cannot be removed from its people. There is again a direct link with the conflict (see Discursive Strategy I), where although territory, property and other material elements have been lost as a response to the Turkish occupation, a strong sense has prevailed where education will be protected from having the same fate. This featured both implicitly and explicitly in my interviews with teachers, but also in online discussions in new media. It also resonates with UNESCO's 1997 report on the appraisal of the educational system in Cyprus which reported that due to the sense of insecurity caused by the massive displacement and associated with the ensuing refugee culture, 'education came to be regarded as "the one possession which could not be taken away" (see Davies, 2004, p.107). Hence, we can see why, if the conflict historically acted as a significant motivation for education, initiatives which aim at removing this conflict ethos are strongly contested and resisted. Educational changes are viewed and discursively articulated within the metaphorical context of 'educational displacement', a powerful strategy given the association with physical displacement caused by the Turkish invasion.

*Positioning of the 'self' and the 'other'*

Educational identity allows a certain positioning of the Self and of the Other, which further enhances the securitization effect. Specific meanings against peace educators have become hegemonic. A quest for defining peace education (and how a specific meaning has become dominant), therefore, can be conceptualised as a quest for determining the antagonistic Other, as well as the Self that is opposed to it (Herschinger, 2011). The Self organizes its interpretations of the other around a particular notion of what the Self is. Nationalists, for example, consistently organize their narrative around a notion of the ‘self’ as identified with the morals of Hellenism, preserving the master grand narrative, and as an agent who is morally responsible to preserve these values, merely by being born ‘Greek’ and more specifically an Orthodox Christian. They explain and justify their identity by referring to historical discourses that produced their identities in the first place, thereby engaging in tautological legitimisations.

In line with Derrida’s (1981) theoretical position, discourses over peace education are indeed structured largely using binary oppositions, which privilege one of the two elements in the binary. Following Derrida (1981), Doty (1993) and Milliken (1999), I emphasise the persistence of **binary oppositions**, where one pole:

a) represents ‘morality’, ‘honour’, ‘integrity’, ‘respect’, ‘tradition’, ‘patriotism’, ‘respected intellectuals’, ‘loyalty’, ‘pride’, ‘sensitivity’ ‘rationality’ ‘prudence’, ‘reverence’;

b) and the other represents ‘immorality’, ‘disgrace’, ‘corruption’, ‘disrespect’, ‘pseudo-modern’, ‘betrayal’, ‘pseudo-intellectuals’, ‘disloyal’, ‘perfidious’, ‘traitors’, ‘shame’, ‘irrationality’, ‘blasphemy’ .



The persistence of binary oppositions makes it impossible for mediation, negotiation or compromise to occur, resorting to either the one or the other; reaching a ‘middle ground’ becomes unimaginable. Where as the ‘other’ in Discursive Strategy I was the Turk, the Other in this case, includes anyone who would support peace education, both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, as well as non-Cypriots. In other words, it includes both an ‘internal’ and ‘external’ Other.

An article by Demetris Taliadoros published in *Fileleftheros* newspaper on 26<sup>th</sup> January 2009, was accusing Panayiotis Mavros, current Chief Education Officer of the Ministry of Education and Culture, of being an ‘opponent of Greek education’ because he supported the rewriting of the history textbooks in an article in the same newspaper. The title of his reply was interestingly titled ‘A reply to a Doctor’, an ironic reference to Mavros being a holder of a doctorate qualification. The ironic emphasis on qualifications alludes to the subject-positioning mentioned above, that of a ‘pseudo-intellectual’ who is presented as arrogant and as an ‘opponent’ of traditions and Greek heritage.

### *Predication of history textbooks as ‘sacred’*

Securitizing the educational identity promoted by peace education, also allows for a strategy where the books should be left ‘untouched’. I argue that there is a link, albeit not always explicit, between the Orthodox tradition of continuity and ‘purity’ (from change), and the desire to keep the history textbooks the same, regardless of whether

what they include is representative of the past or not. In other words, there is an element of treating the books as analogous to the holy books that emerged from the spiritual fathers and therefore proclaiming it ‘a blasphemy’ to interfere with them. Orthodoxy after all represents the Christian denomination which remained intact over time. They are almost treated as hierographical output that is worthy of religious veneration and hence fierce protection.

This is also linked to earlier attempts by the British to alter the educational system of Cyprus, attempts that were faced with marked resistance, and only served to strengthen the nationalistic feelings of the Greek-Cypriots (see Chapter One). We have to keep in mind the role of priests in promoting the anti-colonial struggle of EOKA and Greek Orthodox values through catechitika (see also Aggelidou, 2011, p.28). The anti-colonial struggle was represented ‘as a religious crusade to be waged with a bible in one hand and the sword in the other, the rebels as Christian warriors headed by Christ, the new Champion of Liberty’ (Crawshaw, 1978, pp. 278-88). The subjects of religion and Greek nationalist history “were prescribed as the perfect curriculum for the education of Greek Cypriot youth” (Crawshaw, 1978, pp.278-88). Therefore, given this legacy, it is not surprising that attempts to change education are perceived as attempts to change a religious tradition.

#### 5.4.4. Discursive Strategy III- Intertextuality

##### *Intertextuality with Greek discourses*

Intertextuality, here, refers to the strategy where discourses draw meaning from, and refer to, other texts. The most explicit form of intertextuality that emerged from the findings was that of drawing comparisons with a major history textbook controversy that took place in Greece and using it as an example for justifying why peace education efforts should be avoided. Reference is made to other texts, in this case discussions over other textbooks. A strong sense of fear and anxiety is related to the past experiences with the history textbook changes in Greece which had caused such a fiasco that the textbooks were withdrawn with the election of a conservative government in September 2007 (see also Repoussi 2008).

Almost all of my teacher interviewees (92%) referred to this incident, which represents a positioning of similarity. This theme was not predominant only in hegemonic discourses present in teacher interviews, but also in newspapers, websites and blogs, and generally in the public discourse. The textbook has been widely accused of presenting the 1922 flight from Smyrna (modern-day Izmir in Turkey) where thousands of Greek people died, as a matter of being ‘too crowded’ while they were being transported. It also represented a revisionist view of the Greek War of Independence (1821), which has been treated as a sacred war by the Greeks. Fierce criticism and angry debate ensued, the history textbook authors were castigated and vilified as ‘unpatriotic’ for disrespecting and downplaying the suffering of Greeks because of the Turks.

Regardless of whether the textbook did or did not go too far in embellishing a view of the past, what is important here is that it set a negative precedent; there is a continuously recurring theme of comparing potential history textbook changes in Cyprus with what happened in Greece. There is therefore, a fear, of distorting ‘the truth’, presenting a glossy version merely for the sake of peace.

### *Intertextuality with other educational policies*

Proposed history textbook changes are not the only educational policies that are highly contested. In fact, an Educational Reform Program (New Analytical Programs) which was recently implemented (2009-2013), also included a strong emphasis on intercultural education. This policy has raised intense debates over policies of bilingual education in schools. The reason this is important in the context of this study is that references to such initiatives are explicit in discourses against peace education. Efforts to change the history textbooks as well as their supporters, are compared and placed in the same group as those who support bilingual education, and are strongly attacked and accused ‘of investing efforts into the task of leading the Greek language into **extinction**’ (Mavros, 2013, p.122; see also Mavros, 17<sup>th</sup> September 2010, *The Cyprus Weekly*). A similar mindset is prevalent when it comes to history textbooks, where the attempts are seen as feeding into this wider discourse stream, being part of a wider ‘effort’ to ‘extinguish’ the Greek identity and language of Cypriots.

#### 5.4.5. Discursive strategy IV – Invoking Time

The final strategy is related to the emphasis given- as part of, and as a consequence of, Cypriot culture- on inheritance, tradition, and continuity. It seems that time is a prominent nodal point around which discourses are articulated. This strategy of time also has to do with invoking the impact of the past and present on the future. Therefore, any policies that are affecting history textbooks now, are seen as not only distorting the past, but also presenting a menace for the future. A Gramscian approach offers constructive insights into the importance of both history and culture of a given society. The consensus, or ‘common sense’ represents the values and ideas that the network of alliances is based on. There is the necessary level of agreement with regards to the past, the importance of the past in the present, which is inextricably linked to the cultural milieu of the people- a culture deeply immersed in history and tradition. As an article in *The Cyprus Weekly* put it:

*“People are proud of their history since it expresses their national ideals, culture, traditions and aspirations. It has **passed down from generation to generation** having formed the **character** of a nation, which is regarded as **indisputable**. This is the reason why many people **flatly refuse** to accept any revision of History textbooks”* (Mavros, 8<sup>th</sup> July 2011).

Another newspaper included the following quote with regards to the education circular by the Minister of Education mentioned above:

*“The minister's circular is tantamount to "castrating our Hellenic heritage," according to nationalistic opposition party DISY.” (Agence France-Presse , 11 October 2008)*

Cultural tradition is deeply valued in Cyprus, and as we saw earlier there is a strong – and non-accidental- interconnectedness of this tradition with the religion values championed by the Orthodox Church i.e. keeping the Orthodox traditions alive and unaltered. There is fear about the impact the textbook changes will have on the nationalist feeling and hence, security of the future but also on the continuation of Orthodox traditions. Changes are viewed as ‘dislocations’ of time, where time is seen as linear and continuous, that are fundamentally opposed to the principle of tradition and cultural inheritance.

### **5.5. What are the implications/effects of these constructions?**

This section offers an assessment of the impact of these hegemonic constructions, using the meta-strategies identified earlier on. With regards to the Cypriot culture, a lack of dialogue and critical thinking is prevalent. These conditions make it difficult to speak out, thereby having a deterrent effect, not least due to the fear of ostracisation. Although in theory it might seem much easier to express different ideas, in a society where one wishes to participate actively, to be treated with dignity and respect, the fear and possibility of losing this by publicly expressing one’s ideas and thoughts becomes a deterrent. These ideas are not just treated as alternative positions, or narratives, but are juxtaposed as we have seen in binary terms. Therefore by daring

to speak out, you are immediately exposing yourself to a position of vulnerability, of attack, of criticism, of being labelled as the Other. Even merely questioning dominant narratives becomes impossible, as it immediately creates suspicion.

The psychological need of fitting into a larger normative structure (Goodin, 1996, p. 4) is left unmet, and one can no longer be perceived as an equal, to be treated with respect. Kaplan argues that humans are compelled by their nature to share with others their experiences in order to make meaning out of them (Kaplan, 2005). Humans, she argues ‘need to share and “translate” such traumatic impact’ (2005, p.1). Yet, people who dare speak out are treated as immoral and blasphemous traitors. Amongst the cultural idiosyncrasies of Cypriots, and stemming from the binary framework of viewing the world, is the tendency to generally ‘blacklist’ people if they hold different views, being very absolute, and rejecting them from other areas of life that might be totally unrelated to the particular educational controversy.

Meletios Apostolides, the famous Greek-Cypriot architect of the Apostolides vs Orams court case regarding the former’s property in northern Cyprus, presents an interesting case. He confessed to me his disappointment with the absolute mentality that is prevalent in Cyprus, and the hypocritical nature of some citizens. During our interview he mentioned how years before he won the court case, he returned from a bi-communal meeting with the Turkish-Cypriots only to find his car being sprayed with paint all over forming the words ‘traitor’. Yet, the same community that had branded him a traitor, proclaimed him a ‘hero’ after he had emerged victorious from the legal case against the Orams. Even more, when an outspoken and very nationalistic journalist, tried to secure an interview with him for his story, and

Apostolides admitted that he still supports and will continue to support bi-communal activities, he simply shut the phone down on him. This vignette, is illustrative of the ‘all or nothing’ culture that is prevalent in Cyprus. Apostolides, who came across as an extremely gentle and kind man, further confirmed the deterrent effect that hegemonic discourses have on Greek-Cypriots (or others who disagree with the hegemonic position), when he admitted that during his current history classes at the University of Cyprus, though he strongly disagrees with certain interpretations of the past, he is prevented from voicing his opinion, out of fear of strong backlash. Again, one can only understand the full extent of this meta-strategy only when they place themselves in the particular cultural context and small size of Cyprus.

Unfortunately, acts of violence are not always limited to one’s property but extend to one’s relatives as well. Two male interviewees, one a supporter of the peace process, and the other a founding member of the ‘Cyprus Friendship Programme’- an NGO that tries to bring Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot youth together through bi-communal camps as well as one-month visits to the USA- admitted that their sons had been physically attacked from nationalist classmates due to their fathers’ role in peacebuilding activities. The nationalist classmates were particularly angered by the fact that in both cases there was not only physical contact of the fathers with the ‘other’ but also an attempt to acknowledge the pain and historical narrative of the other side.

In addition, given the clientelistic environment and practices prevalent in Cyprus, not ascribing to the hegemonic discourse leads to professional alienation as well, thereby impeding professional mobility. Friends and family members advised me not to



express my views on peace education publicly if I want to be taken seriously, and ‘find a job in Cyprus one day’. One taxi driver who picked me up from a border crossing-point in 2010, threatened he would drop me off after I answered honestly to his question of why I had crossed to the other side (to present at a Turkish-Cypriot university).

According to the Financial Times a female teacher, Anthoula Demitrou, her ability to present the Turkish-Cypriots’ suffering in class is strongly limited: being ‘pretty much a forbidden subject’. The newspaper reported that:

*“Last year when she and some of her colleagues tried to adopt a multi-cultural approach they were told by the school authorities they would throw away their chances of promotion if they persisted.” (Financial Times, 19 July 2004)*

One of my female interviewees who is an NGO activist spoke of how she felt rejected by her immediate family environment and how the male members, both old and young, never gave her ‘any attention’ when they were discussing politics at large family gatherings (men often gather on one side of the table, women on the other, and whereas the men stay seated from the start until the end of dinner, the women juggle bringing the different food plates, offering replenishments and taking care of any children/grandchildren). She claimed that this was not only due to the gender prejudice prevalent in Cyprus, but also because her previous efforts to offer alternative viewpoints resulted in one of her cousins losing his temper, ordering her to ‘change the conversation please’. People who support peace education are assumed to be certain types of people, not the desired ones.

This is not limited to gender however. One of my male interviewees, also commented on this feeling of isolation. Responding to the question of if he was ever reluctant to speak out, or afraid that people would offer him the label of ‘Turkofilos’ (translated as Turko-friendly) which is used as a derogatory term with very negative connotations in public discourse, he stated the following:

*“No, no I do not care if they call me a Turko-friend. And I have already been attributed this characterisation anyway. For example, I posted a Turkish song on Facebook, and someone commented underneath a song saying ‘entampou re Marie [not real name] etourjepses jie si’ which is a Cypriot way of saying ‘now what, you have also turned into a Turk?’ And I replied: if my Greekness depends on what kind of music I listen to, then, I am a Turk, and also an Italian. And then I also posted the same song in Italian so he can keep quiet. It is a song by Haroula Alexiou (a very famous middle-aged Greek singer) which is called ‘Fosforo’. And then you think: there is no point arguing with a stupid person...Why should I sit down and be sad, you just end up being isolated in the end as you cannot communicate with the rest. All of us with these kinds of mindsets have ended up being isolated. (Marios, male interviewee, age 27)”*

This quote is telling in many ways. Firstly, the emphasis on isolation goes beyond specific debates, but extends to cultural issues such as listening to music etc. Marios’s response also confirms the argument made earlier about totally dismissing people, imposing labels from a simple action of posting a Turkish a Turkish video song from YouTube on Facebook. Secondly, there is another extension, in relation to subject-

positioning, that is made this time from the interviewee. He says that in the end he has decided to stop the conversation with 'such people', whose particular comment actually reflects a wider type of 'mindset'. Thirdly, the mere fact that he felt that there is no point in engaging in a dialogue with either this person, or 'the rest' as he says, have left him isolated. Although in the beginning he starts by saying he has never been reluctant to speak out, towards the end of his comment what emerges is a manifestation of the 'deterrent' effect, as he is no longer willing to engage in dialogue, as well as a manifestation of the 'exclusionary/disabling' effect as he is, in practice, left out of the discursive space, and his position is rejected.

By not allowing every individual the same opportunity to participate in discourse, marginalised groups are deprived of their dignity and of a true deliberative democracy as described by Habermas (1984). Marginalised groups are forced to remain silent, or at least, do not have an equal say, and their opinion, beliefs and perspectives are excluded, leading to social injustice (Lyotard, 1984). The asymmetry over discourse capacity leads to a 'hegemonic speech situation' rather than an 'ideal' one as envisaged by Habermas. This lack of a discursive space, translates to the absence of a truly public sphere conducive to dialogue and communicative action.

## **5.6. Alternative discourses and NGOs**

How do NGOs deal or receive the hegemonic peace education constructs? Although during my interviews with NGOs I placed emphasis on resistance to peace education, some interesting empirical findings also emerged in terms of how they perceive peace

education, its participants but also those who resist it. It is also important to examine the ambiguities and ambivalence of NGO discourses.

Peace education activists need to self-reflect on their own strategies, questioning their own norms and assumptions (for example over religion), lest they end up unconsciously reinforcing practices they do not condone, or reproducing assumptions they disagree with. Some of the themes that emerge from the empirical analysis have shown certain contradictions, and even prejudices. The positioning of religion and religious leaders in a binary of 'blame' and 'enemy' discussed below is illustrative of this.

Politics in Cyprus has historically been so aligned with religion (see Chapter One) that 'enlightened' intellectuals end up turning against religion completely and blaming it entirely for their up to now mal-education. This is understandable, yet not an entirely fair or accurate accusation. As the analysis of marginalised discourses shows, and as one of the priest interviewees pointed out, dogmatic religion is often conflated with spiritual faith. Where the latter is seen as divine and teaches self-less love, peace, humility, forgiveness, self-criticism and subscription to a universal love towards all mankind, the other has historically showed individuals tormented with their passions, and hence, vulnerable to sin, allowing conflict, hate, revenge, pride and fanaticism to prevail (Broadcasted Radio Speech by Archbishop of Limassol, Athanasios, 2012). This involves a further related conflation of spiritual Orthodox faith/beliefs which are seen to be divine and offered by the triadic God (the Holy

Trinity with three distinct hypostases, see Sophrony, 1977; Zacharou, 2010) with human, individual actions of either priests<sup>93</sup> or ordinary citizens.

There is also a paradox concerning empathy. On the one hand, the Orthodox Faith teaches one to become so empathetic to others' tragedies, that one prays for the whole world just as they would do for themselves, in Father Sophrony's words becoming 'like a world-wide radio receiver' picking up others' stories and signals (1977, p.40). On the other hand, Archbishop Chrysostomos II, a less-respected priest (due to the fiasco surrounding his election and claims that they it was rigged) but a very outspoken one, with almost daily media appearances often either ignores the tragedy inflicted upon the Turkish-Cypriots or blames it solely on the Turkish side, or the mistakes of the Greek-Cypriots, depicting a lack of empathy that is so crucial to peace education (see Chapter Three).

The depiction therefore, over the past four decades especially, of religion and the Orthodox Church or faith as a main, if not the main, cause for the Cyprus Conflict, by the (so-called) progressives and intellectuals, which also participate in NGO peacebuilding activities needs to be further problematised. Peacebuilding actors need to be cautious not to replicate stereotypes that they themselves are fighting to demolish, or reproduce hegemonic discourses that are prevalent in the official Turkish-Cypriot discourse.

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<sup>93</sup> The Archbishop, in the Orthodox Faith has less direct connection with the God, compared with the position of the Pope in the Catholic Church. The Roman Catholics believe that the Pope has a supreme divine authority, and consider the Pope the Vicar of Christ, whereas the Orthodox Church does not accept the papal concept (Morris, 2007).

The lack of a powerful peace education discourse, the ambiguity in what peace education is, the ambivalent and problematic discursive strategies arguably hampers the role of NGOs as a social movement for peace education, and in particular as a driving force for normative marginalised discourse. NGOs also are very weak at exposing the contradictions and paradoxes within hegemonic discourse, at least not doing so in the public domain. Attempts at interrogating hegemonic practices are limited to academic output.

My argument is that the NGOs in their efforts to present peace education efforts in a way that is not outrightly rejected by the Cypriots, have fallen into the trap of building on the their way of thinking and therefore carrying traces of it. In a sense peace education no longer comes after something but is taking place alongside the conflict education current. The implications of this simultaneity is not merely that it compromises the effect of peace education but more importantly for the nature and the goals of the peace education project is that rather than replacing the conflict education with peace education it tries to build on it, and most of the times not only is it overshadowed by the past foundation but more importantly the past turns out to distort the current peace education initiatives as other things that they are not, either too naïve (covert, trying to disguise it using architecture etc), or on the other extreme, as something that should be avoided at all costs. So we see that instead of pulling them away from the modernist current (modernity of the conflict), in their efforts to ‘save them’ from it, they are themselves sucked in.

Another weakness of the counter-hegemonic discourses that emerged from both official documents, policy papers, as well as interviews, was a lack of a clear

definition of what peace education is. In fact, the President of the AHDR Board since 2011<sup>94</sup> was quite reluctant to include ‘peace education’ as one of the organisations’ main objectives even when I probed him. Instead, he clarified that the main aim of the organisation was to foster historical dialogue, promote research and activities related to history and history teaching, and in particular the development of critical thinking. This was also my experience from the teacher workshops I attended in 2011, where the topics discussed did not cover the crucial historical narratives post-1960, but rather focused on more neutral topics like the architecture of the divided capital of Nicosia. A glance at the ‘about/who we are’ section of the website of the AHDR also has no mention of peace education.<sup>95</sup> In fact, there is not even a single reference to the word ‘peace’. This is of course not to say that they do not directly deal with peace- but their reluctance to frame their activities in particular ways is perhaps a sign that they still do not think that the time is ripe for more explicit discussions of their aims. In fact, when I interviewed the previous President of the AHDR, her response to my observation regarding the lack of a clearly defined and explicit peace education focus was that they felt that ‘the community was still not ready for it’. Indeed, once she listed the resistance towards their attempts that emerged from the state in the years immediately before and after the Annan Plan, it became clear that any hesitations are at least understandable. However, she was much more eager to use peace education as a term throughout our interview and to indeed link the objectives of the AHDR with peace education, than the current President. This by itself reflects a lack of a coherent position as to what the organisation’s aims are vis-à-vis peace education. A recent policy paper (AHDR, 2013) does refer to peace education, but only in passing. Again,

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<sup>94</sup> Interview with Kyriakos Pachoulides, November 2012

<sup>95</sup> [http://www.ahdr.info/about\\_ahdr.php](http://www.ahdr.info/about_ahdr.php)

my contention is that it is time for the peace education community to be more bold and concise in their discursive articulations of peace education.

### **5.7. Conclusion**

History, Goodin argues, ‘amounts to the telling of stories about the past which we internalize as our own and which, in the telling and retelling, shape us and our future actions’ (1996, pp.3-4). The same can be said of discourse, through which its construction and reconstruction, shapes both who we come to be seen, by our selves, others, across time. It is this discourse, constrained and socially shaped as it may be, that drives social understandings and public conversations. Individuals are embedded in social relationships, raised in some particular culture with its own distinctive characteristics, values and concerns (Goodin, 1996, p. 18), the particular cultural baggage we bring with us. Yet, this social upbringing, this cultural baggage is not inevitably fixed; it can be transcended and resisted. It is this particular possibility of overcoming the prejudices of that original upbringing that gives peace education credence and plausibility.

This chapter has allowed me to explain why peace education has not been materialised, understand why people are so afraid of it, question the language used from both camps, and identify the implications/effects of the hegemonic discourse on marginalised subject constitution and action. It has also enabled me to highlight the paradoxes and contradictions within both arguments, but also point towards openings



for reducing the distance between the two sides. In other words, to move toward a Habermasian ‘paradigm of mutual understanding’ (1987, p.296).

By adopting a combination of two methods of discourse analysis, I was able to answer the question of how-possible, rather than merely the conventional ‘why’ question. Whereas, the constructivist and post-structuralist discourse methodology exposed the power relations that include, exclude and deter, Securitization theory opened up a space for analysing how and explaining why hegemonic discourses have been successful in enhancing their ability to attack peace education, citing its effects as a threat to national security interests, and justifying the use of unusual or exceptional measures. This two-pronged approach has enabled me to address the issue of how peace education discourses become hegemonic, what exactly these discourses are, and the implications hegemonic discourses have had for the identities of the subjects involved.

There is a need to recognise and work against ethnocentric discourses and practices that serve to silence alternative voices. This does not mean to outright dismiss and reject their proponents, nor to attack them, but to engage in a dialogue that deconstructs both positions thereby reducing the gap. I have drawn on post-structuralist understandings of power to illuminate problematic and traditionally hegemonic discourses. Deconstructing the status quo and taken-for-granted ‘common sense’ assumptions, both implicit and explicit, can help expose how they affect educational policy and to whom they might cause forms of injustice and disadvantage (Niesche, 2014, p.39).

## CONCLUSION

The year 2014 marks forty years since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (and the coup d'état that sparked the invasion in the first place) and the displacement, death and suffering of mostly Greek but also many Turkish Cypriots. It also marks four decades of consolidated, systematic attempts by the Greek-Cypriot government to collectivise and nationalise this trauma, instilling it deeply into the national identity and psyche of Greek-Cypriot citizens; forty years of cultivating intense negative feelings about the 'Other', which is by now as much an other as it is a part of the 'Self'. Forty years of representing the 'Other' as a danger, as a threat, whose only goal in life is to do harm to the 'Self'.

A Greek-Cypriot, almost by default, is born and raised in an environment where the crux of his or her identity is composed of, and defined by, the ambiguous 'Cyprus Problem'. In other words, Greek-Cypriots are socialized into a pool of insecurity, with the constant lurking danger of drowning. Things seem almost simple for a moment. It seems quite obvious why, in a conflict context that is seen as a zero-sum game, one would not want to engage with processes that reduce the accuracy or even validity of the one-sided victimization discourse that is used to justify one's position and claims, and acknowledge the narrative and suffering of the other side. Yet, amidst this perceived simplicity and anticipated resistance, lies a multi-layered, multi-faceted problem, a vicious cycle that left unexplored and dismissed as a simple dead-end can become almost as dangerous as the problem itself. It is, therefore, hugely important to try and delve deeper into these attitudes, surpassing disciplinary constraints, offering a

critical yet constructive viewpoint to not only the hegemonic but also the marginalised actions and behaviours. This is how and where my thesis has attempted to offer a contribution.

The aim of this chapter is to summarise the dynamics of the vicious circle of nationalism in Cyprus, explain why peace education has been unable to break through this, while then suggesting the politics of ‘peaceagogy’ that are required for this to occur. The first section of this concluding chapter summarises the contributions of the thesis, showing how it has enhanced the current literature on peace education, both empirically and conceptually. In answering the research question posed at the beginning of the thesis, the findings have themselves raised additional questions. These issues together with other limitations are then addressed. Reflecting upon the limitations of the thesis is important not only as an exercise of critical awareness and self-reflection, but also for opening up avenues for future research that build on this study.

### **Moving towards a more comprehensive understanding of the ‘Politics of Peace Education’**

As we have seen in Chapter One, the conflict did not begin in 1974, nor did it confine itself to the island of Cyprus, influencing and being influenced by the negative state of Greco-Turkish relations as well as British colonial policy. However, it is after the events of 1974 that there has been a systematic, conscious, and even strategic attempt to present and manipulate a chosen trauma surrounding the invasion. Collective trauma has successfully been passed through generations. Previous research has

focused on government attempts to promote this chosen trauma through parades, educational policy, political rhetoric, state machinations, foreign policy etc. Despite the undeniably important role of the state, it is problematic to only attribute the current success of these policies to the government. It is evidently not only a top-down approach, at least not anymore, given that after decades of particular narratives and propaganda directed at the public, when a left-wing government came in power for the first time in February 2008, strong opposition to education-based reconciliation initiatives actually came from the public. My research therefore has taken a macro-level approach towards public resistance, one that has incorporated the power exercised through hegemonic discourses and institutions- power that is in no way limited to political elites. Institutions such as the media, schools, the Church, the family, all play an instrumental role in the reproduction of discourses that ensure that formal peace education remains by and large an impossibility in Cyprus.

Moreover, despite the existence of a strong ideological association of resistance with the 'right' and with the Church on the one hand, and of peacebuilding NGOs with the secular 'left' on the other, the presentation of this binary system in the literature is not only too simplistic, but it is also dangerous; it risks losing sight of the potential openings offered by fissures i.e. of citizens that do not fit this categorization. Examples of these include very religious people who are engaged in peacebuilding activities, or NGO leading members who belong to conservative parties, or who have lost a close family member during the war yet exhibit empathy towards the other. These may not seem unconventional examples, yet, as I discuss below, this binary system was often one that was also implicitly or explicitly adopted by NGO actors. Ultimately, it is through these 'abnormalities', as few and limited in power as they

are, that a politics of possibility emerges. These examples of people, are, in a sense, a step ahead of the rest: they have moved *beyond* the pigeonholing dichotomy, evolving towards a synergistic model that should be at the centre of peace education efforts. Therefore, they offer a foundation for possible links to be forged in ways that do not simply counter the hegemonic order and support the counter-hegemony, but are determined by values such as respect, empathy, multi-perspectivity, sensitivity and flexibility. It would be ridiculous to argue that NGOs are totally void of these characteristics. But what I suggest is that whereas in relation to the 'Other', NGOs do practice these values, when it comes to in-group treatment- and in this case the Greek-Cypriot community, the NGO community has perhaps not been as self-critical as it could. They can be seen as being reflective (as members of either community) when it comes to the treatment of the 'Other' community but not as reflective when it comes to, in turn, their own outward practices as NGOs, or even towards members of their own community. A word of caution is necessary here. Self-reflection in both relations towards the 'Other' and towards the wider community 'Self' is perfectly compatible, these are not mutually exclusive; NGOs need not exercise reflection on one at the expense of the other. Although evidently this mistake is easy to do, it is, I contend, perfectly avoidable.

Overall, what has emerged from this study into the politics of peace education is, primarily (and unsurprisingly perhaps), the marginalisation of peace education efforts through hegemonic resistance and securitisation practices. The more unexpected finding is the one that points towards a kind of second-level marginalisation, with the result that some of these rare subject positions are associated with a 'double burden'. If for example, an individual posits him/herself strongly with the 'left' or merely with

the peacebuilding process, then (s)he has to face the opposition of the nationalists, and is branded as a 'traitor'. If this person is also strongly affiliated with the Church, then (s)he faces degradation from the so-called progressives on the left who reject and publicly mock such 'stupid' or 'old-fashioned' beliefs. Both peace education researchers and practitioners, therefore, ought to be more aware of these possibilities. This is not to say that research should focus primarily on these issues; they are indeed exceptions, and they do not help explain the resistance to peace education. As the empirical chapters show, the success of the resistance can be explained by recourse to the hegemonic institutions and discourses. But this second-level marginalisation can help unravel a deeper politics of peace education, a by-product that can explain why NGO efforts have not been as successful in maximising their potential as they could have been. What researchers or practitioners should do is to be careful not to lose sight of these fissures, and hence miss the flashes of light amidst the dark.

As I mentioned in the Introduction, in examining the politics of peace education through discursive and institutional power, I am not ignoring the importance of material power embodied in the state. Yet, again all these processes, institutions and policies cannot be separated from discourse. As such my thesis should not be viewed as merely emphasising a social contest over the issue of peace education, but a deeply power-laden struggle. Power can be analysed from a variety of lenses, but I contend that an emphasis on discursive and institutional power, rather than an emphasis on material power (related to force or economic resources, for example) maximises our deeper understanding of this politicised struggle. This is not only due to the nature of the research question, and my deviation from state-centric approaches, but also because of the nature of the particular issue under consideration i.e. resistance to

peace education. As we saw in the Introduction, this resistance, has in a sense, a counter-factual element to it that does not lend itself to more traditional analyses of material power; unpacking the dynamics surrounding peace education in Cyprus in empirical terms is problematic to begin with given that there has not been much practical activity in this area, and therefore resistance is harder to capture. This does not mean that resistance is slight, or that resistance is impossible to research, but rather that researching resistance towards the possibility of something being introduced, is different to researching resistance to tangible policies that have been realised. In fact, the abstractions that come with this resistance, I argue, are often used or abused to exaggerate and securitise what peace education wants to do. But they also provide a source of optimism by point towards an answer: there is potential for clarifying and strengthening the positive peace education discourse.

### **Contribution to knowledge and extant literature: ‘zooming in’**

After offering a brief exposition and justification of my particular approach to the politics of peace education, as well as an overview of both the expected and unexpected findings, this section ‘zooms in’ to demonstrate and elucidate how I have made a contribution, what exactly my contribution consists of, and where precisely I have contributed to (in terms of the extant literature).

Going beyond the scope of current literature that treat peace education merely as a necessary and unproblematic tool; use a positivist linear model of cause and effect; and are limited to state-centric explanations that ignore the crucial importance of

wider power politics, my approach has advanced and illuminated original findings about resistance to peace education hitherto obscured by less critical, positivist and apolitical approaches.

I was able to address the weaknesses of the existing literature by constructing a conceptual framework (of the politics of peace education), and using this to undertake an empirical analysis which delineated the role of power through discourse and institutions. My underlining assumption here is that an examination of the discourses and institutions that affect the state of peace education can shed considerable light on the question of the politics of peace education and the power systems that it is a part of. This is commensurate with my argument that a long-term viable political settlement has not- and will most likely not- become a reality unless the very institutional dynamics and conflict discourses (and hence, mindsets) undergo a transformation. Giving emphasis to the discursive and institutional politics of peace education is also useful in highlighting areas in which future governments, NGOs, and policy-makers can focus in order to influence how peace education is presented and responded to. Therefore, in order to problematise the (power) politics of peace education I have, throughout this thesis, grappled with the following research question:

“What are the particular hegemonic institutions and discourses that resist peace education, and how have they managed to be so successful in resisting peace education?”

In order to answer this question I offered an exposition of the power dynamics that are



affecting both the present and the future of Cyprus. These power dynamics involve the use of monolithic, exclusionary historical narratives to re-imagine a past, and plan a future, therefore always ensuring that when the future becomes the present, the break from this particular version of the past is never achieved. Taking a critical constructivist approach I was able to problematize issues such as history and memory, historical context, culture, language and framing in order to expose the struggle over meaning but also the contingent nature of the hegemonic order; an emphasis on the mechanisms of reproduction is also a reminder that continuity is neither inherent nor inevitable.

### **Chapter Summary: History & Memory, Literature review and Conceptual Framework**

The structural and cultural violence with regards to education matters in Cyprus fit into what Galtung (1969) would describe as a ‘negative peace’ context. Yet, using the term ‘negative peace’ is still somewhat problematic as it is an understatement of the conflict ethos: long periods of no violence do not equate to peace. It is within this conflict context that peace education has been prevented from becoming a reality in Cyprus. Concerned with the persistent opposition to the rewriting of history textbooks and the wider lack of formal and informal peace education efforts in Cyprus, my research agenda began by situating this resistance in a historical context. This was useful as it not only offered the reader necessary background information with regards to the history of the conflict, but especially because by illustrating the two conflicting historical narratives portrayed by the history textbooks, the education-conflict nexus and hence, the urgent need for peace education, became apparent. Moreover, the

particular conditions that influenced the contemporary state of Cyprus helped to situate today's chosen narratives as well as delineate the national identity politics that coincided with the nation-building project. Such conditions included the two historically opposed 'motherlands'; the EOKA and TMT violence and their opposed aims for *enosis* versus *taksim*; the colonial 'divide and rule' British policy; as well as the unwanted, externally imposed independence of 1960.

Tracing the conflicting narratives back to their respecting historical starting points illustrated the multi-layered and historical nature of Greek-Turkish enmity, showing that today's chosen narratives have within them other older narratives on which pre-1974 violence was based. Historical analysis of the events leading up to the Turkish invasion further illustrated the importance of the politics of memory, since Greek-Cypriots' official discourse suffers from selective amnesia with regards to 1963 and 1967, whereas Turkish-Cypriot officials prefer to remember massive displacement and large-scale military invasion as a 'Happy Peace Operation'. The conflation of memory with history, collective memory that is dangerously passed on from generation to generation, as well as identity politics are all important issues that were important to delineate for the empirical findings to make sense to the reader. In other words, they help conceptualise and contextualise the discourses of resistance towards peace education, as well as highlight the conditions under which social, religious and educational institutions were established in Cyprus.

After locating the peace education puzzle in a historical context, I delineated and theoretically informed my research agenda by situating it within the wider literature. Due to the nature of peace education I took an interdisciplinary approach, which

ensured that I was able to borrow from the strengths of different disciplines and add to the core political science lens I was employing. After grounding my work in the relevant premises and definitions of peace education, I was able to show how my contribution lies at an intersection between three strands or fields of research:

a) Firstly, the literature on the Cyprus conflict, and in particular peace education, conflict and history education/history textbooks. The intersection between power politics and peace education in Cyprus is the main focus of my empirical contribution. This in turn fits into the wider literature on history textbooks in conflict settings.

b) Secondly, by developing a niche area of the resistance to peace education, I am making a theoretical (Gramsci and Foucault) and conceptual (politics of peace education i.e. discursive strategies and institutions) contribution that affects peace education literature generally as a multidisciplinary field. A shift to local perceptions of peace education - viewing peace education as a discursive construct and not a pre-existing entity - draws attention to the signifying power and practices associated with peace education.

c) Thirdly, I am making a contribution to the politics of peace education that fits with the wider power and critical peacebuilding literature. When the first two research strands meet this third location is where my contribution can be seen at a macro-level. However, it is this latter level that acts as the lens of my work, and therefore through its existence it is pushing forward a new area of research, which it simultaneously contributes to. I am moving the field toward a place where political science can contribute more to issues of education and conflict, and in particular peace education.

For example, without the political science lens, I would not have been able to elucidate the discursive strategy of securitisation that is taking place, while also opening up avenues for deconstructing and reversing this process through a mode of desecuritisation. Moreover, my findings with regards to counter-hegemonic practices of the NGO community fit with the critical peacebuilding agenda and their emphasis on local peacebuilding and cultural sensitivity. Guelke emphasises that ‘in general, external interest in conflict in a deeply divided society can have malign rather than benign consequences’ (2012, p. 145). Although Guelke’s argument may be overstated, it does serve as a poignant reminder of the negative repercussions external peace education efforts might have on the peacebuilding process, in particular when there is a lack of cultural sensitivity and utility of local advocacy across civil society.

The relationship between power and peace, let alone power and peace education, remains elusive in existing studies. This thesis has shown that both institutions and discourses that share a conflictive ethos play a detrimental role in the actualisation of peace education in Cyprus. It makes a valuable contribution to understanding how education can be politicised to the point of creating deep, lasting divisions and power asymmetries that act as barriers to peace. Up until now there has not been any literature on Cyprus that applies a poststructuralist power politics lens to peace education, let alone analysing it from a particular securitization angle, nor has this occurred within the general literature.

A study, which promises to ‘problematise’ a particular matter, will often raise more questions than it can possibly address. This study is no exception. Unearthing these issues nevertheless remains important if we are to start engaging with them in a

systematic way. With regards to the circularity of peace education, although this is arguably an endogenous characteristic of peace education that cannot be avoided, it is important for the literature to acknowledge this. Partly as a result of this cyclical nature, there is a conflation of what peace education is and how it is manifested, with why it is not being operationalised (which is not the same as why it is not working efficiently, if it *were* adopted). Is peace education only plausible (because of its cyclical nature) when it is an NGO-centred approach, or is it possible to convince the state to do it?

Arguing that the state (RoC) will never authorise peace education given that it would threaten its nationalist *raison d'etre*, is both problematic and unhelpful. Firstly, if we resign ourselves to the position that peace education will never succeed because the state will never consent to a practise that threatens it, then this would practically mean turning our backs to the possibility of change. This does not square with the contingent nature of our world. Indeed, it would be naïve to argue that nationalism could be distanced from a state that has historically built its legitimacy on it. Yet, peace education can find ways to build on these nationalist identities and make them more inclusive and less fearful of the Other. Secondly, and building on this point, resigning to the inevitable failure of peace education would essentially mean falling into the same mentality that resists peace education in the first place. In other words, it would mean accepting that these fears and perceived dangers that some argue come with peace education are well-founded and inevitable. To put it more candidly, it would be an act of securitisation, similar to the one that this thesis has argued we have to move away from. Thirdly, this position is also problematic in that it rests on a

clear-cut division between the state and civil society,<sup>96</sup> that as I have argued in this thesis, does not reflect the links and overlaps between the two, while at the same time, overlooks the potential for agency and discrepancy. Finally, if indeed we accept this unconstructive position, then how can we explain the fact that the TRNC *did* introduce peace education policies in 2004 despite what one may describe as its ‘nationalist, state-occupying’ *raison d’etre*? The state, its elements and subject positions, are not ‘fixed’ but in constant need of reproduction. Again, we need to start questioning assumptions about what is ‘to the interest’ of the state, and look at ways in which the state might be encouraged into a dialogue about power and peace.

As I have argued in the Introduction, although existing literature does not explicitly touch upon this tension between peace education objectives and its limited operationalisation, perhaps because of its inherent circularity, there needs to be a more explicit and honest discussion about it, an acknowledgement, and then efforts to try and work around this issue, even if no ‘solution’ to its cyclical nature can be found. My post-positivist framework presented in Chapter Three has been an effort in this direction. I contend that we need to shift the focus from the state-civil society dichotomy to subject positions, to expose the power, contingency, and hence potential of discourse for overcoming the educational inertia.

The conceptual framework of the politics of peace education that I brought forward deals with the weaknesses of the existing literature by both avoiding a cyclical argument and by bridging the gap between peace education and political science. This conceptual framework is not a ‘neatly sorted’ model; it includes a dichotomy between

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<sup>96</sup> By civil society, here, I am referring to the whole of civil society, not merely those groups that are involved in peacebuilding activities.

institutions and discourse only as an ordering device to enable me to answer my initial research question.

The ideological struggle over peace education has arguably become more profound, yet its theoretical assumptions less visible. Taking into account the contributions of Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony and its subsequent elaboration, but also the work of Michel Foucault, the theoretical section integrated important theoretical foundations that displace the clear ontology/epistemology boundary, rendering primacy to either one or the other as a futile exercise. I have instead argued for a *re-conceptualisation* of peace education, one that views peace education in the context of power relations. This transforms our understanding of resistance to peace education in research productive ways. The primary theoretical tools used include a) (educational) hegemony and power to reproduce educational identity, and b) the securitization of peace education through hegemonic discourses that present it as a threat to the existence of educational, and by extension, national identity. I have also produced a more concrete, albeit normative definition and problematisation of peace education in Cyprus.

### **Summary: Empirical Findings**

*'I think it is us who make the future. The future is the way we react to what is happening, it is the way we transform a movement, a doubt into truth. If we want to be masters of our future, we must fundamentally pose the question of what today is'. (Michel Foucault, 1994, 'Le monde est un grand asile'. In Dits et Ecrits vol. 11. Paris:*

*Gallimard, p. 434. (trans. Clare O'Farrell).*

Notwithstanding the real presence of myths and propaganda across Cyprus, my analysis is not one that claims that there is 'only mythology' in the arguments which resist peace education. Instead, my analysis has problematised these arguments and forces of resistance as being dependent on certain forms of knowledge, theories, techniques and social relations (Foucault, 1996, p. 408). It has posed the question of 'what today is' in order to ultimately assist in the project of transforming education from an ethos of conflict to an ethos of peace. I have tried to provide and provoke a critical outlook on some long-held notions about education, and especially history education, in the deeply divided society of Cyprus. I have offered a critical analysis into both hegemonic but also counter-hegemonic efforts, as it is important to question practices, even if these are stemming from peacebuilding NGOs. Failing to do so would not only be a deficiency as it would preclude the exposition of constructive policy and practice assessments and consequently, recommendations, but it would also be problematic in the sense that it would entail an 'exemption' for the NGO actors from criticism due to their benign intentions, implying that mainstream hegemonic actors are always characterised by *de facto* malevolent intentions and dispositions.

Competing peace education discourses link education to different domestic and foreign policies to be pursued. I have argued for a reworking of the political assumptions and 'identity solutions' (Walker, 1992) to questions of citizenship, identity, belonging and order that the modern state has offered (see also Hansen, 2010, p.23). I explored the continued significance of educationalised discourse in the



construction of national identity and security policies. I illustrated how educational identity is discursively produced and enacted, and how it impacts on and co-constitutes thinking and emotions about foreign policy and the Other, and how it positions people in ‘appropriate’ locations. Also, I have shown how it has acted as a deterrent, silencing alternative voices. Education discussions in Cyprus turn into a political space in which certain representations – in this case negative- are constantly hegemonised at the expense of others.

Chapter Four highlighted the institutional power relations upon which educational policies and their imagined educational communities are predicated. The authorisation of specific educational policies and the refutation of others indexes the power relationships between those who control educational policy and resources and those who do not, but most importantly between those who hold the hegemonic ideology regarding such policies, and those who do not. By exploring the hegemony exhibited by particular institutions over educational matters, I was able to point towards the historical origins as well as contemporary characteristics and conditions of institutions that, together with a specific discursive landscape (Chapter Five), enable resistance to dominate. In addition, Chapter Four pointed towards a particular decentralised educational governmentality that shows the extent of consensus present in the Greek-Cypriot society emerging through the network of alliances on a macro-level, from institutions such as schools, the Church, the media as well as the wider Cypriot ‘common sense’.

In Chapter Five I proposed that resistance to peace education rests upon problematic assumptions rooted in modernist representations and showed how ambiguities and

misunderstandings allow hegemonic actors to continue resisting peace education and making counter-claims to those of the marginalised peace educators. I shed light on the modernist features of dichotomous identity representations, not only of the external Other, but also of the internal Other i.e. the different perceptions and positions *within* the Greek-Cypriot side. In fact, NGOs themselves are often sucked into modernist representations that augment rather than reduce the space between the nationalists and peace educationalists.

Chapter Five illustrated how educational hegemony in Cyprus is achieved through three effects of discursive power or ‘meta-strategies’: the possibility, impossibility, and deterrent effect. Through my empirical analysis I was able to shed light on the hegemonic practices that ensure the marginalisation of peace education activities, including social ostracisation, verbal abuse, impending of professional mobility, reverting to even more ethno-centric discourses, humiliation and other violations of human rights. The desecuritisation of peace education will form a window of possibility which although also involves a transformation of educational identity (due to circularity), it does not have to directly deal with the full-blown issues that a wider identity conflict transformation would require i.e. issues of territoriality, sovereignty etc. These issues inadvertently form part of the conflict, but there are ways of promoting peace education – and indeed peaceagogy- without necessarily dealing with them first. Chapter Five has highlighted the need to ‘un-silence’, empower and strengthen existing discourses, and for the articulation of new discourses through which peace education is desecuritised.

Whereas the constructivist and post-structuralist discourse methodology exposed the power relations that include, exclude and deter, Securitization theory opened up a space for analysing how and explaining why hegemonic discourses have been successful in enhancing their ability to attack peace education: citing its effects as a threat to national security interests, and justifying the use of unusual or exceptional measures. As we have seen, discussions of history textbooks influence educational and peacebuilding policies and use the importance of the history textbook to articulate policies of national survival. They present the preservation of history as integral to national survival, and any changes as a threat to national survival.

As a way out of the educational impasse, I propose the introduction of a politics of 'peaceagogy'. Unravelling the privileging of certain discourses over others can ultimately help to create space for alternative viewpoints. There is a need to recognise and work against ethnocentric discourses and practices that serve to silence alternative voices. This does not mean to outright dismiss and reject their proponents, nor to attack them, but to engage in a dialogue that deconstructs both positions, thereby reducing the gap. Arguably, peace educators need more empathy in order to achieve this i.e. to place themselves into the shoes of those hegemonic actors and try to reduce the distance without imposing stereotypes that will only serve to alienate these people more. Peaceagogy is underpinned by a form of teaching for and about peace that is much more institutionalised, and involves a discourse about peace education that is very clear, desecuritised, concise and sensitive to local fears and insecurities.

### **Putting things in context: ‘zooming out’**

#### ***A) In relation to the external sphere***

History education has only very recently been linked with international relations (Hirano, 2009) and the empirical findings have shown that the interrelationships between the domestic sphere and foreign relations are much more interrelated than hitherto acknowledged. The way citizens construct peace education as affecting the national interests, and their security from the ‘enemy’, as well as the strong interest in maintaining a ‘victim’ outlook to the outside world, are all indications that domestic articulations of history education include references to external issues. This comes as no surprise when we place the internal struggle within the wider conflict context of a struggle with the external ‘other’. Therefore, we can see that education (which is often seen as a domestic issue) has a substantial impact on foreign policy considerations but also that these foreign policy considerations affect education policies and discourses.

***B) In relation to other conflicts:*** In the social sciences, findings often can not just be ‘applied’ in mechanical ways, but they can point towards new ways of thinking and practicing, impact policy-formulation and drive debates in new directions. We should not assume that the definitions of peace education which might work in Cyprus, will automatically be transferable to other conflict contexts. However, this warning does not in any way weaken their applicability in non-mechanical ways. Cyprus like any conflict region has its own unique features, but at the same time these research findings provide general insights into the politicisation of education in conflict regions. I insist on the conflict-specific conditions, sensitivities, cultural idiosyncracies and histories of each region that requires peacebuilding. But starting

small, from a particular conflict, and shedding light on this conflict, looking at grassroots transformative projects and their barriers can act as a framework that can be modified and adapted to other settings. It is possible that religion is an issue in other countries as well, for example, although the education-religion relationship may not share the same discursive strategies as the ones that references to Orthodox traditions have. The conceptual framework of the ‘politics of peace education’ can be used to conceptualise the relationship between power and education in areas of conflict, offering a guide of critical inquiry that interrogates both the discursive and institutional politics of a conflict-region.

***C) In relation to the Other:*** Throughout this thesis one of the threads underpinning my main argument was the need to reduce the distance between competing definitions of peace education. This point is also emphasised here: what we need is not one immutable definition that will be imposed from one side to the other, or one community to the other, but a way of bringing different perceptions of peace education into contact and dialogue with each other, comparing their different assumptions, frictions and purposes, but also exploring their current and potential intersections.

### **Limitations of the thesis**

The overarching rationale of this thesis was to explain, and try and bridge, the gap between peace education in theory and peace education in practice. In other words, my goal was to try and reach informed conclusions as to how to respond to this educational impasse that characterises the Cyprus conflict. This stems from a

normative and political position which sees peace education as something positive and desirable, and is motivated by the desire to transform the conflict ethos of the Cyprus. Underpinning this is a conceptual understanding of peace education as empowering and enlightening, that views peace education as intertwined with radical social change. This is also related to my conceptual framework that uses concepts like power and hegemony to expose asymmetries and injustices that partly stem from the state. However, a tension emerges when this conceptual framework is empirically applied. I locate this tension firstly, in the particular context of Cyprus; given the legacy of resistance to peace education as well as its inherent circularity, implementing the radical forms of peace education prove to be extremely difficult, if not also unrealistic. Therefore, a more diluted, but still direct, form of peace education is recommended. Secondly, this tension is also associated with a poststructuralist understanding of subject positions, whereby the very notion of progress upon which peace education initiatives is premised are questioned, for the sake of acknowledging the right of differing interpretations to exist, whilst at the same time attempting to find ways to reduce the distance between them.

In addition, although the thesis has raised some issues related to gender, it is admittedly limited in terms of discussing gender issues in a more detailed way. Moreover, although I have shown the influence of external actors- negative and positive, historical and contemporary- my predominant focus was the domestic sphere, domestic institutions and discourses of resistance. Due to space constraints, contemporary actors including Europe (catalysing or cementing conflict), Council for Europe, the UN, USA, Turkey, Greece etc. have not been discussed, nor has the relationship between international and local actors been analysed.

## **Directions for Future Research**

This section will build on my findings and limitations in order to offer suggestions for a future ‘politics of peace education’ research agenda.

Whereas this study has focused on a time frame covering the past ten years, the underlying research design was not a longitudinal one. I was not comparing changes over time, but rather, through the lens of ‘power’, trying to understand why people’s attitudes towards peace education are, and have been, so negative and impervious to change. This also explains why a Foucauldian discourse analysis was the preferred method of data analysis. However, it would be useful to build on these findings by turning the emphasis on the direction of time. A content analysis, using Nvivo for example, could help identify possible –even if subtle- societal changes over time. Given the added impetus for a solution due to the recent financial crisis and the unprecedented levels of mistrust in the existing political parties and leaders, it is likely that in the near future changes will develop at a faster pace than the one we have seen post-referendum. A future study identifying possible changes is likely to produce some interesting results.

Another potentially fruitful avenue for research is the one that examines the relationship between gender discrimination and peace education. The gender-peace education nexus is certainly not new in the general literature<sup>97</sup>, but there has been no specific study on Cyprus that investigates this link. Although there have been some

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<sup>97</sup> See Brock-Utne, 1989.

studies on gender issues in relation to peacebuilding efforts, these remain very few in number and do not directly address the specific aspect of peace education.<sup>98</sup> Similarly, the Gender Advisory Team, set up recently (2009) and working explicitly on UNSCR 1325, still remains unknown to the majority of politicians and to the public.<sup>99</sup> However, given that in 2013 a new project entitled ‘Where are the women’ in the peace process, stemming from CCMC (community media NGO) has received media attention, and has been supported by Andreas Mavroyiannis, the new Greek Cypriot negotiator at the peace talks (since September 2013) is a promising sign. Nevertheless, the gap between gender issues and peace education still remains. Given that even today women asking their husbands how to vote (or young women following their fathers’ party line) is still a quite common phenomenon, the impact this has on political attitudes towards peace education efforts is not hard to see. Promoting empowerment and critical thinking with regards to women’s rights is likely to have an impact on hegemonic discourses as well. Power asymmetries, human rights, education, are all common issues for both gender and peace education studies, and addressing these intersections may provide constructive synergies for future education policies.

At a later stage a wider project could perhaps focus on the comparative context, not merely between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot discourses, but also in relation to other conflict-ridden areas such as Israel-Palestine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Southern Philippines, Northern Ireland etc. The findings could be useful not only in highlighting commonalities and differences/idiosyncrasies of both discursive strategies and institutional dynamics, but also in identifying successful cases of

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<sup>98</sup> See Anthias (1989) and Hadjipavlou (2010)

<sup>99</sup> Interview with a founding member (February 2013)



educational transformation within conflict-settings that could be useful for the Cypriot context.

Chapter Five has shown that political discourses of education in Greece, and in particular history textbooks, affect similar discourses in Cyprus. Certain characteristics can be seen in both discourses, such as strong positivist tendencies, gender discrimination, strong accusation of academics who support peace education or are directly involved in the rewriting of history textbooks, fierce resistance by nationalist groups, as well as the Church and media. However, there is nothing to suggest that the influence does not occur in both directions i.e. Cyprus discourses affecting perceptions in Greece. New and online media make news instantly available to both countries, and the common language is another factor that strengthens the connection between the two countries. An in-depth comparative study could be useful in investigating the influence of one country on the other. Although the impact Greece has had on Cyprus (with the history textbook fiasco setting the discursive framework and negative climate for similar future attempts in Cyprus) was to some extent covered in Chapter Five, a more detailed study may reveal further connections that may even be positive (for example, to what extent those academics which were supporting peace education influenced Cyprus through their direct visits, talks, and involvement in NGOs) as well as address the possibility of influence going the opposite direction e.g. books being declined in Greece because of the Cypriot Minister of Education declining them (Onnassis Website video). It would also be interesting to draw out any differences between the resistance discourses of each country, given that Greece is not in a direct conflict with Turkey within its sovereign

territory. How do negative attitudes and discourses over history textbook changes in Greece compare with those of the Greek-Cypriots?

As Volkan points out, it may be useful studying past countries which have experienced conflict but are now in peaceful relationships. How do these countries manage the mental and discursive representations of chosen traumas and chosen glories in such a way so that they do not inflame negative large-group sentiments? How do they ‘adaptively mourn past losses and changes so that they do not induce feelings of anger, humiliation, and the desire for revenge?’ (1997/8, p.225) And finally how can we build a model of education where differences, both in narratives, but also of language, religion and ethnicity, be accepted without invoking racism and perpetuating a conflict ethos? Future research on these questions can inform the way we design future peace education projects.

### **Concluding thoughts**

The last century was the ‘the bloodiest century in human history’ (Gallagher, 2005, p.6), and the early twenty first century does not look very promising either. It is imperative therefore not to be complacent or indifferent; we need to learn the lessons of the past- as cliché as this sounds- if further genocides are to be avoided. A generation raised in a framework of peaceagogy is definitely not going to conduce to the systematic slaughtering of other people in the same way that a generation that is raised in years of ethnic hatred, propaganda and demonization, will. Recognising the imminent dangers of an educational ethos of conflict is crucial, and it is our duty as

researchers to inform the public of these dangers, but also to contribute in alleviating them where possible. When conducting peace research, scholars have to fully appreciate the constraints under which policy makers but also peace practitioners are operating. They should also make genuine efforts to participate in these, or to try and otherwise forge links so as to enhance communication and knowledge exchange between the two.

Underscoring the numerous negotiations and settlement proposals is an ethical dilemma, that Michael sums up nicely in his popular book *Resolving the Cyprus Conflict*:

“how to construct a legal-constitutional order, dictated by a set of historical determinants, including the desire to rectify past injustices, which reconciles human rights and group security, with the expectation of upholding the fundamental precepts of liberal democracy, whilst fortifying the foundations for sequential integration/unification” (2009, p.191).

Placing all these issues within the context of a divided country that is only ‘partly’ a member of the EU makes it even more complicated. The various levels that a proposed settlement needs to take into consideration serves as a reminder that confronting each attempt to resolve the conflict is the simultaneous need to address and reconcile the past with the present, the external with the domestic, the individual with the collective, but perhaps more crucially (for peace education), the chosen ghosts and chosen traumas of the past, with current realities and more inclusive narratives. Greek-Cypriots, as we have seen in this study, see it as their duty to keep

the memory of past injustices alive. Although this is understandable to an extent, what is perhaps questionable is the reasoning behind doing this. Even if we agree- and I do- that memory of the past injustices should remain alive, should this not be done for the purpose of preventing such pain and suffering i.e. from preventing further conflict? Up until today, the driving force behind keeping the memory alive has been idea that each Greek-Cypriot 'will fight' or 'will struggle' to restore justice and 'rectify' the invasion- as if the northern part has remained intact since 1974- kept in a vacuum waiting for its liberation.<sup>100</sup> Because in the meantime we may not have any violence, but we certainly have not resolved the conflict<sup>101</sup> and complacency should not let us forget that conflict breeds violence. We need to prevent ethnic pride from turning once more into ethnic violence. Chosen traumas are extremely powerful and dangerous and peace education can help to transform them into inclusive narratives with a peaceful ethos. Giving examples from how stories about the Battle of Kosovo played an instrumental role in fuelling mass atrocities committed by Serbs in Bosnia in 1992, Volkan reminds us how 'the memory of the chosen trauma is used to justify ethnic aggression' (1997, p.78). The long-term cessation of violence in Cyprus should not be taken as a guarantee that violence will not occur in the future.

For the last twenty years at least, each period of negotiations is dubbed as 'the last opportunity to solve the Cyprus problem'. This artificial sense of urgency is somewhat understandably instigated, in order to counteract the seemingly endless impasse, the sluggish attitude with which the negotiations proceed, by putting back momentum as a form of political pressure to reach an agreement. Whether this is a good or bad thing

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<sup>100</sup> An exception to this is the town of Famagusta and even this is soon changing with the 'Famagusta Ecocity Project' led by Vasia Markides. <http://ecocityproject.com/famagusta/>

<sup>101</sup> I disagree with the use of the term 'post-conflict' to describe the situation in Cyprus. If we were in a post-conflict situation there would not be a need for UNFICYP after 51 years, enclaves, borders, issues of non-recognition etc. Rather, we are experiencing a long-term cessation of violence.

depends on the context and manner with which it is instigated. However, this attitude is based on a paradigm that views human behaviour as merely rational behaviour that will weigh up the benefits, and only act if s/he really has to. But, my thesis (position) is that we need to think in terms of a different paradigm- one that is based on the ability of human beings to act because they see it right to do so, because this particular behaviour toward peace is something they see is not only necessary but morally just. Hence, it is important to think of ways in which people will want to vote for a particular solution, where they will desire to do so, and arguably peace education is one of the paths that can lead to this direction. Peace education, that goes beyond merely educating people about the importance of peace, reaches the intellectual and emotional discourse of society, affecting both past, present and future constructions of the Cyprus conflict. It exposes the strategies and ways in which the hegemonic order worked only to keep itself alive, and empowers people to transform their state from one of political masochism, to one of political maturity. It offers a totally different set of glasses (see Introduction pp.17-18) through which one can view the world, the distant 'other', the close 'other', the 'self'. After all, national self-reflection and self-criticism, so critical for sustainable peace, can only start from honesty and humility, the ability to not only see underneath the myths but also to assess one's own contribution to reproducing them.

Even if there is a solution before peace education has been officially implemented, or even promoted more widely at an informal civil society level, then how is it expected that the society will respond adequately to the increased heterogeneity? If an organically integrated and long-term sustainable community is ever to be expected, then peace education, as part of a wider peaceagogy needs to finally take shape at a

wider and deeper level.

As the Canadian Institution for Conflict Resolution<sup>102</sup> puts it:

“A signed peace agreement signals only the beginning of a long process of post-conflict reconciliation. Bringing together former parties to a dispute whether in a community, institutional, political or other context, to begin re-establishing civility, working relationships, and strong institutional structures is a complex and demanding task.”

When studying the Cyprus conflict one needs to bear in mind that there has not been an organic development of Cypriot identity in the island. Not only has the division meant the existence of two ‘divorced parents’, pulling at opposite directions, but it also meant the development of a somewhat ‘artificial’ identity in the sense that it has always been based on a struggle: the existence of one identity based on the hatred and exclusion of the other. Arguably, identities whose base is conflict will always be problematic as there will always be a need to impose, to assert over the other- an inherent ontological insecurity. One could go as far as to argue that the Cyprus conflict does not reflect the Cypriots; in a sense they have themselves ‘become’ the conflict. It has become a part of who they are and more importantly, a part of who they feel they *should* be. It is very difficult to undo this process, the long-term impact of the collective and generational trauma. It involves trying to undo the self, or rather more accurately, the self’s perception of the Self, and this involves a psychological detachment that does not come naturally. This undoing may perhaps be seen more

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<sup>102</sup> <http://www.cicr-icrc.ca/en/international>

constructively –and desecuritised more- if the self is seen as changing as a result of a wider change of our altered worldview, what is called in Greek as one’s or ‘κοσμοθεωρία’ or ‘cosmotheory’, rather than (simply) a change of one’s identity. In other words, the emphasis shifts from the self to a wider change stemming from a reconceptualization of one’s preferred future path of the world. Since tragedy and trauma have introduced a particular hegemonic narrative into the collective consciousness of the Greek-Cypriots, peacebuilding requires the introduction of a new narrative which enters not to fill a void, but to transform an existing state of negative peace into a state of positive peace. Again, as I have tried to show in Chapter Three, this process of ‘undoing’ involves a hefty amount of emotional baggage that should not be taken lightly but accounted for (e.g. counsellors, psychological support) especially in the context of peace education efforts/workshops for adults who have lived a much longer period with particular beliefs and perspectives. However, what does come naturally is the human bond, and the commitment to our shared values as human beings. It helps to keep in mind the question of what the tragedy has ‘helped to reveal about the *world that we want* as opposed to the actions (related to the tragedy) *that we revile?*’ (Jenkins, 2011, emphasis in the original).

Besides, living physically apart for decades, does not necessarily mean that the two main communities do not have things in common- or even that their differences are in direct opposition. Lack of contact may have meant that certain traits have existed or developed distinctively, without the organic growth of Cypriot identity in terms of societal processes and institutions. Nevertheless, a pre-1963 basis existed and this can be discerned in the fact that there are many cultural similarities, for example, in terms of music, food, family ties, favourite pastimes, even colloquial phrases. Greek and

Turkish-Cypriots for example, have unsurprisingly perhaps, much more in common culturally (and anthropologically) than either does with the British!

For now at least, this thesis has not been the most optimistic. Yet, if it has helped expose one thing this is the constant reproduction of certain discourses and institutional processes which obstruct peace processes. This shows that there are neither fixed institutions, nor fixed discourses, but an ongoing struggle. The fact that a struggle exists is evidence of the existence of an alternative, yet marginalised force. *This*, is something that deserves, at least some, optimism.

This optimism also fits with my framework of social constructivism; the importance of historical contingency and the belief that there is nothing inevitable or eternal about the conflict. It is not doomed to be eternal; peace is *always* a possibility exactly due to the fact that humans are living, dynamic organisms and not eternally fixed or static. This makes it all the more important to be able to listen and see those exceptions to the rule, those misfits which in fact create the basis for the possibility of the perfect fit for peace.

The known story of the two salesmen who went down to Africa in the 1900s is a useful reminder here. The salesmen had been ordered to go to Africa from the UK to find out if there were selling opportunities for shoes there. They both wrote telegrams back to Manchester: one of them wrote “Stop. The situation is hopeless. The people here don’t wear shoes”. The other wrote “Glorious opportunity. They don’t have any shoes yet here”. This demonstrates the power of a constructive mindset i.e. one that looks for *opportunities* amidst seemingly hopeless situations.



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## APPENDIX

### 1878-1940: British Changes to the Cypriot socio-political landscape

According to Paul Sant Cassia, an anthropologist who has written extensively on Cyprus, Greek Cypriots are somewhat justified for pointing out that ‘the dominant culture with the greatest continuity since at least the fourth century BC’ has been Greek and hence, Christian (1999, p.24). However, since the island fell under Ottoman rule in 1571, a substantial Turkish minority emerged, mostly descendants of the Ottoman settlers, comprising about 18% of the island.

Through the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Britain was given the administration of Cyprus, in exchange for a guarantee to defend the Ottoman Empire against Russia. Despite being under Ottoman rule for over 300 years, the majority of the population remained Greek. These Greek Cypriots regarded themselves as ‘Greek’ and desired union- in Greek- *enosis*, with Greece. When the British took over, Bishop Kyprianos met the first High Commissioner, Sir Wolseley and said:

We accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected (Hill, 1952, p.297).

After the First World War there was a gradual increase in Greek Cypriot nationalist sentiment. Since Turkey joined the First World War on the side of Germany, Britain regarded their 1878 agreement as null and annexed Cyprus in 1914. In 1923 Turkey

recognised this annexation through the Treaty of Lausanne and in 1925 Cyprus was officially declared a Crown Colony. One of the reasons for this post-War intensification of nationalist demands was Britain's proposals towards the government in Athens, regarding the possibility of Cyprus being given to Greece: firstly, informal discussions in 1912, in exchange for a base in Argostoli on the island of Kephallonia and secondly, in 1915, a formal offer was made on the condition that Greece would support Serbia against the Germans (see Stavrinides, 1999, pp.11-12; Varnava, 2006, pp.40-57; Hadjidemetriou, 2007, pp.334-5; Faustmann, 2008, p.46). Although these proposals never materialized, the mere act in the eyes of the Greek Cypriots conferred a degree of legitimization of their demands- 'an implicit admission that their claims were justifiable, if not justified' (Hitchens, 1997, p.34), so when it became clear by the end of the war that Britain had no intention of giving up the island, the disappointed Greek Cypriots decided to move from verbal demands to physical action.

Proposals were put forward for at least greater representation of the Greek Cypriots in the Legislative Council both before and after the War but the British turned proposals down, telling the Greek-Cypriots that they were considered 'immature' for constitutional freedoms (Hill, 1952, p.431). The British similarly and scornfully rejected earlier proposals for an elected legislative council and in 1881 the English-language newspaper *Cyprus Herald* stated that the 'natives of Cyprus' were not 'ripe for an innovation of so extensive a nature' (see Georgallidis, 1979; Katsiaounis, 1996; Faustmann, 2008;). A wave of anti-British feeling was exacerbated by what the Greek Cypriots saw as a lack of formal respect for Christian Orthodoxy, which they were used to under the Ottoman rule. The more the British rejected and dismissed the



Greek Cypriots as inferior, the more they became embittered. Malcolm Stevenson, the High Commissioner and later Governor of the Cyprus colony, characteristically remarked in a memorandum submitted to the British Government in 1922:

I fear that I cannot...advocate...self-government... The average standard of intelligence and education of the Cypriot is low...The Island is in truth immature...(cited from Georghallides, 1979, p.234).

The 'divide and rule' policy was primarily institutionalized early on through the Legislative Council,<sup>103</sup> where the Turkish-Cypriot minority vote when combined with the British actually equalled those of the Greek-Cypriot, effectively giving the British Governor the casting vote on controversial issues (Orr, 1972, p.106; Faustmann, 2008, p.46). As Colonial Secretary Sir Charles William James Orr wrote in a critical manner, the British Empire relied:

...on the permanent hostility between two sections of the population to carry into effect the policy of the Government...It has been urged with...considerable force that such a balancing of votes must tend to keep alive the racial animosity that naturally exists in an island inhabited by a mixed Christian and Moslem population (1972, p.106).

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<sup>103</sup> By this time the Council although controlled by Britain, it became an important platform through which both communities voiced their political demands.

The Greek Cypriots disliked the fact that such power was given to the Turkish Cypriots that could effectively push aside their own views, and vehemently demanded what they saw as a fairer representation, proportional to the population numbers of the two communities. Orr goes on to describe the impact this policy has had on the Greek Cypriots:

The situation created has always been a cause of considerable dissatisfaction amongst the Greek elected members, who have from time to time been loud in their denunciation of what they call “stifling the voice of the majority of the inhabitants” (1972, p.106).

It is also important to contextualize the Greek Cypriots’ sentiments in relation to events that were occurring outside Cyprus at the time. Firstly, when Greece was engaged in revolts to gain liberation from the Ottoman rulers, Greek Cypriots joined the Greek army as volunteers. For example, in 1896, 682 volunteers set off from Cyprus to fight on the side of Crete, which was revolting against Ottoman rule (Bose, 2007, p.63). Unsurprisingly this intensified their anti-Turkish feelings, at the same time further igniting their own nationalist desires once they returned back to Cyprus. Moreover, the fact that Crete achieved *enosis* with Greece in 1913, set a positive precedent for the Greek Cypriots. Related to this, is the second significant contextual factor: the firm establishment of the so-called ‘Megali Idea’ (meaning Grand Idea) in Cyprus. This ‘Idea’, arguably the epitome of Greek irredentism, encapsulated and envisaged an enlarged Greek state which would re-unite all the Greeks of the Mediterranean and Balkan world, previously part of the Byzantine Empire.

It was in this catalytic yet conflicting context that Greek Cypriots' struggles for *enosis* gained momentum. Unsurprisingly, Turkish Cypriots complained to the British that the Greek Cypriots 'had adopted a menacing attitude' toward them (Katsiaounis, 1996, p.210-214, cited in Bose, 2007, p.63). Despite the common antipathy of both the Turkish Cypriots and the British towards *enosis*, it would be misleading to argue that the Turkish Cypriots were simply stirred into opposition by the colonial rulers.<sup>104</sup> Instead, the Turkish Cypriots protested against *enosis*, as they perceived it as a threat for the Muslim minority. The following excerpt from a speech made by a Turkish Cypriot member of the Legislative Council, in 1930, evidences this:

We vehemently protest against this [pro-*enosis*] representation as we have always done in the past. We believe that if Cyprus were annexed to Greece there would be no chance of life for the Moslems in Cyprus. We know that the Greeks are in the majority in Cyprus, but there are many other countries in the world similar to Cyprus which are being administered by foreigners in spite of the fact that the majority of the people belong to another race (cited in Georghallides, 1985, p. 390).

On the other hand some authors (see Hill, 1952; Choisi, 1993; Hadjidemetriou, 2007) argue that the Turkish Cypriots were used as an excuse by the British, who made references to their moral obligation to defend the interests of the minority whenever the two interests concurred, in order to prolong their stronghold in Cyprus and prevent *enosis* from becoming a reality (see also Orr's account above). It is probable that both arguments have some validity as the Turkish Cypriots' resistance towards *enosis* gave

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<sup>104</sup> This of course, does not nullify the argument that the British used the Turkish Cypriot stance favourably to pursue their own goals.

the British an added barrier against the *enosis* movement. In addition, the fact that the British bases - a total of 98 square miles (2.7%)- still occupy the small island to this day despite protests against them, testifies to the diachronic geopolitical significance of Cyprus and to the British denial of allowing Cyprus to unite with Greece.

Moreover, the system of parliamentary representation of the British in Cyprus, created a feeling amongst the two communities that the task of their respective politicians ‘was to promote the interests of different and opposing groups of people’ (Stavrinides, 1999, p.19). On the rare occasions when Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot representatives agreed, usually the British vetoed their decision. In October 1931 when a Turkish Cypriot representative voted together with the Greek Cypriot members against a taxation proposal, the Governor overruled the decision and still imposed the tax bill. This triggered the first anti-British riots, as well as the burning down of the Government House, bringing *enosis* back. The British reacted with emergency laws, exiles, curfews, abolishment of the Council, as well as a fine of £30,000 imposed only on the ‘non-Moslem’ population, ‘an event that further identified in Greek minds the Turkish community with the colonial rulers (Stavrinides, 1999, p.20).<sup>105</sup>

The October 1931 revolt is often seen as a turning point in the period of British rule in Cyprus, after which Britain practiced an almost dictatorial system on all activities of social and political life, at least until the Second World War. Ironically, the Governor of Cyprus between 1926 and 1932, Sir Ronald Storrs, wrote in his memoir that ‘The

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<sup>105</sup> It is unclear whether or not some Turkish Cypriots participated in the October 1931 revolts against colonial authorities. Some historians (e.g. (Hadjidemetriou, 2007, p.339) mention that both communities fought together and also suffered the consequent punishments, whereas most historians only mention the Greek Cypriot community as protesting in a revolt that was clearly for *enosis* and not simply against the British rule.

Greekness of the Cypriots is, in my opinion, indisputable. A man is of the race which he passionately feels himself to be' (cited in Hitchens, 1997, p.35). But, such ideas came into sharp contrast with British actions in 1931 after the *enosis* riots broke out. Emergency laws aimed at curbing the authority of the Church, political parties were banned, as was the use of the Greek flag, two thousand Cypriots were imprisoned, and ten communal leaders, including two Bishops were deported. The riots sharpened relations between the Greek Cypriots and the British, set a precedent for the later armed struggle, but also formed 'a reference point' as the 'riots entered the *enosis* lexicon' of Greek Cypriot nationalist discourse (Michael, 2009, p.17). Moreover, the dynamics of massive repression by the colonial ruler helped generate support for 'collective overt hostility' towards the colonial government through the creation of militant organisations (Sant Cassia, 1999, p.49).

With the beginning of the Second World War, the *enosis*'s hopes were once more raised as Greece and Britain were fighting on the same side, and they anticipated that the British would 'reward' Greece's efforts by offering Cyprus. As a result, many Cypriots joined a special regiment, and the British capitalized on these nationalist feelings by recruiting soldiers under the slogan 'Fight for Freedom and Greece' (Michael, 2009, p.17). But the ensuing Cold War made Cyprus far too vital for British interests for it to be relinquished to the Greeks.

#### 1941-1954: Beginning of the era of mass politics in Cyprus

One of the political parties made illegal as result of the 1931 riots was the Communist Party of Cyprus, which was founded in 1926, reflecting the beginnings of working

class consciousness in Cyprus. The communist party set as its aim the protection of the working class from exploitation as well as the independence of Cyprus (Faustmann, 2010, p.273). It was banned in 1931 and only after the beginning of the Second World War were political parties allowed to develop again.<sup>106</sup> The early 1940s saw an institutionalization of the internal politics of the Greek Cypriots and not long after, of the Turkish Cypriots- according to Faustmann this was the beginning of ‘the era of mass politics in Cyprus’ (2010, p.273). In 1941 leading members of the previous communist party helped establish AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People), a left-wing peoples’ party which supported self-government but was ambivalent regarding *enosis*. On the right, the bourgeois class organized the Cyprus Nationalist Party. The Greek Civil War of 1946, and the later emergence of the Cold War, only helped to polarize the internal struggle between the Left and Right even further, allowing for the fermentation of political developments that characterize the Greek Cypriot community to this day. The first Turkish Cypriot political party, the Turkish Minority Association (KATAK), was formed much later than the first Greek Cypriot one (1920s), in 1942.

Indeed, it was the Greek Cypriots who first initiated the nationalist movement that resulted in an intense anti-imperialist struggle (that finally led to Cyprus’s independence). The Greek Cypriots wanted ‘freedom’ from British colonial rule in order to unite with what they regarded as the nation they belonged: ‘motherland’ Greece. The main exponent of the demand for *enosis* with Greece was the Orthodox Church. As we shall see throughout this thesis, the role of the Church as an institution in Cyprus is crucial, both from a historical and contemporary perspective. In January

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<sup>106</sup> Trade unions however, were legalized earlier, in 1936.

1950, Archbishop Makarios II, the head of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus led a plebiscite in which 96% of Greek Cypriots supported *enosis* with Greece.<sup>107</sup> His successor, Archbishop Makarios III returned from his postgraduate studies at the University of Boston, back to Cyprus in 1948, and in September 1950 he became the youngest Archbishop in Cyprus, at the age of 37. Until his death in 1977 he was to play a prominent role in the Cypriot political scene as he became the leader of the populist movement for *enosis*, was seen as the leader of the Greek Cypriots, and subsequently became President of the Republic of Cyprus.

The potential of this union stirred up counter-feelings in the Turkish Cypriots which responded with Turkish nationalism. Following the Second World War, the Turkish Cypriots who wanted to prevent union with Greece at all costs started to ‘fully back the British’ and at the same time their leaders increased their pressures on Turkey to regain control of Cyprus if British colonial rule ended (Faustmann, 2008, p.51). This was the beginning of the emergence of Turkish nationalism as a critical force within the Turkish Cypriot community, which was becoming increasingly secular, identified less by its religion and more by its ethnicity. In the 1950s, seeing that the possibility of Turkey annexing the whole of Cyprus was meagre, the Turkish Cypriots crystallized their formal desires into fighting for partition- in Turkish- *taksim*. Taksim represented the partition of Cyprus into two, giving one part to Turkey and one part to Greece, sometimes referred to as double-*enosis*.<sup>108</sup> Here we can see the roots of

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<sup>107</sup> This was not the same Makarios III who was later to become the President of the Republic, but his predecessor. Sumantra Bose in his 2007 book entitled *Contested Lands* misleadingly states that it was Makarios III that organized this plebiscite and that this was a reason he ‘had risen to prominence’ (p.66).

<sup>108</sup> Notwithstanding the different ethnic desires, a practical point to consider here is how tiny Cyprus is (in contrast to India for example) and the fact that the Turkish Cypriots were not concentrated in a particular geographic area that could be sectioned out, but were dispersed as were the Greek Cypriots all around the island. When partition of the island into a Greek region, a Turkish region and strategic British enclave, and displacement of the population was suggested by an MP in a House of Commons debate in 1956, it was rejected by most Members: MP Aneurin Bevan said: “My right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot) gave us a very interesting dissertation upon partition...I must say, however, that analogies based upon the situation in countries separated by the 49th

difference in nationalist sentiments, but also regarding the desired future of each community.

Whereas the Greek Cypriot community formally articulated its struggle for self-determination in terms of union with Greece as early as 1919 (during a Cyprus mission visit to London),<sup>109</sup> the diametrically opposed Turkish position of *taksim* only formally emerged in the late 1950s. KATAK was formed in 1942 but it was only after the mid 1950s that the level of political organisation in the Turkish Cypriot community improved (Bose, 2007, p.64).

Stavrinides argues that the Turkish leaders (note that he uses Greeks and Turks and not Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots and this is perhaps a reflection of the sentiment of the time as he first published this book in 1977, shortly after the war) ‘lacked the numbers, the sophistication, and the organizing ability of their opponents’ (1999, p.29) to put their case forward. It is highly likely that this argument has some validity, in that the Turkish Cypriots were smaller in number and even though some were still practicing Muslims, they did not have the political boost given to the Greek Cypriots by the Orthodox Church. However, it would be misleading to argue that the nationalist sentiments of each side were, apart from size, of the same intensity or nature, given the historical conditions and contextual differences. As we have already seen, in addition to the Church, the Greek Cypriots, were imbued with irredentist feelings like the ‘Megali Idea’, had fought in mainland Greek wars, and were

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Parallel, or in India, are not very accurate, bearing in mind the very small size of Cyprus. (HC Deb, 19 July 1956, Vol. 556, 1526). Another MP, Reginald Paget also pointed out that : “Surely there is a much bigger difficulty here, the fact that there is not a Turkish area? There is no part of Cyprus which is of county size in which there is anything like a Turkish majority” (HC Deb, 19 July 1956, Vol. 556, 1423).

<sup>109</sup> The idea of *enosis* can be traced earlier during the Ottoman rule, where the idea of freedom was identified with the idea of union with Greece. However, this was not formal and on a more limited scale (Hadjidemetriou, 2007, p.331)



arguably far less content to stay under British rule than the Turkish Cypriots were.<sup>110</sup> Before 1931, the Turkish Cypriots were allowed if they desired, just like the Greek Cypriots were, to form political parties, but none were formed. According to Choisi (1993), Turkish nationalism, unlike Greek nationalism, initially emerged as a result of personal elite ambitions and later on facilitated by the British in their attempts to prevent *enosis* from materializing. Moreover, later on once Turkish nationalism gained momentum in Cyprus, the fact that it was a *Dr* Fazıl Küçük who led the Turkish Cypriot Nationalist Party (in 1955 renamed as ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ Party), and that the Turkish Cypriots in the late 1940s managed to organize themselves effectively and win the support of Turkey who had earlier renounced all claims to the island (by the Lausanne Treaty in 1923) shows that Stavrinides argument may perhaps be an underestimation.

Another example is that in 1949 the British accepted the demand to change the terminology within its administration from ‘Muslims’ to ‘Cypriot Turks’. This successful demand was led by the new secular Kemalist elites in Cyprus and is important also ‘as an attempt to secure the patronage of mainland Turkey in rather the same way as the Greek Cypriots tried to involve Greece (Faustmann, 2008, p.52; see also Atesin, 2006). This was not a limited example but reflective of a stronger wind of change. During the late 1940s, various political and educational efforts were made to strengthen the ties between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots in an attempt to raise national consciousness. These efforts included the setting up on the island in 1948 of a ‘Special Turkish Committee’ by Britain; the celebration of national holidays of Turkey in Cyprus; the implementation of Kemal Attaturk’s reforms in the Turkish

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<sup>110</sup> According to Stavrinides: We should not assume that the leaders of the Turkish Cypriots ‘were willing slaves of the British, or even Anglophiles’ but instead that they ‘would rather be under British domination than Greek’ (1999, p.29).

Cypriot community; and crucially the advent of educational resources, including both material (textbooks) and human resources (teachers from mainland Turkey) (Kizilyurek, 2006, p.323; Faustmann, 2008, p.52).

By 1950, 'two fully-fledged nationalist ideologies in the island' (Stavrinides, 1999, p.24) were allowed to flourish under the British system of governance. Britain's main aim was to ensure that neither desired goal was achieved, and that instead 'their subjects' remained loyal to the British Empire. In 1948, Lord Winster's<sup>111</sup> proposals for limited self-government excluded self-determination and these were thus rejected by the Greek Cypriot representatives. The slogan of 'enosis and only enosis' first declared by Archbishop Leontios, had already entered into Greek Cypriot nationalist discourse. In 1949 even the Greek Cypriot left-wing party AKEL changed their policy (after the British rejected their demand for self-government), from demanding self-government to adopting the one of *enosis* instead, shared by the majority of their compatriots. This year also saw the first Turkish Cypriot public protest against *enosis*, which took place in Nicosia. The Turkish National party was formed by uniting two previously separate Turkish Cypriot political groups.

British policy during this period was neither clear nor consistent, with representatives oscillating from giving statements of hope for self-determination, to statements that excluded such possibility indefinitely. They underestimated the capacity of *enosis* to mobilise the masses and did not seriously consider that it could ever challenge British hegemony (Purcell, 1969, p.227, cited in Michael, 2009, p.19). The importance of Cyprus to Britain, and the latter's use of the Turkish Cypriots as a justification for

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<sup>111</sup> Lord Winster was Governor of Cyprus from 1946-8.

their anti-enosis stance continued in the 1950s. The following quote by Laurence Durrell, the Director of the Cyprus Public Information Office from 1954 to 1956, illustrates these two points. He argued that Cyprus could not be allowed to unite with Greece as this

might undermine the Eastern bastion of NATO. There was also the Turkish-speaking minority to consider, eighteen per cent of the population, who were against any change. We had a duty to them; besides, Turkey played a vital part in NATO (Foley, 1964, p.17, cited in Hadjidemetriou, 2007, p.346).

1954 was a crucial year during which there was a further polarisation of attitudes not only within Cyprus, but between Britain, Greece and Turkey. During the debate in the House of Commons, Henry Hopkinson, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, issued his infamous ‘never’ statement with regard to the self-determination of Cyprus, shortly followed by Anthony Eden repeating the same words to Greece’s Prime Minister, Papagos.<sup>112</sup> Greece countered<sup>113</sup>, and in July 1954, raised the issue of ‘self-determination’ of the Cypriots at an international organization, the United Nations (UN) in an attempt to internationalize the issue and put pressure on the British. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots saw this as their only peaceful outlet since their demands were otherwise not acted upon.

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<sup>112</sup> He made the following statement on behalf of ‘Her Majesty’s Government’: ‘it has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can *never* expect to be fully independent (HC Deb, 28 July 1954, Vol. 531, 508, emphasis added). Shortly afterwards, Eden (then Foreign Secretary) on a visit to Greece, repeated the declaration that Cyprus would ‘never’ be allowed to unite with Greece to Prime Minister Papagos (Hitchens, 1997, p.35).

<sup>113</sup> Greece had decided to reproduce the idea (Grand Idea) of uniting the Greek-speaking diaspora once more: ‘For Greece, the activation of a quiescent, if not actually dormant, claim to Cyprus arose, most profoundly, from the attempt after 1950-1 to build a new “national politics” following the end of the civil war in that country’ (Holland, 1995, p.34).

This attempt however, was defeated by Anglo-Turkish cooperation, with both countries reacting with stark opposition to Greece's action. The British representative unsurprisingly condemned this action at the UN, claiming Greece was interfering in its internal issues. Faustmann argues that Britain encouraged Turkish claims over Cyprus so that it could neutralize the pressure from Greece (Faustmann, 2008, p.52). The same view is shared by Holland who argues that whereas before the colonial government was 'very careful to avoid giving the slightest hint to Turkey that there might be a chance for it to put a foot back in the Cypriot door', after Greece's yearly recourse to the UN (1954 was the first year, 1958 the last), 'hotting up the Turks' became a feature of British politics (1993, p.164). "This, of course, is not to say that the British wished to activate a real Turkish claim to Cyprus....what they did quite consciously set out to concoct was the specter of a *potential* claim by Turkey with which to frighten both Greeks and Greek Cypriots. Yet this was a very dangerous game to play and one that might all too easily spill over from international polarization into communal conflict within Cyprus. " (Holland, 1995, p.37).

Nevertheless, back in London the parliamentary debates showed a rather ambivalent picture; parliamentary attitudes fluctuated from deploring Hopkinson, justifying Greece's intervention, and criticizing Britain as hiding behind the Turks, to supporting Turkey's case and her interests and praising her as Britain's ally. Another interesting point made by British MPs was that one of the reasons there was 'so much agitation about Cyprus' in Greece and Turkey was that they were 'seeking distractions in an external quarrel from their internal economic difficulties' as a way of achieving internal unity (see HC Deb, 19 July 1956, cc1391-1532).

The Turkish representative in reaction expressed the importance of Cyprus for ‘the defence of southern Turkey and of the northern Mediterranean in general’ (cited in Stavrinides, 1999, p.26) and supported the view that neither Cyprus, nor Cypriots were Greek (Hadjidemetriou, 2007, p.347. With hindsight, one can argue that Turkey’s stance crystallized as a result of Greece’s resort to the UN. Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes also encouraged the formation of a ‘Cyprus is Turkish Committee’ back in Ankara and it was his government that was responsible for instigating and orchestrating the Istanbul mob attacks against the Greek minority there in September 1955.

Over 4,000 Greek-owned businesses, hundreds of hotels, and over 70 Greek Churches were vandalized or completely destroyed and within the next five years the Greek population in Istanbul alone decreased by 16,000 (De Zayas, 2007; Güven, 2011).<sup>114</sup> The attacks were sparked by the false news that the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki (Ataturk's birthplace), was bombed, and ironically, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs even apologized for the alleged bomb. However, it in fact later emerged that this was an orchestrated attempt by Turkey’s leaders to ignite nationalist sentiments within the Turkish nation to resist *enosis*, as well as to show to the Greek Cypriots that if Turkish Cypriots were harmed, the Greek minority in Turkey would suffer as well (Güven, 2011). An account of the events put together by the British Consul-General also implied British involvement, referring to language being used in the British Foreign Office -‘a few riots. . . will do us nicely’ (Holland, 1998, p.75; De Zayas, 2007;).

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<sup>114</sup> According to De Zayas, the Istanbul riots, ‘can be characterized as a “crime against humanity,” comparable in scope to the November 1938 Kristallnacht in Germany because the “intent to destroy in whole or in part” the Greek minority in Istanbul was demonstrably present’ (2007).

The riots took place at the same time as a Tripartite conference between Greece, Turkey and Britain was held in London, called by Harold Macmillan, the Foreign Secretary. Britain organized this conference in order to convince the Greek side that Turkey also had a rightful claim over Cyprus, but also to formally involve Ankara in discussions over the future of Cyprus, thereby legitimizing the necessity of British rule to maintain peace (Faustmann, 2008, p.53). It is important to note that no Cypriots were invited at the conference, only Greece and Turkey. According to some authors, Britain's position could only be strengthened "as long as Turks were awakened from their own passivity" (Nicolet, 2001, p. 59, cited in Güven, 2011. Holland notes how the British knew that the conference would fail, but the point of this conference was to shift the Cyprus issue from an Anglo-Greek conflict, to a primarily Greco-Turkish one (1999, p.39).