SILENT SUFFERING:
THE CORPORATIST COMPROMISES AND EAST TIMORESE CAMPS
AFTER 1999

By

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ABSTRACT

This research focuses on the question why the East Timorese in exile after 1999 are suffering in silence. Today, many of them still live in temporary camps for more than a decade after East Timor referendum. Using Foucaultian approach in investigating the long period of history of the construction of the people in camps, and also the concept of reflexive sociology this research tries to explain the construction of victims within the trend of transitional justice in post Cold War period. The victims of structural violence are rarely recognised within the liberal human rights campaign. Following Arendt’s idea that the camp is the place where human rights and citizen right are not recognized, this research finds that Agamben’s argument that the making of camp itself is not separated from the juridical and disciplinary power is valid. Using historical narratives in three different settings Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia, Portugal, Portuguese Timor/Provinsi Timor Timor/East Timor this thesis explains the process of exclusion of different communities in different periods in particular those who are victims of modern state and also cosmopolitan solidarity in camps.

Key words: Camp, Distant Suffering, Silence, Politics of Pity, Human Rights, Nationalism, State, Sovereignty, Decolonisation, Empire, and Cosmopolitan Solidarity.
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List of Abbreviations

ASDT, Associação Social Democrata de Timor or Social Democratic Association of Timor

ASEAN, Association of the Southeast Asian Nations

Apodeti, Associaçao Popular Democratica Timorense or Timorese Popular Democratic Association

APCET, Asia Pacific Conference for East Timor

BAKIN, Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, or State Coordinated Intelligence Agency

CAVR, Comissao de Acolhimento Verdade e Reconcilicaco or Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation

CCP, Chinese Communist Party

CNRM, Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Maubere, or National Council of People Resistance

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CNRT, Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense, or National Council of Timorese Resistance

CPDM, Comissão dos Direitos para o Povo Maubere, or the Commission for the Rights of the Maubere People

CRRN, Conselho da Resistência Revolutionário Nacional, or the National Council for Revolutionary Resistance

CSIS, Center for Strategy and International Studies

DOM, Daerah Operasi Militer or Military Teritorial Operation

EEC, European Economic Community

EFTA, European Free Trade Association

ETAN, East Timor Action Network

ICMI, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Moslem Intellectual Organization

IFET, International Federation of East Timor
Fecletil, *Frente Clandestina dos Estudiantes de Timor Leste*

Fretilin, *Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente*

Frelimo, *Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique*

*Golkar, Golongan Karya*

PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*

PDI, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*

ABRI, *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*

Hansip, *Pertahanan Sipil* or Civilian Defense

Kamra, *Keamanan Rakyat* or People Security

KNIL, *Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger*, or Royal Colonial Army in the East Indies

Kolakops, *Komando Pelaksana Operasi*

KWI, *Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia*, or Indonesian Bishops Conference

MPLA, *Movimento para a Libertacao de Angola*

MRPP, *Movimento Revolucionario do Popular Portugues*

MFA, *Movimentro Forcas Armadas*, or the Armed Forces Movement

Nurep, *Núcleos de resisténcia popular*, or popular resistance centres

PAIGC, *Partido Africano para Independecia da Guiniea e Cabo Verde*

PCP, *Partido Comunista Português*, or Portuguese Communist Party

PIDE, *Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* or International Police for the Security of the state

PKI, *Partai Komunis Indonesia* or Indonesian Communist Party

PMKRI, *Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katholik Republik Indonesia*, or Indonesian Catholic Student Association.

PMLF *Partido Marxista-Leninista Fretilin*
PNI, *Partai Nasional Indonesia*, or Indonesian Nationalist Party

PRP-BR, *Partido Revolucionario do Proletarido-Brigadas Revolucionarias*

PS, *Partido Socialista*

Ratih, *Rakyat Terlatih*, or trained citizens

Renetil, *Resistencia Nacional dos Estudiantes de Timor Leste*

SI, *Syarikat Islam*, or Islamic Association

STOVIA, *School tot Opleiding van Indlandsche Artsen*

TBO, *Tenaga Bantuan Operasional* or general assistants for Indonesian military during Indonesian occupation of East Timor

UDT, *União Democrática Timorense* or Democratic Union of Timorese

UNTAET, United Nations Transitional Administrations in East Timor

UNAMET, United Nations Mission in East Timor

VOC, *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, or the Dutch united merchants’ organization
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORY OF CORPORATIST COMPROMISES AND EAST TIMORESE CAMPS AFTER 1999

..at every turn, it denounces and digs pits to mark out its own path. At every turn it denounces any possible confusion. It rejects its identity, without previously stating: I am neither this nor that. It is not critical, most of the time; it is not a way of saying that everyone else is wrong. It is an attempt to define a particular site by the exteriority of its vicinity; rather than trying to reduce others to silence, by claiming that what they say is worthless, I have tried to define this blank space from which I speak, and which is slowly taking shape in a discourse that I still feel to be so precarious and so unsure.

Foucault (2002, pp. 18)

What is a camp? What is its political-juridical structure? How could such events have taken place there? This will lead us to look at the camp not as a historical fact and anomaly that—though admittedly still with us—belongs nonetheless to the past, but rather in some sense as the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we still live.

Giorgio Agamben, in his essay ‘What is a Camp?’ (2000, pp. 37–45)
In September 1999, after the announcement of the East Timor referendum result, more than 300,000 people were forced to flee from East Timor and came to the western part of the island when Indonesian military and East Timor militias took part in the scorched earth policy (Robinson, 2003; Tanter, Van Klinken & Ball (eds.), 2006; Martin, 2001; TKT, 2001). For those who were considered victims of forced migration, a gradual repatriation process was provided by UNHCR and various international organizations.

However there were also others who were deemed as the lost group from the referendum and categorized as IDPs (internally displaced persons). Their backgrounds ranged from civil servant, member of the Indonesian Army, militias, TBO (Tenaga Bantuan Operasional or general assistants for the Indonesian military during the Indonesian occupation of East Timor), farmers and others. They are the East Timorese group who lost in referendum in 1999. For these people, several places, which are known as camps, are provided to accommodate them.

There are about 200 camps built in West Timor to accommodate East Timorese refugees (TKTB, 2001). These camps are mostly defined as an open field where long rows of houses or individual huts were built made of bebak, plywood and tin-roof, with no floor. The sanitation facilities there are very poor. Most of the children are suffering from digestive and respiratory disorders.

This thesis is aimed to answer why the suffering of those who still live in camps in West Timor remain in silence. Even though there are several media reports on the silence of the people in camps in West Timor, Indonesia, but this issue is tend to be forgotten.
Who are in Camps?

The general idea about the camp for outsiders is that many in former militias still live there. They were the associates of the Indonesian military regime in East Timor against the independence clandestine network in East Timor. Most of the residents of camps for more than a decade are the lower class East Timorese. The militias themselves are in the position of low rank economic level.

Their economic stratum shows significant difference when compared to the pro-integration East Timor elites. When the elites of the ‘pro-integration’ could afford to buy a new house or new land in 1999 so that they could stay outside of camps; the people in camps, mostly farmers and other manual workers, had no choice but to stay in the camps. Even the naturalisation project, which focuses on the resettlement project, follows rank as well. Those who are in top priority to move out from the camps are soldiers, police, and Kamra (kemanan rakyat or people’s security).

Table 1.1: List of the East Timorese in East Nusa Tenggara Province after 1999¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Army</td>
<td>3,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant in Army institution</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>14,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamra (Kemanan Rakyat)</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the data from The East Nusa Tenggara provincial government, there are about 189,345 persons without regular salary, and they are mostly farmers and low-wage labourer families from the total number of 295,751 persons. The latest data, which was released in

2008 by the provincial government mentions that 55,241 persons or 18,530 households have repatriated to East Timor since 1999.

Today, there is no exact number of how many people still live in camps. But it is generally predicted to be about 25,000 people who still live in temporary camps. The other East Timorese groups who have chosen to be Indonesian citizens have followed different paths to be naturalised from the camps, such as participating in resettlement projects in different places in East Nusa Tenggara Province, or transmigration, which is understood as moving to other Indonesian provinces in Kalimantan (Borneo). However, most of the soldiers, former East Timor militias, police, and civil servants from East Timor, prefer to live in West Timor (Indonesia).

Figure 1.1.: Map of Indonesia after 1999

Source: Map no. 4110 Rev.4 United Nations
In term of ethno-linguistic groups, the people in camps are divided into 17 ethno-linguistic groups: (1) Tetun Terik; (2) Kemak; (3) Takodade; (4) Mambai; (5) Lakalei; (6) Bunaq; (7) Idate; (8) Waima’a; (9) Galolen; (10) Tetun Dili; (11) Kairui; (12) Habu; (13) Makasai; (14) Naueti; (15) Makalero; (16) Fataluku; and (17) Midiki (McWilliam & Traube (eds), p. x, 2011). Although, the East Timorese speak different languages, Tetun Dili or Tetun Terik is the common language for different East Timorese ethno-linguistic groups. This is explained in Chapter VI.

Figure 1.2. Map of West Timor (Indonesia) and Timor Leste

Source: United Nations

The existence of ethno-linguistic groups does not imply strong clan relation within the members, since under Indonesian occupation the loyalty within clans was mixed with different clandestine networks, either the New Order regime or Fretilin. Even within the same
family, the political choice may be different. Politically, under Indonesian occupation East Timorese are divided into two political groups. They are known as **firaku** and **caladi**. The **firaku** live in the eastern part of East Timor, known as *loro Sae*, and the **caladi** live in the western part of East Timor, known as *loro monu* (Fox, 2001; Aditjondro, 2005). The making of these two political categories are not separated from the fact that the basis of resistance of the pro-independence East Timorese during the war against Indonesia are located in the eastern part of East Timor. Therefore, the basis of the **firaku** group comes from the ethno-linguistic groups of Makalero, Midiki, and Fataluku.

Since 2005, those who still live in camps no longer hold the status of IDPs. This means that they are the poorest among the poor and have to survive in the level of ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998). Furthermore, they are not seen as victims, but rather as criminals or part of the human right perpetrators. The paradox is in an international publication on Indonesian IDPs (Hedman (ed.) 2008), where the East Timorese in Indonesia are not presented, while the East Timorese IDPs in East Timor are presented, even though East Timor is already outside Indonesian territory. While the history of the pro-independence East Timor group is shared by the global solidarity work after the Santa Cruz Massacres in 1991, the other East Timorese camps’ history is not covered. They are portrayed as traitors and the creators of the New Order regime.

The current East Timorese political group in the West Timor camp today was known for the anti-revolutionary movement in the 1970s for their political stance against Fretilin. Today, they are known as the human rights abusers for their association with the Indonesian military regime, in particular to East Timor massive destruction in 1999 (CAVR, 2005; CTF, 2008). Two periods of decolonisation give double exclusion for the East Timorese.
Decolonisation, Corporatist Compromise and the Birth of Camp After 1999

Here, Agamben’s thesis (Agamben, 1998, p. 181) that ‘today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West’ finds its evidence when hundreds of camps are set up in West Timor, Indonesia after the referendum of East Timor in 1999. Within the camps the human rights and citizens’ (Arendt, 1958) rights are not applicable, since the status of the refugees is degraded into bare life. This particular point is very important to be read again since the birth of the new state in East Timor has its consequence with the birth of camps in West Timor for the East Timorese. The double exclusion in the two periods of East Timor decolonisation highlights the logic of the birth of the modern state. It is identical with exclusion of the other group.

The second East Timor decolonisation was only possible at the end of corporatist compromise with the end of the New Order regime. I argue that Indonesian annexation of East Timor was in the low point of the Cold War when in the middle of the 1970s Indonesia’s western allies supported Indonesia in invading East Timor. The Indonesia New Order regime shared the corporatist state character, which is similar to Portuguese Estado Novo. In term of state politics, during the first decolonisation of East Timor, Indonesian invasion to East Timor was seen by the western allies as a better choice rather than East Timor taking over by the revolutionaries, the pro-national liberation fighters. Therefore, those who are lost in the East Timor referendum in 1999 are the supporters of the corporatist compromise in the 1970s.

The Indonesian model of the corporatist state, a state with a strong military regime is similar to other South American countries, which control the population such as Brazil and Chile. The ideology of the corporatist state itself is very close to Catholic ideas. It is against liberalism, which is considered as extreme individualism, and it is also against communism, which only focuses on the binary class division. While in Chapter V I explain about the rising
of *Estado Novo* in Portugal in the 1920s, which is part of the influence of Salazar’s Catholicism, further research is still needed to confirm the role of the Indonesian Catholic elites in the early period of Indonesia’s New Order regime in adopting corporatist compromise against Soekarno’s politics.

The corporatist compromise is seen as a ‘third way’ during the Cold War when there was a rivalry between liberal and communist camps. However, while in Portugal, the crisis of the corporatist state was already experienced in the late 1960s with the expansion of foreign capital to Portugal with its liberal economic policy in the early 1960s, but the corporatist compromise was imposed on Indonesia in the 1960s. The corporatist compromise is seen as a better choice for the Western countries under the threat of nationalisation of Western companies in Indonesia during Soekarno’s period (Chapter IV). The basis of the New Order regime to control the population is the Indonesian Army under Soeharto.

In Gramscian framework, the coercive element of state is co-opted by the western supported Army under Soeharto. This is the irony of postcolonial Indonesia, when the Indonesian Army functioned in line with the foreign interest rather than developing new politics that would promote the emancipative project. For Gramsci (1971), ‘state’ is the combination of political society and civil society, or ‘hegemony protected by the armour of coercion’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 263).

Following Gramsci’s definition of state (Gramsci, 1971), it is known that in the Indonesian context the coercive power is separated from the majority of political society and civil society. The Indonesian Army’s coup d’état in 1965 placed the Army as a state within a state. It has impunity and its institution is above the state. After Soekarno who proposed nationalization of western companies in Indonesia, the New Order military regime functions as the guarantor for the big corporations. The history of the Indonesian Army does back to the
moment when the Dutch in the post-Napoleonic War recruited the native soldiers to conquer different authorities in the East Indies.

The corporatist compromise is also imposed on East Timor by the Indonesian New Order regime. For more than 20 years, East Timor resistance fighters were against Indonesian occupation. The corporatist compromise over East Timor ended when the financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997. In the end of the New Order regime, Indonesia moved to the neo liberal camp, the East Timor independence supporters found similar momentum when Portuguese Estado Novo were in a similar structural crisis two decades before. This was the right moment for a referendum for independence with strong support from the global network.

The UN’s decision to conduct the referendum in East Timor in August 1999 challenges Indonesian annexation of East Timor for 24 years (8 December 1975 – 25 October 1999). From the result of the ballot, it is known that more than 70% of the East Timorese population vote for pro-independence, and less than 30% vote for integration to Indonesia (Martin, 2001).

While ‘liberation’ or ‘independence’ of East Timor is finally accomplished, the consequence of the referendum for the lost group is not anticipated. First, it was about the Indonesian military’s violent reaction. Second, it was about the possible exclusion of the lost group after ballots since they are not part of the new East Timor state.

The UN’s intervention is part of the work of the East Timor resistance group, which is capable of attracting the global solidarity to support them during the remaking of world order. At the same time the ‘pro-integration East Timor’ was isolated and associated with the Soeharto regime. The international attitude toward the pro-integration East Timor has not changed.
The UN’s decision to conduct the referendum as the mechanism of self-determination according to international law in 1999 was not balanced with the serious effort to prepare the peaceful transition (Martin, 2001). The UN does not count the legacy of the Cold War for the East Timorese and the Indonesians in particular to their state politics.

Historically, the political division within East Timor in the 1970s is not separated from the politics of the world order during the Cold War. Fretilin as the revolutionary party is associated with the communist bloc, and the other political parties are associated with the anti-communist bloc. The Cold War connection is not limited to the East Timor geopolitical location, but rather it was also connected with the transition of Portugal in post Estado Novo (New State) period after the Carnation Revolution. The political divisions in Lisbon are also transported into East Timor.

The history of decolonisation itself, which is generally shared by the left, is the global history against global capitalism. The engagement of the international communist party against colonialism was mostly presented in binary class opposition within state. This kind of narrative was also shared by the three different communist parties (Indonesia, Portugal, and East Timor), which have the connection to the East Timor decolonisation.

As part of my attempt to sketch the formation of the East Timor state in former territories of the European Empire, I present the historical connection of three communist parties in three countries: Indonesia, East Timor, and Portugal. This relation shows how during the Cold War, different strategies are employed in three different countries to challenge these three communist parties as part of the making of capitalist world order.

In the 1970s Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) was only a memory (See Chapters III and IV), when most of its members were assassinated or jailed in the Indonesian gulag, Buru Island. Its political domination was replaced by the Orde Baru (New Order) fascist regime,
which invaded East Timor in 1975. The New Order itself is a corporatist state, which is remodelled according to the Portuguese Estado Novo.

East Timor Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente) was the leading front of East Timor and proclaimed its independence when the Indonesian New Order regime attacked East Timor on 7 December 1975. The decolonisation of East Timor from the Portuguese Empire was also a problem since there were contested political parties in Portugal and the political divisions were also shared during East Timor’s first decolonisation in East Timor. For instance, the split of the coalition between Partido Comunista Português (PCP) and Partido Socialista (PS) had a direct impact on East Timor decolonisation. In Chapter VI I show that the Portuguese military takeover during the transitional process in the 1970s from the radical wing, which shows the connection between how other military operations are also conducted in East Timor.

The coercive power by the Indonesian Army for the East Timorese revolutionaries is seen as an invasion. The military attack in November 1975 marks the presence of Indonesia until 1999. The territory of East Timor was categorized as an Indonesian military territory between 1975 and 1989, and it was treated as a closed area. The New Order invasion into East Timor was only possible during the Cold War in which it gained military support from U.S. and British governments. In the post-Cold War period, the criticism over authoritarian government became a global trend in the West and also among pro-democracy activists in authoritarian countries. The campaign against the Indonesian military brutality is marked by the Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November 1991.2 The financial crisis, or the currency crisis, ruined the value of Rupiah, the Indonesian currency, in 1997 and it was the beginning of the

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2 This massacre was widely broadcast, based on the real footage by a British documentary filmmaker and the testimony of American journalists.
end for the Indonesian New Order regime. After a year, the New Order regime could not recover from the great loss, and the Indonesian New Order collapsed.

**East Timor Second Decolonisation after Soeharto Regime**

In the Indonesian case, the financial crisis shows that the sovereignty of the state is no longer there, since the state is under the control of different international financial institutions. What is interesting in the Indonesian case is that the ‘iron law’ proposed by Marxist critics happened, despite that Indonesian New Order economists kept denying the Marxist critics on Indonesian economic policy. Without a real economic base, Indonesia in the 1990s was a dependent country to IMF and other major international donors.

In this work I still focus on the Marxist-Leninist argument on state, but I also engage with other leftist thinkers, such as Gramsci, who theorized state under fascist regime, and also Poulantzas (1979) who also studied fascism and argued that fascism is the imperialist stage of capitalism. I find that Poulantzas’s (1979) account of fascism when he studied Italy and Germany in Europe is still a very important work, which should not be neglected when revisiting the Indonesian New Order regime and the late era of Portuguese *Estado Novo*. Poulantzas argues that the emergence of the fascist regime and the development of fascism are connected ‘to *a crisis of party representation*’ as the result of no dominant political power that was able to be the dominant party (Poulantzas, 1979, p. 73) in which I find the most plausible explanation for the end of Sukarno’s era in Indonesia in 1960s and in the Soeharto period. By accepting the structural element on the emergence of a fascist regime it is not necessary to neglect the other elements within the network that relate to ‘state’.

The state or the prince, as it is called by Machiaveli, and also Gramsci, is part of the modern idea. The concept of the modern state is based on Hegelian state, either in Marxist-
Leninist theory of state or others. In the early period of the national-liberation movement the new class in Indonesia and also in the later years in East Timor, the communist and socialist groups were the dominant groups that also adopted this concept of state, but the Indonesian Army outmanoeuvred them.

In the post-colonial period, the privilege to define the new future and institutional building had been given to the first educated group in the colonies, but for the leaders in Indonesia in 1945 and also East Timor in 1974, decolonisation was a consequence, or an effect, of a vacuum of power. In Indonesia it was the vacuum of power in post-WWII after Japan surrendered to the allied forces, and for the East Timorese it was the vacuum of power after the split of the socialists and communists in Lisbon after the coup d’etat in Portugal in 1974. The Independence War of East Timor was done against the Indonesian fascist regime, but it was not against Portugal.

The transformation process from a colony to a nation-state in most of the colonies is determined by the first educated group. Moreover, ‘modern education’ is still seen as a core element to communicate with other communities in the nation-state system, so that the divisions and dynamics inside the first educated group are the decisive element. Therefore different positions or ‘political interests’ of the first educated, or modern, elites are the crucial thing for the rest of population in the ex-colonial area. This issue has been explored in the work of the subaltern studies group associated with Ranajit Guha, or in Fanon’s work on how the first modern elites in an ex-colonial area had positioned themselves toward their former colonizers.

While Ranajit Guha and other subaltern studies group members theorize about the position of the people and the elites within the post-colonial state or about internal colonialism, I am trying to explain the effect of “double colonialism”, decolonisation from the
fascist regime, and the silent suffering that resulted from structural conflict, the Cold War, and also from the transition to a modern state for a particular group. This group, I would argue is the legacy of the Cold War and its presence marks the effect of the remaking of the world order. This political group is the East Timorese political community in Indonesia—in particular in West Timor after East Timor’s second decolonisation.

The scope of analysis of these academics is on the role and dynamic of the elites inside the nation-state in the postcolonial era, and in particular how they responded to the alien culture. However, their focus is more on the role of the elite within the new nation-state who are alienated from the people. In this research design, I am exploring a certain community group from an ex-colonial area, which is not represented in any nation-state. Theoretically, the East Timor Diasporas in Indonesia in 1999 could be seen as a form of double post-colonial studies.

**Solidarity in the Information Age and the Silent Suffering**

To understand the complexity of East Timor decolonisation is a big step for the East Timorese in Indonesia in order to understand why they live in their current condition, or live in a borderland. Without the ability to understand the historical background and to explain their problematic position, as victims and also as violent actors—for those who were involved in the terror and forced migration in 1999—they still have no vision of where to go other than remain in camps without any ability to speak for more than a decade.

With their inability to articulate their position or to constitute their narrative to an internationally targeted audience, they have assumed the role of a non-existent group. In relation to the East Timorese migration in 1999 and the remaining East Timorese group who still live in temporary camps in West Timor (Indonesia) for more than a decade, I argue that
this group has been unrecognized by the contemporary international organizations, and their political narrative is excluded from the dominant political narrative, which is acknowledged by the global humanitarian network.

As a continuing conflict, the existence of this group has continued to be denied. Their struggle and hardship of living in camps for more than a decade are mostly explained as the consequence of decisions arising from the self-determination process. The process of exclusion as part of the implementation of international law in East Timor as a disputed territory has been neglected. This is the paradox of the adoption of state as a modern political institution.

The actual numerical size of this group is the object of dispute with several different causes. First there are different claims about the numbers of the voters during the ballot in 1999 (Martin, 2001). Second, it is related to the amount of aid for the people in camps and resettlement areas. It is an object of dispute among the government at different levels and this particular community.

I argue that for international researchers, including human rights activists and international socialist groups, the existence of East Timorese in West Timor becomes the dark side of the moon. The existence of this group is always associated with Indonesian political interests, in particular as the instrument of the Indonesian military. Therefore most of the political arguments of the researchers in this area only focus on Fretilin’s role as the representative of the independent force, or socialist political force, or the CNRT as the national coalition. Without denying the atrocities for the last three decades during the Indonesian military incorporation of East Timor, I think the researchers should not deny that there exists another political community outside East Timor today. When Anderson gives his reflection on the cenotaph of unknown soldiers on the problem of nationalism, I think about
what the ‘global society’ may say about the small graves around the East Timor refugees’ camp in West Timor. Do we have nothing to share on this problem? I find that both liberal humanitarian networks and international socialist thinkers do not want to speak on this issue. It shows the dilemma and the unresolved problem faced by the global society over East Timor decolonisation and the limit of solidarity.

The second part of East Timor decolonisation has a different character on ‘nationalism’, which has a different character than Anderson’s periodisation of nationalism. The dominant role of the global humanitarian network shows the cosmopolitan element in East Timor independence. Whether it is still possible to describe it as nationalism or not is exactly the ambivalence of East Timor’s second decolonisation. The role of global solidarity is so dominant (Pureza, 2004; Simpson, 2004); the exclusion is not only experienced by the East Timor community outside East Timor, but it was also experienced by the East Timorese in East Timor (Chopra, 2000; Lemay-Herbert, 2011). This shows the paradox of solidarity in relation to the constitution of a new political juridical territory, and also, I argue, it shows the limit of cosmopolitanism and at the same time it enforces the argument that there is no political institution above the state.

Outline of the Thesis

Chapter II is a methodological chapter. It explains my research journey, how I conduct the research, and how I see things as a social researcher.

In Chapter III, I draw the history of Dutch colonialism in the East Indies and the transition of the Netherlands East Indies into Indonesia. The two wars in Europe, the Napoleonic War and WWII, contributed to developments within Dutch state colonialism and to its vanishing in the 20th century. The formation of Indonesia as a sovereign state, led by
President Soekarno, was challenged by the U.S. and its allies. It marks the birth of the Indonesian *Orde Baru* (New Order) regime.

In Chapter IV, I sketch what kind of Indonesian state emerges post WWII. This chapter covers the making of the Indonesian military regime. Soekarno’s idea of a sovereign state was replaced by the pro-Western New Order regime, or as the semi colony of the U.S., which is quite similar to the status of the Philippines. The end of the Soekarno presidency highlights the failure of Indonesia to establish a sovereign state. It is also the end of the nationalisation of foreign assets.

In Chapter V, I explain the Portuguese narrative, which focuses on Portuguese colonialism, and how Antonio Salazar defined the *Estado Novo* regime as a corporatist state. This chapter covers the war and decolonisation in Portuguese Africa, and how it influences the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon. The transition in the post *Estado Novo* period is conducted under the rivalries of the political parties in Lisbon, and the different military factions. In this chapter I show how the political progress in Lisbon influences the political situation in East Timor in 1974/1975.

The focus of Chapter VI is on the history of East Timor’s decolonisation from the East Timor nationalist perspective. It covers the emergence of different political parties and the rivalry among them. The history of the pro-independence group is at first about the history of Fretilin, a political front that was later proclaimed as a Marxist-Leninist Party. From a Marxist Leninist party, Fretilin, under Xanana Gusmao, transformed itself into a nationalist coalition.

In Chapter VII, I described the suffering and silence among the East Timorese in exile after the East Timor referendum. In this chapter, I explain how the modern state contributes to the silence of the other political community of East Timor in exile post 1999.
This thesis is about the history of decolonisation, and in particular the history of the East Timorese in exile after the East Timor referendum in 1999. Their historical narrative is excluded from the East Timor national liberation narrative today. This group has been neglected since they have been characterised primarily as criminals—with their involvement in massive violence in 1999—rather than as victims of decolonisation and the making of a modern state. The global humanitarian network, which was greatly involved in East Timor’s second decolonisation, does not share their political narrative. This is the tragedy of the modern project of state-making in which inclusion/exclusion is embedded. The exclusion of this political group is related to the politics of world order, which strongly controls the decolonisation in former European Empires with the experience of the double colonialism under the Portuguese Empire and also Indonesian New Order regime.

Being a witness of this particular community in different camps and resettlement projects in West Timor (Indonesia) for several years has inspired me to write about them. This particular evidence shows the impossibility of the concept of a world state, which has been imposed with the world order policy in the post-WWII period. The hierarchy of the victims within world order is clearly evident in this particular community. Inside Indonesia, in the post New Order period, the existence of this group tends to be forgotten since they are associated with the former regime, which has been replaced since 1999.
CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

*Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced by only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth.*

Foucault (1980, p. 131)
This research topic was chosen and sparked by my working experience in West Timor as a journalist for three years (2002–2005) and also as an information officer for a short time in a refugee organization, which covered East Timorese in refugee camps in Indonesia (mainly in West Timor) after the ballot. This experience leads me into this research to answer the research question regarding how silence and victims are constructed and accepted by the public.

Rather than continuing to adopt the dominant position in global discourse on East Timor in the post-Portuguese period—that these East Timorese in exile are dominated by criminals and human rights perpetrators—I decide to elaborate on how the pro-integration group exists, and in what trajectory the history of Portugal, East Timor, and also Indonesia met and influenced the birth of this group in a global context. In particular I wish to explain the historical aspects of world politics after World War II.

This methodological chapter is included as part of the research diary, which justifies and explains how different steps in the research process are taken and conducted. Thus, this methodological chapter is divided into three main sections. First, it will include how the research is conducted, the challenges it faced, and also my self-reflexive moments as a researcher. Second, it covers how the socio-historical sociology framework is adopted. It also includes the history of decolonisation. Third, it explains how the historical materials are used within this research, and how they are selected.

My Personal Account on the East Timor Referendum in 1999

In 2000, I went back to Kupang, my hometown in West Timor and found that my cousins with their five children had became ‘refugees’ in my parents’ house. My cousins are not East Timorese. They are traders who went to East Timor in 1989, after East Timor was
declared an open area, after the end of military operation. Ten years later they became part of
massive exodus group from East Timor. Their house was burned and they lost most of their
possessions in Maliana, a town in Covalima District, East Timor, next to the border of West
Timor. Another refugee, whom I met in Kupang, is Rui Amaral, an East Timorese. He lost
one of his daughters in a refugee camp. Today, he still lives there with his family and
grandson, the result of a teen pregnancy often found in camps. Besidethese personal stories,
there are still many similar or even more tragic events of East Timorese in camps that remain
untold. For me as a researcher, these stories provide one of the reasons why I wanted to do a
PhD.

The experience of being a witness for silent suffering first came to me 10 years ago
when I worked as an Information Officer for the Jesuit Refugees Service (JRS) in West Timor
in 2001 for a very short term. The most tragic memory that I still hold is the dead body of a
little girl in an unadorned coffin in Noelbaki Camp, West Timor. There was only a coffin in
the living room, with a cross and candles. I also remember some children who were neglected
and some others who later worked as beggars. Then, behind the long rows of semi-permanent
houses built of bebak (traditional building materials for the walls made of palm branches),
people showed me more small graves. I encountered more of these painful facts when I

As a student, I participated in solidarity demonstration for the victims of the
Indonesian Orde Baru regime. I also published articles for the East Timor resistance in
student newspapers in the 1990s, and organized discussions in relation to military oppression.
However, at the same time, I contemplated a question and brought it forward as a reflective
question, ‘if what I did was right by protesting against the regime, why the little girl should
die in a refugee camp without any media interest?’ Why can her suffering and that of other
children in camps not be spoken about when they have lost everything? East Timor finally got its independence, but the guilty feeling continued within me. It made me resign from JRS Indonesia in West Timor after working there for three months. I did not answer the question from the Jesuit priest, the country director, about why I decided to quit. I found that to be silent was the best answer at that moment. I was confused since the reflective questions above were mine but the emergency action to answer the needs of refugees was the main priority of organization and it is greater than my own doubt.

A Reflection on Critical Sociology of Suffering

In the late 1990s I was not really an enthusiast for the idea of the referendum for East Timor, which was done in the transitional period of the Indonesian New Order regime. Although I was part of the student activists against the Indonesian military violence in East Timor I hold the opposite view from the dominant idea that the East Timor referendum should have been done during the period of ‘a pointed president’ by Soeharto.

In those days, I lived with a global humanitarian activist, Herb Feith. He helped the East Timor resistance during the occupation period. We shared the same house, but we had different opinions on the East Timor referendum. For me, to conduct the referendum during the transitional period disadvantaged the pro-democratic movement in Indonesia in the late 1990s and prevented further progress. There are two other reasons: first, the ad interim president, B.J. Habibie lacked legitimacy to rule and there was and is no political institution responsible for the East Timor referendum in the transitional period of the Indonesian New Order.

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3Herb is an Austrian Jewish survivor of WWII who emigrated to Australia in 1939, and later became a political researcher on Indonesia from the 1950s on. Herb’s story makes it easier for me to think about the relation of Arendt’s work on the Jewish communities in Europe in WWII to his own life and humanitarian work. What I know is that Herb was one of two foreign researchers who witnessed the trial of communist party members in Indonesia in the late 1960s. This tragedy still leaves a deep silence in Indonesia. I believe that recounting Herb’s story is important in the discussion about life and our shared humanity, since it shows there also exists those who struggle to go beyond the border of state to speak about shared humanity.
Order regime. Secondly, at that time I thought that the East Timor independence would relocate the problem of East Timor to West Timor, Indonesia.

At the same time for Herb and the global left politics and other global networks, this transitional period gives a momentum to the movement for East Timor independence. To conduct the East Timor referendum in this year is considered as necessary (Martin, 2001), and Herb and other Indonesian NGO and INGO activists shared this opinion.

After the referendum, Herb gave an East Timorese family a safe shelter from the attack of the pro-autonomy supporters by allowing them to live with us in Yogyakarta where we shared the same house. I know of many other pro-independence East Timorese were also hunted after the ballot. Several years after that, I experienced working among the ‘refugees’ in West Timor, Indonesia as I mentioned earlier.

I remember that I found it difficult to write when I first began this research. Picking a word may represent the political community in which I belong, and oppose other political communities. To be critical to CAVR (Comissao de Acolhimento Verdade e Reconciliacao or Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation) and CTF’s (Commission of Truth and Friendship, or Komisi Kebenaran dan Persahabatan) report may leave me in the difficult position of being against the pro-independence or left activists in East Timor, in Indonesia, and in other countries. I realize the injury is still there as I witness the remains of burned houses, churches, and official buildings in East Timor when I worked for three months in Dili, East Timor, in 2011.

One of my good friends in Birmingham is an East Timorese who was part of the resistance, and he was once the asylum seeker in England in the 1990s. To write about this research from this perspective may have the impact that I take a different political position from him. If it is the case, I am not that worried. What I am worried about is that by writing
about the suffering and silence of the East Timorese in exile after 1999, he may get the impression that I do not respect the injury that he and other East Timorese experienced. At the same time to think about my other friend, Rui, who is still struggling with his family in a camp for more than a decade in West Timor, makes me feel obliged to write about this research.

Bourdieu (1993, p.4) insists that it is important to understand ‘positional suffering’, which he defines as ‘experienced from inside the microcosm’. Bourdieu (1993) remarks that it is significant to understand reality as what it is, rather than trying to frame it with other images, which may lead to going in a different direction. He concerns himself with the bias that is produced by the sociologist and recommends the importance of reflexivity. Wacquant (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1996, p.39) explains Bourdieu’s position as follows:

The *intellectual bias* which entices us to construe the world as a *spectacle*, as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as a concrete problem to be solved practically, is more profound and more distorting than those rooted in the social origins or location of the analyst of academic field, because it can lead us to miss entirely the *different specifica* of the logic of practice (Bourdieu, 1990a, 1990e).

What Bourdieu (1993, p. 628) proposed is a method of deep listening to the subjects, which is necessary in order to know ‘by breaking with what Émile Durkheim called preconceptions”—the representations that social agents make of their own condition’. Here Bourdieu criticizes the position of intellectuals who follow the Cartesian logic who strictly separate the subject from the object of analysis. Contrary to Cartesian tradition, for Bourdieu, the existence of the text, produced by intellectuals, is not separated from the self.4

These preconceptions mentioned by Bourdieu are very common in the era of the global media and they are enforced with the invention of the new information and

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4 This, I believe, is Bourdieu’s final message, which he contributes, as a confession, with his *Sketched for Self-Analysis* (Bourdieu, 2008). The division between reason and feeling is presented by other writers (Nussbaum, 1996 & 2003; Wilkinson, 2006).
communication technology in the early 1990s. Boltanski (1993, p.11) explains that ‘a politics of pity’ in order to be able to be transferred to a wider audience, should be able ‘to detach itself from the local and so from those necessarily local situations in which events provoking compassion may arise’. Bourdieu and Boltanski both see the possibility of manipulation of distant suffering in the contemporary society.

Boltanski argues that it is possible to establish a line between politics and humanitarian intervention, which is strongly related to three different time frames about ‘past victims’, ‘future victims’ and ‘present politics’ and he claims that there is no perplexity about these three political orders (Boltanski, 1993, p.192). For him, compassion as an element in humanitarian action is necessary in order to avoid the problems in which the politics of the pity has been conducted in the last two hundred years (Boltanski, 1993). However I argue that it is impossible to cover the three different time frames in order to live ‘the real’ as Boltanski wishes because the time gap to a global audience has made the action of compassion in humanitarian action always positioned as post factum. Each of the collective suffering needs three decades in order to be able to speak out or to escape from the hegemony of world politics and to achieve release from previous stigma as in East Timor’s case where it is part of a different kind of structural domination from Cold War to cultural or identity politics.

Bourdieu (1999) argues that ‘understanding’ is a central element in order to recognize social suffering in today’s world, which camouflages itself with over-abundant information. He proposes particular focus or ‘to go beyond appearance’ in order to understand ‘the real’ social suffering. Bourdieu’s reminder to go beyond the appearance of social suffering is necessary. Otherwise it is impossible to reveal the hidden narrative of the new exiled community of East Timor. Their histories are mostly unknown to the global public. Generally, in the publication of global solidarity movement such as Estafeta from East Timor Action
Network (ETAN), which was concerned with East Timor in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the existence of the other political community of East Timor is rarely mentioned. If they are mentioned in the political narrative by scholar-activists, their figure is told as insignificant in numbers. However, based on the result of the referendum on 30 August 1999, there were 94,388 voters (21.5%) from the eligible voters of East Timor population in 1999 (Martin, 2001).

To talk about the injury of the one party is mostly understood as forgetting about the injury of another. On the one hand, *Mea Culpa* as the expression of asking for forgiveness for the unforgivable action cannot occur in a short time.

Today the tension in the global world in relation to past violence arising from decolonisation is about conducting the punitive justice in the name of crime against humanity. The CAVR is oriented for punitive justice, and the CTF focused on reconciliation. About reconciliation, the reflection of CTF (2008, p.5) is that:

> On this journey we learned that no reconciliation can be reached without sacrifice from all relevant parties. Sacrifice is needed in the dynamics to accept the fact of truth that determines the degree of responsibility of all relevant parties. The Commission also reached a conviction that in looking at events of the past that caused resentment, no one could claim oneself as being fully/absolutely right, and other parties as absolutely wrong. This is because in the reconstruction of history to reveal the fact of truth, challenges faced pertain to how all parties can reach a fact of truth that can be agreed upon.

What is clear is that even today reconciliation is still far from the condition that ‘all parties can reach a fact of truth that can be agreed upon’. For those who are in exile, to return sometime is not a solution, since many cannot accept the present East Timor as it is today. Many of them prefer to live in very difficult condition in camps and be Indonesian.

The present suffering experienced by the East Timor community is still not recognized. While both truth commissions focus on the violation of human rights of the past,
at the same time there is an East Timor community of people who are unable to speak for their suffering. They are not part of any ‘political bodies’ that construct both truth commissions and the truth narrative.

While looking for the rationalisation or explanation of the silent suffering is the goal of this research, I argue that the importance of ‘feeling’ has been neglected. Wilkinson describes how feeling has been put under the shadow on the analysis on rationalisation of the society within the sociological field. I think this may be the answer for my question that triggers this research: why suffering, which should be very simple to feel, is very difficult to understand. I argue that in the name of rationalisation of the past injury, the hierarchy of international law follows the hierarchy of cognitive development that has played the dominant role in marginalizing the way of the non-modern or less modern people’s way to visit the past injury in which the construction of the victim has been developed. Therefore, I would like to suggest that the cosmopolitan network and its claim might become an egalitarian project if compassion is considered as the instrument of reason (Rousseau, 1979; Nusbaum, 1996&2003; Wilkinson, 2005; Santos, 2008).

In the past I did interviews with militia leaders, however the way I conducted the interview was better fit to be part of investigative journalism. Based on the ethical standard of academic life, I could not use the interviews since the recording was made without the consent of the interviewees. Here is the moment of the paradigm shift within this research, from an investigative journalist to a social researcher.

To write from the perspective of those who live in camps in West Timor, may also leave me with another problem that I may be suspected to support what the militias have done in 1999, which contains human rights abuse action. That is not my intention; rather I would

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5How feeling in sociological analysis has been abandoned in sociological analysis is sketched by Wilkinson (2005) in Chapter V of Sociology of Suffering.
like to show that decolonisation and the birth of state in postcolonial states is not separated from the new form of exclusion. The birth of state is always identical with the birth of camps for others.

**Suffering and Silence: Beyond Politics of Ressentiment and the Ethic of Spectator**

To witness the painful experience or to encounter the injury does not necessarily enable the spectator to find a comfortable way to deliver her/his concern as a public discourse. To find the best way to talk about silence in order to acknowledge the suffering of past injuries requires certain strategy. Baning’s strategy (2006) to visit the past injury is to show how the people from two different nationalities become victims, either the Dutch or the Indonesians, under the Japanese occupation. The problem of this strategy is when it places one side as the oppressor and the other as victims. The other problem is when one side’s suffering is claimed to be deeper than the other, or known as *ressentiment*. In that kind of narration the suffering is always partial; it is taken from a certain position or enunciation (Nussbaum, 1996; Boltanski, 1999). There is a possibility to turn suffering into vengeance (Brown, 1995). Baning brings the silent suffering into public discourse by combining photography and short narrative on Dutch and Indonesian suffering under Japanese rule. With photography Baning look on the traces of war on the bodies, he gives his reflective question as follows (2006, p.8):

> How much burden was the legacy of the war to others? Were they still haunted by visions of the past? And to what extent did they think the war determined who they were and what they thought and felt today?

Those questions above are mostly asked in silence, since remembering the injury of the past becomes the burden of the present. I believe that what I have done is similar to what Baning has done, that is to write from the position of several different victims, despite the fact that
Banig does not cover the suffering of the oppressor who becomes oppressed in a later period, after the atomic bomb in August 1945 in Japan.

Reading the text of suffering, silence, and forgotten community as the impact of the constitution of state has placed me in a position not to narrate from a heroic point of view. The narration produced by the truth commission has the possibility to produce the ‘truth text’ as part of the past injury and to follow the politics of ressentiment. By saying this, I do not mean that a patriotic position is not good, but I argue that it takes a really long time for us to recognise the existence of silent suffering. This, we may learn from the experience of the people of the East Indies/Indonesia and Portuguese Timor/East Timor and in the other part of the world, which need more than two centuries of the making of the modern state, to be understood.

For instance, reading the history of the exile in the Netherlands as the consequence of the constitution of modern Indonesia, which is presented by Osstindie (2011) in Postcolonial Netherlands left me with deep impression about the similar exclusion that has been experienced by the new East Timorese community in Indonesia today. This particular description may help us to rethink about the past injury. Osstindie (2011, p.28) points out that:

In the Netherlands, as many were to experience, there was little and decreasing sympathy for the resentment they felt about the end of colonialism and their complaints about inadequate accommodation and the cold reception they had received. Requests for compensation for lost possessions and unpaid salaries were turned down. The Netherlands was too busy with its own reconstruction and with forgetting about the East Indies to pay much attention to the Dutch repatriates. Moreover, they increasingly came to be regarded as reactionaries who longed to return to a gilded colonial existence.

It usually takes a generation, considered three decades, as the pause before the past injury has the possibility to be discussed or become included in public discourse. The emerging of postcolonial studies in the Netherlands in recent years (Oostindie, 2011) is also part of this phenomenon.
Different writers have acted as my companions on this journey to remind me of being critical about how to present suffering (Arendt, 1963; Foucault, 1980; Brown, 1995; Bourdieu & Vacquint, 1996; Nussbaum, 1996 & 2003; Wilkinson, 2003; Bhambra & Shiliam, 2009). When they help me on the conceptual basis, they made me think that it is very important to reflect on how others, not strange others, but my friends, may feel about me when she or he read this research. I think that is the boundary or limit of words when writing about suffering. The position of friends in two opposite groups acts not only as interlocutors or partners in dialogue, but they represent the humanity that we share.

I agree with Arendt (1963) that suffering itself can only be felt when it is related in a personal way, and it is opposite to the cosmopolitan position, which is known as the ethic for strangers. Doing good thing for strangers is not enough. To support the other from a distance without recognizing the context may place the spectators of suffering as the tyrant for the others.

For years the topic of East Timorese in exile after the referendum in 1999 has become the chosen topic for this research. One way to keep the research spirit is by remembering that this research is also about human suffering today. How human beings organise themselves and how the tragedy is born are behind the research question.

From its very beginning, Ian Wilkinson’s work, Suffering: A Sociological Introduction, has been a great help in investigating the problem of suffering from a sociological perspective. His work makes it possible to reflect and to learn on how the early and contemporary sociologists have made the issue of suffering the causa prima of their works, and to remind the sociologist of the criticism made by Gouldner more than two decades ago on the importance of listening to human suffering (Wilkinson, 2005).
Led by Wilkinson’s work I find that the so-called ruptures in histories are deeply marked by the reflection of the authors on suffering. It is important not only to read their works, but also to read what they think about their lives or how other people think about them, in biography and autobiography as Mills reminds us in *Sociological Imagination*. Other than Wilkinson and Mills, Foucault makes a great contribution to the study of silence and suffering in social science. His reflection on suffering places the suffering of others at the first place as part of the indicator of the existence of social inquiry before taking position as a final judge in the position of a writer as a truth claimer. It does not mean that there is no such thing as truth, but the claim for truth or the acceptance of the truth claim should consider the others who may be excluded and suffer in silence as the effect of the truth claim.

Therefore, rather than placing sociologists or other social scientists in the place of the truth claimer in which, for instance, Marx has been placed for more than a century by his strict followers after the release of *Communist Manifesto* (1848), I think the role of the sociologist should be expanded to cover the effect of ‘truth claim’ over the others.

As it is shown by Foucault (1980), the attempt to avoid others being placed in ‘silence’ is still far from a settled account. It is still a work in progress. While Marx’s Theses on Fuerbach that ‘the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point however, is to change it’ (Marx & Engels, 1968 [1845]) may help us to understand how the world has been constructed in the last two centuries in relation to suffering as part of the alienation of the capitalist system. At the same time, as a social researcher I am questioning how to place myself in particular when the social research is a contested project. At a certain point it is important to show the clear position, which is taken by a researcher. On the other hand, it is also significant to realise the impact of the research toward other people. I think
finding the balance and developing the awareness on the critical points where suffering is produced is important.

The next step to trace the constitutive elements of silent suffering is by ‘rewriting’ the histories from which certain discourse dominate and also conflict. This step is important since ‘the historical contents allow us to rediscover the ruptural effects of conflict and struggle that the imposed by functionalist or systematising thought is designed to mask’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 82). In here Foucault’s method on archaeology (Foucault, 2002) gives the insight how to use historical material to analyse the ruptural effects of conflict. The ruptural effects of conflict itself is understood as the moment of transition before new understanding comes to the fore and it takes the heat of conflict.

On the ideas of silence, related to the human rights issues as a contested project, Bhambra and Shiliam’s work ((eds.) 2009), gives a different comparative analysis from which I can benefit. Interrogating silence is one way to generate critical thinking and to lead the researcher to understand reality in several settings, which are presented by different authors.⁶

To think about how the disciplinary power is conducted within the global humanitarian work and how its direct implication to the local population gives me an idea about why suffering, which is supposed to be a simple thing to be felt, has become very difficult to recognise. Thus, the humanitarian work also has the tendency to be totalitarian under its general discipline, which is not necessarily related to the political humanitarian intervention in the making of a new juridical order. However when the convergence of both

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⁶I do benefit not only from social sciences but also from humanity and also theology (Gutierrez, 1996) in which the philosophical idea about suffering is also elaborated. Doing this particular research, reflection is a must as it is already told by other researchers who have gone before (Foucault, 1980; Brown, 1995; Bourdieu, 1999; Santos, 2008; Bhambra & Shiliam (eds.), 2009). At the same time, coming from the ‘non modern’ background makes me realise my ‘in-between’ position to rewrite the decolonisation as part of a modern project, and how the silence is produced. It is not only about the silence as the construction of the universal toward the particular, but it is also about the silence as the effect of domination of the modern subjects toward the others, which is the position of most of the postcolonial scholars (Chakrabarty, 1992; Subrahmanyam, 1997; Spivak, 1999; Bhambra, 2009).
powers exists together the silence is even greater in particular for those who are suffering and excluded.

While Arendt’s views on the suffering of stateless people are discussed from a juridical-political perspective (Arendt, 1958), Foucault stresses the practice of domination, which distinguishes itself from the idea of sovereignty or certain political institution in his concept of power and biopolitics as part of disciplinary power. Foucault (1978, pp. 92–93) defines power as follows:

It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relation immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggle and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.

Foucault’s insight may help us to understand the relation between the construction of truth and power. Today, what I understand about power and truth with regard to this particular context is that the construction of the truth is not separate from the hierarchy and logic of the world order.

Furthermore, in relation to the silent suffering of the East Timorese community in exile after 1999, the explanation of Nussbaum (1996) gives insight into why the global politics of compassion fails to recognise this particular distant suffering. Nussbaum's (1996, p.31) take on Aristotle’s definition of pity is as follows:

Pity, Aristotle argues, is a painful emotion directed at another person’s misfortune or suffering (Rhet. 13895b13ff). It requires rest on three beliefs: (1) the belief that suffering is serious rather than trivial; (2) the belief that the suffering was not caused primarily by the person’s own culpable actions; and (3) the belief that the pittier’s own possibilities are similar to those of the sufferer.
From these three, the second point is what is absent from the East Timorese community in exile after 1999. I would suggest that the dominant discourse, which is shared by the global humanitarian agencies, is that the East Timorese community in West Timor are human rights abusers, belonging to a group created by the invaders. Therefore, their suffering is seen as a result of their own wrongdoing in the past.

On further inquiry into the contested human rights projects, Bhambra and Shiliam (2009, p. 6) suggest that ‘rather than exposing truth, talking of silence becomes a generative moment in re-production of social meaning’. On the construction of ‘silence’, Bhambra and Shiliam (2009, p. 8) give a framework that focuses on three inter-connected concepts:

a) to analyse the silence that renders certain social categories of meaning and identities excluded and others included; b) to expose the act of silencing that re-produces a hierarchy of political power through the construction of meanings and identities in the moment of representation; and c) to reflect, consistently and carefully, on the responsibility of the intellectual to undermine this act by problematizing the resulting silences.

The critics of Bhambra and Shiliam (2009) should be taken into account since it is possible, I would argue that in attempting to defend human rights, activists may in fact function as instruments of power to oppress others who have no power to defend themselves because they live outside any political communities (Arendt, 1958), and because their existence is ignored in the name of international justice.

At the same time Bhambra and Shiliam (2009, p. 9) also remind the intellectual responsibility by ‘problematising the resulting silences’. I am aware that writing about silence in a historical sociology framework may give the impression that the role of actor as human rights abuser is insignificant, since their role is placed in more than two hundred years of history. However, by writing in the historical perspective, it gives another perspective to look at this current problem. In order to avoid the politics of ressentiment, which has the tendency
to produce another totalitarian regime, what I have done in this thesis is to present the formation of inclusion/exclusion of different modern states in several settings (Indonesia, East Timor, and Portugal).

**Historical Sociological Framework**

The historical sociological framework is chosen since writing about crisis on the second East Timor decolonisation also demands the contextual reconstruction on the development of European colonialism in East Timor and also in the East Indies (Indonesia). This is not only the history of East Timorese in exile in post 1999 referendum, but this thesis is also about the history of decolonisation in post World War II. The materials that are used in these chapters are chosen based on their relation to the construction of European colonialism in these two countries, Indonesia and East Timor, for a few centuries. At the same time this thesis also focuses on the historical development of colonialism in Portugal and in the Netherlands.

In general the historical materials used within the thesis are divided into four parts: the first part is about the construction of European colonialism; the second part is about the emerging of the modern state in Europe and the connection to imperialism in colonies; the third part is about the crisis of European colonialism during WWII and the emergence of the new states; and finally the fourth part is about the Cold War and how the new states are coopted under the influence of other states.

In relation to Dutch colonialism in the East Indies, or in later years known as Indonesia, it is important to trace the construction process of the Netherlands East Indies as the largest colony of the Netherlands. Several primary resources from the 18th century, such
as the Dutch economic development in the East Indies are used to sketch the early development of modern Dutch economic expansion.

Some other secondary resources are used. It ranges from the work of J.S Furnival (1939), which covers liberal politics of the Netherlands in the East Indies, to contemporary author such as Oostindie (2011) who drew the sketch of postcolonial Netherlands. These primary resources are important since they help to sketch how the Dutch liberal expansion occurred in the East Indies. The secondary materials used in this thesis in relation to early modern Indonesian history are part of the critical points in Indonesian history.  

At the same time I also use the primary resources of other writers such as the document on the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955 (Kahin, 1956). This particular year is the critical point in which Indonesia and other new countries tried to promote other international political blocs outside the political blocs of the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War. Some secondary political historical analysis are used from the South East Asian region (Lowe, 1997; Easter, 2004; Roosa, 2006; Simpson, 2008) to explain about the end of the Soekarno era. These authors use the declassified materials, which are now available for the public. The historical part about the Cold War and the end of the Soekarno era in Indonesia is not only about Indonesian history, but it is also seen from the regional point of view. For instance other supporting materials from the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and also Thailand give the political atmosphere of the region in the 1960s.

Furthermore, the idea of European sovereignty as the basis of Dutch colonialism could be traced back from the period of Dutch colonial expansion into the East Indies based on Hugo Grotius’ work. Grotius’ work is investigated by Van Ittersum (2006). Martine Julia Van

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7For instance this thesis also highlights the Dutch political system or known as verzuilen (pillar system) in the 1920s when it is introduced to Indonesian politics and how in later years it is abandoned by the liberal system in the 1950s. Feith’s (1962) and Shiraishi’s (1990) work have significant contribution to draw the political development in Indonesia during the Dutch colonial period and early independence era.
Ittersum contribution is significant in particular about sketching the development of international law from the Dutch colonial period, which also explains the decline of Portuguese colonialism in Asia.

To trace the impact of the second East Timor decolonisation is not complete if it does not cover the reconstruction of the era of Portuguese *Estado Novo* under Salazar. The main sources on Portuguese history in Asia, which are used in this thesis are written in English. The secondary sources on Portuguese colonialism in Asia are written by authors such as Boxer (1947, 1969), and Subrahmanyam (1993). Other primary sources of *Estado Novo* are taken from Salazar’s own note (Salazar, 1939) and also from Nogueira (1964) who explains the late Portuguese decolonisation.

In relation to the history of Portuguese colonialism, East Timor itself is one of the oldest Portuguese colonies in Asia. Ideally, to map the rupture of East Timor from Portuguese colonialism, which existed for four centuries in the region to the Indonesian New Order regime, should be done with the support of access to the Portuguese source. This is one of the gaps that needs to be covered in the future by other researchers.

**Historical Materials and Gramsci’s Framework on State**

Tracing the history of state in the Marxist point of view, has led me to Gramsci’s concept on state. Thus following his definition on state, I trace the history of Indonesia with its connection to the Dutch history. I take the post Napoleonic war as the starting point of the modernisation of Dutch colonialism in the East Indies.

In this research, I have designed each chapter to represent the reconstruction of the ideas about political society and civil society in a certain era. For instance, in Chapter III, I present the era of Dutch modern colonialism in the East Indies, and how it is transformed into
the Indonesian New Order. The data about the Dutch economic setting in the East Indies comes from Day (1904), Furnivall (1939), Laanen (1980), and also De Vries & Der Woude (1997).

Within Gramscian framework, I show the formation of the native army as the instrument of Dutch colonial expansion in the Dutch East Indies that still left its legacy to the Indonesian Army, which still plays the role as the ‘foreign army’ (Hack & Rettig, 2006).

Using Foucault’s method (Foucault 2002) in doing social research, and in particular using historical elements known as archaeology, I have mapped how the coercive element of the Indonesian New Order emerges in Indonesia. To sketch how the Indonesian Army is employed as the foreign Army, the work of Roosa (2008) and Simpson (2008) contributes to explain the role of the U.S. in the 1960s, which ends the decolonisation as an emancipative project as Soekarno and other new independent leaders have the same opinion in the Bandung Conference (Appadorai, 1955; Legum, 1958; Soekarno, 1958). McVey’s (1961) work on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is also very important since it covers its link with the international communist movement in the last century. For Indonesia, the historical material on PKI is still prohibited since the discourse of PKI is seen as a threat to the discourse, which was developed by the Indonesian Army about this period.

The history of the New Order is covered in this research since it explains the condition of the postcolonial state of Indonesia, and also it gives a general idea about the motive of its invasion on East Timor in the 1970s.

Prior to introducing the East Timor decolonisation, I also argue that the history of Portuguese Estado Novo under Salazar is important to be read in detail. Therefore, the work of Salazar (1939) as the head of the Estado Novo regime, and Noguiera’s book (1964) on Portuguese colonialism is important, because he, in the capacity of the Portuguese foreign
minister, explains why the Portuguese were against decolonisation, which he argues was different from colonialism by a powerful state. About the history of the Portuguese corporatist state, Wiarda’s work (1977) is one the authoritative sources to be read. Reading Portuguese history in the *Estado Novo* period is very close to the role of the Catholic Church in Italy in Gramsci’s period.

To explain about different positions in the Indonesian invasion to East Timor in 1975, I also use different historical sources from the Indonesian Army (Soekanto, 1976) and the book of the last Indonesian consulate in East Timor (Tomodok, 1994). This work contains the Indonesian New Order regime argument to invade East Timor.

To see the connection between Jakarta-Lisbon-Dili, taking different resources, which represents different historical settings is important. Several secondary sources such as Bruce (1975), Mailer (1977), Bruneau (1984), and Mechado (1991) have helped me to expand my imagination about the conflict in Lisbon, and how it influences the East Timor decolonisation. How the decolonisation in Portuguese colonies is conducted is also important to see from the national liberation fighter from Portuguese African colonies such as Cabral (1974 & 1980).

How the Indonesian invasion is seen from East Timor freedom fighters’ perspective could be read from the work of Jollife (1978), Horta (1988), Gusmao (2000), Hill (2000), and Dunn (2003). Their books are considered as documents since they write their first hand experience in relation to East Timor decolonisation.

Another political institution that is really important during the East Timor conflict as part of the Portuguese legacy is the Catholic Church. Therefore, the politics of the Catholic Church is also represented in this research when I use the work of several authors who focus on the role of the Catholic Church in East Timor such as Carey (1999), Kohen (1999), Lennox (2000), Durand (2004), and Smythe (2004).
Finally, the main legal document on the East Timor decolonisation used as the historical basis of East Timor status in the UN could be found in the edited work of Krieger (ed.) (1997). The main sources about the post 1999 status could be found in CAVR’s document (CAVR, 2011) and also in CTF’s document (CTF, 2008).

Whether it is primary or secondary sources, these documents above have functioned as valuable material to understand the tragedy in Timor’s history in which many people have had to migrate and leave their home in the past or today. All of the documents are the main documents in the East Timor problem. For future research, conducting research on oral history of those who live in camps is really important since their personal narratives are still unknown.
Then we were suddenly confronted the necessity of giving content and meaning to our independence. Not material content and meaning only, but also ethical and moral content, for independence without ethics and without morality would be indeed a poor imitation of what we sought.

Soekarno’s opening speech in the Asian-Africa Conference in Bandung, 1955 (Kahin, 1956, p. 41)
The Indonesian narrative ‘From the Dutch East Indies to the Indonesian New Order (Orde Baru)’ represents the narrative of those who were and are in power, and also those who were and are striving for power in the last two centuries in the East Indies/Indonesia. This particular narration is constructed from the early 19th century to the end of the 20th century. It starts from the Dutch East Indies (Nederlands-Indië) colonies to the Indonesian New Order Military Regime.

Despite the fact that it is a new narrative, it does not cover the view of marginal or outer islands. If this particular narrative were written from the view of outer islands, such as Moluccas, Aceh, Papua, or other places in the periphery of Indonesia, which were marginalised since the unification of the republic, the narrative would be different. To be more precise, the construction of Indonesia in this chapter represents the history of Indonesia, which is written from the centre of power—that is from Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia—or as a continuation of Batavia when it was under the Dutch rule. As a result, this narrative covers the narrative of the educated elites, and not the narrative of those who are considered “non-modern”, “underdeveloped” or “uncivilized”.

This narration covers the history of the archipelago, however, this territory is not the only one designed to be written about, following the concept of ‘connected histories’ (Subrahmanym, 1995; Holmwood, 2007). In order to construct the connected histories, Subrahmanym (1995, pp. 761-762) has warned that ‘we not only compare from within our boxes, but spend some time and effort to transcend them, not by comparison alone but by seeking out at times fragile threads that connected the globe’. Thus, the great events in human histories related to colonial wars, working-class revolutions, and also wars for independence have certain similarities in which they are all the manifestation of the struggle for life in different forms. This narration covers the connection of histories from the Netherlands East
Indies in the Post Napoleonic War, Japan’s expansion into Asia, and the emergence of a military regime in Indonesia.

Figure 2.1 Dutch East Indies

This particular Indonesian narration is divided into three historical ruptures, which are linked to three different periods and related to state formation in modern Indonesia. *First*, it covers the territorial expansion and consolidation of the Dutch East Indies in the post Netherlands East Indies Company Era by the King, the Dutch Parliament, and later, the Dutch East Indies government. The vast archipelago in South East Asia, which is known today as the territory of the Republic of Indonesia did not exist in that political form a hundred years ago. Although the presence of the Dutch in this archipelago started in the 15th century, Dutch
state penetration and also the consolidation of the East Indies territory took place from the 19th century to the early 20th century, in particular after the Dutch Napoleonic War in the early 19th century (Anderson, 2006). It also covers how the local and traditional authorities across the archipelago surrendered under the Dutch consolidation.

Secondly, it covers the rise of Western capitalist empires, which were challenged by the global revolutionary movement, as articulated by Lenin (1974) and others, who concluded that imperialism was ‘the highest stage of capitalism’ and organized the people in European and American colonies to challenge these colonial powers. The communist theory, which is claimed as the new universal theory, was set to challenge the European capitalist empire. It was also linked to the nationalist movement. In the Indonesian case, other than the nationalist and communist slogan there were also various post-colonial projects, which contested among each other such as pan-Islamism, regionalism and ethnic projects. While the nationalists and communists challenged the colonial presence in Indonesia, there were different imaginations as well, such as ethnic nationalism in South Moluccas, and the proclamation of an Islamic state in West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh.

Thirdly, it covers the emergence of the New Order regime, which is marked by the elimination of PKI as the Leninist Communist Party in Indonesia and also PNI in 1965. It continued with the New Order territorial expansion to East Timor during the Cold War in 1975, which challenged Fretelin as the Leninist Communist Party in East Timor. It also covers the decline of the New Order regime in the post-Cold War period in the 1990s as the consequence of financial crisis and mass pressure by students and also human right activists.

These three historical ruptures are the main pinnacles in constructing Indonesian history today. The first phase functions as the background to the territorial frame of how ‘Indonesian’ territory is constructed. The second phase is about how the communist
international connection tried to establish a network against global colonialism, incorporating Indonesian groups into it. The third phase represents how the Cold War influenced the nationalist movement and how the Western backup military regime conquered the nationalist movement and its downturn post 1989. In sum, this chapter explains the background of Indonesia before the emergence of the corporatist regime.

**The Return of Dutch Colonialism in the East Indies After the Napoleonic War**

The return of the Dutch to the East Indies after the Napoleonic War was aggressive. It was part of state capitalism under royal order. Before the Napoleonic War, the East Indies was governed by the VOC (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*), or the Dutch united merchants’ organization, but after the war the East Indies was placed under the Dutch Republic. During Napoleon’s invasion of the Netherlands, the French took over the Dutch colonies in the East Indies and later they were recaptured by the British East Indies. In 1814, the East Indies was returned to the Dutch. Under the Dutch Republic, the control over the East Indies colonies was more systematic and centralised colonial government was established in Batavia (Jakarta).

The modern military was the strong element of the Dutch Republic (Gorksi, 2001), and it not only showed its strength when the Dutch had to fight against the Spanish Habsburg Empire, but it was also effective in conquering the Portuguese and the traditional authorities in the East Indies. The Dutch colonial war was started in 1817 in Moluccas, in the eastern part of Indonesia. A century ago, Moluccas was known as the land of spices where the Dutch got the very valuable commodities for the European market. From the East, the military expansion was followed by two big wars in West Sumatra and Java, the Padri War in West Sumatra (1821–1837) and the Diponegoro War (1825–1830) in Central Java.
In order to ensure the Dutch ambition for control over the East Indies, in 1830, they established the Royal Colonial Army in the East Indies (KNIL, Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger). The composition of KNIL consisted of Dutch and native East Indies soldiers. With this military power, Bali, Aceh, and other islands including West Timor, were conquered. The colonial war to unite the East Indies territory, or, as it is known today, the Indonesian Territory was achieved in 1914. Over the native polities, the Dutch combined direct and indirect rule. In ‘indirect rule’ the native leaders were still in power, but at the same time acknowledged Dutch sovereignty.

With the rise of capitalism, the return of Dutch colonialism to Indonesia was marked by the introduction of the duiten as the new common currency in 1826, when duiten was massively transported into Java and the rest of East Indies. This was the preliminary step to introduce the singular currency (Royal Tropical Institute, 1977), and it was important to introduce taxation in the East Indies. Before the duiten was brought to the East Indies, other local currencies existed in Java and Madura. The East Indies was placed as the source of Dutch income to rebuild the country after the Napoleonic war. This particular step also marks the beginning of Dutch control on the currency system in the East Indies, and also part of the formation of a market economy, since the Dutch placed Java as the market for Dutch manufacturers (Day, 1904). At the same time, taxation was introduced to Java under Dutch authority. The year after, in 1827, the Java Bank was introduced to the East Indies with the establishment of the first modern financial institution. This event also marked the birth of modern capitalism in the East Indies with the transition from a barter economy to a monetary economy (Laanen, 1980, p. 25).

Furthermore, the process of the Dutch taking money into the East Indies and turning the farmer into a waged labourer is what Marx calls the beginning of ‘primitive
accumulation’. It is the process of ‘expropriation of agricultural population’, or a process of taking a farmer and turning him into a paid labourer (Marx, 1995). Rather than taking the land of the local population, the Dutch controlled the agricultural commodities by imposing a certain kind of tax, and forced the farmers into unpaid labour and later into cheap labour (Furnivall, 1939).

In this period the two commercial commodities from the East Indies were agricultural commodities and slaves (although later it was changed from forced labour to cheap labour). The colonial war had opened the opportunity for the Dutch to benefit from the labour power in Java as the most populated island. In 1829, the Dutch initiated the compulsory cultivation scheme (cultuurstelselor tanam paksa) by which the commodities from different plantations, such as coffee, sugar, and rubber, were bought at low prices. The Dutch not only benefited from the cultuurstelsel, but they also took advantage from the slave trading, which was banned in the East Indies much later, in 1860. However, it was continued with the practice of using cheap labourers, who were known as coolies or semi slaves. For the Dutch, the criticism over the exploitation over cheap labour in the East Indies did not come from Karl Marx or other communist party members, but from EduardDouwes Dekker, a plantation officer, who wrote a very influential novel, Max Havelaar, about a ‘Dutchman’s burden’ in the East Indies.

After 1850, the economic policy in the East Indies was no longer under the royal authority but under the Dutch parliament. In 1857 the parliament under the liberal party decided to introduce a laissez-faire economic policy, which ended the Dutch monopoly in the East Indies. During this period different mining companies from the U.S. and also from Britain entered the East Indies. The liberal policy was followed with the introduction of
Agrarische Wet (1870), which allowed private companies to own the land. Following this policy, the Dutch also adopted the gold standard in the 1870s (Van Laanen, 1980).

The expansion in the East Indies was not only achieved by military power but was due to a combination of military strategy and social science. For instance, Snouck Hurgronje, an Islamologist from Leiden, was recruited to work as an advisor for the military strategy to conquer Aceh. Indology was the name of the department in Leiden University, which focused on native life in the East Indies.

The Dutch private companies expanded their business into the East Indies during the ‘liberal period’. Economically, 50% of the Dutch economic activities were centralized in Java and Madura, while the rest were in the ‘outer islands’ (Laanen, 1980). This uneven development would contribute to different reactions against Dutch colonialism in post WWII.

As a consequence of the high level of exploitation in the East Indies, in the early 20th century the Dutch introduced modern education to the East Indies as part of an ‘ethical policy’. This program contributed to the emergence of modern educated elites from the aristocratic background, the Chinese and Arab families, and also the children of Dutch officers in the East Indies. The emergence of the first educated elites itself correlated with the first modern organisations in Indonesia in the early 20th century, or a few decades before (Bolsma, 2004).

The Emergence of Modern Elites and Organisations in the Early 20th Century

The first part of this section is focused on several elements: the development of Indonesian modern elites, the emergence of the first modern organization, the birth of Volksraad, and the contestation of different political parties before World War II. The racial distinction is an important element in Indonesian historiography, in particular in Java where
the rivalry between *pribumi* (native) and other racial groups was more frequent and made more evident with the colonial presence.

In Indonesian ‘national narration’, the historiography of modern Indonesian organisation, as taught in schools, started in 1908 with the foundation of *Budi Utomo*. It is an organisation that was created by several educated Javanese aristocrats’ sons who studied in STOVIA (*School tot Opleiding van Indlandsche Artsen*, Native Doctors’ Training School). Although in fact there were several modern organisations founded in the late 19th century by the *indos* (mix races or the Dutch born in the East Indies) in the East Indies to criticize the practice of Dutch colonialism (Bosma, 2004), the *indos’* organization was not recognized in Indonesian historiography. The construction of Indonesian historiography is related to those who are considered ‘natives’ of Indonesia. It influenced the construction of citizenship in Indonesia in 1957–1958 when the ‘nationalization’ of foreign companies was conducted by *Serikat Buruh Indonesia* (Indonesian Labour Organization), which was against the dual citizenship (De Kerkhof, 2005).

The emergence of the modern educated elites led to the development of native organizations in Java and also West Sumatra as the result of early Dutch colonial penetration in those areas. The majority of the first Indonesian modern leaders came from West Sumatra, Moluccas, Minahasa (South Sulawesi), and Java. Shiraishi (1990, p.29) points out that ‘according to the 1920 census, the literacy rates of the natives in Java was still only 2.74 percent in vernacular and 0.13 percent in Dutch’. The table below shows the number of students in the East Indies who received their education in the Dutch language, the symbol of adopting European modernity. Adoption of Dutch modern education was not necessarily a statement of emancipation of the native elites from the Dutch; rather it was a reaction of ‘the white men’s burden’ of the ethical policy from the Dutch liberals’. 
Table 3.1: Native students attending Dutch-language schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Secondary HBD and MULO*</th>
<th>Vocational (STOVIA, OSVIA, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,681</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>25,808</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>38,024</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>3,917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Shiraishi (1990, p. 29) who quotes from Van der Wall, *Het Onderwijsbeleid*, pp. 11–12

*MULO stands for Meer Uitgebreide Lagere Onderwijs, Extended Primary Education or junior high school. OSVIA (Opleiding School voor Indiandische Ambtenaren, Training School for Native Official)

In response to the birth of modern organisations in the East Indies, the colonial government established a pseudo parliamentary body, the *Volksraad*, in the East Indies. It was not a representative body, but it was the Dutch response to nationalist and revolutionary ideas. The existence of the *Volksraad* was intended to accommodate the moderate political organisations and non-revolutionary parties. The Dutch categorized these early Indonesian modern organisations into two categories: collaborative and non-collaborative organisations. The non-collaborative were the communist party and also the nationalist party. *Volksraad* could be seen as the Dutch strategy to pacify the Indonesian elites. Giving them seats in the *Volksraad* would be a strategy to separate the moderate elites from revolutionaries.

However, the revolutionary party, *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI or Indonesian Communist Party), managed to infiltrate the collaborative organisation, *Syarikat Islam* (SI), which had seats in the *Volksraad*, and thus divided the organisation into two elements. The SI itself was divided into two political blocs, *SI Merah* (The Red Islamic Organization symbolised communist infiltration) and *Syarikat Islam Hijau* (The Green Islamic Organization who were against the communist element).
The Indonesian Communist Party had connections with the Russian Bolsheviks since its early years. The anti-colonial movement in Netherlands East Indies was connected to the communist revolution in Russia in 1917 (James, 1973). PKI was the first communist party in Asia that was established a year before the China Communist Party (CCP). However, the history of PKI was not a continuous history as was the CCP, since PKI failed in its rebellion in 1926 and its influence declined in the national liberation movement (Furnivall, 1956, p. 235).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Indonesians</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Foreign Orientals</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIVB (Netherlands Indies Liberal Association, 1916)</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
<td>NIVD</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP (Christian Ethical Party, 1917)</td>
<td>3 (-)</td>
<td>Budi Oetomo, 1908</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKP (Indies Catholic Party, 1918)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>NIP (National Indies Party, 1912-1913)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISDP (Indies Social Democratic Party, 1914)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>Sarekat Islam</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIP (National Indies Party)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>Sumatra Bond</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VABB (Association of civil servants)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>8 (4)</td>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>5 (2)</td>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>3 (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20(9)</strong></td>
<td><strong>15 (10)</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 (0)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schmutzer (1977: 165), *Dutch Colonial Policy and the Search for Identity in Indonesia*

Historically, the *Volksraad* never functioned as a parliamentary body as the Dutch parliament in metropolis. Rather, it functioned as the advisory body to the Governor General (McMahon, 1981). Although this new political body was introduced to the East Indies, there was no electoral system. In vertical structure, the racial category was still used. Even when
the native political parties dominated the Volksraad in the 1940s, it never functioned as a decision body until Japan invaded Indonesia in WWII. The Indonesian elites worked with the Japanese military officers, and at the same time also challenged them. Those who were part of the communist or socialist link refused to collaborate with Japan, or at least in public they never collaborated with Japan (Anderson, 2006). Table 3.3 shows that the emergence of several political parties based on ethnic background such as the Pasundan and Minahasa Party. In later years the regional solidarity as the foundation of the federalist claim was not acknowledged when it was contested to the unitary state, which was purposed by Soekarno. Furthermore, the emergence of different religious parties shows that the replication of the pillar system (verzuilen) from the Dutch political culture emerged in the late 1930s.

Table 3.3: Survey of the Composition of Volksraad (1939–1942)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEB (Political Economic</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>PEB</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
<td>PEB</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association, 1919)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEV (Indo European</td>
<td>8 (7)</td>
<td>PPBB</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>CHH (Indo European Association)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association, 1919)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISVO (Netherlands Indies</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>VAIB</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Women’s Organization)</td>
<td></td>
<td>of higher civil servants)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKP</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>PPKI (Indonesian Catholic Party)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VABB</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>Partai Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Party, 1938)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec.Group</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>PM (Persatoean)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The challenge for the Western Empires in Asia came from Japan. The Japanese movement into South East Asia was started in 1931 when Japan prepared their ‘southern advance’ known as *nanshin-ron* into Asia Pacific and the Pacific Rim (Shimizu, 1987). It came with two economic goals: to find a market for Japanese products and also to access raw materials. In 1940 Japan was the main importer for Netherlands East Indies or NEI (Vandenbosch, 1944). The invasion itself two years later was not only influenced by Japanese ethno-nationalism but also by the development of Japan’s industry, which was started with the Meiji Restoration. Japan’s expansion into the southern area of Asia was part of its competition with the U.S. and other Western countries.

The Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies occurred after the German attack on the Netherlands. The Dutch authority in NEI was in an indeterminate state in 1940 after the Dutch metropolis was invaded by Germany, and had to arrange its colonial government from London. In that year, Indonesian leaders requested decolonisation, but the Dutch authority declined it.

Japan attacked NEI in 1942 and invited a group of Indonesian leaders to collaborate with them. Within the Japanese propaganda the Indonesian leaders had to acknowledge them...
as the ‘older brothers’. For the Dutch, the Indonesian leaders who worked with Japan were considered collaborators, but the Indonesian leaders also used the war machine propaganda to spread the ideas of nationalism, and also to get the military training from Japan to challenge Western military supremacy, in particular the coming of the allied forces after the war (Feith, 1962).

On the other hand before WWII, the legacy of the Dutch KNIL’s to the Indonesian military could also be seen by the number of soldiers that existed in 1937. They were divided into different ethnic groups. Hack and Rettig (2006, p. 57) point out that ‘By 1937 the ‘Indonesian’ component of the KNIL included 12,700 Javanese, 5100 Menadonese, 4000 Ambonese, 1800 Sundanese, 1100 Timorese and 400 assorted others’. The impact of Western military recruitment tends to be forgotten in Indonesian history. I think this is fundamental in the making of Indonesia in post WWII. This historical account may show its significance when it is linked to how militarisation training took place during the Japan era.

Under the Japanese military empire, the youth groups gained massive military training from Japanese soldiers. They were trained in different military organizations such as Peta (Pembela Tanah Air or Voluntary Army of Homeland Defenders), Heiho, Kenpeitai, and others. These organizations were created as part of the consensus among the Japanese military commanders and Indonesian leaders to win Indonesian support in WWII in 1943. According to Feith (1962) when Japan surrendered, about 62,000 Indonesians were trained as Peta and Heiho (the auxiliary corps), and more than 230,000 ‘had been drilled, disciplined, and indoctrinated (but armed only with bamboo spears) in several para-military youth organizations’ (Feith, 1962, p.7). According to Anderson (1983, p. 480) ‘Java, Sumatra, and eastern Indonesia were ruled separately by the Japanese Sixteenth and Twenty-fifth armies,
and an arm of the Japanese Navy’. The eastern and Western parts of Timor were under the Japanese Navy, and were used as barriers where Australia came out to meet Japan in WWII.

At the same time Japan also recruited Indonesian workers for *romusha* or forced labour to work on its military project in Burma and in other parts of Indonesia. During the Indonesian collaboration with Japan, other revolutionaries also worked underground, such as Sutan Sjahrir, Tan Malaka, and Amir Sjarifuddin.

The militarisation of Indonesian society was important to mobilize the population to fight against Dutch military action in post WWII, but at the same time it also contributed to the emergence of the military faction in Indonesian politics and the constitution of an Indonesian military regime. The year 1965 is important in Indonesian politics as it marked the transition of power from Soekarno to Soeharto.

**Indonesian Independence and the Return of Western Empires**

Indonesian nationalism emerged in the middle of a clash of empires. Therefore, for the Western Empires, the end of the Japanese Empire did not necessarily mean that the Indonesians had the right to proclaim a new sovereign state. Rather, they had to follow the terms of reference from Western Empires, in particular that of America. The revolutionary element in Indonesia was not in power; the former Dutch KNIL and the educated intellectuals defeated them. This key issue is elaborated in the next chapter.

The Japan Empire in Asia ended with the nuclear bombs in Japan and its admission of defeat on 14th August 1945. Three days later Soekarno and Hatta, who worked with the Japanese during WWII, proclaimed Indonesian independence during ‘the vacuum of power’. Soekarno was from East Java and Hatta was from West Sumatra. They were considered the most legitimate among elites during these early days since both of them were in exile several
times under the Dutch colonial power for their non-collaborative politics against Dutch colonialism. However, the Dutch and the allied forces did not acknowledge the Indonesian proclamation of independence.

To challenge the ideas of Indonesian independence in the post-war era, the three empires, Britain, the Netherlands, and the U.S. worked together. They had different ideas about Indonesia. During the early period the British was the representative of the allied forces to control the East Indies and landed in East Java in October 1945. However, the British troops retreated after three months of war in East Java, and decided they would not continue to disarm the revolutionaries in the East Indies. The British decided not to continue the military operation in the East Indies regarding the limited resources in post WWII. On the other hand, the Dutch government at the end of World War II insisted on recapturing its ‘East Indies’ with two military actions (Kahin, 1952; Taylor, 1960). The U.S. wanted Indonesia to follow the Philippine’s style, in that Indonesia could gain its independence but under the control of America.

In 1948, Indonesian revolutionaries were defeated. Under the Dutch educated elites, the revolutionary forces were disbanded and the Indonesian military elites were replaced with the former KNIL elites. There was a distinction inside the early Indonesian Army between the ‘Professional Army’ and the ‘People’s Army’ (Tentara Rakyat) (Said, 1991). The People’s Army is similar to Mao’s concept of the People’s Liberation Army in China. However, in Indonesia the People’s Army leaders, who fought in East Java, were not elected as the military commanders. They were left without strategic posts (Kecik, 2010), and most of them were considered uneducated compared to former KNIL or PETA. The People’s Army in Indonesia was associated with General Sudirman, a teacher, who collaborated with Tan Malaka. Tan Malaka was the prominent leader of the nationalist-communist group who
attended the second *internationale* in Moscow with his idea of Pan-Islamism against capitalism (McVey, 1961).

Although the Surabaya War was the first and the last war in revolutionary terms in Indonesian modern history, its importance has not been recognized in Indonesian historiography because the revolutionaries, nationalists and communists were defeated in the Indonesian Army politics. In post WWII, Hatta, the first vice president, favoured the former Dutch soldiers in the East Indies, the KNIL soldiers. The socialist leader, Amir Sjarifuddin, and the Stalinist leader, Musso, were killed in December 1948 by the Indonesian Army under KNIL’s elites, and in the following year Tan Malaka, the nationalist-communist leader, was also killed in 1949.

Therefore, when Hatta, the first Indonesian vice president, went to Den Haag for the transfer of authority, Indonesia had no bargaining position other than to follow the terms of Western Empires. Hatta as the leading diplomat at the Round Table Conference in 1949 reassured the U.S. and other Western countries that the Indonesian government would not nationalize their companies, which had existed since the colonial period (McMahon, 1980). The revolutionaries in the nationalist-communist protested at the government’s decision to follow the negotiation path with the Dutch government, which only arranged for transferring political authority and the payment of the Dutch East Indies debt, which was as much as $1.13 billion USD, of which $800 million USD was part of the Dutch military expenses against the Indonesians (Thee, 2010). This is the critical difference between Hatta and Tan Malaka. For Tan Malaka, the transfer of sovereignty should be done with the ‘mass action’ rather than a ‘negotiation’ if the new Indonesia wanted to reach its independence (Malaka, 2000). Asking a colony to pay the colonial debt is a humiliation for the revolutionaries, but for Hatta it was seen as the price of the independence negotiation; it was
Hatta’s consensus for the Dutch who suffered from the Nazi invasion and had to rely on Truman Aid for the reconstruction period.

Hatta’s decision to negotiate and to follow the peaceful transfer of power placed Indonesia under the shadow of U.S. domination. During the Indonesian decolonisation period, U.S. warned the Netherlands not to use the Truman Aid for the military action in Indonesia, and at the same time supported the non-revolutionary leadership in Indonesia. In sum, in 1949, after the transfer of power, the same colonial structure was still in its place, the only difference being that the leaders were Indonesians. The colonial exploitation, which was introduced since the early 19th century by the Dutch liberal party is still there, and it even expanded in the post-Soeharto period.

Indonesian Independence from Western Imperialism

In the next two decades after independence, Indonesia struggled against several challenges: (1) to form an independent state under the Cold War; (2) to form a government for the people in an archipelago, which was colonized by the Dutch; and (3) to finance the new state, the Republic of Indonesia. Between the period of the transfer of authority in 1949 and the first Indonesian general election in 1955, the battle among supporters of different postcolonial projects had taken place. It started with the regional conflict against a unitary state, and developed into different ideological positions such as an Islamic state and also a communist state. Therefore, during this era Indonesia strived to consolidate its territorial boundary, to form the pillars of a unitary state, and had to resist foreign intervention, such as the U.S., which preferred Indonesia to be a federal state.

The first challenge for Indonesian leaders was about how to construct the new state formation whether it was a federal state or unitary state. For Hatta and Sjahrir, they preferred
federal states. For Soekarno and other revolutionaries, all of the areas of the former Dutch East Indies should be a unitary state. Historically, in 1949 when the ‘transfer of authority’ occurred, the state formation of Indonesia was a federal state, known as the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI). After the transfer of power, supporters of a federalist state were considered ‘Dutch puppets’ by the pro unitary state supporters. In 1950, the first Dutch migration to Netherlands was done with almost 60,000 civilians following the liquidation of the federal state (Feith, 1962).

Against the unitary state (Negara Kesatuan), the first new state, which was proclaimed outside the unitary state was the South Moluccan Republic (RMS, Republik Maluku Selatan). The South Mollucan Republic was defeated militarily under the Natsir cabinet (Van Kaam, 1977). In the next few years the U.S. challenged the formation of an Indonesian unitary state by supporting some regional uprisings against the central government in West Sumatra and also North Sulawesi (Kahin, 1997). The dominant role of the Indonesian Army itself is not only the legacy of the Japanese training, but it is also related to the ideology of Indonesia as a unitary state where the presence of the Indonesian Army is vital to ensure its territorial unity.

The next problem for the infant Indonesian Republic was how to organize the new political representation to fit the Indonesian conditions. In its first years Indonesia adopted a liberal democratic system and left in place the foundations of the pillar system (verzuilen), which had been introduced by the Dutch. In the Indonesian context the pillars system after 1945 was composed by different political parties, based on different religious groups, and also some other parties based on nationalist, communist, and socialist groups. The religious groups are still divided as they were in the Netherlands, where the verzuilen system divided the Dutch society into certain pillars. This division could be found in different schools, hospitals, newspapers, and political parties.
In 1955, in the first parliamentary election, the five big parties that received significant votes were the PNI, PKI, and three Islamic parties (Masyumi, NU, and PSII). Other political parties (another Islamic party called Perti; the socialist party; the nationalist party; the Catholic party; and the protestant party) were on the top of the list, but received less than 3 percent of votes. However, since the majority of the population lives in Java Island, this figure did not, and still does not represent the true situation of the Indonesian political landscape since the differences in the political stance by the minority groups on the outer islands is impossible to represent within this particular system, except in Aceh where the local party has been introduced. The social political contour in the general election represents the centralistic element of the Indonesian political system. Here lies one of the old disputes between Soekarno and Hatta. Today, to find the more appropriate political representation is still an Indonesian problem, which is not only complex in terms of ethnicities but also because of the emergence of big cities on different islands (Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Bali).

Table 3.4.: The Big Ten in the 1955 Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of valid votes</th>
<th>Percentage of valid votes</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
<th>No. of seats in provisional parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party)</td>
<td>8,434,653</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjumi (Majelis Sjuro Muslimin)</td>
<td>7,903,886</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU (Nahdlatul Ulama)</td>
<td>6,955,141</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI (Indonesian Communist Party)</td>
<td>6,176,914</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSII (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia)</td>
<td>1,091,160</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkindo (Indonesian Christian Party)</td>
<td>1,003,325</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Katholik (Catholic Party)</td>
<td>770,740</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party)</td>
<td>753,191</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia) 541,306 1.4 4 -
Perti (Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah) 483,014 1.3 4 1

* The table has been modified so that other political parties that received less than 1 percent of the valid vote were not included in this list.


In 1957 or two years after the first Indonesian general election as a parliamentary democracy, Soekarno saw it as a failure for several reasons: for example the new cabinet could not be constituted as the consequence of the conflict between Masjumi (the modern Islam Party) and the PKI; the Islamic leader challenged Sukarno’s secular state; and there was criticism among the military commanders from the outer islands that the unitary state was overcentralized in Java.

Feith (1962) notes that the liberal democratic system was condemned by the supporters of Soekarno as failing to provide leadership for the unitary state. At the same time the question is ‘on what basis would leaders organize and gain their legitimacy to rule?’ To avoid a state of anarchy, President Soekarno proposed *Demokrasi Terpimpin* (*Guided Democracy*) with setting the presidency and the central role on Soekarno. However it is important to note that the translation into English as ‘Guided Democracy’, obscures its meaning in Dutch as ‘planned democracy’ (Jones, 1973), which is closer to *verzuilen* with its pillar system.

The main conflict among the Indonesian new class or among Indonesian first modern elites was about how to form the political representation system, and how to accept different ideologies among political parties. In those years the political ideologies of the political parties in Indonesia were still seen as being totalitarian ideologies. Therefore, there seemed to
be no mechanism for opposing parties to put forward their views; a one-party state or an authoritarian regime seemed to be the only option. This is illustrated by the outcome of the rivalry between Soekarno and Hatta, Indonesia’s first president and its vice president respectively. Hatta was a strong opponent of the communist party since the very early days (Kahin, 1960), while by contrast, Soekarno had the ambition to form three political pillars for modern Indonesia: Nationalist, Communist, and Islam (known as Nasakom: Nasionalis, Agama dan Komunis). Hatta’s resignation as the vice president in 1956 marks two symbolic things: first, it ends the symbolic partnership between the leaders from Java and West Sumatra; second, it also represents the end of a modernising Islamic leader. Other than that Hatta was the symbol of administrator and one of the designers of constitutional democracy, who was also against the centralistic state system (Feith, 1962).

However, the unbalanced development of Java and Madura and the outer islands was one of the main concerns of Hatta who was pessimistic about the idea of state capitalism proposed by PKI and also PNI. The latest data of the period of Dutch East Indies was in 1939 in which the income by industries showed a big gap between Java and the outer islands (Mansvelt & Creutberg, 1979).

On 15th February 1958 the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, PRRI) was proclaimed in Padang, West Sumatra (Feith, 1962, p. 586). Military officers from North Sumatra and South Sulawesi as well as the U.S. government supported this revolutionary government. The elites of this rebellion consisted of several members of the two political parties, Masyumi and also the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI). These two political parties in the later years were considered illegal by Soekarno. Following this political dispute, the Indonesian Army emerged as the new political institution after General Nasution proclaimed
that Indonesia was under emergency conditions (Feith, 1995)). General Nasution also decided to install the military territorial command in Indonesia.

When the workers’ union started to nationalise (nasionalisasi) the Dutch companies in 1957/1958, the leading elites of the Indonesian army took over the role of the top position in former Dutch companies. The rivalry among the elites of the Indonesian Army and PKI continued until 1965, which was a decisive year for both political factions during the peak of Cold War in Indonesia. The involvement of the Indonesian Army to control former Dutch companies is a continuous trend in Indonesia.

When the workers union started to ‘nationalise’ (nasionalisasi) the Dutch companies in 1957/1958, the leading elites of the Indonesian Army took over the top positions in the former Dutch companies. The rivalry among the elites of the Indonesian Army and the revolutionary leaders continued to 1965, as the decisive year. The involvement of the Indonesian Army to control the Dutch companies would be a continuous trend in Indonesia in the post New Order regime, which is considered as the embryo of the oligarch under the New Order regime, which still exists until today (Robison & Hadiz, 2004). The state capitalism under the New Order regime was promoted under the military command.

Out of the elite’s conflict, the Indonesian Army emerged as the new significant modern institution in which its discipline can only be compared to PKI. In 1962 Soekarno criticized the role of the Indonesian Army and he pointed out that ‘the arms in the Army should be like they were on the people, to protect the people, and to strive for the sovereignty of the people and People’s revolution’ (Soekarno, 1962, p.43). He continued to warn that there should not be any contradiction between the interest of the army and the people. His preemptive warning would be proved right several years later. Many regarded Soekarno’s speech
itself as representing the voice of PKI. McVey (1963, p. 165) shows the strength of the Indonesian Army as follows:

The Army, now united under the authority of the central command, possesses a virtual monopoly of force; moreover, it has embedded itself firmly in the economic and political administration of the country. It is increasingly unpopular; but it is unquestionably powerful.

The increasing role of the Indonesian Army in Indonesian politics was influenced by the decline of the Indonesian constitutional democracy in which the representational system was replaced by the dominant role of Soekarno in the presidential system. At the same time the Indonesian Army was functioning as the guardian to ensure the unification of Indonesia. From PKI Soekarno enjoyed the popular support of the most organized political parties, while the other two parties, PNI and NU, were part of the coalition but they lacked discipline and organization and depended on Soekarno’s charisma (McVey, 1963).

In the next few years the rivalry of these two political camps, PKI and the Indonesian Army, became stronger particularly about the succession of Soekarno’s presidency. Without any obvious political representation, the means of succession of the president was uncertain. While PKI received support from CCP (China Communist Party), the Indonesian Army was supported by the U.S., and also other state leaders in the region such as Malaysia, Singapore and also the Philippines who were also engaged in civil war against communist parties in their own countries. Therefore, the internal conflict was always an external one.

To summarize this part of this chapter there are two important points: first, the decision to stop the liberal democracy system in the 1950s was a fatal decision, since it destroyed the chance of solving the conflicts of the political parties and the regional interests in a constitutional way. Secondly, with the end or decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia, the political leadership was centralised to President Soekarno, and the economic
and political administration was controlled by the Indonesian Army. Therefore, I propose that the emergence of a military regime already started since the late 1950s. In the next part of this chapter I will explain about the connection of the ‘internal politics’ of Indonesia with the Cold War, and of how the Indonesian Army collaborates with the Western power as the new regime to command this archipelago within the logic of World Order.

**Cold War and the End of the Soekarno Era**

The Cold War was part of Indonesian internal politics. As an alternative option in international politics since 1955, Indonesia and other leading states attempted to promote a new international political bloc with the Asian-African Conference in 1955. It was an ideal goal, but without a long-term commitment among the participants.

Financially, Indonesia was not an independent state. It received financial aid, from the Soviet Union and also from the United States. From both countries Indonesia received military training and also scholarships for the new elites. In 1965 Soekarno politically moved to the left when he supported the nationalization of Western companies, which had been there since the late 19th century. If for the British the challenge was Soekarno’s confrontation to decolonisation of Malaya and Singapore and also the integration of North Borneo into Greater Malaya, then the real trigger for U.S. hardliners was the nationalization of foreign companies in April 1965 in Indonesia.

Against the British, Soekarno had supported the right of self-determination for North Borneo and challenged the incorporation of North Borneo into the Malaysian Federation. A direct war between Indonesia and Britain happened in Borneo in the 1960s. Indonesia was not only a threat to one dominion in the British Commonwealth, but Indonesia in the Soekarno era was also associated with the communist movement in this region. The Soekarno political
stance against British hegemony in South East Asia, in particular on the creation of Malaya and the expansion of Malaysia to North Borneo, put him as the target of the covert operation of British and Malaysia (Easter, 2004).

Therefore in 1965, both Britain and America were against Soekarno’s leadership. When the predicted political crisis happened in Indonesia they were in favour of supporting the military side, and assisted the Indonesian military to take over power, in particular to eliminate the PKI as the main threat and who were also strong supporters of Soekarno. With more advanced information and communication systems, Indonesia was outclassed by the British and American intelligence officers who also worked with the most hostile elements toward PKI in the Indonesian Army, namely Soeharto’s faction. The rivalry between Lieutenant Colonel Soeharto and General Ahmad Yani is explained in Hario Kecik’s books. Yani was Soeharto’s junior but his military rank was higher since Soeharto was punished with a lowering of rank after some corruption allegations as Diponegoro Military Commander in Central Java. Soeharto’s corruption under his regime became excessive when the state capitalism under the military officers were only responsible to him (Robison, 1978).

Indeed, the military training provided by the U.S. was transformed into a Trojan horse. Soekarno was defeated from within under the covert operation, which was practiced by U.S, British, Malaysian and Philippine intelligence who worked together with the elites in the Indonesian Army who would later emerge as the new regime (Lowe, 1997; Easter, 2004; Roosa, 2006; Simspon, 2008). In 1965 the rivalry between PKI and the Indonesian Army was at its height. The conflict was just a matter of time because the role of the Indonesian Army in politics was not regulated in any political system yet played a central role in politics. The internal conflict in Indonesia heavily corresponded with the international politics, in particular the rivalry between U.S.-British vis a vis Sino-Soviet interests.
How the U.S. Empire’s invisible hand was involved in the Indonesian tragedy is investigated in *Economist with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S-Indonesian Relations 1960–1968* by Bradley R. Simpson (2008) and *Pretext for Mass Murder* by John Roosa (2006). These two American historians have tried to explain the role of the U.S. in the Indonesian Tragedy using the newly declassified documents in the U.S., although the operational report of CIA on Indonesia during these years remains classified (Simpson, 2008). For most of the Indonesian generation today, the historical account of the Indonesian tragedy is a labyrinth without the exit gate but it still has great impact to Indonesian society since this event onward is still considered a state secret. If in Vietnam, the U.S. was involved directly in the former French colony, in Indonesia the main tactics were conducted via its influence over the Indonesian Army.

According to Simpson (2008, p.39), there were two political groups in the U.S., the ‘accommodationist’ ready to work with Soekarno, and ‘the hard-line’ who planned for ‘isolating Soekarno or even seeking his overthrow and replacement by a military regime’. For the U.S., to defeat Indonesia by a covert operation with part of the Indonesian Army was seen as a better choice if it was compared with U.S. strategy in Vietnam, which had a cost for their own citizens. The position of the ‘accommodationist’ in the U.S. was weaker after the death of President Kennedy. U.S. policy on Vietnam itself was acknowledged by Indonesia as a form of neo imperialism and neo colonialism, which brought Indonesian foreign politics to the left. Both Kennedy and Johnson had the same ambition to defend the ‘Free World’ in South East Asia with direct military action.

Regarding the U.S. role in Indonesian, Roosa (2008, p.193) published his finding about the plot before the mass murder as follows:

Before the outbreak of the movement, U.S. officials and their allied Indonesian officers had already written a script that contained the following plot elements: blame
the PKI for a coup attempt, launch general repression of the PKI throughout the country…

Simpson (2008) concludes that the Johnson government was directly involved in the Indonesian mass slaughter that followed. He (Simpson, 2008, p.190) explains as follows:

‘Political officer Robert Martens and CIA analysts in the embassy compiled the lists, using published sources, to create detailed profiles of the PKI and its affiliate organizations from the national leadership down to regional, provincial, and local cadres. Martens handed the list to Tirta Kentjana Adhyatman, an aide to Adam Malik who in turn passed them to Suharto, who used them to track down PKI members for arrest and execution’.

The death of Soekarno also ends the anti-colonial rhetoric and marks the emerging of New Order regime under General Soeharto. If until the last days of the first Indonesian president the discourse of anti-colonialism was his agenda, in the new regime internal colonialism showed its formation through Indonesian military dominance. During the New Order regime the modern state is represented by the presence of a military institution and centralistic bureaucracy. Most of the significant positions in the state administration in the next three decades would be run by military officers, in particular from the Indonesian Army.

The rivalry between the Indonesian Army, PKI, and Soekarno was solved by General Soeharto with the house arrest of Soekarno, and PKI was proclaimed as an illegal political party. The repression toward PKI and other organizations was done by the elimination of PKI members and its sympathizers, and also by establishing ‘the gulag’ in Buru Island, in the Eastern part of Indonesia. To maintain the stigma of PKI as the state enemy for younger generations, the New Order indoctrinated the society using a propaganda film in which PKI was portrayed as a perpetrator behind the assassination of several generals, which was claimed as the PKI’s plot to engender a coup. In this film, the ‘demonizing communist woman’ was also a powerful negative figure against PKI (Wieringa, 2001). More than half amillion people
were killed and 360 concentration camps (Utrecht, 1969) were built in the ‘Indonesian Tragedy’, and since that day, for common people, Indonesian politics has become inaccessible and also a luxury.

In 1970s the Indonesian Army secured its political position and started to dominate Indonesian society since PKI was announced as illegal. If Soekarno depended on the Indonesian Army and PKI to govern the state, in this ‘new’ era Soeharto’s regime controlled other institutions using various intelligence bodies under the Indonesian Army. Indonesia under the New Order regime became a military state. The population was controlled by a different military hierarchy and under constant surveillance by different intelligence bodies. In the following years Indonesia entered the militaristic bureaucratic government and its foreign politics was under the shadow of U.S. foreign policy. The mass murder of PKI members and sympathisers remains as a silent agenda not only for the New Order regime but also for the two big states of the Western countries, Great Britain and the U.S. (Easter, 2004; Roosa, 2008; Simpson, 2008; Lowe, 2009). Different NGOs and individuals do bring this issue to the public arena, but there is no statement to represent state politics from these two countries about the murder of PKI members.

New Order controlled the state using several military bodies, which functioned as the super body organization to control the civilian activities, including different political ideologies, freedom to organize, press content, and also in the level of educational materials (Southwood & Flanagan, 1983). Under the New Order regime there was only a single state narration and it was indoctrinated to students since elementary school. This is the reason why, for the new generation after the 1960s, to visit the Indonesian Tragedy is like entering a labyrinth. The context of this event no longer exists in international politics, but the impact on Indonesian society is still there. Indonesian Tragedy is a long and unsolved political violence,
which is still in the grey area, and this conflict has been a long debate (Wertheim, 1970; Anderson, 1987; Simpson, 2008).

The New Order regime rearranged the Indonesian political system, from ‘Guided Democracy’ to an authoritarian state. The New Order regime created pseudo general elections and the multiparty system was replaced with three political parties: Golkar (Golongan Karya), which is a fusion of military backed organizations, PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) or the fusion of the Islamic parties, and PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia), the fusion of the nationalist parties and Christian parties. However, ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) or Indonesian military as an institution had the advantage because it did not obtain seats in the legislative body through general election, but their seats were directly given. To cut people’s politics at the grassroots level, the New Order regime introduced the ‘floating mass’ policy, so that there was no structure of political parties in villages. The main goal of this policy is to prevent the mobilization of the grassroots people from day-to-day politics. This strategy is against the PKI’s model of organization, which had a strong grassroots connection.

After the era of Soekarno, Indonesia emerged as the leading state that preferred to collaborate with Western states and also established ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations). Indonesia promoted the network among the states in this region and also a peaceful resolution including the end of the confrontation with Malaysia and re-entrance into the United Nations. These foreign political policies are in opposition to Soekarno’s policy, which was against the Western domination in this region and also proposed to form a new international organization to replace the United Nations. Soekarno considered the UN as the instrument of imperialist states and part of the neo-colonialism project.
Indonesian New Order established its regime since 1967 and its economic policy shifted from ‘anti-imperialism’ to ‘developmentalism’ (Schwars, 1967; Caldwell, 1970; Simpson, 2008). Indonesian economic policy during the New Order followed U.S. guidelines (Simpson, 2008), and since these years Indonesia has operated as a semi-colony state. The switch of Indonesian political economy policy to the Imperialist camp was also marked with the high proportion of foreign debt and investment. It was challenged by student mass action in 1974, in particular during the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka. It was the most challenging demonstration, which had been made by the students during the consolidation era of New Order regime, after which Soeharto’s position in this regime became undisputed. In the following years the Indonesian government prohibited students in all Indonesian universities to be actively engaged in different political organizations. The internal consolidation and also repression of the New Order regime in 1974 is connected to its territorial expansion in the South East Asian region by expanding Indonesian territory to East Timor.

**East Timor as the Next New Order War (1975–1999)**

Indonesia under Soekarno never acknowledged its territorial ambition on East Timor, or in Anderson’s term, it is outside the old colonial map as the logos for the state of Indonesia. However, under General Soeharto the emergence of the revolutionaries in East Timor was seen as a threat. The attitude of Soekarno toward the other neighbour territory, which was colonized by another Empire was respecting their right for self-determination. Under the New Order regime, Indonesia’s claim over Papua is endorsed by the U.S. and bartered with the concession for U.S. mining companies in Papua (Simpson, 2008). The Freeport McMoRan
Copper & Gold Inc., which was also led by Henry Kissinger, remains the largest copper and gold mine in the world.

In the middle of the 1970s, Indonesia’s claim over East Timor did not follow the colonial boundary, but it followed the ‘Cold War’ boundary. The Indonesian military regime’s claim over East Timor was based on the new geopolitical map of the Cold War, which was defined by the U.S. and allied forces, and also the Sino-Soviet political position. Its claim over East Timor was only possible during the Cold War period, hence its legitimacy decreased after 1989. Indonesia under the New Order regime acted as the pillar against the communist parties in South East Asia. In the 1960s most of the regimes in power in South East Asia were anti-communist, except Vietnam, which was led by a communist state yet had conflict against China in 1978.

Indonesian political territorial positions with regard to East Timor under two different Presidents represent two different ideological positions in world politics. During the anti-colonial campaign in Soekarno’s era, East Timor was not considered as part of Indonesia because it had a different colonial background and also because Portugal’s political position in world politics against liberalism and communism (Nogueira, 1967) was similar to Soekarno’s foreign politics. In the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia only launched its claim over West Papua but not East Timor (Kahin, 1956), but in Soeharto’s era East Timor was claimed as part of Indonesia with the Cold War as the background, and the anti-communist claim toward Fretilin.

East Timor according to Soekarno (1962) is not part of Indonesia. Subandrio, one of Soekarno’s aides pointed out that ‘we have no claim on Portuguese Timor, nor on North Borneo or on any other territory outside the former Dutch Indies’ (Weatherbee, 1966, p. 690). The issue of Portuguese colonies in Asia was not mentioned in the Bandung Conference in
1955. In fact, in that conference the Portuguese Empire in Asia, such as in Goa, East Timor and Macao, was not on the decolonisation list. Later Goa was incorporated into India in the early 1960s, and Macao was already under China’s shadow occupation in the 1960s.

For Soeharto, it was seen as compulsory to intervene in East Timor, against a new possible communist state. In Chapter V, I explain about different political fronts within Fretilin and how the Marxist Leninist faction dominated it. Indonesian intervention in East Timor was done after Fretilin took control of East Timor, but the preparation to take over East Timor had been done a year before as the anticipation of the possible communist regime in Portugal. It is elaborated further in Chapter IV about the Portuguese political situation during East Timor’s first decolonisation in the 1970s. To have a new communist state in the South East Asian region was seen as unacceptable by Indonesia and its Western allies. This particular view was shared by Soeharto, U.S. President and his secretary, Nixon and Kissinger, and Gough Whitlam, the Australian Prime Minister in the 1970s. It should be noted that the Cold War tension in the Nixon period was already in anti-climax position. The relationship between China and the U.S. was normalized in the Deng Xiao Ping period with Kissinger’s visit and also after detente.

Soeharto’s decision to attack Fretilin and invade East Timor was supported by two other major political parties from East Timor such as UDT and Apodeti, which were known for their anti-communist stance. For the international public, the invasion was labelled as the anti-communist attack. It is clear that the Western Empires do not distinguish between the nationalist and communist, for them the two parts are the same if they are revolutionaries and have the same ideas about sovereignty against foreign power.

Indonesia’s attack on East Timor did resemble the U.S. attack on Vietnam. As the pillar of Western Allies in this region, after the Indonesian Tragedy, the problem of
decolonisation in East Timor and the emergence of the leftist groups were among the main concern for the New Order regime. A comparative analysis to the U.S. political stance toward the left, either communist or social democrat, could be seen in the Chilean case when Pinochet was supported against Allende. The complete Indonesian political stance to take over East Timor can be read on *Integrasi* (1976), which explains how the Indonesian military regime took over East Timor. U.S. and British support of the Indonesian Army was shown by military aid, which was used against Fretilin during the Indonesian war in East Timor (Horta, 1987; Taylor, 1991 & 1999; Hill, 2002; Dunn, 2003). In the later years the issue of East Timor was brought into the United Nations by the East Timor diplomat, Jose Ramos Horta. This was not seen as a serious challenge to Indonesian foreign politics, since in the 1970s and the 1980s Indonesia was supported by its Western allies, Japan, the Middle East countries, and ASEAN countries.

East Timorese resistance used guerrilla tactics to challenge the Indonesian military. Fretilin was different to PKI. The PKI had no arms and military equipment, but Fretilin inherited NATO’s standard military equipment from Portuguese military officers who sympathized with them. Therefore for the first three years, Fretilin was able to respond with direct attacks against the Indonesian military. However after 1978 the military element in Fretilin weakened and in the 1980s it developed clandestine organizations in the form of various student movements in East Timor and also in major Indonesian cities. Internationally, the network of global human rights activists challenged Indonesia’s integration policy and became the backbone for the East Timor independence campaign. In later stages, there were two events that defined the turning points of the East Timor issue in international politics: first, the end of the Cold War; and second, the publication of details of the Santa Cruz Massacre in 1991.
The end of the Cold War, which was defined by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, also ended Indonesian legitimacy over East Timor in international relations. U.S. political positions also shifted following the Gulf War. Indonesia was no longer seen as the U.S. ally in South East Asia, instead it became internationally known as the country with the biggest Muslim population in the world. Thus, Indonesian action to overtake East Timor came to be treated as Indonesian internal politics, rather than as the non-communist political bloc decision, which was done as part of a geopolitical consensus among the U.S. and its allied states.

The Santa Cruz Massacres in Dili, East Timor was the turning point for international support that questions Indonesian legitimacy over East Timor. When Indonesian soldiers shot the East Timorese demonstrators in the Santa Cruz cemetery their notorious action was filmed and shown worldwide. The impact of this visual campaign against Indonesian military violence forced Soeharto to disband the generals who commanded the territorial area, which had been categorized as a restricted military area from 1975 to 1989.

In the Indonesian perspective, the Santa Cruz event shows the deeply contested factions inside the Indonesian army. History had repeated itself in Indonesia’s two presidents, Soekarno and Soeharto. If in the 1950s Soekarno relied on two main forces—the Indonesian Army and PKI—at the end of the 1980s Soeharto relied on the support of the Indonesian Army and the Islamic Organizations. The Santa Cruz event had shown two contested groups inside the Indonesian Army: the nationalists and the Muslims (Rinakit, 2005).

The rise of Islam as the new political identity happens in the post Cold War period and it twists the egalitarian concept of rakyat (people), which is associated with the Marxist ideas, and ummat as an egalitarian term among the Muslims. During the Soekarno and Soeharto regimes, the Indonesian government was centralized in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia in the
western part of Java. What is interesting in the post New Order regime, the political formation in Indonesian politics still resembles the different political ideologies in the 1950s. Other than the political parties, which were allowed to exist by the New Order regime, religious organizations have strong grassroots members.

In Indonesian politics, the elites are still centralized in Jakarta. There are two civilian organizations, which were established during the Dutch period in the 1920s that survived the New Order regime. They are Nadhlatul Ulamma and Muhammadiyah. These two Muslim organizations are based in Java and are popular at the grassroots level. In the later years these two organizations have transformed or developed their political wings into political parties in the post-Soeharto era. The emergence of Islamic organizations with their popular supporters in the late 1980s ended the single domination of the Indonesian Army in Indonesian politics. The other active political organizations that play non-parliamentarian politics are the students in Indonesian universities, in particular in Java Island. These student organizations played a decisive role in the last days of the Soeharto era with their massive demonstrations in major cities of Indonesia (Widjodjo, 1999). Soeharto had to step down from his presidential seat because of the pressure from the economic crisis, and various civilian movements such as the Muslim groups, student movement, human rights activists and different international campaigns, including the free East Timor movement.

The political crisis to transform the power of the second Indonesian president intertwined with the Indonesian financial crisis and triggered a people power movement. The famous one was in Yogyakarta where more than a million people joined the demonstration demanding Soeharto’s resignation, whereas the Indonesian Army seemed to play a neutral role and did not appear publicly in their uniform. If in 1965 the U.S. used the Indonesian Army to control the revolutionaries, in 1998 the U.S. used IMF to influence Indonesian
politics (Rinakit, 2005; Zon, 2004). With high dependency on foreign debt starting in 1967, the Indonesian economy was fragile. Zon (2004) has highlighted the role of IMF to liberalize Indonesian economics since the middle of the 1980s. This is the critique of the PKI in the past that came to fruition after three decades. During the currency crisis the value of the Indonesian Rupiah has dropped 80%, and it has remained in a prolonged economic crisis. Indonesian Rupiah in comparison to the U.S. dollar fell 80%, from IDR 2,432 on 1 July 1997 to IDR 14,800 on 24 January 1998 (Montes, 1999).

This currency crisis left the Indonesian transitional leader, B.J. Habibie with no option, and followed the U.S. pressure using the financial instrument. This is similar to the way practiced by the U.S. towards the Netherlands to postpone the Truman Aid during the Indonesian decolonisation in 1949, and it is practiced again towards Indonesia with the threat that IMF funding would be postponed if the decolonisation of East Timor is not done. In addition, the Australian government demanded Habibie to re-open the East Timor case and hold a referendum. B.J Habibie as the representative of Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals Association (ICMI, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia) then proposed the referendum without consulting the Indonesian Army as the other political force in Indonesia (Rinakit, 2005).

In Indonesian internal politics, Habibie’s decision is seen by the Indonesian Army as a bypass, therefore it got no support from the Indonesian Army and Soeharto. Habibie as the first civilian president with no background in the Indonesian Army was only supported by ICMI and human rights groups. Given that for East Timor and as well as other parts of Indonesia, people were familiar with two different governments: the civilian bureaucracy and the military structure, Habibie’s decision stood for the civilian government’s act, while for East Timor, as a military area operation, the military structure has been the dominant structure.
since the 1970s, and for other Indonesian places since the late 1950s. Although Habibie was appointed by Soeharto, he had no control over the Indonesian Army. This complexity explains the reaction of the Indonesian Army towards the referendum result. As a response to Habibie’s decision, various militia groups were established by the pro-autonomy group who worked together with the Indonesian military in East Timor campaign for pro-autonomy and also part of the pro-integration. The militias groups are Halilintar, Besi Merah Putih, Aitarak, etc.

In September 1999, the result of the referendum, facilitated by the UN, was published and the pro-independence group won it. East Timor militia groups were defeated but with their connection to the Indonesian Army, they showed their reaction in a scorched-earth action burning. Later, most of the East Timorese population had been forcibly moved to West Timor. The split decision between the Indonesian civilian transitional president and the Indonesian Army was revealed by this humanitarian tragedy (Rinakit, 2005).

Eventually the whole affair of second decolonisation of East Timor under Habibie’s presidency left another untouched agenda, which was about the voice of the pro-integration groups. These groups consist of some former members of UDT, Apodeti, other small parties, military officers, civil servants and many others. These groups did not participate during the preparation for referendum under Habibie’s presidency. Habibie’s government did not prepare the ground for the transitional period.

Thus, their reaction over Habibie’s decision was also catastrophic because there was no anticipation for the post-independence period and also there was no option for them on how to solve different political disputes among the East Timor political factions. If in 1975 the Fretilin voice was the abandoned voice, in 1999 the voice of ‘the pro-integration’ or ‘the pro-autonomy’ group, which used to be known as the anti-communist group, was the
abandoned voice and their existence is repressed in Indonesia, and also worldwide, because they are assumed to be the collaborators of the military regime. This dilemma will be explained further in the chapter about the relation between suffering and silence with this political group as the focus of the research in Chapter VII.

**Summary**

The problem of the New Order regime, and in particular how this regime governs Indonesia, is clearly seen in the East Timor problem. The role of the Indonesian Army in the Indonesian New Order is exclusive and it has the impunity against civilians. The central role of the Indonesian Army in Indonesian politics started since 1957 after President Soekarno suspended liberal democracy. It is also related to the nationalization of the assets of foreign companies, which existed since the Dutch colonial period in the 19th century.

The critics on human rights practice in relation to state violence, which is conducted by the New Order regime, is a general criticism that does not only exclusively belong to East Timor. While the New Order regime is regarded as the sovereign power, the excessive violence conducted by its state apparatus has put the legitimacy of the leadership in question in the 1990s. Student activists and humanitarian networks have addressed the criticism toward the authoritarian government. Now the problem for the Republic of Indonesia remains the same, while the Western countries are able to develop ‘biopolitics’ and tolerance as the model of governmentality (Brown, 2006), in Indonesia the social landscape of the people still needs to be understood. Otherwise, the so-called state violence is against the will of the people. Whether they are in big cities in Java or in outer islands such as in Papua it has no difference. The anti-colonial jargon that was intended against foreigners in the 1940s has a different
meaning today. It is now about the problem of internal colonialism in which the military regime also has the central role in capitalist expansion.

In the next chapter I elaborate about how the Indonesian nationalist movement failed to exercise the sovereignty of the people as it was projected in Bandung in 1955. The elite contestation in postcolonial Indonesia in the 1960s is championed by the Indonesian Army, which is backed by the Western powers to secure the position of Western companies in Indonesia during the critical period of the Cold War. It explains how the corporatist scenario of the New Order regime was born and supported by the its Western allies during the Cold War.
'What makes me resentful is the fact that the same colonial system is now operated by the people whose skin is the same brown as mine, whose hair is as black as mine, who speak the same language that I use.'

A victim of New Order regime, quoted by W.F Wertheim (1983, p.i)
The idea of state sovereignty is one of the central ideas in political theory, in particular as the central element of national liberation in the leftist camp. This chapter is about the problem of sovereignty in the aftermath of decolonisation in the former Dutch East Indies after WWII. In this chapter, I would like to present a historical analysis of the process of state formation in Indonesia.

The goal of this chapter is to explain and to interrogate how different sovereign powers practiced their claim for sovereignty in the East Indies/Indonesia. My investigation of the problem of sovereignty in the East Indies begins from the Portuguese *Estado da India* period when Christian divine right was used to justify the colonisation of parts of ‘the uncivilized East Indies’ and continues through to the New Order military Regime in the 1960s. From a ‘Eurocentric’ perspective the making of the East Indies has the same time span as the making of Latin America (Mignolo, 2005).

The focus of this chapter is to show how in specific periods, different regimes of power practiced the idea of sovereignty in the East Indies (or, later, Indonesia). The first period was marked by the presence of the Portuguese in the East Indies. The Portuguese *Estado da India* domination started in the 16th century, but was challenged by the VOC (*Vereenighde Oostindiche Compagnie*) in Malacca in the early 17th century. This was part of the contestation of different European Empires in the East Indies and also the decline of the Roman Catholic Church in Europe following the Reformation movement. In sum, this is the era of sovereignty exercised by corporations that had strong relations with the magistrates of the United Provinces in the Netherlands.

Following this, the Dutch Republic itself became the new colonial state, or the new imperialist state in the East Indies, after the Napoleonic War. It was under the Dutch Republic that the territory of the East Indies was conquered and consolidated, and the racial structure
was applied as a form of social stratification. In practice, the sovereign power in the colony in this period was the white Dutchman since women rarely travelled to the East Indies. The racialised system remained in the East Indies until the advent of the Japanese military Empire in WWII.

The third period follows the end of the imperialist WWII. It was proclaimed on 17 August 1945 and involved the establishment of a ‘new native government’, as a reaction against the racialised system practiced by the Dutch. From 1945 to 1965 Indonesian attempts at state formation were challenged by the former Western Empires. An Indonesian ‘state’, in Gramscian terms, fails to develop and it is replaced by a military regime, which is part of the Cold War scenario implemented by the Western bloc since Soekarno and other third world countries failed to develop an alternative at the Bandung Conference in 1955.

The fourth period, the New Order regime involves full subordination to U.S. domination. This period represents the end of state building attempts and is simply about the consolidation of military rule; the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) was proclaimed as illegal and political participation was restricted under the ‘floating mass system’. This was a system created by the New Order Regime to depoliticize villagers. According to the New Order regime, villagers were ‘unsuitable’ for political activities and therefore the political parties were banned from opening their branches in villages (Dhakidae, 2003). This was a controlling strategy to prevent the people from involving themselves in day-to-day politics. It was clearly against the strategy of the PKI, which had a strong grassroots organization.

Finally, the last period of the sovereignty is the triumph of capitalist sovereignty against nation-state sovereignty. As it argued by Hardt and Negri (2000) the capitalist sovereignty takes over the sovereignty of the nation-state. The currency crisis, which was experienced by Indonesia in 1997/1998 marks the transition into global Empire. The currency
crisis marks the end of Indonesian military corporatism, and the transition into Empire. East Timor independence from Indonesia in 1999 resembles its first decolonisation from Portuguese corporatist state in 1974/1975.

**Hugo Grotius and Free Sea (Mare Liberum)**

Before the coming of the VOC, the major kingdoms in this archipelagowere spread from Aceh to Moluccas and they acted as the sovereign powers in their regions. *Sultan* and *raja* were the common noble designation of leaders of the kingdoms in the East Indies and they acted as sovereign powers. They had the divine right to rule based on religion or local belief. The war among different religious claimants also happened in Java and Sumatra before the coming of European Empires, for example, among the Hindus, Buddhists and also Muslims from South, South East Asia, and East Asia.

Several major kingdoms existed in this archipelago from the 7th century to the 17th century. Sriwijaya, the Buddhist kingdom existed in Palembang, South Sumatra until the 12th century, and Majapahit, the Hindu Kingdom in East Java in the 15th century (Schrieke, 1955; Simbolon, 2007). Although the area of the two grand kingdoms is not exactly the same as that of the Dutch East Indies territory, the vast territory of these two grand kingdoms, Sriwijaya and Majapahit, is often compared to the Indonesian territory of today.

During the first Dutch colonial period, the VOC had come, dominated, and become the decision maker for the new sovereign rulers in the East Indies. The VOC would only support the king who was friendly or agreed to send the annual tribute. The VOC had transformed from being merely a group of traders to becoming the new sovereign power in the East Indies, and they controlled the trading arena. Most kingdoms in the East Indies traded their sovereignty to the VOC when there was dualism in the power struggle. For instance the
VOC took part in the conflict of Mataram Dynasty between Mangkurat II and Trunajaya in the 17th century. Schrieke (1957, p. 274) explains that ‘[t]he Company’s authority expanded further and further, so that all of Java was coming either under its direct control or within its sphere of influence and its monopoly system’.

European domination over the East Indies started with the Portuguese expansion in the 15th century. However, the presence of the Dutch company in the East Indies replaced the main role of the Portuguese and also the English. During this period, the Dutch claimed the legal right to seize a Portuguese ship—a claim outlined in the work of Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist in Holland, in his work *Mare Liberum* (Free Sea), particularly in the eleventh chapter of his work *De Jure Praedae*. It remarks on the presence of VOC in the East Indies, and is a defence of it against Portuguese merchants (Van Ittersum, 2006). VOC replaced the Portuguese *Estado da India* as the dominant power in the region by seizure of the ship, Sta. Catherine. The attack was based on the claim that VOC had the right to seize as a consequence of the killing of VOC members in Macao by Portuguese merchants. The significance of the chapter also concerns the connection between the establishment of VOC as the new trading empire in the East Indies and the survival of the United Provinces, which influenced ‘the close cooperation between Dutch Merchants and magistrates’ (Van Ittersum, 2006, p. 111).

The defeat of Portuguese in Malacca as the strategic port ended its domination in this region in the early 17th century. Thus Portuguese moved from Malacca to the Eastern part of the East Indies. The Portuguese *Estado da India* consisted of several islands: Flores, Solor, and the Timor islands. In the 19th century, part of the Portuguese Empire was only the eastern part of Timor Island, and the other half of the island belonged to the Dutch.
In Europe the rise of the Dutch power in the East Indies was triggered by nationalist and also by religious sentiment. It was marked with Dutch independence against the Spanish Habsburg Dynasty, and the Netherlands as strong base for the Reformation movement, in particular for Calvinistic beliefs. Religious sentiment was part of the idea of the new sovereign power in the Netherlands. For instance, in the early period the Dutch treated the two Catholic southern provinces in Holland also as equivalent to colonies and exploited them economically (Bagley, 1973).

The VOC as the most powerful trading company in the 17th century, compared to companies from other European nations in the East Indies such as the English East Indies and French East Indies, was controlled by 76 bewindhebbers (active partners), and directed by 17 active directors, known as Heeren VII (De Vries & Der Woude, 1997; Furnivall, 1939). The Heeren VII was the sovereign body of the VOC and their decisions were closely based on its trading principles.

For two centuries (1619–1795) the East Indies was under the control of VOC until it collapsed and was proclaimed as a bankrupt company and replaced by the Republic of the United Provinces. In the following years, the Napoleonic war in Europe put the Dutch control over the East Indies in jeopardy, and it came to be administered by the English in the early 19th century.

Historically, VOC did not replace the old polities in the East Indies, but it did monopolise trade in the East Indies using special tractates with the local polities and also military power. The VOC did not only act as a trading company but it also acted as a semi state and controlled the different kingdoms in the East Indies. However, many parts of the East Indies remained untouched, including Papua, which was only penetrated by the Dutch in the middle of the 20th century (Bagley, 1973).
The possession and the special right of the VOC was not only limited to trade or monopoly on specific commodities, but it was also extended to land and turning other human beings into commodities. The right to sell others was taken by the company. This does not mean that the old polities in the East Indies had no slaves, but the difference is the old polities did not treat slaves as commodities, but as a social stratum. VOC as the sovereign power had the right to sell others and impose the distinction between human as human being, and human as commodity. The slave trade in the East Indies was banned in the middle of the 19th century, but in fact the practice continued until the early 20th century.

The Dutch East Indies in the Post Napoleonic Period

It is intriguing that by the end of the Napoleonic War, the Dutch expansion into the East Indies became the state agenda or part of the nationalistic movement of the Republic of United Provinces. Its territorial Empire was extended and the traditional kingdoms in the East Indies were conquered or placed within limited sovereignty, also known as indirect rule, which is similar to what was done by the British Governor in India. While under the Dutch, the local polities were incorporated into the juridical law of Dutch colonial state, in Indonesian postcolonial state the different polities are the object to conquer. There are only two ‘special territories’ under Indonesian jurisdiction, the Aceh and the Yogyakarta. Both provinces have a special status, but they also have become the target for further modernization or another kind of modernization.

Java Island was the most populated, and Majapahit was one of the two strongest kingdoms that existed in Java. Its domination toward the population on other islands happened for centuries. Thus, the conquering of the Javanese prince in the Java War (1825–1830) marked the surrender of the Javanese ruler to the European sovereignty in total. Some
kingdoms (*Keraton*) in Java then continued to operate within limited sovereignty or indirect rule.

In the post Napoleonic period, in order to finance the rebuilding of Netherlands, people in the East Indies, in particular Java as the most populated island, were forced to run a cultivation system (*tanam paska*) in which farmers had no right to plant other than valuable agricultural commodities, and the colonial government had the single right to distribute them. If VOC had a monopoly over the trading process, the Dutch state with its cultivation system established a monopoly over production.

The main difference on the practice of colonialism between VOC and the Republic is that under VOC the colonial target was mainly to secure trading advantage (Furnivall, 1939), while the Republic was concerned to pacify different sovereignties and consolidate them as part of its Empire territory. The penetration of modern bureaucracy in the East Indies depended on the economic interest of the Dutch Empire.

Under the constitutional monarchy, the Dutch system of political representation in the middle of the 19th century was divided into six political blocs, or pillars (*verzuiling*) and they were not only functioned as political pillars, but also as a system for socialisation (Bagley 1973). In that sense, the state presence does not dissolve different communities’ groups into a single state community.
Table 4.1: Division of Parliamentary Seats in 1897 and 1963 (Second Chamber)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1897 (%)</th>
<th>1963 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Total Non-confessional</em></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholics</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Revolutionary Party</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Historical Union</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Total Confessional</em></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of seats</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>150</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In this way, it accommodated rivalry among different religious groups in the Netherlands, but at the same time it legally excluded others under the ‘democratic system’. Under the Dutch Empire, this system was carried to the East Indies, which was governed under a strict, pillarised racial structure. The racial stratification was divided in three levels: European, Native, and Foreign Oriental (Chinese and also Arab). Table 4.1 above shows how the Dutch managed their political system in the late 19th century. This could be compared with Table 4.2. The significant difference is that the Dutch applied different standards in the metropolis and in the colony.

Table 4.2: Distribution of Population by Racial Groups in the Dutch East Indies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Groups</th>
<th>Population in 1920</th>
<th>Population in 1930</th>
<th>Population in 1930 in per cent of that of 1920</th>
<th>Percentage of females per 1000 males</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>43,304,620</td>
<td>59,143,775</td>
<td>122.4</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,020.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

89
Europeans 169,708 242,372 142.8 0.3 0.4 786.2 878.5
Chinese 809,647 152.4 1.6 2.0 562.0 646.2
Other 66,859 166.1 0.1 0.2 701.7 812.3
Asiatics 111,022
Total 49,350,834 60,371,025 123.1 100 100 1,009.7 1,019.1


The problem of inequality during the Dutch colonial period was not only related to political participation based on apartheid system but it was also related to economic gap among racial groups. Table 4.3 below shows the ‘income gap’ among three different racial categories. In 1930, 69% (40,890,244) of the native population lived on the two main islands, Java and Madura (van Den Bosch, 1942:14). The general category for the colonial government in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century was ‘Java and Outer Islands’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indonesian</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Foreign Asiatic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Changing Economy in Indonesia* (Vol.5, National Income), 1979: 75

In order to govern its subjects, the modern administrative system needs to know them. Therefore, in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the study of native people in colonies was intensified; this study is known as ‘indology’ in Leiden. This approach paid practical dividends when the Leiden trained Islamologist, Snouck Hugronje, gave crucial advice to Dutch forces in their war of conduct against Aceh, whose population was largely Muslim, during the Aceh War. Islamic opposition against Christian Dutch colonial ambitions was also a factor in the Padri War against the Dutch in West Sumatra in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.
Introducing the European educational system into the East Indies brought modernisation to the East Indies. Access to the educational system was determined by racial colour and social status. The selected natives who were allowed to join the European educational system came from aristocratic families. From the early 20th century, the governance of the East Indies was transferred from the Dutch parliament, to the Governor General of the East Indies. In the early 20th century a colonial government was formed in the East Indies with the Dutch as the sovereign ruler.

The protest of the PKI in 1926 did not become an armed social revolution as it was later to do in China. The rebellion in Indonesia was mostly a movement among the educated elites in schools through the writing of pamphlets and also through discussion groups, but it never became concentrated into a massive social rebellion against Dutch colonialism or in a military organization against the Dutch colonial power. A military strategy was never used by early Indonesian educated elites against Dutch colonialism. The function of military elements as the coercive instrument to defend the right of the people was not known among these early leaders. Several periods of exile were experienced by the educated leaders but there was never any war to defend the right of emancipation against the Dutch colonial administration led by any educated elites, except from members of the PKI. The armed resistance from the PKI marked the start of the struggle against the colonial power in 1928.

**WWII, the Japanese Empire and the End of the Dutch Empire in the East Indies**

The Indonesian proclamation of independence was the result of the imperialist war, rather than the result of a continuing resistance against colonial practice. Therefore, symbolically, the Japanese Empire ended Dutch colonialism, but what would have happened to the population in the East Indies Archipelago without that external intervention is unknown.
During the interregnum period, after the collapse of Japan, from American commando occupation to British authority, on 17 August 1945, Indonesian leaders, Soekarno and Hatta, proclaimed independence over the territory from Jakarta/Batavia.

For two decades, Soekarno struggled to defend the new native government but failed to build an Indonesian state. The Dutch were against Indonesian independence and sought to regain the East Indies. However, in the new international setting in which Dutch requirements for Marshall Aid to build up the country after Germany’s occupation, the Dutch government was also under American influence. The sovereignty of the new Indonesian government became dependent on the U.S.

After WWII, the imperialist states learned that territorial occupation, which they had practiced for several centuries had met its end in WWII and that the colonial model would need to be transformed. Colonialism is no longer seen as a matter of the imposition of imperialist sovereignty on the colonial subjects, but can manifest itself in different controls of power, such as the combination of economic domination and disciplinary control.

Following WWII, it became increasingly clear that the joint pressures of imperial political and economic exhaustion, U.S. political hegemony and resistance to imperial rule from below, were to lead to progressive decolonisation. Empires that had lasted for centuries were due to collapse within a very short period of 20 years, leaving a mixture of legacies.

The construction of the world order develops during the Cold War period in which market penetration is achieved without taking up the position of direct sovereign power. I argue that, for the U.S. and other European Empires, the nationalist, communist or other revolutionary groups in former European Empires are lumped together as similar and regarded as the enemy if they are opposed to Western economic domination. Foreign corporations established in the colonial period were to be defended and controlled by the
former European powers. As a matter of fact, while challenging the reestablishment of territorially-based European Empires in Asia, the U.S. also promoted new international arrangements to promote its economic interests. It proposed the Philippines model as the model of ‘decolonisation with U.S. assistance’. McMahon (1981, p.61) points out that:

The very concept of total independence for colonial territories was still regarded as a radical idea; most American policy makers, while eager to effect a fundamental change in the traditional colonial system, simply did not believe that the underdeveloped world was prepared to accept the responsibilities and burdens that the self-rule would inevitably bring.

What is implied by the statement that the underdeveloped were not ready to accept this kind of responsibility, is that there is no assurance that the U.S. enterprises would not be nationalised in postcolonial Indonesia. The significance of Indonesia for the U.S. during WWII was related to its position as the source for natural resources and also as a potential market for American goods—and this continued into the Cold War period, when the principal enemies were seen as Communist China, the USSR, and the spread of communism through South East Asia, which would have serious economic as well political implications for the U.S. The debate on sovereignty among Indonesia’s early leaders could be divided into two blocs. The first group led by Sjahrir, Soekarno and Hatta preferred negotiation for independence. Sjahrir (Anderson, 2006, p. 316) points out that they sought to ‘negotiate on the basis of recognition of 100 per cent merdeka’ (freedom). Freedom without sovereignty would only be a transfer of government.

The other bloc led by Tan Malaka, a former Comintern officer, argued that ‘the state should be based on the acknowledgement of 100 per cent sovereignty and all foreign troops should leave the shores and waters of Indonesia’ (Anderson, 2006, p.290). The dispute between these two political camps was also represented in the formation of the Indonesian Army. The former KNIL, which was acknowledged by the first educated elites, claimed that
laskar, or spontaneous militia groups, would be incompetent for the new national army. Therefore, the first target for the recruitment of the top leader came from the former KNIL members or the Dutch Colonial troops. It was this ‘new national army’ that was used to eliminate the PKI and the revolutionaries in 1948.

The Indonesian communist party, the prime supporter of territorial sovereignty for the new state, lost in the Indonesian civil war in 1948, and the PKI was discredited as was declared illegal. Ironically, most of the communist leaders who were killed in 1948 and 1949 were the underground guerrillas during two colonial periods: against the Dutch and Japanese occupation. They had also anticipated the new international setting. However, the advantage gained by other leaders working under the Japanese war propaganda was that they became known for their anti-colonial oratory against the Dutch, using the Japanese propaganda machine, while the underground communists were unknown to the popular masses. Indeed, Indonesian nationalism was popularised hand in hand with the Japanese war campaign, which resembled Nazi war propaganda. With the absence of the PKI, the transfer of authority from the Dutch government to the Indonesian government followed the establishment of a new world order. The vital role of the U.S. during the transition of power from other European colonial powers in South East Asia marked the emerging of the new empire (Southwood & Flanagan, 1983; McMahon, 1999), or the new model of empire, which does not resemble the emergence of European Empires.

Tan Malaka opposed the decision of the early Indonesian government to negotiate under U.S. military supremacy. The weakness of early Indonesian leaders in power is pointed out by Lev (1985, p. 57) that ‘nothing more clearly indicates the lack of a new ideology of state, society, and economy, or the absence of a consensus on one, than that the substantive law of post-1945 Indonesia remained almost exactly the same as it was in 1941’. Indeed, there
was no radical element among Indonesia leaders who were able to form and challenge the new colonialist formation.

I argue here that for the Indonesian early popular leaders, or the new class, the notion of colonialism is limited to the racialised apartheid system, which had been the main element of Dutch colonialism, with no awareness of the significance of a broader idea of imperialism. In this context, Indonesian nationalism itself became reduced to merely the reaction against the Dutch apartheid system without any awareness that the emerging new state after WWII would be part of a new capitalist international system, dominated by the U.S. and the former Western Empires (Giddens, 1985; Anderson, 2006). U.S. policy in this period was ‘to defend the free world’ and it did so by challenging or sometimes offering financial, economic and/or military support to guarantee anti-communist regime, to the new independent governments and also to other weaker European Empires.

The U.S. reaction over an emerging Indonesian political role in the international context gave rise to U.S. involvement to challenge the unitary state by supporting the regional rebellion in South Sulawesi and West Sumatra in 1950s (Kahin & Kahin, 1995). Roosa (2008) argues that the separatist movement against the Indonesian unitary state was also related to U.S. designs to exclude Java from other outer islands, since Dulles, the Secretary of the State of U.S., claimed that Java was communist based (Roosa, 2008). With the support of different agencies based in the U.S., it also sought to win over the Indonesian new class in the latter years with scholarships. This would have real consequences during the New Order regime. Southwood and Flanagan (1983, p.30) conclude that ‘Indonesia achieved (American-backed) independence’ from Dutch colonial domination only to become increasingly subordinated to American corporate and state power after 1950’. Roosa (2008) also points out that the
U.S. preparation against the PKI started at the end of the 1950s by developing close ties with Indonesian Army generals.

To challenge the new international settlement, Indonesia, as well as other new states, responded by proposing a different settlement in 1955 at the Asian-African Conference. According to Kahin (1956) the spirit of anti-colonial racism itself dominated that conference, and it was not a surprise since racial domination was still a normative element in Western countries until the end of the 1960s. However, the Asian-African Conference, which China also attended, failed to offer a new international setting, and the participants of the conference had no long-term commitment, to disturb U.S. hegemony.

**Indonesian Nationalism: Post Dutch Apartheid System, and the Apex of the Cold War**

The problem of any new state is not only to ensure state sovereignty from foreign intervention, but also to find a new representation system for the new state. Indeed, the early Indonesian new class in the 1950s failed to develop a new political representation system, which might accommodate various parties with diverse ideological backgrounds, and with different geographical interests. As the consequence of the failure, Soekarno as the new Indonesian president dissolved the parliamentary system and proclaimed *demokrasi terpimpin* (Led Democracy, or, as it is usually translated, ‘guided democracy’). In the same year an Indonesian Army general had proposed a new policy, called the ‘middle way’ (*Jalan Tengah*). With this policy, the Indonesian Army installed the military structure side by side with the civilian bureaucracy (Said, 1991).

The contradictory character of these developments is they widened the dissatisfaction of people, who already complained about the Jakarta-based centralised system. It was also seen as a new form of domination, or internal colonialism, inside the unitary system of the
Republic of Indonesia. The idea of federalist states, which had been proposed earlier by the Dutch, as part of the idea for a Dutch Commonwealth was not accepted by early leaders since it was seen as a new alternative instrument for securing Dutch control, but the unitary system did not give the right balance for the people in the archipelago either. During the period of the consolidation of the Indonesian unitary state, the U.S. government supported the rival unitary state, in particular the territorial commander of the Indonesian army in the regions as part of the Cold War politics to divide this new state. Since the 1950s, the issue of central government domination over the outer islands sparked the separatist conflict to challenge the idea of the unitary state (Feith, 1962) in which the role of the Indonesian Army becomes a vital element for the integrative revolution (Geertz, 1973). The Indonesian military itself, and in particular the Indonesian Army, was also targeted for infiltration by the two foreign countries, the USSR and the U.S., during the Cold War.

The centralistic role of leadership is also shown by the constitution of guided democracy, since it had no managerial organization and placed Soekarno as the singular sovereign power. Revisiting the Indonesian tragedy in 1965 has reminded us that deep inside the Indonesian political culture, the early Indonesian elites were unable to settle most of the political tensions through peaceful agreement. Since the early years, modern Indonesian elites were unable to reach a consensus. Conflict at the level of elites had a tremendous effect at the grassroots level, as well as reinforcing the paternalistic style of Indonesian society. The ‘guided democracy’ with its central role in the President’s hands showed its ultimate weakness because state power became personalized. The racial stratification, which had been implemented by the Dutch in the East Indies, was reversed with the construction of Indonesian citizenship in 1957–1958. During these years the debate about who was ‘Indonesian’ and who was not, became central. This debate was triggered by the
nationalisation or *Indonesianisasi* of the Dutch companies in 1957–1958 when the Dutch refused to cede West Papua to Indonesia (Kerkhof, 2005). This was a second exclusion in relation to the construction of Indonesian citizenship following the exclusion of Dutch settlers in 1950. The Europeans, including the *Indos* who were born in the East Indies, and also the Chinese, were sent to a ‘home’, which most of them had never seen. In Java and South Sulawesi the racial hatred against the Chinese community is still a threat. Therefore citizenship in Indonesia is strongly correlated with both property rights, and sovereignty with racial origin.

In response, the U.S. intensified its intervention in particular with its military assistance and also scholarship for the new class in Indonesia. Modernisation by militarisation was already part of the U.S. and also the USSR program by the late 1950s. At the same time, the Indonesian military was also sent to Russia as a symbol of non partisanship in the rivalry between the two political blocs. In South East Asia, the formation of SEATO (the South East Asian Treaty Organization) in 1957 was done as part of a countering communist subversion strategy. It consisted of the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, France, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand. It was a global anti-communist treaty organization that operated in South East Asia, and was a South East Asian equivalent of NATO in Europe, since the reference of the communist movement was not limited to Asian context, but also covered Eastern Europe. To counter the global communist campaign in the former Western Empires, the U.S. introduced ‘modernization as ideology’, whereby states were seen as being on a linear development strategy leading, eventually, to a society mirroring the consumption patterns and democracy of Western states (Simpson, 2008). According to Simpson (2008) the connection of the U.S. to the Indonesian Army was started earlier in 1948 against the PKI.
Internally, the emergence of new states in the former European colonies as the normative agenda in the new global world was not only hostile to the former coloniser, but also to the non modern communities, and to other political factions among the new class. In the Indonesian case the competition among the new class was championed by a faction inside the Indonesian Army supported by the Western states. As a matter of fact, the new class contest for power in Indonesia corresponded directly to the Cold War politics. Following the end of WWII, Lenin’s account (Lenin, 1975, p. 106) of Imperialism—in particular, the idea of a ‘territorial division among the biggest capitalist powers’—started to lose its relevance since the decolonisation process was internationally acknowledged by all Empires. However, for the U.S. and other Western countries, the corporate monopoly, which was the legacy of the old Empires, becomes irrelevant to the colonial problem. In regards to this idea, Hardt and Negri’s (2000) analysis on the emergence of imperial sovereignty has distinguished two notions: ‘imperialist’ and ‘imperial’. The new American policy after 1945 showed the difference, particularly in how the U.S. treated the Philippines by giving them independence, to let the natives self-govern, but with no real sovereignty over their land or control over the means of production. In South East Asia the military regime as the pillar against the communist party is not only an Indonesian case, but it is also similar to the experience of the Philippines, which had been under American colonialism since the end of the 19th century based on the Paris Treaty (Guererro, 1970).

The ‘Indonesian Tragedy’ Prefigured

With the rivalry between the Indonesian Army and the PKI, McVey notes that there was a ‘spectre of a second Shanghai’ haunting Indonesian politics. Her observation is important (McVey, 1963, p. 188):
The PKI’s position depends very much on the protection of one man; he may be removed by a coup, by retirement, by death. In a post-Sukarno era—and Indonesian political calculations center increasingly on such a period—would a modus Vivendi between the Army and the PKI be a possible? The military, which would undoubtedly be the major force in a post-Sukarno situation might not wish to push the issue immediately, for a move to destroy the Party might bring civil war and would surely entail serious unrest in Java.

This rumour above was already common knowledge in 1963, but its realization was achieved two years later in 1965. While giving a clear account of the possibility of such tragedy, McVey’s political analysis does not count the different views of political economic policy between these two potential political groups. In particular, they had different points of view in relation to decolonisation as an emancipative project. The PKI was strongly committed to the communist doctrine, whilst the Indonesian Army was influenced by the Japanese spirit as part of their training in WWII. These groups had very different attitudes to Western companies, which had been present since the 19th century.

Historically, the year 1965 is known as the year of the ‘Indonesian Tragedy’. For the PKI this year was the point of decision as to whether the process of socialist revolution could be continued or not after a bourgeois-democratic revolution was completed in the 1940s. Was it possible for the PKI to implement the Marx-Leninist (Lenin, 1976, p.9) doctrine on a state that ‘is a product and manifestation of the irreconcilability of class contradictions’?

At the same time, the year 1965 marks the end of the process of nationalization of Western companies in Indonesia, which was known as part of the Berdikari (Berdiri di atas kaki sendiri, or self resilience) program. With the coup of Soeharto (Roosa, 2008), PKI and Soekarno’s power ended.

This idea of class emancipation within Indonesia vanished after 1965 when the Indonesian Army under General Soeharto persecuted the communist and also nationalist supporters. During the Cold War, the West made no clear distinction between these two
elements as long as both of them were anti-communist and pro-Western. General Soeharto, supported by the Indonesian Army, rose to presidential power with U.S. and British assistance (Easter, 2004; Roosa, 2008; Simpson, 2008; Lowe, 2009). As the new president, Soeharto practiced limited sovereignty over the Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian Army was the core power with real control over the region, but at the same time it could not and cannot challenge the U.S. policy within the state or region when it acted to protect Western companies whose origins dated back to the Dutch colonial period.

At the international level, there are clear political reasons why Soekarno was attacked by U.S. and British intelligence. As explained in the previous chapter, Soekarno as an Indonesian president was against British decolonisation that sought to incorporate North Borneo into Greater Malaysia. Second, he challenged the West by nationalising all Western corporations in Indonesia. Third, Soekarno developed an alliance with China under Mao Tse Tung, which was part of the communist bloc. Fourth, Soekarno was critical of the idea of the United Nations and proposed a new international system. Fifth, Indonesia was the leading country in South East Asia, and the Western bloc, following the domino theory, could not tolerate South East Asian countries turning into communist states. In the regional context, for Indonesia, the challenge of global imperialism in the 1960s in South East Asia along with the rise of nationalist and communist groups was directed to Anglo-American restrictions on sovereignty. In sum, Soekarno did challenge the U.S. hegemony following WWII.

The year 1965 also marks the end of the process of the state sovereignty in the postcolonial period, and the coming of a new world order. Sukarno represents the Hegelian idea of the state, but his goal is eliminated with the victory of the Indonesian Army when the new regime took over power from 1965.
The PKI was powerless since it had no control over the main territorial military force of the Indonesian Army. But, the party weakness was not only limited to the absence of coercive forces, but also on its inability to connect the concept of Marxist-Leninist ideas with Indonesian terrain, as had been done by Mao Tse Tung who incorporated the Chinese culture in his Communist revolution. Indeed, the issue of sovereignty was not only about sovereignty over territory but over the production of knowledge (Foucault, 1980; De Sousa Santos, 2007). Mao was not only following the doctrine but he also produced the knowledge based on their condition; for instance he did not eliminate Buddhism and its followers, rather he corrected the exploitative element, which was practiced by the Buddhist monks (See Welch, 1972).

In Indonesia the PKI was also easily labelled as anti-religious. While in China and also in Latin America, the Marxist doctrine was not regarded as a religion but as a scientific method of analysis, in Indonesia it was placed as if it were a religious doctrine in competition with others. Tan Malaka did bring this question to the Second Internationale but there was no final answer on this matter (See McVey, 1961). Lenin’s view that it is necessary to combat Pan Islamism remained as the general doctrine among the communists. I argue that the PKI’s inability to bring the Marxist-Leninist ideas forward as a method of analysis was seen as a weakness. I argue that this was used to justify the communist massacres in 1965. Furthermore, in the Indonesian Tragedy it was not only Soeharto’s faction in the Indonesian Army that perpetrated massacres of the PKI members; but both religious leaders and followers were conditioned as the enemy of PKI, since the PKI had been labelled as atheist.

As a national leader Soekarno had no clear statement in answer to this contradiction. Instead he sought to unify three political factions known as Nasakom (Nasionalis, Agama, dan Komunis or Nationalist, Religious and Communist) without elaborating their substances in order to see the material differences that existed among them. Various attempts to regain
grassroots support based on local culture while challenging the international structure of exploitation remained in place from the era of Haji Misbach (Shiraishi, 1990) in the 1920s.

Another crucial factor in the defeat of Soekarno’s leadership is that there was no social map to distinguish friend or enemy, as Mao Tse-Tung (1980) created for China, when the Cold War was in its peak in Indonesia. I argue that Soekarno preferred the ideas of harmony among different elements in society, rather than being adamant on principal contradictions, such as between the interest of landowners and peasants, foreigners and natives, or the Chinese communists as in the case of China, as it was shown by Mao.

The crucial factor related to the decline of Soekarno’s legitimacy is related to the economic conditions of Indonesia. While the nationalisation of Western companies continued from 1963 to 1965, the rate of inflation in Indonesia reached 600%. Within the self-resilience policy, Refdern (2010, p. 576) points out:

By essentially withdrawing from the world, Indonesia could afford to confiscate foreign companies without compensation. However, the price for this disengagement was essentially dysfunctional by 1965-66.

On the other hand, the resources to support the military operation in 1965 were obtained from the Western corporations explained in the previous chapter, in particular from the U.S.-based companies. Soeharto’s faction in the Indonesian Army as the new sovereign power was able to persecute the PKI members and the sympathisers on a large scale with the support of its military technological advantage in communication and also transportation. What is clear from this era is the crisis of capitalism following the end of colonialism in Indonesia and the loss of the supporters of the ‘self-resilience project’.

In general the reaction of the U.S. toward the global communist threat should not only place it within the general interstate system but it can also be traced to how the U.S. persecuted its own citizens in the early and mid 20th century for alleged communist
sympathies. While reading different historical documents related to the U.S. decision to persecute supporters of the communist movement at the global level, I find that this particular tendency did not originate in the Korean War, even the U.S. reaction to the communist triumph in China in 1949 originates as early as the Bolshevik revolution. In fact, the 1920s and 1930s saw hostility towards socialist and communist movement within the U.S.

To conclude this part of the chapter, I would like to summarize the main argument. The end of Soekarno’s government and the coming of the Soeharto military regime marked the failure of the sovereign state formation in Indonesia. The process to distinguish between ‘government’ and ‘state’ is defined by Gramsci (1971, p. 262-263) as follows:

We are still on the terrain of the identification of State and government—and identification which is precisely a representation of the economic corporate form, in other words of the confusion between civil society and political society. For it should be remarked that the general notion of State includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that State= political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion).

Following Gramsci’s definition, there is no State in Indonesia even today. The New Order regime is only a military government and, as such, merely a continuation of the former Dutch KNIL military regime and also shows the influence of Japanese military training in WWII, with its anti apartheid character. At the same time it has no awareness of imperialism and also has no conception on the new colonialism or the new imperialism as was developed by Soekarno. In Indonesia, and some other South American states, the U.S. supported and used the military regime to control the native population as was done by the VOC using indirect rule to control the people of the East Indies. The coercive element is hijacked by the military regime, which works within the hegemony of the American Empire.
New Order Limited Sovereignty and Crony Capitalism

The coercive element of the New Order regime was used to police the people. How the New Order regime organized different institutions to eliminate the communist and nationalist groups in Indonesia, however, resembles several features in the organization of a Communist state. First, the position of the Indonesian Army is as the ‘vanguard element’ in the New Order regime with total control over the population. Second, the state party in the Indonesian context is Golkar (Golongan Karya). Third, the majority of the population was made apolitical and had no access to the political institutions, but was, rather, identified as massa mengambang (floating mass) (Dhakidae, 2003).

In relation to the knowledge sovereignty, the New Order regime as the new sovereign power in Indonesia for two decades concentrated on ‘modernisation’, which is understood as development. The model of capitalism, which is developed by the New Order regime is, ultimately, crony capitalism. The new economic model in Indonesia is mainly designed by the new educated elites who were and are trained in the U.S. and this pattern is still continued. Therefore, the idea of developmentalism, or the concept of development, as the ideology was introduced by the U.S during the Cold War in the late 1950s.

Regarding this matter, Mignolo (2005, p. 11) points out that ‘it is not modernity that will overcome coloniality, because it is precisely modernity that needs and produces coloniality’. By claiming that U.S. is superior to any other state, in particular the other new states after WWII, the U.S. has positioned itself as the superior power with the right to teach others, including how to live on their own lands. This is what Mignolo coined as a new form of ‘land appropriation’, which is not something new but has a very old character starting from the European colonialism in the last 500 years.
I argue that what has been practiced by the U.S. through the New Order regime is the combination between the VOC’s indirect rule and what Gramsci called Fordism through the military regime. The birth of the New Order regime can be traced as far back as the birth of the KNIL. To police the native population in the Netherlands East Indies the Dutch had recruited native soldiers into KNIL. Therefore, in the East Indies, the first modern and trained subjects were the KNIL members, and modernisation in the military sector was further enforced during the presence of the Japanese. Thus, I argue, since the very beginning, the Indonesian military, which was transformed from KNIL to TNI had no roots among the people. It is still part of the colonial state, in clear contrast to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. The military regime and the corporative state model were the first choice of the Western countries, since it not only helps the colonizer to access the natural resources of the former colonies but also maintains effective control of the population. The similar corporatist state practiced by the New Order regime was imported from the similar model in Portugal, which was practiced by Salazar’s Estado Novo. This connection is part of the contribution of the Catholic elite to Indonesian politics within the New Order regime. This particular connection is important to the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. It was a transfer from one corporatist state to another corporatist state.

Benedict Anderson (1983, p. 478) claims that ‘New Order is best understood as the resurrection of the state and its triumph vis-a-vis society and nation’. His definition of the state itself is ‘an institution, of the same species as the Church, the university, and the modern corporation’. Robison and Hadiz (2004) agree with Anderson’s analysis in that the New Order regime was a continuation of the old state, without defining what kind of ‘institution’ that state is. However, this view is problematic in relation to organisations such as the mafia, which is also an institution, but is not a state. In Gramscian terms, there is an intermediate
category of institution comprising a combination of political society and civil society (Gramsci, 1971). Therefore, the expansion of the New Order military regime itself to East Timor does not represent ‘the state’, since there was no ‘civil society’ or ‘political society’ that supported the war in East Timor, but it was a military incursion, which represented the Western anti-communist policy in the region. The mobilisation of civilians in the border area to attack Fretilin in 1975 was part of a campaign of military propaganda and it was within the context of the formation of the world order. This general assumption about ‘the state’, I argue, contributes to false assumptions about Indonesia in general by the global public. The distinctive nature of Indonesian historiography should be recognized, otherwise this is just a cynical claim made by an intellectual who is taking a privileged position from the heart of an Empire. As a comparison, a Gramscian analysis on postcolonial state is presented by Chatterjee (1986) on India.

The coercive element in the military regime was used not only to colonize the people of East Timor, but also the people of Indonesia. While in international politics the New Order regime supported the Western bloc, in internal economics New Order followed the World Bank design to follow ‘the trickle down effect’ model, which favoured oligarchal interests and also those of multinational companies. Under the New Order regime in the early period the oligarchs or the conglomerates or taipan in Indonesia mainly came from the second layers of the former Dutch racial stratification. Although, in the latter years the identities of oligarchs has been varied, the Chinese group is still the dominant oligarch.

The Indonesian military was used to police the people who complained about the so-called development project. In this particular part, following the critics on single modernity, which is presented by Mignolo (2005) and Santos (2007), the Indonesian military government has a similar attitude to the indigenous people in the Indonesian archipelago. Regarding
emancipative ideas, following the new liberal design, the Indonesian military regime has neither political representation nor a program of economic equality. The Indonesian military regime was given full foreign support during the period of the Cold War.

The Indonesian claim on East Timor itself is very weak since its legitimacy was part of the cold war policy and it was only maintained by the Soeharto military regime, so that with the end of the New Order there was no legitimacy to the control of East Timor inside Indonesia. This follows the logic of the New Order as part of the American mercenary action. In sum, the New Order regime was not only a failed government, but it was also a mercenary government. The foreign interventions in the post WWII period into Indonesian politics secured the mercenary government for three decades, but it placed the population as the prisoners.

Without transforming the Indonesian military element through an emancipative agenda, it is impossible to see that the military oppression of the people by the Indonesian army toward the people in this archipelago in the name of a development project, or various different species of colonialism will be ended. Indeed, while WWII ended the imperialist agenda of territorial expansion, it gave birth to a different kind of sovereignty—the sovereignty of an American Empire, which is not necessarily about direct colonialism. Instead we see the same old VOC practice in which indirect rule replaces the old-style colonialism and produces the triumph of capitalist sovereignty.

**Empire/Indonesia**

While claiming to defend Indonesian sovereignty and using patriotic jargon, Indonesian military elites were and are the key instigators of ‘internal colonialism’ and the continuation of free market policy in Indonesia. The Indonesian Army had dominant power in
controlling economic activities and administrative policy was initiated when Dutch companies were nationalized in 1957–1958 (Feith, 1995; Jaspers, 2005).

The armed corporatism, which places the central role of the state within the Indonesian army, has established a group exerting dominance over the Indonesian population, since ‘Western privatization’, which started in the middle of the 19th century and was the native oligarchy, emerged in the late 1950s and was marked by the nationalisation of the Dutch companies. It has never been evaluated and it has been claimed to practice state capitalism under the New Order regime (Robison, 1978; Anderson, 1983; Robison & Hadiz, 2004). Again, I criticize the definition of ‘state’, which is merely understood as ‘institution’. Rather, the state is a complex system that consists of social, political, and economic networks (Foucault, 1980). What is claimed as ‘state capitalism’ in Indonesian economic policy under the New Order regime is, I argue, only a pseudo state capitalism. It is impossible that the regime that eliminated the left political party from Indonesian politics is able to understand the critics of capitalism.

The Indonesian technocrats who studied in the U.S. in a certain type of economic school, known as ‘Mafia Berkeley’, have been responsible for designing and planning the Indonesian economic system for the three decades. Therefore, it is impossible for them to anticipate the anarchy of financial capitalism. Rather, they are followers of market capitalism. The New Order regime itself functions as military corporatism, and it only functions as the transition to capitalism as it has been explained by Poulantzas on the development of fascist states in Europe (Poulantzas, 1976; 1979).

Furthermore, the currency crisis in 1997/1998 has placed Indonesia as a patient of the IMF. The IMF is the new institution that controls Indonesian economic policy in the post Soeharto period. The structural adjustment, which has been done in the post Soeharto period...
has included decentralization. It is not decentralization as the critical movement from the authoritarian ruler; rather it is further market expansion through local bureaucracy. Oligarchs have controlled the political parties that have operated in this period. Thus, this period is what Rousseau (1979a) calls ‘ochlocracy’ or the anarchic form of democracy since the market penetration goes beyond the political parties. During the military regime political life is controlled by the Indonesian Army, but in the era of Empire the political life is controlled by the oligarch. This is the new hierarchy under the capitalist sovereigny.

Today, the Indonesian population is under the threat of capitalist sovereigny. However, the most adversely affected communities are those who have no land. Land is the basic capital of those living in the subsistent community. Taking land from them is tantamount to allowing them to die. This is the problem of the East Timorese group who have been living in exile since 1999 as the consequence of the self-determination process.

What I may suggest is that when the global left imposed the self-determination process for East Timor in 1999, it was only possible when the New Order regime was no longer a sovereign power within the new Empire. Here, once again it shows that the domination of external power is vital in Indonesian politics since its early formation in WWII. Indonesian elites are continuously reshaped by the foreign countries, which are involved in the continuing marketization in Indonesia. It began with the elimination of the communist element in the 1940s, the popular nationalists and communists in the 1960s, and also the withdrawal of the military regime from the Indonesian political landscape in the late 1990s.

**Summary**

In this chapter I have shown how in different periods sovereigny has been exercised in different guises in Dutch East Indies/Indonesia. It starts from the corporate sovereigny
introduced by the Portuguese *Estado da India* and the Dutch VOC and it ends with capitalist sovereignty.

American sovereignty, as the result of WWII with U.S capability to dominate Europe and also the Asia Pacific region does challenge the idea of the sovereignty of the former European Empires. But the main issue is not the Cold War, but the new form of sovereignty in the making.

The next point on how ‘state of exception’ has been made by the sovereign power is about the double standard on totalitarianism. For instance, in Europe Nazi fascism is seen as the biggest taboo for the Western countries, but at the same time countries that condemned the Holocaust also supported new fascist regimes in Asia or South America. The Indonesian gulag under Soeharto established as part of the persecution of the communists was part of the silent element by the Western countries (Roosa, 2005). Since it is a sensitive issue, the control of information about Western involvement is still part of the so-called state sovereignty. The ‘state’, which is only understood as an institution, tends to legalize totalitarian regimes as long as there is a guarantee for the continuation of ‘free market’ policy in former Western colonies.

Hardt and Negri in *Empire* claim that nation-states have no great impact and no future in the modern world today with the argument that ‘civil society no longer serves as the adequate point of mediation between capital and sovereignty’ (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 328), I argue that they miss one important point: it is not only about the absence of Hegelian civil society within the nation state that means the nation state boundary has lost its significant position. The coercive element and the rights of the citizen, which are retained by the citizen of the sovereign nation-state, is still a real boundary and functions as a direct instrument to control and to dominate the people in former Western colonies, in particular Indonesia. Coincidentally, the birth of East Timor as the result of the global solidarity movement also
raises the question of what type of state emerges in the neoliberal period in which the globalization of financial markets and informational systems is vital. The problem concerns the sovereignty of the state, which has been dominated by foreign support in order to continue its existence. Here the clear-cut answer about the boundary of cosmopolitan and communitarian position does not exist. At the same time the problem of sovereignty of the nation-state returns when it is dealt with from the practical element point of view.

Therefore, while I agree on Hardt and Negri’s suggestion that the character of contemporary capitalism is immanent, I do not agree that the coercive element embedded in each nation-state is no longer important. When non sovereign states, such as Indonesia, were intervened by sovereign states, their coercive power is manipulated and turned into predator upon their own people. Here the Indonesian military has not been able to redefine its role since the emergence of the New Order regime in the 1960s and the mercenary regime is still the Indonesian problem.

The critics of the subaltern group about the ‘internal colonialism’ in the new state is not only about bourgeois class domination, but, I argue, the state building itself is part of the modern project and it has the same colonial character whether it is conducted by Western powers or not. How the non modern people have to follow the modern project enacted by the modern elites is what Mignolo (2005) describes as ‘land appropriation’. The quote that formed the heading for this chapter is resonant: ‘What makes me resentful is the fact that the same colonial system is now operated by the people whose skin is the same brown as mine, whose hair is as black as mine, who speak the same language that I use’ (Wertheim, 1983, p. i). The silence of the people in the East Indies/Indonesia is not only part of Western domination but also domination by the Indonesian modern elites who are still under the spell of the new liberal doctrine.
The new liberal doctrine has expanded following the Indonesian financial crisis in 1997 in which ‘the structural adjustment’ has been implemented in Indonesia and the oligarchs also play a very vital role in Indonesian politics today (Robison & Hadiz, 2004). This is a similar condition to that experienced in a post corporate state such as Portugal, which continues to operate in patron-client style. Thus to call New Order a ‘Leninist state’ (Robison & Hadiz, 2004), I think is a mistake.

In the next chapter, I investigate the process of decolonisation of the Portuguese Empire. The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 is also to be explained by the history of the decolonisation by the Portuguese of their Empire in the last century. How the semi-colonial state, which was under British protection, had to dissolve its last Empire, and at the same time was in the position to choose between a communist and a socialist path, is the focus of the next chapter. The Indonesian incorporation of East Timor could be understood as a transfer between a former corporatist state, Salazar’s Estado Novo (New State), into a new corporatist state, Soeharto’s New Order regime.
CHAPTER V

DECOLONISATION OF PORTUGUESE EMPIRE
AND THE COLD WAR

The two swords of the civil and the ecclesiastical power were always so close together in the conquest of the East that we seldom find one being used without the other; for the weapons only conquered through the right that the preaching of the Gospel gave them, and the preaching was only of some use when it was accompanied and protected by the weapons.

Fr. Paulo de Trindade, Conquista Spiritual do Oriente (Spiritual Conquest of the East) in ‘The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415–1825’ (Boxer, 1969, p. 228)

De-colonization, conducted as it has been, constitutes a mirage: either it leaves behind the aggravated extension of pre-existent colonial situations; or it transforms under different names; or it permits of re-colonization by a new colonizer, even though the political and economic terms in which the latter operates may be different. Generally speaking, it may be said that the new empires do not seek a territorial base after the classical fashion, but their colonialism is no less real on that account.

Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Foreign Minister, in Third World (1967, p. 35)

In previous chapters, I have presented a historical narrative of Indonesian decolonisation, and also of the emerging American Empire, which became the dominant
regional power in the former Dutch East Indies in post WWII (in particular, during the era of the New Order regime). In this chapter I shall elaborate on the simultaneous decolonisation of the Portuguese Empire following the demise of the Salazar-Caetano regime on 25 April 1974 by MFA (Movimento Forcas Armadas, or the Armed Forces Movement). The narrative here is not only about the crisis of the left, concerning the rivalry between the communist and socialist in the post Estado Novo (New State) regime in the metropolis, but it is also about how the Estado Novo corporatist state collapsed in the 1970s and its impact on the Portuguese political system and the colonies.

The Estado Novo is the regime that emerged in the 1930s and it is identified with Salazar, an economist from a Catholic background. Salazar developed the corporatist state as an alternative from either a communist or a liberal state. He was influenced by Catholic philosophy and social teaching about the state. The regime considered that it was undertaking a civilizing mission with the special approval of the Vatican, which had signed a treaty with Salazar in 1940 to educate people in Portuguese colonies (Hill, 1978).

This chapter develops an historical analysis of Portuguese colonialism, intended to explore the different polities, and their legacy for the last colonies. At the same time, I also elaborate on why the Estado Novo regime, a corporatist state, created during the great depression, collapsed in the 1970s. Following the collapse, its overseas provinces were under the seizure of a new empire as had been predicted (Nogueira, 1967), and further explained by Poulantzas (1976) as a consequence of the hegemony of U.S. over Europe since WWII and as part of its strategy toward dictatorship regimes (Spanish, Greek, and Portuguese) based on military and financial aid. This is intended to explain the relation of political dynamics in the decolonisation of Portugal and East Timor in the 1970s.
The national liberation war in Portuguese Africa was a significant trigger of *Revolução dos Cravos* (Carnation Revolution), since the Portuguese economic crisis was occasioned by the war in Africa. The Portuguese had already predicted the Cold War politics and contestation of Western Empires over Portuguese colonies in the 1960s (Noguiera, 1967), but there was no action that could prevent it after the Carnation Revolution. The Carnation Revolution itself was the protest by the middle rank soldiers, who served in Africa, and concluded that the retention of a Portuguese Empire was not realistic. The decolonisation of the Portuguese Empire in the 1970s was conducted at the same time as the end of the *Estado Novo* era in which the Portuguese struggled to constitute its new political system, and to redefine the State and its national unity (Graham, 1993).

**Portuguese Catholic Empire**

The path of the Portuguese Empire in Asia started from Vasco da Gama’s landing in Goa in 1498. Different historical accounts of the Portuguese Empire in Asia, either from the perspective of Europe or from the former European colonies, help us to expand the imagination on the past centuries (Boxer, 1969; Subrahmanyan, 1993). Two aspects are significant: first, the Portuguese trading posts (*feitorias*) along the coastline from Lisbon, such as Cape Verde, Mozambique, Goa, Macao and East Timor; and second, the Catholic Church, which still functions as the living Portuguese legacy.

As one of the two oldest European Empires from the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal left its mark with missionary and old trading posts. This legacy exists not only for the Catholic Church in East Timor but also connects it with other places around Timor such as Flores Island, Sikka, Larantuka, and Solor where the old tradition of Portuguese Catholicism is still practiced. These places used to be connected to other *feitorias* in Macao, Goa, and Malacca.
Culturally, the influence of Catholicism is embedded in all Portuguese colonies since Christianization was the mission and within Catholic doctrine colonialism was justified (Salazar, 1939).

Although, Portuguese traders were known as path finders for European voyages and colonialism into Asia, they had lost the dominant position in East India to the Dutch and English traders by the 16th century. Furthermore, even though the Portuguese had built a vast Empire since the 15th century, its trading class was not as competitive as Dutch or English traders. English merchants were the dominant traders in the Portuguese Empire. Shaw (1998, p.4) points out that under Roman law the Portuguese ‘aristocrats or fidalgos were forbidden to trade because it was considered that the consequent competition would be unfair to plebeians’. Rather, the Crown was responsible for trading, and the fidalgos would get a share (Shaw, 1998). The Portuguese in later years did not enforce Estado da India in Asia and competed against VOC, or the English East India Company, but instead focused on its South American colony of Brazil (Subrahmanyan, 1993). As with the Dutch Republic, the Napoleonic invasion of Portugal in 1807 made the Portuguese rule its empire from Brazil, and Portugal was considered as a dependent (Feijó, 1993).

In Asia, other than Goa and Macao, after Portugal lost its feitorias in Mallaca, it continued to retain its control in other feitorias in Flores, and later it moved to Timor. In Solor, Portuguese colonialism was conducted under the Dominicans, but it was challenged by the Dutch. The Portuguese moved its feitorias to Lifau in Timor Island. However, the dispute with the toepassen, known as the black Portuguese in the 17th century, forced the Portuguese to once again move its trading post to Dili, East Timor. Toepassen is the word for those who were considered mixed race as the result of the intermarriage of ‘Portuguese soldiers, sailors, and sandalwood traders from Mallaca and Macao’ with the natives (Boxer, 1947, p.1).
Although the Catholic mission was the main part of Portuguese colonialism, it did not mean that the natives in colonies who became Catholic would be treated as equal. On this account Guimarã Sá (2007, p. 276) concludes the following:

Conversion did not imply equality; if converted “pagans” were to be equal in their afterlife, the same could not be said of the earthly one. Never before the second half of the eighteenth century was there any serious or successful effort to give the newly converted the same access to colonial institutions as whites.

Salazar, *Estado Novo*, and Portuguese Colonialism

The unstable condition of Portuguese politics in the 20th century was part of the dynamic of European politics, which was contested by different kinds of ideologies. A century after the Napoleonic invasion, instead of having a stable political system at the end of the constitutional monarchy in 1910, Portugal faced ‘twenty-one revolutions and forty-four cabinet reorganizations’ from 1910 to 1926 (Wiarda, 1977, p. 46). In 1926 the Portuguese military took power.

In 1933 the military transferred the power to Dr. Antonio Salazar, an economist with a strong Catholic background. He was influenced by Thomas Aquinas (Opello, 1985), and his ascendancy marked the era of *Estado Novo*. The new ideological regime of the Estado Novo was based on Catholic corporatism (Wiarda, 1977; Opello, 1985; Graham, 1993). He conducted his government based on Catholic social teaching of *Rerum Novarum*, which ‘supported the non conflictual, non-antagonistic system of interest representation’ (Bruneau, 1984, p.18).

The difference between Salazar’s New State as a corporatist rather than a fascist state is captured by West (1937, p. 21) who explains that ‘it agrees with fascism in that it seeks to make its corporations subordinate contributors to the life of the State, but it differs from it in that it urges men to realise their freedom in their corporative state’. Salazar argues that the
Portuguese should not follow the totalitarian state. He points out the following (West, 1937, p. 25):

The State which would subordinate everything without exception to the idea of the nation or race, as represented by it morally, legally, politically, and economically, would put itself forward as an omnipotent being, a beginning and end in itself, to which all individual and collective manifestations were subject, and would involve an absolutism worse than that which preceded the liberal regime, because that at least did not withdraw itself from human destiny.

Although he associated himself with a Catholic interpretation of freedom, which is represented in his interpretation of ‘human destiny’, Salazar separated the role of state and church (Wiarda, 1977). For Salazar (1939, p.229) there was a clear emphasis on Christianity as being vital to Portuguese nationalism, which is evident when he points out that:

We wish to organize and strengthen the country by means of principle of authority, order, and national tradition in harmony with those eternal verities which are happily in the inheritance of humanity and the sustenance of Christian civilization.

Writers such as Wiarda (1977) and West (1937) suggest that it is incorrect to conclude that Salazar’s regime was a ‘fascist regime’ because Salazar and other intellectuals developed a corporatist state that Salazar (1939) characterized as based on ‘Christian Civilization’. While there is debate as to whether Salazar’s corporatist state is fascist or not, Chilcote (1967) notes that Salazar connected to other fascist states, such as Italy and Germany in the 1930s for modelling and training of Portugal’s security police, the PIDE (Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado or International Police for the Security of the state).

To execute Salazar’s authoritarian system, the corporatist organizations were created, and to secure the dictatorship he created PIDE in 1945. As the Prime Minister and also primary intellectual for Estado Novo, his political position was publicly explained in Doctrine and Action: Internal and Foreign Policy of the New Portugal 1928-1939, and it can be summarized in his own words as follows (Salazar, 1939, p. 228):
We consider it to be as distinct as from the individualistic liberalism of some countries and from internationalism of the Left, as it is from other theoretical and practical systems that have originated abroad as a reaction against liberalism and internationalism.

In sum, *Estado Novo* proclaims the Portuguese version of a third way between the socialist left and liberalism. With this definition, the communist party and social democracy party, alike, were construed as the enemy of the regime. The difference between corporatist and liberal in political representation systems is that the corporatist state is based on ‘functional representation’, rather than the one-person-one-vote liberal system (Wiarda, 1977). On economic policy Salazar accepts private enterprise, but he opposes ‘monopolies and capitalistic speculation’ (West, 1937, p. 27). At the same time he is against the antagonist economic interest as it is seen in the communist point of view and he encourages harmony as a basic principle.

In 1930, when Salazar served as minister of the colonies, he created the Colonial Act, which included several important features: *first*, Portuguese colonies were directly under the authority of the central government; *second*, Portuguese overseas territory status as ‘provinces’ were returned as ‘colonies’. Using the Colonial Act, Salazar designed the Portuguese Empire as a civilizing mission. Salazar in his *Doctrine and Action* (1939, p. 306) described Portuguese colonialism as follows:

> It is only right that the efforts of the Portuguese should be given the place of honour, for they discovered, evangelized, and colonized the most distant and inhospitable regions, where they have left traces of their language, art, religion and culture—as in Africa, in the Far East, and in Brazil.

Reading Salazar’s ideas, provides insight into how Cabral’s criticisms on Portuguese colonialism emerged and contributed to Marxist ideas, when he recognized culture as the central element of resistance against Portuguese colonialism (Cabral, 1980).
Under Salazar the Portuguese Empire was reorganized and a centralized bureaucracy was introduced. In 1944 Marcelo Caetano, one of the ideologists of the Portuguese corporatist regime (Wierda, 1977, p.255), introduced a new Organic Law, claiming that the Portuguese overseas territories were provinces and were no different in juridical status than metropolitan Portugal. However, only those who were recognized as civilized after they had been educated by the ruling authority, which was not always linked to racial identity, experienced the equal juridical status. In Angola and Mozambique, for instance, the white Portuguese who were not educated were also categorized as ‘uncivilized’ and were not allowed to vote in the election in the 1970s (Bruce, 1975). In those places, regardless of racial difference, every individual categorized as educated could vote and some white Portuguese who were listed as illiterates with other Africans could not vote in the elections (Bruce, 1975, p. 100).

Opello (1985) criticized Salazar because although he was the founder of Portuguese corporatism, he failed to institutionalize it. Other writers who try to characterise the Salazar period also arrive at a similar conclusion that the government operated on a personal basis (Figueiredo, 1975; Wierda, 1977). For Wierda (1977) Salazar had already failed to establish a corporatist state after WWII. The decline of Estado Novo happened after the era of Salazar because he always dealt with problems on a personal basis. No one understood the power system of Estado Novo other than Salazar. The Estado Novo regime after Salazar was not able to control the colonies and was also incapable of answering the national liberation movements in colonies, along with the protest from the Portuguese military, mostly from the middle rank soldiers who served in the colonial war in Africa in the 1960s. In addition to this there was opposition from the banned parties, the communist group and liberal socialist party.

Anti-Colonialism in Portuguese Africa, and Portuguese Reaction to Decolonisation
Decolonisation in Asia and Africa was a general agenda for most European Empires, but not for Portugal, which considered that it would be followed by re-colonization (Nogueira, 1967). The Portuguese decision to retain its colonies was challenged by national liberation movements in Africa, but the Estado Novo succeeded in maintaining the Empire until the 1970s. The Portuguese colonies under the Estado Novo regime were the manifestation of the isolationist policy in the 20th century against Anglo-American Empires. Furthermore, in the 1970s the democratization and also decolonisation in Portugal were influenced by Cold War politics.

Although the Portuguese African colonies had challenged Portuguese colonial authority since the 1950s, the decolonisation of the Portuguese Empire would not take place until two decades later. In the era of Salazar, the centralization process as part of ‘administrative dictatorship’ (Salazar, 1939; Wiarda, 1977) was finalized. This policy not only operated in metropolitan Portugal, but also in Portuguese Ultramar, the overseas provinces. Administrative dictatorship took place at home and in the colonies, with PIDE there to ensure the coercive element after October 1945. For Portuguese East Timor, PIDE was introduced after the Viqueque rebellion in 1959 (Gusmao, 2000).

For the Salazar regime, the decolonisation in post WWII was still considered part of the political contestation between the liberal and communist camps over the former European colonies. Therefore, when other European empires dissolved their colonies in the post WWII period, Portugal challenged this decision and claimed that Portugal had a different road for its Empire and would not follow either of the other political camps.

The national liberation front in Portuguese Africa did call for international solidarity against Portuguese authority. For instance, internationally, the issue of decolonisation of the

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8 Here it should be noted that at the end of Sukarno’s long era of the presidential period in Indonesia in the 1960s, General Soeharto established a new government, the ‘New Order’ (Orde Baru) regime. The basic idea of this regime was similar to Estado Novo, and it operated with corporatist state ideas as well.
Portuguese Empire in Africa was part of the agenda of the Bandung Conference in 1955, but the non-aligned movement failed to bring this issue further in later years. In this Conference, the issue of decolonisation of other parts of the Portuguese Empire in Asia such as East Timor, Macao and Goa, were not on the agenda (Kahin, 1956). The real challenge to Portuguese colonialism came from the revolutionary movement in Portuguese Africa and India’s takeover of Goa in the 1960s.

With the support of recommendations from the Bandung Conference in 1960, the UN released General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) on the right of self-determination, known as the ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples’. It was followed with ‘requests’ to the Portuguese Government to provide information about their colonies. However, Portugal defended itself and criticized the UN, arguing that decolonisation under the UN was only an illusion very different from the reality, which was just another kind of new domination. Noguiera (1964) criticized the posture of the UN, which was dominated by the Security Council. Noguiera’s critique was linked to the position expressed by participants of the Bandung Conference in 1955, which supported the sovereignty of these new states (Appadorai, 1955; Legum, 1958; Soekarno, 1958). In particular, the Conference concentrated on ‘mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence’ (Appadorai, 1955, p.9).

In 1962, at the height of Cold War politics, the UN returned to a status quo position, and left Portugal’s claim on its colonies as its overseas provinces. Noguiera (1967, pp. 33–34)

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9See Krieger, H.ed.1997. East Timor and International Community: Basic Documents, p.30. In General Assembly Resolution 1542 (XV): Transmission of Information under Article 73 e released on 15 December 1963 the General Assembly urged Portugal to submit information on several countries under its authority. They were: (a) Cape Verde Archipelago, (b)Guinea/Portuguese Guinea, (c)São Tomé and Príncipe and their dependencies, (d)São João Batista de Ajudad e Angola, including the enclave of Cabinda, (f) Mozambique, (g) Goa and dependencies, (h) Macau and dependencies, and (i) Timor and dependencies.
criticized the super power policy toward the new state, the former European colonies, and argued that if Portugal followed the decolonisation process, its overseas provinces would become the object of ‘struggle for power in the world which would inevitably be concentrated on the territories in order to place them within the orbit and dominion of one or other of the world poles of force’. Nogueira’s prediction was correct, in particular for the decolonisation process in East Timor and Mozambique.

Nogueira argued that it was an intervention to its national constitution. He challenged the UN’s definition of colony, and offered a different definition (Nogueira 1964, p. 90):

A “colony”, we maintain, can be said to exist when one people dominates another which it considers to be inferior, when the principle of equal rights and opportunities is not recognized; when there is economic and financial exploitation; when territories and positions are retained for military reasons or to bolster national power; when a religion or culture is imposed on others; and when, finally, a political system or ideology is forced upon other peoples for the aggrandizement of a country or group of countries. In the case of Portugal none of these conditions is fulfilled.

Nogueira’s claim was not so persuasive, because the Portuguese in colonies did divide the population between ‘natives’ or ‘indígena’ and ‘assimilados’ or ‘non indígena’ (Young, 2001, p. 284; Machado, 1991, p. 108), which placed the other culture as an inferior.¹⁰

As a reaction against Salazar’s ambition to build a Portuguese Empire based on Christian Civilization, Amilcar Cabral (1974), the revolutionary leader from Guinea Bissau, theorized the idea of culture as the instrument of resistance. Cabral’s theoretical ideas challenged the ‘Salazar corporatist ideology’, which intended to assimilate the natives into

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¹⁰The assimilado’s policy, which locates Christian Culture as the distinct element of Portuguese colonialism was abolished in the 1970s (Bruce, 1975). Angola and Mozambique, which were given the status of states in 1972 and the general elections, were held in these two states. In those places, regardless of the racial difference, every one categorized as educated could vote and some white Portuguese who were listed as illiterates with other Africans could not vote in these elections (Bruce, 1975, p. 100). This evidence supports the character of Portuguese colonialism, which was based on culture rather than racial identity—at least it was started since the era of Pombal.
Christian civilization. He enriched the theory of anti-imperialism with culture as the basis of resistance and argued that ‘as long as a section of the populace is able to have a cultural life, foreign domination cannot be sure of its perpetuation’ (Cabral, 1974, p. 11). Here, the antagonistic relation between colonized and colonizer, based on Marxist-Leninist ideas, is employed by Cabral but he brings the culture of the colonizer as the element of domination, in which it could be compared to Gramsci’s account of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971).

Nogueira’s claim on equal rights and opportunities operated inside the ‘corporative state’ that did not recognize the cultures of the others as equal to Christian Civilization. In contrast, the others’ cultures were seen as imperfect or inferior and needing to be assimilated or civilized by the Portuguese colonial mission. Table 5.1 describes the number and percentage of those categorized as civilized in four Portuguese overseas provinces in 1959. In East Timor, less than 0.5 percent of the population were categorized as civilized.

Table 5.1: Population Distribution in Four Colonies by “Civilized” Status, 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Non civilized</th>
<th>Civilized</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>502,457</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome</td>
<td>16,747</td>
<td>37,950</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>5,646,957</td>
<td>25,149</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor</td>
<td>434,907</td>
<td>1,541</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Table 5.2 (Weatherbee, 1966) the population of Portuguese East Timor was not only mapped according to ‘culture’ but also according to ‘racial’ difference.

Table 5.2: Composition of Portuguese Timor’s population
Table 5.3: Catolicismo in Portuguese Timor in 1964

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (população)</td>
<td>517,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics (Católicos)</td>
<td>113,590 (21.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catechumen (Catecúmenos)</td>
<td>13,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priests (Sacerdotes)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superfície (km²)</td>
<td>14,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parishes, missions and mission stations (Paróquias, missões e estações missionárias)</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square kilometers per parish, mission or mission station</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Quilómetros quadrados por paróquia, missão ou estação missionária)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges (Colégios)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School education for adaptation (Escolas de ensino de adaptação)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school (Escolas de ensino de elementar)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard school (Escolas normais)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarding school (Internatos)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminary (Minor)/Seminarios (menores)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Atlas Missionário Português (Da Silva Rego & Dos Santos, 1964: 195). In table 4.3 above, the different instruments of the civilization mission in East Timor can be seen, which was introduced by the Catholic Church, its educational system and the development of this progress in 1964.
While Cabral gave a theoretical explanation about cultural domination within the Portuguese Empire, Machado (1991, p.109–111) explained the connection between cultural domination and Portuguese exploitation in Africa and how it was revealed in different ‘classes’ of labour. The Portuguese categorized labour in its colonies in Africa as follows:

(1) correctional labour; (2) obligatory labour; (3) contract (forced) labour; (4) voluntary labour; (5) forced cultivation; and (6) emigrant (export) labour.

Machado (1991, p.109) also points out that ‘all able-bodied indígenas (indigenous) were required to work at productive activities’.

On this issue, there is no information about the categorization of labour in East Timor, but Tomodok (1994, p.30), the last Indonesian consular in Portuguese Timor, mentioned a ‘native head tax’ for everyone above 18 years old, regardless of whether the person had job or not. In Mozambique a person who was not able to pay the native head tax would have to work in the category of *correctional labour*. In Timor there were two options: the person could work, or his relative could pay the tax. This native head tax in East Timor was collected by *liurais* (the land lord and also the traditional secular ruler). To encourage tax collection, colonial authorities gave a bonus to *liurais* who reached the minimum target.

On the issue of imperialism under the *Estado Novo*, Machado (1991, p. 7) also argues that a specific character of Portuguese capitalism developed in the era of Salazar and Caetano (1933–1974) as follows:

…it was not liberal-democratic capitalism but a particular subtype of capitalism. It was based on private ownership of the means of production; it was subject to ubiquitous and extensive management by the state; it was almost totally risk-free; and it assured the highest profits with the least possible costs.

The challenge to the ideas of economic harmony of the *Estado Novo* corporatist state had already been experienced by Portugal in the 1950s when foreign companies were allowed
to operate in Portuguese Africa. Historically, Portugal became a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1958, but the real effect of ‘free trade’ to Portuguese society was experienced in 1973 when Britain, Portugal’s oldest ally, joined the European Economic Community (EEC) (Nataf, 1995). The increased free trade from Britain is argued as one reason behind the economic crisis in Portugal (Poulantzas, 1976), which combined with war expenses in Portuguese Africa, and the oil crisis in the 1970s.

Ideas about exploitation, domination, or unbalanced relations in the Portuguese Empire were critical issues at the UN. The debate about ‘self-determination’ inspired by Lenin was mostly denied by the Western Empires. For instance, Portugal and France argued that both countries had a different notion of colonialism. Thus, Portugal kept their colonies and classified them as ‘overseas provinces’. Although the General Assembly defined East Timor and other Portuguese colonies in Africa as ‘Non-Self-Governing-Territories’ in 1962, the same UN body also acknowledged these as ‘Territories under Portuguese Administration’.¹¹

Nogueira (1964) argued that the Atlantic Charter, the basis of the Human Rights declaration, in particular its argument about self-determination was supported by the U.S. and British governments because of the specific situation in Europe, mainly associated with Germany. In later years, he also claimed that the anti-colonial issue in world politics was part of a power struggle between two political blocs: Russia and the U.S. Portugal claimed the right to be independent and to decide a decolonisation process rather than having to accept the consequences of international intervention. He argued that the declaration of Human Rights proposed by the U.S. government was not a universal agenda but a new political instrument in world politics to disengage the Portuguese Empire.

As the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Nogueira claimed that the national liberation movements were merely the result of provocative actions of the world political blocs, rather than self-originating movements. He also denied the existence of dominant power relations in the ‘overseas provinces/colonies’ and proposed the concept of ‘multi-racialism’ (1967, p.32). The Portuguese refusal to follow UN policy was also a form of opposition against the possibility of ‘re-colonization by a new colonizer’ with a different *modus operandi* (1967,p.35). However, in the late 1960s it was not only the UN that questioned Portuguese colonialism, but the papacy in Rome that also criticized its colonial policy.

The liberation movements in Portuguese Africa were considered to be part of the Soviet and Chinese political blocs and during the Cold War, Portugal in the late Salazar era associated herself with NATO in a very limited role. Noguiera claimed that the anti-colonial movements in world politics in 1960 should be categorized as part of the Soviet’s bloc or ‘supporters of socialist the bloc’ (1967, p. 45), and within this political position there was no chance for the Portuguese colonies to exercise proper ‘self-determination’. The Portuguese position did not change even when Goa was incorporated into India in 1961. The Portuguese still claimed that Goa was “‘temporarily’ occupied” (Bruce, 1975, p. 53), and it was still called a ‘province’ in the Portuguese Narrative in 1974.

To challenge Portuguese colonialism in Africa, there were several political factions with military arms to promote national liberation, such as PAIGC (*Partido Africano para Independencia da Guniea e Cabo Verde*) in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, MPLA (*Movimento para a Libertacao de Angola*) in Angola, and Frelimo (*Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique*) during the decolonisation period (Chabal, 2002). In this period East Timor was not an active player in the liberation movement. The only known resistance movement against the Portuguese in East Timor was in 1959 in Viqueque. Gusmao (2000) points out that about
60 political prisoners from East Timor were sent to Angola after the rebellion. In fact, East Timor itself was a place of political exile from Lisbon during the Salazar dictatorship (Horta, 1987; Gusmao, 2000). East Timorese political prisoners in Angola were released only after the coup in Lisbon in 1974.

**Carnation Revolution and Political Contestation in Lisbon**

General Spínola’s book about Portuguese colonies and the African war was the trigger for a coup in April 1974 (Bruce, 1975; Bruneau, 1984; Mechado, 1991). As the former military commander in chief of Guinea Bissau, Spinola criticized the Salazar-Caetano regime for spending ‘almost fifty percent of its annual budget’ in the African war (Mechado, 1991, p.162). The coup on 25 April 1974 was led by the middle ranking Army officers grouped in the MFA (*Movimento Forcas Armadas* or Armed Forces Movement).

The MFA members came from middle and lower class backgrounds and had served as soldiers in Portuguese Africa during the liberation war. They protested against Caetano’s regime for its failure to find a solution to 13 years of African war (Oppelo, 1985). MFA played the same role as the military did in 1926 to secure the transition of authority and functioned as the guarantor during the transitional era. Several writers argue that ‘1974’s Portuguese revolution was not a revolution because it lacked a grass roots base (Mailer, 1977; Machado, 1991).

For others, the Portuguese crisis in the 1970s did not follow an internal agenda of Portuguese citizens (Poulantzas, 1976; Janistchek, 1985; Opello, 1985; Bruneau, 1985). Poulantzas argues that the crisis in the 1970s had the same pattern in Greece, Spain and Portugal. According to him the Portuguese economy was dominated by Western European

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12 Other factors behind the Portuguese economic crisis, besides the mounting cost for colonial war, is the increasing price of petroleum from 1973 to 1975 (Morisson, 1981).
capital, mainly from West Germany and Great Britain. Poulantzas (1975, p. 16) explained that the specific character of Portuguese capitalism was ‘the extreme concentration and centralization of capital, particularly given the level of industrialization: 168 companies out of a total of 40,000 (i.e. 0.4 per cent) hold at least 53 per cent of the total capital’.

The impact of the Cold War on post Estado Novo politics is evident in several coups in Lisbon undertaken by different political factions in the 1970s. There were two possibilities for Portugal in the post Caetano government. It could switch to a communist state or adopt a liberal democracy. In the middle of this political transition, Portugal experienced two attempted coups. The first was by General Spinola in March 1975 representing a right wing group. The second was in November 1975 by a communist group in the military. Spinola in March 1975 accused the communist group of intending to create a dictatorship of proletariat. After General Spinola left Portugal to exile in Brazil in March 1975, the composition of the MFA also changed. In Mario Soares biography, Janistschek (1985) describes that European political leaders and U.S. politicians feared that the Portuguese would turn into a communist state.

In Portuguese politics the most notable political parties after the Salazar-Caetano era were the Portuguese Communist Party\textsuperscript{13}, under Alvaro Cunhal, and Socialist Party, under Mario Soares, and, of course, the military, which also functioned as a political force. In civilian politics, both leaders were in exile before the Canary Revolution, and the rivalry among these political groups had strong links with their international counterparts. For instance, the European Economic Community (EEC) supported the socialist group in Portugal politically and financially during the contested period (Bruneau, 1984; Janistschek, 1985) and the CIA provided support to the Portuguese military (Poulantsaz, 1976). The role of

\textsuperscript{13}The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) since 1934 functioned as an underground party (Machado, 1991) until MFA came to power.
international counterparts in the process of the Portuguese redefinition of the state was triggered by the economic crisis in the 1970s. It was influenced by the Portuguese War in its African colonies, the oil crisis, and also the penetration of the European market. One of the important points in the Portuguese crisis was in 1972 when Portugal signed a proposal to open its market and also start the process of decolonisation of the Portuguese empire with the EEC (Nataf, 1995).

Decolonisation of Portuguese Timor

The influence of the U.S. was not limited to the former dictatorship regime in Europe, but also extended to its colonies through the decolonisation process. Portuguese elites in Lisbon were also left with a dilemma whether they focused on the transition of their political system in the metropolis or engaged with the decolonisation of Empire. In the midst of conflict in the metropolis, decolonisation of Timor was also ‘arranged’ by the neighbour states, such as Indonesia and Australia, and the other main pillars of the western bloc, the U.S. and Britain.

Portuguese Timor was considered the most backward Portuguese colony and, as already mentioned, it functioned as the place for political exile during the Estado Novo regime (Horta, 1987). In contrast to Portuguese Africa, it was the crisis in the Portuguese metropolis that was the trigger for decolonisation. For instance, the ideas of ‘national liberation’ only emerged among the East Timorese educated elites in the 1970s. On the other hand, Cabral in Guinea Bissau had started his theoretical formation since 1952. By the 1970s Cabral’s work, as well as Mao’s work, were read by the Fretilin’s leaders as ‘their theoretical background’ (Gusmao, 2000).
Jolliffe (1978), Dunn (2003), and Tomodok (1994) provide an account of the East Timor situation in the 1970s, which explains the early formation of political organizations. These authors observe that the early critical thinking on colonialism in East Timor emerged from writers in several newspapers such as Seara, a Catholic newspaper and published by the Jesuits, which was closed by PIDE in 1973 (Carey, 1999), and A Voz de Timor, a weekly newspaper that became the only remaining newspaper (Jollife, 1978; Dunn, 2003). The leading writers in these newspapers were part of the new leadership in the political parties that emerged after the coups in Lisbon.

East Timorese decolonisation got less attention compared to decolonisation in Portuguese Africa. Bruce (1975, p.139) points out that, for East Timor, ‘there was little talk of its future—whether it was to be independent, or absorbed into Indonesia; again it is solely of cultural interest’.

The East Timor decolonisation process was marked by the emergence of political associations, which later became parties. These parties were preparing for the post-Portuguese governance in the transitional era. In East Timor the assimilados who were also the first educated group became the founders of the three main political parties. Each political party brought different proposals to define the future state formation in the Post-Portuguese era. What kind of state postcolonial East Timor would be was the key issue among the different organizations that emerged after the revolution in Lisbon.

UDT (União Democrática Timorense or Democratic Union of Timorese) was the first political party in East Timor and was formed on 11 May 1974. Its early post-colonial planning was to keep the link with Portugal. The early leaders of UDT were also the members of Timor’s legislative assembly under the Salazar-Caetano regime.

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14 In East Timor according to Jollife (1978, p. 61) ‘technically’ the political parties did not exist before the coup of UDT in August 1975 related to the withdrawal of Portuguese authority.
The second political organization to emerge was ASDT (Associação Social Democrata de Timor or Social Democratic Association of Timor). It was founded on 14 May 1974. One of ASDT’s initial ideas was a social democratic vision for the state (Tomodok, 1994, p. 93). On 12 September 1974 ASDT became Fretilin (Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente) and announced itself as ‘the only legitimate representative of the people’ (Dunn, 2003 [1983], p. 55), with a Marxist-Leninist ideological position (Gusmao, 2000). However, as ‘a front’ it also accommodated moderate factions such as Ramos Horta. These internal divisions inside Fretilin were shown by different opinions expressed about Macao’s meeting within Fretilin (Horta, 1987). Ramos Horta as the spokesperson supported Macao’s meeting, but Fretilin did not attend the meeting in Macao.

The third political group is Apodeti (Associação Popular Democrática Timorense or Timorese Popular Democratic Association). Its political position was to integrate with Indonesia. The question of ‘the originality’ of Apodeti’s aspiration to integrate with Indonesia remains disputed among political commentators. Most writers (Dunn, 2003; Jolliffe, 1978; Horta, 1987) claim that Apodeti was ‘created and directed’ by the Indonesian New Order regime. I suggest that this claim is only partly true, since political factions supporting integration already existed. This is the key issue for understanding the part played by the Cold War in Portuguese decolonisation, which has not been addressed as a contributing factor to the internal contradictions. Most authors hesitate to question the history of the New Order regime precisely because it was an anti-communist regime and under American protection.

Tomodok (1994), the last Indonesian consulate to Portuguese Timor, notes that in early June 1974, Osorio Soares, Apodeti’s secretary general, sent a telegraph to the Indonesian President and foreign minister, about its political stance of integration with Indonesia. Osorio’s telegram is a request for Indonesia to become involved in the East Timor
conflict. Apodeti’s political stance was national, anti-colonial and anti-white (Jolliffe, 1978, p. 80). That last characteristic of Apodeti, to be anti-white, distinguished itself from the other two political parties (Fretilin dan UDT), *mestizos*.\(^{15}\) However the term ‘anti-white’ inside Apodeti is also an ambiguous term because Osorio Soares as the founder and also intellectual of Apodeti was also a *mestizo*.

I suggest that the rivalry between different political blocs in the Portuguese metropolis influenced the transformation of ASDT into Fretilin, from a social democratic association to a revolutionary front. At first, ASDT was based on social democracy but became a more radical political front and renamed itself as Fretilin, close to Frelimo in Mozambique, as a communist party. As well as being influenced by what happened in the ‘mother country’, geopolitically, Portuguese Timor was also trapped in the anti-communist arena in South East Asia. East Timor was subject to the contested power of the China Communist Party and the Indonesian New Order regime. The latter was notorious in its action toward PKI and its *onderbouws* in the late 1960s with the support of the U.S.

According to Jollife (1978) though the MFA gained control in Portugal, it could not control the decolonisation policy of its former colonies because its non-partisanship policy (non *apartidarismo*) was intended to stand above all political parties. However, I suggest that Jollife (1978) does not quote the whole context of MFA, which has three political phases (Nataf, 1995). In the first phase (25 April 1974 to 11 March 1975), the coalition was dominated by the left, the communist and socialist. In the second phase (11 March to 25 November 1975), it was dominated by the communist or the revolutionary. During this period the ‘nationalization of banks, insurance companies, and major firms owned by Portuguese interest’ was protected by MFA (Graham, 1993, p.25). In the third phase (25 November to 25

\(^{15}\) There is a distinction between the term *assimilado* and *mestizo*. *Assimilado* is more related to cultural relations, and the term *mestizo* related to biological mixing of races as a consequence of inter-marriage.
April 1976), the left lost the political power and the MFA was positioned not as the leading revolutionary group, but as the guardian into the European democratic system. I argue that the dynamic role of MFA power and also the balance of power among the left politics in Portugal (the socialist, communist, and Maoist) contributed to the political dynamics in East Timor. Jolliffe (1978, p. 61) and Dunn (2003, p. 47) note that there were three post-colonial options offered by the Portuguese administration in June 1974 as follows: ‘(1) to continue the link with Portugal, (2) to integrate with Indonesia, or (3) to have an independent state’. However, it should be noted that these three options were also repeated by Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo (Soekanto 1976), from Indonesia on a visit to Portugal after General Spinola’s withdrawal from the presidential chair on 28 September 1974 as a result of the rivalry against the leftist elements inside MFA.

**The Connection of Cold War to Portuguese Timor Decolonisation**

This section aims to set out the connection of Lisbon politics, conflict in East Timor, and Cold War as part of the hegemony of the American Empire in post WWII and the different challenges to it. My account here is based on the contemporary historical resources that have been made available in the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, I argue that the idea of a communist state was seen as a challenge to U.S. hegemony and its aim to push the former European Empire to adopt a global free market policy, or domination without territorial occupation. Under American hegemony, the tendency to develop a state based on a Marxist-Leninist framework would be challenged militarily. In South East Asia, the American military network was based in the Philippines, a former Spanish colony that became an American colony in 1889.
The competition of empires was behind the conflict at a local and also international level. At that time the coordination between the US, Indonesia, Australia, and also Britain was united in the same goal as the anti-communist movement on the world scale, in particular in East Timor and Portugal (Chomsky, 1979). In most of the third world countries, the decision for one to proclaim itself as a ‘communist state’ or be allied with communist states would be seen as a challenge to Western sovereignty, with direct impact on that country’s international relations. They would not have access to particular blocs and would be isolated in international trading, including military and financial aid.

To be saved from that isolation, most of the third world states acted in ‘neutral term’, or worked with both political blocs. For instance in Portuguese Africa, Frelimo in Mozambique was supported by the U.S. and also by the Soviet Union. The ‘non bloc’ strategy was interpreted as gaining as much financial, technology, and military assistance as possible from any major power. Indonesia, in Soekarno’s era also took advantage of the two political blocs and was later crushed by General Soeharto and his supporters.

After the Cold War, it is evident that international relations were the political medium for manipulation using the intelligence service, but their activities only became known decades after the actual events. For instance the detail of the background of secret operations in East Timor and also links to CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) activities in Portugal during this era is revealed in “Integrasi” (Indonesian adaptation for ‘integration’) by Soekanto (1976), which was only widely accessible after the Cold War. Soekanto’s report itself is an intelligence work that reveals the relationship between the CIA and Indonesian intelligence service, the BAKIN (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, or State Coordinated Intelligence Agency). This work itself is a product of CSIS (Centre for Strategic International Studies) Jakarta, the think tank associated with the New Order regime, which consisted of former
Catholic student activists and also former Indonesian students in Europe (Dhakidae, 2003). This link is important to mention since the New Order regime also collaborated with the Indonesian Catholic elites to lobby the Vatican and Portugal to takeover East Timor from Fretillin. This link is also important to show how the Indonesian New Order takes the model of corporatist state, as a solution for the New Order political system in Chapter IV. In South East Asia, the model of the corporatist state itself has been practiced by the Philippines, the former colony of Spain and U.S. in Southeast Asia, which is also dominated by the Catholic population. The last chairman of the Catholic Party, Frans Seda, was directly involved in lobbying with the Vatican and also the Portuguese provisional government during the transitional crisis in East Timor (Soekanto, 1976).

A pre-war meeting about Portuguese Timor between the representatives of the Indonesian military regime and the Portuguese provisional government took place in 1974 in Lisbon. Following political developments in Portuguese Timor, in early October 1974, General Soeharto sent his personal aide, Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo, to Lisbon to meet several key members of the provisional government such as: President (General) Da Costa Gomez; Prime Minister (Colonel) Vasco de Goncalves; and the Foreign Minister, Mario Soares, the socialist leader. Following this, they agreed to have another meeting in London on 9 March 1975. At the London meeting, the Portuguese delegation opposed the Indonesian idea to create a consultative body composed of Portuguese and Indonesian representatives for the East Timor Governor to conduct the decolonisation process (Soekanto, 1976).16

Aware of the possible direct conflict in East Timor, the Portuguese government arranged a meeting in Macao for the three major political parties from 26 to 28 June 1975.

16Soekanto (1976) notes that after Spinola withdrew from the presidential chair and moved into exile, MFA replaced the Governor of East Timor with Governor Fernando Alves Aldeia. Aldeia was the personal secretary of General Spinola, and he came with five of his aides, and five majors and three of them were members of the Portuguese Communist Party.
This was an opportunity for a peaceful decolonisation process among East Timorese political parties, facilitated by the Portuguese government. However, this plan was rejected by Fretilin. Horta (1987) as the representative of the moderate faction within Fretilin argues that there was no adequate explanation about the absence of Fretilin at the Macao meeting. Horta was in Darwin, Australia, at that moment, and the decision not to attend the Macao meeting represents the more radical faction of Fretilin. It is also linked to the political dynamic in Lisbon where the political power of that period was associated with the revolutionary leading role of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho within MFA who had strong ties to the Maoist MRPP (Movimento Revolucionario do Popular Portugues) and PRP-BR (Partido Revolucionario do Proletarido-Brigadas Revolutionarias) (Graham, 1993, p. 27). According to Graham, Otelo’s influence in MFA also decreased when it was later known that the revolutionary brigades received arms from the military institution that controlled Lisbon’s military region.

The national liberation movements in former Portuguese Timor and also other Portuguese colonies in Africa worked with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rather than the Soviet Union. However, Dunn (2003, p. 65) claims that the news of Chinese communist infiltration in East Timor were ‘reports without foundation’. In contrast, Tomodok (1994, p. 203), the last Indonesian consulate in the Portuguese era in East Timor, argues that the Taiwanese consulate Yiong Chuan Huang was aware of the infiltration of CCP influence on his local administrative staff, and he was also aware about the rivalry between the Provisional government in Lisbon who were more pro-Moscow than CCP.

The connection between Lisbon, Dili and Jakarta can be understood through the following events. The revolutionary control over MFA was over on 25 November 1975. The revolutionary element within MFA, PCP, MRPP, and PRP-BR and other revolutionary elements had to face the PS and also other anti-revolutionary soldiers in Lisbon. Three days
after the Portuguese revolutionaries in Lisbon lost their dominant position Fretilin proclaimed East Timor independent on 28 November 1975. Formally, nine days after Fretilin proclaimed the independence, the Indonesian New Order regime invaded East Timor on 7 December 1975, or just a day after U.S. President Gerald Ford and U.S. state secretary, Henry Kissinger, visited Jakarta. I used the word ‘formally’ because the killing of the Australian and New Zealand journalists in Balibo, the area near the border to West Timor, occurred in the previous month.

Lawless (1976) notes that on 9 December 1975 there was an article in the People’s Daily in China condemning the Indonesian invasion. He also notes that on 19 December 1975 Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan Hua met Rogerio Lobato, the head of Fretilin Armed forces, in Beijing (Lawless, 1976, p. 963). The political involvement at an international level during the decolonisation process was the major background to local conflict, which turned into civil war.

The Indonesian aggressive politics in East Timor was part of the New Order’s anti-communist position, as has been explained in a previous chapter. For the Indonesian New Order regime Fretilin was considered to be a communist party. Frelimo and Fretilin had international connection with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who also challenged American global sovereignty (Lawless, 1976).

Portugal in the post-Salazar period also faced similar problems in the international arena. The Western European Community preferred for Portugal to choose liberal democracy rather than communism (Janistchek, 1987). This particular political position was similar to that of Adam Malik, Indonesian foreign minister, when ASDT was still a ‘social democratic’ party, but in later years the Indonesian anti-communist regime had different ideas when
ASDT changed its ideological position to a revolutionary stance as Fretilin, and was reinforced after Fretilin became a state party after the proclamation of independence.

According to Tomodok (1994, p. 128) the reconstitution of ASDT as Fretilin is influenced by the President Spinola speech on 24 June 1974 in which he only mentioned the decolonisation process in Portuguese Africa. This was interpreted by the members of the new political organizations in Dili as anti-decolonisation in Timor. Whether Spinola’s statement was the single determinant factor for the ASDT leaders to move to a revolutionary front is unclear. However, in local politics UDT’s leaders were well aware that the change from General Spinola to General Costa Gomes as president in September 1974 (Tomodok, 1994) was a sign that the political composition in Lisbon was in favour of the Portuguese left. When Fretilin declined the invitation to attend Macao’s meeting, there was still a possibility that the Portuguese revolutionaries could take power.

In 1975 before the Indonesian military attack on East Timor, Tomodok (1994) stated that there were some Maoists inside Fretilin. In the past this was seen as war propaganda (Dunn, 2003). However, in a recent work, Subin (2008) identifies the Sino-Soviet rivalry inside Frelimo in 1975. This shows the active role of Chinese foreign affairs. In 1975, Frelimo under Samora Machel’s leadership worked closely with the Chinese Communist Party. In the Indonesian case in 1965, it was also the same. For General Suharto, CCP was still a threat to his regime. Hansen (1976, p.158) points out that:

Suharto made it quite clear that relations between the two nations would remain frozen as long as Peking continued to harbour former members of the Indonesian Communist Party and to advocate openly the party’s revival in Indonesia.

In East Timor, the ‘revolutionary’ turn in Fretilin also caused resistance from the Catholic Church, because it was associated with secular communism. Mgr.Martinho da Costa Lopes, the Catholic Bishop in Dili, was a strong opponent of communism (Tomodok, 1994,
p.172). Tomodok noted that he commanded the Catholic priests in East Timor to preach against communism and also pressured Colonel Pires as East Timor Governor to keep East Timor from communism. In the early days of Fretilin’s power, the Catholic Church also opposed it. This was a significant point, because the other structure in East Timor society that remained strong after the end of Portuguese authority was the Catholic Church, hitherto an integral part of the *Estado Novo* regime.

**Fretilin as a One Party State, and the Indonesian Invasion**

Based on the political conditions in Lisbon up to August 1975, Portuguese authority was not in a condition to facilitate the decolonisation of Portuguese Timor. They were not even sure about what path they would take in Lisbon. Portuguese authority could not facilitate the process because they faced the dilemma of whether to focus on decolonisation or the political contest in Portugal (Janistchek, 1987).

The process of decolonisation in East Timor was on hold when Portugal left East Timor ungoverned in 10 August 1975 (Tomodok, 1994). The next day, UDT took power, something that Jollife (1978) argues was supported by Portuguese authority. However, one can ask: which authority? In those days, the political control in Lisbon was in favour of PCP and General Otelo. It is also known that ‘in July 1975 the PS and PPD/PSD left the fourth provisional government’ (Nataf, 1995, p. 47).

Thus, the UDT coup itself was known as a revolutionary anti-communist coup on 10 August 1975 (Gusmao, 2000). It was not only against the revolutionaries in East Timor, but also against the revolution in Lisbon. On 19 August 1975, Fretilin made a contra coup to UDT. In this contra coup on 19 August 1975 not only UDT leaders, but also Apodeti, Kota,

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17 The Catholic Church in Europe and also East Timor are known for the opposition toward the Marxist-Leninist Party, which is quite different from the Catholic Church in Southern America.
and Trabalista followers were captured and seized by Fretilin. These two minor political parties had made a coalition with Apodeti and UDT. The pro-communist Portuguese military officers supported Fretilin (Tomodok, 1994). Indeed, Fretilin’s proclamation of independence was done after the pro-military communist group took power in Lisbon in November 1975.

The other idea that brought Fretilin closer to a communist character was the rearrangement of property rights, in particular around landowning. One of Fretilin’s political programs was to abolish the right of liurai, or the native aristocrat over the land. This was one of the major issues for UDT’s leaders who mainly came from the liurai’s background. Nicolau Lobato, the leader of Fretilin, was the son of a liurai, but he gave up the right to his land (Gusmao, 2000). How the concept of possessing land in ‘common’ translated to a subsistence community was unclear, because private subjects actually did not own most of the land in East Timor in the European sense, but collectively by a suku (clan). The land was governed by a liurai, but it was not his private property. I elaborate on this in the next chapter.

The legacy of Estado Novo, which constructed the Portuguese Timor society, placed the intellectuals in a very high position. The term cizivilado is almost the synonym of educated. Salazar (1939, p.38) himself names the dictatorship as the ‘dictatorship of reason and intelligence’. The first educated elites among the natives of Portuguese Timor in the 1970s were the children of liurai, catechist, and also the mestizos. I argue the new class or the new educated elites were the main actors during the decolonisation process. They were divided on these issues, such as state model, land property, and international affiliation. The decision to form a new Marxist-Leninist state would be challenged by the Western Empire, which was pro-free market. Gusmao (2000, p.19), a member of Fretilin, describes how the political factions in 1975 divided kinship relations as follows:
At first, friends and colleagues in the UDT continued to raise their hands and greet me. Then came indifference, until finally it became obvious that we were avoiding each other. This really was not what I had wanted. UDT parents, Apodeti Uncles, Fretilin children. What contemptible shit freedom this was!

Gusmao’s critical point of view shows how political rivalry during the decolonisation process went beyond kinship relations in East Timor.

Ramos Horta (1988) notes that the civil war between the two main factions, UDT and Fretilin, marked the beginning of the violent era in East Timor society. He (1988, p. 55) writes as follows:

I visited FRETILIN prisons in Dili and Aileu, and for the first time I was confronted with the ugliness of the war. I was dismayed at how we had turned against each other overnight, we who had been friends neighbours [sic.], and relatives, just yesterday.

The experiences of both Gusmao and Horta show that the political divisions in 1975 did divide the East Timorese society, even families. The constant fear of Indonesian invasion, the political contestation in Lisbon, and also the possibility of a Marxist state were real determinants to this era. They overpowered family relations, kinship connections and also the integrity within the *lulik* (the sacred and genealogical house) of the families.

Against Fretilin’s proclamation of independence, Indonesia and other East Timor factions launched the military attack on East Timor on 7 December 1975. In Gusmao’s record Fretilin’s prisoners consisting of UDT and Apodeti members were killed on 25 December 1975 (Gusmao, 2000, p. 39). On 7 January 1976 Fretilin continued to kill its political prisoners both from UDT and Apodeti and of the 36 founders of Apodeti 18 of them were murdered by Fretilin (See Tomodok, 1994). Fretilin’s revolutionary action and also the divisions within itself are elaborated in the next chapter.

In Indonesia, there was no long military conflict against the Indonesian Army from PKI, but in East Timor from December 1975 to 1979 Fretilin was able to manage a counter
attack against the Indonesian military presence. However, after May 1977, because of the aerial attack from Indonesian Air Force, Fretilin suffered great losses and most of the early leaders were killed during the first three years (Gusmao, 2000). After two years of disorganization and under military control, in 1981 Fretilin was able to reorganize under Xanana Gusmao’s leadership. From exile, other Fretilin leaders such as Mari Alkatiri, and Jose Ramos Horta continued to challenge Indonesian incorporation of East Timor through a diplomatic campaign in the UN and also other grassroots networks.

The Indonesian New Order regime under Soeharto was ‘pacified’ by the U.S Empire and had given up its claim from the Bandung Conference of anti-colonialism. The military regime under General Soeharto associated itself with the U.S. political bloc (Roosa, 2008). Horta (1987, p. 79) quotes an analysis by a CIA officer concerning Suharto’s ambivalent position over East Timor and whether it should be incorporated by military attack or diplomatic persuasion. Indonesia was known as the U.S. pillar in South East Asia along with the Philippines, and its firm stance against the communist party and also the ideas of communism since 1965. This explains the background of the extermination of PKI in 1965 onward, and in 1975 when Indonesia attacked Fretilin in East Timor.

Inside Indonesia, in 1975, five years after the death of Sukarno during a house-arrest, General Soeharto had reached a point that made him almost beyond criticism. Soeharto played the same role as Salazar did in Portugal. The state under his authority became highly personalised. Therefore for UDT, Apodeti, Kota, and Trabhalista the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia was another option with a very similar character. In international politics, in particular for U.S. and allies, this transition is close to the status quo position from former corporatist state to another corporatist state. Indeed, Indonesian military occupation over East Timor was not only a consequence of the internal dynamics in Indonesian or East
Timorese nationalism but it is interwoven with the politics of the American Empire in post WWII.

In this chapter I have elaborated the history of Portuguese colonialism from the end of the 15th century, which led to the Portuguese decolonisation of East Timor in the 20th century. In general, Portuguese colonialism combined two main activities: trading and missionary work. Feitorias (trading posts) existed together with the churches in Portuguese colonies in Southern America, Africa, and Asia. The decline of the Portuguese Empire in Asia was the result of conflict among nation-states in Europe, most notably among French, English, and Spaniard, and the direct competition in Asia between the Dutch and English traders.

In the colonies, the penetration of Portuguese modern bureaucracy was intensified in the era of Estado Novo under Antonio Salazar since the 1930s. The corporatist state based on a Catholic philosophy was formulated in Europe as the alternative to the liberal and communist political camps. During WWII, Portuguese Estado Novo practiced the isolationist position and did not collaborate with any political camps.

In post WWII, when decolonisation became a global phenomenon in most of the former Western Empires, the Portuguese Empire under Salazar corporatist state was reluctant. The deficit of its financial budget as the result of war in Portuguese Africa invoked the revolution to challenge the legacy of Salazar’s regime under Marcelo Caetano. During this period the main factions for struggle for the power in the Portuguese Metropolis were among different factions of military officers from different ideological backgrounds, the communist party, and socialist party. The first election in Portugal was won by the Socialist Party.

Summary
The dismantling of the Portuguese Empire in the 1970s is part of the process to redefine the Portuguese state, political community and also its system of representation in the post Estado Novo regime. The basic change is the transition from ‘a corporatist state’ into ‘a liberal state’ model, which was influenced by the European Economic Community (EEC). This is a historic change in the Portuguese political tradition after 500 years following the corporatist tradition, which is based on natural law in the Aquinas tradition. The attempt of Estado Novo to offer the corporatist state as an answer to the anarchy of capitalism failed in the 1970s.

Chapter V elaborates how the process of redefining the Portuguese state, which was meant as the end of Portuguese Empire, had a direct impact on East Timor, one of the oldest Portuguese colonies in Asia. While in Portugal the revolutionary faction within MFA and other organizations did not succeed, in East Timor Fretilin, as the revolutionary front, was in power and proclaimed East Timorese independence on 28 November 1975. While in Europe, the carnation revolution was a transition into joining EEC, in East Timor the reaction was the emerging of a revolutionary party against the Indonesian New Order invasion and also the coup from UDT, an anti-communist party.
CHAPTER VI
EAST TIMOR RESISTANCE:
FROM THE LEFT PARTY TO GLOBAL NETWORK

48. Ford—We recognize that you have a time factor. We have merely expressed our view from our particular point of view.
49. Kissinger—If you have made plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the president returns home.
50. Do you anticipate the long guerrilla war there?
51. Suharto—There will probably be a small guerrilla war. The local kings are important, however, and they are on our side. The UDT represents former government officials and Fretilin represents former soldiers. They are infected the same as is the Portuguese army with communism.

Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger and Suharto, 5 and 6 December 1975, the transcript of the meeting of the US President Gerald Ford, U.S. State Secretary Henry Kissinger and the Indonesian President Soeharto in Jakarta, a day before the attack in recently declassified document (The U.S. National Security Archive, 2001, Doc.4)

Our predecessors saw Marxism as the ‘immediate solution’ to the problems of an incredibly underdeveloped people. They saw in Maoism a shining path to a revolutionary process conducted behind ‘closed doors’ that would amaze the world with the ‘undeniable creative capacities’ of a people still relying on artisan methods of production. We were, in truth, lulled by a fanciful revolutionary processed dubbed ‘Mauberism’. This political infantilism and thoughtless adventurism has driven the movement since 1974.

Xanana Gusmao, President of CRRN, 7 December 1987
In ‘To Resist is to Win’ (Gusmao, 2000, p. 131)
Joze Pureza, a scholar activist from Portugal in his 2002 article asks, ‘Who Saved East Timor?’ He questions the role of international solidarity in East Timor independence. East Timorese self-determination was conducted by popular consultation, which was facilitated by the UN in 1999. Pureza’s question highlights the problematic constitution of the East Timor state. It is a combination of nationalism with a cosmopolitan taste.

This is an anomaly that when compared to Anderson’s theory of nationalism cannot be categorized as ‘the last wave’ of nationalism. The character of the last wave of nationalism consisted of: (1) the contribution of printed capitalism in modern transportation such as railway and steamship; (2) the emerging of the bilingual group to connect the ‘metropolitan nation’ and the people in colonies; and (3) the presence of modern education elites (Anderson, 2006, pp. 115–116).

Compared to the analysis of nationalism from a Eurocentric perspective, which has been built by Anderson, Chatterjee (1986) provides an explanation based on his Indian roots of the problem of state within a Gramscian perspective. He draws out how the Indian people have been alienated within the new modern state in post-Gandhian politics in which Gandhi’s alternative out of capitalism is not considered as a modern choice.

Today the picture of the new emerging Republic out of colonialism is a complex one. For instance, here, I believe the form of nationalism of East Timor has been a transformation in itself. It is a combination of a nationalist movement, the global left, and other humanitarian projects and is therefore a cosmopolitan network rather than a monolithic communist-nationalist alliance. The rhetoric of national liberation, which was challenged in the 1960s during the Cold War, has been replaced by global solidarity.

In this period, the concept of the people has been replaced by different nodes of global solidarity. The global social resistance network consists of different non-governmental,
religious and solidarity organizations triggered by the media coverage of the Santa Cruz massacres in 1991.

In this chapter, I explain how the process of self-determination of East Timor has moved through different transformations, from a revolutionary force in the 1970s to a global solidarity network in the 1990s. This transformation is quite different from Anderson’s picture of nationalism in the 1980s, and it takes the form of complex network formation in which different information and communication technology have been used to build the global solidarity network prior to East Timor independence (Hill, 2000) in which capitalism was at its peak height and the state formation was still a problem of the former European colonies.

Furthermore, in this chapter I argue that the Indonesian annexation of East Timor was only possible as long as the Cold War existed, since its claim on East Timor was based on Cold War binary politics. Its annexation was justified as an anti-communist war, rather than as a territorial claim based on the former Netherlands East Indies, such as Papua. The Indonesian annexation of East Timor itself came into crisis following the fall of the Berlin wall as the symbol of the end of the Cold War, and also the rising of the ‘clash of civilizations’ in global politics that marks the era of a new ‘identities war’, in which East Timor is presented as the Catholic population within the biggest Muslim Country in the world.

*De facto*, the Indonesian takeover of East Timor in 1975 was the transfer of power between two corporatist regimes, from Salazar’s *Estado Novo* (New State) to Soeharto’s *Orde Baru* (New Order). Rather than supporting East Timor’s Declaration of Independence proclaimed by revolutionaries in the Fretilin party, Western countries supported Indonesia, or abstained during the voting in the General Assembly in the UN. However, *de jure*, the
Indonesian takeover of East Timor is interpreted as an invasion and the UN called for Indonesian withdrawal. Indonesian intervention in East Timor turned out to be an invasion when East Timor was incorporated as Indonesia’s 27th province in 1976.

At the same time the UN also did not acknowledge Fretilin’s right to govern when it became the single power in the country after the defeat of UDT and other political parties. The UN claimed that decolonisation should be done in ‘the right order’ as it was practiced from 1999 to 2002 when UNTAET acted as the sovereign power in East Timor, before it transferred the authority to the East Timorese in 2002. The emergence of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste as the new Republic is not separated from the transformation of East Timor resistance from the revolutionaries in the 1970s to a global resistance network in the 1990s (Gusmao, 2000; Hill, 2002; Simpson, 2004; Pureza, 2004).

The irony is that while the referendum solved the problem of East Timor’s international status, the problem for the ‘the other’ East Timorese who collaborated with the New Order regime, or who chose ‘special autonomy’, or who were pro-integration, had no solution. They have had to live without a homeland since 1999, or with a ‘spoiled identity’ in the new republic. The cosmopolitan solidarity is unable to prevent the dislocation of the other East Timor community.

Therefore, in this chapter I intend to show this significant transformation of East Timor nationalism, which has been undertaken by Fretilin as the vanguard party, the emergence of the nationalist coalition that is declared by Xanana Gusmao, and the connection of the East Timor nationalist movement with the global solidarity in the 1990s.

From Fretilin to Nationalist Organization
In this chapter I elaborate on the failure of Fretilin to converge all political parties in East Timor into a single political faction or within a model of democratic dictatorship. I trace the historical narrative of Fretilin and its argument as a nationalist front within the Marxist tradition. While Fretilin argues that they defend the sovereignty of East Timor, at the same time they face internal divisions and disputes with other political parties and communities. This political division opened the possibility for Indonesia to invade East Timor in December 1975 in collaboration with the East Timorese from different political parties such as UDT and Apodeti.

The history and the transformation of Fretilin follow the transformation of left politics, and correspond to the development of Marxist critics. As it is explained in the previous chapter, the political dynamic in East Timor is closely related to the political divisions in Portugal and also a different interpretation on the politics of the left.

After the Indonesian New Order regime launched its attack on Fretilin on 7 December 1975, the General Assembly of the United Nations stated the following (Krieger (ed.), 1976, p. 52):

The revised draft made no mention of the declaration of independence by FRETILIN nor of the declaration of integration with Indonesia by the other Timorese parties and omitted also any reference to a possible Indonesian role in the problem of Timor. It called upon all States “to respect the inalienable right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination, freedom and independence”, requested Portugal to continue to make every effort to find a solution by peaceful means through talks with the political parties of Timor, appealed to the latter to respond positively to efforts to find a peaceful solution, and requested the Special Committee to send as soon as possible a fact-finding mission to the Territory.

This statement is worth quoting at length since it gives clear ideas of the UN position that would come to be implemented in 1999. The revised draft was made on 8 December 1975. This statement shows what kind of ‘self-determination’ model is authorised by the UN. The UN was not in favour of the revolutionary model.
Western hegemony within the UN is shown by the silent support for the Indonesian invasion into East Timor. This made the war in East Timor a silent war, and the information on East Timor was very limited during the isolationist period (1975–1989). It was not only because of the limited coverage by Western media (Chomsky, 1979), marked by the killing of five journalists from Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand and also actions against Indonesian journalists (Aditjondro, 2000) during the early days of invasion, but also because East Timor was designated as a territorial area for military operations (Daerah Operasi Militer or DOM).

Inside Indonesia in the 1970s, being labelled a ‘communist’ under General Soeharto’s era was similar to receiving a death sentence. Those who received the title would be excluded, controlled, and sent to a Gulag island in the Moluccan Province, Buru Island. For a comparison, at a local level, in West Timor the stigma of communism also had a serious impact. Even in 2000, discussion about the massacre of communists was still considered a taboo and I experienced in 2004 that praying for these victims in Mass was also considered to be problematic and prohibited.

The main background of the Indonesian New Order regime’s attack on Fretilin is that it is associated with the communist bloc. The ideological division within Fretilin is rarely clear stated, and this has made the claim that Fretilin was a Marxist-Leninist party before the Indonesian invasion debatable. Here is the difference between Amilcar Cabral’s approach to Marxist theories in Guinea Bissau during the liberation movement and the early Fretilin leaders in East Timor, and also how the PKI Indonesian leaders approached it. Cabral for a period of time had worked as an agricultural researcher before he made his theoretical contribution. In Fretilin’s case the studying of the East Timor situation was intensified under Indonesian occupation, and not before it. I argue that ‘the left’ in East Timor and also
Indonesia was mostly accepted as jargon. For instance, in Fretilin, the term for oppressed people was translated as *maubere* (Horta, 1987), and this was a similar attitude taken by Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president who coined the word *marhaen* to replace the term ‘proletariat’. Both of them failed to defend the revolutionary politics against anti-communist propaganda. The idea of emancipation was mostly acknowledged as the rhetorical comment of the leaders and as a consequence, the national leaders in both countries were not able to find a common ground to unify the politics of different identities.

Reading East Timorese historical materials, I find that there is a crisis of representation in which the Cold War propaganda was the dominant framework. It placed communism as the target and whoever was associated with this word was free to be attacked or invaded. Therefore, to kill the communists was part of ‘the just war’ during the Cold War. As it has been argued in the previous chapter, Fretilin was a mix of revolutionaries and moderates. The Marxist-Leninist ideas, combined with Mao’s, developed in Lisbon study groups and also with the interaction of East Timorese students in Portuguese Africa, for instance Mari Alkatiri (Hill, 2002), influenced the early Fretilin elites.

Stevan Farram (2002), in his work *Revolution, Religion and Magic: the PKI in West Timor, 1924-1966*, suggests that communist ideas were adopted by some political activists in West Timor (Dutch Timor) since the 1920s in synthesis with local cultures. About the development of the PKI in West Timor he states the following:

*The PKI in West Timor showed from its earliest days up until the point when the party was dissolved that it was capable of mixing radical politics, Christianity, traditional magic, and witchcraft into a blend that was palatable to the variety of local tastes.*

In West Timor, the resistance toward the communist party also came from the religious leaders, from the Catholic and also Protestant Church. The followers of local religion in the border region of West and East Timor also set an alliance with the communists.
For the Catholic priests, the local believers who held to their local religion were seen as practicing witchcraft (Farram, 2002, p. 36). In everyday life, the local religious followers were positioned as *orang kafir* or non-believers. The communists in Indonesian New Order Narration was demonized and positioned as ‘evil’. Further research on the relation of Marxist-Leninist ideas and other ‘subjugated knowledge’ in East Timor is necessary in order to understand how the adoption of western rationality criticizing the problems of capitalism is mixed with different local knowledge in East Timor. As I understand the special connection to the creator (*Maromak*) is vital for the East Timorese either in *lulik* (the sacred genealogical house of every family in East Timor), or in the Catholic Church or others.

In the 1970s, Fretilin revolutionary ideas also placed the Catholic Church in opposition to its politics (Tomodok, 1994). In Europe, anti-communism remained the stance the formal political stance of the Catholic Church. The Portuguese Catholic church itself is one of the two legacies of the Portuguese Empire (Boxer, 1969). Other than the Portuguese colonial administrative government (*Divisao Administrativa*) in East Timor, the Catholic Church was the second administrative body in East Timor since 1940, marked by the establishment of the *Diocese de Dili*.

A Marxist scientific approach by Catholics in conjunction with ‘Dependency Theory’ was developed in the 1960s in Latin America as a Theology of Liberation, but was unknown in East Timor up to 1975. A clear distinction is made by Gustavo Gutierrez (1996) to distinguish between Marxism as ideology and Marx as one of the principal thinkers in social science. He explains how theology of liberation corresponded to a social science tradition following Thomas Aquinas’s ideas that faith and reason are not in contradiction and how social science helps to provide a deeper understanding about the concrete world (See Paul VI, 1971; Leo XIII, 1891).
Rather than taking up a position from the margins to give a different criticism of capitalism within the Catholic Church, most of the priests in East Timor and Indonesia followed the line of the Roman Catholic Church in Europe with its core mission to civilize others as part of Salazar’s policy. Although, the failure of the Estado Novo corporatist state is already shown in the 1960s in the Portuguese Empire (See Chapter V)—which coincided with the penetration of foreign companies into the Portuguese African Empire—the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia as another corporatist state was seen as a more reliable option than the emergence of the new East Timor state led by Fretilin (Smythe, 2004; Tomodok, 1994). As the result, both the East Timorese Catholics and the Marxist groups in East Timor could not settle their dispute into a common struggle, and were mostly trapped in the Cold War binary politics. They faced similar tragedies experienced by other third world countries, which had to follow the order outlined by former western Empires.

During the period of overt war (1975–1978) the political divisions within Fretilin between the Marxist-Leninist faction and the moderate faction grew. The Marxist Leninist faction on the Central Committee was led by Nicolau Lobato, the first Fretilin vice president, and the moderate faction was led by Fransisco Xavier, the first Fretilin President. In 1977 Fretilin transformed into Partido Marxista-Leninista Fretilin (PMLF), or from a front into a party (Niner, 2009, p. 74). The rivalry within Fretilin ended with the expulsion of Xavier from Fretilin and his surrender and exile to Indonesia on 30 August 1978. Nicolau Lobato was shot dead on 31 December 1978 (Niner, 2009). According to Constancio Pinto, the leading student clandestine leader, Xavier wanted to surrender in order to negotiate the status of East Timor regarding the human suffering they had experienced during a three-year period (1975–1978). Pinto (Pinto & Jardin, 1995, p. 73) points out that ‘the arrest of Xavier was the biggest mistake that FRETIILIN ever made’, since East Timor people acknowledged him as the main
leader, and his arrest had made ‘the Falintil and population demoralized’. Falintil *(Forças Armadas de Timor Leste)* was the military wing of Fretilin, and in later years it was transformed into the national military.

During the Indonesian occupation and five years after heavy military operation, Xanana Gusmao and other guerrillas were able to reorganize Fretilin military power in the early 1980s after setbacks in 1978 (Niner, 2009). In 1981 Gusmao with other Fretilin members in East Timor created a new body, CRRN *(Conselho da Resistência Revolutionário Nacional*, or the National Council for Revolutionary Resistance), which remained under the control of the Fretilin Central Committee (Niner, 2009).

To bridge the connection between the people in towns and the guerrillas Nurep *(Núcleos de resistência popular*, or popular resistance centres) were constructed. Different clandestine organizations were also formed in East Timor, such as Renetil *(Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor Leste)* and Fecetil *(Frente Clandestina dos Estudantes de Timor Leste)*. Fretilin also created its external office in Mozambique with its top diplomat, Ramos Horta, who continued to protest Indonesian annexation in different international forums (Horta, 1987), and also CPDM *(Comissão dos Direitos para o Povo Maubere*, the Commission for the Rights of the Maubere People) in Lisbon (Pinto & Jardin, 1995).

After Portuguese Timor was claimed as Indonesia’s 27th province in July 1976, the East Timorese civilian leader was appointed for East Timor. The first governor came from the former Apodeti leader, to be replaced later by the leader of UDT, Mario Viegas Carrascalao. During the Indonesian occupation there were two principle bureaucratic institutions: firstly, the Indonesian military bureaucracy was centralized from Jakarta to different villages in East Timor. Second, there was a civil bureaucracy that started from *gubernur* (governor), to *bupati* (regent) in *kabupaten* (regency, or district), and *camat* (chief or several *sucos*). Under
Indonesian bureaucracy East Timor was divided into 13 districts (*kabupaten*) and 442 *aldeias* (*desa* or village) (Bappeda, 1998). A *suco* consists of several *aldeias* or villages. The head of the *suco* is a *chefe de suco*, and the head of the *aldeia* is the *chefe de aldeia*.

This kind of bureaucratic structure is part of the standard bureaucracy in Indonesia. The difference is ‘the combat’, also known as the *pasukan organik*, which was deployed in the areas where the guerrillas operated, such as in East Timor, Aceh and also West Papua. The military operation in East Timor also operated in ‘dual structure’, ‘combat’ and ‘territorial’ (Kamen, 1999). Combat was the military operation to attack Fretilin guerrilla tactic, and the territorial was to control the population. To control the East Timor population, the Indonesian military operation also introduced different civilian organization such as Hansip (*Pertahanan Sipil* or Civilian Defense), and Kamra (*Keamanan Rakyat* or People Security) who came from East Timor society.

Although Indonesian modern bureaucracy tried to penetrate East Timor society for more than twenty years, these two different institutions were unable to co-opt local structures, such as *aldeia* (village) and also the head of *lulik* (sacred house or the genealogical house of every extended family in East Timor), known as *liu nain* or *lia nain*.

The East Timorese resistance movement was transformed and reorganized several times under Gusmao’s leadership as part of his political strategy against the New Order invasion. After Nicolau Lobato, Gusmao became the elected leader of the remaining Fretilin Central Committee. His political position was different to other orthodox Marxists such as Marie Alkatiri who still operated within a Bolshevik framework, where the vanguard party led the popular mass. However, this significant difference is not really clear or given significant recognition within the East Timor resistance movement, since Alkatiri was in exile during the military struggle in East Timor. However, Gusmao moved his political position from a
vanguard party imposing ideology from above down to the population, to a Gramscian political position where he searched for consensus among other political pillars, such as the East Timor Catholic Church. There were also attempts to include the political youth groups that were educated under the Indonesian educational system, and also among the East Timor Diaspora.

There are several steps that marked Gusmao’s political transformation. First, in 1984, Gusmao separated the Falintil from Fretilin. Fretilin was positioned as the national army (Carey & Cox, 1995). Second, in 1986 he formed CNRM (*Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere*, or Council of National Resistance). This particular move positioned CNRM not as a vanguard party as it was in Fretilin’s framework, but CNRM functioned as a council in which different organizations were represented, and it also dropped its revolutionary strategy. This was a strategic political step because CNRM functioned as the united body for a national organization, with Fretilin as the Marxist-Leninist Party and other resistance organizations inside it. UDT still rejected this proposal.

The next organizational transformation happened in 1998 when CNRT (*Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense*, or National Council of Timorese Resistance) was formed and accepted by the major resistance organizations (Soares, 2000). Gusmao, as the leader of the East Timor resistance in the post 1970s, struggled to find a national common ground with the youth groups and also the Catholic Church in the 1980s. A ceasefire between the Indonesian military and Fretilin was made in 1983 (Kammen, 2009) but the Falintil would continue the guerrilla war until the 1990s. What Gusmao managed to do was to form a broad political consensus, which linked different political communities within East Timor to global networks.
East Timor Catholic Church and Struggle for Independence

The narrative about the Catholic Church in East Timor is independent but related to the independence narrative since this institution is the legacy of Portuguese colonialism. The Catholic Church has a wide network in East Timor comparable with other institutions, such as the Indonesian bureaucracy and military, introduced by the Indonesian government into East Timor. The Catholic Church played a distinctive role for the East Timorese during the Indonesian occupation.

The position of the Catholic Church in East Timor is generally hostile to either revolutionary and Marxist, communist or socialist politics. In the early days of emergent parties in Portuguese Timor in the 1970s, the Bishop of the Diocese of Dili, Mgr. Ribeiro, ordered priests to preach against Fretelin (Tomodok, 1994). The political position of the Catholic Church in East Timor during the early political contest among political parties was in favour to UDT, rather than Fretelin, which was considered to be under communist influence (Jollife, 1978). On 23 January 1975, Mgr. Ribeiro wrote a pastoral letter instructing the Catholics in East Timor not to vote for communist or socialist candidates (Durand, 2002, p. 85). In this sense, the Catholic Church’s political position was not neutral and could not function as a mediator when UDT made its coup in August 1975 (Durand, 2004; Lennox, 2000).

One of the turning points came when Gusmao (2000, p. 125) made a direct call for the Catholic Church to support East Timorese independence in 1986 via the youth Catholic clandestine movement to the then bishop, Mgr. Felipe Ximenes Bello, as follows:

A church that lives with the people, a church that suffers with the people, a church that cries with the people, a church that receives the same humiliations as the people, is a church that can never ever abandon the people! The church serves the people and because it serves the people it can interpret the wishes and the sentiments of the people.
Gusmao’s call reflects the history of the Catholic Church in East Timor. The Indonesian collaboration with UDT, Apodeti, and other small political parties such as Kota and Trabalhista indicated that the Catholic Church’s decision was a political blunder from the perspective of the East Timorese. As a consequence, in October 1977, or two years after Indonesian military presence in East Timor, Mgr. Jose Ribeiro, a Portuguese citizen, resigned his position as the bishop of Dili. He was replaced by Martinho da Costa Lopes, a native East Timorese, as the apostolic administrator for the diocese. Although he was not yet ordained, the East Timorese people called him ‘the bishop’ (Lennox, 2000). During the leadership of Dom Martinho da Costa Lopes (May 1977 to May 1983), he openly criticized the massacres in East Timor, but the Vatican did not support his critical voice toward the Indonesian military operation. Therefore, he was not appointed as the future bishop of Diocese of Dili, but was replaced by the young bishop Mgr. Felipe Ximenes Bello (Lennox, 2000; Smythe, 2004).

The Catholic Church in East Timor developed as a national state-church in that it could be compared in function to the English Anglican Church. The tendency of the Catholic Church in East Timor to function as a ‘national church’ is signified by the adoption of tetum as the formal language to conduct the mass, rather than using Indonesian language as favoured by the Indonesian government (Carey, 1999). Dom Da Costa Lopes tried to bring the Church to a neutral position, by not taking any side, in the early years. But after May 1981 he started to speak openly about the violence against the East Timorese (Lennox, 2000; Smythe, 2004). Two years later he was dismissed by the Vatican and replaced by Felipe Ximenes Bello. He had to wait for five years before he was inaugurated as the bishop, which made him the first native Bishop in East Timor (Kohen, 1999; Lennox, 2000).
During the resistance period, the Catholic Church in East Timor transformed itself from a colonial into a national church and became a shelter for the East Timorese against Indonesian military operations (Kohen, 1999). As one of the two different colonial administrative structures since the Portuguese period, the Catholic Church remained there after 1975 when the Portuguese authority escaped to Atauro Island during the Indonesian military invasion. In the next 25 years, the Catholic Church in East Timor established itself as the institution for the East Timorese people, a transformation that did not happen in the Estado Novo period. For the people in the colonies, the Catholic Church and its educational system from Portugal was the symbol of civilization. The solidarity between the Church and the resistance movement can be described as follows (Carey, 1999, p. 273):

This solidarity between Church and people in East Timor has been especially noticeable in the way in which the church has cared for the wives, widows, children, and orphans of the Timorese resistance fighters. This has been done principally through the institution of the colégios...

As a consequence of the ambiguous position of East Timor’s status in international politics and also following the United Nation’s legal position, Pope John Paul II placed the Diocese of Dili directly under the Vatican, rather than the Catholic hierarchy in Jakarta, or under KWI (Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia, or Indonesian Bishops Conference) after the Portuguese era. The East Timor Catholic Church was under direct coordination of the Vatican, but it was organized by the Vatican Apostolic Pro Nuncio to Indonesia (Lennox, 2000, p. 164). The relationship between the Catholic Church in East Timor and the Indonesian Catholic Church was also ambivalent. They shared the same beliefs, but they did not share the same suffering as was experienced by the East Timorese. The Catholic Church in Indonesia was under the domination of the New Order nationalist ideology. The elites of the New Order came from the former Catholic Party (Partai Katholik) and from Indonesian
Catholic Student Organization members (*Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katholik Republik Indonesia*, or known as PMKRI). Some of these students were funded by CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), the think tank of the New Order regime in the 1970s, which advocated the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.

Six months before the papal visit, in February 1989, Bishop Bello sent a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations in which he wrote that ‘as the person responsible for the Catholic Church and as a citizen of Timor I hereby request your Excellency to initiate a genuine and democratic process of decolonisation in East Timor to be realized through a referendum’ (Kohen, 1999, p. 137).

Pope John Paul II visited East Timor on 12 October 1989 and his presence brought East Timor to the central stage of the world media again. This represented a drastic change in Catholic Church policy on East Timor, compared to 1981 when Dom Martinho sent a letter for a special audience with Pope, John Paul II, but at that time was refused with the answer that the meeting ‘was neither timely nor necessary’ (Lennox, 2004, p. 38). The Vatican’s changing reaction followed the dynamics of international politics. For the European public, the problem of East Timor decolonisation was discussed after 1986 when Portugal became a member of the European Union (Leite (ed.), 1998). Carey (1998, p. 277) points out ‘In two decades, the proportion of nominal Catholics shot up from around 30 per cent to close on 90 per cent of the East Timorese population—from 220,314 in 1974 to over 620,000 in 1994’. The Catholic Church in East Timor became the safe house for the East Timorese from Indonesian military aggression. The rising number of the religious followers itself could also be compared to the rising number of religious followers as the impact of the anti-communist propaganda of the New Order regime, which labelled those who did not hold any belief as communists.
Based on statistical data in 1989 (Table 6.1) there were six dominant religious divisions in East Timor. The Catholics were the majority, followed by the Protestants and Muslims. Hindus were a small group as part of Balinese transmigration into East Timor to teach the farming division. The Protestant group demonstrate the influx from Southern Molluca, West Timor and other parts of Indonesia. The Buddhist group was associated with the Chinese community in East Timor. Then, those who were considered as the others were those who held the local beliefs.

Table 6.1: The Religious Composition in East Timor in 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islam (Muslim)</th>
<th>Kristen (Protestant)</th>
<th>Katholik (Catholic)</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Budha</th>
<th>Lainnya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14,786</td>
<td>25,580</td>
<td>570,674</td>
<td>2,379</td>
<td>2,099</td>
<td>85,678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Timor-Timur Dalam Angka 1989*, p.142, Bappeda Tk. 1 dan Kantor Statistik Propinsi Timor Timur

The demographic data based on the religious composition of East Timor was in stark contrast to the population of Indonesia as it is shown in Table 6.2 below. In Indonesia the majority of the population was Muslim and, in 1989, 64% of the Muslim population lived in Java. Therefore this number does not cover different demographic composition in other provinces such as Bali, Moluccas, East Nusa Tenggara, and also West Papua in this year.

Table 6.2: The Religious Composition of Indonesia in 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islam (Muslim)</th>
<th>Kristen</th>
<th>Katholik</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Budha</th>
<th>Lainnya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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Durand’s table (Table 6.3) shows the changing number of Catholics in East Timor before (86%) and after independence (94%). The composition of the Catholic followers highly increased before and after independence, from 28% in 1973 to 80% in 1981. This particular increase could be understood as part of the community affiliation to the religious body to avoid the stigma of a communist label.

Table 6.3: Proportion of Catholics in East Timor, 1930–2001

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At the same time Table 6.3 also shows that the composition of Catholics in East Timor decreased for the first time in two decades, from 90% in 1990 to 86% in 1998. This could be explained by Table 6.4 based on the general election in East Timor, between Golkar (a party that consisted of functional parties, or also the government party, which was also supported by the Army), PPP (the united Islamic parties), and PDI (the nationalist and Christian parties). This number implies the increased presence of various ethnic groups from Indonesia into East Timor. The number of voters for PPP increased for the first time from 1.43% or 5,291 in 1992 to 16.6% or 77,188 in 1997. This number is quite a significant increase and for the global campaign where Indonesia is seen as a Muslim country and East Timor has a majority of Catholics. It sends a different message to the global public within the context of the ‘clash of civilization’, which was promoted by Huntington (1996).
Table 6.4: Number of voters in 1982, 1987, and 1997, in the East Timor General Election for the Central Council of the People Representatives (Indonesia).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Total Vote</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPP (Vote &amp; %)</td>
<td>Golkar (Vote &amp; %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>673 0.22</td>
<td>309,608 99.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2,648 0.73</td>
<td>338,078 93.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5,291 1.43</td>
<td>305,930 82.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>77,188 16.59</td>
<td>334,718 71.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Golkar=Golongan Karya, A political party based on functional organizations and civil servants. 
PDI=Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, A party based on old Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI or Partai Nasional Indonesia) and also the fusion of several Christian parties in 1971.

The rise of Catholicism as a new identity of the East Timorese under Indonesian incorporation also shows the other side of Amilcar Cabral’s theory on ‘liberation and culture’, which was read and adopted by Gusmao. According to Cabral, the leading political activist and theorist from Guinea Bissau who inspired the early leaders of Fretilin, ‘the greater the differences between the culture of the dominated people and that of the oppressor the more possible such a victory becomes’ (1980, p. 147).

In the 1990s Indonesian President Soeharto acknowledged the important role of the Muslim community in Indonesian politics. For instance, Indonesia took a leading role in the Islamic Conference Organization, and also Soeharto took a Hajj pilgrimage to show that he was a good Muslim. Soeharto himself is known for practicing his local beliefs known as Kejawen. However the significance of Muslim grassroots organizations, such Nadhlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, made him change his political orientation in the post-Cold War
period. Thus, in this period when the internal politics of Indonesia corresponds to the remaking of world order, for the global public the emergence of East Timor is seen as a Catholic enclave inside the biggest Muslim population in the world. Identity is a central part of global politics in the 1990s. In Indonesia in the 1990s the role of the Catholic elites decreased, although the model of the corporative state as part of ‘Catholicism’ was still used by the New Order.

Prior to the invasion, the supporters of integration argued that East Timorese culture was closer to the West Timorese, or they ‘have much in common’ (Hill, 2002, p. 79), but the politics of identities in the post-Cold War period provided a different direction to Indonesian annexation of East Timor. I am also aware there are divisions within the Catholic Church as the result of the political difference among the East Timorese. The pro Indonesian East Timorese usually attended a different Catholic church in Dili.

With the majority of the soldiers from Java, East Timorese resistance leaders have strong arguments to justify that what was happening in East Timor was the domination by the Javanese. The increase in the Muslim population in East Timor in the 1990s is demonstrated in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 after the open policy was introduced into East Timor.

The different religious identities of the majority of the Muslim Indonesian population the Catholic East Timorese increased sympathy from the global church for the East Timorese struggle. In South East Asia, the resistance of MNLF (Moro National Liberation Movement) in the Philippines could also be compared to that in East Timor. While East Timor activists in exile in the 1990s enjoyed the support of the Church network and also the human rights organizations, MNLF did not follow this path, but was linked to Al Qaeda. In the 1990s, when the issue of the ‘clash of civilization’ was on the stage again, the Church solidarity was among the main pillars of the East Timor global network.
The New Generation of Resistance and Santa Cruz Massacre

In Santa Cruz a massacre took place on 12 November 1991, with most of the victims coming from the youth group. In the early period Fretilin proclaimed itself as the only party for the East Timorese and also a revolutionary party with a military strategy as the main objective. For the next stages Gusmao, the main leader of the East Timorese resistance movement, collaborated with other broad youth clandestine organizations and the Catholic Church and coordinated with global networks to develop a resistance movement.

In January 1991, although there was disagreement over the Portuguese parliamentary visit to East Timor, President Soeharto agreed to it (Purnomowati et al., 1991). During this period, Mario Carrascalao, the Governor of East Timor, opposed Soeharto’s idea of letting Portuguese Parliamentary members into East Timor. He preferred East Timor to stay outside of international press and international attention. Before the planned visit to Dili, the tension between the two youth groups—the pro-independence and pro-integration—was increasing. In the clash between the two different political youth groups, a member of each side was killed in late October 1998. On 12 November 1991, there was a misa requiem for the youth activists from the pro-independence side, but it was not only a requiem mass, it was also a massive demonstration against the Indonesian regime in East Timor (Hadad et al., 1991).

Although at the last minute the Portuguese parliamentary visit was cancelled, international journalists and activists were already in East Timor to cover the reaction to the visit. For the resistance group, the world coverage of the East Timor decolonisation process after 1975 was important. Therefore, one of the goals of the youth demonstration was to break the silence by attracting media coverage to East Timor.
Indeed, the global publicity of the Santa Cruz Massacre became the turning point for putting the East Timor resistance on the global media map again. The number of people killed in the Santa Cruz massacre was far less than the estimated number of the causalities in three years (1975–1978) in which around one-third of the total East Timor population was killed (Feith, 1992). However, the presence of international journalists in East Timor made the difference from the earlier years. After two decades of Indonesian annexation, the world’s political gaze on East Timor started to change.

The high number of youth victims and also the visual evidence of the Santa Cruz Massacre shocked the world. According to the Indonesian Army Investigation team, the victims were 50 young East Timorese. Pinto, the leader of the youth clandestine movement on that day, estimated 273 victims (Pinto & Jardin, 1997). The footage of the massacre taken by a documentary filmmaker spread rapidly around the world. It was the first time that the international public had proof of the atrocities in East Timor. Two U.S. journalists were also victims of the Indonesian military and later gave testimonies in different cities in the U.S., and the network campaign grew. The global activist networks to support East Timor’s human rights issues emerged as strong pillars from different countries and organizations around the globe. They varied from journalists, socialists, human rights activists and also church networks. In East Timor, after the Santa Cruz massacre and following the international pressure, the military approach was revisited and prosecuted within Indonesian military law. It was followed with the dissolution of Kolakops (Komando Pelaksana Operasi), ‘the combat’ part of the Indonesian military, which had operated for the last 17 years in East Timor (Purnomowati et al., 1991). In a reverse of the existing military strategy, Abilio Soares, a member of Apodeti who was supported by Prabowo Subianto (Soeharto’s son-in-law),
replaced Mario Carrascalao, a moderate and the second East Timor governor in the Indonesian era who had served his second term.

Not all Portuguese schools had been closed after the Indonesian occupation. The *Externato De Sao Jose* became central to the resistance among the youth clandestine movement in the 1980s. The students in *Externato* were taught in Portuguese. In schools, the symbol of resistance was shown by opposing the learning of the Indonesian language (*Bahasa Indonesia*) and other subjects related to Indonesian civic education.

The clandestine movement among the East Timor youth group was the next phase of resistance. If the military structure of the Fretilin resistance could not operate inside urban areas, and other cities in Indonesia, the networks of the youth clandestine movement were able to do so. The testimony of Constancio Pinto (Pinto & Jardin, 1997), one of the leading figures in the clandestine movement, shows that even under strict military control they were able to develop a communication system to link the youth activists in urban areas, as well as the Fretilin guerillas, and also function as the channel to different international organizations.

The emergence of the youth activists in 1983 (Pinto & Jardin, 1997) not only indicates the regeneration of resistance, but it also signifies the ability of Gusmao’s leadership to build a nationalist front with the younger generation. For instance, Gusmao’s appeal for the Catholic Church, cited above, to act as a ‘liberating church’ in East Timor was made in his letter to the Catholic Youth on 20 May 1986 (Gusmao, 2000, p. 125). In February 1989, this appeal was acted upon when Bishop Bello wrote a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations to ask the body to take responsibility for East Timor. Bishop Bello’s appeal would be seriously considered after the Santa Cruz massacre.
Indonesian researchers from Gadjah Mada University who conducted research in East Timor in 1990 captured the conditions for the young in this era, before the Santa Cruz Massacre, writing as follows (Mubyarto et al., 1991, p. 43):

Students groups feel psychologically imprisoned because of the military pressure which always limits and controls their movements. When this pressure accumulates, it is not surprising that the students make their presence felt though a ‘form of resistance’. Given the intellectual capital and strength of the students, along with the basics of a practical political education, it is not impossible that this will give rise to tension.

Their recommendation to the Indonesian government was that, ‘the failure of the colonial system must not be repeated by bringing in new colonists and a new model of colonialism’ (Mubyarto et al., 1991, p. 43). They insisted that the Indonesian government should end the ‘war condition’ as soon as possible (Mubyarto et al., 1991, p. 65). However, this warning was ignored and also banned.

In Indonesia, after Santa Cruz the protest against the New Order regime among the clandestine groups of East Timorese students developed in different cities across the rest of Indonesia. The East Timorese clandestine groups collaborated with different Indonesian student organizations and also with different Indonesian NGOs that demanded a democratic system and respect for human rights issues. The central criticism was against the military operation in Aceh, East Timor, and also in Papua. Here lays the central problem of the New Order regime, since territorial sovereignty under the Indonesian military did follow an emancipation project as the goal of Indonesian independence as declared in 1945.

While in the early years, the East Timor liberation movement was attacked for its association with communism, in the 1990s the East Timor resistance groups in Indonesia were attacked as being ‘anti integration’ or a challenge to Indonesian national identity.
**East Timorese Resistance as a Global Network**

The footage of the Santa Cruz Massacre was the final call of global solidarity for East Timor in 1991. For instance, in the U.S., it was not only a matter of a reaction to Santa Cruz massacres but also criticism from U.S. citizens toward their government’s foreign policy to East Timor from the 1970s onward. One of the leading organizations was ETAN (East Timor Action Network) founded in the U.S. in December 1991 and consisting of ‘students and also veteran activists’, including Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn. This was a grassroots organization with branches in different states in the U.S. ETAN supported East Timor’s self-determination campaign by publishing *Estafeta* (a messenger), a newsletter, facilitating East Timor activists to give testimonies in the U.S., filing news on East Timor and distributing them through a vast network using the Internet.

ETAN’s mission statement (ETAN, 2011) proposes that:

…we work to influence the policies of the United States government and international institutions as they relate to East Timor. The history of U.S. support for Indonesia's illegal invasion and occupation of East Timor underlies ETAN’s efforts to achieve accountability for those responsible at home and abroad for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed from 1975 on. ETAN is also motivated by the need for continued vigilance to ensure genuine self-determination for the people of East Timor.

The critical voice from the grassroots movement in the U.S. was a significant contribution in 1998, leading to the U.S. government’s support for an East Timor referendum in 1999.

During this period, different East Timor clandestine members actively campaigned. In Jakarta many in the youth group were looking for political asylum in different Western embassies (Himawan, 1993). Simpson (2004) argues that the international campaign was important to maintain the visibility of the East Timor issue in the Western media between 1975 and 1991. Realizing that control of information by the Soeharto regime was the key to domination for claiming truth, different clandestine groups operated in Indonesia to
challenge the information blockade by transferring information using cassette, fax machine, satellite phone and also Internet (Pinto, 1997; Hill, 2002; Rei, 2007).

It took more than fifteen years for the East Timorese activists to get the momentum to tell the world about their suffering under Indonesian occupation and it was only possible when Western journalists were there and also became the victims of the Western supported military regime. Max Stahl, the documentary filmmaker of the Santa Cruz massacres, writes that ‘the foreigners had been there and filmed the event, and the foreigners, for once also, were also beaten up and this they believe will be noticed’ (Cohen, 1999, p. 168). In the following year, Xanana Gusmao, the East Timor resistance leader was captured in Dili in November 1992. His arrest was followed by the surrender of 200 Falintil members as political prisoners in East Timor.

Thus, from late 1991 onward, the campaign in East Timor in the U.S. became a global public agenda, and not the minor issue as it had been treated before. In Simpson’s record (2004) in December 1991, ETAN (East Timor Action Network) was formed, and followed with the establishment of the International Federation of East Timor (IFET) and also the Asia Pacific Conference for East Timor (APCET) (Inbaraj, 1995, pp.128–149). The character of the transnational activism is shown by the fact that in 1995 ‘East Timor solidarity groups existed in more than twenty countries—Japan alone had fifty local organizations’ (Simpson, 2004, p. 461).

Before the Santa Cruz massacre was filmed, Western governments, and Vatican bureaucracy, only gave neutral comments about the East Timor case to their citizens or remained silent. However, after the publication of the documentary film, these governments were challenged by various grassroots organizations that focused on human rights issues. For instance, in 1994, the World Council of Churches had a special meeting ‘to advise on the
contributions churches might make towards the advancing of justice, peace and human rights in East Timor’ (John (ed.), 1995, p. 19). However, the countries in ASEAN (Association of the Southeast Asian Nations) continued to support Jakarta’s policy on East Timor and challenged the human rights group meetings in their own territories.

Indonesian New Order policing of information sharing among the East Timorese was possible when East Timor was treated as a closed area under military control and when the Internet was not widely used. Furthermore, it was still possible for Indonesian intelligence officers in East Timor to take effective control over the East Timorese population, as it was not possible to travel freely into East Timor or out of the area when the open policy had not yet been decided. However, by 1989 it was impossible to control the East Timorese sharing of information by meeting, phone call, exchanging letters and also cassettes to share the ideas of resistance.

In 1996, the global campaign for the East Timorese received another significant result by being able to support two East Timorese leaders to receive a shared Noble peace award for Jose Ramos Horta and Bishop Bello. The endorsement of the Nobel peace prize came from the East Timor global network. They were not only the global solidarity activists for East Timor but also came from the East Timorese Diasporas in exile, in places such as Australia, Portugal, Mozambique, the U.S. and other European countries (Wise, 2006). It is not an accident that East Timor nationalism is focused on international solidarity. This was part of East Timor resistance strategies to ‘focus on international diplomacy and negotiated solution’ and to coordinate ‘with international solidarity and sympathetic politicians’ (Niner, 2009, p. 84). The strategy to win international public opinion was taken since the military challenge to the Indonesian New Order regime was seen as impossible.
East Timor Self-Determination

The possibility of East Timorese independence came when Soeharto, the leader of the Indonesian New Order regime decided to step down in May 1998. In the 1970s, the end of the Portuguese Empire began with the crisis in Lisbon as the result of the Portuguese financial crisis, brought about by its African War. In 1999 in East Timor the second decolonisation started with the crisis of the New Order regime in Jakarta as the consequence of a currency crisis, and also with a pro-democracy movement in Indonesia (Widjojo et al., 1999).

On 5th May 1999, the Indonesian interim president, B.J. Habibie reached an agreement with Portugal and the UN to offer a referendum as an option for self-determination for the East Timorese (Martin, 2001; Nevins, 2002). This very important decision was made without any involvement of the East Timorese, neither the pro-independence nor pro-integration groups. It was not based on the mutual agreement of all political factions in East Timor. Ramos Horta had designed it several years before as the representative of CNRM (Pinto & Jardin, 1997; Leite (ed.), 1996). The immediate decision for a referendum was made without preparation and contingency planning, which in the post-referendum later led to a strong reaction from the Indonesian army and also the militias who were supported by them.

On 21 May 1998, the U.S. Senate had demanded the temporary president B.J. Habibie, the former vice president of Soeharto, to support ‘an international supervised referendum on self-determination’ (Simpson, 2004, p. 469). On 19 December 1998 John Howard, Australian Prime Minister sent a letter for Habibie to reconsider ‘the status of East Timor’ in the future, which sparked Habibie to take a drastic change on East Timor policy (Martin, 2001, pp. 20–21). Howard’s policy was the continuation of that of the Labour Party, which had revised policy since August 1997 to support a self-determination process in East Timor.
Although the referendum had been decided, there was no further planning for those who might lose in the referendum process. For the international public and also in Habibie’s government, the existence of the other political faction, in East Timor was unrecognised or simply considered to be the creation of the New Order regime as it is always claimed by the major political faction of East Timor. With a lack of understanding of different factions inside the New Order regime and also the political dynamics in East Timor, it was impossible to creatively transform the existing conflict into a better transition period for the East Timorese. Even the Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas, did not consider the existence of ‘the pro-integration’ group. When Alatas concluded that ‘our proposal was that if they reject it, then let’s pack and leave’ (Martin, 2001, p. 24), he disregards the East Timorese who supported integration but decided to be incorporated after the referendum.

The Indonesian military officers or Indonesian civil servants who were not from East Timor might easily follow his suggestion to pack and leave, but the real problem was about the East Timorese who were born in East Timor but voted for integration. How might they move from East Timor was not on the agenda of Indonesia, Portugal or the UN on 5th May 1999.

Formally, BJ Habibie was the president, but he had no real power to control the various factions inside the Indonesian military, and also the semi-military organizations, known as the militias in East Timor. His background as a civilian was different from that of Soeharto who was a general of the Indonesian Army. Unlike Soeharto, Habibie’s main supporters came from ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Organization). In contrast, during the Indonesian annexation under President Soeharto, the New Order regime think tank was CSIS (Center for Strategic and International
Studies) led by several former exponents of the Catholic youth organization such as Harry Tjan Silalahi as the leading lobbyist for East Timor to Australia.

The complex relation of Indonesian politics can be read in Kuntari’s *Timor-Timur Satu Menit Terakhir* (2008), in particular about the atmosphere of Habibie’s political decision. There was strong rivalry between Habibie and the Indonesian Army, represented by General Wiranto, and also the different factions within the Indonesian Army, which had made it impossible to comprehend Indonesian politics as a coherent entity.

**Post-Indonesian Development of Politics in East Timor**

In this part of the chapter, I would like to present why the atrocities occurred in East Timor without the ability to transform the conflict into a nonviolent consensus. The politics of the UN for the East Timor referendum in 1999 contributed to the massive violence in East Timor. For the UN Secretary General the result of the referendum was the goal as he led the UN to take the advantage on Habibie’s transitional period. It was the momentum that forced the UN to take this decision.

It should be noted that after 24 years of Indonesian occupation, the East Timorese population was highly divided between the pro-independence and pro-integration group. When the East Timorese pro-independence guerrillas were in the jungle or in the mountainous areas, the East Timorese civilian militias were part of Indonesian occupation power since 1975. For instance, in 1982 it is estimated that about 31,000 Ratih (*Rakyat Terlatih*, or trained citizens) existed in East Timor (Robinson, 2003). In 1997 there were approximately 10,000 civil defence members (*Hansip*, or *Pertahanan Sipil*) in East Timor (BPS Timor Timur, 1997). East Timor was a militarised society; from 1975 to 1989 East Timor was part of the
Indonesian military closed area. Different military networks were created, either from the East Timor resistance and also Indonesia as the occupier.

The New Order strategy to win the East Timor population was to modernise and develop East Timor, known as strategi pembangunan (development strategy). Under Indonesian occupation, East Timor was the 27th province of Indonesia and prioritized for its development program. However, the development policy did not answer the critics of the right to invade for the Indonesian regime. At the same time the unprepared referendum was not the best answer to the problem of Indonesian occupation. While the UN secretary general claimed that the East Timor referendum was necessary, at the same time the possible victims in East Timor in 1999 were underestimated (Martin, 2001; Schulze, 2001). The conflict within the UN, in particular between ‘UN’s peacekeeping experts’ and ‘Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s political team’, also contributed to place the agreement on 5 May 1999 as ‘a victim intra-organizational competition’ (Schulze, 2001, p. 80).

While in Indonesia the two political blocs were represented by Habibie, the ad interim president, and General Wiranto, in the United Nations a similar dilemma was also faced by the peacekeeping forces and the political side of the United Nations. The two contested agendas for UN are explored here. First, the peace building experts were concerned about the outcome of such an instant decision with very limited preparation (Schulze, 2001). Second, the ‘Secretary General and his personal Representative and all the key members states were, however, determined to maintain the momentum’ (Martin, 2001, p. 123). What was considered as momentum was the period of Habibie as the ad interim president from the result of the first Indonesian general election in post Soeharto era. From this particular point, we can see that the UN is not a neutral body in the East Timor case. The crisis in Indonesia was not only seen as momentum for a ‘referendum’ as an instrument for self-determination, but it was
also the momentum for independence. The difficulty here is primarily one of accountability in terms of the question of who holds the UN accountable when it makes a poor decision.

The UN’s decision for East Timor was a revolutionary one. The UN is not a neutral body; it is also a political instrument. In the joint meeting on 5th May 1999, there was no planning on how to solve the different political factions within East Timor. After living under military surveillance for more than 24 years under Indonesian occupation and also experiencing tragic war, there was no transition period for the East Timorese, from the surveillance period coordinated by different Indonesian security institutions during the occupation to a reliable situation for democratic self-determination. While the legal terms had been agreed in New York for a referendum, in reality East Timor as part of Indonesian juridical territory was also vanishing. During this period violent action was uncontrollable, since the juridical agency was also part of the problem. In Indonesia, the Indonesian Army was excluded from the decision making process by Habibie (Kuntari, 2008; Schultz, 2001).

Focusing on ‘the political momentum’ to conduct the referendum as the mechanism of self-determination, neglected the possibility of mass violence. The process did not even recognize the life of the new population of influx into East Timor since it was proclaimed as an Indonesian province, and also East Timor as an open area in 1989. In less than four months, the migrants from Indonesia into East Timor had to pack their things and return. At the same time the big question addressed by the ‘pro integration group’ from East Timor was where these migrants would go. They were not represented by UN’s secretary general, Indonesian or Portuguese leaders. The referendum covered the problem of East Timor legal status in International relations, but did not solve the legacy of the Cold War, which was embedded with the invasion. The referendum was the mechanism for self-determination but
also functioned as an instrument of ‘exclusion’ of the others who were not considered as part of the ‘self’. I elaborate on this in this next chapter.

The end of Indonesian development politics in East Timor was followed by a scorched earth policy: a massive violent action to burn the public facilities, and also the houses in East Timor. At the same time the radical group within the Indonesian Army coordinated the killing to those they regarded as ‘traitors’. The targets were not only the Westerners and East Timorese, but also Indonesians.

**Referendum and the Aftermath**

The result of the referendum according to UNAMET (United Nations Mission in East Timor), which registered 451,792 voters, is quoted by Martin (2001, p. 11) from Kofi Annan as follows:

In fulfilment of the task entrusted to me by the 5 May Agreements, I hereby announce that the result of the vote is 94,338, or 21.5 per cent, in favor and 344,580, or 78.5 per cent against the proposed special autonomy.

The announcement of the referendum was followed by massive migration from East Timor. It was a combination of forced migration, the majority, and also voluntary migration for those who voted to be Indonesian citizens. Forced migration and violence during the referendum process was predicted earlier, but those who were responsible for organising the migration failed to reach a general consensus to prevent such atrocities. The international powers could not do anything to prevent it when the territory was under Indonesian military control and the Indonesian military was part of the problem itself (Martin, 2000).

From 25 October 1999 to 4 May 2001, United Nations introduced the UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administrations in East Timor) into East Timor with its ultimate mission ‘to administer the non-self-governing territory and prepare it for independence’
(Smith & Dee, 2003). Thus the UNTAET major task was to introduce temporary government during this transition period, to re-establish peace conditions in East Timor, and also to resettle the East Timorese population who were forced to move to West Timor.

Figure 5.1: Map of Timor Leste


Those who were forced to migrate in the later period returned under the repatriation scheme, while the rest were considered as part of ‘voluntary migration’ and still live in camps, or temporary shelter in West Timor (Indonesia), and other semi-permanent houses. To distinguish between the victims of forced migration and self-migration, several international organizations, such as IOM (International Organization for Migration), UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees), ICRC (International Committee for the Red Cross), and JRS (Jesuit Refugees Service), facilitated the repatriation process for the East Timorese refugees. Those who did not return to East Timor were considered as pro-integration or part of the voluntary migration and labelled as internally displaced persons. However, this term is also ambivalent and they were also internally categorized as Indonesian citizens.
The history of the East Timorese in East Timor after 1999 has been elaborated by various writers, but the story of East Timorese after the referendum in West Timor is forgotten (Li, 2002; 2007). Most of them have lived in temporary shelters for more than a decade. In the international media most of them are positioned as part of the militia groups. However, since the very beginning, there should have been a clear distinction made between the ‘collaborators’ with the New Order regime and ‘refugees’ from the political divisions in East Timor society.

During the convergencia, there was no representation for Apodeti because they were, and are, considered as part of the New Order regime. Thus, at an international level while looking for an East Timor solution there was no representation for other East Timorese political parties who decided to support the Indonesian incorporation.

Here lies the problem. The incorporation of East Timor was a decision of the New Order regime. With the end of the New Order regime its legitimacy was also at an end. The main supporters of East Timorese integration were the New Order regime led by the Indonesian Army. But the terror story of militias should not dominate the whole story of the massive migration and the history of those who are suffering in West Timor (Indonesia). The new sovereign power should not forget about those who have lived in temporary camps for more than a decade and claim that they are the creation of Indonesia. The distinction between the ‘New Order Regime’ and ‘different political faction out of East Timor’ after the referendum should be made or they will not be acknowledged anywhere and their suffering will be silenced.

The other aspect, which is neglected by most researchers, is that the processing of East Timor’s decolonisation by the U.S. senate in just one day after Soeharto transferred his presidential chair halted decolonisation in Indonesia. In particular it halted the proper
evaluation of the New Order regime over the last three decades. Thus, the assumption that Habibie was a legitimate president does not display a proper understanding of the situation. As a temporary president with limited authority over the Indonesian army and its factions, it was not possible to assume that in three months the UN mission would be able, from June to August 1999, to arrange a peaceful transition from the New Order regime to a United Nations mandate.

Thus, at the same time not only did the problems of the New Order regime in East Timor remain unsolved, but the issue of the victims of the New Order regime in Indonesia could not be opened. Habibie, as the first civilian politician in three decades was faced with one of the most difficult tasks. However, while Indonesians were not able to continue state building as a result of Cold War politics, East Timor decolonisation entered a new phase of state building after the transition of power from the UNTAET.

Summary

The decolonisation of East Timor in 1999 is still considered a modern project that followed global order. Those who are decolonized are positioned as inferior, and do not act as subjects of the agreement, which are constructed by former colonizers. Rather, they are positioned as objects of the agreement. When self-determination is only understood as a technical term, it fails to understand the complex power relation that existed in East Timor prior to the referendum, and led to mass violence in East Timor. While most commentators posing this problem in the post-1999 period as only legal, as part of the mass violence conducted in 1999, the problem of the East Timor conflict remains untold. The political divisions within East Timor are not yet understood, and the legacy of Cold War politics, which is embedded within the New Order regime, is also forgotten. To this point Althusser
(Althusser & Balibar, 2009, p. 57) gives his advice ‘to open a new space on a different site—the space required for a correct posing of the problem, one which does not prejudge the solution’.

When the referendum is only posed as a legal instrument in international politics and only represents the East Timor resistance movement, it does not function as conflict settlement; rather as an instrument of exclusion. What was the point of doing the referendum when the result was already known? Yes, it is important for international legitimacy for the East Timor independence group, but at the same time there is no responsibility of Habibie’s government, the UN and other international solidarity groups toward the ‘pro-integration’ group. Here, the UN and also its counterparts do not open a new space or look for new solutions for the new exclusions as the consequence of the ballot. Rather, the UN enters new political terrain when it operates as though it were a political existence, which could form ‘UN’s sovereignty’. The problem of the political institution above the state is not yet answered. Here the debate about the politics of humanitarian action and its political implications in decolonisation takes its real context. I elaborate on this part in Chapter VII.

The decolonisation in East Timor in 1999 did solve its legal status for the international public, but the problem of the dislocation of the East Timorese remains. If the East Timorese who fought for independence have the possibility to speak about their right for self-determination, the other group of East Timorese who were the loyalists to the New Order regime have no place to speak about their suffering. In Indonesia in 1999, the New Order regime is in a phase of transition, and, internationally, its history remains unknown. Thus, ‘internal colonialism’ in Indonesia is rarely acknowledged and the continued hegemonic structure of Empire is also rarely acknowledged. In the next chapter I elaborate on the
suffering and silence of the excluded East Timor group, which is beyond the reach of global solidarity.
...today’s democratic-capitalist project of eliminating the poor classes through development not only reproduces within itself the people that is excluded but also transforms the entire population of the Third World into bare life. Only a politics that will have learned to take the fundamental biopolitical fracture of the West into account will be able to stop the oscillation and to put an end to the civil war that divides the peoples of and the cities of the earth.


In ‘Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life’
The independence of East Timor from Indonesia reminds us about similar events in the 1970s on the Iberian Peninsula when Estado Novo was collapsed and it was followed by decolonisation of Portuguese ‘overseas provinces’ in the 1970s. On the first era of East Timor decolonisation, rather than becoming an independent state, the East Timor independence was challenged by Indonesian military regime. East Timor was taken as Indonesia’s 27th province. This is part of the corporatist deal that was imposed on Indonesia and later to East Timor during the Cold War.

However, after two decades the Indonesian New Order corporatist regime is unable to survive against the expansion of the neo liberal market economy, and the international community proposed East Timor’s independence during the financial crisis in Asia. At the lowest point of the Indonesian New Order corporatist regime, East Timor’s second decolonisation was conducted. It follows the path of Portuguese decolonisation on its colonies two decades before.

What was not anticipated is the new displaced group as the international community did not predict the consequence of East Timor’s second decolonisation. The paradox is that while the global solidarity celebrates East Timor’s second decolonisation as the triumph of the global solidarity network, the new displaced group of East Timor remains in the dark. Today, many of the displaced still live in camps in West Timor, Indonesia. The camps for East Timorese in West Timor (Indonesia) were only intended for a temporary period before they were to be naturalized, but after a decade they remain without a clear resolution. They live in very poor conditions.

The second East Timor decolonisation took place in 1999. If the exclusion of the Fretilin members was part of the first East Timor decolonisation by the Indonesian regime, in the second East Timor decolonisation the new exclusion is experienced by those who affiliate with the New Order regime. The vanguard element in East Timor’s second decolonisation is a combination of East Timorese and an international network of either communitarian or cosmopolitan groups.
The reason why this new excluded group is unable to speak from the camps is because as Arendt (1958) argues, life in camp is not only a life in which citizenship rights are not applicable but also void are the broader rights of man (Arendt, 1958). I argue that this particular suffering is a consequence of the decolonisation project but it is beyond the capability of global solidarity to recognize the unknown political community whose narrative is beyond the reach of the global network. Here, Agamben’s critics—derived from Arendt and Foucault—gives insight about the problem of ‘the people of camps’ in the margins of nation-states as the effect of two different powers: juridical and disciplinary power. Rather than accepting the formation of state as the final project, the state should be seen as an unfinished project. Based on historical analysis, which I have presented in Chapters III, IV, V, and VI, the critique of the emancipatory role of state goes beyond the Marx critique. Here the work of Agamben, Arendt, and Foucault help us to recognise this particular problem.

The Right of Self-Determination, Sovereignty of the People, and Camp: a Postcolonial Agenda

Retrospectively, the problem of the East Timorese in camps in West Timor is not simply about their conflict with the East Timor nationalist group, but it is bound up with the modern imagination of the state as a set of normative political institutions in international relation for the former European colonies after WWII. The state model itself is seen as a model that is available to be duplicated in postcolonial states with coercive strategy. In contrast, during the era before the idea of the state is adopted by the elites, different local polities existed together. However, when the modern state is imposed as the normative form
of political community, and life becomes the object of invasion, those polities are seen as lower and should be replaced as the consequence of the modern project.\textsuperscript{20}

After WWII, it was not likely that the decolonisation would be translated as the recognition of the ‘other’ in Western modernity nor as part of the acceptance of sovereignty of the new states. In contrast, decolonisation is the continuation of the modern project, which is similar to different kinds of colonialism in different practices of ‘the state of exception’ to other non-sovereign states.

The non-sovereign states are the object of discrimination by other sovereign states. Colonialism itself is defined as a state of exception (Agamben, 1998; Schmitt, 1985) with its multiple layers of exception.\textsuperscript{21} The creation of United Nations in post WWII is followed by different military alliances with the exceptional right to intervene in other states. In the Indonesian context during the Cold War, as presented in Chapters III and IV, foreign intervention to support the military regime against Soekarno took place in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{22} For Portugal, it is a different case, since the extreme pole between communism and liberalism during the Salazar regime was answered by a corporatist regime, influenced by strong

\textsuperscript{20} Historically, those who live in exile are not necessary classified as pro integration or aiming to follow Indonesian New Order political stance, but are part of it since their collective leaders (liurai) were part of the conflict; or their family members were part of Fretelin but they were killed by Fretelin to impose party discipline when they intended to surrender during the guerrilla war as it was experienced by the first President of Fretelin; or their families were members of the opposite political parties such as Apodeti, and UDT. The politics of fear, which was conducted during the revolution by Fretelin, is rarely mentioned. These stories, which are the point of divergence of the two political communities of East Timor, are treated as minor stories in comparison to the violence in 1999. The violence itself is a tragedy that marks the exclusion of a new East Timor political community, which is rarely spoken about by the global public.

\textsuperscript{21} For instance it is not only about the state of exception by the sovereign state to other non-sovereign states, but also it is about continuing discrimination by native modern elites to other indigenous communities. The elites assume that they have the right to make an exception to rule the country when the idea of the modern state is recognized as higher than the local culture. If in the past the consent of the people in colonies was denied by the European colonisers, today in international relations this exceptionality is defined by Chatterjee (2005) as the prerogative to intervene and also to collaborate with the modern educated elites.

\textsuperscript{22} The emerging postcolonial state of Indonesia after the European colonisation period is mostly understood as the continuing modernization of the state. However, the unification of the territory Republic of Indonesia as the legacy of the Netherlands East Indies is done without consensus. Different political ideologies and local political communities are placed as the enemies of the state by the dominant political group. Therefore, they are eradicated without considering the peaceful way to incorporate them within the new Republic. The violent effect of the totalitarian impulse of political rationality in state formation, and failure to calculate the realistic tempo of state formation are the two main causes behind the emerging of the totalitarian state in postcolonial Indonesia.
Catholicism because of his background. It should be noted that while in the 1970s the Portugal corporatist deal ended, different corporatist regimes in the 1970s were supported and imposed by the U.S. and its allies. The corporatist deal was chosen by Western countries to control other states by controlling the military as the coercive element of the state, such as in Brazil and Chile during the military regime.

‘Foreign intervention’ into a new state arose as part of the process of defining the ‘self identities’ of state and is strongly related to contested ideologies in early state formation. It also coincides with the constitution of world order. As an ideal concept in international juridical thought, in order to practice the right of ‘self-determination’, the elites of the former colonies need to challenge the legacy of imperialist colonialism. Here the conflict lies. The construction of the self may be related to or be the result of the contest of primordial identities such as ethnic, religious, and other pan movement, such as Communism or Islamism.23

The foreign intervention into South East Asia, in particular into Indonesia and East Timor in the 1960s and 1970s, is based on the shared political concept of the state among the early leaders about sovereignty of the state.24 It is about their preference on how the state is defined in particular. It is also about the economic problem and the concept of equality among citizens. The Cold War politics in both countries have been narrated in previous chapters.

Hardt and Negri (2000) point out that in the post World War II period, the U.S. emerged as the most powerful state where its particular constitution strengthens the idea of

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23 Hannum (1990, p. 31) points out that when the idea of self-determination is practiced “the assertion by one ‘self’ of political auto-determination almost necessarily entails the denials of auto-determination to another ‘self’”.
24 In this early period, the left in Indonesia and East Timor is close to China. In Indonesia, the Communists and Nationalists share the idea of a strong centralistic state. The emergence of central government itself has direct impact on the existence of local polities. Here is the different practice between the Dutch and the new modern Indonesian leaders. The Netherlands East Indies under the Dutch in the 19th century conquered the local polities in order to gain a trading monopoly, but they did not replace it with direct rule. Rather, the local polities accepted the model of indirect rule. Under the new Indonesian elites the local polities are not accepted, except for certain provinces, but the unification of Indonesia into centralistic government has been done under military domination since its formative period. This similar attitude was also shared by UDT and also Fretilin in 1975.
imperial sovereignty in a new form. They (Hardt & Negri, 2000) claim that the existence of the nation-state is no longer important in the coming empire. However, I argue that the existence of capitalist sovereignty with its disciplinary power does not necessarily eliminate the existence of nation-states as the juridico-political territory (Brown, 1995; Agamben, 1995). If the camps are part of their analysis, then the other cosmopolitan authors, who are represented by Hardt and Negri’s claim, once again discard the existence of the camps in the contemporary period.

In the East Timor case the decolonisation with the strong cosmopolitan network has placed East Timor under direct intervention from the global network. What is claimed as the sovereignty of the cosmopolitan state is practiced as extreme westernisation, which excludes the local population in their homeland. I also argue that the state as a particular juridical field is still very important, otherwise the process of exclusion becomes very banal in the neoliberal period. In relation to the existence of ‘states’ within the Empire, Foucault (2010, p. 5) gives his clear ideas as follows:

The state only exists through and for itself and it only exists in the plural. That is to say there is nothing like an imperial structure which it has to merge with or submit to at a more or less distant point on the historical horizon and which would in some way represent God’s theophany in the world, leading men to a finally united humanity on the threshold of the world. So there is no integration of the state in the Empire. The state only exists as states, in the plural.

Foucault’s argument above is different to the claim of Hardt and Negri that the coming Empire is directed by capitalist sovereignty with no centre. In contrast, I argue that the centre of the capitalist sovereignty exists in the sovereign state. About the problem of sovereignty, Arendt (1958, p. 269) points out that national sovereignty is a ‘mockery except for giant states’, since only the sovereign states could impose their policy to other states.
By supporting the idea of the significance of state sovereignty, it is not necessary to discard subaltern criticism of ‘internal colonialism’ in postcolonial states (Guha, 1982), and to neglect the tension between ‘social regulation’ and ‘social emancipation’ (De Sousa Santos, 2007). The difference is that the criticism toward these new elites is not only limited to the topic of class division, but also pertains to the idea of modernity, which has been adopted by the elites and function as the main ‘difference’ between them and the rest of the society. This ambivalent position is possible to be understood through understanding Hardt and Negri’s (2000, pp. 132–134) analysis of national liberation as a ‘poisonous gift’, and also Bhabra’s (2007) critical ideas toward the postcolonial theorist who ‘simply inverts the dualism inherent to the dominant conceptions and, in that way, preserves the very intellectual structure that is being challenged’.  

Furthermore, the transformation of former colonies into independent states in post WWII brings two possibilities; either the sovereign state or the postcolonial state is treated as a non-political community or a quasi-state. What is considered as the strategy against foreign hegemony in international relations is only possible when the subjects in a postcolonial state are able to form a sovereign state. The state is intended to protect them from the anarchy of themarket, which is embedded in different versions of capitalist logic, and also the dominancy of the giant states. In postcolonial states, further expansion of capitalist sovereignty is made easier when the local tradition is mostly abandoned under the claim of non-scientific or uncivilized. The capitalist expansion is also wildly expanded under the Lockean claim on property of the uncivilized in which the state has become a toxic institution for the indigenous communities.

25 Related to these criticisms, it should be remembered that the decolonisation project for postcolonial states at least has internal and external directions. Internally, it should be able to govern the population, and externally, it should be able to challenge the foreign domination and work together with other states or organizations for mutual purpose.
On the existence of capitalist sovereignty, I argue that, first, Hardt and Negri have forgotten to notice the distinction between sein and sollen, and how in the level of concept these two things should not be conflated in order to give the room for the imaginative sphere. In the juridical field this particular criticism is the fundamental difference between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt in practicing the idea of interstate sovereignty (Ojakangas, 2003, pp. 33-40).

Second, there is the problematic issue related to the organization of the multitude on a global scale, as suggested by Hardt and Negri, to resist against the domination of the Empire. I suggest that their criticism toward Western Modernity, or Empire, as the two sides of the same coin is similar to Marx’s assumptions about the Asiatic mode of production and the ideas of barbarianism. This Eurocentric imaginary to which Karl Marx was also bound more than a century ago is not a thing of the past. On the contrary, by assuming that the multitude is already an adequate concept to create a new multifaceted model of contemporary solidarity, there is the potency to silence others in this modern era. This is the general condition of knowledge production, not in terms of race and ethnicity, but in terms of Western sites, which provide the reference point for academic claims to knowledge. The new ‘educated elites’ in postcolonial states look on their fellow citizens through European lenses. Academia from the postcolonial state are also trapped in Western hegemonic knowledge production (Santos et al., 2007).

**Network of Power/Global Solidarity: Refugees and Suffering as a Postcolonial Problem**

From Chapters III to VI, I have tried to explain how the silence of the East Timorese in exile is constructed. Foucault (1980) suggests that in order to understand the technology of
power, research should be conducted from the periphery. The margin that I have taken so far
is from the position of those who live in camp.

The ‘right’ to exclude others using discourse as the instrument of legitimacy is an
operating feature of modern states. Foucault (1980,p. 102) invites us to focus on ‘techniques
and tactics of domination’ rather than to continue to return to the institutional problem of
state sovereignty. Here I take a different step from Foucault, who does not focus on the
institutional problem in which certain juridical rules operate. How tactics of domination
operate in three different juridical territories I have presented in Chapters III through VI.

The construction of the ‘self’ in self-determination as part of the decolonisation
project is also a process of exclusion. Those who are not included in the main characters of
the state but challenge the domination are likely to be excluded from state construction. In
many former colonies, the making of the state is a modern idea, and it is ‘marked’ as an
unfinished project. ‘New knowledge’ as the symbol of modernity among the very first elite in
postcolonial states also functions as the reason in whose name the rest of the population are
dominated. The early modern educated subjects in the postcolonial states mostly positioned
themselves as the new sovereign and the representative of the people. How various groups
contested this power in early postcolonial states defined the position of exclusion or inclusion.
Those who are excluded, as ‘other’, from the modern state find themselves in the position of

The emergence of the excluded others in postcolonial states, which are named in
global news as rebels, refugees, or internally displaced persons, represent mechanisms of
control within the state and also under the imperial sovereignty. Since decolonisation itself is
part of the modern project and is seen as the triumph of reason (Larrain, 1994) over
‘subjugated knowledge’ in former colonies (Foucault, 1980), it is impossible for the ‘others’
in the postcolonial states to be represented in global solidarity. Therefore, it is interesting to understand how the global network present the major conflicts, which are related to the decolonisation project, since it is very common that misinterpretation is the synonym of globalization, which is strongly related to the politics of pity in the global network.

Indeed, the question why the ‘voice’ of the social suffering related to decolonisation after the WW II, or in the ‘post’ post-colonial condition, is impossible to be heard and spoken publicly as ‘language’ is a significant one. The distinction between ‘voice’ and ‘language’ has been traced by Agamben (1998). He (Agamben, 1998, p. 8) points out that:

The fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoē/bios, exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion.

Today the ‘good life’ in the modern period is understood as a complex relation of multiple institutions within or beyond state borders, which are related to each other under different disciplinary networks. Therefore, adopting the state model as the step to form modern political existence, for the postcolonial subjects, has led to the new kind of exclusion, which they did not experience before the state was there. Here Agamben shows how modern fantasy on equality within the state is also an unfinished project since the very beginning.

Agamben (1998, p. 11) argues that ‘Western politics has not succeeded in constructing the link between zoē and bios, between voice and language, that would have healed the fracture’. His statement is significant when it is linked to the problem of suffering. Suffering

26 Before Agamben makes the distinction between voice and language, he explores the legacy of Western knowledge, which is inherited from Greek tradition on the idea of zoē and bios, as two distinct words to define “life”. The word zoē is the expression for ‘the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods)’ (Agamben, 1998, p.1), and the word bios is the Greek word for ‘the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group’ (Agamben, 1998, p.1). He demonstrates that this distinction is parallel with the distinction of life (zēn) and good life (eu zēn), which is part of the telos of the political in Western tradition.
as the object of modern humanitarian intervention is not immune from disciplinary power. When it is established under a certain discipline, it is not as simple as it used to be.

For those, according to Agamben, who have been excluded from the political existence into the level of ‘bare life’ he defines their life as ‘the life of homo sacer (sacred man), who *may be killed and yet not sacrificed*’ (Agamben, 1998, p.8), the effect of which may lead to the formation of the new political community. Agamben argues that as long as politics is understood as a form of exclusion from bare life, violence is the instrument for exclusion. The violence itself is not necessarily a direct violence, but it could be a structural violence, which is, I argue, identical with the presence of sovereign power.

Further disciplinary power, which operates in ‘life’, has the side effect as the response to social suffering. The standard of humanitarian intervention has been made in detail. The contrast in East Timor’s second decolonisation is clear. Those who are part of the construction of the modern state lives exclusively under the full attention of the humanitarian program, and it is conducted under ‘international standard’, which has become another word for a Eurocentric project.

Different from the Western political tradition, the East Timorese have a different philosophy of life. However, it has been modernized, or excluded, by the presence of different political administrative authorities, such as Portuguese, Indonesian, and International intervention, in East Timor. The existence of the subaltern group and knowledge in East Timor is highlighted by Traube (1986).²⁷

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²⁷She is an anthropologist in Durkheimian tradition, who investigated the philosophy of East Timor life with her book *Cosmology and Social Life: Ritual Exchange among the Mambai of East Timor*. The Mambai is one of several ethno-linguistic groups in East Timor. For them, life is not conducted from the top down model as it is imagined by the sovereign power in the modern imaginary world of their educated elites when the state is adopted as the political institution (Babo, 2004). Rather, ‘the house’ (*fada*) is ‘as a source of life’ (Traube, 1986). *Fada* is the source of cultural meaning, which is revisited in a regular period for those who share the same genealogical house with different rituals in life. About *fada*, Traube (1986, p.66) writes as follows:
The invasion of modern rationality into the life of the East Timorese has been developed in several colonial phases, and it continues to exist during the construction of the East Timor political community (state). In almost all of the three colonial periods, the Timorese way of life is regarded as non-existent and the lives of the East Timorese has been the object of the colonizers to civilize. This particular condition is not only clear in the Portuguese *Estado Novo*, and Indonesian *Orde Baru* regime, but also in the latest phase when the UN is in power.

When the exclusion of the East Timorese population in East Timor is regarded as the convergence of the two different powers, the exclusion into the current ‘camp pengungsi’ is understood as the constitution of the fourth element of ‘the old trinity composed of the state, the nation (birth), and land’ (Agamben, 1998, pp.175-176).

About the relation between sovereign state and the right of man, Arendt has warned that the right of man is problematic, when she (Arendt, 1958, p. 291) clarifies that:

As mankind, since the French Revolution, was conceived in the image of a family of nations, it gradually became self-evident that the people, and not the individual, was the image of man.

This argument supports her argument about the impossibility for the people in camps to be able to speak outside the ‘nation-state’ (Arendt, 1958). Here, Arendt (1958, p. 293) points out that ‘the first loss which the rightless suffered was the loss of their homes, and this meant the

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To Mambai, *fada* connotes a concept of relatedness as a condition grounded in the past events, a product of processes that have transformed earlier states. Oppositions between the closed and the open and between the full and the empty define the content of those processes. Mambai conceive of their collective history as a steady movement away from plenitude, a passage from unity to diversity. Different native communities in East Timor share different sacred houses (*Uma Lulik*). This traditional element remains in the interior life of East Timorese, despite the presence of the foreign sovereign rulers who impose the political authority over them. For the Mambai, Traube points out that there is diarchic rule among the Mambai in which the ‘categories of sovereignty are applied at two levels, to differentiate between the indigenous people and their foreign rulers, and to signify a functional opposition that is realized in institutional forms’ (Traube, 1986, p.102). For this community, Traube (1986, p.244) points out that ‘the symbolic power to define social reality is always a stake in a political struggle that may intensify under conditions of intercultural contact and foreign domination.’
loss of the entire social texture in which they were born, and in which they established for themselves a distinct place in the world.’

The explanation of Arendt and Agamben may help us to answer the silence of the East Timorese group who has been excluded and has to live as the rightless group on the borderland. Furthermore, I argue that what constitutes silence in social suffering is possible to be understood within three main categories: silence as the absence of voice, silence as the effect of discourse construction, and silence as the combination of both, which is tragedy. In this third category, silence is not only misunderstood, but it is also not recognised and it has come to be accepted as a normal condition or even as banal.

This approach follows Wendy Brown’s (1998, p. 316) argument that ‘silences themselves must be understood as discursively produced, as part of discourse, rather than as its opposite’. Historical analysis as Foucault introduces it is also shared by Bhambra and Shiliam who develop a strategy to move out from silence by deconstructing history from its dominant narration.

This is well defined by Brown (1995,p. 7) who points out that ‘such images of freedom perform mirror reversals of suffering without transforming the organization of the activity through which the suffering is produced and without addressing the subject constitution that domination effects’. If Brown’s statement is translated to the context of national liberation, the idea of liberation itself is limited if it is only construed as the succession of foreign ruler to native ruler, and it does not question the illusion of modernity, which has been adopted by the postcolonial elites who adopt the idea of the Western model of states as a complete product. Thus the emancipative role of the state itself is accepted but the consequence of the birth of the state and exclusion as the inherent part of the state are not further traced.
Suffering: Beyond Global Solidarity

Other than the dilemmatic problem of state, the silence of the East Timorese could be read as the impossibility of certain distant suffering to be accepted by global solidarity. During the period of East Timor resistance against the Indonesian regime the publications on East Timor nationalist figures are abundant. In the East Timor nationalist narrative, those who were against the Indonesian regime are posed as ‘heroes’, and those who collaborated with the regimes are considered as the ‘accursed faction’ (See Boltanski, 1993). The popular consultation as the mechanism of self-determination was conducted without preparing the ground for the possible result by considering the legacy and the length of the excessive violence in East Timor.

The underrepresented publication on the narrative of this particular community is caused by marginalization of their political narrative by the East Timor nationalists and global supporters. The narratives of the pro-Indonesian East Timor political community are rarely mentioned because their histories are hidden behind the narrative of Indonesian military regime, which is known as the invader. Thus, their political narrative itself is recognized as illegitimate. In the past the choice to elaborate the narrative of the other East Timor political community may be a sign of enforcing the presence of the Indonesian regime in East Timor. The regime is hardly to be called an invasion if there is still a political community that welcomes their presence.

Today, the sympathy of global audience does not belong to those who collaborated with the Indonesian ruling regime. With the rise of the human rights issue in the post Cold War period, which highlights the importance of biopolitics behind the global humanitarian campaign, the historical narrative of the other East Timor political group is unattractive.
Today, it is generally acknowledged that the politics of pity could not be employed to the collaborator of the foreign regime (Nussbaum, 1996).

While the global solidarity movements are still able to address the issue of East Timor decolonisation in post Santa Cruz massacres (1991) as part of the unfinished decolonisation project, the suffering of the East Timorese after 1999 cannot be spoken. In the previous period the global solidarity for East Timor was able to address the issue of East Timor in global fora when the issue was about state formation, or delayed decolonisation.

The problem of silent suffering, which has rendered others subaltern in their camps, is that it is not recognized globally so that there is no connection to the global network and so it remains beyond the imagination of global solidarity. For those who speak in the right language for the global audience, it is easy to gain support and be acknowledged. On the other hand, for others whose claims are not understood and recognized, they are ignored.

This particular aspect is important in the era of informatization—in particular about its connection with the definition of ‘node’ in network society—and I would like to argue that it is impossible to conclude or to define a new node without knowing the ‘new knowledge’ of the other. The term new knowledge here is equal to Foucault’s ideas on the insurrection of the subjugated knowledge (Foucault, 1980). This kind of knowledge does exist but it is generally considered as tradition, although it is possible to know as the diversity of knowledge system or the philosophy of different communities, whose reflexive question is not based on the Greek tradition.

The development of advanced communication and information technology has been presumed as the new possibility for a more democratic and transparent society. However, at the same time I argue that the development of the new media does not have the similar meaning for the development of democratic society. This new media reproduces the old
foundation of power relations such as who is the author with the sovereign power and the criteria of the spectators, which is used and accepted by the majority of the public or targeted audience in a certain period of time (Boltanski, 1999; Chouliaraki, 2006).

The advanced development of new information and transportation technology brings back the historical connection to the fore in which the state politics are not the only politics of the modern world. It also revives the connection of religious belief, which goes beyond national boundaries, where the notion of citizens competes with the notion of ummat.

The exclusion of the East Timor community in exile after 1999 in relation to ‘globalization and informationalization’ (Castels, 2004) of East Timor decolonisation is related to different political positions, which were taken by the global network group in the East Timor decolonisation. The social exclusion, which is experienced by the East Timor community, is part of the effect of the cosmopolitan politics in the East Timor issue. This point is clearly the critique, which is made by the Zapatista movement when it defends its position in using the informational network from a local point of view. I believe that this is one of the weaknesses in the East Timor solidarity network, by claiming from global position that it is open to a new kind of domination.

The nation-state model and the cosmopolitan state model represent two different claims: the right of the people, or the right of the citizen, and the human right. The right of the people is closely linked with the idea of the sovereignty of nation-state as a solid institution for its citizens. The idea of sovereignty of the state has been contested with the idea of human rights, which have been posed as a universal agenda or part of a cosmopolitan citizen.

However, as Agamben has explained it, both rights—either human rights or the rights of the people in relation citizenship—do not work for those who live in camps. For the early years, the East Timorese who still live in camps are still recognized as refugees. However,
when their status is changed to ‘internally displaced persons’ their suffering is part of the Indonesian government’s problem, but that particular regime, which is part of the invasion, is already a past regime. Living as ‘inbetweeners’ in camps has reduced the possibility for them to have both rights (Arendt, 1958).

The idea of human right as a cosmopolitan agenda has been criticized by Santos (2007) because it becomes an instrument of domination with its universal claim. He (Santos, 2007: p.3) argues that human rights may be the instrument of emancipation ‘only if a politics of human rights radically different from the hegemonic liberal one is adopted and only if such a politics is conceived as part of broader constellation of struggles and discourses of resistance and emancipation rather than as the sole politics of resistance against oppression’. Several different writers have criticized Eurocentric domination under the universal claim on East Timor humanitarian intervention (Chopra, 2000; Hohe, 2002; Lemay-Hebert, 2011).

Human rights as universal agenda in a cosmopolitan era has been criticized as the instrument of powerful states to control other states. Arrendt’s account on state sovereignty (Arrendt, 1958) as the privilege of the powerful states is parallel to Schmitt’s (1985) thesis that ‘sovereign is he who decides the state of exception’. In this current inter-state system, the sovereign states have the right to impose the sanction toward other non-sovereign states. Under the notion of exceptionality the politics of liberal human rights have been imposed on weaker states.

The claim of the objectivity in international law and the universality of human rights are close to the totalitarian approach, or the interest of the subjects as the lawmaker or law interpreter. Santos (2000) suggests that the politics of human rights should be posed as something incomplete or as part of a continuing dialogue. About the peculiarity of
international law, in particular related to human rights, it should be considered as something that is not universal in application.

It is clear that the politics of decolonisation in the last century continues to orchestrate the lives of people in the former Western colonies after World War II. While several former colonise have been able to establish strong states, such as China and India (Chatterjee, 2005; Bedeski, 2007), there are many ‘independent states’ that are still under the domination of foreign power, or simply under a different form of colonialism.

Furthermore, I argue that the concept of universal human rights has its limit in its encounter with those who live in camps or on the border of states, or for those who are considered under non-political organizations or for the stateless people. It is not as simple as the UN’s suggestion to call them ‘refugees’, or subsequently to label them as ‘internally displaced persons’ (IDPs) as they are called now.

It is not fully right to call them IDPs since they are excluded from their homeland, and it is impossible to name someone a citizen while she or he has no support to survive by any government and has to live in a ‘temporary condition’ for more than a decade. Here global solidarity is not able to offer a concrete solution, and this becomes a blind spot for human rights campaigners. The existence of the camp as it has been argued by Arrendt and Agamben (1993) finds its evidence. Camp as a permanent ‘temporary’ destination for those who are excluded from their homeland is almost unnoticed within modern imagination.

Therefore, the suffering of those who live in temporary camp for more than a decade is hardly to be represented in the context of nation-state-territory. To this particular problem, Agamben (1993, p. 245) writes as follows:

Only in a world in which the spaces of states have been thus perforated and topologically deformed and in which the citizen has been able to recognize the refugee that he or she is—only in such a world is the political survival of humankind today thinkable.
Agamben’s insight brings us to two different possibilities to look into this problem: first, suffering as the consequence of the decolonisation project, and how suffering is understood in this particular society and how they redeem it.

**Human Rights, Justice, and Hierarchy of World Order**

Regarding East Timorese in exile post 1999, one of the important issues that I address here is about the logic of human rights practices on the second East Timorese decolonisation, and its consequences for the IDPs, or the East Timorese in camps, and or in the exile after 1999.

Criticisms of contemporary human rights practice have been addressed by a number of different writers (Thompson, 1992; Santos, 1995; Derrida, 2001; Hardt & Negri, 2000&2006; Matua, 2002; Cowan, 2006; Santos, 2007; Shiliam & Bhambra (eds.), 2009). While the issue of human rights has become a global agenda, the right to be listened to is only limited to certain communities, who follow the new posture of the world order. Here the problem of perceiving distant suffering is not only experienced by the two dominant views in international relations, the cosmopolitan and communitarian points of view, but also by the alternative vision, which is represented by Hardt and Negri (2000) in their concept of ‘multitude’, which goes beyond the borders of the state.

Related to East Timorese decolonisation, global solidarity within the imperial nexus is unable to break the silence of those in East Timorese camps post 1999. What I argue here is global solidarity is only possible when it is conducted within the logic of world order, either it is pro or contra, so that when the global activist-scholars adopt the cosmopolitan position to construct ‘the truth’ they are also trapped within world order logic. Similarly, when global solidarity is visited with the communitarian point of view, it also leaves those who are in the
borderland in silence since the making of the state is also accepted as the final form of a political community, which is considered as one nation. Furthermore, even the concept of multitude, which focuses on the ability of counter power to the immanence of capital, is almost impossible to stop this unknown silence.

The existence of the East Timorese community in exile after 1999 has demonstrated the paradox of human rights. It is claimed that human rights are universal, but their realisation is always particular. The existence of this community is not separate from the making of the New World Order after the Cold War.

The set-up of truth commissions has become a general resolution in post-authoritarian regimes, such that their establishment is the next step in reconstruction of the history of the old regime and its impact for the local population. In the East Timorese case, there are two different truth commissions that have been established after 1999. They are CAVR (Comissao de Acolhimento Verdade e Reconcilicao or Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation) and CTF (Commission of Truth and Friendship, or Komisi Kebenaran dan Persahabatan). In this chapter, I outline how these commissions work, and the limitations of their mandates. The focus of both commissions is to reveal the scorched-earth action, which was carried out in 1999 and in which many East Timorese in exile were involved. By focusing only on the direct violence in 1999, the problem of suffering experienced by certain political community in East Timor, as the impact of unanticipation to the consequence to the self-determination process of East Timor, has been ignored.

In juridical-political terms, these truth commissions represent two different kinds of authority: the particular nation-state sovereignty and universal cosmopolitan sovereignty. However, in practice the CAVR truth commission, created by the UN’s mission in East Timor, also follows the national boundary framework, rather than taking the ‘insurgent
cosmopolitanism’ position, as it is proposed by Santos (2007), to reconstruct the violation of human rights during the historical period of decolonisation after WWII in which the UN is also seen as part of the problem.

Although the two different truth commissions have presented their historical investigations, they make no comment on the East Timorese people in camps who live within the boundaries of the state. Arendt’s inquiry about the relation between ‘the rights of man’ and the ‘nation-state’ gives us insight into the inability of the people in camps to be recognized when rights can only be recognized within the framework of modern nation-states (Arendt, 1958; see also Agamben, 1998). The presence of the UN and other international aid organizations is limited according to the status that is given to this community. During the early migration this particular community were called ‘refugees’. After the repatriation process was considered final, their new status became IDPs. Today they are called warga baru (‘newcomers’). The changing status of this community is not related to their condition, but to the availability of a budget, and the willingness of international aid organizations or the Indonesian state to support them. UNHCR, IOM, and other international NGOs were involved when they were still considered refugees. Today, this particular community still lives in camps, and also competes with the local West Timorese. Based on the economic strata they occupy, they should not be so different from the local West Timorese, but the problem is most of the East Timorese have no land, which leaves them in a very difficult situation. Most of them have to sell their labour for money, which is mostly below the standard wage. If they had land, they could provide food for themselves, but without land, they are removed from the subsistence economy or are barely able to survive.

The key point of this section is that the truth commissions operate in line with a certain hierarchy and do not offer the emancipatory role, which is claimed to be embedded in
human rights discourse. What I argue here is that the same global hierarchy, which produced
the silence of leftist politics in East Timor in the 1970s, is now being used against the other
East Timor political group, which used to be the anti-communist party during the Cold War.
For instance, in its recommendations, CAVR assumes that the UN functions as a sovereign
institution and that it is possible to conduct the international tribunal. What is forgotten here is
that the same states that support East Timor today, previously supported the Indonesian Army
in the 1970s (Chomsky, 1979). The U.S. position on the International Criminal Court (ICC) is
that it does not recognize it (Stacey, 2003). Therefore, when CAVR recommends an
international tribunal for the Indonesian regime I believe that this is a utopian
recommendation, since the countries that support the ICC have not made a historical
assessment of the contribution of their own countries to the East Timor invasion and to the
birth of the New Order regime in Indonesia. Here, it may be argued that this demand is not
part of state politics, but of global solidarity, which crosses state boundaries. The question is
how far these countries are willing to revisit the past and how far these countries are willing to
see beyond the narrative of direct violence and to see that structural violence has been
neglected. Whether it is possible or not to bring the perpetrators, from both left and right, to
the court remains an open question.

The discourse on international justice or transnational justice, which is promoted on
the global scene today, derives from the idea, among the humanitarian workers, that there is a
moral imperative to intervene in conflict areas. However, while the claim of justice is made
from the global position, the claim for justice is limited to the right to punish, and it mostly
neglects the constitutional process.  

28On international justice, Thompson (1992, p.10) suggests that:
A theory of justice, so understood, always has a context. It has to be appropriate to the interests and
objectives of individual and groups in the political-social environment in which these interests are
By continuing to enforce the existence of universal history and neglecting the particular history in which the accusers, victims and spectators exist together, the human rights politics operates within the concept of the state of exception in which the international sovereignty has the right to punish the human rights abusers within world order hierarchy. Here is the concept of justice promoted by CAVR. The paradox of CAVR is while taking the East Timor nationalist position to narrate about the victims, it assumes that it has the right to prosecute the accusers in international court. What CAVR neglects to mention is that the decolonisation of East Timor, and also Indonesia, is related to the capitalist development and state formation under the world order. What the truth commission neglects is the emergence of a different type of state apparatus, which is connected to market penetration, whereby the concept of human rights is dominated by the liberal human rights in which property rights are paramount. For instance, the campaign for the ‘free world’ during the Cold War is in line with market penetration in former European colonies. Again, the focus of the truth commission is limited to the direct violence carried out by the local actors, and it does not consider the complex causality of the violence. The structural violence by Western countries, which is embedded in the reshaping of the politics of new countries, is forgotten.

Thus, the hierarchy of world order is not only shown by the military intervention during the Cold War, but it is also presented by the moral claim to intervene or to conduct necessary violence to the people in other countries. It is resonated to the definition of the sovereign, which is presented by Schmitt in his definition that the ‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (Schmitt, 1985, p.5), which is his critique to the liberal camp.

Thompson (1992) criticizes the politics of compassion which is the basis of human rights politics in the contemporary period. The politics of human rights has the tendency to claim a universal view, and also universal history, but to neglect its particularity.
The presence of UN in East Timor is assumed as a supranational institution above the states, although this idea has been challenged by different writers (Arendt, 1958; Hardt & Negri, 2000; Foucault, 2010). I agree with them that the institution above the state is more of an idea, despite the presence of the UN and the network of humanitarian bodies that give significant impact in international politics and cosmopolitan connection (Beck, 1999).

The hierarchy of global order is not shown by the world order’s institutions but by the privileged right of humanitarian intervention to operate in East Timor. The UN’s attempt to introduce modern institutions into East Timor is still far from succeeding. Lemay-Hebert (2011) has explained how ‘the empty shell approach’ is resisted by the local population. He also points out that ‘according to Simon Chesterman, only around one-tenth of the UNTAET’s budget actually reached East Timorese’ (Lemay-Hebert, 2011, p.191). The impact of disciplinary action, which is embedded with the modernisation claimed, is not just experienced by the East Timorese in exile, but also by the East Timorese in East Timor.

Chopra’s (2000) argument on the ‘UN’s kingdom’ explains the irony of the post-referendum period, when the majority of East Timorese in East Timor are excluded from the UN’s project after the referendum as the mechanism of self-determination had been done. Today, East Timor is assumed to be a new independent republic, but at the same time the privilege that is enjoyed by the elites of INGOs and NGOs in East Timor’s capital is still not experienced by the rest of East Timor population. The transitional period, in particular for the post-conflict reconstruction, has lasted longer than expected. Here, the definition of ‘independence’ in the neo-liberal period has become problematic, and the humanitarian intervention, which is represented by the NGOs and also the multilateral agencies, also faces the ethical question regarding the economic gap between those involved, the project organisers, and the people.
While the campaign for universal human rights has become the main title to support East Timorese independence against the atrocities of the Indonesian regime, it does not mean that the human rights campaign is possible to be started by the people without the involvement of the international actors and institutions. The same view is also shared by Santos (2008) on today’s human rights practice. When the campaign of human rights is claimed to be derived from a universal position, what is clearly defined in human rights practice is the definition of ‘human’ from a liberal perspective, or the Eurocentric model.

Furthermore, the question is when are human rights seen as a contested subject (Bhambra & Shiliam, 2009), and whose human rights should be excluded/included when the narrative is produced? Is it the human rights of those who are the victims of the past, or the human rights of those who have been suffering in temporary camps for more than a decade? How it is possible for the global solidarity movement to campaign for the human rights of the victims of the past when the suffering of the present victims is not recognized? What is the chance of these ‘others’ to be heard after they have spent more than a decade in ‘temporary camps’ as the impact of the hierarchy within the Empire? Is this a new governmentality that we feel comfortable to live with? While human rights workers under the banner of global solidarity campaign about the past violence of the dying New Order regime, where is the place of those who now live in exile? There are two options for them: either they succeed to be naturalized as Indonesians or remain in camps as ‘in-betweeners’, the people of the borderland.

In relation to the neglect of this particular community by the two truth commissions, those who are considered as the perpetrators within the framework of transitional justice have no human rights. Despite their role as criminals who perpetrated human rights violations in 1999, whether they have human rights or not is not clear when the transitional justice
campaign in the post-conflict period dominates the scene. Today, they are present in the East Timor narrative, but only as violators of others’ human rights.

On this particular problem, Arendt (1963) gives her analysis on the relation between ‘violence’ and ‘necessity’. During the decolonisation in the 1970s, both UDT and Fretilin claimed the necessity of using violent action, and similar ideas were shared by the counter-revolutionary New Order regime in Indonesia, to eradicate the members of PKI and Fretilin during the military attack against the revolutionaries in Indonesia and also in East Timor. The violent action against Fretilin was seen as necessary and it was accepted by the West during the Cold War. Murdering the youths in the Santa Cruz Massacre gives an idea to the world about the irresponsibility of the state apparatus to the people. It is against the idea of biopolitics as the contemporary ethics, which is shared by the global human rights campaigners who focus on the victims of the state. The condemnation of the Santa Cruz massacre not only demonstrates to the global public the unsuccessful integration of East Timor into Indonesia or the continuing resistance among East Timorese youth (See Chapter VI), but the massacre itself is obviously against the ethics that are shared by many states today.  

To speak, to record, and to present the victims’ experience during the decolonisation period (1974–1999), was done by CAVR, to establish the identity of a certain political community. Furthermore, the construction of human rights tends to be top-down and this is considered as the combination of juridical and disciplinary power. While the East Timorese has the local mechanism to forgive the unforgivable action, today they believe that the

29Furthermore, the investigation of the violence in 1999 is taken out of its context. The decision on 5 May 1999 to conduct referendum on 30 August 1999, according the UN’s secretary general, should be done immediately when the momentum was still there (Martin, 2001), when the power was still in the hand of Indonesian ad interim president whose internal legitimacy to rule was very weak. In reality, the threat for a peaceful transition process was recognized either by East Timorese or the international advisors. The presence of Indonesian military was real and its relation to militia groups was also transparent. Furthermore, the two political groups of East Timor have no agreement on how they would settle their conflict after the ballot.
hierarchy of the international law is the main determinant to solve the problem. The CAVR report as East Timor state narrative also shows how within East Timor juridical system the other political group of East Timor is excluded, and their position is posed as the enemy of the state. What is not included in CAVR and also in the CTF narrative is the failure to bridge the difference between the two political extreme groups in East Timor, the pro-independence and the pro-integration group before the referendum. The inability to reach the consensus has led to massive violent action before and after referendum; either it was systematic violence or part of the spontaneous violence. Hereinlies the gap of reality that is not recognized while the international intervention is conducted.

Further effect of disciplinary power in East Timor occurred in the post-conflict period; either it is about the post-conflict reconstruction or the installation of different modern institutions within the state. Lemay-Hebert (2011, p.195) mentions the empty-shell approach in which the international agencies pose ‘the local context as a Tabula Rasa’. Interestingly, the East Timor case is similar to what was practiced in Kosovo, so that the disciplinary action is not only a local phenomenon.

For instance, there is a local mechanism to tell about the past injury and to reconcile, but today it is limited to the action, which is considered a non-serious crime. Nahe Biti (or known as stretching the mat) is a popular mechanism at the grassroots level to achieve dame (peace) and hakmatek (stability)(Babo, 2004). However, the local mechanism is considered informal, which is different to the mechanism of state justice. For instance Babo (2004,p.28) writes the following:

The intervention of the ancestor’s spirit is so important here that it is seen as prerequisite for dame and hakmatek to be reached. Consequently, whenever a consensus has been achieved, a ritual ceremony—often in the form of a blood oath or oath of loyalty before the lineage’s uma lulik (literally, sacred house)—is held to both ‘officialise’ and legitimise the process.
The question remains: where is the place of the ancestor’s spirit in state law or in the international court? This question may be considered as irrational due to the effect of the disciplinary power, which has been introduced into East Timorese society by different institutions, such as the Catholic Church, political associations, and the Catholic educational system. I argue that what is understood as the ancestor’s spirit in East Timor’s tradition is the philosophical tradition in East Timor society, which is very important in giving balance to the ‘excessive power of political rationality’ (Foucault, 1982, p.779).

The convergence of juridical and disciplinary power is embedded in decolonisation or prior to the emergence of the state in the postcolonial state. They are different, but there is a moment of convergence (Brown, 1995), and I argue that decolonisation, which marks the emergence of state, is one of them. The practice of modern juridical system is considered more superior higher than the ‘local custom’ (Babo, 2004; Lemay-Hebert, 2011). However, when justice in the international criminal court is a utopian agenda, why is the local mechanism to solve the past injury not accommodated? When the global human rights activists are pushing East Timor’s case as an experiment of human rights in international law, I argue, it is only at the level of simulation (Baudrillard, 2006), since those who fight for the past injury are not concerned about the reality of the present suffering of the people in exile.

Again, this point returns to the international mechanism to intervene in East Timor’s second decolonisation in the international community. During the meeting there were two head of states, Portugal and Indonesia, and UN’s secretary general who represented the international community. While this approach covers international juridical law to conduct East Timor referendum particularly about its international status, it does not cover the right of the East Timorese who may be excluded as the consequence of the referendum. Hence the catastrophic violence before and after the ballot marks the era of new exclusion. On this point
I argue that the international community and these two governments do not anticipate the consequence of the birth of a new state, which is another inclusion/exclusion. When the international law on East Timor status is rightly addressed, the *de facto* element about the rivalry among East Timorese in East Timor is not considered. The different view between Indonesian New Order regime and the Indonesian *ad interim* president is also neglected.

Furthermore, in the post ballot period when the international criminal court is assumed as the best place to solve the injustice, which is experienced by the East Timorese under Indonesian colonialism, it is assumed that the existence of a world order is finally recognized. The question is what about the power of world order during the Cold War? Who decided that it was necessary to attack the communists in South East Asia? Is it possible to prosecute that power or that sovereign state? Or, is the question about justice only limited to the non-sovereign states? Here, once again the voice from the past of Hobbes and Hegel about state is proved relevant and actual to our contemporary world.

These questions are the reminder of the condition and term for the postcolonial states during the Cold War period in which the claim about legitimacy/illegitimacy of Indonesian New Order presence in East Timor is related to the state of war. What has never been explained is the Indonesian presence in East Timor in its first decolonisation process following the construction of the world order. However, after the remaking of world order (Huntington, 2003) in the post-Cold War period, the presence of Indonesian New Order regime in East Timor is claimed as only a bilateral problem, between Indonesia and Portugal by the UN as the international broker.\(^\text{30}\)

\(^{30}\)The paradox is in order to meet the demand of international law for self-determination, which is facilitated by the UN, the meeting on 5 May 1999 is attended by the head of the state of Portugal and Indonesia, and also UN’s secretary general. The focus of the meeting only covers the status of international law of East Timor. It is presented as part of the Portuguese Empire, and the Indonesian presence is considered as an intervention during the Civil War. This is ironic, since the result of the meeting is vital and has great consequences for the life of the East Timorese, yet the East Timorese themselves have no voice to decide. In Indonesia the request of the half
Incarnation of Subjugated Knowledge: another Knowledge is Possible

Santos (2000) and Falk (1999) claim that there is a new model of globalization from below with the emergence of the global NGOs. However, within this humanitarian formation there exists the new hierarchy, from the INGO, local NGOs, and those who are outside of this network. These humanitarian organizations have their own disciplines in which I argue it also contributes to the silence of the others. That kind of silence, as the new East Timor community in exile experiences it, is the effect of the disciplinary power and also juridical power. The form of juridical power within INGOs is a new phenomenon, since it is embedded with the INGOs’ role when they played a vital role in the East Timor decolonisation. Generally, there is a moment of transition from the humanitarian program to the political humanitarian program among INGOs and NGOs in the East Timor decolonisation.

Therefore, I argue that those who are outside ‘the radar’ or knowledge map of these global elites with the modern knowledge simply do not exist. Indeed, Santos et al. (2000, pp. xix-li) proposed that within the emancipation project as a continuing process, ‘there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice’. The hierarchy of knowledge and discourse formation with its modern claim has its dark side in silencing the others as the effect of domination.31

Noble winner, Felipe Ximenes Bello, as one of the leaders of the Catholic Church in East Timor, to meet Indonesian ad interim president was also ignored. The request from the pro integration leader, Lopez Da Cruz, to settle this problem properly for the life of the East Timorese was also ignored. I argue that the decision for the referendum is a premature political decision because it did not consider the life of those who were in East Timor. Thus the decision for referendum was made without taking into account the life of the East Timorese in East Timor and the non-East Timorese in East Timor.

31 For Foucault, decolonisation is not only about transferring authority from the alien power to the local ruler, but it is strongly related to the ability to affect knowledge production. He conceptualizes this effort as a genealogy which he (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) defines as follows: ‘the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today.’
Regarding the possibility of discursive practice, Foucault (1980) investigates the interplay between power and knowledge. For instance, how certain discourses have a stronger position than the other while having the legitimacy to claim the dominant construction of reality. However, in the discursive practice, neither Western countries with their ideas of modernity nor the former Western colonies have the position to be described as the only reality.

Then it is possible to understand the construction of various narratives related to collective suffering. Further investigation should be made on how different groups or states have constructed social suffering for themselves. How distant suffering is posed in global media networks as part of the politics of suffering is related to the politics of human rights. How suffering remained as a condition of silence and untouchable in the postcolonial politics has its connection with modernity and the inter-state system as the normative system as the legacy of the Westphalia treaty for the world. How this particular system dominates and replaces various ‘traditional organizations’ in the postcolonial state is part of the question to look into the core of the conflict.

Based on his understanding about current practice, human rights politics and its relation to the crisis of Western modernity, Santos (2007) suggests ‘intercultural post-imperial human rights’ as an option. Modernity, which is assumed as the phase of maturity, has been

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32 For him (Santos, 2007, pp. 28-35) the politics of human rights may function as part of the cosmopolitan insurgency against global hegemony, if several underground rights, and he calls it as ur-rights, are recognized. The ur-rights consist of: (1) the right to knowledge; (2) the right to bring historical capitalism to trial in a world tribunal; (3) the right to a solidarity-oriented transformation of the right to property; (4) the right to grant rights to entities incapable of bearing duties, namely nature and future generations; (5) the right to democratic self-determination; and (6) the right to organize and participate in the creation of human rights. Taking the new step to construct a new form of human right politics may be the answer to know other humanities, and their silences, outside modern Western humanity.
practiced by the elites in postcolonial states and also in other modern persons as self-denial. In relation to distant suffering, the suffering of the other may be spoken if only it is understood and hasa connection with dominant global politics. Otherwise it remains as a local problem or considered as people who are part of a non-political community or ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998), or in Arendt’s (1958) word as ‘the rightless suffered’. Those who live in camps may be part of the oppressed group, but they are also the victims of a modern project. Silence is not only an effect of power but also a state of confusion.

**Summary**

What I propose here is in order to be able to see the process of multiple exclusions in several different periods it is a must to visit the history of East Timor decolonisation and the importance of the East Timorese to revisit the introduction of state into postcolonial society.

I also argue that to impose the reflexive question on the East Timor problem within East Timorese tradition is not a sign to give impunity to the direct violence that has been conducted by this particular group in exile, but it is a message of the excessive political rationality that has been introduced into East Timor since 1974/1975. This particular event is not the problem of East Timorese themselves, but it is the problem in modernity (Agamben, 1998), which is also shared by the postcolonial society.

The role of the global humanitarian intervention itself is problematic when it has become a political humanitarian project. Whether it is possible for the different cosmopolitan solidarity to address this issue is also uncertain, since there is no other political community above the state, to cover those who are living in the borderland. When the birth of a new state for a new nation is accepted as the final decision in international relations, there is tendency to accept the exclusion also as a final decision. Here I believe that I have presented the different
perspectives to see the birth of the East Timor state from those who are excluded from this process.

This chapter also focused on the irony of the humanitarian project, which focuses on the effect of past violence and the continuous ambition to punish those who are responsible for that, while the present suffering is abandoned. The ‘bare life’ condition that has been experienced by this particular community for more than a decade is not yet recognized. Here it is also important for the international actors to revisit the dialog of different thinkers such as Agamben, Arendt, and Foucault to focus on the non-emancipative role of state.

Furthermore, on the irony of human rights, Arendt (1958, p. 299) gives her powerful reminder as follows:

> The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with the people who indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships—except that they were still human. The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human. Here, I realize that my experience to face the silent suffering in the camps in West Timor, when I worked for an INGO, an NGO, and also a TV journalist in refugee camps has different meanings. I find that Arendt’s words are relevant and true.

When the UN took the right to govern East Timor in 1999, the claim of universality has led to further Westernisation in which the inquiry about subjectivity becomes the dominant dispute. The importance of the issue of subjectivity with the East Timorese in exile is related to the disbandment of local mechanisms to revisit the past injury. So far the local custom or local mechanism to revisit the past injury is considered as ‘non-formal’ or outside ‘the state justice’. In sum, the local custom is considered as non-modern. When the state itself is considered a modern project, it is assumed that there is no local mechanism to solve the violence and human rights violation, which accompany the emergence of the East Timor
state. At the same time the ideas of the International Criminal Court is also a utopian idea since the sovereign states operate in Hobbesian posture.

The making of a modern state in the former European colonies is seen as the rupture from the European colonialism, and it is the rupture from the native political communities, which is considered as non-modern. At the same time the making of a state is also considered as the rupture from capitalist imperialism, which is embedded in the imperial colonialism as it is argued from the national liberation camp. Both revolutionary and contra revolutionary movements argue to have legitimate claim for the necessary violence.

The construction of both truth commissions is intended to recapture the violent moments that existed during decolonisation. However, by focusing on the violence only as direct action, the truth commission failed to present the existence of the global dominance, which continues to present itself from the day of the European Empire and how the violence is embedded within the birth of a state.

At the same time the global human rights campaigners, who played a vital part in the birth of East Timor, only focus on the direct violent actions during decolonisation and taking from the cosmopolitan position, which has the effect of silencing the community on the borderland. In both reports of the truth commissions this other group is only known as criminal, or the perpetrator of human rights violations, without accepting that this group is the legacy of the Cold War and also victims of the making of a modern state. By presenting the connected histories, which show the birth of modern states in Europe, in colonies, and also in the first and the second postcolonial period of East Timor, I show that the transition into the modern state is embedded with violent action.

The construction of victims is very much dependent on certain juridical-political boundaries in which the problem of rights is still the main pillar within Hegelian logic.
Furthermore, in the case of the East Timorese community in exile after 1999, the suffering of this community is unable to be spoken of from the cosmopolitan position since the independence of East Timor is very much part of the support of the humanitarian project, which shares the cosmopolitan position. This particular group, which is already living in the borderland, has nowhere to go and nothing to do, except to pray and wait for charity. At the same time the compassion of global cosmopolitan solidarity for this particular group is limited by the dominant ideas, which portray them first as criminals, rather than listening to them as part of the victimised group.

One significant point in the formation of the East Timor state is that the global humanitarian network has given a major contribution for the birth of East Timor in 1999. What is new about the current East Timorese in exile, post East Timor second decolonisation, is their exclusion, which is contributed by the convergence of juridical and disciplinary power. Based on this evidence, I find that both of the sovereign power and disciplinary action can exist together, which opposes Hardt and Negri’s claim (2001) in Empire, who undermine the existence of a nation-state or sovereignty of a state. The paradox is when the cosmopolitan network takes a very important role in East Timor’s independence, and at the same time the exclusion of the East Timorese, whether in East Timor or in other political groups in exile, is not realised. They are simply forgotten. Chomsky (1999) calls it the ‘hypocrisy of the West’, but I would prefer to call it a tragedy.
At that moment a whisper, melodious
Seconds to the announcement of the Timor Lorosae’s independence
But why are the children still scattered in all directions?
...

Edy M Parada,
a child from Viqueque living in Naibonat refugee camp in West Timor, Indonesia
CAVR, 2006, Part 11, p.28
I started my research with a question about the silent suffering experienced by the East Timor community in exile after 1999. This question led me to reconstruct the historical elements contributing to the constitution of this community which has been marginalized during the struggle for East Timor’s independence. The research has also addressed the multiple exclusions experienced by different political communities during the different periods associated with East Timor’s decolonization. I have also sought to show that the global politics of the development of the modern state, from colonial state to post-colonial state, and post post-colonial state is associated with different phases of the development of capitalist and different governmentalities which have had consequences for the relations among elites and processes of state formation in East Timor and Indonesia.

The most important historical connection, I have suggested, is intersection of the decline of the Portuguese Estado Novo, and the rise of the Indonesian Orde Baru in 1970s which coincided with the emergence of the East Timorese national liberation movement. The mutually imbricated histories of Indonesia and Portugal also shaped East Timor’s decolonization. Both countries are known for their anti-communist and anti-socialist governments operating under corporatist ideologies. In this light, the Indonesian invasion of East Timor can be understood as the transfer of authority from an old corporatist state from the European metropolis to a new corporatist state operating in the former Dutch colony.

The Portuguese presence in East Timor is the legacy of one of the oldest Portuguese ventures into the East in 15th century. On the other hand, the history of Indonesia is about a newly emerging country after WW II with a territory largely based on the Dutch East Indies legacy. My research finds that both Indonesia and East Timor share the old political divisions of their former European colonies, the Netherlands and Portugal. For instance, ‘the pillar system’ among Protestants and Catholics (and secular socialists) in the Netherlands, also
exists in Indonesia with different political organizations based on religious differences. In
Netherlands, under this system, the Communist Party could never become a major political
party. In East Timor, for its part, the rivalry between UDT and also different factions within
Fretilin has resembled the contested parties in Lisbon, such as the Portuguese Communist
Party, Portuguese Socialist Party and also the supporters of the Estado Novo regime. While in
Portugal and Indonesia the communist parties were defeated before 1973, in East Timor the
national liberation movement, which was inspired by the similar action in Portuguese Africa,
led by Fretilin emerged as the majority, until Indonesia invades in 1975.

Historically, the two most significant periods of East Timorese decolonization, from
the Portuguese Empire in 1974/1975 and from the 27th province of Indonesia in 1999, have
certain similarities in that both periods mark the end of a corporatist state which had been
adopted as a ‘third way’ beyond liberalism and communism. In addition, the second East
Timorese decolonization after 1999 took place after the financial crisis hit Indonesia. This
shows the importance of geo-politically induced structural problems within processes of state
formation. Another significant element in the post Cold War period is the rise of human
rights as a factor in international relations. In this period, human rights came to be associated
with the violence conducted by different type of regime against their citizens. In 1990s human
rights campaigners focused on the transition from military regimes to democratic institutions.
However, military regimes were themselves strongly allied to the West during the Cold War,
and the emergence of ruling elites was also related to the support of the western countries up
until the present. However, in the Indonesian case while the military regime was perceived as
anti-democratic, the transition to liberal democracy was also in line with neo liberal economic
interests, since the old military regime was organised as a corporatist state. The transition to
liberal democracy, as it is experienced is Indonesia today is the ‘ochlocracy’ or ‘anarchy of
democracy’ (Rousseau 1979) associated with the neo liberal era and not intrinsic to democracy itself which reminds about the capitalist penetration in second part of 19th century. Thus, while critical assessments of human rights are mostly focused on the expression of liberal principles, the victims of structural violence associated with market expansionism frequently go unnoticed. While communists claimed the dictatorship of proletariat could challenge the anarchy of the market, liberals defended democracy as a mechanism to criticize the imperfection of political practice. Today, both camps face similar problem in neo liberal period.

Hardt and Negri’s (2001) claim that capitalist sovereignty has replaced the sovereignty of nation-states is only half true. Some countries are no longer properly considered as sovereign states since they are controlled by different global financial institutions and other states, but those other states remain and express their power through the market rather than against it. The absence of the state, as normally understood, in ‘third world countries’ is the direct impact of the state politics of the West (Wertheim 1997) as the consequence of further market penetration and also the domination of foreign countries.

While in Europe the problem of the state and its relation to market has led to the idea of cosmopolitan state (as set out by Kant (2008) and Kelsen (2007) this particular idea has been used to attack the national liberation movements among the former European colonies in post WW II. While, the period of Cold War marked the contestation of super power states, today the problem of market penetration leaves the rights of citizens in places subordinated to the market and its effects as still a central question. As Burawoy (2005) argues, the claim of objectivity in economic analysis has marginalized the rights of the publics.

In this context, to write about the injury of the past is a real challenge. The East Timorese second decolonization was not without problems. The focus of the human rights
campaigners was mostly engaged with direct violence, and they tend to separate this from the structural violence which is embedded within ‘free world’ market expansion.

In this research I have attempted to present both structural violence and direct violence. The question posed is why only direct violence becomes the dominant issue of the liberal human rights campaigners? Considered from a different perspective the category of victims may be extended. On a broader understanding, those who are identified as perpetrators are also victims, although this is not to diminish their responsibility.

Excessive violence marked the transitional process in East Timor. In the 1970s the main trigger of violence was the conflict between the revolutionary and anti-revolutionary forces, while in the process after 1999 the conflict was between the pro-independence and pro-integration groups. Decolonization in both periods functioned to create new excluded political communities.

The anarchy of violence is a challenge to social science raising the question of the extent to which it is possible to predict its eruption. At the same time, to look on past violence is also difficult, since the injury continues. How people narrate the injury of the past is the question addressed by the two truth commissions for East Timor. This difficulty of narration explains why the suffering of those who are in exile can go un noticed or be simply accepted as part of the punishment due to a losing group. The exclusion of East Timor society has been justified by the victors’ and its processes of transitional justice in post conflict period. The significant point behind this problem is about the simplification of the history of certain communities who is the target of political humanitarian intervention. It influences the categorization of victims and the appropriate response. Here, I suggest that silence and suffering are the two inseparable elements in relation to the birth of state (Agamben 1998).
In the East Timorese case, the humanitarian intervention is the main driven for East Timor independence. The irony is that when the human rights campaigns focus on the victims of state violence, in this particular case it shows that it is possible for the global humanitarian project to exclude certain communities when, in post conflict reconstruction, the human rights of other victims is not acknowledged, and they are treated as the target of different transitional justice programme. I argue that this kind of simplification in humanitarian intervention has contributed to the violence and also it has dominated the construction of reality in the global media which obscures people’s understanding of the reality of distant suffering which is a crucial problem of our globalized world.

Furthermore, the narrative which is produced in this thesis may be compared to the two truth narratives which are produced by the two truth commissions, CTF and CAVR. In the narrative of those truth commissions, the narratives the East Timor community in exile has no place in it. They are also not represented in both commissions, since they are only known as perpetrators or former militias within the framework of transitional justice. This is the similar stigma which is used to be built against the communists during the Cold War and now it is applied to them. Thus, it explains why they are hardly accepted in new resettlement project, since most of them are still treated as criminal who are objects of policing by Indonesian state apparatus and also the humanitarian network. The East Timor community in exile is not only excluded from the political economic formation of the state of East Timor, but this community is also excluded from Indonesia itself which has moved from the former military corporatist regime. It explains why after a decade many of them still lives in borderland in very difficult condition. The poem of an East Timorese child reproduced at the beginning of this chapter is a simple and powerful reminder of this truth which I have tried to answer – ‘why are the children still scattered in all directions?’
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