Leadership and Participatory Development in Post-Reform (2001-2010) District Governments of Punjab, Pakistan: The Cases of Attock and Sahiwal Districts.

By

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explored whether, why and how leadership or other factors in Punjab's District Governments were related to participatory development programme introduced in Pakistan's local governments in 2001. Networking/Partnering and transformational styles were found to be significantly correlated with participatory programme utilization levels in sixteen districts. Qualitative analysis in two districts concluded that leadership; local socioeconomic and power patterns; public awareness, trust and confidence; institutional-legal design of participatory development; policy-orientation of higher-level government(s); and local group politics were important factors affecting participatory development programme.

Charismatic leadership is highly conductive to change when it builds integrity and trust in a novel public programme, but strong charisma could also lead to discouragement or even suppression of a poorly designed change when leaders intellectualize it in an unfavourable way. Participative leadership led to building follower ownership in participatory policy. Individualized consideration sub-style led to building follower capability for participatory development while intellectual stimulation was the most important leadership sub-style for checking elite-capture. The extent of participatory programme utilization was determined by Networking/Partnering leadership style. 'Deliverance' leadership behaviour was idealized by followers under conditions of poor citizen-rights. An ongoing uninterrupted participatory programme was found to be generally empowering for the communities in the long-term.

DEDICATION

……to the many local government and community leaders who made participatory

development (CCB) programme a success in Punjab.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB: Asian Development Bank

ADP: Annual Development Programme

ADLG: Assistant Director Local Government

BVDP: Barani (rainfed) Village Development Programme

CCB: Citizen Community Board

CD: Community Development

CM: Chief Minister

DCO: District Coordination Officer

DG: District Government

DHQ: District Headquarter

DN: District Nazim

DO: District Officer

EDO: Executive District Officer

GBPP: Ghazi Barotha Power Project

LG: Local Government

LGCD: Local Government and Community Development

LGDP: Local Government Development Programme

MNA: Member National Assembly

MPA: Member Provincial Assembly

PD: Participatory Development

PM: Prime Minister

TMA: Town/Tehsil (Sub-division) Municipal Administration

UA: Union Administration

UC: Union Council

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study is about elected Local Government leaders, the way they behave when put in '-ship', and the way they navigate through uncharted waters of reform. Since a single study couldn't have investigated all the aspects of leadership and local government reform, the current research focused on relationship between leadership styles and participatory development as an innovative feature of Local Government reform in selected districts of Punjab province in Pakistan. Built on a mixed-method multi-stage architecture, the study explored interrelationships between leadership styles quantitatively during the first stage, while leadership factors contributing to participatory local development were investigated qualitatively during the second stage. During the course of qualitative enquiry some other associated factors were also discovered to be affecting participatory development positively or negatively.

1.1. Broad aims of research:

Leadership theory is not always clear on the correlation between leadership styles. Theorists such as Burns (1978), House (1977) and Conger and Kanungo (1998, 1987) consider transformational and charismatic leadership and their associated styles to be independent and separate from transactional leadership and its associated styles. Other theorists such as Bass (1985b) and Avolio and Bass (2004; 1999) consider transactional and transformational leadership and associated styles as lying on a single continuum of leadership from non-leadership to transactional to transformational leadership. It is implied by the later camp that transformational leadership exists and extends beyond a sufficient level of transactional leadership provided by leaders. Also, the interrelationship between transactional/transformational leadership and directive/participative

leadership style typologies is not clear (Van Wart, 2005; Bass, 1999; Kouzes and Postner, 1987). Although the role of networking/partnering and transformational leadership is central in change, the need for change is predominantly environment-driven in Networking/Partnering leadership style while change-orientation is predominantly a leader property in transformational leadership (Van Wart, 2005). However, theory development and research is scant on networking/partnering leadership style and its relationship with transformational and other leadership styles (Wan Wart, 2011; House 1996). Accordingly, the first broad aim of this research is to extend the research on leadership styles and to examine whether leadership style interrelationships implied in leadership theory and supported by leadership research mostly conducted in the West hold good in local government context of Punjab.

Although citizen participation literature recognizes leadership as a general condition contributing to process and outcomes of citizen participation in local development (e.g. Cornwall, 2008; Cornwall & Coelho, 2007; Oakley, 1995), there is little theory development and research regarding the relationship of leadership styles as developed in the theory of leadership with participatory development. Existing citizen participation literature is also deficient in describing leadership style contingencies for participatory development. Writers such as Gaventa (2007), Gaventa and Valderamma (2000), Leeuwis (2000) and Mansuri and Rao (2004) have provided theoretical foundations and research based evidence for political, cultural and economic determinants of citizen participation in local development in developing countries. However, there is a dearth of rigorous qualitative studies offering a deeper understanding of citizen participation in local development and its multiple determinants in different community contexts in developing countries. Oakley (1995) has suggested that multiple qualitative case studies are needed for development of theory in participatory development in developing countries.

Accordingly, the second broad aim of the current research is to extend and enrich leadership and participatory development theory and research by describing relationship between leadership styles and participatory development, and explaining why and how leadership and other situational factors may contribute to local participatory development in a developing country like Pakistan.

Post-decentralization local government tenure from 2001 to 2010 had a special historical significance in Pakistan not only because empowered local governments with strong executive heads were elected for the first time, but also because high levels of citizen participation in local development was introduced with institutional-legal foundation for the first time in Pakistan. The final broad aim of this research is to provide inputs into improvement of policy and praxis of participatory development in Pakistan by analyzing institutional design and policy weaknesses that uncovered during the first experiences of communities and local governments with participatory development. These broad aims of the current research have been developed into more specific objectives and focused questions in quantitative and qualitative research design chapters later in the thesis.

1.2. Contextualizing the research:

Since its birth in 1947, Pakistan has had four major local government reform legislations[1]. The three local government reform legislations passed in 1960, 1974 and 1979 were able to achieve little in terms of decentralization, citizen empowerment, improvement in local services delivery and local development (Siddiqui, 1992; Abedin, 1973). Local government (LG) system of 2001, designed by central government and promulgated by Punjab Government in form of Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001 (hereafter PLGO, 2001), made LGs powerful instruments of

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[1] See Appendix 1 for an analytical history of local governments in Punjab, Pakistan

service delivery and local development. For the first time in the history, empowered and fully responsible LGs were installed under PLGO (2001) in Punjab (Zaidi, 2005). LG reform of 2001 was introduced by the ex-President Mussharaf regime as a part of a major decentralization programme enshrined in the Devolution Plan of Pakistan (2000). Under the PLGO (2001), LGs were divided into three vertical tiers of District, Tehsil (Sub-district) and Union government. Each tier had a representative house and elected head of government called the 'Nazim' (or administrator). District is the highest tier with its elected District Council and District Nazim.

Under the Devolution Plan (2000), substantial functions and powers had been decentralized from the Provincial Government to the District Governments. The structure of District Administration was also changed by 'de-concentrating' the powers and functions concentrated in the office of district Deputy Commissioner—a high ranking bureaucrat seconding from Federal or Provincial government and heading the District Administration under the earlier LG systems—into several District Offices. District Nazim is the elected executive head of the District Government. In addition to conferring substantial administrative and developmental functions and powers on District Nazim, PLGO (2001) also empowered him/her to oversee functioning of district administration and conduct inspections of Tehsil (Sub-district) Municipal Administrations (TMAs). Development in social sector areas of LG such as health, education, community development, agriculture extension and sports, etc, was assigned to District Government (DG). Municipal services were a responsibility of TMA. Municipal functions of erstwhile Municipal Committees/Corporations which were limited to urban limits only were assigned to TMAs which were now responsible for municipal services in urban as well as rural areas. Union Administrations were also assigned a mix of small scale municipal and neighbourhood

development responsibilities. Registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces was the most important function assigned to the Union Administrations (UA). Decentralized LGs operated under the political control of elected local representatives in Punjab from August 14, 2001, to December 31, 2009, when the constitutional protection granted to them expired.

Till recently, the new Punjab Government elected in February 2008 failed to hold fresh LG elections under PLGO (2001) ever since the constitutional guarantee for LG tenure ended on December 31, 2009. Local development programmes of DGs were also reduced considerably and CCB programme in most districts was brought to a halt by the time interviews were conducted for this study in the winter of 2009/2010. However, the structure of local administration as envisaged in PLGO (2001) continues without local political direction and control. Although government members in Punjab Assembly have not been able to agree as yet on continuing the 2001 LG system or legislating on an alternative LG system—neither is Punjab civil bureaucracy in favour of an empowered democratic LG system—public pressure for elected LGs is mounting. A LG system has be introduced sooner or later by the Punjab Government under Article 140-A of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973). It is expected that any new LG system will be informed by learning from the LG experience from 2001-02 to 2009-10 and may include many successful or popular features of LG system of 2001 such as participatory development.

1.3.Significance of research timeframe:

Pakistan's LG reform of 2001 created a unique opportunity for research in local leadership, LG policy and local development. Local governments in Pakistan from 2001-02 to 2009-10 stand out as a distinctive experience in LG history of Pakistan not only because it was a great experiment in decentralization in an over-centralized country, but also because massive local development programs were carried out in the districts through democratically elected and empowered LGs. A

new cadre of powerful elected leaders in governance structure of Pakistan was created in the form of District Nazims. The position of District Nazim was made not only highly responsible and resourceful, but also enjoyed wide autonomy and discretion in development planning of the district. Further, the overall structure of leadership in the district also included Union Nazims— the directly elected executive heads of geographical-political LG constituencies within the district. Union Nazims were also ex officio members of District Council and constituted Electoral College for election of District Nazim. Together, District Nazim and Union Nazims constituted an integrated structure of primary and secondary leadership in the district. The nature and level of local development in a district depended much on how relationships emerged between primary and secondary leaders in a district.

This period is also distinctive because a significant portion of local development budgets was planned and executed for the first time by unelected citizens in local communities. Besides continuing the conventional channels of development planning and implementation, PLGO (2001) introduced citizen participation in local development in form of Citizen Community Boards (CCBs). CCBs were the first comprehensive experiment in participatory development in Pakistan. CCBs are organized groups of local community which can identify, plan and implement local development projects falling within the general classifications identified in Punjab District Government CCB Rules (2003). Since participatory development at District Government level is a key focus of research in this thesis, it is important to briefly describe the CCBs programme in the next section.

1.4. The CCB Programme:

The CCB program was an innovation brought about the decentralization reform of 2001 and involved development projects identification and execution by the registered community based

organizations called CCBs. 25% of the local development budget was to be earmarked for use through CCB program (NRB, 2001).

A CCB could be registered by a minimum of 25 volunteering non-elected community members as its General Body members. The General Body could then elect a 7 to 15 member CCB Executive Committee including Chairperson, Secretary and other office bearers of the CCB. Executive Committee executed all the business of CCB. All decisions and reports of the Executive Committee had to be approved by the CCB general body. CCBs Executive Committee made formal development proposals to the Local Government and executed the participatory projects on a non-profit basis through appointing project coordinators from amongst CCB members. Project coordinator was responsible for hiring skilled or other workers for executing works and disbursing payments to them. He/She could request formation of work groups from amongst CCB members for assisting him/her and presented formal work progress reports to the CCB.

A CCB registered within a district government jurisdiction could identify and demand development projects anywhere in the district with the only conditions that general community was involved in development need identification process and community contributed 20% of the estimated cost of the project. CCBs needed to formally explain how local community was involved or proposed to be involved during the need identification, implementation and post-completion phases of the project (CCB Form 4, Government of Punjab, 2003b). CCBs submitted their proposals to the District Community Development (CD) department of the District Government (DG) which coordinated with other relevant departments of DG for proposal feasibility assessment, detailed cost estimations and project placement in the DG budget.

The local council was to set policy guidelines regarding the sectoral priorities for CCB projects. District planning offices could then make allocations to individual projects within prioritized sectors according to a ranking procedure given in the Punjab CCB (Budget) Rules (Government of Punjab, 2003b). Development funds were available for disbursement to CCBs after CCB proposals were approved in the development budget by the council.

Punjab Local Government CCB Rules (2003) required CCBs to submit periodic progress reports for release of instalment as agreed in the project implementation plan at the proposal stage. The first instalment of CCB funds, in addition to the 20% community contribution, was released to the concerned CCBs after approval of the proposal by the council. Subsequent instalments were released to the CCB as per the project schedule agreed between the CCB and Local Government once the official(s) notified by the concerned Local Government could verify progress on project execution against the plan. As part of overall District ADP, CCB projects were also required to be completed within a single financial year, with only exceptional projects phased over two years (Section 42, Government of Punjab, 2003a).

Monitoring and evaluation of the CCB projects were to be 'non-intrusive' and carried out through the CCB Monitoring Committee elected from the district council, or through any other 'agency/official(s) notified by the Local Government concerned' (Section 18, Government of Punjab, 2003b).

CCBs represented a major change in prevailing concepts and practice of local development. CCBs were unlike the citizen involvement programs of 1960s and 1980s in which citizens participated in small-scale rural development projects only to the extent of development need

identification or providing some paid labour[2]. Under CCBs, citizens could not only identify development needs of their community but also implement and run the project without any interference from the government. Further, medium or large-sized projects could also be undertaken.

Elected Local Government representatives had the first-hand knowledge about CCBs through official communications and trainings and were expected to encourage and educate communities for popularization of CCBs. However, elected representatives could neither be a part of CCBs nor were they made formally responsible for achieving any level of CCB program implementation. CCBs projects had to be initiated and implemented by communities alone, but elected representatives could play a big role in adoption and diffusion of CCBs by disseminating participatory development knowledge and encouraging communities.

1.5. Personal Motivation for Research:

As a LG trainer I had conducted some training modules for Union Councilors and Union Nazims regarding LG system of 2001 and the new instrument of participatory development—Citizen Community Boards (CCB)—introduced under the decentralization reform. I had already developed a teaching interest in leadership, LGs and participation during my experience as a faculty member at Institute of Administrative Sciences, Lahore. But my research interest in District Government leadership and participatory local development formed during the enriching experience of LG trainings. The leadership characters suddenly seem to have come out the texts, animated, and talking about their experiences with the LG reform and unfolding drama of participatory development. In the year 2007, I also got involved in a health-sector CCB project in

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[2] See Appendix 1 for a history of local governments, local government leadership and participatory development in Punjab, Pakistan.

Toba Tek Singh—a rural district in Central Punjab—in an advisory role. The blend of teaching and field experience gave me some very useful insights and an inspiration to pursue a PhD in District Government leadership and Participatory Development. It was also an opportune time to carry out research by the end of two terms of DG in December 2009 since respondents could reflect on their LG and participatory development experiences during the whole experiment of reformed LGs. Overall CCB funds utilization position in District Governments would be clear by the end of two tenures of LGs in Punjab.

1.6.Significance of research

Following from its broad aims, this research can be significant in two important ways:

i. Modern leadership theory has developed in the West. Most leadership research has been carried out in private business environments of the developed countries. This research intends to make contribution to leadership research by testing whether a small but important section of leadership theory is valid in LG context of Punjab, Pakistan. Furthermore the research also enriches the theory and research on participatory development theory and research by explaining the factors contributing to participatory development in context of less developed societies. The research also contributes to leadership theory by explaining the contingency factors of leadership in participatory development context of less developed societies.

ii. No attempt has been made to systematically study LG leadership under the new system and its relationship with the greatest change that accompanied LG reform of 2001: citizen participation in local development. The current research provides an indigenous perspective on LG leadership and has some important implications for participatory

policy and design. All of this comes at a time of great debate in Punjab Government about continuation of the 2001 LG system or introduction of an amended LG system. This study can provide important input into the policy and institutional design of participatory development that may be introduced under the anticipated LG system in Punjab.

1.7.Structure of the thesis:

This thesis is divided into twelve chapters. The current Chapter 1 briefly introduced the study and its context. Major perspectives and theories on leadership are reviewed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 reviews citizen participation in developing countries. A typology of citizen-participation in local development is suggested in Chapter 4 after reviewing several model of participatory development. Chapter 5 reviews the special issue of elite-capture.

This study was conducted in two stages: quantitative and qualitative. Chapter 6 discusses the research design and methods employed in Quantitative Stage of the research. Chapter 7 discusses leadership style data analysis and findings from 16 districts of Punjab. Chapter 8 describes research design and methods employed in Qualitative Stage of the research carried out in two districts of Punjab. Chapter 9 briefly introduces the two districts (Attock and Sahiwal) selected for Qualitative research. Chapter 10 presents qualitative data analysis and findings from the first district: Attock. Chapter 11 presents qualitative data analysis and findings from the second district: Sahiwal. Overall conclusions from the study are drawn in Chapter 12. A list of bibliographic references and appendices are included in the end.

CHAPTER 2

LEADERSHIP THEORIES AND PERSPECTIVES

Leadership has meant different things to different people. Consequently there are probably as many definitions as the number of people who have tried to define leadership (Stogdill, 1975, p.7). Bass and Bass (2008,p.15-22) have presented theoretical conceptualizations of leadership as traits, skills and behaviours required for success; a process of attribution of success or failure; a focus of group activity, change and other processes; a process of symbolic representation to the external world and meaning-making for the followers; a process of exerting influence through intellectual activities; purposive behavior directing and coordinating the work of followers; the art of inducing compliance by followers; a process of persuasion without coercion; initiating structure or a process of originating and maintaining role-structure and role-relationships; a general process of exerting influence for achieving specific change-oriented and routinized goals; and as an instrumental value for envisioning and/or achieving organizational goals and employee needs and affecting organizational adaptability. Conceding that it would be fruitless to look for an 'only true and proper' definition of leadership, Bass and Bass (2008) have concluded that leadership should be defined in relation to methodological and substantive aspects of interest to the researcher.

2.1. Conceptualizations of leadership:

Power and influence literature defines leadership as a special case of interpersonal influence that gets an individual or group to do what the leader wants done (Ravens & French 1959). Combining humanistic-psychology with a power-perspective, Burns (1978) has suggested that leadership is an aspect of the larger domain of power: all leaders hold power, but not all power-

holders are leaders. Whereas power is a process 'in which power-holders, possessing certain motives and goals, have the capacity to secure changes in the behavior of a respondent, human or animal, and in the environment, by utilizing resources in their power base, including factors of skill, relative to the targets of their power-wielding and necessary to secure such changes', 'leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological and other resources so as to arouse, engage and satisfy the motives of followers' (Burns, 1978, p13,18). Clearly while both power and leadership are relational, collective and purposeful, leadership has additional characteristics: leadership is necessarily 'interactional'; it leads 'followers' according to motives recognized and accepted by them, and follower motives and goals are not obliterated by leadership, although it may elevate some follower motives/goals and ignore others (Burns, 1978, p.18). Yukl (2006) has defined leadership rather broadly as 'the process of influencing others to understand and agree about what needs to be done and how to do it, and the process of facilitating individual and collective efforts to accomplish shared objectives' (p. 8). Northouse (2007,p3) has defined leadership as a 'process', rather than an internal set of characteristics of a leader, involving 'influence', or how leaders affects followers and vice versa, that occurs in a 'group' setting that may be a small task force or a community or a large organization, in pursuit of some identified 'common goal(s)'.

Organization change and transformational leadership literature has defined leadership as a process of providing direction and motivation for collective, coordinated and collaborative efforts towards an envisioned state that is espoused as morally superior and pragmatically better than the current state (Hersey & Blanchard 1972, Kotter 1990). Taking lead from the Weberian idea of emergence of charismatic leadership in societies transforming from traditional to bureaucratic

order, Kotter (1995;1990) has argued that the essential function of leadership is to produce and sustain adaptive and useful change. Similarly, theorists such as Schein (1985, p.2) and Bass (1990) have argued that challenging existing values and creating and sustaining new organizational cultures is a significant thing that distinguishes leaders from managers. At one extreme, writers such as Zaleznick (1977) have pointed out to the serious scarcity of leadership throughout organizational levels and associated leadership exclusively with grand change, whereas other theorists such as Katz and Kahn (1966) consider leadership as 'influential increment' or 'discretionary influence' over and above formal role of the leader as embodied in rules and regulations, and that is directed towards dealing with new situations or unanticipated events that may interact with organizational processes in a positive or negative way. Most organization change and transformational leadership theorists agree that change in organizational technologies, administrative systems and culture is necessary for survival in response to changing environments, and change requires leadership (Van Wart, 2008; Kotter,1995; Bass,1990).

2.2.A review of major leadership models and theories:

The history of modern leadership theories started in early 20th century (Bass and Bass, 2008). The focus of various leadership theories till 1970s was to investigate the traits, behaviours or situational variables of leadership, and its role in transacting an 'exchange' in which leaders promise tangible and/or intangible rewards and benefits to the followers in return for followers fulfillment of agreements with the leader (Bass and Bass, 2008). This represented a static and closed model of leadership.

During 1970s a new dynamic and open-system approach to leadership theory and research, the transformational approach, was emerging. The term transformational leadership was first used as a concept by James Downton in 1973, but developed into a full theory of leadership by James

Macgregor Burns in 1978 (Bass and Bass, 2008,p.50). Transformational leadership was contrasted with the earlier theories of leadership—now popularized as transactional theories—in that the transformational leadership focused on articulation of a future vision and elevation of follower needs and goals beyond their immediate self interest in order to ethically achieve a positive change in people and processes at all organizational levels in an environment that was increasingly uncertain; whereas transactional theories focused more on maintaining a healthy and well-calculated exchange between leaders and followers, mainly at operational or supervisory levels, in order to achieve largely fixed and predetermined organizational goals in a environment that was assumed to be stable and predictable (Bass and Bass, 2008; Van Wart, 2005). 1970s and 1980s were marked by sweeping changes in business and government environments in developed economies. Consequently there was demand for a rarer leadership in 'transformational' mode— that was different from more common management-like leadership in 'transactional' mode—that could effectively align and realign people and processes with the ongoing changes in environment (Bennis and Naus, 1985). 1970s also witnessed a renewed academic interest in neo-Weberian charismatic leadership theories that 'focused on influence processes of the individuals and the specific behaviours used to arouse inspiration and higher levels of action in followers' (Van Wart, 2005,p.8). House and Aditya (1997) found a similarity in meanings of charismatic and transformational leadership. Bass (1985) and Avolio et al. (1999) included charismatic leadership as the largest factor in their transformational leadership model. Tichy and Devanna (1986) included charismatic characteristics such as change-orientation, courage and visioning in their transformational leadership model. Although there are some distinct differences, charismatic and transformational approaches have tended to merge more and more into a single approach since 1980s as theories from both have been revised and expanded (Van Wart, 2005,p.338).

2.2.1. Trait theory: The Trait theory of leadership emerged in early 20th century under the scientific mood of early industrial psychology and remained dominant till 1940s. According to trait theory, leaders possess specific psychological and physical traits and certain skill that distinguish them from non-leaders, and that presence or absence of these traits and skills in the current leaders marks the difference between success and failure in various collective human forms (Van Wart, 2005). These traits and skills were considered largely innate, universal and measured by scientific methodology in a variety of leaders. Personality research during 1930s and 1940s by psychologists such as Gordon Allport, Raymond Cattell and Hans Eysenck produced lists of personality traits and led to the development of 'Big Five' personality model (Bass and Bass, 2008). The five universal core traits that constituted the personality of an individual include extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability or neuroticism and openness to change. Trait theory suggested that leaders ranked uniquely and more or less uniformly on these traits. Long lists of leadership traits and skills developed during the first half of 20th century continued to be refined and integrated into fewer mega-categories in several studies carried out during the following years. As shown in the Table 2.1, Stogill (1974) identified some distinctive traits and critical skills associated with leaders.

However there were two main problems associated with the traits theory: First, the list of leadership traits and skills became longer and longer as more and more studies were conducted, and second, the identified traits and skills were not powerful predictors of leadership outcomes across different situations (Van Wart, 2005).

Table 2.1: Leadership traits and skills

Traits	Skills
- Situational adaptability - Alertness to social environment - Ambitious and achievement-orientated - Intelligence - Assertiveness - Cooperativeness - Decisiveness - Dependability - Dominance with a desire to influence others - Energetic (high levels of activity) - Persistence - Self-confidence - High stress tolerance - Willingness to assume responsibility	- Conceptual/intellectual skills - Creativity in problem solving - Diplomatic skills/tactful dealing of sensitive situations - Verbal communication skills/fluent speaking - Knowledgeable about group task and processes - Organization/administrative skills - Persuasion skills - Social/interpersonal skills

Source: Stogill, 1974

2.2.2. **Behavioural Models of Leadership**: Behavioural models of leadership emerging during 1940s and 1950s discovered certain leadership behavioural styles or aggregated sets of behaviours over which the situational theories could later build. Michigan studies found two independent aggregated leadership behavior sets subsuming a number of other behaviours: task-oriented and relationship-oriented behaviours. Ohio studies found similar two independent mega-categories of leadership behaviours: initiating-structure and consideration. Task-oriented or initiating-structure styles described a variety of behaviours relating to defining roles and tasks, control mechanisms, and work coordination whereas relationship oriented or consideration behaviors related to inclusion, development and wellbeing of followers (Van Wart, 2005). Based on behavioural models of leadership, Blake and Mouton's (1964) Managerial Grid locates five leadership styles

on a 9x9 grid constructed along two axis representing leader's concerns for production and people. Leader's concern for production and people have been constructed as interactive rather than independent reflections of behavior and measured through leader's endorsement of statements regarding management assumptions and beliefs. A brief description of the five leadership styles, i.e., impoverished, country-club, authority-obedience, organization man and team management, is shown in the Figure 2.1:

Figure 2.1: The managerial grid

Source: Blake and Mouton (1985) Managerial Grid III, in Bass and Bass, 2008

Managerial grid predicted that organizational success in achieving production efficiency and follower satisfaction depended on the degree to which leaders used a combined directive and supportive style (Van Wart, 2005, p.314).

2.2.3. Situational-Leadership Theory: Situational or contingency theories first emerged in 1940s and remained distinct leadership theories till 1980s when these started to be subsumed by more comprehensive leadership theories at macro-level (Van Wart, 2005).

2.2.3.1.Hersey and Blanchard's (1969, 1988) situational leadership theory: Hersey and Blanchard's (1969, 1988) situational leadership theory synthesizes Ohio State leadership studies, Blake and Mouton's (1964) Managerial Grid theory and Argyris's (1964) maturity-immaturity theory (Bass and Bass,2008,p59). According to Hersey and Blanchard's Situational Leadership Theory, leader's behavioral adjustment with regard to task and relationship behaviours will depend on follower maturity (renamed 'follower-readiness' by Hersey and Blanchard in 1988) composed of two elements: 1) job maturity based on experience, education and capacity of the followers that determines their ability to perform, and 2) psychological maturity based on motivation and confidence of the followers that determines their willingness to perform. Accordingly, Hersey and Blanchard (1969, 1988) prescribe four leadership styles: telling, selling, participating and delegating. Telling style is characterized by high task and low relationship leadership behaviours and prescribed when both follower ability and willingness to perform are low. Specific behaviours involve providing high degrees of direction and attention to defining roles and performance goals of followers. Telling style enables followers to take responsibility and feel secure and recommended for dealing with new staff, or where the work was menial or repetitive, or where things had to be completed within a short time

span (Doyle and Smith, 1999). Selling style is characterized by high task and high relationship leadership behaviors and prescribed when follower are willing and motivated, but lack the ability to perform. Specific leader behaviours include providing direction, opportunity for explanation and clarification of decisions, and encouragement of followers to maintain enthusiasm and 'buy' them into the task (Doyle and Smith, 1999). Participating style is characterized by high relationship and low task leadership behaviours and prescribed when followers possess the ability, but are not motivated or feel insecure to perform the tasks (Doyle and Smith, 1999). High support and participative leader behavior is prescribed for motivating unwilling followers in moderate to high follower-maturity situations. Leaders typically contribute ideas and facilitate followers in shared decision-making, but are least directive. Delegating style is characterized by low relationship and low task leadership behaviours and prescribed in situations of high follower maturity with regard to both ability and willingness to perform. The main role of leader is to identify problems or issues, and delegate the responsibility of decision-making about these issues to the followers (Doyle and Smith, 1999). Highly competent followers require little direction and opportunity for independent decision-making helps sustain their motivation levels. Hersey and Blanchard's Situational Leadership Theory is summarized in the Figure 2.2:

Figure 2.2: Hersey and Blanchard's Situational Leadership Model

	Participating	Selling
	Share ideas and facilitate in decision making	Explain decisions and provide opportunity for clarification
	Delegating	Telling
	Delegate responsibility for decision making and implementation	Provide specific instructions and supervise performance

Relationship Behavior: Hi / Low

Task Behavior: Low — Hi

Able & Willing	Able & Unwilling	Unable & Willing	Unable & Unwilling
Hi	Moderate		Lo

Follower maturity

Source: Hersey and Blanchard (1988, p.187)

2.2.3.2.Path-Goal Theory: Path-goal theory proposed first by Robert House in 1971, and later revised by House and Mitchell (1974) and House (1994), argues that in order to be effective, leadership must compensate for the deficiencies in work-setting and follower attributes (Van Wart, 2005). Path-goal theory takes into account intervening situational variables of work-settings and follower needs and suggests that effective leadership clears and facilitates the path between task goals and follower goals and needs, and thus motivate followers to a high level of performance. Task ambiguity, task difficulty, inherent quality of the task as represented in associated boredom and stressfulness, task-interdependency and worker control built into the task are some of the most commonly identified *task-related* contingency variables. Followers' ability as reflected in their education and experience, follower preferences for supervision and control, individual

differences in follower needs and desirable rewards are commonly identified *follower-related* contingency variables (Van Wart, 2005). Path-goal theory is an ever expanding dyadic theory of a transactional nature. Path-goal theory is illustrated in the Figure 2.3.

In order to adjust to the task and follower-related contingency variables, leaders assume one or a combination of four most common styles: directive (non-punitive and non-authoritarian), supportive, participative and achievement-oriented (House and Mitchell, 1974).

Figure 2.3: House's Path-goal theory

Leadership factors	Contingency factors	Follower outcomes
Leadership behaviors •Directive •Supportive •Achievement oriented •Participative	**Subordinate attributes** •Work preferences: Authoritarianism, Internal-external orientation •Types of fulfilment desired •Ability: Experience and training **Work setting attributes** •Task clarity •Level of difficulty •Stress and danger involved •Interdependency •Autonomy and feedback	**Job satisfaction** •Job leads to valued rewards **Acceptance of leader** •Leadership supplies what is lacking in follower and work-setting attributes **Motivational behavior** •Expectancy •Instrumentality •Valence

Source: Adapted from House and Mitchell (1974).

a) Directive leadership includes instructing, clarifying and guiding followers regarding the work content, work schedules, work-contingent rewards, etc. a directive style may

be suitable when tasks are unstructured and/or complex and followers are insecure, inexperienced and/or hold authoritarianism/dogmatic beliefs.

b) Supportive leadership includes consideration for follower needs, creating a friendly and fear-free working environment, encouraging creativity and innovation in work and recognition of followers' efforts. Supportive leadership is a source of 'self-confidence and social satisfaction' and 'stress reduction and alleviation of frustration', and is thus most useful when work is boring, unpleasant or frustrating and/or when followers' need for recognition/self-esteem is high (House, 1996,p.326).

c) Participative leadership is directed towards encouraging followers influence in decision-making by actively seeking and taking into account their suggestions in the process of making decisions (House, 1996). Van Wart (2005, p.321) has argued that participative leadership clarifies relationship between effort, goal-achievement and external rewards; increases leader-follower goal congruence through the influence process; increases follower efforts and performance as followers autonomy is enhanced and intentions are clarified in the participatory process; and collective commitment and peer-group pressure for performance is built as a result of greater involvement. Participative leadership is most useful when followers have high ability and their advice is both needed and they expect to be consulted. Participative leadership may also be needed in non-repetitive and complex group tasks involving high levels of interdependency, or when open-minded but experienced followers have to perform low-significance or boring tasks (Bass and Bass, 2008, p.809-810).

d) Achievement-oriented leadership involves performance excellence. It emphasizes jointly setting challenging goals, both work-related and self-improvement-related,

seeking improvement, showing confidence in the ability of followers, differentiating the levels of contingent rewards more sharply, and emphasizing self-actualization through superior performance and work-goal achievement. Achievement-oriented style is expected to work better when followers have high control over their work that is challenging and non-repetitive, and when followers have high ability, internal locus of control and/or have high need for individual recognition (Van Wart, 2005,p.322).

2.2.3.3.Normative-Decision Theory: Vroom and Yetton's (1973) normative-decision theory originally suggested that leaders should select from six decision-making styles under a variety of situational variables in order to attain good decisions with regards to quality, timeliness, acceptance, cost-effectiveness and follower development (in Van Wart, 2005). Autocratic (two variants), consultative (two variants) and group/participative (two variant) styles were originally proposed in 1973. The theory was refined in 1974 and 1988 by Vroom and Jago and a delegative style was added to the list. Further, only the collective variant of group decision-making was retained. Vroom (2003) later used a single facilitative style instead of two group decision styles and single 'decide' style instead of two autocratic styles. A brief description of leadership decision styles proposed by the theory over time is given in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Vroom, Yetton and Jago's Normative Decision-Making Styles:

Decision Making Style	Description
Autocratic I (AI)	Leader uses information currently available to him and takes a decision.

Autocratic II (AII)	Leader collects any necessary information from the followers and then makes the decision himself/herself. Leader may or may not want to inform Group members.
Consultative I (CI)	Leader shares the issue/problem with group members *individually*, gets information, ideas and analysis from Group Members/followers, but makes the decision himself/herself. The decision may or may not reflect followers' influence.
Consultative II (CII)	Leader shares the issue/problem with group members *collectively* in a group meeting, gets information, ideas and analysis from Group Members/followers, but makes the decision himself/herself. The decision may or may not reflect followers' influence.
Group I (GI)	Leader shares the problem with an individual follower, jointly analyze the issue and reach a mutually satisfactory solution in an atmosphere of open and free exchange of ideas and information.
Group ll (Gll)/ Participative/ Facilitative	Leader shares the issue/problem with group members *collectively* in a group meeting, focuses attention on certain critical issues, coordinates and facilitates discussion, and tries to bring about a consensus solution, but does not impose his will or preference. Alternative solutions are generated and evaluated collectively. Group makes the final decision and leader has the willingness to accept and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group or at least a considerable majority of the followers.
Delegative (DI)	Leader delegates the decision to a follower with all necessary information, responsibility and authority to make the decision. Any proposed solution will receive the support of the leader.

Source: Extracted from Bass and Bass (2008,p.490-91)

2.2.3.4.Fiedler's contingency theory of leadership: As opposed to other situational theories discussed above, Fred Fiedler's (1967) contingency theory of leadership assumes that leaders have personally consistent task and relationship oriented behaviours. Thus either different leaders need to be chosen for different situations or leaders need to change their situation to suit their particular behavioural style (Bass and Bass, 2008,p.522). Fiedler (1967) suggested a Least Preferred Co-worker (LPC) scale to identify a leader's dominant

style. Based on leader's responses on statements about a co-worker working with whom he/she described as least well, a leader could be a high LPC or a relationship-oriented style leader or a low LPC or a task-oriented style leader. In order to achieve group effectiveness there should be a match between leader's style and situational control, the contingency variable introduced by Fiedler (1967). Situational control in turn consists of three variables: leader-member relations determining the member support for leader; task-structure determining the ambiguity of the group work; and position power of the leader determining the leader's formal capacity to issue directives and administer contingent rewards/punishment. Group effectiveness would depend on how well situational control is matched with leader's behavioural style. The main predictions of the theory are that a task-oriented leader with directive style will be effective in situations offering low or high control while a relationship-oriented leader with a non-directive style will be effective in moderate control situations (Bass and Bass, 2008,p.534).

2.2.4. Leader-member exchange theory:

Originating in the Social Exchange Theory (e.g. Blau, 1964; Hollander, 1958; Homans, 1958), Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) theory holds that leader-follower relationships in an organizational setting develop as a series of small dyadic interactions (in Van Wart, 2005). Members of the dyad initially engage in successive exchange of small values in order to test if the relationship can grow to a higher level (Uhl-Bien, 2000). Although the relationship is a shared one, LMX theory puts the final responsibility for initiating and managing the relationships on leaders. If gestures of dyad members are responded according to expectations in these initial exchanges, the relational factors of mutual *trust, respect and obligation* grow gradually. As a result, more exchanges of successively

higher value take place and followers get more access to resources and information controlled by leaders. If the initial gestures of one party to the dyad are not responded or responded less than the expectation of the other party in the social exchange dyad, the exchange stops or is sustained at a low level in the early stages. Eventually the quality of this exchange is reflected in mutual trust and loyalty, professional respect and liking for each other and obligation to reciprocate (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Davis and Gardner, 2004).

A longer high-quality LMX tenure enacted between leaders and followers will result in higher efforts by both leaders and followers to further develop the relationship (Maslyn and Uhl-Bien, 2001). These efforts expended by leaders and followers are not limited to just in-role behaviour in organizations, rather these extend to discretionary extra-role behaviours as well. Termed as 'organizational citizenship behaviours' by Smith, Organ, and Near (1983), these behaviours include spontaneous and innovative responses benefiting both leaders and followers at all levels in organization and contribute to expanding organization's capability in meeting its goals (Ilies et al., 2007). Since followers in a formal supervisor-subordinate relation do not have the reward power, they reciprocate in form of positive extra-role 'discretionary' citizenship behaviours as a result of high-quality relationship with leaders (Katz, 1964, in Liden et al., 1997). Some studies have suggested that LMX predicts individual-targeted discretionary out-role behaviours by followers more strongly than their organization-targeted discretionary citizenship behaviours (e.g. Ilies et al., 2007, Liden and Maslyn, 1994). Others argue that development of LMX relationships is based on characteristics of 'working' and

'professional' relationships as opposed to personal or friendship relationships (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995).

LMX research suggests that leaders do not adopt an 'average leadership style' with all their followers. Rather, acting under time or resource constraints, they adopt 'differentiated' styles in their dyadic relationships with different followers (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995). Vertical Dyadic Linkages (VDL) between leader and followers described by higher degrees of trust, respect and obligation were called 'in-group' exchanges, and VDLs described by lower degrees of trust, respect and obligation were called 'out-group' exchanges. The same VDLs are called low-quality and high-quality exchanges respectively in later LMX research during 1980s and afterwards.

LMX theory describes the process of gradual partnership development in dyadic LMX relationships. As shown in the Figure 2.4 below, Leader-follower partnership development was described as a life cycle Leadership Making Model comprising three stages of stranger, acquaintance and maturity. It is in Leadership Making Model that a bridge between transactional and transformational theories can be found. It suggests that transactional leadership matures into transformational leadership as the quality of relationship between leaders and followers increases over a number of positively reciprocated interactions.

In moving from stranger to maturity stage, relationships between leader and followers move from formal and highly contractual to informal and highly extra-contractual, reciprocation becomes more 'in-kind' and takes place in a longer time horizon, and the basic pattern of leadership moves from transactional to transformational leadership. The quality of LMX relations, as reflected in professional respect for each other, mutual trust

and obligation, develop from low to high. Incremental influence, or the leadership influence in addition to the definitions of formal role and authority, increases from none to almost unlimited. Leaders and followers are in the process of finding potential roles that could be expected of each other during the stranger stage. After response to initial exchanges and some repeated exchanges overtime, role expectations start to take shape. Leaders and followers start to understand what could be expected of each other. Role expectations crystallize in maturity stage. Leaders and members understand and play their discretionary roles beyond formal job descriptions.

Figure 2.4: Leadership Making Model

Time			
Characteristic	Stage of LMX relationships		
	Stranger	Acquaintance	Maturity
Nature of relationships	Contractual Formal		Extra-contractual Informal
Reciprocity type	Cash and carry	Mixed	In-kind
Reciprocity span	Immediate	Some delay	Indefinite
Quality of LMX	Low	Medium	High
Incremental influence	None	Limited	Almost unlimited
Role construction during LMX	Role finding	Role making	Role implementation
Type of leadership	Transactional		Transformational

Source: Adapted from Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995

Various studies have found out significant correlations between quality of LMX relationships and job performance, satisfaction with supervision, job commitment, role conflict, role clarity, member competence, member access to information and

organizational resources, member career development and turnover intentions and organizational output and profitability performance measures (e.g. Maslyn and Uhl-Bien, 2001; Vecchio, 1997; Gerstner and Day 1997).

The quality of relationship in LMX also depends on perceived level of reciprocating effort put into the relationship by both leaders and followers. LMX relationships fail to develop to a higher level, or may even regress, if higher levels of one's own efforts are perceived as coupled with lower efforts by the other (Maslyn and Uhl-Bien, 2001). Followers in lower-quality LMX relationship with the leader, as opposed to higher-quality relationships, may perceive higher-quality LMX as unfair behaviour of the leaders, attribute it to hidden and collusive motives, and form cynical attitudes towards the organization (Davis & Gardner, 2004). Leaders may project their biases to low LMX members and attribute low performance to poor ability or negative attitudes of low LMX members. Similarly leaders are likely to give an external attribution of failure and internal attribution of success to the high-quality LMX members. This may result in a cycle of resentment between leaders and low-quality LMX members which may become very difficult to break over time, a situation which LMX theory blames squarely on leaders (Van Wart, 2005).

2.2.5. Charismatic theories of leadership:

Charismatic theories have tended to focus on leader as person (Van Wart, 2005). Modern charismatic theories are usually traced back to classical work by Weber (1947) who argued that charismatic leadership emerges during periods of great social and economic crisis when leaders with radical ideas, compelling personality and some early success are

perceived by the masses as endowed with exceptional skills or talents to provide an appealing alternative to the traditional values (Barbuto Jr., 2005; Van Wart, 2005). Successful, charismatic leaders eventually challenge and replace the traditional values/institutions with their envisioned ones. These values are eventually routinized and form the basis of formalized institutions and authority. Overtime the formalized institutions/authority may become dysfunctional in face of changing needs of the society thus setting the stage for another cycle of charismatic leadership.

Charisma has been considered as a fundamental factor in the transformational leadership process by many later theorists (e.g. Bass, 1985; Conger and Kanungo 1998) and is described as the leader's ability to generate great symbolic influence by relying primarily on personal bases of power (Barbuto Jr., 2005). However, several studies have concluded that charisma lies in the eyes of the beholder and that charismatic character of a leader is perceived differently by individual followers (Van Wart, 2005). Charisma develops in the leader-follower relationship when followers perceive highly desirable personal characteristics—such as self-confidence, courage, power, etc—in accordance with their leadership prototypes and schemas, to be present in certain leaders, and when followers attribute success to personal characteristics of these leaders (Galvin et al., 2010; Avolio and Yammarino, 1988). Since charismatic leadership is largely a social relationship, a leader can practically be rendered ineffective if followers do not commit themselves to leader's vision (Jermier, 1993; Erez and Earley,1993, p.220-221).

Charismatic relationship also has been described as a product of a leader with charismatic qualities and one or more followers who are open to charisma and have certain perceptions, emotions, and attitudes toward the leader, the group led by the leader, and the

vision advocated by the leader, within a 'charismaconducive' environment (Howell and Shamir, 2005; Klein and House, 1995). House and Shamir (2005, p.99) have defined charismatic leadership as 'a process through which charismatic relationship is created and maintained'.

Charismatic research has generally focused on social, political and economic conditions demanding change and charismatic leadership's role in bringing about change; attributes of charismatic leadership; leaders' use of charismatic attributes for negative or positive ends; characteristics of followers predisposed to charismatic leadership; and perception and attribution processes through which followers accept charismatic leaders' influence (e.g. Howell and Shamir, 2005; Avolio et al., 1999).

2.2.5.1.**Conger and Kanungo's Charismatic leadership theory:** Building on the ideas of House (1977), Conger and Kanungo's (1987; 1998) charismatic leadership theory focuses on how charisma is attributed to the leaders. The theory differentiates between non-charismatic, good charismatic and bad charismatic leaders. Good charismatic leadership is associated with an ideal style including 1) articulation and effective communication of an overall idealized vision that is highly discrepant from the status quo, 2) articulation of collective identity with regards to follower needs, dissatisfaction with the status quo and desirability of the new vision, 3) communicating high performance-related expectations to the followers, 4) showing confidence in the abilities of followers to achieve the goals set for new vision, 5) taking calculated risks by challenging the status quo, promoting counternormative values and example-setting through unconventional methods, and, 6) passionate advocacy of self-beliefs and a strong motivation to lead (Conger and Kanungo,

1987;1998). These charismatic behaviours have also been supported by other theorists such as House (1977), Bass (1985) and Shamir et al. (1993).

Situational demands such as long-term failure of systems or leadership, crises or impending catastrophe and unmet needs of masses/followers, etc, greatly increase chances, but do not guarantee either emergence or success of charismatic leadership (Conger and Kanungo, 1987; Bass and Bass, 2008). Effectiveness of good charismatic leaders largely depends on the extent to which new vision is articulated according to realistic estimates of existing follower needs and resources available to achieve the vision; leader's ability and willingness to make adjustments in the proposed vision according to ongoing shifts in environment; leader's self confidence and ability to persuade and sway people; and leader's ability to inspire trust and confidence and avoid excessive alienation (Conger and Kanungo, 1998). Successful charismatic leadership eventually results in follower satisfaction and trust, group cohesiveness, and change in people, processes and organizational outcomes.

2.2.5.2.Burns's Heroic Leadership: Burns (1978, p.244) considered the term charisma as overused, ambiguous and even cheapened, and instead used the terms 'heroic leadership' and 'ideological leadership' to theorize the psychoemotional and substantive effects of charisma. Heroic leadership may be necessary but not sufficient for producing transforming effects of leadership: in order to rise above their mere symbolic value leading to idolatry identification by the followers, heroic leaders must build a distinct ideological structure of desirable human and social values over the foundation provided

by their personal charisma, and then show unswerving commitment to those ideals in their endeavours towards 'real and intended change'.

Burns (1978) has argued that under conditions of intense mass alienation and social atomization, crisis of trust and legitimacy in existing institutions and value systems, and frustration of individual and collective needs, a dynamic, resourceful, competent, and responsive leadership emerges which challenges the status quo. Burns (1978) suggests following properties of this 'heroic leadership':

1. Mass belief in leaders, and a faith in their capacity to overcome crisis, is based solely on their 'personage', rather than on their programs, past performance, etc;

2. 'Heroism' or charisma exists in the relationship between leaders and followers that is marked by an absence or very low levels of conflict. Instead of clarifying and articulating their internal and external conflicts in an increasingly unjust society, followers seek freedom from their frustrations, anger, fears and aspirations by projecting them on heroic leaders who are expected to provide at least some symbolic solution, or who, in extreme cases, become idolized as symbolic solution in themselves.

3. The relationship between leaders and the led is predominantly affective; and,

4. Mass support for such leaders is expressed in direct forms such as votes, campaigning, letters, etc, rather than through intermediaries such as parties or other political or state institutions.

However, emergence or existence of heroic leadership alone cannot guarantee that it can do anything substantive for the followers than to satisfy their emotional or psychological needs. This is particularly relevant in developing societies where the bond between the

'idolatrous' form of heroic leaders and highly 'dependent' followers is generally emotional, and serves well to appease leaders' strong needs for affection, esteem and self-actualization. Followers in turn are attracted to the idols because of their needs to project their frustrations and aspirations on 'social objects' as symbolic solutions, identification with the 'awesome', and self-esteem offered by the heroic leaders in form of 'recognition and flattery' (Burns,1978,p.246). Follower are willing to surrender their distinct-self and grant full powers to the leaders to exclusively handle multiple conflicts/crises in the society on their behalf. Bondage of purely psychoemotional exchange with the leaders and a lack of substantive collective purpose frees the followers from their individual responsibility and, consequently, of any internal or external conflict.

The main strength of heroic leaders lie in their extraordinary influence to amass and retain a following based on personal affect, symbolic identification, respect and trust (Galvin et al., 2010; Burns, 1978). Burns (1978,p.248) argues that, although some heroic leaders may convert personal affect and symbolism into at least a loosely defined policy and program, 'idolized heroes' are not 'authentic leaders' because no 'collective intent or central purpose beyond 'short-run psychic dependency and gratification unites performer and spectator' and no true relationship 'characterized by deeply held motives, rational conflict, *and* lasting influence in form of change' exists between them and the followers.

The authenticity of heroic leadership, in that it can convert personal followings into movements or parties dedicated to achieve substantive, intended and real social change, will depend on: 1) articulation of a clear vision by the leadership—including policies, programs and new structures—that is based on a realistic assessment of existing social needs and aspired values for a better future; and, 2) leaders' commitment to

institutionalization of the new vision in various social and political forms. The type of heroic leadership that dedicates itself to 'explicit goals that require substantial social change and to organizing and leading political movements that pursue these goals' has been termed 'ideological leadership' by Burns (1978, p.248). Accordingly heroic leadership can be considered along a scale from low authenticity to high authenticity. As shown in the Figure 2.5 below, low authenticity idolatrous-heroic leaders restrict to personal followings and satisfaction of psychoemotional needs of the followers, have no goal-oriented commitment with followers, and can easily move on to a new audience. In contrast to their followers, they have little 'psychic investment' in their followers.

Heroic leaders may enhance their authenticity by loosely or sharply articulating the needs and aspirations of their followers in form of a vision. In sharp contrast to Idolatrous leadership, Ideological leadership not only articulate and continuously sharpen a vision based on a deliberative assessment of collective needs of the followers in a cultural-historical context, they also commit psychologically, politically and organizationally with their followers through enactment of the espoused vision. Ideologies are usually closed and doctrinaire systems of end and modal values conceived in certain social, political and economic milieus, and enshrined in visions articulated by ideological leaders. As heroic leaders move from idolatrous to ideological end of the scale, the nature of relationship between leaders and followers changes from a predominantly affective to an affective-cognitive one, and from absence of conflict to presence of 'actual or potential conflict inside the movement over specific strategies and goals', which serves to continuously sharpen the purposes of the movement (Burns,1978,p.249).

Since ideologies are doctrinaire and propose alternate set of values and solutions to existing social problems, there is a constant external conflict between competing ideologies. Ideological leaders come to personify external ideological conflicts and collective goals of change, and symbolize substantive causes that transcend psychoemotional needs of leaders and the led (Burns, 1978).

Figure 2.5: Heroic leadership

Source: Adapted from Burns (1978)

Much of charismatic leadership research has focused on follower characteristics, emergence context and cognitive processes of charisma formation (e.g. Galvin et al., 2010; Walter and Bruch, 2009; Conger and Kanungo, 1987). Several researchers have shown that charismatic leadership emerges in conditions of widespread social dissatisfaction and conflict, and that followers of charismatic leaders have a higher need for leadership (De Vries et al.,1999) and are 'prone to feelings of helplessness, frustration, loneliness, anger, distrust and uncertainty' (Van Wart,2005; Kets deVries,1988;

Burns,1978). Due to peculiar role constructs and prevailing social conditions in developing societies, masses develop deep attitudes of overdependence and submissiveness towards authority and charisma (Abedin, 1973). Charismatic leaders are also able to develop and maintain their charisma and its derived influence through positive impression management, or deliberate modeling of self-behaviour in a way that communicates intended meanings, and idealizing or 'likening' themselves to certain powerful figures in history that symbolize values popularized by the charismatic leaders (Lindholm,1988). However, individual's perceptions of leader's charisma will develop or enhance only if leader's projected image fits well in the follower's prototypes and mental schema of effective or 'extraordinary' leadership in given contexts (Galvin et al., 2010; Walter and Bruch, 2009; Javidan and Waldman, 2003).

2.2.5.3.Extreme charisma, dark charisma and personalized charisma perspectives: Some theorists have differentiated between more common milder forms of charismatic leadership, leading to identification with and respect for leaders, and a rarer extreme form of charisma leading to a cult-like status and an omniscient image achieved by the leader (e.g. Bennis and Nanus, 1985; House et al., 1991). Because of their personal grace and magnetism, exceptional abilities to charm, persuade and understand people, wealth or other personal characteristics, some leaders acquire extreme charisma. Owing to their wide referent powers, extreme egocentricism, personal dominance, and unconventional behaviours, extreme charismatic leaders enjoy enormous personal and social esteem, and are able to achieve a mystique that people find fascinating even when they don't like them (Van Wart, 2005). Extreme charisma leads to much stronger and uncritical follower identification with leader's beliefs and consistency with leader's vision or requests for

supporting the vision. However, the relationship between extreme charisma and its outcomes is moderated by leader's abilities to effectively weave social needs, aspirations and other imperatives of an actual or potential crisis into a broadly appealing vision (Van Wart,2005).

Conger and Kanungo (1998, p211-240) recognize that since charismatic leaders may often combine positional, expert and referent powers, opportunities for consciously or unconsciously using power in a negative way are great. Thus negative or 'dark' charismatic leaders use their great powers and personality characteristics and charismatic processes in a self-serving way leading to outright personal benefits or extreme narcissism and egotism, and ignoring the opinions and leadership development needs of the followers. Kets de Vries (2005,p.140) has argued that while charisma can be a 'gift' when it causes 'a contagion of enthusiasm and excellence', it can also be a 'curse' when charismatic leaders project their delusional and narcissistic ideas or behaviuor patterns onto acquiescent followers leading to a 'shared madness' and detriment of both organization and the followers. Narcissistic, controlling/abrasive and paranoid dispositions developed by negative charismatics may lead to contempt and intolerance for those holding different opinions (Kets de Vries,2005).

Conger and Kanungo (1987; 1998) have argued that charismatic leaders can be flawed despite good intentions, and thus ineffective, if they make unrealistic assessments of follower needs or available resources, or if they fail to recognize and resist unconscious temptations of great power. Flawed charismatic and/or 'dark' charismatic leadership involves one or more of the following characteristics: 1) gaining commitment by manipulating stereotypes or biases of followers, allowing positive information and

restricting negative information or dismissal of contravening evidence, 2) turning followers into sycophants, 3) creation of overdependence among the followers, 4) using power in self-serving ways leading to autocratic or dysfunctional informal/impulsive styles, 5) unconventional behaviours leading to alienation, 6) alternation between idealizing and devaluing others, 7) creation of disruptive in-group/out-group rivalries, 8) exaggerated self-descriptions, 9) exaggerated claims for the vision based on leader's own needs, and 10) failure to develop successors of equal ability (Conger and Kanungo, 1998; Conger, 1990).

Similarly, Howell (1988) differentiated between 'personalized' and 'socialized' charisma. While personalized charisma results in failure to empower followers in order to preserve leader's power base and increase follower dependency, socialized charisma results in socialization of power through empowering followers. Socialized leaders engage followers by recognizing their needs and respecting their autonomy, while 'personalized leaders' dominate followers and recognize follower needs only when they deem it necessary to advance their own ambitions (Howell, 1988).

2.2.6. Transformational leadership theories:

2.2.6.1.Burn's Transforming Leadership Theory: The first, and probably the most comprehensive theory of transformational leadership was proposed by Burns (1978) in his book length seminal work 'Leadership', and later expanded by him in 2003 in the book titled 'Transforming leadership: A new pursuit of happiness'. Burns (1978) considers leadership as an interactional and collective phenomenon emerging from hierarchies of psychologically and socially determined needs and morality of both followers and leaders.

The nature of interaction depends largely on motivations and power potential of both leaders and followers pursuing joint purposes, and takes two fundamentally different and mutually independent forms: transactional and transforming leadership. While the interactional purpose of transactional leadership is 'exchange' of values for maintaining the existing systems, transformational leadership purports to engage leaders and followers in pursuit of social change.

In transactional leadership, the parties to the bargain are conscious of the power, resources and motivations of each other, and hold related intent or purposes within a specific bargaining process. But there is no enduring purpose that joins leaders and followers together in a long-term relationship. Each 'act' of leadership is an isolated instance that may build mutual support, but in its very essence transactional leadership does not bind the leaders and followers in continuing pursuit of purposes grounded in higher-order needs, values and ethical standards. In contrast, transforming leadership 'occurs when one or more persons *engage* with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality' (Burns,1978, p.20). Burn (2003) proposes that leaders may begin as ordinary 'deal-makers' and purposes of leaders and followers might be of a transactional nature, but as leadership matures into a transforming character, it becomes key agent of great social change as purposes of leaders and followers become more and more fused and less dependent on short-term bargained reciprocity.

2.2.6.1.1. Characteristics of transforming leadership: Transforming leadership has a central role in "pursing happiness and eschewing misery" for the followers most of whom could be living under conditions of abject poverty and helplessness (Burns, 2003, p.2).

In doing so, transforming leadership has to 1) listen closely to the real wants of the people and recognize them as actionable needs at multiple levels, and 2) marshal and direct material and psychological resources that followers are lacking for the fulfillment of these needs (Burns, 2003, p.235). Thus transforming leadership must have both *moral* and *passionate* dimensions. While moral dimension pins leadership to elevating followers' needs in pursuit of supreme values of life, *passionate* dimension emphasizes that transforming leaders have an internal and heartfelt need for alleviating the conditions of human deprivation and poverty in communities, political constituencies or other public domains they represent. The motivation for change grows out from an internal compassion and genuine concern for the deprived rather than from opportunities and associated requirements for change—such as support and technical requirements associated with government or international donor sponsored local/community development programmes—that may become available from the external environment. Burns (1978) argues that all leadership by definition must operate at some level of *morality*. However, transforming leadership operates at higher levels of morality since it 'raises the level of human conduct and ethical aspirations of both leader and the led', thus having a transforming effect on both (Burns,1978,p.20). Emphasizing moral and passionate dimensions of transforming leadership as common denominators, Burns (1978) proposed that transforming leadership is characterized by highly ethical use of power, collective and moral purposefulness, empowering followers, conflict and conscious-raising and historical causation:

a) **Ethical use of power:** As with other leadership theorists, Burns (1978) argues that leaders are driven by strong needs for esteem (self and social), recognition, and power. However, instead of using their power bases as counterweights as in transactional leadership, transforming leaders pool their power and resources with those of followers for achieving common purposes. At a minimum level of morality, transactional leadership uses power in an ethical way and responds to followers immediate needs. Transforming leadership operates at higher level of morality by using power in ethical ways, not only for responding to immediate needs of followers, but also in 'throwing' itself into a mutually engaging relationship with followers for shaping 'real' needs which may not be apparent at once.

b) **Collective and elevating leadership:** Although the leaders may have their own purposes, and leaders may emphasize some needs of the followers over others, transforming leadership is always collective since it involves "great merging of motivation and purposes" of leaders and followers (Burns,1978, p.30). Burns (1978) has argued that central role and effectiveness of leadership lies in identifying, expressing and tapping into the real wants, needs and aspirations of the followers. Frustration of basic human needs is usually at the heart of most social dissatisfactions, especially in 'new nations'. Only after fulfillment of these needs do people turn to higher needs and hopes. Thus assurance of basic needs demands the first attention of any leadership. However, while transactional leadership may not extend beyond satisfaction of basic needs such as physical survival and economic security, transforming leadership addresses the higher

needs of followers by appealing to higher purposes of life. Transforming leadership does it by 1) engaging with the followers in a conscious-raising and ownership-building process of identifying higher purposes and values of life that they deserve and that they must pursue and 2) integrating existing need hierarchies with universal 'public values that themselves are the profoundest expressions of human wants: liberty and equality, justice and opportunity, the pursuit of happiness' (Burns, 2003,p.3).

Higher purposes of life are conceptually or ideologically driven from universal 'public' values of life and thus have the capacity to include multiple goals. Once certain discrete goals representing basic human needs have been achieved to some extent, the higher values inculcated by transforming leadership helps activate higher needs and aspirations in the followers. Higher goals are in turn set and pursued by engaged leaders and followers in a morally uplifting and mutually engaging virtuous circle (Burns, 2003). Burns (1978, p.455) has argued that transforming leaders acting from a high level of morality are able to effectively connect with all followers at all levels and transmit their moral influence either through their charisma or through founding multiple layered mass movement which "provide linkages between persons at various levels of morality".

c) **Empowering leadership:** Burns (2003,p.184) argues that transforming leaders empower people by giving them 'the confidence, competence, freedom, and resources to act on their own judgments' based on 'a distinct set of moral understandings and commitments between leaders and followers'. Burns (2003) argues that self-efficacy, or a belief that one is capable of producing valued

outcomes and preventing undesired ones, is the missing link between self-directed and situation-directed motivations for change. By empowering followers, transforming leadership provides that 'missing link'. Followers with high self-efficacy develop 'great confidence in their ability to make changes, to remain committed to goals, to overcome difficulties and failures, to exercise control' (Burns, 2003,p.150).

By empowering followers leaders also increase their own power. Armed with a moral cause, the personal or positional power of a person can magnify manifolds. 'A person, whether leader or follower, girded with moral purpose is a tiny principality of power', Burns (1978, p.457) remarked. Transforming leadership empowers followers by equipping them with moral purposes, and their own referent power increases when collective morality rises in virtuous cycle of leader-follower engagement (Burns, 2003).

d) **Conflict and consciousness:** A person will feel internal conflict when his/her value structure at any stage is not reinforced in the social learning process, or when he/she feels that his value structure does not conform to a more universal set of higher values. A person may experience external conflict when his value structure, and the needs and aspirations driven from it, are frustrated by injustices or discrepancies in the society. Conflict may also exist in a society when modal and terminal values are confused, or when modal values are pursued as an end in itself and end values are ignored or overlooked, e.g. when survival and progress of state institutions is pursued as a goal but the quality of human life for which these institutions are created declines. However, because of the imprisoning effect of

prevailing socioeconomic structures and low levels of general consciousness, this conflict may remain latent or below the threshold at which a person may be spurred into action for resolving his/her internal or external conflict. Transforming leadership plays the dual role of activating conflict and directing conflict by raising conscious level of the followers and eventually mobilizing them into a movement for social change. Transforming leadership plays four central roles in this process:

i. Identifying and expressing real and widely felt generalized wants through providing ideological and moral reasoning;

ii. Articulating wants into more focused and conscious needs by providing informational inputs;

iii. Raising aspirations or expectations of followers for deserving those needs and wants by providing ethical and political reasoning; and

iv. Converting needs into political demands through providing technical, political and inspirational support (Burns, 1978,p.304).

e) **Change and Causal effect:** Burns (1978, p.434) has proposed that transforming leadership is not just 'symbolic or ceremonial', or a mere medium of expression for social forces of change as may be the case in transactional leadership. It is causative as it 'causes real change in the direction of 'higher' values' in an interactive leader-follower process. The interactive process results in "change in leaders' and followers' motives and goals that produces a causal effect on social relations and political institutions" (Burns, 1978,p454). Transforming leadership produces lasting and tangible institutions such as social movements, political

parties, or successful implementation of proposed reforms, but "most lasting and pervasive" transforming leadership is intangible and generates intellectual and ideological basis for movements of change in status quo (Burns,1978, p.455). In each case, the new institutions and ideologies shaped by transforming leadership exert moral influence for continued social change long after these leaders are gone. Transforming leadership transforms followers into new cadres of leadership and change agents committed to 'intended and real change' through:

i. an 'elevating' process of collective value shaping and ideological indoctrination;

ii. founding structure of the movement that disseminates espoused values and extends the indoctrination process to the masses; and

iii. engaging followers in shaping and actual working of the new institutions.

Rather than considering leadership as 'embodied' in individuals catalyzing change from personal or positional sources of power, Burns (2003) conceptualized transforming leadership as a continuing process of causing social change in which different persons enter and exit the leader and follower roles.

'…instead of identifying individual actors simply as leaders or simply as followers, we see the whole process as a system in which the function of leadership is palpable and central but the actors move in and out of leader and follower roles. At this crucial point we are no longer seeing individual leaders; rather we see leadership as the basic process of social change, of

causation in a community, an organization, a nation—perhaps even the globe.' (p.185)

2.2.6.1.2. Archetypes of transforming leadership: Burns (1978) has described opinion leadership, group leadership, party leadership, legislative leadership and executive leadership as 'archetypes' of transactional leadership; while intellectual leadership, reform leadership, revolutionary leadership and ideological leadership have been described as 'archetypes' of transforming leadership. Although transactional and transforming leadership have been conceived as distinct forms of leadership, and some of their constituent construct are even polar opposites, Burns (1978, p.343,385) suggests significant "transforming potential" inherent in certain transactional archetypes, such as party leadership or executive leadership. Leadership positions traditionally characterized by transactional interactions offer transforming potential when opportunities for change become available from external environment or when conflict over values, policy and position exists. Either leaders in transactional positions can acquire a transforming mode or competing transforming leaders could replace them through channeling of conflict and organizing for change. A brief description of transforming leadership archetypes is given below:

a) **Reform and revolutionary leadership:** As discussed above, the purpose of transforming leadership is 'real and intended change' in terms of raised human consciousness regarding higher-order needs and supreme public values, and 2) mass movements and institutions needed for realization of these needs and values. Transforming leaders may affect change in one of the two modes: reform

leadership or revolutionary leadership. The change in form of tangible institutions and value structures is mostly piecemeal and gradual, as in reform leadership, and has a cumulative effect over time. In rare cases changes fostered by transforming leadership may be lump-sum and sudden, as in revolutionary leadership. But in each case, the role of transforming leadership is event-making since, gradually or catastrophically, to more or less degree, the espoused changes "permanently alter the course of history" (Burns, 1978, p.454).

b) **Intellectual and ideological leadership:** Transforming leadership is intellectual because it deals with and integrates both theorist's domain of analytical ideas and data and moralist's domain of normative ideas and values through disciplined imagination and creativity (Burns, 1978, p.141). While a pure intellectual may be detached from his or her social environment, transforming leadership brings normative and analytical ideas to bear on their social milieu with a conscious purpose to change it. Transforming leadership may not conceive normative ideas and sophisticated political or social theories from scratch, i.e. he or she may build on the ideas of others. However, it is never a programmed response derived from existing repertoire of experience. In Burn's (1978, p.168) words: "intellectual leadership at its best anticipates, mediates, and ultimately subdues experience with the weapons of imagination and intelligence". Besides being nature's gift, creativity in people assuming transforming role may come from disparate sources, such as conflict and anxiety ridden or supportive, intellectual family or educational backgrounds, interaction of creative people within and among different groups in the society, with the effect that leaders and followers are

mutually uplifted "during epochs of collective creative ferment" (Burns, 1978; 2003,p.161). The values underlying the vision—later articulated by same or separate 'ideological' leaders—and the social structures for achieving the vision are *proposed* by intellectual leaders that inspire many towards transforming change, but draw others into conflict who oppose change or support the status quo. The conflict in turn motivates and fuses transforming leadership and followership into a force pursuing change (Burns,2003). As has been discussed before in the section of charismatic leadership, Burns (1978) theorizes that ideological leadership 1) *articulates* the collective and creative ferment of change proposed by intellectual leadership into a sharpened vision and 2) *enacts* the vision in form of legal, political and social institutions.

2.2.6.2.Bass's Transformational Leadership: Much like Burns (1978), Bass (1985) conceptualizes leadership as a relational phenomenon involving interaction between two or more individuals in a group or organizational setting that usually results in definition or redefinition of values, processes and purposes of the group or organization. Transformational Leadership 'occurs when one group member modifies the motivation or competencies of others in the group' in order to achieve some change goals of the group or organization (Bass and Bass, 2008,p.25). Perceptions and expectations of the group members may also be structured or restructured in the process of transformational leadership. However, unlike Burn (1978), Bass (1985) considers leaders to be those people whose acts influence other people much more in a relationship than other people whose acts influence them. Thus some level of leadership can be exhibited by any member of the group or organization irrespective of his formal or hierarchical position,

though the extent to which members may exhibit leadership will depend on a number of factors including their position and ability.

Bass has argued that change in organizational technologies and administrative system is necessary for survival in response to changing environments. (Bass, 1990;1985b). This requires challenging existing values and creating and sustaining new organizational cultures which lies at the heart of transformational leadership. Accordingly, achievement of routine goals is predicted from a transactional style whereas achievement of change goals is predicted from a transformational style (Conger & Kanungo 1998, Bass 1985). Transformational leaders are agents of change. While transactional leadership may never be able to achieve more than routine performance which may not be sufficient in a changing environment, transformational leadership has the potential of 'performance beyond expectations' in face of change (Bass, 1990; 1985). In Bass's conceptualization leadership occurs on a single continuum from non-leadership to transactional leadership to transformational leadership (Wart, 2005; Bass, 1990).

Bass (1999, 1985b) treats authoritarian/directive versus democratic/participative leadership styles to be 'empirically' correlated but 'conceptually independent' from transactional versus transformational leadership styles. Directive leadership is associated with leader informing and clarifying about details of work goals and processes or procedures to be adopted. Leaders also communicate performance standards expected from followers and clarify the relationship between performance and outcomes for the followers. Decisions are made authoritatively and independently in a formal hierarchical order with little or no input from the followers or subordinates in the workgroup. A

directive style may have negative connotations when it is identified with the term "authoritarian" (Wart, 2005). This is the case when 'telling becomes commanding or being bossy, informing becomes dictating, clarifying becomes threatening, and planning becomes micro-management' (Wart, 2005, p. 289). Authoritarian leadership may also be characterized by rigidity, intolerance, lack of trust in followers or leader-centeredness. Democratic or participative style is associated with followers engaged and sharing in decision-making process through their ideas and opinions. Although the leaders may incorporate followers' ideas and opinions into decisions to varying degrees, followers are encouraged and even rewarded for participation and creative inputs. Leaders can assume 'directive or participative, authoritarian or democratic' styles independently of their transformational style, and may exhibit transformational style in combination with directive or participative style (Bass, 1999). However, the relationship between Transactional/Transformational style typology and Directive/Participative style typology is not always clear. Other writers, such as Kouzes and Postner (2007, p.10-12) have included variants of participative practices (e.g. *enabling others to act*) in Transformational style. Synthesizing Transactional and Transformational theories, Van Wart (2005, p.337) has included variants of directive behaviours in Transactional and variants of Participative behaviours in Transformational styles.

 Most of the concepts employed by Burns (1978) in describing leadership, especially transforming leadership, have been adopted and redefined for quantitative analysis of transformational and transactional leadership by Bernard Bass, Bruce J. Avolio and other theorists. The main contribution of Bass during several years since his seminal work 'Performance Beyond Expectations' in 1985 has been the refinement and

operationalization of transformational leadership concepts developed by Burns (1978). Bass (1985) conceptualized transformational leadership in terms of the following four behavioural styles (Avolio & Bass, 2004):

2.2.6.2.1. Charisma or Idealized influence: Charisma means 'being influential about ideals' already held by followers or instilled in them by leaders (Bass, 1999; 1985b). Charisma or idealized influence includes certain attributes or skills in addition to behaviours exhibited by leaders that are idealized by the followers. In order to influence ideals of followers, leader 'provides vision and sense of mission, instills pride, gains respect and trust' (Bass, 1985a). Followers internalize the ideals associated with charismatic leaders because they trust and respect them. Followers feel pride in being associated with leaders because they see leaders showing energy, power, confidence, selflessness, self-sacrifice, competence, and other attributes, skills and behaviours they perceive as necessary to the attainment of an envisioned state of future.

2.2.6.2.2. Inspirational motivation: Transformational leaders show the ability to excite, motivate or emotionally animate the followers in supporting and identifying with the ideals espoused by them. The ability to inspire or emotionally arouse the followers was originally treated by Bass as a part of Charismatic/Inspirational factor/sub-style (Bass, 1985a). But it was later treated separately since non-charismatic leaders could also be transformational and inspire the followers by exhibiting certain behaviours such as 'communicating high expectations' and 'providing challenge and meaning through the use of simple words, slogans, symbols and metaphors to generate acceptance of missions', etc (Avolio and Bass, 2004; Bass, 1999). The followers will

still be emotionally aroused that they could 'accomplish great things with little extra effort', but they will not need identification with a charismatic leader for their enhanced motivation (Bass, 1999; 1990).

2.2.6.2.3. Intellectual stimulation: It is displayed when leaders encourage and provide followers with opportunities to question the established or known ways of doing things and use reason, innovation and creativity to arrive at new ways of problem solving (Bass, 1999, Avolio and Bass, 1999).

2.2.6.2.4. Individualized consideration: Leaders give personal attention to each follower on a continuous basis to understand their developmental needs and then provide them with needed advice, coaching, support or opportunities for growth (Bass, 1999; 1985a).

Transformational leadership enables the organization to perform beyond expectation. At a level below transformational leadership, transactional leadership offers the potential up to routine performance levels only. Leadership for routine performance or transactional leadership includes the following four behavioural styles (Avolio & Bass, 1999; Bass, 1985a):

2.2.6.2.5. Contingent Reward: Leaders clarify expectations from followers in terms of effort/work contribution and rewards and punishments contingent to different levels of performance. However, punishment has to be managed as a last resort and with great care since it can easily result in demoralization and may have little or even negative effect on performance.

2.2.6.2.6. Management by Exception (active): Leaders actively monitor observance of rules and standards in task execution and takes corrective action as soon as any deviation arises. The goal is to maintain current performance levels

2.2.6.2.7. Management by Exception (passive): Leaders react to problems and take corrective action only after problems start to affect the performance adversely. Corrective action usually takes the form of punitive action(Avolio & Bass, 2004).

2.2.6.2.8. Laissez-Faire: Leaders Abdicate responsibility and avoids taking any corrective action at all. Although measured by Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ 5X) developed by B. M. Bass and B. J. Avolio (1999), laissez faire is considered 'non-leadership' and 'exact opposite of an efficient transformational leadership style' (Avolio & Bass, 2004)

Both transactional and transformational leadership are closely related to success measured in terms of individual, group and organizational performance (Avolio & Bass, 2004, Bass 1999). However, transformational leaders perform beyond the routine levels of performance. This requires that transformational leaders first perform up to conventional standards (Wart, 2005, p.347). Bass (1990; 1985b) conceptualizes contingent reward and active management by exception aspects of transactional leadership as grounds over and above which Charisma/inspirational, intellectual stimulation and individualized attention aspects of transformational leadership operate to surpass performance expectations and affect change. In 2004 version of MLQ 5X, passive management by exception and laissez

faire have been classified and measured under a separate leadership style titled Passive/Avoidant. Passive/Avoidant leadership style has negative effects on leadership results most of the time (Avolio & Bass, 2004).

2.2.7. **Networking and partnering perspective on leadership**: Networking and partnering is a distinct theme in leadership that has not found adequate attention in transactional or transformational leadership theory and research (Van Wart, 2005, p.252). Most work on networking and partnering leadership—such as Mintzberg's (1994; 1973) leadership roles of liaison, figurehead and spokesman—has been carried out in strategic planning tradition (Van Wart, 2005). House (1996) is the main exception in main stream leadership literature who added 'representation and networking' to his existing leadership styles in path-goal theory. Van Wart (2011, p.406) is the other exception who has included networking and partnering in organization-oriented leadership behaviours in his Leadership Action Cycle. The aim of both networking and partnering behaviours is to improve or enhance information and resource flows between organization or leader's domain of responsibility and external environment. Networking and partnering takes place outside of leader's normal chain of command and formal responsibility relationships within or outside the organization (Van Wart, 2011, p.407).

While networking restricts to leaders developing useful contacts during various occasions such as social visits, ceremonial representation of the organization, conferences, formal or informal meetings with leaders of other organizations, etc, partnering extends to include developing voluntary but important working relationships outside leader's normal domain of responsibility (Van Wart, 2005, p.250). Partnering is represented in joint programs or

strategic alliances that leaders in a work group or organization voluntarily make with other work groups or organizations for the purpose of achieving some mutually beneficial outcome. Networking and partnering styles may be adopted by the leaders to align organization with external environment, improve organization's image and legitimacy, bring in needed human or material resources, or pursue some desirable improvement in competencies, processes or outcomes, etc (Van Wart, 2005; Mintzberg, 1998; House, 1996).

2.3.Summary:

There are numerous theoretical conceptualizations of leadership, and, therefore, leadership could be conceptualized and measured according to the methodological and substantive aspects of interest to the researcher. Early theorists conceptualized leadership as traits, skills and behaviours possessed by certain individuals who effectively influenced others in follower roles in achieving goals of the organization. Leadership theory from mid 20th century to 1970s emphasized on situational contingencies of leadership that determined the most appropriate leadership and decision making styles that resulted in achievement of people-oriented and task-oriented organizational goals. By late 1970s, a new leadership theory, namely transformational leadership, emerged which posited that all previous models of leadership—collectively branded as transactional leadership theory—conceptualized leadership as an transactional process in which leaders bargained and exchanged internal and external rewards valued by the followers with formally defined effort-contributions by the followers. Leadership also had a compensatory role when they provided for what was missing in terms of follower willingness and ability. The purpose of transactional leadership was to achieve relatively stable goals of the organization with

high degree of predictability in a relatively unchanging environment. In contrast, the purpose of transformational leadership is to produce and sustain adaptive and useful change that is based on the higher-order needs and motivations of the followers in an ever-changing environment. Transformational leadership provides direction and motivation for collective, coordinated and collaborative efforts towards an envisioned state that is espoused as morally superior and pragmatically better than the current state. The neo-Weberian Charismatic theory that predicts widespread interpersonal influence and useful change from highly desirable leader traits and behaviours also gained popularity during 1980s and increasingly merged into transformational school. Networking and partnering style of leadership originated in strategic planning literature and predicted greater organizational resourcefulness and alignment with the changing environment from outside-formal-chain-of-command relationships and influence of leaders based on integrity and trust.

CHAPTER 3

CITIZEN-PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

3.1.The concept of citizen participation:

Peoples' participation is neither a unique nor a shared construct; it's a complicated process with different meanings to different people holding different expectations (Moynihan,2003; Cornwall,2008). Peoples' participation has been employed for different purposes like policy development, development planning and implementation, poverty alleviation, regulation of public services and projects, citizen/community/group rights protection, environmental protection, and democratic governance (Gaventa and Valderamma,1999; Hayward,2010). Peoples' participation has been explained in different disciplinary and interdisciplinary backgrounds like political sciences, international development, public administration, etc, and accordingly been labeled as 'public participation' (e.g. Rowe and Frewer, 2004; 2005), 'political participation' (e.g. Conge,1988; Verba et al.,1978, p.46), 'social participation' (e.g. Gaventa and Valderamma,1999), 'community participation' (e.g. Bowen,2008; Paul,1987), 'citizen participation' (e.g. Bowen,2008; Arnstein,1969), and 'societal participation' (e.g. Ackerman,2004). Different scholars and practitioners have used the term 'public participation' in a more general way as stakeholders' involvement in public decisions regarding policy, planning or implementation issues in diverse political, economic, developmental or cultural contexts, and frequently interchanged the word 'citizens' with 'public' or 'stakeholders' for describing, analyzing or researching public participation (e.g. Schlossberg and Shuford,2005; Rowe and Frewer,2004; Laird,1993; Cogan,1986; Paul,1987). The main focus of these scholars has been the integration of 'representative and meaningful citizen involvement' as a normative goal of ideal

democracy with the concern for 'perceived costs and benefits' as an instrumental goal of ideal technocracy (Moynihan,2003).

In a political-administrative sense, the concept of 'participation' has been associated by various authors with the movements of pluralism and direct democracy which have risen during the last century in reaction to managerial-technocratic model of international development and public administration (Rowe and Frewer, 2004; Moynihan, 2003; Kweit and Kweit, 1980). Originating in the political science tradition, political participation is concerned with individual or collective action taken by citizens aimed at influencing decisions taken mainly by public representatives and officials (Gaventa and Valderamma, 1999; Verba et al., 1978, p.46).

Community participation has its roots in international development or government sponsored participatory projects concerning mainly social sector community-level issues like poverty reduction, local socioeconomic development or environmental resource management (Bowen, 2008; Ribot, 2002; Paul, 1987). Community participation encourages direct participative action by primary stakeholders or the project 'beneficiaries' outside the public sector and focuses on different levels of citizen engagement from informing and consultation to full control over project decision making in all phases of a project cycle (Gaventa and Valderamma, 1999). However, community participation has also been used for other purposes like holding others accountable, self-development and building popular forms of organizations at community level (Paul, 1987).

Whilst in earlier writings 'citizen participation' has been assessed by political measures such as voter turn-out and campaign activities (Verba et al., 1978,p.47), and equated with the increasing power of the erstwhile 'have-nots' in taking full control over the public decisions affecting them or their neighbourhoods (Arnstein, 1969), more recent treatment of citizen participation is grounded in the theory of citizen rights, empowerment and democratic governance (Gaventa,

2004; Fung and Wright, 2001, Wiedemann and Femer, 1993). In the rights-based approach to participation, the right to participate is regarded as a basic citizenship right which helps to protect and guarantee all other political, social, economic and cultural rights through an empowered agency of citizens (Gaventa, 2004; Lister 1998). With a general move towards need for 'good governance'—which sees a new role for institutions of civil society with the objective of making government more accountable, transparent, and democratic—there has been an ever-growing demand for greater citizenship rights and citizen participation since 1990s (Gaventa and Valderamma, 1999).

At the same time, mainly under the donor pressure for 'up-scaling' participation as a means for assuring performance of international development funds, governments in developing countries have been urged to move beyond limited participation at project level to more inclusive participation at multiple levels of planning and in core functions of government heretofore insulated from the influence of non-state actors (Ackerman, 2004; Gaventa and Valderamma, 1999). Gaventa and Valderama (1999) have argued that, as a result of these trends, there is a greater engagement between the civil society, governments and the international development sector, and the concepts of participation in community, social and political spheres have expanded and converged into a common space of citizen participation—the 'rightful' and 'responsible' intervention of private citizens with determined social interests in public activities concerning all the walks of their lives. The 'citizenship' approach to participation regards citizens as 'makers and shapers' of public choices affecting their lives rather than as 'users and choosers' of interventions or services designed by others (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000).

3.2. Reasons for citizen participation:

It was during mid 1960s that citizen-participation was institutionalized in the US with President Lyndon Johnson's Model Cities programs (Cogan et al., 1986, p.283; Davidson, 1998). In the UK, beginning of institutionalized citizen-participation in local governance can be traced to government-commissioned enquiries and reports during the 1960s (McGee at al., 2003).

3.2.1. Greater democratization: Following developed countries, citizen-participation was established as a democratic principle and institutionalized in constitutions or statutes of post-colonial developing countries under pressures generated by international development actors or indigenous movements towards greater democratization. Initiatives at democratic decentralization were matched by increased opportunities for citizen-participation during 1990s in some Latin American countries like Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay (McGee et al., 2003). Since 1990s, civil society participation in local community and national policy affairs has been encouraged in many poverty-stricken East African and Sub-Saharan African countries under donor pressure (Ribot, 2002; McGee et al., 2003). The prospects for direct citizen-participation greatly increased in India after 73rd (1992) and 74th (1993) amendments to the constitution which established the principle of democratic decentralization to the local governments. The prospects for citizen-participation were greatly enhanced in Bangladesh after democratic decentralization was established in the Local Government Acts of 1997, 1998 and 2000 (McGee et al., 2003).

Some citizen inclusion in centrally-managed community development programs sponsored by USAID was permitted during the late 1950s and 1960s developmentalist regime of Ayub Khan in Pakistan (Abedin, 1973). As a part of its Integrated Rural Development Programs funded by international development agencies during 1980s, National Government of Pakistan provided limited rural participatory development

opportunities to the citizens in form of Small Village-Level Development and Matching Grants programmes (Khan, 2006; Siddiqui, 1992). Local Government Ordinance of Pakistan 2001 (LGO 2001) established the principle of democratic decentralization and institutionalized citizen-participation in community development in form of Citizen Community Boards or CCBs (Khan, 2006; Zaidi, 2005).

3.2.2. International donor/lenders' preferences: In most developing countries movement toward greater citizen involvement has primarily been a result of international donor or lender preferences (McGee et al., 2003). Several international development studies conducted in developing countries have suggested that citizen-participation is both a condition as well as an outcome of successful decentralized governance (Paul, 1988, p.63; Schiavo-Campo, 2001; Shah and Shah, 2006). As a result, international donors and lending agencies such as World Bank are increasingly concerned about inclusion of grass-root participation in decentralization programs, both as an instrument for project sustainability and peoples' capability-building and as an essential element of greater democratization (Zaidi, 2010; Paul, 1988,p.71; Paul, 1987). UNDP's Country Program Action Plan for Pakistan (2004-2010) identified 'enabling and involvement of local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas' in the 'planning and management of development activities, including the provision of services' as its key outcome (Zaidi and Dohad, 2010, p.3-5). Clearly it means citizen-participation in decentralized governance process.

3.2.3. Reaction to technocratic approach: Another reason for increased demand for citizen-participation lies in the public reaction against technocratic approach to developmentalism of 1960s and 1970s in developing countries. DeSario and Langton (1987) have argued

that social goals are often complex, conflicting and unclear, and application of technocratic approach to social issues has frequently resulted in more failures than successes. This has led to citizen skepticism towards technocratic decision-making and greater demand for citizen-participation in public decisions (Moynihan, 2003, DeSario and Langton, 1987, p.9-11,205-221).

3.2.4. Public disillusionment with traditional governance structures: Under the shift in societal condition brought about by the rise of post-modern values—including distrust of traditional authority and formal institutions like government and political parties, disillusionment with insulated bureaucracies and 20th century 'representative democracy' ideal that popularly elected officials will design policies representing the public desires and get these implemented through a neutral and accountable bureaucracy—and a never-ending demand for greater citizen rights and democratic governance ideals, there has been a definite rise in popularity and desirability of direct and deliberative participation (Corwall, 2008; Moynihan, 2003; Fung and Wright, 2001). Rowe and Frewer (2004) have argued that this rise is in part attributable to declining public confidence and trust in public policy processes, and elected officials or permanent technocrats on whom these processes are conferred. As a result the governments or their agencies, through legislation or inclination, have increasingly sought public views on policy issues by directly involving the public (Rowe and Frewer, 2004).

3.2.5. Governments' recognition of their limits: Since 1980s many governments have recognized limits to their resources and capacities to respond to public needs, and consequently moved away from 'provider' models to 'facilitator' and 'enabler' models of the state (Lewis and Hossain, 2008; Cavaye, 2004). A recognition exists in these

governments that sustainable social and economic development and greater coordination and integration of the entire gamut of government activity is not possible without greater involvement of communities (Cavaye, 2004; Bouder, 2001).

3.3. Benefits and pitfalls of citizen-participation in developing countries:

3.3.1. Benefits of citizen-participation: Various normative and pragmatic arguments, supported by a considerable body of empirical evidence from developed as well as developing countries, have been given in favour of proclaimed benefits of citizen-participation (Hayward 2010, Reed 2008). While normative arguments support benefits like deepening of democracy, greater social justice, fairness and equity, enhanced citizenship, development of public trust and social capital, empowerment and social learning (Nikkhah and Redzuan, 2009; Reed, 2008, Blackstoke et al., 2007; Fung, 2001), pragmatic arguments are given in favour of benefits like cost-effectiveness, higher quality, and stakeholders' ownership of participatory projects, realistic need identification and design of community development projects, higher adaptation and diffusion of technologies and participatory interventions, development of scientific foundation of participatory research, refinement of laws and constitutions, resolution of community conflicts and avoidance of protracted conflicts, cooperation and trust building amongst government and community groups engaged in the participatory process, etc (Hayward, 2010; Reed, 2008; Crocker, 2007; Irwin and Stansbury, 2004; Leeuwis, 2001; Cogan et al., 1986, p.284).

Citizen-participation has been treated in the theory and praxis of community development as an instrument of hedging against poor-disempowering effects of socioeconomic

differentials in heterogeneous societies, and an institutionalized way of assuring that development funds reach the poor or marginalized groups in communities in a way defined and managed by them (Martin and Sherington, 1997). While participation may not erase power differentials between state and the civil society, or between elite and the proletariat, it may help to 'level the playing field' for bringing about developmental benefits to all groups in the society (Bowen, 2008; Schafft and Greenwood, 2003). Participation in community development has frequently been identified as an instrument of economic improvement and purposive social change that can promote new values, attitudes, knowledge and skills among citizens and build their capacity as agents of social and economic development (Bowen, 2008; Rothman, 2001).

3.3.2. **Pitfalls of citizen-participation:** While growth of civil society and citizen-participation have produced great benefits for democratic governance, it is not a panacea for all the ills of democracy; neither can it be trusted to produce benefits using similar forms under all contexts during all times (Hayward, 2010). Through partnerships with international development agencies and resulting transference of (neo-liberal) values, developing countries adopted Western models of direct participation in order to strengthen 'people-centered' and 'socially conscious' democratic governance (Evans, 2004; Menocal and Rogerson, 2006; Mercer, 2002). However, there is no reason to believe that prevailing patterns of inequality and exclusion in the developing societies will not be reproduced after civil-society institutions, based purely on Western democratic experience, are uncritically adopted in developing countries. Not only could such a participatory design be unacceptable or poorly understood in the local culture, but, in absence of local-culture

specific legal-institutional safeguards for the poor and disadvantaged, it could be manipulated by the local groups to further exclusion of the former (Evans, 2004).

Community institutions in unequal social and economic contexts are otherwise more vulnerable to elite-domination (Bardhan, 2002). In absence of effective fraud-detection and elite-capture monitoring mechanisms, local power groups dominated by elites can easily 'collude beyond the control of higher-level institutions and the attention of the media' to capture any local participatory forums (Platteau and Gaspart, 2004 ; Bardhan 2002 ; Leonard and Leonard 2004).

Mercer (2002) has argued that the role of organized civil society, both as an agency of popularizing direct participation and as instrument of exercising direct participation, is axiomatically taken as positive and democratizing in the Western prescriptions followed by developing countries. Although there is as much scholarship and empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of different forms of organized civil society for popularizing and exercising citizen-participation, there has been a general failure to "theorize the political impact of NGOs" leading to an overly "inadequate, explicitly normative interpretation of NGO ideology" (Clarke [1998], in Mercer, 2002; Scholte, 2002). Civil society organizations can even lead to anti-democratic consequences if these are monopolized by 'westernized elite' or if there is no 'internal democracy' in them (Scholte, 2002).

Several authors have differentiated between 'invited' and 'created' participatory spaces (Cornwall, 2008; Gaventa, 2004; Cornwall, 2004). 'Invited' or 'provided' spaces are designed and enforced by various kinds of authorities, acting as sponsors and/or organizers of participation process, who invite 'beneficiaries' or the 'affected' to

participate. Authorities largely determine the nature and extent of participation by setting its institutional framework. 'Created', 'claimed' or 'organic' spaces are claimed and constituted by citizen groups, with or without formal recognition by the state, in response to some common characteristic, common concern or commonly felt need by the citizens. Created spaces are more egalitarian and less regulated in character than the invited spaces. These include popular social mobilizations, voluntary associations or other forums in which like-minded people join together in pursuit of common concerns. Although overall space for citizen-participation may have increased in developing countries because of increased democratization and citizen-participation requirements of most international development programs, it may not mean increased voice or influence of the less powerful (Cornwall, 2008), or as noted by Peter Oakley (1995), participatory development and participation in development may be two different things.

Apart from being a technique for involving citizens and deepening democracy, participation has variously been identified as an essentially 'political' process in which participants representing various groups may be engaged in struggles for power and resource acquisition (Cornwall, 2008; Bowen, 2008; Cornwall and Coelho 2007; Gaventa, 2005). Citizenship theorists consider participation as a fundamental right for claiming other political, social and economic rights whose fulfillment in turn draws on state, community or international development resources (Gaventa, 2002). Citizens representing civil society organizations in various forms of engagement with the government or donor institutions may not reflect the aspirations of all their members, or the range of citizens' preferences on a certain public issue may not be reflected in the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) claiming to represent or advocate citizens' voice on that issue.

Citizens may be included in the participatory exercises and actually contributing little because of unfamiliar participatory practices. Biases resulting from prevailing election system or citizen sample selection procedures adopted by 'sponsors or organizers' of participation may also restrict citizen-participation. The participatory design itself may lead to selection of a narrow and even unrepresentative section of population, especially if self-selection is the criteria. Previous involvement in hectic and time consuming participatory exercises with little outcomes may lead the people to show little interest in future. The poor may be too preoccupied with their economic pursuits to take out time for participatory exercises or they may be least interested in absence of pecuniary incentive (Cornwall, 2008; Rowe and Frewer, 2004; Asante and Ayee 2004; Mercer, 2002). Problems associated with these factors either increase costs or minimize benefits associated with public/citizen participation (Irvin and Stansbury 2004).

Cultural and socioeconomic conditions in developing countries may also lead to domination of elites in participatory forums and conventional representative local councils (Mahmud, 2007, p.61-65; Asante and Ayee, 2004; Mercer, 2002; Spargue, 2000). For practical reasons most invited spaces call for stakeholders' or citizens' representatives to participate on behalf of the affected or beneficiary populations (Cornwall 2008). Starting from Sidney Verba and Norman Nie's pioneering study of 'Participation in America' (1972, expanded in 1978 by Verba, Nie & Kim), many studies have concluded that the people who participate or represent the affected or beneficiary groups in participatory exercises are socioeconomically better-off, more civic-minded and better connected than those who don't (e.g. Bowen, 2008; Claggett and Pollock III, 2006; Hoff, 1993; Verba et al., 1978, p.170-171). Spargue (2000) concluded that unequal

socioeconomic conditions in communities also led to lack of internal democracy and underrepresented general community interests in participatory forums.

Under these conditions the representative character of the participatory forums may become questionable and participatory exercises can actually become disempowering for the poor and less powerful groups. Thus participation is not a seamless process and needs an active state and vibrant civil society committed to social, political and economic change aimed at reducing inequalities in the society. It also requires strong and continuing support from sponsoring and organizing authorities, including the government bureaucracies and political leaders in power which set the institutional frame and provide political will for effective and continuing citizen-participation. Without political support from influential political parties and cooperation from at least non-inimical official planners committed to fair representation of citizens' diverse interests, there is little hope for citizen-participation to survive for a long time or exist beyond token presence (Cornwell, 2008; Oakley, 1995; Hoff, 1993; Rondinelli, 1990).

3.4. Contextual conditions affecting the success of citizen participation:

Experiences from developed as well as developing countries show that citizen-participation is able to achieve its proclaimed benefits under certain contextual conditions (Reed, 2008; Cornwall and Coelho, 2007: 1-29, Oakley, 1995; McNair, 1981). These conditions may be summarized as follows:

3.4.1. Citizenship quality and equality in society: Societies get differentiated into numerous communities or community groups on the basis of regions, ethnicity, tribes, castes, religion, occupation, wealth, gender and sexuality, etc. These differences create distinct

group identities which may in turn give rise to status, power and privilege differentials in the societies where growth of citizenship is low (Gaventa, 2002).

Largely based on liberal tradition, there are a number of 'citizenship' principles necessary for 'empowered participatory governance' (Howell and Pearce, 2001; Fung and Wright 2003, 2001). These principles, developed in the West and prescribed for adoption by the global South, include endowment and protection of individual liberties and rights (civil, political, social, cultural and economic); rational and mutually agreed upon rules, laws, conventions or constitutions governing the individual conduct and interaction of citizens; mutual recognition of individual autonomy between individuals and a shared concept of justice and moral order; availability of equal economic, political and social opportunity to each individual to develop himself to maximum possible extent; and social solidarity guaranteed by equitable economic development (Hayward, 2010; Marshall [1950], republished 2009).

These themes of rights in a democratic order influenced capitalistic growth and democratic development in many developing countries of Asia and Africa during their postcolonial history. However, since the success in adoption of these principles depends much on socioeconomic, political and cultural configurations in communities, it has been questioned by various researchers (e.g. Hayward, 2010; Coelho and Cornwall, 2007; Mercer, 2002; Oakley, 1995).

Faulks (2000) contends that limits of liberal perspective on citizenship can be explained in terms of its neglect of socioeconomic, political and cultural context of rights and responsibilities. Patterns of decision-making and inclusion, and recognition and appreciation of rights and obligations in communities depends on structures of local

power, economic production and social institutions on one hand, and the local groups and inter-group relations generated by these structures on the other (Faulks 2000, p.163). A universalistic approach to rights, including the right of social participation through organized civil society, can leave the voices of the vulnerable groups unheard and their rights usurped in unequal societies. Faulks (2000, p.9-10) has suggested that the key to rendering citizenship and citizen-participation more inclusive is to recognize and remove 'inherently racialized, patriarchal and classed-based' nature of an unequal state and society. Communitarian solutions such as 'special rights' or 'group rights' alone may offer only short-term and contentious solutions and, if adopted as a policy, may actually reinforce the exclusionary identity of marginalized groups in the communities (Lewis and Hossain, 2008; Faulks, 2000).

3.4.2. Institutional Design: Institution design, by contrast, is a more pragmatic issue and, at any given time and stage of citizenship in a community/society, must at least be non-inimical to local cultural, economic and sociopolitical contexts (Evans, 2004; Oakley, 1995). Institutionalist studies of participation have argued that legitimacy, fairness and effectiveness of participative initiatives in developing countries can be enhanced by designing rules and decision-making processes that encourage genuine participation by the target communities (Fung and Wright, 2003). These rules and processes configure forms of representation and roles to be played by individual citizens or representatives of target communities, assure symmetry of resources distribution amongst diverse groups in a target population which may be asymmetric in socioeconomic structure and power distribution, provide for conflict-mediation, design fraud-detection and embezzlement-deterrence mechanisms through third party contracts or a network of donor agencies and

institutionalize direct communication with the target populations (Hussain, 2008; Cornwall and Coelho, 2007; Crocker, 2007; Platteau, 2004; Fung and Wright 2003). In each case the institutional design of participation provides some protection against exploitation by the local elite. However, institutional design must address the issue of striking trade-offs between level of inclusiveness, legitimacy and fairness since no single institutional design can maximize effectiveness in all the three outcomes (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007).

Various authors and international donor agencies have emphasized the 'culturally sensitivity' of institutional design for effective participatory programs (Cornwall and Coelho 2007; Hussain, 2006; Bowen, 2008; UNESCO, 2000, p7; Wood, 1997). Institutional designs are likely to be acceptable when they do not militate against the existing norms, customs and values. But this presents a paradox since when a 'culturally acceptable' institutional design for participation does not exclude the historical-cultural power relations in the community, it may become vulnerable to clientilism, elite capture or even systematic exclusion of certain groups unless sponsors or organizers of the system incorporate some minimum safeguards in the institutional design of participation (Cornwall, 2008; Evans, 2004; Fung and Wright, 2003).

3.4.3. **Political and administrative support for participation:** Political leadership sets the participatory policy and direction for administrative leadership in government. Donor agencies and administrative leadership sets the institutional framework for participation, whereas local elite can significantly influence the implementation of participatory projects in communities. As long as political leaders, bureaucracy and the local elite perceive citizen-participation to be a threat to their positions of power and privilege or other

interests, they will remain resistant (Cornwall 2008, Oakley 1995). Oakley (1995) has suggested that lack of political and bureaucratic support and absence of a national policy conducive to participation will discourage people from active participation in community driven development and frustrate any disconnected efforts towards promotion of citizen-participation in development.

3.4.4. Historical context of peoples' involvement: Several researchers have emphasized the need for understanding participation and designing participatory frameworks in the historical context of peoples' involvement (e.g. Cornwall, 2004, p.77, Oakley 1995, p.4). Participation is a 'spatially' and 'temporally' situated concept outside which it may have little transformative development potential and meanings for the target communities (Hickey and Mohan, 2004, p.15-16). Cornwall (2008) has suggested that in order to identify and design 'forms of genuine delegated control that enable people to exercise a meaningful part in making the decisions that affect their lives', it is necessary to understand the exploitative forms of participation that were designed by the colonists or other powerful interest groups for meeting their own purposes rather than true community development, but which may have become embedded in the cultural contexts and power structures of the communities in developing countries by now.

Oakley (1995, p.23) has argued that 'traditions of community organization and mobilization' is one important factor determining the success of peoples participation in development, and that a strong need exists for qualitative 'situation analysis', including traditions of community organization and mobilization, as an informational base for designing the (participatory) projects. A vibrant civil society mobilizes associational forms like student organizations, media groups and labour unions during historical

periods of 'democratic transition', and plays an even greater role during 'democratic consolidation' by 'checking abuses of state power, preventing the resumption of power by authoritarian governments and encouraging wider citizen-participation' (Mercer, 2002). Successful change towards modernism, including greater democratization through citizen-participation, requires a history of accomplishments by social movements or civil society organizations committed to social change agendas in different sectors (Deutsch, 1961). Longevity of social movements and CSOs not only provide greater legitimacy to the cause of movement but also result in higher degrees of professional sophistication, existing ties to constituents and experience in fund-raising procedures (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).

3.5. **Summary:**

The concept of citizen participation has been used in different disciplinary and interdisciplinary backgrounds like political sciences, international development, and public administration to mean the rightful and responsible intervention of private citizens with determined social interests in public activities concerning all the walks of their lives. Citizen participation has been undertaken as an instrument for greater democratization, as a precondition of international development actors, as an alternative to technocratic approach to development and in response to public dissatisfaction with public authorities and governments' recognition of its own limitations to address the problems of development. Citizen participation offers normative values such as deepening of democracy, greater social justice, fairness and equity, enhanced citizenship, development of public trust and social capital, empowerment and social learning. It also offers pragmatic values such as cost-effectiveness, higher quality, and stakeholders' ownership of participatory projects, realistic design of community development projects, higher adaptation and

diffusion participatory interventions, resolution of community conflicts, and cooperation and trust building amongst government and community groups.

However, conceptualizations and models of citizen participation developed in the West may not result in its proclaimed benefits because of several peculiar conditions existing in the developing countries. Asymmetrical power relations and social-class structure based on socioeconomic, ethnic, clannish, religious, or regional cleavages; time, cost and spatial constraints involved in organizing participation exercises; poor citizen-rights situation; lack of fairness and transparency of the participation mechanisms as perceived by the participants in the enactment of participatory exercises; 'non-participation' or 'passivity' of many actual or potential participants caused by 'time and effort' costs, status and security concerns; information constraints or lack of understanding of participants in case of technical complexities involved in the issue requiring participation; and lack of leadership or political support are some of the conditions which may not only render citizen participation ineffective in achievement of its proclaimed benefits but even disempowering for the poor.

CHAPTER 4

PARTICIPATORY LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

4.1.Local development:

The term 'local development' has been used in the literature to refer to positive changes in 1) local economy as measured by productivity gains and growth in terms of local business, agricultural output, local employment and income levels, value added by local manufacturing, etc (Nelson, 1993, p.27); 2) quality of life of local people as reflected in decrease of poverty levels, greater availability and access to healthcare, improved public health standards, availability of greater educational opportunities to all the groups within the local population, improvement in local literacy levels, greater availability and access to public welfare, more opportunities for intellectual and cultural growth, improvement in local environment, etc; (Crocker, 2007; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Nelson, 1993); and 3) provision and management of local infrastructure like roads, health centers, schools, water and sanitation works, etc, leading to improvements in local economy and quality of life of the local people (Dongier et al., 2001; Conge, 1988). Crocker (2007) has used the term 'local development' for 'grass-root, or micro-development initiatives'.

4.2.Participatory local development:

National and international development initiatives in developing countries since 1960s have tied development assistance to increasing degrees of community involvement (Crocker, 2007; Conyers,1986). As the weaknesses of top-down, technocratic models of international development started to surface and virtues of homegrown micro-experiments of participatory local development started to be noticed by governments and development experts during 1960s, a new interest started to grow in research and practice of indigenous participatory development

during 1970s and 1980s (Tandon, 2008; Conyers, 1983). Writers like Chambers (1983), Escobar (1995) and Sen (1985,1999) criticized top-down, expert-led, 'big' development perspectives as leading to project ineffectiveness, dependency and disempowerment of the poor, and suggested small-scale community-driven 'participatory-development' through empowering the poor and building their capabilities for initiating and sustaining economic and social development (quoted in Mansuri and Rao, 2004).

World Bank and other donors have incorporated these ideas in their development agendas during the last decade marking a transition from 'community-based development'—the umbrella term from 1990s which meant active inclusion of beneficiaries or primary stakeholders in design and implementation of projects (Mansuri and Rao, 2004)—to its recent variant 'community-driven development, or giving control over key project design and management decisions, including project choice and investment decisions, to well identified and organized community groups. These community groups work in partnership with 'demand-responsive support organizations' such as local or central governments, private sector and civil society organizations to co-provide 'social and infrastructure services, organize economic activity and resource management, empower poor people, improve governance, and enhance security of the poorest' (Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Dongier et al., 2001, p.304). The focus in participatory local development has shifted 1) from people participating as targeted *beneficiaries* of external funding to people participating as active *partners* and *assets* in the community development process, and 2) from well-advocated but predetermined *inclusion* of the people to handing over complete *control* over the project to the people (Dongier et al., 2001). In all cases, participatory development needs commitment and support by governments and donors in form of 'strengthening and financing inclusive community

groups, facilitating community access to information, and promoting an enabling environment through policy and institutional reform' (Dongier et al., 2001:303; Oakley, 1995,p.28).

Although international development agencies, governments and scholars have had different perspectives on the objectives and methods of participatory local development, decentralization programs adopted in form of local government reform during 1970s and 1980s in many countries of Asia and South America were seen as means of integrating National Rural Development Programs, facilitating physical asset sustainability and increasing citizen participation in community development (Tandon 2008; Streeten, 1995; Conyers, 1983).

Models of participatory development conceived by scholars and international agencies since the last two decades have increasingly adopted a rights-based approach to development (Tandon, 2008), and added the democratic ideals of citizen capability-building, human development, and public deliberation or 'open public reasoning' to the agenda of participatory local development (Crocker, 2007; Streeten, 1995; UNDP, 1995).

4.3. Institutional types of local development:

Although community participation in development is known to achieve maximum success if accompanied and supported by decentralization programs, community involvement in local development can take place with or without decentralization of powers and functions to responsible local governments provided there is a supportive national development policy, or at least recognition of an administrative need and political will to support peoples' participation at the grass-root level (Dongier et al., 2001). Further, in absence of decentralized local governments, central or state governments can facilitate community participation either directly through partnership between its field offices or agencies and community-based organizations

(CBOs), or indirectly through facilitating partnership between private sector or non-government organizations (NGOs) and CBOs.

Local development typically involves issues of financing, planning and management of development initiatives. The level of community participation in these issues depends on political will and government policy regarding citizen participation, the extent to which this will is translated into legal and institutional support, and local socioeconomic and cultural patterns. Donor preferences can also exert pressure on the governments for institutionalizing decentralization and building 'inclusive' community participation in local development programs (Gaventa, 2002). The legal-institutional basis of participation can be provided by building participatory principles into development policy, building participatory mechanisms into strategic plans of existing agencies, creating new government agencies with the goal of integrating citizen participation in development, or by making constitutional and statutory provisions for participatory development at any level of government (Ackerman, 2004).

Based on the work of Dongier et al. (2001, p.309), Ackerman (2004), and McGee et al. (2003), Table 4.1 summarizes different institutional types of local development, key partners and possible support providers, resource flow patterns, and legal framework requirements needed to initiate and sustain each of these types. Resource flows are shown by the arrows. Participatory development programme in Punjab, i.e. Citizen Community Boards, represented the 'local government-community partnership' type of local development.

Table 4.1: Institutional types of local development

Institutional type of local development	State-led development: Centrist model/ no partnership	State-led development: Central-local government partnership	Participatory development: Central government-Community partnership	Participatory development: Private firms/NGOs-Community partnership	Participatory development: Local government-Community partnership
Resource flows	Donors/Central government/state government ↓ Field offices/Agencies	Donors/Central government/state government ↓ Elected local governments	Donors/Central government/state government ↓ Community-based organizations	Donors/Central government/state government ↓ Private firms/NGOs ↓ Community-based organizations	Donors/Central government/state government ↓ Elected local governments ↓ Community-based organizations
Possible support providers at service provision level	Private firms/NGOs. Elected local governments, if present, may provide some support to field offices/agencies of higher governments	Private firms/NGOs. Informal support by community.	Private firms/NGOs. Elected local governments, if present, may provide some support to organized local community (CBOs)	Elected local government, if present, may provide support to CBOs	Private firms/NGOs may provide support to CBOs
Legal-institutional framework	Standing orders, government rule and regulations in-force for local administration and development. Contract enforcement law. NGOs registration and regulation laws	Constitutional provision and statutory law for elected local governments. Contract enforcement law. Government rules and regulations in-force NGOs registration and regulation laws	Constitutional provision or judicial review legitimating the democratic principle of citizen participation Statutory law outlining general structure, methods, level, etc, of incorporating peoples' participation Contract enforcement law. Government rules and regulations in-force NGOs registration and regulation laws	Constitutional provision or judicial review legitimating the democratic principle of citizen participation Statutory law outlining general structure, methods, level, etc, of incorporating peoples' participation Contract enforcement law. Government rules and regulations in-force NGOs registration and regulation laws	Constitutional provision and statutory law for elected local governments. Constitutional provision or judicial review legitimating the democratic principle of citizen participation Statutory law outlining general structure, methods, level, etc, of incorporating peoples' participation Contract enforcement law. Government rules and regulations in-force NGOs registration and regulation laws

4.4.A typology of citizen participation in local development

While orientations of the various participation models proposed since 1960s have ranged from citizen power (e.g. Arnstein, 1969), participation as citizen right included in government mandates (e.g. Wiedemann and Femer, 1993), conflict resolution and negotiation (e.g. Conner, 1988; Leeuwis, 2000), planning process (e.g. Dorcey, 1994), community welfare (e.g. Hirschl and Rank, 1999) to determinants of political participation (e.g. Verba et al., 1978), there is a general similarity in the levels of citizen participation described by various scholars as ranging from non-participation or minimum participation to citizen control or full participation.

In most models of participation, there is an assumption of power differential between the 'frame-setters' of participation and publics to be involved in the process of participation. Whereas the frame-setters of public participation in officially created or 'invited' spaces are policy-making institutions like government or international development agencies, different types of participating publics can be identified using a stakeholder analysis (Schlossberg and Shuford, 2005; Mitchell et al., 1997). The levels of participation to be achieved and the types of participatory structures suggested in the literature depend on prevailing political and administrative support, objectives of participation and socioeconomic and cultural characteristics of the society (Rowe and Frewer, 2005; Schlossberg and Shuford, 2005; Oakley, 1995). Some models of participation in local development are given below:

4.4.1. **Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation:** In a pioneering study of citizen participation in planning and implementation of federal social works program of the urban low-income minority neighbourhoods in the US during 1960s, Arnstein (1969) proposed an eight rung ladder of citizen participation. The ladder shows the nature and degrees of

inclusiveness that a government or one of its agencies allows to private citizen interest groups.

Figure 4.1: Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation

Source: Arnstein, 1969, p.217

While first two rungs represent "non-participation" by the weaker groups in the society, and are designed by the power-holders in the local society to "engineer" the former's support or drain out their exasperation at power-accumulation by the power-holder groups, the next six rungs of the "participation ladder" describe increasing levels of citizen participation. At informing stage, power-holders pass on some information to the marginalized groups about the public programs affecting them and in fact ask them for some suggestions or their opinions about those programs in the consultation stage. At placation stage, power-holder groups permit limited advisory function to the marginalized groups by allowing representation to some of their prominent on formal advisory boards. However, citizen participation in the three rungs of informing, consultation and placation stage is tokenistic since the "have-nots" are not given any power to ensure that their

concerns will be "heeded". At the most, the focus of power-holders is only on getting inputs from the have-nots. The next three rungs represent greater "decision-making" clout of the weaker groups, more so when they have some financial resource and organized power-base in community. In partnership stage weaker groups are in a position to "negotiate" with and make "trade-offs" with the traditional power-holders in joint committees or boards. At delegated power stage, weaker groups achieve a majority of seats in decision-making boards or committees. The final citizen control stage represents a complete control over public decisions by the formerly weaker groups. The negotiation process is started by the traditional power-holder groups in the last two stages rather than the weaker groups.

4.4.2. **Conflict-negotiation Model of Participation:** Participation in development is necessarily a socially constructed concept and a negotiated political process involving resource and power struggles between stakeholder groups (Cornwall, 2008, Leeuwis, 2000). Crocker (2007) has argued that poorly conceived or poorly managed participatory development programmes taking insufficient account of political and conflictual nature of participation can instead lead to further disempowerment of the poor in unequal societies. Conflict management and negotiation have been treated as skill and capability issues around which the political process of participation can be organized (Leeuwis, 2000). Leeuwis (2000) has differentiated between 'distributive' and 'integrative' approaches to conflict management and negotiation in community development and argued that genuine participatory development can only be organized around integrative negotiation process between elite and non-elite. In distributive approach to conflict management, stakeholders make unilateral claims to resources or other value to their respective groups such that gain

of one group is perceived as loss of the other. In integrative approach to conflict management, stakeholders jointly define the problem situation in a collective learning environment and commit to an agreed action plan leading to maximization of benefits for each group (Leeuwis, 2000, Schermerhorn et al., 1994, p.491).

The distributive approach is exhibited in situations marked by power and/or status imbalances when the administrative or community elite have formal or social control over the decision making structures. The non-elite groups may *competitively bargain or negotiate* with the elite under conditions of improving socioeconomic equality and public education, or even under conditions of socioeconomic inequality provided the non-elite are sufficiently empowered and secured by law in terms of their basic human rights and officially supported in well-institutionalized participatory structures. Under conditions of socioeconomic inequality and absence of official and institutional-legal support, the poor will either *accommodate* the elite by showing uncritical support or *avoid* any form of participation at all. The local elite in this case will have their interest served at the cost of poor's interest through *authoritative-command* conferred upon them by culture, family lineage, control over economic and power resources, etc (Schermerhorn et al., 1994, p. 490-492).

In integrative approach both parties to conflict adopt a *collaborative* style of negotiation, i.e. elite and non-elite, have high willingness for fulfilling both their own and others' interests and commit to the principle of non-deception. Only integrative approach can produce win-win outcomes for all stakeholder parties in a conflict situation (Schermerhorn et al., 1994, p.492). These conditions can be secured in participatory local development by incorporating integrative negotiation structures, supported by

authoritative and experienced facilitators, in the institutional design of participation (Rowe and Frewer, 2005; Leeuwis, 2000). While facilitated 'integrative' negotiation is expected to produce win-win outcomes in most participatory local development projects, other forms of 'distributive' negotiation with win-lose or lose-lose outcomes are more likely to be used by different stakeholder groups in absence of an obligatory facilitated integrative negotiation process (Leeuwis, 2000).

4.4.3. **International Development Model of Participation:** Since 1980s, major development agencies like Food and Agriculture Organization, UNICEF and World Bank have documented several prescriptive models outlining objectives, intensity and instruments of community participation, and emphasized 'participatory development' as an 'antidote to the woes' which 'befall their development programs' in developing countries (Oakley,1995, p.2; Paul,1987). Most international development models emphasize intensity of citizen participation at successive levels, but place responsibility for "final decision or policy formulation" with the government (OECD, 2009). OECD (2009) identifies 'information', 'consultation' and 'active participation' as levels of public engagement. While information regarding public decisions flows from government to citizens at the 'information' level and citizens opinions and feedback are sought at the 'consultation' stage, 'active participation' is defined as a favoured public engagement "relation based on partnership" in which citizens actively engage with government in the formulation of policy and the provision of public services at various levels of government. (OECD,2009,p.21-23,320; OECD,2001,p.15-16).

Representing World Bank's perspective on assisted-development, Paul (1987) has defined community participation in development as "an active process by which beneficiary/client

groups influence the direction and execution of a development project with a view to enhancing their well being in terms of income, personal growth, self reliance or other values they cherish". Paul (1987) goes on to suggest different objectives, intensity levels and institutional devices for organizing community participation. Community participation can be undertaken with the broad objectives of community empowerment and building stakeholder capabilities through equitable sharing of power, building political awareness and enriching project management experiences of the community, or with narrower objectives of increasing project's effectiveness and efficiency and cost-sharing. The intensity of community participation increases at four successive levels: information-sharing with community, consultation with community, sharing in decision-making by the community and community independently initiating actions. A project can use institutional devices such as field staff of project agency, community-based workers or committees and end-user groups within the community to organize and sustain community participation. Intense levels of participation are able to accommodate multiple and broader objectives employing more than one institutional devices. Similarly, objectives and intensity levels of participation may also be determined according to design or implementation phase of the project and complexity of technology involved in a particular phase of project.

4.4.4. Moynihan's instrumental-normative model of citizen participation: Moynihan (2003) has differentiated between the instrumental perspective and normative perspective on public participation, with instrumental perspective closely reflecting the managerial-technocratic views of administrators and normative perspective closely reflecting democratic ideal of deliberative direct participation. Citizen participation refers to non-

elected citizens interacting with and providing feedback to government at some part of the policy process. Inclusion of broadest range of citizens representing different socioeconomic groups—not just a handful of citizens or a particular socioeconomic group gaining influence because of election, status, position, expertise, or money—in public decision making and high degree of authentic citizen-government discourse are "dual goals" of participation. Moynihan's (2003) typology is summarized in Table 4.2 below:

Table 4.2: Moynihan's Model of Citizen Participation

Level of participation	Level of Representativeness	
	Narrow	Broad
Pseudo • Token effort at fostering participation • Citizens informed to more or less degree about decisions	Decisions: Lack transparency, made by public officials Participation: symbolic, using a handful of citizens	Decisions: made by public officials Participation: symbolic, but involves large diverse group of citizens
Partial • Citizen consultation with limited impact • Citizen views may be considered in decisions	Decisions: made by government elite with limited influence of chosen interest groups Participation: interest groups exert influence; most citizens lack opportunity to participate	Decisions: made by public officials, with limited influence of participation Participation: large diverse group of citizens engage in limited discourse with government
Full • Authentic citizen-government discourse • Citizen views built into decisions	Decisions: made by public officials and chosen interest groups Participation: interest groups exert substantive influence, most citizens lack opportunity to participate	Decisions: made by public officials with strong influence of participation Participation: large diverse group of citizens engage in meaningful discourse with officials

Source: Adapted from Moynihan, 2003.

It is clear that public participation moves from mere tokenism in the top left corner, where only a handful of citizens participate to create a semblance of participation, to real participation in the

bottom right corner, where a large number of citizens representing diverse groups engage meaningfully with the government in order to influence public decisions.

4.4.5. **Pretty's low end—high end interactive forms of Participation:** In explaining participatory learning for local agricultural development, Pretty (1995) has proposed seven types of participation by the rural community. While cautioning against the use and interpretation of the term 'participation', she has argued that the first four types, i.e. manipulative, passive, consultation and material incentives, can become "stage-managed" forms of (non)participation, and may lead to "distrust and greater alienation" of the stakeholders in sustainable rural agricultural development. Emphasizing the inevitability of involvement of local stakeholders in sustainable agricultural development, Pretty (1995) argues that international development agencies and government institutions providing developmental support should shift focus from the "more common, passive, consultative and incentive-driven participation toward the interactive end of the spectrum". Interactive forms of peoples' participation in increasing order of community learning and decision-sharing include functional participation, interactive participation and self-mobilization.

4.4.6. **White's Stakeholders-interest model of Participation:** White (1996) has suggested that citizen-participation in local development can be explained in terms of 'interests' of the citizens and authorities, and argued that popular movements for citizen participation can be frustrated by transforming its essentially political nature into technocratic details. Incorporation, rather than exclusion, can become new instrument of control by authorities. White (1996) has identified distinct 'interests' of 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' publics served by participation 'forms' at four levels of increasing intensity: nominal,

instrumental, representative and transformative participation. As forms of participation become more intense, interests of authorities change from achieving legitimacy and efficiency to assuring project-sustainability and facilitating citizen-empowerment, whereas interests of the citizens get strengthened from minimum inclusion and pecuniary incentives to achieving leverage and eventually full control over project decisions.

4.4.7. **Crocker's Modes of Participation:** Crocker (2007) has suggested seven 'modes' of participation in micro-development at local level, ranging from 'thinner' modes like nominal participation, passive participation, consultation, petitionary participation and participatory implementation to 'thicker' modes like bargaining and deliberative participation. Taking a human-agency focused approach to community development, Crocker (2007) has argued that thicker modes of participation involve greater capability of the non-elite to make a positive difference in their lives. Non-elites deliberate amongst themselves as well as engage in interactive reasoning and joint scrutiny of development proposals with the elite 'in order to forge agreements on policies for the common good' in deliberative participation. In certain contexts characterized by limited citizen rights, non-deliberative modes such as petitioning or bargaining may be more efficacious for 'promoting development as capability expansion and agency enhancement', and may serve as a base on which future deliberative participation could be built (Crocker, 2007,p.434).

4.5. A proposed typology of citizen participation in local development:

Based on the work of Arnstein (1967), Leeuwis (2000), Schermerhorn et al. (1994, p.491-492), Paul (1987,p.8), Pretty (1995,p.1252), White (1996,p.7-9), and Crocker (2007,p.434), the following typology of citizen-participation in local development is proposed (Table 4.3):

Table 4.3: A typology of citizen-participation in local development

Typology	Characteristics
1.Manipulative participation	• Showcase participation; unelected and powerless peoples' representatives on participatory boards. Mostly non-elite members, some of whom don't attend the meetings because of other responsibilities or because they are unwelcome. Some don't participate when they do attend because of fear of reprisal or lower socioeconomic status roles demanding compliance. Narrow symbolic representation of community on participatory boards/forums. • Main function of participation is to create a display. • Distributive approach to conflict management: Non-elite likely to adopt 'avoidance' or 'accommodation' style and elite likely to adopt 'authoritative-command' style.
2.Passive participation	• The non-elite participate by listening to what agency, local administration, or community-elite within a participative board have already decided; unilateral announcements by authorities without peoples' feedback. Project beneficiaries may get information about a project to be implemented or about use of services in an implemented project. Non-elite may be briefed by the elite about the collective stance to be taken before the agency. Broad symbolic representation by both non-elite and elite groups OR narrow representation by local elite who exert influence over the local administration and broad symbolic representation by non-elite. • Main functions of participation may be to create a display or use participation as a means to diffuse public dissatisfaction or educate people. • Distributive approach to conflict management: Non-elite likely to adopt 'avoidance' or 'accommodation' style and elite likely to adopt 'authoritative-command' style.
3.Consultative participation	• People are consulted through feedback or by answering their questions. The elite define problems and info-gathering processes, and control information analysis. People's opinions are not binding on external professionals. The non-elite may seek clarifications or give opinions about a collective stance already decided on behalf of the group by the local elite within a community

	participation forum. Non-elite do not deliberate as a group. Narrow representation by local elite who exert influence over the local administration or large diverse groups of citizens engage in limited discourse with the local elite and officials.
	• Participatory design may provide non-elite with the opportunity to participate by petitioning the external authorities or formally raising concerns with the elite members within the participation forum regarding their grievances or other concerns in local development or broader governance issues. The elite have an obligation to listen and consider, if not heed the concerns of the non-elite. Elites have the prerogative to decide.
	• Main functions of participation may be to create display or use participation as a means to diffuse public dissatisfaction, manage conflicts, educate people or get their informational inputs to identify and design cost-efficient and demand-specific projects.
	• Distributive approach to conflict management: Non-elite likely to adopt 'avoidance' or 'accommodation' style and elite likely to adopt 'authoritative-command' style. In petitionary consultation, both local non-elite and elite within the participatory forum may adopt 'competition' style whereas external agents may decide by 'authoritative command' or try to forge a 'collaborative' decision.
4.Incentive-based participation	• Members of participation forum participate by contributing resources like labour, farm fields, etc, in return for cash or other material incentives, but are not involved in the process of participatory learning. People have no stake in prolonging technologies or practices after the incentives end. Narrow or broad representation of non-elite allowed by officials to use participation as a means to share resources, reduce costs, and win support for the project by providing livelihoods for local people. Narrow or broad symbolic representation of elite on participatory boards to win political support.
	• Distributive approach to conflict management. Elite elements within the participating community may use traditional authority and/or open reasoning to elicit compliance from the non-elite who may cooperate by

	providing labour or other inputs in return for cash, higher share in crop harvests, etc.
5.Functional/ Instrumental participation	• People participate by forming groups to meet predetermined project goals, including contribution towards project cost. Interactive learning and public ownership may be built into the project by some involvement in shared decision-making in planning and implementation phases, but only after major decisions have been taken by the agency or administrative elite. At worst, local elite within the participatory forum may solely control any decision-making that may be allowed in planning or implementation phase of the project. People may only be co-opted by the external agents or high-status community members to implement previously taken decisions. Narrow representation by local elite on participatory boards who exert influence over the local administration or large diverse groups of citizens engage in limited discourse with the local elite and officials. • Participation used as a means to achieve project goals like cost-sharing, capacity-building of the beneficiaries, building project effectiveness by involving people in project design and implementation, etc. • Primarily 'distributive' approach to conflict management. Agency or government elite adopt 'authoritative command' style, or to a lesser extent may deliberate with the citizen-participants to reach 'compromised' outcomes. Within the participatory forum, local elite may assume control over decisions and adopt a competitive style to secure their interests or they may compromise with the non-elite depending on elite's willingness to allow concessions or the official support available to the non-elite. Non-elite may adopt cooperative, avoidance or collaborative style depending on the perceived benefits of the project and support available to them from the elite.
6. Restitutive participation	• Participation takes place in forums specifically created by law for bargaining with officials or other elites for public grievance-redressal, or for direct public accountability. Non-elites may participate individually or as a group in order to bargain with the elite or hold them to account on the basis of powers and influence they have gained as a result of external or higher-

	level support, ongoing socioeconomic change and institutionalization of participation as a citizen right. Those who bargain or seek redress are more adversaries than partners. Self-interest more than anything else motivates each side to take positions.
	• The primary function of participation is to give effective voice to the people to protect and fulfill their civil, political and socioeconomic rights. Legally established rights, institutionalized participatory forums and a fair and transparent system of restitution procedures constitute the grounds for formal interaction between elite and non-elite.
	• Adversarial context of restitutive participation make distributive approach and competitive style of conflict resolution most likely to be adopted by both elite and non-elite. However, non-elite may 'cooperate' with the elite in the final "deal" if they are willing to give up something in order extract other concessions from the elite now or if they expect larger future gains. Alternatively, the elite may cooperate or collaborate with non-elite tactically. In addition to institutionalized rights and obligations, conflict management styles and outcomes may also be influenced by power imbalances generated by cultural and socioeconomic factors.
7.Deliberative participation	• People participate by deliberating with authorities for joint planning in design and/or implementation phases of local development. Participation based on at least a minimum level of trust between elite and non-elite. Participatory rights, institutions and deliberation procedures are clearly established in law and practice. Large diverse groups of citizens represented in participatory boards engage in meaningful discourse amongst each other and with officials.
	• Rather than a zero-sum view of dividing power and resources, joint exploration of problems and opportunities leads to 'enlargement of pie'. Non-elites deliberate amongst themselves and with the elite to scrutinize development proposals and other values. The deliberative-participatory process employs 'open public reasoning' and 'collaboration' for making interactive decisions and may involve multiple stakeholders such as immediate beneficiaries, supervising authorities, intermediary NGOs and

	donors.
	• Participation in development is not just an instrument to achieve project goals set by external authorities, but it is increasingly acceptable as a democratic end in itself. Project sustainability and community capability goals are also pursued. As participatory groups take greater control in local development decisions and co-determine how resource will be employed, they assume a greater stake in project sustainability. Interdisciplinary methodologies for systemic and structured learning are employed and capabilities of the local people grow as a result.
	• Since deliberative participation takes place ideally in a synergistic context involving mutual trust and supported by a national policy and political will, an integrative approach to conflict management employing collaborative style of negotiation is most likely to be adopted by both elite and non-elite. However, participatory decisions and conflict management processes may be influenced by cultural and socioeconomic factors leading to elite-domination and compliance by the non-elite. In this case narrow elite interest groups represented in participatory boards may exert substantial influence on both non-elite groups within the participatory boards and/or officials. Facilitation or monitoring by government or donor representative(s) required if socioeconomic and power disparities are expected to influence decision making in the participatory board.
8. Transformative participation	• People participate by independently initiating action for deciding the developmental course of their communities. This is qualitatively different from 'joint-planning' or people's 'deliberative participation' on developmental tasks in various stages of the project-cycle assigned to them by external agents. People's role transforms from decision implementers or decision makers to decision initiators. Participants develop contacts with external institutions for resources and technical advice, but retain complete control over resource use. Large diverse groups of citizens represented in participatory boards engage in meaningful discourse amongst each other and with officials.
	• Transformative participation may take place in self-help based community

initiatives without any involvement of authorities or it may take place in formally created forums in which entire responsibility and control of resource use is placed with the people. Self-help based community groups are voluntary in nature and generally created around common needs, and thus expected to be more egalitarian. When government and/or donor provide resources and technical advice, effective participation by the local non-elite must be legally secured and institutionalized by the government along with formal mechanisms of monitoring or facilitation of project decision-making process and hierarchical referral or restitutive participation by the local non-elite. Otherwise vesting all powers of resource use can become actually disempowering for the non-elite if the elite come to dominate community based forums of participation. With experience and practice, communities may become completely self-mobilized by being able to develop and sustain their internal resources and capabilities needed for local development. Transformative participation can spread if governments, donors and intermediary NGOs provide a supportive framework, but it may not challenge existing distribution of wealth and power in absence of a broader socioeconomic change.

- Participation is both a means for empowering people—a process of socioeconomic, political and psychological change by which powerless or less powerful groups gain the power, ability, self-efficacy and willingness to take action in public domain and make such choices that are intended to improve their quality of lives (Nikkhah and Redzuan, 2009; Zimmerman and Rappaport, 1988). Participation is a desirable end in itself for deepening democracy and bottom-up local development (Nikkhah and Redzuan, 2009). In presence of a comprehensive institutional framework and favourable administrative/agency elite, an integrative and deliberative approach is likely to be adopted by the participation forums and the resource-providers. Otherwise efforts of the citizens at securing resources and technical assistance may be frustrated by an unwilling and competitive administrative/agency elite.

4.6.Summary:

The current chapter synthesizes various levels and types of citizen-participation in local development into a single typology. Although the suggested typology is not presented as 'levels' of participation, it is implied that intensity of participation as a practice, institutionalized procedure and agenda of citizen rights increases as one moves from manipulative to transformative participation. Furthermore, more intense types of participation may subsume less intense types of participation in one or more phases of the project cycle. For instance, deliberative participation may include preliminary consultation with the citizen-participants in the project planning phase or elements of functional participation like cost-contribution in the project implementation phase. Similarly, transformative participation may include grievance-redress mechanisms of restitutive participation in order to safeguard against elite-capture during development need identification phase.

Several developing countries have integrated varying degrees of citizen participation in local development since 1960s as a part of their decentralization and local government reform programmes. However, there is an assumption of power differential between the 'frame-setters' of participation and publics to be involved in the process of participation. Conventional approach of decision-makers towards citizen participation has not stretched beyond consultative forms (Gaventa, 2004; Rowe and Frewer, 2005). Manipulation, passive participation and consultative participation may be intended to serve 'show-case' purpose or to diffuse public dissatisfaction. Incentive-based and functional participation are geared towards efficiency or other instrumental goals of authorities. Restitutive participation is based on participation as a basic citizen right but at best it is a compensatory mechanism for claiming other rights of the citizens in an adversarial

fashion. Only deliberative and transformative types of participation are directed towards a high level of community empowerment for local development.

Citizen participation in development is presented in the typology as taking place in 'invited' spaces. Participatory literature suggests that participatory local development may be undertaken in spaces that are 'created' by the community members and that may not seek or be able to achieve legal-institutional status. Such 'created' spaces may become highly institutionalized in social norms and practices and can be even more influential in producing their intended effect than legally-institutionalized participatory spaces. For instance, citizens may make informal individual or group contacts with elected officials or local administration for requesting local development projects with individual or narrower group benefits (Verba et al., 1978; Claggett and Pollock III, 2006).

CHAPTER 5

ELITE CAPTURE OF PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

5.1.Elites and the basis of their power

According to concepts of 19th and 20th century classical elitism represented by Pareto, Mosca and C.W. Mills, the elite are a small select group in a society with superior wealth, wisdom, innovative ability, education, training or experience, or other distinctive characteristics, who are considered most fit to govern; their views on various issues are to carry the most weight, and their ideas and actions are most constructive for the society as a whole (Parry, 2005, p.3-4, 15). In the discussion of political elites, Parry (2005, p.13) has applied the term 'political elite' not just to politicians, but to leadership emerging in many small groups within the society, including the business, politics, unions, military and bureaucracy.

A defining characteristic of 'political elite' is that it attempts to exert influence over the allocation of values in society. Elites can exert a disproportionate influence over collective action processes and 'circumvent limitations on their freedom of action' even in democracies because of their control over recruitment to elite positions, provision of patronage, generation of ideological consensus and its wider transmission in the society through education and socialization (Wong, 2010; Parry, 2005, p2, 86-89; Khan, 1998). The elite in developing countries can extend their power across time and beyond their personal spheres of influence through a system of land holdings, intricate networks of families and friends, political and religious affiliations, reputation and personality (Wong, 2010; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000).

Wong (2010) has argued that lay people accept the influence and follow the leadership of elites almost imperceptibly because of elites' moral claims and symbolic powers.

Another characteristic of elite-non-elite relationships which makes the elite so powerful in developing countries is their ability to provide patronage in form of financial assistance in times of poor harvest or unemployment, political influence in government offices—especially in matters pertaining to administration of law and justice—and using their immediate and extended networks for getting appointments and postings of choice in government offices (Lewis and Hossain, 2008; Scott, 1972). Intercession on behalf of client is almost a universal favour patrons can offer to their clients in a variety of setting ranging from government offices to family feuds (Scott, 1972). Platteau and Gaspart (2004) have argued that there is no reason to think that patronage is less prevalent at local level than at higher levels in developing countries since 'local leaders are typically enmeshed in patronage webs that go up the whole ladder linking the periphery to the center'.

To writers such as Schumpeter (1942) and Kornhauser (1959) masses in a postindustrial mass society have become 'atomized'; general public, deeply engrossed in the complexities of modern life, has become a non-rational political power, indifferent to political ideas of interest articulation and interest aggregation, whereas elite are smaller in number, privileged in various ways and an ardent and rational political power able to mobilize and lead the general public in direction of positive advancement and development of society (cited in Hong, 2008; Parry, 2005, p.126-129). Not only that the ascendency of elites in a society to leadership and decision-making positions is an inevitable phenomenon, but they can also play an important role in the democratization process of society.

However, for latter writers such as Huntington (1993), democratization may not be automatically associated with the elite in the society. Democratization will occur only if elites agree "that democracy is the least bad form of government for their societies and for themselves" (Huntington 1993, p.315-316). Democratization process is not an inevitable outcome of an elitist regime, democratic or otherwise, rather it will largely depend on the beliefs, attitudes and actions of the power-holding elite towards democracy and democratic institutions and their willingness to cooperate for democratization (Hong 2008).

Anti-elitist or pluralist political theories argues that concentration of economic and political decision making powers in the hands of political or technical elites is corruptive and disempowering for the masses (Hong, 2008). They dismiss the assumption that elite leadership's ideas are always most constructive for the society, or that they will necessarily lead the society towards betterment and growth; elites can abuse their powers even in democratic societies if effective accountability and transparency systems are not in place or implemented poorly. They also reject the idea that the elite form natural or inevitable order of leadership or decision making in the society. Domination of the traditional democratic institutions such as local governments or national legislatures and direct participatory forums such as community boards by the elite is likely to result in public decision making favouring certain powerful groups in the society. If higher levels of awareness or civic-mindedness are prerequisites for making better public decision, ordinary citizens need to get appropriate training and support so that they become more knowledgeable and competent as decision-making partners in conventional democratic institutions and direct participatory programmes. Such training will build community capacity to address issues and solve problems with less dependence on elites and on external aid.

5.2.Elite-Capture in Developing Countries:

The movement of non-elite into elite groups/class can be non-existent or very slow in developing countries because of limited socioeconomic opportunity, deep class or group cleavages, strongly guarded class or group interests and little social class mobility. This may lead to extended presence of traditional elite in power corridors. 'Elite-capture' of public resources occurs when elites manipulate the public decision-making arena and obtain most of the benefits for themselves or the interest groups they represent (Wong, 2010). Elite capture increases the propensity of high-status individuals to take over development programs, often for personal or group gains that may be available as a result of funding and operational practices, and can effectively result in self-perpetuation of existing power-status and wealth distribution patterns, exclusion of less powerful groups and social stagnation (Fanany et al., 2011; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007). However, there may be no effective way to eliminate the presence or influence of traditional elites in public decision-making forums, although the influence of elite can be lessened or channeled through various institutional mechanisms (Wong, 2010; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Rao and Ibanez, 2002).

Under influence of the ruling Whig philosophy at home, the British colonial government in India recognized the great landlord families as the 'natural leaders' of the land without whose cooperation and interest governance in colonial India would be problematic, and gave them permanent settlement rights in land towards the close of 18th century (Abedin, 1973, p.13-15). The British Indian Government later created classes of landed aristocracy—largely in what constitutes Pakistan now—after the Indian Mutiny of 1857 once it discovered that dissatisfaction of the dispossessed 'landed class of ancient lineage' was a major reason for anti-British sentiment before and during the Mutiny (Gazdar, 2011; Abedin 1973, p.28). Many of those great families of *zamindars, pirs* and *jagirdars* have remained dominant in politics of India and Pakistan since

then, though some new elites families have also emerged and entered politics since the partition of India in 1947 (Gazdar, 2011; Tinker 1968, p.88, 131-137).

5.3. Dealing with Elite Domination:

Two approaches have been dominant in dealing with elite domination: counter-elite and co-opt-elite (Wong, 2010). *Counter-elite* approach considers elites as manipulative and exploitative and elite-domination as detrimental to democratic and pro-poor values. Scott (1985) study of Malayan rural power structure led him to argue that even in absence of pro-poor interventions, a subtle, non-threatening but potent counter-elite resistance is always being offered by the powerless and poor groups to the elites. The resistance comes in form of least noticeable 'weapons of the weak', including 'foot-dragging, evasion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander and sabotage' and rejecting ideological power structures through anti-elite 'rumor, gossip, disguises, linguistic tricks, metaphors, euphemisms, folktales, ritual gestures, anonymity', eventually leading to change in society's power structure (p. 136-137). But counter-elite approach does not limit itself to the evolutionary elimination and replacement of the contemporary elite. It argues that countering elite is necessary for reorganization of power in the society and suggests purposeful and active ways of replacing the current elite from decision making structures, such as popular protests and social movements and assuring inclusion of weaker and marginalized groups in the government decision making structures through institution-making processes (Scott, 2007, p.25-39; Abe, 2009; Scott, 1985).

The *co-op-elite* approach accepts the power differentials in communities. But instead of taking an antagonistic view of the elite, it seeks to cooperate with and build on the resources and networks of the elite (Wong, 2010; Mansuri and Rao, 2004). In a study of participatory management of common pool community resources in rural South India, Wade (1987) suggests that there is

greater likelihood of success for collective action in communities if the state has little capacity or desire to undermine locally-based authorities including the local elite. Local authority structures are culturally embedded in developing countries and it may be necessary to organize participatory projects around them (Mansuri and Rao, 2004).

The co-opt-elite approach does not consider all the elite as necessarily power-greedy and exploitative. Some field studies have differentiated between helpful, pro-poor or 'benevolent elite'—acting out of a sense of 'public' or 'moral' duty for genuine empowerment of the target groups—and the ill-intending or the 'exploitative' elite who see availability of participatory projects as opportunities for personal benefit or enhancing their power or status within the community (Rao and Ibanez, 2001; Khwaja, 2001). Although communities in developing countries are yet divided into elite and non-elite groups, power structures and elite leadership are no longer static because of socio-political and technological change that has permeated the traditional societies since 1980s (Lewis and Hossain, 2008; Wood, 1999). Platteau and Gaspart (2004) have argued that dedicated and benevolent elite are more numerous in Asian and Latin American societies than in African societies because of better educational systems and richer history of social and political movements in Asia and Latin American countries.

Lewis and Hossain (2008) have argued that rural power structure has become less rigid and more complex under the emergent change in rural Bangladesh. In order to find a new role under changed circumstances, 'village elite not only seek to capture external resources, but now more than ever play active brokerage roles between villages and wider institutions, thus maintaining their power bases through a more flexible *politics of reputation*' (Lewis and Hossain, 2008). In order to consolidate their new roles through 'politics of reputation', the 'benevolent' rural elite

now have a greater incentive in showing genuine concern for the poor and sharing some benefits with them (Wong, 2010; Lewis and Hussain, 2008). The co-opt-elite approach seeks to capitalize on emergent change in traditional societies, the new 'room for maneuver' and 'benevolent' character of the elite, and engage in a cooperative rather than a competitive relationship with them in order to empower the poor and marginalized community groups (Wong 2010, Lewis and Hossain 2008, Hossain 2004, p.1,34).

The above reasoning has led some researchers to categorize elite domination into 'elite capture' and 'elite control' (e.g. Wong, 2010; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007). While decisions are selfishly made and resources are exploitatively allocated by the local elite in the former, the project is controlled by local elites and yet resources are 'targeted to deserving beneficiaries' in the later (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007). In analyzing a community driven poverty alleviation project in Indonesia, Dasgupta and Beard (2007) found that communities where both non-elites and elites participated in democratic self-governance demonstrated an ability to redress elite capture when it occurred. However, Wong (2010) has suggested that local elites do not show interest in a project in which they see limited benefit for themselves. It's the potential value of the project to the local elite, rather than empathy, which motivates the local elite to get involved.

5.4. Conditions Contributing to Elite Capture:

Several studies have identified conditions conducive to elite capture (e.g. Cornwall and Coelho, 2007, p.9; Bowen, 2008; Platteau and Gaspart, 2004; Platteau 2004). These include economic dependency and security of the poor, inevitability of elite presence, ability of the elite to collude with or influence local authorities, informational asymmetries, media attention and ongoing socioeconomic and technological change (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007, p.9, Plateau and Gaspart, 2004).

5.4.1. **Economic and social dependency:** The poor and the marginalized in developing countries engage in class or group relationships that are directly related to their livelihoods and security in the communities. Mahmud (2007, p.58) has argued that the marginalized live in strong 'dependency relationships', they are highly 'risk-averse and unlikely to violate common practices of allegiance and submission', and, therefore, hindered by their conditions in claiming even their 'legitimate and formally established rights'. Strategies such as 'countering' or 'co-opting' elites, or a combination of both, may not be effective in themselves in dealing with problems associated with elite domination in democratic institutions unless some alternate means of livelihood and security measures are provided for the weaker groups in the community (Wong, 2010).

Under conditions of patronage, low trust and associationalism in the community, and poor transparency mechanisms, elite-dominated CBOs may purposefully operate beyond the knowledge of distant donors to 'serve the interests of a small number of people hand-chosen to work with the project, to the exclusion of broader rural public' (Robert, 2001). Thus better outcomes for participatory development can be expected if participatory projects are supported and closely supervised by external donor agencies or international NGOs (Platteau and Gaspart, 2004, Robert, 2001). However, this offers at best only a temporary solution since participatory development is a continuous process, sometimes with unanticipated outcomes, and external agencies cannot be expected to provide unlimited support and supervision for empowerment of the local communities (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007, p.10; Ribot 2002; Robert, 2001). External intervention can only be a transitional strategy; eventually there is a need for the poor and marginalized groups in communities to be economically independent so that they have resources for political

action to assure their positive role in empowered participatory development (WDR, 2000, p.31).

Several studies have recognized the problem of effectively reaching the beneficiary or affected populations in donor-sponsored 'community driven development'—sustainable community based development projects where communities have direct control over key project decisions as well as the management of investment funds—without involvement of the local elite in one way or the other (e.g. Fanany et al., 2011; McDuie-Ra and Rees, 2010; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Wherever robust socioeconomic class or power-status structures exist, local elites have high likelihood to emerge as elected or nominated representatives of affected or beneficiary communities. Moreover, for practical reasons, sponsoring/organizing authorities of participatory projects often require target populations to nominate or elect their leaders to represent their interests (Rowe and Frewer 2005). This in turn can result in elite capture or elite control if those leaders happen to be local elites.

5.4.2. **Information asymmetries:** The influence of local elite and their interaction with organizing agencies—e.g. local governments, NGOs, etc—usually comes to play during participatory appraisal and funds transfer processes at an intermediary stage between donors and target populations (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005). It is mandatory in most government or international donor funded community development programs that the funds should be channeled through community based organizations (Platteau and Gaspart, 2004; Platteau, 2004). If such CBOs in communities are dominated by elite, they will play the linking-pin role in information flows between community and program organizers or donors. Exploitative elite in heterogeneous communities in developing countries are likely

to manipulate information or restrict information flows between community and donors/organizers in order to serve their purposes (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; 2005). Donors or government may appoint field workers or project facilitators, but several studies have shown the limitations of field staff: their personal incentives may be tied only with positive performance reports regarding the projects, they may be vulnerable to manipulation or control by the locally powerful individuals or groups, or they may simply be inexperienced or have little experience of community participatory projects (Mansuri and Rao 2004; Jackson, 1997).

5.4.3. **Elite's ability to influence authorities:** Government may constitute the supervisory or regulatory agency for the community organizations through which program funds are channeled or managed, but collusion between government agencies and elite-dominated CBOs is equally likely in unequal communities (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Elite 'interest groups' may be able to capture the supervision or regulatory agencies through 'collusive activities' including outright pay-offs, personal relationships with agency officials, refraining from public criticism of agency's management, use of political influence to affect transfers or posting of agency officials and offer of additional or alternative employment opportunities to the agency staff (Laffont and Tirole, 1991).

Most national government or donor-sponsored participatory projects are channeled through CBOs with local governments as supervisory or regulatory agencies because local governments are closest to the people and have most accurate information about their development needs. While local governments may have advantages of better local knowledge and stronger accountability because they are closer to the communities and

readily accessible to voters, the same reason can make them more vulnerable to clientistic pressures and capture by the local elite (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; Bardhan, 2002, Oakley 1995).

5.4.4. **Media attention:** Other studies have suggested *media attention* as an effective 'horizontal' or 'external' accountability mechanism for checking elite capture through raising political awareness among the masses, exposing exploitation by the elite, and making local authorities more responsive to community needs and expectations (e.g. Bovens, 2007; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002; Conning and Kevane, 2002). Besley and Burgess (2002) found state governments in India to be more responsive to citizens' concerns vis-à-vis food shortages and calamity relief expenditure where there was greater newspaper circulation and electoral accountability. Contrary to an idealized view held by many aid agencies that local institutions have 'naturally democratic' qualities, community organizations or local governments may actually be more vulnerable to capture by local elites, because local power groups can easily collude beyond the control of higher-level institutions if media attention is weak or unavailable (Platteau and Gaspart, 2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002).

However, elite-capture is not a generalized or a uniform property of an entire society or a whole region (Bardhan, 2002). The degree of elite capture can vary widely within and across developing countries, from community to community and from time to time. Lewis and Hossain (2008) have shown how elite domination has declined in rural Bangladesh since 1980s because of ongoing social and technological change. Degree of elite-capture can also vary with cohesiveness of interest groups, fairness and regularity of elections, level of electoral uncertainty, levels of education and political awareness in communities,

nature of party politics, relative intensity of electoral competition at local level, transparency in local decision-making and government accounts and even religio-cultural patterns (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; Bardhan 2002).

5.5.Summary:

The influence of elite is inevitable in participatory local development in developing countries because of peculiar characteristics of elite and the society. However, not all the elite may be exploitative. While literature suggests a counter-elite strategy for dealing with exploitative elite, a co-optation strategy is suggested for inclusion of benevolent elite in participatory development. Domination of benevolent elite in participatory development forums can result in channeling of resources to 'deserving beneficiaries'. However, there is always a chance of elite-capture of participatory projects depending on prevailing class interests, level of economic dependency and security of the poor, ability of the elite to collude with or influence local authorities, lack of community-level information available to participatory frame-setters, lack of media attention in remote communities and socioeconomic and technological backwardness. Genuine involvement may be impossible without an approach that reflects the specific characteristics, perceptions and needs of the target community which may be masked by the exploitative and suppressive elite to maintain the status-quo (Fanany, 2011).

5.6.Conclusions from literature review

Although transformational leadership has amassed considerable research support in predicting change-oriented follower, task and organizational outcomes from behavioural styles of leadership, there is little empirical work on how and why intellectual style of transformational leaders may lead to different change outcomes. Current leadership theory also needs enrichment

in terms of contingency factors that determine the choice of one or more transformational leadership sub-styles under different situations. Transformational and networking/partnering leadership are both change-oriented, but there is scanty theoretical work and research-based evidence to explain how the two concepts integrate. This research purports to address these gaps in theory and research of transformational leadership in specific context in which it was undertaken.

Citizen participation has been posited as an instrument of democratization and community empowerment. Participation theory also recognizes conditions under which citizen-participation may actually be disempoweinrg for the poor. However, research on benefits and pitfalls of participation in developing countries is scanty. It is not clear from the literature how certain conditions prevailing in developing countries may result in empowering or disempowering effects for the poor if citizen participation is institutionalized as a regular feature in state sponsored local development. It is also not clear from participatory literature how an ongoing process of citizen participation may contribute towards democratization of society in general and whether and how an ongoing process of citizen participation and participatory leadership may be self-rectifying in the long-term. The current research intends to explore these under-researched areas in citizen participation.

Literature review suggests that citizen participation in local development takes place in both formal 'invited' spaces and informal 'created' spaces. Most participatory models suggested in literature assume citizen participation in local development as taking place in an 'invited' space designed and regulated by government or other sponsors/organizers of citizen-participation. Although created spaces of participation can be much more prevalent and influential in developing countries, there is little research on these types of citizen participation. Participatory

development theory and research is also deficient in explaining whether and how created spaces may initiate and eventually institutionalize as informal mechanisms within formal invited spaces of citizen participation. The current research explains how some types of participation presented in the citizen-participation typology developed in Chapter 4, which may not be included in the formal participatory design, may eventually become institutionalized in the praxis of participatory development in specific socioeconomic, political and cultural context in which it is undertaken.

There is a general lack of research regarding processes and conditions that may lead to elite-capture of participatory projects in different national and sub-national contexts in developing world. Participatory literature is also not clear why some elite may act with a sense of moral responsibility towards the poor and help channel a large part of participatory benefits towards the poor. There is little research on integrating participatory development with local governments and local government leadership, and its effect on elite-capture in participatory development. Several writers such as Bowen (2008), Oakley (1995) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) suggest that several qualitative studies will be required to explore the nature of local leadership and development needs in communities, political and socioeconomic patterns in local society, and patterns of elite-capture in diverse contexts in order to design successful participatory development programmes. The current research purports to address the abovementioned gaps in participatory research and practice in local government context of Punjab, Pakistan.

CHAPTER 6

QUANTITATIVE STAGE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

6.1.Research Objectives and Questions

The first objective at quantitative stage of this study was to investigate correlations among observed leadership styles of District Nazims. Transformational school proposes that only routine levels of performance can be achieved through transactional leadership. Transformational leadership builds over the foundation provided by transactional leadership in order to perform 'beyond expectations'. Although transactional leadership may not *cause* transformational leadership, it provides the pedestal from where to step on a higher level of leadership: transformational. It was thus expected that transactional and transformational leadership styles will be positively correlated. It was also expected that there will be a negative correlation between passive/avoidant style on one hand, and all leadership styles on the other.

The relationship between Transactional/Transformational style typology and Directive/Participative style typology is not clear in the theory. Bass (1999) maintained a conceptual distinction between transformational/transactional and directive/participative typologies. However, transformational leadership could also be participative or directive and transactional leadership could also be participative or directive leadership according to situation (Bass and Bass, 2008; Bass, 1999). Other writers, such as Kouzes and Postner (1987, p.10) and Van Wart (2005, p.337) included variants of directive and participative behaviours in Transactional and Transformational styles respectively. This study intended to investigate the nature of correlation that may exist between the transformational/transactional leadership and directive/participative leadership style typologies.

The second objective of this study was to investigate whether transformational leadership style of District Nazim observed by the District Council Committee heads and the extent of participatory development undertaken in districts of Punjab were correlated. Leadership theory predicts achievement of change-oriented or non-programmed goals from transformational leadership. Participatory local development in Punjab under the local government reform of 2001 represented a major change from the past because complete control over planning, implementation and operations of the local development projects had been allowed to the communities for the first time in the history of Pakistan. Citizen-participation was formalized in the local government budgets for the first time in the history of Pakistan. However, communities were not accustomed to participating in public decisions or contributing towards development costs. Public repertoires of participatory development knowledge and skills and positive attitudes towards citizen participation in development had to be built from scratch. The laws and rules for participatory development were drafted for the first time and were expected to be refined as their weaknesses surfaced as a result of practice. A compelling vision and strong inspiration by the leadership was needed to popularize CCB programme.

Since community members collectively identified, planned, implemented and managed the CCB projects without any official involvement, CCB programme also entailed the higher value of citizen empowerment and addressed higher order esteem or self-actualization needs of the community. CCB projects were expected to address higher needs of the elected leaders as well. CCB projects did not involve the usual 'political support in return for development projects' transactional relationship between elected officials and communities. When community members contributed towards the project cost and planned and implemented the projects independently from the government, they were expected to attribute most credit for the project to themselves.

CCB project could result in political credit for the supporting elected leaders only in the long-run when communities reflected on the overall facilitative role played by elected representatives in empowering the people. It was thus expected that transformational leadership style will be positively associated with utilization of District Development Funds reserved for CCB projects.

A third objective of the quantitative part of research was to investigate whether leadership styles other than transformational leadership were correlated with extent of participatory development undertaken in a district. Elected LG leaders had the first hand information about the formal process and funding available in the District Government budget for participatory development programme (or Citizen Community Boards—CCB—programme). Education, encouragement and facilitation by District Nazim and Union Nazims' could result in high level of CCB projects undertaken by the communities. However, any elected local representative could not legally become a member of participatory forums (CCBs). CCB projects could be demanded and implemented only by the community. District Nazim was responsible for initiating developmental vision and participatory development policy for the district. But CCB programme of District Government could be popularized in the Unions only if Union Nazims were involved in the policy-formulation process for CCBs. Achieving any level of success in CCB programme was not a formal responsibility of elected leaders at any level of LG. An element of political risk was also involved when elected LG leaders encouraged the community to contribute towards project cost. People could have doubted the intentions of leaders because of unfamiliarity with the CCB programme or low level of trust in leaders and government. The poor may also have resented contribution towards cost. Thus a high level of encouragement and involvement in CCB policy and programme decisions was needed for Union Nazims. Under these conditions it was

expected that an increasing strength of participative leadership by District Nazim will be positively correlated with increasing level of CCB programme utilization.

CCB programme presented a form of government-community partnership in local development because local governments contributed 80% of the cost of development projects demanded by the community while community contributed 20% of the project cost and effort involved in planning and implementation of the project. CCBs had to work with Community Development Department of District Government during proposal and progress evaluation stages of the project. However community's decision to enter into a working relationship with the District Government was voluntary and District Government had no hierarchical/formal control over the planning or implementation activities of the CCB as long as these remained within the approved proposal design. A major problem in the CCB programme was unfamiliarity of the people generally with participatory development and specifically with its institutional form of CCBs. People were long accustomed to fully funded development projects by the government. People also have little trust in bureaucracy or elected leaders because of known corruption in government development projects. Under these circumstances, people had little understanding and confidence to commit personal resources and effort to public projects. Information and trust provided by the personal networking style of the district leader could compensate for these disabling conditions. Networking efforts of leaders could lead not only to dissemination of CCB information to resourceful people within and outside the communities, these could also lead to building District Government image and public trust in District Government and its leaders.

District Nazim could explain the CCB process clearly and easily to the contacts in his personal network. District Nazim was the most prestigious position in the District Government. District Nazim could identify and tap into higher order needs of resourceful people when they expressed

their concerns about the district. He/she could motivate them to commit their resources and effort in a voluntary working relationship with District Government. As a result resources and efforts of the affluent class could be channelled towards participatory projects providing welfare to the public. It was thus expected that networking style of District Nazim will be positively correlated with utilization of District Development Funds reserved for participatory development programme.

Following three questions were posed at the first stage survey:

1. What was the pattern of correlations among Passive/Avoidant, Directive, Participative, Networking/Partnering, Transactional and Transformational Styles of District Nazims?

2. What was the pattern of correlation between Transformational Styles of District Nazims and extent of participatory development in Punjab's District Governments?

3. What was the pattern of correlation between other leadership styles of District Nazims and extent of participatory development in Punjab's District Governments?

A fourth objective at Quantitative Stage of this study was not related to research itself, but to selection of districts for research in the Qualitative Stage. It was intended that districts for qualitative study will be selected partly as a result of comparing leadership style scores of individual District Nazims with extent of participatory development in that particular district.

6.2. Research Design and Methods:

Since the design and methods choice largely depends on research questions being asked (De Vaus 2001, Neuman 2000), a first-stage 'ad-hoc survey' design was employed to measure different leadership styles of District Nazims in 35 districts of Punjab. Hakim's (2000, p.76-79) 'ad hoc survey' is the research design equivalent of De Vaus's (2001) 'cross-sectional' design. Because of its simplicity and ease of simultaneous implementation in all the 35 districts of

Punjab, a one-time survey design was suitable for the research contribution I intend to make. Since survey design is open to methodological and technical refinement and easy to replicate over time, the first ad hoc study can be a starting point for a full scale longitudinal study on local government leadership (Hakim 2000). Punjab LG Act 2001 devolved substantial functions to local governments and conferred vast formal decision making powers upon executive district leadership. In absence of regular national or provincial longitudinal studies in Pakistan, an ad hoc survey design may be a first step towards systematic evaluation of District Government leadership and its relationship with participatory development.

The survey was intended to measure leadership styles on close ended questions and also to provide some qualitative information on district leadership issues of high importance in Punjab. This information could be used in subsequent qualitative stage of the research to focus major leadership issues that might be related to participatory development.

6.3. Leadership Style Questionnaire:

The Leadership Style Questionnaire (LSQ) used in this research was based on 'Assessment of Organizational Conditions and Leadership Performance' questionnaire developed by Montgomery Van Wart (2005, p.437-447) and inspired by Avolio and Bass's (2004) Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ 5X). After much deliberation with my supervisors and colleagues, I was able to place 30 items on the questionnaire. I travelled to Pakistan with the questionnaire for the 'scoping leg' (as my supervisor termed it) of my research in June, 2008. In August, 2008, during a Local Government Seminar in Lahore, I was able to arrange a meeting with twelve Union Nazims and Women Councillors from different districts of Punjab. During the two hour intensive meeting that commenced at our seminar room at Institute of Administrative Sciences, Punjab University, I was able to get immensely useful feedback on my 'draft'

questionnaire. Many of the items developed in questionnaires of Western origin have a different meaning in Punjab's political-cultural context. A few items in the draft questionnaire meant to the local representatives quiet different from what these were intended at. For instance, I did not intend to measure 'non-leadership' in my draft questionnaire. But two items that were intended to measure 'ceremonial' and 'general management' factors of transactional leadership were unanimously interpreted as: "if the District Nazim under this system is not doing even this minimum, then he is not a leader at all". That is, in a reverse order, these items were measuring non-leadership, laziness or abdication of responsibility. I decided to keep those items (with suggested rephrasing) to investigate passive/avoidance style's relationship with transactional/transformational style and participatory development achievement. Similarly, item number 18 in the current questionnaire was intended to measure participative behaviour, but to the panellists it meant "providing *different* followers suitable opportunities to develop skills in their *specific* area of responsibility". Thus the item was switched to Individualized Consideration category. Item 19 in the current LSQ was intended to measure Intellectual Stimulation, but almost all the panellists were of the view that it meant involving people, or participative behaviour. Panellists also helped me to rephrase some of the items in Urdu language in order to convey the 'closest' intended meaning.

During the scoping leg of my research I conducted brief interviews with DNs of Sahiwal and Bahawalpur district, an ex-Chairman of Punjab Local Government Board and some Union Nazims in Toba Tek Singh District. In addition to getting useful information about district governance, participatory projects and leader's attitude about these projects, I was able to get some further insights on fine tuning my questionnaire. On my return to UK in September, 2009, I finalized the LSQ with fewer response categories (now 4 instead of 5 or 7, partly because many

local representative opined that 'politicians' should better not be given a 'middle-of-the-road quick-tick' option, and partly because I and my supervisor concluded that political people may not have enough patience or time to engross in making judgements across many options, item after item.

The final LSQ had a total of 26 items[3]. Respondents could rate the District Nazim on each item along a four point *ordinal* scale (1=rarely, 2=sometimes, 3=usually, 4=always). Two items measured Passive/Avoidant or 'non-leadership' style in reverse order (Items 14&15). Transactional style was measured by the 4 items on Contingent Reward (items 2,4,7 and 11) and 2 items on Active Management by Exception (items 5&21). Transformational style was measured by 7 items on Charismatic/Inspirational (items 6,10,12,13,16,22 and 26), 4 items on Individualized Consideration (items 3,8,9 and 18), and 3 items on Intellectual Stimulation (items 17,20 and 23). In addition to non-leadership, transactional and transformational typology developed in the works of Burns (2003;1978), Bass (1999) and Avolio and Bass (2004), directive and participative styles were measured on single items (items 1 and 19). Items 24 and 25 measured Networking/Partnering style of the District Nazim with government and non-government leaders respectively.

The effort going into the development of LSQ paid off well. The response rate was around 25%. Responses on the questionnaire confirmed a fair degree of reliability. The Cronbach's Alphas for passive-avoidance, transactional and transformational styles were 0.65, 0.72 and 0.88 respectively (Table 7.4). Only networking/partnering style had a low alpha value of 0.47. But that was because two items for measuring networking/partnering style measured leader's

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[3] See Appendix 2-A, B, & C for LSQ with re-translation in English, along with questionnaire testing panel's interpretations and finally selected leadership style measures. Re-translation in English gives the closest possible meanings in Urdu.

networking/partnering with public and non-public sector. Leaders could be quite different in their preferences for networking with public and non-public sectors. This seems to be the reason for difference in responses on two items of networking/partnering style of leadership (items 24 and 25 in LSQ—Appendix 2-C). However, the two items for networking/partnering were retained and aggregated into a single measure because 1) both items showed a significant inter-correlation of moderate strength and 2) the correlation of either items with extent of participatory development undertaken at district level was not different from the correlation between aggregated networking/partnering style and extent of participatory development. The open ended item at the end of questionnaire requesting opinions regarding most difficult and attention-seeking aspects of district leadership generated rich inputs for focusing research during the field interviews. Best efforts were made to ensure content validity of the questionnaire through discussions with my supervisor and colleagues, and especially with help of the ones who eventually filled it according to *their* interpretations. The questionnaire is also expected to have high construct validity since it was based on leadership questionnaires that have been perfected in the measurement of leadership's theoretical concepts over time, and also because elected representatives from different districts of Punjab provided inputs into the development of the questionnaire.

6.4. Sampling and Data Collection:

The population to be sampled comprised all the Union Nazims (directly elected Administrators of Union Councils) in each district of the Punjab. Union Nazims were ex officio members of District Council and constituted the House of District Nazim who was indirectly elected by Union Nazims. Union Nazims constituted secondary leadership cadres in the district in a direct

Leader-Follower relationship with the District Nazim. However, it was decided to include only those Union Nazims in the sample which were convenors/heads of District Council committees. This was necessarily a non-probability purposive (or judgemental) sample decided for two reasons: 1) Council Committees heads have direct working relationship and more frequent interaction with the District Nazim than other Union Nazims, 2) There are 3464 Union Councils in Punjab. List of Union Nazims was not readily available from the internet or Punjab LGCD department. Requesting lists of Union Nazims from each of the 35 district in Punjab could have taken an unknown length of time. The purpose of study was to study leadership styles of District Nazims and Committee heads were expected to have maximum chance of observation of District Nazims' leadership style. Thus a sample of all District Council Committee heads (8-10 in a single district) from 35 districts of Punjab was finalized, i.e. *total population sample of experts* (Patton, 2002, p. 235-240).

Reaching the district councillors posed a special problem. District in Punjab are spread over a large area of 205,345 square kilometres. One choice was to mail LSQ directly to District Coordination Officers (district bureaucracy heads) or DCOs in each district and request them for coordination with district council. However, DCO office was least expected to respond unless officially instructed on the matter by the provincial secretariat. Fortunately, I was able to find support from Mr Mehmood Rai, once my trainer in Local Governments and now Personal Staff Officer to the Chief Secretary of Punjab Government. LSQ had to be administered at a time when a new government had taken office in Punjab. The new provincial government was not in favour of independent and empowered Local Governments and had started interference in the affairs of elected local governments since its election in February 2008, including blockage of Local Government's Development Funds. Enquiries had been also initiated against the Nazims

affiliated with the political party in power in the earlier Punjab Government. Under these circumstances, anything from DCO office was seen with high distrust by the local representatives. I was advised by Mr. Rai to send the questionnaires instead to the District Council Committee heads through District Council Officers in each district. District Council Officers had been appointed during the heyday of reformed Local governments in Punjab and had generally a high level of interaction and goodwill with the district councillors. However, it was unlikely that the District Council Officers would have responded to my direct request. Mr Rai suggested at this point that he could request the Secretary of Local Government and Community Development (LGCD) department to send these questionnaires to the Assistant Director Local Government (ADLG) offices in each district. The ADLG office in the district is responsible for specific categories of local development planning and has to work in close coordination with District Council Officer for the official movement of Local Development proposals submitted by the District Councillors. The District Council Officer could be requested through the ADLG office for distribution and collection of questionnaires from the District Council Committee heads. That was help—in the nick of time.

Accordingly, 350 copies of Leadership Style Questionnaire measuring transactional and transformational leadership factors of elected District Government Executive Mayor—or District Nazim (DN)—were mailed to Local Government and Community Development (LGCD) Department of Punjab Government in May, 2009. LGCD department officially sent ten copies of the questionnaire to District Council officers in each of the 35 districts of Punjab. As per Punjab Local Government Ordinance of 2001, each District Council elects from amongst its members district committees for Code of Conduct, Audit and Accounts, Assistance in Justice, District Public Safety, Sports and Culture, Farm Produce and Marketing, Health, Education and Citizen

Community Boards (Article 39). The questionnaires were intended to be filled by convenors/heads of District Council Committees constituted in each of the 35 districts of Punjab. By the end of October, 2009, a total of 74 questionnaires from 16 districts were completed and returned to the LGCD department based in Lahore—the capital city of Punjab[4]. I was able to get responses on another two questionnaires when I visited Pakistan for field interviews during December, 2009 to January, 2010. The results from the survey shall be discussed in the next chapter.

6.5. Statistical Techniques and Software for Data Analysis

Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients were used to study correlations among leadership styles and between leadership styles and extent of participatory development. Data from LSQ was recorded and processed in Excel while Statistical Package for Social Sciences (Version 17) was used to transform data, calculate correlations and report results.

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[4] See 'Folder 3-Official Communications 3' in accompanying DVD for communication between Punjab LGCD, District ADLG office and District Council office for administration of LSQ. Original LSQ responses can be seen in 'Folder 8-N=76 LSQ Responses' in the accompanying DVD.

CHAPTER 7

DATA ANALYSIS 1: A STUDY OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN LEADERSHIP STYLES AND PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT IN PUNJAB[5]

7.1. Correlations among leadership styles:

7.1.1. Sample characteristics: Correlations among leadership styles displayed by district leaders were studied in a sample of 76 responses (N=76) from followers in 16 districts of Punjab. The sample included districts and primary sampling units (District Council Committees Convenors/Heads) from all the four economic-geographical regions of Punjab province as shown in the Table 7.1 below:

Table 7.1: Respondent characteristics by regional distribution of districts

Region of Province	Total Districts in a Region	Responding Number of Districts	Total respondents From the Region	Male	Female	High School	University Degree	Rural	Urban
North Punjab	4	2	8	7	1	8	2	7	1
Central Punjab	18	8	34	33	1	34	6	17	17
Western Punjab	3	1	5	5	0	5	0	3	2
South Punjab	10	5	29	28	1	29	4	19	10
Total	35 (100%)	16 (46%)	76 (100%)	73 (96%)	3 (4%)	76 (100%)	12 (16%)	46 (61%)	30 (39%)

16 districts from where response was received represented 46% of the total districts in Punjab and were well distributed in the different economic-geographical regions of the province. Respondents were almost entirely male (96%). This seems to be because women generally do not contest or have little chance of getting elected as heads of formal

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[5] See 'Folder 7-Correlations' in accompanying DVD for all computations and correlations in this chapter.

political forums in male-dominated political culture of Punjab. All respondents had at least high school attainment (a qualifying condition for contesting Union Nazim election) and 16% had university degree. Urban Union Councils represent 29% of the total 3464 Union Councils in Punjab. Respondents in the current study who were Union Nazims of Urban Union Councils represented 39% of the total sample. However, this is not a substantial difference so as to make the sample unrepresentative. All Union Nazims legally have to be at least 21 years of age (NRB, 2001). Mean age of Union Nazims was 40 years in Punjab (Pattan Development Organization, 2005)

7.1.2. Data aggregation and recoding (N=76): As discussed in chapter on research design and methods, the questionnaire measured the following Leadership Styles variables: Passive/Avoidant, Directive, Participative, Networking/Partnering, Transactional and Transformational. Passive/Avoidant or non-leadership style of District Nazim was measured on two items. Scores on two items of Passive/Avoidant style were aggregated by assigning equal weight to each item for each respondent as follows:

$$PA_n = \left[\frac{(PA_{n1} + PA_{n2})}{2}\right]$$

 Where,

PA_n = Passive/Avoidant Style score aggregated for nth respondent.

$PA_{n1,n2}$ = Passive/Avoidant item 1 and item 2 scores reported on the District Nazim by nth respondent

Directive and participative leadership styles both were measured on single items and, therefore, there was no for data aggregation.

Networking/Partnering Leadership Style of District Nazim was measured on two items. Scores on two items of Networking/Partnering style were aggregated by assigning equal weight to each item for each respondent as follows.

$$NW_n = \left[\frac{(NW_{n1} + NW_{n2})}{2}\right]$$

Where,

NW_n = Networking/Partnering Style score aggregated for nth respondent.

$NW_{n1,n2}$ = Networking/Partnering item 1 and item 2 scores reported on the District Nazim by nth respondent

Transactional Leadership Style was measured by two underlying factors: Contingent Reward (four items) and Management by Exception (two items). An equiweighted aggregated score for Transactional Leadership style of District Nazim Score reported by each respondent was obtained as follows:

$$Tact_n = \left[\frac{(CR_{n1} + CR_{n2} + CR_{n3} + CR_{n4})}{4} \times \frac{1}{2}\right] + \left[\frac{(MBE_{n1} + MBE_{n2})}{2} \times \frac{1}{2}\right]$$

Where,

$Tact_n$ = Transactional Leadership Style score aggregated for nth respondent.

$CR_{n1...n4}$ = Contingent Reward item 1 to item 4 scores reported on the District Nazim by nth respondent

$MBE_{n1,n2}$ = Management by Exception (Active) item 1 and item 2 scores reported on the District Nazim by nth respondent

Transformational Leadership Style was measured by three underlying factors: Charismatic/Inspirational (seven items), Individualized Consideration (four items) and

Intellectual Stimulation (three items). An equiweighted aggregated score for Transformational Leadership style of District Nazim Score reported by each respondent was obtained as follows:

$$Tfor_n = \left[\frac{(CI_{n1} + CI_{n2} + CI_{n3} + \cdots + CI_{n7})}{7} \times \frac{1}{3}\right] + \left[\frac{(IC_{n1} + IC_{n2} + IC_{n3} + IC_{n4})}{4} \times \frac{1}{3}\right]$$
$$+ \left[\frac{(IS_{n1} + IS_{n2} + IS_{n3})}{3} \times \frac{1}{3}\right]$$

Where,

$Tfor_n$ = Transformational Leadership Style score aggregated for nth respondent.

$CI_{n1\ldots n7}$ = Charismatic/Inspirational item 1 to item7 scores reported on the District Nazim by nth respondent

$IC_{n1\ldots n4}$ = Individualized Consideration item 1 to item 4 scores reported on the District Nazim by nth respondent

$IS_{n1, n2, n3}$ = Intellectual Stimulation item 1 to item 3 scores reported on the District Nazim by nth respondent

The data aggregation process converted scores on Passive/Avoidant, Networking/Partnering, Transactional and Transformational leadership style variables from ordinal (categorical) to scale (interval) level data. In order to transform aggregated scores on interval scale into ordinal scale, the range between minimum and maximum aggregated scores was divided into four equal subscales in increasing order[6]. Each of the four increasing subscales was recoded into ordinal categories from 1 to 4 (i.e. 1=rarely, 2=sometimes, 3=usually, 4=always). For instance Transformational Leadership Style aggregated interval level scores were recoded into ordinal level scores as follows:

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[6] See xls file 'LSQ inputs and computations' in 'Folder 7-Correlations' in the accompanying DVD.

$$1(Rarely) = From: Tfor_{Minimum} \ to: \left(\frac{Tfor_{Range}}{4} + Tfor_{Minimum}\right)$$

$$2(Sometimes) = From \ over: \left(\frac{Tfor_{Range}}{4} + Tfor_{Minimum}\right) to: \left(2 \times \frac{Tfor_{Range}}{4} + Tfor_{Minimum}\right)$$

$$3 \ (Usually) = From \ over: \left(2 \times \frac{Tfor_{Range}}{4} + Tfor_{Minimum}\right) to: \left(3 \times \frac{Tfor_{Range}}{4} + Tfor_{Minimum}\right)$$

$$4 \ (Always) = From \ over: \left(3 \times \frac{Tfor_{Range}}{4} + Tfor_{Minimum}\right) to: Tfor_{Maximum}$$

Where,

$Tfor_{Range}$= Difference between the maximum and minimum aggregated scores

for transformational leadership style

$Tfor_{Minimum}$ = Minimum aggregated score for transformational leadership style

$Tfor_{Maximum}$ = Maximum aggregated score for transformational leadership style

Using the similar procedure interval scale aggregated scores on other leadership style

variables were recoded into ordinal scale categories.

7.1.3. Data Analysis: Data analysis methods suitable for ordinal level data were used. Table 7.2

below shows that scores on each of the leadership styles measured were roughly normally

distributed except for Passive/Avoidance where skewness and kurtosis both are

approaching nearly twice the magnitude of their standard errors. Most values in Passive

Avoidant style clustered towards the 'rarely' end suggesting that Passive/Avoidant or

non-leadership was seen as least occurring in the District Nazims. 67.1% of the

respondents perceived Districts Nazims displaying non-leadership style only 'rarely' or

'sometimes'. 68.4% of the respondents perceived Districts Nazims displaying transformational style 'usually' or 'always'. Transformational style was followed by transactional, participative, directive and networking/partnering leadership styles which were perceived as being displayed 'usually' or 'always' by District Nazim by 67.1%, 57.9%, 56.5% and 52.7% of the respondents respectively. This suggests that Transformational leadership was relatively the most prevalent type of leadership style displayed by the District Nazims while Networking/Partnering was relatively the least prevalent type of leadership style displayed by the District Nazims as perceived in leader-follower relationships. Non-Leadership or Passive/Avoidant Style was much less prevalent than the Leadership Styles.

Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics, N=76

		PA_T	DIR_T	PART_T	NW_T	TACT_T	TFOR_T
N	Valid	76	76	76	76	76	76
	Missing	15	15	15	15	15	15
Mode		1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	3.00
Skewness		.515	-.228	-.336	-.016	-.479	-.369
Std. Error of Skewness		.276	.276	.276	.276	.276	.276
Kurtosis		-.965	-.576	-.464	-.932	-.588	-.571
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.545	.545	.545	.545	.545	.545
Minimum		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Maximum		4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Frequency of Responses (%)							
1= Rarely		34.2	13.2	13.2	11.8	14.5	6.6
2=Sometimes		32.9	30.3	28.9	35.5	18.4	25.0
3= Usually		17.1	44.7	48.7	31.6	47.4	42.1
4= Always		15.8	11.8	9.2	21.1	19.7	26.3

Table 7.4 below shows Spearman's coefficients of correlations between different leadership styles. Correlation strength was interpreted using the guide shown in Table 7.3 below. Results show a correlation coefficient of 0.675 between transactional and

transformational leadership style. This represents a mildly strong positive correlation between the two leadership styles. The relationship is significant at *p<0.01,* i.e. there is less than 1% likelihood that this relationship existed due to chance. Thus the implication from transformational leadership theory that transformational leadership builds over the foundation provided by transactional leadership is supported in the results.

Passive/avoidant leadership shows high moderate negative correlations with Directive, Transactional and Transformational leadership styles and low moderate negative correlation with Participative and Networking/Partnering styles. Transactional District Nazims were most-least likely to be Passive/avoidant while the Participative leaders were least-least likely to be Passive/Avoidant. All these Correlations with Passive Avoidant style were significant at *p<0.01*.

Table 7.3: Correlation Strength Guide

Strength / Direction	Negligible	Weak	Low-moderate	High-moderate	Low-strong	High-strong
Positive	0<x ≤ 0.167	0.167<x≤0.333	0.333<x≤0.5	0.5<x≤0.667	0.667<x≤0.833	0.833<x<1.0
Negative	0>x≥-0.167	-0.167>x≥-0.333	-0.333>x≥ -0.5	-0.5>x≥-0.667	-0.667>x≥-0.833	-0.833>x>-1.0

Based on: Black (1999)

Transactional leadership was positively correlated with both directive and participative leadership at the significance level *p<0.01*. However, the correlation between Transactional leadership and participative leadership was weak, positive and significant (ρ=0.3, *p<0.*01) while correlation between transactional leadership and directive leadership was high-moderate, positive and significant (ρ=0.607, *p<0.*01). Thus the implication from transformational theory that transactional leadership could be correlated with participative or directive styles was supported. However correlation between

transactional and directive style was much stronger than correlation between transactional and participative style. In fact the correlation between transactional and participative style was weakest of all other positive correlations found in the study.

Table 7.4: Correlations Among leadership styles of District Nazims

			PA_T	DIR_T	PART_T	NW_T	TACT_T	TFOR_T
Spearman's rho (ρ)	PA_T	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative
		Sig. (2-tailed)	(0.65)	High Moderate	Low Moderate	Low Moderate	High Moderate	High Moderate
		N	76					
	DIR_T	Correlation Coefficient	-.554**	1.000	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	--	Low Moderate	Low Moderate	High Moderate	High Moderate
		N	76	76				
	PART_T	Correlation Coefficient	-.410**	.422**	1.000	Positive	Positive	Positive
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	--	High Moderate	Weak	High Moderate
		N	76	76	76			
	NW_T	Correlation Coefficient	-.490**	.489**	.606**	1.000	Positive	Positive
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	(0.47)	High Moderate	Low Strong
		N	76	76	76	76		
	TACT_T	Correlation Coefficient	-.626**	.607**	.300**	.506**	1.000	Positive
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.008	.000	(0.72)	Low Strong
		N	76	76	76	76	76	
	TFOR_T	Correlation Coefficient	-.552**	.638**	.522**	.684**	.675**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	(0.88)
		N	76	76	76	76	76	76

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
PA_T=Passive/Avoidant; DIR_T=Directive; PAR_T=Participative; NW_T=Networking/Partnering;
TACT_T=Transactional; TFOR_T=Transformational.
Suffix '_T'= Aggregated and Transformed, Cronbach Alpha in Parenthesis

Implication from transformational leadership theory that transformational leadership can be both directive and participative was also supported by the results. Transformational leadership had high moderate, significant and positive correlation of ρ=0.638 (*p<0.01*) with directive leadership and high moderate, positive and significant correlation of

ρ=0.522 (*p<0.01*) with participative leadership. However, counter-intuitively, transformational leadership style's correlation was relatively stronger with directive rather than participative leadership. Further, transformational leadership's correlation with directive leadership at coefficient value of ρ=0.638 was slightly stronger than transactional leadership's correlation with directive leadership at ρ=0.607. This suggests that not only transformational leaders could be more directive than participative, but they may also be more directive than transactional leaders could be directive.

Leadership theory generally treats participative and directive styles as having mutually exclusive characteristics, e.g. as in Hersey and Blanchard's (1988;1969) *telling* and *participating* leadership styles. The results from this study suggest that although the two styles may be mutually exclusive, but the same leaders (District Nazims) may display both directive and participative leadership since a low moderate and significant positive correlation was found between these two styles (i.e. ρ=0.422, *p<0.01*). This finding goes against Fred Fiedler's (1967) Contingency Theory's assumption that leaders are unable to change their consistent directive or non-directive styles and supports assumptions of other leadership theories, such as Path-Goal Theory (House, 1994), that leaders can adapt their styles according to the need of situation.

Networking/Partnering Style had low moderate and significant positive correlation with Directive style (ρ=0.489, *p<0.01*) and high moderate correlation with Participative style (ρ=0.606, *p<0.01*). The distinctive characteristic of Networking/Partnering style is that it involves making useful contacts 'outside' the normal chain of command of a leader and engaging them in voluntary working relationships with the organization. Since directive style of leadership includes planning and organizing of tasks to be assigned to the

subordinates/followers, setting goals to be achieved by the subordinates, etc, it most likely to be employed in formal hierarchical leader-follower relationships. However, participative style includes encouraging involvement and creative inputs in decisions or other activities of the organization or domain of leader's responsibility, etc, that could otherwise be closed to subordinates. In addition, participative style does not exclude the involvement of people who may not fall in the formal chain of command of the leader or who do not share formal responsibility both within and outside the organization. Participative style also implies collegial and non-vertical relationships. This may explain a comparatively stronger correlation between Networking/Partnering and Participative style of District Nazims. Participative style may have provided the District Nazims with the 'dispositional allowance' or 'behavioural flexibility' to involve 'outsiders' in District Government activities. Leaders with a Participative style may also have a dispositional inclination towards Networking/Partnering behaviours.

Networking/Partnering Style had high moderate and significant positive correlation Transactional Leadership Style ($\rho=0.506$, *p<0.01*). The correlation between Networking/Partnering style and Transformational style was mildly strong and significant positive ($\rho=0.684$, *p<0.01*). In fact the correlation between Networking/Partnering style and Transformational style was the strongest of all positive correlations found. Networking/Partnering Styles are usually employed for dealing with some internal or external changes (threats or opportunities) an organization may be faced with. District Government's interdependence and alignment with other levels of government, private sector or civil society organizations for dealing with changing internal resource position or pursuing new governance or developmental goals, etc, may be some of the reasons for

District Nazim employing Networking/Partnering style (Van Wart, 2005). Since the distinguishing characteristic of Transformational style is its orientation towards an elevating change in leader-follower relationships and achievement of non-conventional purposes for the organization, a Transformational style of District Nazim may simply have invoked the need for Networking/Partnering leadership behaviours. Alternatively, Networking/Partnering may be yet another aspect of Transformational leadership that has not been properly theorised as yet.

7.2. Correlations between Leadership Styles and extent of Participatory Development

7.2.1. Data considerations at district level (N=16): The final objective of quantitative part of this study was to investigate the correlations between different Leadership Styles and extent of Participatory Development in all the 35 districts of Punjab. However, responses to LSQ were obtained from only 16 districts. Although it was a small sample size in absolute terms, it was decided to carry out a correlation analysis for two reasons: 1) in relative terms, 16 districts represented 46% of Punjab's total districts and were well distributed across different geographical regions of the province, 2) the purpose of study at this stage was not to explain any causation between leadership styles and extent of participatory development undertaken. Rather the purpose was to investigate whether any association existed between leadership styles and extent of adoption of an (unprecedented) innovative change in local development design, i.e. citizen participation in local development.

In order to arrive at correlations between District Nazim's leadership styles and utilization level of participatory development funds in each of the 16 districts in the sample, the aggregated scores of respondents on each Leadership Style variables, i.e.

Passive/Avoidant, Directive, Participative, Networking/Partnering, Transactional and Transformational, were averaged for each district. This procedure again resulted in interval level scores for District Nazims' Leadership Styles. Extent of participatory development was measured by percent utilization of participatory development funds reserved in Punjab Government's formula based development allocations to each of the 16 districts during 2001-2010. A procedure similar to recoding of leadership scores in the earlier section was used to recode/transform the District Nazim's leadership style averaged scores for each district into four ordinal categories (1=Rarely, 2=Sometimes, 3=Usually, 4=Always). Level of participatory development funds utilization (CCB Utilization) in each district was also transformed into four ordinal categories (1=None to Low, 2=low to medium, 3=medium to high, 4=high to very high)[7].

7.2.2. Data Analysis: It was expected that Transformational leadership and Networking/Partnering styles would have positive and significant correlations with extent of participatory development undertaken in a district since both of these leadership styles are change-oriented. However, Spearman rank correlation coefficients show that none of the reported leadership styles of District Nazims had a significant correlation with extent of participatory development undertaken (four response categories column in Table 7.5). In terms of correlation strength, only Networking/Partnering style had a positive low-moderate correlation ($\rho=0.341$, *p<0.2)* with extent of participatory development undertaken (as measured in Citizen Community Board—CCB—funds utilization). All other correlations were weak or negligible. However, comparing across District Nazim's leadership style categories it appeared that District Nazim's Networking/Partnering style

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[7] See SPSS file 'N=16 Leadership and CCBs' in 'Folder 7-Correlations' in the accompanying DVD.

had relatively strongest and least insignificant correlation with extent of participatory development undertaken in a district than all other leadership styles. Next in order to Networking/Partnering style, Transformational style had a weak, positive and insignificant correlation with CCB Funds Utilization ($\rho=0.302$, *p<0.26*). All other correlations were highly insignificant and weak/negligible.

In order to further explore the behaviour of correlation strength and significance between District Nazim's Networking/Partnering style and extent of participatory development undertaken, the response categories on leadership styles and CCB Funds Utilization were collapsed from four to three by recoding district averaged scores on leadership styles and CCB Funds Utilization into three ordinal categories (i.e. 1=low, 2=medium, 3=high). As can be seen in 'Three response categories' column of the Table 7.5, now the positive correlation between District Nazim's Networking/Partnering style and CCB Funds Utilization became high-moderate ($\rho=0.526$) and significant at *p<0.04*. The strength and significance of positive correlation between Transformational leadership style and CCB Funds Utilization also increased marginally (i.e. from $\rho=0.302$, *p<0.26* to $\rho=0.333$, *p<0.21*).

The correlations discussed in this section suggest that 'information or resource sharing', 'voluntary engagement', and 'horizontal relationships' implied in Networking/Partnering style of leadership may be more related to adoption and popularization of participatory development (presented as an innovative feature of decentralized local government) than 'change-orientation' and 'human empowerment' implied in transformational leadership.

A Transformational character may provide the leaders—District Nazims and Union Nazims in local government context of Punjab—with moral reasoning and motivation for

involving citizens in government decision-making domains. Transformational Leadership

may also provide inspiration for change to followers. However, participation comes from

the followers—or citizens in case of participatory development. Citizens may get

involved in participatory development program only if leaders take initiative in 'building

horizontal bridges' for information sharing and mutual engagement.

Table 7.5: Correlations Between Leadership Styles and Participatory Development

			CCB_T FUNDS UTILIZATION (Four response categories)	CCB_T FUNDS UTILIZATION (Three response categories)
Spearman's rho	PA_T	Correlation Coefficient	.173	-.018
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.521	.947
		N	16	16
	DIR_T	Correlation Coefficient	-.156	.205
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.565	.447
		N	16	16
	PART_T	Correlation Coefficient	.045	.034
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.869	.900
		N	16	16
	NW_T	Correlation Coefficient	.341	.526*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.196	.036
		N	16	16
	TACT_T	Correlation Coefficient	.099	.109
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.714	.688
		N	16	16
	TFOR_T	Correlation Coefficient	.302	.333
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.255	.208
		N	16	16

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

PA_T=Passive/Avoidant; DIR_T=Directive; PAR_T=Participative; NW_T=Networking/Partnering;
TACT_T=Transactional; TFOR_T=Transformational; CCB_T=Citizen Community Board Program
funds utilization percent transformed into four categories (1=none to low, 2=low to medium,
3=medium to high, 4=high to very high).
Suffix '_T'= District Averaged and Transformed

CHAPTER 8

QUALITATIVE STAGE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

8.1. Research design:

The main objective of research in qualitative stage of research was to explain the factors contributing to participatory development at the district government level. District Attock and District Sahiwal were selected for qualitative research for the following reasons:

i. Highest proportion of participatory development allocations were utilized during two terms of District Government from 2001-02 to 2009-10 in Sahiwal district while the participatory development programme failed to take off in Attock district (see Table 8.1 below). In this sense District Attock and District Sahiwal represented two extreme cases in Punjab. It was expected that factors negatively affecting participatory development would be best represented in Attock district while factors positively affecting participatory development would be best represented in Sahiwal district.

ii. Data from LSQ in the Quantitative Stage of analysis revealed that District Nazim (DN) Sahiwal had a maximum total leadership score and maximum scores on all individual styles of leadership except Directive style (see Table 8.1 below). Thus a combination of maximum scores on Networking/Partnering and Transformational leadership styles and high achievement in change-oriented outcome of participatory development made Sahiwal district a perfect case confirming the predictions from Leadership Theory.

iii. District Nazim Attock scored third highest on total leadership score, second highest in Transformational style and third highest in Networking/Partnering style. But the greatest change accompanying the local government reform of 2001, i.e. participatory development

program, failed to take-off in Attock district. This combination made District Attock an atypical case in the sample where predictions from the Leadership Theory were not supported. Correlation results from this study also found positive relationships between Networking/Partnering and Transformational styles, and extent of participatory development in a district. Thus district Attock was also a perfect case where correlation findings from this study were not supported. District Attock was expected to provide best explanations for exception to theoretical predictions.

iv. The same leaders were elected as District Nazims in both the districts during the two terms of District Government, i.e. from 2001-02 to 2004-05 and 2005-06 to 2009-10. Although this was only a coincidence, but it assured that explanations for participatory development related to district leader could not be confounded because of change in district leadership.

To use De Vaus's (2001) typology, a multiple case, explanatory case study design focusing on, but not limited to, the role of elected district government leadership in participatory development during two terms (2001-02 to 2009-10) of district governments, was employed in a retrospective way and sequential order. The goal of methodology was to develop explanations for participatory development in the manner of grounded theory. Using Patton's (1990) typology, purposeful extreme case sampling was used to select two districts which ranked highest and lowest in extent of participatory development undertaken among the districts from where response to LSQ were received. These two districts, i.e. Sahiwal and Attock, also ranked highest and lowest in the extent of participatory development undertaken at District Government level in the whole province.

Table 8.1: District Averages of Aggregated Leadership and Participatory Development Scores[8]

Variable / District	Passive/ Avoidant	Direct-ive	Particip-ative	Networ-king	Transact-ional	Transform-ational	Total Leadership Score	CCB Utilization (%)
Sahiwal	1.10	3.20	3.60	3.80	3.10	3.05	16.75	64.00
Muzzafargar	2.00	4.00	3.00	2.70	2.88	2.92	15.50	10.00
Sheikhupura	1.58	3.17	2.50	3.17	3.04	2.87	14.75	45.00
Faisalabad	1.75	1.75	2.75	2.75	2.26	2.43	11.94	26.00
Gujranwala	2.30	2.00	3.00	2.70	2.05	2.35	12.10	13.00
Attock	1.60	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.05	2.98	15.03	0.00
Multan	2.00	3.00	1.00	2.50	3.00	2.64	12.14	11.00
Layyah	2.00	1.80	1.20	1.50	2.43	1.98	8.91	4.00
M.B.Din	1.88	2.75	3.00	2.88	2.88	2.81	14.32	60.00
Gujrat	3.10	1.00	2.00	2.60	2.00	1.81	9.41	56.00
Narowal	2.83	2.33	2.33	2.00	2.30	2.18	11.14	43.00
Jhelum	1.83	3.00	2.67	3.17	2.88	2.77	14.49	55.00
DG Khan	2.38	2.25	2.50	2.75	2.85	2.83	13.18	54.00
Bahawalpur	1.88	2.56	2.38	2.56	2.92	2.63	13.05	1.00
Nankana	2.00	3.00	2.50	2.75	2.75	2.90	13.90	40.00
Lodhran	2.25	2.00	3.00	2.75	2.69	2.60	13.04	38.00

8.2. Research objectives:

The first objective of this study at the qualitative stage was to discover and explain 1) leadership factors contributing positively or negatively to participatory development, including leaders' assumptions, beliefs and interpretations (as reflected in their 'value-judgments', 'statements of facts' or 'logical explanations'), and the roles played by the elected leaders in District Government (District Nazim and Union Nazims) with regards to participatory development, and 2) other factors contributing positively or negatively to participatory development in two extreme cases.

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[8] See xls file 'LSQ inputs and computations' in 'Folder 7-Correlations' in the accompanying DVD.

Another objective of research at this stage was to identify and explain the pattern of elite-capture or CCB misuse in Sahiwal District Government. Elite-capture of participatory projects is an important issue in the literature of participatory development. Ensuring proper use of Citizen Community Board (CCB) funds (participatory development funds) was also identified as an important district leadership issue in responses to the open-ended question posed at the end of the LSQ in earlier stage of this study. With a high level of participatory development in Sahiwal district, there was also a possibility of elite-capture of CCB projects.

The research objectives can now be posed in form of following broad questions:

1. What were specific leadership related factors that explained non-occurrence and a high level occurrence of participatory development in Attock and Sahiwal districts respectively?

2. How other political, economic or social factors positively or negatively contributed to the extent of participatory development in each of the two districts?

3. What was the extent of elite-capture of participatory projects in Sahiwal district?

4. How leadership-related or other factors explained elite-capture of participatory projects in Sahiwal District?

The scope of qualitative research at second stage included these broad questions but was not limited by them. It was intended that any relevant conceptual scheme emerging from grounded explanation of participatory development but not covered by the above questions shall be included in the data analysis. On the basis of factors underlying participatory development discovered during the qualitative analysis stage, specific conclusions were to be drawn about relationship between leadership styles and participatory development under certain contingencies of leadership.

Research strategy adopted at this stage was to suspend leadership styles considerations and investigate leadership and other factors affecting participatory development in a district. There were two reasons for suspension of leadership styles and focus on explanatory factors for participatory development at this stage:

i.   The study objective was to identify, explain and compare a maximum number of factors, not just leadership factors, which may have affected participatory development in two districts.

ii. Investigating how leadership styles influenced participatory development may have introduced a teleological bias in the study. CCBs represented a change in practice of local development and public thinking and knowledge regarding local development. CCBs thus required a change-oriented leadership for their adoption and popularization by definition. Any action or decision by the District Nazim to promote participatory development could reflect one or more factors underlying Transformational leadership. In addition, CCB projects were necessarily public-private partnerships involving out-of-formal-hierarchy interactions. Since Transformational style by definition is change-oriented and Networking/ Partnering style by definition includes horizontal interactions and influence, a focus on finding leadership style explanations for known level of participatory development performance could have resulted in teleological bias, i.e. explaining different levels of participatory development with a known theoretical design of leadership styles.

Conclusion of the study was intended to explain 1) why and how leadership styles led to different outcomes of participatory development, and 2) the conditions under which leadership styles affected participatory development *as reflected* in leadership factors discovered during qualitative analysis.

8.3.Sampling and Data collection:

Primary data from field interviews and secondary data from various district government records and legal documents was used for analyzing, comparing and contrasting the explanations arising from extreme-deviant and extreme-strategic cases. Within each district the goal of sampling was to get information from a diverse set of respondents who had high degree of relevance and/or knowledge or experience of CCBs in some way. It was also desirable to request initial respondents to help in locating and arranging interviews with 'information-rich key informants' as the interviews progressed (Patton, 1990). Accordingly, a *purposeful maximum variation sampling* combined with *chain sampling* was used in each district (Patton, 1990).

Primary data in Sahiwal district included a total of 27 in-depths interviews from an MPA and Senior Minister of Punjab Government, District Nazim, Union Nazims, Women Councilors, CCB Chairmen and Members, District Government Officers and Secondary School Head Teachers/Principals (see 'Folder 11-Interviews Sahiwal' in accompanying DVD). As expected, I had to find the 'right connections' to arrange interviews with District Nazim and Union Nazims—not because they were unapproachable, but because of a general environment of distrust that prevailed at the time of interviews. In the atmosphere of intense opposition and malice towards District Governments and elected leaders in District Government created by the new Punjab Government, elected local government leaders were reluctant to trust a stranger conducting interviews (presumably) for his PhD. Also elected leaders were not accustomed to such interviews since there is no tradition of academic research in local governments in Punjab. The 'right connections' were two Union Nazims from Sahiwal who had been in a training session conducted by me and a few politically influential friends who had personal relations Punjab Government's Minister from Sahiwal and some Union Nazims in Sahiwal District Council.

District Nazim Sahiwal was relatively easy to approach and himself interested in promoting research in local governments. District Government officers cooperated since I had a letter from the Punjab Local Government and Community Development department (thanks to Mr. Rai, a friend and then a Joint Secretary in Punjab Government). CCB Chairmen and Members were approached through District Nazim or Union Nazims. Except for a three interviews—one typed while a Union Nazim drove me to a rural Union Council and two written down because respondents did not want to be recorded—most interviews were recorded and later transcribed. District Planning Officer frequently requested turning off the recorder when he wanted to say something 'off the record'.

Primary data in District Attock included 19 in-depth interviews from District Nazim, Union Nazims, Union Assistant Nazims, a Women Councilor (and a Social Worker) and District Government officers. As with Sahiwal District, I was able to approach elected Union Nazims by finding the right contacts. None of the Union Nazims from Attock had been in one of my training session. However, I was fortunate that District Coordination Officer of Attock district marked my letter to Assistant Director Local Government (ADLG) for coordination with elected local leaders. The ADLG Attock had good working relationships with Union Nazims and was able to arrange my interviews with them. I could not meet with District Nazim while I was in Attock for more than two weeks since he was not available in Pakistan. I was able to interview him later in Lahore, but only after I had approached him through his nephew (colleague of a cousin in Punjab Forest Department). Connections assured only one thing: trust. All interviews in Attock were recorded. Recording was frequently requested to be 'turned-off' by district officers whenever they wanted to say something 'off the record'. However, I was allowed to make written notes. In addition to assurance from trusted sources, I had to present my letters from Birmingham

University and Punjab LGCD department to all the respondents in both Attock and Sahiwal Districts before I could conduct interviews. All the respondents understood my purposes and consented to be a part of research interviews. I have changed or generalized the identity of some respondents (mainly district officers) who requested anonymity.

Sample characteristics from both Sahiwal and Attock districts are summarized in Table 8.2 below.

18.52%, 11.11% and 70.37% of interviewees in Sahiwal district represented public sector employees, private or civil society partners of DG in participatory development programme and elected representatives respectively. This compared with 31.58%, 0% and 68.42% of interviewees in Attock district representing public sector employment, private or civil society partners of DG in participatory development programme and elected representatives respectively. DG Attock did not partner with non-government sector in local development during its entire term and thus no interviewee could be found in this category. Female representation in the respondent set was very little since of all the women officials, CCB members and elected representatives approached, only these women consented to be interviewed. Average of midpoints of age intervals of interviewees was 46.67 years (SD 12.09) and 46.32 years (SD 9.3) respectively in Sahiwal and Attock districts. All interviewees in both districts had High School educational attainment at a minimum. 85% and 79% of interviewees had college degree or above in Sahiwal and Attock district respectively. 37% of elected representatives interviewed in Sahiwal district were from urban Unions while urban Unions constitute 16% of the total Unions in the district. 46% of elected representatives interviewed in Attock district were from urban Unions while urban Unions constitute 22% of the total Unions in the district. Urban Union Nazims were more accessible and willing for interviews than their rural counterparts.

Table 8.2: Interviewee characteristics in Sahiwal and Attock

District	Occupation					Gender		Age-Interval					Educational Attainment		
	Government Employee	Government Partner	Elected Leader	Elected: Government	Elected: Opposition	Male	Female	25-35	36-45	46-55	56-65	65+	High School	College	University
Sahiwal	5	3	19	12	7	25	2	5	8	7	5	2	4	9	14
Percent	*18.52*	*11.11*	*70.37*	*63.16*	*36.84*	*92.59*	*7.41*	*18.52*	*29.63*	*25.93*	*18.52*	*7.41*	*14.81*	*33.33*	*51.85*
Attock	6	0	13	8	5	18	1	2	7	6	4	0	4	9	6
Percent	*31.58*	*0.00*	*68.42*	*61.54*	*38.46*	*94.74*	*5.26*	*10.53*	*36.84*	*31.58*	*21.05*	*0.00*	*21.05*	*47.37*	*31.58*

8.4.Data Analysis:

The main part of data analysis centered on open-ended in-depth interviews. As with most qualitative studies, the process of data analysis began when rudimentary themes started to emerge during interviews. In formal analysis, all the basic techniques used were those of grounded theory method(Glaser, 2002): listening to recordings and reading through transcriptions again and again, open coding or anchoring the transcribed data around key points, grouping codes into conceptual themes emerging from data, categorizing similar concepts into broad factors explaining participatory development and elite-capture, revisiting and coding the data for certain links that emerge between categories or conceptual themes within categories as more and more interviews were analyzed (axial coding). Continuously recording memos during the coding process resulted in defining and saturation of emerging ideas into theoretical concepts and later sorting and integration of concepts into categories (Fielding & Lee, 1998).

In order to develop a deeper understanding of qualitative research and methods, I took courses in 'Narrative Research' and 'Content Analysis using QSR Nvivo'. I also undertook a skills-development course in QSR Nvivo 9. I developed my course projects in Nvivo 9 and also analyzed data from some field interviews in Nvivo 9. The best thing about Nvivo is that it has been designed according to methodology and even terminology developed in qualitative research, especially Grounded Theory and Content Analysis. However, I eventually switched over to the good old method of coding and writing memos in MS Word (highlighting text, adding balloons as codes, writing comments as description of codes, writing footnotes as memos, etc) because it was much easier, familiar and quick.

Excerpts from interviews were used as direct evidence in developing the arguments. While analyzing the content of interview text, attention was also paid to the use of language and verbal

and non-verbal expressions for conveying meanings in certain contexts. Most interviews were in Punjabi language. Punjabi is a less explicit 'high-context' language in which non-verbal expressions and adages/aphorisms are frequently used under different contextual conditions. Certain two or three-word verbal expression accompanied by specific facial expressions or other body gestures convey specific meanings. For instance, the half expression 'Ravi's (a river) fruit is sweet, but…' used in context of a discussion about how a project was awarded and accompanied by a meaningful purse-lipped facial expression and a continuing slight nodding movement of the head has the following *closest* meaning in English: 'you have rights but you have to *take them by effort* (not simple claiming), and if necessary, by force'. The expression has almost a threatening pitch and frequently used by the lower or lower middle class who are becoming more and more conscious that their rights are being usurped by the rich in an institutionalized way. I came to realize during the interviews that the expression had almost a neo-Marxist tone. I come across many such meaning-rich, terse verbal and non-verbal expressions. When such adages or context-specific complete verbal expressions were used as evidence, original expression was included in the evidence along with closest contextualized translation in English. In case of partly-verbal partly-non-verbal expressions, only a closest contextualized translation was used in presenting evidence.

In addition to content from interviews, evidence available from official communications, legal documents, financial/budgetary documents available from District Governments and Punjab Government, and development/statistical publications of Punjab Government were also used to support the arguments developed in the analysis. Special attention was paid to critical analysis of Punjab Local Government Ordinance (2001), Punjab District Government Budgetary Rules

(2003) and Punjab Citizen Community Board Rules (2003) in discussion of elite-capture and weaknesses in institutional design of participatory development.

Including a variety of respondents and rigorous methods adopted in data collection and analysis are expected to result in robustness and internal validity of findings (Hakim 2000, Denzin 1978). Although generalization to other districts is not the objective of this research, the external validity of findings can be established by hypothesizing propositions from this study and testing them in other districts of Punjab. The suggested design is intended to seek rigorous ideographic explanations from a 'holistic' unit of analysis, i.e. it is intended to develop a complete picture of the conditions and contexts in a district (the holistic unit of analysis) under which participatory development achieved either no success at all or a very high level of success (Hakim, 2000). The 'holistic' unit of analysis included the 'embedded' units of District Nazim, Union Nazims, Women Councilors (special seat), CCB Chairmen and Members, MPs, District and Provincial Government Officers, and other key informants (Hakim, 2000).

CHAPTER 9

INTRODUCTION TO THE FIELD[9]

9.1.District Attock:

The area which today constitutes Attock district has great historical significance. Attock had been at the cross-roads of Alexander the Great's armies and once been a part of Persian and Bactrian empires. The Mughal Emperor Akbar recognized the strategic importance of Attock and built the fort of Attock overlooking the Indus River in 1581. Attock was passed over to Sikh Maharajas after the fall of Mughal Empire in 18th century. The Attock region was annexed by the British-Indian forces after defeating the Sikh armies in 1849. The British colonists also brought railway to Attock and built first permanent bridge over Indus River at Attock in 1880. Attock was originally named 'Campbellpur' after the Scot, Field Marshal Sir Colin Campbell, who remained Commander in Chief of British-Indian military from 1857 to 1859. The name of the district was changed to Attock in 1978. The foundations of modern day Attock were laid in 1904 by merging of Talagang Tehsil from the Jhelum District and the Pindigheb, Fatehjang and Attock Tehsils from Rawalpindi District[10].

Attock district is located in the northern-most corner of Punjab Province of Pakistan (see Map 9.1). District Attock is located at 33° 46' 20N Latitude and 72° 22' 6E Longitude. It has an altitude of 348 meters and a total area of 6857 square kilometers. Attock District's climate is characterized extreme summers and winters with temperatures reaching 40°C in summers and 0°C in winters. Average annual rainfall in Attock is 783 mm (Government of Punjab, 2009a).

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[9] This section is drawn from various Punjab Government reports including Punjab Development Reports of 2009 and 2010, Pre-investment studies on Attock and Sahiwal districts for 2009, and web sources including http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahiwal_District, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attock_District, www.sahiwal.gov.pk and www.punjab.gov.pk

[10] A 'Tehsil' is an administrative sub-district in Punjab

Map 9.1: Districts of Punjab, Pakistan

Haripur and Swabi districts of Khyber-Pakhtoonkwah Province form the northern boundaries of district Attock while Rawalpindi district (Punjab) lies to its east, Chakwal and Mianwali districts

of Punjab form its southern boundary while the Kohat and Nowshera districts constitute western boundaries of district Attock. The mighty Indus in its upper middle valley flows along the north-western and western boundary of district Attock for 130 Kilometers (Government of Punjab, 2009a).

District Attock consists mainly of hills, plateaus, and dissected plains (See Map 9.2). The northern part of district is pierced by southern extensions of lesser Himalayas from Haripur district in the north, while the Northwest-Southeast range of Kalla-Chitta Hills traverse across the district in the middle. Northern part of the district is drained by a small river 'Haro' forming alluvial flood plains along its course before it falls into Indus after completing a course of 50 Kilometers in the District. Rest of the district is devoid of any regular river system thus making it dependent on rainfall. As a consequence agriculture forms only a small part of Attocks economy. A large part of district's total workforce is employed by government, military, private services sector and manufacturing/industry. Kamra Air Base and Artillery School of Gunners attach military importance to Attock district.

Administratively, the district is divided into six sub-districts or 'Tehsils' (namely Attock, Hassan Abdal, Hazro, Pindi-Gheb, Fatehjang and Jand) and 72 unions. Attock city is the District Headquarter. Besides Attock city, there are 6 towns and 440 villages and 3 Cantonments in the district. Local governments are constituted at three vertical levels of District, 6 Tehsils and 72 unions. There are three National Assembly and five Punjab Assembly constituencies in Attock district. Other important district information is given in Table 9.1 below:

Table 9.1: Attock District Facts:

Population	1.589 Million (Urban 21.3% -Rural 78.7%) Est. 2010
Population Density	277 per Sq. Km.
Main Crops	Wheat, Ground Nut and Maize.
Forest Resources	163,176 Acres
Mineral Resources	Argillaceous Clay, Bentonite, Fireclay, Limestone, Iron Ore, Marble, Latrite and Silica Sand.
Total Metalled Roads	1,981.35 KM
No. of Electric Grid Stations	12
No. of Telephone Exchanges	56
Number of Industrial Units (Large, Medium and some Small units)	52
Type of Industrial Units	Carpets, Cement, Cold Storage, Flour Mills, Food Products, Glass and Glass Products, Iron & Steel Rolling, Light Engineering, Packages, Poultry Feed, Power Generation, Cooking Oil and Textile Spinning and Weaving
Literacy and education	Literacy rate 63% (77% Male; 46% Female); 1403 Educational institutions
Government Health Institutions	1 District Headquarter Hospital, 5 Tehsil Headquarter Hospitals, 5 Rural Health Centers, 57 Basic Health Units (union level), 23 Rural Dispensaries and 8 Municipal Corporation/Committee Health Units.

Source: Government of Punjab, 2009a & 2009c; http://pportal.punjab.gov.pk/portal/portal/media-type/html/group/780/page/default.psml/js_pane/P-1225e2bb987-1000b?nav=left)

Map 9.2: District Attock

9.2.District Sahiwal:

The region that constitutes Sahiwal District today had been inhabited by pastoral tribes (locally called *jaanglis* or jungle dwellers) such as Sahus, Kharrals, Sials, Wattus and Hans, during the Mughal Empire. Only paying a nominal allegiance to Mughal rulers, these tribes had been in continuous rebellion against the Sikh rulers after the demise of Mughal empire in late 18th and 19th century. British influence came to region after British annexation of North-Western Punjab in 1847 when colonial officials were first deputed for summary settlement of land revenue with the local tribes. The region came under direct British rule in 1849 when it was made a part of Gogira district and included parts of what are now Pakpattan, Okara and Toba Tek Singh districts. The district witnessed the only uprising of the local tribes against the British colonists taking place north of the Sutlej-Bias River during the Indian Mutiny of 1857. Most of the region along the Ravi River belt in Sahiwal District was settled in the years following the Mutiny by dispossessing the warring tribes and making land entitlements to the non-warring or compliant tribes. The British brought railway to the region in 1865 and shifted the district headquarters to what is now the Sahiwal town. The village railway station 'Sahiwal' along which the district headquarters was established was renamed Montgomery in 1865 after Sir Robert Montgomery, then Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab. The name of was changed again to Sahiwal in 1966. Sahiwal District, Okara District and Pakpattan District were administratively combined in 2008 to constitute the Sahiwal Division. The city of Sahiwal is the capital of both District Sahiwal and Sahiwal Division of Punjab Province.

Sahiwal district is located between 30° 40' N Latitude and 73° 10' E Longitude at the juncture of Central and South Punjab (see Map 9.1). It has an altitude of 150 meters and a total area of 3201 square kilometers. Sahiwal's District's climate is arid and characterized by extreme summers and

winters with temperatures reaching 47°C in summers and 2°C in winters. Average annual rainfall in Sahiwal is 177 mm(Government of Punjab, 2009b). Topographically, the district is a homogenous semi-arid plain irrigated by a well-developed system of inundation and link canals. The district has rich alluvial soil since it lies between the flood belts of River Ravi and Satluj-Bias River system (see Map 9.3). This makes agriculture the mainstay of district's economy. Wheat, sugar cane, cotton, rice, maize and a variety of vegetables and fruit are extensively cultivated. Sahiwal's Zebu cattle breed and water buffaloes are among the largest milk producer in the world. More than three-quarters of the total workforce is employed directly in agriculture/cattle-farming or in agriculture-based industry (Government of Punjab, 2009c).

Administratively, the district is divided into two subdivisions (Tehsils) of Sahiwal and Chichawatni and 89 union councils. Sahiwal city is the District Headquarter. Besides the cities of Sahiwal and Chichawatni, there are 530 villages and 7 semi-urban sub towns of Qadirabad, Yousafwala, Iqbalnagar, Kassowal, Noorshah, Harappa and Ghaziabad in the district. Local governments are constituted at three vertical levels, i.e. District Government Sahiwal, Tehsils Municipal Administrations for Sahiwal and Chichawatni Tehsils and 89 Union Administrations. There are four National Assembly and seven Punjab Assembly constituencies in Sahiwal district. Other important district information is given in Table 9.2 below:

Table 9.2: Sahiwal District Facts:

Population	2.212 Million (Urban 17%-Rural 83%) Est. December 2009
Population Density	691 persons per Sq. Km.
Main Crops	Wheat, Sugar Cane, Cotton, Maize.
Forest Resources	4662.68 Hectares
Mineral Resources	Nil
Total Metalled Roads	1,773.67 KM
No. of Electric Grid Stations	06
No. of Telephone Exchanges	25
Number of Industrial Units (Large, Medium and some Small units)	335
Type of Industrial Units	Agricultural implements, Aluminium Products, Biscuits/Confectionary and Food Products, Chip/Straw Board, Cotton Ginning and Pressing, Cold Storage, Flour Mills, Dairy Products Fruit Juices, Cooking Oil, Rice Mills, Tobacco Processing, Textile Spinning and Weaving, Foundry/Industrial machinery, Leather Tanning, Leather Garments, and Pharmaceutical.
Literacy and education	Literacy rate 57% (67% Male; 46% Female); 1400 private and government educational institutions
Government Health Institutions	1 District Headquarter Hospital, 2 Tehsil Headquarter Hospitals, 11 Rural Health Centers, 77 Basic Health Units (union level), 18 Sub-health centers, 8 Municipal Health Centers, 23 Rural Dispensaries and 5 Municipal/Social Security Hospitals.

Source: Government of Punjab, 2009b; Government of Punjab, 2009c; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahiwal_District)

District Sahiwal roughly forms a parallelogram of approximately 100 kilometers width and 45 kilometers depth along the South-East bank of Ravi River. District Faisalabad and District Toba Tek Singh lie to North and North-West of District Sahiwal across Ravi River. District Okara lies to Its East while the now dry River Bias separates it from the district of Pakpattan to the South-East. District Khanewal and Vehari District constitute the South-Western and Southern boundaries of District Sahiwal respectively. An archaeological site from 3000 to 5000 B.C lies in Sahiwal district 24 kilometers southwest from Sahiwal city in the semi-urban subtown of Harapa. The site is under exploration since the 19th century. Earliest deposits found date back to as long as 5300 B.C and archaeological evidence suggests that the area has been inhabited ever since. Harrapa was an urban centre in northern part of ancient Indus Valley Civilization. Sahiwal city is

twinned with the Borough Council of Rochdale in England since 1992. There is a direction sign in Rochdale's town centre with the inscription 'Sahiwal 3960 miles'.

9.3.Political and socioeconomic characteristics of Sahiwal and Attock districts:

The political culture is more or less similar in Punjab and includes deeply held values and assumptions about leaders, political parties and local political grouping (Akhtar, 2001). These values and assumptions manifest themselves in campaign and election patterns, relationship patterns between opposing groups or parties and the way in which voters relate to their leaders. Political leaders are expected to come from established political families with sound economic and social backgrounds. Large landownership or business ownership and family networks in bureaucracy and politics are the traditional basis of power and influence in political elite. Elite backgrounds were described as charismatic qualities necessary for leaders in both Sahiwal and Attock districts. All district nazims elected in 35 districts of Punjab, except for Lahore's DN who was a business tycoon, owned sizable tracts of agricultural land and came from traditional political families that had shared government powers in the past or current governments during the last three decades (Pattan Development Organization, 2005). Leaders typically engage in clientistic relationships with their supporters and are strongly expected to provide patronage in form of government jobs, winning public works contracts and political influence in public offices—especially police, lower courts of justice and civil bureaucracy.

Political groups rather than political parties centered on powerful local leaders dominate LG politics in Punjab. Communication or collaboration with political opponents across opposing groups is seen as a sign of weakness, intrigue and disloyalty, and, therefore, highly discouraged. Voting pattern in elections at all levels of governments depend heavily on how community-level notables and biradari or tribal heads are aligned with the competing candidates. These

community-level politically active people and tribal heads have substantial influence in their communities or tribes either because they serve as sources of political information and political analysis or because they enjoy traditional authority as tribal heads. They negotiate expectations of future exchange with the candidates and support them with the votes under their influence. However, the power of political elite and social equality varies in districts depending on the average landholding, existence of multiple employment opportunities, relative presence of feudalistic culture, and level of socioeconomic development in a district. Average land holding in Sahiwal district is around 8 Acres in Sahiwal district while it is above 12 Acres in Attock district (Government of Pakistan, 2000). Large-scale landownership is concentrated in a few feudal families from Syed, Malik, Awan and Khattar tribes in Attock while there is no large-scale landownership pattern breeding feudalistic culture in Sahiwal district. Landownership is roughly equally distributed among various tribes of Jats, Rajputs, Sials and Syeds in Sahiwal district. 39% of households own agricultural land in Sahiwal district while only 32% households own agricultural land in Attock district (Government of Punjab, 2008).

As can be seen from Tables 9.1&9.2 employment opportunities in industrial sector in Sahiwal district are substantially higher in Sahiwal district than in Attock district. Sahiwal is mainly an agricultural district with a well-developed system of river and canal irrigation. Over 80% of Sahiwal's population is directly or indirectly employed in agricultural sector while only 4.3% is employed in government jobs (Government of Punjab, 2008). This contrasts with poorly drained and largely rain-fed Attock district where less than half the population is employed directly or indirectly in agriculture sector and 14.2% of population in employed in government jobs. Although literacy and basic education level in Attock is higher than Sahiwal, the level of socioeconomic and infrastructure development in Attock is less than Sahiwal because of much

higher development needs of Attock district (owing in part to much larger geographical size, poor natural drainage and rugged topography in Attock). Unemployment rate is 9.6% in Attock district whereas it is 7.1% in Sahiwal district. The mean household size is 6.5 persons with 3.6 persons per room in Sahiwal whereas it is 5.8 persons with 3 persons per room in Attock (Government of Punjab, 2008).

Political elite can also derive their powers from religious factors such as stewardship of an ancient religious seat of eminence or family lineage with an ancient saintly figure. Voters frequently arrange and vote in groups based on affiliation with religious sects of Shia and Sunni schools of thought in Islam, and religious or political alignment of these voter groups with contending candidates for political office. Religious grouping is much higher in multi-religious-sect Sahiwal district than in almost uniform Sunni Attock district. Candidates from saintly-political seats in Kameer Sharif in Sahiwal district and Makhad Sharif in Attock district hardly ever lose an election. Christians are the only notable religious minority in Punjab and their population proportion at 4% in Punjab is highest among all the four provinces of Pakistan[11]. 3.15% of Sahiwal's population constititutes Christian religious minority whereas it is only 0.67% in Attock. Christian minorities are represented by special seats in elected legislative bodies at all levels of government of Pakistan. Religious minorities tend to vote, campaign and make political demands as a unified group whenever there is no special representation in an elective government office, e.g. for District Nazim office[12]. Evidence from interviews also revealed that all Christian villages voted enbloc for Rai Hassan Nawaz, two times DN elect in the district.

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[11] Source: Christian population of Pakistan by districts. Christian World Service Pakistan/Afghanistan. Website: http://www.cwspa.org/resources/research-and-surveys. Last accessed on January 10, 2013

[12] Religious minorities in Pakistan's elections. Christian World Service Pakistan/Afghanistan. Website: http://www.cwspa.org/resources/research-and-surveys. Last accessed on January 10, 2013

Map 9.3: District Sahiwal

North

River Ravi

DISTRICT FAISAL ABAD

DISTRICT T. T. SINGH

River Ravi

River Ravi

DISTRICT KHANEWAL

TO MULTAN

TO KAMALIA

PP-225

NA-160

PP-222

PP-224

NA-163

PP-221

DISTRICT OKARA

NA-161

PP-226

PP-223

NA-162

PP-220

TO BUNGA HAYAT

TO BURE WALA

TO BURE WALA

TO ARIF WALA

DISTRICT PAK PATTAN

TO PAK PATTAN

DISTRICT VEHARI

LEGEND

Constituency PP-220
Constituency PP-221
Constituency PP-222
Constituency PP-223
Constituency PP-224
Constituency PP-225
Constituency PP-226
NA Constituency (BOUNDARY LINE)
Railway line
LBDC
G.T (LMQ) Road
UNION COUNCIL
MAIN ROADS
MINOR ROADS
RHC

CHAPTER 10
DATA ANALYSIS 2: FACTORS EXPLAINING NON-OCCURRENCE OF PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT IN ATTOCK DISTRICT

Under LG 2001 system, local development in social sector and non-municipal infrastructure was made a key responsibility of District Governments (DG). DGs were provided with liberal development funds through a system of intergovernmental resource transfers. The powerful elected District Nazim (DN) was the executive head of the DG and was made formally responsible for district-wide development planning and participatory development. The elected DN in Attock District ranked second highest in transformational leadership on Leadership Style Questionnaire results received from sixteen districts of the Punjab province. It was expected that a high level of participatory development will be undertaken in a district with a highly transformational leader. However, there were no participatory development projects—or Citizen Community Board (CCB) projects—undertaken at the district government level in Attock. Instead, Attock was the only district in Punjab where development funds reserved for participatory development were used for funding non-participatory new and recurrent development expenditures. This was a contravention of Punjab Local Government Ordinance (PLGO), 2001, which required that twenty five percent of the development budget transfers shall be reserved for utilization through CCBs (Sections 109-5a & 119, NRB, 2001).

Table 10.1: Attock District Development Program: Income and Expenditures 2001-2010 (Million Rupees)

Years	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2001-10
Total Income Available for District ADP (a+c+d)	**151.58**	**166.06**	**166.41**	**166.94**	**181.34**	**232.58**	**335.00**	**260.00**	**133.12**	**1793.03**
a. PFC allocation/Punjab Government Grants of which*:	134.71	148.94	148.94	148.94	163.84	210.58	240.00	240.00	113.12	1549.07
-LG Development Allocations[13]	*134.71*	*148.94*	*148.94*	*148.94*	*163.84*	*210.58*	*180.00*	*180.00*	*38.12*	*1354.07*
-De Facto CCB Allocations	*0.00*	*0.00*	*0.00*	*0.00*	*0.00*	*0.00*	*60.00*	*60.00*	*75.00*	*195.00*
b. De Jure CCB Allocations	0.00	38.00	38.00	38.00	41.00	53.00	60.00	60.00	75.00	403.00
c. Grant in Aid (Prime Minister)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	75.00	0.00	0.00	75.00
d. District OSR (used only for LGD Program)	16.87	17.12	17.47	18.00	17.50	22.00	20.00	20.00	20.00	168.96
Total District ADP Expenditures (e+f)	**70.83**	**137.83**	**227.32**	**161.48**	**59.87**	**359.40**	**359.99**	**92.23**	**38.12**	**1507.06**
e. LG Development	70.83	137.83	227.32	161.48	59.87	359.40	359.99	92.23	38.12	1507.06
f. CCBs	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Gross Surplus/Deficit for LGD Program	80.75	28.23	-60.91	5.47	121.47	-126.83	-84.99	107.77	20.00	90.97
Cumulative Surplus/Deficit for LGD Program**	80.75	108.99	48.08	53.54	175.01	48.19	-36.80	70.97	90.97	90.97
Gross Surplus/Deficit for CCB Program	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	60.00	60.00	75.00	195.00
Cumulative Surplus/Deficit for CCB Program	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	60.00	120.00	195.00	195.00
Overall Percent Utilization	**46.73**	**83.00**	**136.60**	**96.73**	**33.01**	**154.53**	**107.46**	**35.47**	**28.64**	**84.05**
% Utilization LG Development	46.73	83.00	136.60	96.73	33.01	154.53	130.91	46.11	65.59	94.31
% Utilization CCBs	NA***	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Vertical Tied Grants Available	**79.03**	**133.52**	**156.40**	**113.49**	**328.43**	**306.78**	**208.74**	**590.67**	**464.14**	**2381.20**
Vertical Tied Grant Expenditure	**59.28**	**116.65**	**154.05**	**111.97**	**328.40**	**304.59**	**204.27**	**590.67**	**461.27**	**2331.16**
% Utilization Tied Grants	**75.02**	**87.37**	**98.50**	**98.67**	**99.99**	**99.29**	**97.86**	**100.00**	**99.38**	**97.90**

Source: Attock DG Budget documents 2001-10 (see accompanying DVD: 'Folder 5-Attock Development Budget Utilization' and 'Folder 1-Official Communications 1')
*Punjab government non-formula grants in 2001-02 and 2009-10. Provincial Finance Commission (PFC) formula-based grants from 2002-03 to 2008-09.
Cumulative deficit financed by supplementary grants from Punjab Government. * NA=Not Allocated in District ADP

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[13] Local Government Development (LGD) program is the fully government funded part of District ADP while Citizen Community Boards (CCB) program is the 80% government funded and 20% community funded participatory development part of District ADP (Government of Punjab, 2003a)

This chapter addresses the basic questions of why participatory development did not *occur* in Attock district and why a highly transformational district leadership did not lead to success of a change-oriented participatory development programme. The evidence from field interviews and official documents suggests that primary and secondary district leadership effects, power differentials between primary and secondary district leadership, low levels of public awareness, confidence and trust, low potential for corruption in CCBs and Provincial Government decisions were the factors explaining non-occurrence of CCBs in Attock district. These factors are discussed in the sections below:

10.1. Primary leadership effects:

DN Attock had a lack of preference for CCBs. DN's lack of preference for CCB projects can be seen in his role in CCB programme and attributed to his general conceptualization of development, his beliefs regarding nature of the local society and his evaluation of central government participatory development policy and CCB's institutional design.

10.1.1. DN's role in participatory development: DN Attock played the overall role of discouraging participatory development programme in the district by making a logical and moral case against CCBs, inducing Union Nazims for blocking CCB programme in the District Council, and making executive decision to convert the legally sanctioned participatory development funds towards state-led development. District Government (DG) Attock spent 208 Million Rupees—that should have been de jure reserved for

CCBs—on non-participatory development heads from 2001-02 to 2006-07 (Table 10.1)[14].

Evidence available from official correspondence between District Nazim Attock and Punjab Chief Minister (CM) office and field interviews suggests that at least 60% of these funds were used for paying salaries of new staff hired by DG Attock for maintenance of ongoing development projects in roads sector, while the remainder went into financing of new development projects through DN's executive orders[15].

> "…..[District Nazim] said that rather than going for repairs through contractors, you may hire road maintenance workers. It will produce employment opportunities for many families, and these maintenance workers will have the permanent duty of repairing new and under construction roads as soon as marks of wear and tear started to appear. So we hired some 900 road maintenance workers in 2005, DN devised this solution to road repair problems….I told you DG did not reserve 25% CCB share, you see each person has a different vision." (Wajid)

It can also be seen in the Table 10.1 that no funds were utilized for undertaking any CCB project at DG level during any years from 2001-02 to 2009-10.

Political justification for not allowing participatory development projects was articulated in form of a resolution passed by district council. This resolution laid down that no CCB

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[14] Evidence available in DG Attock District Coordination Officer Letter No. 214 DCO/F&P/DO(A)/Atk, Dated 05-06-2008, addressed to Local Government &Community Development Department, Government of the Punjab (See accompanying DVD: Folder 1-Official Communications 1").

[15] Summary for Chief Minister: Short release of funds on different accounts—exemption required for CCBs. Request from District Nazim Attock, dated 09-05-2007, approved by Punjab Chief Minister office on 12-05-2007. District Council Attock summary approval receiving reference no. 239, dated 13-05-2007 (See accompanying DVD: Folder 1-Official Communications 1).

projects shall be undertaken at DG level and funds reserved for CCBs in District Annual Development Programmes (ADP) should instead be made available for fully-funded regular district ADP schemes. This was despite the fact that a few councilors/Union Nazims who understood the legal position that district council or provincial government had no powers to change or relax any provisions of the PLGO, 2001, warned District Council about the illegality of the said resolution.

> "…they formally passed a resolution to convert CCB funds. I voted against the resolution and opined in the house that these funds cannot be converted according to the Local Government Ordinance 2001, but they had the majority" (Mir)

A large majority in the district council house failed to heed this admonition either because they had little understanding of law or because collectively developed understandings regarding CCBs prevented them from realizing the legal position. As shall be discussed later, DN conveyed his lack of support for CCBs, along with its logical and moral rationale, to Union Nazims. Knowledge of DN's lack of support for CCBs and DN's ability to 'get things done' at higher levels of government encouraged the house to pass a resolution barring CCBs at DG level.

> "…somehow the people in district council couldn't realize for the first four years that it was obligatory under the law to reserve 25% of the development budget for CCBs, they only came to understand it later" (Sardar)

"Whenever they wanted to do something for which DG had no powers or get routine procedures waived off from the CM, DCO would prepare a summary, DN would go to 7 Club Road, Lahore, and ask DG officers to reach there with their summaries for waiver. Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister, GM Sikandar would write on these summaries that Chief Minister is pleased to approve the summaries for such and such purpose presented by DN or DCO, Attock…..They would bring that summary to district Attock and do whatever they wanted." (District Officer 3)

In order to provide legal protection to unauthorized use of participatory development funds, the District Nazim (DN) was able to get exemption from reserving 25% funds in district Development Budget for CCBs from 2001-02 to 2006-07. This exemption was obtained through a summary approval by the Punjab Chief Minister in 2007 after these funds had already been spent under other development or recurrent expenditure heads. The DN was able to get this exemption in relaxation of rules because of the great political influence he exerted in provincial government and the political party in power at province and the centre—the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam, or simply, PML-Q).

However, getting 'exemption in relaxation of rules' posed a significant risk to the DN Attock and the CM Punjab because in the very first place Punjab Local Government Ordinance (PLGO), 2001, was not a set of 'rules' regulating some government business. It was a law created for establishment of Local Governments (LG) under the provisions of Constitution of Pakistan. Secondly, PLGO (2001) was promulgated by provincial

governments under a Presidential Ordinance. Any relaxation or amendment to PLGO (2001) could not take effect unless approved by the President of Pakistan[16]. It was only because of exceptional political power acquired by the DN and an advantageous political situation which enabled DN Attock and Punjab CM to take the risk:

> "…when you are a leader [reference to DN] and you openly use the funds unlawfully, and then you try to clean it up in another illegal way, that's a suicide. It can spoil your political career forever, and even of those around you...It was a statutory law promulgated under provisions of the constitution that they openly broke. I told them CM couldn't relax it because it was a Presidential ordinance. Even the CM took a big risk…I mean how could be he so ignorant, he is an experienced politician and he has a team of legal experts. But who would dare to object, and where to go? There were PCO judges [judges having taken oath under Musharaf's dictatorial regime] working then. Even the President depended on their [PML-Q's] support." (Mir)

10.1.2. District Leader's Conceptualization of Development Function: The treatment of CCB projects at DG level started from District Nazim's general conceptualization of local development and where participatory development stood in this conceptualization. In

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[16] The DN tried earlier in 2004 to get exemption from 25% CCB fund reservation law through proper channel by sending official request to the Punjab Local Government Department. However, this request was not granted on the ground that Punjab Government was 'not empowered to exempt any Local Government from this legal provision unless the law is amended accordingly' (Punjab Government notification no. SO-D-II (LG)14-10/2003, dated 13 July, 2004).

District leader's definition of local development, certain aspects of development which had to do with citizen rights, justice and economic opportunity were as important as development in infrastructure and much more important than participatory development programme in a highly class-based and unjust society. Participatory development was only a luxury that came later in priority.

> "……development is one major aspect, I mean in usual infrastructure terms, but it's not the only one. There are many other problems of the people, they have problems in *patwar* [revenue] offices, people have problems in police stations, the injustices and wrongs that are done to the people, the worst thing is poverty and joblessness, to undo these things done to the people and to solve these issues of the public is also a major component of DG…."
> (DN)

Leader's conceptualization of development was evident in the channeling a part of CCB funds towards salaries of new jobs created by DG. It was also operationalized in channeling of provincial government funds towards payment of salaries of new teaching and healthcare staff in Attock district. DG can create new or upgrade existing facilities in health and education sectors. But once these facilities are created, the numbers of new vacancies that may become available are decided by provincial government. The salaries of these positions are paid by provincial government by creating new provisions in the provincial current budgets and then transferring these funds to DGs as a part of their general purpose grants. DG Attock constructed new facilities or upgraded existing ones and at an accelerated pace. DN used his extraordinary influence in Punjab Government to

get an exceptionally large number of new positions approved for new or upgraded health facilities and schools in Attock district[17].

> "….there have been countless public sector recruitments in Attock, about 15,000, most of these vacancies were created by provincial government in health and education sectors. *We got them* [emphasis original]. Now you tell me, when DG upgraded 400 schools, wouldn't vacancies be created? Don't people need doctors or other staff in Basic Health Units and new Tehsil Hospitals? We improved these facilities.....Providing employment to the people, I think this is the first important function of DG. That's real development, providing livelihood to people comes before providing any fancy development program [referring to CCBs] they can't eat. Then how will you develop if you don't have doctors to provide healthcare or teachers to educate the children?" (DN)

The original purpose of CCBs identified in the Local Government Plan (2000) was to enable 'proactive elements' in communities to 'participate in development related activities' through the new participatory development opportunity (Sections 82&84, NRB Pakistan, 2000). It was quite acceptable for a subsection of community to undertake CCB projects, as long as 1) it could contribute 25% of the project cost and 2) 'public' need of the project and participation by the general community in various phases of project could be established according to the given procedures (Government of Punjab, 2003b).

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[17] Salaries of DG staff are protected under PLGO, 2001, and paid by provincial government through a system of intergovernmental transfers (NRB, 2001).

Although there was no legal bar on the size and scope of the CCB projects, CCBs were conceived as community-specific citizen-participation projects providing developmental benefit of a public nature[18]. However, designers' conceptualization of CCBs differed from that of Attock's DN. The primary purpose of state-led regular development projects is 'benefit to largest possible section of public', whereas primary purpose of community-led CCB projects is 'citizen participation in development of communities'. District leadership in Attock applied the defining criteria of state-led top-down development projects to community-led participatory development projects.

> "….it was the discretion and personal thinking of the DN…In their opinion, CCB were development schemes with a very limited benefit, I mean these were for smaller sections of community, and CCB projects did not have a developmental benefit to a large section of the local society, so they discouraged it…Individual CCB project funds would work for a specific community, often consisting of a singular social class, but if the same funds for many CCB projects go to regular development projects, they can benefit the local society at large." (District Officer 2)

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[18] For the purpose of this study a community is conceptualized as a geographically distinct and compact residential locality. A village is a natural unit of community in rural Punjab. Populations of villages vary widely according to their geographical location, state of infrastructure development and centrality in local economy. The average village population in Attock is 3,000. A single rural union council can include 5-15 villages. Urban union councils in Attock (16 out of 72) have an average population of 20,000. Urban union councils are much smaller in size than rural ones. In contrast to villages where the whole population resides in a single settlement, urban union councils are divided into land-use zones. Residential zones are divided into residential colonies or sub-towns developed by government or private estate developers. Number of residential colonies/settlements varies from one to four in each urban council of Attock district. Each one of these residential schemes can said to be a well knit and differentiated community with which residents strongly identify (Punjab Statistics Bureau, 2010; Field interviews).

10.1.3. DN's Beliefs affecting CCBs: The district leader had certain beliefs regarding general socioeconomic conditions in communities and nature of the wealthier classes which made CCBs an unfeasible option in Attock district. Although DN's understandings about socioeconomic conditions in communities and nature of the wealthier classes may have been based on past political experience, but still his understandings were untested belief since these were never tested in the DG context, i.e. no CCB ever took place in Attock at DG level.

10.1.3.1.   Generalized poverty: DN believed that CCBs were intended for the general community but masses in Attock district were poor and unable to contribute 20% cost of the CCB projects. In DN's view, CCBs required communities where a majority of people have the economic ability to contribute.

> "…we tried that CCBs should be constituted, but these were not successful because of poverty. You see you have to pay 20% in CCBs, you have to deposit this amount first from your pocket before you get any funds. People don't have money for a square meal…" (DN)
>
> "CCBs are successful where people are economically strong or wealthy" (DN)

10.1.3.2.   Opportunistic wealthy class: DN also believed that wealthy class in Attock was generally opportunistic and even fraudulent. CCBs would provide a good opportunity to the rich groups to misuse public funds. Given the power and social-class differentials that existed in the society, it was possible for the elite to put up a show of inclusion of the poor

in CCB proposals and then capture these projects for their personal advantage. This could be interpreted as DN's lack of trust in the wealthy class in the local society based on his historic knowledge and experience of the local society.

> "I *disagree* [emphasis original] with the concept of CCBs on another account, now what's that? If there is a mill owner, he pays 20% of the cost and gets a road constructed for his mill, or there is a landlord or an *amirzada*[19] who pays just 20% of the cost, asks the poor farmers to put their names on the CCB forms and accompany him for half an hour to the community development office…these poor people are weak, what can they say, then he gets 80% from the government in order to get his derra's road carpeted[20], and they are doing fraud in that as well….they get the road and at the same time they take out their 20% contribution during the construction process…" (DN)

10.1.4. DN's evaluation of CCB's institutional design and central government policy on participatory development: CCBs were designed by National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB)—a central government agency created by Musharraf government in 1999 for planning and implementing decentralization reform. Federal government adopted a policy of encouraging participatory development at LG by including a legal requirement in LG

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[19] *Amirzada* means 'children of the rich', original stress and specific style of expression delivery means 'spoiled children of the rich'

[20] A *derra* is a private establishment where an influential person/leader attends to the general public. Literally meaning a stay-place, it can be in the middle of the agricultural holding of a landlord.

law for compulsory reservation of 25% LG development budgets for CCBs. District leadership in Attock district regarded centrally-set CCB institutional design and participatory development policy as flawed because 1) CCBs institutional design created no system of public answerability of CCB members; 2) CCBs institutional design had a potential to earn political *discredit* for the LG leaders; and 3) CCB policy presented intergovernmental discrimination. However, the DN could not publically proclaim his critical evaluation of participatory development policy and CCB's institutional design since he was a staunch supporter and a close ally of the military-turned-civilian government that held power in the country during 1999-2008, and which introduced and encouraged the policy of participatory development and innovative instrument of CCBs. Senior district bureaucracy responsible for registration and coordination of CCBs and the district councilors who worked in close collaboration with the DN throughout his two term in office reflected on DN's (unofficial) critical evaluation of CCB policy and design.

10.1.4.1. **No Public Answerability of CCB members**: CCB funds were a part of district development budget and all CCB projects had to be approved by the district council. However, CCBs could be registered with District Community Development office through an application (along with formal identity documents) made by two founding members (who usually become the Chairman and General Secretary of the CCB). The application had to be accompanied by a signed list of at least 25 community members with residence addresses (as shown on the identity documents) within the district where this CCB was to be registered. This list represented a show of interest and intention by at least 25 community members to become members of the general body of the proposed

CCB. Once the CCB was registered, its general body would elect an executive committee of 7 to 15 members (from among its total members) which planned and executed all CCB projects on behalf of the CCB. CCB general body also elected chairman and secretary of the CCB. CCB general body had to approve all the project plans made by the executive committee. However, CCBs were non-elected non-profit voluntary organizations in which people joined as members out of their own choice, i.e. self-selected. DN did not favour the CCBs because he believed that there was no political answerability of the CCBs to any constituency, whereas CCBs utilized public funds approved by district council whose members were directly answerable to the public. Without any pressure of public answerability, CCBs could act opportunistically and embezzle public funds.

> "He was basically not in favour of CCB projects, he expressed his thinking about CCBs to me quite a few times, he was of the opinion that development schemes approved by the council cannot go on properly like that, people will make away with public funds. He was in favour of getting the projects executed through C&W department or through TMAs, but not through CCB members who were not officially responsible to any constituency.......(Wajid)

10.1.4.2. **Political Discredit**: CCBs were supposed to run parallel to the regular district Annual Development Program (ADP) projects which were 100% funded by the government. If DN or Union Nazims encouraged people to take up CCB projects in a neighbourhood where other projects were being taken up through the regular ADP programme, there was a chance of earning political discredit. Community could perceive

DG and the local representatives as unjust and biased towards certain groups since they were providing fully funded projects for some groups and suggesting others to contribute a part of the cost. The resulting loss in political good will could erode the voter support for the leaders or their fielded candidates not only in the LG but also in provincial and national assembly elections since some of the elected local leaders would eventually be contesting or campaigning in elections to higher assemblies from the same constituencies.

> *"....political people don't get any credit from community participation schemes like CCBs, rather there is more a chance of earning discredit* [emphasis original]. This was his reasoning. Now you erect an electricity pole in this street, you don't charge me anything, but you ask a neighbour to contribute 20% share in cost against an 80% share in cost that you will contribute, and then he will be able to get electricity supply. You see, discrepancy sets in. What do you think the neighbour who has contributed 20% share will appreciate the government when he sees me get electricity free of any cost? He will say that you have discriminated against him"
>
> (District Officer 1)

Attock's DN had been a Member Punjab Assembly before being elected as a DN in 2001. As shall be discussed later, DN Attock fielded and campaigned for his family members in 2002 and 2008 provincial and national legislature elections. Given the strong political groups formed within districts and dominant position of district Nazims throughout the country after the LG reform of 2001, it was highly likely that political reputation (or

political discredit) earned in LGs could greatly influence voter attitudes in general elections.

10.1.4.3. **Intergovernmental discrimination:** Participatory development policy was set and enforced at National Level through Local Government Ordinance (2001) drafted by National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB, 2001). Local Government Ordinance (2001), promulgated in Punjab as Punjab Local Government Ordinance (PLGO, 2001), required reservation of 25% of LG development budgets for CCB projects. Institutional design of CCBs was enshrined in Punjab CCB Rules (Government of Punjab, 2003). CCB rules required 20% cost contribution by the community. In DN Attock's view, participatory development policy was discriminatory towards LGs on two counts: 1) a proportion of total developmental allocations was set 'off-limits' only for local councils; and, 2) LGs could become unpopular when these asked public for contribution in a specific category of development projects in their ADPs, while none of the federal or provincial government ADP projects being executed simultaneously within or across local jurisdictions required any contribution from the public.

> "……the projects of federal and provincial government were 100% funded and public didn't have to pay anything in it….but what do you want to get done through the local representatives by taking a small segment out of their development budget? You see a mature policy is that which is uniform….The leadership was right to quite an extent, for instance, if you have upgraded the main GT road to a double carriage highway, or for that matter, if you have done any mega project, you have not asked anyone for a single

penny and NLC has made all these roads from federal or provincial government money, but if a person demands a local road for his area, although it's importance is not that of GT road or Motorway, but even then it's a public way, then why do you demand 20% of its cost from the local people? (District Officer 1)

10.2. Secondary leadership effects: A majority of Union Nazims (representing secondary leadership in DG) had an unfavourable attitude towards CCBs. Consequently, CCBs ranged from least important to undesirable in their priorities. These attitudes existed because of a) their generalized belief regarding inability of the people to *afford* CCBs and b) negative political value they attached to the CCBs.

10.2.1. The Poverty belief: All Union Nazims interviewed from DN's political group in District Council maintained that there was generalized poverty in Attock's communities and that CCBs couldn't be undertaken because of poverty. While generalized poverty could be historically known to the Nazims and could be observed and objectively assessed, poverty as a reason for not undertaking CCBs at DG level was an untested belief held in common by a majority in DN's group. It is highly likely that this belief was formed as a result of interaction between DN and his group's Union Nazims since all the DN's group Nazims interviewed expressed and endorsed this belief while none of the opposition Nazims interviewed did the same. Alternatively, as discussed later, this belief may simply have been supported superficially by some DN group members as a show of solidarity with the group or in order to avoid negative consequences.

> "I never had the time for CCBs and people couldn't deposit 20% of the project's cost. Our people are poor and they cannot afford it. It's simple." (Salim)

10.2.2. Negative value attached to CCBs: Union Nazims attached a negative value to CCB projects because community led development was seen as a political rival to state led development. This rivalry grew out of a perception of loss in political credit and patronage that becomes available to the elected representatives as a result of getting development projects for the constituencies they represent.

10.2.2.1.   Political credit: Elected Nazims and councilors had an important role in awareness building and demand making for CCBs. But once the CCB projects were approved by the District Council, these were executed by the community-based organizations. Communities were expected to take a greater role in CCB registration, proposal making, planning and execution of CCB projects with the popularization of CCBs. Communities were also expected to take greater ownership and credit for the CCB projects when they contributed in both cost and effort. As a result, it was less likely that voters would attribute most credit for the CCBs to the elected representatives. Moreover, if community leaders represented on CCBs gathered greater public credit for local development in a community, it was possible for CCB leaders to become future political rivals to current LG leaders.

> "They didn't want CCBs because CCBs would carry out the same works that they were doing, why would they like to lose their

position as benefactors? Then those *kharpainchs* would say we did it[21]…..Some Nazims would say here, you are training a wife how to get a *sokun* [a second wife in polygamy]. A few Nazims were too much interested otherwise CCBs are against their basic interest." (Rana)

10.2.2.2. **Patronage:** In traditional Pakistani politics, local development projects are a form of patronage in the hands of elected representatives. Governments at all levels provide this patronage in form of block grants to elected representatives. Elected representatives use these development grants to strengthen their individual and party's/group's political position by awarding development projects in their respective constituencies.

Union councils had their fixed independent funding from the provincial government. But these grants were smaller as compared to what they could get from the DG[22]. District government is not legally required to distribute its development funds according to any fixed formula among the constituent unions. Rather the PLGO (2001) recognizes a system of bottom-up district-wide development planning in which all Union Nazims are expected to communicate development needs of their individual unions to the DG (Sections 109&119, NRB, 2001). As district councilors, Union Nazims are also required to deliberate on and assure district-wide development planning (Section 39-c, NRB, 2001).

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[21] *Khairpainchs* refers to a certain category of leaders in local language. Kharpainchs are the people who have leader-like qualities, who take initiative in voicing peoples' concerns in specific groups, but who have no formal leadership position. The term is used derogatively by the formal authorities to denounce/dismiss informal group leaders creating some threat/trouble for them.

[22] Under Punjab Provincial Finance Commission Award, an intergovernmental funds transfer institutional mechanism, each union council—the lowest tier of LGs—in the province received around 120,000/- rupees per month as a general purpose grant for meeting their current and development expenditure needs (except Lahore's 150 unions which received almost twice as much. There are a total of 3464 unions in Punjab).

DN is required by law to provide a vision for district-wide development planning and oversee formulation and execution of district development plan (Section 18, NRB, 2001). DN has broad discretion in approving development projects demanded by the Union Nazims for their respective unions and can also suggest development projects for any union or a number of unions in the district on his own initiative (Government of Punjab, 2003a). Evidence from the interviews suggests that a basic level of development funding went to every union in District Attock. But beyond basic funding, the level of development funding going into a union depended on group allegiance and political or personal closeness of the Union Nazim to the DN.

> "As far as development is concerned, there were some people in the whole district who were selected for this purpose. You can say that there were 9 or 10 Union Nazims that were very close to him, you know the hot favourites of DN. By and large these were the Nazims who were accommodated, number one. Then there was a next grade of favourites, these were about 25 or 30 people who were accommodated next…..Other unions got lesser share in development." (Haji)

The practice of awarding development projects as a patronage was followed in DG Attock where DN's Group Nazims were provided additional development grants to build political goodwill specifically for the Union Nazim and generally for DN in individual Unions. DN's Union Nazims could get development projects of choice executed anywhere in their unions through these grants.

"This is our misfortune that we identify development projects from a political point of view, that how many of my voters and supporters will benefit from a development scheme in a certain place, so most of the schemes which got approved and implemented were not given on the basis of ground situation, rather these were given on the basis of who was asking for a scheme like a road or a street….that's the price of power leaders must pay. Our whole political system revolves around the single question that how we could strengthen our party or group position." (District Officer 1)

"…if a Union Nazim is more close to the DN, he gets some more funds than others, but it's not a very big difference." (Salim)

Reservation of 25% development budget would place a 75% ceiling barrier on the maximum district development funds available for distribution among unions. This would result in decreased funding available to Union Nazims for union-specific development projects. Since Union Nazims could also deliver development projects as patronage to certain groups in their unions, they feared political loss if a part of district development funds was channeled towards CCB projects. This loss could gradually increase if CCBs gained popularity.

"They argued that if they will encourage CCBs, an unlimited number of unelected people would start to demand these funds and

> they will not be able to give enough funds to Nazims for carrying
>
> out their schemes in the unions." (Mir)

CCBs may have been popular in district Attock if these had been presented as non-rivals to state-led local development. CCB's rivalry with state-led development grew out of competing claims on district's development resources and earning public credit for development works. Rivalry for public credit cannot be eliminated as long as community undertakes participatory development projects in the same jurisdictions and in developmental sectors common with local governments. However, rivalry with LG-led development program due to competing claims on district's development resources could be eliminated or significantly reduced if CCB projects are funded through some independent provincial/federal government programme, or through some International Development Agency—local civil society partnership programme, or a combination of both which has nothing to do with district ADP. The possible effects of public credit-based rivalry may also be lessened in this case since District Council approval for independent development funding will not be required.

> "CCBs shouldn't have been a part of [DG] budget, or better these
>
> should have been an alternative way for the community." (Rana)

10.3. Power asymmetry between DN and Union Nazims: Non-occurrence of CCBs in Attock district can also be explained in terms of power asymmetries that existed between the DN and Union Nazims. Not all the DN's group members held an unfavourable attitude towards

CCBs[23]. Some DN group Union Nazims were favourable to CCBs because they had personal interest in the new mode of participatory development and/or they wanted to make maximum utilization of their unions' development budgets. Accordingly, these Nazims got small-sized CCB projects implemented in their unions through Union Administration or Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA) CCB budgets.

> "if a Union Nazim took personal interest in CCB projects, and planned effectively to utilize 25% of the union development budget reserved for CCBs, well then CCB projects took place in that specific union. A few of our district's union made good progress with regard to CCB projects, they utilized these funds mostly for public health related projects, some union CCB projects were undertaken for developing village street and sewers, you know union's development funds are small and they cannot undertake larger projects". (Riazuddin)

However, DN's group Nazims favourable to CCBs did not support the demand for CCB projects at the DG level. DN *disagreed* with the very idea of CCBs and adopted an informal policy of discouragement of CCBs at DG level. Evidence from interviews suggests that the resolution in district council demanding a bar on CCB projects at DG level and converting CCBs funds into LG Development funds was passed by the DN's group Nazims on inducement from DN. Once DN group Nazims passed the said resolution, they had no ethical

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[23] Different Union Nazims reported the number of Union Nazims belonging to DN's group from 60—65 out of a total 72 Union Nazims in the District Council. Union Nazims are ex officio members of District Council.

ground to support the demand for CCBs at DG level. Political backing for CCBs at DG level by some favourable Nazims from DN's group would have resulted in exclusionary pressures and criticism by the group and a possible loss in political reputation as well.

> "Whenever DG wanted something, a resolution would be passed to *show the political will* [emphasis original], then DG would send just a single page summary to the CM house, Lahore, and it was approved within no time and Attock would get the demanded development schemes or posts in different departments. Now it was the discretion and personal thinking of the DN that he didn't allow the execution of development funds through the community organizations, so all these steps were undertaken and CCB projects were not allowed to happen here." (District Officer 2)

> "I raised this concern once in the house in 2003, I said that it was obligatory under law to set aside 25% of our development funds for CCBs and that we cannot use these funds for other schemes, but house was determined not to allocate any funds for CCBs. So we passed the resolution and then we couldn't go back on it." (Wajid)

Although DN could not formally stop his group's Union Nazims from backing communities for demand of CCBs at DG level since official policy of the ruling PML-Q at Federal and Punjab government level was to promote CCBs, he made his thinking regarding CCBs clear to them. Disagreement on any decision taken by the DN could easily provoke an authoritarian attitude in him. DN's group Nazims perceived that active support for DG-level CCB projects

may result in discontinuation or delay of district development funds for their unions as punishment for non-conforming behavior. This perception of Union Nazims had developed because 1) DN had become disproportionately more powerful than the Union Nazims and district council as a whole, and 2) Union Nazims actually witnessed delay or discontinuation of development funds of Union Nazims who actively opposed his policies[24].

> "…In Attock at least, a major reason [for failed CCB programme] was DN's authoritarian attitude, he made all decisions in DG Attock according to his own preferences and then he wanted to keep all the control buttons in his hands. (District Officer 3)

> "…..if a Union Nazim is not cooperating with your policy or he is not supporting your group, his funds are stopped in order to give him a little punishment, sometimes his development funds are delayed, I mean these things don't suit a leader at that level, but these happened here in all major policies." (Khan)

The large asymmetry of power between DN and Union Nazims lay in the greater number and rich sources of power available to DN. While Attock's DN partly derived his powers from his personal charisma, background factors, and his formal position as DG executive head, the other source of his powers were the political exchange relationships with higher level government leaders and developmental dependencies within the district that he purposefully created. DN wielded wide influence in higher levels of government because he acquired

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[24] However, Union Administration was an independent tier of LG headed by Union Nazims and the interested Union Nazims could facilitate CCB projects at the level of their unions. There were no resource or policy domain conflicts between Union Administration and DG.

control over the electoral resources needed by the ruling party at centre and province. Within the district he acquired control over the developmental resources needed by the Union Nazims. Union Nazims depended much more on the DN for development funding and government jobs in their unions and overall political influence in DG offices than DN depended on them for political or policy support.

10.3.1. Background and Charismatic factors: Some of the factors that contributed to the enormous power of DN came from his family and professional back ground and personality. For instance, DN came from an established political family representing upper socioeconomic class. DN and his immediate family members had served on Punjab and National Assemblies. The Chief Minister of Punjab from 2002 to 2008 was also his close family member. All interviewees explained DN's close family ties with the CM as one reason for exceptional powers of DN. Opposition Nazims regarded DN's family ties as the most important or the only reason for Attock's special treatment by the Punjab Government.

> "the only reason why Attock was treated in a special way by Punjab government at that time was Major's close family ties with the CM." (Ghafoor)

DN also had long professional experience in military and civilian bureaucracy. None of the Union Nazims had comparable family back ground and experience.

All opposition and DN's group Nazims interviewed admired certain charismatic qualities that they associated with DN, such as boldness, courage, self-confidence, high-energy/energetic, persuasiveness, decisiveness, and firmness/persistence.

> "Major is a fearless man with a lot of self-confidence, may be from his experience in military and bureaucracy…. He makes decisions confidently and promptly. Once he makes a decision then he makes it, whatever it is, he has broken a rule or not, he wouldn't be swerving about different positions. He is firm. To tell you the truth, I like him for that." (Ghafoor-Opposition leader)

DN's group Nazims attributed additional qualities such as sharp wit, intelligence, initiative, uprightness/honesty, generosity, responsiveness, intolerance for red-tape, compassion for the poor and even his awfulness for police or district bureaucracy who are historically known to unduly bother the public. DN influenced the behavior of his group Nazims partly because his charismatic traits were idealized by the Union Nazims. All DN group members strongly identified with one or more leadership styles of DN by drawing similarities with their own styles. For instance, one Union Nazim who described *ghurba-parvari* or poor-benevolence as an inspiring quality of DN also narrated how he used to financially help the poor at his personal expense. Another Union Nazim admiring high 'responsiveness' of DN to individual problems of the people also expressed that personally responding to tribal conflicts was his key priority as a Union Nazim.

> "Major sahib is a generous person and he has worked tirelessly. …he is quite fearless and straightforward. When PM came here

once during the second term of LG, MTS asked him for some additional funds for district's projects….One of the federal ministers accompanying the PM said that Attock's contribution in taxes was declining. MTS instantly replied that but Attock's vote share in PM's basic constituency was very high. Does someone say such a thing to the PM?....These officers, especially the police, wouldn't bother the public since they feared that Major sahib's phone call, who knows where they might be sent…This is true people fear him, but…Pakistani society doesn't follow the right course unless they have a fear of someone." (Ammar)

"…he will always call you back and ask you about your problem, and then he will tell you to wait for a while and he will get back to you in this regard. Then he would call you himself and tell you what could be done in connection with your problem. This is a real quality he has, I mean I realized this was the most important thing when poor people place their trust in us, otherwise these political people rarely bother, you have to run after them if you want their help in some issue." (Salim)

Although DN came from an upper class (but non-feudal) background, he eventually came to symbolize 'middle class' power and 'enlightenment' of masses in largely rural and backward Tehsils of Attock district where feudal leaders had held political power and

control over the people since the colonial times. The feudal class held power over the people by virtue of the great estates that had been entitled to them by the British colonists. Union Nazims in Tehsils with feudal estates saw DN as a 'revolutionary' who envisioned freedom for the masses by bringing them development in education, health and communications. The feudal class had denied the people these basic developments because these would empower the poor people who may then question their traditional-feudal authority. The Union Nazims from feudal-dominated Tehsils perceived themselves as a cohesive group representing middle class power and stood resolved to challenge and change the repressive outcomes of feudal leadership. DN also belonged to a Tehsil where traditional politics was dominated by a few feudal families. DN came from a wealthy landowning but a non-feudal family which had been in provincial and national level politics since 1980s. The rise of DN's family in politics was associated with weakening of feudal power in Tehsil Fatehjang. DN's developmental choices as DG head also reflected poor-empowerment and anti-feudal values. Thus most Union Nazims in feudal dominated Tehsils of Jand, Pindi Gheb and Fatehjang identified with DN as a source of power and inspiration. The foregoing explanations can be seen in the following narrative from a Union Nazim who headed the group of all twelve Union Nazims from Jand Tehsil represented in Attock district council.

> "DN is basically not a big landlord, but you are right he has been in provincial assembly, his mother and father had been MPAs, yes he comes from a class, but not feudal.…generally Fatehjang as a whole as well, has developed a lot since MTS's family came into

politics…I myself led the movement against them, against these Nawabzadas of Pindi Gheb and Maliks of Khunda, *they* [feudal leaders] are products of British-given titles, you can go and check anywhere in these backward Tehsils, *we* [Union Nazims] are middle class people and we have come to this point after contesting elections against them, it was very difficult but we contested elections against them in their areas…Their mentality is that no school should be allowed to establish in their areas, why should children of their tenant farmers become college graduates, provision of educational facilities will loosen their stranglehold over the illiterate tenant-farmers and their families…nothing would happen against their wishes since they had hegemony over politics....if a road was to be built for a village, they would say that this road cannot be built through their land, you go and find some other access to the village……[DN] reversed this mentality in politics. The result was that many roads and schools were built in these areas, electricity was provided to the poor farmers and other people in the villages. Until and unless your political leadership is open-minded, unless it is enlightened, I mean if your leadership is good, whether it is at union level or Tehsil level or district level, all things are set on the right course….it all depends on the person who has risen to power, it depends on whether he is a revolutionary or he follows the same conservative patterns. (Wajid)

10.3.2. Political exchange relationship with higher-level Government leaders: However, most evidence suggests that the main source of his power was the network of mutually beneficial relationships that he built with the Punjab Government and Federal Government leaders. Within the district, DN Attock represented Provincial and Federal Government power as much as he represented DG power. Consequently, DN was able to greatly extend his influence beyond that allowed by his positional power as a District Nazim. DN Attock intentionally built his influence into *political exchange* relationships that he nurtured with provincial and central government.

> "……[DN] was related to the Chief Minister, and he got the Provincial Assembly seats for PML-Q in 2002 elections, but MPAs' support was the main thing for the Chief Minister". (District Officer 3)

10.3.2.1.   Power strategies of district leader: Two main strategies were conceived and employed by the DN Attock to build his power in Punjab and Federal Government: Strengthening the regime party in Attock district and use of his home constituency for building influence in regime party and central/federal government.

10.3.2.1.1. Strengthening the *regime* party: PML-Q was a new political party created by military regime that took power in 1999. Military regime did it by breaking away 'like-minded' political leaders from different political parties. However, the top leadership and a majority of PML-Q's membership came from Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)—PML(N). Following the precedent set by earlier military regimes,

Musharraf's regime invited the like-mined leaders in different parties to support its local government reform and constitute a new political party which could then make government at the centre and in provinces after contesting the general elections.

> "Musharraf was holding on to the seat of president of Pakistan in a highhanded way, he made a new party and put Chaudhries [Pervaiz Illahi—Punjab's CM during 2002-2008—and Chaudhri Shujaat— federal minister during 2002-08] at its top." (Tahir)

Decentralized local governments were installed through party-less LG elections in 2001 under a presidential ordinance promulgated by the then Military Chief and President, Pervaiz Musharraf. However, the public vote-bank of the new created PML-Q had not been built by the time of general elections of 2002. Musharraf's continuation as a President and PML-Q's existence as a stable party depended on how PML-Q performed in the general elections of 2002. DN Attock strengthened the regime party through a) making local political alliances and selecting the right candidates for PML-Q and b) Running extensive election campaign for these candidates.

a) **Local political alliances and selection of candidates**: PML-Q needed candidates with a strong chance of winning the elections. Established provincial and national-level political leaders in Attock district come from traditional landholding families with a feudal, tribal or religious-spiritual background. These families have strong

social-class based, religion-based[25] or clan-based identities in specific regions. These regions also correspond roughly to certain constituencies in provincial or national legislatures. The traditional pattern of provincial or national politics in Attock district involved tough contestation between these traditional groups from different party-platforms. Attock's DN had a special ability to assess political position of individual leaders and political groups amongst the voter groups. He had also made special efforts to forge political alliances between otherwise opponent groups in the past. DN's abilities and past political record was well known to PML-Q's provincial leader, Pervez Illahi, who was also a close family member and a political mentor to DN during 1990s. Because of these reasons the PML-Q leadership selected Major Tahir Sadiq, Attock's DN, as the main ally in Attock district for making key decisions regarding selection of party candidates for National Assembly and Punjab Assembly seats in 2002. DN also played the central role in selection of party candidates in 2008 general elections:

> "He is very good at making political alliances, even with his traditional opponents like the Malik Aitebar family, and he can also make biradari alliances when it comes to making groups and winning elections. Otherwise Attock is a district of distinct tribal identities and powerful families with feudal backgrounds, they hardly go along with each other, that's history. Then there are die-

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[25] For instance, the saintly *Gaddi* of Makhad Sharif in Attock District. A *Gaddi* is a spiritual-religious position of eminence transferred in a single family lineage. The *gaddi—*traces its origin to a saintly religious person who lived at a specific place in the past. *Gaddis* in Pakistan have a sizable loyal following. The current descendant occupying the *gaddi—a gaddi-nashin—*can himself (always a male) contest an election or throw his support behind another candidate. The influence of a *gaddi-nashin* partly depends on religious attitudes of the place where this *gaddi* is situated, but now it largely depends on reputation of the *gaddi-nashin* as a public figure.

hard voting groups as well. Major knew the local position of these groups and how to make alliances and so he was literally distributing the PML-Q tickets in 2002 and 2008 general elections, I mean at least for the majority of candidates…." (Jehangir)

"…..no matter whether he contests an MPA or an MNA election, Pir sahib would never lose from this constituency…..Pir sahib didn't contest in 2008 because Pervaiz Illahi was fielded for his MNA seat, DN had requested him for that, and he won because of Pir sahib's support. Truth should be truth, Pervaiz Illahi did not win because of DN or for any other reason, he won because of *Gaddi* [religious-spiritual seat] of Makhad." (Salim)

b) **Running election campaigns of PML-Q candidates**: In his official position as a District Nazim and head of the DG political group, the DN was able to use the Union Councilors and Union Nazims of his group for running election campaigns for PML-Q candidates. Unions are relatively compact and small communities with an average population of around 20,000 in District Attock. Since Union Nazims and Union Councilors had frequent official and private interaction with the people at the grass-root level, they were able to make maximum mass contact for political canvassing. There are five Punjab Assembly and three National Assembly constituencies in Attock district. DN and his group ran election campaign for and help win four Punjab Assembly and one National Assembly seats in 2002 general

elections. All of these candidates won the 2002 general election and became allied with DN's political group in the district.

> ".....we maintain contact with the influential people in different Tehsils, just like every party carries out its propaganda campaign…there are biradari people (biradari binders). We made contacts with them, we work for their interests….DN made public contact on Tehsil level, but we made contacts on the lower level. We hold conventions at Tehsil levels to which all influential and common people are invited. At union and village levels we held group meetings and carried out mass contact ourselves and through local political leaders….All our candidates were elected as MNAs and MPAs in 2002, MPAs used their funds in consultation with DN during the last provincial government..…" (Wajid)

> "…it was the PML-Q government which was everywhere from President and PM's offices to CM in province and DN in district, and Musharraf was the actual leader of PML-Q. Major Tahir was not a DN for them, he meant two NA and at least four PA seats to PML-Q party." (Rana)

10.3.2.1.2. Use of home-constituency for gaining influence in central government: Shaukat Aziz was a top international banking executive at Citicorp in USA before he joined as a finance minister to the Government of Pakistan on General Musharraf's invitation.

He was unknown in Pakistani politics. However, Musharraf wanted him to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. DN Attock saw this as an opportunity for the development of the district and building his own influence in central government as well. DN got his daughter, Eman Wasim, resign from his home National Assembly constituency NA59 in 2004, and got the little-known Shaukat Aziz elected as a Member National Assembly in bye-elections by carrying out an extensive election campaign for him[26]. DN's decision to offer his family seat to Aziz and his efforts in Aziz's election were highly appreciated by the PML-Q's leadership. Shaukat Aziz was sworn in as 23rd PM of Pakistan in the same year. DN was later able to get liberal development funds for Attock district through PM's discretionary fund. Election of Shaukat Aziz from home constituency of DN also led to increase of prestige and power of DN office in Attock district.

> "Shaukat Aziz [the PM] was MNA from NA 59, naturally he had given all the authority to decide about the use of his development grant to DN….Shaukat Aziz became PM after he got elected from National Assembly seat vacated Eman Wasim, otherwise who knew him? MTS arranged Sardar Mehmood to get the senator seat

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[26] A 'home constituency' in Pakistan's politics refers to a national or provincial assembly constituency where a leader's permanent residence is based and from where a leader or his family members are known to contest elections historically. DN, his Father and Mother had been contesting and winning Punjab Assembly elections in the past from their home constituency in Fatehjang Tehsil of Attock district. Shaukat Aziz got elected from DN's home constituency and also from another NA constituency in deep rural Sindh, some 1000 kilometers from the capital Islamabad. Aziz preferred to retain a constituency which was just 40 Kilometers from Islamabad, although he barely survived a suicidal bomb attack in Attock during his election campaign.

left by Shaukat Aziz. Then what else could have been expected in
Attock?" (Wajid)

In a similar way DN campaigned for Pervaiz Illahi, the ex-Chief Minister of Punjab, personally and through his group of local councilors during the 2008 general elections. Although PML-Q lost power in provincial and national assemblies, Pervaiz Illahi won MNA elections from DN's home constituency. DN was also able to get PML-Q nomination for a Senate seat for Attock district. With PML-Q's support in Punjab Assembly and National Assembly, he was able to get a local political ally elected to that seat.

10.3.3. Creation of dependencies in unions: Creation of dependencies within the district was another strategy that DN used to *enhance* his powers over the Union Nazims who were also the members of district council. DN has powers to approve/disapprove any development project in the district ADP(Government of Punjab, 2003a), but he has no control over provincial/federal government grants in the district. Recruitment and selection of DG jobs is also done through 'notified committees' comprising entirely of officials. The original PLGO, 2001, gave vast political control powers over the district bureaucracy to the DN. Although still significant, much of these powers were transferred to the Punjab Chief minister through a series of amendments to PLGO, 2001, in 2005. The actual control over the district bureaucracy available to a DN depended on his relationships with the higher governments because all officers posted to DG seconded

from provincial or central bureaucracy[27]. Using his exchange relationships with the higher-government leaders, DN Attock created developmental, employment and influence dependencies in the unions.

10.3.3.1.   Developmental dependence: As can be seen in Table 10.1, Attock's District Development Programme had two main parts: District Annual Development Programme (ADP) and Tied Grants (TGs). Development projects could be identified, debated and voted for inclusion in DG annual budget in the ADP part. Attock's ADP expenditures constituted 1.507 billion rupees during 2001-2010. Constituent unions in the district could lay legal claim only to ADP development funds for their unions since only these funds were open to project identification and approval by the District Council. However, DN had broad approval powers over development priorities identified by the Union Nazims acting as district councilors, and was not legally bound to distribute ADP funds among the constituent unions equally or according to some formula (Section 11, Government of Punjab, 2003a). DN could approve district ADP projects for implementation anywhere in the district in his discretion.

Another 2.331 billion rupees were spent on earmarked or Tied Grant projects. Tied Grants projects are funded through provincial and federal governments' Vertical Development Programmes (VDPs) in specific sectors. Tied Grants are used for assuring implementation of federal and provincial government development policy in development sectors under the purview of district governments. DG departments select Tied Grant projects through

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[27] PLGO, 2001, had a section for creation of a 'District Services' cadre. However, this cadre of civil services could not be established.

their field offices or from amongst development requests made by different 'stakeholders' including general public, elected members of local councils and higher assemblies and private businesses and NGOs (Sections 11&33, Government of Punjab, 2003a). Tied Grants are a part of overall district development programme but district council has no power to vote over the use of Tied Grants. Evidence from interviews suggest that DN used his immense influence over provincial bureaucracy staffing DG offices to get projects of his group's Union Nazim's or his personal choice completed through Tied Grants.

> "District council schemes could be financed only through development funds approved for the District Council, or what is now called the district ADP, but they financed them through provincial funds that came to the district as part of tied grants or CM's special grants, or simply a Tied Grant was utilized as a block grant…….This is a classic example how DN used his authority, and how they put their immense influence to work, and *shabash* [kudos] to bureaucracy that they let all this happen without any resistance." (District Officer 3)

> "…they used to pick and choose from amongst the district projects demanded by the political people within the areas specified for the use of tied grants. For example if there were water supply or water turbine installation demands by the Union Nazims, DN would pick and choose from amongst these schemes to be funded under DERA

program funded by the provincial government, or he would select district schemes in education sector to be funded through Education Sector Reform Program of Punjab government. Development schemes funded through tied grants were mostly those which were identified by the political people in the district and not the ones identified by departments and sent to the provincial government in order to be included in annual tied grants." (District Officer 1)

Yet another 3.17 billion rupees of development funding came through Prime Minister's and Punjab Chief Minister's 'special packages' for Attock district[28]. These funds constituted a part of provincial or federal government ADPs and were spent in Attock district on development priorities identified by DN or his group in specific deficient sectors whether these fell in DG purview or not. A large part 'special packages' was spent on village electrification falling in DG purview and urban/semi-urban gas provision which did not fell in DG purview. The overall development spending of 7 billion rupees—including District ADP, Tied Grants and Special Packages—during 2001-02 to 2008-09 in Attock district was variously quoted by district officers and local leaders interviewed.

"…most of these funds were not a part of the PFC development shares awarded to districts, the bulk of these development funds came from special funds of Chief Minister or Prime Minister. Now most large development projects were carried out in Attock district

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[28] Prime Minister and provincial Chief Minister's in Pakistan can award development projects in any district in the country or province respectively from the large discretionary development funds available to them.

through Shaukat Aziz's PM funds. He was an MNA from our NA 59 constituency, and he used to send liberal development funds for his basic constituency, but DN would utilize these funds for development projects in the entire district, not just NA 59." (Riazuddin)

"….something over 7 billion rupees has come to Attock since 2001. But this is the overall development figure. DG doesn't have such large ADPs of its own. These funds have come through PM, Punjab Governor and CM's directives…..This money has not just come to Attock, this money has actually been utilized." (District Officer 4)

Union Nazims had no legal claim over the special development grants that were made available in District Attock because of DN's personal influence in Punjab and Federal government. But DN could recommend development projects demanded by his political group members for inclusion in sector-specific Special Development Packages.

Since the level of infrastructure development had been poor in district Attock under the past system of local development through MNAs/MPAs or provincial departmental offices, there was a strong need for basic infrastructure development projects in unions—especially the rural unions constituting 78% of total unions in Attock district. There was strong influence of feudal-type traditional Provincial and National level leaders in largely rural Tehsils of Fatehjang, Pindi Gheb and Jand in Attock district. These were also the most backward Tehsils in Attock district. Traditional leaders in these Tehsils were known

to be averse to development in their constituencies because development in sectors such as health, education and communication could empower the general masses and free them from dependency on elite. As discussed earlier, Union Nazims represented middle class in Attock district. To them, offering political allegiance to DN also meant freedom from elite-imposed backwardness in their unions.

> "…..that colonial system taught us slavery under the rule of district bureaucracy and feudal-type MPAs or MNAs, they never let develop so that we could never get out of their grip. This system under DN has taught us real freedom for the first time." (Riazuddin)

> "You will find most large landlords in the Tehsils of Fatehjang, Jand and Pindi Gheb, the most backward Tehsils of Attock…Pindi Gheb and Jand are the Tehsils with the most difficult terrain and these are also the most backward and deprived Tehsils, but MTS carried out development works in most parts of these Tehsils as well". (District Officer 3)

DN brought huge development spending to these backward areas after he was elected for his first term. However, evidence suggests that level of underdevelopment alone did not determine the level of development spending in a union. Most of these development funds went to the unions where there were DN's group Nazims. Once the Union Nazims witnessed exceptional development funds coming to district Attock because of DN's

efforts and spending of most these funds in Unions with DN's group Union Nazims, they came over to DN's group. Thus it became a necessity for the union leaders to support DN because he had demonstrated the willingness and ability to bring desperately needed development funds in Attock district and because he had demonstrated a political style of generous development funding for his supporter Union Nazims.

> "In the first tenure of DG, I was the only Nazim from Tehsil Jand who was with DN, all of the other 11 Union Nazims were against him. in the second tenure, 11 Nazims were with us and only one Nazim was from opposition group, even they joined us some time later. Opposition Nazims in the first time saw the working style of DN, and they came to the conclusion that they can get more development in their unions only by being a part of DN's group." (Wajid)

10.3.3.2.   Dependency in Jobs: The pattern of using political relationships with Punjab and Federal Government leaders to patronize supporting Union Nazims was also visible in government jobs. As discussed above, a large number of jobs were made available in district Attock through Punjab government. A proportion of these jobs were distributed over the constituent union councils. Selection to these jobs were made from the list of candidates nominated by DN group's Union Nazims or, in case of an opposition Nazim in a union, DN group's assistant Nazim/union councilor(s) in that union. Getting government jobs for constituents was an important source of political prestige and credit

for Union Nazims or union councilors and thus highly valued by them. There was also evidence from interviews with government officers and opposition Nazims that many of these jobs were in fact 'given' by DN or his group's Union Nazims to patronize political supporters or biradari and the system of merit in selection was not properly followed. Irrespective of who recommended people for newly created jobs, creation of DG jobs and their distribution among unions was generally viewed as highly desirable.

> "…..I mean even though I was just a Union Nazim, but I got 45 class four employees appointed, there was no selection criteria for these jobs, only poor people were appointed to these jobs.…I even went to the homes of some people personally in order to give them interview call or appointment letters, they came to Attock city only for their medical. These were all deserving people, I mean at least I didn't appoint any non-deserving person. Then there were 80 seats in vacant in primary schools in my union, I got educators appointed on these seats as well, and it was not like people who had simply matriculated from high schools were appointed as educators, a CT certification along with BA or B.SC was compulsory for appointment of these educators, and this merit was followed in all appointments. Our role was to recommend eligible candidates within our unions because we know each and every person who is a resident in the union." (Salim)

"Some people say that these jobs were distributed among Union Nazims who would then give out these jobs to the applicant from their unions, it's very good that these jobs were distributed in unions, but my observation has been that DN himself made decisions about giving out a majority of these jobs to the applicants….They made recruitments to union secretary posts, clerical posts in TMAs for which DG is not even authorized and many others, selection procedure documentation was repeatedly tempered with….Merit was followed only in those places where positions were available, but they didn't have any of their own applicants in the applicants' pool." (District Officer Local Government)

10.3.3.3.   Influence in government offices: Owing largely to poor human rights situation, wide socioeconomic disparities and an overly-powerful non-responsive bureaucracy, general masses in Pakistan frequently seek the help of their leaders for getting their issues resolved in government offices, especially district police, district administration and district courts of law. DN enjoyed extensive influence in government offices in Attock district because of the power relationships he had developed with higher governments. DN allowed his group's Nazims to use his influence for helping their constituents with problems in these offices.

"Most of the time it was our residents who had some grievances in courts or with the police, and we used our political influence to get

them relief from police or in the lower courts. But we could only

help people because we had the backing of DN." (Javed)

From the above discussion it can argued that the DN may have felt more need and pressure for adopting a favourable policy towards CCBs if additional political influence in higher-level governments had not been available to him. Not only had DN been able to convert CCB funds into fully funded Local Development Programme by getting approval for his action from provincial Chief Minister, he had also been able to get additional fully funded projects for his group's Union Nazims from provincial or federal government development programmes. Explaining the undesirability of CCBs, many of the DN's group Union Nazims argued that there was no need for asking the community to contribute toward projects when they could get these projects free. This argument was based on 1) partial understanding of CCBs only as 'contributory' projects and on 2) demonstrated ability of the DN to get extraordinary provincial or federal government development funds with 'no strings attached'.

> "…..then they [DN group Nazims] argued that people wouldn't pay 20% share, they argued that what was the need of making 20% contribution when you could get the same project through regular district or provincial funds without paying anything…" (Wajid)

10.4. Lack of public awareness regarding CCBs: Before devolution, masses were familiar with the usual state-led mode of local development in which they had no role to play. There had been a few limited participation local development programs in Pakistan, such as the USAID-sponsored Village-AID programme of 1960s and Punjab Government's Small

Village Level Development (SLVD) schemes and Matching Grants System (MGS) of 1980s[29] (Khan, 2006; Siddiqui, 1992; Abedin, 1973). But public knowledge regarding these schemes was limited. These schemes had been unpopular because of a high proportion of contribution required from the community, high involvement of provincial bureaucracy in project demand and approval process, and limited participation allowed to the communities (Siddiqui, 1992). CCBs were different from earlier participatory development programmes on at least five important counts: a) public developmental funds were channeled to the communities through local rather than provincial government; b) local representatives, rather than bureaucracy, were assigned the important role of facilitating and popularizing CCBs among their communities; c) communities' contribution toward project cost was small but their participation level during all project stages was high; d) local development projects of any scope or size permissible under the development rules of state-led/regular development programme of a LG could be undertaken under CCB programme; e) CCBs had a statutory basis in PLGO (2001). Institutional design of CCBs was coded in Punjab CCB Rules (2003). The success of the new CCB program required at least some degree of public orientation regarding participatory development concepts and some public input into the institutional design/framework of CCBs. A deeper community-level diffusion of participatory development concepts and knowledge regarding CCBs as specific instruments of participatory development was also vital to the success of CCB program which presented

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[29] Small Village Level Development schemes were small-sized schemes (up to 50,000 rupees) and required 25-30% community contribution. These schemes were identified by the village communities and executed by the provincial Local Government and Rural Development (LGRD) department. Matching Grants schemes were larger and required 50% contribution by the community. Development schemes under Matching Grants program were identified by the community but executed by LGRD or any other provincial executing department delegated in the district. There was a principle of 'higher the community contribution, higher the priority in approval' in these schemes. As a result only richer communities could benefit from these schemes.

itself as a new source of complexity in the local society. A deeper level of community awareness regarding concepts of self-help and participatory development and specific instrument of CCB was required not only because strong 'state-dependency' attitudes of the powerless masses developed during years of clientistic-relationship with the political and bureaucratic leadership had to be unfrozen (Abedin, 1973), but also because CCBs were highly structured instruments of participatory development governed by formal rules and regulations.

CCBs are sketchily described in the PLGO (2001) but detailed rules regarding structure and functioning of CCBs were published by Punjab Government in 2003. The processes involved in registration, proposal making, approval and actual execution of CCB projects by the community are complex and require prior understanding of CCB rules. The process of registering a CCB and proposal-making through a registered CCB involves submission of a number of documents and filling of many forms on prescribed formats. CCB proposal making involves reporting on project costing and scheduling and providing information on how general community was or would be involved in identification, execution and operations of the proposed project(Government of Punjab, 2003b). CCB processing also involves formal interaction with project-sector departments and newly devolved Community Development department of DG(Government of Punjab, 2003b). On the whole CCBs presented a new complexity in the local society. CCB programme needed a deeper study of the system (at least by some), practice and reflection before the new complexity could routinize into public consciousness.

While the initial public orientation could have taken place during the process of seeking public inputs through country-wide public debate or consultations, subsequent diffusion of

participatory development knowledge and institutionalization of CCBs was expected to take place through formal CCB training programmes, and education of communities through elected local representatives who were recognized as the agents of change under the devolution reform of 2001 (NRB, 2000). Civil society could also play an important role in the diffusion of CCB knowledge and practice.

10.4.1. Lack of country-wide public debate on CCBs: General public was largely unfamiliar with the basic concepts of CCBs because CCBs were promulgated as a part of new LG system in 2001 without necessary orientation through public debate/consultations. Trainings were arranged for local representatives regarding CCBs. But since public had no prior information about CCBs, public demand for CCBs was expected to be low or non-existent where local representatives were not interested in dissemination of CCB information. In case of Attock district a majority of local representatives were averse to CCBs. Accordingly public largely remained unfamiliar with CCBs. According to one Union Nazim, this was tantamount to not giving a fair chance to the people.

> "People had no idea what was being given to them, they had no idea about the new administrative set up and how it would affect them…you are interested in CCBs, well the communities didn't know anything about what these were and how they could benefit from these, many of them still don't know. They were giving us training for CCBs while it was the community for which CCBs were intended. All this would be a waste where there would be disinterested elected people. Now they say people are poor. I don't

think so. People were unaware or they were simply not given a fair chance. It's simple; the whole thing was foisted from above without any planning or preparation." (Jaam)

10.4.2. **Absence of community training programmes**: CCB training programmes were organized in all districts by the Punjab government in collaboration with Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). These training programmes were organized only for Union Nazims and Union Councilors since facilitating 'the formation and functioning of Citizen Community Boards' was one of the stated functions of union council (Article 88-c, NRB, 2001). CCB funds were to be channeled through ADPs of Local Governments. Although CCBs were intended as participatory development projects for which planning and execution lay completely with the community, no orientation or training exercises were ever organized for the general communities. Providing training only for Nazims was a waste of national and international development funds in district Attock—not only because most Nazims were unfavourable to CCBs and therefore least likely to educate and encourage communities in this direction, but also because it were the communities for which participatory development was intended and for whom the instrument of CCBs was designed.

10.4.3. **Unfavourable DG policy in district Attock**: There was an unofficial policy of CCB discouragement in Attock DG. Consequently, CCB projects were not encouraged or sponsored by Union Nazims and thus the knowledge and practice of CCBs could not spread out into the communities. Without knowledge or practice of CCBs, no step towards routinization of CCBs in public consciousness could be taken. Awareness of the

new system resulting from study and experience existed only where 1) Union Nazims had a personal interest in the concept of participatory development or economic value of the CCB projects, and 2) where they made an extra effort to 'learn by doing' CCBs at the level of their Unions Administrations.

> "…..initially there was no awareness about CCBs in our areas, there was a long and complex process of CCBs, how to constitute a CCB, how to get it registered, what documents to fill and how to demand a project through CCB was quite a complex process…It took us about a year after our first trainings in CCBs in 2003 to develop an understanding about the working of this new office of EDO CD, that there was an office of DO Social Welfare with whom CCBs will have to be registered in a detailed prescribed way, and then make project demands in certain categories identified in the CCB Rules of Business. Even these rules for CCBs were published in 2003. So it took us about 2 or 3 years to understand the system of CCBs. Since this new form of development interested me, I studied the rules in detail and personally communicated with EDO CD office in this regard. Public took another four years to understand it. When public got a little familiar with CCBs, they have set out to abolish this system" (Wajid)

But even in the few cases where CCBs were utilized at Union level, there was no routinization of CCBs in public consciousness because 1) the practice was limited in terms of the number of the projects undertaken; 2) only Union Nazims, their few friends or some wealthy people in the community took interest in the CCB projects and eventually implemented them. General population had little or no interest in CCB projects because they were not involved in the process of participatory development. There was only one exception in which a Union Nazim made extra efforts to involve community and undertook at least 12 union and Tehsil level CCB projects in a single union (discussed later).

> "In my Tehsil, there has been a CCB project in Jangal union council only. Generally people didn't have an interest in CCBs because its procedure was very long and complex." (A.Ghafoor)

> "There have been a few CCB projects at union and Tehsil level in my Tehsil, but whether CCB projects were undertaken or not in a union depended primarily on the interest and effort of the local Nazim, how much he liked the idea and how much he understood it. Most CCBs in my Tehsil have been carried out in my union…one of these is a union level Library project and other three are street and sewer schemes….it was me and some of my well off friends and a few other wealthy people in the community whom we persuaded…..but you know not everyone could make sense why they should be making contribution". (Wajid)

10.4.4. Lack of civil society activism for CCBs in district Attock: No NGO campaigned for or demanded CCB projects at any tier of LG in Attock district. NGOs in district Attock were reported as being generally ineffective and performing their role in a perfunctory way. None of the NGOs active in Attock district had advocacy or implementation of CCBs on its agenda. Thus organized civil society also failed to promote CCB awareness in Attock district.

There were some international and national NGOs (such as Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and National Commission on Human Development respectively) in Attock district which trained union councilors and Union Nazims in different aspects of devolved LG system. As a part of their province-wide programme, CIDA, in collaboration with Government of Punjab and partner NGOs, organized CCB training programme in Attock district only for Union Nazims and union councilors. Pakistani NGOs enter the districts where they are able to find favorable partners in the field of their interest, while international development agencies rely on their partner NGOs in Pakistan for selection of districts. But NGOs did nothing for CCB popularization in the communities. It is possible that national or international NGOs/ID Agencies didn't focus on Attock for promoting CCBs because they couldn't find political support in DG Attock.

> "NGOs have been providing training to the union councilors for running the new system, but they have done nothing in the field of local development." (Salim)

"Well these NGOs are just there without any clear work to do, they go to the field whenever their distant patrons give them some project, they assemble people and do some paper filling work and then they go.....The best thing this government could have done to use NGOs was to give them CCB awareness and registration task in the local communities. Then the funds which their foreign patrons waste on 'look busy do nothing' NGOs could have been [instead] used directly for CCB projects. (Rana)

10.5. Lack of community trust in leaders, self-confidence and confidence in the system:

Union Nazims were expected to be the sources of mass awareness and sponsoring agents for CCBs under the LG 2001 system (Sections, 76, 87 and 88, NRB, 2001). General masses in Attock district had little trust in their elected leaders because their trust had repeatedly been breached by the elected leaders in the past. Consequently, communities had developed a negative stereotypical image of their leaders.

Local development had always been a government function and people had never been allowed any opportunity in the past to take any level of responsibility for development of their own communities. Historically developed state-dependency attitude was high among communities in Attock. As a result, level of self-confidence in general community to take initiative in CCB projects by the time these were introduced was low.

Community generally had little confidence in any type of state-sponsored local development system because they had experienced these systems benefit only the leaders. General masses had deliberately been kept out of the state-led development process because only then the

elite, who also represent the traditional leadership class in provincial and central politics and bureaucracy, could hide behind the complexities of the system and misuse it for their personal advantage.

Owing in part to absence of any prior public orientation exercise and in part to DG policy of discouragement of CCBs, public's general perception of isolated and corrupt state-sponsored development systems and selfish/corrupt leaders was also extended to CCBs and elected LG leaders in Attock district. The following explanation for non-participation from the general people comes from a DN group's Union Nazim who undertook a maximum number of union-level CCB projects in Jand Tehsil of Attock district:

> "…it's only a stroke of luck if public gets some good leaders, otherwise communities are not yet prepared to take responsibility for at least some of their own affairs, or maybe they were never allowed this responsibility. Somehow a mindset of public has developed, a mindset of dependency, they don't participate in anything and hold government responsible for everything, and they take it as a given that if some funds have become available to a Nazim or any other leader, he will swindle them, its again a mindset. But our public has not developed these mindsets without a good reason, they developed it after watching their political leaders for years, they have seen the system work for their leaders' benefits for a long time……I am telling you frankly we were deliberately kept away from development." (Wajid)

10.6. Poverty: Poverty was described as the main reason for non-occurrence of CCBs in district Attock by DN and his entire group of Union Nazims interviewed. However, it was a 'believed' reason since it was given without actually offering the poor any opportunity to get involved in their community's development thorough CCBs. As discussed before, this belief had two parts: 1) the poor did not have the financial capacity to contribute 20% community share, and 2) wealthier class was opportunistic and manipulative of the poor. If CCBs were allowed, the poor will not be able to contribute. The rich and powerful would contribute the 20% share, use the powerless poor class to make a show of community involvement and misuse public funds for providing personal benefits, i.e. elite-capture. The poor would be enlisted on CCB general body membership, deliberation and cost contribution by the poor will be engineered on the papers, fake community project demands will be made and the actual beneficiaries will be the rich.

The belief that the poor were unable to undertake CCBs was not just an emotional defense crafted by Nazims in support of DG policy of discouraging CCBs. It was based on certain logical arguments. The poor in Pakistan are characterized by low income levels and day to day work for their very survival and, therefore, unable to invest time or contribute financially. Economic hardship of the poor is also associated with lower levels of education and lower social-class status and powerlessness leading to poor social confidence and ability to take charge of their collective affairs. As a result, the poor are less likely to indulge in development issues of their communities. Elected leaders and other high-status 'respectable' people are educationally and economically in an advantageous position to think and decide about development issues of their communities including the poor.

"…our people don't come out of their economic problems, they don't have any time to think about participation or development matters. It's the Union Nazims or councilors, and the local *muazzazeen* (revered people) who think about development issues of their area, they are well in touch with the people and are able to voice their development [needs]." (Salim)

"…poverty and lack of education are also important reasons why people are yet not able to take responsibility for their affairs. This was DG's focus in our areas during the last 8 years, our policy was to develop the basic infrastructure and educate the people in these areas as a very first measure." (Wajid)

CCBs were not undertaken at DG level in Attock district. However, the evidence from interviews with Union Nazims involved in non-CCB participatory projects and Union or TMA level CCB projects in district Attock supports leadership beliefs regarding poverty and CCBs only under certain conditions. Evidence from interviews suggests the following:

a) The poor did not contribute towards CCB projects when they were not involved in an ongoing process of development need identification before making a contribution request. Development needs identification, cost contribution and decision making in CCBs in this case was by the well-off. General community involvement in ongoing development need identification depended on choices made by leaders holding first-hand information about the participatory option.

When a Union Nazim from Jand Tehsil attempted to encourage general community for contributing towards certain CCB projects which were 'announced' to them without their awareness of CCBs and prior involvement in need identification for these projects, general community members failed to 'make sense' of this request. The choice of these projects was based on Union Nazim's personal assessment of the development need in a locality, or on consultations among a small group of influential and/or wealthy people within the locality. Given their historically developed general beliefs about leaders and government systems, general community members may have become doubtful about the intentions of Union Nazim and the group of his 'well-off' friends when they requested them for contribution in cost. When contribution from general community was not forthcoming, only a handful of wealthier community members contributed in these projects. When asked about general community participation in CCB projects in his Union, the aforementioned Union Nazim replied as follows:

> "I would have avoided this question if asked by someone else, but you are doing academic research, and I am sure it's going to be beneficial for devising a better LG system in future. To be honest, it was me and some of my well-off friends and some other wealthy people in the community whom we persuaded, we generally announced about these projects and the need for raising contributions, but you know not everyone could make sense why they should be making contribution, most people are poor and already too overburdened to contribute even a few hundred rupees, it is generally like that. Anyway, we contributed money and

deposited this money as 20% CCB share for certain projects I mentioned earlier, you see it was still worthwhile since 80% would be contributed by the government. But these were mostly small projects of 200,000 or 300,000 rupees, only one was a million rupees project. Accordingly we raised contributions of a few thousand rupees from each of our well off friends. That's how we did our CCB projects. But now the whole community uses these projects, everyone is welcome to the small library we made, the sewers drain the whole street, neither could you stop anyone from burial in the graveyard….we made sure that CCBs are not misused." (Wajid)

CCB rules did not place any condition on who could make cost contributions or how much cost contribution could be made by an individual. Thus cost contribution only by the rich was not a reason why the Union Nazim 'would have avoided' the question regarding general community's participation in CCB projects. CCB rules required involvement of general community for identification of community development needs (Form 4, Government of Punjab, 2003b). Thus Union Nazim wanted to avoid question regarding general community's participation because only Union Nazim and a few of his wealthy friends and acquaintances selected the projects and later contributed towards its cost.

b) In case of non-involvement and consequent non-contribution by the general community, misuse of a CCB project for providing private benefits to the rich depended on intentions

and purposes of the elected local leader holding first-hand information about CCBs and sponsoring the CCB project. CCB programme was made a part of LG development programmes. CCB projects required Nazim's approval for inclusion in the draft budget and local council's approval in the final budget (Government of Punjab, 2003a&b). Thus CCB projects required support of elected leaders. Local elite could misuse CCB projects to provide terminal benefits only to themselves if the concerned Nazim supported the private-type proposal and concerned local council approved it. That was the only condition under which a CCB project could be misused by the rich to provide personal benefits when poor class did not take interest. However, elected leaders not involving the general community in development need identification may not necessarily be manipulative or self-seeking.

The evidence from interview of the Union Nazim from Jand tehsil does not suggest that projects selected without community involvement were opportunistically used for providing outcome benefits to a single or a few rich individuals, or to a subsection of community where only rich people resided. The nature (i.e. sewer, drainage and street construction), small size, and location-specificity of these schemes suggest that these projects provided public benefit to specific subsections of the community where at least some people had the ability and willingness to contribute towards the cost of the project. Because the selected projects and need for community contribution was "generally announced" and 2) most people were "poor and already too overburdened to contribute" (see narrative from Wajid above), it is expected that there were rich as well as poor people in these localities and both were expected to use these projects. Also, some of the projects such as improvement of cemeteries, construction of public library, and common water-

supply provided benefit to all irrespective of their status as rich or poor. The contributing wealthy may have manipulated CCB projects, but Union Nazim in this case insured against CCB misuse through selection of collective benefit projects. Also, there was also no allegation of misuse or corruption in union level CCB projects by opposition Nazims or district officers interviewed.

c) Interactive involvement of general community, the largest proportion of it poor, in an ongoing process of development need identification resulted in 1) building community awareness regarding CCBs and community self-confidence to take care of its own developmental needs, 2) building community confidence in the new system, and 3) building community trust on elected leaders. Cost contribution from the poor sections of community followed when community awareness, confidence and trust were achieved to a sufficient level as a result of interactive involvement of general community.

The evidence from a Union in which maximum number of CCB projects (Union and Tehsil-level) were undertaken in the whole district suggests that interactive involvement resulted not just in general awareness of the community regarding purposes and functioning of CCBs, but also in community confidence that CCBs were not an obscure government programme which would be manipulated by the leaders to plunder community contributions. Interactive involvement of the community also resulted in general community trust for elected and CCB leaders.

In this specific union, general community was educated by the Union Nazim regarding the value of CCBs for their community's development. Union Nazim also played a facilitative role by 'getting' the CCB registered. CCB general body discussed development 'needs' of the community and what were options for 'improvement' of the

local area. Once desirability of a CCB project was established as a result of Union Nazim's education and deliberation among CCB members, community leaders representing various socioeconomic and occupational groups in CCB raised contribution amongst themselves and from the sections of general community they represented.

The poor represented in the CCB membership had a special role to play in this instance. Except for a small proportion of wealthier members of this specific CCB, the majority of members represented lower-middle or lower income classes, i.e. retired teachers, retired soldiers, workers. Many community members who volunteered to join as CCB general body members were 'ordinary worker-type'—an expression commonly used to denote the poor working class or lower income groups in the society. The poor represented *in* the CCB general body were not only actively involved and contributed towards the project cost, they also raised contributions from 'general population in the union'. It is expected that these poor members of CCB raised contribution from the lower income groups or poor sections of community they represented. The poor who could not contribute because of their circumstances appreciated the participatory development efforts being made in their community.

The ongoing community involvement process of ideas/opinion-sharing in multiple direct interactions and successful completion of successive projects may also have resulted in building both CCB general body and community trust in the Union Nazim and CCB executive members (i.e. CCB leaders). Community confidence in the CCB system increased as community and its representatives in the CCB experienced working processes of CCB and benefitted from collective outcomes of community contribution in successive projects 'once' these 'started'. Community's self-confidence in its capability to

plan and implement projects of collective benefit increased when it planned and implemented many successive projects. The fact that general community contributed 20% share in '8 million rupees worth of public works' in at least 12 successive CCB projects carried out in this particular union during two terms of LG from 2001-02 to 2009-10 while there was the same Union Nazim suggests that community awareness and learning regarding participatory development, confidence in the CCB system and trust in leaders sponsoring the CCB raised to a new level during community involvement in each successive project[30]. The 'affluent people' in the CCB executive body may have manipulated CCB projects, but Union Nazim in this case insured against CCB misuse by the rich through involving members representing poorer sections of the community in the process of collective need identification. This represented a participative style of leadership adopted by the Union Nazim.

Thus poor's limited financial capacity did not stop them from contributing towards participatory projects once they were interactively involved in an ongoing process of development need identification. Inclusion of the general community in an ongoing process of development need identification and decision to undertake a CCB project for addressing some of these needs was encouraged and facilitated by the Union Nazim. The following narrative from the Union Nazim in this case illustrates these explanations:

> "I was the first person in district Attock who got CCB registered in the union council and got projects executed through the CCB scheme, there were some others that followed….I educated the

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[30] Provincial Finance Commission fixed allocation for a Union Council's annual current and development budget was 1.416 million rupees in 2008-09(Government of Punjab, 2006).

people in my union about CCBs and motivated them to register a CCB, I prepared the people to get development works done through this scheme. Nazims have frequent contact with the people, we could explain to them the value of CCBs and how they could use it for their advantage. We named it Al-Madina [a trust inspiring name for Muslims]…..Our CCB is on top of list in all respects in district Attock. There were mostly *aam worker-tap* [ordinary worker-type] members in our CCB general body, and some affluent people were also a part of it. Retired army officers, retired soldiers, journalists, retired school teachers, mosque imams and workers were all represented on general body of this CCB. All of these members came up with their opinions, what are our needs, how we could improve our area…all of them contributed as well, and they also raised funds by going to the general population in the union, well some are not in a position to contribute but they appreciated our efforts, overall we got a very good response from the community and once we started we were able to undertake more than 8 million rupees worth of public works through this CCB, we made ten streets and a couple of union roads through these projects, we also undertook street sewerage works and completed a boundary wall project for our local cemetery, and we could have done much more if this commission mafia had not created troubles for us…" (Tahir)

10.7. Participatory design features: The findings in section on 'poverty' were also confirmed in a non-CCB village relocation participatory programme undertaken in Attock and Hazro Tehsils of district Attock. Village relocation was necessitated by construction of a new mega power project GBPP (Ghazi Barotha Power Project). The poor contributed in the participatory projects after GBPP leaders involved the local community in creation of Community (Based) Organizations (COs) for identifying collective development needs and later implementation of identified projects as well.

The community trust in GBPP leaders sponsoring participatory development may have been there partly because GBPP was an Independent Power Project created through public-private sector partnership and sponsored by the World Bank. The leadership in GBPP did not represent conventional government bureaucracy or political leaders about whom general community held a negative image. An element of World Bank credibility may also have been there. Community confidence in its own capability to plan and implement projects of collective benefit increased when it planned and implemented many successive projects.

As has been discussed before, general community involvement in CCBs and resultant confidence in CCB system depended to a large extent on intentions of leaders and styles adopted by Union Nazim and CCB leaders. Community involvement in CCB was high when leaders had good intentions and adopted a participative style in development need identification and subsequent processes in CCBs. However, there were three institutional design elements in GBPP sponsored projects which insured community involvement and consequent community confidence in GBPP sponsored community projects. These design features were absent in CCB projects making them vulnerable to elite-capture if Union Nazim was disinterested or failed to play his/her role in involving people and guardianship of the

CCB system. Evidence from interview with a Union Nazim involved in GBPP sponsored participatory projects suggests that existence of an independent and comprehensive community involvement process in development need identification, official supervision of overall participatory process and formal check on bank account operations were institutional design features of GBPP projects which assured general community involvement and community confidence as part of systemic requirements:

10.7.1. Community involvement as distinct and comprehensive part of formal participatory process: Development need identification and implementation of identified projects by community organizations were distinct and comprehensive parts of formal participatory process, i.e. projects were implemented only after these had been comprehensively identified by the COs as a result of involving community. In case of CCBs, formal CCB process started after development needs had already been identified and placed in proposal form for presentation to the Community Development office (Section 12 & Form 4, Government of Punjab, 2003b). CCB leaders could simply explain in the CCB proposal how the general community had been involved in need identification process. CCB leaders could persuade poor members of the community to become members of CCB general body and endorse the proposal in meetings with Community Development department without actually being involved in the need identification process.

10.7.2. Formal supervision of participatory process: GBPP closely 'watched the whole process' of community involvement in collective need identification and funds utilization in project implementation by the COs. This also contrasted with CCBs in which DG officials did not supervise community involvement during need identification or project

implementation phases at project sites (Sections 11, 12, 13 & Form 4, Government of Punjab, 2003b).

10.7.3. Systems check on finances: COs deposited community share in a joint account with GBPP. This was in contrast to CCBs which retained and used community share from its independent account (Sections 16&17, Government of Punjab, 2003b). CCB account was jointly operated by its chairman and secretary, i.e. only by CCB leaders, while GBPP and CO leaders both had to agree to operate the CO account. This created a systems check against misuse of the projects by COs and gave confidence to the general community that leaders represented in the CO will not misuse their contributions.

The following narrative from the aforementioned Union Nazim supports the 1) findings on relationship between poverty and participatory development and 2) illustrates the weaknesses in institutional design of CCBs as explained above.

> "It would not be correct to say that CCB projects didn't happen because people couldn't afford the 20% contribution. There is an organization here in Attock called GBPP, this organization was created for helping with the development works in the areas affected by the Ghazi Barotha Power Project some years back. A little population in Hazro and Attock tehsils was relocated because of construction of Ghazi Barotha project and GBPP carried out the minor local development projects for the relocated population with funds from World Bank…...GBPP worked by motivating the local people to constitute their COs and identify development works that they all needed, GBPP watched the whole process. Then these COs

contributed a small proportion of total cost of the needed works by collecting little amounts from each household and deposited it in a joint account with GBPP, single party could not draw money, then they got many useful works executed in this way….they were able to do all this only because people contributed, the 20% share would be so thinly spread over the entire village's population that people wouldn't find it difficult to contribute. The important thing was that these ordinary people were planning and executing the projects themselves and now they show these projects to everyone with pride. If people could do it in GBPP projects, they could do it in CCB projects as well….there are mostly poor people in Attock and Hazro Tehsils, and the village populations which were relocated were not rich, it were mostly the poor people who participated in the GBPP projects. In my Kamrah union, only 25% people would be rich, I mean it's an urban union and the most heavily populated in the whole district, all others here are middle class or poor people. There would be much more poor people in rural areas." (Ashfaq)

10.8. Comparable opposition leadership: There was no permanent opposition group in district Attock, held together by a leader of comparable powers with DN, which could pressurize DN or his group for making only authorized utilization of CCB funds. As discussed before, many traditional provincial or national leaders in Attock are feudal-minded. These leaders have strong identification with certain constituencies-cum-territories they have

been representing generation after generation. The political interest of these leaders seldom goes beyond their respective provincial/national assembly constituencies. None of these leaders had a district-wide interest or voter influence. Four out of five MPAs during 2002 to 2008 were in DN's group. Two out of three MNAs from district Attock had personal differences with DN and made groups with Union Nazims opposed to DN during local government elections in 2005. CCBs were an item on opposition propaganda in 2005. But once the DN candidates fielded by these MNAs lost election to Major Tahir Sadiq, opposition Union Nazim/union councilor groups forged during election time were also abandoned by MNAs. MNAs or MPAs also have no formal role in administrative or development affairs of DG, including CCBs. Consequently, MNAs had no interest in these opposition Nazims or their concern regarding CCBs once their candidates lost to Major Tahir Sadiq. In absence of continued support by a strong provincial or federal government leader who could unify the group of opposition Nazims/opposition union councilors and who could bring provincial or federal government pressure to bear on DN, it was not possible for opposition Nazims to pressurize DN or the District Council to stop discouraging CCBs at DG level.

> "A Union Nazim cannot unify a group against DN, all our Union Nazims were middle class people with a maximum of local government experience. Punjab or National level leaders in Attock do not bother what is happening outside their constituencies, that's why we had *friends* group here in Fatehjang or *accountability* group in Attock Tehsil…..just like Malik Aslam's group was blaming DN for misusing CCB funds in Fatehjang Tehsil, Malik

Allahyar was doing the same in Jand in 2005 election, both were MNAs and both disliked DN, but both of them lost interest in their groups after DN elections. I mean what role they have in DG if their candidate loses? Then these names and energies vanished as it became clear it was no use, each opposition Nazim was on his own. Then to whom would you protest about CCBs or whatever? Major was heading all MPAs in Attock, Shaukat Aziz was the MNA from his home constituency." (Ghafoor)

10.9. Potential for corruption:

Local development projects carried out under the routine non-participatory process are identified and approved by the local councils. Once approved, the funds for these projects are transferred to the DG executing departments (Government of Punjab, 2003a). These departments then call tenders and execute the projects through private contractors. Commissions paid out by the contractors to permanent and elected officials have become routinized in Pakistan to such an extent that no one seems to question it. As reported by various respondents, system of commissions in DG regular development program continued unabated in District Attock after devolution as well. In a way devolution created additional potential of corruption for elected officials at all levels since political control of planning and executing departments was decentralized to the local governments.

"But of course it [commission system] was here, where it is not? It has become a part of the system. …..It extends right up to the governor…Once a contract was awarded, there was a series of

government offices where a part of fixed rate commission had to be paid. These included offices in executing department, the finance department offices which released the bills of the contractor and auditor's office which audited their bills. But share of political people used to be paid out at the beginning when contract was awarded." (District Officer 1)

"What would those other Union Nazims check? They were busy in making money, I didn't have any interest in making money out of Nazimship. They had become contractors themselves, many of them were less Nazims and more of contractors". (Mir)

The authenticity of allegations of corruption on the DN's group by the opposition Nazims and officials could not be confirmed through any documentary evidence. The allegations are used only as illustration of corruption 'potential' in routine development projects. Officials may have spoken out of inimical feelings against the DN and his group since DN was known to censure DG officers in official or public meetings if he found their behaviour or official conduct to be unacceptable in any way. The general attitude of Nazims towards the district bureaucracy was described by one officer as a 'nuisance'.

"DN, in fact all the Nazims were much stronger in those days, and they completely dominated the bureaucracy, DN allowed them this power, but it grew something more than simple dominance, an

element of open and visible nuisance developed in the attitude of

Nazims towards the bureaucracy." (District Officer 1)

CCBs may offer potential for corruption to its members, but they offer very little chance to

the Nazims—the elected officials—and the local bureaucracy to make any corruption money

or commissions out of CCB operations. This is because, once approved, the DG share of

project cost is transferred to the account of the CCB in installments according to agreed work

progress schedule. CCBs don't have to go through tendering process or hire any contractors

through the usual government procedures. There is no involvement of DG planning or

executing departments in the work of CCBs except for the verification of work progress at the

time of installment request. The only points where a normally functioning CCB could

possibly be made to pay any bribes are at the stage of initial plan approval in the community

development office or at the time of payment of cheques by the accounts department. CCBs

especially offer little corruption potential to elected Union Nazim since CCB members are

themselves members of the relatively small and well-connected constituency which has

elected the Union Nazim[31]. CCB executive council members are usually well-known and

well-connected members of the community. If a Union Nazim tries to make corruption

money from a CCB in collusion with the local government officials, he can eventually be

exposed and brought under community pressure. It is easier for elected local representatives

to make corruption money in CCB projects if they collude with executive members in a CCB.

Such money could be made by making cost-cuts through substandard work. Even in this case

there is political risk for the Union Nazim since CCB members are after all his voters and

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[31] A union in Punjab has on the average 25,000 population (WB, DFID, ADB, 2004)

there is always chance of exposure. CCB projects are also open for inspection to the general public who can notice any substandard work for themselves.

For these reasons, CCBs offer very little opportunity of commissions or corruption money to both elected representatives and government officials. Little potential for commission in CCB projects was also described by respondents as a reason for lack of interest in CCBs by DN and his group of Union Nazims. It was also described as a reason for bureaucracy's obstructionism towards CCB projects undertaken at Union or TMA level.

> "Union Nazims don't tell it to anyone, but all this cannot happen without their involvement, when they get the development projects approved, when they get the things done and when they get the public works contracts for certain people, they would be taking commission money as well, well they do take it, if this is what you want to know, and that is also one reason for no CCBs here."
> (Rana)

> "…district government and TMA departmental officials didn't want CCBs because they take about 35% of the project's total estimated cost as their commissions, it was very difficult for them to charge any commission on CCB projects because CCB projects were executed directly by the executive body of the CCB instead of government executing departments." (Tahir)

However, DG and TMA bureaucracy in Attock was able to take advantage of the complexity of the CCB process and block CCB projects at registration or proposal stages only after it knew that DN and his group did not have a political preference for CCBs.

> "…getting a CCB project from DG was impossible, Community Development people [officials] would find one or another fault in documentation…*There was simply no force behind it*." (Ashfak)

10.10. Decisions/policies of higher-level government: CCBs were becoming rivals to a Punjab government Vertical Program called Barani (rain-fed) Village Development Program—BVDP (Government of the Punjab, 1998). This development program was intended at reclamation of badlands and development of agriculture and live stock in areas of Punjab not served by river or canal irrigation. BVDP was partly financed by International Fund for Agricultural Development—IFAD (US$15.3 Million) for its first award tenure from 1999 to 2005 and subsequently extended till 2007 with a renewed funding of similar amount(LEAD Pakistan, 2007). For different sub-sectors under soil conservation, agriculture and live stock, medium term (3-5 years) funding was provided to farming communities in six rain-fed or *barani* Tehsils in northern Punjab (including three Tehsils of Attock, Pindi Gheb and Jand in Attock district). With the introduction of LG system of 2001, CCBs became rivals to BVDP projects for the following reasons:

a) District Government functional domain included all developmental sectors for which BVDP was created.

b) CCBs required only 20% community contribution whereas BVDP projects required 25% to 50% community contribution for different categories of projects.

    c) Community participation level in BVDP projects was limited as compared with CCB projects.

As the concept of CCB popularized, CCBs started to become preferred choice in Jhelum and Rawalpindi districts' rain-fed Tehsils covered by BVDP. However, popularization of CCBs could lead to low utilization of IFAD funds and poor evaluation of BVDP performance by IFAD. This could in turn lead to termination of substantial international development funds to Punjab Government. Thus Punjab government started to discourage CCBs in BVDP development sectors in BVDP Tehsils by issuing informal requests to DNs. Although Local Governments are a provincial government subject in Pakistan, Punjab Government couldn't stop CCB programme formally in any local government because CCB programme had a legal/statutory basis in Punjab Local Government Ordinance (2001). Also, PML-Q party government couldn't stop a development programme 'on record' which it proudly claimed to have introduced to the nation. However, since district bureaucracy seconds from provincial government, provincial government could informally instruct district bureaucracy to discourage CCB programme by failing to release project funds or not letting the proposals go through the administrative approval stage. DN Attock also had a close personal and political relationship with the Punjab Chief Minister. Informal request from Punjab Government may have provided additional reason to the DN in continuing his policy of CCB discouragement at DG level. However, Punjab Government interference could have negatively influenced CCB projects only in Agriculture and Farm-to-Market Roads sectors in a maximum of three out of six Tehsils of Attock district.

> "In fact there used to be Barani Village Development Project under the Punjab government agency 'Arid and Barani Areas

Development' in Attock, Jand and Pindi Gheb Tehsils of Attock district. This project started in 1999, and it continued into district governments after 2001. This project had the contribution ratio of 50:50….When this system of CCBs came into operation, the BVDP schemes went into disfavour, I mean it was a good idea to contribute just 20% of a project's cost rather than 50%. Then it was decided at Punjab secretariat level that CCB projects will not take place at district level in the Tehsils covered by BVDP program….most of the participatory projects done under BVDP in these three Tehsils are in the areas of livestock, agriculture extension, and on-farm water management. In fact BVDP was a foreign aid funded program, and it was becoming a failure due to introduction of CCBs…Punjab government stopped district governments from CCB projects in the areas where ABAD was implementing BVDP schemes. [but] You will not find any formal notification in this regard since the government at that time had itself given the idea of CCBs and were sending us notifications to encourage CCBs, it was conveyed to them through authoritative channels, you know what I mean." (Arshad, DO)

CHAPTER 11

DATA ANALYSIS 3: FACTORS AFFECTING PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT IN SAHIWAL DISTRICT

The elected District Nazim in Sahiwal District ranked highest on transformational leadership as per results of Leadership Style Questionnaire received from sixteen districts of the Punjab province. As expected a high level of formal participatory development took place in the district Sahiwal during 2001 to 2010. As can be seen from Table 11.2, a total of 298.95 million rupees were made available out of Punjab Finance Commission grants to Sahiwal district for CCB programme during 2001-2010 out of which 63.2% or 188.92 million rupees were utilized. This level of CCB funds utilization was the highest in Punjab during DG years from 2001 to 2010 (Table 11.1).

Table 11.1 : Utilization of CCB Budgets Allocations in Punjab District Governments, 2001-10

DISTRICT	% Utilization	DISTRICT	% Utilization	DISTRICT	% Utilization
1. Lahore	57	13. Attock	0	25. Khanewal	43
2. Kasur	42	14. Jhelum	55	26. Sahiwal	64
3. Sheikhupura	60	15. Chakwal	49	27. Vehari	33
4. Okara	39	16. Sargodha	31	28. Lodhran	35
5. Nankana	50	17. Khushab	23	29. Pakpattan	46
6. Gujranwala	10	18. Mianwali	37	30. Bahawalpur	1
7. Sialkot	51	19. Bhakkar	35	31. Bahawalnagar	54
8. Gujrat	56	20. Faisalabad	26	32. R.Y. Khan	34
9. Narowal	43	21. T.T. Singh	42	33. D.G.Khan	52
10. M.B.Din	59	22. Jhang	18	34. Layyah	4
11. Hafizabad	56	23. Chiniot	16	35. Rajanpur	38
12. Rawalpindi	47	24. Multan	11	36. Muzzafargarh	10

Source: Punjab LGCD Department (see accompanying DVD: Folder 2-Official Communications 2); and Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment Website: http://www.dtce.org.pk/DTCE/public.html

Table 11.2: Sahiwal District Development Program: Income and Expenditures 2001-2010 (Million Rupees)

Years	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2001-10
Total Income Available for District ADP (a+b+c)	**74.78**	**175.53**	**184.87**	**236.54**	**216.00**	**277.29**	**266.19**	**258.05**	**76.19**	**1765.42**
a. PFC allocation/Punjab Government Grants*, of which:	62.78	161.00	161.09	161.09	188.00	247.19	247.19	247.19	65.19	1540.70
-LG Development Allocations	*62.78*	*140.60*	*120.82*	*120.82*	*142.09*	*185.39*	*191.84*	*212.95*	*52.15*	*1229.42*
-CCB Allocations	*0.00*	*20.40*	*40.27*	*40.27*	*45.91*	*61.80*	*46.05*	*31.22*	*13.04*	*298.95*
b. Grant in Aid (Prime Minister)	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00
c. District OSR (used only for LGD Program)	12.00	14.53	23.78	25.45	28.00	30.10	19.00	10.86	11.00	174.72
Total District ADP Expenditures	**33.89**	**31.38**	**241.96**	**409.90**	**221.59**	**304.75**	**165.14**	**114.22**	**47.75**	**1570.57**
d. LG Development	33.89	29.42	230.89	362.03	216.88	228.43	134.19	101.80	44.13	1381.65
e. CCBs**	0.00	1.96	11.07	47.87	4.71	76.32	30.95	12.43	3.62	188.92
Gross Surplus/Deficit for LGD Program	40.88	125.71	-86.29	-165.76	-46.79	-12.94	76.65	122.01	19.02	72.49
Cumulative Surplus/Deficit for LGD Program***	40.88	166.59	80.30	-85.46	-132.25	-145.19	-68.54	53.47	72.49	72.49
Gross Surplus/Deficit for CCB Program	0.00	18.44	29.20	-7.60	41.20	-14.52	15.10	18.79	9.42	110.03
Cumulative Surplus/Deficit for CCB Program	0.00	18.44	47.64	40.05	81.25	66.73	81.83	100.62	110.03	110.03
% Utilization of Overall District ADP	**45.33**	**17.88**	**130.88**	**173.29**	**102.59**	**109.90**	**62.04**	**44.26**	**62.67**	**88.96**
% Utilization LG Development	45.33	18.96	159.68	184.46	127.51	106.01	63.64	45.48	69.88	95.02
% Utilization CCBs	0.00	9.62	27.48	118.87	10.25	123.49	67.22	39.81	27.76	63.19
Vertical Tied Grants Available	**148.22**	**144.26**	**81.93**	**665.26**	**331.64**	**335.77**	**202.11**	**1011.80**	**896.93**	**3817.92**
Vertical Tied Grant Utilization	**50.84**	**111.10**	**63.78**	**193.30**	**104.76**	**281.53**	**134.22**	**479.41**	**640.16**	**2059.10**
% Utilization Tied Grants	**34.30**	**77.01**	**77.84**	**29.06**	**31.59**	**83.85**	**66.41**	**47.38**	**71.37**	**53.93**

Source: Punjab Government Budget White Papers 2005-06 to 2009-10, Sahiwal District Government Budget documents 2001-2010 (see accompanying DVD: Folder 4-Sahiwal Development Budget Utilization)

*Non-formula Punjab Government development grants in 2001-02 and 2009-10. Formula-based Punjab Finance Commission Grants from 2002-03 to 2008-09.

**Expenditures less 20% community share in completed CCBs during all years

***Cumulative deficit financed by supplementary grants from Punjab Government

This chapter discusses the factors that led to high level of participatory development programme success and pitfalls of participatory development in Sahiwal district. An analysis of field interviews, various district and provincial government documents and CCB Law suggests that District Nazim's (DN) conceptualization of LG's development function and CCBs; DN's belief regarding trustworthiness of general community and secondary LG leaders; positive roles played by DN and secondary LG leaders with regards to CCBs; gradual increase in community awareness, trust and confidence regarding CCBs during successive participatory development stages; and positive roles played by the non-poor community members assuming leadership positions in CCBs, positively affected adoption and popularization of CCB projects in district Sahiwal. Evidence also suggests that local group politics, unfavourable policy orientation of provincial government and exploitation of CCBs by secondary LG leaders and non-poor community members under conditions favourable to elite-capture negatively affected CCB program in district Sahiwal.

11.1. Primary leadership effects:

11.1.1. DN's conceptualization of LG's development function and CCBs: Sahiwal's DN conceptualized LG's development function as 1) increasing or adding to 'capacity' in social services through expanding existing facilities and 2) increasing 'opportunities' for poorer sections of the local society by making these social services available free or at a nominal cost. This conceptualization of LG development function applied to both fully-government-funded LG Development projects and largely-government-funded CCB projects. Providing social welfare in form of community development projects such as opening of skills development centers, community centers, distribution of *zakat,* etc, and

basic infrastructure for local economy were also included in district leader's definition of local development[32].

However, local development function did not include poverty alleviation. The root cause of poverty was lack of economic opportunity for the poor. In DN's view LGs were not intended for addressing 'financial hardship of the poor' through generating long-term employment. Local development projects, including CCBs, generated some temporary work. But this was not a solution to perennial problem of poverty. In view of Sahiwal's DN, general human development conditions in the district, such as basic health standards and school enrollment rates in communities, could not improve unless economic hardship of the poor was addressed. Sahiwal DG was able to increase general awareness regarding health and educational issues, but increased awareness levels did not lead to poorest sections of the society sending their children to school or seeking increased medical assistance for their health related issues. It was because their financial hardship prevented them from doing so. The poor work for day to day survival. Social welfare in Pakistan is limited and financial security nets are also fewer for the poor. Addressing economic problems of the poor requires large-scale investments in employment generation for which DG did not have any responsibility or resources.

> "LG system was not intended for generating employment or making large improvements in infrastructure. At District Government level we increased the access of the poor to health and education, that was our key development function, we expanded

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[32] *Zakat* is a compulsory charity that must be paid by a Muslim at a rate of 2.5% if he/she owns a certain prescribed minimum level of wealth. The eight heads on which *zakat* could be paid are given in the Holy Quran, Chapter 'Taw'baa'. Financial hardship and human misery are the main conditions for a person to become deserving of *zakat*. Faith is not a qualifying condition.

the opportunity in these areas by increasing capacity, we also provided relief and welfare…but we couldn't do much about providing permanent economic opportunities for the poor…We improved basic infrastructure for local economy and social services and some local employment was also generated in this process, especially in our CCBs, but that's only a partial solution. The poor don't send their children to schools not because they don't afford it, education is totally free in government schools...Unless we are able to solve the financial hardship of the poor, they will not stop sending their children to garages……there has been no such improvement, like significant increase in school rolls, because of this system….We think that school fees or stationery expenses, or a lack of awareness regarding the importance of education is not a plausible reason why the poor don't send their children to schools. But the real reason is that they don't have money for their bread and butter if their children don't work as helping hands…..I think most rural and urban people are aware about basic health issues because of various campaigns. But again basic survival is the first concern for the poor man….Then if a person is already hand to mouth, how can he afford expensive medicine if he falls ill?...the medicines that are available free in OPDs of hospitals are basic medicines like aspirin or paracetamol or some basic antibiotics. Other medicines you have to purchase

privately. Charities can work only on a limited scale. Expanded
healthcare depends on the resources of government and we don't
have many resources. What we have done at DG level is that the
educational or healthcare facilities which were available in Multan
or Lahore, we have tried that people should get them in Sahiwal or
Chichawatni, even if people have to pay a small price for these."
(DN)

11.1.1.1. **Process and end value of CCBs:** DN considered CCBs as opportunities for
achieving desirable values that could empower communities with regards to local
development. CCBs were a 'special' feature of the new LG system that offered great
opportunity to the people to get involved, 'learn' to help themselves and 'take control' of
local development in their communities. Community learning and community control of
local development represented both process and terminal/end values that community
could acquire as a result of undertaking participatory projects. Participatory projects also
had desirable process value of generating temporary economic opportunity since CCBs
involved drawing local labour and procurement of building materials from local business.

> "You see, it's a great opportunity that has come to the public, to
> take control of development in their communities and learn to help
> themselves, it's a waste if we don't utilize this option." (DN)

> "CCBs normally drew labour from the local community to do this
> work. Most materials would be procured locally. You see this
> generated good of local employment and business." (Kaiser,

adding to DN, DN endorsing forcefully: *"billkull"*—"but

offcourse")

CCBs had desirable end/terminal value since community 'enjoyed the fruit' of its

participatory efforts, such as in case of increased agricultural production through

construction of watercourses or as in case of increased access of the poor to healthcare

through addition of new facilities to government hospitals providing free or highly

subsidized treatment. Not utilizing CCBs would have been a waste not only in terms of

25% budgetary allocations which had to be legally reserved for CCBs, but also in terms

of community-empowering processes and end values associated with CCBs.

"Community carried out these schemes and enjoyed the fruit, they

still are, this was special about this system." (DN)

"Watercourses have been developed or improved in 200 villages

under CCBs. Watercourse provides benefit to all the cultivators

from whose farms it passes, their farm production increases

greatly. Then it's not just 10 or 20 farms that benefit, our thinking

has been that overall agricultural economy improves…. all

residents in a village have similar access to free medicine at a CCB

dispensary. Before such a dispensary, only less poor could afford

medicines on payment. " (DN)

Although the DN did not deny the possibility of corruption within CCB operations or

when bureaucracy demanded bribes for releasing project installments, he considered

these to be individual-level problems limited only to a small number projects. In DN's

conceptualization corruption could be have been justified as a reason for discouraging CCBs if it took place at a systemic level. Systemic-level Corruption could have been there in CCB projects if a) these were approved by the district council and the DN for providing private or narrowly-focused benefits, or b) if bureaucracy was involved in CCB projects during planning, implementation and operations phases. But since the policy adopted for approving CCBs protected against political corruption and CCBs carried out participatory development projects independently from DG offices during most of its phases, there was little room for systemic corruption in CCBs. Thus there was no reason for depriving people of a highly valuable opportunity for participatory development. District offices involved in progress evaluation or bills clearance could cause some delays with the intention of extorting bribery, but community could choose not to yield to bureaucratic delays since bureaucracy could not withhold approved payments of the projects with satisfactory progress for a long time. The community-empowering values offered by CCBs were much greater than individual-level corruption potential involved in CCBs.

> "…..you don't have to search hard for corruption in our society, but it doesn't mean that people shouldn't make progress, corruption didn't deter us from trying this new idea. People may have done it individually in some CCBs, I don't know about it. As far as DG is concerned, we did not pass any CCB project for private or individual benefit." (DN)
>
> "CCBs get payment against bills and project instalments when DO roads or DO Buildings…pass the bill or endorse the satisfactory

progress of the CCB project. They used to create hurdles because they didn't get commissions. My information is that 90% of the CCB people tolerated delays created by bureaucracy, but didn't pay any commission to them. They knew that CCB funds have been approved and sooner or later these will have to be paid in any case." (DN)

11.1.1.2. **CCBs as alternative to fully-funded projects:** DN Sahiwal regarded 'partly government funded participatory development projects' (i.e. CCB projects) as alternatives to fully government funded non-participatory projects when certain development projects demanded by community groups could not be funded through District LG Development programme because of resource constraints or policy reasons. DN also suggested CCB option to individual philanthropists, business groups or civil society groups which expressed concerns and interest regarding some broader developmental needs affecting many communities or the whole district. Participatory option could be undertaken by these groups if 1) demanded project had a definite need and intended to produce a collective public benefit rather than private benefit to a single or few individuals, 2) demanding group had the ability and willingness to contribute 20% project cost.

"The only thing we would assess was the need of the project and its benefit to the community. The first demand of people would be that they should be given a project from district funds. When we would explain that this was not possible for certain reasons, but the option of CCB was available since LGs had to reserve 25% of their

development budget for CCB projects. Then the people who would be willing and who could contribute 20% of the project cost would get the project. The people who had genuine problem would somehow collect 20%. They would get the project and monitor it as well". (DN)

11.1.1.3. **CCB's suitability to the poor:** In DN's view, CCB projects were more suited to the poor since CCB projects provided free or low cost services to the people. Poor's level of interest in CCBs could be greater than the rich if 1) a development need felt by them was high and 2) they perceived getting a large economic or social benefit by contributing marginally towards the project cost. If the poor were willing for a CCB project, they could absorb the cost by thinly spreading it over a large number of households. Affluent class had little interest in collective services produced by a CCB project *if* they could *buy* similar or better services without mixing with poorer class and without having to make any efforts in the CCB process.

"Poor contribute more enthusiastically than the rich. Children of rich people don't need a good school in the village: they will drive to a private school in the town in any case. Poor people need good schools at door step……in my experience people contribute happily if they see a value for themselves in the project. It's not difficult for each household to raise 500 rupees in a village of 1000 households. What they get is a first class school for their children. A big farmer will get private tube wells. Small farmers are more interested in watercourses." (DN)

However, as shall be discussed later, the poor started to perceive value for themselves and take interest in CCBs only after the initial stage of CCBs when they had developed some awareness of CCBs and only after they had seen examples of CCBs providing some desirable collective benefit to the general community.

11.1.1.4. **Public credit for leaders:** DN Sahiwal considered CCBs as source of public credit for both community leadership and elected LG leadership. People attributed credit for a CCB project to 1) a union nazim or the DN who was seen as instrumental in getting the project approved, 2) a CCB managing a public utility project in an honest way, and 3) philanthropists or other community leaders making sizable cost contribution and efforts towards a CCB. Thus CCBs projects in community interest could result in political goodwill for the sponsoring DG leaders. If a CCB project sponsored by a local representative was in public interest and implemented in a transparent way, he/she could present it as an evidence of his/her own political performance while claiming credit in next LG or higher level elections.

> "The credit for CCB projects goes to the CCB itself, or to the nazims or local government, that's for sure…No one will say that this project is being implemented by MPA; people will remember Younis sahib for his charitable efforts or DG for one of the CCB projects in their locality. People will remember DG for CCB projects in their localities. Everyone will say that Fatiana sahib [a Union Nazim in the panel] got us this CCB project from the DG, or that the DN arranged these funds for the CCB." (DN)

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11.1.2. DN's trust in the general community and secondary leadership: Since 80% of the CCB project cost was contributed by DG and placed at the disposal of CCB without any cash or property collaterals, CCB projects required a level of trust in the community leadership represented in CCB. DN believed that trust between communities and local representatives was reciprocal. DN had a high degree of trust in his group's Union Nazims because of their 'elected' character. He was willing to place a high degree of trust in general community provided this trust could be guarded through formal and informal arrangements. Lack of trust in the ability and integrity of community by past governments was in fact considered by the district leader as a reason for general conditions of poverty and underdevelopment in Sahiwal's communities. Communities in Sahiwal district performed better than the conventional state machinery both in terms of cost and quality of local development projects once communities were encouraged and provided opportunities by the elected DG. DN answered in the following words when asked whether people could be trusted with public funds:

> "I believe people could be trusted no more than we could be trusted. They vote for us because they trust us, we manage public funds for them, then why can't they do it for themselves. They are poor because no one has ever trusted them, and they have proved that they could do better than the official machinery. They need a chance and a little confidence. Then we had this system of nazims who could verify the correct use of funds. Nazims represent communities in the true sense, their political interest, their social

> "prestige is more aligned with the general voters than with the elite." (DN)

> "CCB projects have lesser cost and better quality of work than the projects implemented by the DG departments" (DN)

Local development was the key formal role of councilors and nazims in the new LG system (NRB, 2001). Union nazims and union councilors emerged from amongst the small constituencies they represented. Community voted for those candidates whom it considered honest and dependable for bringing about development in local communities. Local elections were the institutional arrangement through which communities could express their trust in certain leaders. Local elections were likely to return leaders whose main interest lay in building political goodwill and personal vote-bank by genuinely serving the development needs of their communities. Local elections were also capable of returning more trustworthy representatives than general elections because local constituencies were small and communities had greater information about the candidates' past performance and general reputation in the community.

> "In local elections, people know your track record so well, they even know all of your personal history…..party affiliation may not count more than 10%. It's the person which counts here. People know about your political and even your moral character on their fingertips." (DN)

"I don't think it's [party is] going to have an effect on local development, be it a party or a non-party election. Similar people are going to return, I mean political minded people who want to serve their people and areas. They will contest in any case…..public representation is the important thing at local level. That surely has a positive effect on local development." (DN, adding to Fatiana)

A vast majority of Union Nazims elected in Punjab represented middle socioeconomic classes in the communities they represented and where they had lived for a long time(Pattan Development Organization, 2005). Unions in Sahiwal district have an average population of 24,000. Union Nazims worked within their unions and were readily available to their constituents without any social class barriers. These conditions created additional pressures for the Union Nazims to look after the interests of general community rather than a few local elite. Altogether, a better election choice made by small and compact communities, socioeconomic class status and work conditions of union nazims greatly enhanced their representative character.

"…..since contesting an MNA or MPA seat is a very costly affair, the public leadership came to the middle class at grass root level, especially in the hands of UC nazims. You will see that quality of UC nazims is better than, or no less than, any other type of public leadership. This is so because they are educationally better off than others, they are practically sound because most of them are into

field, the most important thing is that people see them as one of their own…..if any person had a problem, he would straight away knock at the nazim's door, nazim is always there in the UC. MPAs are in Lahore, MNAs are in Islamabad, or *Chaudhry saabs*, *Mian saabs* [i.e. big people] are otherwise not available. (Hussain)

DN also believed that communities could be trusted with public funds provided a system could be devised for verifying integrity of the community leadership represented in CCBs and need of the projects demanded by the CCB. As shall be discussed later, DN Sahiwal devised this system by creating a sponsoring role for the union nazim, special seat district councilor or a union councilor in whose union a DG level CCB was demanded. DN was able to trust Union Nazims when they verified the authenticity of CCB leaders and CCB proposals in their unions because he believed that strong public representative character of Union Nazims established their trustworthiness.

"….people elected their local representatives whom they know for ages, they trust them for what they say and that they will not waste their contribution or effort." (DN)

11.1.3. Roles of Primary Leader (DN) in CCBs:

11.1.3.1.   Local development policy-making: Local development policy-making role of the DN is implied in 'functions' of DN in PLGO (2001) and developmental 'responsibilities' of Nazims in Punjab DG Budget Rules (2003). PLGO (2001) assigned DN the formal function of providing 'vision for district-wide development' and overseeing 'formulation and execution of district ADP' as 'head' of DG (Sections

17&18:1, NRB, 2001). Punjab Government District Budget Rules, 2003, identify interacting with the 'stakeholders to assess their needs', encouraging 'Citizen Community Boards to participate in the development activities' and ensuring that 'Citizen Community Board projects are given priority', overseeing the 'preparation of development project proposals', reviewing 'progress of development projects' and ensuring 'timely completion of the development projects' as responsibilities of the DN in relation to district development planning (Article 32, Government of Punjab, 2003a). Using his implied powers in PLGO (2001) and Punjab DG Budget Rules (2003) and his position as the executive head of DG, which included Community Development department responsible for registering CCBs and processing CCB proposals, DN Sahiwal actively guided the DG policy on local development, including CCBs, in consultation with his group's Union Nazims. However, development policy-making was not entirely a formal process. Development policy itself, including policy on CCBs, was not drafted into a formal official document in Sahiwal district. Rather it was reflected in relative allocation priorities given to different development sectors in LGD and CCB parts of District Annual Development Program.

11.1.3.1.1. Local development and CCB policy-making process: Local development and CCB policy making process in Sahiwal district was intertwined with the budget-making process, and displayed both formal and informal processes of developmental prioritization. As part of the formal development need identification process, Union Nazims kept on articulating development needs communicated to them by the local communities in proposal form and sending these to the DN office throughout the year. People from different communities in the district also communicated their

development needs directly to the DN. DN could then approve and recommend these priorities to the District Planning Office for inclusion in the draft development budget (Section 11, Government of Punjab, 2003a). CCBs could also identify development needs, develop proposals and submit these to the Community Development office from January to December 15th of each year (3rd Schedule, Government of Punjab, 2003b). Community Development department then scrutinized CCB proposals and communicated any changes to be made to proposals to the CCBs before these could be included in draft development budget in April of each year.

Reviewing developmental progress and ensuring timely completion of development projects are sketchily defined formal responsibilities of Nazims at each level of DG (Section 32, Government of Punjab, 2003a). Nazims are also responsible for providing an overall development vision for their respective LGs (NRB, 2001). However, no detailed formal mechanism for carrying out these responsibilities by elected LG leaders is defined in the law. DN developed a system of informal development review and planning meetings that eventually resulted in crystallization of DG's development policy. A system of monthly progress review meetings was developed in which progress on CCB and LG Development projects in each union was discussed. Development needs and CCB proposals from the unions represented by local representatives attending the monthly meetings also came under discussion. Special developmental prioritization meetings between DN and district councilors were also called by the DN towards the end of each financial year[33]. During the monthly development progress review meetings and final intensive sessions before

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[33] There is evidence from interviews that opposition district councilors did not attend these meetings and so not all the development projects sent to the DN office by the opposition councilors would be included in the district ADP.

presentation of next year's budget, DN and Union Nazims developed 'common understandings' of local development issues. Final prioritization and selection of development projects, including CCB projects, to be sent to District Planning Office for inclusion in the draft budget for next year was made in the light of these common understandings. The common understandings of local development issues guiding the prioritization of development sectors and individual projects for inclusion in district ADPs constituted the development policy of the district.

> "We did not have any specific policy document that identified our focus, but our development priorities were reflected in our budget….Most of our public policy was informal. People would also come with their concerns to the DN office….Nazims had direct, day to day contact with the people at grass root. That was the biggest strength of this system. Local people were the greatest agency of LGs, and they would directly provide us with feedback about on-ground situation. All friends (councilors) would get together here in my office or in the adjacent committee room and discuss the issues faced by the district in its different parts and then develop common understandings. These understandings of the local issues guided our decisions. You can call them our informal policy. (DN)

> "He used to call all the UC nazims before the annual budget sessions of the district council. He would tell us that much amount

is available for CCBs in the coming year; we need to construct such and such college, develop such and such lab, and such and such auditorium during this year. He would ask us for our agreement. We would usually appreciate these projects as we had been communicating most of these needs to the DN throughout the year. We would normally discuss development issues in the monthly progress meetings at DN office, but we would specially meet two or three times at the end of the year so that we could prioritize these needs in next year's budget. We also passed resolutions to support our priorities. (Iftikhar)

11.1.3.1.2. Sahiwal DG CCB Policy: CCB policy in Sahiwal presented sectoral preferences and project-level criteria according to which CCBs could be approved. It also included mutually understood conditions under which CCBs could be offered to the community and a uniform methodology of exposing community to the option of CCBs. The following CCB policy elements were extracted from field interviews and district ADP spending patterns in Sahiwal district from 2001 to 2010:

a) The proposed CCB project will provide benefit to at least a section or a subsection of community.

b) The proposed CCB project will not be installed/built at private property unless its ownership was transferred to DG.

c) The proposed CCB will provide the benefit to the target community free or at a nominal cost.

d) CCB programme will compensate for the sectors given low priority in the LG Development program, but which are otherwise important.

e) CCB projects will be offered only in response to community demand for a project 1) when it will not be possible to place that project in LGD programme because of resource constraints or higher demand for other projects, or 2) when a community group itself was looking for a charitable opportunity to fulfill an important but yet unaddressed development need in the community.

Sahiwal DG CCB policy is illustrated in the following excerpts from DN's interview:

"Our dialysis centre, well most of CCB projects are pro-poor. A single kit costs 2000 rupees, and none of the patients has to pay a single rupee for that. It's not because of me, I just facilitated. It's because the wealthy people donate heavily...Our District Public Schools provided top quality education at a nominal cost that even the lower income class can afford." (DN)

"First, we did not give a single such project which was beneficial only for an individual or a small group of individuals, that was the policy.…..we have given maximum CCBs for three purposes: number one, for watercourse improvement, number two for schools, number three for healthcare facilities. We also focused on women development, we also used CCBs for providing rural roads

and sports facilities...….Divisional Public School Chichawatni has been constructed under a CCB at a cost of 30 million, Sahiwal's DPS Hall has been constructed with 20 million rupees. We established four District Public Schools….Then we established Khadija Kubra maternity hospital and upgraded Gumbad Khizra hospital under CCBs. We upgraded Rahimia Trust Eye hospital. We gave 15 million rupees worth of equipment there. We also established a haemodialysis centre at DHQ...The main thing is that we didn't give benefit to a few people through CCBs; we approved only those projects which had a definite need and community benefit…..[a] main beneficiary can only be there if you build private type projects, like a tube-well in a specific person's farm. …Usually it will be the sole beneficiary because he will not share water with anyone else, or if you build a poultry farm on private property. We never passed any such project." (DN)

CCB policy guidelines were communicated to the Community Development department of the DG which was formally responsible for assuring their compliance (5th Schedule, Government of Punjab, 2003b). As shall be discussed later, DN created a special role for the Union Nazims to complement district bureaucracy in assuring compliance with the first three policy guidelines.

CCB projects providing benefit to a few individuals could encourage elite-capture by the rich resulting in discouragement for the wider community, unpopularity of the

CCB programme and political ill-will for the DG[34]. The only mechanism provided in Punjab CCB Rules (2003) to assure public benefit of CCB projects was a self-reported declaration in CCB Proposal Forms that had a section on how general community was involved or was intended to be involved during various phases of the demanded project (Form 4, Government of Punjab, 2003b). However, this mechanism was very weak and, as shall be discussed later, could be easily bypassed by ill-intentioned elite. DN and his group laid out the policy of approving only those CCB projects which had a public benefit and created an informal political system of assuring 'community need and public benefit' of CCB projects (discussed later).

CCB rules allowed an option to CCB that there could either be a government or CCB ownership of a project (Form 4:2, Government of Punjab, 2003b). However, CCB rules did not specify where a CCB project could be built if there was CCB ownership of the project. If a CCB owned project was built on private property, the owner of property could potentially stop a member of the target community from enjoying the benefit of the public asset created on private property. CCB policy of not building a CCB project on private property closed out this possibility.

Local Government Development (LGD) programme was fully-funded by the government. General community had the first choice to get development projects without having to contribute anything towards the cost. It was in the political interest of the Nazims to get widely demanded projects funded from the LGD programme. Since roads have the widest public demand in infrastructure deficient rural districts of

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[34] A collective benefit to a community, or a section/subsection of a community, either at a very low cost or free, was referred to as 'public benefit' by Nazims and DG officers interviewed. The term was used in contrast to providing 'private benefit' which meant providing personal benefit to one or few people by misusing public funds meant for providing public benefit. This point must be made clear here in order to avoid confusion with other meanings of the term 'public benefit'.

Punjab and since political visibility of roads is also high, roads sector had high priority in LGD policy. However, disproportionately high funding in roads sector came at the cost of social sector development—the main developmental responsibility devolved to the DGs— in Sahiwal LGD programme.

> "…our [LGD] development priorities were reflected in our budget. We put district roads on the first priority, then there were education and health." (DN)

Roads sector received 49.7% of total LGD Budgetary spending during 2001-2010 (Chart 11.1). Leaving aside development grants for union councils (17.99%), roads sector was followed by education sector (7.44%) and health sector (6.05%). Culture and sports sector and community development sector received 4.5% and 0.76% expenditure share in LGD budgets. Sahiwal is principally an agricultural district, but partly because most funding for on-farm irrigation facilities was expected to come through National Programme for Improvement of Watercourses (NPIW), a Vertical Development Program, agricultural sector received only 1.74% of total LG Development Funds in DG budget.

 However, DN was mindful of the farm-irrigation needs and health and educational deficiencies in the district which could not find the needed attention in the LG Development programme because of political preferences of the elected representatives for roads sector and union-specific grants. Accordingly, education, on-farm water management (main part of agricultural sector devolved to the DG), and health sectors received first priority in the CCB budgets during 2001-2010 (Chart

11.2). Second priority was given to roads, community development, and culture and sports sectors. Sectoral priorities for CCBs were communicated to the Community Welfare department of the district government (DG) which prioritized CCB proposals for inclusion in the budget accordingly [Punjab LG (CCB) Rules, Section 11].

Sahiwal is an agricultural district. Almost 80% of its population lives in villages where agriculture is the main mode of employment. Thus community preference for on-farm watercourses was greatest and reflected in 41.98% of the total number of CCB projects completed during 2001-2010 (Chart 11.2). Watercourse projects are typically small-sized and therefore represented only 15.38% of the total CCB funds spent. There was a policy preference for education and health sectors with regards to CCBs. Philanthropists were also interested in undertaking participatory projects in education and health sectors. Under the informal system designed by DN for 'sponsorship' of CCBs by elected LG leaders, DN sponsored some of the largest CCB projects in education and health sector demanded by philanthropists or civil society groups. As a result educational projects represented only 29.25% of total CCB projects but accounted for 44.57% of the total CCB funds spent. Similarly DN's policy preference for health sector largely accounted for 13.43% of all CCB funds spent on 11.32% of total CCB projects completed during 2001-2010.

The last CCB policy element related to exposing communities to CCB opportunities. Punjab LGO 2001 identifies facilitation of 'formation and functioning of CCBs' as a distinct function of union council [Section 88(1), clause C, PLGO 2001]. Union Nazims were formally charged with the responsibility of encouraging 'Citizen Community Boards to participate in the development activities and ensure that the

Citizen Community Board projects are given priority' (Section 32-iii, Government of Punjab, 2003a). However, people were unfamiliar with the concept of CCBs before LG 2001 system. They had long been dependent on the government for their developmental needs. There had been no public consultations or public awareness campaigns before or after the introduction of LG 2001 system regarding CCBs. There was a potential risk of earning public ill-will if Nazims proactively promoted CCBs or encouraged an unaware or unprepared people to identify and demand development projects that required them to contribute towards the cost. It could raise even more doubts in the community about the integrity of the Naizm or a councillor if he/she suggested a project on his own initiative and then asked the community to take up that project through a CCB.

However, Nazims could suggest the option of 'participatory development involving community contribution' 1) in response to community's demand for a project 2) when nazim could provide some evidence to the community that their demanded project could not be funded through the LGD programme. If the community showed interest, Nazim could then educate and encourage them about CCBs and facilitate the CCB registration and CCB demand making process. This was a uniform CCB promotion and facilitation policy learnt and adopted by the nazims as a result of working with CCBs.

> "….When people would demand certain development works needed by their communities we would tell them our funds position, everyone could check our union budgets. Then we would tell them that a quarter of districts development funds are reserved

for community projects, if they were willing we could tell them how these community projects worked.…...We generally discuss about CCB options with our union councillors and the people or whatever new options are available for our communities, but we only suggest CCBs to people when they demand a community project which we cannot undertake through union or district funds. It is rather strange for the people if an elected representative asks them to spend money on development schemes, it is foolish if we just go about inviting people, I mean the way CIDA people had been telling us." (Fatiana)

Chart 11.1: Sectoral Share in LG Development Programme, Sahiwal 2001-2010

	Agriculture	Roads	Water Supply/ Sewerage	Education	Health	Culture and Sports	Government Buildings	Community Development	Rural Electrification	Gas supply	Misc.	Defunct Zila Council Schemes	UC Nazims Grant
Sectoral Expenditure	1.74	49.70	1.74	7.44	6.05	4.50	2.68	0.76	5.22	0.45	0.53	1.20	17.99
Number of Projects	3.19	43.06	3.71	10.10	2.21	0.91	3.06	0.26	3.97	0.07	0.59	5.67	23.19

Chart 11.2: Sectoral Expenditure Share in CCB Programme, Sahiwal 2001-2010

A bar chart titled "Chart 11.2: Sectoral Expenditure Share in CCB Programme, Sahiwal 2001-2010". The y-axis is labeled "Percent" ranging from 0.00 to 50.00. The x-axis shows six sectors with two bars each (Sectoral Expenditure and Number of projects):

Sector	Sectoral Expenditure	Number of projects
Roads	12.07	8.49
Education	44.57	29.25
Health	13.43	11.32
Agriculture	15.38	41.98
Community Development	7.32	4.72
Culture and Sports	7.22	4.25

11.1.3.2. **Encouragement for secondary leadership**: DN Sahiwal played the role of encouraging and motivating his group's Union Nazims for making use of participatory projects within their unions and elsewhere in the district. Union Nazims' basic interest lies in getting as much district funding for development in their unions as possible. Although there was no legal requirement or statutory formula for dividing district's development funds among unions, Unions received 18% of the district ADPs from 2001-2010 as equally distributed development funds (Chart 11.1). DG also had to reserve 25% PFC development transfers to the district for CCBs. CCB Rules (2003) also required unutilized CCB funds from past years to be added to CCB allocations in the following years (Section 17, Government of Punjab, 2003). As can be seen in Table 11.2, CCB unutilized funds kept on accumulating after 2002-03 till 2009-10 when these amounted to 110 million Rupees. Because of an earmarked nature of CCB funds and comparatively

low public demand for projects involving cost contribution, there was no pressure on DN by the Union Nazims to equally distribute CCB funds among unions. Also, there was no legal ceiling on CCB funds or number of projects that could be approved in individual unions. Consequently, DN Sahiwal motivated Union Nazims to get as much additional development funding as possible for their Unions from the 25% CCB reservation by bringing forward eligible CCB proposals.

> "[DN's] vision was very broad and deep, and he would go to the roots of every thing. I mean he knew the problems of his district deeply and knew how to manage these developmental problems…..Although DN is not involved any where as far as the law is concerned, but he had passed instructions to his UC nazims that they should present development proposals under CCBs." (District Planning Officer)

> "….it's the district nazim who informs us that such and such amount is available for CCBs, and that we should bring forward any such schemes which are permissible under CCBs…..He keeps on motivating us that we should give our suggestions about new projects that can be done through CCBs." (Asif)

In order to address the issue of gender disempowerment in Pakistan, 33% of general seats in all local councils were reserved as special seats for women. In a total district house of 129, women district councillors numbered 30. Women seats were reserved to represent

women-specific issues and women perspective on DG in the whole district (NRB Pakistan, 2000). DN understood the sensitivity of gender-based disempowerment and importance of women-specific development projects to women councillors. In order to increase the utilization of CCB projects, DN Sahiwal motivated women councillors to bring forward women-specific development projects that could be taken up through CCBs. As a result several women-specific CCB projects such as skills development centres, handicraft schools, and maternity hospitals were completed.

> "Well with regards to women development, all the CCBs which were registered by women groups in Sahiwal got CCB projects for which they applied. A group of twenty-five women pooled their contributions, registered their CCB and started a maternity hospital in Farid town in Sahiwal. It's a mini community hospital and is running well. Five large skills development centres have also been made in rural areas….[DN] would tell us that we should not think that he gives development schemes only to male UC nazims, and that he wouldn't give CCB schemes to us, provided we were able to raise 20% contribution. He encouraged us to develop our own development schemes and we would get them….We never had this feeling that we were ever discriminated against. We were equal partners in DG with the UC nazims….In 2005 tenure, there were all women monitoring committees supervising women-specific development projects in social welfare, health and education

sectors. That's one of the reasons that CCB funds were fully utilized in Sahiwal." (Nabila)

11.1.3.3. **Networking:** Another important role of DN was networking with important actors in local and international civil society, business and government sectors for involving them in participatory development projects in Sahiwal district. In doing so, DN could tap in the resources of network partners for Sahiwal's local development. Sahiwal Chamber of Commerce and Rotary Club partnered with existing CCBs and DG for upgrading district hospitals. Members from Chamber of Commerce and Industry registered a CCB to establish and run a haemodialysis unit in Sahiwal District Headquarter Hospital. A large charity/trust Eye Hospital in Sahiwal City registered a CCB to procure specialist eye surgery equipment, upgrade the hospital and establish a school under the trust. A Punjab level private school chain and a national level NGO in collaboration with local philanthropists also registered CCBs to establish and run four large-sized District Public Schools in semi-urban and rural centres of the district. A mega-sized Divisional Public School was built in Chichawatni town through a CCB in which local business and civil society leaders were represented. Expensive semi-urban and urban land was donated by philanthropists for these schools. An international level flood-light cricket stadium was also developed in Chichawatni town with the help of local civil society and prominent businessmen registering a CCB. At international level, a Rochdale based NGO partnered with DG and a CCB for providing specialist equipment in District Headquarter Hospital in Sahiwal city. All these were largest CCB projects in Sahiwal district during 2001-2010. The common thread among all these CCB projects

was networking of DN Sahiwal with prominent personalities in business and civil society.

DN Sahiwal had been Chairman Sahiwal District Council under the earlier LG system and a member of Punjab Assembly before getting elected as a DN in 2001. His father and two elder brothers had been in Punjab and National Assemblies. One of his elder brothers as Chairman District Council was instrumental in declaration of Sahiwal as a twin city with Rochdale Borough Council in 1991. DN and his family had made good reputation in politics. Prominent people from Sahiwal trusted him because of his family background and his own performance as a DN. As a result they were willing to transfer their private land to DG and invest large amounts of private money in DG assets for philanthropic or social welfare purposes.

> "…..these are well connected and people in Sahiwal. It happens in typical pattern. All major groups of local society, be it a trade union or chamber of commerce, pay social visits to DN office. They also invite me on various occasions. A delegation of chamber of commerce visited me once…..They said that people complain about the lack of capacity in emergency department of DHQ hospital. I had already been informed of this problem by the MS of DHQ, and I was thinking about funding options for this project. When chamber people pointed out to the problem, I suggested to them that this problem could be solved if they could raise just 20% of the expansion cost for the emergency department. They agreed and the solution came up. Similarly, I went to a function of rotary

club and they said that children ward at DHQ is not in good condition. I said OK, you contribute 20% and I will arrange the rest. They agreed and we were able to improve the children ward. When these wealthy people like chamber of commerce members would demand from us a specific project, we would ask them to contribute. There are around 40 members of chamber. These are all rich people and they wouldn't think twice before donating 5000 rupees each." (DN)

"Rochdale and Sahiwal were declared twin cities when my elder brother was a Chairman District Council in 1991. He signed an agreement of collaboration on sharing local governance experiences then…..The Mayor [of Rochdale in 2003], Sultan Ali Dogar, invited us on his Oath taking ceremony. We signed an agreement there with a local NGO, Mahboob Foundation, which was working with the local authority there. We motivated them to collaborate with us…..They donated us the equipment required for trauma centre, CT scan machinery alone would cost about 20 million rupees….Our fourth tour was to Australia, there is a sizable community from Sahiwal in Sydney…." DN

Sahiwal DN's relationships with the affluent business-class groups and civil society groups were built around his personal or ceremonial relationships with them. Political leaders in Punjab frequently maintain social relationships with influential and rich

groups. The rich and accomplished can have considerable influence with certain voter groups. Industrialists and business leaders are also known to support election campaigns of MPs who could then support their policy preferences in the provincial or national assemblies. DN's networking with the affluent groups may have been based on political exchange because he had been contesting and winning elections to Punjab Assembly as well.

> "….politicians try to keep close relations with such people since they have a vote bank of their own. Politicians try to take such people along. So may be the idea [a CCB school] was launched by the DN and picked up by the late Nasarullah in this way, he was basically a philanthropist and was interested in such ideas. (CCB executive member)

However, it was the trust DN inspired in these relationships that resulted in channeling of rich's resources towards the welfare of the poor. Accomplished and affluent individuals and groups in Sahiwal are well connected and have knowledge and concern about the general problems in the local society. They are motivated to contribute towards welfare of the society because of higher order esteem or self-actualization needs. However, they are also concerned that their charity will not be wasted. Good reputation and high degree of prestige built into the office of DN by Rai Hassan Nawaz inspired trust in these rich groups that their charitable donations will not be wasted. Personal sponsorship and facilitation of such large CCBs by the DN may have provided additional confidence to

the charitable or civil society groups that a traditionally obstructive bureaucracy will not create hurdles for their project.

> "….rich people generally look for opportunities of charity. We provided them with one....But why philanthropists would contribute? Obviously they are rich and at a stage of personal development where they want to contribute something for the welfare of their community. Second, they have a level of trust in DG that their money is going to contribute towards building some public asset in which there is no chance of a private takeover. An element of goodwill or reputation may well be there. …We would arrange a meeting of the CCB executive committee, concerned EDO, EDO CD, and technical committee, and ask them to sort out the requirements of the project." (DN)

> "Most of our wealthy and influential people want to do something for the welfare of the people. This passion is there. But if this passion gets into the hands of a wrong person, all the money and effort goes wasted. These instances are not uncommon in our society; people had been cheated when they gave donations. People donated a lot of funds in Sahiwal because of reputation and personal networking of Rai sahib." (Hussain)

DN also performed the role of interlocking leadership from multiple networks in the district into large health and education sector CCB projects. Leaders from different

networks could build the trust of donors in their respective networks to donate in the CCB on which they were represented and could also be a source of rich experience.

> "DN placed me on a number of committees; he put me on DPS [a CCB school] Board of Governors and appointed me as a chair of Vocational Training Institute BOG. He also made me a member of Khadija Maternity Hospital [CCB] board of trustees. I used to take a lot of interest in charitable activities. DN appreciated this and suggested my name in a number of public welfare organizations." (Younis)

11.1.3.4. **Role creation for secondary leadership**: As shall be elaborated in the next section, DN created an informal extra-statutory role for union nazims in the verification of CCB proposals. DN created this role to complement the authenticity of CCB projects formally carried out by district bureaucracy because 1) he believed that nazims were in a much better position to make these verifications, 2) he had a low level of trust in bureaucracy's general integrity and 3) he had a high degree of trust in nazims' integrity.

11.2. **Secondary leadership's role in CCBs:**

11.2.1. Reactive guidance: Union Nazims did not proactively educate and encourage the people to take up CCB projects. Rather, they suggested the option of CCBs to the community if a project demanded by them could not be undertaken at union or district level for

verifiable reasons. Union nazims educated, encouraged and facilitated the community for a CCB project if it expressed interest in the option.

Although elected representatives could not be members of CCBs, union councils had a formal function of 'facilitating the formation and functioning of CCBs' (Section 88, NRB, 2001). Union nazim as a head and part of union council also had an additional function of 'disseminating information' regarding CCBs (Sections 76,87 & 88, NRB, 2001). In recognition of these roles of Union Nazims, Punjab government, in collaboration with Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), arranged CCB training workshops for union nazims. However, most practical knowledge about processes involved in CCBs was acquired by Union Nazims as a result of 'working with CCBs', i.e. facilitation in formation and functioning of CCBs. Evidence from interviews suggests that local representatives learnt about legal procedures and on-ground practices involved in CCBs both as a result of formal trainings and practical engagement with CCBs. Union Nazims could then disseminate their cumulative learning to the community as required.

> "…a CIDA--DSP team visited us here in 2003, and conducted a three day workshop regarding CCBs. We learnt about CCBs and their procedures in that workshop. But the main understanding regarding the whole process of CCBs came through working with CCBs….A UC nazim had about six or seven villages in his UC. He could [then] educate the people." (Kaisar)

11.2.2. CCB Verification: Sahiwal DG CCB policy included criteria according to which CCB proposals could be scrutinized and approved by officials. Verifying the need of proposed

CCB project and community involvement during various stages of the proposed project, and scrutinizing CCB proposals according to DG CCB policy was a formal responsibility of Community Development department (Government of Punjab, 2003b). Community Development department also coordinated with other DG offices for processing of CCB projects during its various stages. As shall be discussed in a later section, Community Development department carried out their responsibilities while being stationed in their offices during meetings with the CCB members and from the registration and proposal documentation provided by the CCB. However, it was not possible for the officials to accurately assess the project information given in the documents or verbally during meeting with CCB members unless they had some in-depth knowledge about the community, CCB leaders and development needs as these actually existed on the site of proposed project. This in-depth knowledge required not only proposed project-site visits but also detailed interaction with the target communities.

There is also evidence from interviews that DN had little trust in the bureaucracy's integrity to honestly perform its functions related to CCBs. Since CCB projects offered little opportunity for commissions to the bureaucracy as CCB project management remained in the hands of CCB leaders during most stages of the project, bureaucracy either remained averse to CCBs or tried to spoil CCB leaders by suggesting to them to inflate the project costs in order to get their contribution back.

> "Policy making or project identification doesn't catch their interest…For them it's the commission which matters. Neither did they ever interfere, nor did we let them….if a CCB project trend started, and if these projects continued to be completed at

comparatively lesser costs than government approved rates and with a better work and material standards in a shorter time, the provincial government may shift all the development projects under CCB schemes. They had this fear. That's why they would try to spoil or delay the CCB projects." (DN)

"[District bureaucracy] wanted to sabotage the CCB system. Eventually they came up with a solution…They would suggest CCB members at the registration to raise the projected cost by 20%, and they will get back their share after DG releases its 80% share. It was the departmental officials who were teaching this new way of corruption." (Happy)

DN wanted to know about the integrity of CCB members and the authenticity of CCB projects demanded before he could give final approval. Also, his level of general trust in bureaucracy was low. Thus DN created an informal verification role for his group's union nazims in order to assure compliance of CCB policy guidelines. DN had the formal authority to give final approval for CCB projects, but he would do it only after he could either himself or through his group's union nazims verify 1) the extent of community involvement that had taken place, 2) the need and public benefit of the demanded project, and 3) nature and integrity of community leadership as represented in the CCB[35]. Union

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[35] Union Nazims were also members of the District Council under the PLGO (2001). In addition to 89 Union Nazims in Sahiwal district, there were 30 special seats for indirectly elected women councillors and 6 seats for workers, minorities and farmers. Sponsoring/verification of CCBs was done through a union councillor belonging to

Nazims and DN also discussed the development need with the community members before a CCB option could be considered or suggested. When a nazim sponsored a CCB project by verifying its authenticity, he/she also assumed a degree of informal political responsibility for authenticity and progress of the project.

> "Union Nazims were not eligible to be a part of the CCBs, but it was their people, the people whom they motivated to register CCBs and deposit 20% share so that they could get projects from DG's CCB funds. They used to bring the CCB schemes to me and they would brief me on the need and nature of the project, they would also tell me about the people in CCBs, that these CCB people were genuine and how they intended to work for the community benefit, and they would ask me to get these CCB projects funded." (DN)

Nazims were in the best position to verify the need and public benefit of demanded CCB projects because they were residents of those communities and had firsthand experience of community's development needs. Since CCBs were frequently associated with LGs and the local Nazim, the political interest of Union Nazims also required that development projects of maximum public utility were recommended. Union Nazims or other local representatives in a community knew CCB members/leaders as a result of long community-based interaction with them. Union Nazims or other local

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DN's group if a union had an opposition nazim. This was because, as will be discussed later, opposition district councillors maintained minimum contact with the DN.

representatives had no formal supervisory/monitoring role in the functioning of CCBs, but they could verify the integrity of community leadership represented in the CCB on the basis of their knowledge regarding the reputation of these people.

> "…..[nazim] will know each and every street and corner of these villages very well. So he is in best position to identify his union's needs. He wouldn't demand an electric supply line in barren fields. He will demand it for populated areas. Nazims always identify development projects which provide most needed benefits to maximum possible people in their constituency. That's the basic interest of nazims….DCO or EDO will know little about it." (DN)

> "Elected representatives cannot be a formal part of CCBs in any way, and departments cannot watch them all the time. Our support is mostly based on knowledge about integrity of the local people that we know for years, otherwise I cannot watch them plan or implement all the time…." (Irum)

11.2.3. Supporting CCBs in district council and DG offices: CCB projects were approved in a separate session during budget sessions of the District Council. Union Nazim also involved in getting political support of other councillors in the district council for approval of the CCB project he/she sponsored. District bureaucracy was not in favour of CCB projects for several reasons, and so it could try to cause procedural delays in approval process or instalment payments of CCBs unless it knew that there was political force behind the project. Nazims also could not abandon a CCB project because

community expected continued support from them. For these reasons Union Nazims also involved in following up on the project in concerned DG offices during its various stages.

> "…you [nazims] have to follow-up on community's proposals in the offices, otherwise our bureaucracy doesn't let things happen in a straightforward way." (Irum)

> "The local nazim would take the project to the council and gets it approved there. He pushes the project further by following it up in departmental offices as well." (Happy)

11.2.4. Contributors in CCBs: There is evidence from interviews that Union Nazims made voluntary contributions to CCB projects when 20% cost contribution could not be raised from the community. Union Nazims made this contribution irrespective of whether they resided in the locality which benefited from the CCB project or not. There is also evidence from the interviews that some Union Nazims may have misused or perverted the CCBs in watercourse sector for getting private benefits for themselves or a few friends. Union Nazims in this case contributed the entire 20% or a large part of 20% community share.

11.2.4.1.   Contribution for maintaining image: In research studies of Local Government elections of Pakistan in 2001 and 2005 by Pattan Development Organization, patterns of landownership, occupation, ownership of movable property items such as cars, tractor, TV, etc, and educational attainment suggest that a large majority of general Union Councilors came from lower or lower middle socioeconomic class while a large majority

of Union Nazims/Union Naib (assistant) Nazims came from lower middle or middle classes (Pattan Development Organization, 2005; 2001).

Union Nazims were socially prominent figures in their unions. Most of them were able to build good reputation as a result of developmental performance as union administration executive heads and as district councilors. Pakistan's traditional political culture of clientelism and patriarchic relationships between leaders and masses has resulted in overdependence of masses on government and leaders (Kabeer, Mumtaz, & Sayeed, 2010; Abedin, 1973). Evidence from interviews suggests that general community had strong expectations from their Union Nazims, including the expectation to contribute towards project cost whether they lived in the community benefiting from the project or not. General community formed these expectations from Union Nazims not only because they were perceived as economically better-off and principal sponsor of a CCB project, but also because communities formed 'good Samaritan' image of the Nazims. This image of Union Nazims was created because of a highly people-centered and focal nature of their roles within the union. Union Nazim or union councilor was the first point of contact in the union if a resident wanted any kind of help in public offices or even personal matters. Union Nazim was freely available to the people and had influence in district offices through the office of DN and also because his position as a district councilor. The functions of Union Nazim defined in the PLGO (2001) are very specific and include providing union-wide leadership for development, organizing management of inter-village municipal infrastructure, and constitution of Conciliation Association (NRB, 2001). However, the role of union nazim got much expanded in real practice to include a number of functions related or unrelated to his/her formal role. Union Nazims felt obliged

to contribute towards project costs in order to preserve their image. A deterioration of image could result in loss of political good-will and social prestige.

> "…In one such projects, I spent 80,000 rupees from my own pocket, in fact I was trapped in a situation by backing the project. People couldn't collect it, then they said you are a wholesale broker in the vegetable market and you are also our nazim……It was not just motivating the people or informing them about the utility of these projects, the main thing was that many nazims paid a good part of contribution money." Hussain

> "I got a CCB registered and needed 60,000 rupees contribution to get a project approved under it. I asked the well-off chaudhries there to contribute a few thousand rupees. I contributed 5000 myself. Just 13000 was collected and the number of 'chaudhries' exhausted.….I deposited the proceeds from the sale of timber and had the water supply laid out for all three villages there. I am not a resident there, but I contributed as well." (Munnawar)

> "……[Nazims] were responsive and treated people with respect. Nazims used to work day and night for solving peoples' problems. At least they would bring some relief to their immediate community. Someone is holding a *panchayat*[36], someone is trying

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[36] *Panchayats,* a carryover from historical village administration in pre-partition India, had never been a formal part of LG systems in Pakistan. However, panchayats are alive in tradition in many parts of rural Punjab. Panchayats are small groups of locally revered people, usually the local dignitaries, who arbitrate in the matters of family or civil disputes among the villagers/local community. PLGO (2001) provided for a formal structure similar to *panchayats* called *musalihat anjuman* (Conciliation Council for amicably settling petty civil/criminal disputes out of the courts). The difference from *panchayat* was that instead of local dignitaries becoming members of *panchayat* because of

> to reconcile disputing parties, someone is running after streetlights
> or a local road, at least some benefits were coming to the people."
> (Asif)

11.2.4.2.   Contribution for private benefit: There was also evidence from the interviews, something not reflected in CCB documentation and least likely to be revealed through structured/semi-structured questionnaires, that some Union Nazims may have registered CCBs through other people (proxies) in order to get projects at DG level which provided them with private benefits. These benefits included profit-making from the works involved in CCB projects and terminal benefit of being the sole or main beneficiary of the project. These Nazims considered CCBs as 'opportunities' for affording people who understood the economic value that a partial investment in CCBs could return to them. Union Nazims in these cases initiated CCB projects on their own and then tried to involve community members so that community benefit could also be built into the CCB project proposed by them. But when other community members refused to take interest or contribute, the Union Nazim registered a CCB through his friends or other community members from lower socioeconomic status who were under his influence. Union Nazim's name appeared nowhere in the CCB registration documents, though he was the main or one of a few main beneficiaries.

However, these projects were limited to watercourse construction since only these projects had the potential to provide terminal benefits of purely economic nature to one or

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their social influence, a group of three conciliators with commonly known integrity, good judgement and respect were to be selected by the union council's elected Justice Committee. Union Nazim had no formal role in working of Conciliation Council except that he/she shall use his/her good office 'to achieve the amicable settlement of disputes amongst the people in the Union' (Section 103, PLGO, 2001). But in actual practice Union Nazims assumed the most important organizing and arbitration/conciliatory role in musalihat anjumans.

few individuals who owned agricultural lands. The CCB founding members in these cases included 'water-sharers' in contiguous farms who agreed to be a part of CCB, i.e. a compact farming community collectively benefiting from a single watercourse, and whose farms were adjacent to the Union Nazim's farm. However, 20% contribution towards project came either only from the Union Nazim or from other water-sharers along the watercourse who wanted to contribute.

53% of private farmlands in Sahiwal district are below 5 acres. Another 32% are from 5 to less than 7.5 acres(Government of Pakistan, 2000). Wage-labour and sharecropping is more prevalent in small (less than 5 acres) or medium (5 to 22.5 acres) farms in Punjab(Government of Pakistan, 2000). These categories of farm-workers are economically dependent on the cultivator-landlord, and could easily be persuaded to be a part of CCB general body[37]. Sharecroppers agreed both because of landlord influence and because they were water-sharers in adjacent farms. Sharecroppers expected increased share in farm produce when water supply to farms increased[38]. The following narratives by a Union Nazim illustrate these points:

> "There would normally be a clever bloke who would contribute 20% and get a road or a soling or a watercourse for himself through a CCB. He would understand that he could get it by paying just 20% of the cost and the rest would be paid by the district government. If the community is not willing to pay anything, he would make his own comparisons. There were some clever nazims..…I have made a watercourse and pavement along

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[37] Contractual tenant farming is more prevalent in large farms of above 22.5 acres.
[38] Total farm production increases as a result of decrease in water losses

my three squares of agricultural land leading up to the derra…. Registering a CCB is no problem. You just have to get 20 or 30 people together and fill in some forms and submit a few documents. The CCB gets registered. But this CCB is run by just 5 or 10 people; nobody else is going to contribute." (Sindhu)

"We don't register a CCB ourselves. We ask other people to do it. Besides, it's not the political or non-political people, it's the people who have money who run the CCBs. We invest the money. You have to do it if you want to put such participatory projects to good use. Otherwise community is neither willing to participate, not does it understand its collective benefits…..The whole story was that I called all the water-sharers along that watercourse and explained to them the utility of a concrete watercourse. I told them that if we build such a water course we will have more water available and there will be no losses through seepage or water theft. They would have to contribute a few thousand rupees each. They said they didn't need it. I told them that they will be able to get this watercourse at a cost of just their labour. They said: no thanks, we don't want it[39]. I said alright then, I will make the watercourse myself, you just put your names here…." (Sindhu)

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[39] Punjabi expression *'nai ji, sanoo nai chai daa'* delivered with a grin, meaning that we don't want it because we know your hidden motive behind it, or that we are not foolish to trust you.

This category of Union Nazims had accomplices in the DG offices. They knew the 'official rates' at which DG Local Development projects were awarded to the contractors. These rates included contractor profit margins and were always above the actual costs of the projects because of the commissions paid out in various offices of the DG through which projects had to be processed. As per law, CCBs could not charge any profit on the works they carried out. But detailed cost estimation of CCB proposals was made by the sectoral office of DG under which the demanded project category fell (Government of Punjab, 2003b). The Union Nazim who wanted to draw private benefits from CCBs could also make profit in participatory projects by paying out some commission and getting cost estimated at the official rates. However, unlike government contractors who have to pay out commissions to the DG offices during project implementation stage as well, CCBs implemented projects without any involvement of DG offices. As a result, a CCB could easily make profit out of inflated cost estimates. The Union Nazims backing the project could also make profit by arranging procurement of building materials and save cost by providing part of the labour. The net result was that Union Nazim was able to get back his 20% project cost contribution and a privately-benefitting project as well. It was corruption in the first place since CCBs were estimated at inflated cost by bribing the officials in order to get back 20% cost contribution. It was also elite capture of CCB projects since participatory projects meant for providing benefit to section or a subsection of a community were perverted to benefit a few rich and operational practices resulted in private gains for the Union Nazim, i.e. making profits on supplies or works involved (that was also not legally permissible in CCBs). Union Nazims who engaged in such practices

justified them since they believed that CCBs were business opportunities for those people who were smart and who understood the value of CCBs.

> "We know the rates at which contractors do the projects for the district government. They prepare proposals at least 50% above the cost they are actually going to spend on the project. They have to adjust 30-35% for the commissions paid out to bureaucracy and 5% for tax. Then they also have to adjust their profits. We get the CCB proposals estimated at the same rates, you just need to pay a small share at this stage, but we don't have to pay any commissions later since we don't get them implemented through government departments. We also save by way of doing some part of the project ourselves or by providing some material as a supplier. That saves the labour and some money comes out of it as profit earned on supplies. We spend the a little more amount on the project than the government contractors and are able to get back our original contribution. (Sindhu)

Although it was not possible to know the exact number of CCB projects captured or perverted by the Union Nazims, these are expected to be few. It was against the political interest of a local representative who intended to contest local or higher level elections in future to engage in such a practice. Membership in CCBs and scope of CCB projects could be engineered in registration documents. Community involvement could also be shown from friends or compliant dependants in the rural community. But a misused CCB

project could not remain hidden from the general community for long. The word would eventually spread in the community and reach the DN who may not trust that Union Nazim afterwards. Opposition also kept looking for something against the Union Nazim. If they found any evidence of corruption or misuse in a CCB project, they could use it to damage integrity and political goodwill of the Union Nazim.

"In case of DG projects, people understand that when projects are being implemented by the government departments, and nazims' have no role. But once a CCB project is being carried out, people know that local nazim must be behind the CCB and the project is being implemented by a community group. Union nazim's opponents live in the same community as he does, so they will be more active in checking and looking for any problems in the project. If they are able to find one, they start giving applications against the CCB and the local nazim to the DN office or social welfare department so that any goodwill accruing to nazim because of the project can be converted into ill-will….That's why CCB projects are closely watched by the local residents and us as well." (Fatiana)

11.3. Public awareness, confidence and trust:

The formal design of CCBs required both community *involvement* and community *contribution in* the participatory projects (Section 11, 13 & Schedule1, Government of Punjab, 2003b). CCB program in Punjab was expected to be broad based through

involvement of different sections of general community in decision making during different phases of CCB project. CCB program also intended to build elements of community self-help and ownership in development projects through 20% community *contribution* in project cost. Success of the CCB programme thus depended on broad-based participation by all socioeconomic sections represented in the general community. This, however, depended on level of *public awareness* regarding the concepts of public participation in development, i.e. self-help, ownership, community-capability, collective effort, etc.

There was no repertoire of public knowledge regarding broad-based participatory development in Punjab when CCBs were introduced in the LG system of 2001. The limited public participation programs of early 1980s, i.e. 70%-30% Small Village Level Development program and 50%-50% Matching Grants System of early 1980s, had been unpopular and long been a dead letter (Siddiqui, 1992). The prevailing public knowledge and local development norms were also contradictory to participatory development.

CCBs were intended for collective benefits to the general community. Proportion of the poor class in general communities in Pakistan is substantially large, i.e. 60.2% of Pakistan's population lives below the $2 a day poverty line (World Bank, 2008). Evidence from the interviews in district Sahiwal suggest that 1) general community's awareness regarding CCBs increased mainly as a result of observing ongoing or completed CCB projects in which they had no direct involvement and interacting with peers with regards to these projects, i.e. non-project-specific involvement in the ongoing participatory program, 2) increased awareness of the poor regarding CCBs as a result of non-project-specific involvement led to an increase in their confidence in the system of CCBs and trust in leaders sponsoring or managing CCBs, 3) poor decided to contribute towards project cost after their awareness,

confidence and trust level had been built to a satisfactory level through non-project-specific involvement and once they directly involved in project-specific development need identification process. It was through direct involvement in development need identification that the poor could select a project in which they perceived social and economic value for themselves.

Thus public awareness, confidence and trust with regards to CCBs were instrumental in the proliferation and popularization of participatory development programme among the general communities. Although general community participation in CCB projects, including both project-specific involvement and cost-contribution, did not reach a high level during 2001-2010, it gradually increased after the first experiences of elected local representatives and communities with CCBs. Gradual increase in public awareness, confidence and trust with regards to CCBs in Sahiwal can be best seen in the three progressive stages of participatory development (discussed in next section) visible in data from district Sahiwal (See Table 11.3). Since total number of CCB projects approved and completed was increasing with each successive stage till CCB programme was obstructed by Punjab Government in 2008, it is concluded that there was a cumulative effect on level of community awareness, confidence and trust in each stage.

There is also evidence from the interviews that CCBs generated temporary employment and materials-supply business opportunity in the communities irrespective of the participatory development stage during which a project was undertaken. The poor members of community participated in CCB projects by way of providing labour when civil works involved in CCB projects offered them 'good' daily-wage labour.

"Most CCB projects we had in the unions involved some kind of civil works in street pavements, waterways or classrooms construction. CCBs normally drew labour from the local community to do this work…. Government projects are not like that; their contractors have their own labour so why would they hire locals…." (Fatiana)

"…..they were interested in getting educational facilities for their children, and they could get make good *dayhari* [unskilled or semiskilled daily-wage labour] as well…..Most labour was provided by general members or the community." (Irum)

11.3.1. Stages of participatory development in district Sahiwal:

11.3.1.1. **Initial experience stage:** During first experiences of Nazims and communities with participatory development, CCBs were registered by well-off community members after participatory option was suggested to them by the Nazim since he/she could not get their development demand accommodated through the fully-funded development budget. The few community members who decided to take up CCB option at this stage were usually better educated and able to understand the economic 'value' of CCB projects. They also had the means to contribute 20% cost. Consequently, both interactive involvement and cost contribution in CCBs was limited to the aforementioned few. If Union Nazim or CCB leaders in Sahiwal district tried to inform general community about the participatory project and raise contribution from them at this stage, they generally refused to participate due to lack of awareness about CCBs, confidence in the system and

trust in leaders. Lack of CCB awareness during initial experience stage in district Sahiwal could be attributed to following reasons:

a) Initial public sensitization to participatory development did not take place since no public consultations/debate was initiated regarding CCBs before their introduction. No attempt was made at any level of government to build community awareness and education through wider public awareness campaigns after the introduction of CCBs in PLGO, 2001.

b) LG system of 2001 recognized 1) dissemination of information regarding matters of public interest and 2) facilitation in formation and functioning of CCBs, as formal functions of Union Nazim as part of Union Council (Section 76-i&88-c, NRB, 2001). Although the law did not fix clear responsibility for public awareness regarding CCBs, it can be argued that Union Nazims were expected under the law to raise CCB awareness in the general community. However, evidence suggests that Union Nazims in Sahiwal district were not proactively educating general communities regarding CCBs. The awareness that was initially built regarding CCBs was largely a result of 'reactive guidance' by the elected local representatives to certain community members showing interest in CCBs. These community members represented only the well-off classes in the community.

c) Another potential source of awareness for the general community was actual experience in CCBs. The number of CCB projects being approved was increasing during the initial years of CCBs (Table 11.3). But since it were the high-status community members who decided to contribute and utilize CCBs only as instruments for fulfilling development needs they had already identified or decided among

themselves, the need to involve poor classes did not arise with them. Thus this source of awareness was also closed to the general community.

d) Yet another source of community awareness could have been completed projects providing collective benefits within the community or in neighbouring communities. Community awareness could also increase when they enquired peers having some knowledge about in-process projects. However, as can be seen in the Table 11.3, only 15 projects were initiated during the first year and 45 projects were initiated during the second year of CCB programme in district Sahiwal. Out of these, a mere 16 projects could be completed during the first two years of CCB program in Sahiwal district. Thus sources of community learning from observing and enquiring about in-process or operating examples were also limited during the initial stage.

In absence of general awareness campaigns, proactive education by the local elected leadership, interactive involvement in CCBs under process and completed projects within the community that demonstrated how a CCB project provided a desirable collective benefit, general communities had little or no *awareness* of the concepts of participatory development and the new mode of development that was being suggested to them. The economic value of CCB projects was that community could get large collective benefits by contributing a small part of the cost. But since general community had not yet been exposed to CCB regulations and procedures through involvement or demonstration, its *confidence* regarding working of CCBs and how these instruments of participatory development actually lead to collective benefits to the community was also low. As a result general community had little interest in CCBs.

"Initially people did not have the awareness, or may be it couldn't afford. They didn't appreciate the value they could get for the community by contributing just 20%." (Hussain)

"Besides poverty, there was another reason why people did not participate initially. That reason was their lack of confidence; they were not confident how the little money they contributed could actually lead to the completion of a project that had such a high cost, obviously they were not a part of it." (Tarik)

Table 11.3: DG Cost Share and Number of CCB Projects Approved and Funded, DG Sahiwal 2001—10

Years	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	**2001-10**
Number of Projects Approved in Budget	0	15	45	67	0	82	66	4	0	279
Number of Projects where Funds Released	0	15	45	67	0	82	3	0	4	216
Number of Completed Projects	0	7	9	45	12	59	41	38	1	212
Approved cost in Budget (Mill. Rs) for New Projects	0	2.875	21.988	65.648	0.000	87.711	113.968	1.240	0	293.43
Funds Released (Million Rs) for New Projects	0	2.875	21.988	65.648	0.000	87.711	9.968	0.000	1.24	189.43
Funds Released & Utilized (Mill. Rs) for New & Ongoing projects	0	1.962	11.068	47.870	4.707	76.315	30.951	12.426	3.619	188.918
Average Size / Approved Project (Million Rs)	0	0.192	0.489	0.980	0.000	1.070	1.727	0.310	0.000	1.052
Average Size / Funded Project (Million Rs)	0	0.192	0.489	0.980	0.000	1.070	3.323	0.000	0.310	0.877

Source: Computed from DG Sahiwal Budgets and CCB Budget Utilization Documents 2001-02 to 2009-10 (see accompanying DVD: Folder 4-Sahiwal Development Budget Utilization) and CCB case files from Sahiwal DG records (summarized in 'Folder 6-Sahiwal CCBs Project-level Data' in accompanying DVD)

The concept of community contribution in development was also contradictory to the repertoire of public learning and prevailing norms regarding local development. This may actually have served as a roadblock to raising community awareness regarding CCBs. Fully-funded development works had been a norm in the past. Current DG projects under the LG Development programme were also fully-funded by the government. The past learning had led to the popular belief that taking care of all collective development needs was solely a government responsibility. People were accustomed to spending private resources only for private goods. If people paid for civil works of some kind, they did it only for private benefits. General community did not expect government to contribute anything towards a project which was initiated by private people. People also believed that government didn't have any funding problem: If government could fund 80% of the cost, it could also fund 20%. As a result of contradictory past learning and prevailing norms, general community, most of it poor, was unable make sense of CCBs.

> "[General] people did not have much knowledge about CCBs in the beginning. They would think why the government would contribute rest of the cost, and if the government could pay 80% of the cost, it shouldn't have any problems in paying the other 20%. They didn't understand what their public participation in development meant. They thought of CCBs only as spending personal money…...[people] had been looking towards the government for all their problems, hardly ever taking responsibility for improving their conditions, then why they should do it now. (Tarik)

There was a general deficit of *trust* in leaders. One union nazim compared examples of giving charity at durbars or shrines of ancient religious-spiritual personalities with giving charity at formal religious institutions to illustrate the poor level of people's trust on their leaders. This illustration has cultural meanings and shows how deep is people's general distrust of each other and specifically of their leaders of all categories when it come to placing their money at their disposal in the hope of its honest use. There is a promise of great worldly and eternal reward for charity in general in Islam. But there is special emphasis on feeding the poor in teachings of Islam[40]. Although there are no special places where the poor could be fed, nor there is any specific religious importance of graves/shrines of religious personalities except the Prophet of Islam, shrines have assumed cultural importance in Pakistan as a result of historical interaction between cultures and religions. There is a cultural practice of giving charity, especially food, directly to the poorest in the society who often flock to the famous shrines looking for help from the better-off. It has become a part of religio-cultural beliefs that shrines are special places for acceptance of supplication to God, especially when accompanied by the practice of charity. Charity-givers also know that they could always find the destitute at the durbars that are genuinely deserving of their charity. Further, food is also least likely to be redeemed in cash at durbars since the people to whom it is given directly are obviously in great need of it and there are no intermediaries that manage and dispense the charity on behalf of charity-givers. Thus people happily give away food directly to the obviously needy at durbars. Leaders from well-known institutions of Islamic learning are the ones expected to be most God-fearing, and, therefore, least likely to pilfer peoples'

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[40] Thus many Islamic charities include feeding the poor as main objective in their missions, e.g. the UK based large Islamic charity IRSA has the mission 'Feed the Poor' (http://feedthepoor.org.uk/)

money given in charity through them. But people are not willing to trust even this category of leaders anymore because they fear their charity will be misappropriated by them acting as institutional intermediaries. Instances of corruption by political and bureaucratic leaders are well known and much more common.

> "People do charity only at *durbars*; they give away food there. But contribute nothing towards their area's development. They say that government should do everything. May be people do want to contribute towards public welfare, but they don't have any trust. Even if they give charity to Jamia Rashidia[41], they have this fear that their money will be eaten up by the high-ups of the institution. This doubt is strong in our minds because we are not honest ourselves. Whoever comes to the fore as a leader would plunder recklessly, people know it from history. If money gets collected, many projects of public welfare could be done. But as a nation we don't trust each other. CCBs are [also] like that…. most people have this doubt that their contributions will be embezzled." (Munawwar)

Leaders needed to prove their integrity and trustworthiness by demonstrating process and end value of CCB projects to the general community before they could ask them to contribute. Otherwise it only raised doubts of the people about intentions of the elected or CCB leaders when they asked them to contribute a small percentage of cost in a public project. Since corruption and dishonesty is rampant in government and society, general

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[41] A large local religious education institution

people saw any suggestion by the elected or community leaders encouraging them to contribute as a potential hoax to deprive them of their money.

11.3.1.2. **Intermediate stage**: At an intermediate stage, general communities had an opportunity to actually observe the under completion and operational CCBs within their own and adjacent communities. As can be seen in Table 11.3, 209 CCB projects were approved and released funds out of which 132 were completed from 2002-03 to 2006-07. CCBs *awareness* at this stage spread mainly as a result of social interaction among peers and direct observation by community members who could now witness for themselves the working and community benefits of CCBs. People could judge for themselves whether a CCB provided benefits to many or a few. Drawing example from others, general community gained *confidence* in how CCBs could be utilized to address many of their own development deficiencies. For instance, farmers learnt how their peers increased farm produce by constructing concrete waterways through CCBs during the first stage. CCB projects in health, education, community development, and sports sectors offered services free or at a nominal price. Any community member could observe or utilize these services whether s/he participated in these projects or not. Community's *trust* in elected representatives and community leaders also started to build if they observed them play their roles in CCB projects honestly.

> "I will say that a change in that culture had just started to begin. Anything which is new has different results in the initial years and different results in the later. Now people had just stated to understand that if we could have a water supply by paying a

marginal cost, then we should have it, but it was only after they had some good examples….. Their confidence had been built to a good degree after they had seen so many contributory projects work around them. Now their doubts about right use of their money were also going away, they could see that their contribution will not be stolen by the nazim or the government. The awareness and consciousness among masses, that was not there earlier, had just started to build…. Again by looking at others getting more irrigation water through concrete watercourses, the traditional farmer was now thinking about water losses through seepage in earthen watercourses. They were now thinking about construction of concrete watercourses, better schools and better healthcare."

(Hussain)

Intermediate stage involved a transition from no or insignificant participation by general community to *start* of participation by general community. Participation by the general community in this stage was in form of non-project-specific involvement in overall CCB programme that was going on in same community or neighbouring communities. *Community awareness, confidence and trust* were built at this stage as a result of non-project-specific involvement of general community during general progression of CCB programme in district Sahiwal.

Although some CCBs may have realized the necessity of involving general community to some extent in development need identification process for specific projects at this stage,

all contribution towards 20% cost still came from well-off classes in the general community represented in CCB executive committee members[42].

> "They may have asked people about their problems, but the main question is *who contributes*? A condition for CCBs is that first CCB has to deposit 20% in the government's account and submit the deposit slip to CD department…..So you could proceed only if you have been able to raise that amount. When wealthier people make contributions, they are naturally the ones who lead..…This pattern has not changed much, most of the CCBs have been registered and run by middle class, they have the means to do it. (EDO Community Development)

Evidence from the interviews suggests that there were social class differences in both rural and urban communities in Sahiwal district and these differences were visible in CCB membership classes as well. CCB executive members in villages belonged to high or middle socioeconomic classes while the non-executive members came from the lower class. While leadership positions (i.e. executive committee) in the urban CCBs are likely to be in the hands of high-status individuals, both middle and lower socioeconomic classes were represented in general body of urban CCBs.

> "In rural areas these projects have been largely supported by well-off people. Well it's all types of people in urban CCBs, but when people came to meet with us for registration or development proposals from villages, we could easily see the difference between

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[42] CCB executive committee includes CCB chairman, CCB secretary and other CCB officials (Government of Punjab, 2003b)

> chairman or secretary and the general members." (EDO Community Development)

Public *awareness-building* at this stage required spread of CCB knowledge. Since the upper (middle or high) class members held formal decision making roles in CCBs, spread of CCB knowledge among general community at this stage depended largely on whether social class differentiation restricted inter-class communication. Restricted communication between classes could restrict spread of CCB knowledge from the well-off to the poorer classes both within the CCB, i.e. from CCB executive committee to general members, and from CCB to general community. Inter-class communication becomes restricted in feudal or feudal-type culture where there is absolute or near absolute dependence of the poor on the rich. This dependence is largely based on highly disproportionate distribution of economic resources, especially land, between a few extremely rich and powerful and a large number of extremely poor and powerless. Norms of feudalistic culture and associated poor confidence of the poor stop them from seeking any information or clarification from the rich. Feudal-type culture does not exist anywhere in district Sahiwal, though a show of symbolic feudal prestige in form of ownership of large tracts of land or large herds of cattle still exists in some villages of river Ravi belt in Sahiwal distinct.

> "Most cultivator landowners in our district own 2 to 5 acres of land. We don't have big landlords." (DN)
>
> "….there is also a pride associated with large herds of cows and buffaloes, you see it's more a leftover of feudalish prestige in our

> river belt. Call it false pride, feudals are long gone, but the show-
>
> off survives." (DN)

Evidence from interviews suggests that social class differences were not deep enough to restrict free communication between community members from different social classes represented in both urban and rural CCBs. General community could also freely communicate with CCB general and executive members regarding the working and benefits of CCB. Social class differentiation was reflected in the formal roles assumed by community members in the CCB, but it was not a barrier in dissemination of CCB knowledge. This was strongly expressed by a respondent when she used the Punjabi expression '*ji hazoor*' meaning absolute compliance and awe in a relationship of complete domination of one by the other. The expression was used to show rejection and detest against the bygone feudal culture in which the poor could not even talk freely with the rich because of fear and feelings of self-worthlessness.

> "Many people may not know the dictionary meanings of the words *chare-man* or *sak-tree* (Punjabi phones), but they have grown up listening to these words and they know these words mean high status. You can see it in our CCB, almost all general members of our CCB were from poorer working class, chairman and executive members were from middle class, these things are important in villages…..[but] this is not interior Sindh that people cannot communicate with each other, that you are big and I am small and I will be afraid to say anything except *ji hazoor* [so be it, Master]."
> (Irum)

11.3.1.2.1. Intermediate stage participatory development in rural areas: A village is a traditional unit of community in rural areas in Pakistan (Abedin, 1973). There are 530 villages in Sahiwal district with an average area of 1493 acres and average population density of 2.4 persons per acre (Table 11.4). Although population density is low in villages, the level of intra and inter-village interaction is not likely to be low because of peculiar characteristics in Sahiwal's rural society.

Villages in Sahiwal are generally deficient in infrastructure and other amenities of life since successive governments have paid less attention to villages. Because of their economic, administrative and political centrality and greater population concentration, the level of development in towns is much higher in Sahiwal district. Villagers in Sahiwal district are highly critical of this discrimination against rural areas. Accordingly, the felt need for development in villages is high.

> "Town-folks think that since they live in towns therefore all the development and municipal facilities should to come to them as a matter of right. They think that there is no need for services or development in rural areas….[town-folks] think the people in rural areas are mud eaters who need nothing such as the modern facilities of life. They don't realize that humans have similar needs." (Anwar)

Table 11.4: Area and Population of Communities in Sahiwal District

Union Council	Community Unit	Population (2010)	Area (Acres)	Population Density
	Circle 1	7693	330	23.31
	Circle 2	6872	310	22.17
Chichawatni City I	Circle 3	15922	570	27.93
	Circle 4	8810	310	28.42
	Circle 5	11927	370	32.24
Chichawatni City II	Circle 6	9036	330	27.38
	Circle 7	11823	500	23.65
	Circle 8	9503	460	20.66
Chichawatni City III	Circle 9	6900	340	20.29
	Circle 1	7705	580	13.28
	Circle 2	9080	580	15.66
Kameer	Circle 3	8149	600	13.58
	Circle 1	10344	130	79.57
Sahiwal City I	Circle 2	8412	95	88.55
	Circle 3	15127	160	94.54
Sahiwal City II	Circle 15	15014	180	83.41
	Circle 5	13115	140	93.68
Sahiwal City III	Circle 9	13750	190	72.37
	Circle 6	6355	110	57.77
Sahiwal City IV	Circle 10	12939	220	58.81
	Circle 7	10656	120	88.80
Sahiwal City V	Circle 8	9929	100	99.29
	Circle 20	15414	210	73.40
Sahiwal City VI	Circle 21	11594	190	61.02
	Circle 11	7356	85	86.54
	Circle 12	5956	70	85.09
Sahiwal City VII	Circle 23	8649	95	91.04
	Circle 4	9190	105	87.52
	Circle 13	12568	125	100.54
Sahiwal City VIII	Circle 14	10529	115	91.56
	Circle 18	16764	150	111.76
Sahiwal City IX	Circle 19	11527	100	115.27
	Circle 16	5011	100	50.11
	Circle 17	16468	210	78.42
Sahiwal City X	Circle 22	7374	100	73.74
14 Urban Union Councils	35 Census Circles	10499	239	43.93
75 Rural Union Councils	530 Villages Average	3578	1493	2.40

Source: Computed from Pakistan Population Census 1998 and Punjab Development
        Statistics, 2010

Rural life is relatively simple. Less complex life in villages also means that there are fewer other attractions for people. If some development work starts or some completed project starts to deliver benefit, it catches great attention and interest of the rural people—both because it is less usual and because there is a greater felt need for development.

In contrast to towns where clannish ties are less significant, clannish identities are an important determinant of population settlements in villages of Sahiwal[43]. Rural areas in Sahiwal are inhabited by sizable pockets of *biradarees* living in same or adjacent villages. Literally meaning a 'brotherhood', a biradari has common ancestral lineage from a tribe. Although the prestige and social power differences associated with different biradarees has eroded over time, rural people still maintain a strong identity with and pride in biradari. The main instrument that maintains the integrity and continuation of biradari is intermarriage[44]. Villagers in Sahiwal district frequently travel to other villages in the vicinity where they have biradari or family ties. Social bondage based on family or biradari is very strong in rural society in Sahiwal. According to rural customs in Punjab, 'hours of happiness and sorrow' of even little significance obligate visits by a relatives or biradari fellows in same or other village.

[43] The name 'Sahiwal' itself comes from the ancient tribe *Sahi* or *Sahu* that still lives along the river Ravi belt area to the northwest of Sahiwal City. Tribal or *biradari* identities are generally stronger in northern part of the district adjacent to the River Ravi. This part of the district was inhabited by various tribes before the annexation of North-West part of pre-partition Punjab by the British colonists in 1849. The British Indian government settled this part of the district by mapping the land, allotting 'landownership titles' to the incumbent tribal heads, and apportioning land revenue obligations amongst them. The new settled district lies to the south of this belt and was largely settled after independence of Pakistan in 1947. Most people inhabiting the new settled district migrated from Indian Punjab or later from other parts of the Pakistan's Punjab (Gazetteer of Sahiwal available at http://www.sahiwal.gov.pk/gazetteer%20book.htm, accessed on 24-10-2011).

[44] Biradari still gives a sense of collective security and identity to the individual within the wider society. Since agriculture is the mainstay of economy and agricultural landholding is the basis of social power in rural areas, biradari intermarriage assures that landownership does not go outside the biradari. There is also some uniformity in social habits and norms held within a biradari.

Most people in villages are employed in a single occupation, i.e. agriculture. The villagers also travel to adjacent villages for work when they have rented out land or when they work there as sharecroppers.

> "We have to go to all of these villages in hours of *shadi ghami* [happiness and sorrow], it is like that in village biradaris. That's how the contact is sustained in our rural areas." (Fatiana)

> "….our people in villages usually have family or biradari ties in nearby villages and so they frequently visit other villages….some of them work or have rented [cultivable] land in adjacent villages. When they see a neighbour doing something beneficial, they say why can't we do it? Just like a melon catches colour by seeing another. Most CCBs have happened in this way during our second term. First we were telling them about CCBs, how to register them, or how to deal with bureaucracy. Then they learnt from each other. Eventually CCBs spread in the people gradually and with experience." (Fatiana)

When people observed a CCB working or providing benefit to community in their home village on in a neighbouring village, they became interested in knowing about it. Besides the great need for development that exists in villages of Sahiwal, a source of strong motivation for villagers in Sahiwal district was achievement of other communities. The Punjabi phrase literally meaning 'a melon catches colour by seeing

another' conveys a combined sense of 1) peer *learning* through observation and 2) *inspirational motivation* in a group of peers. Rural folks in Sahiwal not only *learned* more about CCBs from direct observation and interaction with peers when they travelled to other villages, they also gained motivation to make similar effort to improve some conditions of underdevelopment in their own village.

> "The awareness and consciousness among masses had just started to build. People who used to say that there is no need for water storage and filtration were now looking at others doing something about it…..They were now changing their changing their opinions that clean water supply is in fact needed. Again by looking at others getting more irrigation water through concrete watercourses, the traditional farmer was now thinking about water losses through seepage in earthen watercourses. They were now thinking about construction of concrete watercourses, better schools and better healthcare….They were learning it from each other." Hussain

11.3.1.2.2. Intermediate stage participatory development in urban areas: Roughly comparable to census circles within constituent union councils in each town, there are 35 urban communities in Chichawatni, Kameer and Sahiwal towns of Sahiwal District (Table 11.4). Urban communities are small in size (average 239 acres) and have a high population density (average 44 persons per acre). Urban communities within the towns in Sahiwal district are laid in close spatial proximity to each other. Since there

is a higher level of complexity and interdependence in urban life, urban community members are expected to have greater social interaction and exchange of social and economic values at individual and institutional levels. Urban residents are also more mobile than their rural counterparts. As a result urban community members are expected to have a greater chance to observe CCB projects working and *learn* about CCBs both within their own communities and across adjacent urban communities. Since urban literacy rate is much higher than rural literacy rate in Sahiwal district (71.8% and 53.5% respectively), urban residents are expected to have developed a quicker understanding of CCBs than their rural counterparts when they observed CCBs and communicated with peers regarding CCBs(Government of Punjab, 2008). Media is also more active in town and plays a greater role in raising public awareness regarding development works.

> "……[but] in urban areas people are enlightened, they understand CCBs. The public is watching here, media is also active. People keep on moving round in towns. I come across four or five CCBs on my way to district council. When I go to *ghalla mandi* [grain market] for some business, I can see the CCB road myself."
> (Arshad)

CCBs offered an opportunity to the communities to fulfil their development needs through collective effort. CCB process involved CCB registration, project-costing and proposal making on prescribed formats, civil works requiring certain technical skills and

dealing with community development and accounts offices of DG. When general community *learned* about these things by direct observation and interaction with peers within and across communities, their *awareness* level regarding CCB increased. Their *trust* level in elected leaders sponsoring the CCBs and CCB leaders managing the projects increased when they saw these projects actually delivering benefits for the general community. They also gained *confidence* in CCB system when they observed how small contributions could be converted into large collective benefits through the instrument of CCB. The main advantage of non-project-specific involvement of general community at this stage was that their general attitude towards CCBs improved as a result of increased confidence in the system and trust in leaders. The prospects of participatory projects in the next stage were higher in a community with greater knowledge and favourable attitudes towards CCBs. However, General community was still not involved directly in consultations or cost contributions aimed at specific CCB projects.

11.3.1.3. **Later experience stage**: By this stage some CCBs which had first experiences in participatory projects started to demand more projects. These CCBs had gained enough *working knowledge and confidence* to demand new projects without any motivational support or proposal-making facilitation from the elected representatives. New CCBs were also being registered and demanding projects as a result of *awareness, confidence and trust* acquired by the general community in the intermediary stage. It is expected that community awareness, confidence and trust building continued to rise in this stage as a result of peer interaction and direct observation of operational CCB projects since a total of 212 projects had been completed and delivering services by 2009-10 (Table 11.3). In

contrast to the earlier practice of development need identification only by a few better-offs, different sections of general community were being involved in the process of development need identification by both old and newly registered CCBs because of the following two reasons:

11.3.1.3.1. Independent identity of CCBs: Participatory projects at this stage were no more an alternative solution suggested by a local representative to a section of community demanding a certain project. CCBs had now established an identity of their own in public consciousness. Older CCB officials and members had been interacting with the general community in an ongoing dialogue of local development during earlier stages. New CCBs were now an outcome of general community's collectively felt and deliberatively identified development needs for which they wanted a participatory solution. The practice of interactive involvement of the community for collective development need identification *before* new CCB registration or CCB proposal-making started to institutionalize at this stage. CCBs at this stage were crystallizing as agencies for involvement of general community in local development projects of collective benefit. Reactive guidance and suggestive role of the local representatives declined in this stage. The main role of elected representatives at this stage shrunk to assure the need and community benefit of the project.

> "There has been so much of good work in this area that today people say that contributing 20% towards construction of these watercourses has been the best decision that they ever made for their local improvement. Any person who would use the watercourse for irrigation of his farms happily participated in the

scheme. People had long demanded new school in our village 98-6R. We couldn't construct all new school, but people had good example of watercourses in 100-WM. Then they said we could increase the capacity of existing village schools by constructing new class rooms through CCBs. I said OK, they registered a CCB and raised 20% from the community. Then we built additional class rooms for the school." (Muneeb)

"At a later stage awareness about CCBs had developed and people would themselves suggest CCB options. We used to give them a go ahead. The only thing we would assess was the need of the project and its benefit to the community." (DN)

11.3.1.3.2. Need for broader resource base: Older CCBs had to involve the general community in the process of development need identification before they could be requested to contribute. General community would contribute in a project only when it saw a need for the project and some desirable value resulting from a project. Old CCBs at this stage needed to expand their resource base if they wanted to undertake more projects for the community. It could be difficult for the same well-off people who had contributed the 20% project cost in earlier project to contribute again and again. Newly registered CCBs also expected a broader resource base if different socioeconomic sections in the general community were involved in the need identification process.

"These CCB members undertake one project at a time. Before they demand another one they hold consultations with the people about the need of a project, otherwise it is difficult to raise the money. Then they would collect their 20% share amongst themselves and whatever poor people in the community were willing to take on, then they took their proposal to the concerned local council….Similarly some people from my UC came to me and said that they want to build a road which is beneficial to their community, that they had consulted with the community and it was willing to make a CCB and pay 20% of its cost. I said OK, let's look into it. Estimates for that road were prepared, and that road was also constructed." (Asif)

Evidence suggests that the poor as the largest group in general community participated in terms of both project-specific involvement and contribution at this stage. Poor's awareness, confidence and trust had been built to a certain level during earlier stages. When they were directly involved in need identification process in this stage, they were able to see a value in CCB option for fulfilling a developmental need felt by them. As a result they also contributed towards the cost of projects.

"Children of rich people don't need a good school in the village: they will drive to a private school in the town in any case. Poor people need good schools at door step……in my experience people

contribute happily if they see a value for themselves in the project. Its not difficult for each household to raise 500 rupees in a village of 1000 households. What they get is a first class school for their children. A big farmer will get private tube wells. Small farmers are more interested in watercourses." (DN)

However, community share of project cost was not equally divided amongst all the community members benefitting from the project. There was general consideration in the communities that the poor had limited capacity to contribute. But at the same time there was also a need to expand resource base for participatory projects. As a result it became acceptable that the poor members of community contributed smaller amounts or whatever they could while the well-off members of the community made larger individual contributions towards the project cost.

"….there will be a little amount for an individual if we could spread the 20% share over a sufficient number of community members. It used to be like that for most common people. The wealthy would contribute more." (Happy)

Most foregoing evidence suggests that decision making positions in CCBs (i.e. executive committee membership) remained in the hands of well-off community members. Also, no evidence was available from the interviews that decision making positions in CCBs (i.e. executive committee membership) in district Sahiwal ever passed into the hands of the

poor. It can thus be concluded that leadership of CCBs remained in the hands of non-poor even in the last stage of participatory development in Sahiwal.

11.4. Local group politics:

During the first LG term (2001-02 to 2004-05), no unified opposition group existed in Sahiwal's district council. Some Union Nazims during the first LG term had personal or party-based political opposition to the DN[45]. But this opposition remained weak because of 1) its smaller number and 2) because opposition Union Nazims could not find leadership support from any Pakistan Muslim League—Qaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) party member of Punjab or National Assembly from Sahiwal district. PML-Q party was able to form governments in Punjab and at the Centre after 2002 general elections. Rai Hassan, Sahiwal's DN from 2001-02 to 2009-10, had political support of leader of PML-Q party's local group leader in Sahiwal district during the first term of DG. As a result DN Sahiwal did not face any organized or strong opposition in district council during the first term. The PML-Q Sahiwal's leader was also a senior minister in Punjab Government.

"…..first time there was no government at the province or centre. It was also sort of an independent election, the opposition in district council came from only eight or ten union nazims who had personal or political differences with Rai Hassan. But second time it was his behaviour and equal treatment with all unions in the

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[45] Union nazims were directly elected heads of union administrations and ex officio members of district council as well.

division of development funds that got him success in DN elections." (Hussain)

During October 2005 elections of DN Sahiwal, Rai Hassan, contested and won the election for a second term against Punjab's Chief Minister (CM) backed candidate who was also son-in-law of PML-Q's leader of Punjab Government group in Sahiwal district.

"Lodhi sahib's brother was Chairman District council in 1998. Rai sahib supported him then. Then Arshad Lodhi supported Rai Hassan in his election as a DN in 2001. Then Lodhi sahib tried that his son (in-law) should become the DN in 2005, but Rai Hassan decided to contest DN election again. Lodhi sahib had PML-Q's backing but they couldn't win the election. Rai became the DN again and a tussle started between the two groups, one headed by Lodhi and the other by Rai." (Anwar)

Union Nazims who supported Punjab CM's candidate in DN Sahiwal election of 2005 constituted opposition in Sahiwal's district council during the second term. The opposition group in district council was formally headed by Naveed Aslam—a Union Nazim from Harrapa Union and CM's candidate in DN elections of 2005—during the second local government term from 2005-06 to 2009-10. However, the actual leadership and power of opposition group in Sahiwal district council lay in patronizing by the aforesaid Punjab Government's senior minister. He had a personal dislike for DN because 1) Rai Hassan had

contested DN election against his son-in-law, 2) he believed that his son-in-law was not being accorded the importance by the DN that he deserved and 2) he believed that DN opposed Punjab Assembly PML-Q candidates in the general elections who had his support. As a result an intense rivalry developed between DN and Punjab's Senior Minister Group (locally called the 'Lodhi' group) in district Sahiwal. In addition to the PML-Q MPAs from Sahiwal district, all opposition Union Nazims in Sahiwal District Council were aligned with Lodhi group. Consequently, a well-organized and fair-sized opposition group existed in Sahiwal District Council during the second term of DG.

"You see we contested election for district nazim. He bought votes and we lost the election by just 20-25 votes. I was a minister at that time. As a minister I am looking after my constituency. But as union nazim, there was this good boy of ours, he is also our son [in law] and he is very important and all that. But he was ignoring him because he contested election against him. And then during the general elections, this district nazim has outright opposed our candidates." (Provincial Minister)

"There was no grouping in the first term. In second term there were about 30 opposition members in the house of 126." (DN)

11.4.1. Effects of local group politics on CCBs at district council level: CCB budget utilization data from Sahiwal district shows that a very small proportion of CCB projects were

utilized in union councils during both LG terms when there was an opposition union nazim at the head of Union Administration (Chart 11.3). A total of 127 CCB projects were implemented in Sahiwal district during the first LG term out of which only 15 projects (11.8%) were in unions with opposition nazims. During second term of LGs, a total of 85 projects were implemented out of which only 13 projects (15.3%) were in the unions with opposition nazims.

Chart 11.3: DG CCB projects implemented in union councils when union nazims were from government and opposition groups, Sahiwal DG 2001-2010

■ First term 2001-02 to 2009-10   ■ Second term 2005-06 to 2009-10

Total CCB project implemented	CCB projects implemented when Union Nazim was from Government Group	CCB projects implemented when Union Nazim was from Opposition Group
127 / 85	112 / 72	15 / 13

Source: Computed from CCB Budget Utilization reports (see 'Folder 4-Sahiwal Budget Utilization' in accompanying DVD) and Union Nazim/District Councillor lists during 2001-2005 and 2005-2009 (see Folder 9 in accompanying DVD)

Evidence available from interviews suggests that local group politics, or *palti-bazi* (making local groups for playing partisan politics) in Punjab's political discourse, existed at Sahiwal district council level. *Palti-bazi* had its origin in electoral groups formed during LG elections and involved 'opposition for the sake of opposition' in district council. Palti-bazi generally had a negative effect on participatory development in Unions with opposition group Union Nazims because of 1) tit for tat politics in district council, 2)

minimized interaction between the DN and opposition union nazims, and 3) different preferences for utilization of CCB funds.

> "But in *palti-bazi*, there is opposition in the [district] house for the sake of opposition. All of the projects are primarily given to nazims of own party, others don't get it straightaway, they have to involve some Rai [DN] group's member, or maybe put some pressure on Rai Hassan." (Sindhu)

11.4.1.1. **Tit for tat politics in district council:** Evidence suggests that local group politics led to discrimination against opposition unions when CCBs supported by opposition Union Nazims were not approved by the government group majority in the council. The opposition group in Sahiwal district council identified with the PML-Q group of MPAs from Sahiwal district. The minister did not let any special provincial grants come to DG Sahiwal except its usual development share from the Punjab Finance Commission. The local group polarization was so strong that the opposition group, or Lodhi group after minister's name, would try to stall certain DG projects initiated by DN or his group of Union Nazims in the district council by using provincial government power. DN's group in the council greatly resented this and retaliated by blocking CCB projects supported by the opposition group nazims. Evidence also suggests that DN group District Councillors may have applied pressure on the DN not to approve CCB project backed by opposition councillors for inclusion in the draft budget.

> "I registered a CCB myself. We arranged its members and chairman….We submitted proposal under it, submitted all the

documents, we even deposited our 20% share. But the proposal was not approved…. We fell victim to palti-bazi. If there are MPAs from N League or PPP, they don't let the system work. When there were MPAs opposed to the DN, they would try to create hurdles in their own way. Obviously this would be responded in the [district] council." (Anwar)

"….the union nazims who did not support DN were a part of the group who got our funds stopped from above, obviously then we would also say to the district nazim that why he gives funds to the nazims who get our funds stopped from provincial government…..…then DN would act accordingly. (Asif)

11.4.1.2.   **Minimized interaction and communication**: Local group politics also resulted in minimization of interaction and direct communication between the DN and opposition group Union Nazims. Making contacts with DN or his group could have resulted in sharp criticism or exclusion pressures for an opposition nazim since the provincial minister patronizing the opposition group in district council had a strong dislike for the DN.

As a result of local group politics in Sahiwal district council, fewer DG general development funds were being channeled in unions with opposition nazims. Further, these funds were being used according to development needs identification by the union councilors or Union Vice-Nazims opposed to the Union Nazim. However, projects identified by the opposition Union Nazims were being funded through provincial

minister's or his group's MPA's development quotas. Opposition Union Nazims may also have feared losing provincial funds for their unions if they tried to establish contact with the DN for CCB projects.

> "We were able to survive through 8 years of opposition only because of Arshad Lodhi sahib, because he was a senior minister in Punjab. All nazims from my group would get funding directly from Punjab government, whether their union constituencies fell in our PA constituency or not….they got funding through lodhi sahib's (discretionary) fund, or Lodhi sahib would get them funds through MPA of their constituency. Some funding to our group would come through MNAs of our party as well. Lodhi sahib was senior minister, his development funds would be in tens of millions. It wouldn't bother him if he gave 2 or three million to each of us." (Naveed)

As discussed earlier, DN Sahiwal had carved out an informal role of Union Nazims for verifying authenticity of CCB projects and building political responsibility of union nazims. This role required direct interaction between DN and the union nazim sponsoring a CCB project. It became difficult for the opposition union nazims to get a CCB project approved by the DN for their unions when they failed to communicate with DN for playing their verification role. Aside from communicating with DN for sponsoring/verifying CCBs, opposition Union Nazims generally did not maintain any contact with the DN. However, a few opposition nazims who were able to contact the DN

directly or through a friend in his group for making necessary clarifications and verifications regarding a CCB in their union were able to get CCB projects approved for their unions.

> "…..there wasn't any cooperation with the opponent group. Opponent group was never helpful, opposition nazims don't even meet with DN, local group politics is like that. (Muneeb)

> "I think the communication between the DN and opposition gets minimized….Well a few of us may have got some projects by making personal contact with him or by approaching him through one of DN's group nazim. He didn't give anything in my UC, that's what I know for sure." (Anwar)

11.4.1.3. **Preferences for utilization of CCB funds:** Evidence suggests that DN and opposition leader had very different preferences for utilization of CCB funds. LG system of 2001 made Tehsil/Town Municipal Administration (TMA), the middle tier of LGs, responsible for municipal services in both rural and urban areas. However, TMAs in Sahiwal district failed to provide satisfactory municipal services to rural areas. Opposition leader wanted CCB funds to be spent on expensive machinery for providing municipal services in rural areas of Sahiwal district. However, DN believed that DG could spend development funds only in those sectors which came under its formal-legal purview. Since municipal services came under TMA, DG could not spend district CCB funds on municipal-related machinery.

"Sewer lines have been laid in all the villages of Sahiwal district, but unluckily we have not been able to get sewer sucker and pumping machines. Each machine would cost just 8 million….We kept on shouting for four years in district assembly that, this CCB fund that you are siphoning off, why don't you buy these sewer and pumping machines from CCB funds? That would be the best use of CCB funds." (Naveed)

"They couldn't get schemes for parks or water supply or sewer drains because these functions come under municipal affairs performed by TMAs. Our Nazims could give proposals only for school development, district roads, Basic Health Units and dispensaries which fall under DG purview." (DN)

11.4.2. Effects of local group politics within unions: Evidence suggests that palti-bazi existed independently within unions as well. Evidence suggests that intra-union local group politics can play both negative and positive roles with regards to CCB projects proposed for implementation or implemented within the union and sponsored by the Union Nazim. Intra-union *palti-bazi* could create hurdles in the way of CCB progress within a union by shaping public opinion against a CCB project. Political opponents of the Union Nazim created hurdles in the way of a CCB project known to be backed by a Union Nazim by spreading doubts in the minds of the local community about the CCB and persuading them not to contribute towards the project cost. When local groups within rural

communities were dominated by rival biradarees, inter-biradari jealousy could also contribute to opposition of CCB projects initiated by rival biradarees.

> "…there is lots of *palti-bazi* here, if I say that this project is useful and it should be taken up, the opponent party will say for no good reason that it should not be taken up….Opponent group doesn't want that CCB project to be carried out because they believe that the political credit and good name for the project will go to the group which has made this CCB. Community is already reluctant to contribute anything. The rest is done by the opposition party by creating doubts in the minds of the people." (Sindhu)

> "Sometimes Biradariism plays a role in CCBs, if a person from one biradari is doing a public welfare work, the other biradari will not support it." (Munnawar)

However, palti-bazi can also play a positive role within the unions by acting as a monitoring mechanism guarding against perversion or corruption in CCB projects. When a Union Nazim sponsored a CCB project, his opponents closely watched the project. If they could find an evidence of corruption in the project, they could use it to damage political goodwill of the Union Nazim. Thus local group politics created extra pressure for the Union Nazim to remain vigilant about any corruption in CCB projects.

> "Union nazim's opponents live in the same community as he does, so they will be more active in checking and looking for any

problems in the project. If they are able to find one, they start giving applications against the CCB and the local nazim to the DN office or social welfare department so that any goodwill accruing to nazim because of the project can be converted into ill-will…….That's why CCB projects are closely watched by the local residents and us as well." (Fatiana)

11.5.   Provincial Government Policy:

There is evidence that CCBs continued to rise in popularity by the close of second term of LGs in district Sahiwal in 2009-10 since a total of 279 CCB projects had been approved by Sahiwal District Council during its two terms from 2001-02 to 2009-10 (see Table 11.3). However, a new provincial government was installed in Punjab in 2008 which was opposed to the ideas of empowered LGs and participatory development. As a result, only 7 out of 70 projects approved in 2007-08 and 2008-09 were released funds by the district bureaucracy now working under direct instructions and control of Punjab Government. Local Governments are a Provincial Government responsibility in Pakistan (Article 140-A, Constitution of Pakistan, 1973). Punjab Government could not formally stop CCB programme in the LGs unless it legislated for amendment to the existing system or for a new LG system in the province. However, Punjab Government found an easier way by stopping funding to CCB projects.

"We could have continued a useful relationship with Pakistani community and that NGO in Australia as well, in fact they were interested in education and health sector collaboration and I had a

CCB arrangement in mind, but then DGs were crippled after new provincial government took office in 2008, they stopped our development programme entirely, there was no use following that lead then….." (DN)

This suggests that policy orientation of provincial government has a direct effect on participatory development in LGs. In case of Punjab's districts including Sahiwal, Punjab Government policy after 2007-08 had a negative effect on continuation of CCB programme in DGs. Evidence from Sahiwal district also shows that effective policy reversal on CCB by Punjab Government in early 2008 also had a regressive effect on community confidence on government backed systems and popularization of participatory development. As reported by a Union Nazim, they faced great difficulty in getting community contribution returned when Provincial Government stopped the release of funds to projects that had already been approved in 2007-08 budget, and for which community had invested effort and resources. Drawing lesson from experience in the previous year and not wanting to earn further public ill-will in the current year, only 4 projects were finally approved by the District Council in 2008-09 (Table 11.3). But funds to even these projects were not released before the next year. No CCB project was approved by the District Council in the final year (2009-10) of Sahiwal DG. As a result community confidence in state-initiated participatory development system and trust in government and its leadership that had taken two terms of LG to build suffered a reversal. The process of communities' continuous learning regarding participatory development also stopped.

"But then this newborn public confidence suffered a shock. I got CCB projects approved in 2007 for classrooms in our two schools. People contributed their 20% and the proposals got approved. But now 2 years have passed and the funds have not been released for these projects. The new government stopped all the DG CCBs. With great difficulty we got the money contributed by the community back and returned it to people. How they are going to trust government in future? People would have taken initiative on their own in such projects had the process rolled on for another LG term or more. I got a watercourse constructed under CCB. Now people are saying that get us more watercourses like that. How could we get them any watercourse now? We are already returning the money people contributed in the projects 2 years back. Public awareness was rising, and so was public confidence. But new provincial government shattered this public confidence." (Tarik)

11.6. CCB Leadership by the non-poor socioeconomic classes:

It has been discussed that leadership positions in CCBs remained the hands of middle or upper class during all the stages of participatory development. These were also the people who contributed larger part of project cost. As shall be discussed later, there was evidence that CCBs were possibly or definitely misused by their leaders from non-poor classes in some cases in order to draw private benefits for themselves, i.e. elite capture. CCB leadership by higher-status individuals in these cases negatively affected the participatory development in

district Sahiwal. However, evidence from the interviews suggests that this was not the general case. As shall be discussed below, leadership by the non-poor had a positive effect on overall participatory development programme in Sahiwal district. Intention of the CCB leaders in Sahiwal district was the main factor that determined proper use or misuse of CCB projects.

> "The important thing is that your intention should be good in undertaking such projects. CCBs in my opinion have been carried out in a clean and fair way in most of the cases here in Sahiwal. Wherever these have been misused for private benefit to a few, action has been taken against those responsible." (District Officer)

In most cases it was not the intended capture of the CCB projects or class-based exclusion of the poor by the better-off which motivated the middle or upper class individuals to assume leadership in CCBs, rather there were certain participatory development design and bureaucracy's issues associated with class characteristics that made the better-off more likely to register CCBs, make participatory development proposals and execute CCB projects. Given the socioeconomic characteristics of poorer sections in communities, institutional design of CCBs and prevailing attitudes of bureaucracy, it can even be argued that participatory development programme in Sahiwal district may not have achieved the degree of popularity and success it did if middle or higher socioeconomic class members had not taken leadership roles in CCBs.

11.6.1. CCB design and social class: CCB registration, proposal making and project management process was governed by CCB regulations issued by Punjab government. A

fair amount of time and effort had to be invested in CCB projects during various stages. Lower class in Pakistan is characterised by lower levels of education and income. 60.2% of Pakistan's population lives below the $2 a day poverty line (World Bank, 2008). Day to day survival issues leave them with little or no time and savings to engage in CCBs. Basic literacy in the lowest wealth index quintile of Sahiwal district is only 29.5% whereas it is 46.6% in the second lowest quintile(Government of Punjab, 2008). Only 29.7% of age group 10-14 years attend middle or secondary school in district Sahiwal (Government of Punjab, 2008). 15.6% and 21.9% of these children belong to lowest and second lowest wealth index quintiles respectively[46]. Because of lower levels of literacy and education in the poor class, it was difficult for them to understand the legal procedures and carryout formal paperwork involved in CCBs. CCBs involved administration of civil construction or procurement activities. CCB regulations also required some relevant experience in CCB membership for assessing the project implementation capacity of the CCB (4th Schedule, Government of Punjab, 2003b). The lower classes generally lacked the administrative skills or experience that was required in management of CCBs. Government-dependency attitude is also stronger in the poor and less educated.

> "There were all types of, I mean rich and poor people in it. Financially well-off persons would normally be made its secretary and chairman. It is also a consideration that the secretary should be able to spare time to go to the offices for dealing with CCB affairs. The consideration for the executive body of 7-9 people is that they

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[46] 43.7% of children in the same age bracket attended the primary schools.

should be able to monitor the project and do the necessary paper work." (Asif)

"These people are also better educated and easily understand the value of CCB projects....I think they are able to appreciate the general problems of the community because they don't have day-to-day survival issues." (Irum)

Upper and middle class community members were usually the first to understand the economic value of CCBs. However, a simple understanding of economic CCBs' value was not enough to motivate well-off people in the community to spend private resources for public projects and lead the process of CCBs: the attitude of government dependency had also to be broken. Within the upper and middle class there were a limited number of community members who appreciated the value of CCBs to the point that they actually contributed towards project cost and led the CCBs. Under the traditional design (pre-2001) of local development, all development needs had been met through fully-funded government programs. There is a commonly held assumption in Pakistani society that local development is solely a government responsibility. Public assumptions regarding government's role in local development and government's traditional fulfilment of its expected role has resulted in overdependence of people on government for fulfilling their local development needs. However, since the need for development spending in Pakistan has always been much higher than government's resources, only a limited number of local development needs get served through government programmes.

The need to lead participatory development in the communities aroused because some community members from the higher socioeconomic classes recognized that fulfilling collective development needs, which also benefitted them as part of community, through CCBs was preferable to waiting endlessly for government projects under conditions of underdevelopment. The leadership of these community members lay in breaking the attitude of dependency on government and doing something about local development through self-help and self-determination of local development needs. Evidence suggests that it was mainly the self-interest of some higher socioeconomic class community members *embedded* within the overall community interest which motivated them to take up CCB projects, i.e., these community members decided to take initiative and contribute 20% project cost only when they saw some personal needs fulfilled as a part of community needs. They were able to better understand and appreciate the value of CCBs because of 1) better education, 2) relative freedom from day-to-day economic survival, 3) an understanding of undesirability of overdependence on government, and 4) a motivation to fulfil some personal need that could be served as part of a collective development need of their community. These better-off community members initiated and led the participatory development process with or without the financial support from the poor.

> "…it so happened in many CCBs in our district that some well-off people contributed 20% from their own pockets and got the projects completed which provided personal benefit to them, although they provided benefit to the community as well. But generally people don't contribute….though they benefit from that project as well. They understand the benefits they will have by

paying a fraction of the cost, but still they have this attitude, why should we spend, government should do it, you see even the educated class has this general attitude, only some have come out of it. Only some from our middle class who really appreciate the value of CCBs have used them. The current era has brought on much more poverty. Low income class really don't have the capacity to contribute." (Munawwar)

CCBs required 20% project cost contribution from the community. It has been discussed before that pattern of distribution of this cost over the community depended on the willingness and ability to pay of the different classes represented in the community. Upper socioeconomic classes also had the confidence that they could raise financial resources amongst themselves even if general community refused to contribute. They could ask the general community to contribute. But if contribution from general community was not forthcoming, they could raise it from few amongst themselves. Registration process of CCBs required that CCB application should be accompanied by the names of first Chairman, Secretary, and 25 general founder members of whom 7 to 15 should be executive members (Section 5&12, Government of Punjab, 2003b). A function of general body was to elect the chairman and other office bearers for two years term[47] (Section 7, Government of Punjab, 2003). But since no general body formally existed before registration of the CCB and there was no mention of first election schedule of CCBs, the first executive committee would practically be self-selected for two years.

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[47] Extendable by another term

Thus appreciation of CCB value and greater ability to raise contribution led upper or middle class community members to register CCBs and assume formal leadership roles in CCBs. Favourable conditions set in CCB regulations allowed them to hold these positions at least for the first two years of CCB.

Economic and community value of CCBs could be equally understood and appreciated by some poor members of the society with some level of education. However, it is highly likely that their confidence to raise 20% community share was low because:

a) The necessary contribution could not be raised by a limited number of poor people appreciating the value of CCB if the general community refused to contribute

b) Raising contribution from a large number of people required considerable time and effort which the few CCB value-appreciating poor could not afford

c) Evidence from interviews suggests that social class hierarchy was also visible in leadership rank hierarchy in rural CCBs. The poor may have felt less confident in getting support, including financial contribution, from the rich or middle class community members when they (the poor) held formal leadership roles in CCBs. Leadership titles in voluntary associational forms in Sahiwal communicated social status in the local community. Leadership titles going to the poor class members could have undermined the social prestige of the upper classes thus rendering them less likely to support CCB initiatives by the poor.

> "Well in our villages there is a little class issue as well. As a general rule the socially or economically better-off would be reluctant to be in the came category as the working class poor, but it does not mean that there is a wall between rich and the

> poor….people here generally don't have any barriers in communicating with each other, but when you put them in a situation where there are titles and types of works, class distinctions come into play….people have moved out of feudal culture. But yes, if you are a run a village shop or work in the farm and you are also CCB chairman, then Chaudhry sahib will have some pain in the tummy." (Irum)

11.6.2. Bureaucratic attitudes and social class: CCBs had to interact with DG offices for the purposes of registration, demand-making, progress verification and instalment release. Just like many other administrative states of the developing world, bureaucracy in Pakistan has acquired high social status because of its wide powers and control over the people. Because of their lower socioeconomic status, lower classes may have had little social confidence or assertiveness to interact with bureaucracy as equal partners in local development.

> "….what we should talk about a poor man, even a landlord with a fair sized holding would think twice before he would go to meet with the bureaucracy or the deputy commissioner. He would wonder how the bureaucracy would treat him once he goes to meet them…(Asif)

11.7.Misuse/Elite-capture of CCBs in Sahiwal District: Ill-intentioned leadership of participatory development:

As discussed before, leadership positions in CCBs remained in the hands of higher-status individuals. Union Nazims had the role of political sponsorship of CCB projects. It has been

discussed in section on 'secondary leadership's role in CCBs' that some Union Nazims may also have been general or personal beneficiaries of CCB projects, though officially they were not members of CCBs. As with most Union Nazims elected in Punjab under PLGO (2001), most Union Nazims in Sahiwal also belonged to middle class (Pattan Development Organization, 2005).

> "You will see that quality of UC nazims is better than, or no less than, any other type of public leadership. This is so because they are educationally better off than others, they are practically sound because most of them are into field." (Hussain)

When these non-poor community members assuming various leadership roles with regards to CCB projects manipulated decision making process to get greater advantages for themselves or the interest group they represented, it became elite-capture of CCB projects. The term '*misuse*' of CCB projects used by various respondents represents the *field-equivalent* of '*elite-capture*'. However, the term 'elite' is used here in a broader sense to mean 'better-offs' or 'high-status' members of the community as opposed to the disproportionately large poor class in Pakistan.

> "…you cannot call them exactly *aala tabqua* [high class or elite], but generally executive members are better-off than a majority of people. In our CCB there were school teachers, there was a retired government officer….small zamindars [cultivator-landlords] and businessmen were also represented in executive committee." (Irum)

Accordingly, the term elite-capture includes both middle and upper socioeconomic class members channeling most benefits of CCBs towards themselves or the groups they represented. The term 'misuse' of CCB projects was commonly used by the elected local representatives, community leaders and DG officials in Sahiwal to mean the following malpractices in CCBs:

a) Manipulating project approval and/or progress verification process. This type of misuse involved paying out commissions to officials for getting approvals at proposal and installment release stages of project. When paid commissions by CCB leaders or elected representatives behind an 'ill-intended' CCB, officials did not object to procedural shortcomings or irregularities in project proposal or work bills presented by the CCB. Approval of (CCB) proposals without fulfillment of legal criteria, approval of proposals at inflated costs, and approval of inflated works bills without necessary verification or auditory procedures were the usual malpractices involved.

b) Taking out 20% community share from project installments paid according to inflated cost approvals or from inflated or forged work/materials procurement bills.

c) Making additional profit (after extraction of original 20% cost contribution) by inflating forging works/materials procurement bills.

It has been discussed in the section on secondary leadership that corruption in CCBs could not remain hidden from the community for long. CCB misuse was detrimental to participatory development not only because it led to generating bad reputation for CCB system in a community, but also because it weakened the trust of the community in the elected representatives who politically sponsored the CCB projects and community leaders who managed the CCB projects. Misused CCB projects were also least expected to add

anything positive to the knowledge of the general community regarding participatory development—firstly, because ill-intentioned leaders supporting or managing the project had reasons to keep their machinations hidden from the community, and, secondly, because there was no involvement of general community in decisions of these projects.

11.7.1. Types of private benefits available from misused CCB projects: The elite could reap two types of private benefits by misusing CCB projects: process and outcome/terminal benefits.

a) **Process benefits:** These could be reaped during various implementation phases of CCB project. These benefits included monetary benefits that could be made as a direct result of works or materials procurements involved in implementation of CCB projects. Process benefits also included return/extraction of 20% share originally contributed by the few well-off individuals. Process benefits were available to the 'ill-intentioned' CCBs in all development sectors allowed under the DG CCB policy.

b) **Outcome/terminal benefits:** This type of benefits is also economic in nature and could be reaped by the elite as a result of CCB operations, i.e. outcome benefits. As has been discussed in the section on 'secondary leadership's role', these benefits were available to ill-intentioned CCBs in Sahiwal only in watercourse sector because of the following reasons:

i. Social sector projects such as public schools, skills development centers or basic health units by their very nature produced collective services to the community and did not offer any income from operations to the private individuals. Only watercourse projects offered increases in private agricultural income through

increased water-supply to farms. The elite who wanted to personalize project outcomes wanted individual as against collective *and* economic as against social outcome benefits.

ii. Because of the class structure and division of work patterns in rural Sahiwal, landowning class held comparatively more social and economic power, though distribution of power between classes was not as unequal as in feudal-like/feudal society. Landowner cultivators could ask the tenant sharecroppers on their farms to be a part of general body of CCB or support them during meetings with the community development office or when Union Nazim verified need of the project. The tenants would agree in the hope of higher shares in the future agricultural income or because of social influence of the cultivator landlord. However, the permanent benefit of watercourses could be guaranteed only for the landowner since they could terminate the services of a sharecropper any time, or simply refuse to increase tenants' share since CCBs rules did not bind them into such an agreement (Government of Punjab, 2003b). As evidenced in the forthcoming narrative, the cultivator landlords in a few cases also tried to change the watercourse's plan of implementation in order to have water-supply only for their farms.

11.7.2. Categories of misused CCBs: According to evidence available from interviews and CCB utilization data and CCB case files available from Sahiwal DG, there were 'irregularities' or symptoms of misuse in 79 out of 212 CCB projects (i.e. 37.26%) completed during 2001-2010 (see Table 11.5 below). Subsequent installment(s) of DG share of project cost

were stopped or delayed in each of these 79 cases until the concerned CCB was able to rectify the identified problems and show satisfactory progress. These projects represented 56.856 million rupees or 24.18% of the total cost of CCB projects completed.

Table 11.5: Confirmed and possibly misused CCBs in Sahiwal DG, 2001-10

Reason for blocked/delayed payments as 'remarked' in CCB case files.	First term 2001-2005	Second term 2005-2009	Total
Confirmed Misused: Unsatisfactory progress/Bills forging	29	0	29
Possibly Misused: Billing Objections/ Unsatisfactory Progress	22	8	30
Possibly Misused: Billing/Audit Objections	4	16	20
Total	55	24	79

Source: Computed from Sahiwal DG CCB Budget Utilization Reports (Folder 4 in DVD) and official CCB case files (see 'Folder 6-Sahiwal CCBs Project-level data' in accompanying DVD)

Evidence suggests that the original intention of the CCB leaders in these cases was to get projects implemented only through DG funds. Thus the first action of ill-intended CCBs was to take back/extract entire or a greater part of its 20% share after DG released the first installment for the project. If CCB leaders wanted to extract any remaining community share from a subsequent installment or if they wanted to make some profit out of the project, they could inflate the wage bills or materials procurement receipts that CCBs presented to DG for claiming subsequent project installments. Based on information available from interviews, CCB Case Files and DG CCB utilization reports, misused CCB projects could be categorized into possibly misused and confirmed misused CCB projects.

a) **Possibly Misused CCB projects:** Evidence suggests that there was possibility of 'intentional' misuse in 50 projects on which 'Billing/Unsatisfactory Progress' or 'Billing/Audit' objections were raised by District Planning or District Accounts

offices during two terms of Sahiwal DG. As can be seen in Table 11.5, there were 'Billing/Unsatisfactory Progress' objections in 30 CCB projects and 'Billing/Audit' objection in another 20 CCB projects as remarked in the CCB case files (see Folder 6-Sahiwal CCBs Project-level data' in accompanying DVD). Evidence from interviews suggest that possibly misused projects bore three *symptoms* of misuse: 1) behind schedule progress even when CCBs had enough funds at hand, 2) higher than market payments for labour or materials, etc, shown on bills/invoices, and 3) dissatisfaction expressed by the general community on their own initiative or during progress verification visits by the District Planning officials. However, these projects were not 'confirmed' as misused because 1) these were completed within 3 years maximum limit allowed for CCB projects and 2) District Planning or District Accounts could not find documentary or 'market-check' evidence to support suspected forgery in bills. Table 11.5 shows the break-up of 'Billing/Unsatisfactory Progress' and 'Billing/Audit' objection CCB projects during first term (2001-2005) and second term (2005-2009) of DG Sahiwal[48].

b) **Confirmed misused projects:** As can be seen in Table 11.5, 29 CCB projects were qualified as 'Unsatisfactory Progress/Bills Forging' in the CCB case files. These projects represented 13.68% of the total CCB projects completed (i.e. 212 projects) and 18.481 million rupees, or 7.86% of the total cost of CCB projects completed (i.e. 235.16 million rupees) during 2001-2010 (Table 11.6).

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[48] Second term of elected LGs under Local Government Ordinance 2001 in Pakistan was practically extended to first half of the year 2009-10 till December 31, 2009, under the constitutional guarantee provided by the Musharraf government through 17th amendment (available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/)

Table 11.6: Confirmed CCB Misuse in
Sahiwal DG, 2001-10

Sector	Total	
	Size (mill)	Number
Education	10.202	12
Health	0	0
Agriculture	5.242	14
Roads	0.25	1
Sports	2.787	2
Community development	0	0
Total	18.481	29

Source: Computed from official CCB performance
reports & Sahiwal CCBs project-level data (Folders-
4 and Folder 6 in accompanying DVD)

This category of CCB projects bore two characteristics in addition to the three *symptoms* discussed before: 1) completion of these projects was delayed beyond the maximum three year permissible limit for CCB projects and 2) forgery in bills/invoices presented by the CCBs was established during scrutiny and market-check by the District Planning and Development office or during pre-audit by District Account office. District Planning Officer referred to projects with these characteristics as 'confirmed' misused projects. These projects were approved and initiated during the first term of DG Sahiwal, but delayed into and completed under stern measures adopted by DG during the second term.

The reasoning developed till this point regarding 'misuse' of CCBs is illustrated in the following narrative from Sahiwal District Planning and Development Officer:

> "…..development planning is our job; they can't dodge us unless we want it. The first sign is when we start getting applications against a CCB or when a CCB is unable to progress according to schedule. In 2006 and 2007 we caught three or four projects where

they were doing something else on ground, it was in these cases that I got threatened. Chaudhries were constructing most length of watercourses through their private land, we forced them to make the channels at planned locations at their own expense or be prepared for appropriation of their land by revenue department. Anyway these cases were rare. The actual problem was with leakage of public money……as per departmental policy the maximum permissible duration for any CCB project was three years. A majority of CCB projects here were small, I mean not more than a million rupees, and all of these projects had a completion time of one year. A small number projects were approved for two years but these were medium or large-sized. If there was budget lapse or some billing mistake, payments could be made by the next budget. But if a project that could be completed in six months time is not completed in two years, then something is not right about it. It's a typical pattern, they take out 20% and show us some inflated bill and make excuses, then we stop their payment and ask them to show progress. Even if payments are released, they repeat the same thing, you see their intention is bad, they want to make maximum money out of these projects. Eventually three year limit is over, then we also find evidence of fake receipts in some cases, these things confirm they have misused the projects……..DG released 33% of it's [part of] share as the first

instalment, then CCB also had it's 20% share. It means a CCB had at least 45% of the total cost at the time of first instalment release. But then if a CCB is not able to complete even 33% of the work as per schedule, it means they are up to something else. The usual pattern here is that they take out their 20% share as soon as the first instalment is released, then they also try to make some profit by cutting on materials cost, naturally this is their original intention. Then they are left with no money to complete the work as agreed, and then they try to inflate the bills or make other excuses…..they eventually get caught when we check the actual progress, or when we talk to the local community or check the bills in the market. Accounts people were also in our 2006 decision, they also started pre-auditing the bills before releasing payments, they couldn't just release the payments like that now because they knew that we were also checking the unusual receipts. You pay two or three hundred to a labourer and have his thumb on six or seven hundred, or you pay three hundred for a bag of cement and ask the supplier to put four hundred on the receipt, do you think all these people will keep silent when we question them?...I don't know what nazims might have told you, but as per our assessment there were about 80 projects in which we found irregularities [precisely 79 in official documents], well we were not able to confirm misuse in all these cases, but we stopped payments in all these cases till we were able

to verify satisfactory progress, it's in their files.......So now when we scrutinize, we return some of the schemes which are deficient. When the scheme would go back, it would require estimation and vetting at different places, and the officials who had signed them would be much more careful now. The money which had earlier been going to the officials in the name of approvals also stopped."

(District Planning Officer)

It is expected that 'Unsatisfactory Progress' in CCB projects declined significantly during the second term because of effective proposal scrutiny and progress monitoring and evaluation measures undertaken by Sahiwal DG. Punjab CCB rules stated that audit of DG CCB projects shall be carried out as 'prescribed by the Auditor General office of Pakistan' (Government of Punjab, 2003b). However, since details of external or internal audit procedures for CCBs were never prescribed, subsequent installments were released to the CCBs during the first term subject to simple approval of CCB bills by the Community Development department. It is expected that bill adjustment or audit objections increased during the second term because of 1) greater bills/invoice scrutiny made by district planning and finance department and 2) start of 'pre-audit' by District Accounts Office[49].

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[49] In a pre-audit by District Accounts Office, CCB bills requesting release of subsequent installments are checked against 1) supplier receipts or acknowledgement of wage/salary payments by the workers, and 2) budgeted project allocations *before* payment of installment cheques to the CCBs.

11.7.3. Patterns in misused CCB projects: Table 11.8 shows patterns in participatory misuse in Sahiwal DG by project size, rural-urban location and development sectors. Three patterns of CCB misuse emerge from Table 11.8:

11.7.3.1.   Total number and size of misused CCBs by development sectors: Largest misuse of CCBs occurred in education and agriculture sector. Education sector accounted for 41.38% of total misused projects and 55.20% of total misused CCB funds, while agriculture sector accounted for 48.28% of total misused projects and 28.36% of total misused funds (see Table 11.9). Only 6.90% of total misused projects were in sports sector, but these projects accounted for 15.08% of total misused funds. Roads sector accounted for lowest 3.45% of total misused projects and 1.35% of total misused funds. It means that while extent of misuse was largest in agriculture sector, magnitude of misuse was largest in education sector. Extent of CCB misuse was next largest in education sector while magnitude of CCB misuse was next largest in agriculture sector. Sports sector ranked next in descending order both in extent and magnitude of CCB misuse while roads sector ranked the lowest. There was no confirmed project misuse in health and community development sectors.

11.7.3.2.   Misused CCBs by rural-urban areas to development sectors: Rural CCB projects represented 74.53% of the total number of CCB projects implemented and 50.49% of the total funds spent on CCB projects while Urban CCBs represented 25.47% of the total number of CCB projects implemented and 49.51% of the total funds spent on CCB projects in Sahiwal district during 2001-2010 (Chart 11.4&Table 11.7). 14.56% of rural CCB projects representing 6.79% of CCB funds utilized in rural areas were

confirmed as misused, while 11.11% of urban CCB projects representing 8.94% of CCB funds utilized in urban areas were confirmed as misused (Chart 11.4&Table 11.10).

This suggests that while the extent of CCB misuse was comparatively higher within rural areas, the magnitude of CCB misuse was comparatively larger within urban areas. However the differences in extent and magnitude of confirmed CCB misuse between rural and urban areas were small, i.e. rural and urban areas were not very different with regards to extent and magnitude of CCB misuse.

Chart 11.4: CCB Misuse Pattern Within Rural and Urban Areas, Sahiwal DG 2001-10

Source: Based on Sahiwal DG CCB Budget Utilization Reports; CCB case files

Within urban areas, the highest proportion of misused CCB projects and corresponding CCB funds was in education sector, i.e. 66.67% of the total misused projects representing 73.23% of the total size of misused projects (Table 11.10). It was followed by the sports sector, i.e. 33.33% of the total misused projects representing 26.77% of the total size of misused projects. Whereas within rural areas, the highest proportion of misused CCB

projects and corresponding CCB funds was in agriculture sector, i.e. 60.87% of the total misused projects representing 64.94% of the total size of misused projects (Table 11.10). It was followed by the education sector, i.e. 34.78% of the total misused projects representing 31.96% of the total size of misused projects.

It means that within urban areas both extent and magnitude of misuse in CCBs was higher in education sector followed by sports sector. Within rural areas both extent and magnitude of misuse in CCBs was higher in agriculture followed by education sector and then roads sector.

Since 1 out of a total 9 sports projects was undertaken in urban areas and 87 out of a total 89 watercourse projects were undertaken in rural areas, these projects can said to be almost exclusive to urban and rural areas respectively (Table 11.7). However, a significant proportion of extent and magnitude of misused projects was in education sector in both urban and rural areas. Further, the proportion of both extent and magnitude of CCB misuse in education sector within urban areas was around twice as large as rural areas (Table 11.10).

11.7.3.3.   Misused CCBs by project size category to development sector: Table 11.11 shows that 72.41% of total misused CCB projects were in the small-size (less than 0.5 million rupees) category and represented 32.48% of total misused funds. 17.24% of the total misused projects were in medium-size (greater than 0.5 million to 1.0 million rupees) category and represented 20.33% of the misused funds. Finally, 10.34% of the total misused projects were in large-size category but these represented 47.19% of the total misused funds. Within small-size category, 52.38% of the misused projects were in agriculture sector representing an equally high 52.98% of misused funds. Agriculture

sector was followed by education sector where 38.10% of the misused projects accounted for 39.74% of the misused funds. Roads and sports sectors combined accounted for less than 10% of the number of misused projects and less than 8% of the misused CCB funds within small-project category. Within medium-size category, agriculture sector again accounted for 60% of the misused projects and 54.88% of the misused funds, while education sector accounted for 40% of the misused projects and 45.12% of the misused funds. Within large-size category, education sector accounted for highest 66.67% of the misused projects and 70.19% of the misused funds while sports sector accounted for 33.33% of the misused projects and 29.81% of misused CCB funds.

In other words extent of CCB misuse was highest in small-size projects while magnitude of CCB misuse was highest in large-size projects. Next highest extent of CCB misuse was in medium-size category while next highest magnitude of CCB misuse was in small-size projects. Least extent of CCB misuse was in large-size projects and least magnitude of CCB misuse was in medium-sized projects. Within small-size category, both extent and magnitude of CCB misuse was largest in agriculture sector, followed in descending order by education, roads and sports sectors. Within medium-size category, both extent and magnitude of CCB misuse were again largest in agriculture sector followed by education sector. There was no CCB misuse in medium-size category in other sectors. With in large-size sector, both extent and magnitude of CCB misuse were largest in education sector followed by sports sector. There was no CCB misuse in other sectors in large-size category.

Table 11.7: Number and size of urban and rural CCB projects completed in Sahiwal District, 2001-10

Sector	Total Number	Urban Numbers	Rural Numbers	Total Size (Mill. Rs)	Urban Size (Mill. Rs.)	Rural Size (Mill. Rs.)	Urban Average Project Size (Mill. Rs)	Rural Average Project Size (Mill. Rs.)	Urban to Rural Average Project Size Ratio
Education	62	14	48	104.05	53.97	50.08	3.85	1.04	3.69
Health	24	17	7	32.92	29.18	3.74	1.72	0.53	3.21
Agriculture	89	2	87	35.07	0.75	34.32	0.37	0.39	0.95
Roads	18	8	10	28.51	6.96	21.55	0.87	2.16	0.40
Sports	9	8	1	17.11	16.86	0.25	2.11	0.25	8.43
Community Development	10	5	5	17.50	8.70	8.80	1.74	1.76	0.99
TOTAL	212	54	158	235.16	116.42	118.74	2.16	0.75	2.87

Source: Computed from official CCB performance reports & Sahiwal CCBs project-level data (see Folder 4 and Folder 6 in accompanying DVD)

Table 11.8: Misused CCBs in Sahiwal DG by Project Size, Rural-Urban and Sector Categories, 2001-10

Sector	Up to 0.5 million				0.501-1.0 million				Above 1.0 million			
	Rural		Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural		Urban	
	Size (mill)	Number	Size (mill)	Number	Size (mill)	Number	Size (mill)	Number	Size (mill)	Number	Size (mill)	Number
Education	1.885	7	0.5	1	0.695	1	1	1	0	0	6.122	2
Health	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Agriculture	3.18	11	0	0	2.062	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roads	0.25	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sports	0	0	0.187	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.6	1
Community development	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	5.315	19	0.687	2	2.757	4	1	1	0	0	8.722	3

Source: Computed from official CCB performance reports & Sahiwal CCBs project-level data (see Folder 4 and Folder 6 in accompanying DVD)

Table 11.9: Percent misused CCBs in DG Sahiwal by number and size to development sectors, 2001-10

Sector	Size	Number
Education	55.20	41.38
Health	0.00	0.00
Agriculture	28.36	48.28
Roads	1.35	3.45
Sports	15.08	6.90
Community development	0.00	0.00

Source: Computed from official CCB performance reports & Sahiwal
CCBs project-level data (see Folder 4 and Folder 6 in accompanying DVD).

Table 11.10: Percent misused CCBs in Sahiwal DG by Rural-Urban areas to development sectors, 2001-10

	Rural		Urban	
Sector	Size	Number	Size	Number
Education	31.96	34.78	73.23	66.67
Health	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Agriculture	64.94	60.87	0.00	0.00
Roads	3.10	4.35	0.00	0.00
Sports	0.00	0.00	26.77	33.33
Community development	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total	6.79	14.56	8.94	11.11

Source: Computed from official CCB performance reports & Sahiwal
CCBs project-level data (see Folder 4 and Folder 6 in accompanying DVD)

Table 11.11: Percent misused CCBs in Sahiwal DG by project size category to development sector, 2001-10

	Project Size Category					
	Up to 0.5 million		0.501-1.0 million		Above 1.0 million	
Sector	Size	Number	Size	Number	Size	Number
Education	39.74	38.10	45.12	40.00	70.19	66.67
Health	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Agriculture	52.98	52.38	54.88	60.00	0.00	0.00
Roads	4.17	4.76	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sports	3.12	4.76	0.00	0.00	29.81	33.33
Community development	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total	32.48	72.41	20.33	17.24	47.19	10.34

Source: Computed from official CCB performance reports & Sahiwal CCBs project-level data
(See Folder 4 and Folder 6 in accompanying DVD)

11.7.4. Conditions favourable to CCB misuse: Evidence from interviews suggests that there were several given conditions under which it was possible for the higher-status individuals assuming leadership roles in CCBs or a few Union Nazims playing the strings of CCBs to misuse them for personal advantage. These conditions could be grouped three broad categories: Socioeconomic conditions, political conditions, and weaknesses in institutional design of CCBs.

11.7.4.1.   Socioeconomic conditions: Certain conditions associated with poverty, i.e. low levels of income, education, social confidence, etc led to little or no interest of the poor class in CCB at least during the initial stages of CCBs. Awareness and participation of the poor class was growing but still limited during the later stages of CCBs in Sahiwal district. The poor constitute the largest class of people, especially in rural areas, of Punjab. Groups or individuals representing higher classes also have some degree of social or economic influence on lower class members in rural areas of Sahiwal district. When lower socioeconomic class members from general community took no or little interest in CCBs, they had little concerns about how a CCB was implemented or to what use a CCB was put. Similarly, it was possible for the ill-intended high class members to use their control over local employment to induce low class community members to become non-executive members of CCBs. The high-status CCB members could then put up a show of poor-inclusion during proposal-stage meetings with the Community Development department or influence poor members of CCB general body to approve the decisions/reports of CCB executive committee. In case of watercourse projects the cultivator-landlord CCB members could even deny the landless sharecroppers registering

as non-executive CCB members any gains in farm produce resulting from increased water supply. Thus socioeconomic conditions in rural areas led to less interested or compliant poor class. The ill-intending high-status individuals could use these conditions to misuse CCB projects.

> "Our poor rural folks are also least educated. When the general community in these villages does not take interest in CCBs, it's a good chance for the chaudhries to misuse CCBs to their advantage. We have to watch if a chaudhry is trying to pack the CCB with the poor tenants working on his farms without offering them any benefit. I wouldn't encourage such chaudhries for CCBs in my union...look, CCBs are good for the community only if it takes active interest in it, otherwise these can be hijacked by the chaudhries, and it's easy for them since they can easily put up a show of community participation [during meetings with officials], CCBs can be misused for private profit-making or for providing private benefit, especially when the general body of a CCB is packed with the poor dependent on chaudhries. But not all of them are the same. The CCB that built a school building in my union is headed by a local landlord. He is from a traditional zamindar family, but he was more interested in education of the children than getting a road for his farms, so I supported him." (Irum)

11.7.4.2. **Political conditions**: Evidence from interviews suggests that there were two broad political conditions that contributed to misuse of CCBs by the elite: Political fervor for CCBs and political compulsions of the elected representatives.

11.7.4.2.1. Political fervor: There was a great fervor for CCB projects among the elected leaders in Sahiwal DG. DN encouraged the union nazims to bring forward CCB proposals from their unions. DN and union nazims also tried to expedite the processing of CCB projects by 'pushing' them in relevant DG departments. This may have resulted in compromising the administrative propriety needed in processing of CCBs. Ill-intentioned elite may have noticed the haste or carelessness in system and got self-enriching projects passed through the departments which would not have qualified had there been a more cautious and prudent process. The ill-intentioned elite did not include only the community leaders represented in CCBs; it has already been discussed that a few union nazims who saw CCBs as investment opportunities also engaged in the capture of CCBs. It may have been even easier for them since they were 'insiders' and had assumed de facto legitimacy to 'push' through the system.

> "[DN] had literally made a distribution amongst his nazims that you bring that much worth of CCB scheme and you present that much worth of CCB scheme…..so most of these schemes were sponsored by the UC nazims. Departmental process was expedited on a similar pattern. CCB were registered by Community Development and estimates got prepared through the departments by making telephone calls to them. When I joined here I noticed

that process was incomplete in some of the CCBs." (District
Planning Officer)

"The local nazim would take the CCB project to the council and get
it approved there. He *pushes* [emphasis original] the project further
by following it up in departmental offices as well. That's how
nazims worked for the CCB projects." (Happy)

11.7.4.2.2. Political compulsions: The term '*siasi majboori*' or 'political compulsion' was used
by various interviewees in both Sahiwal and Attock Districts to defend or explain
actions of elected leaders which could not be defended or explained through other
legal or moral justifications. Political leaders' main interest is in the vote. There are
certain unelected people in each community with a political orientation. These
politically active people have varying degrees of social influence in the subsections of
general community by virtue of their individual or class-based status and close
interaction that they maintain with the people. These people can influence political
opinions and voting preferences of the common man by interpreting the actions of
leaders in power to the general community. In Punjab's traditional political culture it's
very difficult to win over a voter who dislikes a leader for personal or political
reasons. However, it is easy to lose a political supporter if his/her expectations
regarding developmental or other public choices are not met, or shown not to be met,
by the leader. Since the aforementioned political opinion-shapers in small subsections
of community can significantly influence voter behaviour by interpreting the

actions/decisions of leaders in power, it becomes a political compulsion for the leaders in power to oblige their developmental demands—even if these are unjustified.

> "……..political people have a role in shaping local development. In each constituency there are such political people who command votes, and they are obliged by the leaders in power because they have votes. Political people try their utmost to oblige these people from as much groups as they could. It's their siasi majboori [political compulsion] otherwise people will not vote as leaders want. MPs or DN or UC Nazims cannot say no to them, sometimes there is a cost, but they try to oblige them." (Munawwar)

> "I think every elected representative is a little greedy…..Opponents will never be his supporters, he fears that his supporters may not leave him [as well]. Then he gives them a little advantage." (Happy)

Union Nazims were directly elected from smaller rural or urban constituencies comprising of several village or urban communities. Evidence from interviews suggests that Union Nazims may have felt compelled to oblige, whether they knew the ill intention behind the project or not, if unelected political people 'commanding' certain pockets of votes in Sahiwal's communities requested their support for ill-intended CCB projects.

DN was indirectly elected by the union nazims and union councilors from all unions of the district. In addition, DN depended on the union nazims acting as district councilors for the support of his policies and decisions in the DG. Sahiwal DN's also needed greater support from his group's councilors in face of tough opposition from Provincial Government's political group in Sahiwal (Lodhi group). Thus DN may have felt compelled to approve ill-intended CCB projects forcefully backed by one of his group's Union Nazim. This was one major disadvantage of tying participatory development with elected local governments in Punjab.

> "DN also had *siasi majboorees* [political compulsions], people would demand all these CCB schemes from them and he couldn't say no to many of them." (District Officer Planning)

11.7.4.3. **Institutional design weaknesses**: CCBs were designed by the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB)—a federal government agency constituted by General Musharraf immediately after takeover of civilian government in the year 1999—as a part of LG System of 2001. NRB designed the LG system of 2001 and basic structure of CCBs therein with the help of senior federal government officers and independent consultants and NGOs paid for their services by UNDP as a part of its international development program supporting devolution in Pakistan (Iqbal, N., 2008). Detailed design of CCBs was drafted later by NRB and promulgated in form of CCB rules and regulations by Punjab Government in 2003. No institutional consultations took place between NRB and provincial government departments that were engaged in local development planning and implementation in the districts under the erstwhile LG system.

It has also been discussed before that there were no country-wide public consultations or debate regarding the new LG system or participatory development. As a result there were certain weaknesses in institutional-legal design of CCBs that created confusion in implementation of the program and offered opportunities for some ill-intentioned elite and colluding officials to misuse participatory projects.

> "Government's check and balance was not mentioned in the CCB law, it seems as if no comments were taken from anyone when CCB rules were drafted. NRB made these laws without any consultation from any provincial departments and handed them down to districts. In fact all provincial departments…P&D, finance, LGCD, all of them were giving their own guidelines directly to the district" (District Officer Planning)

Institutional design weaknesses of CCB programme emerging from interviews and a critical analysis of Punjab CCB rules were a) flawed assignment of departmental roles, b) ineffective system of 'political' monitoring, c) failure to fix personal responsibility and d) weaknesses in internal structure and functioning of CCBs.

11.7.4.3.1. Flawed assignment of departmental roles: Planning and Development Office of DG had a central role in need assessment and subsequent approval of local development demands made by the communities or sectoral offices of LG under the earlier systems. Planning and Development Office also had a central role in progress evaluation of development projects under the earlier systems. As a central office in development planning of the DG, Planning and Development office coordinated between district

sectoral departments (such as health and education), works executing departments (such as roads and buildings) and district finance and budget office. Planning and Development officials had resources, experience and training in travelling to project sites and performing their developmental roles. Planning and Development Office kept on performing its developmental roles in fully funded LG Development program of DG after the 2001 LG reform. However, Planning and Development office was not given any independent and clear role in CCBs, except an ambiguous role of ranking of CCB proposals according to sectoral priorities set by District Council (Section 14, Government of Punjab, 2003b). Planning and Development department could then forward ranked and selected projects for placement in draft development budget for DN and council approval (Section 14, Government of Punjab, 2003b). However, there was ambiguity in the CCB ranking function as given in the CCB Rules. Section 14 of CCB rules stated that Development and Planning officer was responsible for drawing statements for ranking the CCB proposals for inclusion in the budget. However, the Fifth Schedule to the CCB Rules, which exemplified drawing of statements for ranking of CCBs, stated that concerned CCB official shall draw these statements. CCB official for DG was Executive District Officer Community Development (5th Schedule & Section 2, Government of Punjab, 2003b).

CCB rules stated that Community Development department shall forward only those CCB proposals to Planning and Development department for ranking where legally required documentation was complete in all respects (Section 13, Government of Punjab, 2003). A proposal scrutiny role was implied for Planning and Development office in this section. However this role was not clearly laid out and was open to

interpretations. Similarly, despite the fact that resources and expertise for on-site progress evaluation lay with the Planning and Development office, it was not given any clear progress evaluation function in case of CCBs.

Ambiguity in law created potential for role confusion and role conflict between Community Development department and Planning and Development office of DG[50]. How much role in CCBs was assumed by the District Planning and Development Office in a certain district depended on how assertively and rationally an incumbent head of office claimed this role and how much political pressure he/she was willing to take.

CCBs were registered by the Community Development department of DG which was recognized as the concerned department for CCBs in the DG (Section 5, Government of Punjab, 2003b). Registered CCBs presented development proposals to the Community Development department which assessed community involvement in need identification by meeting with CCB members; facilitated in detailed cost-estimation of the proposal by coordinating with the DG sectoral office with which the proposal was related; and scrutinized for required documentation—including evidence of 20% community share deposit (Sections 11&12, Government of Punjab, 2003b). After necessary scrutiny and cost estimation, final ranking of CCB proposals was carried out either by Community Development department or District Planning and Development office depending on how departmental role configuration took place in each district. Once CCB projects were ranked and placed in draft budget, these had to

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[50] Planning and Development Office is grouped into Finance and Planning Department of DG (Schedule 1-C, NRB, 2001)

be approved by the DN and the District Council. After District Council approval, first installment of CCB was released by Community Development office. Progress reports of the project were to be prepared internally by a project coordinator appointed by the CCB from amongst its members (Section14 & CCB Form 5, Government of Punjab, 2003b). Instead of assigning a clear departmental responsibility, progress evaluation of CCBs for release of subsequent installments was assigned to 'concerned local government' (Section 17.6, Government of Punjab, 2003b). However, in practice progress evaluation also became a part of Community Development department's functions because official forms for reporting progress and requesting subsequent installments were addressed to Community Development department (CCB Form 6, Government of Punjab 2003b).

In addition to unclear role assignment, departmental role for CCBs was also assigned without consideration for institutional capacity. Community Development department was a new structural division created in DG as a result of devolution in 2001. Officers from a variety of sections in the erstwhile DG setup were now re-grouped and posted to Community Development department (Schedule 1-C, NRB, 2001). Community Development department was functionally divided into a number of sections including social welfare (including CCBs), women development, labour and human resources, community organization, sports and culture. CCBs were the only function assigned to Community Development department that involved infrastructure development planning and evaluation. However, Community Development department did not have any repertoire of institutional knowledge or human expertise for performing developmental planning and evaluation functions. Moreover, Community

Development department was not sanctioned needed resources to make necessary verifications at project-sites widely spread over a district of 3200 square kilometers area. Under the CCB rules, Community Development officials were expected to register CCBs, scrutinize and coordinate CCB proposals and assess requests for subsequent installments on the basis of information provided by CCB executive members while being stationed within their offices (Part 2&4, Government of Punjab, 2003b).

The confusion and conflict in departmental roles and departmental capacity issues arising out of a poorly laid out institutional design had practical implications for participatory development in Sahiwal. During the first term of DG in Sahiwal district, Planning and Development office was not assertive in claiming its implied powers with regards to CCBs. In absence of refinement and interpretation of CCB rules by Punjab Government and active role claiming by Sahiwal Planning and Development office, CCB rules were adopted in Sahiwal district as these were interpreted by the DG department 'concerned' with CCBs, and as these suited elected leadership's political preference for CCBs. The CCB process involving 1) CCBs submitting CCB proposals and subsequent progress reports and bills to Community Development department; 2) Community Development department scrutinizing the documents provided by CCBs and recommending these to the Planning and Development department for placement in the budget or to Accounts department for release of subsequent CCB installments; 3) DN approving the CCB proposals for inclusion in draft budget; and finally 4) district council passing the CCBs in final budget, was simple and quick, and favoured by keen elected local leaders.

Consequently, most power and responsibility for processing CCB proposals, evaluating progress of CCB projects and releasing funds to the CCBs was assumed by a single department—Community Development—during the first term of Sahiwal DG when 60% of the total CCB projects were implemented (see Chart 11.3). According to the departmental role configuration and CCB process routine that developed during first term, Sahiwal Community Development department was performing many of the aforementioned departmental functions related to CCBs in the second term as well. However, as shall be discussed later, Planning and Development department was claiming a greater share in departmental functions through redefinition of official roles and 'extra-statutory innovations in DG departmental structure.

> "Once cost estimates are made, EDO Community Development sends them to EDO Finance for the release of funds. Our job is to register CCBs and prepare statements for ranking of these proposals into project classifications. We also coordinate about other issues of CCB projects with sectoral departments [for cost estimation], executing departments [for technical advice on progress evaluation] and finance department [for transfer of CCB payments allocated in budget]." (EDO Community Development)

Corrupt CCB leaders may have found it convenient to settle commissions with a single department in which most responsibility for proposal scrutiny and project evaluation was concentrated. Lack of requisite skills and resource support for development planning and evaluation in Community Development department may

have facilitated the ill-intentioned elite to mask the misuse of CCB projects. Consequently, proposals deficient in certain aspects could be approved and installments could be recommended for projects with unsatisfactory work progress by some corrupt official in Community Development department and Sectoral Office with which Community Development Department coordinated for cost-estimation of the project. It has already been described that 70% of the total CCB projects that were possibly or definitely misused were initiated during the first term (Table 11.5). There was also evidence from the interviews that officials charged bribe from the CCB leaders who wanted to misuse participatory projects. Thus there was great likelihood that weaknesses in institutional design of CCBs led to the ill-intentioned elite to connive with a closed circuit of corrupt officials to misuse CCBs in Sahiwal district.

> "They would suggest CCB members at the registration to raise the projected cost by 20%, and they will get back their share after DG releases its 80% share. It were the departmental officials who were teaching this new way of corruption. But this happened only in a few projects, may be in 1 or 2 percent projects. And it happened where quite influential people were behind the CCB projects ..…Obviously, they had approach in district government departments, they had influence with the officers. It didn't happen where common people were involved in the CCBs. (Happy)

PLGO (2001) and CCB Rules (2003) also failed to provide for a clear audit mechanism for CCB projects. Auditor General of Pakistan failed to prescribe any

external or internal audit mechanism for CCBs as envisaged in CCB Rules (Section 21:4, Government of Punjab, 2003b). Sahiwal District Accounts office did not conduct any systematic pre-audit of CCB bills during the first term, either because Auditor General of Pakistan was expected to provide for a separate CCB audit mechanism or because they did not want to enter in unnecessary conflict with elected leaders. Lack of audit also contributed to misuse of CCB projects during the first term of DG.

> "CCB rules were poorly laid out…EDO CD would say that he had no responsibility once the funds had been released to the CCB. He would ask us to collect guarantees from the CCB. If he is managing funds approval for them and sending the proposals directly to the DN, then he is responsible for demanding completion reports from them. He is also responsible for checking the completion of projects on site. Instead we would write to him that send us the completion reports so that we can go and check the CCB project sites. The fact is that few reports were ever complete. We made them clear on all the rules of CCBs, but CD department never took any pain for that…. People here had been talking about commission payments for approval of these schemes or release of instalments. Some officials might have taken advantage of ambiguity in rules and regulations, but they couldn't do it unless CCBs provided them with a good reason." (District Officer Planning)

A new set of officers in Planning and Development department was posted in Sahiwal district in 2006. These officers included the new District Planning and Development Officer who had been politically transferred from Okara and Pakpattan districts because of his tough stance on CCBs and 'loose construction' of CCB rules to find a greater 'scrutiny' role of District Planning Office. He was able to stop much of the misuse involved in CCBs by logically persuading the DN Sahiwal about the 'real intent' of CCB rules and providing evidence on how gaps in CCB rules and political pressure for CCB projects could lead to their misuse. As a result of District Officer and his team's deliberations with the DN, the DN authorized 1) District Planning Office to perform development planning and on-site progress evaluation functions, 2) involvement of a greater number of departments in the project 'vetting' process, 3) involving district audit office in release of CCB installments, and 4) constitution of a multi-departmental CCB committee for streamlining of CCB process and filtering out CCB misuse by ill-intentioned elite in collusion with corrupt officials. The following narrative from the new District Planning Officer illustrates a) the misuse of CCBs attributable to ambiguity in departmental roles, b) redefinition of departmental roles to control CCB misuse and c) creation of cross-departmental team to streamline overall CCB process during second term of Sahiwal DG:

> "When I came here in 2006 and looked at these projects, my BP shot up. There was no detailed estimate or scrutiny, there was simply the name of the CCB project with a rough estimate figure. "Release it": they demanded. What the hell is going on, I thought. And these projects did not go through us. It was just EDO

Community Development to district council to DN; that was the simple route. Without any body having scrutinized it, it would come to us with an order of releasing the funds. Then we had detailed discussions with the DN in this regard. We said to the DN that neither these projects are being routed through us to the council, nor any body is scrutinizing these projects. Pressure is being applied on us from above, and some wrong projects are also going through as a result, some even do not fall in our purview ….The lawful development process is being flouted because of flaws in rules. We quoted the rules and regulations of CCB to the DN and explained the real intent of these rules…..Eventually, after much argument and persuasion, we [planning office] won. DN agreed that our *point of view* [on CCB rules] was correct……. Then before the release of third instalment for the CCB projects in 2007-08 budget, DN made a committee headed by District Officer Planning and asked for our recommendation regarding the streamlining of CCB funds. We recommended that all documentation requirements should be fulfilled before the release of any further instalments for both ongoing and new CCB schemes. DN agreed to that. The committee was further authorized to check the need for the scheme on site and thoroughly scrutinize the scheme. We were already making CCB site visits as DN had authorised me last year, it was the in the same continuation. For

first instalment, DN asked me to release the funds only for those schemes which fulfilled criteria. DN asked me to release the second instalment if the sectoral head and audit office has approved the scheme in addition to our own scrutiny. Before the third instalment, DN authorized that I could go and check the scheme on site, along with the other committee members….. There was no audit system for CCB schemes, and until there is some effort like what we did in Sahiwal, the funds are much likely to be wasted….So now when we scrutinize, we return some of the schemes which are deficient. When the scheme would go back, it would require estimation and vetting at different places, and the officials who used to sign them carelessly….well they are much more careful now. The money which had earlier been going to some officials in the name of approvals also stopped. The *phraadee'ay* [Punjabi term used in context to mean 'rich, mean fraudsters'] ran away and the number of schemes also came down." (District Officer Planning)

11.7.4.3.2. Ineffective system of 'political' monitoring: CCBs were subject to overall 'monitoring and evaluation' by the district council's statutory CCB monitoring committee (Section 18, Government of Punjab, 2003b). Sahiwal district council's CCB monitoring committee compiled its reports but no action was ever taken on these reports. Analysis of the CCB Rules and evidence from interviews suggest that there were two reasons for ineffectiveness of CCB monitoring committee in Sahiwal:

i. **Absence of enforcement mechanism:** No formal mechanism for enforcement of CCB monitoring committee's reports was provided in PLGO (2001) and CCB Rules (2003). Rather CCB Rules stated that CCB monitoring committee shall work in a non-interfering and non-intrusive way, though CCBs were required to provide full access to monitoring committee to its record. As provided in CCB Rules, Sahiwal CCB monitoring committee submitted its reports in the council and these reports were forwarded to the DG department for further action (Section 18, Government of Punjab, 2003b). But no action was taken on these reports by the district bureaucracy. The council had no power to affect a house enquiry against misused CCBs on the basis of monitoring committee reports. DN was also not given any formal power in CCB rules to initiate an official enquiry on the basis of these reports. One union nazim used the Punjabi expression that these reports 'are eating dust somewhere in departments'. This does not convey the same meaning as gathering dust. Rather it meant that report writing effort of monitoring committee was abortive in the first place because it was already known that bureaucracy will inevitably waste the effort. Bureaucracy did not want these reports to be debated at any forum or any enquiry to be launched on the basis of these reports. Misuse in CCBs was not possible without collusion of corrupt officials with the community or elected leaders. Any enquiry on the basis of CCB monitoring reports could have exposed both the corrupt elected leaders and their colluding partners in DG offices.

"……..there was a monitoring committee on CCBs. It presented its reports on CCBs, but these reports never came back to the house, neither do we know of any action that was taken on these reports. These reports are eating dust somewhere in the departments." (Munnawar)

ii.   **Lack of sanctioned resources**: As discussed before, CCB projects were spread over a wide region in Sahiwal district. CCB monitoring committee needed transportation and other resources to carry out their functions. However, there was no legal provision for these resources for CCB monitoring committees. When CCB monitoring committee members in Sahiwal district demanded these resources, district officials failed to comply since, in absence of a legal provision, accommodating such a request would make them liable to audit objections. District bureaucracy in Sahiwal also believed that elected representatives demanded these resources as a matter of protocol rather than for performing their task. However, this may reflect more of a bureaucratic mindset and stereotyping of local representatives rather than a factual assessment of CCB monitoring committee in Sahiwal district.

"District councils' monitoring committees were constituted in many districts in Punjab, but nowhere these were effective. Once constituted, their conveners or members wouldn't do their job. Instead they would say "give us official vehicles for field visits,

give us office, do as I say, etc". Instead of performing their functions, they would start running after protocol……law did not entitle them to any of the things they demanded. If a department provided them with vehicles or fuel, who would have dealt with audit objections?" (District Officer)

11.7.4.3.3. Non-fixation of personal responsibility: Punjab CCB Rules failed to fix personal responsibility in case a CCB was misused in any way by its executive members. If any irregularities were found in a CCB during its implementation or operations phases, the concerned local government could only stop the remaining payments of the project or takeover the assets or property of CCB. But no criminal prosecution could be initiated against the CCB leaders breaking the law. As per Sahiwal DG policy, CCBs could be built either on DG property or private property transferred to DG. If ill-intending CCB leaders had already taken-out 20% community share from the initial installment(s) made to the CCB, they wouldn't feel any personal consequences if assets created by CCB were taken over by DG. Section IV, Part 2 of CCB Agreement Form 5 read as follows:

> In the event the Project is not carried out in accordance with this agreement or the provisions of the Ordinance, the local government may, in addition to any other remedy available under law, cancel this agreement and terminate disbursement of the outstanding portion of the grant. In such eventually the property or assets of the CCB in respect of the Project shall pass to the local government. (Government of Punjab, 2003b)

Legal criminal prosecution against the individual decision makers in CCB, i.e. CCB executive committee, was practically removed from the list available under 'other remedy available under law' by Section 9(3) of the same set of rules which said that 'a CCB shall use and be used in the name of its executive committee; provided that a judgment against the CCB shall only be enforced against the property of the CCB'. Sahiwal District Planning Officer pointed out to this predicament created by CCB rules in the following words:

> "The concerns or check and balance side of the government, like money shouldn't be wasted in CCBs or how the CCBs would be monitored, was absent in the CCB laws…..Government employee has this problem that he is responsible to someone, but CCBs are not responsible to anyone. A CCB member could walk away after taking benefit from government money". (District Planning Officer)

Frame-setters of CCBs in Pakistan wanted to encourage 'proactive' people in the communities to play a greater role in the development of their communities. They wanted the law to be least restrictive to community initiative. However, the 'too open scope' of CCB rules was suitable for a society which could use public money with a high degree of moral responsibility. Frame-setters of CCBs were unconnected to the reality that communities in Pakistan are not yet mature enough for such an 'open scope' development programme. A participatory development programme with

stricter checks and balances and legal mechanisms for fixing personal responsibility could have been more suitable.

> "Its scope was kept too open. For the nations which you can call the honest and responsible nations, for them it is a very good system, because there is all the flexibility and free hand for CCBs. But for a people who always think about what is in there for me, who would always look for a selfish interest in everything, there couldn't be a better plunder program than CCB. They didn't consider what our people were like." (District Planning Officer)

11.7.4.3.4. Weaknesses in internal structure and functioning of CCBs: CCB general body comprised of at least 25 members from the local community. A seven to fifteen member Executive committee of CCB was elected by CCB general body and included CCB's chairman, secretary and other office bearers. It has been discussed before that the first chairman and secretary and other office bearers of the CCB would practically be self-selected since CCB rules required the names of first chairman, secretary or other office bearers at the time of first time registration (Government of Punjab, 2003b, Schedule 1). Further, the power to conduct all business of CCB, including its management of its internal affairs and CCB property, planning and implementation of participatory projects, and preparation of reports and statements was vested in executive committee. CCB general body was the approving authority for all decisions made by executive committee (Government of Punjab, 2003b, Schedule1). CCB rules required submission of development proposals and progress reports developed by

executive committee and *approved* by general body to the Community Development office. It has already been discussed that relatively higher classes were represented in executive committee while lower classes figured in general body of CCB. However, it was possible for the high-status members in CCB executive committee to get a proposal approved in the general body without deliberative consideration by the poor class members for the following reasons:

i.   Executive committee members were elected from within the CCB general body. CCB rules did not bar executive members from being simultaneous members of general body and from voting as general members in general body meetings. General body could approve any decision or proposal, etc, presented to it by executive committee by a simple majority of those present and voting in a general body meeting (Government of Punjab, 2003b, Schedule 1:8). However, the quorum required for general body meetings for transacting any business was kept at just 25% of the total members of CCB. It effectively meant that in a CCB with 25 total members, just seven CCB members were required for transacting business of CCB. Even this small number required for approval could include executive members acting as general members since CCB rules did not bar them from voting as general members. In case of smaller attendance by the general members, only executive members vote could be enough for approval of a project in general body meeting.

ii.   CCB secretary was required under the law to record proceedings of general body and executive committee meetings (Government of Punjab, 2003b,

Schedule 1:11). General body was required to meet at least once every three months while executive committee was required to meet at least once a month. However, CCB Rules did not require CCBs to regularly or periodically send proceedings of general body or executive committee meetings to the Community Development office. There was no legal provision allowing elected representatives or officials to attend the meetings of CCBs. Community Development officials performed their functions related to CCBs while remaining stationed at their offices. Under these conditions, there was no effective way assure that proposals or progress reports sent to Community Development department by the CCB executive committee were actually or deliberatively approved by the non-executive members in general body meetings. Executive members could use their class-based influence to get proposals or progress reports approved by the non-executive members, or they could forge record of general body meetings if Community Development department required them to present this record.

CHAPTER 12

CONCLUSION

In Leadership theory and research, Transformational and Networking/Partnering leadership styles are associated with change-oriented outcomes in task performance, human relations and organizational alignment (e.g. Van Wart, 2005; Javidan & Waldman, 2003; Kotter, 1995). There is also a general impression in corporate world and government circles that transformational leadership inevitably leads to achievement of change-oriented or non-programmed outcomes. This thesis explored whether, why and how transformational leadership or other leadership styles in District Government were related to change-oriented outcome of participatory development in two districts of Punjab, Pakistan.

Most leadership research after Bass (1985) is based on Bass's Full Range Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (Avolio and Bass, 2004), or on leadership measurement questionnaires styled on Bass's MLQ. This study also used a similar leadership measurement instrument in quantitative part of analysis. Participatory development was conceptualized as an innovative change in prevailing practice and thinking about local development in the LG history of Punjab. Networking/Partnering style was significantly and strongly correlated with level of participatory development undertaken in a district. Transformational style had a less significant and weak correlation with participatory development. Although leadership theory suggests a strong relationship between transformational and networking/partnering leadership styles and change, the correlation results from this study partly supported these implications from leadership theory.

Sahiwal district and Attock district were selected at the quantitative stage as cases of extreme confirmation and disconfirmation of predictions from theory and were expected to provide best qualitative explanations of why and how leadership, especially transformational leadership, may or may not result in participatory development. The objective of qualitative analysis was to identify and explain leadership or other 'factors' that positively or negatively affected participatory development under the specific institutional arrangements in which it was offered in Punjab. The institutional type of participatory development in Punjab was 'local government-community partnership' in which community based organizations were funded by international development actors (such as DFID, JICA, CIDA and ADB) and Punjab Government through reserved allocations in Local Government Annual Development Budgets. Local Governments and participatory development were sanctioned, protected and regulated after the year 2001 under constitutional provision and an elaborate set of newly created laws and rules.

Qualitative analysis of interview data from District Attock and District Sahiwal suggested that Leadership was the most important factor explaining participatory development. Historically determined socioeconomic and power patterns in a district, policy-orientation of higher-level governments, local group politics and institutional-legal design of participatory development were other important factors.

Most leadership theory and research methodology developed after Bass (1985b) describe and measure transactional or transformational leadership in terms of behavioural styles and assumes that change-orientation of leadership is reflected in an inspiring 'vision' of future which is *better* than the present (i.e. included in Charismatic/Inspirational factor or sub-style of transformational leadership). But Charismatic/Inspirational leadership does not provide any explanation as to why and how leadership conceives and adopts a change-oriented inspirational vision, and why it

makes choice between supporting or rejecting a change or why it makes choices between one or more change options that may become available or possible (e.g. Dealtry, 2001; Bass, 1985b). A methodological conclusion from this study is that while currently popular behavioural styles/sub-styles may explain *how* leadership contributes to high or low achievement of participatory development, these have little potential for explaining *why* leadership may lead to different participatory development outcomes. For a deeper understanding of *relationship* between leadership and participatory development and implications of this relationship for policy and institutional-legal design, the question of *why* leadership is related to different participatory development outcomes is of much more importance. This question is addressed in this study by another theoretical construct of leadership: intellectual leadership.

The concept of intellectual leadership in management was used by Harold Koontz in as early as 1965 to highlight the importance of integrating new theoretical concepts with the existing analytical tools available in the developing 'jungle' of management theories. But a full theoretical treatment to intellectual leadership in a book-length typology of leadership was given by Burns (1978). Burns (1978) theorized intellectual leadership as an 'archetype' of transforming leadership on which all other archetypes of transforming leadership depended. Intellectual leadership contemplates and integrates philosophical and analytical ideas and brings them to bear upon the times or situations that transforming leaders intend to change. However, Burns (1978) did not make any attempt at operationalizing the concept into measureable styles. UoB and Copec Library Catalogue book search returned only three titles directly addressing the issue of 'intellectual leadership'. A Journal article search for this study using MetaLib QuickSearch engine found only 13 titles on 'intellectual leadership' from four data bases (EBSCO, ebrary,

ProQuest and Web of Science ISI)[51]. Only one of these articles attempted to provide a conceptual framework for measuring and analysing intellectual leadership in 'corporate university' context (i.e. Dealtry, 2001). Thus intellectual leadership is still a mega-category of leadership (Van Wart, 2005). Without attempting to operationalize intellectual leadership into constituent measurable concepts, this study attempts to delve into philosophical and analytical realms of the district leaders as exhibited in the field interviews and supported by the official records. A summary of research aims and questions, research methods used and key conclusions is given in Table 12.1.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first two sections draw leadership explanations for participatory development in polar opposite cases of Sahiwal and Attock districts. Why participatory development was undertaken in Sahiwal and why it was rejected in Attock, and why state-led development was adopted as an alternative change-oriented goal in Attock district is explained by Intellectual Leadership provided by the district leaders. Styles of leadership explain how district leaders attempted to achieve their policy goals of 1) discouraging participatory development and instead encouraging extraordinary state-led development in case of Attock, and 2) encouraging participatory development in Sahiwal district. Contingencies of leadership explain the conditions affecting the choice of a leadership style and conditions under which a selected style was more or less effective. Certain leadership traits were found to be substantial in selection of leadership style in two conclusions in Sahiwal district. Although traits are normally treated as antecedents to leadership behaviour rather than contingencies, these have been included in contingency section in both cases for the sake of simplicity and also because traits in a sense represent a 'personality' condition under which a leader may be expected to acquire a behavioural style.

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[51] Last search done on July 3, 2012.

Table 12.1: Summary of broad aims, research questions, research methods used and key conclusions

Broad Aims and Research Questions	Research Methods	Key Conclusions
Quantitative Research: **Broad Aims** -Extend research on leadership styles by examining whether leadership style interrelationships implied in leadership theory and supported by leadership research mostly conducted in the West hold good in local government context of Punjab. -Extend and enrich leadership and participatory development theory and research by describing the statistical association between leadership styles and extent of participatory development. **Research Questions** -What was the pattern of correlations among Passive/Avoidant, Directive, Participative, Networking/Partnering, Transactional and Transformational Styles of District Nazims? -What was the pattern of correlation between Transformational Styles of District Nazims and extent of participatory development in Punjab's District Governments? -What was the pattern of	**Quantitative Research:** Data on leadership styles collected from purposively chosen 76 respondents in 16 districts (purposive total population sample of experts). Data on extent of participatory development programme utilization collected from 16 districts. Spearman coefficient for rank correlation among leadership styles displayed by district leaders. Spearman coefficient for rank correlation between leadership styles and extent of participatory development in 16 districts of Punjab.	Transactional and transformational leadership styles are strongly and significantly correlated. Transactional leadership may provide a pedestal for higher level transformational leadership.
		Correlation between transformational and directive leadership style was significant and strong. It was stronger than correlation between transactional and directive leadership. Transformational leaders can be more directive than transactional leaders.
		Correlation of networking/partnering style with both transformational and participative styles was significant and strong. Correlation between networking/partnering and transformational style was strongest of all correlations found. Networking/partnering, transformational and participative styles may be complementary to each other to take advantage of an emergent change opportunity.
		Only networking/partnering style was significantly and strongly correlated with the extent of participatory development.

correlation between other leadership styles of District Nazims and extent of participatory development in Punjab's District Governments?		
Qualitative Research: **Broad Aims** -Extend and enrich leadership and participatory development theory and research by explaining why and how leadership and other situational factors may contribute to local participatory development in a developing country such as Pakistan. -To provide research input into improvement of policy and praxis of participatory development in Pakistan by analyzing institutional design and policy weaknesses that uncovered during the first experiences of communities and local governments with participatory development. **Research Questions** -What were specific leadership related factors that explained non-occurrence and a high level occurrence of participatory development in Attock and Sahiwal districts respectively? -How other political, economic or	**Qualitative Research[52]:** Explanation of leadership and other factors contributing to participatory development, and contingencies of leadership in participatory development in two districts (strategic and deviant cases) of Punjab. Purposeful maximum variation sampling combined with chain sampling used within each selected district. Constant comparison method used for building categories of factors explaining participatory development, analysis of interview content for extracting direct evidence and analysis of narratives for interpreting subjective meanings in support of explanatory factor categories for participatory development.	Leadership is the most important factor explaining participatory development in a district. Intellectual leadership is the most important leadership style explaining district government policy preference for participatory development. Intellectual leadership for participatory development in part depends on generally known nature of equality in local society.
		Transformational leadership is not always pro-change. Charismatic/Inspirational sub-style of transformational leadership can be the most important leadership style for either encouragement or discouragement of participatory development presented as a change in local development thinking and practice.
		Ideological opposition of district leader to central government policy and institutional design of participatory development are the intervening factors leading to adoption of charismatic/inspirational sub-style by a leader for discouraging participatory development.
		Need for non-stimulation of public demand and political cover for legally unjustifiable executive decision, and poor strength of opposition group in the district are intervening factors leading to adoption of Contingent Reward sub-style of Transactional Leadership for discouraging legally mandated participatory development.
		High level of deprivation in basic developmental needs in communities is an intervening factor leading to adoption of Contingent Reward sub-style for displacing participatory development and providing state-led development as a preferred alternative.
		The relationship between Contingent Reward sub-style and discouragement of legally mandated participatory development is moderated by strength of district leader's political exchange relationship with higher level government.
		Participatory Leadership style leads to facilitation of participatory development process by building follower ownership in the participatory development policy and program.
		Charismatic/Inspirational sub-style of transformational leadership leads to facilitation of participatory development process by establishing integrity and guardianship of trust in participatory development program.

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[52] Quantitative development budget utilization analysis and cross-tabs percentage tables for elite-capture analysis also used to supplement qualitative analysis.

| social factors positively or negatively contributed to the extent of participatory development in each of the two districts?

-What was the pattern of elite capture and how leadership-related or other factors explained elite-capture of participatory projects?		Individualized Consideration sub-style of Transformational Leadership leads to facilitation of participatory development process by building capability (including self-confidence and skills) of followers in participatory planning and implementation.
		Intellectual Stimulation sub-style of Transformational Leadership leads to improving the quality of participatory development process by creatively developing solutions for rectifying weaknesses in institutional design and checking elite-capture. Leader's tolerance for dissent, appreciation for constructive dissent, and preference for reason over political consideration are leadership antecedents leading to adoption of Intellectual Stimulation sub-style. Logical and creative interpretation of law by at least a few active and keen members of bureaucracy is an intervening factor leading to adoption of Intellectual Stimulation sub-style.
		Networking/Partnering Leadership Style facilitates the channelling of motivation and resources of non-government actors towards collective developmental needs. In this way Networking/Partnering style directly leads to the extent of participatory development programme utilization. This relationship is moderated by the level of public trust generated by district leader based on his current and past performance.
		Institutional design's inadequacy to achieve participatory development vision and district leader's trust in secondary cadres of elected local government leadership are intervening factors leading to adoption of Charismatic/Inspirational sub-style for building integrity and public trust in the process of participatory development.
		Low community awareness regarding general participatory concepts, community information regarding participatory development policy and process and level of community skills in dealing with bureaucracy are intervening factors leading to adoption of non-authoritarian directive leadership style for building community capability for participatory development.
		Level of community trust in leaders, community's self-confidence for participation, community's confidence level in government-backed programmes and community trust level in bureaucracy are intervening factors leading to supportive style for building community willingness for participatory development.
		Extent of non-authoritarian directive and supportive leadership style declines with increasing participatory experience of communities.
		Continuous participatory learning in closely knit social networks, verification of participatory projects by elected local government leaders and free and fair local government elections mediate the positive relationship between an uninterrupted ongoing participatory development programme and empowerment of non-elite.
		Unfavourable policy or conflicting programs at higher level government negatively influence the participatory programme at local government level when local government offices are staffed and controlled by higher-level government.

The third section draws conclusions about how an ongoing programme of participatory development may lead to community empowerment. The fourth section draws conclusions about how policies or decisions at higher levels of government may affect participatory development at LG level. Fifth section discusses limitations of the research. Some considerations of conclusions and implication for future research are suggested in the sixth section.

A number of propositions summing up conclusions have been made. Propositions about leadership include two types of contingency factors (not variables)[53]: 1) intervening factors, i.e. the factors that affect which leadership behaviour or style will be selected in a given situation to achieve the desired outcome and 2) moderating factors, i.e. the factors that affect impact, quality or success of a behaviour or style (Van Wart, 2005, p.306).

12.1. Leadership and participatory development: Attock district

12.1.1. Intellectual leadership for discouraging participatory development: DN Attock scored high on transformational style but opposed the innovative LG feature of participatory development in DG because of following philosophical and analytical reasons:

i. Making efforts to eradicate different forms of widespread poverty was a key developmental responsibility of DG which must be fulfilled before DG could invest efforts and financial resources in any innovative design of development such as CCBs. Scarce resources must first be utilized for providing economic and social opportunities to the poor sections of the society in form of public sector jobs and expanded facilities

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[53] Although contingency factors are clearly variable in character, these have not been posed as 'operationalized variables'. Contingency factors can be operationalized as specific 'variables' in later confirmatory studies by framing 'propositions' from this study as specific 'hypothesis' to be tested in same or different districts.

in primary healthcare and education. It was unfair to ask the poor to contribute towards cost of public projects.

ii. Citizen-rights condition in the district was poor in Attock. The poor class in Attock district was characterised by powerlessness and social vulnerability in a sharply unequal society. Given the unjust nature of class-based society in which the poor were either unaware or unable to claim and realize their rights, a voluntary exercise in participatory development as enshrined in CCB could potentially lead to further disempowerment and exploitation of the poor. The poor did not have the capacity and ability for participatory development and, therefore, could not be expected to take initiative in CCBs. If DG opened the opportunity for CCBs, most rich would register CCBs and demand projects in the name of poor that they could pack in CCB general body. The rich in local society were generally manipulative and corrupt, and could not be trusted for behaving ethically towards the vulnerable poor. In view of DN Attock, the values and purposes on which CCBs were conceived by the framers of participatory development in Pakistan were not applicable in socio-economic and cultural conditions prevailing in Attock.

iii. CCBs were discriminatory towards Local Governments because a certain portion of LG budgets was set off limits for Local Councils while there was no such restriction in Provincial or National Government ADPs. Also, since Local Development in Pakistan is a shared-function between different levels of government, LGs and their leadership could become unpopular if they required people to pay a cost for a certain category of development projects while Provincial or National government did not require people to do so.

Following his intellectual opposition to participatory development, DN Attock adopted a policy of discouragement of CCBs. However, this policy was unofficial and informally understood among DN, Union Nazims and DG officials. CCB programme could not be officially discouraged because it was legally sanctioned in the PLGO (2001) and officially supported by the PML-Q government at the centre.

12.1.2. Transformational leadership—Charismatic/Inspirational sub-style for discouraging participatory development: DN Attock displayed a combination of transformational and transactional styles to discourage participatory development in Attock district. DN inspired Union Nazims by expressing his moral and logical stance on how CCB programme discriminated against the LGs and District Councillors, and by providing them with a moral justification to stop CCB programme. DN showed them how they could avoid the discriminatory programme by passing a resolution in the council in support of barring CCB programme in DG and converting the use of CCB funds, thereby giving him political justification to use CCB allocations on fully-funded Local Development projects for the Unions. In Punjab's political and cultural context, DN was inspiring power in his followers and displaying highly valued behaviour of taking personal risk for protecting the political interest of his followers. Altogether, DN demonstrated a highly Charismatic/Inspirational style by displaying 1) idealized attributes of instilling power and taking personal risk, 2) idealized behaviour of showing high-level of concern for the followers and 3) inspirational motivation for stopping the CCB programme (Avolio and Bass, 2004).

12.1.3. Transactional leadership—Contingent reward sub-style for discouraging participatory development: Once CCB policy was mutually understood between DN

and Union Nazims and politically supported in form of a District Council resolution, DN Attock ensured compliance of policy by clarifying 1) rewards for support of policy, i.e. channelling of Punjab Government special development funding on top of DG development projects in the Unions where Union Nazims supported the policy, and 2) punishment for non-support of the policy, i.e. stopping of Punjab Government's special development funds to Unions where Union Nazims did not support unofficial CCB policy and District Council resolution on CCBs. This represented contingent reward factor of transactional leadership style in Avolio and Bass's (2004) typology.

12.1.4. Transformational leadership—Charismatic/Inspirational sub-style for encouraging state-led development: Eradicating elite-imposed backwardness through state-led development was the big change Attock's DN and his group represented. Irrespective of a highly transactional style adopted by the DN to ensure compliance on unofficial CCB policy, he was perceived by Union Nazims as highly influential, dominant, morally conscious, energetic, assertive and individually considerate in bringing about unprecedented state-led development to the most underdeveloped (rural) parts of the district. DN and all of his group's Union Nazims interviewed emphatically expressed how these areas comprising a large number of rural Unions had been deliberately kept backward by traditional political leaders from feudal backgrounds. Expecting poor and aggrieved communities in these unions to pay a part of development cost was morally unjustified. Union Nazims from these unions deeply identified with the DN who came to symbolize middle class power and struggle against the control of traditional feudal class and their handmaiden bureaucracy. Offering political allegiance to DN also meant being

part of the movement against elite-imposed backwardness in their unions and a supporter of state-led development on moral grounds.

12.1.5. Transformational leadership—Individualized consideration for encouraging state-led development: In playing his key role in state-led development in the district, DN displayed individualized consideration when he paid focused attention and took personal responsibility for Union-specific developmental needs expressed by Union Nazims. These needs included infrastructure and social sector projects, and employment requirements.

12.1.6. Transformational leadership—Charismatic/Inspirational sub-style: deliverance behaviour for protecting citizen-rights: A special type of charismatic/inspirational behaviour in political and cultural context of Punjab is proposed in this study as 'deliverance behaviour'. Deliverance behaviour involves leaders interceding in government offices on behalf of common people in order to ensure that they are not done injustice or that their legal rights are not usurped. Deliverance behaviours are not only expected of leaders but also appreciated as positive behaviours in Punjab's political culture. The deliverance behaviour was displayed by DN Attock when he interceded in government offices on behalf of citizens to protect against transgression of their rights, or when he passionately advocated citizen rights to basic development in intentionally deprived feudal-dominated rural areas of Attock. DN Attock considered that protection of citizen rights was the most important social development responsibility of DG.

Union Nazims from DN's group were also able to use DN's influence in Provincial Government to get DG jobs for their deserving constituents when the privileged were more expected to get these jobs, or for helping their constituents when they were done

injustice in Police Stations or other DG offices. Deliverance behaviour by DN Attock was extended to political supporters and opponents alike.

However, deliverance behaviour should not be confused with patronage. Patronage also involves intersession of leaders on behalf of citizens. But patronage leadership behaviour 1) benefits only political supporters and 2) does not differentiate between rightful/legal and unrightful/illegal demands of political supporters.

12.1.7. Contingency Factors for leadership in Attock:

12.1.7.1.   Ideological flaws in Central Government's policy and institutional-legal design of CCBs: DN Attock adopted an unofficial policy of discouraging a legally mandated participatory development programme. In absence of CCB awareness programmes for the general public by any level of government in Punjab, Union Nazims and Union Councillors were key agents of building public awareness and confidence with regards to CCBs in the communities they represented. DN adopted a charismatic/inspirational style when he provided inspirational motivation to his group of Union Nazims that there were ideological reasons for discouraging CCB programme. Central Government's non-uniform policy on participatory development was discriminatory towards LGs and that institutional-legal design of CCBs undermined the developmental decision making autonomy of District Council.

> *Proposition 1: Adoption of charismatic/inspirational style by the district leader to get Union Nazims' acceptance for a policy of suppressing a participatory development programme mandated under law will depend on 1) ideological flaws in Central Government policy on participatory development, and 2) ideological flaws in institutional-legal design of participatory development.*

12.1.7.2.   **Suppression of community demand and need for continued political cover**:

CCB policy implementation posed a problem since CCB programme could not be legally stopped if there was demand from the community. However, community demand for CCBs was unlikely if Union Nazims and Union Councillors 1) did not try to promote CCBs in their Unions, and 2) discouraged any demand for participatory development in their Unions by explaining discriminatory nature of CCBs (as conceived by elected DG leaders in Attock) and instead offering fully government-funded state-led projects to their voters. DG would be under no public pressure for CCBs if Union Nazims did not stimulate the demand or discouraged the community demand for CCBs at Union level. The choice of fully government-funded state-led development had greater appeal for the general community because it conformed to state-dependency attitudes and prevailing norms of local development. Fully government funded also had greater appeal for the Union Nazims since these could result in immediate political credit. Thus DN could get continued political support for his unofficial policy on CCBs from the Union Nazims if he approved fully government-funded projects from Provincial and District Government funds in their Unions over and above their usual funding from District ADP.

If District Council passed a resolution for barring CCB projects, it would become morally and politically binding upon the signatory Union Nazims not to support any CCB projects at DG level. DN clarified it to the Union Nazims that CCB projects placed a bar on maximum funding they could get for their Unions, and that CCB allocations could instead be used as additional fully-funded projects in their unions only if they gave him a continued political cover by 1) passing a resolution in District Council for barring CCBs

in DG and using CCB funds under fully government funded District ADP, and 2) not revoking the resolution in any of the subsequent years.

DN thus adopted a 'contingent reward' sub-style for CCB policy implementation when he approved additional DG and Provincially-funded projects for rewarding Union Nazim's compliance of CCB policy. Also, any non-compliance on policy of CCBs by a Union Nazim could lead to highly undesirable consequences of group disapproval and discontinuation of additional development funds.

Proposition 2: Adoption of contingent reward sub-style by the district leader for implementation of a policy of discouragement of a legally mandated participatory development programme will depend on 1) need for non-stimulation or suppression of community demand for participatory development, 2) need for a continued political cover for executive policy-support decisions that couldn't be legally justified.

12.1.7.3. **Political-exchange with higher-level governments**: Union Nazims were rewarded or punished by channelling or stopping Provincial and Central Government development funds into the unions they represented. Attock gained control over higher governments' resources because of the political support he built and controlled in the district for the PML-Q party in power at Province and Centre.

Proposition 3: The level of success of transactional style adopted by the district leader in discouraging a mandatory participatory development programme in the

district will depend on strength of district leader's political-exchange relationships maintained with leaders in higher levels of government.

The traditional feudal elite had resisted basic facilities for the communities in their large estates (sometimes including many villages) by using their political influence in past governments. DN provided *idealized influence* (Charismatic/Inspirational style) when he supported a moral cause and led a middle-class movement of Union Nazims and Union Councillors for eradicating elite-imposed deprivation of basic community needs, such as schools, rural health centres, roads, etc. Because of DN's strong political influence in Punjab and Central government, it was very difficult for the traditional elites to resist developments in rural electrification, education, health and rural road sectors during the years of District Government from 2001 to 2009. Union Nazims' were able to hold together as a group resisting elite-power because of DN's political influence in higher-level governments.

Proposition 4: The level of success of transformational leadership provided by district leader for unifying Union Nazims around a moral cause of resisting elite-domination will depend on his/her political-exchange relationships with leaders in higher levels of government.

DN Attock was also reported as firm and decisive. His policy of non-encouragement of CCBs originated from his intellectual leadership and persisted throughout his two tenures as a DN from 2001 to 2009. It can be concluded that that a highly charismatic leadership

displaying strength of conviction and firmness in decisions can not only be persistent in its non-support of participatory development, but can also be suppressive of participatory development when it controls political resources for higher governments as well.

12.1.7.4. **Level of deprivation in basic development needs**: Although transactional leadership style represents 'stranger' or 'acquaintance' stages in Leader-Member/follower Exchange relationships, it delivers better on lower order needs which usually have a greater level of urgency (Davis & Gardner, 2004; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Burns, 1978). Union Nazims were directly elected by smaller constituencies—a large majority of them rural—with a clear mandate for development in communities. A majority of rural unions in Attock district were largely poor and highly backwards in terms of basic infrastructure and social services. Union Nazims were under great voter pressure to provide fully government-funded basic infrastructure and social sector projects immediately. A transactional exchange with DN in which support for DN's policies was immediately rewarded by wholly government-funded projects suited Union Nazims more if voter expectations were to be met within their office tenures. Union Nazims were clarified that they could get additional DG development funds converted from CCB allocations and development projects from higher-level governments for their Unions if they supported DN's CCB policy by honouring the District Council resolution.

Participation represents community learning and empowerment needs of a higher order than basic infrastructure development in the communities. These needs could be invoked and their satisfaction could be attributed to leaders only in the long-term after basic development needs of community were met to some minimum level of satisfaction.

A high level of deprivation of basic development needs in largely poor and unequal communities of District Attock resulted in a desire of both voters and Union Nazims to immediately complete the exchange of lower order values with short-term political credit. In turn, a contingent reward sub-style of DN was preferable for both Union Nazims and DN in which political allegiance and compliance to DG's local development policy, including the unofficial policy of discouraging participatory development, was immediately returned with fully government-funded projects in the Unions. The following propositions can be made in the institutional-legal context of Punjab LGs.

Proposition 5a: Adoption of contingent reward sub-style by the district leader for providing state-led development will depend on a high level of deprivation in basic development needs in poor communities.

Proposition 5b: Secondary leaders' preference for contingent reward sub-style by the district leader for providing state-led development will depend on a high level of deprivation in basic development needs in poor communities.

12.1.7.5. **Weak political opposition:** The opposition group of Union Nazims in District Council Attock was small and scattered among unions in different Tehsils/sub-districts. DN Attock was disproportionately more powerful than the Union Nazims. Local group politics in Punjab's districts is centred on individual powerful leaders rather than parties. In order to be influential, opposition in District Council usually needs to align with a local political group headed by a strong leader in Punjab or Central government. DN Attock

had created strong political resource dependencies for Punjab and Central government in Attock district. No Provincial or Central government leader of comparable political influence was available to the opposition Union Nazims in Attock district to protest in Punjab or National Assembly against the exchange of political support for unlawfully barring CCB programme with state-led development projects.

Proposition 6: Adoption of contingent reward sub-style by the district leader for suppressing a participatory development programme mandated under law will depend on 1) strength of opposition group in the District Council, and 2) availability and willingness of a leader in higher-level government with comparable political influence to unify the District Council opposition group and represent their concerns in higher-level government.

12.2. Leadership and participatory development: Sahiwal district

12.2.1. Intellectual leadership for encouraging participatory development: DN Sahiwal also had a highly transformational style. But in contrast to DN Attock, DN Sahiwal supported and provided a compelling vision for participatory development on following philosophical and analytical grounds:

i. CCBs provided desirable value of community empowerment. CCBs were an opportunity for building community capability for participatory development through practical learning, community control of local development and building self efficacy of the people. Not allowing communities a chance for participatory development resulted in their deep seated government-dependency attitude and lack of confidence for self-improvement. CCBs also provided desirable economic value: CCBs provided

process value of generating temporary employment for the poor and terminal value of collective benefits at a fraction of a cost to the community. One reason for poverty was that communities were never given the opportunity and confidence to take charge of their own communal affairs.

ii. People could be trusted with public funds and expected to act in the best interest of their communities. Political leaders emerge from the society and bear the characteristics of the society. DN viewed himself and Union Nazims as honest and capable. If leaders could be trusted with public funds by the people and if leaders had the capability to effectively manage public funds in the best interest of communities they represented, then community groups could also be trusted to honestly manage public funds in the best interest of their own communities. Only a system of verifying development need authenticity and political answerability needed to be developed to hedge against the possible misuse of public funds by the community groups.

iii. Cost-contribution was a limiting factor for poor's participation only when most of them did not perceive a value for themselves in a CCB project. If the poor saw a value for themselves at the community level, they contributed more enthusiastically than the rich by thinly spreading the cost over a large number of people. The poor perceived a value for themselves in a CCB project when they were involved in the development need identification in some way. CCB projects were more suited to the poor because these provided low-cost or free collective solutions to public needs. The rich could buy these services privately without having to share with the poor.

iv. Individual level corruption could be present in any development programme but it could not be a justification for discouraging participatory development thus depriving

entire communities of a valuable opportunity for participatory learning and self-development. Participatory development could become destructive of its goals only when systemic level corruption was there. But systemic level corruption could be stopped through CCB policy.

v. CCBs were a source of public credit for sponsoring leaders. However, leaders could claim credit for participatory development only in the long-term when community realized the overall value (social and economic) of citizen participation in local development and the role of supporting leaders in retrospect. When community contributed towards the project cost and implemented the project, it attributed most immediate credit to itself. This was in contrast to fully state-funded projects where leaders could claim immediate credit for funds approval and project implementation by the government.

vi. When community planned, implemented and managed projects in its best self-interest, the outcomes were high quality projects completed at lower cost. Participatory development was important also because it created competitive benchmarks for government departments which were otherwise inefficient and corrupt.

A highly favourable policy for participatory development followed from intellectual leadership provided by DN Sahiwal. Comparing the relationship between intellectual leadership and ensuing DG policy on CCBs in Attock and Sahiwal districts, the following major conclusion can be drawn: Irrespective of any 'styles/sub-styles of leadership' perceived by the followers as generally characterising the leaders, intellectual leadership provided by the district leader will determine in the first place whether a specific change, e.g. participatory development, is encouraged or discouraged in the DG policy as a

desirable or undesirable change. An important corollary to this conclusion is that a study of leadership styles alone my not be useful in explaining a specific change unless a deeper enquiry is made into intellectual leadership provided by the leader with regards to that change. Intellectual leadership explains why some changes are adopted and others are resisted by leaders in specific socio-political and institutional contexts.

> *Proposition 7: The policy level support available to participatory development in a district will depend on intellectual leadership provided by the district leader.*

12.2.2. Participative style: Although development planning and policy making was sketchily defined as a formal responsibility of individual nazims for their specific LGs, PLGO (2001) or District Government Budget Rules (2003) did not provide for participation of district councillors in district-wide development policy making. DN Sahiwal, along with his group's Union Nazims (acting in capacity of District Councillors) and other special-seat District Councillors, developed a system of district-wide development planning and policy making during informal monthly meetings and special pre-budget sessions. Certain long-term elements of CCB policy, such sectoral compensation for regular Local Development programme and provision of low-cost or free services to the community, etc, were guided by DN and collectively set by his group in the early phase of participatory development programme.

Prioritization of development sectors and certain high-value projects for CCB programme during the informal sessions in each year constituted the informal short term participatory development policy of DG Sahiwal. During the pre-budget intensive sessions, DN briefed

about the CCB funding position and sectoral and project prioritization that had taken place during monthly sessions throughout the year. Sectoral prioritization policy and project selection for CCB programme for the next year was finalized during interactive deliberations in the pre-budget sessions. DN described that "people were the greatest agency of LGs" since their direct feedback to him or Union Nazims eventually became a part of district's development policy. A deliberative and participative policy making process ultimately resulted in building ownership of Union Nazims in CCB programme. From the overall picture of DN's role emerging from interview data, it can be concluded that *participative* style was the most important leadership style provided by DN for building *follower ownership* into participatory development policy and programme in the DG.

12.2.3. Transformational Style: Charismatic/Inspirational: The role played by DN in devising and working a system of CCB authentication by elected representatives displayed an idealized behaviour of building trust in followers and process of participatory development (a part of Charisma/Inspirational factor in Bass's typology of transformational leadership). The system involved Union Nazims sponsoring CCB projects for approval by the DN. Sponsoring of CCB proposals by Union Nazims included verification of genuineness of development need in a community, endorsing integrity of the community group demanding the project, briefing DN about the project and how it matched the CCB policy, and building political answerability of the supporting Nazim for the project. The overall objective of CCB sponsorship was to engage community leaders and Union Nazims in a process of building trust and authenticity in participatory projects. The role played by DN in involving Union Nazims and Community

leaders for establishing integrity of CCB projects was seen as positive and highly valued by Union Nazims. It can be concluded that charismatic/inspirational was the most important sub-style provided by DN for *establishing integrity and guardianship of trust* in CCB programme.

12.2.4. Transformational Style: Individualized Consideration: Formal process of CCB approval did not involve Union Nazims. However, creation of a CCB sponsoring role for Union Nazims by the DN also represented a kind of individual assignment of tasks to Union Nazims which provided them with independent opportunities to develop participatory facilitation and planning skills. For Union Nazims, fulfilment of self-development represented needs of a higher order than simply getting development projects demanded by their constituents. This represented individualized consideration factor of DN's transformational leadership style. Individualized consideration was generally reflected in DN's support of participatory development because he valued CCB projects as learning opportunities for any community member who participated in these projects. It can be concluded that individualized consideration was the most important leadership sub-style provided by DN for building *follower capability* (including self-confidence and skills) for participatory development.

12.2.5. Transformational Style: Intellectual Stimulation: DN Sahiwal played a key role in redefining the departmental roles and creation of an innovative structural feature of cross-departmental team for streamlining approval and progress evaluation process of CCBs. DN encouraged the team members to suggest and institutionalize new ways of streamlining CCB approval process and controlling misuse of participatory projects by the ill-intending elite. This represented intellectual stimulation factor in transformational style

of Sahiwal DN. It can be concluded that intellectual stimulation was the most important sub-style provided by DN for *checking misuse* in CCB projects.

12.2.6. Networking/Partnering Style: CCBs were community based non-profit organizations in which relationships between CCB members and elected leaders or district bureaucracy were voluntary and non-hierarchical. Participative and networking/partnering styles were required from elected LG leaders if they wanted to encourage communities for a new type of local development initiative requiring them to commit time, effort and resources (Van Wart, 2005).

DN office represented a central position in a network linking multiple classes and groups both within and outside the district. There was evidence from interviews that largest CCB projects in health, education, sports and community development sectors—constituting almost half the size of total participatory development programme in district Sahiwal— were a direct result of Sahiwal DN's networking with local and expatriate leaders in business, organized civil society and charitable organizations. Although DN (and Union Nazims) provided general education and operational guidance forms of directive leadership when CCB members needed them, the general style adopted by DN was participative and partnering, and based on a high level of mutual trust.

General motivation for public welfare was already there in high-status philanthropic, civil society and business individuals or groups. In his networking role, the DN 1) inspired high level of trust in community leaders, and 2) intensified and channelized the motivation of these individuals/groups to focus on social development needs of the district *in* partnership with DG *through* the instrument of CCBs. The high level of trust necessary for the partnership to initiate and sustain largest CCB projects delivering social

services on a district-wide scale was a result of 1) personal reputation built by the DN during his entire political career, and 2) general image/integrity of DG built under DN's leadership. DN not only inspired community leaders to trust DG with private resources, he was also willing to trust community with a much larger proportion of public resources going into participatory projects.

Since poorer sections of the society were the main beneficiaries of largest health and education sector participatory public-welfare projects supported by affluent groups and organized civil society, networking role of the DN also contributed to redistribution of substantial resources of these groups towards the welfare of the poor. From this discussion it can be concluded that the most important leadership style in determining the *high level of CCB programme utilization* in Sahiwal district was Networking/Partnering style of DN.

State-led development in Attock also depended to a large extent on partnering of DN with higher-level government leaders 'outside the formal chain of command'. But partnering in case of Attock's state-led development was based on transactional relationships of shorter-term political-exchange. Partnering in case of largest participatory projects in Sahiwal was based on longer-term mutual trust between DN and well-intending elite.

12.2.7. Leadership contingency factors in Sahiwal District:

12.2.7.1. **Institutional-legal design inadequacies, socioeconomic inequality and leader's trust**: Involvement of general community and honest use of participatory funds depended to a large extent on intentions and integrity of CCB executive committee because institutional-legal design of CCBs did not provide for a robust mechanism for insuring involvement of general community in development need identification and propriety in

use of participatory funds. Thus a level of trust had to be placed in community leaders for involvement of general community in planning and implementation of the project and honest utilization of public funds. Two elements were needed for this trust: district leader's willingness to trust community leaders represented in the CCB and guardianship of trust placed in the community leaders.

DN Sahiwal was willing to trust general community and community leaders in CCBs. While 'trusting others' may have been a charismatic attribute of the DN, his willingness to trust community leaders was also based on his historical knowledge of people and socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the district.

Large scale socioeconomic and power inequalities characteristic of a feudal society or feudal-like society (i.e. where feudal estates may be few or may not exist at all, but where feudal attitudes from the past strongly influence the relations between poor and non-poor, e.g. Attock district) create conditions for generalized manipulation of lower classes by the upper class at a social system level. These conditions did not prevail in Sahiwal district because feudals or feudal influences were a story of past in the district. Thus the argument that participatory projects will be generally captured by the disproportionately powerful rich in the name of powerless poor was invalid in view of DN Sahiwal and unjustifiable for distrusting whole communities. DN's perception about conditions of socioeconomic and power inequalities prevailing in the district was not different from the general impression among the respondents. Opinions such as feudal or feudal-like power relationships did not exist between members of rich and poor classes or that socioeconomic disparity between classes was not wide enough to inspire fear or absolute

compliance in the poor were variously expressed by respondents in Sahiwal district including the DN.

In opinion of Sahiwal DN, systemic-level corruption in CCBs was also possible if there is corruption at the political system level. But corruption in CCBs at political system level was also not possible because of the system-level checks developed in the CCB policy by DN and Union Nazims. However, owing to the deficiencies in institutional-legal design of CCBs, it was possible for the individual ill-intending elite to breach the trust placed in them and misuse CCB funds by putting up a show of broader community's involvement in development need identification. An alternate system needed to be developed for safeguarding project-level trust placed in community leaders.

Although DN provided a compelling vision for genuine community empowerment through participatory development, DN believed that the general community did not need to trust the achievability of participatory development vision only because he presented it (i.e. personal charisma). DN provided *inspirational motivation* for participatory development to the general community, who were required to participate by way of effort and cost contribution, by building a system for establishing trust in community leaders and political answerability of Nazims in CCB projects. General community could now trust the intentions of community leaders in CCB executive committee when their directly elected Union Nazim endorsed participatory proposals after proper scrutiny. Union Nazims assumed a degree of political responsibility and 'obligation to voters' for the project when they endorsed it.

Since Union Nazims were formally a part of DG power structure and also held social prestige and power as directly elected representatives, they could get a project stopped in

DG or put pressure on the CCB executive committee if a CCB project was misused. General community could thus be assured that high-status members will not waste their efforts and/or financial contributions or misuse public money provided to CCB for general community's betterment during project implementation. Sponsoring/endorsing role of Union Nazims thus served to safeguard general community trust in CCB projects.

Sponsoring/endorsing of CCB projects by Union Nazims also served to safeguard the trust placed by DN in community leaders. As an executive head of DG, DN also assumed a level of responsibility for honesty and effectiveness in CCB programme. The system of political endorsement ensured the DN that a community development need represented in a CCB proposal was genuine and high-status community members did not intend to misuse CCB funds. DN placed a high degree of trust on Union nazims because he believed that their trustworthiness was already established by their direct election. He believed that Union Nazims were in the best position to endorse need of the project and integrity of the community group/leaders demanding the project because 1) they resided in the communities where development need existed, and 2) they had known the community members demanding the project for a long time. However, Union Nazims could predict financial propriety in a CCB project only indirectly by commenting on reputation and integrity of community group/leaders that they had known for a long time. The Union Nazims were expected to act with great caution and integrity and in best interest of the general community they represented. It can be proposed that:

Proposition 8: District leader's willingness to trust community leaders for participatory development will depend on generally known nature of socioeconomic and power inequality in the local society.

Proposition 9: Provision of inspirational motivation by the district leader to the general community in form of a system of safeguarding public trust placed in the community leaders through Union Nazims will depend on 1) institutional-legal design's inadequacy to achieve district leader's vision of participatory development, and 2) district leader's trust in Union Nazims (i.e. secondary-level elected LG leaders).

District leader's trust in Union Nazims is an antecedent of leadership.

12.2.7.2. **Leader attributes and bureaucracy's role**: There was political ardour for CCBs in Sahiwal district because of high preference of DN and his group Union Nazims for participatory development. CCB Law was also ambiguous in terms of departmental roles and flawed in terms of departmental structure for official approval and evaluation of CCB projects. As a result there was a rashness in the official process of CCBs during the first term of DG Sahiwal. Some Ill-intending elite colluded with corrupt officials to misuse a small proportion of CCB projects by taking advantage of rashness in the system.

District officials, either because they were corrupt or not willing to enter into an undesired contestation with powerful elected LG representatives, did not object to political pressure for expediting CCB projects during the first term. A new District Planning officer posted into the district at the beginning of the second term of DG noticed the rashness in the

system and investigated into its causes and consequences. The said District Planning Officer mentioned that he observed for some time that DN had the quality of being 'polite' and 'respectful' to others. He could be carried away if his group Nazims lobbied against a District Officer, but he always listened to what others had to say and had a special quality of being open to 'reason'. Planning Officer also mentioned that DN had a deep understanding of district's development needs and a 'very broad vision' of district's development, but a rather poor understanding of real intent of law and rules of CCBs. Noticing these qualities, he made a forceful and logical representation to the DN that misuse in CCBs was attributable to ambiguities and deficiencies in institutional-legal design of CCBs and political pressure for expediting the official process of CCB approval. Sharing concern over CCB misuse and recognizing the logic in District Planning Officer's arguments, DN constituted a group comprising the District Planning Officer and other officers of DG and encouraged then to come up with logically justifiable interpretations of ambiguous CCB rules and suggest new ways of checking misuse of CCBs. Certain interventions in administrative structure, including redefinition of departmental roles and creation of a cross-departmental team for streamlining CCB process, resulted from an intellectually stimulating style adopted by the DN in collaborative engagement with District Officers.

Although it was not possible to entirely stop misuse of CCB programme by the high-status community members, DG Sahiwal was able to check and gradually minimize its occurrence by combining political and policy checks with administrative interventions. However, most significant reduction in misuse of participatory projects occurred during second term of DG in Sahiwal when administrative interventions were made in the

official structure. The following proposition could be made under conditions of a deficient institutional-legal design and political ardour for participatory development:

> *Proposition 10: Adoption of an intellectually stimulating style by district leader in devising innovative solutions to the problem of elite-capture will depend on the following antecedent factors of district leadership: 1) district leader's level of tolerance for dissent, 2) District leader's level of appreciation for constructive dissent, and 3) district leader's preference for reason over political considerations in exercising judgement in technical issues.*

> *Proposition 11: Adoption of an intellectually stimulating style by district leader in devising innovative solutions to the problem of elite-capture will depend on logical and creative interpretation of law by at least a few active and keen members of district bureaucracy.*

A strand of literature in participatory development in developing countries suggests that applying Western models of participatory development as a means of democratization and empowerment of communities may be a utopian ideal that is bound to fail in developing countries where organization structures for participation do not exist(Dichter, 1989). International development or state efforts should instead focus on "assistance packages" for transferring "nuts-and-bolts" skills and structures for participatory organization first (Dichter, 1989). The case of Sahiwal district confirms the validity of these arguments in the first tenure of DG when most misuse of participatory development programme

occurred because of deficient organizational structure for proposal processing and project evaluation.

However, an important conclusion of this study is that a participatory development programme can be successful in the long-run even without prior application of donor-sponsored interventions for learning *nuts-and-bolts* of organization structure for participation. Institutional-legal design of CCBs provided a low-quality 'invited' space for participatory development in form of weak and ambiguous organization structure for CCBs (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007). Weaknesses in organization structure started to reveal as the CCB programme progressed and instances of CCB misuse started to accumulate. Continuous collaborative interaction between elected DG leadership and district bureaucracy in an ongoing CCB programme in Sahiwal district gradually improved the quality of 'invited' space for participation by supplying necessary organization structure elements for checking CCB misuse which were lacking in the formal institutional-legal design.

> *Proposition 12: A participatory development programme can be self-improving in the long-run when continuous collaborative engagement between elected district leader and district bureaucracy results in provision of missing organization structure necessary for participatory development.*

Sahiwal DG policy on CCBs, creation of special roles for Union Nazims for establishing integrity and political answerability in CCBs, demarcation of departmental roles and responsibilities in the light of relevant skills and resources and creation of cross-

departmental teams for streamlining CCB process can provide important inputs for refining institutional-legal design of participatory development in Punjab.

12.2.7.3. **Follower ability and willingness**: Confirming the implications from Situational Leadership theories, both District Nazim and Union Nazims were providing for what was missing in followers with respect to their ability and willingness for participatory development (Van Wart, 2005; House,1996).

12.2.7.3.1. Follower ability: Communities had little ability for participatory development during the early part of CCB programme implementation in District Sahiwal because they were unaware and inexperienced with regards to participatory development. Nazims had first-hand information about the formal process of CCBs and influence in DG by virtue of their formal position and their presence in the power network within the DG. Nazims at this stage were educating the community about concepts of participatory development. They provided instructions and clarifications about registration of CCBs, CCB policy of DG, formal proposal making process, what may be expected in dealing with DG offices at proposal making and instalment release stages, etc. Non-authoritarian instructional/clarification behaviours of Union Nazims and District Nazim represented directive behaviour in House's (1996) typology. Nazims provided political support by facilitating and pursuing the CCB projects in DG offices since bureaucracy tended to slow down or obstruct CCB processing during various stages of the project. Facilitation of CCBs in government offices represented a 'deliverance style' discussed earlier.

Educational/clarification behaviours of leaders receded as communities gained experience in participatory development during the later part of CCB programme in Sahiwal. However, elected leaders continued to provide a deliverance style for participatory project in the later stage of CCB programme as well. These types of behaviours represented task-oriented behaviours compensating for low ability of followers.

Proposition 13a: Adoption of non-authoritarian directive behaviour by elected leaders in DG will depend on 1) general community's lack of awareness regarding participatory development concepts, 2) general community's lack of information about a) participatory development policy and b) formal process of participatory development, and 3) general community's lack of familiarity with what may be expected in dealing with bureaucracy.

Proposition 13b: The extent of directive leadership provided by an elected LG leader in a community will depend (inversely) on extent of participatory experience gained by that community.

Proposition 14: Adoption of deliverance style by the elected leaders in DG will depend on generally known obstructionist tendencies of district bureaucracy.

12.2.7.3.2. Follower willingness: Community groups in Sahiwal expressed initial interest in CCB option 1) if they had some level of trust in the elected LG leader who first

suggested the participatory option to them, and 2) when the elected LG leader gave some evidence as to why a demanded project could not be provided through fully government funded development programme. Once Community groups expressed initial interest in CCB option, Union Nazims or DN provided them with further encouragement and assurances to undertake CCB projects.

Since communities in Sahiwal had no prior experience of participating in local development in the initial stage of CCB programme, their self-confidence in undertaking CCB projects was low. People also had little confidence in complex government systems: they knew through historical experience that government systems were slow, inefficient and full of procedural complexities. People also had low level of trust in bureaucracy.

Nazims encouraged community groups that undertaking CCB projects would not be a problem for them. Nazims assured the communities that their contribution or effort will not be wasted in procedural complexities of a government-backed development scheme since they will be guided by Nazims during all the stages of the project. Nazims also assured the communities that district bureaucracy will not be able to frustrate their projects since these will be backed by political force. These role played by DN and Union Nazims represented a *supportive* style in House's (1996) typology and compensated for low follower willingness to undertake participatory projects.

Proposition 15a: Level of supportive style provided by elected LG leaders to encourage community members for undertaking participatory projects will depend on 1) level of community trust on suggesting Nazim, 2) initial interest expressed by

community members in participatory development, 3) community's self-confidence level in undertaking participatory projects, 4) community's confidence level in formal participatory process, and 5) community's trust level in district bureaucracy.

As community's awareness, confidence and trust about CCB projects started to build as a result of experience, they started to demand CCB projects on their own initiative, i.e. without motivational support from the leaders. Data analysis suggests that follower-oriented compensatory role of elected leaders started to recede as CCB programme in Sahiwal progressed into later stage.

Proposition 15b: The extent of supportive leadership provided by an elected LG leader with regard to participatory development in a community will depend (inversely) on extent of participatory experience gained by that community.

DN set challenging goals for the Union Nazims by exhorting them to bring forward as many as possible CCB proposals permissible under the DG policy and available resources. DN also expressed trust in integrity and confidence in ability of Union Nazims to successfully promote CCB programme in the district. This represented an *achievement-oriented* style of the DN. However, it was not clear from the data whether DN adopted achievement-oriented style because of his own desire for participatory development, Union Nazims' reluctance to suggesting a 'contributory' option to their voters or Union Nazims' 'ideological' preference for providing fully-funded projects in their communities.

12.3.Participatory development and community empowerment:

A key conclusion of this study is that a continued participatory development programme can lead to community empowerment in the long-run under certain conditions. Only a narrow section of rich or middle class participated by way of involvement in decision making for development need identification and project cost contribution during the initial stage of participatory development in Sahiwal district. Most community members, especially the poor, did not participate during the initial stage because they had little or no awareness about the CCB programme. CCB general body members, usually representing the poor sections in community, were only informed or asked for a minimum feedback on decisions already taken by the executive committee, i.e. passive or low-consultative participation. At an intermediate stage, poor's interest in CCB started to build through non-project-specific involvement and social learning. General community, most of it poor, started to learn about basics of organizing for participatory development, proposal making and project implementation, and dealing with different actors involved in CCB process by seeking information from friends, relatives or other acquaintances who had direct or indirect experience with CCBs both within and across their communities of residence. The main learning of general community at this stage was regarding social and economic value of CCBs. General community's trust in leaders supporting the CCB projects and their confidence in CCB programme started to build as a result of direct observation and social learning during the intermediate stage. The attitudes of the poor towards CCBs, which were indifferent or negative during the initial stage, started to improve during the intermediate stage when they learnt about many useful projects going on within their own and in neighbouring communities.

Consequently, poor's direct involvement in development need identification and contribution towards project cost, which were non-existent or minimum in the initial or intermediary stage,

started to take off during the later stage of CCB programme, i.e. beginning of instrumental participation and deliberative participation by the poor. Poor participated by way of providing paid-labour, i.e. incentive-based participation, during all stages of participatory programme in Sahiwal.

Institutional-legal design of CCBs did not provide for a formal structure for organizing the poor to make collective political demands for participatory projects, i.e. it failed to provide sufficient political space for citizen-participation to the non-elite (Cornwall, 2004; Gaventa, 2004). It had not been designed keeping in view the socioeconomic and power disparities prevailing in Punjab's communities—especially rural communities. Leadership positions within CCBs remained in the hands of middle class or high class community members during all stages of CCB programme mainly because of their ability to spare greater time and their better educational and self-confidence levels required for registering and managing CCBs. However, active non-project-specific social learning by the non-elite during the intermediary stage led to non-elite's 1) greater appreciation of social and economic value of CCBs and 2) greater expectation and demand for direct involvement in participatory decision-making in CCBs during the later stage.

LG elections in smaller constituencies of Unions were reported as generally free and fair with a greater voter turn-out than Provincial and National assembly elections (Pattan Development Organization, 2005; 2001). LG elections in Pakistan are non-party. Voters in small constituencies know local candidates and their histories personally and vote on the basis of personal evaluation of the candidate rather than his/her party affiliation. Under these conditions, political interest of directly elected Union Nazims was more aligned with common people than with local elite who are always fewer in numbers. Elected Union Nazims could build a large personal vote-bank for next LG elections or elections to Provincial/National Assemblies if they supported non-elite's

participation in CCB projects. Elected LG leaders were thus under greater public pressure in the later stage for supporting broader community participation before they could endorse CCB proposals for approval by DN. There may have been a stage in future when some poor community members may have gained enough self-confidence and experience in participatory development to assume leadership positions in CCBs.

> *Proposition 16: An ongoing participatory development programme is empowering for the non-elite in the long-run when 1) continuous learning about participatory development in the general community takes place in a closely-knit social network of family and friends both within and across communities, 2) participatory project approval is linked to endorsement by elected LG representatives at community level, and 3) LG election system is free and fair.*

12.4. Provincial government policies and decisions

Provincial Government policy or orientation of Provincial Government leaders can have positive or negative influence on participatory development in local governments. This was evidenced when the new Provincial Government leadership in Punjab averse to ideas of empowered LGs and participatory development as a regular feature of LG development budgets reversed the popularizing CCB programme and participatory learning in Sahiwal district in 2008 by instructing the district finance office to stop the release of funds to approved CCB projects. This was despite the fact that PLGO (2001) was still in operation.

Alternatively, certain provincial government policies or decisions can conflict with participatory development program at LG level. Provincial government may try to suppress LG participatory programme in such a case. This was displayed in case of BVDP in Attock district when a foreign

development agency funded participatory development program faced potential competition from CCB projects at District Government level. Provincial Government leadership did not want a discontinuation of international development funds based on low performance. As a result, discouragement of LG participatory development programme was unofficially engineered in each case since CCBs had a statutory basis and couldn't be legally stopped by provincial government. Provincial government was able to do it through Provincial bureaucracy posted in the DGs. Institutional-legal design of Local Governments provided for the establishment of District Government Services Cadre. However, this part of the PLGO (2001) was never implemented and Provincial Government officers continued to be seconded/posted to DG positions.

Participatory development literature suggests that higher-level governments may choose to ignore or restrict participatory development programmes at local level if these are undertaken on an ad hoc basis without a permanent institutional-legal basis (e.g. Ackerman, 2004). This study adds that absence of institutional-legal basis is not the only condition when higher-level governments can choose to ignore or restrict participatory development programmes. Irrespective of institutional-legal basis of participatory development, an unfavourable Provincial Government policy or Provincial Government leadership orientation can negatively influence participatory development programmes at LG level if permanent LG offices are staffed and controlled by higher-level government.

> *Proposition 17: An unfavourable Provincial Government policy or Provincial Government leadership orientation can negatively influence participatory development programmes at LG level if 1) a permanent institutional-legal basis for participatory development is absent, OR, 2) District Government positions are staffed and controlled by Provincial Government.*

12.5.Limitations of research

Leadership style correlation findings of this research are based on response to survey from 46% of the total districts in Punjab. Although it was possible to get responses from all 35 districts of Punjab by officially pursuing Punjab Local Government sub-offices and District Council offices in remaining districts of Punjab, but it may have taken an unknown length of time and repeated efforts by my facilitators in Punjab Government. The time available for research was limited and my facilitators also felt exhausted at one point when responses to repeated requests were coming very slow. Since there were variations in elected District Leaders, socioeconomic conditions prevailing in different regions of Punjab and Provincial-District Government relationships and power configurations that took shape in each district after LG reform of 2001, leadership styles and leader preferences for participatory development may also have varied in each district. For a fuller understanding of correlations among leadership styles and correlation of leadership styles with participatory development, at least a few survey responses from all 35 districts were required. Survey responses from a limited number of districts, albeit from all geographical regions of Punjab, may have diluted the correlation results of this study.

The qualitative part of current research involved extensive interviewing in two districts of Punjab, one theorized as a strategic case and other as a deviant case. Extensive travelling to and within these two districts located in extreme north and deep interior of Punjab took considerable time and effort. Since Attock is located 450 Kilometres Northwest and Sahiwal around 200 Kilometres Southwest of Lahore—my base station in Pakistan, and no more than one or two interviews could be arranged in a single working day despite best efforts, I had to stay within the field for two to three weeks in each District. Travelling (by personal transport) and lodging costs were very high and fully borne by myself since no external funding was available. An ideal

qualitative study should have involved data collection/interviewing in more than one strategic and deviant cases, and would likely have resulted in findings with higher theoretical robustness and external validity. In fact I attempted to conduct some interviews in another deviant case—Bahawalpur district some 400 Kilometres Southwest of Lahore (geographically the largest district in Punjab), but I had to call off the trip because I was not able to get funding from an expected source and all my personal savings had exhausted. Also, the few interviews I conducted were giving initial impressions similar to that in Attock district. Thus the time and costs involved in qualitative fieldwork were a limitation in my research.

As can be seen in the official reports on development programme performance for Attock and Sahiwal districts, each District Government developed its own methodology and formats for reporting budgetary performance results. Not only that these formats are non-standard across different districts of Punjab, these are also very complex and difficult to understand (even with a background in public budgeting procedures as in my case). Development budget performance analysis is not carried out by local governments in Punjab. Also I had to make best-guesses about some state-led development and participatory development figures which were not available from the official reports. With limited help from different DG officers in Attock and Sahiwal, the development budget utilization analysis conducted for this research is based on my general understanding of Public Finance principles and interpretation of non-standard and complex DG development budget utilization reports.

I must admit I have avoided some extreme evidence in interviews or toned it down in other ways for the reasons of personal security. Such evidence points to leadership malpractices and fits well with other indicators of general corruption in government. However, the interviewees may also have overstretched or misrepresented the reality and spoken out of dislike towards the leaders. In

any case, any direct or indirect personal attribution for corruption in local development has been avoided and the evidence has been utilized only to contribute to theory of leadership and participatory development. The caution was necessary since identities could be easily assessed in district specific case studies and leaders are very powerful in a still post-tribal developing society in Punjab.

12.6.Some considerations in conclusions drawn and implications for future research:

Conclusions reached in this study were drawn from in-depth case studies of two districts from North and Central Punjab in their peculiar socioeconomic and political contexts, and are not proposed to be generalized to other districts as such. There is a general similarity in political culture of Punjab. Depending on differences in land tenures, irrigation water availability and soil conditions there are also some differences in socioeconomic conditions and power inequalities in districts of North, Central and South Punjab. Theoretical propositions from Sahiwal district may be hypothesized and tested empirically in other districts of Central Punjab and propositions from Attock may be tested in North Punjab as a first step towards confirming the results of this study.

Similar in-depth case studies eventually need to be carried out in all the districts of Punjab to enrich participatory and leadership research and provide a rich input for development of policy and institutional-legal design of participatory development. Further research on LG leadership and participatory development through LGs is especially needed now since Pakistan is passing through a phase of reflecting on its first 10-year experience with a participatory development programme that deeply empowered communities with the concepts and practice of self-help and self-improvement.

The pattern of participatory development in Sahiwal suggests that participatory learning and practice may have spread out into communities over time as community of practice (Wenger, 2000). Some community members were playing 'leadership-in-learning' roles during the intermediate stage. Participatory learning was embedded in webs of social relationships and expanding as a 'joint enterprise'. A repertoire of mutually held participatory development knowledge such as dealing with bureaucracy and conversion of savings to additional construction, etc, was also developing. Spatial pattern of CCBs in Sahiwal shows that participatory development was radiating out into the adjacent communities to form certain clusters of participatory development with high-concentration cores (see Map 12.1). Future research in participatory development as community of practice seems promising.

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APPENDIX 1:

PUNJAB LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP AND PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Local governments, local government leadership and participatory development in Punjab Province of Pakistan are analytically discussed in the following five historical phases:

A. Phase 1: 1947—1958:

After partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan was left with 16 out of 29 district boards and 65 out of 124 municipal committees in West Punjab. Another 42 small towns, 22 Notified Area Committees for backward areas, and 3544 village panchayats came to the share of West Punjab in Pakistan. Demand for democratic Local Governments popularized during Pakistan movement was reflected in manifesto of Muslim League, the ruling party in the newborn nation, and various Local Government seminars held during 1947-1958 (Abedin, 1973, 160-162). As a result of democratization drive during 1950s, system of nomination to local bodies was eventually abolished, Deputy Commissioners were withdrawn from the chairmanship of District Boards and non-official chairmen were popularly elected, and restricted franchise was replaced by universal adult franchise for all elective bodies (Hasan 1983, pp47, Siddiqui 1992, pp 100). However, these changes took a general and country-wide effect after the passage of Basic Democracies Order of 1959.

Local Governments were faced with declining performance and institutional degeneration during 1947—1958 because of several reasons. The new nation was faced with enormous administrative and economic crisis, and Local Governments did not get the needed attention of higher governments. The district officers, preoccupied with nation-building activities of a newborn nation and under pressure of popular demand for independence of local bodies, remained aloof from active guidance and supervision of the local bodies. Local bodies were also handicapped by serious shortage of funds because of rising prices and inelasticity of local income resources (Abedin 1973, pp. 160, Hasan 1983, pp 37).

Under military and bureaucracy dominated centre, more and more centralization took place from 1947 to 1958 (Talbot, 1998). Many eminent provincial and national level political leaders and senior government functionaries left for India after partition. As a result many Local Government leaders, who had opted for local politics because they couldn't find a prominent place in higher politics, now moved into openings created in provincial and central government political leadership in Pakistan (Abedin 1973, pp. 159-160). Their place in Local Governments was taken by people, usually from medium landholding class, with lesser experience and ability. Many a times, this new class of Local Government leaders were more interested in seeking personal favours from the district bureaucracy or Provincial Government and frequently resorted to election malpractices (Siddiqui 1992 pp. 100).

As a result of foregoing factors, serious maladministration and corruption became a common feature in many municipalities and local boards, and Provincial Governments resorted more and more to supersession or withdrawal of functions from local bodies (Abedin 1973, pp162). By 1958, 11 out of 16 district boards were superseded in Punjab. All municipal committees and district boards were disempowered and superseded in NWFP in 1952 where Provincial Government followed a policy of centralization. Nomination practice was abrogated in Sind province in 1938 through an amendment act and all seats of local bodies became elective. But Provincial Government embarked upon a policy of centralization after partition. Key posts in local bodies were provincialized in 1947 under Sind Local Authorities Services Act. A similar situation existed in Baluchistan as well (Hasan 1983, pp46, Siddiqui 1992, pp.100).

Despite their successful experience in 1920s, village panchayats were moribund in Punjab during 1947-57. There were about 20,000 villages in Punjab, but only 4,500 panchayats were constituted for 7000 villages during this period. However, over half of these panchayats were non-functional (Abedin, 1973). These panchayats had a statutory basis and were vested with some local taxation powers and judicial powers in minor non-criminal cases. Local landlords opposed the panchayat system because they feared a loss of their individual social prestige and power in the village. Village-folk feared more obligations and taxes from panchayats. Factional politics of rural areas also undermined the performance of many panchayats where these existed. As a result statutory village panchayats remained unpopular and no serious attempt was made during 1950s at their strengthening or reorganization.

Participatory Development During 1950s:

The first major step towards citizen participation in Pakistan was taken in form of the Village Agricultural and Industrial Development (V-AID) program started by central government in 1953. Financially supported by USAID, the main purposes of the V-AID program were to raise awareness of the rural masses regarding modern agricultural techniques and ways of modern social and economic life, and develop community leadership to bring social and economic development to rural areas on the basis of self-initiative and self-help. The district was divided into 'development areas' with each development area comprising many villages as basic units of socio-economic development. A V-AID Development Officer was responsible for each development area where as a V-AID Development Worker was responsible for implementation of V-AID program in each village. The V-AID worker was responsible for organization of rural communities in each village for constituting village development councils. These village councils were trained in planning and implementation of small village development schemes in the areas of agriculture and irrigation, adult literacy, primary education, household and community sanitation, minor rural roads, etc. Village councils identified locally needed development schemes in these areas with the help and supervision of V-AID worker and sent these schemes to V-AID Area Development Officer. These schemes were then taken-up in District V-AID Committee which could require modification, approve or disapprove the schemes.

The District level V-AID committees were chaired by the Deputy Commissioner of the district while all Tehsildars (the official Collector of Revenues in a Tehsil—an administrative subdivision of district), V-AID Areas Development Officers, and other heads of provincial state-building offices in the district were its members. Chairmen of village development councils were also represented on the district level V-AID committee. Once approved by the District V-AID Committee, these projects would be executed through employing local labour and under joint supervision of village councils and provincial technical departments in the district. Overall control was vested in the bureaucracy-dominated District V-AID committee.

V-AID program has been variously appreciated as a first attempt, however limited, towards citizen participation in local development. However, V-AID program eventually fell to disfavour because of three important reasons (Abedin, 1973): 1) the village councils were non-statutory and the method of constituting these councils depended largely on the attitudes of official

development officers and village development workers. There were no democratic elections at any level of the government from birth of Pakistan in 1947 till 1959 and so no democratic electoral processes prevailed in the society. As a result the appointive or limited election methods turned up local elites as the leaders of participatory development in the village councils. V-AID development scheme were criticized as largely serving the interests of the local elite; 2) the British Indian tradition of local development through a combination of guardian central bureaucracy and higher socioeconomic classes in subordinate role continued to guide V-Aid organization and management philosophy. Although the official V-AID village development worker and area development officers were required to assume the role of friends and coaches of people, the evidence from field suggested that they assumed more of bureaucratic and super-ordinate attitudes, and interacted on parity basis only with the local elite; and, 3) with the election of local councils under the Basic Democracies system of 1959, village development councils were seen as rivals by the elected Basic Democrats who wanted all local development funds to be channelled through elected local representatives. These Basic Democrats also constituted the electoral college for the President and higher legislative assemblies and therefore had strong influence on the regime. Eventually, the V-AID program was discontinued and its operations and funding was integrated into the local bodies created under Basic Democracies Order of 1959.

B. Phase 2: 1959—1970:

In October 1958, President Iskander Mirza dismissed the government of Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon, abrogated the constitution of 1956, and declared Martial Law with Army Chief General Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. A few days later, Ayub Khan toppled Iskander Mirza from the position of President and assumed the control of government. Ayub Khan introduced a new country-wide system of Local Governments through Basic Democracies Order of 1959. The municipal Local Governments were set up under the Municipal Administration Ordinance 1961. The new laws established a complex four tier Local Government system throughout the country (Siddiqui, 1992). The term of local bodies was fixed at five years and local elections were held twice in 1960 and 1964 under this system. Local councillors or the 'Basic Democrats' elected under the new system were assigned an important role of acting as an electoral college for the election of President and national and provincial legislatures. Ayub Khan

got himself appointed as a President through an indirect referendum by the newly elected basic democrats in 1960. A new Constitution of Pakistan was promulgated in 1962 making her a federal state with presidential form of government and Basic Democrats as electors of higher leadership in political structure of the country.

Structure of Local Governments under Ayub's LG Legislation:

The first tier constituted of Union councils, town committees and Union committees. Union councils were rural bodies and had a population of around 10,000 each (Abedin 1973, pp 165). Union committees were constituents of larger municipal committees and were constituted for geographically compact urban areas with population less than 14,000. Included in this tier was another category of small rural towns which showed some characteristics of urban areas. Termed as 'town committees' these towns had a population less than 14,000. The members of first tier Local Governments were initially partly elected and partly nominated non-officials, but later all members were made directly elected in 1964 Local Government elections. Each first tier local body elected an executive Chairman from amongst its members. In West Pakistan, 37,959 villages were constituted into 3414 Union Councils. There were 222 town committees and 810 Union committees. The directly elected members of first tier local bodies were called Basic Democrats. Each Basic Democrat represented 800-1400 people (Khan, 2006; Abedin, 1973, pp 165). Election of 1960 returned 80,000 basic democrats and elections of 1964 returned 120,000 basic democrats from all over the country.

Union councils and town committees were rural bodies and had 37 executive functions and 29 sources of own-income in form of taxes, rates, fines and fees. These rural bodies also received large grants from Provincial Government and higher local councils. Union committees performed functions assigned to it by the Municipal Committees. Union committees had no income sources of its own and depended on Municipal Committees which made provision for their budgets. Family Laws Ordinance 1961 and West Pakistan Conciliation Courts Ordinance 1961 gave arbitral and judicial powers to first tier Local Governments in petty family or civil matters.

Rural Tehsil Councils and urban Municipal committees were included in the second tier of Local Government. Tehsil Council was created originally as a coordination body for Union Councils and Town Committees with in its jurisdiction. But later Tehsil Councils were integrated in a Vertical Development Program (VDP)—central/Provincial Government development programs

intended for local development works—called Rural Works Programme (RWP) and emerged as important actors in rural development. Tehsil Councils didn't have own sources of income but received substantial grants from Provincial Government and district council. All chairmen of Union Councils and Town Committees within each of the 211 Tehsils in west Punjab became the members of Tehsil Council. Tehsil level government officers within the Tehsil, constituting not more than 50% of council's total membership became official members of Tehsil Council. Sub-Divisional Officer or the Tehsildar became the official Chairman of Tehsil Council. Deputy Commissioner was the controlling authority. Municipal committees were created in towns of more than 14,000 population. Municipal committees had many important sources of own source income and received grants from Provincial Governments. These bodies had 73 optional and compulsory municipal functions and coordinated the activities of Union committees within their jurisdiction. The chairmen of all Union committees within a Municipal Committee were its members. Officials and non-official members, together constituting less than the number of Union-committee chairmen members in the Municipal Committee, were appointed to the Municipal Committee by the Divisional Commissioner. Divisional Commissioner was the controlling authority for these committees. The chairman of Municipal Committee was either a full time official in case of big cities, or an administrative officer in smaller towns to whom an additional charge of Municipal Committee Chairman was assigned by the Provincial Government. The Vice Chairman was elected by the committee members from amongst its non-official members. The Vice Chairman of Municipal Committee also became the ex-officio official member of District Council (Abedin 1973, pp. 166).

The third tier consisted of 46 District Councils in West Pakistan. Rural urban distinction ended in District Council as not less than 50% of its members were elected by an electoral college consisting of all Chairmen of Union Councils, Union Committees and Town Committees. Deputy Commissioner was its Chairman and its Vice Chairman was elected by the council from amongst its non-official members. All Tehsil level officers and most district level officers became its official members. Divisional Commissioner was its controlling authority. District council had executive responsibility for 28 compulsory and 70 optional functions. It had its own modest sources of income and received grants from Provincial Government as well (Siddiqui 1992; Abedin 1973). District Council was made responsible for planning and execution of a large part

of Rural Works Programme. It also made development grants to Union Councils and Town Committees for the development projects forwarded to it and coordinated their activities. District Council could give approval for Rural Works Programme development projects up to a certain limit without prior sanction from Provincial Government (Abedin 1973).

Divisional Council was the fourth tier of local bodies and was a coordination body for the lower councils. Not less than 50% of its members were elected by an electoral college comprising of elected members of District Councils within the division. All Deputy Commissioners of the districts within the division were its official members. Divisional Commissioner was its Chairman and Provincial Government was its controlling authority. Divisional Councils didn't have income sources of their own and received ad hoc grant from Provincial Government. There were 12 divisions in West Pakistan during 1960s (Abedin 1973, Siddiqui 1992).

None of the local bodies had any kind of law and order or general administration function which remained in the hands of district bureaucracy. Secretaries of all local councils, except for first tier councils who were appointed by the respective councils, were staff officers of Deputy Commissioner or the Divisional Commissioner. Official control over local bodies was complete and no legal safeguards were provided against actions of controlling authority. The controlling authority could quash, withhold, review and substitute any actual or intended action of local bodies. It approved the budget estimates and could even supersede local bodies if it thought it to be expedient. In practice, however, no such eventuality occurred because on one hand officials had an advantageous position as Chairmen of higher councils and commanded the support of appointed members, and they had become a part of Ayub Regime (Cheema, et al, 2005; Abedin, 1973).

Local Government Leadership During 1960s

In order to give legitimacy and extension to his dictatorial rule, Ayub Khan created a triangle of interwoven interests (Abedin, 1973, pp. 385). Central bureaucracy supporting Ayub's regime, pro-Ayub Muslim League Party and Basic Democrats were the three actors in the triangle. Basic Democrats constituted the main elected local leadership created by Local Government system of 1959. Ayub regime and system of Basic Democracies eventually became unpopular because Constitution of Pakistan 1962, drafted and promulgated by Ayub regime, made 80,000 basic democrats the electoral college for electing national and provincial legislatures and the President

of Pakistan. A vast majority of people and opposition parties did not understand why they were effectively disenfranchised to elect their representative to the higher legislatures (Cheema, et al, 2005; Abedin, 1973, pp. 382). The dictatorial regime didn't like to go to the polls and preferred to control the national and provincial legislatures through a smaller number of favourable basic democrats whose own survival depended on continuation of Ayub as a president. A number of opposition parties, including the Pakistan Peoples Party, wanted direct elections but the ruling pro-Ayub Muslim League's saw its continuation in power tied to system of indirect elections through Basic Democrats.

The system of Basic Democracies had created a new powerful 'social class' of local leaders over a short period of time (Cheema, et al, 2005; Abedin, 1973, pp. 386). Although Basic Democracies resulted in election of middle-class local leadership in urban areas, the new 'social class' of leadership constituting the core of political support for Ayub regime was based in rural areas since 82% of the total Basic Democrats represented rural councils (Abedin, 1973). Most basic democrats elected to rural local bodies in the first tier were small-sized landlords; almost all chairmen of these local bodies were medium or large-sized landlords. Being members and chairmen of local bodies added to their prestige, but the main factor that raised their social status and power as a class was their association with Ayub Regime, and that members of provincial and national legislatures were dependent on them for election. Being electors of the President and Parliamentarians, they could influence the district administration through Ayub regime for getting favours and patronage for themselves or their supporters. Massive development fund were also coming to rural councils through Rural Works Program which were spent by the basic democrats without any effective administrative control or external audit thus providing them with rich opportunities for making quick fortune (Cheema, et al, 2005; Abedin, 1973). These factors provided enough incentives to a vast majority of basic democrats to identify with Muslim League and support Ayub in Presidential election of 1965.

Ayub's regime was necessarily developmentalist since it promoted industry and capitalist agriculture unknown to the country yet (Zaidi, 2005). The Green Revolution technology package coupled with industrial and agricultural credit schemes and central government subsidies (introduced in 1959 and continued later) produced a new class of middle class capitalistic farmers and small to medium scale manufacturers. Growth in manufacturing and agricultural output was

attended by growth in service sector and an increase in the numbers of skilled and technical workers. Ayub's land tenure reforms of 1959 had also introduced some change in feudal agriculture and landholding system. Feudal landlords were also tempted to adopt mechanistic farming methods now. However, mechanistic farming rendered many tenants landless. This landless and workless class was now allured to industry much of which was clustering around towns and cities. 1960s also witnessed a general increase in education. The spread of education in rural areas also contributed to rural-urban migration. Thus 1960s created a new class of middleclass yeomanry and capitalistic landlords (Zaidi 2005, Abedin 1973). Many of these joined Ayub's Basic Democracies and later entered national or provincial politics.

Participatory Local Development During 1960s

Rural Works Programme was started by the central government in 1963 with the help of US government as part of national socio-economic planning framework. Central government reserved 2.5 billion rupees in the third five year medium-term national development plan (1965-1970) to be spent on rural development through Basic Democracies, and created an important role for Union Councils, Town Committees, Tehsil Councils and District Councils in social, economic and infrastructure development of the rural areas (Siddiqui 1992, pp102). The main objectives of RWP were to improve rural infrastructure in roads and agriculture sector and generate local employment for the landless rural poor in the course of works initiated under the program. The system of Basic Democracies pioneered the integration of vertical Rural Works Programs with local bodies, particularly at the first tier, and included some features of participatory development at the basic community level. Since then, Vertical Development Programs of central or Provincial Government had been integrated into local development programs under different arrangements. Under Rural Works Program, the Union councils and town committees could identify and execute rural works of smaller scale through Project Committees. Members of local council and general community members elected by the villagers were required to be represented on the project committees. The Project Committee was also required to work in close consultation with general community for the identification and prioritization of local development schemes. Projects identified by project committees at Union, Tehsil or district level had to be approved by all-official committees constituted for each level. Once approved, the development schemes of Union councils or town committees could be

executed by the project committees, while the schemes of Tehsil or district council could be executed by project committees or district executing departments through the usual tendering process.

This was the second experiment of limited community participation in local development. Critics of RWP maintain that general community members represented on project committees were mostly nominated by the chairmen of the local councils and usually belonged to the upper socio-economic classes. Chairmen of elected councils themselves belonged to affluent classes and such membership of the project committee assured developmental preferences of the local elite in project committees. Any representation of lower classes on the project committee was tokenistic. As a result, the record of rural development through local bodies was not glorious because of wide spread malpractices, including corruption and patronage, and lack of auditory and administrative control (Abedin 1983). RWP has also been criticized as being unrepresentative of community needs and dominated by bureaucratic thinking on local development since Deputy Commissioner was the Project Director of RWP at the district level (Khan, 2006).

C. Phase 3: 1971—1977

Ayub Khan's BD system became dysfunctional after Ayub relinquished power in 1969. It was eventually abolished by President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1971. Pakistan Peoples Party government came to power in 1971 after the first democratic election in the country held in 1970-71. Peoples Party promised its Peoples Local Government Plan as a part of its political agenda. A Local Government Ordinance 1972 was passed which envisaged a three tiered rural Local Government structure and two tiered urban Local Government structure with a tenure of three years. Punjab government passed Punjab Local Government Act in order to give effect to the LGO 1972. However no Local Governments were established during Bhutto's years from 1971 to 1977 because elections to Local Governments were never held. Several reasons are quoted for this including Bhutto's centralist tendencies, eventual rise of rural feudal-type landlord class leadership in Peoples Party, and opposition's mistrust of Local Governments as political agents of ruling party (Siddiqui, 1992).

Participatory Local Development 1971—1977

The Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) initiated by Prime Minister Bhutto in 1972 was aimed at both economic and social development of the rural society. A number of Vertical Development Programs (such as Peoples Works Programme funding local development projects in health, education and roads sector) involving local administration, nation-building departments of central and Provincial Government (such as social welfare, health, education, etc), private sector and professional organizations were started to improve rural economy, agricultural productivity, rural infrastructure and increasing the general quality of life in villages. The ultimate objective was to achieve national development through alleviating rural poverty since rural society formed the bulk of country's population (more than 80% in mid-1970s) and agriculture was the mainstay of national economy[54].

At village level, the planning and implementation of rural development schemes such as improvement of school buildings, development of village drains and sewers, adult literacy, improvement of agricultural waterways, etc was organized around project committees selected by villagers (Khan, 2006). Development schemes identified by village project committees in a Tehsil jurisdiction were sent to the *markaz*—the basic unit of IDRP administration centred at Tehsil Headquarters—headed by an official project director. The *markaz* evaluated, processed and coordinated the village schemes with various nation-building departments if these schemes were larger than the capacity of the village project committees, or amended/approved these schemes and sent them back to village project committees for implementation. Village project committees also acted as cooperatives for achieving economies of scale for the farmers in procurement of seeds, fertilizers and other agricultural inputs. The overall supervision of village development schemes lay within the purview of *markaz* project director who was mostly a middle or senior career officer of Provincial Local Government and Rural Development (LGRD) Department. IRDP was coordinated at national level by Ministry of LGRD.

IDRP achieved some sizable achievements in its objectives but it has been criticized on two counts: 1) Under the prevailing rural social power structures, there was little possibility for the representatives of ordinary masses to be selected on village project committees. When elite capture occurred or otherwise village schemes executed by village project committees were misused, there was no way to hold village project committees accountable since these were

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[54] Agriculture still constitutes 24.7% of national GDP and employs 47% of total workforce directly

neither formally registered/incorporated under any law nor were they answerable to any electoral constituency; and, 2) The frequent amendment and subsequent approval by fully official *markaz* changed the participatory character of village schemes and reflected the priorities of bureaucracy. In addition, many rural schemes could be identified, planned and executed directly by the *markaz* which was unrepresentative of the rural community. Thus in absence of popularly elected local councils IRDP faced many operational problems and public criticisms (Khan, 2006; Siddiqui, 1992).

D. Phase 4: 1978—1997

General Ziaul Haq dismantled the government of Prime Minister Bhutto in 1977 in a military coup and declared Martial Law in the country. This time, however, the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was not abrogated, rather it was held in abeyance. Following his predecessor, Zia embarked upon a policy of centralization of powers in non-representative military-dominated centre and limited administrative, political and financial decentralization from provincial to local level through introduction of elected Local Governments (Zaidi, 2005). Zia repealed the Peoples Local Government laws and introduced another Local Government system in 1979 through Local Government Ordinances in each province, Northern Areas, Tribal Areas and Azad Kashmir (Siddiqui, 1992).

Local Government Structure, Functions and Finances under Local Government System of 1979

Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 created rural Local Governments at two tiers of Union Council (UC) and District Council. A UC consisted of 8-10 villages with 10,000 to 25,000 population. An electoral ward returning one UC member represented about 1000-1500 people. A District Council approximated a revenue district in Punjab and a single electoral ward in District Council represented about 50,000 people. Urban Local Governments were singled tiered: Town Committees for towns up to 30,000 population, Municipal Committees for towns with 30,000 to 500,000 population, and Municipal Corporations for large cities with population over 500,000. A fourth tier of Metropolitan Corporations was later introduced for two largest cities of Lahore and Karachi. An area could be termed urban on the basis of its population and nature of economic activity as reported by the census officers. The general councillors of both urban and rural local councils were directly elected at all tiers on the basis of adult franchise fixed at the age of 21.

Provision was made for the first time for reservation of indirectly elected seats for women and peasant councillors in all councils. Provision was also made for representation of non-Muslims through separate electorates. The executive Chairmen of all local councils were elected indirectly by the councillors. There were no appointed or official members in any council. In 1983 local elections, 70% new candidates were returned in local councils (Siddiqui, 1992; Hasan, 1983).

Controlling authority was abolished for budgetary, taxation and by-laws approval. Now local councils did not need the approval of an out side authority for affecting their by-laws and budgets (Khan 2006; Siddiqui 1992). However, the Provincial Government reserved the right to quash resolutions or proceedings of local councils and suspend Local Governments. Provincial Governments used these powers to suspend Local Governments in early 1990s. All local councils were to be elected in non-party elections and Divisional Commissioner had the power to disqualify members who contested Local Government election from a party platform.

Except for Metropolitan Corporations which were given additional functions, urban Local Governments were given 11 compulsory functions of municipal nature and 80 optional functions. In actual practice, most urban Local Governments performed compulsory functions only, mainly provision and maintenance of sanitation and waste disposal, water supply, streets and roads and management and maintenance of primary schools within town limits (Khan, 2006; Zaidi, 2005). Smaller municipalities restricted themselves to least required municipal functions. While larger urban councils performed most services-related functions, development and town planning functions were performed by provincial development and planning agencies (Zaidi, 2005). Union councils were given 27 civic and 8 welfare functions, in addition to development functions of minor importance. The civil functions included the provision and maintenance of public ways, sanitation, and maintenance of wells, water pumps and tanks. Welfare functions included undertaking relief measures in case of calamities, promotion of general welfare and health. Development functions included measures to increase food production, industry and promote community development (Zaidi, 2005; Siddiqui, 1992). In actual practice, Union Councils performed only civic functions. District council functions were given largest number of compulsory and optional functions. Compulsory functions included provision and maintenance of roads, bridges, public buildings, water supply, maintenance and management of small rural hospitals and maintenance and construction of school buildings. In real practice, district council

undertook only a small number of functions like construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, basic health units and veterinary hospitals (Siddiqui 1992). Local Governments were not given any general administration or law and order functions (ICG, 2004).

Local councils were given a number of internal income sources, but only a few of them were usefully employed (Zaidi, 2005; Siddiqui, 1992). Union Councils in Punjab were given 19 sources of taxes, toll, rates, fees, etc. But in practice only health tax, tax on births, marriages and feasts, and community tax were employed as important sources. District Councils in Punjab were given 14 sources of internal income, but in practice only export tax, local cess on land rent and revenue, immovable property transfer fee, fees on cattle fairs and markets and vehicle tax were employed as important sources of income. Urban local bodies were given 27 sources of internal income, but in practice only octroi, property tax, and tax on building control were usefully employed. More than 50% of urban councils' own-source income came from octroi alone.

Just like Ayub's BD system, incomes of Local Governments was very small under 1979 LG system. Own-source revenue generated by all local councils during the operation of 1979 system constituted just 5% of revenue generated by all tiers of government (Zaidi, 2005). Total income of all local councils in Punjab constituted less than 17% of the province's total income in 1985-86. Higher government grants were small and constituted an average 6% of yearly income of all rural and urban local councils in the country from 1979 to 1987. In Punjab, annual rate of increase in total income of all local councils fell from 33% in 1979-80 to 20% in 1985-86 (Siddiqui, 1992, pp 125; Hasan, 1983, pp72). Total income of all rural and urban local councils in Punjab was 1.7 billion rupees in 1982-83 (Hasan, 1983, pp73). Twenty one years later in 2003-04, this was less than total annual income of a single District Government Attock in Punjab (1.9 billion rupees). Although now Local Governments could levy scheduled local taxes without approval from an outside authority, Provincial Governments could direct any specific local council to reduce or increase any existing tax and suspend or abolish the levy of any existing tax.

Overall, Zia's Local Governments failed to deliver. Paucity of funds, non-facilitative attitudes and low skill levels of Local Government staff, and non-ownership by the Provincial Governments were the main reasons failure of Local Governments during 1980s and 1990s (Zaidi, 2005; Cheema, et al, 2005).

Local government leadership during 1979-1997

Pakistani society had changed considerably from 1960s to 1980s. The growth of middle class farmers, traders, professional and business people had crystallised into a new bourgeoisie. A general affluence existed in the society because of foreign aid during Afghan War years and also because of the Middle East boom. Large industrialist and conservative feudal class who had left the political scene during Bhutto's years of 'nationalization', land reform and populist politics also returned. Local Government elections were held in 1979, 1983 and 1987 on non-party basis because Zia didn't want parties to capture emerging political leadership at the grass root. In the absence of political parties, newly emerging political groups and factions at the local level were captured by the military leadership as its political base. Traditional provincial or national political leaders and richer classes didn't consider it befitting or worthwhile to engage in Local Government politics. The vacuum created by them was filled with middle class aspirants with some financial and political means. These included political aspirants from the small or medium land-owning rural groups as well. Particularly in Punjab, where a strong Ayubian tradition existed, it was quite easy and much less expensive to develop clientistic network with this new middle class leadership by channelling federal and provincial development funds through them and responding to their localized interests or offering personalized support through bureaucracy (Cheema, et al, 2005; Wilder, 1999).

Urban middle class in Punjab had been active against Bhutto and Zia found a natural ally in them when they got elected to the urban councils (Cheema, et al, 2005; Wilder, 1999). Moreover the disproportionate affluence of urban areas created through municipal taxation system and restrictive laws barring the spending of urban income on rural areas also contributed to winning over urban middle class to Zia (Cheema, et al, 2005). This made rural areas dependent or grants from provincial or federal government. Under the mixed effect of rural landholding patterns and social change of 1970s and 1980s, most small landlords were elected members and chairmen of Union councils. The members of district councils were also small to medium landowners. However, district council chairmen usually represented large landholding class (Siddiqui 1992, pp. 112). The military dictatorship planned to get endorsement from the 75% population living in rural areas by providing localized and personalized benefits through a set of collaborative local leaders it had found in the newly elected rural local leadership.

A loyal corps of leaders developed in the local political nursery later entered the provincial and national legislatures in 1985 and took over the clientistic political culture of Local Governments to higher assemblies (ICG, 2004). In 1985 elections, almost 50% of the Punjab Assembly members were the sitting members of local councils; in 1993 general elections, more than 70% of members of Punjab and National Assembly had started their career in Local Governments (Zaidi 2005; ICG 2004). It is no wonder the practice of personalized development grants from Head of Government's unaudited discretionary funds made to MNAs or MPAs started during Zia's years and continues till now (Cheema, et al, 2005).

Local Development and Citizen Participation during 1979--1997

With the introduction of elected Local Governments in 1979, the IRDP unit of rural development administration—the *markaz—*was restructured. All chairmen of Union councils and district councillors elected from within the territorial jurisdiction of a Tehsil were now members of markaz council. Project manager and departmental officers posted to the markaz were also the official members of the markaz council. The chairman of the council was now to be elected by the non-official members form amongst them. The developmental responsibility of markaz now was to process and scrutinize development Union council proposals and send these over to the district council.

Local development programs of 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were largely funded through foreign aid programmes. After the introduction of 1979 LG system, foreign funding for Local Government development programmes was stopped. Only small infrastructure development schemes funded by local sources could now be undertaken by Local Governments at all levels (Khan, 2006). Rural development schemes were identified through elected councils at Union and district levels while municipal committees/corporation identified development schemes in the urban areas. These schemes were executed through offices of provincial or central executing departments delegated in the districts, municipal administrations or other government agencies. District Coordination Committee was constituted for coordinating all development activities in the district. District Council Chairman was the ex-officio Chairman of District Coordination Committee with district Heads of Nation-Building Departments as its members. District Council Chairman was also made the Project Director of all the development projects carried out under

District Council development program. Assistant Director Local Government was the secretary of the District Coordination Committee. However, District Council or its elected Chairman had no disciplinary or service-related control over the departmental employees represented in the District Coordination Committee. As a result, the heads of nation building departments never felt themselves bound to listen to the District Council Chairman (Siddiqui, 1992). However, as a result of popular politics of 1960s and 1970s, official control over Local Governments was loosened this time by introduction of wholly elected councils (Cheema, et al, 2005; Siddiqui, 1992).

Citizens participated in the local development process indirectly through consultations with the local councillors who could then formulate and convey their development demands to the concerned Local Governments. Citizens could also participate by submitting their development demand requests directly to the delegated development planning offices in district administration (Khan, 2006). However, this type of direct participation in development need identification for communities was limited to a small section of society since district administration responded mostly to the elite class having political connections at higher levels of government or influence with senior bureaucracy—a practice that continues till today.

The only notable direct citizen participation development programs during 1980s were Small Village Level Development (SVLD) schemes and Matching Grants System (Siddiqui, 1992). Small Village Level Development schemes were small-sized schemes (up to 50,000 rupees) and required 25-30% community contribution. These schemes were identified the village communities under supervisory and financial control of Provincial Local Government and Rural Development (LGRD) department's local office. Matching Grants schemes (MGS) were larger and required 50% contribution by the community. Development schemes under Matching Grants program were identified by the community. Although people were allowed limited participation by way of sharing project cost, providing paid labour and some consultation during project planning and implementation phases of the project, these schemes were executed by sub-offices of Punjab LGRD or other provincial executing department delegated in the district. There was a principle of 'higher the community contribution, higher the priority in approval' in these schemes. As a result only richer communities could benefit from these schemes. Both SVLD and MGS schemes remained rarely utilized and unpopular with the people because of a high level of

contribution required from communities, limited involvement of the people and a high level of control exercised by the Provincial Government offices (Siddiqui, 1992).

E. Phase 5: 1998—2010:

In 1998, Nawaz Sharif government held elections to Local Governments in Punjab under the PLGO (1979) after five years of dissolution. An important change made to Local Governments during their short operation was the introduction of District Development Committee with powers of local sanction of development projects up to 5 million rupees. The committee was chaired by Deputy Commissioner of the district and District Council Chairman and MPAs from the district were represented on the committee. This was an important step towards financial decentralization. In 1999, shortly before the military coup, Import Tax (Octroi) of urban Local Governments and Export Tax of District Governments was abolished since these local taxes were regressive, inefficient and fraught with corruption. In lieu of the abolished Octroi and Zila Tax (OZT), Provincial Governments were now to be transferred 2.5% of proceeds from the federal government General Sales Tax according to the baseline OZT that was being collected by their Local Governments in 1998-99 (ADB, DFID & WB, 2004). Federal government increased the GST from 12.5% to 15% in 1999 in order to finance the OZT transfer. Provinces were required to redistribute share from the GST among the rural and urban Local Governments (Ahmad, et al., 2007; ADB, DFID & WB, 2004).

Local Government System of 2001

Following a brief conflict with the elected government, Army Chief, General Pervaz Musharraf, dismissed the government of Nawaz Sharif and dissolved elected parliament and provincial legislatures in October 1999. LG system of 2001 was conceived by the National Reconstruction Bureau, an institution created by military government in November, 1999, for chalking out national reconstruction policy. Consultants employed by NRB were paid by UNDP. Its main agenda was reform in governance system of Pakistan, especially in police, district administration and Local Governments (Iqbal, 2008). The military government unveiled its devolution plan in May 2000 and proclaimed that a new Local Government system will be installed on August 14, 2001, a deadline it was able to meet. The devolution plan was summarized 5D's as shown in the following diagram:

Figure: 5 D's of Devolution Plan 2000, NRB (2000)

The terminology of decentralization can be easily seen in the devolution star developed by the UNDP consultants. ICG (2004) report on Devolution in Pakistan argues that although US had supported military regimes in Pakistan during 1960s because of policy of containment of communism and in 1980s because of Pakistani military's role in Soviet-Afghan war, no such reason existed in 1999. Furthermore, world had become much more democratized by now and Musharraf was criticized worldwide for forestalling democratic process in Pakistan. Under mounting international pressure, this time the military regime decided not to introduce just a token decentralization reform. As a result Musharraf's Local Government plan was markedly different from the earlier ones in that it decentralized substantial powers to the elected representatives at the local level (ICG, 2004). Devolution of political power meant establishment of fully elected Local Governments in three vertical tiers of Union, Tehsil/town and District. Each tier had clear assignment of functions and authority. Instead of local bureaucracy, MPAs/MNAs or higher governments, the elected political leadership at each tier of LG could now set the vision, policy and goals LG he/she represented. Political authority and control over

local bureaucracy was now to lie with the elected executive heads of Local Governments at each level. Under decentralization of administrative authority, operational decision making authority from 32 Provincial Government departments was devolved to DG (NRB, 2001). Before 2001, Deputy Commissioner represented Provincial Government in the district. He was the executive head of district government and maintained administrative oversight and control over all Provincial Government departments delegated to the district. After 2001, Deconcentration of Management functions meant that office of Deputy Commissioner was abolished and district government was divided into 11 specialized departments, each headed by an Executive District Officer. The powers and functions devolved from 32 Provincial Government departments were regrouped into 11 DG departments. Elected District Nazim was to initiate the Annual Performance Report of the District Coordination Officer, the new head of district administration. Performance based incentives were to be introduced for local administration at each tier of government. Before 2001, a social power-official authority nexus had developed in the society because of clientistic networks involving local elites and bureaucracy. Under this system local bureaucracy and police was not responsive to the public and exchanged personalized benefits with the local elite. Public had no say in the local development process as well. Under diffusion of power authority nexus, Local Government plan of 2000 envisaged to break this nexus by constitution of local council monitoring committees' and watchdog institutions like District Public Safety Commission and District Ombudsman. People were to be involved in local development process either directly or through their local representatives. Effective checks and balances were to be ensured in form of councils' control over the elected heads of Local Governments, institution of internal audit system and district ombudsman office, etc. Distribution of fiscal resources meant both assignment of tenable and substantial own-source income to Local Governments as well as non-lapsable formula based transfers from Provincial Government consolidated funds.

Local Government Structure under LG system of 2001

The new Local Government system in Pakistan was promulgated in all provinces through Provincial Local Government Ordinances, 2001. The new Local Government system introduced three vertical tiers of Union Administration, Tehsil Municipal Administration and District Government as shown in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1: Three tiers of Local Government under PLGO (2001)

Source: NRB 2000, 2001

Union council was to comprise of 13 members: 6 general Muslim seats including two seats reserved for women; 4 seats reserved for women, peasants and workers including two seats reserved for women, 1 seat reserved for minorities, and 1 Union Nazim and 1 Naib Nazim elected as joint candidates (NRB, 2001). Elections were based on principles of first-past-the-post, adult franchise and joint electorate. Tehsil council (Town Councils in case of City Districts) included all the directly elected Naib Nazims of Union councils falling within the territorial jurisdiction of Tehsil/Town. In addition 33% seats were reserved for women, 5% seats were reserved for workers and peasants and 5% seats were reserved for minorities in the Tehsil/Town Council. Tehsil/Town Nazim and all reserved seats were to be indirectly elected by the directly elected Union council members, Union Nazims and Union Naib Nazims within Tehsil's jurisdiction. Tehsil/Town Naib Nazim was to be elected by the Tehsil/Town Council. On the same analogy, all Union Nazims of the Unions within district's territorial jurisdiction became the members of District Council. In addition 33% seats were reserved for women, 5% seats were reserved for workers and peasants and 5% seats were reserved for minorities in the District Council. District Nazim and reserved seats for peasants and workers in the District Council were to be elected by the directly elected Union council members, Union Nazims and Union Naib Nazims within District's jurisdiction. 33% seats reserved for women were to be proportionately divided among the Tehsils (towns in city districts) and elected by the Union councilors, Union Nazims and Naib

Union Nazims from respective Tehsils/Towns (NRB, 2001). District Naib Nazim was to be elected by the District Council. The net effect of this election method was that Union Councils become integrated in Tehsil/Town Councils and District Councils. In this way coordination between different tiers of Local Government was to be achieved, mainly for development planning issues. However, each Local Government tier was independent in the operational terms and no hierarchical reporting relationships existed between the different tiers.

Punjab Local Government Ordinance of 2001 (PLGO, 2001) created an integrated pattern of Local Governments in which public representatives at Union level could effectively voice the concerns of the people at higher level of Tehsil and district government. Local representatives also found a formal role in local monitoring institutions, such as district and Tehsil house monitoring committees and District Public Safety Commission, which were created to non-intrusively monitor the activities of various departments of Local Government. Probably the greatest achievement was the reservation of 33% seats for women, 5% seats for peasants/workers and minorities and 5% seats for minorities that gave these heretofore disadvantaged groups a greater representation.

Zila/District Government comprised of elected Zila/District Nazim and official District Coordination Officer, and headed by the District Nazim (DN)[55]. 11 executive offices of DG constituted district administration and were responsible to the District Coordination Officer (DCO) who coordinated their activities (NRB, 2001). DCO was made responsible to the District Nazim. District Police Officer (DPO) was made responsible to District in matters pertaining to law and order in the district. Similarly, Tehsil Nazim headed the Tehsil Municipal Administration with the assistance of Tehsil Municipal Officer. Union Nazim headed the Union Administration with the assistance of official Union secretaries. This was a major departure from the past since now local bureaucracy was made responsible to an elected head of the Local Government. This responsibility meant that elected head of the Local Government could issue directives to the official head of local administration within the functional purview of the concerned Local Government. Executive control over local bureaucracy rested in the authority of the elected head of the Local Government to initiate Annual Performance Report of the head of concerned local administration, and request higher authorities for his/her transfer in case of unsatisfactory

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[55] District means a Zila in Urdu. Sub-district means a Tehsil in Urdu. 'Nazim' means Administrator.

performance. However, local bureaucracy was not made accountable to the people either through their representatives in the respective local councils or through creation of a cadre of District Services as envisaged in the Local Government Ordinance 2001. Structure of Local Governments at district, Tehsil and Union tiers is shown in Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 below:


Figure 2: Structure of District Government (NRB, 2001)

Figure 3: Tehsil Municipal Administration

Source: Adapted from NRB, 2001

Figure 4: Union Administration

Source: Adapted from NRB, 2001

Local Government Finance under PLGO (2001)

The main source of income for LGs under the 2001 LG system was formula based funds transfer from Provincial Government (discussed later). However, some internal sources of revenue were also assigned to each tier of LG under PLGO (2001). District Council were given own-source income sources including education tax, health tax, tax on vehicles other than motor vehicles, local rate on land revenue, fee in respect of schools, health facilities established or maintained by DG, fees for grant of license the district government, fees for specific services rendered by a district government, collection charges for recovery of tax on behalf of the government, toll on new roads, bridges within the limits of a district, other than national and provincial highways and roads. Some of the most important income sources of district council like fee for fairs, agricultural shows, cattle fairs, industrial exhibitions, tournaments and other public events, were handed over to Tehsil Council. In actual practice, own source income of DGs was typically less than 15% of their total income (ADB, DFID & WB, 2004), and the bulk of their own-source income was derived from a few non-tax sources like local rate and toll on roads and bridges. For the rest of their income, DGs depended on provincial transfers.

Tehsil/Town Councils were given jurisdiction over local tax on services, tax on transfer of immovable property, property tax on annual rental value of buildings and lands, fee on advertisements and billboards, fee for fairs, agricultural shows, cattle fairs, industrial exhibitions, tournaments and other public events, fee for approval of buildings plans and erection and re-erection of buildings, fee for licenses or permits and penalties or fines for violation of the licensing rules, charges for execution and maintenance of works of public utility like lighting of public, places, drainage, conservancy and water supply, fee on cinemas, dramatical, theatrical shows and tickets thereof and other entertainment, collection charges for recovery of any tax on behalf of the Government, District Government, Union Administration of any statutory authority. Own-sources of Tehsil/Town government income were more viable and a relatively large number of these were employed. Most Tehsils governments were able to generate 40% to 50% of their total income from their own sources (ADB, DFID & WB, 2004).

Union councils were given internal income sources like fees for licensing of professions and vocations, fee on sale of animals and cattle markets, market fees, fees for certification of births, marriages and deaths, charges for specific services rendered by the Union council, rate for the remuneration of Village and Neighborhood guards, rate for execution or maintenance of any

work of public utility like lighting of public places, drainage, conservancy and water supply. In real practice, although some urban Unions could usefully employ some additional income sources like market fees or rate for maintenance of drainage and water supply, most own-source (internal) income of Union Councils was generated by fees for marriage, birth and death certificates. However own-source income of Unions was very small and these heavily depended on transfers from provincial, district and Tehsil governments.

Functional division among local government tiers:

As can be seen in Table 1 below, social sector services, including agricultural extension services, were the sole responsibility of District Governments whereas functions of a municipal nature were made the central responsibility of Tehsil Municipal Administrations.

There was some responsibility sharing between the tiers of Local Governments in other areas. Except for roads sector, in which each tier of Local Government spent a significant proportion of funds, each tier restricted itself to its core sectoral responsibility. An important formal role of Union Administration was identification of local development projects and coordinating with higher Local Government tiers so that district-wide development could take place according to bottom-up planning. Union Administrations were assigned the most important function of to collect and maintain statistical information for socio-economic surveys and register births, deaths and marriages and issue certificates in this regard. This was the single most important function performed by all the Unions surveyed in this study. For provision of municipal services, Unions were expected to coordinate with TMAs. In actual practice, TMAs generally failed to cater to the municipal needs of the Unions in the rural hinterland of the towns. Municipal needs of rural Unions were fulfilled to some extent by the district government or the Union administrations themselves.

Table 1: Functions of District, Tehsil/Town and Union Governments under PLGO (2001)

Functional Responsibility	District/Zila Government	Tehsil/Town Municipal Administration	Union Administration
Education	Primary & secondary education, literacy	NONE	NONE
Health	Dispensaries and local hospitals	NONE	NONE
Roads	District roads, farm to market roads	local roads and streets	Local streets
Water Supply	NONE	Includes water-lifting turbines and pumping stations and supply network.*	Wells and ponds
Sewers and Sanitation	NONE	Includes sewer network and Public Health Engineering.*	NONE
Fire fighting	NONE	Hiring and maintenance of firefighting staff, acquiring/maintenance of vehicles/equipment. *	NONE
Playground and Parks	Can be built or improved under Social Welfare/ Sport	Building and maintenance of public parks and playgrounds.*	Union Administration can build or maintain playgrounds.
Culture and Sports	Cultural events, sports festivals	NONE	Can organize cultural or sports fairs.
Social Welfare and Community Development	Mainly a DG responsibility, award of CCB projects	Award of CCB projects	Provision and maintenance of Public Libraries, Award of CCBs, care of the destitute
Street maintenance and services	NONE	Includes street repair/ maintenance, streetlights and traffic lights. *	Street lighting
Agriculture (extension), fisheries, livestock	On-farm water management, fish farming, animal husbandry	NONE	NONE
Animals	NONE	Management of Slaughterhouses, Cattle fairs*	Cattle Ponds and Grazing Areas
Public Transport	Only in case of city district government	NONE	NONE
Enterprise and Industrial promotion	Only in case of city district government	NONE	NONE
Town planning and regulation, zoning	Only in case of city district government	Sole TMA responsibility, DG shares responsibility in case of City District	NONE
Recording basic social data	NONE	NONE	Registration of birth, death, marriage and divorce.

Source: Adapted from PLGO (2001)
* Sharing of spending responsibility by DG in case of city district.

Local leadership characteristics

The first Local Government elections under the new system were conducted under the supervision of Election Commission of Pakistan in two phases in Dec/Jan 2000 and March 2001

(Bari 2001:I). Accordingly, city district governments in 4 city districts of Lahore, Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar, 97 district governments, 306 Tehsil Municipal Administrations, 29 Town Municipal Administrations and 6022 Union Administrations, each with its own elected council, were installed on August 14, 2001 (Khan, 2006; ADB, DFID & WB, 2004).

According to a study conducted by Pattan Development Organization (2001), the highest percentage, i.e. 45.3%, of Union Nazims elected in 2001 elections were small or medium agriculturists. These were followed by small businessmen who constituted 30.2% of all winning Union Nazims. All Union Nazims and Naib Nazims surveyed, and 58.2% of the general Muslim councilors had educational level of high school or above. While education and age were not statistically found to be factors in success or failure of all candidates, land ownership was definitely a factor in winning of elections for general Muslim councilor category and Nazims/ Union Naib Nazims (Pattan Development Organization, 2001). A consistent pattern of land holding stratification was revealed in two research studies of Local Government elections of 2001 and 2005 by Pattan Development Organization. On the average, 40% of elected Nazims owned more than 13 acres of land. Small to medium landowner class dominated Union Nazim and Naib Nazim while and small land owners dominated the councilor category in Union councils. Land ownership was a factor in winning LG elections in both rural and urban areas and this pattern was strongest in Punjab province. Combining pattern of landownership, ownership of movable property items such as cars, tractor, TV, etc, and educational attainment suggest that a large majority of general Union Councilors came from lower or lower middle socioeconomic class while a large majority of Union Nazims/Union Naib (assistant) Nazims came from lower middle or middle classes (Pattan Development Organization, 2005; 2001). All District Nazims (DNs) elected in 35 districts of Punjab in 2005 belonged to upper class. All DNs, except DN of Lahore who is a prominent business leader in Punjab, came from established political families and had experience as Chairman of former District Council or as members of Punjab or National Assembly.

Difference between LG system of 2001 and earlier LG systems

LG system of 2001 was different from the earlier LG systems on three major counts. First, LGO 2001 created LGs with wide administrative and developmental functions with commensurate administrative and financial authority decentralized from the provinces. Under the devolution

plan of Musharraf's government, 32 Punjab government departments were devolved to the district governments. In an effort to de-concentrate government powers within the district, the powers vested in the erstwhile pivotal office of deputy commissioner, representing provincial and central government powers and control in the district since colonial times, were divided into 11 district government departments, each headed by an Executive District Officer. The 32 Provincial Government departments devolved to the district were grouped in the newly created 11 DG departments. For instance, fisheries, on farm water management, animal husbandry and urban forests sections of the provincial departments were devolved to the district and were grouped together under Agriculture department of DG. In fact parts of Provincial Government departments, representing decision making authority in a compact unit of administration, were devolved to the districts. The administrative and financial decision making authority relevant to these departments vested in the Provincial Government before 2001. This authority was decentralized to the DG in the LG reform of 2001. An elected District Nazim, with executive control over the district administration departments for ensuring the implementation of functions decentralized to the DG, was made the head of DG. 'Performing functions relating to law and order in the district' was also a stated function of DN (Section 18, NRB, 2001).

Abolishing the 150 years old position of Deputy Commissioner, the ultimate reflection of Provincial Government power in the district and pivot of district administration functions, a new district bureaucracy position of District Coordination Officer (DCO) was introduced. DCO was designated as the 'coordination head' of the 11 departments in 'district administration'. His job included coordination of DG departments, general supervision over the activities of district administration, and assisting the DN in performing such functions and exercising such powers as have been assigned to him under the PLGO 2001 (Section 18&28, NRB, 2001). PLGO (2001) gave formal authority for initiating annual performance reports of DCO to the District Nazim.

Bottom-up identification of development projects in well defined sectors within the district was a function of District Council. DN had the responsibility to provide district-wide development vision and oversee the formulation and implementation of district Annual Development Plan. DN had the most important role in Annual Development Plan (ADP) of the district. DN had to approve the preliminary estimates for development projects in the Annual Draft Budget after which it could be placed before the District Council for deliberation and approval [Section 57(4),

Government of Punjab, 2003a]. In addition, DN was also the recommending authority for Demand for Grants made by the administration to the district council, and approving authority for the Authorized Schedule of Expenditure after district budget had been approved by the District Council (Sections 58-3 & 59-ii, Government of Punjab, 2003).

Secondly, PLGO (2001) made a provision for constitution of a Provincial Finance Commission which would estimate and transfer formula based funds for development and current budgets of LGs from the provincial consolidated account. PFC made fiscal transfer award every three years. Accordingly PFC was constituted by the Provincial Government and declared its first interim award in September, 2002, which specified fund allocations for current and development budgets of DGs, TMAs and Union Administrations for financial year 2002-03. PFC declared interim awards for financial years 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06 because dividing Provincial Consolidated Funds into Provincial Allocable Funds for LGs and Provincial Retained Funds was a contentious issue. First regular PFC award was declared in July 2006 which made current and development allocations to all LGs in the province for the duration from 2006-07 to 2008-09 (Government of Punjab, 2006). Yearly shares specified by PFC award were transferred to LGs on the basis actual monthly receipts of Punjab Government. In absence of sufficient internal sources of income for LGs, PFC award provided a credible source of definite and ample funding for meeting current and development expenditure needs of LGs. Since PFC awards were made according to a formula taking population size and level of underdevelopment in a district as equal weight measures of fiscal needs, these could not be reduced by the Provincial Government, although the payments from Provincial Government to LGs could be delayed because of delays in resource distribution flows between Federal and Provincial Governments. Before LG 2001 system, LGs had used to have small budgets owing to their insignificant municipal and developmental functions. Medium or large development projects were carried out by Provincial Government departments directly or through its various delegated offices in the districts.

Third, LG system of 2001 created much more room for direct and indirect participation by the local people. Direct public participation occurred in both districts of the current study in form of traditional informal assembly of commons—or 'Panchayats' frequently held by Nazims at all tiers of Local Governments)—where public expressed their concerns regarding developmental and administrative issues. Under PLGO (2001) a type of panchayat called *Musalihat Anjuman* or

'reconciliation council' had to be formally constituted in each Union Council for the purpose of out-of-court amicable settlement of minor contestations regarding money matters, land ownership or family issues. The most important and innovative formal mechanism of direct public participation introduced in PLGO (2001) was Citizen Community Boards (CCBs). CCBs provided for a comprehensive 'community-led development' option to the people for the first time in history of Pakistan. Participatory development or the CCB programme was integrated with the overall Annual Development Programmes of LGs at each tier. However, since development allocations of District Governments constituted a very large proportion of LG developmental allocations under the PFC system, i.e. 78.26%, and districts had to legally reserve 25% of these allocations for participatory development, CCBs offered immense potential for citizen empowerment and community centred local development. Since CCBs at District Government level are a key focus of research in this thesis, it is important to briefly describe the formal structure of District Annual Development Program and CCBs after the LG reform of 2001:

Post 2001 District Annual Development Programme: Post-decentralization legislation on local development created a distinction between Local Development (LD) Programme and Citizen Community Board (CCB) Programme within the District Annual Development Program (Section 9, Government of Punjab, 2003a).

i.   **Local Development Programme:** LD program was a carryover from the past and involved the traditional process of local development from past LG systems. Local development projects were identified by local 'stakeholders' including local councillors, LG offices, MPs, private sector and civil society organizations and general public, and communicated to relevant sectoral office of LG. However, since local development need identification was the key responsibility of local councils (PLGO, 2001), and also because local councils were the final approving authorities of local budgets, a majority of development projects in the district Annual Development Programs (ADP) reflected councils' priorities. Local councils could set policy for development sector prioritization and make demands for any number of development projects without any formal allocative or regulatory restrictions. After administrative and technical approvals by the relevant offices in district bureaucracy, development

projects demanded by stakeholders were prioritized for inclusion in local development draft budgets by district planning office. Final scrutiny and approval of the LD program was carried out by the council in the annual budget sessions. Once approved, sectoral development plans were communicated to the relevant DG departments for execution. Project execution involved the usual tender-invitation and works contract award procedures. Any private contractor could bid for a project as long as it was not 'blacklisted' by any other government department (Government of Punjab, 2001a). Initial instalment—usually a third of project cost allocated for a given year—is released to the contractor after award of the contract. Subsequent payments could be released to the contractors after technical supervision staff from the DG Works and Services department verify the progress on project. LD projects were required to be completed within one to two years. Political oversight on LD program execution was to be carried out through statutory 'Monitoring Committees' elected from the local council.

ii.   **CCB Programme:** The CCB program was an innovation brought about the decentralization reform of 2001 and involved development projects identification and execution by the registered community based organizations called CCBs. 25% of the local development budget was to be earmarked for use through CCB program (NRB, 2001).

A CCB could be registered by a minimum of 25 volunteering non-elected community members as its General Body members. The General Body could then elect a 7 to 15 member CCB Executive Committee including Chairperson, Secretary and other office bearers of the CCB. Executive Committee executed all the business of CCB. All decisions and reports of the Executive Committee had to be approved by the CCB general body. CCBs Executive Committee made formal development proposals to the Local Government and executed the participatory projects on a non-profit basis through appointing project coordinators from amongst CCB members. Project coordinator was responsible for hiring skilled or other workers for executing works and disbursing payments to them. He/She could request formation of work groups

from amongst CCB members for assisting him/her and presented formal work progress reports to the CCB.

A CCB registered within a district government jurisdiction could identify and demand development projects anywhere in the district with the only conditions that general community was involved in development need identification process and community contributed 20% of the estimated cost of the project. CCBs needed to formally explain how local community was involved or proposed to be involved during the need identification, implementation and post-completion phases of the project (CCB Form 4, Government of Punjab, 2003b). CCBs submitted their proposals to the District Community Development (CD) department of the District Government (DG) which coordinated with other relevant departments of DG for proposal feasibility assessment, detailed cost estimations and project placement in the DG budget.

The local council was to set policy guidelines regarding the sectoral priorities for CCB projects. District planning offices could then make allocations to individual projects within prioritized sectors according to a ranking procedure given in the Punjab CCB (Budget) Rules (Government of Punjab, 2003b). Development funds were available for disbursement to CCBs after CCB proposals were approved in the development budget by the council.

Punjab Local Government CCB Rules (2003) required CCBs to submit periodic progress reports for release of instalment as agreed in the project implementation plan at the proposal stage. The first instalment of CCB funds, in addition to the 20% community contribution, was released to the concerned CCBs after approval of the proposal by the council. Subsequent instalments were released to the CCB as per the project schedule agreed between the CCB and Local Government once the official(s) notified by the concerned Local Government could verify progress on project execution against the plan. As part of overall District ADP, CCB projects were also required to be completed within a single financial year, with only exceptional projects phased over two years (Section 42, Government of Punjab, 2003a).

Monitoring and evaluation of the CCB projects were to be 'non-intrusive' and carried out through the CCB Monitoring Committee elected from the district council, or

through any other 'agency/official(s) notified by the Local Government concerned' (Section 18, Government of Punjab, 2003b).

F. Local Governments after 2008:

Musharraf was ousted from Presidency after a new central government was elected in Pakistan in 2008. A new Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) led Provincial Government also took office in Punjab in February 2008. In addition to labelling empowered LGs as remnants of ex-President Musharraf, PML-N party in Punjab Governments considers LGs as parallel governments which substantially share Punjab Government powers under the current system. Bureaucracy has also seen its powers shrunk under the current system of LG. The PML-N government in Punjab has effectively made the LGs powerless since it come to power in Punjab by strengthening district bureaucracy and taking many of the developmental and general administrative functions away from LGs. Funding to CCB projects was also stopped in most districts by the time interviews were conducted for this study in the winter of 2009/2010. Punjab Government also carried out an accountability drive against many District Nazims alleged to have indulged in corruption and embezzlement of public funds, though none of the charges could ever be proved.

The political opponents and media critics of the two major political parties in Pakistan—Peoples Party of Pakistan and Pakistan Muslim League (N)—are of the opinion that these parties are intolerant of the current LG system because it challenges their power at the centre and provinces, and instead empowers the local leadership and common people at the grass root (Zaidi, 2012; Iqbal, 2008). The LG system of 2001 made the lower socioeconomic class sit on Union Councils. Union Nazims elected predominantly from lower middle or middle classes now posed a challenge to the social control exercised by local landlords or political henchmen of MPs. This represented a socio-political change not fitting well with traditional political patterns in Pakistan.

LGO 2001 created powerful and resourceful Local Governments for the first time in the history of Pakistan. Surviving many amendments and encroachments from the provincial and national level political leaders and bureaucracy, the system remained in operation from August 2001 till Dec 31, 2009. Since then the Provincial Governments in all provinces have appointed official or political administrators to run the Local Governments on ad-hoc basis, though they remain

obligated under Article 32 and 140-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, to continue with the earlier system or introduce a new system of Local Governments.