COMMENTARY ON VALERIUS MAXIMUS' BOOK IX.1-10.

A DISCOURSE ON *VITIA*: AN APOTREPTIC APPROACH.

by

SIMON ROBERT MATRAVERS

A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Classics, Ancient History and Archaeology
University of Birmingham
April 2016

Abstract

Valerius Maximus situates his ninth and final book (henceforth referred as V9) in clear contrast to the rest of his output by adopting an apotreptic approach and focusing entirely on *vitia*. This makes a break from the dispersive manner in which *vitia* had hitherto been treated by different authors across a myriad of works, nor was V9's structure replicated in the same manner by any other Roman author since V. Worthy of note is also how V treats his subject exclusively in a single book, creating *intensity* as a technique *per se* to shock the reader into making them fully aware – beyond all reasonable doubt – how pernicious and dangerous *vitia* are. At the heart of V9 is the ubiquity of vice that transcends ethnicity. In fact V brings domestic and external *exempla* closer, vice is inherent in life itself; the characters inhabiting both the domestic and external sections are not opposites, but are presented as culpable of the same vices (although sometimes certain *exempla* are graded worse than others).

Contents

Introduction **1**
Prolegomena **2**
The Historiographical Commentary 2
Literature Review 6
Quellenforschung 11
A. Contextualization **16**
1. Vitia 16
2. Exempla. 18
3. Chronology 22
4. Declamation 33
5. *Memoria* 35
6. The study of the emotions 37
B. Structure of V9: Comparability **39**
1. Comparanda between chapters 40
2. *Comparanda* between *exempla* in each chapter 41
3. Connectives 43
4. Us and Them 44
5. Externals in V and Plutarch 46
6. Contrasting Values 47
C. Differentiations **50**
D. Conclusion **53**
Chapter 1: *de luxuria et libidine* **56**
Commentary 62
9.1.externa 105
Chapter 2: *de crudelitate* **121**
Commentary 131
9.2.externa 148
Chapter 3: *de ira aut odio*. **167**
Commentary 175
9.3.externa 201
Chapter 4: *de avaritia* **209**
Commentary 212
9.4.externa 222

Chapter 5: *de superbia et impotentia* **227**
Commentary 231
9.5.externa 246
Chapter 6: *de perfidia*. **255**
Commentary 257
9.6.externa 271
Chapter 7: *de vi et seditione*. **275**
Commentary 277
9.7.Mil.Rom.1-3 289
Chapter 8: *de temeritate*. **298**
Commentary 302
9.8.externa 312
Chapter 9: *de errore*. **317**
Commentary 318
Chapter 10: *de ultione* **332**
Commentary 334
9.10.externa 339
Bibliography **347**

Introduction

This PhD is in the format of a historiographical commentary dealing with chapters 1–10 of V9. It is important to first examine why I have chosen this format rather than a discursive thesis before moving on to examine V9 more closely. In the *prolegomena*, I discuss the format of the historiographical commentary adopted in this PhD, I outline a general literature review for Valerian studies and I approach the question of *Quellenforschung* in V.

The introduction consists of four further parts. In part A, I contextualise V9 in terms of moral discussions of *vitia*, the *exempla* tradition, declamation, *memoria* and the study of the emotions. In part B, I discuss the structure of the book from the standpoint of 'comparability'; I argue that V uses this technique to organise his material. In part C I discuss two distinctions: first, how 'the last five chapters of V9', which are not examined in this thesis because of their content, differ from the rest of V9; second, how the miscellany and the encyclopaedia are two fomats which are not to be confused with V. In Part D, I provide a conclusion.

Prolegomena

The Historiographical Commentary

The Commentary Format

My reading of V9 draws on detailed and sequential analysis of the text, so that the distinctive structural features which I have identified and the thematic arcs which this thesis proposes can be mapped directly to in-depth study of V's historiographic agenda expressed within each *exemplum* and across the body of *exempla* as a whole. For these purposes, the commentary form is ideal.[1]

My commentary primes the reader to isolate a word or series of words for comment in a compartmentalised manner, bringing into sharper focus their importance and the themes they invoke, but also maintains a clear relationship between new thematic analysis and the language and form of the text from a user's perspective. This supports more nuanced observations than a more discursive or general view of the text encourages, and reflects the kind of reading strategy (detail and big-picture) which my thesis proposes for V9. The incremental, compartmentalised accumulation of small-scale insights in the *lemma* on particular choices, allusions and complexities, organised around the same order as the text, thus helps one to create and organise webs of connections at chapter and book level. Furthermore, this cumulative building-up of knowledge of certain areas of study is an effective way to address points which may not be directly relevant to one of the broader

[1] On the significance of the commentary see Gibson (2002), Enenkel (2013), Kraus (2016).

themes of a text, but which are still part of the rich tapestry of an overall text and thus should be brought out in one's comments. In addition, such an approach can be of use to scholars working on related projects thus benefiting classical scholarship more widely.

Kraus describes the commentary format as 'responding to what someone else says, a form of interaction that might be called a moment of dialectic'.[2] I think the dialectic element is a fitting *conduit* when approaching a moral work such as V9, which interacts with so many different discourses and *topoi* from antiquity. V9, in fact, embodies what Kraus identifies as constituting the commentary: the 'manifold form of scholarly discourse'.[3]

By producing a commentary, I am following the example set by the only two existing published commentaries on books by V, thus showing that this approach to V works successfully: Wardle (1998) on book 1 and Themann-Steinke (2008) on book 2. More discursive approaches in Valerian studies have instead been taken when dealing with general issues in V (rather than a focused attention to a particular book), such as: Guerrini (1981), Bloomer (1992), Skidmore (1996), Weileder (1998) and Lucarelli (2007).

The Historiographical Commentary

By historiographical commentary I mean the mixture of the historical and literary.[4] From a literary position, my approach has been how an author produces his work in terms of, *inter alia*, intertextuality, even between different literary genres and interpretative methodologies.[5]

[2] Kraus (2016: 1).
[3] Kraus (2016: 1).
[4] For this definition see Ash (2002: 274). For V not being a historian see Bloomer (1992: 15-6, 39, 40, 47, 50).
[5] Burgersdijk (2010).

In terms of this intertextuality, I have made allusions in this PhD to *echoes* to other texts in antiquity, namely, Herodotus, Euripides' *Medea*, Accius and Lucretius; therefore these allusions are consistent with the eclectic nature of historiography.

Wiseman situates V in the Roman tradition of historiographical writing; similarly, Maslakov and Bloomer have written in terms of Valerian historiography; therefore, the association of V with historiography is not new.[6] In particular, *memoria* and the *exempla* tradition, which are integral elements in V (as I argue in this introduction), have been identified in classical scholarship with historiography. From one perspective, historiography has been defined in classical scholarship as one of the meanings of *memoria*.[7] As Timpe states, historiography is a 'special and historically conditioned medium of memory'; V9 is the same, thus contributing to the Roman historiographical tradition.[8] The other important element to V is the *exempla* tradition, since the *exemplum* is, after all, at the heart of V's work and constitutes its fundamental building block in providing ethical and moral dimensions (points which I discuss throughout this PhD).[9] Timpe and Roller, for example, connect historiography and *exempla*. Timpe describes historiography in terms of recounting *facta* to perpetuate *exempla* that can be helpful for the moral or educational improvement of individuals; and Roller refers to the ubiquity of the *exempla* tradition in Roman historiography.[10] A historiographical approach seems most coherent for a commentary on any of V's books because the author ultimately wrote *exempla*, and the elements of exemplary discourse 'saturate' historiography, which can be seen as a 'monument' within that discourse.[11]

[6] Wiseman (1979: 39), Maslakov (1984: 484-496), Bloomer (1992: 147-184).
[7] '*Memoria* means historiography' (Timpe 2011: 150). Also see TLL s.v. *memoria*.
[8] Timpe (2011: 173).
[9] 'Exemplary education is embedded in the narrative of Roman historiography' (Leigh 1997: 165).
[10] Timpe (2011: 167); Roller (2009: 217).
[11] Roller (2009: 219).

Hornblower argues that historiography is a manipulation of the past by individuals who are unreliable (or not objective) because of their own baggage of beliefs and political ideology; or their own *agenda*.[12] Manipulation is key in V too. V, in fact, tweaks the *exempla* to make the book his very own literary work and thus his agenda also emerges in the kinds of editorial choices he makes in selecting and shaping his material. It is often interesting to note what sources V privileges over others, the order which *exempla* take and their relationship to each other at chapter and book level, thus influencing the reader's view and perception of the moral lessons that are to emerge from the *exempla*. All this impacts on V9's overarching architecture, its structure and themes (which I point out frequently in this PhD). As Hornblower argues, silence in historiography relates to what and why an author decides *not* say about a topic, and the function of silence is something I discuss in V9 in relation to *memoria* in this introduction.[13] Both manipulation and silence (which display degrees of selectivity) are Valerian tools that I draw out in this commentary and they are integral to V's *agenda*, they constitute what today classical scholarship associates with historiography: the manipulation of the past rather than just recounting it.

However, I do recognise certain deficiencies in approaching a text via the medium of a historiographical commentary. In fact, this PhD will not concern itself with textual criticism, manuscript traditions or variant readings. Nor do I focus on stylistic and literary features *per se*, although the PhD still has a literary dimension, as stated above, in terms of intertextuality; and this is at the heart of what a historiographical commentary is about. These deficiencies have also emerged as a response to word count constraints that come with a PhD thesis, so my focus has focused on developing certain aspects over others in more detail, rather than attempting to cover the myriad possibilities that a commentary can offer on a more superficial

[12] Hornblower (1994: 38).
[13] Hornblower (1994: 69).

manner. In the section below on *Quellenforschung*, I give a rationale for any lack of discussion on issues of sources and reliability in the commentary itself.

Literature Review

The purpose and function of V's work has divided scholars into three groups: (1) those who see it purely as a handbook for rhetorical education: Maslakov (1984: 445), Bloomer (1992: 14-17); (2) those who only see a moral purpose in the work: Skidmore (1996); (3) and those who combine both views: Sinclair (1981: 6), Weileder (1998: 20-21), Wardle (1998). I find the conclusions of the last group the most persuasive because V's work has served rhetoricians, moralists, and ancient historians, 'categories which are not always mutually exclusive'.[14] Indeed I cover this hybridity in each chapter of the thesis.

Bloomer (1992) constitutes a crucial work in the development of Valerian scholarship. Bloomer's most significant innovation, for my thesis, was that of presenting V as an author of a literary work, rather than a derivative compiler, arguing for V's independence and treatment of him in his own right. Scholarship previously tended to focus on V's use of sources (*Quellenforschung*) and textual criticism.[15] Bloomer concentrates on the declamatory element to the work, stressing that 'the structure and organization of Valerius' books arise from and seek to direct declamatory composition'.[16] Bloomer argues that V is not simply addressing declaimers; he *is* a declaimer, in the way in which he tweaks traditional anecdotes in new and

[14] Mueller (2002: 3).
[15] For examples of this wave in *Quellenforschung* see Maire (1899), Bosch (1929), Ramelli (1936), Helm (1940), Klotz (1942), Bliss (1951). For a summary of papers on textual questions in V see Lawrence (2006: 6 n. 14).
[16] Bloomer (1992: 17).

eye-catching ways.[17] Bloomer, in fact, identifies this tweaking of traditional *exempla* as a typical feature of Roman declamation.[18] Bloomer brings attention to V's style of *manipulating* traditional narrative material to produce the emphasis he desires, to fit into his chapter headings. This framing clarifies V's overall methodology, design and organisational structure and it is an aspect I have argued for *passim* in V9 too. Bloomer also discusses V's sources and likely audience or readership. Whereas in Skidmore (1996) V's ethics and moral purpose are the main focus, in Bloomer this function is rhetorical. My thesis also explores this rhetorical dimension in V9, for instance, I allude to this several times in the main commentary and in the first footnote of each chapter on 'rhetorical devises'. However, as I state below, my reading emphasises the complementarity between the rhetorical and moral elements of V's work. In fact, I argue that V's rhetoric is primarily a *conduit* to emphasize the moral angle of particular *exempla*.

Skidmore's (1996) study focuses on the various themes pervading V's *opus* and introducing a new outlook on V's aims and structure. Skidmore's attention to V's thematics has inpired me to draw out and develop the various themes in V9, especially the more implicit ones. This has been an important angle to this commentary, contributing to my outline of the book's overarching structure and architecture; *inter alia*, how the themes inter-connect and complement each other at book level. Skidmore's main area of interest is on V as a work of moral guidance to elite men and the educated *paterfamilias*, by providing *exempla* of good or bad behaviour. This moral angle has been my main focus for V9 and my argument for its principal *modus operandi*. Skidmore's distinctive interpretation is that V's work aimed to instruct as well as to entertain; but his overall emphasis is on the practical nature of the *opus*. In fact, 'practical' is a crucial keyword in the title and contents of Skidmore's book and it

[17] Bloomer (1992: 134, 239).
[18] Bloomer (1992: 31).

goes to the heart of my interpretation of V9, it could not be anything else than practical, since its sole focus on *vitia* is to instruct the reader on how *not* to live (what I identify as the book's apotreptic approach). The practicality that Skidmore argues for suggests that the reader is meant to find in V's *exempla* material to consult in cases of moral quandary, thus reinforcing and expanding the moral dimension of V, that Bloomer only alluded to. At the heart of Skidmore's interpretation, and one which is intensely relevant for V9, is V's implicit message that the Romans of previous generations had founded an empire on the strength of their moral qualities, thus reminding his readers of the dangers of ignoring or forgetting these standards. This is apparent by V's framework of *virtus* and *vitia*, paired with the moral judgements of *laus* and *reprehensio*, as well as identifying certain *exempla* as morally ambiguous, which are not always resolved by V.[19] The sole focus on *vitia* in V9 reinforces in my view Skidmore's moral interpretation and informs my reading of V9 as requiring an apotreptic approach.

Mueller's (2002) argument is that Valerius sets a religious dimension into his text, that is both emotional and moral.[20] Morality and V's attitude to it are, indeed, central to Mueller's analysis of V, as was the case in Skidmore. For Mueller, the gods are a device that the reader can use as a means to reflect on good or bad behaviour: therefore if bad deeds arise (*vitia*) these are then punished by the gods. Mueller's moral focus of *vitia* versus virtue has reinforced for my commentary the important function that vice occupies in V9. In the framing of virtue versus vice Mueller emphasises the practical element in V, although Mueller does not use Skidmore's keyword of 'practical'. It transpires from Mueller's critique that in V religion *is* for daily life, the two – religion and daily life – are inter-related; religion has a moral purpose. This everyday element is also important in my reading of V9, that it should have a strong and immediate impact upon the reader's actions in daily life, with the

[19] Skidmore (1996: 62, 70).
[20] On the study of the emotions in V see below in this introduction.

intended aim of extricating him from a life of *vitia*. I agree with Mueller's point about the 'timelessness' of the *exempla* (and this is an argument I incorporate into this main introduction, under the section of chronology) whereby events are stripped of their historical context.[21] Like Mueller, I also draw on the comparisons of V's versions of stories with those of other authors (mainly Livy and Cicero) in order to bring out what is distinctively Valerian. What Mueller does not do, but which I do *passim*, is bring into play the overarching themes, structures and organisation of the *exempla*. Mueller's main interest focuses more on each *exemplum* as a self-contained unit, while I attempt to bring both approaches (focus on the individual *exemplum* and more overarching themes structures) into my commentary and in the introductions to the chapters.[22]

Lucarelli (2007), after analysing the concept of *exempla* and its function in the early Principate, considered V from a social angle: relations within the family and other social structures: between family and slaves or freedmen, and ones involving *amicitia*, *clientela*, *beneficium*, *gratia* and *officium*; and sets out V's vision of social relations in terms of *moderatio*, *iustitia* and *humanitas*.[23] I interpret the focus on distance in V9 (which I comment on at 9.1 and especially at 9.5) as an implicit emphasis on the importance of its opposite, *amicitia*, a subject which Lucarelli identifies as key in V.[24] Lucarelli's work outlines the wider framework of V's *opus* as a whole, and from the perspective of this commentary it shows that V9 is consistent with V's other books in treating the same themes of family (especially relations between father and son) and *amicitia* (or the absence of it).

[21] Mueller (2002: 42, 176).
[22] On religion in V see also Wardle's (1998) commentary on book 1.
[23] At the end of the work, Lucarelli provides a table containing all the different types of social relations in V with direct references to the *exempla*.
[24] This is consistent with V9's apotreptic approach.

Besides the monographs I outline above, articles have addressed various detailed aspects of V, in particular, themes as self-contained units. This strand of *Valeriana* is exemplified by the work of Guerrini (1979), Langlands (2008), Gowers (2010), Spencer (2010b), Lawrence (2015 and 2016), Lennon (2015), and Wardle (1997 and 2000).[25]

Other notable contributions to Valerian studies include:

- Studies that have drawn comparisons between V and other authors in antiquity show interesting questions and varying degrees of intertextuality and dependence: on Velleius, see Paladini (1957) and Jacquemin (1998b); on Diodorus Siculus, see Maire (1899); on Livy, see Maslakov (1979: ch.4); on Plutarch, see Jacquemin (1998c); on Cicero, see Langlands (2011, focusing on *Off.*) and Lawrence (2015, 139, 146-7, 153-4-5, focusing on *Tusc.*), on Sallust, see Guerrini (1979 and 1981).

- Commentaries on book 1 (Wardle 1998), on book 2 (Themann-Steinke 2008).

- On the construction of V's collection of *exempla* see Römer (1990) and Thurn (2001).

- On V's use of rhetoric see Sinclair (1980 and 1984).

- On sexuality and *pudicitia* in V see Langlands (2006:123-191).

[25] Their themes, aims and arguments are too varied and detailed to summarise here and mainly focus on particular *exempla* from several of V's books. It is however useful to have a panoramic view of the breadth of 'the article' in Valerian scholarship.

- On articles chartering a particular character in V: on Marius, see Carney (1962); on Alexander the Great, see Wardle (2005), Spencer (2010b) and Bellemore (2015).[26]

There has been no particular scholarly tradition on V9's treatment of *vitia*. Only Guerrini, Bloomer and Lawrence have focused in some detail on 9.1 and 9.2.[27] These studies on 9.1 and 9.2 operate at chapter level, as a self-contained unit, and mainly concern possible sources (or parallels) and general historic observations. Therefore, I hope that this commentary will provide a wider, more overarching and intensive discourse of V9's *vitia*.

Quellenforschung

The arguments set by Bloomer (1987) and Maslakov (1979, 1984) about *Quellenforschung* are consistent with V9, too. As Bloomer sums up, the exercise of attempting to connect sources to V is especially futile, since V is an author who does not write historical narrative and, in fact, 'works against narrative – stripping anecdotes from the historical surrounding, from all the patterns and details which give a particular event its individuality'.[28] This very terseness of many of the *exempla* is, in fact, typical of the *exemplum* genre, but makes attempting to identify a source accurately, more difficult.[29] Furthermore, Bloomer discusses

[26] There are two **Teubner texts** for V: Kempf (1888) and Briscoe (1998). Notable **translations** of V are: in English: Samuel Speed in 1678, Shackleton Bailey (2000) and Walker (2004); in Italian: Faranda (1976); in French: Combès (1997) and Constant (1935); and in German: Blank-Sangmeister (1992). Other **miscellaneous** Valerian studies, spanning different formats (PhD theses, articles, essays and monographs), include: David (1998), Gowers (2010), Guerrini (1979, 1980), Gunderson (2013), Lennon (2015) Langlands (2008, 2011), Lawrence (2006, 2015 and 2016), Maslakov (1979, 1984), Wardle (1997, 2000, 2005, 2005b), Weileder (1998), Welch (1993).
[27] On 9.1: Guerrini (1979), Lawrence (2006: 45-7). On 9.2: Bloomer (1992: 49-53, 175, 90, 92-3, 97-8), Lawrence (2006: 230-8).
[28] Bloomer (1987: 3).
[29] Bloomer (1987: 127).

V's frequent departures from the sources as part of his 'stylistic pastiche' argument which reveals, in his argument, V's independence of treatment.[30]

Maslakov, before Bloomer, also argued for the ineffectuality of looking for V's sources and that *exempla*, with the passing of time 'standardized imagery and vocabulary' that writers modified independently of each other.[31] Therefore, V might have worked with a myriad of sources which today are no longer extant but which could have been commonplace in the rhetorical schools.[32]

I argue that, if one cannot recognise and identify the full extent of the lost sources, how can one, in fact, know if V did depart from those sources; he may even be following a source *verbatim* but which is now lost. Therefore, I argue that, it is futile to attempt to reach definite conclusions on *Quellenforschung* in V.

I have already alluded to the rhetorical aspect (besides the moral dimension) in V, and in the section on contextualisation in this introduction, I go into more depths about this aspect, under the heading of 'declamation'. The effect that the world of declamation had on sources gives one a clearer understanding of the problem of *Quellenforschung* in V more generally. As argued by Bloomer, the artificiality of declamation, where historic episodes were often twisted for effect to achieve a certain *memorability* and emotional effect, often led to inaccuracies – the actual source became forgotten, or distorted.[33] The importance to V of *memorability* is evident by the presence of the word *memorabilium* in the title of the *opus*, it

[30] Bloomer (1987: 17).
[31] Maslakov (1979: 143).
[32] Maslakov (1979: 461), Bloomer (1987: 49).
[33] Bloomer (1987: 56). Also see Sen. *Contr*. 1 pr. 10-11.

is a crucial keyword for understanding V. In terms of the dilution of the original sources, one must also consider that declamation was 'fundamentally an oral and not written art form'.[34]

Prior to Maslakov and Bloomer, Bliss wrote a thesis on V's use of sources. Bliss' main argument is that V's close verbal dependence on Livy and Cicero (especially) is one of *variatio*, whereby V's tweaking of *exempla* consisted of using synonyms, changing word order and expressions, while sometimes keeping some phrases *verbatim*.[35] However, as argued by Maslakov, this dependence, in the end, cannot be conclusive (not even when presented cumulatively) and can often lead to subjective and less than reliable conclusions.[36] Even Bliss concedes to the ultimately uncertain and ambiguous nature of V's relationship with sources, since, he argues, that what might appear *prima facie* as V's deliberate tweaking of *exempla*, could instead be explained as an 'inheritance of a common tradition of treatment'.[37] Similarly, Wardle also states that one is still left with plenty of uncertainty even in cases where the sources survive and more complete comparisons can be made.[38]

V9's dependence on Livy and Cicero is probable in the following seven *exempla*: 9.1.ext.3, 9.3.1, 9.3.5 (two episodes in one *exemplum*), 9.3.6, 9.4.1, 9.6.1.[39] These are not cases where we can argue that Livy and Cicero were definite sources for the *exempla* but they are close parallels.[40] Out of these seven *exempla*, in the first four, <u>stylistic variation and imitation</u> from

[34] Bloomer (1987: 56).
[35] Wardle (1998: 16-18); Maslakov (1984: 459). Wardle (1998: 16-18) notices that V often abbreviates the sources, something which is consistent with the skills of the excerptor and with V's own comments at 1.praef that he could not possibly improve upon the writers who preceded him.
[36] Maslakov (1984: 143).
[37] Maslakov (1984: 460) paraphrasing Bliss.
[38] Wardle (1998: 15).
[39] Other authors have been mentioned as possible sources in V more generally, but I am focusing solely on V9 here. For more on V's sources see my bibliography above in the literature review in the second footnote, on the early wave of Valerian *Quellenforschung*.
[40] This PhD concerns itself with 9.1-10, but there are other examples relating to the last five chapters of V9: 9.11.1: Liv. 1.48 (Maslakov 1979: 188-9); 9.12.4: Cic. *Tusc*. 5.56 (Maslakov 1979: 303); 9.13. ext.4: Cic. *Tusc*. 5.57 (Maslakov 1979: 304); 9.13. ext.3: Cic. *Off*. 2.25 (Maslakov 1979: 311).

Livy and Cicero is highly possible, two cases for each author: 9.1.ext.3: Cic. *Tusc*. 5.20; 9.3.1: Liv. 27.40.8; 9.4.1: Cic. *Off*. 3.73; 9.6.1: Liv. 1.11.[41] For the textual comparisons *per se*, see the individual *exempla* in this commentary.

It is highly probable that Livy is a source in both 9.3.5 – with its two episodes in one *exemplum* (Liv. 2.43.5-10; 2.59.2) – and 9.3.6 (Liv. 2.27).[42] This is the only case in V9 where consecutive *exempla* (three in this case) can reasonably be connected to the same source, Livy book two.

For reference, I include here a complete table of all Livy and Cicero parallels in V9, as footnoted by Shackleton Bailey.[43] However, as it is evident from the two tables, and as noted by Maslakov and Bloomer, the parallels have no clearly identifiable common thread. The only interesting thing about the tables, is that the biggest cluster of parallels in V9 is that from Livy at 9.3, seven in total (there are two *exempla* in one at 9.3.5); this however appears to be random and one should not surmise too much from it. The only thing one might say, perhaps, on V frequently choosing Livy over other sources, is that in so doing he selected a version of an event which might reflect or imply an orthodox perspective sensitive to the formation of traditions in the late first century BC.

[41] Also see Maslakov (1979: 147-153; 1984: 461-4).
[42] For 9.3.6, also see Maslakov (1979: 218-9).
[43] Shackleton Bailey (2000 vol.2).

VALERIUS	LIVY
9.1.3	34.1-8.3
9.1.ext.1	23.18.10-16
9.1.ext.5	*Per*. 59
9.2.2	*Per*. 80. Also see Cic. *Orat*. 3.10, *Tusc*. 5.55
9.2.ext.2	39.51
9.3.1	27.40.8
9.3.3	9.46.12
9.3.4	8.7.1-22. Also see Cic. *Fin*. 1.7, 2.19
9.3.5	2.59.2
9.3.6	2.27
9.3.ext.3	21.1.4
9.5.ext.3	22.5.1-4
9.6.1	1.11
9.6.4	*Per*. 54
9.6.ext.2	23.15.3-6, 17.4-7
9.7.3	*Per*. 69
9.7.4	*Per*.74
9.7.ext.2	*Per*.77
9.8.1	28.17.10-18
9.8.3	*Per*.75
9.9.3	4.17.1-6
9.10.1	8.37.8-12
9.10.2	*Per* 86. Also Cic. *Verr*. 2.1.70

VALERIUS	CICERO
9.1.6	*Phil*. 2.45
9.1.7	*Att*. 1.16.5
9.1.9	*Cat*. 1.14
9.1.ext.3	*Tusc*. 5.20
9.2.2	*Orat*. 3.10, *Tusc*. 5.55. Also see Liv. *Per* 80.
9.2.ext.8	*Off*. 3.46
9.2.ext.10	*Hort*. *Fr*. 95
9.3.4	*Fin*. 1.7, 2.19. Also see Liv. 8.7.1-22.
9.4.1	*Off*. 3.73
9.4.3	*Orat*. 2.269
9.7.2	*Sest*. 101
9.10.2	*Verr*. 2.1.70. Also see Liv. *Per* 86.

A. Contextualization

1. *Vitia*

The fourth century Greek sophist and rhetorician Aphthonius of Antioch coined the terms apotreptic and protreptic, that is, rhetoric designed to dissuade or persuade. The two important elements in V's *opus* of *sententia* (or maxim) and *exemplum* find resonances in Aphthonius' work in their Greek equivalent forms of *gnome* and *chreia*, respectively.[44] Aphthonius and V use both rhetorical devices for apotreptic and protreptic purposes, in their work.[45] The apotreptic approach that V9 takes focuses on *vitia*. The longest uninterrupted sequence of *exempla* on *vitia* in V is book nine and this is what makes a study of this text worthy of particular attention.[46] The *vitia* of V9 are in marked contrast to the values of most of the rest of V's *opus*.[47]

V9 contributes substantially to a wider debate about the role that *vitia* have had on moral and socio-economic decline in Rome. In fact, V9 is a discourse on the effects of abuses of power via a number of *vitia* that developed in Roman rhetoric through the ages.[48] Each of V9's first ten chapters is devoted to one or a pair of these vices.[49] These vices are fourteen in total:

[44] Kennedy (1994: 204). Kennedy's argument is that *gnome* and chreia, inter *alia*, were part of a strand of Greek rhetoric used and assimilated in the Roman Empire.
[45] For the importance of the apotreptic function in Greek philosophy see Collins II (2015: 82-7, 140).
[46] V depicts vice in other books at 3.5, 5.3 (Skidmore 1996: 126 n. 18). It might be argued that the characters at 1.1.16-21 also display *vitia*. However, the fundamental difference in the portrayal of *vitia* between books 1 and 9 is that the ones in the former are recounted from the perspective of divine intervention and punishment, V9 is not given this angle. For a general outline of V's other books see Carter (1975: 26-9), Sinclair (1980: 5-7), Bloomer (1992: 20-28), Skidmore (1996: 53-82), Thurn (2001).
[47] See my discussion of contrasting values in the section below on comparability.
[48] For the use of *vitia* elsewhere in ancient writings see Plut. *Demetr*. 1.4-5; Pseudo-Aristotle, *Rh. Al*. 8.1429a; Sen. *Contr*. 9.2.27; Sen. *Ira* 3.22.1. Also see Wardman (1974: 26).
[49] I intend the wider meaning of *vitia*: not just immoral or wicked behaviour but also faults, defects, shortcomings. V9 is in complete contrast to book four, which covers good qualities in people.

luxuria, libido, crudelitas, ira, odium, avaritia, superbia, impotentia, perfidia, vis, seditio, temeritas, error and *ultio*.[50] No other extant piece of Roman literature is organized quite in this manner, thus immediately showing *prima facie* V9's uniqueness in creating *intensity* for the reader by focusing particularly on *vitia*. This technique is not matched in the other books, where V diversifies more in content and mood.[51] In other classical authors vices are often contrasted with virtues for easy comparison, rather than being isolated, like here, in one book.[52] But even in V there are fewer vices overall than there are virtues, these are covered mostly in the ninth book but there are a few instances elsewhere in V too.[53]

Classical historiography tends to represent the stability of a state as dependent on individual citizens.[54] I argue that V refines this concept so that V9's message is ultimately a practical one: individuals make choices, prioritize. V9's message, in my view, is aimed particularly at the leading men of Rome who were not leading by example. In V9, and elsewhere in V, 'the theme emerges that the whole structure of society is threatened if there is a failure to reward moral excellence and punish vice', especially so in the ninth book where a strong cautionary and exhortatory model is palpable.[55] Although V never explicitly appears to be critical or undermining of the Tiberian regime, an available implicit message is that even in prolonged periods of peace one still needed to be alert to the emergence and spread of *vitia*. V first of all

[50] *Luxuria, libido* are combined in 9.1 and the same applies to *ira, odium* in 9.3, *superbia, impotentia* in 9.5, and *vis, seditio* in 9.7. It should be noted that the present chapter titles of the opus as we know it today are not part of the original manuscript but are an editorialization which approximate V's own headings and a putative table of contents (Bliss 1951: 8, n. 24); Sinclair (1980: 55, n. 16), Skidmore (1996: 31).

[51] It could be argued that V's books 2 and 4 create a difference type of intensity, one focused on virtue. On V9 mainly exhibiting *vitia* see Thurn (2001: 83). For a brief outline of V9 see Thurn (2001: 92-94). 9.12.1-3 is the only point in V9 where V distances himself momentarily from this intensity, writing instead about events outside human control, not involving direct human decisions.

[52] V however does not highlight this uniqueness, unlike his contemporary Pliny the Elder, who wrote the following about his own work: *nemo apud nos qui idem temptaverit, nemo apud Graecos, qui unus omnia ea tractaverit* (pr. 14).

[53] Skidmore (1996: 125, n. 10; 126, n. 18). For vices in other books of V see: 3.5, 5.3, 7.8a (Skidmore 1996: 126 note 18).

[54] Skidmore (1996: 61).

[55] Skidmore (1996: 56), who references: 5.3.2e, 5.3.ext.3, 5.2.ext.4. For this cause and effect approach in V9 see my comments in the introduction to 9.10. Also see Sal. *Cat.* 5; Earl (1961: 13-16; 86). V overall follows the epideictic tradition of praise and blame. The latter alone pervades V9.

addresses this theme of reward and punishment – for both virtue and vice – by using the chapter prefaces to condition the reader, so that the reader does 'not draw the wrong conclusions' from the *exempla* he is about to read.[56] The *praefatio* in V therefore 'takes the place of the argument in theoretical treatises by stating the morals' in the *exempla* of a particular chapter. Therefore the preface is an important and indispensable unit in V for structural reasons also.[57] In providing moral lessons, V9's apotreptic approach spans the study of rhetoric (in particular declamation) memory and emotions.

2. Exempla.[58]

V9 can be seen as fitting into that field of modern research that focuses on self-presentation and self-fashioning within the Roman political class.[59] Like other Roman authors, V played with the way Romans understood themselves as Romans, and V does this in the ninth book in an original way by taking a distinctive, apotreptic approach in order to create a strong identity or subject- position for its audience. Whereas scholars such as John Dugan (2005) have used the terminology of self-fashioning to interrogate the *imago* Cicero creates and the new *persona*-focused model of success this produces for the *novus homo*, with V it is not possible to glean much about the man himself behind the text. V's relative invisibility as an authorial *persona* foregrounds the power of the *exempla* tradition and its personalities, and potentially

[56] Skidmore (1996: 58). Conditioning in V9 is apparent in the prefaces to the following chapters: 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.6 and 9.9. For other notable cases elsewhere in V see: 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 7.4, 8.7 (Skidmore 1996: 55).
[57] Skidmore (1996: 58).
[58] On *exempla* in ancient historians see Woodman (1977: 30-45), Fornara (1983: 10-2), Wiedemann (2000). On the Roman definitions of the *exemplum* see Quint. *Inst*. 12.2.29-31; *Rhet*. *Her*. 4.62 and Cic. *Inv*. 1.49. On Roman historical *exempla* see Dueck (2000), Turpin (2008). For V's use of *exempla* in particular see Bloomer (1992), Maslakov (1984) and Skidmore (1996). For a detailed bibliography on *exempla* in other Roman authors see Chaplin (2000: 6 n. 16). For the idea of literature as a constant source and preservation of *exempla* see Cic. *Arch*. 14.
[59] Hölkeskamp (2010: 100), Patterson (2000: 29); Flower (2004: 338); Connolly (2007: 30 and *passim*). For the original term 'self-fashioning' see Greenblatt (1980). For a comparable model for Cicero see Dugan (2005).

creates a sense of objectivity regarding his moral and epideictic stance; that is, exemplifying and affirming values and role models, ideal standards, expectations and patterns of desirable behaviour that befit Romans.

V9's apotreptic approach encapsulates the genre of *exempla* on what to avoid (*mala exempla*), which is also used by Seneca – *exempla quae vites* (*Ira* 3.22.1) – and is one that fits within the tradition of rhetorical writers who can speak of arguments from opposites.[60]

Exempla and Stoic thought

I place V among those Romans who were certainly familiar with Stoic ideas but were not 'marked down as committed Stoics'.[61] To determine what is part of Roman tradition and what is Stoic is 'complicated and sometimes impossible to pin down'.[62] In fact, ideas that were associated with Stoicism was integral to elite Romans' early education and manifests itself implicitly in the works of Virgil and Horace, *inter alia*, despite their never formally claiming adherence to this philosophical school of thought.[63] Bellemore, in particular, captures this ambiguity in relation to V, thus: 'Either V was a Stoic or the intellectual climate in the first few years of the reign of Tiberius was so uniform that many writers viewed the world using the same intellectual parameters as those of the Stoics'.[64] Römer and Lawrence have argued for V's close affinity to Stoicism.[65] In particular, Lawrence strongly suggests that V's *exempla* are congruent with Stoic ideas, especially those of the rational death, the

[60] Turpin (2008: 368). On this technique in antiquity see *Rhet. ad Alex*. 7. 1429b-1430a. Also see Horace *Serm*. 1.4.103-129 that recounts how his father would point to various people as illustrations of what not to become. For the function of *exempla* in Seneca see Mayer (2008). Tacitus also adopted the *mala exempla* for the same purpose (Turpin 2008: 378).
[61] Brunt (1975: 7).
[62] Turpin (2008: 364). See Roller (2001) for an analysis of the Roman tradition and Stoicism.
[63] Brunt (1975: 7).
[64] Bellemore (1989: 9).
[65] Römer (1990), Lawrence (2013).

passions, and the importance of self-control. As I outline below, these last two elements have a specific relevance for V9.[66] In fact, the passions, and the importance of self-control are inextricably linked. As I argue in this commentary, in V9 emotions and passions are out of control, they are in conflict with reason, and are actually destructive and perpetuate *vitia*: the illustrated problem ultimately boils down to humans not understanding what is good or bad in life, thus affecting their decision-making. As Lawrence argues, lack of understanding (which affects human decision-making) is intensely relevant to Stoic thinkers such as Diogenes Laertius, Hecato, Zeno, and Chrysippus; and also Cicero, in his *Tusculan Disputations*.[67] The other point argued by Lawrence, as constituting another Stoic element in V, is self-control. Self-control is at the heart of my interpretation of V9's stance against *vitia* and *cupiditas* overall, as a way not totally to deny the existence of vice (which is not possible) but proposes living in a way so that one is not defined by it, or does not live perpetually based on it. In Stoic thought this is identifiable with *temperantia*, an approach which Lawrence (2015: 144) argues is in line with the Stoics Diogenes Laertius 7.1.92 (Lawrence 2015: 145 n.33) and Musonius Rufus (Lawrence 2015: 148), referring to a mind ruled by reason rather than by *cupiditas*.[68]

Stoics were actively employed with *exempla* as they were deeply interested in the moral improvement of others.[69] According to Stoic philosophy, true moral value is ascribed to mental disposition following the concept of the 'proper function' (*officium*).[70] 'Proper function' means undertaking activities that conform, *inter alia*, to the agent's social role

[66] Lawrence (2015: 135). The rational death is more of a theme at 9.13, as Lawrence's analysis clarifies.
[67] Lawrence (2015: 147). On 'Stoic theories of emotion' in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* (5.60) see Lawrence (2015: 154-5). On Stoic thought and the passions see Strange (2004).
[68] Lawrence (2015: 145 n.33) references Morgan (2007: 145-6 n. 6) on 'the [Stoic] central role of self-control in V'. Lawrence (2015: 152 n.57) references Long (1987: 419 n. 38), on the 'importance of self-control as one of the defining features in the ancient perception of Stoicism'.
[69] On Stoics and *exempla* see Turpin (2008: 363-5), Nussbaum (1994: 339).
[70] On the Stoic 'proper function' see Roller (2001: 91-97), Long (1996: 164-6).

(which Cicero discusses in the first book of *De Officiis*) and to a person's 'natural constitution', for which a rational justification can be given.[71] The following are four Stoic elements that pervade V9:

- V's implicit Stoic definition of *vitia* as unnatural and going against nature (see the introduction to 9.1).
- The definition of freedom and moral slavery.[72]
- The Stoic position that the mind is to be ruled by reason not by emotion, exemplified by the Roman Stoics such as Musonius Rufus.[73]
- This last point is not uniquely Stoic, but certainly has certain resonances to this philosophical school of thought, and it is that of practical ethics, how one can apply them to one's life.[74] In fact, the general Stoic belief was that 'everyone had a role to play' in society therefore the great quantity of *exempla* (and their topical range) provided by V overall and the practical ethics it provides (also see Skidmore 1996 and Langlands 2011) would have appealed to the ethical needs of a wide range of readers.[75]

[71] Cic. *Off*. 1.32, 53-56, 122-5, 149. On rational justification as part of Stoic ethics see Diog. Laert. 7.107, Stob. 2.85-6, Cic. *Fin*. 3.58. Also see Tsekourakis (1974: 25-30), Engberg-Pedersen (1990: 133-6).
[72] On Stoic views of freedom and its relations to ethics see Bobzien (1997). For freedom, see my comments under *mancipium* (9.4.ext.1) and as part of the introduction to 9.5 (on *impotentia*). For the reason versus emotion point in V9 see especially 9.3 and 9.8. Also see my comments in the last paragraph of this introduction on V9's 'last five chapters' concerning the Stoic view on death.
[73] Lawrence (2015: 148). On Stoic views of the passions see Strange (2004).
[74] See Cicero on the *exemplum* of Regulus (*Off*. 3.99-115). On V's approach to practical ethics see Skidmore (1996). On memorability and vividness as essential qualities to the *exemplum* see Habinek (2000: 265) and Graver (1996). On the pictorial element to *exempla* in V9 and its function to reinforce *memoria* see my comments at *imagines* (9.3.praef).
[75] Turpin (2008: 370).

3. Chronology

V composed the *Factorum et Dictorum Memorabilium* around AD 27, with an end date of after 31st October 31, as a *terminus post quem* (see below, in this section, on 9.11.ext.4).[76] As Wardle states, however, the case for these dates is 'far from watertight'.[77] The *exempla* in each chapter of V9 are rarely deployed in chronological order.[78] This absence of chronology between *exempla* generates a sense of temporal disorientation for the reader who moves between *exempla*, even where historical context within a given *exemplum* may be clear. This model allows the reader to *compare* between *exempla* and think about them in more flexible, malleable ways without feeling constricted or defined by chronological sequence or 'annalistic' historical causation. In fact, in V9 comparison *per se* is more important than chronology.[79] Another purpose for a lack of a chronological order is that it draws the past, and even remote past, close to the present so that all events can thus be considered relevant for the reader of the times.[80] The purpose of making the *exempla* 'timeless' is crucial if they are to remain relevant and make a moral impact on the contemporary reader.[81] This is particularly important in book nine in order to maximise its apotreptic approach to *vitia*.

The characters and *dénouement* of the majority of the *exempla* in V9 are not set in V's own era of Tiberian Rome. V, in fact, might have used past characters and vicissitudes to address his concerns 'through the mouths of past characters, without direct advertisement', which is a

[76] Briscoe (1993: 398).
[77] Wardle (1998: 2).
[78] For the same lack of chronological organization in V's book 1, see Wardle (1998: 137, 144, 153, 166, 183, 217).
[79] As I shall argue below in the section on comparability, comparison is an important dimension to V9.
[80] 'By removing chronology, Valerius removed time. They are present, not ancient examples' (Mueller 2000: 42). An exception to this lack of chronology in V9 is evident by the book's three *exempla* from the regal period, all of which are positioned as the first *exemplum* in each chapter: 9.6.1, the other two, outside the remit of this PhD, are 9.11.1 and 9.12.1. For studies on the important distinction between historical and mythological *exempla* see Canter (1933) and Goldhill (1994).
[81] Mueller (2002: 176).

technique adopted in antiquity as highlighted by Laird.[82] I interpret this temporal gap as being consistent with the exemplary tradition as a genre, of which V was of course an exponent. In fact, *exempla*, so that their moral message is maximised, need to allow some temporal distance between its audience and the lesson. More recent *exempla* lack the same moral baggage, *gravitas* and pedigree of older ones, which have had more time to become part of the historic, literary and rhetorical *topoi*. I argue that temporal distance canonises the *exempla*, and because they have had a longstanding place in Roman historical consciousness**,** V's tweaking of them for moral purposes consequently would have particularly caught the reader's attention.[83]

The most historically recent *exemplum* in the first ten chapters of V9 is from 42 BC (9.9.2) and there are a further three more recent *exempla* in the last five chapters of V9 (but which are beyond the remit of this commentary):

- 9.11.ext.4: Supposedly refers to the condemnation of Sejanus, thus dating this *exemplum* at AD 31.[84]

- 9.15.2: Dates from 23 BC, following Marcellus' death.

- 9.15.ext.2: Ariarathes is executed by M. Antonius in 36 BC.

[82] Laird (2009: 209).
[83] Exceptions to this general rule, where the *exempla* are more contemporary to V, can be seen at 5.5.3, 4.3.3 and, possibly, 9.11.ext.4.
[84] Shackleton Bailey (2000 vol.1: 2). For the opposite view, that it does not refer to Sejanaus see Briscoe (1993: 401-2).

Their close positioning in the last five chapters of V9 provides a striking divergence from the book's first ten chapters. For more on the differences between the two parts of V9 see my penultimate section in the main introduction.

Valerius' own times

Apart from exceptions from the last five chapters of V9 above (and a handful of other *exempla* elsewhere in the Valerian *corpus*), V typically avoids *exempla* from his lifetime. V, in fact, ensured his *opus* was scattered with praise for Caesar, Augustus and Tiberius. It is uncertain whether V was so wary of being prosecuted himself for treason that he wanted to be seen as praising it, instead.[85]

There is no conclusive evidence that any of V's *exempla* were designed to mirror or echo events of contemporary Tiberian Rome. However, one can only conjecture that V still might have wanted to draw attention to recent contemporary vicissitudes in an indirect manner, by using *exempla* from the past which had elements in common with more recent history. Suffice to say, keywords (such as the chapter themes themselves) in V9 encapsulate the *vitia* that were significant in terms of their power to disrupt Rome's harmony, irrespective of temporal considerations, which affected history and its *memoria*. There are three *exempla* in V9 that might mirror events closer to V's times, and these could extend the end period of V's writing by five years, from AD 31 to AD 36.[86] The three events below are incidents where a Roman was prosecuted by Tiberius on accusations of libel. If V had indeed wanted to draw

[85] This would reflect the negative perspective on Tiberius' reign of, *inter alia*, cruelty and torture, see Sen. *Ben*. 2.7, 3.26, 5.25.2, *Marc*. 1.2, 1.3-4; Tac. *Ann*. 1.6, 1.72, 1.74, 2.27-32, 3.49-51, 3.66-69; Suet. *Tib*. 42-5 and Josephus (*Ant*. 18.6.5, 18.6.10). It is worth remembering here that Suetonius (*Tib*. 26-32) and Dio (57.7-13) state that Tiberius' conduct in the earlier part of his reign (until Germanicus' death) was good, and that he afterwards degenerated.

[86] The dating of V's *opus* is not certain, *circa* AD 27 to AD 31.

attention to Tiberius' unfair and cruel proscriptions then this indirect way could have been a safer manner of doing so, without incurring the wrath of the vengeful emperor. These echoes are reinforced by the fact that the *exempla* they could be mirroring follow each other sequentially: 9.5.2, 9.5.3 and 9.5.4. Furthermore, the events *per se* are chronologically close to each other, only two years apart: AD 32, 34, 36.

AD 32: Tiberius drove Sextus Vistilius, an ex-praetor and his *amicus*, to suicide.[87] This *could* find an echo with 9.5.3, *nobilem virum et sibi amicum*, where *amicitia* is dismissed.[88] This element of *amicitia* reoccurs in a far more eye-catching and famous manner in another contemporary incident during V's life, involving Piso *pater* and the edict of the *Senatus Consultum Cn. Pisone Patre* (*SCPP*), which I treat in detail below.

AD 34: Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus was accused of libel against Tiberius because of his tragedy 'Atreus' and was driven to suicide.[89] This could mirror 9.5.4 and my allusions to the 'Atreus'.

AD 36: Sextus Paconianus (*praetorius*) was strangled in prison for composing verses vilifying Tiberius.[90] This could mirror the strangling at 9.5.2, although at 9.5.2 it does not lead to the victim's death. The parallel between the event of AD 36 and 9.5.2 is the act of strangling *per se*. However, this or other events mentioned above would be more likely to evoke faint senses of correspondence rather than clear correlations, while at the same time perhaps contextualising V's selection of *exempla*.

[87] Tac. *Ann*. 6.9.2.
[88] At 9.5.3 no suicide takes place but the dismissal of *amicitia* has serious consequences for Hypseus.
[89] Tac. *Ann*. 6.29.3-4; Dio 58.24.3-5. On the 'Atreus' see Suet. *Tib*. 61.3.
[90] Tac. *Ann*. 6.39.1.

Velleius Paterculus

Velleius Paterculus and the *Senatus Consultum Cn. Pisone Patre* (*SCPP*) complement V's *opus* with additional insights on the language and value system (intellectual, cultural and political) of Tiberian Rome.

Velleius lived and wrote in the same period as V, and as Elefante argues, the two authors share many similarities. Both assume an orthodox, official line in supporting and praising the *princeps* and his regime.[91] The language of both writers reflected the public decrees published by the Roman Senate of the time, such as the *Senatus Consultum de Gn. Pisone Patre* (*SCPP*), see below.[92] Velleius' attitudes, praise and loyalty to the Senate and *princeps* were typical of those holding optimate views.[93] This is also noticeable in V's comparably conventional aversion towards the *populares*.[94] Particularly noteworthy among aspects which V and Velleius share is the profuse commonality of the characters they wrote about, a parallel that has not been drawn in scholarship before.[95] The correlation between the two authors is a reflection of the most popular historical characters in the Tiberian period.[96] Among the most frequent characters in both authors are, for example, Marius, Sulla, and the two Gracchi. To comment on these convergences is, however, beyond the scope of this commentary but I believe the table below can become the basis for a new and interesting angle to Tiberian

[91] Elefante (1999: 39).
[92] Levick (2011: 11-12).
[93] Levick (2011: 11), Elefante (1999: 25).
[94] For V's optimate stance see my comments at 9.5.1 and 9.10.1.
[95] The parallels between V and Velleius are based on the indexes provided by Shackleton Bailey (2000) for the former; and Yardley (2011) for the latter.
[96] For more on the statistics of the characters inhabiting V's work see Bloomer (1992: 150-2) and Carney (1962: 289).

scholarship worth exploring in the future, drawing similarities and differences on how the two authors presented their *dramatis personae*.

CHARACTER	**VALERIUS' NINTH BOOK**	**VELLEIUS**
Aelius Sejanus, L.	9.11.ext.4	2.127.3, 2.128.4
Aeschylus	9.12.ext.2	1.16.3
Alexander the Great	9.3.ext.1, 9.5.ext.1	1.6.5, 1.11.4, 2.41.1
Allobroges	9.6.3	2.10.2
Antonius, M. (cos. 99)	9.2.2	2.9.1, 2.22.3, 2.36.2
Antonius, M. (triumvir)	9.3.3, 9.5.4, 9.15.ext.2	Book 2 *passim*
Appuleius Saturninus L.	9.7.1, 9.7.3	2.12.6, 2.15.4
Aquillius, M. (cos. 101)	9.13.1	2.18.3
Arverni (tribe)	9.6.3	2.10.2
Atilius Regulus M.	9.2.ext.1, 9.6.ext.1	2.38.2
Augustus	9.15.2	Book 2 *passim*
Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus Q. (cos. 143)	9.3.7	1.11.2,3,6; 1.12.1; 2.1.2;2.5.2,3
Caecilius Metellus Numidicus Q. (cos. 109)	9.1.5, 9.7.2	2.8.2; 2.9.1; 2.11.1,2; 1.5.3,4; 2.39.2, 2.45.3
Caecilius Metellus Pius Q. (cos. 80)	9.1.5	2.15.3, 2.28.1, 2.29.5, 2.30.2
Caecilius Metellus Scipio Nasica (cos. 52)	9.1.8, 9.5.3	2.54.2
Cassius Longinus C. (Caesar's assassin)	9.9.2	Book 2 *passim*
Catilina Sergius, L.	9.1.9, 9.11.3	2.34.3,4; 2.35.5
Clodius Pulcher P.	9.1.7, 9.15.4	2.45.1,3,4; 2.47.4; 2.68.3
Cornelius Cethegus	9.2.1	2.34.3,4
Cornelius Cinna L. (pr. 44)	9.9.1	2.20.2,4; 2.21.1,3,6; 2.22.2,3; 2.23.1,3; 2.24.5; 2.41.2; 2.43.1
Cornelius Lentulus Spinther P. (cos. 57)	9.14.4	2.53.1
Cornelius Lentulus Sura P. (cos. 71)	9.14.ext.3	2.34.3,4; 2.35.3
Cornelius Merula L. (cos. 87)	9.12.5	2.20.3, 2.22
Cornelius Scipio Africanus P. (maior) (cos. 194)	9.8.1, 9.11.ext.1	1.10.3; 1.12.3; 2.1.1; 2.2.1; 2.3.1; 2.7.1; 2.8.1; 2.38.5; 2.90.2; 2.127.1
Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio P. (cos. 138)	9.14.3	2.3.1
Cornelius Sulla L.	9.2.1, 9.3.8, 9.15.5	Book 2 *passim*
Domitius Ahenobarbus Cn. (cos.122)	9.6.3	2.10.2; 2.39.1

Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus Q. (cos. 121)	9.6.3	2.10.2; 2.39.1
Fulvia (wife of Clodius)	9.1.8	2.74.3; 2.76.2
Fulvius Flaccus M. (cos. 125)	9.5.1	2.6.4,6; 2.7.2
Gabinius A. (cos. 58)	9.1.ext.6	2.31.2
Hortensius Hortalus Q. (cos. 69)	9.4.1	2.16.3; 2.36.2; 2.48.6
Iulius Caesar C. (dictator)	9.2.4; 9.8.2; 9.9.1	Book 2 *passim*
Iulius Caesar (Strabo Vopiscus) C.	9.2.2	2.9.2
Iunius Brutus M.	9.9.2	Book 2 *passim*
Iunius Brutus Albinus D.	9.13.3	2.56.3; 2.58.1,2; 2.60.5; 2.61.4; 2.62.4; 2.63.3; 2.64.1; 2.87.2
Iunius Brutus Damasippus L.	9.2.3	2.26.2
Licinius Crassus L. (cos. 95)	9.1.1,4	2.9.1; 2.36.2
Licinius Macer Calvus C.	9.12.7	2.36.2
Livius Drusus M. (tr. pl. 91)	9.5.2	2.13.1,3; 2.14.1; 2.15.1
Lutatius Catulus Q. (cos. 102)	9.12.4	9.12.5; 2.22.4
Marius C.	9.2.2, 9.7.1, 9.7.mil.Rom.1, 9.11.2, 9.12.4, 9.15.1	*passim*
Mithridates	9.7.mil.Rom.1, 9.11.ext.2, 9.13.1	2.18.1,3,6; 2.23.3,5,6; 2.24.1; 2.33.1; 2.37.1; 2.40.1
Octavia	9.15.2	1.11.3; 2.78.1; 2.93.1
Opimius, L.	9.4.3	2.6.4-6; 2.7.2,3,5,6
Papirius Carbo C. (pr. 81)	9.7.milRom.3	2.26.2
Pharnaces (son of Mithridates)	9.11.ext.2	2.40.1, 2.55.2
Philippus(V, king of Macedonia)	9.1.3	1.11.1
Pindar (poet)	9.12.ext.7	1.18.3
Pompeius Magnus Cn.	9.3.2, 9.5.3	*passim*
Pompeius Q. (cos. 141)	9.3.7	2.1.4-5; 2.21.5; 2.90.3
Pompeius Rufus Q. (cos. 88)	9.7.mil.Rom.2	2.17.1, 2.18.6, 2.20.1
Ptolemy (Cyprus)	9.4.ext.1	2.38.6, 2.45.4
Pyrrhus of Macedonia	9.1.4	1.14.6, 2.17.2
Rupilius P. (cos. 132)	9.12.ext.1	2.7.4
Scribonius Curio C.	9.1.6	2.48.3; 2.55.1; 2.68.1
Sempronius Gracchus C.	9.4.3, 9.5.ext.4, 9.12.6	1.17.3, 2.2.3, 2.6.1,4-7; 2.7.1,3,7; 2.9.1; 2.13.2,3; 2.32.3
Sempronius Gracchus Ti.	9.7.1,2; 9.15.2	1.17.3; 2.2.1; 2.3.1,2; 2.4.4; 2.6.1,4,7; 2.7.1,3,4; 2.9.1; 2.13.3
Sertorius Q.	9.1.5, 9.15.3	2.25.3; 2.29.5; 2.30.1,5; 2.90.3

Servilius Caepio (cos. 140)	9.6.4	2.1.3
Sophocles	9.12.ext.5	1.16.3
Tullius Cicero M.	9.11.3, 9.12.7	Book 2 *passim*
Viriathus	9.6.4	2.1.3, 2.90.3
Xerxes	9.1.ext.3, 9.5.ext.2, 9.13.ext.1	2.33.4

The one thing that sets Velleius apart from V is his overly servile and adulatory attitude towards Tiberius, V's support and praise for the Tiberian regime is less effusive, by comparison. While Tacitus and Suetonius were part of a more consistent trend of negative discourse on Tiberius, Velleius' account is a somewhat disjointed and isolated voice in presenting a too consistently rosy depiction of the emperor.[97]

The *Senatus Consultum Cn. Pisone Patre* (*SCPP*)

The *Senatus Consultum Cn. Pisone Patre* (hereafter referred to as *SCPP*) was published on 10th December AD 20. The *SCPP* (lines 26-9) recounts the *renuntatio amicitiae* of Germanicus toward Piso *pater*; and although there is no evidence for Piso's murder of Germanicus, the latter thought he was responsible.[98] However, the charge of murder was dismissed early on in the trial.[99] V may be indirectly mirroring this momentous event in history by making *amicitia* a theme in V9.[100]

The reason I have singled out the *SCPP* here as a comparator to V9, in mirroring the value system of Tiberian Rome, is twofold: first, because both their aims are moral and apotreptic, to dissuade citizens from *vitia*; second, their similar framework of contrasting *vitia* with

[97] For a bibliography on the arguments of Velleius' highly sycophantic and servile attitude to Tiberius see Elefante (1999: 25 n.40-1). On the possibility, which mirrors my own for V, that Velleius' attitude was such on account of the cruelty and severity of the Tiberian regime see Elefante (1999: 42).
[98] *amicitiam ei renuntiasse*, Tac. *Ann*. 2.71.1.
[99] Cooley (1998: 199).
[100] The word *amicus* or *amicitia* occurs thirteen times in V9: 9.1.1, 9.1.ext.3, 9.3.ext.1, 9.5.3, 9.6.4, 9.11.4 (x2), 9.11.ext.3, 9.11.ext.4 (x2), 9.12.6, 9.13.ext.2, 9.13.ext.4.

virtue. This framework in the *SCPP* is represented by Piso's vices, contrasted with the virtues of the Imperial family and Germanicus. The dichotomy of virtue and vice is an important dimension to the *SCPP*'s moral agenda, whose moral aim was that of encouraging upright behaviour.[101] Furthermore, the *SCPP* focuses on Piso's *vitia*, so that the reader could observe even more the difference between Piso's behaviour and that of the imperial family, with the latter's positive image thus greatly magnified, by comparison. This, I argue, is a similar framework to V9's apotreptic approach, where vice is brought to the fore to reinforce the value of their opposite virtues.[102] Nevertheless, V9 is unique in bringing together various *vitia* as chapter themes in one piece of literature, representing one way, at least, in which vices were thought of in Tiberian times.

The *SCPP* at lines 93 and 100 contrasts the *humanitas* of the Senate and *princeps* with Piso's lack of *humanitas*. It does so by focusing on Piso's *crudelitas* (*SCPP*, 49-52) and *feritas* (*SCPP*, 27), both crucial keywords in V9.[103] In addition, it describes Piso's reaction of joy when responding at the news of Germanicus' death, in contrast with the majority of Romans and *exterae gentes* who, instead, mourned him (*SCPP*, 58). This distance from what was conventional Roman behaviour constitutes an important theme in V9, namely, how by distancing oneself from social and rational emotions and actions can become dangerous especially for those in power, in terms of aggravating their own extreme actions and the reaction of others toward them.[104] In fact, Piso is compelled to commit suicide. Through its

[101] Cooley (1998: 209). For the contrast of vice and virtue in V, see my section on 'contrasting values' in this introduction.
[102] Bodel (1999: 44). For Piso's *scelera* see *SCPP*, lines 29-70.
[103] *Crudelitas* is the chapter theme of 9.2, and *feritas* occurs three times out of four in 9.2: 9.2.1, 9.2.ext.1, 9.2.ext.4 and a final time outside 9.2 at 9.1.ext.1.
[104] See my comments at 9.5.

negative portrayal (*crudelitas*, *feritas* and distance) the *SCPP* dehumanises Piso by ostracising him from Roman society; in effect it is a posthumous damning of him.[105]

The themes of civil war and the corruption of military discipline in V9.7 are intensely relevant to the concerns of the *SCPP*.[106] Because Augustus was instrumental in stopping the civil wars and worked assiduously in making sure they would not re-occur, Piso's actions in Syria could have been seen, or presented, as alarming and threatening. Therefore, Piso's main accusation was his attempt at starting a civil war.[107] At the lemma *sed quis ferat … corrigentem* (9.7.Mil.Rom.1), I will emphasize V's portrayal of disquiet when the traditional organs of government are replaced by people-power, whether the plebs or soldiers. I argue here that this may be a reflection of a genuine feeling in Tiberian Rome, that after Augustus minimised the involvement of the military in politics **(**Dio 52.27), the mutinies of AD 14 gave rise to this fear re-emerging during Tiberius' reign.[108] The subject of civil war in V's lifetime of Tiberian Rome was painful, and the commonplace of this grief found expression in declamation.[109] V, in fact, finds murder and wars among Romans rather than between barbarians particularly painful: *quia, ut necessariae istae, ita lugubres semper existimatae sunt victoriae utpote non externo, sed domestico partae cruore* (2.8.7). Although deeds during a civil war may become famous, they did not attract the same level of kudos and reward had the opponent been a non-Roman.[110] Like V, Seneca, regrets the fact that savageries had not remained with the barbarian *exempla* but had instead infiltrated into the

[105] Cooley (1998: 201).
[106] *SCPP* lines 45-8 and 52 respectively.
[107] Severy (2000: 329 n. 18), Cooley (1998: 203), *SCPP*, lines 45-8.
[108] Suet. *Tib*. 25.1-2.
[109] Bloomer (1987: 27).
[110] Gowing (2010: 253).

Roman way of life.[111] For this, and other instances in V9, the context offered by the SCPP is vital.

The *SCPP*'s recounting of Piso's attempts to secure personal loyalty from the legions of Syria have a certain resonance in the context of 9.7.Mil.Rom.2, with Pompeius Strabo's overly strong bond between troops and commander and its dangers to the state.[112] This is especially so since military loyalty signified loyalty to the emperor.[113] *Ergo*, this constituted *maiestas* at its most obvious. The theme of paternity at 9.3 and family more generally in V are relevant to *SCPP*, where Piso is denounced for his inadequacy as a father.[114] The *SCPP* portrays loyalty to Rome via familial duty and uses terms traditionally associated with the family to describe the inter-relationships between different socio-political groups.[115] These groups, mainly the *equites*, *plebs*, and *milites* (the last two constituting the protagonists of 9.7), are commended in the *SCPP* for their loyalty to Rome via praise of their family-based allegiance to Tiberius.[116] As Wardle argues, V had no explicit agenda regarding the Republic but in praising the advantages of imperial rule, he too was part of a group of loyalists to the imperial family.[117] This position in V is not surprising since even the *SCPP* shows how much even the senate praised members of the imperial family. V9 (and therefore his entire *opus*) reaches its conclusions with praise for the imperial family, by contrasting and juxtaposing Caesar with

[111] *Ira* 3.18.1. *utinam ista saevitia intra peregrina exempla mansisset nec in Romanos mores cum aliis adventiciis vitiis etiam suppliciorum irarumque barbaria transisset* (*Ira* 3.18.1).
[112] For Pompeius Strabo as a controversial figure in Tiberian narrative see Seager (2011); on Strabo and his troops see Hillman (1996 and 1997); for Strabo's political ambitions see Keaveney (1978).
[113] Severy (2000: 328).
[114] Severy (2000: 335).
[115] Severy (2000: 327).
[116] Severy (2000: 328).
[117] Wardle (1997: 345).

Sulla: *Sullana violentia Caesariana aequitas* (9.15.5).[118] Reference to Caesar continues into the following *exemplum* at 9.15.ext.1 (*eodem praeside*).[119]

Remarkable, but not surprising, is V's exclusion of *exempla* on Julia and Agrippina the elder in V9, consistent with the public discourse in the early Principate of portraying women of the imperial family as praiseworthy for their virtues and restraint. For example, this emerges in the SCPP, about the Senate commending women *quarum aeque et dolorem fidelissimum et in dolore moderationem senatum probare* (*SCPP*, line 145); and in V himself, on Antonia at 4.3.3 and on Livia Augusta (Iulia) at 6.1.praef. In fact, since Augustus' reign, the dynastic house had 'a collective identity, in which women had public roles' too; this was a considerable change in the value system of Rome.[120] This dynamic in the changing discourse surrounding women in public makes it unsurprising that V also avoids the *vitia* of Imperial women in V9.

4. Declamation

It was part of the conventional educational goals of the elite Roman to have a commanding grasp of *exempla* for redeployment in speeches.[121] *Exempla* were also commonly used as models of behaviour in the education of young people.[122] Therefore it was, in part, education

[118] Wardle (1997: 325). The adjective *Caesarianus* reoccurs in V at: 1.1.19, 3.2.13.
[119] The other mention of Caesar in V9 is at 9.8.2. Also see for the rare use of the adjective *augustus* at 9.11.ext.4, referring to Tiberius: *augusto capite* (Wardle 1997: 325). As referenced by Wardle (1997: 325 n.15), on *augustus* elsewhere in V see 1.8.8, 2.8.7, 6.1.praef, 8.11.ext.5, 8.15.praef.
[120] Rowe (2002: 1).
[121] Chaplin (2000: 13). See Cic. *Off.* 2.46. Offering specific definitions of *exemplum* as a rhetorical term see *Rhet. ad Her*. 4.62; Cic. *Inv.* 1.49; and Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.1-2. On the theory of the *exemplum* in rhetoric see Alewell (1913: 5-35), Price (1975) and Litchfield (1914: 1-71). Also see Bonner (1977: 283), Maslakov (1984: 445), Urban (2011: 5-11). For more on rhetoric in V9 see my section on declamation below. For a discussion between *exempla* and didacticism in Tacitus see Fornara (1983: 118).
[122] Chaplin (2000:11-13), van der Poel (2009). See often cited passages such as Ter. *Ad*. 414-19; Hor. *S*. 1.4.105-21; Plin. *Ep*. 8.14.6. For a study on the moral character of *exempla* see Litchfield (1914).

and particularly declamation that mitigated a social problem relating to Roman fathers, allowing Roman sons to 'rehearse their future roles as *patres* and *cives*'.[123] This was essential since many Roman fathers, at least those among the Roman political and economic elite, were often not present in their sons' lives, thus leaving a *lacuna* in their sons' upbringing on how to learn to be *patres*; therefore the sons of elite Romans used declamation, to a certain extent, as a way to learn to become Roman fathers of the next generation.[124]

Of the many themes found in Roman declamation, I draw to the question of paternity in V9, in particular, because many *exempla* in V9, and V overall, focus on tensions and conflicts within the family as a microcosm for deep-rooted social problems of violence and tensions pervading Rome.[125] In fact, the *paterfamilias* represented the private tyrant, because Roman law allowed the *paterfamilias* absolute power, *inter alia* in being able to punish members of his household. At a public level paternity also mattered as the emperor was the *pater patriae*. As Spencer notes: 'V's direct address to Tiberius represents a relationship between author and emperor that invokes the *paternal* qualities of imperial power'.[126]

Learning how to behave as a Roman involved learning about the boundaries that defined the licit and illicit.[127] V9 embodies *the illicit* and aims for the shock effect in seizing the reader's

---

[123] Imber (2008: 161). Declamation involved role-playing characters as diverse as a patron or *paterfamilias* or a slave (Bloomer 1997b: 58).

[124] Imber (2008: 161). For declamation as a way to 'replicate, re-establish and re-interpret the previous generation' see Corbeill (2007: 69). Also see Bloomer (1997b: 57).

[125] Also see my comments in the introduction to 9.3 on the father-son relationship in V. In V9, 13 *exempla* are Roman and 13 are external. Parricide: 1.9 and 3.4. Traditional tensions in paternal authority: 1.2, 1.6, 1.9, 2.ext.5 and 7, 3.4, 3.5, 3.ext.2-3, 6.1 and 11.5-6. Treachery: Tarpeia (6.1) and Tullia (11.1): not just treachery *per se* but also involving their fathers, Titus Tatius for Tarpeia and Tarquinius Superbus for Tullia. False family members: 7.1-2; 14.2 ext.1; 15. Other instances on the family in V9 are: 1.8; 1.ext.5; 10.ext.1; 11.1; 11.7; 11.ext.1-4; 12.2; 12.ext.1; 13.ext.3-4. Also note the problem of the generation gap (which has further reaches into society): *quorum alterius senis, alterius adulescentis sectam secuti longius manus porrexerunt: neque enim ullum vitium finitur ibi ubi oritur* (9.1.2); and 9.1.6.

[126] Spencer (2010: 178). For more on V's notion of paternity and his relationship with the emperor see Wardle (1997), Skidmore (1996), Langlands (2008).

[127] Gunderson (2003: 6, 14).

attention.[128] Declamation became a safe and protected *conduit* for the expression and dissemination of contentious notions, a way to liberate the individual, to give rise to one's full expression, unencumbered by the restrictions of the political climate of the times. Although the unpleasant, ominous and sinister become habitual, it also allowed these notions to become less alarming, through the disciplining activities of declamation.[129] V's approach to *vitia* was steeped in the declamatory tradition, and I argue that V9's production of *exempla* on *vitia* illuminate the textual power to startle the reader. From the study of emotions it is consistent with the book's apotreptic approach for V to wish to appeal to the readers' fears, to this highly heightened side of the emotions.

5. *Memoria*

Memory is an important element in this opus as a whole, as highlighted in the title itself: *Facta et dicta memorabilia*.[130] Furthermore, in V9 notice the recurrence of forms of *memoria*, twelve times: *immemorem* (9.1.4), *memoria* (9.2.1, 9.2.3), *memor* (9.3.1), *immemorem* and *meminerat* (9.3.2), *memorem* (9.3.5), *mementote* (9.5.ext.2), *memoriam* (9.6.ext.2), *memoriae* (9.8.ext.1), *memoriam* (9.11.ext.1), *memoria* (9.15.2). The importance of terminology relating to *memoria* in V is also indicated by Wardle in his commentary on book one.[131] *Memoria*, as captured by history and literature, can be likened to imprints suspended in time, reflecting a period's or an author's attitudes, affecting present and future generations of readers. *Memoria*

[128] Declamation is omnipresent in V's writings. For studies on declamation in V see Skidmore (1996), Bloomer (1992 and 1997), Sinclair (1980 and 1984), Gunderson (2003) Wardle (1997).
[129] Pagán (2007: 166).
[130] This is comparable to the *rerum memoria dignarum libri* by Verrius Flaccus, a Tiberian antiquarian and scholar, who also wrote about the Roman civil wars. The title is known from Gel. 4.5.7.
[131] Wardle 1998: 218 (*memoriam*, 1.7.1), 257 (*memoria*, 1.8.6), 287 (*memoria*, 1.8.ext.18). The word or theme of *memoria* occurs eleven times in book one: *Memoratu* (1.praef), *memoria* (1.1.10), *memorabile* (1.1.11), *memoria* (1.1.16), *memorabile* (1.5.3), *memoriam* (1.6.9, 1.7.1), *memor* (1.7.ext.3), *memoria* (1.8.6, 1.8.ext.2, 1.8.ext.18). *Memoria* is, instead, not signposted as a point of interest by Themann-Steinke in her commentary to book two, although it occurs fourteen times in book two (and a total of 119 times in V overall).

can act like a revenant, coming back to haunt those for whom certain memories affected their lives, no matter how wide the temporal gap or even the identity of the character under discussion, since certain individuals can be recollected just by an implicit comparison. In particular for the political elite, commemoration was a distinguishing feature of identity.[132]

Tiberius' era is notorious for the 'silence of literature'.[133] Silence is explicitly identified in Roman thought with the act of negating memory.[134] However V9's focus on *vitia* and the negative *memoria* of historical personages represents the opposite to such silence.[135] V9 is also an opposite to *damnatio*, since, with its *apotreptic* approach, the *mala exempla* of V9 take centre stage rather than being silenced, hidden or obliterated.[136] The aim of this in V9 is that it ensures that the reader learns about himself, so that history does not repeat itself.[137] The punishment of *damnatio memoriae*, a modern term, 'reflects Romans' preoccupation with the concepts of memory and fame'.[138] Although outside the remit of this commentary, which focuses solely on the first ten chapters, it is interesting to note here however that the conspirator at 9.11.ext.4 is unnamed. The conspirator could be Sejanus.[139] I interpret this as a case of *damnatio memoriae*, since Sejanus is not mentioned by name. V may have

---

[132] Gowing (2005: 3).
[133] Butler (1909: 2), Goodyear (1984: 603-4). The idea of something being obliterated by silence is found at 8.2.2 (*obliteratum silentio*) and 8.14.6 (*silentio obliterati*).
[134] Gowing (2005:76). On the etymology see Valpy (1828: 294). On silence and oblivion in Roman thought see Gowing: (2005: 51). For the urge to remember colliding with the seemingly contradictory urge to forget in V and Velleius see Gowing (2010: 257). Also see Levene (2012). The theme of forgetting in V9 occurs five times in total, far more than any other of V's books, with the exception of book five (six times): 9.1.4 *immemorem Hannibalis*; 9.1.4 *oblitum Pyrri*; 9.2.2 *quarum oblitus plus criminis domi quam laudis in militia meruit*; 9.3.2 *prudentiae moderationisque inmemorem reddiderunt*; 9.9.2 *Titini uero non obliteranda silentio uirtus*.
[135] On the theme of forgetting, Flower (1998: 180) discusses the two approaches: 'tendency to forget' and 'urge to remember'.
[136] V in fact writes about vices needing to be 'dragged forth from a hidden place', see my comments at 9.4.praef and 9.6.praef. On *damnatio memoriae* with particular relevance to the Roman Republic (which constitutes the context for the majority of the *exempla* in V9) see Varner (2004: 16-20), Flower (2006: 67-111), Scarth (2004). For modern scholarship on *damnatio memoriae* see Varner (2004: 2 n.5). For the idea that *damnatio memoriae* reinforces the memory of the public enemy see Hedrick (2000: 114): 'why would the Romans carry out two seemingly contradictory motions, trying to erase the memory of an enemy whose memory would nonetheless be reinforced, since the continuance of memory was essential to the success of repression?' (Hedrick 2000: 114).
[137] One of the definitions of memory is 'history' (OLD. 7).
[138] Varner (2004: 2).
[139] Skidmore (1996: xv). For comments on this conspirator see my subsection 'chronology' in this introduction.

approached this *exemplum* in this way because vicissitudes surrounding Sejanus were too recent. In fact, this is one of those unusual instances where V covers *exempla* from his own times. This striking *damnatio memoriae* of an enemy of Tiberius is consistent with the author's praise for the emperor and his regime (1.praef), and is thus positioned towards the end of the book, and the *opus* as a whole, so that this point could be more eye-catching.[140]

To reinforce the role of *memoria* in book nine and to aid the memory of the reader so that the book's contents are more readily remembered for its moral purpose, I argue that V sets the sequence of chapter themes in a particular order.[141] In fact, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* explains that to arrange *loci* in a certain determined order will aid the reader in remembering them in sequence and therefore create a more versatile way of considering them.[142] V's attempt at conditioning the reader via his selection, positioning, and commenting on *exempla* is another way of controlling *memoria*, since any combination of *exempla* can add, or create new meanings and memories which might then perpetuate.

6. The study of the emotions

I interpret the range of vices spanning V9 as a 'spectacle of deviance', as emotional responses that deviate from *Romanitas*, that serve as a framework for the discourse on Roman identity and *mores*.[143] V seeks to make an impact on the readers' emotions in order to persuade and he does so mainly through causing shock and indignation in the reader. The study of emotions is

[140] V 'invokes' Tiberius and addresses him as a god at the beginning of the opus (Wardle 1998: 25).
[141] The drive to remember was also partly achieved in Roman society through texts in their capacity of creating or establishing memory. As an example of extolling the republican past as a repository for moral *exempla* see the 'parade of heroes' (Verg. *A.* 6.710-886). Also see the passage on the pictures on the shield of Aeneas (Verg. *A.* 8.626-728).
[142] Scarth (2004: 74). See Quint. 3.17.30, 3.18.30-31, 3.20.34. Quintilian states at 11.2.20 that 'symbols must be placed in order, *per ordinem*. Virgil at *A.* 8.629 uses *in ordine* to describe the shield of Aeneas' (Scarth 2004: 74 n.24).
[143] For this in Juvenal see Harrington (2009: 20).

closely linked to rhetoric, an important dimension to V9. The application of the emotions was at the heart of Aristotle's rhetoric.[144] In Aristotle the use of the emotions was applied through the 'two dimensions of an audience's emotional response', so that the orator could stir pity, anger, indignation and so on in those listening.[145] This approach to the emotions in rhetoric is also present in V9, as one moves from vice to vice in each of the chapters. Cicero and Quintilian put great importance on the role of the emotions in oratory and the process of persuasion.[146]

In V9 *mens* is interchangeable with emotion and V states this at the opening of the book, in terms of the emotions that motivate one to indulge in and respond to *luxuria* and *libido*: *gemino mentis errore connexae*.[147] Particularly in this case I interpret *mens* as an intersect between mind and body, since both vices appeal to the pleasure of the physical and mental faculties; in V9 more generally (with the exception of the first chapter) *mens* is not linked to pleasure but mental and physical discomfort. In 9.8.praef V specifically correlates vice to the impulses deriving from the mind, almost like an electric circuit running through the body, since emotions, as portrayed in V9, are impulses resulting in action. The close correlation between emotion and acting on that emotion is what V9 is about, that is, learning not to react

[144] Hall (2007: 232). *Rh*. 1377b22ff. See also Solmsen (1938: 393-4); Wisse (1989: 153).
[145] Hall (2007: 232). 'First, ethos, based on the reaction to the speaker's character, thus a speaker's projected persona could win the audience's trust or respect. Second, pathos, the arousal of strong emotion within the audience through the use of different tropes' (Hall 2007: 232).
[146] Cic. *Orat*. 2.188-214. Also see Quint. *Inst*. 6.1.30-5. On the emotions in rhetorical theory see Wisse (1989). In Plutarchan morality, Greek *paideia* provided the reasons necessary to control one's passions (Preston, 2001:117).
[147] *Error* is the theme for 9.9. Lucretius asserts that the mind (*animus* 3.136-46) is 'physically located in the chest' (Sanders 2008: 364 n.11), and discusses it 'in terms of the emotions' (Sanders 2008: 364). 'Lucretius' proofs (3.141-2,148) are all derived from emotion and not from thought' (Sanders 2008: 364 n.14). Cicero questioned where the *mens* is really situated: *alii in corde, alii in cerebro dixerunt animi esse sedem et locum* (*Tusc*. 1.19).

based on emotion but on reason.[148] The view of mind and body as one is further developed at 9.12.ext.10, where mind and body influence each other.[149]

B. Structure of V9: Comparability

Synkrisis, the comparison of *opposites* – things, people and the framework of virtue *versus* vice – does not apply to V9, because the book only concerns itself with vices, they all belong to the same side of morality.[150] V9 is ultimately a collection depicting vice at different levels, comparing like with like, and grading some worse than others. Within the realm of *vitia*, in the ninth book V makes comparisons between the vices themselves – that is, comparing like with like (rather than contrasting them with virtues, their *opposites*) – in order to organize his material. Comparability is conveyed often implicitly by its position within the architecture of the book; a reader's perception in interpreting the moral message of a particular *exemplum* is influenced by what *exempla* have preceded and followed it, both within and across chapters. Therefore V makes a conscious choice of how the *exempla* are organised in the book, manipulating a reader's perception to fit into his moral agenda. This technique is demonstrated by the *exempla* in each chapter of V9 rarely being deployed in chronological order, thus allowing for a greater fluidity in the way in which *exempla* are compared.[151]

V conveys comparability via his own interventions.[152] This authorial voice emerges often in V9, setting the gradient of severity between the *exempla*. These interventions accentuate the

[148] On this see *inter alia* my introduction to 9.9.
[149] *Possunt hi praebere … sapientissimum*.
[150] Neither is the comparison between Roman and non-Roman *exempla* one of opposites, see the section below 'us versus them'. For implicit comparisons and contrasts with V's other books see my section below 'contrasting values'.
[151] See also my section on 'chronology' above.
[152] On the authorial voice see also my introduction to 9.10.

degree of comparability, bringing the *exempla* closer together. It is a more assertive way of taking control of how his material is to be interpreted than letting the *exempla* speak for themselves.[153]

In all the following cases, V compares the chapters and *exempla* retrospectively. There is greater comparability in the first three chapters of V9. There are no *comparanda* at 9.5 and 9.10.

1. Comparanda between chapters

For the comparison between 9.2 and 9.1 see my comments under the lemma *haec societas … crudelitatis vero … referta* (9.2.praef). There is an implicit comparison made between chapters 9.4 and 9.6 by referring to them in a similar manner, that is, by portraying vices as needing to be 'dragged forth from a hidden place'.[154] This element resonates with a particular strand of declamation which, as Gunderson argues, had, as one of its purposes, the disclosure of lines of thought which would have been otherwise *hidden*, 'offering insights into the Roman un-conscious'.[155] I argue V connected to this element of declamation so as to give his moral lessons greater *gravitas*.

V puts the following on a par: 9.2 and 9.3 (in terms of their power on the emotions): *ira quoque … excitant* (9.3.praef).

[153] An example of this is 9.4.ext.1 on king Ptolemy. It is not an isolated *exemplum* about a foreign king *per se* only; when taken as part of a cluster of *exempla* it can implicitly exemplify closer dangers to Rome regardless of the ruler's ethnicity or the type of *vitia*. This is further accentuated by the fact that Ptolemy is a more recent *exemplum* to V's times.
[154] *protrahatur … latentium* (9.4 praef); *occultum … latebris suis extrahatur* (9.6.praef).
[155] Gunderson (2003: 115).

At the heart of V9 we find a triad of comparisons: between 9.8 and 9.7 based on violence (stated at 9.8.praef); and between 9.9 and 9.8 on rashness (stated at 9.9.praef).

2. *Comparanda* between *exempla* in each chapter

9.1. In the domestic section, comparison occurs at: nos. 1-2 (the opening to the second *exemplum* puts the actor's son on a par to Orata's extravagancies); nos.5-6: *consimilis mutatio* (9.1.6); and nos. 7-8 *aeque flagitiosum* (9.1.8). The last domestic (9.1.9) and external (9.1.ext.7) *exempla* are unconnected to the rest of the chapter and to each other, but they both use superlatives and therefore, in terms of *gradatio*, constitute the worst in human behaviour within their respective domestic and external sections: *praecipue scelesta* (9.1.9), *effeminatior* (9.1.ext.7). Likewise, *praecipua crudelitatis indicia* (9.2.ext.5) and *praecipuam iniuriam* (9.9.3) are also the last and worst *exempla* of their respective chapters.

The three cases of comparability in the domestic sections are matched in number by the external section: *continentioris*: links ext.3 and ext.4; *consentaneus*: links ext.5 and ext.6; *effeminatior*: grades ext.7 worse than ext.6. The external section of 9.1 is more severe and violent than the domestic section, a feature it shares with 9.2.

9.2. 9.2.2 is worse than 9.2.1: *cuius tamen … levat* (9.2.2); 9.2.3 is worse than 9.2.2: *nihil laudis … licentiore accusatione* (9.2.3); 9.2.3 and 9.2.4 are on par signalled by *etiam*. V puts the domestic and external sections on par in terms of *dolor*, *ut par dolor* (9.2.ext.1). *Tam hercule* puts ext.2 and ext.3 on par. Ext.4 is termed as being 'less surprising' than its antecedent: *minus admirabilem crudelitatem*. Ext.7 is *apertior* and *taetrior* than ext.6. Ext8 is compared with ext.7, almost on par: *consimili genere aemulationis*.

9.3. V provides a summary at 9.3.5 of the preceding three *exempla* and thus compares the three by putting them on the same level in terms of how anger is often victorious over victory: *congratulationem … reddidit*.[156] V compares between *exempla* nos. 1 and 2: *ardentis spiritus … reddiderunt* (9.3.2); nos. 2 and 3: *itaque ne … protectum sit* (9.3.3); and nos. ext.3-4: *in puerili … valuit* (ext.4).

9.4. 9.4.2 is presented as worse than 9.4.1: *verum …exhibuit* (9.4.2). *Ante omnes* at 9.4.3 is the worst of the domestic section and the chapter.[157] 9.4.3 is deemed worse than ext.1, the former deserving hatred, while the latter being laughable: *odium … risu prosequenda* (9.4.ext.1).

9.7. V distinguishes between violence which is *vesana* (9.7.2) and *cruenta* (9.7.3), *vesana haec … seditio* (9.7.3). V connects the section of people and military thus: *aeque magna orietur indignatio* (9.7. mil.Rom.1). V sets the moral gradient as more severe for mil. Rom.2 than mil.Rom.1, *pro consule … consulem* (9.7.mil.Rom.2). 9.7.mil.Rom.3 is set on the same level as mil.Rom.2 in terms of the wickedness of its violence, *ille quoque exercitus nefarie violentus* (9.7. mil.Rom.2).

9.10. The only comparison in this chapter is the link V makes between the two episodes of 9.10.ext.1 *within* the same *exemplum*, because of what they have in common. The exemplars are both queens and both seek to avenge their sons' murders: *clarae ultionis utraque regina*.

[156] It is rare for V to provide a short summary of preceding *exempla*.
[157] Superlatives are used instead at 9.1.9, 9.1.ext.7 and 9.9.3 for *the worst exempla* (see *ad loc*.) in their respective sections or chapters.

3. Connectives

V also brings the *exempla* of V9 together through what I term 'connectives'.

9.2. At 9.2.ext.5, *iterum* (again) connects the two *exempla* in V9 of Ptolemy Physcon: 9.1.ext.5 and 9.2.ext.5.[158]

9.3. *Eademque* (9.3.5) connects the same emotions of *ira* between 9.3.4 and 9.3.5. The connective *e quibus* (9.3.ext.3) links 9.3.ext.3 with 9.3.ext.2, referring to the sons of Hamilcar, Hannibal.

9.5. There is a connective, indicating the same subject, the people, between 9.5.1 and 9.5.2 *quae… quoque* (9.5.2). This serves the same purpose as *idemque* (9.7.2), see below.

9.6. There are two sets of *exempla* in the domestic section of this chapter that are connected to each other within the set, each indicated with *etiam*: the first set (9.6.1 and 9.6.2) because of the extremity of their treachery (*Ser. quoque Galba summae perfidiae* 9.6.2); the second set, because of the double charge of their respective *perfidia*: *etiam caedes duplicem perfidiae* (9.6.4).

9.7. *Idemque* (9.7.2) links the subject of 9.7.1 and 9.7.2, the people.

[158] Note that they are each the fifth external *exemplum* in their respective chapters.

4. Us and Them

I have chosen the conjunction 'and' rather than using 'versus' between us (domestic *exempla*) and them (external *exempla*) because in V9 the two parties are not contrasted as clear-cut opposites but are instead compared. As I stated above, in V9 like is compared with like, in terms of *vitia* but also in terms of ethnicity. V9 represents the ubiquity of vice that transcends ethnicity, therefore this framework brings domestic and external *exempla* closer.

My conclusion that V's work does not have a divisive 'us versus them' framework of opposites, despite the fact that the work is divided into domestic and external sections is substantially aligned with, and builds from, Lawrence (2006). Indeed, Lawrence argues that V depicts a universality of human qualities and behaviours that transcend ethnicity, with V's main focus being on conduct. Therefore, in terms of the inclusion of external *exempla*, V again adopts an apotreptic approach, comparable to book nine's focus on the ubiquity of *vitia*, in dividing his work 'in two parts in order to demonstrate that it is essentially one; who creates externality in order to stress universality and who demonstrates that both Romans and externals are primarily citizens of the world'.[159]

In V9, comparability itself works on three levels: between the domestic *exempla*, between the external *exempla*, and as a function of the us and them category of comparison, that is, between the domestic and external sections.[160] I interpret the us and them category as aiding V to define true *Romanitas* – according to the *mos maiorum* – from non-Roman attributes.[161]

[159] Lawrence (2006: 4).
[160] See my comments above at the beginning of the section on comparability about the distinction I give between *synkrisis* and comparability in V9.
[161] For the definition of *mos maiorum* see Hölkeskamp (2010: 17-18). As it will become clear in the commentary itself, and as argued *passim* in Lawrence (2006), there are gradations and nuances within the

It is noteworthy that V gives more space to domestic over external *exempla*.[162] The imbalance between domestic and external *exempla* occurs in other Roman authors too.[163] Among the external category ambiguity arises when V chooses *exempla* relating to the Italian peoples, which represent a midway point between external and domestic because of their geography (their position in Italy) and by the close historical connections with Rome itself via conquests and mutual linguistic influences. I explore this ambiguity particularly at 9.9 and 9.10. Because of this ambiguity in the external category I have preferred the appellation 'external' instead of foreign or barbarian, in that the umbrella term 'external' is a more accurate and inclusive representation of the broader material overall. What V does share with other authors in his inclusion of externals is the Roman onlooker's frame of mind, surfacing twice in V9, at 9.2.ext.1 and 9.11.ext.1, in terms of feeling lighter and experiencing less shame when including externals, compared to relating the vices of domestic *exempla*.[164]

The most recurrent external people in V9 are: the Carthaginians (9.1.ext.1, 9.2.ext.2, 9.3.ext.3, 9.5.ext.3, 9.6.ext.2, 9.8.ext.1), Etruscans (9.1.ext.2, 9.2.ext.10, 9.9.3, 9.10.1), Campanians (9.1.ext.1; 9.5.ext.4. At 9.1.ext.1 it is not the Campanians but the Romans living in Campania. Nevertheless, note how the theme of Campania occurs as the first *exemplum* of both the domestic and external sections of 9.1), Lusitanians (9.2.4, 9.6.2, 9.6.4), Persians (9.2.ext.6-7), Cypriots (9.1.ext.7, 9.4.ext.1) and the Athenians (9.2.ext.8, 9.8.ext.2).[165] The presence of the Campanians and Etruscans in the external *exempla* is interesting in terms of

---

external *exempla*, thus the more accustomed binary framework at work in V9 sometimes becomes more ambiguous and complex to interpret.

[162] In all V there are, according to Skidmore, 694 Roman *exempla* and 336 external *exempla* (1996: 121 n.3). For V's attitude to external *exempla* see 3.8.ext.1, 4.7.ext.1, 6.3.ext.1 Also see Alewell (1913: 39-40).

[163] Alewell (1913: 96-7) gives reference to Plin. *Ep*. 7.121, 7.116; Sen. *Marc*. 13.1; Cic. *Tusc*. 1.100, 1.113, *Sest*. 141, *Fin*. 2.19.62, 5.64, *Off*. 1.18.61, 3.26.99. For this in Quintilian see Skidmore (1996: 22-25).

[164] *tranquilliore adfectu narrabitur* (9.11.ext.1); *transgrediemur nunc ad illa quibus, ut par dolor, ita nullus nostrae civitatis rubor inest* (9.2.ext.1). Also see 6.9.ext.1 The same view is found in Cicero's foreign examples: *Off*. 2.26, 3.99, *Tusc*. 5.105, *Rep*. 1.4. For the Ciceronian perspective see Alewell (1913: 98-9), Schoenberger (1911: 34).

[165] For a geographical breakdown of the external material in V9 see Lawrence 2006 (260-261).

how the Romans thought about what constituted a foreign people; it was not fixed to a geographical point (since both people are from the Italian peninsula) but it constituted rather a state of mind: 'everything that is not "us" is automatically a function of this mythic, fascinating and threatening, dangerous sphere'.[166] From this perspective the external *exempla* of V9 are not confined only to the topos that 'threats to Rome come from the East'.[167] In fact, since the presence of Campania, Campanians and Etruscans spans both domestic and external sections, a certain ambiguity is apparent in categorising us and them in terms of geography and ethnicity, underscoring a contradiction V identified with on this issue and reflecting the complexly shifting identities over time.

I do not think V's primary concern was to link a theme or vice to any external people in particular, his choice was much more based on what was most memorable, which sometimes could have also coincided with certain topoi, observable in the following three external people: Etruscans with luxury, Campanians with luxury and arrogance, Carthaginians with perfidy.[168]

5. Externals in V and Plutarch

In order to situate V's use of comparability against ancient practice I propose a brief overview of points of comparison with Plutarch's *Lives*. The *Lives* have received considerable scholarly attention from this perspective and are far better known on account of it than V.[169] In fact, I argue that V might be read as a forerunner to Plutarch in comparing

[166] Spencer (2002: 240, n.41), who goes on to refer to this as the 'realms of the mind'.
[167] Spencer 2002: 158).
[168] For a discussion of these points in the commentary see my references above.
[169] For modern scholarship on Plutarch's comparability and *synkrisis* see especially Duff (1999: 243-286), Larmour (2014).

Greek with Roman personages as part of a work's main framework.[170] In addition, Plutarch represents a useful point of comparison because he presents the comparison between domestic and barbarian (or external) peoples, and between virtue and vice, in a similarly explicit structural and organizational manner as V.[171] However, in contrast to Plutarch's *Lives*, where comparability is typically self-contained, mainly between two characters, V's *modus operandi* instead is wider, working at the aforementioned three levels.[172] I argue that V9's structure allows for a greater flexibility and complexity in giving the *exempla* a richer meaning rather than considering them in isolation. It could also be said that V isolates scenes from a person's overall life, thus making more focused snapshots when making moral points compared to Plutarch, who ultimately wrote biographies and, as such, as a function of the different genre and agenda compared to V, covered a wider timespan in terms of a character's life span.[173] The main difference from V is that Plutarch's use of comparison was primarily a tool for discussion and understanding rather than a means of grading.[174] Grading is more noticeable in V. This works between chapters and, within them, between individuals.

6. Contrasting Values

It is noteworthy that the majority of V9's chapter-themes concern values which are opposites to certain virtues discussed in earlier books, exploring the dualism of virtue versus vice. Both virtue and vice are inherent in life and therefore inescapable. In fact, one could argue, that for

[170] Plutarch refers to the 'Lives' as *paradeigmata* (patterns, models, *exempla*) at the preface to *Demetr*. 1. There is a similarity in the *modus operandi* between V and Plutarch, in terms of morality conveyed through *exempla*, especially in the treatment of vice versus virtue, as shown also in Plutarch's *Moralia*. V and Plutarch provide moral lessons through the characters they chose to depict, so that the reader would imitate virtue. Both authors shared the conviction (also a rhetorical commonplace) that a decline in morals caused the decline of the Roman Republic (*Phoc*. 3.3; *Sull*. 1.5). See Levick (1982).
[171] Duff (1999: 59-60, 271) explores the virtue versus vice angle in Plutarch.
[172] For the already mentioned three level structure see the beginning of the 'us and them' section above: between the domestic *exempla*, between the external *exempla*, and between domestic and external
[173] See Van der Stockt (2014) for Plutarch's *Lives* as biographies and on their organization and purpose.
[174] Duff (1994: 246).

there to be virtues, vices also need to exist. If vice did not exist then how could one define virtue (and vice versa)? Although the two are pole opposites, their duality helps to define each of them.

Although there is no proof as to how the ancient reader read V, the purpose of V9's sole and concentrated focus on vice could have been to allow the reader to recall all the opposites to V9's themes in the previous books (where positive qualities are extolled) and then compare them with the themes of V9. By employing this apotreptic approach in V9, the author is thus able to sum up and remind his readers, almost like an epilogue, of the several other themes from his previous books via comparability between opposites.[175] The contrasting values of Roman morality that emerge between V9 and the preceding books are the following:

de luxuria (9.1) versus *de moderatione (*4.1); *de paupertate (*4.4); *de abstinentia et continentia* (4.3); *necessitas* (7.6).

de libidine (9.1) versus *pudicitia* (6.1).

de crudelitate (9.2); *de ultione* (9.10) versus *de humanitate et clementia* (5.1).

de ira aut odio (9.3) versus *de amicitia* (4.7) and *de moderatione* (4.1).

de avaritia (9.4) versus *amicitia* (4.7); *liberalitas* (4.8).

de perfidia (9.6) versus (*fides*) (6.6.-8); *strategemata* (7.4).

[175] This works also from the opposite perspective whereby earlier books can also precondition the reader's attitude forward to book nine (it is not always retrospective to the preceding books), for example, the preface to 4.3 *de abstinentia et continentia* mentions lust and greed (general themes in V9) and raises the theme of states that fall because of vice, which also reoccurs at 9.1.ext.2, 3 and 6 (Skidmore 1996: 126 n. 20).

mil. Rom. 9.7.1-3 versus *de disciplina militari* (2.7).

de temeritate (9.8) versus (*audacia, prudentia*) *de moderatione* (4.1).

de iis qui infimo loco nati mendacio se clarissimis familiis inserere conati sunt (9.15) versus 3.4 *de humili loco natis qui clari evaserunt*.

It could be argued that this intensity of *vitia* in a single book could be counterproductive, as it could desensitise the reader when confronted by so much vice, violence and horror in a single place. However, I propose that, first, the isolation of vice in V9 serves to delineate clearly for the reader the positive and negative *exempla*. Second, the overall effect of comparing like-with-like within the book and comparing opposite values between V9 and the rest of the books would ultimately prompt a spontaneous process of recall in the reader where their memories are cast to the rest of the books, thus capitalising on comparability as a means of bringing out the full moral messages from the *exempla*.[176] In my opinion, then, V's original scheme was most meaningfully understood as nine books to be read sequentially, so that links could fully emerge in the reader's mind between: first, the implicit comparisons of opposites between V9 and the other books and, second, comparing *exempla* which were of a similar nature especially within V9 but also occasionally across other books too. If one were to read V9 on its own it would lose its fullest possible impact. Ultimately, V left the most shocking and uncomfortable material he could collect as last in his *opus* to ensure that *exempla* on *vitia* would become the freshest and clearest in the reader's memory. This move is a rhetorically

[176] For the importance of *memoria* in V9 see above.

apt one so that the ninth book, through its apotreptic approach, reinforced in the reader a stronger aversion against vice and a greater desire to follow positive *exempla* in life instead.

C. **Differentiations**

V9's Last Five Chapters

This thesis does not include the last five chapters of V9 because of the thematic divergence between 9.1-10 and 9.11-15.[177] Thurn, however, argues for this divergence to be put at the end of 9.11, instead of 9.10, because 9.11 also contains *vitia*.[178] Although this is true, one should also be mindful that the *vitia* at 9.11 are varied, and therefore anomalous compared to the previous ten chapters. In fact, unlike 9.1-10, 9.11 does not focus, as a self-contained unit, on a vice or pair of vices as the rest of V9. By varying the *vitia* that emerge at 9.11, V chooses a different methodology in his organisation of the chapter, compared to the individual ones of 9.1-10. One cannot conclusively state that this divergence was a deliberate move by V because the opus may not be complete.[179] Because of this anomaly the focus of the thesis lies with 9.1-10 as it forms a more coherent and consistent whole. If the divergence were deliberate, however, then the last five chapters could be interpreted as a form of rhetorical *variatio*, a final flourish to end his opus as a whole. Another reason for not covering 9.11 in this commentary is that 9.11 is one of V9's longest chapters and, as such, will not fit within the word count limitations of a PhD.

[177] Carter (1975: 29), Lawrence (2015: 136-7).
[178] Thurn (2011: 93). For a brief outline of V9 see Thurn (2001: 92-94). However, I do agree with Thurn's statement that chapters 9.12-15 are devoted to other matters from the rest of the book ('Die letzten Kapitel 9.12-15 anderen gewidmet', Thurn 2011: 93).
[179] Carter (1975: 29). Also according to Wardle (1998: 5) V9 lacks a conclusion.

It is interesting to outline here some peculiarities within 9.11-15:

- 9.11 is a continuation of 9.5 in terms of outrageousness in human behaviour. The parricide at 9.11.ext.4 in the context of V9's moral discourse of *vitia*, distinguishes V's contribution within a wider prevalence of this anxiety in the early Principate.

- V9.1-10 concerns itself with vice from a perspective of internal human qualities but uniquely the characters of 9.15 use their *physical* likeness to deliberately deceive in order to acquire wealth; thus continuing the theme of deceit of 9.6.[180]

- In order to emphasize the perniciousness of the deeds in 9.15, which are ultimately based on greed, V chooses a different use of resemblance at 9.14, where the focus is physical similarity (like 9.15) but which generates *accidental* effects, out of their control, for those involved (they are not fraudulent).[181]

- A contrast of opposites reoccurs at 9.12-13: 9.13 concerns cowardly deaths, 9.12 brave deaths (12.4-7).[182] In light of my comments above on Stoicism in V9, it is interesting to note here how chapters 12 and 13 in V9 focus on how people face death, as such *exempla* on good and bad deaths fit within one of the areas that was most important to the Stoics.[183]

- There is a common motif between 9.12-13 and 9.14-15 on the accidental versus the deliberate: 9.12-13 cover deliberate suicides and accidental deaths; in 9.14-15 similar

[180] V describes treachery's strength as *mentiri et fallere* (9.6.praef).
[181] For a discussion of 9.13 see Lawrence (2006: 33-35).
[182] 9.12.1-3 and 8 are unusual deaths (*non vulgaribus*), thus V ventures into the genre of *mirabilia* in Roman literature.
[183] Turpin (2008: 365, 368-9). For an analysis of Stoic death in V see Lawrence (2015).

physical features in people can have consequences out of their control (accidental, 9.14) or can be used deceptively for gain (deliberate, 9.15).[184]

The miscellany and the encyclopaedic formats

When it comes to the nature of the text it is important to note here that V's work is not to be confused with the miscellany or the encyclopaedic format.

The miscellany is a term not actually attested in antiquity and it is in the very nature of *exempla* to be varied, miscellaneous.[185] Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* constitutes a prime example of the miscellany, a work pervaded by disorder, with no connections, written in different formats and styles.[186] V's work is none of these things, but it is organised (thematically), is inter-connected between books via comparability (the true force to V's moral lessons comes from seeing an *exemplum* in context, in its relationship to previous and subsequent *exempla* within and across chapters and books, seeing how they influence each other, see the section below on comparability), it consistently uses the same format (it does not vary with first person narratives, short notes, treatises, dialogues) and employs a uniform style of writing.[187]

Like the miscellany, the encyclopaedia was also not recognized in antiquity as a generic term.[188] Pliny's *Naturalis Historia*, which is generally considered encyclopaedic, treats some

[184] Another chapter in V that covers the accidental is 9.9, *de errore*.
[185] Rust (2009: 29). The miscellany *is* a genre, as the following states: 'The *Noctes Atticae* have often been identified by the anachronistic term miscellany. It conveniently indicates the variety of material the *Noctes Atticae* contain, but its regular use implies that the work is an example of a clearly understood genre' (Rust 2009: 28-9).
[186] Rust (2009: 31).
[187] For the opposite of these elements in Gellius as representing what is typical of the miscellany see Rust (2009: 28-32).
[188] Lao (2008: iii).

of the same themes as V9 and both works are 'collections of knowledge' of sorts.[189] However, to be considered an encyclopaedia 'a work must characterize itself as covering a system of knowledge in its entirety'.[190] V does not attempt to cover any 'system of knowledge in its entirety', as he himself makes clear in the opening of his first book: *nec mihi cuncta complectendi cupido incessit: quis enim omnis aevi gesta modico voluminum numero comprehendit* […]? Furthermore in most cases the assumption is that encyclopaedias are reference works primarily used for consultation, and, as I argue, there is no conclusive evidence of V's work being read in titbits (or as a whole).[191]

D. Conclusion

V is not simply as a compiler of *exempla* but an important author and literary exponent of the early Principate whose moral code and choice of *topoi* reflect the times he lived in.

V situates his ninth and final book in clear contrast to the rest of his output by focusing entirely on *vitia*, which represented *topoi* that have previously been treated *passim* by various authors.[192] What V does which is distinctive and original in the ninth book is to conveniently bring together many of these vices into one place, thus the book ultimately becomes a procession, a spectacle of *vitia*. This process *almost* canonises the *vitia*, in a similar way to the more established canon of virtues.[193] This makes a break from the dispersive manner in

[189] For more on Pliny and the encyclopaedic tradition see Conte (1994), Doody (2003), Murphy (2004) and Lao (2008).
[190] For this definition see Murphy (2004: 11).
[191] Lao (2008: 3).
[192] I mention these in each chapter of the commentary.
[193] Fears (1981).

which *vitia* had hitherto been treated by different authors, nor has V9's structure been replicated in the same manner by any other Roman author since V.

Worthy of note is also how V treats his subject exclusively in a single book, creating *intensity* as a technique *per se* to shock the reader into making them fully aware – beyond all reasonable doubt – how pernicious and dangerous *vitia* are. Again, this intensity is a distinctive original feature of V9 and it is further illustrated by the fact that the reader encounters the vice first – as it is introduced in each chapter's preface like a character *per se* – before presenting the persons inhabiting the *exempla*. I do not think however that V9's prefaces are personifications *per se* nor do they constitute cases of prosopopoeia; since they do not contain characters, vices, or other abstract terms that start with a capital letter; or which are in the vocative case.[194] I argue, however, that each of V9's prefaces embodies a particular chapter's vice as an abstract idea (without the means of an *exemplum* or character) and as such, due to its position in the chapter, preconditions the reader, accentuating the element of blame which can be attached to the exemplars of V's vices.[195] In other authors instead the two elements are reversed, the tag or name of a vice emerges within the context of a narrative after a character is introduced and during or after the *dénouement* of an *exemplum* has been outlined. This way of presenting vice in V9, which pervades different characters and ethnicities in each chapter, helps the reader understand that vice is something which anyone at any time can develop; this ubiquity of vice transcends ethnicity.

[194] By personification I mean the 'anthropomorphic representation of any man or human being' (Stafford 2000: 4).
[195] For personification in antiquity see Strafford (2000) and Murray (2005). Also see Fears (1981).

V brings domestic and external *exempla* closer; vice is inherent in life itself; the characters inhabiting both the domestic and external sections are not opposites but are presented as culpable of the same vices (however, sometimes certain *exempla* are graded worse than others). Although the domestic and external sections are separate, a clear-cut us versus them framework is not observable in V9. The authorial voice does not indicate a clear moral, ethical divide between the two and this constitutes another distinctive feature of V.

Chapter 1: *de luxuria et libidine*.[1]

Introduction.[2]

Luxuria is a historiographical *topos*, a criterion against which to interpret the development of Roman society, and especially it is used as the important factor in rhetorical models characterizing Rome's imperial expansion as a trigger for growing decadence.[3] *Luxuria* is attacked in Roman historiography, including V, not so much *per se* but as an outward manifestation of internal deviance, of *vitium*.[4] By foregrounding it V became part of the development of a tradition of its significance, responding to his experience of the ubiquity of *luxuria* in multiple dimensions of Roman culture, from the socio-political to the rhetorical and historiographical.

---

[1] N.B. The lists of rhetorical devices in each chapter of this PhD are from Sinclair (1980). I use these lists as general overviews to show the rhetorical dimension to the text, but without going into depths.
Rhetorical devices for 9.1: *Adnominatio*: 9.1.1 *quae inpensa … penetravit*; 9.1.ext.5 *sororem natu … nubere coegit*; 9.1.8 *probrosae ... futura*. *Antithesis*: 9.1.5 *non in Graecia ... provincia*. *Exclamatio*: 9.1.4; 9.1.7; 9.1.8; 9.1.ext.3. *Interrogatio*: 9.1.3; 9.1.5; 9.1.ext.5. *Sententia*: 9.1.2 *neque … oritur*; 9.1.5 *nam cuius ... orsa est*.

[2] The juxtaposition of *luxuria* and *libido* can also be observed in the following: Sal. *Cat*. 13.3-4; Cic. *Ver*. 2.1.3; Sen. *Ep*. 99.13 Overall there are four chapters in V9 which contain two nouns in the title: 1, 3, 5, 7 and 11, occurring where there is a particular closeness between two vices.

[3] For a discussion of 9.1 see Lawrence (2006: 43-7). For *luxuria* at Rome generally see Wallace-Hadrill (1988, 1990); Slob (1986); Astin (1988: 14, 23-26); Baltrusch (1989); Miles (1987), especially appendix 4: Manifestations of luxury at Rome; Edwards (1993); La Rocca (1986); Schneider (1974); Griffin (1976); Dalby (2000) and Weeber (2003), Zanda (2011). Sallust made *luxuria* one of the cornerstones of his vision of the downfall of Rome in *Cat*. and *Hist*. For vocabulary and thematic similarities between Sallust and V (in particular for 9.1 overall, 9.2.1 and 9.13.2) see Guerrini (1981, chapter 2). For a case study on *libido* in Livy see Halle (1957: 114-159).

[4] A crucial distinction to make is that acquiring luxury items *per se* is not the problem but the extent that it becomes quantifiable as *luxuria*, as a vice. Luxury items, if categorised as demonstrating one's power and education in appropriate ways, were acceptable but not eating lavishly for the sake of it, or wanting more art and properties than one can legitimately enjoy. 'Tacitus believed that the period from the battle of Actium to Vespasian's day had witnessed the zenith of luxury expenditure' (Miles 1987: 360 n. 57).

During the Roman Republic the question of luxury became inseparably linked to the growing impact of Hellenistic culture on Rome, and stereotypes associated with the Hellenistic courts.[5] The culture of luxury was assimilated by Roman aristocrats who were seeking to acquire and master the sophistication that Greek heritage had to offer and who attempted to introduce it into almost every area of their lives.[6] In this era these imports often took the form of *objets d'art* brought home from military campaigns abroad.[7] Livy argues that Cn. Manlius Vulso was to blame for the arrival of *luxuria* in Rome, in Sallust it is Sulla.[8] Even though historiography has associated luxury goods primarily with the East, imported to Rome from the outside, V focuses the domestic *exempla* on luxury goods and resources whose provenances are indigenous (with the exception of 9.1.4) as a tactic to demonstrate the futility of blaming outside influences only. For V, I argue, vice is inherent in life, independent of whether the goods themselves are foreign or not. Thus V compels the reader to look inwardly at human nature itself, at its frailty and vulnerability, as shown by the very first word of book nine: *blandum*. *Blandum* clearly indicates that *luxuria can* become a vice, hence its meaning of 'tricking, deceiving, flattering'.[9] On the one hand, luxury was something one might have aspired to, when associated with success and status, but, on the other, through excessiveness, V points out how intoxicating and deceptive it can also

[5] Of course not the whole of the Hellenistic world displayed the same levels of wealth and extravagance, some courts were more prone to it than others. On Hellenization at Rome see Edwards (1993: 22-24).
[6] Momigliano (1975), Gruen (1993).
[7] Cn. Manlius Vulso (L. Calpurnius Piso *fr*. 34), L. Piso (Plin. *Nat*. 37.12, 33.148); L. Mummius (Plin. *Nat*. 37.12), Attalus (Var. *fr*. 112-3, Plin. *Nat*.8.196, 33.148, 33.63), Sulla (Sal. *Cat*. 11.6) and Pompey (Plin. *Nat*. 37.13, 37.18). Also see Polybius' stern comments (9.10.1) on Rome's appropriation of plunder from her conquests.
[8] Liv. 39.6.5, Sal. *Cat.* 11.5; 12.2. Also see Plin. *Nat*. 33.148-150, 34.34. According to Velleius Paterculus it arose out of Scipio Aemilianus' destruction of Carthage (2.1.1). In the historical digression at the beginning of *Cat*., the dictatorship of Sulla marks the advent of *luxuria*. In the *Historiae* a few fragments remain referring to the proscriptions which resulted from maybe *avaritia* and *luxuria* (Sal. *Hist.* 1, fr. 49-51M). As an *exemplum* of post-Sullan luxury see the longer fragment describing in detail a banquet given for Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius in Spain in 74 BC (*Hist*. 2, fr 70M), recalling luxurious practices which became prevalent after Sulla. These scenes are also captured in V9 at 9.1.5. For V's dependence on Sallust for 9.1.5 see Guerrini (1979: 158-9). Evidence in Polybius, Livy and the annalists show that this was not the first time that an army of the Roman people conducted itself thus. *Primum* in Sallust may be just a rhetorical colour, commonplace or a reflection of Sallust's rejection of the tradition of growth of *luxuria* being ascribed in the earlier 2nd century. Sallust believed that *luxuria* was a comparatively late development in the process of decline (Shaw 1975).
[9] OLD.3. With this meaning see Cic. *Att*. 12.50, *Amic*. 95; Sen. *Ep*.45.7, Stat. *Theb*. 12.246.

become.[10] In this respect, an apt variant translation is: *insidious*.[11] It is exactly that, like a virus, *luxuria* can invade the mind, making its way to the very fabric of one's morals; therefore the word *blandum* as the first word of 9.1 encapsulates this concept, and provides the reader with a key or lens on how to read the chapter, in order to remain alert to *luxuria* and *libido*. One might argue that the wealthier, the more sophisticated and advanced humans become, the easier and quicker it becomes for them to get access to their goals, thus leaving more room for temptation to creep in. Thus more opportunities unfold to live based on *luxuria*, as one gives less thought to what one really needs. Therefore V's message is that the extent to which his readers decide to use luxury goods defines them, boiling down to choice and discipline.

If *luxuria* is pursued to extreme levels it can become a *vitium*. This is relevant to the discourse of situation ethics: to judge an act not by absolute moral standards but by taking into account the particular context.[12] This fluid way of evaluating *exempla* via the tool of situations ethics helps the reader to learn about acquiring moral skills in a balanced way, by not totally excluding things outright from one's life, such as *luxuria*, thus making it more achievable and realistic to live less defined by vice for longer.

Luxury caused protest amongst the populace. V's work takes as one focus the role of *luxuria* in generating civic discord. Generally, this manifested in society by creating distance between men, widening social divisions and causing a breakdown in dialogue and communication between Romans. In turn this created misunderstandings, tensions and conflicts within the populace. The Stoics defined *vitia* as a failing to live according to nature, as unnatural,

[10] This is comparable to my comments on *temeritas*, see introduction to 9.8, about boundaries, limits (*terma*).
[11] OLD.2b. With this meaning see Lucr. 1.19; Ov. *Pont.* 1.5.46; Sen. *Ep*. 118.8; Luc. 5.732; Mart. 5.84.3; Stat. *Theb*. 11.655; Sil. 3.580.
[12] For situation ethics in V see Langlands (2011). On the other side of the argument, note how an excess of *severitas* (Langlands 2008: 166) and *clementia* (Dowling 2006: 279) can also become negative.

compared to what the rest of the Roman people could access, thus creating the distance from the ordinary and the everyday.[13] Pliny the Elder writes in a similarly didactic mode to V, for what must have been an overlapping audience, offering an interesting comparative context when he deals with unnaturalness.[14] The focus of V9 on *vitia* is comparable to Pliny's seventh book, which contains *passim* passages also addressing certain *vitia*.[15] Pliny addresses unnaturalness by drawing on the relationship between *natura* and *luxuria*.[16] *Luxuria* in fact is one of the most prominent themes of the *Naturalis Historia* in modern scholarship.[17] Wallace-Hadrill argues that Pliny's opus is 'underpinned by the simple idea that nature supplies everything man needs, […] but man, blinded by *luxuria*, abuses nature and turns it into the tool of his own destruction; the function of science is to reveal the proper use of nature and so save mankind'.[18] The difference between V and Pliny on *luxuria* is one of approach: V takes a moral, philosophical perspective, with implicit Stoic influences; Pliny's focus is primarily empirical, where 'knowledge about nature, or science […] functions as Pliny's antidote to luxury'.[19]

A 'link between pleasure, extravagance, debt and ruin' (all major themes in V9) is common across many literary genres.[20] Livy (1 pr. 2) draws a link between *avaritia*, *luxuria* and *libido*

[13] On this Stoic view see the main introduction. For more on the theme of distance in V9 see my introduction to 9.5.
[14] For Stoicism in Pliny see Paparazzo (2011: 104-108, 91, 95).
[15] Such as '*luxuria*, ambition, avarice, lust and rage' (Wallace-Hadrill 1990b: 89).
[16] For the role of *luxuria* in Pliny see Wallace-Hadrill (1990).
[17] Wallace-Hadrill (1990b), Lao (2011: 35). For Pliny on *luxuria* also see Lao (2008: 113-147). Pliny takes on *avaritia* and fraud (Lao 2011: 55) as *vitia* engendered by *luxuria* as V does in V9, see below. As made clear in Pliny, *avaritia* (the theme of V9's fourth chapter) is the insatiable search for raw materials (that would go on to become luxurious items) and *luxuria* is the 'uncontrolled use of them' (Isager 1991: 52), so the two are closely connected. For this narrative in Pliny see the chapters on art history, especially 2.154-9. On the use and abuse of mother earth through the vices of *avaritia* and *luxuria* see Isager (1991: 52-55). On the relationship between *natura* and *luxuria* also see Carey (2003: 102-5).
[18] Wallace-Hadrill (1990b: 86). Also see Lao (2011: 36). For discussions of Pliny's science see the bibliography provided by Paparazzo (2011: 89, nos. 2 and 3), for philosophical discussions in Pliny see the bibliography provided by Paparazzo (2011: 90, n.4). For the mutual relationship of philosophy and science in Pliny see Paparazzo (2011: 90-110).
[19] Lao (2008: 114).
[20] Edwards (1993: 178).

(in V9 chapters 9.4 and 9.1) in relation to the negative effects of wealth.[21] Livy contrasts this to Rome when men had fewer possessions with more modest desires. In Cicero and especially in Sallust's analysis of the breakdown of the Republic we find a similar correlation between luxury, licence, pleasure, extravagance, debt and ruin.[22] In Cicero the real damage from pleasure is financial, as in Tacitus, who tells of those who by their extravagant lifestyles fell into abject poverty and were excluded from the senate.[23] Sallust refers to 'debt as an extension of *luxuria*', and represents *luxuria* as a 'much more dangerous and corrupting vice than either *avaritia* or *ambitio*'.[24] As often featured in the comedies of Plautus and Terence, 'extravagant tastes quickly erode family fortunes' thus creating debt.[25] Ultimately, 'the impossibility of paying debt back leads to the commission of desperate criminal acts'.[26] Cicero also made this connection in his treatment of the Catilinarian conspiracy.[27] For Sallust *luxuria* and *avaritia* are the evils which predominate in the post-Sullan period and which form the main causes of the conspiracy.[28] In Sallust, Catiline and his conspirators become *exempla* to highlight the repercussions of *luxuria* on Rome's young people.[29] In fact the *iuventus* were so corrupted by *luxus* and *avaritia* that it was said that they had been born without the ability either to keep their own patrimony or to allow others to do so.[30] This malaise is also highlighted in V with regard to Roman youth at 9.1.6 and 9.1.7. From this

[21] *Avaritia* and *luxuria* in Livy are joined, but in Sallust the genesis of each is clearly distinguished as they are also in V, since *avaritia* is a chapter in itself (no.4), separated by the two chapters on cruelty and anger (nos. 2 and 3).
[22] Cic. *Cael*. 44; Sal. *Cat*. 5.4, 14.2.
[23] Cic. *Cael*. 17; Tac. *Ann*. 2.48. For other examples of the poverty of the prodigal: Hor. *Sat*. 1.2.4-11; 2.2.94-9; Juv 1.33; 1.59-62; 1.88-109; 11.1-55; Sen. *Ep*. 87.10; *Ben* 1.10.2; Tac. *Ann* 3.55. For more on the link between money, pleasure and ruin as a commonplace in Roman texts see Hor. *Carm* 1.12; 2.15; 3.2; 3.6; Vell. 2.1.1; V. 4.4; Sen. *Ep*. 87.9-11.
[24] Shaw (1975: 188).
[25] Shaw (1975: 188). See Wilkins (2005: 37). See also the comic passages listed by Gruen (1984: 261, n. 63). For more on Roman dining see my comments at 9.1.8.
[26] Shaw (1975: 188).
[27] 'Sallust's innovation was to introduce this concept into a fully developed scheme of moral decline' (Shaw 1975: 196).
[28] *Cat*. 12.2; 5.8.
[29] On the *perdita iuuentus* and the evil influence of *luxuria* upon it see Sal. *Cat*., 12, 2; 13, 1-5; 14, 5-6; and 5, 4: *alieni adpetens, sui profusus, ardens in cupiditatibus*.
[30] Sal. *Hist*. 1, fr.16M.

perspective *luxuria* is attacked for the impulse it generates to spend far beyond one's means, leading to debt. In V9 debt is not a major theme but V certainly recognizes its implications. *aeris alieni* as used at 9.1.6 can mean debt but also spending someone else's money. Spending someone else's money is a motif in V9 at 9.1.2, 9.1.6, 9.3.6, 9.4.1 and chapter 9.15. Although the presence of Catiline at 9.1.9 is an *exemplum* of *libido*, the reader would also connect him to his culpability in exploiting the debts of other Roman young men to recruit them to his conspiracy, thus indebtedness becomes a political motivation.[31] When debt occurs among the ruling classes the danger is increased because of their influence and power to commit dangerous political acts.

Gowers' study of the human body as a 'literary metaphor that links individual consumption, the Roman Empire and the literary text itself' contextualises my understanding of why V chooses to combine *luxuria* and *libido* in the same chapter.[32] The luxuriating physical bodies of Romans are comparable to the socio-political body of the Roman Empire as it grew, comparable to an over-consuming body both in terms of lust and consumption.[33] The verb *luxurio* also means 'of the body, to fill out, swell'.[34] Gellius and Plutarch address the problem of corpulence in men as an effect of luxury, of eating too much, as a social problem.[35] The worst possible outcome, from the state's perspective at least, in pursuing such an excessively luxurious lifestyle would have been reaching such a physical state that one would no longer be able to serve the State or the army, thus becoming powerless, useless to one's own State. Although not referring to the effects of corpulence *per se*, V mentions food and over-

[31] 'The conspirators are characterized by all of the vices of *luxuria*, but especially that of debt' (Shaw 1975: 191). See Sal. *Cat*. 14. 2.
[32] Gowers (1993: 12).
[33] Gowers (1993: 13).
[34] OLD, 1b. On this use of *luxurio* see Verg. *G*. 3.81; Ov. *Met*. 7.292; Stat. *Theb*. 6.841; Gel. 6.22.4.
[35] Gellius tells that 'Cato made an example of a knight deprived of his horse because he was too fat' (Gowers 1993: 13). See Gel. 6.22.4. Also see Plutarch: 'how can such a body be useful to the state when everything between the gullet and the groin is given over to the stomach?' (Plut. *Cat. Mai*. 9.5, Loeb translation, referenced by Gowers 1993: 13). Also see Cato's image of Rome as a 'belly without ears' (Plut. *Mor*. 198d). 'Gluttony was an image of the Romans' uncontrolled appetite for power' (Gowers 1993: 19).

spending on food and also makes similar points on the manifold effects that *luxuria* have on the body and the mind in this chapter.[36] If an increasing majority of people become empowered via asserting more control over their own *vitia*, that would eventually have a knock-on effect on the State itself.

Commentary

9.1.1

Summary: Orata's extravagant tastes for the pleasures of the table and for constructing fishponds and luxurious villas.

The close proximity in the first quarter of 9.1 of fish-ponds (9.1.1), birds (9.1.2) and architectural structures (both within 9.1.1 at *aedificiis etiam spatiosis et excelsis*, and at 9.1.4 with the columns) strikingly resembles Varro's depiction of the same themes.[37] Although the similarity between Varro and V is striking, it cannot be proven absolutely whether V had in fact read Varro; suffice to say that authors of the times wrote on similar themes thus explaining this contiguity. Like Varro, V uses the material of this *exemplum* to let the reader reflect on the dichotomy between morally bad and good villas and landscaping, in terms of how they are used and what they represent, that is, *inter alia*, if their use was for a common

[36] For V on food see: *Oratae mensae varietate ferculorum abundarent* (9.1.1); *edendi ac bibendi voluptas reperta* (9.1.2). 'An overindulged stomach was thought to disturb the equilibrium of mind and body, since desires ought to be ruled by the head' (Gowers 1993: 13). On attributing too much importance to food see also 9.5.3 where dinner is prioritized over the quintessential Roman value of *amicitia*.

[37] *R*. 3.17.2-3. On all three elements see 3.3.1-5, 3.5.9-17. On birds, Varro's aviary and connections to Virgil's *Georgics* see Kellum (1994: 217-8). See Varro's comments on the great cost of fish ponds at *R*. 3.17.2: *primum enim aedificantur magno, secundo implentur magno, tertio aluntur magno*, and his comments (*R*. 3.17.2) on contrasting fresh water ponds (for common folk) versus ponds containing salt-water (for the elite). Hirrus provides another example of a Roman who spent considerable amounts of capital on fish-ponds (Var. *R*. 3.17.3).

interest or solely for the owner's benefit.[38] The moral lesson extends to bad villa dwellers, the so-called 'soft townies' who do not engage in hard labour and as such do not represent what the Roman *maiores* ideologically stood for, that is, a preference for *rustici* (countrymen) to *urbani* ('city slickers').[39] This encapsulates the slippage from villa-as-farm to villa-as-luxury, a growing trend in Rome which V through this *exemplum* wishes to address, to such an extent that he gives it the prominent position as first *exemplum* of the book.[40] Pliny encapsulates a perception of tensions between country and city lifestyles and of a contamination of rustic values with new luxury-lifestyle estate, thus: *iam quidem hortorum nomine in ipsa urbe delicias agros villasque possident*.[41] As Edwards summarises the Pliny passage, 'in the wrong place, rustic "simplicity" and "peace" become "luxury"'.[42]

C. Sergius Orata: Orata held no public office and was a member of the equestrian order. Wikander argues that Orata belonged to an aristocratic branch of the *gens Sergia*.[43] Perhaps because Orata himself is not as well-known as many other characters that inhabit this book, he is the person V tells us the most about, portraying a fuller view of this man's life than he provides for other characters with allusion to his many day-to-day activities: making baths, exploits into improving his farming, his lawsuit with Considius and finally his indulgence with oysters.[44] Furthermore, V may have chosen Orata because of the conspicuous position

[38] Spencer (2010: 79-80). Also see Edwards (1993: 137-8) for key context.
[39] Spencer (2010: 77-78). Var. *R*. 2 Praef. 1.
[40] For this slippage see Var. *R*. 3 as a whole. Another slippage in 9.1.1 is between human bathing (pleasure; health) and fish-farming (commerce; food).
[41] Plin. *Nat*. 19.50.
[42] Edwards (1993: 149).
[43] Wikander (1996: 181-182). Linking Orata's *nomen gentile*, Sergius, with the patrician family the Sili see Nicolet (1974: 849 n. 2).
[44] As pointed out by Fagan (1996), there are several sources mentioning Orata and his pursuits see Plin. (*Nat.* 9.168, 26.16); Cic. (*Off*. 3.67, *Orat*. 1.178, *Fin*. 2.70, *Hort*. *fr*. 76); Macrobius (*Sat*. 3.15.2-3), Col. (8.16.5). The vicissitudes of this *exemplum* are amply covered in Bannon (2001: 34-52; 2009: 221) on both of the subjects V deals with: (i) farming of oysters and (ii) the invention of the hypocaust. Also see Castner (1986: 145).

Cicero had given this character in his work, *Hortensius*.[45] The *cognomen* Orata has an aetiological resonance associated with 'wealth and extravagance as being derived either from his habit of wearing a gold earring or from his passion for goldfish'.[46] The prominence of Orata as the first character of V9 helps the reader to think of semiotics and of the connection between names, sites and Roman social life, since 'farming, family (names), landholding and politics are intimately connected'.[47] His extravagance was such that Cicero mentions him because he was an 'exemplar of extravagance and indulgence, unmotivated by even superficial philosophical belief'.[48] It is a widespread belief among the ancients and scholars that Orata was the inventor of the hypocaust, or may have just 'perfected it in some way' or introduced it to the Italian peninsula, but there is also evidence that it was already in use a century and a half previously at 'Gortys in Greece and at Gela, Megara Hyblaea and Syracuse in Magna Graecia'.[49] The 90s BC seem to be the period for Orata's activities for the law suit, taking into account Pliny's mention of Crassus as consul (95 BC) and the Marsic war (91-87 BC).[50]

pensilia balnea … suspensa: Refers to the hypocaust itself, thus making Orata generally occupy a 'significant role in the early history of the development of the baths'.[51]

---

[45] Bannon (2014: 168, 170), Altman (2016: 59). Bannon (2014: 168) states that Cicero is the earliest writer to mention Orata, and besides *Hortenius* she also references his inclusion in Cicero's *De oratore*, *De finibus* and *De officiis*.

[46] Castner (1985: 145). The fish concerned is the gilt-head (*sparus aurata*), see Higginbotham (1997: 48). On Orata see also Var. *R*. 3.3.10; Cic. *Fin*. 2.70; Col. 8.16.5.

[47] Spencer (2010: 76). In addition, villas were seen as 'miniature states that blur the boundaries between land and sea' (Spencer 2010: 85). On suburban villas see Purcell (1995), Terrenato (2001) and Wallace-Hadrill (2007).

[48] Castner (1985: 145). See Cic. *Fin*. 2.22.70.

[49] Fagan (1996: 56 n. 3). For an outline of Greek and Roman hypocausts see DeLaine (1989).

[50] Fagan (1996: 56). See Plin. *Nat*. 9.168. However, because Orata's commercial activities could extend back for decades it is not possible to determine a more exact date or period.

[51] Fagan (1996: 56). For more on Orata's contributions on the hypocaust and its connection to baths see Pomeroy (1989) and Fagan (1996). See Vitruvius 5.10.1-2 on *hypocausis* (furnace, not raised flooring, see Fagan 1996: 57 n.12) and *suspensura* (simply meaning hypocaust, see Fagan 1996: 57).

quae impensa … penetravit: This is the first of three cases of *adnominatio* at 9.1.[52] A very common rhetorical device in V, its purpose according to Quintilian: *convertit in se aures et animos excitat*.[53] Their ubiquity in V and among his contemporaries shows a 'change of taste in style' between the Latin prose of the Republic and the early Principate.[54]

penetravit: '(Of actions, practices) to go to a certain length, go as far as'.[55] It is a particularly apt verb to have as the second main verb of the first *exemplum* of V9 with its two main nuances of, first, evoking the aggressive, forceful pace which *luxuria* is being carried out by Orata (and men like him in Rome); second, the penetrative imagery of the verb is suggestive of 9.1's second theme of *libido*. *Penetravit* also prepares the reader for the next section of the *exemplum*, where Orata actually encloses *maria*, thus helping the structure along.

videlicet ne gulam Neptuni arbitrio subiectam haberet: Significant here is the notion of a lack of satisfaction. This concept is an important one in V9, where a constant need for satisfaction reoccurs, almost akin to trying to fill an emotional hole, which always cannot be sated, showing that the link between an emotion and a desperate need to satiate it perpetuates a life based on vice. The following are instances where this occurs in V9: 9.1.2: *neque enim ullum vitium finitur ibi ubi oritur*; 9.2: *adversus mulieres quoque gladios destrinxit, quasi parum caedibus virorum satiatus* (As if not quite knowing when and how to stop). 9.2.ext.1: *barbaram feritatem satiarent*; 9.3.praef: portrayed as mighty waves that never fail in their violence to torment itself. Here one gets a feeling of something being not satiated, of being unresolved. 9.4.praef: *latentium indagatrix lucrorum, manifestae praedae avidissima vorago,*

[52] For other *adnominationes* in V9 see each chapter's first introductory footnote. For *adnominatio* in V see Sinclair (1980: 22-46).
[53] *Inst*. 9.3.66. They also 'display a sophistication which transcends a simple predilection for sound effects' (Sinclair 1980: 38). For bibliography on the use of *adnominatio* by Plautus and Cicero see Sinclair (1980: 42).
[54] Sinclair (1980: 46).
[55] OLD 6. Used by V in this same meaning in 2.1.2, 5.4.7. Also see Ov. *Ars* 3.291; Tac. *Ann*. 15.20; Plin. *Nat*. 33.3.

neque habendi fructu felix et cupiditate quaerendi miserrima. This is reminiscent of Plutarch's comment on luxury in *Demetr*. 52: 'they do not even know how to take pleasure in their luxury'. The imagery of *vorago* in V is perfect in describing this whirlpool-like state of mind that is ever revolving, not finding an outlet and yet taking one ever lower. 9.4.1: Crassus was one of the richest men of Roman times already, and yet V showcases him as remaining greedy and involved in complicit fraud, so strong was the pull he felt towards even more wealth.[56] 9.10: *exprobans illi insatiabilem cruoris sitim, simulque poenas occisi ab eo filii sui exigens*.

ne gulam Neptuni ... molibus includendo: Also see Columella: *lautitiae locupletium maria ipsa Neptunumque clauserunt*.[57] I see both authors here correlating the growth of fishponds and the aspiration of artificially controlling nature, in this case of enclosing, confining the natural landscape. The latter is an important facet in the debate on memory, see my introduction. Orata built his oyster bed in the Lucrine Lake at Baiae by damming part of the Bay of Puteoli, profiting Orata a great deal, as the oysters from this lake were later regarded as the best. Varro also uses Neptune to indicate the contrast between the sea-water of the elaborate pond type, indicated in this *exemplum*, and the fresh water of the ordinary pond.[58] Bannon points out the wordplay of *gula*, indicating 'both the physical passage, the gullet, through which food enters the body, as well as an appetite for food'.[59]

peculiaria … includendo: The sea itself is frequently linked with a decline in morality. Seafaring is often associated with the quest for wealth and luxury and with the taint of

[56] Based on this I argue that Tacitus' famous words *si locuples hostis est, avari, si pauper, ambitiosi, quos non Oriens, non Occidens satiaverit* cannot be seen as being universally true (Tac. *Agr*. 30).
[57] 8.16.3. A few lines later Columella also mentions Orata: *ita Sergius Orata et Licinius Murena captorum piscium laetabantur vocabulis* (8.16.5).
[58] Var. *R*. 3. 17.2.
[59] Bannon (2014: 179). For the joke, word play, later in this *exemplum* see the lemma *in tegulis reperturum*.

exposure to foreign cultures. Overall, luxuries, such as oysters, fishponds and buildings were seen as offensive against nature by disrupting the ordering of space determined by nature itself, in this case causing Orata's lawsuit with Considius (mentioned in this section).[60] This has certain resonances with Horace on the sanctity of boundaries between properties, where 'attempts to compete with nature itself, by reordering the boundaries between land and sea, were particularly linked to the figure of the tyrant'.[61]

mensae varietate ferculorum: On the great variety of luxurious dishes that Roman men such as Orata would have had recourse to see D'Arms (1994: 434, 436). 'Culinary extravagance reached its peak in the mid-first century AD'.[62]

fluctus: Particularly in the context of V9, note the alternative meaning of *fluctus* as 'having no firm moral principles' (*fluens* OLD, 3).[63] Juxtaposition of *fluctus* and *tempestas* in their *physical* sense in V9 see 9.8.2; in a *figurative* sense (OLD, 1c) it occurs twice more: at 9.3.praef. and 9.8.1. The idea of water or the sea in metaphors and similes connected with strong, intense emotions is common in Roman literature.[64]

ut nulla tam … abundarent: As Bannon argues: V's Orata 'challenges Neptune not for control of the sea but for control of the seafood on his table'.[65] This personification of the sea emerges in Varro and Columella in the challenging of Neptune also.[66]

---

[60] For more on buildings in this context see 9.1.4 below.
[61] Edwards (1993: 146). See *Carm*. 2.18. See also Horden (2000), Romm (1992).
[62] Skidmore (1996: 62). See Tac. *Ann*. 3.52.
[63] See Quint. *Inst*. 1.2.8.
[64] See Cic. *Tusc*. 5.16; Catul. 64 and 65.4; Lucr. 3.296-8, 3.1051-2; 4.1077, 6.74-5; Verg. *A*. 8.19-20, 10.680, 12.486-7, Luc. 5.118-20.
[65] Bannon (2014: 179).
[66] Bannon (2014: 179).

Lucrini lacus: 'A certain Domitius of Ostia saw to it for his tomb to bear an inscription that he had dined on Lucrine oysters and drank Falernian wine; and even as late as AD 527 Lucrine oysters were praised by the young Gothic king Athalarich as one of the attractions of Baiae'.[67] The Lucrine became during Pliny the Elder's time a place where oysters from Brundisium were imported to mature.[68] The *exemplum* of Orata is especially useful for V because it allows him to flag a type of luxury that demonstrates boundary-crossing in terms of luxury on the palate, unnatural economies, and a water that's somewhere on the cusp between sweet and salty.

aedificiis etiam spatiosis et excelsis: The first marked increase in the building of private villas on the Campanian coast is ascribed by ancient sources directly to Orata, described by d'Arms as 'an acute and fortunate speculator, a type new to Rome and indeed infrequent throughout antiquity'.[69] Orata's market was for the wealthy Romans 'who were beginning to want pleasure villas on the coast. Therefore they were not for personal use or for the benefit of resident Campanians'.[70] On the discourse for and against luxurious buildings see 9.1.4 below. Relevant to the study on the increase of buildings at Rome are the social and cultural implications of the seasonal *peregrinatio* to seaside resorts like Baiae or to country seats.[71]

Considio publicano iudicium nanctus est: This was not the first lawsuit that Orata was involved in. Previously he had 'sued Gratidianus for fraud in the sale of an estate at the

[67] Andrews (1948: 300).
[68] D'Arms (1970: 19). See Plin. *Nat*. 9.169; cf. 32.61. For the Lucrine oyster in literature see, for example: *tu Lucrina uoras, me pascit aquosa peloris* (Mart. 6.11.5); *vis scribi propter quinque Lucrina, vale* (Mart. 12.48.4); *Circeis nata forent an/ Lucrinum ad saxum Rutupinoue edita fundo/ ostrea callebat primo deprendere morsu* (Juv. 4.140-2). For references to dining – *convivium* – in V9 see 1.5, 1.8, 1.ext.2, 5.3, 5.4, 8.2.
[69] (1970: 18).
[70] D'Arms (1970:19).
[71] The *peregrinatio* was 'the seasonal visiting of one's villas in the country and by the sea' (D'Arms 1970: 45). See Cic. *Att*. 16.3.4. On the role of the *domus* in aristocratic self-fashioning see below 9.1.4. On *peregrinatio* also see D'Arms (1970: 159) and Leach (2004).

Lucrine lake, claiming that Gratidianus had failed to disclose that the land was burdened by a servitude'.[72]

in tegulis reperturum: Cicero remarked that Orata 'could make oysters grow even on tiles'.[73] As Bannon points out, the wordplay and joke 'refers both to the roof of a house (an unlikely place for oysters) and to the ceramic tiles that were used as a platform for growing oysters in artificial ponds, Orata's innovative technique'.[74]

9.1.2

Summary: The *exemplum* concerns the son of Aesopus, characterised as prodigal and wasteful for buying and then serving expensive little birds in the place of beccaficos and for dissolving costly pearls in vinegar to then sprinkle them over drinks.

It is ironic that the attack is here not on an actor but the actor's son. The actor himself is actually portrayed as being on the right side, morally, and represents the opposite of vice. This is unusual in Roman texts, where negative portrayal of actors associated with licentiousness, excess and sexual deviancy was common.[75] Seen from this perspective, V's positive portrayal of the actor in this section would have been unexpected, serving as a rhetorical attention-grabbing tactic, all the more so since the actor was wealthy but was not of

[72] Bannon (2001: 48). See *Orat*. 1.178, *Off*. 3.67. Also see Bannon (2001: 34-52; 2009: 221). Contrary to Bannon's view of there being two separate lawsuits, I agree with D'Arms' (1970: 20) point that they both stemmed from a single trial.
[73] Cic. *Hort. Fr*. 69: *sollertiaque ea posset vel in tegulis proseminare ostreas* (Grilli 2010: 76). For other refences to Orata in Cicero's *Hortensius* see fragments nos. 67, 68, 70 and 71 (Grilli 2010: 74-77).
[74] Bannon (2014: 179-180). For the joke, word play, earlier in this *exemplum* see the end of the lemma *ne gulam*.
[75] For example, see Hor. (*Ep*. 2.1.200-7), Tert. (*de spect.* 17), Tacitus (*Ann*. 14.20) and for the trend see Edwards (1993: 98-136).

the squandering sort, displaying the old Roman virtue of *frugalitas*.[76] A contradiction existed in Rome between the popularity and high demand of theatres and certain actors, and at the same time actors being regarded with deep suspicion because of their foreign influence and potential contamination of morals.[77]

huic: This refers to Orata, from the previous *exemplum*, as a morally suitable father to adopt Aesopus' son, because of their common temperament for the pursuit of *luxuria*.

Aesopus: A famous tragic and possibly also a comedy actor.[78] Cicero called him *summus artifex*.[79] Plutarch relates an incident where Aesopus was acting the part of Atreus, and struck a slave with such a violent blow with his sword that the slave fell dead.[80] Aesopus was a personal friend of Cicero himself.[81]

filium suum: Unlike Cicero (*Att*. 11.15.3) and Horace (*S*. 2.3.239-42), V does not name Aesopus' son, M. Clodius Aesopus.[82]

in adoptionem dare ... debuit: The authorial comment on adoption by V gives the impression that there was a disparity in morals and behaviour between father and son. However, this contradicts V's words a few lines later at *alterius … alterius*, where old and young are put on the same level, impliying father and son. Pliny, instead, is more definite,

[76] For more on theatre in V see 2.4.4 and 2.6.7.
[77] Edwards (1993: 98-136).
[78] 'Vielleicht trat er auch als Komöde auf' (Leppin 1992: 195; Cic. *Or*. 109, ohne Namensnennung). Also see Henry (1919: 352-3). For the possibility of Aesopus being involved in comedy see the arguments made by Henry (1919: 353). Mentioned by V at 8.10.2 alongside his contemporary, Roscius (appears in V at 8.7.7), also a famous comic actor.
[79] *Sest*. 120. 'He was an older man than Cicero, but younger than Roscius. Cicero writing in 55 BC, shortly after the occasion of the dedication of Pompey's theatre, speaks of Aesopus as an old man. [...] we may put his death at about 54 BC' (Henry 1919: 352-3).
[80] Plut. *Cic*. 5.
[81] Cic. *QFr*. 1.2.14: *noster familiaris*. Cic. *Div* 1.80 (Quintus speaking): *familiaris tuus*.
[82] For his association with the name of Ticidas see Frank, (1920: 91-93).

attributing the very extravagant life and in particular the bird episode (see below) to the father instead of the son, thus concluding that he deserved such a son: *dignus prorsus filio* (*Nat*. 10.72).

bonorum suorum heredem: According to Macrobius, the son inherited 20 million sesterces: *Aesopum vero ex pari arte ducenties sestertium reliquisse filio constat*.[83] The only other actor to approximate Aesopus' fortune was the already mentioned Roscius, who was made a knight by the dictator Sulla.[84] Aesopus, on the other hand, was able to 'improve his social standing by retiring from the stage'.[85] Both Aesopus and Roscius had Cicero as their pupil as well being 'close friends'.[86]

non solum … iuvenem: I interpret *perditae* as 'morally depraved' because, although *perditae* clearly refers here to the son's extravagance, it also comes more into sharp focus when read against the other theme of this chapter, *libido*, based on what Cicero wrote of Clodius Aesopus: *filius Aesopi me excruciat*.[87] *Excruciat* is associated by Cicero with the intrigues connecting his son-in-law Dolabella to Metella, Clodius Aesopus' lover.[88]

cantu commendabiles aviculas: The voice of these birds resembles the human voice: *in qua posuit aves cantu aliquo aut humano sermone vocales*.[89] Pliny draws a connection between the voice of the actor Aesopus, which allowed him to sustain a career in theatre (and ultimately led him to amass a great fortune), and the voice of the bird, used for his own

[83] *Sat*. 3.14.14.
[84] Roscius 'played comic as well as tragic roles, received a thousand denarii for a performance, and earned ordinarily some 6oo,ooo sesterces per year' (Frank 1916: 178).
[85] Green (1933: 304).
[86] Green (1933: 304).
[87] *Att*. 11.15.3. Cicero (*Att*. 11.23.3) writes that Dolabella was being led astray by Clodius Aesopus, thus increasing the great orator's uneasiness. Also see Frank (1920: 92).
[88] Frank (1920: 92), Palmer (1964: 302).
[89] Plin. *Nat*. 10.141. Pliny's interpretation of this story was different from V, namely, he attributed this episode not to the son but the father.

gain.[90] It is interesting how the interplay between human and avian voices draws on from the tradition of metamorphoses and fable, where animals somehow stand in for humans in order to draw out moral points. Although the fable, like the *exemplum*, represents an anecdote with a moral meaning, this genre is absent from V overall.[91] Quintilian associates the telling of fables with uneducated audiences, making it the wrong idiom for V's readership.[92] Strabo and Diodorus believed *exempla* from history were more suitable to those in higher echelons of society, rather than myth and poetry.[93] Credibility was the major element here, different sections of society were more prone to believe in and be more receptive to different *stimuli* and this was partly impacted by the level of their education, as well as their social background.

immanibus emptas pretiis pro ficedulis: Aesopus provided songbirds at the dinner-table instead of the customary low-priced beccaficos.[94] Indeed, their value was such that *ergo servorum, illis pretia sunt et quidem ampliora quam quibus olim armigeri parabantur*.[95] The money spent by the children of the rich is regularly described as inherited.[96] The treatment of the prodigal in Roman law shows how seriously squandering inherited money was.[97] Like the *furiosi*, so the *prodigi* were deprived of control over their own finances and were assigned to a curator.[98]

---

[90] *nulla alia inductus suavitate nisi ut in iis imitationem hominis manderet, ne quaestus quidem suos reveritus illos opimos et voce meritos* (Plin. *Nat.* 10.142).
[91] Skidmore (1996: 97-9).
[92] *Inst.* 5.11.19.
[93] For this distinction see Strabo 1.1.23, 1.2.8; Diod. 1.2.2. Also see Skidmore (1996: 95, 106).
[94] Plin. *Nat.* 10. 84 and 87.
[95] *Nat.*10.141.
[96] Edwards (1993: 180). For a psychological appraisal of material excess and prodigality in the children of well to do Romans see Leon (1952: 211-214).
[97] See Digest 27.10.1 taken from the Twelve Tables (earliest Roman law code).
[98] Parkin (1997: 146).

acetoque … solitum: There is a debate as to whether Aesopus or Cleopatra was the first to initiate this practice.[99] V overlooks Cleopatra's example, while Pliny mentions both, giving Aesopus chronological precedence.[100] Macrobius retells the Cleopatra story based on the Pliny.[101] Horace also mentions Aesopus' son in relation to the pearls.[102]

uniones: In describing the same episode on Aesopus, Pliny uses both *unio* and *margarita*, and charts a short history on the use of pearls, concluding that the term *unio* came into existence *cum Aelius Stilo circa Iugurthinum bellum unionum nomen inponi cum maxime grandibus margaritis prodat*.[103] Horace uses *baca*, and attributes it to Metella's property, Metella being the person over whom both Aesopus and Dolabella (Cicero's son in law) were fighting. Suetonius identifies Caligula as another pearl swallower.[104]

neque enim … oritur: This constitutes the first of two cases of *sententiae* in 9.1, a rhetorical device that is a *sine qua non* to Senecan declamations and Latin literature of the 1st century AD overall.[105] Also note the alliteration of *ibi ubi* aptly used here to highlight V9's theme of insatiability.

manus porrexerunt: Note the double meaning attached here: of actors' famous gestures, and of greedy grasping.

---

[99] Ullman (1957: 194).
[100] *prior id fecerat Romae in unionibus magnae taxationis Clodius, tragoedi Aesopi filius* (9.122).
[101] *Sat*. 3.17.14-17. On the debate surrounding the credibility of this story see Ullman (1957: 193).
[102] *Sat*. 3.17.14-17. On keeping and eating birds see also Lucullus' Tusculan aviary in Var. *R*. 3.4.2-3 and Spencer (2010: 80).
[103] *Nat*. 9.123.
[104] *Cal*. 37.
[105] Bonner (1966: 260-2). For *sententiae* in V see Sinclair (1980: 160-174).

censusque edendi ac bibendi voluptas: Although in this case 'the pleasure of eating and drinking a fortune away' has a literal meaning, it is also a common bankruptcy metaphor in Latin literature: 'a person who squanders wealth "devours" it (*comedo*, *devoro*); to declare oneself bankrupt is to "overcook" or "boil away" (*decoquo*)'.[106] This lack of self-discipline has a ripple effect on not being able to maintain control of one's estate or not having time to do so, thus impacting on society more generally, on one's own household, and the ability to fulfil one's civic duties.[107]

9.1.3

Summary: Roman elite women organise themselves to attempt to affect Roman legislation to annul the *lex Oppia*.

secundi Punici belli finis: This is the only explicit mention by name of the Second Punic War in V9, the tenth and last mention in V overall.[108] 9.1.ext.1 and 9.2.ext.2 are also set during this war but V does not mention it by name. This war constituted for V a *Wendepunkt* (turning point), because the end of the second Punic war is often held as the beginning of a loosening of morals at Rome.[109] 'Did the Romans learn their corrupt appetites from the East or did their new prosperity simply give them the freedom to satisfy desires? […] Lucan (1.161-2) suggests the second alternative: *rebus mores cessere secundis praedaque et hostiles*

[106] Corbeill (1997: 101). For this use of *ebibo* elsewhere in Latin literature see: Pl. *Trin*. 250; Hor. *Sat*. 2.3.122 and Edwards (1993: 175) for a similar use with *effundo* and *profundo* (pour out). For the theme of debt and bankruptcy in *luxuria* see my introduction to 9.1. For popular Latin vocabulary on bankruptcy such as *comedo*, *devoro* and *decoquo* see Corbeill (1997: 101-2, 124).
[107] See my comments in the introduction to 9.1 on corpulence, excessive consumption and the effects these have on one's duties as Roman citizens.
[108] The *first* and *third* Punic Wars are not featured in V9. In V the *first* Punic War is mentioned five times, and the *third* Punic War three times; thus showing how the *second* Punic War, with ten mentions, far outweighs the other two, highlighting its significance. On the importance of this war *per se* and other wars in V see Coudry and Chassignet (1998).
[109] Guerrini (1981: 39 note 30).

luxum suasere rapinae (this in his view was the fate of all powerful peoples). Florus (1.47.7), on the other hand, stresses the particular influence of the East: *Syria prima nos victa corrupit, mox Asiatica Pergameni hereditas*'.[110]

legis Oppiae: In 215 BC during the Second Punic War the *Lex Oppia* (a sumptuary law) was passed, forbidding elite women the display of luxurious dress and carriages. The *Lex Oppia* was about avoiding ostentatious behaviour and display, 'it affected only the display of wealth not its ownership', it was not against owning luxuries *per se*.[111] With a return to prosperity, 'the question whether to repeal the *Lex Oppia* in 195 BC had divided the senate into two opposing factions', and Roman elite women, demanding its repeal, organised public demonstrations and even resorted to picketing and intimidating the magistrates.[112] The issue with these demonstrations was twofold for the Senate of the time: first, the freedom that the women show in 'attempting to influence the legislative process' in an otherwise male-dominated political system.[113] This freedom displayed by the women was an attack on the Roman *status quo* of sustaining a purely male hierarchy, consistent with the discourse of men controlling women versus women's 'power to disrupt'.[114] Second, the issue of sexuality: women in public streets talking to men generally was seen as a threat. Again, this constitutes another facet to women's power to disrupt. Livy and Juvenal (sixth Satire) 'drew on a wider

[110] Lintott (1972: 627).
[111] Culham (1986: 241). Also see Culham (1982: 793) and Desideri (1984). Clemente (1981: 9) discusses the various sumptuary laws against luxury that covered many areas of Roman life. See also Briscoe (1981: 39-63) on this episode in Livy book thirty-four.
[112] Ruggini (1987: 188-189). Livy 34.1-8. On views in antiquity about the inequality of women see Ruggini (1987: 188-190). On the use of historical texts to re-construct the lives and attitudes of Roman women see Finley (1968), Fischler (1994). On the rhetoric of gender in Latin prose see L'Hoir (1992) and Ginsburg (2006). On women in Roman historiography see Milnor (2009).
[113] Staples (1998: 60). Also see Levick (2012: 102), Keith (2012: 396). However, women's interventions in important Roman national crises were not unprecedented, see Valerius' speech in Livy 34.1-8; namely, 'the Sabine women, the women led by the mother of Coriolanus, the women who ransomed the city from the Gauls with their own jewellery and the women who escorted the image of Cybele into Rome' (Staples 1998: 62).
[114] Wyke (1994: 148). For the 'hierarchy of gendered values incorporated into the male narrative voice' see Henderson (1989: 53). On Roman women's power and authority see Rosaldo (1974: 20-1) and with particular focus on the imperial period see Fischler (1994).

tradition of misogynistic discourse that obtained in Roman society'.[115] This *exemplum* epitomizes the trope of women who, via their wearing of increasingly more ostentatious jewellery and clothes, become a symbol of degeneracy.[116] In the topsy-turvy and chaotic world of *vitia* V portrays, *luxuria* renders men effeminate and women become 'masculinized by the wealth of empire'.[117]

varii coloris: *Versicolori* in Livy. The two speakers in Livy, Cato and Valerius (the tribune), 'refer only to purple garments (3.9, 7.3) not to multi-coloured clothes'.[118]

propius urbem mille passus: This ('*within* a mile of the city') is at odds with Livy who includes not just the city of Rome but also all other Roman towns (*urbe oppidove*).[119] 'The whole *ager Romanus*, and *urbe* does not refer to Rome alone'.[120]

Brutorum domum: Marcus and Publius Iunii Bruti were *tribunes of the plebs* at the time of the women's revolt in 195 BC.[121] Marcus was *plebeian aedile* in 193, *praetor* in 191 and consul in 178. The other Brutus is 'almost certainly to be identified with the *curule aedile* of 192 and *praetor* of 190'.[122] They opposed the repeal of the law and as such became the targets of the women.[123]

---

[115] Staples (1998: 62).
[116] Wyke (1994: 140).
[117] Bowditch (2006: 315). Also see my introduction to 9.1. For more on the masculine woman in V9 see my comments at 9.10.ext.1.
[118] Briscoe (1981: 44). For other allusions to women's attire in V see Hilton (2008), covering 2.1.4, 6.3.10 and 6.3.12. For the role of clothes in V see Lawrence (2006: 37-40).
[119] Note the number of similarities between the language of V and Livy in this section. Both use *propius* with the accusative (*propius urbem mille passus*), in a legal or quasi-legal context and the use of *semunciam* (an *uncia* is a twelfth part). See Briscoe (1981: 45, 39-63) on Livy book thirty-four.
[120] Briscoe (1981: 45).
[121] Found only here in V.
[122] Briscoe (1981: 45).
[123] On the women's siege of the house of the Bruti also see Liv. 34.8.

ausae sunt obsidere: This constitutes the crux of V's grievance against the women of this *exemplum*.[124] This is the only case of violence in the domestic section of 9.1 until the culmination of its worst *exemplum* at 9.1.9.

ius per continuos viginti annos servatum aboleretur: The reference to the law being a recent one, only twenty years old, constitutes in Livy one of the arguments made by one of the tribunes, Valerius, who was in favour of repealing the Oppian law.[125]

cumulum: There is a divergence in the text between the Teubner and Loeb editions in this sentence.[126]

Teubner: *ad quem cultum tenderet insoliti coetus pertinax studium*.

Loeb: *ad quem cumulum tenderet insoliti cultus pertinax studium*.

In the Teubner edition, *cultum* differs from the second *cultum* later in this *exemplum*, *ad curiosiorem sui cultum hortatur*: for the former, has the sense of 'luxury'; for the latter, 'adornment'.[127]

In the Loeb edition, both occurrences of *cultus* mean 'finery' or 'adornment'.[128]

The Teubner's reading of *coetus* refers to the women gathering for the repeal of the *lex Oppia*. Livy's text, on which V bases this *exemplum* on, in fact, has *coetus* at 34.2.4. I believe both Teubner and Loeb readings are possible.

[124] For other instances of the verb daring (*audeo*) in V9 see: 9.1.ext.2, 9.5.2, 9.7.mil.rom.2, 9.11.ext.2, 9.13.ext.4, 9.15.2.
[125] 34.1-8.
[126] The text in the Loeb edition is independent of Briscoe and Kempff (Shackleton Bailey 2000 vol.1: 6).
[127] For *cultus* in the sense of luxury see TLL iv.1337.48; OLD 9c.
[128] OLD 6.

cultus: Repeated in this *exemplum* seven lines later.[129] *Cultum* is a rhetorically charged keyword in Roman morality in the 'discourse of adornment'.[130] Originally, *cultus* referred to care of the body, what 'distinguishes human from animal, the civilised from the savage'.[131] The body then went on to become a feature of 'social identity' and Roman citizens defined and expressed themselves through the body.[132] However, the idea of ostentatious and excessive care of the body permeating Roman society as a result of the embrace of *luxuria* became 'symptomatic' for certain elite commentators 'of the softening of the state's moral fibre' so that a causal thread was drawn between the body of individuals and the body of the state.[133] The case of women, however, was different from Roman men because of their lack of social freedom: they could not vote, hold public office, and typically received little formal education (see below). Therefore, from this perspective, the *lex Oppia* had removed a significant facet of a Roman woman's freedom: adorning herself and thus expressing herself.[134] By choosing to include a rhetorically charged word such as *cultus* twice in this *exemplum*, V is raising the issue of the social definition of woman, and the ambiguity of the concept of *cultus*: on one hand, as a display of social status and of a civilizing influence; on the other, a symbol for personal excess, of *vitia*. Despite the threat that the Roman male feels in women's power to disrupt (see above), I think V is trying to impress implicitly on the reader that such *exempla* as this do not leave their readers with a sense that 'male intervention had actually successfully achieved in thwarting perceived dangers posed by women'.[135] In fact, V emphasizes that the women's campaign was successful, and this is unusual in V who, especially for *exempla* that are particularly well-known, assumes that the reader knows the

[129] It reoccurs a further three times in V9: 9.2.praef, 9.3.ext.4, 9.5.ext.1.
[130] Wyke (1994: 135).
[131] Wyke (1994: 135). Also see Lakoff (1984: 158).
[132] Wyke (1994: 135).
[133] Wyke (1994: 141).
[134] Culham (1986: 238); Balsdon (1962: 33); Gardner (1986: 262).
[135] Wyke (1994: 148).

outcome of an event.[136] At 9.1.3 V does have reservations about the slippery slope that such a victory had created as a dangerous precedent relating to women's *luxuria*, but at the same time does not explicitly blame the Roman male for allowing the annulment of the *lex Oppia per se*.[137] V seems to almost condone the Roman male for not foreseeing (*providerunt*) just how far *luxuria* would have escalated in Roman life.[138] The implicit message here is that men do not have the *providentia* of a Tiberius and the effects are dangerous.[139]

audacia: Other famous Roman women connected to this quality are Tullia (who surfaces in V9 at 9.11.1), who hates her sister for not displaying *muliebris audacia*; and Sempronia, described by Sallust with *virilis audacia*.[140] The women in V9 exhibit a variety of *vitia*.[141]

in ipso introitu ruenti luxuriae obstitissent: This mirrors the argument of female despotism made by Cato, who opposed the repeal of the *lex Oppia*.[142] He believed that not enough had been done in the past to support the authority of the husband in the household and, had this been done, 'we should not now have this trouble with the whole body of women'.[143] Cato is presented as seeing the uprising of women as setting a dangerous precedent if they succeeded in their purpose, likening it to the successful *secessio plebis*. If this was how it was commonly seen, as providing a dangerous precedent, then Cato's and V's language of blocking is understandable but one counteracted by the tribune Valerius. He reminds us in fact that Roman women had often positively intervened and led in past crises, so that nothing

[136] *et quidem obtinuerunt ut ius per continuos viginti annos servatum aboleretur* (9.1.3).
[137] *Non enim providerunt … victrix audacia* (9.1.3).
[138] *quid si animi … obstitissent* (9.1.3).
[139] On Tiberius' *providentia* see Martin (1982, 103–39), Wardle (2000: 491-2), Levick (2003: 97).
[140] Bauman (1992: 10).
[141] See 9.1.8-9, 9.1.ext.7, 9.6.1, 9.11.1 and 9.12.2.
[142] Liv. 34.1-8.
[143] Liv. 34.1-8, Loeb translation.

should be really feared. But this more positive outlook on women from the tribune Valerius is not picked up by V, see below.

imbecillitas mentis: In Livy's version, despite the tribune Valerius' best efforts to defend women, he does eventually refer to their inherent weakness compared to men (*patiendum huic infirmitati est, quodcumque vos censueritis*, 34.7); this is also comparably evident in V's choice of *imbecillitas mentis*.[144] This very weakness or infirmity of mind becomes for Valerius the tribune, a comforting assurance, because of it they cannot really pose a true danger to the State. For Cato, however, they were still to be feared collectively *en masse*, thus reflecting the general chronic 'Roman fear of gatherings which were not officially sanctioned and closely supervised'.[145] It may be that because of their high status Cato was somewhat inhibited in his criticism of them.[146]

graviorum operum negata adfectatio: I interpret this as meaning women's education. Seneca's view was that 'women were uncontrollable unless they received instruction'.[147] *Consolatio ad Helviam* 17.4 indicates Seneca's view that women might benefit from philosophical study, which would mean that he thought that they were not intrinsically devoid of the intelligence to pursue what men studied. This reflects the general Stoic philosophy of equality of men and women, as stated in Seneca.[148] In V, however, this is not apparent, relegating women as inferior to men. But just as Seneca's mother was not allowed by her husband to pursue education more seriously so V's 'denial of opportunity' indicates a social

[144] For a similar view on women see 9.12.2: *sed minus miror, quod mulieres*.
[145] Rawson (2006: 326) This very fear is clearly represented at 9.7 below with *exempla* on collective action from both the populace and the army.
[146] Rawson (2006: 326).
[147] Viden (1993: 122).
[148] *Dial*. 6.16.1. Also see Manning (1973: 170 n.1).

custom of the times.[149] Women were denied a proper education because certain women abused it, so that it could come to signal a luxurious disposition rather than support a virtuous lifestyle.[150] Overall there is little evidence for the education of women in the ancient world, with no formalized institutional system except for instruction received at home from parents or tutors, the focus largely resting upon domestic matters and skills that would prepare them for life as a *matrona*.[151]

viros: V's blame for men, here, acts structurally as a transition: it introduces the individual male exemplars in 9.1.4. V here blames men more than women for a lack of *continentia* because, unlike women, men had 'more experience and training in matters of public importance'.[152]

continentiae: Before the corruption of traditional Roman *mores*, virtue and frugality were more prevalent in the old days when previous generations 'knew how to control their women'.[153] In subsequent times, failure to control women created social and political turmoil.[154] V uses *continentia*, here, as a structural device to connect to Crassus in the following *exemplum* (9.1.4), who exemplifies the opposite of *continentia*.

sed quid … idque iurgio ipsorum pateat? This is the first of fourteen cases of *interrogatio* in V9, a rhetorical device which, according to Sinclair, the author employs for 'variety and

[149] On Seneca encouraging his mother's education see *Dial*. 12.17.3-4. For Seneca's attitudes toward women see Lavery (1997: 8).
[150] Viden (1993: 139).
[151] Deslauriers (2012: 352).
[152] Rawson (2006: 327).
[153] Staples (1998: 61). Also see *quam a maioribus acceptam continentiam retinere maluerunt* (9.1.4), with the same meaning of frugality, self-control. For the opposite of this see the introduction to 9.5 on *impotentia*, *Antiochus quoque Syriae rex nihilo continentioris exempli* (9.1.ext.4) and, the related verb, *contineo* 9.11.ext.4, 9.12.praef.
[154] Staples (1998: 61). Gel. 1.17.4.

vivacity of expression and, as Quintilian affirms (9.2.8), may serve as an effective vehicle for the conveyance of a wide range of emotions'.[155]

I argue that this constitutes the first of three short meditations in V9, the other two are 9.2.ext.11 and 9.12.ext.10.[156] This meditation serves as a structural device in 9.1 to introduce the next four *exempla*, whose focus are men (9.1.4-7). The domestic section concludes with the last two *exempla* featuring, *inter alia*, prominent female characters (9.1.8-9).

9.1.4

Summary: An altercation between Domitius and Crassus on the extravagance of their respective houses.

The philosophical and ideological rhetoric of disdain in antiquity for luxury buildings was widespread, coloured by author and context for each text.[157] In texts, if a house was praised, the author would emphasise that it was built with modesty and restraint, as in the case of Nepos' description of Atticus' house: *plus salis quam sumptus habebat* (it was elegant rather than luxurious).[158] Generally, 'attacks on luxurious buildings were a way for members of the Roman elite to air their anxieties about threats to the social hierarchy and their own places within it' and fed the moralists' preoccupation with social status and were 'useful fodder for

[155] Sinclair (1980: 114). On the importance of emotions in V9 see my main introduction. For the remaining thirteen cases of *interrogatio* in V9 see: 9.1.5 (five questions in quick succession, the longest case of *interrogatio* in all V), 9.1.ext.5, 9.2.1, 9.3.2, 9.3.6, 9.3.8, 9.6.ext.1, 9.7.mil.Rom.1, 9.11.1, 9.11.ext.4, 9.12.praef, 9.13.1 and 9.13.ext.2. In V overall there are more than one hundred and fifty such instances (Sinclair 1980: 114).

[156] For the meditation of 9.2.ext.11 see my introduction to 9.2. I will not be discussing the meditation of 9.12.ext.10 as it falls outside the scope of this PhD (see the section on 'the last five chapters of V9' in the main introduction).

[157] See Edwards (1993: 139 n. 5) and Oltremare (1926). In contrast, on the modesty and humbleness of Augustus' Palatine house see Wiseman (1987). For more detailed and up to date work on Augustus' Palatine house see Wardle (2014: 454-5) and Tomei (2014). For an in-depth bibliography on the moral discourse of domestic architecture in the late Republic and early Empire see Nichols (2010: 40). Also see Hales (2003: 17-25).

[158] Nep. *Att*. 13.2.

ad hominem attacks'.[159] In addition, as V's contemporary Velleius Paterculus notes that, eastern, foreign influences on public buildings were widespread, and as I mentioned in the introduction to 9.1, fed into the Roman anxiety on the contamination of *vitia*.[160]

Buildings were important in setting and defining 'the relationship between individual and community', since houses for the elite were integral part of the political stage.[161] 'They were not private places only but played an essential role in public life' going hand in hand with the public role of a politician.[162] 'House and state in Roman texts are symbolically charged metaphors for one another'.[163] In this respect, grand private houses might be justified by pointing to the public functions which occurred in them. 'The size and splendour of someone's house was a barometer of his social and political ambitions'.[164] Seneca (*Ep*. 86.6-7) and Pliny (*Nat*. 36.59-60) commented how 'there was something wrong and unnatural about men who had money but no real status', such as freedmen, some of whom did in fact own luxurious homes and were in possession of fortunes.[165] 'Vitruvius stressed how a house must be appropriate to the position of its owner', suggesting the scale of construction appropriate to one's position in society, thus accommodation being carefully graded by status.[166] From this perspective therefore, 9.1.4 displays the discrepancy of having two censors, who were responsible for moral standards, actually themselves indulging in

[159] Edwards (1993: 138) and Nichols (2010: 47).
[160] Vell. 1.11.3-5; 2.1.1-2. For example, Varro complains of a villa that re-echoed with Greek sounding names (*R. praef.* 2).
[161] Edwards (1993: 138).
[162] Edwards (1993:150-1). For this reason the circumstances at 9.1.8 below are presented by V as particularly degrading and infamous.
[163] Edwards (1993: 138).
[164] Edwards (1993: 152). On the overlap between the private and public functions of the grand houses of the Roman elite see Coarelli (1983) and Wiseman (1987). On the importance of building in order to perpetuate the fame of its owners (*memoria*, including the use of *imagines* and *monumenta*) or that of *damnatio memoriae* (through the demolition of the actual houses) see Wiseman (1987).
[165] Edwards (1993: 155). On the luxurious properties of Sulla's freedman Chrysogonus see Cic. *Pro Rosc Amer*. 133 For other instances see also Plin. *Nat.* 18.7; 33.145; Sen. *Ep*. 27.5; Mart. 5.13; Juv. 1.109; Plin. *Ep*. 7.29 and Petr. 71.
[166] Edwards (1993: 152). Vitr. 6.5.1-2.

luxury.[167] The perception of luxurious houses was considered such a 'threat to the social hierarchy that Roman writers resorted to drawing on Stoic principles' further to justify their moral positions.[168]

In contrast to the previous chapter on the *lex Oppia*, note the curious lack of evidence for sumptuary laws on buildings. The closest one gets to a sumptuary law on buildings is the *lex Quinctia* on aqueducts (9 BC).[169] Note also Rutilius Rufus' speech *de modo aedificiorum* read out by Augustus, although this might have had safety rather than luxury as its aim.[170] Pliny expresses *opprobrium* and surprise at the lack of legislation and the fact that the 'importation of (coloured) marble was not regulated' (the latter point is particularly relevant considering this *exemplum*).[171]

Discourse on luxurious buildings was not always consistently negative, in fact, if large sums of capital were spent on houses, as opposed to excessive eating, drinking and on courtesans, then that was considered a 'sound investment and compatible with other Roman moral virtues'.[172] In Roman morality the long-term aspect of investing in property and decorating buildings contrasts with gratifying short-term pleasures such as eating and sexual gratification; and, furthermore, the difference was highlighted between decorating a house and the human body, whereby the beauty of the body would fade quicker than that of a building.[173]

---

[167] On the theme in V9 of people who should lead by example but do not, spreading their vices to the populace see my comments at *exercitus imitatus* (9.1.ext.4).
[168] Nichols (2010: 40); Edwards (1993: 137-72).
[169] Miles (1987).
[170] See Strabo 5.3.7, Suet. *Aug*. 89.2, Cass. Dio 55.26.4.
[171] Nichols (2010: 43). See Plin. *Nat*. 36.4.
[172] Nichols (2010: 56). See also Pavlovski (1973), Edwards (1993: 141-2).
[173] Nichols (2010: 56).

Cn. Domitius: Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus was consul in 96 BC, and appears only once more in V at 6.5.5 when occupying the office of tribune of the plebs. Other members of his family are mentioned elsewhere.

L. Crasso: Lucius Licinius Crassus was consul in 95 BC with his father in law Quintus Scaevola (see V: 4.5.4; 8.8.1 and 8.15.6), censor in 92 BC with Domitius. V's portrayal of Crassus is often one of high esteem: *apud maiores eloquentia clarissimus fuit* (3.7.6); *summae dignitatis atque eloquentiae viro* (6.2.2); *tantus apud iudices* [...] *suffragia robustissimis et felicissimis eloquentiae stipendiis regebat* (8.5.3). However, V's stance here on Crassus is more complex as there are textual problems associated to the sentence. V's use of *introduxerunt*, relating to Crassus (and Domitius), could read as a heavy accusation; that is, *they* were the ones who introduced *luxuria* in the first place! One cannot categorically be certain about this though. Another interpretation of this *exemplum* might be that V is somewhat lessening Crassus' culpability in connection to *luxuria* by putting his activities into perspective, by comparing them to the later generations: *quanto tamen insequentium saeculorum aedificiis et nemoribus angustiorem quam introduxerunt*.[174]

collegae: The fact that Domitius and Crassus together occupied the hallowed position of censors (in 92 BC) aggravates their culpability since one of the duties as censor, one 'which most strongly characterized' this position, was their supposed guidance on *mores* and self-discipline (*regimen morum*).[175]

[174] V's bitterest note appears when Crassus loses against Marcus Marcellus in 8.5.3: *impetu gravis, exitu vanus apparuit* and as a consequence dies in 91 BC (Cic. *Font*. 24).
[175] Astin (1988: 14). Also see Liv. 4.8.2, Plin. *Nat*. 17.1.2-4, 36.7.

altercatione: This constitutes the longest exchange in direct speech in all V, spanning six lines; and could be a tribute to the famous *eloquentia* of Crassus.[176] 9.1.4's exchange is based on the value of trees, which Pliny emphasizes: *ad Neronis principis incendia cultu virides iuvenesque, ni princeps ille adcelerasset etiam arborum mortem*.[177] Another *dictum* of Crassus is reported by V at 6.2.2: *mihi, Philippe, consul, quia ne ego quidem tibi senator sum*. This exchange about the columns of Hymettian marble and the expensive trees with which they had enhanced their respective residences, is not the only altercation between the two men that has come down to us in the written sources. Aelian captures another episode where Domitius again opens an invective upon Crassus, who had been weeping at the death of his pet eel, which he had adorned with jewelled earrings and necklaces.[178] Like V, Aelian gives Crassus the last word in the shape of another clever and sharp riposte, like the episode under discussion: 'I mourned for an eel but you never mourned for the three wives you buried'.[179] This is significant because it points to a trend in rhetorical deployment of Crassus. Pliny without recounting the eel episode, also recognizes Crassus as a witty speaker: *ut praesens ingenio semper, ut faceto lepore sollers*.[180]

columnas Hymettias: L. Licinius Crassus is a significant person for marble in Rome as he was the first to import Hymettian marble to Rome when serving as curule aedile in 100 BC and was deemed to have been the first to have had columns of foreign marble on the Palatine.[181] A famous Roman to have used Hymettian columns was Cicero, whose Palatine

[176] In V *facta* overwhelmingly outweigh the *dicta*. Other *dicta* in direct speech in V9 are found at: 9.3.1, 9.3.2, 9.5.2, 9.5.4, 9.9.3 and 9.11.3.
[177] *Nat.* 17.1.5.
[178] Ael. *NA.* 8.4.1.
[179] My own translation from the original Greek.
[180] *Nat.* 17.4. On the idiosyncrasy of censorial position-taking see Astin (1988: 24-25).
[181] Ober (1981: 70). See *Nat*. 17.6, 36.114. For more on Hymettian marble in relation to Crassus but also generally at Rome before and after the Augustan period see Ober (1981: 70). On Hymettian marble in Rome also see Allen (1944).

house had 'been built by M. Livius Drusus. It was large, tastefully furnished, and had beautiful grounds'.[182]

columnas: According to Pliny (*Nat.* 7.36) the first person at Rome who covered the whole of the walls of his house with marble was Mamurra, who dwelt on the Cælian Hill and was satirized by Horace (*S.* 5.37) and repeatedly attacked by Catullus (*Carm*. 29, 43, 57), with accusations of extortion, and other vices. Although columns were widespread in Rome, it is often overlooked that they were the 'hallmark of Greek public and sacred architecture'.[183] In terms of luxurious buildings, even Cicero was not against them.[184] As Wallace-Hadrill states: 'a man of rank, a *princeps*, does need housing to fit his social standing, *dignitas*. It may even play an active part in enhancing his standing, as did that of Cn. Octavius on the Palatine, which was thought to have stood its builder, a *novus homo*, in good stead in the consular elections (*suffragata domino*)'.[185] '... *aedificatio* was regularly represented as a vice, and its avoidance was applauded, whether by Cato warning the estate-owner to defer building, or by Nepos praising Atticus as *minime aedificator*, or by the younger Pliny contrasting Trajan with the palace-building Domitia'.[186]

sexagies sestertio: Prices such as these are often not reliable, and even in the case of Cicero and Pliny minor, whose financial affairs are well documented, it is not possible to calculate costs accurately.[187]

---

[182] Fortner (1934: 180). See Vell. 1.14.1, 3. For more on the importation of marble generally see Ward-Perkins (1980). On Cicero and the Palatine see McDaniel (1928), Cerutti (1997) and Attanasio (2006).
[183] Wallace-Hadrill (1988: 64).
[184] *Off*. 1.138-9. Wallace-Hadrill (1988: 45).
[185] Wallace-Hadrill (1988: 45).
[186] Wallace-Hadrill (1988: 44).
[187] Rawson (1976: 95). For V's taking a conventional approach to these figures 'of prices expressed in multiples of thirty (up to thirty million)', see Scheidel (1996: 266).

luxuriosior: An important facet to the discourse on luxurious buildings, and V9 contributes to this via 9.1.1 and 9.1.4, is the tendency to 'conflate home with home-owner', namely that the state of a building corresponds to the owner's moral uprightness.[188] This in turn has effects on the environment and the Roman landscape (as I have commented on at 9.1.1).

sermonem oblitum Pyrrhi, immemorem Hannibalis: V compares a character to historical personalities again at 9.2.1: *Sulla* [...] *Scipionem se populo Romano, dum exercet, Hannibalem repraesentavit*.

quam a maioribus … maluerunt: Also see at 9.1.3 *priscae continentiae ignotum* for the re-appearance of the key term *continentia* and the same nostalgic backward glance typical of Roman moralizing.[189] Notice the theme of *continentia* in both 9.1.3 and 9.1.4.

9.1.5

Summary: The luxurious lifestyle displayed by Metellus Pius.

Sallust is a significant source for the *exempla* in this chapter: 1.5; 1.9 and 11.3.[190] For 9.1.5 and 9.1.9 V also uses Sallust's tone and vocabulary of moral indignation.[191] Other Sallustian elements range from *luxuria* and *libido* (V9.1's main themes) to '*audacia, abundantia, pudicitia, stupra, edendi et bibendi voluptas*, past banquets, grand private buildings, the

[188] Nichols (2010: 53). For more bibliography see Nichols (2010: 53): 'Coarelli (1989); Thomas (2007: 20-21); Nichols (2009: 106-50)'. Also see Wiseman (1987).
[189] See Nichols (2010: 56).
[190] Guerrini (1979). On Sallust's influence in V see also Guerrini (1981: 29-60, which includes references to V9: 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.6 and 9.9) and Jacquemin (1998). Guerrini's general argument of a Sallustian influence that spans V's moral vision and his use of rhetoric and vocabulary.
[191] See Guerrini (1979).

squandering of inheritances, and unhealthy interests in youths and women'.[192] Key words at 9.1.5 are deliberately reproduced from Sallust's account of this episode in his *Histories*: *ture*, *aulaeis*, *demissas*, *coronas*, *capite*.[193] The main convergence between the two authors is two-fold: first, the portrayal of *luxuria* itself as the direct cause for the demise of the Roman socio-political world; second, the disappearance of *metus hostilis*, thus removing all inhibitions and breaks in Roman society. For the first point, see especially the capsizing of the *prisci mores* (9.1.5) and the abandonment of the ancient *severitas* (9.1.5), emphasizing the generational divide where the past was seen as generally uncontaminated. This is apparent in V both explicitly but also as an undercurrent throughout his *opus*.[194]

Metellus Pius: Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius was consul in 80 BC.[195] Another Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius is present in V, appearing twice in book nine (9.1.8 and 9.5.3), he is the nephew that the Metellus Pius of this section adopted (a change of name ensued, with the added Scipio Nasica at the end). The latter is associated with this chapter's other theme of *libido* in 1.8 In 99 BC Metellus Pius petitioned for his father to be allowed to be returned from exile, thus earning his *cognomen* of Pius.[196] This is also celebrated by V: *pertinaci erga exsulem patrem amore tam clarum lacrimis quam alii victoriis cognomen adsecutus* (5.2.7). Pius also appears in a chapter named *de gratis*, showing V's ability to bring out a person's different traits to fit into his subdivisions, like his gratitude for Callidus, who was instrumental in helping Pius' father get recalled from exile, shown by assisting him be successful in the election for the Praetorship (5.2.7). Family history repeated itself when Metellus Pius' adopted nephew Scipio Nasica was similarly helped by his son-in-law, Gnaeus Pompeius (9.5.3), this time in a court of law.

[192] Bloomer (1992: 112).
[193] Guerrini (1979: 159 n. 21).
[194] This is reminiscent of Sal. *Jug*. 87.4 especially, also see *Jug*. 41.2-3.
[195] Cic. *Arch*. 6, 7, 9, 31.
[196] Cic. *ad Quir* 6, *Arch*. 6, *Red. Pop*. 37; Vell. 2.15.3.

So many of the characters in V have strong connections to either Marius or Sulla; Pius being an ardent follower of the latter.[197] References to the famous enmity between the two political leaders are plentiful in V, in terms of the people involved on either side and the events of these civil wars, thus creating a meaningful web of inter-connections. The Marius and Sulla *Leitmotif* becomes in fact one of the most important and central themes of V9.

tunc cum in Hispania ... et ubi ista: Five rhetorical questions in quick succession suggest a frenzied indignation. Sallust's tone is also one of indignation and expresses a similar regret to V concerning Pius' extravagance; especially, *quibus rebus aliquantam partem gloriae dempserat*.[198] The essence of Sallust's quote also represents a reoccurring sentiment in V9. V normally expresses this sentiment after having acknowledged a person's accomplishment and then contrasts it to that same person's negative deeds; showing how one can diminish one's previous achievements; like being one's worst enemy. Because of V's emphasis on choice and responsibility as variables affecting vice, it is noteworthy that V gives *voluit* – which conjures up the issue of 'intention' – a rhetorically prominent position at the start of the *exemplum*.[199] At other times in V, questions of choice and responsibility become entangled in ambiguity; that is, when more established norms or traditions (like *severitas*) are at loggerheads with other competing morals, which can, when combined, be counterproductive and, thus, also create negative outcomes.[200]

non in Graecia ... provincia: The rhetorical strength of this *antithesis* is amplified by its position, immediately following the five questions above, to indicate indignation and

[197] Indeed, there existed already an open enmity between Pius' father and Marius around 109 BC (Plut. *Mar*. 8.3).
[198] Sal. *Hist*. 2.59M.
[199] Main verbs in V are rarely at the beginning of an *exemplum*.
[200] For example see 9.3.4 on diminished glory.

disbelief. The way in which all the luxuries above have been enjoyed by Metellus Pius is comparable to 9.1.ext.1, which is also contextualised by battle.

luxuria Severitas: *Severitas* is emphasized by juxtaposition with its opposite, *luxuria*. This contrast is mirrored with the same effect by *adulescentia priscos* (9.1.5) highlighting the differences between the generations: *adulescentia priscos … novos orsa est*.[201]

Sertorius: Quintus Sertorius was governor of Hispania in 83 BC, and a Marian general. In antiquity, there was a strong anti-Sertorian tradition, and Sallust complains of *invidiam scriptorum* (*Hist*. 1. 88M). Appian says that he succumbed to luxury and debauchery in his last days (*B Civ*.1.113), suggesting that V's embedding of Sertorius in this theme was at least part of a recognisable trend. Following his consulship, Metellus Pius was sent to Spain to combat Sertorius, where he faced resistance for eight years. It was not until Sertorius was assassinated by his own men that the rebels yielded to Pius.[202]

Romanorum exercituum oculos Lusitanis telis praestringeret: Sertorius' Lusitanian connection is repeated in V at 7.3.6.[203] The natives' choice of Sertorius goes back to when he was governor in Spain and the reforms he effected for the benefit of the natives, and so 'when he later became a rebel leader they were fanatically devoted to him'.[204]

[201] For more on *severitas* see below, *supercilium* (9.1.6). Also see *severissime vindicantur* (1.1.praef).
[202] He is mentioned again in book nine at 15.3, through his widow.
[203] *proscriptione Sullana dux Lusitanorum fieri coactus*.
[204] Africa (1970: 532), Plut. *Sert*. 6.4, 14.1.

praestringeret: This is an interesting choice of verb, 'to dazzle, traverse, graze' (OLD.3a) the eyes of the Roman army.[205] As if the very visual power of the sheer number of natives that Sertorius was able to lead (represented by their spears, *telis*) was piercing their chests like a blunt weapon (*telis*) even before the real physical impact.[206] After all, what the Romans had before them must have appeared particularly forbidding but also impressive, since Sertorius himself had only one eye.[207] It is noteworthy that this is the only use of *praestringo* in V. *Praestringo* does not appear at all in V's Tiberian contemporaries Velleius and Seneca *maior*.[208] I argue that V employs the verb here to make the rhetorical point of contrasting the diminished potency of Sertorius' gaze (as being less 'piercing', because he had only one eye) with the army he was leading, which instead would have made a strong visual impact on the Roman army. V conveys the idea of this visual impact on the Romans by Sertorius' army thus: *Romanorum exercituum oculos Lusitanis telis praestringeret* (9.1.5). This rhetorical point also implies the strength of Sertorius' attitude and spirit in warfare, of being able to transcend disability and still lead an army.

adeo illi patris sui Numidica castra exciderant: Pius had served with his father Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, whilst still a young man, during the Jugurthine War of 109-

[205] For similar uses of *praestringo* see Plin. *Nat*. 7.64; Pl. *Truc*. 492, *Mil*. 4; Lucil. 1094; *Rhet. Her*. 4.63; Liv. 40.58.4; Sen. *Dial*. 5.9.2, 11.12.3; Cic. *Vat*. 25; Tac. *Ann*. 14.54.

[206] There are two figures of rhetoric here associated with *telis*: metonymia (a related word conveying the same idea for another, so *telis* for *exercitus*); and synecdoche (the part stands for the whole, that is, weapons are part of the army).

[207] He lost the eye in the Marsic war (Plut. *Sert*. 4.2), but he rejoiced in the disfigurement, regarding it as a badge of honour (Sal. *Hist*. 1.88).

[208] *Praestringo* appears the most in the following: nine times in both Seneca *minor* (*Dial*. 5.9.2, 9.1.8, 11.12.3, 12.8.6; *Ben*. 7.9.1; *Ep*.48.11.3; *Nat*. 4b.5.4, 5.6.4, 7.20.1) and Pliny *minor* (*Nat*. 7.64.5, 8.32.5, 10.197.7, 15.52.7, 17.227.2, 17.234.4, 18.334.3, 22.134.3, 22.138.4) seven times in Cicero (*Brut*. 26.3.13; *Rhet. Her*. 4.63.20; *Caec*. 46.8; *Vat*. 25.1; *Rab. Post*. 43.9; *Fin*. 4.37.5; *Sen*. 42.6); four times in Quintilian (*Inst*. 10.1.30, 10.1.92; *Decl*. 249.3.5, 252.18.6); three times in Tacitus (*Hist*. 1.84.9; *Ann*. 12.47.7, 14.54.11), and twice in Plautus (*Mil*. 4; *Truc*. 492). Other authors, like V, use *praestringo* very sparingly, only once: Liv. 40.58.5; Gel. 11.13.10; Front. *Strat*. 2.1.12; Vitr. *Arch*. 10.15.7.

107 BC.[209] The accusation by Sallust and V against Pius of indulging in luxury is also similarly made against his father Metellus Numidicus.[210]

celeri transitu luxuria adfluxerit: The speed with which the morals have declined from the former to the present generation is made by V only here, but it is a crucial and disturbing point for one of V's major themes (see my main introduction) about the generational disjunction. The theme has already appeared at 9.1.2 but it is here and in the following two *exempla* that V fully develops it.

9.1.6

Summary: The contrast between the lifestyles of the older and younger generations of the house of the Curios.

supercilium: The frown indicates sternness, *severitas*, gravity (*gravissimum*)*:* 2.9.praef, 2.7.5 (in both cases censorial), 6.3.10 (marital) and 7.2.ext.1 (haughty).[211]

sescenties sestertium aeris alieni: Curio *pater* improved his financial position by his service in the east with Sulla and especially when he became *triumphator* in 72. He rescued his son, who had become guarantor for the debts of M. Antonius. Curio *pater* seems to have been 'modest in his own expenses' thus being able to 'leave a considerable sum for his son to

[209] *is eo tempore contubernio patris ibidem militabat. Annos natus circiter viginti* (Sal. *Jug.* 64).
[210] In Sallust this is done more implicitly in reported speech by Marius, using it as the cause for the delayed victory over Jugurtha, see *Jug*. 64.
[211] On *severitas* in book nine see 1.5, 3.4 and 7.mil.Rom.3 For *severitas* in V generally see Langlands (2008).

squander.'[212] V uses this episode to mark the difference between the generations in their set of values and lifestyles, namely the profligacy and luxury indulged by the young, compared to the more frugal times of their ancestors. I noted in my introduction to 9.1 and at 9.3.6 that debt represents a theme in V9; it seems that in this case, considering the life as a whole of Curio *filius*, V has selected an especially apt example. Curio *filius* incurred further debt when he gave theatrical performances and games in honour of his father (Plin. *Nat*. 36.116-120), thus showing that even when he was behaving in an appropriate manner he was still a victim to his own tendencies to accumulate debt. Debt would eventually cause him to withdraw from his candidature for the aedileship (50 BC) and ask unsuccessfully for pecuniary assistance from Julius Caesar.[213] However, one should take into account the possibility that this might be fictional.[214]

contractum famosa iniuria nobilium iuvenum: Like Cicero, V finds a homosexual link here. Cicero explicitly describes Antony's sexual relationship with the younger Curio (*Phil*. 2.44), mocking Antony's passive, womanly role, comparing him to a male prostitute. Significantly for my reading of V9, this servile presentation of Antony originates from his debt to Curio.[215] Antony was passive to Curio both sexually and financially. Although this is classed as an *exemplum* on *luxuria*, its undercurrent introduces a prominent *libido* element.[216] The plural *iuvenum* may be rhetorical or it might suggest other partners than just M. Antonius.

[212] McDermott (1972: 411 n.80). Cicero, who was a friend of the Curios, relates this episode in his *Philippics* 2.45. Quintus was considered to have become 'heir of Clodius' *popularis* policies' (Welch 1995: 188).
[213] Linderski (1972: 186). For an alternative reading that this is probably mythical see Gruen (1974: 180).
[214] Gruen (1974: 180).
[215] Huzar (1978: 24).
[216] See Guerrini below at 9.1.7.

9.1.7

Summary: The debauched and fraudulent lifestyle displayed by Publius Clodius.[217]

quanta luxuria et libidine: This section stands at the very heart of the chapter, both structurally and thematically: *exempla* 1-6 are ones on *luxuria*, 8-9 on *libido*, no. 7 is a union of the two themes.[218]

P. autem Clodii ... abundavit! A case of *exclamatio* (a rhetorical form used to designate an impassioned outburst) which V uses frequently for emotional effect.[219] This is the first occurrence of an *introductory* exclamation in V9. Wardle asserts that exclamatory *introductions* are rare in V but in his list of such instances he does not deal with the following from V9: 9.1.7, 9.5.3, 9.8.3, 9.13.3, 9.13.ext.4 and 9.15.4: Wardle only mentions 9.3.ext.2 and 9.8.1.[220] Introductory exclamations elsewhere in V are rarer; therefore, the fact that V9 has eight such cases makes it a distinct structural device in this book.[221] Because of V9's distinctive apotreptic approach in focusing on *vitia*, it is perhaps not surprising that it attracts more *introductory* exclamations than other books. The emotions V wishes to stir in the readers are meant to be more acute to further impact the moral lessons imparted. *Introductory* exclamations are also a useful way to grab the readers' attention from the beginning of an *exemplum*.

[217] Also see Cic. *Att*. 1.16.5, Sen. *Epist*. 97.2.
[218] Guerrini (1979).
[219] Sinclair (1980: 95).
[220] Wardle (1998: 171, 232).
[221] The exception is book 7 where there are four cases in one chapter alone, 7.2 *de felicitate* (perhaps a theme which naturally attracts exclamatory remarks: 7.2.4, 7.2.ext.5, 7.2.ext.6, 7. 2.ext.14) and an additional two in the book: 7.7.6 and 7.8.1. V9 still has the most with a further two cases. Elsewhere in V the average is two or three per book, with only one for book 8: **1**.1.15, 1.5.3; **2**.6.6, 2.10.ext.2; **3**.2.ext.2, 3.5.2; **4.**1.4, 4.1.8, 4.4.8; **5**.1.4, 5.1.10, 5.6.8; **6**.1.4, 6.2.12, 6.8.6; **8**.14.ext.2.

incesti crimine: This is a reference to the *Bona Dea* affair. On the *Bona Dea* affair elsewhere in V see 4.2.5 (*incesti crimine*, same formulation as in 9.1.7).[222] The expression *incesti crimine* reoccurs in V in other contexts at 8.1.abs.5 (*Tucciae virginis Vestalis incesti criminis*) and 8.5.5 (*incesti crimine*). For the word *incestus* meaning 'impurity' in V see also: 3.7.9, 6.3.7 and 6.8.1.

matronarum et adulescentium nobilium: Like 9.1.8 the seduction and corruption infiltrates into the very fabric of the Roman family, where the women and children are the victims. Clodius' targeting of the *adulescentes* is comparable to Catiline's own corruption of the same. The central Sallustian *excursus* on the corruption of the young returns often as a symptomatic aspect of the more general undoing of the *mos maiorum*.[223] Notice the connectives *matronarum* and *nobilium* to the following *exemplum*; the former referring to Mucia and Fulvia, the latter to Saturninus (*nobilem puerum*, 9.1.8).

in quo …**erogatae sunt**: In this sentence V makes an important overall social point, showing how deep-rooted vice was in Rome, even affecting a jury, which was supposed to help keep order and administer justice. The paradox in the sentence is that vice is being responded to with more vice, rather than justice; thus showing the vicious circle of *vitia*.

pudicitiam: Very much in tune with Cicero, V implicates the sexual crimes of Clodius with the moral decline of the 1st century BC. Langlands describes V's use of *pudicitia* as 'a political metaphor, standing for political integrity and refusal to bow down to the demands of

[222] On the *Bona Dea* affair in V, see Mueller (2002: 45, 60, 130-1). On the scandal generally, see Tatum (1986: 85-147, 1990). On the cult of the *Bona Dea*, see Brouwer (1989).
[223] Guerrini (1979: 155).

another'.[224] Here *pudicitia* not only refers to respectable married women but also to the sexual integrity of noble jurors – both were compromised. So V adopts this very Ciceronian use of *pudicitia* in this context from an apotreptic point of view to highlight the jury's fickle nature in being easily bribed by Clodius. In this context V uses *pudicitia* as a term of barter, to highlight the vulgarity of this transaction and as a result undermining *pudicitia* as a wasted, 'squandered' resource.[225]

religionem: Refers to the jurors' oath but might also be a reference to Cicero's connection of Clodius' lack of *religio* (religious observance) and his excessive sexual immorality in a double charge: *duas res sanctissimas, religionem et pudicitiam, uno scelere violasset.*[226] Mirroring Cicero, V constructs the sentence so it also has the same two objects (in the accusative case), *pudicitiam* and *religionem*; like in a mirror, in inverted order.

stupro: Used also in Sallust's characterization of Catiline's supporters who, allegedly, supported their extravagances with prostitution.[227] A similar charge was made by Cicero against Antony who, as a young man, prostituted himself, to support his expensive lifestyle.[228] Notice here the contrast of *religionem* immediately followed by *stupro*, emphasizing how they are being traded with each other. As Mueller states that at 9.1.7, '*stuprum* (illicit sexual indulgence) and *religio* (here adherence to a ritually undertaken oath) appear incompatible'.[229] Mueller goes on to argue that V draws out a similar moral polarity

[224] (2006: 303). For *pudicitia* and political resistance see Langlands (2006 chapter 2 and p.295). For more on *pudicitia* in V9 see my comments at 9.5.3 *maritalis lecti blanditiis*. For a case study on *pudicitia* in Livy see Moore (1986: 228-232).
[225] Edwards (1993: 189). On V9's apotreptic approach see my main introduction.
[226] *Prov*. 24.
[227] *primo ingentis sumptus stupro corporis toleraverant* (Sal. *Cat*. 24.3).
[228] *Phil*. 2.44-5. On Antony's prostitution see my comments above under *contractum famosa iniuria nobilium iuvenum* (9.1.6). On the subject of prostitution see also the following *exemplum* (9.1.8). For a study of *stuprum* in Roman historiography, see Fantham (1991); with particular relevance to V see Fantham (1991: 273, 276-282).
[229] Mueller (2002: 131).

between the jurors and the Vestal Virgins (see my comments above on *incesti*) by virtue of their respective rituals: sacrifice for the Vestals and oath-taking for the jurors.[230] Both rituals have been contaminated. Pollution is a theme in V9.

9.1.8

Summary: A tribunician messenger sets up a brothel in his own house for two senior Roman politicians where among the prostitutes, two women and a boy, are from high-ranking Roman families.

The normative Roman view on prostitution was based on status, so even when V narrates at 9.12.8 a story of two men having sex with *underage* boys this still does not attract V's horror, as it does here, because status codes are not breached: the boys are slaves at 9.12.8.[231] In fact in 9.12.8 the reality that the boys are underage does not seem problematic at all, V even uses *perridicula* to describe the episode.[232] Forcing prostitution on free citizens, as opposed to slaves, *was* a crime. We see this in V at 6.1.10, where Gaius Cornelius is imprisoned for having a sexual relationship with a freeborn adolescent boy.

The most well-known cases of members of the upper classes supposedly being involved in prostitution were: first, Augustus' daughter, Julia (whose described conduct came close to a voluntary prostitution of sorts); and, second, Messalina, Claudius' wife.[233]

[230] Mueller (2002: 131).
[231] 9.12.8 also constitutes the eighth section of a chapter, as it does here at 9.1.8. This mirroring is also present between 9.1.1 and 9.1.ext.1, as the first *exemplum* in each section, based on the link of Campania, and the character of Ptolomy Physcon appearing as the fifth *exemplum* at 9.1.ext.5 and 9.2.ext.5.
[232] For prostitution of slaves in V see, for example, 6.1.6, where the freedman Publius Atilius Philiscus, when still a slave, was forced into prostitution by his own master.
[233] For the connection between elite women and prostitutes, especially during the reigns of Caligula and Nero, see McGinn (1998: 104-6).

convivium: V includes *convivia* in the chapter *de institutis antiquis* (2.1.10) thus showing their importance to Roman identity.[234] At 2.1.10 V remarks on the elders using *convivia* (banquet songs) for declamation, singing the achievements of their ancestors to inspire their young men to imitate these *res gestae*. This scenario of the young imitating the old resembles the aims of the *exempla* tradition, V perhaps regards his own work as a 'modern descendent of banquet songs' (*convivia*).[235] Although *convivia* were associated with *luxuria* they were also occasions for declamation and for performing the kind of knowledge found in Pliny's *Naturalis Historia*.[236] Therefore, as I argue in the main introduction to 9.1, V's take on *luxuria* is not an attack on this vice *per se* but only on its addictive elements; therefore, as a collorary, V's portrayal of a Roman institution such of the *convivium* is not in itself negative, allowing it instead to continue to flourish in the readers' minds. Sources on Roman public feasting are more numerous during the Principate than the Republic, and among them is V who thus places himself in that Roman literary tradition of using dining and the banquet for moralising purposes. This tradition intersects with V9's main themes of luxury and excess.[237] *convivia* are covered *passim* in V, but their greatest concentration is in books two and nine.[238] The reoccurring presence of the banquet in V9 encapsulates *inter alia* the tradition of the 'negative discourse of dining that derives from concerns about empire' and the obfuscating of Roman identity by other cultures.[239] The study of commensality is a study of 'social morphology' and via V's numerous glimpses of this, with its focus on social groups, it gives

[234] V's book two focuses on Roman institutions. On declamation in V9 see the main introduction.
[235] Skidmore (1996: 60).
[236] Lao (2008: 74-112; 2011: 55). Also see Horace capturing the moral duality of *luxuria* as vice and as a topic for discussion (*S*. 2.8.90-3, 2.4).
[237] Donahue (2005: 95), Wilkins (2005: 31-32), Roller (2001: 135). On Roman dining generally see Roller (2001: 129-172), Dunbabin (2003: 11-102).
[238] It is consistent with book two's main theme of Roman institutions that one of the biggest clusters on dining and *convivia* in all V should appear there. I have considered the range rather than the repetition of words such as *convivium*, *cena* and *epulum*. Book nine: *cena* (9.5.3, 9.5.ext.3, 9.12.ext.4); *convivium* (9.1.5, 9.1.8, 9.1.ext.2, 9.5.3, 9.5.4, 9.8.2); *epulum* (9.1.5, 9.1.8, 9.2.2, 9.13.ext.3). Book two: *cena* (2.1.2, 2.1.9, 2.5.5, 2.8.6); *convivium* (2.1.8, 2.1.9, 2.1.10, 2.6.1, 2.6.7, 2.8.6, 2.9.5); *epulum* (2.1.2, 2.2.9, 2.5.4, 2.5.5, 2.5.6).
[239] Wilkins (2005: 34).

us a window on Roman society itself.[240] 9.1.8 raises the question of public and private in the Roman world and the moral damage that a private *convivium* such as this could have on society.[241] Considering that Roman dining literature portrays mainly the adult male, the presence here of two Roman women at a *convivium* would is distinctive.[242] For an instance in V where women occupy a more equal place at a *convivium* see: *feminae cum viris cubantibus sedentes cenitabant* (2.1.2).[243]

V in this chapter has already dealt with two elements of the immoderate feast: eating and drinking (9.1.1 and 9.1.2). The *convivium* here at 9.1.8 combines *luxuria* and *libido* with its association with sexual pleasure, as a sequel to a banquet.[244] In fact sexual intercourse was also part of *convivia*, alongside drunkenness, the telling of jokes, dancing, singing, and the recitation of poetry.[245] *Convivia* are also associated with *avaritia* (the theme for V 9.4): Cicero criticizes Piso for his pursuit of sensual pleasures but not spending enough on his *convivia*.[246] For a shocking *convivium*, and one grossly incongruent with the typical elements of dining and conviviality because it was an occasion for *saevitia* and *crudelitas*, see 9.5.4; where the host's behaviour would have offended, insulted and appalled his guests.[247]

Gemellus tribunicius viator: V tells us that Gemellus was of free birth; however three quarters of *viatores* known to us were actually freedmen.[248]

---

[240] On Roman commensality as a social morphology see Grignon (2001: 24-25) and Donahue (2005: 97).
[241] For more on this see below. Also see Riggsby (1997: 36-56); more generally see Wallace-Hadrill (1994)
[242] On the overwhelming presence in Roman dining literature of the adult male rather than women see Wilkins (2005: 42). Also see Dunbabin (2003: 23): 'By the late Republic, and throughout the imperial period, there is no doubt that elite women could and did attend mixed banquets, and they would recline when they did so'.
[243] On women's dining posture, literary representation and issues of sexuality see Roller (2005: 65-76).
[244] See Cic. *Phil*. 2.104-5; *Fin*. 2.23; Sen. *Ep*. 47.7, 95.23. On the archaeology of the *convivium* see Hudson (2010).
[245] Corbeill (1997: 104). Also see, for example, Cic. *Sest*. 20, *Red*. *Sen*. 14-15.
[246] *Pis*. 67.
[247] On hostilities of causing offense and insult in *convivia* see Roller (2001: 146-153).
[248] McGinn (2004: 160).

intra servilem habitum: On the possibility that this could be a case of hyperbole see Doria (2014: 493 n.3).

Metello Scipioni consuli: This name gives us the date for this episode as 52 BC.[249]

lupanari: This house-brothel was perhaps an elaboration of the custom of inviting prostitutes for the *comissatio* and may have helped set the precedent for the Pompeian 'sex clubs'.[250]

cum a patre tum a viro utramque inclitam: Mucia had both a famous father and husband, since she was daughter of Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the augur and consul of 117, and wife to Pompey.[251] Fulvia's father is unknown but her husbands are famous: Clodius, Curio and Mark Antony.[252] V's *opprobrium* is not against brothels or pimping *per se* but the prostitution of persons of high status adds a particular point, especially since the two women would have been seen as representatives of the Roman world and culture, because of their family connections, thus staining Rome's reputation and memory for posterity. V does not only blame the two women and boy for their involvement (*probrosae patientiae*), that is, for being irresponsible or too prone to *libido*, but blames also the chief organizer, the consuls and the tribunes. [253] This is an altogether different position to the more ambiguous one involving women of whether they were at all blameworthy, at 9.1.3 (on the *lex Oppia*), and at 9.1.ext.7.[254] What distinguishes the *patientia* between a freeborn and a slave is that, in the

[249] The consul is mentioned again in this book at 5.3.
[250] For *comissatio* see McGinn (2004: ch.5). For sex clubs see McGinn (2004: 92, n.82).
[251] V mentions Quintus Mucius Scaevola elsewhere 3.8.5, 4.5.4, 8.8.1, 8.12.1.
[252] For more on Mucia and Fulvia in the context of this *exemplum* see Doria (2014: 496-7).
[253] According to McGinn (1998: 97), 'the main focus of criticism is […] the host'.
[254] This is in contrast with the *exempla* on treachery of Tarpeia (9.6.1) and Tullia (9.11.1).

former it is 'self-possessed' and in one's 'own *potestas*'; in fact, the two women and boy had free-will, they had a choice in the matter.[255]

nobilem puerum Saturninum: Gnaeus Sentius Saturninus, grandson of the praetor of 94 BC Gaius Sentius. The family became prominent under Augustus and his successors.[256] For the status of the Sentii and the Appuleii and the possibility that Saturninus was noble see Shackleton Bailey.[257] Saturninus appears to be underage so the fact that he was not just freeborn but also maybe from a noble family aggravates the situation further. Children forced into prostitution was a topic covered by comedy; these, however, were mostly abandoned children.[258] Therefore V presents an important *exemplum* here as it is very rare in Roman historiography for aristocratic male youths to be used as prostitutes.

prostituit: 9.1's two themes converge here: *luxuria*, because in Roman literature prostitutes were associated with 'exorbitant prices on account of their expensive tastes'; and *libido*, because of the context of this *exemplum*.[259] The issue that the women prostituting themselves here were actually elite Romans, represents, in my view, V's attempt to address the Roman social anxiety of the 'dichotomy of *meretrix* versus *matrona*'.[260] This anxiety brings into focus the centrality of marriage and family in Roman life and the powerful resonances it gives both conceptually and in practice to the representation of political order.[261] Therefore the dichotomy of *meretrix* versus *matrona* was intended to arouse a degree of social responsibility against the extramarital affair.

[255] Lawrence (2016: 247) references Kaster (2002: 137).
[256] Briscoe prefers Appuleius over Sentius, see Shackleton Bailey (2000, vol.2: 301 n.9). On the noble status of Saturninus, see McGinn (1998: 97) and Doria (2014: 495 and n.16).
[257] 2000, vol.2, p. 301 n. 9.
[258] McGinn (2004: 36).
[259] Bowditch (2006: 315).
[260] Wyke (2002: 139).
[261] Wyke (2002: 139-140).

ludibrio: Only here may be translated as 'plaything' rather than 'mockery'.[262] 'Plaything' conveys more accurately their nature as almost tradable commodities, thus V is encapsulating here just how low the dignity of these three individuals have plummeted. V conveys a similar message on an individual's dignity in the case of the organizer of this *convivium*, describing him as *intra servilem habitum deformis*, despite his alleged free born status.

non celebrandas sed vindicandas: V frequently expresses his disappointment in the ruling class in book nine (see my main introduction); this is especially evident here (since so many elite Romans were in attendance, including the consul and various tribunes) on account of their lax morality and for not leading by example. V implies that this elite group's behaviour, which is celebrating vice rather than punishing it, is in itself perpetuating *vitia*, not just in their own class but throughout Roman society. Although the feast took place within the privacy of a private house, behind closed doors, the fact that it happened at all has a wider, deeper effect on its surrounding community. Thus V dramatizes the civic, societal implications of shame (*magno cum rubore civitatis*).

vindicandas: 'Punish' but also 'avenge' are recurrent verbs in V9's overall moral discourse. At 1.praef, V's *vitia severissime vindicantur* is noteworthy, as it sign-posts to the reader that this is a significant structural feature of the *opus*. For V9 it actually constitutes the main aim of the book, hence its apotreptic approach. The emotions underlying the *exempla* involved in punishing and avenging are powerfully charged with meaning for V. V9 displays that so many of these vignettes from history have remained unpunished or unresolved, provoking many authorial outbursts of indignation (such as here). These authorial interventions are

[262] *Ludibrium* with the meaning of mockery elsewhere in V see 3.7.1, 6.2.4, 7.8.9, 9.12.5 and 9.14.2. For my comments on mockery and derision in V9 see *risu prosequenda* (9.4.ext.1) and *cavillari* (9.12.8).

made more complex when V tries to find someone to blame, and often they are influenced by gendered rhetoric and associated anxieties concerning changing gender roles (for example 9.1.3).[263]

9.1.9.

Summary: Catiline poisons his own son in order to marry Aurelia Orestilla.[264]

In this *exemplum* V clearly evokes Sallust's version, keeping certain words, or slightly and carefully altering others, but always in a way to evoke the Sallustian text.[265]

libido: Apart from the sexual side, Aurelia helped him meet his debts, a detail of their relationship not alluded to by V: *et alienis nominibus liberalitas Orestillae suis filiaeque copiis persolveret*.[266] V follows Sallust very closely here, *inter alia*, by using *libido* as the main reason for Catiline's son's murder.

Aureliae Orestillae: For women in this chapter see above on the *lex Oppia* (9.1.3) and under *domi suae* (9.1.8).[267] It is surprising that V does not mention Sempronia, the Catilinarian conspirator, who because of her unnaturalness would have been perfect material for V9.[268]

---

[263] See my comment above above under *cum a patre tum a viro utramque inclitam*. For more on revenge and punishment see 9.10 *de ultione*. Fantham (1991: 276) argues that 'V's vignettes exploit gender and social hierarchy'.
[264] The present episode is covered by Cicero (*Cat*. 1.14), Sallust (*Cat*. 15.2) Appian (*B Civ*. 2.2). Also see Catul. 15.
[265] This is covered in detail in Guerrini (1979: 159).
[266] Sal. *Cat*. 35.3.
[267] For more on women in V9 see my comments at 9.6.1.
[268] In book three V does mention another Sempronia, the sister of the Gracchi. On the two Sempronias see Milnor (2009).

unum impedimentum: The only obstacle to the marriage was Catiline's son, since Aurelia 'was not willing to marry a man who had a son'.[269] Perspective is the main difference between Sallust and V: in Sallust the obstacle to the marriage is from the point of view of Aurelia, in V it is from Catiline's perspective.[270]

veneno sustulit: Poisoning is frequently mentioned in Roman literature especially during the early Empire.[271]

patrem egerat ... patriae: Catiline shows parricidal tendencies both toward the State and in killing his son.[272] V's comment here is certainly climactic, being preceded just in the previous sentence by two *oxymorons*.

9.1.externa

9.1.ext.1

Summary: Hannibal and his army, while caught off-guard enjoying and undermined by the effects of different types of luxuries, are caught and defeated by the Romans.[273]

Campana: This region of Italy is the same as in 9.1.1 (Lucrine Lake). Note how V interweaves the domesticity of Campania with the foreign and ambiguous presence of Hannibal. This region is significantly foregrounded in the external section as an attention-

[269] App. *B Civ*. 2.2 (Loeb translation).
[270] For more on the theme of fathers murdering their sons see my comments below at 9.3.4 under *filium adulescentem securi percusserat*.
[271] Kaufman (1932: 156, 158). For a study on the role of poison in Roman society see Golden (2005).
[272] On Catiline's parricidal tendencies see also Cic. *Cat*. 1.14.
[273] 216-15 BC. Also see Liv. 23.18.10-16.

grabber, linking Rome and everywhere else as mass-audience for V's warning against the effects of *luxuria*.

utilis: For the first time in the chapter, *luxuria* becomes *utilis*, its role is turned from one of pleasure to a weapon applied against the enemies of Rome.[274] As I mentioned in the introduction to 9.1, by emphasising luxuries whose origins are geographically Italian, V overlaps domestic with external. Campania is a good example of this ambiguity; it is located on the Italian peninsula but also had Samnite and Greek influences.

invictum: 'Hannibal was *invictus* only until Campanian luxury seduced him'.[275]

Hannibalem: Hannibal is the most frequently treated non-Roman in V covering some forty *exempla*, eight of which are in book nine alone. These span six *vitia*, two *exempla* for each of the first two chapters (one domestic, the other external).[276] In 9.1 the domestic *exempla* focus on the effects of *luxuria* on particular individuals while the external ones portray collective groups of people (except for ext.3).

fracta et contusa Punica feritas: The gradient of destructiveness and ruin brought about by *luxuria* and *libido* in the external *exempla* is markedly worse than the domestic *exempla*.[277] This choice of vocabulary suggests the violence of *luxuria*'s attack.

---

[274] Similarly the Egyptians whose minds were so enervated with pleasure and unaccustomed to hard manly work are unable to withstand the Romans (ext.6). On being captured, imprisoned by *luxuria*: *vincendum Romano militi tradidit* (ext.1); *adeo ut nescias ab hostibusne an ab illis capi perniciosius habendum sit* (ext.1); *dum deliciis nimis capitur* (ext.3).

[275] Wardle (2005: 151 n. 48).

[276] V's other great exemplar Alexander only features three times in book nine (chapter nos. 3, 5 and 10), thus making him in V's exemplary structure a less flawed individual than Hannibal.

[277] This is apparent also in the following: *animique pariter et corporis vires expugnantur* (ext.1); *in profundum iniuriam et turpitudinis decidit … dominationi subiceret* (ext.2); *quanta…amplissimi imperii ruina evasit* (ext.3). The only truly dark domestic *exemplum* is 1.9 with Catiline's murder of his son. The introduction of savagery and cruelty is an early resonance to 9.2 *de crudelitate*.

Seplasia: 'A street in Capua where unguents, perfumes were sold'.[278]

vitiis … quibus virtus atteritur: This touches on an important rhetorical point regarding masculinity.[279] This is the thread that connects 9.1.ext.1, 6 and 7: *vitiis ... quibus virtus atteritur* (*ext*.1); *effeminatior… viris enim, si modo viri erant* (ext.7).[280] *Luxuria*'s strong power over men is developed when contrasted thus: *invictum enim armis* followed by two superlatives: *vigilantissimum ducem … exercitum acerrimum* (ext.1). The crucial point is that, no matter how grand and strong a person is, they can still fall prey to the vices. Similarly in ext.2 V describes Etruria as *opulenta … moribus et legibus ordinata, Etruriae caput habebatur*, demonstrating that even a country seemingly rich and stable can be toppled easily by *luxuria*.[281] It can happen to anyone and anywhere. *Effeminatior* also conjures up crucial associations with Sallust and Cato maior, who linked female behaviour with *luxuria*, thus V shows 'effeminacy becoming more than a metaphor for degeneration'.[282] The Catonian position appears in Livy with a version of the proposed repeal of the *lex Oppia*, with speeches delivered by Cato Maior and Lucius Valerius, presented by V above at 9.1.3.[283]

atteritur: I argue that this verb is in the present tense to show the gradual impact of *luxuria*. This is comparable to my comments in the introduction to 9.1, on the deceptive and insidious nature of *luxuria* described by the word *blandum* (9.1.praef). Because *luxuria* is *blanda*, that

[278] OLD. Also mentioned in Cic. *Sest*. 19; Plin. *Nat*. 33.164; Var. *Men*. 38.
[279] See my introduction; also see McDonnell (2006). Compare to Sallust: *viri muliebria pati* (*Cat*. 13.3), for this expression see Tacitus, *Ann*. 11.36.4; also see Adams (1982: 189-190).
[280] *virtus* in ext.1 means 'manliness' in this context. The quote in ext.7, namely that death should be preferable than living in such intoxicated levels of luxury is comparable to Sallust's comment: *nonne emori per virtutem praestat quam vitam miseram atque inhonestam . . . per dedecus amittere*? (*Cat*. 20.9).
[281] For Etruria and the Etruscans in V9 see especially 9.2.ext.10, 9.9.3 and 9.10.1.
[282] Boyd (1987: 190). On women and *luxuria* see Sal. *Cat*. 24.3; and for Cato maior's position see Livy in the opening of book thirty-four.
[283] Compare Livy: *saepe me querentem de ... sumptibus audistis; diversisque duobus vitiis, avaritia et luxuria, civitatem laborare* (34.4. 1); and Sallust: *saepe numero . .. multa verba in hoc ordine feci, saepe de luxuria atque avaritia nostrorum civium questus sum* (*Cat*. 52.7).

is why the impact is gradual, and one might argue therefore also more deep-rooted and difficult to change or even notice.

animique pariter et corporis: The mind features three times in the external *exempla*: nos. 1, 6, and 7. It is curious that there are no such mentions among the domestic *exempla*, considering that V wrote the following at 9.1.praef, thus highlighting its importance: *ex iisdem vitiorum principiis oritur … gemino mentis errore conexae*. More than all the other *vitia* of V9, this first chapter is the one which most fully encapsulates the relationship between mind and body and the role of the emotions. As noted in the main introduction, the study of emotions is crucial to V9, especially to its apotreptic approach which seeks to create a reaction in the reader by triggering recall of experiences and memories.

9.1.ext.2.

Summary: The Volsinians' dependence on *luxuria* spirals out of control to the extent that their slaves take control and subjugate freeborn women to their vices.[284]

Volsiniensium: Volsinii was a town in Etruria.[285] The reversal of power with the slaves is not explained in Florus, where no reference is made to them.[286]

opulenta: *Opulentissimi Etruscorum*.[287] *Opulenta* is here juxtaposed with *moribus et legibus ordinata* as a way to contrast the state of the town before and after the slave revolt. But the

[284] For the topos of Etruscan luxury depicted in Roman literature see Bittarello (2009: 213, 218), in Greek sources see Firpo (1997: 103-11), Macfarlane (1996: 261, n.60), Dench (1996: 249, n.5).
[285] On the Etruscan theme in V9 see 9.2.ext.10, 9.9.3 and 9.10.
[286] Flor. 1.16.
[287] Flor. 1.16.

fact that the town was *opulenta* in the first place was *part* of the problem since *luxuria* flourished. As I comment in the introduction to 9.1, V does not blame *luxuria per se* for the downfall in morals at Rome, but instead the inhabitants' enslavement to it. Therefore here the slaves become a personification of that vice, that is, their legal status of slaves is emblematic of free citizens' moral slavery to *vitia*.

servorum … dominationi: The slaves take over the rule of their country. Note the deeper meaning between slaves and becoming slaves to one's desires, lack of discipline. *Luxuria* can also 'denote the violation of hierarchy, wherein people do not know their "right" place in society', for this portrayal of slaves see 9.15.[288] Note the quasi-paradoxical *dominationi*, being dominated by slaves, since usually it is the slaves who are dominated, the ultimate in a reversal of power. The tyrant-like traits in the slaves here show that these dangerous attributes can be acquired by anybody if the morals of a community are corrupt, from a king (the usual subject on tyrannical power) to a slave. Although V's horror is directed at the slaves, with *postquam luxuria prolapsa est* the author also hints that the Volsinians as a whole had fallen into the trap of vice to the extent that they could no longer even defend themselves from their own slaves.[289] Although V uses *servorum* here, in Florus instead they are freedmen: *servos quondam suos, qui libertatem a dominis datam*.[290]

senatorium ordinem intrari ausi: The juxtaposition of insolence (*insolentissimae*, in the previous sentence) with the senate reoccurs at 9.5.1 and 9.5.3, but while at 9.5 the transgressors were men who had been previously entitled to enter the senate, here it is the unentitled, the slaves who 'dare' (*intrare ausi*). *Ausi* clearly expresses V's indignation.

[288] Griffin (2005: 248).
[289] The latter point is comparable to 9.1.ext.1 and 9.1.ext. 6 where the enemy army was so seduced by pleasure as to become incapable of defending itself.
[290] Flor. 1.16.

Intrare is used in a similar manner as *penetravit* at 9.1.1, where a crossing of physical and moral boundaries is made. V here lists one of Rome's most hallowed institutions or practices: for the importance of *testamenta* see 9.4.1, for *convivia* see 9.1.8. The last three points on the list fall within the remit of this chapter's second theme of *libido*, involving the sexual undermining of freeborn women.[291]

lege: The concept that V lets emerge from this clause is emotionally powerful and rhetorically charged, the legislative process itself becomes the vehicle to lawfully allow criminal acts.

impunita: On events going unpunished see my comments at 9.10. In this case however the slaves do eventually get punished by Fabius Gurges (not mentioned here), but V lets this *exemplum* go unresolved rather than capitalizing on offering a moral message.[292] I see this as deliberate, so that the effect of V's outrageous narrative affects the reader in a more powerful lasting manner, independent of whether the reader knew the full story or not. The structure of the *exemplum*, a genre where an episode from history is isolated from its context, serves V well here as he is able to capture in a snapshot the feelings of the Romans and Volsinians at a point in time before these vicissitudes were resolved, namely, their outrage and horror promulgated by the slaves' actions.[293]

[291] On the latter see my comments at 9.1.8.
[292] *sed hic quoque duce Fabio Gurgite poenas dederunt* (Flor. 1.16).
[293] The first display of gladiators at Rome in 264 included the captive freedmen from Volsinii (Welch 2007: 19).

9.1.ext.3.

Summary: Xerxes publishes an edict offering a reward to anyone who discovered a new sort of pleasure.[294]

age: It is a stylistic feature of V sometimes to begin an *exemplum* thus, and it occurs most often in V9.[295] Its chief purpose is to draw in the reader more, as if speaking directly to his audience.[296]

Xerxes: For Xerxes' presence in V9 see my comments at 9.5.ext.2.

usque: For this use of *usque* in a consecutive clause, 'to such an extent' (OLD 7b), in V9 see 9.1.3, 9.4.3, 9.8.ext.2, 9.14.2.

gaudens ut edicto praemium … repperisset: The sense of novelty implied here in the searching of *novum voluptatis genus*, is reminiscent of the unusual and new activities conducted by Orata (9.1.1) and Aesopus (9.1.2). It also looks forward in V9 to 9.2; where, cruel, eccentric unusual and *new* acts of cruelty are being devised in the *exempla* of its external section. Here, the encouragement Xerxes gives people to search for *novum voluptatis genus* (by publishing the edict), looks forward in the book to 9.4, on the insatiability of vice and its vicious circle.[297] The quasi-competitiveness in this *exemplum* is

[294] For this story see Cic. *Tusc*. 5.20 and Bridges (2015: 169). On the connection between Xerxes, *luxuria* and Campania see 9.5.ext.2. On the theme of Xerxes' reputation for luxurious excess see Cic. *Fin*. 2.111-2.
[295] Four times in book 9: 9.3.6, 9.8.3, 9.13.ext.4. Three times in book 2: 2.6.6, 2.7.7, 2.9.6. Twice in books 3, 4 , 5 and 7: 3.2.ext.2, 3.5.2; 4.1.4, 4.3.11; 5.1.4, 5.6.8; 7.2.ext.2, 7.2.ext.10. Once in books 6 and 8: 6.2.12, 8.5.4. No cases for book 1.
[296] See Themann-Steinke (2008: 507) on 2.9.6.
[297] See my comments under *avidissima vorago* (9.4.praef).

comparable to the 'competition in insolence' (*insolentiae … aemulatio*) of 9.5.ext.4. On exultation elsewhere in V9 also see *per summam animorum alacritatem* (9.7.1).

As argued by Maskakov (1979: 302), stylistic variation and imitation with Cicero (*Tusc*. 5.20) is probable here:

V: *ut edicto praemium ei proponeret, qui novum voluptatis genus repperisset*.

Cicero: *praemium proposuit, qui invenisset novam voluptatem*.

capitur: V continues the theme of moral slavery, see also 9.1.ext.2. V does not take into account the following by Cicero, in connection to this *exemplum*: *qui invenisset novam voluptatem, qua ipsa non fuit contentus; neque enim umquam finem inveniet libido*.[298] V could have capitalized on the latter to tie into V9.4's theme of the emotional hole that can never be satiated.[299]

9.1.ext.4.

Summary: The visible display of luxurious possessions carried by Antiochus' army.[300]

Antiochus: Antiochus VII Sidetes ruler of the Hellenistic Seleucid Empire from 138 to 129 BC. This is his only mention in all V. The expedition in this *exemplum* relates to the war against the Parthians who are expelled from Babylon and Media.

nihilo continentioris exempli: Antiochus and Xerxes here are compared for their direct influence on the crowd in the pursuit of *luxuria*: Xerxes challenges the people to find new

[298] Cic. *Tusc*. 5.20.
[299] See my comments at 9.4.
[300] 131 BC. For this story see also Just. 38.10.

pleasures, Antiochus has his army carry luxurious objects on an army expedition.[301] V does not emphasize the numerical details that Justin (38.10) would go on to provide on the disparity between camp followers (carrying the luxurious items) and actual armed men: the former were three hundred thousand, the latter only eighty thousand. It is odd that V would not have wished to emphasize this point to drive harder his moral lesson and to show in this instance how *luxuria* was more of a priority and an expense than the actual expedition itself.

caecam et amentem: A metaphoric blindness of reason reoccurs in V at *caeco furore* (9.2.ext.5) and *caeca et amens* (2.2.5).[302] Themann-Steinke (2008: 182) terms this expression spiritual blindness instead (*geistige Verblendung*), but because of the significant theme in V9 on reason, or absence of it (see my main introduction), blindness of reason seems a fitter and more consistent interpretation.

exercitus imitatus: On an army imitating their leader also see 9.7.mil. Rom.2: *ambitiosi ducis illecebris corrupti*.[303] This is an important point for V9 that I discussed in the main introduction: the very people who should lead by example do not, spreading their vices to the populace. V's emphasis has a structural force within the chapter, mirroring the same moral message as 9.1.4: both are the fourth *exempla* in their respective domestic and external sections.

avaro … strenuo mora: *Avaro*, link to 9.4 *de avaritia*. Note the imagery here of the heavy and slow (implied) army with many ponderous luxurious items and the burden of the extra men who were not actual soldiers; versus what could have been a light and fast army.

[301] For V's treatment of the crowd in V9 see 9.7.
[302] For similar expressions in Latin literature of *caecam et amentem* see Themann-Steinke (2008: 182).
[303] Like in this chapter, the *exempla* of 9.7 have collective subjects, people (9.7.1-4) and the army (9.7.mil.Rom.1-3).

optabilis: 'Wished for, desirable' (OLD) plunder for the enemy, is similar to V's use of *utilis* in connection to *luxuria* at 9.1.ext.1, in both *exempla luxuria* is advantageous to one side to defeat the opposing other.

9.1.ext.5

Summary: The sexual crimes of King Ptolemy (Physcon): he forced his sister to marry him, raped her daughter, then married her after divorcing his sister.

This is the only *exemplum* in the external section of 9.1 which *solely* focuses on *libido*, but there are allusions to *libido* also in 9.1.ext on sexual indulgence (ext.1) and rapes (ext.2). The family-based crimes of 9.1.ext.5 hark back to 9.1.9 with Catiline's murder of his son, an act which enabled him to marry Orestilla.[304] 9.1.ext.5 is the only external *exemplum* of the chapter with individual rather than collective victims.

The likely source for 9.1.ext.5 is Trogus (cf. Justin 38.2.5) shown by V's *per vim stuprata*.[305] This story is also related by Livy, where the main focus is Ptolemy's cruelty.[306] V instead takes a secondary clause from the Livy to let the *libido* element become more prominent in this *exemplum*.[307] V focuses on Ptolemy's cruelty at 9.2.ext.5 instead, in the only instance in V9 where the reader is referred back to another place in the book, to this *exemplum*.[308]

---

[304] Guerrini (1979: 164 n.45) draws our attention to other Sallustian resonances in the *externa exempla* in this chapter.
[305] *ipsam quoque sororem filia eius virgine per vim stuprata et in matrimonium adscita repudiat* (38.8.5).
[306] *Per*. 59.13.
[307] *quam filia eius virgine per vim compressa atque in matrimonium ducta repudiaverat* (Liv. *Per*. 59.13).
[308] Note that Ptolemy Physcon appears as the fifth *exemplum* in both the external sections of 9.1 and 9.2: 9.1.ext.5 and 9.2.ext.5.

accessio vitiorum: Ptolemy lived in a manner which was subordinate to his vices.[309] This *moral* slavery is a significant characteristic in my reading of 9.4 *de avaritia*, but also defines V's moral lessons on the pitfalls of living based on *vitia* generally.[310] At 9.4.ext.1 V relates the story of another king, another Ptolemy (of Cyprus), who was a slave to riches; thus the author displays the image of kings, who would normally dominate and rule, in a passive role in relation to *vitia*.

Physcon: This nickname, whose meaning is sausage, potbelly or bladder, is due to Ptolemy's obesity, a consequence of *luxuria* that I have discussed in this chapter's introduction (on corpulence and excessive eating, see also 9.1.2).[311] This term and its associations thus drag particular politico-cultural issues into the frame in ways that are different but complementary to V's treatment of greed in the domestic and external contexts.

9.1.ext.6

Summary: When the Egyptian people were ordered to surround their camp with a rampart and ditch they asked for the work to be contracted out at public expense.[312]

consentaneus: Gabinius' other *exemplum* in V at 8.1.absol.3 also starts with this same word but this is a coincidence since *consentaneus* at 8.1.absol.3 refers to Gabinius and here to the

[309] OLD 5a. With this use of *accessio* see also Val. Max. 5.7.1, Liv. 31.7.9, 45.7.2; Sen. *Dial*. 8.7.2; Plin. *Nat*. 29.11; Tac. *Hist*. 3.13.
[310] See my comments at 9.4.ext.1 and the main introduction.
[311] Physcon is also used twice by Pompeius Trogus via his excerptor Justin at *Hist. Phil*. 38. pr. 4, 39. pr. 8.
[312] 55 BC.

Egyptian people. It is however an unusual instance in V where the people and the kings are placed on the same level morally.

Archelai: Archelaus was appointed high priest of Comana in Cappadocia by Pompey in 63 BC. Archelaus, who was on friendly terms with Gabinius, died fighting Gabinius' troops.[313]

Gabinium: (pr. 61 BC, cos. 58 BC) The setting of this *exemplum* is that Aulus Gabinius, during his tenure as proconsul in Syria, was sent by Pompey to restore Ptolemy XII to his kingdom and he was successful in doing this in a short campaign, supported by a young Mark Antony.[314] V does not mention Gabinius' strong associations with *luxuria*, perhaps expecting the reader to instinctively make the connection; therefore it is not surprising that the author should mention Gabinius in a chapter on *luxuria*, since Cicero made Gabinius synonymous with luxury.[315]

universus … locaretur: The Egyptians by refusing to build a rampart and ditch themselves, asking for it to be done with public money instead, allowed Gabinius the opportunity to obtain victory on sea and land, the conquest of which he then passed on to Ptolemy XII. This margin of opportunity that the Egyptians missed is comparable to two significant keywords from 9.1.ext.4: the enemy (the Egyptians) were greedy (*avaro*) and Gabinius capitalised on that delay (*mora*). This sluggish frame of mind is the very opposite to *temeritas*, the theme for 9.8, which instead is characterised by speedy, vigorous action (although *temeritas* is negative, as V advises his readers). The Egyptians' response in wanting the ditch and rampart funded at public expense (*opus publica pecunia faciendum*) additionally displays their

[313] Strabo 12.3.34 and 17.1.11; Plut. *Ant*. 3.2 - 3.6; App. *Mith*. 114.
[314] On Gabinius see Cass. Dio 36.23-36, 38.13. 30, 39.55-63; Plut. *Pomp*. 25. 48; Joseph. *AJ* 14.4-6; App. *Ill*. 12, *B Civ*. 2.24. 59; Cic. *Att.* 6.2, Q. *Fr*. 2.13, *Red*. *Sen*. 4-8, *Man*. 17, 18, 19.
[315] On Gabinius and *luxuria* see Cic. *Pis*. 21.

avaritia, they refused to pay for it. Had the Egyptians paid for it themselves instead, then this lack of (or shorter amount of) delay might have generated a different outcome.[316] While in V money is the reason the Egyptians did not undertake the building work (*ut id opus publica pecunia faciendum locaretur*), Fraser's interpretation, instead, is that they thought that the work 'should be done by hired labor'; the latter view is thus focused on the physical work *per se* rather than any financial considerations.[317]

quapropter … non potuerunt: The gain from the enemy's dependence on *luxuria* is in the Romans' favour, similarly to 9.1.ext.1 (*utilis*). V's remark here that *spiritum exercitus nostri sustinere non potuerunt* strengthens his message, that it was not the spirit of the Romans' army that the Egyptians were unable to withstand, rather their inability to conquer their own addiction to *luxuria*, which in the end prevented them from implementing Archelaus' orders immediately.

deliciis tam enerves: For *enerves* referring to *animus* see also 2.7.15 *sic enerves animos odisse virtus solet*. *Enerves* occurs the most in V and Seneca minor (five times each), and is evidenced no earlier than Seneca the Elder, therefore V is the earliest extant user of the word.[318] *Enerves* shows how mind and body are inter-dependent, and V would have hoped that such an insight would have empowered the reader to be alert to their thinking patterns and their consumption of *luxuria*.

---

[316] For the connection between *luxuria* and *avaritia* in Roman historiography see Bowditch (2006: 307, 315).
[317] Fraser (1972 vol.2: 225).
[318] For *enerves* elsewhere in V see 2.7.15 (Themann-Steinke 2008: 425), 3.5.3, 6.4.2, 9.13.praef. Also see Sen. *Con*. 1. Pr. 9; Sen. *Ep*. 71.24, 74.33, *Thy*. 176, *Her*. *O*. 172, *Dial*. 7.13.4; Tac. *Dial*. 18.5; Plin. *Pan*. 33.1; Apul. *Apolog*. 74.29. Livy uses <u>*enerves*</u> to describe Hannibal and his army in the episode V uses for 9.1.ext.1: *somnus enim et vinum et epulae et scorta balineaque et otium consuetudine in dies blandius ita* <u>*enervaverunt*</u> *corpora animosque* (Liv. 23.18.12). For *delicia* see also 9.1.ext.3; 7.6.2; 6.1.10; 6.9.5; 4.3.2; 4.4.4; 4.7.praef; 2.6.1; 1.5.3.

9.1.ext.7

Summary: The Cypriots allowed their queens to mount chariots using women's bodies so that their footsteps would feel softer.

This *exemplum* stretches both 9.1 and 9.2 thematically, to embody women's *luxuria* (the theme for 9.1) and their cruelty (the theme for 9.2).[319] In fact, bodily degradation, an expression of cruelty, features *passim* in 9.2. In terms of *luxuria*, however, it is of a very odd type of luxury, as it distances itself from the rest of the chapter; because the pursuit of luxury leads directly to abuse and victimisation. The cruelty of the *reginae* here is heightened by the fact that the bodies they were trampling over were those of other women and that these acts occurred for their own sake, they lack the purpose of 9.1.3 which did have a good cause, standing up for women's rights.[320] This juxtaposition of opposites – *luxuria* (softness) and cruelty (women used as steps) – is somewhat paradoxical, but is comparable to the discussion of another but similar juxtaposition of opposites, that of effeminate luxury and violence in the fragments of Clearchus.[321]

reginas: The *reginae* of this *exemplum* were called 'step-stools' (*Klimakides*) by Plutarch.[322] Athenaeus called them 'flatterers' (*Kolakides*).[323] Athenaeus identifies them as

[319] Also see *feritas* at ext.1 above as another allusion in this chapter's external section to cruelty, savagery.
[320] Here, at 9.1.ext.3, cruelty has an element of pleasure, see the introduction to 9.2 on how this matches my definition of *crudelitas* for 9.2 specifically. This reinforces V's rationale for positioning this *exemplum* here, bridging the two chapters. On trampling in V9 see *proculco* at 9.3.7 and 9.5.3. For more on the role of women in V see 9.6.1 on Tarpeia.
[321] Nenci (1989), Bollansée (2008: 405), Tsitsiridis (2008 70–1). For the opposite position, that this reading is anachronistic for Clearchus see Gorman (2010: 187).
[322] *Mor*. 50 E, as referenced by Briant (2015: 329).
[323] As referenced by Briant (2015: 520 n. 40), *Deipnosophists* 6.256c-d (which mentions, *inter alia*, how Clearchus of Soli explains the origin of the name 'flatterer'). For Clearchus on the *Klimakides* and the *Kolakides* see Tsitsiridis (2013: 112 n.23, but misquotes V: '9.ext.9' instead of 9.1.ext.7).

female despots, as a translation from the term *anax*.[324] This effeminate power (*delicato imperio*) from a woman is in contrast to that of Samiramis, Queen of Assyria, at 9.3.ext.4. Samiramis, who is also the last *exemplum* of an external section (at 9.3), instead disregards effeminacy or any concern for appearances or pleasure to restore Babylon from a revolt. The *reginae* of this *exemplum* and Samiramis are women of royal status but differ in their temperament.

sustinebant: Rather than focusing on the women who were trampled on, V expresses his abhorrence at men being subservient, passive to women; in fact the Cypriot men allowed, tolerated the actions of the *reginae*; therefore they had the power to stop this from happening, but they did not.[325] Relevant to this, note later in this *exemplum* the verb *obtempero*: the men *obeyed*, *complied* with the women's wishes. V refers to the men here as *effeminatior*, placed in an emphatic position at the beginning of the *exemplum*, to allude to their passivity to women**.** This view emerges in V's choice of the comparative (*effeminatior*), to suggest that V grades this *exemplum* as worse, in moral gradient, compared to the rest of the external section. This story provides an instance of V's structurally emphatic model whereby the worst *exemplum* in a section (domestic or external) is kept until last.[326] At 9.1.8 I commented on the *opprobrium* at Rome when Roman citizens took a passive role in a homosexual relationship. The setting here is somewhat different (this is not sexual nor does it involve another male) but the man's position is one of obeying a woman in carrying out a wrongdoing. The true blame of this episode is not with the women themselves but the men who *allowed* it to happen, especially as they did so with *aequo animo*. Note how V places

[324] Briant (2015: 520 n. 41).
[325] (*sustineo* OLD.7). This is mirrored at 9.1.5 twice with the same meaning of 'allowed': *patiebatur* and *sinebat*.
[326] See my section on comparability in the introduction to 9.1 for the structural feature of leaving the worst *exemplum* till last.

sustinebat at the end of the clause for effect, leaving the reader waiting to find out the full meaning of his moral lesson till the end. Naturally the *reginae* themselves were also to blame, since the men are being described as allowing, tolerating this, as the *reginae* must have come up with the idea. It is striking, however, that any blame with the women is only *implied*, while the full force of V's *opprobrium* is directed at the men. The desired rhetorical impact of *sustinebant* is to conjure up in the reader's mind an association with the women of 9.1.3, since both *exempla* are about men allowing women to behave in unaccustomed ways. In that respect what V writes in 9.1.3 on women's 'infirmity of mind' (*imbecillitas mentis … studium*) is applicable here too, somewhat attenuating the *reginae*'s culpability for V.

viris enim … delicato imperio obtemperare: Note three rhetorical devices to emphasize the meaning behind this *exemplum*'s moral message.[327] First, the assonance: *viris enim, si modo viri erant, vita carere*. Second, the alliteration: *imperio obtemperare*. Third, the unusual combination (not quite an oxymoron but the two are juxtaposed for effect) of *delicato* and *imperio*. Regimes (*imperia*) are usually described differently, even when they do indulge in *luxuria*, *libido*. The softness implied by *delicato* (reflecting perhaps *mollius vestigia pedum*, a few lines earlier) indicates the men's softness of mind, their lack of manliness and decency.[328]

[327] See my comments on *obtemperare* in the context of *sustinebat*.
[328] *Delicatus* reoccurs immediately after this *exemplum* at 9.2.praef (*delicato*). Elsewhere in V see also 6.8.5, 6.9.6; 2.6.1.

Chapter 2: *de crudelitate*.[1]

Introduction.[2]

The cruelty displayed in the *exempla* of 9.2 is for the most part an act of pleasure *per se* for the perpetrator.[3] By pleasure or desire for cruelty in 9.2, I mean that the characters display this mentally or emotionally; it is not an appetative need. In fact, *crudelitas* in 9.2 is not a means of punishment or revenge (there is usually no wrong) and this is why V devotes a separate chapter to revenge and punishment at 9.10, where V deems *ultio* as *iustus*.[4] The pleasure element in violence is what makes cruelty stand out in 9.2 against the rest of the book's other vices, and distinguishes cruel from ordinary violence (for the latter see 9.7). Therefore I situate V's interpretation of the *exempla* of 9.2 within a wider historiographical

---

[1] **Rhetorical devices for 9.2**: Adnominatio: 9.2.1 *apud quem … admittere fuit*; 9.2.3 *principum civitatis … permixta sunt*; 9.2.ext.1 *tormenti genus … dignissimum*; 9.2.ext.2 *paria fere … ferro*; 9.2.ext.2 *ut aeque terrestrium … experiretur*; 9.2.ext.10 *qui vivorum … constricta*. Antithesis: 9.2.2 *plus criminis … meruit*; 9.2.ext.10 *amari vitae … tortores*. Asyndeton: 9.2.praef *crudelitatis vero … imperiis referta*. Exclamatio 9.2.1 *quam porro … gessit*! 9.2.1 *en quibus … putavit*! Hyperbole: 9.2.1 *egregie namque … inundavit*; 9.2.1 *lacerata ferro … coactus*; 9.2.1 *abscisa miserorum … manderet*; 9.2.ext.2 *eorum dux … transduxit*. Interrogatio: 9.2.1 *sed mortuorum … pepercit*? Loci communes: 9.2.praef *crudelitatis vero … odisse*; 9.2.ext.11 *queramur ... excogitaverit*. Metaphor: 9.2.praef *etenim quem … revocata*. Paradox: 9.2.1 *novus punitor … admittere fuit*; 9.2.ext.10 *amari vitae … tortores*. Sententia: 9.2.praef *ad summam … odisse*.

[2] Vocabulary of cruelty. *Atrox*: 9.11.2, 9.11.5, 9.12.ext.4. *Asper*: 9.2.ext.11, 9.3.4, 9.12.praef. *Feritas*: 9.1.ext.1, 9.2.1, 9.2.ext.1, 9.2.ext.4. *Saevus*: 9.1.1, 9.2.1, 9.2.2, 9.2.ext.2, 9.2.ext.4, 9.2.ext.9, 9.8.2, 9.8.ext.1, 9.8.ext.2, 9.9.1. *Crudelitas*: 9.2.praef, 9.2.1 (x2), 9.2.2, 9.2.4, 9.2.ext.1, 9.2.ext.4, 9.2.ext.5 (x2), 9.2.ext.7, 9.2.ext.8, 9.2.ext.11, 9.11.5, 9.12.ext.4. *Cruentus*: 9.2.praef, 9.2.1, 9.7.3, 9.11.ext.3, 9.11.ext.4. *Trucido*: 9.2.2, 9.2.4, 9.2.ext.5, 9.6.2, 9.7.Mil. Rom.1, 9.11.4. *Truculentus*: 9.2.praef, 9.2.4, 9.2.ext.5, 9.8.ext.1, 9.11.ext.4. Note that in the following both *trucido* and *truculentus* appear in the same *exempla*: 9.2.4, 9.2.ext.5. I see this as V emphasizing their close connection to *crudelitas*.

[3] In Seneca this is termed *saevitia*, taking pleasure in killing for the sake of killing, not necessarily out of vengeance or anger (*Clem*. 2.4.1-2). It is a word used often in V9, see the above footnote among the vocabulary of cruelty. There is cruelty elsewhere in V9 but which is devoid of this element of pleasure, namely, the *exemplum* on Torquatus at 9.3 is ultimately one of *severitas* or *inter alia* see the warfare cruelties of 9.7.

[4] *Ultionis autem quemadmodum acres ita iusti aculei sunt* (9.10.praef).

context where, as argued by Dowling, the Roman definition of cruelty was developing from the times of the late Republic when 'the killing of citizens or captives as part of the securing of power was judged to be cruel, to the definition which emerges in Julio-Claudian authors, that killing for pleasure is cruel'.[5] I see 9.2 at a transitional stage in this development which becomes more defined, accentuated, *inter alia* in Seneca as a reflection of the reigns of successive generations of the Julio-Claudians. Since Dowling argues that this development started with Sulla, it is therefore noteworthy that the chapter should open with vignettes at 9.2.1 of Sullan cruelty, thus reflecting this underlying development. Furthermore I see this as providing the reader with a key or lens in interpreting the rest of the chapter in terms of identifying pleasure as the motivating force for cruelty.

Dowling further argues that 'Sulla's cruelty occasionally implies that he enjoyed the massacres; in this he is portrayed as a forerunner of the emperors who tortured and killed out of sadistic pleasure'. [6] In fact, the imperial period saw an increase in cruelty and a deprivation of freedom, since the emperor had complete control over his subjects, a position the literary sources take as a reflection of reality, but which has also been defended in certain quarters as responses to judicial punishment.[7] The truth probably lies between the two, since much of the judicial punishment was based on fear, paranonia and suspicion. I therefore see this theme as being consistent with V9's discourse on abuses of power. I interpret the link between cruelty and pleasure as the main reason for 9.2's position in the book, immediately after a chapter on the pleasures of *luxuria* and *libido*.

[5] Dowling (2000: 338). Also see Dowling (2006: 225).
[6] Dowling (2000: 338).
[7] Garnsey (1968: 142), MacMullen (1986). During the Tiberian period, for example, the treason trials show the increasing cruelty, insecurity and paranoia of the emperor, as depicted in Tacitus' depiction of Tiberius as cruel and vindictive. On the topos of freedom in V9 see my comments at 9.4.ext.1 under *mancipium*, which I contrast to its opposite, moral slavery.

In V9.2 the inference of pleasure in cruelty is explicitly expressed with the gaze on severed heads (9.2.1, see also 9.5.4) and Marius' *laetis manibus* (9.2.2). It is also noticeable implicitly, and more importantly overall because of its ubiquity in the chapter, that for the majority of the *exempla* in 9.2 the cruelty is unnecessary, gratuitous; as stated above, often not even constituting a direct act of retaliation. In 9.2 the fact that the *crudelitas* contained therein is unnecessary suggests that pleasure *per se* could constitute the motivation for such violent and murderous acts. The element of something which is unnecessary is shared by 9.1's theme on *luxuria*, thus being the second reason for the proximity of the juxtaposition of V9's first two chapters.[8]

Within V9's overall discourse on abuses of power, 9.2's *crudelitas* encapsulates a philosophy of horror and terror as the manifestation of passions, against reason, and, as such, V uses it, as he does for the rest of the *vitia*, to reemphasize the importance of self-control.[9] Seneca, for instance, stated that the man who indulges in cruelty has to protect himself with ever more acts of cruelty (*Clem.* 1.13.2-3), thus entering in a vicious circle which escalates and worsens the problem; and that a people's anger, when aroused by abuses of power, can backfire and become dangerous to a ruler.[10] On the topos of the vulnerability of one who abuses power, the tyrant has often been portrayed as fearful of the morally superior citizen and of being incapable of sustaining friendship.[11]

[8] Luxury is not necessary, it is not what man needs to stay alive.
[9] Seneca asserts that the source of cruelty is anger (*Ira* 2.5.2-3), V9's next chapter.
[10] I refer to this self-inflicted vulnerability of sorts of the ruler also in my comments at 9.5 and 9.7. On the reciprocity of the ruler-ruled relationship, namely, the extent of a tyrant's cruelty determines the response to it in terms of arousing the hatred of individuals and communities (private and public antithesis) see Braund (2009: 373).
[11] Pl. *Grg*. 510b-c, Htd. 3.80.4-5. On the topos of *amicitia* in V9 see my introduction to 9.5.

Consistent with V9's apotreptic approach, V's purpose in highlighting *crudelitas* is to emphasize its opposite, *clementia*.[12] Braund (2009) defines *clementia* as a 'type of restraint in a powerful person who would otherwise lash out and act cruelly' and as such involves a readjustment of emotions and is thus less likely to be caught up in the vicious circle of revenge that results from *crudelitas*.[13] This is a useful model for V's structure because it allows him to depict individuals displaying opposite qualities throughout his nine books at different times of their lives, the individual being constantly pulled, morally and emotionally, in different directions. Therefore self-restraint is key; one acknowledges one's weaknesses but then decides not to act upon them.

A more negative outlook on *clementia* emerged during the civil wars of the Late Republic where Caesar's position gave him authority to be able to pardon, to offer clemency to citizens, suggesting that his position was excessively exalted.[14] In Roman historiography, revenge and punishment (the main themes of 9.10) are often contrasted with their opposite, *clementia*, which constitutes a significant Roman ideal of Augustan propaganda and Roman political though generally.[15] There are no occurrences of the actual word *clementia* in V9, as it would be out of place in a book focusing on *vitia*.[16] There are, however, three instances of *misericordia* (appeal to compassion, pity) in V9, the means by which one attempts to

[12] For changing Roman attitudes and ideas about *clementia* before and after Caesar, see Weinstock (1971: 233-243), Roller (2001: 182-5), Konstan (2005), Moser (2010); especially for in its apposition to cruelty see Dowling (1995 and 2006) and Lynd (2012, ch.3). Also see my comments on *clementia* and *misericordia* at 9.10.
[13] Braund (2009).
[14] Sulla was a precursor of this see Dowling (2000).
[15] Weinstock (1971: 237-243), Fears (1981), Campi (1997), Galimberti (1998), Schettino (1998). For the vocabulary see Hellegouarc'h (1963: 261-3), Flamerie de Lachapelle (2011).
[16] The most occurrences of *clementia* in V cluster around book 5, in particular 5.1 (8 times), *de humanitate et clementia*: 5.1.praef, 5.1.1 (x2), 5.1.4, 5.1.5, 5.1.9, 5.1.ext.1, 5.1.ext.3. Elsewhere in book 5: 5.3.ext.3, 5.7.2, 5.9.praef, 5.9.4. Elsewhere in V: 2.7.11, 3.3.1, 4.1.7, 7.3.ext.6, 8.1.abs.6. On *clementia* see also Seneca's treatise *de clementia* and Moore (1986: 158-163). On a similar concept to *clementia* in V see 8.1.*absol*.1-13, on acquittals.

generate *clementia*: two at 9.2.1 and 9.2.ext.9.[17] These are only *appeals* to *misericordia*, in response to excessive cruelty; they do not successfully generate *clementia* in the perpetrators of those cruelties.

Most of the *exempla* at 9.2 have shock-value, where the horror of the vicious death can become compelling reading.[18] In fact V, by providing such an intense sequence of unrelenting horror, is consciously provoking the reader's curiosity, tapping into the inner conflict of being caught between wanting to look in fascination at something abhorrent but also being in dread and not wanting to look, covering one's eyes.[19] V creates this effect here by piling on the scenes of cruelty, allowing them to take on a similar admonitory, eye-catching and gruesomely deterrent force to the scenes of execution and punishment familiar from everyday life.[20]

The prolonged element to the pain or agony that constitute the majority of the *exempla* at 9.2 give such acts of physical violence and cruelty a tortured dimension.[21] However it is not torture in the sense that the act is conducted as a means of extracting information from the tortured, nor is it always in response to retaliation or punishment. Consistent with my comments at the beginning of this introduction to 9.2, such violent and cruel acts often seem to derive from the perpertrators' twisted sense of pleasure and they are thus unnecessary. Such instances appear more frequently in the external section than the domestic one; their only glimpses among the domestic *exempla* of 9.2 are *oculos … confringeret* (9.2.1) and *ut*

[17] For *misericordia* elsewhere in V see: 1.8.2, 3.2.ext.1, 3.8.ext.2, 4.2.7, 4.7.ext.2, 5.3.ext.3, 5.4.7, 6.5.ext.3, 6.8.5, 8.1.abs.2. On *misericordia* see Flamerie de Lachapelle (2006), Katz (1981), Aubrion (1989), Munteanu (2009), Manfredini (1992).
[18] This is comparable to Herodotean narrative, see Desmond (2004). V9.10 attempts at a similar effect, see my introduction 9.10.
[19] See Pl. *Resp*. 440a. Also see Coleman (1990: 58).
[20] For public punishment as a deterrent see Gell. *NA* 7. 14. 4 and Sen *Clem*. 1.20.1 and Quint. *Decl*. 274. 13.
[21] For a study of torture in V see Lawrence (2016).

caedes … iussit (9.2.4).[22] Note however that in 9.2.4 the atrocities are ordered by the Romans but actually carried out by the Lusitanians. The *exemplum* is thus aptly positioned as the last of the domestic section, immediately before the externals, at an interface between the domestic and external sections, and this further substantiates my argument about a designed quality to the structure of the book. To write on torture is important if one is to show how governments maintain order, suppress upheavals and create deterrents.[23] As shown at *transgrediemur … rubor inest* (9.2.ext1) and at *illud autem facinus, quia externum est, tranquilliore adfectu narrabitur* (9.11.ext1) one can observe how V distances himself from the external *exempla*, almost as if relieved to not have to assume responsibility on behalf of Rome in connection with what is to follow.[24] In fact, the external section of 9.2 undoubtedly makes for the most uncomfortable reading in V9, especially since the states that V selects are the cradle of civilization but are here represented as the birthplace of cruelty and atrocity itself.

Had V lived under the later Julio-Claudians perhaps the ratio of domestic and external *exempla* may have been different to the disparity present in V9.[25] In fact just a generation after V, Caligula's brand of autocracy was characterised (in the literary record at least) by his attendance at sessions of torture, insisting upon slow and painful executions so that the

[22] I interpret the forcing of men to witness the murder of their wives and children as a type of torture. For torture as punishment see DuBois (1991), Mirhardy (2000), Ballengee (2009). Boyle (1994: 188) notes that torture was treated in the rhetorical schools as the mark of a cruel tyrant see Sen. *Con.* 2.5.6: *instabat tyrannus: torque...seca, verbera, oculos lancina, fac iam ne viro placeat matrix*. There is no mention in V of the cruelties and atrocities of the early Roman punishment of execution for debtors (Radin 1922).

[23] For example, the fasces themselves, the symbol of Roman *imperium*, had at their centre an axe, the power to decapitate. Also see Cic. *Verr*. 2.5.22 where it is stated that it is not possible to govern *sine metu ac severitate*.

[24] Striking how the emotions – *dolor*, *rubor* and *tranquilliore* – feature so prominently in V's interventions. Apart from this distancing oneself, in V9 it is only at 9.2 that the external *exempla* outnumber the domestic ones, a statement that V wanted to portray *crudelitas* as being more prevalent among barbarians than the Romans. Note that in V9 the ratio of domestic and external is not balanced to the point that it may look haphazard, however one needs to consider the possibility that V9 is incomplete (Carter 1975: 29).

[25] See below my comments at 9.2.1 on Sulla, namely, where future generations of writers, although they condemn some of Sulla's actions, find that, by comparison, the rulers of their own days were by far worse than Sulla. This mitigating effect is presented by V at 9.2.2 (*levat*), when comparing Sulla to Marius.

‘condemned would be made to feel that they were dying and had human beings fed to animals’.[26] V is distinctive in this uninterrupted concentration of text on acts that induce prolonged pain, agony, thus contributing to scholarship on the extreme forms of violence or torture in the ancient world. In the discourse of emotions, torture represents emotions in hyper drive, where pain intersects mind and body, since torture does not only concern physical pain but also anxiety, torturous and prolonged.

V still does not allow torture to be represented in the domestic section of 9.2, not even by Sulla, despite his considerable *opprobrium* towards him (9.2.1).[27] In 9.2, torturers and the tortured are reserved for the external *exempla*, including cutting off of limbs involving the Romans.[28]

Perhaps the topic of Roman torture was too dangerous and too close to home for V to write about, so he does so obliquely via the ostensibly non-Roman *exempla*, so that certain points are alluded to implicitly. At 9.2.ext the audience and therefore the aspect of torture as a deterrent are absent, or at least lessened, because V focuses on the perpetrators’ perverse pleasure. The *exempla* at 9.2.ext. are ultimately from the perspective of one who abuses power, often holding absolute power, rather than a government. Otherwise the element of an audience during the torture itself is key, to bear witness to the event.[29]

[26] Suet. *Cal*. 11, 27-32, 36. Also see Claudius and Nero who shared some of Caligula’s tastes (Suet. *Claud*. 34). Caligula is one of Seneca’s stock examples of the cruel tyrant in *Ira* 2.33.3-6; 3.18.3-21.5; *Const*. 18.1-5.

[27] Although Sulla is famous for his cruel and savage treatments.

[28] Chopping off hands: App. *Num*. 3, Mith 29; Flor.1.39; Caes. *Gal*. 8.44; App. *Hisp*. 68; Cass. Dio 22.75. I do not include decapitations among the methods of torture since it does not entail a deliberate lengthening of suffering, the process is instantaneous. What would be torturous for the victim would be the time leading up to the execution itself, the psychological anxiety. This would exclude those cases where decapitation occurs in battle with a sword. For torture in the Roman home see Gardner (1991: 24-6); Dionisotti (1982, line 75).

[29] See Ballengee (2009: 3-7). For a discussion of 9.2 see Lawrence (2006: 230-238).

The Meditation

At the end of 9.2 (*queramur … excogitaverit*, 9.2.ext.11) V adds a short meditation, to divide V9's first ten chapters into two parts, those that involve pleasure (9.1-9.2) and those that do not (9.3-9.10).[30] Had the cruelty of 9.2 been a form of punishment alone, rather than pleasure, then the meditation might have perhaps been integrated with 9.2.praef. While in 9.1 and 9.2 the focalizer is pleasure, in the meditation V discusses ill-health, human mortality and vulnerabilities.

Rerum natura (at the end of 9.2.ext.11 and part of this meditation) is a frequently reoccurring expression in Latin literature especially in Cicero, Lucretius, Quintilian, Valerius Maximus, Seneca the Elder and Younger, Pliny the Younger.[31] It also features in less frequently in Caesar, Livy, Sallust, Ovid, Velleius (nothing in Virgil).[32] Because of the discourse of V9.2.ext.11 on mortality, immortality and ill-health, an educated audience might recall here the title of Lucretius' *opus* (Lucr. 2: 1-61), of all the above sources using the expression *rerum natura*. Especially in this context of *crudelitas* and savagery, one would also be mindful of Lucretius' frequent use of *saevus*.[33] The biggest cluster of keywords in Lucretius to be found in this Valerian meditation occurs at 3.34-144, also reflected in their shared message.[34] However, V is not specifically cross-referencing Lucretius, but it is likely that V's educated readership would have had a general knowledge of key works of Roman literature

[30] For another meditation in V9 with reference to *natura* and human *robor* and which also occurs at the end of a chapter see 9.12.ext.10 (*possunt hi … sapientissimum*), which is also positioned at the end of a chapter merged with its last *exemplum*. Here human limitation is explored in relation to *natura*, in terms of the balance between strength of mind and of body. For V9's only other meditation, unrelated to *natura*, see 9.1.3: *sed quid ego … pateat*.

[31] All these are too numerous to list here but for V see 1.8.ext.18, 3.2.23b, 3.3.ext.2, 5.3.2d, 5.4.7, 5.4.ext.5, 5.10.ext.3, 8.1.absol.13, 8.7.ext.1 and ext.12, 8.8.2.

[32] Caes. *Gal*. 4.17.7, 6.14.6; Liv. 37.54.6; Sal. *Hist*. 65; Ov. *Met*. 15.6, *Tr*. 5.10; Vell. 2.66.5.

[33] *saevus* occurs 21 times in total in Lucretius: 1.276, 475. 2.1103. 3.302, 801, 992. 4. 1002, 1012. 5. 218, 858, 983, 993, 999, 1071, 1230, 1305, 1307, 1310, 1323. 6.12, 454. (*crudeles gaudent* 3.68, an important combination of words considering my comments above linking pleasure to cruelty). For the close proximity of the words *rerum natura* and *crudelitas* see Sen. *Con*. 10 pr. 6; Sen. *Dial*. 11.1.4.

[34] *Adversus* 3.52; *humanus* 3.34, 76; *crudelis* 3.68; *valetudo* 3.100; *concruciamur* 3.144.

and made the connection. My mention of this Lucretian idea is consistent with my comments on the possibilities of the format of historiography (main introduction) and is in line with that branch of scholarship represented by works such as Miller (2010), that I allude to under the lemma, *taetrum* (9.5.4).

Denegatum (9.2.ext.11) underscores human natural vulnerability, that of being at the mercy of the nature of life itself, in the grip of so many *adversae valetudinis incommodis* and *tot cruciatus*.[35] By ascribing a cruelty of sorts to mortality itself (*ipsa mortalitas*), V broadens the remit of *crudelitas* from something devised by people to a state of being, inherent in life itself (*sibimet … excogitaverit*).[36] V juxtaposes the inevitability of what *mortalitas* or *natura* can bring to humans, against the *exempla* of 9.2, that is, the man-made cruelty, which, in contrast, we *can* control or resolve. It is a question of perspective, V contextualises man-made *crudelitas* within a wider context of life itself by focusing on what we can and what we cannot control in life. This retrospective view of looking back at the *exempla* of 9.2 also explains why this meditation is placed at the end of the chapter for rhetorical effect. I see this as a structural key to reading the rest of the book, a *sine qua non* to V9's approach to the other *vitia*.

Queramur at 6.9.15 and here at 9.2.ext.11 are the only occurrences in all V used in the same person, tense and mood. At 6.9.15, in the context of where *queramur* is used, V states that we should not blame fortune.[37] Although the subjects of *queramur* are different (*Fortuna*, 6.9.15; *natura* and *mortalitas*, 9.2.ext.11), they are both, however, out of humans' reach and their repercussions are inevitable; humans do not have control over them. Because of this

[35] Torment and torture are common themes in the external *exempla* of 9.2.
[36] Man-made devising is a theme in 9.2, see my comments under *animadverteret* 9.2.ext.5 and *excogito* at 9.2.ext.6.
[37] *Parva igitur … parcit*?

commonality of outcome, I believe that here too, at 9.2.ext.11, V does not blame nature for mortals' sufferings. To think otherwise, of 9.2.ext.11, would be inconsistent with V's thought processes, as presented at 6.9.15. V refers to *natura* in this way here to contrast it to the sufferings deriving from *vitia*, which we *can* avoid.[38] The tone of the meditation is applicable to what Beagon refers to in Pliny's work as a 'fundamental struggle inherent in *natura*'.[39] This emerges at 9.2.ext.11 in terms of human frailty, but also implicitly with human nature too, that of humans' weaknesses and proclivities, which constitute V9's main theme of *vitia*. In fact, Pliny does not deny that there is a cruel, darker, savage, unpredictable and dangerous component to *natura*.[40] *Naturae dimicatio* (to use Beagon's exact term, 1992: 159), was observable, *inter alia*, 'in the unending conflict between the opposing elements, land and sea', and the sea *per se*, because of its unpredictability, size and savage force.[41] We get glimpses of this conflict of land and sea also in V9 at 9.1.1 and 9.8.2 externally from man's *vitia*, to represent the totality of nature's forces, internal (*vitia*) and external.

Wardle, commenting on V 1.8.ext.18, summarises Beagon's argument on Stoicism and evils, thus: 'The Stoic view could accommodate evils, by considering them as beneficial to man or really as man's perversions'.[42] This beneficial element, which might at first seem paradoxical, of focusing on evil, is what V does in V9 on *vitia*, by taking an apotreptic approach. It *can* be beneficial to consider life from the darker side to emphasize its opposite. V's portrayal of *vitia* as being part of *natura*, reflects my argument in this PhD that V's approach is not to extinguish vice, because it is inseparable from life itself, it is part of *natura*, but to develop the discipline and moral fibre to transcend it, by not reacting with emotion but rationally. Wardle comments that at 1.8.ext.18 *natura* is not connected to a

[38] For V not blaming *natura* also see 1.8.ext.18.
[39] Beagon (1992: 159).
[40] Beagon (1992: 36-42, 151). Examples of this are extreme weather conditions, volcanos, illnesses, conflicts in the animal world.
[41] Beagon (1992: 159).
[42] Wardle (1998: 285), Beagon (1992: 38).

philosophical school; however, because of my contextualisation of Beagon's point in connection to *vitia*, I argue that here the opposite is the case.[43] My reading of *natura* at 9.2.ext.11 is that it might be Stoic, a philosophical stance that has already been recognised in scholarship in relation to V9.[44] In not blaming *natura* V is consistent with the following Ciceronian passage: *vereor enim ne natura, cum corpora nobis infirma dedisset iisque et morbos insanabiles et dolores intolerabiles adiunxisset … nos rerum naturam quam errorem nostrum damnare malumus.*[45]

At 8.7.ext.1 V writes, in contrast to *natura*: *proeliatus est cum Rerum Natura et quidem victor abiit, malignitatem eius pertinacissimo anumi robore superando*.Whilst still keeping the themes of nature as being cruel or malignant, here instead the exemplar Demosthenes wins and overcomes nature's *malignitas*. He does this with *animi robore*, strength of mind. Note how V uses the word *robor* both at 9.2.ext.11 and 8.7.ext.1 but which have different outcomes. V's slant on *robor* at 8.7.ext.1 is a sobering one for the reader (compared to 9.2.ext.11), showing that mortals are not as helpless before *all* of the forces of nature.[46] At 9.12.ext.10, mental and physical *robor* are contrasted in relation to *natura*, referring to a lack of physical strength which *natura* has assigned to mortals, with the message that nature does not endow mortals with both types of strength, one can dull or enfeeble (*hebescere*) the other.

Commentary

[43] Wardle (1998: 285).
[44] Lawrence (2015) on V9. Also see my comments on Stoicism in V9 in the main introduction. Other instances in V where *natura* could be associated with Stoicism are: 5.4.7, 5.4.ext.5, 5.10.ext.3.
[45] Cic. *Tusc.* 5.3-4.
[46] Another victory over *Rerum Natura* is exemplified at 8.7.ext.12, in the case of Sophocles, being able to achieve the writing of his final play *sub ipsum transitum ad mortem*. Here too the victory or glory is described in terms of a struggling of sorts against *Rerum Natura*, as *certamen*, and at 8.8.2 in terms of *laboris*.

9.2 *Praefatio*

societas vitiorum: V dramatically contrasts the *cupiditas* between 9.1 – *delicato cultu adfluentis perque varios illecebrarum motus volitantis animi* – with 9.2 – *horridus habitus, truculenta species,violenti spiritus, vox terribilis, omnia minis et cruentis imperiis referta*. Both are unequivocally negative, hence their inclusion into the ninth book. However, the contrast between 9.1 and 9.2 (signalled by *vero*, 'on the other hand') brings into focus the more appealing side of the former and the horrendous nature of the latter, but without taking away the fact that V deems both as morally negative and vicious. With this contrast the former does appear more appealing to the senses, compared to the latter. The aim of this rhetorical contrast is not to encourage *luxuria* and *libido*, but it is to emphasize the terrible nature of *crudelitas*. The contrast also makes one ponder on how misplaced or twisted one's mind or desires are, like a moral barometer, if the individual lives based on *crudelitas*. It is as if V is implicitly asking the reader: if people really are to pursue *cupiditas* at all, why then should anyone wish to pursue cruelty when compared to *luxuria* and *libido*? The *cupiditas* of acting based on *crudelitas* at 9.2 belongs to the mental and emotional processes of the individual, it is not an appetative desire.[47]

cui silentium donare crementum est adicere: V's use of *donare* here is striking, by remaining silent we are giving cruelty a gift or a favour, subconsciously allowing it to grow in our lives. V's aim, like that of declaiming generally, was to break the danger of silence and bring out 'from the shadows' themes which were controversial and hard to discuss.[48]

[47] For *societas vitiorum* as an abstract idea also see *corporis atque animi … societas* (9.12.ext.1). For other instances of *societas*: 1.6.9; 1.8.ext.17; 2.7.5; 2.9.6; 4.7.ext.1; 6.6.ext.1 and 2; 7.4.1; *amoris vincula … omnium virtutum inter se iunctum societate* 8.8.1 (opposite of *societas vitiorum*).
[48] Similarly about avarice (9.4): *protrahatur etiam avaritia*; and treachery (9.6): *occultum iam et insidiosum malum, perfidia, latebris suis extrahatur*.

timeri ... odisse: With its use of fear and hate in the same sentence, this is an allusion to the famous Accius quote: *oderint dum metuant*. It is as if V were looking for a personification for the subject of cruelty, and finds it in Accius' character of Atreus. This is reinforced by the second *exemplum* of this chapter, Antoninus' severed head being held at dinner by Marius (*contaminari mensae sacra*).[49]

9.2.1.[50]

Summary: Nine events from Sulla's life, he: (1) orders four legions, which had taken his word, to be cut down in the Campus Martius (*quattuor ... coactus*); (2) orders the murder of 5,000 men from Praeneste, having lured them outside the town walls and stripped them of their arms (*quinque ... curavit*); (3) proscribes 4,700 men (*quattuor ... dilueretur*); (4) attacks the wealthy (*nec contentus ... adiecit*); (5) attacks women (*adversus ... satiatus*); (6) orders the severed heads of his victims to be brought to him so he can gloat (*id quoque ... manderet*); (7) gouges Marius Gratidianus' eyes out and breaks his body (*quam ... confringeret*); (8) kills Plaetorius because he faints upon witnessing an execution (*vix ... fuit*); (9) defiles the corpse of Gaius Marius (*sed mortuorum ... putavit*).[51]

L. Sulla: Sulla appears numerous times throughout V and five times in V9 alone, not surprisingly for a book on vice. Among these, Sulla's death is recounted at 9.3.8, where he is

[49] See below at 9.2.2, under the heading of Marcus Antonius. Accius' line was subsequently said to have been used by Caligula to describe himself (Suet. *Cal*. 30.1), another exponent of cruelty.
[50] V rarely covers a character in so much detail. This is the longest *exemplum* in V9, closely followed by 9.11.ext.4. This section is extensively discussed by Bloomer (1992: 48-54).
[51] Sulla's cruelty is a subject also covered by V at 3.1.2b, when Cato as a boy enters Sulla's house. V aptly calls it *officina crudelitatis*, since Cato sees the 'heads of the proscribed' (also see point six above) at a time when Sulla was 'slaughtering consuls, municipalities, legions and the greater part of the equestrian order' (3.1.2b). V's 'treatment of this section is chronologically disorderly' (Bloomer 1992: 50). Bloomer sees these *exempla* as 'schizophrenic historical *exempla*' (1992: 50).

said to have been consumed by his own anger (*impotentia furens*). So it could be said that Sulla exemplified the *vitia* covered by the first three chapters.[52] This shows how his life, more than other characters portrayed in V9, was consistently dominated by the vices throughout his life, even causing his own death.[53]

V follows a highly rhetorical approach where the vice of *crudelitas* is magnified compared to its treatment in other authors.[54] Cicero, Livy, Sallust, and Seneca the Elder portray Sulla in a dichotomised way, in terms of both clemency and cruelty.[55] Nepos, Diodorus and Strabo offer an overall positive portrayal of the man.[56] Dionysius gives a purely negative outlook.[57] In V, with the exception of a carefully balanced assessment at 6.9.6 and the positive presentation at 1.6.4 and 6.5.7, the remainder of any Sullan *exempla* or allusions is negative.

A dichotomized angle on Sulla therefore would help us restore and balance the original historical picture. Sulla spared his opponents who surrendered to him and asked for his clemency, he voluntarily handed power back to the state and stepped down, which other later leaders did not. All this is lost in V who thus presents a very one-sided view of Sulla in V9 and elsewhere in his opus.[58] The loudest warning from Sulla's example is that even the best

---

[52] Also chapter six, *de perfidia*, see below for my comments at *fidem suam secutas ... fallacis dexterae*.

[53] As pointed out by Klotz (1942: 84), note the remarkable similarity between the passage here *L. Sulla quem neque … potest* and Velleius (2.17.1): *L. Cornelius Sulla, vir qui neque ad finem victoriae satis laudari neque post victoriam abunde vituperari potest*.

[54] Sullan cruelty is a long standing and widespread tool of the declamations of the rhetorical schools. See Dowling's case study on Sullan *clementia* versus *crudelitas*, covering most of extant sources with the exception of V (2000). The close affiliation in Roman rhetoric between Sulla and the proscriptions is the main source of Sulla's cruelty at 9.2.1. Note Cicero's creation of a verb from Sulla's name to indicate savage, cruel behaviour: *sullaturit*. The context for this is Cicero asserting that Pompey is planning to replicate the Sulla-like proscriptions: *hoc turpe Gnaeus noster biennio ante cogitavit; ita sullaturit animus eius et proscripturit iam diu* (*Att*. 9.10.6). See Quintilian, *Inst*. 8.3.32 on the use of *sullaturit* and the proscriptions.

[55] For Cicero's portrayal of Sulla's victories see *Div*. 2.65, *Man*. 8, on Sulla's generosity see *Arch*. 25, on his *clementia Sul*. 72, contrasted with Sulla's proscriptions see especially *Cat*.3.10, *Har*. 25.54, also see *S. Rosc*. *passim*. In Sallust see *Cat*. 11.4-5. In Livy for the positive side see *Per*. 84 and 85, for the negative especially *Per*. 88. In Seneca the Elder see *Contr*. 2.4.4 (negative view), 9.2.19 (dichotomised view).

[56] Nep. *Att*. 4.1-2; Diod. Sic. 37.2.8, *frg*. 38.7; Strabo 9.1.20, 13.1.27.

[57] Dion. Hal. *Ant*. *Rom*. 5.77.4, 8.80.1-3. In V see 9.2.1, 9.3.8, 2.8.7, 3.1.2b, 6.9.6.

[58] This is also apparent in Dionysius but who, unlike V, does not devote much material to Sulla.

and most exemplary Republican general can turn into a dangerous and cruel tyrant.[59] The connection of cruelty to pleasure in Sulla portrayed by V (here evoked by *oculis manderet* but also see my comments in the introduction to 9.2 about the overall implicit inference on pleasure in cruelty) is also found in Seneca the Younger, the distinguishing point between the two lies in the period in which they lived, affecting how Sulla was portrayed as a benchmark, against which others were to be compared.[60] For Seneca the crimes of Caligula are worse than those of Sulla as there was no danger to the state during Caligula's reign from irrational and capricious cruelty.[61] The use of Sulla as a benchmark of cruelty shows how much more cruel and dangerous the Julio-Claudians were than Sulla for Seneca; but also in his comparison of Catiline to Sulla, Cicero sees Sulla as the greater man and the lesser evil.[62]

Unlike Livy (*Per*. 88), V seems to have 'stripped the episode of context', thus blurring the picture.[63] Decontextualisation has the advantage, in the very directness of some of its details, of creating more vivid, striking and shocking images than could have been achieved in a more discursive style. For example, V portrays Sulla in 6.9.6 thus: *vitam libidine, vino, ludicrae artis amore inquinatam perduxit* [...] *consul moleste*.

quem neque laudare … potest: This sentiment is captured by Livy's statement: *reciperataque re p. pulcherrimam victoriam crudelitate quanta in nullo hominum fuit, inquinavit* (*Per*. 88). In the Livian text we also get the sense that what Sulla deserved praise

[59] Sallust points out that Sulla started well, describing his military prowess and his good judgment. He goes on to state with regret and sadness that in his later years Sulla turned out bad, allowing his men to sink into vice (*Cat*. 11.4-5). On Sulla's decline see Levene (1992: 53-70). See also the topos in Livy of the good general who becomes a bad dictator, including accounts on Sulla and Marius.
[60] On cruelty and pleasure see my comments above in the introduction to 9.2.
[61] Dowling (2000: 334).
[62] In V both Catiline and Sulla are portrayed consistently negatively. The reason why Cicero's outlook on Sulla may have been more benign was that Sulla, like himself, 'was accused of similar crimes; such as, putting to death citizens without a trial, so Cicero may have felt in less of a position to condemn him' (Dowling 2000: 337).
[63] Bloomer (1992: 52).

for often was overshadowed or contaminated by his cruel acts. This is a subject also treated in 9.3.4, in which victories and achievements are somehow polluted, by one's darker side, human weakness and the vices in particular, potentially even obliterating one's positive deeds.

quaerit victorias: Cicero depicts Sulla moving through a moral arc from legitimate victory through the confiscation and auctioning of citizens' property, to dishonour (*Off*. 2.27). Turning victory into something abominable or dishonourable is also a recurring theme in V9.[64] For Sallust, Sulla's victories were *inter alia* a vehicle by which luxurious tastes were transmitted like a deadly contagion to Italy from his Eastern campaigns.[65] Sulla is not just the importer of *luxuria* but is also seen as actively encouraging vice in others, that is to say, a contaminant. Making explicit a link between Catiline and Sulla, Sallust states that many joined Catiline hoping to profit and gain access to luxury. Thus Catiline's depravity becomes a learned behaviour from the dictatorship of Sulla, and a pernicious feature embedded in the *memoria* of the Roman people.[66] Being inspired by bad leaders is also present at 9.7.mil.Rom.1-3.

dum quaerit victorias … repraesentavit: Sulla, unlike Hannibal, used extreme cruelty even towards his own people.[67] This is a leitmotif in Roman history which V often touches upon, lamenting on the tragedy of this reoccurring internal strife, *civilis sanguinis fluminibus* (9.2.1). As Bloomer sums up, 'Rome's cruelty is never national but individual'.[68]

---

[64] *victoriae relanguescunt* (9.1.ext.1); *paene tanti uictoriae eius non fuerunt* (9.2.2); *Manlio … percusserat* (9.3.4); *tres maximas … reddidit* (9.3.ext.1); *victoriamque non meruit, sed emit* (9.6.4); *an ne victoriae … superesset* (9.6.ext.1); *et quidem … necavit* (9.8.ext.2).
[65] For more on how luxury was directly blamed as a vice in the downfall of Rome see my comments at 9.1.
[66] *Cat*. 5.6-8. Also see Earl (1961: 86, 105-106).
[67] Bloomer (2000: 50).
[68] Bloomer (2000: 50).

egregie: This refers to Sulla's legislative programme in 88 BC before the proscriptions. V.'s own optimate preferences led to his support of Sulla's conservative policy. *egregie* is a rare and brief instance in which V concedes a positive quality to Sulla. Sulla's relationship with the nobility was a crucial one in his political career, a relationship of mutual dependence, both political and personal.

crudeliter … inundavit: As V states here, Sulla targeted, in his killings, all parts of Roman society, including innocent people among the wealthy, women and even the dead, having dug up the ashes of a praetor by the name of Marius.

[1] fidem suam secutas ... fallacis dexterae: In V9 Sulla's *vitia*, as I have stated, encompass 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 (see above) and in addition, here we have treachery, a theme for 9.6. Despite Sulla giving his word, he still kills the four legions. The horror of this is accentuated by the fact that we have a Roman man killing other Romans. Therefore V is here treating 'the most difficult of his subjects, the horrors of Roman civil war'.[69] *Fallacis dexterae* is a striking paradox, since for the Romans, the right hand stood for the favourable, the propitious. But it also indicated a pledge, a contract, which in this case Sulla had broken [*dextera*, OLD. 2].[70]

misericordiam implorantes: Comparable to Livy's *viii milia dediticiorum in villa publica trucidavit* (*Per*. 88.2). The fact that they were killed even if they had surrendered defines the treachery and emphasizes the cruelty.[71]

[2] quinque milia Praenestinorum: There are two aspects which V mentions that Livy does not: first, the number of the Praenestines; second, the reason why the Praenestines had

[69] Bloomer (1992: 53).
[70] On breaking of oaths and faithlessness as a theme in V9 see my comments on *perfidia* at 9.6.
[71] See my comments at *misericordiam implorare* 9.2.ext.9.

become *inermes* (unarmed).[72] This was part of Sulla's treachery, namely the hope of safety being granted to them by Publius Cornelius Cethegus, Sulla's lieutenant.

extra moenia: This boundary is often used in V9, inside the walls being equated with safety, outside with danger.[73]

evocata: Can be translated as 'lured', consistent with this chapter's theme on trickery and device, see below at 9.2.ext.9.

[3] dirae proscriptionis edicto iugulatos: When Sulla was appointed dictator (82 BC), his *lex Cornelia de proscriptione et proscriptis*, enabled him to draw up a list (published in the *Forum Romanum*) of those deemed enemies of the state to be executed.[74]

nec contentus in eos saevire qui armis a se dissenserant: The first of three comments in this section that helps to escalate the insatiable cruelty of Sulla: not satisfied with killing enemies, he killed peace loving men because of their wealth, since he was not satisfied with killing men so he killed women.[75] Lastly, he was not satisfied with just defiling the living so he also defiled the dead.[76] Because this cruelty never seems to be satiated, it produces an animalistic image prompting V to use more sarcasm a few lines earlier in this *exemplum*: *ut oculis illa, quia ore nefas erat, manderet*.[77]

---

[72] Liv. *Per*. 88.
[73] Also see 9.1.ext.6, 9.2.4, 9.6.1, 9.6.ext.2 and 9.12.ext.2.
[74] *tabulam proscriptionis posuit* (*Per*. 88).
[75] *adversus mulieres quoque gladios destrinxit, quasi parum caedibus virorum satiatus*.
[76] *sed mortuorum umbris saltem pepercit? minime*.
[77] Indeed it is with further sarcasm, a frequent Valerian tool when dealing with uncomfortable and gruelling details, that this section on Sulla ends: *en quibus actis felicitatis nomen adserendum putavit*.

cives propter pecuniae magnitudinem: Wealth became another reason to widen the proscriptions, also mentioned by Sallust: *nisi approbaritis omnes proscriptionem innoxiorum ob divitias*.[78]

feritatis: the use of *feritas* in relation to *crudelitas* might be reminiscent for the modern reader of the much more famous passage on cruelty in Sen *Clem*. 2.4.2, where Seneca distinguishes between the terminology of the two. The distinction does not apply here for V, and constitutes, in fact, a peculiarity to that Senecan passage.[79] Seneca deems an action cruel only if it is a form of punishment, otherwise the appropriate term is *feritas*.[80] As I have stated in the introduction to 9.2, the crimes in the *exempla* of this chapter are not forms of punishments or revenge, therefore according to the Senecan passage would not constitute cases of *crudelitas*. However, since V in the preface to 9.2 clearly states that the theme of the chapter to be *crudelitas*, the two authors diverge in their interpretation of this vice.

abscisa … **capita**: Other beheadings in V9 include: 9.2.2 *caput* … *abscisum*; 9.2.3 *cuius iussu* … *gestatum est*; dinner and severed head at 9.5.4.

vultum ac spiritum retinentia in conspectum suum: This concept of a head still keeping an 'expression and breath' is reminiscent of a piece by Cicero, describing the severed head of Marius: *plenum animae et spiritus*.[81]

---

[78] Sallust, *oratio Lepidi cos. ad populum Romanum* 17

[79] 'La differenza tra *feritas* e *crudelitas* è una novità di *clem*. e di questo capitolo in particolare' (Malaspina (2001: 392).

[80] *Possumus dicere non esse hanc crudelitatem, sed feritatem, cui voluptati saevitia est; possumus insaniam vocare* (Sen *Clem*. 2.4.2). On this passage also see the comment by Braund (2009: 397): 'Seneca concedes that such behaviour constitutes cruelty, but proceeds to rule it outside his definition because his focus is upon the exacting of punishment and to give it different labels, that of *feritas* and *insania*. He thus works towards a more limited idea of *crudelitas*'.

[81] *quod caput etiam tum plenum animae et spiritus ad Sullam usque ab Ianiculo ad aedem Apollinis manibus ipse suis detulit* (Cic. *Tog*. *Cand*. fr. 90).

ut oculis illa … manderet: the meaning of *mando* (OLD.2a) here as 'to chrush with the teeth, chew, bite' makes Sulla's gaze truly disturbing for its ferocity, cruelty and animality.[82]

[4] Marium … necavit: This is the fourth and last episode shared with Livy's account: *Marium, senatorii ordinis virum, cruribus bracchiisque fractis, auribus praesectis et oculis effossis necavit*. This refers to Marcus Marius Gratidianus, nephew of Gaius Marius and twice praetor (85 and 84). Apart from Livy and V, Gratidianus' torture and death is covered by many other sources.[83]

C. Marii ... sparsit: Cicero describes this episode thus: *C. Mari sitas reliquias apud Anienem dissipari iussit Sulla victor, acerbiore odio incitatus, quam si tam sapiens fuisset quam fuit vehemens* (*Leg*. 2.56).

punitor misericordiae: An oxymoron *par excellence* and an embodiment of the reality of living during Sulla's times. It is as if morality turned on its head: the lofty becomes lowly, and all that was vicious and cruel becomes lofty. In other words, a representation of an extremely dangerous regime, where just fainting as an onlooker at an execution, like Plaetorius did, could be as dangerous as being the victim of that very execution. In fact Plaetorius does get murdered for fainting. Sulla would have considered the fainting by a man as a sign of weakness and perhaps interpreted Plaetorius' manifestation of compassion for the victim as one of disagreement with Sulla. V's use of *iniquo animo*, that is, 'reluctantly'

[82] For the abhorrent gaze in V9 see my comments at *aversantibus … iussit* (9.5.4). As referenced by Bartsch (2006: 151 n. 85), on the theme of 'feeding one's eyes on the suffering of others see Liv. 24.14.2; Nep. *Eum*. 11.2.2, Quint. *Decl*. 7.10.20, 7.18.10; Calp. *Decl*. 4.9, Suet. *Vit*. 14.2.6; Tac. *Hist*. 1.44.2; Cic. *Mil*. 58.9, *Ver*. 2.65.12, *Phil*. 11.7-8'. Also see Leigh (1996).
[83] Sen. *Ira* 3.18; Luc. 2.173-193; Flor. 2.9.26; see also Cic. *Tog*. *Cand*. fr. 2, 9, 10, 16.

(Shackleton Bailey), or having a different mind (from Sulla), becomes tantamount to committing a crime.[84]

felicitatis nomen: This refers to Sulla's cognomen of *Felix*, 'fortunate', relating to his luck as a general.[85]

9.2.2

Summary: Gaius Marius' murder of Lucius Caesar (consul 90 BC) and his holding exultantly the severed head of Marcus Antonius in his hands at dinner.

C. Marius: Diodorus presents Marius' downfall as the result of his own greed for power and wealth, presenting a long excursus on the evils of wealth, a subject treated by V at 9.1. Diodorus' account of Sulla instead is purely positive (see above at 9.2.1).[86] This is similar to Livy who presented Sulla's cause as just and Marius as the usurper, further describing the cruelty of the Marians, especially Damasippus, one of the most notorious Marian killers (*Per*. 86), as recounted by V below at 9.2.3.[87]

levat: This key verb sets clearly that V deems Marius' crimes as worse than Sulla's because of the Caesar reference.[88] As expressed by Carney, V classifies Marius favourably three times; and unfavourably six times, of which 9.2.2 is a case in point.[89] However, as argued by Maslakov, V does not deem Marius worse than Sulla consistently, in fact, Maslakov has

[84] *apud quem iniquo animo scelus intueri scelus admittere fuit* (9.2.1).
[85] V mentions the *cognomen* at 6.4.4 and 6.9.6.
[86] Sacks (1990: 184-195).
[87] For the famous murder of Mucius Scaevola by Damasippus see 9.11.2.
[88] As Shackleton-Bailey clarifies 'the consul and censor was L. Caesar, not his younger brother Gaius' (2000 vol.2: 310 n.2).
[89] Carney (1962: 334).

noted that often V has a bias againt Sulla, but clearly not here.[90] Despite classifying Marius' crimes as being worse than Sulla's, he makes Sulla's *exemplum* the first in the chapter, and the longest in the book. I argue that V does this as a rhetorical move to emphasize and condemn in the strongest terms Marius' crime against a member of the imperial family. Despite the contrast of numerical difference of *exempla* between 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 (multiple ones in the former, and two in the latter), the moral culpability of Marius' crime is still deemed worse, by comparison.

cupiditate: For V it is the excess of Marius' desire that is problematic – pursuing one's enemies *per se* was acceptable. In V9 what distinguishes vice is the element of excess, doing something over the required or acceptable level. It is ultimately a question of limits, boundaries; and I make a similar point at 9.1 for *luxuria* (luxury is not bad in itself) and in the introduction to 9.8.

C. Caesaris consularis et censorii: Gaius Julius Caesar Strabo Vopiscus was curule aedile in 90 BC. It is inaccurate to link Gaius to these two offices which were occupied instead by his older brother Lucius (consul in 90 and censor in 89).[91] However reference to Gaius as an opponent of the Marians is correct, specifically his clash with Sulpicius Rufus in 88 BC. This took place on account of the latter's opposition to Gaius' candidature for the consulship, since Gaius had not been a praetor yet.[92]

ut Vario Caesar piaculo caderet: Quintus Varius Severus Hybrida, tribune of the plebs of 90 BC. Hybrida literally 'mixed race', since he was originally from Sucro, in Spain

[90] Maslakov (1979: 375).
[91] Shackleton Bailey (2000: vol.2, 310 n.2). For V's wide use and treatment of Marius see Carney (1962).
[92] Being praetor first was an essential step for political promotion in the overall *cursus honorom*. There is no other source reporting the alleged slaughter of Caesar at the tomb, see Shackleton Bailey (2000: vol.2, 310 n.2).

(*Sucronensis*, V. 3.7.8) and *propter obscurum ius civitatis* (V. 8.6.4). He was the author of the *lex Varia*, punishing all who had assisted those who took up arms against the Roman people. He himself was convicted by that same law and exiled in 89 BC. Varius, according to V, 'must have been brought back to Rome, maybe by Sulla, in 88 BC, and executed there'.[93] This would match Cicero's account (*N. D.* 3.81), namely, that Varius was put to death in a most painful manner.

M. Antonii: Marcus Antonius was consul in 99 BC and censor in 97 BC. He supported Sulla during the Social War (90 BC) and because of his relationship with Sulla he was killed when Marius and Cinna gained possession of Rome in 87 BC. His oratory is widely praised by Cicero, who makes him one of the chief speakers in *de oratore*. Overall V's portrayal of Antonius is very positive and, even when he is accused of impurity (sexual relations with a Vestal), V praises the way he carried himself through the prosecution.[94] In this section, Antonius' stature as an orator, as highlighted by V, is in contrast with the disrespect displayed by Marius, who is described as holding Antonius' head whilst talking insolently.[95] The setting of Marius at dinner holding a victim's head is comparable to another *exemplum* in V9, where the head of a senator is brought to Mark Antony whilst at dinner (9.5.4). While the rest of the diners avert their eyes, Antony actually asks for the head to be brought nearer so he can identify him. V's focus in both instances is on the power of the spoken word, like here in the case of Marius: *verborum insolentiam*. In Antony's case this is described as arrogant, outrageous and *taetrum facto pariter ac dicto*.[96] V presents grandfather and grandson on

[93] Shackleton Bailey (2000: vol.2, 310 n.2).
[94] V highlights Antoninus' famous eloquence at 3.7.9, 7.3.5 and 8.9.2.
[95] Focus on Antonius' eloquence and death is found also in Velleius: *M. Antonius, princeps civitatis atque eloquentiae, gladiis militum, quos ipsos facundia sua moratus erat, iussu Mari Cinnaeque confossus est* (2.22). Also see Florus who alludes to this episode in passing: *caput* [...] *Antonii consularis in Mari ipsius mensis* (2.9.14).
[96] Also see 9.5.3 for the combination of dinner and insolence (*Pompeius quam insolenter*) in speech: Gnaeus Pompeius disregards a friend who is seeking his help by telling him that he is holding up his dinner, thus prompting the following from V: *huius dicti conscius securo animo cenare potuit*.

opposite sides of the moral spectrum, but also adds the quality of victim for the former and of cruel perpetrator for the latter.[97] Antony's actions (in 9.5.4) closely resemble the manner in which the older Antonius' head was treated, adding shock value and depravity to Antony's actions by mapping them onto actions whose horror was acknowledged, and hinting at deeper levels of disconnect between Antony and Rome's *maiores*.[98] After all, the 'memory of Antonius had been highly influential upon Antony's ambitions and career'.[99]

aliquamdiu tenuit: Marius holds the head *for some time*, a gesture which becomes even more disturbing within a context of dining, food, pleasure; reinforcing the inference of Marius becoming increasingly more engrossed in something exceedingly cruel and obscene verging on pleasure.[100]

contaminari mensae sacra: The expression *mensae sacra* in V reoccurs at: 2.1.8, 4.2.3, 5.3.3, 8.15.7, 9.2.2.[101] Of these, the *exemplum* that has 'received most scholarly attention is 9.2.2'.[102] V is the earliest and one of the few extant sources to use the expression *mensae sacra* 'repeatedly across a variety of scenarios'.[103] *Mensae sacra* was used mainly in a metaphorical sense to characterise the customs of dining in Roman culture.[104] Because of the dining element of this episode, the moral pollution here clearly goes against the tradition embodied by the *mensae sacra*; and this fits within the overall *Leitmotif* in V9 of moral

[97] Cicero presents grandfather and grandson as opposites too, calling the day Antonius died as *acerbissium eius supremum diem*, whilst in the same section criticizing his grandson (*Phil*. 1.34).
[98] This is comparable to the later debate on Caligula, who would be characterized as learning to be cruel by his association with Tiberius in his last years of reign on Capri.
[99] Huzar (1978: 13).
[100] For V's take on cruelty as pleasure see my introduction at 9.2. *societas vitiorum* (9.2.praef). This perverse type of pleasure is absent in 9.5.3-4 but reoccurs at the beginning of this *exemplum*: *cupiditate persequendi inimicos* and at 8.9.2: *civilis profundendi sanguinis cupiditate furentes* (still within a Marian context).
[101] As referenced by Lennon (2015: 719 n. 3).
[102] Lennon (2015: 720). For an analysis of 9.2.2 see Lennon (2015: 720-2).
[103] Lennon (2015: 720).
[104] Lennon (2015). On pollution generally (moral and religious) in V see also Lennon (2014: 31, 36, 65, 96, 117, 131).

pollution.[105] As Lennon (2015) argues – and this is also applicable to 9.5.4 – disregard of such traditions were 'most commonly employed within the rhetoric of civil conflict, tyranny and betrayal in the writings of the early Principate'.[106]

P. Annius: V describes the killer of Antonius as *solus in aditu expers Antonianae eloquentiae steterat* (8.9.2). This is a kind of contamination, although a positive one, since the title of the chapter for that *exemplum* is *quanta vis sit eloquentiae*. Annius was able to kill Antonius as he had not heard the orator speak and therefore had not been taken in and moved by his rhetorical strength and power.[107] Appian, post-V, in fact writes that a tribune (Annius) killed Antonius as he was trying to persuade the soldiers not to murder him.[108] Annius does this having noticed that the soldiers, sent by Marius to kill him, were actually listening to the orator. Such was Annius' concern that Antonius would have been able to soften the soldiers' resolve. According to Appian, Antonius died whilst still declaiming.[109]

9.2.3.[110]

Summary: In 82 BC Damasippus orders the heads of Roman leaders to be mingled with the heads of sacrificial victims; the mutilated body of Carbo Arvina was carried around fastened to a gibbet.

[105] The theme is ubiquitous in V9 but also implicit, as the actual word appears only this once in V9. For the word elsewhere in V see 3.1.3, 3.8.ext.3 and 6.1.2.
[106] Lennon (2015: 720).
[107] See also Plut. *Mar*. 44, App. *B.Civ*. 1.72, Vell. 2.22.3.
[108] App. *B.Civ*. 1.72.
[109] App. *B.Civ*. 1.72.
[110] See also Liv. *Per*. 86; Cic. *Arch*. 4, *N.D*. 3.80; Diod. Sic. 38.17; Vell. 2.26; App. *B Civ*. 1.88; Flor. 2.9.21; Oros. 5.20.4.

Damasippus: Lucius Iunius Brutus Damasippus, praetor in 82 BC.[111] Damasippus' murder executed by Sulla's followers was considered by many as deserved and just, since he had been 'one of the most notorious Marian killers', massacring all the leading Romans at the wishes of Marius.[112] His relationship to Marius explains his position as the third *exemplum* of 9.2 following on from the previous on Marius. So organizationally 9.1-3 follow on from each other: Sulla first, followed by his enemies, Marius and his closest supporter, Damasippus.[113]

principum civitatis capita: V does not detail the casualties, with the exception of Arvina. Gaius Papirius Carbo Arvina was praetor of 83 BC and a staunch supporter of the aristocracy.[114] Other victims, according to Livy and Appian, included Quintus Mucius Scaevola (*pontifex maximus* and consul of 95 BC), Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus and Publius Antistius (tribune of the plebs in 88 and aedile in 86 BC).[115] Velleius Paterculus writes that these were cut down in the *curia Hostilia*, or according to Livy's version, in the temple of Vesta, as supporters of Sulla's party: *in vestibulo aedis Vestae occisus est* (*Per*. 86). Appian instead traces different locations in which their deaths took place: Antistius and Arvina 'were slain in their seats as Marius had ordered, assassins having been introduced into the senate house for this purpose. Domitius ran out but was killed at the door and Scaevola was killed a little further away'.[116]

9.2.4

[111] Verboven (1997: 196).
[112] Verboven (1997: 196); Dowling (2000: 315, n. 25). Sal. *Cat*. 51.32.
[113] 'Damasippus is not tied to a cause, that is, called a Marian; he seems by V's account a solitary manifestation of vice' (Bloomer 1992: 50).
[114] See Shackleton Bailey (2000 vol.1: 306 n. 18) mentioned in connection to his father, the consul for 120 BC.
[115] Liv. *Per*. 86, Vell. 2.26.3.
[116] *B. Civ*. 1.88, Loeb translation.

Summary: In 45 BC upon being shut inside a Spanish town by Caesar, Munatius Flaccus killed all citizens (and their wives and children) suspected of favouring Caesar, in full view of each other.

Munatius etiam Flaccus: Pompeian commandant in Ategua, wreaks his cruelty on Caesar's Spanish sympathizers in 45 BC.[117]

vesaniae: Whereas 'madness' and 'frenzy' are words which V uses frequently, *vesania* in particular appears only in V9, this being the first of four such occurrences.[118] 'Acting without reason, uncontrollably' (OLD. 1), with its cognate meanings of 'madness and frenzy' (OLD. 1b). Acting without reason is repeatedly used in V9 to emphasize the horror ever present in history of so many tragedies, injustices, deaths brought about by people who just do not think clearly or in a balanced manner, just as in a frenzy or a temporary madness, conquering a person completely and utterly, making him its slave. What is implicit in such *exempla* is the preventable, avoidable element in such tragedies.[119]

cum ab imperatore ... obsideretur: *Bello civili, cum Ategua urbs in Hispania Pompeianarum partium obsideretur, Maurus inter noctem tamquam Caesarianus tribuni cornicularius vigiles quosdam excitavit: ex quibus cum tesseram accepisset, aliquos excitans constantia fallaciae suae per medias Caesaris copias praesidium Pompei transduxit*.[120] Frontinus does not name him, but Dio (43.33.4) confirms that it is the same Munatius Flaccus. Dio's version is more detailed about Munatius' nocturnal operation but differs from

[117] For different accounts of this *exemplum* see *bell. Hisp*. 19.4, Front. *Strat*., 3.14.1 and Cass. Dio 43.33.4-34 and Caesar, *de bello Hispaniensi*, 19.4. Shackleton Bailey points out V's confusion in the telling of this *exemplum* (2000: vol.2, 313 n.4).
[118] 9.7.3, 9.8.ext.2, and 9.11.4.
[119] See Sen. *Clem* 2.4.2 for the link between *insania* and *crudelitas* and the inference that the act is not therefore justifiable.
[120] Fron. *Str*. 3.14.1. Loeb translation.

Frontinus and V in asserting that Munatius had been sent by Caesar, contrary to the other two sources who make him a Pompeian.

Lusitanis manibus: Lusitania, which approximately covers modern Portugal, reoccurs in V9 twice more: at 9.1.5, where Sertorius is mentioned, *Romanorum exercituum oculos Lusitanis telis praestringeret*.[121] It also reoccurs at 9.6.2, where Servius Sulpicius Galba, the consul of 144 BC, massacres eight thousand Lusitanians, an episode that reappears at 8.1.absol.2.[122]

omnes [...] **liberos trucidavit**: Undoubtedly one of the most dramatic, cruel and disturbing passages of the domestic *exempla* in V9. V alludes to people being flung from the walls (*muris praecipitavit*). The only similar reference in the sources is in Caesar, but not in the way V describes it: *insequenti luce materfamilias de muro se deiecit* (*de bello Hispaniensi*, 19.4). In Caesar's account the action of people falling from the top of walls is voluntary rather than constituting part of Munatius' cruelty.

9.2.externa

Mutilations are a recurring element throughout the external section of this chapter and are of three types:

- Those that do not directly cause death: cut off eyelids (ext.1), feet (ext.2), thumbs (ext.8).

[121] Sertorius becomes leader of the Lusitanians at 7.3.6 and is mentioned again in connection to Lusitania at 1.2.5

[122] The region is alluded to a last time at 6.4.ext.1, the only case where Lusitania appears in an external *exemplum*.

- Fatal mutilations: cut *living* men in half (ext.4).

- Mutilations that occur after a killing: head, hands and feet (ext.5).

In ext.1, 2 and 3 the victims are Romans, hence they take precedence over the rest of the external *exempla* but also serve to generate shock and indignation in the reader as a technique to grab their attention, thus increasing the impact of the moral lesson. In their position they bridge the domestic and external sections. In ext.1 and ext. 2 the perpetrators are the Carthaginians.[123] There are two episodes at ext.1 connected by *eadem usi crudelitate*: (1) Regulus and (2) *milites nostros*.

9.2.ext.1

Summary: Two stories about the Carthaginians: (i) in 255 BC they capture and torture Regulus to death; (ii) they spread out the Romans under the ships and crush them to death by the weight of the keels.

(1) **Atilium Regulum**: There is a theme in V9 about characters who become famous for the wrong reasons. V states at 1.1.14 that the torture Regulus suffered made him even more famous in history.[124] This is similar to my reading of V's Tarpeia (9.6.1): had it not been for her treachery she never would have become famous in history. But it is not always because of

[123] Carthaginians elsewhere in V9: 9.2.ext.1-2, 9.6.ext.1, 9.6.ext.4, 9.5.ext.4.
[124] *quo clarior esset Atilii gloria, Carthaginienses moribus suis uti passi sunt*

vitia that characters become famous, as here in the case of Regulus, it is misfortune that leads to his death, which is particularly tragic since Regulus had returned to the Carthaginians because of his oath (*iuraverat* 1.1.14). Regulus was captured by the Carthaginians in 255 BC.[125] V covers this episode also at 1.1.14.[126] Significantly, 1.1.14 fits into V's moral scheme which acts in rapport with the gods; the gods, in this instance, having given the Carthaginians a choice in their treatment of Regulus, punish the Carthaginians' inhumane treatment of Regulus by granting the Romans the opportunity to 'exact just punishment upon them'.[127]

Palpebris …**necaverunt**: Torture of Regulus consists of cutting off his eyelids, being shut into a machine of torture (extension of pain) and sleep deprivation.

(2) **milites nostros**

inusitata ratione mortis: On unusual deaths in V9 see 9.12 *de mortibus non vulgaribus*.

ipsum mare violatur: The abstract concept of violating the sea is intensely relevant for V9. At 9.1.1 I noted that the sea is associated with the importation of *luxuria* and vice. Here V turns the concept around by stating that the Carthaginians' deeds are violating the sea rather than the sea being the means for a violating and polluting of minds.[128]

[125] Liv. *Per*.18.7, Flor. 1.17-26, Eutropius 2.17, 21, 25. For Cicero on Regulus see *Off*. 2.65; 3.99-101, 105; *Pis*. 43-44. On the revenge of Regulus' widow see Diod. Sic. 24.12.1; Gel. 7.4.1; Cass. Dio 11. Also see Mix (1965). For women avenging a family member in V9 see 9.10.ext.1.
[126] Regulus elsewhere in V9: 1.8.ext.19, 4.4.6.
[127] Skidmore (1996:66). Also see my comments at *quas di* … *voluerunt* at 9.3.praef on the gods punishing vice.
[128] Mueller (2002: 128).

satiarent: Here and at ext.2 below *neque ante sanguine explebatur* the same concept emerges of not feeling satiated, constantly trying to fill a hole inside (comparable to my comments in the cases of 9.1's *luxuria* and 9.4's *avaritia*). Lack of satisfaction constitutes a variant, in terms of V9's vocabulary, in the overall discourse of individuals driven to excess.

9.2.ext.2.[129]

Summary: Stories of Hannibal making a bridge of the corpses of Roman soldiers, cutting off the forepart of Roman soldiers' feet and arranged for Roman prisoners to kill each other in fights by pairing them against brothers and kin.

Hannibal: For Hannibal's presence in V9 see my comments at 9.1.ext.1.

virtus saevitia: The juxtaposition of the two, an obvious oxymoron, indicates sarcasm, a recurring rhetorical tool for V.

corporibus Romanis ponte facto exercitum transduxit: This is the first of three acts demonstrating Hannibal's *crudelitas*: the use of dead bodies as a bridge, as a convenient way to cross a river shows disrespect for the dead, a form of religious sacrilege for the Romans.

fessos prima pedum parte succisa relinquebat: Second act of cruelty: the reason for cutting off part of the prisoners' feet was that they were tired from walking indicates cruelty. The fact that he left them behind (*relinquebat*) thereafter indicates not just cruelty but the element

[129] 216 BC. Liv. 23.5.11-13, 22.51.7.

of torture, ensuring that pain is prolonged as long as possible (see my comments in the introduction to 9.2).

paria fere fratrum et propinquorum iungens ferro decernere cogebat: This constitutes the third and worst act of cruelty of this *exemplum*, as it involves forcing family members or people close to each other to fight and kill each other. This fits into the theme of family and generational tensions in V9 that I discuss in the main introduction. The fact that in this context they should be *forced* into conflict was a particularly painful memory for the Romans, reinforcing therefore both the savage, cruel conduct of Hannibal and the hatred he aroused in the Romans.

supplicio: For vengeance in V9 see my comments at 9.10.praef.

Prusiae regis … **voluntariam mortem compulit**: Hannibal escaped to Prusias I, king of Bithynia, but a Roman envoy (Flaminius) was sent to persuade Prusias to surrender Hannibal to Rome.[130] Prusias had his palace surrounded by guards so that Hannibal could not escape. When Hannibal learnt this he committed suicide by taking poison. He does this since his host had given him up to the Romans, he was therefore forced (*compulit*) to commit suicide. Livy's choice of words in describing Hannibal's last thoughts are relevant to V9's main discourse on abuses of power, referring to his distrust of the good faith of a monarch, having observed, *inter alia*, Prusias' fickleness of temper and knowing the tyranny of kings.[131]

[130] V recounts this episode of Hannibal at the court of king Prusias also at 3.7.ext.6. Also see Cic. *Div*. 2.52, Plut. *Mor*. 606C.
[131] Liv. 39.51

9.2.ext.3.[132]

Summary: Two episodes form this *exemplum*: in 88 BC, with one letter, king Mithridates VI king of Pontus causes the death of eighty thousand Roman citizens; next, his suicide in 63 BC.

All Roman and Italian residents of the province of Asia were murdered by inhabitants of more than a dozen cities, masterminded by Mithridates. Sulla was sent by the Senate to avenge the killings: interesting, given that Sulla was presented by V at the opening of this chapter as the very essence of cruelty. But V does not wish to present a positive memory of Sulla as an avenger of Romans.

tam hercule: The only such occurrence in V9 as a exclamatory remark. It is a relatively rare opening formulation at the beginning of an *exemplum* in V, occurring only three more times: 1.1.21, 5.2.5 and 8.15.2.[133] All four occurences of the sequence serve in each case to connect an *exemplum* to the preceding one and puts it on a par with it.

una epistula octoginta milia civium Romanorum: A rhetorically apt juxtaposition, contrasting the power that one letter had in bringing about the murder of eighty thousand Roman citizens.[134]

veneno: In Mithridates' life there had been a strong connection to poison, his father was murdered with poison and Mithridates' himself was able to elude attempts made on his life

[132] Also see Oros. 6.2.2, Plut. *Sull*. 24.4, App. *Mith*. 22-3. For Mithridates VI in V9 see 9.7.mil.rom.1, 9.11.ext.2, 9.13.1.
[133] For *hercule* in different positions in an *exemplum* in V see 7.3.ex.9, 5.1.10, 5.3.2, 5.1.10, 2.8.2, 1.1.17.
[134] See Sallust for Mithridates' letter to the king of Parthia, Arsaces (*Hist*. 4.69).

by his mother and sister to kill him with poison.[135] It is understandable therefore that Mithridates later developed an interest in making himself immune to poisons by researching deadly plants and minerals and then testing these experiments on others and himself.[136]

spadone: Another term for eunuch, *eunuchus*. Neither term is used again in V.

9.2.ext.4.[137]

Summary: Zisemis, son of the king of Thrace, cuts living people in half and forces parents to feed upon their children's bodies.

Zisemis: This mid-second century century BC Thracian Prince is the most obscure name among the external *exempla* in V9. V does not expand on Diodorus' account of Zisemis, but his inclusion here among more famous personages raises his profile as an exponent in cruelty so that the atrocities performed by him will not forgotten, or, more importantly, so that future generations, on reading these disturbing lines, can commemorate the lives that unfortunately crossed Zisemis'. V does not refer to a particular episode in Zisemis' life, perhaps because so little has been recorded about him, but encapsulates his life in this *exemplum* in just one sentence. Diodorus refers to his father, Diogyris, from whom he allegedly inherited cruelty. While for Diodorus Zisemis' cruelty is a family trait, inherited from his father, Diogyris, for V it is a *sine qua non* for the whole country of Thrace.[138] The case of Zisemis illustrates a

[135] Mayor (2011).
[136] See Mayor (2011). For the theme of poison in V9 see 9.2.ext.6, 9.1.9, 9.12.ext.1. See section on *venena* in Calhoon (2010: 276-280).
[137] Mid-second century. Diod. 35.12 (also known as Zibelmios in Diodorus).
[138] Also see my comments on Campania (9.5.ext.4) for another case where V integrates a country's traditional associations to a particular trait or vice into V9. Diodorus ascribes Zisemis' cruelty to an act of revenge for what the Thracians had done to his father, thus showing the vicious circle of cruelty, murder and revenge, since Zisemis himself was also killed by his own people in response to this cruelty.

ruler's incapacity to learn from past events and the inability to stop himself from acting based on his own passions.[139]

minus admirabilem: As an expression in V9 see *minus miror* (9.8.ext.1, in the case of Hannibal). It is also used as another type of generalization, besides that for Thrace, in V9 for women see 9.12.2 (also see 9.1.3 for the topos).

parentes liberorum vesci <cogere> corporibus: Making others into cannibals is reminiscent of Accius' *Atreus*, where Atreus makes his brother eat his children, unwittingly.[140] In Zisemis' case we do not know if the parents in question knew who they were eating. The editor's choice of *cogere* might point to the possibility that the parents knew and therefore were forced to eat their children.[141] Being conscious of who they were eating would then make this *exemplum* far worse than the Atreus story (where they were not aware), thus making 9.2.ext.4, which constitutes a real life incident, far worse than what is portrayed in tragedy (fiction).

9.2.ext.5.[142]

Summary: Two incidents ascribed to the life of Ptolemy Physcon. (i) In 129 BC Ptolemy has his son put to death before his own eyes and sent his severed head, hands and feet to his wife as a birthday gift. (ii) Ptolemy arranged for young men in a gymnasium to be killed by fire and steel.

[139] See my comments in the introduction to 9.2 about the didacticism of the topos of cruelty to help perpetrator reflect that acting cruelly can bring about his own death.
[140] A comparison also made by Diod. Sic. 35.12. References to Accius' *Atreus* is a theme in V9, see my comments at 9.2.praef and 9.5.4.
[141] The addition of *cogere* aids the flow of the text for a clearer narrative; whereas, without it, one would need to interpret *pasci* as a transitive verb, which it clearly is not.
[142] 129 BC. Diod. Sic. 34-35.14; Just. 38.8.

iterum: This is the only instance in V9 where the author refers to prior material in the book, referring back to Ptolemy VII (Physcon) at 9.1.ext.5. Note how both occupy the same position in their respective external sections, ext.5.[143] This is the same technique in V9 for Alexander the Great (9.3.ext.1; 9.5.ext.1).

Memphitem: Note how V does not mention how he kills his son, emphasis instead is on the disrespect shown to the corpse (a theme inV9), and on the fact that his son was killed before his very eyes.[144] Also note how the mutilations upon Memphites (head, hands and feet) are inflicted after his death and therefore *crudelitas* here is not as severe as in the case of other *exempla* in this external section, where mutilations instead take place while the person is still alive (constituting the torture theme of the external section in 9.2).[145]

timori remedium: For this same expression see 9.2.ext.8, also see my comments below at *quoque tutius plebe trucidata regnaret*.

animadverteret quanto sui odio patria tenetur: V here draws a close relationship between cruelty and hate, since the author's interpretation of what motivated Physcon's actions was his perceiving the hate of the people towards him. For more on the relationship between these two vices in 9.2 see 9.2.praef, 9.2.ext.2. Also *ultio* is closely related to cruelty too, as shown below, thus we can see how 9.2 is linked to 9.3 and 9.10, but also 9.6 and 9.15 on account of evil creativity and devising tricks, deceptions, tortures and traps.

[143] V's only other mention of Physcon is at 6.4.3. For V9's other Ptolemy see 9.4.ext.1, the king of Cyprus.
[144] For other fathers killing their sons see Catiline at 9.1.9; Manlius Torquatus at 9.3.4. Both at 9.3.4 and here (9.2.ext.5) these crimes arouse the people's *odium*.
[145] Cut off eyelids (ext.1), feet (ext.2), thumbs (ext.8). Saw *living* men in half (ext.4).

quoque tutius plebe trucidata regnaret: As I argued in the introduction to 9.2, rulers make themselves vulnerable by their actions, since the more people they kill the more likely they are to be murdered.

gymnasium: For this setting in V9 see 9.10.ext.2. People in a gymnasium are generally associated with the young, the vigorous, in the bloom of their lives; but it is used here as a place of execution and death. This is comparable to 9.2.ext.8, *iuventuti* (see my comments *ad loc*.) where such people are again victims of cruelty. As for Ptolemy's motivation, Fraser argues that it was in retaliation for his expulsion in 163.[146] Thus, the massacre at the gymnasium was part of Ptolemy's 'open persecution of the Greeks'.[147]

9.2.ext.6.[148]

Summary: Darius I arranges a fatal booby trap for his accomplices that does not violate the oath he had taken with the Persians for not killing them.

V focuses ext.1 and ext. 2 on the Carthaginians; ext.6-7 on the Persians.

Ochus: V confuses Darius II with Darius I, son of Hydaspes.[149]

[146] Fraser (1972 vol.2: 166 n. 325). For more on the role of the populace in events of Ptolemy's reign and his expulsion see Fraser (1972 vo.1: 119-123).
[147] Fraser (1972 vol.2: 215 n.232). In connection to V's 9.2.ext.5, Fraser argues further: 'There is no necessary link between the murder of Memphites and reprisals of Euergetes […] By associating the reprisals with the murder, V can be said to support a later date for the beginning of these events, for the murder occurred in 131-0' (Fraser 1972 vol.2: 166 n. 325).
[148] Ov. *Ib*. 315.
[149] Shackleton Bailey vol.2: n.15, p. 318. Darius I reigned 522 BC – 486 BC. For Darius I elsewhere in V see 5.2.ext.1, 5.4.ext.5-6, 6.9.ext.5, 7.3.ext.2.

magos: For more on Darius and the *magi* in V see 3.2.ext.2. The term *magus* appears in the trilingual Behistun inscription (c. 520 BC) of Darius I, where 'certain rebels have magian as an attribute'.[150]

excogito: Devising is a reoccurring theme of 9.2 and 9.1.1 (*excogitavit*), I comment on this at its major occurrence below at 9.2.ext.9-10-11.[151]

saeptum enim … **prominente** … **collocabat**: The only case in 9.2 whereby death is caused by a trap, rather than torture or mutilation. Like torture, traps share a similar evil ingenuity, which I comment on below at 9.2.ext.9.

cibo … **sopiti**: For a trick involving the combination of food, drink and sleep see 9.1.ext.1, a trick, like here, to allure one's victims via the unsuspecting means of *luxuria*. Interesting that one of the things Ochus was not supposed to do was to suppress any of the magi via *inopia alimentorum* (9.2.ext.6) *inter alia*, and thus proceeds with the very opposite, that is, by relying on food to break down their defences and alertness.[152]

9.2.ext.7

Summary: Artaxerxes buries his sister alive and kills several of his family members.

[150] Rommel (2015: 119). Also see Mantzilas (2012).
[151] Devising is a *sine qua non* to the topos of *dolus* present at 9.6 and 9.15. *insidiosa* (9.2.ext.6) is also a keyword for *perfidia* see 9.6.praef.
[152] The expression *cibo et potione* reoccurs below at 9.2.ext.11. Also see Cic. *Fin*. 1.37, 2.7; *Tusc*. 5.100; Var. *R*. 2.5.12, 3.17.6.

Apertior et taetrior: V here contrasts the hidden and secretive nature of the trickery of the previous *exemplum* (an essential element to a trap or trick if it is to work, like treachery at 9.6) with *apertior*, its opposite, as the first word of the *exemplum*. *Taetrior* however marks a greater cruelty compared to 9.2.ext.6, in that the victims were conscious.

Artaxerxis: Artaxerxes III (Ochus) king of Persia, reigned 358-38.[153] All counts of cruelty in his name are against family members rather than outsiders.

Atossam sororem … **defodit**: The burying alive of Atossa, his sister and mother-in-law, constitutes a form of torture which, unlike the *exempla* involving mutilations of eyelids (ext.1) and feet (ext.2), directly leads to the victim's death.[154]

nulla iniuria lacessitus: This encapsulates the very essence of *crudelitas*, as commented on in the introduction to 9.2, since there was no justification for punishment; thus constituting a case of tall poppy syndrome, with the specifically tyrannical twist of fear of others' excellence.

9.2.ext.8

Summary: Based on a recently passed decree, the Athenians, in order to halt a challenge to Athens' thalassocracy, cut off the thumbs of the young men of Aegina, so that they could not compete in a contest of maritime strength.[155]

[153] Just. 10.3.1; Curt. 10.5.23
[154] On torture also see below 9.2.ext.9-11.
[155] Shackleton Bailey (2000 vol.2: 319 n.18) points out that 'it is nowhere stated that the decree was put into effect'. Also see Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.1.31; Plut. *Lys*.9.5. The date is uncertain. For another *exemplum* in V9

consimili … aemulatio: Rivalry (*aemulatio*) is the cause for Artaxerxes' cruelties in the previous *exemplum*, and for the Athenians here too, who cut the thumbs of the young men from Aegina to disable them in a maritime contest.[156] V's specifies *iuventuti* to focus on the fact that the victims have been disabled at a time in their lives when displaying their full potential, similar to V's comment at 9.6.2: *flos iuventutis*.

indigno gloriae: A rare moment amid the horror and terror of 9.2 in which V allows the juxtaposition of good and evil in one person or community to emerge.[157] Here V emphasizes his disappointment at the decline of a great city's morals, showing that nothing and nobody is consistently good, everything is in a constant state of flux: there is nothing more unreliable than human character.

timori remedium a crudelitate: For a similar phrasing see *timori remedium scelere petiuit* (9.2.ext.5). Although cutting thumbs does constitute a form of torture, this is the only *exemplum* in 9.2 which does not involve murder. The other mutilations in the external *exempla* of 9.2, which in themselves do not cause death, are paired, however, with actions which do. This type of cruelty corresponds to my comments in this chapter's introduction regarding the insecurity and inherent vulnerability of a ruler, or in this case a group of leading men, whose response to fear of being beaten is to act cruelly. The study of emotions in V9 is thus used to tackle and bridge the disconnected parts of a person's emotions and instinctive reactions to what one feels threatened by in society and even, in the case for ext.7, within the family.

---

with the Athenians as exemplars of vice see 9.8.ext.2. Notice how the numbers 2 and 8 appear in reverse order at 9.2.ext.8 and 9.8.ext.2.

[156] *Consimili* as the opening to an *exemplum* in V9 see 9.1.6, 9.12.7, 9.15.ext.1.

[157] Elsewhere in 9.2 this dichotomy is lost, such as is the case for Sulla (9.2.1).

mutuantes: A rhetorically charged term in V9, encompassing, in financial terms, the theme of debt at 9.1, and, on a moral perspective, the theme of *pudicitia*, undercutting a sense of a vulgarizing and cheapening of important human qualities. Here instead it is a country's *gloria* and the qualities that helped achieve it which are undermined, and rhetorically speaking, it is exchanged (note the imagery of barter as in the case for *pudicitia*) for the baser and more vulgar trait of cruelty via acts of torture.[158]

9.2.ext.9.[159]

Summary: The inventor of the bronze bull becomes its first victim.

Ext.9, 10 and 11 share the themes of invention, punishment and torture.[160] Thus they represent humanity's innate potential for malign creativity rather than producing inventions which can benefit others. *Crudelitas* misapplies one's potential, turning it into a twisted type of creativity focusing on the invention of new instruments of torture to vary and prolong pain. The bronze bull is what makes this *exemplum* distinctive, it marks a physical representation of cruelty itself. Another distinctive point is that the physicality of the bull becomes a tangible testimony that the tortures and deaths it caused really did happen, thus impacting on the *memoria* of future generations of writers.[161] Underscoring the bull's physicality as a

[158] For debt in V9 see my comments at the introductions to 9.1 and 9.4. Also see 9.1.6, 9.1.9, 9.4.ext.1 (*mancipium*). For *pudicitia* as a moral form of barter see 9.1.7 (*pudicitiam*) and the introduction to 9.4.
[159] 560 BC. Pind. *Pyth*. 1.95; Callim. *Aet*. fr.46, Diod. Sic. 9.18-19; 13.90.4–5, 33.5; Polyb. 12.25.3; Lucian, *Phalaris* I.12, Cic. *Verr*. 2.4.73.
[160] On both also see the extra paragraph at the end of 9.2.ext.11. Torture (*cruciatu*) is a substantial theme in 9.2. For punishment in V9 see my comments in the introduction at 9.10. *excogito*, with its primary meaning of 'devising', is comparable to the treachery and *doli* of 9.6
[161] On the importance of *memoria* in V9 see my main introduction.

reminder of the cruelty and torture it provoked, Cicero aptly calls the bronze bull *monumentum … crudelitatis*.[162]

saevus … aenei tauri inventor: The Bronze Bull was a torture machine invented by Perillus of Athens, offered as a gift to Phalaris, tyrant of Acragas.[163] It was of hollow brass with enough room inside to fit a person, and with a fire lit beneath it he would then be roasted to death.[164] V does not name Perillus but simply starts the *exemplum* with *saevus*, to create the effect that this person is the embodiment of savagery and evil itself, rather than giving that moral place to Phalaris, the tyrant of Acragas, who would have sanctioned the bull's use countless times after Perillus' demise. The reason V does so is shown by the emphasis he puts on Perillus' *artis suae*, denoting a moral punishment, against his perverse skill: Phalaris may have accepted and used the machine thereafter, but it was Perillus' hands and skill that actualized the machine.[165] V's focus on the inventor's cruelty and savagery, rather than the tyrant's, appears also in Diodorus (9.18-19) and Lucian (Phalaris I).[166]

cruciatu … **vocis**: Besides the physicality of cruelty itself, what is especially distinctive about this machine of torture is the auditory impact it would have created on those witnessing it in action. Owing to the way the bull was constructed, the screams of the victims in the bull

---

[162] *Verr.* 2.4.73: *cogitare utrum esset Agrigentinis utilius, suisne servire anne populo Romano obtemperare, cum idem monumentum et domesticae crudelitatis et nostrae mansuetudinis haberent*. This exemplifies the 'us and them' approach of V9 between domestic and external *exempla*, also reflected in the opening statement to this chapter's external section, see above on my comments under *transgrediemur … inest* (9.2.ext.1). In the Cicero quote note the juxtaposition between being under Roman rule, allegedly without the cruelty, versus retaining independence but being subjected to such excessive cruelty.

[163] Acragas became Roman Agrigentum, now Agrigento (Adornato 2012: 485). Phalaris ruled from approximately 570 to 554 BC. For more on Phalaris see Adornato (2012). Phalaris was famous for his cruelty, *inter alia*, cannibalism and eating suckling babies (Tatian's *Address to the Greeks*, Chapter 34).

[164] For in-depth investigations on the bull see Schepens (1978) and Walbank (1945). The Romans used heat as a form of cruel torture see Ov. *Met*. 3.697-698 *dum crudelia iussae / instrumenta necis ferrum ignesque parantur*; Juv. 14.22 *uritur ardenti ferro*. Mayer (1991: 268).

[165] For the opposite approach on the tyrant's ferocity and savagery in extant sources, see Bianchetti (1987); and Murray (1992). Seneca relates this *exemplum* when drawing the close relationship between *crudelitas* and exacting punishment, calling cruel those who do not show moderation in punishment (*Clem*. 2.4.1-3). Ovid, on the other hand, judges Phalaris a *just* punisher since *necis artifices arte perire sua* (*A.A.* 1.656).

[166] The opposite appears in the remainder of the sources.

would have sounded like the real lowing of a roaring bull, this effect was achieved by having small sounding pipes carved in the nostrils of the bronze bull, thus modulating the screams of the victims. In Diodorus and Lucian, the depravity of making the agonized screams of a victim approaching death sound *pleasurable* to the ear appalled Phalaris and is allegedly what made him decide to execute Perillus.[167] V is vague on Perillus' death by using *primus inclusus* rather than actually stating that he died inside; in fact Diodorus (9.18-19) and Lucian state that Perillus was thrown off a cliff, after being subjected to torture for some time in the bull. V often leaves questions of this sort without a conclusion, perhaps assuming that the reader knows the outcome already.

misericordiam implorare: Among extant sources, only V raises this point on the possibility of the victims' howls attracting the tyrant's pity.[168] To wish to arouse pity is also a rhetorical tool, but here pity would have been a more raw and primordial tool to gain salvation from a tyrant, not based on clever mechanics of words and rhetoric. The unusual element in this *exemplum* of the scenario of the victims calling for salvation from the tyrant is that the tyrant is not presented by V as the bad person, but the inventor is.[169]

merito: Thus V explicitly applauds Phalaris' actions against Perillus. This is striking as both Phalaris and V – in sharing a moral platform – could be seen, especially from a modern reader's perperctive, as reacting with cruelty. *merito* is consistent with my comments in the introduction at 9.10 about the second of the two voices that emerge from V9 – the authorial

[167] 'The cries of pain will give you pleasure' (Diod. Sic. 9.19); 'most tender, most pathetic, and most melodious of bellowing. Your victim will be punished, and you will enjoy the music' (Lucian, *Phalaris* 1.1). Both sources choose direct speech for dramatic effect, while V prefers a brief description, but one which is one of V9's most haunting passages.

[168] This is why this torture is described as *abdito* (9.2.ext.9) since secrecy is also a feature at 9.6, *occultum … extrahatur* (9.6.praef).

[169] Despite Phalaris' reputation for cruelty and savagery, see above. To implore but not being heard or being given a reprieve elsewhere in V9 see *misericordiam implorantes* (9.2.1); *ante pedos suos prostratum* (9.5.3); *oranti et obsecranti* (9.8.3). For an entreaty with a positive outcome in V9 see *precibu*s (9.3.ext.3); *deposcere* (9.5.3). For *misericordia* in V9 see 9.10, in connection with my comments on *clementia*.

voice – that wishes, approves the avenging of a crime. Here however it is unusual because of the moral ambiguity surrounding the manner of the retaliation. On a similar type of authorial intervention in V9 see: *absit reprehensio, quia impia proditio celeri poena vindicata est* (9.6.1).

9.2.ext.10.[170]

Summary: The Etruscan punishment and torture of binding the bodies of the living to those of the dead and leaving them to rot together.

Etrusci: V here generalizes by referring to the Etruscans (on Etruria also see 9.1.ext.2) but the torture described here is, according to Virgil (*A.* 8.485-8), associated specifically with Mezentius, an Etruscan king, exiled by his own subjects because of his practices of torture (for details, see below). Mezentius is comparable to Tarquinius Superbus as they were both exiled by their subjects and were famous for their cruelty and arrogance.[171] V could expect the reader to connect Mezentius and Tarquinius Superbus thematically to prompt the thought in the reader that certain Roman elite men have shared common behavioural traits with other non-Roman peoples, in this case the Etruscans. This complicates the moral quandary for the Romans on the complex and contingent manner in which they saw the relationship between domestic and external, undercutting the Roman anxiety of wishing to be as different as possible from non-Romans. This *exemplum*, like the rest of V9, in fact implies that cruelty and vice transcend race, there is a common denominator in the human race that all peoples share.

[170] Cic. *Hort.* fr.95 (Cicero quotes Aristotle); Verg. *A.* 8.485-88, 7.648, 10.786. For the topoi of Etruscan cruelty and luxury depicted in Roman literature see Bittarello (2009: 218).
[171] Basson (1984: 58, no. 60 p.70). Also see Burke (1974). On Mezentius see Liv. 1.2, Dion. Hal.1.64.4-65.

From a textual perspective, note the similarity of vocabulary in this *exemplum* to Cicero: *cum in praedonum Etruscorum manus incidissent, crudelitate excogitata necabatur, quorum corpora viva cum mortuis adversa adversis accommodata quam aptissime colligabantur; sic nostros animos cum corporibus copulatos, ut vivos cum mortuis esse coniunctos*.[172]

qui vivorum … **accommodatae**: The practice of binding together living and dead people hand-to-hand and face-to face was ascribed to Etruscan (Tyrrhenian) pirates.[173]

tabescere: On rotting and the living being forced to be with the dead is also part of the torture at 9.2.ext.11 (*putrefacti* … *tabidis*). These are the only instances of putrefactions in V9.[174]

vitae … **tortores**: Disrespect for corpses and the dead is a recurring theme in V9, see my comments at *caput Cyri* … *iussit* (9.10.ext.1).

9.2.ext.11

Summary: V outlines the barbarian punishment of sewing human bodies of the living into those of slaughtered cattle and leaving them to rot.

This is not found elsewhere. This differs from the previous *exemplum* as animals rather than other humans are used. Apart from the pain and torture of human flesh being sewn (*insero*, OLD.1), the fact that men were sewn into animals reveals a degradation even more horrific

[172] Cic. *Hort*. fr. 95.
[173] Basson (1984: 58), Haynes (2005: 258).
[174] In terms of Aristotle's metaphysical model explaining the conditions of being alive in regard to the body, soul and intellect see Negarestani (2008: 130) and Bas (2003). For the mind and body relationship in V9 see 9.1.praef.

than that of the preceding *exemplum*. This is arguably the most disturbing *exemplum* of V9, amplified by its closing description: *laniatui sint animalibus quae tabidis in corporibus nasci solent*.[175]

barbari quos ferunt: V plays with the reader's perception of reality by using the expression *ferunt*, 'we are told', thus not confirming the accuracy and certainty of the report. V clearly wishes to leave a lasting, shocking impression on the reader, in this, the closing *exemplum* of the chapter. V wishes to bring about the following thoughts in the reader: what if this were true; what if this actually could happen one day. He is attempting to evoke in the reader's mind the very far reaches of the human mind's capacity for evil and corruption.[176]

V's use of *barbari* strips the *exemplum* of any context. V does not refer to the Etruscans here, as a continuation and escalation of the previous *exemplum*, since he does not use a connective particle or word to link this to ext.10. Also note *illi* instead of *hi* (the latter would have referred to the Etruscans). Again in two other *exempla* in V9 (9.13.ext.3, 9.15.ext.2) the author uses *barbarus* to refer to an unknown subject, but only here it is used in the plural to refer to a group.[177]

nasci: It could be argued that *nasci*, as the penultimate word of this long five line sentence, allows V a more fluid transition to *natura*, in the second half of this *exemplum*.[178]

[175] In V9 the worst *exemplum* often comes last in a chapter, see my comments in my section on comparability in 9.1. Note the rarity of *laniatus* in V, recurring in V9 only at 9.12.ext.4. Elsewhere in V: 1.6.11 and 5.4.ext.6.
[176] For another 'what if' question in V9 see my comments at 9.5.ext.1 on Alexander.
[177] 9.13.ext.3, 9.15.ext.2.
[178] For my comments on the second half of this *exemplum* see my introduction to 9.2, 'The Meditation'.

Chapter 3: *de ira aut odio*.[1]

Introduction.[2]

The preface to 9.3 opens with the definition of *ira* (*Quia dolorem … anxius*), which has resonances of standard ancient discussions on the topic. It incorporates elements of pain and desire: 'the agent feels unjustly harmed (psychological pain) and wants to enact revenge (desire)'.[3] At 9.1 we see *luxuria* and *libido* encapsulating the pursuit of pleasure *per se*. At 9.2 the pleasure element becomes twisted (*crudelitas*), the agent experiences pleasure in inflicting physical (and emotional) pain on others. At 9.3 the pain is emotional and the wrong suffered unjustified and it becomes the catalyst for seeking revenge, but here the intention to damage another is not presented as pleasure, unlike *crudelitas*. Thus a gradual progression

[1] **Rhetorical tools for 9.3**: *Adnominatio*: 9.3.2 *an nos consulere … nescitis*; 9.3.5 *quotiens victoriae victrix*; 9.3.8 *in dubio est … extincta*; 9.3.ext.1 *quia tres maximas … reddidit*. *Exclamatio*: 9.3.5 *quotiens victoriae victrix!* 9.3.ext.2 *quam vehemens … odium!* *Interrogatio*: 9.3.2 *nam quis populo … potest?* 9.3.6 *negas efficacem … praelatus est?* 9.3.8 *quid Sulla ... erogavit?* Paradox: 9.3.8 *in dubio est … extincta*. *Sententia*: 9.3.8 *in dubio est … extincta*.

[2] Vocabulary of anger: *Iracundia*: 9.3.2, 9.3.8, 9.3.ext.1. On the difference between *ira* and *iracundia* see Cicero (*Tusc*. *Disp*. 4.12) and Seneca (*Ira* 1.4). On *ira* and other anger-related emotions (*excandescentia*, *odium*, *inimicitia* and *discordia*) see *Tusc*. *Disp*. 4.9. On Latin vocabulary on *ira* being poorer than in Greek see Harris (2001: 69): *ira*, *iracundia*, *indignatio*, *dolor* 'these perform many duties including tantrums and annoyance and towering rages' (Harris 2001: 69) Also see on anger see TLL. More unusual variants include *stomachari* (Cicero) and *excandescentia Tusc*. *Disp* 4.21. For more terminology see Sen. *Ira* 1.4.2.

[3] Vogt (2006: 57). Also see Harris (2001, Chapters 2 and 3). The active part of anger of seeking revenge is present in all the *exempla* of 9.3 except for 9.3.2 and 9.3.8. On this definition of anger see Cic. *Tusc*. *Disp*. 4.9 *ira sit libido poeniendi eius, qui videatur laesisse iniuria*. For the opposite view in Cicero see *Tusc*. *Disp*. 4.19 *nec vero solum … a natura datum*). On this apparent contradiction in Cicero see Wisse (1989: 257-68).

through different levels of attempting to reach satisfaction is noticeable; moving away from the desire, aim of pleasure (as an end to itself) in 9.1 and 9.2, to intention (seeking revenge).[4]

Modern scholarship tends to concentrate on the following ancient writers for material on anger: Aristotle, Philodemus (*de ira*), Lucretius, Cicero, Seneca, Juvenal and Plutarch (*de cohibenda ira*).[5] In addition we rely greatly on Diogenes Laertius for evidence for the existence of several treatises on anger in Greek antiquity which are now lost or in fragmentary form.[6] V's 9.3 is absent from any mention in modern scholarship on anger, such as Harris (2001) and Braund (2003). I argue that V's 9.3 as a unit *per se* and in its dynamics with the rest of V9 contributes substantially to the study of anger in antiquity.

The debate on anger is part of a larger Graeco-Roman discourse on emotional self-control or moderation and, more than other *vitia*, its treatment in ancient writings has, according to Harris, occupied a 'longer and more intense history than attempts to control any other emotion'.[7] According to Plato anger is instrumental in protecting the state and according to Cicero it is also necessary to aid courage in battle.[8] Seneca attributes to Aristotle expressions such as: '*Ira' inquit Aristoteles* '*necessaria est, nec quicquam sine illa expugnari potest, nisi illa implet animum et spiritum accendit*' (*Ira* 1.9.2); *Aristoteles defensor irae et vetat illam*

[4] See Aristotle's famous assertion that the 'imagination of revenge is sweeter than honey' (*Rh*. 1370b15-20, 1378b5-10. Also see Fortenbaugh 1975: 68). 'Craves satisfaction through retaliation' (Hom. *Il*. 4.178). Also see Cairns (2003: 25).

[5] Arist. *Rh*. (in particular see Sokolon 2006: 51-68). On Philodemus' *de ira* see Procopé (1993), Annas (1989), Tsouna (2007; 2011); Juvenal see Braund (1988); Plutarch see Laurenti (1988). Sotion, Seneca's philosophy master, also wrote a treatise on anger see Stobaeus, *Floril.* 14.10; 20.53; 84.6-8, 17, 18; 108.59, 113.15. Lucr. **1**. 61, 723; **2**.651; **3**.284, 291 (x2), 294, 299, 307; **4** (none); **5**. 395, 1031 (*iratus*), 1144, 1195; **6**.68, 70, 749. Vell. 2. 24.5, 41.1, 68.4, 74.4, 119.2. *ira* in Cicero see also *Tusc*. *Disp*. 3.19, 4.12, 4.19, 4.77 and Graver (2002).

[6] Diog. Laert. 4.12 (Xenocrates), 5.23-24 (Aristotle), 5.45 (Theophrastus), 7.4, 110 (Zeno), 7.110 (Hecato), 7.111 (Chrysippus), 7.166 (Herillus of Carthage), 7. 178 (Sphaerus), 10.28 (Epicurus), as referenced by Harris (2001: 127-128).

[7] Harris (2001: 26, also ch. 5 and 10); Graver (2002: vii).

[8] *Resp*. 4.439e3-4, for Plato on *thumos*. On this Janus-like perspective on anger and courage see *iracundiam laudant, cotem fortitudinis* (Cic. *Tusc*. *Disp*. 4.19), Harris (2001: 29, 111) and Sokolon (2006: 51, 78).

nobis exsecari; calcar ait esse virtutis.[9] Cicero claims that anger when deployed in public speaking can manipulate the emotions of the juror, thus affecting the outcome of a case.[10] Cicero presents two sides: one from the perspective of the Peripatetics and the other from that of the Stoics. Speaking for the Peripatetics, Cicero likens the orator's position to that of an actor and a playwright and states that in order to rouse anger in the audience the orator needs to feel that same emotion even more strongly.[11] From the Stoic perspective, Cicero states the opposite, that an orator does not need to experience anger himself to create it in others, one can pretend to be angry.[12] In all these cases anger, whether feigned or not, takes on a positive role.

In V9 *ira* and *odium* pervade much of the action and motivation in the *exempla*. The primary differentiation between V's take on anger and hatred compared to other commentators in antiquity is that V does not attempt explicitly to provide a cure or alleviation for these two emotions, he lets the *exempla* speak for themselves.

At 9.3 the two main manifestations of *ira* are: those which lead to violent action towards others (9.3.1, 9.3.ext.1), those that do not (9.3.2-8). Therefore the majority of the *exempla* of 9.3 do not have violent consequences. The opposite can be said of 9.10, which shares with 9.3 the element of revenge and anger in their *dénouement*. I view the separation of the effects of *ira* into two distinct, and physically separate chapters as an aid to the reader, so as not to have too many *exempla* in any one chapter (9.3 already being one of the longest of the book). It also helps to emphasize, first, the just versus unjust in revenge, since at 9.10 *ultio* is

[9] *Ira* 3.3.1. On this matter also see Graver (2002: 166).
[10] *Or*. 128-32. On anger and other emotions in public speaking see Wisse (1989: 282-96); Solmsen (1938).
[11] *Or*. 2.189-96. Also see *Tusc*. *Disp*. 4.19 *nec vero solum … a natura datum* and Graver (2002: 168).
[12] *Tusc*. *Disp*. 4.47-57. The latter is comparable to Seneca's view in *Ira*. 2.17. On this apparent contradiction in Cicero see Wisse (1989: 257-68).

presented as *iustus*.[13] Second, it helps to emphasize the violent and non-violent aspects of anger and revenge by compartmentalizing them.[14] It is striking that V should choose to combine revenge (negative) with non violent (positive) at 9.3, and on the other side, avenging (positive) with violence (negative) at 9.10.[15] This is a rhetorical move consistent with V9's apotreptic approach. Furthermore, the reason for 9.3's mostly non-violent output may be to balance the book, since the preceding chapter on cruelty was replete with violence. It also gives V an opportunity to do something distinctive on the discourse of anger, compared to other ancient approaches.[16] By focusing on non-violent anger V shows a different side to this emotion, it is not always an obvious, outward emotion, but elicits greater attention and study, especially in its more hidden, secretive variants of anger-like emotions such as resentfulness and bitterness *inter alia*.[17] The widespread ancient interest in anger has been that of a particularly violent emotion, but it is not so in 9.3, thus making V's interpretation of it distinctive. 9.3.8, is the exception, and becomes the climactic case in the chapter where the violent nature of anger results in the death of the person experiencing it.

In the main introduction I highlighted the importance of the father-son relationship in declamation generally, and in V9. This emerges as a particularly significant theme in 9.3: a candidate's memory of his own father spurs him on in attempting to be elected to public office but also causes feelings of bitterness when he fails in his endeavour (*memoria patri*,

[13] *Ultionis autem quemadmodum acres ita iusti aculei sunt* (9.10.praef). Also see *satis iusta ultio* (9.10.ext.2). In contrast see *iniustae damnationis* (9.3.1) and *iniustis caedibus* (9.3.ext.1). Therefore 9.10 is closer to the modern concept of avenging, rather than revenge (9.3). I comment on the difference between the two in the introduction at 9.10. On moral ambiguity in V on revenge see Skidmore (1996: 69-70). For moral ambiguity elsewhere in V see 7.3.praef and 7.4.praef (*illa vero pars … remota*).

[14] The first *exemplum* of 9.3 and 9.10 are rhetorical contrasts, opposites, in terms of violent versus non-violent, to the rest of their individual chapters. In the case of 9.10 the additional function of 9.10.1 is to connect it to 9.9's last *exemplum*, the Etruscan and Italian debate. Also see my comments at 9.9 and 9.10.

[15] My definition of violence and non-violence is based on the majority of the *exempla* in each of the chapters and always refers back to the agent of the redress itself, there may be violence from other parties in the background of that *exemplum*.

[16] 'The concept of anger may have been different from our own; for the ancients, anger may have been a more violent state, a state which cannot consist in solitary brooding or silent indignation' (Harris 2001, 25). Also see Vogt (2006).

[17] Another hidden, secretive vice in V9 is *perfidia* (see 9.6.praef).

9.3.2); a man is blamed for being of low birth (as an extension of his father's social position, 9.3.3); a son is killed on his father's orders for disobeying him (9.3.4 *severitas patri*); a man is being punished because of what his father did (9.3.5b); a father's hate and anger towards Rome deeply affects his children (9.3.ext.2 and 3).[18]

V9's main discourse on abuses of power continues at 9.3, on the importance of curbing the anger in powerful individuals and the members of the political classes. On account of their position in society, their actions have a greater impact on the rest of Rome.[19] In antiquity's ethical discourse on *ira*, it was advised for elite men to control one's anger, before enforcing one's powers as a ruler, waiting till the anger subsided, in order to judge more impartially, otherwise that anger would affect one's decisions and ability to apply *clementia*.[20] If this precaution was not taken, the action and the punishment that would ensue could also exemplify *temeritas* and lead to *error*, topics treated at 9.8 and 9.9 in V9.[21] The timing of the action while in the state of *ira* is what distinguishes *temeritas* from courage.[22]

Anger cannot be extinguished, but can be controlled.[23] The key is to feel an emotion but not to act on it, but, as 9.3.ext.1 and 2 show, not acting on *ira* but keeping it brewing inside may

[18] See Lucarelli (2007: 37-129) who treats the subject of the father-son relationship in V in detail.

[19] See Harris (2001: ch10). Seneca makes the point that a good ruler does not react rashly when offended, but endures injuries without retaliation (*Cl.* 1.20.3). Anger plays an important role in Seneca's tragedies too, see Lynd (2012: 72-117), as anger functions as one of the major motors of action in Senecan tragedy where 'rage triumphs in an uncivilized world' (Boyle 1994: 155-156). Elsewhere in my comments on V9 I have alluded to the *Atreus* and *Medea* tragedies, in fact anger plays an important role in their Senecan adaptations (Lynd (2012: 72-117). Cicero writes about the anger of the sons of Atreus (*Tusc*. *Disp*. 4.77), see Graver (2002: 67-8).

[20] From Theophrastus onwards it was advised not to punish whilst still angry but to wait till the anger departed and then one should punish when cooled down (Harris 2001: 30 and ch.12 and 13). I treat the topos of *clementia* in the introduction to 9.2 and here it has considerable relevance in that, although it does not quite denote a freedom from anger, it certainly points at a general response to not act on emotions – feel the anger but not to act on it (Harris 2001: 243). 'Suppose that someone thinks himself harmed and wishes to exact retribution, that something dissuades him and he promptly calms down – this is not called anger, since it is a motion of the mind obedient to reason' (Sen. *Ira* 2.3.4, see Loeb translation).

[21] The connection of *ira* to *temeritas* and *error* reoccurs elsewhere in Latin literature. For *ira-temeritas*: Sen. *Ira* 1.11.8, 2.15.2, 3.2.5, 3.13.5; Cic. *Tusc*. *Disp*. 2.47, 3.17. For *ira-error*: Sen. *Ira* 1.14.2, 1.16.2, 1.18.2, 2.10.1 (x2), 2.10.6, 3.25.2, 3.27.3, 3.36.3; Cicero *Tusc*. *Disp*. 3.1-4 and also see Graver (2002: 74-5) on this Ciceronian passage and the origins of *error*. Both *temeritas* and *error* also appear in Plutarch, *de ira* 11, 12.

[22] Sokolon (2006: 63).

[23] Graver (2002: vii), and Plutarch *de cohibenda ira*.

also be negative as it can manifest later with even worse effects. To be in this state can lead to diminished objectivity and poor judgement. In other words, anger remains a moral fault, greatly affecting our relations with everyone around us.[24]

Seneca's famous work *de ira* has eclipsed V's 9.3 in the scholarly tradition. Nevertheless, while it would be difficult to prove or disprove conclusively that Seneca's *de ira* was inspired by V's 9.3, cumulatively certain similarities between the two suggest such a connection was present and at least likely to have been made by Seneca's contemporary audience. Taking the similarities one by one: (i) in Seneca's treatise, *odium* features frequently in its own right and in relation to *ira*.[25] (ii) Four characters from V's 9.9.3 reappear in Seneca's *de ira*: Sulla, Fabius Maximus Cunctator, Alexander the Great (Seneca also mentions Alexander's killings of Clitus and Lysimachus, just as in 9.3.ext.1) and Hannibal.[26] These characters can be divided into two comparable groups: Cunctator and Sulla feature very close to each other in Seneca (2.31.4 and 2.34.3 respectively) which mirrors V9.3's domestic section. The other group is that of Hannibal and Alexander (2.2.5 and 2.2.6 respectively), mirroring V9.3's external section. The mirroring is all the more interesting because both clusters appear in Seneca in reverse order to V9.3. (iii) Much of the vocabulary in the preface to V's 9.3 features in culturally significant contexts in Seneca's *de ira* overall.[27] (iv) The numerous references to the word *pater* in Seneca's *de ira* are such as to produce a sense of echoing the

[24] Adams (1985: 3, 4).

[25] *Odium* reoccurs twenty-five times in Seneca's *de ira*: book 1 (x11), book 2 (x3), book 3 (x11).

[26] Sulla (9.3.8): 2.2, 2.34.3, 3.18. (Also see Seneca's allusion to the fact that the famous Accius' line from *Atreus* 'let them hate if only they fear' was written during the time of Sulla (*Ira* 1.20.4); see my comments at *timeri … odisse* at 9.2.praef, where V alludes to that line in an oblique manner). Fabius Maximus Cunctator (Verrucosus) (9.3.1): 1.11.5; 2.31.4. Alexander the Great (9.3.ext.1): 2.2.6; 2.23.2-3; 3.17.1 (murders Clitus); 3.17.2 (Lysimachus and the lion; also see *de clementia* 1.25.1); 3.23.1. Hannibal (9.3.ext.3): 1.11.6; 2.2.5; 2.5.4. Sulla, Hannibal, and Alexander all in one section comparable to V 9.3, see Sen. *Ira* 2.2 (2.2.3 Sulla; 2.2.5 Hannibal; 2.2.6 Alexander). *De ira* is a highly rhetorical work and its addressee Novatus, Seneca's brother, was an eminent declaimer. For V's connection to declamation see my main introduction.

[27] *Excito*: 1.13.4, 2.14.1, 2.35.5, 3.30.1, 3.34.3. *Fluctus*: 1.10.2, 2.35.3, 3.12.4, 3.25.3. *Procursus*: 1.3.8. *Pertinax*: 1.1.2, 1.4.3, 1.17.4, 1.18.2, 2.12.4-5, 2.19.2, 2.27.2, 2.34.4, 3.8.4, 3.28.6, 3.29.2. *Tormentum*: 1.9.1, 3.16.1, 3.42.2. *Amarus*: 1.4.2-3. *Sollicitudo*: 1.3.8, 3.5.6. *Nocens*: 1.1.5, 1.3.2, 1.6.1-2, 1.8.7, 1.17.6, 1.19.6, 2.27.2, 2.30.1, 2.31.6-8, 2.36.5. *Anxius*: 3.8.1. *Ultio*: 1.1.1, 1.11.5, 2.1.4, 2.3.5, 2.5.2, 2.32.1-3 (x2), 3.3.3, 3.4.4, 3.12.7, 3.27.1, 3.39.3. *Dolor* a total of twenty-eight times: book 1 (x8); book 2 (x5), book 3 (x 15).

paternal theme I discuss above in V9.3. The correlations connecting the two works, both focusing so unusually as uninterrupted, self-contained units on *ira*, make reading Seneca through V9.3 seem appropriate.

Odium.[28]

V specifically describes *odium* as *nocendi cupidine hoc pertinacius*. In the context of *odium* being 'less impetuous and quick to motivate action' (*procursu celerior illa, nocendi cupidine hoc pertinacius*, V 9.3.praef), Aristotle similarly states to the fact that *odium* cannot be cured by time, unlike *ira*.[29] Even when retaliation is completed against the transgressor, or the transgressor repents, *odium* does not abate, unlike *ira*. This is because *odium* 'is not connected to revenge'.[30] This is the reason that Aristotle combines discussions of hate with love, in that both share the same attribute of being more constant (not even death can destroy them) compared to the rashness (*temeritas*) and swiftness (*procursu celerior*, 9.3.praef) of *ira*.[31] Although love and hate are opposites, they are 'not strictly negative or positive emotions'.[32] While both can motivate beyond self-interest (thus showing more abstract, complex emotions compared to *ira*), love can motivate the care and defence of another but can also 'inspire partiality that undermines the public good'.[33] Similarly, *odium* can cause violence, death and 'encourage faction and antagonism against others, but it also motivates

[28] Vocabulary of hatred in V9: *odium*: 9.2.praef, 9.2.ext.2 and 5, 9.3.praef, 9.3.ext.2, 3 and 4, 9.4.ext.1. For justified hatred in V9 see *iusto odio* (9.2.ext.2). Its relation to disdain and contempt see *contemno*: (9.5.1), *spernandam* (9.3.5), *spreto* (9.5.ext.1), *aspernatus* (9.5.ext.3). For *odium* in Plutarch see Lanzi (2004), in Aristotle see Sokolon (2006), in poetry see Balmer (2004), in classical literature in general see Coin-Longeray (2011).
[29] *Rh*. 1382a5-25, 1390a10-30; Sokolon (2006: 76-77).
[30] Sokolon (2006: 77), *Rh*. 1378a30-40. For the opposite in *ira* see my comments above.
[31] Aristotle combines *ira* with gentleness as sharing certain features, in the same way as he discusses *odium* with love, see Sokolon (2006: 51-68).
[32] Sokolon (2006: 69).
[33] Sokolon (2006: 77).

resistance to injustices and political tyranny'.[34] What counts is whether there is a 'symphony of reason and emotion' in one's actions.[35] Again, the presence of reason here fits in with V's Stoic beliefs as reflected with the rest of V9 in relation to *vitia*.

Of the two *pathe* of *ira* and *odium*, it is the latter that is more dangerous to the perpetrator, since it involves human calculation, scheming, deliberation on how to destroy someone who abuses power.[36] *Ira*'s main component, on the other hand, is rashness and because of it error can more easily ensue when, for example, citizens act quickly or impetuously to topple a tyrant. Thus *ira* is more dangerous to the citizens or subjects, something which a tyrant would capitalise on in attempting to gain the upper hand over his subjects.

In V9 *odium* surrounds the monarch, or one with tyrant attributes: as *objects* of hate see Hannibal, by the Roman Senate (9.2.ext.2); Ptolemy Physcon, by his subjects (9.2.ext.5); and Septimuleius, *odium merita* generally (9.4.ext.1). For *odium* experienced by the 'kings' themselves towards others see Hamilcar (9.3.ext.2), Hannibal (9.3.ext.3) and the Queen of Assyria (9.3.ext.4).[37] Hamilcar and Hannibal are of course not kings but their dependence on the Carthaginian Senate in Livy and Polybius is elided and glossed over.[38] They are depicted instead as independent agents, giving them some of the positional qualities of kings, rather than straightforwardly representing them as generals controlled by Carthage.[39] V attaches *odium* to Septimuleius, Gaius Gracchus' friend (9.4.ext.1), who is the only individual who

[34] Sokolon (2006: 77).
[35] Sokolon (2006: 79).
[36] Arist. *Pol*. 1312b20-35, 1315b5-10. Sokolon (2006: 85). I comment on this in relation also to *perfidia*, see the introduction to 9.6.
[37] Of the three, only in the last *exemplum* does *odium* manifests itself into immediate action. In 9.3.ext.2-3 the *odium* is static.
[38] With the presence of Hamicar and Hannibal V continues the theme in V9, and specifically in 9.3, on the relationship of father and son that I alluded above, and integrates it to the discourse on the hatred of kings, in other words, the *odium* towards those who display tyrannical attributes.
[39] In fact the problems the Carthaginians had with Hannibal are somewhat comparable with Rome's dealings with Julius Caesar.

did not hold the same power or position in society as the other exemplars of *odium* in V9.[40] V emphasizes this exception by rhetorically juxtaposing Septimuleius with Ptolemy: *odium merit Septimuleii avaritia Ptolomaei autem, regis Cypriorum, risu prosequenda* (9.4.ext.1). One would expect the close proximity of the word *odium* to refer to Ptolemy (because of the tradition of the hatred of kings), but it does not, it refers instead to Septimuleius. By making this clear exception V emphasizes the culpability and *odium* attached to Septimuleius in Roman *memoria*, but also expands the discourse on *odium* in V9 by showing the power that hatred can generate among people when *any* individual (and V9 increases the force of this argument to include those who are neither royal nor in a senior political position) betrays such an important Roman institution such as *amicitia*.

Commentary

9.3 *Praefatio*.

fluctus: With this term V foregrounds the impulses, an important angle for the study of anger, as I have commented (above) in this chapter's introduction. *Fluctus* is used metaphorically in V9 here and at 9.8.1 *fluctuatus*.

claris personis: The opposite to 6.4.praef where famous men are linked with *laus* and *virtus*; here they are instead associated to vice.

[40] For the rhetorical commonplace on the hatred of kings in the Roman psyche see Erskine (1991).

imagines: V is fond of evoking 'pictorial representations' as stronger evidence and expressions of *exempla*, showing that literature is as effective in appealing to the imagination and memory as a picture.[41] V's rhetorical style evokes 'word-pictures' in the readers' mind to aid memory since, 'for his moral lessons to be followed they need to be remembered first'.[42] This is achieved by the 'vividness, verisimilitude and plausibility' that *imagines* can create when readers see the historical *exempla* forming in their minds.[43] After all, it is 'easier to remember a concrete example than an abstract idea'.[44] This is consistent with a crucial keyword in V's defining title *memorabilium*, showing how necessary it is for V's audience to remember. It is observable in V a championing of Roman art, and although it was 'held in low esteem in the mid Republic' (8.14.6) it became a more effective medium than literature to, first, 'aid memory'; second, in its 'role as instruction' (5.4.ext.1).[45] In 9.11.praef V 'equates his *exempla* with *imagines*, serving much the same function as the family *imagines* displayed in Roman *atria*', which were comparable in function to tombstones, being mnemonic reminders of the deceased ancestors.[46] 'The *tituli* which accompanied the *imagines* were labels that, like the *elogia*, displayed the deceased's name and likely offered an outline of his career'.[47] These brought together both memory and the aim of 'prompting the viewer to emulate the virtues' that such *imagines* represented.[48] Seneca similarly used Roman aristocratic houses as a '*locus* of memory'.[49]

[41] Skidmore (1996: 85). Skidmore (1996: 126 n. 6) helpfully quotes Fears (1981: 845) on Romans' thinking in terms of the metaphysical in the context of *imagines*. Also see Weileder (1998: 88). For this same use of *imagines* as here in V see also 9.11.praef, 4.6.praef, 5.4.ext.1.
[42] Skidmore (1996: 85).
[43] Skidmore (1996: 85).
[44] Skidmore (1996: 85). Also see Eyben (1972: 200).
[45] Holliday (2002: 18-9).
[46] Gowing (2005: 56).
[47] Flower (1996: 180-184).
[48] Gowing (2005: 56).
[49] Gowing (2005: 80).

quas di … voluerunt: 'By rewarding virtue or punishing vice, the gods themselves make men into *exempla* to be imitated or avoided'.[50] This is the only direct mention in V9 of divine intervention therefore it is striking when considering this book in isolation suddenly to confront this notion, especially since vice as depicted in V9 is usually presented as the result of freewill.[51] Divine intervention is, however, a major theme in book one where it is made clear there that the gods reward virtue or punish vice, ergo the ultimate message is that the 'stability of the state is linked to the individual by his morals and respect for the gods'.[52] Therefore freewill is at the basis of V's system of belief, freewill itself affects the gods' response to individuals, communities and to a whole state, hence V's moral purpose. Thus direct divine intervention in people's lives becomes an 'incentive to upright moral conduct' and reverence towards the gods, religion and morality being elements that have generally been 'regarded as the foundation of Roman political success'.[53] Although here the lack of free-will is at odds with Stoic thought *per se*, the two opposites can co-exist in V9 since, as I argue in the main introduction (under '*Exempla* and Stoic thought'), the notions generally associated with Stoicism might not have been exclusively associated with Stoicism, but could also have been interpreted as a reflection of a certain uniformity in the prevailing intellectual thought of Tiberian Rome. I argue here that, any parallels with Stoicism in V9 need not be applied consistently throughout the book, since one cannot firmly identify them with this philosophical school.

[50] Skidmore (1996: 68).
[51] For an exception see my comments at 9.8 on the implicitly alluded ambiguity of divine intervention versus *fortuna*.
[52] Skidmore (1996: 68). On the gods rewarding or punishing men's behaviour see also 2.7.7, 7.6.3.
[53] Skidmore (1996: 64). See Liv. 1.9.4, Sal. *Jug*. 14.19. Also see Lind (1972: 236-52), Walsh (1961: 66).

aut dicto aliquot aut facto: The combination of the words *dicta* and *facta* reoccur in numerous variations with regards to word order and conjunctions appearing mostly in V's prefaces, purposely reflecting the title of the *opus*.[54]

9.3.1.[55]

Summary: In 207 BC Fabius Maximus warns Livius Salinator not to go into battle until he had acquainted himself with Hasdrubal's power and morale. But Livius shows disregard for any such preparation in preference for immediate action.

Noticeable within the chapter is the progression of anger between the first three *exempla* (9.3.1-3) where it is individual, to the following three (9.3.4-6) where anger is collective.

The element of *temeritas* at 9.3.1 is implied by Salinator going against Fabius Maximus' advice (*ne ante descenderet … cognosset*) substantiated by the use of *festinanter* and *celerrime* in close textual proximity. As I stated in the introduction to 9.3, *temeritas* and *error* (the main themes to 9.8 and 9.9) are key consequences of *ira*. Therefore V's positioning of this *exemplum* as the first in the chapter is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it is comparable to the structure at 9.8.1, since both treat episodes from military history where *temeritas* puts Rome at serious risk, with disastrous consequences for Rome had the Romans failed. Second, 9.9.1 also shares the element of *temeritas*, as V's portrayal of the plebs' actions suggest. In addition 9.9.1 has a strong link to *ira* via two keywords: *saevire* (in the sense of fury) and

[54] This combination reappears in the following 9.11.praef, 9.11.2, 4.1.12, 6.2.praef, 6.4.praef, 7.2.praef, 7.3.praef. See also Weileder (1998: 38).

[55] Fabius is portrayed as the opposite of V's Salinator by Seneca: *quo alio Fabius affectas imperii vires recreavit, quam quod cunctari et trahere et morari sciit, quae omnia irati nesciunt? Perierat imperium … si Fabius tantum ausus esset quantum ira suadebat* (*Ira* 1.11.5).

iratus. Ergo V makes an indirect statement by positioning these three *exempla* as the first within each chapter to emphasise the closeness of *ira* to *temeritas* and *error*.

V's main source here is Livy (27.40), the structure of whose narrative shows close similarities with V's, in addition to the position of certain words and in the use of reported speech and direct speech. V's account is longer, developing into a moralising section which is absent in Livy:

V: *monente Fabio Maximo/ ne ante descenderet in aciem quam hostium vires animum cognosset, primam occasionem pugnandi non omissurum se respondit*

Livy: *monenti Q. Fabio/ ne priusquam genus hostium cognosset temere manum consereret, /respondisse ubi primum hostium agmen conspexisset pugnaturum*

V: *quid ita tam festinanter manum conserere vellet/ 'ut quam celerrime aut gloriam ex hostibus victis aut ex civibus prostratis gaudium capiam*'

Livy: *quae causa festinandi esset,/ 'aut ex hoste egregiam gloriam' inquit 'aut ex ciuibus uictis gaudium meritum certe, etsi non honestum, capiam'.*

Livius Salinator: Marcus Livius Drusus Salinator (cos. 219, 207 BC) fought in both Punic Wars.[56] His *cognomen* derives from the days when he was censor in 204 BC with Gaius Claudius Nero, a period in which both were often quarrelling.[57] Nero and Salinator were also consular colleagues in 207 BC, when they led an army that defeated the Carthaginians and killed their commander, Hasdrubal (Hannibal's brother). Despite working together in two of Rome's highest offices of State, the two men were enemies *propter privatas dissensiones* (V 7.2.6a), which provides another dimension to V's treatment in this chapter on *odium*, since he

[56] Salinator is mentioned seven times in V: 2.9.6 (a and b), 3.7.4, 4.1.9, 4.2.2, 7.2.6a, 7.4.4 and 9.3.1.

[57] *quam destrictam simul egerunt censuram*! (V 2.9.6). Disputes included *inter alia* the salt taxes, hence the *cognomen*, which was then adopted by Livius' descendants, including Gaius Livius Salinator.

also writes of the *pertinax odium* (V 7.2.6a) between them, to such an extent that the Senate attempted to reconcile them in order that they could manage public affairs better.[58]

monente ... cognosset: Fabius Maximus' exchanges with Salinator (his warning here and his question below asking him why he was in such a hurry to engage), would seem apt material for this book's eighth chapter, *de temeritate* (9.8). Indeed Salinator's case would seem rash not just *per se* but for the potential consequences for Rome's safety. The outcome, however, was victory for Rome over Hannibal and Hasdrubal. A similar type of personal and public risk-taking or gamble to 9.8.1: *suam pariter et patriae salutem depositurus!*

ut quam ... capiam: On direct speech in book nine see 9.5.2 below: *ipse...venit*.

Fabio Maximo: Contrast Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus' (Cunctator) temperament to Salinator's who, being 'a religious conservative', did not share, in this instance at least, Salinator's impulsive, rash nature.[59]

virtus: It takes a strong man to transcend the past and personal enemies for the sake of protecting one's country. In fact it is surprising that from exile, he would have followed the Senate's request to take up the consulship at all, considering his strong feelings towards Rome and the colleague he would be sharing the consulate with, the very person who was involved in sending him into exile.

[58] V 4.2.2.
[59] Wardle (1998: 91).

illa iniustae damnationis memor: Salinator's *ira* refers to his supposedly unfair exile, because in 219, during his consulship, he was accused to have not divided the spoils after his victory against Demetrius of Pharus.[60]

sed nescio an eiusdem fuerit hoc dicere et sic vincere: V employs here the rhetorical device of *dubitatio* to emphasize the contrast between the two parts of Salinator's *sermo*.

9.3.2.[61]

Summary: Gaius Figulus, whose father had been elected consul twice (162 BC, 156 BC), resents the fact that the very people who consult him as a lawyer did not vote for him for the consulship. This is the only attestation that Figulus existed.

9.3.2, 9.3.3, and 9.3.4 have in common the important dimension of shame.[62] In all three cases the subject is responding to the threat of damage to status or reputation. The shame and *ira* at 9.3.2 is distinctive from the rest of 9.3. Figulus' relationship with his electorate is on a different level since he had hitherto been the lawyer for many of them, legally protecting them, but the electorate did not return the favour by voting for him.[63] In 9.3.2 Figulus feels he deserves the votes for the consulship from those who owe it to him.[64] Since *ira* is a judgement of 'another's actions that reveals a low opinion of the subject', emotions for Figulus in V9.3.2 are exacerbated by the *memoria* of his father who had been a consul, the

[60] Frontin. *Str*. 4.1.45; *vir*. *ill*. 50.
[61] Lucarelli (2007: 302) places this *exemplum* under the category 'Väter und Söhne, Inszenierte Beziehungen, Abstammungsverhältnis (als Verpflichtung, Unterstützung, Problem)' alongside: 9.3.5, 9.7.1-2, 9.14.ext.3, 9.15.1, 9.15.3-5, 2.9.1, 2.10.4, 3.1.3, 3.4.2, 3.4.4-5, 3.5.3, 3.8.6, 4.5.3, 5.6.1, 6.2.8, 6.4.1, 7.8.5.
[62] Shame is 'an emotional response or judgement regarding public opinion' (Sokolon 2006: 109). *Ira* and shame are inextricably linked (Sokolon 2006: 111).
[63] On the perception of a violation of reciprocity in the context of shame in the ancient world see Sokolon (2006: 59).
[64] 'Shame is influenced by perceptions of what is deserved' (Sokolon 2006: 112).

very office Figulus was attempting to reach.[65] V mentions Figulus' father to show the impact his *memoria* would have had on Figulus' feelings of inadequacy, and the effect on his own reputation and status in Roman society.

iracundiae: It is noteworthy that *iracundia* occurs only at 9.3 in V: first, here, referring back to Salinator from the previous *exemplum*; second, to Sulla at 9.3.8; and, third, to Alexander at 9.3.ext.1. The fact that V chooses *iracundia* over *ira* suggests a nuanced description of the exemplars, namely, V portrays them as *being prone* to anger, as part of their general disposition. In other words, their anger does not constitute isolated instances. All three cases of *iracundia* in V9 have forceful verbs attached to them, signalling the exemplars' heavy dependence on – or enslavement to – this emotion in their lives: *iracundia* drove (*egerunt*) Salinator's fiery spirit (9.3.2); Sulla obeyed it (*obtemperat*, 9.3.8); and it almost snatched (*deripuit*) Alexander from heaven.

Figulum: Nothing else is known about Gaius Marcius Figulus except for the few details provided here. He was an unsuccessful candidate for the consulship, son of another Gaius Marcius Figulus, who was consul twice.[66] From what V tells us, he was a very famous lawyer and well regarded too, considering the number of people who consulted him: *pacato iuris civilis studio celeberrimum*.

consulere... nescitis: V gives Figulus this line, where the following word-play is employed: (i) between the words for 'consulting' (*consulere*) and 'to make one a consul' (*consulem facere*), (ii) the contrast of *scitis* and *nescitis*. Within this rhetorical and concise address to the Roman people is contained the speaker's full *ira*, which V advises against expressing: *nam*

[65] Sokolon (2006: 56).
[66] 162 and 156 BC. Mentioned once more by V at 1.1.3 and in Liv. *Per*. 47.

quis populo Romano irasci sapienter potest? I see V's *tamen aliquanto melius non dictum* as indicating that it was advisable not to worsen matters, since he had hitherto been a well-liked lawyer, also taking into account the violence of the *plebs* towards political leaders (see V 9.7). V's word-play here is reminiscent of Varro (see below) which suggests that V has an interest in making available to his audience the kind of learned antiquarian word-play that Varro offers, and that he is interested in embedding a late Republican approach to this kind of linguistic archaeology in the palette of *exempla* for a very different era: *consul nominatus qui consuleret et senatum, nisi illinc potius unde Accius ait in Bruto: qui recte consulat, consul cluat*.[67]

dictum merito: V writes that Figulus' resentment is deserved (*merito*). Although Figulus seems to have worked hard in his profession and in his relations with the Roman people (who came to consult him), he fails undeservedly to be elected for the consulship. The fact that his father had been elected twice as consul would have also exacerbated his *ira*, a point V draws out with *eo quidem magis quod illum bis patri suo datum meminerat*. Earlier in the *exemplum* V also highlights Figulus' otherwise placid character: *mansuetissimum*, *pacato*, and *prudentiae moderationisque immemorem*. This is a rhetorical move to increase the moral impact of the *exemplum*, showing the reader how easily one can be caught off guard by one's emotions.

[67] Var. *L*. 5.14. For more rhetorical word-play in Varro on *consul … consulere* see, for example, *de vita populi Romani* 61.1: *quod idem dicebantur consules et praetores, quod praeirent populo, praetores: quod consulerent senatui consules*.

9.3.3.[68]

Summary: In 304 BC a group of high-ranking Romans displays their disapproval towards the election of Gnaeus Flavius on account of his low social background by stripping their gold rings and their horses' trappings.

Although Flavius, as someone who, being an outsider, wanted to fit in would have felt *ira* at this treatment, V chooses not to focus on *his ira* or resentment at all.[69] The author's focalizer instead lies with an unnamed group of high ranking Romans. In attempting to defend the Roman institution of the aedileship, the group of nobles display the emotion of shame, feeling ashamed that this position should be occupied by a man not from the Roman elite.[70] V uses *tantum non luctus* – they showed their lack of self-control by 'almost open mourning' – to describe their emotions. The emphasis is on 'almost', V uses *luctus* as a metaphor and hyperbole. Here *pudor* is implicit in V's reading of the *exemplum* of the nobles' emotions. The following points are intensely relevant to this *exemplum* on shame:

- One reacts to shame via other emotions, such as *ira*, so it is consistent here that shame itself as a word does not appear in V's text; shame is an undercurrent emotion.

- *Pudor* was most prevalent among Roman adult elite males; as it is here with the nobles.

[68] 9.3.3 and 2.5.2 'probably derive from Livy' (Oakley 2005: 600). On this episode in Liv. 9.46.12 see Oakley (2005: 635-639). Also see Plin. *Nat*. 33.18. For Flavius elsewhere in V see 2.5.2 and the commentary of Themann-Steinke (2008) on V2. For other sources on Flavius' career (but not specifically on this episode) see Oakley (2005: 601-4). Lucarelli (2007: 313) categorizes 9.3.3-8 under 'Der Umgang mit Konflikten-Affektbegründete Konflikte' alongside 9.2.1-2, 9.5.4, 9.11.2, 9.11.4.

[69] Shame, as a social emotion, 'increases when known by respectable individuals. Reputation among the respected matters more because their opinion matters more' (Arist. *Rh*. 1379b25-30; Sokolon (2006: 115). I see this of particular relevance to Flavius.

[70] On the connection of defensive anger and shame in Aristotle see Sokolon (2006: 112).

- Maintenance of *pudor* tended to lead to the maintenance of the *status quo*, in which the elite had much invested; and here the *status quo* is threatened by this unusual candidate's lower status.

humillimae quondam sortis: Gnaeus Flavius: *libertino patre genitus et scriba* (V 2.5.2). Pliny gives his father's name as Annius.[71] He was curule aedile for 304 BC with Quintus Anicius Prænestinus, during which he was the first to publish the Fasti (Plin. *Nat*. 33.18) and the *ius civile Flavianum* (V's 2.5.2*).* The latter was a book of *actiones*, procedures, and formulas to be recited in the courts.[72] The purpose of the publication was to 'extend the knowledge and the practice of the law to the plebeians and to separate the *ius civile* from the *ius Pontificium*'.[73] The publishing of it (*vulgavit*) aroused the nobility's indignation because until then the contents of the *ius civile* had been kept hidden *per multa saecula inter sacra caerimoniasque deorum immortalium abditum solisque pontificibus notum* (V 2.5.2). The fact that something held so sacred and private for such a long time had been published was made even worse by Fabius' lowly status thus provoking *ira* among the nobility towards him and towards Appius Claudius Caecus, for whom Fabius worked as secretary and was the person responsible for promoting him to *curule aedile.*[74] The latter had been censor in 312 BC, a period in which *qui senatum primus libertinorum filiis lectis inquinauerat.*[75]

[71] *Anni filium*, *Nat*. 33.18.
[72] Cic. *Or*. 1.41.
[73] Smith (1843: 562). See Liv. 9.45, Gel. 7.9, Cic. *Mur*. 11. Ultimately however, its 'publication did not involve the disclosure of any holy secret at all and many of the forms of action may have been common knowledge already' (Wolff 1976: 94).
[74] *scriba Appi Caeci* (Plin. *Nat*. 33.18).
[75] Liv. 9.46.10.

Cn. Flavius: Gnaeus Flavius may have come from Praeneste, the son of a freedman and by a profession a scribe.[76]

anulos … abiecerunt*:* In the late Republic and early Principate, golden rings were a distinguishing mark of senators, *equites* and of their children. For another reference to golden rings in book nine see 9.6.1: *anuli magno ex pondere auri*. According to Pliny, the episode in this *exemplum* was caused by the fact that not only was Flavius appointed curule aedile but also *simul et tribunus plebei*, thus provoking these actions of indignation. In V the provocation was entirely based on the actions he took in his tribunate (*tribunus plebis*), rather than these two offices combined; while Livy only mentions the curule aedileship.[77] Flavius has been connected by extant sources to three high ranking positions: tribune of the plebs (as a direct consequence to his popular move among the people to publish the *ius civile Flavianum*), senator and curile aedile.[78] For an argument on the accuracy of the sources relating to Flavius' positions, see Oakley (2005: 608).

phaleras: See Oakley (2005: 639) under *phaleras*.

[76] Massa-Pairault (2001: 108-9). There are eight other sources apart from V and Livy (9.46.1-15) on the career of Flavius (Oakley 2005: 600-608).
[77] *curulem adferri sellam eo iussit ac sede honoris sui anxios invidia inimicos spectavit. ceterum Flavium dixerat aedilem forensis factio* (9.46).
[78] Oakley (2005: 608).

9.3.4.[79]

Summary: In 409 BC Manlius Torquatus returns to Rome victorious over the Latins and Campanians and is met by a mixed response from the people: the older generation rejoice but the younger one do not acknowledge him because he had beheaded his son for disobeying his orders.

The Roman youth here feels shame for Torquatus *minor*, because of the social disgrace and bad opinion attached to him after his death, which affected his *memoria*.[80] In Aristotelian terms they saw things from 'the eyes of another person', displaying empathy which underscored the fact that shame is in fact a social emotion, which can be used for justice.[81] Thus they attempt to restore his reputation by making a statement, that is, by being conspicuously absent.[82] By being absent, that is, not being part of the welcoming party on the arrival of Torquatus *maior*, they are 'simultaneously absent and present'.[83] They thus display their sense of shame in this unique manner via silence.[84] Although V does not condone their action (*nec factum eorum defendo*), the Roman youth's stance is one taken from moral responsibility and it is also non-violent, therefore it is in contrast with V's depiction of youth at 9.1.[85]

---

[79] For other sources telling this story see: Cic. *Fin*. 1.7, 2.19; Liv. 8.7.1-22; Quint. 5.11.7; Plut. *Fab*. 9.2; Gel. 9.13.12-20, 17.21.17; Oros. 3.9.2. On this *exemplum* from V's book two (2.7.6) see Themann-Steinke (2008: 379-383). On this episode in Livy see Oakley (1998: 436-451). On the themed-conflict between youth and elders see also Bettini (2000: 343-7). Lucarelli (2007: 301) categorizes this *exemplum* under 'Väter und Söhne, mittelbar inszenierte Beziehungen' alongside 9.1.2, 9.1.5-6, 9.1.9,9.11.5-6, 2.7.6, 6.1.5, 6.9.1, 7.7.1-3, 7.7.5, 8.6.1; and under 'Der Umgang mit Konflikten, *Ingratia*' alongside 9.4.3, 9.5.3, 9.11.ext.4, 5.1.3, 5.3.3-5, 5.3.ext.3, 7.8.5-9.

[80] For social disgrace and bad opinion in relation to shame see Arist. *Rh*. 1383b10-20, 1384a20-25.

[81] Sokolon (2006: 112). See Arist. *Rh*. 1411b20-30, 1383b30-40.

[82] On restoring reputation in shame see Sokolon (2006: 111).

[83] For this dimension to the role of shame see Kaster (1997: 7).

[84] For the role of silence in V9 see my main introduction. For the element of silence in shame see Kaster (1997: 7).

[85] On the concept of responsibility in shame see Williams (1993: 50-74).

Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus: Was three times consul (347, 345 and 340 BC) and twice dictator (353 and 348 BC). In 361 BC he gained the name Torquatus by defeating a Gaul in single combat and taking his ornamental neck chain (*torques*) from him.[86]

victoriam in urbem referenti: During Torquatus' consulship in 340 BC, Latin envoys complain of Roman misrule. Nothing comes of this and these join the Campanians against Rome. Following the heroic death of his consular colleague, Publius Decius Mus, in the battle which ensued, Torquatus wins a victory as the rebels surrender. Mus' death resembles self-sacrifice as a way to fulfil the prophecy (one side will lose its general and the other its entire army) that both colleagues experienced through a dream (see V at 1.7.3).[87] Although the prophecy was that the Romans would win, they did not know until later that it was down to Mus to die. *Romani consules, priusquam educerent in aciem, immolauerunt. Decio caput iocineris a familiari parte caesum haruspex dicitur ostendisse: alioqui acceptam dis hostiam esse* (Liv. 8.9); *quae neutro reformidante Decium depoposcerunt* (V 1.7.3). Mus' reply to this was said to have been: *Manlium egregie litasse. 'atqui bene habet' inquit Decius, 'si ab collega litatum est'* (Liv. 8.9). This follows the traditional Roman ethos of *dictatores imperatoresque soli possunt devovere* (Macr. *Sat*. 3.9.9), in that it rests on those invested with the highest *imperium* to sacrifice themselves for their country. In fact Mus was at the time the highest magistrate in Rome. Mus set a precedent for the later tradition of *devotio* as he was the first with the appropriate authority to perform it. On the other hand, Mus' *devotio* might also be 'considered a fiction derived from the praises sung at the funeral of his son in 295'.[88] Only after Mus' death does Livy state *Romani exsolutis religione animis, uelut tum primum signo dato coorti pugnam integram ediderunt*; showing us just how enrapt in their religion

[86] Harvey (1980: 259).
[87] Also see Versnel (1981).
[88] Wardle (1998: 222).

and superstition the Romans were and that often the victory of one (Torquatus) is at the expense of another (Mus).

filium adulescentem securi percusserat: This constitutes the other sacrifice of this event: Torquatus kills his own son.[89] Torquatus had forbidden single combats with the enemy, thus his son's actions constituted a loss of military discipline (*quam patriam militari disciplina carere*, 2.7.6) and was therefore punishable by death.[90] In this way he showed no bias towards his son but treated him like any other soldier. Killing one's own son constituted a peculiar feature of Roman law of a father's dominant position of *vitae necisque potestas*: their legal right of life and death over their children.[91] This constitutes the *exemplum par excellence* of Roman *severitas*.[92] V praises Torquatus at 2.7.6, in a chapter about military discipline, where the sections 2.7.3-6 are about men who punish their own family in order to support military discipline. Manlius Torquatus' deed is 'the paradigmatic *exemplum* of *severitas* in Roman tradition and his name a byword for *disciplina* as well as *severitas*'.[93] Often the 'virtue required of a man to muster the strength to carry out a deed which is difficult, such as killing one's son, is at loggerheads with and breaks other social codes (protection of one's family members, respect for the status of others, and so on), which can have wider negative repercussions (grief, family dishonour, public censure)'.[94]

[89] On this episode see Liv. 8.7 (Oakley 1998) and for further ancient references also see Langlands (2008: 170 n.45).
[90] It is unclear why he had forbidden these, since it was single combat that had brought him renown, see above about the origins of his name.
[91] For more on this see Harris (1986: 81-95), Eyben (1993: 301, note 40) and Plescia (1976: 143-171). On the moral ambiguity of *patria potestas* see Feldherr (1991: 225-234). For a discussion of V's *exempla* on *ius vitae necisque* see Fantham (1991: 277).
[92] Also see 5.8 on the *severitas* of fathers towards their children. 9.3.4 raises the important discourse, which is also central to Livy 8, 'on how *imperium* should be exercised and that the use of extreme *severitas* is not always the best in commanding an army' (Oakley 1998: 437). The expression *Manliana imperia* becomes 'proverbial' (Oakley 1998: 451) as the following passages show: Liv. 34.2, Cic. *Fin*. 2.105, Gel. 1.13.7.
[93] Langlands (2008: 171).
[94] Langlands (2008: 171). For other cases of *severitas* in book nine see 1.5: *quarum luxuria Severitas ipsa corrumpit poterat*; and 7.mil.Rom.3: *disciplinam militarem praefractius et rigidius astringere conatum*.

adversus imperium suum: At first seems like an act of straightforward insubordination by his son but V expands on this point earlier in his work: *quod provocatus a Gemino Maecio, duce Tusculanorum, ad dimicandum te ignaro descenderat* (2.7.6). Of course we do not know what this provocation consisted of, but it might have been a very urgent matter which his son thought could not be delayed. The fact that the combat was not initiated by his son and that we do not know how urgently that provocation needed to be responded to (it may have even been prompted by self-defence) are all details which V chooses not to dwell on but which could have given V more moral ammunition in favour of the son.

fortissime … proeliatum: Picks up the earlier *forti filio* (2.7.6). The bravery mentioned by V refers to Torquatus' son actually having defeated Geminus Maecius, who was the leader of the Tusculans. What makes this episode all the more sorrowful is that he was killed as *gloriosam victoriam et speciosa spolia referentem* (2.7.6).

iuniorum nemo obviam processit: I have alluded to the theme of silence in the main introduction (under *memoria*) in the context of forgetting and erasing from *memoria* a person or incident. Here the role of *silentium* is different, it is a mark of *ira*.[95] Livy, who presents a far longer account of this incident, is 'somewhat of a specialist in silences'.[96] In fact Livy 'uses silences to bring out the emotions of his protagonists', and so does V here too and at *nec quaestio … versata est* (9.10.2).[97]

[95] As I have commented in the introduction to 9.3, the *ira* in the majority of *exempla* in this chapter does not take expression in violent action.
[96] Oakley (1998: 130).
[97] Oakley (1998: 130). For other examples of this in Livy, as referenced by Oakley (1998: 130) see (in the case of grief) 9.38.13, 40.12.2; (in the case of shock and astonishment) 3.47.6, 6.40.1, 8.7.21. On Livy 3.47.6 and for *silentium* as a Livian narratological device see Ogilvie (1965: 486).

irae vim … valuit: The entire Roman victory (specifically the fact that father and son individually prevailed in battle and Decius Mus' own self-sacrifice in battle for his country, *devotio*) becomes obscured by the outcome of Torquatus' action towards his son. Because Torquatus beheaded his son, there was a holding back from a section of the Roman people, without the full outpouring of emotion and celebration of the whole city. Since only the older generation came out to congratulate Torquatus, and implicitly also Mus' huge contribution and self-sacrifice, Torquatus in a way let his former colleague down, since Mus' courage was not celebrated and glorified to the maximum either.[98] This point has not been covered in scholarship yet nor does V mention it here either. However, even if Torquatus was congratulated by the older section of the community, V encapsulates the mood perfectly at the end of 9.3.5 by stating *congratulationem eius in Torquato spernendam*. Note the contrast of having *sperno* linked to *congratulatio*, by doing so V captures the bitterness felt by the Roman youth, creating the effect for the reader that something is not as it should be, not quite natural or wholesome: part of the population feels scorn and disdain in a context where another is in high spirits congratulating the victors. This dissonance within the *populus Romanus*, when viewed within the context of V9 overall, emphasises V's point on the dangers of having conflicts and divisions within the populace that can potentially lead to civil wars.

9.3.5.

Summary: (i) In 481 BC the whole Roman cavalry refuse to follow consul Fabius' orders to pursue an enemy because the latter had previously blocked an agrarian law. (ii) In 471 BC

[98] For Decius Mus' *devotio* in V see 1.7.3 and 5.6.5.

because Appius' father had assailed the interests of the people, Appius' army rebel, preventing him from gaining a triumph.

Notice there are parallels for the two *exempla* in 9.3.5 and for 9.3.6 to Livy's book two: for the former, 2.43.5-10 and 2.59.2; for the latter, 2.27.

Unlike the 9.7.mil. Rom. section, the two *exempla* in 9.3.5 do not involve any violence between the army and their military leaders, but instead rely on silence and inaction to illustrate this chapter's moral aim on *ira*. This is comparable to 9.3.4, thus V creates a tryptic of episodes on the power of silence.[99]

Exemplum 1.[100]

Fabio: Caeso Fabius Vibulanus belonged to a prodigiously successful family for their ability of securing consulships. He was the middle of three brothers, the three siblings amassed a total of seven consulships between them: Quintus (the eldest), in 485 and 482; Caeso in 484, 481 and 479 and Marcus (the youngest) in 483 and 480. In V, Caeso is mentioned only here, his other two brothers appear at 5.5.2 Their father was also Caeso (Maior), for whom there is no surviving information.

ad hostium copias persequendas: This is expressed in more detail by Livy: *ad duo simul bella exercitus scribitur; ducendus Fabio in Aequos, Furio datur in Veientes* (2.43).[101] Fabius was able to send only the cavalry against the Aequi, since the infantry refused to obey. It is

[99] On the theme of silence in V9 see my main introduction.
[100] On Livy's (2.43.5-10) recounting of the episode see Ogilvie (1965: 350-1). Also see Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.2.
[101] On the scholarly debate concerning what enemy force this was see Ogilvie (1965: 350-1).

curious how only one part of his army were mutinous. Livy highlights this: *exsecrantes nunc imperatorem nunc nauatam ab equite operam*.[102]

legis agrariae ab eo impeditae memores: Like in the preceding section, this is another example on division in society based on anger. Rather than a division between generations this is on account of political policy, namely the agrarian law. It refers back to Fabius' first year as consul in 484 BC when he (and his brother Marcus in the following year) secured the opposition of the senate and succeeded in defeating the agrarian law. Livy tells us that this law would have been the same as that of Cassius (2.42).

Exemplum 2.[103]

Appio: the incident under discussion occurred during Appius Claudius Sabinus' consulship of 471 BC. Note how V chooses to relate here an episode from Appius' life as a consequence of his father's actions, rather than his own. This angle continues 9.3's theme of paternity. Livy in relating the episode of the mutiny of Appius' army includes the following, of what the military tribunes were reported to have said to Appius during their mutiny: *monentes ne utique experiri uellet imperium* (2.59). This is the same type of stretching or misuse of one's powers that V alludes to in 6.1.2 about Appius *minor* and this is why it should be taken into account by the reader in interpreting 9.3.5b as it looks back at that earlier incident. V at 6.1.2 provides a glimpse of Appius *minor*'s *vitia*: he took liberties with a girl, something he was able to do because he had become one of the *decemviri* (between 451 BC and 449 BC). Moral condemnation of those who misuse their positions in high public office is a strong theme in V overall. The episode caused an uprising against the *decemviri*, which led to the *decemviri*

[102] For V misunderstanding of Livy see Shackleton Bailey (2000, vol.2, p. 324 n. 5).
[103] Liv. 2.59.

being expelled from Rome in 449 BC, with the ordinary magistrates being re-instituted. Subsequently Appius committed suicide in prison.[104]

duci, cuius pater: The father in question is *the* Appius Claudius Crassus Inregillensis Sabinus, the semi-legendary founder of the Roman gens Claudia, consul in 495 BC.[105] He is again mentioned by V in the next *exemplum*, about the same issue as here on his stringent handling of the debt problem with the plebs: *Appio quod obstitisset quominus aere alieno suo succurreretur*. Furthermore he seemed to have handed down some of his own cruelty to Appius (minor), as the incident with the girl ended with her murder.[106] The notion of inherited characteristics among the Claudii was strong in Roman historiography.[107]

dum pro senatus … impugnaverat: This refers to Appius' (maior) harsh enforcement of debt laws, which forced the *secessio plebis* of 494 BC with the plebeians fleeing to the *Mons Sacer*. This eventually brought about the freeing of some plebeians from their debts and the patricians conceding some of their powers to create the office of tribune of the plebs. Nevertheless because of Appius' (minor) family connection his army retaliated against him. This episode is also related by Livy (2.59) who marks the fact that the army's mutiny was even worse against Appius than Fabius, since *non enim uincere tantum noluit, ut Fabianus exercitus, sed uinci uoluit*. The army continued on their mutiny leading to a defeat, only fighting back to defend their camp. As in the preceding section, this is another example

[104] Impelluso (2003: 372). The prosopography is disputed (see Broughton *MRR* iii. 45f). Even if Appius minor was later a decemvir, V does not highlight it.
[105] Previously known as Attius Clausus (2.16)
[106] For Appius' cruelty on the debt issue see Livy (2.27): *cum Appius et insita superbia animo et ut collegae uanam faceret fidem, quam asperrime poterat ius de creditis pecuniis dicere. Deinceps et qui ante nexi fuerant creditoribus tradebantur et nectebantur alii*.
[107] Suet. *Tib*. 1-4.

where a father's actions have a profound effect on a son, since V points towards Appius' (maior) stance on debt laws as the direct cause for the mutiny by his son's army.[108]

9.3.6.[109]

Summary: The Roman people are angry with the consuls Appius and Servilius for not representing them adequately, they dedicate the temple of Mercury not to the consuls but to the chief centurion instead.

This section continues the same theme in 9.3 of the inherent power of the Roman people, last commented on at *nam quis populo Romano irasci sapienter potest* (9.3.2), where it was used to consult Figulus in his capacity of lawyer rather than voting for him as consul (in that *exemplum* the anger was Figulus' rather than the people's). In 9.3.6 the power of the people is expressed in their choice of who the dedicatee of the temple of Mercury will be, see below. The people's choice is based not only on anger but also revenge and hatred. With so many *exempla* in V9 about abuses of power and injustice, 3.2 and 3.6 stand out as rare glimpses of ordinary, non-elite, people speaking out for themselves, making decisions and being successful in implementing them. Anger can be used negatively (see the rest of the chapter) or, as shown in these two sections, positively, to assert justice and the people's will.

violenter: V's mention of violence seems to be connected to the people's *emotions* via the way they voted for the dedication, rather than, as in Livy's narrative, the violence surrounding the debtors' and creditors' issue and the danger to personal liberty. Like here, at

[108] See Seneca's comment on not bearing malice towards children of the enemy or dictators: *nihil est iniquius quam aliquem heredem paterni odii fieri* (*Ira* 2.34).
[109] 495 BC. Liv. 2.27.1-6. See Ogilvie (1965: 303).

9.7 the focus is on the crowd's violence (although 9.7 it is *physical* violence). The sense of injustice in this *exemplum* parallels that of Livy; that is, the choice had not been made on merit: *suo data esset factum quam ad consulum ignominiam* (2.27).

aedis Mercurii: The Plaetorii were plebeian Etruscans. As a *gens*, they had been involved with religion, hence the people's decision to dedicate the temple of Mercury to a member of such a family. As Livy states, he was selected not so much to honour him but to bring discredit on the consuls. The original temple was restored in 300 BC, but originally it went back to the 490s, and was re-dedicated to Plaetorius, whose name would have appeared on the inscription.[110] Historians 'invented an earlier M. Laetorius when they invented the characteristics of his family: a dislike for the Servii and a military record'.[111]

Appio: Appius Claudius Sabinus Inregillensis at 9.3.5 was mentioned as the cause of the army's desertion of his son's command. In in the Livy he is described twice as angry: *furente Appio* and *saevire inde utique consulum alter patresque* (including the whole Senate). In V, anger is seen only from the people's perspective. In Livy, the people are also basing their actions on *animus* (courage), not only *ira*: *plebi creverant animi et longe alia quam primo instituerant via grassabantur* (Liv. 2.27).

Servilio: Publius Servilius Priscus Structus was Appius' consular colleague of 495 BC. Appius was at least favoured by the patricians (*Servilius neutris, Appius patribus mire gratus*, Livy 2.27), whilst Servilius did not escape the *odium* (*odium* rather than *ira*, see reference to Livy 2.27 in footnote) of the people, who considered him *fallax* (false) and was not supported

[110] Ogilvie (1965: 303).
[111] Ogilvie (1965: 303).

by the patricians. In addition he was denounced as a traitor by Appius himself, for his support of the plebs.[112]

languido patrocinio: Servilius arouses popular anger for being half-hearted in the people's defence. Livy calls it 'taking the middle course': *ita medium se gerendo* (2.27). Servilius' position was complex, trying to strike a balance between his loyalties to the people and still retaining credibility among the patricians. He failed in both.[113]

9.3.7

Summary: In 141 BC Quintus Metellus, just before he is succeeded by Quintus Pompeius as Proconsul for Spain, effects a number of changes that will unfavourably impact upon his successor's tenure, but in so doing also loses his own triumph.

Notice how here V's *opprobrium* is that *ira* caused a holder of *imperium* to exercise it badly. In the preceding *exemplum*, by contrast, those who suffered under holders of *imperium* were led to anger to reject the highest *imperium* (that they should have obeyed).

proculcavit: Found again in book nine, used metaphorically, of a 'trampling over', in the context of an insult at 5.3: *qui balneo ... proculcatum*.

impotenter: For *impotentia* in V9 see my introduction to 9.5.

---

[112] *Ita medium se gerendo nec plebis vitavit odium nec apud patres gratiam iniit. Patres mollem consulem et ambitiosum rati, plebes fallacem, brevique apparuit aequasse eum Appi odium* (Liv. 2.27).

[113] What complicated matters was also his consular colleague's attitude towards him from the outset: *ut collegae uanam faceret fidem* (Liv. 2.27). The word *patrocinium* is a legal term, as if Servilius had assumed the role of *patronus* in a court of law or taken up a position akin to V's 9.15.1 *fere omnia patronum adoptarent*.

Q. Metellus: Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus is one of the most frequently reoccurring characters in V. In 7.1.1 V portrays his life as the perfect example of good fortune, to such an extent that he uses the word *indulgentia* in connection to it – in terms of fortune being indulgent to Metellus – because of the way in which he was almost spoilt by such a happy, idyllic life. V who is otherwise brief and succinct, devotes thirty-six words to describe the actions Metellus performs to *indulge* his spite towards Pompeius. Later in the *exemplum* – and in contrast to fortune's *indulgentia* of Metellus at 7.1.1 – V also writes that Metellus indulged his spite: *cupiditati suae indulsit*, a picture consistent with *impotenter* above, in the sense of 'without restraint, without self-control'. The object of the indulgence however is rather peculiar. One would usually associate it with material (*luxuria*), bodily (*libido*) pleasure, or indeed in the happiness he derived from life, described in 7.1.1. But in this case it concerns a perverse pleasure derived from anger, hatred and revenge. From this perspective therefore, Metellus' episode is also an *exemplum* in *avaritia* a quality he displays through his *cupiditas* (OLD, 3. *cupiditati suae indulsit*, 9.3.7). As so sometimes in V, an *exemplum* can span various categories making it suitable for inclusion in multiple chapters. It is the author's spin on that particular episode that determines its position in the opus, and adds the distinctively Valerian value. This authorial angle is further noticeable when considering that, in contrast to the present *exemplum*, V portrays indulging one's anger as acceptable at 6.1.13; thus showing a moral flexibility consistent with my comments on situation ethics in the introduction to 9.1.

consul prius, deinde pro consule: The former in 143 BC, the latter (of *Hispania Citerior*) in 142 BC. He suffered two consular defeats.[114]

[114] *Auct. vir. ill.* 61.3 (Shackleton Bailey, note 6, pg. 160, Loeb vol. 2).

Quintus Pompeius: Consul in 141 BC (Shackleton Bailey 2000, vol.2 p. 447) when he was sent to Spain as the successor of Metellus Macedonicus in command of the Numantine War.

hostium quam irae fortiori victor: This seems to be the only criticism directed at Metellus. In fact in V's other mentions of him he is portrayed extremely favourably, see especially 4.1.12; 5.1.5 and 7.4.5. V's main point is that despite Metellus' past victories he was nonetheless unable to conquer himself, and specifically his anger. Referring to Metellus also see: *humanitatem propinquae victoriae praetulit* (5.1.5).

9.3.8.[115]

Summary: Sulla dies from a fit of rage because Granius, the magistrate of Puteoli, is slow in providing money for the reconstruction of the Capitol.

Sulla's reaction at 9.3.8, at least in the way V presents it, is involuntary in that infinitesimal moment in which he is completely absorbed by rage, casting such an irreversible and final effect on his life.[116] This marks a contrast to the rest of 9.3, where anger more typically occupies a larger timeframe in a person's reaction. This quality may be behind the placement of 9.3.8 as the last *exemplum* of the domestic section. V utilizes this space at the end of a long

[115] See also Plut. *Sull.* 37.1-3. Also see Valgiglio (1954: 178). On alternative traditions of Sulla's death see Plin. *Nat.* 26, 86 and Carney (1961).

[116] On the discussion between involuntary and voluntary impulses in the study of the emotions see Inwood (1993: 175); on strong emotions being irresistible external forces beyond our control versus human autonomy and self-control see Adams (1985). On psychic movements directly causing voluntary bodily movements see Cooper (1999: 453-461). That which is involuntary is also a feature of error, where, as outlined in my comments at 9.9. For the connection between *ira* and *error* see *ira… amat et tuetur errorem* (Sen. *Ira* 1.18.2). Seneca makes *error* the base for men's wrongdoings: *cur oderit cum error illos in eiusmodi delicta compellat?* (*Ira* 1.14.2).

domestic section as a *caveat* on human frailty, in order to leave a lasting impression on the reader.[117]

V's is the first (of two, followed by Plutarch) account that depicts Sulla's death as deriving from a fit of anger. No prior extant literary or historic tradition survives. In V9, it functions as a rhetorical embellishment to emphasize the negative power of being at the mercy of a vice and not being able to control it.[118]

quid?: In connecting the message to the previous episode, V starts an *exemplum* in this way twice more in book nine at 13.3 and 15.4. It conveys disbelief at the frequency of human frailty and is used at the end of a chapter's domestic section (like here and at 13.3), or very near the end (as the penultimate *exemplum* of 15.4's domestic section).[119] Another rhetorical instrument to attract the reader's attention at the start of a section in V is *age*, which is used nearly as frequently as *quid* in V9 (one more time than *quid*).[120] Both feature prominently throughout V's other books.

Sulla [...] **suum erogavit**: This feeling of due retribution is similar to Pliny the Elder's conclusion on Sulla: 'was not the close of his life more horrible than the sufferings which had been experienced by any of those who had been proscribed by him? His very flesh, eating into itself, and so engendering his own punishment'.[121]

[117] On human frailty in V9 see my comments on V's 'meditation' (9.2.ext.11) in the introduction to 9.2.
[118] As an example of V's divergence from other sources on Sulla's death see Dowling's (2000: 312) comment when contrasting the 'peaceful death' of Sulla with the violent death of Caesar. In V, Sulla's death is all but peaceful.
[119] On human frailty in V9 see immediately above.
[120] For this use of *age* in V9 see 9.1.ext.3, 9.3.6, 9.8.3 and 9.13.ext.4.
[121] *Nat*. 7.44, see Loeb translation.

cunctantius: It is unclear whether the money was being paid back (*cunctantius*) or, as Plutarch tells us, there was an outright refusal to pay it back altogether.[122] Plutarch, in addition, recounts that Sulla, because the debt had not been paid, in full or not at all, had Granius summoned before him to be strangled. The scene that ensues, yet again, differs from V's text. Both texts talk about a fit of anger that causes his death but, while in V we get the impression that Sulla dies on the scene, in Plutarch he expires later on, 'after a night of wretchedness'. Sulla's early demise might have led to Granius' release but we do not know the outcome.

animi concitatione nimia: Sulla dies from excessive emotions, agitation of mind, comparable, on the opposite scale, to the two women in 9.12.2, who die of joy.[123] The physical description of Sulla here is noteworthy in terms of the Stoics' attention to the theory of physiognomy as a rhetorical device, namely the interpretation of character from the physique prompted by the emotions.[124]

9.3.externa

This is the only instance in V9 where a *praefatio* is given for an external section, something which V does not even do for chapters where he provides more external *exempla*, such as 9.1, 9.2 or 9.12. This is not altogether clear why, but the possibility that V died before he could finish his *opus* may be a reason for it. Either way, one cannot determine or identify any evidence to substantiate the possibility that V chose to do this to make any rhetorical or moral point.

[122] Plut. *Sull.* 37.3.
[123] On biological responses as part of the emotions see Sokolon (2006: 11-32, 121).
[124] Evans (1950).

verecundiae: A frequently reoccurring word in V, appearing a total of thirty-eight times.[125] V's message here is similar to the opening to the external section of 9.2 where V seems relieved that the following *exempla* are not Roman.

propositi: V's allusions to his undertaking are rare, and this is the only one in V9.[126]

9.3.ext.1.[127]

Summary: V names three events that nearly prevented Alexander's deification: (i) exposing Lysimachus to a lion; (ii) killing Clitus with a spear; (iii) ordering Callisthenes to die.

There are several variants to the stories on the three men portrayed in this *exemplum*. V strips the stories of all their context and detail and provides the very essentials by devoting only three words for each event, all wrapped up in a single sentence presented symmetrically: first, the name of the person in the nominative (Lysimachus, Clitus, Callisthenes), followed by what that person met his fate by (*leoni*, *hasta*, *mori*), in the ablative for the first two, and followed by the past participle (*obiectus*, *traiectus*, *iussus*). The three individuals are connected simply by *et*.[128] V's terse exposition presents a quick snapshot of Alexander's *ira* unencumbered by the multifarious versions circulating, and in doing so he concentrates the reader's attention on Alexander's nature, which transcends those details.

[125] 2.9.praef, 2.1.4, 2.1.7, 2.1.9, 2.3.praef, 2.5.5, 2.7.7, 3.8.6, 4.1.4, 4.1.10, 4.5.praef, 4.5.1, 4.5.3 (x2), 4.5.4, 4.5.5, 4.5.6, 4.5.ext.2, 4.7.5, 4.8.ext.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.5, 5.4.1, 5.7.ext.1, 5.8.3, 5.8.4, 6.1.7, 6.3.ext.1, 6.5.praef,7.3.5, 7.7.1, 8.2.2, 8.2.4, 8.3.praef, 8.12.1, 8.14.ext.3, 9.13.2. On the importance of the term *verecundia* in Roman thinking see Kaster (1997: 8, 14). For *verecundia* in V see Lucarelli (2007: 201-2, 302, 307, 310-1).
[126] *propositum*: 1.6.praef, 3.2.2, 3.8.1, 4.1.12, 5.2.praef, 6.2.praef, 7.3.praef, 8.10.1. *coepto*: 1.1.praef. Note the frequency in the preface passages.
[127] On Alexander's presence in V9 see my comments at 9.5.ext.1.
[128] They are also in chronological order (Wardle 2005: 159).

(i) Lysimachus: There are different versions of the story of Lysimachus and the lion.[129] Wardle argues that 'Valerius takes the story from Pompeius Trogus (cf. Justin 15.3.7-8), who himself inherited it from a Hellenistic source […]'.[130] In this version Lysimachus survives but note that V does not specify this, either expecting the reader to know or wanting the reader to focus on the word *obiectus*, signalling Alexander's cruelty in prompting terror (mental torture) in Lysimachus by being confronted by a lion, not knowing if he will be saved or be eaten alive. The *exemplum* might be classified in the previous chapter on cruelty, if it were not for the strong motivating force of *ira* here.[131]

(ii) Clitus: In 328 BC following a drunken quarrel at a banquet an inebriated Alexander kills Clitus with a lance (sources differ on the nature of the quarrel).[132] Clitus is also known as 'Clitus the Black' and may have belonged to Macedonian nobility. Besides the relationship of *amicitia*, Clitus' sister Lanice was nurse to Alexander.[133] Clitus himself had even saved Alexander's life during the battle at Granicus.[134]

(iii) Callisthenes: His execution in 327 BC was due to his opposition to his *proskynesis*, that is, the traditional Persian act of bowing before a person or god.[135] One of the versions of the above story on Clitus was that Clitus, instead of praising Alexander, praised Philip, which

[129] See Wardle (2005: 159, note 85).
[130] Wardle (2005: 159).
[131] Alexander was fond of hunting lions (Plut. *Alex*. 40-41). For another allusion to lions in V9 see 9.3.ext.2.
[132] Carney (2000: 274) identifies the main sources as being: 'Plut. *Alex.* 50-52.4; Arr. 4.8.1-9.9; Curt. 8.1.19-2.13; Just. 12.6.1-18'. Diodorus' version is lost. Also Sen. *Ep.* 83.19; *Ira* 3.17.1. On the dangers of being in a state of drunkenness see 9.1.ext.1. Drunkenness caused Philip to nearly kill Alexander (Plut. *Alex.* 9.5) and Alexander to set Persepolis afire (Plut. *Alex.* 38; Curt. 5.7.1-7; Diod. Sic. 17.72.1-6). In particular on Clitus' death and its various interpretations see Carney (1981).
[133] Arr. *Anab*. 4.9.3; Curt. 8.1.21; Just. 12.6.10.
[134] Plut. *Alex.* 16, Arr. *Anab*. 1.12, 15, 16.
[135] Wardle (2005: 160). Callisthenes was tortured and crucified (Arr. *Anab*. 4.14.3; Curt. Ruf. 8.8.21, as referenced in Wardle 2005: 160 n. 87). On the different versions of his death see Heckel (1992: 270, note 85, as referenced in Wardle 2005: 160 n. 87). Also see Bosworth (1998: 114, note 27).

angered the king to the point of killing Clitus. This would provide us with a pattern in the two incidents, that of being offended, a characteristic of *ira*, as V states in the *praefatio* to 9.3: *quia dolorem … patitur*.

victorias … **victas**: Turning victory into defeat or something abominable, dishonourable is a theme in V9.[136]

amicorum iniustis caedibus: For the theme of *amicitia* in V9 see my comments in the introduction at 9.5.

9.3.ext.2

Summary: Ext.2 and 3 are two *exempla* on the Barca family. First, Hamilcar, the Carthaginian commander and statesman, is portrayed here as inciting hatred in his sons against Rome from a young age.

quattuor filios: Hamilcar was father of Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Mago. The fourth son never appears in history.[137]

alere … **nutrimenta**: It is rare for V to use both *alo* and *nutrimenta* in the abstract; he does so again for *nutrimenta* at 6.3.11 *nutrimentis culpae*.[138] Noteworthy is the contrast of the

[136] *victoriae relanguescunt* (9.1.ext.1); *paene tanti uictoriae eius non fuerunt* (9.2.2); *Manlio ... percusserat* (9.3.4); *tres maximas ... reddidit* (9.3.ext.1); *victoriamque non meruit, sed emit* (9.6.4); *an ne victoriae ... superesset* (9.6.ext.1); *et quidem ... necavit* (9.8.ext.2).

[137] Cassiodorus seems to follow V on the mention of the fourth son (*Chronica, anno urbis conditae* 524). There may be two possible explanations for the fourth son. First, it may derive from a 'fuzzy awareness that Barca had more children'; second, the numeral is mistaken, since in V's text 'the preceding word is *odium* which could have corrupted a iii or iv' (Hoyos 2003: 223).

rearing, nourishing of children in the conventional manner alongside that of more perverse, twisted approach of inculcating hatred.[139] This *exemplum* is unique to V, and it may be a rhetorical tool of *inventio* to let the reader consider how certain vices are taught, developed. Vice is innate in human life but can be brought out and magnified beyond all sense of proportion by a third party. It points to the dangers of allowing such strong emotions to simmer in one's life until they explode, in this case in the person of Hannibal. The fact that Hannibal would become one of Rome's fiercest enemies emphasizes this danger. The *exemplum* prepares the reader for the following one, with the boy Hannibal. In a way V blames Hamilcar for his son's future actions against Rome.[140]

eiusdem … leoninos … se praedicabat: This *dictum* attributed to Hamilcar is not found elsewhere. V again on lion cubs see 7.2.ext.7.[141] On a lion also see 9.3.ext.1. Note that all three of these mentions on lions are in the external *exempla*.

9.3.ext.3.[142]

Summary: At the age of nine Hannibal swears during a sacrifice that he will be a deadly enemy to Rome one day.

novem … futurum: This story is also recounted by Livy (21.1). While V presents the story with Hannibal seemingly swearing of his own initiative and free will, in Livy the sentence

[138] For non abstract meanings of the two words in V see: *Alo*: 3.4.4, 4.4.6, 5.4.7, 7.4.1, 7.6.ext.3. *nutrimenta*: 2.1.10, 2.4.5, 3.2.ext.7, 5.4.ext.3, 6.3.11, 6.6.ext.1.
[139] Seneca stated that repeated anger which goes unchecked, like that of Hamicar's sons who grew up with it, turns into cruelty and is enjoyed by those exercising it, see *Ira* 2.5.2-3.
[140] The hate displayed here by Hamilcar is comparable to the modern description of racism, as 'modern theorists have connected hate to racism' (Sokolon 2006: 77).
[141] 'V attributes the advice about a lion cub (*Frogs* 1430-2, of Alcibiades) to Pericles returned from the dead' (Olson 2013: 304).
[142] 237 BC. Also see Liv. 21.1. On Hannibal's presence in V9 see my comments at 9.1.ext.1.

structure suggests pressure from Hamilcar on the boy: 'Hamilcar made Hannibal swear that as soon as he could he would be enemy to Rome'.[143] V presents the boy, during the years in which he would have been exposed to his father's hatred of Rome, as acting independently of Hamilcar, displayed in this *exemplum*'s scene (*pulvere* … *pulveris*). Here the nine year old Hannibal (*novem annorum*, 9.3.ext.3; *annorum ferme novem* Liv. 21.1) is said to have stated that the war between Carthage and Rome would only really end when either city was reduced to dust. Hannibal in that moment created the effect of rising dust by having stamped his feet on the ground in a temper. The latter is more associated to an average nine-year-old boy's temperament compared to this *exemplum*'s two *dicta*. I see this as V showing the adverse effects of being raised to learn to hate, affecting the child in such a way that, in this respect at least, he seems like a boy beyond his years, somewhat unnatural, disfigured by his hate.[144]

9.3.ext.4.[145]

Summary: Samiramis, legendary queen of Assyria, interrupts her coiffure upon hearing of Babylon (a city she herself had founded) revolting and immediately leads the way to restore the city.

[143] *Fama est etiam Hannibalem annorum ferme novem, pueriliter blandientem patri Hamilcari ut duceretur in Hispaniam […] altaribus admotum tactis sacris iure iurando adactum se cum primum posset hostem fore populo Romano* (Liv. 21.1).

[144] On children and anger in the ancient world see Hanson (2003). Apropos Hannibal's childhood, see Seneca's comment that repeated anger which goes unchecked turns into cruelty and is enjoyed by those exercising it (*Ira* 2.5.2-3). 'Anger is the greatest evil' (*maximum malum iram*, *Ira* 2.12.6). In V9 Hannibal in fact appears in the chapter 9.2 on cruelty and is exemplified as the deadliest enemy to Rome. See 9.1.ext.1 for my comments on Hannnibal's role in V9. I comment on moral disfigurement or deformity also at *deformiter* (9.5.ext.2) and on Campanian arrogance at 9.5.ext.4 under *Campanum*.

[145] This episode is not found elsewhere. 'Samiramis was an invention of Greek legend only' (Lane-Fox 2008: 176). On Samiramis see Diod. Sic. 2.4-7, on the founding of Babylon see Diod. Sic. 2.7-9. On Samiramis also see Oros. 1.4, 2.2.5, 2.6.7; Just. 1.2. On women and anger in Graeco-Roman historiography see Harris (2003 and 2001: 264-284).

in puerili … valuit: Samiramis' comparison to a boy is striking. It indicates here the woman's subordinate position in society and their faculties compared to a man's (for a typical view in V's times of women see my comments at 9.1.3, also see 9.12.2).[146] V here goes a step further by equating a woman to a child, a person who has not fully developed into an adult. This is all the more striking since V decides to have Samiramis follow an *exemplum* of a boy. The presence of women and children in these two *exempla* also works rhetorically to impress on the reader that the *pathe* of hatred and anger in children and women are also found in men, indicating the weak attributes these two emotions represent, especially inconsistent with elite men's *Romanitas*. As Seneca later wrote: *ita ira muliebre maxime ac puerile vitium est. 'at incidit et in viros'. Nam viris quoque puerilia ac muliebria ingenia sunt* (*Ira* 1.20.3).[147]

altera parte crinium adhuc soluta: Perfectly captures the queen's pragmatism, resoluteness and sense of urgency upon hearing the news, she springs into immediate action**.** V's portrayal of Samiramis is ambiguous. On the one hand, Samiramis' inclusion in V9 is *per se* an implicit categorisation of her as a negative exemplar, in terms of *ira*, *odium*, *ultio* and *temeritas* (*praecipiti celeritate*). However, at the same time, one also gets the impression that the author might have admired this legendary figure. This is apparent by V's use of *quocirca*, linking the sentence immediately before to the mention that a statue of Samiramis had been set up in her memory in Babylon, immortalasing this *exemplum*. Implicit to this portrayal of Samiramis, certain admirable qualities emerge which belong to *ira*, such as spiritedness and drive, thus V implicitly makes the implicit moral point that *ira* is not an *exclusively* negative

[146] Encapsulating this view of the times: 'Susceptibility to anger and irrational impulsiveness are traits of women who having less strength of reason have less ability to regulate and control their emotions' (Dowling 2006: 328 n.50). On comparisons between women and children in terms of *ira* see Viden (1993: 122, 138).

[147] Also see my comments in the introduction to 9.1 on the Roman view on vice encapsulated by those who did not have a full role to pay in politics, including those who were too corpulent because of their self-inflicted lifestyle of *luxuria*; or who showed too womanish or childish a temperament (as expressions of certain vices, as not fit of *Romanitas*).

emotion. I argue that V deliberately ends the chapter leaving the reader on an ambiguous note for rhetorical effect.

redegit: *Redigo* is used in V9 only once more at 9.2.ext.2, using the same sentence structure as here in a temporal clause: 'she did not restore her coiffure to a seemly order before (*prius*) she brought it [Babylon] back into her power' (9.3.ext.4, Loeb translation); 'he did not get his fill of blood before (*ante*) he had reduced them all to one victor' (9.2.ext.2, Loeb translation). Her prioritizing of Babylon over her hair, somewhat lessens her femininity, as she disregards her appearance. It is implied, however, that once Babylon is restored, then her attention to her looks resumes as something she cares about, since *occupatae* suggests an image of a woman at one with that activity, denoting effort, attention to detail. Note the contrast between Samiramis' lack of vanity with V's portrayal of Alexander at 9.5.ext.1, focusing on the king's preoccupation with appearances.

statua: The presence of a statue to aid the memory of an event is also found in V9 at 9.8.ext.1.[148] V opens 9.3 with reference to the function of images in art (*imagines*, 9.3.praef) and closes the chapter with the mention of another type of art, sculpture. On V's view on the purpose of art see my comments at *imagines*.

celeritate praecipiti: The pleonasmus is used here to indicate the intensity of Samiramis' hate as it fuelled her desire for *ultio* (the subject for 9.10).

[148] *igitur angusti atque aestuosi maris alto e tumulo speculatrix statua quam memoriae Pelori tam Punicae temeritatis ultra citraque nauigantium oculis conlocatum indicium est*. On the importance of *memoria* in V9 see my main introduction.

Chapter 4: *de avaritia*

Introduction.[1]

Avaritia has been treated far less extensively than other *vitia* as a subject in its own right, in both primary and secondary sources.[2] V is therefore distinctive, alongside the later Plutarchan text *de cupiditate divitiarum* (*Mor*. 7.40, Pettine 1986), in devoting a concentrated, continuous unit of text to *avaritia*.[3] Like other ancient authors who focus on the topic, V presents *avaritia* at 9.4 by focusing on individual rather than group misbehaviour.[4] As such, *avaritia* is, like *ambitio*, morally wrong in V's model because it is the 'pursuit of *individual* ambitions at the expense of the public welfare'.[5]

Avaritia is a well-established characteristic of the rhetorical tyrant.[6] Accusations of being a tyrant became a commonplace from the last century of the Republic; in debates and invective

---

[1] **Rhetorical devices for 9.4**: Adnominatio: 9.4.ext.1 *procul dubio … possessus est* (it is also antithesis). Antithesis: 9.4.ext.1 *titulo rex … mancipium*. Exclamatio: 9.4.1 *quantam culpam … rettuli*. Sententia: 9.4.ext.1 *hic non possedit … mancipium*.

[2] 'Questo vizio dell'avaritia è presente sempre un pò di sfuggita, e gli accennni ad esso, pur abbastanza frequenti, non si organizzano mai in una vicenda che ne faccia in qualche modo un proprio centro di interesse' (Tabacco 1985: 118).

[3] *Avaritia* as covered *passim*, rather than a concentrated piece of continuous text, see Feldher (1997). The chief exemplar of *avaritia* in Livy is (book five) Camillus versus the Romans, where the vice itself emerges among the Romans collectively rather than in an individual alone; and at 5.33.2 with the Gauls as exemplars of the consequences of *avaritia*. See Luce (1977: 273, n.4). For a case study on *avaritia* in Livy see Halle (1957: 160-178). Also see Hor. *Sat*. 1.1, 2.2, 2.16, 3.16. As a theme in Horace see Mader (2014). Notorious for stinginess, greed and avarice were the inhabitants of the island of Mykonos and Pericles (Pindar fr. 124a). For *avaritia* in Plutarch see Pettine (1986).

[4] The dynamics of a group versus an individual in V9 are more prevalent at 9.7.

[5] Monti (1981: 50). *namque avaritia fidem probitatem industriam ceterasque artis bonas subvortit. pro his superbiam, crudelitatem, deos neglegere, omnia venalia habere edocuit* (Sal. *Cat*. 10.4, as referenced in this context of *avaritia* and *ambitio* by Monti 1981: 49). For greed and *avaritia* in Lucretius see Monti (1981).

[6] See Socrates on the avaricious life: 'always greedy, suffering from unfulfilled desires' (*Resp*. 9.578). Cic. *Off*. 2.77. See for example Nero's warning to Seneca to remain as his adviser or otherwise he would fall into vice if

this marked a way to undermine and discredit the accused, invariably creating a powerful effect on an audience or reader.[7] Kings are usually the stock character for signalling tyrant-like traits but V surprises the reader by only providing one such example in 9.4 at ext.1, the only external *exemplum* of the chapter. In V9 there is a higher proportion of kings in the external than in the domestic sections. This produces and reflects a perception that propensity for kingship is characteristic of those outside Rome.[8] After all, in the national consciousness, the kings of Rome are from a very remote past, on the fringes of mythology, and, as such, are less experientially real to V's readership, than the external kings that he showcases. The more recent external kings show the immediacy of the danger for Rome because of their temporal closeness to V's times. This danger does not necessarily derive from outside Rome but from within, if the rulers base their lives on *vitia*.[9]

To illustrate the ubiquity of avarice (which is not just found in those who abuse power but it is in fact a far more common vice), V contrasts ext.1 to the three domestic *exempla* of 9.4 which have characters of decreasing levels of power and are ordered in terms of increasing violence: (4.1) Crassus the triumvir and Hortensius the consul and orator, (4.2) Cassius the tribune of the plebs, (4.3) Septimuleius with no record of public office whatsoever but who receives V's worst moral appraisal. The difference between the domestic and external

---

abandoned: *mea avaritia, meae crudelitatis metus in ore omnium versabitur* (Tac. *Ann*. 14.56; Suet. *Ner*. 26.1). Also see Dunkle (1971: 18) on 'the emperor Galba's most prominent tyrannical vice of *avaritia* (Tac. *Hist*. 1.5.11; 1.37.21; 1.38.2) combined with *saevitia* (Tac. *Hist*. 1.37.20; 1.87.5)'.

[7] On Roman political invective in the late Republic see Dunkle (1967). For instances of *avaritia* combined with the tyrannical vices of *audacia*, *superbia*, *libido* and *crudelitas* in Cicero's speeches see: *S. Rosc.* 37-142, 75, 86-88,101, 118; *Sest.* 150; *Verr*. 1.13, 2.1.86, 2.2.9, 2.3.126, 2.5.42, 2.5.63, 113, 189; *Red. Pop*. 13; *Prov.* 11; *Phil*. 2.115; 13.18. Also see Vasaly (1985).

[8] Roman commentators from the century before V tend to represent their empire as the work of not *unus homo* but of multiple individuals' contributions, in contrast to external kings: *nostra autem res publica non unius esset ingenio sed multorum, nec una hominis vita sed aliquot constituta saeculis et aetatibus* (Cic. *Rep*. 2.2.1). See also Livy's digression in book nine on this point of one man rule and the difference between Romans and external peoples.

[9] This immediacy of the temporal closeness of the *exemplum* to V's times is emphasized by its structural position in the chapter. Chronologically, it is flanked, on one side, by *exempla* nos. 3 (121 BC) and 1 (67 BC); on the other, by no.2 (48 BC). It is very much *in medias res*. The moral significance of 9.4.ext.1 is affected by its position in the chapter, see further my comments on 'comparability' in the main introduction.

sections of 9.4 is also reflected in the two main meanings of *avaritia*. The first is greed, therefore a desire to accumulate, to increase one's wealth as shown by 9.4.1-3. The second is miserliness, stinginess, meanness, associated to keeping the *status quo*, such as 9.4.ext.1.[10] In both cases the object of the greed itself is money, gold or silver, therefore they cannot be enjoyed *per se* unless put to some use. In other words, the characters of this chapter are confusing the means with an end, since money, gold and silver are just for exchange purposes, in order to buy something (or barter).[11] Not being able to enjoy life because of this approach to possessions is emphasized by V twice in the preface to 9.4 with the words *neque felix* and *miserrima*.[12]

The concept of *avaritia* is more importantly a poverty of the soul itself.[13] Plutarch quotes a Menander fragment on the relative ease with which a *financially* indigent man can feel the beneficial power of just one friend, and contrasts it with his own thought that a man of *spiritual* poverty could not be moved not even by all his friends alive and dead, alluding to inheritances and legacies.[14] *Amicitia* is in contrast with *avaritia*, thus demonstrating why the Romans condemned the latter, in order to safeguard the quintessential Roman institution of *amicitia*.[15]

---

[10] See *sordibus* (stingy) at 9.4.ext.1. For occurrences of *sordes* relating to *avaritia* see: Hor. *S.* 1.6.68; Sen. *Ep*. 104.20.6; Tac. *Hist*. 1.52.5, 1.60.1.
[11] For a similar point on barter see 9.1.8.
[12] For the close proximity of *avaritia* and *miser* see Cic. *Verr*. 2.5.24.1-2, *Dom*. 11.2-3; Lucr. 3.59-60; Hor. *Serm*. 1.4.26, *Ep*. 1.1.33; Juv. *Sat*. 8.89; Tac. *Ann*. 13.48.2-3.
[13] Plut. *de cup. Div*. 4.
[14] Plut. *de cup. Div*. 4. For the Menander quote see 'The Cithara player' fr. 282: 'It is the most unsubstantial of all evils that is stinging thee, namely poverty. For what is this poverty of which a single friend might be the physician by lightly bringing aid?' (Loeb edition translation).
[15] On theme of *amicitia* in V see Lucarelli (2007: 214, 245-257, 273-281) and Williams (2012: 10-13, and 56 in the context of Tiberian Rome).

Commentary

9.4 *Praefatio*.[16]

latentium ... **lucrorum**: The process of 'dragging forth from a hidden place' is crucial to *memoria*, an important facet to V's writings.[17] Because of V9's *apotreptic* approach, *vitia*, such as *avaritia* and *perfidia*, take centre stage in order to make moral points. It is also part of declamation as a genre to 'reveal lines of thought otherwise hidden' giving us a 'glimpse of the Roman subconscious'.[18] Note the similarity between 9.4.praef and 9.6.praef: (i) the similarity of their main two verbs: *protrahatur* (here) and *extrahatur* (9.6.praef); (ii) the hidden element: *latentium* (here) and *occultum* (9.6.praef).

Note the hidden versus manifest dichotomy present in 9.4.praef and 9.4.1: (i) *latentium* ... *lucrorum* and *manifestae praedae* (praef., *latentium* and *manifestae* are the first words in each clause for emphasis); (ii) *quidam* (an unknown person) and *potentissimos viros* (referring to Crassus and Hortensius, well-known figures) and then again *ignotus*, followed by *evidens*. Furthermore note that the fraud at 9.4.1 has the hiding element too, hiding the true beneficiary of the will; and at 9.4.ext.1 Ptolemy attempts to hide his wealth by sinking it all in the sea. The hidden element in 9.4.1 and 9.4.ext.1 is in contrast with the ostentatious *luxuria* at 9.1 and the more open quality of 9.4.2 and 9.4.3. Plutarch comments on this visible, invisible dichotomy by stating that if nobody sees, admires our riches then the riches become

[16] *avaritia* ... *avidissima*: for the juxtaposition of these two words see also Pl. *Rud*. 1238-9, for their proximity see Liv. 24.45.13.2 – 24.45.14.1; also see Sen. *Dial*. 1.6.1.3-4, *Ben*. 4.27.1.14-5. For the proximity of *avaritia* and *vorago* (as here at 9.4) see Liv. 29.17.13.2-3.
[17] See my main introduction.
[18] Gunderson (2003: 115). *Avaritia* 'although hidden, it was leading the way all the time' (Levick 1982: 54 on Sal. *Cat*. 10).

invisible and lose their splendour.[19] When stripped of one's interaction with the community there is no yardstick against which one can set one's riches and, I argue that, one's satisfaction in enjoying those riches also diminishes, which might explain why there is no satiety in accumulating riches in the state of *avaritia*.

indagatrix: With its meaning of 'tracking down' (*indagator* OLD) something, it contributes to the theme of the hidden: one can only track something down when it is initially out of view. Note the rare use of this word in Latin literature, its only significant use is in Cicero: *o virtutis indagatrix expultrix vitiorum*.[20] Thus V reverses *virtutis indagatrix* with *indagatrix* referring to *vitium* (*avaritia*). V chooses this rare word as a rhetorical device to attract the reader's attention.

praedae avidissima: Another connection between plunder and greed in V is at 1.1.21, despoiling the treasury of Proserpina: *sceleratam avaritiam*.[21]

avidissima vorago: *Cupiditas* as depicted in V9 takes different facets, which makes one strive for luxury (9.1), or a more basic, fundamentally human type of greed, that for life itself (9.13). The outcome in both these types is generally positive, that is, a more comfortable living and more life, compared to those of 9.4. The desire exemplified by 9.1 and 9.13 however can also be taken too far and become weaknesses and vices. There is no such ambiguity for the greed in this chapter which can only be negative. It is a type of desire that leads to no pleasure, it is enslaving, ultimately leading to wretchedness; it is like a *vorago*, whirlpool, dragging the victim down morally and spiritually.[22] In this scenario life lacks

[19] Plut. *de cup. Div*. 10.
[20] *Tusc*. 5.5.7. For V as a reader of *Tusc*. see Lawrence (2015).
[21] Also see *praedae* at 9.4.ext.1.
[22] See my comments on *mancipium* (9.4.ext.1) on the enslaving nature of *avaritia* and *vitia*.

momentum and outlet, unlike the chapter on luxury or lust, for example. The imagery of *vorago* is important, representing a moral 'deep hole' (OLD.1) in one's life, which the Romans of the time filled with *vitia*, a general malaise which V observed all around him. A lack of judgement and self-discipline to know that enough has been obtained or to stop when a desire or need is fulfilled is what ultimately causes this *vorago* effect. It is a lack of awareness of limits and boundaries, making it impossible to rest content, moderated by good sense.[23]

fructu felix: For the juxtaposition of these two words see Luc. 7.727.

cupiditate quaerendi miserrima: Contains the same sense of unhappiness as in: *neque copia neque inopia minuitur* (Sal. *Cat*. 11), in turn comparable to V: *inopiam atque avaritiam* (6.4.2). This resonates with Plutarch's comment on luxury in *Demetr*. 52: 'they do not even know how to take pleasure in their luxury'.[24]

9.4.1

Summary: Crassus and Hortensius become heirs to a well-to-do Roman man's estate despite knowing that this came about via a third party's criminal, unlawful actions.

[23] Moral limits and boundaries are crucial themes in V9, see 9.5.ext.1 (footnote) under *aemulatus… dissimulare* and the introduction to 9.8. On insatiability see Aristophanes *Pluto* 188-197; Pl. *Resp*. 4.442a, 8.562b, 9.578a; *Leg*. 8.831d, 832a, 9.870a, 11.918d; Democritus *fr*. b219; Plut. *de cup. Div*. 3, *de virt e vitio* 4. Also see Solon's *Hymn to the Muses* and Helm (1993). For a later perspective on error and lack of judgement in men as the root for their different *pathe* see Plut. *de cup. div*. 3, *de superst*. 1, *de virt. Mor* 10-12.
[24] Loeb translation.

L. Minucio Basilo: This is the only mention of this man in V.[25] The incident under discussion took place in the 70s BC.[26] Cicero may have been an acquaintance of this Basilus, referred to only in *de Officiis* 3.18.[27] There is more certainty that he knew the nephew.[28] His *heres* Marcus Satrius later assumed his uncle's full name, Lucius Minucius Basilus.[29] He was the recipient of a two line missive by Cicero, in response to Basilus' communication to Cicero of the murder of Caesar.[30] Basilus had previously been praetor in 45 BC and one of Caesar's lieutenants.[31] Later on he became one of the conspirators. He died in 43 BC.

falsum testamentum: The *lex Cornelia de falsis* instituted by Sulla in 81 BC covered offenses of forgery (*falsum*) and it was also known as *lex Cornelia testamentaria* or *nummaria*, since it dealt with the 'forging of testaments and wills and the counterfeiting of coins as well'.[32] Charges of *falsum* were widespread but 'difficult to prove', since generally the testator was dead, with the real will having been destroyed and with no techniques, in those days, of scientific analysis.[33] Elsewhere in V on wills see 7.7-8, some of which are cases of disinheritance (for example 7.7.3 and 7.7.5), which find commonality with this section, since Basilus' nephew was disinherited when the will was forged. Among them V makes the following remark: *plus cum excellentissimi viri gratia quam cum parentis cineribus negotii fuit* (7.7.2). This is a similar scenario to the section under discussion, since, had Basilus' nephew decided to contest the will, he would have found it impossible to face up

[25] Other members of the Municia *gens* are recounted in V who achieved high office: Lucius Minucius Augurinus (consul 458) at 2.7.7 and 5.2.2; Marcus Minucius Rufus (consul 221) at 6.6.3.
[26] Champlin (1991: 84).
[27] Merrill (1913: 49).
[28] Merrill (1913: 50), *Att*. 11.5.
[29] *ad Satrium nihil praeter nomen pervenire* (Cic. *Off*. 3.74). also see *sed cum Basilus M. Satrium sororis filium nomen suum ferre voluisset eumque fecisset heredem* (*Off*. 3.74).
[30] *tibi gratulor, mihi gaudeo; te amo, tua tueor; a te amari et, quid agas quidque agatur, certior fieri volo* (*ad familiares*, 6.15). Also see Petersson (1920: 592).
[31] For the date of his praetorship see Dixon (2005 index). Also see Caes. *Gal*. 6.29-30.
[32] Berger (1953: 467). Also see Champlin (1991: 83). For the juxtaposition of *falsum* and *testamentum* see: Cic. *Clu*. 12.5.3-4, *Leg*. 1.43, *Off*. 3.36, 3.73; Liv. 39.8.7.3; Quint. *Decl*. 388.25.2.
[33] Champlin (1991: 87, 85). Forgeries were also associated for a period with the Bacchanalian affair (see Champlin 1991: 83; Robinson 2007: 22-4). On falsifying identities also see 9.15.

to such formidable opponents as Crassus and Hortensius. Nevertheless their offence would have been covered by the *repetundae* law, which applied to 'those who took money while holding office'.[34] According to Aristotle, 'profiting from the dead', as it occurs in this *exemplum*, is associated with shamelessness and constitutes the vice of 'illiberality'.[35]

There is something perverted in this immoral and financial crime, in the breakdown of a contract between the man who had just died and his family. There is also a spiritual, semi-religious element here of desecration of the *fides* of the deceased, who would have died feeling assured that his legacy would be transmitted to the people of his choice.[36] Among the perpetrators of this type of crime were legacy hunters who 'loomed large in the collective imagination of the Late Republic and Early Empire'.[37] These would seek friendship, *inter alia*, 'with rich and usually childless elderly people hoping to inherit their fortune'.[38]

quidam: The unknown identity of the author of the forgery is in the singular in V (*quidam ... subiecisset ... inseruisset*), while Cicero puts it in the plural (*quidam ... attulerunt, scripserunt*). Despite this numerical difference, the two sources agree on the fact that the forger came to Rome from Greece.

M. Crassum: Despite V's ominous introduction for Marcus Licinius Crassus as *inter grauissimas Romani imperii iacturas numerandus* (1.6.11) and his considerable position in

[34] Robinson (2007: 83). This type of offence became more frequent as the Roman Empire grew. Among some famous cases of *falsum* where murder went hand in hand with the crime of forgery, see Cic. *Clu*. and Plin. *Ep*. 7.6.8-10. It would be interesting to ascertain whether Basilus himself had been killed for his will but there is nothing in extant sources. Had poisoning occurred, it would have been difficult to prove anyhow since the 'Romans had no adequate knowledge of internal diseases' (Robinson 2007: 39). This would have somewhat simplified a criminal's plan, without the risk of raising suspicions.
[35] Sokolon (2006: 113). See Arist. *Rh*. 1383a30-b30, 1381a5-20.
[36] For another type of a break of *fides* see below *de perfidia* (9.6). For more on sacrilege and religious imagery in V9 see 9.7.
[37] Verboven (2002: 336).
[38] Verboven (2002: 337). This type of legacy hunters are the feature at 9.15. I discuss trickery, *dolus*, as an essential component of *perfidia* at 9.6.

history, there are only two other mentions of him in V.[39] This is particularly striking when compared to V's frequent allusions to Pompey and Caesar. Perhaps, as Wardle argues, 'there was no political reason for preserving his memory'.[40]

Q. Hortensium: Quintus Hortalus Hortensius (114-50 BC) was a Roman orator and advocate, whose eloquence V frequently refers to.[41] On account of his huge wealth and extravagance he would have also been eminently suited to appear in the chapter *de luxuria* (9.1); and in *de avaritia* which highlights the theme's feature of desiring the superfluous, that which one does not really need.[42] Plutarch argues that riches are worshipped for the very reason that they are superfluous; on the other hand, items that are necessary do not make the same emotional impact.[43] While Hortenius' wealth is well attested (Var. *R.* 3.13; Dio 39.37.3), Crassus' is not.[44] It could be argued that, because of his wealth, Hortensius' moral culpability is worse than Crassus', in that he gained additional wealth illegally, preventing Basilus' legitimate heirs what was their due.

evidens fraus: V devotes three chapters to wills in book 7, a subject which 'provided opportunities to examine moral criteria in practice'.[45] V shows approval of wills that were cancelled at 7.7, and disapproval of wills at 7.8a and 7.8b. V is 'not only advising those making wills but also those whose duty it was to adjudicate them'.[46] Therefore *evidens* here is a powerful keyword ('open', 'unconcealed' OLD.3; in contrast to the hidden, secretive element of *avaritia* in the preface to 9.4) which is used to show the low moral compass not

[39] 1.6.11 and 6.9.9.
[40] Wardle (1997: 203).
[41] 3.5.4, 5.9.2, 8.3.3, 8.5.4, 8.10.2.
[42] Also identified as part of *avaritia* in Plut. *de cup. div*. 3, *Cat. Mai*. 18.4. On the difference between what is necessary and the superfluous also see Pl. *Resp*. 8.12558c-559d; Arist. *Pol*. 1.8-9, 1256b26-1257a14. On the unlimited purchase of what is beyond the necessary see Pl. *Resp*. 2.373d, 9.591d.
[43] Plut. *de cup. div*. 8.
[44] For the argument that Crassus was not *dives* see Marshall (1973).
[45] Skidmore (1996: 72).
[46] Skidmore (1996: 72).

only of the false beneficiaries (who still accepted the terms of the will despite knowing the will was fraudulent) but also, implicitly, of those adjudicating or administering the will. Therefore V thus draws attention to the fact that society at a wider and deeper level was complicit in fraud.

facinoris … repudiavit: As argued by Maskakov (1979: 321-322), stylistic variation and imitation with Cicero (*Off*. 3.73) is probable here:

V: *facinoris alieni munus non repudiavit*.

Cicero: *alieni facinoris inhonesti lucri captura invitati munuscum non repudiaverunt*.

lumina curiae, ornamenta fori: This emphasis on the culprits' position in Roman society makes their culpability even greater. Throughout his work, V draws on this sense of injustice, that the very individuals who are supposed to run Rome in fact undermine her and her people, easily getting trapped by vice and into acts of criminality based on personal gain, such as here, *inhonesti lucri*.

vindicare: See my comments in the introduction to 9.10 for a discussion on V9's theme of the injustice of matters being unavenged.

9.4.2

Summary: Cassius releases two men, who had intended to assassinate him, in exchange for great sums of money, thus showing Cassius' *avaritia*, since he could have ordered their executions.

Q. Cassio: Quintus Cassius Longinus (not to be confused with Gaius of the same name, one of Caesar's assassins) was *tribunus plebis* in 49 BC. His attempted assassination in Spain took place in 48 BC, while he was governor of Hispania Ulterior, a position he gained through his support of Caesar. Organising the revolt against Longinus were Marcus Claudius Marcellus Aeserninus (quaestor), Quintus Silius and Calpurnius Salvianus.

quinquagies sestertium ab illo, ab hoc sexagies pactus dimisit: Also in Caesar: *nam palam HS LX cum Calpurnio paciscitur et cum Q. Sestio L. Qui si maxime nocentes sunt multati* .[47]

9.4.3

Summary: Septimuleius cuts off the head of his friend Gracchus in exchange for gold.[48]

L. Septimuleii: Septimuleius is among a handful of characters recounted by V who had committed a crime but had not held public office. History remembers Septimuleius solely through this example, nothing else is really known about him except that he was a *familiaris* of Gracchus, which makes his actions even worse, since considerable *opprobrium* was

[47] *de bello Alexandrino*, 55.
[48] This episode is also recounted in Plut. *C. Gracch*. 17, Cic. *Orat*. 2.269, Plin. *Nat*. 33.48.3-4. Cicero is the only source mentioning Septimuleius' provenance: Anagnia (a town of the Hernici, in Latium, OLD).

attached to betraying a friend in Roman society. Septimuleius was, in addition, Gracchus' *cliens* (9.4.3). The consul Opimius' public announcement of the reward for Gracchus' head was the reason for Septimuleius' actions, an ordinary man corrupted by vice and the temptations in society. Tarpeia betrays her country (*perfidia*) for riches in 9.7.1, similarly Septimuleius betrays Gracchus' friendship for gold.[49]

possedit: This verb appears only in 9.4 in V9: here and at 9.4.ext.1 with the rhetorical word play of *possedit … possessus*.[50]

C. Gracchi: Gaius Sempronius Gracchus was *tribunus plebis* in 123-22 BC. In V he 'is almost uniformly damned except for his oratory'.[51] V's language is one of regret despite Gaius' seditious acts. First, he displays compassion for the manner in which his corpse is treated. Second, V laments Gaius' political choices and aims because of two important traits that he identifies in his character. If these traits had been used differently, they would not have led him to become a revolutionary: (a) 4.7.2: the loyalty and friendship he could arouse through his leadership, as two friends risk their lives to protect him, one of them even committing suicide.[52] (b) 8.10.1: His eloquence is better than his aims, so that if the eloquence had been used for a different cause, his life would have taken a better course. Note the focus of both points on aim, that is, if one's intent or aim is morally wrong even a virtue or a generally good trait becomes bad (vice), leading a person to their doom. No other source states both moral points as explicitly as V does about such a famous character in Roman

[49] On betraying friendship also see 9.5.3, 9.11.4 (*amicitiae hostis*) and 9.11.ext.4 (*violatis amicitiae foederibus*). On the importance of *amicitia* as a crucial social and political Roman institution and value see Cic. *Amic.* Also see footnote under *fames* below on Virgil. For more on *amicitia* in V see 4.2 and 4.7.
[50] Its noun *possessio* surfaces at 9.12.ext.1 but in a different context to *avaritia*.
[51] Wardle (1998: 227). Gracchus is featured widely in V, with two further mentions in V9: 9.5.ext.4 and 9.12.6. For the significance of Gracchus in V9 see my comment under the lemma Marcus Fulvius Flaccus at 9.5.1.
[52] This is opposite to the leadership qualities found at 9.7.*mil Rom*.1-3. Another friend of Gaius Gracchus, Herennius Siculus, also commits suicide at 9.12.6.

history.[53] On the negative side, Gaius exhibits the following *vitia*: seditiousness (9.4.3); nefariousness (5.3.2f); and insolence (9.5.ext.4).[54]

abscidere: The beheading occurred after Gracchus' murder, it was not the cause of his death. Gaius Gracchus committed suicide by asking his slave, Philocrates, to kill him.[55] The body was then thrown into the river Tiber. Subsequently Philocrates also committed suicide.[56] *caput eius abscidere* is juxtaposed to *familiaris fuisset* to suggest that *abscidere* is not only referring to the beheading but also to the severing of their patron and client relationship.

cavatam partem capitis: Diodorus Siculus, unlike V and Plutarch, identifies Lucius Vitellius as the friend who betrayed Gaius (and extracted the brain for the lead), instead of Septimuleius.[57]

Opimius: Lucius Opimius (cos. 121 BC) is mentioned again by V in 2.8.4 and 7, his victory over Gaius Gracchus confirmed, where V moralises on the tragedy of similar so-called victories, where the killings involve the Romans themselves rather than an external enemy.[58] V rounds up that section with the following mournful closing statement of regret: *piget taedetque per vulnera rei publicae ulterius procedere* (2.8.7).

fuerit ille seditiosus: V addresses Gracchus' *seditio* here rather than at 9.7, because in the latter the focus of the violence and sedition is on the crowd rather than individuals.

---

[53] V does this also at 8.10.1.
[54] Another regret that V expresses is that Gaius had not heeded the warning contained in his dream on his fate (1.7.6). On 1.7.6 see Wardle (1998).
[55] For the topos of slavery in V9 see below *bono perierit exemplo*.
[56] On the debate surrounding Gaius' death see Beness and Hillard (2001: 135-140).
[57] Diod. Sic. 35.29.
[58] *ut necessariae istae, ita lugubres semper existimatae sunt uictoriae utpote non externo, sed domestico partae cruore. itaque et Nasica Ti. Gracchi et Gaii Opimius factiones maesti trucidarunt* (2.8.7).

bono perierit exemplo: Livy does not mention the beheading and the replacement of the brain with lead, and states that he was killed by Opimius instead, omitting the mention of suicide altogether.[59] V, in contrast, does mention the suicide, praising his decision to die in that manner, *bono perierit exemplo* (9.4.3). Livy goes on to state *cum eo Fulvius Flaccus consularis, socius eiusdem furoris*.[60] According to V, Flaccus died separately from Gaius, slaughtered by Opimius' men.[61]

scelesta fames: This could be said of many of the characters in V9, something they all have in common: a ravenous and raging hunger for acquiring or possessing things, which is not always correlated to one's station in society. As we saw in 9.4.1, two of Rome's powerful and resourceful men still committed fraud despite their wealth. So this is a moral *fames*, a poverty of the human heart and soul, a lack of respect for life itself, as shown in this instance by Septimuleius, in the way he inflicted injuries on a *dead* body, and not just of anybody but of a *familiaris* and a *cliens*.[62]

9.4.externa

9.4.ext.1

Summary: Before being captured by the enemy, King Ptolemy is unable to carry out his own plan to sink his possessions and money prior to committing suicide.

[59] *Per*. 61.4.
[60] *Per*. 61.4.
[61] 6.3.1c.
[62] For *fames* as a moral *topos* see Verg. *A*. 3.57 (on killing Polydorus and taking gold by force), which is also a case of *avaritia* similar to 9.4.3. Also see Lucan 1.164, 4.376 on the link between moral *fames* and *luxuria*.

This *exemplum* is dated to 57 BC making it the most recent external *exemplum* to V's times in the book after 9.1.ext.6 (55 BC), there are however two later *exempla* in the domestic section of V9 from after 43 BC: 9.5.4 and 9.15.2.

odium: Whether the person who actually beheaded and put lead in Gracchus' head was Septimuleius or Lucius Vitellius, this person 'was afterwards hated by all to the day of his death, as a betrayer of his friend'.[63]

odium merita … risu prosequenda: This opening statement has the same format as *vesana haec ... seditio* (9.7.3.), used elsewhere in V as a formula to compare two *exempla*. Unlike the rest of V9, the domestic sections in chapters 9.4 and 9.5 are more violent than their respective external sections.[64] The reason for this may be that V found *avaritia* and *superbia* as more widespread in the Rome of his time, thus drawing more attention, by their violence, to the domestic *exempla*.

risu prosequenda: This mocking voice when associated with negative *exempla* is also apparent in Juvenal's *Satires* and Seneca as a device for a moral purpose.[65] V does the same, coupled with sarcasm, here and at the opening of 9.1.2 and at 9.12.8 (*cavillari*).[66] Sarcasm and humour are not really themes *per se* in V9 but they are worthy of mention for two reasons. First, they give a small glimpse of V's personality as it is reflected in his style of

[63] Diod. Sic. 35. 29 (Loeb translation). On *odium* see 9.3.
[64] The opposite of the dynamics in 9.1. Elsewhere in the book the external *exempla* are worse or similar in moral gradient to the domestic sections.
[65] See also Sen. *Ep.* 40.9-10, 122.13. For the rare expression *risu prosequenda* see: *Quanto risu prosequenda sunt quae nobis lacrimas educunt*! (Sen. *Dial*. 5.33.4.6).
[66] For more on mocking and humour in V9 see *iocum* (9.9.3, 9.14.ext.3); *ludibrium* (9.1.8, 9.12.5, 9.14.2) *risus immoderati* (9.12.ext.6), *urbanitatem dicti* (9.12.ext.6), *cachinnorum* (9.12.ext.6). In total there are eleven such instances in V9, including the ones I cite in the lemma above.

writing. Second, although these instances of mockery are random, they do serve as a rhetorical device to attract the reader's attention as techniques of *opprobrium*.[67]

Ptolemaei: King of Cyprus, younger brother of Ptolemy XII and son of Ptolemy IX Lathyros.

hostes praeda carerent: The enemy is Rome. V does not specify this nor the manner of Ptolemy's suicide (see below), because perhaps he wanted the least amount of *obiter dicta* as possible, so to focus more on the *avaritia* itself, and maximise the objectivity of the *exemplum* by not mentioning Rome. V gives wealth as Ptolemy's motivation for his suicide.[68] V does not state that Ptolemy commits suicide by drinking poison. Among extant sources only Dio (39.22.2) and Plutarch (*Cat. Min.* 36) do so. Suicide was Ptolemy's response to a law at Rome enacted by Clodius to dethrone him, making Cyprus a province of the Roman Empire and to confiscate all of Ptolemy's property.[69] V does not mention it, but it was Ptolemy's avarice itself in a previous encounter with Clodius that prompted the latter to enact the law in question. Clodius, who had been captured by pirates, had an old grudge against Ptolemy. The latter had contributed only two talents towards his ransom.[70] Perhaps V chooses not to provide the above details in order to fit the episode more into a chapter of avarice than revenge (9.10 *de ultione*), that is, a revenge based on Clodius' grudge and actions. Velleius, like the other extant sources except for Appian, also does not mention Ptolemy's avarice of the earlier episode regarding Cato's ransom, simply stating: *omnibus morum vitiis eam contumeliam meritum* (Vell. 2.45.4). Nor is the avarice highlighted in connection with Ptolemy's suicide *per se* either. V is the only author who makes the link, even mocking

[67] Aristotle connects humour to *philia*, as a description of friendship, indicating that humans love those who are witty see *Eth. Nic.* 1156a10-15, *Rh.* 1381b1-25. Also see Sokolon (2006: 80).
[68] *Nam cum anxiis sordibus magnas opes corripuisset, propterque eas periturum se videret* (9.4.ext.1).
[69] App. *B Civ.* 2.23, Cic. *Sest.*, 26-27, Cass. Dio 38.30.5, 39. 22.2, Vell. 2.45.
[70] App. *B Civ.* 2.23. Strabo's account states that Clodius was nevertheless released even without ransom (the only extant source that says so), and that Ptolemy's contribution was so small that the pirates disdained to take it and sent it back again (14.6.6).

Ptolemy for his lack of determination in carrying out his suicide: *risu prosequenda*. V concludes the *exemplum* by highlighting the pitfalls of avarice: *non possedit divitias sed a divitiis possessus est and titulo rex insulae, animo pecuniae miserabile mancipium*. V deliberately manipulates this *exemplum* to present Ptolemy negatively, after all V could have chosen to use this episode as an *exemplum* of honourable deaths (as he has done for 9.12.5-6 and 8), for choosing to die a free man. In fact Ptolemy did have a choice, when he heard the news of the law he 'neither dared to rise against the Romans nor could endure to live deprived of his kingdom'.[71] Cicero's moralizing is altogether different, focusing instead on Ptolemy having been a friend to Rome and circumstances turning against him so suddenly and unexpectedly despite his good track-record.[72] Cicero presents this *exemplum* as a *caveat* for other kings and rulers not to be complacent or take things for granted, despite their country's present good circumstances.[73] The latter is not dissimilar to V's own implicit message above at 9.1.ext.2.

mancipium: The importance in V9 of metaphorical slavery to *vitia* is underscored by the prominence of *mancipium* as the last word of the *exemplum* and of the chapter.[74] This is a major theme in V9: being a slave to money (this is also the case for the theme of debt in 9.1), to one's passions, *vitia* generally.[75] Metaphorical slavery took expression also in debt, another facet of *avaritia* which I discuss in the introduction to 9.1. Debt is an extension of *luxuria*, which in turn can lead to the display of other vices such as *crudelitas*, *avaritia*,

[71] Plut. *Cat. Min*. 36 (Loeb translation).
[72] *Sest*. 59.
[73] *em cur ceteri reges stabilem esse suam fortunam arbitrentur, cum hoc illius funesti anni prodito exemplo videant per tribunum aliquem et sescentas operas se fortunis spoliari et regno omni posse nudari*! (*Sest*. 59).
[74] For *mancipium* as an alternative to *servus* in V see book four (3.6, 3.13, 4.11) and 7.6.1.
[75] On becoming dominated by slaves see my point at *servorum … dominationi* (9.1.ext.2).

violence (all themes in V9: 9.2, 9.4 and 9.7) and arouse ill-will (*odium*, theme for V 9.3), the latter being on occasion connected to the intervention of money lenders.[76]

It is particularly striking that *mancipium* here refers to a king.[77] V's use of metaphorical slavery was a reflection of a more general *topos* that became widespread in Rome at the end of the Republic and early Principate of a city in 'servitude to its political leaders'.[78] Slavery as a term was used more widely to denote 'any situation where dignity and freedom was felt compromised for a free citizen'.[79] In V true freedom is moral and ethical, since even a free citizen can become enslaved by the vices, reflecting the Stoic *dictum* that only the wise man is free and also the belief that actual legal slavery ultimately left the true self untouched, relegating the physical part only to slavery.[80] The polarity of ruler and slave is used here by V to emphasize the importance not to become a slave to vice, so that those in power – including kings – learn to be truly free.[81]

[76] See my comments at 9.1.6 and 9.1.9. Specifically lending at interest which was generally motivated by *avaritia* had a bad reputation in ancient Rome of increasing the debt itself and thus the overall moral malaise. Also see Cic. *Off*. 1.150: *primum improbantur ii quaestus qui in odia hominum incurrunt, ut portitorum, ut faeneratorum*.
[77] On the king and slave dichotomy see the more physical *exemplum* of Caesar dressing in slave's garb at 9.8.2.
[78] Fitzgerald (2000: 71). Cic. *Phil*. 6.19, 8.32. For Tacitus' take on political servitude see Wirszubski (1950: 160-7). For Sallust's use of servile metaphors see Hock (1985: *passim*).
[79] Fitzgerald (2000: 71).
[80] For ancient references to Stoic *dicta* such as only the wise man is free (see above) see Meyer (2007: 181 n.89). For the Stoics on slavery see Manning (1989) and Garnsey (1996: 128-152).
[81] On the high value Romans put on citizens' autonomy, not having to rely on *vitia* and others for money see Fitzgerald (2000: 72). On the importance of *libertas* versus servitude see below *quae* (9.5.2). Also see Wirszubski (1950) and Arena (2012).

Chapter 5: *de superbia et impotentia*.[1]

Introduction.[2]

With *superbia* V continues his narrative on the characteristics of the rhetorical tyrant (*tyrannici spiritus*, 9.5.1), or one who abuses power generally, alongside V9's other *vitia*.[3] Sallust made a case for *superbia* as a quality inherent within the Roman aristocratic character itself, but uses one character alone, unlike V, as the only exemplar for this vice.[4]

The statement from Euripides' *Medea* '[A shameless man] is confident that he can cleverly cloak injustice with his words, his boldness stops at no knavery' is a clear picture of the typical flaw of hubris or a lack of shame of the tyrant, lacking the moral compass or mental capacity to restrain himself.[5] In this configuration then even a positive trait such as confidence can turn negative if taken too far, a reoccurring moral lesson in V9. In 9.5 the

[1] **Rhetorical devices for 9.5**: Adnominatio: 9.5.2 *tribunus senatus … paruit* (and *sententia*). Exclamatio: 9.5.3 *Cn. Autem … insolenter*. Metaphor: 9.5.3 *qui balneo … proculcatum*. Sententia: 9.5.ext.3 *felicitatis … contubernium est*. For the juxtaposition of *superbia* and *impotentia* (9.5.1, 9.5.4, 9.5.ext.2) in Roman literature see Cic. *Tusc*. 4.35 *impotentiam et superbiloquentiam* (the latter is relevant to V 9.5 in terms of arrogant *dicta*, see below); Liv. 42.46.10; Sen. *Dial*. 10.10.4, 11.1.3, *Ag*. 247; Quint. *Decl.* 5.2.14; Apul. *Apol*. 18.3: *quam superbia inflavit, neminem impotentia depravavit, neminem tyrannnide efferavit* (the latter is particularly relevant to V 9.5 in relation to the discourse on tyrants and abuses of power). For the close proximity of these two words see Cic. *Phil*. 5.24, Liv. 3.36.2, Sen. *Tro*. 266-7, *Med*. 851, 855.

[2] Vocabulary of *superbia*: two keywords reoccur in relation to *superbia* in Latin literature: (i) *insolentia*: V 9.5.3, 9.5.ext.1, 9.5.ext.2 (x2), 9.5.ext.4 (elsewhere in V9: 9.1.ext.2, 9.2.1, 9.12.5); Cic. *Ver*. 2.4, *Phil*. 8.21, *Rep*. 1.51; Liv. 2.45, 45.23; Quint. *Decl*. 19.2; Sen. *Dial*. 2.11, 10.2, *Ep*. 83.20; (ii) *contumelia*: V 9.5.2, 9.5.3 (elsewhere in V9: 9.12.5, 9.14.3); Cic. *Agr*. 2.79, *Phil*. 5.24; Liv. 24.5, 35.33; Sal. *Jug*. 82.3; Tac. *Hist*. 4.4; Sen. *Dial*. 2.11, 2.14; *Ben*. 6.4, *Ep*. 100.10.

[3] For *superbia* in tyrants see Dunkle (1971: 13-18).

[4] *Jug*. 7.2-9.2. 'Metellus is the only Roman who is *explicitly* referred to as possessing *superbia*, the single vice identified in the prologue as initiating the process leading to civil war' (Montgomery 2013: 38). For a case study on *superbia* in Livy see Halle (1957: 179-196).

[5] Eur. *Med*. 469-71, 582-3 (Loeb translation).On the inability of restraining oneself, of lack of self-control see *impotentia* below.

figure of the tyrant is characterized by the everyday of his passions, his hidden instincts, reflecting the Platonian dictum that in every one of us there is a tyrant.[6]

In 9.5 *impotentia* signifies the reckless, immoderate, unbridled, intemperate. However I would like to explore another of *impotentia*'s meanings, namely, 'powerlessness' and the dichotomy this presents in terms of the discourse on tyranny between power and powerlessness.[7] At the root of every tyrant's thirst for power there is the intrinsic basic fear of being powerless, this fear is then manifested in a display of *superbia*. Based on Stoic thought, V may have used *superbia* and *impotentia* in a comparable way to Seneca in his *Thyestes*, to illustrate the freedom that comes from not having power and thus being able to live more freely without that same degree of fear, and being content with simplicity.[8]

Since there is only one *exemplum* on *impotentia*, and that is joined with *superbia* at 9.5.4, the chief subject for 9.5 is therefore arrogance.[9] V interweaves *superbia* and *impotentia* with *quoque et*, after already using *atque* at the beginning of the sentence.[10] This superfluous use of conjunctions makes the relationship between the two themes less binding, compared to other double-themed chapters in V9. In addition, although the use of a singular verb

[6] Lanza (1977: 44).

[7] On power and powerlessness in V see also 9.2.3: *adeo aut flagitiosissimmi hominis praetura multum aut rei publicae maiestas nihil potuit*. Also see Var. *L*. 5.4 on *impos* and its opposite *potentia*. On the fear of powerlessness see Lanza's (1977: 56) comments on Creon in Sophocles' *Antigone*: 'l'avidità insieme all'incontinenza e la paura di perdere il potere ne fanno necessariamente un empio e un blasfemo'. On the same also see Petrone (2002): 'sono infatti le passioni che il tiranno ispira e su cui intende fondare il suo potere, ma anche quelle che si revosciano per contrapasso su di lui, instigliandogli il timore della perdita di potere propiziata dall' odio'. On the latter point, on the danger the tyrant also puts himself as a result of *vitia* of hatred, arrogance or otherwise, see my comment below under *quae* (9.5.2). On the vulnerability of the tyrant see also my comments under *quae* (9.5.2), *quia interfari* (9.5.2). Even a vice as dominant as *superbia*, being generated by confidence taken too far (based on my comment above), is a vulnerability of sorts in itself too (the same for *ira* at 9.3 which can also be seen as a dominant vice).

[8] Rose (1987: 127): 'Thyestes equates freedom from the possession of power with the freedom to live without desire or fear in contentment and simplicity'.

[9] Through its many synonyms: *superbia*, *arroganter*, *insolentia*, *imprudentia*. See *arroganter* at 9.5.ext.2. For the association of *superbia* with *arrogantia* see Cic. *Inv*. 105, *Off*. 1.90; Quint. *Decl*. 5.4; Gell. 4.16.8.

[10] The *aut* in *quoque aut* at 9.3 already implies a degree of connection between *ira* and *odium* (there is no additional *atque* there either). Nowhere in 9.5 is there a link between the two themes, implied or otherwise, unlike the other double-themes chapters of V9.

(*ponatur*) relating to two subjects is not always grammatically incorrect, it is rare in V and it is used here relating to this double-themed chapter.[11] This reinforces my belief that *impotentia* is an afterthought and that 9.5's only real theme is *superbia*.[12]

V, especially for 9.5.1-3, displays a robust level of *indignatio*, a common device in Roman rhetoric, as exemplified by Cicero's fifteen sources of *indignatio*.[13] The case of *indignatio par excellence* in V9 is undoubtedly at 9.11.ext.4, which is conveyed with particular vehemence against Sejanus: *omnibus indignationis viribus*. Overall in V9 *indignatio* is ubiquitous, certainly a *sine qua non* for V's treatment of *vitia*. In the preceding chapter I wrote that *avaritia* does not represent in V the typical stock tyrant, this is not repeated in the case of *superbia*. In the present chapter, *exempla* are clustered around characters who truly did rule Rome and who were closer therefore to the traditional image of the tyrant, like those of 9.3 *de crudelitate*.

In the introduction to 9.1 I commented on the distance that *luxuria* creates. *Superbia* also creates distance, observable in all of this chapter's *exempla*, which share the element of exclusion and separation:

- 9.5.1-2: Two individuals try to separate themselves from being accountable to the Senate;
- 9.5.3: Pompeius separates himself from his friend and refuses to help him;

[11] The other double-themed chapters of V9 have plural verbs when introducing each chapter's vices: *separentur* (9.1), *excitant* (9.3), *referantur* (9.7).
[12] *Superbia* emerges as a significant theme in Roman literature in the following: Verg. *A*. 6.851-53 (see Lloyd 1972 and Christenson 2002); Livy on Tarquinius Superbus (book 1 *passim*) and at 9.9; Tac. *Ann*. 4.1, 6.19 (both on Sejanus), 13.23 (the conduct in court of Claudius' freedman Pallas). For *superbia* elsewhere in V9 see: *legum vitrix audacia* (1.3), *insolentissimae* (1.ext.2), *insolentiam* (2.2), *pro impudentia et audacia*! (7.2), *audacissimum* (11.2), *insolentissimis* (12.5), *impudentiae…audaciae* (15.2).
[13] *Inv.* 1.100-105.

- 9.5.4: Antony's distance from normal human emotions, see my comments at *aversantibus … iussit*;
- ext.1: Alexander separates himself from his father, by adopting Jupiter instead, and takes on Persian dress an customs cutting himself off from his Macedonian roots;
- ext.2: Xerxes cuts himself off from any advisors;
- ext. 3: Hannibal refuses to give admission to anyone;
- ext.4: Campania and Carthage exclude the people from the baths and forum.

This theme of isolation or separation runs contrary to the societal model supported by a network based on *amicitia*, which was regarded as a crucial element in the fabric of Roman life and relationships.[14] I argue that V treats the theme of distance or isolation in one who abuses power to emphasize the importance of its opposite, *amicitia*. This is consistent with V9's apotreptic approach. *Amicitia*, or a lack of it, could say a lot about a ruler's personality, his relationship to those around him and his propensity to exercising tyranny or abuse of power.[15] This empowering perspective observable by the people was a pragmatic way to keep the ruler in-check.[16] However, not all rulers are devoid of *amicitia*, in fact *kings* can depend on friendship as protection or sanctuary, while a *tyrant* is instinctively suspicious of friends.[17] In relation to tyranny, *amicitia* was instrumental in building protection among citizens in the event that a tyrant decided to take advantage of fear and distrust between citizens, if *amicitia* were forgotten or not fostered.[18]

[14] For the political significance of *amicitia* see Arist. *Eth. Nic*. books 8 and 9, *Eth. Eud*. book 7.
[15] Sokolon (2006: 83). See Arist. *Pol*. 1313b30-40, 1314a5-15, Noreña (2009). See also Dio Chrysostom *Or*. 3.38-41. On *amicitia* generally see Schmidt (1977), Fitzgerald (1997), Wallace-Hadrill (1989), Saller (1982), Konstan (1997), Boissevain (1974), Damon (1997).
[16] A focus on a ruler's personality was central to Roman political thought, see Noreña (2009), Griffin (2000), Wiedemann (2000), Wallace-Hadrill (1982).
[17] Sokolon (2006: 83).
[18] Sokolon (2006: 84).

Commentary

9.5.1

Summary: Consul Flaccus refuses to answer the Senate upon questions put to him on his recent legislation on citizenship.

M. Fulvius Flaccus: Flaccus (cos. 125 BC) appears in V only once more, at 6.3.1c, in an account of *severitas* surrounding Flaccus' murder by consul Lucius Opimius' supporters in 121 BC.[19] Here V adds that the cause for the murder was that Flaccus had been among the *hostes libertatis* and a *seditiosissimus civis*. In Flaccus' case it is exactly that, as he was working towards a wider freedom. When the Senate disagrees with him, he continues in his quest, but in this way becomes an enemy of the State, and his actions seditious. For not only was the Senate against these proposals but so were the other status groups of Rome, who saw these changes in legislation and increase in *cives*, as a threat to their own privileges as Roman citizens. Flaccus' death had a very different effect on the Italians however, as Appian (*B Civ*. 1.34) recalls: 'When they [Flaccus and Gracchus] were both killed the Italians were still more excited. They could not bear to be considered subjects instead of equals, or to think that Flaccus and Gracchus should have suffered such calamities while working for their [the Italians'] political advantage'.[20] So their death reinforced the Italians' determination rather than diminishing it, making sure he had not died in vain.[21] The reader might still have in

[19] Following his failure in getting himself re-elected, Flaccus was killed while leading a protest on the Aventine Hill. See Cic. *Dom*. 102.
[20] Loeb translation.
[21] App. *B Civ*. 1.21.

mind here V's Gracchus from 9.4.3, used as *locus classicus* as a popular figure for change, who took innovation too far.[22]

M. Plautii Hypsaei: Very little is known about Flaccus' consular colleague, Marcus Plautius Hypsaeus, from extant sources. There is a high probability, due to the rarity of the surname, that he belonged to the same family as Gaius (praetor in 146) and Lucius (praetor in 135).[23] He is mentioned in passing by V in this very chapter at ext.4, when referring to a speech that Gaius Gracchus delivered against him on the subject of baths. The reason why it is alluded to in an external *exemplum*, is that Campania's *insolentia* is contrasted with that of Carthage.

perniciosissimas rei publicae leges: There was such *opprobrium* surrounding these laws that they sent Flaccus, who still was consul at the time, to take over as commander of the war in Gallia Narbonensis, so that when he came back, his consulship would be over.[24] However, he also did manage to get himself elected for the tribuneship, thus still being able to retain some power and influence, but these laws did not materialize in Flaccus' lifetime. With the Social Wars (91-88 BC) new laws were finally established, gradually conceding citizenship rights to the Italians, although the granting of citizenship remained a source of criticism against particular generals throughout the 1st century BC.[25] It was not until the *lex Plautia Papiria* of 89 BC that it was possible to grant citizenship to individuals in addition to entire cities, whether they were rebels or not. In fact the *lex Iulia* had been introduced earlier as Rome attempted to forestall the spread of the rebellion with offers of citizenship to those communities which had not yet taken up arms. This was as recompense to those Italians who

[22] This tendency can be equated to vice since certain things, if taken too far, can become vice.
[23] Rosenstein (1990: 44).
[24] To defend Massalia against the Saluvii. He was successful and received a triumph in 123 BC.
[25] Cic. *Balb*. 19-21, 27-28. In 90 BC there were two laws, the *lex Calpurnia*, (giving commanders the power to reward valour with *civitas*), and the *lex Iulia de civitate Latinis danda* (extended *civitas* to Italian communities and entire cities who had not participated in the uprising against Rome).

did not join the rebellion. With the *lex Plautia Papiria* citizenship could be granted to Italian freemen too, even those who had continued the struggle and had been suppressed. The laws made the votes of the new citizens virtually worthless as the Italians continued fighting against Rome, because the newly admitted citizens from these laws were placed into new tribes instead of being assimilated into the previously established tribes. Consistent with V's optimate stance, with the word *perniciosissima* V criticises the widening of Roman citizenship.[26] V's political leaning as an optimate emerges again: in this chapter, at 9.5.2, in focusing on the *vitia* of a tribune who was intent on expanding the franchise. The superlative *perniciosissima* is distinctive here, the only such occurrence of the word in the superlative in all of V.[27] Throughout V the word is always connected to *vitia*. It is uncertain how strong (and consistent) Tiberius' view on the granting of citizenship was, therefore one cannot accurately measure whether V was taking any kind of risk in expressing his stance on the subject.

de provocatione … noluissent: Also known as *ius provocationis*, offered by Flaccus and later by the elder Livius Drusus, to those who did not wish to transfer their rights for Roman citizenship.[28] It was essentially a right of appeal by the individual, 'regarded as a possible alternative to enfranchisement'.[29] 'Flaccus' expedient was put into operation on a small scale,

[26] For V's position on granting citizenship to non-Romans see also my comments in the opening paragraph at 9.10.1. In the main introduction (chronology section, under the Velleius Paterculus sub-section) I point out that both V and Velleius hold optimate views; however, on this point, Velleius's stance on citizenship is the opposite to V. For a similar view to V on granting citizenship and specificallyon granting citizenship as a result of the manumission of slaves see: *magni praeterea existimans sincerum atque ab omni colluvione peregrini ac servilis sanguinis incorruptum servare populum, et civitates Romanas parcissime dedit et manumittendi modum terminavit* (Suet. *Aug*. 40.3). Also see: 'Among these injunctions was one to the effect that they should not free many slaves, lest they should fill the city with a promiscuous rabble; also that they should not enrol large numbers as citizens, in order that there should be a marked difference between themselves and the subject nations' (Dio 56.33.3, Loeb translation).

[27] For the other occurrences of the word in V see *pernicitas* (2.4.4), *perniciosiora* (3.1.ext.1), *perniciosa* (4.4.2), *perniciem* (7.2.ext.17), *perniciosius* (9.1.ext.1), *perniciem* (9.3.ext.2). Note that in V9 there are three such cases, more than in V's other books.

[28] Sherwin-White (1973: 136), Dart (2014: 60).

[29] Sherwin-White (1973: 135).

since a similar proviso was included in the section of the Gracchan law which regulated the rewards of successful prosecution for extortion'.[30]

responsum non dedit: Also see *nec responsum … dedit* (9.5.ext.3).[31]

adversus unum senatorem: For V, Flaccus would have been culpable even if he had displayed such arrogance to just *unum senatorem*. It is rhetorically clever to emphasize this point just before stating that the Senate was a victim of *superbia*. V does this in order to increase the level of *indignatio* that he would hope to generate in his audience.[32]

in totius amplissimi ordinis contemnenda maiestate: Both Flaccus, in this section, and Drusus, in 5.2, have this same contempt for the Senate.[33] In Flaccus' example *aegre compulsus est ut in curiam veniret* and most particularly *senatui* [...] *responsum non dedit*. Drusus when asked to appear in the Senate, refuses to go but yet is able to make them come to him instead, to the Curia Hostilia. What both *exempla* have in common therefore is arrogance even in the face of Rome's Senate, in their communication with it and its senators. Only V records this incident of Flaccus refusing to answer the Senate. On the theme of despising (*contemnenda*), in this chapter see ext.1: *fastidio*.

amplissimi: Is a stylistic feature in V9, as the most frequent superlative of the book.[34] Other superlatives in V9 mostly occur once.[35]

---

[30] Sherwin-White (1973: 137).
[31] On silence in V9 see my comments at 9.3.4 and in the main introduction.
[32] *adversus* is a frequently reoccurring word in V9, as an alternative to *contra*.
[33] For the expression *totius amplissimi ordinis* in V see also 8.13.4.5 (*toto ordine amplissimo*). It has a more frequent use elsewhere without *totius*, see Cic. *Har*. 45, *Clu*. 122, *Mur*. 83, *Sul*. 15, *Dom*. 55; Liv. 4.26.9, 34.54.5, 37.52.7; V. 2.7.15, 5.8.3; Plin. *Ep*. 8.6.13, 10.3a.3, 10.95.1; Suet. *Cal*. 49.1, *Otho* 8.2, *Ves*. 2.3, 9.2, *Dom*. 4.5.8, 5.1.1. For the expression *contemnenda maiestate* see Cic. *Agr*. 2.79: *contemni maiestatem populi Romani*.
[34] 9.1.2; 9.1.ext.3; 9.3.4; 9.12.praef; 9.14.1; 9.15.1.

9.5.2

Summary: Tribune of the Plebs Drusus refuses the command of the Senate to come to them and instead succeeds in having them come to him, having already throttled a consul because he had interrupted him during a speech.

quae: The Senate connects 9.5.1 and 9.5.2. From the perspective of this book's apotreptic approach, V chooses to make the Senate span the two *exempla* because of what its opposite represents: the violation of laws, leading to servitude and the negation of *libertas*; in other words, the establishment of tyranny (as it is often defined in declamations on tyranny).[36] It is accompanied here with violence, the only such case in this chapter.[37] The man displaying tyrannical traits that V is striving to portray, as he does here in Drusus' case, has abused existing laws, in order to assert his status, power and control; thus not only has he put himself above those laws but also outside them and is therefore deprived of their protection.[38] This underscores the implied vulnerability that the tyrant puts himself under because of his own

---

[35] *apparatissimos* 9.1.5, *gravissimum* 9.1.6, *frugalissimum* 9.1.6, *nequissimum* 9.1.6, *vigilantissimum* 9.1.ext.1, *insolentissimae* 9.1.ext.2; *insolentissimis* 9.12.5 (twice), *nobilissimum* 9.2.2, *seditiosissimi* 9.2.2, *abiectissimi* 9.2.2, *clarissimique* 9.2.2; *clarissimae* 9.7.2; *clarissimae* 9.15.2 (three times), *flagitiosissimi* 9.2.3, *truculentissimo* 9.2.4, *dignissimum* 9.2.ext.1, *sanctissimo* 9.2.ext.6; *sanctissimae* 9.15.2; *sanctissimi* 9.15.2 (three times), *certissimae* 9.3.praef, *mansuetissimum* 9.3.2, *gloriosissimam* 9.3.4, *fortissimo* 9.3.4, *excellentissima* 9.3.ext.praef, *pertinacissimis* 9.3.ext.3, *avidissima* 9.4.praef, *potentissimos* 9.4.1, *evidentissimis* 9.5.ext.1, *efficacissimae* 9.6.praef, *vetustissimum* 9.11.1; *vetustissimi* 9.12.5 (twice), *audacissimum* 9.11.2, *clarissimi* 9.11.4; *clarissimis* 9.14.3 (twice), *excellentissima* 9.11.ext.4; *excellentissimum* 9.15.2 (twice), *indignissimi* 9.12.ext.5, *valentissimum* 9.12.ext.10, *sapientissimum* 9.12.ext.10, *felicissimus* 9.13.ext.2, *ferocissimarum* 9.13.ext.4, *generosissimum* 9.14.4.

[36] See pseudo-Quint. *Decl.* 13.11. For the opposition between tyrant and law see: *ex hac parte tyrannus iubet, ex altera ex vetat* (Sen. *Contr*. 9.4.15).

[37] Violence is a key concept which characterizes tyranny as a form of government, which is both illegal and arbitrary, subverting laws. On violence in V9 see 9.7, particularly see *adversus leges* 9.7.1, in its combined context of violence and of being contrary to the laws. Also see Tabacco (1985).

[38] *supra leges se ponendo extra illas se posuit* (pseudo-Quintilian 274). Also see Tabacco (1985: 14-27).

actions.[39] From this angle therefore, Drusus' disrespect for the Senate (*senatus imperium despexit*) takes on a more complex meaning, not just in terms of legality *per se* but also of the laws of nature (*tyrannus* versus *natura*).[40]

Druso: Marcus Livius Drusus was Tribune of the Plebs in 91 BC. His only other mention in V is at 3.1.2, in connection with his nephew, Marcus Cato, whom he was bringing up at his home. That section centres on Cato when still a boy, but V also mentions what would become the defining topic in his uncle's political career: *Latini de ciuitate inpetranda conuenissent*. Drusus wanted for the the Italian allies to be given citizenship rights, but he was strongly opposed by many and was killed. His death led to the Italians (who had supported him) revolting and the start of the Social War of 91-88 BC.

Philippum: Lucius Marcius Philippus was censor in 86 BC with Marcus Perperna.[41] When Philippus was consul in 91 BC, he sent Lucius Crassus to prison, during a debate in the Senate, because of a disagreement.[42] The altercation was also recorded by Cicero, giving Crassus the following line of reported speech: *cum sibi illum consulem esse negaret, cui senator ipse non esset*.[43] V transforms it into direct speech: *mihi, Philippe, consul, quia ne ego quidem tibi senator sum* (6.2.2). Having unfairly driven a man to prison on account of a disagreement, he in turn also is incarcerated.

---

[39] Also see my comments on *impotentia* and the fear of powerlessness of the tyrant in the introduction to 9.5, under *quia interfari* (9.5.2) and under *impotentia* (9.5.4). As a corollary, see Mader on how 'fearful minds, especially fearful monarchs, are easy prey to suspicion' being 'the standard component in tyrant psychology of the topical association of fear and high station' (1993: 108, 110). This also touches upon important issues of paranoia, distorted perception in the mechanics of the tyrannical *ratio*.

[40] *certamen erat in uno homine utrum plus posset natura an tyrannus* (Sen. *Contr*. 9.4.14). Also see my main introduction on the Stoic definition of *vitia* as going against nature, linked in its own terms to insanity, lack of reason, lack of self-control.

[41] *collega L. Philippi* (V. 8.13.4).

[42] V. 6.2.2.

[43] *Orat*. 3.2.4

quia interfari se contionantem ausus fuerat: It seems that it was not a simple matter of Philippus interrupting (*interfor*) but, according to Florus, an actual opposing (*abrogo*) of the bills that Drusus was attempting to pass through.[44] The bills concerned their plan of granting citizenship to the Italians. In either case, Drusus felt offended. Being hurt, offended, is a theme in V9.[45] In V9 it points to a tyrant's vulnerability, something not usually associated with tyrants, which I alluded to in the introduction to 9.5.[46] *Interfari* (interrupt a speaker, OLD. b) appears only here in V.[47] If indeed he was interrupted, then the man with a tyrannical mind-set would have interpreted being reduced to silence as becoming powerless (on fear of powerlessness see *impotentia* in 9.5), with dangerous and brutal consequences as 9.5.2 shows. Because of V9's declamatory dimension (that I set out in the introduction), interrupting *per se* here becomes a vehicle for V to prompt the reader to reflect on their behaviour when declaiming or discussing matters (politically or other) with others. In fact, interrupting is something that pervaded declamation halls, since rhetoric itself contained many devices of interruption, such as: *anacoluthon*, *aposiopesis*, *appositio*, *correctio*, *hysterologia*, *parembole*, *parenthesis*, *tmesis*.[48]

non per viatorem sed per clientem suum: Although V makes this distinction, Florus simply chooses *viator*. A *viator* indicates an 'agent employed on official errands by Roman magistrates' (OLD. 2), while a *cliens*, in this context, would be a 'citizen of an Italian or other city in their relationship to the Roman (*patronus*) who looked after their interests in

[44] *ausus tamen obrogare legibus* (2.5.8).
[45] *quia dolorem…patitur* (9.3.praef); *acceptum dolorem <dolore> pensare cupientes* (9.10.praef).
[46] This is comparable to my points on *impotentia* in the introduction to 9.5 and 9.5.4 and under *quae* (9.5.2).
[47] Used like here with the accusative see Verg. *A.* 1.386; Liv. 32.34.2, 36.28.4; Plin. *Ep*. 1.23.2. For *interfatio* see Quint. *Inst*. 4.2.50; Cic. *Sest*. 79.
[48] On the frequency of being interrupted in declamation see Dominik (2003: 142-3): 'laughter, shouts, applause, sharp retorts and sudden interruptions were everyday occurrences in the declamation hall'. Also Habinek (1997: 211): 'declamation allows the audience's interruptions…' But the tyrant here displays tendencies consistent with the Stoic definition of *vitia*, not just with the unnatural but also with the weaker speaker, who on feeling offended reacts with anger, violence and vengeance, rather than relying on one's eloquence and powers of rhetoric (see my main introduction on the connotation of unnatural in defining *vitia*).

Rome' (OLD). In this respect, the fact that a high ranking Roman such as Philippus had been treated in such a way by an Italian, adds to the sense of injustice.

adeo violenter: There is a difference of emphasis between V and Florus in their focus of violence. Florus' attention is on the way in which the bills were passed, *sic per vim latae iussaeque leges* (2.5.8). V instead concentrates on the violent manner in which Philippus was driven into prison. Furthermore, there is a slight divergence on the manner of assault described in the two sources. Florus states *adprehensum faucibus viator non ante dimisit quam sanguinis in os et oculos redundaret*, so the strangler does not let go of the throat until the blood comes out. V however attests that the gushing out of the blood occurs in the process of driving the victim to prison, that is to say, the gushing out of blood is not intentional, it just happens as a result of the violence involved in getting him to prison, while in Florus' account, the act is an intentional one.

ipse ... **venit**: The chapter contains the most *dicta*, reported and direct, in V9.[49] This instance is one of a handful of *dicta* in direct speech in V9.[50] Overall V's *dicta*, whether in direct or indirect speech, are, by far, outweighed by *facta*.[51]

tribunus ... **paruit**: As pointed out by Sinclair, there are two rhetorical devices at play here, *sententia* and *adnominatio*.[52] There is also a chiasmus in *tribunus senatus ... senatus tribuni*.

[49] Direct speech: 5.2, 5.4 and ext.2. Indirect speech: ext.3.
[50] 1.4, 3.1, 3.2, 5.4, 9.3, 11.3 and 11.5.
[51] A more concentrated focus on *dicta* span five chapters in V overall: *libere* (6.2); *graviter* (6.4); *sapienter* (7.2); *vafre* (7.3); *improba* (9.11) *dicta*.
[52] 1980: 27, 166; the former for *adnominatio*, the latter for *sententia*.

9.5.3

Summary: Two episodes of Cn Pompeius' display of *superbia*. First, he refuses a request to help a friend regarding a legal matter because after having bathed he was eager to go to dinner.[53] Second, he asks a jury to bypass his own laws in favour of Scipio, his father-in-law.

Pompeius: This is the only *exemplum* in which Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus is an exemplar in V9.[54] But in the overall opus, Pompey constitutes one of V's most significant reoccurring characters. Bloomer draws our attention to the 'agonistic treatment and climactic juxtaposition of Pompey and Caesar' which seems to dominate the rest of V.[55] 'Pompey's virtues are overall overshadowed by those of Caesar', V focusing on Pompey's vices instead.[56] Wardle puts this down to necessity, since V felt he was faced with the 'challenge of portraying Pompey so as not to denigrate Caesar and the institution of the *Principate*'.[57]

Hypsaeum: Publius Plautius Hypsaeus, curule aedile for 58 (Shackleton Bailey vol.2 2000: 446) is only mentioned here by V.[58] The incident of this *exemplum* occurs after Hypsaeus becomes a rival for the consulship (for 52). Bribery was used by all three candidates for the consulship (hence V's use of *ambitus reum*) and gave rise to a law implemented by Pompey, as described below.[59]

---

[53] *Superbia* with the setting of *convivia* and meals appears in 9.5 three times: *convivium* (9.5.3 and 9.5.4), *cenaret* (9.5.ext.3), occurring in Latin literature see also Hor. *S*. 2.6.86; Sen. *Ep*. 47.2; Mart. 10.37.18, 12.48.15, 12.75.6.
[54] In 13.2 he is only mentioned in passing.
[55] Bloomer (1992).
[56] Wardle (1998: 176).
[57] Wardle (1998: 176).
[58] Another member of the Hypsaeus family, Marcus Plautius Hypsaeus, surfaces in this chapter at 9.5.ext.4 also in connection to the baths, and above at 9.5.1 on legislation of questionable nature.
[59] The other two candidates were Quintus Cornelius Metellus Scipio and Titus Annius Milo.

proculcatum: It is a *metaphorical* trampling because it is done, according to V, with *contumeliosa voce*. Only because Hypsaeus was at Pompeius' feet (*ante pedes suos*) does not necessarily mean that Pompeius actually then proceeded to physically trample on him. V uses *proculco* in this context – where a man is literally at the feet of another – to maximise the morally offensive snub of Pompeius towards a former friend. For *proculco* used figuratively in connection with anger see 9.3.7.[60] Interestingly 'trampling' reoccurs in V9 conveyed through another verb: *obtritus* (9.11.ext.4, OLD). In the latter example it is also connected to violating the bond of *amicitia*: *violatis amicitiae foederibus*, thus encapsulating the full force of the Romans' *opprobrium* on betraying, violating friendship. For a more physical trampling in V9 (although conveyed by another verb) see 9.11.1: *veheretur*.[61] V is the first to use *proculco* in a figurative sense.[62] There is a considerable use of metaphor in V, a total of forty-five instances throughout his work, these being 'so varied that they defy classification by subject, spanning *inter alia* the realms of navigation, meteorology and equestrianism'.[63] Their impact is seldom 'softened by an introductory word or phrase such as *velut*, as in Livy, or *ut ita dicam*, *tamquam*, *quasi*, as in Cicero'.[64] V uses such conventions very sparingly.[65] Compared to other books in V, the ninth however does not make an extensive use of metaphors to maximise its apotreptic approach.[66]

nobilem virum et sibi amicum: Pompey's culpability is increased, first, by Hypsaeus' status (*nobilem*) but despite that he entreats Pompey like a *supplex*, his plea being nevertheless still

[60] It does not reappear anywhere else in V. For *proculco* in the context of *superbia* see Sen. *Suas*. 6.26.
[61] Tullia orders for her coach to actually physically *run over* her father's dead body.
[62] Sinclair (1980: 148 n.26). In this use V is followed by Seneca (*Phoen*. 193), Tacitus (*Hist*. 1.40) and Suetonius (*Ves*. 5).
[63] See Sinclair (1980: 135) on metaphors in V and for further studies of this trope in V. For metaphors as a general rhetorical trope see Quintilian (8.6.4), *Rhet. Her*. (4.34) and McCall (1969 *passim*).
[64] Sinclair (1980: 141). See *Orat*. 3.41.165.
[65] *Tamquam* is used only once (8.1.abs.12) and *quasi* twice (6.9.6, 8.13.praef).
[66] Five times in total (9.2.praef, 9.11.ext.4, 9.12.praef, 9.15.2). Metaphors are more prevalent for books 3 and 8 (eight times each), 6 (seven times). In other books: nos. 4 and 9 (five times each), 2, 5 and 7 (four times each). There are none for book one.

ignored. In terms of status, Hypsaeus qualifies as a *nobilis* for V because he had a consular ancestor and he himself had held a praetorship (c. 55).[67] Second, Hypsaeus was a friend of Pompey but the latter puts his dinner before friendship.[68]

legibus obnoxium quas ipse tulerat: The law under question is the *lex Pompeia de ambitu* of 52 BC, which replaced Cicero's law on electoral corruption.[69] Dio tells us that: 'Scipio was indicted, and by two persons at that, but had not been tried, thanks to Pompey's influence'.[70] Scipio along with Plautius Hypsaeus and Milo had been accused of bribery in the 53 BC elections for the consulship of 52 BC, but only Hypsaeus was convicted. Milo's later conviction was connected to murder, not bribery.

non erubuit: In V9 see also *erubescendis* (9.1.ext.2) and *erubescendae* (9.15.1).

Scipionem: Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica (cos. 52) became father-in-law to Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, which V emphasizes three times out of the total five mentions of him in the whole opus.[71] I interpret this as V showing how a family connection can override not only friendship but also laws and morals, since due to Pompey's support, Scipio is not convicted.

muneris: Metellus Scipio is here in receipt of a gift. In contrast, earlier in V, Scipio himself offers gifts at 8.14.5: *dona militaria ... habebis donum viri divitis*.

---

[67] Gruen (1974: 107).
[68] [Hypsaeus] 'had also been *quaestor* to Pompey in the East and enjoyed close relations with the general. His political loyalty was reliable and had already been demonstrated in the Senate as well as in the field. Pompey campaigned industriously for Plautius' (Gruen 1995: 151).
[69] Bauman (1985: 31).
[70] Cass. Dio 40.53.2, Loeb translation.
[71] Here and 3.2.13 and 3.8.7.

maritalis lecti blanditiis: Becomes an astute rhetorical tool for Pompey to win the case on behalf of Metellus Scipio.[72] The subject of the bed takes on a rather more sordid element in connection with Scipio's only other mention in book nine.[73] It also retraces V9's theme of *pudicitia*. V devotes a whole chapter to the subject at 6.1. In V9 we have already encountered *pudicitia* at 9.1.7 and there are certainly resonances of it at 9.7.1 in the character of Tarpeia.[74] It resurfaces at 9.14.ext.3.[75]

9.5.4

Summary: Antony states that he does not recognise the senator's head that he had just asked to be brought closer while he was having dinner.

taetrum: Miller's (2010) collection of essays is relevant to my following point about V possibly echoing tragedy, since it argues that historiography interfaces and is in apposition with tragedy and poetry.[76] Furthermore, generally speaking, poets' focus on the causes of wars mirrors historiography's interest with causation, an aspect to V9 that I discuss in the introduction to 9.10. I argue that V uses *taetrum* to attract the reader's attention, as the first word of the *exemplum*, since its accusative form suggests a potential wordplay on *theatrum*, although there is no etymological connection. In fact, the episode could be compared to a play in the theatre, on the verge of fiction and reality; as if real life were 'imitating' Roman

[72] Pompey's favour is however unsuccessfully returned by Scipio: *Scipio Metellus namque infeliciter Cn. Pompei generi sui defensis in Africa partibus classe Hispaniam petens* (3.2.13).
[73] At 9.1.8, in this case in connection to a brothel, linking in the reader's mind, because of his last mention, Metellus Scipio to *libido*, and within 9.1 to the opposite theme of *pudicitia* (see 9.1.7). See also *matris suae pudicitiam* (9.14.ext.3).
[74] For *pudicitia* in Tarpeia see also Cairns (2011). On *pudicitia* in V see Mueller (1998: 239) and Langlands (2006). Also see Parker (2004).
[75] Also see 8.1.abs.2; 8.15.12; 7.1.1; 2.1.3; 2.1.5.
[76] Miller's (2010) discussion is based on Quintilian's statement that 'historiography is very close to the poets', *historia … est enim proxima poetis*, 10.1.31.

myth or theatrical tragedy. It is 'memorable' for the wrong reasons, and through its memory down the generations it almost becomes a myth or tragedy in itself, in terms of its horror. It is reminiscent of Accius' *Atreus*, which saw many different adaptations including Seneca's *Thyestes*, where no head was offered (unlike here at 9.5.4) but the meat from the children themselves evokes a similar degree of abominable horror to 9.5.4.[77] The connection of 9.5.4 to Atreus and Thyestes is particularly relevant, as well as Accius' *Brutus*, in terms of highlighting the importance of tragedies as a part of a *nexus* of rhetorical agenda.[78]

facto pariter ac dicto: This constitutes the first of two cases in V9 where a person's action and words have been put on the same level, the rarity of this makes the *exemplum* stand out from the rest. Also see 9.11.2 *factum et dictum*.

M. Antonii: V consistently depicts Antonius as a murderer.[79] Even when he does a good deed, he is still not praised. [80] As in the case of Octavian's other rivals, Antonius has been thoroughly maligned by V.

convivium: My comments under *contaminari mensae sacra* (9.2.2) are also relevant here.

triumvirum: Marcus Antonius' tenure as triumvir gives us the date for this *exemplum*: 43 BC. The triumvirate was legalised by the *lex Titia* (November 27, 43 BC), giving Octavian,

[77] Accius may have been spurred to choose the subject of tyranny since his patron, D. lunius Brutus Callaicus (consul in 138), was an opponent of the Gracchi, also see Bilinski (1958). I draw another Accius reference in V9 at 9.2.praef: *cum penes illam sit timeri, penes nos sit odisse*, reminiscent of the famous fragment from Accius' *Atreus*: *oderint dum metuant*.

[78] For this in the subsequent generation to V see Seneca's tragedies, see especially Rose (1987), Mader (1993) and Lynd (2012).

[79] Bloomer (1992: 225). As a contrast, for V's depiction of his grandfather see my comments at 9.2.2 under M. Antonii.

[80] See 3.8.8 and 5.1.11. V does praise Antonius' display of humanity towards Brutus' corpse but, as Bloomer (1992: 226) points out, this is only a reflection of Julius Caesar's glory.

Antony and Lepidus power to defeat the assassins of Caesar. By specifying the triumvirate, V links this momentous period in Roman history to a *malum exemplum* which the author flags as one of the most shocking of the book. By so doing he renders the *exemplum* more eye-catching for the reader. The *exemplum*'s position follows V's method of sometimes placing the worst *exemplum* as the last within the individual domestic or external section within a chapter.[81] This sign-posting helps V apply his apotreptic approach to his moral agenda.

Caesetii Rufi: Very little is known about him, only two extant sources have recorded his name, complementing each other in giving us a slightly fuller image of the man and this particular incident. Those two sources are V, in this section, and Appian.[82] V tells us that Rufus was a senator and that his head was brought to Antonius at dinner but without giving us a reason why his head would have been severed. Appian provides this information: Antonius' wife wanted Rufus' house. Appian goes on to reveal three further points not covered by V, that (i) Antonius sent the head back to his wife, (ii) Fulvia then ordered for the head to 'be fastened to the front of his own house instead of the rostra' (Appian *B Civ*. 4.29, Loeb translation), (iii) and most importantly, Rufus had eventually changed his mind and *was* prepared to sell the house to Fulvia, but was still killed.

aversantibus … iussit: In the introduction to 9.2 I comment on humans' inherent inner conflict of being caught between wanting to look in fascination at something abhorrent but also being in dread and not wanting to look. This dichotomy is represented here from two perspectives: on one side, *aversantibus id ceteris*; on the other, *propius admoveri iussit*. From the latter point, Antony embodies not just *superbia* in the statement he is about to give (after seeing the head up close), but also displays an indifference, a lack of shock and a certain

[81] See my comments on 9.1.9.
[82] *B Civ*. 4.29.

distance from what the readership of V's times would have considered a normal reaction or behaviour when presented with something as horrific as here. Antony's indifference is in clear contrast to the shock that V deliberately wishes to cause the reader, apparent in the way he presents this episode, and also heightened by the author's choice of the words *diu diligenterque* (note how these two keywords are placed in the middle of the *exemplum* for rhetorical effect), making such a gaze truly disturbing.[83] When referring to V, Leigh identifies the double audience as a crucial element to the Valerian text.[84] First, Leigh points out that 'an exemplary deed needs an audience or it cannot become an *exemplum*'.[85] In 9.5.4 this indicates the diners, if it were not for their appalled gaze there would not have been a witness to the horror in the first place. The second element of the double audience in V, Leigh argues, is the reader who becomes a spectator; the reader 'learns how to behave based on the *exemplum* so it is a type of audience'.[86] I further argue that, in V one can also speak of a triple audience, the third component being V himself, the ethical gaze.[87] Another two noteworthy and abhorrent gazes in V9 are at 9.2.1 (*in conspectum … manderet*) and at 9.2.2 (*idem caput … tenuit*).[88] Both involve severed heads and the latter has the same setting to 9.5.4, the dinner table.[89]

superba … impotens… confessio: It is rare to find two vices (*superbia* and *impotens*) directed at just one person in a single sentence which also correspond to that chapter's two

[83] On the cannibal eye (in connection to the Accius reference above) of Roman tyrants see Leigh (1996: 178-185).
[84] Leigh (1997: 165, 240).
[85] Leigh (1997: 184). Leigh (1997: 181-4) argues for the *exemplum* as spectacle in V and Lucan.
[86] Leigh (1997: 165).
[87] On the ethical gaze for the purposes of exemplarity see Bartsch (2006: 117-138).
[88] At 9.2.2 although V writes *tenuit* rather than using a more obvious verb that denotes looking, it is implicit that the act *per se* was also one where the gazing aspect of holding the head was prominent in V's portrayal of cruelty and horror. Also note the meaning of *teneo* as 'to retain in the mind' (OLD. 24), therefore I argue here that the retaining of it in the mind was something which was prompted by a visual cue, hence the gaze.
[89] V and Lucan 'emphasize the violation of the sacred rites of the dining table' (Leigh 1996: 179).

main themes.[90] Note the oxymoron: V calls Antonius' confession *superba* and *impotens*, which are not normally associated with a confession.

9.5.externa

The juxtaposition of domestic and external on the theme of *superbia* raises the issue of the lexical connection between *superbia* and *hubris*, especially their differences.[91] *Hubris* emerges here because of Alexander's desire to be equal to the gods (ext.1).

This is the only instance in V9, alongside 9.10, where the domestic and external parts are perfectly balanced, four *exempla* each.[92]

9.5.ext.1

Summary: V focuses on two elements in Alexander's life that display *superbia*: adopting (i) Jupiter as his father and (ii) Persian dress and customs.

Alexandri: V positions himself in the tradition of the Alexander topos, a reoccurring rhetorical commonplace.[93] This is the second of two *exempla* on Alexander in V9, both of which portray him negatively.[94] Elsewhere in V, Alexander appears as an exemplar eight

[90] This reoccurs at 9.5.ext.2 for Xerxes, for both *impotentia* and *superbia*, but it is still rare in V.
[91] On the changing meanings and the inter-relationship of *superbia* and *hubris* see Murphy (1997).
[92] In 9.10 it is two *exempla* for each part.
[93] Morello (2002: 66 n.22). On Rome and Alexander see Livy's digression in book 9.
[94] 9.3.ext.1.

times in total, four times negatively, four times positively.[95] This balance is in contrast with V's portrayals of Xerxes and Hannibal which are consistently negative.[96] Both the *exempla* on Alexander in V9 at 9.3.ext.1 and 9.5.ext.1 occupy the position of first external *exemplum* in each chapter. This is not chronological since the character in the following *exemplum* is of an older generation than Alexander.[97] Both *exempla* have a religious flavour, dealing with divine aspiration and consist of a single lengthy sentence, organized around a *tricolon*.[98]

Bellemore portrays V's Alexander as 'unflaggingly positive'.[99] Bellemore's main argument for including V9's two *exempla* at 9.3.ext.1 and 9.5.ext.1 in her conclusion is that Alexander's *vitia* are shown within the context of the 'military conquests that won him eternal glory', and this, she argues, mitigates Alexander's culpability. For the reasons I have given in this PhD, I disagree with Bellemore, and I agree with Wardle's statement that in V9 Alexander's portrayal *is* definitely negative.[100]

exsultavit: Used in the same way in V9 through the synonym *gaudens*: *luxuria gaudens* (9.1.ext.3), *mendacia et fallacia …gaudens* (9.6.ext.2).[101] In V9 *exsultavit* occurs only here and this is the only case in all V with the meaning of 'excess', 'running riot'.[102] Here the

---

[95] Negatively: 1.7.ext.2, 8.14.ext.2, 9.3.ext.1 and 9.5.ext.1. Positively: 3.8.ext.6, 4.7.ext.2, 5.1.ext.1 and 6.4.ext.3. Apart from the actual exemplars of Alexander there are many other mentions of him *passim*. For Alexander in V see Spencer (2010), Wardle (2005) and Bellemore (2015).

[96] Note that V never uses the epithet *magnus* for Alexander. However this demonstrates nothing of the author's view of Alexander, as Rubincam (2005) has shown in her case-study of different classical authors, some of whom do use the epithet while others do not.

[97] Contrast Alexander the Great (356-323) with Hamilcar (275-228 BC, 9.3.ext.2), who is some twenty years older than Alexander, and Xerxes (518-465 BC, 9.5.ext.2).

[98] For a further similarity between the two *exempla* see below *exsultavit* (9.5.ext.1).

[99] Bellemore (2015: 316).

[100] Wardle (2005: 146). Bellemore (2015: 315 n. 98) draws attention to two authors in antiquity who 'excuse Alexander's vices because of his success': Curt. 10.5.26, 33; Arr. *Anab*. 7.30.1. For Bellemore's comments on 9.3.ext.1 and 9.5.ext.1 see p.302, 313-5.

[101] Similarly see *per summam animorum alacritatem* (9.7.1).

[102] All other uses of the verb in V denote 'joy', 'delight': 2.2.9, 2.6.11, 2.6.14, 4.3.13, 4.8.3, 5.3.4, 8.15.7. It is also the only use in an external *exemplum*. This verb used in a similar way to V9 see references in OLD 2a.

positive nature of joy and jubilation is turned into negative through the energy of vice.[103] V9 is like a portal of metamorphosis, what is normal and natural becomes topsy-turvy, its direct opposite, especially so since the two subjects for *exsultavit* are *virtus* and *felicitas*.[104] This metamorphosis of sorts is also observable at V9's other Alexander *exemplum* (9.3.ext.1) whereby *tres maximas victorias* turn into defeats. This verb's meaning of excess is consistent with V9's main themes of luxury, greed and vice's main definition of 'going beyond what is natural' (see main introduction) and the definition of *hubris*, see above in the introduction to 9.5.ext.

fastidio … **aemulatus est**: Like an illness, the three *gradus* of Alexander's *insolentia* are chronological and listed in order of increasing arrogance, showing the deterioration of Alexander's condition as time passes. The tricolon in this *exemplum* points at Alexander's 'loss of self (Greek or Macedonian), an element which might have contributed to his success when compared to other invaders'.[105]

fastidio … **taedio** … **spreto**: The three main emotions that encapsulate Alexander's state of mind and that motivate him in his acts of arrogance. Note how two of these are the feeling of 'despising': *fastidio*, *spreto* (*spernor*, ext.1), which also reoccurs with *aspernatus* (ext.3).[106] This emotion ties in with *odium* as covered at 9.3.

[103] For this same use for *exsultavit* in 9.5 see *elatus* (9.5.ext.3).
[104] For the latter's good side in V see *de felicitate* (7.1).
[105] Spencer (2002: 41-42). Note V's presentation of Alexander's preoccupation with his appearance here in contrast with Samiramis' lack of vanity at 9.3.ext.4.
[106] See Carney (2010) on dynastic concerns between Philip II and Alexander (Alexander despised his father). For other cases of despising in V9 see *ordinis contemnanda maiestate* (9.5.1), *senatus imperium despexit* (9.5.2), *dictu fastidienda* (9.13.2).

Iovem Hammonem: The first of the tricolon. In 331 BC the priest at the oracle of Ammon at Siwa is said to have greeted Alexander as the 'son of Ammon'.[107]

Macedonici vestem et instituta Persica: The second of the tricolon.[108] 'In late 330 he had introduced some elements of Persian court dress'.[109] Alexander's clothes appear in the Livian digression too (see above). Also see 9.1.3 on clothes in the *luxuria* debate.[110]

mortali … **divino**: An extension of the second point in the tricolon on the clothes and of the first point reflecting his belief that he was the son of a God.

ascivit: With its general meaning of taking a person to oneself as an ally, including citizenship, this is a link to 9.5.1-2 about adopting the Italians, bringing them over, to Roman citizenship.

aemulatus … dissimulare: Note the difference between the two: 'imitate' or 'copy' for the former (*aemulor*, OLD.2a), 'falsify' for the latter. Note the contradiction here in V's choice of verbs as he uses *dissimulare* for the whole tricolon, including for the clothes, which he just referred to as *aemulatus*.

I argue that Alexander's change of clothes is comparable to the role of Medea in Euripides, thus continuing the link with tragedy in 9.5.[111] For this kind of literary echo in V9, see my comments on *taetrum* (9.5.4), in connection to Miller (2010). I argue that because of the

[107] Plut. *Alex*. 17.5; Strabo 814. Also see Bosworth (1977).
[108] For more on this transition see Bosworth (1980).
[109] Wardle (2005: 155).
[110] Also see V at 3.6 on the theme of *qui ex illustribus viris in veste aut cetero cultu licentius sibi quam mos patrius permittebat indulserunt*. On falsifying one's identity see 9.15. For the role of clothes in V see Lawrence (2006: 37-40).
[111] See above for implicit connections to Accius' *Atreus* in this chapter. On the role of clothes in Euripides' Medea see Bartel (2010).

rhetorical element in V's *opus* (see main introduction), V engages with a set of tropes to maximise the moral potential of his *exempla*. In this case, since it is book nine, the subject is the negative portrayal of a power figure. The trope that a power figure is bad is usually indicated by their change of clothes, they take on the signifiers of externality; in this case it is Hellenistic, as a rhetorical move to consider how patterns work in history. Clothes are 'visible markers' of social status (see on luxury in 9.1) and customs, gender and race, they can 'shape one's identity' up to a point, outlining one's relationship with the surroundings, therefore they are 'carriers of meaning'.[112] Both Euripides and V also show that these markers are not set in stone, clothes can also be used to disguise or 'distort their wearer's identity' (see Alexander here and Caesar at *servili veste occultata* (9.8.2), for instance), thus disrupting and 'violating an established order' or conventional code.[113] Medea's dress changing from Greek to oriental reflects her character as an 'interface between Greek versus barbarian; Colchis versus Corinth; self versus other'.[114] This is comparable to the interface presented by Alexander in 9.5, see above. In both characters there is also a distancing of oneself (geographically, culturally, politically, socially) and the important supernatural element: in Medea, her magical powers; in Alexander, his divine status. Violating an established order is an important facet to V9, put into discussion via the various *vitia*, but clothes are a reoccurring feature of it too. 'Crossing boundaries defined by dress code' in V9 becomes a metaphor indicating moral demise where the established order is critically questioned and can become overthrown, as V shows via his *exempla* in V9.[115] In the same way that clothes are used in Euripides, clothes could stand in for the collective identity that distinguished Romans from the enemy. To the Roman audience, the Medea and Alexander *exempla* would be likely to have represented a disturbing tarnishing or clouding of this way of thinking. Despite

[112] Bartel (2010: 161).
[113] Bartel (2010: 161).
[114] Bartel (2010: 161). Medea's changing from Greek to foreigner is central to Euripides' play.
[115] Bartel (2010: 162). On crossing moral boundaries and limits see the introduction to 9.8.

Medea being a myth and Alexander's comparative remoteness in history, their image or concept might have felt 'disturbingly close to home'.[116] In the case of Alexander this is especially so since his position in the chapter bridges the domestic and the external sections.[117]

9.5.ext.2

Summary: V reports Xerxes' words admitting that he only called together his leading men to be seen as taking their counsel, while in fact he only relies on his own, and further states that their role is to obey, not to advise.

Xerxes: He is an exemplar three times in V9.[118] This is the most concentrated focus on Xerxes in the whole of V.[119] In the first two examples, Xerxes is put in close proximity to *exempla* on Campania. This seems to me to be prefiguring Plutarch's remark about the building projects in Campania of Lucullus as 'Xerxes *togatus*'.[120] The comparison between Xerxes and Lucullus emerges also in Tiberian Roman literature, reminiscent of the discourse of constructing luxurious villas at Rome at V9.1.[121] Thus Xerxes was a byword for the stock-tyrant for both the Roman and Greek worlds in his display of the quintessentially tyrannical *vitia* of *luxuria* and *superbia*. V emphasizes his *opprobrium* towards Xerxes seven times in

[116] Bartel (2010: 165). Alexander was made less remote by his extensive deployment in Rome in the first century BC.
[117] There are three more mentions of clothing in V9: 9.1.3 (*veste*); 9.1.5 (*palmata veste*); 9.6.ext.2 (*vestimenta*). In V9 clothes however do not always matter, see 9.14.1, 3-5 where each *exemplum*'s characters are very similar physically to the extent that they are mistaken for each other. Clothes in these cases would have easily settled their identity and status, crucial to the *exempla*'s *dénouement*.
[118] 9.1.ext.3 and 9.13.ext.1.
[119] It can be observed that the only other proper *exempla* on Xerxes are 1.6.ext.1a and 2.10.ext.1, the remaining six references to him are merely made in passing (3.2.ext.3, 5.3.ext.3e and g, 6.5.ext.2, 8.7.ext.4 and 15). The concentration of the Xerxes *exempla* in book nine reinforces V's extremely negative tyrannical portrayal of him.
[120] *Luc*. 39.2-3. Also see Jolivet (1987).
[121] Vell. 2.33.4; Plin. *Nat*. 9.170. On building luxurious villas see my comments at 9.1.1 and 9.1.4.

just the eight lines of text for this *exemplum*, this is rare in V: *superbia*, *impotentia*, *insolenter*, *arroganter*, *deformiter*, *insolentius* and *imprudentius*. Compared to Alexander where he is portrayed four times positively, four times negatively (see above ext.1), Xerxes is a negative exemplar throughout V.

ne viderer … suadendum: Summarized version of the speech in Herod. 7.8.[122] Xerxes' arrogance is not mentioned in Herodotus, thus V makes this his own contribution, as he does again for the following *exemplum* and for 9.4.ext.1 in the case of *avaritia* (see my point above).[123] Xerxes' arrogance (*hubris*) is a dominant theme in Aeschylus' *Persae*.[124]

insolentius … imprudentius: The association of these two words is not found elsewhere.

9.5.ext.3

Summary: Hannibal refuses to give admission to anyone, even rebuffing his lieutenant's proposal for a window of opportunity to dine at the Capitol.

Hannibal: Only Hannibal of all of V's external exemplars appears more often than Alexander, some forty times in total.[125] Of these forty times, there are eight occurrences in V9, while Alexander only features three times. Hannibal, because he became 'embedded in the Roman consciousness', posed a real threat to Rome, unlike Alexander who never set foot in Italy.[126]

[122] On speeches in book nine see 9.1.4.
[123] For 9.5.ext.3 Shackleton Bailey points this out too (Loeb vol.2, note 8, p.338-9).
[124] See Papadimitropoulos (2008).
[125] Spencer (2010: 182 and 293).
[126] Spencer (2010: 182).

felicitatis et moderationis: Hannibal was *felix* up to this point, but lacked *moderatio*.[127]

9.5.ext.4

Summary: The custom of having the common folk use separate baths in Carthage, and a different forum in Campania.

Here we find three references back to other parts of the book: (i) Plautius Hypsaeus, the consul of 125 from 9.5.1; (ii) Campania (see below) and (iii) the baths (*balneo*) from 9.1.1, 9.5.3, 9.6.ext.2.

insolentiae … aemulatio: V is unique in this expression, also not found lexically with *superbia* and *aemulatio* either.

Campanum: Campania is a theme in V9: 9.1.1.[128] In our extant sources, Campania is a crucial interface zone between Magna Graecia to the south, and Latium and the Etruscan north; thus, in V9, I see Campania becoming a metaphorical boundary between domestic and external, especially when connecting the vices of luxury (9.1) and *superbia* (9.5) to Campania, which Cicero also postulated: *Capuae, in domicilio superbiae atque in sedibus*

[127] In V see also *de moderatione* (4.1), *de felicitate* (7.1).
[128] 9.1.ext.1 (with the same Hannibal connection as here in the form of Carthage, Hannibal's birth place); 9.3.4 (another Hannibal connection), 9.6.ext.2 (Nuceria and Acerrae, towns in Campania). For the connection of Hannibal to Campania see Stat. *Silv*. 4.3.4-6.

luxuriosis.[129] Campania's importance to Rome was also economic, especially in agriculture and wines, 'culminating in the period between the late Republic and early Principate'.[130]

As Knorr argues, the connection V makes between Campania and *superbia* (also denoted by *arrogantia* or *fastidium*) is a recurrent theme in Livy, as in Cicero.[131] The Romans were jealous of Campania's prosperity and never forgave Capua for her defection after Cannae.[132] Horace alludes to this, calling it *morbus Campanus*, a metaphorical appellation rather than a physical one, perhaps referring to its inhabitants' typical trait of arrogance.[133] Capua, the leading city of Campania, mentioned a few lines below, is called by Cicero the 'home of arrogance'.[134]

[129] *Agr*. 2.97. For luxury in Campania see 9.1.1. For the role of Campania in Livy and V see Kadleck (2010: *passim*).
[130] Arthur (1991: 153). Arthur (1991) discusses Campania's economic importance to Rome.
[131] Liv. 9.6.5, 9.40.17, 4.52.6, 7.31.6, 23.5.1, 25.18.2. In Cicero, as referenced in Knorr (2012: 871 n.14) see *Agr*. 1.18, 20; 2.91, 92, 93, 95, 97. See also Sil. 11.33-7, 127, 281; Gel. 1.24.2.
[132] Oakley (2005: 99). See Liv. 9.6.5: *superbiam ingenitam Campanis*.
[133] Knorr (2012: 871). See *Sat*. 1.5.62. On the Romans thinking in metaphorical terms see Fears (1981: 845).
[134] *domicilio superbiae* (*Agr*. 2.97), *domicilium* […] *superbiae* (*Red. Sen.* 17).

Chapter 6: *de perfidia*.[1]

Introduction.[2]

The main two themes in 9.6 are trickery (or stratagem) and betrayal.[3] All the *exempla* in 9.6 on treachery involve some sort of trickery or stratagem for the treachery to take place.[4] On the moral spectrum, trickery can be identified on two levels: first, deliberate lies and falsehoods; second, slanting, distortion, 'economy with the truth', what today we would call spin.[5] V distinguishes between deceit (or lies) and *perfidia*, the latter signifying a breaking of *fides*, thus belonging to a more severe group on V's moral barometer.[6]

The *perfidia* of 9.6.1 is treason against one's country, the only such case in this chapter.[7] For another such case in V9 see Tullia at 9.11.1. The nearest one gets to this theme elsewhere in

---

[1] **Rhetorical devices for 9.6**: *Antithesis*: 9.6.4 *victoriamque … emit*. *Interrogatio*: 9.6.ext.1 *an ne victoriae … superesset*. On the etymology and semantics of *perfidia* see Freyburger (1986: 84-94).

[2] For vocabulary on treachery in V9 see: *insidiosum* (9.6.praef, 9.8.ext.1); *insidiosam* (9.2.ext.6); *insidiis* (9.10.ext.1). *seditiosissimi* (9.2.2); *seditiosus* (9.4.3). *proditio* (9.6.1). *perfidia* (9.6.praef, 9.6.2, 9.6.4, 9.6.ext.1).

[3] See Abbott (2000: 75 n. 38) on deceit in Livy and the connections in the *Aeneid* books 2 and 5 to *dolus*, *arma*, and civil strife, which are also present in V 9.6. Also see Harrison (1997).

[4] *Perfidia* is a reoccurring word and theme in V. *perfidia* in V9 is clustered exclusively at 9.6: praef, 2, 3, 4 ext.1. This is unlike other vices which emerge in the other chapters of V9. For *perfidia* elsewhere in V see: 1.8.9, 1.6.8, 2.9.8, 2.7.12, 2.3.3, 3.2.ext.1 and ext.3, 5.1.10, 5.3.3, 5.6.ext.4, 6.2.8, 6.5.4, 6.8.4. Connected to *perfidia* see also *mendacium*: 9.6.ext.2,9.15.1, 9.15.ext.1, 7.2.5, 7.3.ext.10, 4.7.4, 4.7.6, 3.2.ext.9, 2.6.7; *proditio*: 9.6.1, 8.1.abs.9, 6.1.3, 6.5.7, 5.4.ext.7, 2.6.10; *fraus*: 9.4.1, 6.1.13, 6.5.ext.4,3.8.2, 1.1.9; *infidelitas*: 9.8.1.

[5] Rich (2010: 168). On the variety of hypocrisy and deceit in political life see Runciman (2008).

[6] On a similar breaking of *fides* see *populus* (9.7.1). On another type of break of *fides* in V9 see in the main text in my introduction to 9.4, on the desecration of the *fides* of the deceased. For a case study on *fides* in Livy see Moore (1986: 65-97).

[7] Also see *parricidium* in the sense of *patriae parricidium* at 9.11.3, 9.11.ext.4 and *perduellio* 6.5.3. Also see d'Aloja (2011).

V is 6.8.4 in the case of Caesar's assassin Cassius; and that of Campanian *perfidia* (2.3.3 and 3.2.ext.1). Campania, as I have noted at 9.1.ext.1, represents an interface between Roman and external.[8] Treason and *seditio* (the latter is the theme for 9.7) represent a rebellion of sorts from within a community, a going against what one belongs to.[9] The difference between the two is that *seditio* is a term in V9 used to characterize collective behaviour, as 9.7 shows; while the implied treason of 9.6.1 refers to the individual character of Tarpeia, hence her inclusion in this chapter on *perfidia*, and not in 9.7.

The general view is that Romans saw trickery as less honourable than open combat and direct confrontation with the enemy, the latter being associated with honour and valour.[10] Livy asserted: *postremo minime arte Romana, fraude ac dolo, adgressus est* (1.53.5). However, it was also acceptable in the Roman consciousness to use some trickery against the enemy, as shown in 9.6.1, the only such case in 9.6.[11] This sometimes was labelled differently to make it more honourable and acceptable to Roman morality, so *consilium* would be used instead of *dolus*.[12] So often in Roman historiography one can notice that Romans 'rationalize their use of deceit'.[13] The *exempla* of 9.6 do not contain any attempt by V to mitigate the perpetrators' culpability and like the *exempla* of 9.2 on cruelty, the treacheries themselves at 9.6 are unnecessary and unjustified, that is, they are not motivated by a desire to protect Rome or to

[8] Two common threads within *perfidia* in V are the following: the presence of Pompey the Great (1.8.9, 5.1.10 and 6.2.8) and the connection to *amicitia* (*perfidi hospitis* 1.6.8; 9.6.4). For *amicitia* in V9 see my introduction to 9.5.
[9] For more on *seditio* see 9.7.1.
[10] Liv. 42.47.4-9, Farron (1993: 4-7). Also see Wheeler (1988: xiv) on the moral decision between the 'Odysseus ethos' (trickery, underhand approach) and the 'Achilles ethos' (open, face-to-face confrontation).
[11] '*Dolus* could be considered admirable or at least defensible cleverness, *sollertia*' (Abbott 2000: 63). Livy's 'Romulus is clever with traps and surprises (for example, 1.5, 1.14), and Fabius's canny frustration of Hannibal is a *sollers cunctatio*, a clever policy of delay (22.23.2). Cicero went so far as to compare Fabius to the notorious Hannibal (*Off*. 1.108)' (Abbott 2000: 64).
[12] Abbott (2000: 65). See *Rhet. Her*. 3.8. Thus emerges the moral dilemma of trickery being *bonus* or *malus*, consistent with the debate of situation ethics (Langlands 2011).
[13] Abbott (2000: 65 n.18). This subject is treated in Cic. *Off*. 3.73.

upholding virtues. This sense of the futility of such actions becomes more obvious at the close of the chapter: *alioqui insignem nominis sui memoriam relicturus* (9.6.ext.2).

A final point to make is that there is a connection between 9.6.1 and 9.6.ext.2. In both, *luxuria* is used as a crucial element to the *exempla*'s *dénouement*. At 9.6.1 money and gold are used to entice Tarpeia, through her *avaritia* (the theme for 9.4, note in general the interconnectedness of *vitia* in V9), to betray her country and father.[14] At 9.6.ext.2 vapour and the smoke of the baths are used as a trick, despite their association with pleasure and luxury, to suffocate its victims.[15]

Commentary

9.6 *Praefatio*

occultum … extrahatur: V uses *occultum* here to show that the *perfidus* acts deviously, the treacherous act is thus harder to prevent or recognise at first, there is a hidden element to it. *Occultum* is also an interesting choice of word because, despite V's mention of wanting to bring out the hidden vice of *perfidia* from the shadowy darkness he then selects *exempla* which are instead famous. V's rationale for selecting famous *exempla* may be consistent with this book's apotreptic approach, to raise the issue of *perfidia* as a vice which lurks in society behind closed doors. Thus V makes a moral point on how more ordinary cases of *perfidia* should become more open, like the famous ones are, so that once they are in the open they

[14] On the betrayal of an ally see 9.6.ext.1.
[15] Similarly *luxuria* is described as *utilis*, a useful trick to distract or mollify the enemy at 9.1.ext.1. Significantly V uses in this case *tradidit*: *luxuria … Hannibalem … Romano militia tradidit*, meaning that *luxuria* herself handed the enemy over, betrayed them. For a more usual use of *tradidit* as betrayal see 9.11.7.

can be fully confronted and challenged.[16] As an example of a lack of the hidden (*occultum*) element in this chapter, note the version V chooses for the Tarpeia story, since the author could have selected the version of Tarpeia falling in love with the enemy, thus secret love would have been more consistent with *occultum*. Instead V opts for a version where material gain (bracelet) becomes motivation for Tarpeia's actions, perhaps reflecting the earlier chapter on *avaritia* (9.4). Love is not a theme in V9, so this version of Tarpeia's story, focusing on power and money, makes sense contextually. As I have remarked elsewhere in V9, when money comes into the picture then corruption or treachery follow quickly. Continuing the financial gain theme in 9.6 see the case of Viriathus (*victoriamque non meruit sed emit*, 9.6.4).[17]

9.6.1

Summary: Tarpeia is bribed by Tatius and lets the Sabines into the citadel but is subsequently killed by them.[18]

Tarpeia and Tullia are the only individual female protagonists of the domestic sections of V9. Other women are mentioned either collectively (9.1.3; 9.1.ext.7) or in passing but accusations of vice are not directed at them specifically (Aurelia Orestilla, 9.1.9).[19] The role of the women at 9.1.8 is more ambiguous as the real blame is directed at the elite men, but there is also perhaps *implicit* blame towards the women (as argued above at 9.1.8). Tarpeia and Tullia

[16] This is comparable to the binarism on the private versus public on revenge and punishment at 9.10.
[17] On this theme elsewhere in V9 see 9.1.4 on the exorbitant price of marble columns, the topos of debt at 9.1 as an extension of *luxuria*, its connection to *avaritia* itself at 9.4 and my comments to debt and credit in my introduction to 9.4, *creditorum consternatio* 9.7.4 and the impostor slaves of 9.15 wishing for financial gain via their trickeries.
[18] Liv. 1.11.6-9. For a comparison of the interpretation of the story of Tarpeia between Livy and V see Maslakov (1984: 461-4).
[19] I do not see the women at 9.12.2 as displaying a vice.

are among a handful of ancient exemplars in the book (also throughout all V) that skirt the borders of myth and history. More importantly they have in common the same vice: treachery. V places Tullia in a different chapter to Tarpeia because of her *dicta improba*.[20] The case of Tullia's *perfidia* is somewhat worse than Tarpeia's because Tullia, in addition, runs over kills her father's corpse (King Servius Tullius). Both their fathers had the responsibility of protecting their respective territories, since Tarpeia's father *arci praeerat* (9.6.1), so their daughters represent the enemy from within. They are positioned to personify vice as something which insidiously corrupts and causes harm from within themselves (microcosm), but which also ripples out to have an effect on their homeland (macrocosm). Although Tarpeia was an unmarried girl and on the surface powerless compared to Tullia, her treachery gave her a degree of power that virtue would never have given her. Although both women's predominant vice is that of treachery, the underlying, more basic vice for each of them is different: for Tarpeia it is *avaritia* (inward looking, acquisitive), for Tullia it is thirst for power and domination (outward gaze, expansive, so the dynamics are opposite to Tarpeia).

The Tarpeia story is a famous one, of which there are several variants. 'Valerius here copies Livy's narrative almost word for word'.[21] Neither V nor Livy make any attempt to alleviate the girl's culpability on account of her youth, inexperience and naivety. The example of Tarpeia could have also qualified for inclusion in other of V9' chapters: on luxury and greed (chapters 1 and 4, in terms of the things she wanted from the Sabines), rashness (chapter 8, her deed seemed to have been done rather impetuously, without careful consideration, in that

[20] 9.11: *dicta improba aut facta scelerata*. Conveyed in reported speech: *ut comperit corpus patris Servii Tullii occisi ibi iacere, supra id duci vehiculum iussit*. For Tarpeia's *dicta* see below: *pactam quae in sinistris manibus gerebant*, as words were also a major element of the Tarpeia story, but V did not choose to mention them.

[21] Welch (2013: 81). For more on a comparison between the two texts see Welch (2013: 80-1) and Maslakov (1984: 463). The version of the story line and the 'undramatic and brief' (Ogilvie 1965: 74) style are the same in both authors. The concise and terse style is more a common trait in V than Livy. For variants on this story in other ancient authors see Ogilvie (1965: 74-5).

it was not premeditated, she was initially just fetching water from the well for a sacrifice), and error (chapter 9.9, on account of her youth and also for the point I make below, see *quae in sinistris manibus gerebant*).[22]

The structure of the *exemplum* is unusual, Tarpeia, the chief exemplar of 9.6.1, is not mentioned by name, and the two words used for her, *filiam virginem* and *puella*, are not in the nominative but in the accusative. The displacement created by not having Tarpeia in the nominative could perhaps even confuse the reader as to who the main exemplar is meant to be. The nominative is instead used for Tarpeia's father, Spurius Tarpeius, and this shows the reader that the *exemplum* is Roman rather than external, that is, the Sabines are not the chief exemplars, although they do provide with an additional element of *perfidia* in 9.6.1 (for their word-breaking, see below). V does not mention Tarpeia by name deliberately, a blatant refusal to let her actual 'poisonous' name materialise in print because of her terrible treachery against Rome. The same can be said of Livy's presentation of the story, on whom V bases his version on. Neither V nor Livy supply us with the name of Spurius' daughter, but Propertius, Florus and Ovid do.[23]

Spurius Tarpeius: Is a mythological character. He was the commander of the Roman citadel under Romulus.

corrupit: Both V and Livy use the same verb for 'bribe', albeit in different tenses (*corrupit*, *corrumpit*), which also means injure, harm, disorder, ruin, destroy and undo (OLD. 1b). Hence to 'undo' her innocence, but also to ruin and destroy her, as the deed she performs

[22] There are other versions, notably in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.38-40). Varro (*L*.5.41) and Propertius (see above) identify Tarpeia as a Vestal Virgin. Also see Rutledge (1964) and Janan (1999).
[23] Tarpeia is named in Propertius (4.4), Flor. *Epit*.1.1 (1.1.12) and Ov. *Met*. 14.776. V does mention the *mons Tarpeius* in passing earlier in his work at 6.5.7, *saxo Tarpeio*.

leads to her own death. It is also a ruining and destroying forever of her memory and her image, transforming her into a byword for treachery.[24]

mercedis nomine: (*Merx* = commodity, goods, merchandise, trade) Emphasizes the commercial flavour to Tarpeia's betrayal of Rome, that is, the gold. This commerciality heightens her vulgarity and how low she held all that Rome stood for, including her own identity as a Roman woman.[25] *Merx* also means 'a payment for services rendered'. Therefore when it is associated with Rome's safety itself, it brings Tarpeia's crime even more corrupt, since Tarpeia's services are almost like a prostitute's: the enemy penetrates the city.[26]

virginem: There are two inferential readings here, one focused on age the other on religious status. By juxtaposing *virginem* with *aquam sacris*, V intensifies the image of the innocence and purity of a young girl fetching water for sacrifice and then contrasting it, later in the sentence, with the impurity and lack of innocence connected to treachery: *corrupit mercedis nomine*. Apart from meaning young, unmmarried girl, *virginem* indicates that Tarpeia was a Vestal, 'for it was a daily duty of the Vestals to draw water for cult purposes'.[27] This is supported by (two words later) *sacris* (sacrificial rites), thus intensifying her infamy. V follows Livy in this also, using the same exact words in the exact order as Livy: *aquam ... sacris ... petitum*.[28] Therefore Tarpeia's basic function of preserving the state is subverted, thus her actions are tantamount to betrayal of religious duty.

---

[24] For the importance of *memoria* in book nine see my main introduction.
[25] *merx* is also found in V at 3.7.8 *Aemilium Scaurum regia mercede corruptum* in the same scenario of bribes and dishonesty as here.
[26] See 9.1.8 on the prostitution of free Roman women.
[27] Ogilvie (1965: 75). Varro (*L*. 5.41) and Propertius (4.4) also identify Tarpeia as a Vestal Virgin. On the Propertius version see Rutledge (1964) and Janan (1999).
[28] Other sources where Tarpeia is openly depicted as a Vestal, rather than being implicitly implied, are Varro: *hic mons ante Tarpeius dictus a virgine Vestali Tarpeia, quae ibi ab Sabinis necata armis et sepulta* (*L*. 5.41) and Propertius with two quotes: *quae uoluit flammas fallere, Vesta, tuas?* (4.4.18) and *nam Vesta, Iliacae felix tutela fauillae, culpam alit et plures condit in ossa faces* (4.4.69).

Tatius: Titus Tatius, Sabine king of Cures (a town between the Tiber and the Via Salaria).

pactam quae in sinistris manibus gerebant: This draws attention to the ambiguity of Tarpeia's contract with Tatius, for *quae in sinistris manibus gerebant* could have been the Sabines' gold or their shields. Therefore in an apparent attempt to deceive the Sabines with a word-play of *armillae* and *arma* (in one of the variants on this myth), Tarpeia demands that they hand over their weapons (*arma*), thus portraying her in a favourable light, thus, as I commented above, Tarpeia's *exemplum* could also have been classified in the chapter *de errore* (9.9).[29] Livy plays on this ambiguity too with *seu ... seu*, but gives us a more varied account, open to multiple interpretations.[30] V, on the other hand, rigidly adheres here to the more mainstream version of Tarpeia being the culprit. Indeed, the very title of the chapter *de perfidia*, gives us an immediate *key* to V's stance on the myth.

armillae et anuli magno ex pondere auri: *Armillae* could have been 'golden bracelets carrying a talisman, often seen on the arms of men in Etruscan paintings, ornaments that were used in the fifth century BC but not seen after the third century'.[31]

poena: For punishment and revenge in V9 see 9.10.praef.[32]

absit reprehensio … vindicata est: Here there is none of V's more usual condemnation of a barbarian killing a Roman. According to V, the murderers are not even blameworthy, since the author holds a view of a more universal law of cause and effect where *proditio* is

[29] For another *exemplum* in V9 where ambiguity of words leads to a disaster see 9.9.3.
[30] Although I allude above on the similarity of Livy's and V's presentations of the Tarpeia story, here note how the two authors diverge on details.
[31] Ogilvie (1965: 74). Also see Rumpf (1951: 170-1).
[32] Punishment: *poena* (9.6.1), *impunitate* (9.6.4). Revenge: *vindico* (9.6.1).

punished no matter by whom, even by the enemy. Lawrence (2006: 259, and *passim* chapter 7) argues for an 'inclusive universality of behaviour' in V, that transcends ethnicity and language: what really matters is how people behave. Therefore underlying this argument one must also take into account the importance of the universality of a law of cause and effect, that is, behaviour (cause) creates effects (virtue or vice). In V9 this universality of cause and effect is key to a reader's understanding of what perpetuates *vitia*, in order to liberate themselves from destructive patterns of behaviour. Also in terms of punishment, such as here, in terms of a Roman being killed by an enemy, V implicitly shows and supports the idea that one cannot always escape retribution, which is met by either one's enemy avenging a wrong or by other means. In Livy the implication is that the Sabines themselves exacted actual *active punishment* onto Tarpeia for an ethical reason, rather than just killing her *per se*: *ne quid usquam fidum proditori esset* (1.11). This tells us that treachery, even from an enemy perspective, had such a strong element of *opprobrium* as to deserve death.[33]

9.6.2

Summary: Galba deceives the Lusitanians, stating he would help them, but instead selects 8,000 of their young men, kills some of them and sells the rest.

8.1.absol.2 describes the outcome of Galba's *summae perfidiae* (9.6.2) in this *exemplum*, where Galba is accused by the Tribune of the Plebs Libo but is able to secure an acquittal: *misericordia ergo ... non aequitas rexit*. If there is one good attribute that V assigns to Galba

[33] This can be seen as a rebalancing of Tarpeia's transgressed *fides* by the Sabines, as a form of retaliation or punishment, rather than from the Romans (true injured party). This is the only such case in V9. On the rebalancing effect see Guastella (2001: 44, 46, 68).

is that of a *disertissimi oratoris*.[34] As such he was able to receive, in the above hearing, *paene nullum triste suffragium* (8.1.absol.2) by resorting to pity. For V this is an injustice since he starts that section with *acrem se tunc pudicitiae custodem populus Romanus, postea plus iusto placidum iudicem praestitit*.[35] With a short sub-clause, V summarizes Galba's culpability, specifying more clearly than in book nine, the *crux* of his treachery: the fact that he broke a treaty: *quod Lusitanorum magnam manum interposita fide praetor in Hispania interemisset*.[36] Although Galba organised a false guarantee, promise, assurance (*fides* OLD 2.a), he broke it with his massacre, thus also breaking, in the eyes of the Romans, the *fides publica* of Rome. Furthermore Galba betrayed the Lusitanians' trust (*fides* OLD 1), and herein ultimately lies the *perfidia* which V uses in this section. Neither here nor at 9.6.3-4 is it acceptable for treachery to be used against even the enemies of Rome.[37]

trium enim Lusitaniae civitatium convocato populo: It is not clear in this *exemplum* that Galba had broken a treaty, V specifies this at 8.1.absol.2; we have no evidence in any source of what this treaty entailed exactly.

tamquam de commodis eius acturus: With this little *addendum*, 'as if he were about to take action for their benefit', V reinforces how successfully Galba was able to trick the Lusitanians into a false sense of security. At the heart of these *exempla* on treachery is the power of *dicta*, which are not always specified, as here, but are as important and memorable (for this book's apotreptic approach) as the more explicit *dicta* that V tells us about. Although

[34] 8.7.1.
[35] 8.1.absol.2.
[36] 8.1.absol.2.
[37] See the introduction to 9.6 for my comments on 9.6.1, which constitutes the exception in this chapter in this regard. The incident in 6.4.2b, not to be found anywhere else (Shackleton Bailey 2000 vol.2: 46), describes what seems to have happened after his *summa perfidia* in Spain. When Galba was consul (144 BC) he was disputing in the senate with Cotta (his co-consul) which of them should be sent to Spain against Viriathus (a Lusitanian leader who had survived Galba's campaign in Spain). Scipio's argument that neither of them should go defined the outcome.

these *dicta* are more hidden they are essential to the treachery being successful. As V tells us in the preface to 9.6, he wishes to drag the hidden element of treachery *latebris suis*.

flos iuventutis ... **electa:** V escalates the description of this incident by adding that among the 8,000 men, he had further selected those he would butcher or sell (no criterion given). According to the Roman moral compass, death would have been preferable to selling men in their prime (*flos*). This is why V emphasises it. This incident deeply upset the Tribune of the Plebs Libo as he attacked Galba.[38]

armis exuta: Has a flavour of *opprobrium* about it. By removing their weapons before butchering (*trucidavit*) them, the enemy would not have been able to fight on par with the Romans, once they understood Galba's real intentions. This is clearly a touch of cowardice by Galba, who achieved the easy subjugation of the Lusitanians by trickery, rather than in manly armed combat. He made the enemy believe that there was still an alliance between them.[39]

9.6.3

Summary: Domitius deceives Bituitus and deports him to Rome, on account of a past grievance. The Senate is unable to intervene despite its disagreement over Domitius' action as it fears Bituitus might start a war against Rome if he were allowed home.

[38] (8.1.absol.2). The act of selecting is also strongly associated with another member of the *Sulpicius* family: Galba the Emperor. His famous remark and epigram: *legi a se militem, non emi*. (Tac. *Hist.* 1.5, Plut. *Galb*. 18.2; Suet. *Galb*. 16.1; Cass. Dio 64.3.3).

[39] In many cases of treachery there is a strong element of cowardice on behalf of the perpetrator, and as such contrary to the Roman value of *virtus*.

Domitium: Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus was consul in 122 BC. The events in this section took place in 121 BC.[40]

summi generis: Gnaeus, like Servius Sulpicius Galba in the previous section, was descended from a distinguished family, many of whom were consuls, including his father (162 BC), and grandfather (192 BC), who were also called Gnaeus.

magni animi: V is differentiating this personage from the two previous examples who had been portrayed badly from the beginning. V seems to be arguing that we can all fall into the trap of *perfidia* no matter how good our family lineage is (like the previous two examples) or how polished our character.

nimia gloriae cupiditas perfidum exsistere coegit: The motivation for the treachery is markedly different from 9.6.1 (*avaritia*) and 9.6.2 (*crudelitas*).[41]

iratus: Literally *angered* by Bituitus but I also interpret it as being *offended*.[42] The latter gives a fuller picture behind Gnaeus' motive for his deed: *vinxit ac Romam nave deportandum curavit* (9.6.3). Ultimately, he was *envious* of Quintus Fabius since he was chosen by Bituitus instead of himself.

Bituito: Bituitus was the last known king of the *Arverni*, a Gallic tribe, enemy of the Roman Republic during the third and second centuries BC.

---

[40] He is also mentioned at 2.9.9.
[41] On the theme of *cupiditate gloriae* in V see 8.14.
[42] For the connection between anger and feeling offended see 9.1.3.praef: *quia dolorem … patitur*. Also see 9.3.2 for another case where V connects the emotions of anger and feeling offended to not being chosen or elected for a public office or role.

successoris: Fabius Maximus was consul the year after Gnaeus Domitius.

per colloquii simulationem: He commits a treacherous act via the trickery of seeming to wish to conduct dialogue and to receive the king hospitably. This is comparable to Galba's *tamquam de commodis* towards the Lusitanian people in the previous section, being able to put on and keep up an appearance and be credible enough to then make the treacherous deed. In both cases the perpetrators of *perfidia* successfully appeal to the enemy's *credulitas*.[43] This must have required great skill and confidence in language for these acts to be achieved successfully. With Tarpeia however the trickery backfires as Tatius outwits her.[44] In 9.6 a theme on the importance of speech emerges in utilizing trickery. V's writings have been associated in scholarship to the practice of 'declamation and declamatory training'.[45] This chapter on treachery is showing the other side to the power of speech, how it can be used adversely to people's downfall and nemesis rather than being a bastion of a Roman's career in public life, declamation and justice. This is consistent with V9's apotreptic approach.

cuius factum: V calls Gnaeus' deed simply a *factum* rather than the more serious and onerous *impia proditio* (9.6.1) or *facinore* (9.6.2).

senatus neque probare potuit: Like Galba's deed, so Gnaeus' actions end up being discussed in the Senate. In both *exempla* the culprit is not punished.[46] Furthermore, in this section, the Senate does not even wish to undo what Gnaeus did (*neque rescindere voluit*),

[43] 9.6.praef
[44] See my point above (9.6.1) on the ambiguity of *quae in sinistris manibus gerebant*, the words Tarpeia used to try and trick the enemy.
[45] Bloomer (1992: 4).
[46] For punishment and revenge in V9 see 9.10.praef.

even though it is against what had been done to Bituitus, as the repercussions of undoing the trickery could be potentially risky to the Romans: *ne ... Bituitus bellum renovaret*.[47]

igitur eum Albam custodiae causa relegavit: Is the only solution open to the Senate. There was a different type of *custodia* (protection) earlier in this *exemplum*: *ad Q. Fabii [...] dexteram confugere*. This time though he receives protection rather than wanting others to enjoy the protection *he* could give others.[48] The fact that Bituitus had not sought that protection from him offended him and becomes the cause for the treachery itself.

9.6.4

Summary: Viriathus is murdered by his friends and by Consul Servilius Caepio.

Viriathi etiam caedes: This is closely linked with the narrative of 9.6.2 involving the Romans in Lusitania, where Viriathus was commander of the Lusitanians.[49] It is unclear why V should wish to make a thematic and chronologic break here.[50] Maybe 9.6.4's position in the chapter can be explained by the fact that some of the Lusitanians had also betrayed Viriathus and this makes an appropriate transition to the external section of 9.6.

etiam duplicem perfidiae: Considering Viriathus' formidable track record, as described above, treachery must have seemed a more prudent way of operating rather than open confrontation. It is a *duplex perfidiae* because of V's description of the role of Caepio *and*

[47] V's frustrations about the limitations of the Senate's powers resurface at 9.5.1-2.
[48] The mention of Alba (Longa) here, through its connection to its founder Romulus, takes us back to 9.6.1 with the opening *Romulo regnante*.
[49] *per XIIII annos quibus cum Romanis bellum gessit, frequentius superior* (*Per*. 54.8).
[50] 9.6.2: 149 BC; 9.6.3: 121 BC; 9.6.4: 139 BC.

Viriathus' friends. The dynamics of the double betrayal at 9.6.1 is of a different kind: that of Tarpeia toward her country, and Tatius, the Sabine king, toward Tarpeia.

in amicis quod eorum manibus interemptus est: (First of two counts of *perfidia*) Caepio's reaction to it was the following: *numquam Romanis placuisse imperatores a suis militibus interfici*.[51] This is the ultimate treachery, being killed by not only one's people but also by one's friends. They were in fact '*his most trusted friends* Audax, Ditalco, and Minurus'.[52] One can observe considerable difference when comparing this to the attempted murder of Caepio (see below) by his own men. The latter was hated for his harshness and cruelty but Viriathus' case was different.[53]

Caepionem: Quintus Servilius Caepio, of the *gens Servilia*, was consul in 140 BC and is also mentioned with his brother by V at 8.5.1. Before the murder of Viriathus, Caepio's men tried to burn him alive, reflecting Dio's accounts on what a dangerous and difficult man he was.[54] This attempted treachery of the Romans against their general would have been more understandable, since he was risking his men's life on foolish military operations without listening to them.[55]

[51] Eutr. 4.16.
[52] App. *Hisp*. 74, Loeb translation.
[53] *ut adsertor contra Romanos Hispaniae putaretur* (Eutr. 4.16.3) and following his murder 'straightway there was grief and lamentation throughout the camp, all of them mourning for him, fearing for their own safety, thinking what dangers they were in, and of what a general they had been bereft. Most of all were they grieved that they could not find the perpetrators of the crime. They arrayed the body of Viriathus in splendid garments and burned it on a lofty funeral pile' (App. *Hisp*. 74-75, Loeb translation). Taking into consideration the affection that even his people had for him, it is surprising that his most trusted friends would be able to murder him.
[54] 'He visited many injuries upon his own men, so that he even came near being killed by them. For he treated them all, and especially the cavalry, with such harshness and cruelty that a great number of unseemly jokes and stories were told about him' (Cass. Dio 22.78, Loeb translation).
[55] Cass. Dio 22.78.

sceleris huius auctor impunitate promissa fuit: Caepio promised impunity to the friends of Viriathus and also 'bribed them by large gifts [...] The murderers fled to Caepio and asked for the rest of their pay. For the present he gave them permission to enjoy safely what they had already received; as for the rest of their demands he referred them to Rome'.[56] 'Enjoy safely' is possible because of the immunity referred by V, not mentioned by other sources in the same explicit way. Although for V the perfidy of Caepio is solely against Viriathus, what is absent in this *exemplum* is that Caepio also retains the remainder of the money promised, the second of the two counts of *perfidia* (betrayal of trust). This is comparable to Galba's treachery in 9.6.2 with the Lusitanians. When Appian (*Hisp*. 74) writes 'he referred them to Rome' it is not clear if in fact the immunity the killers were promised was also broken, especially since Eutropius (4.16.3) writes: *et cum interfectores eius praemium a Caepione consule peterent, responsum est numquam Romanis placuisse imperatores a suis militibus interfici*. Was referring them to Rome a trap in itself? If it were, it would constitute a *third* count of treachery, especially considering the very high value Romans put on friendship itself.

emit: Used metaphorically from a moral perspective again at 9.13.3. Also see my point on buying and barter under *pudicitia* (9.1.7). Note the position of *emit* here as the last word of the *exemplum* and of the domestic section as a whole for rhetorical emphasis. Bribery also occurred at 9.6.1 but with the Roman and external roles reversed.

non meruit sed emit: Such cases of binarism as moral or abstract rounding-off points are a common stylistic feature of V9, usually found at the end of an *exemplum*.[57]

---

[56] App. *Hisp*. 74, Loeb translation.

[57] For other such instances in V9 see: *incohatur … maluerunt* (9.1.4); *nam cuius adulescentia … orsa est* (9.1.5); *frugalissimus … nequissimus* (9.1.6); *non celebrandas … vindicandas* (9.1.8); *adeo ut nescias … habendum sit* (9.1.ext.1); *avaro … mora* (9.1.ext.4); *viris enim … satius fuit* (9.1.ext.7). *adeo aut … potuit*

9.6.externa

9.6.ext.1

Summary: The Carthaginians drown Xanthippus despite having been a close ally.

verum: Used three more time in the book as an opener to an *exemplum*.[58]

fontem perfidiae: V here implicitly refers to the trope of *Punica fides*, an oxymoron indicating the reliability (*fides*) of Carthaginians to be mendacious, treacherous.[59] In Roman literature Carthaginian perfidy has its earliest origins in Ennius (*Ann*. 474Sk; 274V) and Cato (*Orig*. 84P).[60] Sallust is the first to use the expression *Punica fides* and to ascribe it to the Numidians.[61] In Cicero (*Leg*. *agr*. 2.95) *non genere sed natura loci* underpins the parallel of the sea with corruption, since Carthage's position is on the sea, which resonates with my comments in V9 at 9.1.1 on the sea and a decline in morals. After Carthage was destroyed, Carthaginian treachery became an exercise in the rhetorical schools (see Cic. *Inv*. 1.71; *ad*

(9.2.3); *tormenti genus … dignissimum* (9.2.ext.1); *libidinosus … adfecerat* (9.2.ext.3); *quod in communi … reddiderat* (9.2.ext.5); *illa iniustae … intenta* (9.3.1); *igitur in dubio … exstincta* (9.3.8); *Procul dubio … mancipium* (9.4.ext.1); *tribunus … paruit* (9.5.2); *Superba … confessio* (9.5.4); *Nescias … imprudentius* (9.5.ext.2); *ille enim … lavabatur* (9.5.ext.4); *quo facinore … antecessit* (9.6.2); *maiorne an peior vir* (9.6.ext.2); *satiusque … mutare* (9.7.mil. rom.3); *itaque exiguo … fieret* (9.8.1); *in memoriam … indicium est* (9.8.ext.1); *necessitate … deberet* (9.8.ext.2); *duplex … erroris illa* (9.9.2).

[58] 9.1.9, 9.4.2 and 9.13.praef.

[59] For a summary of bibliography on this subject see Perley (2012: 38, n. 79). For the Carthaginians elsewhere in V9 see V 9.2.ext.1-2; 9.6.ext.1, 4; 9.5.ext.4. Also see Cic. *Off*. 1.38 (on Carthaginian as breakers of treaties, *foedifragi*). For the image of Carthaginians as being not necessarily negative in the Principate see Devallet (1996: 17-28).

[60] Perley (2012: 40). Also see *quod neque non petere pacem propter metum neque manere in ea prae insita animis perfidia potuissent* (Liv. 30.32). For Carthaginian deception in war, contrasted to the Roman approach to warfare see Liv. 42.47.

[61] Perley (2012: 40). See *Jug*. 108.

Her. 4.20), as a trope also against non-Romans generally.[62] *Punica fides* was used to contrast the idealised Roman *fides* with that of non-Roman people, and thus constitutes an approach comparable to V9's apotreptic one. Therefore being accused of *Punica fides*, was synonymous with being un-Roman, thus helping to define *Romanitas*.

merserunt: V mentions Xanthippus' drowning, and so do Appian (*Pun*. 4), Diodorus (23.16) and Zonaras (8.13). Polybius (36.2-3) presents a different version of the story whereby Xanthippus reaches home alive.[63] Like many other instances in V9, this *exemplum* could also have been classified under the chapter on cruelty (9.2), where Regulus is also covered (9.2.ext.1).[64]

optima opera: V refers to the capture, torture and death of a Roman national hero in this striking way by using *optima* as a rhetorical move to emphasize the culpability of the Carthaginians' actions and to intensify the reader's reaction of indignation toward such a killing.

Regulum: Marcus Atilius Regulus was consul twice: in 267 and 256 BC.[65] The Romans saw him as a hero who exemplified the very opposite of treachery, as V clearly states: *perfidiam … duxerat* (2.9.8).[66] Morally Regulus becomes a further good exemplar to V in terms of teaching not to crave for wealth, the theme for 9.4: *multo magis… comparatio* (4.4.5).[67]

---

[62] Gruen (2011: 115-140).
[63] For the counterargument see also Lazenby (1996: 106).
[64] Notice how both *exempla* on Regulus constitute the second external *exemplum* of each chapter.
[65] For more on his capture see 1.1.14, on his torture and death see 9.2.ext.1. On the battle between Regulus and Xanthippus see Polyb. 1.32-35. The fate of Regulus does not appear in Polybius and Punic-specialist commentators particularly argue that it is a late legend.
[66] Both father and son are mentioned here, both called Marcus, the son was consul in 217 BC.
[67] For a survey exploring the use of Regulus in different sources to provide ethical or moral *exempla* see Mix (1970). Regulus from a philosophical perspective see Arieti (1990) and Harrison (1986).

simulantes: Pretending is a theme in this chapter, a *sine qua non* to treachery in V9.

in alto merserunt: Drowned, but also as a moral metaphor that fits well with V9's main theme of *vitia*: to drown, bury in pleasure, wine, excess (OLD.9). Note the motif of man being overwhelmed by temptation, *vitia*.[68] For the Carthaginians' habit of drowning victims, also see 9.6.ext.2 below, where people are thrown down wells (*puteorum*). Also see the episode covered by Polybius (3.46.10) of Hannibal's Rhône crossing where the Carthaginians drown their mahouts because they had no more use for them, after having used them for the elephants. Similarly, Xanthippus is drowned once he was of no more use to the Carthaginians.

9.6.ext.2

Summary: Two episodes of Hannibal deceiving people outside their city walls: (i) the citizens of Nuceria, whom he suffocates with vapour and smoke; (ii) the senate of Acerrae, whom he throws down deep wells.

These events also belong to 9.2.ext.1 but the details of 9.6.ext.2 are not mentioned in that *exemplum*.[69] This is because V would have wished to isolate, compartmentalize them, since they span two different *vitia*, so that they could become more powerfully imprinted in the readers' moral consciousness and memory.[70]

[68] For a study on death by drowning in Roman historiography see Adams 1991 (on V see Adams' appendix 'The distribution of *neco* and *eneco*' p.30).
[69] Nor are they in Livy (23.15.3-6, 17.4-7). However they do emerge at App. *Pun*. 63, Dio *fr*. 57.30.
[70] On the importance of memory in V's agenda see my main introduction.

Nuceria … Acerranorum: Both are towns in Campania. For Campania as a significant theme in V9 see above 9.5.ext.4.

inexpugnabilibus muris: Because the walls are inexpugnable, trickery is used instead. Walls are mentioned twice in this *exemplum* and once at 9.6.1. Walls signify protection and solidity. If one's virtues were as strong as walls, they would in fact protect one against temptations, making one stronger and more able to resist living based on *vitia*. Thus walls take on a moral metaphor too.[71]

balnearum strangulando: Baths were associated with pleasure and luxury at 9.1.1 but here are used instead as weapons, using their vapour and smoke to suffocate.[72] The stifling suffocating element of luxuriating in luxury can also be comparable to my comments above on drowning: *in alto merserunt* (9.6.ext.1).

praeclaris artibus gaudens: For similar sarcastic remarks see *usque luxuria gaudens* (9.1.ext.3) and *insolentiae… quasi aemulatio fuit* (9.5.ext.4).

[71] Also see *propter inexpugnabilem Caesaris constantiam* (9.15.ext.1), *vestram inexpugnabilem taciturnitatem* (4.7.7).
[72] Also see 9.12.4 on suffocation.

Chapter 7: *de vi et seditione*.[1]

Introduction

This is a chapter on crowds, the first half focusing on the Roman people, *togata* [1-4]; the second on the Roman army, *armata* [*mil. Rom.* 1-3]. Several studies have aimed to place the *populus Romanus* at the centre of the Roman political system.[2] I argue that V, by positioning this chapter centrally in V9, does just that, thus making a bold statement on how important crowds *per se* have been in history, thus imparting the moral lesson not to underestimate its powers. The importance of the Roman crowd for V is further highlighted by the fact that no external *exempla* are given, replaced instead by more *exempla* on Roman crowds, this time on the army.[3] So this is a deliberate decision by V to omit the external *exempla*, in order to help the reader focus on the Roman issue. After all, the ultimate question was 'how great ought the authority of the Senate to be', compared to the rights and powers of the populace.[4] Often in V9, we are confronted by moral limits, boundaries and the practicalities of what happens when these boundaries are overstepped, what happens when the *populus Romanus* resorts to violence (this chapter's main theme) to assert what they think are their rights, often doing so illegally.

[1]**Rhetorical devices for 9.7**: *Adliteratio*: 9.7.mil.Rom.2 *tantumque scelus … confessa*. *Adnominatio*: 9.7.mil.Rom.2 *pro consule … consulem*. *Interrogatio*: 9.7.mil.Rom.1 *sed quis ferat … corrigentem*.
[2] See Gruen (1995b), Mackie (1992) and Millar (1998) for further bibliographies.
[3] V's opening remark in 9.7, indicating his move from *togata* to *armata*, emphasizes the distinction.
[4] Mackie (1992: 57).

Respect for law also safeguarded the populace against the unreasonable or authoritarian use of power by the Senate, so by going against the laws put the *populus* in a vulnerable position; through disrespect of the laws one also loses the protection deriving from them.[5] This is an interesting crossing of a boundary, and these points can be compared to the comments on the tyrant in the introduction to 9.5. Violence and sedition from crowds would have been the very essence of why a ruler would aim to achieve tyrannical power, for fear of losing power, of being toppled by either the *populus* or the army.[6] This is at the heart of the psychology of the tyrant. Therefore 9.7's main theme is what happens when one loses control of the crowd.[7]

It is striking that V uses the word *populus* rather than *multitudo*. The author generalizes when in fact the crowd involved in an *exemplum* is just a *multitudo*, an unrepresentative portion of the people. This generalization by V is indicative of a certain disparagement, *opprobrium*, towards the *populus*, one which is also present in Cicero.[8] The presence of Lucius Appuleius Saturninus (9.7.1 and 3) and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (9.7.1 and 2), who were both *populares* politicians, offers a heavily one-sided and therefore not particularly objective or balanced portrayal of violence at 9.7. This prompts one to recall the important topos in political theory of *populares versus optimates* that runs as an undercurrent in V9 including *inter alia* issues such as widening rights of citizenship, the debate on corn laws, debt relief etc. All of these of course were ways in which the *populares* tried to appeal to the wider

[5] Despite this vulnerability, like V's portrayal of the tyrant, the *populus* is also depicted in the same violent, aggressive way. The people and the army can become vulnerable to a tyrant's deception thus initiating the type of violent actions outlined in some of the material in this chapter. This fits into the topos of cults of personality, underscoring the dangers that crowds can present on becoming victims to charismatic leaders, see especially 9.7.mil.Rom.2.

[6] I discussed this fear when commenting on *impotentia* in the introduction to 9.5.

[7] Violence itself was part of the disintegration of the Republic, symptom of an increasing disrespect for all established values.

[8] We know so little about non-elites in Rome, as the Roman authors who wrote about them gave an elite perspective on the *populus* in political contexts (O'Neill 2003).

populus of Rome, called the *commoda* of the plebs, referring to material or abstract interests.[9] Scholarship has moved on from seeing the topos of *populares* versus *optimates* as having a distinctive, binary position. They rather represented modes of behaviour, which politicians often switched from at different times, rather than constituting two actual political parties *per se*.[10]

9.5 and 9.7 are the only chapters in V9 to have no prefatory material, that is, they are not contained in a separate grammatical unit from their first *exemplum* but are attached to it. In these two cases V does not feel the need to introduce the themes. This is random and we should not imply anything from it as they are no less significant than the rest of the *vitia* in V9. There is considerable disparity between how much V chooses to devote to his chapter introductions, even philosophizing at length in some cases.[11]

Commentary

9.7.1

Summary: The people liberate from prison the man they think was Gracchus' son, not knowing he was the impostor Equitius.

[9] For the rights and powers of the populace among its *commoda* see Mackie (1992: 56 n.34).
[10] See Lacey (1970), Seager (1972 and 1972b), Runciman (1983), Yakobson (1992), Hölkeskamp (1993).
[11] Especially 9.12.praef. For the connection of philosophy to moral treatises and political theory see Griffin (2000). For more discursive philosophical interventions in V9 see: 9.1.praef; 9.2.praef; *queramur … excogitaverit* (9.2.ext.11); 9.3.praef; 9.3.ext.praef; 9.6.praef; 9.9.praef; 9.13.praef; 9.14.praef. Another two discursive passages that are not introductions nor part of the *recounting* of an *exemplum* see: *sed quid ego de feminis … pateat* (9.1.3); *possunt hi praebere … sapientissimum* (9.12.ext.10).

seditionis: See my introduction to 9.6 for a comparison between treason (9.6.1) and *seditio*. Thematically, this *exemplum* has features of both deception (theme for 9.6) and violence (9.7).[12] 'Fear of riots was justified demonstrated by episodes of attacks on individual senators and repeated threats to burn the senate's meeting place'.[13] Had the events of this chapter occurred during the Principate rather than the Republic (100 BC-80 BC), then the *lex Iulia de vi publica* (which punished political violence) would have been particularly helpful. In addition, the *lex Lutatia de vi* covered both *vis* and *seditio* (the two themes of this chapter) since it was directed at *seditio*.[14] Although laws against political violence came into effect late, from the perspective of V's audience, the impression must have been one that some progress had been made, as far as criminalizing certain acts of violence in Roman legislation, since the times of the Roman Republic.[15]

referantur: V has an inclination to have the main verbs in the passive voice at the beginning of chapters when introducing a new vice.[16] This might show a preference for a construction that places the vice in the dominant nominative case, to indicate the power that *vitia* have over men. In V9 the final clause is used to introduce a chapter. This helps his overall moralistic aim by giving his narrative structure.[17]

---

[12] For *seditio* in V9 see 9.2.2, 9.4.3, 9.7.1 and 3. Elsewhere in V: 2.2.9, 2.8.7, 3.2.18, 3.2.ext.9, 3.8.3, 3.8.6, 4.1.6, 4.4.2, 6.2.3, 6.3.1, 6.5.ext.4, 7.2.6, 7.5.2 and 8.9.1. It is also present in V's contemporary Velleius: six mentions of the word *seditio* and eight of *tumultus* (all contained in book two). Also see Chrissanthos (1999).

[13] Mackie (1992: 61). For references in extant sources to attacks on individual senators and threats to burn the senate's meeting-place see Mackie (1992: 61 n.64).

[14] Lintott (1999: 115).

[15] 'Romans lived in a society where violence was commonplace, not one in which violence was deployed occasionally for particular purposes' Lintott (1999: xiv).

[16] *inseratur* for the subject of *luxuria*, and *iungatur* for *libido* (9.1 praef); *protrahatur* (9.4.praef); *ponatur* (9.5.1); *adiciantur* (9.5.ext1); *extrahatur* (9.6.praef); *contemplemur* (9.6. ext1); *referantur* (9.11.praef); *narrabitur* (9.11.ext.1).

[17] For other such instances in V9: *ut ullum honorem recipiat* and *ut ad paenitentiam impelli possit* (two such clauses here, 9.1.praef); *ne non contingat ultio anxius* (9.3.praef); *ut superbia quoque et impotentia in conspicuo ponatur* (9.5.praef); *ut ipsa comparatione pateat* (9.13.praef).

L. Equitium: Paid freedman chosen by Saturninus to impersonate the son of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, to promote the Gracchan proposals.[18] Saturninus' scheme was for Equitius to gain enough support with the people, who respected the memory of the Gracchi, in order to get him elected as tribune alongside himself. *cum L. Saturnino* implies that Saturninus and Equitius were campaigning jointly.

L. Saturnino: There are several references to Lucius Appuleius Saturninus in V: on his sedition *maximos seditionum motus* (3.2.18), *seditiosissimorum civium* (6.3.1c); in connection with his famous Agrarian Law see 3.8.4.[19] At 8.1.damn.2, someone who attempted to investigate Saturninus'death was not condemned, the issue was not tackled until 63 BC, when, in connection with the prosecution of Rabirius, the case was re-opened for ideological reasons.[20] And lastly, 8.1.damn.3 shows the negative effects that Saturninus' *memoria* could generate, where someone was condemned by the assembly's votes because he had kept a portrait of Saturninus in his house.

populus: The subject of this sentence is delayed until the fifth line of this seven line *exemplum* to create anticipation. It is in clear contrast to the following *exempla* where *idemque* (7.2) and *populus* (7.3) are the first word in each sentence. The subject *populus* is the same subject for the first three *exempla* of the chapter, which are not presented in chronological order but in order of ascending atrocity.[21] The people: tear down the bars of the

[18] In Florus (2.4.1), Marius actually encourages Saturninus to propose Gracchan laws, not to support Equitius (there may be a lacuna in Florus). Florus relates the incident thus: [Saturninus] *subrogare conatus est in eius locum C. Gracchum, hominem sine tribu, sine notore, sine nomine; sed subdito titulo in familiam ipse se adoptabat* (2.4.1). On the theme of deception and impersonation in V also see 9.15 and with particular reference to Equitius including his provenance and further deceptions see V at 9.15.1, 3.8.6 and at 3.2.18 (as *tribunus designatus*).

[19] At 3.8.4 V morally contrasts Saturninus with Metellus Numidicus, also covered in the next *exemplum*. Violence is the prevalent association made to Saturninus in history, amid accusations of *seditio*. On Saturninus see Cic. *Sest*. 37; Liv. *Per*. 69.

[20] Cavaggioni (1998 and 2004).

[21] For the charged term *populus* in Roman historiography see Seager (1972 and 1977) and Tracy (2008).

prison where Equitius had been kept and then carry him on their shoulders (7.1); try to stone Censor Quintus Metellus and harass their leaders (7.2) and drive Nunnius by violence into a private house then drag him out and kill him (7.3). The above three actions by the people constitute *seditio*. V does not blame Saturninus for Equitius' imposture; in fact Saturninus' actions can be seen as being consistent with a Gracchan agenda and upholding his *fides* to his electorate. On the opposite side of the moral spectrum, a more speculative reading could also take into account the possibility of Saturninus here standing as an exemplar of *perfidia* instead, see the previous chapter. *Perfidia*, which means 'faithlessness, falsehood, a breaking of *fides*' (OLD), could also encapsulate Saturninus' actions and intent, who deliberately deceives the people, whom he is supposed to represent, and breaks their *fides*.[22] This occurs often in V9, some *exempla* span two or more *vitia*, reflecting the different interests and roles of each *exemplum*'s main characters. V's intervention and interpretation of history's moral lessons emerge according to what theme he assigns any given *exemplum*.[23] This is also apparent when V decides to withhold information, as for instance in this *exemplum*, when portraying Saturninus as not purposely wanting to elect Equitius illegally. Because V withheld this information, the reader is given the impression that the scheme of deception was solely Equitius'. Therefore the book is arranged thematically to give the text structure and unity, adding more weight to certain aspects than others.

tribunatum: According to V, Equitius' candidacy was for the tribunate of 99 BC, that is, entering office on 10th December 100 BC, and he was murdered on the first day of his *tribunatus* alongside his colleague Saturninus in 100 BC in the *Curia*.[24] 'On the first day of

[22] For *fides* as a key Roman concept that underpinned both religion and law see Freyburger (1986). In contrast, the people's actions are based on a genuine belief of truth.
[23] V achieves this by deciding what percentage or weight he assigns a vice to an individual character or group.
[24] See App. *B Civ*. 1.32-33.

the *tribunatus*' may mean the first day after the election.[25] V decides not to mention his premature death here but delays it to 9.15.1. The effect of this is to highlight the moral case at hand, the violence of the people (the real subject of the *exemplum*), rather than the deception of the two perpetrators, otherwise it would have been off-topic for 9.7.

adversus leges: 'Illegally' (OLD 9.b). Based on the wider meaning of *leges* as 'propriety, what is allowable or right' (OLD, 9), V is moralizing upon the deception of both Saturninus and Equitius in trying to impersonate the latter as the son of Gracchus.[26] Another reading could be that with *adversus leges* V indicates that there were legal issues involved with Equitius' candidature: not being qualified as lacking the prerequisite ten years' military service and citizenship, or altogether being precluded from office if he were a freedman (as claimed in *vir. ill.* 73.3).

alacritatem: This was used by V earlier at 4.8.5 in a similar way, involving a group (*homines*) and a release from captivity. This is the only *exemplum* in the chapter where violence is performed not leading to murder or harm. Not only is it done with *alacritas*, but *summam animorum alacritatem*, reflecting perhaps just how much the people still cherished the memory of the Gracchi.[27] *alacritas* is in contrast with *adversus leges*, where violence and joy arise simultaneously from the same people in a single act.[28]

[25] Benness (1990: 269 n.5). MSS say *quintum consulatum* but Marius' fifth consulship was in 101 BC, so Pighius emended this to *sextum*. Briscoe's apparatus (op. cit.) suggests that the mistake may be one made by V himself, not of transmission. One might observe that at 3.2.18 V writes *C. Marium consulatum sextum gerentem*, of an episode taking place in the same period as the above.
[26] Reflecting this sense see also Hor. *S.* 2.1.2; Sen. *Con.* 2.6.11; Juv. 6.635.
[27] This is further conveyed by *raptum*, which could also be translated as 'plunder' or 'spoils' (OLD, used as a substantive), creating an imagery of an almost public triumph.
[28] For more on *alacritas* and its various uses as an importantly reoccurring word in V see, 1.praef; 8.15.praef, in connection with the imperial family; 8.13.praef, towards Tiberius; and 7.4.1, as an emotion which Tullus Hostilius was able to inspire in his troops, replacing fear. Also see Mueller (2002: 17-20).

umeris suis ... portavit: This testifies to the success of Saturninus' plan of deceit of trying to pass Equitius as a member of the Gracchi family but also of Lucius Equitius' great skill in being so credible as to being believed, despite just being a paid freedman.[29] Equitius' skill can be equated to a brilliant actor's performance, since not only did it involve trying to convince those in power but also the people.[30] However there is no way of knowing whether a natural resemblance to the Gracchi had also helped Equitius.[31]

claustris carceris convulsis: In two instances in 9.7 V makes alliteration a structuring device. Here the heavy alliteration in this ablative absolute evokes the noise and violence and force produced by such an action. Also see *curia castris cedere se confessa* (9.7.mil. Rom. 2).

9.7.2

Summary: The same individuals (*idemque*) who liberated Lucius Equitius from prison also try to stone Metellus to death, who was attempting to prove that Equitius was an impostor.

idemque: A simple transitional formula, repeated another five times in V9.[32]

Q. Metellum: Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus commanded the war against Jugurtha (hence *Numidicus*).[33] He unsuccessfully tried to drive out Saturninus, Marius' ally, from the Senate. Saturninus was, however, able to send Metellus into exile following the latter's

[29] His status is according to the account in *uir. ill.* 73.
[30] *turbulento vulgi errore, amplissima tribunatus potestate vallatum est* (9.15.1). Although he did fail to convince the censors. On actors in V9 see 9.1.2.
[31] On physical likenesses in V9 see 9.14 and 9.15.
[32] 3.5, 12.ext.10, 13.ext.1, 15.ext.1 and 2.
[33] As the censors' term lasted up to 18 months these events may belong to 101.

refusal to take an oath in support of his agrarian law.[34] Metellus preferred the alternative of going into exile rather than having to follow a law enforced by his enemy.[35] In 99 BC he was able to return to Rome as a result of the unceasing lobbying of his son Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius.

lapidibus prosternere: *Lapidatio* reoccurs in the next chapter, against Aulus Postumius Albinus, Sulla's legate, who was stoned to death by his troops (an *exemplum* which could have also been classified as a 'mil. Rom.' belonging to 9.7) for his *superbia*: *in castris ab exercitu lapidibus obrueretur* (9.8.3). In the present chapter, however, it is the *populus* which *attempts* to stone Metellus. Saturninus (see 9.7.1 above) had also been attacked with stones.[36] Stoning has been portrayed by Hornblower as a 'paradigm of the undisciplined collective act' and is consistent here with 9.7's main theme of the dangers of the crowd.[37]

adfirmantem ... decessisse: Metellus states that Equitius is an impostor, based on the fact that all three sons of Tiberius Gracchus have died, in one of V's longest clauses in indirect speech spanning four lines. The surprising amount of detail on the three dead children shows that Metellus did a thorough job as censor.[38]

sordes: Referring not only to the low origins (and an actual slave according to Appian *B Civ*. 1.32), but also to their 'morals, greed and meanness of character, conduct' (OLD, 4, 5). *sordes* reappears at 9.15.2, a chapter that shares the same subject of slaves trying to impersonate the Roman elite, *falsi sordida contagione inquinarentur*. Like deceit in 9.6, falsehood is also a theme in V9 and within that the clear delineation or marking of one's

[34] The law stated that all senators had to take this oath within five days of the law being passed.
[35] App. *B Civ*. 1.29; Flor. 2.4.1; V. 3.8.4.
[36] App. *B Civ*. 1.32; Flor. 2.4.6.
[37] Hornblower (2011: 232-3; 273-4). On stoning in V9 also see *saxo ictum prostravit* (9.10.ext.1).
[38] For this *exemplum* see also App. *B.C.* 1.29-30.

status was a Roman concern. This concern was particularly relevant in Tiberius' reign, where the impersonation of Agrippa Postumus by the slave Clemens caused problems and embarrassment.[39]

improvida temeritas: Also found at 7.2.ext.17. Here *improvida* points to a more loaded political comment by V, as it constitutes the reverse of the key imperial virtue of *providentia*, consistent with V9's apotreptic approach. I interpret *improvida* also as 'blind' because of the people's ignorance, in fact, V's portrayal of *populus* is seldom positive. In this case, in their excited (*concitatae*) state, the people make mistakes having been deceived by Saturninus and Equitius, rather than coming to a more informed and decisive opinion themselves. In V the people are associated with: blind temerity, excitement, impudence, audacity, offensive behaviour, harassment *inter alia*. It is a stereotypical portrayal of the masses in all their baseness and vulgarity versus the Roman upper class. For V it is not only the *populus* but any mass of individuals that take on often negative connotations, such as in the *armatae exempla* (mil. Rom.) in this chapter. This is because of the power these large groups have through violence, ignorance, lack of thoughtfulness (*improvida*), and in an almost frenzied manner the impulsiveness (*temeritas*) to topple the establishment, the *status quo*. *Temeritas*, which has a strong presence here at 9.7, is also the topic of the next chapter, where *individuals* rather than the people act upon their *temeritas*. In 9.7 however the subjects are always collective nouns (*populus* or the army).

pro impudentia et audacia! Exclamatory remarks are not rare in V9, surfacing fifteen times as rhetorical culminations within the *exempla*. This one constitutes the only such instance occurring in mid-sentence in V9. The majority are at the end or in the middle of a section.[40]

[39] Tac. *Ann*.2.40.

9.7.3

Summary: The people murder Nunnius, a competitor for the tribunate in order to give his opponent, Saturninus, an opportunity for power.

vesana ... cruenta seditio: A clear signal that this *exemplum* is of a much more serious nature compared to 7.1-2. V here classifies the sedition in terms of its seriousness, not just crazy but also (*etiam*) bloody. The use of *etiam* here as 'also' emphasises the element of accumulation in seriousness, 'more and more' (OLD, 1c), which is how the vices, the chief subject of V9, essentially work, by viciously and gradually accumulating and taking over. An addictive nature, which is a fundamental characteristic of vice, is also a variant on the meaning of *cruenta* '(of persons) addicted to the spilling of blood, insatiably cruel, savage' (OLD, 3). Being addicted to spilling blood could also be seen as cruelty, a subject V treats at 9.2 *de crudelitate*.[41]

Nunnium: Aulus Nunnius was a man of noble birth.[42] The name is uncertain, Appian and Plutarch call him *Nonius*; in Livy (*Per*. 69) and Orosius it is *Nunnius* and in Florus it is *Ninnius*.[43] He was Saturninus' rival for the tribunate. Nunnius is killed by the people in V which is at odds with Livy's account: *per milites occiso A. Nunnio* (*Per*. 69). Had he been killed by soldiers then the *exemplum* would have been classified among the *Mil. Rom*. section of this chapter. V and Appian have different versions of the circumstances of his murder.[44]

---

[40] For *introductory* exclamations in V9 see my comments at *P. autem Clodii ... abundavit* (9.1.7).
[41] *vesana* is used again in the context of cruelty by V at 9.2.4.
[42] App. *B Civ*. 1.28.
[43] See Briscoe's apparatus.
[44] Valerius Maximus: *vi prius in aedes privatas compulit, extractum deinde interemit*.

Unlike V, Appian gives a reason for the relative ease with which this murder was accepted: 'the killing of Nonius was hushed up, since everybody was afraid to call Appuleius to account because he was going to be tribune'.[45] The reason for the hushed-up element was the inviolability of the *tribuni plebis*. This went in Saturninus' favour and made his plan easier to execute, by capitalising on this almost diplomatic immunity and the fear which he could arouse in people because of it. This very point seems to give rise to V's following complaint: *ut caede integerrimi civis facultas adipiscendae potestatis taeterrimo homini daretur*.

novem iam creatis … restante: The *tribuni plebis* were originally two in number; in 471 BC they were increased to five and then in 457 BC to ten. They possessed the right to intervene in the activities of patrician magistrates and the Senate and to veto their decisions. As representatives of the people, they often initiated agrarian laws and democratic reforms, such as those of Gaius Flaminius and Lucius Appuleius Saturninus. Under the principate, the institution of tribunes of the people was retained, but the tribunes lost their independent importance. Tribunician power was assumed by the emperors, who followed the precedent set by Augustus.

9.7.4

Summary: Creditors murder the City Praetor Sempronius Asellio, because he had taken up the cause of the debtors.[46]

Appian: they rush upon him with a crowd of ruffians just as he was going away from the *comitia*, pursued him into an inn, and stabbed him (*B.Civ*. 28, Loeb translation).
Florus: *occiso palam comitiis A. Ninnio competitore tribunatus* (2.4.1). Here *comitiis* means he was killed at the *comitia* (not the same as Appian).
[45] App. *B Civ*. 1.28, Loeb translation.
[46] Liv. *Per*. 74, App. *B Civ*. 1.54. For debt in V9 see my introduction to 9.1 as, *inter alia*, an extension of *luxuria*.

creditorum consternatio: In the dissensions between creditors and debtors, *consternatio* arose among the creditors because an ancient law forbidding lending on interest was being revived. 'But, since time had sanctioned the practice of taking interest, the creditors demanded it according to custom'.[47]

adversus: Used in this chapter five times.[48] Only in the present section is *adversus* not directly placed next to its object, being delayed instead, preceded by four other words: *adversus* *Sempronii Asellionis praetoris urbani* *caput*.

Sempronii Asellionis: Aulus Sempronius Asellio is not to be confused with Publius Sempronius Asellio, the historian (158 BC-91 BC). He was City Praetor, murdered in 89 BC by angry creditors.

quia causam debitorum susceperat. This took the form of Asellio trying to revive an ancient law that banned lending that carried interest, thus granting some relief to debtors.[49] Asellio's actions gravely affected the professional moneylenders who, revolting under L. Cassius, murdered him, as told here by V. Lending that carried interest typically attracted *opprobrium* also from writers and philosophers in both Greece and Rome.[50]

L. Cassio: Tribune of the Plebs in 89 BC, he excited the crowds to riot and to murder the praetor Asellio. Like Saturninus, another Tribune of the Plebs mentioned in 7.1 and 7.3,

[47] App. *B Civ*. 1.54, Loeb translation.
[48] *adversus leges* (7.1), *adversus consulatum* (7.2), *adversus Mithridatem* (mil. Rom. 1) and *adversus consulem* (mil. Rom. 2).
[49] For more details on this see Barlow (1980: 213) and Barlow (1977: 59-60). For debt also see my chapter introduction for 9.1.
[50] *Primum improbantur ii quaestus, qui in odia hominum incurrunt, ut portitorum, ut feneratorum* (Cicero, *Off.* 1.150); *et cum ille, qui quaesierat, dixisset:* '*Quid faenerari?*' *tum Cato:* '*Quid hominem*' *inquit,* '*occidere?*'(Cic. *Off.* 2.89); *sane vetus urbi faenebre malum et seditionum discordiarumque creberrima causa eoque cohibebatur antiquis quoque et minus corruptis moribus* (Tac. *Ann*. 6.6). Also see Evans (2007) for a scenario as to the reality of debt and a subsequent attempt to deal with it in 88 BC.

Cassius was the *artifex* of the sedition in this incident, rousing the creditors to violence and, once again, to murdering a public figure.

inque tabernacula latitantem: Appian, like V, gives as the location for the murder a shop: 'after he had fled into a tavern they cut his throat' (*B.C.* 1.54, Loeb translation), while according to Livy: *ab his qui faenerabant in foro occisus est* (*Per*. 74).

pro aede Concordiae sacrificium facientem: The office of state of praetor is stained, see below at *praetextatum*. Also there is the religious sacrilege, in that, as praetor, he was carrying out a sacrifice.[51] The theme of sacrifice reoccurs in 9.7 at mil.Rom.2.[52] Cicero and Polybius recognized the importance of religion in Roman public life, as control of religion involved political power and vice versa, thus to a certain extent religion preserved the distribution of power at Rome. Therefore the charged concept of sacrilege would have shocked V's readership.[53] V specifcies the location of the killing, *pro aede Concordiae*, rather than generally mentioning the *forum*. V does this to emphasize the sacrilege of the act and to increase the moral *opprobrium* attached to the murder, since the temple was considered a boundary where conflicts between the rich and poor ended.

The sacrilege in this *exemplum* is executed at two levels. First, Asellio is actually participating in a religious ceremony before getting interrupted and having to flee for his life *ab ipsis altaribus* (conveying the level of urgency in his flight and the severity of the sacrilege). Second, there is an extended account by Appian of the murderers running

[51] For the topos of sacrifice in V9 see: *piaculum*: 9.2.2; 9.2.ext.3; 9.9.1. *sacrificare*: 9.1.3; 9.3.ext.3; 9.7.4; 9.7.mil. Rom.2; 9.12.3. *macto*: 9.2.1; 9.2.ext.11; 9.7.mil.Rom.2. *hostia*: 9.2.3; 9.7.mil.Rom.2. Also see 9.6.ext.1. For the topos of sacrilege in V9 see: *sacra* 9.2.2, *sacris* 9.6.1, *sacrario* 9.12.5.
[52] For more on religion in V9 see my comments at 9.9.1 under the heading *piaculum*.
[53] Polyb. 6. 56.6-15; Cic. *N.D.* 2.8; *Leg*. 2, esp. 2.23. On the relationship between politics and religion (*Religionspolitik*) see Rawson (1974), Kragelund (2001), Gesztelyi (1982), Mackie (1992: 52, 53 n.14-15). For politicians and religion see Varhelyi (2010).

deliberately into the House of Vestal Virgins, a place not lawful for men to access, as they thought Asellio had taken refuge there.[54]

praetextatum discerpserunt: Another point of disagreement is how Asellio was murdered. Appian (*B Civ*. 1.54) says his throat was cut, in Livy simply *occisus est* (*Per*. 74) without any more details, while V uses the verb *discerpserunt* 'torn to pieces, shreds'.[55] The latter is a far more violent, barbaric, cruel treatment. There is a huge difference in the way historians relate this murder, not just in the severity of the killing but in emphasing the *toga praetexta*, thus making the deed even worse. Appian (*B Civ*. 1.54) writes that the moneylenders obstructed any investigation into the murder, but one might speculate that this public manifestation of violence, emblematic of the ongoing civil conflict, was too wide-ranging in its implications to encourage or facilitate thorough investigation.[56] Following Asellio's murder, even though those probably responsible were not prosecuted or even investigated, a major change in Roman legislature came about, namely the introduction in 88 BC of moderate debt relief via the *lex Cornelia Pompeia*, thus making the profession of money lenders less profitable but even for the creditors it did add more certainty in terms of having the remainder of their loans paid.

9.7.Mil.Rom.1-3

In this section the army, normally expected to obey, instead shows independence.[57] This group of *exempla* spans the time of the conflicts of Sulla and Marius, 'from the Sulpician law

[54] *B Civ*. 1.54.
[55] *Discerpo* reoccurs in V9 at 9.9.1, again, in a religious setting.
[56] On Asellio's murder see Barlow (1980: 213-4).
[57] This is comparable to the episodes discussed in Hornblower (2011: 226-249).

wrestling Asia from Sulla, to the death of a Sullan partisan at Volterrae in 81 BC'.[58] Focusing on a period of history and making it span a certain amount of paragraphs is comparable in this chapter to the common thread of Saturninus' influence (9.7.1-3). In 9.7.1-3, the people were the agents by which the violence and murder were enacted, in the Mil.Rom. 1-3 it is armies instead. Three different armies: the one belonging to Sulla kills Gratidius, Gnaeus Pompeius' kills Quintus Pompeius, and Gaius Carbo is killed by his own soldiers.

9.7.mil.Rom.1

Summary: Marius' representative was killed by troops loyal to Sulla.

condicio: Is not just the 'state' of affairs (OLD 6c) but more particularly the 'state of health' (OLD 6d) of those in the forum and military camps, indicating the morals and psychology of the people involved, the degeneration of the soldiers.[59]

Gratidium: Marius' legate and son of Cicero's great-uncle M. Gratidius.[60] According to Orosius, (5.19.4) it was Sulla himself who killed Gratidius (it is not mentioned whether he did this via someone else) rather than the soldiers. Gratidius, however, becomes, in the words of Orosius (ibid), *quasi primam victimam belli civilis*. In V the soldiers themselves are the direct killers of Gratidius, hence the *exemplum*'s position in the *Mil. Rom*. section.

[58] Bloomer (1992: 178). Sulla and Marius have been frequently cited by V, making them among the most re-occurring figures in this work. Marius appears in six chapters in just V9, the larger number of quotes than in any of the preceding books. Similarly, Sulla appears in four chapters in V9, still more than any other book.
[59] On the moral deterioration of soldiers also see Tac. *Hist*. 2.93.1 &2. Moral decline is the theme of Sallust *Cat.* and *Jug.*
[60] Treggiari (2007: 176, note 20).

aeque: This is one of the examples where comparability is embedded in the text.[61]

indignatio ... indignati: Its message is not dissimilar to that of *ira* (9.3), since the word is defined by OLD.1 as 'anger aroused by a sense of wrong, indignation, resentment'. While in V9's third chapter *ira* refers to the individuals in the *exempla*, here instead V wishes to stir indignation and anger in the reader, a rhetorical move consistent with my comments on the importance of the emotion in the main introduction, so to involve the reader in the plot of the *exemplum* to drive harder the moral lesson. Furthermore, notice how the *ira* of 9.3 focuses on certain men (with the exeception of 9.3.4, which refers to a group) while here it is a collective feeling, that of the soldiers (*procul dubio … cogerentur*). There is another crucial distinction between the *ira* between 9.3 and here. At 9.3, *ira* does not cause murder; here, however, the overriding feeling among the soldiers is much stronger, that of extreme anger, pushing the soldiers into killing Gratidius.[62]

trucidarunt: Emphasizes the barbarity and savagery of the killing, an image reinforced by the fact that the killing, according to V, was not provoked by a third party but wholly devised and carried by the soldiers themselves. This worsens the army's moral deterioration. *Trucidare* is frequently used in Livian battle narratives. *Trucido* also means to 'slaughter animals' (OLD, 1), which connects to the theme of sacrifice in this chapter.[63]

lege Sulpicia: One of several *leges Sulpiciae* proposed in 88 BC by the tribune Publius Sulpicius Rufus at the behest of Gaius Marius. It was to be enforced through the use of mob violence to transfer the consular command voted by the senate from Sulla to Marius against

[61] For more on comparability in V9 see Introduction.
[62] For punishment and revenge in V9 see 9.10.praef. For violence as punishment see Eldred (1997) and Chrissanthos (1999). V uses *indignatio* earlier at 9.3.8 *ardens indignatio*, and at 9.8.3, 9.11ext. 4.
[63] 9.7.4, 9.7.mil. Rom.3

Mithridates.[64] The senate attempted a *iustitium* (a halt of public business) to bypass the vote but it had to be cancelled because of the mob violence of the Marians, thus all the proposals were passed and this caused Sulla's march on Rome in opposition to the Marians.

sed quis ferat … corrigentem: This rhetorical question is imbued with indignation, utterly 'deploring the incident from a social point of view'.[65] Consistently at 9.7 one gets a sense of disquiet when the traditional organs of government are replaced by people-power, whether the plebs or soldiers; particularly so when the outcome is the execution of an *exitium legati*, thus showing not only violence *per se*, but also contempt and disrespect for the State. *Quis ferat* 'who could tolerate' is a rhetorical variant of the earlier *intolerabili modo exarsit* (7.4) in the preceding section. *Exarsit* goes back to the imagery of *ira*, burning, flaring; closely associated with a state of anger.[66]

9.7.mil.Rom.2

Summary: Corrupted by their general Cn. Pompeius, soldiers murder Consul Q. Pompeius during a sacrifice.

consule ... consulem: Polyptoton.

Q. Pompeium: Q. Pompeius Rufus was consul with Sulla in 88 BC. The *optimates* assigned him Strabo's army, causing him to be killed by Strabo's soldiers.[67] There are no other

[64] Liv. *Per*. 77; Cicero, *Phil*. 8.7; Vell. 2.18; Plut. *Sull*. 8 and *Mar*. 35; Florus, 2.9; App. *B Civ*. 1.56.
[65] Bloomer (1992: 178). Also see my point on V's indignation in the introduction to 9.5.
[66] *Ira* is the theme for V.9.3.
[67] Liv. *Per*. 77.8; Vell. 2.20.1 and App. *B Civ*. 1.63.

references to him in V. Strabo remained with the army until 87 BC, when he responded to the request for help of the *optimates* against the Marian party.

senatus iussu ... ausum: Not really a daring deed since, as V states here, he was ordered by the Senate, he did not venture on this decision from his own initiative. Perhaps, *ausum* is used sarcastically, or it might refer to the precariousness of Pompeius' task ahead.

exercitum … quem aliquamdiu invita civitate obtinebat: The image of power rebounding thus serves as a *caveat* to rulers about asserting too much control over a crowd, comparable to the next *exemplum*: *disciplinam militarem praefractius et rigidius astringere conatum* (9.7.mil.rom 3).[68]

illecebris corrupti: 'Rendering morally unsound' (OLD. 4). In the present chapter, we see how the actions of a single man in each *exemplum* (Saturninus, Lucius Crassus and Gnaeus Pompeius) morally corrupt huge numbers of people. Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo does so with *illecebris*, so that the victims are befuddled and are not aware of the damage they are causing.[69] Here, the army becomes attracted, enticed by the dark charisma and personality of their leader, and so are corrupted in a far more subtle and insidious way, not being forced by a leader but by following him in admiration unaware of his true nature.

sacrificare incipientem: It is striking how several of the *exempla* on vice are associated with sacrifices, thus worsening the severity of the episodes. Tarpeia draws water for a sacrifice before being bribed by Tatius (9.6.1), Sempronius Asellio was sacrificing in front of the

[68] Of course, some control is positive and essential to keep the Empire in order. For the good side of military discipline and of the Roman army see 2.7.
[69] Liv. *Ann*. 15.44; Sall. *Cat*. 37.5 (The latter passage is an instance of the theme, although it does not have *illecebrae*); Juv. 3.62-65; Tac. *Hist.* 2.93 *per inlecebras urbis*. On the use of *illecebris* in a military context like here in V also see Tac. *Ann*. 4.2.1, where Sejanus proposes to move the camp *procul urbis inlecebris*.

temple of Concord before being killed (9.7.4), and likewise was Pompeius Rufus, in the present *exemplum*.

in modum hostiae mactarunt: Pompeius Rufus starts to lead a sacrificial ceremony but ends up becoming the victim of a sacrifice; slaughtered (*mactarunt*) like a sacrificial animal. This implies the full degradation of the human being. Livy uses *mactare* of human victims too.[70] Imagery of human sacrifice in a Roman setting would have been particularly abhorrent, uncomfortable for V's readership, reminding them that it was not only a foreign issue but also a reality in Roman history.[71] Human sacrifice at Rome was in fact not entirely unheard of in the last two centuries of the republic, sometimes sacrificing representatives of the enemy with the aim of 'giving the immortals absolute power over mortals'.[72] Furthermore, human sacrifice was sometimes attributed to 'subversive groups and tyrannical individuals within Roman society'.[73] That V should wish to address the latter group is consistent with V9's apotreptic approach.[74] See 9.7.4 above on sacrifice and sacrilege.

inultum: V often highlights miscarriages of justice, stressing how unfair it is that so often the perpetrators to these crimes go unpunished, through cover-ups and things being hushed-up or overlooked in fear of retaliation or lest by reporting them might aggravate matters.[75] V does not follow the version of the story whereby Pompeius Strabo was killed my lightning, fully capitalising instead on the moral point of the miscarriage of justice.[76]

---

[70] 38.47.12, 39.43.4, 42.29.2, 40.8.
[71] See Pl. *Nat.* 30.12-13; 28.12-19; Liv. 22.57.4. For the Romans' obsession with Carthaginian sacrifices, see Grottanelli (1999), Schultz (2010). Also see 9.6.ext.1 above. For human sacrifice in a Roman context see Mueller (2002: 112, 129-31, 144, 177).
[72] Scheid (2007: 269).
[73] Schultz (2010: 520).
[74] For more on this approach in V9 see my main introduction.
[75] On Roman attitudes to social justice see Brunt (1962: 69) and Mitchell (1995: 199-200).
[76] On this alternative reading of Strabo's death see Hillard (1996). On being struck by a thunderbolt in V9 see 9.12.1.

curia castris cedere se confessa: The alliteration lends emphasis, and a certain binding, assertive effect to highlight the author's regret and frustration that the normal organs of government have been allowed to take a subordinate position to that of the military camps. *confessa* used thus in the active sense, has a more nuanced meaning of 'admitting a crime' (*confiteor*, OLD 1.c) rather than just 'admitting, acknowledging'.

9.7.mil.Rom.3

Summary: The army murders C. Carbo because he had tried to tighten military discipline too strictly.

C. Carbonem fratrem Carbonis ter consulis: Was nephew of Gaius Papirius Carbo (*cos.* 120), *tribunus plebis* in 89 BC (Brennan 2000: 382), may have been praetor in 81 or during the period 'under the government where his brother played so an important role'.[77] Gnaeus was Gaius' brother, confirmed by Gran. Lic. (36.8): *is Cn. Carbonis frater fuit*. Gaius' brother was consul three times: in 85 and 84 BC with Cinna, a third time in 82 BC with Gaius Marius the younger (the latter also mentioned in 7.6.4).

praefractius et rigidius astringere conatum: This may be the reason why Carbo's endeavour to tighten military discipline failed: it was attempted rather abruptly and unbendingly. Had the improvements to discipline been attempted differently, then Carbo's plans might have had a better outcome. V's use of the comparatives *praefractius* and *rigidius* can be interpreted as conveying a certain degree of *opprobrium* on V's part. Although the

[77] Brenann (2000: 382).

author completely condemns the violence of the army towards Carbo, he also disapprovingly draws attention to Carbo's leadership style. Here we are presented with two extremes, on one side the constrictive and cruel approach of Carbo's discipline; and on the other, the freedom which had developed gradually, making the discipline up to that point loose, on account of the civil war (*propter bella civilia*). The latter is the reason why the military discipline had been *dissolutam*. This binarism fits in with the general theme in V9 on moral limits, boundaries, which I discuss at the introduction to 9.8.

privavit vita: At least this is not an unavenged murder (*inultum*). It is striking, however, that when in one of V's examples the culprit in a murder and injustice does get his comeuppance, like here, the author does not mention it. It is as though V is not fully capitalizing on what could be further lessons in morality, especially since V, as I commented at *absit reprehensio* (9.6.1), a universal law of cause and effect is observable in V, especially in V9, alongside lawful patterns of punishment. But this is part of the spin V gives to his *exempla*, some *exempla* are developed more than others. How much this is the result of conscious decision-making cannot be ascertained. Also to be taken into account is the possibility that the V's work overall is unfinished.[78] One might also argue that for V to take a more definite stance on the Sullan proscriptions might have been dangerous because of contemporary resonances with the Tiberian expropriations.[79] We have to rely on Granius Licinianus (36.8.1) to learn what happened to Carbo's murderers: *proscriptos ex oppido dimiserunt, quos equites a consulibus Claudio et Servilio missi conciderunt*.[80] Licinianus states two things that V does

[78] On the latter point see Carter (1975: 29).
[79] See my section on chronology in the main introduction.
[80] These are the consuls of 79, Ap. Claudius Pulcher and P. Servilius Vatia.

not. First, the incident took place in Volaterrae.[81] Second, how Carbo was killed: *occiso* ... *lapidibus*.[82]

coinquinari: 'The army thought it better to become polluted themselves (...) than to change (...)'. This implies that the army had a degree of choice in the matter, that is, they could have 'let themselves *not* become polluted' (*satiusque duxit* conveying the idea of choice).[83] In other words, they lacked self-discipline, inner strength and moral fibre. But why choose the rare verb *coinquino*, over the much more used *inquino*? Had V wished to give the verb a more moral flavour then *inquino* would have been suitable, with its specific meaning: 'pollute or defile with crime or immorality' (OLD, 3). The co-prefix highlights the shared guilt of the troops; that is, they took it upon themselves, together. *coinquinari* is reminiscent of Accius' choice of vocabulary: *matres coinquinari regias* (*trag*. 207), which is also in the passive voice.[84]

[81] Modern Volterra, an ancient Etruscan town in Tuscany.
[82] The killing took place in 80 BC.
[83] This is comparable to the point I made for *sustinebant* (9.1.ext.7).
[84] On the use of Accius in V9 see 9.5.4. V uses both *coinquino* and *inquino* with the same moral meaning: *quia stupri se crimine coinquinaverat* (6.1.6, also with an ablative); *facinore inquinaverat* (2.9.3).

Chapter 8: *de temeritate*.[1]

Introduction

For V self-control and self-mastery are crucial in being vigilant against the vices. Superficially, this approach to life may appear constrictive when contrasted to *temeritas*, with its free, unrestrained, uninhibited nature. The chief features of *temeritas* are in fact shared with other V9's *vitia* such as *libido*, *luxuria*, *ira*.[2] Within that freedom (not in the sense of *libertas* but more akin to licence, referring to actions that are not always criminal but which are expressed without asserting too much vigilance), violence and danger are sometimes unleashed. Therefore freedom *per se* can be positive or negative, depending upon how it is expressed. Through self-discipline, which entails some constrictive elements, V's message is that one gains a wider, deeper type of freedom: that of living less constrained by vice.[3] The tension between constrictive versus freer states of mind is an important facet to V9's moral boundaries and one which is instrumental in attempting to define the extent to which one can express one's emotions, in order to live in a balanced manner, safely and harmoniously with others.

---

[1] **Rhetorical devices for 9.8**: Asyndeton: 9.8.3 *Albinus … eximius*. Exclamatio: 9.8.1 *quam enim temere … depositurus*; 9.8.3 *age illa… temeritas*.
For the vocabulary of *temeritas* in V, see *temeritas*: 9.7.2, 9.8.praef, 9.8.3, 9.8.ext.1, 9.9.praef, 9.15.praef, 9.15.ext.1; 7.2.ext.17; 6.2.8, 6.2.11; 4.1.praef, 4.1.14; 3.2.20, 3.8.3, 3.8.ext.2 & 3; 2.9.6; 1.6.6, 1.6.8. *Audacia* is always in the negative sense in book nine (9.1.3, 9.7.2, 9.15.2) and at 3.2.7, 3.8.6 and 1.6.7. Elsewhere in V *audacia* has a positive sense: 7.3.9, 7.4.ext.1; 6.2.5, 6.2.ext.2; 4.7.1; 3.2.20, 3.2.23; 2.6.14. Neither *temeritas* nor *audacia* emerge in books 5 and 8.
[2] For example, Livy describes *temeritas* as *liber* (free) at 22.28.1-2.
[3] The main message of V9 is that living based on *vitia* is what ultimately *enslaves* the individual. For the topos of freedom versus servitude in V9 see 9.4.ext.1.

In V, *temeritas* is an absolute vice, there is none of the ambiguity of situation ethics applicable to other vices or virtues.[4] For example, on one hand, *audacia* can be used in its positive sense (courage) or negatively also (daring, rash).[5] On the other, too much self-confidence can lead to *temeritas*, and also can increase one's appetite for glory.[6] But *temeritas* in itself is consistently portrayed negatively by V, with no redeeming features.[7] In contrast to V's usage of *temeritas*, Cicero's interpretation represents it as an 'unhealthy extension of *benevolentia* (*Off.* 1.49) and of *liberalitas* (*Off.* 2.63)'.[8] Also see Livy where *synkrisis* is deployed in contrasting pairs of generals who displayed *prudentia* and *temeritas*.[9]

There are a further three main themes within the chapter. First, there is the theme of the individual versus the crowd.[10] Notice the frenzied psychology of the crowd of 9.8.3 and 9.8.ext.2, versus the individual actions of the characters at 9.8.1, 2 and ext.1. Second, the sea and the nautical, which occur in all *exempla* in 9.8, except for 9.8.3, have strong resonances in terms of moral boundaries and excess, I discuss below under *saevitia maris interpellante* (9.8.ext.2). Third, punishment carried out with *temeritas*, see 9.8.3 and 9.8.ext.1-2.[11] This

[4] This uniqueness could be linked to Tiberius, who was an exemplar of the very opposite – cautious and slow decision-making, see Tac. *Ann*. 1.80.

[5] For good *audacia* see Kaster (2005: 55, 171 n. 96, for the negative side n. 95). 'Daring, of course, always risks spilling into culpable rashness, as 3.7.5 reminds us: *fiduciam non solum fortem sed paene etiam temerariam*'. (Langlands 2011: 112 n.44). (3.7.5 is from V). On *audacia* see Moore (1986: 38-47, and for the dynamics between *audacia* and *temeritas* especially p.40, 42-43), Kaster (1997: 16-17), Bruggisser (2002: 273, 281).

[6] Too much self-confidence and appetite for glory could also transform negatively into *superbia* (9.5). For their *positive* portrayal in V see 3.7 *de fiducia sui*; 8.14 *de cupiditate gloriae*. In both 3.7 and 8.14 are also V's only two direct references to Accius (3.7.11; 8.14.2), whose influence upon V I have remarked on at 9.5.4.

[7] This is also the case in Livy, see Knoepke (2013). For opposites to *temeritas* such as *moderatio*, *consilium*, *prudentia* and *cautus*, see the individual word studies by Moore (1986). In particular the case of *consilium* reminds one of the concept of *ratio*, the reason not to succumb to action based on excessive emotion, as an 'exercise in judgement, discernment, strategy' (OLD, 3). On the latter point of strategy, V devotes a whole chapter to the importance of stratagems in a positive way at 7.4 (for strategy in the negative, that is, trickery, deception, see my comments at 9.6).

[8] Zarecki (2005: 138). On the latter point Zarecki (2005: 138) comments on Caesar's 'enormous personal debts and his largesse while serving as aedile'. I treat the theme of debt in V9 in the introduction to 9.1. *temeritas* is a recurring theme in *de officiis*: <u>*temere*</u>: 1.18.7.4, 1.73.9.4, 1.81.5.10, 1.82.2.4, 1.84.14.1, 1.103.4.5. <u>*temeritas*</u>: 1.26.6.9, 1.49.4.2, 1.101.5.7, 2.8.3.4, 2.63.3.4, 2.68.4.6. For Cicero's use of *temeritas* see Zarecki (2005: 138; and 2014: 144). *Temeritas* is rare in Velleius (1.11, 2.51, 2.72) and Sallust (*Jug*. 7, 85, 94).

[9] For *prudentia* as opposite to *temeritas* and for further references to *temeritas* in Livy see Oakley (1997: 582).

[10] I comment on this theme in V9 at 9.7.

[11] For more on punishment and revenge in V9 see 9.10.

theme is developed at 9.9.1-3 building into the additional element of *error*.[12] In contrast, the *exempla* that constitute 9.10 have a more premeditated approach to punishment and revenge.

There is a difference between the first two *exempla* of 9.8 and the rest of the chapter: the instances of *temeritas* of 9.8.1 and 9.8.2 have positive outcomes, the rest lead to a democratically imposed death; the characters in the first two *exempla* endanger their own lives, the remaining ones endanger other people's lives and are permeated by violence towards others nor do they have the same intangible reliability on *fortuna* of the first two *exempla*. *Temeritas* is prompted by over-reliance on *fortuna* at 9.8.1-2; suspicion (rather than based on evidence) at 9.8.3; error at 9.8.ext.1, and *severitas* at 9.8.ext.2.

Over-reliance on *fortuna*.

Livy book twenty-two explores the tension between *temeritas* and *fortuna*, ascribing catastrophic defeats for Romans to *temeritas* and an over-reliance on *fortuna*, thus constituting *exempla* on how not to behave in battle.[13] Livy's moral lesson is that to act upon *temeritas* is to leave the result of an outcome to the 'fickle force of the unknown, which is *fortuna*', unpredictable and over which one has no control.[14] *Temere* at the opening of 9.8.1 encapsulates the close relationship between *temeritas*, *fortuna* and chance.[15] It is an

[12] On the relationship between 9.8 and 9.9 see my introductory remarks at 9.9.praef.
[13] Knoepke (2013: 52). Also see Chaplin (2000: 22), de Sélincourt (1965). *Temeritas* occurs 'eighteen times in Livy book twenty-two' (Knoepke 2013: 51).
[14] Knoepke (2013: 51). This is comparable to *temeritas* itself which is often described as uncontrollable, unbridled. The excessive element in an individual's reliance on *fortuna* is indicative of its vice-like quality. For a definition of *vitium* see my main introduction. The frequency of *fortuna* in V9 is markedly lower than V's other books: books 1 (14 times), 2 (5), 3 (11), 4 (10), 5 (19), 6 (19), 7 (8), 8 (6). The only glimpses of *fortuna* in V9 are 9.11.ext.1 and 9.12.praef.
[15] The adverb *temere* appears in V at 8.1.abs.5; 8.4.praef; 8.9.1; 5.2.4; 4.7.praef; 3.2.9; 3.3.ext.5; 2.6.7 and 1.6.9.

ambiguous word meaning 'rashly', as a human mentality, but also 'chance, fortune'.[16] The *nexus* of fortune and chance with *temeritas* is found elsewhere in Latin literature.[17] Why would V choose *exempla* where his characters rely on *fortuna* but have positive outcomes instead of negative ones, since V9's approach is *apotreptic*? The answer to this is V's use of *exiguo momento*, emphasizing the tenuous balance between disaster and safety for Africanus (9.8.1) and Caesar (9.8.2). This effect would not have relayed the same tension had the outcome been inevitably disastrous. A shift of emphasis in this over-reliance on *fortuna* in 9.8.1 and 9.8.2 is observable between them: *fortuna* at 9.8.1 is linked with the concept of luck or good fortune, whereas at 9.8.2 the *caelestium cura* indicates a degree of divine intervention.[18]

As a corollary to its relationship to *fortuna*, *temeritas* is fed by success, which *fortuna* bestows on individuals. As Livy indicates (*hanc insitam … aluerat*, 22.3), on seeing a number of successes in one's past, one unquestionably trusts that trend to continue (independently of whether this trend constituted of merely lucky incidents or generated by one's own efforts), thus relaxing, softening one's alertness to external events and *stimuli*.[19] This is comparable to V9's two *exempla* on Caesar (9.8.2) and Hannibal (9.8.ext.1), two

[16] Synonym of *forte*, *fors*; *fortuna*, *casus* (also used here at 9.8.1). On this definition of *temeritas* see Gilbert (1973: 105 n. 2): '*temeritas* originally refers to what occurs *temere* i.e. by chance and without calculation or planning. Thence it was extended to an unthinking and un-calculating state of mind'.

[17] Sal. *Jug*. 94.7; Cic. *Amic*. 6. 20, *Marc*. 2. 7.

[18] On the gods punishing vice in V see my comments on Regulus at 9.2.ext.1. On the significance of *fortuna* and its 'continual adaptability to new social and literary influences from the Roman Republic to the Principate' see Lazarus (1985). For the rhetorical dimension of *fortuna* in Livy (which is also observable in V) see Lazarus (1978) and Matthews (2011). On *fortuna* in Sallust as more as a literary device than as an agent of history see Hock (1985). On the different meanings of *fortuna* see Walbank (1957: 1. 16). Related to *fortuna* is *fors* (chance) which V signposts at the beginning to 9.9.3, *forte*. On both *fortuna* and *fors* in Sallust see Gilbert (1973: 104 n. 2); in Plutarch see Swain (1989b passim). On *fortuna* in Plutarch's *De Fort. Rom*. and Swain (1989a: 506).

[19] Knoepke (2013: 58). Knoepke goes on to state that this gives one a 'false sense of courage'. Although a *temeritas* episode may involve action, the individual displays a degree of 'mental laziness', since he takes no control but depends on *fortuna* (Knoepke 2013: 59). The contrast is striking 'if the action is especially vigorous, showing a disparity between action, or the physical side, and the mind' (Knoepke 2013). See V's comments on mental processes being dulled by excessive bodily strength (*possunt hi praebere … sapientissimum*, 9.12.ext.10).

leaders with a track-record of successes which fuels their *temeritas* but which here lead them to reverse their decisions. While Hannibal does so on a moral point, showing a certain degree of humility (he acknowledges he was mistaken), Caesar is compelled to reverse his decision if he wishes to survive the storm.[20] It is rare for V to actually present Hannibal as reacting in a better manner to Caesar, by admitting his mistake.

Commentary

9.8 *Praefatio*

vehementes … ictibus: The violent element to *temeritas* is also present elsewhere in V9 particularly in cruelty (*violenti spiritus*, 9.2), in anger (9.3.praef, *vehementiore*; and 9.3.ext.2, *vehemens*) and in the chapter on violence itself (9.7). The physical reference here of *ictibus* (blows) reinforces the violence of this vice, making something abstract more tangible.[21]

mentes … nec sua pericula despicere: The mind (and its relationship to emotions and insanity) is a significant theme in V9, and is tackled in detail in this thesis' Introduction. V's writings typically operate within a Stoic framework and as such are similar to Cicero's Stoic position, that the mind is to be ruled by reason and that there is no place for *temeritas*.[22] *nec*

[20] Knoepke (2013: 62) points out how Hannibal in Livy 22 is shown to make the most of the Romans' *temeritas* by 'turning it to his advantage' in terms of military strategy (for V on the importance of stratagems see 7.4). This shows how more preferable it is to rely on stratagem than *fortuna*. Knoepke argues thus that *temeritas* is often obvious to an enemy but the person who exhibits it is oblivious to it. This blinding or clouding of one's view is stated at 9.8.praef.

[21] All other uses of this word in V9 allude to the non-abstract: 9.10.ext.1; 9.12.1; 9.12.ext.2. Also note the verb used here *concussae* lending to the violent imagery.

[22] *consilio autem dominante nullum esse libidinibus, nullum irae, nullum temeritati locum* (*Rep.*1.60); also see *omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate* (*Off.* 1.101). 'Since the *Off.* is primarily a Stoic work, unbridled emotion and desire in any form would be despised and incompatible with Cicero's concept of the *societas humana*, *Off.* 1.53ff' (Zarecki 2005: 138).

sua pericula despicere is part of a pattern that recurs in 9.9 with incidents that are beyond one's control and their dangerous repercussions. Again V raises the issue of human vulnerability and helplessness that I mention to in 9.5 and 9.7, that is, despite being the transgressor generating the action, that same person is at the same time putting himself in a vulnerable position if he has acted on the basis of *temeritas* (similarly to other *vitia* in V9), by his lack of design and swiftness of action. In this way the detail becomes lost (through lack of planning and strategy) then the risks and dangers infiltrate. The very lack of design, not having thought things through properly is aptly encapsulated by *amens*, *amentis*, that is, disconnected from the mind. Thus, V reminds the reader of the *pericula* of uncontrolled emotions and a life based on *vitia*.[23] Before a person reaches this level in which he is no longer able to 'discern dangers' and is devoid of independence, V aims to help the individual become more self-aware of his impulses, drives and desires. This will affect the *force* and *impact* of those impulses' blows (*ictibus … concussae*) that a person feels, and this in turn will affect a person's actions. V's aim is to raise the veil of ignorance on the individual's perspective on his choices and actions, so that he is better able to steer his life in the right direction.

9.8.1

Summary: In 206 BC Africanus the Elder confronts the Numidian king, Syphax.

The degree of rashness involved here is ambiguous. Livy tells us that Africanus did send his envoy, Gaius Laelius, to Syphax with gifts first. Laelius received a positive response from the king, an invitation and an assurance of safety for Africanus. The latter had to wait for Laelius

[23] For the building metaphor (*fundamenta*, *exaedificatio*) in historiography see Cic. *Orat*. 2.63. Also see Laird (2009: 211 n. 49).

to return, the set out with him to meet Syphax. Considering all of this and that a certain amount of preparation and waiting was involved, it cannot be said really that the plan was as rash as V portrays it. V does not include all these factors, thus making his account distinctive and in its turn conditioning the reader's judgement. In fact V goes as far as telling us that one of Africanus' own sayings was *explorato et excusso consilio quae ferro aguntur administrari oportere arbitrabatur* (7.2.2). It is evident that Africanus did exactly that in this *exemplum*.

Africanus: V reminds us that Scipio Cornelius Africanus Superior defeated Hannibal at 9.2.1: *dum quaerit victorias, Scipionem [se] populo Romano, dum exercet, Hannibalem repraesentavit*. Note how V re-emphasizes this by choosing to portray Africanus and Hannibal as the first *exempla* in their respective domestic and external sections in 9.8. 9.8.1 is the penultimate mention of Africanus in V. The reader is plunged into one of his greatest achievements, but one which V characterizes as rash and too risky, despite its positive outcome.[24]

ex Hispania ... traiecit: In 205 BC Africanus drove the Carthaginians, headed by their leader Hasdrubal, out of Spain, thus making it a Roman province. Hence, when Africanus left Spain it was still very much a *provincia novae dicionis* and as such more vulnerable to the enemy.[25]

in unius Numidae ... Syphax: Not just any Numidian but the king of the Masaesyli.[26]

in unius Numidae … depositurus: Similar to another of V's passage: *verum huius temeritatis utinam sua tantum, non etiam populi Romani, maxima clade poenas pependisset*

[24] The association of *temeritas* with Africanus the elder is also found in Livy in the tribunes' second speech at 38.52.5: *habetis ergo temeritatis illius mercedem*.
[25] Liv. 28.18.3.
[26] Liv. 28.17.3.

(1.6.6). What these two passages have in common is the connection between the pursuit of *temeritas* and the endangering of one's country. In the former case it does not come to pass, in the latter it does. These two comments by V focus on the sides of certain individuals' characters that push them to 'take risks' (*temeritas*, OLD 2), which potentially endanger not just themselves but their country. The precariousness of the balance of safety between the state and its commander-in-chief was a real concern for V, and this emerges in V9 more clearly at 9.11.ext.4, with its theme of *parricidium*, as a reflection of Rome's cult of *salus*.

V's accusation here against Africanus is that of rashness but more particularly that of endangering his country's safety, via putting 'too much trust in Fortune'. A similar point still involving Africanus is *ne quis nimis Fortunae crederet* (6.9.ext.6).[27] While with V there is a clear sign of *opprobrium* towards Africanus, Livy instead uses triumphalist language to characterize his winning over not only of Syphax but also his defeat of his old enemy, Hasdrubal.[28] Polybius even relates a sentence supposedly uttered in the meeting of the three: 'Scipio, who was highly gifted in this respect, spoke to Syphax with such urbanity and adroitness that Hasdrubal afterwards said to Syphax that Scipio had seemed to him to be more formidable in his conversation than on the battle field' (11.24a.4, Loeb translation). The bigger picture versions offered by Livy and Polybius suggest a tradition very different to the

[27] For a more positive deployment of Africanus elsewhere in V see: *quem di immortales nasci voluerunt ut esset in quo virtus se per omnes numeros hominibus efficaciter ostenderet* (6.9.2), *vir sincerissimae vitae* (8.1.damn.1), *cui quae in vita praecipua adsignata sint et longum est referre quia multa* (8.15.1). Another reference to Africanus and religion is found in 8.15.1, where his statue is sought in the sanctuary of Jupiter whenever a funeral of the Cornelian *gens* is on, a fact which V found *eximium*. V also writes on Africanus' weakness for beautiful women and his promiscuity at 6.7.1-3.

[28] The latter had been commander of the Carthaginian armies in Spain, and had just recently lost against Africanus himself. In fact Africanus had not even expected that Hasdrubal would be there with Syphax, he certainly was not part of his initial plan. In fact, Hasdrubal arrived in Carthage about the same time as Africanus, see Liv. 28.17.12. *spe ac magnitudine animi* (28.17.3); *tantum ducem Romanum* (28.18.3); and 28.18.3.

version cast by V.[29] The overarching structure adopted by V must be a prime cause for his decision to emphasize fortune to support the tightly focused thematic *exemplum* rather than to explore a more nuanced version. By contrast, Livy's expansive annalistic model allows him to represent a paradox in Scipio's behaviour, for example when he comments that Scipio 'was insatiable in his craving for merit and well-earned distinction' (28.3, Loeb translation).[30]

suam ... salutem: As espoused in this chapter's preface: *nec sua pericula dispicere*.

itaque exiguo momento maximae rei casus fluctuatus est: Similar to *ita exiguo tempore magnoque casu totius exercitus salus constitit*.[31]

9.8.2

Summary: Caesar disguises himself as a slave and boards a ship with the hope of defying a raging storm to reach the Adriatic.

Caesar appears frequently in all V, an expression of the important ruler-cult element in his writings.[32] In this section, Julius Caesar is not able to cross the sea from Dyrrachium to Italy in the winter of 48 BC. The aim was to rally the rest of his troops, who were still in Italy under the command of Antony. Without these troops Caesar 'could not progress with

[29] Polybius' pro-Africanus viewpoint may be explained however by his close friendship to Africanus the Younger (adopted by the eldest son of Africanus the Elder), even accompanying him on campaigns to Hispania and Africa.
[30] See also: *dignam itaque rem Scipio ratus quae, quoniam aliter non posset, magno periculo peteretur* (Liv. 28.17).
[31] Caes. *Civ*. 3.14.
[32] For Valerius' use of ruler-cult in presenting Julius Caesar, Augustus, Tiberius and the *domus Augusta*, see Wardle (1997 and 2000). Also see Mueller (2002: 13-20, note 4) and Weileder (1998: 48, 295-98).

hostilities against Pompey'.[33] Having failed to persuade Antony to make the journey from Italy, Caesar decides to cross the sea himself, believing the gods were on his side. This episode is covered by various sources across multiple genres.[34] If there were a version by Livy that is now lost, therefore V 9.8.2 is the only record before Lucan's.[35] Scholars have argued for and against the historical authenticity of this episode.[36] It has been argued that the origins of this episode derive from 'hostile propaganda characterizing Caesar as trusting in luck rather than rationality'.[37] Also note the quinarius coin of 44 BC of P. Sepullius Macer, the first representation of Fortuna with a rudder, thus encapsulating this episode.[38]

As Wardle argues, [V] 'adapts the material so that Caesar escapes blame'.[39] Therefore, although V's presentation of Caesar is not altogether blameless (his *temeritas* here at 9.8.2), when referring to Caesar's own murder V attributes no blame to him, despite the *exempla* outlining his headstrong and stubborn attitude.[40]

anceps: 'Hazardous', 'dangerous' (8.OLD). Also at 9.15.praef, with the same meaning and also on the first line of the *exemplum*. The element of danger is a *sine qua non* for *exempla* on *temeritas*.[41]

---

[33] Matthews (2004: 6).
[34] As referenced by Matthews (2004: 247) the sources are: Plut. *Caes*. 38; Plut. *De fort*. *Rom*. 319b-d; Suet. *Jul.* 19, 58; Flor. *Epit*. 2.13.35-8; App. *B Civ*. 2.52-9; Cass. Dio 41.43-8. There is also a literary adaptation by Lucan who uses a number of embellishments for this story, but in so doing does not accurately follow real events (5.497-677). For a discussion of this episode see Pelling (2009: 246-7). Also see Pelling (2011: 344-347).
[35] Matthews (2004: 247).
[36] As referenced by Pelling (2011: 344-5): for those arguing against it as fictitious, see Weinstock (1971: 112-27), Brutscher (1958: 75-83), Friedrich (1954: 1-24); arguing for its authenticity, see Veith (1920: 108-12), Bömer (1966: 63-85).
[37] Pelling (2011: 345). Also see Friedrich (1954: 1-24).
[38] 'It seems that some version of the story had become current before or soon after Caesar's death and was presumably encouraged by Caesar himself' (Pelling 2011: 344). For *fortuna* and Caesar generally and in this episode see Clark (2007: 243 n. 129).
[39] Wardle (1997: 334).
[40] Therefore I disagree with Harrisson (2009: 183 n. 496): 'However, in this case, Valerius Maximus does appear to attach some blame to Caesar himself'. By 'in this case' she refers to Caesar's murder. Except for 9.8.2 I do not see any other blame directed at Caesar by V.
[41] On Caesar's disregard for danger and divine portents see my comments under *ex funere C. Caesaris* (9.9.1). For another use of *anceps* in a battle with the elements see Verg. *A*. 10.359.

etsi caelestium cura protectus est: V here emphasises the reality of divine intervention and protection, which Caesar himself had great confidence in. This is reflected in his famous *dicta* in the midst of the storm, when he even encouraged the master of the vessel thus: *quid times? Caesarem vehis*.[42]

per simulationem adversae valetudinis: The first of two stratagems by Caesar. This first stratagem is also recorded by Appian, the only other source that does so: 'Rising from supper he pretended to be fatigued and told his friends to remain at the table'.[43] The second stratagem is when Caesar hides his real identity by dressing as a slave. This is the opposite of what happens in 9.15, where slaves dress as free-born citizens instead.[44]

naviculam: Plutarch, writing later, tells us that it was (i) a boat of twelve oars and (ii) once he was on board he 'lay along at the bottom of the vessel'.[45] Both these factors reinforce the extent to which Caesar went in his subterfuge in order to secure his victory. The image V depicts of Caesar's position on such a small ship suggests a boat smaller than what Plutarch indicates and thus conjurs up a more dramatic scene in the reader's mind in imagining the mighty Caesar on such a small vessel. Florus, unlike other sources, calls the boat *speculatorio navigio*, a reconnoitring ship, used for observation of the enemy (*speculatorius*, OLD. 1).[46]

protinusque in altum dirigi iusso navigio: V is distinctive compared to other sources in that he does not state directly that Caesar reveals his real identity, since no slave would have

[42] Flor. *Epit*. 2.13.35. 'Such spirit and such hope had he, either naturally or as the result of some oracle, that he felt firm confidence in his safety even contrary to the appearance of things' (Cass. Dio 41.46, Loeb translation).
[43] *B Civ*. 2.57 (Loeb translation).
[44] For trickery elsewhere in V9 see 9.6 (a *sine qua non* to *perfidia*) and 9.15.
[45] Plut. *Caes*. 38.
[46] *Epit*. 2.13.37.

delivered such an order.[47] This revelation occurs here implicitly and in a sub-clause (ablative absolute), constituting more of an *obiter dicta* rather than taking the centre stage, in the almost climactic position of the other sources. V instead trades the potential for generating such dramatic effect for a closer focus on the importance of *necessitas*.[48]

in altum … multum ac diu contrariis iactatus fluctibus: This is reminiscent of the famous Virgilian line: *litora multum ille et terris iactatus et alto*.[49] 'The vessel now took in so much water that Caesar found himself in such danger' (Plutarch), 'nor did he make himself known until they were ready to sink' (Suetonius).[50] V, like some of the other sources, does not go into so much detail about how close Caesar was to drowning; again a use of *brevitas* that somewhat detracts from the drama and tension of the *exemplum*. V at the beginning of this *exemplum* writes *non tamen vix sine horrore animi referri potest*, and yet we are not given the full extent of this *horror*.[51]

necessitati cessit: Note how these two key words emphatically end the *exemplum*. An effect further realized by the alliteration *necessitati cessit*, note the deliberate and unusual effect produced by *cessit* being contained within *necessitati*.[52]

As I commented under *protinusque in altum*, I view the word *necessitas* here as V's distinctive slant to this *exemplum*. *Necessitas* has the meaning of 'difficulty, need, necessity'

[47] The other sources in question are Plutarch, Suetonius, Appian, Florus, Dio, for their exact references see above.
[48] See below for a perspective to this *exemplum* not mentioned by the other sources
[49] *A.* 1.3.
[50] Plutarch, *De fort. Rom.* 319b-d; Suet. *Jul.* 19.
[51] Matthews (2004: 248) remarks that Lucan 'greatly exaggerated' his portrayal of the intensity of the storm.
[52] *Necessitas* in V9: 9.8.2, 9.8.ext.2 (both at no.2), 9.12.4. Also see *de necessitate* in V at 7.6

but also ‘constraint imposed by external circumstances’, here in the shape of the storm.[53] Another type of constraint would also have been Caesar’s disguise itself.[54] Caesar realized that his own disguise was at that point a type of *necessitas*, constraint, and one which would, once tackled, produce a change of morale on the ship, once he revealed his true identity, which it did. Plutarch, Suetonius and Appian at this point all note that the sailors found a renewed sense of purpose, courage and determination. Nevertheless they were still unable to go any further but perhaps this change in morale contributed towards saving their own lives.[55] So here the meaning of *necessitas* is wider: firstly ‘needing to yield’ to the storm, that is, acknowledging to himself that he will not be able to cross the sea, and secondly, yielding to the need to uncover his disguise and trickery in an effort to increase the chances of him reaching his destination or surviving the storm. *Necessitati cessit* here also takes on a moral dimension, despite a ruler’s or tyrant’s position in society he is not invincible. This is relevant to the discourse on tyranny in V9, challenging the tyrant’s mentality of extremes, which usually leads to rashness and cruelty.

9.8.3

Summary: In 89 BC Albinus is murdered by his soldiers.

Aulus Postumius Albinus: ‘A man of praetorian dignity’.[56] Consul of 99 BC with M. Antonius, *legatus classi* in 89 BC.[57] Orosius states he was a *vir consularis* (99 BC) and Pliny

[53] OLD.3. For the same usage see Ter. *Hec*. 492; Cic. *Phil*. 5.53; Liv. 1.48.3; Tac. *Hist*. 4.11. For a different usage of *necessitas* in 9.8 see *necessitatem puniens* (9.8.ext.2) meaning ‘an act performed under compulsion’ (OLD.7); on the latter see also Cic. *Off*. 2.56. For more on *necessitas* in V see 7.6, *de necessitate*.
[54] In a slave’s dress (V, Plutarch), ‘pretending to be the messenger sent by Caesar’ (Appian, *B Civ*. 2.52-9, Loeb translation). Suetonius goes into more detail on how he was dressed: *Gallico habitu* (*Jul*. 58).
[55] *Civ*. 2.57.
[56] Plut. *Sull*. 6.

the Elder specifically connects the man to the year 655 which is equivalent to 99 BC.[58] Cicero says that he was a good speaker.[59]

propter falsas et inanes suspiciones: V claims Albinus' complete innocence, at odds with Livy and Orosius.[60] For other *exempla* in V9 where a man has been killed by one's own soldiers or side see 9.7. *mil. Rom.*1-3. In all these cases, V presents them as undeserved, as miscarriages of justice, therefore, because of V's classification, these victims are not in the chapters on cruelty or treachery. This cannot be altogether construed as V being hostile to soldiers, rather a hostility to *en masse* rash actions, which is the main theme for 9.7, which has a further resonance here too.

lapidibus obrueretur: See also 9.7.2 on stoning.

oranti atque obsecranti duci: Aptly worded for effect, to increase dramatic tension, since a leader is not usually associated with begging and imploring. As a way to prepare but also to highlight his rhetorically chosen finish, V introduces this with *quodque accessionem indignationis non recipit,* thus further heightening the dramatic dynamics of the *exemplum*. Also notice the alliterative effect of the cluster *obruo, oro, obsecro,* their meaning in aggregate further emphasizing Albinus' passive position of a man totally crushed by his circumstances, not just physically (being overwhelmed by stones) but also by the social degradation he suffered (*oranti atque obsecranti*, note the emphatic *atque*).

---

[57] For the consulship see Shackleton Bailey (2000 vol.2, index). For the position of *legatus classi* see Liv. *Per*. 75

[58] *Nat*. 8.19.

[59] *Brut.* 35, *Red. Pop.* 5.

[60] For the former see: *infamis crimine perduellionis*, (high treason *Per.*75). For the latter see *intolerabili superbia omnium in se militum odia suscitasset* (Oros. 5.18.22).

causae dicendae potestas negata: In such an extreme situation, Albinus, is denied the opportunity to plead at all; particularly discouraging for him since he had relied on the power of speech to pursue a successful career in public life. This heightens the helplessness and injustice of the episode, especially placed here as the closing clause for this *exemplum*, where it additionally impinges on his right of speech to defend himself. His freeborn and high birth status is ignored, and he is treated as if he had been debased to the status of a slave.[61] This is in contrast to the seven words, in the middle of the *exemplum*, describing Albinus' status: *nobilitate moribus honorem omnium consummatione civis eximius*. And yet his fate is decided not by his equals or superiors but by his subordinates.

9.8.externa

9.8.ext.1.

Summary: In 203 BC Hannibal kills his ship's steersman after having accused him of treachery, not believing that Italy and Sicily were divided by so small a space. Upon realizing the steersman was correct, Hannibal acquits him.[62]

V chooses Hannibal over the commonplace of Alexander as an *exemplum* of *temeritas*.[63] There are two main themes at work in this *exemplum*: the possible *error* (the theme for the following chapter) by the steersman (but in hindsight that of Hannibal); second, Hannibal's

[61] On slavery as a moral topos in V9 see my comments on *mancipium* (9.4.ext.1).
[62] See also Mela 2.116, Serv. *A*. 3.411. See Shackleton Bailey (Loeb vol.2 pg. 350-1).
[63] For the trope of Alexander's *temeritas* see Liv. 9.18.18; App. *B Civ*. 2.149-50; Sen. *Ben*. 1.13.3 (*cui pro virtute erat felix temeritas*) and Bosworth (2004: 556; *passim*). 'The quality of rashness links Caesar with the prototype tyrant Alexander' (Matthews 2004: 40).

rashness based on his own *error*. All three *exempla* on errors at 9.9 lead to murder, each based on different *vitia*; here it is rashness.

minus miror: An expression used again in V9 at 9.12.2 in the case of women generally, and as a variant *minus admirabilem*, in an external *exemplum* as here (9.2.ext.4).[64] Both here and at 9.2.ext.4 V uses this expression to open and introduce the *exemplum*. By doing so, V achieves two things: first, he grabs the reader's attention; second, by foregrounding the *exemplum* in this way, he gives the reader the moral context and key of how to interpret it. In fact, V, by conceding that one should not be surprised by an *exemplum*'s contents, is bringing an angle of reality and credibility to an *exemplum*. This type of authorial intervention directed at the reader is useful for V, because for an *exemplum* to work, in order to provide a moral lesson and be persuasive enough, it needs to be believable. Otherwise, V's audience would not feel that an *exemplum* could in any way relate to their daily lives. Skidmore argues also for this reading, and specifically makes the distinction between the 'empty' *exemplum* for rhetorical purposes, as an exercise which is self-fulfilling and with no further use, which is what V is definitely *not* about; and the *exemplum* whose aim is that of moral improvement for its readership, which constitutes V's main purpose.[65]

diligentius: Can apply also to *temeritas* more generally and to error (9.9). By being a little more careful one can save lives.[66]

sepulchri: Both 9.8.ext.1 and ext.2 portray unjust punishment and attitudes to burial from opposite perspectives. At ext.1 the honour of burial is in response to unjust punishment; while

[64] For *minus minor* elsewhere in V also see 4.1.ext.2, 8.7.ext.3.
[65] Skidmore (1996: 93).
[66] *diligenter*: 9.5.4, 9.13.ext.3, 9.13.ext.4. Related in meaning: *prudentiae* 9.3.2, *prudens* 9.13.ext.1. For the opposite see *inprudentius*: 9.5.ext.2, *inprudens* 9.9.2.

at ext.2 the lack of honourable burial becomes the *cause* for punishment in the form of murder.

insidiosum: On treachery generally in V9 see 9.6, for Carthaginian treachery as a trope see 9.6.ext.1. In V9 Hannibal is usually the perpetrator of vice rather than a punisher.[67]

9.8.ext.2.

Summary: In 406 BC the Athenian community passes a sentence of death on its ten generals upon returning home after a victory because they did not bury their soldiers.[68]

Atheniensium civitas: V's subjects span individuals and collective groups. The latter can be smaller gatherings of people (and army) from 9.7, to larger collective subjects, like here, *civitas*, which reoccurs in V9 predominantly in the external *exempla*.[69]

vesaniam: Madness and its association to *vitia* is a crucial theme in V9.[70]

decem universos imperatores suos: Note Diodorus' account of only six generals returning to Athens, not all ten (*universos*).[71]

---

[67] For punishment and revenge in V9 see 9.10.praef.
[68] See also Diod. Sic. 13.102. This episode is also covered by V at 1.1 ext.8. For the Greeks elsewhere in V9 see Cyprus (9.1.5, 9.1.ext.7, 9.4.1, 9.4.ext.1; 9.5.ext.2, 9.10.ext.2). The Athenians appear also at 9.2.ext.8, note the mirror image effect of the numbers 9.2.ext.8 and 9.8.ext.2.
[69] At 9.5.ext.4: *Carthaginiensem et Campanum senatum*. Especially found at 9.3: *Carthaginienses* (ext.1), *civitas Atheniensium* (ext.8), *Etrusci* (ext.10), *barbari* (ext.11).
[70] *Vesania* occurs three more times in V9: 9.1.9, 9.2.4, 9.11.4.
[71] Diod. Sic. 13.102. See Shackleton Bailey (Loeb vol.1 pg. 40) on the fact that six of the ten returned to Athens and were executed.

necessitatem puniens: I see this as a rhetorically charged coinage, that of punishing not an individual *per se*, like other punishments in V9, but something abstract and intangible, *necessitas*.[72] 9.8.ext.2 is comparable to the case *par excellence de severitate* of Manlius Torquatus (9.3.4), where victory and celebration are followed and contrasted so starkly and dramatically with cruelty and tragedy.[73] Both V and Diodorus relate Diomedon's (one of ten generals) last request before execution.[74] The request consisted of asking the public to pay his vows to the gods on his behalf, as he was unable to, because of the approaching execution. Because the request did not even refer to his own fate but to religious observance, it was felt that this was the 'act of a man who was god-fearing and magnanimous and undeserving of the fate that was to befall him'.[75] Diodorus emphasizes the religious purity and virtues of Diomedon, which in V remain implicit within the request itself. Diodorus in fact maximizes the *exemplum*'s *pathos* by emphasizing the people's opinion of Diomedon: 'excelling in both justice and in the other virtues' (before the request); 'aroused great compassion and tears' (when describing the effect of the request).[76] This *exemplum* would have constituted somewhat of a shock for V's readers, as sometimes even being highly virtuous and religious does not bring one good fortune and a good death. However, this depends on the manner in which a reader would have approached V's *opus*. In the main introduction I argue that the reader would have derived the most from V9's moral message when contrasting it to the preceding books, rather than reading it in isolation.

[72] For punishment and revenge in V9 see 9.10.praef.
[73] For a case study on *severitas* in Livy see Moore (1986: 256-263).
[74] The request in Diodorus is conveyed in direct speech, in V it is reported speech. This difference greatly affects the way in which the readers perceive the episode, direct speech generally being more dramatic and striking.
[75] Diod. Sic. 13.102.
[76] For all translations from Diodorus see the Loeb edition.

saevitia maris interpellante: 'Rough', 'stormy', see *saeva tempestate* (9.8.2) and *aestuosi maris* (9.8.ext.1).[77] Also see Lucan (5.476-721) covering the same episode as 9.8.2 with five mentions of *saevitia*, all relating to the sea.[78] The other meaning of *saevus* as cruel and savage (*saevum animum Hannibalem* 9.8.ext.1) is a major theme in V9 as the synonym *crudelitatas* (9.2) indicates. *interpellante* is used in the same meaning as here 'obstruct, impede, prevent' only twice more in all V.[79] Its meaning is not dissimilar to the nuance that I commented on (see above) for *necessitas* at 9.8.2 '<u>constraint</u> imposed by external circumstances' (OLD. 3).

honorare virtutem deberet: Diodorus likewise makes the same point: 'they vented their rage upon men who were deserving, not of punishment, but of many praises and crowns'.

[77] Used only once more in all V referring to the sea and storm at 9.1.1 *saeva tempestas*. The nautical theme reoccurs throughout 9.8 except for 9.8.3. For the sea and boundaries see 9.1.1.
[78] Lines 568, 587, 687, 692, 709. Also see Matthews (2004). *interpellante* is used in the same meaning 'obstruct, impede, prevent' in V at 5.4.2, 8.7.4 (OLD 4).
[79] 5.4.2, 8.7.4 (OLD 4).

Chapter 9: *de errore*.[1]

Introduction

Hamartia, among its various meanings, can refer to error but also to acts undertaken under the influence of 'passion, weakness of will', in other words, *vitia*, V9's main theme.[2] Although *hamartia* is used only twice in Aristotle's *Poetics* (1453al0 and 16) some scholarship has been devoted to it.[3] One of the meanings of *hamartia* is 'mistaken identity', which also surfaces in V9.[4]

Error in V occurs the most in books seven (nine times) and nine (eight times).[5] Error opens and closes V9.[6] The error of all three of 9.9's *exempla* cause death, while elsewhere in V error it does not, not always. Thus by connecting error to death in the shortest chapter of the book, creates an uncomfortable intensity for the reader to reflect on the frailty of life.

---

[1] **Rhetorical devices for 9.9**: *Exclamatio*: 9.9.1 *officii sui … miserabile*. 9.7 and 9.9 are the only chapters in V9 without external *exempla*. The word *error* and its concept features the most in V, compared to Velleius Paterculus, where it only emerges three times (Vell. 1.4, 1.7 and 2.6). For the theme of *error* in Roman literature: in Virgil see Nappa (2003); in Ovid see Claassen (1987), Rosiello (2002) and Ingleheart (2006); in Plato see Levi (1971), Lott (2012).

[2] Stinton (1975: 232). Also see Moles (1984). On *hamartia* generally see Bremer (1969).

[3] For further bibliography see Dyer (1965) and Ho (2010).

[4] See 9.7.1, 9.9.1, 9.14 and 9.15. For *hamartia* with this meaning see Stinton (1975: 228, 236), Moles (1984: 49) Ho (2010: *passim*). For Aristotle on ignorance of identity see the *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1.1110b-1111a. In the Roman comedies of Terence and Plautus consider the role *error* and mistaken identities that occupy the plays' *dénouements*, underscoring the playwrights' reliance on them to amuse their audience, *inter alia*.

[5] In V9 the presence of the word *error* is clustered around 9.9, while in book seven it is evenly distributed. Book 7: 7.2.2, 7.2.ext.1, 7.2.ext.17, 7.3.ext.1, 7.4.5, 7.5.3, 7.5.6, 7.7.1, 7.8.3. Book 9: 9.1.praef, 9.9.praef, 9.9.1 (x2), 9.9.2 (x2), 9.9.3, 9.15.1. Error elsewhere in V: 1.6.9, 1.6.12 (x2), 1.8.5; 2.2.1, 2.6.2, 2.6.7; 4.3.14, 4.7.ext.2, 3.1.1, 3.4.ext.1; 5.1.7, 5.2.4, 5.3.2, 5.4.3; 6.1.1, 6.1.4, 6.5.ext.4; 8.2.2, 8.11.ext.4.

[6] *gemino mentis errore conexae* (9.1.praef), *euidens mendacium turbulento uulgi errore* (9.15.1).

Commentary

Praefatio

temeritati proximus est error: V opens 9.9 by emphatically drawing on the close relationship between *temeritas* and *error*. 9.9.2 (*properavit*) and 9.9.3 (*impulsi*) are, in fact, based on *temeritas*; and 9.9.1 (*iratus*) is based on *ira* (main theme at 9.3).[7] The link between *error* and *temeritas* (9.8) is further heightened by V positioning these two chapters next to each other.[8] Furthermore, perceiving incorrectly and calculating wrongly, in both 9.8 and 9.9, is at the heart of the mistaken action.[9] Implicit to both 9.8 and 9.9 is V's portrayal of actions that do not benefit from reason but are very instinctive and highly reactive, indicating a frenzied disposition. Note how the incidents in 9.9.2-3 occur as a result of chance, the individuals therein have no control over what is happening. This is shown by the use of *non sua sponte* (9.9.praef), *varium … ignotum eventum* (9.9.2), *prospero* (9.9.3), *forte* (9.9.3). The exemplars in 9.9 and 9.12 are out of control, the opposite to the rest of the book. In V9 the outcomes to incidents are generally ascribed to the people themselves via their actions (they have a choice whether to live based on *vitia* or not).

error … imagines: For the juxtaposition of these two words see, for example, Cic. *Pis*. 1; Prop. 1.20.4; Ov. *Ep*. 17.45, *Tr*. 3.3.75. On the importance of *imagines* in V9 see my comments at 9.3.praef.

[7] Cicero also connects *temeritas* and error in the following: *Rep*. 1.52; *Acad*. 1.42, 2.66. On 9.9.3's *impulsi*, see also 9.8's definition of *temeritas* as: *subiti et vehementes sunt impulsus*.
[8] Also see my comments on comparability in the main introduction and 9.8.praef between these chapters. For the juxtaposition of *temeritas* and *error* also see Cic. *Sest*. 122, *Rep*. 1.52, *Ac*. 1.42, 3.2, *Luc* 66.24, *Div*. 1.7.11.
[9] *Erro* can denote a 'wandering from a path' (Short 2013: 141), akin to travelling on a journey.

qui quam late … obnoxius: V uses similar language as here in the following chapter in the way he expresses the ubiquity found in error and revenge: *quos latius complecti non attinet* (9.10.praef).

9.9.1.

Summary: In 44 BC Helvius Cinna was murdered by the people after being mistaken for Cornelius Cinna.[10]

Suetonius goes into more details surrounding this episode, sharing with V the 'sacrificial' element of this murder.[11]

Cinna: Both Cinnas occupied public office in the momentous year of 44 BC: Gaius Helvius Cinna as tribune of the plebs, Lucius Cornelius Cinna as praetor. Cornelius Cinna features only here in all of V's *exempla*, where his presence is only to illustrate the point of confusion with his namesake. The present *exemplum* constitutes also Helvius Cinna's only mention in V but this is more understandable, he occupies a less important role in history.[12]

ex funere C. Caesaris: Tradition had it that Helvius Cinna was not only a friend of Caesar (Plutarch), but 'one of his most devoted friends' (Dio); thus explaining his presence at

[10] Suet. *Jul.* 85; App. *B Civ*. 2.20; Cass. Dio 44.50; Plut. *Brut*. 20.
[11] *Postea solidam columnam prope viginti pedum lapidis Numidici in foro statuit inscripsitque* '*parenti patriae*'. *Apud eam longo tempore sacrificare, vota suscipere, controversias quasdam interposito per Caesarem iure iurando distrahere perseveravit* (*Iul.* 85).
[12] Plutarch is the only source who suggests that this Cinna was the poet, who wrote the poem *Zmyrna* and the *Propempticon*. The former, completed in 55 BC, is a mythological epic poem focused on the incestuous love of Zmyrna (Myrrha) for her father Cinyras. The latter work is a guide book to Greece in verse. Neither work is extant (Harvey 1980). For the connection of this Helvius Cinna to the tribune of the plebs and the poet see Gel. 19.9.7, Suet. *Gram*. 18, Ov. *Tr*. 2.43.5, Quint. *Inst*. 10.4.4, Verg. *Ecl*. 9.35.

Caesar's funeral.[13] Plutarch tells us that Cinna had a dream on the night before Caesar's death, which in hindsight proved to be an omen for the deaths of both Cinna and Caesar.[14] Considering the possible connection to Caesar, V's omission of Cinna's dream is conspicuous, but perhaps only so in hindsight as the association might not have been intuitive during V's day, or conversely, too obvious to need mention.

populi manibus discerptus est: To such an extent that according to Appian: 'They were so mad with rage and grief that like wild beasts they tore to pieces the tribune Cinna [...] so that no part of him was ever found for burial'.[15]

in quem saevire se existimabat: 'Thought', but in fact the murderers did not even 'wait to hear any explanation about the similarity of name', such was their rage (*saevire*).[16] Therefore this is an example of *error* but based on rashness and anger, so it could also qualify for 9.3, 9.8 and 9.9. Only Plutarch describes exactly how the murderers came to think that they had the correct Cinna in their midst.[17]

iratus ei … orationem habuisset: This grim scene of murder was undertaken as retaliation but one which raises the moral question of how culpable is an individual who avenges in error and the ripple effect that this has on society. V does not seek to resolve this quandary but provides the reader with a place to ponder this point.

---

[13] Loeb translation. Suet. *Jul*. 85, Plut. *Brut*. 20, *Caes*. 68.

[14] See Plut. *Caes*. 68. It is curious however, that V does not refer to the dream either here, or in book one, in the chapters devoted to omens (1.5) and dreams (1.7). For dreams as links to the divine in V see Mueller (2002: 91-93).

[15] *B Civ*. 2.20, Loeb translation. On mistaken identities in V9 see 9.14; 9.15. *Discerpo* is also found at 9.7.4 which also has a religious setting. The religious setting in this *exemplum* is that Cinna had just left Caesar's funeral.

[16] App. *B Civ*. 2.20, Loeb translation.

[17] Plut. *Brut*. 20. 'One of the multitude told his name to another who asked him what it was, and he to another, and at once word ran through the whole throng that this man was one of the murderers of Caesar' (Plut. *Brut*. 20, Loeb translation). Since the intelligence behind the murder was carried out by word of mouth, who knows at what stage the communication failed.

cum adfinis esset Caesaris: On the significance and symbolism of marriage as, *inter alia*, a political tool in V9 see my comments under *maritalis lecti blanditiis* (9.5.3).[18]

impiam orationem: After Caesar is killed, Cornelius Cinna delivers a speech supporting the murder of his former brother-in-law. The crowd is surprised that the assassins gave way to Cinna on the rostrum, on account of his close family ties to Caesar. The essence of the speech is that Cinna calls Caesar a despot and the men who had killed him tyrannicides. Then he goes on to praise the murder and tells the crowd that they should be grateful to the men who executed the murder.[19] Considering the contents of this speech, it is not surprising that Cinna would have been a target for Caesar's supporters. What is surprising however is that despite delivering such a public speech, and therefore his appearance having been refreshed or become known to the people, that he should still be mistaken for Helvius Cinna.

piaculum: Suetonius goes into more details surrounding this episode, sharing with V the 'sacrificial' element of this murder.[20] No arrests were ever made in the case of the murder of Helvius Cinna.[21] Although sacrifice and religion in V are the main topics for book one, they also form an important thematic strand for V9, with reoccurring vocabulary denoting the sacred part of life, as a contrast to the book's main discourse on *vitia*.[22] V.'s emotive *impia* springs from the fact that Caesar had belatedly revived Cinna's career and should have merited loyalty.

---

[18] Around 86 BC Cornelia, Cinna's daughter, married Caesar.
[19] App. *B Civ*. 2.121.
[20] *Postea solidam columnam prope viginti pedum lapidis Numidici in foro statuit inscripsitque* '*parenti patriae*'. *Apud eam longo tempore sacrificare, vota suscipere, controversias quasdam interposito per Caesarem iure iurando distrahere perseveravit* (*Iul.* 85).
[21] Dando-Collins (2010: 128).
[22] For the theme of religion in V9 see my comments at 9.7.4. *Piaculum*: 9.2.2; 9.2.ext.3. *Sacrificare*: 9.1.3; 9.3.ext.3; 9.7.4; 9.7.mil.rom.2 (another sacrificial victim); 9.12.3. *sacris*: 9.6.1. *religio*: 9.1.7; 9.2.ext.6; 9.11.4; 9.15.4 (although at 9.15.4 *religio* denotes 'conscience' rather than anything religious). *Divinus*: 9.2.4; 9.5.ext.1; 9.11.4; 9.11.ext.4; 9.15.1-2.

9.9.2

Summary: In 42 BC Cassius, thinking that the centurion he sent out to communicate with his fellow general for reconnoitring purposes had been captured by the enemy and that all was lost, commits suicide.

Gaius Longinus Cassius: Praetor in 44 BC and one of Caesar's assassins. In V he is black-listed thus: *quem C. Cassius numquam sine praefatione publici parricidii nominandus* (1.8.8).[23] Cassius' error reveals itself via *temeritas*, in that he causes his own death.[24] This reinforces the link V makes between error and *temeritas*.[25] Cassius' error not only causes Cassius' own death but also the suicides of Pindarus, his slave, and Titinius, the centurion, thus showing, as Velleius (2.70.2) and Plutarch (Brutus 43) also do, the tragic and disastrous ripple effect of a person's error on others. The only two other mentions V makes of Cassius and the parricide are at 3.1.3 and 6.8.4. In 6.8.4 V is much more scathing about Cassius, because it was not just a suicide *per se* but one which needed *sordidum auxilium*. This refers to the fact that Cassius had to bow down and become a *supplex* to Pindarus, whom he had recently freed, in order to be killed by him (so to escape being captured by the enemy). This implies cowardice: *neque retinere vitam vellet neque finire sua manu auderet* (6.8.4), since he neither had the courage to make sure what the real state of affairs was but decided to die early; nor was he brave enough to commit suicide himself but prevailed upon a freedman to kill him.

[23] *parricidii* on account of Julius Caesar having been made *parens patriae* by senatorial decree (Suet. *Iul*. 88).
[24] Note Cassius' anxious frame of mind, the wide jump he makes in his mind, from the belief that Titinius had been capture or killed, to the assumption that everything was lost (*omniaque in eorum potestatem recidisse existimans*, 9.9.2). From a more lucid perspective the two may be less consequential than that.
[25] See my introduction to 9.9.

error a semet ipso poenas exigere coegit: I interpret *poena* here as meaning 'retribution, revenge' (OLD.2). What is distinctively Valerian at 9.9.2 is the connection between Cassius' error of judgement in this episode with an implicit mention to the punishment for his murder of Caesar. This is clear from V's opening to this *exemplum*: *error a semet ipso poenas exigere coegit*, and at 6.8.4 where V ascribes the avenger to Caesar himself, depicted as a god, following his deification. This authorial intervention corresponds to what I term in the introduction to 9.10 as the first voice of *ultio* in V9, that belonging to V's own voice (generally a more positive form of avenging).[26]

excessus: 'Detour' or 'going out of one's way' (OLD.1).[27] Cassius thought that Titinius had been captured and killed, but it proved too much for Cassius to wait for the detours to be completed. In retrospect, had Cassius waited a little longer, Titinus would have returned; had he waited too long Cassius might have been captured by the enemy and subjected to a public execution or torture. Although Brutus *was* in the end victorious, it does not take away the possibility that Titinius *could* have still returned in time for Cassius to get away. Equally, if Cassius had in fact not committed suicide then the overall outcome of the battle might have been affected. Note the myriad possibilies that an individual's choices can have, not just for oneself personally, but also (and especially) wider into society.

tardius ad Cassium rediit: In addition to what V already tells us (*quia tenebrarum ... sinebat*), the following account by Plutarch explains in more detail what would have contributed to Titinius' tardiness: 'the horsemen spied this man [Titinius] as he came towards them, and when they saw that he was a trusted friend of Cassius, his intimates, shouting for

[26] For a further point that distinguishes V from Velleius and Plutarch see my comments below at *duplex* (9.9.2).
[27] It also means 'death' (OLD 1b) as used in V9 at 9.13 praef.

joy, leapt from their horses and embraced him warmly, while the rest rode round him with shouts and clashing of arms, thus in their boundless joy, working the greatest mischief'.[28]

exceptum ab hostibus: Plutarch recounts Cassius' dying words: 'My love of life has brought me to the pass of seeing a friend seized by the enemy'.[29] From this we realize how differently Plutarch portrays Cassius' moral high ground: his assisted suicide was not solely out of personal pride, in order not to be captured by the enemy, but derived from a sense of shame and regret for inadvertently causing the death of a friend.[30] V chooses not to show this level of humanity in the character, thus consistently continuing his negative portrayal of Cassius (and the enemies of Caesar and Augustus more generally), not allowing any glimpses of goodness to emerge. This makes V the most critical of Cassius among the sources covering this *exemplum*.[31]

cum et castra … incolumes essent: This reinforces the tragedy that both men commit suicide despite things not going altogether badly for their side. *Incolumes* is such a contrast to Cassius' and Titinius' predicament. It was doubly galling for Titinius, since, although he was initially successful in what he was instructed to do and went through great risks, he still chose suicide. Velleius Paterculus heightens the tragedy further (i) in stating that Titinius had in fact just returned to Cassius only a few minutes later after the commander had committed suicide, and (ii) in his use of *victorem* as an even more vivid contrast to V, in describing the discrepancy between those two realities.[32]

---

[28] Plut. *Brut*. 43.6, Loeb translation.
[29] *Brut*. 43.7, Loeb translation.
[30] For the topos of *amicitia* in V9 see my introduction to 9.5.
[31] For a similar treatment see my comments on V's portrayal of Sulla at 9.2.1.
[32] For the former point see: *deciderat Cassii caput, cum evocatus advenit nuntians Brutum esse victorem* (2.70.3)

non oblitteranda silentio: There is a theme in V of *exempla* demanding or deserving not to 'be passed over', this constituting the first of two such occurrences in V9.[33]

etsi imprudens ... comitem: Titinius *sacrificing* himself in order that Cassius' death would not go unpunished. Velleius Paterculus also gives the centurion a few words.[34] Both V and Velleius thus add *pathos* to the incident.[35] This seems to be a more engaging way to draw in the reader, rather than Plutarch's rather terse rendition of 'he drew his sword, reproached himself bitterly for his slowness and slew himself'.[36] *Imprudens* with its root sense of not seeing ahead again aptly brings out the nature of error.

impunitum: For punishment and revenge in V9, see 9.10.praef.

duplex: Should really be *triplex*. As intimated above, this incident contains three suicides, those of Cassius, the centurion Titinius and the slave Pindarus.[37] Pindarus is not mentioned here as he was also praised earlier in the *opus* (*de fide servorum*, 6.8.4).[38] The effect is to compartmentalise the fidelity of friendship and that of slaves in order to give each more focus than could have been given if treated together (as Velleius and Plutarch do instead). Although Pindarus deliberately killed himself, this act can be seen as an extension of Cassius' suicide. As Cassius' suicide was based on error, so Pindarus' suicide was a continuation of that same error. Had Cassius not committed suicide then Pindarus would not have needed to die either. Note how the ripple of an individual's actions affects multiple individuals.

---

[33] See 1.6.11, 1.7.5, 4.1.14, 5.4 ext.2, 8.2.2 and 9.13.2. Also Wardle (1998: 203). On silence in V9 see *memoria* in my main introduction.
[34] '*sequar*', *inquit*, '*eum, quem mea occidit tarditas*', *et ita in gladium incubuit* (Vell. 2.70.3).
[35] This is particularly so for V who used direct speech very sparingly for dramatic and rhetorical effect, as it is here.
[36] *Brut*. 43.9, Loeb translation.
[37] For V on the fidelity of slaves see 6.8 *de fide servorum*.
[38] In V9 *duplex* was last used in 9.6.4 in the context of a murdered person, and also implicitly present in 9.6.1. *duplex* appears elsewhere in V: 1.6.9 (again in a sacrificial scenario); 2.9.3 (again indicating two *exempla* in one); 3.1.1; 3.5.praef and, as a verb, *duplicent* (to double), at 6.9.ext.7.

Examples in history of slaves committing suicide are plentiful, ranging from those who hated their lives in servitude, to those with more noble reasons of *devotio*: pretending to be their master and thus getting killed in their place, to others who, having been instructed to kill their masters by their masters, then kill themselves.[39] V's opposite view to death and suicide in V9 is summarized in the following comment: *subiciamus nunc aestimationi enerves et effeminatos, ut ipsa comparatione pateat quanto non solum fortior sed etiam sapientior mortis interdum quam vitae sit cupiditas* (9.13.praef).[40]

victima ... erroris: Surprising that V should portray Cassius here as *victima*, after his earlier appraisal of the man, as one of the murderers of Caesar (6.8.4). This is the only negative person characterised as *victima* in V, an appellation usually reserved for the pious and virtuous.[41] *Victima* puts Cassius in a subservient position to something intangible, that is, *error*.[42]

pietatis: An *exemplum* involving *pietas* in this book on vice is indeed rare.[43]

[39] Hooff (1990: 126-9).
[40] *Exempla* reflecting V's views of death and suicide on opposing sides of the moral spectrum see chapters 9.12 and 9.13. For metaphorical slavery see 9.4.ext.1 below *mancipium*.
[41] For *victima* elsewhere in V relating to a human being see 4.6.2.
[42] It is similar to the *error* in 6.1.1, being linked to fortune rather than a person: *Lucretia, cuius virilis animus maligno errore Fortunae muliebre corpus sortitus est*. Another *exemplum* that connects *error* to penalty and suicide, as here, is 6.5.ext 4: *protinus ferro quod habebat destricto incubuit, cumque liceret culpam vel dissimulare vel errore defendere, poenam tamen repraesentare maluit*.
[43] *Pietas* occurs only here in V9. Its opposite *impietas* is at 9.11.ext.1. *Virtus* surfaces more often in V9: 9.1.ext.1, 9.2.ext.2, 9.3.1, 9.5.ext.1, 9.8.ext.2, 9.9.2 (a few lines above in this *exemplum*). Note how in four cases out of six, *virtus* appears in an external *exemplum*.

9.9.3

Summary: Lars Tolumnius, Etruscan king of Veii, during a game of dice utters the word *occide* to his fellow player. The ambiguity of that word inadvertently causes the murder of the Roman envoys who had just arrived at that moment.

9.9.3 is not categorized as an external *exemplum*, unlike V9's other two Etruscan *exempla* at 9.1.ext.2 and 9.2.ext.10, where the Etruscans are also the perpetrators but are categorized as external.[44] Similarly, the Campanians, another Italian people in V9, appear in the external *exempla*.[45] In V9, whenever the Romans are the victims of external people, such as in this *exemplum*, then that usually constitutes an external *exemplum*.[46] This is also the case, more generally, when an external people or individual is the offender or transgressor of vice. The disjunction in identification highlights the ambiguity of identity that clusters around Italian peoples in V. The question of whether his work takes a clear position on their non-Roman qualities sits close to the heart of larger ambiguities around genre and completion that V does explicitly resolve.[47] The next *exemplum* (9.10.1) continues to address the same social conflict of the integration of the Italian peoples into Rome with a three Italian peoples: the Tusculans (Latins) and the people of Velitrae and Privernum (two Volscian towns). Although the Tusculans may have been under the power of the Romans at the time of the alleged crime, ultimately they are still non-Roman by *ethnicity* (they were Latins); in fact people have 'two

[44] For a discussion on the portrayal of Etruscans in Roman literature see Stalker (1991), Bittarello (2009). Bittarello (2009: 218) and Macfarlane (1996: 261, n. 60) cover in particular the topoi that emerge in V9 of Etruscan *luxuria* (see 9.1.ext.2) and *crudelitas* (9.2.ext.10).
[45] See 9.1.ext.1 and 9.5.ext.4.
[46] See, for example, 9.2.ext.1-3.
[47] Bittarello (2009: 213 n. 12) summarises Cornell's point (1995: 151-72) that he denies 'that Etruria ever ruled over Rome but argues for a more nuanced model of reciprocal influences between various centres of central western Italy'. On the importance of Etruscan families in Rome from the early Republic to Caesar see Hall (1996: 149-89).

homelands, Rome and their actual *origo*, be the latter Latin, Sabine or other'.[48] This concept is based on the following text by Cicero: *ego mehercule et illi et omnibus municipibus duas esse censeo patrias, unam naturae, alteram civitatis* (*Leg*. 2.5).[49] As Farney argues, 'as late as the time of Augustus, Romans were still claiming to be Sabine and Latin in origin as part of Cicero's two homelands identity […] and 'maintained a separate intra-Roman ethnic identity despite the fact that they were a fundamental part of the larger political and social construct that was Rome'.[50] Farney (2007: 30 n.77) compares this intra-Roman element to Hall's (1997) study, which was not of a 'collective Hellenic identity but rather the plurality of intrahellenic identities (that is, Ionians, Dorians, Aiolians and Akhalians)'. Cicero's two homelands identity still existed in V's time because the Latins and Italians did not fully merge with Rome 'until the end of the Julio-Claudian era'.[51]

Lars Tolumnius: Late fifth century BC Etruscan king of the city state of Veii, about ten miles northwest of Rome. The actual town in which the following episode took place was a town near Veii by the name of Fidenae, at the time of this incident a Roman colony.[52] The background to this incident is that Fidenae revolted against the Republic. The Fidenates leaders of the revolt gave Tolumnius control of their city, therefore four Roman ambassadors are sent to him to get it back.

praecipuam iniuriam Lartis Tolumni [...] **penatibus intulerit**: Not just the murder of the Roman *legati* but also, as retribution, that of Tolumnius himself, murdered by Aulus

[48] Farney (2007: 6). Tusculum received Roman citizenship ca. 381 BC (Dyck 2004: 258).
[49] On Cicero's *duae patriae* see Salmon (1972) and Farney (2007: 5-26, especially 5-10).
[50] Farney (2007: 30).
[51] Farney (2007: 30).
[52] Liv. 1.27. On Tolumnius see also Verg. *A*. 11.428, 12.257, 451; Cic. *Phil*. 9.4; Liv. 4.18, 58. Also see Salamon (2003).

Cornelius Cossus.[53] V does not mention the latter's murder here, but it is covered at 3.2.4, where it is stated that Cossus was imitating Romulus, and in so doing *eidem deo spolia consecravit*.[54] *Praecipuam* probably relates to the violation of the sanctity of the *legati*, the breaking of the *ius gentium* that this error involved.

Romanorum legati: Were C. Fulcinius, Cloelius Tullus, Sp. Antius, and L. Roscius.[55]

in tesserarum prospero iactu: This is the same exact sequence of words as found in Livy (4.17), *in tesserarum prospero iactu* ('in a happy throw of the dice').[56] *Tessera* is a six sided type of dice, as opposed to a *talus* (knuckle-bone), four sided (OLD. 1b).[57]

per iocum: Unlike V, in Livy this is not mentioned nor is the receiver of that command clearly identified.[58] In Livy we *assume* that Tolumnius is addressing his guards, rather than his playmate. *Per iocum* is translated by Shackleton Bailey as 'in jest'.[59] Livy however disagrees with this theory, calling it *incredibilem* (4.17), believing the misunderstanding to be an attempt to exculpate Tolumnius. In fact, in Livy's version, *occide* was used as a command to kill the Roman envoys: *propius est fidem obstringi Fidenatium populum ne respicere spem ullam ab Romanis posset conscientia tanti sceleris voluisse* (4.17). Livy writes *levant* <u>*quidam*</u> *regis facinus* (9.17), so we do not know who V's source is. The interpretation V chooses over

[53] Consul in 428 BC, *magister equitum* at the time of this incident (V 3.2.4).
[54] The *spolia* is the body of Tolumnius. Cossus' murder of Tolumnius is covered in more detail by Livy at 4.19
[55] Liv. 4.17. Also see Cic. *Phil*. 9.4: *quorum statuae steterunt usque ad meam memoriam in rostris. Iustus honos; iis enim maiores nostri, qui ob rem publicam mortem obierant, pro brevi vita diuturnam memoriam reddiderunt*.
[56] This expression occurs only in these two sources. Ogilvie (1965: 559-560) argues that, since 'there is no trace of any cry as *occide* in all the ancient references to dicing' that the cry refers to the Roman game *ludus latrunculi*, where the aim of the game was to 'corner your opponent's piece and eliminate it. The elimination was called "death"' (see Ov. *Ars*. 3.358). Another possibility, Ogilvie continues, is that of a Greek game called *polis*, a battle type game which can be played both with and without dice.
[57] Harvey (1980: 183).
[58] *collusori*: 'playfellow' in games of dice but also 'fellow gambler' (OLD. 1b).
[59] Shackleton Bailey (2000 vol.2: 354-5). For jest and humour in V9 see my comments under *risu prosequenda* (9.5.ext.1).

Livy's works if one reads or hears *occide* with a short syllable on the 'I': 'give up', that is, the game, since Tolumnius had just had a *prospero iactu* (see above). A long syllable would produce 'die'.[60] So it could be that the real cause of the misunderstanding was a mere difference in stress accent. This ambiguity is key for V because it prompts the guards to have to interpret the meaning and form an opinion, which is why V opens this section with *falsa opinatio*. The tradition which Livy and V follow, which can only speculate about what Tolumnius actually said, states that Tolumnius spoke in Latin instead of his native Etruscan. This demonstrates why he might have mispronounced that crucial word, hence V's use of *errore vocis*.[61]

satellites: This word is used again three more times in V, all in the accusative case, *satellitem*: once more in V9 at 9.10.ext.1, and then at 3.3.ext.5 and 5.1.ext.2. In all four instances in V, the word is used in a negative context and this is consistent with Watmough's analysis of *satellites* in other authors too, its use being 'almost invariably military or violent'.[62] Note that both here at 9.9.3 and 3.3.ext.5, the word *falsa* reoccurs in the same sentence as *satellitem*: *falsa opinatio* (9.9.3), *falsa criminatione* (3.3.ext.5). Varro and Quintilian were interested in the distinction between native and foreign words in the Latin vocabulary and, *satellites* is likely to have been, as Watmough argues, a Latin loanword of Etruscan origin, rather than Indo-European; borrowed in the regal period.[63] Considering the likely Etruscan origin of *satellites*, it is noteworthy that V should use it referring to an Etruscan. V's other mentions of the word do not refer to the Etruscans. Watmough only

[60] Shackleton-Bailey (2000 vol.2: 354-5).
[61] On problems of Etrusco-Latin bilingualism and the fact that a number of Etruscan loan words are present in the Latin language (linguistic interaction) see Watmough (1997). Also see Torelli (1999: 13) for evidence of bilingualism between Italic languages and Latin especially in 1st and 2nd cent BC.
[62] Watmough (1997: 104). According to Watmough's findings, the earliest use of the word in Latin is Pl. *Mil*. 78. It surfaces *passim* in other authors too, especially Livy, see Watmough (1997: 104-7).
[63] Watmough (1997: 11, 103, 108, devoting the whole of the fifth chapter to *satellites*, pp.103-133). As referenced by Watmough (1997: 11), also see Varr. *L*. 5.10: *verba, quae sunt aut nostra, aut aliena, aut oblivia*; and Quint. *Inst*. 5.55: *verba aut Latina aut peregrine sunt*.

makes one reference of the word connected to an Etruscan, Porsenna's *satellites* (Liv. 2.12.8).[64] Therefore V's use of *satellites* referring to an Etruscan is rare. It is odd that Watmough does not include V's usages of the word as part of her findings.

[64] Watmough (1997: 106).

Chapter 10: *de ultione*.[1]

Introduction

Revenge and punishment have a strong presence in V9, surfacing in two distinct voices.[2] The difference between the two voices of *ultio* in V9 reflects a distinction between a public or State sanction (for the authorial voice) and a more private, personal wish for revenge and punishment (for the second voice).

At 9.10, with the authorial voice, V expresses frustration and annoyance when something or someone is unavenged, wishing for punishment of the perpetrators either by human intervention or by the natural forces of cause and effect. Thus the first voice becomes part of V's evaluation of some of the *exempla*, forming his moral barometer for grading the *exempla* in severity, as signposts for the reader. V9's authorial voice wishes for retribution and bemoans a wrong; it does not respond with action to a wrong, unlike V9's second voice (see

[1] **Rhetorical devices for 9.10**: Adnominatio: 9.10.praef. *acceptum dolorem … cupientes*. Adliteratio: 9.10.1 *accidit ut reliquis … iudicaret*. Polyptoton: 9.10.praef *dolorem <dolore>* note Kempf's conjecture.

[2] For punishment in V9 see *punitor* (9.2.1), *puniti* (9.3.4), *puniens* (9.8.ext.2), *poena* (9.1.9, 9.2.ext.11, 9.6.1, 9.9.2, 9.10.ext.1-2, 9.12.7, 9.15.1), *supplicium* (OLD.3, 9.11.ext.4, 9.12.6, 9.13.ext.3, 9.15.ext.2). On undeserved, unjust punishments in V9 see *indignum … dignissimum* (9.2.ext.1); *iusto ergo illum odio* (9.2.ext.2); *deos iniusto sed non inulto cruore* (9.2.ext.3); *iniustae* (9.3.1), *amicorum iniustis caedibus* (9.3.ext.1); 9.8.ext.1, *non debita* (9.12.ext.4), *indignissimi* (9.12.ext.5). For episodes having gone unpunished in V9 see *impunita* (9.1.ext.2); *impunitate* (9.6.4); *impunitum* (9.9.2). On the ambiguity of just versus unjust see 9.10.ext.2: *satis iusta … ambiguae aestimationis*. On the topos of punishment also see my comments at 9.4.1 under Lucius Minucius Basilus. For just punishment in V9 see *iusto … supplicio* (9.15.ext.2), referring to Augustus, which closes the book, and Tarpeia's death at 9.6.1. As part of the theme of punishment see my comments on beatings and floggings at 9.10.1 under *verberatos*.
The language of revenge in V9: *Ultio*: 9.3.praef; 9.3.ext.4; 9.10.2; 9.10.ext.1 and 2. *Ultus*: 9.14.ext.3. *Inulto*: 9.2.ext.3; 9.7.mil rom.2. *vindico*: 9.1.8, 9.4.1, 9.6.1, 9.10.ext.2, 9.12.7, 9.15.1. The balance between domestic and external in this list is almost equal, eight in the former, six in the latter. For revenge also see *puniens* (9.8.ext.2). Also see *supplicio* as revenge at 9.2.ext.2.

below). Although the wrong is not directed at V himself it is, however, morally damaging to Rome, thus the *dolor* generated is indirectly affecting V himself. So the author's comments in the text are charged with what reads as genuine emotion.[3] V wishes for justice, for due punishments to be meted and thus for a balance to be restored.[4] The authorial *ultio* might be equated with *avenging*, with implications of justice and redressing wrongs.[5]

The second voice of *ultio* in V9 is that of the *exempla*'s characters themselves, most of whom display an excessive quality in their redresses and so the consequences of this voice are often negative, in contrast to the authorial, first voice which consistently represents the positive side to retribution. This excessiveness is presented as a vice-like attribute, hence its relevance in V9, but these acts of revenge are, here, often mixed with and exacerbated by a combination of other *vitia*. The difference between these two voices is what distinguishes punishment (first voice) from revenge (second voice).[6] Similar to what V stated about *ira aut odio* (9.3), we could say that *ultio*, and punishment too, emerge from feeling slighted, offended; they are responses to a wrong and transform victims into agents.[7] From the perspective of the study of the emotions, a passive emotion turns into action.[8] Therefore there is a distinct type of vulnerability that the characters inhabiting 9.3 and 9.10 share: they are people at the mercy of and overwhelmed by their emotions, which in turn inevitably prompts them into action when wronged.[9]

---

[3] For emotions and the theory of the passions in V9 see my main introduction. For the vocabulary of punishment and revenge in Latin literature see Thome (1992) and Verdier (1980-4) and Milani (1997: 12-18). For violence as punishment see Eldred (1997) and Chrissanthos (1999).

[4] On the concept of equilibrium see Lateiner (1985) and Boedeker (1988*:* 42-43, 47-48).

[5] This is comparable to the Platonic view: 'One who undertakes to punish rationally does not do so for the sake of the wrongdoing, which is now in the past – but for the sake of the future, that the wrongdoing shall not be repeated' (Pl. *Prt*. 324a-b, Loeb translation). Also see Stalley (1995).

[6] For the moral debate on whether there is any difference between punishment and revenge see Zaibert (2006).

[7] *quia* <u>*dolorem*</u> *cum inferre vult, patitur … ultio anxius* (9.3.praef). *Dolor* occurs in both chapters' prefaces.

[8] On emotions in V9 see my main introduction.

[9] *Dolor* in V9 cluster mostly around 9.3 (9.3.praef, 9.3.2, 9.3.3) and 9.10 (9.10.praef and 9.10.ext.2). The only other two occurrences are 9.2.ext.1 and 9.12.2. For the connection between *ira* and *ultio* see Sen. *Ira* 1.1.1 and for this in Silius Italicus' work see Giazzon (2011). The interconnectedness of the *vitia* in V9 (see my main introduction) also applies to *ultio* which is not only linked to *ira* but also to hatred, violence, rashness and cruelty.

Although the theme of punishment and revenge is treated *passim* throughout V, there is a higher concentration of it in V9 and particularly at 9.10. This is comparable to Herodotus' *History*, since this occurs in both authors towards the end of their last books, their ninth (Her. 9.108-122).[10] The view of history as moral lessons in both Herodotus and V can be seen as a concatenation of punishments and revenges, the driving forces behind historical change, occurring in response to crimes or just simply in response to feeling slighted over a minor incident.[11] This is where miscarriages of justice often occur, as revenge that is 'disproportionate to the initial crime, and constitutes a further crime'.[12] All the *exempla* of 9.10 (and 9.2, on cruelty) share the trait of this disproportionate, excessive element within revenge.[13] This very excessiveness, which is a trait of *vitia* generally, provides us with an apparent window into characters' morals and the vehemence of their passions and emotions.

Commentary

9.10.1.[14]

Summary: In 323 BC the Tusculans entreat the Roman people for mercy following a tribune of the plebs' accusation that they had advised the people of Velitrae and Privernum to take up arms against Rome. All Italian tribes were for mercy except the Pollia. The revenge here by

[10] For the theme and purpose of punishment at the end of Herodotus' ninth book see Fisher (2002), Desmond (2004). Also note V's choice of Herodotus' version of Cyrus' death over Xenophon's at 9.10.ext.1.
[11] See my comments above on *dolor*. Like Herodotus, V's central purpose is 'explaining the relation between events and showing *why* things occurred as they did' (Desmond 2004: 28) in terms of moral lessons, that is, 'the injuries and counter-injuries that people have inflicted upon each other from time immemorial' (Desmond 2004: 28). Also see Lateiner (1985), Fisher (2002).
[12] Desmond (2004: 28).
[13] On the thin moral boundaries between this excessiveness and *severitas* see 9.3.4.
[14] 323 BC. This episode is covered by Livy at 8.37.8-12 Also see Donahue (2004: 59).

the Tusculans is that, after they became integrated with the Papiria tribe, they would never vote for any candidates from the Pollia.[15]

With this *exemplum* V continues the discourse on the social conflict of the integration of the Italian peoples into Rome; in fact 323 BC was 'the first year in which a Tusculan, Lucius Fulvius Corvus, reached the consulship'.[16] It has been argued that Flavius' proposal against the Tusculans was *inter alia* to 'stir up enough prejudice to block the election of Fulvius' to the consulship.[17] As I commented at 9.5.1, V did not look favourably upon the opportunities the Italians had of accessing Roman rights and privileges, since granting citizenship itself was, as shown here, a passport to gaining public office.[18] V aligns himself alongside Livy and Virgil who 'subvert any easy distinction between Roman and local Italian' and who show 'considerable interest in themes of immigration and plural roots, Greek, Latin, Sabine and Etruscan'.[19] At the end of the Republic and the beginning of the imperial period grants of citizenships increased, especially during Augustus' reign when one can observe generosity in terms of offering Roman citizenship, through its 'reordering of society'.[20] As a contrast to V, Velleius writes about 'the most sustained surviving example' of Roman generosity in terms of offering citizenship to the Italians, but his is not the only perspective on the issue in the same period of history, as V's message encapsulates the other side of Romans' views.[21] Suffice to say that V presages the later imperial reluctance as exemplified by instances such

[15] Liv. 8.37.8-12.
[16] Oakley (1998: 755). The three Italian peoples here are the Tusculans and the people of Velitrae and Privernum (two Volscian towns).
[17] Oakley (1998: 755).
[18] For V's position on granting citizenship to non-Romans see my comments in the last paragraph of the lemma *perniciosissima rei publicae reges* (9.5.1).
[19] Dench (2005: 211).
[20] Dench (2005: 139). Also see Zanker (1988, ch.4).
[21] Dench (2005: 119). Dench in fact warns against 'accepting without challenge' only one-sided views of attitudes to citizenship as provided by Velleius (2005: 120).

as the anecdote of Claudius refusing a Lycian citizenship when he finds out that he cannot understand Latin.[22]

Marcus Flavius: Tribune of the Plebs in 327 and 323 BC.[23] It has been argued that Flavius and Marcus Livius Salinator were notable men who belonged to the Pollia tribe.[24]

quod eorum consilio Veliterni Privernatesque rebellassent: The wording here is similar to Liv. 8.37: *quod eorum ope ac consilio Veliterni Priuernatesque populo Romano bellum fecissent*. The Tusculans had been allies of Rome's enemies, including the Samnites who, in 323 BC, the year of the incident in this section, broke the one-year truce with Rome.[25] The Tusculans on this occasion were also able to turn Velitrae and Privernum against Rome and Flavius proposed a bill to punish them for doing this.

salutarem: 'Salvation' or 'safety', because all the other tribes, except for the Pollia, vetoed the following proposal: *Polliae sententia fuit puberes verberatos necari, coniuges liberosque sub corona lege belli venire*.[26] *Salus* here refers to a rejection of the death sentence to keep the Tusculani alive. In V, *salus* is often connected to Tiberius.[27] *Salus* occurs at V9 also at 9.8.1, with the same meaning: *suam pariter et patriae salutem depositurus*.

---

[22] On imperial reluctance generally see Dench (2005: 136-143). See Cass. Dio 60.17.3.
[23] Oakley (2005: 755) argues as follows about this *exemplum*: 'What makes this story so bizarre is not so much the punishment which Flavius wished to inflict on Tusculum, as the fact that the episode is said to have occurred thirteen years after the last recorded fighting between Rome and Velitrae in 338; Tusculum, moreover, had already been punished for her part in the great Latin War. […] That Velitrae and Tusculum were involved in the final struggle of the Privernates in 330-329 is scarcely credible'. On another episode in Flavius' career see Liv. 8.22.
[24] Taylor (1960: 226).
[25] Liv. 8.37.
[26] Liv. 8.37.10.
[27] Wardle (1998: 68-9). See Suet. *Tib.* 29. For *salus* connected specifically to Tiberius see, as referenced by Wardle (1998: 68-9), ' 2.9.6, 8.13.praef, 9.11.ext.4'. For *salus* elsewhere in V see: 1.7.ext.3, 2.9.6, 3.8.1, 4.6.1, 5.4.1, 7.2.ext.15, 7.4.3, 7.6.3, 8.6.2; 8.13.praef. For more references to the development of *salus publica* before and during imperial Rome see the bibliography provided by Wardle (1998: 68-9).

Pollia: Pollia and Papiria were among a total of thirty-five Roman tribes and among the oldest seventeen tribes.[28] The location of Pollia may be in an area between the Tiber and the *Via Salaria*.[29] Tusculum was eventually enrolled in the Papiria.[30]

verberatos … percuti: For beating and flogging see 9.7 on the theme violence.[31]

Privernum: For V on this town and the granting of Roman citizenship upon it see 6.2.1.[32]

ne ad eam ullus honor suffragiis suis perveniret: This constitutes the revenge in this particular incident, however it does not seem to be a revenge to suit the crime. If the Pollia tribe flogged and beheaded Tusculan men of military age, then not voting for the Pollia candidates still seems rather mild, even if it lasted 'as late as the last generation'.[33] By this different level of retribution, V thus shows a similar effect to *odium* (as I comment on 9.3), that is, the way revenge and emotion are expressed is less evident but more long term and deep rooted (compared, for example, to *ira* or *temeritas*). See the opposite approach to revenge at 9.10.2 below, where punishment and revenge are grossly exaggerated in relation to what prompted it.

[28] See Crawford (2002) and Haeussler (2013).
[29] This is based on the evidence of a common burial ground outside the *porta Salaria* see Oakley (2005: 755) and Taylor (1960: 14-15; 39-40). The one man of stature known to have belonged to the Pollia was M. Livius Salinator (Liv. 29.37.8). See also Taylor, (1960: 226). Salinator is mentioned by V several times, including 9.3.1.For Pollia in V see 2.9.6a, 6.3.4.
[30] Papiria's original location was between Rome and Tusculum see Taylor (1960: 43).
[31] Other terms in V indicating beatings and floggings: *virga*: 2.7.4, 2.7.8, 2.7.15f, 5.8.1, 6.5.1, 9.14.ext.3. *verbero*: 1.7.4, 1.8.ext.19, 2.7.5, 2.7.8, 3.2.13, 3.3.ext.4, 4.1.1, 5.5.4, 5.8.2, 6.1.9, 6.8.1, 7.4.2, 7.6.2, 9.10.1. *percutio*: 1.8.ext.6, 2.7.12, 2.7.15, 2.9.3, 3.1.3, 4.6.2, 5.6.ext.1, 5.8.1, 6.3.9, 6.9.1, 8.1.amb.1, 9.3.4, 9.10.1 *pulsatum* (9.10.ext.2), *plagas* (9.10.ext.2), *vapulaverant* (9.10.ext.2). *vapulo* is the only occurrence in all V and *plagas* only reappearing at 3.2.ext.2 *plagam*. Also see my comments below at *vapulaverant* (9.10.ext.2).
[32] Also see Liv. 8.21 and Oakley for Velitrae see (1997: 6.12.6, 507-8).
[33] Liv. 8.37. The Tusculans were incorporated afterwards into the Papiria tribe: *in qua plurimum postea Tusculani in civitatem recepti potuerunt* (9.10.1).

sub corona venire: 'To be sold as slaves'. This expression means the same as *sub hasta venire*, that is, the image of the spear stuck into the ground indicating a public auction, selling slaves (OLD. 2a).[34]

9.10.2

Summary: In 83 BC the Roman citizens living in Utica burn the governor Fabius Hadrianus alive.

approbavit: For the discourse on legitimate and illegitimate executions in V9 see my comments in the introduction to 9.2.[35] Unlike elsewhere in V9, note how V does not specify here whether this killing was deserved or undeserved. The author leaves this moralizing question open, allowing the reader to form their own opinion. Hadrianus' own death has become, in extant sources, the distinguishing fact about his life. So his death becomes memorable for the wrong reasons, an otherwise less known person achieves fame via a horrific death. This is comparable to my comments on Tarpeia (9.6.1), a woman who would have had little impact in society had she not become a byword for *perfidia* via her actions. The context of this *exemplum* makes an interesting contrast to Tiberian Rome, since the emperor took a strong position against gubernatorial corruption, thus amassing many convictions. In fact, Tiberius secured justice for his people so that the public burning of a Roman as happens in this *exemplum* was, at least during Tiberius' reign, avoidable.

[34] For the expression *sub corona venire* see also Cael. 2.3, Fest. 306.38, Gel. 6.4.3. On slavery as a theme in V9 see my comments under *mancipium* (9.4.ext.1).
[35] Unlike elsewhere in V9, note how V does not specify here whether this killing was deserved or undeserved. The author leaves this moralizing question open, allowing the reader to form their own opinion.

sordido: 'Avarice' (OLD. 8).[36] None of the characters in *de avaritia* (9.4) are murdered as *punishment*, that is, as a result of their avarice, because V does not wish to portray the *exempla* in 9.4 from a retributive perspective (unlike 9.10), focusing instead on how *avaritia per se* brings about social disharmony. In fact avarice becomes the killer's motivation for murder at 9.4.3, to *gain* wealth. Cicero, Livy and V all produce versions in which Hadrianus' *avaritia* and general personality were the cause for his murder.[37] I see the confluence of Hadrianus' presentation in the sources as a reflection of the universality in Rome of V's statement *senatus et consensus omnium* (9.10.2).

cives Romanos: Cicero and V both make Roman citizens responsible for the death of Hadrianus. Orosius (5.20) more specifically claims that the killers were the masters of the slaves that Hadrianus was using to attempt to gain the rule of Africa.[38]

exustus: According to Orosius, the whole household, not just Hadrianus, are burnt alive: *cum omni familia vivus incensus est* (5.20.3).[39]

9.10.externa

9.10.ext.1

[36] Cic. *Phil*.6.13; Sen. *Ben*. 4.24.2; *Ep*. 108.9; Quint. *Inst*. 5.13.26; Suet. *Nero* 30.1; *Dom*. 8.2; Hor. *S*. 1.1.65, 2.2.53.

[37] *ille, quod eius avaritiam cives Romani ferre non potuerunt* (Cic. *Ver*. 2.1.70); *propter crudelitatem et avaritiam suam* (Liv. *Per*. 86). Orosius is in disagreement, presenting the following instead: *regnum Africae servorum manu adfectans, a dominis eorum apud Uticam congestis sarmentis cum omni familia vivus incensus est* (5.20.3).

[38] The *populares* were often accused of applying violence to slaves, see Plut. *Mar*. 35.5, 41.2, 42.2, 43.3; *Sert*. 5.5. Also see Lovano (2002: 34). For more on the *populares* in V9 see 9.7.

[39] Both Cicero (*Ver*. 2.1.70) and Livy (*Per*. 86) confirm that Hadrianus was burnt alive.

Summary: Queens Tomyris (530 BC) and Berenice (246 BC) take revenge for their sons' deaths.

Here there are two stories in one, connected simply by an '*et*', putting on the same level what the two queens have in common: the deaths of their sons and wanting to avenge those deaths. The *exemplum* is made of a single sentence which spans ten lines, making it one of the longest sentences in V9.

The only female protagonists of the *domestic exempla* of V9 are Tarpeia and Tullia.[40] However, there are more women who are categorized as non-Roman in V9, so that the author can vary his material and implicitly imply the preponderance of vice, alongside their other exotic and unusual characteristics, in non-Roman women compared to domestic ones.[41]
It might be that this reflects a perception that foreigners are also in some way more easily exemplified by women, who are themselves perennial outsiders (in political terms).

Considering the strong connection between revenge and drama, Tomyris and Berenice display masculine images in their violent, angry actions, comparable to Euripides' Medea.[42] There are no mentions of Medea at all in V, but I find implicit resonances to her character in V9.[43]

[40] See my comments at 9.6.1.
[41] Samiramis queen of Assyria (9.3.ext.4); two queens: Tomyris and Berenice (9.10.ext.1); Thebe, wife of king Alexander of Pherae (9.13.ext.3); Laodice, wife of king Antiochus (9.14.ext.1); the women of Mediolanum (today's Milan) [*muliebris temeritas*] (9.15.ext.1).
[42] For these traits in Medea see Burnett (1973); Kerrigan (1996: 88-111, 315-343).
[43] See 9.5.praef and under *aemulatus … dissimulare* (9.5.ext.1). For an even more masculine characterization in V9 see Samiramis, queen of Assyria (9.3.ext.4). For the extent to which poetic sources, techniques, and motifs have been employed in Roman historiography see Woodman (1988: 98-100, 180-5); Wiseman (1994: 41-56).

Tomyris.[44]

Trogus, upon whom V bases this *exemplum*, chooses Herodotus' version of Cyrus' death over Xenophon's.[45] However, as Griffith argues: 'it may be questioned whether the account was ever really the most credible. Herodotus was drawn towards the most romantic and poetic versions of a story and what he admired most seemed to him the likeliest to be true'.[46] What neither Trogus nor V mention, unlike Herodotus, is that Tomyris' son, Spargapises (V does not name him), is not murdered but commits suicide.[47]

In Herodotus, Tomyris states that Cyrus relied on the effects of wine as trickery rather than engaging in actual battle to conquer and slaughter the enemy.[48] From this perspective, one can notice that V's positioning of this *exemplum* runs parallel to 9.1.ext.1, also the first external *exemplum* of that chapter, where the Romans rely on wine and trickery to conquer Hannibal.[49] Both *exempla* encapsulate the moral ambiguity of wine as poison on the one hand, and on other as a source of *luxuria* or pleasure.[50] The imagery V creates here at 9.10.ext.1 by *sanguine … insatiabilem cruoris* is also present in Herodotus, namely, the excess of blood: the blood coming from Cyrus himself and the blood joining it from the human gore.[51] The element of wine is symbolic from Tomyris' point of view, since 'Cyrus the drinker of wine is in truth a drinker of blood, so he will be served blood just as if it were

[44] 530 BC. Her. 1.206-214; Xen. *Cyr*. 8.7; Just. *Epit*.1.8; Oros. 2.7; Polyaenus, *Strat*. 8.28.
[45] In Xenophon (*Cyrop*. 8.7) Cyrus simply dies peacefully in bed.
[46] Griffith (1996: 116). For credibility in V9 see: *vix mihi ueri similia narrare uideor* (9.2.1); *Vix ueri simile est* (9.12.2). In Polyaenus, Cyrus' death is aided by wine and food (luxuries) which has resonances of 9.1.ext.1.
[47] Hdt. 1.213.
[48] 1.212.
[49] Since V follows Trogus, for the element of wine see Just. Epit.1.8.
[50] Also as the first *exemplum* of an external section of V9 see 9.3.ext.1 on the effect of being drunk, see my comments under Clitus.
[51] For the likelihood that V read Herodotus, Racine argues: 'Ammianus knew his Herodotus through an intermediary such as Valerius Maximus' (Racine 2016: 197). For Herodotus being read by Cicero, Livy and Sallust see Racine (2016: *passim*). For another outrage on the dead involving a head in V9 see 9.4.3.

undiluted wine'.[52] Another Herodotean association in this chapter's external section is the whipping in 9.10.ext.2, which, immediately after this *exemplum* involving Cyrus, would make the reader think about Cyrus' whipping the son of a noble Mede.[53]

caput Cyri … iussit: Disrespect for the dead is a theme in V9 especially 9.4.3 (also involving the victim's head).[54] Here V follows Trogus in the same sequence of words: *cuput Cyri abscisum in utrem humano sanguine repletum* and, a few words later, *insatiabilem*.[55]

insatiabilem … sitim: Thirst that is never satiated is a theme in V9, see the main introduction and 9.4. The closeness of these two words to each other emphasizes the intensity (almost to the point of frenzy) of the thirst. Also notice the alliteration of the sibilants contributing to the same quick-fire effect.[56]

Berenice.[57]

Berenice was the wife of King Antiochus II Theos (9.14.ext.1). Antiochus' first wife was Laodice, also featured here and at 9.14.ext.1.[58] V is dinstinctive in his recounting of this *exemplum*, since neither Justin nor Polyaenus mention Berenice's actions involving the chariot, spear and her killing of Caeneus.

[52] Hartog (1988: 167).
[53] Hdt. 1.114. On whipping generally in Hdt. see 3.130; 7.22, 7.35, 7.54, 7.56, 7.223; 88.109.
[54] *quod militum corpora … sepulturae mandare non potuissent* (9.8.ext.2); *nihil ultra sepulcri honorem dari potuit* (9.8.ext.1). Disrespect for the dead is *passim* in V9 but note especially 9.2 and 9.4.1 (the latter, moral rather than physical disrespect).
[55] Just. *Epit*. 1.8.13.
[56] *satiatus* 9.2.1; *satiarent* 9.2.ext.1.
[57] 246 BC. Polyaenus, *Strat*. 8.50; Just. *Epit.* 27.1.
[58] At 9.14.ext.1 V states that Laodice murdered Antiochus.

insidiis: Treachery and trickery apply to 9.14.ext.1 and to both episodes in this *exemplum*.[59] What did the treachery consist of in this episode? Laodice did not think her son's position as heir to the throne was secure as long as Berenice's son was still alive, so she arranged for his murder.[60]

saxo ictum prostravit: Stoning in V9 see 9.7.2 *lapidibus prosternere*.

super eius corpus actis equis: Comparable to Tullia running over her father's body (9.11.1).

9.10.ext.2

Summary: In 370 BC Iason of Thessaly is murdered by a group of youths.

What is distinctive here is V's version of Iason of Pherae's murder, not found elsewhere.[61] V presents the episode in terms of two linked revenges. First, Taxillus, by permission from Iason, beats the men who had beaten him. Second, these men kill Iason in revenge for giving permission to Taxillus to beat them. Note the escalation in the severity of the *ultio*.[62] While these two revenges belong to the same *exemplum*, the two at 9.10.ext.1 are separate *exempla* but are joined by the author because of what the two women have in common, namely, their revenge for their murdered sons.

[59] For the role and vocabulary of treachery and trickery in V9 see 9.6.
[60] Polyaenus, *Strat* 8.50.
[61] The other two extant sources are Xen. *Hellen*. 6.4.31; Diod. Sic. 15.60.5. On a more fortunate episode in Iason's life in V see 1.8.ext.6 (V's only other mention of the ruler).
[62] Indicative of the vicious circle and worsening of a situation that *vitia* cause.

satis iusta … **ambiguae aestimationis**: In the introduction to this chapter I alluded to the moral quandary of the just versus unjust found in V9.[63] Here, however, the vengeance does not seem ambiguous (*ambiguae*), as V puts it, but it is clearly disproportionate when the reader is given the context of Iason's assassination; and this is also clear by the closing sentence of the *exemplum*. Perhaps *ambiguae* is used rhetorically to encourage the reader to be ready to ponder the nature of vengeance for themselves from the start, so that when they reached the end of the *exemplum*, a certain satisfaction would be felt by the reader when their conclusion matched V's closing sentence.[64] This rhetorical move by V furnishes the first ten chapters of V9 with a final flourish, implicitly communicating to the reader that if one had reached the same conclusion as V then one had, or had attained (by engaging with V's writings), a good moral compass.[65]

gymnasiarcho: A high ranking, prestigious official with the general oversight of order and discipline in the gymnasium, the physical training of youths and possibly literary instruction.[66] *Gymnasiarchus* is used again in V9 at 9.12.ext.7. It is a word that appears only in these two cases in V and is very rare in Latin literature.[67] The gymnasium theme resurfaces in V9 six times, with only two other reoccurrences in other books. The word's concentrated presence in V9 is curious since it is not associated with vice in this book and it is not portrayed negatively.[68]

---

[63] *quoniam ista quaestio in* <u>*ambiguo*</u> *versatur* (9.14.praef). <u>*nesciam*</u> *primum quem detestere* (9.1.7); *adeo ut nescias … habendum sit* (9.1.ext.1); *nescio … vincere* (9.3.1); *nescias … imprudentius* (9.5.ext.2); *opinatio nescio* (9.9.3). *quanto enim* <u>*levius*</u> *… abest*? (9.11.7). *igitur in* <u>*dubio*</u> *… exstincta* (9.3.8); *in dubio … poneret* (9.6.ext.2). <u>*utrum*</u> *interfector* <u>*an*</u> *captivus* (9.8.1); *an qui pudicitiam … an qui religionem stupro permutarunt* (9.1.7); *an tu qui decem … compensas* (9.1.4) [sometimes via the first person or authorial person or via the *exempla*'s characters *per se*, but both reflect V's own moral quandaries, dilemmas, anxieties].
[64] Appealing to the reader's emotions is an important facet to V9, see my main introduction.
[65] On the didactically moral element in V9 see my main introduction.
[66] See Gardiner (2003: 78), Vitale (2014), Schuler (2004), Lewis (1983).
[67] Also see Cic. *Ver*. 2.4.92.
[68] *Gymnasium* in V9: 9.2.ext.5, 9.12.ext.7 (two instances), 9.12.ext.9, 9.14.ext.2; elsewhere in V: 3.6.1, 8.15.ext.4.

quibusdam iuvenibus: While V is vague on the actual numbers, by contrast Xenophon and Diodorus specify *seven* young men. Crowds are the theme for 9.7 and, as here, V makes a point of highlighting a group's response to harsh discipline.[69] Discipline and revenge do not feature in the accounts by Xenophon and Diodorus who portray Iason favourably.[70] Motive for the murder differs between the sources too. Xenophon's reading is particularly interesting in view of V9's moral discourse on tyrants, attributing the murder to the Greeks' fear that Iason might become a tyrant, yet no tyrant-like attributes have been associated by extant sources. For V's reading of the *exemplum* see the next entry below.

aut tricenas … imponeret: The two possibilities left open to Taxillus could be seen as a test of character. Would Taxillus' priority be to escalate his revenge with more violence?[71] The two options could also be interpreted as a ruler giving a citizen choice, a sign of *liberalitas*; if this were the case it would be an exception in V9 in connection to a ruler.[72] In V, the fact that an option was available to Taxillus and that Iason was not responding to a threat directed at himself but was safeguarding a third party's honour, are signs of a benevolent ruler who cared about his subjects. V is the only source to provide more of a glimpse into Iason's character from a literary angle; after all, this *is* V's Iason and not a glimpse into the real Iason. And V does not call Jason a tyrant here or at 1.8.ext.6. Therefore I see V's interpretation of the *exemplum* not in terms of a ruler's tyrant-like attributes but the use of violence of a group fighting a person of authority who has displayed a certain *severitas* or excessive disciplinary practices (an extension to 9.7's theme). In addition to Iason's stance against the youths one must also take into account Taxillus himself, who (although we are not told) may have previously challenged the young men too severely, which prompted their

[69] Particularly compare to 9.7.mil.Rom.3.
[70] 'At any rate this man, great as he was and purposing deeds so great and of such a kind' (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.31). 'was reputed to be governing his subjects with moderation' (Diod. Sic. 15.60.5).
[71] On the vicious circle of violence see the footnote in the introduction to this *exemplum*
[72] The last mention of money in V9 is at 9.1.4.

violence against him in the first place.[73] The manner in which V presents this story, with its emphasis on challenging others too severely and causing matters to escalate and back-fire, will remind the reader of the earlier *exemplum* in V9 at 9.7.mil.Rom.3.[74]

vapulaverant: The term *vapulo* suggests that the caning was closer to an educational correction, rather than constituting a severe judicial response (such as *verbero*). *Vapulo* indicates a disproportionate reaction by the youths, comparable to the mob-driven violence of 9.7. V uses verbs denoting 'beating' twice more in this chapter: *pulsatum* (from the beginning of this *exemplum*) and *verberatos* (9.10.1). The less common *vapulo*, that V chooses here, is used mainly in Roman poetry, especially comedy.[75]

animi non corporis dolore: On mind and body see 9.1.praef. *Dolor*, in the sense of being offended or slighted rather than physical pain, is a theme in V9. See my comments under *quia interfari* (9.5.2) and 9.3.praef. The reason for a mental *dolor* here is that the recipients of the floggings are free men rather than slaves.[76] Taxillus' *dolor* (because of his official position as gymnasiarch) is implicit by the fact that he reported his beatings by the young men to the king in the first instance.

irritamento: Only here with the meaning of 'wound' (moral, not a physical wound, comparable to my comments below under *animi non corporis dolore*). Elsewhere in V it has a meaning of 'provocation, stir, stimulus, incentive'.[77]

---

[73] For the roles and duties of a gymnasiarch see above (including keeping discipline, training etc).
[74] *praefractius et ridigius astringere conatum*.
[75] Ter. *Ph*. 249, *Ad*. 213. Pl. *As*. 404, *Aul*. 457, *Rud*. 1401, *Trin*. 990. Mart. 6.46.1, 12.57.17. Juv. 3.289. It is rarely used in prose. For more on beatings and floggings see above *verberatos … percuti* (9.10.1).
[76] The fact that they are youths (*iuvenibus*) takes us back to 9.1.6-7 on the vices of the youth, also see my main introduction on the generational gap in Roman society as a theme in V9.
[77] See 9.11.4; 8.11.ext.4; 7.4.3; 4.5.ext.1; 2.6.1.

Bibliography

Abbot, J. (2000) The *Aeneid* and the Concept of *Dolus Bonus*. **Vergilius** 46: 59-82.

Adams, J. (1982) **The Latin Sexual Vocabulary**. Duckworth.

---. (1991) The Uses of *Neco* II. **Glotta** 69: 94-123.

Adams, R. (1985) Involuntary Sins. **Philosophical Review** 94: 3-31.

Adornato, G. (2012) Phalaris: Literary Myth or Historical Reality? Reassessing Archaic Akragas. **American Journal of Archaeology** 116. 3: 483-506.

Africa, T. (1970) The One-Eyed Man Against Rome: An Exercise in Euhemerism. **Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte** 19.5: 528–538.

Alewell, K. (1913) **Über das Rhetorische Paradeigma**. PhD thesis. Leipzig University.

Allen, W. (1944) Cicero's House and *Libertas*. **Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association** 75: 1-9.

Altman, W. (2016) **The Revival of Platonism in Cicero's Late Philosophy: *Platonis aemulus* and the Invention of Cicero**. Rowman and Littlefield.

Anderson, P. (2016) "Heracles' Choice: Thoughts on the Virtues of Print and Digital Commentary". In: Kraus, C. and Stray, C. (eds.) **Classical Commentaries: Explorations in a Scholarly Genre**. Oxford University Press: 483-493.

Andrews, A. (1948) Oysters as a Food in Greece and Rome. **The Classical Journal** 43.5: 299-303.

Annas, J (1989) Epicurean Emotions. **Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies** 30: 145-164.

Arbor, A. (ed.) (2005) **Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic**. Cambridge University Press.

Arena, V. (2012) ***Libertas* and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic**. Cambridge University Press.

Arieti, J. (1990) Horatian Philosophy and the Regulus Ode (*Odes* 3.5). **Transactions of the American Philological Association** 120: 209-220.

Arthur, P. (1991) "Territories, Wine and Wealth: Suessa Aurunca, Sinuessa, Minturnae and the *Ager Falernus*". In: Barker, G. (eds.) **Roman Landscapes**. Archaeological Monographs of The British School at Rome.

Ash, R. (2002) "Between Scylla and Charybdis? Historiographical Commentaries on Latin Historians". In: Gibson, R. and Kraus, C. (eds.) **The Classical Commentary: Histories, Practices, Theory**. Brill: 269-294.

Astin, A. (1988) *Regimen Morum*. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 78: 14-34.

Attanasio, D. (ed.) (2006) **The Isotopic Signature of Classical Marbles**. L'erma di Bretschneider.

Aubrion, E. (1989) Tacite et la *Misericordia*. **Latomus** 48: 383-391.

Auguet, R. (1994) **Cruelty and Civilization: the Roman Games**. Routledge.

Bailey, C. (1947) (ed.) **Titi Lucretii Cari *De Rerum Natura Libri Sex***. Oxford University Press.

Ballengee, J. (2009) **The Wound and the Witness: The Rhetoric of Torture**. SUNY Press.

Balmer, J. (2004) **Poems of Love and Hate**. Tarset Bloodaxe.

Balsdon, J. (1962) **Roman Women: Their History and Habits**. Bodley Head.

---. (1969) **Life and Leisure in Ancient Rome**. Bodley Head.

Baltrusch, E. (1989) ***Regimen Morum*: die Reglementierung des Privatlebens der Senatoren und Ritter in der römischen Republik und frühen Kaiserzeit**. Beck.

Bannon, C. (2001) Servitudes for Water Use in the Roman *Suburbium*. **Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte** 50: 34–52.

---. (2009) **Gardens and Neighbors: Private Water Rights in Roman Italy**. University of Michigan Press.

---. (2014) C. Sergius Orata and the Rhetoric of Fishponds. **The Classical Quarterly** 64.1: 166-182.

Barlow, C. (1977) The *Sanctius Aerarium* and the *Argento Publico* Coinage. **The American Journal of Philology** 98.3: 290-302.

---. (1980) The Roman Government and the Roman Economy 92-80 B.C. **The American Journal of Philology** 101. 2: 213-4.

Bartel, H. (2010) "Dressing the Other, Dressing the Self". In: Bartel, H. (ed.) **Unbinding Medea**. Legenda: 161-175.

Bartsch, S. (2006) **The Mirror of the Self: Sexuality, Self-knowledge, and the Gaze in the Early Roman Empire**. University of Chicago Press.

Basson, W. (1984) Vergil's Mezentius: a Pivotal Personality. **Acta Classica** 27: 57-70.

Batstone, W. (1988) The Antithesis of Virtue: Sallust's Synkrisis and the Crisis of the Late Republic. **Classical Antiquity** 7: 1-29.

Bauman, R. (1985) **Lawyers in Roman Transitional Politics: a Study of the Roman Jurists in their Political Setting in the Late Republic and Triumvirate**. Beck.

---. (1992) **Women and Politics in Ancient Rome**. Routledge.

Beagon, M. (1992) **Roman *Natura*: The Thought of Pliny the Elder**. Oxford University Press.

Bellemore, J. (1989) **Valerius Maximus as a Source for his own Times**. PhD thesis. University College London.

---. (2015) "Valerius Maximus and His Presentation of Alexander the Great". In: Wheatley, P. (ed.) **East and West in the World Empire of Alexander: Essays in Honour of Brian Bosworth.** Oxford University Press: 299-316.

Beness, A. (1990) The Death of Lucius Equitius on 10 December 100 B.C. **The Classical Quarterly** 40.1: 269-272.

---. (2001) The Theatricality of the Deaths of C. Gracchus and Friends. **The Classical Quarterly** 51.1: 135-140.

Berger, A. (1953) **Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law** Vol. 43. The Lawbook Exchange Limited.

Bettini, M. (2000) "*Mos*, *Mores* und *Mos Maiorum*: Die Erfindung der Sittlichkeit in der römischen Kultur." In: Braun, M. (ed.) ***Moribus Antiquis Res Stat Romana***. K.G. Saur: 303-352.

Bianchetti, S. (1987) **Falaride e Pseudofalaride: Storia e leggenda**. L'erma di Bretschneider.

Bilinski, B. (1958) **Accio ed i Gracchi**. Signorelli.

Bittarello, M. (2009) The Construction of Etruscan "Otherness" in Latin Literature. **Greece & Rome** 56. 2: 211-23.

Blake, M. (1947) **Ancient Roman Construction in Italy From the Prehistoric Period to Augustus**. Kraus Reprint.

---. (1973) **Roman Construction in Italy from Nerva through the Antonines**. American Philosophical Society.

Blank-Sangmeister, U. (ed.) (1992) **Valerius Maximus. *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia*. Denkwürdige Taten und Worte**. Reclam.

Bliss, F. (1951) **Valerius Maximus and His Sources: a Stylistic Approach to the Problem**. PhD thesis. University of North Carolina.

Bloomer, W. (1987) **Valerius Maximus and the Idealized Republic: A Study in his Representation of Roman History**. PhD thesis. Yale University.

---. (1992) **Valerius Maximus and the Rhetoric of the New Nobility**. The University of North Carolina Press.

---. (1997) "A Preface to the History of Declamation: Whose Speech? Whose History?" In: Habinek T. (ed.) **The Roman Cultural Revolution**. Cambridge University Press: 199-215.

---. (1997b) Schooling in Persona: Imagination and Subordination in Roman Education. **Classical Antiquity** 16.1: 57-78.

Bobzien, S. (1997) Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and their Relation to Ethics. **Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies** 41: 71-89.

Bodel, J. (1997) Monumental Villas and Villa Monuments. **Journal of Roman Archaeology** 10: 5-35.

---. (1999) "Punishing Piso". In: Damon, C. (ed.) **The *Senatus consultum de Cn. Pisone patre*: text, translation, discussion**. Johns Hopkins University Press: 43-64.

Boedeker, D. (1988) Protesilaos and the End of Herodotus' *Histories*. **Classical Antiquity** 7: 30-48.

Boissevain, J. (1974) **Friends of Friends. Networks, Manipulation and Coalitions**. Oxford.

Bollansée, J. (2008) Clearchus' Treatise 'On Modes of Life' and the Theme of 'tryphè'. **Ktema** 33: 403-411.

Bömer, F. (1966) Caesar und sein Gluck. **Gymnasium** 73: 63-85.

Bonner, S. (1966) Lucan and the Declamation Schools. **The American Journal of Philology** 87: 257-289.

---. (1977) **Education in Ancient Rome**. University of California Press.

Bos, A (2003) **The Soul and Its Instrumental Body: a Reinterpretation of Aristotle's Philosophy of Living Nature**. Brill.

Bosch C. (1929) **Die Quellen des Valerius Maximus**. Kohlhammer.

Bosworth, A. (1977) “Alexander and Ammon”. In Kinzl, K. (ed.), **Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory**. Berlin: 51-75.

---. (1980) “Alexander and the Iranians”. **The Journal of Hellenic Studies** 100:5-8.

---. (1998) “Calanus and the Brahman Opposition”. In: Will, W. (ed.) **Alexander der Grosse: eine Welteroberung und ihr Hintergrund**. Habelt: 180-203.

---. (2004) Mountain and Molehill? Cornelius Tacitus and Quintus Curtius. **The Classical Quarterly** 54. 2: 551-567.

Bowditch, L. (2006) Propertius and the Gendered Rhetoric of Luxury and Empire: a Reading of 2.16. **Comparative Literature Studies** 43.3: 306-325.

Boyd, B. (1987) *Virtus Effeminata* and Sallust’s Sempronia. **Transactions of the American Philological Association** 117: 183-201.

Boyle, A. (1994) (ed.) **Seneca’s *Troades***. Francis Cairns.

Bradley, K. (1987) **Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire** Latomus.

---. (1994) **Slavery and Society at Rome**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (2011) “Slavery in the Roman Republic”. In: Bradley, K. (ed.) **The Cambridge World History of Slavery** Volume 1 Cambridge University Press: 241-64.

Braund, D. (1984) **Rome and the Friendly King: the Character of Client Kingship**. St. Martin’s Press.

Braund, S. (1988) **Beyond Anger: a Study of Juvenal’s Third Book of Satires**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (2009) (ed.) **Seneca: *De Clementia***. Oxford University Press.

Bremer, J. (1969) **Hamartia: Tragic Error in the Poetics of Aristotle and in Greek Tragedy**. Adolf M. Hakkert.

Brennan, T. (2000) **The Praetorship in the Roman Republic: Volume 2: 122 to 49 BC**. Oxford University Press.

Briant, P. (2015) **Darius in the Shadow of Alexander**. Translated by Jane Marie Todd. Harvard University Press.

Bridges, E. (2015) **Imagining Xerxes: Ancient Perspectives on a Persian King**. Bloomsbury Academic.

Briscoe, J. (1981) (ed.) **Commentary on Livy Books 34-37**. Oxford University Press.

---. (1993) Some Notes on Valerius Maximus. **Sileno** 19: 395-408.

---. (1998) (ed.) *Valeri Maximi Facta et dicta memorabilia*. B.G. Teubner.

Broughton, T. (1986) **The Magistrates of the Roman Republic**, Vol. 3. Scholars Press.

Brouwer, H. (1989) ***Bona Dea*: The Sources and a Description of the Cult**. Brill.

Bruggisser, P. (2002) *Audacia* in Sallusts “Verschwörung des Catilina”. **Hermes** 130.3: 265-287.

Brunt, P. (1962) The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 52: 69-86.

---. (1966) The Roman Mob. **Past and Present** 35.1: 3-27.

---. (1975) Stoicism and the Principate. **Papers of the British School at Rome** 43: 7-35.

Brutscher, C. (1958) Caesar and sein Gluck. **Museum Helveticum** 15: 75-83.

Burgersdijk, D. (ed.) (2010) **Emperors and Historiography: Collected Essays on the Literature of the Roman Empire**. Brill.

Burke, P. (1974) The Role of Mezentius in the *Aeneid*. **The Classical Journal** 69.3: 202-209.

Burnett, A. (1973) Medea and the Tragedy of Revenge. **Classical Philology** 68.1: 1-24.

Butler, H. (1909) **Post-Augustan Poetry: From Seneca to Juvenal**. Oxford University Press.

Cairns, D. (2003) "Ethics, Ethology, Terminology". In: Braund, S. and Most, G. (eds.) **Ancient Anger: Perspectives From Homer to Galen**. Cambridge University Press: 11-49.

Cairns, F. (2011) Tarpeia's *Pudicitia* in Propertius 1.16.2 and the Early Roman Historians. **Rheinisches Museum für Philologie** 154.2: 175-184.

Calhoon, C. (2010) "Is There an Antidote to Caesar?" In: Turner, A. and Chong-Gossard, J. and Vervaet, F. (eds.) **Private and Public Lies: the Discourse of Despotism and Deceit in the Graeco-Roman World**. Brill : 271-294.

Campi, A. (1997) "La Clementia di Cesare nel *De Bello Gallico*". In: Sordi, M. (ed.) **Amnistia, perdono e vendetta nel mondo antico**. Contributi dell'Istituto di Storia Antica 23. Scienze Storiche 63: 253-270.

Canter, H. (1933) The Mythological Paradigm in Greek and Latin Poetry. **The American Journal of Philology** 54: 201-24.

Carey, S. (2003) **Pliny's Catalogue of Culture: Art and Empire in the *Natural History***. Oxford University Press.

Carney, E. (1981) The Death of Clitus. **Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies** 22: 149-160.

---. (2000) "Artifice and Alexander History". In: Baynham, E. (ed.) **Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction**. Oxford University Press: 263-285.

---. (2010) **Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives**. Oxford University Press.

Carney, T. (1961) The Death of Sulla. **Acta Classica** 4: 64-79.

---. (1962) The Picture of Marius in Valerius Maximus. **Rheinisches Museum für Philologie** 105: 289-337.

Carter, C. (1975) "Valerius Maximus". In: Dorey, T. (ed.) **Empire and Aftermath: Silver Latin ii**. Routledge and Kegan Paul: 26-56.

Castner, C, (1985) Difficulties in Identifying Roman Epicureans: Orata in Cicero *De Fin*. 2.22.70. **The Classical Journal** 81: 138-147.

Cavaggioni, F. (1998) **L. Apuleio Saturnino: *Tribunus Plebis Seditiosus***. Istituto Veneto di scienze Lettere ed Arte.

---. (2004) Il Saturnino di Floro: elementi di continuità, omissioni e incongruenze nel ritratto di un *seditiosus*. **Acta Classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debreceniensis** 40-41: 325-337.

Cerutti, S. (1997) The Location of the Houses of Cicero and Clodius and the Porticus Catuli on the Palatine Hill in Rome. **The American Journal of Philology** 118.3: 417-426.

Champlin, E. (1991) **Final Judgments: Duty and Emotion in Roman Wills, 200 B.C.-A.D. 250**. University of California Press.

Chaplin, J. (2000) **Livy's Exemplary History**. Oxford University Press.

---. (2014) "Livy's Use of *Exempla*". In: Mineo, B. (ed.) **A Companion to Livy**. Wiley: 102-113.

Chassignet, M. (1998) "La deuxième guerre punique dans l'historiographie romaine: fixation et évolution d'une tradition". In: David, J. (ed.) **Valeurs et mémoire à Rome: Valère Maxime ou la vertu recomposée**. De Boccard: 55-72.

Chrissanthos, S. (1999) ***Seditio*: Mutiny in the Roman Army 90-40 B.C**. PhD thesis. University of Southern California.

Christenson, D. (2002) *Superbia* in Virgil's *Aeneid*: Who's Haughty and Who's Not? **Scholia** 11: 44-54.

Clark, A. (2007) **Divine Qualities: Cult and Community in Republican Rome**. Oxford University Press.

Claassen, J-M. (1987) Error and the Imperial Household: an Angry God and the Exiled Ovid's Fate. **Acta Classica** 34: 31-47.

Clemente, G. (1981) Le Leggi sul lusso e la società Romana. In: Giardina, A., and Schiavone, A. (eds.) **Società romana e produzione schiavistica**. Laterza. Vol. 3: 1-14.

Coarelli, F. (1983) **II Foro Romano: Periodo Arcaico**. Quasar.

---. (1989) La Casa dell'aristocrazia Romana secondo Vitruvio. In: de Jong (ed.) ***Munus Non Ingratum*: Proceedings of the International Symposium on Vitruvius' *De Architectura* and the Hellenistic and Republican Architecture**. Stichting Bulletin Antieke Beschaving: 178-87.

Coin-Longeray, S. (2011) **L'amour et la haine: études littéraires et lexicales.** Éditions Chemins de Traverse.

Coleman, K. (1990) Fatal Charades: Roman Executions Staged as Mythological Enactments. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 80: 44-73.

Collins II, J. (2015) **Exhortations to Philosophy. The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates and Aristotle**. Oxford University Press.

Combès, R. (ed.) (1997) **Faits et dits mémorables.** Les Belles Lettres.

Connolly, J. (2007) **The State of Speech. Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome**. Princeton University Press.

Constant, P. (ed.) (1935) ***Valère Maxime, Actions et paroles mémorables***. Garnier Frères.

Conte, G. (1994) "The Inventory of the World: Form of Nature and Encyclopedic Project in the Work of Pliny the Elder." In: Conte, G. (ed.) **Genres and Readers. Lucretius, Love Elegy, Pliny's Encyclopedia**. The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Cooley, A. (1998) The Moralizing Message of the *Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre*. **Greece & Rome** 45.2: 199-212.

Cooper, J. (1999) **Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory**. Princeton University Press.

Corbeill, A. (1997) "Dining Deviants in Roman Political Invective". In: Hallett, J. (ed.) **Roman Sexualities**. Princeton University Press: 99-128.

---. (2007) "Rhetorical Education and Social Reproduction in the Republic and Early Empire". In: Dominik W. (ed.) **A Companion to Roman Rhetoric**. Blackwell Publishing: 69-82.

Cornell, T. (1995) **The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars**. Routledge.

Coudry, M. (1998) "La Deuxième Guerre Punique chez Valère Maxime" In: David, J-M. (ed.) **Valeurs et mémoire à Rome: Valère Maxime ou la vertu recomposée**. De Boccard: 45-53.

Cowan, E. (ed.) (2011) **Velleius Paterculus: Making History**. The Classical Press of Wales.

Crawford, M. (2002) "*Tribus*, tessères et régions" in **Comptes Rendus de l'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres** 146: 1125–1135.

Crook, J. (1967) A Study in Decoction. **Latomus** 26: 363-76.

Culham, P. (1982) The *Lex Oppia*. **Latomus** 41: 786-93.

---. (1986) Again, What Meaning Lies in Colour! **Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik** 64: 235–45.

Dalby, A. (2000) **Empire of Pleasure**. Routledge.

D'Aloja, C. (2011) **Sensi e attribuzioni del concetto di *Maiestas***. Edizioni Grifo.

Damon, D. (1997) **The Mask of the Parasite: a Pathology of Roman Patronage**. University of Michigan Press.

Dando-Collins, S. (2010) **The Ides: Caesar's Murder and the War for Rome.** Wiley.

D'Arms, J. (1970) **Romans on the Bay of Naples**. Harvard University Press.

---. (1994) The Culinary Reality of Roman Upper-Class *Convivia*: Integrating Texts and Images. **Comparative Studies in Society and History** 46.3: 428-450.

Dart, C. (2014) **The Social War, 91 to 88 BCE: A History of the Italian Insurgency against the Roman Republic.** Ashgate Publishing Limited.

David, J-M. (ed.) (1998) **Valeurs et mémoire à Rome: Valère Maxime ou la vertu recomposée**. De Boccard.

DeLaine, J. (1989) Some Observations on the Transition from Greek to Roman Baths in Hellenistic Italy. **Mediterranean Archaeology** 2: 111–25.

Dench, E. (1996) "Images of Italian Austerity from Cato to Tacitus". In: Cébeillac-Gervasoni, M. (ed.) **Les Élites municipales de Italie péninsulaire des Gracques à Néron**. Centre Jean Bérard: 247-54.

---. (2005) **Romulus' Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian**. Oxford University Press.

de Sélincourt, A. (1965) (trans.) **The War with Hannibal: Books xxii-xxx of the History of Rome from its Foundation**. Baltimore Penguin books.

Desideri, P. (1984) Catone e le Donne (il dibattito liviano sull'abrogazione della *Lex Oppia*). **Opus** 3: 63-74.

Deslauriers, M. (2012) "Women, Education, and Philosophy". In: James, S. (ed.) **A Companion to Women in the Ancient World**. Wiley-Blackwell: 343-353.

Desmond, W. (2004) Punishments and the Conclusion of Herodotus' *Histories*. **Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies** 44.1: 19-40

Devallet, G. (1996) *Perfidia plus quam Punica*. **LALIES** 16: 17-28.

Dionisotti, A. (1982) From Ausonius' Schooldays: a Schoolbook and its Relatives. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 72: 83-125.

Dixon, S. (2005) **Childhood, Class and Kin in the Roman World**. Routledge.

Dominik, W. (2003) **Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric in Society and Literature**. Routledge.

Donahue, J. (2004) **The Roman Community at Table During the Principate**. University of Michigan Press.

---. (2005) "Towards a Typology of Roman Public Feasting". In: Gold, B. (ed.) **Roman Dining**. A special Issue of American Journal of Philology. The John Hopkins University Press: 95-113.

Doody, A. (2003) **The Encyclopaedic Reader: Changing Approaches to Pliny's Natural History**. PhD Thesis. University of Cambridge.

Doria, C. (2014) 'Uno scandalo del 52 a.C. e la problematica identità di due donne romane (Nota su Val. Max. 9,1,8)'. In: Hallebeek, J. (ed.) ***Inter cives necnon peregrinos***. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 493-500.

Dowling, M. (1995) **The Development of *Clementia* During the Roman Empire**. PhD thesis. Columbia University.

---. (2000) The Clemency of Sulla. **Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte** 49.3: 303-340.

---. (2006) **Clemency and Cruelty in the Roman world**. University of Michigan Press.

DuBois, P. (1991) **Torture and Truth**. Routledge.

Dueck, D. (2000) "Historical *Exempla* in Augustan Rome and their Role in a Geographical Context". In: Deroux, C. (ed.) **Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History X**. Collection Latomus: 176-196.

Duff, T. (1994) **Signs of the Soul: Moralising in the *Parallel Lives***. PhD thesis. Cambridge University.

---. (1999) **Plutarch's *Lives*: Exploring Virtue and Vice**. Oxford University Press.

---. (2011) The Structure of the Plutarchan Book. **Classical Antiquity** 30.2: 213-278.

Dugan, J. (2005) **Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-Fashioning in the Rhetorical Works**. Oxford University Press.

Dunbabin, K. (2003) **The Roman Banquet: Images of Conviviality**. Cambridge University Press.

Dunkle, J. (1967) The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic. **Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association** 98: 151-171.

---. (1971) The Rhetorical Tyrant in Roman Historiography: Sallust, Livy and Tacitus. **The Classical World** 65.1: 12-20.

Dyck, A. (2004) **A Commentary on Cicero, *De legibus***. University of Michigan Press.

Dyer, R. (1965) "*Hamartia*" in the *Poetics* and Aristotle's Model of Failure. **Arion** 4.4: 658-664.

Earl, D. (1961) **The Political Thought of Sallust**. Cambridge University Press.

Edmondson, J. (2011) "Slavery and the Roman Family". In: Bradley, K. (ed.) **The Cambridge World History of Slavery** Volume 1 Cambridge University Press: 337-61.

Edwards, C. (1993) **The Politics of Immorality in Ancient Rome**. Cambridge University Press.

Eldred, K. (1997) **Reading Violence in Lucan's *Pharsalia***. PhD thesis. Princeton University.

Elefante, M. (1999) **Velleio Patercolo: I due libri al console Marco Vinicio**. Loffredo Editore.

Enenkel, K. (2013) **Transformations of the Classics via Early Modern Commentaries**. Brill.

Engberg-Pedersen, T. (1990) **The Stoic Theory of *Oikeiosis*: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy**. Aarhus University Press.

Erskine, A. (1991) Hellenistic Monarchy and Roman Political Invective. **The Classical Quarterly** 41.1: 106-120.

Evans, E. (1950) A Stoic Aspect of Senecan Drama: Portraiture. **Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association** 81: 169-184.

Evans, R. (2007) The Sulpician Law on Debt: Implications for the Political Elite and broader Ramifications. **Acta Classica** 50: 81-94.

Eyben, E. (1972) The Concrete Ideal in the Life of the Young Roman. **L'Antiquité Classique** 41: 200-17.

---. (1993) **Restless Youth in Ancient Rome**. Routledge.

Fagan, G. (1996) Inventor of the Hypocaust? **Phoenix** 50.1: 56-66.

---. (2011) **The Lure of the Arena**. Cambridge University Press.

Fantham, E. (1991) *Stuprum*: Public Attitudes and Penalties for Sexual Offences in Republican Rome. **Echos du Monde Classique** 35: 267-91.

Faranda, R. (ed.) (1972) **Detti e fatti memorabili**. Unione tipografico-editrice torinese.

Farney, G. (2007) **Ethnic Identity and Aristocratic Competition in Republican Rome**. Cambridge University Press

Farron, S. (1993) **Vergil's *Aeneid*: a Poem of Grief and Love**. Brill.

Fears, R. (1981) The Cult of Virtues and Roman Imperial Ideology. **Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt** 2.17.2: 827-948.

Feldherr, A. (1991) **Spectacle and Society in Livy's History**. PhD thesis. Berkeley University.

---. (1997) "*Caeci Avaritia*: Avarice, History, and Vision in Livy V." In: Deroux, C. (ed.) **Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History VIII**. Collection Latomus 239: 268-277.

---. (2009) (ed.) **The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians**. Cambridge University Press.

Finley, M. (1968) "The Silent Women of Rome". In: Finley, M. (ed.) **Aspects of Antiquity**. Penguin: 129-42.

---. (1980) **Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology**. Penguin Books.

Firpo, G. (1997) "Posidonio, Diodoro e gli Etruschi". **Aevum** 71: 103-11.

Fischler, S. (1994) "Social Stereotypes and Historical Analysis: the Case of the Imperial Women at Rome". In: Archer, L. (ed.) **Women in Ancient Societies: An Illusion of the Night**. Routledge: 115-134.

Fisher, N. (2002) "Popular Morality in Herodotus". In: Bakker, E. (ed.) **Brill's Companion to Herodotus**. Brill: 199–224.

Fitzgerald, J. (1997) **Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship**. Scholars Press.

Fitzgerald, W. (2000) **Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination**. Cambridge University Press.

Flamerie de Lachapelle, G. (2006) Trois traits négatifs de la *misericordia* dans le second livre du *De Clementia* de Sénèque. **Les Études classiques** 74: 309-318.

---. (2011) ***Clementia*: recherches sur la notion de clémence à Rome, du début du Ier siècle a.C. à la mort d'Auguste**. De Boccard.

Flower, H. (1996) **Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture**. Oxford University Press.

---. (1998) Rethinking *Damnatio Memoriae*: The Case of Cn. Calpurnius Piso Pater in AD 20. **Classical Antiquity** 17.2:155-185.

---. (2004) Spectacles and Political Culture in the Roman Republic. In: Flower, H. (ed.) **The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (2006) **The Art of Forgetting: Disgrace and Oblivion in Roman Political Culture**. University of North Carolina Press.

Fornara, C. (1983) **The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome**. University of California Press.

Fortenbaugh, W. (1975) **Aristotle on Emotion**. Duckworth.

Fortner, B. (1934) Cicero's Town and Country Houses. **The Classical Weekly** 27.23: 177-181.

Frank, T. (1916) The Decline of Roman Tragedy. **The Classical Journal** 12.3: 176-187.

---. (1920) Ticidas the Neoteric Poet. **The Classical Review** 34: 91-93.

Fraser, P. (1972) **Ptolemaic Alexandria** vols.1-3. Oxford University Press.

Freyburger, G. (1986) ***Fides*: Étude sémantique et religieuse depuis les origines jusqu'à l'époque Augustéenne**. Belles Lettres.

Friedrich, W. (1954) "Caesar und sein Glück". In: Hiltbrunner, O. (ed.) **Thesaurismata: Festschrift für Ida Kapp**. Beck: 1-24.

Galimberti, A. (1998) "*Clementia* e *Moderatio* in Tiberio". In: Sordi, M. (ed) **Responsabilità, perdono e vendetta nel mondo antico**. Contributi dell'Istituto di Storia Antica 24. Scienze storiche 65: 175-190.

Gardiner, N. (2003) **Athletics in the Ancient World**. Dover Publications.

Gardner, J. (1986) **Women in Roman Law and Society**. Croom Helm.

---. (1991) **The Roman Household: a Sourcebook**. Routledge.

Garnsey, P. (1968) Why Penalties Become Harsher: the Roman Case, Late Republic to Fourth Century Empire. **Natural Law Forum** 143: 141 -162.

---. (1970) **Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire**. Oxford University Press.

---. (1996) **Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine**. Cambridge University Press.

Gesztelyi, T. (1982) *Terra Mater* in der Religionspolitik des Augustus. **Acta Classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debreceniensis** 17-18: 141-147.

Giazzon, S. (2011) "*Ira* e *Ultio* nei *Punica* di Silio Italico" in Mantovanelli, P. and Berno, F. (eds.) **Le Parole della passione: studi sul lessico poetico latino**. Patron Editore: 265-291.

Gibson, R. (2002) (ed.) **The Classical Commentary: Histories, Practices, Theory**. Brill.

Gilbert, C. (1973) Marius and *Fortuna*. **The Classical Quarterly** 23.1: 104-107.

Ginsburg, J. (2006) **Representing Agrippina: Constructions of Female Power in the Early Roman Empire**. Oxford University Press.

Golden, C. (2005) **The role of poison in Roman society**. PhD thesis. The University of North Carolina.

Goldhill, S. (1994) "The Failure of Exemplarity". In: de Jong, I. and Sullivan, J. (eds.) **Modern Critical Theory and Classical Literature**. Brill: 51-73.

Goodyear, F. (1984) "Tiberius and Gaius: their Influence and Views on Literature". **Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt** 2.32.1: 603-10.

Gorman, R. and Gorman, V. (2010) Τρυφή and ὕβρις in the περὶ βίων of Clearchus. **Philologus** 154.2: 187-208.

Gowers, E. (1993) **The Loaded Table: Representations of Food in Roman Literature**. Oxford University Press.

---. (2010) Dangerous Sailing: Valerius Maximus and the Suppression of Sextus Pompeius. **The Classical Quarterly** 60.2: 446-9.

Gowing, A. (2005) **Empire and Memory: the Representation of the Roman Republic in Imperial Culture**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (2010) "Caesar Grabs My Pen: Writing Civil War Under Tiberius". In: Breed, B. (ed.) **Citizens of Discord: Rome and its Civil Wars**. Oxford University Press: 649-60.

Graver, M. (1996) **Therapeutic Reading and Seneca's Moral Epistles**. PhD thesis. Brown University.

---. (2002) **Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4**. University of Chicago Press.

Green, W. (1933) The Status of Actors at Rome. **Classical Philology** 28: 301-4.

Greenblatt, S. (1980) **Self-Fashioning: from More to Shakespeare**. University of Chicago Press.

Griffin, J. (1976) Augustan Poetry and the Life of Luxury. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 66: 87-105.

Griffin, M. (2000) "Seneca and Pliny". In: Rowe, C. (ed.) **The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought**. Cambridge University Press: 532-558.

Griffin, M. J. (2005) Utopian Music and the Problem of Luxury. **Utopian Studies** 16.2: 247-266.

Grignon, C. (2001) "Commensality and Social Morphology: an Essay of Typology". In: Scholliers, P. (ed.) **Food, Drink, and Identity: Cooking, Eating, and Drinking in Europe since the Middle Ages**. Oxford University Press: 23-33.

Grilli, A. (ed.) (2010) **Ortensio: testo critico, introduzione, versione e commento**. Pàtron Editore.

Grottanelli, C. (1999) Ideologie del sacrificio umano: Roma e Cartagine. **Archiv für Religionsgeschichte** 1: 41-59.

Gruen E. (1974) **The Last Generation of the Roman Republic**. University of California Press.

---. (1984) **The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome**. University of California Press.

---. (1993) **Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome**. Duckworth.

---. (1995) **The Last Generation of the Roman Republic**. University of California Press.

---. (1995b) “Popular Politics at Rome in the Late Republic”. In: Malkin, I. (ed.) **Leaders and Masses in the Roman World**. Brill: 91-114.

---. (2011) **Rethinking the Other in Antiquity**. Princeton University Press.

Guastella, G. (2001) **L’ira e l’onore: forme della vendetta nel teatro senecano e nella sua tradizione**. Palumbo.

Guerrini, R. (1979) Moduli sallustiani in Valerio Massimo: il capitolo *De luxuria et libidine* (ix.1). **Rendiconti Istituto Lombardo** 113: 152-166.

---. (1981) **Studi su Valerio Massimo**. Giardini editori e stampatori.

Gunderson, E. (2003) **Declamation, Paternity and Roman Identity**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (2013) “Valerius Maximus and the Hysteria of Virtue”. In: Zajko, V. (ed.) **Classical Myth and Psychoanalysis**. Oxford University Press: 199-212.

Habinek, T. (1997) **The Roman Cultural Revolution**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (2000) Seneca’s Renown: *Gloria*, *Claritudo*, and the Replication of the Roman Elite. **Classical Antiquity** 19: 264-303.

Haeussler, R. (2013) **Becoming Roman? Diverging Identities and Experiences in Ancient Northeast Italy**. Left Coast Press.

Hales, S. (2003) **The Roman House and Social Identity**. Cambridge University Press.

Hall, J. (2007) “Oratorical Delivery and the Emotions: Theory and Practice”. In: Dominik W. (ed.) **A Companion to Roman Rhetoric**. Blackwell Publishing: 218-236.

Hall, J. F. (1996) (ed.) **Etruscan Italy: Etruscan influences on the civilizations of Italy from antiquity to the modern era**. Museum of Art, Brigham Young University.

Hall, J. M. (1997) **Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity**. Cambridge University Press.

Halle, L. (1957) **A Study of Moralization in Livy**. PhD thesis. Bryn Mawr College.

Hanson, A. (2003) “Your Mother Nursed you with Bile”: Anger in Babies and Small Children”. In: Braund, S. (ed.) **Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen**. Cambridge University Press: 185-207.

Harrington, J. (2009) ***Mens Sana*: Authorized Emotions and the Construction of Identity and Deviance in the *Saturae* of Juvenal**. PhD Thesis. University of Michigan.

Harris, W. (1986) “The Roman Father’s Power of Life and Death”. In: Bagnall, R. (ed) **Studies in Roman Law**. Brill: 81-95.

---. (2001) **Restraining Rage: the Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity.** Harvard University Press.

---. (2003) “The Rage of Women”. In: Braund, S. and Most G. (eds.) **Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen**. Cambridge University Press: 121-143.

Harrison, S. (1986) Philosophical Imagery in Horace, *Odes* 3.5. **The Classical Quarterly** 36.2: 502-507.

---. (1997) Survival and Supremacy of Rome: The Unity of the Shield of Aeneas. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 87: 70-76.

Harrisson, J. (2009) **Cultural Memory and Imagination: Dreams and Dreaming in the Roman Empire 31 BC – AD 200**. PhD Thesis. University of Birmingham.

Hartog, F. (1988) **The Mirror of Herodotus: the Representation of the Other in the Writing of History**. University of California Press.

Harvey, P. (ed) (1980) **The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature**. Oxford University Press.

Haynes, S. (2005) **Etruscan Civilization: a Cultural History**. Getty Publications.

Heckel, W. (1992) **The Marshals of Alexander's Empire**. Routledge.

Hedrick, C. (2000) **History and Silence: Purge and Rehabilitation of Memory in Late Antiquity**. University of Texas Press.

Hellegouarc'h, J. (1963) **Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République**. Les Belles Lettres.

Helm, J. (1993) "Koros": From Satisfaction to Greed. **The Classical World** 87.1: 5-11.

Helm R. (1940) Beiträge zur Quellenforschung bei Valerius Maximus. **Rheinisches Museum** 89: 241–273.

Henderson, J. (1989) Satire Writes "Woman": Gendersong. **Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society** 215: 50-80.

Henry, G. (1919) Roman Actors. **Studies in Philology** 16: 334-382.

Higginbotham, J. (1997) ***Piscinae*: Artificial Fishponds in Roman Italy**. Chapel Hill.

Hillard, T. (1996) Death by Lightning, Pompeius Strabo and the People. **Rheinisches Museum für Philologie** 139: 135-145.

Hillman, T. (1996) Cinna, Strabo's Army, and Strabo's Death in 87 B.C. **L'antiquité classique** 65: 81-89.

---. (1997) "The Serpent under the Flower: Pompeius Strabo and Q. Sertorius, 89-87 BC". In: Deroux, C. (ed.) **Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History** 8: 85-115.

Hilton, J. and Matthews, L. (2008) Veiled or Unveiled? (Plut. "*Quaest. Rom.*" 267B-C). **The Classical Quarterly** 58.1: 336-342.

Ho, K. (2010) Aristotle's "Hamartia" Reconsidered. **Harvard Studies in Classical Philology** 105: 33-52.

Hock R. (1985) The Role of *Fortuna* in Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*. **Gerión** 3: 141-51.

Hölkeskamp, K. (1993) Conquest, Competition and Consensus: Roman Expansion in Italy and the Rise of the *Nobilitas*. **Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte** 42.1: 12-39.

---. (2010) **Reconstructing the Roman Republic**. Princeton University Press.

Holliday, P. (2002) **The Origins of Roman Historical Commemoration in the Visual Arts.** Cambridge University Press.

Hooff, A. van (1990) **From Autothanasia to Suicide: Self-killing in Classical Antiquity**. Routledge.

Hopkins, K. (1978) **Conquerors and Slaves**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (1983) **Death and Renewal, Sociological Studies in Roman History vol. 2**. Cambridge University Press.

Hopkins, K. and Beard, M. (2005) **The Colosseum**. Profile Books.

Horden, P. (2000) **The Corrupting Sea: a Study of Mediterranean History**. Blackwell.

Hornblower, S. (ed.) (1994) **Greek Historiography**. Oxford University Press.

---. (2011) **Thucydidean Themes**. Oxford University Press.

Hornum, M. (1993) **Nemesis, the Roman State and the Games**. Brill.

Hoyos, D. (2003) **Hannibal's Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western Mediterranean, 247-183 BC**. Routledge.

Hubbard, T. (2003) **Homosexuality in Greece**. University of California.

Hudson, N. (2010) Changing Places: The Archaeology of the Roman *Convivium*. **The American Journal of Archaeology** 114.4: 663-695.

Huzar, E. (1978) **Mark Antony: A Biography**. University of Minnesota Press.

Imber, M. (2008) Life Without Father: Declamation and the Construction of Paternity in the Roman Empire. **Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome. Supplementary Volumes** 7: 161-169.

Impelluso, L. (2003) **Gods and Heroes in Art**. J. Paul Getty Museum.

Ingleheart, J. (2006) What the Poet Saw: Ovid, the Error and the Theme of Sight in *Tristia* 2. **Materiali e Discussioni per l' Analisi dei Testi Classici** 56: 63-86.

Inwood, B. (1993) "Seneca on Emotion and Action". In: Brunschwig, J. (ed.) **Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind**. Cambridge University Press: 150-183.

Isager, J. (1991) **Pliny on Art and Society: the Elder Pliny's Chapters on the History of Art**. Oxford University Press.

Jacquemin, A. (1998) "Valère Maxime, lecteur et utilisateur de Salluste (l'image du deuxième siècle)." In: David, J.-M. (ed.) **Valeurs et mémoire à Rome: Valère Maxime ou la vertu recomposée**. De Boccard.: 97–110.

---. (1998b) "Valère Maxime et Velleius Paterculus: deux façons d'utiliser l'histoire." In: David, J.-M. (ed.) **Valeurs et mémoire à Rome: Valère Maxime ou la vertu recomposée**. De Boccard: 147–156.

---. (1998c) "Plutarque et Valère Maxime." In: David, J.-M. (ed.) **Valeurs et mémoire à Rome: Valère Maxime ou la vertu recomposée**. De Boccard: 157–81.

Janan, M. (1999) "Beyond Good and Evil": Tarpeia and Philosophy in the Feminine. **The Classical World** 92. 5: 429-443.

Jolivet, V. (1987) Xerxes *Togatus*: Lucullus en Campanie. **Mélanges de l'École française de Rome** 99: 875-904.

Joshel, S. (2010). **Slavery in the Roman World**. Cambridge University Press.

Kadleck, S. (2010) **The Ambivalence of Capua in Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita***. PhD Thesis. Indiana University.

Kaster, R. (1997) The Shame of the Romans. **Transactions of the American Philological Association** 127: 1-19.

---. (2002) The Taxonomy of Patience, or When is *patientia* not a Virtue?' **Classical Philology** 97: 133–45.

---. (2005) **Emotion, Restraint and Community in Ancient Rome**. Oxford University Press.

Katz, B. (1981) *Dolor, Invidia* and *Misericordia* in Sallust. **Acta Classica** 24: 71-85.

Kaufman, D. (1932) Poisons and Poisoning Among the Romans. **Classical Philology** 27.2: 156‑167.

Keaveney, A. (1978) Pompeius Strabo's Second Consulship. **The Classical Quarterly** 28.1: 240-241.

Keith, A. (2012) "Women in Augustan Literature". In: James, S. (ed.) **A Companion to Women in the Ancient World**. Wiley-Blackwell: 385-399.

Kellum, B. (1994) The Construction of Landscape in Augustan Rome: The Garden Room at the *Villa ad Gallinas*. **The Art Bulletin** 76.2: 211-224.

Kempf, C. (1888) ***Factorum et dictorum memorabilium libri novem*: *cum Iulii Paridis et Ianuarii Nepotiani epitomis*.** Teubner.

Kennedy, G. (1994) **A New History of Classical Rhetoric**. Princeton University Press.

Kerrigan, J. (1996) **Revenge Tragedy: Aeschylus to Armageddon**. Oxford University Press.

Klotz, A. (1942) **Studien zu Valerius Maximus und den *Exempla***. Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, in Kommission bei der C. H. Beck'schen Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Knoepke, T. (2013) "Rashness in Battle: a Study of *Temeritas* in Book Twenty-Two of Livy's *Ab urbe condita*". In: Johanning, J. and Miller, A. and Simington, B. and Resch, Z. (eds.) **Et tu, Carthago?** Lulu: 51-73.

Knorr, O. (2012) *Morbus Campanus* in Horace, *Satires* 1.5.62. **The Classical Quarterly** 62: 869-873.

Konrad, C. (1987) Some Friends of Sertorius. **The American Journal of Philology** 108: 519-527.

Konstan, D. (1997) **Friendship in the Classical World**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (2005) Clemency as a Virtue. **Classical Philology** 100.4: 337-346.

Kragelund, P. (2001) Dreams, Religion and Politics in Republican Rome. **Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte** 50.1: 53-95.

Kraus, C. (2016) (ed.) **Classical Commentaries: Explorations in a Scholarly Genre**. Oxford University Press.

Krevan, N. (1993) Ilia's Dream: Ennius, Virgil, and the Mythology of Seduction. **Harvard Studies in Classical Philology** 95: 257-271.

Lacey, W. (1970) *Boni Atque Improbi*. **Greece & Rome** 17.1: 3-16.

Laes, C. (2014) **Youth in the Roman Empire**. Cambridge University Press.

Laird, A. (2009) "The Rhetoric of Roman Historiography". In: Feldherr, A. (ed.) **The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians**. Cambridge University Press: 197-213.

Lakoff, R. (1984) **Face Value: the Politics of Beauty**. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Lamberton, R. (2001) **Plutarch**. Yale University Press.

Lane-Fox, R. (2008) **Travelling Heroes in the Epic Age of Homer**. Penguin.

Langlands, R. (2006) **Sexual Morality in Ancient Rome**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (2008) Reading for the Moral in Valerius Maximus: the Case of *Severitas*. **The Cambridge Classical Journal** 54: 160-187.

---. (2011) Roman *Exempla* and Situation Ethics: Valerius Maximus and Cicero *de Officiis*. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 101: 1-23.

Lanza, D. (1977) **Il tiranno e il suo pubblico**. Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi.

Lanzi, S. (2004) **Plutarch: *De Invidia et Odio***. M. D'Auria.

Lao, E. (2008) **Restoring the Treasury of Mind: the Practical Knowledge of the *Natural History***. PhD Thesis. Princeton University.

---. (2011) "Luxury and the Creation of a Good Consumer". In: Gibson, R. (ed.) **Pliny the Elder: Themes and Contexts**. Brill: 35-56.

Larmour , D. (2014) "The Synkrisis". In: Beck, M. (ed.) **A Companion to Plutarch**. Wiley Blackwell: 405-416.

La Rocca, E. (1986) "II lusso come espressione di potere". In: Cima M. and La Rocca, E. (eds.) **Le tranquille dimore degli dei**. Marsilio: 3-35.

Lateiner, D. (1985) "Limit, Propriety and Transgression in the Histories of Herodotus". In: Jameson, M. (ed.) **The Greek Historians: Literature and History. Papers Presented to A. E. Raubitschek**. Saratoga: 87–10.

Laurenti, R. (1988) **Plutarco: sul controllo dell'Ira**. D'Auria Editore di Napoli.

Lavery, G. (1997) Never Seen in Public: Seneca and the Limits of Cosmopolitanism. **Latomus** 56.1: 3-13.

Lawrence, S. (2006) **Inside Out: The Depiction of Externality in Valerius Maximus**. PhD thesis. University of Sydney.

---. (2015) Dead on Time: Valerius Maximus 9.13 and Stoicism. **Antichthon** 49: 135-155.

---. (2016) Putting Torture (And Valerius Maximus) To The Test. **Classical Quarterly** 66: 245-260.

Lazarus, F. (1978) *Fortuna* and Rhetorical Structure in Livy. **The Classical Journal** 74.2: 128-131.

---. (1985) On the Meaning of *Fors Fortuna*: A Hint from Terence. **The American Journal of Philology** 106. 3: 359-367.

Lazenby, J. (1996) **The First Punic War**. Routledge.

Leach, E. (2004) **The Social Life of Painting in Ancient Rome and on the Bay of Naples**. Cambridge University Press.

Leigh, M. (1996) Varius Rufus, Thyestes and the Appetites of Antony. **Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society** 42: 171-97.

---. (1997) **Lucan: Spectacle and Engagement**. Oxford University Press.

Lennon, J. (2014) **Pollution and Religion in Ancient Rome**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (2015) Dining and Obligation in Valerius Maximus: the Case of the *sacra mensae*. **Classical Quarterly** 65.2: 719-31.

Leo, F. (1901) **Die griechisch-römische Biographie nach ihrer litterarischen Form**. Teubner.

Leon, E. (1952) The Psychiatric Cases in Horace, *Satires* 2.3. **The Classical Journal** 47: 211-214.

Leppin, H. (1992) **Histrionen: Untersuchungen zur sozialen Stellung von Bühnenkünstlern im Westen des römischen Reiches zur Zeit der Republik und des Principats**. R. Habelt.

Levene, D. (1992) Sallust's *Jugurtha*: an Historical Fragment. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 82: 53-70.

---. (2012) "You Shall Blot Out the Memory of Amalek': Roman Historians on Remembering to Forget". In: Dignas, B. (ed) **Historical and Religious Memory in the Ancient World**. Oxford University Press: 217-240.

Levi, A. (1971) **Il problema dell'errore nella metafisica e nella gnoseologia di Platone**. Liviana editrice.

Levick, B. (1982) Morals, Politics, and the Fall of the Roman Republic. **Greece & Rome**, Second Series 29.1: 53-62.

---. (1983) The *Senatus Consultum* from Larinum. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 73: 97-115.

---. (2011) "Velleius Paterculus as Senator: a dream with footnotes". In: Cowan, E. (ed.) **Velleius Paterculus: Making History**. The Classical Press of Wales: 1-16.

---. (2003) **Tiberius the Politician** Routledge.

---. (2012) "Women and Law". In: James, S. (ed.) **A Companion to Women in the Ancient World**. Wiley-Blackwell: 96-106.

Lewis, N. (1983) The Metropolitan Gymnasiarchy, Heritable and Salable (A Reexamination of CPR VII 4). **Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik** 51: 85-91.

L'Hoir, F. (1992) **The Rhetoric of Gender Terms: "Man," "Woman" and the Portrayal of Character in Latin Prose**. Brill.

Lind, L. (1972) Concept, Action and Character: the Reasons for Rome's Greatness. **Transactions of the American Philological Association** 103: 235-83.

Linderski, J. (1972) The Aedileship of Favonius, Curio the Younger and Cicero's Election to the Augurate. **Harvard Studies in Classical Philology** 76: 181–200.

Lintott, A. (1972) Imperial Expansion and Moral Decline in the Roman Republic. **Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte** 21: 626-638.

---. (1999) **Violence in Republican Rome**. Oxford University Press.

Litchfield, H. (1914) National *Exempla Virtutis* in Roman literature. **Harvard Studies in Classical Philology** 25: 1–71.

Lloyd, R. (1972) *Superbia* in the *Aeneid*. **The American Journal of Philology** 93: 125-132.

Long, A. (1987) **The Hellenistic Philosophers**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (1996) "Greek Ethics after MacIntyre and the Stoic Community of Reason". In: Long, A. (ed.) **Stoic Studies**. Cambridge University Press: 156-78.

Lott, M. (2012) Ignorance, Shame and Love of Truth: Diagnosing the Sophist's Error in Plato's *Sophist*. **Phoenix** 66: 36-56.

Lovano, M. (2002) **The Age of Cinna: Crucible of Late Republican Rome**. Franz Steiner Verlag.

Lowrance, W. (1939) Roman Dinners and Diners. **The Classical Journal** 35.2: 86-91.

Lucarelli, U. (2007) **Exemplarische Vergangenheit: Valerius Maximus und die Konstruktion des sozialen Raumes in der frühen Kaiserzeit.** Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Luce, T. (1977) **Livy: the Composition of his History**. Princeton.

Lynd, J. (2012) **Aspects of Evil in Seneca's Tragedies**. PhD Thesis. University of Toronto.

Macfarlane, R. (1996) "Etruscan Literary Figures from Horace to Ovid". In: Hall, J. (ed.) **Etruscan Italy**. Provo, UT.

Mackie, N. (1992) "Popularis" Ideology and Popular Politics at Rome in the First Century B.C. **Rheinisches Museum für Philologie** 135. 1: 49-73.

MacMullen, R. (1986) Judicial Savagery in the Roman Empire. **Chiron** 16: 147-166.

Mader, G. (1993) Tyrant and Tyranny in Act III of Seneca's *Oedipus*. **Grazer Beiträge** 19: 103-28.

---. (2014) Figuring (Out) the *Avarus*: Ethics, Aesthetics and Counter-Aesthetics in Horace, *Satire* 1.1. **Classical Journal** 109.4: 419-438.

Maire, S. (1899) *De Diodoro Siculo Valerii Maximi auctore*. **Schoeneberg**: 1-26.

Malaspina, E. (ed.) (2001) ***L. Annaei Senecae De clementia libri duo***. Edizioni dell'Orso.

Manfredini, A. (1992) *Misericordia Ductus*. **Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité** 39: 203-232.

Manning, C. (1973) Seneca and the Stoics on the Equality of the Sexes. **Mnemosyne** 26: 170-77.

---. (1989) Stoicism and Slavery in the Roman Empire. **Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt** II.36.3: 1518-63.

Mantzilas, D. (2012) The Behistun Inscription and the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*. **Phasis** 15: 450-460.

Marincola, J. (2007) (ed.) **A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography**. Blackwell Publishing.

Marshall, B. (1973) Crassus and the *Cognomen Dives*. **Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte** 22.3: 459-467.

---. (1985) Catilina and the Execution of M. Marius Gratidianus. **The Classical Quarterly** 35.1: 124-133.

Martin, J.-P. (1982) ***Providentia deorum*: Recherches sur certains aspects religieux du pouvoir impérial romain**. Rome.

Maslakov, G. (1979) **Tradition and Abridgement: A study of the *exempla* tradition in Valerius Maximus and the Elder Pliny**. PhD thesis. Macquarie University.

---. (1984) Valerius Maximus and Roman Historiography. A Study of the *Exempla* Tradition. **Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt** II 32.1: 437-496.

Massa-Pairault, F. (2001*) Eques Romanus, Eques Latinus*. **Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome** 107: 108-9.

Matthews, L. (2011) **Roman constructions of *fortuna***. DPhil. University of Oxford.

Matthews, M. (2004**) Caesar and the Storm: a Commentary on Lucan, *De Bello Civili*, book 5, lines 476-721**. PhD Thesis. King's College, The University of London.

Mayer, R. (1991) Notes on Seneca *Tragicus*. **The Classical Quarterly** 41: 268.

---. (2008) "Roman Historical *Exempla* in Seneca". In Fitch, J. (ed) **Seneca**. Oxford University Press: 299-315.

Mayor, A. (2011) **The Poison King: the Life and Legend of Mithridates, Rome's Deadliest Enemy**. Princeton University Press.

McCall, M. (1969) **Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison**. Harvard University Press.

McDaniel, W. (1928) Cicero and his House on the Palatine. **The Classical Journal** 23.9: 651-661.

McDermott, W. (1972) Curio Pater and Cicero. **The American Journal of Philology** 93: 381-411.

McDonnell, M. (2006) **Roman Manliness: *Virtus* and the Roman Republic**. Cambridge University Press.

McGing, B. (1982) Synkrisis in Tacitus' *Agricola*. **Hermathena** 132: 15-25.

McGinn, T. (1998) Caligula's brothel on the Palatine. **Echos du Monde Classique** 42 (n.s. 17): 95-107.

---. (2004) **The Economy of Prostitution in the Roman World**. University of Michigan Press.

Merrill, E. (1913) On Cicero to Basilus (*Fam*. VI. 15). **Classical Philology** 8.1: 48-56.

Meyer, S. (2007) **Ancient Ethics**. Routledge.

Milani, C. (1997) "Il lessico della vendetta e del perdono nel mondo classico". In: Sordi, M. (ed.) **Amnistia perdono e vendetta nel mondo antico**. Vita e pensiero.

Miles, D. (1987) **Forbidden Pleasures: Sumptuary Laws and the Ideology of Moral Decline in Ancient Rome**. PhD thesis. University College London.

Millar, F. (1988) Cornelius Nepos, Atticus and the Roman Revolution. **Greece & Rome** 35: 40-55

---. (1998) **The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic**. Michigan University Press.

Miller, J. (ed.) (2010) **Latin Historiography and Poetry in the Early Empire: Generic Interactions**. Brill.

Milnor, K. (2009) "Women in Roman Historiography". In: Feldherr, A. (ed.) (2009) **The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians**. Cambridge University Press: 276-287.

Mirhardy, D. (2000) "The Athenian Rationale for Torture". In: Hunter, V. (ed.) **Law and Social Status in Classical Athens.** Oxford University Press: 53-74.

Mitchell, R. (1995) "Demands for Land Redistribution and Debt Reduction in the Roman Republic". In: Irani, K. (ed.) **Social Justice in the Ancient World**. Greenwood Press: 199-214.

Mix, E. (1965) Cicero and Regulus. **The Classical World** 58.6: 156-159.

---. (1970) **Marcus Atilius Regulus: *Exemplum Historicum***. Mouton.

Moles, J. (1984) Aristotle and Dido's *Hamartia*. **Greece & Rome** 31. 1: 48-54.

Montgomery, A. (2013) Sallust's Scipio: a Preview of Aristocratic *Superbia* (Sal. *Jug*. 7.2-9.2). **The Classical Journal** 109: 21-40.

Monti, R. (1981) Lucretius on Greed, Political Ambition and Society: *de rer. nat*. 3. 59-86**. Latomus** 40.1: 48-66.

Moore, T. (1986) **Roman Virtues in Livy**. PhD Thesis. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Morello, R. (2002) Livy's Alexander Digression (9.17-19): Counterfactuals and Apologetics. **The Journal of Roman Studies**, 92: 62-85.

Morgan, T. (2007) **Popular Morality in the early Roman Empire.** Cambridge University Press.

Morley, N. (2011) “Slavery Under the Principate”. In: Bradley, K. (ed.) **The Cambridge World History of Slavery** Volume 1. Cambridge University Press: 265-86.

Moser, H. (2010) **From Tyranny to Clemency: How Julius Caesar’s Memory Has Fluctuated Throughout Roman History as a Reflection of Imperial Sentiment**. PhD thesis. University of Kent State.

Mueller, H. (1998) *Vita, Pudicitia, Libertas*: Juno, Gender, and Religious Politics in Valerius Maximus. **Transactions of the American Philological Association** 128: 221-263.

---. (2002) **Roman Religion in Valerius Maximus**. Routledge.

Munteanu, D. (2009) *Qualis Tandem Misericordia in Rebus Fictis*? Aesthetic and Ordinary Emotion. **Helios** 36.2: 117-147.

Murphy, J. (1997) *Hubris* and *Superbia*: Differing Greek and Roman Attitudes concerning Arrogant Pride. **Antike Welt** 28.1: 73-81.

Murphy, T. (2004) **Pliny the Elder’s *Natural History*: The Empire in the Encyclopaedia**. Oxford University Press.

Murray, O. 1992. “Falaride tra mito e storia.” In: Braccesi, L. (ed.) **Agrigento e la Sicilia Greca: Atti della Settimana di Studio, Agrigento, 2–8 Maggio 1988**. L’erma di Bretschneider: 47–60.

Murray, P. (2005) ‘The Muses: Creativity Personified?’ In: Stafford, E. (ed.) **Personification in the Greek World: from Antiquity to Byzantium**. Routledge: 147-60.

Nappa, C. (2003) Fire and Human Error in Vergil’s Second *Georgic*. **The American Journal of Philology** 124. 1: 39-56.

Ndiaye, S. (2000) *Minime Romano sacro*, à propos des sacrifices humains à Rome à l'époque républicaine. **Dialogues d’Histoire Ancienne** 26.1: 119-128.

Negarestani, R. (2008) The Corpse Bride: Thinking with Nigredo. **Collapse** 4: 129-60.

Nelson, H. (1950) Cato the Younger as a Stoic Orator. **The Classical Weekly** 44: 65-9.

Nenci, G. (1989) Un nuovo frammento di Clearco sulla tryphè iapigia. **Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa** 19: 893-901.

Nichols, M. (2009) **Vitruvius and the Rhetoric of Display: Wall Painting, Domestic Architecture and Roman Self-fashioning**. University of Cambridge, Ph.D. Thesis.

---. (2010) Contemporary Perspectives on Luxury Building in Second-Century BC Rome. **Papers of the British School at Rome** 78: 39-61.

Nicolet, C. (1974) **L'Ordre équestre à l'époque républicaine (312-43 av. J.-C.)** Vol.2. De Boccard.

Noreña, C. (2009) “The Ethics of Autocracy in the Roman World”. In: Balot, R. (ed.) **A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought**. Wiley-Blackwell: 266-280.

North, J. (1990) Politics and Aristocracy in the Roman Republic. **Classical Philology** 85.4: 277-287.

Nussbaum, M. (1994) **The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics**. Princeton University Press.

Oakley, S. (1987) **A Commentary on Livy Book Nine: Chapters One to Twenty-Eight**. PhD Thesis. University of Cambridge.

---. (1997) **A Commentary on Livy, Books vi-x**, vol. I. Oxford University Press.

---. (1998) **A Commentary on Livy Books vi- x**, vol. II. Oxford University Press.

---. (2005) **A Commentary on Livy Books vi-x**, vol. III. Oxford University Press.

Ober, J, (1981) Rock-Cut Inscriptions from Mt. Hymettos. **Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens** 50: 68–73.

Ogilvie, R. (1965) **A Commentary on Livy Books 1-5**. Oxford Clarendon Press.

Oldfather, C. (trans.) (1989) **Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes** Vol. 4-8. Harvard University Press.

Olson, S. (2013) **Ancient Comedy and Reception: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Henderson**. DeGruyter.

Oltremare, A., (1926) **Les Origines de la Diatribe Romaine**. Payot.

O'Neill, P. (2003). Going Round in Circles: Popular Speech in Ancient Rome. **Classical Antiquity** 22.1: 135-176.

Pagán, E. (2007) Teaching Torture in Seneca *Controversiae* 2.5 **The Classical Journal** 103.2: 165-182.

Paladini, M. (1957) Rapporti tra Velleio Patercolo e Valerio Massimo. **Latomus** 16: 232-251.

Palmer, A. (1964) **The Satires of Horace**. MacMillan.

Papadimitropoulos, L. (2008) Xerxes' *hubris* and Darius in Aeschylus' *Persae*. **Mnemosyne** 61. 3: 451-458.

Paparazzo, E. (2011) "Philosophy and Science in the Elder Pliny's *Naturalis Historia*". In: Gibson, R. (ed.) **Pliny the Elder: Themes and Contexts**. Brill: 89-111.

Parkin, T. (1997) "Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Elderly Members of the Roman Family". In: Rawson, B. (ed.) **The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space**. Oxford University Press: 123-148.

Patterson, J. (2000) **Political Life in the City of Rome**. Bristol Classical Press.

Parker, H. (2004) Why Were the Vestals Virgins? Or the Chastity of Women and the Safety of the Roman State. **The American Journal of Philology** 125.4: 563-601.

Pavlovskis, Z. (1973) **Man in an Artificial Landscape. The Marvels of Civilization in Imperial Roman Literature**. Brill.

Pelling, C. (2009) "The First Biographers: Plutarch and Suetonius". In: Griffin, M. (ed.) **A Companion to Julius Caesar**. Wiley-Blackwell: 239-251.

---. (2011) **Plutarch: Caesar**. Oxford University Press.

Perley, S. (2012) ***Fides Romana*: Aspects of *Fides* in Roman Diplomatic Relations during the Conquest of Iberia**. Master of Arts dissertation. University of Otago.

Petersson, T. (1920) **Cicero: A Biography**. University of California Press.

Pettine, E. (1986) **Plutarco: L'avidità di ricchezze (*De cupiditate divitiarum*)**. Palladio.

Petrone, G. (2002) "L'Atreo di Accio e le passioni del potere". In: Faller, S. and Manuwald, G. (eds.) **Accius und seine Zeit**. Ergon: 245-253.

Plass, P. (1995) **The Game of Death in Ancient Rome: Arena Sport and Political Suicide**. University of Wisconsin Press.

Plato (1996) **Gorgias**. Harvard University Press.

Plescia, J. (1976) "*Patria Potestas* and the Roman Revolution". In: Bertman, S. (ed.) **The Conflict of Generations in Ancient Greece and Rome**. Grüner: 143-170.

Pomeroy, A. (1989) Hannibal at Nuceria. **Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte** 38: 162-76.

Price, B (1975) ***Paradeigma* and *Exemplum* in Ancient Rhetorical Theory**. PhD Thesis. University of California.

Price, S. (1980) Between Man and God: Sacrifice in the Roman Imperial Cult. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 70: 28-43.

Procopé, J. (1993) Epicureans on Anger. In: Most, G. (ed.) **Philanthropia kai Eusebeia. Festschrift für Albert Dihle zum 70 Geburtstag**. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 363- 86.

Purcell, N. (1995) "The Roman Villa and the Landscape of Production". In: Cornell, T. (ed.) **Urban Society in Roman Italy**. UCL Press: 151-80.

Racine, F. (2016) 'Herodotus' Reputation in Latin Literature from Cicero to the 12th Century'. In: Priestley, J. (ed.) **Brill's Companion to the Reception of Herodotus in Antiquity and Beyond**. Brill: 193-212.

Radin, M. (1922) *Secare Partis*: The Early Roman Law of Execution Against a Debtor. **The American Journal of Philology** 43.1: 32-48.

Ramelli, A. (1936) Le fonti di Valerio Massimo. **Athenaeum** 14: 117-152.

Rawson, B. (2006) "Finding Roman Women". In: Rosenstein, N. (ed.) **A Companion to the Roman Republic**. Wiley-Blackwell: 324-341.

Rawson, E. (1974) Religion and Politics in the Late Second Century BC at Rome. **Phoenix** 28.2:193-212.

---. (1976) The Ciceronian Aristocracy and its Properties. In: Finley, M. (eds.) **Studies in Roman Property**. Cambridge University Press: 85–102.

Rich, J. (2010) "Deception, Lies and Economy with the Truth". In: Turner, A. (ed.) **Private and Public Lies: the Discourse of Despotism and Deceit in the Graeco-Roman World**. Brill.

Richlin, A. (1993) Not Before Homosexuality: The Materiality of the *Cinaedus* and the Roman Law against Love between Men. **Journal of the History of Sexuality** 3.4: 523-73.

Riggsby, A. (1997) Public and Private in Roman Culture: the Case of the *Cubiculum*. **The Journal of Roman Archaeology** 10: 36-56.

Robinson, O. (2007) **Penal Practice and Penal Policy in Ancient Rome**. Taylor and Francis.

Roller, M. (2001) **Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats and Emperors in Julio-Claudian Rome**. Princeton University Press.

---. (2005) "Horizontal Women: Posture and Sex in the Roman *Convivium*". In: Gold, B. (ed.) **Roman Dining**. A Special Issue of American Journal of Philology. The John Hopkins University Press: 49-94.

---. (2009) "The Exemplary Past in Roman Historiography and Culture". In: Feldherr, A. (ed.) **The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians**. Cambridge University Press: 214-230.

Römer, F. (1990) Zum Aufbau der Exemplasammlung des Valerius Maximus. **Wiener Studien** 103: 99-107.

Romm, J. (1992) **The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought: Geography, Exploration, and Fiction**. Princeton University Press.

Rommel, A. (2015) **The Esoteric Codex**. Sorcery I. Lulu.

Rosaldo, M. (1974) “Women, Culture and Society: a Theoretical Overview”. In: Rosaldo, M. (ed.) **Women, Culture and Society**. Stanford University Press: 17-42.

Rosiello, F. (2002) Semantica di *Error* in Ovidio. **Bollettino di Studi Latini** 32: 424-462.

Rose, A. (1987) Power and Powerlessness in Seneca’s *Thyestes*. **The Classical Journal** 82.2: 117-128.

Rosenstein, N. (1990) ***Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic***. University of California Press.

Rowe, G. (2002) **Princes and Political Cultures: The New Tiberian Senatorial Decrees**. University of Michigan Press.

Rubincam, C. (2005) A Tale of Two *Magni*: Justin/Trogus on Alexander and Pompey. **Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte** 54. 3: 265-274.

Ruggini, C. (1987) Intolerance: Equal and Less Equal in the Roman World. **Classical Philology** 82.3: 187-205.

Rumpf, A. (1951) *Armillae*. **The Journal of Hellenic Studies** 71: 168-171.

Runciman, D. (2008) **Political Hypocrisy: the Mask of Power from Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond**. Princeton University Press.

Runciman, W. (1983) Capitalism Without Classes: The Case of Classical Rome. **The British Journal of Sociology** 34.2: 157-181.

Russell, D. (1988) The Ass in the Lion’s Skin: Thoughts on the Letters of Phalaris. **The Journal of Hellenic Studies** 108: 94-106.

Rust, E. (2009) ***Ex angulis secretisque librorum*: Reading, Writing, and Using Miscellaneous Knowledge in the *Noctes Atticae***. PhD Thesis. University of Southern California.

Rutledge, H. (1964) Propertius’ *Tarpeia*: The Poem Itself. **The Classical Journal** 60.2: 68-73.

Sacks, K. (1990) **Diodorus Siculus and the First Century**. Princeton University Press.

Salamon, G. (2003) "Les malheurs du roi Tolumnius (Tite-Live, IV, 17-20)". In: Lachenaud, G. and Longrée, D. (eds.) **Grecs et Romains aux prises avec l’histoire. Réprésentations, récits et idéologie** vol 2. Presses Universitaires de Rennes: 539-552.

Saller, R. (1982) **Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (1987) “Slavery and the Roman Family”. In: Finley, M. (ed) **Classical Slavery**. Routledge: 82-110.

---. (1991) “Corporal Punishment, Authority and Obedience in the Roman Household”. In: Rawson, B. (ed.) **Marriage, Divorce and Children in Ancient Rome**. Oxford University Press: 144-65.

---. (1996) “The Hierarchical Household in Roman Society: a Study of Domestic Slavery”. In: Bush, M. (ed.) **Serfdom and Slavery: Studies in Legal Bondage**. Longman: 112-29.

Salmon, E. (1972) “Cicero, *Romanus an Italicus Anceps*”. In: Martyn, J. (ed.) **Cicero and Virgil: Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt**. Hakkert: 75-86.

Sanders, K. (2008) *Mens* and Emotion: *De Rerum Natura* 3.136-46. **The Classical Quarterly** 58.1: 362-366.

Scarth, E. (2004) **Mnemotechnics and Virgil: The Art of Memory and Remembering**. MA thesis. University of Victoria.

Scheid, J. (2007) “Sacrifices for Gods and Ancestors”. In: Rüpke, J. (ed.) **A Companion to Roman Religion**. Blackwell Publishing: 263-271.

Scheidel, W. (1996) Finances, Figures and Fiction. **The Classical Quarterly** 46: 222-238.

Schepens, G. (1978) Polybius on Timaeus’ Account of Phalaris’ Bull: A Case of DEISIDAIMONIA. **Ancient Society** 9:117–48.

Schettino, M. (1998) "Perdono e *Clementia Principis* nello Stoicismo del II Secolo". In: Sordi, M. (ed) **Responsabilità, perdono e vendetta nel mondo antico**. Contributi dell’Istituto di Storia Antica 24. Scienze Storiche 65: 209-238.

Schmidt, S. (ed.) **Friends, Followers and Factions: a Reader in Political Clientelism**. University of California Press.

Schneider, H. (1974) “Der *Luxus* in der späten Republik”. In: Schneider, H. (ed.) **Wirtschaft und Politik**. Erlangen Studien.

Schoenberger, H. (1911) **Beispiele aus der Geschichte, ein rhetorisches Kunstmittel in Ciceros Reden**. PhD Thesis. University of Augsburg.

Schuler, C. (2004) "Die Gymnasiarchie in Hellenistischer Zeit". In: Kah, D. and Scholz, P. (eds.) **Das hellenistische Gymnasion**. Akademie Verlag: 163-191.

Schultz, C. (2010) The Romans and Ritual Murder. **American Academy of Religion** 78. 2: 516-541.

Seager, R. (1972) Cicero and the Word *Popularis*. **The Classical Quarterly** 22. 2: 328-338.

---. (1972b) *Factio*: Some Observations. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 62: 53-58.

---. (1977) *Populares* in Livy and the Livian Tradition. **The Classical Quarterly** 27: 377-90.

---. (2011) “Velleius and Pompey: Ambiguities and Contradictions”. In: Cowan, E. (ed.) **Velleius Paterculus: Making history**. Classical Press of Wales: 287-307.

Severy, B. (2000) Family and State in the Early Imperial Monarchy: The *Senatus Consultum de Pisone Patre*, *Tabula Siarensis*, and *Tabula Hebana*. **Classical Philology** 95.3: 318-337.

Shackleton Bailey, D. (1982) **Profile of Horace**. Harvard University Press.

---. (2000) (ed.) **Valerius Maximus: Memorable Doings and Sayings**. 2 Vols. Harvard University Press.

Shaw, B. (1975) Debt in Sallust. **Latomus** 34.1: 187-196.

Sherwin-White, A. (1973) **The Roman Citizenship**. Oxford University Press.

Short, W. (2013) Getting to the Truth: The “Wandering” Metaphor of Mistakenness in Roman Culture. **Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics** 21.2: 139-168.

Sinclair, B. (1980) **Valerius Maximus and the Evolution of Silver Latin**. PhD thesis. University of Cincinnati.

---. (1984) Declamatory *Sententiae* in Valerius Maximus. **Prometheus** 10: 141-6.

Sinclair, P. (1995) “Political Declensions in Latin Grammar and Oratory 55 BCE – CE 39”. In: Boyle, A. (ed.) **Roman Literature and Ideology**. Aureal Publications: 92-109.

Skidmore, C. (1996) **Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen** University of Exeter Press.

Slob, E. (1986) ***Luxuria*: Regelgeving en maatregelen van censor en ten tijde van de romeinse republiek**. De Walburg Pers.

Small, J. (1997) **Wax Tablets of the Mind: Cognitive Studies of Memory and Literacy in Classical Antiquity**. Routledge.

Smith, W. (1843) (ed.) **A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities**. J. Murray.

Sokolon, M. (2006) **Political Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion.** Northern Illinois University Press.

Solmsen, F. (1938) Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings. **Classical Philology** 33: 391-404.

Spencer, D. (2002) **The Roman Alexander**. University of Exeter Press.

---. (2010) **Roman Landscape: Culture and Identity**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (2010b) "'You Should Never Meet your Heroes…' Growing up with Alexander, the Valerius Maximus way". In: Carney, E. and Ogden, D. (eds.) **Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives**. Oxford University Press: 175-191.

Stafford, E. (2000) **Worshipping Virtues: Personification and the Divine in ancient Greece**. Duckworth and the Classical Press of Wales.

Stalker, W. (1991) **The Role of the Etruscans in Virgil's *Aeneid***. PhD Thesis. Princeton University.

Stalley, R. (1995) Punishment in Plato's *Protagoras*. **Phronesis** 40.1: 1-19.

Staples, A. (1998) **From Good Goddess to Vestal Virgins: Sex and Category in Roman Religion**. Routledge.

Stinton, T. (1975) *Hamartia* in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy. **The Classical Quarterly** 25.2: 221-254.

Strange, S. (2004) 'The Stoics on the Voluntariness of the Passions'. In: Strange, S. (ed.) **Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations**. Cambridge University Press.

Suolahti, J. *(*1963*)* **The Roman Censors: A Study on Social Structure**. Suomalaisen Tiedeakatemian Toimituksia.

Sussman, L. (1978) **The Elder Seneca**. Brill.

Swain, S. (1989a) Plutarch's *De Fortuna Romanorum*. **The Classical Quarterly** 39.2: 504-516.

---. (1989b) Chance, Providence, and History. **The American Journal of Philology** 110.2: 272-302.

Tabacco, R. (1985) **Il tiranno nelle declamazioni di scuola in lingua latina**. Accademia delle Scienze. Turin.

Tatum, W. (1986) **P. Clodius Pulcher (Tr. Pl. 58 BC): The Rise to Power**. PhD thesis. University of Texas at Austin.

---. (1990) Cicero and the *Bona Dea* Scandal. **Classical Philology** 85.3: 202-208.

Taylor, L. (1960) **The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic**. American Academy of Rome.

---. (1962) The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic. **The American Journal of Philology** 83.2: 191-193.

Terrenato, N. (2001) The Auditorium Site in Rome and the Origins of the Villa. **Journal of Roman Archaeology** 14: 5-32.

Themann-Steinke, A. (2008) **Valerius Maximus: ein Kommentar zum zweiten Buch der Facta et Dicta Memorabilia.** Wissenschaftlicher Verlag.

Thomas, E. (2007) **Monumentality and the Roman Empire**. Oxford University Press.

Thome, G. (1992) Crime and Punishment, Guilt and Expiation: Roman Thought and Vocabulary. **Acta Classica** 35: 73-98.

Thurn, N. (2001) Der Aufbau der Exemplasammlung des Valerius Maximus. **Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte** 129: 79-94.

Timpe, D. (2011) '*Memoria* and Historiography in Rome'. In: Marincola, J. (ed.) **Greek and Roman Historiography**. Oxford University Press: 150-174.

Tomei, M. (ed.) (2014) **Museo Palatino: le collezioni**. Electa.

Torelli, M. (1999) ***Tota Italia*. Essays in the Cultural Formation of Roman Italy**. Oxford University Press.

Toynbee, A. (1969) "If Alexander the Great had Lived on". In: Toynbee, A. (eds.), **Some Problems of Greek History**. Oxford University Press: 441-486.

Tracy, C. (2008) The People's Consul: The Significance of Cicero's Use of the Term *Popularis*. **Illinois Classical Studies** 33-34: 181-199.

Treggiari, S. (2007) **Terentia, Tullia and Publilia: the Women of Cicero's Family**. Routledge.

Tsekourakis, D. (1974) **Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics**. Franz Steiner Verlag.

Tsitsiridis, S. (2008) Die Schrift περὶ βίων des Klearchos von Soloi. **Philologus** 152: 65-76.

---. (2013) **Beiträge zu den Fragmenten des Klearchos von Soloi.** De Gruyter.

Tsouna, (2007) **The Ethics of Philodemus**. Oxford University Press.

---. (2011) "Philodemus, Seneca, and Plutarch on Anger". In: Fish, J. (ed.) **Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition**. Cambridge University Press: 183-210.

Turner B. (1984) **The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory**. Blackwell.

Turpin, W. (2008) Tacitus, Stoic *Exempla* and the *praecipuum munus annalium*. **Classical Antiquity** 27.2: 359-404.

Ullman, B. (1957) Cleopatra's Pearls. **The Classical Journal** 52.5: 193-201.

Urban, D. (2011) **The Use of *Exempla* from Cicero to Pliny the Younger**. PhD Thesis. University of Pennsylvania.

Valgiglio, E. (1954) **Vita di Silla.** S. Lattes.

Valpy, F. (1828) **An Etymological Dictionary of the Latin Language**. Baldwin and Company.

Van der Poel, M (2009) The Use of *Exempla* in Roman Declamation. **Rhetorica** 27.3: 332-53.

Van der Stockt, L. (2014) "Compositional Methods in the *Lives*". In: Beck, M. (ed.) **A Companion to Plutarch**. Wiley-Blackwell: 321-332.

Varhelyi, Z. (2010) **The Religion of Senators in the Roman Empire**. Cambridge University Press.

Varner, E. (2004) **Mutilation and Transformation: *Damnatio Memoriae* and Roman Imperial Portraiture**. Brill.

Vasaly, A. (1985) The Masks of Rhetoric: Cicero's *Pro Roscio Amerino*. **The International Society for the History of Rhetoric** 3.1: 1-20.

Veith, G. (1920) **Der Feldzug von Dyrrhachium zwischen Caesar und Pompeius**. Seidel.

Verboven, K. (1997) Damasippus, the Story of a Businessman? In: Deroux, C. (ed.) **Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History 8**. Latomus 239: 195-217.

---. (2002) **The Economy of Friends: Economic Aspects of *Amicitia* and Patronage in the Late Republic**. Editions Latomus.

Verdier, R. (1980-4) (ed.) **La vengeance. Études d'ethnologie, d'historie et de philosophie**. Vols. 1-4. Editions Cujas.

Versnel, H. (1981) "Self-Sacrifice, Compensation and the Anonymous Gods". In: Reverdin, O. (ed.) **Le sacrifice dans l'antiquité**. Fondation Hardt: 135-94.

Viden, G. (1993) **Women in Roman Literature: Attitudes of Authors under the Early Empire**. Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis.

Vitale, M. (2014) Gymnasiarch über wie viele *Gymnasien*, über welches Einzugsgebiet? Zum Kompetenzbereich von Gymnasiarchen in späthellenistischer und römischer Zeit. **Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik** 188: 171-180.

Vogt, K. (2006) "Anger, Present Injustice and Future Revenge in Seneca's *De ira*". In: Volk, K. (ed.) **Seeing Seneca Whole: Perspectives on Philosophy, Poetry and Politics**. Brill: 57-74.

Walbank, F (1945) Phalaris' Bull in Timaeus (Diod. Sic. xiii. 90. 4-7). **The Classical Review** 59.2: 39–42.

---. (1946) **The Decline of the Roman Empire in the West**. Cobbett Press.

---. (1957) **A Historical Commentary on Polybius** Vol. 1. Oxford University Press.

Walker, H. (ed.) (2004) **Memorable Deeds and Sayings: One Thousand Tales from Ancient Rome**. Hackett.

Wallace-Hadrill, A. (1982) *Civilis Princeps*: Between Citizen and King. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 72: 32-48.

---. (1988) The Social Structure of the Roman House. **Papers of the British School at Rome** 56: 43-97.

---. (1989) **Patronage in Ancient Society**. Routledge.

---. (1990). The Social Spread of Roman Luxury: Sampling Pompeii and Herculaneum. **Papers of the British School at Rome** 58: 145-192.

---. (1990b) Pliny the Elder and Man's Unnatural History. **Greece & Rome** 37.1: 80-96.

---. (1994) **Houses and Society in Pompeii and Herculaneum**. Princeton University Press.

---. (1997) "The Development of the Campanian House". In: Dobbins, J. (ed.) **The World of Pompeii**. Routledge: 279-291.

Walsh, P. (1961) **Livy: his Historical Aims and Methods**. Cambridge University Press.

Walters, J. (1997) "Invading the Roman Body: Manliness and Impenetrability in Roman Thought". In: Hallett, J. (ed.) **Roman Sexualities**. Princeton University Press: 29-43.

Wardle, D. (1997) "The Sainted Julius": Valerius Maximus and the Dictator. **Classical Philology** 92.4: 323-345.

---. (1998) **Valerius Maximus' Memorable Deeds and Sayings Book 1**. Oxford University Press.

---. (2000) Valerius Maximus on the *Domus Augusta*, Augustus and Tiberius. **The Classical Quarterly** 50: 479-93.

---. (2005) Valerius Maximus on Alexander the Great. **Acta Classica** 48: 141-161.

---. (2005b) Valerius Maximus and the End of the First Punic War. **Latomus** 64.2: 377-384.

Wardman, A. (1974) **Plutarch's Lives**. Elek.

Ward-Perkins, J. (1980) The Marble Trade and its Organization: Evidence from Nicomedia. **Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome** 36: 325-38.

Watmough, M. (1997) **Studies in the Etruscan Loanwords in Latin**. L.S. Olschki.

Weeber, K. (2003) **Luxus im alten Rom: die Schwelgerei, das süsse Gift**. von Zabern.

Weileder, A. (1998) **Valerius Maximus: Spiegel kaiserlicher Selbstdarstellung**. Editio Maris.

Weinstock, S. (1971) **Divus Iulius**. Oxford Clarendon Press.

Welch, K. (1995) Antony, Fulvia, and the Ghost of Clodius in 47 B.C. **Greece and Rome** 42.2: 182–201.

---. (2007) **The Roman Amphitheatre: from its Origins to the Colosseum**. Cambridge University Press.

Welch, T. (2013) Was Valerius Maximus a Hack? **American Journal of Philology** 134: 67-82.

Wheeler, E. (1988) **Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery**. Brill.

Wiedemann, T. (2000) Reflections of Roman Political Thought in Latin Historical Writing. In: Rowe, C. (ed.) **The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought**. Cambridge University Press: 517-531.

Wikander, O. (1996) Senators and Equites VI: Caius Sergius Orata and the Invention of the Hypocaust. **Opuscula Romana** 20: 177-82.

Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, U. von (1982) **History of Classical Scholarship**. Duckworth.

Wilkins, J. (2005) "Land and Sea: Italy and the Mediterranean in the Roman Discourse of Dining". In: Gold, B. (ed.) **Roman Dining**. A Special Issue of American Journal of Philology. The John Hopkins University Press: 31-48.

Williams, B. (1993) **Shame and Necessity**. University of California Press.

Williams, C. (2012) **Reading Roman Friendship**. Cambridge University Press.

Winters, J. (2011) **Oligarchy**. Cambridge University Press.

Wirszubski, C. (1950) ***Libertas* as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate**. Cambridge University Press.

Wiseman, T. P. (1979) **Clio's Cosmetics: Three Studies in Greco-Roman Literature**. Rowman and Littlefield.

---. (1987) "*Conspicui Postes Tectaque Digna Deo*: the Public Image of Aristocratic and Imperial Houses in the Late Republic and Early Empire". In: **L'Urbs: Espace urbain et histoire (Ier siècle av. J.-C. - IIIe siècle ap. J.-C.). Actes du Colloque International de Rome**. École Française de Rome: 393–413.

---. (1994) **Historiography and Imagination: Eight Essays on Roman Culture**. Liverpool University Press.

Wisse, J. (1989) **Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero**. Hakkert.

Wolff, H. (1976) **Roman Law: a Historical Introduction**. University of Oklahoma Press.

Woodman, A. (1977) **Velleius Paterculus: The Tiberian Narrative (2.94-131)**. Cambridge University Press.

---. (1988) **Rhetoric in Classical Historiography**. Croom Helm.

Wyke, M. (1994) "Woman in the Mirror: The Rhetoric of Adornment in the Roman World". In: Archer, L. (ed.) **Women in Ancient Societies: An Illusion of the Night**. Routledge: 134-151.

---. (2002) **The Roman Mistress**. Oxford University Press.

Yakobson, A. (1992) *Petitio et Largitio*: Popular Participation in the Centuriate Assembly of the Late Republic. **The Journal of Roman Studies** 82: 32-52.

Yardley, J. (ed.) (2011) **Velleius Paterculus: The Roman History: from Romulus and the Foundation of Rome to the Reign of the Emperor Tiberius**. Hackett Publishing Company.

Zaibert, L. (2006) Punishment and Revenge. **Law and Philosophy** 25.1: 81-118.

Zanda, E. (2011) **Fighting hydra-like Luxury: Sumptuary Regulation in the Roman Republic**. Bristol Classical Press.

Zanker, P. (1988) **The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus**. University of Michigan Press.

Zarecki, J. (2005) **Cicero's Ideal Statesman in Theory and Practice**. PhD thesis. University of Florida.

---. (2014) **Cicero's Ideal Statesman in Theory and Practice**. Bloomsbury Academic.