

CICERO'S
GOVERNORSHIP
OF
CILICIA



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SYNOPSIS

The thesis opens with an account of the early provinces, and then, following upon the acquisition of Asia, deals with the historical growth of Cilicia from the time it was a mere outpost against piracy until its full development as an area stretching from Asia to Syria. There then follows a brief discussion of the provincial governor's powers and the normal method of his selection.

This in turn leads to the special case of Cicero's appointment to Cilicia in 51 B.C. His criticisms of bad governors and his expressed opinions on provincial good order are outlined, showing his desire for moderation and respect for legality. After a chronological account of Cicero's year of office and absence from Rome, the highlights of his governorship are selected, and such topics as finance, taxation, treatment of individuals and military concerns are considered in detail.

The conclusion seeks to point out the main faults of the Republican provincial system and illustrates them with reference to Cicero's governorship. It also tries to show how far Cicero lived up to his earlier theoretical views in the face of the difficulties he experienced in practice. In the final reckoning he is shown to have attained fair success within the confining limits of the system.

CICERO'S GOVERNORSHIP OF CILICIA

THE PROVINCE OF CILICIA

The First Provinces.

During the long and often hesitant growth of Roman power under the Republic, the Senate was loath to accept responsibility for administering overseas territory and preferred, whenever possible, to spread Roman influence and check enemy forces by alliance and treaty rather than by occupation. Frequently there had to be a political crisis or a pressing military danger before this general policy was disregarded. The Senate of course had good reason for its disinclination to take too active an interest in foreign states. Firstly there was no standing army to maintain good order, and secondly the difficulty of checking over-ambitious magistrates in Italy would clearly be increased when a magistrate was in sole command abroad. Further it was feared that the administration of new provinces would be troublesome, if not impossible, and a growing empire would excite the envy and fear of foreign nations which would see in Rome's expansion an end to their own power.

As time went on however the Senate was forced, despite its better judgement and natural inclinations, to acquire new lands outside Italy proper. This expansion of Roman power was not due in the first instance to any desire for aggrandisement or to any wish for empire. Military, not imperial, motives were the deciding factors, and can be clearly seen in the reasons for the acquisition of the early western provinces, which were taken over only because of Rome's fear of Carthage.

The first province was constituted in Sicily, though the whole island was not included at first, in 240 B.C. It is interesting to note the situation which led Rome into the first Punic War in 264 B.C.

and ultimately to the acquisition of Sicily. Among Rome's allies was the city of Rhegium, and when in 264 B.C. the Carthaginians put a garrison into Messina on the Sicilian side of the Straits of Messina it seemed that mainland Italy was threatened. Commercial interests also influenced the decision, for it was likely that if Rome's Italian allies were prevented from trading with Sicily they would think they had entered into a poor bargain by joining the Roman alliance. The Senate's hesitation was finally overcome by the popular clamour, which could consider itself well-justified when, by the terms of the peace treaty, the Carthaginians surrendered Sicily to Rome.

This is hardly the place to discuss in detail the organisation of Sicily, but several points are worthy of notice. Firstly the people and the communities in the province occupied a subordinate position; they were not, as Rome's previous allies, taken into treaty arrangements as equals, nor were they rewarded to any large extent with the grant of Roman citizenship until the time of Caesar. They were also distinguished from the allies of Rome by the fact that as provincials they paid tribute, and to this rule there were very few exceptions. The communities did however retain a good measure of autonomy, except where Roman citizens were concerned. They were not of course allowed to go to war, but they were free from any necessity to provide troops for Rome's armies which were made up almost entirely of Italians. Sicily too provides an example of how, even from the outset, Rome was willing to tolerate independent kingdoms. Hiero, the king of Syracuse, had been Rome's ally in the war and was therefore allowed to retain his kingdom when the Romans took over the rest of the island. Unfortunately Hiero's successors chose to side with Carthage in the second Punic War, and by the peace of 210 B.C. the independent kingdom came to an end.²

The next provinces were those of Sardinia and Corsica, annexed in 238 B.C.; like Sicily, they were considered possible assault points and as such essential to Rome's safety. Further military considerations in the continued struggle against Carthage induced Rome to interfere in Spain, and in 197 B.C. there began the organisation of the two provinces of Hither and Further Spain.³

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1. Livy : Epit XVI : "Contra quos (the Carthaginians) et Hieronem, regem Syracusanorum, auxilium Mamertinis ferendum senatus censuit.....; transgressis tunc primum mare equitibus ('exercitibus' emendavit Weissenborn) Romanis adversus Hieronem saepius bene pugnatum."
 2. Livy XXVI.33.6 : "...in reliquum curae senatui fore rem Syracusanam.."
 3. Livy XXXII.27.6 : "Sex praetores illo anno primum creati crescentibus iam provinciis...(28.2.) Hispanias Sempronius citeriorem, Helvius ulteriorem est sortitus."


About this same time the Romans turned their attention eastwards to Illyricum, but, while they did extend their influence across the Adriatic in order to check the pirates there, no formal occupation of the district as a province took place for some while.¹ A similar delay characterised the organisation of Macedonia which was not formally set up as a province until 146 B.C., after which time its governor was responsible for Roman interests not only in Macedonia, but also in Illyricum and Dalmatia, together with the general supervision over Greece. This same year of 146 B.C. saw the final overthrow of Carthage and the inauguration of the Roman province of Africa,² though a great deal of Carthaginian territory was handed over to allied kings in that area.

These, briefly, are the first provinces taken under Roman domination. Some historians see in their acquisition a compelling desire for empire which manifested itself early in Rome's history and which resulted in the wide growth of Rome's overseas possessions. It is however more accurate to see in Rome's general approach to the early provinces a definite reluctance to accept territories other than those which appeared, either rightly or wrongly, essential to the safety of Italy and her interests. Moreover parts of the territory gained in the wars fought to protect Rome's interests were often divided amongst friendly and allied kings when once the original enemy had been defeated. This hesitancy is nowhere better illustrated than in Macedonia, where it needed three wars to show the futility of the policy of non-annexation before Macedonia was finally organised as a province.

A rather different case arose in 133 B.C. when Attalus III of Pergamum died and left his kingdom in Asia Minor to the people of Rome.³ The gift, which was as much a source of embarrassment as of jubilation, was accepted as a result of the pressure brought to bear on a reluctant Senate by Tiberius Gracchus. However, before anything positive could be done, a revolt broke out under the leadership of Aristonicus, a pretender to the throne, and it was three years before Rome, aided by the Greek cities of Asia, and by the kings of Bithynia, Pontus and Cappadocia, restored peace. The commission sent out from Rome to organise the new province was generous in rewarding the kings for their

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1. Livy XXXII.33.3 : "...restituenda Romanis ea Illyrici loca, quae post pacem in Epiro factam occupasset."
 2. Livy Epit LI : "Carthago, in circuitu millia viginti tria passuum patens, magno labore obsessa, et per partes capta est; primum a Mancino legato, deinde a Scipione consule, cui extra sortem provincia Africa data erat."
 3. Livy Epit LVIII : "Heredem autem populum Romanum reliquerat Attalus, rex Pergami, Eumenis filius."
Pliny : N.H. XXXIII.148 : "At eadem Asia donata multo etiam gravius adflixit mores, inutiliorque victoria illa hereditas Attalo rege mortuo fuit."

Strabo XIII.4.2. : βασιλεύσας δὲ οὗτος ἔτη πέντε καὶ κληθεὶς Φιλομήτωρ ἐτελεύτα νόσω τὸν βίον, κατέλιπε δὲ κληρονόμους Ῥωμαίους. οἱ δ' ἐπαρχίαν ἀπέδειξαν τὴν χώραν Ἀσίαν προσαγορεύσαντες ὁμώνυμον τῇ ἡπείρῳ.



help whilst at the same time freeing Rome from the necessity of governing a too loosely organised district.¹ For example, the district around Cybistra was given to Cappadocia, while Phrygia was given to Pontus.² The western districts of Asia were organised as that Roman province which from this time on was to supply Rome with such a steady income.

There is one other item of Roman policy to be mentioned before commencing the history of Cilicia; this is the treatment of Rhodes. In 169 B.C., during the third Macedonian War, the Romans had quarrelled with their allies in Rhodes³ and, in order to punish the rich merchant state for its temerity in ordering Rome to end the war, had declared Rhodes' possessions on the mainland to be free, and had made Delos a free port. They had succeeded in their aim of punishing Rhodes, but with their once powerful ally thus weakened there was no longer any check maintained in the eastern Mediterranean over the pirates who from this time began to grow in number and finally became so adventurous that even Rome felt obliged to intervene.

In accepting the inheritance of Attalus, and consequent upon its ill-advised treatment of Rhodes, Rome became heir to the wider expanse of Asia Minor and, in turn, had forced upon her the responsibility for the good order and future development of the area west of the Euphrates. Consequently, by the end of the second century B.C., the Romans were forced to turn their attention to the pirates of the southern coast of Asia Minor, and had to develop the responsibilities they inherited with Attalus' kingdom in 133 B.C.

The Historical Growth of Cilicia.

Plutarch states that the power of the pirates was centred at first in Cilicia.⁴ By 102 B.C. they had become so bold that they were attacking ships and cities along the whole coast-line of southern Asia Minor, and the Romans, although not so commercially concerned at the raids as were the merchants of Rhodes, Syria and Egypt, were at last forced to take action. Marcus Antonius,⁵ a praetor, was given consular powers in

1. Strabo XIV.1.38 : Μάνιος δ' Ἀκύλλιος ἐπελθὼν ὑπάτος μετὰ δέκα πρεσβευτῶν διέταξε τὴν ἐπαρχίαν εἰς τὸ νῦν ἔτι συρμένον τῆς πολιτείας σχῆμα.
2. Justinus XXXVII.1.2.: "Post haec regibus, qui adversus Aristonicum auxilia tulerant, praemia persoluta : Mithridati Pontico Phrygia maior, filiis Ariarathis regis Cappadociae, qui eodem bello occiderat, Lycaonia et Cilicia datae." c.f. Strabo XII.1.4.
3. Livy XLIV.14.11 : "Itaque cum id ultra pati non possent, legatos alios ad Persea in Macedoniam misisse qui ei denuntiarent Rhodiis placere pacem eum componere cum Romanis; se Romam eadem nuntiatum missos."
4. Plut. Pomp. XXIV : Ἡ γὰρ πειρατικὴ δύναμις ὠρμήθη μὲν ἐκ Κιλικίας τὸ πρῶτον.
5. Livy Epit LXVIII : "M. Antonius praetor in Ciliciam maritimos praedones persecutus est."

Cilicia and, with the aid of the Rhodians and Lycians, gathered a fleet together, scattered rather than defeated the pirates, and sent them hurrying back to their strongholds on the coast and in the mountains until the danger was over. Antonius won a triumph for his exploits, but just how meagre the real results were can be gathered from an inscription of about 100 B.C. which records a request that all allied cities and nations refuse the pirates admission to their harbours.¹ From this it is clear that the pirates were still very active.

It is just possible that as a result of Antonius' campaigns the Romans may have left some kind of settlements or stations at points on the sea coast; certainly from this date there is repeated mention of a province in Cilicia. In fact it seems unlikely that in 102 B.C. the 'Province of Cilicia' meant any clearly defined geographical unit, and indeed the name itself is not constant and the area is sometimes referred to as Pamphylia.² However, even though there was not always a governor, there was a steadily growing concern about Cilicia, and it appears that from 102 B.C. onwards Roman generals were given Cilicia (i.e. the pirates and other military affairs in that area) as their 'provincia'. This 'province' was a sphere of duty rather than a geographical area, and is the older use of the word.³ A parallel case of even later date is that of Caesar who in 59 B.C. was offered as his province the woods and drove-roads of Italy - provinciae minimi negotii, id est silvae callesque.⁴

There is no information on the names of governors or of further conquests until, in 92 B.C., Sulla was governor of Cilicia/Pamphylia.⁵ By now indeed Rome had probably strengthened her hold on the coastline, but, while Sulla clearly interfered in the affairs of neighbouring states, there is no good reason for supposing that he had any administrative function on the mainland. Rome was still interested in Cilicia only as a means of checking the pirates and controlling affairs in Cappadocia; it was as governor of Cilicia that Sulla restored Ariobarzanes to his throne in Cappadocia.⁶

Of Oppius little is known except the fact of his proconsulship in Cilicia in 88 B.C. After Oppius the next known governor is Gnaeus Cornelius Dolabella who in 79 B.C. was sent out with a body of troops

1. S.E.G. III.378 : ὅπως πολῖται Ῥωμαίων σ[υμμαχοί] τε ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας Λατῖνοι τὰ τ[ε] ἑαυτῶν ὅσων ἂν χρεῖα ᾖ, κατὰ τὰς ἐξῆς πόλεις καὶ γήσους πράσσωσιν ἀκίνδυνον ἢ καὶ κατὰ θ)άλασσαν ἀσφαλῶς πλεῖν δύνωνται.
2. Appian : Mith. 20 : ὑπηγάγετο Λυκίαν τε καὶ Παμφυλίαν.
c.f. Athen V.213.
3. In this sense Italy itself was long described as a province for a consul.
4. Suetonius : Jul. XIX.2.
5. Auct. de Viris Illustr. 75 : "...praetor Ciliciam provinciam habuit."
Livy Epit. LXX : "Ariobarzanes in regnum Cappadociae a L. Cornelio Sulla reductus est."
6. Appian : Mith. 57 : ἐς μὲν Καππαδοκίαν ἐγὼ κατήγαγον Ἀριοβαρζάνην Κιλικίας ἄρχων.

in order to quell the pirates. If one can judge from the pirates' activities thereafter, he met with little success.

With the outbreak of the Mithridatic Wars in 88 B.C. the power of the pirates increased. Plutarch says they took on confidence because they gave themselves to the king's service, and Appian states that Mithridates sent out his own private pirates.¹ Certainly the pirates increased their activities and attacked not only shipping but also islands and cities; they built fortified roadsteads and signal stations; carried off and ransomed wealthy citizens; kept skilled artisans chained to their tasks; gathered large fleets with skilful pilots and crews.² They disliked the Romans especially and, true ancestors of more modern buccaneers, made them walk the plank by "climbing down a rope ladder into the sea and going on their way rejoicing".³ Their numbers were increased not only by the length and severity of the wars but also by recruiting from men of wealth, noble birth and superior intelligence who joined them "to gain a certain reputation and distinction."⁴ As if to prove how successful the pirates were, Plutarch adds that they had lavish equipment, gilded sails, purple awnings and silvered oars.

From 78 to 74 B.C. P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus was governor of Cilicia.⁵ He was more active than his predecessor, Dolabella, and gathered a navy under his command. Soon he defeated the pirate fleet, and so gave Rome her first naval victory over the pirates since Antonius' successes in 102 B.C. With the pirate ships scattered, Servilius turned his attentions to the mainland, and with what success can be seen from the map showing the growth of the province. In terms of positive land acquisitions he took Corycus and Phaselis, and destroyed the realm of Zeniotetes by annexing Olympus and Attaleia; he also took for Rome the eastern coast of Lycia.⁶ After his successful first campaign, Servilius next attacked the brigands who lived to the north east of Pamphylia in the wild and mountainous region of Isauria. By the end of his governorship the two districts of Isauria were, in name at least, part of the Roman province, and Servilius had won himself lasting fame as the first Roman general to lead his troops across the Taurus mountains. In order to record this

1. Plut. Pomp. 24 : φρόνημα καὶ τόλμαν ἔσχεν ἐν τῷ Μιθριδατικῷ πολέμῳ, Χρήσασα ταῖς βασιλικαῖς ὑπηρεσίαις αὐτήν.
2. Plut. Pomp. 24. Appian Mith. 92.
3. Plut. Pomp. 24. --- τέλος ἐν μέσῳ πελάγος κλίμακα προσβαλόντες ἐκέλευον ἐκβαίνειν καὶ ἀπιέναι χαίροντα ---
4. Plut Pomp. 25. ἤδη δὲ καὶ χρήμασι δυνατοὶ καὶ γένεσι λαμπρὰ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀξιούμενα διαφέρειν ἄνδρες ἐνέβαινον εἰς τὰ ληστρικὰ καὶ μετείχον, ἔς καὶ δοῖαν τινὰ καὶ φιλοτιμίαν τοῦ ἔργου φέροντος.
5. Livy Epit XC : "Praeterea res a P. Servilio proconsule adversus Cilicas gestas continet."
6. Cicero : De Leg. Agr. I.5. : "Iubent venire agros Attalensium atque Olympenorū. Hos populo Romano Servilii, fortissimi viri, victoria adiunxit...." c.f. II In Verrem IV.X.21.

success he took the title of Isauricus.¹

The consul of 75 B.C., Lucius Octavius, became the next governor of Cilicia in 74 B.C., but died shortly after reaching his province.

More important regions than Cilicia and its wild inhabitants were again forced upon the Romans' notice when Mithridates re-opened the war in Asia in 74 B.C. Lucullus, the consul of 74 B.C., finally managed to avoid Cis-Alpine Gaul, the province given to him by lot, and took instead Cilicia and with it the supreme command against Mithridates. Cilicia was however only a name, and Mithridates was Lucullus' real 'provincia'. As a result Lucullus never entered Cilicia once during his six year governorship, and contented himself with ordering the two legions left there by Servilius to join him in Asia.

In 68 B.C. Cilicia was taken from Lucullus and given to the consul Quintus Marcius Rex, who, although he took three new legions to his province, seems to have attempted and achieved nothing.

During this quiet period the pirates had grown stronger and even more adventurous, until it became apparent even to the Roman Senate that, while something could be achieved in isolated districts, as by Servilius, the danger from the pirates could only be ended by a combined attack on them by land and sea under the control of one man. This was first attempted in 74 B.C. when Marcus Antonius, the son of that Antonius who 30 years before had first chastised the pirates, was given the naval command, but he had proved himself corrupt and incompetent, and had died in disgrace in Crete. The need for effective action to be taken against the pirates became urgent when finally they closed the seas to all shipping.² In 67 B.C. a tribune, Aulus Gabinus, proposed that a large fleet should be gathered together and placed under the supreme command of one man.³ A general of consular rank was to be given command over the fleet in the Mediterranean for three years, and at the same time was to exercise concurrently with the respective governors of all maritime provinces supreme authority over the sea-coast for a distance of 50 miles inland. Money was provided on a sufficient scale to finance this project. These proposals amounted to a practical

1. Livy Epit XCIII : "Publius Servilius proconsul in Cilicia Isauros domuit, et aliquot urbes piratarum expugnavit."

Strabo XII.6.2. : Τῆς δὲ Λυκαονίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ Ἰσαυρική πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ Ταύρῳ ἡ τὰ Ἰσαυρὰ ἔχουσα κώμας δύο ὁμώνυμους --- ὑπήκοοι δ' ἦσαν ταύτας καὶ ἄλλαι κῶμαι συχναί, ληστών δ' ἄπασαι κατοικίαι. παρεσχόν δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαίοις πράγματα καὶ τῇ Ἰσαυρικῇ προσαγορευθέντι Πουβλίῳ Σεργιλίῳ ---

2. Plut. Pomp. 25 : Ἐπενείματο δὲ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη πᾶσαν ὁδοῦ τι, τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς θάλασσαν, ὥστε ἀπλουν καὶ ἀβατον ἐμπορίᾳ πάσῃ γενέσθαι

3. Pro Lege Manilia 52 : "Contra virum fortem A. Gabinium...cum is de uno imperatore contra praedones constituendo legem promulgasset."

abolition of the Senate by the institution of an office with all but unlimited financial and military powers. The measure was opposed by Catulus and Hortensius, but in vain, and Pompey was nominated by the Senate very much in accordance with the popular demand.

On Pompey's appointment confidence at Rome was restored and the price of grain fell to its normal level.¹ How amply justified were the Romans' expectations is shown by ensuing events. First Pompey cleared the Western Mediterranean of pirates in forty days and then turned to the east; he was soon to annex for Rome a 'large and defenceless empire'.² The pirates were thrown into a panic on hearing the name of the general sent against them and fled back to Cilicia. Pompey hastened after them with all the weapons of war, but he scarce needed them, for the pirates, after defending Coracesium for a while, surrendered in the hope that he would be lenient. Cragus and Anticragus capitulated, and in turn all the pirate cities and forts were taken, together with many captives and much material.³

Pompey's victory over the pirates was as complete as it was quick; with his success organised piracy ended and was not to revive until the late Empire.⁴ As a result of his generous and political nature, he realised that poverty and poor land conditions had been one of the main causes of piracy. He took new land in Asia Minor under Roman control, extended the boundaries of Cilicia, and, in order to provide opportunities for men to live and work in peace, and in an effort to bring some increased measure of prosperity to this area, he settled the ex-pirates in small numbers in half-deserted cities such as Mallus and Adana.⁵ He restored and renamed Soli as Pompeiopolis. In this way he extended Roman control over Cilicia Tracheia, and also revived Cilicia Pedias and brought it under Rome.⁶ Tracheia was of little consequence except as the old haunt of the pirates; Pedias on the other hand was important as a source of abundant crops, especially flax and grapes, and as a land route between Asia Minor and Syria by way of the Cilician and Syrian Gates.

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1. Pro Lege Manilia 44 : "qui quo die a vobis maritimo bello praepositus est imperator, tanta repente vilitas (annonae) ex summa inopia et caritate rei frumentariae consecuta est....."
 2. Appian : Syr.49
 3. Appian : Mith. 96 Plut. : Pomp. 28.
 4. Piracy of course continued to be common in the natural haunts of pirates such as small islands and indented coasts, and at various times has been a scourge in the Greek Islands, N.W. Coast of Africa, Norway and the West Indies.
 5. Virgil Georgic IV.125 : Namque sub Oebaliae memini me turribus altis,
qua niger umectat flaventia culta Galaesus,
Corycium vidisse senem, cui pauca relict
iugera ruris erant....

Servius on the above passage states : "Pompeius enim victis piratis Cilicibus partim ibidem in Graecia, partim in Calabria agros dedit."
Livy Epit XCIX : "Pompeius..acceptis in deditionem piratis agros et urbes dedit."


6. Appian Mith. 96.115.; Plut. Pomp. 28.; Vell.Pat.II.32 : "Reliquias eorum contractas in urbibus remotoque mari loco in certa sede constituit ...data facultate sine rapto vivendi rapinis arcuit."

Pompey's success against the pirates was soon rewarded with an increase of his powers under the Lex Manilia of 66 B.C. which gave him full authority to end the war against Mithridates and settle the affairs of the East. This he did, and as a result of Pompey's campaigns Pisidia and Lycaonia, which had previously been parts of Cilicia in name only, were effectively occupied and, together with the new districts of Cilicia Pedias and Tracheia, were added to the Roman province of Cilicia. At last the Roman province included the real and smaller Cilicia to the east, and the province now stretched from Cape Chelidonia in the west to the Gulf of Issus in the east; its capital was at Tarsus in the fertile valley of the Cydnus. The northern mountain limits of the province were still rather ill-defined, and the wilder regions always required careful supervision. The poorly organised and under-developed inland areas were left under the control of native princes, client kings, priests and local chiefs;¹ for example, Tarcondimotus got a small kingdom in Amanus in Eastern Cilicia, and the priests of Olba continued undisturbed in Cilicia.²

In 58 B.C., when the famous rabble-rouser Clodius was Tribunus Plebis, he managed to stir up the people and had the island of Cyprus declared forfeit to the Roman people because of the support the Cypriots were alleged to have given to the pirates and because of the vicious and unsuitable character of its king. Marcus Cato was entrusted with the task of taking over the island, a task he completed without the aid of an army.³ He hardly needed one for the Cypriot king took poison, the islanders submitted, and the whole island was smoothly transferred to the control of the governor of Cilicia.

Two years later, during the governorship of P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, Cilicia was again extended without any fighting by the addition of the three judiciary districts of Laodicea, Apameia and Synnada. It seems reasonable to presume that the district of Iconium was added at the same time. Spinther was succeeded by Appius Claudius Pulcher during whose governorship Cilicia received no new additions in territory but rather lost weight as a result

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1. Strabo XIV.5.6. : ἔδοκεν πρὸς ἅπαν τὸ τοιοῦτο βασιλεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς τόπους ἢ ὑπὸ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἡγεμόσιν εἶναι ---
 2. Strabo XIV.5.10 : καὶ ὁ ἱερεὺς δυνάστης ἐγίνετο τῆς Τραχειώτιδος
Strabo XIV.5.18 : καθ' ἡμᾶς δὲ κατεστῆ κύριος πάντων ἀνὴρ ἀξιόλογος καὶ βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ὠνομάσθη --- Ταρκονδίμοτος ---
 3. Livy Epit CIV : "Lege lata de redigenda in provinciae formam Cypro, et publicanda pecunia regia, M. Catoni administratio eius rei mandata est."



of the 'doctor's treatment' it received from its governor.¹

By 51 B.C. when Cicero succeeded to the governorship of Cilicia, the province had reached the limits of its growth and had come to occupy an important place in Rome's eastern territories. The memory of its origin as a small coastal district in Pamphylia, at first considered merely an outpost against the pirates, was beginning to slip into the past, though the names of the various districts survived as a reminder of its colourful and in some ways haphazard development. There were still many areas in the mountains which contained fiery embers of resistance, but after the Pompeian settlement the province was no longer considered as being primarily a military command. Rome's representatives were now sent out to govern an established province, not to conquer it.

Geography and People of Cilicia.

As can be seen from the sketch map (Map II), Cilicia in 51 B.C. was a large and scattered province. The governor was to control not only Cilicia proper, but also Pisidia, Pamphylia, Cyprus, Isauria, Lycaonia and the northern judiciary districts. Excluding Cyprus, which the governor was seldom likely to visit in person, the province covered an area of nearly 4,000 square miles.

The province had proved itself a difficult one to conquer mainly because its geography was favourable to a guerilla type of warfare. The hills and mountains, which cover most of this area, formed a safe retreat for the pirates and brigands, but were a forbidding obstacle to the Romans who were long afraid of marching into the interior over the Taurus Range. There are only two reasonably large areas of low or level ground in the whole province. One is the narrow strip of land along the coast of Pamphylia from Phaselis to just beyond Sida and the River Melas, and it is significant that this level district was the first one to be taken over by the Romans as a base against the pirates.²

1. Ad Att.VI.1.2 : "Ut si medicus, cum aegrotus alii medico traditus sit, irasci velit ei medico qui sibi successerit si quae ipse, in curando constituerit mutet ille, sic Appius, cum ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως provinciam curarit, sanguinem miserit, quidquid potuit detraxerit, mihi tradiderit enectam, προσανατρέφομένην eam a me non libenter videt."

2. Pliny Nat. Hist. V.XXII.93 : "In continente oppida....., finisque antiquus Ciliciae Melis amnis."

The second area of level, agricultural land is Cilicia Pedias which is wedged, as it were, between the Taurus and Amanus Mountains and the sea, with its plain well-watered by the rivers Cydnus, Sarus and Pyramus. It is again significant that this was the large area taken by Pompey and used for his settlements of ex-pirates once his campaign against them was over.¹ With the plains securely held the Romans could hope to exercise some control over the tribes in the mountains.

Except for these two areas the province of Cilicia/Pamphylia/Lycaonia was a hilly or mountainous one. The mountain ranges covered the whole country, hindered communications, and kept the province so completely divided into separate districts that Cicero could talk of not being able to cross his province in thirty days and also plead travelling difficulties as the reason for his late arrival.² The main mountain range is that of the Taurus which runs parallel to the southern coast and forms an effective block to regular traffic between north and south.³ In the east the Amanus Mountains, running north-east to south-west, formed the common boundary with Syria, and provided a natural defence to keep the Parthians out of the province.

There were many cities and towns in Cilicia; Pliny gives a list of them in his history.⁴ The most important places visited by Cicero, and marked on Map II, were Laodicea, Apameia, Synnada, Iconium, Cybistra, Podandos, Tarsus, Issus and Sida. Other important cities on the southern coast were Olympus, Phaselis, Attaleia, Corycus and Coracesium. The main road from Laodicea to Issus, and the roads going south from it are also marked on Map II.

A land of hills and mountains, Cilicia was not, like Asia, a source of abundant corn and crops for Rome. The people of Cilicia Pedias were indeed famous for their flax and grapes, but just how meagre was the living that could be made from the land is apparent from the alacrity with which⁵ men turned to piracy and, as Appian says, "harvested the sea" instead. The Cilicians were however well-known as expert gardeners, especially under adverse conditions,⁶ and Pliny credits them with the introduction of a new type of cabbage lettuce.

1. Tacitus II.418 : "Ciliciorum perfida reges sat."
2. Tarsus, the capital city, was also in Cilicia Pedias.
3. Ad Fam.III.6.3.: "...sed eo discessisti quo ego te ne persequi quidem possem triginta diebus..." Ad Fam.XV.2.1. : "...in provinciam venissem neque maturius propter itinerum et navigationum difficultatem..."
4. As far as can be seen from his letters, Cicero confined his marches and visits to northern Pisidia, Lycaonia, Cilicia Pedias and the Amanus. Only once did he visit Pamphylia (at Sida), and that was as he left his province to return to Rome. It is reasonable to suppose that the Taurus Mountains were as important a reason as the Parthian scare for Cicero's failure to visit Pamphylia, the oldest part of the Roman province.
5. Pliny N.H. V.XXII.91-94.
6. Appian Mith. 92 : ἀντὶ τῆς γῆς ἐκαρπῶντο τὴν θάλασσαν
7. Virgil Georgic IV.127. It was on deserted land that the old man was working such marvels.

GOVERNORS OF CILICIA.

Appendix A

Cilician saffron, which was grown under glass, was also renowned for its especial quality as a seasoning for food, medicine and scent sprays.¹ As in all mountainous districts, goats were common, and Cilicia was famous for a cloth 'Cilicium', made from goats' hair which was used as a coarse covering and tent cloth by soldiers and sailors.²

This was Cilicia. Its important cities were not unnaturally situated in the fertile plains and in less hilly districts where evidence of Greek trade, influence and civilisation was to be found. In the mountains the inhabitants were wilder and less amenable to foreign control, consisting as they did of brigands and ex-pirates who had finally retreated into the interior before the compelling Roman advance.

Quintus Oppius

Gnaeus Cornelius Dolabella

Publius Servilius Vatia Isauricus

Lucius Octavius

Lucius Iulius Iulianus

1. Lucretius II.416 : "Et cum scaena croco Cilici perfusa recens est."

2. Virgil Georgic III.313 : "...usum in castrorum et miseris velamina nautis."

Titus Ampius Balbus

Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther

Appius Claudius Pulcher

Marcus Tullius Cicero

Gaius Caecilius Calpurnius. (quaestor pro praetore)

GOVERNORS OF CILICIA.Appendix A

102 B.C. Marcus Antonius

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Lucius Cornelius Sulla

Quintus Oppius

Gnaeus Cornelius Dolabella

Publius Servilius Vatia Isauricus

Lucius Octavius

Lucius Licinius Lucullus

Quintus Marcius Rex

Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus

Titus Ampius Balbus

Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther

Appius Claudius Pulcher

Marcus Tullius Cicero

Gaius Caelius Caldus. (quaestor pro praetore)

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR

Appointment and Powers.

It has already been pointed out that the main reason for the Senate's reluctance to annex foreign lands was its realisation that the administration of such territories involved difficulties of control which the Senate could not overcome. A body which was admirably suited to the control of city magistrates was not competent to direct its chosen officers when they were abroad and in sole command of a province, either in its original meaning as a sphere of duty or in its later sense of an area of land.

However, as a result of the causes already outlined, permanent provinces came into existence, and the Senate was obliged to devise a method of administering them. As so often happened in Rome's history, the Senate first employed the existing machinery and then allowed a gradual and logical extension of it. The parts of the existing machinery used in this case were of course the consuls and praetors who were elected to public office in Rome. On them fell the burden of state affairs, and as these increased the annual magistrates proved insufficient, until finally a method of augmenting the number of magistrates had to be found.

Very early in its history Rome had been forced to swell the ranks of those magistrates who could be used for executive positions by the device of extending the individual's time of service.¹ Simply, this *prorogatio imperii* ensured that a magistrate who was considered to have carried out his duties well during his elected year could have his tenure of office prolonged to take in duties outside Rome. The *prorogatio imperii* was first used as a military measure, and as such can be directly compared to the original use of the word 'provincia'. As with the latter word, time brought changes and magistrates had their *imperium* prolonged in order that they might govern 'provinces' in which there was but small likelihood of fighting; even so, the governor never

1. Livy VIII.23 (326 B.C., in the Samnite Wars) : "...actum cum tribunis est, ad populum ferrent, ut, quum Publilius Philo consulatu abisset, pro consule rem gereret, quoad debellatum cum Graecis esset."

lost his character as a commander of military forces. By the late Republic three years had become quite a normal length of time for this extension of office.

When it came to the actual appointment of a new governor the Romans preferred to leave the final decision to chance. For example, the Senate would decree which two provinces were to be given to the two consuls, but would then leave the decision as to which consul should take which province to be resolved by lot. It is quite obvious that such a system could lead to unsatisfactory appointments, especially when magistrates came to look upon a governorship as a perquisite of public office. Under normal circumstances the Senate, by careful nomination of which provinces were open to the lot, managed to ensure that moderately able men went out as Rome's representatives. With the natural fears of an aristocratic oligarchy, the Senate did not admire but rather feared outstanding ability in its governors. Therefore the special commands, such as the one already mentioned that was given to Pompey against the pirates, were bestowed only in an emergency, and were avoided whenever possible because the Senate feared the loss to its own prestige.

No matter how the governor was appointed, either as magistrate or pro-magistrate, he was during the later Republic Rome's official representative, and as such was head of all civil, military and judicial affairs, and holder of a power that no-one in the province could overrule. He was, for good or evil, omnipotent. Cicero, writing from Rome to his brother Quintus in Asia, points out how in Rome a magistrate has his fellows to control him, but in a province, "there is no appeal, no means of complaint, no Senate, no public meetings."¹ That many governors realised the wide nature of their powers and abused them, is obvious from the many surviving speeches of prosecution for provincial misgovernment. Some of these speeches, and the weaknesses which they illustrate, will be discussed in the next section.

Absolute though the governor's powers were, he did suffer some checks on his activities and few Romans were so foolish as to disregard

1. Cicero speaks of the stern *lex Julia*, passed by Caesar in 59 B.C.,

1. Ad Q.F. I.1.VII.22 : "Ubi nullum auxilium est, nulla conquestio, nullus senatus, nulla contio?"

rationes lege Julia apud duas civitates possis relinquere.

Ad Fam. VIII.8.3 (from Caelius) : "...legitur unum et continentem caput legit..."

2. Cicero had his edict, based on that of Q. Mucius Scaevola, in three

them completely.¹ As has already been pointed out in the case of Asia, a commission was sent out from Rome whenever a new province was set up in order that Roman government and an efficient administration could be established. The commission's duty was to draw up a *Lex Provinciae* which set out the general principles of administration, and included in its scope all matters of taxation and justice. It established a set of fundamental principles by which the governor had to govern; any violation of these principles laid the offending governor open to prosecution on his return to Italy. The *Lex Provinciae* for Cilicia has not survived, but it is fairly safe to assume that it would follow the general lines of the best documented provincial law, the *Lex Rupilia* of Sicily. This was concerned with such details as the appointment of jurymen, the composition of local senates, and qualifications for magistracies and citizenship. The details of course would not be the same for each province, but the general outline would be similar. After entering upon his duties, the governor issued his personal edict, which was largely made up of traditional parts contained in the edicts of his predecessors, and by its terms he amplified where necessary the details of the *Lex Provinciae*.²

The provincial law and the governor's own edict were the two main legal checks to misgovernment. They could however be disregarded by the unscrupulous, for as long as he was in his province the governor had little to fear from external interference. For its part the Senate, which would sometimes detail a specific task to a governor,³ normally allowed the men it appointed to carry out their office as best they would. The governor's apparent omnipotence was in some measure held in check by the influence of patronage, and often the only possibility of redress for the provincials lay in the hope that an influential and benevolent patron at Rome would prosecute the retiring governor for his too obvious mis-government. The fear of such prosecution by the patrons of the provincial cities no doubt prevented many governors from excesses even wilder than those they did in fact indulge. The majority of governors however were prepared to chance their luck in this matter and, provided they had not offended the tax-gatherers, could hold quite sanguine hopes of an acquittal.

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1. Cicero speaks of the stern *Lex Julia*, passed by Caesar in 59 B.C., which had a hundred and one clauses listing offences for which a provincial governor could be prosecuted. *Ad Att.* VI.7.2 : "Ego Laodiceae quaestorem Mescinium exspectare iussi, ut confectas rationes lege Iulia apud duas civitates possim relinquere." *Ad Fam.* VIII.8.3 (from Caelius) : "...legisque unum et centesimum caput legit..."
 2. Cicero had his edict, based on that of Q. Mucius Scaevola, in three parts; c.f. *Ad Att.* VI.1.15.
 3. A case in point is the Senate's entrusting of Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia to Cicero. *Ad Fam.* XV.2.4. : "Cum enim vestra auctoritas intercessisset."

The Governor's Staff.

The Roman Republic, unlike modern states, did not maintain a highly organised Civil Service which was designed to keep affairs of state running smoothly in its overseas territories. The administrative and executive staff in a province changed with each change of governor, and this of course resulted in inefficiencies and injustices as the new staff settled in. The governor, who was nominally in charge of all administration, could not possibly control everything and had to delegate his responsibilities. This staff comprised quite different officers, who often knew as little as the governor about the individual problems of the province, and is worth a brief consideration.

Holding an official appointment there was the quaestor, who would be a young man filling his first magistracy and hoping for future advancement. Like the governor, the quaestor was appointed by lot,¹ and he was expected to follow the paternal lead of his superior who would give him all necessary help and advice. The amount of work the quaestor was allowed depended on his ability. His main duty was to supervise the funds provided by the Senate for the maintenance of the governor, his staff, and the armed forces of the province. The drawing-up of the official accounts at the end of the governorship was also his concern, but a young man of special ability might well find himself in charge of other matters and even, as in Caelius Caldus' case, left to govern the province if the consular governor departed for home before the arrival of his successor.²

In addition to the quaestor, a governor took with him a number of legati whose appointment was approved by the Senate on the governor's recommendation. They were normally older than the quaestor, and were frequently close friends of the governor for whom they filled the role of advisers and delegates. They could be entrusted with any of the duties normally carried out by the governor, and were regularly chosen because they were experienced in provincial

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1. Ad Q.F. I.1.III.11. : "Quaestorem habes, non tuo iudicio delectum, sed eum quem sors dedit."
 2. Ad Att.VI.6.3. : "Nos provinciae praefecimus Coelium : puerum, inquires, et fortasse fatuum et non gravem et non continentem."

3. On his arrival in Cilicia, Cicero deprived Scaptius of the rank.
Ad Att.VI.1.6. : "Litteras misi ut equites ex insula statim decederent."

4. Ad Att. VII.1.6. : "Cum enim huc rectus et gloriosus puerus, et summo sumptu, qui mihi deest, esset, ac C. Caelio quaestori relinquere amicum, referre in aedem ad H.S. OLD ingessit nostrum cohortem, cum

life or experts in military and judicial matters.¹ A legatus could do considerable harm as well as good in the province, and might on occasion be dismissed for misuse of his powers.

The least important members of the governor's suite were the comites who filled only a minor role; they were given no official duties, but were supported from public funds. These companions were again friends or young relatives who went along with the governor as a part of their education in order to study the province and its customs or, more frequently, to improve their own financial position at the provincials' expense. The poet Catullus who accompanied Memmius to Bithynia displays the anger of at least one 'comes' who was cheated of such spoils.²

Finally a governor could also allot the title of praefectus to anyone, member of his suite or not, to whom he had given special duties or command over troops. The praefectus was often a man of little experience, and frequently was working not so much as an officer of the governor as the representative of a Roman financier or tax-company.³

Finance.

The governor was able to support himself and his staff from the allowance, *vasarium*, which he received from the treasury in Rome. The exact amount of this allowance varied from province to province in accordance with the work and activities carried on there and with the size of the province itself. It seems clear however that in all cases the Senate was generous in fixing the total of the allowance. In theory any money outstanding at the end of the year had to be returned to the treasury, but in practice the governor nearly always shared out the surplus among his personal staff.⁴ This *vasarium* was the only money belonging to the state that the governor controlled.

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1. It must be suspected that the legate Pomptinus was taken by Cicero to Cilicia because of his military experience, and for no other reason. This was a case of a specialist being given a specialist's job.
 2. Catullus X.5-13 : "huc ut venimus, incidere nobis
sermone varii, in quibus, quid esset
iam Bithynia, quo modo se haberet,
et quonam mihi profuisset aere.
 respondi id quod erat, nihil neque ipsis
nec praetoribus esse nec cohorti,
cur quisquam caput unotius referret,
praesertim quibus esset irrumator
praetor, non faceret pili cohortem.
 3. On his arrival in Cilicia, Cicero deprived Scaptius of the rank.
Ad Att.VI.1.6. : "Litteras misi ut equites ex insula statim decederent."
 4. Ad Att. VII.1.6. : "Cum enim hoc rectum et gloriosum putarem, ex annuo
sumptu, qui mihi decretus esset, me C. Caelio quaestori relinquere
annuum, referre in aerarium ad H.S. CIO ingemuit nostra cohors, omne
illud putans distribui sibi oportere..."
Cicero could hardly be expected to follow the general rule.

The provincials paid tribute to Rome, but not to the governor who had but a small part to play in taxation. He was not responsible for the collection of the taxes, and interfered with the work of the tax-collectors only when the Lex Provinciae or his own edict on taxation seemed to be infringed. It was not his duty to fix the amount to be paid, and he did not collect the monies due. Frequently there occurred some considerable friction between the governor and the publicani as to ways and means, and it was one of the scandals of the late Republic that no governor could deal firmly with the publicani without incurring the wrath of the tax companies and influential private money lenders at Rome.

CICERO AND THE PROVINCES

Cicero's Appointment.

It has already been stated that it was the practice by the end of the Republic to extend the year of office of most of the senior magistrates after they had carried out their duties at Rome in a satisfactory manner. This *prorogatio imperii* had become an accepted part of holding a magistracy, and indeed was looked upon by many Romans as an essential reward, a period during which they could recoup the financial losses they had sustained in seeking election and in holding office. But not all magistrates, not even all consuls, took up this extra duty. Some were content to lay down their *imperium* and retire into private life when their elected term of office was over.

Such a one was Cicero, who had been consul in 63 B.C. During his consulship he had acted at all times for the good of the state and had so exerted himself that, as far as ability and determination were considered, he was clearly suitable to be sent out to a province as its governor. It does however seem fairly clear that at that time he had little enthusiasm for a provincial command, and he was very grateful for an opportunity of declining Gaul, the province he was offered.¹ This opportunity arose as a result of the major event in his consulship, the Catilinarian conspiracy. Catiline had twice been unsuccessful in the consular elections, and becoming desperate aimed at overthrowing the state and causing financial upsets. Cicero had acted wisely and promptly in putting down the conspirators, though not with a unanimous and wholehearted backing from those around him. His colleague in the consulship, Antonius, had been one of those who doubted Cicero's wisdom, and it was not until he was allowed to take the wealthy province of Macedonia that he was won over.² When the conspiracy was finally suppressed, Cicero was rewarded with the title of *Pater Patriae*,³ and he took much more delight in this than in any provincial command. Thus Cicero not only calmed his colleague's

1. In *Pisonem* II.5 : "Ego provinciam Galliam...in contione deposui reclamante populo Romano."

2. *Plut.*: Life of Cicero XII.4 : καὶ τοῦτον πρῶτον θεραπεύων, ὁ Κικέρων ἐκείνῳ μὲν ἐψηφίσατο τῶν ἐπαρχιῶν Μακεδονίαν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὴν Γαλατίαν διδομένην παρήγγαστο

3. *Juvenal* VIII.244 : "Roma patrem patriae Ciceronem libera dixit."

scruples, but also kept himself in Rome where, he believed, he would be useful politically to the state and contrived to keep away from a country where he might be of no use at all. Therefore, after declining to accept Gaul, he took no province for himself in 62 B.C., and became a private citizen of consular standing.

In 52 B.C. Pompey carried a body of laws for the better regulation of government. Amongst these laws was a Lex de Provinciis which altered the rules concerning the provincial governors. No longer was the consul or praetor to proceed to a province as soon as his term of office in Rome was finished; he would in future have to wait five years before becoming eligible to take such a command. Some have alleged that this law was in fact a covert attack on Caesar, but its main purpose appears to have been to check financial and political excesses both in the provinces and in Rome.¹

Whatever the cause, Cicero was quickly caught up in the result. The initial five year gap from 52 B.C. onwards had to be filled, and it was decided that, as there was not a sufficient supply of ex-magistrates to govern all the provinces, consulars of older standing who had never taken a province should now do so. Cicero, much to his amazement and alarm was compelled to join in the drawing of lots and received as his province Cilicia. He had never even considered the possibility of having to govern a province so long after his consulship, and the sudden call to leave Rome and journey nearly to the eastern limits of the Roman world came as a devastating surprise. He was given no time to plead to be exempted, though later he wished he had tried.² Events had moved too quickly, and Cicero was to be the next governor of Cilicia.

Cicero's Professed Aims and Ideals in Provincial Government.

"Moreover, if any Roman governor restrains himself out of respect

1. Caesar, after his next proposed consulship in 49 B.C., would under the new law lose his army for five years, and thus left open to prosecution would certainly lose much of his influence and power.

Of the Lex Pompeia Dio Cass. says (XL.56.1) : τὸ τε δόγμα τὸ μικρὸν ἔμπροσθε γεγόμενον, ὥστε τοὺς ἀρχάντας ἐν τῇ πόλει μὴ πρότερον ἐς τὰς ἑξὶ ἡγεμονίας πρὶν πέντε ἔτη παρελθεῖν, κληροῦσθαι, ἐπεκύρωσεν.

The main clauses of the law were (a) 5 year interval between office and governorship; (b) tribunes to have the right of veto; (c) a special decree in each case to decide the length of the governorship, which was to begin from the date of entry into the province.

2. Ad Att.V.10.3. : "Reliqua sunt eius modi ut meum consilium saepe reprehendam, quod non aliqua ratione ex hoc negotio emersem."

for principle or moderation, no-one credits him with it because of the crowd of self-seekers by whom he is surrounded. It is impossible, gentlemen, to say how we are hated by foreign peoples because of the greed and violence of those whom in recent years we have sent to govern them."¹

Cicero uttered these words in 66 B.C. when he was speaking in support of the Manilian Law which was to extend Pompey's eastern command. While it can hardly be described as Cicero's mature judgement on provincial affairs, it is true to say that the views expressed are substantially those he held on his appointment to Cilicia. His opinions on provincial concerns were formed mainly from conversations with those who had visited the provinces, though it is only fair to add that Cicero had already seen one year's duty at Lilybaeum as quaestor to Sextus Peducaeus in 75 B.C. Over the years first-hand reports from friends and a growing experience in the law courts combined to fashion and crystallise his theories on provincial government.

As might be expected, Cicero considered that every governor should possess the essential qualities of self-restraint and respect for principle, and it was not in one province only that the supreme command must be given to one who, "is able to keep his hands, his eyes and his thoughts off the money of our allies, their wives and children, and the treasures contained in their temples and cities."² Cicero, influenced by the moderate and mainly sound opinions of his friends in Rome, had formed decided opinions on how a governor should and should not conduct himself in the province. No doubt he hoped that these opinions, which have been preserved from the two main sources now to be discussed, would never have to be tested by his own practice.

1. The Speeches.

The first source for Cicero's opinions on provincial good order lies in his speeches from the law courts. In considering the evidence provided by these speeches it is dangerously easy to adopt

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1. Pro Lege Manilia XXII.64 : "Deinde, etiamsi qui sunt pudore ac temperantia moderatiores, tamen eos esse tales propter multitudinem cupidorum hominum nemo arbitratur. Difficile est dictu, Quirites, quanto in odio simus apud exterarum nationes propter eorum, quos ad eas per hos annos cum imperio misimus, libidines et iniurias."
 2. Pro Lege Manilia XXIII.66 : "...qui a pecuniis sociorum, qui ab eorum coniugibus ac liberis, qui ab ornamentis fanorum atque oppidorum, qui ab auro gazaque regia manus, oculos, animum cohibere possit...."

a modern point of view and condemn practices, such as the tax-farming system, as morally wrong merely because modern states have found a more efficient way of achieving the same end. Cicero does not attack so much for moral reasons as on grounds of inefficiency and waste. It must also be remembered that in the speeches, which concentrate on the darker side of provincial affairs, Cicero is trying to prove a point in order to win his case. He is speaking with a personal bias and clearly exaggerates both when attacking an opponent and defending a friend. However, when due allowance is made, it is useful to consider several speeches and discover the main lines on which Cicero thought the governor of a province could be attacked for mis-government.

Whilst many speeches could be quoted, the range has been deliberately limited and the main ones used for reference are these:- In Verrem, delivered in 70 B.C.; this was an attack on the scandalous conduct of Gaius Verres who, whilst governor, had plundered the Sicilians in a particularly thorough manner. Pro Fonteio, circa 69 B.C.; this was a speech delivered in defence of Fonteius who, as governor of Gaul, had squeezed from his province all that he could, until finally Indutiomarus, chief of the Allobroges, complained and Fonteius was prosecuted for *res repetundae*. De Provinciis Consularibus, 56 B.C.; this was an eloquent appeal delivered in the Senate in support of Caesar's continued governorship of Gaul. In Pisonem, 55 B.C.; a scurrilous and in some ways exaggerated attack on Piso who had late been recalled from his governorship of Macedonia. ly

The moral which Cicero tries to draw is that excess, which shows itself under the three broad headings of 'Extortion', 'Treatment of Provincials', and 'Military Matters', should always be avoided.

(a) Extortion. Many governors considered their tour of duty in a province as a just reward for service in Rome; it was an opportunity for regaining, with interest, the money they had spent whilst gaining office. In his province the governor was the head of the administration, and as such was exposed to many easy and tempting ways of making money.

A rogue like Piso in his governorship of Macedonia was able to

extort large sums of money from Dyrrhachium, ruin the Thessalians, and impose fixed annual contributions on the Achaeans; he was able to sell peace to the people of Thrace who in turn were given a free hand to overrun the Roman province as they wished.¹ Gabinus in Syria is said to have been more interested in money than in his province; when he held out his hand in battle it was not to urge on his troops, but to proclaim that he had bought or was ready to buy everything for money.² The tax-farmers, who were normally well able to fend for themselves, were reduced to ruin by Gabinus' avarice and cruelty; they were handed over to Jews and Syrians; they had their agreements, in which there was no unfairness, revoked; they could not gain a hearing from the governor, and indeed could not be in any town which Gabinus was visiting.³

(b) Treatment of Provincials. No doubt many governors left for their provinces with but vague ideas on the people who lived there; probably most of them went out with the traditional view that no foreigner was to be trusted.⁴ It was therefore very easy to disregard the provincials and their interests if they clashed, as they frequently would, with those of the governor.

Piso, for example, had taken upon himself greater powers than those allowed by the Senate; he had acted as judge and administered justice in a free state contrary to the laws and decrees of the Senate.⁵ In other cases he had been a corrupt judge, had sold justice, savagely condemned and capriciously acquitted.⁶ Not content

1. Pro Sestio 94. : "Alterum Thracibus ac Dardanis primum pacem maxima pecunia vendidisse? Deinde, ut illi pecuniam conficere possent, vexandam his Macedoniam et spoliandam tradidisse?"
2. De Prov. Cons. IV.9. : "Imperator instructo exercitu dexteram tendens non ad laudem milites hortaretur, sed omnia sibi et empta et emenda esse clamaret."
3. De Prov. Cons. IV.10. : "Iam vero publicanos miseros..tradidit in servitutem Iudaeis et Syris..custodias sustulit..vectigales multos ac stipendiarios liberavit." IV.11 : "Itaque, patres conscripti, videtis non temeritate redemptionis aut negotii gerendi inscitia, sed avaritia, superbia, crudelitate Gabini paene adflictos iam atque eversos publicanos." c.f. Pro Fon. VI.13; VIII.17. II. In Verrem II.L.123 : "Iste, qui omnia iura pretio exaequasset omniumque rerum dilectum atque discrimen pecunia sustulisset,....."
4. Pro Fon. XII.26 : "...vos Volcarum atque Allobrogum testimoniis non credere timetis?"
5. De Prov. Cons. III.6. : "Omitto iuris dictionem in libera civitate..."
6. In Pis. XXXVI.87 : "Quid ego rerum capitalium quaestiones, reorum pactiones, redemptiones, acerbissimas damnationes, libidinosissimas liberationes proferam?"

with this, he had given out licences, requisitioned ships, levied corn, robbed not only individuals but whole communities of their liberties - all in defiance of the Lex Julia.¹ Verres in Sicily had ignored local privileges in the same way; he had made demands for statues, had stayed in Syracuse to hold his court, and had altered his edict as he wished. Finally the people lost all hope and ceased to cultivate their fields.²

(c) Military Matters. The harm a governor could do extended to his army also. Military incompetence was not all, for a governor could debase and disunite his forces by the very way he employed them.

Cicero asserts that it is lamentable how Roman soldiers have been neglected, defeated and allowed to dwindle away because of the governor's lack of attention.³ Piso is accused of illegally disbanding his army without any kind of authority or decree from the Senate.⁴ Even worse, Gabinius, after squandering the money he had extorted from the tax-farmers, had to sell himself, the representative of Rome, to be the hired servant of the King of Egypt.⁵ And it is one of the accusations against Verres that he allowed his army to disintegrate, and gave the chief command in his navy to an unqualified and incompetent Sicilian.⁶

These, briefly, are the lines on which Cicero criticised bad governors: they extorted money and hindered the tax-collectors; they neglected the provincials; they were incompetent in military matters. It must however be remembered that this is the negative side of his views on provincial administration. In his speeches he is being destructive, critical and uncompromising. But no matter how critical Cicero is being, the result for Rome and for those she governed was obvious for all to see.

"Because of Roman greed and Roman injustice, all the provinces

1. In Pis. XXXVII.90 : "Mitto diplomata tota in provincia passim data; mitto numerum navium summaque praedae; mitto rationem exacti imperatque frumenti...."
2. II. In Verrem III.XCVIII.228 : "Arationes omnes tota Sicilia desertas atque a dominis relictas esse cognoscitis." I. In Verrem V.13.: "Nulla res per triennium nisi ad nutum istius iudicata est."
3. De Prov. Cons. III.5 : "Miserandum in modum milites populi Romani capti, necati, deserti, dissipati sunt, incuria, fame, morbo, vassitate consumpti."
4. In Pis. XX.47 : "Dimittendi vero exercitus quam potes adferre causam? Quam potestatem habuisti? Quam legem? Quod senatus consultum?"
5. In Pis. XXI.49 : "Exercitum eduxit ex Syria. Qui licuit extra provinciam? Praebuit se mercennarium comitem regi Alexandrino."
6. II. In Verrem V. XXXI.82 : "...naves quibus legatus praefuerat Cleomeni tradit, classi populi Romani Cleomenem Syracusanum praeesse iubet atque imperare."

are in mourning, all the free peoples are complaining, and even all the kingdoms are protesting. As far as the bounds of Ocean there is no place so distant or so hidden away that during recent times the wicked and oppressive actions of our representatives have not penetrated there. The Roman people can no longer hold out, not against the armies of the nations of the world in war, but against their groans, tears and lamentations."¹

2. Advice to Quintus.

In 62 B.C. Cicero's younger brother, Quintus, had been praetor in Rome, and when his year of office there was over he was appointed to the governorship of Asia where he remained for three years as pro-praetor. During this time he seems to have been a moderately efficient and firm governor who improved with experience. His governorship is of interest because it caused his brother Marcus to produce a letter full of advice and rules of procedure for the provincial governor, and is the second main source for Cicero's views on provincial administration. This letter is the most complete statement of positive advice and theory of government as laid down by Marcus Cicero.

That it came only in the last of his brother's three years of office is not altogether surprising. Marcus had had no experience of provincial command, and, while modesty was never one of his characteristics, he had presumably refrained from advising his brother without careful thought.² The advice given in the letter, like the points raised in the speeches, can hardly be called mature judgement, for only direct experience could bring that. Indeed the whole letter may be considered as simply a 'tour de force', in which Cicero displays, not for Quintus' benefit but for the information of the world, his views on provincial government. Certainly he was speaking to a wider audience than his brother when giving these views, and was again counselling moderation and caution. Asia was a most important and lucrative province for Rome, yet nowhere had the exactions of governors

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1. II. In Verrem III.89.207 : "Lugent omnes provinciae, queruntur omnes liberi populi, regna denique etiam omnia de nostris cupiditatibus et iniuriis expostulant; locus intra Oceanum iam nullus est neque tam longinquus neque tam reconditus quo non per haec tempora nostrorum hominum libido iniquitasque pervaserit; sustinere iam populus Romanus omnium nationum non vim, non arma, non bellum, sed luctus, lacrimas, querimonias non potest."
 2. Ad Q.F.I.1.VI.18 : "Quid enim ei praecipiam, quem ego in hoc praesertim genere intellegam prudentia non esse inferiorem quam me, usu vero etiam superiorem?"

and publicani been worse and the people become more alienated. In his introduction to the letter, however, he claims that the only reason for his final unburdening of this advice is because he feels he has failed Quintus in not preventing the extension of his stay in Asia.¹

Cicero is conscious of the supreme importance of the governor as a man who must control not only others, but himself also: "Let these be the foundations of your public rank - firstly, your own integrity and self-restraint; secondly, your careful treatment of all those about you."² A governorship thus established holds out good promise of success.

Quintus has been governing a province which consists of a mixture of the very best type of ally,³ and of Roman citizens, mainly publicani, who are attached to both the Cicero brothers by the very closest ties. It is indeed a noteworthy and commendable fact that in his three years of office Quintus has not been tempted by offers of statues, slaves, or financial rewards. He has not drained his province of its wealth, and is therefore welcomed wherever he goes.

In watching those around him the governor has to be careful not to allow his legati too much freedom, but yet he must not appear overbearing and harsh. It is not enough that the governor should exercise restraint in himself; he must see that all members of his staff, for whom he is ultimately responsible, restrain themselves also.⁴ The governor's signet ring should be a mark of his very self, a witness of the governor's will and intention, not that of his staff. He should make it clear to all that he will not tolerate the giving or receiving of bribes: "Briefly then, let it be recognised by the whole province that the welfare, children, good name and fortunes of all whom you govern are most precious to you."⁵

The governor must beware of new friends; provincials may very well be honest, but it is dangerous to assume this.⁶ Many men are attracted by the governor's position, not the governor, and are only

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1. Ad Q.F. I.1.I.3 : "Quod quoniam peccatum meum esse confiteor..."
 2. Ad Q.F. I.1.VI.18 : "Quare sint haec fundamenta dignitatis tuae, tua primum integritas et continentia; deinde omnium, qui tecum sunt, pudor..."
 3. Ad Q.F. I.1.I.6 : "Constat enim ea provincia primum ex eo genere sociorum, quod est ex hominum omni genere humanissimum."
 4. Ad Q.F. I.1.III.10 - IV.13.
 5. Ad Q.F. I.1.IV.13. : "Toti denique sit provinciae cognitum, tibi omnium, quibus praesis, salutem, liberos, famam, fortunas esse carissimas."
 6. Ad Q.F. I.1.V.15 : "...non quin possint multi esse provinciales viri boni, sed hoc sperare licet, iudicare periculosum est."

too eager to use his authority to further their own financial ends. Greeks are to be regarded as especially shifty and untrustworthy, for they have had a long training in sycophancy, and a close relationship should be maintained only with those, if any, who are worthy of ancient Greece.¹ The governor's slaves too, who are to be closely watched anywhere, should be particularly supervised in the provinces; even slaves of outstanding ability or trustworthiness should not be employed in matters relating to the governor's official work and position.

In administering justice, the governor can be as severe as he likes, but he must always be impartial, just and consistent.² Those who are allowed to play any part in the administration of justice must follow this example and remember how important this matter is because of its effect on all other matters: "I think that there is no great variety in the business of government in Asia, but that the entire government mainly depends on the administration of justice."³ A governor should be civil in hearing a case, clement in deciding it. In Asia (and therefore by implication in any province) a pro-praetor to whom everyone looks, and in whose hands lies supreme power, should be courteous and considerate, and as such he will be especially welcomed.

Even so, the governor, no matter how devoted to his province and how careful in his administration, will find a serious obstacle in the publicani. If he should alienate the publicani, he would be turning against himself and the republic a group of men who not only deserve well of the state but who are bound to it by close ties. Yet by yielding to the demands of the publicani, the governor will be acquiescing in the ruin of those provincials it is his duty to protect. The question of striking the right balance is a hard one and has caused great bitterness amongst the allies: "This is the one difficulty (if we are willing to think honestly about it) in your whole sphere of command."⁴ But even so Asia, and the other provinces, should remember with gratitude that Rome has saved her from foreign wars and internal strife; this peaceful government cannot be maintained without taxes, and the

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1. Ad Q.F.I.1.V.16 : "Atque etiam e Graecis ipsis diligenter cavendae sunt quaedam familiaritates, praeter hominum perpaucorum, si qui sunt vetere Graecia digni."
 2. Ad Q.F.I.1.VII.20.
 3. Ad Q.F.I.1.VII.20 : "Ac mihi quidem videtur non sane magna varietas esse negotiorum in administranda Asia, sed ea tota iurisdictione maxime sustineri."
 4. Ad Q.F.I.1.XI.32 : "Haec est una (si vere cogitare volumus) in toto imperio tuo difficultas."

5. Ad Fam. III.2.2. : "Vides ex amicitiaconsultis provinciam esse habendam."

6. Ad Fam. III.2.3. : "Deorum maiestas."

province should not resent paying some portion of her produce to maintain the peace.

Finally there is one test, a surprisingly modern one, by which Rome's representative must govern: "Indeed I think that those who govern others should measure all their actions by this rule: That there should be the greatest possible happiness for those who are governed."¹

Cicero's Reaction to the Appointment.

It requires little skill to imagine what Cicero's reactions must have been when he heard of the Senate decree which gave him imperium over the people and province of Cilicia. First there must have been a shocked silence, perhaps even a momentary idea that this unexpected and unwanted call to office was a mistake.² Then would come concern at all he was leaving behind in Rome,³ followed by worry and even fear for what he was to meet in his province.⁴ If, as he had said in 62 B.C.,⁵ he had been delighted to avoid this type of command when his consulship was over, then he was surely horrified in 51 B.C. when he was thus summarily allotted a province.

In his letters to his friends, Cicero shows clearly his unwillingness to face the year ahead, and seems almost desperate at the thought of the future dangers and troubles in the East. His first move was to write to his predecessor in the governorship, Appius Claudius, giving him the news of the appointment⁶ and asking that the province be handed over in the best possible order. The strange task has come as a shock and contrary to all expectations; however 'the race of office'⁷ will be made much easier if Appius looks ahead and smoothes away any difficulties.

When writing to Atticus, Cicero reveals his feelings even more than before. Many people will judge Cicero by others and will not believe

1. Ad Q.F. I.1.VIII.24: "Ac mihi quidem videntur huc omnia esse referenda iis, qui praesunt aliis, ut ii, qui erunt eorum in imperio, sint quam beatissimi."
2. Ad Fam.III.2.1.: "Cum et contra voluntatem meam et praeter opinionem accidisset ut mihi cum imperio in provinciam proficisci necesse esset.."
3. Ad Att.V.11.
4. e.g. Fear of losing his legions, if Appius dismissed them: Ad Fam.III.3.2.
5. Ad Fam.V.2.3.: "Ego, si hoc dicam, me tua causa praetermisisse provinciam, tibi ipse levior videar esse; meae enim rationes ita tulerunt atque eius mei consili maiorem in dies singulos fructum voluptatemque capio."
6. Ad Fam. III.2.2.: "Vides ex senatusconsulto provinciam esse habendam."
7. Ad Fam.III.2.2.: "Decursus mei temporis."

his protestations about being an unwilling governor, yet Atticus must believe his friend is sincere in this. His only consolation for the tremendous nuisance of his governorship is the hope that the office will be for one year only. Even though he considers himself ill-suited to the task,¹ he will at least take care to fulfil his unusual office (*munus hoc extraordinarium* : Ad Att.V.9.1.) with all decency and honesty. But it is obviously quite ridiculous that a man of Cicero's calibre should hold his court in such an out of the way place as Laodicea, while a nonentity like A. Plotius holds his court in Rome; the whole business is sickening.² Throughout most of the letters there is once recurring theme; no matter to whom Cicero is writing he nearly always adds an order, a request, a desperate plea that the term of office be for one year only. To Atticus it is : "In the name of heaven, see to it that my provincial command is not extended."³ To M. Caelius Rufus the plea is : "There is nothing that I desire more than that there should be no extension of my term of office in the province."⁴

However once the appointment had been made by decree of the Senate, there was little Cicero could do, and he was forced to take up his duties. The provincial decree restored to Cicero the imperium he had laid aside in 62 B.C. Funds from the public treasury were voted for his *vasarium*, and July 1st was fixed as the beginning of his governorship. As was his duty, he drew up his provincial edict, and set about the task of gathering together a staff. Firstly he had L. Mescinius Rufus allotted as his quaestor. Then as *legati* he chose his brother Quintus, who had already governed Asia, and C. Pomptinus, who had served in Gaul and had received a triumph for his victory over the Allobroges in 61 B.C., together with M. Anneius and L. Tullius, who was probably taken on Atticus' recommendation.⁵ His son and nephew accompanied Cicero as *comites*.

Cicero had given others advice on how to carry out these duties; it was now time to see if he could obey his own rules. He realised the situation himself, and, although he believed he was ill-suited to

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1. Ad Att. V.10.3. : "O rem minime aptam meis moribus! O illud verum *ἔρδου τις* !"
 2. Ad Att.V.15.1. : "Sed est incredibile quam me negoti taedeat.... Quippe; ius Laodiceae me dicere, cum Romae A. Plotius dicat?"
 3. Ad Att.V.11.1. : "Ne provincia nobis prorogetur, per fortunas... provide."
 4. Ad Fam.II.8.3. : ".....cupio tum nihil magis quam ne tempus nobis provinciae prorogetur."

For the period May to 31st July, there are 15 extant letters, some only short notes, written by Cicero to friends in Rome. Of these 8 contain a direct request that the period of office be kept down to one year, and most of the others hint at Cicero's weariness or apprehension as he journeys to Cilicia.

5. Ad Att.V.11.4. : "tuus unus Tullius aberat."


the task, he admitted to Atticus : Now are the professions of a lifetime put to the test.¹ And what would be his guide for the months ahead? "I hope I shall use those rules I learned at your Academy, and I shall satisfy everyone."² It was time for Cicero himself, and by his own governorship, to answer the very questions he had put to the jurors when prosecuting Verres in 70 B.C. "Are you satisfied with the present moral standards? Satisfied that our governors shall govern as they do? Satisfied that our allies should for the future be treated as you see that in recent times they have been treated?"³

The final judgement on Cicero's governorship must take into account his practice in the light of these questions.

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At this point it seems necessary to explain the sequence of the three following chapters. Firstly there come the details of Cicero's activities during his year of office; his journeys to and from the province, and the variety of his concerns within it, are considered in chronological order, together with such discussion of the material as could be contained within suitable limits. In the ensuing chapter there follows a more careful enquiry into those topics raised during the governorship which are too outstanding to be passed over in a summary fashion; Cicero's legal and administrative duties, and a consideration of such other matters as taxation, are reserved until this point. The third chapter is devoted entirely to provincial defence and Cicero's military activities which need a rather fuller historical setting; the Parthian scare and the campaigns against the brigands are therefore treated in a separate chapter at the end.

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1. Ad Att. V.13.1. : "Ex quo te intellegere certo scio multorum annorum ostentationes meas nunc in discrimen esse adductas."
 2. Ad Att.V.13.1. : "Sed, ut spero, utemur ea palaestra quam a te didicimus omnibusque satis faciemus..."
 3. II. In Verrem III.89.208 : "Placent vobis hominum mores? Placet ita geri magistratus ut geruntur? Placet socios sic tractari quod restat ut per haec tempora tractatos videtis?"



— CICERO'S ROUTE

CICERO'S YEAR OF OFFICE

The Journey to Cilicia.

It was towards the end of April 51 B.C. that Cicero, who was probably accompanied by his son, left Rome prior to taking up his provincial command. It seems fairly clear that he travelled along the Via Latina until he came to Tusculum, where he stayed for a short while in order to visit his friend Atticus and bid him farewell for at least a year. The length of this stay at Tusculum is neither known nor important, though no doubt the talk was of politics and all the various tasks and concerns Cicero was leaving under Atticus' care. This final meeting was a poignant one, for the two friends realised how much they would miss each others company, if not advice, during the months ahead.¹

Once the good-byes had been said, Cicero journeyed on during the first days of May to his next halt in his villa at Arpinum where he was shortly joined by the first of his four legati, his own brother Quintus. The two brothers went on together to Quintus' estate at Arcanum, and it was here that Quintus' wife, Pomponia, displayed her petty nature by a show of temper over a small lunch party suggested by Quintus.² There was a festival in progress at Arcanum, and Quintus therefore stayed on for the rest of the day, presumably in order to show an interest in the country festival and the part his own estate labourers were to play in it. Next morning he rejoined Marcus at Aquinum, and together they continued their journey to Minturnae, from where, on about May 5th, Cicero wrote the first of his series of letters back to Atticus in Rome.

The journey went forward in easy stages since Cicero disliked travelling at great speed, and indeed he believed he had time, and to spare, to reach Cilicia by July 1st, the proposed date for the taking of the province. He also found cause for delay in one other weighty consideration. His second legatus, Pomptinus, who was like

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1. Ad Att.V.1.1. : "Ego vero et tuum in discessu vidi animum et meo sum ipse testis. Quo magis erit tibi videndum ne quid novi decernatur, ut hoc nostrum desiderium ne plus sit annum."
 2. Ad Att.V.1.3. : " 'Pomponia', inquit, 'tu invita mulieres, ego ascivero pueros' ".
Who are the pueri? O. E. Schmidt thinks they are the sons of Marcus and Quintus. Tyrrell (Correspondence of Cicero : Vol. III; page 9), whilst thinking the pueri are free labourers on Quintus' estate, supposes that the two Cicero boys are in fact already accompanying their elders at this stage of the journey. This seems a reasonable supposition as we know that they had joined the party by Athens, if not before.

Quintus well versed in military matters,¹ had not yet arrived and Cicero was understandably reluctant to enter a province which was threatened by war without having an expert's knowledge as a compensation for his own lack of military experience.

When Cicero stopped for the day in his villa at Cumae, the place became a miniature Rome for there were so many friends about;² Hortensius, although he was ill, came to say good-bye, but Sempronius Rufus, who was involved in some financial troubles, did not. From Cumae they went on through Puteoli to Cicero's villa at Pompeii, and then on to spend the day at Pontius' villa at Trebula. In all these country towns Cicero noted a good deal of panic in political matters, but also a good deal of nonsense.³ At this point even Cicero realised that he was taking too long over his journey, and so he resolved to carry out a full day's march in future and not to make such frequent halts as of late.⁴ Thus it came about that in the next few days he hurried on; he was at Beneventum on May 11th, Venusia on May 15th, and at Tarentum on May 18th.

As a result of this recent burst of speed, Cicero felt that he might have outpaced Pomptinus, whose presence was all-important, and so decided to await his arrival. Once this decision had been taken it seemed most advantageous and sensible to spend those days of waiting in political talks with Pompey, who in turn seemed pleased with the arrangement.⁵ Thereafter there followed a further delay of several days, probably until May 22nd, in discussions with Pompey, who had apparently decided to appoint new praefecti for Spain. As for Cicero's own staff, there was still no need for the two remaining legati, M. Anneius and L. Tullius, to hurry out from Rome provided Pomptinus reached Brundisium before June.

Quintus and Marcus arrived at Brundisium late on May 22nd, and were destined, by reason of Marcus' sudden indisposition (which seems to have been nothing serious) and a further wait for the still tarrying Pomptinus, to remain there until June 10th. During this stay Cicero occupied himself in part by writing to his predecessor in Cilicia, Appius

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1. Sallust : Cat : XLV.1 & 2. : "Cicero...L. Valerio Flacco et C. Pomptino praetoribus imperat..Illi, homines militares,..pontem obsidunt."
 2. Ad Att.V.2.2. : "Habuimus in Cumano quasi pusillam Romam; tanta erat in his locis multitudo."
 3. Ad Att.V.3.1. : "In oppidis enim summum video timorem, sed multa inania."
 4. Ad Att.V.2.1. : "Deinde cogitabam sine ulla mora iusta itinera facere."
 5. At Att.V.6.1. : "...commodissimum duxi dies eos, quoad ille veniret, cum Pompeio consumere, eoque magis quod ei gratum esse id videbam...."

6. Ad Att.V.10.2. : "...in quocumque loco, ubi mecum fuisset, non in quocumque loco."

8. Ad Att.V.11.6.

7. Ad Att.V.11.1. : "Non enim mecum fuisset, non in quocumque loco."

Claudius, and by spending some while in conferring with one of Appius' legati, Quintus Fabius Vergilianus. This man had come to meet Cicero with advice and to offer various suggestions for the easy change-over of authority in the province. Cicero, who had already written to Atticus saying that he and Bibulus in Syria ought to receive a grant of money from the Senate,¹ now wrote to Appius stating that if it had not been the Senate's wish that he should leave for the province with all speed,² he would have enrolled reinforcements for his Cilician legions. As this is the case, will Appius please see to it that the legions at present in Cilicia are not depleted any further? Cicero was also gratified to learn that Appius was staying on in the province for the express purpose of meeting him.

The party sailed from Brundisium - and still without Pomptinus - on June 10th. Despite his long delay Cicero did not find that sailing conditions were altogether to his liking, and he reports that after having had such a rough sea passage³ he preferred to avoid the dangers of sailing around the island of Leucas and the indignity of landing 'sine impedimentis' in small rowing boats at Patrae. Therefore, after dining like aldermen at Corcyra and Sybota,⁴ he resolved to disembark at Actium on June 14th and travel on overland to Athens, which he reached on June 24th.

He was to stay in Athens nearly a fortnight, and during that time he had an opportunity to consider the manners of his staff and the impression they were making on the districts through which they were travelling. So far no public body, no private person has had to expend money for the support of Cicero or any of his staff, and this has resulted in a good deal of praise and comment from the Greeks who were amazed at this un-Roman restraint.⁵ The staff have followed Cicero's example, and so far have been beyond reproach.⁶ Yet the success of the early part of his journey and the praise for his conduct could not soften Cicero's regrets at leaving Rome; already he is 'ablaze with longing for the city', for 'this dull, tasteless life is unbearable'.⁷

1. Ad Att.V.4.2. : "Igitur senatus consultum si erit factum, scribes ad me : si minus, rem tamen conficies. Mihi enim attribui oportebit, item Bibulo."
2. Ad Fam.III.3.1.: "Id cum Sulpicius consul passurum se negaret, multa nos quidem questi sumus, sed tantus consensus senatus fuit ut mature proficisceremur, parendum ut fuerit : itaque fecimus."
3. Ad Att.V.9.1.: "Actio maluimus iter facere pedibus, qui incommodissime navigassemus, et Leucaten flectere molestum videbatur."
4. Ad Att.V.9.1.: "Actium venimus a.d.XVII Kal.Quinct., cum quidem et Corcyrae et Sybotis muneribus tuis, quae et Areus et meus amicus Eutychedes opipare et φιλοπροσνήετα nobis congesserant, epulati essemus Saliarem in modum."
5. Ad Att.V.10.2. : "...adhuc sumptus nec in me aut publice aut privatim nec in quemquam comitum :Belle adhuc."
6. Ad Att.V.11.5.
7. Ad Att.V.11.1. : "Non dici potest quam flagrem desiderio urbis, quam vix harum rerum insulsitatem feram."

He found Athens in its material embellishments an admittedly pleasing city, but its philosophy was all topsy-turvy. During this halt, which was of necessity a lengthy one for Pomptinus was still absent, Patro, the Epicurean leader, asked for Cicero's help in a certain difficulty he was experiencing. Memmius, to whom Lucretius had dedicated his poem 'De Rerum Natura', was now an exile from Rome and living in Athens. Despite the dedication of the poem however he appears to have had little sympathy for Epicurean feelings, and after gaining possession of Epicurus' old home, now a derelict building, he intended to pull it down. This of course alarmed Patro who turned to Cicero for aid. Cicero complied with Patro's request, and wrote an adroit letter to Memmius asking that the building be returned to the safe keeping of the faithful Epicureans.¹

It was also at Athens that Cicero's staff came up to what was very nearly its full strength. The tardy Pomptinus finally arrived, bringing Volusius with him.² The quaestor Mescinius was there, and, as L. Tullius is stated to be the only absentee, it must be presumed that M. Anneius had joined Cicero either at Brundisium or in Athens itself. Thus on July 6th, already six days after the date he originally intended to enter upon his pro-consular duties, Cicero sailed from Piraeus for Asia.

From Athens they ran into contrary winds and rough seas once more. Their first landfall was at Zoster, where they remained for a full day, so rough was the weather. Ceos was reached in good conditions on July 8th and then, when the wind swung round but remained strong, they made Gyaros, Syros and finally, on the 12th, Delos with greater speed than Cicero could have wished, 'for the open Rhodian boats give scant protection in a rough sea'.³ After such a crossing Cicero resolved not to move across the stretch of open sea from Delos to Icaria until he could see all the peaks of Gyrae, a promontory on Tenos to the north, standing out in a clear sky.⁴

He did in fact wait so long and gain such calm conditions that in his next letter to Atticus he found cause for complaint in the slowness and

1. Ad Fam. XIII.1.

2. Ad Att. V.11.4. : "Venerat Pomptinus, una Cn. Volusius, aderat quaestor : tuus unus Tullius aberat." It is quite possible that this Volusius was later appointed praefectus by Cicero and sent to Cyprus to supervise some legal cases there.

3. Ad Att. V.12.1. : "Iam nosti aphracta Rhodiorum : nihil quod minus fluctum ferre possit."

4. Ad Att. V.12.1. : "Itaque erat in animo nihil festinare nec me Delo movere, nisi omnia ἄκρα Γυρέων pura vidissem."

conduct, the year of his journey began only when the governor entered his province. Therefore Cicero gained nothing by delay, unless it was the assurance of his own presence. Moreover his outward journey, whilst apparently short, was slower than his return a year later when he was more than prepared he was in a greater hurry.

frailty of the Rhodian ships. Clearly the voyage must have been uneventful for Cicero was not sea-sick.¹

At Samos, and even more so at Ephesos, which he reached on July 22nd, Cicero was met by crowds of people : official reception committees, private individuals, provincials, Roman tax-gatherers and Greeks came to greet him. One would have thought Cicero was to govern Asia itself.² Mainland Asia continued to give Cicero a warm reception,³ which may well have been due largely to the continuing good name of Quintus in the province he had recently governed. The prospect of a province had so appalled Marcus that he had had no time to consider what the views of the provincials might be, and he was therefore both surprised and pleased by the enthusiasm displayed at his arrival, and in more auspicious circumstances his head would have been completely turned. The staff too were behaving well, and their coming did not cost anyone a farthing. All these facts gave Cicero some feeling of pleasure, for it now seemed that the impending duties might not be so impossibly difficult as they had seemed at first.

His last halt in Asia was at Tralles and then, on July 31st 51 B.C., Cicero finally reached the western edge of his province and entered upon his year as governor of Cilicia. His arrival has been longed for by the province, but not by Cicero, who is eager that the fact that he arrived one day sooner than he expected should be recorded. "Count that day as the beginning of my year of office."⁴

15	Syros	:			Att.V.12.
30	Delos	:	12th July		Att.V.12.
83	Samos	:			Att.V.13.
28	Ephesus	:	22nd July - 26th July		Att.V.13.
30	Tralles	:	27th July		Att.V.14.
70	Laodicea	:	31st July		Att.V.15.

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1. Ad Att.V.13.1. : "Navigavimus sine timore et sine nausea...."
 2. Ad Att. V.13.1.: "Verumtamen decumani quasi venissem cum imperio, Graeci quasi Ephesio praetori se alacres obtulerunt."
 3. Ad Att.V.14.2.: "Nos Asia accepit admirabiliter."
 4. Ad Att.V.15.1.: "Laodiceam veni pridie Kal. Sext. Ex hoc die clavum anni movebis."

There is a common view, more often implied than expressed, that Cicero dawdled on his journey out to Cilicia in order to avoid some of his duties as governor. Yet in accordance with the terms of the Lex Pompeia de Provinciis, and as shown by Cicero's own conduct, the year of office began only when the governor entered his province. Therefore Cicero gained nothing by delay, unless it was the assurance of Pomptinus' presence. Moreover his outward journey, whilst admittedly slow, was quicker than his return a year later when it might have been presumed he was in a greater hurry.

Appendix B.ROUTE AND DATE CHART FOR CICERO'S JOURNEY TO CILICIA.

Approx.

Miles


	Rome	: End of April	
15	Tusculum	: Early May	(Att.V.1.)
55	Arpinum	: Early May	(Att.V.1.)
15	Aquinum	: Early May	(Att.V.1.)
20	Minturnae	: 5th May	Att.V.1.
35	Cumae	:	(Att.V.2.)
5	Puteoli	:	(Att.V.2.)
25	Pompeii	: 10th May	Att.V.2.
	Trebula	: 10th May	Att.V.3.
40	Beneventum	: 11th May	Att.V.4.
60	Venusia	: 15th May	Att.V.5.
85	Tarentum	: 18th May - 22nd May	Att.V.6. : Att V.7.
40	Brundisium	: 22nd May - circa 10th June	Fam.III.3. : Att.V.8.
125	Corcyra	:	(Att.V.9.)
	Sybota	:	(Att.V.9.)
45	Actium	: 14th June	Att.V.9.
175	Athens	: 24th June - 6th July	Att.V.10. : Att V.11.
15	Zoster	: 7th July	(Att.V.12.)
35	Ceos	: 8th July	(Att.V.12.)
20	Gyaros	:	(Att.V.12.)
15	Syros	:	(Att.V.12.)
30	Delos	: 12th July	(Att.V.12.)
85	Samos	:	(Att.V.13.)
28	Ephesus	: 22nd July - 26th July	Att.V.13.
30	Tralles	: 27th July	Att V.14.
70	Laodicea	: 31st July	Att V.15.

Att.V.1. : References without brackets denote the letter was written at this place.

(Att.V.1.) : References with brackets denote that this place is mentioned.

AUGUST TO DECEMBER 51 B.C.

SKETCH MAP IV



August to December 51 B.C.

Laodicea was reached and the year of office begun on July 31st. Cicero found this a favourable moment to condense those feelings which he had expressed in many letters written on his outward journey. To Atticus he wrote that, though his arrival had clearly been a source of joy to the province, it has given him no pleasure for he found his wide interests were too confined; how he misses Rome's brilliance and activity! His province, which had suffered many patent wounds at Appius' hands, was but poorly protected by two skeleton legions, and this fact gave cause for alarm: "I can endure, provided it is only for a year."¹

He stayed in Laodicea for three days.² Here as elsewhere the new

1. Ad Att.V.15.1. : "...lucem, forum, urbem, domum, vos desidero. Sed feram ut potero, sit modo annuum."
2. Any attempt to fix precise dates for Cicero's movements in August is beset by difficulties of Cicero's own contriving. He refers to the events occurring at this time in three separate letters and, somewhat misleadingly, gives three separate versions. The discrepancies are best listed in tabular form. He states that he stayed in each place for the following number of days:-

	<u>Att.V.16.2.</u>	<u>Att.V.20.1.</u>	<u>Fam.XV.4.2.</u>
Written:-	August 11th	December	January
Laodicea	3	2	2
Colossae	-	?	-
Apamea	3	5	4
Synnada	3	3	3
Philomelium	-	5	3
Iconium	-	10	-

Entered camp on 24th August.

The main difficulty lies in the fact that when giving dates in his letters, Cicero sometimes ignores travelling time, sometimes counts the day of arrival or departure, sometimes both. It seems best in the undoubted confusion to accept the dating supplied by Att.V.16., as this is the nearest in time to the events described, and explain the differences in Att.V.20. and Fam. XV.4. as the result of a slip of the memory after a four month gap. Further, for lack of any other information, it seems best to accept Att.V.20. for the number of days stayed in Philomelium and Iconium. Taking into consideration Cicero's statement that they spent most nights under canvas, it seems probable that a reasonable dating scheme for August, travelling time included, is as follows:-

Laodicea	:	31st July - 2nd August
Apamea	:	3rd August - 5th August
Synnada	:	6th August - 8th August
Philomelium	:	9th August - 13th August
Iconium	:	14th August - 23rd August
Camp at Iconium	:	24th August - 29th August

governor received a rousing reception. The fame of so important a visitor from Rome had gone before him, and expressions such as, "Is this the man who (checked Catiline)? For whom the Senate (decreed a supplicatio)?", were no doubt as common in Laodicea as they were near the Amanus Mountains.¹ Many people came into the town from the surrounding districts to help swell the welcoming crowds, to cheer, or just to stare at the great man; many came to head official public deputations or to make personal requests for tax relief or assistance. In the matter of personal requests no doubt the tax-gatherers were well to the fore.² The law courts and the administration of justice also occupied some of his time, and the nett result must have been that, while Cicero may well have been irked by provincial behaviour and concerns, he found that he had little time spare in which to be melancholy.

After this crowded introduction to his governorship, he set out through the northern circuit of his province, staying for two or three days in each important town, where he was no doubt occupied in much the same way as he had been at Laodicea.³ His aim was to join his army, part of which had lately mutinied,⁴ and then he intended to go on to the Taurus to deal with some brigand chief.⁵ The northern journey led the governor's party through Colossae, which was a very brief halt, on to Apamea, where he received a deputation from a town in Phrygia, then to Synnada and Philomelium. Whilst at Synnada, or thereabouts, he was visited by Deiotarus, King of Galatia, who took the Cicero boys back to his court with him for the summer months.⁶

The states were all insolvent and everywhere the story was the same: the provincials were weary of life, but so exemplary had been the restraint of Cicero's party that unbelievable crowds kept coming to meet him from the farms and hamlets. The people, who came to him with tears and complaints that they could not pay the poll-tax, could also bring stories of Appius' savage conduct, which was more the behaviour of a wild beast than a man.⁷ During this tour Cicero

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1. Ad Fam.II.10.2. : "Multum est enim in his locis : 'Hicine est ille, qui Urbem...? quem senatus....?' ".
 2. Ad Att.V.13.1. : "...decumani...se alacres obtulerunt."
 3. Ad Att.V.20.1. : "Ibi morati biduum perillustres fuimus honorificisque verbis omnis iniurias revellimus superiores; quod idem Colossis, dein Apameae quinque dies morati et Synnadis triduum, Philomeli quinque dies, Iconi decem fecimus. Nihil ea iuris dictione aequabilius, nihil lenius, nihil gravius."
 4. Ad Att.V.14.1. : "...seditio militum sedata ab Appio."
 5. Ad Att.V.15.3.
 6. Ad Att.V.18.4. : "Cicerones nostri sunt apud Deiotarum..."
 7. Ad Fam.III.8.2. : "Apameae cum essem, multarum civitatum principes ad me detulerunt sumptus decerni legatis nimis magnos, cum solvendo civitates non essent."
- Ad Att.V.16.2. : "Audivimus nihil aliud nisi imperata ἑπικεφάλια
solvere non posse ;ὧνάς omnium venditas; civitatum gemitus, ploratus;
monstra quaedam non hominis, sed ferae nescio cuius immanis."

freed many towns from exorbitant taxes and fraudulent claims to debts,¹ and all along his way he noted further signs of Appius' cruel behaviour in the province. This beginning of the governorship was a very satisfactory one, and Cicero hoped that his own justice and restraint would become famous, especially if, like Scaevola the model governor of Asia, he not only gained a good reputation in his province, but also left it early.

On the journey from Synnada to Philomelium Cicero wrote two letters (Ad Att.V.16 and 17), in the second of which he makes no mention of the first. In V.16 he says that he is two (the reading of the manuscripts) or three (Schiche's emendation, adopted by Tyrrell²) days' journey from camp. In V.17 he is two days' journey away. Now the problem arises of which camp this is, and whether and when Cicero did in fact enter it. O. E. Schmidt, followed by Tyrrell, suggested that the camp is the one at Philomelium, where the five cohorts which had mutinied under Appius had settled themselves.³ But it should be remembered that these cohorts were without officers of any kind, and if one may judge from Cicero's letters the recent mutiny was still fresh in their mind. In these circumstances was it likely that a man such as Cicero, who was without real military experience, would actually hurry (nos in castra properabamus : Ad Att.V.16.4.) to a camp of ill-disciplined, probably disgruntled, and even violent soldiers? Was he the man to quell a mutiny? Surely what was needed was a man capable of acting rather than talking. It does therefore seem both reasonable and likely that Cicero, after a rapid journey, halted in the town of Philomelium and sent off one of his legati, M. Anneius, with orders to round up the defecting cohorts, lead them back to the rest of the troops, and then make camp with the remainder of the army as a combined force once more near Iconium.⁴ So, even if Cicero meant the camp near Philomelium, it seems almost certain that he did not enter it.

There is one further point. The distance from Synnada to Philomelium is given by Tyrrell as 55 miles.⁵ This journey should have taken only two days at the most for a man who was hastening on to camp.

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1. Ad Fam.XV.4.2. : "Quibus in oppidis cum magni conventus fuissent, multas civitates acerbissimis tributis et gravissimis usuris et falso aere alieno liberavi."
 2. Tyrrell and Purser : Correspondence of Cicero : Vol.III; Page 70.
 3. Ad Fam. XV.4.2. : "Cumque ante adventum meum seditione quadam exercitus esset dissipatus, quinque cohortes sine legato, sine tribuno militum, denique etiam sine centurione ullo apud Philomelium consedisent, reliquus exercitus esset in Lycaonia...."
 4. Ad Fam.XV.4.2. : "...M. Anneio legato imperavi, ut eas quinque cohortis ad reliquum exercitum duceret coactoque in unum locum exercitu castra in Lycaonia apud Iconium faceret."
 5. Tyrrell and Purser : Correspondence of Cicero : Vol.III; Page 150.

Tyrrell states that Att.V.17 was most likely written the day after V.16; i.e. much nearer to Philomelium than to Synnada. Yet even in V.17 camp is still two days away. It does therefore seem probable that Cicero in fact meant that he was moving towards the regular camp at Iconium, and in that case the distance of 70 miles which separates Philomelium and Iconium represents a reasonable two day journey carried out at speed. Moreover, it was at Iconium that Cicero would meet loyal soldiers, not a mutinous bivouac.

Whichever camp Cicero meant he did not enter it in either two or three days, for after his halt at the town, not the camp, of Philomelium, where he held assizes,¹ he stopped for ten days in Iconium.² For what purpose? Apparently he held yet more assizes, despite the fact that he had come to Iconium expressly to join his army. Why then did he wait for ten days in the town before entering the military camp outside Iconium? The clue to the probable solution of this problem lies in the despatch of M. Anneius to bring the five cohorts from Philomelium to Iconium. By this action Cicero had already acknowledged that he was not the man to discipline soldiers, and at Iconium he probably acknowledged the fact once more by sending on ahead one of his military experts, Quintus or Pomptinus, perhaps both, to take command of the loyal troops, prepare the camp for the arrival of Anneius and the five cohorts, and then by discipline and training prepare for the arrival of their general, Cicero himself. It was only when the troops were obedient once more that their commander would inspect them. During this period while his military experts bestirred themselves in military matters, what was more natural than that the legal expert should hold assizes? And what was more in keeping with Cicero's vainglorious nature than his complete silence on the matter? However that may be, Cicero finally entered camp at Iconium (the camp he was three days away from on August 12th) for the first time on August 24th, and reviewed his army, which was then reduced to order, on August 28th.³

When his judicial business in Iconium was over, Cicero held a levy of troops and gathered together a resolute body of reserve infantry

1. Ad Fam. XV.4.2; Ad Att. V.20.1.
2. Ad Att.V.20.1. : "....Iconi decem (days) fecimus. Nihil ea iuris dictione aequabilius, nihil lenius, nihil gravius."
3. Ad Att.V.20.2. : "Inde in castra veni a.d. VII. Kal. Septembr. A.d. III exercitum lustravi apud Iconium."

4. Ad Fam. XV.1.3. : "Quae res me ad castra cum esset pervenit qui ei regi minores fides habebat potuerunt, statui expectandum esse si quid certius diceretur."

5. Ad Fam. III.2.6. 6. Ad Fam. III.6.5. 7. Ad Fam. III.7.4.

and cavalry, together with volunteers from the free peoples and from the allied kings.¹ He was soon to need this force and the help of L. Tullius who at last caught up with Cicero, possibly at Iconium, for on the very day of the review of the army ambassadors came from Antiochus of Commagene with reports of a Parthian invasion across the Euphrates and rumours of an intended attack by the Armenian King, Artavasdes, on Cappadocia.² This news must have caused Cicero considerable concern, but whatever his private feelings he acted very shrewdly. It seems that several possible courses of action were considered,³ but finally it was decided, probably because the forces available were so small numerically, that after leaving Iconium the army would move cautiously along the borders of Cappadocia in order to offer a show of force and yet be gradually easing towards Cilicia proper to face any possible invasion from that quarter.

Cicero, the general, and his army left camp at Iconium on August 29th⁴ and began to march south-east, but not before D. Antonius, the officer in charge of the reservists, had been despatched to reclaim from Appius those cohorts which the previous governor still had with him, either in Tarsus or at some point west of there.⁵ In the midst of all his concern at the threatening war-crisis Cicero had again written, somewhat acrimoniously, to Appius giving details of his plans and asking where and when they could meet. Hardly had this letter been sent off than Appius arrived, seemingly from nowhere, swept by, and was lost once more in the early dawn before Cicero had any opportunity of greeting him.⁶

In pursuance of his cautious policy of making a lengthy tour through those districts of his province bordering on Cappadocia, and even inside Cappadocia itself, in order to show Roman strength and deter both the Armenian Artavasdes and the Parthians from entering this area, Cicero marched his army through Lycaonia, south through Isauria and into those parts of Cappadocia adjoining Cilicia.⁷ He finally pitched camp at Cybistra on September 19th or 20th.

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1. Ad Fam. XV.4.3. : "...cum interea superioribus diebus ex senatus consulto et evocatorum firmam manum et equitatum sane idoneum et populorum liberorum regumque sociorum auxilia voluntaria comparavissem."
 2. Ad Fam. XV.3.1.: "...iique mihi nuntiassent regis Parthorum filium... ad Euphratem cum maximis Parthorum copiis..venisse..dicique Armenium regem in Cappadociam impetum esse facturum..."
 3. Ad Fam. XV.1.2.: "Quo nuntio adlato cum essent nonnulli qui ei regi minorem fidem habendam putarent, statui exspectandum esse si quid certius afferretur."
 4. Ad Fam. III.6.6. 5. Ad Fam. III.6.5. 6. Ad Fam. III.7.4.
 7. Ad Att. V.20.2. : "Ex his castris, cum graves de Parthis nuntii venirent, perrexi in Ciliciam per Cappadociae partem eam quae Ciliciam attingit...."

From Cybistra he wrote to Rome giving news of the critical state of affairs. He states that his present intention is to march up to the Taurus Mountains, and asks for a powerful army to be sent out to the east as the local auxiliaries are feeble and often estranged, while Cappadocia is useless; "The situation is now such that unless you quickly send out to these provinces an army of the size you normally send out to a full scale war, there is a danger of losing all those territories on which the revenues of Rome depend."¹ Most strangely Cicero did not send this despatch straight to the Senate, but routed it via Atticus who is asked to read it and decide if it should be delivered.² This is an amazing request, and calls into question the role Atticus played in Cicero's affairs during the whole year. Atticus was not only a man of wealth but also of good connections with all the political groupings, and this request possibly means that Cicero was relying on him to gauge the political mood and to judge whether more could be achieved by private representations to individual leaders at Rome rather than by an eloquent appeal to the whole Senate. It is in such a case as this that the one-sided nature of the correspondence between Cicero and Atticus is most to be regretted, for it is not known for certain what action Atticus took. Probably the despatch was delivered, but even so it proved ineffective for no reinforcements were sent to Cicero's aid.

The next step was to send on the cavalry in advance to bring news of the army's speedy arrival, to strengthen morale in the Cilician towns, and to gain advance reports of the situation in Syria. But then, before Cicero could leave Cybistra, he was visited on two separate occasions by King Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia, who had been placed under Cicero's protection by a decree of the Senate.³ On the first day Ariobarzanes assured Cicero that all was well in his kingdom, but on the second he returned in a state of great distress and informed the governor of a plot against his life. Cicero, who believed he had far more important matters to contend with in a Parthian war, satisfied himself with counselling the king and his relatives to exercise care, to punish those most deeply involved in the plot, and to

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1. Ad Fam. XV.1.5. : "Hoc autem tempore res sese sic habet ut, nisi exercitum tantum quantum ad maximum bellum mittere soletis mature in has provincias miseritis, summum periculum sit ne amittendae sint omnes hae provinciae quibus vectigalia populi Romani continentur."
 2. Ad Att.V.18.1. : "His de rebus scripsi ad senatum : quas litteras, si Romae es, videbis putesne reddendas..."
 3. Ad Fam.XV.2.4. - 8.

Appendix C.

pardon the rest. CHART : AUGUST - DECEMBER 31 B.C.

Because of the serious situation he could leave none of his troops behind, as the king requested, and straightway struck camp on September 25th or 26th.¹ As the threat of invasion was now directed against Cilicia rather than Cappadocia,² he moved quickly eastwards by forced marches to the Cilician Gates. The last part of this journey through the mountains would be difficult and tiring going, and Cicero after making one of his customary halts near a town, probably Podandos, rested his troops there and gathered the latest information. Reports no doubt flooded in, and more especially so when he reached Tarsus on October 5th.³

The reports themselves and Cicero's actions after receiving them belong rather to the story of the military campaigns which are to be considered in a later section. It is sufficient for now to say that after early October Cicero's governorship became almost entirely a military affair, which led him across Cilicia Pedias to Mopsuestia, to Issus and finally into the Amanus. Here Cicero discovered to his relief that the Parthians had not crossed into Cilicia, and so he was able to turn from what would have been a serious invasion to the suppression of a minor trouble on the eastern borders of the province. There was some rebellious brigand opposition to be eradicated, and October, November and the greater part of December were spent in toil, and ultimately in victory, in these mountains.

By the time that Pindenissus, the main point of resistance, capitulated, the winter season was already setting in, and Cicero and his staff had been away from the centre of the province for far too long. In consequence Cicero hastily gave the command over the army to his brother Quintus while he, no doubt glad to be free of brigands and mountain fighting, intended to return to Laodicea.⁴

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1. Ad Att.V.20.2.; Ad Fam. XV.4.6.
 2. Ad Att.V.20.2. : "...certior sum factus Parthos ab illo aditu Cappadociae longe abesse, Ciliciae magis imminere.
 3. Ad Att.V.20.3. : "Tarsum veni a.d. III Non. Octobr."
 4. Ad Att.V.20.5. : "Ipse me Laodiceam recipiebam."

Appendix C.ROUTE AND DATE CHART : AUGUST - DECEMBER 51 B.C.

Approx.
Miles.


	Laodicea	: 31st July - 2nd Aug.	(Att.V.16.)
20	Colossae	: 3rd Aug.	(Att.V.20.)
50	Apamea	: 3rd Aug. - 5th Aug.	(Att.V.16.)
45	Synnada	: 6th Aug. - 8th Aug.	(Att.V.16.)
55	Philomelium	: 9th Aug. - 13th Aug.	(Att.V.20.)
70	Iconium	: 14th Aug. - 23rd Aug.	(Att.V.20.)
	Camp at Iconium	: 24th Aug. - 29th Aug.	Fam. XV.3. : (Att.V.20.)
	Lycaonia	: Early September	(Att.V.20)
	Isauria	: Early September	(Att.V.20)
	Cappadocia	: Mid September	(Att.V.20)
	Cybistra	: 20th Sept. - 25th Sept.	Att.V.18. : (Fam.XV.4.)
55	Podandos	: Early October	
35	Tarsus	: 5th Oct. - 7th Oct.	(Att.V.20) : (Fam.III.8)
35	Mopsuestia	: 8th Oct.	Fam. III.8
30	Issus	: 9th Oct. - 11th Oct.	(Fam.II.10)
8	Epiphanea	: 12th Oct.	(Fam.XV.4.)
	Amanus	: 13th Oct.	(Att.V.20.)
	Arae Alexandri	: 14th Oct.- 18th Oct.	(Att.V.20.)
	Pindenissus	: 21st Oct.- 19th Dec.	Fam.II.10. : Att.V.20.
120	Tarsus	: Late Dec. - early Jan.	Fam.XV.4.

Att.V.18 : References without brackets denote the letter was written at this place.

(Att.V.16.) : References with brackets denote that this place is mentioned.

JANUARY TO JULY 50 B.C.

SKETCH MAP V



As already stated, Quintus was left behind in eastern Cilicia to supervise the troops. The next to leave were M. Anneius and Volusius. Anneius had some private business affairs, possibly of a questionable nature, which he wished to settle with the people of Sardis and so he gained Cicero's permission to go in person to that city.¹ In consequence he left for Asia post haste, and was not to be seen in Cilicia again for some months. At about this time Quintus Volusius, who is probably that same Volusius who arrived at Athens together with Pomptinus,² seems to have been appointed as praefectus and was sent to Cyprus. This appointment was a necessary one for Cicero states that the Cypriots could not be compelled to come to the mainland to appear before the courts, and in consequence a deputy had to be sent to the island by the governor.² Volusius was the man chosen for this duty, and he left for Cyprus some time in early January.

Pomptinus too was in a hurry to be moving westwards again for he clearly had his eyes fixed on Rome. Cicero, who hints at some love affair,³ had only persuaded Pomptinus to come with him by the promise of allowing his early departure. He now had to stand by this promise and allowed the man who was probably his chief military adviser to return to Italy with the year of office only half over. Pomptinus returned with Cicero as far as Laodicea, but then with little, if any, further delay carried on his journey to the coast. Certainly he was gone by February 20th.⁴

For his part Cicero left Tarsus on January 5th and, presumably travelling by the route he followed the previous year,⁵ arrived back in Laodicea on February 11th,⁶ thus completing his return journey from the east in half the time he took to go out there. However, he had had many important problems to worry and delay him on the outward journey, whilst on his return in January his major concern seems to have been the alleviation of famine by persuading those Greeks and

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1. Ad Fam.XIII.55.1. : "Eum (M.Anneium) cum Sardianis habere controversiam scis; causam tibi exposuimus Ephesi : quam tu tamen coram facilius meliusque cognosces."
 2. Ad Att.V.21.6.: "Q. Volusium..misi in Cyprum ut ibi pauculos dies esset, ne cives Romani pauci qui illic negotiantur ius sibi dictum negarent : nam evocari ex insula Cyprios non licet." The Volusius in Att.V.11.4. has Cnaeus as his praenomen. This seems to be an error, but it is impossible to say so with certainty.
 3. Ad Att.V.21.9.: "Rapit enim hominem Postumius Roman, fortasse etiam Postumia."
 4. Ad Att.V.21.9.
 5. Ad Att.V.21.7. : "Ipse in Asiam profectus sum Tarso Nonis Ianuariis, non mehercule dici potest qua admiratione Ciliciae civitatum maximeque Tarsensium. Postea vero quam Taurum transgressus sum, mirifica expectatio Asiae nostrarum dioecesium, quae sex mensibus imperi mei nullas meas acceperat litteras, numquam hospitem viderat."
 6. Ad Att.V.21.4.: "Eas Laodiceae denique, cum eo venissem, III Id.Febr. Laenius mihi reddidit, datas a.d. X.Kal. Octobris."

Romans who had stored corn to share it out amongst their local communities. Persuasion, not force, was the method he used, and the provincials continued to be amazed at this restraint, for this was the season of the year when the governor normally enriched himself.¹ But this year no money had been spent by the provincials in entertaining the governor and in buying off his staff. The only man who let Cicero down was L. Tullius, who on one occasion did in fact take something from the people; even this something, no matter how distasteful to Cicero, was legal in the eyes of the Julian Law.²

Once back in Laodicea Cicero devoted himself to a task for which he was well qualified. In writing to Atticus he outlines his plans for the next few months; he has decided to hear the legal cases from the various towns in his province and has drawn up a rota, as it were, of the sessions for each district. From now on, even if he finds that he has little leisure time, he will at least have work more suited and more congenial to his nature. It is all arranged; he will begin on February 13th by trying cases from Cibyra and Apamea, and hopes to be finished by early May.³

The law, however, was not the only thing to exercise Cicero's wits and patience during this time. Clearly he received many deputations from the various towns and from individual Romans and Cilicians alike who came with pleas for financial help or requests for official status. On one of these deputations there is some fairly clear information as it concerns the previous governor, Appius Claudius.⁴ It would appear that Appius had sanctioned, perhaps instigated, some building work at Appia, a town in Phrygia, which, if it is safe to be guided by a name, may have been especially indebted to Appius who was perhaps its patron. This building was proving an intolerably expensive burden on the town. Cicero had forbidden the exaction of a local rate or tax to help speed on the work until such a time as he could investigate the matter himself, something he found

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1. Ad Att.V.21.7. : "Illud autem tempus quotannis ante me fuerat in hoc quaestu."
 2. Ad Att.V.21.5. : "Is, ceteroqui abstinens, sed Iulia lege in transitu (Tyrrell's emendation of m.s. 'transitam') semel tamen in diem..facit ut mihi excipiendus sit, cum terruncium nego sumptus factum."
 3. Ad Att.V.21.9.
 4. Ad Fam. III.7.2 & 3.

no opportunity to do whilst fighting in Cilicia. As a result the building work had ceased. At this, those who wished the building to go on sent news to Appius in Rome, and he in turn wrote to Cicero asking for the work to continue and complaining at the delay. The party which wished to complete the building, thus supported by the previous governor, then sent a deputation to Cicero. One of their, and Appius', main complaints was that unless Cicero revoked his earlier decision, the building could not be finished before winter set in. "And yet", says Cicero, "it was after mid winter before the second deputation arrived"¹. However, Cicero is busy and will hear no more of Appia, its deputations and its petty building; even though the objectors are still in the majority, he will allow the building to go on.

During this same month Cicero found time to interest himself in a problem which was giving anxiety to a friend of his, M. Fadius Gallus. It seems that Fadius, who had come to visit Cicero in Laodicea, was profoundly shocked to learn that his brother was trying to sell an estate at Herculaneum which was owned jointly by them both. Doubtless Fadius left in haste for Italy, and Cicero did his best to help his friend by writing to people in Rome asking for their assistance; would Caelius drop everything else to help Fadius; ² would Paetus undertake the whole business; ³ would the praetor Curtius Peducaeanus, while acting in accordance with the law, allow easy access to Fadius and grant him all proper requests.⁴

Clearly, whilst still very much occupied with provincial concerns, Cicero now found time to interest himself in the activities of his friends, and it would seem that letters, perhaps even visitors, continued to arrive at Cicero's residence for he wrote further letters of commendation, the equivalent of modern testimonials, to such men as C. Titius Rufus, P. Silius, and Q. Minucius Thermus.⁵ Though averse to being pestered by Caelius with his repeated demands for Cilician panthers, Cicero was not above pestering others in order to achieve his own ends.

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1. Ad Fam.III.7.3. : "Quas enim litteras afferebant, ut opus aestate facere possent, eas mihi post brumam reddiderunt. Sed scito, et multo plures esse, qui de tributis recusent, quam qui exigi velint; et me tamen, quod te velle existimem, esse facturum."
 2. Ad Fam. II.14.1. : "Omnia relinques, si me amabis, cum tua opera Fadius uti volet."
 3. Ad Fam.IX.25.
 4. Ad Fam.XIII.59
 5. Ad Fam.XIII. 54; 58; 63.

Rumours of war were still strong in February and forced Cicero to warn Atticus that a war with the Parthians was threatening,¹ though in fact he had no first-hand news from Syria as Bibulus had not written to him at all. Cicero took some hope from the fact that when Deiotarus of Galatia brought up his forces, Cilicia would be ready to meet any invasion. June and July were the months he really feared, yet he considered the situation was already serious. The war scare became such that in March Cicero wrote to Q. Minucius Thermus, the governor of Asia, requesting that M. Anneius be hastened on his way back to Cilicia, 'for there is a great war on in Syria'.² Anneius, who had proved himself a man of military ability and distinction, could be of great use to the Republic in a crisis and it was therefore essential that he was back by May 1st, when Cicero intended to set out for Cilicia again.

Finally the winter closed in and broke the tenuous chain of messengers and tax-collectors' runners that joined Cicero to Italy: "I am longing to hear of events at Rome - it is ages since we had any news, so severe is the winter."³ Yet the winter which hindered communications also prevented any immediate military activity, and no doubt Cicero was grateful for that.

Cicero continued at Laodicea and from March 15th heard legal cases from Synnada, Pamphylia, Lycaonia and Isauria.⁴ Real details of his activity during this period are lacking. It is known that he continued to administer the law, and seems by early April to have become weary of so doing; he has had enough of the province, perhaps because he fears a diminution of his fame, perhaps because the whole business is unworthy of his powers, perhaps because there is the horror of a war hanging over the province.⁵

The assizes came to an end on May 1st. During this period from February 13th Cicero had heard cases from every district in his province except Cilicia itself, and had seen many states freed from debt, many had had their burdens lightened, and all had revived on being allowed to use their own laws.⁶ The majority of the cities were

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1. Ad Att.VI.1.14. : "Parthicum bellum impendet."
 2. Ad Fam.XIII.57.1.: "Quo magis cotidie ex litteris nuntiisque bellum magnum esse in Syria cognosco, eo vehementius a te pro nostra necessitudine contendo ut mihi M. Anneium legatum primo quoque tempore remittas."
 3. Ad Fam.II.14.1. : "Ego res Romanas vehementer exspecto et desidero... nam iamdiu propter hiemis magnitudinem nihil novi ad nos adferebatur."
 4. Ad Att.V.21.9.
 5. Ad Fam.II.11.1.
 6. Ad Att.VI.2.4. : "...omnes suis legibus et iudiciis usae, *ἀὐτονομίαν* adeptae, revixerunt."

now able to pay their taxes, together with the arrears for the previous five years, and the credit for this happy state of affairs must go to Cicero's staff who were behaving in an exemplary manner. The characteristic of the administration continued to be the open conduct and the easy accessibility of the governor himself,¹ a fact which many provincials no doubt found to be a great blessing.²

There was still the threat of a Parthian war, and Cicero who had heard no recent news of Rome was afraid that his year of office would be extended, especially when he heard that Curio was determined that the provinces would be the last thing to be discussed in the Senate.³ Then among all the discordant news of a political crisis in Rome came one cheering piece of information. Some time towards the end of April or in early May Cicero received official information that a new quaestor, Caelius Caldus, had been appointed to Cilicia.⁴ If necessary, this new man could be left behind to govern the province.

On May 7th Cicero left Laodicea once more, intending to spend June in Cilicia and July in an easy return preparatory to his voyage back to Rome.⁵ Little is known of this journey back from Laodicea to Tarsus. Cicero and his party presumably travelled along the same route that they had used during the late summer of the previous year. Certainly they called at Apamea, for in camp at this place Cicero had to stand for a certain amount of impudent behaviour from a man Gavius (Gavius est quidam.....P. Clodi canis : Ad Att.VI.3.6.) whom he had appointed praefectus at Brutus' request. Gavius was openly hostile to Cicero, and declined to escort him as the governor left Apamea, and finally had enquired : "And out of what do I get my ration money?"⁶ Cicero replied with considerable moderation that it was not his practice to pay men whose services he did not use, and at this Gavius went off in a temper. This incident, while seeming such a trifle, was so novel and disturbing to Cicero that he devoted a substantial part of a letter to Atticus in describing it.

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1. Ad Att.VI.2.5. : "Aditus autem ad me minime provinciales...."
 2. The case of the decuriones of Ameria is sufficient proof of the necessity of presenting a petition to the governor or head of state in person. In this instance the decuriones, who had been sent to Sulla, allowed themselves to be fobbed off by an interview with Chrysogonus, the dictator's freedman, who later worked quite contrary to their wishes. Pro Roscio Amerino IX.26 : "Ameriam re inorata reverterunt."
 3. Ad Att.VI.2.6.
 4. Ad Att.VI.2.10. : "C. Coelium quaestorem huc venire audisti."
 5. Ad Att.VI.2.6. : "Nonis Maiis in Ciliciam cogitabam : ibi cum Iunium mensem consumpsissem - atque utinam in pace! magnum enim bellum impendet a Parthis - Quinotilem in reditu ponere."
 6. Ad Att.VI.3.6. : "Is igitur Gavius, cum Apameae me nuper vidisset Romam proficiscens, me ita appellavit ut Culleolum vix auderem : 'Unde', inquit, 'me iubes petere cibaria praefecti?' "



The governor and his party reached Tarsus on June 5th,¹ and immediately Cicero found himself faced with still more urgent and unexpected problems. He had hoped for a quiet month in Cilicia, but at Tarsus he learned of a war in Syria, a good deal of brigandage in Cilicia itself, together with all the problems of fulfilling and concluding his policy of administration now that so little time was left for his year of office. Time was indeed running out, and Cicero had not yet decided who was to be left in charge of the province when he returned to Rome. The original quaestor, Mescinius, was clearly unsuitable, for he was an unsteady and light-fingered character.² Pomptinus, who might have been appointed, had already gone. Quintus, who was still to be approached on the subject, hated the province.³ Lucius Tullius and Marcus Anneius, worthy men as they were, were not even considered, and of Caelius Caldus nothing had been heard. The whole worrying problem was so utterly confusing that it seemed to defy reason, and fortune was left to work it out.⁴

It seems that fortune, in the shape of Quintus Cicero, shortly did work it out. Marcus, who had presumably spent a few days in Tarsus settling the most urgent of his problems, would join Quintus and the army in the summer camp on the river Pyramus some time between June 10th and 20th. When Marcus and Quintus met for the first time since the end of the successful siege of Pindenissus, they would have many topics to discuss and a great deal of news to exchange. One of the matters they certainly talked of was the appointment of a temporary governor for Cilicia after Marcus' departure, but when it was suggested that Quintus might care to succeed his brother, the reaction was quite plain. Quintus refused.⁵ As a result Marcus' plans had to be changed yet again and on June 21st, almost immediately after Quintus' refusal to take over as governor, he must have been considerably relieved to receive a letter from Caelius Caldus, who presumably indulged in the normal polite compliments of a newly appointed junior officer to his superior. Cicero replied promptly and warmly, asking Caldus to hasten to Cilicia, and in order to ensure his speedy arrival sent out lictors and attendants to meet him.⁶ The future governor, all

1. Ad Att.VI.4.1. : "Tarsum venimus Nonis Iuniis."

2. Ad Att.VI.3.1. : "Quaestorem nemo dignum putat; etenim est levis, libidinosus, tagax."

Ad Att.VI.4.1. : "Nihil minus probari poterat quam quaestor Mescinius."

3. Ad Att.VI.3.2. : "(Quintus) odit enim provinciam."

4. Ad Att.VI.4.1. : "Nam de Coelio nihil audiebamus...Sed haec fortuna viderit, quoniam consilio non multum uti licet."

5. Ad Fam.II.15.4. : ".... a Quinto fratre impetrari non poterat."

6. Ad Fam.II.19.2. : "Quae cum essent incerta, existimavi tamen faciundum esse ut ad te statores meos et lictores cum litteris mitterem."

Ad Att.VI.3. : "Parti transierint uenae praeter te videri dubitare nescimus."

unknowing, had been chosen.

It is not known how long Cicero stayed in camp, but, whether it was early or mid July that he left Pyramus for Tarsus, he had delayed sufficiently long to necessitate an alteration to his proposed route for leaving the province. He was still determined to leave Cilicia at the end of July, come what may, and the overland journey to Laodicea, which would take a month, was too long. There had moreover been a slight delay at Issus for Tiro, Cicero's secretary, had been taken ill, and it can be imagined with what reluctance Cicero finally left so faithful a servant behind him.¹ The new and final plan for departure was formed at last. Cicero determined to return to Tarsus so that after the term of office was over he could sail back to Italy via Rhodes, an island which he wished his son and nephew to visit.² Accordingly he wrote to his first quaestor who was still in Laodicea, instructing him to wait there so that the copies of the official accounts, which were drawn up without Cicero's actual supervision, could be left in two separate cities in accordance with the Lex Julia.³

Whilst staying at Tarsus during the final days of July, Cicero received a letter from Sallustius, the proquaestor of Syria, and it is from Cicero's reply that there emerges a possible explanation of much of the uncertainty and wrong information on the Parthians and affairs in Syria. Bibulus, who disliked Cicero intensely, had refused to have him informed of events in his province.⁴ Not unnaturally Cicero was angry at such treatment and in his reply to Sallustius he is curt, decisive and only just short of rude. He makes it quite clear that he intends to leave his province on time and so cannot meet Sallustius or his successor; and he will most certainly leave copies of his accounts in accordance with the Lex Julia, and advises Sallustius to do the same.⁵ In short, Sallustius is the only man who still believes that the Parthians are a danger.⁶

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1. Ad Att.VI.7.2. : "Tiro ad te dedisset litteras, nisi eum graviter aegrum Issi reliquissem."
 2. Ad Att.VI.7.2. : "Rhodum volo puerorum causa....."
 3. Ad Att.VI.7.2. : "Ego Laodiceae quaestorem Mescinium exspectare iussi, ut confectas rationes lege Iulia apud duas civitates possim relinquere."
Ad Fam.V.20.2. : "Rationes confectae me absente sunt tecum, ad quas ego nihil adhibui praeter lectionem."
 4. Ad Fam.II.17.6.
 5. Bibulus of course considered the Lex Julia, passed in his joint consulship with Caesar in 59 B.C., illegal because it had been carried in defiance of his 'obnuntiatio'.
 6. Ad Fam.II.17.3. : "Parthi transierint necne praeter te video dubitare neminem."

Before leaving Tarsus, Cicero sent his final instructions to Mescinius in Laodicea. Once the accounts were completed, copies of them were to be left at Laodicea and Apamea, and sureties for the surplus monies were to be received.¹ By this foresight he ensured that there would be no danger of loss on the long journey home.²

As July came to its close Cicero slipped away from Tarsus, leaving the newly arrived Calvus in charge, and journeyed down to some port on the south coast, perhaps Aegeae or Soli. From there, no doubt on the much longed-for and much publicised July 31st, he sailed for Italy, Rome, and the splendour and spotlight of the forum.³

	Tarsus	: Mid January	(Att.V.21.)
	Asia	: Late January	(Att.V.21.)
	Laodicea	: Arrived - 11th February,	Att.V.21.
		: Left - 7th May	Att.V.21.
70	Apamea	: May	Att.VI.3.
	Tarsus	: Arrived - 5th June	(Att.VI.4.)
		: Left - c. 19th June	Att.VI.4.
40	Camp at Pyramus	: Arrived - before 20th June	Att.VI.4.
		: Left - Early July	
	Tarsus	: Arrived - Early July	Att.VI.7.
		: Left - after 15th July	Fam.II.17.
25	Soli (?)	: 31st July (?)	

Fam IV.4. : References without brackets denote the letter was written at this place.

(Att.V.21.) : References with brackets denote that this place is mentioned.

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1. Ad Fam.V.20.2. : "Illud quidem certe factum est, quod lex iubebat, ut apud duas civitates, Laodicensem et Apameensem, quae nobis maximae videbantur, quoniam ita necesse erat, rationes confectas consolidatas deponeremus."
 2. Ad Fam. II.17.4. : "Laodiceae me praedes accepturum arbitror omnis pecuniae publicae, ut et mihi et populo cautum sit sine vecturae periculo."
 3. Ad Fam.II.12.2.


Appendix D.ROUTE AND DATE CHART : JANUARY - JULY 50 B.C.

Approx.
Miles.

	Tarsus	: Early January	Fam XV.4.
		: Left - 5th January	(Att.V.21.)
35	Taurus	: Mid January	(Att.V.21.)
	Asia	: Late January	(Att.V.21.)
	Laodicea	: Arrived - 11th February.	Att V.21.
		: Left - 7th May	Att VI.2.
70	Apamea	: May	Att.VI.3.
	Tarsus	: Arrived - 5th June	(Att.VI.4.)
		: Left - c. 10th June	Att.VI.4.
40.	Camp at Pyramus	: Arrived - before 20th June	Att.VI.5.
		: Left - Early July	
	Tarsus	: Arrived - Early July	Att.VI.7.
		: Left - after 18th July	Fam.II.17.
25	Soli (?)	: 31st July (?)	

Fam XV.4. : References without brackets denote the letter was written at this place.

(Att.V.21.) : References with brackets denote that this place is mentioned.



Return to Rome.

The hated year of exile from Rome was over at last, and it must have seemed to Cicero as he sailed westwards along the southern coast of Cilicia during early August that, even though stormy political clouds were hanging over Italy, all would be well for him and for his political re-birth from this time on.¹ He could look forward to new exploits and the retelling of old ones in the Forum he had so longed for.

The first of many future shocks however was soon to be dealt him. As he came sailing into Sida in Pamphylia², he received several letters from friends in Rome informing him that his dearly loved daughter, Tullia, had recently married the profligate Dolabella who, in turn, had just failed to prove his charge of maiestas against Appius Claudius. The news came as a double shock and embarrassment, and at Sida Cicero was obliged to write to Appius, firstly congratulating him on his acquittal and secondly thanking him for his good wishes for the marriage of the man by whom he had recently been prosecuted. The position of father-in-law to Dolabella was not a very dignified one at such a moment, and, judging from Dolabella's character, not likely to prove a permanent one. That Cicero was not overjoyed at the marriage is clear from his note to Caelius: "I am glad you speak well of Dolabella, and even like him."³ To Appius it was: "I can find no easy ending to this speech I have begun. I ought not to speak with too much gloom about this marriage which you bless with your best wishes."⁴ Such was the unfortunate beginning of what Cicero had hoped would be a joyous and triumphant progress.

By August 10th he was at Rhodes, and in a letter to Atticus shows clearly that he was still worried about Tullia's marriage and the fact that he had had to leave Caelius Caldus in charge of the province. After all Caldus was a mere boy and perhaps not able to support the weight of

1. Ad Att. VI.6.4. : "Amicorum litterae me ad triumphum vocant, rem a nobis, ut ego arbitror, propter hanc *παλιγγενεσίαν* nostram non neglegendam."
2. Ad Fam. III.12.4.
3. Ad Fam. II.15.2. : "Dolabellam a te gaudeo primum laudari, deinde etiam amari."
4. Ad Fam. III.12.2. : "..... neque enim tristius dicere quidquam debeo ea de re quam tu ipse omnibus optimis prosequeris...."

5. Ad Att. VI.6.4. : "Detrahit ex ipso die etiam spectatus theatrorum."

6. Ad Fam. III.5.1. : "Primo Idus Octobris Athenas venimus, cum ventis adversis ventis autem etiam tardeque et inclementer navigavimus."

duties lately thrust upon him. Indeed had the Parthians continued to threaten war, Cicero claims that he would have defied the Senate's orders and remained in his province beyond July 31st.¹ But once all was quiet it would not have seemed well to put Quintus in charge rather than leave the province under the command of the man sent out by the Senate; it would moreover have been illegal.²

He also sent off a restrained letter to Cato to thank him for his complimentary remarks on Cicero's supplicatio, which Cato had in fact opposed: "What triumphal chariot, or what wreath of laurel could I compare with praise from Cato?"³ And if it should happen that Cicero does gain a triumph, will Cato at least feel pleased that Cicero has gained what he wished. This topic also was clearly on Cicero's mind for in a letter to Atticus he asked his friend's opinion on the possibility of a triumph, an achievement he would have some hope of, if Bibulus were not also trying for one.⁴

Cicero had previously expressed his intention of making his return via Rhodes in order that his son and nephew might visit that island. It is therefore likely that a short halt of several days was made there, and then in late August the party moved on towards Ephesus. During this stage of his journey Cicero, never a good sea-traveller, was considerably delayed by the Etesian winds, and he further lays at the door of the open Rhodian boats the blame for a total delay of 20 days.⁵ It was October 1st before he finally embarked to sail from Ephesus and, even though in a hurry, he was not inclined to travel as quickly as he might.

On October 14th he arrived back in Athens after a slow and uncomfortable voyage against strong headwinds, and lodged some while at the Acropolis.⁶ As Cicero came nearer to Rome, he wanted more and more news of the political situation which he feared was going to be a troublesome one. Throughout his year of absence, Cicero had in fact been kept well-informed, though he often fails to realise it, of

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1. Ad Att. VI.6.3 & 4. :
 2. Ad Att. VI.6.3. : "Videbam sermones : 'Hui, fratrem reliquit! num est hoc non plus annum obtinere provinciam? Quid quod senatus eos voluit praeesse provinciis qui non praeuissent?'"
 3. Ad Fam. XV.6.1. : "...quem ego currum, aut quam lauream cum tua laudatione conferrem?" In Att. VII.2.7. Cicero says that Cato (was) in fact : "...in me turpiter fuit malevolus."
 4. Ad Att. VI.8.5. : "Ego, nisi Bibulus.....adniteretur de triumpho, aequo animo essem."
 5. At Att. VI.8.4. : "Detraxit xx ipsos dies etiam aphractus Rhodiorum."
 6. Ad Fam. XIV.5.1. : "Pridie Idus Octobris Athenas venimus, cum sane adversis ventis usi essemus tardeque et incommode navigassemus."

political manoeuvres in Italy. Caelius and Atticus had been faithful and careful correspondents, and as a result Cicero was well aware of how events were shaping. The course of these events has no part in the present purpose beyond revealing how Cicero in his return to Rome was influenced by the growing struggle for power which he was in no way able to control.

From Athens Cicero wrote to Terentia and Tullia, the only letter to his wife which has survived from this year in Cilicia, and in this note he assured them that he was hastening on so that on his arrival in Italy he might have more time to consider the political situation which seemed to threaten war. In such a crisis he felt he would not be able to conceal his real feelings.¹ When writing to Atticus, Cicero forecast a terrific struggle in which Rome would need all that divine help which Cicero himself had received so plentifully in the Parthian war.² Indeed if there was going to be a war, he wished he had stayed in his province : Atticus may well laugh, yet Cicero ought to have stayed on if such a calamity was threatening.

Next, after a fairly short halt in Athens, Cicero moved on once more, and while he nowhere mentions his mode of transport it seems fairly clear that he must have made the overland journey to the west coast of Greece, such was his loathing of sea travel. Certainly he was in western Greece by early November and made brief stops at Patrae, where Tiro was taken ill again, Alyzia, Leucas, Actium, and Corcyra. Here he was delayed for thirteen days.³ During this time he wrote frequent letters to Tiro,⁴ assuring him of his own and everyone else's concern for the invalid's speedy recovery. In this series of letters Cicero reveals himself as a man concerned at the ill-health of a friend, rather than an employer vexed at the inconvenience of being without his secretary. That this concern is genuine is obvious from all these short notes (on one day he wrote three times) and as a result of it he can be forgiven many of his other faults. The delay at Corcyra was caused by a series of storms, and, even after the weather had seemed to improve and

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1. Ad Fam. XIV. 5. 1. : "Cognovi enim ex multorum amicorum litteris quas attulit Acastus ad arma rem spectare, ut mihi, cum venero, dissimulare non liceat quid sentiam."
 2. Ad Att. VII. 1. 2. : "Videre enim mihi videor tantam dimicationem - nisi deus, qui nos melius quam optare auderemus Pathico bello liberavit, respexerit rem publicam - sed tantam quanta numquam fuit."
 3. Ad Fam. XVI. 9. 1.
 4. Ad Fam. XVI. 1 - 9 (except 8)

the party had gone down to the harbour at Cassiope, the contrary winds continued to blow and prevented sailing until the 22nd November.¹

After crossing the sea at night, Cicero and his party made their first landfall in Italy at Hydruntum on the 23rd November. On the following day they sailed into the harbour at Brundisium just as Terentia herself was entering the town on her way to meet her husband.² With her arrival came further news of politics in Rome and of Caesar's movement of troops in the north. The situation was daily growing worse; "I fear there may be serious disturbances at Rome after January 1st. I shall act with moderation in all things."³ But that was no longer sufficient. For while the man of moderation, the man who had hoped to bring into being and maintain a *concordia ordinum*, while the man of doubts and hesitations came slowly northwards to receive, as he hoped, the acclaim of the people and a triumph from the Senate, the man of action, Caesar, was preparing to decide his own and Rome's fate in Gaul.

As far as his triumph is concerned, Cicero is pleased to hear that Pompey has spoken well of his character and his hope of such an honour: "I shall make every effort, and I hope I shall succeed."⁴ With Pompey's support it will not matter that Cato has behaved most spitefully in trying to prevent full recognition of the victory at Amanus.

Cicero left Brundisium after only a short stay, reached Aeculanum by December 6th, and was at Pontius' villa at Trebula on December 9th. He met Pompey, either at Cumae or Pompeii, on December 10th, and after their two hour meeting he felt a warm glow of hope for his triumph, though he was very apprehensive at Pompey's suggestions of a war. The difficulties of playing the double role of triumph-seeker and liberal politician in such circumstances were daily becoming more obvious.⁵

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1. On this occasion Cicero's fear of the sea appears to have been well-justified. c.f. *Ad Fam.* XVI.9.1. : "Interea, qui cupide profecti sunt, multi naufragia fecerunt."
 2. *Ad Fam.* XVI. 9. 2.
 3. *Ad Fam.* XVI.9.3. : "Romae vereor ne ex Kalend. Ian. magni tumultus sint. Nos agemus omnia modice."
 4. *Ad Att.* VII.2.6. : "Itaque omnia experiar et, ut spero, adsequar."
 5. *Ad Att.* VII.3.2. : "Utrumque vero simul agi non potest, et de triumpho ambitiose et de re publica libere."

Cicero carried out his planned return to Rome. By mid December he was at Formiae, where he intended staying until the end of the month. Here he was able to meet people and gather views and facts on the difficult situation in Rome which was rapidly worsening from stormy to electric. He left Formiae at the end of December, and was at Tarracina on the 31st. Then, travelling via the Pomptine marshes, he came to Pompey's Alban villa on January 3rd, 49 B.C. The date was Cicero's 57th birthday. On the 4th he approached the city and was most gratified at being met by a procession which came out especially to greet him.¹

His arrival however coincided with the flare up of the long-awaited struggle,² and in the midst of such momentous events there was scarcely time to discuss a triumph for Cicero. And yet, at a full meeting of the Senate there was a demand that he should receive his triumph, a demand that was unsuccessful only because the consul, Lentulus, wished to fulfil all the necessary public business before turning to this private matter.³ As the crisis grew, Italy was divided into districts and Cicero, forgetful of his empty threat to cross the pomerium,⁴ took the town of Capua as his sphere of command. Thus it came about that he turned away from Rome on January 17th and, still accompanied by his lictors and their laurelled wreaths, went south again into Campania.

The triumph was not to be. Parthians, Amanus, and Cilicia were far away, and palled into insignificance before Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon on January 11th. While Cicero had hoped and waited, the die had been cast.

1. Ad Fam. XVI.11.2. : "Ego ad Urbem accessi pridie Nonas Ianuar. Obviam mihi sic est proditum ut nihil potuerit fieri ornatus."
2. Ad Fam XVI.11.2. : " Sed incidi in ipsam flammam civilis discordiae vel potius belli....."
3. Ad Fam. XVI.11.3.
4. Ad Att. VII.7.4-5. Pompey had previously suggested that, if any disturbance did occur, Cicero might care to go to Sicily as governor and control the senatorial forces stationed there. In Cicero's eyes this was illegal because his imperium had been voted for Cilicia only. He had therefore replied that he would rather enter Rome, thus laying down his imperium together with any claim to a triumph.

Appendix E.ROUTE AND DATE CHART FOR CICERO'S JOURNEY BACK TO ROME.

Approx.
Miles

50 B.C.			
	Sida	: 3rd August	Fam. III.12.
200	Rhodes	: 10th Aug. - Late August.	Att.VI.6.
155	Ephesus	: Early Sept. - 1st Oct.	Att.VI.8.
215	Athens	: 14th Oct. - Late Oct.	Att.VI.9.
115	Patrae	: 31st October	(Fam.XVI.1.)
60	Alyzia	: 3rd - 6th November	Fam XVI.1.
15	Leucas	: 7th November	Fam.XVI.4.
10	Actium	: 7th November	Fam. XVI.6.
45	Corcyra	: 9th - 16th November	Fam. XVI.7. : (Fam.XVI.9.)
	Cassiope	: 16th - 22nd November	(Fam. XVI.9.)
	Hydruntum	: 23rd November	(Fam.XVI.9.)
45	Brundisium	: 24th November	Fam. XVI.9.
165	Aeculanum	: 6th December	(Att.VII.3.)
	Trebula	: 9th December	Att.VII.3.
55	Cumae	: 10th December	Att. VII.4.
40	Formiae	: 17th- 28th December	Att.VII.5. : Att.VII.9.
18	Tarracina	: 31st December	(Att.VII.5.)
49 B.C.			
42	Alba	: 3rd January	(Att.VII.5.)
	Before Rome	: 4th - 17th January	Fam. XVI.11.

Fam. III.12. : References without brackets denote that the letter was written at this place.

(Fam. XVI.1.) : References with brackets denote that this place is mentioned.

CICERO'S PRACTICE IN CILICIA.

The Governor's Edict.

The legal basis for the provincial governor's method of administration in his province rested on the twin foundations of the Lex Provinciae and the governor's own personal edict. The Lex Provinciae was formulated when the province was first constituted and was concerned with the broader and more general matters relating to the province. It was the governor's edict which dealt with detailed points of an immediate and practical nature. The edict, issued when the governor took up his duties, set the tone for his time of office, and by its terms showed the provincials what kind of government they might expect.

Cicero, who drew up his edict in Rome,¹ followed that model edict of Scaevola, the governor of Asia in 94 B.C., in many details, and clearly aimed at moderate and just government.² He states that his edict was a short one, and divided into two main sections.³

The first of these was concerned with basically provincial matters, and included in its scope the accounts of the provincial towns, debts, rates of interest, civil contracts and, most important, all matters to do with the tax-collectors. Clearly this first section dealt with the practical details of all monetary affairs, especially the vexatious taxes.⁴ It is important at this stage to note that Cicero showed great concern in the rates of interest charged on loans and debts, and proved himself an exception to the general run of governors by fixing on what was considered a low rate. The legal rate allowed by the edict was 12%, an amount which at that time and place was considered ridiculously low. The only alteration made to this section was the addition of a clause at the request of the publicani, who persuaded Cicero to adopt part of Appius' edict and insert a paragraph concerning the reduction of the towns' expenses and including certain innovations

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1. Ad Fam. III.8.4. : "Romae composui edictum."
 2. Ad Att.VI.1.15. : "...multaque sum secutus Scaevolae...."
 3. Ad Att.VI.1.15. : "Breve autem edictum est propter hanc meam *διαίρεσιν*, quod duobus generibus edicendum putavi."
 4. Ad Att. VI.1.15. : "Quorum unum est provinciale in quo est de rationibus civitatum, de aere alieno, de usura, de syngraphis, in eodem omnia de publicanis."

to the advantage of the states. This is a completely unexpected episode, and one which shows that not only Appius but also the tax-gatherers sometimes acted for the good of the towns.¹

The second section of the edict was devoted to legal matters, and dealt with private affairs, civil cases and such things as inheritance, private ownership and sale, appointment of officials, and other matters which, 'are normally raised and settled under the terms of the edict'.² In this section came one of the clauses in which Cicero followed Scaevola's lead, and reversed the practice of Appius Claudius. He laid down that civil cases in which Greeks only were concerned should be tried in accordance with Greek Laws. The Greeks were delighted at this and believed they had gained self-government.³ Cicero's enlightened policy extended this privilege to all the provincial towns likewise, and he was pleased to see that everywhere the provincials revived on recovering such unwanted freedom in their own law-courts.⁴ Cicero, like Bibulus in Syria, felt obliged to check the excesses of the publicani and money-lenders, but, unlike his fellow governor, was somewhat circumspect in the terms used in his edict. He included a clause as to the legality of contracts, and decreed that they should be binding in their terms, "provided the agreement is not such that it offends equity and fair dealing."⁵ Cicero felt that such a clause, whilst just and necessary, was a sad reflection on the order to which he belonged.

There remained one other section of the edict. This was an unwritten part and had to do with the rest of the legal procedure.⁶ Since such a section, to be comprehensive, would no doubt have been lengthy, Cicero was content to announce that in fixing his own provincial decrees and decisions he would follow the edicts proclaimed at Rome. This seemed to please the provincials, and doubtless gave Cicero a certain amount of room for manoeuvre in deciding individual

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1. Ad Fam. III.8.4. : "Nihil addidi nisi quod publicani me rogarunt, cum Samum ad me venissent, ut de tuo edicto totidem verbis transferrem in meum. Diligentissime scriptum caput est quod pertinet ad minuendos sumptus civitatum...."
 2. Ad Att.VI.1.15. : "...alterum, quod sine edicto satis commode transigi non potest, de hereditatum possessionibus, de bonis possidendis vendendis, magistris faciendis, quae ex edicto et postulari et fieri solent."
 3. Ad Att.VI.1.15.
 4. Ad Att.VI.2.4. : "omnes suis legibus et iudiciis usae, *αὐτονομίαν* adeptae, revixerunt."
 5. Ad Att. VI.1.15. : "...EXTRA QUAM SI ITA NEGOTIUM GESTUM EST UT EO STARI NON OPORTEAT EX FIDE BONA."
 6. Ad Att.VI.1.15.: "tertium de reliquo iure dicundo *ἄγραφον* reliqui. Dixi me de eo genere mea decreta ad edicta urbana accommodaturum..."

cases according to their merits.

Taxation.

"This, gentlemen, is the difference in the method of land-taxation between Sicily and the other provinces. In the others there has been imposed either a fixed tax, called 'tribute', as for example among the Spaniards and Carthaginians, (this could be counted as our reward for victory and their punishment for the war), or there is the system of tax-contracts let out by the censors, as is the case in Asia under the Lex Sempronia."¹

When he drew up his edict, Cicero was specially concerned with the reduction of debts and the checking of any illegal extortion. The individual clauses of the edict have not survived, but from what is known it seems safe to say that Cicero was determined to lighten the burdens of the provincial towns, whilst at the same time allowing the publicani and other money-lenders an opportunity to gather what he considered to be a fair return for the money they had expended. So much of Cicero's conduct in Cilicia was influenced by his ideas on this subject, by the activities of the publicani, and by the results of these activities, that it is essential to give a brief outline of the method of taxation used by Rome in Cilicia before going on to consider the treatment received by the various districts of the province.

In the passage quoted above, Cicero described Asia, and by 51 B.C. this meant Asia in its wider sense, as being taxed by a system of contracts fixed by the censors in Rome. This 'censoria locatio', briefly, worked as follows. As the Roman Republic maintained no tax-officials of its own, it fell back on the device of using an individual (Publicanus), or later groups of people associated together in a finance

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1. II In Verrem III.6.12. : "Inter Siciliam ceterasque provincias, iudices, in agrorum vectigalium ratione hoc interest, quod ceteris aut impositum vectigal est certum, quod stipendiarium dicitur, ut Hispanis et plerisque Poenorum quasi victoriae praemium ac poena belli, aut censoria locatio constituta est, ut Asiae lege Sempronia."

In Sicily there were a few allied or free towns such as Messana and Tauromenium. The remainder either paid a tithe, (decumanae), or both a tithe and a rent, (censoriae).

company (Societas), to collect the taxes due from the provinces of Asia. Every five years the censors sold out the contract for collecting the tax on one-tenth of the produce to the company that offered the best price. This price was normally a reasonable one which, whilst providing the Roman treasury with its taxes, allowed the publicani scope for regaining with profit the sum they had paid down.

As far as Rome was concerned, this was the end of the business. It was then the responsibility of the company to ensure that the provincials paid a tithe on their land, the exact amount being left very much to the discretion of the interested publicani, whose sole object was to reap their profit or interest on the money they had speculated in the province. However, as the provincials ability to pay was related directly to the quality of their harvests, the return that the publicani would receive was not a guaranteed one. In a good year no doubt everyone was satisfied, but in a bad year there would be small returns for the publicani and the beginning of debt, the source of further trouble, for the provincials. When the harvests failed for several years, even the most severe methods were unable to bring in any money, and the tax-farmers would discover that in buying the tax-contract they had paid out more than they had recouped from the actual taxes. Such a situation arose in 61 B.C., when, "The men who took up the tax-contract for Asia from the censors, complained in the Senate that because of their greed they had blundered and had paid too high a price : and they demanded the annulment of the contract!"¹

The people who suffered most were the provincials who were frequently unable to meet the demands of the publicani; they often accepted the tax-gatherers' offer to waive their immediate claim, even borrowed money at exorbitant rates from these same tax-collectors who also acted as money-lenders, and then, when they were still unable to pay at the time of the next demand, tasted in full the severity of the publicans' wrath. This system was so wasteful, ruinous and unfair that it could be said : "Wherever the publicanus goes, there common law is of no account and freedom for the allies fails."² In an effort to avoid the

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1. Ad Att. I.17.9. : "Asiam qui de censoribus conduxerunt questi sunt in senatu se cupiditate prolapsos nimium magno conduxisse, ut induceretur locatio postulaverunt."
 2. Livy XLV.18 : "...ubi publicanus esset, ibi aut ius publicum vanum aut libertatem sociis nullam esse."

claims of the publicani, the towns would speak of complaining to the Senate, and, as a preliminary, would appeal to the governor. This action was not always a wise one and could produce very mixed results.

The most invidious role in this system was filled by the governor himself. His duty was merely to supervise the general conduct of publicani and provincials alike; he had no part in fixing the contracts and did not act as official receiver of the taxes. The publicani as a result proved a frequent source of embarrassment to an honest governor for, while they were under his surveillance, they were semi-official figures of great potential influence and independent of his normal staff. Whilst most governors preferred to give the publicani a free hand, a complacent man might allow the extortion of excessive or illegal taxes, and an avaricious one might even join in that extortion.¹ From such a constant and likely cause of friction, a just and observant governor might look forward to future troubles. Any check to their activities could prove calamitous as the case of P. Rutilius Rufus shows : "P. Rutilius, a man of perfect honesty, while legatus to the governor Q. Mucius had protected the people of Asia from the wrongful excesses of the publicani. As a result he was hated by the equestrian order, which had control of the courts, was found guilty of extortion and sent into exile."²

"And yet to all your good-will and devotion to duty the publicani prove a great problem."³ Cicero was well aware of how troublesome the publicani might prove and was no doubt extremely apprehensive, for a serious disagreement could upset all his plans for government and prove damaging to his political and personal prospects in Rome. He was therefore gratified to learn at the very outset of his office that the five-year contracts for the taxes had been fixed before his arrival. Any initial trouble was thus avoided, and his relief is clear : "I shall satisfy everyone, and I shall do so more easily because the tax-contracts have been settled in my province."⁴ Obviously if he had played no part in drawing up the contracts, he could not be held responsible for any

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1. Pro Muraena : XX.42. : "Ipse autem in Gallia ut nostri homines desperatas iam pecunias exigent aequitate diligentiaque perfecit."
 2. Livy Epit 70 : "P. Rutilius, vir summæ innocentiae, quoniam legatus Q. Mucii pro. cos. a publicanorum iniuriis Asiam defenderat, invisus equestri ordine, penes quam iudicia erant, repetundarum damnatus in exilium missus est."
After his condemnation Rutilius Rufus retired to Asia to live amongst those provincials he was alleged to have robbed.
 3. Ad Q.F. I.I.XI.32. : "Atqui huic tuae voluntati ac diligentiae difficultatem magnam afferunt publicani."
 4. Ad Att. V.13.1. : "....omnibusque satis faciemus et eo facilius quod in nostra provincia confectae sunt pactiones." c.f. also Ad Att.V.14.1.

injustices to either publicani or provincials, and his only concern was to ensure that the collection of the taxes went on in a manner that was as seemly and as fair as possible.

5 / This he seems to have achieved. Notices concerning the publicani are few and of a general nature, but what does emerge is a picture of a careful, if moderate, supervision by a governor who wished to protect the people of his province without coming into close contact, let alone hostility, with a class he professed to distrust. At the very outset the tax-collectors were eager to come to the new governor's notice, and no doubt introduced themselves and their claims in the hope of gaining his favour.¹ The light and friendly mood thus established continued throughout the governorship for Cicero wished to follow his own advice, and, as far as is known, refused to alienate the publicani. In his dealings with them Cicero was all charm: he was careful to praise them and show them respect; and at the same time he saw to it that they troubled no-one.²

He maintained a calm atmosphere in monetary affairs by fixing on a date, which he normally made a fairly distant one, by which any debts due to the tax-farmers should be paid. If the debts were paid by this date, then the rate of interest was in accordance with his own edict; i.e. 12%. If however the debt was not paid by that date, the rate would be in accordance with the individual agreements made between the cities and the publicani. As a result the provincials almost rushed to pay on fair terms, while the astounded tax-gatherers took in their dues with unprecedented ease. They did not even complain at receiving their demands at a lower rate provided they were praised and invited out to dinner by Cicero at frequent intervals.³ Whole communities which had paid nothing during the present five year contract not only made good their debts but even paid up for the previous five year period as well;⁴ as the Cypriot Salaminians said,⁵ they were able to do this by paying the publicani that money it was customary for the governor to exact for his own gain. For Cicero of course refused to accept any of the

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1. Ad Att.V.13.1. : "Verum tamen decumani quasi venissem cum imperio.... se alacres obtulerunt."
 2. Ad Att. VI.1.16. : "De publicanis quid agam videris quaerere. Habeo in deliciis, obsequor, verbis laudo, orno; efficio ne cui molesti sint."
 3. Ad Att.VI.1.16. : "...et publicanis res est gratissima, si illa iam habent pleno modio, verborum honorem, invitationem crebram."
 4. Ad Att. VI.2.5. : "Populi autem nullo gemitu publicanis, quibus hoc ipso lustro nihil solverant, etiam superioris lustris reliqua reddiderunt." c.f. also Ad Fam. II.13.4.
 5. Ad Att.V.21.11. : "Homines non modo non recusare sed etiam hoc dicere, se a me solvere."

customary bribes or presents for himself from the towns, and this made available a considerable amount of money for other purposes.

Cicero was also willing to intervene in the law courts in favour of those unfairly oppressed by taxation.¹ As he could not do this by absolving the states from their taxes, it must be presumed that the result was achieved by the governor's insistence on a strict observance of his edict concerning rates of interest and money contracts. On the other hand, the tax-farmers themselves could rely on Cicero's sense of justice to show itself as it had done in 61 B.C.,² for it appears that in at least one case he remitted a contract which was proving ruinous to the publicanus.³ In all this Cicero acted on grounds of reason, and not from favour.

The tithe proved to be the main source of income for Rome, but it was not the only source. The publicani were also active in collecting the customs dues, the pasture tax, and, according to local conditions, the rents on mines, quarries, fishing grounds and saltpans. In 66 B.C. Cicero had testified to the large staffs maintained for these places by the publicani,⁴ but for Cilicia in 51 B.C. there is no direct evidence.

In addition to these official taxes imposed by Rome, there were also such local taxes as those on houses, slaves and columns, very like the English window tax in the 18th and early 19th centuries. For these taxes, which were raised according to local needs, the notices are again brief and inconclusive. Cicero speaks of poll taxes imposed in Phrygia to meet the demands made previously by Appius Claudius.⁵ Later in the year there was the matter of the building work at Appia and Cicero's refusal to allow the magistrates to exact a special tax to cover the cost of the work.⁶ Cicero also illustrates the provincials' feelings on this score when he speaks of 'that grievous exaction - the poll tax and the door tax'.⁷ But the most absurd tax of all, had it been allowed, would have been the one which Caelius wished to see raised to

1. Ad Fam. XV.4.2. : "Quibus in oppidis cum magni conventus fuissent, multas civitates acerbissimis tributis et gravissimis usuris et falso aere alieno liberavi."
2. Ad Att.I.17.9. : Cicero had then supported the remission of the tax contracts on grounds of policy rather than fairness.
3. Ad Fam.V.20.3-4.
4. Pro Lege Manilia 16 : "...cum publicani familias maximas, quas in saltibus habent, quas in agris, quas in portibus atque in custodiis, magno periculo se habere arbitrentur?"
5. Ad Att.V.16.2. : "Imperata *ἑπικεφάλια* " c.f. Ad Fam.XV.4.2.
6. Ad Fam. III.7.2 - 3.
7. Ad Fam.III.8.5. : "...et illam acerbissimam exactionem, quam tu non ignoras, capitem atque ostiorum...."

pay for the hunting and shipping of Cilician panthers to Rome so that they might appear in his aedile games.¹ Cicero most sensibly refused to allow the imposition of special taxes for such worthless ends, and considered that only the repayment of debt was sufficient cause for these exactions.

Further details are lacking, but, if it is safe to judge from Cicero's silence, it seems that during the whole year there was no case of extortion by a tax-farmer in Cilicia. There were of course other troubles concerning loans made to the towns, but it seems safe to assert that at no time did any serious disagreement arise between governor, governed and tax-contractors. Indeed, Cicero could satirically say that he was the apple of their eye to the tax-farmers, and on looking back on his year's duties could claim: "Communities have been saved, and the tax-gatherers have been completely satisfied."²

Treatment of Provincials

1. General Conduct.

One surprising fact emerges from Cicero's dealings with the people living in his province. While he frequently mentions the condition of the various towns, the state of the citizens, and how he is doing much by his own actions to alleviate their distress, he never once considers any individual case of misfortune so important, any particular legal case so outrageous as to merit mentioning any provincial by name. Romans, frequently of the worse sort, are named and discussed, but no provincial is ever thought worthy to be singled out as an individual, with a name and a history of his own, whose story

1. Ad Att. VI.1.21.

2. Ad Att. VI.2.5. : "Itaque publicanis in oculis sumus."

Ad Att. VI.3.3. : "Conservatae civitates, cumulate publicanis satis factum....."

3. Ad Att. VI.18.2. : "Sociis milite fidelioribus utitur quam quisquam unquam est : quibus incredibilia videtur et nostra mansuetudo et abstinentia." This of course is Cicero's own evaluation on the allies' loyalty, and he was never one to minimise a situation which reflected well on himself.

4. Ad Att. VI.18.3. : "Scito non velle nec forensem aut quod e lege Italia dari solent non accipere sed ne ligas quidem, nec praeter quattuor lectos et lectum quoscunque accipere quidquam, nullis locis ne lectus quidem et in tabernaculis manere plerumque."

could be included in any letter sent back to Rome. So it comes about that, while Cicero says much and clearly felt much for the lot of his province, he confines himself to discussing the plight of the various towns and his own actions in trying to bring help.

On his first entry to the province, Cicero was shocked to see the towns in a state of ruin and desolation; it was all he could do to begin the task of healing the wounds left by Appius.¹ Many people came to him with complaints about Appius' conduct, and it was clear that many of them could not pay their taxes if exorbitant demands were made, either by governor or by tax-gatherer. Cicero therefore set to work, and in a comparatively short while turned the enthusiastic welcome he had received at Ephesus into a joyous and almost triumphant one in his own province.² By his restrained conduct, by unselfish moderation, and by his refusal to allow any political jobbery, he gained a reputation for integrity which, when once established, continued with him and made his work much easier throughout the rest of his year of office.³ Further in arranging his tours through the province, he saw to it that no-one was inconvenienced by having to travel long distances to bring a petition to him.⁴ As a result of this wise administration so early in his governorship, the people he was to govern were genuinely pleased to see Cicero, and to his delight he found that the allies were more faithful to him than to any of his predecessors.⁵

Before leaving for Cilicia, Cicero had decided that he would govern moderately and avoid the excesses he had criticised in others. The poverty of his province confirmed him in this opinion. Therefore, throughout his governorship he refused to indulge in the customary claims practised by Roman generals. Firstly he instructed his staff that they were not to demand from the towns even those sums of money allowed by the Lex Julia for the food and travelling expenses of the governor's party. All that Cicero would take, although more was legally allowed, were beds for the night and a roof over their head; he would not accept pay or even so cheap a commodity as firewood.⁶ Often they refused even a roof, and spent the night under canvas when

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1. Ad Att. V.16.2. : "...in perditam et plane eversam in perpetuum provinciam nos venisse..."
Ad Att.V.15.2.: "Appi vulnera non refrico, sed apparent nec oculi possunt."
 2. Ad Att.V.13.1.; Ad Att.V.16.3.
 3. Ad Att.V.15.2.; Ad Att.V.21.6.; Ad Att.VI.2.4.; Ad Fam.II.12.3.
 4. Ad Fam. III.8.4.
 5. Ad Att.V.18.2. : "Sociis multo fidelioribus utimur quam quisquam usus est : quibus incredibilis videtur et nostra mansuetudo et abstinentia."
This of course is Cicero's own evaluation on the allies' loyalty, and he was never one to minimise a situation which reflected well on himself.
 6. Ad Att.V.16.3. : "Scito non modo nos foenum aut quod e lege Iulia dari solet non accipere sed ne ligna quidem, nec praeter quattuor lectos et tectum quemquam accipere quidquam, multis locis ne tectum quidem et in tabernaculo manere plerumque."

they were on a journey. It was therefore a just and honourable claim that Cicero made when he said that provincial expenses were low and there had been no exactions.¹ Only once did a member of the staff forget himself so far as to take money for lodgings, and, even though entitled to it, he was no doubt never allowed to do so again.² As might be expected of Cicero, he not only declined to take money to cover his expenses, but also refused to requisition money and billet his troops on the townspeople.³ There were moreover none of the usual claims for statues, pictures, antiques, or money to cover fictitious personal expenses; he made no exactions to raise money for fleets that were never built, and he did not indulge in public building that would prove a burden to the states.

As the year of office went on, Cicero found that it was not enough merely for him to govern moderately; he had also to repair much of what he considered was the damage caused by Appius Claudius. People who believed that they had received some wrong were sure of a sympathetic, if impartial, hearing from Cicero who by a mixture of good sense and soft words strove to wipe out old injuries and win back for Rome and for himself the good-will of the provincials.⁴ By his mild legal decisions and by the annulling of previous decrees he gained the respect and obedience of those he was governing, whilst at the same time he managed to make himself pleasant and agreeable to individuals from every class in the province.⁵

Such conduct of course did not please everyone. The tax-farmers and money-lenders, Scaptius in particular, found that the provincials were not such an easy prey as formerly, for the new governor stood by his resolution not to give military praefectships to Roman businessmen. Other men even went so far as to suggest that it was as a result of a direct clash of temperament with Appius that Cicero governed as he did; the fact of the matter, says Cicero with his tongue in his cheek, is that Appius' liberality, characteristic of so great a man, ranged over a wider field.⁶ Since Cicero could not possibly compete with his

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1. Ad Att. VI.2.4. : "...quod omnino nullus in imperio meo sumptus factus est - nullum cum dico non loquor ὑπερβολικῶς - nullus, inquam, ne terruncius quidem."
 2. Ad Att. V.21.5.
 3. Ad Att. V.21.7. : "...quae sex mensibus imperi mei nullas meas acceperat litteras, nunquam hospitem viderat."
 4. Ad Att. V.20.1. : "Tibi morati biduum perillustres fuimus honorificisque verbis omnis iniurias revellimus superiores...."
 5. Ad Fam. II.13.4. : "...privatis, summis, infimis fueram iucundus."
 6. Ad Fam. II.13.2. : "Genus institutorum et rationum mearum dissimilitudinem non nullam habet cum illius administratione provinciae."

predecessor in this, he had confined his attentions and, being unwilling to appear generous with other people's money, had fixed on a line of conduct which gave him pleasure whatever anyone else thought of it.¹

2. Administration of Law.

Cicero spent the three months from mid February to early May in hearing legal cases from every district in the western half of his province. During this time he must have heard cases from distant hamlets as well as from large towns, cases which covered a wide range of human disagreements. Yet facts and details are completely lacking. No case was so monstrous as to deserve recording in a note to Atticus; no trial so scandalous that it could be handed on to that lover of gossip, Caelius.

All that is known is that Cicero considered he had worked wonders in the province by his decisions. In the long assizes he ensured that many states were freed from debt, and his judicial conduct was not only skilful but also mild and courteous.² No one had been insulted, and only a very few had tasted strict justice, and even then not so strict that they dared to complain.³

Lengthy though the period was that Cicero spent on the law, it would have been even longer if he had not ensured that the legal duties were evenly distributed between himself and the officials of the provincial towns. He decided that the people would be happier under their own laws, and so it came about that he allowed the magistrates to enjoy what seems to have been an unusual amount of liberty in deciding local cases in accordance with their own body of law.⁴ The provincials responded to such treatment and took fresh heart, while Cicero found his own burden lightened and at the same time avoided a possible cause of complaint and future hostility towards himself. The Greek communities which shared in this privilege were delighted at having Greek jurors, and believed that they were enjoying home rule.⁵

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1. Ad Fam. III.8.8. : "Liberalitas tua, ut hominis nobilissimi, latius in provincia patuit; nostra si angustior est....non debent mirari homines, cum et natura semper ad largiendum ex alieno fuerim restrictior,....."
 2. Ad Att.VI.2.5. : "Iam cetera iuris dictio nec imperita et clemens cum admirabili facilitate."
 3. Ad Att.VI.3.3. : "...offensus contumelia nemo, decreto iusto et severo perpauci, nec tamen quisquam ut queri audeat.... "
 4. Ad Att.VI.2.4. : "...omnes (civitates) suis legibus et iudiciis usae, *ἀὐτονομία*ν adeptae, revixerunt."
 5. Ad Att.VI.1.15. : "Graeci vero exsultant quod peregrinis iudiciis utuntur....Tamen se *ἀὐτονομία*ν adeptos putant."

Clearly Cicero believed that it was his duty to exercise a general supervision only over the activities of the local magistrates, and as long as they conducted themselves with due propriety he was loath to interfere. The only cases he seems to have insisted on trying himself were capital charges, cases concerning the taxes, any suits between members of different towns or communities, and any action concerning Roman citizens. For the rest he preferred to encourage the local magistrates, and by careful non-interference made the communities responsible for their own legal well-being.

3. Relations with the Provincial Towns.

It will be remembered that Cicero arranged his tour through the province in order to take in its sweep the greatest number of towns. It was however impossible for him to maintain a direct check on each place, and so he was again satisfied to lay down general directions and then allow the towns to manage their own affairs with a minimum of interference from himself. He refrained from making demands on the cities, and, as long as they were not running into debts or being vexed by the tax-farmers, they could be sure of a quiet life.

Cicero felt that his proudest boast in his dealings with the provincial towns was his claim that he had saved whole communities from ruinous debts.¹ This was certainly true. As has already been discussed, Cicero achieved this result in two main ways. Firstly he saw that the continual disagreement with the tax-gatherers as to the amount of tax due and the rate of interest charged on borrowed money was a fundamental cause of debt. He therefore supervised all the branches of the tax-gatherers' activities and tried to ensure that the rate of interest allowed by his edict was not exceeded. Secondly he refused to make extortionate demands upon the states for his own private gain, and even refused to accept the customary presents from the towns. As a result of such restraint on the part of their governor

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1. Ad Fam. XV.4.2. : "...multas civitates acerbissimis tributis et gravissimis usuris et falso aere alieno liberavi.

2. Ad Fam. III.8.3. : "...sed his legationibus non minime illum tempus laudandi aut locum dandi..."
3. Ad Fam. III.8.3. : "...ad autem vellent declarare in eo officium suum, laudatorum me, si qui me sumptus functus esset officio, concessurum, si legitime, non permissurum, si infinito."
4. Ad Fam. III.8.3. : "...non necessarium testificatio."
- Ad Fam. III.10.6. : "Ad me adire quendam senem, nimirum ex Epicteto, qui dicebat nimis regnes sumptus legatis decerni."

the states were able to clear themselves of outstanding debts and recovered a sound financial position once more.

Moreover, in some towns Cicero discovered that heavy debts were not always due to the unrelenting exactions of the publicani.¹ He carried out an enquiry into the accounts of several cities and, to his great disapproval, found that certain local magistrates had used their office as a means of gaining money for themselves. Fortunately, persuasion was all that was needed to induce the magistrates concerned to repay into the various treasuries the money they had misappropriated. In this way lost funds were unexpectedly restored. Such an investigation must have caused quite a stir, but that the amount of money thus regained was considerable, is obvious from Cicero's assertion that as a result of the repayment the communities paid up ten years' taxes.

Despite his general policy of non-interference, Cicero felt obliged to limit the number of deputations normally sent out from the province to visit Rome. It was the common practice for the provincial cities to send deputations of their chief citizens to appear before the Roman Senate in order to extol the good government and benevolence of the retiring governor. Most governors demanded such deputations, which often proved a strain not only on the town's treasury but also on the imagination of the delegates who had to speak well of a man they often hated. These deputations were so commonplace as to be useless, and so numerous that a month of the Senate's time was given over to hearing them. Cicero knew from past experience that the deputation frequently failed to gain a hearing,² and so he issued a decree to check these deputations from leaving to praise Appius. Although many had already been composed at such places as Laodicea, Apamea, Synnada and Philomelium, Cicero gave a clear order that if anyone wished to make the journey to Rome at his own expense, or even within the limits of the law, then it would be allowed; otherwise he would not countenance it.³ So it came about that, whatever happened in the larger towns, no deputations set out from such obscure places as Midaem and Epictetus.⁴ Appius was

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1. Ad Att.VI.2.5. : "Mira erant in civitatibus ipsorum furta Graecorum, quae magistratus sui fecerant. Quaesivi ipse de iis qui annis decem proximis magistratum gesserant. Aperte fatebantur...Populi autem nullo gemitu publicanis, quibus hoc ipso lustro nihil solverant, etiam superioris lustri reliqua reddiderunt."
 2. Ad Fam. III.8.3. : "...sed iis legationibus non meminisse ullum tempus laudandi aut locum dari..."
 3. Ad Fam.III.8.3. : " si autem vellent declarare in eo officium suum, laudaturum me, si qui suo sumptu functus esset officio, concessurum, si legitimo, non permissurum, si infinito."
 4. Ad Fam.III.8.3.: ".... non Midaeensium testimonio."
Ad Fam.III.10.6. : "Ad me adire quosdam memini, nimirum ex Epicteto, qui dicerent nimis magnos sumptus legatis decerni."

clearly vexed at this, but Cicero who had acted in this matter for the benefit of the towns was undismayed. If it is right to judge from the tone of Cicero's letters, a good many other towns found it impossible to send their usual deputations and the mighty Appius Claudius went without what Cicero would have considered ill-deserved praise.

In two other matters already mentioned Cicero acted in an effort to prevent money being wasted on trifling objects. He refused to allow any new public building in his honour, and even stopped the work at Appia that had been begun by his predecessor. Further, the offer of several towns to pay for the capture of some panthers for Caelius came as a shock to Cicero who was quick to disallow the offer.

As Cicero looked back on his dealings with the people and states of his province, he felt able to claim that he had saved whole communities, aggrieved no-one by his conduct, and had presented himself as nearly as humanly possible as a model governor.¹ Certainly he could feel happy at leaving the provincials contented and unburdened by such oppressively heavy debts as when he took up office, and he could be sure that not even after his departure would the people cease to praise and remember with gratitude this extraordinary man who had failed to rob them of their money.

Client Kings.

It was part of Roman policy to encourage in their kingdoms various princes or local chiefs who held power on the fringes of Rome's overseas possessions. These kings were formally recognised by the Senate, indeed

1. Ad Att.VI.3.3. : "Reliqua plena adhuc et laudis et gratiae, digna iis libris quos tu dilaudas."

often had the title of king bestowed upon them by that body, and entered into some kind of treaty. Their relations with Rome were of a varied character, but basically were founded on pledges of friendship and goodwill, sometimes without any further very definite promises being exchanged. From such an arrangement the Senate, which wished to avoid the direct control of uncivilised areas, ensured nominally friendly, often slightly dependent, states on its frontiers and so kept a buffer between itself and any openly hostile power, such as the Parthians in the east.

That the client kings were frequently uneasy wearers of their crowns is clear from their weakness and sole dependence on Roman help; they were common targets for plots from both within and without their realms, and often it was only the Senate's unwillingness to acquire new land that prevented a client kingdom becoming a new province. In return for their position, the kings acted as news agencies for Rome and as a result of their advanced position provided a warning of any ugly situations developing along their boundaries. Their main value however lay in their position of a small buffer state keeping Rome from direct contact with a power that would have to be faced, fought and, if possible, defeated.

Cicero in gaining a province so far to the east perforce had to have dealings with several of these client kings. There must have been quite a number of local chieftains in the eastern Taurus Mountains, in Amanus, and in northern Syria. These districts, some nominally within Rome's sphere of influence, some just outside it, were extremely difficult to conquer and keep in subjugation, and the Senate found it more convenient to recognise local chiefs, all of whose names are not known, than to spend large sums in reducing so unprofitable an area. Cicero mentions only five of the client kings and princes by name: Deiotarus of Galatia; Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia; Antiochus of Commagene; Tarcondimotus, a Chieftain in Amanus; Iamblichus, an Arab Chief. These five however are useful in providing an illustration of the value of the client kings, and how also they could be an embarrassment to the governors.

1. Ad Fam. IV.1.3. : "Regis Antiochi Commagene legati primi mihi nuntiaverunt Parthorum magnas copias superiorem transire Asiam."
2. Ad Fam. IV.1.3.
3. Ad Fam. IV.1.3. : "...cum essent non nulli qui ei regi adhaerere fidem habendam putarent...."
4. Ad Fam. IV.1.3. : "...a Tarcondimoto, qui fidelissimus socius trans Taurum antiochiisque populi Romani existimatur... et Iamblicus phylarchus Arabum, quos homines opinantur bene sentire antiochi et nos..."
5. Ad Fam. IV.1.3. : "Reliqui reges tyrannici neque opibus satis firmi neque voluntate sunt."
6. Ad Fam. IV.3.2. : "Publius propter duas causas nihil scripsi, quod et ipsum Commagene legati dicebant ad sanctum civis antiochi litterasque misissent...."

The first, and most important, use Cicero made of the eastern kings was as an advance warning system of a Parthian invasion. All, except Ariobarzanes who had other worries, were prompt in informing Cicero of the likelihood of trouble. Antiochus was the first to send news, presumably because he was nearest to the source of trouble,¹ but he was quickly followed by Tarcondimotus and Iamblichus, who all asserted that the Parthians had crossed the Euphrates.² Once the hue and cry was on, Deiotarus promised to come to Cicero's aid.

It is interesting to note that the frontier kings, who were often suspected of double-dealing, were not trusted individually. Antiochus, whom some suggested to be untrustworthy,³ needed the corroboration of Tarcondimotus, 'our most loyal ally beyond the Taurus', and Iamblichus, 'a man considered well disposed to our state'.⁴ In fact only Deiotarus could be relied upon entirely for, 'the remaining kings and tyrants lack resolute strength in both resources and good-will'.⁵ This situation was of course one of Rome's own making. The border princes were bound to keep on amicable terms with both sides, and as they stood to lose rather than gain by a full scale war would have as cheerfully informed the Parthians of Roman troop crossings as they now informed Cicero of Parthian threats. Indeed Iamblichus himself seems almost an embryo Parthian, lacking in power and organisation only to prove himself no real friend of Rome. Antiochus of Commagene, with a larger kingdom to lose, was clearly eager to summon Roman forces into the area of the Euphrates for he not only sent news to Cicero at Cybistra, where the envoys arrived in some state of agitation, but also wrote a despatch direct to the Senate in Rome.⁶ These kings then, on the very fringes of the Roman world, were bound to Rome not so much by ties of treaty and friendship as by pure self-interest. It is not difficult to realise how much an Arab chief would prefer a vague alliance with Romans who never troubled him and demanded no tribute to the present and powerful rule of harsh Parthians who would deprive him of his small, but to him precious, power. In such circumstances and in dealings with men whose leanings as well as whose persons were

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1. Ad Fam. XV.1.2. : "Regis Antiochi Commageni legati primi mihi nuntiarunt Parthorum magnas copias Euphratem transire coepisse."
 2. Ad Fam. XV.1.2.
 3. Ad Fam. XV.1.2. : "...cum essent non nulli qui ei regi minorem fidem habendam putarent...."
 4. Ad Fam. XV.1.2. : "...a Tarcondimoto, qui fidelissimus socius trans Taurum amicissimusque populi Romani existimatur... ab Iamblichus phylarcho Arabum, quem homines opinantur bene sentire amicumque esse rei publicae nostrae,....."
 5. Ad Fam. XV.1.6. : "Reliqui reges tyrannique neque opibus satis firmi nec voluntate sunt."
 6. Ad Fam. XV.3.2. : "Publice propter duas causas nihil scripsi, quod et ipsum Commagenum legati dicebant ad senatum statim nuntios litterasque misisse...."

unknown, it is not surprising that Cicero prudently waited for confirmation of any story before accepting it as truthful.¹

In his dealings with Deiotarus of Galatia, Cicero conducted himself in a very different manner for this king was not of the same calibre as the rest. He was a powerful and important king, and not so much the governor's client as his friend and adviser, and Cicero was careful to treat him with special respect. In comparing Deiotarus with the other princes Cicero says he is completely loyal to Rome.² He certainly showed his loyalty at the time of the Parthian invasion of Syria. Once the news of invasion was confirmed, Deiotarus sent messengers to Cicero saying that he would join him in camp with all his forces, and Cicero was extremely grateful for this assistance. In fact such help was not needed in the first campaign of 51 B.C., and Cicero was able to inform Deiotarus that there was no immediate cause for alarm. Cicero continued to value the king's counsel and help, and during the early summer of 50 B.C. was no doubt relieved at Deiotarus' promise to join him in full force, which would mean the doubling of the Roman forces; as he was to bring 30 squadrons of foot soldiers and 2,000 cavalymen, such an offer of help was not to be despised.³ The reported size of his army serves to illustrate the power and resources of a king who could match in numbers the army Rome thought fit to maintain in its long and rugged province of Cilicia.

There are other interesting, if brief, sidelights on Deiotarus and his activities. He paid what amounts to a courtesy call on Cicero very early in his governorship, and made such a favourable impression that the two Cicero boys were actually entrusted to his care and allowed to go off to spend the summer at the Galatian court.⁴ It is also mentioned in an incidental way by Cicero that Deiotarus keeps a poverty-stricken Roman, P. Valerius, as his pensioner, and further looked after another Roman, Pinarius, who had been taken ill.⁵

No doubt the fact that Deiotarus' son was engaged to the daughter

1. Ad Fam. XV.2.1. : "...nuntique et litterae de bello a Parthis in provinciam Syriam illato cotidie fere afferrentur..."
2. Ad Fam. XV.1.6. : "Regis Deiotari et voluntatem et copias, quantaecumque sunt, nostras esse duco."
The basis of Deiotarus' power lay in the mercenary nature of his Galatian troops. The Galatians, who were in origin Celts, had forced their way into Asia Minor from the north, and in unfriendly surroundings had maintained their position and reputation as good fighting men.
3. Ad Att. VI.1.14. : "Habet autem cohortis quadringenarias nostra armatura XXX, equitum CIO CIO ."
4. Ad Att. V.18.4. : "Cicerones nostri sunt apud Deiotarum, sed, si opus erit, deducentur Rhodum."
5. Ad Att. V.21.14. : "P. Valerium negat habere quidquam Deiotarus rex eumque ait a se sustentari."
Ad Att. VI.1.23. : "Pinarium, quem mihi commendas, diligentissime Deiotarus curat graviter aegrum."

of Artavasdes, King of Armenia, a hostile power, was not quite so pleasing to Cicero who was probably well aware of the motives behind so diplomatic an engagement.¹ And the reasons for this, as well as for Deiotarus' pro-Roman leanings, are not far to seek. The king was surrounded on three sides by Roman forces in the provinces of Asia, Bithynia and Cilicia, and, on the other side to the east, first by the weak kingdom of Cappadocia and then by Armenia. If he valued his independence, he had to maintain a strong rule inside his own kingdom and at the same time remain on especially good terms with Rome. The example of Mithridates' fall and the carving up of Asia into Roman provinces by Pompey was still too fresh in the memory for Deiotarus to act rashly in a manner not acceptable to the Senate.

Surrounded as he was by Roman possessions, Deiotarus was of necessity concerned about any unrest in the kingdom on his eastern borders. It is known that he was alarmed at the worsening circumstances of this kingdom, and he wrote at least once to Ariobarzanes urging him to pay off his outstanding debts to various Romans and so stabilize his realm.² Any change in Cappadocia was likely to affect Deiotarus adversely. If Ariobarzanes was deposed, or became so powerless as to be unable to carry on his government, then either the Armenian king would seek to extend his power or, more likely, Rome would annex another province. In either case Deiotarus would find his own position weakened. If he gained the Armenian as his neighbour, he would have to maintain increased numbers of troops on his borders to prevent any invasion. If Rome transformed Cappadocia into a province, then he would be completely surrounded by Roman power and it would only be a matter of time before his kingdom was swallowed up too.

Ariobarzanes, the King of Cappadocia, was in many ways the reverse of Deiotarus; only in his alliance with Rome is he similar. It is clear from a decree of the Senate that it was an established fact in Rome that Ariobarzanes was in difficulties, for Cicero was given very clear instructions as to how he should act: "In your resolution you decreed that I should protect King Ariobarzanes, the Pious, Friend of Rome, and should safeguard that monarch's person and his kingdom, should defend both king and kingdom, and you added that the Roman people and Senate

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1. Ad Att.V.21.2. : "...nec dubitat Deiotarus, cuius filio pacta est Artavasdis filia...."
The inter-marriages between all these kingdoms is further shown by the fact that the Armenian king's sister had married the son of the Parthian king. c.f. Ad Fam. XV.3.1.
 2. Ad Att. VI.1.4. : "Deiotarus etiam mihi narravit se ad eum legatos misisse de re Bruti."

were greatly concerned about the safety of that king - a decree never previously passed by our Senate. I therefore decided that I ought to report your decision to the king and promise him my careful protection and loyalty."¹ As king of Cappadocia, Ariobarzanes was a most important ally of Rome. He filled the role of buffer between Cilicia and Armenia, and from Rome's point of view it was important that he remained in power. A civil disturbance within the kingdom would mean either an increase in Armenian power or, if Rome took over, the extension of the Roman frontiers to join those of Armenia; in either case the Senate would be displeased with the result. It can thus easily be seen why Cappadocia and the weakness of its king was a problem not only to Deiotarus but also to Rome, for both feared, and for the same reason, any kind of upheaval within that kingdom.

The fears for Ariobarzanes were well founded, as was quickly demonstrated to Cicero.² At Cybistra, in September 51, Cicero explained the Senate's decree to Ariobarzanes and offered him assistance in case of need. At their first meeting Ariobarzanes expressed his gratitude to the Senate and to Cicero but, as he knew of no plots against his person, was confident that all was well.

He returned however on the following day, accompanied by his brother, Ariarathes, and several of his late father's advisers. They were all in a state of great distress for, as a result of the previous day's conference with Cicero, certain men who had previously remained silent for fear of their own safety had revealed that there was in fact a plot to remove Ariobarzanes and place his brother on the throne. This brother, who asserted he intended the king no harm, had been approached by the conspirators and urged to aim at the throne. He had replied with greater loyalty than sense that he could not accept the throne while his brother was alive (Ad Fam. XV.2.6. : *Id vivo fratre suo accipere non potuisse*). When all the facts became known, it appeared that the plot had been instigated by the Queen Mother, Athenais, with the assistance of the important Chief Priest of Comana.

1. Ad Fam. XV.2.4. : "Cum enim vestra auctoritas intercessisset ut ego regem Ariobarzanem Eusebem et Philorhomaeum tuerer eiusque regis salutem et incolumitatem regnumque defenderem, regi regnoque praesidio essem, adiunxissetisque salutem eius regis populo senatuique magnae curae esse, quod nullo unquam de rege decretum esset a nostro ordine, existimavi me iudicium vestrum ad regem deferre debere eique praesidium meum et fidem et diligentiam polliceri...."

2. Ad Fam. XV.2.5 - 7. & Ad Fam. XV.4.6.

3. Ad Att. VI.1.4. : "Et nebercule ego ita iudico, nihil ille regno spoliatus, nihil regis agentius."

Cicero, as in duty bound, gave the king all the help he believed necessary. He ensured that Athenais was kept in check by the promotion of two men, Metras and Athenaeus, to be advisers to the king, and he further secured the prompt departure of the priest from the kingdom.¹ Apart from this, the help Cicero could give consisted chiefly of advice and moral support, for he could not help the king in his debts and he needed all his cohorts for the imminent struggle with the Parthians. Thus was averted the very calamity the Senate had feared, and Cicero, after suggesting to the king that he should punish only those who were most guilty, felt that Ariobarzanes could continue in full and dignified possession of his throne.

If Cicero's worries had stopped there, all would have been well. But Ariobarzanes proved a constant source of concern, so much so that more than once Cicero thought of resigning his enforced guardianship and leaving that ill-starred king to his fate.² Ariobarzanes was deeply involved in debts to both Brutus and Pompey and, despite the fact that he had wealthy friends, could not possibly pay his creditors in full. Cicero did manage to get the king to promise at Cybistra to pay Brutus the money he owed, but agents from Pompey began to dun the king after the governor had left and for a while Brutus received nothing. It was hardly surprising that Ariobarzanes was in financial difficulties for he had no treasury and no regular tribute; his only income came from the imposition of taxes, which Cicero states were raised in the Appius Claudius manner: "Indeed I believe there is nothing more ravaged than that kingdom, nothing more poverty-stricken than the king."³

One set of interviews with Ariobarzanes was sufficient for Cicero who avoided, possibly deliberately, another meeting with him. Letters were exchanged in which Cicero urged the king to pay his debts, and finally both Pompey and Brutus received at least part of what they considered their due. Even so the sums were fantastically large for so short a period: "The conclusion is this. In proportion to the amount of money lent, Brutus has been better treated than Pompey. About 100

- Trade with Cilicia pr ----- 102 B.C. onwards, but
1. Ad Fam. XV.4.6. : "Metram et eum quem tu mihi diligenter commendaras, Athenaeum, importunitate Athenaidis exsilio multatos, in maxima apud regem auctoritate gratiaque constitui.... perfecti ut e regno ille (sacerdos) discederet."
 2. The divinity worshipped at Comana seems to have been some Mother goddess figure who personified the fertility of Nature. The priesthood was a most wealthy and influential one, and the Chief Priest was second man in the kingdom.
 2. Ad Att. V.18.4. ; & Ad Att.VI.1.4 : "Itaque aut tutela cogito me abdicare aut, ut pro Glabrigone Scaevola, fenus et impendium recusare."
 3. Ad Att.VI.1.4. : "Et mehercule ego ita iudico, nihil illo regno spoliatus, nihil rege egentius."

talents have been found this year for Brutus; for Pompey about 200 talents have been promised in six months."¹ It is small wonder that Ariobarzanes was a poor man.

On the whole Cicero found the client kings a positive advantage during his governorship. The lesser princes fulfilled their duty by providing accurate news of Parthian movements while Deiotarus, who constantly demonstrated his loyalty to Rome by offering troops and advice in a crisis, gained Cicero's lasting regard and, a few years later, was defended by him when charged with having tried to poison Caesar. Even with Ariobarzanes, Cicero felt he had achieved some success and could say: "It is thanks to me that Ariobarzanes lives, and reigns a king."² Certainly he was sufficiently interested in that king and his own official guardianship over him to feel gratuitously insulted when Bibulus refused to acknowledge the title of king and referred to him as 'The Son of King Ariobarzanes'.³

The smaller resident trader, who in Cilicia was no doubt attracted by such natural resources as flax, saffron, grain, grapes and wine, obviously had to be at hand to buy and sell his goods. The second group comprised financiers and money-lenders who normally controlled their interests from Italy. These non-residents in Cilicia, who dealt mainly in loans to towns and individual provincials, were frequently men of high position in Rome who chose to keep their own identity a secret and used lesser figures as their agents in an effort to make favourable investments.

Romans in Cilicia.

Together with those men who came into the provinces on official business from Rome there came also a good many private individuals whose interest in the country was a purely mercantile one. The Gracchan legislation had opened up Asia to Roman businessmen, and from that time onwards they had been very active in the eastern provinces, in the role of either tax-gatherer or private investor. The position of the tax-gatherers has already been outlined, and now there remains the role of the private businessman to be considered.

Trade with Cilicia presumably increased from 102 B.C. onwards, but

1. Ad Att. VI.3.5. : "Summa haec est : pro ratione pecuniae liberalius est Brutus tractatus quam Pompeius. Bruto curata hoc anno talenta circiter C, Pompeio in sex mensibus promissa CC."
2. Ad Att.V.20.6. : "Ariobarzanes opera mea vivit, regnat."
3. Ad Fam II.17.7.

at first it must have provided a somewhat precarious livelihood since the activities of the pirates, who hated the Romans especially, would prove no small risk to profitable commerce. However, once Pompey had successfully suppressed the pirates and later opened up further areas for Roman and Italian traders, commerce revived and Roman businessmen, who were easily the most wealthy in the area, found the east a profitable place for their money speculations. They were helped by the Roman tax system which proved advantageous to them as it drained from the provinces money and resources which only the Roman private capitalist could replace.¹

These men who supplied the money for business can be divided into two groups. One section consisted of such men as bankers and the merchants who traded in the products of the area. They formed a fairly resident community, for while they were frequently men of considerable resources they did not feel sufficiently secure to allow their concerns to be run without their direct supervision. The smaller resident trader, who in Cilicia was no doubt attracted by such natural resources as flax, saffron, grain, grapes and wine, obviously had to be at hand to buy and sell his goods. The second group comprised financiers and money-lenders who normally controlled their interests from Italy. These non-residents in Cilicia, who dealt mainly in loans to towns and individual provincials, were frequently men of high position in Rome who chose to keep their own identity a secret and used lesser figures as their agents in an effort to find secure and favourable investments.

Relationships with the traders and investors were a difficult problem for the governor. His loyalties would most easily lie with his fellow nationals and the members of his own Roman class, though it should be remembered that there were also many Greek traders. In consequence it was all too easy for a corrupt or weak governor to allow the speculators a free hand, while for a reasonably honest and sincere man it was very hard to find the nice balance between offending his fellow Romans, with whom he would have to live on his return to Italy, and protecting the provincials.

1. The Roman businessman, whether merchant or financier, had spread his interests into every part of Asia and had become wealthy by cornering much of the trade in the natural products of the province and by sharing in the collection or financing of the taxes. The provincials were now working to enrich a class they both feared and loathed. The violence of their hatred, and the number of the Roman businessmen, is shown by the massacre carried out at Mithridates' command when he began the revolt against Rome. Plutarch alleges that 150,000 Romans were killed, while Appian says that the motive was hatred for the Romans not fear of Mithridates.

Plut. Sulla XXIV.4 : (τὸν γὰρ ἔχθιστον τῶν βασιλείων καὶ δεκαπέντε μυριάδας ἡμέρας μίαν τῶν ἐν Ἀσίᾳ Ῥωμαίων κατασφαγῆναι παρασκευάσαντα ---)

Appian Mith. 23. : ὧ καὶ μάλιστα δῆλον ἐγένετο τὴν Ἀσίαν οὐ φόβῳ Μιθριδάτου μᾶλλον ἢ μίσει Ῥωμαίων τοιαύδε ἐς αὐτοὺς ἐργάσασθαι.

There were many such businessmen in Cilicia, and, as might be expected of him, Cicero conducted himself in a reasonable manner which allowed the Romans to secure a fair return for their outlay without despoiling the provincials. However he is so careful in his letters to confine himself to generalisation that it is difficult to build up anything like a full picture of what were the trading activities during Cicero's particular year in office. It is clear that the Romans thus engaged in business were so numerous that it was worthwhile for Cicero to organise a levy and conscript them into his army; ¹ even in Cyprus, where their number was small, they were sufficiently in evidence to need a judge to decide any disputes. ² The range of their activities is unknown, but some of these men were traders, or at least speculators, in corn, for Cicero had to induce them to release stored grain to feed the provincials whose harvests had failed. ³

Among the smaller financiers and migrant businessmen, about whom there is more information, there was one P. Sittius, who held a bond, presumably for a loan to some town or individual, and Caelius was very anxious that Cicero should be well aware of how much the matter concerned him. He frequently reminds Cicero that he wishes him to help Sittius, thus possibly revealing that he was the real creditor and that Sittius was only an agent. ⁴ Among the many other letters of commendation in business affairs, ⁵ there is mention of a Roman knight, M. Feridius, "who is in Cilicia on business of his own," who wishes certain lands to be exempted from taxation. ⁶ Perhaps he was both a money-lender and a landowner; another landowner in Cilicia appears to have been A. Trebonius. ⁷ M. Fadius too is frequently mentioned, though no details of his business interests are given. But as he came from Syria (Ad Fam. XV.14.) into Cilicia, it may well be conjectured that he was either collecting money due to him or was on a tour of supervision of his estates. The case of Fadius, who discovered that his brother in Italy was trying to sell a jointly-owned villa, also serves to point out that the Roman speculator was not entirely free from home worries. There was also the businessman Atilius who could feel

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1. Ad Att. V.18.2. : "Dilectus habetur civium Romanorum."
 2. Ad Att. V.21.6. : "Q. Volusium..misi in Cyprum..ne cives Romani pauci qui illic negotiantur ius sibi dictum negarent."
 3. Ad Att.V.21.8. : "...perfeci ut et Graeci et cives Romani qui frumentum compresserant magnum numerum populis pollicerentur."
 4. Ad Fam. VIII.2.2.; VIII.10 ; Ad Fam. VIII.4.5. : "Saepius te admoneo de syngrapha Sittiana (Cupio enim te intellegere eam rem ad me valde pertinere.)"
 5. Ad Fam. XIII.9; 53; 55; 56; 61; 62; 64; 65.
 6. Ad Fam. VIII.9.4. : "M. Feridium, equitem Romanum...qui ad suum negotium istuc venit, tibi commendo...Agros quos fructuarios habent civitates vult tuo beneficioimmunis esse."
 7. Ad Fam. I.3.1.
 8. Ad Fam. XV.14.1. (Oct. 51 B.C.) - Ad Fam. II.14; IX.25; XIII.59 (Feb.50 B.C.)

grateful for Cicero's commendation which had saved him in some business difficulty or other in Bithynia.¹

Not even those who formed the closest members of a governor's staff were entirely disinterested in provincial business concerns. Cicero's own legatus, M. Anneius, had some urgent dispute with the people of Sardis in Lydia. The nature of the dispute remains a mystery, but it is a fairly safe assumption that it was one concerned with money, for it was sufficiently important to gain Anneius a three month leave of absence from Cilicia.² This case of M. Anneius forms a link between the often insignificant surviving details which are concerned with the Roman businessmen in the provinces and those who remained aloof in Rome. He represents the case of the Roman who normally stayed in Italy and employed someone else to dun the provincials for him. As such he points the way to the most fully documented example of a negotiator in Cilicia, the case of M. Scaptius.³

Amongst those who turned out to welcome the new governor at Ephesus in July 51 B.C. there came a deputation from Salamis in Cyprus. The members stated that Appius Claudius had given a praefecture, together with a troop of cavalry, to a certain money-lender, M. Scaptius, who had used his forces to starve out the members of the Salaminian Senate whom he had besieged in their senate-house, and as a result of this treatment five senators had died of starvation.⁴ Cicero, on hearing this, gave orders that the cavalry were to leave Cyprus at once and, following his own rule about not giving office to businessmen, refused to renew Scaptius' praefecture. There the matter rested until, in January 50 B.C., Cicero had more time to settle the dispute.

He had in the meantime received from M. Brutus a memorandum to the following effect: "The people of Salamis owe money to two friends of mine, M. Scaptius and P. Matinius"; and Brutus asked that Cicero should help them to recover the debt.⁵ Cicero, whilst willing to satisfy Brutus, was not disposed to ignore his own edict which allowed 12% as the maximum rate of interest. Scaptius was trying to exact the scandalous

1. Ad Fam. XIII.62.
2. Ad Fam. XIII.55.1. : "Eum cum Sardianis habere controversiam sois...."
3. Ad Att. V.21.10 - 13; VI.1.5 - 7; VI.2.7 - 9.
4. Ad Att. VI.1.6. : "Fuerat enim praefectus Appio, et quidem habuerat turmas equitum, quibus inclusum in curia senatum Salamine obsederat ut fame senatores quinque morerentur."
5. Ad Att. VI.1.5. : "Quin etiam libellum ipsius habeo in quo est, 'Salamini pecuniam debent M. Scaptio et P. Matinio, familiaribus meis' ".

rate of 48%. The two interested parties met the governor at Tarsus in January, and tried to come to terms. Scaptius, to Cicero's horror, demanded the full 48%, and produced a senatorial decree of 56 B.C. ordering the governor of Cilicia to give judgement in accordance with the terms of the bond, which stipulated 48%.¹ Cicero, after some searching, found two decrees of the same year referring to this bond of Scaptius, the one produced by Scaptius and another which stated that the agreement should be valid at law, but should not enjoy any special position.² Cicero therefore said that, while the loan was a legal one, the rate of interest was not, and so refused to allow 48%, 'for it was an impossible sum'.³

The matter might have ended there, had not Scaptius thrust into Cicero's hand a letter from Brutus which made everything at once much clearer and yet more difficult. The letter revealed that Brutus was the man behind the whole business; he was the real money-lender. Thereupon Cicero, Scaptius and the Salaminians tried to fix an agreed total to the debt, but this attempt proved a failure when Scaptius wanted 200 talents while the Salaminians made the total only 106. The accounts were checked and, on Cicero's reckoning, the Salaminians' total proved the correct one. They wished to pay, but Scaptius led Cicero aside once more and asked that the matter should be allowed to rest to a later date.

Cicero himself calls the request 'impudent', and indeed it was, but it was one which brought the affair to a crisis. There were many things to be weighed in the balance before Cicero reached his decision. By refusing to allow the matter to rest, he would make a certain enemy of Brutus, and possibly other men concerned in similar loans, which might lead to unimagined results. By acceding to the request, he would be conniving at the future ruin of the Salaminians, for it was certain that no subsequent governor would show such qualms when dealing with provincial debts. To decide was to displease, and some sympathy is due to the man who was faced with so thorny a problem. In the end Cicero gave way. The matter was to remain undecided, although in his

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1. Ad Att. V.21.11. : "...ille ex syngrapha postulabat quaternas."
 2. Ad Att. V.21.12. : "...deponere volebant; impetrevi a Salaminis."
 3. Ad Att. VI.2.7. : "Fieri non poterat nec, si posset, ego pati possem."
 4. Ad Att. VI.3.3. : "Scaptius qui in Cappadocia fuit."
 5. Ad Att. VI.3.9. : "...praefectus non est, quod ego nominali tribui negotiatori...."

heart Cicero must have known he had merely delayed the verdict against the Salaminians. Scaptius went off to collect money owed him elsewhere, and the poor Salaminians were not even able to deposit the 106 talents in the temple treasury, thus saving themselves from paying further interest on that amount.¹ This was a time when Cicero could no longer be all things to all men as he had hoped. By his decision, indeed by his lack of it, he alienated both parties in the dispute and satisfied no-one.

A Scaptius figures in another weak and quibbling decision made by Cicero at about this time. The case again concerned Brutus' agents, but on this occasion in Cappadocia. The agent mentioned is most probably that same Scaptius, and not a different one, as the man who had previously caused trouble in Cyprus.² The name is most certainly the same, and he was acting as agent for the same man, Brutus, who held Ariobarzanes as his debtor. It seems most probable that Scaptius, having failed to persuade Cicero to force the Salaminians to pay their debts and having lost his cavalry in Cyprus, had no immediate reason for returning to that island. He therefore concentrated his attention on his master's other main debtor, Ariobarzanes, and spent the early summer months in collecting money in Cappadocia. For indeed there was a Scaptius in Cappadocia at this time,³ and, as already shown, some money was paid over by Ariobarzanes to an agent of Brutus during this period.

However, whether this Scaptius is one and the same man or not, the main point remains. Cicero did give a praefecture to a Scaptius and to a Gavius, both at Brutus' request. He did this despite his proud statement that he refused many praefectures to men engaged on business.⁴

But Cicero's conscience seems to have been somewhat elastic in this matter. In his eagerness to satisfy Brutus, he was willing to forget his official guardianship over Ariobarzanes and gave a praefecture to Scaptius who was to be allowed to exercise his office in that kingdom. The technical grounds for ignoring his edict in this case were that the praefectures were to be held outside Cilicia, and therefore the activities

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1. Ad Att. VI.1.7. : "Addo etiam illud quod vereor tibi ipsi ut probem : consistere usura debuit. Deponere volebant; impetravi a Salaminis ut silerent."
 2. Tyrrell (Correspondence of Cicero : Vol. III; page 191) believes they are two distinct individuals. This view however does not explain why Cicero in the space of a few lines refers to two different men of the same name, both agents of Brutus and both engaged in the same business, without making any attempt to distinguish between them.
 3. Ad Att. VI.3.5. : "Scaptius qui in Cappadocia fuit."
 4. Ad Att. VI.3.5. : "...praefectus non est, quod ego nemini tribui negotiatori...."

of these agents were not Cicero's immediate concern.¹ Legally no doubt the decision was in order, but morally it was a deplorable one; and while it is somewhat gratifying to learn that Scaptius did not use his office, it does little to excuse Cicero in this shameful reversal of his policy.²

Yet once more some sympathy is due to Cicero, for he found himself in a most unenviable position. Brutus, who had possibly made the original loan to the Salaminians when he visited Cyprus with his uncle Cato in 58 B.C., was not a man to be scorned. There is ample evidence that Cicero was inundated with letters from Rome urging him to comply with Brutus' requests. Brutus himself wrote to Cicero in an offensive tone, Caelius had offered advice, and Atticus had urged his friend to allow Scaptius a small troop of cavalry, about 50 strong: "No more than 50, you say. Why Spartacus had far fewer at first."³ Clearly pressure was being put on Cicero's friends at Rome to make them persuade Cicero to follow a more tolerant approach to provincial finance. This pressure was finally successful in part, for Cicero, who was conscious of his exposed position in Cilicia, was eager to satisfy Brutus as far as he could. Indeed the whole of the Scaptius affair illustrates the inability of the governor, because of political motives and undercurrents, to deal adequately with unscrupulous businessmen and prevent completely the pillaging of the provincials.

Brutus was not alone however as the highly respected Roman who had interests in rather unsavoury financial concerns. Pompey was another.⁴

In one definite instance Cicero, in commending a man named Cluvius, lets it slip that Cluvius is in fact only an agent who is working for Pompey. When this fact is added to the evidence of Pompey's loans to Ariobarzanes, the probable conclusion is inescapable. There is clear proof that Pompey was concerned in financial matters in Asia and in Cappadocia, and his loans were probably on a wider scale than is generally imagined. Many of the letters of commendation written by Cicero may in fact be letters supporting Pompey's agents in all the provinces of the east, for Pompey

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1. Ad Att. VI.1.4. : "Ego tamen quas per te Bruto promiseram praefecturas M. Scaptio, L. Gaudio qui in regno rem Bruti procurabant, detuli. Nec enim in provincia mea negotiabantur."
 2. Ad Att. VI.3.5. : "Is a me tribunatum cum accepisset, quem ego ex Bruti litteris ei detulissem, postea scripsit ad me se uti nolle eo tribunatu."
 3. Ad Att. VI.2.8. : "Non amplius, inquis, quinquaginta. Cum Spartaco minus multi primo fuerunt."
 4. Ad Fam. XIII.56.3. : "His de rebus eo magis laboro, quod agitur res Cn. Pompei etiam....."

was especially admired by Cicero who would be willing to do whatever he could for the great man. Certainly Pompey's agents seem to have been as widespread as those of Brutus: "After I left, Ariobarzanes was pressed by scores of Pompey's agents."¹ It appears that Pompey had captured the east on one occasion, and from then on held it captive in its debts.

Enough has been said to show the wide compass of Roman business interests in Cilicia. The main danger came not from the small trader but from the money-lender who had entered into dubious and hazardous contracts with poverty-stricken communities. The wealthy and respected men of Rome are figures but dimly perceived through a veil of secrecy, the full extent of whose activities was probably a mystery to the Romans themselves. It is also obvious that a change of governor could easily upset the profits to be made in this way. Cicero, whatever his action towards Scaptius, refused to tolerate any extortion within his own province, and in general must be given credit for fair, if discreet dealings with the financiers' agents. Pompey and Brutus for their part had probably not met such difficulties in the previous governorship, when they had had a reliable agent in that most unlikely person, Appius Claudius himself, who was a close connection by marriage to them both.²

Appius Claudius.

This consideration of Cicero's relations with Romans in his province would not be complete without a mention of one man who, although he did not meet Cicero at this time, greatly influenced the new governor's policy and whose presence and authority pervaded Cilicia. This man was Appius Claudius, the previous governor. When it is remembered that it was customary for the incoming and outgoing governors to meet and preserve

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1. At Att. VI.1.3. : "...post a Pompei procuratoribus sescentis premi coeptus est."
 2. Ad Fam. III.4.2. : ".... - duo enim duarum aetatum plurima facio, Cn. Pompeium filiae tuae socerum et M. Brutum generum tuum -"

3. Ad Fam. III.4.1. : "Nunc studium erga te et dignitas tuorum militum iam rebus spero tibi esse cognitum, tamquam in illis maximis declaratis, quibus plurimum significare potuere tui mihi existimationem et dignitatem carissimum esse."

4. Ad Fam. III.5.1.

5. Ad Fam. III.5.3.

at least a public semblance of unanimity and friendship, it is surprising to find that Appius and Cicero engaged in a violent dispute that arose as a result of Cicero succeeding to the governorship,

Their quarrel, as shown in the letters they exchanged,¹ followed this course. Correspondence begins with Cicero stating how unexpected has been this sudden call to duty in Cilicia, though he is consoled by the thought that he could not take over from anyone more willing to hand on the province as free from all difficulties as possible. Their friendship is such that Appius will see to Cicero's advantage.² This mood of flattery, smooth generalisation and hopeful manoeuvre continued right up to Cicero's entry into the province: "I hope that my regard for you and my eagerness to be of service are already well known to you from many past actions; I shall however make it especially clear in matters in which I can give the most obvious proofs that your good name and position are very dear to my heart."³ To this polite talk Appius acidly replied that, while such friendly sentiments were very pleasing, they were unnecessary since already on record.⁴

One reason for Cicero's pleasure was that Appius had expressed his intention of staying on in Cilicia in order to meet his successor. This pleasure quickly turned to anger however once Cicero was in the province and Appius, instead of hastening to meet him to offer the customary greetings and then leave for Italy, in fact pretended to be unsure of where and when his successor was to arrive. As Cicero entered the western part of the province, Appius set out eastwards for Tarsus and in defiance of custom carried on the judicial duties of governor there. Cicero, making a pretence of trying to help Appius observe the Cornelian Law (which stipulated that the retiring governor must leave within 30 days of his successor's arrival), wrote expressing his gratitude that Appius had relieved him of some duties even though he was rather distressed at losing the support of some of his troops.⁵ Appius was however unperturbed at the acrimonious tone of Cicero's letter and presumably continued to profess his own confusion as to where

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1. Ad Fam. III.2. (March 51 B.C.); 3. (May 51); 4. (June 51); 5. (July 51); 6. (August 51); 8. (October 51); 7. (February 50); 9. (March/April 50); 10. (May 50); 11. (June 50); 12. (August 50).
 2. Ad Fam. III.2.1. : "...haec una consolatio occurrebat, quod neque tibi amicior quam ego sum quisquam posset succedere neque ego ab ullo provinciam accipere qui mallet eam quam maxime mihi aptam explicatamque tradere."
 3. Ad Fam. III.4.1. : "Meum studium erga te et officium tametsi multis iam rebus spero tibi esse cognitum, tamen in iis maxime declarabo, quibus plurimum significare potuero tuam mihi existimationem et dignitatem carissimam esse."
 4. Ad Fam. III.5.1.
 5. Ad Fam. III.6.5.

Cicero was, a pretence that was not difficult to maintain in view of Cicero's rapid march across Pamphylia and Lycaonia.

Cicero in turn said that he had no idea of where Appius and his troops were, and on the only occasion on which they came near to each other, at Iconium in August, there was an air of tragi-comedy as the two men just missed each other. Appius, the silent and aloof, hastened along in the night and early morning and made no attempt to halt at the camp he must have known Cicero was visiting. Cicero in turn, by now the worried general advancing to meet a Parthian invasion, left his army and hastened after Appius, only to arrive, almost panting and certainly undignified, to be told that the opportunity was lost, for Appius had gone by.

This incident led to a good deal of bitter feeling as both men chose to be insulted by it, and it seems that over the next few months Appius and Cicero were only too willing to feel aggrieved by any reported word or action of the other. Both paid a good deal of attention to stories handed on to them by their legati and friends. Appius' complaint was that Cicero by looks and by silence had shown that he was opposed to Appius;¹ he had prevented delegations going to Rome to sing Appius' praises;² he had tried to disparage Appius;³ he had held up the building work at Appia;⁴ he had arrogantly refused to meet him;⁵ in short he had governed in a manner quite unlike that of Appius. In reply Cicero pointed out that he too had heard stories of Appius' conduct;⁶ he reminded Appius of holding court at Tarsus after his arrival;⁷ he pointed out that it was Appius who failed to wait for Cicero and be greeted in the proper manner;⁸ he stated that he at any rate was not willing to govern at other people's expense.⁹ Once this astounding charge and counter-charge was finished, Cicero quickly urged his own good nature and wishes: "To return to my point: I want you to believe that I am not only your friend, but your very good friend." ¹⁰

The tone of this heated correspondence changed early in 50 B.C., and

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1. Ad Fam. III.8.2. : "...nisi me vultu et taciturnitate significasse tibi non esse amicum...."
 2. Ad Fam. III.8.3 - 5.
 3. Ad Fam. III.8.5. : "Ego si in provincia de tua fama detrahere unquam cogitassem, non ad generum tuum neque ad libertum tuum Brundisi, neque ad praefectum fabrum Corcyrae....rettulissem."
 4. Ad Fam. III.7.2.
 5. Ad Fam. III.7.5.
 6. Ad Fam. III.8.6. : "An mihi de te nihil esse dictum unquam putas?"
 7. Ad Fam. III.8.6.
 8. Ad Fam. III.7.4 - 5.
 9. Ad Fam. III.8.8.
 10. Ad Fam. III.7.6. : "Sed, ut ad rem redeam, me tibi non amicum modo, verum etiam amicissimum existimes velim."

it seems that Appius made efforts to calm Cicero. The manner of the letters becomes extremely polished, charming and urbane. Cicero admits a touch of temper (*subiratus*) in his previous notes, but presumes that Appius has changed on learning how loyal Cicero has been.

Once news of Appius' impeachment reached Cilicia, Cicero was able to express his concern in elaborate, if at times laboured, notes.¹ Now all was forgiven, and Cicero, who claimed he had always maintained Appius' prestige, promised to give him the help he had requested; in this he was following Atticus' advice to end the dispute. When Appius was acquitted of the charge, Cicero could show further delight at the salvation of his friend and boasted, now that there was no danger of his being called upon to do so, of how he would have conducted Appius' defence and how he would have ridiculed the prosecution.² After this Cicero felt himself so much back in favour that he could joke about some choleric passages in his previous letters and say that, if they were badly written, then they were certainly not written by him. Normal relations were restored, and by the midsummer of 50 B.C. Appius wrote, apparently in a sincere manner, with congratulations on Tullia's marriage to Dolabella.

This was a completely astounding episode that does little credit to either of the participants. In order to explain the course of events, it may be useful to consider briefly the past relations of the two men.

Appius had his full share of the Claudian arrogance, and there is considerable evidence as to his regular squabbles and quarrels not only with strangers but even with his brother Clodius.³ He seems to have been endowed with a quick temper and an almost congenital inability to remain on good terms with people for any length of time.⁴ Certainly he had good cause for quarrel with Cicero long before 51 B.C. First of all there had been Cicero's exile, which was the direct result of the political activities of Appius' brother Clodius, about whom Cicero was consistently rude and uncompromising. Appius was of course influenced by this and, whilst not openly siding with his brother against Cicero, alone of all his colleagues opposed Cicero's return.⁵ This disappointment

1. Ad Fam. III.10. & 11.

2. Ad Fam. III.11. 2. : "Tuorum autem honorum cursus cui suspectus umquam fuit? Me miserum, qui non adfuerim! quos ego risus excitassem!"

3. Ad Fam. VIII.12.1. Ad Att. IX.1.

4. Lucan V.157.

5. Pro Sest. XL : "De praetoribus unus alienus;"

and quarrel was finally healed in part, and by 54 B.C. Cicero could talk of : "That gallant and distinguished consul, Appius Claudius, who is, I trust, bound to me by ties of a loyal and lasting reconciliation."¹ The old wounds were re-opened however at the time of Clodius' murder, and Cicero's defence of Milo, even though undelivered, was too notorious to allow of any close friendship between him and Appius.

If relations in Rome were strained, what further cause of friction was there in Cilicia? Appius had been very eager to take a province, and had been prepared to go out to Cilicia without the formal ratification of a *Lex Curiata*.² He took up his governorship early in 53 B.C., and was quite possibly looking forward to three full years of office. Certainly, if Cicero is to be believed, Appius was of an avaricious nature as a result of poverty in his youth, and used the period of his command to acquire money for himself as well as in the furtherance of the business activities of his son-in-law Brutus. For if Appius was looking after Brutus' affairs, it is obvious he was also looking after his own.

If this is the case, there seems to be a reason for Appius' unwillingness to leave his province before the last moment allowed by the law and for his refusal to meet Cicero.³ He had hoped for three years in Cilicia, and was no doubt put out by the arrival of an old enemy six months before he had expected. As a result he behaved as though Cicero were the usurper, and deliberately organised his successor's entry at the west of the province rather than the south, and then played a game of hide and seek with him.

Even the reconciliation in the early months of 50 B.C. was more apparent than real. Appius on being prosecuted by Dolabella had made a good initial reply by entering Rome, thus laying down his *imperium* and his claim for a triumph, but he still needed all the support he could get and from every quarter. Whereas he had previously encouraged his friends to criticise Cicero openly, he now had to recover lost ground and gain the good-will of his successor in order to prevent any

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1. *Pro Scauro* XIV.31. : "Hic ego Appium Claudium consulem fortissimum atque ornatissimum virum mecumque, ut spero, fideli in gratiam reditu firmoque coniunctum nullo loco, iudices, vituperabo." c.f. also *Ad Fam.* I.9.4. : "Certiores te per litteras scribis esse factum, me cum Caesare et cum Appio esse in gratia....."
 2. *Ad Fam.* I.9.25. : "....praesertim cum sine suspitione tuae cupiditatis non possis illius cupiditatem refutare."
 3. As was pointed out in *Ad Fam.* III.6.6., Appius was obliged by the *Lex Cornelia* to leave Cilicia within 30 days of Cicero's arrival. Since Cicero arrived on July 31st, Appius had to be gone by August 30th, and this fact explains Appius' haste to move on during the early morning of August 30th. Despite his 'cheek' (*si mehercules Appi os haberem* : *Ad Fam.* V.10.a.2.) he probably wished to avoid openly meeting his successor after the date by which he should have been gone from the province.

uncomplimentary comments or reports leaving Cilicia. His fear of hostile delegations became as great as his desire for friendly ones had previously been. Cicero, who, as Caelius said, did not hate Appius,¹ was bombarded by advice from Rome which urged him to accept all hopes of a return to normal relations with Appius. He played the part asked of him and assured Appius of his support. The reconciliation letters contain some of the most elaborate and polished writing of all the letters that survive from this year's governorship, and yet despite, almost because of, their careful style they are false and empty. The fine phrases of friendship have a hollow ring to them, and even in their seemingly open manner they can hide a double meaning.

Two examples, one from each of the two contestants, will suffice. Cicero, all charm and consideration, expresses a hope that he will shortly hear of Appius receiving his well-deserved triumph, a hope which, as he knew from a note of Caelius, would be particularly galling to a man who had already lost all hope of a triumph by entering Rome.² Appius had to wait a short while before getting in so telling a reply, but his chance came when Tullia married Dolabella, Appius' recent and unsuccessful accuser. Appius, all friendship and bonhomie, expresses his good wishes for what seemed likely to prove the short-lived marriage of Tullia with one of the most unsuitable men in Rome. In giving his good wishes he uses a deliberately ambiguous phrase in 'prosperare evenire';³ that is, he hopes it turns out better than he fears.

The letters offer sufficient evidence to show that it was Appius who set the pace in the quarrel he had forced upon Cicero. Yet it is equally evident from their previous relationships that Cicero had no real liking or respect for Appius, and he was wholeheartedly opposed to his methods of provincial government. It is probable that there was a great deal of truth in Appius' allegations of critical looks and ominous silences by Cicero whenever Appius' name was mentioned, and there is Cicero's own testimony for the revoking of several Claudian decisions. Cicero however would not have allowed the dispute to blaze

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1. Ad Fam. VIII.6.1. : Scio tibi eum non esse odio".
 2. Ad Fam. III.9.2. : "...tamen maximam laetitiam cepi ex tuis litteris de spe minime dubia et plane explorata triumphi tui...."
 3. Ad Fam. III.12.2.

so openly or so fiercely if Appius had not forced this upon him, for he was well aware how open to injury he was whilst marooned in Cilicia. Thus when it became politic to make up their quarrel, Cicero was prepared to be reconciled with Appius as he had been once before. It was however a diplomatic rather than a personal friendship that they resumed, if indeed this was not what 'amicus' and 'amicitia' had come to mean in the late Republic.

That a citizen army, which had with difficulty saved Italy from Hannibal, was totally ill-fitted to defending an ever-increasing empire around the Mediterranean. Along with this refusal came an unwillingness to appoint generals of acknowledged ability to take command for lengthy periods over Rome's armies in troubled provinces and at dangerous frontiers. The Senate still insisted in the majority of cases on appointing its generals from the number of those who had held public office in Rome. While such a system was necessary in a small state, it became ludicrous as Roman power became more extensive geographically, and at a time of crisis repeatedly proved itself embarrassing and disastrous. The reason for the Senate's delay lay in its fear of creating a standing army with regular professional commanders who might prove dangerous in combination, if they decided to turn against their masters. Also added to this there was the inherent jealousy of an oligarchy towards any of its members who gained an exceptional position or a distinct honour.

In giving a description of the Roman army during the second century B.C.,¹ Polybius states that four legions were raised each year in Italy, and indeed it seems that many Roman men must have served their full period of sixteen years in the legions, for Rome was seldom at peace. Military service was not continuous however, nor did the soldier remain in the same legion for the whole of his military life. Ligustinus, a common soldier portrayed by Livy, gives some idea of his life in the Roman army in the middle of the second century. He had served in Macedonia, in Spain, and twice in Aetolia, but even though he served well and faithfully in each campaign he was apparently discharged after the successful conclusion of the war, for he speaks of how he had to volunteer for service for a third time; he had been twenty-two years under arms, and was still an active soldier when over fifty.² Ligustinus' fears of a premature retirement would not have been entirely unfounded even

1. Polybius VI.19 - 42.

2. Livy XXII.54.8. : "Tertio iterum voluntarius miles factus sum."

34.11. : "Viginti duo stipendia annuum in exercitu coacta habeo, et saepe annis sum quinquaginta."

PROVINCIAL DEFENCE

The Governor's Position.

Even when her overseas possessions and commitments had grown on a tremendous scale, Rome surprisingly refused to acknowledge the fact that a citizen army, which had with difficulty saved Italy from Hannibal, was totally ill-fitted to defending an ever-increasing empire around the Mediterranean. Along with this refusal came an unwillingness to appoint generals of acknowledged ability to take command for lengthy periods over Rome's armies in troubled provinces and at dangerous frontiers. The Senate still insisted in the majority of cases on appointing its generals from the number of those who had held public office in Rome. While such a system was necessary in a small state, it became ludicrous as Roman power became more extensive geographically, and at a time of crisis repeatedly proved itself embarrassing and hazardous. The reason for the Senate's delay lay in its fear of creating a standing army with regular professional commanders who might prove dangerous in combination, if they decided to turn against their masters. Also added to this there was the inherent jealousy of an oligarchy towards any of its number who gained an exceptional position or a distinct honour.

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1. Polybius VI.19 - 42.

2. Livy XLII.34.8. : "Tertio iterum voluntarius miles factus sum."
34.11.: "Viginti duo stipendia annua in exercitu emerita habeo, et maior annis sum quinquaginta."

after Marius' re-organisation of the army. Even though the length of service was extended and its basis broadened to encourage the growth of the professional soldier, the numbers serving in the legions were not fixed. In times of crisis the number of legions was increased, but once peace was restored discontented soldiers were frequently forced back into an uncertain civilian life as the legions were disbanded.

In such circumstances the provinces were bound to be ill-defended, not because of any lack of ability or spirit on the part of the Roman legionary, but through an almost wilful disregard of elementary precautions by the Senate. As long as the Senate insisted on disbanding legions as soon as a campaign was over, especially in ill-pacified areas, there was always the danger of a revolt from discontented groups and an initial defeat or two for Rome until her forces were organised and reinforcements sent out; Mithridates had already shown up this glaring weakness in Asia by overrunning the Roman province and killing many thousands of Romans there.¹ The Senate moreover not only left the provinces weakly defended but even risked whatever forces were there by placing them under the command of the provincial governor. This combining of all functions, executive, administrative, legal and military, in the one person of the governor was to lay a heavy burden on men who could seldom fill more than one or two roles satisfactorily, though it says much for the ability and adaptability of most Roman governors in military matters that resounding disasters were so few.

Besides his command over whatever legions were stationed in his province, the governor held powers to call up reserve troops and levy further squadrons from any Romans living in the province or engaged on business there. He might further call upon the provincials to supply any of their specialised troops he thought fit to use, and in a maritime province would draw upon the provincials' ships to supply him with a fleet in case of need.² In theory this aid available from the allied forces seems of positive value, but much depended on the quality of the troops enlisted and, even more important, on the skilful use a governor made of them.

Cicero, who in July 51 B.C. looked but a poor prospect for a future

1. Plutarch : Sulla XXIV.4. : (τὸν γὰρ ἔχθιστον τῶν βασιλέων καὶ δεκαπέντε μυριάδας ἡμέρας μὲν τῶν ἐν Ἀσίᾳ Ῥωμαίων κατασφάγῃναι παρὰ Κεῦδαντα ...)

2. If the provincials' ships proved insufficient or unsuitable, the governor might also call upon them to contribute money for a navy. Pro Flacco XII.27. : "Sed si hoc crimen est, aut in eo est quod non licuerit imperare, aut in eo quod non opus fuerit navibus, aut in eo quod nulla hoc praetore classis navigarit. Licuisse ut intellegas, cognosce quid me consule senatus decreverit, cum quidem nihil a superioribus continuorum annorum decretis discesserit."

general, succeeded to Cilicia at a time when events both within and without his province seemed to be leading to a crisis. Within the province his troops were discontented, and from the east there was the promise of a Parthian attack. The latter threat was by far the more serious, for only two years earlier in 53 B.C. there had been the disastrous defeat of Crassus at Carrhae, and it was only to be expected that the Parthians would be eager to follow up their earlier success by invading and plundering Roman territory in order to repay Crassus' attack. It might have been expected that if the Roman Senate was alive to the danger, it would, despite the unpopularity of a Parthian war, have made preparations by strengthening its forces in all the eastern provinces to ward off any attack, or indeed to make an effort to regain the standards lost at Carrhae. But no such activity had been going on. Cicero, who had good cause for alarm, states that the Senate as a whole was well aware that Cilicia needed reinforcements, yet could do nothing in the face of opposition from the consul Sulpicius.¹

Since he had gained no further troops, Cicero was desperately concerned at any suggestion of reducing the number of troops he was to receive from Appius: "I had understood from your letter that you had discharged a good many of your soldiers. But that same Fabius explained to me that, while you had thought of doing so, at the time he left you the number of your troops was undiminished. If that is so, I shall be very pleased if you will reduce as little as possible those scanty forces you command."² It seems in fact to be the case that Appius did not after all dismiss any of his troops, for if he had, it would certainly have formed the grounds for a complaint in that heated exchange of correspondence between Appius and Cicero.

The legions were not up to full strength however when Cicero took over, and he fairly frequently mentions how thin his troops were on the ground.³ It is impossible to say just what was the numerical strength of the army that he took over from Appius in August, but by late September, with the five mutinous cohorts returned to the fold, fifty cavalymen back from Cyprus and a troop of horse returned from Appius, plus those levies held at Iconium, Cicero's provincial army was made up of 12,000 infantry

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1. Ad Fam. III.3.1. : "...sed universo senatui venerant in mentem, praesidio firmiore opus esse ad istam provinciam. Censebant enim omnes fere ut in Italia supplementum meis et Bibuli legionibus scriberetur. Id cum Sulpicius consul passurum se negaret...."
 2. Ad Fam. III.3.2. : "Ex iis litteris...sic intellexeram, permultos a te milites esse dimissos, sed mihi Fabius idem demonstravit te id cogitasse facere, sed, cum ipse a te discederet, integrum militum numerum fuisse.. Id si ita est, pergratum mihi feceris si istas exiguas copias quas habuisti quam minime imminueris....."
 3. Ad Att. V.15.1. : "...et cum exercitum noster amicus habeat tantum, me nomen habere duarum legionum exilium?" c.f. also Ad Att. V.18.1.; Ad Fam. XV.1.4.

and 2,000 cavalry. These numbers are of course only an approximation arrived at by combining two comments from Cicero's letters. In Att. V.18.2. (written September 20th 51 B.C.) he says that Deiotarus' arrival with all his forces will double the Roman army : quem (exercitum) nos Deiotari adventu cum suis omnibus copiis duplicaturi eramus. In Att. VI.1.14. (written February 20th 50 B.C.) Deiotarus, who is coming with all his forces, is said to have 30 squadrons of 400 men and 2,000 cavalry: habet autem cohortis quadringenarias nostra armatura XXX, equitum CIO CIO.¹ Cicero's early anxieties caused by the weak strength of his army would be in no way relieved by the mutiny of the five cohorts just before his arrival in either June or July. Fortunately however the mutiny did not spread to the rest of the army, and for the remainder of his year's governorship Cicero was able to rely upon a body of troops which, despite its small size for so large a province, was very loyal in its service.


If the Senate would not trust its generals with large forces, it dared not trust the provincials who were practically disarmed. The provincials' good faith was always suspect, and it would indeed have been utter folly to impose the Roman system of taxation with all its excesses on a well armed community which might decide to use force to gain some respite from the tax-gatherers' attentions. Even though he believed that he was the object of more real respect and loyalty than any of his predecessors, Cicero thought little of the support they might give him. He admits that the Galatian, Pisidian and Lycian auxiliary forces are the main strength of his army, but as far as is known he made no attempt to ensure that a Cilician fleet, which the Cilicians with their pirate ancestry should have been able to supply and sail, was maintained in readiness. Cicero's whole attention was directed to the Parthians, who would not attack by sea, and so he paid no regard to raising a fleet for this would have proved a further demand on the cities' resources. The rest of the allies had to be dismissed with : "Because of the harsh and unjust nature of our rule the auxiliary forces of our allies are so weak that they cannot help us much. Or if not weak, they are so estranged that it seems unwise either to expect anything of them or to entrust anything to them."²

1. Plutarch : Cicero 36. *ἔῖτα κλήρω λαχὼν τῶν ἑπαρχῶν Κιλικίαν καὶ στρατὸν ὀπλιτῶν μυρίων καὶ δισχιλίων, ἵππέων δὲ δισχιλίων ἑξακοσίων*
Plutarch here gives Cicero 600 more cavalrymen than Cicero claims for himself.

It should be noted that these figures represent the fully augmented legions and auxiliaries, and can give no clue to the actual strength of the 'exilium legionum' of August. In fact, when the army of the allied king Deiotarus is added to the Roman troops, a combined total of 28,000 men is no small force for a Roman governor to have at his disposal.

2. Ad Fam. XV.1.5.: "Nam sociorum auxilia propter acerbitem atque iniurias imperi nostri aut ita imbecilla sunt ut non multum nos iuvare possint, aut ita alienata a nobis ut neque exspectandum ab iis neque committendum iis quidquam esse videatur."

Cicero is here using the rhetorical arts of the law court in a special plea to gain reinforcements for what he considered weak legions.



allowed to lay claim to part of northern Mesopotamia, the effect of this As far as military matters are concerned Cicero's lot was apparently an unenviable one. A man of little military experience, he was unwillingly put in charge of a province which was dangerously close to the Parthians and poorly guarded by two undermanned, if finally loyal, legions. The sole consolation he could draw from so gloomy a prospect was that since he was advised and supported by officers of no inconsiderable experience in Quintus and Pomptinus, both of whom had seen service in Gaul, he might with luck get through his year's duty without any disgrace to his good name.

The Parthians.

"There is no news of the Parthians. For the rest, may the gods assist us."¹ To this devout prayer, not only Cicero but all his fellow governors of the eastern provinces as well as the government in Rome, would add amen. Of all the likely sources of trouble in Asia, the Parthians were at this moment of time the most dangerous. Any military plans made for the area had to take into account the possibility of an invasion from across the Euphrates frontier, an invasion which could rob Rome of its provinces in Syria and Cilicia and disrupt the whole economy of the east. Cicero's fears of a Parthian invasion therefore were no idle ones, for if any serious war broke out, he was destined to find himself facing those hordes which had all too recently proved that Roman might was not invincible.

The Parthian menace was one which had grown since the final overthrow of Mithridates in 63 B.C., for with Pompey's settlement of the east the power of Rome and Parthia was brought into dangerous proximity as the Parthians became Mithridates' natural successors as Rome's main enemies in this area. The Pompeian settlement effectively brought about a common frontier: the creation of the province of Syria and the extension of Cilicia, together with the assistance given to the King of Armenia, widened Roman influence to the very limits of Parthian territory. By the treaty, which laid down that the Euphrates was to be the Partho-Roman frontier, the Parthians were allowed sovereignty in Mesopotamia, but as Armenia, at this time under Roman influence, was

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1. Ad Att. V.11.4. : "De Parthis erat silentium. Quod superest, di iuvent!"

allowed to lay claim to part of northern Mesopotamia, the effect of this part of the agreement was largely nullified and was to bring the two powers into violent opposition. Thus it can be seen that, with Roman territory or influence in the client kingdoms stretching from Armenia to Syria, the common frontier created the promise of future trouble. Furthermore, when it is remembered that Rome also tried to extend its influence eastwards by taking into a client relationship such places as Edessa, which was in nominally Parthian territory, the promise of trouble became a certainty.

The Senate feared the Parthians, and with good cause, but it failed to realise how difficult it would prove to defeat and hold down so warlike a people. The best hope for Rome lay in a strong army stationed in regular garrisons on the frontier in order to maintain the Euphrates as a convenient line of defence beyond which the Parthians might be confined. But, as already shown, this policy of creating a standing army was not acceptable to the Romans of the Republic, and so the Roman forces in the east were kept to a dangerous minimum. It would need some movement on the part of the Parthians to stir Roman anxieties that troops were prepared in order to complete the conquest of the east.

This movement came when the Parthians turned against Armenia and sought to end its influence in Mesopotamia. The invasion of Armenia was seen as an attack on Rome, and it appeared to Crassus, the wealthy triumvir, that the opportunity had come for rivalling the military exploits of his fellows, Caesar and Pompey. He took the province of Syria as his command, gathered a substantial army, which was swelled perhaps by draining troops from the other eastern provinces,¹ marched forth to punish the Parthians, but, in a campaign which was a series of blunders, was tricked by his Arab guide and allowed himself to be drawn into a Parthian ambush at Carrhae in 53 B.C. Here his infantry were no match for the expert and numerous Parthian cavalry. Crassus was killed, and rather more than 30,000 Romans lost their lives or were captured. The defeat was damaging to both Rome's resources and reputation, and immediately resulted in the return of Armenia to the Parthian sphere of influence and exposed Cilicia to attack from the

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1. In 68 B.C. Marcius Rex had commanded three legions in the then smaller province of Cilicia (Sallust Hist. V.14M), whilst in 51 B.C. Cicero in the larger province had only two depleted ones (Ad Att.V.15.1.). It may be wondered if the reduction in the armed forces was due entirely to the ending of the Mithridatic Wars, for it might well be that Crassus drew troops for his army from those neighbouring provinces which would be safeguarded when, as he hoped, he ended the Parthian threat. There is an example of this transfer of troops to be found in the action of the Senate in 51 B.C., when they asked for a legion each from Pompey and Caesar to go to the threatening Parthian War. If this was done in 51 B.C., might it not also have been done in 53 B.C.?

was his suspicion that any Parthian attack on Cilicia would come through north through the poorly defended kingdom of Cappadocia. It was only to be expected that the Parthians would try to follow up their previous success, and Cicero, who had been ordered to protect Ariobarzanes and Cappadocia, could feel that he was succeeding Appius in what was potentially a most dangerous zone.

This then was no imaginary danger that Cicero foresaw. It was comforting at first to believe that the Parthians were at peace,¹ but later the worry caused by a report that they had cut up some Roman cavalry must have been increased by Caelius' ominous forecast that: "If the Parthian makes any move, I know the struggle will be no small one."²

By the end of August 51 B.C. the danger appeared to be a present one. Reports were daily arriving of Parthian troop movements, of the massing of forces on the banks of the Euphrates, and of a threatened attack on Cappadocia by the Armenians.³ In such a crisis Cilicia was placed in real peril, for two scanty legions could hardly repel a simultaneous invasion from both north and east, while even within the province the wilder elements had taken up arms in the hope of joining in the disturbance of Roman power.⁴ Cicero must have been doubly thankful for the guidance and the very presence of his two principal legati, Quintus and Pomptinus, who probably planned and effected the execution of all the military manoeuvres of this period. For his part, Cicero deserves praise for his resolution and determination at this time. Once it became clear that he would have to marshal his forces to the defence of Cilicia, he made all speed to join his army and further organised the levying of reserve troops amongst the Romans living in his province.⁵ It cannot be denied that during the opening months of his governorship his whole attention was given to the gathering of troops and the strengthening of Cilicia to face what might prove to be a most serious invasion.

By September 20th, after his military tour through Lycaonia, Isauria and Cappadocia, Cicero pitched camp at Cybistra; his reason for so doing

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1. Ad Att. V.14.1. : "...primum otium Parthicum...."
 2. Ad Att. V.16.4. : "De Partho silentium est, sed tamen concisos equites nostros a barbaris nuntiabant ii qui veniebant."
Ad Fam. VIII.5.1. (From Caelius) : "Nunc si Parthus movet aliquid, scio non mediocrem fore contentionem."
 3. Ad Fam. XV.3.1. : "Cum ad me legati...nuntiassent regis Parthorum filium.. ad Euphratem cum maximis Parthorum copiis multarumque praeterea gentium magna manu venisse Euphratemque iam transire coepisse dicique Armenium regem in Cappadociam impetum esse facturum..."
 4. Ad Fam. XV.1.3. : "Et ob eam causam et ut opprimerentur ii qui ex Cilicum gente in armis essent..."
It may not be too fanciful to suppose that those Cilicians who so eagerly responded to a Parthian invasion were the relics of the pirates who wished to see a return to the pre-Roman days of booty and plunder.
 5. Ad Att. V.18.2. : "Dilectus habetur civium Romanorum."

was his suspicion that any Parthian attack on Cilicia would come through Cappadocia, as this was the weakest link in the line of defence.¹ Whilst in camp he was able to review, somewhat pessimistically, the recent events. To date there is no news of Bibulus' arrival in Syria, but it seems that Cassius, Crassus' quaestor who had survived Carrhae and was now governing Syria, is in the town of Antioch with all his forces. He may even be blockaded there, for the Parthian prince Orodes is reported to have crossed the Euphrates and to have occupied Cyrrhestica, a district of Syria which bordered on Cilicia. Winter may well prove Cicero's greatest ally, though perhaps by then the Parthians will already be in Cilicia; Spring the following year might see Pompey's return to the east and the absolution of Cicero from his responsibilities.²

Towards the end of September it became clear that no such invasion was in fact planned through Cappadocia and, when reports came in that the Roman cavalry had cut up some Parthian troops which had crossed into Cilicia from Syria,³ Cicero moved on towards the Taurus Mountains. But first he issued this warning to the Senate in Rome: "The situation is now such that unless you promptly send out to these provinces an army of the size you normally despatch to the greatest of wars, there is a danger of losing all those provinces on which the revenues of Rome depend."⁴ With this desperate and seemingly heartfelt plea, Cicero marched eastwards to face the unknown, resolved if necessary to meet an honourable death.

"Parthians? I don't think there were any. There were some Arabs, with Parthian equipment, but they are said to have gone back. Reports say there is not a single enemy in Syria."⁵ Incredible as it may seem, these words were written by Cicero only a few days after the previous eloquent appeal to the Roman Senate. Events were suddenly changed, and the Parthian menace had become a figment of the imagination. Syria was at peace: Cilicia was safe: the Roman revenue was assured.

This sudden reverse is however too good to be true, and when the facts are examined more closely a rather different picture to the one presented by Cicero emerges. The alarm raised by the client kings had

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1. Ad Fam. XV.2.1. : "Erat enim magna suspicio Parthos, si ex Syria egredi atque irrumpere in meam provinciam conarentur, iter eos per Cappadociam, quod ea maxime pateret, esse facturos."
 2. Ad Att. V.18.1. : "Ea (hiems) si venerit nec illi ante in meam provinciam transierint, unum vereor, ne senatus propter urbanarum rerum metum Pompeium nolit dimittere."
 3. Ad Fam. XV.4.7. : "Interea cognovi...magnumque eorum equitatum, qui in Ciliciam transisset, ab equitum meorum turmis et acchoorte praetoria, quae erat Epiphaneae praesidi causa, occidione occisum."
 4. Ad Fam. XV.1.5. : "Hoc autem tempore res sese sic habet ut, nisi exercitum tantum quantum ad maximum bellum mittere soletis mature in has provincias miseritis, summum periculum sit ne amittendae sint omnes eae provinciae quibus vectigalia populi Romani continentur."
 5. Ad Fam. III.8.10. : "De Parthis quod quaeris, fuisse nullos puto. Arabes qui fuerunt admixto Parthico ornatu dicuntur omnes revertisse; hostem esse in Syria negant ullum."

not been an empty one. The Parthians had certainly crossed the Euphrates and quite successfully overrun the northern part of Syria, finally reaching Antioch where they were met by Cassius. For a while the result had been in some doubt, but in the end Cassius, who acted with fair skill, had forced the enemy to retire from Antioch, though not from Cyrrhestica, where, says Cicero, they spent the winter. The Roman victory was assured before Bibulus' arrival in the province.¹

The real glory for halting the Parthian invasion must go to Cassius whose part in the affair Cicero consistently minimises. Once the danger from the Parthians was over, Cicero tried simultaneously to criticise Cassius, inflate his own achievement, ignore Bibulus, and say that there had really been little to fear from that particular invasion: "Meanwhile - for you realise there are such words as 'panic' and 'idle rumours of war' - the rumour of my approach put heart into Cassius who was besieged in Antioch and inspired terror in the Parthians. Cassius followed them up as they retreated from the town and scored a victory."² The fact is that Cicero had acted very creditably in this whole business up to the point where a mixture of disappointment at not having beaten the Parthians himself and of resentment with the man who had, forced him to belittle the not trifling achievement of repulsing a serious Parthian invasion.

If, as Cicero says, Cassius claimed he had ended the Parthian War,³ then it was a somewhat exaggerated claim. The Parthian War could only be ended by the defeat of the Parthian forces, their expulsion from Roman territory and their containment beyond the Euphrates. This he had not achieved. The Parthians spent the winter in Cyrrhestica and, as the summer months approached, Cicero again became concerned for the safety of his province. He hoped that his fears were idle ones, but everything frightened him. Preparations were however made once more to meet the threat: unfortunately Pomptinus had left for Italy, but with Anneius' recall from Asia and with the help of Deiotarus' troops from Galatia, Cicero hoped he could hold out until Pompey arrived, for Pompey clearly expected to get the command.⁴

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1. Ad Att. V.21.2. : "Recesserant illi quidem ab Antiochia ante Bibuli adventum, sed nullo nostro εὐημερήματι . Hodie (February 50) vero hiemant in Cyrrhestica, maximumque bellum impendet."
 2. Ad Att. V.20.3. : "Interim - scis enim dici quaedam πανικὰ', dici item τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου - rumore adventus nostri et Cassio, qui Antiochia tenebatur, animus accessit et Parthis timor iniectus est. Itaque eos cedentis ab oppido Cassius insecutus rem bene gessit."
 3. Ad Att.V.21.2. : "...litteras...quibus per se scribit confectum esse Parthicum bellum."
 4. Ad Att.VI.1.14. : "Erit ad sustentandum quoad Pompeius veniat, qui litteris, quas ad me mittit, significat suum negotium illud fore."

The months continued to slip by and Cicero, having been alarmed once, was not over-eager to rush eastwards to meet a second attack, real or imaginary. He had lost his main military adviser, and his policy became one of waiting for the arrival of the last day in July and his own happy release from office.¹ This statement of his policy is not meant as a criticism of his action, nor is it meant to imply that he relaxed his guard, for he continued to show that he was as alert as before. He kept his troops, which were augmented by strong allied reinforcements, in a state of watchful readiness,² and, whilst hoping for a few months of peace, he took the elementary precaution of marching slowly eastwards to join the camp on the river Pyramus by June 50 B.C.

Once in camp he prudently waited to see what danger threatened. It appears that he received frequent messages from Bibulus' legati that Syria was once more at war, but when Bibulus himself wrote it was always about any other subject and the Parthians were never mentioned.³ Bibulus, who had no liking at all for Cicero, also pursued a policy of masterly inactivity, and as a result is criticised as the man, 'who never set foot outside the city gate as long as there was an enemy on the Roman side of the Euphrates'.⁴ No major invasion materialised, and by July it was clear to Cicero that the threat was over, for the moment at least, and Orodes' long-awaited, long-rumoured invasion would not take place during his governorship. His policy of waiting and watching had been the correct one, and in a new peaceful atmosphere he disbanded all the strong garrisons he had got ready.⁵

Later, when reviewing the Parthian menace and comparing it to the threat then hanging over the Republic, Cicero could say that it was some god who saved Rome in Cilicia from the Parthian invasion.⁶ This pious view was not altogether accurate, for it was no god who organised the Roman legions, who levied troops, who watched the march of events, and turned himself to meet a dangerous foe. It was a man who, though perhaps ill-suited to, and certainly ill-liking of, his task, was wise enough to

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1. Ad Fam. II.17.1.; Ad Att. VI.5.3.
 2. Ad Att. VI.5.3. : "...tamen esse officium meum putavi exercitum habere quam proxime hostem quoad mihi praeesse provinciae per senatus consultum liceret.
 3. Ad Att. VI.5.3. : "Cum enim arderet Syria bello....Sed, quo ego maxime delectabar, Bibulus molestus mihi non erat : de omnibus rebus scribebat ad me potius."
 4. Ad Att. VII.2.6. : "...nunc illum, qui pedem porta quoad hostis cis Euphratem fuit non extulerit...."
 5. Ad Fam. II.17.3. : "Itaque omnia praesidia, quae magna et firma paraveram, commotus hominum non dubio sermone dimisi."
 6. Ad Att. VII.1.2.

take advice from his legati, a man who showed himself surprisingly competent, if not over-modest, in his military accomplishments.¹

Amanus.

Even though the threat of a Parthian War never developed into actual fighting, Cicero did not make all his military preparations and excursions in vain. As a direct result of the sudden ending of the first Parthian scare in early October 51 B.C., he was able to turn his attention to another hostile group of mountaineers who, if not as dangerous as the Parthians, were at any rate a nuisance, living as they did on the borders of Cilicia and Syria.

These were the inhabitants of the Amanus mountains, a wild, brigand people who had refused to submit to foreign domination from any source. Cicero describes them as old enemies of Rome, and says they were actually looking forward to the Parthian invasion and no doubt hoping to join in the confusion and pillaging consequent upon any Roman defeat.² In this lay the immediate excuse for attacking them. No doubt relying on Pomptinus' and Quintus' advice to find use for the army he had prepared lest inactivity once more lead to ill-discipline, Cicero decided to perform a task he believed was of the greatest importance to both Syria and Cilicia; he resolved to crush these wild mountaineers who inhabited the common boundary line of the Amanus.

With fair military insight, he feigned a withdrawal from his position at the foot of Amanus, and on October 12th pitched his new camp at Epiphanea. As evening closed in, he set out with his lightly-equipped troops and during the night covered so much ground that as day was breaking he was already making his way up into the mountains. It seems that the mountaineers were taken by surprise, but even so

1. The Parthian withdrawal must have been very pleasing to a good many others besides Cicero. Caelius (Ad Fam. VIII.10.2.) reports on how the news of the Parthian invasion was received in Rome. Some wanted Pompey to go out, others Caesar; some proposed the consuls, but they were unwilling if they were later to be recalled. In fact there was a decided disinclination to accept a province.

2. Ad Fam. XV.4.8. : "...et perpetuum hostem ex eo monte tollere...."
10.: "...et Parthorum adventum acerrime exspectarent."

offered a stout resistance to the attack of the Roman army which was divided under the command of all four legati and of Cicero himself, though it was perhaps Pomptinus who commenced the attack and bore most of its burden.¹ Clearly the whole of the Roman power in Cilicia was used to eradicate this foe. It therefore says much for the determination of the mountaineers that they resisted for ten hours, but by the late afternoon Erana, the capital of Amanus, Sepyra and Commoris had been taken, many of the enemy had fallen, and several forts had been captured or burned.² The mountaineers were quelled; many were killed or captured, the rest were scattered.³ The next few days were spent in a leisurely completion of the task they had begun, in destroying the remaining villages and strongholds, and in the plundering of the lands within the boundaries of Cilicia.

This whole episode was a very gratifying one to Cicero who felt that he was treading in the steps of history. For after this glorious and rapid victory he was not only hailed as Imperator by his troops, but he actually camped at the Arae Alexandri, near Issus, which was the very spot on which Alexander had camped against Darius. But even Cicero saw the irony of such a situation and jokingly has to admit that Alexander was his superior as a general.⁴

The winter had not yet set in, and Cicero, flushed by his recent success and glorying in his new-found title, was eager to gain further renown. He therefore turned his attention to a town named Pindenissus, situated on a high and strongly defended position somewhere in the northern Amanus range. The town was inhabited by Free Cilicians, men who, as their name implies, owed no allegiance to Rome and who had never endured the rule of foreign kings.⁵ They had looked forward to the Parthian invasion, and had received fugitives from the other parts of Amanus after the attack on Erana. Cicero therefore considered it necessary to fulfil his policy of reducing these mountain people: "I thought it important for the prestige of the Republic to check their boldness, in order to break more easily the spirit of those others who

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1. Ad Att. V.20.3. : "Castella munitissima nocturno Pomptini adventu, nostro matutino cepimus, incendimus : imperatores appellati sumus."
 2. Ad Fam. XV.4.8. : "Eranam autem, quae fuit non vici instar sed urbis, quod erat Amani caput, itemque Sepyram et Commorim, acriter et diu repugnantis, Pomptino illam partem Amani tenente, ex antelucano tempore usque ad horam diei decimam, magna multitudine hostium occisa, cepimus....."
 3. Ad Fam. II.10.3. : "Multi occisi, capti; reliqui dissipati."
 4. Ad Att. V.20.3. : "Castra paucos dies habuimus ea ipsa, quae contra Dareum habuerat apud Issum Alexander, imperator haud paullo melior quam aut tu aut ego."
 5. Ad Fam. XV.4.10. : "Confectis his rebus ad oppidum Eleutherocilicum Pindenissum exercitum abduxi : quod cum esset altissimo et munitissimo loco ab iisque incoleretur qui ne regibus quidem umquam paruissent.."

are opposed to our rule."¹

However, Pindenissus seems to have been forewarned by the destruction of the other towns and by the news brought by the fugitives it received within its gates. It was prepared for a long siege, and Cicero found that this second campaign was not so much to his liking as the first. The inhabitants were keen fighting men, and were not the sort to surrender after a single day's fighting. The element of surprise that had won the day at Erana was now lost, and it proved necessary to blockade the town: "They were fierce warriors and in every way ready to offer their defence. I surrounded them with a stockade and entrenchment, with massive earthworks, mantlets, a tall tower, a large battery of catapults, and many bowmen. I settled the business after much toil and preparation, after many of my men had been wounded, but with the army safe."² Fifty-seven bitter days taught Cicero how difficult it can be to reduce a mountain stronghold, and when the people of Pindenissus did at last surrender on the 17th December 51 B.C., it was not until their town had been reduced to ruins around them.³

The surrender of Pindenissus induced its neighbouring town of Tebara to offer hostages to Cicero who, after allowing his soldiers to take all the spoil except the captives, immediately handed over the command of the army to Quintus, who was left to arrange for the quartering of the troops for the winter in those places but recently captured and ill-pacified. The sale of the captives raised 12,000,000 sesterces.

Once back at Tarsus it seems that Cicero sent an official despatch to the Senate in which he related his military activities, and in particular reported his success at Erana and Pindenissus. He no doubt made great use of the title of Imperator bestowed upon him by his troops.⁴ As he was entitled to do, he asked for a supplicatio, which he received despite the pedantic opposition of Cato who much preferred to advance the claims of his son-in-law Bibulus. The supplicatio was however only an appetizer, as it were, before the main

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1. Ad Fam. XV.4.10. : "...ad existimationem imperi pertinere arbitratus sum comprimere eorum audaciam, quo facilius etiam ceterorum animi, qui alieni essent ab imperio nostro, frangerentur."
 2. Ad Att. V.20.5. : "Feri homines et acres et omnibus rebus ad defendendum parati. Cinximus vallo et fossa, aggere maximo, vineis, turre altissima, magna tormentorum copia, multis sagittariis : magno labore, apparatu, multis sauciis nostris, incolumi exercitu negotium confecimus." c.f. also Ad Fam. XV.4.10.
 3. Ad Fam. XV.4.10. : "...ut, omnibus partibus urbis disturbatis aut incensis, compulsi in potestatem meam pervenirent."
 4. The actual despatch is lost, but Cicero's intentions in this matter are clear from:-
 Ad Fam. XV.4.11. : "...si de iis rebus ad senatum relatum sit."
 Ad Fam. II.7.3. : "...unis litteris totius aestatis res gestas ad senatum perscriberem." c.f. also Ad Fam. III.9.4; Ad Att. VI.1.9.

course of a triumph of which Cicero was cheated in all probability only by the outbreak of the civil war in January 49 B.C., immediately on his return to Rome.

Certainly Cicero had achieved enough to win the reward of a triumph : he held full imperium; he had been in command of his army on the day of the victory; he had defeated foreign enemies. Moreover, in the troubled circumstances of January 49 B.C., the Senate would wish to ensure the continued support of Cicero, 'novus homo' though he was, by allowing him a new honour. Yet even Cicero, whilst claiming to have done well, would admit he was not a great general. A triumph for what was perhaps an unnecessary victory over robbers and brigands would finally have been an unsatisfactory one : "The people of Pindenissus?", you will say. 'Who the deuce are they? I never heard the name.' What could I do about that? Could I turn Cilicia into an Aetolia or a Macedonia?" ¹

Within the Senate there was a fundamental antipathy towards the growth of the provinces, and a persistent distrust of too great ability in those who governed them. In consequence the Senate as a body remained ignorant of the lands under its control, and paid little more than lip-service to the welfare of the provincials. It considered its overseas territories as lands apart, and continued to treat each province when acquired as a separate department. No overall provincial policy was formulated, and so strong control was exercised from Rome over these officials sent out to govern such a central administration.

1. Ad Att. V.20. 1. : " 'Qui, malum! isti Pindenissitae? qui sunt? ' inquires : 'nomen audiui numquam.' Quid ego faciam? num potui Ciliciam Aetoliam aut Macedoniam reddere? "

EPILOGUE

"Are you satisfied with the present moral standards? Satisfied that our governors shall govern as they do? Satisfied that our allies should for the future be treated as you see that in recent times they have been treated?"¹

Faults Inherent in the Provincial System.

As the Roman Republic expanded its overseas territories, it matched the piecemeal acquisition of provinces with a patchwork method of administering them. Theories of government which had been sound and workable for a small state became cumbersome and outdated in a large and seemingly expanding empire. Yet the Senate obstinately clung to approved and traditional methods, and, fearing a diminution of its own power, refused to make timely changes in the provinces, as well as in other spheres, before events led to the final crisis of the Republic. Cicero's governorship illustrates many of the shortcomings in the provincial system, and while these have become apparent during the preceding pages it will be advisable to restate them briefly. In that way it will be possible to discover to what extent Cicero was confined by the system, and how far he managed to rise above it.

Within the Senate there was a fundamental antipathy towards the growth of the provinces, and a persistent distrust of too great ability in those who governed them. In consequence the Senate as a body remained ignorant of the lands under its control, and paid little more than lip-service to the welfare of the provincials. It considered its overseas territories as lands apart, and continued to treat each province when acquired as a separate department. No overall provincial policy was formulated, and no strong control was exercised from Rome over those officials sent out to govern; such a central administration was not to come until the Empire. This departmental approach often bore heavily on men not suited to their tasks, and in matters of common interest to several provinces, as for

1. II In Verrem III.89. 208.

example in the conduct of the Parthian war, it repeatedly proved unsatisfactory. The Senate, after appointing its governors and providing for their expenses, allowed them an almost unlimited freedom to govern according to their own principles and desires. Beyond expecting infrequent official despatches, the Senators preferred to remain untroubled by provincial worries.

The very method of appointing the governor and his staff lies open to criticism. Not all city magistrates had the temperament or the ability to become administrators of a province, and it was patently unwise to leave the important decision on their appointment to be resolved by lot. The absence of permanent officials caused quite unnecessary hardships, and the perhaps yearly change of governor would result in a considerable upheaval, for ideas and methods varied widely when a Cicero succeeded an Appius, and vice versa. A lack of continuity in both theory and practice of government was bound to have an unsettling effect on the provincials who were obliged to reorientate their attitude to the governor every year or two. By refusing to see anything but danger in the appointment of an experienced governor and his staff for long periods, the Senate deprived itself of the opportunity of stabilising its overseas government and, as Cicero said, of obtaining comparative calm in precisely those areas on which it relied for its revenues.

Arising from the Senate's distrust and many governors' intolerance, there came another defect which time alone could cure but which the later Republic could have done more to eradicate. This was to be found in the sharp division of status between Roman and provincial. The latter had no liking for the Romans, and in return were regarded with suspicion as liars and sullen foes. In such an atmosphere of mutual distrust there was no hope for the growth of common feelings and purposes which might have created a sense of unity between Rome and her provinces. Individual generals in the later Republic were fond of bestowing the Roman citizenship on favoured individuals, but whole communities were not encouraged to aim so high and had to be content with their inferior status of ally. Even as allies they were not to be trusted, and it was considered politic to disarm them. Little care however was taken to ensure that adequate

garrisons were placed in the provinces to protect those who were not allowed to protect themselves.

Of all the defects imposed by the provincial administration perhaps the most burdensome and crippling because it extended into every part of the province without respite was the system of taxation. This system was almost universally condemned except by those members of the equestrian order who profited from it. Condemned in Rome, detested in the provinces, it continued to cause sharp hatreds between governing and governed, and did more perhaps than any other single factor to discredit the Republican provincial administration.

In all this the role of the governor was the vital one. Too much was left to his discretion, and it depended on his character and integrity whether the undoubted defects developed into major faults or were confined to reasonable proportions. If the governor went out to his province determined to enrich himself and accommodate his friends, then the provincials were powerless to prevent him. But by determined and careful administration a moderate man could try to ensure the happiness of his province and the satisfaction of all Roman interests.

Cicero's Governorship.

Cicero was unlike the majority of his fellow governors in that he was an unwilling holder of his office. It had never been his intention to take a province, and he might therefore have been expected to skimp his duties, and even be excused for doing so. Such a line of action however was foreign to his nature and, unwelcome though the task was, he did square up to his responsibilities. Once his initial reluctance was over he applied himself to his provincial duties, and while he was never to become enthusiastic for provincial life he did at least learn to bear with its disadvantages. In some ways his year of office saw quite remarkable progress, and his achievements are noteworthy even in matters which might have been considered beyond him. There were of course several mistakes and failures, about which Cicero is quite

understandably reticent, but they are surprisingly few in a man who cared so little for his work. In fact, it can be said that Cicero conducted himself creditably in spite of the provincial system.

As far as the day to day administration of the province goes, Cicero was quite right in claiming that his governorship was a resounding success. It seems safe to assert that never before had Cilicia experienced such moderate government. Even when the accounts of his actions are stripped of exaggeration and Ciceronian over-statement, it is clear that in his daily conduct, in his supervision of the provincials, in restraining his staff, in administering justice, in dealing with all classes of provincial society, Cicero acted fairly and honourably. While he made no startling innovations and no permanent changes, he insisted on governing his province in accordance with the most restrained and most just code of law he could use, and refrained from using his own position to harass the provincials. Even though he knew he was acting correctly, he often felt isolated, as most governors must have done at some time during their governorship. His letters and despatches reveal how conscious he was of his distance from Rome, and his isolation from immediate help and advice. The whole year shows how self-reliant and self-critical a governor had to be, and in this may lie some reason for the normal low standard of provincial government.

The lack of a civil service, whilst inconvenient, does not appear to have been an overwhelming burden. As Cicero frequently reminded friends in Rome, his staff behaved in an exemplary manner in executing their duties. He does in fact seem to have been fortunate, or well advised, in his choice of immediate advisers. The four legati, even the shadowy M. Anneius and L. Tullius, deserve some credit for the excellence of the year's proceedings, and with a less conscientious staff Cicero might have found his difficulties greatly multiplied. Moreover, by farming out his duties to the magistrates of the various cities and by allowing an almost unprecedented degree of self-government, he lightened his own administrative work and at the same time won the favour of the provincials. In short, the efficiency and fairness of the administration did much to help the governorship.

Perhaps the most amazing because the most unexpected success of Cicero's governorship is to be found in his military campaigns. Cicero

himself would rate Amanus and the destruction of Erana and Pindenissus as his supreme achievement, and it was in this that he placed his hope for a triumph. A more detached view however would give him credit rather for his organisation of his weak and disunited forces in order to face the serious threat of a Parthian invasion. That he never had to fight them is not important. He made very creditable preparations to secure the safety of his province in a time of definite peril, and whilst he was terrified at the prospect of war he mobilised his troops in the way expected of a sensible man. He can be criticised for his lack of communication with Cassius and Bibulus, who of all men should have known what danger was threatening and where. This however is a case where the departmental approach proved too strong, and prevented united action. It was also an illustration of how dangerous was the Senate's military policy when it preferred to make do with a Cicero and a Bibulus rather than use one of its accredited generals.

The victory at Amanus, which Cicero regarded as the highlight of his year, is not so important in an overall estimate. It is true that the brigands were an insult to Roman might, but it may be questioned how useful and how essential was their suppression. They did not constitute any real menace, and if their crime was their hostility and opposition towards Roman authority, they were not alone in it. Cicero's policy of destroying mountain villages and selling their inhabitants runs contrary to the tenor of the rest of his governorship, and, when compared to Pompey's more practical colonisation of the pirates, quite futile. By this victory Cicero achieved little, and proved nothing beyond his own desire for a military reputation and a triumph. If his military achievements had to be judged on Amanus alone, they would have appeared successful in themselves but without lasting benefit to Rome.

In the matter of taxation and the control of the tax-farmers, in which Cicero had foreseen great difficulty, he believed he had scored a great success. There is his own testimony of how he protected the towns whilst allowing the publicani to gather their dues, and he tries to paint a picture of universal agreement and satisfaction. Only in the Scaptius affair and in the incident with Gavius does he recount any trouble. Yet it may be doubted if Cicero is telling the whole of the truth as even he saw it; quite obviously he is relaying only that information which is

beneficial to his reputation, and conceals what is not. He was perhaps hoodwinked more than he realised by the tax-gatherers, who appeared to follow the governor's wishes while in fact they went about their business in as thorough a way as usual, but with less apparent violence. They were sufficiently expert to achieve their own end, which was after all the making of a profit from the taxes. Even in the outrageous affair of Scaptius and Salamis, Cicero was not sufficiently decisive and severe, and in more innocent-seeming cases he was presumably even less inquisitive as to ways and means.

On the whole it would appear that Cicero prevented any great illegalities or coercion by the tax-gatherers. He was however favourably disposed to them in their work, and in what was a prosperous year for the provincials they gathered in the taxes with unprecedented ease. Cicero tried to avoid becoming deeply involved with them, for he was conscious of the mightier and more influential figures who were backing them. It may well be that the details of the Scaptius case would never have been committed to paper, if Brutus had not tried to enlist the aid of Atticus and Caelius, whom Cicero wished to have informed of the true facts. Pompey's loans, which seem to have been on a wider scale than Brutus', are not half as well documented, presumably because Pompey was willing to bide his time.

Cicero's relationship with the tax-gatherers is the most difficult part of his governorship to assess. His political philosophy aimed at securing a mutual agreement between the senatorial class and the equites, and he was not so foolhardy as to risk giving offence to anyone from either group because of any sentimental ideas on the taxes. He wished to be fair to the provincials, but it cannot be doubted that the Salaminians, who really lost in the case against Scaptius, were not the only members of the province to receive less than their due from Cicero. If the tax-farmers were satisfied, as Cicero said they were, then some hardship must have continued under Cicero as under Appius.

This ultimate disregard for the just claims of the Salaminians springs directly from Cicero's mental attitude towards the provincials. Perhaps quite naturally, as a Roman he regarded them as inferior and, while he was sympathetic towards their misfortunes, he refused to see them as

1. Ad App. VI.3.3. "Solique plura eduxit et laudis et gratiae, digne
 illi libris quae de dilectione. Conservatae civitates, summae
 publicanis satis factum, offensus contumeliae nemo, decreta iuste et
 severe persequi, nec tam quisquam ut quari audiat, res gestas
 dignas triumpho...."

people who might yet prove a valuable support to Rome. In the mass, provincials were regarded as unsavoury, and even in his remark that he is on friendly terms with many of them there is a very marked air of condescension. This attitude of course was bound to exist. The province had been acquired as a result of a series of campaigns, and the people were treated as a hostile and lesser breed of men. In this matter Cicero, like most of his fellows, failed to come to terms with the problem of treating the provincials as people who might have certain rights, who might in time become more closely associated with Rome and be taken into its citizenship.

Because of his lack of interest in and enthusiasm for provincial life, as opposed to his wish to govern fairly, Cicero failed to produce any long-term results from his governorship. His own experience seems to have suggested no alterations that could be made in provincial administration, and it must be suspected that had he returned to an untroubled Senate, he would have made no proposals for the better regulation of the provinces in general or of Cilicia in particular. He could see the faults, but, beyond correcting their obvious and extravagant results, he made no attempt to find a cure for them.

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It is interesting to see that as Cicero's governorship drew to its close the letters he wrote home began to reflect his feelings on the year of office. His original fears of Cilicia were vanishing, and as he had looked forward in anguish he now looked back in pleasure. He felt his governorship had been a success, and intended to announce the fact:-

"So far the rest is full of honour and glory, and worthy of those volumes which you praise. Cities have been saved; the tax-farmers have been completely satisfied; no-one has suffered ill-treatment; few have tasted strict justice, and even then not so strict that anyone dare complain; a campaign has been fought deserving of a triumph."¹

1. Ad Att. VI.3.3. : "Reliqua plena adhuc et laudis et gratiae, digna iis libris quos tu dilaudas. Conservatae civitates, cumulate publicanis satis factum, offensus contumelia nemo, decreto iusto et severo perpauoi, nec tamen quisquam ut queri audeat, res gestae dignae triumpho....."

"As with golden volumes has with praise referred his, qui praesent illis, et illi, qui sunt eorum in imperio, sint quam beatissimi....."

As always, Cicero presented himself in the most favourable light, and could now conveniently forget the less happy moments of the governorship. For him there had been no indecision in the case of the Cypriot Salaminians, no building work at Appia, no Parthian threat. The difficulties had been surmounted, and everything had worked out well. He could rejoice in the thought that he was unlikely ever to have to govern a province again. And that was indeed a cause for rejoicing, because his views on provincial government had not changed: "Hold to the city, yes the city, Rufus, and live in its splendour. All foreign service is mean and paltry for those whose work can gain renown in Rome - this is a view I have held from my youth up."¹

For Cicero the conclusion was obvious. The governorship had been an unexpected and absolute success: "Well then, it was worthwhile; I did not know myself, nor realise what I could achieve in this line. I am deservedly 'puffed up', for this is splendid."²

Cicero's exaggerated opinion of his own achievements as a provincial governor, and his blindness to the failures, must not be allowed to conceal the obvious fact that his governorship when considered as a whole was a success. He must be given full credit for two virtues rare in the Roman governor, a humane and impartial approach to the provincials coupled with a genuine desire to rule fairly for the good of the province and for all its members. He may also be praised for a positive improvement in all parts of the administration, for the tight control he maintained over his own staff and all those entrusted with any authority. Despite his unwillingness to become governor, he did in the event govern well. By avoiding the excesses which marred the rule of so many others, he brought to Cilicia a year of moderation which restored some measure of prosperity to the cities and gave the provincials an opportunity to recover from the previous mal-administration.

Cicero had lived up to those principles laid down in his advice to Quintus and in the speeches from the law courts; he had ensured the greatest possible happiness for the governed.³ By his governorship

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- 1, Ad Fam. II.12.2. : "Urbem, urbem, mi Rufe, cole et in ista luce vive. Omnis peregrinatio - quod ego ab adulescentia iudicavi - obscura et sordida est iis quorum industria Romae potest illustris esse."
 2. Ad Att. V.20 6. : "Quid quaeris? Fuit tanti : me ipse non noram nec satis sciebam quid in hoc genere facere possem : recte Περφυσίωμα : nihil est praeclarius."
 3. Ad Q.F. I.1. VIII.24. : "Ac mihi quidem videntur huc omnia esse referenda iis, qui praesunt aliis, ut ii, qui erunt eorum in imperio, sint quam beatissimi....."

he had at last replied to the questions he had posed in 70 B.C. : no, he was not satisfied to see the provinces governed as they had been; no, he was not willing to stand by while the provincials were robbed of their possessions. He had therefore brought a restrained outlook to Cilician affairs, and, provided always that his actions did not offend anyone in Rome, he had tried to protect the interests of the provincials. It was perhaps his main achievement to insist that the province was administered according to the law and not according to the whims of those who governed; the words which Propertius was to address to a later governor of Asia, urging him to restore Roman ways and Roman justice,¹ might well have been applied to Cicero:-

et vetera oblitis iura refer sociis.

1. Propertius I.VI.20.

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