A COMPARISON OF THE WORK OF BULTMANN AND BINSWANGER

by

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Synopsis

The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship between theology and psychotherapy within psychiatry.

It takes the work of a theologian and a psychiatrist and having presented these in turn, explores the emergent relationship between them.

Thus Part I explores the theology of Bultmann, in order to discover its central motifs, its internal coherence, and its relationship to other disciplines. It also considers the relationship between theory and practice in this particular theology.

Part II explores L. Binswanger's understanding of the theory and practice of psychotherapy and psychiatry. It follows his search for a conceptuality adequate for the subject-matter of his discipline, and his account of the place of psychiatry within the disciplines concerned with man and his well-being.

Part III brings the two preceding sections together in an inter-disciplinary study designed (1) to discover whether it is possible for one man to employ both these disciplines at once, and (2) to enquire into the possibility of dialogue between them. It concentrates on the question whether a systematic relationship between them can be established on the basis of their common allegiance to Heidegger.

There is an appendix which consists of two case-studies, carried out concurrently with the systematic exploration, in an attempt to use the work of Bultmann and Binswanger at the level of actual relationships.

Acknowledgements

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Abbreviations

1. Abbreviated references to Bultmann's own works:

EJ - Das Evangelium des Johannes, 8th ed. Göttingen, 1964

EJE - The Gospel of John, tr. by G.R. Beasley-Murray, R.W.N. Hoare and J.K. Riches. Oxford, 1971

HE - History and Eschatology. Edinburgh, 1957

I Joh. - Die Johannesbriefe, 2nd ed. Göttingen, 1969

TNT I and II - Theology of the New Testament, Volumes I and II, tr. by K. Grobel. London, 1955

GV I-IV - Glauben und Verstehen I-IV. Tübingen, 1954
(In GV I, I have used the English translation by L.P. Smith, Faith and Understanding, London 1969 and referred to it as GV I E; I have then normally given the reference to the German edition. In GV II-IV, I have worked with the German edition, and, in the case of GV II, given the reference to the English translation: Essays Philosophical and Theological, tr. by J.C.G. Greig, London 1955, and abbreviated as 'Essays').

2. I have used the following abbreviations with regard to composite works including articles by Bultmann:

Anfänge I and II - Anfänge der dialektischen Theologie I and II, ed. J. Moltmann. Munich, 1962

Heid. und die Theol. - Heidegger und die Theologie, ed. G. Noller. Munich, 1967

KM I - Kerygma and Myth, ed. H.W. Bartsch and tr. by R.H. Fuller. London, 1953

3. Abbreviated references to Binswanger's own works:

AVuA I and II - Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze I and II
Band I, Bern 1947
Band II, Bern 1955

Der Mensch... - Der Mensch in der Psychiatrie. Pfullingen, 1957

Grundformen - Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins, 4th ed. Munich/Basel, 1964

Ideenflucht - Über Ideenflucht. Zurich, 1933

M and M - Melancholie und Manie. Pfullingen, 1960

3FMD - Drei Formen missglückten Daseins Verstiegenheit, Verschrobenheit, Manieriertheit. Tübingen, 1956

4. I have used the following abbreviations with regard to composite works including articles by Binswanger:

Existence - Existence. A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, ed. by R. May, E. Angel and H.F. Ellenberger. New York, 1958

Needleman - Binswanger: Being-in-the-world. Selected papers translated with an introduction to existential analysis by Needlemann. New York, 1963

5. I have used the following abbreviations with regard to the work of other authors:

Gen. Psychopath. - General Psychopathology by K. Jaspers, tr. by Hoenig and Hamilton. Manchester, 1962

ILP-A - Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, tr. by Mrs Riviere. London, 1949

SuZ - Being and Time by M. Heidegger, tr. by J. MacQuarrie and E. Robinson from the 7th edition. London, 1962

(I have given references to the German edition, in accordance with the notation in the English translation: e.g. SuZ H 10)

6. Other abbreviations:

cf. - compare

ibid. - referring to the work quoted immediately above

NT - New Testament

INTRODUCTION

1. The background to the following study

Inter-disciplinary exploration and co-operation in the realm of the humanities and social sciences are a commonplace today. They are a requirement of the age, both for practical reasons and for theoretical ones relating to the internal needs of particular disciplines. The practitioner of a discipline finds himself confronted with, or working alongside practitioners of other disciplines. There is the possibility - indeed the probability - both of overlapping areas of concern and of contradictory aims and methods; and the differing intellectual positions that undergird their various practices constantly require reciprocal elucidation and comprehension, if the 'practice' of the disciplines is to be carried out to greatest effect. Then there is also the more theoretical question asked by any rational discipline regarding the relation between one discipline and another, their relative status, their capacity to call in question each other's presuppositions and statements, their complementarity or exclusiveness.

A prime example - at least from the point of view of theology - is the relation between theology and psychiatry. And here we are confronted not only with two differing disciplines both purporting to understand man and to be able to help him, but with an ancient and a relatively modern discipline, the differing ages of which constitute an additional

factor in their mutual relation.[1] And thus we find the attempt being made by the theologian to incorporate the insights and methods of psychiatry into theology (as a way of bringing theological practice into the modern age),[2] and conversely by the psychiatrist and psychologist to show how the subject-matter of theology is properly understood within a psychological or psychiatric framework.[3] But the methodological and philosophical questions accompanying such attempts are rarely adequately explored and one is left with the suspicion that the appropriation of a particular set of terms by one discipline - or their correction or re-interpretation by that discipline - has taken place haphazardly and too quickly. There is sometimes not sufficient regard for the conceptional totality from which a limited number of concepts have been extracted. Or else the terms are used within the new discipline without regard for the original context - the 'datum' or 'reality' to which they were referring.

Therefore this study takes the work of a theologian and the work of a psychiatrist and presents both of these in their totalities - in so far as this is possible within a reasonable space. It asks of both: does this discipline form one cohesive, systematic whole? And, if so, what are the central axioms on which this whole is built? What are its relations to other disciplines? And how does the intellectual position - the theory of the discipline - relate to the practice?

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1. This is a point of which Binswanger is particularly conscious: see esp. Grundformen, passim, and AVuA I 6.
2. e.g., F. Lake's Clinical Theology.
3. e.g., the work of Freud, and in part, that of Binswanger himself: see below chapter 8.

Such a study sets out with the presupposition that each discipline has its own validity; it might come to the conclusion that one of the two could be translated without remainder into the other one, or be subsumed into it as one sub-section - or, indeed, that the two were totally incommensurable. But it must begin by allowing each its own validity. In the course of the exploration it may well emerge that one discipline refuses the status and meaning ascribed to it by the other, and correspondingly calls in question the other's self-understanding.[1] This means that for the purpose of the inter-disciplinary study, the enquirer has, in the first instance, to operate from a position of impartiality as regards the truth-claims of both disciplines. It is indeed a prime objective to discover the understanding of truth that accompanies each discipline.

The question must of course be asked: why choose two representatives of the disciplines concerned, rather than attempt a general delineation of the basic characteristics of each and then compare these? The answer is as follows:

1) In neither discipline - as they exist at the moment - can there be said to be a unanimity of thought and action such as would enable the enquirer to make such a general delineation. A particular brand of both psychiatry and theology is bound to emerge reflecting a particular viewpoint within the two disciplines. I have therefore thought it better to acknowledge this by making two thinkers, both of whom were practitioners as well as theoreticians, the object of this study.

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1. This is in fact the case with our two thinkers: seen phenomenologically, faith is one of a variety of ways of 'being-in-the-world' - a description which Bultmann cannot accept: and on the other side, seen theologically, Daseinsanalysis cannot attain to the full - or vital - truth about men.

2) This procedure has the important advantage that the enquirer can see both men at work. His subject-matter is thus not simply two academic disciplines - but rather these disciplines in their intellectual totality, and in their practical application.[1] Only by holding these two aspects together can the enquirer hope to do justice to his subject.

Having expounded the work of both men, the study will then set out to answer the question of their relation to each other, bearing in mind the possibility of their incommensurability. But before saying anything more about this third section, a further point needs to be made about the earlier part: such a study must be carried out with the slogan in mind: "a thing is what it is, and not another thing". There must also constantly be held in view what might be called the 'magnetic attraction tendency' in all inter-disciplinary work - i.e. the tendency for the subject-matter of one discipline to be affected by that of the other, so that distortion occurs. That is not to say that the writer regards it as possible to expound his subject-matter with entire objectivity: the fact that the questions he asks are occasioned by the inter-disciplinary exploration must inevitably give a particular direction to his enquiry, such as would contrast it with other explorations of either of the two disciplines. The intention in the present enquiry is to let both disciplines speak to the enquirer on their own terms first, so that he is not approaching

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1. In point of fact we will have to distinguish various sorts of 'being at work', in both disciplines. This is particularly the case in relation to Bultmann, who of course was primarily 'at work' as an academic theologian , and only from time to time as a preacher: see below, chapter 1.

one with the questions of the other in mind.[1]

The 'magnetic attraction tendency' compels the enquirer to proceed by keeping the two disciplines strictly separate for the first two parts of the exploration. This may in fact mean some repetition, but where this occurs it will be because the thinkers concerned share an element, which is not distinctive to either discipline.

The third major section will then have to compare the thought and action of each, concentrating on those questions which appear most important for their mutual relation. At this stage the possibility must be faced that the question one discipline asks of the other may force the enquirer back to that discipline to look in more detail at one particular matter which was not of such central importance within the discipline itself. But having seen that discipline first on its own terms, the enquirer will not be misled by the distortion (in terms of relative importance of the concepts being dealt with), that the business of inter-disciplinary comparison may well entail.

As far as possible incommensurability is concerned, the study will in fact argue that the two disciplines - as represented by Bultmann and Binswanger - are not incompatible or contradictory to one another, but rather, for practical purposes concerned with the care of people, complementary.

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1. An example of the 'magnetic attraction tendency' - which held up the present enquiry - is afforded by the fact that the enquirer took the psychotherapeutic or psychiatric one-to-one relationship as a model, which 'must' have its counterpart within theological communication. Once the methodological procedure of keeping the two disciplines separate in the first instance became clear, the basic model for theological communication (acc. to Bultmann) also emerged: i.e. the preaching model: say, one to fifty!

It will be argued that they do in fact 'speak the same language', with the result that, in cases of mental disturbance, theology can and must listen to Binswanger's daseinsanalytical psychiatry. This being the case, the attempt will then be made - in an appendix - to explore their common application in relation to particular persons.

2. The choice of authors

We come now to the question of the criteria to be used in choosing the men we are to study. Simply to keep the 'magnetic attraction tendency' in mind does not of itself allow the enquirer an arbitrary choice of psychiatrist and theologian. His study must leave open the possibility that the particular psychiatry and theology are incommensurable; in that case, the study must determine whether this is because of the subject-matter of the disciplines or because of cultural or conceptual differences between them, which relate to the culture or philosophy of the places in which the disciplines have been worked out rather than to the disciplines themselves. In that event, the enquiry would be useless as regards determining the relationship between theology and psychiatry. It is therefore necessary to choose a psychiatry and a theology which broadly speaking share the same cultural and philosophical background. It is for this reason that the present work concerns itself with Bultmann and Binswanger.

Here are two men whose lives are practically coterminous,[1] and who share in the same broad cultural heritage of Western,

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1. Bultmann, 1884 - (still alive); Binswanger, 1881-1967.

non-Anglo-Saxon Europe;[1] furthermore they are two people who very probably never met or influenced each other's development, at least directly.

Of greater importance than their sharing a cultural heritage, is their sharing of a philosophical one. This is that which - taking a very broad sweep - draws heavily on the work of Augustine[2] in early times and Kant in later. For both our thinkers, the philosophical questions which accompany their work stem from the situation created by Kant's criticism of metaphysics on the one hand and his understanding of the human mind, though not the individual mind, as the lawgiver of nature on the other.[3] This assessment of the mind as actively 'stamping' its 'categories' onto that with which it has to do gives a particular direction - and urgency - to the questions of objectivity and subjectivity in human knowledge (in short to the 'subject-object relation'), that has been retained to the present time and is reflected in the writings of both Bultmann and Binswanger. In the former it controls the question: how can I know or speak of God?[4] and in the latter it dominates the parallel question: "How can I know my patient as a fellow human being?"[5] Of course in neither is there a straightforward

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1. Certainly there are significant cultural differences between Bultmann's Germany and Binswanger's Switzerland; but if Zurich and Marburg are placed alongside, for example, Oxford it is at once clear that the former two have more in common with each other culturally, than they have with Oxford.

2. For Bultmann, see esp. HE ch. 5; for Binswanger: Grundformen 393ff.

3. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 126, B 164-165.

4. Bultmann, GV I 2.

5. See esp. Grundformen, Part 2.

confrontation or acceptance of the Kantian position;[1] in particular the work of Husserl (esp. in the case of Binswanger) and of Heidegger (in the case of both) modify the questioning and make other answers possible. But the underlying direction of thought is still there. Other thinkers are, of course, also of considerable importance to both - in particular, Schleiermacher and Dilthey (in connection with hermeneutics), Kierkegaard (in relation to 'love' and 'anxiety' - though with considerable differences in the use made of his work by our two authors) and Goethe (in Binswanger's understanding of psychological knowing, and to a lesser extent, in Bultmann's understanding of culture).

There is another reason why this tradition of philosophy is appropriate to our inter-disciplinary purposes: it remains a consciously systematic tradition - one which attempts a constructive account of human experience in its different aspects, even when it is sceptical of the possibility of metaphysics; it is, moreover, a tradition that is at pains to analyse the relationships between the different aspects of human experience.[2]

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1. The analysis will show that Bultmann remains more closely allied to Kant (through his teacher Herrmann - and Ritschl) than does Binswanger.

2. This is not to underestimate within this tradition, the element of discontinuity, and the attack on the 'system' that is characteristic of Kierkegaard. This strand of the tradition is of special importance in the case of Bultmann.

3. The effect of the choice of authors on the direction of the enquiry

Now the fact that the two men we have chosen stand within this 'systematic philosophical tradition' does not mean that the enquiry will seek to relate the two disciplines to each other by means of a common philosophical foundation - viz.: that of Heideggerian ontology. Such an enterprise would - superficially at least - appear the obvious way forward. It would be to work with what might be called the building-bricks model, whereby each discipline forms one brick, and both are thought of as standing on a common foundation. Now in so far as the study does begin with some such model in mind, its actual investigation of the disciplines concerned shows at once that at least one side - Bultmann's theology - cannot tolerate such a hypothesis. That is to say it uncovers the fact that the relationship to philosophical analysis is a much more complicated one than that particular model suggests. Bultmann's theology does not want a foundation outside its own discipline and certainly does not want to be dependent upon philosophy for its foundation. But, on the other hand, nor does it want to withdraw itself altogether from contact with non-theological discourse: it concerns itself with men, and not with angels.[1] Thus it finds itself in an ambivalent, dialectical relationship with other disciplines, and this ambiguous position will need full exposition in the pages that follow.

This means that a substantial section of Part III must devote itself to exploring the complex set of relationships

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1. Bultmann in Heid. und die Theol. p.78.

that exist between Bultmann, Binswanger and Heidegger (as the major philosophical influence on both[1]). It will be argued that theology's ambivalent relation to philosophy precludes the possibility of establishing a fixed or straightforward relationship between theology and psychiatry or psychotherapy, on the theoretical or systematic level.

It will, however, also be argued that they share a common language such as enables them to speak to each other with the confidence that when using the same terms they are referring to the same subject-matter (though each interpreting it differently).[2] The effect of this, it will be argued, is that an existentialist theology such as Bultmann's is bound to listen to the (existentialist) analyses of particular instances of human being, such as Binswanger undertakes. In particular it must listen where Binswanger claims that a particular human being is incapable of hearing its message. This is the price such a theology has to pay for its use of categories shared by non-theological discourse. Thus Part III moves from an exploration of the relationship between theology and psychiatry or psychotherapy on the general level to the question of their relationship in specific instances. This is the reason for the introduction at the end of two actual case-histories.

As far as Parts I and II are concerned, a manifest difference in approach requires comment at this introductory stage.

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1. Chapter 12.

2. The 'key concept' will be found to be 'Sein-können'; see below, chapter 12, sections 5 and 6.

Part I takes the central theme of Bultmann's theology, namely, believing existence, and expounds it in as much detail as space permits. It then analyses the exposition with particular reference to the status of the concepts used viz-à-viz other forms of discourse, and enquires into their internal coherence. There is no need for much examination of developments in Bultmann's thought as these are to a great extent inconsequential.[1]

Part II, on the other hand, follows Binswanger's developing exploration of the status and coherence of psychiatric discourse before it deals with the central concepts of his own brand of psychiatry. That is to say, it follows his exploration of the relation of his discipline to Freud, to the natural sciences, to philosophy and to religion, as these develop. The fact that the exposition takes this form is due to the importance of the developing exploration in Binswanger's own life; his thought exhibits a far greater development than does that of Bultmann. But the result is that the enquiry only reaches the heart of Binswanger's own thought towards the end of Part II.[2]

There is one further point to be made about this: the result of Binswanger's exploration is the attempt to hold together the natural-scientific aspect of psychiatry (with its necessary subsuming of the individual under general disease-categories) with psychiatry's equally important 'inter-personal' aspect (which insists on the uniqueness and individuality of those with whom it has to do). Binswanger's

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1. The one important exception to this is explored in chapter 2, section 5.
2. Chapters 8 and 9.

'Daseinsanalysis' is concerned with this latter aspect, and it is this that he considered his major contribution to psychiatry. Thus he was not in the last resort concerned with psychiatric disorders and clinically accessible diseases as entities that can be classified and studied without reference to the uniqueness of the individual patient suffering from any one of them. Nor is his Daseinsanalysis chiefly a psychotherapeutic method such as understands the symptoms presented to it in terms equally applicable in a thousand different cases, and where the expressed content or subject-matter presented by the patient is regarded as the 'epiphenomenal' expression of the same instinctual disorder. His chief concern lay in understanding the individual before him both as mentally sick (here using categories that must apply generally, and thus proceeding at least analogously to the natural sciences) and as a whole, unique person (here using categories which express the individuality and uniqueness of the person confronting the doctor, and thus not proceeding natural-scientifically). In this latter, all-important aspect of the total psychiatric enterprise as he saw it, he took the patient's utterances as expressions of a unique development, and as valid in their own right and on their own terms. He refused to characterise and subsume these utterances under any categories that were not specifically directed to understanding the individual as a meaning-bestowing, experiencing ego.

Thus it can be seen straight away that our choice of thinker gives a very definite direction and limitation to our enquiry. To repeat, Binswanger's Daseinsanalysis is not in the

first instance a psychotherapeutic method[1]: it is, in his view, the proper means of understanding his fellow men.[2] But, when that has been said, Binswanger was also a practising psychiatrist and psychotherapist, and described in detail the processes relevant to those two enterprises. He can thus be said to be of particular significance for the practice of theology among the mentally ill - concerned as this must be both with the technical work of the psychiatrist and with all possible means of understanding the mentally ill as men and women who are still primarily human beings.

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1. Thus Binswanger's work is to be distinguished from that of the current Daseinsanalytical school of psychotherapy operating in Zurich at the moment under the leadership of M. Boss and G. Condrau.

2. It is for this reason that we will find ourselves constantly concerned with questions of hermeneutics.

PART I

BULTMANN: THEOLOGIAN OF GOD'S WORD OF LOVE

CHAPTER 1

The Theological Arena within which Bultmann worked

1. The nature of faith emerges as the central question

We have set ourselves the task of delineating the essential elements of Bultmann's theology, in order to compare this discipline with that which issues in psychotherapy; a quick glance at the table of contents will make it plain that I regard Bultmann's concept of believing existence as the centre of theology as he understands and practises it. But before we analyse believing existence itself, we must ask why this category occupies the central place that it does in his thinking.

Bultmann stands mid-way between the dialectical theology of Gogarten and Barth and the liberal theology of the history of religions school.[1] His theological education and his over-riding concern with the New Testament show him firmly within the tradition of liberal New Testament scholarship;[2] there is no going back on the historical-critical method of approaching the New Testament documents, the painstaking comparison of biblical material with non-biblical contemporary sources etc.[3]

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1. See esp. Lorenzmeier: Exegese und Hermeneutik, Furche Verlag, Hamburg 1968.

2. See esp. TNT II 245-250 (E), the Epilogue to Bultmann's Theology of the New Testament.

3. See e.g. Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting, English translation by R. Fuller, London, 1956, p. 11f.

Yet at the same time, from a very early stage, Bultmann felt the inadequacy of contemporary exposition of New Testament texts and in particular the inadequacy of the current psychological mode of explanation.[1] All too quickly the exegete sought to explain apparent contradictions in the text by psychological means,[2] without realising that a specific anthropological understanding lay implicit within the attempted explanation, which was possibly quite foreign to Paul's own anthropology.[3] In particular the exegesis availed itself of an understanding of the nature of faith which was itself drawn from sources other than the New Testament. Thus the exegesis required elucidation of its own method, and of the anthropological understanding that accompanied it. But the problem was more fundamental than that: exegesis had largely lost its connection with systematic theology and was operating

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1. See esp. "Das Problem der Ethik bei Paulus", 1924, Exegetica, pp. 36-54.

2. Ibid., pp. 37, 39 etc. Here the point in question is the paradoxical juxtaposition in Pauline thought of the indicative and imperative. Bultmann insists that psychological explanations of Pauline themes do not grasp their meaning. Ibid., p. 37: "They are not satisfactory, because the meaning of a theory is not grasped with the explanation of its origin. What the sinlessness of the Christian means for Paul is not thereby established, and it is a case of bypassing Paul when one presumes to interpret his statements historio-psychologically, before one has grasped their meaning; the only result of such activity is to slip another meaning under them."

3. I am using the term 'anthropology' in its wide sense, meaning the study of man, rather than in its more particularised use within the Anglo-Saxon world to refer to the study of ethnic groups and origins; (see too Existence p. 191, where the translator of an article by Binswanger makes the same point).

independently with the tools of historical research, such as were at least prima facie inappropriate for the study of dogmatics. Or where they were considered appropriate, systematic theology was seen as a rational philosophical occupation alongside other disciplines within the humanities, and accessible to scrutiny by their methods. In such a theology the experiencing creature, rather than the Creator, formed the central category - in particular, the creature as understood by the emerging modern anthropological sciences. In this intellectual atmosphere, 'faith' is seen as an attribute open to empirical investigation; "for it is now included in the social sciences (Troeltsch) and has gained 'universal validity' at the cost of no longer mattering to anyone".[1] Bultmann is dissatisfied with the liberal-theological tradition on two counts: first, as a New Testament exegete, he finds that the actual exegesis carried out by his contemporaries failed to reach the heart of the matter - viz. its meaning, either for the author, or for the author's interpretor - and second, as a theologian of the Protestant Church he sees that the concept of faith that emerges from such exegesis 'no longer matters to anyone'.

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1. GV I 5, 1927, p. 118 (E) (= GV I p. 87). It has to be asked why Bultmann concludes that such a concept of faith 'no longer matters to anyone'. The reason would be that, to be accessible in toto to empirical investigation, faith would become one factor among others, rather than the one eschatological possibility for man (that which makes him a new creature). Certainly, an empirically accessible faith is of interest to e.g. the sociologist and psychologist; but, says Bultmann, if that is all faith is, then it is not that on the basis of which a man finds or loses his life.

This brings us to his association with the movement known as dialectical theology - and in particular to his positive appreciation of Barth's Römerbrief[1], at least as far as its hermeneutic intention is concerned. Barth's exegesis attempted to lay bare Paul's own intention on his terms, so as to allow him to speak to the reader, and to call the latter's presuppositions in question. The underlying assumption of this approach to the text - allowing it to speak to us, rather than us to criticise, assess and explain it - was that Paul's problem was our problem and that it was possible to let the first century speak to the twentieth,[2] and to speak to it in such a way that twentieth century man had to take notice. Here, as Bultmann saw, was a different approach to history; history was no longer seen as a developmental process, such as enabled those presently alive to look back at preceding generations as if from a position of greater knowledge and superior development. Rather present-day man could be called in question by the past: in this sense he was to be seen as being under judgment, rather than as being himself the sole judge and evaluator of all that had been before. Furthermore, since we are here concerned with the exegesis of biblical texts, expounding the subject-matter of theology, the reader would have to allow his own concepts of God, faith, man, and the world to be called in question by the text itself,[3] and in

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1. "Karl Barths Römerbrief in zweiter Auflage" 1922 (Anfänge I p. 119).

2. See esp. Barth's preface to the second edition of his Römerbrief, tr. by Hoskyns, London, 1965, pp. 2-15.

3. Cf.: "Das Problem einer theologischen Exegese des Neuen Testaments" 1925. Anfänge II 1963.

so doing the divide between exegesis and dogmatics would be bridged and Protestant theology would once more stand on the principle of sola scriptura.

Now, as has been often pointed out, the outcry of Gogarten and Barth against contemporary liberal theology - and in particular against its relation to culture - was itself very much a product of the times;[1] Bultmann maintained a distinctive and consistent position in regard to it throughout. For him, dialectical theology was primarily important not so much as a new approach to systematic theology, but rather as a new understanding of history, and of the historical nature of man's existence.[2] Because history was now no longer seen as a continuous development towards an ideal state and its significance found rather in what the individual made of his own history, theological statements came to be viewed not as timeless truths, but rather as true in so far as they were true of the individual who uttered them.[3] And because the individual's existence is a historical one, in which he is called in question, he has to make his theological statements - his confession of faith - again and again.[4]

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1. See Lorenzmeier, p. 58 f.

2. GV I 6 "The Significance of Dialectical Theology for the scientific Study of the New Testament", 1928.

3. Ibid., p. 148 (E) (= GV I p. 117f.).

4. Ibid., p. 149 (E) (= GV I p. 118): "The meaning of the slogan 'dialectical theology' can be briefly expressed in this way. It is the insight into the historical nature of man's being or - since theology is concerned with one specific mode of man's being, namely his speaking - it is the insight into the historical nature of speaking about God. Obviously, then, dialectical theology is not a method of investigation, in so far as method is a way of investigation dependent on the character of the object investigated. It is rather the perception of the peculiar character of the object which precedes every investigation and makes it possible. In this case it is the perception of the historical nature of man and of his speaking of God."

The problem that unites all those connected with 'dialectical theology' is how to speak of God: but the emphasis is placed by different thinkers at different points in that sentence: for Barth it falls on 'God'; for Bultmann on 'how to speak'. For him, as an expositor of the New Testament, the key question is how the New Testament speaks of God, and correspondingly, how we hear it speaking (and then of course, how we enable it to speak to man today). And the issue which unites all these questions is that of the nature of faith, or as he would put it, of believing existence. Of course these questions also raise the question of the nature and existence of God and the World as well, but for Bultmann these two concepts can only be approached through that of believing existence.[1] If one takes seriously the historical nature of man's existence (which includes his rationality and thus his theological utterances), then talk about God must involve reference to the historical situation in which the speaker - confessing his faith - finds himself. There are two

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1. Bultmann's choice of believing existence as the central category for theological work shows clearly his mid-way position in the theological field of the 1920s. He is holding on to the method of doing theology suggested by Schleiermacher, and thus remaining true to his upbringing within liberal theology; i.e. he is retaining the method that takes the 'experiencing I' as the basic factor and explores this 'I' in relation to both God and world. Where Bultmann differs from Schleiermacher - and where he shows the influence of dialectical theology - is in substituting the notion of 'believing existence' for Schleiermacher's 'feeling of absolute dependence'. See esp. TNT II Epilogue p. 239 (E). Cf. Schleiermacher: The Christian Faith, ch. 30. For a positive treatment of Schleiermacher's 'feeling of absolute dependence' by Bultmann, see his early essay entitled "Religion und Kultur", Christliche Welt 1920, Anfänge II, pp. 11-29.

questions which require answering here: the first is strictly theological: how it remains possible to speak of God - an eternal subject, beyond the changes and chances of this fleeting world - within the life of an individual set within a particular historical context; for this is what the New Testament does; and the second, relating more specifically to the nature of this historical relativism, demands a fuller and more adequate account of its extent and of the possibility of its being transcended. Both questions, for Bultmann (for whom they are in the end one), converge on the question of the nature of believing existence.

Furthermore Bultmann sees the Protestant theologian's task, which the Church has entrusted to him, as exposition of the New Testament as Word of God. His way into understanding the Word of God must therefore be via an understanding of those who bear witness to it in the New Testament, and this means via their believing existence.

At this point we need to look more closely at Bultmann's understanding of the process of exegesis. He had commended Barth's Römerbrief because it insisted that we could only understand the text as we let it call our own understanding in question; he commended it because it implied a different understanding of man's historical nature, drawing attention to the categories of the Moment and of Judgment, categories which he saw as fundamental to the New Testament - and as re-emerging in the 19th century especially in the work of Kierkegaard - and because it suggested a different, dialectical way of talking about God, that is to say, of

doing theology.[1] In this way, in Bultmann's view, it opened up the possibility of making the work of Kierkegaard fruitful for theology.[2]

But what needed greater clarification was the relationship of the text itself to the object or subject-matter of theology. It was clear that the two were not identical. What had to be understood was that to which the text referred; only then could the text itself be said to be understood. And here too Bultmann's indebtedness to the tradition of liberal theology makes itself felt. Barth maintained that the commentator had to grapple with the text in a relation to its author "of utter loyalty...Loyalty cannot surely end at a particular point, and certainly cannot be exhausted by an exposure of the author's literary affinities".[3] On the last point Bultmann would agree with him,[4] but on the former argued that because the exegete is concerned with that with which the text has to do, he is entitled - he even has the duty - to

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1. See esp. GV I "What does it mean to speak of God?" 1925, pp. 53-65, E (= GV I pp. 26-37). Here we see Bultmann's close association with the dialectical theology of the periodical Zwischen den Zeiten (theology is concerned with speaking about God: such speech is impossible because we are men: we can only do it, when we are compelled - by God himself) and also his own distinctive understanding of it (to speak of God is at the same time to speak of man - and in particular to speak of oneself).
2. Cf. GV I p. 116 E (= GV I p. 85), where Bultmann describes this as a necessary task for theology. Indeed, if it did not appear to minimise the creativity of his own work, it could be said that Bultmann is attempting to hold together the work of Schleiermacher on the one side and Kierkegaard on the other. An example of this is his continuing attempt to delineate the relation between Christianity and culture - a theme to which we shall return.
3. Barth, ibid., p. 17. Preface to the 3rd edition.
4. - although he would certainly hold that Barth did not in fact sufficiently uncover the literary affinities of the NT authors, or even sufficiently use the other works of the same author, as aids to interpretation: see GV I p. 93 E (= GV I p. 64).

interpret the author better than the latter understood himself.[1] There are three conditions on which such interpretation is possible - and indeed demanded of the exegete: first a detailed and widespread knowledge of the possibilities of discourse open to the writer.[2] Secondly, such exegesis requires a willingness on the part of the exegete to allow his own existence to be called in question by that to which the text refers; and this means, on Bultmann's view, a willingness to allow the text to open up possibilities of existing as yet unknown to the interpreter.[3] This also means, in his view, that central to the business of interpretation is self-understanding - the self-understanding both of the exegete and of the author of the text. And thirdly, such exegesis is only possible so far as the hazard implicit in it is recognised.[4]

To what, then, does the text refer? Bultmann's answer is: to the kerygma; but, as we shall see, the kerygma is itself address[5]: it is the word of God, the Thou addressing

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1. Bultmann, ibid. He is here criticising Barth's Commentary on I Corinthians: The Resurrection of the Dead, English translation by H.J. Stenning, London 1933.
2. As far as Bultmann's understanding of hermeneutics is concerned Schleiermacher (via Dilthey) is one of his main influences: see R.R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, London 1965, p. 223.
3. Here is the dialectical element, with its particular Bultmannian slant. What needs to be seen is that while the text speaks directly of ways of existing - and thus has an essential reference to the inner life of the one concerned - it does not merely refer to this, but rather, indirectly, to that which brings this way of existing about.
4. "I can only repeat that the <u>hazard</u> of this kind of exegesis must always be explicitly recognised..." Bultmann, p. 93 E (= GV I p. 63).
5. See below, chapter 3, sections 1 and 2.

me in my own situation. As such, it is only 'accessible' within that situation; to speak about it is to speak about its effects on my self-understanding,[1] and precisely this is the work of theology. It is the unfolding of the believer's self-understanding, and the work of exegesis is the exposition of that self-understanding as it unfolds.[2] Hence the anthropological centre to theological thinking, but not, nota bene, to the kerygma itself. The kerygma is the Word of God, giving life and forgiveness, and opening up the future. But we can never possess it, or even expound it intellectually in its pure kerygmatic form. It is always expressed within theology and "is understandable as kerygma only when the self-understanding awakened by it is recognised to be a possibility of human self-understanding and thereby becomes a call to decision".[3]

The division between kerygma and theology must not lead one to imagine that 'theologising' is a post hoc reflection on an encounter which is itself ineffable; this would be - using rough and ready terms - to divide experience from reflection,

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1. Bultmann, ibid., p. 75 E (= GV I p. 47): "Christian knowledge of God is only present as a determination of life (as obedience to the claim of God), which expresses itself as love (ἀγάπη). In other words it is clear that God is not object but subject of the Christian's knowledge." Cf. also the words of Melancthon, often quoted by Bultmann (e.g. GV I p. 279 E; = GV I p. 262): "hoc est Christum cognoscere, beneficia eius cognoscere."

2. See esp. TNT II Epilogue, p. 237.

3. Bultmann, ibid., p. 241. The structure of TNT makes the distinction between theology and kerygma clear. The theologies of Paul and John are prefaced by an account of the kerygma of Jesus and the primitive church: cf. TNT I p. 3. But this is a 'working distinction' for methodological reasons, and does not mean that the kerygma can be established once and for all as a 'basic factum', then to be reflected upon. This would be to separate action and thought, and to tear apart the unity that Bultmann asserts of believing existence, expressing itself, e.g. in the unity between faith (hearing) and love (doing). See too GV I p. 218 E, (= GV I p. 186).

or action from thought, and Bultmann is at one with Schlatter in maintaining the importance of the unity of thought and action for the NT writers - and therefore as at least a possibility for believing existence today.[1]

Thus what Bultmann requires is a concept of faith which will do justice to the NT writers' understanding of it; which will not separate thought from action; which will not be reducible to a concept explicable without remainder by the psychological sciences; and which will do justice to the needs of both exegesis and systematic theology. But there is no question of 'constructing' a definition of faith such as will fulfil all these demands, enabling us thereafter to pursue our own theological interests. The concept of faith unfolds as the believer lives 'theologically': it is, in the end, only the believer's necessary explication of his own existence.

2. The Theological Enterprise

We have seen how the nature of faith - or believing existence - emerges as the central concern of Bultmann's theological exploration - as far as content is concerned. It remains, in this introductory chapter, to give an initial account of the nature and status of the theological enterprise as such, as Bultmann sees them. We need to say something at this point about the relationship between theological exploration and preaching; and we must also refer to the ways Bultmann uses the terms theological and theology, and to the question as to what constitutes theology, and what makes a

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1. Cf. Bultmann, TNT II p. 249f.

statement theological. These issues will be discussed again in chapter 3, and our discussion of them here must therefore remain brief.

To turn to the latter set of questions first: the man who attempts to expound Bultmann's theology is open to very considerable dangers of misunderstanding both Bultmann's intention and also the status of his results.

First, there is the risk of regarding Bultmann as a free-thinker pursuing his own interests, as if the resulting theology could be regarded as a self-contained intellectual construction. This is very far from the case; theology is for him an enquiry that stands in the service of the church: his theology is consciously Protestant theology. The Protestant Church sees itself constituted by the Word that is preached; the task of theology is to clarify the self-understanding of the church in its work of proclamation, so as to enable the kerygma to be heard as Word of God. Thus to speak of 'Bultmann's theology' can be very misleading: it would suggest a self-contained whole rather than a working task which has to be continued as long as the kerygma continues to be proclaimed.[1]

Secondly, (and related to the first danger), there is the risk of supposing that one could distinguish Bultmann's

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1. Cf. GV I p. 121 E (= GV I p. 90): "Theology is nothing other than an activity of faith itself. It can be elaborated more by one believer and less by another, but it can never be wholly absent from Protestant faith, provided Protestant faith is faith in its object." (The current jargon of 'theologising' fits Bultmann's activity much better than that of 'constructing a theology'.)

own theology from his NT exegesis, and from his exposition of the theologies of the NT writers. This is only legitimate with very great caution. Certainly Bultmann says that we have to understand the NT writers better than they understood themselves (and this suggests that we are to have our own theological position alongside those of the NT writers) - but only in order to bring out their own intention better than they were able to do.[1] Exegesis and systematic theology must go hand in hand, but where there is a difficulty or difference of opinion within systematic theology, it is to be settled by reference to exegesis.[2] Exegesis of ancient texts is not of course of itself theological:

> "The work of the exegete becomes theological, not because of his presuppositions or methods, but because of its subject, the NT. His character as a theologian is due to the fact that the Church has sent him to the NT which he is to interpret... The responsibility of the theological character of the investigator's work is borne by the NT itself, which he merely serves."[3]

This NT basis to all Bultmann's theological work has constantly to be borne in mind by anyone trying to grasp it as a whole.[4]

But, thirdly, it would be equally false to imagine that we are concerned with an equation such as: Bible (esp. NT) +

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1. Certainly 'Sachkritik' is allowed its validity: Bultmann cites Luther's criticism of James.
2. A point on which he claims to have Barth's agreement: see Exegetica p. 424: "Adam und Christus nach Römer 5". 1959.
3. GV I p. 164 E, (= GV I p. 133).
4. See esp. Erich Dinkler in his Introduction to the Exegetica, Tübingen, 1967, pp. xxi-xxiii.

theological exegesis and interpretation = theology as a whole. This would be to imagine that theology were analogous to mathematics, in which all the concepts employed were valid without reference to 'external' objects. The text of the NT is theologically important because of that to which it refers, and the same is true of the work of the theologian. That is to say, the self-understanding of the writer and that of his expositor are only indirectly important, in that they refer to that which determines them. Thus theology always has this tangential quality about it: it refers to something beyond itself,[1] and is only significant in so far as it does so. To understand a theological statement as being simply about a way of existing, rather than about a way of existing as determined by that which is other than and apart from the existant, is to fail to grasp its meaning. Similarly, to take the sum total of theological statements as themselves constituting an intellectual edifice known as theology, and to compare this with another intellectual edifice, would be to run the risk of great confusion - unless such a comparison included an exploration of the possibly varying ways in which the language of each discipline related to that of which it spoke.

It can be seen, then, that our attempt to take Bultmann's theology as a self-contained intellectual position and to compare it with Binswanger's psychiatry and psychotherapy meets with obvious difficulties, as soon as we approach this sort of theology. And there seems to emerge a shift from exploration of an intellectual position or system to exploration of an

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1. Viz.: the Word of God.

activity - viz. of doing theology, as an enterprise. We must now, therefore, turn briefly to look at this activity, and the following points can be made at this stage:

1) The theological enterprise is incumbent to a greater or lesser extent upon every believer. Faith can never be 'blind': it involves understanding, in particular, self-understanding.

2) This self-understanding is not itself theological reflection or discourse: it is the explication of this self-understanding[1] that forms the subject-matter of theology.

3) The self-understanding that is faith arises in the hearing of the proclaimed word of forgiveness: this is received as Word of God, from God - but it is received 'through' the explication of another's self-understanding.

4) The NT is to be seen as the prime example and source of such explications: it is rightly read or 'heard',[2] when it

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1. The word 'explication' is taken from TNT; Bultmann does not regard theology primarily as reflection on the new understanding afforded by the word of forgiveness, as does Bonhoeffer (Act and Being, English tr. by B. Noble, London 1962, pp. 147ff.), but rather as its explication within the context of further proclamation. See below, chapter 3, for a fuller account of the dynamics of theological communication in Bultmann's thought. Thus where Bonhoeffer sees a place for theological reflection leading to dogmatic and systematic propositions, and issuing in a body of knowledge possessed by the Church (ibid., p. 144f.), Bultmann contains the business of theology more closely within the context of preaching. For him, the church is no continuing sociological factum (as it is for Bonhoeffer, pp. 117-151), but is rather constituted again and again, each time the Word is preached.

1. On 'hearing', see below, chapter 2.

encounters the reader or hearer as Word of God. Such an encounter, in which the words become the Word, is not an inevitable effect of their being uttered in the presence of a hearer, but occurs when the hearer accepts them as preaching, addressed to him as one capable of being changed by them.

5) Thus while it is true that every believer is a theologian, as soon as he gives expression to his faith, there is also the need for both theologians and preachers, commissioned by the church to continue the work of proclamation. The preacher does this directly,[1] by the proclamation contained in the sermon; the theologian, qua theologian, indirectly, by facilitating the understanding of the NT as proclamation,[2] and by elucidating the basic concepts - in particular the anthropological understanding - that the proclamation demands.

Thus while Bultmann sees the functions of theologian and preacher as two distinct elements within the task of proclamation, they cannot be entirely separated from each other: the preacher must at the same time be a theologian, though the latter need not also in fact himself preach.[3]

For the purposes of this study, we will take the term 'theologian' in its fullest sense, to refer to the one who brings his 'theologising' to its rightful (as far as Bultmann

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1. While this is, in one sense, a 'direct' encounter, it has to be remembered that the Word as such is only 'indirectly' accessible.
2. It is here that the question of de-mythologising has its place.
3. Bultmann himself was both, though remaining a layman: see esp. Peerlinck, Rudolf Bultmann als Prediger, Hamburg 1970, who argues that for Bultmann, preaching forms the apex and goal of theology.

is concerned!) conclusion in preaching. And when we speak of doing theology, we will be referring not simply to an academic exercise, but to an enterprise that has its raison d'être in proclamation to a particular group of people at a given time.

When we speak of theological knowledge or understanding we will also use these terms in their comprehensive meaning, and we will have to make certain that it is clear what sort of theological understanding is involved on each occasion: for example, whether we are referring (1) to the self-understanding that occurs when the proclamation is heard[1] or (2) to theological understanding as the explication of believing existence, or (3) to the academic theologian's understanding of the concepts employed in the proclamation, or in the elucidation of the NT.

To summarise, it should by now be clear that for Bultmann the business of theology is directed towards the believer's actual life as this is lived in the world. It is there, if anywhere, that 'theological illumination' has to take place. Bultmann is concerned with the existence of the individual believer: it is this that the Word of forgiveness makes new.

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1. While strictly speaking this is not the stuff of theology (there is no reflection or explication in it: it is rather the awareness of oneself as forgiven: i.e. it is the state of being forgiven), it would be paradoxical in the extreme to refuse to call it 'theological'.

CHAPTER 2

Believing Existence

1. The Approach to the Concept of Faith via Inter-personal Relationships

As I have suggested, at the centre of Bultmann's theological work lies the concept of faith; and the exposition of his thinking on this subject will illuminate every aspect of his theology. Furthermore there is no part of his theological thinking that could be said either to come before his exposition of faith, in the sense of a prolegomenon to faith, or to come after it, as for instance a full exposition of Christian truths in dogmatic statements without reference to the situation of the believer. There is a sense therefore in which his thinking is circular, and yet the language of circularity is inappropriate if it suggests that his thinking is a closed system, self-sufficient in itself.[1] This is not the case: for him, theological thinking takes place in debate with that which is not theological[2]: theology is always polemical[3]: it is always the overcoming of unbelief.[4]

And yet unbelief does not so to speak come first: it is only explicit as such in the light of faith[5]: hence we cannot

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1. See above, p. 28f.
2. GV I 13 "The Problem of Natural Theology".
3. GV I p. 214 E (= GV I p. 181f.) "Church and Teaching in the New Testament".
4. GV I 13; EJ (E) p. 593. etc.
5. See esp. Rom. 7.7-25, and cf. "Römer 7 und die Anthropologie des Paulus", Exegetica 198. Cf. also TNT I p. 301f.

start with an analysis of the thinking of the world and then superimpose upon it the proclamation of forgiveness and the gift of faith. We have rather to start with faith itself and attempt to lay bare the elements that make up its structure.[1]

In this first section, therefore, we will approach the concept of faith first by stating what it is not, and then by asserting what it is like, thus delineating the area in which it is to be sought.

We begin with a negative statement: faith is no sort of attribute, predicable of man, on Bultmann's view.[2] It is not a capacity inherent in man; nor is it a capacity brought to light or to fruition by the revelation.[3] By 'capacity' I mean that which can be observed or assessed with the tools provided by psychology and anthropology.[4] It is not the case that we can discover the psychic phenomenon 'faith' by observation, alongside other 'core traits' of the personality, to use one particular terminology.[5]

1. This is to employ what might broadly be called a phenomenological approach to the phenomenon of believing existence (cf. Heidegger's exposition of his method in SuZ Introduction II 7). It should not however lead one to suppose that we are dealing here with a phenomenon of consciousness (though, for Bultmann, against Barth, it is that: see Karl Barths Römerbrief in zweiter Auflage, Anfänge I, p. 131f., for an important discussion of this very point) and nothing more, or that faith can be observed phenomenologically without reference to that which is believed. For theology's use of phenomenology see "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins und der Glaube", 1930 in Heid. und die Theol., p. 77.

2. Bultmann is concerned at this point to safeguard the distinctiveness and irreducibility of believing existence against two possibilities: one, that would dissolve theology into psychology (see esp. GV I E, pp. 50, 100, 119f., 208, 273 = GV I, p. 22, 70, 87f., 176, 256); and the other, that would dissolve theology into philosophy, as if faith were an ontological 'Existential' of Dasein (see "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins...", in Heid. und die Theol., p. 83f., 90).

3. See esp. Bultmann's criticism of Dibelius's concept of faith as fullness of life: GV I 4 "Historical and Supra-historical Religion".

4. I am using 'anthropology' here in its more strictly scientific sense.

5. Cf. GV II (G) "Anknüpfung und Widerspruch", 1946.

It is possible, Bultmann admits, to build up an inventory of the core traits that make up the human personality and that abide through the passage of time, but such an inventory would never be more than a list of observable psychic phenomena, and it could only regard man as "a somatic and psychic fact"[1] - a way of looking at him which fails to see what he essentially is: a historical being.[2]

Faith is not observable as a phenomenon of this sort. Bultmann does not deny that faith will be accompanied by psychic phenomena or affects but these are secondary to, and dependent upon, faith. He in fact spends little time in spelling out the relation of faith to its psychic accompaniments because the latter are of no interest to him.[3]

From the preceding negative statement we may appropriately move on to Bultmann's use of analogies in expounding the concept of faith. The ones to which he refers are trust and love, the relation of father and son, and friendship. But the use he makes of these analogies is complex, and we will have occasion to return to it more than once. The point that concerns us here is this: the reason that faith can never be primarily an attitude or quality is that neither of these necessarily implies a relationship with someone other than oneself.

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1. GV IV p. 66 (G) "Reflexion zum Thema Geschichte und Tradition" 1961.

2. See below, esp. chapter 3, section 3c.

3. This is of course not the case with regard to 'Angst'; but then Bultmann (following Heidegger) sees this as the natural man's basic way of existing, not in any sense simply a 'psychic accompanying mood'.

A solipsist can have qualities and attitudes, but, according to Bultmann, he cannot have faith, because faith involves the limiting of oneself by that which is other than oneself, the recognition of the demands made upon oneself by another.[1] This point needs to be made strongly in view of the frequent charge brought against Bultmann of individualism. The individual, with whom Bultmann is certainly mainly concerned, is the individual in relation. Hence in approaching the theological notion of faith or believing existence, he does so by means of analogies drawn from the field of inter-personal relations.

Trust, love, friendship <u>can</u> be observed, says Bultmann, but such observation entails moving out of the actual relationship of trusting or loving and observing it from outside. In these areas of human experience, there is, to use Kant's language, a primacy of the practical.[2] If, for instance, one attempts to <u>earn</u> love (a process that involves assessment of what one is doing), one in fact destroys it: it is made into a work, something assessed as achievement.[3] In such an assessment the assessor remains centred upon himself, and his action is not the free response to the love of the other.

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1. Here one can legitimately see the influence of Buber, but more directly, of Gogarten, whose concepts of love and faith - and understanding of hermeneutics - are worked out expressly in the light of an analysis of inter-personal communication. See esp. "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins..." in Heid. und die Theol., pp. 85 ff.
2. The allusion to Kant is worth making both as regards form and content: Bultmann's I-Thou relationship is essentially one that involves reciprocal claims and demands, the one on the other, demands summed up in the demand of love, and analogous at least to the Kantian noumenal realm of ends. However for Kant, the notion of time plays no part at this point, - indeed moral action is regarded as timeless -, whereas for Bultmann it is vital: it is in the encounter with the other that a man discovers his 'historicality'. Here of course the affinity to Heidegger - and Gogarten - is clear.
3. See esp. GV II 9 "Gnade und Freiheit" 1948 (= Essays pp.168ff.).

The love of the other is known as love only in the encounter with it and in the response made to it. It cannot be observed or documented as love from outside the relationship;[1] from this point of view it is only a phenomenon of spiritual or psychic history, open to various interpretations.[2]

Bultmann is saying that we only know e.g. friendship to be friendship from within that relationship: not, that we are then preserved from the possibility of deception and afforded certainty about the relationship. The possibility of being deceived is always there; the point is, rather, that we learn what friendship is as it occurs within an actual encounter as this takes place.[3]

To use Buber's language: in understanding the nature of man the I-Thou relation is paramount and to it belong the categories of trust and love and friendship. Any observation of this relation is, for Bultmann,[4] inevitably of the 'I-it'

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1. One can perhaps illuminate the point Bultmann is making by using Binswanger's terminology: such an attempt at observing the relationship involves moving from 'loving Miteinandersein' to straightforward 'Mitsein'. In the course of the move, the original relationship is - at least temporarily - lost sight of: thus the attempt to observe it is regarded as self-defeating.

2. KM I p. 200 (E). Bultmann makes the point very frequently; see e.g. GV I E p. 128 (= GV I p. 97): "Man can only know love to be real by loving."

3. GV III 1 "Der Begriff der Offenbarung im NT" 1929 p. 4. (We have of course some conception of what friendship must be before we actually meet a friend: Bultmann would call such a conception an example of pre-understanding.)

4. This fact shows that Bultmann is no strict phenomenologist in the sense that Binswanger is. Binswanger does attempt to 'look at' 'loving-being-together' without turning it into a scientific object, an 'it', and his attempt is by means of phenomenology. - Furthermore, Binswanger distinguishes love from trust, asserting that the former is 'loving Miteinandersein', while the latter belongs within the world of every-day human intercourse (Mitsein).

sort. Bultmann departs from Buber at two points: first, in his insistence that this relation is worked out in encounter and response within a historical situation (there is no mystical element in Bultmann); and secondly, in maintaining the importance of the self-understanding in the relation: it is in their encounter with each other that each finds or fails to find his own true existence.

2. The Anthropological Approach to the Concept of Faith: the Role of Existential Analysis within Theology

We are seeking to explore Bultmann's understanding of faith. We have seen how in his exposition of its nature, he makes use of analogies taken from the field of inter-personal relationships, thereby taking the discussion out of the realm of analysis of the isolated individual, and highlighting those aspects of human experience that are indicative of the I-Thou encounter. In this we see him, along with Gogarten, drawing on the work of Buber - and ultimately also of Kant.

But in the course of our as yet very brief exploration a question has already emerged which requires an answer before we can make any further headway, namely, the question as to the nature of man's existence. Such a question is raised both by the denial that man is simply the totality of psychic and somatic facts that can be observed in regard to him (see above p. 34), and also by the suggestion that we look in the direction of the inter-personal, on the assumption that something of importance with regard to man's existence is to be found in this area.

Bultmann's use of these analogies may provide him with a pointer as to the nature of faith, but it cannot possibly provide him with a systematic account of the possibilities of human existence: it merely presents us with one possibility. It does not provide us with a set of hermeneutic categories such as would enable us to explore the being of man as such, nor does it give us any understanding of man's relation to history. We must now turn to this subject, realising that it will hold up our immediate exploration of Bultmann's concept of faith - and instead take further some of the other issues touched on in chapter 1, section 1; but further progress cannot be made until this subject is tackled.

We therefore have to plunge straight into Bultmann's relationship to Heidegger, who was also working at Marburg during the crucial decade of the 1920s.[1]

In Heidegger's existential analysis Bultmann found first, an understanding of man that did justice to the demands he was feeling from the quarter of dialectical theology - viz. the demand for an appreciation of man's historical involvement;[2] he found in it secondly, an appreciation of the work of Kierkegaard, with its preoccupation with the phenomenon of anxiety and with the necessity of man's deciding about his own existence. Thirdly, he found in it an analysis of the notion of 'world', which distinguished the concept of the objective world of nature from the a priori concept of world presupposed

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1. The first volume of Glauben und Verstehen was dedicated to Martin Heidegger.

2. N.B. Heidegger's own denial of the relevance of his work for dialectical theology: Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 39.

by human existence as such. Fourthly, he found in it a concern for the hermeneutic task of uncovering the meaning of man's existence, a task that had its roots in the work of Dilthey and Schleiermacher and therefore had affinities with Bultmann's own liberal-theology background. Fifth, he found in it a way of holding together the two elements that were so often torn apart in NT exegesis, namely will (leading to act) and understanding.[1]

Now Bultmann saw very clearly that Heidegger's analysis was a piece of philosophical work: moreover it was philosophy that concerned itself with ontology - and had as its goal the uncovering of being itself. It was a philosophical approach which self-consciously regarded itself as logically prior to all other disciplines: it was an ontological analysis: they were ontic.[2] It was not an empirical science but rather an enquiry into the ontological presuppositions of all empirical science; its epistemological method of enquiry was phenomenological: it attempted to allow things to show themselves in their essential form and being.

In his enquiry into a philosophy of being, Heidegger, as is well known,[3] never got beyond the analysis of the being of

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1. On this view, man comes to understand himself precisely as he resolves to exist in a certain way.

2. This distinction, crucial and difficult as it is, will concern us throughout. An ontological analysis is, for Heidegger, one that lays bare the being of that which is under scrutiny; an ontic analysis deals with the (changing, actual) qualities of an existent entity. Ontology is the business of philosophy; the study of the ontic, that of the empirical disciplines.

3. At least in SuZ (the last third of which was never written), which remained the work of Heidegger's with which Bultmann was largely concerned (contrast Binswanger).

man - of Dasein,[1] the being whose existence is an issue for it, and whose being is limited by the horizon of time, or more accurately, by temporality.

Now it is of great importance to understand how Bultmann used this philosophical analysis of man's existence.[2] In the first place, he accepted Heidegger's distinction between the ontological and the ontic; philosophy belongs to the first sphere, theology to the second. That is to say, theology does not intend to spell out the a priori ontological structure of Dasein,[3] nor is it in the position of being able to correct the philosophical analysis of this structure.[4] To do so would be to turn itself into philosophy, and to stray from its proper subject-matter, namely, the elucidation of man's self-understanding as this is determined by the Word of God that has been spoken. Theology deals with the elucidation of an actual occurrence within history - which as such cannot be the object of ontological analysis. Thus Bultmann uses the ontological-ontic distinction to defend himself against the charge of turning theology into philosophy.

What then of his use of Heidegger's existential analysis for the business of theology? While theology is clearly not

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1. In this discussion we will use the Heideggerian term Dasein (which Bultmann takes over - although it was of course used in German philosophy before Heidegger) to refer to the specifically human way of existence; for Heidegger, 'being-there' sums up the way in which human existence is always existence consciously within a spatial and temporal horizon.

2. See esp. "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins" in Heid. und die Theol., pp. 72-94.

3. Ibid., p. 75.

4. Ibid., p. 92.

ontological philosophy, neither is it one of the empirical sciences, with a subject-matter within the reach of observation; nor is it simply history,[1] although it has this fundamental rootedness in an historical event, which we have seen marks it off from philosophy of being. Moreover it purports to concern itself with the whole man, as he stands under the Word;[2] it therefore cannot avoid a seemingly ambiguous and oscillating stance over against philosophy.[3] What Bultmann sees as his indisputable right as a theologian is to use the categories of Heidegger's existential analysis in the service of his theologising:

> "Believing Dasein is in any case certainly Dasein; the believer too exists as man, just as the proclamation from which faith springs encounters him as a human word."[4]

Philosophy reveals the centrality in man's existence of the question as to its meaning: Dasein is the being whose existence is an issue - indeed the issue - for it; it can find life or lose it; it can exist authentically or it can become submerged in the inhuman forces that surround it, as Heidegger puts it,

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1. For a more thorough elucidation of the relation of theology to other disciplines in the thought of Bultmann see chapter 3.
2. See GV I p. 50 E; (= GV I p. 24); GV II 9 p. 159 (= Essays p. 179).
3. See esp. GV I 13. The theologian's use of philosophical analysis can, in the last resort, only be adequately understood, so Bultmann maintains, by the man who is sympathetically aware of the intention behind it ("Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins..." Heid. und die Theol., p. 76).
4. Ibid. p. 75; and again p. 78: "The believer has not become an angel, but simul peccator, simul justus."

in the world of the 'they'.[1] But while philosophy (understood of course in the Heideggerian sense as existential analysis - the necessary preliminary for asking the question about being per se) illuminates the questionableness of man's existence, and defines him as the being who is in search of the meaning of his existence, it cannot itself provide the answer to its own question. In so far as it does claim to do so, it is unserviceable to theology; but Heidegger's existential analysis refrains from so doing, by making a distinction as fundamental as that between ontological and ontic: namely, between existential and existentiell[2] - a distinction which is of central importance in Bultmann's own work. Existential analysis discloses the structure of man's being; in particular it points to man's moment of existential decision as the 'locus' in which the meaning of his existence becomes clear to him: Dasein 'comes to itself' as it is confronted with the task of how to be - and it is so confronted again and again in its own historical existence. So much can be stated by philosophy: but the actual meaning which is disclosed to each Dasein is no longer within the scope of existential analysis; this is a matter of existentiell understanding. At this point we have left what may be called the arena of intellectual reflection, and have embarked on the practical business of actual resolve and decision; it is here that man discovers the meaning of his existence and does so each time

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1. SuZ H 176f.

2. Cf. SuZ H 12: "The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself. The understanding of oneself that leads along this way we call existentiell." The translation of this term into English presents notorious difficulties; it seems therefore best to follow the example of the translators of SuZ and leave it in its German form.

afresh as he actually decides how his life is to be lived.[1] Bultmann himself puts it as follows:

> "A philosophy would be unusable [by theology] if it undertook to demonstrate the meaning [Sinn] of Dasein in the sense of trying to show that Dasein was 'meaningful' (or, alternatively, like Nietzsche, 'meaningless'). It would then be trying to take away from the actual Dasein the question of the meaning of its existence which can only be put to it and answered by it again and again in each situation; it would be attempting to give a general answer to Dasein's question: 'What is truth?', which as Dasein's question is always posed by each moment. Instead of this legitimate philosophical Daseinsanalysis shows that only the actual Dasein itself can raise and answer the meaning of its existence, the question 'What is truth?'"[2]

Now theology, as Bultmann understands it, is certainly concerned with the actual meaning man gives to his existence as he is confronted with the Word of God. Bultmann therefore takes over this distinction existential-existentiell, and attempts to make both parts of the division fruitful for theology. Existential analysis provides him with the categories he requires to interpret the NT, seen as the unfolding of the self-understanding

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1. This exposition should not allow one to suppose that the philosophical analysis must precede the existentiell understanding: this would deny Heidegger's phenomenological approach: he starts with the phenomenon of actual decision and asks what the being of man must be, if this is what we see him do.

2. Bultmann, in Heid. und die Theol. p. 77.

of the NT writers. But because, as a philosophical tool, it can never answer the question as to the actual meaning of man's existence, which is the concern of theology, its counterpart on the ontic level, existentiell understanding must always also be present as the goal of the theologian's activities (since his work finds its fruition in preaching: see above, p. 30f). In this way Bultmann is able to accomplish one of his major concerns both as exegete and as theologian, namely to hold together thought and action;[1] while giving a necessary priority to action (the meaning of Dasein's existence is to be found in existentiell resolve), he is able in this way to preserve for theology (in the more limited sense of the term) the intellectual function of clarifying the concepts it uses and interpreting the statements of the NT writers as men expressing believing existence as they know it to be.[2] The distinction between kerygma and theology is parallel to that between existentiell understanding and existential analysis. By means of it, Bultmann contains theology within the sphere of service to the Church, which means in his case, of service to the proclamation. But just as one only arrives at the kerygma through the human words through which it is proclaimed,[3] - words which require interpretation - so the intention behind existential analysis of the NT texts is that it should issue

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1. See TNT II Epilogue, pp. 246, 149.

2. This existentiell 'goal' of theological work is another way of expressing that tangential quality of theological statements to which I referred above (p. 28).

3. TNT II p. 239.

in existentiell understanding.[1]

Two further points require comment before we can proceed into our exposition of Bultmann's concept of believing existence: first, the relation of the analysis of I-Thou relationships to Heideggerian existential analysis (and this will have the effect of bringing together these two first sections of this chapter), and secondly, the question of the status of the resultant 'theological anthropology'.

In the second half of the essay which we have been drawing on for the purposes of this discussion,[2] Bultmann brings Gogarten's analysis of the I-Thou encounter into relation with Heidegger's existential analysis.

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1. TNT and EJ are both to be described as examples of existential analysis: they seek to interpret their subject-matter as the unfolding of believing existence (cf. Lorenzmeier p. 70). But the intention behind such exposition is not ultimately literary criticism, but existentiell understanding. Cf. Bultmann TNT II p. 251:

   > "Either the writings of the NT can be interrogated as 'sources' which the historian interprets in order to reconstruct a picture of primitive Christianity as a phenomenon of the historical past, or the reconstruction stands in the service of the interpretation of the NT writings under the presupposition that they have something to say to the present. The latter interest is the one for which historical labour is put to service in the presentation here offered."

   The same intention lies behind Bultmann's 'Jesus' (= Jesus and The Word), but here the element of encounter is more strongly pronounced (and thus also the possibility of existentiell understanding) because it is an analysis of Jesus's own proclamation, both ethical and eschatological.

2. "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins..." in Heid. und die Theol., pp. 85 ff. For a discussion of Bultmann's viewpoint see Malet, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, Shannon, 1969, pp. 326ff.

Heidegger, as a philosopher concerned with ontology, can say nothing about the actual encounters of Dasein; he cannot speak of love or hate,[1] because these are ontic possibilities of existing. Furthermore if he wants to grasp Dasein as a whole (and this he needs to do if he is to understand it ontologically), then the only boundary that he can find to Dasein is its end in death: to understand Dasein as a whole is to understand it as limited by its own final possibility - death. Gogarten, on the other hand, as theologian of the Word that encounters me in my own existentiell situation, knows of another limitation to my existence, namely the Thou (whether human or divine does not matter here) who calls me in question and at the same time forgives me. Thus whereas Heidegger has to see man as finding the meaning of his existence in the resolute anticipation of his own death, Gogarten can find it in the encounter with the Thou who becomes the determining factor in my existence. So I now no longer find my 'historicality' (the meaning of my existence as a historical being) by reference to my own death, but by reference to a Thou who confronts me in love (and for the theologian this is primarily the Divine Thou - but see below, section 5). But if I am now determined by this Thou, and not by my <u>own</u> 'ownmost possibility', then death has lost its original significance for me.[2]

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1. Bultmann ibid. p. 89. (This is of extreme importance in regard to Binswanger, who as a phenomenological anthropologist seeks to widen the basis of Heidegger's analysis, so that 'love' becomes a basic structural element of Dasein, see below, chapter 8.)

2. N.B. this is said as theologian, not as philosopher - and is not to be regarded as a correction of philosophy: Bultmann ibid. p. 92.

To turn to the question of 'theological anthropology', Bultmann as we have seen, holds it to be legitimate for theology to use Heideggerian existential analysis as a philosophically derived conceptual framework of what it is to be man. It is legitimate because theology is an ontic discipline, which does not presume to ask or answer philosophy's ontological questions; therefore the theologian's intention is consciously different from that of the philosopher: he takes over the latter's analysis of the '<u>locus</u>' in which the question of the meaning of man's existence is to find its answer - and this means also taking over the underlying understanding of the nature of man. And from within the theological analysis of the encounter with the Word of God, as this takes place on the ontic level, he is entitled to speak of a 'theological anthropology'. For the Word of God encounters a <u>man</u>, and the encounter must be expounded in its significance for man's existence; and for this purpose theology must employ anthropological analysis. However, such an anthropology is only legitimate theologically in so far as it is the explication of Dasein's encounter with the Word: it is not a free-roaming exploration of human existence, but stands under this strict limitation.[1] But within this situation it is the task of

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1. Bultmann himself comments on the suitability of Heideggerian existential analysis for theological purposes as being at least in part due to Heidegger's own study of the NT. He holds that Heidegger's anthropology in fact agrees with that of e.g. Paul, at least as far as the essentials of believing existence are concerned: of course Paul shares the beliefs of his time - e.g. in regard to the possibility of the Spirit being infused into man (see KM I 3, thesis 7), just as he believes in the existence of demons etc.; but, for instance, in both, man's existence is conceived of as through and through historical (cf. TNT I 269; GV III 7 p. 102 - in Paul, man is in fact only capable of living historically - of fulfilling his true being - when he is living eschatologically -; but cf. this with SuZ H 387f);

(contd.)

theology to spell out and explore the anthropological presuppositions that lie behind its utterances;[1] only by so doing will it retain clarity in its formulations of the kerygma which the Church has to proclaim.

One final point: this particular anthropology is appropriate for Bultmann precisely because it does operate on the ontological-ontic axis; it is expressly existential analysis, that is to say, an analysis which will not rest content with the ontologically undefined terminology of body, mind, soul, will etc., but instead asks about the way man is: it is thus concerned with man in his totality and unity, and sees him existing in a variety of modes, rather than as possessing a variety of faculties or capacities.[2] It is in accordance with this that for Bultmann faith has to be expounded as a way of existing rather than as a faculty or capacity.[3]

Continuation of foot-note from p. 47.

in both, man's existence is an issue for him (cf. TNT I p. 196 with SuZ H 12 - where admittedly Heidegger's ontological intention is manifestly present: Dasein is "ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very being, that Being is an issue for it"); in both, man finds himself caught up in inauthentic existence (cf. the Pauline notion of "man's enslavement to powers for whose dominion he is nevertheless responsible", TNT I p. 257, with Heidegger's language of inauthentic existence in the 'they', SuZ H 176f).

1. It would therefore be a mistake to abstract from the account of believing existence the underlying anthropology and to present this, e.g. in this thesis, as a separate preparatory section. Believing existence must remain central; but in the course of analysing it, we will have to dwell on the underlying anthropological views as these emerge, in relation e.g. to sin, love, openness to the future etc. In this way we will avoid the temptation of regarding the anthropology as an independent unit , alongside theology. See Lorenzmeier p. 56.
2. The language of 'possessing' is suspect to Heidegger: it is ontologically undefined. And while it so remains, its meaning for man cannot be established. For the question of meaning ('die Sinnfrage') is a question that (for Dasein of course) cannot be answered without reference to the question of being ('die Seinsfrage').
3. Bultmann's use of the (ontological) categories of existential analysis will concern us again in chapter 12, where the attempt will be made to analyse both Bultmann's and Binswanger's use of the (crucial) ontological-ontic distinction.

3. Faith as Response to the Proclamation of Forgiveness

We can now return to the exploration of the nature of faith. It is to be granted a status analogous to that of love and trust within the existence of man. Just as the latter are fundamental ways in which a man can exist, open, formally, to the scrutiny of existential analysis,[1] and yet, as regards content, matters of the existentiell understanding, to be known by actually trusting and loving, so too it is with faith.[2]

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1. Existential analysis concerns itself with 'Mitsein' (being with) as an integral part of 'Dasein' (being there); i.e. one of its aims is to lay bare the apriori ontological structure of Dasein such as makes possible such relationships as actually exist between men. What it cannot do is spell out the content of such relationships in terms of love and hate etc. (acc. to Heidegger and Bultmann).

2. The expositor of Bultmann's thought runs the risk of sticking too closely to Bultmann's relation to Heidegger, thereby failing to see that Bultmann regards it as equally legitimate for theology to call upon the work of poets and a wide variety of thinkers, in order to illuminate man's condition. For his own use of Rilke and Hölderlin see in particular EJ passim; he also concerns himself with Goethe's Faust and with Nietzsche, as well as with Kierkegaard (e.g. EJ p. 450 note 2 = EJE p. 584 note 2); in this connexion see also his quotation of Hölderlin, Empedocles II 4 (in EJ p. 442 note 6 = EJE p. 574 note 4), where the poet's words about the continuity of the revelation are regarded as pointing to the same sort of existential 'experience' as that described by John, although the former is concerned with a revelation through the word of nature. We have here a further example of that oscillating, ambiguous relationship between Christian faith and non-Christian experience: both refer to the same subject-matter (man in the world) and yet not to the same subject-matter (man encountering the Word of God, and man outside this relationship). See esp. GV I 13, where this oscillating stance viz-a-viz man's natural reason is most fully expressed. See too GV II 7 (Essays 133ff).

And yet the structure of faith, as a way of existing, is more complex than these others, because it involves all three possible temporal references: an understanding of one's past, a 'hearing' of the proclamation in the present, and a resolute reaching out towards the future. These three temporal references are all essential to the structure of believing existence. In this section we will be dealing with the 'hearing' in the present.

To return to the point from which we started (p. 33f): faith is not a quality or capacity that can be isolated within the personality of man. It is a specific understanding of the whole of man's existence: it sees this existence as forgiven.[1] We are concerned with the totality of man's existence, seen not philosophically, but theologically; it is precisely this existence in its totality which is declared both sinful and forgiven.

It should now be clear that we are not dealing with a philosophical prolegomenon to theology in Bultmann's understanding of faith as a way of existing. Quite apart from the fact that such a non-theological prolegomenon to theology would be as impossible for Bultmann as it is for Barth, the theological

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1. The language of forgiveness is one which Bultmann uses frequently in GV, but which, as he observes, is in fact not used frequently by Paul (TNT I p. 287); we have therefore here a *prima facie* case of Bultmann developing a theology independent of the NT (and thus breaking the unity between exegesis and systematic theology). That this is not the case becomes evident on closer inspection of both GV and TNT; in both we find Bultmann dealing with the NT's account of God's justifying, reconciling, loving - and hence forgiving - encounter with man, which enables him to repent and to grasp hold of life rather than death. Bultmann asserts (ibid.) that Paul avoids the term 'forgiveness of sins' because it suggests an emphasis on individual sins rather than on the life of sinning *per se*.

position can now be seen to be paramount. It is Bultmann's theological understanding of the kerygma that demands that he see faith as embracing the totality of man's existing: faith is existing as a forgiven sinner. Hence faith cannot be anything additional to the make-up of man, nor can it be any one part of that make-up; the believer has the same nature, qua man, as the unbeliever; his existence is human existence but he knows it to be addressed and forgiven by God;[1] and in so far as he does so view it, he is freed for the future.

Central to Bultmann's concept of faith is therefore the doctrine: simul justus et peccator.[2] It is the sinner who is forgiven; the old man retains continuity with the new because it is the sins of the old man that the new man knows to be forgiven, and yet he knows them to be his sins.[3] It is the same man who is freed for the future, and who thus becomes new.

At this juncture we need to proceed into the elaboration of these three temporal references with care; it is here that a simple three-fold division would tend to divide up the notion of faith irreparably. We are dealing with one act - the act of believing - which involves three temporal references.[4]

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1. For God as a forgiving God see esp. I Joh. p. 29, on I John 1.10: "God is a God bestowing forgiveness, and that means, that he is a God who speaks to man; for forgiveness is bestowed through the Word..."
2. See e.g. GV I p. 63f; 122 etc. E (=GV I p. 36, 91). Cf. also: "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins..." Heid. und die Theol. p. 78.
3. See esp. John 3.1-21 (and 31-36): EJE pp. 131-167 esp. p. 159 (= EJ p. 113f).
4. It needs to be stated that our focussing on believing existence could lead to a quite unBultmannian separation of believer and God. God remains for Bultmann the ultimate subject-matter of Christian thought (cf. GV I p. 120 E = GV I p. 90), but we are only confronted with him through the human word that is proclaimed. So too here, God remains the indispensible 'horizon' within which our analysis of believing existence has to be carried out.

We must start with the act of 'hearing' in the present. To go back to our analogies: if a man expresses his friendship to another, the second can receive this communication in two ways: either simply as the expression of the speaker's feelings, the expression of a psychological state, which he can objectively observe, or he can receive it existentielly, i.e. as demanding a specific response from him, making him see himself and the other person in a new light.[1]

Now he may attempt to stand back and find a vantage point from which to assess the speaker's remarks, in order to test their genuineness; but if he does this he at once calls the friendship in question and is in danger of destroying it, while searching for an illusory and unobtainable certainty.

The hearer of the proclamation is faced with an analogous alternative: how is he to hear the message of judgment and forgiveness? He can either hear it as of existentiell importance for him, or as the communication of some past facts or claims within history. To hear it existentielly, is to realise his own involvement in history, and to allow the communication to change the manner of his own existence. It is (and this is to anticipate section 4 of this chapter) to allow it to be transcendent over him.

What has been said about the two ways of hearing could well lead to misunderstanding: it could suggest that the act of existentiell hearing is secondary to a decision to hear it in this way. To suppose that it were, would be to imagine that we had, so to speak, a neutral position from which we

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1. Cf. KM I 7 p. 203 (E).

could decide upon our course of action in our own time and without reference to our own historical situation.[1] This would be a return to Idealism, to the setting up of the transcendental I as substantial subject. This is both theologically and philosophically impossible for Bultmann. We cannot gain a position external to history from which to assess it and plan our own response to it; we are 'thrown'[2] into a particular history and are part of it, and by the way we act we can either show ourselves abandoned to it[3] ('ausgeliefert' is the term Bultmann uses) or we can respond authentically and responsibly to its demands. Within theology, this means that we cannot gain for ourselves a position which would enable us to give an independent and objective assessment of the proclamation, to which we would then decide how to respond.[4] Bultmann has to say that it is in the way we hear the communication that the decision takes place to hear it in this way. This means that (and this is true of gratitude, trust etc.) the speaking and hearing of the communication - and thereby the establishing of the relationship - are themselves the decisive element in the communication; they are its content. It is in the uttering

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1. It would be to fail to see that the proclamation is judgment before it is forgiveness; that is to say, that it is eschatological event (TNT I p. 306f), taking place within history; it is possible for man to be 'too late' in making up his mind about it; see esp. the attitude of the Jews in John (EJ p. 231f = EJE p. 306f):

   > "Thus it is the historical contingency of the revelation which throws this terrible weight of responsibility upon the hearer of the Word. For the revelation is not generally available, but presents itself to man only at a certain limited time of its own choosing. It does not consist in universal truths, which can be grasped at all times and for all times, nor in dogma which one could invoke at any time, but it confronts man in time, it is in every case the present moment in a personal history. Should one neglect the opportunity, when confronted with the challenge of the Revealer, then the verdict applies: too late."

2. SuZ H 135.
3. TNT I p. 249f, 257.
4. See esp. GV I 2.

and hearing of the proclamation - as the communication between God and man - that the possibility of new existence is given.

We have now to consider the content of the proclamation, as Bultmann sees it. But we find ourselves confronted by a characteristic problem: the content of the proclamation cannot be scrutinised without reference to the believer's own existence, nor apart from the fact that it is proclaimed.[1] As we have seen the proclaiming the message of forgiveness is itself that forgiveness; or, to use Pauline language, to declare that the believer is righteous is itself to establish his right relation with God.[2] God is known to man as the Word,[3] and man finds his being, his life, in response to the Word that he hears; thus the hearing is itself the eschatological event and the Church's proclamation its continuation.[4] Bultmann ascribes to it this eschatological, ultimate, status, because it is in hearing the proclamation that the believer discards the

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1. In Bultmann's thought the fact that the proclamation is proclaimed (the Dass) far outweighs the content (the Was) in importance; the 'Was' in fact changes with man's changing self-understanding; the 'Dass' remains the unchangeable historical actuality of the revelation in the historical, contingent, event of Jesus' life and death. Cf. I Joh. p. 51: "It is precisely the fact of Jesus' having come in the flesh that the Gnosticising false teachers deny (I John 4.1). This means that Gnosticism certainly has a doctrine but no proclamation."

   And as a comment on the first sentence, Bultmann writes:

   > "In the disputed contemporary terminology one can also say: here it becomes clear how decisive in the Christian proclamation the Dass (the fact of Jesus' coming) is. For one might perhaps have been able to come to an agreement as regards the Was (the life and the words of the historical Jesus)."

   See too GV I p. 287 E (= GV I p. 268f) and TNT II p. 66.

2. TNT I p. 272f.

3. Cf. EJ pp. 15-19 (= EJE pp. 31-36) on John 1.1-2.

4. Cf. EJ p. 443 (= EJE p. 575f) on John 16.14.

standards of this world and finds himself to be a 'new creation'. To go back to our analogies, it is in hearing another man (existentielly) that one is confronted with the demands he makes upon one and asked to respond - which is to say that one is confronted with that which transcends one.[1] A fortiori, argues Bultmann,[2] in the case of the divine proclamation of the word of forgiveness.

But this word is not, and cannot be, unambiguous or straightforward, like the communication of some fact about the world: it is paradoxical in that (and here we are speaking about the content) it is proclamation of the cross, a stumbling-block to Jews and folly to Greeks;[3] and to accept this as Word of God, as transcendent over one, inevitably involves the re-orientation of one's self-understanding, and the abandonment of mankind's normal standards of assessment and achievement.

Now this re-orientation is not a subsequent activity, that the believer undertakes after he has heard the proclamation: it takes place actually in the hearing. The new self-understanding is itself integral to the act of hearing - and that means, to the act of believing.

We will return to this new self-understanding below. What needs to be said now is that we have here the means whereby Bultmann holds together the act of believing with the content

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1. In this connection see esp. Essays 8-10 in GV IV.
2. Cf. GV I p. 141 E (= GV I p. 110).
3. Or, to use John's language, it is the stumbling-block of the ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο . This sentence forms the bedrock of Bultmann's understanding of the 4th Gospel (contrast Käsemann, The Testament of Jesus, tr. by G. Krodel, London, 1968) and shows him closely aligned to a Kierkegaardian Christology of the 'Christus Incognitus'.

of belief; or, to use the language in which he conducts the debate, the *fides qua creditur* with the *fides quae creditur*.[1] These two elements which together make up the concept of faith tend to fall apart, and the result is that the question of truth is affixed to one part only, or goes by default. Roman Catholic theology, as Bultmann sees it, declares the truth of its doctrine as something to be taken on trust: here the *fides quae* is to be taken as authoritatively true. The *fides qua* is then the resolve to take it as such.[2]

Alternatively, 'experience' in one form or another, can be taken as the touch-stone of truth, in which case the *fides qua* becomes all important and the *fides quae* is subjected to the bar of 'experience'[3]; unless, to take an example, the figure of the earthly Christ is presented to me in such a way that I can experience the force of his personality etc., he is as nothing to me. But such a reconstructed Christ is a 'Christ after the flesh'.[4]

The question of truth cannot be answered in either of these ways; for Bultmann it is quite central that the *fides qua* and the *fides quae* belong together. The *fides qua* is never without reference to its ground or source in the event of Christ (as he puts it, faith's intentionality is an indispensable element within it).[5] Conversely the *fides quae* is never

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1. Cf. GV I 5 "On the Question of Christology" 1927 pp. 116-144, E, (= GV I pp. 85-113).
2. Ibid., p. 117, E, (= GV I p. 86).
3. GV I p. 124, E, (= GV I p. 93).
4. Ibid. p. 126, E, (= GV I p. 95).
5. Ibid. p. 119, E, (= GV I p. 88).

to be considered true as a system of doctrines independently of the fides qua; it can never be used in such a way as to demote the fides qua to the role of secondary affect.

To hold these two together is, as far as the question of truth is concerned, to maintain the primacy of believing existence within Christian theology.[1] The believer is not afforded a total view, such as might be provided by a system of doctrinal truths apart from faith, nor can he assert e.g. the resurrection or divinity of Christ independently of faith. He asserts them in so far as he believes.[2]

This position does not mark an escape into subjectivism,[3] but is, Bultmann maintains, the correct order of the matter,

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1. See above all GV I pp. 146ff (E) (= GV I pp. 116ff), where Bultmann discusses the notion of truth within theology. It is important to realise that he does not first establish an understanding of truth and then apply it to theology. For him truth is revealed in the encounter with the Word of God - after all, Jesus is the truth: John 14.5 (EJ p. 468ff = EJE p. 606ff), and this means that theological truth is revealed in the unfolding of man's self-understanding as this is determined by the Word of God. Hence a theological assertion - e.g. that God is merciful - is true in so far as it is asserted of his relation to the speaker and "its truth applies to the specific time of the speaking" (GV I p. 147 E = GV I p. 116). Hence theology is not a science that can be learned at second hand: "In Christianity everyone has to start for himself from the beginning" (EJE p.607), nor does Christianity provide the believer with answers to the puzzles of the universe, but rather with that "authentic self-understanding that knows God as its creator" (EJE p. 435). The understanding of truth is therefore dependent on the encounter with the Word of God. Bultmann's position viz-a-viz the truth of the resurrection must be seen in this light, and indeed, the whole de-mythologising programme is to be seen as the attempt to carry through the implications of this concept of truth.

2. See e.g. KM I pp. 40-42 (E).

3. Subjectivism is, as Bultmann sees it, the attempt to make man's inner life - his capacities for experiencing - the criterion for truth. Such a view sees man as first and foremost one who experiences: his psychic life is all important. The view of man revealed by existential analysis (and e.g. by Paul: witness II Cor. 12.1 - TNT I p. 335) is that man's subjective experiences are not the occasion for his finding the truth or meaning of his life, but must rather be seen as secondary to the moments of decision - in particular to the eschatological event of the hearing of the proclamation.

because faith is response to the transcendent, i.e. expresses the conviction that something other than me, transcendent to me, has changed me.

Now the temptation is, as Bultmann sees it, to reverse the order: to attempt to establish first the divinity of Christ, and then to assert my belief in this divinity. But this is again the attempt to find a vantage point from which to judge matters, and is motivated by the desire to avoid the claims of the transcendent. Epistemologically, it is to rely on a process of knowing that is other than that which is involved in faith.[1]

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1. EJE p. 435 describes the γινώσκειν of John 8.30 as "an element within the structure of faith itself, namely faith in so far as it understands itself!

   - There is a further problem involved here, namely, the subject-object dichotomy, which tends to afflict epistemologies that deny that man's mind is a tabula rasa and particularly concerns a theology such as Bultmann's. For he wants to insist that the encounter with the Word of God is 'objective' in the sense of 'originating outside me', irreducible to my subjective experiences, and yet which cannot be known as external objects are known - by 'impartial, neutral' observation (cf. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: especially the Second Analogy). The question for Bultmann is: how can I 'know' that which transcends me (viz. the Word of God) without making it into an object over against which I can maintain my unchallenged, unaffected existence as observing subject? Kant (NB in relation to objects rather than persons) attempts to overcome the difficulty in his analysis of the sublime (Critique of Judgment: tr. Meredith, Oxford 1952, pp. 92-117): in, for instance, man's confrontation with a majestic mountain (ibid. p. 104) the intuition of time, essential for observation, is, as it were, suspended and "the mind feels itself set in motion" (ibid. p. 107).

   By locating the discernment of truth and meaning in decision, Bultmann overcomes the difficulty by saying: I know the wholly other (i.e. the transcendent) in its otherness to me, in that it makes me wholly other, i.e. changes the manner of my existence. Thus only in so far as I know myself changed, and believe, can I assert e.g. the divinity of Christ (for such a confession of faith involves decision in the light of changed self-understanding). To reverse the order would be to remain trapped in the subject-object dilemma. See Malet p. 19: "The other is only itself, for me, when it changes me."

The building up of mythological statements and stories about Christ (e.g. the nature miracles) is a typical example of this urge to avoid the immediacy of the 'hearing' situation. Bultmann's enterprise of de-mythologising is designed to strip away this objectifying tendency, and to confront the believer again with the true stumbling-block of the cross as the transcendence of God. As such he describes it as the necessary carrying through of the doctrine of justification by faith, at the epistemological level.

4. The Life of the Natural Man as Faith sees it: Faith as it views its own Past

Before leaving the actual hearing of the proclamation as it takes place again and again in the present, we need to mention one further aspect of the matter (and this will provide the link between the foregoing and 'man in relation to his past', which is the theme to which we must now turn): a man can only 'hear', if he already has some prior understanding of the matter being referred to.[1] For instance I can only understand a statement expressing gratitude, if I have some prior under-

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1. Cf. as an example within the NT, the concepts introduced in the Prologue to John's Gospel: EJE p. 13 (= EJ p. 1):

   "The concepts ζωή and φῶς, δόξα and ἀλήθεια are the kind of motifs for which the reader brings with him a certain prior understanding; but he still has to learn how to understand them authentically."

   Cf. also GV I p. 151-9 E (= GV I pp. 120-128).

standing of the meaning of gratitude.[1] I must be aware of the possibility of being grateful. So too of forgiveness, and of justification and self-validation, the particular matter to which we must now turn our attention. The proclamation must speak of possible ways for me to exist, if 'hearing' is to take place.[2] It takes place when what was previously dimly known (or feared), or else theoretically known, is grasped as an existentiell reality such as changes the manner of my life.

This movement from a dim 'prior' understanding to full authentic knowledge has a further application which we need to consider here. Just as, for example, our present life in the world gives us some indication - however shadowy - of what fullness of life might be, so there are other aspects of present existence which point beyond themselves to what might be described as their real eschatological expression, sometimes as the fulfilment of what present experience hints at, sometimes as the reality for which present experience provides a perverted example. The latter is the case with the phenomenon of everyday life with which we are now concerned: it is what Bultmann

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1. Cf. "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins..." in Heid. und die Theol., p. 82:

   "First of all an analogy! A friendless life, that consciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly, longs for friendship, knows what friendship is - and yet at the same time does not know."

2. i.e. it must speak to my actual situation - to that which makes up my humanity; but if it is to do that, then I necessarily have some prior understanding of it; cf. GV I p. 140 E (= GV I p. 109f):

   "The proclamation does not detach us from our historical situation, but propels us into it...it directs man to his own humanity. For <u>this</u> humanity, grace is valid."

describes as the universal urge among men for self-validation, or self-justification. Here is something that points beyond itself to a new manner of existing, known to man in this kind of dim prior understanding, where validation is no longer required, because it is given and received definitively within the relationship between God and each individual.

As far as prior understanding is concerned, we will have to return to it again, in relation to the prior understanding of the notion of God. This latter is relevant here in so far as Bultmann maintains that the search for validation in our own eyes and in the eyes of others involves in the end the appeal to the ultimate court of appeal - which men call God.[1] The need for self-understanding, self-esteem, for an appreciation of one's place in society etc., these needs are seen by Bultmann as universal to man. Man is the being whose existence is an issue for him, the one who seeks to solve the meaning of his existence by assessing himself in terms of his achievements. He is therefore able to 'hear' the proclamation of a new self-understanding because the questionableness of his own existence is always before him.

But it is only in the light of his new existence that he can fully see his previous existence for what it was - an existence enslaved to the ever-recurring need for self-validation. It is for this reason that the following analysis of life under law (to use the language of NT theology) is life as seen by the believer - the classic NT expositions being Phil. 3 and

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1. Cf. GV II 9 p. 152 (= Essays p. 171).

Rom. 7 in which Paul with the illumination of existence that comes with faith, looks back at life under law and sees it essentially as a life of boasting, an attempt to gain self-validation.[1]

It is the world (into which a man is thrown[2]) that affords man the means of self-validation: not the world as an objective phenomenon, but my world, the world of the things and people with whom I have to do.[3] I understand myself in contrast to,

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1. The Jew did not see the life directed towards the keeping of the law as misery or bondage etc.; on the contrary, it was his greatest pride (Phil. 3.7); it is because Paul sees the proclamation of Christ as the eschatological event (that is, the event that brings man the gift of life = salvation), that he sees his former life as leading inevitably to death, and thus cries out: "O wretched man that I am..." See esp. "Römer 7 und die Anthropologie des Paulus", Exegetica, pp. 198-209 (an indispensible article) and GV II 3 pp. 32-58 (= Essays pp. 36-66).

2. SuZ H 135. What is esp. important here is the category of the Whence of Dasein: Dasein is there in its thrownness, but integral to its understanding of its 'being-there' is the reference to the origin from whence it came: its 'Woher', or its past, which determines its present, and to which Dasein can relate authentically or inauthentically (H 348). Within the NT this relation to the past is depicted most clearly in the Johannine literature - by the phrase εἶναι ἐκ (cf. I John 2.21; 4.1-7; III John 11; John 3.31; 1836); and the two possible ways of relating to the past are described as ἐκ τοῦ πατρός or ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου (I Joh. p. 40). See esp. EJ p. 97 note 3 = EJE p. 138 note 1. "John 3.31 shows clearly that εἶναι ἐκ describes someone's nature, for here a person's nature and origin are expressly identified..." And the Christian claim (as expressed in John 3) is that one's response to the proclamation can change one's 'Woher' - i.e. one can be born again: EJE p. 138: "The goal of man's life corresponds to his origin. If his way is to lead to salvation, it must start from another point, and man must be able to reverse his origin, and to exchange the old origin for a new one. He must be 'reborn'!"

3. On 'world' in Paul see TNT I pp. 2540259; in John, see TNT II pp. 26-33. Bultmann distinguishes a variety of meanings of the term in the NT, but because the NT is not concerned so much with the ontological as with the ontic (TNT I p. 227) the term 'world' normally implies opposition to God: see esp. John (I Joh. pp. 38, 69, 81, 91f) and is

(contd.)

and in relation to them. But this means that I understand myself in terms of what I achieve in this world - and this is inevitably, in terms of what is passing (for my existence is only comprehensible against the horizon of temporality[1]). Hence I always need a fresh achievement with which to satisfy my ever recurring need for self-validation, and furthermore my criterion for assessing achievement can only be what I already know of myself.

Bultmann returns to these themes again and again in his writings, and it is worth quoting some of his clearest descriptions of this sort of life, because they will be of importance in Part III and the appendix of this thesis.

He makes it clear that this need for validation and justification (described in the German as 'Geltungsbedürfnis') is a natural part of what it is to be man.[2]

Continuation of foot-note 3 from p. 62.

therefore to be contrasted with creation. The Heideggerian analysis of 'world' (as that within which Dasein inevitably is, simply by being) comes through in e.g. GV I p. 252 E (= GV I p. 220). (In my use of the word in this paragraph the theological implication of the world's - ontic - rebellion against God remains in the background, but by describing the world as passing away, the paragraph shows that the world is seen theologically against the background of the encounter with the Word - i.e. against the background of the eschatological event).

1. SuZ H 387. On the futility of finding meaning by means of the world that is passing away see GV I p. 252f E (= GV I p. 220f).
2. GV II 3 p. 39 (= Essays p. 43)

"As regards the need for validation, it is immaterial what sort of achievement one is dealing with, whether physical or intellectual, moral or immoral. Modern psychology and educational theory know that achievement gives the child consciousness of self, the feeling of validity [Geltung], and they try to make possible for the child an achievement in accordance with his ability, in order to strengthen his consciousness of self."

In the essay "Gnade und Freiheit" he writes:

> "Paul knows quite well that man simply cannot exist without validation."[1]

And a little later:

> "The need for validation is not perverse in itself, but is appropriate for man, who has to live with and before others. But it is a fundamental mistake, if he thinks he can force this validation, or base his claim to validation on achievement, through his work rather than through his being."[2]

This urge to find validation finds its crowning example in religious man, typified by the Jew (cf. Barth's critique of religion as the highest form of human striving);[3] it is in boasting before God that it comes to its logical climax:

> "At its deepest, however, such an urge for validation always means: to want to validate oneself before God. It means to want to validate oneself before the highest, final, court of appeal (call it what you will), which must show me to be right, which will confirm me in the face of all my self-uncertainties and self-doubting, which continually assail me. Even the seeking of validation before other men really only intends to make me secure before myself. Now the man who sees that the verdict of other men can never give him this final self-assurance, and who therefore wants his self-understanding,

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1. GV II 9 p. 152 (= Essays p. 171).
2. Ibid. p. 153.
3. Barth, Romans, pp. 240 ff.

his validation before a final - for him possibly unnamed - authority, he is the man who wants to boast before God, to be justified by his works."[1]

Bultmann then gives what might best be described as a psychopathological account of the effects of this striving on human life:

"Periods of heightened pride alternate...with periods of depression or even despair, until such a man manages to let go of his pride and live by grace."[2]

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1. GV II 9 p. 152 (= Essays p. 171).

2. Ibid (= Essays 172). Such a description of his account can only be made with caution: the psychopathological element is secondary to the contrast between life under law and life under grace: it is this to which the description is leading. That is to say, we have here one of those contrasts on which Bultmann's theology thrives (and which, needless to say, he finds in the NT); here it is that between law and grace; equally it could be between death and life, or darkness and light, or σάρξ and πνεῦμα . But in each case it is the proclamation that illuminates the contrast, and presents the hearer with two contrasting possibilities for which he can decide. Thus it would be a gross methodological error to abstract such a 'psychopathological' account from the theological 'axis' (law-grace) in which it stands. Theology operates, on Bultmann's view, on such 'axes' of contrasting opposites and the anthropology that underlies such a view is one that would regard the description of subjective experiences (as in e.g. the psychopathological account given above) as an inadequate account of man's existence: it does not do enough justice to his will which is concerned ultimately with life or death, i.e. with his origin and his goal. See esp. Exegetica, p. 201:

> "According to Paul, human being transcends the sphere of man's consciousness. This is expressed very clearly in the fact that, according to Paul, man is and operates under the dominion of σάρξ or πνεῦμα (e.g. Rom. 8.5ff, 12; Gal. 5.16ff); tertium non datur."

A similar point is made in a rather different context:

> "How can e.g. Paul's doctrine of man's justification by faith alone and not through works of the law be made comprehensible to modern man for whom it is in the first instance incomprehensible? For what is the meaning of works of the law for him? Theology has to show that in the Jewish striving to establish a claim on God's grace by doing works of the law, nothing else is present but the natural man's desire for validation, which is also a living force in modern man: that need for validation which expresses itself in business, in rigidity, in inferiority complexes and their effects. It is the same need for validation, which can really only find fulfilment when one sees that validation can never be achieved through striving, but can only be received as gift."[1]

The tragic element in this life of striving is brought out by Bultmann in his Gifford Lectures, where he points to man's realisation (expressed in theatrical tragedy) that it is not only external factors within man's environment that bring suffering and destruction upon him, but his own actions, even where these have been regarded as good in themselves, and he quotes from Goethe's Faust:

> "Ach, unsre Taten selbst so gut als unsre Leiden,
> Sie hemmen unsres Lebens Gang."[2]

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1. GV III p. 193 (1958).

2. HE p. 2. See too TNT I p. 248 (E), where Bultmann is again commenting on Rom. 7.7-25: man wants to find life and acts on that desire, but in fact he finds death.

Here we have expressed what was always implicit in the life of striving: man's alienation from himself,[1] so that his existence is not only an issue for him, but becomes an intolerable burden from which he tries in vain to escape. Even his own actions, good as they may appear to be, contribute to his downfall, and he comes to regard his own body as itself a hostile power. This sort of experience is given classic form in Gnosticism, which Bultmann regards as a vital influence upon the NT. Its mythology attempts to make this sense of alienation from self bearable by objectifying it, in a manner characteristic of mythological thinking, and explaining it in terms of the fall of primeval man from the world of light, and of the consequent emprisonment of the self in an alien body, subject to the forces of darkness.[2]

Here a man does not even acknowledge what he has done as his own actions; they are the acts of an evil power from which he needs to be freed. While the proclamation takes very seriously man's domination by the powers of evil,[3] it does not collude in this analysis in the sense of promising an escape from the body, but proclaims that the whole person with his past life is both judged (i.e. his past is seen as his responsibility: sin springs from sin: cf. Kierkegaard[4]), and at the same time forgiven.

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1. TNT I p. 245 (on Rom. 14) E; cf. Exegetica p. 202: "Der Mensch ist der Zwiespalt!"
2. Cf. GV II 7 (= Essays pp. 133-150).
3. E.g. TNT I p. 257.
4. Concept of Dread, English tr. by W. Lowrie, Princeton 1957, pp. 41-46.

The underlying attitude involved in this life of striving is anxiety, and its basic motivation is fear (Bultmann quotes Rom. 8.15[1]); it is a putting of confidence in that which is known to be passing away, a living 'according to the flesh', or, as Bultmann puts it, 'out of the created world',[2] as if man could derive his life from it.[3] So it is that man can be described as 'sold to the powers of flesh and sin',[4] or, to use Heideggerian language, abandoned to the world of the 'they'[5], or given over to the life of 'care' (cf. I Cor. 7.32).[6]

Seen theologically, this is the field of sin and death. It is a being bound to what is passing away, as if this alone can illuminate my existence; it is an imprisonment within the past, and its only possible horizon is death. It becomes sin when it is maintained in opposition to the possibility of another kind of self-understanding, which is offered to man not through achievement, but through the 'hearing' of the proclamation of acceptance at the highest court of appeal.[7]

The hearing of the proclamation is the acceptance of this radically different understanding of existence.[8] It calls in

1. TNT I p. 243.
2. Cf. TNT I p. 239.
3. Cf. TNT II p. 19, 23f.
4. Cf. TNT I p. 245.
5. SuZ H 128 .
6. TNT I p. 226 and pp. 241ff.
7. For the language of acceptance in Bultmann see I Joh. p. 63; GV I p. 244: "Das Christliche Gebot der Nächstenlieve", tr. in the Scottish Periodical I (1947) pp. 42-56; and GV I p. 64 E (= GV I p. 36f).
8. The difference lies primarily in the fact that man's existence is now understood through the encounter with the Thou: this is the determining factor - rather than the (self-centred) concentration on attaining one's own authenticity in relation to one's coming death. The encounter with the Thou - i.e. with love, including within it justification and acceptance by the Thou - transports the believer into a new - eschatological - existence. See esp. EJ p. 403 = EJE p.524f.

question the attitude that assesses action in terms of achievement, and it sets a limit to the notion of the universality of the causal understanding of the world.[1]

It shows up the life of striving for what it is: unbelief;[2] the refusal to let go of the world's standards of assessment and its understanding of existence; it is the insistence on continuing to judge myself by what I have known of myself in the past. Hence it is essentially 'closed-up-ness',[3] resistance to the possibility of illumination of existence from elsewhere, flight from the encounter with a transcendent Thou.[4]

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1. Bultmann makes the point in GV I p. 258 E, (= GV I p. 225):

> "To see the world in this way [i.e. as creation] is not to have a 'world-view'; it is not a theory about the world in general. The world is so seen only when the claim of God is heard on the basis of forgiveness. Hence the error of understanding the world and ourselves as past must be continually combatted. This means that our 'working ideas', in which we count on the controllability of the world, that is, on its conformity to law, must always be limited by our 'conceptions of faith'. Furthermore, in our actual living, conceptions belonging to work and those belonging to faith are interchanged in such a way that the former are always delimited by the latter. For his working ideas, man needs the conception of nature. To what extent he must use it cannot be stated in general terms. He uses it in so far as he is required to use it in a specific task. If he lets it become his master, then the use becomes sin."

2. Faith is openness to the Thou; a willingness to let go of my fearful desire to secure the future for myself by my own achievements. Unbelief is not merely the opposite of this: it is the conscious striving to establish oneself over against the rest of the world, and thus also over against God; as such it is rebellion against God.

3. "What is the real crux of sin? What is it if sin is closed-up-ness against the future? It is anxiety. It is the anxiety of man who does not want to surrender himself to what is dark, who wants to hold onto himself. It is anxiety before God, and therefore rebellion against God." GV II p. 71 (= Essays p. 81).

4. Sin can equally well be described as refusal to love (and this means it is hate: tertium non datur), because the encounter with the Thou is an encounter with the love of

(contd.)

Faith, on the other hand, is the way of existing that is based on this new understanding of existence as love. It accords meaning not to the thing done, as a work (love seen as achievement is no longer love), but to the doing of it as an action, an action that is itself a response to the word of forgiveness that has been heard.[1] Thus I see my existence as sinful and yet at the same time as forgiven; I no longer assess it or accord it meaning in terms of achievement, nor do I judge myself on the basis of what I have been; in this sense I am freed for the future, by being freed from the past, freed for new opportunities of existing, which I can now grasp.

Faith means abandoning any attempt at self-validation in terms of achievement. Indeed the believer starts believing in the struggle to overcome the urge for validation through achievement, i.e. in the struggle to overcome unbelief; and this is not done by ever greater effort and concentration, in the first instance, but by hearing the proclamation of forgiveness and by responding to it in resolve for the future, equipped with the new self-understanding it provides, which requires no further validation.

Continuation of footnote 4 from p. 69.

> the Thou; it is the recognition of the primacy of the unity of the I and the Thou in love, and it issues in the demand of love:
>
> > "The Christian command of love demands a turning round of the natural man's direction of life (something that is admittedly only discovered in love, and is previously incomprehensible); it demands this because the life-direction of the natural man is aimed at the loosing of I from Thou, at the establishing of I over against Thou."
>
> - "Das Christliche Gebot...", in GV I p. 238.

1. See esp. EJ p. 362f (= EJE p. 474f) on John 13.12-20.

5. Faith as Response to the Transcendent

We can return from the analysis of the individual's past, seen (from the standpoint of faith) as being ultimately unbelief, and approach again the present act of faith. We need now to concentrate on a concept which has up till now concerned us only in passing: the concept of transcendence, and we need to do so because, as must now be clear, faith only becomes a possibility in the encounter with that which transcends me, - with the Word of God.

The transcendent, for Bultmann, is that which is other than me, that which can change me, laying its claims upon me. Now it needs to be said at the outset that Bultmann sees more than one 'transcendent' in relation to human existence. There is, first of all, the 'I' which is always beyond me, in the future, the 'I' which I am summoned to become. Indeed, says Bultmann, the moment I speak of myself, I move out beyond the realm of the observable, for "I myself, my real self, am no more visible than an act of God".[1] But more important than this, as a being whose whole existence takes place within the sphere of the historical, 'I' stand in front of myself as my 'beyond' ('Jenseits'), as that which on each occasion I can choose to become.[2] But I can never, so to speak, possess my

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1. KM I 7 p. 199.

2. See esp. GV III 4 "Humanismus und Christentum" 1953. Because my essential 'I' stands before me, over against me, Bultmann must deny that the human being can be understood as the totality of his past and present experiences and actions. His existence lies before him - to be grasped. Here too the Heideggerian analysis holds good (SuZ H 322); his being is potentiality to be: in this sense he has to transcend himself.

authentic way of existing: it is always there in front of me in the future, and I can either stay as I am or become new.[1] The 'I' that I am challenged to become, I can in fact fail to become. Nor do I become that 'I' through any natural or inevitable development of mind or spirit, but through decision and resolve.[2] In this sense, as a believer, I must be said to 'live out of the future';[3] and Bultmann can shift (in the same essay) from talking of the otherness of the future 'I', to talking of the otherness of the futurity of God:

> "God's otherness is his continual futurity, his being-continually-out-in-front. With this God man only has fellowship in the openness for the future, which is <u>not</u> at his disposal, in the preparedness to go assured into the darkness of the future."[4]

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1. But to become new is to hear the proclamation, and this the believer has to do again and again, because the demand of love is never fulfilled once and for all.

2. Nor is the 'I' to be thought of as an Ideal State of being, to which I get increasingly near, through education and training; this says Bultmann is the Greek (Humanist) way of thinking (GV III 4 p. 70).

3. Cf. TNT I p. 348.

4. GV III 4 p. 70. - These two notions of futurity, the futurity of the 'I' and that of God, could be brought together into a theology of Being, if a hint thrown out tentatively by Bultmann in 1962 (GV IV 7) were developed. For Heidegger, Being is both that which is transcendent to man, and at the same time, that which he is called to become (Malet pp. 326-336). Being calls him out of himself, to be that which he is not. In this essay of 1962, entitled "Zur Frage einer philosophischen Theologie" GV IV pp. 104-106, Bultmann suggests using the Heideggerian notion of Being as a formal description of God, and it would seem reasonable to connect this use of the concept of Being (referring it to God) with the notion of the futurity of God, to which we have been referring immediately above. But as MacQuarrie says Bultmann does not follow up this possibility - as, of course, MacQuarrie himself does: Principles of Christian Theology, London 1966 (pp. 120ff, in this regard).

The second area where Bultmann locates transcendence is one with which we are already familiar: it is in the Other, as he confronts me, challenges me, and calls forth decision from me. In so far as a man seeks to maintain his own independence, to maintain a mastery of himself and all around him, he is refusing to allow himself to be limited by the other, or to be open to the claims of love. "The neighbour, the Thou, with whom he has to do, is given him as the real limit of his 'I'."[1]

Bultmann is here using a characteristic argument by comparison: this is how the matter stands in human intercourse; in the encounter with the revelation of God the matter is similar, in that it too is the encounter with a Thou who establishes the relationship with a 'me' by speaking the word of forgiveness and acceptance. In so doing the Thou bestows upon me a new understanding of the world and myself: through the encounter I see the world again as creation. This re-discovery of the world as creation, in the light of the encounter with the revelation is a recurring theme in the commentary on St John.[2] Again we have the comparison with human encounter:

> "As a self who exists historically I am not isolated either from my environment or from my own past and future, which are in a special way part of my environment. If, for instance, my encounter with another's love should vouchsafe to me a new understanding of self, what happens is by no means restricted to consciousness, at least if

1. GV II p. 12 (= Essays p. 13).

2. E.g. EJ p. 379 (= EJE p. 496).

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1. GV II p. 12 (= Essays p. 13).

2. E.g. EJ p. 379 (= EJE p. 496).

> consciousness is to be taken as a psychic rather than as an existential phenomenon... By understanding myself in this encounter I understand the other in such a way that the whole world appears in a new light..."[1]

Such is Bultmann's main use of the I-Thou encounter, but it is worth pointing out here that in the last volume of GV Bultmann returns to it and gives the human 'I'-Thou encounter a positive significance for theology: the encounter with the other is paradoxically the encounter with God himself.[2]

Bultmann's main argument, however, runs only in one direction - from the human I-Thou encounter to the revelation of God in the event of Christ. But this encounter has built into it the additional but quite central stumbling-block of the incognito of Jesus:[3] he who by his life and death pronounces the divine forgiveness and acceptance could be mistaken for a mere man. Here too we can draw on the commentary on St John. Jesus pronounces his and the Father's love for his own by performing the task of a slave: by ministering to them in love, and giving himself up for them.[4] Man has to

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1. KM I 7 p. 203.

2. - a point to which we will return below.

3. There is an essential ambiguity about Jesus' person; Bultmann dwells on Jesus's repudiation of any unambiguous sign of authentication - GV I p. 206 E (=GV I p.174) - and faith is allowed no way round this ambiguity such as would give it a false security, unrelated to the actual hearing of the proclamation (the 'Dass'), which is the only real security the believer has. There must be "no attempt to unveil the incognito (to speak with Kierkegaard)" or "to dissolve the paradoxical nature of the ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο." (GV III p. 189).

4. John 13.1-20 (EJ pp. 351-365 = EJE pp. 461-478).

accept this love with which God encounters him, a love summed up in the word of justification, pronounced by Jesus's life and death, and he has to do so without any further proof that this is God's love, and without any way of holding onto the revelation, as if it were at his disposal and could be produced whenever he felt doubtful. What is given to him is a new understanding of himself and the world, not in the form of a Weltanschauung, nor as a set of timeless truths, but an understanding that is to be realised ever afresh within the actual situation of the believer, i.e. existentielly. The believer cannot linger in a mystical union with the Revealer but is directed back to his own existence within the world, and, in so far as he accepts Jesus's act of service upon him (symbolised in the footwashing of John 13), is freed from his own past and from self-assessment by achievement.

Jesus's "service is accomplished in the word that he speaks, and which, by speaking, he himself, is. For his word is not a doctrine that could be separated from his person, a complex of ideas with general validity. Rather, he is himself encountered as the word, in all the separate things he says; because he is the Revealer, the presence of God - in the form of the flesh, with death as his destiny - becomes event in him. Thus to accept his service means to believe; it means readiness to accept the disintegration of all the standards which the world uses to judge what is great and divine. Whoever can do this is free from the world..."[1]

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1. EJE p. 470f.

There are a number of points which need to be made here:

1. For Bultmann, the notion of the departure of the son to the father is crucial: it is precisely when Jesus leaves his own that he can be recognised as Revealer of God. That is to say, the disciples have to have their gaze taken away from the figure of the earthly Jesus[1] and re-directed into their own situation. It is there that they will realise who Jesus is, by realising what he has done for them - by the new understanding they have of their own situation. In this sense the revelation is always only indirect.[2]

2. To refer again to the programme of de-mythologising: it is Jesus who, fully in control,[3] leaves the disciples and re-directs their gaze at each other, i.e. at their own situation. Now this re-direction is itself the necessary stripping away of the mythological impulse: the impulse to gaze at the Revealer and to try to find in his words and actions unmistakeable proof of his divinity, and thereby avoid the stumbling-block which is indispensable for faith. St John, as Bultmann understands him,[4] sees the death of Christ as of primarily epistemological significance, namely, as the means whereby we are confronted with him as Revealer, stripped of all

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1. Jesus 'after the flesh' is - somewhat notoriously - not the object of faith, on Bultmann's view; cf. GV I p. 132 E (= GV I p. 101): "I calmly let the fire burn for I see that what is consumed is only fanciful portraits of Life-of-Jesus theology, and that means nothing other than 'Christ after the flesh'."

2. EJ p. 401 (= EJE p. 522f).

3. Cf. John 13.1-3; ch. 17; 13.31-35.

4. EJE p. 467 f: Jesus's "death is not exceptional because it happened to him, but because of the special experience or knowledge which the believer gains in the light of the cross. The cross shows him the whole truth of the ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, it leads him to the λύπη and the ταραχή, from which the χαρά and εἰρήνη grow."

mythological trappings, and all Messianic glory.[1] Seen in this light, de-mythologising is not an 'optional extra' for the modern theologian, but is an integral part of the creation of faith. To turn to Christology it means:

3. To know Christ is to know his benefits: Jesum Christum cognoscere, beneficia cognoscere - the central Christological affirmation of Melancthon, to which Bultmann frequently refers.[2] Here we can refer back to the question: how can I know the transcendent? (p. 57ff): I know the other in so far as through the encounter I become new and am transformed myself.[3]

4. This transformation is, on Bultmann's view, itself the 'revelation-event' or the 'eschatological event'. The two are of course one, God's act to man, his word spoken to man.[4]

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1. - and precisely in this self-emptying, showing his true glory. It is worth mentioning that Bultmann picks out the concept δόξα as the characteristic Johannine designation of the content of the revelation: it is the δόξα of the ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο , and it finds its fulfilment and culmination in Jesus's return to the father in obedient death.

2. GV I p. 279 E (= GV I p. 262).

3. This does not mean that God is, ontologically speaking, confined to, or reduced to, the transcendent element within the encounter; only that this is where we know him, as he speaks to us: "that God cannot be seen apart from faith foes not mean that he does not exist apart from it" (KM I p. 200f). But NB the negative form of the statement: to assert such an existence of God a se would be to go beyond faith.

4. On the unity of God's word and act see Bultmann's discussion of Faust's translation of λόγος in John 1.1 (EJ p. 18 = EJE p. 36) - from Goethe's Faust I 11, lines 1224-1237; - Binswanger also approves of the Faustian translation; see AVuA II pp. 346-366; 1946. See also EJ p. 471 = EJE p. 609 and GV I pp. 286-312 E (= GV I pp. 268-293).

The notion of revelation determines the concept of God from the outset. 'The Word was God' is taken by Bultmann as definitive of the Christian understanding of God:

> "The idea of God is therefore determined from the outset by the idea of revelation. To speak of God means: to speak of his revelation; and to speak of his revelation means: to speak of God. And revelation is not here intended in any general sense; it is rather the saving will of God that can be experienced in the Incarnate Revealer."[1]

The knowledge that the revelation bestows on the believer is itself life;[2] that is to say, it enables the believer to 'find himself', to find his authentic existence; and he does so precisely in the confrontation with the Thou in love, and thus is freed from the realm of sin that leads to death. It is because we are concerned here with the finding of life, and with the passing from death to life that we can claim that the revelation-event is itself the eschatological event[3] - the event by which history is judged.

5. Bultmann thus re-interprets the primitive Christian eschatological hope in terms of a man's personal history,

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1. EJE p. 35.

2. Cf. John 1.4 (EJ p. 22f = EJE p. 40f).

3. Eschatology arises out of the search for life, within the present experience of the encompassing nature of death; see Römer 7 und die Anthropologie des Paulus, Exegetica p. 203f.

following Paul and John.[1] Eschatology is always an attempt to answer the question of the meaning of history in terms of its goal,[2] and the proclamation of Jesus Christ answers this question in two closely related ways. It pronounces judgment on world history seen as an unending process: Jesus's death is itself the end of world-history in this sense,[3] and it is so in that it opens up the possibility of truly historical existence for the individual, who is now no longer abandoned to the inexorable processes of world history.[4] Bultmann is not asserting that the historical occurrence of Christ's life and death is itself ipso facto the end of world history, but

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1. See esp. HE ch. 4 pp. 38-55. On Paul cf. Bultmann, ibid. p. 43:

   > "But although the history of the nation and the world had lost interest for Paul, he brings to light another phenomenon, the historicity of man, the true historical life of the human being, the history which everyone experiences for himself, and by which he gains his real essence."

   And it is precisely in the conviction that the eschatological age is already here, that what is for Bultmann the true historicality (sticking to the term used by the translators of SuZ) of man is brought to light. This is the case, because it is the proclamation of Christ that is the means of man's justification; and his justification - itself regarded as the eschatological event - sets him free for a new life, and in this freedom he can realise his historicality for the first time. (Here we see the theologian's concern with the ontic realities of man's life - his 'enslavement to sin', rather than with the ontological possibilities of his existence as laid bare by existential analysis.)

2. HE ch. 1; see also GV IV 4 "Reflexionen zum Thema Geschichte und Tradition", pp. 56-68 (1961).

3. Cf. GV III 7 p. 102: "Christ who is the end of the law is simultaneously the end of history." For the individual, the encounter with Christ is the decisive event, yes in fact the event through which the individual begins to exist really historically, because he begins to exist eschatologically.

4. Cf. GV I 4, p. 65f.

rather than when that occurrence <u>becomes event</u>[1] within the life of the individual, then the category of world history loses its ultimacy: a limitation is put on it and man no longer seeks to find the meaning of his life within it.

6. Because Jesus's own work of revelation is carried through in the word of judgment and forgiveness which by his action he speaks to his own, this same work is to be continued in the preaching of the community, after Jesus has himself returned to the father.[2] For this reason the first disciples have no advantage over those of later generations.[3] Each

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1. The Word 'becomes event' when it becomes the factor determining my existence at any specific moment. The language of event is of central importance for Bultmann. It implies the existentialist analysis of man as a being who discovers the meaning of his existence in the decisions for action that he takes - decisions that are both action and reaction to that which confronts him in the situation in which he is set. Thus that a word or statement 'becomes event' means that it becomes the occasion of decision and the moment of illumination. That it <u>becomes</u> event, means that it <u>can</u> be taken otherwise, namely, as the communication of a 'neutral' fact.

   For an example of this language in Bultmann's work see Jesus and the Word pp. 153ff (= Jesus p. 181f). Here we find Bultmann stressing the necessity of there being a 'hearer' who hears existentielly, if a word is to become event, and also stressing the element of judgment within the term 'event' as he understands it. Where man is not seen as 'under judgment', the language of a word - or an occurrence - becoming event, involving change in man's existence, is meaningless. Cf. also EJE p. 36, with reference to Faust's translation of λόγος ;

   > "By confidently writing deed (Tat), he...approaches the actual meaning of the text, in so far as he has grasped the element of judgment in ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος correctly: how the world and time came to be, is not to be deduced from the timeless; their existence became event through the divine act (Tat)."

2. EJ p. 441ff (EJE pp. 572ff).
3. EJ p. 431 (EJE p. 559) (with an allusion to Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments, tr. D. Swenson, Oxford 1936, p. 95f).

generation is confronted with the need to decide whether it will accept the word of forgiveness addressed to it or not.

But this repetition of the eschatological event in the life and proclamation of the community does not mean that it becomes a general principle in the spiritual life of man, divorced from the original event of the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth. The historical occurrence remains the source and ground of faith. The community's life and faith are grounded in a particular set of contingent occurrences within history,[1] and there is no avoiding this stumbling-block. But

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1. Cf. EJE p. 566:

> "The world struggles against this idea, that a contingent historical event should be the eschatological event, the means of grace or of judgment for the world. This is a for it; for it claims the right to subject everything that happens within it to its own standards, and to judge it by them."

- As far as the grounding of the life of the community in these historical occurrences is concerned, we need customary caution. It is not the case, acc. to Bultmann, that one first establishes the truth of the historical record of Jesus's life, and then asks for its existential significance, or that the grounding follows automatically upon the establishment of their historicity. This would be an objectification of the 'facts' suggesting we were observers of the divine action, free to respond as we wished. But this is not to say that the question whether or not these things actually occurred is illegitimate. On the contrary, for him theology stands or falls on the claim that the Revealer of God was an actual man, living and dying at a particular time. The point is rather that the occurrence - Jesus's life and death - is only properly grasped when it is grasped as event, i.e. as putting the enquirer in question and directing him into his own history. The stumbling-block is therefore two-fold: (1) it lies in the claim that the meaning of existence is to be found within historical living, rather than anywhere else; and (2) that it is to be found in this particular historical occurrence as it 'becomes event' in one's life. To say: 'it becomes event' is to say: 'one's life is grounded on it'. See esp. EJ p. 362 (= EJE p. 475) on the καθώς clauses in John 13-17; also TNT II p. 81. On the indispensability of the (historisch) actuality of Jesus's life and death for its (geschichtlich) existential significance as event, see GV IV 10 "Zum Problem der Entmythologisierung", 1963.

expressed positively this means that its existence must always be truly historical, for only by existing historically itself, can it grasp the meaning of the original occurrence. And because man, as a historical being, 'moves on' he has to grasp this meaning again and again in each new situation. In this way the fides quae and the fides qua are held inseparably together, and neither is secondary to the other.[1]

7. The result is that the life of the believer is carried on in a peculiar tension or dialectic. He remains in the world,[2] and yet is freed from the world's power; he no longer 'lives out of the world', but 'out of the word of forgiveness'. As Bultmann frequently describes it, he lives in the dialectic of a 'between-period', between the 'no longer' and the 'not yet'.[3] The fact that he is no longer dependent on the world for his self-understanding, but is orientated on the eschatological event, means that he is afforded a characteristic 'distance' from the things of the world, expressed in the ὡς μή of I Cor. 7.29-31, quoted repeatedly by Bultmann:

> "Since grace renews our whole existence, it frees us radically; and now we receive a distance from our motivation, from ourselves, in the sense of Paul's words in I Cor. 7.29-31."[4]

Thus for Bultmann the believer's life has this dialectical or paradoxical element about it. And the temptation is to try to get rid of the dialectic, and to replace it by some (for Bultmann illusory) direct relation with the divine, whether in sacramentalism, mysticism, or pietism.[5]

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1. See above, pp. 55ff.
2. See esp. EJ p. 383f (= EJE p. 502).
3. Cf. GV III 2 pp. 35-54 (1952) and TNT I p. 325.
4. GV II 9 p. 161 (= Essays p. 181).
5. TNT I p. 92 and esp. TNT II pp. 111-118.

8. If the question persists: how does the event of Christ forgive me my sins? How is it transcendent in this way over me?, the answer must be as follows: the question is itself illegitimate, if it suggests that a general answer is possible.[1] Christ forgives me my sins in that the proclamation with which I am confronted, opens up for me a new self-understanding, and a new directive for life, namely that grounded in love; as such it leads me away from my former way of life, based on the urge for self-validation, and discloses the sinfulness of this manner of living. The forgiveness is therefore implicit within the establishment of the encounter with the love of the transcendent Thou in the proclamation.[2] This encounter, which opens up the possibility, and indeed the command[3] of love, has to take place again and again,[4] and when I know my life to be determined by love encountered in the proclamation, I can say that Christ's act is efficacious in respect of me. Bultmann is here, in characteristic fashion,

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1. - as for instance: 'Jesus has overcome the powers of darkness'.

2. See esp. GV I "Das Christliche Gebot..." (pp. 235 ff).

3. The structural element within believing existence that we have not as yet touched upon is that of obedience; it is of central importance, and is implied in the notion of 'hearing'; see esp. TNT I p. 314-317. NB in particular in regard to Bultmann's understanding of ethics; cf. T.C. Oden, Radical Obedience, London, 1965. The encounter with the proclamation does not issue in mystical vision or gnosis, but in radical obedience to the command of love.

4. Acc. to Bultmann, the need for the recurrence of the encounter, the continuing need for forgiveness, is dealt with expressly by John, while Paul did not consider it, because of his expectation of the rapid approach of the end (held together with the de-mythologised view of eschatology expounded above). See TNT II p. 79f and I Joh. p. 28 (on I John 1.9):
   "The Christian through his faith has never earned the light [of divinity] as a continuing possession. He has to preserve his faith in περιπατεῖν , he is always en route, and never stands there ready before God, but is always directed to forgiveness."

carrying his initial premisses through to their conclusion. Just as human love is not demonstrable 'from the outside', so neither is the love of God; thus the continual search for an adequate exposition of e.g. the atonement per se cannot find satisfaction. Theological truth is not of this order; it has a continual existentiell reference.[1]

Before we leave the subject of transcendence, as it concerns the creation of faith, there are two further points that need to be discussed: (1) the question of the status and importance in Bultmann's thought of what I have called the positive theological assessment of the human I-Thou encounter and (2) the question of natural theology, and the prior understanding of the notion of God.[2]

1. We have seen that Bultmann uses the human encounter in order to approach the encounter with God in Christ.[3] In

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1. Cf. GV III 1 p. 34:

> "What Word of God means can certainly be explained formally, but precisely this formal clarification states that a contents of the Word of God cannot be expounded definitively, but can only be heard again and again."

2. It needs to be stated that in both these areas the needs of our particular inter-disciplinary study are making themselves felt. Particularly as regards (1), we could not maintain that we are still expounding what is central to Bultmann's conception of believing existence, but rather one tentative development of his theology - but a development of some importance when comparing his thought with a discipline centred almost exclusively on the I-Thou encounter (as Binswanger's psychotherapy is). While (2) is clearly of special importance for this study, it remains an important feature of Bultmann's thought in its own right.

3. See above pages 34 ff.

both sorts of encounter a central place is given to the concept of the present moment, the Now, in which the encounter takes place. Our response to the encounter depends on how we view the Now: the question is whether a man wants to

> "recognise that the Moment is richer than can be stated through observation, measurement and reckoning, i.e. richer in possibilities for joy and gratitude, for pain and remorse, for duty and love, rich in possibilities which demand a decision in the Now, a decision which cannot be derived from any science, a decision in which a man achieves or loses his real being; whether that is to say, he recognises the responsibility of the Now or not..."[1]

It is only at a late stage in his theological writing that Bultmann draws out the positive significance for theology of the human I-Thou encounter[2]: the believer can see the transcendent in the other who encounters him in the situations of his life. Believing that the encounter in the Now is capable of enriching and changing his own self-understanding, he can view it as the encounter with God himself - but with a proviso: he can only so view it paradoxically, in the light of the essential

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1. GV II p. 13 (= Essays p. 17).

2. But cf. (from "Das Christliche Gebot..." from GV I, 1930)

> "We know ourselves, with our neighbours, to be in the same situations as they, sinners as they are, with grace bestowed both on ourselves and on them. For them too the forgiveness is already present in Christ and we have to see them as those who are forgiven; in them the love of Christ encounters us."

dialectic of his own situation as believer viz-a-viz the world: the ὡς μή is central here too.[1] Hence we are not involved with a pantheism, but with a paradoxical viewing, such as is expressed by Bonhoeffer's language of the transcendent as the beyond in our midst (language which Bultmann quotes with approval).[2] In this way Bultmann affirms what has been implicit in his theology from the beginning: the 'this-worldliness' of his understanding of the encounter with the transcendent.[3]

Bultmann draws out these implications of his own theology in the process of reacting to two widely differing influences on his thinking: firstly, the theological radicalism of Robinson, whose book Honest to God he sympathetically reviews in GV IV, and secondly to the artistic work of Ernst Barlach, to which he refers in the course of the said review.[4] It is the way in which realism and abstraction are held together in the work of Barlach which impresses Bultmann. The extraordinary vitality of the figures he produces (their very 'this-worldly' character) is at one and the same time expressive of that which

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1. See pages 82 f above.

2. GV IV 11 p. 139.

3. GV IV 8 p. 112: "There is no escape from the world into a beyond, but God is encountered in this world. What matters is to understand the paradoxical nature of this encounter - and this is done in the last analysis not in theological reflection, but in real living, in existence."

4. "Ist der Glaube an Gott erledigt?" GV IV pp. 107-112 - reproduced unfortunately apart from the last section, in The Honest To God Debate, London, 1963, tr. F. Clarke, pp. 134-138. The original review appeared in Die Zeit (10th May 1963).

is other than this world. The figures are nearly always active: Barlach catches them in the moment of some activity, singing, praying, begging, whatever it may be, and something of the infinite claim which one man has on another, as he encounters him, is brought out in the drawing or the sculpture. Barlach himself refers to his works as 'Wandlungen Gottes' (transformations of God) and Bultmann writes:

> "'Transformations of God' - paradoxical language! For of course God does not himself change; but that which the transcendent speaks of, that which stirs man fundamentally as the depth and ground of his being, that which makes demands on his existence as the unconditional, as the most sinisterly challenging, - this can always be expressed afresh, as it transforms itself in the visible creations of art, just as in the confessing or reflective word."[1]

Bultmann returns to the same theme in the next essay of GV IV,[2] also dealing with radical theology:

> "Whoever has understood the dialectical relationship between worldliness and faith in the transcendent God, also sees that the recognition of God as the neighbour, who is in the middle of worldly life, does not imply pantheism. For there the dialectic is missing, and the paradox which man has to overcome is avoided, namely, the paradox of grasping the unconditional in each case

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1. GV IV 8 p. 112.

2. GV IV 9 "Der Gottesgedanke und der moderne Mensch", pp. 113-127.

> in the conditional, i.e. in each case, not in a theory, but in existential living, in the conscious or unconscious decisions of life. The contrast can be made clear by saying that faith in the transcendent presence of God finds expression in talking of the 'transformations of God'."[1]

Bultmann then refers to the ancient sagas and myths which speak of a God transforming himself and visiting a dying man, whose fate depends on the way he responds to the visitation; here we have a mythological account of the same notion of the '<u>Wandlungen Gottes</u>', and the intention of the myth (which existential analysis can bring out) is to express this paradoxical encounter with the transcendent experienced in human encounter.[2] Bultmann then goes on to refer to Matt. 25.31-46, as the most impressive proclamation of the 'Wandlungen Gottes' in the NT.[3]

2. We have now to elucidate the concept of prior understanding. It should be said, first of all, that Bultmann's concern is with the prior understanding of theological ideas, viz. God, faith, etc. And here we are only concerned with the prior understanding of the notion of God. This has been referred to briefly before, in connection with the validation

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1. GV IV, p. 123 (followed by another ref. to the works of Barlach). - NB here how Bultmann includes unconscious decision-making within his understanding of decision.

2. See too GV IV 11 "Was ist der Sinn unseres Weihnachtsfestes Heute?", pp. 138-140.

3. GV IV 9 p. 127.

demanded by the life of striving before the highest court of appeal, namely, God. In this connection Bultmann can quote Augustine's dictum with approval: all human life is consciously or unconsciously directed by the search for God: Tu nos fecisti ad te, et cor nostrum inquietum est, donec requiescat in te.[1]

And yet Bultmann stands alongside Barth in denying any positive theological significance in the assertions of natural theology, or in those of other religions. Seen from the point of view of faith, such assertions are really statements about the enigmas of life, about, for example, the desirability of what are nevertheless unattainable goals.[2] Hence 'natural man' raises the questions, but Christian theology is bound to say that he cannot provide the answers,[3] because they are only to be found in the existentiell listening to a specific proclamation, involving a specific set of historical events. But - and here Bultmann seems almost to retract what has just been said - the raising of the questions is vital, and itself involves some prior understanding of the notion of God - which has now to become authentic understanding.[4] As Bultmann puts it, natural man has a 'not-knowing knowing',[5] which has to be

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1. KM I 7 p. 192; also quoted in "Jesus Christ and Mythology" p. 52, in the same connection.
2. See GV I 13 p. 319 E (= GV I p. 300).
3. See esp. GV II 5 "Die Frage der natürlichen Offenbarung" 1941 (= Essays p. 90-118).
4. Cf. GV I p. 159 E (= GV I p. 128). "Unless I ask, I cannot hear; for man is not a tabula rasa, a photographic plate. But to be able to question, I must in some fashion already know."
5. GV III 1 p. 6. Bultmann makes the point that the distinction between the prior understanding of something and the authentic understanding of it is not that between knowledge of the concept that represents an object and knowledge of the object itself, as if the latter in some way 'by-passed' the concept, no longer requiring it. Clearly in both cases, a concept is required, but in the former the concept is posited as a possible answer to a pressing question; in the latter it is grasped hold of as an existentiell reality.

distinguished from an authentic knowing - the understanding given in the creation of faith by 'hearing' the proclamation.

Bultmann's analysis of this prior understanding takes the form, characteristically, of an analysis of the concept of revelation (this being central to his concept of God).[1] Here the relevant passage in his writings is the first essay in GV III.[2] The prior understanding that we have of the notion of revelation involves the realisation that we do not ourselves have the answers to all questions about the meaning of existence, but stand in need of illumination from beyond ourselves. That is to say, implicit within the concept of revelation is the consciousness of our own limitedness.[3] But this is not something to be learned about theoretically, but is something that 'comes home' to us again and again in our actual lives:

> "To know of our limitedness is to know something other than e.g. the boundaries between Persia and Afghanistan."[4]

This sort of limitation is intimately bound up with our lives, because it finds its ultimate expression in the event of death, and "we carry our death around with us"[5] as "the fate that makes existence sheerly unintelligible!"[6]

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1. See above, page 78.
2. GV III 1 "Der Begriff der Offenbarung im NT" pp. 1-34, 1929.
3. It might well be argued that in this account of the limitedness of human existence we have an echo of the Thomistic 3rd Way. But Bultmann is referring to the frustration inherent in human life, our limitedness due to factors outside our control - rather than to the contingency of the universe as such.
4. GV IV 1 p. 6.
5. GV IV p. 6.
6. EJE p. 43.

Bultmann is here[1] expounding our prior understanding of revelation and its corollary, limitedness; and it is in this area, i.e. before we receive the illumination that comes with faith, that death is seen as the ultimate expression of our limitedness; here Bultmann does draw on existentialist thought in general and on Heidegger's 'being-towards-death' in particular, as illuminating the situation of the natural man. However, in the encounter with the revelation, the believer encounters his authentic limitedness, namely God himself, as the Thou who stands over against him, demanding decision from him; seen in the light of this, death loses its ultimacy and becomes again something passing, provisional and transitory.[2]

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1. I.e. in GV III 1.

2. Ibid. pp. 30-32. 'Natural man' comes up against his limitedness again and again in his actual life - in particular, in relation to death. But this means that he already has some prior understanding of that which transcends him, limits him - and thus also of the possibility that the limitations be overcome by revelation. With the encounter with the Thou, "this prior understanding ...is radicalised and corrected; it is not a matter of bursting the boundaries, but of understanding oneself within them" (ibid. p. 32).

   Thus in Bultmann's view of revelation it is the significance of death that disappears. But this is not to say that for the Christian death simply becomes insignificant, while still in fact remaining operative as the natural end of man's existence. In expounding John, Bultmann holds to the orthodox Christian hope in life after death: he cannot of course give any affirmative description of it; it can only be described in mythological terms, e.g. of the δόξα , which the father has given the son (John 17.24-26):

   > "History runs its course before the judgment seat of God. Thus it is also true of the believer that his participation in life is not exhausted in his historical existence within time, even though nothing positive can be said about the 'then' beyond death" (EJE p. 520).

6. Faith as eschatological Existence within the World

We can now return to the analysis of the life of the believer as he hears the word of forgiveness. To hear it is to pass from an inauthentic, shadowy, half knowledge[1] to an authentic understanding, which is an illumination of oneself and the world, as these are seen in the light of the encounter with God.[2] But such an understanding is not a theoretical or intellectual matter but involves the whole existence of the believer. Thus (with reference to the description of the farewell discourses of Jesus as 'enigmatic talk'[3] - John 16.25) Bultmann writes: "For us a certain effort is required to find anything enigmatic in such words as these...",[4] the reason why they are so described is this:

> "It is only possible to understand the words of Jesus in the reality of believing existence. Before that, they are incomprehensible - not in the sense of being difficult to grasp intellectually, but because intellectual comprehension is not enough. It is precisely this that the disciples must realise, namely that the commitment of one's whole existence is required to understand these words."[5]

And this means a repeated hearing in every situation in which the believer finds himself. In this sense faith is victory

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1. Cf. EJ p. 1 (= EJE p. 13).
2. Cf. EJ pp. 22-25 (= EJE pp. 40-45).
3. ταῦτα ἐν παροιμίαις λελάληκα ὑμῖν.....
4. Bultmann is quoting Wrede, Messiasgeheimnis, p. 286.
5. EJE p. 587.

over the world;[1] it is the continual overcoming of unbelief, of the self-understanding that measures one's own value in terms of achievement, in terms of what can be seen; it is continual obedience to the requirements of love presented by each situation.[2]

Thus faith implies a continual relation with unbelief, or, as Bultmann can put it, with natural theology[3] - with the attempt to find a vantage point from which to speak of God (an illusory longing, which is of the nature of sin[4]).

> "In other words, natural theology is a permanent accompaniment of dogmatic work, as it clearly is for Paul and for Luther."[5]

Thus believing and unbelieving existence do not stand alongside each other as two unrelated entities,[6] but, seen from the point of view of faith, believing existence is always the overcoming of unbelief:

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1. Cf. EJ p. 457f (= EJE p. 593f) on John 16.33; see too I Joh. p. 81f on I John 5.4.

2. It is necessary to balance this 'triumphant' language of 'overcoming the world' with the sober necessity of 'obedience' to the Word. Faith involves both. While Paul is the NT writer who stresses the obedience of faith most strongly, it is in fact equally present in John, in the form: 'keep the commandments which I have given you', - and these are summed up in the one command: love. What love actually demands will be 'self-evident' (einsichtig) on each occasion; cf. Jesus pp. 68, 76, 82 (= Jesus and the Word pp. 61, 67, 71f) and Oden p. 31.

3. Under the term 'natural theology' Bultmann includes all human striving to understand the ultimate meaning of human existence, but particularly its attempts to move out towards God. As we have seen, there is a necessary oscillation in his evaluation of such striving; it is necessarily sin, and yet is an indispensible part of human existence.

4. Cf. GV I 2 "What does it mean to speak of God?"

5. GV I p. 330 E (= GV I p. 311f).

6. Ibid. p. 327 E (= GV I p. 308).

> "Even the man of faith remains in existence;[1] he does not have a new structure of existence created for him. His faith, as a historical act, is always concrete resolve in the moment. And that means that faith always exists only in the overcoming of unbelief."[2]

The central dogmatic statement remains: simul justus et peccator. The believer remains in this world and it is precisely his this-worldly existence that faith is concerned with, an existence not different in kind from that of the unbeliever. Hence theology's continual debate with non-theological thinking, and hence the fact that theology can never provide a definitive answer to the questions with which it is concerned, but is rather a continuing requirement of the life of faith.[3]

Part of overcoming unbelief is overcoming the longing for verifiable proof: it is, to use the language of the 4th Gospel, the realisation of the need for the Revealer to 'depart to the Father', the realisation that there is no holding onto the past, as if this could remain a definitive or self-sufficient experience. But this means there is a certain grief, or bewilderment within the structure of believing existence: Bultmann expounds John 16.16:

> "the believer remains in time, in which the present passes away as something preliminary, and the believer, for whom the world has become strange, stands so to

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1. For a critical discussion of Bultmann's use of the concept of existence as a 'common denominator' between believer and unbeliever see Bonhoeffer, Act and Being pp. 73-76.

2. GV I 13 p. 329 E (= GV I p. 311).

3. Cf. GV I 1 (esp. p. 52 E, = GV I p. 25) and GV I 6.

> speak in emptiness. If he turns his gaze back to what is past, he is in λύπη: it has gone by! But this very emptiness is also only a μικρόν, a temporary thing, something 'between', an essential stage if he is to understand his faith correctly. He does not have faith as a timeless possession, but only as a gift that has always to be grasped afresh."[1]

Faith, as Bultmann understands it, involves the believer in the transformation of his relation to the world around him.[2] It first of all takes him away from this world ('the world has become strange to him'), with its relationships, tasks, standards and self-understanding, and places him before God, as an individual stripped of all support, and left in isolation before the transcendent.[3] But the validation that is the content of this encounter, i.e. the pronouncement 'forgiven sinner' is itself the transformation of the believer's self-understanding, and therefore of his relation to himself and to those around him. This understanding is no longer on the world's terms, i.e. it is no longer in terms of assessment of the relative value of one's own and other people's actions and achievements.

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1. EJE p. 582.

2. The German word Bultmann uses is "Entweltlichung", for which no English equivalent could possibly be found. It is the end result of the process of robbing the world of its dominion over man. Its opposite "Verweltlichung" - used by Binswanger - expresses the sense of being utterly submerged by the world.

3. GV II 3 "Christus des Gesetzes Ende" p. 48 (= Essays p. 36).

Faith can therefore be said to overcome all solipsism, or individualism such as assesses the world in relation to me, as if I were the final standard of judgment, limited by nothing outside myself, but in complete mastery of myself and my environment. Such individualism is an illusion: it is for instance (to go to the level of the nation) the illusion under which the National Socialism of Hitler was labouring.[1]

Faith is the acceptance of one's limitation by the Thou - firstly by the Thou of the revelation, and secondly by the Thou of one's fellow-men. But this does not mean that it is the removal of man's freedom. Quite the reverse: true freedom is only possible where bounds are recognised,[2] and where a man knows his responsibilities to the other.[3] The solipsist's freedom is (again) an illusion: he is in fact dominated by his own desires and anxieties, in the last resort, by his own impending destruction.[4] The believer, on the other hand, in hearing the word of forgiveness is referred back to his relationships with those with whom he has to do; and the way

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1. GV II 16 "Die Bedeutung des Gedankens der Freiheit für die abendländische Kultur" pp. 274-292 (= Essays pp. 305-325).
2. GV III p. 32 (see above p. 90 f).
3. See esp. TNT I pp. 343ff:

   > "The Christian then is free from all men, and yet there is a proper subjection of himself as 'slave to all' (I Cor. 9.19) and the imperative 'be servants of one another' (Gal. 5.13) still stands."

4. This is an allusion in the first instance to the totalitarian state (the relevant essay being still GV II 16); but see too TNT I p. 246ff.

he responds to them will decide whether he has really 'heard' the proclamation or not, whether he has really grasped the freedom offered to him.[1]

> God's will "is met with continually afresh and in new form, in the encounters of human intercourse, in which on each occasion my decision is demanded, my decision to be for the one I encounter as on each occasion 'my neighbour'. This being for the neighbour is called love, and is a love which does not spring from common concern for something, which binds those in the encounter together, but is grounded in the openness for that for which on each occasion the neighbour needs me."[2]

But it would be a mistake to imagine that this 'being for the neighbour' could be divorced from the 'hearing' of the proclamation; that would be to divorce the fides quae and the fides qua, and it would run the danger of turning the 'being for the neighbour' into a work, and this would of course be the dissolution of the whole matter. As Bultmann puts it, in his exposition of the footwashing of John 13:

> "Jesus is only to be seen in that which on each occasion he is for me. Thus the imperative [viz.: to love one another] only holds good for the sphere in which Jesus's service has been received; only the man who is loved can

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1. See esp. GV III p. 174f where Christian freedom is compared with the freedom of the Kantian moralist, based on: 'you can, because you ought'; the Christian "gains the courage to hear the 'you ought' as 'you are'".

2. GV II 8 p. 136 (= Essays p. 154f).

himself love; and its fulfilment is not by performing a work analogous to his, but by readiness for the same existing for the other."[1]

The believer, as he hears the word of forgiveness, is afforded that distance from himself and the world that enables him to face the future with resolution (and this brings us to the third temporal reference within believing existence);[2] Bultmann says: it enables him to anticipate the future:

"According to John 15 faith and love are in fact a unity. Faith is not authentic unless it is steadfast; i.e. unless it is the kind of faith that enables a man to decide beforehand the way all future action is to go. The fact that the word assures faith of the love of God manifest in Jesus, and that this love is only received when it becomes the means whereby a man is himself freed to love, means that the word is only properly heard when the believer loves, <u>in that he is a believer</u>. Thus to hear in faith is to anticipate the future because it is actually later in the temporal sequence that the brother makes his claim on the believer's love."[3]

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1. EJE p. 475. On the assertion: 'only the man who is loved can himself love' see too GV I "Das Christliche Gebot..." pp. 241-244.

2. See page 50 above.

3. EJE p. 547. The unity of faith and love in Bultmann's thought cannot be stressed too highly; much that is said of faith must also be said of love (e.g. "love is not a 'property', which a man can have for himself, like self-control or teachability; it is certainly not a feeling, an affect, which can fill the individual, if only for the reason that it would be stupid to demand this." GV I p. 237. Also: "ἔρως is already distinguished from ἀγάπη in that ἔρως does not mean primarily the relation to the Thou." Ibid.). But there is a primacy of faith, in that the love here referred to is grounded in the encounter with the Revealer, only knowable by faith.

At the same time, the 'world' is given back to the believer as creation, i.e. no longer as that out of which he tries to live, which in fact comes to dominate him, but as that which he can now use in the service of love.

CHAPTER 3

An Analysis of the Foregoing Exposition

1. The Dynamics of the Creation of Theological Understanding of Believing Existence

The last chapter presents us with the basic elements that go to make up the subject-matter of Bultmann's 'theologising'. We need now to focus our attention more completely on the question of the internal coherence and structure of his theology, and on his view of the relationship of the theology he practises to other disciplines. The former question will concern itself with the function of the different sorts of statement that occur in his theologising in the hope of establishing its logical structure; only when we have done this will we be in a position to isolate parts of his work and bring them into relation with what may be corresponding or antithetical elements within Binswanger's psychotherapeutic understanding and practice. The latter question is concerned with the distinctiveness of the theological statement from other forms of discourse; thus here we are not concerned with questions of internal coherence, but with theology's external relationships. This too is clearly a vital prolegomenon to exploring its relationship to the particular science of psychotherapy.

But before we can do either of these things we need to look again at the role and task of theology as a whole, as

Bultmann sees them.[1] This can best be done by bringing them into relation to the question of truth. The truth with which theology is concerned is, as we have seen,[2] revealed dialectically within the believer's own history: it is here that the assertions of theology receive their only authentication; it is for this realm that they are valid and "absolutely certain".[3] Hence the truth the believer knows is only known within his believing existence; it cannot be abstracted from its 'Sitz im Leben' and made universally available. Nor can it be abstracted from the forms of thought and conceptuality within which it is known, and reproduced in a series of timeless principles, such as 'God is love', without thereby losing its nature as theological truth, and becoming part of a 'Weltanschauung'. And yet - and this is of vital importance - theological truth is communicable; indeed it must be said that a statement is theological only when it is communicated and understood - but understood existentielly. It is communicable because it does not refer primarily to the inner life of the believer (which may well have to be described as unique and in part at least incommunicable), but to the believer's life as it is changed by that which comes to him from outside him.

We need to look now more closely at the 'dynamics' of such communication and understanding.

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1. See above, chapter 1, section 2.
2. See above, pp. 55ff.
3. GV I p. 154 E (= GV I p. 123).

As we have seen, theological understanding - in the form of authentic understanding[1] - only arises in response to the Word that is heard as addressed to it. It arises when that Word 'becomes event'[2] in the life of the believer. Thus the mode of perception which is, at it were, the model with which we are primarily concerned is that of hearing rather than of seeing,[3] it issues in obedience,[4] rather than vision, and the medium of communication is the spoken or written word, rather than the picture or visual image. Man is seen here as understanding his existence primarily in the I-Thou relationship carried on by means of language.[5]

We have therefore the following elements making up the 'dynamics' of the relationship within which theological understanding (= believing existence) takes place. There is a speaker, proclaiming the kerygma of forgiveness; there is a listener who sees himself addressed in the words that are spoken. As he listens he sees his past life condemned, he sees a different future opened out before him, such as he is capable of grasping, and he sees himself as forgiven and accepted. The articulation of this new understanding is the business of theology, in the strict sense of the word; it is

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1. See above, for the notion of prior understanding, p. 88 f.
2. See above, p. 80f.
3. Cf. GV IV 2 p. 43; there is of course a 'theological seeing'; cf. John 1.14 (EJE p. 69f; EJ p. 45f), but it is used alongside 'hearing'. And both, in John, refer to the act of believing.
4. To hear and to obey have the same root in both the Greek (ακου) and the German (hör) languages.
5. Cf. Heidegger (SuZ H 163):

> "Listening to...is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with for others. Indeed hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-being."

not only done by the professional theologian, but by each Christian as he seeks to understand what is happening to him and the decision he is making.[1] But as he articulates this self-understanding, he is himself at the same time engaged in proclaiming the kerygma. For, as we have seen, the kerygma is itself always expressed within a man's articulation of his self-understanding.[2] But this makes the matter somewhat more complicated than might appear at first sight: because theology depends on understanding the words a man speaks as kerygmatic Word of God addressed to me, the work of hermeneutics, of interpretation, is quite central to it. Bultmann, as NT scholar and theologian concentrates his hermeneutic endeavours on the written text of the NT; but this is not different in kind from the business of interpreting the spoken word addressed to me by another man.[3] Both the written text and the spoken word can be said to be understood theologically, when they are 'heard' as address, directed to my own historical situation.

Of course there are statements which require little or no interpretation; their 'existential reference' is self-evident. But even they would not be comprehensible without a

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1. It goes without saying that this has to be done repeatedly.

2. See above p.29f.

3. Cf. Gogarten, who expressly places his study of biblical hermeneutics within the general area of the interpretation of one man by another, and sees this as the area of responsibility ('Ver-ant-wort-lichkeit') of one man over against his fellow ("Das Wort und die Frage nach der Kirche": ZZ 4/1926, pp. 279-296). Cf. Lorenzmeier pp. 51ff. Schleiermacher too saw hermeneutics within this setting; cf. Niebuhr pp. 77-79.

prior understanding of that to which they refer. The example of the expression of gratitude comes readily to mind. It is an example used by Bultmann himself, but to make the rather different point that the existential situation of the hearer viz-à-viz the speaker is changed simply by the utterance of the statement: "A word of thanks is itself gratitude."[1] By the speaking of the words a new situation is brought into being, and here we come up against another important aspect of the 'dynamics' of theological communication. We are concerned with the imparting of that which is radically new in the life of the believer, which he can only come to know through the encounter with the other, and cannot discover for himself, as for instance he can discover 'objective facts' about the world.[2] What he needs to know about his relationship with another person, or, in the case of theology, with God, requires by the very nature of the case a communication from that other person. And such a communication itself creates

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1. GV I 8 p. 189 E (= GV I p. 157). (One might compare the reluctance of small children to say 'sorry', as if, at least at an early stage, they realised that actually 'saying sorry' itself affects the relationship and brings about a new situation.) Bultmann gives us other examples, where we cannot reduce the content of the communication to the fact that it is communicated. He instances a mother who makes some sacrifice for her son to enable him to pursue his career; the son is then told of the sacrifice and can only be said to understand what he has been told if he now relates to his mother in a new way. To take it as purely a biographical fact is not to understand its meaning. - Bultmann also refers to Kierkegaard's relation to his father (GV I p. 190 E = GV I p. 159), in the same connection.

2. See esp. "Church and Teaching in the NT" GV I 8 pp. 184-219 E (= GV I p. 153-187).

the relationship anew. In this sense, within the world of theological communication, to hear the proclamation of God's Word of love to me, is to exist eschatologically, to be made new:

> "Just because it is said, my situation becomes a new situation, and I myself, deciding this way or that, become a new person."[1]

If we now attempt a formal analysis of the process of the emergence of theological understanding, we will find that the following elements are constitutive - elements which we may describe as 'functional operations'[2] within theology.

1) The proclamation of the kerygma. This latter is, as we have seen, strictly speaking, not the subject-matter of theology, but rather the datum which first makes theology possible.[3]

2) Knowledge of the existential situation of the hearer, on the part of the speaker. For the proclamation to be 'heard', it must be addressed to the present self-understanding of the hearer; as human discourse, therefore, it requires knowledge of that self-understanding.[4]

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1. GV I 8 p. 193 E (= GV I p. 161).

2. 'Operations' because we are referring to different human activities of feeling and understanding; 'functional' in that they each perform a necessary function in the creation of theological understanding.

3. TNT I p. 1; GV I p. 218 E (= GV I p. 186); see above p. 24 .

4. Cf. GV I 5 p. 140 E (= GV I p. 109f): "The proclamation therefore comes to us each time within our own historical situation, not outside it. It proclaims forgiveness. It does not detach us from our historical situation, but propels us into it."

3) Acknowledgement by the hearer of the existential claim of the proclamation upon him. It is heard when it is acknowledged as authoritative in regard to my own historical situation i.e. when its hearing issues in obedience.[1]

4) Explication by the hearer of his new self-understanding. This obedience is not blind; to hear the proclamation is to receive life, and to life belongs understanding. The believer is thus faced with the task and the privilege of setting out his new self-understanding; and he will need to do this repeatedly.

5) Interpretation of the theological meaning of the hearer's account of his self-understanding. This account itself requires interpretation; interpretation which can only be said to 'understand theologically' when it, in its turn, acknowledges the authoritative claims of that which it is interpreting, existentielly.

There, then, are the five 'functional operations' necessary for the creation of theological understanding and communication. It may then be asked: what makes them 'theological'? And can one be assured of their theological nature? Bultmann's answer to these questions would be, I think, as follows: first, there is nothing theological in the operations themselves; they are

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1. Cf. GV I 8 p. 199 E (= GV I p. 169): "Faith is obedience". - We are of course concentrating here on the emergence of believing existence, not of unbelief, as the conscious rejection of the Word. This of course also involves a 'hearing' of the Word (and a prior understanding), issuing in a decision 'against' it. See EJ p. 259f (= EJE p. 341f) and GV I p. 189 E (= GV I p. 158).

so, because of the subject-matter to which they refer.[1] But second, their theological nature can never be guaranteed, because the statements which issue from them are theologically true only in so far as they are existentielly true of the speaker at the time of speaking, within the obedience of his believing response to the proclamation. A similar question: how does one know that the proclamation is speaking of God? will receive the same sort of answer. There is no guarantee of the fact; faith has to come to terms with the stumbling-block of the contingency of the revelation, and with the fact that it is proclaimed by man. Nor should it be imagined that by analysing the emergence of theological understanding in terms of these five 'functional operations' we are positing five different roles within the church, corresponding to them. On the contrary, the community is both speaker and hearer, in that it brings before itself (and of course before the world) the 'things of Jesus', namely the declaration: Simul justus et peccator, and thus continues the eschatological event.[2]

One final point needs to be made: although, as we have seen, Bultmann uses examples taken from one-to-one relationships, to illuminate theological communication, there can be no doubt that in so far as he has a model before him at all it is that of preacher to congregation.[3]

1. See above, pages 25-31, esp. p. 27.

2. Cf. EJE p. 14, on the Prologue of St John's Gospel:
"Who is it who is being addressed? In one sense, no-one. There is no differentiation between author and reader, as is the case in I John 1.1-4; rather, just as there, the distinction is withdrawn in a first person plural that embraces speaker and listener, so here from the beginning everything stands under this all embracing We. It is the community that is speaking!"

3. See above, p. 5, note 1.

2. The Internal Coherence of Theology

We are now in a position to see the internal coherence and structure of theological thinking as Bultmann sees it. We will approach the subject by returning to the five 'functional operations' that we have seen to be constitutive of the creation of theological understanding.[1] To each 'functional operation' there belongs a corresponding form of language or statement. We will begin with (1): the proclamation of the Kerygma itself. This takes the form of either direct or indirect address; an example of the latter is: 'the Kingdom of God is at hand', and of the former: 'Repent and believe the Gospel'.[2] Thus if we are analysing the grammatical construction of such sentences, they are either imperatives or affirmative assertions implying an imperative. Their meaning as proclamation is only grasped when the actuality of the demand they contain is encountered by the 'hearer' in his own situation.[3]

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1. See above p. 105f.

2. For our purposes, we can by-pass the question of the relation of the preaching of Jesus to that of the early church: how the proclaimer became the proclaimed. See e.g. Jesus und Paulus, Exegetica, pp. 222ff. It is relevant here in as much as theology in the strict sense (see above p. 30) begins first with the early church, and couches its sentences largely in affirmative, not overtly imperatival form. Jesus's own proclamation is the demand for radical obedience to the command of love (Jesus p. 68 = Jesus and the Word, p. 61); i.e. it is overtly imperatival. Paul's proclamation is that the crucified is to be recognised as the eschatological act of God; i.e. it is overtly affirmative, but implies address, in that to accept the assertion involves re-orientation of life, radical obedience.

3. NB the 'ontic' character of theology as explication of a 'Dass' - which can become the decisive event of history.

If we move to the second 'functional operation', namely, concerning the knowledge of the existential situation of the 'hearer', we can see that the language used here is going to consist primarily of descriptive statements; one might cite Rom. 1.18-3.20 as an example,[1] and we have already encountered instances of Bultmann's own use of descriptive statement of this sort.[2] It is clear that these statements are not necessarily autobiographical; many of them claim universal validity.[3] But they are to be made in the light of the proclamation, and must be regarded as logically dependent on statements pronouncing the Kerygma.[4] There is of course no need to deny that the proclamation will pick up and make use of the language and forms of thought current among those who are to be addressed; in this sense it makes use of the prior understanding of the hearer,[5] and transforms this into authentic knowledge.

The third 'functional operation' concerns the hearer's acknowledgement of the authoritative claim of the proclamation upon him; this is his confession of faith, e.g. 'Jesus is Lord', or 'Christ is risen', etc. Here we have affirmative assertions that arise from the encounter with the proclaimed Word, and are theologically true in so far as they do so. Hence they too must be regarded as logically dependent upon the word of proclamation that is essentially address.

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1. Cf. TNT I pp. 250, 279.
2. See above p. 63 f.
3. Cf. e.g. Rom. 3.20, 23!
4. See esp. Bultmann's discussion of Rom. 7.7-25; Exegetica pp. 198-209; TNT I p. 247 (E).
5. See Bultmann's discussion of the Johannine Prologue. See also GV I p. 140 E (= GV I p. 110): "Faith directs man to his own humanity."

The fourth functional operation (the explication by the hearer of his self-understanding) is not different in kind, as regards its claim to truth, from the confession of faith referred to immediately above. Its classic example, as we have seen, is Romans 7.7-25. The statements it uses are descriptive and in the first place autobiographical;[1] they can refer both to the believer's present self-understanding, and to his (present) assessment of his past unbelieving existence. By having this two-fold reference, this type of theological utterance can itself be seen as faith expressing its overcoming of unbelief.[2]

The explication by the hearer of his new self-understanding might be thought to be essentially the individual believer's own preoccupation, such as can be carried out without another hearer to listen to it. If this were so, theology would have its beginnings in the encounter situation within the community, but would end in individualistic preoccupation with one's own faith. This cannot be Bultmann's view of the matter; it would make nonsense of the proclamation as directing the hearer to the Thou whom he now meets in love, and with whom, in the community, his life is carried out. No, the believer's explication of his own self-understanding takes place within the

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1. Bultmann refers too to Augustine's Confessions (cf. GV IV 6: Das Verständtnis der Geschichte im Griechentum und im Christentum" 1962 pp. 91-103).

2. John 16.33; cf. EJ p. 457f (= EJE p. 592f). Faith of course also implies its future temporal reference: see esp. EJE p. 547:
   "Faith is at once the resolute decision for the word that has been heard, and the resoluteness that embraces all future decisions."

community of believers, and must itself have the nature, as discourse, of indirect summons. In this sense it is itself proclamation, and expresses the essential continuation of the tradition:

> "Church and word therefore belong together. The word is what it is, not because of any content of timeless meaning, but as authorised preaching continuing the tradition."[1]

Thus the functional operation we described as (5),[2] the interpretation of the theological meaning of the hearer's account of his self-understanding is itself an integral part of (4): the explication by the hearer of his new self-understanding. For interpretation is itself a 'hearing' and has the same logical structure as the latter. As we have seen, in Bultmann's case, interpretation is largely concerned with the NT texts, i.e. with the written explication of believing self-understanding, but the text of the NT on Bultmann's view cannot be different in kind from the expression of believing existence in any age.

But one does have to distinguish between the believer's continuing explication of his own self-understanding, and "the conceptual interpretation of the understanding of the word" as "a task undertaken consciously and intentionally"[3] by the theologian.

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1. GV I 8 p. 215 E (= GV I p. 181).
2. See above p. 106.
3. GV I 8 p. 213 E (= GV I p. 181).

> "If such theological, theoretical, doctrinal work is not to lose its way, if it is to remain indirect summons, and is to be achieved in the obedience of faith, then the venture to accept the task may only be made if it becomes a duty. It is not to be attempted because of any 'conception of the scientific discipline' to which theology allegedly belongs. Therefore, to be legitimate, theology must always be critical and polemical."[1]

Conclusion: The foregoing analysis shows us how description[2] and address are interwoven within the language of theology. It has also demonstrated Bultmann's view of the primacy of the address: this must be maintained if theology is to remain the explication of a faith that is pure response to the word addressed to it, and that seeks no guarantee of its 'ultimate correctness' beyond that which is found in the encounter. That is to say: that theological language is address, direct or indirect, follows from its subject-matter: justification by faith.

But, as we have seen, the address necessarily includes description; where, however, descriptive statements become separated from the kerygmatic statement, and assume an independent status, they threaten to become a positive evaluation

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1. Ibid., p. 214 E (= GV I p. 182).

2. As far as the affirmative statements are concerned, we need to distinguish carefully between descriptive and constructive statements: for Bultmann, the believer's statements about his self-understanding are descriptive and do not themselves involve any attempt at constructing a 'view of reality'. However, they do clearly imply a particular understanding of what it is to be man, such as can be 'constructed' - see above pp. 37 ff.

of the world, self and God, and the relations between them, that no longer issues from a man's existentiell decision for the proclamation, and thus can no longer lay claim to theological truth. Such an evaluation becomes a 'Weltanschauung', or a 'mythological world-view', which then obstructs the proclamation by presenting itself as a theoretical (theistic) view of the world, which man has to accept or reject, by intellectual effort. In so far as he cannot accept it, it becomes an apparent stumbling-block to faith. But it is not the real stumbling-block which faith has to face, namely, the claim that the (contingent) event of Christ is the eschatological act of God. If this, latter, stumbling-block is avoided, then faith is rendered impossible, for faith is the acceptance of the dissolution of the standards of the world and the embracing of the 'folly' of the cross. Descriptive statements, divorced from address, tend to become either metaphysical or mythological, and to remove the hearer from the point of decision. To de-mythologise is to re-assert the primacy of the address within theology, address not supported by objective guarantees of the truth of what is being asserted. Or, to put it another way, it is to re-assert the primacy within theology and within the lives of men of the categories of love and obedience.

Thus we must conclude that the language of theology consists of these two elements: address and descriptive statement, and that they are held together by the specifically theological occurrence, namely, the event of the Word of God being addressed and heard and responded to. It is in the context of this event that theological language finds its internal coherence.

3. The Relation of Theological Discourse to that of other Disciplines: its Distinctiveness and Character

We must now attempt an assessment of the relation of theological discourse as delineated above to other forms of discourse; and here again Bultmann himself gives us a great deal of help because, as we have seen, his theology is a continuing debate with non-theological thinking.[1] Indeed the enterprise of de-mythologising is to be seen as the attempt to lay bare the essential kerygmatic character of theological language, and to ensure that description within theology remains dependent upon address. We must now look more closely at Bultmann's constant preoccupation with questions of the distinctiveness of theological discourse.[2] We will do so by allowing him first to make the contrast between theology and other disciplines as sharply as possible (namely, in its relation to the natural sciences) and then watch the gap being closed as he deals with anthropology and history. The question is whether Bultmann in fact maintains the rigid contrast that he at first sight seems to draw between theology and all other forms of discourse. This contrast is really between existential

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1. NB, of course, GV I 13; but the comparison of theological language with that of the natural sciences runs right through GV.

2. Our own interest in the distinctiveness of theological language in relation to other forms of discourse arises out of the particular inter-disciplinary concerns of this enquiry. Before enquiring into the relation of theology and psychiatry we need to look carefully into Bultmann's own view of the relation between theological discourse and other forms of language. We will find Binswanger equally concerned with this subject - from the psychiatric standpoint.

statements and 'objective' scientific statements, and is of equal importance to Binswanger. The question with which Bultmann is concerned is the relation between the knower and the knowledge he gains. In the case of the natural sciences the knower remains master over that which he knows - unaffected by it, and detached from it. Existential knowledge is, on the other hand, by definition, knowledge that affects the existence of the knower; it is, in other words, to some extent transcendent over him. It is this contrast which we must now explore.

3.a) The gulf between scientific and existential statements

The first essential is to see the radical division Bultmann makes between these two forms of statement.[1] The scientist, qua scientist, is an observer who seeks to carry through his work with the greatest possible personal detachment - not in the sense of being disinterested in the results of his labours, but in the sense of himself being unchanged by the material with which he is working, and master over it.

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1. See esp. GV III 8 Wissenschaft und Existenz, 1955. Bultmann is at this point standing firmly in the tradition of Ritschl (mediated by his teacher Herrmann), for whom the distinction between religious judgments (value judgments) and theoretical judgments is fundamental. See esp. Ritschl: Theologie und Metaphysik, 1881. Bultmann's division is somewhat different in content, but it has the same effect - of differentiating theological statements very sharply from those of natural science. For a critical discussion see Gollwitzer, The Existence of God as Confessed by Faith, tr. by J.W. Leitch, London, 1965 and Moltmann, Theology of Hope, tr. by J.W. Leitch, London 1967, pp. 53ff.

Scientific knowledge "is always the expression of man's will to power".[1] As such Bultmann contrasts it with existentiell knowledge of, for example, a friend, over whom I do not attempt to assume mastery, but who confronts me as a person over against me, capable of changing me. In contrast to this:

> "Scientific thinking frees itself from the immediate encounter with the phenomena, and places itself, as subject to object, at a distance over against them."[2]

Again:

> "My receiving, in the scientific relation to the object, is purely passive, i.e. pure receiving, disinterested seeing, in distinction from a hearing of that which the object has to say for my personal living."[3]

Bultmann's position requires careful analysis. When he speaks of the scientific enterprise he is speaking as a theologian, and is not attempting a philosophy of science. However, he does make his view of scientific knowledge clear in the contrast he makes between it and existential knowledge.

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1. Malet, p. 7.
2. GV III 8 p. 107.
3. Ibid. p. 108; cf. Ritschl, for whom in the natural sciences the greatest possible passivity was demanded: Ritschl pp. 187-191 (Gollwitzer p. 74f). - A rather different analysis of the scientific enterprise is given by Heidegger (SuZ H 356-363); he too is concerned to spell out the relation of scientific work, esp. scientific knowing, to 'Being-in-the-world' as such. It is a particular modification of the latter which allows us (1) to project our understanding of the world as nature onto those objects we wish to scrutinise, (2) to limit the area to be studied (i.e. to take things out of their 'contextual totality of involvements'), and (3) to sketch out appropriate ways of conceiving the entities concerned. Heidegger's main point is that it is the manner of Dasein's existing that changes; it is no longer 'concernful' but 'deliberative'.

The scientific statement aims at universal applicability without reference to the actual situation of the speaker. It comes therefore into the category of general truths,[1] such as can be tested for purposes of verification. The question of the extent of the scientist's commitment to his work is secondary to the main point Bultmann is making, namely, that the scientist can remain, as far as his own existence is concerned, unchanged by the material with which he is dealing. Here we must distinguish between (1) the scientist's detachment from the phenomena with which is working; (2) his commitment to his work; and (3) the effect of the phenomena on the scientist.

As regards the first, Bultmann admits that the model of detachment, or neutrality, taken from mechanical physics, is inappropriate with reference to e.g. nuclear physics, where the scientist's own observations affect what he is observing. Indeed I think it is possible to detect a move in Bultmann's thinking (which is an infrequent occurrence: most of his later thinking is implicit in his earlier work with a remarkable consistency) between the early essays, such as "What does it mean to speak of God?"[2] and the later ones, such as "Das Befremdliche des christlichen Glaubens";[3] in the former the

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1. Cf. GV I 2, where Bultmann is discussing the possibility of the (empirical) sciences speaking of God (p. 54 E, = GV I p. 27):
   "For speaking of God in scientific propositions, that is, in general truths, means speaking in propositions the significance of which is their universal validity - a validity which is not related to the concrete situation of the speaker."
2. GV I 2 1925.
3. GV III 16 1958.

scientist is seen as producing a body of universally valid objective statements while remaining himself a neutral observer, i.e. operating from a vantage point external to the phenomena. In the latter, this position has been modified: Bultmann, speaking of historical research writes:

> "Here the historical event has been objectified, as the natural sciences objectify nature - at least the natural sciences of the past. Modern natural science sees that the subject-object relation cannot be the point of departure for a true understanding of nature, that there is no such thing as a pure objectivisation of natural occurrences."[1]

However (and here we are anticipating the section that will deal with historical statements) in comparison with the historian, the natural scientist is essentially a neutral observer of phenomena, who tries to minimise the effect of his own presence on what he is observing. The more objective he can be, in the sense of being without prejudice or individual preference, according to Bultmann, the greater will be his contribution to scientific knowledge - knowledge consisting of general truths.[2]

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1. Ibid. p. 200.
2. NB. Bultmann is only concerned with scientific knowledge in order to compare and contrast it with historical and ultimately theological knowledge; he is not concerned to develop an epistemology of the natural sciences. However, it must be said that he stresses the element of, as it were, innocent observation in scientific work, without doing justice to the intuitive capacity necessary to the formulation of the hypotheses on which observation depends. And it is this that calls in question the scientist's detachment from the phenomena with which he is dealing.

Now, while stressing this detachment of the scientist, Bultmann does not wish to imply his passivity qua scientist. Within the epistemological process, as Bultmann sees it, there is a passivity; the scientist simply allows himself to see what there is to be seen,[1] and it can be said that he understands what he sees, when he is able to explain it in terms of causal relatedness.[2] But for Bultmann, the scientific enterprise in its total motivation is essentially active: its goal is the mastery of the world; it leads inevitably and logically to technological achievement. Epistemologically, the scientist learns the truth or falsity of a scientific statement by methods of verification, which demand detached observation etc.; but the motivation behind what he is doing is the extension of his knowledge, and this means the extension of his control over the world. In this way we arrive at the statement that scientific knowledge is the expression of man's will to power.

It must be noted here that in seeking to understand Bultmann's characterisation of scientific knowledge, we have had to supplement an analysis of epistemology proper (i.e. the relevant process of knowing) with statements regarding the motivation behind the scientific enquiry. And the following quotation brings out this, broadly speaking, psychological analysis of scientific work very clearly:

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1. Cf. GV III 8 p. 107f.

2. Ibid. p. 119.

> "The question Hellenism or Christianity is a question always confronting man. If he needs Hellenism for his activity in the world, the decisive question concerns the intention (Sinn) behind his activity. We are at bottom all Greeks: for in Hellenism we find an attitude developed which is in fact common to man: the striving to master the world and thereby achieve security for oneself. The powers of science and πολιτικὴ τέχνη always tempt man to use them as means of mastering the world."[1]

Here Bultmann is following a philosophical tradition that reached its most extreme expression in Nietzsche, whose thinking centres round the exposition of the will to power as the driving force in man's life. This concept provided him with an instrument (psychological in essence) for interpreting the world and man's place in it, and for criticising ostensive human values, by pointing out the 'real' motivation lying behind man's adherence to them. Thus for Nietzsche, knowledge is an instrument of power, and its aim is not further knowledge for its own sake, but mastery of the world.[2] Nietzsche, of course, in contrast to Bultmann, goes on to describe the will to power as sovereign over the whole of man's existence, and is thus in the end condemned by Bultmann as supremely arrogant.[3] But Bultmann

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1. GV III 4 p. 77 "Humanismus und Christentum" 1953.
2. Cf. Nietzsche: Werke, ed. K. Schlechta, Munich 1954-1956: W. III, p. 440, - quoted Copleston: A History of Philosophy Vol. VII London 1963, p. 408f.
3. GV II 16 p. 290 (= Essays p. 323).

accepts his characterisation of the scientific enterprise as at least largely and normally true, thereby almost ruling out of court the possibility that scientific knowledge may illuminate and itself change the observer in any fundamental way. But we have to distinguish what is in fact a psychological interpretation of the natural scientific enterprise from the analysis of natural scientific epistemology as such. But before we look more closely at Bultmann's view of the latter, there is something further to add concerning this characterisation of knowledge as mastery. For Bultmann, theologian not psychologist, the main weight of his criticism of the scientific enterprise, when it is exalted to an all embracing place in human affairs, is that, by aiming at mastery over the environment it is aiming in the end at an illusory universal security for mankind.[1] And this security is seen as closed-up-ness,[2] as a shutting oneself off from all that threatens (in particular from the Thou that calls me in question), and thus from all that offers new life.[3] It is the expression of solipsist isolationism, and is, of course, an illusory security. In this sense the

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1. Cf. GV III 4 p. 77. Bultmann's essay entitled "Die Bedeutung des Gedankens der Freiheit für die abendländische Kultur" (= Essays 16, pp. 305-325) shows that Bultmann saw the political implications of the limitless application of the natural-scientific approach to reality exemplified in the Nazi Regime in Germany. Here, as he saw it, the scientific-technological drive for control and mastery became completely dominant, allowing no place for freedom, which is to be discovered and exercised in the recognition of reciprocal constraints between the individual and his neighbour and the state.

2. See above p. 69.

3. For the linking of life with encounter with the Thou, and (correspondingly) death with security within the self, see above chapter 2, section 4.

scientific enterprise is seen as having the same motivation as the metaphysical one, which (and here Bultmann refers us to Heidegger) is the attempt to secure man's place in the universe. Heidegger's destruction of metaphysics teaches us to "give up 'the metaphysical enterprise of trying to find a foundation' and thus also to abandon the desire that is inherent in metaphysics of self-assertion."[1] Both science and metaphysics express man's desire to remain subject, and do not allow his encounter with anything that might put him in question.[2]

As far as Bultmann's understanding of the nature of the scientific enterprise (as opposed to its motivation) is concerned, it is clear that he stands in the tradition of thought stemming from Kant,[3] mediated by Ritschl, and modified by Heidegger.[4]

The understanding which these natural sciences seek is regarded by Bultmann as synonymous with causal explanation.[5] The scientist can say he understands a phenomenon

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1. GV III 16, p. 212. - This is an important quotation in relation to Binswanger's relation to Heidegger.
2. Bultmann refers to Heidegger's characterisation of the modern age as dominated by the idea of 'Subjektität' (man remaining subject viz-à-viz all to which he must relate); see GV IV 9 pp. 115ff).
3. For Kant's influence on existentialist theology see Gollwitzer, pp. 67ff.
4. See esp. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 3rd ed. Frankfurt, 1965.
5. Here we have one side of a distinction which will occupy us recurrently: that between the understanding of meaningful connexions, and causal explanation: see esp. Jasper's General Psychopathology (tr. Hoenig and Hamilton, Manchester 1962). - Another influential figure, standing in the same tradition, was Lotze (1817-81), who stressed the need for the natural sciences (including psychology) to extend as far as possible the application of the category of mechanical (= causal) explanation of phenomena, while at the same time contrasting this form of enquiry with the equally valid teleological viewpoint. See his Mikrokosmos, 5th ed. Leipzig, 1896-1909 (and Copleston pp. 376ff).

when he sees it in its causal nexus: to know x is to know its relation to y - and that means its causal relation.[1]

However, Bultmann follows Heidegger in giving a different status and setting to the natural sciences to that accorded them by Kant. Heidegger maintains that Kant's starting point[2] and his overriding epistemological interest already obscure the central question: the ontological nature of Dasein, defined as inseparably 'being-in-the-world', as the pointer to Being itself. Kant's starting point makes the mind-body, subject-object dilemma inevitable. Heidegger attempts to 'go back behind' the mind-body division to its ontological presuppositions, and he therefore regards knowledge of the world as one specialised way of 'being-in-the-world'; it is, in his language, "a founded mode in which Being-in is exemplified".[3]

Heidegger thereby places our conscious processes of learning about the world within the context of our every-day existence in the world. Normally we do not need a conscious exploration of the things with which we have to do: they are 'ready-to-hand' and we simply use them.[4] For instance,

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1. Within the Kantian scheme of thought, causality means the succession of effect upon cause within time. Cf. Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, London, 1961, Vol. II, p. 283:
   "We can state the causal relation in the form 'if A, then B', or 'if A is posited, B must follow'. This analogy with the form of judgment does not, however, mean that the relation of cause and effect is in any concrete instance intelligible apriori... We can discover the cause of a given effect, or the effect of a given cause, only by means of experience."
2. Kant's preoccupation with the problem of knowledge of the external world sets him within the framework of Cartesian philosophy, operating with two opposed 'data': mind and external world.
3. SuZ H 59.
4. This analysis will also concern us in relation to Binswanger's thought; see below Part II.

we do not come to know a room by observation of its spatial characteristics, but by using it as somewhere in which to live.[1] Its 'readiness-to-hand' (to use his language) is ontologically prior to our observation of it. It is only in special cases, e.g. when something is out of order, that we bring our observational, scientific powers to bear on the situation. In this case, we refrain from 'using' and simply look;[2] the phenomenon in question, so to speak, keeps still, so that it can be observed,[3] and the whole body of such observations then becomes a preoccupation of human life, and the scientific approach to reality becomes a new possibility of being: "it becomes a task to be accomplished and as scientific knowledge it can take over guidance for Being-in-the-world."[4] But it remains a derivative activity, dependent on Dasein's normal intercourse with the world around it.

It is in accordance with this, that the notion of causality is seen as a central precondition of man's everyday existence in relation to his environment:

> "The idea of conformity to law, the idea of Nature, underlies explicitly or implicitly all of our ideas and actions which relate to this world. This conception is not 'an interpretation of the world', 'a judgment about the world', 'a world view'; it is not a conclusion about

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1. SuZ H 68. Thus for Heidegger, Dasein works normally with 'wholes', and normally perceives things as wholes. Contrast Kant, for whom perception is piecemeal (our understanding is discursive; God's intuitive).
2. SuZ H 61.
3. Cf. GV III 8.
4. SuZ H 62.

> the world, either subjective or based on a conscious decision. It is given in our existence in the world [Bultmann's italics]. We act always on reliance on a sequence of world events conforming to law... We recognise as real in the world only what can be set within the context of the rule of law; and we judge assertions which cannot be accommodated to this conception as fantasies.
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> "The notion of the universal validity of natural law, of nature's conformity to law, did not arise for the first time in modern science. It is a very primitive idea indeed, for it is a part of human existence."[1]

Scientific statements claim a universal validity precisely because, in making his observations, the scientist 'stands back' from his every-day use of the things in his environment, and attempts to exclude himself from the observation. Thus scientific statements normally have no reference to the existence of the individual who makes them (or do so, only in so far as his presence inevitably affects his observations - and that in a uniform, observable manner); the consequence drawn by Bultmann from this is that they cannot tell us anything

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1. GV I 10 p. 248 E (= GV I p. 215f). Of course when contrasting Heidegger's - and Bultmann's - view of the givenness of the notion of causality with Kant's view, one must not suppose that Kant thought there was anything arbitrary or optional in the employment of causality in human thought; on the contrary, it was an essential category of all experience of the external world.

radically new about possibilities of human existence,[1] for statements of this kind require both in their utterance and in their comprehension the existential involvement of speaker and listener.

This brings to an end our rather lengthy exploration of the scientist's relationship to his data (and of the status and nature of the statements he makes about those data); it is a necessary exploration, because Bultmann works out the nature and status of theological discourse in part at least by means of contrast with these other forms of discourse. Having made the contrast in its most distinct form, we can now proceed to look at instances which are not so completely dissimilar to theological language.

I have said that we need to distinguish the scientist's detached observation of his data and his passivity in regard to them from his commitment to his work in general. Now Bultmann does not deny that there may be some fields in which there is an existential commitment required:

> "Scientific anthropologies always take for granted a definite understanding of existence, which is invariably the consequence of a deliberate decision of the scientist."[2]

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1. Cf. GV I 8 section 1. By 'radically new' Bultmann means that which changes the manner of the existence of those involved in the communication. As we have seen, existence is carried out on the level of decision and action, and believing existence is carried out in response to the Thou (both divine and human). The 'thou' can never be the object of observation and still remain 'Thou'. Objective knowledge of the 'Thou' - and indeed of the 'Ego' - is of course possible, but only when the 'Thou' or the 'Ego' are viewed as objects among other objects, and when the call to obedient response to the personal historical claims of the other are put on one side. In GV IV 9 (1963) Bultmann admits the possibility of relating to the human Thou in both ways at once (p. 123), which then stand in a dialectical relationship to each other.

2. KM I p. 16.

Now, significantly, Bultmann is talking here of anthropology, and not e.g. of chemistry, which presumably does not require an understanding of existence, such as anthropology or psychology do. We are therefore bound to distinguish the human sciences from the physical ones, and accord the former an existential understanding (and commitment by the scientist to this understanding) which is not necessary for the latter. Bultmann makes a similar point in an essay entitled: "Ist voraussetzungslose Exegese möglich?"

> "I am leaving on one side the special questions, as to how, for instance, an existentiell relation to history can be at work in the study of grammar, lexicon, statistics, chronology, geography, or how the historian of mathematics or physics can be existentielly concerned with his subject. One thinks of Plato!"[1]

Here again the subjects concerned are the human ones (it is the history of mathematics). But there is an existential commitment in any scientific work which comes to the fore when some new facts cannot be assimilated into the general framework of the science in question. We then have "what is called a foundation crisis of the relevant science".[2]

As regards the effect of the phenomena on the scientist, enough has already been said; the main point is that the observational method of enquiry demands a vantage point from which to operate which ensures that the observer's own existence

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1. GV III 11 p. 147 f.

2. GV III 8 p. 119.

remains unquestioned; he must exclude himself so as to attain to objectivity and universal validity for his statements. Furthermore the motivation behind his enquiry is the will to power, and together these facts, as Bultmann sees the matter exclude the possibility that the phenomena make any existential impact on the observer - or at least render such an impact fortuitous and incidental.[1]

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1. We need to remind ourselves of the meaning of 'existential', if we are not to misunderstand Bultmann at this point. He speaks as theologian of the Word of God; i.e. as one who sees existence as being played out in historical living in response to the Word of love that is addressed to it. Thus he is not suggesting that scientific work, and especially scientific discovery may not 'make a great impact' on the discoverer; or even that the believing scientist may not find his understanding of the creation enhanced by what he does. What as theologian he is insisting upon is that man's existence finds its authenticity and meaning in his I-Thou encounters with his fellow-man. His assessment of scientific work follows, - including his view that, methodologically speaking, the scientist qua scientist proceeds as if there were no God:

   > "The atheism of the natural sciences is a methodological procedure, in so far as it submits the world to the objectivising kind of observation. This necessarily has to look away from God." (GV IV 9 p. 115)

   (This is clearly of importance as regards theology's understanding of psychiatry.)

3.b) Towards bridging the gulf: anthropology and psychology

I have referred briefly to an implicit 'intermediate stage' (as regards the extent of the knower's involvement in what is known) between the natural sciences and existential knowledge, as Bultmann sees the matter. This was concerned with the existential understanding that lies behind every anthropology.[1] We must now explore this stage in greater detail, and in so doing we will approach the subject of hermeneutics, which is basic to Bultmann's understanding of history.

The point there, was that the study of man's behaviour always presupposes some conception of what human existence is. The enquirer approaches his field with certain questions, interests and presuppositions, conscious and unconscious, which inevitably affect the answers he obtains.[2] For our present purposes we need to move from anthropology to psychology, for this leads us to the heart of Bultmann's argument.[3]

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1. See above p. 126.
2. It is difficult to see that this is not also true of the natural scientist. But the questions the anthropologist brings with him concern the meaning of human existence - the question which concerns him himself in his own existence.
3. In discussing objectivity in any particular science, the question of truth must be borne in mind at every stage. We need to know the criteria by which the enquirer concludes that he 'has reached the truth' in his enquiry. In the case of natural science we have seen it to be Bultmann's view that the scientist regards the establishment of causal explanation as 'reaching the truth'. We must now ask the same question in relation to the anthropologist and psychologist. (For Bultmann psychology is a more limited enquiry than anthropology; it is concerned with the 'inner life' of the individual, whereas anthropology seeks to spell out the total existence of man. Accordingly Bultmann can speak of theological anthropology, but not of theological psychology; this would be, for him, a 'category mistake', because the kind of psychology he has in mind cannot grasp the central fact of human being, - decision, action, response -, with which theology has to do.)

In the case of psychology the questions the scientist asks may be causal in nature and the picture of man that he builds up will be one of a complex of psychic and somatic phenomena.[1] This sort of enquiry is described by Bultmann as explanatory psychology, and is contrasted with an 'understanding psychology' ('erklärende' as opposed to 'verstehende'), and it is the latter with which Bultmann is really concerned. This does not aim at producing a body of statements valid of all men, but at understanding the meaning of the actions and behaviour and utterances of individuals. Here we have an example within one discipline of two (for Bultmann) fundamentally different forms of enquiry, the one concerned with causality, the other with meaning.[2] The former demands detachment for its accomplishment, the latter involvement. The former says: I understand this phenomenon satisfactorily, when I discover its precipitating and underlying causes; the latter says:

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1. GV IV p. 66 (see above p. 34).

2. GV IV 10 p. 127 "Zum Problem der Entmythologisierung", 1963. The article draws on this distinction within psychology in order to illustrate the two-fold approach needed for historical study, namely, knowledge of what happened in its chronological sequence and knowledge of its meaning or significance. Clearly the first can be established at any time; but the latter, acc. to Bultmann, the meaning of the event, will only be completely known at the end of history. And if we ask our truth-question here: when will the historian be satisfied that he has arrived at the truth concerning a particular event, then Bultmann's answer must be: when he has involved himself in it to the greatest possible extent, namely, in his own existentiell existence. We have therefore a separation between a fact of the past and a historical phenomenon, which is such precisely in that it has meaning for the historian; thus conceptually we can distinguish a fact of the past from its meaning (cf. Essays p. 254: "facts of the past only become historical phenomena when they become significant for a subject which itself stands in history"). But NB note 1 to page 81.

I understand what this phenomenon means, when I share in the experience it expresses.

The philosophical influence that is at work here is that of Dilthey, and it is significant that Dilthey's work is concerned primarily with historical biography rather than with psychology itself.[1] Psychology is used by Dilthey to unlock the door to historical understanding,[2] and it is 'verstehende Psychologie' with which he is concerned. Dilthey's primary question is epistemological: how is it possible to comprehend a historical event? And his answer is: the events of the past can be understood in so far as they are expressions of mental and spiritual experiences common to man. Apart from this, the events themselves are irretrievable. Dilthey is asserting a historical relativism, which is only transcended by psychological understanding: the only 'abiding factor' is the empathic understanding (to use Jasper's phrase) of the historian. Bultmann writes:

> "Here historical observation becomes understanding psychology. All historical phenomena are understood as growing out of the spiritual ('seelisch') life of man, whose experiences objectify themselves in historical pictures. But such objectifications do not have any

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1. See esp. his study of Schleiermacher's life and thought: Dilthey: Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. IV, Stuttgart 1959.

2. Psychology was paramount in Schleiermacher's conception of hermeneutics: Schleiermacher: Werke, Vol. IV, ed. Braun and Bauer, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 151ff (in the lectures on hermeneutics). Cf. GV II 12 pp. 213ff (= Essays pp. 237ff).

validity that goes beyond the experience, even if, in being understood, they enrich the spiritual life of him who understands."[1]

Examples of Bultmann's assessment of 'verstehende Psychologie' - which cannot provide the theologian of the Word with an answer to his most pressing problem, namely, how past occurrences can become authoritative event for succeeding generations, drawing forth obedience - are to be found in his commentary on St John. Such interpretation, on his view, would be concerned with some specific moment in the psychological life of a particular individual, e.g. Peter in the incident of the footwashing in John 13. Peter vehemently resists Jesus's desire to wash his feet: does the author give us here an insight into the character of Peter? To interpret John in this way is, Bultmann argues, to run contrary to the intention of the author, who is using the story of the footwashing to depict the inevitable reaction of the 'natural man' to the revelation; i.e. what we have is a case of anthropological description within the framework of theology, subordinate to the major

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1. GV IV 4 p. 62f. - It is worth noting here how epistemological and (broadly speaking) ontological concerns go hand in hand; Dilthey sees man emprisoned within his own age and life-span; he does not appear to have any free will that makes any real difference to events; these are not actions in any real sense but are only a superstructure to an underlying emotional and spiritual experiential life. It is this latter that can be understood, in so far as the same kind of experiences are open to him who attempts to understand.

theological statement, which is address.[1] Psychological interpretation, on the other hand, would be (as Bultmann sees it) concerned with the behaviour etc. of individuals, describing and understanding their emotional states at particular times; it could not tell us anything that could be described as authoritative for us. That is to say, in contrast to Dilthey, the psychological interpretation of a historical event does not disclose its meaning, nor is an event merely the superstructure of an underlying emotional-spiritual experience. Rather, it is the other way round: the event (the meaning of which is disclosed existentielly) will be accompanied by emotional-spiritual experiences,[2] as its incidental superstructure - a point which brings out the priority of the will in Bultmann's understanding of man.[3]

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1. See EJ p. 355f (= EJE p. 468). It is in accordance with this that Bultmann can accept the various contradictions in the Johannine text, while agreeing that they are "impossible psychologically"; i.e. if the intention had been to describe a situation psychologically, the author would have involved himself in contradiction; but this is not his intention; cf. EJ p. 460 note 4 (= EJE p. 597 note 1). His intention is the exposition of believing existence, in such a way that it will be proclamation (cf. GV IV 1 p. 36).
2. See above, p. 34 f.
3. This means that for Bultmann a historical event is constituted primarily by acts of will, responses to the demands of a situation. Here again we see how Bultmann stands within the tradition of Kant and Ritschl. - One must say however: a historical event is primarily but not exclusively constituted by acts of will; cf. Bultmann's discussion of Collingwood's view of history in HE chapter 9 esp. pp. 136ff.

3.c) On the existential side of the gulf: history

What has just been said appears almost wholly negative in its assessment of 'verstehende Psychologie'; this would be a misleading impression. Dilthey's work, and the notion of understanding by means of involvement,[1] as contrasted with explanation by detached observation, is indeed a vital rung on the ladder of Bultmann's argument. Dilthey's achievement consisted in seeing that there was more to understanding the historical event than could be accounted for by causal explanation, and that another kind of epistemological tool was needed to answer the question of its meaning. Where he failed, as far as Bultmann was concerned, was in his understanding of the nature of man. He did not grasp man's 'historicality' sufficiently radically, that is to say, his existential freedom to decide what he is to become.[2]

> "Heidegger's analysis of historicality can be described as the radicalisation of Dilthey's relativism. But because, in this radicalism, every certainty is withdrawn from man, by which he might base the objective validity of values and standards of judging and acting from a point beyond his historical Now, a radical freedom is

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1. Cf. GV II 12; Essays p. 240:
   "So far as Dilthey characterises the relationship between author and expositor as the conditioning factor for the possibility of the comprehension of the text, he has, in fact, laid bare the presupposition of all interpretation, which has comprehension as its basis."

2. This is an ontological, not ontic, statement: in fact, for the theologian, man is 'fallen' and can no longer make use of the freedom which is his as creature.

promised to man, and thereby a full responsibility is placed on the Now."[1]

Thus the special position accorded by Dilthey to psychological interpretation - as that which can bridge the gap between past and present - is replaced by an existentiell interpretation, in which the meaning of an event is only disclosed in the individual's present reaction to it. But because the individual is himself a historical being, in process of becoming,[2] such an understanding is never achieved once and for all, but has to be won again and again as life continues.

It can be observed here how epistemological and ontological concerns go hand in hand. The nature of man is seen by Bultmann and Heidegger as through and through historical: his life is made up of decisions as to action and response; he is active before contemplative; his actions make a meaningful difference; but he comes out of a past, and what he makes of his past is vital for his future.[3] And, on the epistemological level, the understanding that is of consequence for his existence is the appreciation of the significance of the past, as it affects him now. And to gain such an understanding into a past event requires the greatest possible involvement in it (that is to say: we are at the furthest possible remove from the detachment demanded by the natural sciences). But this

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1. GV IV p. 66. Cf. GV II 12 (Essays p. 251f).

2. Cf. GV IV 4 p. 65f and HE pp. 140 ff.

3. Indeed, as we have seen, a man's past, his 'Woher', determines the nature of his existence; cf. p. 62, note 2, above.

involvement is not a kind of empathic understanding of the relevant experience, but is the existentiell response to the past event, as an event demanding a response - for only in this way will its meaning disclose itself.[1]

The study of history, then, is seen as radically different from that of the natural sciences.[2] It is of course still possible to write history by utilising the methods of causal explanation, e.g. from a sociological or geographical point of view - or from that of the genetic understanding (psychologically) - but such studies will not disclose the full significance of past events.[3] The historian who asks the question of meaning will have different criteria of objectivity from those of the natural scientist, and his statements will

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1. GV II 12 p. 229f (= Essays p. 255f).

2. Bultmann's discussion of Toynbee's work is illuminating in this respect (see esp. A.H. Toynbee, Civilisation on Trial, 1948), HE pp. 86ff. Toynbee is concerned with the survival of civilisations, and his method (on Bultmann's terms) is partially historical, partially 'naturalistic'. He has

   > "detected the law of challenge and response. Every society is brought both at the beginning and in the course of its history into situations which are challenges to it and provide an ordeal for the challenged. The decisive question is the answer given to the challenge. On it depends whether the society enters into history, or remains in history." HE p. 87f.

   But Toynbee then interprets this law naturalistically, by attempting to measure the extent of the challenge and the vitality of the civilisation, by introducing the concept of the élan vital (which is equally unacceptable to Binswanger: see below). - For a critical evaluation of Bultmann's position, see Moltmann, p. 35.

3. That is to say, their meaning for human existence itself (cf. GV II 12 p. 229f = Essays p. 255f).

remain particular to one event; i.e. it will be impossible either to generalise from them or for the historian to abstract himself from them: they disclose their meaning to him, in so far as they present him with possibilities of existing about which he has to make up his mind. Furthermore, in so far as they do this, they illuminate his very existence. In themselves such past events are ambiguous: the historian's reaction to them decides their significance. Thus, on this view, historical study can be said to be more important ontologically than that of the natural sciences. It leads to the illumination of Dasein, and Dasein (e.g. for Heidegger) is the pointer to Being itself.

At this point we need to look again at the question of the effect of the phenomena upon the observer. It will now be clear that for Bultmann, the historical event itself affects the historian, in so far as its meaning becomes apparent to him. He has to 'listen to what it has to say', and the switch from 'seeing' to 'listening' is significant. The historical event can be said to be transcendent over the historian, in that he has to react to it; he cannot simply observe it and remain neutral. In this sense it can be said to be authoritative for him.

It should now have become clear why Bultmann regards theological statements as of the same sort as historical statements. But before we finally come to theological language itself, two further points need to be made. First, the study we have been undertaking is itself a part of existential analysis; it is a matter of philosophical reflection upon (in this last section) the philosophy of history. But it

would be completely misunderstood, if it were thought to imply the need for the same sort of thinking on the part of everyone about to make a decision; such a supposition forgets the vital distinction between existentiell and existential. Statements about actual historical events are to be understood existentielly; just as those events themselves are contingent events that, as occurrences of the past, make up part of an individual's actual world. They are, to use a different term, to be dealt with on the ontic, not the ontological, level, and the appropriate existentiell response to them is not philosophising, but action in day-to-day living.[1]

Secondly, it must be stated explicitly that, in view of the historicality of man's existence, all existential statements (referring to the existence of Dasein) have a historical reference. It is not the case, in Bultmann's thought, that historical statements, and the study of history, form part of a larger class comprising all existential statements. Love, trust, friendship, hatred etc. between people, all involve decision and resolve and thus all involve a relation to history;

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1. But, of course, when it comes to interpreting historical texts, in order that their meaning should be apparent to those who read them, the interpreter needs to equip himself with an adequate conceptuality with which to do his work. And if, as in the case of theology, he is approaching the text with the general question in mind concerning human existence as such, then he must approach it with the conceptuality of existential analysis: cf. GV II 12, Essays p. 258:

   "Now at least for scientific exegesis, it is decisively a question of the relevant interpretation of the enquiry, and that means, at the same time, the relevant interpretation of human existence. To work this out is a matter for human reflection - concretely the task of philosophical, or existential, analysis of human being."

   But: "It is axiomatic that such work is not the prerequisite for paying simple heed to what the NT says - which is directed directly towards an existentiell understanding of the self, and not towards an existential knowledge" (ibid.).

decision is always decision in respect of one's future and one's past, and only in decision is the meaning of existence known. That does not of course mean that 'Dasein' is always consciously relating itself to past events, 'doing history' in the technical sense of the work of the historian. But it does mean that 'Dasein's' existence is inseparably bound up with past and future and that all statements concerned with its existence are historical statements; in particular it means that 'love' and 'trust' are both historical categories for Bultmann.[1]

3.d) Theological discourse

We can now turn to theological discourse itself, which as should now be clear, must claim to be existential in nature, issuing in existentiell understanding.

The analysis can take the form of a number of theses with comment.

Thesis 1: The theological statement does not claim any universal validity independent of the speaker; indeed, such a claim would make nonsense of the notion of meaning within the context of history, as understood by Bultmann.

Comment: a) It is therefore to be distinguished from all observational statements, as Bultmann understands them, nor can the truth or falsity of its claim be established by empirical

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1. This point is of importance in regard to the relation to Binswanger's thought. For Bultmann, there is no 'supra-historical being' open to man - see GV I 4 "Historical and Suprahistorical Religion in Christianity".

observation. When talking of the relation of Christianity to Humanism, Bultmann makes the latter point explicitly: "both Humanism and Christianity know a truth which is quite independent of empiricism."[1]

b) By denying its validity as a general truth Bultmann is at the same time distinguishing theological language (particularly of the 'descriptive' kind) from statements concerning man's 'Weltanschauung', which is precisely the result of the attempt to rationalise one's experience in terms claiming a general validity.[2]

Thesis 2: Theological language has about it a two-fold particularity: it refers to a particular set of events, contingent within history,[3] in their relation to a particular individual whose existence it puts in question.

Comment: This is the reverse side of Thesis 1, and puts the theological statement within the category of existential statements, which all imply the framework of the 'I-Thou' relation, although the transcendent 'other' is sometimes a historical event (itself of course consisting of personal action) rather than a living person, illuminating my history.

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1. GV III 4 p. 65 "Humanismus und Christentum", 1953; the question at issue here is whether present experience can invalidate the theological claim. Bultmann regards it as a mistake to think that it could - because observation cannot apprehend that with which theology is concerned. However he acknowledges the reality of the tendency to regard experiential data as relevant to the question of faith and admits that faith always involves a 'nevertheless' (cf. GV II 1, Essays p. 6); furthermore these recurrent crises serve a useful function theologically in highlighting the real crisis for faith, which is the question of the primacy of love with the life of the individual: ibid. p.15.

2. Cf. GV II 1, Essays p. 6.

3. Cf. the 'Too late' of John 7.32-36; see above, p. 53, note 1.

Thesis 3: Its historical reference[1] ensures for the theological statement an irreducibility. Given the notion of the historicality of man, it is impossible to reduce theological statements to any non-historical (i.e. naturalistic[2]) categories, such as those of sociology or psychology.

Comment: This would appear to be Bultmann's answer to the anthropocentric interpretation and criticisms of theology by Feuerbach. - But Bultmann also takes issue with Feuerbach over the nature of man; Feuerbach is too essentialist in his approach; he does not see that man's historicality transcends his 'psychological nature' or 'subjectivity'; that man is always 'beyond himself'.[3]

Thesis 4: The existential reference of the theological statement (as address) cannot be demonstrated or verified; it contains the ambiguity common to existential statements: their 'existentiality' is recognised existentielly by the 'hearer'.[4]

Comment: Again, this draws out something implicit in Thesis 1. It is important in Bultmann's Christology, where the divine Incognito is a central idea,[5] and the 'signs' in the Fourth Gospel only highlight the ambiguity and paradoxical nature of Jesus's claim to be the Revealer,[6] thus compelling the reader to allow his own self-understanding to be called in question.

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1. See above, p. 54.
2. See above, p. 136 note 2.
3. KM I 3 p. 133.
4. See above, p. 105f.
5. KM I 3 p. 118; GV III 14, p. 189.
6. Cf. EJ p. 161 (= EJE p. 218).

Thesis 5: The de-mythologising of the theological statement is not an instance of reductionism, or, primarily, of translation; it is rather a stripping away of those elements within theological language which attempt to explain the transcendent by objectifying it, i.e. by using naturalistic categories to describe it or demonstrate its actuality.

Comment: De-mythologising is thus the attempt to secure for theological language its correct status, or in other words, to present the hearer with the essential stumbling-block without which faith (involving as it does a new understanding of the world and the self, and the response of obedience) is impossible. De-mythologising has therefore to be distinguished from translating and from secularising (which is an illegitimate attempt to do away with either the historical reference or the element of transcendence).[1]

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1. Bultmann sees an example of such secularised theology in theological work conceived of as psychotherapy:

> "The preaching has to show man that he needs forgiveness [i.e. that his past is sin and not simply a lack that he can make good himself], and its paradoxical nature becomes plain in that, as human word, it promises the forgiveness of God.
>
> "The proclamation is also secularised when the emancipation which as God's forgiveness it promises man, is made into the business of the psychotherapist who wants to use his own methods to bring about the emancipation of a man, such as he has come to be through his past. Then there is no further need of God's forgiveness. The therapist has replaced the confessor. And yet the fact that so many men find refuge in the psychotherapist shows a dependence upon authority ('angewiesensein auf') and a longing for it - shown above all in the fact that the patient so often becomes dependent ('hörig') on the therapist."

Thesis 6: The theological statement is not just one historical statement among others. The event of which it speaks claims to be the end of history.[1]

Comment: Its intention is not therefore simply to state historical truth,[2] but to bring the hearer into the eschatological mode of existing, in which he finds that characteristic 'distance' from the things of the world which allows him to see them again as creation and to use them in the service of mankind, instead of being dominated by them.

Thesis 7: In so far as the theological statement speaks of man's existence descriptively, it does so 'dialectically'; the 'as if not' remains, because the believer is 'in the world but not of the world'.[3]

Comment: In so far, however, as the theological statement is heard as address, there is nothing paradoxical or ambiguous about it; indeed, Bultmann stresses its transparency ('Einsichtigkeit'). Thus the believer, hearing the Word in his situation, is confronted with the command of love, universal in its applicability, and binding on all who hear the proclamation, demanding an obedient - and self-evident - response.[4]

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1. See pp. 78ff.
2. GV III 8 p. 127ff.
3. See above, pp. 92-99 .
4. See esp. Jesus p. 68, 76f (= Jesus and the Word p. 61, 67f) and Oden p. 31.

Thesis 8: In so far as it speaks of the transcendent, of God's act etc., theological language is necessarily analogical, and is only permissible (i.e. because non-mythological) so long as it speaks at the same time of the believer's own historical existence.[1]

Comment: We have to distinguish 'analogical' from 'mythological', and Bultmann does so through his analysis of the intention behind the latter.[2] The intention is to express the transcendent, but the means used leads inevitably to its objectification, bringing into play a different motivation, namely, to demonstrate the objective reality of the transcendent, by means such as must convince the neutral observer.

Thesis 9: That theological language really is theological, i.e. speaks of God, is not open to verification, except within the hearing of the proclamation of forgiveness.

Comment: In answer to the question: when does human language speak of God, and when not? the theologian can advance no positive criterion for deciding the first half of the question; but he can say when it is not speaking of God - namely, when it is not referring also to the speaker's own existential situation.

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1. See esp. KM I p. 196-211 esp. p. 197, 199f:
   "Such language is therefore neither symbolical nor pictorial, though it is certainly analogical, for it assumes an analogy between the activity of God and that of man, and between the fellowship of God and man and that of man with man" (ibid., p. 197).

2. Cf. GV IV 10 "Zum Problem der Entmythologisierung", 1963 pp. 129ff.

PART II

LUDWIG BINSWANGER: PSYCHIATRIST AND ANTHROPOLOGIST

Preface

Before we turn to Binswanger's work it would be as well to remind ourselves of the aim of this section of the thesis.

We are seeking to explore the practice of psychotherapy within the discipline of psychiatry[1] and the understanding of the nature of man that lies behind it, as Binswanger saw them. Thus Chapter 4 will set out Binswanger's understanding of the psychotherapeutic relationship as it actually operates, and the following chapters (5-8) will present his exploration of the nature of the psychiatric enterprise which lies behind his psychotherapeutic practice. Thus Chapter 4 sets the scene for what follows.

In Chapters 5 to 8 we will follow Binswanger as he assesses the relative importance and status of the different approaches to man that are involved in the psychiatric enterprise. He is aware that psychiatry involves both philosophy and the natural sciences, and one of his major preoccupations is to assess the relative place of each, and to discover the unifying factor within psychiatry which binds together its disparate components. Thus Chapter 5 presents his view of the place and function of the natural sciences within psychiatry and also - equally important - his assessment of the extent of the jurisdiction of what he describes as the natural-scientific

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1. A preliminary need is to define these two terms, psychotherapy and psychiatry: this we will do at the outset of Chapter 4.

way of thinking within psychiatry. We will find him critical of all attempts (whether by Griesinger, Bleuler or Freud) to give this way of thinking unlimited jurisdiction.

It is at this point that Binswanger comes up against the philosophical question of the nature of man, in the form in which it is particularly urgent for the psychiatrist: the question of the status and significance of man's meaningful mental world. Thus Chapters 6 and 7 explore Binswanger's appropriation and use of the work of Husserl and Heidegger, and Chapter 8 then presents his own account of the nature of man and of psychological knowledge such as the psychotherapeutic relationship presupposes. Thus these four chapters are all concerned with prolegomena to psychotherapy itself. It is only in Chapter 9 that we can make Binswanger's actual practice and analysis (in his Daseinsanalysis) our explicit subject. Then Chapter 10 will complete Part II by looking again at the scope and goals of psychotherapy.

CHAPTER 4

The Place of Psychotherapy within Psychiatry

Despite the tremendous variety of Binswanger's gifts and interests, ranging from philosophy to literary and artistic criticism, he remained a practising psychiatrist all his life. Indeed he viewed these other interests as integral to his practical work, informing and enriching his understanding of human life. The centre of his work remained the practice of psychiatry and psychotherapy in the Sanatorium he ran at Kreuzlingen.[1] And therefore in exploring these we are dealing with the centre of his total activity and thought.

We must start by defining the terms psychiatry and psychotherapy as he used them. By psychiatry Binswanger means the whole gamut of knowledge concerned with the diagnosis, prognosis and treatment of the mentally ill; it is an 'umbrella term' containing within it as he was well aware, a great diversity of ways of thinking and acting; indeed, one of his key concerns, out of which Daseinsanalysis was born, lay in the systematisation of this conglomerate mass encompassed

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1. See esp. a report of his work there which he wrote on the 75th anniversary of the Sanatorium in 1932: "Zur Geschichte der Heilanstalt Bellevue in Kreuzlingen: 1857-1932" - to be found in the library of Burghölzli Mental Hospital Zürich.

by the term psychiatry.[1] When we ask how the term psychotherapy relates to this umbrella word, it is at once clear that we are dealing with one main 'thrust' of psychiatry, namely, with its therapeutic aspect. I use the word 'thrust' carefully because, as we shall see, psychotherapy includes diagnosis and the assembling of the case-history, neither of which is itself healing.[2] Nor would it be right, in Binswanger's case, to distinguish psychotherapy from psychiatry by supposing that the former were conducted purely on the level of meaning (using linguistic communication), while the latter always involved (in its dealings with the patient) some manipulation of the organism. This would be to adopt the mind-body distinction as an ultimate, whereas it is one of Binswanger's main

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1. Binswanger makes the point that, in contrast to psychoanalysis, Daseinsanalysis originated in the course of searching for the ground or basis of psychiatric judgments: 3FMD p. 173f:
   "Only the one who has, as psychiatrist, concerned himself, year in year out, with the 'philosophy of life' and searched for a foundation for psychiatric research can estimate how liberating the ontology of Dasein must have been; for whereas the élan vital and 'life' do not allow one to recognise any real structure, for which reason psychiatric research based on these concepts always ends in vague conceptualisations, the ontology of Dasein presents us with an a priori essential structure with its own structural constituents ('Existentialia'), which allow the psychiatrist to explore and describe the forms of illness with which he is concerned as modifications of this a priori structure." See too AVuA II p. 293f.

2. This is not to deny the psycho-analytical insight, shared by Binswanger, that enabling the patient to become aware of his own inner life-history can have vital therapeutic results. - In an essay of 1928 Binswanger distinguished between psychotherapy (which could be said to accompany all psychiatric work, in the sense of care of the psyche) and what he termed 'active psychotherapy', where the psychiatrist decided to treat the patient primarily on the level of his mental life, with the aid of psycho-analytical methods etc. See Psychotherapie als Beruf: Nervenarzt No. 3, 1928. This distinction (which is not consistently maintained) will be referred to again when our analysis of Daseinsanalysis is complete; see below chapter 10, section 3.

concerns to try to overcome this, or, as he puts it, to "tunnel underneath it".[1] However, it remains true that when Binswanger speaks of the psychotherapist, he means one whose essential task is with the patient's mental world, the world of meanings, whereas the psychiatrist has to range through the various levels of the patient's life, from the meaningful to the organic (and back). This distinction, it must be repeated, is only an approximate guide.[2]

Psychiatry, then, is the whole gamut of knowledge concerning mental illness: the psychiatrist is one who deals, as a doctor, in a great variety of ways with the mentally disturbed; psychotherapy is the art and practice of healing mainly but not exclusively on the level of inter-personal communication, by helping the patient to gain insight into his situation, and thereby enabling him to face his own future freely.[3]

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1. AVuA I p. 145.

2. Jaspers neatly defines the areas of concern of psychiatrist and psychotherapist as follows: "Neuroses are the field for psychotherapists, psychoses the field for psychiatrists" (Gen. Psychopathology p. 576). But he then adds as a note: "This does not mean that they cannot be the same people. Clear knowledge and effective therapy in both fields requires that psychiatrist and psychotherapist should be one person..." (ibid.). Binswanger would agree with this latter point, while remaining critical of Jasper's distinction between neurosis and psychosis (cf. Ideenflucht p. 145).

3. One has not only to distinguish between the science of psychiatry as a body of knowledge and the work of the psychiatrist as he deals with patients (such work being sometimes most aptly described as psychotherapy), but also between his approach to the patient as a doctor and as an enquiring scientist. - For the notion of 'insight', cf. 3FMD p. 132:

> "In psychiatry we speak of insight into the disease, and when this insight breaks through [on the part of the patient] we see the sick person as 'saved'."

We can now look more closely at the practice of psychotherapy as Binswanger describes it. He (and he spent his whole life within reach of the Alps) has an apt illustration of the psychotherapeutic situation and task; it is like the situation of a man who goes ill-equipped into the mountains and gets stuck, requiring someone to help him down:

> "What we call psychotherapy is in the end nothing other than bringing the patient to the point at which he can see how the total structure of human Dasein or 'Being-in-the-world' is formed, and at which point he has over-reached himself. That means: the task is to bring him back from the over-reaching of himself 'to the earth', the only place from which it is possible for him to attempt a new departure and ascent."[1]

This quotation spells out that 'thrust', which is psychotherapy, mentioned above: it has to do with the individual in the total development of his life. This means that central to it is first of all an understanding of the individual's life-history,[2] and second, of the possibilities of being that are open to him, as the particular man that he is.[3]

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1. 3FMD p. 8.

2. For this term, see esp. Chapter 9, section 1, below.

3. The illustration (repeated in AVuA II p. 305) comes in the analysis of a disturbed mental state described in the German as 'Verstiegenheit' (meaning lit. a mis-climbing and tr. by Needleman, Being-in-the-World, New York 1963, as 'extravagance'), a state seen by Binswanger as a possible preliminary to schizophrenia. Thus the illustration arises directly out of the material with which the psychiatrist is dealing.

Before leaving this quotation, it is worthwhile dwelling on an observation Binswanger makes in connection with his analysis: a man is only stuck on a mountain (to use the image) when he has isolated himself or been isolated from deep relationships with his fellows to such an extent that he proceeds on his 'journey through life' without reference to anyone else: only when this has happened, will he arrive at a position from which he cannot move.[1]

> "For only where the communio of love and the communicatio of friendship are missing and where mere intercourse and traffic with 'others' has taken over the exclusive direction of our existence, only there can height and depth, nearness and distance, present and future have so much importance that human existence can go too far, and attain to an end and a now from which there is neither retreat nor progress."[2]

Here we can see how Binswanger's breadth of understanding of human existence is employed in the service of psychotherapy: man lives out his life primarily in loving relationships with his fellow man;[3] and most mental disturbance implies that this fundamental mode of being human has been lost. An ultimate

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1. We can see here the phenomenon referred to frequently in psychiatric literature as the autistic element within schizophrenia. Binswanger is cautious of his use of the word, because of its indefiniteness: it is one of those concepts which he attempts to delineate more accurately by means of the terminology of Daseinsanalysis.

2. 3FMD, quoted from Needleman's translation, p. 343.

3. See esp. Grundformen, and Chapter 8 below.

goal of psychotherapy is its restoration. But more than that! Later in the same book Binswanger claims that it is only through love that such an isolationist position can possibly be overcome, although he admits the extreme difficulty of this.[1]

This brings us to the question of the relation of the psychotherapist to his patient. Binswanger is quite clear that this is a truly personal relationship, involving love on the part of the psychotherapist for his patient:

> "You have to address yourself to the sick fellow-human being with the whole of your being and with all your love."[2]

A little later on in the same essay he writes:

> "That your love normally comes to grief is no counter argument against this demand; quite apart from the fact that you first really approach the life-form of the sick person when the authentic I-Thou communication is coming to grief, you have as a mental physician the job of rescuing your love for the patient from this very process of its coming to grief."[3]

What, in this context, does 'love' mean? It means, first, accepting this relationship as itself an existentiell

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1. 3FMD p. 82 this time with ref. to 'Verschrobenheit', lit. 'screwiness'.

2. AVuA II p. 253 "Über die manische Lebensform", 1945. Cf. Boss, Psycho-analysis and Daseinsanalysis, tr. Lefebre, New York, 1963, p. 260.

3. Ibid. p. 259f. Cf. Grundformen, p. 604.

communication[1] between two people, as itself a new relationship,[2] rather than one artificially set up for the sake of transference, i.e. to work out afresh a relationship that has already taken place between the patient and someone else.[3] It means, second, that the psychotherapist remains a 'Daseinspartner' with the patient, "putting his own existence at risk",[4] engaged in an encounter which takes place, "as Buber says, 'over the abyss of Dasein', - Dasein which is essentially in the world not just as self, but also as Mitsein or intercourse, and as 'Being-together or love."[5] We will return to the psychiatrist's self-understanding and commitment to his patient at the end of this chapter.

Thirdly it means attempting to understand[6] the patient as a fellow human being, which means understanding his life-history and the world in which he lives, not solely to arrive at a diagnosis (although this will be a result), but because

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1. By which is meant a relationship of mutual trust (preferably not expressed verbally); see AVuA I p. 138 "Über Psychotherapie", 1935 (an article to be used extensively later in this chapter).
2. Cf. AVuA II p. 307 "Daseinsanalyse und Psychotherapie", 1954.
3. Cf. Boss, pp. 237-247.
4. AVuA II p. 307 "Daseinsanalyse und Psychotherapie".
5. Ibid. p. 306. Binswanger also expresses his indebtedness to Buber in the introduction to the Grundformen, p. 11. For a similar understanding of the psychotherapeutic relationship see H. Trüb, Heilung aus der Begegnung, Stuttgart, Klett, 1951. See too R. May's introduction to existential analysis in Existence, p. 63f.
6. The nature of psychological understanding according to Binswanger is expounded more fully in Chapter 8 below.

of the essentially personal nature of the relationship, which transcends the distinction between sick and healthy. Thus an essential part of understanding the 'patient' in a psychotherapeutic relationship is understanding him not as psychiatric patient, but precisely as a man with his own particular way of being-in-the-world. The therapeutic aspect of this relationship becomes clearer, when it is made explicit that its purpose is to enable the patient so to understand himself. In this respect Binswanger stands alongside Freudian psycho-analysis. The patient must be shown how his 'being-in-the-world' is modified, narrowed down, in other words, how he has 'got stuck' - and this not intellectually, but in "existentiell shock".[1]

This task of understanding the patient's world occupies a central place in Binswanger's practice as a psychotherapist and as a psychiatrist; it is also central in his investigations into the nature of psychiatric knowledge.

> "Psychiatric knowledge has, in my eyes, no more vital concern than that of pressing forward to understand and describe the worlds and 'being-in-the-world' of the sick. Only then do we know what divides them from us...why we have difficulty in understanding them...

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1. AVuA II p. 305. 'Shock' translates 'Erschütterung'. One might compare, as an extreme example of such shock, the case described by Boss, p. 273-283, involving a psychotic episode. But Binswanger is, as we shall see, very cautious of describing mental illness as existential crisis, particularly where the psychoses are concerned. It would appear that in speaking of psychotherapeutic rescue he has in mind primarily neurotic persons, or those not yet immersed in a psychosis (AVuA II p. 306).

and how far this understanding is still possible."[1]

But we have as yet referred to only one side of the psychotherapist's approach to the patient: the other remains equally fundamental: viz. as medical practitioner, trained in the natural sciences; and we can best explore how these two aspects have to 'live together' in the work of the psychotherapist by looking more closely at Binswanger's essay on the subject of psychotherapy.[2] First, a substantial quotation to make this point:

> "This new element - you know it already - cannot therefore itself come from the being-together,[3] but only from the specifically medical service to the actual medical task, i.e. from medico-psychological knowledge, and action consequent upon that knowledge. These two spheres, the being-together and the being-a-doctor, do not relate to each other in such a way as to follow, coincide with, or be separable from one another, but 'dialectically'. The dialectic between the native soil of every sort of psychotherapy, the factual 'life-historical' absorption in the being-with and the being-for-one-another, on the one side, and the knowledge and

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1. AVuA II p. 255: "Über die manische Lebensform", 1945. At this point we hit upon one of Binswanger's main criticisms of Jaspers; for the latter the psychoses remain an unintelligible puzzle (Jaspers, p. 778), and the 'worlds' of psychotic patients are inaccessible to us because our only means of understanding each other is by empathy, and the psychoses are beyond the scope of empathic understanding, as it were by definition. Binswanger employs the Daseins-analysis of patients, on the basis of Heideggerian ontology, because he sees the latter as applicable to all men qua men, thereby enabling him to overcome Jaspers' difficulty.
2. AVuA I pp. 132-158.
3. As used here, this term designates a personal relationship which is not purely utilitarian, but which expresses itself in friendship and love.

> mastery of the 'psyche' as an organism consisting of different biological-psychological life-functions, on the other,[1] this dialectic dominates every medical psychotherapy as it is practised and all scientific statements about it. Communication in the realm of the existence [of the patient], and action to release and direct biological-psychological 'powers' are the two dialectical poles of medical psychotherapy, and neither of them may appear purely on their own, nor may either retire to the advantage of the other... A good psychotherapist is always the one who, to use an excellent phrase of M. Buber's, is able to see aright the 'Kontrapunktik' operating in this dialectical relationship and to utilise it appropriately."[2]

Binswanger illustrates this dialectic with reference to a girl[3] who came to him suffering from an inability to control her larynx,[4] particularly during menstruation, so that she uttered loud noises in the night such as disturbed the neighbours, and, since they were completely uncontrollable, caused herself

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1. The distinction between (inner) life-history and life-function is integral to Binswanger's thought, expressing his re-assessment of Jaspers' division between the understanding of meaningful connections and the explanation of causal relations.

2. AVuA I p. 135.

3. The case is referred to, somewhat inaccurately, by Sadler in his study of Binswanger's thought, entitled "Existence and Love - A New Approach in Existential Phenomenology", New York, 1969, p. 135.

4. Binswanger describes the attacks as "Singultus attacks".

and those around her great embarrassment. When this began happening during treatment, Binswanger saw that it was necessary not just to look on, but actively to intervene.[1] He therefore put his finger on her throat, pressed hard so that she could not breathe, then removed it so that she instinctively took in her breath in a big gulp, thereby breaking the rhythm of the 'singultus' movement, which had itself presented a physiological 'Gestalt-circle'.[2] Binswanger was, as he says, playing off one force against another - which is often all that the doctor can do; i.e. he can only "act as scene-changer in the play which life is carrying out, sometimes in hidden stillness, sometimes noisily and angrily".[3] The essential thing is that the intervention should be appropriate; and this comes from hard work and experience, not from heaven![4]

But clearly such intervention is only possible where existentiell communication has been established; i.e. where the patient trusts the doctor; if she did not, she would see the intervention as violation and the symptom of the uncontrollable larynx would become all the more 'fixated'.[5]

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1. Thereby going against the advice of the master, as Binswanger called Freud, which was never to intervene actively during analysis.
2. A term of W. von Weizsäcker's, to describe a movement of forces complete in itself, whether on the physiological, neurological or (by analogy) on the personal level of human behaviour. See Wyss: Die tiefenpsychologischen Schulen, 3rd ed. Göttingen 1970, pp. 302ff.
3. AVuA I p. 138.
4. Ibid. p. 137.
5. Trust (AVuA I p. 138) is the gift the patient brings to the doctor, a gift which he cannot elicit or work for, and which will be the harder to obtain the more he works for it.

Now Binswanger admits, and here he must have Freudian criticism and interpretation in mind, that in the case in point there may have been feelings of domination (on the part of the doctor) and of masochistic erotic subjugation (on the part of the patient); but what matters is not their presence, but "what they mean, in the meaning-context of the psychotherapeutic action as a whole, whether they dominate or serve this whole".[1]

This intervention was merely the beginning to the therapy that was still to take place; the particular action now became a rite, by means of which the noise could be stopped each time it occurred. At the same time Binswanger was exploring the life-history of the patient, including events within her social environment, her own inner adjustment and development, and particularly her feelings towards her mother. Simultaneously, he was persuading those concerned to allow her to become engaged. He describes all this to show

> "how psychotherapy can work as a strategy, that is to say, as a totality comprising separate tactical psychotherapeutic decisions and methods; thus in our case, a totality comprising a psychotherapeutic individual act, a psychotherapeutic rite arising from that act, a social psychotherapeutic intervention and a particular psychotherapeutic fundamental method, in the sense of the systematic exploration of the outer and inner life-history."[2]

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1. Ibid. p. 139.

2. AVuA I p. 141.

There are two more points in regard to this case that require comment at this stage: first, the relationship between psychotherapist and patient, and second, the former's role as mediator between the patient and the outside world. They are closely linked in that the patient does not 're-discover herself' (which is the goal of the one to one relationship in which insight is gained into her 'inner world') without at the same time re-discovering the world of her fellow human beings. Hence (to take the second point first):

> "Psychotherapy in its real i.e. communicative-awakening and educative form and function always shows the doctor in a characteristic spiritual ('geistig') mediating role between the patient and the world, that is, the world of his fellows and the world of his environment...; for the way to the self always goes over the world, and the way to the world always over the self. Every correctly understood psychotherapy is reconciliation of man with himself and thus with the world, is the transformation of enmity with oneself into friendship with oneself and thus with the world."[1]

As regards the first point, Binswanger stresses that it is only when there is communication "between existence and existence"

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1. AVuA I p. 155. Cf. AVuA II p. 165 ("Geschehnis und Erlebnis", 1930) where Binswanger is commenting on W. von Weizsäcker's book "Soziale Krankheit und soziale Gesundung" (1930) and speaking of cases which require 'situation therapy', i.e. have a societal basis, and as such are beyond the scope of psycho-analysis; here "the personality of the doctor as mediator between patient and community plays a particularly important part". Cf. his report on his own Sanatorium at Kreuzlingen, where he observes that healing is being seen increasingly as taking place into, and through the society of which the individual is a part, p. 35.

that the inner life-history of the patient can be reconstructed and understood - and such communication is only possible if the relationship is regarded as a new one, a new and creative attempt to overcome the difficulties experienced in past relationships.[1]

This example illustrates the psychotherapist's dual approach to his patient; as psychotherapist, the doctor is concerned with his patient as fellow-man: but as psychiatrist he has to approach him as a 'natural object'. Even however, as psychotherapist, the doctor cannot disregard the clinical approach: he has, e.g. to see whether the central nervous system is 'intact', and if not, whether its condition puts 'particular limits' to his psychotherapy.[2] Here we can see the overlapping of the two terms, and I want to conclude this initial discussion by referring to an article in which Binswanger describes the four stages, or levels of enquiry, in which the psychiatrist has to be 'at home', if he is to do his therapeutic work properly.

First, there is that of the life-history, of which sufficient has been said, for the moment.

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1. AVuA I p. 143: Binswanger comments: "psycho-analytical doctrine in its emprisonment within mechanical categories, and thus within mechanical repetition, is peculiarly blind to the category of the new, and thus to that of the authentically creative in the life of the soul."

2. AVuA II p. 267 "Die Bedeutung Martin Heideggers für das Selbstverständnis der Psychiatrie", 1949.

Secondly, there is the

> "diagnostic reduction of the being-in-the-world and - if the case demands it - of its life-historical transformations into disease characteristics or symptoms... Here the sick person has stopped being partner in a relationship of communication...we have now got to the stage of 'the case'."[1]

The third stage is the psychopathological enquiry, in which the symptoms, which the previous stage had dwelt on, are used as the basis of a diagnostic judgment about the mental organism and its functioning (Binswanger is careful to use the term 'organism' here because psychopathological judgments are about the malfunctioning of that which can function, i.e. an organism).

> "Such judgments are teleological value-judgments, measured against the norm of the integrity of the achievements and functions of an organism."[2]

The fourth stage is concerned with the localisation of the mental function (and of the functional disturbance) in the physical organism.

> "You will have realised already that we are concerned here with the reduction of the third stage, psychopathology to pathophysiology and pathological anatomy of the psychoses."[3]

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1. AVuA II p. 261 "Über die manische Lebensform", 1945.
2. Ibid. p. 262.
3. AVuA II p. 262.

Binswanger concludes this particular essay by describing again the task of the psychiatrist: his purpose in writing had been to show the complexity of the path the psychiatrist has to tread before he can get to questions of "disease causation and disease process, heredity, eugenics and causal therapy".[1] This does not, however, mean that when we have reached this fourth stage of the process of reduction[2] the psychiatrist has found the physical cause and can discard the rest;[3] on the contrary Binswanger writes:

> "You will only become a psychiatrist in the full sense of the term if you do not see the whole of the psychiatric task in any one of these separate stations or stages on the way, if you do not jump over any of the stages as unimportant or insignificant, but are always en route from one stage to the next and feel yourself at home precisely in being thus 'en route'; for it is

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1. Ibid.

2. To sum up this process of reduction one can say that it is a systematic narrowing down of the phenomena of human existence presented to the doctor to that which is accessible to his specifically medical categories of investigation; it involves the doctor in consciously looking away from the totality and uniqueness of the individual over against him, and submitting the mental and physical organism that remains to assessment in terms claiming universal validity (though remaining aware of the value judgment implicit within diagnosis). For the relation of this kind of reductional process to that of the phenomenological epoché, see below Chapter 6.

3. This would make nonsense of Binswanger's unceasing criticism of 'reductionist psychologies and psychiatric theories', see esp. Chapter 5 below.

there that both psychiatry's authentic method and also the authentic being of the psychiatrist himself will disclose themselves to you."[1]

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1. AVuA II p. 263. In a later essay: "Daseinsanalytik und Psychiatrie" (1950: AVuA II pp. 279-302), Binswanger expounds these stages again, with the help of the metaphor of a building, which has as its basis Daseinsanalysis, with the first floor occupied by psychopathology, and the second by psycho- and somato-therapy; and the main point he makes is that access to all parts of the building has to be maintained at all times.

CHAPTER 5

The Importance of the Categories of Natural Science for Psychiatry

Preface

The last chapter set before us Binswanger's account of the psychiatrist's work with his patient; it described him as operating on a variety of levels with various sets of categories.[1] One of these was what must be termed for the moment simply the natural scientific. We must now therefore explore Binswanger's view of the place and role of the natural sciences within psychiatry. He does not present us with a systematic account of the relevance of e.g. biology, neurology, or physiology for psychiatry, but rather asks about the place of these categories both in the characteristic psychiatric judgment in regard to the individual case, and the psychiatric way of thinking as a whole.

As we have seen, the psychiatrist carries out his work with his patient in a dialectical tension between the I-Thou and the I-it relations; in this chapter we concentrate on

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1. The term 'category' in this chapter should not be taken to imply the ontological significance which is traditionally associated with it.

the latter, but the former remains a 'silent companion' throughout, until at the end it becomes imperative to turn our attention to the patient's experiencing ego, that lies 'behind' and 'holds together' the variety of phenomena accessible to the psychiatrist with the categories of natural science.

We will find Binswanger's debate concentrating on two major issues: one, the question how he can grasp the whole (whether the whole man, or psychiatry as a whole), in particular whether the categories of natural science enable him to grasp the whole; and two, the nature of mental phenomena and the question of the appropriate categories to understand them. In the course of this debate, we will be confronted with the mind-body problem, and with theories of associational psychology.[1] Here in particular it will be necessary to see exactly what use is being made of a theory (and whether philosophical conclusions are being drawn from it as to the nature of man), and what status Binswanger accords it. We will find, as so often, that Binswanger's debate is conducted with Jaspers, and then with Freud.

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1. These are traceable to David Hartley (Observations on Man, 1749) and ultimately to Locke.

1. The problem stated:
   On what basis can one speak of psychiatry as a unified whole? With what categories can psychiatry grasp the patient as a whole?

We were looking in Chapter 4 at the psychiatrist at work as a doctor, employing a variety of hermeneutical categories in order to understand his patient and diagnose his ailment. But this is not, as Binswanger saw it, his only task. He has also to systematise his findings, as an enquirer into conditions of the human mind, i.e. to build up his own working discipline, in order better to approach his patients. Thus psychiatry is not only the practice of medicine, but also research and systematisation; only when both these aspects are carried through, only when the psychiatrist has become aware of the nature and presuppositions of the categories he is using, can his psychiatry lay claim to the status of a scientific discipline.[1]

Here we have one of Binswanger's constant concerns - indeed the concern that makes his work potentially rewarding for an inter-disciplinary study such as the present one. It is the concern for the whole, and for the relation of the parts to the whole and to each other; characteristically, this search is carried out both in relation to the whole human being, and to the whole that makes up the discipline of psychiatry, as the complex of categories with which he works. The question (primarily a philosophical one) as to the nature

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1. Cf. AVuA II "Die Bedeutung der Daseinsanalytik Martin Heideggers für das Selbstverständtnis der Psychiatrie" 1950 (pp. 264-278), part 1.

of the whole and its comprehensibility will accompany us throughout the exposition of his thought; and the account Binswanger gives of this matter will be seen to be his major point of divergence from Jaspers and the reason he embraces (with modifications for his own purposes) the ontological framework provided by Heidegger's existential analysis. Briefly, Jaspers remained a Kantian in this respect: the whole is unattainable to human scientific knowing; it is rather a 'regulative idea' which human reason requires for its exploration of the world, but which it can never read off the material it is studying. Knowledge is always partial, discursive, and the faculty of knowing, one that divides up, differentiates.[1] Indeed, for Jaspers, to imagine that a man can ascertain 'the whole', in whatever field of knowledge, personal or otherwise, is to deny the essential feature of man's existence: its limitless possibilities of illumination.[2]

Binswanger thought that Jaspers was too sceptical with regard both to understanding the patient as a whole, and to the possibility of grasping the discipline of psychiatry as a whole.

As regards the former, he draws attention to the experienced psychiatrist's intuition as regards e.g. the diagnosis of schizophrenia: this starts with the man 'as a whole' and 'senses' his schizophrenic condition, not in the

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1. I am of course referring to theoretical, not practical, reason, within the Kantian scheme.

2. See Jaspers, Gen. Psychopath., Introduction and passim.

way the physician has a 'hunch' that he is dealing with a case of appendicitis, but rather as an immediate act of interpersonal perception.[1]

In an important article, written a year before that in which the preceding discussion was set out, Binswanger wrote:

> "Jaspers, in his General Psychopathology, we should not forget, speaks of an 'intuition of the whole that is the schizophrenic',[2] and of a 'schizophrenic atmosphere' in which the various symptom-complexes can be submerged. But with his characteristic caution, indeed scepticism, he explains everywhere that we cannot grasp the whole, but can only recount a multitude of separate items, and only by our experience of intercourse with the patient experience the total phenomenon. Now this intuition of this particular whole that we call autism...has to be laid hold of phenomenologically, fixed and worked through scientifically."[3]

Binswanger sees this as a task for psychiatry: to work out systematically the epistemological basis on which such personal

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1. AVuA II p. 136 "Welche Aufgaben ergeben sich für die Psychiatrie aus den Fortschritten der neueren Psychologie?" It is worth noting that this article (and the following quotation) were written before SuZ appeared in 1927.

2. Jaspers, Gen. Psychopath. p. 581.

3. AVuA I p. 44 "Über Phänomenologie", 1923; Binswanger also criticises Jaspers' colleague (in the Heidelberg school), C. Schneider, for presenting the reader with a heap of material but not enabling him to catch sight of the "specific schizophrenic in the sense of the intuited whole" (3FMD p. 21 with ref. to C. Schneider: "Die schizophrenen Symptomverbande", Berlin 1942).

perception of the nature of another person is possible.[1] This is by no means to deny the piecemeal, discursive, understanding of another man's character and personality - using the categories of natural science for the purpose -, but it is to assert the possibility and indeed the primacy of the perception of the other as a whole, as a 'Gestalt'.

This task as regards the knowledge of the individual also applies to the total body of psychiatric knowledge: Binswanger seeks to establish and expound that which makes it a systematic whole; and here again we find him consciously differentiating his position from that of Jaspers:

> "The first and fundamental presentation of psychiatry as a science, Jaspers' Psychopathology, certainly exhibits a horizontal juxtaposition of its tasks, directions and results of research, but it does not recognise any a priori ground-plan, in accordance with which one could conceive of the construction of psychiatry as a science. In view of the variety and differentiation within the psychiatric task and the many different 'Gestalts' its subject-matter assumes, one might reject the idea of such a ground-plan as essentially unattainable; or one could explain that such a ground-plan is unnecessary because psychiatry is built up purely on the basis of biology."[2]

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1. For his solution see Chapters 6 and 7 below.

2. AVuA II p. 280 "Daseinsanalytik und Psychiatrie", 1950.

The last sentence of this quotation will make it clear why I have introduced this discussion of the whole - and perception of the whole - at this point. Traditional psychiatry had thought that the natural sciences could provide it with the categories and basis it required to encompass the totality of its interests.[1] We must now look more closely at this conception of psychiatry, and at Binswanger's criticisms of it.

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1. Binswanger recounts the attempt to provide such a basis, first by Griesinger, who saw the personality in terms of brain anatomy, then by Wernicke, in terms of neuropathology, and in the same tradition by Freud, in terms of teleological biology: AVuA II "Freud und die Verfassung der klinischen Psychiatrie" (tr. Needleman, pp. 182-205), 1936, pp. 81-104. The motto of Griesinger's school was: "all psychic or mental illness is cerebral illness". Clearly Jaspers regards this with as little favour as does Binswanger: it is, he says, dogmatic (Jaspers, Gen. Psychopath. III Introduction). He concludes that the search for one all-embracing basis for psychiatry is doomed to failure. One has to admit diverse and even contradictory approaches.

2. The all-embracing claims of the natural-scientific approach to psychiatry

First let us state again Binswanger's commitment to clinical psychiatry, involving as that does the task of isolating physical disturbance as sometimes the cause of mental disturbance:

> "Perhaps it is necessary, once and for all, to say that no one values the clinical enterprise more highly than I do. As one can see, I always start there and come back to that point. Just as, in the case of normal dealings between men, the unexpressed presupposition holds good: morality as a matter of course, so for investigations such as ours, the presupposition: the clinical as a matter of course, holds equally well. Only on the basis of the mastery of the clinical enterprise are such anthropological investigations possible,[1] just as, on the other side, only through such investigations does the clinic become aware that anthropology remains its continual nourishing soil. If it loses sight of this, if it sees only its goal, and not its origin, it must inevitably become ossified."[2]

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1. Binswanger is referring to his studies of the 'worlds' of patients suffering from 'flights of ideas'; see chapter 9, part 2, below.

2. Ideenflucht, pp. 146-147. The final sentences of the quotation state briefly the 'locus' where Binswanger finds the basis for which he is looking.

We must bear in mind the two-fold task of the psychiatrist: first as doctor, second as scientist. As doctor Binswanger stands firmly within the tradition of clinical psychiatry: it is an essential part of his expertise.[1] As scientist, seeking for the unifying basis of his discipline, he hesitates in joining those who would associate psychiatry solely with the natural-scientific method and find its unity in categories which are those of the natural sciences. Their reasoning, as Binswanger saw it, went as follows: there are occasions when it is clear that mental changes are the result of a physical disturbance to the organism, such as can be observed. (Indeed Binswanger would himself argue that all physical change to the organism is accompanied by mental change, though, as we will see, precisely this body-mind parallelism is a dualism which his holistic approach cannot in the end tolerate.) Hence the necessary presence of the natural-scientific method of enquiry such as observes and theorises (the two occupations going hand in hand), and explains in terms of cause and effect. Because mental change has been known to accompany observed physical change, it is argued that mental phenomena 'behave in the same way' as physical

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1. Cf. AVuA II p. 108 (from "Bleulers geistige Gestalt", 1940):
> "For where would we get to, if e.g. we wanted to give a purely psychological 'explanation' for the ending of a paranoid syndrom following the systematic reduction of sugar in the blood? For medical thought and action, the organism and the biological method remain the fundamental category of being and thought."

phenomena.[1] The essential point is not now that all mental disease is cerebral disease,[2] but that all mental happenings or events proceed analogously to physical events, and are to be understood (or better, 'explained') in terms of cause and effect. 'Ideas' are conceived of as blocks of material which move against and in relation to each other, to produce consciousness, and (to turn to the 'ideas' themselves) are to be regarded as having some counterpart - on the physical level - within the brain or central nervous system.

Binswanger takes his own teacher, E. Bleuler, to task for this kind of thinking: Bleuler was working with psychological terms within his psychiatric explanation, but was handling them as if the psychological phenomena to which they referred 'behaved' analogously to neurological phenomena. For instance, he sought to explain the psychological judgment of 'sameness' - e.g. of colour - in terms of 'engramms' which, on the perception of a red poppy and a red carnation, are juxtaposed within the central nervous system, in some way corresponding to the two observed phenomena, and bringing about ipso facto the judgment: 'the colour is the same'. Binswanger asks: who does the judging? What sort of an act is this? And he concludes that this theoretical account, constructed on the basis of the natural sciences is firstly quite untestable (and therefore invalid within the framework of natural scientific theory itself), and secondly leaves out of account the primary

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1. This is the basis of the work of men as different from each other as Bleuler, Wernicke and Freud.

2. This would ultimately eliminate 'mind language'.

phenomenon that makes its appearance in any sort of mental judgment: the 'I' that does the judging.[1]

We find a more developed argument along the same lines (and of considerable pathological significance) in the introduction to Binswanger's work on 'flights of ideas'.[2] Here the phenomenon that presents itself to the observer is a mass of apparently disconnected words or ideas, following no normal logical pattern, but arising, as it would appear, out of similarities in their vocal formation or acoustic sound. Furthermore, ideas which we would normally regard as of primary importance are 'levelled down' to the status of other words or ideas which are normally incidental or secondary. Wernicke had accounted for this 'levelling down' process, by the supposition of a rise in physiological excitation "in particular chosen channels".[3] Now here we do have the attempt to explain

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1. Cf. AVuA II p. 116: "Welche Aufgaben ergeben sich für die Psychiatrie aus den Fortschritten der neueren Psychologie?" 1924. See too AVuA I p. 23 "Über Phänomenologie", 1923. In both references, we can see Husserl's influence on Binswanger; he himself states that it was his preoccupation with Husserl that brought him to realise the limitations of the 'naturalistic' viewpoint. See Chapter 6 below.

2. Ideenflucht, pp. 1-15.

3. Binswanger quotes Wernicke's Grundriss, 2nd ed., 31st lecture (Binswanger, Ideenflucht, p. 4). He refers later to a similar attempt to analyse flights of ideas, this time by measuring the speed of (thoughts and) words issuing from the patient, as if thought-formation could be measured:

> "The application of the category of objective time to [a man's inner] experiencing is itself a stupidity in the sense of the most serious of all scientific mistakes - the 'error of mistaking categorial levels' (Hartman). Speed and tempo in general are categories of objective time. If we apply them to experiential thinking, we translate the very experiencing fictitiously into a psychological or physiological function, which we can never directly observe or register..." ibid. p. 50.

mental phenomena in terms of physiological change, but such explanation depends on regarding the words themselves as 'behaving' analogously to e.g. anatomical phenomena, that is to say, being affected (as regards their relationships to each other) by quantitative changes in their 'surroundings'.

> "Here we can see with all clarity what sacrificia intellectus psychiatry can demand, when it insists on going ahead at all costs natural-scientifically. Today we know perfectly well that the logical and moral value of an 'idea' or an action or a character can never be explained in terms of the intensity of a physiological function, that we have here, rather, two categorially incommensurate 'levels', two completely un-unitable conceptual worlds. Such a crass violation and translation of psychological, logical and ethical value-questions into biological-physiological questions of intensity, you can only find today in the work of Freud."[1]

From Wernicke, Binswanger moves on to consider the work of Liepmann,[2] who took the discussion of 'flights of ideas' at least partially out of the realm of mechanical-association of ideas and compared the phenomenon with that of the ordered movement of ideas in ordinary thought; this he expounded psychologically, i.e. in terms of the meaning of the words uttered. But he then went on to explain the 'disordered' movement of ideas natural-scientifically (i.e. in terms of the

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1. Ideenflucht, p. 4.
2. Liepmann, Über Ideenflucht, 1904.

mechanical-association theory), as if the meaning of the words uttered were inaccessible or non-existent.

> "That means nothing other than that as long as a man thinks in an orderly fashion, he is an object of psychology, but that when he no longer does so, he is an object of natural science! This view, that goes against the simplest demands of scientific theory and has to be described as purely opportunistic, has founded schools of thought (and still to a large extent dominates psychiatry)."[1]

Liepmann, from Binswanger's point of view, shows an advance, in that he is prepared to bring in the question of the meaning of words - at least as the background to discussing flights of ideas. But the pull of the natural-scientific approach is so strong that any disturbance of the orderliness of ideas is regarded as only explicable by analogy with the physical attraction of one object to another. Later in the same work,[2] Binswanger returns to the same theme: this (i.e. Liepmann's) approach to language views it as if it were made up of a large number of separate blocks (= words) each of which is a whole on its own, and then posits some blind force within the person that associates one word with another on the ground of common or contrasting sound or formation. Binswanger observes that we are in fact not dealing here with wholes, but with a thousand fragments separated from that which alone can make them into wholes, namely, the conscious ego that utters

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1. Ideenflucht, p. 6.
2. Ibid. pp. 85ff.

them. Instead of the 'I', we have an 'it':

> "The hypothetical 'it' does not 'live' in a world, does not 'have' a world over against it, does not 'transcend', is on the contrary an anonymous blind force or power, indeed a thoroughly mechanical function, which is capable of binding everything with everything..."[1]

Binswanger points to the circular nature of the argument: it requires the hypothesis of elemental 'bricks' out of which sentences are formed (in the healthy these are thoughts, in the sick they are mechanical associations); the theory sets out to explain such phenomena as flights of ideas, but in fact itself depends upon conclusions reached from the 'observation' of flights of ideas seen precisely as collections of 'verbal blocks' in confused formation.

To summarise: we have here mental phenomena being explained by analogy with physical phenomena: i.e. we have an extension of the use of categories employed to explain physical phenomena to another area, viz. the mental; and the underlying motive behind such an extension (Binswanger claims) is the incorporation of psychiatry without remainder into the realm of the natural sciences. Binswanger calls this a 'category mistake' (by which he means the mistaken appropriation of one set of categories to another realm of discourse), perpetrated at the cost of leaving out all reference to the meaning-bestowing ego, and also of irrevocably separating psychiatry

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1. Ideenflucht, p. 86. This quotation draws on Husserlian language, which will be referred to in the next chapter.

from psychology.[1] The task such thinking sets Binswanger is that of expounding the meaning-content of phenomena such as flights of ideas, which are, he admits, at first sight meaningless. It is clear that a lot is at stake here: can the man who is 'mentally ill' still be regarded as a human being with whom meaningful discourse is still possible?

> "The big mistake, which we, guided by clinical practice, so much want to believe is that the mentally ill ('cerebrally ill') patient is no longer man..."[2]

Before leaving this section, in which we have touched on the theory of the free association of ideas, it is worth referring to a note Binswanger adds to his discussion, drawing the reader's attention to the dual role of psychiatrist, as practitioner and as theoretician; it will lead us into his discussion of Freud's work. He says[3] that he has no objection to the practice of associational psychology (in the course of psycho-analytical treatment), from which a great deal can be learned about the way a patient thinks and is, i.e. about his individuality, particularly in view of the fact that in discursive discussion it is possible for the patient to be highly defensive. It is rather the presuppositions and

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1. The psychology referred to is of course not behaviourist, but phenomenological, and includes the Gestalt school.
2. Ideenflucht, p. 121.
3. Ibid. p. 86.

interpretations of associational theory that he criticises, and in particular its mechanistic view of language[1] (at least of the mentally ill): it analyses words without reference to the thinking ego that bestows meaning upon them.

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1. The phenomenon of language plays a central part in Binswanger's understanding of human existence (as it surely must on any account). In speech we are presented with a physical act that requires physical co-ordination within the organism, but an act that is simultaneously the paradeigmatic act of the thinking, communicating ego. Binswanger engaged in a long debate (AVuA II "Zum Problem von Sprache und Denken", 1926) with Lotmar on the nature of aphasia, which he attempted to understand on the basis of Husserlian (philosophical) phenomenology. In the preface to the same volume (published much later - in 1955) he admits that he was putting a weight on Husserl's purely philosophical investigations which these were not designed to carry, and was also not giving due weight to Lotmar's analysis of neurological breakdown in the functional apparatus that effects speaking. (It should be added that this withdrawal from his former position did not mean an end to Husserlian analysis on Binswanger's part: see below, Chapter 9, section 5). On the significance of language in general see AVuA II pp. 346-366, "Über Sprache und Denken", 1946. There language is seen as the expression of meaningful thinking such as constitutes the unity of the human being, transcending the mind-body dichotomy.

3. The all-embracing claims of Freudian psycho-analysis

We can now turn to Binswanger's critique of Freud,[1] having just seen, in his criticism of the theory of the association of ideas, how the distinction between practitioner and theoretician has constantly to be borne in mind.

There is an important sense in which Freud did not try to reduce the mental phenomena to the physical; he insisted on staying alongside the mental as mental; indeed, his whole theory depends on the thorough-going meaningfulness of all mental phenomena, and in this respect he must of course be contrasted with those thinkers with whom we have been dealing up to now (apart from Jaspers). But he is entirely at one with them in thinking it right to extend the jurisdiction of the natural sciences to cover all mental phenomena, which are held to 'operate' within the framework of strict causal sequence.[2] Hence the importance in both the theory and the

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1. See too Chapter 9, section 1, where Binswanger's appreciation of Freud and his considerable dependence upon psycho-analysis will be discussed. Cf. Grundformen, p. 426.

2. Cf. Freud ILP-A p. 21:

> Does the man who maintains that mistakes are accidental and thus meaningless "mean to maintain that they fail to come within the causal sequence of things, that they might as well be other than they are? Anyone thus breaking away from the determination of natural phenomena, at any single point, has thrown over the whole scientific outlook on the world."

practice of psycho-analysis of the 'free' association of ideas, where the freedom is of course illusory, and where ideas are conceived of as independent entities that can be located in various spheres of the mind (conceived of, analogically, topographically), and moved about from one area to another. Here ideas, and spoken words, <u>are</u> considered with regard to their meaning, but are still thought of mechanistically.[1]

Now Freud's express aim is to provide the missing foundation for psychiatry, by demonstrating that what appeared an alien (i.e. humanistic, non-natural-scientific) factor, namely meaning, could itself be incorporated within the structure of natural-scientific psychiatry.[2] He does in fact aim to go further and finally establish the organic, physical, foundation of psycho-analysis, and thus of psychiatry.[3]

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1. Contrast Liepmann (see above p.176). Thus Freud draws consciousness and the intentionality of the ego (to use Husserl's phrase) into his framework but then (says Binswanger) literally murders the ego by turning it into an 'id'; he rightly translates the 'I cannot' into an 'I will not', but then translates this latter into an 'it cannot' (see AVuA I p. 154f: "Über Psychotherapie", 1935). This de-personalising of the constituent parts of the person is not carried through consistently by Freud. Indeed Binswanger draws attention to the (pictorially) personal language that Freud finds himself constrained to use in describing the relation of one constituent part to another ("Mein Weg zu Freud" in Der Mensch... p. 37f).

2. Cf. ILP-A p. 16: Psycho-analysis "hopes to provide psychiatry with the missing psychological foundation, to discover the common ground on which a correlation of bodily and mental phenomena becomes comprehensible".

3. Cf. ILP-A p. 302: "The edifice of psycho-analytic doctrine which we have erected is in reality but a superstructure, which will have to be set on its organic foundation at some time or other; but this foundation is still unknown to us."

The form of the natural sciences championed by Freud to fulfil this function is biology,[1] a biology that looks at an organism not so much with regard to its origins as to its end (e.g. in the pursuit of pleasure seen as the satisfaction of instinctual desire); the concept which holds the key position within this framework is the instinct, of which Binswanger writes:

> "In Freud's instinct there lurks hidden that little metaphysical devil which in psychiatry makes its nonsense in the form of the cerebral cortex."[2]

This framework enables Freud to explain human action and motivation in quantitative terms: an action now depends on the correct intensity and quantity of 'libido' present in the organism at the time.[3]

Binswanger makes the following comment:[4]

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1. AVuA II p. 94 "Freud und die Verfassung der klinischen Psychiatrie", 1936 (in Needleman's translation p. 195): "To understand Freud's great ideas correctly one must not, therefore, proceed from psychology - a mistake I myself made for a long time. Otherwise one does not do him justice, and stumbles at every point against the thoroughly unpsychological concept of a psychic apparatus, against its topographically overlapping structure of well-defined 'systems' related dynamically and economically to each other."
2. AVuA II p. 54 "Psychoanalyse und klinische Psychiatrie", 1920.
3. Cf. Wernicke's account of the 'levelling down' of ideas in the phenomenon known as 'flight of ideas'; see above p.175.
4. The quotation that follows (AVuA I p. 66 "Lebensfunktion und innere Lebensgeschichte", 1928) was written eight years before that recorded in note 1 above, and describes psycho-analysis as a whole, rather than its theoretical constructions. It remains true that Binswanger came to see Freudian psycho-analysis more and more exclusively in terms of biology: the anthropology that underlies Freud's work is that of homo natura (cf. "Freuds Auffassung des Menschen im Lichte der Anthropologie" AVuA I pp. 159-189 = Needleman pp. 149-181); and the concept of nature that lies behind the whole enterprise is regarded by Binswanger as a romantic-mystical one, inspired at least in part by Goethe. According to this view, human beings are experiments of nature, which is itself in the last

(contd.)

"Certainly as far as the carrying out of any motivation is concerned, i.e. its possibility or impossibility, quantitative dynamic-functional life-conditions, especially in the brain, play a part; but a quantitative plus or minus can nowhere ever decide whether 'those constituent elements required to produce meaning'[1] come together to a unity, i.e. to a unified psychological meaning Gestalt; the mental[2] motivational process must be taken into account here, as Freud 'in practice' carries out with unsurpassed effect. This discrepancy between theory and practical psychological hermeneutic provides straight away the answer to the very short-sighted question as to whether psycho-analysis is to be assigned to the natural sciences or to psychology or to the humanities. As if we were concerned here with <u>one</u> science in the sense of one unified meaning-complex, and not rather with a multiplicity of the same which are on their side held together solely through general and individual practical research purposes, rather than by any immanent theoretical principle. As a hermeneutic

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Continuation of note 4 from p. 183:

resort inaccessible; what we have (even in e.g. physiology) are pictorial descriptions of it. Some of these descriptive languages appear more straightforward and acceptable than others (viz., chemistry than psychology), but all are attempts to approach that which in the end is inaccessible ("Mein Weg zu Freud" in Der Mensch... pp. 54-61).

1. A ref. to Husserlian analysis; for the influence of Husserl on Binswanger, see below, Chapter 6.

2. German: 'geistig'.

> method in the sense of the exploration, exposition and reconstruction of inner-life history, psycho-analysis belongs to psychology, as a theory of dynamic-functional life-processes to biology etc. Even Jaspers...did not properly see and expound this fact."[1]

Thus what Freud sought to establish as the common ground of psychiatry, Binswanger sees as a mixture of different kinds of statements, belonging to different disciplines, held together by "general and individual research purposes".[2] We will return to this point later, throwing light as it does on Binswanger's account of the validation of scientific work. But at the moment we must turn to look more closely at the psychopathological diagnosis, which exhibits, according to Binswanger, a similar mixing of categories.

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1. Jaspers divided his work on Psychopathology into several sections, each of which expressed one methodological approach to psychopathology. The two most important were: (1) causal explanation and (2) the understanding of meaningful connections. Jaspers said that Freud thought psycho-analysis belonged to (1), whereas in fact it should be assigned to (2), i.e. its claim to being 'causal exact explanation' is misleading as regards its scope and its method; Gen. Psychopath. pp. 537ff. Binswanger cannot follow Jaspers here, because he cannot let the latter's division between causal explanation and meaningful connections rest as it stands; he regards the notion of 'meaningful connections' as only a 'helping-out construction', which itself leaves on one side the intentional ego. Cf. AVuA II p. 78. Elsewhere Binswanger attacks Jaspers for criticising the whole Freudian enterprise by reference to only a part of it, namely, the notion of the unconscious. Binswanger himself insists on the heterogeneous nature of the theory and practice of psycho-analysis, while at the same time coming to see Freud's own conception of it as placing it within the field of biology (i.e. within the natural sciences).

2. Doubtless at least some of the impetus for the search to find a 'common ground' for psychiatry stems from Binswanger's preoccupation with Freud, his dependence upon psycho-analysis as a psychotherapeutic method, and his dissatisfaction with it as regards providing a base for the whole. In the end it is (apart from anything else) too theory-laden (as opposed to phenomenological); psychiatry can only stand a certain amount of theoretical construction (AVuA II p. 15f), because it always involves the theoretician in the direct personal encounter with the patient, which draws on resources other than theory.

4. The heterogeneous nature of psychopathological judgments

We may start with a quotation on the subject from Binswanger's studies on flights of ideas:

> "When we state that someone suffers from 'flights of ideas' we are making a psychiatric diagnostic judgment, which expresses a fairly well known state of affairs, but which is thereby by no means understood in the complexity of its construction or in its actual basis; for in the diagnosis that someone suffers from 'flights of ideas', there is present not only a clinical-natural-scientific judgment concerning a particular kind of mental occurrence or function, but also a psychological judgment about a particular way of experiencing, of intentional directedness or 'opining'. This means that here, as in every psychopathological diagnosis, natural-scientific and psychological questions, conceptuality and judgments, in other words, clinical fact and psychological material interpenetrate each other. In this interpenetration or crossing lies the real destiny of psychological-psychiatric diagnosis and the history of the same. We cannot close our eyes to it, but must look it in the face, and comprehend its methodological significance. This is however only possible on the basis of ontological or anthropological study."[1]

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1. Ideenflucht, p. 1. The last sentence shows how Binswanger is going to solve his problem. Jaspers would agree that we need to be aware of the 'crossing' of different scientific approaches to man, and that we need to disentangle any conceptual muddles that arise therefrom. But he would refuse to go beyond the critical business of becoming aware of our methodology, i.e. by constructing, or better 'discovering' an *a priori* (ontological) basis such as would enable us to order our various approaches.

The question is: psychiatric diagnosis is concerned with the assessment of the person, both mind and body, as a functioning organism, an organism that can malfunction. It is also concerned with that person as a thinking-experiencing ego, considering (and bewildered by) its own experience. How can it do justice to both, and where must it start, if it is to do justice to both? Binswanger maintains that if it starts with the organism, it can never get from there to the thinking ego: it must therefore start by exploring the patient's state of consciousness, in such a way that the patient's ego is maintained as an ego, over against the enquirer. Having done that, he will no longer be able to see the organism with which he is concerned as de-personalised, or perhaps better 'mindless', but rather inseparably one with a Thou.[1]

We have already inevitably anticipated the subject of the next chapter: Husserlian phenomenology; suffice it to say here that it is a cardinal feature of the phenomenological analysis of consciousness that it is always 'mine' or 'yours' or 'his'. Consciousness as such is an abstraction, just as is the notion of 'the body' as such. A human body is always 'mine' or 'yours' or 'his',[2] the body itself is an abstraction - but a necessary one if science is to do its job. Psychiatric diagnosis works with this abstraction, whether it is concerned with the physical or the mental organism: it abstracts from

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1. Cf. Buber's I-Thou, in contrast to the I-it.

2. AVuA II p. 273, "Die Bedeutung der Daseinsanalytik Martin Heideggers für das Selbstverständnis der Psychiatrie", 1949.

the phenomenon of consciousness of meaning.[1]

Binswanger stresses that as soon as psychiatry deals with functions, it abstracts in this way; he accepts that it is right to do this with the workings of the mind as well as with those of the body,[2] and to employ biological teleological value-judgments for the purpose;[3] it is right to do this, so long as psychiatry does not imagine that it is thereby concerning itself with the whole of the person.[4] The whole will only be grasped, if one concerns oneself both with the life-function and with the life-history of the individual, employing different methods for dealing with each aspect,

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1. Clearly, to substantiate this point Binswanger would have to expound his view of the nature of consciousness; viz. that consciousness is not a 'tabula rasa' on which sense data are imprinted, but is itself an active intentional meaning-bestowing agent. If it were a tabula rasa, i.e. a passive organ of receptivity, then it is arguable that it would be open to natural-scientific inspection without reduction or abstraction, as indeed Freud thought it was (with modifications: see AVuA I p. 163, where Binswanger compares Freud with Locke: Needleman p. 174).

2. Hence the mind-body problem, which looms so large in so much discussion, is seen by Binswanger as largely a pseudo-problem; the real division lies not between mind and body, as between the person as agent and as physical-mental organism. See Chapter 9, section 1. Suffice it to say here that as soon as one sees the person in the latter way, the person as agent stands before one by contrast; necessity, determination, causality, at once point to their opposites, and make it clear that the view of man that sees him as an organism is 'not the whole story' (cf. AVuA I "Freuds Auffassung des Menschen im Lichte der Anthropologie", 1936; Needleman, p. 167).

3. All biological judgments are teleological (cf. Kant, Critique of Judgment), acc. to Binswanger. The psychopathological judgments are value judgments in that they contain within them a valuation of the person concerned in terms of the value: health. This evaluation is culturally conditioned. See 3FMD p. 41. (They are also sociological judgments - see AVuA II p. 165, Existence p. 227, Boss, p. 56.)

4. See esp. AVuA I "Freuds Auffassung..." (Needleman, pp. 149-81).

namely, natural-scientific method in the first case, and an as yet undefined method in the second. We return to our starting-point and to the question: how can the whole man be grasped - if the methods for understanding him are incommensurable? One thing is certain:

> "Even if the concepts function and life-historical moment are not bridgeable, it remains in each case one and the same real man who has an organism that functions in such and such a way, and a life-history that proceeds in such and such a way."[1]

One other point needs to be considered: the scientist who works with the methods of the natural sciences and the psychiatrist who diagnoses with biological-teleological categories not only abstract from their object its meaning-bestowing ego, but also abstract themselves as observers as far as possible from the phenomena they are observing.[2] There is therefore a double abstraction or reduction from what is actually the case in the encounter between the two concerned. We are left with two 'factors' necessarily unresolved, or 'left out of focus': the consciousness of the two egos involved. As long as this remains undefined and

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1. AVuA I p. 53f. "Lebensfunktion und innere Lebensgeschichte", 1928.

2. Cf. AVuA I p. 182ff. (Needleman, pp. 166-181, esp. 171ff.).

unclarified, it is, says Binswanger, impossible to come to a clear understanding of the nature of the enterprise and discipline of psychiatry.[1]

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1. Cf. Grundformen, p. 685, where Binswanger is speaking of Dilthey and Freud: neither of them realised that their own understanding was involved in, and part of, the work they were doing (described by Binswanger as the game Dasein plays with itself - viz. in understanding itself):

> "Dilthey sees the play of Dasein with 'the eyes of love', in enthusiastic deepening involvement in the same, and selfless giving of oneself to the same; but he does not see the 'eyes of love' in Dasein's play with itself. Freud on the other hand wanted to see this game with 'the eyes of truth'; but he did not see the 'eyes of truth' in the game itself. Both were great researchers into the game; but they were not able to discover the sense of their own research in what they researched; they did not place themselves (in their research) into Dasein's play with itself. And so with each of these teachers there remains an unmastered residue."

CHAPTER 6

The Importance of Phenomenology for Psychiatry; the Accessibility of the Conscious (Meaning-bestowing) Ego to Analysis

Preface

The following two chapters take us into the realm of philosophy (in particular, to the thought of Husserl and Heidegger), and may seem far removed from the actual business of psychotherapy. They are, nevertheless, essential, if we are to understand Binswanger's thought as well as his practice. However, the following chapter will inevitably raise the question of the appropriateness of Binswanger's involvement in philosophical investigations.[1] At the outset the following needs to be said: first, he saw all his deliberations as being in the service of psychiatry; he did not intend to become a philosopher. Second, the subject-matter with which he was concerned as a psychiatrist were the mental worlds of his patients; thus questions as to the nature of consciousness are unavoidable. Thirdly, he found the psychiatry of his day dominated by a methodology which, as he saw it, was incapable

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1. Cf. Jaspers' Gen. Psychopath. pp. 775ff., where he takes 'existential psychiatry or psychology' to task for attempting to do a scientific task by philosophical means.

of grasping the content of the patient's consciousness as meaningful utterance; he therefore saw it as a prime task to explore the nature of meaning, and to establish categories capable of grasping hold of the meaningfulness of the phenomena of consciousness. Fourthly, he was aware that a psychiatrist met his patient both as doctor and as fellow human being; he needed therefore to become as clear on the nature of the latter encounter as he was on the former - and for this he required the direct help of philosophical analysis.

The movement of thought in this chapter is as follows: we begin by referring again to Binswanger's assessment of Jaspers' concept of the understanding of meaningful connections; we will find the same thing lacking here (on Binswanger's view), though with much less disastrous results, as in the natural-scientific approach to consciousness, namely, an adequate means of understanding and expressing it as a meaning-bestowing agent. We will then explore how Husserl's phenomenology provides Binswanger with a method for exploring the mental worlds of his patients, and at the same time with an analysis of the essential constituents of consciousness. In the course of this we will look at the phenomenological account of perception (as Binswanger reproduces it), which will provide us with some of the basic terms of Husserl's phenomenology of consciousness. We will then move from the examination of a man's consciousness at any one time, to the examination of it as it unfolds as a continuing totality through time (Binswanger needing to grasp hold of this, if he is to understand the total development of his patient's consciousness). At this point we will see how Binswanger feels the need to move on from Husserl - in the direction of Heidegger.

1. The reason for turning to phenomenological enquiry

We saw in the last chapter how Binswanger concluded that the natural-scientific tradition within which he was working was unable to find its way 'inside' the consciousness of the patient it was studying.[1] It normally contented itself with theoretical constructions of what was 'going on' in the life of the patient, constructed on analogy[2] with data taken from areas in which it was at home, such as anatomy or physiology. But while it constructed its theory in this way, its best practitioners were in fact describing the inner consciousness and experiences of their patients with categories largely undefined, but taken from outside the natural sciences.[3]

In this connection we must turn again to Jaspers' General Psychopathology, for this work is really Binswanger's inspiration for his own exploration. One of Jaspers' aims was

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1. Ideenflucht, p. 24:
   "It should not be forgotten that the psychiatrist does not only want to be a diagnostic clinician, but also wants to 'get inside' his patients and understand them."

2. AVuA II p. 121 ("Welche Aufgaben ergeben sich für die Psychiatrie aus den Fortschritten der neueren Psychologie?"):
   "Here you have before you an example, if only fleetingly drawn [Binswanger is referring to associational theory], that proves the importance and value of an independent psychology, orientating itself purely on the data of consciousness. The continual fusion and comparison with the processes of the organism was the biggest hindrance to the emergence of an independent psychology, because the reference, the analogy, went unseen, was regarded as identity, and thus the nature of the mental was mistaken."

3. One such practitioner was Binswanger's own teacher, E. Bleuler (Dementia Praecox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien, 1911); Jaspers records Bleuler as saying: "Interpretation is a science only in principle, in its application it is always an art" (Jaspers, p. 311).

to expound the real nature of such description of patients' inner lives; this was a task that required philosophical expertise and the ability to stand outside the actual business of psychopathology and assess what sort of statements the psychopathologist found himself making. Binswanger recognised Jaspers' work as the first attempt within psychiatry to come to grips with the problem of the nature of our understanding of other people, but regarded the solution he proposed as inadequate. Jaspers had asserted that 'the understanding of meaningful connections'[1] stood 'half-way' between natural-scientific knowledge and 'philosophical illumination',[2] and formed man's natural (intuitive) understanding of his fellow man's meaningful life and (in its formal application) made up the subject-matter of psychology in the strict sense of the term. Binswanger criticised this position on two main grounds: first, with reference to Jaspers' concept of causal explanation (the other side of the distinction[1]), the notion of causality was itself only valid with regard to biology by way of analogy. Biology as has been said,[3] involves judgments of a teleological nature, such as move beyond the sort of causality one could expect to work with in the sciences of physics and chemistry. But secondly (to move to the second part of the distinction) Binswanger maintains that the notion of 'the understanding of meaningful connections' does not do justice to the full nature

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1. See above, p. 185, note 1.
2. Gen. Psychopath., pp. 310ff.
3. See above, p. 188.

of psychological knowledge;[1] in the end it too leaves out of account the primacy of the conscious ego that 'has' the feelings and thoughts that psychology records, and instead contents itself with empathically connecting different ideas, or ideas and gestures, into a meaningful 'behaviour pattern'. Binswanger requires a method that allows the conscious ego to disclose itself without thereby being subsumed under a series of classifications, or made into an impersonal 'thinking unit'. He believes that there is such an immediate, non-classificatory, non-reductive form of psychological knowing which we in fact use and live by, without reflecting on it. It is one of the two main aims of the Grundformen to expound this form of knowledge. At the moment we are, however, concerned with the more limited task of finding a way of approaching the conscious ego that is not subject to the limitations of the natural-scientific approach, i.e. that does not 'abstract' from its object,[2] or pre-judge its

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1. See above, p. 185, note 1, and AVuA I p. 56 "Lebensfunktion und innere Lebensgeschichte", 1928. The basic objection to Jaspers' distinction is his use of the term understanding to refer to the making of 'meaningful connections', whereas in fact it can only refer to the individual person "whom alone we can say that we really 'understand' in the act of psychological understanding" (Binswanger, ibid.).

2. See above, p. 189.

object with theory,[1] or divide it up into a lot of irretrievably separate pieces, namely, ideas.[2]

One other method that Jaspers used to overcome some of these difficulties was simply to record the utterances of his patients;[3] here he is on the borders of Binswanger's

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1. Cf. AVuA II p. 133 ("Welche Aufgaben...", 1924):

> "I would only remind you of that wise, often quoted word of Goethe's, that it would be to reach the heights, were one to grasp 'that all the factual is already theory', i.e. that theory is already involved in the simplest observation or statement of fact, or more correctly, that a statement of fact is always guided by a theory."

Binswanger goes on to assert that natural-scientific concepts are not simple reproductions or reflections of real phenomena, but are to be regarded as intellectual symbols; he instances atomic theory. Natural-scientific knowledge is built up from such symbols. He then refers the reader to Lotze, who showed how the phenomena of consciousness were inaccessible to this sort of enquiry. He then concludes:

> "May the other branches of medicine quietly work on, on the assured ground of natural science, of which they can be rightly proud. Psychiatry, whose object is mental disease and its various relations to the world of the spirit, to art, morality, and religion, to law, the state and politics, psychiatry cannot content itself with the natural-scientific section of its task." (p. 133)

2. Ibid. pp. 135-138; NB again, how Binswanger's holistic demand is making itself felt.

3. Jaspers, Gen. Psychopath. p. 55:

> "The term phenomenology was used by Hegel for the whole field of mental phenomena as revealed in consciousness, history and conceptual thought. We use it only for the much narrower field of individual psychic experience. Husserl used the term originally in the sense of a 'descriptive psychology' in connection with the phenomenon of consciousness; in this sense it holds

(contd.)

phenomenology, but sets very severe limits to what can be achieved by this method. He uses it as a purely empirical enquiry; he is out to 'let his patients speak' without any attempt at diagnosis or theoretical explanation.

Continuation of note 3 from p. 196:

> for our investigations also, but later on he used it in the sense of 'the appearance of things' ['Wesenschau': this translation is of course wrong: we need 'intuition' or even 'vision of the essence'], which is not a term we use in this book. Phenomenology is for us purely an empirical method of enquiry maintained solely by the fact of the patient's communications. It is obvious that in these psychological investigations descriptive efforts are quite different from those used in the natural sciences. The object of study is non-existent for the senses and we can experience only a representation of it. Yet the same logical principles are in operation. Description demands the creation of systematic categories, as well as a demonstration of relationships and orderly sequences on the one hand and of sporadic appearances, unheralded and unforeseen, on the other."

2. The phenomenological analysis of phenomena of consciousness: Binswanger's use of the work of Husserl

We can now turn to Binswanger's own use of phenomenology, which is various, and takes different forms at different stages of his life.[1]

First it must be said that Binswanger is concerned with more than a particular methodological approach to man. He is himself a disciple of Husserl, and in particular of Husserl's refutation of a psychologistic exposition of logic. Husserl (having himself been influenced by this school of thought at the beginning of his career[2]) devoted the first part of his Logical Investigations[3] to its refutation - that is to say, to the refutation of the idea that the science of logic could be explained by means of an empirical experimental psychology. This would threaten the autonomy of 'pure thinking' (i.e. logic) and open the way for a naturalistic interpretation of all mental phenomena. In this refutation Husserl carried Binswanger with him,[4] thus opening up the way for an exploration of mental phenomena on their own terms. Hence one of Binswanger's cardinal convictions - the autonomy of thought -

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1. Apart from this chapter, see chapters 8, and 9 section 5.
2. See his Philosophy of Arithmetic, 1891.
3. 1901 - English translation by J.N. Findlay, with foreword, 1970.
4. See Binswanger's foreword to AVuA I, and the Introduction to the Grundformen.

is to be traced back to Husserl.[1]

But he also took from him his method of exploring the phenomena of consciousness - and this is the first of his uses of phenomenology: to attain, as he puts it, to a phenomenological psychopathology.[2] To expound the method, he looks at one of the central phenomena of consciousness, namely, the perception of objects, and states that if, instead of constructing a theory about how perception works, one looks at it as it happens, the following becomes clear: first, the man who perceives is not confronted with undefined sense-data, but with actual objects.[3] Secondly, the object

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1. This is not to deny that other thinkers such as Hönigswald and Lotze were also influential (along with a host of others from the history of philosophy, including of course Kant and Goethe, Aristotle, Plato and Heraclitus).

2. The following analysis is taken from AVuA I "Über Phänomenologie", 1923. As far as Husserl is concerned Binswanger makes special reference to the 6th Investigation of the Logical Investigations, chapter 6, entitled "Sensuous and Categorial Intuitions".

3. Binswanger makes it clear that when the phenomenologist refers to objects, he does not mean phenomena as opposed to noumena (Kant); on the contrary, in so far as he is involved in an epistemology of knowledge of the external world (and this is not his primary question - which is rather concerned with the nature of consciousness as such), he is committed to saying that it is the actual object 'as it is in itself' that is perceived; if pressed, as I understand the matter, he is bound to say that the categorial intuitions (see below in the text) happen to harmonise with what is 'out there'. Otherwise he falls into a straightforward idealist subjectivism or into the Kantian phenomenal-noumenal division; i.e. he holds to a rational view of the correspondence of the mind with the external world, or, to put it in another way, to a monism. Binswanger says as much when he takes Bleuler to task for operating with a biological monism - when what we in fact need (and have) is an ontological monism (AVuA II p. 108).

is in relation to the perceiving consciousness, or (to put it the other way round) the conscious ego, in perceiving an object, finds itself (speaking analogically) directed towards that object. Thirdly, even where no object is actually perceived, but is simply imagined, there is still this directedness of consciousness to the imagined object; hence the emergence of the key concept: the intentionality[1] of consciousness, which forms the cornerstone of the phenomenological understanding of the ego.[2] Fourthly, in the perception of an object, - or even in the imagining of one -, it is necessary to distinguish between the sensuous intuition and what Husserl called the categorial intuition. For instance, in thinking about the Welsh coast while in Birmingham, my consciousness is directed towards an intuitive notion of the Welsh coast. When I leave Birmingham and go there, I find this preliminary intuition 'fulfilled' in sensuous intuition. But more than that, while I am there on the Welsh coast, it is not the case that the imagined concept is simply replaced by the 'real = sensuous' one, but rather that the categorial intuition (Welsh coast) accompanies and in fact controls what

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1. For Bultmann's use of this term see above, p. 56.

2. See e.g. the question of the connection of ideas with each other in 'flights of ideas'. Here it was seen that the ideas that came crowding in on the mind of the patient sometimes came against his will; it was therefore thought that they no longer had any relation to the actively conscious ego, but were being 'supplied' to it mechanistically. It was Hönigswald who pointed out that the intentionality of the ego was not to be identified with the ego's will; that the former is a wider concept than the latter and implies precisely this directedness of the ego to objects; see Ideenflucht, Introduction - ref. to Hönigswald "Denkpsychologie", 2nd ed. 1925.

I actually see at any one moment. Or to take another example, I hold a key in front of me and observe it in its three different planes, so that sometimes I see more of its surface and sometimes less - but all the time I know it to be a key.[1]

We must leave this account of perception there for the moment; Binswanger regards it as encouragement[2] to take the phenomena of his patient's consciousness as they appear to him and to let them inform him as to 'what is in his patient's mind'. This is his first use of phenomenology. We can now move to what for him is the second and vital point. We have seen, he argues, the distinction between sensuous and categorial intuition, and the independent status of the latter within consciousness. We can now turn our attention to this, without concerning ourselves any further with the former, i.e. with questions as to the actual existence of that to which the particular concept refers.[3] By concentrating in this way on the phenomena within consciousness we can clarify our understanding of them and make them 'appear before us' in increasing purity and clarity. This process is what Binswanger understands by the phenomenological reduction, or bracketing of questions concerning the actual existence of objects in the

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1. For this example see Binswanger, ibid. section II. He adds the comment that the question where this whole process of perception takes place (e.g. in the brain etc.) is one which phenomenology cannot answer; all that actually reveals itself, if I simply look at myself perceiving, is that my consciousness is 'beside' the object of which it is conscious (but that is to point again to 'intentionality').

2. It was chosen as an example of phenomenological thinking; it is of course more than that, in that it provides us with some of the basic categories of the phenomenology of consciousness.

3. That is not to deny their existence! Cf. M and M, p. 16.

outside world. The purpose of the reduction is to reach out to what Husserl calls the pure eidetic forms of intuition, or, to use a further technical term of his, to 'Wesenschau', to the vision of the essence of the (categorial) phenomenon.

We are now able to distinguish empirical phenomenology, which remains beside the changing objects as they are observed or experienced, and transcendental phenomenology, in which the reductional device (the ἐποχή) is operative, and in which we move towards the pure eidos of the phenomenon, such as will not in fact be seen in 'every-day life'.[1]

Now Binswanger goes in for both these kinds of phenomenological enquiry, and sees them not so much as qualitatively different, but as an ascending scale.[2] However far up the scale one goes, the purpose remains the same: to clarify the concepts with which one is working to the end that further empirical investigation is carried out more adequately.

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1. It can be seen from what has been said that Binswanger follows Husserl in the development the latter makes in the 'Ideas' - at least with regard to the propriety of indulging in eidetic philosophy. Indeed it is this that makes the method useful for Binswanger, allowing him to see an experience 'as a whole', in its essence. However Binswanger does (at the end of the article referred to above) record his doubts - as a philosopher - about the status that the Husserl of the 'Ideas' accorded to his pure intuitions: do we therewith arrive at 'a philosophically final point'? (And are we right in assigning to consciousness an absoluteness which we deny to the objects of consciousness, transcendent though these are within consciousness?) Binswanger extricates himself by saying that this is a philosophical question which it is not his place to answer. But we will return to this doubt towards the end of the chapter.

2. The supreme example of transcendental phenomenology is the science of mathematics, where the mathematician is dealing with pure forms.

In this way Binswanger ensures that his deliberations remain in the service of psychiatry and do not turn themselves into philosophy as such.

So far we have been concerned with the phenomenological method as it enables a man to explore the phenomena of his own consciousness; but Binswanger wants to use it in conjunction with the phenomena relating to the consciousness of another ego - in phenomenological psychopathology. The method remains essentially the same; Binswanger remains beside the phenomena described to him, does not resort to theoretical explanation,[1] but seeks to understand the 'eidos' of the experience. And the most important point is that - in contrast to Jaspers' understanding of meaningful connections - he sees the experience always in relation to the experiencing ego. Here, says Binswanger, a tool is presented to psychopathology which can be used to prevent its judgments being one-sidedly natural-scientific, to ensure that it keeps before it the whole man,

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1. For instance (an example given by Binswanger himself), if a man complains of living in an interviewing room, which sometimes appears as a telephone exchange, with voices crossing each other in a meddly of sounds, the phenomenologist does not diagnose schizophrenic paranoia; nor, if the man goes on to speak of one particular voice, and at the same time complain of difficulties with his father, does the phenomenologist (as phenomenologist) embark on an exploration of the man's relation to his father; instead he 'stays alongside' the man's subjective experience, attempting to understand it, by 'working his way' into it, always seeing it in relation to the man's experiencing ego, and not as an isolated phenomenon (the intentionality of consciousness remains vital). Ibid. pp. 36-38.

including first of all consciousness.[1]

Now Binswanger does not claim that phenomenological psychopathology can ever attain to the pure eidos of a phenomenon; that is not its intention. It is rather that a view of a phenomenon as a whole be presented to the psychopathologist,[2] so as no longer to heap up description ad infinitum,[3] or allow the ego to 'slip through one's fingers' in the process of theoretical construction. But there is a further reason why we will not get to the pure eidos, and that is because the psychiatrist's immediate subject-matter is the continuing experiences of his individual patients; he seeks to establish these as they actually occur rather than

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1. Binswanger comments on the impetus Jaspers' distinction between the disease process and the development of the personality gave to these explorations - which are ultimately explorations in search of a psychological foundation for psychiatric work. As he says (ibid. p. 38f.), the concept of the development of the personality is a thoroughly psychological one; what Jaspers failed to give him, nevertheless, was an adequate psychology of the person.

2. On this see esp. Psychotherapie als Beruf, Nervenarzt, 1928, p. 141.

3. See 3FMD pp. 65-66:
   "In a phenomenological comprehension of the essence - in contrast to natural-scientific knowledge - we are not concerned with the greatest possible heaping up of examples or facts, but with the 'exemplary' accomplishment or 'exemplary' realisation of individual human facta, and the comprehension and establishment of the 'pure essences' on the basis of such an 'exemplary ground' or starting-point (Husserl, Logical Investigations, and Ideas). But even so, we are not only far removed from a 'pure' comprehension of the essence of the Daseinsfactum of 'screwed-up-ness' [German: 'Verschrobenheit'] as far as 'adequate ideation' or 'intuition' is concerned, but may not even expect to reach this goal... The point at which in this description and understanding we may and must have to call a halt, is a matter of phenomenological tact and daseinsanalytical experience."

to go back to the essential forms of being human that underlie them.[1] However, it is a matter of degree and phenomenology of this sort does involve analysis of the 'categorial' or 'eidetic' form inherent in the actual experience.

But Binswanger is not content with looking at the individual experiences one by one; before he can claim to have understood the individuality of his patient he needs to discover the total 'world' in which his patient exists, and furthermore, the historical progression,[2] by which he has come to be where and what he is. Here too he draws on the (later) work of Husserl, and since most of the material comes from the period following the impact of Heidegger on his thinking, we need to try to disentangle Husserl's influence from Heidegger's and to concentrate on the former in this chapter, leaving Heidegger till the next.

We are clearly concerned here with a more complex phenomenological exercise than in the cases already referred to. We are now dealing with consciousness as it unfolds itself "in a unity of meaningful moments of experience", as

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1. In the Grundformen, on the other hand, Binswanger as phenomenological anthropologist, does claim to reach the 'pure forms' of human being. See below, chapter 8.

2. I have avoided the term 'process' because it is associated in Binswanger's thought (as in Jaspers') with the (mal-) functioning of the organism, and therefore cannot be easily juxtaposed to the category of 'history' - although Binswanger is prepared to speak of 'process' in regard to the development of a schizophrenic condition (see below, chapter 9, sections 1 and 3).

it shapes its form (Gestalt) on the basis of its inner motivation.[1] We are reminded in this connection of Jaspers' term: the development of the personality;[2] Binswanger's own term, which has already been used, is the 'inner life-history'.[3]

If we move from an analysis of the separate phenomena of consciousness (which Husserl describes as 'transcendencies', in the sense of the concepts of objects within consciousness, with which the ego is in relation, but which are still transcendent to the ego because not absorbed by it[4]), if we move from this to the analysis of the state of consciousness as a whole, we are moving to the total world of the individual, described by Husserl as "the Universum of constituted transcendencies".[5] Binswanger is trying to discover the total

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1. This difficult language is taken from AVuA I p. 61 "Lebensfunktion und innere Lebensgeschichte", where Binswanger quotes from Husserl, without giving any exact reference.
2. See e.g. Gen. Psychopath., p. 639f.
3. See below, chapter 9, section 1, for a fuller exposition.
4. We are here involved in transcendental phenomenology, i.e. with the analysis of the relation of the ego to the categorial forms which belong to it, without any reference to the 'empirical world outside'.
5. Quoted by Binswanger (without exact ref.) in Ideenflucht, p. 54f. On 'constituted' cf. the term used by Binswanger as a synonym: 'projected' ('entworfen') - which is a favourite term of Heidegger's, used within an ontological context. 'Constituted' refers to the mind's active function in 'projecting' or 'constituting' its own frame of references, in other words, its 'world'. Thus Binswanger can speak of the 'world-projections' implied by the various disciplines, e.g. biology or anthropology, as each being a "Universum of intentional transcendencies": Ideenflucht, p. 89. (We might prefer to speak of the frames of reference within which a subject is explored.) But Binswanger is not thinking only of the frameworks within which we approach a certain field of study, but also of the frames of reference within which men live their lives - hence the use of the broad term 'world', to refer to this whole. Cf. the statement: "He lives in a world of his own".

structure of a man's consciousness as it continues through the course of his life-history, in order to be able to understand his development. He sees this consciousness as made up of a number of 'worlds', constituted by the ego, and only really comprehended when the ego is itself seen as the other of these two essential elements of consciousness, namely, world and ego. They belong inseparably together, and neither is possible without the other; and yet they have to be distinguished, in the light of the fundamental axiom concerning the directedness (intentionality) of the ego towards the objects of which it is conscious.

It must be borne in mind that Binswanger is following the phenomenological 'epoché' here, and describing the structure of consciousness, without reference to that to which it is directed at any one moment. Only by doing this, can we hope to arrive at any of the total 'worlds' within which a consciousness is operating.

At this point we have to draw on the famous sentence of Hegel's which Binswanger comes back to again and again, as giving the clue for understanding a man's own inner life or consciousness: "Individuality is what the world, as its own world, is".[1] This sentence in fact contains within it

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1. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind (tr. J.B. Baillie, 2nd ed., New York, 1931), p. 335f. See e.g. The Case of Ellen West: Existence p. 268f.:

> "In contrast, however, to the historical delineation of the individual configuration, we now leave out as far as possible all judgments on this individual, be they moral, aesthetic, social, medical, and most of all our own judgment, in order not to be prejudiced by them, and in order to direct our gaze at the forms of existence in which this particular individuality is in-the-world. (After all, 'individuality is what the world, in the sense of its own world, is'.) The

(contd.)

those two elements of consciousness ('world' and 'ego'), which act as it were as the two pivotal points or poles within the same structure that is consciousness; the sentence points out that the 'world' with which we are concerned is that 'inhabited' by the ego, and both together making up a man's individuality. Binswanger refers to the correlation which exists between these two elements "a correlation that can of course only be due to the relatedness, i.e. the inter-relation (Zurückbezogenheit) and dialectical reciprocal directedness ('Aufeinandergewiesenheit') of the concepts of man ('I') and world in general".[1]

Before leaving the somewhat rarified atmosphere of this discussion, we need to go one step further to what Binswanger, following Husserl, describes as the transcendental-phenomenological ego itself. This he sees as the a priori condition for the actual experiencing ego as it moves through the course of its development from one moment to the next, the moments being thought of as separate moments of consciousness in which the real world is experienced. This development can only be understood on the condition of the existence of the transcendental ego - the underlying stream of consciousness - which ensures the continuity of experience.[2]

Continuation of note 1 from p. 207:

> place of the historical figure, built up of impressions and judgments, is taken here by the phenomenologically described and analysed existence-Gestalt."

- To demonstrate the influence of Hegel's dictum, one may point to its emergence in the work the 'left-wing post Hegelian' Marx: see Grundrisse, McLellan, London 1971, p. 35.

1. Ideenflucht, p. 60.

2. Husserl in fact goes one stage further - to the 'pure ego' (5th Cartesian Meditation); for Binswanger's use of this concept see chapter 9, section 5 below.

Husserl himself puts it like this:

> "The real world is only in the continually prescribed assumption that experience will continue constant in the same constitutive way."[1]

To which Binswanger adds the comment: "This transcendental-phenomenological ego cannot be the concern of either psychology or psychiatry, and yet it is this that makes both of these 'possible'."[2]

To summarise: Husserl has provided Binswanger with a method that allows him to approach the phenomena of consciousness on their own terms, thus enabling him to view the patient as other than simply an organism. Psychopathological phenomenology is thus phenomenology of a fairly 'lowly' sort. But Husserl has also given Binswanger the tools, via transcendental phenomenology, for understanding the structure of consciousness, in particular isolating the two fundamental and reciprocal elements, 'ego' and 'world'. These categories Binswanger regards as appropriate tools for enquiring into the subject-matter of consciousness, and the phenomenological method the appropriate method. For this purpose the question of the subjective nature of the Husserlian analysis (the fact that this is all going on 'in the mind', without reference to the external world) is in the first instance irrelevant. Indeed the reductive device of the 'epoché' ensures that this

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1. Husserl, Tranzend. u. formale Logik, p. 222, quoted by Binswanger in Ideenflucht, p. 172f., and M and M, p. 16.

2. Ideenflucht, p. 173.

is the case. But if the very different question is asked: does this analysis provide philosophy's last word on the nature of man's knowledge of himself and his world?, then the answer must be that, purporting to do that, it must be regarded as a subjectivism, and the transcendence it assigns to consciousness, a subjective transcendence. Such at least was Binswanger's view: and to understand his position we must go back to the distinction between practitioner and theoretician. As the former, Binswanger found phenomenology indispensable. As the latter, he found it a bulwark against naturalism, and against all forms of over-extension and emphasis of particular points of view,[1] beyond their proper scope. But in the end Husserl's transcendental ego seemed to Binswanger to be left unsupported in the air. "We were left", he writes, "in the thin air of the transcendental ego" (and that means, in subjectivity);[2] such an ego is not a real Dasein in-the-world whose historical development can be traced in his own life-history.

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1. See his article on Bleuler: AVuA II "Bleulers geistige Gestalt", 1940, where he refers to the discussions he had with Bleuler concerning what he regarded as his teacher's category-mistakes, his refusal to see phenomena in all their variety as qualitatively distinct from each other (one might say: ontologically distinct: see Findlay's Introduction to Husserl's Logical Investigations, Vol. I, p. 5), and his insistence on seeing the whole world as a biological monism (ibid. p. 105f.).

2. AVuA II p. 264f. "Die Bedeutung der Daseinsanalytik Martin Heideggers für das Selbstverständtnis der Psychiatrie", cf. Grundformen p. 21, where Binswanger describes Husserl's phenomenology as a one-sided idealism.

Furthermore, Husserl's phenomenology remained centred on the phenomena of one's own consciousness; it left unresolved the question as to the nature and possibility of inter-subjective understanding.[1] One was left with the working position: I understand another man's consciousness on the supposition that it is analogous to my own, as far as its structure is concerned. But, for Binswanger, this question could not be left in this somewhat unsatisfactory state, if his professional work as psychiatrist was going to be clarified in regard to its presuppositions. To help him here, Binswanger turned to Scheler's phenomenology which was much more centrally concerned with inter-personal relationships and knowledge;[2] but before discussing this we must move to Heidegger, in order to retain the continuity in the development of Binswanger's major exploration.[3]

Lastly, Husserl's phenomenology left the phenomenological observer as precisely that, an observer whose existence is not at risk;[4] in this respect it did not rise above the level of the natural-scientific observation, and did not reach the 'heart' of the other person, as Binswanger was convinced was possible in inter-personal knowledge.[5]

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1. Cf. Sadler, pp. 41ff.
2. Cf. Sadler, pp. 46ff., and p. 124f.
3. This is concerned primarily with discovering an anthropology adequate to his professional requirements as psychiatrist; the question of inter-personal knowledge (where Scheler can help him) is only one aspect of this wider search.
4. See above, p. 154.
5. Our full analysis of Binswanger's account of inter-personal knowledge must wait until we consider the Grundformen.

"It is only as a non-participant observer of Dasein that I am able to employ the phenomenological method at all to human Dasein."[1]

The way is now open for our consideration of the impact of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit upon Binswanger's thinking.

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1. Grundformen, p. 637.

CHAPTER 7

The Transition from the Analysis of Subjective Consciousness to Analysis of the Whole Man as he Actually Lives in the World

1. The importance for Binswanger of Heidegger's 'Existentialanalytik'

To facilitate our approach to Binswanger's use of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein,[1] we will go back to one of his continuing demands: that psychiatry find its own foundation and unity, and the psychiatrist a way of fulfilling his fundamental task of comprehending his patient as a whole: the task is "to investigate the whole man medically, and to help the whole man medically".[2]

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1. From now on this will be referred to as the Analytic of Dasein, to distinguish it from Binswanger's own hermeneutical procedure, which he called 'Daseinsanalyse'; see AVuA II p. 279f. ("Daseinsanalytik und Psychiatrie", 1950):

   > "May it simply be said here that by the term Daseinsanalytik I understand the philosophical-phenomenological illumination of the a priori or transcendental structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world, and by Daseinsanalyse, on the other hand, the empirical-phenomenological, scientific analysis of factical forms or 'Gestalten' of Dasein. The latter is, for its part only possible on the basis of the former, i.e. in continual regard to the nature, being and event of Dasein itself."

2. Psychotherapie als Beruf, 1927. Nervenarzt, 1928, 3, p. 139. Binswanger heads the article with which we are concerned immediately below with a quotation from Plato (Phaidrus): ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου
   κατανοῆσαι οἴει· δύνατον εἶναι
   ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως;

   (AVuA II p. 264)

In one very important respect Husserl had provided Binswanger with the means to fulfil this aim; the phenomenological method allowed him to see the eidos of a phenomenon of mental life, and that means, to see it as a whole, in its intentionality. But he had not thereby found the way to grasp the whole man (in the historical continuity of his life), nor had he fulfilled the other side of his task: to put psychiatry as a whole onto its proper foundation.[1] It is in these two areas, and particularly in the latter, that he sees Heidegger as providing some of the answers.

First, Binswanger sees Heidegger as giving empirical psychopathological work its methodological and ontological basis.[2] It was already clear that such work had to start with psychological categories, and use natural-scientific ones as aids,[3] not as a basis, but the psychological categories themselves rested solely upon Husserl's transcendental ego, which

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1. For a discussion of the nature of this 'foundation', see below, Part III, chapter 12.

2. AVuA II p. 264ff. ("Die Bedeutung der Daseinsanalytik Martin Heideggers...", 1949).

3. AVuA II pp. 139ff. ("Welche Aufgaben ergeben sich für die Psychiatrie aus den Fortschritten der neueren Psychologie?", 1924). Notice the date. At this stage Husserl's influence on Binswanger was at its height; Jaspers' search for an adequate description of the development of the personality was a major challenge. Both of these influences showed Binswanger that he had to start with psychology, and use the natural sciences as aids, in his search for an adequate conceptuality for psychiatric knowing.

by the very nature of the method that led to its phenomenological 'discovery' was seen without reference to its place in the 'real world'. Certainly it was an analysis of the relation of the ego to its world, but this within subjectivity. In particular, the relation of the transcendental ego to its body (and thence to the 'outside' world) was inadequately dealt with. Heidegger's great achievement, according to Binswanger,[1] was to see that Husserl's intentionality was itself only possible on the basis of the prior ontological characterisation of Dasein as 'being-in-the-world'; that Husserl had failed to subject the concept of the intentionality of the ego to ontological analysis. To this extent, it remained 'hanging in the air'. And - and this is the vital thing for Binswanger[2] - it left an unresolvable dichotomy between consciousness and the body; or, to put it another way, it left out of account the temporality of the individual consciousness, and the fact that the particular ego found itself where it did, when it did. Hence Husserl's transcendental ego could not fulfil the demand upon psychiatry to see

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1. AVuA II p. 264f. ("Die Bedeutung der Daseinsanalytik Martin Heideggers...", 1949).

2. It must be borne in mind that Binswanger used Husserl, as indeed he did Heidegger, for his own purposes, knowing that they were not necessarily the same as Husserl's. Furthermore, it could well be argued (as Findlay does in his introduction to the Logical Investigations) that Husserl's later subjectivist-idealist exposition of the ontological implications of his phenomenology (such as occurs in the Ideas) was a great mistake; a mistake in which he changed very fruitful investigations into the nature of thought and consciousness into a common or garden subjectivism, precisely by asking ontological-type questions, which his method really precluded him from answering.

the whole man, any more than could the methods of natural science. According to Binswanger, the psychiatrist worked with two, apparently unbridgeable, conceptions of reality, that of natural science, and that of human intercourse (the psychological conception) and in his view no amount of psychosomatic theory could bridge the gap. What was needed was to 'go back behind' both conceptions and look at the "understanding of being, as the (transcendental) function of providing the ground" on which both stand.[1]

This can be done if one asks the ontological question, as Heidegger framed it, with regard to the intentional consciousness: on what ontological conditions is consciousness conscious? And his answer is: its reality (from which we start) necessarily implies the existence both of itself and of that of which it is conscious.[2]

Binswanger explains the point with reference to Heidegger's treatment of the Kantian 'I think'; Heidegger criticised Kant for failing to see that the statement 'I think' is really 'I think something'.[3] Kant was still operating with a Cartesian opposition between the world and the transcendental 'I', and could even talk of the philosophical

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1. Binswanger, AVuA II p. 268.

2. In this sense one might say that Heidegger's intention was to set Husserl's philosophy on its feet instead of its head (cf. Marx's treatment of Hegel). See Grundformen p. 65.

3. This is again to underline Husserl's conception of the intentionality of the thinking ego.

scandal of not yet having solved the problem of proving the reality of the external world. The scandal, for Heidegger, (and Binswanger followed him) lay in thinking that this was a problem that needed solving. The 'I' of the 'I think' is only significant in relation to 'something'. Binswanger concludes:

> "Anyone who does not fully understand this thoroughly creative criticism of the Kantian-Cartesian basic (transcendental-idealist) position, will not be able to understand this work either."[1]

Perhaps one can explain the difference that Heidegger's setting of the question made, in the following way: his primary aim in SuZ was ontological; he wanted to make the question of 'being' a live question again; hence SuZ starts by raising the question as generally as possible, and ends by delineating the proper framework within which the question must be asked, namely, the framework of the temporality of human being, or, as Heidegger puts it, the horizon of time. As is well known, Heidegger never finished his work, the third part remaining unwritten. What was written was an exposition of what it was to be man, the essential precondition for asking about being itself. By stressing the ontological question from the outset, using, as Needleman puts it (in the long introduction to his selection of Binswanger's writings)[2]

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1. Grundformen, p. 538f.
2. Needleman, p. 21f.

the device of a simple FIAT, Heidegger endeavoured to overcome the traditional setting of the question, which embedded it within an epistemology that required prior clarification. Thus Heidegger was no longer asking how the transcendental ego related to the real world, on the supposition that it was the former we knew about and that had to form the starting-point for all ontological enquiry; instead of this, but still using the phenomenological method,[1] he set out to clarify what the being of the man who asks the ontological question must itself be. Hence the question is not now about the nature of consciousness, but about the nature of being. The 'epoché' is now no longer used, as a means of eliminating questions about the existence or otherwise of the objects of categorial intuition; instead we start with man in his actual existence, and enquire into the structure of this existence, rather than of this consciousness. The result, of course, is to see man as, in a radical sense, a historical being.[2] Here Binswanger finds the categories for which he has been searching, enabling him to overcome the dichotomy that had prevented him from grasping the human being as a whole, enabling him now to explore the totality of human being. But the question that now arises is where we should start this exploration: at the stage at which the various specialised sorts of knowledge have

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1. SuZ H 17.

2. See above, pp. 40 ff. - For an analysis of the turn-round that Heidegger's setting of the question involved, see Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, p. 59f.

already been worked out (and if so, which of these specialised disciplines on man would form the starting-point?) - or at a stage prior to all specialised conceptualisations as to man's nature? The answer goes without saying: both Heidegger and Binswanger believed it possible to choose the latter course. Ontological enquiry, "laying the foundations for the sciences", does not "limp along after", but "leaps ahead" of all specialised enquiry.[1]

At this point it is necessary to turn our attention for a moment to the years prior to 1927, to refer to the work of Häberlin and Haering, men who were important to Binswanger for making what he regarded as a vital and original contribution to the inter-disciplinary discussion of the status and relationship of the various disciplines concerned with the nature of man. Instead of delineating the boundaries of the disciplines to each other, they contrasted the disciplines themselves with the pre-scientific knowledge that belongs unself-consciously to every-day life.[2] The result was that they came to see the specialised disciplines (and they were thinking of those working on the model of the natural sciences) as being simply one of a great variety of human processes of reasoning, namely, "the recognition of things and of processes as special cases of general laws".[3] Thus Binswanger was already

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1. SuZ H 10.

2. See AVuA II p. 128ff. "Welche Aufgaben ergeben sich...?" See also Grundformen, p. 287ff.

3. AVuA II p. 131. For a similar process of thought in the work of Bultmann, see above, p. 123 f.

aware of the sort of argumentation that was important to Heidegger, namely, the attempt to put the specialised disciplines within the broader context of human reasoning. For Heidegger, of course, it was the ontological question that enabled the enquirer to 'go back beyond' the specialised disciplines, or, putting it another way, to 'leap out in front of them'. But the effect in either case was indeed to 'put' the specialised disciplines 'in their place', by limiting their authority and jurisdiction and showing them to be derivative ways of thinking.

Heidegger argued that if we use the phenomenological method and allow phenomena to unfold themselves to us, we will be brought closer to their real nature, than if we approach them with any one particular conceptual schema. Clearly, if our task were to analyse them for any purpose other than that of discovering their being, we would have to use a conceptual schema appropriate to our specialised enquiry. But, as he puts it, we are asking the question about being, and for this the phenomenological approach is the appropriate one. But furthermore, we are to ask our question of man, not when he is concentrating on himself, but when he is simply being a man in his normal every-day world. It is here that his being will unfold itself to us, with the least number of accidental extras or distorting features, originating from a specialised viewpoint.

Thus Heidegger's analysis of man's perception, and of his consciousness, centres on his every-day life in the world.[1]

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1. Cf. Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 3rd ed., Frankfurt, 1965, p. 212.

He analyses man's use of things in his environment, and thus arrives at the concept of spatiality: man is directed towards objects, he is in relation to them; this is an essential fact about him, described by Heidegger as an existentiale.[1] The relationship he has to particular objects allows us to see, as its condition, his own being as a being-in-relation, and the totality of these relations allows us to regard his being as a being-there, or being-in-the-world.[2] But his being-there reveals itself not only spatially, but also temporally: he is as he is at all times with a past, and with a future; a past that is largely shaping the present, and which cannot be changed;[3] and a future that he can either grasp hold of and shape, or shun and refuse to face. Hence there belongs to being-in-the-world both a reference to the past, expressed by the term 'the thrownness of Dasein',[4] and a reference to the future, not as something external to Dasein, but as containing within it the possibilities of existence open to Dasein. Moreover, when man looks at his future in this latter way, he is faced with the ultimate possibility (which is a future

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1. Cf. Grundformen, p. 292.
2. In the term Dasein we can see how the Husserlian concept of the intentionality of consciousness is now expressed ontologically as a being-there, a being-in-the-world.
3. Contrast Bultmann! See p. 62 above.
4. SuZ H 135, 175 (and p. 62 above).

certainty) of not-being. Thus if he faces his future, he at the same time faces his own nothingness: the fact of his own death. This realisation - and the mood that accompanies it[1] - is termed existential anxiety, the basic disposition of man's consciousness as he faces his own ultimate possibility.[2]

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1. An essential feature of the Heideggerian analytik of Dasein, singled out by Sadler as of special importance for Binswanger, Sadler p. 160f., is Dasein's 'attunedness', the fact that Dasein always has a mood; this is seen as an ontological condition of Dasein's being-in-the-world.

2. The phenomena of anxiety, guilt and conscience are said by Binswanger to be inaccessible to the phenomenology of the intentional consciousness, as Husserl conducted it. For Heidegger (through the influence of Kierkegaard?), they are essential elements of his analytik of Dasein. See Grundformen, p. 637 (and SuZ H 184). (They are of course also phenomena which the psychiatrist knows at first hand - leaving on one side for the moment the distinction between existential and neurotic guilt.)

2. The emergence of Binswanger's Existential Analysis

We are now in a position to see what use Binswanger makes of this 'Analytik'. First, in his analysis of observation Heidegger had said that we first concentrate on an object when there is something peculiar about it - or when it is missing and needs to be looked for.[1] In normal life our perception goes on in the course of our using those things which we require, without their being the focus of our attention; moreover, in using them, we relate to them as 'wholes'[2] within a totality of references that together make up one total meaning-complex; when something is out of place or broken we attend to it in a different way: we 'stay beside it' and 'let it be'[3], so that we can see it, not as something we use within a definite total complex of use, but rather 'as it is in itself', with a certain detachment. We then approach it with a particular conceptual framework and 'correct it' or analyse it, in a way that may well involve breaking it down into constituent parts, and then re-assembling it.

Binswanger found this analysis illuminating with regard to his central question about the psychiatrist's dual approach to his patient. Here was a model that accorded with his experience of the schizophrenic. He had held from early days

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1. See above, p. 123 f.

2. Grundformen, p. 65f.

3. SuZ H 72f. See also Grundformen, pp. 100ff. (where Binswanger also refers to SuZ H 157, 356ff.).

that the psychiatrist built up a piecemeal psychopathological picture of his patient, but at the same time 'intuited' his schizophrenic condition in the course of the inter-personal dealings he had with him, as one man to another. He discusses this in connection with the phenomenon of 'Verschrobenheit',[1] best translated as 'being-screwed-up' - a term used in both lay and psychiatric circles, to describe schizophrenic characteristics, normally without further clarification.

Binswanger sets about analysing this concept more closely[2]- and he does so, significantly, by looking at its uses in everyday life. We have certain parallels in English, though our usage does not extend as far as the German; we say of someone: 'he's got a screw loose' or 'he's all screwed up'. The German 'verschroben' means more than this: the picture is that of a faulty screw that is wrongly screwed into a fitting and has become stuck. Now it is in the everyday dealings with a man that one comes to make such a judgment about him: a particular way of behaving amongst those with whom he lives shows this over-all peculiarity of relating - which would not necessarily be evident in a clinical investigation. We can leave the rest of Binswanger's analysis of the phenomenon on one side. It is enough to show how Heidegger's analysis of man's every-day dealings with his surroundings was used by Binswanger to help him understand a way of recognising

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1. 3FMD pp. 88-90, and see above, p. 168.

2. Binswanger uses the term in relation to a condition that might herald a schizophrenic state.

the condition of patients which by experience he knew to be valid.[1]

But Heidegger gave Binswanger much more than simply an insight into a way of knowing patients; he gave psychiatry (in Binswanger's language) an account of man's being that embraced both his subjective and his objective transcendence;[2] i.e. Heidegger's account of man's being is one that does justice both to his subjective experience, summed up in the 'worlds' within which he lives and is conscious, and to his actual possibilities of 'transcending himself' in the life that he lived within the world of other men and history. It is the latter, which Binswanger sees as Heidegger's special contribution, not forgetting that he also puts the former - the subjective experience - so to speak on firm ground, instead of 'in the thin air of the transcendental ego'.

Heidegger takes as his starting-point the ontological fact that consciousness is there in its world (is 'Dasein'); he then spells out the temporal horizon within which Dasein

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1. NB Heidegger's concern, where he first makes this analysis is quite different from Binswanger's: he is out to show the 'worldly character of the world', and does so by pointing to the break in a normally assumed continuity that we experience when something we use goes wrong or is no longer there. The break in continuity, which 'puts us off balance', discloses the totality of the world as an element of our a priori consciousness (SuZ H 72). His purpose is to disclose the ontological structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world, and to show e.g. worldliness as an ontological category of Dasein. Binswanger is fully aware, that his purposes are not the same as Heidegger's (Grundformen p. 128).

2. AVuA II p. 284 "Daseinsanalytik und psychiatrie", 1950.

is, thus providing those who follow him with an analysis of the structure of Dasein which will enable them to understand both its subjective experience, and its objective possibilities of being. At least this is how Binswanger took it. On the level of his understanding of individual patients, he was now in a position to build up an account of the 'worlds' in which they were operating,[1] using as his categories the 'existentialia' of Heidegger's Dasein,[2] and paying special attention to the categories of spatiality and temporality, and attunedness (mood). At the same time, as far as psychiatry as a whole was concerned, he saw in Heidegger's analysis a conception of man that succeeded in overcoming the dichotomy between the psychological and the natural-scientific approaches to man, by 'going back behind' them to their ontological basis.[3] Heidegger's notion of 'Geworfenheit' (thrownness) provides

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1. Chapter 9 will spell out Binswanger's own conception of the different worlds in which a man lives; mental illness means the narrowing down of these worlds, until they are distorted or indeed sometimes altogether missing. From Heidegger himself he took the concept of the 'Mitwelt' (the world of men) and contrasted this with the 'Umwelt' (the world of the environment). Any Dasein exists in both these worlds - and the appropriate form of being-in-the-world that belongs to each is in each case different.

2. AVuA II p. 286:
   "With his existentialia and his account of the a priori structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world Heidegger has not only given us access to the horizon of our own empirical-phenomenological investigation, but has also given us an instrument with which we can further build up the edifice of our own science."

3. For a discussion of this claim see Part III, chapter 12.

Binswanger with an account of 'bodiliness',[1] which does not separate the latter from consciousness, and which at the same time does justice to the finitude of man's being-in-the-world. But it also points to man's existential possibilities of being, in the future, understanding him as a being who finds his own existence in choosing it, a being whose existence can be discovered and grasped in decision, or lost in the amorphous world of the 'they'.[2]

In 'Dasein', psychiatry is presented with a concept designed to express man's structural ontological unity; i.e. we are concerned here with more than a regulative idea giving rational unity to what is in experience a multitude of different sorts of entity; we are concerned rather with the 'ground' that underlies all that is experienced of man.[3] Binswanger sees Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik as providing him with the ontological foundation for his own endeavour.

When we move to the Daseinsanalysis of patients (i.e. to Binswanger's own work), we find him insisting that this takes place on, and is concerned with, the 'ontic' level;[4]

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1. Cf. AVuA II pp. 269ff. "Die Bedeutung der Daseinsanalytik..." 1949. One is inclined always to under-estimate the importance of the physical in Binswanger's thought. He does not advocate an idealism in which mind can and should control body, nor does he explain e.g. psychosis in terms purely of mental stress, ignoring physical causation. He in fact asserts the probability of an organic basis to schizophrenia (Case of Jörg Zünd, Schizophrenie).

2. 'Das Man' SuZ H 113.

3. Binswanger, AVuA II p. 271.

4. See above, p. 39.

but that does not mean that it is itself psychopathology; nor does it claim to replace the latter; it does not have the criteria to produce a psychiatric judgment as regards health or illness[1] - indeed Binswanger regards it as a strength that Daseinsanalysis stands 'before' or 'beyond' this distinction and instead simply looks at the development that has taken place in the life-history of this particular individual. Furthermore, in exploring this life-history, Binswanger can say that Daseinsanalysis goes 'back beyond' the distinction between 'willed' and 'non-willed' development, and 'brackets' questions as to whether or not the individual concerned could help the development taking the form it did.[2] The sole purpose is to understand the life-history of the individual, and its presupposition is that all mental phenomena are comprehensible as meaningful phenomena, when once we see the

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1. AVuA II p. 288.

2. Thus Binswanger does not champion existentialist categories because he wants at all costs to maintain the freedom of all, including the 'sick', to decide the course of their life. See esp. 3FMD pp. 38-41, where he describes a man, who at Christmas time placed a coffin at the bottom of the Christmas tree as his gift for his daughter, who was suffering from incurable cancer. Binswanger leaves on one side the question whether this was a free action, and instead concentrates on demonstrating how it was at one with the development this particular personality was undergoing, and understandable and meaningful from within the context of this development. In Ideenflucht, p. 25, Binswanger juxtaposes the concepts of freedom and necessity and says that analysis of a patient's Dasein can demonstrate how her world must have been for a particular action to have happened, "for her to have to react as she did (the aspect of necessity), or have to decide life-historically as she did (the aspect of freedom)". - I would suggest that Sadler's interpretation of Binswanger implies too great an emphasis on the individual's freedom; i.e. it refuses to take seriously Binswanger's claim that he is operating 'behind' the distinction between freedom and necessity, i.e. ontologically. But then one of the chief arguments of Sadler's doctoral thesis was that Binswanger's preoccupation with ontology was a mistake, clouding an otherwise illuminating phenomenological study; cf. Sadler, p. 118.

particular form that being-in-the-world has taken in this particular case. In this sense Binswanger is completely at one with Freud, whose presupposition is the same: that mental phenomena are meaningful, but in Freud's case, to understand meaning is to explain it in terms of instinctual drives.[1] For Binswanger, to understand the meaning of mentally abnormal phenomena is to understand, as he puts it, the modifications that that particular Dasein's being-in-the-

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1. This means that Freud translates the manifest phenomena into other terms, regarded as 'closer to reality'; as Binswanger sees it, there is an ontological presupposition at work here, such as maintains that the language of instinctual drives is 'prior to' or 'more basic than' the language of manifest meanings. Cf. the famous sentence of Freud's: "In our method, observed phenomena must take second place to forces that are merely hypothesised" (Ges. Schriften VII p. 62). This is especially clear in regard to the interpretation of dreams, and symbols. Here Binswanger parts company with Freud (it is at essentially the same point that we have seen before, namely, at Freud's assertion of the ultimate jurisdiction of the biological sciences over mental phenomena). Daseinsanalysis takes the manifest content of dreams seriously, on its own terms and sees e.g. the common dream motif of rising and falling as pointing to an essential feature of man's being-in-the-world, namely his elation and dejection, as two 'poles' of his existence. Cf. AVuA I "Traum und Existenz" (Needleman, pp. 222-248).

   In the same way, what are normally regarded as metaphorical statements, such as: "I'm sorry; I was miles away" are taken as expressing what is actually the case about the being-in-the-world of the speaker; i.e. the notion of spatiality is not identified with 'objective' geographical space, but refers rather to Dasein's relatedness to objects, as this manifests itself in consciousness. So too with temporality: "time flies by when I'm the driver of a train" sings the Lord of the Manor in the children's serial 'Chigley' and the Daseinsanalyst takes him seriously; there is a different tempo for every experience. See esp. AVuA II "Das Raum Problem in der Psychopathologie", pp. 174-226, 1932, and Ideenflucht, pp. 153-162.

world has undergone.[1] While engaged in this activity, the psychiatrist is still seeing his patient as a fellow-man, and understanding him with what Binswanger holds to be the categories of psychology. But as soon as you, for instance, regard psychotic enthusiasm as delirium, to be explained by extra-conscious and physical causal connections, you are in fact saying that you no longer "understand the psychotic man as man".[2] Having said that, one must repeat[3] that Binswanger regards it as psychiatrically essential to make a psychopathological diagnosis of the patient who is being viewed daseinsanalytically. But in making such a diagnosis, one needs to be aware of the reduction involved, of the 'scientific objectivity' aimed at, with its consequent distance and abstraction from the inter-personal relationship with the patient. In this regard we can look at Binswanger's assessment of psychoanalytical explanation, to see what is involved in the reduction from the (primary) daseinsanalytical understanding to the diagnostic or explanatory statement:

> "The experiencing of the succession of events is replaced here, as in psychopathology in general, by a succession of experiences (happenings, processes, functions,

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1. Here we can see Binswanger's fundamental objection to Jaspers' resignation to the impossibility of understanding the mentally ill. His 'understanding of meaningful connections' depends on the exercise of empathy. Empathy is impossible in regard to schizophrenia, for example. Binswanger replaces empathy with analysis of 'being-in-the-world'. - For Jaspers' discussion see Gen. Psychopath. pp. 386ff.

2. Ideenflucht, p. 145.

3. See esp. chapters 4 and 5 above.

mechanisms), in the mind or consciousness. Thereby the 'mind' or 'consciousness' becomes a second mental organism or even mental apparatus, operating alongside the bodily organism. As we could see especially in the case of Ellen West, this means a vast simplification, translation and reduction of human Dasein to the categories of objectivising knowledge. All this psychopathology is prepared to accept, in order to find its connection with biology, which as already stated, alone guarantees the concept of illness in the medical sense, and the possibility of a medical diagnosis, and of causal therapy."[1]

Thus we have a clear distinction between Daseins-analysis and psychopathology, though it is not an absolute one; the former can help the psychiatrist to see aspects of the latter more clearly, precisely by enabling him to look at the patient as a whole, and to see separate symptoms within this whole.[2]

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1. AVuA II p. 297 "Daseinsanalytik und Psychiatrie", 1950. - One might add here (with reference to 'causal therapy') that Binswanger by no means disapproves of the latter; when describing Freud's conception of man as homo natura, he comments:

   "When I refer to Freud's homo natura as only an idea, this should not be understood as disparagement. Science, after all, works as a rule only with ideas... With the theory of homo natura one can work not only scientifically, but practically. One can, that is, do something with the idea, namely, make people healthy."

   AVuA I "Freuds Auffassung des Menschen im Lichte der Anthropologie", 1936 (tr. Needleman, p. 155).

2. AVuA II p. 286f. "Daseinsanalytik und Psychiatrie", 1950.

3. Binswanger's anthropological interpretation of Heidegger's ontological analysis

Having obtained this preliminary view of Daseinsanalysis, we must now raise the question as to how Binswanger is in fact using the Heideggerian analysis. First, a summary of Binswanger's position: he distinguishes Daseinsanalysis from Heidegger's analytic by saying that his operates on the ontic level (i.e. with what actually presents itself to view, rather than with the ontological presuppositions of these phenomena). Secondly , he recognises that Heidegger's intention is different from his:[1] his is not the philosopher's question about the meaning of being, but the psychiatrist's or psychologist's, about the possibilities of human life,[2] in general[3] and in particular. It is the particular way Heidegger puts his question, namely by exploring the horizon within which the one who asks about being must ask his question, that makes his work fruitful for Binswanger. But it is fruitful because Binswanger uses it as an anthropologist, delineating the horizons within which human life is played out, and the possibilities open to it.

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1. Binswanger, AVuA II pp. 284 ff. and Grundformen pp. 17 and 128.
2. What makes the matter more complex is that Heidegger sees the ontological significance of Dasein precisely in its possibilities of being ('Sein-können').
3. i.e. as anthropologist (see below, chapter 8).

There is, however, a further point to be considered: Binswanger is concerned with the status of the various disciplines dealing with man, over against one another, and he therefore insists on regarding his anthropology as an 'ontological anthropology';[1] for only by so doing, i.e. by relating his studies of man to the ultimate ground of all study can he become clear about the status of these various disciplines over against each other. And this is not a purely academic question but one of central importance for his work as psychiatrist.[2]

That his use of Heidegger's analytik was primarily anthropological and only secondarily ontological can be seen by the way in which he is prepared to supplement the analysis of 'being-in-the-world as care (Sorge)' with an analysis of being-in-the-world as 'Daseins-joy',[3] as a counter-balance. For Heidegger, Care has an ontological status that prohibits any possible balancing concept. It is in Care and Anxiety that man comes to understand his own existence, as he responsibly grasps hold of the possibilities of his own life; hence

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1. Cf. Grundformen, p. 394:
   "If human understanding can no longer rest on theology, cosmology or ethics, and if it is not to become dependent on science, politics and technology, then it has no alternative but to refer back to ontology; without such a resting-point (Stütze) any anthropology 'hangs in the air'."

2. See above, p. 161 f.

3. Ideenflucht, p. 44f., pp. 153ff. The concept 'Daseinsfreude' is taken from Häberlin's analysis of the unproblematical way of being-in-the-world (but Binswanger is conscious of the difficulties of correcting Heidegger in this way: ibid . p. 190).

their ontologically privileged position. Binswanger is not asking what the ontological conditions are within which man learns the nature of his being, but rather what the several ways are, within which human life is played out.[1] Binswanger is in fact taking the Daseinsanalytik as an analysis of human experience,[2] and as such he sees it to be in need of supplementation.[3] But its link with ontological analysis does remain fundamental, in Binswanger's own thought. His mind will not rest content until his investigations have been 'put on the total map' of human knowledge. As he does his Daseinsanalysis he is concerned first with the man before him - but he is also concerned to use the knowledge so gained to deepen his insight into the possibilities of human being in general. A quotation from Ideenflucht will make this clear; Binswanger has put a particular psychopathological phenomenon within its life-historical setting:

> "But in an anthropological-psychological study we cannot rest content with that. The exploration of the concrete inner life-history is indeed a final goal for the

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1. There is a fundamental difference in the position from which each asks his major questions: Heidegger sees that the question as to the nature of being itself, and prior to that, as to the nature of man's own existence, can only be answered within resolute decision within that very existence itself. Binswanger, as anthropologist, seeks to lay bare the various possibilities of human being; as psychotherapist he agrees with Heidegger that a man will only find the meaning of his life as he resolutely grasps hold of it.

2. Binswanger himself admits this later on: Wahn, p. 11f.

3. See below, chapter 8.

> historical biographer, proceeding purely with the categories of psychological hermeneutics; but it is far from being that for the enquirer employing the categories of anthropological hermeneutics, i.e. for the phenomenologist and phenomenological psychologist who directs his gaze at the universal human essential forms of being. Not even the individual human life-history 'hangs in the air', but is for its part, to be understood on the basis of the universal essential forms of being that belong to existence."[1]

This brings us to Binswanger's overtly anthropological exploration, the Grundformen, in which he spells out these "universal essential forms of being".

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1. Ideenflucht, p. 42. NB the phenomenologist's concern with the essential, i.e. eidetic forms. This concern will be amply illustrated in what follows.

CHAPTER 8

Binswanger's own Conception of the Nature of Man and of Inter-personal Understanding

Preface

The time has now come to pull together the various strands of the exposition that has been developed up to this point. We have seen Binswanger in debate with the natural-scientific approach to psychiatry (Griesinger), and with Jaspers and Freud; we have seen his thought centre on the search for an adequate conceptuality for psychiatry: adequate to grasp man's mental life (hence his involvement with Husserl), and beyond that, man's total being-in-the-world (hence his involvement with Heidegger).

In the course of the exploration we have come up against the question of the nature of the specialised disciplines relating to man, and their relation to philosophy; we have also been confronted with the question of the nature of inter-personal knowledge, and have seen how for Binswanger, as for Heidegger, such an epistemological question is put within an ontological setting; that is to say, a particular form of knowing is seen as a particular mode of being towards objects.

Binswanger brings all these questions together in the Grundformen, where one sees that he is not just a sampler

of other men's ideas, but a creative and systematic thinker in his own right.

But in approaching the Grundformen (and especially the nature of inter-personal knowledge), we need to refer to one further individual, whose work was of special importance to Binswanger, namely, Scheler. The question was put in the form: how is inter-personal knowledge possible? (i.e. it was seen in a characteristically ontological form: what is the basis in the life of man that makes such knowledge possible?). Here Binswanger was able to draw on Scheler's phenomenological explorations of inter-personal knowledge and of love, and make these fruitful for his own work.[1] For Scheler, man's being was essentially relational; man shared a 'coinherence' with his fellow; and the relationship of love was seen as the basis of inter-personal knowledge.[2] The tendency of philosophy was to start with the individual (as in the case of Husserl), and

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1. Binswanger records his debt to Scheler in Grundformen, p. 483, and p. 689 (in particular, for his attack on the alleged privileged position of self-knowledge within the whole arena of human knowledge).

2. Scheler, Ordo Amoris. Schriften aus dem Nachlass. Vol. 1, p. 356 (quoted by Sadler, p. 60). - Sadler (p. 124) stresses Binswanger's indebtedness to Scheler; but it must be pointed out that Binswanger was critical of Scheler's own phenomenology of love (The Nature of Sympathy), based on a feeling of oneness; see Grundformen, pp. 124f., 162. Where he agreed wholeheartedly with Scheler was in the view that inter-personal understanding was an irreducible way of being human (Binswanger, Grundformen, p. 504, 686); furthermore that such knowledge was not a construction by one individual knower of what - by analogy - the content of another's consciousness must be (ibid. p. 689).

then establish how he comes to know his fellow. But this was the wrong way round; man's knowing in fact began with a relationship with another person, and grew on this basis. This meant that man had a natural, or, as it were 'built in' capacity for understanding his fellow - on the basis of the love-relationship.

Scheler's work encouraged Binswanger to undertake a phenomenological exploration of the various different ways a man relates: - to another person in love, to other people in social intercourse, and to himself, - in order to lay bare the form of personal knowledge appropriate to these different ways of relating, and springing out of them. Such an exploration forms the subject-matter of the Grundformen; in it we will find Binswanger's answer to many of his pressing tasks: first, to establish a phenomenology of man's ways of being-in-the-world (where Heidegger had helped him, but not provided all the answers); secondly, to locate the place of the disciplines relating to man within these various ways of human being; and thirdly, to establish the nature of inter-personal knowledge at the deepest level (such as is demanded by the psychotherapeutic relationship).

To aid comprehension, let me start by giving Binswanger's conclusions. The most common form of being-with-another person is of course normal human intercourse within society;[1]

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1. See section 2 below.

this is seen phenomenologically by Binswanger as a taking-hold-of-x-by-y: this is its essential feature; and a form of personal knowledge accompanies it, such as assesses a man, gets to know his character by repeated experience, learning his weak points and his strong ones, for the sake of some goal. Psychological theory, characterology, personality testing etc. all belong to this form of knowing. It does not however lead one to the person himself as he is in himself - nor is it an adequate form of knowing, if one is seeking to help him grow (e.g. entering into a psychotherapeutic relationship with him). For a form of knowing appropriate for this, one needs to look at another form of being-with, that of friendship and love; here you find inter-personal knowledge of the deepest kind, the relationship itself being 'of the deepest kind';[1] it is not utilitarian, nor is the resultant inter-personal knowledge partial, i.e. concerned only with one aspect of man, but rather complete, concerned with him as he is in himself.

The Grundformen is first of all an exploration of this form of relationship: it is a 'phenomenology of love',[2] and its aim is to discover the most profound sort of inter-personal knowledge available to man - and to set this out as the presupposition of the psychotherapeutic relationship.

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1. Sections 1 and 4 below.

2. Grundformen, Introduction, p. 17.

Such an exploration will lead Binswanger away from the sombre existentialism of Heidegger; indeed the Grundformen is in part a running discussion with Heidegger, though undertaken with the realisation that their intentions are different.[1]

At the same time it must be repeated that we are not leaving the world of psychiatry and psychopathology, but are, on the contrary, exploring the bases on which these disciplines are possible:

> "The total science of psychopathology can (and must) be understood and described out of these two constituent elements of Dasein, care and love."[2]

In the Grundformen, Binswanger carries his discussion with Freud on the one side and Heidegger on the other into his home territory, - anthropology -, and does so in systematic fashion. But he also introduces a discussion which has been implicit in the intention that informs his psychiatric work, but which is not made explicit elsewhere, namely, with the tradition of Western Christianity. This chapter must make clear Binswanger's position viz-à-viz these three influences. But it must concentrate on the cardinal features of Binswanger's own doctrine.

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1. Grundformen, p. 128.
2. Ibid. p. 75.

1. The phenomenology of love

Binswanger describes the Grundformen as an "ontologically proceeding anthropology",[1] to be distinguished from Heidegger's purely ontological intention, yet still retaining an ontological reference.[2] Binswanger is out to show that the phenomenon of love is as basic a part of man's being as the phenomenon of care ('Sorge'); indeed, that it is in important respects 'more fundamental'. He does not regard it as sufficient to demonstrate its actuality, as one anthropological phenomenon among others; he seeks to demonstrate that it is a 'Grundform' of human being, irreducible to other forms, and essential to the structure of psychological knowledge in the full sense of the term.[3]

Binswanger starts with the actuality of that which he seeks to explore[4]: the 'I-Thou' relationship,[5] which he

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1. Grundformen, p. 128.
2. Ibid. p. 13: "Precisely the attempt to hold on to the ontological viewpoint showed itself to be particularly fruitful for our investigations."
3. It is important to hold together both parts of this sentence, if we are to do justice to the intention of the Grundformen: using philosophical terminology, we can say that (anthropological) ontology and (psychological) epistemology make up the two major sections of the work; the second part is only comprehensible on the basis of the first, but is itself the goal of the whole enquiry.
4. Binswanger is conscious of the fact that by starting with that the existence of which he seeks to demonstrate he is within a 'hermeneutical circle'. This is a legitimate and indeed necessary procedure, on his view: see Ideenflucht, p. 88 and Heidegger, SuZ H 7.
5. Binswanger refers to Buber's influence on his thought in Grundformen, Introduction, p. 11, and again on p. 46f. - For what follows, on the phenomenology of love, we are drawing on Grundformen, pp. 23-219.

expresses in the plural form: 'We-ness' ('Wirheit'), in order to stress the inseparability of the two terms 'I' and 'Thou' within the loving relationship. These two terms are what they are precisely in this relationship, and not as separate 'units', outside it. Hence the relation is itself the primary factor, and is termed: 'loving-being-together'.[1]

In describing this relationship, Binswanger uses poetry as his 'source', seeing it as love's interpretation of itself.[2] Thus, within the Heideggerian terms of reference, he enquires into the spatiality and temporality of loving-being-together, and contrasts it with that implied in man's concernful dealings with his fellows. There, one man takes the place of another; here, 'I' make a place for 'Thee'; I do not deprive 'thee' of a place, by taking it up myself, but, by being there with 'thee' in love, I create space for both.[3] A 'home' is created for 'us'.[4] Furthermore in loving-being-together 'eternity' is - somewhat paradoxically - an essential structural element of its temporality (this again documented from poetry);[5] here there is no individualist seeking of one's own destiny, or anticipation of the future, but an 'eternity in the present moment', shared by both lovers.

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1. 'liebendes Miteinandersein'. The terms Binswanger uses are built up on the basis of, and in contrast to, the Heideggerian Daseinsanalytik.
2. Grundformen, p. 37: 'die Selbstauslegung der Liebe'. The poets chiefly used are Goethe, Rilke, and the two Brownings (Elizabeth Barrett-Browning's works having been translated into German by Rilke).
3. Ibid. p. 28ff.
4. 'Heimat' - taken from Rilke, and playing an important part in contrast to the homelessness of Dasein (see chapter 10 below).
5. Ibid. p. 37f.

It needs to be stated here that Binswanger does not regard such poetic description as metaphorical use of language, permissible within the context of 'poetic licence', and in 'a cool hour' to be 'de-mythologised'. His anthropological understanding of the Heideggerian analytik (as a characterisation of what it is to be human) enables him to use the same (ontological)[1] method to describe a way of being that on his view Heidegger has not correctly evaluated. Heidegger had seen love in terms of concernful being-there-for the other person, that is to say, still on the basis of Care (as indeed he had to).[2] Binswanger contrasts the two, seeing them (anthropologically speaking) as two quite different ways of being.

> "Love is more, it is something quite other than mood ('Stimmung') or how-one-finds-oneself ('Sichbefinden'). Loving-being-together cannot be understood as a feeling or affect (just as little as can Anxiety ['Angst'], of which it is the ontological opposite), but only as a particular ['eigene'] way to be, in contrast both to being-in-the-they, and to being-oneself."[3]

Binswanger continues to use Heideggerian terminology when describing the relation of loving-being-together to the world. Whereas Dasein achieves authentic existence in grasping

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1. Ibid. p. 33.
2. SuZ H 122f.
3. Grundformen, p. 54. The end of the quotation makes it clear that Binswanger distinguishes love from both authentic and inauthentic ways of existing.

hold of one set of possibilities over against another (which means that 'transcending' here always also implies 'excluding' other possibilities, and is therefore always a self-limiting transcendence), the transcendence involved in loving-being-together[1] is a 'pure transcendence', issuing not in the exclusion of possibilities or self-limitation, but in a fullness, a super-abundance within the I-Thou relationship. The latter is a reciprocal giving and receiving of the whole being of each; it takes place in the 'eternal moment', without reference to any particular historical situation, so that, alongside 'historicality', one now finds the dimension in human being of 'supra-historicality'.[2] Dasein, as Care, 'finds itself', when it assumes control over its own destiny, when it exposes itself to its ultimate nothingness. Loving-being-together finds itself precisely when it receives its being as grace, or gift;[3] here, one does not gain control of oneself, but allows oneself to be filled by encounter with the Thou. Thus love cannot be procured; to suggest that it could, is to suppose that it is ultimately reducible to being-in-the-world as

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1. The terms involved here (the discussion takes place against the background of Heidegger's 'Vom Wesen des Grundes, Husserlfestschrift, 1929) are very difficult to translate. Dasein's transcending is 'entziehend - überschwingend' (a transcending that at the same time excludes); love's transcending is a 'being-swung-up-out-of-oneself' ('Überschwung', 'Überschwang'): a "being transported into the heights" (Sadler, p. 190, on this concept).

2. Grundformen, p. 154f.

3. Ibid. p. 153.

care.[1] On the contrary, Binswanger sees love (as pure transcending) as 'world-conquering', as overcoming the world of care and concern:

> "The fullness of loving-being-together overflows into the world of concern, is essentially world-conquering, whereby under world we mean both the world of men and that of the environment."[2]

It is not of course suggested that love takes place apart from the world of care; it comes into being within that world, and human being is seen as a dialectic between these two ways of being, in which love can transform care: Binswanger points to

> "the fact of the possibility of the penetration of the world of concern and solicitude with the 'spirit' of love, on the one side, and on the other, the possibility of the transparency of the world of concern, when seen in the light of this spirit. Here lies the dialectic of love and world. It is resolved, when the lovers are able to apply to the superficiality and business of concern the weight and calm of love, to the seriousness of mundane labour the blessedness of

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1. Grundformen, p. 93. - Sadler (p. 224) appears to misunderstand Binswanger at this point (or else to correct him), suggesting that the category 'conscience' is applicable to loving-being-together, in the sense of 'beckoning me to discover' the world of I and Thou. But for Binswanger there is nothing outstanding in love; nor can conscience or resolve have a part in it; where there is care in respect of love, love is already at an end.

2. Ibid. p. 76.

> their humour, to the ambition for success in the world the knowledge of the unending, the trusting steadfast standing in eternity: the world is 'clear and kind', and they know 'why they are in the world'."[1]

Furthermore, once the I-Thou encounter has been experienced there can be no doubt as to the reality of this way of being-in-the-world:

> "I must have encountered thee, to 'know' at all about true encounter, about being as we-being. If this encounter was really true, in other words, if it <u>was</u> in reality, then this knowledge will never again be lost, I am 'in eternity' a member of loving we-being."[2]

Loving-being-together involves knowledge of a sort quite different from discursive knowing. 'I' know 'thee' as a whole being, in relation to me;[3] in love, my <u>idea</u> of the Thou and Thou thyself in actuality co-incide.[4] Thus the I-Thou

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1. Grundformen, p. 98. The words in inverted commas are allusions to Goethe (without more exact reference). Binswanger sums up this aspect of love by the longest ever hyphenated term: being-in-the-world-beyond-the-world.
2. Grundformen, p. 683.
3. Imagination ('Ein-bild-ung', with stress on the notion of creativity within the root 'bild-') is of central importance here, as the creative element within the conscious awareness of loving-encounter. Here
   > "the whole and the particular, unity and multiplicity, essence and matter of fact are called by one word only: Thou. Thy smile (this is how loving knowledge speaks and judges), thy smile is not a part of thee, but is Thou thyself! Thy greeting, thy word, thy movement, thy Gestalt, thy history, thy activity, thy work is Thou. All purely discursive knowledge, just as all purely intuitive knowledge, is foreign to loving knowledge; it does not divide <u>Factum</u> and <u>Eidos</u>." Ibid. p. 118.
4. Ibid. p. 118f; 166f. NB the phenomenological method, working with the concepts <u>Factum</u> and <u>Eidos</u> (Husserl); the <u>Eidos</u> (the categorial intuition) is normally to be distinguished from the <u>factum</u> (object of sensuous perception), because many '<u>facta</u>' are normally subsumable under one <u>eidos</u>; but here, <u>eidos</u> ('Duhaftigkeit') and <u>factum</u> (Du) coincide.

relationship is indeed just between 'me' and 'thee', and in this sense is exclusive (but not in the sense of excluding other possibilities, for Thou and the idea of Thou coincide!): "it is a coming from and a going to the heart" and the disclosure that belongs to it is a disclosure of Dasein as 'heart' and 'home'.[1]

Trust and faith are an integral part of loving-being-together; as I speak, I take on trust thy response, and in this way love is self-creative.[2] That is not to say that 'I' and 'Thou' lose their individuality, or are subsumed under an all-embracing 'We'; within the 'two-ness' ('Zweisamkeit'), there remains an essential one-ness on each side (Einsamkeit); i.e. within love, I find myself, when I find thee.[3]

This very limited exposition of Binswanger's conception of love, necessarily detracting from the richness of his own descriptive writing, must suffice; we must now look again at his position viz-à-viz his three major 'discussion partners'.

The section has already touched on the relationship with Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik, and referred to the involved question of the ontological status that Binswanger accords to loving-being-together. It is the anthropological interpretation

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1. Grundformen, p. 105.

2. Ibid. p. 80.

3. Ibid. pp. 121ff. - The reciprocity in loving-being-together is summed up in Browning's words: "This I say of me, but think of you, love!" One Word More. To E.B.B. Sept. 1855. Quoted Grundformen, p. 117.

of Daseinsanalytik that makes Binswanger's position possible. Once again,[1] it needs to be said that Heidegger's analytik lays itself open to this sort of interpretation: by setting the ontological question (following the Kantian critique of metaphysics) within the context of the question of the meaning of the being of Dasein, Heidegger's treatment inevitably deals with the being of man as man himself experiences it (this is what is open to phenomenological enquiry). When Binswanger explores the horizons and modes of man's experience, the question of being as such, i.e. the strictly ontological question (taking seriously the meaning of Dasein as 'being-there') slips into the background, and Dasein comes to be synonymous with 'humanity'. He in fact uses the term in this sense.[2] But as we have seen, he also wants to retain an ontological reference, in order to maintain the irreducibility of loving-being-together.[3] That is to say, 'ontological' is

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1. See above, chapter 7, section 3.

2. Grundformen, p. 219:
   "When we speak of Dasein, in contrast to Heidegger, we never only mean Dasein as in each case mine, or thine, or his, but human Dasein as such, or, if one will, Dasein as 'humanity'."

3. One could I think, also write: '...the irreducibility of the experience of loving encounter'. His argument is Heideggerian in method, in that it looks at the experience of love and asks for the ontological conditions which make it possible.

   One must distinguish Sadler's exposition of love from Binswanger's at this point, in that Sadler asserts the reality and importance of love psychologically, not ontologically, i.e. by reference to the relationship of love between mother and child, seen as the first and basic inter-personal relationship. Sadler is here drawing on the work of H.S. Sullivan, and E. Erikson; see Sadler, p. 118.

here being used in the sense of 'irreducibly fundamental to the being of man'. But Binswanger does want to insist that loving-being-together itself illuminates the being of man; indeed that it is what makes sense of the totality of human experience. Hence it has a vital epistemological function in disclosing the truth of human being.

To claim this status for it is to make what must be a groundless assertion; love itself, as Binswanger never tires of saying, cannot be procured or manufactured; it is a gift, or grace; in this sense it is groundless, and itself an ultimate way of being; itself an ultimate 'ground'.[1] For this reason its assertion is a risk; but, to repeat, a risk that makes sense of the totality of human experience, a risk the presupposition of which is that all things are ultimately, ontologically, one, of the same nature.[2]

This is the context in which we have to see Binswanger's criticism of Heidegger; Heidegger showed us the finitude of man:

> "What he did not show, is that Dasein, as human being, is not absorbed without remainder...in the being-to-its-own-end; that is to say, does not at all understand itself purely on the basis of its own facticity, i.e. on the basis of the actuality of its own Dasein."[3]

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1. Men love because they love, not because they recognise an attribute worthy of love in each other. Grundformen, pp. 114ff.
2. This is to anticipate the exposition of 'Daseinsknowing', which is itself essentially a risk; ibid. pp. 618-622. The (monist) ontological claim referred to here is a fundamental condition of Binswanger's concept of love and loving knowledge. See below, section 4.
3. Grundformen, p. 88.

Nor is Dasein always related to its own end; in loving being-together it finds itself as 'always-already-having-arrived-there', and as 'being-at-home-there'.[1]

But behind the whole Heideggerian understanding of man, Binswanger sees the 'Idea of Power',[2] and man's urge to control his own destiny. This is what needs to be balanced by an equally 'primordial' idea, namely that of the grace or given-ness of love. And at this point we can move to Binswanger's discussion with the heritage of Western Christianity, and as we do so, we must bear in mind his claim to be doing ontological anthropology.

This discussion has two parts: first, an assessment of contemporary man's capacity for theology, and secondly a critique of the theological understanding of love. We will confine ourselves to the first at this stage. Binswanger's thesis is that the realm of theology can no longer be a starting-point for anthropological investigations, a terminus a quo; it can only be a terminus ad quem.[3] While admitting that there are some matters most appropriately expounded

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1. Ibid. p. 95. When speaking of the eternity of love, we have to bear in mind Binswanger's comment: "love is totally this-worldly". Ibid. p. 171.

2. Ibid. p. 147f.

3. Grundformen, p. 394f. In his introduction, Binswanger expressly differentiates his position (as regards theology) from that of Feuerbach, in that the latter "wants to turn theology into anthropology, with the result that the latter is raised to the status of divinity"; ibid. p. 15.

theologically,[1] he argues that because theistic belief is no longer generally acceptable, anthropology (and via anthropology, psychology) must find a basis other than theology.

> "What cosmology, theology and politics each in its own way discovered, described and understood about man, we have now to understand in an a-cosmic world stripped of both Gods and ethics, but thereby all the more scientific, politicised, and technologised, and we have to do it by reference back to being itself, i.e. ontologically. For the fact that man is in the world is the only thing today that no one will dispute."[2]

Binswanger refers to secular man's ambivalence, as far as theology is concerned: he seems to be a "weak vessel, no longer able to conceive of the Gods..., unable to bear the 'divine fullness'",[3] and yet innocent of the implications of thus doing away with theology:

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1. "Ontologically...for love, and for every faith, everything is possible: reconciliation, repentance, riches of forgiveness, and humility - these are always possible, for they are themselves ontological possibilities of love. That is more difficult to describe anthropologically than theologically..." ibid. p. 164.

2. Grundformen, p. 394. It is worth noting that Binswanger regards ethics as being as impossible as theology - as a basis for anthropology. But he does not define 'ethics' more closely here. In the next section of the Grundformen, he expounds morality as one particular way one man takes hold of another, namely, by his word, or honour. Thus the ethical dimension is contained within the all embracing umbrella of anthropology.

3. Grundformen, p. 164.

> "Humanity as a rule makes light of doing away with the gods or God; it does not see, it will not see, what it puts onto itself, when it dethrones the deity."[1]

Again:

> "When the realisation of the meaning of Dasein is no longer possible with reference to God, human being experiences a colossal impoverishment, an enormous shortening of its claims, yes, a withering in its being. The problem 'man' now requires a new solution. If it is not to be sought in 'the transcendent' or eternal, then it must be sought in the temporal or finite, in being and time, i.e. in being-in-the-world. But the 'reckoning' does not finish there. There remains something over, which does not fit into finitude, the longing that goes beyond the 'worldly' finitude of Dasein to the unity with infinite and eternal being. This longing is, we know, only possible in contradiction to finitude. Its name is still: love."[2]

From this we can see that Binswanger's attempt to retain an ontological status for his concept of loving-being-together is at least partly due to the need to replace the foundation provided in previous cultures by theology.[3]

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid. p. 407.

3. Cf. AVuA II, Freuds Auffassung des Menschen im Lichte der Anthropologie, 1936 (tr. Needleman, p. 178f.):

> "It is equally clear that at present psychology must take the place of theology, health of redemption, symptom of suffering, the physician of the priest, and that instead of the meaning and substance of life, pleasure and unpleasure have become the major problems of life."

When we move to consider Binswanger's evaluation of Freud's work, we will again have two matters in front of us. First (and this should require no great elaboration here), Binswanger regards loving-being-together as an essential element in man's being, such as cannot be reduced to other categories, such as, for instance, those of Freudian analysis. The I-Thou encounter is ontologically prior to either of its constituent parts: to take 'I' or 'Thou' on their own, apart from this encounter, is to take less than the whole. And the possibility of any 'I' meeting a 'Thou' at any particular time rests on the ontological fact of Dasein as We-ness: this is the presupposition of any actual encounter.

> "We are not speaking here of empirical conditions of this encounter, such as e.g. the 'unconscious excitations of love', which may - for there is no necessity - precede the emergent awareness of loving, nor are we speaking of conditions of love, whose tangled ways Freud has so brilliantly hit upon and described, but we are speaking of a structural moment which belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein."[1]

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1. Grundformen, p. 83. See too p. 194, where Binswanger criticises Freud's account of the process of mourning, the purpose of which (in Freud's view) is to free the libido from its reference to one object and make it available elsewhere. Such a process has nothing to do with Binswanger's conception of loving-being-together.

2. The phenomenology of man's social life

How, then, does Binswanger view Freud's form of psychology? For an answer we have to move to the second sub-section of the first half of the Grundformen, namely, to Binswanger's exposition of man's social life. He is, so to speak, coming down the scale from loving-being-together, to socially being-with-another,[1] and the basic form that sums up man's social life, where love is not involved, is 'a taking-hold-of-x-by-y'.[2] This generalised formula, stripped down in phenomenological fashion to its bare essentials, refers to the whole area of man's dealings with his fellow man and with his environment. The formula highlights the essential difference from loving-being-together that obtains here, namely, that 'I' and 'Thou' have become separate individuals, who have to do something in order to relate to each other; the relating is no longer given as 'grace'. Here a man has to find some means whereby he can approach or get hold of the other. For example, in physical terms, the teacher gets hold of the schoolboy by his ear (Binswanger was writing at the end of the 1930s!), or, in terms of knowing, a man has to find some aspect of the man over against him (the language is significant), which he can

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1. I have left on one side his exposition of friendship, as a partial exemplification of loving-being-together; here the eidos (Duhaftigkeit) and the factum (Du) do not coincide; but friendship is still to be seen as a form of love, Grundformen, pp. 266-381.

2. 'Das Nehmen-bei-etwas'. I have found it useful to insert the letters 'x' and 'y' in the English translation of the term in order to bring out the meaning.

grasp hold of mentally,[1] before he can enter a relationship with him.

Binswanger lists four areas in which we do this: first, that of impressionability (in which we take hold of a man by some part of him in order to impress something upon him); secondly, that of affectivity (in which we take hold of the side or aspect of a man that he continually shows us, normally a 'weak point', and work with him on this basis); thirdly, that of responsibility (in which men take hold of each other by their word, making contracts and agreements etc.); fourthly, that of historicality (in which a man takes hold of another by his name, his reputation etc.).

Now in each of these areas we do not take hold of the totality of the other man, but rather a part; however, we take hold of the part, in order to relate to the whole.[2]

To each of these ways of being, there corresponds a way of knowing, each of which must be termed discursive; the knower operates with a part, he moves from part to part, discursively. Thus (to come to our specific concern) in so far as Freudian psycho-analysis is a method of obtaining knowledge about persons (whether about oneself or others makes no difference here) it is to be seen within this anthropological dimension of 'the-taking-hold-of-x-by-y', and in this case the specific dimension is that of affectivity, i.e. where

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1. Binswanger takes the German 'wahr-nehmen', 'ver-nehmen' seriously; cf. also the Latin com-prehendere.

2. Furthermore the relation of the part to the whole differs in each case.

men relate to each other by what they know of each others' personalities. A man repeatedly shows one side of his character to his neighbour, who comes to know this side, and via the knowledge so gained relates to the whole man. If we are to view it aright, Binswanger argues, we must see discursive psychological knowledge within this anthropological 'locus'. When this knowing is abstracted from the relationship, and regarded as complete in itself, then what was originally a 'way in' to a relationship (i.e. a taking-hold-of-the-totality-x-by-the-part-y) is regarded as itself the whole.[1] Thus the science of the personality (which is that which a man shows to himself and to his fellow men) is taken to be the science of the whole man, as if the category 'personality' (originally the part) was itself the whole. This, on Binswanger's view, is what happens when one loses sight of the anthropological 'locus' of such discursive psychological disciplines, and regards any one of them as capable of grasping the total truth about a man's being. Thus Freudian psycho-analysis, or e.g. characterology, or the science of the personality, must all be seen as approaches to human being which are essentially limited and derivative enquiries, in the sense that they are dependent upon a particular anthropological mode of being, which is not itself

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1. Grundformen, p. 373f.

the sole or most important mode (loving-being-together 'overcoming' the world of social intercourse - the world of 'care').[1]

One further point needs to be made: the foregoing analysis should not lead one to posit 'the man himself' as a noumenon 'behind' that which lets itself be known: within the context of that relationship a man <u>is</u> his personality, and he who so approaches him <u>is</u> the psychological-enquirer; but neither are at that time and in that relationship participating in the whole of human being.[2]

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1. Cf. Grundformen, p. 374f.:

> "Anthropology has a far wider area [than the specialised sciences], quite apart from its quite different methods; it embraces the encounter, which is inaccessible to psychology, and existence, which is inaccessible to objectifying psychology; in other words, it embraces being as a whole in the sense of the superabundance of love, and being on the basis of the nothing. If psychology deals with love it turns it into a passion, an affect, a feeling, a psychic phenomenon or action, a phantasy or illusion, a more or less passing happening (an accident); if it deals with existence, it turns it into a property, a moral phenomenon, a type ('introversion'), a tendency, a specific level of the personality."

2. Grundformen, pp. 337-341.

3. The phenomenology of a man's relation to himself

We have referred above to Binswanger's three discussion partners; the discussion is not complete without reference to man's relationship to himself.

This is a crucial area for anthropology - an area in which it feels the strength and value of the theological position, as for instance expounded by Augustine. For the Christian, self-love is a possibility, and can form the basis of a man's relationship to himself. It is a possibility, in that the Christian theist knows himself created by God; in loving himself, then, he is loving God's creation; indeed he loves himself in so far as, and because, he is God's creation.[1] For secular man no such basis for his relationship to himself exists.[2] The matter is of importance precisely

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1. Binswanger observes that the Christian

> "'Redi in te ipsum' does not mean withdrawal from the world or 'introversion' in the modern sense, but at the same time 'extraversion', i.e. a return to the world, by way of God. The Christian 'introvert' is thus the loving one who is filled with God and active in the world; the modern introvert, on the other hand, is the love-less and God-less refugee from the world, the 'neurotic'." Grundformen, p. 413.

2. Ibid. p. 387:

> "Because it belongs to the most vital interests of anthropology to show that it does not rest on either theology or ethics, and that it ought not to merge into either the one or the other, the problem of self-love comes to assume a central importance anthropologically. But quite apart from that, an exploration of the anthropological foundations of psychological or Daseins-knowledge has the greatest interest in discovering whether there is a form of self-love which corresponds to love or friendship in the sense of loving encounter or participation as we have worked it out, or whether that is not the case."

in relation to psycho-analysis and to psychotherapy in general. Within what setting and on what basis does and should the (non-Christian) analysand receive the knowledge of himself gained in the course of analysis? Should his relation to himself be one of love, or hate, or fear, or indifference? Why should one suppose that the knowledge gained in analysis should prove integrative rather than destructive? The Christian ought to be able to enter the process of analysis in the expectation of learning more about the Creation.

Nevertheless, Binswanger criticises Christian self-love precisely because of its theological basis; he argues that for Augustine, love of self and love of the neighbour are not different in kind; neither is loved for his own sake, but for the sake of the '<u>Gratia Dei</u>'; thus we are not concerned here with loving-being-together such as Binswanger describes: in Christian love (whether of self or of neighbour) a man loves precisely that element or dimension which 'comes to him from outside' (i.e. which is of God); in other words, Binswanger argues, he loves himself for that which he is not, and his neighbour likewise.[1]

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1. In this respect the Christian tradition is comparable to Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's concernful being-with for the sake of the other (SuZ H 123): Dasein anticipates the other's future and makes it available for him. But this means that Dasein does not love the other for what he is, but for what he is not (yet).

   "Here it becomes clear that, and to what extent, one can describe the anticipatory solicitude of Heidegger as a secularised Christian love of neighbour."

But the valuable element within the Christian tradition of self-love is its awareness of the human being's search for the 'ground of his being', for that ultimate ground on which he stands.[1] Anthropology can no longer find that ground in the Creator, but must accept the search as integral to human being. Nor can it any longer speak of this relation to one-self as one of love, in the sense of loving encounter. Precisely the 'Thou' is missing in this case. Instead Binswanger holds that anthropology must speak of Dasein's essential relatedness to its own ground.[2] But this ground is, and must remain, a mystery (for anthropology); thus Binswanger speaks of the being-to-one's-ground as the being-to-the-mystery-of-one's-being.[3] Such an awareness of the mystery of one's ground must not be regarded as discursive knowledge:

> "This sort of self-discernment (one cannot speak here of an act of knowing) means a transformation of the whole self in the sense of a maturing, of self-realisation, i.e. of the actual grasping hold of one's ownmost possibilities. For in questioning the mystery of Dasein, I go further and further into the possibilities of my being, and there opens up to my questioning

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1. Ibid. p. 451f.

2. The word used is 'Tendenz' or 'Zug', and the meaning must be: 'directedness towards', or 'referredness towards'; Bultmann can also speak of 'existential Tendenz' to mean the over-all direction of man's existence: Exegetica, p.202.

3. Grundformen, p. 478:
   "The truth of the self, the being-to-one's-ground as mystery, is founded in mystery, and remains surrounded by mystery; for that reason it is modest: it is knowledge of one's ignorance."

more and more of what I could be."[1]

We can now look again at Binswanger's assessment of the status and jurisdiction of psychological (in particular, psycho-analytical) knowledge. As we have seen,[2] discursive knowing, in the realm of psychology, has as its subject-matter that which enables one to grasp hold of a man, e.g. his personality; it brings to our notice the various roles men play, and the '<u>personae</u>' they assume, on the basis of which they understand themselves and act in the world. But all these roles - and knowledge of them - are to be contrasted with man's relatedness to the mystery of the ground of his being, and with his awareness of that relatedness. Binswanger quotes some words of James Joyce:

> "We walk through ourselves, meeting robbers, ghosts, giants, old men, young men, wives, widows, brothers-in-law. But always meeting ourselves."[3]

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1. Ibid. p. 479f. Binswanger is not referring simply to Heidegger's being-towards-one's-own-death; that is "anthropologically speaking, the ontological boundary-case" (ibid. p. 480).

   - This quotation (in the text) suggests that Binswanger sees the goal of human understanding in the same kind of philosophical illumination, openness and avoidance of final definition or answer that Jaspers advocated. See Gen. Psychopath., e.g. p. 771. This is only partially the case. The awareness of the mystery of one's own being (indispensable as regards self-understanding) has to be seen beside the creative-imaginative knowledge of the whole of Dasein, which Binswanger holds to be the goal of 'Daseinserkenntnis'. See below, section 4.

2. See above, section 2.

3. Ulysses, I p. 220 (The Odyssey Press). Quoted in Grund-formen, p. 442.

Here we have a description of a man's own world,[1] as opposed to the worlds of his fellow men and his environment. The danger, on Binswanger's view, is to suppose that analysis of one's own world presented one with the whole of oneself definitively. It is a form of discursive knowing and has to be distinguished sharply from awareness of the mystery of one's ground. If the latter awareness is lost, the whole human being is interpreted in terms of levels of the personality, and each level (or, 'persona', - role -) is hypostasised, and man is seen as nothing more than a number of warring elements. Indeed, this is precisely what happens in the case of the neurotic (one who has lost this awareness).

Characteristically, Binswanger's criticism is concerned with the universal application of this analysis, which was appropriate in the case of the neurotic:

> "This then becomes the basis on which the healthy man is also interpreted, and the ego is made either into a battleground between the worlds of the conscious and the unconscious, or into a ball being played with by warring forces. The existentiell directedness, in the sense of the freedom of transcendence, is thus banished from human being; that which makes man man is banished from the area of exploration, or at best plays the role of a more or less incomprehensible intellectual luxury,

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1. 'Eigenwelt': it is this 'world' which Binswanger says Heidegger has never adequately analysed; but it must be regarded as of equal importance to the Mit- und Um-Welt.

or else of intellectual coercion (Freud's super-ego), or even of 'an opponent of life'."[1]

To conclude our exposition of this first half of the Grundformen, we must ask how these three basic forms of human being-with relate to each other. Characteristically, Binswanger is not prepared to allow them an undefined position alongside each other. The latter two (taking-hold-of-x-by-y and being-towards-one's-ground) can be subsumed under the Heideggerian notion of 'Care' so that one is left with two fundamental modes of being: love and care. The whole of human life is seen as being played out in the tension between these two, and in the overcoming of this tension or contradiction.[2]

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1. Grundformen, p. 440. For the notion of the mind as a battleground see Freud, ILP-A p. 61. - Binswanger admits the presence of psychic conflict within man; indeed he writes: "the achievements of Freud's doctrine within the realm of the opposing own-world, the realm of psychic conflict, remain untouched" by anthropological criticism (Grundformen, p. 451); but psycho-analysis, "the deepest scientific experiental theory of man" only manages to see man in relation "to the various worlds with which he is confronted" (ibid.). - Binswanger contrasts Jung's doctrine of individuation with Freudian psycho-analysis, in that it retains the vital anthropological distinction between discursive self-knowledge (producing analyses of 'personae') and awareness of one's own ground; ibid. p. 436f.)

2. Binswanger maintains that the (unspecifiable) 'ground' of Dasein must be the same in both forms of being (love and care); it is the being-towards that ground that differs. The ground itself must be defined as "'one', not in the numerical sense, but in the sense of 'universal unity' ('All-Einheit')"; ibid. p. 482.

4. Psychology, or the knowledge of Dasein

The last section ended with the contradiction between love and care; what follows in the Grundformen (the second half and the major goal of the work: pp. 489-704) is an exposition, surprisingly in the first instance, of psychology. But this is psychology - or, better, psychological knowing - in the fullest sense of the term, to be distinguished radically from both discursive or objectivising psychologies (which operate by observation and theoretical construction) and the awareness of the mystery of one's own ground (which cannot really be termed knowledge). In discursive psychology, the enquiry is made within the anthropological dimension of being-with; the creative imagination (which has its home in loving-being-together) is necessarily left out of account. But this means that such an enquiry is incapable of grasping hold of the element of loving-being-together (it turns it into something else), and is thus incapable of comprehending the whole being of him with whom it is concerned.

Binswanger argues that there is a form of knowing that employs both discursive understanding and creative imagination, and as such embraces the worlds of both love and care, and is to be seen as the paradigm for that overcoming of care by love which the last section set as a task (if human being is to be ultimately 'one').

Again it needs to be stressed that we have not left the world of psychiatry: this form of psychological knowing, on

Binswanger's view, lies behind his work as psychiatrist, informing it and alone enabling him to keep the whole man before him; for, as we have seen, his work involves both discursive, scientific enquiry, and the 'risk' of loving encounter; here we see Binswanger showing how he can work in both ways - admittedly overcoming one by the other.

The first thing to be said is that psychology (and from now on we will be using the term in the full sense) concerns itself with a 'subject-matter' that answers the enquirer,[1] and in answering, changes the relationship between questioner and questioned: thus psychology is to be described as the science of the game[2] Dasein plays with itself, a game in which neither player remains unaffected subject, and furthermore a game that continually transforms itself.

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1. Grundformen, p. 489:
   "The uniqueness of the scientific character of psychology and its position in the system of sciences is not only due to the fact that it is concerned with the questioning being itself - and thus with the very being which psychology's own being presents - but much more is it due to the fact that the questioned being does not itself remain dumb, but answers the questions. Psychology is the science of 'the question-answer game of Dasein with itself'."

   - It must be borne in mind here that Dasein means humanity (ibid. p. 219), and not an individual: we are not concerned here with self-knowledge.

   - The above quotation also highlights Binswanger's preoccupation with ontology: psychology cannot rid itself of the fact that it deals with man's being - and yet, not with the a priori existentialia, but with the factual manifestations of the being of each individual. Cf. p. 573.

2. A term used by Heidegger (Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 32) with ref. to Kant's 'Anthropologie'; Kant had spoken of the game man played in the world, and Heidegger (ibid.) had interpreted him as referring to "man's existence in historical being-with-one-another". Binswanger confines his use of the image to our present concern, psychological knowing; but then he goes on to say that this is a far broader dimension than historical existence (see below).

Thus two things can be said at once about 'Daseinserkenntnis';[1] imaginative creativity and change or transformation belong to its essence. We have already seen how it is the imagination which enables 'I' and 'Thou' to know each other as such, and it is to the imagination that Binswanger returns here. The knower of Dasein operates on the basis of the loving relationship, knowing the 'home' and 'hiddenness' of love, its reciprocity and its imaginative creativity;[2] thus he sees himself within what is to be created, an essential part of it.[3] From within this framework he can see the other as a whole person. But of course no content, of a scientific nature, is as yet available, and it is impossible at this stage (for we are not dealing here with loving-being-together in its original and exclusive givenness within an encounter) to speak of knowledge. Knowledge implies thought, and therefore 'care', i.e. discursiveness, knowing the parts; this, then, is the second constitutive element of Daseinserkenntnis. But it is a discursiveness shot through with love; that is to say, the knower of Dasein 'dares' to see the parts from within

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1. The term is perhaps best left in the original German. It involves a combination of 'knowing' ('erkennen') and 'recognising' ('anerkennen'); but also of 'perceiving' and 'learning'.

2. 'Imagination' is again used literally: 'Ein-bild-ung': 'creating-into-oneself', i.e. involving change on the part of the knower, not just observation or even vision (ibid. p. 502).

3. Hence the distinction between Daseinserkenntnis and 'objectivising psychology' (cf. Grundformen, p. 21 and passim); - hence also the 'risk' in the psychotherapeutic relationship.

the whole;[1] thus this sort of knowing is dialectical: the prime example of that overcoming of care by love.

> "Daseinserkenntnis is by no means the common denominator for the truth of the heart and theoretical truth, but is the risk of (human) Dasein to overcome precisely that incommensurability, the risk, that is, instead of being either I and Thou in the truth of the heart, or I and object in the truth of objective knowledge, but rather to surpass both forms of being in a higher dialectical form of being. This risk is a risk to be taken for the sake of the non-contradictoriness or unity of human Dasein as a whole."[2]

As an example of this sort of knowing, Binswanger meditates on the words of Jesus: 'thy sins are forgiven':[3]

> "Here we have neither theoretical-scientific knowledge, nor 'purely subjective' knowledge. If it were so, we could never speak of an overcoming or reconciliation between love and care in Daseinserkenntnis. Rather the judgment, the decision, takes place (by no means on the

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1. Ibid. p. 551f. - This 'daring' is not an arbitrary act of will: its foundation is the eidetic knowledge of the being of Dasein as love. Does this then take away the element of risk? Binswanger would say: no. We are again within the hermeneutic circle, and the 'ground' that love is, is itself without a ground (see above, p.249).

2. Grundformen, p. 555. - Here again we see Binswanger's holistic intention: he cannot tolerate an ultimate duality in man's being-in-the-world.

3. Ibid. p. 561. (The example comes from Hegel's Jugendschriften.)

basis of his own fullness of power or his own estimation of his own worth), but in 'the name of' a higher authority, to which the one uttering the judgment had raised himself in loving imagination. Only the man who has lovingly wrestled with God and taken him fully into his will is in a position of forgiving sins. The judgment is not only made in relation to Mary Magdalene, but to the one who makes the judgment himself."

Here we see the involvement of both 'parties' in the Daseinserkenntnis, and the statement 'thy sins are forgiven' is taken as the climax of a relationship between knower and known, which manifests a total 'picture' of a Dasein created in imagination, on the basis of what is known to be possible within the relationship of love. To describe this totality Binswanger uses the concept 'Gestalt',[1] and takes as his inspiration the work of Goethe. Goethe, he argues, saw the phenomena of nature from within the framework of the experience of love (in Binswanger's language, from within the structure

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1. Binswanger's use of this term is both important and difficult. He is cognizant of the Gestalt school of psychology, and as we have seen of the work of V. von Weizsäcker (see above, p. 158). The 'Gestalt' of something is the total form and shape it assumes - but this does not mean that it is the 'formal' framework into which a specific content is 'poured': rather, it is the totality of form and content that a phenomenon presents. It is a particularly appropriate concept for Binswanger in that it implies both formation (he talks of 'Gestalt-wandel': the transformation of the Gestalt within the game that Dasein plays with itself) and totality (a totality that can be grasped because the being, expressed by the Gestalt, is shared by both knower and known); it is in fact that which unites both knower and known within Daseinserkenntnis, because for Binswanger its creation is only possible on the basis of the ontological unity in which both knower and known share.

of We-ness), and saw them as Gestalten.

> "The Gestalt is here the manifestation of the we-structure, but not in the sense of a philosophical absolute, i.e. which is always the case, if only you 'see' it so, but rather as something which you actively create, by the use of the power of the imagination. Daseinserkenntnis is thus an act. It is far from being simply knowledge of a loving heart, or aesthetic-visionary knowledge, but, as a comprehending act of will is also 'labor', 'work which never tires', involving the discipline of a method."[1]

The Gestalt is not simply the philosophical Eidos, but is the Factum as well, in that the Daseins-knower risks to make it so.[2]

Now the ground on which the creation of Gestalt is possible is the participation by both knower and known in the same being, or nature: "the same nature is at work in both of them".[3] When dealing with Augustine and Eckhart, Binswanger

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1. Grundformen, p. 586. Cf. p. 618f.:
   "The Gestalt is the presupposed condition of knowledge. Thus Gestalt is for Goethe not simply an epistemological concept, nor one just required for practical purposes of research, but rather one that contains within it a particular ontological statement about the way things are."

2. Ibid. p. 600. Here Binswanger refers to the Daseins-analytical school within psychiatry, where the attempt is made to create such 'Gestalten'. We will consider the 'Gestalt' of Ellen West in the next chapter (section 3).

3. Grundformen, p. 622. Cf. Existence, p. 293, where Binswanger speaks of "the uniting of the human existence with the common ground which I and Thou share..."

had dwelt on the theory of knowledge, according to which the knower was able to know what he did in fact know only in so far as he shared in its level of being.[1] Here we see the same thought operative: perception, knowledge, and creation of Gestalt within the game Dasein plays with itself are possible because the knower shares the being of the known.[2] And the art of such knowing[3] is described as psychological formation;[4] Binswanger uses this phrase both of the creation of the Gestalt that is known in Daseinserkenntnis and also of the continuing process of formation and maturation of the knower,[5] who, as a creative artist of psychology, makes possible a new way of being human - one in which the contradiction between love and care is overcome.

Here Binswanger draws on the work of Dilthey, who saw himself as a psychological-historian, understanding the lives

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1. Ibid. p. 398.

2. Here is Binswanger's answer to Jaspers' denial of the possibility of understanding the psychotic - and the reason why he insists on the ontological reference; even the psychotic shares the same being as the psychiatrist - albeit with its own modifications due to its own life-history and functional structure; see below, chapter 9.

3. It is not a 'quietly staying beside', but a 'lively, moving, creative, staying-beside', in which both the eternal moment and the passing temporal stream are momentarily 'caught' in 'Gestalt'. Cf. p. 621. - On the creative aspect of loving knowledge of the other see Sadler, p. 59.

4. German: 'psychologische Bildung'.

5. Binswanger (ibid. p. 677) quotes Goethe's remark that "every new object, well observed, reveals a new organ in us who observe it". Goethe was referring to the observation of nature, Binswanger to the knowledge of men.

of others in so far as he shared with them in human being. Binswanger criticises Dilthey for extending the sphere of the historical to the whole of human being, and also for never 'rising above' regarding each individual as an isolated monad.[1] In this sense his understanding of other men never rises to the full status of Daseinserkenntnis.

> "'Life'...cannot be understood on the basis of historical vitality; it is pre- and supra-historical. For this reason psychological understanding cannot be simply historical, but must also be existentiell and dual [i.e. must refer to being-towards-one's-ground and to loving-being-together]; ...the critique of the 'psychological reason' has a far wider field than does that of the 'historical reason'.[2]

What then are its boundaries?

> "Daseinserkenntnis or psychological understanding cannot and will not 'know' either God or being itself or the soul; as knowledge of human Dasein it limits

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1. Binswanger also criticises Dilthey for regarding psychological knowledge as 'one-way'; cf. Grundformen, p. 684:

> "Dilthey's formula: 'life grasps hold of life here' expresses one direction of the 'game'; it must be supplemented by the formula: life radiates back to life... Only where there is this double unending productivity, is there reconciliation of love and care, is there psychological formation."

2. Grundformen, p. 695; cf. p. 669.

itself to the Gestalten and transformations of Gestalt of this 'there' [of Dasein], knowing the groundlessness of the ground of its being, and herein recognising its boundary."[1]

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1. Grundformen, p. 704; cf. p. 608, where Binswanger says that Daseinserkenntnis does not look at 'somethings', but at 'the one'. And yet this 'one' is "not being in general, but human being; we are not doing ontology, but anthropology; but in so far as we are concerned with the being of Dasein, then it is an ontological anthropology."

CHAPTER 9

Binswanger's Daseinsanalysis

Preface

Up to this point our analysis of Binswanger's thought has remained peculiarly lacking in detailed study of individuals, i.e. of the stuff of which psychiatric and psychotherapeutic practice is made up.

We must now turn to his actual dealings with patients, and here for the first time we will find him differentiating between men, by means of psychopathological categories. Thus the sub-headings of this chapter refer to differing psychopathological phenomena. But, as we would expect, Binswanger at the same time insists that his patients remain human beings, and that what unites them with the 'healthy' is more fundamental than what distinguishes them. To understand them, they must be seen both psychopathologically and daseinsanalytically.

Corresponding to this 'dual' approach to the patient is Binswanger's central distinction between life-function and inner life-history.[1] He distinguishes between the physical

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1. See esp. "Lebensfunktion und innere Lebensgeschichte", AVuA I, 1928, and "Psychotherapie als Beruf", Der Nervenarzt No. 3, 1928.

and mental organism with its functional structure on the one hand, and "the succession of the contents of mental experiences on the other",[1] which as a totality form a man's inner life-history.

In approaching the patient in these two ways, the psychiatrist is working with two different ideas of the 'whole': on the one hand, with a teleological-biological regulative idea that embraces the task of the discursive exploration of the organism, and on the other, an intuitive conception of the whole man which precedes and informs the whole exploration of the inner life-history.[2]

The divide, or gulf, which appears to open up here, is of course not an absolute one;[3] it is rather a necessary methodological procedure - and the patient so viewed remains one man; nor should one suppose that any psychotherapeutic activity is possible solely on the basis of one side of the division;[4] in investigating the patient both sides must be considered, if mistakes are to be avoided in diagnosis,[5] and thus in treatment.

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1. AVuA I ibid. p. 52.
2. Psychotherapie als Beruf, p. 141.
3. AVuA I p. 53.
4. Psychotherapie als Beruf, p. 142.
5. Ibid. p. 142f. Binswanger modifies this statement somewhat, at a later stage, when he denies the need to investigate the life-history of manic-depressives: M and M, p. 139.

As an example of the close inter-relation of both sides we may take the phenomenon of sexuality. Binswanger is clear that to understand the inner life-history (i.e. the daseins-analytical side), Freudian psycho-analysis is an indispensable hermeneutic tool: Freud has made abundantly clear how far sexuality shapes our lives, by showing its pervasive importance in our relations to others.[1] Binswanger describes psycho-analysis as "the nerve, the foundation, the A and Ω of psycho-therapy..., the systematic penetration into the inner life-history of the sick person, its theoretical reconstruction and practical reproduction".[2] But, characteristically, he refuses to put sexuality into the straight-jacket into which Freud had put it, and says that its central importance can be seen

> "in individual cases, if we consider the particular relations of sexuality to the experience of space and time (extension and momentisation, broadening and shortening of existence), the experience of change and

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1. Cf. AVuA I "Freuds Auffassung des Menschen...", 1936; tr. Needleman, p. 158: As regards the historicality of sexuality "I refer not only to the extreme complexity that Freud first showed to be characteristic of the biological and physiological development of sexuality. What I am primarily referring to is the power and significance of sexuality, that, in shaping our relations to other human beings, shapes our inner life-history."

2. Psychotherapie als Beruf, p. 139; cf. AVuA II p. 261. NB in the same context Binswanger describes psycho-analysis "as the most violent attempt at the dynamic-functional transformation of the inner life-history" (AVuA I, p. 65f.).

continuity, of the creative and the new, of repetition and fidelity, of drivenness, on the one hand, and resolve and decision on the other."[1]

Thus (interpreting and correcting Freud) Binswanger places sexuality within the context of the human being's life-historical development, relating it particularly to the spatiality and temporality of his 'inner worlds', but also, significantly, to concepts such as resolve and decision. By this means, he takes it out of the realm of pure necessity; on his view, for instance, a judgment as to a person's sexual disposition (which he describes as a characterological judgment) does not tell us how he will act in any situation,[2] but tells us rather of the boundaries with which "an experiential content can but by no means must be the motive for a new experience".[3] Characterology provides us with information as to what the motivation of a particular individual might be, but not what it must be, at any one time.

Each inner life-history is to be considered the unique development of one particular human being,[4] a development the

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1. AVuA I "Freuds Auffassung..." Needleman, p. 158.

2. To suppose that it did, would be to reduce what seen in its totality must be considered a life-historical phenomenon embracing both instinctual drives and the making of (free) decision, to a functional process of the organism. This reduction may well be necessary for purposes of research etc., "but the fact remains, it is still a transformation, a translation, a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος "; AVuA I, p.67.

3. AVuA I p. 68. NB Binswanger's concentration on 'experience', where one might expect him to speak of action, or act of will. His inner life-histories are histories of experiences, rather than of acts of will, although these are certainly present (and themselves evaluated as experiences).

4. AVuA I ibid. p. 55.

course of which depends upon the 'nature' (Wesen) of the person concerned.[1]

The question whether the unfolding of the inner life-history is to be seen in its totality as a free or necessary development is regarded by Binswanger as important philosophically, but not within the scope of this enquiry.[2] As far as psychological understanding of the patient is concerned it is 'bracketed'.[3] What matters here is not whether a man could have developed otherwise, but how he did in fact develop. This will inform us as to his 'nature' (Wesen: cf. Augustine), or, as to his particular 'being-in-the-world' - and this we need to know, if we are, for instance, to make a prognosis about his capacity for coping with e.g. a depressive episode.

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1. In this early essay (AVuA I, "Lebensfunktion...", 1928) Binswanger uses the term 'Wesen' to describe the essential nature of a man as it develops through his life-history. Later, he will speak of the modifications in the being-in-the-world of a particular Dasein; the term 'Wesen' must be regarded as somewhat unsatisfactory because it is ontologically undefined. (Binswanger is discussing the 'Wesen' of Augustine, as it emerges in Karl Holl's "Augustins innere Entwicklung": it is in the way Augustine related to his illness (a chest complaint) that we come to see his 'essential nature' (Wesen); a different sort of man would have reacted to his illness in a different way:

   > "Thus in the life-history, the nature of a man discloses and shapes itself...the process of getting to know this inner life-history is the task of historical and psychological-hermeneutic exposition." Ibid. p. 64.

2. Cf. Existence, p. 293. Daseinsanalysis transcends the distinction between freedom and necessity.

3. Binswanger clearly will not extend the jurisdiction of concepts implying necessity beyond the area of the (functioning) organism, and his writings in fact imply a position in which man has considerable areas of freedom.

1. Flight of ideas

Binswanger's first major attempt to expound his Daseinsanalysis was concerned with the phenomenon of flights of ideas within manic episodes;[1] his intention was, first, to understand them as irreducibly mental phenomena (involving the intentional consciousness[2]); secondly, to demonstrate the continuity of such episodes with the total life-history of the individual concerned, while recognising that they were, looked at clinically, episodes of illness.

As an example of Binswanger's work we will look at his third study;[3] this concerned a young man, whose father had shot himself before his son's birth; he had lived for most of his life with his mother, and been dominated by her. He had fallen in love with a married woman, and went to visit her against his mother's wishes, and in connection with this visit fell into what Binswanger describes as a 'manic attack', in which he became violent, and had to be taken into hospital. Here he indulged in long 'soliloquies' including very 'disorganised' flights of ideas, which were recorded by the medical staff, and thus made available for analysis.

To understand this patient, according to Binswanger, we need to look at his world - or worlds -, on the one hand, and to his continuing, developing, ego, on the other (the two being

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1. Ideenflucht; see too chapter 5 above (pp. 175 ff).
2. See above, p. 200.
3. Ideenflucht, pp. 71-187.

the two 'poles' or aspects of the existence of one and the same Dasein).[1] We will bring this world before us, by referring to the spatiality, temporality, and attunedness that it exhibits. We will then look at the life-historical development.

a) The impoverishment of the patient's mental world

The only method of communication left open to the patient was verbal. The common manic phenomena of the writing of notes and letters, the spending of money and indiscriminate giving of presents, are no longer possible for him. This itself shows something about his temporal experience: he no longer waits for a response from those with whom he tries to communicate (such as is presupposed in the writing of notes); i.e. his relation to the future is 'blocked'; indeed, one can say, he has no future. Nor do his statements, if such they can be called, have any reference to the past. His world is therefore a world of the present moment, experienced without reference to either past[2] or future, and therefore not even a real present.[3]

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1. See above, p. 207 f.

2. There is one exception to this: see below, (d).

3. The Heideggerian understanding of the present as involving references both past and future underlies this analysis (SuZ H 326); - it is of course also true of Husserl; see M and M, where Binswanger confines himself to Husserl.

b) The patient's impoverished way of being-with-others

The statements he makes take the form of address;[1] they address a 'Thou', sometimes identifiable with God, sometimes with his own father, sometimes with other people (interspersed with apparently meaningless babble). There is no reference to himself; he puts himself in a one-directional relationship to the 'Mitwelt' - away from himself (the 'Umwelt' does not concern him). His world (seen spatially) is a world of people, sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile with whom he has to communicate. And yet there is no real communication;[2] he does not wait for one, or allow time for one; nor do the words he uses often 'make sense'. Indeed, he is no longer using them in order to communicate meaning; he is often only playing with their sounds - this is the only use of words left open to him.[3] This 'game with words' expresses the 'attunedness' of his world; it is that of unproblematical (manic) joy - a joy that has fled and excluded the world of reality, and now exists on its own. His existence as a whole is seen

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1. Ideenflucht, p. 95f.

2. Binswanger is drawing on Husserl's analysis of communication (Log. Investigations, Investigation I, Expression and Meaning, chapter 1), in which he distinguishes the act of communication, the meaning of what is communicated, and the objects referred to in the communication. In our (pathological) case, the latter two elements have receded to the point of extinction.

3. In this way Binswanger retains the intentionality of the conscious ego towards the words it utters, while admitting that they have no meaning-content. Ideenflucht, p. 112.

as an inconsequential 'whirl',[1] and his utterances as coming from the periphery of his being, and not from the 'heart'.

c) The patient's broken existence

But we have seen only half the picture. The 'manic' world which is described above will be counterbalanced by a world that is just the opposite: 'slow, dead, dull and anxious', when the melancholic episode follows.

Experiencing both these worlds, is the ego, the existence itself, which must be described as 'torn':

> "The half-ness and brokenness of existence, the oscillating bearing between reflexion, problems and culture on the one side, and simple, unproblematical, self-surrender into the absence of anxiety of the festive life on the other, without being quite absorbed in either form of life - this makes the nature of this form of Dasein what it is."[2]

d) The unifying (life-historical) factor

This fragmentation of existence is not however total; it is still possible to see a Gestalt emerging.[3] It is to

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1. German: 'Wirbel' (ibid. p. 153). In regard to manic confusion, Binswanger comments (Ideenflucht, p. 113):

   > "So much is certain; in it one can see an anthropological-existential extreme; one step further, and from an anthropological standpoint one could no longer speak of existence!"

2. Ibid. p. 121.

3. Ideenflucht, p. 121f.

be found in the patient's life-historical struggle to come to terms with his father;[1] indeed the manic utterances themselves exhibit this one theme again and again. The recurrent and unanswerable question, sometimes angry, sometimes loving, that runs through all the utterances, only just 'below the surface' is: 'why did my father do what he did? And what was/is his relationship to me?' Binswanger interprets the repeated 'Thous' as referring to the patient's father, sometimes equated with God, sometimes with the devil. And in the midst of the 'flight of ideas', for a moment the patient speaks as if his problem were resolved (in that he claims to 'see' his father). Here we have a solution to his problem - but a solution within what we would describe as the patient's phantasy world. The world of the manic has no stabilising continuity: "the smallest push is enough to transform it";[2] hence what is longed for, can suddenly appear to be realised.[3] Here is no authentic solution to his problem, but a typically

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1. NB the obvious impetus given to the investigation by the psycho-analytical framework of thought.

2. Ideenflucht, p. 166.

3. What makes this particular phenomenon pathological is that the patient "loses all consciousness of the fictitiousness of the fiction"; ibid. p. 167.

manic one, i.e. one that (from the 'sane' point of view)[1] 'jumps' reality and attempts to solve everything at one fell swoop.

e) Summary

Binswanger presents us with no solution - or permanent healing - for this man's broken existence; there is a repetitiveness about it, as he always struggles with his major problem: the relation with his parents.

His achievement is to show that a (psychotic)[2] manic episode - giving all the signs of total madness - meaningfully illustrates the development the life-history of this particular Dasein has undergone.

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1. One of Binswanger's concerns is to show how psychiatric diagnoses commonly impose the values and total 'world-systems' of the so-called 'normal' man onto the patient; hence the movement of his ideas is called a 'flight', and he is said to 'jump' or 'spring' from one thing to the next; his relationships with others are described in moralistic terms as 'thoughtless', 'tactless', 'naive' etc. Binswanger seeks to show that these 'symptoms' are meaningful elements within a 'world' which has been unusually modified; i.e. to see this form of existence as a modification of Dasein.

2. Binswanger concludes the study with the psychopathological diagnosis that the patient was almost certainly suffering from a schizophrenic process - which he would not regard as susceptible to 'active psychotherapeutic' cure; Ideenflucht, p. 185f.

2. Schizophrenia and 'Manieriertheit'

Before coming to Binswanger's exposition of the 'Gestalt' of Ellen West, we ought to draw attention to a distinction he made towards the end of his life between the schizophrenic and manic-depressive experience.[1]

A schizophrenic condition is to be seen as a life-historical mistaken development[2] (and Binswanger can even say: "everyone has his own schizophrenia"[3]). The schizophrenic condition as such breaks out where Dasein is confronted with impossible alternatives, breaking apart the consistency of experience, and leading the person concerned into a 'dead-end' situation.[4]

Manic-depressive conditions are not in the same way life-historical; it is not possible to trace a life-historical

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1. M and M p. 139f; 1960.
2. See esp. 3FMD, e.g. p. 92.
3. M and M p. 139.
4. For most of his life Binswanger was prepared to speak of the "schizophrenic process" (which eventually took control of the life-historical development); he used it to refer to "the transformation of the existence or being-in-the-world concurrent with the still unknown schizophrenic noxa" (Existence, p. 342); later on (1965), commenting on Jaspers' account of the case of August Strindberg (published in 1922), he says that psychiatry has now become more cautious of its use of the term 'process' in relation to schizophrenia, because "we know nothing more about the nature of the process now than we did then" (Wahn, p. 133); - in particular, caution is required in regard to any assertion of irreversibility, that the term 'process' might imply.

development, leading to the onset of this condition.[1] It is to be seen rather as a threat to Dasein from the side of its bodiliness, its 'thrownness' into existence; i.e. as arising from the fact that Dasein carries through its existence 'in' and 'as' a body, which it however cannot always control.

> To summarise: these two sorts of psychoses "lie on quite different levels, or more correctly, are based on quite different spheres of Dasein, schizophrenia on the sphere of the consistency of experience being broken on particular objective goals, and thus on the sphere of historicality, manic-depressive insanity, on the other hand, in the sphere of thrownness ('Geworfenheit').[2]

Schizophrenia presented Binswanger with his greatest challenge; in the Grundformen he wrote that anthropological understanding of it was still almost absent "because of its terrific variety, and the impossibility of bringing it into one unified anthropological structural formula".[3] The volume

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1. Binswanger considered the instance of mania that we have just looked at to be in fact a manifestation of schizophrenia, rather than part of a manic-depressive syndrome; it does not therefore contradict the distinction being made here. But it must be admitted that when writing Ideenflucht Binswanger held that all mental illness required life-historical analysis, and this view is more representative of his thought than the later one evidenced in M and M.

2. M and M, p. 138.

3. Grundformen, p. 476.

'Schizophrenie' was Binswanger's main contribution to the anthropological understanding of the phenomenon.[1]

In recounting Binswanger's analysis of Ellen West[2] we must seek to bring out his view of the 'worlds' in which her existence was carried out, his account of the overriding idea that accompanied and finally dominated her, and his exposition of her life-historical development.[3]

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1. Three of the case-histories which make up the volume have appeared in English: "Der Fall Ilse" as "Insanity as Life-historical Phenomenon and as Mental Disease" - Existence, pp. 214-236; "Der Fall Ellen West" as "The Case of Ellen West", ibid. pp. 237-365; and "Der Fall Lola Voss" as "The Case of Lola Voss", in Needleman, pp. 266-341.

2. Her 'case-history' is reported as follows (in outline): highly intelligent person, aristocratic family; considerable 'social concern' as young person, for position of the poor; interested in literature and thought; as a philosophical position, accepted a 'metaphysical nihilism' then much in vogue; strongly vacillating moods, from extreme high spirits to depression (therefore diagnosed by Kraepelin as a case of melancholia); the 'self-will' and 'defiance' of her nature are brought out as outstanding traits. As regards the course of her life: fairly normal childhood, but from early adult life increasingly occupied with food - with staying thin at all costs. Many obsessional characteristics developing in this regard; consequent deterioration of health. Had an 'affair' with a student, which was broken off; subsequent marriage to her cousin, who assumed ever increasing control over her (which she accepted). From early adult life in the hands of numerous doctors, including two psycho-analysts. Came to Binswanger three months before her death; he diagnosed 'schizophrenia simplex', with very poor prognosis. After three months she insisted on discharge, and soon afterwards committed suicide.

3. Because of the 'artistic-imaginative' element that we have seen to be essential to the psychological understanding and exposition of a 'Gestalt' (chapter 8, section 4), any summary will have the same relation to the original as the summary of a novel has to the novel itself.

We will turn first to the worlds in which this Dasein carried through her existence. As far as 'Mitwelt' is concerned, she had repeated glimpses of 'loving-being-together' in her affair with the student and her later marriage. But this all important way of being-in-the-world-beyond-the-world became increasingly closed to her, through her preoccupation with the 'over-valent' idea of her own fatness. Her relationship with her husband was not one of reciprocal giving and receiving, but of accepted domination. But at the same time there was the continuous longing for the 'eternity' and 'home' of love, expressing itself in the urge to do social work, an urge that never found real satisfaction. Because she was unable to attain to the 'eternity and home' of love within the 'Mitwelt', Ellen found herself increasingly frequently 'at home' in an ethereal world of her own where everything was possible; her existence began to be torn between this light, thin, ethereal 'world', and the fat, dead, sluggish earth 'world', in which all was degenerating and coming to a stop. The conflict between these two contrasting worlds came to centre on her own body: on the urge to keep it thin - an urge continually thwarted by the necessity to eat, and the consequent torment as regards the possible results of eating. Here we see the emergence of the dominant idea, the dread[1] of

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1. German: 'Angst'; although normally translating this term by 'anxiety' I will retain the term used by the translators in Existence, namely, 'dread'.

becoming fat (behind which lay the dread of being at all - existential dread); this dominant idea was focussed on her own existence, which is now seen as entirely coincidental with her own body: her existence had become 'reified'.[1] Increasingly she saw the only solution in terms of death, for the future had come to be dominated by the thought of what would happen to her own body, and thus to her herself. There is therefore no real future, nor is the past any longer truly past; on the contrary, it had come to dominate and 'encircle' the present, in that it has produced the 'impasse' in which Ellen now existed.[2] She finds herself restricted on all sides - by both 'Mitwelt' and 'Umwelt', which are becoming increasingly hostile, offering her no way out[3] of the 'swamp-world' or 'hole-world' in which she now exists.[4] Her whole existence

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1. Existence, p. 277.

2. Ibid. p. 281f.

3. And yet at the same time she had glimpses of the 'way out' - of reciprocal loving-being-together (ibid. p. 290) and it is this that makes her existence such a torment.

4. Existence, p. 319. Binswanger uses these terms to sum up the 'dead, earthy, world' which comes to control Ellen's existence. It expresses the ambivalence of her relation to food etc.: her existence (which is now straightforwardly synonymous with her physical body) is empty; it is no more than a hole to be filled up, yet filling it up is precisely what she dreads - and yet at the same time longs for (and dreams about). - Binswanger discusses the relation between the analysis of the 'hole-world' and the psycho-analytical explanation of anality. The pleasure connected with oral gratification (in terms of the eating of chocolates etc., which Ellen goes in for, and then bitterly regrets) is understood by Daseinsanalysis as only occurring when the world, in which the existence is, is itself a 'receptacle', an 'opening', to be filled.

is experienced as an emptiness and ultimately it is this which is the cause of her dread:

> "That all Ellen West's dread is a dread of being-in-the-world as such is shown by the fact that she is now in dread of everything, of the dark, and of the sun, of quiet, and of noise... The entire world has now become threating."[1]

Ellen comes to feel like a corpse; death is seen as release: it comes from the desirable, ethereal world. Hence suicide is the only appropriate action that would accord with the life-historical development of this particular Dasein or Gestalt.[2] Thus Binswanger, concluding his discussion of Ellen's development, sees her suicide as the only authentic act which she could resolutely choose for herself, as the appropriate response to her life.

> "In this resolve Ellen West did not 'grow beyond herself', but rather: only in her decision for death did she find herself and choose herself. The festival of death was the festival of the birth of her existence. But where

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1. Existence, p. 282; cf. p. 307.

2. From this brief account, we can see that Binswanger regards the isolation and exposition of recurrent 'themes' as central to a person's life-history. The question is always how he copes with the 'themes' presented to him. This comes out very clearly in "Der Fall Ilse" (Existence, pp. 214-236); the constant theme in Ilse's life-history is her relation to her father; here (in Ellen's case) it is her relation to herself (equated with her body); - contrast Part II, chapter 8, section 3, on awareness of the mystery of one's ground.

the existence can only exist by relinquishing life, there the existence is a tragic existence."[1]

Now the question must be asked: is it possible here to speak of a genuine life-historical development? In normal parlance this would imply a freedom to choose the path of one's development, at least within limits, whereas in Binswanger's account the only choice open (at the end) was the choice of death. The assumption that in such a case we are dealing with a physical process of deterioration, in regard to which the mental life is an 'epiphenomenal superstructure', is hard to resist. Binswanger is himself prepared to talk of the "concurrence" of the transformation of existence "with a still unknown schizophrenic toxa".[2] But, as must now be clear, he insists that we see the human being as a whole, and would regard the assumption of the causation of mental phenomena by physical as a 'category mistake', involving two incommensurate terms 'physical' and 'mental', which are needed for practical purposes of science, but are nevertheless 'abstractions' from the totality that is the individual man.

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1. Existence, p. 298.

2. Ibid. p. 342. - As regards the notion of 'concurrence' between transformation of existence and an active 'toxa', we can compare Binswanger's assertion (in a quite different context) that a κοινωνία between mind and body is essential to existence, and its restoration a key goal in therapy; cf. AVuA II p. 275f., and Grundformen, p. 470:

> "In order to be able to exist in the manner of authentic existence, I must not only be fully master of my body, but must also experience my body as fully belonging to me (not as an object or obstacle); in other words, I must not experience any separation 'between' my body and myself, but must be both in an undivided totality"..... "Existence is therefore essentially one with health; it is an ontological and anthropological interpretation of the words of Juvenal: 'mens sana in corpore sano'" (Grundformen, p. 471).

As we have seen, Binswanger is not prepared to enter philosophical debate concerning the relation of mind to body, or to answer the question: could she have acted otherwise? For him, the category of life-history is concerned with the actual unfolding of a particular form of being-in-the-world, and the most important reason for adopting analysis of being-in-the-world is that it does not come down on one side or the other as regards the 'priority' of mind or body in the life of man, but replaces these terms with the existential analysis that insists both on the bodiliness of human existence and its meaningfulness.

Binswanger's discussion of the case of Jürg Zünd[1] is illuminating in this respect. We will be referring to it immediately below, but here Binswanger's remarks at the end of his analysis are helpful. He has diagnosed a case of 'creeping schizophrenic process', but is not prepared to say that the process is a purely physical one, in which psychological categories are irrelevant:

> "We ought not to regard the physical-psychic division as rigidly as we previously did, but must realise that such dogmatic formulations only bar the way to psychiatric knowledge."[2]

But it is equally important, he goes on to say, not to be dogmatic on the other side, and interpret schizophrenic experience too much on the basis of the normal experience of man:

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1. Schizophrenie, pp. 193-288.

2. Ibid. p. 287.

> "We must be aware of a dogmatic prejudice. We also suppose that schizophrenia has an organic foundation. But that does not absolve us from the duty to research and develop the psychopathology of schizophrenia as far as is possible today life-historically and daseins-analytically, and this all the more because it is only after we have fulfilled this obligation that we can ask and perhaps decide where the schizophrenic process is to be located in the brain."[1]

The categories of Daseinsanalysis are employed to enable the psychiatrist to 'stay by the whole man' for only by so doing can he hope to understand him, whatever stage the schizophrenic process - in so far as we are right in referring to it as such - may have reached. He seeks to describe the illness in existential-ontological terms (including using the notion of 'existential anxiety'[2]), in order to see the whole as a modification of Dasein's being-in-the-world.

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1. Schizophrenie, p. 288. See also pp. 161 ff. above. - The organic foundation of schizophrenia does not detract from Binswanger's Daseinsanalysis, once one realises that being-in-the-world involves bodiliness quite centrally. Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik is an attempt to supersede both idealism and materialism.

2. In the period of 'Schizophrenie' there is a definite ambivalence in Binswanger's use of the concept of 'existential anxiety'. In contrast to his use of it in relation to Ellen West's all pervading 'dread', he expressly contrasts Jürg Zünd's anxiety from Heidegger's concept:

> "The suffering, battles, and anxieties of the deluded patient are a happening ('Geschehen'), not existentiell suffering and action, and most certainly <u>not</u> existence being called in question in the presence <u>of</u> the nothingness of anxiety".

This hermeneutic approach is just as relevant at an earlier stage in a schizophrenic life-historical development, e.g. in that depicted by the psychopathological term 'Manieriertheit'. This itself requires daseinsanalytical interpretation.[1] What is referred to is the over self-conscious attempt to force oneself into the mould of another person's being-in-the-world. The person concerned is conscious of an inability to find his own 'true being' within himself; he therefore looks outside himself, and copies another form of being-in-the-world, striving ever more frantically to take it upon himself. This is an attempt which is bound to fail; it is one of the ways in which the ' developing Dasein' comes to grief.[2]

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1. 3FMD pp. 91-197. Nearest English equivalent: affectation.

2. 'Missglückt'. - Binswanger compares and contrasts Manieriertheit with the artistic style, mannerism, which is itself to be seen as a way of being-in-the-world. It is the attempt by an artistic generation that follows a great flowering in art to copy their predecessors' style, without thereby being able to reproduce its substance. It is a phenomenon of a period of change, in which the artist displays the uncertainty of his position, and indeed the basic anxiety of not knowing whether he belongs to the past, the present (with its emptiness) or the future (which must be different from the past). Binswanger refers the reader to Bronzino, as a good example of a painter in this position; the features of his portraits are impassive, immovable, their faces impenetrable masks. But the underlying uncertainty is betrayed by the fussy, stylised position of the hands, which are caught in a particular, unnecessary, nervous movement. Light and shadow are both heightened, and the over-all effect is menacing. Binswanger also mentions Tintoretto in this connection (and P. Tillich's analysis of the phenomenon in The Courage to Be).

As an example of this 'modified' form of being-in-the-world, which could develop into schizophrenia, Binswanger takes Jürg Zünd[1]; here is someone who, as a child, lived in three different worlds (using the term here in the first instance in its normal sense): the world of the street, where he met his peers; the world of his parents, in the top of a three-storey house, and the world of his grandfather's home on the ground floor of the same building. The latter 'world' was consciously of a 'higher' social class, and Jürg felt more at home here than with his parents. He continually tried to 'live up to' the world of his grandparents; he would 'put on a show', attempting at all costs to become what he wanted to be socially, and in fact becoming more and more affected in his manner. He became increasingly fearful of 'letting himself down' in front of others, and thus withdrew from them; at the same time, when forced to be in their company, his fear produced precisely what he sought to avoid, his actions and bearing becoming more and more artificial. In the end, he 'fled' into the safety of a mental hospital.

Now Binswanger observes that the development the life-history of Jürg took would not have become pathological, had there not been a basic anxiety 'deep-down'[2] in his life, to

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1. We are concerned here, in the first instance, with 3FMD pp. 111-117 (1956).

2. I am here using non-daseinsanalytical categories, because one of Binswanger's aims at this point is to show how daseinsanalysis can clarify otherwise opaque terminology; see below.

begin with. There must have been from the beginning what normal parlance would call a 'constitutional weakness'[1] in his make-up, such as did not enable him to come to terms with the contrasts between the three worlds in which he lived.

Daseinsanalysis, however, cannot rest content with concepts that imply that life-historical development is due to a quantitative plus or minus in an undefined quality called 'life'.[2] It reaches out to the ontological structure of this particular Dasein's being-in-the-world. Hence once more Binswanger uses Heideggerian analysis - in this case, Dasein's fascination with the world of the 'they'.[3] This is the 'world of inauthenticity'; in the 'they' authentic finding of the self is, by definition, impossible. 'Manieriertheit' is seen by Binswanger as a special example of Dasein's fascination with some aspect of the world of the 'they' - a fascination which is itself an expression of Dasein's anxiety at being in this inauthentic 'they-world'. The attempt to realise 'one's ownmost possibilities' in this way is from

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1. German: 'Lebensschwäche' and 'Lebensangst'; 3FMD p. 167f. - In his parallel exposition of mannerism Binswanger argues that the mannerist artist is in an analogously 'weak' position; he is looking for a foothold in a threatening world, and finds it in copying another artist, thereby trying to compensate for his own lack of trust in himself and his contemporaries. The paradigm such an artist chooses is of course not an arbitrary one, but precisely the past out of which he has come; but he relates to it not as past but as (eternal and dominating) present.

2. See above, p. 149, note 1.

3. SuZ H 322.

the outset doomed to failure.

> "It means...not only an existentiell, but also an existential contradiction. This contradiction, as becomes clear from the artistic-scientific presentations of mannerism, and abundantly clear from the case of Jürg Zünd, is the πρῶτος ψεῦδος , springing from anxiety and despair, the 'first' untruth, the 'first deceit', and self deceit of this sort of affectation..."[1]

Such a Dasein is inevitably split between what it is, and 'the mask' which it tries to impose upon itself, and behind which it seeks to hide. Hence its historical development comes to a dead-end, precisely in the anxious[2] effort to ward off the emptiness that it feels within itself. In this sense it can be said that such a Dasein itself becomes a mask.

Summary

Binswanger's work on schizophrenia shows the fullest flowering of his daseinsanalytical method and terminology. It is here that he seems most confident in his use of Heideggerian language, and least concerned about the use of existentialist terms for psychopathological-daseinsanalytical

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1. 3FMD pp. 178f.

2. For a further discussion of the nature of the 'anxiety' referred to here see below, chapter 12.

purposes. Thus we have to conclude that there is no clear demarcation here between existential and neurotic or psychotic anxiety; on the contrary, the whole thrust of his argument is to show the existential foundation of neurotic and psychotic phenomena, and by this means to regard the patient as still fully 'human being'.[1]

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1. Sadler's exposition of Binswanger's thought draws largely from this period, and makes no reference to the development that is still to come. He affirms Binswanger's grounding of neurotic and psychotic anxiety on existential anxiety, describing Tillich's distinction between them as possibly "spurious" (Sadler, p. 281). If there is a distinction, it is one of degree, not of kind. Indeed Sadler wants to turn the matter round, and use Binswanger's and Sullivan's studies of anxiety (taken from within the world of psychiatry) to correct Heidegger's own concept: "Heidegger has scarcely touched the real meaning of existential anxiety". (Ibid. p. 91)

3. The distinction between ontological analysis and the analysis of experience

Before we move to a discussion of Binswanger's later treatment of melancholia, we need to refer to what has been called his "phenomenological change of direction".[1]

In his introduction to Melancholie und Manie, Binswanger wrote that he had come to see

> "that the characterisation of the 'worlds' of the mentally ill, and of the 'anthropological structure' of psychiatric 'forms of existence', as I put it then, is not itself sufficient as regards phenomenological and daseinsanalytical investigation; what is absolutely essential is to investigate the peculiarity of these worlds with regard to their establishment ('Konstituierung'), i.e. to study the constitutive factors ('Aufbaumomente') which establish these worlds, and to work out those constitutive differences which are decisive for their establishment."[2]

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1. "Die phänomenologische Wendung Ludwig Binswangers": a review of M and M by K.P. Kirker, Jahrb. für Psychologie, Psychotherapie und Medizin. Anthropologie, 1962.

2. M and M, p. 13 (1960). It is important not to take 'establishment' as referring primarily to the process whereby such worlds come into being; the language is Husserl's and refers to the 'structural' constituent parts of consciousness, which are presupposed in experiencing. Binswanger sees Husserl's analysis of consciousness as providing him with its constituent elements: for experience to be possible at all, such and such must be the case 'within' the experiencing consciousness; thus Husserl's analysis can be said to be a "giant vivisection" of consciousness (Binswanger quoting Eugen Fink: Husserl Festschrift: den Haag, 1959, p. 110); as such it provides "psychiatry with a method and set of concepts such as are

(contd.)

Thus we see Binswanger turning from existential-ontological analysis of forms of being-in-the-world (though not thereby in any way calling in question the validity of that enterprise), and looking again at the structure of consciousness that such forms of being-in-the-world imply. In this sense we can speak of a move from a Heideggerian setting of the enquiry to a Husserlian and phenomenological one.

Now it was easier for Binswanger to see the need for such a phenomenological analysis after he had been persuaded of the need to distinguish more carefully between analysis of human experience and ontological analysis of Dasein. As he says, in 'Schizophrenie' he had not made this distinction clearly enough.[1]

Continuation of note 2 from p. 298:

> provided for physical medicine (via biology) by the concept of the organism" (Binswanger, ibid. p. 140).

1. Cf. Wahn, p. 30: "We can see here too how much the relation between experience and Dasein or existence needs clarification." - NB here (in 1964) Binswanger by implication equates Dasein and existence, whereas in the Grundformen, 'existence' is used as a much narrower term; i.e. in 1964 'Dasein' is no longer being used to mean 'humanity' (with its various ways of being-in-the world, one of which was 'existence') but as an ontological category whose way of being is precisely existence (lit.: 'ec-sistence'; cf. Manet, p. 12); hence, in the foreword to Wahn, he writes:

> "The result is that I am increasingly able to value Heidegger's ontology in its purely philosophical significance, while at the same time increasingly separating myself from it, as far as its application to the sciences, and in this case to psychiatry, is concerned."

The matter had come to the fore in regard to the problem of delusion, which Binswanger had expounded (at the time of 'Schizophrenie') by means of what in 'Wahn' he calls a "daseinsanalytical model".[1] He had then held that delusional experience was to be understood as Dasein refusing to let objects of perception 'come before it', 'allowing them to be', but instead of this subsuming their various modes of appearing to one over-riding way of looking at the world, namely, as threatening, persecutory etc. Binswanger now feels that this account departed from the purely phenomenological approach (which was the only appropriate method for investigating matters relating to consciousness) and substituted for it an explanatory (daseinsanalytical) model;[2] - a model, moreover, taken from a frame of reference seen increasingly to be concerned with ontology rather than with experiencing as such. Husserl's phenomenology, on the other hand, is willy-nilly concerned with modes of experiencing (being an analysis of all that is involved in consciousness, the fount of experience).[3] Thus it is the relevant form of analysis of delusional ways of experiencing reality.

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1. Wahn, p. 30f.

2. As such it could only be considered a theoretical construction; see above, chapters 5 and 6.

3. A similar reconsideration concerns the linguistic usage occurring in 'Schizophrenie', whereby Dasein is said to 'have given itself over' to powers other than itself. Binswanger comments (Wahn, p. 24f.):

   > "This should not be understood ontologically. We have to hold on to Heidegger's ontological insight, that 'Dasein, as long as it is, is for its own sake'.

(contd.)

It was with this renewed interest in Husserlian phenomenology that Binswanger turned his attention again to the correct understanding of melancholia. And he did so, as we have seen,[1] in the conviction that the category of life-historical development was not directly relevant to the understanding of depression; on the contrary, this was rather to be seen as "a threat to Dasein from the side of its bodiliness", without direct relation to Dasein's developing life.

Thus phenomenological-daseinsanalytical enquiry can concentrate its attention here on the changes in the structure of consciousness that melancholia involves.

Continuation of note 3 from p. 300:

> The formulation in the introduction to Schizophrenie is, on a closer view, too anthropological, yes too psychological; for, even in the being handed over to strange powers, indeed in being enslaved to them, Dasein is still for its own sake, in the Heideggerian sense, namely, for the sake of its being handed over or enslaved. This insight seems to me to be of fundamental importance for the daseinsanalytical foundation of the delusional being-in-the-world."

1. See above, section 2 of this chapter, pp. 284ff.

4. Melancholia (viewed phenomenologically)

Binswanger regards these studies of melancholia as complementary to those concerned to illuminate the 'worlds' of the manic-depressive, in Ideenflucht.

As far as method is concerned we have here a return to phenomenological analysis, but here the aim is precisely to do "transcendental phenomenology".[1] That is to say, this time we are to "mean business with regard to the 'epoché'",[2] and 'bracket' questions related to individual situations and themes within the lives of those studied, and instead seek to discover the way consciousness constitutes its world within the melancholic experience.

The main categories with which Binswanger is now working are those concerned with inner time-consciousness; Husserl had set out three as essential constituent elements of our normal temporal experience.[3]

Now if we look at the language the melancholic uses, we will see that it exhibits a malfunctioning of these three references. A patient's moans often take the form: "If only ...then (all would be well)", but the "if only..." refers to

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1. Contrast his earlier use of Husserl's phenomenological method; see above, chapter 6.
2. M and M, p. 16.
3. 'Protensio', consciousness's reference forward to the future; 'Retentio', its past reference; and 'Praesentatio' its present intentionality. In normal experience these three must all be operative; for instance, one can only speak in Praesentatio, if one knows - and can hold on to - what one has just said (i.e. has a 'Retentio'), and also knows what one is about to say (has a 'Protensio').

what has already happened, and therefore the apodosis of the conditional clause is always completely empty; for nothing now can alter what has happened. The conditional sentence (if it is to issue in purposive action) must refer to the future: "If x happens, then I will..." or "then it would..." In melancholia it refers in this empty way to the past. If we then ask the question: what therefore must be the case regarding the consciousness of the patient?, the answer will be: the '<u>protensio</u>' has taken the place of the '<u>retentio</u>', and therefore has no real content any longer. The result is the disturbance of the whole thought-process of consciousness.[1] Similarly in the case of melancholic fatalism with regard to the future: what is happening, seen phenomenologically, is that the <u>Retentio</u> (referring normally to what has been and therefore cannot be changed) takes the place of the <u>Protensio</u>, and thus prevents the patient from seeing a future that presents anything other than a continuation of the (dreadful) past.

Now it needs to be stressed that Binswanger is not seeking to explain the genetic origins of melancholia;[2] his is a phenomenological study of how the mind must be functioning, if it expresses itself as it does within melancholic episodes. Thus the analysis of 'what is happening to' the three temporal

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1. M and M pp. 27-32.

2. This would be to fall into the same trap as that into which Binswanger saw himself fall in his discussion with Lotmar on the nature of aphasia (see above, p. 180).

references of consciousness simply seeks to draw out the implications of the phenomena of consciousness that present themselves to the psychiatrist. Such a study Binswanger considers essential if we are to seek to understand the melancholic. It is not, however, without its straightforward practical implications:

First, such a study expressly leaves on one side the life-historical themes that make up the content of melancholic discourse. Binswanger's life-long psychiatric experience has confirmed him in his view that in melancholia the specific themes of the patient are without importance. As evidence, he points to the

> "exchangeability of the themes of the melancholic, so that if one theme is actually put right, he at once switches to another."[1]

Furthermore, if melancholia entails a disturbance of inner time-consciousness, such as has been suggested, then an explanation is thereby given for the evident futility of

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1. M and M p. 28. Most psychiatrists hold that the particular theme, especially the experience of guilt, assumes such a large place in the consciousness of the melancholic that it displaces everything else. (This would, in their view, be true at least in regard to reactive depression - a term which Binswanger rejects, regarding all depression as endogenous.) Binswanger believed that the 're-arrangement' of the structure of consciousness (the language is unavoidably reminiscent of Freud's topographical constructions!), or, as he puts it, the 'loosening' of the normal structure, means that 'melancholic themes' inevitably make up the content of the melancholic consciousness.

attempting to overcome melancholia by comfort and encouragement.[1]

Binswanger then turns to look at the anxiety involved in melancholia and finds it not so much in the actual themes about which the patient feels guilty etc., as in the underlying emptiness which is the result of the confusion in his inner time-consciousness (a man can only be said to 'have a full life' when he is open to the future, and freed from the past, i.e. when his time-relations are 'normal'). It is this emptiness to which the patients bear witness; and the themes, that occupy all their attention, are a desperate attempt to fill it. When no theme at all appears, then the final attempt to fill the emptiness will be the attempt at suicide.

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1. The result of this disturbance is an emptiness which is experienced by the patient as a general capacity to suffer, which over-rides all else:

> "The insusceptibility of the melancholic to encouragement and comfort would accordingly be understood on the basis of the extensive disturbance of the transcendental constituents, resulting in theisolation of the suffering capacity from within the Koinonia of the possibilities open to Dasein." M and M p. 18.

- As regards the need for encouraging the melancholic, Binswanger writes:

> "For the melancholic the other is first and foremost the receiver of his unabating and repeated moanings, the passive listener to his self-recrimination, his fears and anxieties, at best the bestower of comfort and hope. As important, indeed essential, as this ability to bestow hope can be - and even in the Tofranil era, still is - it remains impossible to break the melancholic's monologue and above all to give him another turning-point on the basis of man to man encounter, except at the beginning of the process of recovery (today: when the Tofranil begins to take effect)." M and M p. 67.

Now - and here we find Binswanger clarifying what in relation to schizophrenia was opaque - melancholic anxiety must be differentiated from Heideggerian existential anxiety: facing his own nothingness is precisely what the melancholic cannot do:

> "Hence we must never confuse recovery from melancholia (and with it the consequent re-discovery of the self) with authentic self-realisation on the basis of exposure to (existential) anxiety."[1]

Nor can one describe melancholic episodes as "existentiell crises", for which the patient can afterwards feel thankful.[2]

> "The result of all this is that we cannot see the ontological Eidos of 'anxiety' as Heidegger worked it out, as a prescription of the possible relations of all that we in fact call anxiety; we have rather to

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1. M and M p. 59, and again, p. 61.

2. Binswanger says that in his experience this is very rarely the case. The melancholic - and the manic - episode is normally valueless from the point of view of the life-historical development. To argue that the melancholic experience of emptiness is the same as Heidegger's discussion of Dasein seeing itself simply as 'there', exposed and unprotected in the face of its own nothingness, is a mistake. The sameness, says Binswanger (ibid. p. 59) is one of words, not of content, and "does not do justice to the original essence of melancholic anxiety as an illness of the spirit; indeed, we seem thereby to lose sight of the aspect of disease ('das Krankhafte') within melancholia". Cf. pp. 113ff., where Binswanger contrasts his own view with that of Tellenbach (Gestalten der Melancholie: Jahrb. f. Psychologie und Psychotherapie H 1/2, 1960), who regards melancholic-manic episodes as examples of existential sadness, with ref. e.g. to Kierkegaard. Binswanger admits the difficulty of deciding which one is dealing with, but insists that in melancholia itself, the time-structure of consciousness has broken down.

look for an Eidos which corresponds to the fact of melancholic anxiety, i.e. for a prescription of the possible relations of all that appears before our eyes as melancholic anxiety. This does not mean a departure from Heidegger, but on the contrary a return to him, in the sense of a deepened insight into the purely ontological intention of Sein und Zeit."[1]

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1. M and M p. 61. This search for an Eidos corresponding to melancholic anxiety (without reference to its ontological status) represents a return to an earlier non-Heideggerian approach to mental phenomena. The ontological-holistic demand seems to have retreated; and later in the book Binswanger uses Husserl's concept of the 'transcendental ego', which he had criticised before (see above, p. 208 f. and p. 210f.), for its lack of ontological foundation; here (pp. 69ff.) he is drawing on Husserl's 5th Cartesian Meditation.

CHAPTER 10

The Goal of Psychotherapy

Preface

Before we leave this exposition of Binswanger's thought and practice we must turn again to the latter, with particular reference to his account of the goal of psychotherapy, and the relation between this and daseinsanalysis.

The language of 'goals' suggests a rather different conceptual framework from that of Binswanger's ontological-anthropological analysis of being-in-the-world, and indeed he himself supplies us with a different image that accords better with this aspect of human experience;[1] it is to be found in a short essay on a sentence of Hofmansthal's[2] and could be said to complement the account of human being given in the Grundformen. Here we are no longer looking at the a priori forms within which life is played out, but rather at the essential movement of that life itself, when played out to the full.

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1. It would be a mistake to take this as an alternative view of man to that of analysis of being-in-the-world, or of equal weight to the latter; we are dealing far more with a poetic image, applicable in the first instance to the poet's own life, and then more widely, in descriptive fashion, to all human experience.

2. AVuA II pp. 243-251: "Über den Satz von Hofmansthal: 'Was Geist ist, erfasst nur der Bedrängte'". 1948.

The sentence runs: "Only the man who is pressed hard,[1] knows what spirit is". Here is the kernel of the essay. One only discovers the nature of 'Geist', when the world is pressing in upon one, i.e. when in a position of constraint, from which one has to break out, in order to 'find a new home'. The experience of constraint is the experience of anxiety; anxiety at the world's closeness, and at the same time at its infinite distance, i.e. at the impossibility of 'capturing' or 'taming' it.

What the poet sets out to achieve is to break out of this oppression, "to strike camp"[2] and "find a new home". But of course the new home is never a final home;[3] there is always need of a further 'breaking out', of further movement. In his new, yet always temporary, home, the poet finds freedom, and sees the world afresh.[4] In the constraint of the old 'home' he had lost his trust in the 'world-design' in which he found himself;[5] in the new, he re-discovers trust, and a 'oneness' with the world, as he creates a new 'world-design'.[6]

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1. 'Bedrängt': 'oppressed', 'confined', 'hemmed in'.

2. Binswanger remarks on the frequency of this motif in dreams, signifying the dreamer's constraint in his present situation.

3. It must be clear to the reader that we are working with different imagery here from that of the Grundformen, where love is itself 'eternity' and 'home'. Here love - which appears to be synonymous with 'Geist' in this context - is the driving force behind the movement.

4. Cf. the language of the Grundformen, where love enables a man to experience "the transparency of the world of concern"; Grundformen, p. 98, and see above, p. 245.

5. Cf. Binswanger's discussion of mannerism, in the previous chapter, section 2.

6. For a similar motif in Bultmann's thought, see I Joh. pp. 22, 28.

Binswanger sees a similar struggle to be central to Heraclitus's view of man;[1] man's destiny is to be found in his emergence from the ἴδιος κόσμος into the κοινὸς κόσμος, from the world of his own individual passions and desires and dreams, to the world of the universal norm. His life is in fact a struggle to learn how to live historically,[2] how to gain the φρόνησις that allows him to balance and order the claims of the ἴδιος κόσμος and the κοινὸς κόσμος. It is the struggle to move from dreaming (an essential quality of which is the loose connection between the ego of the dreamer and the ego as subject of the dream) to historical living (in which I myself grasp hold of the possibilities of my Dasein, as purposive agent[3]).

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1. AVuA I pp. 98-131 "Heraklits Auffassung des Menschen", 1935. - For a similar discussion of Heraclitus's concept of 'world' see Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 22. - Binswanger regards Heraclitus's concept as forerunner to his own (via Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger):

   "'World' generally (and the cosmos) in Heraclitus mean the thoroughly displaceable boundaries and norms relative to the Dasein of man and its various foundational ways; - boundaries and norms which thus thoroughly belong to him and are in each case temporary." Ibid. p. 117.

2. Ibid. p. 131: "the 'learning' is the historical process of becoming man".

3. Cf. AVuA I "Traum und Existenz", tr. Needleman, p. 247:

   "Dreaming, man (to use a distinction I have drawn elsewhere) is 'life-function'; waking, he creates 'life-history'."

   The Daseinsanalyst uses dreams in the course of his work; they tell him much about the 'worlds' of his patients; but he does distinguish them from mental phenomena 'occurring' within the purposive activity of waking life. - For a critical discussion of Binswanger's evaluation of purposive, waking, activity as of more fundamental existential significance than the mental activity of dreaming, from the standpoint of phenomenology, see Sadler, p. 132. Sadler regards Binswanger's work on Heraclitus as a "manifestation of intellectual exhibitionism" (p. 131).

The Goal of Psychotherapy

We can now look more closely at those passages where Binswanger spells out the goal of psychotherapy.

The psychotherapist does not attempt to turn his patient into a fatalist, accepting the inevitability of the consequences of his disposition etc., but rather seeks "to make him free for the whole of the potential being of his Dasein, for the resoluteness, as Heidegger says, to restore to Dasein its ownmost possibility of being itself. That is the goal of daseinsanalytic treatment."[1] This means showing the patient how his being-in-the-world has become narrowed down, or how he has 'got himself stuck', and then trying to help him down.[2] Or, in the case of depression, he seeks to 'bring him up' from the depths and into the κοινὸς κόσμος of Heraclitus.[3] But he also seeks - and here the anthropological interpretation and correction of Heidegger's analytik shows its practical importance - to show the patient the possibility of being-in-the-world as loving-being-together, in the first instance by his own relationship to the patient.

Binswanger can also give a rather more limited and sober objective for psychotherapy, when he speaks of the need to re-establish the Koinonia of body and mind. This often means helping the patient to realise his own bodiliness:

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1. AVuA II p. 294 "Daseinsanalytik und Psychotherapie", 1950.
2. See above, pp. 151 ff.
3. AVuA II p. 305 "Daseinsanalytik und Psychotherapie".

> "That man can become 'neurotic' is also a sign of the thrownness of Dasein and of the possibility of falling; in short, it is a sign of his finitude, of his (transcendental) limitedness and lack of freedom. Only the man who disregards his limits can become 'neurotic'; i.e., to speak with Kierkegaard, [the neurotic is] the man who has fallen out with the fundamental conditions of his Dasein, while non-neurotic or 'free' is the man who knows the non-freedom of finite Dasein, and in the midst of this weakness becomes 'master' of existence. The one task of psychotherapy lies in helping 'to attain mastery' in this way. It is only the routes to this goal that vary."[1]

As regards the question as to where psychotherapy is to be applied and where not, certain comments must be made: first, psychotherapeutic intervention is not to be considered, on Binswanger's view, until an assessment of the whole person has been made; one should not attempt to treat phenomena either of organic-functional disturbance or of life-historical deviation, in isolation from the whole of the person concerned.[2]

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1. AVuA II p. 276: "Die Bedeutung der Daseinsanalytik Martin Heideggers für das Selbstverständnis der Psychiatrie", 1949.

2. Indeed he regards it as a very naive question, and one which refuses to see the unity of the human being behind and within the abstractions: body-mind, neurosis-psychosis, which medicine has to make:

> "We will therefore from the very outset avoid the question which is so often asked and which betrays a complete lack of insight into the possibility and nature of psychotherapy, namely, the question as to which isolated functional disturbance is accessible to psychotherapy and which not. Whoever asks this

(contd.)

Secondly, psychotherapeutic activity must in a general sense be said to accompany any psychiatric treatment; it is implicit within the 'loving' aspect of the psychotherapeutic relationship and carries through the demand that the patient be viewed at all times as a fellow human being. But one must distinguish this sort of psychotherapeutic activity from 'active psychotherapy', which is only sometimes appropriate, i.e. where life-historical factors are clearly uppermost.

The question whether active psychotherapy is appropriate or not

> "is decided only by looking at the role which the individual disease-symptom plays or does not play, both from the biological (physical and psychical-functional) and from the life-historical viewpoint. And here there must also be clarity concerning the relations which generally and in the specific case pertain between the organism and the inner life-history. For instance, a compulsion to count ('Zählzwang'), which has made its appearance as the accompaniment of an acute endogenous depression (i.e. of a psycho-physical disturbance of the organism), demands a quite different treatment from that

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Continuation of note 2 from p. 312:

> question will never get an answer because no answer is possible. But also the question as to how the total organism or its disturbance must be structured if we are to be able to approach it psychotherapeutically, is insufficient, because insight into the course of the life-history must come in as well. Nor vice versa, does insight into the life-history itself on principle alone decide, without reference to the total organism";

"Psychotherapie als Beruf", p. 142, of Der Nervenarzt, No. 3, 1928.

of the primarily life-historically conditioned compulsion to count of a constitutional compulsive-neurotic. In the former case, psychotherapy would be a mistake; in the latter, it is the only possible medical help."[1]

Thus the distinction between Daseinsanalysis and 'active psychotherapy' is an important one. The former is relevant wherever the human being remains in existence.[2] It is the necessary response to the demand that the patient be treated both as patient and as fellow human being, and that he be understood in both these ways. It is thus a wider concept than both psychotherapy and 'active psychotherapy', and is not primarily a psychotherapeutic technique,[3] so much as the fullest available means of understanding one's fellow-man. However, as will by now be clear, it can itself be used as a psychotherapeutic technique (in which the corrected insights of psycho-analysis play an indispensable part),[4] illuminating the patient's being-in-the-world and showing him the opportunities open to him.[5]

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1. "Psychotherapie als Beruf", p. 143.

2. In the Daseinsanalytical sense of 'existence'; but the meaning is: wherever his being remains being-in-the-world, however modified this may have become. Hence the daseinsanalysis of cases of schizophrenic process, even where the medical prognosis is very poor.

3. See above, p. 13.

4. Binswanger describes his decision to introduce psychoanalytical techniques into the Sanatorium at Kreuzlingen: he had first accepted it with too great enthusiasm; he then came to see it as "only a particularly finely developed instrument to awaken a man from self-deception and to enable him to regain freedom in the sense of the possibility of making one's own choices, of educating and training oneself". Zur Geschichte der Heilanstalt Bellevue..., p. 35.

5. Cf. AVuA II p. 305 ("Daseinsanalyse und Psychotherapie", 1950).

Furthermore, as we have seen,[1] it is not an understanding that withdraws from its object and stands apart, but rather one that is only possible from within a relationship created and sustained by the experience of love (on the psychiatrist's part). Hence Daseinsanalysis can itself be indirectly therapeutic, wherever the patient is open to the experience of loving encounter.[2] But this raises the question as to how one can assess a patient's capacity for that openness towards others which is the presupposition of loving encounter. Binswanger comments on this, with characteristic caution in a discussion which deals in general with the question of patients' capacities for rising above their problems:[3]

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1. See above, chapter 8, section 4.

2. Cf. 3FMD p. 82. Cf. Wyss, who ends his substantial work on the various schools of depth psychology by commenting on how the two essential features of any psychotherapy (knowing and loving) must be held together in what (following V. von Weizsäcker) he describes as the 'Gestaltkreis' between doctor and patient. Indeed Wyss singles out this relationship between doctor and patient as itself the vital instrument in all psychotherapeutic treatment. This dialectic between knowing and loving is the same as that depicted in Grundformen - but made 'scientifically respectable' by von Weizsäcker's assertion of the necessary employment of the term 'Gestaltkreis' within the realm of biology; see Wyss, Die tiefenpsychologischen Schulen, Göttingen, 3rd ed. 1970, p. 419.

3. To make such an assessment is to reduce the life-historical concept of decision (which is implied in such openness) to the functional concept of ego-potentiality. But the concept of decision appears unavoidable within the realm of 'active psychotherapy' - even Freud uses it; when speaking of the phenomenon of transference he writes:

> "The decisive part of the work is carried through by creating - in the relationship with the physician, in the 'transference' - new editions of those early conflicts, in which the patient strives to behave as he originally behaved, while one calls upon all the available forces in his soul to bring him to another decision."

Freud, ILP-A p. 380.

"The fact that Goethe himself, despite the cyclical Ananke, gave us the greatest example of free human development, shows us that this form of life,[1] if it does not appear too massively, does not need to be alone decisive in regard to the life-history of the individual. Another example, where the 'great personality' triumphs over the law of this Ananke is William James, who in the most difficult endogenous depressive desperation and anxiety did not lose his religious bearing, his hold on God, thus preserving existence for himself... Such examples show that even existential anthropology with its thematic consideration of the actual existentiell possibilities, does not arrive at the unique reality of the individual man.[2] The individual man is always 'more' than a mixture or synthesis of such possibilities. This is particularly true with regard to the clinical standpoint. The melancholia of a William James, however much it may harmonise clinically with that of 'the man in the street' means existentielly something quite different, is indeed a quite different illness, - not to speak of the 'cyclical oscillations' of a personality of genius, such as Goethe."[3]

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1. Binswanger is referring to the manic-depressive cycle.

2. Here we see Binswanger admitting (at a relatively early date - 1933) the limitations even of Daseinsanalysis to encompass the whole man - and thereby lessening the force of Jaspers' criticism that the Heideggerian ontological framework turns philosophy into a conceptualised pseudo-scientific knowledge. (Cf. Jaspers, Gen. Psychopathology, p. 749.)

3. Ideenflucht, p. 138.

PART III

THEOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY: A COMPARISON IN THE LIGHT OF THE WORK OF BULTMANN AND BINSWANGER

Preface

We must now examine the relation between the work of our two thinkers; but before we do this we must set out the questions that are to be asked, and the methodology required to answer them.

In the first two parts, I have tried to bring out the distinctive features of each discipline as seen in our two exponents, and to give as detailed and coherent an account as possible of the thought and practice of each. It has been in the main a descriptive and expository account, in which criticism has been kept to a minimum; my aim has been to find the centre and coherent structure of each body of thought. In the case of Bultmann this has meant concentrating on his understanding of believing existence, and exploring its implications for both theological thought and ecclesiastical practice. In the case of Binswanger it was rather a case of tracing through his own search for an adequate conceptuality for psychiatric thought and practice; of seeing this in daseinsanalysis, and then watching him apply it.

Our exploration has shown us that we are dealing with two very different kinds of enterprise, both as regards subject-matter and methodology, but it has not marked out the boundaries between them, or answered the question as to their incommensurability, incompatibility, or complementarity; these three possibilities are still undecided. Thus we find ourselves faced with two major sets of questions. The first relates to the practical relationship between the two disciplines; here

the issues can be focussed in the question: is it possible for one man to operate in both these ways in regard to the same person at the same time? Supposing the answer to this question to be negative, one can still ask: is it possible for the psychiatrist (naturally of daseinsanalytical persuasion) to work alongside the pastor who bases his work on that of Bultmann? How does what each seeks to do relate to what the other is doing? Is it possible (to use Binswanger's language) to be 'en route' between daseinsanalysis and Bultmannian theology? We will begin to answer these questions in chapter 11, but our findings there will lead us on into the systematic exploration of the relation of the subject-matter of the two disciplines, which will take up the major section of this third part of the thesis, and constitute the second major set of questions. Here our questions are on two 'levels': the first is concerned with the setting of the two disciplines within the total 'map' of human ways of knowing; thus at this level we are concerned with each discipline as a whole and its specific contribution to the totality of human knowledge.[1] In particular, in view of the recourse each has to Heidegger, we will be concerned with the relation of daseinsanalysis and Bultmann's theology to daseinsanalytik.[2] To obtain clarity here, it will be necessary to examine the intention behind

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1. I am not unaware that to look for the contribution each makes to the totality of human knowledge supposes that there is such a totality, and that it is within our grasp.

2. Chapter 12 below.

Heidegger's own use of ontology, so that we can see how Bultmann and Binswanger make use of it themselves. Only when we have done this (and in the course of it seen whether our authors allow their disciplines to be placed alongside each other within a total 'map' of human knowledge)[1] will we be in a position to turn to the second 'level', namely, that concerning the actual concepts used by the two disciplines. At this point we must answer the question whether it is possible to be 'en route' between the two disciplines. To put it in other words the question here is: when both disciplines use the same word, e.g. 'Dasein', 'existence', 'world', 'anxiety', does their common usage extend to the level of meaning, or is it mere coincidence of words? Once a term, of central importance to both, has been found to possess the same meaning in both, it can then be used as an 'anchor' for the systematic comparison of other key terms or thought-patterns in each discipline (or, to change the metaphor, as the 'bridge' by means of which it is possible to be 'en route' between the two).[2] In other words, the issue here is whether Bultmann's theology and Binswanger's Daseinsanalysis in fact share a common language such as would make a dialogue between exponents of both disciplines meaningful - and useful. Thus even at the stage of the philosophical exploration that takes up

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1. At this point we will also be in a position to answer the question as to whether our two disciplines are neutrally, critically, or 'parasitically' related to each other.

2. It will be argued that the key Heideggerian term 'Seinkönnen' can in fact perform this function.

Chapter 12, the 'thrust' of the enquiry is practical: does the apparently common philosophical terminology employed by both point to a common language such as can be used to illuminate specific situations confronting the daseinsanalyst and the Bultmannian theologian?

If a common language is established - by means of such a bridge concept - then one can go on to ask questions concerning the use either discipline can legitimately make of the other's conceptuality: e.g., if such a bridge concept is found, one can then argue that there is a prima facie case for the appropriation of concepts or patterns of thought from one discipline for use by the other; though this is not to deny that there may in fact be other reasons why such appropriation is out of place.[1]

Thus Chapter 12 concerns itself with the relation of the two disciplines to Heideggerian philosophy, and on this basis, with their relationship with each other. In particular it examines the use both make of the concept of Sein-können (potentiality-for-being), and isolates this concept as the basis for the comparison of further elements of both disciplines. Thus Chapter 13 explores the concept of love in the thought of Bultmann and Binswanger, with reference to this ontological category; and Chapter 14 deals with the relationship between what Binswanger describes as healing, and what Bultmann knows as salvation. If Chapter 12 concerned itself with the philosophical framework of each, Chapter 14 deals

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1. See Chapter 14, section 1, below.

with the goals and values of each (a subject that can only be handled after an examination of their understanding of love). Just as the hypothesis on which Chapter 12 is based is that both concern themselves with the existence of man, so the hypothesis of Chapter 14 is that, in that both are concerned with man's well-being (or fullness of life), both will be informed by an understanding of what is the good for man, and what the evil.

As the exploration continues the general conclusion will emerge that, in the instances where it is employed (i.e. in regard to the mentally 'sick'), daseinsanalysis will claim a certain 'priority' over theology, in that the latter, as a thoroughly ontic procedure, will have to listen to the 'ontologically-proceeding'[1] phenomenological approach of the former, before embarking on the proclamation. To put it in straightforward language: the pastor may find himself being told by the doctor that this particular patient is not capable of hearing the proclamation. Chapter 15 will explore this question theoretically, and then the appendix will look at it again, from the point of view of practice.

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1. See above, Chapter 8, section 1.

CHAPTER 11

Theological and Psychotherapeutic Communication

1. The point of convergence: their concern is with man

We begin Part III with a comparison of the activities of theologian and psychotherapist, in particular with the different kinds of communication and the different sorts of relationship which each discipline demands. Thus at this stage we are concentrating on the 'medium' rather than the 'message', though the latter can never be divorced from the former, in either of our authors. For both of them, 'communication' between 'practitioner' (be he preacher or psychotherapist) and 'receiver of the communication' (be he hearer of the Word or patient/client) is of central importance.

This is of course not necessarily the case with either theology or medical healing within psychiatry. Where theology comprises a systematic account of the relationship of the world, man and God, claiming universal and timeless validity, the dynamics of theological communication would be irrelevant. As we have seen,[1] this is far from the case with Bultmann, for both ecclesiastical and philosophico-theological reasons: his theology is a theology of the Word of God encountered in the

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1. See above, Chapter 3, section 1.

spoken (human) word,[1] and he refuses to regard as theological statements that purport to describe man's ultimate destiny and relationship with God without reference to the speaker's own existence: such statements are bound to be part of a 'Weltanschauung'.

To turn to psychiatry and psychotherapy, inter-personal communication must presumably always be involved, though it will be sometimes of far less importance than it is in Binswanger's case.[2]

Both Bultmann and Binswanger, then, are concerned with speaking with and to men; what they have to say (and this is particularly true of Bultmann), claims to be true precisely in its being spoken and 'heard'; moreover, both are primarily concerned with the individual rather than with the community or society; salvation and healing are both categories applying first to individual men, rather than to societal structures or total communities. In this respect they both belong to their age, and especially to the various existentialist strata within it.[3]

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1. See above, esp. pp. 18ff.

2. E.g. in behaviour therapy, or therapy carried out exclusively be means of drugs.

3. This is not say that it is impossible to combine an existentialist philosophical position with Marxist political conviction; cf. J-P. Sartre.

One can take their agreement an important stage further (and here we are speaking of the subject-matter of their disciplines): both are concerned with man as the being, whose existence is an issue - indeed the issue - for him: they speak to man as a self-conscious individual who has to decide his own future. Man, for both of them, is irreducibly a conscious meaning-bestowing agent;[1] he is of course much else besides, for instance, a mental and physical organism, as Binswanger makes abundantly clear,[2] and as Bultmann would himself admit.[3] But primarily his being is 'Dasein', meaning-bestowing historical being,[4] who discovers himself (as he discovers the world around him) in purposive action, and who conversely bestows meaning on himself as he bestows it on the world.

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1. Here one may properly detect Husserl's influence on both Binswanger and Bultmann (see esp. Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins und der Glaube, Heid. und die Theol., p. 77).

2. See esp. Ch.s 4 and 5 - and also, as regards man's 'dual mode' of 'loving-being-together', ch. 8, section 1.

3. See above, Chapter 2, p. 34, and cf. TNT I pp. 192ff.

4. See esp. the last two chapters of HE (as regards Bultmann), e.g. pp. 151ff., where he states that the task of preaching is to bring a man again and again to the point of decision as regards his past and his future; i.e. man finds his historical being (and his 'personality'; ibid. p. 145) in the confrontation with the Word that addresses him.

2. Point of divergence: the concept of the whole man

Both Bultmann and Binswanger are, as we have repeatedly seen, concerned to speak to, and with, the whole individual man. But as regards what constitutes the whole man, we find them parting company significantly.

Binswanger seeks to understand man in his totality; we have seen this to be on his view essential if psychiatry is going to claim to be one coherent discipline, embracing both natural-scientific and psychological categories;[1] it is equally essential from the point of view of therapy. But this can only be done within "daseinsanalytical communication".[2] For only in this inter-personal communication is it possible for a man to realise that he shares a "common ground" (as human being) with the patient who confronts him;[3] only so can he understand him in his essential totality. But this does not mean that Binswanger brings every possible approach to man to bear, in an attempt to ensure that no aspect of this totality be possibly omitted. On the contrary, he is well aware that the sort of knowing that he is engaged in 'abstracts' from the individual in important respects: in particular there

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1. See esp. Chapter 5 - and cf. Binswanger, Der Mensch, p. 19.
2. Ibid.
3. Cf. Binswanger, Existence, p. 293, and 'Der Mensch...', p. 133ff., where Binswanger refers to Kierkegaard's distinction between real and apparent sympathy: real sympathy is grounded in the realisation that e.g. the madman is a man as I am, and furthermore that I could become as he is.

is the deliberate attempt to refrain from all ethical judgments concerning his behaviour.[1] His present situation, and his life-historical development to the position he now occupies, are both seen without reference to ethical values; indeed psychiatric treatment deliberately takes him out of the normal situations of life, with their inevitable demands for ethical decision. Only by so doing, will it be possible to see him as he really is,[2] and understand how he arrived at his present

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1. Cf. Ideenflucht, pp. 70ff., and Existence, pp. 234, 268, 293.

2. The language that speaks of 'how he really is', 'his essential nature' etc. is unavoidable, if we are to do justice to Binswanger's intention. This sort of language accords with Binswanger's use of Heidegger's 'analytik' to provide him with analysis of the individual's being-in-the-world, and although he frequently insists that his is an ontic endeavour, it is one that seeks to work with the categories of ontology, in order to get to the 'basic', 'essential' structure of the being of those with whom it is concerned. Cf. 'Der Mensch...', p. 10f. - It cannot be stressed too highly that the whole argument of the Grundformen depends on the ontological status accorded to loving-being-together; only on this basis can Binswanger claim that psychological knowing (in the sense of the creation of Gestalt) can reach man 'as he really is', in that, in loving-being-together, he shares a common ontological ground with the one known. Thus Binswanger accords the imagination a very high status as a faculty of the intellect; it is founded on the ontological relation of loving-being-together. But ethical judgments (to return to the point at issue here) according to Binswanger necessarily remove men from their common ground, and set them over against each other, evaluating each other. Thus while for Bultmann the ethical demand (to love) is precisely what unites all men and illuminates their true being, for Binswanger it is that which separates them from their fundamental unity in loving-being-together.

position. Hence for Binswanger the demand to see the 'whole man' is closely related to the demand to see 'the real man', in his life-historical development; and this demand can only be met by suspending (cf. the Husserlian epoché) any account of his actual situation at any time, in terms of the ethical demands that it makes. Moreover his analysis of the individual is 'prior' to all value judgments and to all particular points of view, such as man may adopt on the basis of ethical, religious or aesthetic conviction or appreciation.[1] If one asks the question: on what basis can such a 'prior' analysis be made?, Binswanger's answer is: it is possible through phenomenological analysis of the being of man, particularly as this is revealed in loving-being-together. His understanding of love is integral to his conception of the comprehensibility of the individual. But in loving-being-together, all evaluation and measurement is suspended; ethical, religious and aesthetic considerations fall away and we are confronted with each other as we 'essentially' are, as a whole 'I' and a whole 'Thou', within the I-Thou relation.

To turn to Bultmann's concept of the whole man: here too the I-Thou relation plays a central part. But the hearer is addressed as a whole man precisely in his ordinary situation with its ethical demands: that is to say, his will is addressed.

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1. Binswanger would regard all these as examples of 'taking-hold-of-x-by-y' (see Chapter 8, section 2), which do indeed 'take hold of' the whole man - but only indirectly, via 'a part', and which therefore cannot claim to apprehend the 'essential totality'.

In the will, man is addressed in the totality which he is; his whole existence is seen to be questionable: such address is inevitably at the same time evaluation: his will is shown up for what it is: either good or evil. The response to the address (which is a response primarily of the will) illuminates the nature of the man in his totality.[1] He decides what he is; Bultmann can even say: he decides whence he has come,[2] in responding to the address directed to him. But Bultmann of course goes further: the proclamation is one of forgiveness,[3] acceptance, justification; it is thus the proclamation of a loving Thou and the response to it is one of either love or hate, but in either case it is a response that involves the whole person, just as the Word of God calls the whole person in question.[4] Furthermore the hearer can only understand the proclamation, if he 'listens' to it with "the whole of his existence".[5]

Thus, as with Binswanger, we have here too the claim that theology concerns itself with the whole man; yet here it is precisely that aspect of the matter that was left 'in

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1. Cf. Jesus and the Word, p. 42: Since Jesus "sees man standing at the point of decision, the essential part of man is for him the will, the free act, and in this connection the dualistic anthropology which sees two natures, flesh and spirit, active in man, has no meaning. For on will, on free act, depends man's existence as a unity, as a whole; reflection on the antithesis of spirit and flesh has no place here. It is not the physical in man which is evil in him- the whole man is evil, if his will is evil."
2. See above, p. 62.
3. See esp. GV II 9 (p. 159 G), where Bultmann contrasts the divine forgiveness with human forgiveness: the latter is limited, referring to particular events etc.; the former embraces the totality of the penitent's existence.
4. Cf. Jesus G p. 69 (= Jesus and the Word, p. 62f.).
5. Quoted on p. 92 above.

abeyance' in Binswanger's case, that forms the essential element of it. Man is addressed in his actual situations with its ethical demands - and as the situation changes, so the address must be heard again and again. And in each case it is the whole man who is convicted and acquitted. Again, as with Binswanger, 'love' is central to the communication; but here love is the supreme ethical demand laid on the hearer; it is of course more than that, in that it is the means whereby a man comes to self-understanding and to an appreciation of the world as creation, but it is centrally that. In Binswanger, love is a matter of timeless, effortless, communion, in which the will played no part. In Bultmann, love is a resolute act of will, itself the response to the love it has received. For Bultmann, the believer may not dwell on the love he has received, as if it were now his: there is no place for the mystical enjoyment of the love bestowed upon him; the moment he is tempted to 'tarry', he is re-directed to the practical demands of the moment.[1]

Thus enough has already been said to show that we have a fundamental divergence between the aims of theological and psychotherapeutic communication as our two authors see them: the one abstracts the individual from his situation, in order that he should see himself - and be seen - 'as he really is': a particular 'Dasein', running his life's course with his own particular modifications of a being-in-the-world that he shares with every other 'Dasein'. The other directs a man into his own situation, precisely with its immediate, demanding,

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1. Apart from EJ p. 431 (= EJE p. 560) etc., see also I Joh. p. 22.

ethical dimension, also in order that he might see himself 'as he really is' - a forgiven sinner, summoned to obedient love of his neighbour.

3. Theological and psychotherapeutic communication

We must now compare the 'locus' and 'dynamics' of theological and psychotherapeutic communication.[1]

It must already be clear from what has immediately preceded that Binswanger regards the basic psychotherapeutic relationship as a one to one encounter, in which the patient is taken out of his normal setting in life, and his normal activities suspended - at least for the purposes of the psychotherapeutic communication.[2] It should now be equally clear

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1. For the sense in which I am speaking of 'theological communication' see above, pp. 101ff. For the purposes of this chapter I am using the word psychotherapy rather than daseinsanalysis, because we are concerned with the total psychiatric relationship in its therapeutic aspect; it goes without saying that the basic hermeneutic method involved is that of daseinsanalysis.

2. It is worth remarking that Binswanger worked all his life within the enclosed institution of his Sanatorium, which patients normally attended residentially. Such an institution encourages the 'suspension' of the normal ethical demands made on man, though it must be said that it inevitably has its own rules of conduct: in his account of the history of his Sanatorium Binswanger describes how he concluded that it was necessary to impose complete abstinence from alcohol within the Sanatorium: Zur Geschichte der Heilanstalt Bellevue, p. 41. But the normal ethical demands were in an important sense 'not counted'; i.e. anti-social behaviour was not taken as such but as symptomatic or indicative of the particular being-in-the-world of the patient in question. Cf. the analyses in Ideenflucht.

that the fundamental model with which Bultmann is working is that of a preacher to his congregation.[1] This is the paradigm for theological communication, though Bultmann is clear that it can also take place elsewhere, as in a one-to-one relationship, and indeed does not necessarily involve the spoken word. But even in the paradigm case, as we have seen, it is the individual who is addressed so that in a real sense the preaching situation is itself a one-to-one encounter. It is not however what is normally described as 'pastoral counselling',[2] and it is far from 'talking something over'.[3]

We must now compare and contrast these two sorts of relationship in more detail. First, we need to look again at the aims of each.

In the case of the psychotherapeutic relationship the aim is a two-fold one: on the one hand the creation of the Gestalt of the patient in 'loving imagination';[4] and on the other, the expressly therapeutic aim of 'freeing' the patient from his present dead-end situation, and enabling him to fulfil the possibilities of his particular mode of being-in-the-world.[5] These two aims must not be regarded as separable

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1. See above, p. 107.

2. I have not encountered this term in Bultmann's work, but assume that he would regard such activity as theological - but only in a derivative sense, along with the activity of teaching; the existential element is not necessarily present in such communication. See GV I 8: Church and Teaching in the NT.

3. Bultmann, GV I p. 205 E.

4. See above, Chapters 8 and 9.

5. See above, Chapters 4 and 10.

from one another: the intention of the daseinsanalytical creation of the patient's Gestalt is itself therapeutic; what matters is that the patient come to see his manner of being-in-the-world for what it is. But it is not only therapeutic, but expresses the conviction that the patient, however poor his prognosis may be, remains at all times a man, to be understood as such, namely, as a particular way of being-in-the-world.

In the case of theological communication, the aim is to confront the hearer with the forgiveness and demand of the proclamation, so that he views the moment of hearing as the eschatological Now in which decision has to be taken. This eschatological moment of decision has of course to be re-created again and again.

In both the theological and the psychotherapeutic case, the aim can only be said to be achieved when the patient or penitent sees for himself the 'true nature' of his situation - though, as should be becoming increasingly clear, Bultmann and Binswanger would differ in their view of what constitutes the 'true nature of the situation'.[1]

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1. In assessing what makes up the 'situation', Bultmann would accord priority to the individual's self-understanding, which itself determines his relationship with those around him at any one time; Binswanger would see the 'situation' as constituted by the total development of the individual up to that time, and he would investigate equally his relations to himself, his environment, and his fellows.

To turn to the relationships themselves: the psychotherapeutic one is itself a direct, creative and therefore new relationship. Its directness is illuminated by contrast with the theological relationship; here there is an essential indirectness: the preacher himself confronts his hearers, but is really pointing beyond himself to their relationship with the divine Thou[1] - but, again, not in order that the hearer may remain in communion with the divine Thou, but may rather turn to his fellows in love.

For Binswanger, the psychotherapeutic relationship is both new and creative[2]: it is to be seen as in itself a real relationship, rather than merely the arena in which former relationships are repeated - one hopes with a different outcome.[3] In this sense the classical psycho-analytical relationship, as described by Freud with its problems of transference and counter-transference, has an indirectness similar to the theological relationship. In both, the present encounter is significant not for what it is in itself, but for what it points towards and re-enacts.[4] Both would make the claim: what is really significant here is other than the encounter

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1. We have already referred to the way in which the divine Thou is hidden (and yet revealed as address) within the human Thou that speaks the word of proclamation. This tension finds its concrete expression in the ambiguity of the role and person of the preacher. See above, p. 29f. and esp. the discussion of the positive evaluation of the I-Thou encounter, pp. 85ff.
2. See p. 154 above.
3. See above, p. 315.
4. Cf. Binswanger's criticism of Augustine's concept of love in chapter 8, section 3 above; see also below: Chapter 13.

itself. This means that the classic psycho-analyst and, one might argue, the Bultmannian preacher regard themselves as less 'at risk' in their present encounter than the daseinsanalytical psychotherapist.[1] The Daseinsanalyst sees himself as an essential and active partner in the creation of something new,[2] namely, the Gestalt of the patient. Such an act of creation requires both artistic imagination, experience of the 'eternity and home' of love,[3] and, of course, medical expertise. Furthermore, it is only possible in so far as the doctor commits his whole existence - and all his love - to the relationship in question.[4] It follows that each psychotherapeutic relationship is unique, new and unrepeatable.

In contrast to this the theological relationship has, as we have seen, to be repeated again and again, because the meaning of the proclamation has to be understood again and again; such understanding is never permanent, and "must always be newly achieved".[5] It is not a relationship in which

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1. Boss, pp. 255-260, states that the classical psycho-analytical view of transference and counter-transference can in fact be a defence on the part of the analyst against the demands of the relationship - a defence that can prejudice the chances of therapy, by refusing to allow the relationship to be one of creative love (on the part of the analyst). - One must certainly add that the Bultmannian preacher, though not 'at risk' qua preacher confronting his hearers, 'risks' his existence in so far as he believes - purely on the basis of the (unverifiable) encounter with the divine Thou.
2. - And is prepared to correct the classical psycho-analytic view on this point and assert that the analyst is himself equally creative - see Boss, pp. 237-247.
3. See above, Chapters 4, 8 and 10.
4. See above, p. 153.
5. GV I p. 218 E.

imaginative creativity has a part to play,[1] nor does it require, on the part of the preacher, attention to his own personality:[2]

> "In order to proclaim 'the faith that is believed' so that it becomes manifest to the faith 'by which it is believed', the proclaimer must attend not to his personality, but to his theological training."[3]

Both kinds of communication lay claim to create a new situation: Binswanger does so in explicit criticism of Freud, castigating classical psycho-analysis for its dislike of the category of the new. For him, the 'newness' is clear: something new is being created in the life-history of the patient (and, of course, of the doctor). In Bultmann the 'newness' consists in the hearing of the address anew: its meaning is discovered anew each time it is properly, i.e. obediently, heard: or, to put it another way, each time it becomes event in the life of the hearer.

In theological communication, love is not expressly demanded of the preacher qua preacher; he does not require it in order to understand those to whom he is speaking; indeed

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1. For a different assessment of the place of the imagination in theological thinking, see Moltmann, Theology of Hope, e.g. p. 34 (where, significantly, it is linked with love).

2. Whereas the psychotherapeutic relationship clearly does, both on Freud's and Binswanger's view of it.

3. GV I p. 131 E. For the distinction Bultmann uses here see above, pp. 56ff.

it is not the sort of category - in Bultmann's view - that is appropriate to the task of understanding another person.[1] But, of course, the preacher is himself a believer; and preaching is the explication of a man's own response to the Kerygma. As a believer he faces and accepts the demands of love: as a theological 'communicator' he is not thereby loving his hearers. To say that he were would be to turn love into a feeling of affection, which he may or may not have.

Nor does the theological communicator demand or expect love for himself on the part of his hearers; this again would be to turn love into affection, and to avoid the essential indirectness of the relationship: it would be to create a dependency which it is Bultmann's great concern to avoid.[2] At the same time it must be added that Binswanger too is aware of the dangers of dependency, regarding it as a fallen caricature of love, which does not really deserve the name of love

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1. I.e. it does not have any "cognitive power" (Sadler, p. 60) - except with regard to the self-understanding of him who receives love. What is always required, if understanding is going to take place is sympathy; and it seems clear that Bultmann comes closest to Binswanger's concept of love with his own understanding of sympathy: it is a prerequisite of hermeneutics. See esp. GV II 12, The Problem of Hermeneutics; for Binswanger on Kierkegaard's concept of sympathy see 'Der Mensch...", pp. 13ff.

2. He comments on the dependency problems so often created in psychotherapeutic relationships: GV III 9 p. 125 (see above, p. 142). - On the necessity of the indirectness of the revelation, and thus of the proclamation (whether carried through by Jesus or by his followers) see esp. John 13.31-16.33 (and EJE p. 523).

at all (love being essentially a free reciprocal relationship between I and Thou).[1]

We can now turn to the question of the authority of the preacher and psychotherapist, in regard to those with whom they have to do; and what needs to be said, follows from what has gone before. The fact that the psychotherapeutic relationship, in Binswanger's view, is one which is itself creative at an inter-personal level means that there is the need for trust within the relationship, primarily on the part of the patient for the psychotherapist.[2] Furthermore this is not only trust with regard to his medical proficiency, but also trust in him as a fellow human being. In this case his role as professional psychotherapist and his existence as fellow human being are coincidental; they are united in the one task of psychotherapy.

In the case of theological communication there is not the same coincidence of the role of the speaker qua speaker with his existence as fellow believer. The hearer is not asked to enter into a relationship with him of personal trust, any

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1. Grundformen, p. 36, and Schizophrenie, p. 230, where Binswanger is describing the dependency-relationship of Jürg Zünd on his mother. - I have not come across a detailed treatment of transference by Binswanger; the phenomenon clearly does not have the same importance for him as it has for Freud. But it would be a mistake to imagine Binswanger was unaware of it, since, as we have seen, he draws so heavily on psycho-analytical technique. But he would not be able to accept Freud's theoretical explanation of the phenomenon. Here Boss, pp. 237-247, has expressed the daseinsanalytical viewpoint more thoroughly than Binswanger.

2. See Chapter 4, esp. the account of the case of the girl with the Singultus attacks (pp. 157 ff. above).

more than he is asked, as hearer, to love him. If however, he hears the word that is spoken as the Word of God, i.e. if he hears it obediently, this implies acceptance of the Christian community's authorisation of the speaker.[1] But, as has been said above, it is also true that the speaker is himself a believer[2] - indeed a fellow human being - and as such ought to be the object of the hearer's love, and trust.

There are two further points: Binswanger makes it clear that the psychiatrist or psychotherapist operates as a mediator between the patient and society;[3] his goal includes the restoration of communication between the patient and his fellows. At its highest, indeed, the goal includes the restoration of the possibility of loving-being-together; often it has to remain content with the restoration of every-day communication on the level of straightforward human intercourse.

The preacher's aim also entails the establishing of a fellowship of loving service between men; in this sense he is a reconciler, speaking on behalf of Christ, or God.[4] But

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1. Cf. GV I p. 211, 213, E.

2. The question whether a non-believer can proclaim the Word of God I find unresolved in Bultmann's thought. The Kerygma is only accessible to man, only addresses man, through the explication of another's self-understanding. Hence it would appear that only a believer can proclaim the forgiveness of God. Yet the encounter with the forgiving God is indirect: the speaker points beyond himself: what is vital is what is heard through his words, not the words themselves.

3. See above, Chapter 4, p.160.

4. Bultmann, ibid.

he is not a mediator, whether of God to man, or between man and man; that is to say, the reconciliation is not effected through or by means of him in any direct sense. In the psychotherapeutic relationship this is the case: the patient learns to relate first to the therapist, and then, over or via him, to those beyond.[1]

As far as Bultmann is concerned, there is no sense in which the theological communicator takes upon himself that which those with whom he is concerned cannot bear for themselves. That is to say, he does not direct to himself the anger or hatred which they are incapable of dealing with themselves, and which was destroying their relationship with each other.[2] The psychotherapist on the other hand, whether of the Freudian school or of Binswanger's persuasion, is prepared to do precisely that.

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1. Again we can see here the contrast between the classical psycho-analytical account of transference and Binswanger's account of the psychotherapeutic relationship.

2. He is in no sense representative of Christ in his person and only indirectly (in that the Word speaks through his words) in what he says. This position follows from Bultmann's doctrine of salvation, which is effected solely by the speaking and hearing of the Word (in the first place of course by Jesus of Nazareth - whose death is not thought of as of primarily vicarious significance); the position is then endorsed by the separation of the preacher's words from his person (which on Bultmann's view is of no account). - Bultmann does of course admit the validity of the Pauline language of 'sharing the sufferings of Christ' - but this is simply the inevitable consequence of following him, and has no soteriological significance.

Secondly, it needs to be observed that the psychotherapeutic relationship starts (normally at least) with a decision on the part of the patient to approach the therapist. Thus a particular structure is built into the relationship from the beginning, and a particular expectation dominates it.[1] As far as the theological communicator is concerned on this point, a distinction has to be made between the believer who goes to hear the proclamation and the non-believer who is confronted by it in word or action. The believer, of course, goes in obedience, and the relationship is in this sense structured. The non-believer clearly does not, but simply meets the speaker with his own prior understanding of that of which the speaker speaks.

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1. Bultmann may be referring to this when he contrasts the ability of psychology or psychiatry to produce principles for relating with people, with the fact that love, as the Christian sees it, lays down "no principles of action according to which I can, when I know them, comport myself" (GV I p. 235 "Das christliche Gebot der Nächstenliebe"). But it must be said that his account only holds good for Freudian analysis (with its principles for dealing with transference), and not for Binswanger's much more open-ended creation of relationship and thereby of Gestalt, for which the gift of trust is required.

4. Can one act as both psychotherapist and theologian at the same time?

We come now to answer the question raised by this comparison of the work of psychotherapist and theologian of the Word, namely, the question whether one man can act as both Daseinsanalyst and Theologian in regard to the same person at the same time.

One point can be made straight away. On Binswanger's view, the Daseinsanalyst is a psychiatrist: he is one who is as much at home in clinical psychiatry as he is in daseins-analytical and psycho-analytical psychotherapy.[1] It would be contrary to Binswanger's intention for someone not psychiatrically trained as a doctor to appropriate the daseinsanalytical method and apply it on its own. Thus the man who seeks to be a Daseinsanalyst must also be trained psychiatrically. Similarly for Bultmann, the theological communicator is normally one trained in theology[2]: the man who seeks to preach the Word of God must look to his theological training[3] - and this means, in the first instance, knowledge of the NT.

Now if the question is taken exactly as it stands: can a man work in both these ways at the same time with the same person?, the answer must be in the negative. You cannot both

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1. See above, p. 161

2. - Though not necessarily - see above, p. 29.

3. See above, Chapter 11, p. 336.

abstract a man from his situation (for the purposes of daseins-analysis) and at the same time direct him into it (as the proclamation does).

It might be argued (but such an argument does not meet the real stumbling-block that prevents an affirmative answer from being given to the question), that the same man can operate in both these ways with a patient/parishioner over a long period of time - for instance, with someone with recurrent psychiatric illness; thus when in e.g. a state of acute schizophrenic illness, the theological way of being-with the man (directing him into his situation on the basis of the proclamation of his forgiveness by God) could be suspended, and the daseinsanalytical approach (seeking to make sense of his life-historical experience) brought to bear.[1]

One could further argue that by keeping strictly to the paradigm of relationship for theological communication (namely, the preaching situation) one could combine both the theological and daseinsanalytical roles with regard to the patient/parishioner. In the one to one relationship such a

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1. As an example, I refer the reader to the case of P., in the Appendix, below. Here one key life-historical factor is P's relation to his mother; here the absence of love between him and his mother is a matter of daseinsanalytical importance; but (when P. is not ill) his search for loving-being-together (with regard to his mother) could be confronted theologically with another sort of love, which has nothing to do with affection, namely, being-there for his mother (but this of course only on the basis of P's realisation that he is himself loved and accepted by the divine Thou).

man would be with the patient daseinsanalytically; in the preaching situation he would be with the parishioner theologically.[1]

But this brings us to the heart of the question, which is really concerned with the different ways of relating to the patient/parishioner that our two disciplines entail - or, to put it another way, with the problem of two different sorts of authority. The question is: can one man relate to someone both directly 'with all his love', in a direct encounter, aimed at creating something new on the basis of the encounter, and at the same time, indirectly, in such a way that his words are merely the vehicle of something else, namely the Word of God? At first sight the answer is a plain 'no', and this would indeed seem to be the case; but there is a proviso: we are dealing here with a general theological problem, namely, that concerned with rightly distinguishing the words of the preacher and the Word of God, and the person of the preacher and the Word of God. The preacher remains fellow man: his words, to be theological proclamation, have to have that tangential quality that mean they point beyond themselves; their import is indirect. And it could be argued that in theory at least this leaves the preacher, as fellow man, free

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1. In pastoral practice, - and now using our two sets of categories very loosely-, this can in fact be the case. But what normally happens is that one role dominates the situation, so that either the preaching situation is seen as an extension of the daseinsanalytical role, or the daseinsanalytical role is prevented from coming into being because the preaching role has extended its jurisdiction into this phere also. See below, Appendix.

to relate with 'all his love', daseinsanalytically with the patient. However it is hard to see how he could[1] at the same time maintain that indirectness of relationship with its essential withdrawal (the Revealer has to leave the disciples, before the import of the revelation is clear to them - and the same is true, speaking theologically, of the preacher), which is essential for theological communication.

The question becomes all the more difficult to answer in the affirmative, when it is seen from the point of view of the patient/parishioner, who is being asked to relate in these two ways to the same person. Again, before saying this is impossible, one has to repeat that the preacher's words are only Word of God indirectly; his utterance becomes authoritative theologically when (through the words that are spoken) the hearer encounters existentially the Word of forgiveness and the demand of love as the divine Word, addressed to himself. Yet in so far as preaching is normally a structured exercise - as is the daseinsanalytical relationship - the possibility of 'role confusion', both on the part of the theologian-daseinsanalyst and on that of the patient/parishioner, is clearly great. We are therefore left with the less ambitious question: can a theologian and a daseinsanalyst (two men) relate to the same patient at the same time? But for an answer to this question, we must wait till Chapter 15.

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1. It is clear that we have now left the area of logical possibility or impossibility, and are concerned with the more fluid question of what is 'humanly possible'.

CHAPTER 12

Bultmann, Binswanger and Heidegger

Preface

It is fitting at the start of this necessarily complex chapter to make clear to the reader what we are looking for, and how we intend to proceed. We are asking whether Binswanger's and Bultmann's use of Heidegger enable us to relate their two disciplines to one another by means of this shared third element, namely, Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik. Thus we are in the first instance looking at the relation of the two disciplines as 'wholes', and attempting to relate them to one another *in toto*. We are encouraged to do this by the recourse each has to Heidegger's ontological-ontic distinction, both of them thus differentiating their work from his, and by implication allowing the reader to associate them together on the basis of the distinction. Thus we will need to look at this distinction again and will do so in section 2 below. But we are also searching for a way of relating our two thinkers' work by means of a shared concept which can act as a bridge between them on the basis of which a common language could be established. Here we are not looking at the two disciplines *in toto*, standing as it were outside them, but are rather searching for a shared concept to form the basis of a dialogue

between them, as it were at the outset of that dialogue.

As far as our procedure is concerned, we will start by a broad characterisation of the two types of philosophical thinking, one of which is more closely associated with Binswanger and the other with Bultmann, which it is argued find a convergence in the work of Heidegger; this will be our way into the subject (section 1: transcendental and ontological thinking). The title of section 2 (the ontological and the ontic in the thought of Heidegger) explains its content: we need clarity on Heidegger's own use of the distinction on which our two authors draw so heavily, before we can assess the propriety of their use of it. Sections 3 and 4 then deal separately with Binswanger's and Bultmann's use of the Heideggerian analytik; the results of this exploration are then presented in section 5, and the conclusion reached that no straightforward relationship between the two disciplines is possible - at least on the basis of what emerges as divergent uses of Heidegger's work. Section 6 then explores the more limited question of the common use of important concepts taken from the 'analytik', in the hope of finding a basis for dialogue in this way.

1. Transcendental and ontological thinking

The last chapter had looked at theological and psychotherapeutic communication; it investigated the relationships operative in each case, and thus saw the theologian of the Word and the Daseinsanalyst at work. Now the time has come to look more closely at the fundamental categories with which our two thinkers work, and ask how far they share a common conceptuality. In particular we must ask whether they are using the ontological categories of existence and being in the same way to refer to the same phenomena.

But before we turn to this it is fitting to make two closely related observations that in part follow from the last chapter: the function each performs and the aims each has in view result in an important general difference in the way each sees the world of men, in short, 'human reality'. The categories Binswanger uses are intended to be all embracing; his anthropological-ontological approach covers all possible eventualities by seeing every phenomenon as a modification of an all-encompassing a priori formula. He operates within a framework of "both...and". Bultmann, the theologian, in sharp contrast, operates on an "either-or" axis: it too intends to cover every aspect of human experience, but does so by asserting: "either x or y: tertium non datur".[1] The contrast is a perfectly reasonable one in view of the aims of each man - in the

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1. Cf. I Joh. p. 34f: Jesus p. 69, 101 (= Jesus and the Word, p. 62, 87); Exegetica, pp. 20, 205, 481; Heid. und die Theol., p. 87 etc.

one case the loving, creative, understanding of another man in his own life-history; in the other, the setting of the hearer before the moment of decision. We will have occasion to return to this contrast more than once; Bultmann himself refers to it in his almost wearisome debates about the relation of Greek thought to Hebrew, and of theology to culture.

It is well illustrated in the matter of the life-histories of individuals. Binswanger sees the life-histories of his patients as the gradual unfolding of their potentialities - or as the gradual closing up of Dasein in upon itself, over against its own possibilities of becoming.[1] Of course, decision and resolve are present again and again within this process; but what interests Binswanger is the development itself, and the question whether a man could or should have done otherwise is suspended: it belongs to another 'level' of assessment, namely, that of philosophy and ethics. Binswanger is concerned to lay bare phenomenologically the life-historical modifications this particular Dasein has made in his being-in-the-world.

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1. Bultmann too can speak of the individual's 'becoming': but the category of becoming remains subordinate to that of the decision to become. He can also speak of the developing personality, but its continuity is found, significantly, in the act of repentance (HE p. 145) - which Binswanger himself regarded as a concept belonging to theology rather than to anthropology; see above, Chapter 8, section 1.

For Bultmann no such suspension of the ethical dimension is possible or desirable; furthermore the categories of decision and resolve are all-important. Nor is it legitimate for the theologian to dwell on the believer's past life and assess his 'progress': the course his life has run belongs to the past and must remain in the past. He is not allowed to 'tarry' in past experiences, either his own or anyone else's, but, at least as far as his faith is concerned, is continually re-directed towards the present moment, and thus towards his future. Thus the kind of all embracing account of the total life-history of a person is simply outside the scope of a theology such as Bultmann's. As the believer looks at his history he finds it determined by the axis: sin or grace, or: death or life.[1] The attempt to see the significance of the whole as a developing process (using the term now in its non-medical sense) is thwarted by the re-direction of the believer into his present situation with its present demands.[2] In this way we can see how thoroughly Bultmann

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1. On Bultmann's terms a theological case-history in which one looks at the development of a process is an impossibility. Certainly theology can and must include autobiographical statements: but the autobiography itself consists of these polarised categories, such as are found in Rom. 7, and is subordinated to the demand and promise of the present moment.

2. For a trenchant criticism of this refusal to see the life of faith as anything other than a series of new beginnings (a view Bultmann shares with the Barth of the Commentary on Romans), see Bonhoeffer: Act and Being, pp. 100, 104 (tr. Bernard Noble, New York, 1962). See also the essay entitled Act and Being by F. Sherman in The Place of Bonhoeffer, ed. M.E. Marty, SCM 1963.

sees the task of theology to lie on the ontic level: it is the elucidation of the response made to an actual 'summons' (address) at a particular moment.

The contrast to which I have been referring is well illustrated by the central theme of Bonhoeffer's Act and Being, namely, that any theology tends to be either transcendentalist or ontological in its way of thinking. The transcendentalist theology concentrates on act, and is typified in modern times by the work of Kant[1]: it is termed transcendental because the key concepts with which its theology operates - God and 'I' - remain ontologically undefined; they are boundary points within which experience, be it what is traditionally known as religious experience, or existentialist decision, takes place. Ontological theology, as is manifest, concentrates on 'being' and (obviously) gives ontological status to the concepts with which it operates. The act-theology works with the category of discontinuity: history can only be viewed as a series of decisions. On this view the life of faith is a life of continual new beginnings. Ontological theology dwells on continuity: the 'I' that decides remains the same 'I', developing within continuity.

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1. Cf. The Critique of Practical Reason. Whether Bonhoeffer's categories are themselves over-simplified need not concern us at the moment; he points, at least, to discernible tendencies. On the other hand, for an ontological understanding of Kant, see Martin, G., Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science, tr. Lucas, Manchester, 1955.

In the light of this stylised division, it is easy (and this is the second general observation, which will lead into the discussion of the relation with Heidegger) to put Bultmann within the realm of transcendental-act thinking, and Binswanger (for the division is a philosophical, not merely theological one) within that of ontological thinking. The tendency of the thought of the one is towards transcendentalism; that of the other towards ontology.[1] The intriguing factor is that they share a common allegiance to Heidegger. But this becomes less of a puzzle, when one views Heidegger's philosophy as precisely an attempt to hold together transcendentalism (a philosophy of act) with ontology (a philosophy of being).[2] As we have seen Heidegger's basic category is the ontological one of Dasein: but Dasein is laid bare phenomenologically as decision and 'decidedness' in relation to its possibilities of being. It is ontologically "Sein-können" (possibility to be):[3]

> "Heidegger has succeeded in forcing act and being into partnership in the concept of Dasein - that is to say, the actual decidings of Dasein coincide with its given decidedness."[4]

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1. This thesis can be supported by reference to the philosophical tradition in which each has been nurtured; for Bultmann it is the neo-Kantianism of Ritschl and Herrmann; for Binswanger it is the phenomenological world of Husserl and Scheler, including the subjectivist ontological thinking associated with the former's phenomenology. Of course, both draw on Schleiermacher, on Kierkegaard (but at different points) and on Dilthey.
2. Bonhoeffer, pp. 59ff.
3. It is no accident that it is this concept (the cornerstone of Heidegger's own work) that forms the 'bridge' for which we are searching in section 6 of this chapter.
4. Bonhoeffer, p. 64.

Both of our thinkers find it difficult to hold together what Heidegger attempted to unite; Bultmann on the whole looks away from the question of the ontological status of the notion of God,[1] for fear of turning theology into metaphysics, and, despite his appropriation of the category of Dasein, remains at heart a 'transcendentalist'; and Binswanger, pressurised by the claims of ontologies of nature (from Goethe to Freud)[2] loses the centrality of decision and act.[3]

But both of them champion ontological analysis and relate their thinking consciously to Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik as far as the life of man is concerned. The question then is whether, despite these evident tendencies in both our authors, when referring to the being of man, they are sufficiently close to the Heideggerian ontology of man for us to conclude that they are using it in the same way as each other. If this is the case, and they are operating with the

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1. For a tentative exploration in this direction (significantly on the basis of Heideggerian ontology) see above, p. 72, note 4.

2. See p. 183, note 4, above.

3. See esp. p. 276, note 3, above , where it is pointed out that when Binswanger does speak of decision it is likely to be viewed primarily as an experience.

same notion of existence,[1] then it will be easier to maintain that one can be 'en route' between the two.

We must therefore look at the various ontological categories used by our two thinkers and by Heidegger, and ask whether they are being used in each case in the same way. The most important words are: Dasein; existence (and existential, existentiell); being - and its various hyphenated forms: being-in-the-world, being-for etc., and most important, potentiality-to-be ('Seinkönnen').

But there is another important factor in the discussion that needs prior clarification: and that is the use Bultmann and Binswanger make of the ontological-ontic distinction. Both claim that their disciplines are ontic, yet both 'look over their shoulders' at ontological analysis, and it is these two facts that make them prima facie a 'good pair' for interdisciplinary study. So we must look again at this distinction, and in the first instance, at Heidegger's own intention in using it as he did.

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1. This would corroborate Bultmann's claim that the believer 'has' his existence in common with the non-believer (see above, p. 41); but what he makes of it is different: his existence is a being-for the other.

2. The ontological and the ontic in the thought of Heidegger

a) Heidegger's enquiry is transcendental-ontological

To begin with, let me state Heidegger's view of the nature of his enquiry.

As must by now be abundantly clear it is an enquiry into the nature of being, and in this sense a strictly ontological enquiry. However, that is not a sufficiently clear account of its nature. Heidegger also calls it a transcendental enquiry. Thus the two terms which were used in the last section as stylised contrasts are here brought together to express the nature of his one enquiry.

He terms his exploration transcendental because it is concerned with the a priori conditions which must obtain if Dasein is what it phenomenologically reveals itself to be. In this sense it is the same sort of enquiry as Kant's who was concerned to discover the a priori conditions of experience (although his method was not technically speaking phenomenological). But where Kant concerned himself with the concept of the external world or Nature, and the knowledge of the external world, and sought to discover the transcendental conditions that must obtain 'in' the mind for man to experience the external world as he does,[1] Heidegger pushed the exploration 'back' to its overtly ontological basis, by asking about the conditions that must obtain if Dasein is to be what we know it to be.

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1. SuZ H 11.

Thus his is a transcendental-ontological enquiry. And to do justice to his intention one must give equal weight to both these words. In Kantian terms, to describe an enquiry as transcendental is to assert that it deals with conditions of knowledge which must obtain for experience to be what it is. Such an enquiry (e.g. transcendental logic) is 'prior' to all empirical enquiries into data obtaining in the world;[1] it does not positively further these enquiries, but clarity here is essential if one is to understand the scope and limits of such empirical enquiries. Transcendental philosophy asks: what can the mind know, and at what point has its knowledge lost its relation to 'reality' and become vacuous? For Kant the ontological question could only be put when the mind's capacities and limitations were known. Heidegger argues that this 'put the cart before the horse', in assuming an ontologically opaque concept 'mind' as its starting-point. Thus for him the ontological question has an equal claim to 'priority' to the epistemological one. Thus his enquiry is transcendental-ontological.[2]

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1. As we have seen such a transcendental analysis only makes sense where the mind is conceived of as more than a '<u>tabula rasa</u>'; see above, p. 7.

2. The reason for stressing this point is as follows: if the enquiry is transcendental-ontological, then so must any results be - and their use elsewhere problematical.

b) The emergence of the centrality of the question of Dasein's being for transcendental-ontological enquiry

Such an enquiry means that we arrive straight away at the question of the being of Dasein, i.e. of human being; this assumes centrality in the exploration of being itself. Ontological enquiry in the past did not necessarily start with the being of man, but its combination with transcendental enquiry means that it must do so: the first thing that needs to be done is to explore the being of the existent that asks about being. Only when this is clarified can that existent go on to ask about being in general, for only then will it know what it means by the concept.

But (and this is a point that has been made many times), this particular existent, Dasein, is the one whose existence is itself its central pre-occupation, - in other words, whose existence is possibility-to-be ('Sein-können'). This is what distinguishes it from other existents, and Heidegger can say that this gives it an "ontological priority" over them:

> "And finally, to the extent that Dasein, as an entity with the possibility of existence, has ontological priority over every other entity, 'hermeneutic', as an interpretation of Dasein's being, has the third and specific sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence; and this is the sense which is philosophically primary."[1]

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1. SuZ H 38.

But care must be taken over the interpretation of this claim by Heidegger for Dasein's 'ontological priority':

> "When Dasein is interpreted as that existent which can raise the problem of being as one that belongs to its own existence, then that does not mean that this existent, which gua Dasein can exist both authentically and inauthentically, is itself the real ('eigentliche') existent, among all other existents, as if the latter were only a shadow of the former. On the contrary, in the illuminating of transcendence, the horizon is to be found in which the concept of being - including the frequently hailed 'natural' concept - can be philosophically grounded as a concept. Ontological interpretation of being within and on the basis of the transcendence of Dasein does not mean the ontic derivation of the totality of non-dasein-existents from the existent that is itself Dasein."[1]

Thus the anthropocentricity of Heidegger's approach to the question of being does not necessarily mean either a subjectivism[2] or an ontological scale of being in which man is at the top of a hierarchical ontological structure. It is simply correct methodological procedure, if the question of being is to be put aright. We will return to this point in a moment, in relation to the ontological-ontic distinction, which could

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1. Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 39.

2. SuZ H 14.

itself be interpreted from the standpoint of a traditional ontology of a scale of being.

The point here is that when man asks about the being of existents other than his own kind, Heideggerian transcendental ontology demands that the question be re-phrased so that first of all Dasein's own being is the subject of analysis. Heidegger puts it succinctly at the end of his lectures on the concept of the thing:

> "The question: 'What is a thing?' is the question: 'Who is man?'"[1]

c) The onto-logical function of Heideggerian analysis

Thus Heidegger maintains that the exploration of the question of being (the proper business of philosophy) is antecedent to all other sciences; it is an exploration of their foundation.[2] And we will have to look at the meaning of this claim at the end of this section. But we can arrive at the same position (viz-à-viz the centrality of the question of Dasein's being for the ontological enquiry) by starting at the other 'end' - with existents other than Dasein.

For there is an obvious if slightly paradoxical way in which the ontic precedes the ontological. That with which man has to do in his every-day dealings with the world is 'ontic';

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1. Die Frage nach dem Ding, p. 189.

2. SuZ H 10.

i.e. it is existent: the manner of its being is normally undefined; it is not a matter of concern. But it is still true that man's relation to it is to that which is. When he draws up an account of the operation of something with which he has to do, in what we would call 'scientific terms', he makes use of categories such as time and place and measurement,[1] etc., which themselves imply an understanding of the way things are, but do not, in their usage in connection with the particular operation, make that understanding explicit.

To give such an account is to be concerned with the 'ontic'; it is 'to operate on the ontic level'. Such an account does not of itself raise the question of the understanding of being implicit in it. But any science that deserves the name of a 'scientific discipline', argues Heidegger,[2] must become clear as to the conceptuality with which it operates, in particular to its implied ontological assertions, and thus subject its ontic categories to 'ontological analysis'.[3] This will not further the exploration of the subject in itself, but will enable the hearer to assess the value and status of his results.

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1. Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 13f.
2. SuZ H 9f.
3. E.g. the concepts employed by biology such as 'life' or 'organism'; or the concept employed in anthropology of 'world' - the world(s) in which a man is, etc. For the former cf. SuZ H 10: "In biology there is an awakening tendency to enquire beyond the definitions which mechanism and vitalism have given for 'life' and 'organism', and to define anew the kind of Being which belongs to living as such." - For the latter, cf. Vom Wesen des Grundes, pp. 27-33, on Kant's anthropological understanding of 'world'.

d) The two aspects of ontological analysis

Thus ontological analysis is seen to have two aspects: First it is the philosophical means whereby we attain clarity in regard to the ontological presuppositions of the conceptuality we are using in ontic enquiry. This ontological elucidation of an ontic statement does not add anything to it, nor does it take that discipline as such on to a 'more fundamental' level: rather it illuminates the way that to which the ontic statement refers, is. We will describe this as the onto-logical function of philosophical analysis. But man is not simply striving for clarity in the concepts he uses: he is striving to answer the question how he is to exist. Heidegger argues that unless this onto-logical analysis moves forward into an analysis of being itself, it remains naive and opaque,[1] in regard to its central concept Being. And to move forward into such an analysis is inevitably to raise the question of Dasein's being; but then the question of Dasein's being is the question 'par excellence' for Dasein. Hence we arrive again at the centrality of Dasein's being in the exploration into being itself. This second aspect, alongside onto-logical analysis, is the ontological question <u>per se</u>.

Here we are not concerned with clarity in the empirical disciplines, but with (to use Heidegger's language) the 'laying bare' of being itself. But - and here we seem to turn round on ourselves - we can only hope to lay bare being itself, if

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1. SuZ H 11.

we subject our own being to onto-logical analysis. This was the immediate purpose of Sein und Zeit: to elucidate the horizons within which man had to ask that question which was central to his existence, namely the question as to the meaning of being. And within the onto-logical analyses of Sein und Zeit one must never lose sight of its ontological goal.

e) The ontological difference

From what has been said it can be seen that Heidegger's work can be used in a variety of ways: first, onto-logically and secondly, with reference to the question of being itself. Heidegger's own argument is that the onto-logical enquiry leads inevitably into the ontological one. But his initial conclusion in Sein und Zeit is that being is only accessible to man from within the horizon of his own temporality and spatiality. We therefore find ourselves limited to an anthropocentric and finite understanding of being. It is impossible for man 'to get outside himself'[1] and see any 'eternal whole'. Thus

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1. In an important note in Vom Wesen des Grundes (p. 39), Heidegger comments on the anthropocentricity of the analytik:

> "And as far as the accusation...of an 'anthropological standpoint' in Sein und Zeit is concerned, this criticism which is passed all too quickly from person to person remains ineffective as long as one refuses to think through the starting-point, the total direction, and the goal of the setting of the problem in Sein und Zeit, so as to comprehend how, precisely through working out Dasein's transcendence, 'man' comes 'into this central position'; only in this way can and must his nothingness in the totality of the existent be raised as a problem. What dangers lie lurking in such an 'anthropocentric standpoint', when the whole enterprise is directed to show that the essence of Dasein, that

(contd.)

metaphysics, in the traditional sense of the science of the ways in which God, man and the world are, metaphysics in this sense is impossible. Thus the knowledge man can have of himself in his finite and ontic state is all that he can know of himself and his position 'in the universe' - but then this knowledge is not to be found authentically in intellectual resignation and nihilism, but existentielly, in resolute anticipation of the future. And this is the case because the ontological question remains a question for man; it is not settled in a purely nihilistic relativism. What man has to do, on Heidegger's view, is to take seriously his capacity to distinguish the ontic and the ontological (onto-logical and ontological analysis) and to find his being precisely within this difference. Thus Heidegger's doctrine of the transcendence that is open to man, as 'being-in-the-world', is to be 'located' at this point in his way of being. This is not in any straightforward sense an intellectual/academic illumination, nor is it to be equated with any particular sort of action. It lies behind both these 'ontic' experiences, and is the a priori condition of their possibility; i.e. what Heidegger is referring to is the transcendental-ontological condition

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Continuation of note 1 from p. 362:

> stands there 'in the centre', is ec-static, i.e. 'ex-centric', and that, for this reason, the apparent freedom of standpoint (held in the face of the total intention of philosophising as an essentially finite possibility of existence), remains an illusion?"

And again (ibid):

> "All concrete interpretations particularly concerning time, are to be evaluated solely in the direction of making possible the question of being."

of Dasein's being. A quotation from Vom Wesen des Grundes will make the matter clearer:

> "Ontic and ontological truth concern themselves respectively with the existent in its being and the being of the existent. The two belong essentially together on the basis of their relation to the difference between being (Sein) and existent (Seiendem) - the ontological difference. The nature of truth in general, with this necessarily two-pronged ontic-ontological fork, is only possible in conjunction with the emergence of this difference. If, on the other hand, the peculiarity of Dasein lies in the fact that it relates to existents as that which understands being, then the capacity to distinguish, in which the ontological difference becomes an actuality, must be rooted, as far as its own possibility is concerned, in the ground of the essence (Wesen) of Dasein. This ground of the ontological difference we will call, by anticipation, Dasein's transcendence."[1]

To repeat: Heidegger is not left with a nihilistic relativism, because the question of being remains open to Dasein, and this capacity to distinguish the ontic question from the ontological is what makes Dasein what it is; it is on the basis of this that Dasein bestows meaning on its world, and acts purposefully etc., as being-in-the-world. It is on the basis of this 'transcendental' capacity to distinguish the

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1. Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 14f.

ontological and the ontic that the specialised sciences are possible. Man finds his transcendence first simply in being-in-the-world: this is itself a transcendental category, which Heidegger uses with reference to Dasein's capacity to 'project' the worlds in which Dasein exists.

If one asks the question: where does man become aware of this capacity to transcend, i.e. to project worlds and thus meaning, and so to be, authentically, as Dasein, and in this sense to exist?, the answer is: Dasein becomes aware of this, precisely in the face of its own potential nothingness. It is here that Heidegger's analysis of anxiety ('Angst') has its place; but, again, it needs to be stressed that while Heidegger 'gets at' this concept onto-logically, he is in fact still doing transcendental ontology when he uses it. Anxiety is in this sense 'more primordial' than e.g. 'fear'.[1] But (and here I return to the possibility of confusion in interpreting Heidegger) to say that it is 'more primordial' cannot possibly mean that it is higher on an ontological scale of being.

What has been said should have made it clear how Heidegger regards ontological analysis (using the term in its fullest sense) as laying the foundation of the empirical sciences. One can only see how ontology can be the basis of, say, anthropology or biology, when one sees how, on Heidegger's view, analysis of the ontological implications of either of

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1. SuZ H 183-191.

these sciences leads one into analysis of Dasein, and in these instances, of the ways in which the biologist and anthropologist project their particular 'worlds' or conceptual framework: they do this on the basis of their transcendental capacity for 'projecting worlds', i.e. on the basis of their being-in-the-world as such. Thus, in a way with which we are already familiar through Binswanger, analysis of the subject-matter of a discipline becomes analysis of its 'practitioner's' way of being-in-the-world.

The 'practitioner's' way of 'being-in-the-world' is, however, itself only possible on the basis of the primordial 'being-in-the-world' of Dasein as such - and Dasein becomes aware of this essential nature of its existence when confronted existentielly with the possibility of its own nothingness (a confrontation that lies behind every actual decision that Dasein makes). Here again we see the transcendental-ontological nature of Heidegger's analysis. But (and again this requires no further elucidation) this ontological level is not separate from the ontic; on the contrary, Heidegger claims that ontology is rooted in the ontic, - but not identical with it.[1]

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1. Cf. esp. Heidegger: Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p. 212; Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 49; SuZ H 13, 199, 403. For a comment see J. von Rintelen: Beyond Existentialism, tr. H. C. Graef, London 1961, p. 179f.

3. Binswanger's use of ontological analysis

Our task is so to explore Bultmann's and Binswanger's use of Heideggerian Daseinsanalytik that we can then answer the question whether it is possible to move between the concepts of existentialist theology as presented by Bultmann and those of Daseinsanalysis as used by Binswanger. We will start by clarifying Binswanger's various uses of Heideggerian analytik.

For the purpose of this discussion I will concentrate on the central period of Binswanger's work, namely that starting in the 1930s with Ideenflucht and ending in the mid-50s, with the studies on Schizophrenia. To the middle of this period belongs the Grundformen.[1]

We need first to remind ourselves of the various reasons why Binswanger turned his attention towards the categories of ontology, - reasons that spring out of the requirements of a systematic treatment of psychiatry.

He seeks (1) a foundation for the discipline of psychiatry, which will bring together its various disparate elements, and provide unity for the whole.

He seeks (2) an all-embracing anthropological account of man's various ways of being, within which he can then place the individual's unique development.

He seeks (3) an adequate conceptuality for the purpose of spelling out the development of his patients' inner life-histories.

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1. For Binswanger's later assessment of Heideggerian ontology, see above, Part II, Chapter 9, section 3.

He seeks (4) an account of the underlying unity between men on which alone psychological knowledge, of the sort that Binswanger knows in his daseinsanalytical practice, is possible.

These four requirements are all in the end part of the same search, but they must be distinguished both for the sake of clarity, and also because, more importantly, they in fact exhibit different conceptions of ontology on Binswanger's part.

As far as (1) is concerned, we have seen that Heidegger himself claims that his transcendental - or 'fundamental' - ontology can and must provide the ontological foundation which is essential for any empirical discipline which claims scientific status. It does so, as we have seen, by showing these empirical disciplines to be only possible on the basis of Dasein's primordial 'being-in-the-world' as transcendence. Empirical disciplines (and by these all specialised knowledge of existents and Dasein is meant) are to be seen as derivative modes of being-in-the-world; they are ontic, not ontological; in other words they work with entities existent in the world, without themselves raising the question of being. However, that question is there by implication, and onto-logical analysis will bring it to light.

Now this requirement applies to all specialised knowledge, but it is much more urgent in the case of disciplines such as biology, anthropology and history (and, for that matter, theology). Here are disciplines using terms such as 'organism', 'life', 'time', 'history', 'world' (as well as overtly ontological terms such as 'existence' and 'being'), the status and scope of which are very far from clear. But these are the

disciplines with which Binswanger is concerned as psychiatrist. Thus the ontological analytik of Dasein is relevant to his purposes in a very direct sense, in that clarity in these fields is clarity in concepts which are in overt, actual, use, rather than simply clarity in regard to implied ontological references.

But because of the way Daseinsanalytik is carried through by Heidegger, its 'pull' is even stronger than that, for the discipline of psychiatry. The 'existentialia' which emerge from the analysis of Dasein's being are apparently precisely those which the psychiatrist knows at first hand, from his (ontic) experience with patients: such as guilt, anxiety, being-towards-death etc. There is of course a proviso, of which Binswanger is well aware: namely, that Heidegger's analytik is an ontological one, while his is an ontic analysis[1] - and this is at least <u>prima facie</u> permissible, because existential analysis is rooted in the ontic.[2]

But now, - and we are already in part trespassing on (3) - we must be aware of what is happening in Binswanger's appropriation of Heideggerian analytik. The direction of Binswanger's enquiry is diametrically opposite to that of Heidegger's: as we have seen, the whole thrust of Heidegger's enquiry (a point on which he lays considerable stress) is towards Being itself: the movement is from the ontic, through the being of Dasein, towards being itself; its preliminary conclusion is the laying

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1. For this distinction see above, Chapter 7, p. 213.

2. SuZ H 13.

bare of the ontological difference and Dasein's being as transcendence in the face of nothingness. One could say that it moves in greater abstraction from the particular towards the universal, towards being itself; - albeit, in paradoxical fashion, because the illumination of Dasein's being comes to Dasein precisely in his most complete individuation.[1]

The movement in Binswanger's thought, however, is in the opposite direction: from the ontological to the ontic, again, via the analytik of Dasein's being (which is where the ontological is known). It is a movement from the universal transcendental categories of the analytik to the particular, unique, ways in which individual 'Daseins' (in the plural) are.

The question is whether this is a misuse of Heidegger's analytik (taking Heidegger's own intention as our standard of judgment). I would argue: 'not yet'; or 'not necessarily'. Heidegger has himself claimed to provide the ontological foundation for the empirical sciences. But the danger (and I think this is a danger for Binswanger and not simply for my reading of him) is that of interpreting the ontological in traditional ontological terms - for instance, in that of primary substance. If this is done (and I will argue that something of this nature is happening in regard to 4), then the Heideggerian analytik is indeed being misused. For in the Heideggerian analytik the foundation that is afforded the empirical sciences is the illumination of Dasein's being, precisely in the face of its

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1. SuZ H 38.

own nothingness; thus the analytik is itself the destruction of all positive foundations,[1] for instance in the sense of the relation between primary and secondary substance.[2]

But if this danger is avoided, it is certainly possible to take Binswanger's use of Daseinsanalytik as a legitimate one, from the point of view of Heidegger's intention. Binswanger is aware that psychiatry, and in particular Daseinsanalysis, operates on the boundary-point between the ontological and the ontic; it cannot avoid raising the question of being, yet it cannot itself answer it.

> "Here is the boundary between philosophical-phenomenological ontology or daseinsanalytik and every science of man, - including empirical-phenomenological psychiatric daseinsanalysis. The relation of the <u>being</u> of that which exists... (of which Heidegger speaks) to that self-same <u>existent</u> (of which the psychiatrist speaks) is certainly a strict and close one, but the two are not the same thing: for there the question is ontological, here we are dealing with ontic or empirical enquiries and subject-matter."[3]

Binswanger can allow philosophy its claim to illuminate the nature of being: that is its business, and not his; it

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1. See above, p. 122.
2. Characteristically, Heidegger is discontented with the language of substance because, on his view, it is never clear whether <u>Substantia</u> is an ontic or ontological category: SuZ H 94.
3. 3FMD p. 22.

provides the ultimate illumination of the concepts with which he is working, and in this sense can be the foundation of daseinsanalysis.

This brings us to Binswanger's second major requirement, namely for an all-embracing anthropological account of the ways in which man lives out his life. Here, as we have seen, he admits his intention is not the same as Heidegger's.[1] But at the same time he insists that his phenomenological account of man's being as loving-being-together have ontological status.

His argument is not an unreasonable one, granted that it is intended as a correction of Heidegger; as Binswanger sees it, Heidegger has reached his position as regards the horizon within which man must ask about being by concentrating on phenomena such as anxiety; Binswanger will show that a different ontological position can be reached by concentrating on the equally important phenomenon of love.[2] In particular the difference will centre on loving-being-together being irreducibly ours, as opposed to being-in-the-world, which is irreducibly mine. But Binswanger does not want his work to be regarded as a correction of Heidegger's, because he insists that their intentions are different. And so they are - but this means that he is working with a different understanding of 'ontological'; for him, in the first half of the Grundformen

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1. Grundformen, p. 128.

2. But he has at the same time to show that Heidegger's analysis of Anxiety is not uniquely significant ontologically; on this point see esp. K. Löwith, Phänomenologische Ontologie und protestantische Theologie, in Heidegger und die Theologie, p. 110f.

at least, it means 'ultimate' or 'irreducible'.[1]

What he seeks to show is that loving-being-together is a different way of being-in-the-world from that of being as care, - and that the former is not reducible to the latter. But this means that he is now taking being as care as one phenomenologically accessible way of being amongst other ways of being. Thus now being-in-the-world (which was originally a transcendental-ontological designation of Dasein's existence) is contrasted with being-in-the-world-beyond-the-world. But this can only be done if being-in-the-world is no longer used as a transcendental condition of Dasein's existence, but as an actual, concrete manifestation of it. It has moved onto the ontic level. So indeed - with even greater violence to the original intention- has the business of philosophical illumination: this is now one way of being among other ways - namely that of philosophical existence. (And Binswanger wants to confine the use of the term Existenz to this one form of being).[2] Again this is a reasonable move once it has been

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1. It also comes close to meaning: 'deep down in the being of man' - a usage which Heidegger encourages by the language he uses when (of all things!) contrasting the ontological and the ontic: SuZ H 190: "Only because Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its Being, does it become possible for anxiety to be elicited physiologically". Binswanger's own implicit understanding of ontological (when used in connection with loving-being-together) betrays itself in statements such as the following: "The greater the reality of the We-ness, the greater the possibility of independence of 'me' and 'thee'". (Grundformen, p. 125) Thus here an ontological condition or state of being can obtain to a greater or lesser extent.

2. At least in the Grundformen; see pp. 468ff.

accepted that we are doing phenomenological anthropology and not ontology in the sense used by Heidegger. It is made difficult by the fact that Binswanger still uses the term ontological in reference to these ways of being, without stating that his usage is other than Heidegger's.

This brings us to Binswanger's two other (related) requirements: first to find an adequate conceptuality in which to express the developing life-histories of his patients, and secondly, to expound the basis of psychological knowledge.

As regards the first of these we have seen that he regards his daseinsanalysis as an ontic endeavour - but one which uses the categories provided for him by daseinsanalytik. In particular the term 'being-in-the-world' assumes a central role - no longer used transcendentally, but in its concrete manifestation in an individual's development. Hence being-in-the-world is said to undergo 'modification'. Now this, from Heidegger's point of view, is impossible (unless 'modification' referred to a correction of the transcendental concept). A transcendental characterisation of Dasein's being cannot receive empirical modifications! For by 'modification' Binswanger means that the actual <u>being</u> of this particular Dasein is 'modified'. The concept has been taken (to use a topographical metaphor) from the area of ontology and placed at the disposal of psychiatry within the area of the ontic.[1]

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1. This topographical metaphor describes Binswanger's understanding of the ontic-ontological distinction. It is seen as implying distinctly different levels of operation. While it does imply that for Heidegger, its greatest importance for him is found when these two elements are held <u>together</u> in such a way that the 'ontological difference' emerges, and man's being is seen for what it is: being-in-the-world

(contd.)

And the justification for this is that Heidegger's own ontology is rooted in the ontic.

One could argue for the philosophical propriety of this move by holding that in its ontic role the concept were functioning like a regulative idea of Kant's. But Binswanger wants to do more than this: he champions being-in-the-world as a concept which maintains the unity of the person, otherwise (for the purposes of science) split irrevocably into mind and body. Moreover, this being-in-the-world can itself change and be changed in the course of Dasein's existence.

But Binswanger's most fundamental reason for maintaining the ontological concept being-in-the-world for his ontic endeavour is that it does justice to his fourth requirement, namely, to expound the basis of psychological knowledge. Binswanger argues that it implies an underlying ontological unity between knower and known, such as is made manifest in loving-being-together. Here the different understanding of ontology that was implicit in the analysis of loving-being-together becomes explicit (with reference to Augustine's ontology of being).[1] Here we are working with a 'ground of being' that

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Continuation of note 1 from p. 374:

> as transcendence; Thus in Heidegger's thought the ontological and the ontic are interwoven, and the being of man emerges precisely in the contrast between them. The purpose of the distinction is the illumination of Dasein's being. For Binswanger the purpose of the distinction is to maintain different levels of operation; but because he insists on employing being-in-the-world on the ontic level it is hard to resist the conclusion that he is working with an ontological 'scale of being'.

1. See above, Chapter 8, section 4.

'I' and 'Thou' share - and we have clearly departed from Heidegger who could not possibly make such a claim about the nature of being: this 'ground of being' is an ontological foundation which is contrasted with that to which the Heideggerian analysis leads - namely, to that disclosed in the face of a man's nothingness. Here we can see how far Binswanger is still involved in traditional ontological frameworks, despite his allegiance to Heidegger.[1] (One might add that when in his later life Binswanger said that he had come to appreciate Sein und Zeit for its specifically philosophical and ontological intention, and increasingly to leave it on one side as far as psychiatry was concerned,[2] he was making a wise decision!)

In conclusion we must ask how Binswanger comes to interpret Heidegger in such a way that he can contrast being-in-the-world (with, ontologically, its close affinity to nihilism) with being-in-the-world-beyond-the-world (with its very different assessment of man's being) and still retain them both within the being of Dasein. The answer must be: he interprets both as descriptions of experiences[3] - which indeed being-in-the-world must be, if it is to be known existentielly. But for Heidegger it remains a transcendental category, employed in the service of 'transcendental ontology'.

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1. See above, this chapter, section 1.
2. See above, Part II, Chapter 9, section 3.
3. See above, Part II, chapter 9, section 3.

4. The function of ontological analysis for Bultmann's theology[1]

Turning to Bultmann, we will proceed in the same way as with Binswanger. First a summary of his aims and requirements viz-à-viz the field of ontological analysis.

(1) Bultmann needs to spell out the relationship between theology and philosophy - in particular to preserve the former's rightful autonomy.

(2) He requires an analysis of non-believing existence to which the Word of God can be addressed.

(3) He requires a conceptuality adequate to express the subject-matter of theology, namely, believing existence, in particular a conceptuality capable of maintaining the continuity between non-believing and believing existence.

As far as (1) is concerned the distinction between the ontological and the ontic is of course central: philosophical analysis is ontological, theology an ontic discipline. Theology is concerned with the explication of the significance of a given set of events for man. It is not speculation as regards the nature of being, but rather the response to an actual summons, and actual word of love. It does not surmise as to the possibility of an existence of altruistic love, but sets before a man the question how he is to respond to an actual encounter (through the Word of proclamation) with the Word, addressed personally to him. Thus it would appear that

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1. See too Part I, Chapter 2, section 2, above.

the division between the ontological and the ontic can be strictly maintained, and theology 'located' in the latter area.

In which case, can one say that ontological analysis forms the foundation for this ontic discipline? For an answer to this question we have to distinguish two elements within the Heideggerian analysis, namely, onto-logical analysis, and the philosophical search for illumination of the being of man. In so far as we are concerned with the former, Bultmann can allow the Heideggerian analysis to act as a foundation. It gives theology the essential 'existentialia' of Dasein, which must be the framework of existence to which the Word of God is to be addressed. In this sense it can clarify the concepts theology uses.

But can it provide a foundation in the strictly ontological sense of illuminating the understanding of being that informs and pervades theology on the ontic level? Here Bultmann must answer 'yes and no'. In so far as philosophical analysis of the ontological question claims to issue in an existentiell understanding of the meaning of the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world (in the face of nothingness), theology must take issue with it, and cannot use it as a foundation. For it claims that the definitive illumination of existence comes in the encounter with the divine Thou, and not in the face of one's own nothingness. At this point theology and philosophy face one another as opposing forces, operating in the same arena (of existentiell experience).

But, Bultmann would argue, here philosophy has ceased to be formal analysis of existence and has become material analysis; in other words, it is no longer drawing out the a priori ontological conditions which make up Dasein's existence. Heidegger, of course, cannot allow this, because the whole thrust and direction of his analytik, as we have seen, is towards the laying bare of the question of being. And when man is seen as 'through and through' historical, then such illumination must come within historical existence, i.e. existentielly.

And yet there is another sense in which Bultmann is prepared to accept Heidegger's philosophical analysis as a 'foundation' - namely, in a negative sense. Heidegger on Bultmann's view has taught his contemporaries (theologians and others) the futility of the old attempts at finding a foundation in terms of a constructive (metaphysical) ontological foundation.[1] As a denial of the possibility of metaphysical theology (of natural theology as a discipline which can provide ultimate answers), Bultmann accepts Heidegger's position. In this sense he can use his work as a foundation for his own. It is where that work itself suggests a possibility of the definitive understanding of man's being, within its own terms,

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1. See above, Part I, Chapter 3, p. 156.

that theology has to take issue with it.[1]

What has been said has already taken us in part into the province of Bultmann's second requirement, namely, for an analysis of non-believing existence to which the Word can be addressed. This one might describe as Bultmann's apologetic requirement. Believing existence takes place within the world of men: it has therefore to be proclaimed as a possibility for Dasein's existence - indeed as the possibility that makes sense of what is otherwise simply an amalgam of questions without answers. Hence it requires an analysis of human existence, not so much in order to speak to the essential structure of man's existence (although it must clearly have this in mind, in order to be heard at all), as to speak to man as he at any one time expresses himself. Here it is not transcendental-ontology itself that is directly required, but rather analyses of existence as it is actually played out in unbelief, which have been clarified as regards their ontological presuppositions.[2] Bultmann himself undertakes such

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1. This 'oscillating ambivalence' towards philosophy, to which I have referred before, is best illustrated in GV I 13 "On Natural Theology"; I would suggest that this essay describes Bultmann's relationship to philosophical analysis better than does his orthodox answer to the question along the lines of the ontic-ontological distinction.

2. It is at this point that there is a prima facie case for arguing for the relevance of Binswanger's analyses for theological proclamation.

analyses - but it must be remembered that these are made from within the illumination of believing existence. However, in as far as theology is to speak to unbelief, and speak in such a way that that unbelief has a 'prior understanding' of the matter of which is being spoken, it can and must make use of 'existential analyses' which are themselves atheistic; indeed, on Bultmann's view, they must be atheistic, because theological address is directed to man, who is, apart from that address, without God.[1]

We have already spoken at length about Bultmann's third requirement at the hands of ontological analysis.[2] At this point Bultmann is taking Heidegger's daseinsanalytik as precisely that, the analytik of Dasein's existence, while looking away from the direction of the argument of Sein und Zeit, namely, towards the 'ontological difference' and being itself. That is to say he is taking the central theme of Sein und Zeit (analysis of Dasein), and using it on its own, as applicable to the ontic discipline of theology. Here again he is working with the ontological-ontic distinction in order to speak of Dasein as it is ontologically, and as

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1. Cf. Bultmann's insistence that God is only present in the proclamation.

2. See above, Part I, Chapter 2, section 2.

it in fact is, ontically; i.e. he is seeking to speak of Dasein 'at different levels'. Thus an important requirement for him is to secure the continuity of existence between man under law and man in faith; conversion does not issue a man into a different world (using the term in its every-day sense), nor is the 'new' existence one which must be described purely by means of its own language; man remains 'simul justus et peccator' ('conversion' takes place again and again),[1] and theology is not the language of angels but of men. The continuity between these two ways of existing can be maintained by saying that the ontological structure of Dasein remains 'intact' both 'before' and 'after' the act of faith;[2] what has changed (and this is the theologian's real interest) is the ontic way of being; but both these ontic ways of being presuppose the ontological structure of what it is to be man.

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1. Cf. I Joh. p. 28.
2. Cf. TNT I p. 227.

5. The relationship between Bultmann and Binswanger in the light of their respective uses of Heideggerian ontological analysis

The preceding two sections have made it clear that a straightforward comparison of the thought of Bultmann and Binswanger on the basis of their common allegiance to Heidegger is out of the question. The relation of both of them to Heidegger is so complex and manifold that it is clear that no simple, unequivocal, relation can possibly obtain between them.[1]

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1. Such a comparison had already become questionable from Bultmann's side early on (see above, pp. 26ff.); his theology is not a body of knowledge in the sense in which Binswanger's psychiatry can be said to be, nor can one speak in any straightforward sense of its having a foundation (other than itself). Moreover one could well speak of the application of Binswanger's psychiatry to individual instances. Theology is not 'applied' in this sense of the application of the general to the particular. Indeed it does not consist of general truths at all. And yet because it only sees the light of day at all within the dialectic between the proclamation and the explication of the proclamation within the life of the believer (i.e. anthropologically), it is possible to draw up the content of a believer's theology. Bultmann sees his task as theologian as at least in part the drawing up of other men's theological self-expression, in such a way that it may be the medium of further communication of the proclamation. This is the intention of TNT (TNT II p. 250f.). Thus we not only have to bear in mind the intention that such theological proclamation issue in further proclamation, but also that further proclamation is only 'heard' existentielly. This in itself puts a large question-mark against theology (if it were a self-sufficient body of knowledge) as such entering into dialogue with non-theological thinking in the idea that in some way such a dialogue would be 'mutually beneficial'. If we still insist on going ahead with such a comparative study then we can only do so aright, if we bear in mind (1) the tangential nature of theological expression: it is anthropological, yet is significant because of what speaks through it, not simply as anthropological discourse, and (2) its intention in being uttered - namely, that it will issue in further confrontation with the proclamation.

For instance, Binswanger accepts the Heideggerian analytik of Dasein as a foundation at the very point at which Bultmann rejects it, namely, at the point of philosophy's claim to be able to give existentiell illumination of Dasein's being. Binswanger accepts Heideggerian ontological analysis as the essential foundation of psychiatric exploration: he can use the image of the building, with its foundation, first floor, and upper storeys.[1] Daseinsanalytik is that which brings unity to an otherwise amorphous amalgam of specialised forms of observation. In theology, on the other hand, it is not daseinsanalytik that performs the unitive function, but rather believing existence itself - albeit clarified in regard to its centrality for theology by the Heideggerian analytik of historicality.

However, what we are in fact saying is no more than that psychiatry, in its daseinsanalytical form, and theology (in its Bultmannian form) are different 'species of animal': or, to use the building image again, that they are not two semi-detached houses sharing the same foundation (as one might argue was the case with, for instance, neurology and physiology).

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1. See above, p. 164.
   - Heidegger himself uses the same image, but, characteristically, in regard to fundamental ontology (as the foundation) and metaphysics; and he stresses that the foundation determines the structure and capacity of the whole building; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p. 13f.

However, since Binswanger admits to a Heideggerian foundation for his psychiatry, including within this the possibility of philosophical illumination of existence, theology will take issue with it. This is to turn to another facet of Binswanger's intention (expressed in the Grundformen).[1] He is, as we have seen, a reluctant non-theist, at least in his psychiatric enterprise.[2] He sees in Heidegger the attempt to secularise the Christian heritage, and expressly joins this attempt. Modern man has to live without God, and modern thought - especially those disciplines which are there to interpret 'modern man' - must also be without God; at least theology, if it is to 'have a place at all' must be a terminus ad quem, not a terminus a quo.

Thus Binswanger is consciously seeing daseinsanalysis as a replacement for Christian theology (and the physician as a replacement for the priest).[3] This is one of the reasons for his insistence upon the ontological status of loving-being-together - and upon the propriety of the assertion that his was an ontologically-proceeding anthropology (embracing and at the same time broadening the insights of Heidegger). It is the ontological reference that is all-important here, when it comes to assessing the relationship of his work to Bultmann's theology. If Binswanger were engaged in an

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1. See above, Part II, Chapter 8, sections 1 and 3.

2. His half-brother, Prof. Otto Binswanger, confirmed that this also reflected his normal practice, in his own life, - in a private discussion I had with him in April 1972.

3. AVuA I Freuds Auffassung des Menschen; Needleman, p. 179.

'objectivising natural science' (to use Bultmann's language), it would be, methodologically, necessarily a-theistic[1] - but it would also make no claims to existentiell illumination. Even the ontologically-proceeding anthropology, on the basis of which Binswanger seeks to understand the worlds of his patients need not in itself claim to lead to the illumination of existence such as theology claims comes from the encounter with the Word. But where such 'creation of Gestalt' includes (within daseinsanalytical communication) the illumination of existence in an ultimate sense, as the illumination of the groundlessness of one's own ground, there theology must take issue with it: for it sees man's definitive illumination as the gift of God issuing solely from the encounter with the revelation.[2] In other words Bultmann would take issue with Binswanger at the same point and for the same reason as he would take issue with Heidegger.

To conclude this discussion: Binswanger's psychiatry, resting, as it does, on an ontologically-proceeding anthropology, cannot be seen as only an ontic discipline alongside theology (just as theology, by claiming to speak of the definitive illumination of existence, cannot at the same time claim

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1. Cf. GV IV 9, p. 115.

2. The last quotation from the Grundformen at the end of section 4, Chapter 8, above, might suggest that Binswanger was trying to preserve the boundaries between psychological knowing and philosophical illumination: but because of the kind of illumination obtaining in loving-being-together (and in being-towards-one's-ground) one must say that it claims to be definitive.

to be a purely ontic discipline). Both of them make ontological claims for themselves. In so far as Binswanger consciously attempts to found his psychiatry on a philosophical anthropology that seeks to take over the Christian theological heritage, re-interpreting it so that the specifically theological aspect of it is a terminus ad quem (thus mirroring Western society's actual view of theology - as an optional extra), in so far as he does this, Bultmann's theology is bound to take issue with it. But he would not do so on Binswanger's own terms, i.e. by arguing that theology ought to be a terminus a quo; for instance, that the study of man ought to be based on a doctrine of the created order. He takes issue with him purely by letting the proclamation be heard - i.e. on the ontic, existentiell, level.[1] Where it has not been preached, then a doctrine of philosophical illumination such as we find in Binswanger or Heidegger is simply a natural human possibility (seen theologically, a case of prior understanding, to be brought by the revelation to full authentic knowledge). Where the proclamation is heard, the concepts with which such philosophy (or 'natural theology') operates, will be fundamentally transformed. For instance, 'death' will become a transitory event, whereas it had been the

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1. This is an illustration of how thoroughly redemption-centred Bultmann's theology is: the doctrine of creation is wholly subordinate to it. - One might add here that Bultmann has no means of giving a theological interpretation of a natural event (such as the gaining of insight into one's own character or history); there is no understanding of God working unknown in the world: he is there in the revelation and nowhere else.

limiting concept, by means of which a man becomes aware of his own nothingness. But one quickly becomes aware of the complexity of the comparison between our two thinkers at this point, because of course Binswanger has himself contrasted the way of being-in-the-world which is love, and which knows of an eternity within the temporal, with Heidegger's being-in-the-world as care, resolutely anticipating its ownmost possibility, namely, death. Thus within Binswanger's own thought the Heideggerian concept of death has been robbed of its finality. And the aim of daseinsanalysis would certainly be to enable the patient, preoccupied with death, to experience the possibility of loving-being-together, in which death - and historicality - lose their centrality. But whereas in Bultmann's theology death simply becomes insignificant, in Binswanger's thought being-in-the-world as care and being-in-the-world as love remain dialectically in tension with one another, and in fact Dasein remains bound by death and limited to finite existence.

This section has considered the mutual relationship of theology and daseinsanalytical psychiatry taking both these as 'total enterprises'. In the case of the latter this has involved seeing daseinsanalysis consciously 'resting on' daseinsanalytik, which in its turn Binswanger regarded as an attempt to take over and re-interpret the Christian tradition, so that the specifically theological was left out of account (modern man being unable to 'bear' it). Taking the two disciplines in this sense they are to be seen not as 'partners' but rather as 'rivals'.

But in its strict psychiatric use, daseinsanalysis does not in fact need to claim this allegiance to an ultimately non-theistic interpretation of being. As Binswanger himself says: it can leave this issue open, and concentrate on its own task, which is the unfolding of the ways actual individuals are in-the-world. Now where it simply does this (and this is clearly Binswanger's major interest) it can still, prima facie enter into 'dialogue' with a theology that also concerns itself primarily with the existence of man. What follows in this thesis assumes this more limited role for daseinsanalysis; i.e. it does not draw out the implications of daseinsanalysis being founded on daseinsanalytik, understood as consciously non-theistic understanding of being.[1]

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1. It goes without saying that Heidegger's work need not be interpreted as being necessarily atheistic, or as excluding the possibility of theology: what Sein und Zeit is concerned with, to repeat (!), is a transcendental-ontological exploration of the horizon in which the philosophical question regarding being has to be put; but even the emergent concept of being is not necessarily atheistic; see Malet, pp. 319ff. - Bultmann himself gives a (negative, but for that reason, paradoxically positive) theological significance to Heidegger's a-theistic understanding of human existence:

> "The judgment that man's existence can be analyzed without taking into account his relation with God may be called an existential decision, but the elimination is not a matter of subjective preference; it is grounded in the existential insight that the idea of God is not at our disposal when we construct a theory of man's existence." (Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 58)

Again,

> "In the fact that existentialist philosophy does not take into account the relation between man and God, the confession is implied that I cannot speak of God as my God by looking into myself." (op. cit. p. 59)

Our question is now: can the analyses of daseins-analysis of patients' being-in-the-world be made fruitful for theology? Are they in fact the kind of analysis which theology requires in order to be able to speak to man, as he actually is? Or do they in fact exclude the possibility of theological relevance by referring to an aspect of man's existence (using the term broadly), namely his <u>experience</u>, within his inner life-history, which is of no importance to theology, concerned as this is with the categories of act and decision? These questions will accompany us throughout the rest of Part III. Where we now have to find clarity is in the use Binswanger and Bultmann make of key terms taken from daseinsanalytik. Only when we have done this will it be possible to assess the importance of the fact that both work within the distinction between the ontological and the ontic (although as we have seen, neither stick absolutely to one side of it).

6. The use made by Binswanger and Bultmann of the central concepts of Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik

We must now look at the use Bultmann and Binswanger make of the central concepts of Heidegger's analytik of Dasein: the aim of the study is to find out whether they use the same terms in the same way, so that we can move, without violating the meaning of the concepts involved, from one field to the other. To put it another way, the purpose of this study is to find out whether coincidence in the use of words is also coincidence in their meanings. In this respect we will find it necessary to distinguish Binswanger's use of particular concepts in the Grundformen, where he is doing ontological anthropology, and in his specifically daseinsanalytical studies. The concepts we are concerned with are primarily 'being' and 'existence' and the derivatives of each; but we will also find ourselves having to deal with the concepts of 'world', 'historicality' and 'anxiety'.

We will start with the word 'being' itself, 'Sein'. In so far as both Binswanger and Bultmann accept Heideggerian daseinsanalytik as ontological analysis of the being of man, while their own discipline is in each case ontic (and we have seen there are difficulties here), it is fair to say that they are working with the same formal concept of being. In the daseinsanalytik of Sein und Zeit 'being' remains a formal concept, about which nothing positive can be said except concerning the way to approach it (namely, through Dasein),

and the necessity of differentiating the question raised about it, from the question of the being of entities or existents. For both Bultmann and Binswanger, in so far as they work within their own disciplines, 'being' is a limiting concept belonging to the sphere of fundamental ontology, and thus outside their purview. For this reason it cannot be used as the 'bridge-concept' for which we are seeking, although our two authors use it in the same way. The proviso to be put against this is of course the ambiguity in Binswanger's use of the ontological in the Grundformen; in so far as he uses 'being' there in the sense of the 'ground of being' that unites 'me' and 'thee' then he is clearly using it in a sense foreign to Bultmann.[1]

If we move on to 'Dasein', we will find that Binswanger's use of the concept in his daseinsanalytical studies corresponds closely with Bultmann's; i.e. it is a general term that characterises the central 'fact' about man, namely that he is a conscious existent, one that realises that it is, and moreover that it is 'there', i.e. in a particular 'spatial contextuality'; thus it is used by both authors as the general, but correct, designation of the existent normally known, in an unclarified manner, as man.[2]

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1. See e.g. Grundformen, p. 482, and p. 696.
2. For Bultmann's use of the term see 'Die Geschichtlichkeit des Glaubens...' in Heid. und die Theol., p. 75:

> "Philosophy and theology have the same subject-matter: Dasein, but they make it their theme in different ways: philosophy, in that it makes the being of Dasein its theme, i.e. in that it investigates the formal structures of Dasein ontologically; theology, in that it speaks of actual Dasein, in as far as it believes (or does not believe - which for theology is not something negative but rather positive), in so far as its how ('Wie') is characterised by the fact that a particular proclamation has encountered or should encounter it."

Thus both authors take the concept (which of course occurs elsewhere in German thought) which Heidegger had used transcendental-ontologically, and use it in regard to actual human being on the ontic level.

For Binswanger what is most important in it, as can be seen from the intellectual route that he took to find it is that it expresses man's being as a conscious, experiencing, meaning-bestowing ego; for Bultmann its chief importance lies in its designation of man as 'there', with the implication that man has to 'make something' of this fact.

In the Grundformen this general use of the term (it occurs in the title: Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins), runs alongside a more particularised and limited use of it to describe one way of being-in-the-world, namely, that of care. Here, da-sein, 'being-there', is contrasted with loving-being-together, where the spatial implications of the term Dasein are wholly inappropriate; in loving-being-together 'I' am not 'there' over against 'thee' in another 'there'; instead we share space, create space for each other. In this sense Dasein is contrasted with 'Wirsein' (we-being). Binswanger is here asserting that human being is not always 'mine', 'yours' or 'his', but is equally importantly 'ours', and in this sense an important limitation is put on the concept Dasein, which for Heidegger is always 'mine' etc. Here, as far as transcendental ontology is concerned, Bultmann follows Heidegger;[1]

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1. For Heidegger himself, and for Bultmann, being-with-others is expressed transcendental-ontologically by the term: 'Mitsein'; but this does not exclude Dasein, nor does it mean that Dasein is not always 'mine'.

while saying that in the ontic sphere Dasein as 'mine' (looking to its 'ownmost' end) is confronted with the love of the Thou that takes away this self-centredness.

We have to conclude that when Bultmann speaks of Dasein, Binswanger will not automatically take him to mean human being in its totality. In Binswanger's own work the context makes it clear in which sense he is using the term. But the ambiguity in Binswanger's use of the term, and the fact that he puts alongside it the equally important concept 'we-being', means that it cannot form the 'bridge-concept' we require.

We come on now to the term 'Sein-können': potentiality-for-being - the term that forms the linch-pin of Heidegger's characterisation of Dasein. For Heidegger, concerned to raise the question of being in general, the stress in this term is on the last word: Dasein is potentiality to <u>be</u>, and Dasein realises that this is the case in regard to its being, precisely when facing the possibility of not-being (here the ontological-ontic distinction becomes effective). That is to say, the term expresses Dasein's freedom - freedom to choose to be, and how to be; but this not as an 'optional extra', as if it need not choose; but rather this is its being, potentiality-for-being; how it is to be is a matter of ontic decision (at least that is Bultmann's view of the matter); that it is itself potentiality-for-being is constitutive of its being. This means that historicality is also constitutive of its being, in that the ontic decisions that are made, are made in relation to its destiny, within the world of men.

Bultmann follows Heidegger closely here, but, as one would expect, the chief import of the concept lies in the centrality of the decision to be; and, in its ontic manifestation within theology, the concrete 'how', that is to be decided ontically, is seen to be being-for-the-other. Thus if one asks: potentiality-for-being in what way?, theology answers that there is only one possibility for him who hears the proclamation, namely, being-for-the-other in love.[1]

For Binswanger the stress (again, as we would expect) falls rather on the first word in the term: i.e. potentiality-to-be. Binswanger sees Dasein as potentially capable of a wide variety of ways of being in the world; in normal health Dasein operates in a great number of them at once; but in sickness these ways are narrowed down, until some of them are no longer open to Dasein at all. What then are these ways of being and how are we aware of them? In contrast to Bultmann, they are not first manifest to us in our ontic decision, but are uncovered by phenomenological analysis. In other words, the Grundformen is itself intended as the phenomenological laying bare of the various ways of being open to man, which were, so to speak, contained in embryonic form in the Heideggerian term potentiality-for-being.[2]

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1. Cf. Bultmann, "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Glaubens...", in Heid. und die Theol., pp. 89-91.

2. For an account of these ways of being see above, Chapter 8, sections 1 to 3. - One needs to repeat here that Binswanger knows that his intention is not the same as Heidegger's. He is taking an ontological term and drawing out its anthropological significance.

Binswanger speaks of Dasein's potentiality-for-being both in regard to psychotherapy,[1] and in relation to being-towards-one's-ground:

> "In questioning the mystery of my Dasein, in the authentic being-to-the-ground of being as mine, I go further and further into the possibilities of my being, and there opens up to my questioning more and more of what I could be."[2]

To summarise the relationship between Bultmann's and Binswanger's use of the term: 'Seinkönnen'. In Binswanger the centrality of decision, which is there in Heidegger's use of the term and which Bultmann has taken over, has given way to analysis of potentialities of being, without any stress any longer on the freedom that the term originally implied. Indeed Binswanger himself says that his employment of the categories of daseinsanalysis was at least in part because they enabled him to 'get behind' the question of freedom or determination.[3] At this point it is easy to see how Binswanger can then use the language of the 'unfolding' of the life-history: potentialities are developed in a process of continuity, enabling one to see the being-in-the-world of a particular Dasein as it unfolds; the realisation that man is free to be or not to be, on the other hand, has to be carried out again and again in existentiell decision. But their respective

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1. See above, Chapter 10: the goal of psychotherapy.
2. Grundformen, p. 479f.
3. See above, Chapter 9, preface.

use of this Heideggerian term also shows their use of the ontological-ontic distinction. Bultmann can stick rigidly to it, and say that the actual 'how' of being is given only ontically; Binswanger, on the other hand, derives his account of the actual potentialities open to man by means of an 'ontologically proceeding phenomenological anthropology'. At this point he does not stick to the ontic side of the distinction; (if he were to do so, how could he ensure that the ontic that he studied would provide him with the all-embracing account that he needs in order to understand his patients?).

Thus for both of our thinkers the term is of great importance. And while they interpret and use it in different ways, they both retain its centrality in the characterisation of man with which they are working. Their stress on different aspects or implications of the term highlights their different concerns and methodologies - and the different uses to which the Heideggerian analytik can be put (once it is no longer used purely in the service of the philosophy of being). It is this term which will be picked up in subsequent chapters as the bridge-concept enabling dialogue to take place between our two disciplines.

We come now to the term which is central to Binswanger's daseinsanalysis, but which plays very little part in Bultmann's thought, viz., being-in-the-world. In Heidegger's usage, this term was very closely connected with the preceding: it characterised Dasein's transcendence:[1] in order to be able to

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1. Vom Wesen des Grundes, pp. 34ff.

relate to any particular existents in the world in the way that Dasein does relate to them, namely, understanding them, Dasein must, 'in itself' be capable of relating to 'world' in general, i.e. must be able to 'project world' and in this sense to 'transcend'; in this sense, Dasein is 'being-in-the-world'. As we have seen,[1] Binswanger takes this concept from its ontological setting and uses it to characterise his patients' individual life-histories. It is particularly suitable for this precisely because it refers to Dasein's capacity to project its worlds (to transcend), and thus brings before the enquirer the patient's life as it is lived and experienced by him.[2] By analysing the temporality, spatiality, mood and 'attunedness' of a patient's Dasein, he seeks to show how the transcendental-ontological category 'being-in-the-world' has, in its ontic manifestation, been 'narrowed down' or 'modified' in this particular case. Thus he is taking a concept which originally characterised Dasein's being as such, and is using it as a hermeneutic category enabling him to explore particular ontic manifestations of Dasein's being.[3]

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1. See above, section 3, pp. 367 ff.

2. See esp. Existence, p. 301f.

3. In so far as Binswanger uses the concept hermeneutically it could be described as a legitimate use; in so far as he maintains that the being of Dasein is itself modified, rather than the way in which Dasein is in the world, he is departing from Heidegger's understanding of ontology.

One need not look far to discover why the term does not occur frequently in Bultmann's work; the reason is precisely that this is a category of transcendental ontology, and therefore the proper concern of the philosopher. Bultmann is prepared to accept Heidegger's analysis at this point: Dasein's existence is being-in-the-world; and it is to this sort of existence (and not to that of angels) that the proclamation must address itself. As theologian, however, it must be added, that he cannot, on the ontic level, simply take over this concept of 'world' as used in the transcendental-ontological term being-in-the-world. 'World' for him is the 'fallen world'; as an ontic reality, it has assumed a negative evaluation. But this ontic understanding of 'world' is only possible on the basis of Heidegger's elucidation of what it is to be in-the-world at all.[1]

As we will see[2] Binswanger also uses the concept 'world' in an ontic context, namely, where he is describing his patients' delusional experience: here 'world' is no longer that which I design or 'project', nor the way in which I authentically ec-sist in transcendence, but has become a menacing independent 'reality' over against Dasein. But his major use is the one delineated above, and in it we see again the divergent

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1. Bultmann can use 'world' in the ontological sense: cf. GV I p. 252 E: world is "the specific reality in which I live and act, my world"; see also p. 124f. above, and "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Glaubens..." in Heid. und die Theol., p. 78, where he says that the theological concept of world is only possible on the basis of the ontological one.

2. See below, Chapter 14, pp. 439 ff.

methodological approaches that characterise our two authors: Bultmann can take the ontological analysis as in a straightforward sense 'given' - and work with an ontic 'actuality', i.e. the Word that is proclaimed. Binswanger on the other hand proceeds phenomenologically and argues that in some instances of Dasein (namely the 'mentally ill') the manner of being-in-the-world is in important respects altered. His justification in doing this, to repeat, is that the ontological is rooted in the ontic.[1]

We must move on to 'existence', and here again it is necessary to distinguish Binswanger's more limited and, in his own terms, technical use of the concept in the Grundformen, from a more general use of it in daseinsanalysis itself.

To start with the Grundformen: here the term 'Existenz' is only used to refer to the authentic way of being-towards-the-groundlessness-of-one's-ground.[2] In this sense the category is not itself a historical one,[3] but is rather seen as a 'parallel' anthropological phenomenon to that of being-in-the-world (itself seen anthropologically in the Grundformen);

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1. If Binswanger's case is to be maintained (even if somewhat violently in regard to Heidegger's own intention), then the argument that theology must listen to daseinsanalysis if it wishes to speak to particular Dasein, is greatly enhanced; for it seeks to speak to Dasein as potentiality-for-being: but Binswanger's argument is that the potentiality-for-being is in these instances of being-in-the-world significantly narrowed down or modified. See below, Chapters 14 and 15.

2. See above, Chapter 8, section 3, and Grundformen, pp. 479-482.

3. Grundformen, p. 695.

seen from this point of view, Heidegger's 'Existenz' is the 'ontological boundary case'.[1] Corresponding to this usage is a use of the adjective 'existentiell' to refer to this way of being-towards-one's-ground. There is a certain departure here on Binswanger's part from the Heideggerian use of this adjective, to which Bultmann adheres very closely. For Heidegger and Bultmann[2] 'existentiell' is an epistemological term, referring to the illumination of Dasein's being which comes to Dasein in resolute decision, in the face of one's own nothingness (in the case of Heidegger), and in the encounter with the loving Thou (in the case of Bultmann).

Binswanger can speak of existentiell communication[3] where he is referring (somewhat confusingly in the light of his use of the noun Existenz in the Grundformen) to that form of communication which is possible within loving I-Thou encounter.[4] In his use of the adjective here we can conclude that he is retaining its epistemological significance, but doing so in a way that is impossible for either Bultmann or Heidegger. He is relating it to that form of knowing that is an integral part of loving-being-together; thus here it does refer to the illumination of man's being, but to that illumination which takes place in loving-being-together in direct contrast to that which pertains to being-in-the-world's

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1. See above, section 3, p. 373.

2. See above, p. 43f.

3. See above, p. 153 f.

4. The Grundformen explicitly differentiates Existenz from loving-being-together: ibid. p. 695.

resolute anticipation of its ownmost end, i.e. in direct contrast to what Heidegger describes as existentiell!

This matter is of considerable importance for our investigation, and reflects the same contrast between our two thinkers as that which we found to obtain in regard to Binswanger's strict use of the term 'Dasein' in the Grundformen, over against Bultmann's use of the concept. In each case what is at issue is Binswanger's exposition of human being as loving-being-together - as a mode of being 'on a par with' or even more 'fundamental' than being as care. Here the effect is the emergence of a different form of knowing, - and, as Binswanger insists, of knowing the being of man. But this means that the unique status given to existentiell knowing (in anticipation of one's ownmost end) in the thought of Heidegger (and taken over from him by Bultmann) no longer obtains. Such existentiell knowing, for Heidegger and Bultmann, takes place precisely at the moment at which Dasein realises that its existence 'stands before it' as something outstanding: it is to become what it is not - for its being is potentiality-for-being; this is the sense of existence as ec-sistence,[1] which (again) Bultmann takes over from Heidegger as a definitive account of the nature of that 'Da-sein' to which the proclamation is to be addressed. Binswanger, on the other hand, contrasts this mode of being as ec-sistence, with that in which nothing is outstanding, where by contrast the

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1. See esp. the quotation from Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 39, in section 2 above, p. 362, note 1.

being of man is complete as it is at the present (eternal) moment. It is totally in accord with this that for Bultmann the 'historicality' of Dasein includes the totality of his being: there is no supra-historical dimension to human life[1] - whereas in Binswanger's anthropological studies it is one dimension of human being amongst others.

If we turn to Binswanger's daseinsanalysis itself, we will find that here his use of existence is more closely in accord with that of Heidegger and Bultmann. Both Bultmann and Binswanger speak of Dasein's different forms of existence in the world - though for Bultmann, characteristically there are in the end only two forms: believing and unbelieving existence: tertium non datur! For Binswanger's use, we may take an example from Ideenflucht:

> "The half-ness and brokenness of existence, the oscillating bearing between reflexion, problems and culture on the one side, simple unproblematical self-surrender into the absence of anxiety of the festive life on the other, without being quite absorbed in either sort of life, this makes the nature of this form of Dasein what it is."[2]

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1. - although there is for Bultmann an existence, which ontically, knows no anxiety. Clearly the ontological category of Angst cannot disappear in believing existence, if this is to retain continuity with unbelief; - but Bultmann does find it necessary to say that this 'existentiale' receives a vital modification in believing existence: it is now to be denoted by the term 'joy': if one wanted to put

   > "a theological term over against the philosophical concept of Sorge (care), it would have to be the concept χαρά , which can be described as the Christian modification of Sorge, or better, of Angst."

   (Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins... in Heid. und die Theol., p. 81f.)

2. Ideenflucht, p. 121.

Thus both Binswanger and Bultmann can use the verb to 'exist' and the noun 'existence' in a straightforward manner, not very different from the common or garden usage. But, particularly in the case of Binswanger, in his actual daseinsanalysis (as opposed to his anthropological phenomenology or descriptions of his own psychotherapeutic practice etc.) the specifically Heideggerian sense of ec-sistence, of the 'projecting' or 'designing of worlds' is never far below the surface. But then (and this could well lead to confusion) such daseinsanalysis takes over the thesis of the Grundformen that Dasein also carries out its being in loving-being-together, and Dasein's potentiality-for-being in this dimension must be considered equally important, in a daseinsanalytical exploration of the whole person. Thus considerable care has to be taken in deciding in which sense Binswanger is using the term existence.

The result here is the same as with the concept 'Dasein'. In his phenomenological-anthropological studies Binswanger puts alongside what for Heidegger and Bultmann is a complete characterisation of Dasein's way of being (viz.: ec-sisting) another way of being (viz.: loving-being-together); by doing this he limits the sphere in which 'ec-sistence' obtains. To put it another way, he is seeking to show that for man as potentiality-for-being, there is another way of being besides 'ec-sistence'. Again we can see how the term 'Sein-können' must act as the bridge-concept rather than e.g. 'ec-sistence' because of the ambiguity of the latter, and the limitations put upon it by Binswanger.

In conclusion it must be said that, as when comparing Bultmann's and Binswanger's use of Heideggerian analysis as a whole, we found that no straightforward comparison was possible, the same is the case here. But on the level of particular concepts it is Binswanger's multifarious usage that makes matters complicated. However, we can say that if we want to be 'en route' between the two disciplines the following concept will be of central importance: Sein-können, potentiality-for-being. This latter concept is the point at which the differing interests of the two disciplines of theology and daseinsanalysis diverge, Binswanger to the business of spelling out Dasein's potentiality for being, in its various forms, and Bultmann, in proclaiming that in response to the Word Dasein can decide on an ec-sistence which is being-for-others. It is to a more detailed study of this way of being (loving-being-together or being-for-others) that we must now turn, for it is here that the different interpretations of potentiality-for-being make themselves most clearly manifest.

As far as use of the ontological-ontic distinction is concerned the following points must be made in summary:

(1) Both Bultmann and Binswanger are consciously 'looking away from' the original ontological direction of Heidegger's use of the distinction, which was towards the illumination of the being of Dasein. (2) Having thus changed the direction of Heidegger's distinction they now use it as if it were a topographical division, enabling them to operate on one side of a fixed boundary, namely, on the ontic side. (3) Neither

in fact manages to stay on this ontic side of the distinction: Binswanger's concern to give ontological status to loving-being-together, and his equally important concern to analyse the being-in-the-world of individuals entail his making ontological assertions; and Bultmann's claim that the proclamation illuminates man's being definitively (as being-there-for-others) at least appears to have ontological implications. However (4), the fact that they 'cross the boundary' at different points - and by different means (e.g. Binswanger by using an ontologically-proceeding phenomenological method) - ensures that the distinction cannot be used to establish the relationship between them.

CHAPTER 13

Love in the Thought of Binswanger and Bultmann

Preface

We must now turn to an analysis of the concept of love, and as we do so we must be clear as to our aim. Straightforward comparison is not enough: we want to know whether, when speaking of love they are referring to the same phenomenon, and speaking about it in the same way; whether, if this is not the case, their analyses of love are incompatible with each other; or whether they are rather highlighting different aspects of love, or alternatively referring to different phenomena (or dimensions of human being), which are both required in a total analysis.[1]

It is in the first instance theoretical interest (i.e. interest in the systematic relationship of our two disciplines) that dominates the questions; but there is a possible implication within the realm of practice, which needs to be referred

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1. The notion of a 'total analysis' is of course itself an obscurity - and one which inter-disciplinary study must face; it would seem to imply the sort of phenomenological anthropology that Binswanger engages in. For the moment, this question need not concern us, for the two conceptions of love may not highlight different dimensions of human being at all.

to now. Following the last chapter we are in a better position to ask these questions, in that we have isolated the Heideggerian concept of potentiality-for-being as an ontological category, shared by Bultmann and Binswanger, but interpreted (in its application within the fields of daseinsanalysis and theology) differently by each of them. For Bultmann Dasein's potentiality-for-being finds its (ontic) theological expression in being-for-the-other. For Binswanger, potentiality-for-being includes within it, as an ontological 'reality', loving-being-together; but - and this is the point that interests us - in some ontic instances of Dasein as potentiality-for-being, the ontic capacity for the giving and receiving of love is blunted or restricted to the point of disappearance. If (and this is where the matter is of practical importance) Binswanger is referring to the same dimension as Bultmann at all, then there is a prima facie case for arguing that the proclamation cannot be 'heard' in these cases. This would then accord with Binswanger's claim that Existenz of the type implied in Heidegger's daseinsanalytik implied health.[1] A similar problem (but with considerable complications in view of Binswanger's denial of the possibility of self-love) will be found to emerge in the overtly straightforward and fool-proof command of love: 'love thy neighbour as thyself'.

The exploration will clarify a point that we have already become acquainted with, namely that Bultmann sees loving

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1. Grundformen, p. 471.

existence as the true expression of man's historicality, while Binswanger opposes love and historicality as two contrasted dimensions of human being. It will become clear that Bultmann is staying closely within what can be loosely described as the existentialist tradition, drawing heavily on the work of Kierkegaard at this point,[1] while Binswanger reaches back to Browning, Goethe, and the Romantic tradition, while at the same time insisting that his is phenomenological analysis, 'proceeding ontologically'.

In concluding this preface, it is worth reminding ourselves of the requirements of each of our authors in regard to the concept of love. Binswanger needs to show the place and nature of love in 'normal' human life, in order to assess what has happened in pathological situations[2]; he is not concerned to propagate a particular way of life, - apart from seeking to expound the daseinsanalyst's own relation to his patient (which includes loving him). Bultmann, on the other hand, seeks a conceptuality that will adequately express his understanding of an actuality: that of self-less love, as a way of life; - not simply as a command 'out of the blue', but as itself a way of being that is man's authentic realisation of his existence as potentiality-for-being.

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1. Binswanger expressly contrasts his position with that of Kierkegaard (Grundformen, pp. 58, 128f.) on two grounds: (1) the latter's individualist-orientation; and (2) his conviction that one has first to relate to the world before one can love the Thou; Binswanger argues that it is rather the other way round: in loving the Thou, one first learns to relate to the world.

2. For instance he needs to assess the significance, within a psychological association test, of reactions such as (in regard to the word 'to love'): "something commanded, that

(contd.)

1. 'Loving'

We will begin by referring to Bultmann's commentary on St John's Gospel,[1] and in particular, to the passage where he is dealing with John 13.34.[2] The question there is what the departure of the Revealer means for the disciples; up until this moment they had been in the immediate presence of the Revealer, who 'loved his own', and was loved by them; and the conclusion could be drawn that the Revealer was establishing a relationship of intimate, direct, mutual trust and love, between himself and them. But at this point there comes the impending departure, and the consequent threat of the collapse of this relationship. And in this situation, with the disciples anxious about their continuing existence, nothing direct is said about that, but instead a 'new commandment' is given to them. Bultmann writes:

Continuation of note 2 from p. 409:

> has nothing to do with reality. One often reads about it in German literature. Has something unmanly, deceitful, conventional, about it". Or again, with regard to the noun: 'love': "a platitude, conventional lie. When someone speaks of love, I say there's no such thing, there's only transitory passion". (Schizophrenia, - the case of Jürg Zünd - p. 225, 226.)

1. It is appropriate to make Bultmann the starting-point because Binswanger sees his own account of love as (a) springing out of the Christian tradition, and (b) as being in part a reaction to the Kierkegaard-Heideggerian movement of thought, with which Bultmann closely associates himself.

2. EJ p. 403 (= EJE p. 525).

> "Those who are concerned about their being as a continuing state of being are directed into a being that has the character of an ought."[1]

That is to say: they are commanded to love one another. Here we have, very concisely, the major difference between Binswanger's concept of loving-being-together and Bultmann's understanding of Christian love. The former is a state of being, and one in which 'ought' has no place; it is a state of being as fundamental and 'primordial' as Dasein as care, but strongly to be contrasted with it; it is a state, or perhaps better a 'reality' that is 'given' to man;[2] he cannot procure it, and certainly cannot be commanded to enter into it. In loving-being-together the world of care, which is the world of ethics, of the 'ought',[3] is transcended.[4] In contrast the believer, as he enters authentic existence, is directed into an existence that is carried through under the commandment to love the neighbour.[5] Bultmann, too, can describe

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1. The English translation will not do at this point (mea culpa): I translated 'zuständliches' as 'actual' whereas the contrast is between a being, that is primarily a 'state' (Zustand), and one that is primarily an 'ought'.

2. Grundformen, pp. 96, 153, 214.

3. See above, Chapter 8, section 2. - Sadler (p. 252) argues that, from the point of view of his own - i.e. Sadler's - phenomenology at least, Binswanger's separation of love and morality is "nonsense, pure and simple".

4. Grundformen, pp. 76, 95ff.; 407.

5. Cf. Kierkegaard's discourse: "Love is the fulfilment of the law"; Works of love, tr. Swenson, London 1946; pp. 74-107.

love as a 'How of da-sein',[1] just as Binswanger can say it is a "peculiar ('eigene') way to be".[2] But whereas Binswanger's loving-being-together is phenomenologically accessible to man's contemplation (and is indeed itself a chief way of knowing at the inter-personal level), Bultmann's love as the ontic 'how of being' is not open to such scrutiny:

> "The question: what is love? can only be answered in one way, by the doing of love."[3]

For Binswanger, the category of decision is inapplicable to loving-being-together: it belongs to historicality, to the being of Dasein as care, which has to anticipate the future in resolute decision. In loving-being-together there is no anticipation of the future: there is an eternal being-together, which knows neither past nor future.

The force of Binswanger's position is seen viz-à-viz the question of the totality of Dasein: Heidegger could only 'grasp' Dasein 'as a whole', by seeing it over against its ownmost end, and thus anticipating the future; for Binswanger this is indeed an authentic way of being, but it is transcended by loving-being-together in which 'I' and 'thou' are totally present to each other now; hence he can talk of the eternity of the present now in loving-being-together.[4] But, as must by

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1. 'Ein Wie des Daseins': in "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins...", Heid. und die Theol., p. 88.

2. Grundformen, p. 54.

3. GV I p. 238. Bultmann's Kantian background is in evidence at this point.

4. Cf. Grundformen, p. 44.

now be clear, he is not content with a romantic, poetic, vision of this love, but, using the works of poets as love's own form of self-interpretation,[1] seeks to ground it phenomenologically in Dasein's ontological structure: Dasein is loving-being-together, before it is individualised as care.

Bultmann, too, can say that love is a particular understanding of the unitedness of the I and the Thou,[2] but in so far as it needs an ontological grounding, this is in the Heideggerian category of care.[3] This means that for Bultmann love is demanded of the individual; but this should not be taken to imply that Bultmann's thought remains emprisoned within a monad-like individual self-sufficiency; on the contrary, as we have seen, the individual finds his authentic

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1. Was he aware of the attack Kierkegaard made on such poetic love? See Works of Love, pp. 38ff. and p. 48: "this love stands or falls" on the poet's understanding of it.

2. "Das Christliche Gebot..." GV I p. 235:

   > "Love, defined formally, is therefore an acting guided by a particular (namely, loving) understanding of the unitedness of I and Thou."

3. "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins..." in Heid. und die Theol. p. 79. - Bultmann can of course also have recourse to the notion of 'Mitsein', as a further transcendental ontological characterisation of Dasein. Binswanger's dislike of Heideggerian daseinsanalytik at this point may be the result of his tendency to regard transcendental-ontological analysis as referring directly or mainly to ontic realities. This is at least how Heidegger himself would counter-argue; cf. Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 35:

   > "Only because Dasein as such is determined by self-hood, can such a thing as an I-myself relate to a Thou-thyself. Self-hood is the presupposition for the possibility of I-hood, which always only discloses itself in the Thou. But self-hood is never in relation to Thou, but, because it makes all that possible, and in contrast to I-being and Thou-being (not to speak of sexuality), is itself neutral."

existence precisely in this turning to the Thou; in this movement he finds the illumination of his existence.

But - and this is the next important point - Bultmann's concept of love remains fundamentally theological: i.e. God remains the "middle-term". Here the influence of Kierkegaard is pronounced and the divergence from Binswanger equally pronounced. Kierkegaard had written:

> "Worldly wisdom believes that love is a relationship between man and man; Christianity teaches that love is a relationship between man - God - man, that is, that God is the middle term."[1]

For Bultmann, God is the middle-term in all loving, in that our love is the response to the total, and completely trustworthy love of God for us, a love which meets us in the actuality of the forgiveness of sins.[2] Thus our love for each other is and remains grounded in God's love for us;[3] it is thus fundamentally other than loving-being-together such as Binswanger describes, in that this latter is expressly devoid of any theological 'middle-term'. Nor does it require ontological status, as Binswanger has to argue; it does not require this, because it is grounded in a historical event, which gives it an actuality that ontological analysis cannot 'match' (and

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1. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 87. In Bultmann, see EJ p. 405 (= EJE p. 528); the 'middle-term' is a central motif in Kierkegaard's work: cf. ibid. pp. 48, 87, 91, 99 etc.

2. GV I "Das christliche Gebot...", p. 241ff. (ref. to John 13.34; 15.12; I John 2.7,8).

3. See esp. Bultmann's exposition of the footwashing in EJ.

it is this actuality that Bultmann requires, if he is to do justice to the fact[1] of the proclamation). In Binswanger's understanding on the other hand, the two lovers love each other in each other, not via anything else, nor for the sake of anything at all.[2]

At this point we can stop for a moment and take stock: several factors have now emerged in greater clarity. First, both theologian and daseinsanalyst are concerned to maintain the irreducibility of love - Binswanger, in the first instance, over against Freud,[3] and Bultmann, in that (seen from the point of view of faith) it is the one possibility open to Dasein as potentiality-for-being. But they do so in very different ways. To take Bultmann first: His reason for retaining the centrality of the concept of historicality in relation to love is now clear: human love is grounded in God's act of love for men in the event of the revelation: this divine 'act' takes place within the realm of the historical; it is thus as a historical being that man relates to it. On the other hand, to turn to Binswanger, who clearly

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1. Cf. 'the Dass', see above, p. 54.

2. Grundformen, pp. 114ff. - There is also a complete reciprocity in loving-being-together, which, Binswanger argues, differentiates his understanding from any that might be based on the Heideggerian analysis of concernfully being-there-for-others; the being-there-for-others can still apply - and indeed in the Christian concept of love applies precisely - where there is no reciprocity. - Of course Binswanger admits that in the special matter of the psychotherapist's love for his patient, there is no necessary reciprocity (see above, p. 153).

3. See above, Chapter 8, section 1, p. 253.

has to 'look away from' any such revelatory act in which to ground his own concept of love, we can see that for him its irreducible status will be best maintained by arguing for it as an ontological constituent part of human being - and the bedrock on which his argument stands is the transcendental-ontological understanding of Dasein as potentiality-for-being. But having to his own satisfaction established its ontological status, he can claim that it is a more exalted view of love than the theological, because it is love purely for the sake of the lovers.

It can also be seen here, how, at this level of the comparison or 'dialogue', Binswanger's thought deliberately takes issue with that of theology (though not of course consciously with that of Bultmann); thus the two disciplines, between which we seek to be 'en route', are in themselves not indifferent to each other.[1]

But it also becomes clear that they are in fact referring, at least in part, to different dimensions of human experience; the question is then: where they are not correcting or reformulating one another's positions (and this refers mainly for Binswanger in relation to Bultmann), can they each disregard the areas of human experience to which the other refers, and still claim to be working with an adequate concept of love? To make this specific: can phenomenological anthropology look away from the dimension of the moral and the 'ought' (agreeing that methodologically it must look away from the specifically

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1. See above, Chapter 12, section 5.

theological matter of the revelation-event - and also that daseinsanalysis itself refrains from moral judgments) and still give a full account of the human experience of love? And conversely, can Bultmann ignore the dimension of receptivity and reciprocal abiding in one another's love, to which Binswanger refers?

To answer the second question first: if Bultmann is to remain true to the subject-matter of theology as he sees it, namely, man in relation to the revelation event in the historical encounter with Jesus of Nazareth, then he cannot 'import' insights gained from elsewhere (in this case from phenomenological anthropology) to supplement the knowledge that is accessible to faith within the revelation event itself. That is the precise point of the quotation with which this section started:[1] man, who seeks to continue and secure his love-relationship, is re-directed into another dimension of love, namely, love-for-the-other, regardless of reciprocity. And, in so doing, the search for security as regards love, is transformed into resolute loving action towards the neighbour. (Bultmann would go on to say that Binswanger's search for ontological status for love is an instance of that search for security of which metaphysics was a supreme example, and which Heidegger has taught man to live without.)[2]

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1. See above, p. 411.

2. See above, p. 122. - The question still remains, whether love is seen ontologically or not, as to whether the man who has not received love in Binswanger's sense can be-there-for-the-other in Bultmann's sense.

To answer the former question (in relation to Binswanger): we can agree with Sadler[1] that Binswanger was "guilty of over-simplifying morality and ethics, putting it all on one plane or in one form of encounter". In other words, the moral dimension to life cannot be kept apart from the realm of love, as if it had no place there. But the issue is not so much whether morality has a place there, as whether the will does; this category, which is of central importance to Bultmann, does not play a large part in the subject-matter dealt with in the Grundformen. However, in the matter of the psychotherapist's relation to his patient (one of love), the activity of the will is implied. Such a relationship is described as a risk - a risk to be undertaken for the sake of maintaining the unity of human being;[2] the relationship is one in which the psychotherapist 'risks' his existence. Now here the will is clearly active - but is it responding to an 'ought'? That is to say, we are still left with the question: why risk your existence, in the psychotherapeutic relationship? And the implicit answer is: for the sake of love transcending care.[3]

We can now proceed in our investigation of love; as far as Bultmann is concerned, it shows itself in its greatest purity "in the preparedness to forgive. In forgiving, the radical turning-round of self-love is most clearly efficacious".[4]

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1. Sadler, p. 252.
2. See above, Chapter 8, section 4.
3. See above, Chapter 8, section 1.
4. "Das christliche Gebot..." GV I p. 244.

Here we find another major divergence from Binswanger and affinity to Kierkegaard. For the latter, the Christian commandment to love is summed up in the words: 'love thy neighbour as thyself'.[1] Here it is presupposed that a man loves himself, and the ground is thereby removed from under the feet of those who suggest that they cannot fulfil the commandment because they do not know what it is to love: the question is whether they love themselves aright; and this they will only do if they love God, for

> "the Christian conception is: truly to love one's self is to love God; truly to love another man is by every sacrifice (even to oneself being hated), to help the other man to love God or in loving God."[2]

Now at this point one needs to distinguish all three thinkers with whom we are at the moment concerned from each other. Kierkegaard knows of an authentic self-love (which is in the end love of God); in this sense he stands firmly within the Christian tradition which Binswanger criticised by reference to Augustine; self-love on this view (of Binswanger's) was only possible on a theistic basis - for one loves oneself

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1. And nowhere does this commandment speak more directly to man than in the business of forgiving; for it is there that one gives up one's own claims and rights, and natural self-love. To forgive another is to apply one's will primarily to oneself: to let one's own rights and self-understanding to be of no account, so that one can be there for the other. Bultmann refers to Kierkegaard (Works of Love, pp. 15ff.) expressly at this point: Jesus, p. 100 (= Jesus and the Word, p. 86).

2. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 93.

as God's creation. Without the notion of creation, there is no Thou in the self that can be loved; one can therefore only relate to the groundlessness of one's own ground. But Kierkegaard also knows of an inauthentic self-love and it is at this level that Bultmann takes up Kierkegaard's exposition of the command: love thy neighbour as thyself. It is hard to see how, within Bultmann's theology, there can be an authentic self-love, viz., an authentic being-there-for-oneself, except paradoxically, in that this is precisely found when one is there-for-the-other.[1] However as far as Bultmann is concerned we are thinking of self-love in its straightforward, non-theological sense of care or concern for oneself rather than for others, an orientation of one's life and self-understanding round oneself, typified in the life of boasting and achievement.[2] This on his view is a 'natural fact' in the life of the 'natural man'; thus when the commandment to love says 'as thyself', it speaks to that which man knows at first hand.

Now this sort of (self-) love is not love at all, in the eyes of Binswanger: it is rather concern, and belongs to the diametrically opposed way of being, namely, being as care, so that he can interpret the commandment as an ethical command, belonging to the proper sphere of ethics, which is that of the 'world' of care. But taken on this level a problem arises with specific reference to the relevance of daseins-analysis for theological proclamation. The commandment:

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1. This is an example of the extent to which the traditional doctrine of creation has receded in Bultmann's thought.

2. See above, Part I, Chapter 2, section 4.

'love thy neighbour as thyself' presupposes a common 'world' shared by both; i.e. it presupposes that a man understand himself as living within the same 'world' as that of those around him, with the same standards and points of reference obtaining in each. But daseinsanalysis shows how the 'world' or 'worlds' of the mentally 'ill' are different from the worlds of those who are 'normal'. It is not the case that the man who thinks that all around him are persecuting him will in fact be able to love them as he loves himself, if he simply tries the harder. There is a prima facie argument, to which theology has to listen, that the transformation in the patient's 'world' makes such a commandment impossible to fulfil, or even meaningless. Furthermore there may well be cases where patients do not in fact love themselves in the way indicated. In such cases, Binswanger can argue (again on the basis of the category of 'Sein-können') that being-there-for-the-other is not a possibility within the potentiality-for-being of this particular Dasein.[1]

Two further points need to be made: first, the emphasis that Bultmann places on forgiveness is, Binswanger admits, a difficulty for non-theistic accounts of love. Psychology, - and, with characteristic honesty in regard to the impoverishment secular man faces without theology, he would include his own daseinsanalysis and anthropological studies at this point -, psychology finds the notions of repentance, forgiveness, and reconciliation peculiarly inaccessible to it; and one suspects that the reason is precisely that these involve an act of will,

1. See in particular case study 2, below, Appendix.

the motivation for which (on Binswanger's terms) can only be the assertion (itself something foreign to loving-being-together) of the transcendence of love over care. All that he in fact says, again with characteristic honesty, is that their actuality is confirmed by life's experience, time and time again.[1]

Secondly, Binswanger's love is essentially exclusive: there is a completeness and ultimate self-sufficiency in the being-together of I and Thou; friendship is considered only a partial form of loving-being-together precisely because it is shared between more than two. For this reason Kierkegaard had said of 'worldly love' that if it had a 'middle-term' this would have to be 'partiality', whereas Christian love was love for the neighbour, which, as he points out, is the most prosaic and egalitarian word that could be chosen.[2] Christian love thus cuts across all natural associations of men.[3]

In conclusion attention must be drawn to the fact that Bultmann expressly terms his love 'agape', as one would expect, and Binswanger his 'eros'[4] - though it needs to be stressed that Binswanger's central purpose is to show that 'eros' is more than libidinal instinct, more than a feeling or affect, that it is rather an irreducible structural element in Dasein.[5]

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1. Grundformen, p. 173.
2. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 43.
3. Bultmann, EJ p. 405 (= EJE p. 527f).
4. Bultmann: "Das christliche Gebot..." GV I.
   Binswanger: Grundformen, I A passim.
5. Bultmann regards 'eros' - in strict contrast to Binswanger's account of love - as an individualistic concept:
   "Ἔρως is already distinguished from ἀγάπη in that ἔρως does not mean primarily the relation to the Thou".
   Bultmann, ibid. p. 237.
   Indeed Bultmann regards man's natural inclination, in the normal direction of his life, to be towards the "loosing of I from Thou, at the establishing of I over against Thou" (ibid. p. 238).

CHAPTER 14

Healing and Salvation in the Thought of Binswanger and Bultmann

Preface

Our exploration (in this third Part) has so far concerned itself with three major areas of the relationship between Binswanger and Bultmann. We began by considering the activities of psychiatrist/daseinsanalyst and theologian/preacher of the Word, and brought our comparison to a climactic conclusion by asking whether it was possible for one man to operate in both these ways at the same time, in regard to one person. The analysis showed the difficulties (in regard to 'role') facing such a proposition.

The second major area of comparison (Chapter 12) concerned their relation as it emerged from the recourse each had to the philosophical analysis of Heidegger. Thus here our concern was with the subject-matter of philosophy. Our conclusions here were that the two disciplines were so different in aims, structure, and relation to daseinsanalytik that a comprehensive comparison of the subject-matter of each, taking both '*in toto*' was impossible. A more constructive approach was found to be to take major ontological concepts that each

used and to ask whether any of these were used in the same way by both men, and in such a way as to 'anchor' other concepts that might then be compared. Here we found that the concept of 'Sein-können', potentiality-for-being, though used differently by both men, held a central position in the thought of each such as would enable us to use it as a basis for the comparison of further aspects of their thought. It was the different usage by both men of the same concept, along with their mutual acceptance of its transcendental-ontological status in the thought of Heidegger, that made it potentially fruitful.

Their respective uses of this concept (itself central with daseinsanalytik) illustrated the different methodologies with which they approached Dasein as potentiality-for-being, and also their different application of the ontological-ontic distinction. We found that Bultmann could stay closer to the Heideggerian use of this latter distinction (at least as far as it concerned the relation of ontological philosophy to the 'ontic' disciplines), insisting that theology, while not empirical, was certainly ontic. Theology was therefore dealing with the exposition of one way of being (which it claimed to be the way of being), which was ontically presented to it, in the historical actuality of the proclamation and the events to which this referred.

Binswanger, on the other hand, wishing to utilise the daseinsanalytik as the proper basis for his own understanding of the essential ways his mental patients were in-the-world,

felt himself justified, first, in spelling out phenomenologically what was involved in 'Sein-können', while not thereby removing from Dasein its potentiality, in fact, ontically, to be something 'new'. And secondly, he felt himself justified in the daseinsanalysis of individuals to show how, in its ontic expression in particular instances, Dasein as potentiality-for-being was narrowed down or 'modified' so that certain ways of being were in fact excluded from the possibilities open to it. In this sense, while being an ontic discipline, it was, in its own intention, so to speak, closer to the ontological than was Bultmann's theology, claiming to be heard before the latter, in regard to particular instances of Dasein.

We thus found ourselves pressing on towards an exploration of these particular instances to which daseinsanalysis referred.

However, before doing that, it was necessary to go a step further on the systematic level, and clarify the systematic relationship which was beginning to emerge (bearing in mind the difficulties about any total comparison, concept for concept), on the basis of the concept 'Sein-können'; and the first concept requiring elucidation in this respect was love, itself Bultmann's one ontic possibility for Dasein as potentiality-for-being. Again we found that, when allowing the intention of each author to stand in its own right, there was a claim being made by daseinsanalysis that the proclamation (in so far as it included a demand to love) would in certain cases be incapable of being 'heard'.

We come now to conclude the theoretical and systematic comparison of the two disciplines by exploring their inter-relation as this emerges in relation to the concepts 'healing' and 'salvation'. Here are two concepts central to the subject-matter of each discipline, which are however as yet quite undefined in their relationship to each other.

As in the case of love, we can base our exploration on the concept of 'Sein-können'. For Binswanger 'healing' (which we will define more closely below)[1] is concerned with the restoration to Dasein of the fullest possible extent of its potentiality-for-being. For Bultmann, salvation is concerned with the restoration to man of the authentic way-of-being, in which his potentiality-for-being is in fact, ontically, fully realised. Following our previous line of investigation, our supposition will be that there will be cases where Binswanger's 'healing' is a precondition for the 'hearing' of the proclamation, in response to which authentic life (salvation) is to be found. But before we jump to this conclusion we need to repeat the questions we have asked before: are they speaking of the same thing, when they are referring to healing and salvation respectively (there is a prima facie case for saying they are, in that Bultmann sees salvation occurring within the realm of - a new - self-understanding)? If not, what is the relation of the one to the other? Again, when they speak of that from which salvation is to be sought, or that which requires healing (i.e. in their analyses of unbelieving existence and of 'broken', 'modified' existence) are they speaking of the same thing, or, if not, what is the relation of the one to the other?

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1. See below, p. 449 f.

Both these concepts, healing and salvation, imply an understanding of the question: what is the good for man?, and conversely, an understanding of what the 'evil' is, from which man requires healing or deliverance. We will therefore begin our exploration by looking at the understanding of 'the good' and 'the evil' in both our thinkers (section 1).

In both Bultmann and Binswanger we will find that 'understanding' plays a central role in 'healing' and 'salvation', and we will therefore look for the final time at the role 'understanding' plays in the thought of each in conjunction with the exposition of their treatment of healing and salvation (section 2).

A further issue will emerge during the course of the exploration, namely, the relation between particularity and universality in respect of the statements of theology and daseinsanalysis. Put briefly the position is this: daseinsanalysis focusses on the uniqueness and particularity of the being-in-the-world of a Dasein - but does so on the basis of a shared human being, common to all men. The proclamation issues man into a universally applicable dimension, namely that of being-there-for-the-other; - but does so on the basis of the transformation of the self-understanding of the individual in a way that is unique and peculiar to the individual. The chapter will end by looking at this contrast, thus opening up the way for the discussion in the next chapter of the relevance of daseinsanalytical and psychopathological judgments concerning particular forms of mental illness for a theology proclaiming the same message to all men, whatever their actual condition.

1. The good and the evil in the thought of Binswanger and Bultmann

Binswanger has himself made it clear that the judgments of medicine, and in his case of psychopathology, are biological value-judgments[1] - and furthermore that biological judgments are themselves teleological.[2] Thus his work as psychiatrist, concerned with the diagnosis and prognosis of mental conditions, itself involves both the understanding of a goal for human life (if only on the level of the harmonious functioning of the mental and physical organism) and an appreciation of the values held by any particular society to constitute 'health'. But as we have seen, his psychiatry concerns itself in daseins-analysis with the life-history of the individual as well as with his mental and physical organism, and he can speak of the movement of a life-history as on the one hand appropriate, and on the other, of its 'coming to grief'[3], of Dasein finding itself in a dead-end.[4] This kind of judgment also implies an underlying understanding of what is the good for man, and conversely,

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1. See above, pp. 186 ff.
2. See above, p. 162.
3. Cf. the title 3FMD: Three forms of unsuccessful ('missglückten') Dasein.
4. See above, p. 149.

what the evil.[1] Thus if we are seeking to understand Binswanger's concept of healing we must first enquire into his underlying understanding of the good.

As far as the theologian Bultmann is concerned, it should not need arguing that we need to enquire into the understanding of good and evil that informs his work. As we have seen, theology 'runs' on axes of this sort: life - death; light - darkness; good - evil. It is more explicitly concerned with these concepts implying value than is psychiatry. However, if we are to be clear concerning Bultmann's treatment of 'salvation' we need again to look at what on his view is the good, and what the evil, for man.

To take Binswanger's understanding of the good (the '<u>bonum</u>') first: it will by now be clear that for him to be fully human means to know (at first hand) the superiority of the realm of love over the realm of care; here Dasein is being-in-the-world-beyond-the-world,[2] and this form of being is the focus or central point of all human being, where

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1. This is not to deny that daseinsanalysis as such, i.e. the understanding of the 'sick' man as fellow human being, abstracts from all value judgments and simply looks at the development a particular life-history has taken; but as soon as it asks about healing, it is employing its concept of the good.

2. Cf. Grundformen, pp. 107, 114, 124, 218, 265. His favourite quotation in this respect is from Elizabeth Barrett-Browning:

   "Yet still my heart goes out to thee...ponder how...
   Not as to a single good, but to all my good."

   Sonnets from the Portuguese, XXXIV, translated by Rilke as:

   "Mein Herz geht hin zu dir nicht wie zu einem,
   Nein, wie zu allem, was ich Güte heisse."

   Quoted in Grundformen, p. 107, as of fundamental importance for the development of Binswanger's argument.

Dasein's potentiality-for-being is fully realised. It is here, for Binswanger, that the meaning of human life can be found - precisely in the movement in which love transcends care. In loving-being-together nothing remains outstanding; here human life finds its fullest possible fruition, and expectation its fullest possible fulfilment. This is the 'good' as far as human being is concerned. Indeed one can describe it as itself the 'summum bonum', the totality of the good. And in so far as Binswanger consciously sees his own ontological anthropology as being the (albeit in some respects unworthy)[1] inheritor of the Christian tradition, we can legitimately say that loving-being-together is the content of his secularised (presentative) eschatology. Furthermore that 'eschatology' (the 'eternal' state of loving-being-together) transcends - 'overcomes' - 'history' (the always inconclusive movement of human Dasein as ec-sistence within temporality).[2] Thus we find in Binswanger's thought no concept of a future '<u>bonum</u>' towards which society is moving, nor indeed does the '<u>bonum</u>' have any societal reference or relevance: it is rather the place where, or the dimension in which, I find myself precisely as I find and am found by thee.

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1. See above, Chapter 8, section 1.

2. Binswanger's insistence on the 'purity' of loving-being-together, as a phenomenologically accessible 'Grundform' of human Dasein may be linked with his insight into its role in relation to human being as care: he gives it (to speak theologically) a 'redemptive' function: it is to transform or 'redeem' the world of care. Thus his insistence on its separation from e.g. the world of morality, should not be taken to imply that these areas are in fact separate from one another; on the contrary they are intertwined: what matters is that love transcend, transform, redeem, care.

If we turn to Bultmann we find that here too any notion of a future '<u>bonum</u>' towards which society is moving is missing: his eschatology too is a presentative one: the <u>eschaton</u>, the κρίσις , is to be carried through in respect of each individual (precisely as that individual stands alone before God).[1] There is no future eschatological culmination of world history still to come[2] (at least, if there is, it is not the concern of faith); there can be nothing more for man, in the future, than that which has already been given, namely, the love of God.[3] This is itself 'the good' for man: the love of God encountered in the revelation, such as issues him into the authentic way of existing: being-there-for-the-other. This 'good' is to be contrasted from all the goals that man sets himself: it is only available as gift from God. Thus it calls forth man's hostility, by denying to man any natural capacity to achieve for himself that which he most desires, viz., 'life' in the sense of authentic existence. Indeed such hostility is inevitable

> "if the good is understood not as a gift of God, but as the goal of man's efforts in which he realises himself".[4]

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1. Cf. GV II p. 242 (= Essays p. 269).
2. Cf. GV III 7 p. 99.
3. Cf. esp. EJ pp. 357ff. (= EJE pp. 469ff.).
4. EJE p. 388f.

The Revealer, who brings the gift, is described as the Good Shepherd;[1] and the gift is received only in the hearing of the proclamation. Thus here, precisely in conjunction with theology's account of the good for man, we find its fundamental intolerance;[2] it asserts that only here is God present, and only here is salvation possible. Only in the Revealer is the light finally, definitively, present.

We can turn now to Bultmann's and Binswanger's understanding of the 'evil' from which man is to be saved, or in regard to which healing must take place. And in comparing their analyses we can answer some of the questions which have concerned us implicitly throughout: are Binswanger's analyses of psychopathological conditions (and of those conditions 'bordering' on the psychopathological, e.g. of 'Manieriertheit') speaking of the same thing as Bultmann's expositions of unbelieving existence? And if not, are they qualitatively, or only quantitatively,[3] different? Can either make use of the other's categories and analyses for their own purposes of theology or daseinsanalysis?

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1. EJ p. 276ff. (= EJE pp. 363ff.).

2. The exposition of the Revealer as the Good Shepherd is also the exposition of the finality and exclusiveness of Christ: see EJ pp. 286ff. (= EJE pp. 375ff.). - It is worth noting that we have again here that separation of the revelation from the person of the proclaimer that we have spoken of before (see above, Chapter 11, pp.338f.): in the revelation
   > "there can be no tolerance. But of course it is the revelation which is intolerant; men can only be tolerant of each other. Indeed, in so far as men are required to uphold the intolerant claim of the revelation, it is principally against themselves that it is directed. The intolerance of the 'homo religiosus' and the dogmatician is not the intolerance of the revelation."

   Ibid. (EJE) p. 379.

3. By 'quantitatively different' I am referring to the possibility that the phenomena to which Bultmann refers may be (contd.)

We will begin with Bultmann. But first a general thesis: Bultmann's theological descriptive statements refer primarily to all unbelief, and only secondarily to the actual individual whose existence is at the moment under consideration. Binswanger's daseinsanalytical account of a life-history of an individual refers primarily to that unique individual, and only secondarily, by phenomenological 'abstraction' to a particular form of being-in-the-world, that may present itself more or less frequently.[1]

Thus the theologian is not concerned with the autobiography of any individual as such; this, on Bultmann's view (and Binswanger would largely agree), is the business of the psychologist. Indeed it is one of Bultmann's major concerns to overcome the kind of NT interpretation that contented itself with the psychological explanation of the particularities of the personalities referred to.[2] Such interpretation would only be of interest if we were directly concerned with character studies of the saints; but Bultmann knows of no life by imitation, that can be called authentic. Theology is only concerned with individuals in so far as they have been confronted with the revelation, and express the same in their new

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Continuation of note 3 from p. 432:

only different in degree from those to which Binswanger is referring.

1. As for instance 3FMD, e.g. 'Manieriertheit'.

2. Cf. the familiar character studies of e.g. Peter; or the interpretation of Rom. 7.7-25 in terms of Paul's personality and conversion experience.

self-understanding.[1] Thus Bultmann's interpretation does not remain on the level of the subjective experiences of individuals, but rather seeks to illuminate the way of existing that issues in the variety of subjective experiences, i.e. to illuminate, as Bultmann says, the 'Tendenz' or 'direction' of the existence of man.[2] Thus Rom. 7.7-25 is only indirectly concerned with Paul's own autobiography: what Paul is seeking to do, is to lay bare the essential nature of the life of the natural man, i.e. unbelief (which was indeed his own life in the past). And Paul's interpreter must do the same. There is therefore a necessary looking away from the factual details of the past, and a drawing out of the 'existential Tendenz' of such a life, which really applies to all men in their natural existence. This is of course seen from the standpoint of their encounter with the revelation, and is regarded as an account of 'what is <u>really</u> the case' in the life of the natural man at all times. Hence the revelation is the hermeneutic instrument that allows theology to see 'what is really happening'; in other words, theology's concept of truth derives from - and is dependent upon - the revelation. It sees man in his search for definitive self-understanding, placed before

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1. NB (again) theology's concern is with people in so far as they speak not of themselves, but of God.

2. See esp. Exegetica, pp. 198-209; for 'Tendenz' cf. ibid. p. 202:

   "θέλειν (Rom. 7.15) is the trans-subjective direction (Tendenz) of human existence in general."

the absolute contrasts of light and darkness, life and death etc.[1] Thus theology concerns itself with man's ultimate destiny, rather than with the penultimate issues of which Bonhoeffer spoke.[2] Nor is it possible for theology to see that part of man's life which is past as a gradual unfolding, or growth, of a personality:[3] it sees it either as belief (in which case it says nothing about it) or as unbelief, either as sin or grace - and it does so because its viewpoint is strictly that of faith. Faith can and must expound what happens in unbelief; indeed only by becoming aware of the truth about unbelieving existence can faith overcome it.[4] But it only learns the truth about unbelief in opening itself to the word of forgiveness and acceptance offered to it.

If one then asks why faith cannot give a positive exposition of the believing existence that is now past, as it can of unbelief, one is thereby showing that faith has been improperly conceived. There is no tarrying in past experiences of faith,[5] nor has faith any interest in the affective or cognitive content of particular religious experiences.[6] Descriptions of such experiences are of course possible; they are not mystically ineffable, but simply not the business of faith. When faith speaks of believing existence, its

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1. See above, Chapter 12, section 1.
2. Letter and Papers from Prison, Fontana, 1953, p. 92.
3. GV III 4 Humanismus und Christentum, section 3.
4. See above, p. 91f.
5. Cf. EJ p. 448 (= EJE p. 581f.) and I Joh. p. 22, 28.
6. Cf. EJ p. 446 (= EJE p. 578).

interest is on that which makes that existence possible, i.e. on the revelation, or encounter with the Word of God. But of course where faith speaks of unbelief (our present concern), it is concerned, by definition, with existence apart from God, or in explicit rejection of the revelation; but (to make the point quite clear) when it speaks of this, it speaks from the standpoint of faith. If one then asks: does this mean that faith - or theology - has no interest in descriptions of unbelieving existence made outside faith, i.e. by non-belief?, the answer must be two-fold: first: theology is concerned to get to know the 'world' etc. of unbelief; indeed, it needs to know the specific forms of self-understanding that pertain in the case of those to whom it would speak - for otherwise the proclamation could not be 'heard'. But, secondly, it must consider such expressions of unbelieving existence by unbelief to be only a prior understanding of the same, to be brought into full clarity in the encounter with the revelation.

As an example of this we may refer to the notion of anxiety: here is a concept used both ontologically (as an existential of Dasein) and ontically (in the existentiell illumination of Dasein's being in the face of its own nothingness) by non-belief. But when theology takes over the concept it asserts that anxiety is in fact sin:

> "But what is the real crux of sin? What is it if sin is unresponsiveness towards the future? It is dread[1]

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1. I.e. 'Angst'.

> - the dread of the man who is unwilling to surrender to what is a mystery to him, and who wishes to cling on to himself. It is dread of God and so revolt against God."[1]

Here we see the existential notion of anxiety interpreted within the framework of theology: this existential anxiety, which, on the 'level' of ontology, brings to light Dasein's capacity to decide to live authentically, is seen ontically to issue in 'closed-up-ness' against the future; but for theology, the future consists of God's call to Dasein to live authentically, i.e. to be there-for-the-other; thus closed-up-ness is a turning away from God, and is thus sin.[2]

If one then asks how such a state of affairs is possible for man, the answer can only be in terms of his capacity for self-deception. Rom. 7 makes it clear that man wants authentic existence (he aims at life: this is his goal; he recognises it as 'the good' for him), but that in searching for it and attempting to procure it, he inevitably loses it; for it cannot be grasped hold of by effort or achievement. Because man knows this, his unbelief must be described as self-deception, as in fact the ψεῦδος.[3] Such a way of life purports to be a positive way of being, capable of achieving life, whereas it is in fact a negative, a nothing, and must therefore in the end

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1. Essays, p. 81 (GV II 4).

2. See above, p. 69. For a fuller account of Bultmann's analysis of unbelieving existence, see the whole of that section (Chapter 2, section 4).

3. Cf. EJ p. 243.

be described as self-deception. Thus just as God is the reality for man, presenting him with the possibility of life so the Devil is that deceitful reality that is in fact nothingness, leading to inauthentic existence and death.[1]

In conclusion it must be repeated that this analysis applies to all unbelief, and not to some people more than others. Because it claims to be universally applicable, theology must look away from the changing and infinitely variable characteristics of the personalities of those with whom it has to do, and, for the same reason, must dwell on the demand that, to make sense at all, must apply equally to all.

If, turning to Binswanger, we ask in what 'evil' for him consists, the answer in general terms will be that it is '<u>privatio amoris</u>', 'love' being 'the good'; he deliberately refrains from assessing mental illness in terms of evil, though he is prepared to say that an existence like that of Ellen West is an example of the tragic.[2] But, and here he is

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1. Bultmann speaks of the 'deceitful reality' that is the Devil, deceitful because it is in fact nothing. "It is because of this nothingness that the ψεῦδος kills, because it robs the man who imagines it is real of his own authenticity"; EJE p. 321, on John 8.44. See also I Joh. p. 25:

   "If ἀλήθεια denotes the authentic reality, ψεῦδος is the inauthentic, the unreal, the nothing, indeed ultimately, death itself."

   Cf. Exegetica, p. 208.

2. See above, p. 290.

at one with Bultmann,[1] he has no understanding of e.g. an organic deteriorating process of mental illness as itself something to which the category 'evil' could be applied - though it is certainly something which it is the physician's duty to combat with all his skill. And, as we have seen, the first thing the mental physician has to do, is to understand the life-history of the patient before him: it is this which requires a change of direction, in so far as this is still a possibility for the particular Dasein concerned. But this means that his interest is in this particular Dasein and the 'modifications' that it has undergone, in respect to its 'being-in-the-world'.

The particular life-history which is most appropriate for our present purpose is that of Jürg Zünd - a figure with whom Binswanger is concerned both in 'Schizophrenie' and in 3FMD, in the former simply to lay bare the being-in-the-world of this particular Dasein, in the latter to go on from that to lay bare, by phenomenological reduction, a particular form of being-in-the-world, namely, 'Manieriertheit', that appears from time to time. Its particular significance for our purposes is that it is Binswanger's fullest treatment of the notion of

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1. As far as Bultmann's theology is concerned, 'evil' in the form of physical or mental suffering must be seen as more or less severe stumbling-blocks in the face of which faith has to 'stand the test': faith in God always implies an 'in spite of', which faith has to overcome; see above, Chapter 2, section 6.

'anxiety' and also one that leads him to employ the same terminology of 'self-deception' that we have encountered in Bultmann's account of unbelief. Thus here the two analyses, theological and daseinsanalytical 'run parallel'.

Jürg Zünd's Dasein is 'given over' to anxiety; it is dominated by it. Here Heidegger's existential anxiety has taken on an ontic form (cf. Bultmann's anxiety as 'sin') in which it is precisely the factor that stops Jürg Zünd making an authentic decision to be himself. Here the anxiety that dominates the world of this Dasein, forces it, in its attempts to exist authentically, to adopt a heteronomous Ideal on which to model itself, and this happens because of Jürg Zünd's lack of experience of the 'eternity' and 'home' of love. Thus attempting to avoid the anxiety that necessarily accompanies the decision to exist authentically (by imitating someone else's existence instead) he becomes enslaved to it. Such an existence is an example of the closed-up-ness of which Kierkegaard spoke; in particular it is a closed-up-ness against the possibility of love: the lack of experience of love results in the determination never to experience it. Such closed-up-ness is not itself a pathological phenomenon.

> "As Kierkegaard himself once said, everyone has something of closed-up-ness and of a 'fixed idea'. It all depends on the nuances, and on the degree - and especially on the content."[1]

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1. Schizophrenie, p. 264 (note 33).

This quotation encourages us to see the daseinsanalytical condition described here as being of the same sort as that to which we have referred immediately above in Bultmann's analyses. Moreover, when Binswanger goes on to describe this attempt at existence by the adopting of a heteronomous Ideal, which will avoid the necessity for Jürg Zünd ever to decide to be himself, as itself the "πρῶτος ψεῦδος,...the first untruth, the 'first deceit', and self-deceit...",[1] the conclusion seems certain that they are referring to the same phenomena. But in fact there can be no easy identification - particularly as the schizophrenic process (for that is what Jürg Zünd's illness is thought to be) develops: the patient's 'anxiety' must be distinguished more and more completely from existential anxiety:

> "Wherever and as far as anxiety dominates Dasein, all existentiell maturing is excluded; for when it is anxious (more correctly, when it is continually fearful), Dasein is not - in contrast to existentiell and religious anxiety - anticipating itself, but is disconcerted and caught by already-being in the past. Anxiety is the enforced perpetuation of the past."[2]

Now in assessing whether the sort of language to which we have been referring in regard to both daseinsanalysis and theology expresses simply a coincidence in words or also one which extends to meaning, the following points must be taken

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1. See above, p. 296.

2. Schizophrenie, p. 258.

into consideration: (1) the theological account of self-deception and closed-up-ness is part of the believing exposition of unbelief: as descriptive statement it is subordinate to the primary theological statement, namely, the address;[1] its criterion of truth issues from the encounter with the revelation, and it can only claim to be generally valid of all men on the basis of the truth of the encounter with the revelation; but (2) the revelation is itself only encountered by individuals; in other words, it only becomes 'revelation' for individuals. So from the standpoint of theology, there is a prima facie difficulty in the way of taking such analyses out of their theological context, and suggesting that they refer in the same way to the same phenomena as non-belief, in this case to that spoken of by daseinsanalysis. Such an attempt would involve taking the analysis of unbelieving existence purely as anthropological analysis, i.e. without what I have described as its characteristically tangential reference (to the Word of God).[2]

Furthermore, from the standpoint of daseinsanalysis (3), the account of Jürg Zünd's closed-up-ness would be quite misunderstood if theology were to assume that this condition could be overcome by the encounter with a loving Thou, whether divine or human. Within daseinsanalysis Kierkegaard's term is being used to characterise an impoverishment or modification of a Dasein's essential being-in-the-world. This impoverish-

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1. See above, p. 112f., and sections 1 and 2 of that chapter, in toto.
2. See above, p. 28.

ment (in the case of schizophrenia) has its accompaniment at the organic-physical level: indeed Binswanger can say that he assumes schizophrenia has an organic foundation. Thus the 'deceit' that lies at the basis of Jürg Zünd's Dasein is not something to which blame or guilt is to be attached, but is rather, as Binswanger puts it, an existential, as well as existentiell, contradiction. That is to say (and it is admittedly difficult language) a contradiction that lies within the structure of his potentiality-for-being, such as in fact excludes the possibility of authentic existence.

We must therefore conclude that, if we take seriously the intentions of both our authors, it is impossible to assert that they are consciously referring to the same phenomena, even where the words used are identical. But (4) that does not exclude the possibility that there may be some 'overlap'; i.e. that the phenomena referred to by Bultmann[1] within the realm of theological understanding, may sometimes assume psychopathological severity, seen from the point of view of psychiatry. One is the readier to make this assertion, when one reminds oneself that psychopathological judgments are value-judgments - and presumably that what in some situations must be judged to require medical treatment (in daseinsanalytical language: where anxiety has taken control of Dasein) in other situations can be left alone medically.

If one asks (5) whether daseinsanalysis can make use of the theological analyses for its own purposes, again a negative

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1. See e.g. pp. 65f., 67f. above.

answer is the most likely one - but this for methodological reasons. Daseinsanalysis proceeds phenomenologically, with reference to the one particular Dasein whose 'Gestalt' it is in the process of 'creating' in loving imagination. But this means that it cannot 'import' from elsewhere accounts of e.g. life dominated by anxiety/sin, as if these could form a 'model' which could be used to illuminate other conditions. The only way in which such a procedure would be legitimate (and this always bearing in mind that each Dasein's development is unique) would be to use one daseinsanalytical study to illuminate another.

In conclusion we must say that daseinsanalysis claims to deal with matters 'prior' to the ontic concerns of theology; that its analysis of the life-histories of patients uses the same language as Bultmann uses, but must not be thereby identified with the latter; but this is in fact to say what one would expect from the outset, namely, that theology (as worked out by Bultmann) concerns itself with the (medically speaking) normal man, whereas daseinsanalysis is preoccupied with the life-histories of that small class of individuals who are (medically speaking) 'sick'. The question is then: what does theology make of this small class of people? And are there those who cannot hear the proclamation?

Appendix: a practical comment

But if one then asks whether the division between the two disciplines in terms of 'areas of operation' (daseinsanalysis with the 'mentally ill' and theology with those who are medically speaking 'healthy') whether this division is a hard and fast one, the answer must be in the negative. Neither theology nor daseinsanalysis is as such concerned with the psychopathological judgment as to whether a person is to be said to be 'sick'. Daseinsanalysis is in fact concerned with those who are on psychopathological grounds judged to be sick, but the intention behind it is to transcend these categories of health and sickness and show that the person concerned is still a human being, sharing his humanity (which has indeed developed uniquely) with the rest of mankind. As such daseinsanalysis uses categories appropriate to human Dasein in general. Thus for most of his life, while wanting to distinguish existential anxiety from psychopathological anxiety, Binswanger does not want to separate the two completely, for to do so would be to sever precisely the link with 'normal' Dasein which it is his business to maintain. Conversely, from the point of view of theology, the phenomena there described must most certainly be said to obtain in regard to the actual existence of the natural man, albeit seen theologically. And the phenomena concerned being those of anxiety, guilt, self-assertion, inferiority complexes etc., there is no reason to suppose that they may not at times assume psychopathological proportions,

- though that is a judgment theology is incompetent to make. Thus one must conclude that there is every ground for supposing that there is considerable overlap between the two areas of operation, and that, for instance, there are those who if they were 'hearing' the Word regularly, would not need to enter 'active psychotherapeutic' treatment. But Binswanger's major concern was with those whose illnesses would normally be described as psychotic, or perhaps better, as having an organic foundation. It is here that a pastor operating with a theology such as Bultmann's would have to beware. For in these instances the normal conditions of existence on which Dasein 'hears' the proclamation may not obtain; indeed one can see it as a purpose of daseinsanalysis to show whether or not they do obtain. Where that is not the case, and the pastor maintains his theological role with his parishioner, then he must be aware that its function will be different from the normal theological one; it will now be one of maintaining the normal links with the 'outside world' during the period of severe illness during which they can otherwise be almost completely severed.

2. Healing and salvation in the thought of Binswanger and Bultmann

Our task now is to explore the relationship between the terms 'healing' and 'salvation' themselves, and as we do so to clarify the use made by both our authors of the notion of understanding. The reason why the respective notions of understanding find their elucidation here is that for both Binswanger and Bultmann 'understanding' is central to man's life, and in particular for his well-being. We are working with two thinkers for whom 'understanding', the illumination of existence, forms the apex of what it is to be man; for both of them, man finds his true life in the act of truly appreciating or understanding his existence, his ways of being-in-the-world.

We can start with a general observation. Our exploration in this 3rd Part has found itself coming to the conclusion that, in respect of particular persons, namely the mentally 'ill', daseinsanalysis claims the right of a prior hearing by theology, before the latter embarks on its proclamation. To put it another way: daseinsanalysis, while being an ontic discipline, is still ontologically prior to theology, in that it claims to disclose structural peculiarities in the being-in-the-world of particular persons, such as would need to be overcome before the proclamation could be 'heard'. For instance, Binswanger's analysis of melancholia aimed to show that the disease entailed the alteration of the time-consciousness

of the patient in such a way that, for the duration of the disease, he had no real capacity to relate either to past or to future, and hence no real present.[1] It is only with the healing of the disease (the withdrawal of the depression), that normal time-consciousness is restored, and with it the conditions on which the hearing of the proclamation can take place. Thus our hypothesis will be that, as far as Binswanger and Bultmann are concerned, one cannot regard 'healing' and 'salvation' as parallel terms, nor can one suppose that 'salvation' includes 'healing' within it: it is rather the case that 'salvation' presupposes 'healing' as the condition which must, in certain instances, obtain, if the proclamation is to be 'heard'. Furthermore, in Bultmann's case, no attempt is made to see such medical healing as itself of theological significance; it cannot for instance be regarded as a 'sign of the coming of the Kingdom'; theology gives it its autonomy; in so far as it assesses it at all, it must consider it simply part of the world, with which the revelation is to be contrasted, and which in the light of the revelation is 'passing away'. But this is a difficult position to hold, if it can be shown that this form of healing is itself (in particular instances) the necessary precondition for the hearing of that which alone can bring salvation. By identifying 'salvation', as we will see that Bultmann does, with the illumination of the self-understanding in the (conscious) encounter with the proclamation as the Word of God, Bultmann refrains from giving it any

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1. See above, Part II, Chapter 9, section 4.

'over-arching' status such as could embrace occurrences such as psychotherapeutic healing. But in doing this, he is only remaining true to his understanding of the theological enterprise as such: namely, to the fact that its subject-matter arises solely from the encounter with the revelation; faith has no stand-point from which to assess the import for salvation of psychotherapeutic illumination.[1]

But we must now look in more detail at these two kinds of 'event'. For Binswanger, there are two uses of the term 'healing' or therapy, the first being a strictly medical one and the second a broader one related to being human in its totality.

Just as disease is strictly a medical term, and the judgment 'x is mentally ill' a medical judgment, employing the biological value-judgments of psychopathology,[2] so 'healing' denotes first of all the recovery from disease. To 'heal' is to restore health.[3] Thus in this strictly medical usage, Binswanger is referring to the recovery of the organism in respect of some malfunctioning. This applies to both physical

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1. The only possible development from this somewhat unsatisfactory position (and it needs to be said that mental disease is a difficulty for any theology, but particularly for one laying so much stress on 'understanding') is, as far as I can see, related to what I have called the positive theological evaluation of the human I-Thou encounter (see above, pp. 84ff.). This later development in Bultmann's thought (which does not mark any significant departure from his previous general position) would allow one to see the human I-Thou encounter (such as Binswanger claims the psychotherapeutic relationship to be) as itself a paradoxical revelation of the divine Thou; but this is a way of seeing the other man (as a transformation of God) and does not refer to the sort of illumination that accompanies psychotherapy.
2. See above, Part II, Chapter 4.
3. Grundformen, p. 231 speaks of 'making' someone 'health'.

and mental conditions of functional disturbance. Accordingly, the statement 'x is healed' involves the same objectifying and 'abstracting' in regard to the particular Dasein as being-in-the-world, as did the preceding psychopathological diagnosis.[1]

But Binswanger contrasts this medical definition of healing with a wider concept which, to repeat, concerns the totality of human being, and the setting of the particular Dasein 'back on the path' of the further authentic development of its life-history.[2] 'Active' psychotherapy[3] involves this broader concept of healing, in as much as it includes within it the establishment of an I-Thou relationship of trust and love.[4] Only the man who is capable of responding to such a relationship can be said to be 'heilbar' (capable of being healed) in this fuller sense of the word. And, in accordance with this, healing in this sense means restoring to a man that way of being which is being-in-the-world-beyond-the-world, i.e. that way of being in which love transcends care. Now, to turn for a moment to the relation with Bultmann, we can at once see that where Binswanger claims that psychotherapeutic communication can restore to man all that belongs to full human being,

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1. See above, pp. 188 ff.

2. Grundformen, p. 231, contrasts the patient who is capable of 'real healing' from the one whom it is only possible to 'make healthy'.

3. See above, p. 313.

4. See above, Part II, Chapter 4, pp. 153 ff.

so that such a man can thereby have 'life in its fullness', we are moving again onto that battle-ground where Binswanger and Bultmann take issue with one another, in that both claim to make the definitive illumination of existence possible.[1] Furthermore they will also take issue with one another in regard to their respective conceptions of the love which is to perform the vital function of 'transforming care' or 'overcoming the world'.[2] Now where this happens, our two disciplines are 'running in parallel' or 'operating on the same level'. Here 'healing' is not a preliminary to, or condition of, 'salvation', but rather a replacement of it, in the situation of modern secular man, where the physician replaces the priest.

However, as we have seen, Binswanger does not carry through this programme of replacing theology by psychotherapy in any systematic way: on the contrary theology remains a terminus ad quem, and active psychotherapy (not to speak of daseinsanalysis as such) does not exclude the possibility of Dasein thereafter 'hearing' the proclamation. For such psychotherapy entails illuminating the patient's particular life-historical development, and showing him - or better, allowing him to see - the possibilities that are open to him and the limitations that his particular condition imposes. And this does not of itself preclude the possibility of theological illumination, such as that to which Bultmann refers, or of a

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1. See above, Chapter 12, section 5.

2. See above, Chapter 13.

theistic understanding of existence, on the part of the patient.[1] But there remains an ambiguity in Binswanger's account of psychotherapy which we must bear in mind. On the one hand he claims that, in so far as it restores the possibility of loving-being-together, it contains within it the possibility of the bestowal of life in its fullness; on the other, he claims that its concern (or more strictly, the concern of anthropological phenomenology) is 'prior' to that of theology, and that the latter can remain a '<u>terminus ad quem</u>'; that is to say, that 'healing' or 'health' is a pre-condition for existential commitment of the kind that is implied in the hearing of the proclamation. In the first instance, theology will take issue with it, - chiefly on the grounds that Binswanger's account of love is illusory -; in the second, we have argued, Bultmann (by insisting that the proclamation refers to a man's existence - a category shared by believer and non-believer) must listen to the analysis Daseinsanalysis makes of the modification of being-in-the-world in particular instances.

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1. The daseinsanalytical psychotherapist will, for his part, accept the patient's understanding of his relation to God (where there is such understanding) as one factor within the existence of this particular Dasein; he will not attempt a psycho-analytical explanation of it as a projection necessarily following on a father-complex; - although he will not rule out the possibility that the form the understanding of God has taken in this particular instance may be 'meaningfully connected' to infantile experiences of father: see Ideenflucht, p. 125.

We must now look more closely at the understanding of healing that emerges from Binswanger's writing. As we have seen, Binswanger can speak of the healing of the organism (the life-functional aspect of human being, whether physical or mental) in respect of some malfunctioning. Here we have the term used within the area of psychopathology, and at this point the judgment 'x is healed' is one that concerns the functions of human being that are shared by all men. The judgment therefore puts 'x' within a general class of 'the healthy'; furthermore, the criteria of health have universal applicability - even if this must be said to be relative to a particular society.

However in the broader use of the term 'healing' (where we are dealing with the 'freeing of a man from his dead-end situation'), we are manifestly concerned with the individual's life-historical development in its uniqueness.[1] Thus here the judgment 'x is healed' does not imply that x's life-historical development is the same as that of the majority of men, but rather that x is now free to pursue his own unique development within his own life-history. What he does now share with others (in contrast to his former 'sick' condition) is a lack, namely, the absence of that which could prevent or incapacitate his own free development. Here the criteria for what constitutes health are to be found in Binswanger's anthropological-phenomenological analysis of what it is to be man, viz. to be 'at home' in the various 'Grundformen' of Dasein,

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1. See esp. Part II, Chapters 4 and 10 above.

which together spell out its potentiality-for-being. Here the border between health and an absence of health is more fluid: Binswanger can speak of Ellen West's 'glimpses' of loving-being-together,[1] and hence of her at least knowing the possibility of health, but the over-all conclusion of his daseinsanalysis of her life-history is that the hints of health are illusory, and that we are in fact concerned here with a Dasein whose being-in-the-world is becoming increasingly 'closed-up' and limited (and hence increasingly 'unhealthy').

In such a case 'active psychotherapy' is clearly out of place; it can only be embarked upon where 'life-historical factors' are uppermost, such as are not determined by an irreversible condition of the organism. A case in point is that of the girl suffering from 'Singultus' attacks.[2] Here we have an example of psychotherapy which indeed restores to Dasein its full potentiality-for-being; nor can we say that Binswanger in any sense in this case encroaches on the domain of theology. Rather psychotherapy restores the person concerned to that ordinary life-situation in which alone the proclamation can be 'heard'. But equally clearly, such a restoration, entailing as it does the re-establishment of harmony between the various modes of being-in-the-world, also involves the patient's reconciliation with herself, and this clearly implies a process of understanding.[3] Thus we find ourselves at this

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1. See above, Chapter 9, section 3.
2. See above, Chapter 4, pp. 157 ff.
3. See above, Chapter 4, p. 160.

point concerned with the sort of understanding that psychotherapy involves. But before we examine this, we must look again at Bultmann's understanding of salvation. Having done that, we will be in a position to focus our examination of the difference between healing and salvation in the thought of our two authors on the nature of the understanding that healing and salvation respectively involve.

When we turn to Bultmann's conception of salvation we find ourselves concerned straight away with a man's self-understanding, and we must therefore examine the content and nature of this understanding and the part it plays in the life of the believer.

First, it should by now be clear that Bultmann is not concerned with the illumination of the 'inner life' of a man, as if the realm of subjectivity, of itself, had a privileged and ultimate status in the life of man. We are concerned with a man's self-understanding because man is through and through an historical being, whose existence is carried out in act and reaction: but this acting and reacting is not an automatic response, but rather the business of conscious, responsible decision on the part of each individual, as to who he shall be, and how he shall be. His existence is itself the central issue for him;[1] his existence is dominated by the search for the authentic way to be; in the search he knows anxiety and this anxiety leads him into inauthentic ways of being, i.e.

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1. See above, Part I, Chapter 2, section 2.

into ways of living which are in fact dominated by death.[1]

In the encounter with the Word of forgiveness (the 'salvation-event') man is brought 'face to face' with the possibility of existing on a basis that is quite different from that of continually striving (by his own effort) to find authentic existence: his way of being is now an accepting that he is accepted at the highest court (the 'judgment-seat' of God); but this involves letting go of his own autonomy and accepting his way of being as this is given him by the other, in the encounter with the other's love. At the centre of this process of allowing the encounter to take place is therefore (somewhat surprisingly in a theology where so much emphasis is placed on act) a passivity - an allowing oneself to receive - that goes against the instincts of the natural man and is resisted by him. The fact that he normally resists it, means that the bearing of passive receptivity is itself only possible as an act of will. But this obtaining of a new self-understanding does not end in passivity; it issues in (for the first time) authentic historical existence, i.e. being-there-for-the-other.

In looking more closely at the 'understanding' involved in this process which is for Bultmann salvation, we can call first on an early essay, in which he spells out the receptivity

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1. See esp. Bultmann's discussion of Rom. 7.7-25 in Exegetica, pp. 198-209.

to which he is referring.[1] Bultmann is contrasting religion with culture: in the latter the "activity of the human spirit is essential";[2] religion, on the other hand,

> "is the opposite of the creative-active bearing of the spirit; it does not consist in creating, but in allowing oneself to receive (whereby the psychic condition of the experiencing individual, which one can describe as highest activity, has to remain quite on one side)."[3]

Religion is the feeling, or, as Bultmann would rather have it, the consciousness of absolute dependence:

> "The experience of being able to open oneself to such grace is the experience of absolute dependence, of free self-abandonment; this is the birth-hour of religion."[4]

Now this particular essay does not spell out the foundation on which this experience of absolute dependence is based; but Bultmann's later work makes it clear that he sees the work of Christ as the sole foundation of that experience. Later on, he refrains from using the language of absolute dependence, but what remains throughout is the centrality accorded to passive receptivity within the process of knowing that is faith; only in this way can man's mind be rid of that element of mastery which willy-nilly imposes its own stamp on that which it knows,

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1. Religion und Kultur, 1920, Anfänge II pp. 11-29; in this essay Bultmann draws extensively on the work of Schleiermacher.

2. Ibid. p. 17.

3. Anfänge II p. 17.

4. Ibid. p. 25.

in all discursive and scientific knowing.[1]

If one asks what the content is of this consciousness that comes to man as he 'hears' the Word of forgiveness, the answer must be: the hearer knows that he is accepted by God - but knows this not simply intellectually (as if someone were telling him the views of a third party, namely God, about him), but knows it by actually hearing the Word of forgiveness (admittedly uttered by a fellow human being) as itself God's word directed to him as this particular individual. Thus the knowledge is primarily of a relationship, and, as we have seen, only remains true so long as the relationship obtains, i.e. so long as the man continues to be a 'hearer' of the Word. In this sense the content, of which he is conscious, is first, the fact that his existence is now founded on the act of God in Christ; this is the '<u>fides quae</u>'[2], which faith confesses.[3] If he looks at his present existence this is what is significant about it: it is existence founded on what has been received in the encounter. But in so far as he looks at his

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1. See above, Part I, Chapter 3, section 3a.

2. See above, p. 56f.

3. Cf. Bultmann, in criticism of Barth's Römerbrief:

> "Perhaps one can also illuminate the problem: faith and consciousness by making clear to oneself: faith is not without confession (cf. Rom. 10.9ff.), but that is not to say that the confession is necessarily one of words or thoughts: it can just as well find its language in a man's action or bearing. My trust of other men, my love, my gratitude are not only 'visible' processes; indeed they do not have their meaning as psychic processes, and I do not need to 'know' anything about them. But it remains true that they are not outside my consciousness, and that they are not without confession." (Anfänge I, p. 132)

past existence, the content of which he is conscious must be said to be, secondly, the theological assessment of unbelief, namely, as a life leading to death; thus he is aware of his old life, but not so much of the particular course it may or may not have taken, but of its 'existential direction' leading to death. Thus the self-understanding involved is not in the first instance a more accurate psychological self-assessment, but rather a theological self-assessment in terms of life without, and life with God. Both elements, which make up the content of which the believer is conscious are of fundamental importance for our own enquiry: the intentionality of faith (the '<u>fides quae</u>') marks off the act of faith from all other experiences of receptivity and openness, such as might otherwise appear very similar to the consciousness which is faith; and the subsuming of the particular developments of a particular past to theological categories which apply to all unbelief mark off the act of understanding which is faith from psychotherapeutic illumination of the sort to which Binswanger refers; (one might well argue that here as elsewhere there are closer formal parallels between Bultmann and Freud than between Bultmann and Binswanger: for Freud, particular developments, thought to be unique, are shown in psycho-analysis to be instances of general psychological processes).

Thus the illumination of man's existence that faith implies is necessarily founded on Christ's act of love;[1]

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1. See esp. on John 13.1-20.

it is only here that the eschatological hope becomes a present reality - and must become so again and again; but, as it does so 'become event', it affords the believer definitive understanding:

> "That however is the eschatological situation: to have no more questions! In faith, existence has received its unequivocal explanation, because it is no longer explained in terms of the world, and is therefore no longer a puzzle. But this is to say that the believers live in joy; because it is the nature of joy that all questioning grows silent, and nothing needs explaining."[1]

The believer's existence

> "is joy which no one can take away, because it is not dependent on a cause which can be surrendered to the world, and is thus without care or questions. The believers stand beyond the κόσμος and rejoice that He 'sees them again'."[2]

In the encounter with the love of God, the believer is forced to give up his own attempts to find the way to life,

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1. EJE p. 583.

2. EJE p. 584. The theologian's use and assessment of the notion of 'world' is apparent here; there is no question of the believer's salvation being effected 'via' the world; i.e. of the 'world' having any redemptive function as is the case in Binswanger's psychotherapeutic illumination; for him the way to a true self-understanding always 'goes via' the world, and the way to the world always via the self (see AVuA I p. 155; and cf. his critique of Kierkegaard in Grundformen, p. 128).

and instead to open himself to the demands of his neighbour; but in doing this, he recognises that he has in fact found his authentic being: - in being-for the neighbour; and in so doing he finds his existence no longer dominated by anxiety in the face of death. Thus the encounter with the Revealer (in the proclamation) is the encounter with 'the light'; and in that the world is now seen as creation, rather than that into which Dasein is 'thrown',[1] the Revealer is seen to be one with the Creator, and existence itself something received from Him. Thus the believer exists in 'the illumined state of existence',[2] in which he feels himself at home.[3]

We have seen that 'receptivity' is central to the understanding that is involved in faith; but it is only correctly understood when it is seen as the necessary and only possible bearing that leads to loving action for the neighbour; this is 'the other side of the coin'. Love requires an openness to the other that abandons self-concern; so much can be said by the philosopher, theoretically. For the theologian, however, this is not a theoretical truth, but an actuality with which the individual is confronted and in respect of which is decided his manner of existence, i.e. what he has in fact to do in his actual life. This is always the thrust of the 'theological communication', towards the actual situation in which decision for the neighbour has to be made. It is in this decision that

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1. See above, p. 62.
2. EJE p. 46 on John 1.3ff.
3. See above, Chapter 2, section 6.

the believer's reception of the love of God is tested: if he does not respond to the neighbour in love, then he has not in fact opened himself to the love of God. As we have seen, what the believer has actually to do is in each case transparent to him. The definitive nature of the self-understanding he has received is paralleled by the transparency of the demand laid upon him.

We can now draw this discussion to a close by returning to psychotherapeutic illumination; from what has gone before it will be manifestly clear that the two sorts of event, 'healing' and 'salvation', differ from each other considerably.

Psychotherapeutic understanding is first of all 'insight into the disease' (without at this stage defining disease more closely), on the part of the patient.[1] That the analyst also requires insight into the disease goes without saying;[2] but whereas the latter insight is in the first instance a matter of psychopathological and psycho-analytical comprehension of a condition of the organism, in the case of the patient this insight has to be achieved, as Binswanger says, in 'existentiell shock', i.e. in such a way that it has direct bearing on the patient's own existence.[3] Now this kind of therapy is

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1. 3FMD p. 132: "In psychiatry we speak at this point of insight into the disease, and when this insight breaks through, we see the sick person as 'saved'."

2. For Freud's comment on the difference between the patient's and the analyst's learning of the nature of the disease in question, see ILP-A p. 237f.

3. See above, p. 155. - A certain difference in the use of the term 'existentiell' emerges at this point - due to the different concerns and activities of the two disciplines. For Bultmann 'existentiell understanding' only occurs in the active response to the Word addressed to Dasein; for Binswanger, existentiell understanding takes place in the reflective situation of the dialogue with the therapist (even if it does involve 'shock'). However, in neither is intellectual understanding on its own sufficient: as Freud points out (ILP-A Pt. III, ch. 19) intellectual understanding can be a defence; and see EJE p. 587.

concerned with one particular area of the patient's life: with one particular functional disturbance, albeit one that has, for the patient himself, assumed dominant importance, such as to make him 'ill'. Here psychotherapy would not want to claim that the illumination which is its immediate goal is a definitive understanding of the patient's self and 'worlds', in the sense that theology claims to concern itself with definitive understanding such as knows no further questioning.

But of course for Binswanger, as we have seen, psychotherapeutic insight demands the establishment of a relationship of trust between doctor and patient,[1] and this latter is of equal importance to the gaining of insight into the functional disturbance. Thus, in what we have called the fuller concept of healing, with which Binswanger is working, two sorts of 'experiential content' are required for consciousness, if health is to be achieved: first, insight into the particular functional disturbance, and second, an awareness on the part of the patient that he is capable of relationships of trust such as the one he discovered with the therapist. Once this second kind of awareness has broken through, then the patient has before him the possibility of loving-being-together, where all questioning is silenced and understanding is complete. This is not however itself achievable within the therapeutic relationship (which is not simply one of loving-being-together, but rather a dialectical one, sui generis, involving the overcoming of care by love). Thus on Binswanger's view the therapy

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1. See above, p. 158.

is the necessary condition for the 'achievement' of the definitive understanding that is possible in loving-being-together.

But we must return for a moment to that from which the patient is to be healed: we have spoken above simply of functional disturbance; but Binswanger is of course concerned that the patient, where this is necessary, obtain insight into the whole (mistaken) development of his life-history. This is the concern of daseinsanalysis proper, in its therapeutic aspect. Here the content of consciousness which is required of the patient concerns his own past historical development, seen in such as a way as to enable him to proceed further, instead of coming to a 'dead-end'. Thus the insight required is illumination of the possibilities of being that are now open to the individual concerned. Such insight carries with it no demand as to how he shall comport himself in the future: it shows him rather the ways of being that he is open to choose. Thus the insight given in psychotherapeutic illumination does not itself dictate action in the situation in which a man finds himself - except negatively, in that it shows how particular ways of being have in fact led to a dead-end, e.g. to a life dominated by anxiety.

To summarise: (1) psychotherapeutic insight is concerned either with particular functional disturbances, or with the total life-history of the individual in its uniqueness; in either case the concern is directly and solely with the particular individual. Theological insight, on the other hand, is certainly a new self-understanding, but the self is understood

not in its own life-historical development but in the relationship of encounter with the transcendent Thou; in so far as the believer looks at his own past he sees its particular development subsumed under categories applying to unbelief as such.

(2) The illumination of existence that occurs in faith is founded on the revelation of God's love for the believer as this is shown in the event of Christ; this 'confessional' aspect of the content of the believer's consciousness is irreducible (though mediated by the human word of proclamation). In so far as there is a parallel within psychotherapeutic illumination, it is that this is founded on the relationship of trust between patient and therapist. But once that relationship has taken place, in such a way that 'insight into the disease' is obtained, the relationship itself can be terminated.

(3) Psychotherapeutic insight into mistaken life-historical development need only be gained once, and it is then at least potentially secure. Theological illumination has to take place again and again: it has ever to be achieved anew. The believer is always at the beginning. The patient on the other hand can grow, and the psychotherapist can be seen as an educator, participating for a while in the continuing creation of the Gestalt of his patient.

(4) For theological illumination, the element of passive receptivity is an essential constituent: it is the only way in which the act of being-for-the-other becomes possible. In psychotherapeutic insight, such receptivity, or openness, performs a different function: here it is the means whereby - but also the condition upon which - a man allows himself to

be confronted with the (psychological) truth about his mistaken development.

(5) As we have seen before, theological illumination issues a man into his every-day situation in which decisions have to be made, and is only valid within that situation. Here it is claimed to be the authentic way of existing. Psychotherapeutic insight takes place in abstraction from the demands of the every-day situation: it shows man his various possibilities of existing: but necessarily holds back from dictating or suggesting a particular way of being - although its underlying presupposition is that man will find 'life' as he finds loving-being-together.

We may conclude by saying again that psychotherapy concerns itself with the various potentialities-for-being, open to particular individuals, while theology concerns itself with one actual potentiality-for-being, which it claims to be the solely authentic one and places the individual before the choice of taking up or refusing this particular way of being. Again we find ourselves faced with the question: does the daseinsanalytical basis to psychotherapy, bringing out particular modifications in the being-in-the-world of particular people, in these instances invalidate the theological assertion that being-for-others is the universally valid way of being? We are now in a position to turn to this question.

CHAPTER 15

The Significance of Daseinsanalysis for Theology

1. The problem stated

We have seen from time to time in this third part of our exploration how daseinsanalysis puts a question-mark against the possibility of theological proclamation, or more accurately, against the possibility of the proclamation being heard. We must now examine more exactly what is involved and where the difficulty applies.

As has been said before, Bultmann 'lays himself open' to this sort of criticism by insisting that the proclamation is addressed to man's existence - a category common to all Dasein, and accessible to ontological analysis. But this very fact means that the discussion of the issues can be a systematic one, in which both sides know that they are speaking of the same thing; this is the great advantage of their common - albeit extremely complex - recourse to Heideggerian daseinsanalytik.

I have argued that Binswanger's daseinsanalysis claims to operate (in cases of mental 'sickness') 'before' Bultmann's consciously ontic theology. The former is, in these instances, a prior endeavour, claiming to spell out those modifications in being-in-the-world which the 'sick' person's existence has

undergone, thereby differentiating him from 'normal' Dasein. The problem arises for theology when those modifications are of such a kind as to render the hearing of the proclamation impossible. To find out where this applies, we need first to set out those conditions of consciousness which must obtain if the proclamation is to be heard.[1]

These are in the main two: first, relating to time-consciousness. The act of faith is only possible where a man can relate to his own past, know himself now to be in the present, and conscious of a future stretching out before him.[2]

The second condition is that man have a relationship to himself,[3] such as (a) allows him to love himself,[4] and (b) to recognise the questionableness of his own existence.[5]

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1. As regards the propriety of doing this, from Bultmann's own point of view, cf. his discussion with Barth over the latter's 'Römerbrief', in which Barth took his criticism of psychologising interpretation to the point of denying that faith was a psychic event at all. In reply Bultmann states: "But faith is certainly a particular determination of the contents of our consciousness". Karl Barths Römerbrief in zweiter Auflage. 1922. Anfänge I p. 131f.

2. Theology itself knows of experiences of 'closed-up-ness' which 'blot out' the future etc., where the proclamation is precisely the means of opening up the future again. We are not concerned with such experiences here, so much as with what Binswanger would call 'structural changes in consciousness': see above, Part II, Chapter 9, section 4, with special reference to the Husserlian categories employed there.

3. Cf. TNT I p. 198: "If man were no longer σῶμα - if he no longer had a relationship to himself - he would no longer be man". - But he might be mentally ill; and the purpose of daseinsanalysis is to show that he is nevertheless still man.

4. See above, Part III, Chapter 13.

5. See above, Part I, Chapter 2, section 2.

2. The disturbance of the consciousness of time

We have touched on this matter before,[1] and can therefore deal with it quickly here, although, in that its subject-matter is depression, it raises one point of general concern that we must deal with first.

Binswanger regards all depression or melancholia - in the medical sense of the words - as endogenous.[2] He would be presumably still be prepared to treat so-called reactive depression medically, when it has reached psychopathological severity, but he would not regard it as a case of 'real' depression. Such episodes are, by definition concerned with the person's life-historical development, whereas endogenous depression is seen rather as an 'experiment of nature',[3] in which life-historical factors are only of apparent significance.

Thus Binswanger's analysis of the disturbance of the depressive's time-consciousness applies only to endogenous depression. Binswanger does not make it clear whether what is known as reactive depression (including, for instance, 'brooding' on actual guilt) could be overcome by e.g. 'hearing' the proclamation of forgiveness. Presumably to 'hear' the proclamation (i.e. to believe) is itself to overcome the so-called reactive depression - and thus to show that this was only reactive and not endogenous depression.

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1. See above, Part III, Chapter 14, section 2.
2. See above, Part II, Chapter 9, section 4.
3. M and M, pp. 49-61.

But this leads us on to say that Binswanger's analysis concerns itself with psychotic rather than neurotic conditions - although this distinction is nearly as suspect in his eyes as is that between reactive and endogenous depression.[1] The point at issue is whether we are justified in using the psychotic-neurotic distinction to demarcate the areas where the proclamation may be meaningfully proclaimed and where not. As far as depression is concerned, and in so far as so-called reactive depression is a neurotic condition, one is inclined in this direction. In this case Binswanger's analysis of the disturbance of the depressive's time-consciousness is a phenomenological demonstration of the disease character of depressive illness.

The very fact, however, that the neurotic-psychotic distinction is suspect to Binswanger (just as, in parallel fashion, the body-mind distinction is suspect) means that we cannot use this distinction as the general means of demarcation. Thus, as far as Binswanger is concerned, one cannot remain content with the simple statement that in neurosis (i.e. reactive depression) the proclamation <u>can</u> be 'heard', whereas in psychosis (endogenous depression) it cannot. This would be, at best, a working division - and one that rests on psychopathological distinctions rather than on daseinsanalytical assessment, which we have seen to be the element within psychiatry which works 'on the same level' as theological statements of an existential nature.

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1. Schizophrenie, p. 284f.

However, as far as endogenous depression is concerned (i.e. the only sort of depression Binswanger regards as a medical disease), the illness itself implies, on his view, the disturbance of time-consciousness, in such a way as to call in question the possibility of the proclamation being heard. The future is no longer the dimension of possibilities that can be realised, but rather has assumed the inevitability that belongs properly to the past. Nor should the preacher suppose that he can right this 'structural' change of consciousness by his preaching. It will only be restored to normal as the illness recedes and recovery takes place. At the height of the disease, to take away that on which the melancholic is focussing his guilt and anxiety, may be to take away the last 'hold' he has on the 'real world', and leave him even more vulnerable to suicide.[1] Here the pastor's role can only be that of listening and comforting.[2]

One has to conclude, therefore, that (endogenous) depression, as portrayed by Binswanger's phenomenological analysis, presents an instance where the Bultmannian kind of theological proclamation cannot be 'heard' - for the duration of the illness. It thus vitiates theology's claim to the universality of the proclamation.

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1. For a fuller discussion see above, Part II, Chapter 9, section 4.

2. Cf. (again) M and M, p. 67:

> "As important and indeed essential as this being able to listen and bestow hope can be - and even in the Tofranil era still is - it remains impossible to break the melancholic's monologue and above all to give him another turning-point on the basis of man to man encounter, except at the beginning of the process of recovery (today - when the Tofranil begins to take effect)."

3. The disturbance of the relation to the self

Again we need to start by saying that Bultmann himself knows of disturbance in a man's relation to himself.[1] What we are concerned with here (in Binswanger's analysis), however, is rather a 'structural' disturbance, caused by the particular modifications to being-in-the-world undergone by a particular Dasein, such as rule out the possibility of that relation to oneself which the proclamation implies.

We may begin by looking at the question of the questionableness of Dasein's existence to Dasein itself. Now it needs to be said straight away that Binswanger contrasts the kind of anxiety experienced by e.g. Jürg Zünd with that existential anxiety in which man is aware of his own questionableness. Indeed he goes so far as to say that Jürg Zünd is incapable of this latter anxiety - at least at the more advanced stages of his illness.[2] At an earlier stage, when we are concerned with a case of 'Manieriertheit', the distinction between the two kinds of anxiety would be more difficult to draw - but that is not to say that if Jürg Zünd had 'heard' the proclamation at that early stage, he would not have developed as he did.[3]

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1. See above, Part I, Chapter 2, section 4, and Part III, Chapter 14, section 1.

2. Schizophrenie, p. 258.

3. Such speculation leaves out of account Binswanger's acceptance of the probability of an organic basis for schizophrenia: Schizophrenie, p. 288.

Thus the mental bearing in which Dasein becomes aware of its own questionableness is itself beyond the capacity of the patient undergoing a schizophrenic illness, on Binswanger's view. This is not so much because of any overtly intellectual demand inherent in the awareness of one's own questionableness, as because of the concentration and mental equanimity that it demands. The mental patient is by definition one who has lost mental equanimity.

Turning more directly to the question of the disturbance of the patient's relation to himself, we may return to the case of Ellen West.[1] Here daseinsanalysis shows that Ellen's relation to herself, which in the case of 'health' would entail a dialectical relation between being a physical body and being 'more' than that, namely a meaning-bestowing ego, that this relation has become 'narrowed down', until Ellen equates her whole existence with her bodily existence.[2] She becomes her body; i.e. her only way of being-in-the-world is being as a body (in the physical sense of being a hole which can be filled and emptied). The ability to 'stand outside' this experience, in such a way that meaning can be given to it (as one perhaps can in the case of physical suffering or disease), is denied to her, precisely because it is the mind that is incapacitated in this way; she regards her body as

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1. See above, Part II, Chapter 9, section 2.

2. Existence, p. 292ff.

already a corpse,[1] and herself as 'really' already dead. Here it would seem impossible to speak of self-love in the part of Ellen,[2] indeed of any relation at all to herself, such as would make the resolve to exist in a particular way a possibility. Indeed the only exception to this - and one which Binswanger takes seriously - is to be found in the possibility of actually terminating her life, so that she did in fact become a corpse. In the act of suicide there finds expression the only possible authentic way of relating to herself.[3]

We can conclude that at this advanced stage of her schizophrenic condition there is no possibility of her relating to herself in such a way as to be able to 'hear' the proclamation - a conclusion that raises again forcibly the problem of theodicy (unless the theologian is at this point to bring in the escape-route of miracle, but this would be to render impossible any useful dialogue of the sort with which this chapter is concerned).

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1. Ibid. p. 291. It is worth comparing this with Bultmann's statement in TNT I p. 195: "It may also be significant that Paul never calls a corpse σῶμα..."

2. See above, Part III, Chapter 13, section 1.

3. Cf. Existence, p. 295:

> "Existential aging had hurried ahead of biological aging, just as the existential death, the being-a-corpse-among-people, had hurried ahead of the biological end of life. The suicide is the necessary-voluntary consequence of this existential state of things."

However, if we go back to an earlier stage in her life-history, when she was still in part operating normally (engaging in social work etc.), it is possible to conclude that she could then meaningfully hear the proclamation. At this stage she was capable of normal relationships (including that of loving-being-together), and of an at least apparently normal relation to herself. However to delineate the point at which she could no longer hear the proclamation is extremely difficult, and the difficulty points to a general problem to which we have already referred from time to time, and which we must now look at again. The intention of daseinsanalysis is, as we have seen, to spell out the unique development of a particular individual. Now this uniqueness does not only obtain when the individual becomes medically ill; it is presupposed throughout. Thus the daseinsanalytical approach to Ellen West does at no stage subsume her particular development to categories claiming to be true of all men. It is an approach that concentrates on the individuality of the person to the exclusion of those dimensions of existence that embrace all individuals. Thus from a strictly daseinsanalytical point of view it could be argued that Ellen West should never be confronted with a demand (the demand to be-for-the-other) which claims universal validity; but if that is true of Ellen West, it is true of every Dasein, and entails the denial of any system of values or imperatives claiming universal validity. However this conclusion is only reached if the jurisdiction of daseinsanalysis is asserted to be such as to embrace every dimension

of human being. While this may be a legitimate conclusion theoretically, in practice Binswanger would accept the limitation that daseinsanalysis is the correct method to be employed for the psychological understanding of individuals, - a method which, as we have seen, demands abstracting the person from his immediate situation.

Now while theology does not claim that its demand of love is the 'material principle of an ethic',[1] it does without doubt claim universal validity: it is the authentic way of being for Dasein as such. It therefore has to show that the understanding of human being that emerges from daseinsanalysis does not exclude or on principle rule out of court the reality of that dimension to which theology refers, namely, that of the actual situation with its immediate demands and promises. This would seem to be a reasonable position to hold, where daseinsanalysis is taken as the method of obtaining psychological knowledge of individuals without reference to whether they are 'well' or 'sick'. Taken in this way, daseinsanalysis and theology would appear to be complementary to one another, each dealing with a specific dimension of human existence.[2]

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1. GV I p. 235: if it were such an ethical principle it would as such claim universal validity; for Bultmann it is rather a 'way of being' which 'underlies' all norms of (Christian) behaviour.

2. In this context Bultmann would classify daseinsanalysis as a legitimate and indeed necessary contribution of humanism (cf. GV III 4).

However - and at this point we can return to the case of Ellen West - daseinsanalysis is in practice concerned with the psychological knowledge of those who are medically ill, and, in regard to particular instances, seeks to show how their existence is narrowed down to the point at which that dimension to which theology refers must be held in abeyance.[1] The only way of discovering when that point has been reached is to find out where what we have described as the conditions for the hearing of the proclamation no longer apply. In Ellen West's case this would have been when her existence had become so dominated by her physical body that she was no longer capable of distinguishing herself from her flesh. At this point, daseinsanalysis would argue, there was no possibility of her relating to herself in such a way as to be able 'resolutely to grasp hold of existence' as a 'being-there-for-others'.

We cannot leave this discussion without referring to another phenomenon with which Binswanger's daseinsanalysis was much concerned, namely, that of delusion. Where a patient is suffering from delusional ideas about those around him, for instance, that they are threatening him, persecuting him, watching him etc., then clearly the demand that he be <u>there-for-them</u> takes on a different significance. The situation then becomes a caricature of that referred to in the command to love one's enemies, where it is presupposed that there are

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1. This is given practical expression by taking such a person out of his every-day situation and placing him in an institution - an asylum, which is a place of refuge (a point which Binswanger makes expressly : Zur Geschichte der Heilanstalt Bellevue, p. 15).

objective grounds for supposing that those concerned really are enemies. It would appear that the command to love ('as thyself') does entail the realisation that one shares a common being with those whom one is to love. The command is transparent precisely because the needs of self-love are transparent. Where this is no longer the case, or where the patient is so deluded about those around him that they have ceased to have any of the same characteristics as he has, then it is hard to see on what basis he should know how to love them. There is no general rule for saying when this point has been reached; daseinsanalysis could clearly only decide in each individual case; but certainly the point does not necessarily coincide with entry into a hospital, which brings with it its own 'actual situation' in which (from the theological point of view) there is a prima facie case for asserting the validity of the demand of love.

One must conclude therefore that (1) daseinsanalysis does not present theology with a general a priori account of schizophrenic conditions in which the proclamation cannot be heard, but that (2) it does seek, in individual instances, to demonstrate that the being-in-the-world of a particular Dasein has reached the point at which the proclamation could not be heard. In this way, again, it calls in question theology's claim to universality.

The time has now come, in the Appendix, to ask, in two actual instances of schizophrenia, whether or not the conditions for hearing the proclamation obtain.

APPENDIX TO PART III

Studies of Two Men Suffering from Schizophrenic Episodes

Preface (author's note)

Concurrently with the theoretical exploration of the thought of Bultmann and Binswanger I engaged in actual case-studies of individuals suffering from mental disorder, in order, as it were, to 'earth' the theoretical exploration. The aim was to attempt to put into practice the two approaches to man exemplified by Bultmann and Binswanger, and in particular to ask whether it was in fact possible for the author to operate in both ways at the same time. This practical exploration went on concurrently with the systematic and theoretical one.

As has been made clear,[1] the systematic exploration came to the conclusion that it was impossible to work with both these approaches at the same time. In this sense it vitiated my practical exploration; moreover the results of the practical work corroborated the conclusion arrived at systematically.[2]

Nevertheless, it seemed worth-while including these two case-studies (a) as evidence of my own understanding of the application of these two approaches to man, and (b) in order to illuminate the specific question which emerged in the course of Part III, namely, whether there were mental conditions which precluded the possibility of the proclamation being heard.

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1. See above, Chapter 11, section 4.
2. See below, section 1(e), and section 2(d).

Section 1 'P'

P is an Irishman in his thirties, of high intelligence and considerable capacity for self-expression. All his life he has been interested in religion and theology (being a practising Catholic), and his self-understanding takes a largely theological form. It was first thought that he was suffering from a schizophrenic condition in 1961 and since then he has been in psychiatric care on several occasions.

a) A biographical sketch

aa) Family. P's father, originally a Protestant, became a Catholic on marrying P's mother; this was his second marriage, having had a son and daughter by a previous marriage; this daughter's husband was subsequently killed in the second world war, and her two children came to live with P's family at that time.

P's father died when P was two years old. His mother, a Catholic, had to bring up the family on her own; there were five children of this marriage; first came two boys (both now living in England), then two girls (6 or 7 years older than P), and lastly P himself. The sister nearest in age to P is the only other member of the family to have suffered from mental illness requiring hospital treatment (again for a schizophrenic condition).

bb) Childhood. The family was financially poor, living in a working class area in a Northern Ireland city. P has very few happy childhood memories (one concerns an elder brother coming home and then leaving again, forgetting to take his guitar with him); his father's brother used to visit the family, giving the children £1 when he came. Otherwise (apart from the two children) there appears to have been no contact with the father's side of the family after his death. P's second eldest brother was continually away from home, and did not get on well with his mother. P's own life was shared most closely with his immediately older sister.

From an early age P felt rejected by his mother; he records one particular incident, in which (presumably aged 3 or 4) he offered to help her in the kitchen: she threw up her hands in exasperation and told him to go away: she 'didn't care what he did with himself'; he went away, feeling, as he put it, empty and rejected. In public his mother would pick him up and 'nurse' him - behaviour which he would openly reject. From this kind of experience, he sought to find a love-relationship with his sister, with whom he used to sleep, being involved in, as he put it, an overtly sexual relation with her, which he hid from those around him (including the priests to whom, from a very early age, he went for confession). He describes these sexual experiences as 'very fine, very fine'.

P was from an early age involved in church life; his first communion was at the age of 5, and confirmation at 6 or 7; he was also a member of the choir from an early age.

Being an intelligent child P went to Grammar School, where he had three close friends[1] (two of whom have since become priests, and the other a teacher). At this stage he became increasingly interested in music (to which he listened alone, on the radio), and intellectual matters. As a teenager he was tormented with guilt over masturbation - which he confessed to the priests (who ran the school), and whom he describes as 'very tolerant'.

cc) Adult life. P left school without 'A' levels, and embarked on a course of teacher training. However, this was never brought to a conclusion, being interrupted by a move to England, and his first hospitalisation (5.7.1961 until 9.10.61). From then on he had a variety of jobs, being at one stage a hospital porter in a children's hospital, where he was, as he puts it, involved in carrying out 'hundreds' of dead children. Then came his second and third spells in hospital (1966 and 1968), ending in rehabilitation in the 'industrial unit' attached to the hospital. In 1971 he was again in hospital care (in the same hospital as for his first stay), including a period of working in the Industrial Training Unit (as a clerk), from which he was discharged towards the end of 1971, to take up full-time ordinary employment (as a clerk) in the same city, where he is at the same time now pursuing a course of study leading to A levels.

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1. The relationship with his sister seems at this stage to have lost its former importance; it needs also to be said that the three friends do not appear to have impinged deeply on his life.

b) Psychopathological account of the period of hospital care (1961-1971)

In 1961 his illness was disclosed as schizophrenia, with a certain amount of thought disorder and "multiple half-formed vague delusions, replete with philosophical and religious connotations".[1] It was noted that "thoughts" were "outstripping actions";[2] he was "beset with free-floating guilt" (he is reported as having said: "yesterday is a long way away"[3]). Severe depression accompanied the illness, and ECT was administered. His gait was noted to be "fixed" and "rigid"[4] - but there was no evidence of open psychosis.[5] He was finally discharged with medical approval.

In 1966 and 1968, which he regards as the worst set of crises, schizophrenia was again diagnosed; he was described as an "intelligent young schizophrenic" with "few active symptoms", but "fatuous and unrealistic".[6] On his discharge

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1. From his case-notes of the time.
2. Ibid.
3. Cf. above, Part II, Chapter 9, section 4, for the disturbance of time consciousness in depressive conditions.
4. From his case-notes. - P mentioned this feature to me himself, in regard to his illness of 1966, describing it as 'walking stiffly, like a soldier', expressive of the fact that he was 'walking backwards into his childhood despair and lack of love' (discussion of 20.6.1972).
5. This is corroborated by the Rorschach test: "No signs of anything florid and hardly anything to suggest schizophrenia. There were, I should say, signs of anxiety, but nothing untoward. The record was not very impressive considering his intelligence level. This is what one would expect in his present state." From his case-notes.
6. Ibid (letter from the hospital to the Industrial Unit).

in 1966 it was said that "the patient's delusional system was not far from the surface".[1]

In 1971 (when he was only an outpatient) he was assessed in the Industrial Training Unit as having made excellent progress, with the result that (as far as the job to which he was going was concerned) he "should be able to hold this type of job, provided he continues with his medication".[2]

During outpatient treatment in 1972 the psychiatrist records: P "can't help continuing to try to solve things at an intellectual level".[3]

c) Daseinsanalytical account of P's inner life-history[4]

P has very few memories of his father; the one incident he does recall is of touching his father's leg (while the latter was lying in bed), and being told not to. Apart from this, any relationship to his father, or to a substitute father, is conspicuous by its absence.[5] On the other hand,

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1. From his case-notes.

2. From his case-notes.

3. Ibid. (dated 17.6.72).

4. I am not unaware that for me to attempt such an analysis goes contrary to Binswanger's cardinal point that daseinsanalysis is a matter for a psychiatrist; see above, Part II, Chapter 4, and Part III, Chapter 11.

5. The exceptions to this are P's uncle, and the various priests (and psychiatrists) with whom he has communicated from time to time. It might be suggested that his interest in, and pre-occupation with, the subject-matter with which priests concern themselves show that they have fulfilled a 'father-role' for him. Psycho-analysis would also suggest that his pre-occupation with his divine Father is compensation for lack of an earthly father.

the relationship with his mother has clearly been of central - negative - importance for P's development.

P describes his mother as totally withdrawn into herself, and incapable of affection. As we have seen, he felt himself rejected by her from an early age, and for his part withdrew himself from her. She became for him "a flat blob of congealed matter", totally "intransigent", living "in a world of her own". He describes her as dirty, as filling him with feelings of revulsion, and he wonders why he should have been born to such a mother.[1]

Such are his later thoughts concerning his mother; during his childhood what is clear is that he experienced no love relationship with her; no trust or dependency was possible, and as a result he turned to his sister for warmth and affection, and to his own world of phantasy, to gain his understanding of himself and his world.

Thus we find developing an interior world of intense activity and increasing aesthetic appreciation (as a teenager). It was a world of pleasure (the pleasure afforded as a child by the relation with his sister, with its libidinal gratification, and thereafter with a variety of other persons, and also in masturbation), and of beauty and intellectual extravagance. P describes this period of his life as being closed to all normal relationships and experiences; thus this world of beauty and intellect was not shared by others (his siblings

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1. We will return to this point below.

do not appear to have appreciated his intellectual ability), but experienced on his own. It became his real world, in which he felt at home; but he kept it private to himself, spending considerable energy maintaining its privacy. Thus he would pretend to be a normal child enjoying normal childhood experiences, while in fact regarding himself as different from other children.[1] At times the pretence worked even with himself, in that he thought sometimes that he really was normal. At confession (as a child) he would hide this real world of pleasure (which he sensed he ought to confess, but for which he lacked the necessary conceptuality) and instead think up make-believe sins such as stealing sugar, in order to satisfy the priests (clearly the authority figures in his life).

At the same time as this private world was developing, the world of other people was becoming threatening and unfriendly (the 'Mitwelt'). He began to feel people could see through his pretence; he experienced the priest, in his sermon, as speaking directly to him, and knowing the truth about him. Often what people had to say was accusatory. But above all, this 'outside' world was dominated by his mother, with whom he came to identify all that was disintegrative and evil.

These two worlds could not 'co-exist' side by side, but clashed in his own person: on the one side he knew himself to belong to the world of light and purity and intellectual

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1. Cf. above, the case of Jürg Zünd, Part II, Chapter 9, section 2, and Part III, Chapter 14, section 1.

excellence; on the other, he was conscious of the libidinal side of himself as something bad, and dirty, attributable to his mother. Thus his sexual side (the world of libidinal pleasure) was the object of his hatred and fear; despite, or indeed because, he hated it (we are now dealing with his experience as a teenager and later), it came increasingly to dominate his existence. He became fascinated by pornography, and indulged in increasing sexual phantasy (as he puts it himself, he had lots of experience to go on).

The 'good' side of him (and here we come to the overtly theological content) came from God; indeed he saw himself sent into the world by God, with a mission to that world. Thus God himself has taken the place of his earthly father, and the question that tormented him was why God should choose a pure virgin[1] to be the mother of Jesus, while he had chosen a woman like 'that woman' (as he referred to her in conversation) to be his own mother; - why, furthermore, God should possibly allow him to undergo such experiences as childhood incest and maternal rejection.

These conflicting aspects of his 'being-in-the-world' came to a head (in his own subsequent assessment) in the schizophrenic episode that occurred in 1966. This was when he was working in the children's hospital, the chief memory of which was his carrying out dead children. The crisis

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1. Mary is for him the type of pure and beautiful womanhood (the unblemished 16 year-old), which he still idolises.

concerned the question: which world would assume the ascendency? The 'good' world which he identified himself with, as sent by God, or the evil world of decay and disintegration, with which he was surrounded? And the outcome of the struggle depended on him, and his mission of redemption. At the height of this crisis he experienced those around him as confirming him in his mission, by 'making such a lot of him' (not just over-reacting to him as mentally ill); for instance, a Jesuit priest offers to let him celebrate the Mass, the newscaster on television speaks directly to him,[1] Harold Wilson and the Pope refer to him; - and yet the world does not in fact respond to his mission. Nor are the necessary tools given to him (e.g. a job in the mass-media or government) whereby the mission could be accomplished.[2]

This crisis is not yet (1972) resolved; it is only much less acute. There is still consciousness of the special relation with God, and of a mission to the world. But this is balanced by another dominant theme,[3] to which we must now turn.

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1. P still experiences direct communication between himself and the newscaster, seeking to explain it on the basis of telepathy.

2. There was evidenced here a strong desire to influence people, to be in a position of power: - power for good.

3. For the notion of 'theme' see above, Part II, Chapter 9, section 2.

d) The two dominant themes in P's being-in-the-world; and his hope for the future

I have mentioned P's idolising of the 'pure sixteen year old' (and his linking her to the Virgin Mary); in the course of his developing life-history, with its absence of loving-being-together, he has come to see the feminine love-companion as the loving 'other', who alone can bring him healing.[1] His existence is a continual search for this 'other' - the essence of purity and beauty, and this search has become a dominant theme in his life. It is paralleled by his understanding of his relation to the divine other (in which at times all distinction between himself and God disappears), and his consciousness of his mission to the world. Just as the search for the other is maintained as a search (and the other is not in fact found[2]), so the mission does not in fact take place, and remains a divine demand laid upon him.

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1. See above, Part III, Chapter 14, section 2, where the therapeutic aspect of loving-being-together was the subject of comment. However it was argued there that Binswanger would regard psychiatric healing as itself issuing in the possibility of loving-being-together; i.e. as a condition of the latter. One must bear in mind that the love shown to the patient by the therapist, while being itself a therapeutic 'agent', is not a straightforward or pure example of loving-being-together.

2. He has in fact had what was promising to be a love-relationship with a girl, whom he left, as it would appear, precisely when the relationship was developing (and with its development, of course, the possibility that she might one day reject him, as he had previously been rejected by his mother); this possibility was too great a risk to take. Thus he only really made his feelings known to her, after he had left her.

These are the 'two cards' he has to play (as he puts it), i.e. the two themes that make existence meaningful, and for the sake of which he refrains from committing suicide (to which he has referred). Of the two, it is the search for the human 'other' that has come to dominate; if this were accomplished, then the divine mission might even be abandoned; it would no longer be necessary. If the 'other' is not found, then there is no future; all that would remain is a 'scorched earth policy', i.e. the devastation of all life.

But there is an important ambivalence about this search for the human 'other'; as we have seen, P is very concerned about his own libidinal nature; he is fascinated by the pornographic, and terrified (a) that he would use such a relationship solely for his own gratification, and (b) that his existence would become swamped or dominated by the pornographic, precisely as he attempted such a relationship (that is to say, his existence would be swamped by that evil, decaying, world with which he identifies his mother).

e) The content of my discussions with P, and my relation to him

Most of the time we have spent in discussion has concerned those matters to which I have referred in subsections (a) to (d). However from time to time we have considered how he should proceed (e.g. in regard to the two dominant themes of his existence), and also as opportunity occurred, I have endeavoured to speak in a strictly theological role.[1]

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1. See above, Part III, Chapter 11 (and Part I, Chapter 3, section 1).

In regard to the first of these themes (i.e. his search for loving-being-together) I have suggested he look at the variety of relationships which are already possible for him, and see them as a partial realisation of the sort of relationship which is his goal. He says that he is more prepared (at least intellectually) to allow such a relationship to grow, rather than to try to force it into existence, in a way that would in fact destroy it. But the possibility of facing the future without such a relationship is difficult for him to countenance - although it might well be that it would in fact develop precisely as he accepted the possibility of being without it.

Furthermore (again, intellectually) he is less afraid now than he was of using such a relationship for purposes (a) of his own growth, and (b) of his own gratification. He sees that both these elements are in fact constituent parts of human loving-being-together, though they must never dominate it, if the relationship is to remain one of love.

As regards both this search for love, and his relationship to his mother, I have confronted him with the theological understanding of love as being-there-for-the-other, on the basis of the received love of God.[1] I have suggested that

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1. It may well have been a mistake to refer the demand for being being-there-for-the-other straight to his relationship with his mother (the most traumatic relationship of his life); there is no doubt that he can, and does, relate selflessly to other people, who, as far as his life-history is concerned, are more 'neutral' in their effect upon him, than his mother.

his mother was really in need of help; that she had a difficult task in bringing up the family on her own; and that this task cost her her well-being. While the possibility of looking at his mother in a different light arrested his attention, he does not regard his mother as any longer of fundamental significance for him.

In general, as regards this 'theme', I have suggested that if he turn his attention to being-there-for-the-other, loving-being-together may well be given him (i.e. precisely when he is not striving for it).

As regards his relationship with God, I have tried to differentiate his existence from that of God's, so that after several months of (often) weekly discussion, it was possible to say: "P, you are not God", to which he replied with relief: "I am glad to hear you say that".[1] But at the same time I have tried to affirm his belief that he is called by God to serve others - though with the essential proviso that this is a 'lowly' activity, involving only a limited circle of people, rather than a quick and universal 'act of redemption'.

As far as his ability to 'hear' the proclamation is concerned,[2] there is little doubt but that his mental state is such as to allow this to occur. He is still on medication,

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1. 4th July 1972. What we have not explored is the connexion between his special relation to God and his lack of relation to his earthly father.

2. See above, Part III, Chapter 15.

and any element of disease that there might be is thereby kept under control.[1]

He has asked me to put on paper for him the theological proclamation, as it would be addressed to him, and my response to this request is appended to the end of this section.

As far as my own relation to P is concerned, it is clear that, apart from this last opportunity implicit in his request, and the various insertions of an overtly theological nature to which I have referred, my relationship to him has been one of dialogue and counselling rather than that of preacher to a member of his congregation; in other words it has been of the nature of direct I-Thou encounter, and any element of address (i.e. of the primary theological statement)[2] has been a rather forced insertion, involving transference to another role, on my part at least.[3] On the other hand, there has been a good deal of 'theological explanation', where the role has been that of teacher rather than preacher, and therefore, as far as Bultmann is concerned only theological in a derivative sense.

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1. See above, Part III, Chapter 14.
2. See above, Part I, Chapter 3, section 1.
3. See above, Part III, Chapter 11.

f) The theological proclamation to P, in the form of theses

1. Like all others, you are known, loved, and accepted by God. His acceptance of you applies to the whole of you, including that part of you you find most unacceptable.

2. Your fears of not being able to relate to others hide from you the fact that the most important relationship of all is offered to you at all times - by God himself. But this is a relationship which you share with other men, and is not yours as of special right. Thus your relationship to God illumines your (created) humanity, which you share with all men; "our hearts are restless, until they find their rest in thee" (Augustine).

3. This relationship will not be discovered by intellectual effort, nor by mystical communion, nor by withdrawal from the world, but by accepting God's love for you, and expressing this in self-less love for those around you. It is in this existence for the sake of others, that you will discover the meaning of your existence, and fullness of life.

4. In this being-there-for-others, there may (but not necessarily will) be given to you that love-relationship for which you search. But it will be given, when the attempt to achieve it by your own efforts is abandoned.

5. Your worries about why you should have been born into that particular family at that time are likely to distract you from the main business in hand, namely, that of encountering God's love and finding your own fullness of life in being-

there-for-the other. In doing that you will come to see your own past as itself a part of God's creation.

6. God does not expect you to convert the world; He asks you to be there for those around you - and leave the rest to Him.

Section 2 'R'

In contrast to P, R is a hospital patient, of lower than normal intelligence, with much more pronounced symptoms of psychiatric disorder. His chief interest, for our purposes, lies in his present condition, in relation to the question as to whether the proclamation can be meaningfully 'heard' by him. For this reason we will move more quickly over his past history, and concentrate on his present condition.

a) Biographical sketch

aa) Family. R's family lived on the outskirts of a large Midland city, until the death of his father, when R was aged 14. At that point R's mother moved the family to less expensive accommodation in the middle of the same city, very close to the mental hospital in which R is now a patient. R has an elder sister, aged 31 (now married with one daughter), and a younger brother aged 16, who visits him once a week. On her husband's death R's mother took a job with the mental hospital and worked there until her own death a year ago; since then R's younger brother has gone to live with his sister and her family. R is now 24 years old.

bb) The course of R's own life. R's childhood appears to have been a normal one for a child of below average intelligence, who was however able to go to a normal school.

As far as childhood memories are concerned, he speaks warmly of his father (describing how he tried to teach him to play the piano), and with great affection of his mother; although, on asking him what he can remember about her, his only reply concerns her strictness, and her shouting at him, e.g. that he should not touch the fire.

On leaving school at the age of 15 R attempted a number of jobs, without staying long in any of them. He became a compulsory hospital patient in his late teens, after attempting to rape a girl in the ladies' toilet in a block of offices. He has been in hospital care ever since, though for a time as an outpatient.

His chief interest is wrestling, which he watches regularly on television, and reads about in the relevant magazines. He would like to have become a wrestler, and seeks to look like one, with close-cropped hair.

b) Psychopathological description

At the time of his enforced hospitalisation the chief characteristic that caught the attention was his low mental capacity, and his tendency to violence; as time went on his condition became more obviously one of mental disease, which was diagnosed as schizophrenia. Since the death of his mother, his condition has deteriorated considerably; he hears 'voices', urging him to do 'awful things', the exact nature of which he is either not prepared or not able to describe (the voices started two years ago); he cannot tolerate noise, and is

extremely restless. Various forms of treatment have been tried, including E.C.T., but nothing has proved very effective. R is no longer under a court order, and is mostly away from the Ward, walking in the grounds or in the city, except at meal-times and at night. He occasionally leaves the area altogether, to be brought back by the police. Although only 24, he has a pronounced stoop.

c) Daseinsanalytical account of R's present condition

Despite his childhood experience of love (going on his own account), R's being-in-the-world has now been narrowed down to that which Binswanger describes as a taking-hold-of-x-by-y, at least as far as relations with others is concerned. He comes to the Ward for his meals, and leaves as soon as they are finished; he seeks to borrow money from those who visit him, or to 'scrounge' a cigarette - and receives the gift of one with warmest gratitude: his way of being with people is a taking-from-them; and if there is nothing to receive, then there is only limited and superficial interest in the relationship. His all-consuming interest in wrestling accords with this form of being-with others: it is a physical expression of the anthropological 'Grundform' of taking-hold-of-x-by-y. His attempt at a love relationship with a member of the opposite sex took this same violent form, which in fact excluded all possibility of real loving-being-together. The little we know of his relation to his mother, on whom he depended totally (so that, now that she has gone, he has

nothing to live for, and would commit suicide if he had the courage), suggests that it too was a relationship of some violence, in which her shouting at him was for him the most memorable feature. In his present condition the violence continues in the form of the assailing voices.

As far as his 'own world' is concerned, there is no rest or composure in it: the mood is one of constant unrest. His interior lack of peace is expressed physically in his inability to sit still (except on 'good' days, when he will make conversation, sitting forward on the edge of his chair), and in his hurried, earnest, continual walking. He cannot tolerate the noise of the television in the ward, or the noise of the traffic at night.[1] Above all, the voices confuse and alarm him, and he can find no way of avoiding them or getting the better of them; even the traffic speaks to him at night, and he cannot sleep. This interior confusion[2] manifests itself continually in his conversation, in that he interrupts himself by saying: "I'm not insulting you, am I, vicar?" ..... "Do I sound strange?" (a question asked with a faint smile) ... "Am I worse than I was the last time you came?" ..... "Do I sound

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1. I once met him on the hospital corridor, and on hearing his complaints about noise, persuaded him to come to the hospital chapel, where he did in fact manage to sit and talk for some time, and where he agreed that there was in fact silence. But the agreement was only at the superficial level.

2. There is, in his case-notes, the suggestion more than once that R is not as confused as he makes out - and somewhat idle!

strange?" Any assurance that he does not in fact sound strange (which is the case), is only effective for a few moments; then the question comes again.

R's existence has indeed become questionable to him;[1] it is certainly an existence that knows anxiety at first hand; but we must follow Binswanger's account of Jürg Zünd at this point and conclude that the questionableness of existence here (and the anxiety with which R is afflicted) are very different from existential anxiety (and the grasping hold of one's own-most possibility); indeed they dominate the existence of R to such an extent that the existential resolution is rendered impossible. There is thus a strong case for saying that R's present condition renders the 'hearing' of the proclamation an impossibility.

d) The theological content of our discussion and my relation to R

R is ambivalent about the existence of God. On the one hand he says that his own experience (of suffering) proves that there cannot be a God. On the other, he wants God to exist, and can ask about him with an affirmative answer in mind: there is a God, isn't there?

He used to pray, but has given it up ('it can't be any use, can it?'); he would like to try again. He has a Bible,

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1. See above, Part III, Chapter 15.

and will try putting his hands on it and praying at the same time; perhaps something will happen then.[1]

I have not attempted to discuss his understanding of the existence of God or of prayer with him; there is scarcely enough continuity of conversation for that to be possible. I have, however, prayed with him on his behalf (and at his request).

As far as my relation with him is concerned, it never became one of trust, or of I-Thou encounter, in which any friendship could develop; sometimes he would talk with me for a considerable length of time, and show gratitude for my coming; at other times he suggested (very apologetically) that I talk with other patients, because he was too confused. He always saw me in what he regarded as a theological role, always addressing me as 'vicar' (I always came in my clerical collar). In this sense the relationship had an indirectness about it which made it closer to the authority-structure implied by the theological relationship (as Bultmann sees it) than the daseinsanalytical one.[2]

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1. Again, as far as his relation to God is concerned, it is dominated by the 'Grundform' taking-hold-of-x-by-y: i.e. by the attempt to create a relationship in which he can 'take for himself' from God.

2. See above, Part III, Chapter 11. I am fully aware that there are many reasons for this besides the improbable one that we were in fact entering on a relationship such as Bultmann's theology implies; among these are (a) his own mental and physical condition; (b) my inability to make a direct relationship with him; and (c) his evident expectations as to what a vicar should be and do.

Concluding Summary

This investigation must now be brought to a close. In conclusion it must be said that for both our thinkers it is their use of Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik that is the distinctive feature of their thought. In both cases, many would argue that they have too readily appropriated for their own purposes the conceptuality of a philosophy of ontology. But it is precisely this appropriation which renders their work suitable for a systematic exploration of the relationship between the two disciplines they represent.

Bultmann's use of the language of existential analysis has been seen to be both a strength and an embarrassment: a strength, in that it insists on the relevance of Christian theology for human existence, whether believing or unbelieving; an embarrassment, in that it thereby commits theology to the universal correctness of a particular understanding of human being, even where another discipline (namely, daseinsanalysis) can point to significant modifications in human being, such as render the hearing of the proclamation impossible.

Binswanger's use of the analytik, in a way strangely parallel to Bultmann's is motivated by the insistence that the mentally ill are still human beings - albeit with a being-in-the-world peculiarly modified through their illness. It

is an attempt to subsume the categories of health and disease to a 'prior' analysis of ways of being-in-the-world; and, as such, it deliberately gives to psychiatry a foundation other than that provided by the natural sciences, namely a foundation resting on Heidegger's humanist analysis of human being. The strength of this attempt lies in the insistence that the mentally ill be regarded as human beings, and related to as such; its evident weakness is precisely its tendency to under-play the disease character of mental illness, through a reluctance to accept the possibility of the sheer unintelligibility of that which is presented to it in mental illness.

In both our thinkers the faculty of the understanding is given a privileged position, indeed the privileged position, in the life and being of man; the assertion that life is lived to the full when it is understood to the full is the unmentioned presupposition of both; the illumination of existence, for Binswanger in loving-being-together, and for Bultmann in being-there-for-the-other, is the shared assumption of both. In neither is this illumination an academic or purely intellectual matter; it does not demand a high capacity for conceptualisation; but it is, nevertheless, a matter of the understanding; a conscious awareness of oneself and one's situation in the world and in relation to others is seen as central to life itself.[1]

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1. It goes without saying that this 'awareness' is in Bultmann an historical understanding (i.e. an understanding of the historicality of human existence - a dimension that has not been accorded its due place in Part III's investigation).

As far as the emergent relationship between our two thinkers is concerned only this need be said in summary: existentialist theology such as Bultmann's and daseins-analytical psychiatry are seen to differ from one another both as regards the internal conceptual structures of their disciplines, and as regards the methodologies they employ. It has not proved possible to establish any straightforward relationship between them as conceptual totalities. Nevertheless their shared use of the Heideggerian analytik does enable systematic dialogue between them - on the basis of the concept of 'Sein-können' - to take place. Furthermore, the result is that, in certain instances, theology has to pay attention to the analyses of daseinsanalytical psychiatry before it can embark on the proclamation - a fact that, as we have seen, raises considerable problems for the theology itself.

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