CASTLEREAGH AND THE HOLY ALLIANCE.

Thesis

by

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CHAPTER I.

THE EUROPEAN SITUATION in 1815.
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THE EUROPEAN SITUATION IN 1815.

The modern ideal in international politics is the League of Nations. The idea of alliances, not of monarchs or of diplomats but of free nations, has its origins much further back than the recent war. It has shown itself in several previous attempts to realise a state of existence in which national conflict has given way to co-operation, and in which the world's energies have been devoted to universal progress.

It is only by a careful research into these earlier flights of idealism that we are able to understand the weakness and the strength, the hopes and fears, embodied in the present League. Without a realisation of the periodical outwelling of this spirit, despair or cynicism might easily take the place of the optimism of the years immediately following the peace of 1919. Delays or half-hearted intervention in international questions, the defection of some nations and the secret diplomacy of others, aggravated by general mistrust and wide-spread poverty, are
hardly effective guarantees of a successful future. The Balance of Power theory is now partially discredited owing to its frequent opposition to the national spirit, while this latter often degenerates into mere desire for self-aggrandisement and aggressive selfishness. The chaos following on the excesses of nationalism resulted in the formation of the League of Nations.

In 1815 these same excesses led to the conception of the Holy Alliance as the arbiter of European disputes. It lacked the unifying force of an organised administrative body to act as a headquarters staff, but the causes of its failure lie deeper. The desire for self-aggrandisement, with its accompanying cankers of mistrust and suspicion, prevented the nations from embarking on the sea of mutual confidence and fraternity. As now, so in the years before Waterloo. Narrow alliances were adhered to, limited conferences were held, both expressive of forces adverse to the realisation of the ideal of the League of Nations, of the Holy Alliance, and of all other projects of a similar nature since the Truces of God in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
The foreign policies of nations are, of course inter-dependent. Therefore in dealing with the attitude of the British Government towards the Holy Alliance it is necessary to investigate briefly the aims and ambitions of the first-class European powers. For this investigation there is no better field than the Council Table of the Vienna Congress. Here, with the reactionary Metternich as host, the diplomats of Europe fenced and fought among themselves from November 1st. 1814 until, after Waterloo, they moved on to Paris where the final act of the Congress was signed on July 9th. 1815.

The matter of the greatest moment to the plenipotentiaries was the re-settling of Europe, with rewards for the victors and punishments for the conquered. The guiding principles in the re-settlement were the desire to re-establish a Balance of Power, and the desire to restore all things, as near as possible, to their position in 1789; the first from fear of Revolution and Napoleonism, the second as a concession to long enthroned authority. The ideas of a "Concert of Europe" and "legitimacy"
effectively smothered any recognition of either Nationalism or Democracy. This fact alone was sufficient to nullify any idea of a lasting peace, and it caused more than sixty years of intermittent revolution and war. But the failure of the Holy Alliance was the result rather of the cupidity and ambition of nations which should have been "satisfied" than of struggling nationalism.

Even before the "Hundred Days" serious tension had been occasioned in the Congress owing to conflicting opinions on the distribution of rewards. England desired above all else the consolidation of her maritime and commercial preponderance. To assure this, she was determined to obtain sanction for her colonial extensions, and her policy during the many crises of the next decade was to keep open her trade exits both in Europe and America. This she did regardless of the effect of her attitude on European relations. Another danger on the political horizon was the possibility of an entente between Russia and Prussia and later between Russia and France. This latter country had great opportunities for naval and commercial development in opposition to England. Russia was likely to become a menace to our Eastern
possessions. Of all the European monarchs and statesmen assembled at Vienna the Tzar, Alexander I, had the greatest prestige. He believed, with reason, that the Grand Alliance could not have conquered without his aid. His views were diametrically opposed to those of Austria and England, and he had the ruin of the Ottoman Empire before his eyes. But in one respect he, and some of his advisers, were more advanced than the rest; they were liberal in sentiment, whilst the other representatives with Metternich at their head, discouraged the democratic idea. Their overwhelming desire for reaction manifested itself in the immediate rejection of the Tzar's tentative suggestion of a general public law and an international police, and the fires of democracy and nationalism were for a time damped.

The foundation on which the "Confederation of Europe" was built, was laid on March 10th., 1814, by the Treaty of Chaumont, in which were clauses expressing the desire of the allies "to unite the powers closer — assuring the repose of Europe by the re-establishment of
a just equilibrium*. England had no option but to take a prominent position in the Settlement. At no period in her history have the relations of Great Britain with the Continental Powers been more intimate than from 1815-1820. She had been the most constant member of the anti-Napoleonic Alliance, and, until matters on the Continent became more settled, it would be impossible for her to resume an insular policy, even if she wished to do so. Even in December 1813 Castlereagh had stated that England's interest in European affairs was not to end with Napoleon's defeat.

"The Treaty of alliance is not to terminate the war, but is to contain defensive engagements with mutual obligations to support the power attacked by France. The casus foederis is to be an attack by France on the European dominions of any one of the contracting parties."

The bogey of the French Revolution and subsequent aggression was hiding all future possible complications. A limited union with limited objects, to work for

the general good of Europe. This was the aim with which Castlereagh believed English interests to be consistent. Both in the Treaty of Chaumont and in the later Treaties of Paris, this attitude is maintained and its hold on the mind of the Foreign Minister is shown in a letter sent by him to his leader, Lord Liverpool in February, 1814.

"The wish of the Government is to connect their interests in peace and in war with those of the Continent,......and that as now she might look forward to a return to ancient principles, she was ready to make necessary sacrifices on her part to reconstruct a balance in Europe."

The weight of Russia's influence during these years is of extreme importance. Alexander, with his mystical impressionable character, had been greatly affected by the study of Rousseau under the director of his Swiss tutor La Harpe. He saw himself and his minister Czartoryski as the successors of Henri IV and Sully in their endeavour to bring perpetual peace to Europe. The burning of Moscow moved him greatly, but even before this, in 1804, he embodied
his idea of a permanent Christian republic in his instructions to his friend Novoreltsovo, who was Russian envoy on a special mission to London. He instructed him to lay before Pitt the proposals for an Alliance, which was to re-establish Europe in such a way that the various governments were "to be everywhere founded on the sacred rights of humanity."

But the European nations had their doubts about the Tzar's Christian charity. Like his predecessors he maintained a constant inimical attitude towards the Ottoman people, the age-long foes of the orthodox Church. Even in the document sent to Pitt he could not refrain from alluding to the corruption and disintegration in the Turkish Empire. When the Holy Alliance was made public the nations looked askance at it for the same reasons. To counteract this feeling Alexander published the text of the Treaty in March, 1816, and also sent an address to the Sublime Porte to dissipate their misgivings.

But this had little effect. Europe was firmly convinced that the Tzar had a deep-laid scheme of reconstructing Europe and of taking over the supremacy laid down by Napoleon.
CHAPTER II.

THE TREATY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE.
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THE TREATY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE.

On the 26th. of September, 1815, the Emperor Alexander, at a great review of the Allied troops on the Vertus plain near Chalons, made the first public announcement of the Holy Alliance. The idea had been inspired in his impressionable mind by a certain Madame de Krudener, who, after "une jeunesse une peu legere," was smitten by a religious fervour. Alexander, for a brief moment was the arbiter of Europe. His piety was sincere. Always he had held war in horror, and the desolation of Moscow had burned itself into his imagination. He had been commissioned by God to rescue Europe from strife, and the destruction of the Russian capital had been a warning of his last opportunity. He was now determined to persuade Europe to recognise the kinship of mankind. His remaining years were to be spent in the service of Christianity and in giving to the world a durable peace.

His weak nature had been impressed by a series of conflicting enthusiasms from the first. His tutor, La Harpe, had instructed him in Rousseau's doctrines;
Traditions of Russian autocracy were in his blood. From the turmoil of these two irreconcilable ideas he turned to religious mysticism and the belief that he was set apart to calm the world's unrest. This first appears in his proposition to Pitt in 1804. At Vienna he had tentatively proposed an international European police. And now, the main items of the Treaty having been drawn up, and the sovereigns and statesmen being ready to depart from Paris, the Tzar thought the moment propitious for advancing his scheme in order to make the understanding between the Great Powers a permanent security for peace. Its final form was as follows:

"ACT OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE"

"In the Name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the king of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia, having, in consequence of the great events which have marked the course of the three last years of Europe, and especially of the blessings which it has pleased Divine Providence to shower down upon those States which place their confidence and hope in it alone, acquired the intimate conviction of the necessity of settling the steps to be observed by the powers, in their reciprocal relations, upon the sublime truths which the Holy Religion of our Saviour teaches.

They solemnly declare that the present Act has
no other object than to publish, in the face of the whole
world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration
of their respective states, and in their political rela-
tions with every other Government, to take for their sole
guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely, the
precepts of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace, which,
far from being applicable only to private concerns, must
have an immediate influence upon the Councils of Princes,
and guide all their steps as being the only means of
consolidating human institutions and remedying their im-
perfections. In consequence, their Majesties have agreed
on the following articles:

Art I. Principles of the Christian Religion.

Conformably to the words of the Holy Scriptures
which command all men to consider each other as brethren,
the Three contracting Monarchs will remain united by the
bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and consider-
ing each other as fellow countrymen, they will, on all
occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and
assistance; and, regarding themselves towards their sub-
jects and armies as fathers towards families, they will
lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with which
they are animated, to protect Religion, Peace and Justice.

Art II. Fraternity and Affection.

In consequence the sole principle of force,
whether between Governments or between their Subjects,
shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, and
of testifying by unalterable goodwill the mutual affection
with which they ought to be animated, to consider them-
selves all as one and the same Christian
nation, the Three allied powers looking on themselves as
merely delegated by Providence to govern three Branches
of one family, namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, thus
confessing that, the Christian world, of which they and
their people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign
than Him to whom alone power really belongs, because in
"him alone are found all the treasures of love, science and infinite wisdom, that is to say God, our Divine Saviour, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life. Their Majesties consequently recommend to their peoples, with the most tender solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that Peace which arises from a good conscience and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind.

Art III. Accession of Foreign Powers.

All the Powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present Act and shall acknowledge how important it is for the happiness of nations, too long agitated, that these truths should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all the influence which belongs to them, will be received with equal ardour and affection into this Holy Alliance.

(Signed) Francis.
Frederick William.
Alexander."

There is no doubt that Alexander was absolutely sincere in his desire for international friendship and for liberal reforms. The suspicion with which the proposal was greeted by the governments and peoples were, at the time, groundless. Both the Polish and Ottoman questions were stored away in another corner of his ill-balanced brain.

National aggrandisement in these quarters was permissible, if he could satisfy his conscience that the result would be beneficial to the peace of Europe.

Frederick William of Prussia and the Emperor Francis had both added their names to the document prior to its being made public. The former, "piously simple", trusted the Tzar implicitly. The latter followed Metternich's advice and humoured Alexander's madness. All the European monarchs with the exception of the Sultan, ominous omission, were invited to accede to this Treaty. All, save the Prince Regent of England and the Pope, accepted the invitation. The majority signed in 1815, the Netherlands and Wurtemburg in 1816, Saxony, Switzerland and the Hanse towns in 1817.
CHAPTER III.

THE ATTITUDE OF GREAT BRITAIN
FROM 1815 to AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.
The dominating figure in British politics at this time was the Foreign Minister, Castlereagh. Lord Liverpool, the Prime Minister, was a man of mediocre qualities who seldom overruled his more illustrious colleague. The monarchy was no longer a potent political force, George III having become permanently insane in 1810. His son George, Prince of Wales, was regent.

The Government of Great Britain was much further advanced along constitutional lines than that of any other European state. In theory the king was still the head of the Government, the appointer of judges, holding the right of making war, peace and treaties. In practice none of these powers was exercised by the ruler personally. Every political act ordered by the king had to be ordered through a minister who assumed responsibility for it. The king thus yielded control to the Cabinet, which, by this time, was composed of the Party which held a majority in
the Commons. From 1733 - 1830 the Tory Party held this majority. They were elected to power by an aristocratic oligarchy, the only enfranchised part of the nation, and the part the least influenced by any change in public opinion. This restricted franchise, the "pocket" and "rotten" boroughs, the all-powerful system of bribery, all conduced to keep any Government in power. The landed classes were settling down again, after the holocaust of the war, to a serene political domination. The Industrial Revolution had not yet had any effect on the constitution of the country. Therefore, although far removed from the despotism of Eastern Europe, responsibility for the policy of England, at home and abroad, lay chiefly with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

Liverpool was never in the front rank of English Statesmen, but he was a careful and efficient administrator with a great capacity for holding together a party in danger of disruption. The Earl of Eldon was Lord Chancellor, a friend of George III and the Regent, and a stern, unyielding Tory, who would countenance neither compromise nor reform.

Castlereagh was incomparably a more able
minister, and a more interesting personality than any of his colleagues. He has suffered greatly at the hands of the political satirists and historians of the first half of the century, by whom he was considered the arch-enemy of freedom. This was partly due to the fact that he was looked upon as the English representative of the Holy Alliance and all its works, and partly to his entire lack of personal charm. But even his most ardent critics were silenced by his masterly handling of affairs at Vienna, and when he returned to London in 1814, the whole House rose to welcome him. But this triumph was his last. The necessary obscurity of diplomatic transactions make no appeal to the popular imagination, nor do the qualities of a diplomatist. He was a man of no enthusiasms, and in Parliament his dignity and culture, so valuable in the European congresses, could not replace his lack of oratory. His mixed metaphors were a by-word in Parliament, and his bald and ungraceful speeches were not atoned for by any conversational ability. He had no romance about him, no warm sympathy or idealistic fervour, and because of this he was alone, without a personal following to support him.
during his career, or to follow up his policy afterwards. His sole merit and strength lay in his statesmanship, and until Napoleon was safely in St. Helena, the nation looked to him as to a pilot during a storm. But after 1815, his popularity steadily waned. His intellectual temper, and well balanced judgment now seemed to be a cloak hiding a deadly zeal against the liberties of mankind. The bigots of the age could not believe a man to be void of prejudice, and the lack of ardour in his character and declamation in his speeches was looked upon as a pose. His stumbling block was that he was too reasonable.

The first intimation received in England of the existence of the Holy Alliance Treaty, was a letter sent from Paris on September 20th, 1815, to the "Prince Regent of Great Britain", by the Sovereigns of Austria, Prussia and Russia.

"Sir, Our Brother and Cousin:— The events which have desolated the world for the last twenty years have convinced us that the only means of arresting them is to be found in the loyalest and most intimate union between the Sovereigns whom Divine Providence has placed at the head of the nations of Europe....but in order to assure to this bond the solidity which the grandeur, and the purity, of the aim to which it leads imperiously demand, we have thought it should be founded on the sacred principles of the Christian Religion.

(Signed) Francois, Frederick-Guillaume, Alexander. 1

1."Map of Europe by Treaty" (Hertslet) Vol. I. No. 36.
This plausible appeal to the Prince Regent himself, characteristic of Eastern European autocracy, and his personal attitude towards it is difficult to determine, and has little bearing on British policy. The sentiments expressed in his official letters are, naturally, largely due to official influence. However, taking into consideration the lack of nobility in the Regent's character, the constitutional situation, and the relative prestige of England, Russia and Alexander, a fairly reliable conclusion may be drawn. He was certainly not of a sufficiently exalted and idealistic nature to appreciate the religious fervour of the Tzar, but he was flattered by the invitation. It came from three sovereigns, the personal influence of each of whom was much greater than that of the King or Regent of England, and whose kingdoms, bound together by this Alliance, would form a considerable combination in peace or war.

The only private letter of the Regent referring to this matter, is one written to the Tzar in May of the following year, 1816. This was enclosed with an official reply to Alexander's overture for a closer co-operation.
between England and Russia in matters of European policy:—

"I am anxious to accompany the official answer

"which your Imperial Majesty will receive to the overture.....

"with the Personal Assurance of my unalterable determina-

"tion to combine my exertions with those of your Imperial

"Majesty to secure for the world the Blessings of a lasting

peace.....Whilst I rejoice to observe that your Imperial

"Majesty is prepared to found what yet of Glory it remains

"for your Imperial Majesty to acquire, upon the re-establish-

"ment of morals, and upon the Consolidation of Peace, I

"desire no prouder task than to co-operate with your Imperial

1 Majesty in this great work."

There is something akin to servility in this letter. Anxiety to allay any misunderstanding with Russia which the luke-warm character of the official reply to these particular overtures might have caused. The sympathy of a restricted ruler with a fellow monarch having unlimited power, overcame state interest, in private. Fortunately this sentimental leaning of the Regent was quite compatible

with Castlereagh's policy of flattering Alexander into a friendly state of mind.

However, in 1815 the Regent's reply depended upon the advice of his Ministers. And his ministers remembered that they had to meet the assembled Houses of Parliament ere long, and give an account of their negotiations. Caution therefore was necessary. The aristocracy and gentry of the electorate had never been particularly partial to prolonged interference in continental matters. The ministry might frame the reply in whatever manner they wished, but they must be able to justify their actions on the grounds of expediency. Throughout the war foreign policy had correctly interpreted national sentiment. Life and independence had been worth any sacrifice, and the lower classes, ignoring their miseries and degradations, had fully supported their aristocratic leaders.

But the fear of revolution haunted this ruling class with an amazing persistence, and by excessive measures of repression they were endeavouring to crush a class already dragged down to the starvation line by corn laws, enclosures, and factory conditions. In 1815
a terrific optimism had taken hold of the whole country
as trade and industry revived with an unlooked for vigour.

By the beginning of 1816 the inevitable after­
math of the war had set in. Commerce was at a standstill.
Scandalous wages were paid. Thousands were unemployed,
and bread rose to an unprecedented price. This degradation
of the working classes roused a strong feeling of resentment
against the party in Power. The Whigs, taking the opportun­
ity of blending humanity with party politics, wished to
condemn Castlereagh as an opponent of popular rights and
an enemy to freedom. Brougham, one of their ablest spokes­
man, seized upon the Holy Alliance Treaty as a means of
exposure. When Parliament met he moved for a copy of
the Treaty to be placed before the House. He declared
that it was a convention for the enslaving of mankind under
the mask of piety and religion. Castlereagh, without
denying its existence, was able to declare that the Prince
Regent had not signed it,"as the form of the British
Constitution prevented him from acceding to it".1 Brougham's
motion was defeated, but it had sufficient support to in-

dicate what would have happened had the "form of the British Constitution" not been observed.

This opposition to the Holy Alliance, with its "intention of enslaving mankind", found its root in antipathy to the Tzar and his Empire. Russia was powerful. Since the time of Ivan III she had been expanding and consolidating, and, excepting the Time of Troubles, she had had no serious set-back.

Peter the Great had turned her aspirations westward, and had caused tremors in the hearts of European nations. Now Alexander had acquired the premier place amongst European sovereigns, and the Western Napoleon having been overthrown, what wonder that men paused, fearing to take a step which might raise up an Eastern successor to the exile at St. Helena. At the first Paris Conference his haughty demand for a reconstructed Kingdom of Poland, under his own sovereignty, caused a secret alliance between Britain, France and Austria in January 1815. His triumphal entry into Paris, and his reception there as the guardian of French liberties against Prussian vindictiveness, occasioned the alarm of the English Ambassador, Sir Charles Stewart. With a nightmare vision of the Tzar at the head
of a Franco-Russian Alliance with Jacobinism, Stewart wrote to Bathurst, and, in answer, Castlereagh hurried to Paris with his remedy. Alexander must be "grouped". Here we have the logical outcome of his foreign policy. Not nationality or democracy; these were almost unknown to him as political forces. But peace in Europe by means of the Balance of Power. And the "grouping" of Alexander was the very vital adjustment necessary at the moment and, indeed, up to the Crimean war.

With these adverse influences at work, the reception of the announcement of the Holy Alliance in England could not be anything but cool. A great deal of capital was now in the hands of the manufacturers, who were still unenfranchised. The Whigs, eager for constitutional reform, were amongst the first to show their suspicion of any such proposal from the Russian autocrat. They, with Brougham, regarded the Alliance as a conspiracy of despots against the Liberties of Christendom, a confederation of reactionaries ready to interfere in the internal concerns of any European State attempting to secure political freedom. Besides this fear there was one which possessed both Whigs and Tories alike, the fear that Russia intended
to use the Holy Alliance to sweep the Ottoman Empire out of Europe. For centuries the Slavonic converts to Greek Orthodoxy had turned envious eyes towards the alien inhabitants of the home of their religion on the shores of the Bosphorus. Since the beginning of her decline, Turkey had been held in a constant state of fear by the menaces of succeeding Russian monarchs. By some, portions of her territory had been wrested from her, by others she had been merely terrorised. But to Europe this anti-Turkish policy seemed to be inseparable from the very existence of Russia, and Alexander, inspired both by his temporary zeal for the progress of Christendom and his more permanent zeal for the progress of Russia, apparently was aiming at the administration of the coup-de-grace to this pariah nation in his most Christian continent. In the dismemberment of Turkey the rest of Europe saw only the addition of power in Russia. Jealous of her newly won supremacy in India, England presented a united front of both Whigs and Tories in her mistrust of this menace across her route to the East.

The reply was sent to Alexander on October 6th. The opinion of Castlereagh, as Foreign Minister, was
the most influential in determining the tone of the official note. Liverpool was neither sufficiently capable nor self-assertive to originate a policy, but he was punctilious in the observance of the forms of the British Constitution.

Castlereagh's advice was given in his official letter to the Prime Minister enclosed with the "letter autographé" from the three sovereigns to the Prince Regent, -

"Prince Metternich......communicated to me in confidence the difficulty in which the Emperor of Austria felt himself to be placed; that he felt great repugnance to be a party to such an act, and yet was apprehensive of refusing himself to the Emperor's application; that it was clear that his mind was affected; that peace and goodwill at present engrossed his thoughts....and that he was unwilling to thwart him in a conception which, however wild, might save him and the rest of the world much trouble so long as it should last.

Foreseeing the awkwardness of this piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense, especially to a British Sovereign, I examined with Prince Metternich every practical expedient to stop it.

I ventured to express to the Emperor my satisfaction that the sovereigns had not given to this instrument an official character; that this might have rendered its production as a state document necessary; that it was better it should pass as an autograph communication between Sovereign and Sovereign, binding upon their own consciences.....than that it should be exposed to public discussion as an act advised by their ministers...

Upon the whole this is what may be called a scrape, and yet, in the long run, it may be attended with
more beneficial results than many of the acts which are
in progress........The fact is, that the Emperor's mind
is not completely sound. Last year there was but too
much reason to fear that its impulse would be to con-
quest and dominion. The general belief now is, that
he is disposed to found his own glory upon a principle
of peace and benevolence. Since the point of Poland was
disposed of, there has been nothing in his political
conduct in the progress of arrangements which indicated
another purpose and he really appears to be in earnest.
It is, at all events, wise to profit by this disposition
as far as it will carry us......I am desired by the
Emperor of Austria, through Metternich, to express
his earnest hope that the Prince will not refuse him-
self to this overture, however much he may feel with him
the embarrassment of the proceeding....My own opinion
very much concurs with that of His Imperial Majesty....
I think no person will blame the Prince for not refusing
himself to a proposition so made to him where the
objection lies rather against the excessive excellence
than the quality and nature of the engagement, but then
I think the Prince must take it upon himself and sign
it without the intervention of his ministers....to
"decline doing so might produce very unpleasant con-
"sequences." 1

It is necessary to examine this letter
closely as the opinion expressed in it remains fairly
stable until 1818. The first thing to be noted is the
unanimity and lack of reserve between England and Austria.
At Vienna Castlereagh and Metternich had acquired a con-
siderable respect for each other's capabilities. There

is no doubt that Castlereagh realised the duplicity of the Austrian minister, and he also kept in mind the narrowness of his views, but he also knew that he was the only other capable diplomat amongst the Allies. Besides this, the interests of Austria and England lay along the same lines of policy. In trade Russia was a rival to England, especially in the Mediterranean. Her territorial expansion at the Ottoman expense in the Danubian Principalities would be a menace to Austria. Any further disturbance in France might end in a Franco-Russian alliance, and set all Europe by the ears. This would neither suit England's desire for increased trade and colonial expansion, nor would it forward the aspirations of Austria in the German Confederation. Very soon Castlereagh was to find dangers in this understanding which he had difficulty in avoiding, but for the moment unanimity was complete.

The second item of importance to be deduced from the letter is Castlereagh's opinion of Alexander. He had not lost the opportunities afforded by the conference of Vienna and Paris of studying the character and motives of the Tzar. At the former Congress, where each
statesman eyed his fellow plenipotentiaries with suspicion, the English Foreign Minister, and also Metternich, soon discovered the national ambitions of Alexander. His altruism was still diluted by the idea of Empire expansion, rekindled by the short-lived alliance with Napoleon. In any case the theories of legitimacy and the Balance of Power left no scope for idealistic experiments. Had the Tzar brought forward his project at Vienna, any sympathy would have been nullified by his attitude towards the Polish Question, and his refusal to consider any article to guarantee the independence of Turkey. The only step made in the direction of a Confederation was his suggestion of a system of general public law and an international police, but Castlereagh was instrumental in the rejection of this plan. "I agree with you," he wrote to Liverpool, "that our interests are with Austria and Prussia rather than with Russia."¹ The interference of a Russian police in the affairs of the Mediterranean peninsula would have been almost as serious a blow to English commercial development

¹ Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh. Vol. X. Page 484.
and naval supremacy in that region, as the Russian ac-
quisition of Turkey would have been a set back to our
Power in India.

In Paris, the atmosphere cleared somewhat.
Alexander's "impulse to conquest and dominion" was submerged
in his disposition to found his own glory upon a "principle
of peace and benevolence". The diplomatists soon realised
his change of attitude. For the present he was not to
be feared but to be regarded with an amused contempt,
"the Emperor's mind is not completely sound". But this
contempt had to be tempered by the knowledge that Russia
was still, to all intents and purposes, omnipotent in the
Councils of Europe, and that unscrupulous aggression might
easily be substituted for benign tolerance.¹

But though Castlereagh and Metternich, from
their personal contact with Alexander, could appreciate
the sincerity of his conviction, it was obvious that the
nations at large would look at the matter in a different
light. The power of an autocrat was a vague quantity

¹. Wellington's Supplementary Despatches. XI. 175.
to the constitutionally enlightened people of England, where the whim of a king would have little effect on national policy. Even then, if the Tzar had become a victim to religious mania, which was very much doubted, how could this purify the militant energies of a whole nation? There was little doubt as to the reception which the Holy Alliance Treaty would receive from the Commons. The safest course would be to avoid parliamentary discussion on the matter. There would be serious opposition, if not complete rejection, and they "might produce very unpleasant consequences". The peace of Europe was too much in the hands of the Tzar, and his friends were too strong, to allow the risk of disturbing his unstable mind. The problem at hand was to steer a course between the rocks of English Liberalism and Alexander's "excessive excellence". To a skilful pilot the channel was sufficiently broad.

Lastly, Castlereagh's opinion as to the course to be steered needs consideration. It illustrates the cause of his lack of success as a party leader. His sweeping intellect failed to recognise the importance of constitutional detail, nor did he allow for narrowness and
prejudice in his opponents. He was certain of the righteousness of his own plans, and his lack of experience of party politics, which had been in the background during the war, led him to think that there would be no opposition to any policy pursued for the country's good. Besides this there is evidence of another defect of which he was accused by his critics, that is the lack of balance when flattered by the company of foreign monarchs. Perhaps this is to a certain extent true. Perhaps he felt that the very fact that the policy which he advised had been advocated by the Emperor of Austria was sufficient to convince the English political public, that is if they bothered their heads about the matter at all. His forgetfulness of the necessary formality accompanying the Regent's signature might point to this, as might his advocacy of the exact solution advised by Francis, that of a personal acceptance by the Regent. At any rate to Castlegeagh the way out of the difficulty was for the Prince "to take it upon himself to sign it without the intervention of his ministers". This drastic means of cutting the knot was not at all attractive to the scrupulous
and official mind of the Prime Minister. Castlereagh might dominate him by his keener intellect and more forceful personality in the matter of foreign politics, but here he found himself confronted by the immovable rock of the British Constitution. Liverpool's reply is definite:

"It is quite impossible, however, to advise the Prince to sign the Act of Accession which has been transmitted to him. Such a step would be inconsistent with all the forms and principles of our government, and would subject those who advised it to a very serious responsibility....The very best course for the Prince to adopt is to write an autobiographical letter to the three sovereigns according to the enclosed drafts".1

Both wished for the same policy, that of personal accession only. Castlereagh's method would have caused the Regent to have usurped the rights of Parliament, and forced the Treaty before the Houses. Liverpool, more accustomed to parliamentary craft, succeeded in avoiding this. As mentioned before Brougham lost his motion for the placing of the Treaty before the Commons, because it had not been signed.

The Regent's reply then is comparatively valueless from the point of British Foreign Policy:

Sir, My Brother and Cousin,

...As the form of the British Constitution, which I am called upon to administer in the name and on behalf of the King my father, prevents me from acceding formally to this Treaty in the shape in which it has been presented to me, I adopt this course of conveying to the august sovereigns who have signed it, my entire concurrence in the principles they have laid down....and it will be always my earnest endeavour to regulate my conduct....by these sacred maxims, and to co-operate with my august allies in all measures which may be likely to contribute to the peace and happiness of mankind.1

A soothing letter, which Alexander might interpret to his own satisfaction. It might give England an ally, it certainly did not bind her by an alliance. Any unpleasant consequences were avoided, and Castlereagh took advantage of this general goodwill to establish an understanding somewhat more tangible than the impracticable brain of the Tzar could devise.

His efforts resulted in the signing of the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance between Russia, Austria, France, and England on November 20th. The primary object of this was to watch over the affairs of France. The

1. "Map of Europe by Treaty" (Hertslet). I. No.36.
excesses of Louis XVIII's Parliament, "more royalist than the king", was causing considerable disturbance, and that country was still regarded as a cauldron from which anything might issue. It had taken to itself also a further function of holding periodical meetings "to concert measures for the repose and property of the peoples". A dictatorship, differing greatly from the Christian brotherhood proposed by Alexander. But to Castlereagh and Metternich the arrangement seemed highly satisfactory.

But the consummation of the Congress had not been reached without some difference of opinion. Both Russia and Austria were trying to bind England more closely to a Continental policy. Alexander made a great effort at Vienna when the first draft of a preliminary Quadruple Alliance was drawn up. Castlereagh saw that its aims and scope were too indefinite to appeal to his temper, or, that of the Houses of Parliament.

"It appeared to me that the proposed draft of a Treaty was open to very considerable objections. First "as not being sufficiently definite in the scope and "nature of its stipulations, secondly as bearing, on the "face of it, too strong and undisguised a complexion of
"interference on the part of the Allied Sovereigns in
the internal concerns of France."\(^1\)

Never had England concerned herself so much in European affairs as during the time when Castlereagh was at the Foreign Office. But his object was to secure such tranquillity by his influence that there should be no need of intervention. The letter refutes many of the harsh criticisms of his policy and character. He hated intervention in internal affairs of foreign nations knowing, as he said, that history had sufficient examples of its futility, and often of a reaction against the intervening state. Even France must be allowed a considerable amount of privacy.

But neither a-Castlereagh's attitude towards the first Vienna proposal, nor the Regent's refusal to sign the Alliance, caused Alexander to leave his path of friendship., At the end of the year (1815) the Regent sent a despatch to Alexander setting out England's guiding principles in foreign policy. Cathcart read it to him and sent back an account of the interview.

\[\text{On reading the paragraph which begins, 'In treating of the system of your own Court', his Imperial Majesty observed that the consolatory sentiments therein stated, viz., 'that there is no longer any object which}\]

F.O. 92. (Continental Treaty Papers) 29. No. 30
the Prince Regent can desire for the British Empire and that his only desire must be to employ all his influence to preserve the peace, was one in which he for one fully participated, that, thank God, he had no object of ambition, and that his own wish and, he trusted, the wish of all other sovereigns, could only be to preserve peace.... and in the next paragraph, where it is said, 'His Royal Highness's voice will only be raised to discourage the pursuit of Secondary and Separate Interests', his Imperial Majesty declared that he was perfectly in unison with his Royal Highness in that 'The Emperor read with great attention the last paragraph after he had arrived at the phrase 'to combine the powers of Europe against the State whose perverted policy or criminal ambition shall first menace the repose in which all have a common interest', and then said he thought it would be long before any state would venture to trouble that repose, and that the precautions taken to prevent that case were wise and salutary'.

This letter was received February, 1816.

The Tzar's mind was still obsessed with his benevolent tolerance. Whatever rebuffs he had received were so well presented that they had seemed like expressions of acquiescence. But as soon as this flattery began to ring hollow, which it was bound to do so often repeated, then Alexander gave up his ambition to be a second Christ and his desire to be another Napoleon was reborn. His nature was one which had to have success, adulation and omnipotence in some sphere or another. If not in the Liberal

1. F.O. 65 (Russia). 103. No. 11.
and universal, then in the autocratic and national. At the beginning of 1816 his Liberalism was still unimpaired, but his autocratic court and diplomatic corps was already impatient of opposition, and eager for a more offensive foreign policy. This atmosphere was not long in affecting Alexander. It was a struggle between Liberalism, modified and guided by Castlereagh's flattery, and ambition, fertilised by Court atmosphere. The fight lasted long. By 1818 the Court atmosphere was triumphant, but for some years afterwards flattery had its results at the Russian capital.

The Congresses having been finished, and the Alliance re-established, monarchs and ministers back in their various capitals, politics gradually began to descend from the rarer atmospheres to levels more worldly and more national. In the years now to be dealt with in this chapter, 1816 and 1817, it is the Austrian policy which concerns England the most. Metternich and Castlereagh together in Vienna and Paris had worked to a great extent with unanimity, agreeing to pursue an Alliance policy, pacific, but with a watchful eye on Russia. Metternich, alone in Vienna with Russia close on the frontier and with
Castlereagh away over the Channel, began to show signs of nervousness. An alliance against Alexander appeared to become more and more desirable and urgent, and England was the country whose interests and policy should coincide with his own. From the beginning of 1816, we find Metternich trying to draw Castlereagh from his policy of semi-aloofness. He thought that the friendship formed at Vienna could be the basis of a closer union. On every possible occasion he brought to Stewart's notice the hostile actions of Russian agents against England and Austria. He exaggerated greatly but failed to move Castlereagh. There certainly was much ill-feeling between British and Russian officials, especially at Madrid and Naples, but the policy was not originated at the Russian Court. Metternich tried to force this into the open, and the nervousness of the lesser countries assisted him. On January 5th, 1816, Castlereagh wrote to Stewart —

"The Courts of Madrid and Naples have conceived "a very unnecessary alarm as to the views of the Russian "Government".

Stewart is ordered to do his best to heal the breach, "as nothing can be more likely to disturb the harmony of the

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Alliance upon which the serenity of Europe rests." ¹

A week previous to this letter he had written to Mr. Rose, the British Ambassador in Berlin —

"I perceive in more than one quarter a tendency to alarm as to the designs of particular Powers, but especially of Russia, for which I have reason to suppose there is not the smallest foundation....His language, his engagements and his proceedings, as far as they are known to me, are in direct opposition to such a conclusion....In the present state of Europe it is the province of Great Britain to turn the confidence she has inspired to the account of peace by exercising a conciliatory influence between the Powers, rather than to put herself at the head of any Combination of courts to keep others in check....All appeared to separate (from Paris) deeply impressed with the value of their common connexion to themselves and to the world, and I trust nothing may arise to shake this impression."²

With reference to the unrest in Germany and France —

"The interposition of Great Britain will be always most authoritative in proportion as it is not compromised by being unduly mixed in the daily concerns of these states."²

Castlereagh had reason later to modify this view of Alexander. Written of the end of 1815, the Tzar

² Castlereagh's Correspondence. Vol.XI. page 104.
was still in the first flush of his holy zeal, and Russian intrigue and aggressiveness was still very local. Fresh from personal contact with the idealism of Alexander, the disturbed feelings in Naples and Madrid were ascribed to personal sentiments rather than a national policy.

In July, 1816, Metternich again tries to rouse the fears of England. In answer Castlereagh wrote to Stewart.

"I have no doubt that upon all great principles of European politics, the British and Austrian Governments are agreed....Prince Metternich mistakes the sentiments of this Court if he supposes that we urge him to adopt a submissive or a conceding policy towards Russia....we only wish to moderate that 'Cri de Bureau' against Russia."

The question of armaments was one upon which Metternich entertained the liveliest suspicions of Russia. Proposals had been put forward and approved by the great powers for a mutual reduction of armies. But, with schemes for an international police, and for military intervention in the affairs of lesser states, especially Turkey, Russia wished for special consideration with regard to the time taken to reduce her armies, and her final military strength. The German Confederation

had first approached Castlereagh with regard to the scheme. He wrote to Clancarty, the English Ambassador at Frankfurt in August 1816.

As the Emperor likes an army, as he likes an influence in Europe, and is under an impression of some alarm with respect to the effervescence of the times, I do not expect him very rapidly to part with the troops he has formed, nor should, from this circumstance alone, call in question his pacific disposition. 1

To Stewart he wrote in the same month,

Upon the main point of your despatch, viz., the question of armaments, I see no distinction in the reasoning of the two Governments other than that the same arguments are urged by Prince Metternich with less reserve in his comments than it would have become the Prince Regent's Ministers to press them in a memoir when replying to the Emperor of Russia's overture. Upon a policy of a mutual and relative reduction all are agreed,.... that the magnitude of their armies is amongst the most serious of the dangers to which the cause of legitimate sovereigns is exposed at this day, no one can doubt, who knows of the existing state of the finances of every European power. 2

In another sphere the fear of Russian activity was troubling Metternich. The Mediterranean pirates at this time were a terror to all Europe. The Tzar proposed that his fleet should be used to exterminate them.

2. F.O. 7. (Austria, 185. No. 13.)
Metternich looked upon the proposal as an excuse for the extension of Russian sea-power.

In the same letter to Stewart, Castlereagh refers to the subject -

"Prinoe Metternich seems to understand the Russian overture as a proposition coming from the Emperor to put himself at the head of a Maritime Confederacy... Quite agreeing with the Austrian Minister in not wishing to see the Mediterranean made the theatre of Russian Maritime exertions, I really cannot see a trace of such a policy disclosed."

The excuse, if excuse it was, had a good foundation. In 1814 Austria had had to put her shipping under Turkish protection. English trade, the largest in the Mediterranean, had suffered severely both in ships and in range of activity. Yet it was the joint opposition of these two countries which caused the Russian offer to be rejected, the nuisance to remain unchecked. Russian warships in the Mediterranean would have been too much for the nerves of any nation except Prussia. Yet, in spite of this joint rejection, England refused to agree with Austria that Russia was directly out for aggression. Castlereagh

said that the Austrian fears were groundless, and then took precautions in case they had some foundation. His first anxiety in European politics was his fear of Russian ambition disturbing the newly-won peace, his second was to keep his first fear hidden from Metternich. In July, 1816, to Stewart —

"...I always look upon Russia as the power which without essentially exposing itself, is most capable of mischief, and that in proportion as her connection with France is closely connected the danger is increased."  

At this time Castlereagh launches a brilliant diplomatic attack, which is, and indeed, can be, only partially successful. He proposed that the questions of the Barbary pirates and the Abolition of Slavery shall be combined, and, in point of fact, refuses to consider the former by itself. If both were rejected then the fear of Russia in the Mediterranean would be removed, and also, in consequence, Austria would lose an excuse for an anti-Russian alliance. If both were accepted by Russia then the Emancipation of the Slaves would mean a considerable increase of power to Castlereagh in Parliament, and Austrian jealousy would still neutralise Russian Maritime

power. The Holy Alliance here proved useful, and Castle-
reagh appeals to the principles stated therein as far
as he dared without compromising England's aloof attitude.
He wrote to Cathcart urging the Tzar to support the aboli-
tion of the Slave Trade with the greatest zeal. It had
already been condemned at the Congress of Vienna.

*I can have no doubt that the Emperor of Russia
*and those sovereigns who have given their sanction to the
*Treaty of September 14th., will feel that it is one, not
*of mere choice, but of indispensable moral obligation,
*and you may therefore assure the Emperor that in this
*enlarged view of the interests of humanity, the Prince
*Regent is fully prepared to do his duty*."

This letter was written before the question
of Russia and the Barbary pirates became acute. His policy
at this time was to gain Whig support. Slave emancipation
was a great advance in humanitarian thought, especially
on the part of one who was, now, considered as the arch-
enemy of freedom by his opponents. But apart from the
desire for Whig support the proposal was a disinterested
one, and typically British in its scope. Far from attaining
the universality of the scheme of Alexander, nevertheless
it aimed at something of which the Tzar was not capable,

the application of theories to existing conditions.

But the Russian menace again loomed large and the importunity of Austria was becoming troublesome. The uniting of the two questions assured to Castlereagh a partial success. On May 18th, 1816, he explained his point of view to Cathcart,

"Your Lordships will perceive that it is only by making the Slave Trade and the Question of the Barbary Powers go pari-passu that we can fully meet the wishes of the Emperor and of the other Powers who press the latter point as one of universal interest. I think his Imperial Majesty will enter cordially into the views if the British Government upon thus combining them in one common course, and I have no doubt if we all draw heartily together upon the broad ground of giving repose upon Christian principles to the Human Race, of whatever colour, and in every part of the globe, that we shall do ourselves credit and render a lasting service to mankind."

"Whatever colour" is as applicable to Turks as to negroes, and despite the idealism of the letter, it was received with suspicion. The idea of English warships searching out the slave traders was looked upon as another move of "egoism and commercial calculation". Another nation leading a humanistic crusade would deprive Alexander of much Christian glory, besides, his participation would be a tacit recognition of the rights of coloured races whether Christian or not. So the scheme fell through, but

the Tzar was not able to blame Castlereagh that the Barbary pirates still remained at large. If any nation lost some of the confidence of the lesser states over the business that nation was Russia. In England much Whig opposition had been aroused by this apparent surrender to the principles of the Holy Alliance of the Tzar. The independent action of the nation seemed to be imperilled. But it was not as a member of the Alliance that Castlereagh asked for the Tzar's support. He merely asked him to put his Christian principles into practice. This apparent pandering to Russia, and its lack of results, was much more obvious to the general political public than was the highly satisfactory diplomatic success achieved. The Tzar had angrily rejected the combined projects. Therefore, as there was no fear of Russian naval aggression in the Mediterranean, Metternich's excuse for an anti-Russian Alliance was rendered useless.

For a time the Austrian dispatches became calmer. Metternich had apparently given up the idea of a closer understanding. But in 1817 Russian intrigue at Madrid, and his fear of her designs on Turkey, again stirred him to action. He hoped once more to rouse England's
fear for her Mediterranean commerce, and to obtain a secret Triple Alliance with the French. The object of this desire to "isolate Russia" was made clearer by an interview which Metternich had with the English Ambassador when the Turkish anti-Christian policy came under review.

"It appeared to me (wrote Stewart) that the Austrian Minister was very desirous of ascertaining from us the utmost length we should be prepared to go in the tone, language, and even means we should employ in the event of the negotiations at Constantinople taking an unfavourable turn. All this, however, was covered by an ardent desire for complete union....The Prince said that it was true everything was in the best train, but the ample explanations of Austria, England, Prussia and, he trusted, France, must still be more extensive. To secure the latter from the influence of Russia and place her on the same line with ourselves was unquestionably the point of the greatest solicitude, and this he trusted, by the retiring tranquility and steadiness of the King of France's government, would be affected. For his own part he considered the Quadruple Alliance as the great palladium upon which the peace of Europe depended. In this the Emperor of Russia was so bound up that he could not extricate himself from its obligations without sacrificing all his principles. To this, therefore, we must endeavour that Russia should for ever cling. But at the same time it became necessary to prevent an extension of the means of one Empire, already too powerful, to counteract designs of a suspicious nature." 1

Immediately afterwards, April 1817, Metternich sent an appeal to Castlereagh through Esterhazy. But the

1. F.O. 7. (Austria) 125. No. 7.
persuasion was ineffective. He was bent on peace and to achieve this he had to make England's policy as unemotional as his own character. He fulfilled his obligations to the Quadruple Alliance but nothing beyond. He had stated these aims and limitations in a circular sent round to the British Ministers in Foreign Courts on January 1st. 1816.

The first object of the Alliance being to "serve both, (Louis XVIII and his Kingdom) and through "them the rest of Europe, from becoming a prey to revolutionary anarchy and violence...."

Such an alliance could only have owed its "origin to a sense of common danger, in its very nature "it must be conservative. It cannot threaten either the "security or the liberties of other states".1

England was the one nation which could be trusted to pursue a disinterested policy in Europe, the one power on which the lesser states could rely. The Peace of Paris had shown that her ambitions lay in a wider field. Castlereagh knew that the nervous tension of Europe had not yet relaxed; that a sign of panic from any one of the great powers might shatter the unstable structure of peace so laboriously constructed. As long as

1. F.O. 83 (Continent) 81 (Circular).
England remained calm the Quadruple Alliance would remain unbroken, and its prestige high. Castlereagh strove to stay apart until intervention should become inevitable. The nations had no doubts about England's commercial egoism, but they had faith in her disinterestedness on the Continent. Any "meddling" would undermine this, any nervousness in her policy would undo Castlereagh's life's work.

With reference to his interview with Esterhazy, and Metternich's dispatch, he sent a letter to Stewart in the next month, May.

"The principles laid down by Prince Metternich, when taken in the abstract, and with due caution in their application, are perfectly wise and sound and no difference of opinion can arise upon them, but, whilst we agree in considering the Quadruple Alliance, combined with a system of conciliation and support to the existing order of things established in France, as the basis of all our policy, we must proceed with circumspection in adopting any measure of precautionary policy upon speculative grounds which might be fatal to the system itself. In our practical views upon the subject, I am persuaded we must mean the same thing, namely to preserve the system which exists as long as possible; that if it is shaken the fault shall not be with either court, and to secure this object that nothing should be done either upon chance or upon suspicion inconsistent with our declared relations, and that, whilst the elements of security in the goodwill of other powers are cultivated, it should be left to necessity to combine them...as the development of an ascertained danger shall point out."1

1. F.O. 7. (Austria) 128. No. 4.
The absence of an "ascertained" danger made the success of Metternich's advances impossible, and he had to abandon his design of a secret alliance of the rest of Europe against Russia. In England, Castlereagh was experiencing an increasing opposition. His consideration towards Alexander, both now and also later at Aix-la-Chapelle, occasioned great criticism from the Whigs and also from a section of the Tories who feared the Russian menace in the East. The great share which he had had in the triumphs and treaties of 1814, and 1815 had doubtless attached him strongly to the maintenance of the Quadruple Alliance. He was accused of having become enamoured of the homage and flattery paid by Emperors and Kings to the representative of England, and he was obviously less at ease in Parliament, faced by a strong and vituperative opposition, than among the diplomats of Europe, each seeking the friendship of his country. In England the general feeling was moving away from an active continental policy and the forceful speeches of Canning at this time foreshadow his policy when, as Castlereagh's successor, he definitely breaks the connection of England with the
The funeral oration of Metternich's proposed anti-Russian alliance is contained in a letter from Stewart to Castlereagh written on June 21st. 1817. Esterhazy had returned to Vienna.

"Prince Esterhazy observes with regret that "your Lordship does not seem disposed to enter into a more "active system of precaution against Russian encroach-
"ments which he conceives would be more acceptable to his "own government and to Prince Metternich's ideas; and I "am thus more confirmed in my opinion that the Austrian' "Minister's first desire was to secure without "loss of time the Courts of London, Paris and Berlin, in "some engagement that would bind them to act together in "the possible contingency of Russia's overstepping the "bonds in which she is now held".1

The subject was not mentioned again and the relations of the two statesmen continued to be of the closest but no more is heard of a secret alliance.

1. F.O. 7. (Austria) 130. No. 2.
CHAPTER IV.

AIX - LA - CHAPELLE.
Castlereagh now began to think the time ripe for one of the reunions of statesmen and monarchs provided for by the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. He knew well how much of the distrust in Europe, especially between Austria and Russia, was due to misunderstanding, and petty official intrigue, and he hoped to ensure a continuance of European amity by re-establishing a closer acquaintance between the principals. There were also important questions with regard to the settlement of France. The Army of Occupation had accomplished its purpose. France was ready to negotiate immediately for the payment of reparations and Wellington had stated that a further extension of the occupation period would only rouse the peasants against both the army and the existing government. Besides these matters there was the question of the future of France and the Alliance. What was to be her position in relation to the other Powers.
The proposal of a Conference to settle these problems would meet with little opposition even in England, where the idea of periodic meetings, being new, was suspect, but there were other disturbing factors in Europe, which Castlereagh hoped to render less dangerous through calm consideration at the Congress. There was the Slave Trade still active, chiefly because of the denial of the British Right of Search by Spain and Portugal. The Barbary Pirates were still terrorising the Mediterranean; the Bavaria-Baden question of succession was still in dispute; the relations of Spain and Portugal were greatly strained and, most important of all, the independence or submission of the Spanish Colonies.

There was a general desire in Europe for the Congress to take place as early as possible. The Tzar was still pondering over his extensive schemes of fraternal peace, and perhaps three years of the Russian climate made the prospect of a holiday all the more pleasant. Metternich was anxious to meet Alexander both to get some further insight into his curious mind; and also to influence him in a more reactionary policy. Recent student riots at Wartburg had alarmed both the Emperor Francis and the
King of Prussia, but Russian friendship was certainly advisable before any extension of Austro-Prussian supremacy and autocracy was to be attempted in the Confederation.

The date of the Conference being fixed the next item to be arranged was the form which it was to take. Castlereagh knew that the British public would be against any unnecessary interference in European politics. Any idealistic, extravagant, or incomprehensible form of reunion would raise a storm of opposition. Only the matters connected with France interested Englishmen, and only the nations immediately concerned in those matters ought to be present at the Conference. There must be no General Congress. On March 27th, 1818, Castlereagh wrote to Cathcart —

"As far as the Prince-Regent has been enabled to weigh this question without either having the opportunity of being informed of the sentiments of His Allies, it has appeared to His Royal Highness desirable to give this meeting, as much as possible, the character of Special Conferences held under the stipulations of the Treaty of Alliance, and, as little as may be, that of a European Congress, and that the objects of its deliberations should, as far as possible, be understood beforehand.....

The real question is, whether a General Congress be desirable or not. As there does not appear to be new matter for deliberation sufficient to call for so extraordinary a measure......and as it might be productive of more embarrassment than utility, and give rise to ideas of change which it cannot be desirable to encourage, I
"cannot hesitate to acquaint Your Excellency that the opinion of the Prince Regent's Government, as at present informed, leans strongly in favour of the most simple and expeditious course of procedure." 1

This hardly suited the Tzar's scheming ministers Pozzo di Borgo in Paris and Capo d'Istria, who were hoping to bring in the lesser powers, especially Spain, in order to counterbalance the Austro-British understanding. Even Castlereagh himself wished the agenda of the Conference to be more elastic than he dared admit to the Cabinet. Nor did he mention his scheme for further reunions to this body.

Metternich agreed with Castlereagh over limiting the size of the Conference. He was too uneasy to wish to see the Tzar reinforced by Spain and possibly by other states, and he even suggested a preliminary discussion with Castlereagh in Paris. This suggestion the latter ignored but the general feeling forced Alexander to come into line, and to agree to the Quadruple Alliance alone being represented and even to rebuke his over zealous ministers.

The town of Aix-la-Chapelle was chosen on

account of its central situation and its ability to afford opportunities for recreation, necessary accompaniments to any diplomatic gatherings at this time, and certainly much desired by the Russian section. Metternich was losing his appetite for gaiety. Besides these advantages the journey to Aix-la-Chapelle provided an opportunity for the Emperor Francis to traverse the Rhineland states where he was received as though the Imperial crown were still on a Hapsburg head.

Castlereagh arrived with two Memoranda, both of which had been approved by the Cabinet. The first dealt with France and justified the proposal of withdrawing the Army of Occupation by Article V of the Treaty of Paris. It proposed that France should make arrangements to pay reparations partly through bankers and partly by a Government loan, and that any further military surveillance should be left to the Army of the German Confederation across the frontier. The most difficult question dealt with in this first Memorandum was that of the future relations of France and the Alliance. This latter had been reformed in 1815 to see that France carried out the Treaty
or policy when he presented the scheme to the Cabinet. It was not so far from London to Aix as from London to Vienna in 1815. Criticism was near at hand and more hostile, but Castlereagh wished to allow himself as free a hand as possible for, in such matters as the Slave Trade and the Barbary Pirates much depended on the support he would get from Russia and Austria.

Stewart warned Castlereagh of the attitude to be expected from the Austrian representatives in a despatch sent on August 24th, 1818. He also suggested that the probable policy of Russia would lean towards an additional Quintriple Alliance and the evacuation of France.

"That the Emperor of Russia will still uphold the Quadruple Alliance, there can be no doubt, and uphold it so long as he fancies himself the champion and Founder of it, and is still alive to the work of the Holy Treaty. But this Government is keenly alive to the consideration that the time is not very far distant when this greatest link will be torn asunder, and that the approximation of Russia and France will sooner or later be the result. The longer and more remote such a political change can be deferred, the better on every possible consideration, and the just and wise political action may be to turn from the contemplation of such possible unfavourable prosperity, but unhappily with these men like Prince Metternich, who have brilliant and inventive imagination, they are generally disposed to look further than the present moment, and it is impossible to turn a deaf ear to their reasoning."
"Already it is said that the Quadruple Alliance only forms "a great skeleton, from which a Triple Alliance will, in "futurity, arise between the Central Powers." 1

Capo d'Istria's ambitious schemes were in no way acceptable to Stewart.

"I thought he talked with respect and advantage "of the Quadruple Alliance, still he implied that if the "Sovereigns came together with France and Spain, more ex- "tensive arrangements seemed probable. In short from the "details I received I should conclude his doctrine to be "generally in opposition to those which in principle at "least, are entirely the same between the Austrian and "British Governments." 2

Discussions having been opened at Aix, Castlereagh's optimism was soon justified. The enthusiasm and sincerity of Alexander left nothing to be desired. He was in full accord with his allies. His love of peace was unbounded, and his faith in the Quadruple Alliance, and in future conferences, was as great as ever; "my army as well as myself is at the disposal of Europe". he said to Metternich who, cynical as he was, could not help but be struck by the exaltation of his mind. Castlereagh wrote to Stewart on September 10th, from Aix, with reference to a conversation which he had had with the Tzar.

1. F.O. 7 (Austria) 139. No. 4.
2. F.O. 7 (Austria) 139. No. 10.
His Imperial Majesty then adverted to the
"insinuations which were afloat, that he kept up his Army
"for purposes of war and conquest, and that he wished for
"an expansion of dominion. "The Emperor said that the
"same stories were circulated in the first years of peace....
"'I consider my army as the army of Europe, and as such
"alone shall it be employed'."

Wellington enclosed a despatch in this letter:-

"I observed to His Imperial Majesty that,
"although we ought to do everything to consolidate and
"render effectual the Quadruple Alliance, yet it appeared
"to me that we ought to endeavour to conciliate France,
"and show that country that the other Powers of Europe were
"not disposed to exclude her from their councils, if she
"conducted herself with moderation. 'Oui, La France
"gouvernée par ses Souverains légitimes', and according
"to the existing system he said, 'but not Revolutionary
"France!'"

But the Tzar's solicitude for the future of
France still worried Metternich.

The first British Memorandum formed the basis of negotiations, and was soon approved by Metternich
and Hardenburg. The Tzar's ministers withheld their opinion for a time. The questions of evacuation and re-
paration were soon settled, and the proposal to invite France to join in the deliberations of the Powers under
Article VI was agreed upon. So far Alexander's holiday

1. F.O. 7. (Austria) 139. No. 10.
had been peaceful and pleasant, and Castlereagh felt able to justify his Conference system to the Cabinet. On October 4th. he wrote to Liverpool:—

"My belief is that in the main the Emperor of Russia is in earnest in what he says....My persuasion is that he means to pursue a peace policy, that he aims at sway, but that he has no desire to change his connexion, or to render the revolutionary spirit in Europe more active. Upon the whole it seems working as well as we could wish, and we have only to encourage the sentiments of attachment of which we are all so prodigal towards each other, and which I believe at this moment are sincerely entertained. I am quite convinced that the past habits, common glory, and these occasional meetings, displays, and repledges, are among the best securities Europe now has for durable peace." 1

The Cabinet however had been suffering from the lack of Castlereagh's reassuring presence, and its apprehensions had been played upon by the irrepressible Canning, bitterly hostile to further conferences, "which will necessarily involve us deeply in all the politics of the Continent, whereas our true policy has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies and then with commanding force." He was the only Cabinet Minister who was against the system itself; the others only disliking any fixed dates for the meetings. Bathurst sent a report

1. Castlereagh's Correspondence, XII. 47.
of the vital Cabinet meeting to Castlereagh on October 19th. outlining Canning's objections:

"My dear Castlereagh - You will be desirous of receiving some account of what has passed in Cabinet....We were all more or less impressed with the apprehension of great inconvenience arising from a decision being now publicly announced of continued meetings at fixed periods. It is very natural in you to feel a strong wish that they should continue, from having experienced the advantages which have been derived by this which has taken place; but, even if we could be sure that the subsequent meetings would be equally cordial, is there any advantage in fixing beyond the next period, and we all, without exception, in the Cabinet, concur in thinking that the next meeting should be fixed and announced....

The objections which Canning feels on this subject are not confined to the inexpediency of announcing a decision of meetings at fixed periods, but to the system itself. He does not consider the ninth article as having been generally understood to apply to any meetings, except for the purpose of watching the internal state of France, as far as it may endanger tranquility. He thinks that system of periodical meetings of the four Great Powers, new, and of very questionable policy; that it will necessarily involve us deeply in all the politics of the Continent, whereas our true policy has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies, and then with a commanding force. He thinks that all other states must protest against such an attempt to place them under subjection, that the meetings may become a scene of cabal and intrigue, and that the people of this country may be thought to look with great jealousy for their liberties if our court is engaged in meetings with great despotic monarchs, deliberating upon what degree of revolutionary spirit may endanger the public security, and therefore require the interference of the Alliance."

I do not subscribe to Canning's opinions, nor did any of the Cabinet who attended. But if this is
"felt by him, it is not unreasonable to apprehend, it may "be felt by many other persons as well as by our decided "opponents. And what I wish to ask you is, why take the "bull by the horns".

Lord Liverpool also sent advice, urging caution -

"If it is thought advisable, with a view of "keeping France in some order to fix a period, the "Sovereigns will again assemble, we see no objection to "such a decision, and though it might be open to some mis-"representation, the good might perhaps counterbalance the "inconveniences of such a proceeding, but it is often as "unwise to look too far into futurity as to put narrow and "contracted limits to our views.

"We must recollect ourselves in the whole of "this business and ought to make our Allies feel that the "General and European discussion of their questions "will be in the British Parliament, that we have a new "Parliament to meet which has not been tried, of doubtful "character and certainly not accustomed to look at foreign "questions as Parliaments were some years ago when under "the pressure or immediate recollection of great foreign "danger." 2

While these letters were on the way to Aix, a dispatch from Castlereagh was travelling in the opposite direction. In this, sent on October 19th., he shows himself hardly less anxious than the Cabinet to keep British obligations within reasonable bounds. The Tzar and Capo d'Istria had brought forward their prepared scheme of a

1. Castlereagh's Correspondence. XII. 55.
2. Castlereagh's Correspondence. XII. 61.
Common League of all nations guaranteeing both territories and thrones. This guarantee was to be secured by a protocol defining the *casus foederis*, and the military measures to be taken should the necessity arise. This meant the creation of a single state in which the nations were to be treated as individuals.

Although the Tzar had broached the matter as gently as possible in order not to embarrass the British representative, yet the proposal had a hostile reception. Castlereagh could not think of acquiescence, and Metternich agreed with him, — perhaps regrettfully, with his ear turned to the growing murmur of revolt in Naples. So Castlereagh and Gentz drew up a series of proposals wrapped up with many idealistic expressions, which he hoped would gently disillusion the Tzar. He sent a copy of the proposals to London with an accompanying dispatch on October 19th.

"I observe that both the Emperor and His Minister, Count Capo d'Istira, were, in conversation, disposed to push their ideas very far indeed in the sense of all the Powers of Europe being bound together in a Common League guaranteeing to each other the existing order of things in Thrones as well as in Territories... I thought the best chance of preserving the Emperor's mind within the principles which we could maintain in Parliament, was by trying to present something that night at once keep
"within our own line, and at the same time present the
"subject in the one of his own ideas."

He went on to consider the Russian proposals
in greater detail -

"The Russian paper, much of which I have reason
"to believe, was brought in a prepared shape from St.
"Petersburg, goes wide into the field of European Alliance.

","When the Duke of Wellington and myself came
"to consider this paper together, though abounding in the
"principles of Union and Peace, we felt some dismay in
"observing the abstractions and sweeping generalities in
"which it was conceded. It appeared to us that whilst
"we could by no means subscribe to its doctrine in the
"extent to which it was pushed, it would be hazardous to
"attempt a written answer to it."l

When Alexander put his tentative suggestions
into a definite form, in which all States were to
join together in suppressing any revolution, Castlereagh
thought it time to call the powers together. He severely
criticised the Russian proposals at this meeting, and re-
fused to countenance any obligation beyond the maintenance
of existing boundaries, of the Quadruple Alliance including
Article VI. He sent a Memorandum to the Cabinet.

"The Benign Principles of the Alliance of the 20th.
"September 1815, having been either formally or substantially
"adhered to by all Powers, may be considered as constituting
"the European System in matters of political conscience. It
"would, however, be derogatory to this solemn act of the
"Sovereigns to mix its discussion with the ordinary diplomat-

1.F.O. 92. (Continental Treaty Papers) 35, with Gentz
document.
"ic obligations which bind state to state and which are
alone to be looked for in the Treaties which have been
concluded in the accustomed form."

Then follows one of the first declarations
of the doctrine of non-interference. The first insertion
of the wedge which was to split the Alliance.

The only safe Principle is that of the Law
of Nations; that no state has a right to endanger its
neighbours by its internal proceedings, and that if it
does, provided they exercise a sound discretion, then
right of interference is clear.

The desire of the Prince Regent always is to
act cordially with his Allies, but in doing so, to
stand quite clear in the view of his own engagements, not
to be supposed to have taken engagements beyond the Text
and Import of the Treaties signed. The Problem of an
Universal Alliance for the Peace and Happiness of the world
has always been one of speculation and of Hope, but it has
never been yet reduced to practice, and, if an opinion
may be hazarded from its difficulty, it never can, but
you may, in practice, approach towards it, and perhaps
the design has never been so far realised as in the last
four years, during that eventful period of the Quadruple
Alliance, formed upon Principles altogether limited."

The idea of an Alliance Solidaire, by which
each State shall be bound to support the State of Success-
ion, Government and Possession, within all other States
from violence and attack upon condition of receiving for
itself a similar guarantee, must be understood as
morally implying the previous establishment of such a
system of general government as may secure and enforce
upon all Kings and Nations an internal system of peace
and justice. Till the mode of constructing such a system
shall be devised the consequence is inadmissible as
nothing would be more immoral or more prejudicial to the
character of Government generally than the idea that their
force was collectively to be prostituted to the support
of established power without any consideration of the
extent to which it was abused. Till a system of admin-
istering Europe by a General Alliance of all its States
"can be reduced to some practical form all notions of
"general unqualified guarantee must be abandoned and States
"must be left to rely for their security upon the justice
"and wisdom of their respective systems." 1

How could the Powers agree to maintain
systems, some of which might be rotten already. In the
case of Britain, there were further special difficulties.
The great advance of England towards democracy was a matter
which the European autocrats failed to realise. An auto-
crat and his ministers might foresee perilous complications
in "small beginnings" of revolution in foreign states, but
Britain could only lend her support with the permission of
Parliament, and Parliament might be very slow in appreciat-
ing the serious possibilities of the situation. The exist-
ing Parliament was bent on peace and retrenchment, and only
when the danger threatened England as well as other nations
would it sanction interference abroad.

Castlereagh's determination on these points
produced the desired effect. His criticisms of "benign
principles" were as scathing in council at Aix, as in his
despatches home. He fully realised that the only way to

preserve his system was to keep a tight reign on Alexander. If that member of the team were given his head the experimental coach would soon be in the ditch. Metternich agreed with Castlereagh and so did Prussia and their joint efforts succeeded in substituting "diplomatic obligations" for "benign principles" as the key-note of the settlement. The Quadruple Alliance was still maintained, while France, though still on probation, was conciliated by admission to the Alliance under Article VI. This latter clause was strongly supported by Metternich, who imagined that Alexander was trying to bring about the exclusion of France in order to make a Russo-French alliance possible. The Tzar had to be "grouped".

Meanwhile Bathurst's letter arrived at Aix very much out of date. Castlereagh's latest report had calmed the Cabinet. He assured them that no dates would be fixed, but at the same time he allowed no opportunity to pass of lauding the system of reunions. He enlarged on the many dangers avoided, and the many thorny questions amicably discussed. He particularly asked that the Cabinet should refrain from too close a criticism of the actual languages of the documents. In a letter to Liver-
pool on November 9th, he says:

"The expression in allusion to the Holy Alliance, "I think Canning, if he reads the Prince Regent's reply to "the Sovereigns at Paris, will feel we could not object to; "and if we are to go on with Russia for any time I fear "it is in vain to hope for a pure vocabulary". 1

He had already caused many vague and objectionable phrases to be expunged. He rejected an article declaring the "threatened return of revolutionary crises" to be a "casus foederis"; and also refused to put his signature to an article stating that the Alliance had become stronger and more dissoluble by the bonds of Christian brotherhood existing between sovereigns and by the accession of all the European states to the Holy Alliance which had concentrated these bonds. Furthermore, he refused to entertain any suggestion of fixed meetings. A reunion was automatic in the case of a fresh French revolt; and in that case alone. Alexander in his turn gained his point over the announcement of the decisions of the Congress to the smaller states. Castlereagh wished for an unostentatious protocol, and a circular to each nation. Alexander pressed for a General Declaration, and this was issued on November 15th. in the form of two instruments. The

1. Castlereagh's Correspondence. XII. 76.
first renewed the Quadruple Alliance for the express purpose of watching over France, and the second, to which France was invited to adhere, asserted that –

"The intimate union established among the "monarchs offers to Europe the most sacred pledges of its "future tranquillity. The object of the Union is none "other than the maintenance of peace. The sovereigns, "in forming this august union, have regarded as its funda-"mental basis their invariable resolution never to depart "from the strictest observation of the Law of Nations... "They solemnly acknowledge that their duties towards God "and the people whom they govern make it peremptory on "them to give to the world....an example of justice, con-"cord, and moderation." 1

So the Conference was over and Castlereagh still in office. The Cabinet was even pleased with him and thanked him for his "spirit of accommodation, and yet firm when principles were involved". They knew that if he had acted in a less accommodating manner, Britain would have had to withdraw from the Alliance, and few wished that to happen even of the Opposition. He had kept Britain to her obligations and had preserved a piece of machinery necessary to European peace. Besides this the Conference System was still in existence without having

1. "Map of Europe by Treaty" (Hertslet) I. 573.
been defined, and it had bee justified by results. Austro-
Russian relations had been improved, and the fear of a
separate Russo-French Alliance removed. France was in the
European Concert and free from the leading rein. All these
results were good, and if anything could possibly have
justified the Conference System to the English people, the
contents of the General Declaration would have done so.
Castlereagh had been at the height of his powers
and influence abroad, and in none of the more vital
issues of the Conference had he had to give way to any
important degree. His diplomacy had been crowned with
success, but his statesmanship had failed to please his
Parliament and people. Although he had used his great
influence and personality to bring the ideas of Alexander
into line with his own yet he had failed to lull suspicion,
except within the Cabinet itself. Without knowing it, he
had made his supreme effort, and, though his plans had
met with every success, the resistance was deeper than
he had suspected, and later when the opposing force, which
he had successfully counteracted at Aix, began to be felt
once more, his Conference system was rent asunder and
entirely destroyed.

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On questions other than the ostensible ones for which the Conference was called, though in some cases immediate danger was averted, yet no definite practical decisions were reached. Spain was too haughty over her colonial question, and neither she nor Portugal would grant any further Right of Search concession in the Slave Trade. The internal affairs of the German Confederation took up much time. Prussia wished for a guarantee of her possessions against France. This type of General Guarantee was what the Tzar wished to lead up to and even Metternich thought that Prussia might be held in check herself by this. But Castlereagh could see a vision of a Russian army marching across Germany with its inevitable complications, and had the idea "postponed".

The question of the Bavaria-Baden succession was more disturbed than settled, and finally it was left to the Diet at Frankfurt, but Bavaria, not consulted, felt aggrieved.

Castlereagh had, by astute diplomacy contrived to steer himself through some dangerous waters. He had maintained the friendship of Austria and Russia by suffering
gladly the fooleries of the Russian monarch. He had established the intermediary character of British policy in foreign affairs and in doing so had laid down a boundary beyond which England would refuse to commit herself to co-operation with her allies. The continuation of the Alliance ensured the maintenance of friendship with Austria to whom England looked as the protector of her interests in the Mediterranean and South Eastern Europe. But both Russia and Prussia vaguely realised that England was drawing away from the Eastern Powers. In spite of his fraternal exterior Alexander was chagrined at the vague state in which the Conference System was left. He still entertained the idea of the realisation of the Holy Alliance, and still believed in "liberal principles". But his idea of liberty had become paradoxical. It was to be "limited by the principles of order". This meant nothing less than benevolent despotism. In his complex brain the teachings of La Harpe were beginning to lose ground. The hereditary notion of the Tzar as Father of his people was superseding his sentimental attachment to the principles of
Liberty, and what was good for Russia must be good for Europe - whether it was Christian principles or a beneficent overlordship. Until after Aix the fear of France and of each other, had kept the Allies together, but from this time onwards we find Alexander gradually slipping from his pedestal, and hope for the future of the Alliance fading away. Had he had the moral force to keep his own belief untarnished, the disruption of the Confederation, and the definite breaking away of England from the Alliance might have been indefinitely postponed. Had he pursued an active Liberal policy as understood by Western Liberals, the deep-rooted suspicion of him and his creation would most likely have gradually disappeared. But even during the years 1815-1818 he had given no active proof of his conviction and so, when his opinions changed and his reactionary ideas were emphasised by deeds, to Europe at large this was in keeping with his general character.
CHAPTER V.

FROM AIX-LA-CHAPELLE to TROPPAU.
During the next three years the points at issue between the principal nations become defined. Between 1815-1818 much of the distrust and enmity had been occasioned by vague rumour and insinuation rather than by actual cause. There had been no definite events during those years on which the stream of good will was likely to divide. The tension before Aix had been caused more by apprehension than by action. But from 1818 to 1821 new events and disturbances forced the cross-current channels, and the Eastern Powers, leaving England to follow her narrow and definite course, themselves turned aside into a more congenial bed. Sovereigns and ministers had left the Congress satisfied, but Castlereagh, in his desire to placate both Tzar and British nation, even to the extent of rejecting a "pure vocabulary", had found it necessary to whitewash much of the Alliance structure in order to hide its cracks and flaws. He hoped that periodic white-
washings and renovations would preserve it indefinitely, but
he reckoned without the wild weather of the succeeding
years.

In almost every country in Europe revolutions
or riots broke out between 1818 and 1821. In England re­
pression and coercion led to the Peterloo massacre and
culminated in the Six Acts. Fear of the masses caused
outspoken approval of Metternich's Carlsbad Decrees by
Wellington and the Tories, who were excitedly advocating
repression of Liberalism in every nation - without external
interference. In Germany and Italy discontent was in­
creasing rapidly and events seemed to be moving towards
a general outbreak.

Austria's interests in these countries were
generally acknowledged but Metternich was still afraid
of Russian interference in what he considered to be domestic
concerns and spared neither paper nor ink in trying to make
Castlereagh share his views. He had grounds for his sus­
picions on many counts. The Tzar had paid a visit to
Vienna at the moment when the French government was changing
hands, and had startled the Emperor Francis by suggesting
mobilisation and interference in that country. He returned to Russia leaving Metternich more alarmed than ever. In Italy, Russian agents were preaching revolution against Austria, in Germany they were advocating autocracy and repression to the petty sovereigns, but it was La Harpe who occasioned Metternich's most lively fears. His letters to Castlereagh began to show signs of irritation. He remarks on the "pusillanimité" of Castlereagh, "captivated by the Tsar" as he says, and on the egoism of England. He begged for a closer union, and "coup de bato" not "cajolerie" as the policy to be pursued towards Russia, but Castlereagh made no sign.

To find out the true state of affairs in Italy, Metternich decided to travel through the peninsula and with him went the Emperor and Gordon. Their reception was cold in the extreme. La Harpe and the Carbonari had been rousing the Duchies to a state of rebellion encouraged by hopes of aid from Russia and perhaps from France. Metternich had no difficulty in collecting evidence of unrest and of foreign intrigue which he handed on to London with the usual exaggerations. The person on whom these despatches
had most effect was not Castlereagh, but the Tzar. He began to get alarmed at Austria's attitude, at the general disturbed state of Europe and at the share taken in these disturbances by his own ministers and agents, whose zeal for Liberalism had doubtless caused them to exceed their instructions. He began to damp down their activities and soon this part of his external policy ceased.

Metternich next proceeded to Carlsbad in a more satisfied frame of mind. This last move of Alexander had removed a certain amount of anxiety and his chief aim now was to keep him out of Germany. In this matter he hoped that England's friendship and policy of advocating general non-interference might stand him in good stead. Liberalism had been crushed in the Confederation after 1815 although some of the rulers had progressive tendencies. Student excesses at Wartburg, before the Congress of Aix, had brought repressive measures and now the Russian agent Kotzebue had been murdered for condemning these University riots. Almost every state had its centre of revolt. Metternich arrived at Carlsbad with a ready-made scheme sanctioned by Prussia by which both Press and Universities were re-
stricted, the gymnasiums closed, and a commission appointed to root out the great conspiracy supposed to be permeating Germany.

In England the Carlsbad Decrees were anathematised by both press and people, but the Tories applauded this return to high-handed methods. The Cabinet however refused to accede to Metternich's request for official approval of the Decrees nor would Russia give them her public sanction. Metternich had hoped to strengthen autocracy in the individual states in the Confederation by a system of Mutual Guarantee, but the British Government considered each German state as an individual member of the European system, and therefore protested against this guarantee as an unwarrantable interference with the liberties of independent states and pointed out the inadvisability of an alliance between Governments against Peoples. Alexander's objections were less emphatic though Capo d'Istria expressed himself in strong enough terms. He was afraid of Austrian supremacy in Central Europe, and would only agree to separate measures of repression of liberalism by the several courts. He even went
so far as to send a circular round to the various nations asking for a general condemnation of the Decrees, and for support for the South German states, which were holding out against Metternich. Castlereagh, taking the opportunity of driving home his non-interference policy, refused to make any statement regarding the Decrees, and through Neumann, Austrian Charge d'affaires in London, remonstrated with Metternich for approaching Russia and England on the subject. If the matter had been brought up in the Houses, the press and public would have forced an anti-Austrian policy on the Cabinet, and this might have led to a Russo-British alliance with the South-German states against Austria. Metternich realised his mistake, pacified and converted the Southern States and so extracted a confirmation of the Decrees from the Diet. The Austro-British friendship now seemed stronger than ever, and while Wellington and the Regent were congratulating the Austrian minister on his repressive measures, Castlereagh was expressing pleasure at his moderation.

Meanwhile matters in France had been engaging
the attention of the Powers. With the closing of the Aix Congress and the withdrawal of the allied troops, the power of Richelieu declined and his ministry fell, and his place was taken by Decazes, a Liberal and a friend of the King. This change in itself troubled Pozzo di Borgo, but when the new War Minister began to rearrange the army on Napoleonic lines, and to recall many of Napoleon's officers, he hurriedly wrote to Alexander. The Tsar was as alarmed and apprehensive as his minister and immediately, in January 1819, asked the Allies to intervene in order to stop this progress of the Left. In Paris Pozzo di Borgo lost the prestige which he had possessed under the Richelieu ministry, and in consequence he was extremely jealous of Sir Charles Stuart who now rapidly rose into the favour and confidence of Decazes. Castlereagh warned him not to let this favour affect his relations with the other ambassadors, and to keep the Alliance solid in Paris. This policy of refusing to follow up a temporary advantage shows great restraint and wisdom and a determination to uphold the Alliance and peace even at the cost of neglecting a diplomatic opportunity.

Castlereagh and Metternich were agreed that interference in France was both unnecessary and impolitic. The latter wished for a renewal of the Ambassadorial Con-
ference in Paris but nothing more. Pozzo di Borgo next suggested joint instructions on (1) a Remonstration against the new War Minister (2) joint action on the death of the French King. This last might be necessary on account of the dislike entertained by the people for the declining Louis' prospective successor, the Comte d'Artois. Castlereagh replied with a circular rejecting interference and asking for unity between the Allies. On April 12th., the Tzar again proposed active measures and a renewal of the Ambassadors Conference. Metternich wrote to Esteyhazy with regard to the Russian circular disapproving its suggestion but proposing to make Vienna a centre of diplomatic conferences, and asks Castlereagh's support for a proposal to send joint "eventual instructions" to the ambassadors in Paris to indicate their line of action on the death of the French king. Castlereagh, busily occupied with home affairs, refrained from any definite answer to this, but opposed the idea of the Vienna Conferences.

At last the further intrigues of Pozzo di Borgo and the appearance in England of Capo d'Istria, still trying to extract a promise of interference, caused Castlereagh to issue his important Memorandum of September
The first claimed that there had been no change in the French constitution since the Aix-la-Chapelle Conference to call for interference. The second stated that unless France committed an Act infringing the Treaties no conference of the Quadruple Alliance was necessary or could, justly, be assembled.

"The fair import of the whole of these proceedings (at Aix-la-Chapelle) seems to be that the Five Powers then formed a strict Union and Concert, which was to continue binding so long as France committed no act which could be regarded as giving rise to the casus belli under the Treaty of Alliance. Till such an act should occur the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance was declared to be suspended, and inoperative. ".....As the Four Powers, it is conceived, cannot allege a single instance in which the Government of France has actually failed in its external relations since the transactions were signed at Aix, they must ground these proceedings upon the alarm with which they regard her internal situation....In taking such a step, the Four Powers ought therefore gravely to look at all the consequences and...they should not disguise from themselves that the dissolution of the Concert taken with France at Aix would be the immediate and probable consequence of it."

"Assuming that there exists no immediate ground for direct intervention on the part of the Allies either by remonstrance or otherwise, and that the only measure of precaution now suggested for adoption is the establishment of a ministerial conference on the part of the Four Powers either at Vienna or Paris to deliberate (to the exclusion of the French Minister) on the state
"of France...is the establishment of such a Conference under present circumstances. Considered within either the letter or the spirit of the engagements taken with France at Aix-la-Chapelle, and, if there should exist a doubt upon the point, and the deliberation of such a Conference compensate the risk of shaking that arrangement in the present state of both France and Europe."

In Proposition 5 follows an argument against the suggested scheme of renewed ambassadorial conferences which would become the centre of intrigue.

"Is such a system of Conferences necessary to the accomplishment of the object which the Allies have alone in view, namely the preservation of that Union upon which Europe is to depend for its security in case France should in violation of the Treaty, compromise its repose."

Ought the Conference to be one merely of Report or of Deliberation.

"The last alternative (Conference of Deliberation) is certainly the most serious, countenancing as it does a direct agency on the politics of that country, and it is obvious, if a conference is to be placed at Paris, whether our ministers interfere or not, that the nation will be taught to believe that they do, and perhaps it will be difficult for them not to meddle more or less. Now upon this question it has always appeared to the British Government that even could we see our way much more clearly than we do, we should nevertheless abstain from such interference.

"The Prince Regent's Government is strongly of the opinion that the most prudent, the most commanding, as well as the most useful course which the Four Powers
"can pursue is to avoid every demonstration of a disposition to interfere in the internal concerns of France." 1

The final argument is against "Eventual Instruction" which the Memorandum says would do more harm than good by prejudicing France against the very man they were intended to support, the reactionary Comte d'Artois.

Certainly the opinions expressed in this document are neither confused nor half-hearted. Had Castlereagh been in a compromising mood he might have agreed to those articles in the Tzar's proposals which had been endorsed by Austria and rejected the rest but the refutation was complete. In the eyes of Parliament and people moderation alone would justify his policy of keeping England bound to the Continent, and to obtain this justification he had to risk driving Austria into the arms of Russia. His instruction to Sir Charles Stewart on his conduct towards Decazes and the ambassadors showed his earnest desire to keep in with the Alliance, but this was dependent on Parliamentary sanction. Metternich was afraid

1. F.O. 7. (Austria) 142. No. I.
of Russia, but still more of Revolution, and until Germany and France were settled again he was retiring behind "a cloud of ink". Anxious to be friendly all round, trimming his sails, so as to be ready for squalls, from any quarter —

"For my part," reported Stewart,"I really believe that the Austrian Minister is perfectly pliant on all this subject and he holds it up merely to afford ammunition for working upon; he will be amenable to anything the Prince Regent's Government may deem advisable; but as the Emperor of Russia brought forward the idea of common instructions to the Ministers at Paris for the guidance of their conduct, Prince Metternich is desirous of flattering that Cabinet".1

His wish for "eventual instructions" was probably sincere, complying with the Tzar in this respect in order to share with him the honour of helping the Comte de Artois to his throne. A Franco-Russian Alliance was the last thing he desired.

He pressed for these "instructions" with such zest and so little care that the French Ambassador at Vienna discovered the negotiations and warned the King of France.

1. Castlereagh's Foreign Policy. (C.K.Webster) 210; F.O. 7 (Austria). 143.
Louis was alarmed and piqued at having his demise discussed and sent a letter to Metternich on the subject. He twisted this into a demand from Louis for "instructions" from the Four Powers, and passed it on to Castlereagh who well knew that unqualified support for any Bourbon would bring down the Government. This tense situation was eased by the murder of the Duc de Berri which caused a violent anti-Liberal reaction and the December ministry was overthrown. Richelieu was returned to power and no external help seemed necessary to ensure the legitimate succession. Metternich was satisfied and the "eventual instructions" finally appeared as instructions to the Ambassadors of the three Eastern Powers to: "recognise the legitimate successors of the King of France". Castlereagh even held aloof from this moderate declaration though the Cabinet was satisfied with the policy of the other Powers. His honest treatment of France in this matter was ill-rewarded for the fallen Decazes became Ambassador in London, and turned from his old Pro-British policy to one of antagonism shared equally by the ultra-Royalist Government. This animosity was soon to increase over the troubles in Spain.
In 1812, after Wellington had forced the French troops to retire from Madrid, local Juntas had sprung up to maintain order and government in their various districts. These had maintained a vigorous opposition to French control while the central government had issued an extremely democratic Constitution. Since Ferdinand's return, the country had been ruled in an autocratic and incompetent manner; King and ministers were incapable and obstinate; relations with Portugal and with the South American colonies were in a state of rupture, the Florida Treaties with the U.S.A. had not been ratified, neither could England get her to follow any satisfactory policy towards the Slave Trade. Since Aix-la-Chapelle, Madrid had been a hot-bed of Russian intrigues and Alexander had even been forced to withdraw his ambassador Tatishchev because of the alarmed protests of the other Powers. At last the active portion of the nation took matters into their own hands by carrying out a military revolution, and having Ferdinand in their hands they forced him to sign the 1812 Constitution once more. The majority of the Spaniards remained nonchalant, and though they disliked the Constitution as too extreme and impracticable, yet they preferred it to the
ignoble rule of Ferdinand.

The effect outside Spain was considerable. Alexander's Liberalism, which had been backed up by eight-hundred bayonets, was reduced to a minimum when he saw a brother monarch deposed by his own troops. Besides being seriously alarmed for his own safety he also saw an opportunity for getting the Alliance working along his own lines. He proposed, first at Berlin and then in a circular to the Allied courts that there should be an Assembly of the Ministers in Paris to consider a course of action. "The interests to be decided," he said, "are those of the universe and involve the future perhaps of all civilised peoples."

The Central Powers were busy with the Vienna Conference but Berlin was of the same mind as the Tzar, and Rose was informed that Russia would be supported by Prussia in invoking the Holy Alliance and in converting it into a means of a General Guarantee of Territories. This would have forced the withdrawal of England from the European System.

In France the new Richelieu -Fasquier ministry regarded the whole Spanish problem as a private...
the whole Spanish problem as a private concern of the Bourbon family, and thought the question of interference to be a domestic one. The ministry was definitely anti-British, chiefly on account of trade antagonism in the Americas, and Stuart had fallen from the exalted position he had held when Decayes was in power. To uphold the assumed prerogative in the Spanish Question, Richelieu sent La Tour du Pin to Madrid with instructions to advise Ferdinand. Stuart, hearing of this, forewarned both Wellesley and the Spanish Liberals. The design had to be abandoned, and Le Tour du Pin returned to France where the antipathy to Stuart and England was consequently increased.

This mission of Du Pin had been backed up by Prussia, who at the same time was advocating a meeting of the Ambassadors in Paris and common action. Everything rested on the final decision of Austria. There is no doubt that Metternich was greatly alarmed by the Revolution. In Italy the Liberals were toasting the success of their Spanish comrades and the Austrian Emperors interests were scattered in too wide and diverse a field to allow
any encouragement to, or even hesitation toward, a movement which might cause disruption. This fear, however, was outweighed by the older and greater fear of Russia. Metternich was bound by the Holy Alliance to collective action if the moral ills of Europe so required, but the idea of a Russian Army marching across the Confederation to the assistance of Spain, although it might be in the interests of autocracy, yet it would certainly have its disadvantages. Undue Russian influence either at Frankfurt or Paris was to be avoided at all costs.

This fear of Russia on the part of Austria saved Spain from intervention and, for the moment, saved England from isolation. Castlereagh and Wellington had been greatly alarmed at the step taken by Russia, Prussia and France. Though very much occupied in England with the unsavoury Royal Divorce Question, yet the Foreign Minister had time to advise Wellesley in Madrid as to the policy to be pursued. He was to abstain from any interference unless either the King's life was in danger or Portugal was attacked. He hoped that a more moderate Cortes, elected by the new constitution, would alter that constitution for one less democratic. To the invitation of
the three Powers for intervention he gave no reply, but proceeded to draw up a Memorandum, with Wellington's assistance, to be approved by the Cabinet and sent round to foreign courts.

This document appeared as the famous Memorandum of May 5th, 1826. Wellington's contribution naturally dwelt almost entirely on the internal condition of Spain with which he had an intimate acquaintance. He described the situation as critical, but interference was impossible owing to the dislike which the Spaniards entertained for any foreigners, even when in the country for their advantage, as in the Peninsular War, and "of all foreigners the French are the most odious to that country". Castlereagh laid down very definite opinions. He knew that it was no occasion for subtlety or half-hearted statements but that the British interpretation of the Aix obligations must be definitely brought to the notice of the Powers once again. His first care was to justify the policy of Britain towards Spain, that of non-intervention. The Spanish monarch had accepted the Constitution, and moreover Spain was not likely to menace other countries:
The care is not such as to warrant such an inter-
ference and we do not feel that we have at the moment "either the right or the means to interfere by force".

He rejected the Russian and Prussian proposals and suggested that any advice should be offered separately. England had no desire to allow "the character of the British Ambassador to be merged into that of the French Ambassador at Madrid.... Nor under our national prejudices would it be felt otherwise than as an objection to such a course."

Non-intervention and the Alliance Principles as understood by Britain were fully set down -

"Many States of Europe are now employed in the "difficult tasks of casting anew their Governments upon the "Representative System; but the notion of revising, limit-
ing, or regulating the course of such experiments, either "by Foreign Council or by Foreign force, would be as "dangerous to avow as it would be impossible to execute."

"In this Alliance, as in all human arrangements, "nothing is more likely to impair, or even to destroy its "real utility than any attempt to push its Duties and its "Obligations beyond the sphere which its original Con-
ception and understood Principles will warrant. Having "subdued the conqueror it took the state of possessions, "as established by the Peace, under the protection of the "Alliance. It never was however intended as a Union for "the Government of the World or for the Superintendence "of the internal affairs of other States.... It was the "Revolutionary Power in its military character, actual "and existant within France, against which it intended to "take precaution, and not against the Democratic Principles "then as now, but too generally spread throughout Europe". 1

The notion was "too deeply prevalent" that the Allies could interfere whenever any great political event occurred.

Castlereagh went to the root of the difference in ideas between England and the autocratic states:-

"The King of Great Britain has, from the nature of our Constitution, all his means to acquire through Parliament, and he must well know by experience, that, if embarked in war on grounds which the voice of the country does not sustain, the efforts of the strongest administration which ever served the Crown would be soon unequal to the prosecution of the contest. In Russia there is but little Public Sentiment with regard to Spain which can embarrass the decision of the Sovereign. In Great Britain there is a great deal, and the current of that Sentiment runs most strongly against the King of Spain....

This intervention coming from the Five Great Powers has always more or less the air of Dictation and of Menace, and the possibility of its being intended to be pushed to a forcible intervention is always assumed or imputed by an adverse party. The grounds of the intervention thus become unpopular....

The fact is that we do not and cannot feel alike upon all subjects. Our Position, our Institutions, the Habits of Thinking, and the Prejudices of our People, render us essentially different. We cannot, in all matters, reason and feel alike. We should lose the confidence of our respective nations if we did, and the very affectation of such an impossibility would soon render the Alliance an object of odium and of distrust. Whereas if we keep it within its commonplace limits, the representative Governments, and those which are more purely monarchical, may well find each a common interest. The Governments will then respectively retain their faculty of independent action". 1

1. F.O. 7 (Austria.) 148. No. 9.
Castlereagh had already experienced sufficiently the ceaseless attacks of the opposition on his foreign policy. Even when his friendship towards the Powers remained passive these attacks continued, and actually endangered the Cabinet. If he followed the Tzar in an action opposed to the wishes of Parliament and people the Government was doomed. The tendency of English thought and feeling was in favour of insularity. Coupled with national bigotry this was the cause of the belittlement and dislike of all things foreign which was very prevalent at this time. Proud and confident of their own system of Government, the English people wished to see other States following their lead. This feeling accounts for the initial sympathy towards the French Revolution, and the later antipathy towards its excesses, for the support given to the Spanish rebels and colonies, and for the desire to aid the Danes and Italians later in the century. Absence of restraint, and freedom to work out their own national destinies were necessary conditions for obtaining this result. Such conditions then should be the privilege of the serfs in Russia and the colonists in South America, whether prepared or not for self-government.
But this opinion was modified by the conviction that a country, in order to achieve the blessed state must reach it by its own efforts. Constitutional government and a tradition of freedom must be earned. The moral strength of a nation does not necessarily lie in its constitution, but in its history.

"The Principle of one State interfering by force in the internal affairs of another in order to enforce obedience to the governing authority is always a question of the greatest moral as well as political delicacy, and it is not meant here to examine it. It is only important on the present occasion to observe that to generalise such a Principle and to think of reducing it to a system, or to impose it as an obligation, is a scheme utterly impracticable and objectionable.

It is impossible, therefore, to make such a Principle the Basis of a General Alliance. No country having a representative system of Government would act upon it.

Great Britain has perhaps equal Power with any other State to oppose herself to a practical and intelligible danger capable of being brought home to the national feeling. When the Territorial Balance of Europe is disturbed she can play her part with effect, but she is the last Government in Europe which can be expected, or venture, to commit herself on any question of an abstract character which the national sentiment cannot be made to feel."

Interference and the General Guarantee proposed by the Tzar, each presented the same problem, that of supporting dynasties which had not received popular
sanction. No Cabinet could support this policy and hope to survive. Castlereagh was fighting a hard battle against the vagueness of Alexander. Besides exaggerating the Alliance obligation he refused to accept the facts of the situation. The British Memorandum recognises the Liberal movements in Europe. Though undesirable they must be left alone to the nations concerned. Alexander was also soaring too high to notice the difference between forms of Government, and its importance. Castlereagh brought it home to him as an explanation of his line of policy. As regards "interference" he merely says that the British nation would not stand it. The moral issues of one state regarding itself as sufficiently inspired to dictate to others he left alone.

So decided a policy was bound to carry weight and all the powers except Russia agreed to the Memorandum and withdrew their proposals. Metternich still preferred the friendship of Castlereagh to the doubtful benefits to be reaped by supporting Alexander, especially as the attitude of each towards the German Confederation question was fresh in his mind. Even France agreed with the proposal and rejected a second circular appeal by the
Tzar, though Richelieu still hoped for a Conference at which she could assert her own prerogative in Spanish matters. So all seemed to be settled north of the Pyrenees with Spain left to work out her own destiny, when affairs in Naples caused a general shifting of sympathies and interests of which Russia took full advantage.
CHAPTER VI.

TROPPAU AND LAIBACH.
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The occurrence which was to be fatal to the Alliance took place in Naples to the astonishment of Europe. Since 1815, the Southern part of Italy had shown the best results of any of the States from the re-imposition of autocracy. Ferdinand I, though cowardly and incapable, had sufficient sense to take advantage of Austrian advice, and to moderate his reactionary rule, and, despite discontent caused by the reinstatement of priests and military, yet it was in Naples alone that Metternich found any signs of contentment and of general industry. The British Ambassador could report with relief in March 1820 that the "quiet and prosperous state of these Kingdoms affords but few subjects worthy of being brought to your Lordship's notice". Partly through the influence of the Muratist officers still in the army intriguing with the Carbonari, and partly through the general desire to consolidate and ensure the

prosperity by a constitutional change, the Neapolitan militia rose under General Pepe and forced on Ferdinand the Constitution of 1812. The chief object of the rebels was the exclusion of Austrian influences and Ferdinand's position was in no way endangered. After feigning illness he signed, calling upon God's vengeance if he lied, and immediately sending to Austria for help and advice.

Europe was astounded. Castlereagh wrote to Stewart, "What an event directed against a Government without reproach". This revolt was obviously in a different class to that in Spain. The other Italian States were directly menaced by an extension of its influence and, to all appearances, it had no justification in its origins. Castlereagh did not hesitate to assure Metternich that, in his opinion, it was an Austrian matter, to be dealt with immediately and with severity. Wellington even offered military advice. But in case this support created too great an optimism, Castlereagh also mentioned that his State Papers of May 5th. still held good, and that neither

assistance nor open approval was to be expected from Britain.

Metternich was excited and alarmed. He saw future revolution all over Italy and the German States, and in his trepidation did not hesitate to blame first Russia and then England for affairs in Naples. But at this point his natural timidity reassumed its domination and he refused to take Castlereagh's advice until he could be sure of more backing, preferably, from Russia. Not only might the revolutions themselves be too strong for him, but there was also the liberation of France and the Tzar to provide against. If Alexander was not for him he might possibly be on the other side.

The Tzar was not in a kindly mood. His Liberalism had recently received a severe blow from the "ingratitude" of his Polish subjects and he was disgusted with his Allies over their attitude on the Spanish Question. He was longing to recover the lost ground by intervention, to seal the Alliance of his dreams by military action. In his present state of mind, this action was unlikely to be on the side of disturbers of the peace.
Metternich's appeal was a heaven-sent opportunity, and he rejected the proposal of a conversation between Austria and Russia, and demanded a meeting of the Quadruple Alliance. At the same time France, to ensure her new status in Europe demanded a Conference of the Quintuple Alliance. She still had her old fear of Austria alone in Italy and Louis XVIII was still head of the Bourbon House. These demands placed Metternich in a corner. It seemed that he had either to offend the Tzar or Castlereagh, and his immediate policy was to gain time in which to find out how far each power was willing to support him. For this end he proposed that Ambassadorial Conference of all the Powers should be held at Vienna to decide on the method of intervention and afterwards a Conference of the three Eastern monarchs which would satisfy Alexander. Castlereagh would rather Prussia was excluded but he promised Esterhazy that, for the time being, he would not recognise the Neapolitan Ambassador nor the independence of Sicily. He then set to work through Decazes to persuade France to withdraw her proposals for a Conference. He wrote to Stewart on August 5th., referring to the French Ambassador:—

"I told him that, if any military interference was to take place, it appeared to me that it could only be safely or effectively executed by an Austrian army, that
European contingents would never do, and that the local interests which Austria had in the question appeared to me to render her interference both more natural and more justifiable and less odious than if the particular case was to be avowedly taken up in the face of Europe upon abstract grounds.

"The remark of the French Minister originated in that disposition, which the French as well as the Russian Government always feel, to generalise every question and to try to bring it within the strict pale of the Alliance. Russia will always regard her control as complete in proportion as the Governments of Europe can be made to form a single machine of which the Russian military power must ever constitute one of the very principal wheels".

By September Metternich had decided that the Tzar's friendship would be more useful than that of Britain should the worst occur. He allowed Alexander to understand that the meeting at Troppau would be a reunion of the Alliances, and meanwhile tried to throw dust in Castlereagh's eyes. He suggested reforming the Alliance and asked for Stewart's presence at Troppau while asserting that practically the whole question would be settled previously at the Vienna Ambassadorial conference, where he would be supreme. Castlereagh's suspicions were by this time fully aroused. He definitely told Stewart that Britain could have no part in joint action, and that the

uestion of Naples was a "special", and not a "general" question, "Italian" and not "European", and that interference should come from Austria and not from the Alliance.

He sent this Memorandum on September 16th.

" I, therefore, hope that the Emperor of Russia will be content to confine the interview at Troppau within "the limits proposed by his ally the Emperor of Austria, "that whatever ministerial conference may be held may be "regarded as only adding to other means of confidential "explanation, and that whatever is done shall be done "upon the particular case without hazarding general "declarations containing universal pledges that cannot "be redeemed, and which, from the first, will be "seen through and despised. Dissertations upon abstract "principles will do nothing in the present day unless "supported." 1

He never varied this view in the slightest degree from 1815 to the day of his death. The Memorandum then deals with the case in point and the proposed intervention of the Alliance -

" Now this is a concert which the British Govern-
"ment cannot enter into, first because it binds them to engagements which they could not be justified in taking "without laying the whole before Parliament, second it "creates a League which at any moment may involve them in "the necessity of using Force, for it is clear that the "defacto government of Naples, upon such an act being agreed to by us, might according to the ordinary Law of Nations, "sequester all British Property at Naples, and at once shut "their ports against British commerce....fourth, such a "League would render the British Government both morally "and in a Parliamentary sense responsible for all the

1. F.O. 7. (Austria) 148. No. 6. Also Castlereagh's Correspondence Xii. 311
"future acts of the League.....sixth such a League would "most certainly be disapproved by our Parliament and, even "could it be sustained, it is obvious from that moment that "every act of the Austrian Army in the Kingdom of Naples "would fall as much under the immediate cognisance and "jurisdiction of the British Parliament and be canvassed "as freely as if it were the act of a British Army and "Commander-in-Chief." 1

In addition to his permanent, deep-rooted objection to interference such a move in the case of Naples would be disadvantageous to England's commercial interests and fatal to the Ministry. The state of British politics did not allow any bold measures. The Opposition had already made itself felt in the House of Lords over the Naples revolt, and the slightest sign of weakness would render the overthrow of the Cabinet unavoidable. A foreign army in Naples would inevitably cause damage, and such damage to the property of British subjects would mean questions in the Commons, and if these troops were there with the open sanction of the Government, then, not only the Government, but even the monarchy might be in danger, such was the existing temper of the country. But these fears only loomed in the distance. Most probably the Cabinet would not last long enough to meet such questions.

Castlereagh now heard of Metternich's double

dealing through Lieven, the Russian Ambassador, and immediately informed Stewart who confronted the Austrian Minister and he, for once, made a very bad show in endeavouring to explain matters. It was obvious that his real reason was that he needed support, and to conform with the Tzar's demands was the only means of getting it. He denied that the Troppau Congress was to be an Alliance Conference, and said that Stewart's presence there would be sufficient to maintain the Alliance intact. By this time Castlereagh was very annoyed with the whole matter. Lieven was pressing for a plenipotentiary from England to turn the suggested Conference into another Aix-la-Chapelle meeting. But Esterhazy, with greater imagination saw that importunity might even irritate Castlereagh into revoking Stewart's permission to be present, and that, in any case, none of the ministers could leave England, so tense was the state of domestic politics.

At last they left Castlereagh alone with his principles, and Metternich decided to get what support he could near at hand. Stewart had the unenviable task of finding out what was going on without giving anything in
return. He had definite Cabinet instructions. He was to maintain the policy and theories of the State Paper of May 5th., and to watch over the integrity of the territorial system as settled at Vienna, but he had neither power to act or to sign for Britain. The Government were quite willing to fulfil Treaty obligations but no more. Castlereagh was too afraid of Alexander's generalisations to give Stewart any more power. Each disturbance or revolt should be treated as a separate event. No general policy ought to be discussed. Who was to distinguish between "reforms" and "revolutions". No general principle of intervention could be laid down. If England acquiesced in any such principle in what position would the House of Hanover stand, and for how long would the Tory Government last. An ominous note was sounded in a conversation between Castlereagh and Esterhazy —

"If it is desired to extend the Alliance so as to include all objects present and future, foreseen and unforeseen, it would change its character to such an extent, and carry us so far, that we should see in it an additional motive for adhering to our course at the risk of seeing the Alliance move away from us without our having quitted it." 1

TROPPAU.

As a discussion between members of the Alliance, the Conference at Troppau was a ludicrous farce. No country but Austria and Russia had any voice in it. The King and Ministers of Prussia were, as usual, entirely subservient to Metternich, while the French representatives had even less influence than Stewart owing to jealous bickerings amongst themselves. Stewart himself showed the most incapable and weak side of his character especially in the early stages of the Conference, and he had to trust for information to the former friendliness of Metternich by the insincerity of whom he was entirely duped. Gordon, his subordinate, was even less effective than Stewart himself.

So the only personages who counted in the Conference were Metternich, Alexander and his minister Capo d'Istria. Alexander came from Poland in a disturbed state of mind. The recent ungrateful conduct of the Poles had further undermined his decaying Liberalism. Metternich was not slow in taking advantage of this factor in the situation. His aim was to get support for his scheme of interfering in Naples, and yet to refrain from an irrevocable alienation of Britain. This was a difficult problem,
for Castlereagh would countenance no protocol, treaty, definition, or commitments of a "general" character, and both Capo d'Istria and the Tzar wished for something of this sort. To them Naples was only the particular case of a disastrous wide-spread "general" disease, only to be cured by sweeping counteraction. Alexander immediately granted a long interview to Stewart in which he loudly and at length harangued him on the necessity for keeping the Alliance together in order to settle upon some principle of "common action" against the evil which was making such rapid progress in Europe, and which had originated in France. He met Stewart's protests against "general" actions with a pious appeal to God. Fortunately for Metternich there was sufficient divergence between the ideas of the Tzar and Capo d'Istria for a wedge to be inserted. Capo d'Istria had remained a Liberal and, in consequence, whilst Alexander's creed of Christian brotherhood, European amity and concerted action had gradually been solidified into a policy of ensuring boundaries, and "guaranteeing" monarchs, Capo D'Instria, with his eye on Greece, still wished the various peoples to have a say in their own government. This was Metternich's opportunity.
At the first meeting of the Congress on October 23rd, he put the facts of the case forward in a Memorandum with the request of the King of Naples for help, and with the protest of the Neapolitan Government. He asked only for moral support in his action towards that Kingdom and left "general" questions alone. Neither did he mention any form of Government which he proposed to apply to Naples afterwards. This last omission roused Capo d'Istria. Prussia immediately gave her whole support to the Austrian document, but the Russian answering Memorandum was long in appearing. It was issued on November 6th, and strangely enough it offered troops for the overthrow of the revolution, but withheld "moral support" until it should be shewn what was to be substituted in its place.

"Did the Emperor of Austria want of Russia 150, or 200,000 men to cut the throats of the Carbonari? They were at her disposal. Did they want the dissent of Russia to military revolutions? They had it. But if they wanted an appui moral to overturn a government, it must be shewn what was to be substituted in its place. The reconstruction of governments for the welfare of mankind was a subject worthy of the consideration of the great Association of Europe". 1.

1. Castlereagh's Foreign Policy (C.K. Webster) Appdx. 525.
After comparing the question of Naples and Spain, it suggested a National Constitution in Naples. This, of course, did not suit Metternich. If Austria was to grant a Constitution to every Italian state which revolted she might as well leave the peninsula altogether. This Russian Memorandum was chiefly the work of Capo d'Istria. When Metternich went to see the Tzar on the subject, he found him much more pliable. He cared little for "National Constitutions" if he could get a 'general' principle stated. So a compromise was arrived at in which Metternich satisfied both the Tzar and Capo d'Istria by invoking the spirit of the Treaties of 1815.

Stewart and the French Ambassadors were excluded from these Conferences almost without protest on their part. The former had expressed his approval of the Austrian Memorandum in opposition to that of Russia.

"1st. I consider the Reasons Alleged in the Austrian Memoir for an interference on the part of the Allies are in a stronger and more palatable shape.

"2nd. The Russian Memoir mixed up too much the two Revolutions of Spain and Naples in one general conclusion, whereas there is a vast and decided difference which has been forcibly dwelt upon in my transactions.

"3rd. The endeavour to induce England to acquiesce in the principle that her interference in the late Revolution at Naples is defined and resolved upon
"under the spirit of the existing Treaties is a Doctrine that I am clear our Government (from all their communications hitherto) will not admit, and I question the Policy of Russia's renewing and forcing this reasoning.

4th. The inference drawn from our imputed silence is unfair because we have explained our line of a strict neutrality and we have taken our position and we do not consider the Treaties in which the casus foederis et belli is mentioned as applicable to the case of Naples.

5th. The consigning in a formal and obligatory act the General Principles upon which the Allies would take cognisance of insurrection in regular Governments of a particular nature will be a very difficult, if not an impossible undertaking." 1

Metternich could have been in no doubt as to how far he could rely on Castlereagh's support having had the interpretation of the Treaty obligations thrust down his throat so often. This being the case, it would be best to keep Stewart out of the way while he made sure of the Tzar.

The Ambassadors of France and England understood that no decision would be made public until ratified by them. Metternich explained to Stewart that he wished

1. F.O. 7. (Austria) 154. No. 3.
to "unmask completely Russia". He wanted to beguile the Tzar away from Capo d'lstria and his Liberalism, and then Russia would be committed against revolutionary doctrines and Austria's back would be safe whilst her army marched down through Italy. If he could do this and at the same time keep British friendship so much the better, though an endorsement of any "general instructions" clause would sever this connection. But the necessity of immediate and supported intervention in Naples and the instability of Castlereagh's cabinet made the Russian Alliance very attractive if Capo d'Istria's influence over Alexander could be checked. On November 14th. the news of the revolt of the Russian Guard regiments clinched the matter. Though caused by the brutalities of their colonel yet the Tzar saw in it another manifestation of that "spirit of revolution only too prevalent in Europe".

Confused by the behaviour both of his European children and of his own nation, uncertain as to what policy to pursue, he now resigned himself into the hands of the Austrian

1. Castlereagh's Foreign Policy (C.K.Webster) 292.


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Minister. "So we are at one Prince, and it is to you that I owe it....Tell me what you desire and what you wish me to do, I will do." He had finally abjured Liberalism, and he found support for his newly defined policy in the very scriptures, from which his former state of mind had received its justification. His suspicions, entertained since Aix-la-Chapelle, had been confirmed, and now Revolution was the Evil Thing, to be combatted by Faith embodied in the principles of the Holy Alliance, now to be used as an instrument of reaction.

Stewart, Caraman and La Ferronays were invited to a Conference on November 19th. They had been in the dark since the beginning of the month, Stewart trusting so implicitly in Metternich's goodwill that he had been some time away at Vienna with his wife. His astonishment and indignation knew no bounds when Metternich laid before the Conference the famous Troppau Protocol, signed by the three Eastern Powers. This Protocol, drawn up by Capod' Istria, laid down as motives of action, all the principles which Castlereagh had so ruthlessly repudiated at Aix.
(1) States forming part of the European Alliance, which have undergone a change, due to revolution in the form of their constitution (regime in terrem) and the results of which menace other States, ipso facto cease to be part of the Alliance and remain excluded from it, until their situation gives guarantees of legal order and stability.

(2) The Allied Powers do not limit themselves to announcing this exclusion; but faithful to the principles which they have proclaimed and to the respect due to the authority of every legitimate government as to every act emanating from its own free will, agree to refuse recognition to changes brought about by illegal methods.

(3) When States where such changes have been made, cause by their proximity other countries to fear immediate danger, and when the Allied Powers can exercise effective and beneficial action towards them, they will employ, in order to bring them back to the bosom of the Alliance, first friendly representations, secondly measures of coercion, if the employment of such coercion is indispensable.

Capo d'Istria's "National Constitution" had vanished, and the King of Naples was to be allowed to reform his government as he liked. An army of occupation was to invade Naples, and Ferdinand was to be invited to Larbach to consider how the invasion and restitution were to be effected.

Metternich and Capo d'Istria did their best to

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soothe Stewart. The Russian Minister laid all the blame on Metternich whom, as he said, he had thought was keeping the Ambassadors informed of the course of events. He lamented the absence of a "National Constitution" clause, and even suggested Britain interfering to persuade the Neapolitan Moderates to come to some agreement with Austria. Metternich was as profuse and still more vague in his explanations and apologies. Wishing to avoid offending Stewart at any cost he even consented to consider the Protocol as still needing the approval of the French and English Ambassadors. Stewart was so impressed and appeased that he once more returned to his wife in Vienna whilst Metternich was endeavouring to neutralise Stewart's dispatches to Castlereagh by a multitude of excuses sent through Esterhazy.

Castlereagh's suspicions were aroused before those of his brother, and he had a Memorandum ready to send off when the copy of the Protocol arrived from Stewart on December 4th. Besides his knowledge of Metternich's duplicity, and of his brother's weakness, recent develop-
ments in the Spanish Question had increased his uneasiness. The King of Spain, finding his position weakened by the preoccupation of the Eastern Powers, decided to place his own case before the same tribunal as the King did little to allay Castlereagh's fears on this matter, and both on these occasions and in letters to Stewart he constantly urged the danger of such developments; of monarchs trusting to an outside source for help rather than to their own initiative in defence, or to their own judgment in carrying out conciliatory reforms; of nations being subject to the decisions of a Monarchical Council. So urgent did he think the matter that he issued a Memorandum on December 4th, the day on which he received the Protocol. In this document he absolutely refused to co-operate in any inter-allied occupation of Naples. He denounced any form of General Guarantee or General Precaution, and both refused to interfere in Spain and to recognise the right of any other nation to do so. The bulk of this had been written before he received Stewart's despatch showing with what remarkable insight he had gauged the
tendency of the Conference. He very much regretted his enforced absence from Troppau, for he was sure of his ability to influence Alexander, even in direct opposition to Metternich, and from his experience at Aix, he well knew the persuasive powers of the wily Austrian uncontrolled. At London he had guessed more of the Conference results than Stewart had learned at Troppau, until Metternich had shewn his hand. After the Protocol arrived he had only to add a short note emphasising what was already said -

"To involve us and all other Powers without "the semblance of discussion in a formal diplomatic complica-"tion quite unparalleled in all former times and irreconcil-"able, if I correctly understand it, with any admitted "principles of public law, does quite astonish me." 1

Further study of the Protocol rather increased than diminished his annoyance. Despite apologies and explanations from Metternich he trounced the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors in a most undiplomatic fashion, and then sent off a scathing criticism of the Conference and its achievements to the Emperors through Stewart.

1. F.O. 7 (Austria) 148.
The right claimed of excluding States from the "European system and altering their institutions by force is against international Law, and not likely to be obtained by Universal consent. Are the Great Powers prepared to apply such Principles to themselves...If so any attempt to recognise it in Great Britain would be so revolting to every class and description of the people that it might shake His Majesty's title to this throne, if not expiated by the punishment of the Minister by whom such advice had been given....The extreme right of interference between nation and nation can never be properly made a matter of stipulation or be assumed as the attribute of any Alliance....The Protocol appears to the British Government to make the Alliance into a "Super-State which would tend to destroy all independent action, more especially within the smaller States". The King trusts that he will not be regarded however as presuming to interfere beyond the just limits of the "obligations which unite His Majesty with his Allies, if he should again recommend to their consideration the wisdom of not being tempted, by the nature of their particular "institutions, to hazard an experiment which cannot fail "to excite public feelings and public discussions through-out Europe, the effects of which, in the present state "of moral and political ferment, no human foresight can "estimate..." 1

1 F.O. 7, (Austria) 148. No. 33.
the constitution of Naples, and in this matter he had an ally in France. Caraman however ruined any Franco-Russian understanding by proposing mediation on the part of France between the revolutionaries and the monarchs, and such an idea was utterly abhorrent to the Tzar. This was one danger avoided but Alexander was still determined to bring the question of Spain under the scope of the Conference, and still half-supported Capo d'Istria in wishing to establish some sort of Constitution in Naples after Ferdinand had been restored. Metternich was anything but happy when the action of the extremists in that country gave him the advantage. Since the revolt the more moderate reformers had been trying to get the Constitution of 1812 modified with a view to a return to a moderate monarchy, and the British, French and Russian Ambassadors had also used their influence in that direction. But the extremists had defeated the plan at the last moment and forced the King to sign the Spanish Constitution. After signing and swearing to it with unnecessary warmth he was allowed to leave for Laibach accompanied by the Duc di Gallo as government representative. Metternich was now
happier. He found "the situation much improved" as there was no danger of a Franco-Russo-British combination to oppose his right of way with a solution of his own. The Neapolitans had ruined their cause by greed and an Austrian army would march on Naples. He even made a last attempt to pacify Stewart by promising to restrict the forthcoming Conference to Italian affairs and so disappoint Alexander.

At Laibach Metternich's supremacy was even more increased. Pozzo di Borgo arrived from Paris with whole-hearted support for the Austrian Minister, and the French Minister from Rome, Blacas, caused French policy to assume a more definitely autocratic course. Stewart left his duties to Gordon until January 25th. The King of Naples arrived in the middle of that month and, despite his promise to the Neapolitan government, immediately repudiated all he had signed. He urged the Allies to use rigorous methods in Naples, and even disgusted Metternich
by his meanness and cowardice. Capo d'Istria and his "constitution" were quite out of the picture. The Conference opened on January 12th, and it was immediately decided to send down an Austrian Army into Italy to be followed by Ferdinand. Gordon and even Blacas refused to sign a General Protocol on this point and so the decisions were only recorded in the Conference Journal. Stewart now arrived, and despite Metternich's attempts to bluff him into silence he refused to accept a clause in the report which stated that the measures to be taken with regard to Naples had the support of all the Allies. Metternich had to give way and a further declaration was added stating the inability of the British Ministers to add the signature to the rest.

This report was then handed over to the Duc di Gallo, representing the new government at Naples, but not before the ministers had tried to get round Stewart by substituting fresh papers for the report passed by him. This having been found out by him and rectified the Duc di Gallo accepted the report much to the relief of the Austrian and Russian ministers. He had failed to make any capital out of the added clause, and promised to counsel
submission to his countrymen. Stewart's protests had not prevented Metternich's complete success.

At this point the flow of the autocratic tide received a setback by a memorandum issued by the British Cabinet. Castlereagh was determined to frustrate the attempt at the inclusion of Britain in the acts of the Alliance, by a protest sent to all courts. Its tenor is the same as before and his Troppau policy is reiterated. Neither the policy towards Naples nor General Principles could be supported by Britain though Austria herself might settle, what were to her, internal problems.

"The system of measures proposed under the former head (general principles), if to be reciprocally acted upon, would be in direct repugnance to the fundamental law of this country. But even if this decisive objection did not exist the British Government would, nevertheless regard the principles on which these measures rest, to be such as could not be safely admitted as a system of International Law....with respect to the particular case of Naples, the British Government, at the very earliest moment, did not hesitate to express their strong disapprobation of the mode and circumstances under which that Revolution was understood to have been effected; but they, at the same time, expressly declared to the several Allied Courts that they should not consider themselves as either called upon or justified to advise an interference on the part of this country; they fully admitted however that other European States, and especially Austria and the Italian powers, might feel themselves differently circumstances..." 1

Castlereagh was still clinging to the Alliance while rejecting its methods. Austria should have acted on his advice in the beginning, without any attempt at manufacturing doctrines, or rather adopting those of the Tzar, in order to justify interference. But she preferred Russian support to that of England, and now Britain was applauded by Liberals all over Europe, and in the House of Commons the opposition forgot for a time their antagonism to Castlereagh, though he himself was as desirous of Austrian friendship as ever, and through Esterhazy he constantly pressed for a moderate constitution for Naples which he could support in Parliament. But Metternich would not support this despite the protests of Stewart. Capo d'Istria, La Ferronays and Esterhazy had to inform Castlereagh that Ferdinand would not allow any constitutional liberty in his Kingdom and that the Powers would support him in that determination.

While the Austrian army was marching southwards to re-establish Ferdinand on these terms a new insurrection shook Metternich's self-satisfaction. This occurred in Piedmont on March 10th., and though temporarily
successful its final result was to substitute the Ultra-Royalist Charles Felix for Victor Emmanuel. Austria, who had little influence in Piedmont before this time, now sent an Army of Occupation to support the new Monarch. Austria, who had little influence in Piedmont before this time, now sent an Army of Occupation to support the new Monarch. The Tzar, much to Metternich's trepidation, ordered 100,000 Russians to march westwards and only stopped them for fear they would become infected with Western heresy. France also hoped to interfere, on which side Metternich was uncertain, but he was sure that she would not forego an opportunity of making her age-long claim to predominance in Italy felt. Castlereagh refused to intervene both on principle and in order to keep the Mediterranean as free from Russian and French influence as possible. He was greatly afraid of foreign interference in Piedmont, and, although he sympathised with the old King and disliked the harshness of Charles Felix, yet he did nothing but express a wish for the return of Victor Emmanuel for fear of bringing in either, or both, France and Russia against him.

This wish had no effect and brutal punishments and an intricate spy system were the immediate results of the revolt.
Meanwhile the Austrian army had entered Naples and the revolutionaries had fled in a most cowardly panic. Many had been assisted to escape by A'Court the British Ambassador. This collapse of Liberalism in Italy brought a proportionate decrease in the power of the opposition in Parliament, but Castlereagh was quick to let Metternich know that this new security of the Government mean no change in policy:—

"I see by your and Gordon's letters that our Allies will still deceive themselves upon the political attitude of this Government. They idly persevere in attributing the line we have taken, and must steadily continue to take, to the temporary difficulties in which the Government have been placed, instead of imputing them to those principles which in our system must be immutable, and which, if the three Courts persevere much longer in the open promulgation of their ultra doctrines, will ere long work a separation which it is the wish of all of us to avoid." 1

Gordon had written:—

"The Emperor of Russia stopped me, the other day, in the promenade, to desire I would particularly express his congratulations upon the success in Parliament. I have even some difficulty in persuading Prince Metternich that our foreign are not in that degree intimately connected with our domestic politics as will permit of any change in our attitude poise upon the affair of Naples, which he almost expects as in consequence upon the successes of our Government at home". 2

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1. Castlereagh's Foreign Policy. (C.K. Webster). 334
2. Castlereagh's Correspondence. XII. 372.
Metternich's objects were now achieved, and he was very willing to re-establish friendly relations with England. He knew that the Tzar was expecting his support for interference in Spain and trouble was brewing in the East in which he would need support. Castlereagh was dead against even French interference in Spain, much less the Alliance. Wellesley's advice was sent from Madrid on January 21st, 1821.

"I am still of the opinion that the best line of policy which the Allies could pursue with respect to this country, even for the attainment of their own objects, would be to abstain from all interference in its affairs. An intimation to this effect might be made to the Spanish Government, wherein it might be required that they should abstain from promulgating their principles in other countries. A declaration of this kind would at once gratify their vanity, allay their apprehension, and would go far to deprive them of any pretext, found upon alleged attacks upon the Spanish Constitution, for exciting Naples to resist the views of the Allied Sovereigns". 1

But no "Declaration" was forthcoming, and fear of the monarchs at Laibach begat mob violence in Madrid and caused the Tzar to advise an immediate French advance into Spain. France dare not do this for fear of her own Liberals. Metternich was against it for fear of utterly

1. F.C.Spain. 244. Castlereagh's Foreign Policy. (C.K.Webster) 339.
breaking with England and Castlereagh merely referred to the State Paper of May 5th. when Lieven approached him on the matter. By the time that Capo d'Istria brought up the matter officially at Laibach, the fears of an ensuing French revolt had so taken possession of Alexander's mind that he agreed to a postponement of invasion but would allow no declaration of non-interference hoping for a favourable opportunity later. The Conference then issued its last Protocol re-stating the general principles of Troppau and placing all revolutions under the ban of the Alliance, finally announcing a meeting of the Alliance the next year at Florence. This declaration was soon under fire from the opposition in the Commons and Castlereagh did not attempt to defend it. He pointed out that it was in direct opposition to his last Memorandum —

"He did not scruple to declare his disappro- *bation of the principles advocated in the documents which *had been brought to the notice of the House. He could *not recognise the principle that one State was entitled to *interfere with another because changes might be effected *in its Government in a way which the former State dis-*approved. For certain States to erect themselves into a *tribunal to judge of the internal affairs of others *was in defiance of the Law of Nations, and the principles *of Common sense". 1

1. Hansard, Commons, Thursday, June 21st. 1821.
CHAPTER VII.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.
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Interest was soon to turn from middle Europe to the Near East. The Congress of Vienna had left the Turks supreme in the Balkans and the Powers even wished to receive Turkey into the circle of European nations. Russia was naturally opposed to this policy. Since the time of Peter the Great, she had cherished hopes of expansion towards the Mediterranean, and Turkey was in the way. In religious matters Russia saw her Greek brethren of the Orthodox Church under the infidel heel, and by the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainarji in 1774 she had succeeded in obtaining guardian rights over the Greek Christians of the Principalities and over the church in Constantinople. These rights she had endeavoured to extend. To the Tsar the Turks were Asiatics, incapable by their traditions and their intelligence of taking their place as a nation in Europe. The only means of dealing with them was by fear as they understood no code of honour or of humanity. During the Napoleonic struggle there had been peace between
these two nations obtained by promises of certain con-
cessions in Asia on the part of Russia. But these con-
cessions had been withheld, and Russia was supposed to be
supporting a Serbian revolt. Besides these irritating
circumstances, there was also the long standing question
of the rights of Russian vessels in the Straits. Though
war was unlikely relations were hardly friendly. Austria
and England both wished for a strong power in the Balkans
to keep Russia in check and France already had a centuries
old tradition of alliance with the Turks.

The Turks themselves were ruling their vassal
states with the utmost incompetence. They had neither
subjugated nor pacified the Greeks who kept their own
religion and paid the same taxes as the Musselmans and had
advantages over them such as exemption from military ser-
vice. Sporadic massacres mingled with periods of peace
and quiet only served to keep alive the spirit of revolt
and nationality fed as it was by the secret societies such
as the Heteira Philike and by a great literary revival. But,
like the Turks they were little better than half-civilised
and when war did break out it was waged on both sides with barbaric cruelty. The recent revolts in the west had encouraged the revolutionaries in the archipelago, already influenced by the efforts of Capo d'Istria and the earlier attitude of the Tsar. All the Greeks confidently expected help from their co-religionists whenever they opened the struggle for freedom. In 1820 Ali Pasha, the 'Lion of Janina', roused wide interest by setting himself up as a King of the Mountains, and the occupation of the Turkish army with this rebel roused the hopes of the Greeks. The first rising took place in Moldavia and Wallachia under the leadership of Prince Hypselantes. These two provinces were not Greek in population or in sentiment and with little popular enthusiasm it was evident that only Russian intervention could save the cause. This intervention so confidently expected, was not forthcoming, and in a short time Turkish troops occupied the principalities and the chief Greek leaders fled over the frontier. But a far more formidable revolt followed in Greece proper. It was amongst the islands and mountains of Morea that the Greek rebel bands had always been more or less in freedom, sometimes
fighting for the Turks, sometimes against them. Amongst the islands the Greek sailors had maintained the ancient seafaring traditions of their race and the Turkish navy was manned by the subject people. Aided by the support of these accustomed fighters, having command of the sea, and the Turkish army being fully occupied with Ali Pasha, the revolt made considerable headway and hundreds of Turks were cruelly massacred. But still there was no sign of support from Russia. The choleric old Sultan now revenged himself in the true Turkish fashion by ravaging Greek villages and hanging many prominent Greeks, including the old Patriarch of Constantinople himself. Had the Tzar at this moment been in Moscow or St. Petersbury with Capo d' Istria at his elbow his religious zeal and national hatred would doubtless have got the better of his wish for peace. But he was still at Laibach under the influence of Metternich, and Metternich was for leaving the East to itself "beyond the pale of civilisation". He had just been a leading figure in subduing revolt in Italy and, despite the urgings of Capo d' Istria, and the outcry of the Russian people, he wished to keep at one with his chief
ally if possible.

Roughly the situation from the beginning of 1821 to the death of Castlereagh was this. England was determined on peace and non-interference as long as Turkish existence was not imperilled. Metternich, now having thoroughly utilised the Russian alliance in Italy, wished for a renewed understanding with England, especially so because the Eastern policy of each was the same, that is to maintain a buffer state to Russia in the south, and therefore to stop Russia attacking Turkey. The Tzar was in a quandary as to whether to help the Greek Christians against "legitimacy" or to keep his friendship with Austria by discountenancing rebellion. He had either to sacrifice the old Russian Policy of Self-aggrandisement at the expense of the Turks, or his new anti-revolution theory of the Holy Alliance. All Russia was for revenge on the Sultan.

In Constantinople, the two chief ambassadors were Strangford the Englishman, who adopted a pro-Turkish policy and Stroganov, the Russian, anxious for war. While Strangford was endeavouring to mitigate the severity and
cruelty of the Turkish methods, Stroganov was denouncing the Porte on account of the continued occupation of the Principalities, the massacre of the Greeks, and the holding up of the Russian vessels in the Black Sea. Strangford's aim was to avoid any suggestion of collaboration or joint appeal by the ministers and so to gain the confidence of the Porte. This done he tried to ensure peace by persuading that body to adopt a moderate policy towards both Russia and the Greeks and to avoid further friction. Stroganov opposed him in every way and, in July, having received instructions from the Tzar, now back in Russia, he demanded redress of the Russian grievances. Receiving no answer from the Sultan he left Turkey on August 10th., being allowed to go alive only by the persistent appeals of Strangford to the Turkish Foreign Minister.

Since 1815, Castlereagh's persistent advice to his ambassadors at Constantinople had always been to reconcile Russia and Turkey. He now followed the same policy in a more emphatic manner. There was a large Hellenic following in England. Classical enthusiasts, poets who longed for the revival of the ancient Empire, liberals anxious
for the overthrow of autocracy, religious enthusiasts to whom a war against the Turks was a new Crusade. Many of these people offered their money and their lives in the Greek cause, and while governments supported Turkey for fear of Russia, popular sympathy was on the side of the rebels. Metternich and even Prussia suggested the substitution of a Greek for a Turkish State as equally suitable for buffer purposes. Castlereagh was against this, first as incurring war and interference and secondly because Russia would have too much influence in a Greek State. He made his policy clear in a person letter to the Tzar on July 16th. Fresh from Laibach Alexander had strongly denounced the revolt as in the same category as all the other risings and with its root in Paris. He would abide by the Alliance, he said, since then he had been subject to the clamours of his people, but Castlereagh urged peace, the maintenance of the Alliance, and the suppression of revolution. In language which can only be excused as diplomatic, considering his policy towards Austria and Russia at Laibach, he called upon the Tzar to maintain the solidarity of the Alliance for the
repose of Europe, and to stamp out revolt by allowing the Turks to suppress the Greeks.

Sire — When admitted to take leave of your Imperial Majesty, previous to your departure in 1812 from Aix-la-Chapelle, Your Majesty condescended to permit me to address myself directly to Your Majesty on any occasion when the interests of the European Alliance might justify me in having recourse to this indulgence.

That I have not hitherto availed myself of Your Majesty's gracious permission is a proof that I have not been tempted to abuse the peculiar mark of Your Imperial Majesty's favour and confidence.

In obedience to the King my Sovereign's commands, and under a deep sense of the importance of the present crisis, I now presume to address Your Imperial Majesty upon the affairs of Turkey. . . I am confident that the dreadful events which now afflict that portion of Europe are not regarded by Your Imperial Majesty as constituting in the history of these times a new or an isolated question. They form a branch of that organised spirit of insurrection which is systematically propagating itself throughout Europe, and which explodes wherever the hand of the governing power, from whatever cause, is enfeebled...

It would be superfluous to waste Your Imperial Majesty's time by arguing that Turkey, with all its barbarism, constitutes in the system of Europe what may be regarded as a necessary evil. . It is an excrescence which can scarcely be looked upon as forming any part of its healthful organisation; and yet, for that very reason, any attempt to introduce order by external interference into the jarring elements or to assimilate it to the mass, might expose the whole frame of our general system to hazard. The real question which presses for consideration is how the danger shall be kept at a distance from other States, and how the adjacent Powers can best preserve their pacific relations with a people so convulsed.

He sympathises with the Tsar because of the
No doubt humanity shudders at the scenes "which are acting, as it appears, throughout the greater "part of European Turkey, and it will require all the "commanding authority of Your Imperial Majesty's great "name and character to reconcile the Russian nation to "witness the ministers of a congenial faith so barbarously "immolated to the resentment of a government under which "they have the misfortune to be. But it is in vain to "hope that we can materially alter their lot or deliver "them from their sufferings, and preserve the system of "Europe as it now stands. The hazard of innovating "upon this constructed work and the reflection that whilst "we cannot refuse to the Greeks our sympathy and our com-
"passion, they have been the aggressors on the present "occasion; and that they have yielded to the corrupting "practice of the times, so reprimanded by Your Imperial Majesty, "may well reconcile Your Imperial Majesty and your Allies "to observe rather than to meddle in the endless and "intricate mazes of Turkish confusion.

The flame burns at the moment too ardently "to be of long duration; a time must arrive, and that "probably at no distant period; when the Turkish power "exhausted by its own convulsions will be accessible to "reason, and when Your Imperial Majesty's voice will be "heard, and your wrongs redressed, and perhaps Providence, "in many trials to which it has destined Your Majesty in "your eventful and glorious life, has never presented "an occasion in which Your Imperial Majesty may afford "to your own times and to posterity a prouder manifesta-
"tion of Your Imperial Majesty's principles than by exer-
cising towards this fanatic and semi-barbarous state that "degree of forbearance and magnanimity which a religious "and enthusiastic respect for the system which Your Imperial "Majesty has so powerfully contributed to raise in Europe "could alone dictate under such provocations and with "such means at Your Imperial Majesty's disposal.

I presume to hope that the sentiments I
have ventured to express will neither prove unacceptable to nor be disavowed by, Your Imperial Majesty. Whatever degree of divergence of opinion may have occurred in late discussions on abstract theories of international law, and however the position of the British Government may have latterly been rendered distinct from that of the three Allied Courts, by the line of neutrality which the King thought it necessary to adopt with respect to Italian affairs, there happily has hardly occurred an instance since the auspicious period which gave birth to the existing Alliance, of any point of grave practical political difference between Your Imperial Majesty's councils and those of my august Master. I feel intimately convinced that each state, avowing conscientiously in the face of all the world its own principles, and at the same time adhering to its peculiar habits of action, will nevertheless remain unalterably true to the fundamental obligations of the Alliance, and that the present European System, thus temperately and prudently administered, will long continue to subsist for the safety and repose of Europe...."1

This policy is not inconsistent with previous declarations. It is still non-interference. There was no thought of supporting Turkey, only of pacifying her and persuading her to conciliate the rebels by clemency, and justice, and to avoid irritating Russia. The arguments used to influence the Tzar are rather thin. Castlereagh now shows himself as anxious to merge all revolutions into the same category, in order to get Alexander to commit himself to a uniform policy, as before he had been to keep

1. Castlereagh's Correspondence, XII. 403.
them separate to prevent "General Declarations". The statement that "it is in vain to hope that we can materially alter their lot or deliver them from their sufferings, and preserve the system of Europe as it now stands" had no supporting argument and carried no conviction. His appeal to the Tzar's "forbearance and magnanimity" would have left anyone but Alexander unmoved. It was in short a warning as to where England's interests lay, wrapped up with that flattery and appeal to lofty ideals which would be most likely to influence the Tzar.

Metternich, whilst supporting Castlereagh in this, wished for a joint policy at Constantinople by England, Austria, France and Prussia, but Castlereagh knew that Strangford had more influence when on his own, and rejected the Austrian suggestion of an Ambassadorial Conference at Vienna. Metternich had a difficult game to play as he was in the Tzar's debt, and unless he could get a backing from England, he might have to fulfil his obligations by supporting a policy contrary to Austrian interests.

The Tzar sent his reply through Bagot on
August 29th. He pointed out that "he had to contend with a strong tide of public opinion and public prejudice, and that he had to oppose his own anxious desire to preserve the tranquility of Europe to that of the great mass of his people."

"At my last audience with the Emperor, he repeated to me "what he said at my former one - that he was much gratified by your lordship's letter to him, and that there was nothing which he so much desired as to encourage the fullest and most unreserved communications with the British Government." ¹

This letter shows the effect of Capo d'Istria on the Tzar since he had left Laibach. There is no doubt that but for the representations of Britain and Austria, he would have thrown his anti-revolutionary crusade to the winds and declared war on the Turks. Even now peace was far from certain. All depended on the Sultan's reply to the Russian demands. Alexander had stated his terms. If they were not accepted before the spring war would be the result. To simplify matters Metternich reduced the demands to four points (1) the protection of the Greek religion,(2) the restoration of the Greek Churches, (3) the recognition

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¹. Castlereagh's Correspondence XII. 431.
of the distinction between the guilty and the innocent Greeks and (4) the evacuation and reorganisation of the Principalities. The Sultan was willing to concede all but the last of these and it was upon this point that both British and Austrian Ministers tried to influence him.

Metternich and Castlereagh had met at Hanover in the late autumn of 1821, and had come to a thorough understanding. Peace was to be urged both at St.Petersburg and at Constantinople, but no sign of collusion must appear. This might shake the Tzar's faithfulness to the Alliance and cause him to adopt an isolated defiant attitude. It was all the easier to hide the joint policy as Castlereagh could go so far as to leave her friendly neutrality in doubt, much further than Austria, if Russia proved intractable.

It was the influence of Austria and England against that of Capo d'Istria and the Russian nation in the councils of the Tzar. For some time it seemed that the latter would win. A decision had to be reached before March and the winter was already well spent. Capo d'Istria
and his supporters were sure of war, especially as the Porte refused any further concessions in the Principalities until Greek refugees in Russia had been turned out. Voluminous dispatches passed between London, Vienna and St. Petersburg with little result. On December 14th. Castlereagh wrote to Bagot, again for the benefit of the Tzar, urging that the Greek revolt was the most formidable of a series of revolutions and that any intervention should be on the side of the Turks, but as the Tzar could hardly take this course, the next best thing was to keep quiet. On January 19th. he again wrote to Bagot, this time urging a resumption of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey as the Turks had made considerable concessions.

"In reflecting upon the present state of affairs in Greece as connected with those of the rest of Europe and one may say of the world, it is impossible the Emperor of Russia should not be struck with the critical nature of the course which he has to pursue.... The first point that deserves the Emperor's attentive consideration is the wide and increasing spread of the revolutionary movement throughout the American as well as the European Continent.... The same spirit has deeply mixed itself in the affairs of Greece. The insurrection throughout European Turkey, in its organisation, in its objects, in its agency, and in its external relations, is in no respect distinguish-"
able from the movements which have preceded it in Spain, Portugal and Italy....In short, it is impossible that the Emperor should not see that the head of this revolutionary torrent is Greece, that the tide is flowing in upon his Southern provinces in an almost uninterrupted and continuous stream from the other side of the Atlantic; and it is upon this principle, and not upon local views of policy, that his Imperial Majesty will, I doubt not, as a statesman, regulate his conduct.

I am not now about to say what the British Government would do in such a case....but sure I am that, if what is now passing in Greece, especially in Morea, had shown itself in any other countries limitrophe to Russia, the Emperor would, ere this, have acted as he did when at Laibach, and no question with the Turks would have induced him to hesitate in opposing the common and formidable enemy. 1

As things were this was too much to expect, and Bagot withheld the dispatch until a more favourable opportunity should occur. It might have produced the same result which had been avoided before by separate representation, that of irritating Alexander into defiance. Even without such an irritant, he was on the point of dispatching an unfriendly letter of complaint to Metternich which seemed a preliminary to a rupture. But this was immediately followed to Vienna by Tatishchev. The Tzar had changed his mind. The letter meant defiance, possibly war, the

1. Castlereagh's Correspondence XII. Page 443.
diplomatist meant peace. Alexander was afraid of throwing away all the influence he had gained at Troppau and Lai- bach if he broke with Austria. It would mean cancelling her debt to Russia. He imputed to himself higher motives of policy.

"I am sensible of the danger which surrounds us all when I look at the state of France and the new Ministry, when I see state of Spain and Portugal, when I see, as I do see, the state of the whole world, I am aware that the smallest spark which falls upon such combustible materials may kindle a flame which all our efforts may perhaps hereafter be insufficient to extinguish."

He could hardly risk encouraging this "all too prevalent" revolutionary feeling and be looked upon as the sponsor of Liberalism by a combination of Austria and Britain. Tatishchev had instructions to put the Russian demands forward, and even to extend the Four Points to a demand for a re-organisation of Turkey in the interests of the Greeks. Metternich was too wily for the Russian

1 Castlereagh's Correspondence XII. 443.
diplomatist and in order to satisfy him and the Tzar he promised his moral support to Russia in case of war, and also to break off diplomatic relations with Turkey if the Allies, in that event, would do the same. He knew that Britain would refuse. The final settlement of the question could wait till the conference arranged at Laibach should meet.

Castlereagh had been even less pliable to Lieven who had put forward similar proposals to those of Tatischev. He refused to hear of any alteration of the Four Points which Strangford was still pressing on the Porte and on his official reply to Bagot he entirely refused to break off diplomatic relations in any event. The general public in England might like to see the Greeks independent but not at the price of an increase in Russian power, and Castlereagh was determined rather to err in over caution than to get trapped into joint action with the Alliance which was as unpopular as Russia herself.

Meanwhile in Turkey Strangford's labours had at last borne fruit. In January an interview with the Sultan and strenuous exhortation had resulted in a vague
promise of evacuation of the Principalities — sometime. The assassination of Ali Pasha gave the Porte a further excuse for procrastination for a few months, and then in April there was a change in the ministry and orders were given for the evacuation. For the time—peace was secure. Capo d'Istria had failed and in all likelihood some final settlement would be made at the coming confer-

cence.
CHAPTER VIII.

VERONA.
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The Powers were to meet at Verona in October. The Italian settlement, on account of which the Conference had been proposed, was not expected to take up very much time; nor, as things had turned out, was the more vital Eastern Question; but further west storm clouds were piling up blacker than before, and the Tzar's interest in Spain and even in the Spanish American Colonies meant more trouble ahead for Castlereagh.

In Spain reactionary plots, countenanced by Ferdinand and the French Royalists, had caused the overthrow of the moderate Cortes and its replacement by one more extremely Liberal. The Comte d'Artois and Montmorenci in France and the Tzar in Russia were anxious for interference to re-establish Ferdinand. Alexander's usual Circular Despatch met with a cold, though not entirely antagonistic, reception from both Metternich and Castlereagh. These two Ministers kept each other well informed of their various moves, and
neither was willing to see a Russian army marching across Central Europe. Even the French thought interference was their own right and duty, especially as the Russian troops would have to cross France, and Alexander himself was afraid of his troops coming into contact with Liberalism. However he did not wish to lose the opportunity of receiving payment for Austria's debt to him, and Metternich was half committed at Troppau to a policy of joint interference in Spain. The Machiavellian nature of Central Europe an diplomacy was as yet little realised.

Ferdinand's appeals to France had resulted in a strong party in the Government for interference, and the Cordon Sanitaire in the Pyrenees, to prevent the spread of smallpox, had become a formidable army. But the party in the ascendant led by Villele waited for the decision of the Alliance.

The Question of the Spanish Colonies was even more intricate and more important to England. Napoleon's invasion of Spain had resulted in loyal Juntas being set up in the Colonies. Ferdinand's ill-rule had turned these into revolutionary governments, and these Colonies had opened
up a brisk trade with Britain even before 1812. When the monarchy was restored in Spain the Cortes wished to re-establish its authority in South America and also its trade monopoly. In 1812 Castlereagh offered to mediate between the mother country and her Colonies provided that, (1) there should be no secret advantages such as Spain had offered for active help, (2) that the mediation should apply to all her Colonies, (3) that force was not to be used. England could afford to refuse special trading privileges in any country on account of her universal superiority both in the navy and in the merchant service. She had no need to buy advantages, and free trade in all Colonies of whatever nationality was the policy which would benefit her the most. Ferdinand would not consider the last term of the proposal which was then rejected.

In 1817 the Alliance was approached by Ferdinand through the Tsar. This was the time when the negotiations relating to the old Russian fleet caused so much anxiety at Vienna and London. But the anxiety was so much allayed that even Austria joined with the other ambassadors in supporting a scheme of Pozzo di Borgo and Fernan Nunez for
settling the Spanish–Portuguese dispute. Only the refusal of Castlereagh to allow intervention in Portugal by force of arms caused its rejection by the Alliance. In a dispatch dealing with this matter, Castlereagh goes on to the more important question:

"There is another branch of this question of great importance and upon which the Prince Regent is desirous to be most distinctly understood; namely that His Royal Highness cannot consent that his mediation shall, under circumstances assume an armed character.... His intervention must throughout be understood to be confined within the bounds of good offices and the employment of that just influence which must belong to any Great Power when labouring only to promote the welfare of an Allied Sovereign and his people. His Royal Highness deems it proper to be more explicit on this branch of the subject as he is persuaded that the party in Spain, which still unfortunately clings to the ancient colonial system of that country, and which has hitherto had influence enough to prevent any effectual attempt at reconciliation, will continue to obstruct any such attempt so long as they are permitted to indulge a hope of involving other Powers in the contest and thereby availing themselves of foreign arms for the subjugation of the Spanish Colonies." 1

A few months later Castlereagh said to Lieven -

"By what right could she (England) force a population which had freed itself because its government was oppressive and place itself once more under the domination of that same government."

"Interest and sentiment lay in the same policy, non-interference and the expansion of over-seas trade. Britain would not allow the Alliance to interfere except on her own terms and Spain had refused these terms."

1.F.O. Spain 204. Cabinet Memorandum. Castlereagh's Foreign Policy,(Webster) 414) -150-
At Aix-la-Chapelle nothing was decided. Russia and France proposed a scheme by which Wellington was to settle matters in Madrid as representative of the Powers. Nothing was said with regard to force not being used. To Castlereagh the scheme was "highly unsatisfying and objectionable", we could "mediate or facilitate" but not "compel or menace". No external power was entitled to "arbitrate or judge" between the King of Spain and his subjects. In consequence the scheme fell through.

Meanwhile the United States were moving towards a recognition of the independence of the Colonies. Their tendency towards isolating the American continent, their suspicions of the Powers in Europe, and their own revolutionary beginnings, all tended to make for their recognition of the South American Colonies as self-governing states. Added to this was the feeble policy of Spain which provoked rather than suppressed or conciliated the rebels. Castlereagh endeavoured to sheer America off this isolation policy by making the interference of the Alliance seem probable, but after the Aix-la-Chapelle Congress this was difficult. However he passed the Foreign Enlistment Bill to prevent Englishmen from joining the
rebels as Lord Cochrane and many others had done. But this attitude of fair play to Spain was considerably modified, when he found out that the French Government had been intriguing for a French Prince to set himself up as monarch of one of the Colonies. In reply to this treacherous policy he informed Zea, the Columbian representative in London, that the British Government would recognise any Colony adopting monarchical institutions.

On May 4th, 1822, Congress passed a Bill allowing expenses for "such missions to the independent nations of the American Continent as the President of the United States may deem proper". On June 19th, the representative of Columbia was formally received in the States. By this time Castlereagh had given up hope of Spain settling her own affairs and having re-entered upon friendly terms with Metternich after the storms of Troppau and Lai-bach, he was beginning to adopt a policy of recognition. This hardly agrees with his oft declared non-intervention dogma as it would be a distinct blow to Spain. Commercial interests however were outweighing other considerations, and he knew that the public was behind him as English mer-
chants trading with South America were being treated as pirates by the Spaniards. So the first step he took was to get the Navigation Acts revised so as to allow Spanish American vessels to use English harbours, thus establishing freedom of trade and commercial recognition. Diplomatic or political recognition would come later. An appeal to France to do likewise failed but Russia was less hostile to Castlereagh's policy. A new offer from Spain of more liberal institutions in South America brought a pause and a warning from Castlereagh, "that the State which can neither by its counsels nor by its arms effectually assert its own rights over its dependences so as to enforce obedience and thus make itself responsible for maintaining their relations with other Powers, must sooner or later be prepared to see those relations established from the overruling necessity of the case, under some other form."

In his instructions for his own use at the forthcoming Verona Congress he wrote -

"If the actual governments of South America shall maintain themselves, and if Spain shall, neither by her counsels nor her arms, re-establish her authority within a limited time, other States will acknowledge them sooner or later; and it is in the interest of Spain herself to find the means of restoring an intercourse where she cannot succeed in re-establishing a dominion. The whole may be regarded rather as a matter of time than of principle..."
"It is with regard to the territories in which the struggle "may be said to be over, and the possession become complete "on the part of the local government, that the discussion "must turn." 1

No question as to commercial recognition

already accorded. He drew up his instructions very broadly in order to allow himself every freedom.

The question then resolves itself into one "rather as to the mode of our relations than as to whether "they shall or shall not subsist, to the extent, in the matter of right, as regulated by the law of nations.

In judging this point it is material to distinguish the following descriptions of recognition.

(1) the recognition de facto, which now substantially

(2) the more formal recognition by diplomatic agents.

(3) the recognition de jure, which professes to decide upon the title, and thereby to create a certain impediment to the assertion of the rights of the former occupant.

Now as to the last description of recognition there can be no fair pretence for calling upon this country to commit herself by its adoption. It is for the two contending parties themselves to settle the question of title, not for a third party to interfere. They have a motive of convenience in doing so however difficult may be the judgment.

The practical question is — How long should the de facto system of recognition be maintained to the exclusion of the diplomatic, and when can the latter be adopted?" 2.

There is no doubt as to Castlereagh's intentions. This last Memorandum is the most important document he has left. It contains his latest thoughts on the general situation and gives a fair idea of the policy which he intended to use at Vienna. Before he could use it he was dead. The strain of the session was too much for him. Trouble in England, the Divorce Question, constant opposition attacks in addition to the persistent foreign problems caused his health to fail. He had few friends and none to whom he might ease his mind and open his heart. He bore almost the whole responsibility of government and the hatred of all Liberals at home and abroad. His torture of mind was overwhelming, but he never broke his reserve and dignity. At last the burden was too great, his brain gave way and he committed suicide by cutting his throat on August 12th, 1822.

Canning, who was on the point of starting for India as Governor-General, was prevailed upon to fill his position and the task of British Ambassador to the Verona Congress was assigned to Wellington. Metternich viewed these changes with some alarm. He realised that the understanding with England was purely personal, and
that Canning "the malevolent meteor" would be bound by no old associations with the Eastern States. His fears were realised for Canning's impatient mind had long disagreed with the apparent half-hearted measures of Castlereagh, and he cut England adrift without hesitation by the energy of his character. The continental policy entered upon in 1793, was broken, and, as Castlereagh had feared, "the Alliance moved away from Britain".

Wellington went to Verona with Castlereagh's Memorandum as his plan of campaign. He found that the Eastern Question had been temporarily settled at a preliminary conference at Vienna, and the Italian question was also a matter for Russia, Austria and Prussia alone and had also been provided for at the same previous conference, there only remained the Spanish problem. With regard to Spain itself, there was to be no interference, and in the Spanish Colonial Question attempts at a solution of the constitutional quarrel were to be made but above all British trade interests must be protected. Canning had nothing to add to the Memorandum on these subjects.

On September 14th, 1822, Bathurst forwarded to Wellington the instructions left by Castlereagh mentioned above —
With regard to Spain there seems nothing to add to or vary in the course of policy hitherto pursued. Solicitude for the safety of the Royal Family, observance of our own engagements with Portugal, and a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country must be considered as forming the basis of His Majesty's Policy. 1

This policy seemed to take the Alliance by surprise. The proposals before the Congress were either for French interference or for a general European intervention. Wellington opposed both and withdrew from the Conference when the proposals were pushed forward. Fear of Alexander's Russian Army marching across the Confederate States and France, led to a rejection of the second proposition and it was left to Louis XVIII and Villele to take the responsibility of a war on their own shoulders. This defined the relations of Britain and the Alliance.

In Canning's words:

"So things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and God for us all. The time for Aeropagus and the life of it is gone by."

"Come what may," he wrote to Wellington, "His Majesty will not be a party to any interference."

This excited much Liberal opposition from Wilberforce and his supporters, but Canning had little sympathy with their idealism.

"interference is one on which we were already irrevocably
at variance in opinion with the Allies...on the one
hand the Alliance upholds the doctrine of an European
police. This country protests against that doctrine.
Great Britain has come out of the negotiations with all
the honour due to her. She has not sprung forth armed
indignantly but has reflected and assumed the attitude
of Justice with an unsheathed sword. I was and still am
an enthusiast for national independence, but I am not —
and I hope I never shall be — an enthusiast in favour of
revolution." 1

His famous renunciation of the Alliance and
recapitulation of all our efforts to control its wayward
flight towards autocracy, was in reply to Metternich who
had been complaining at the freedom of speeches in
Parliament. The letter was sent to Sir Henry Wellesley,
British Minister, at Vienna on September 16th.

The pretensions of Prince Metternich in respect
to this country appear to me to be perfectly unreasonable.
They must be founded upon some strange misconception of
our obligations, our interests and our feelings...England
is under no obligation to interfere or to assist in in-
terfering in the internal concerns of independent nations.
The specific engagement to interfere in France is an ex-
ception so studiously particularised as to prove the rule.
The rule, I take to be that our engagements have refer-
ence wholly to the state of affairs between nation and
nation, not (with the single exception above stated) to
the affairs of any nation within itself. I thought the
public declaration of my predecessor had set this
question entirely at rest.

Referring to the place occupied by England
in the construction of the policy of the Alliance:

We protested at Laibach; we remonstrated at Verona. Our protest was treated as waste paper; our remonstrances mingled with the air. Our influence, if it is to be maintained abroad, must be secure in the sources of strength at home and the sources of that strength are in the sympathy between the people and the Government, in the union of the public sentiment with public counsels; in the reciprocal confidence and cooperation of the House of Commons with the Crown. Our business is to preserve the peace of the world and therefore the independence of the several nations which compose it. In resisting the Revolution in all its stages...we resisted the spirit of change to be sure, but we resisted also the spirit of foreign domination. 1.

What would have been the outcome of the Conference had Castlereagh been present? Had the Powers taken the line which they did take the result would probably have been the same. Castlereagh's opinions on intervention, especially in Spain, were as decided as those of Canning, though the dramatic and forceful manner in which the latter minister made his views public has prejudiced opinion greatly in his favour. Nothing was new in his attitude to the Alliance, little was new in what he said about it, but he made a distinct break with Castlereagh in the way in which he said it. It is most probable that Castlereagh would have altered the whole policy of the

1. F.O. (Austria) 160: No. 41.

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Congress of Verona by his influence over the Tzar and Metternich. The Austrian minister's sorrow at his death, his eulogy, and dejection when Canning was appointed are sufficient to show that he intended a continuance of his understanding with England, especially as Russia and France would probably come to an agreement on intervention in Spain. This Metternich did not want, certainly not at the price of losing Castlereagh's friendship.

When the latter was dead and England's support was not to be hoped for he had to pursue an Alliance policy almost as laid down by Russia. Austria could not stand alone in opposing intervention.

The Alliance still survived. Shorn of its power, with its principles perverted, its endeavours to interfere decisively in European matters were entirely ineffectual. In 1823 the adoption of the Monroe doctrine by the United States, together with the recognition of the South American Republics in 1825, by the British Government, dealt a final blow at the universal extension of the Alliance which Alexander had in mind. The American declaration and Canning's well-known declamation only served
to turn the limelight away from the people who had really won their own liberty before 1823. Castlereagh would have recognised their independence sooner and in a less ostentatious manner. He would probably have forestalled the Monroe declaration and thus prevented the formation of an unfortunate tradition.

The Alliance was further undermined by the divisions on the Eastern Question, and the advent of the reactionary Tsar Nicholas did little to re-establish its prestige in Western eyes. The London Conference and the Peace of Adrianople in 1829 settled for a moment the difference of opinion of England, Austria and Russia as to the fate of the Turkish and Greek nations, and it was left to the events of the revolutionary year 1830 finally to split the Alliance. A tardy recognition of Louis Philippe by the Eastern Powers was followed by the Liberal Alliance of England and France in favour of the Belgian and Polish revolutions. William IV having thrown his crown into the "gutter" in 1832, and Palmerston the "Jacobin" being Foreign Minister of the Liberal Party, Nicholas thought it time to cast out so infected a nation from amongst the chosen peoples. Austria and Prussia had to follow and in 1835 the Holy Alliance was transformed into a Triple Alliance by the Convention of Berlin. Once more the determination
to interfere in disturbed countries was asserted. The Alliance had become a definite and proclaimed league against revolution in Europe. It existed until the Crimean War and its last united action was the crushing of the Hungarian revolt under Louis Kossuth in 1849. Then came the Eastern Question again, a wedge sundering that much repaired and ever more unstable structure which was once Alexander's Most Christian Brotherhood.
CHAPTER IX.

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During the years from 1815 to 1822 European politics present an ever-increasing tension and finally open conflict between two conceptions, Alexander's Holy Alliance ideal, a great European Confederation with unlimited powers of supervision for maintaining the peace and happiness of Europe, and Castlereagh's European Alliance to achieve the same result by the elimination of friction between nations. Both these systems were new, born during a chaotic period of strife. The years of the last coalitions had profoundly affected the outlook of the various countries and time seemed ripe for some great advance in international relations. The personal influence of the leaders on each other, and the necessity for co-operation if the integrity of European national life were to be achieved, created for a time a desire for mutual friendship and external assistance. The idea of a future war was unthinkable, and Castlereagh might well have imagined that his Conference System to
perpetuate peace would find strong and lasting support. Both schemes failed. The Holy Alliance was killed chiefly by the perversion of the ideals which created it and partly by the unkindly nature of the soil which was to nourish it. With the passing of the memory of the horrors of the war and of the danger from France, egotistic considerations regained their control. A General Alliance was as yet an anachronism, its necessity unrealised. Not only did it fail itself but it helped to ruin Castlereagh’s Alliance because to the popular mind they were identical.

Any matter with which the Tsar was connected was suspect especially to Englishmen. Criticism of him in the House was often very bitter. Brougham on February 4th. 1825, said

"Can anyone imagine, that, if there be a portion of territory in the neighbourhood of the Emperor Alexander’s, peculiarly suited to his views, he will not soon be able to discover some fault, to spy out some flaw in its political institutions requiring his intervention, however little these may savour of democracy, supposing it even to be a part of the Ottoman Empire itself....."The Three Gentlemen of Verona" I fear, will turn a-deaf ear to argument and set about prying for some imperfection in which to enter the territory; and if they cannot find a way, will probably not be very scrupulous about making one.....In about three months time the Emperor Alexander will be found one morning at Constantinople, or if it suit him, at Minorca...." 1

He died on December 1st, 1825, and three weeks later the Times refers to his death:

"But if the death of Alexander was an event to be deplored by the great majority of his own people, by Europe generally we may suppose it will be looked at with very different emotions. As the author and master and mover of the Holy Alliance the late Emperor was a declared foe to the political rights of civilised nations, to the cause of freedom over the whole earth, and to the improvement and happiness of man as a member of Society."

These were the sentiments of the men who were upholding the Corn Laws, suspending the Habeas Corpus Act, and passing the Six Acts. They certainly had little sympathy with democratic movements either in England, Naples or Spain, but they had less sympathy still with any external interference. Had Castlereagh been a popular hero it is likely that he would still have found Alexander's supposed iniquities too large a burden to be carried against so critical an Opposition. As it was it was a sheer impossibility. He was successful up to 1818 and the end of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle found his Conference

1. The Times, Dec. 21st. 1825.
System still undamaged. He had gained all he had wished for solely by his dominating personality, but by this time Parliament, and even the Cabinet were less complacent. The Opposition was attacking the Holy Alliance and the Tories were demanding a more insular policy. Unrest and riots were causing general nervous irritation, and protests against the European connection became more and more aggressive and menacing.

Castlereagh's personality was useless to stem this tide. He was looked upon as the friend and advocate of the Tzar, that "foe to the political rights of civilised nations". His friendship with Metternich helped to brand him as the "arch enemy of freedom". Domestic repression on the part of his Government strengthened this idea especially amongst the Opposition whose rancour was increased by the fact that "a Whig administration seemed as remote as a thaw in Zembla." Wellington was more reactionary than he, but Wellington was a military commander whose victories had made him a public hero. The victories gained by a diplomatist are not such as appeal to the popular imagination and the secrecy of his successes told against him. The country was convinced that he was the English representative of the Holy Alliance and an accomplice in all its doings. As late
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1833, in the Introduction to the speeches of Brougham his responsibility for all the actions of the Alliance is unquestioned.

The denial first, the explanation afterwards, "finally the defence of the Holy Alliance, devolved upon one who had been the associate of the three Sovereigns".

His mediocrity, limited capacity and sorry discourse are commented upon, the only asset allowed being his bold and fearless speech.

His foreign administration was as destitute of all merit as possible. No enlarged views guided his conduct, no liberal principles claimed his regard. It is little to be wondered at that those potentates found him ready enough with his defence of their Holy Alliance. When it was attacked in 1816, he began by denying that it meant anything at all. He afterwards explained it away as a mere pledge of pacific intentions and a new security for the stability of the settlement made by the Congress of Vienna. Finally when he was compelled to depart from the monstrous principles of the systematic interference to which it gave birth and to establish which it was originally intended, he was tardy and cold in the cause of international independence.  

The policy of the Government at the Congresses of Troppau, Laibach, and Verona are then criticised. Castlereagh's policy is considered to be reactionary "a very meagre dissent from the principle of intervention" while he was in perfect agreement with the restoration of the old governments in Naples and Spain. The advent of Canning is hailed with delight.

His views were widely different from those of Castlereagh. He was justly jealous of the whole policy and principles of the Holy Alliance. He was disgusted with the courtly language of the cruel and crafty despots who, under the mask of religious zeal, were enslaving Europe. He was indignant at the subservient part in those designs which England had been playing and he resolved to change it. 1

Brougham’s speech following the Introduction is an example of the separatism against which Castlereagh had struggled so long. Referring to the Alliance:-

Let us not deceive ourselves; these despots can have but little liking towards this nation or its institutions, more especially to our Parliaments and Press, therefore as long as England remains unenslaved she will be the object of their hatred....My co-operation is with any faithful servant of the Crown who shall, in performing his duty to his country, to freedom and to the world, pursue a language that is truly British, pursue a policy that is truly free, and look to free states as our best and most natural allies...quarrelling with no one, whatever their form of government, keeping peace but prepared for war, determined to maintain the supremacy of all separate states.” 1a

Such opposition had Castlereagh’s policy aroused. And in the face of it he was alone. Calm, cold, and self-contained he had no disciples, no Castlereagh-ites to continue his policy. As the dramatic and passion-

1a. Ibid. Page 675.
ate Pitt had found himself alone amongst the cynical, polished and prosaic Whig Society of the 1750's, so Castle-reagh, aloof and reasoning, was isolated amongst the emotional enthusiasts of his day. They refused to believe in him, first in his ability and, when this was proved, then in his sincerity. They pretended that his calm exterior cloaked a deadly zeal against mankind. Had he taken the trouble occasionally to declare his faith in Nationality or his sympathy with the oppressed he might have pursued his policy with impunity. But he was too honest and too obstinate. He failed to appreciate either Nationalism or Democracy. Nevertheless he helped to destroy the Slave Trade which to him was cruel and degrading. He spent a great part of his life in freeing Europe from Napoleon, because he was enslaving Europe and upsetting the Balance of Power. He repeatedly advised Louis XVIII and Ferdinand of Spain against autocratic methods. All this was for the sake of Peace. He let nothing come in the way of that aim and had he had loftier and more impracticable ideals he could not have achieved the resulting forty years of peace which were to a great
extent the outcome of his policy.

As a diplomatic Metternich had to recognise in him his equal. At Aix-la-Chapelle his energy and persuasive powers backed by his courage and insight enabled him to lead the Conference as he wished. In this sphere his ability and success are indubitable, but it is his statesmanship which has provoked such hostility, and the backbone of his policy was his Conference System. He had succeeded in saddling England with this when she was still befuddled by war, but he knew that it was essential to Europe in her crying need of a lasting peace. He thought he could succeed and so did other impartial critics such as Adams the American Ambassador, who saw no reason why the Alliance should not last for ever. But in less than two years from his death it had been ousted to make place for Canning's ideal of "every State for itself and God for us all".

In this policy he was only voicing the sentiments of the majority of the English public. Limited

franchise meant a limited interest in politics of any kind, and an absence of almost any knowledge of external affairs left opinions on foreign policy to be formed chiefly by tradition. There was the tradition of liberty, both national and individual: the tradition of self-determination for nations: and the tradition of insularity. The overthrow of the old social order in England during the latter half of the 18th. century and the subsequent distress and starvation might make the English landowners support of liberty abroad seem a mockery of his domestic conditions, but the Anglo-Saxon spirit of liberty was to survive and to emerge triumphant over existing facts.

Centuries of alternate repression and triumphs of freedom, of hard knocks and successful revolts; have only served to engrave this characteristic still deeper in the mind of the race. The idea of a Holy Alliance formed by a combination of monarchs without the consent of their peoples was repugnant to this instinct. It savoured of the Stuart tyranny and of France before the Revolution, and, except in extraordinary conditions such as the late war, could not be tolerated. Even benevolent despotism was now outworn and when the desire of repressing
popular revolutions became of paramount importance to the Alliance the feeling of quiescent disapproval changed to active dislike.

Contempt for all things foreign was the chief factor in the renewed desire for insularity. Prejudice against foreign methods and foreign governments and a general feeling of distrust, especially of Russian ambition, moved both country and Government alike. This disdain and suspicion was now aggravated by the increasing commercial rivalry. The desire to control or to gain a footing in particular markets overseas was a considerable incentive to the policy of turning away from Europe. England was for a short time the sole factory of the world and customers in South America must not be offended even though a cleavage in the European Confederation should result.

This cleavage was inevitable in the circumstances, but it would have needed more imagination than Castlereagh possessed to have foreseen the failure and probed its causes. Unlike the present League of Nations, it had no definite constitution and no fixed occasions for
reunion. Too much was left to the whims of monarchs and statesmen who themselves might have but transitory power. The great motive forces of the century, nationality and democracy, were as yet dormant or, if active, suppressed by the Alliance which later they were to overwhelm. There was no popular support in any country and Castlereagh's internal repression made the Alliance appear as an instrument for external repression. Despite the Six Acts and his hatred of Radicalism his protests against this use of the Alliance were continuous, emphatic and genuine, but whereas he himself could be blind to such interference as was sanctioned at Troppau, in order to preserve the Conference System at Verona, as he had hoped, yet the general public could not forget. Finally the lesser Powers would not have been content to have stayed out in the cold, neither could the Eastern Question have been either shelved or solved in a manner satisfactory to all the Powers. So in spite of Castlereagh's diplomatic genius and utter self-sacrifice in the cause of peace, yet his system was bound to fail, but in spite of its failure it helped to keep Europe free from wars for forty years.
Since then the definition of national frontiers, a growing dislike of armaments, the growth of democracy with its greater interest in and comprehension of foreign politics, the commercial interdependence of nations, and rapid transport and communications have removed much of the undergrowth which held up the pioneer and the way is clearer for the present League.