*Ethnicity and Statehood in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia (8-13\textsuperscript{th} c.): Contributing to a Reassessment*

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Abstract

What is the line between the “ancient” world and the “medieval” world? Is it 476? 330? 632? 800? Most historians acknowledge there is no crisp line and that these are arbitrary distinctions, but they are made anyway, taking on lives of their own. I believe they are much the same world, except for the pervading influence of one flavor of monotheism or another. This thesis endeavors to study top-down, monotheistic conversions in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia and their respective mythologizations, preserved both textually and archaeologically, which serve as a primary factor for what we might call “state formation.” These narratives also function, in many cases, as the bases of many modern nationalisms, however haphazard they may be. I have attempted to apply this idea to Christian Rome (Byzantium)’s diachronic missionary policy around the Black Sea to reveal how what we today call the “Age of Migrations” (the so-called “Germanic” invasions of the Roman Empire), was actually in perpetual continuity all the way up to the Mongolian invasions and perhaps even later. In this way, I hope to enhance the context by which we understand the entirety of not only Western history, but to effectively bind it to a broader context of global monotheization.
Acknowledgements

Many must be recognized and thanked for their contributions. First, none of my time in Birmingham would have been possible without the constant, steadfast guidance, support and everlasting patience of my supervisor, Archie Dunn, from our first e-mails about the baptism of Vladimir in 2012, to finishing an MRes, to agreeing to supervise my PhD research, all the way through to end. Thank you Archie.

Correspondingly, I owe myriad thanks to Ruth Macrides, my advisor and mentor, who has constantly pushed and prodded me toward better writing and expression, who has guided my Greek reading, who has been continually patient through the many drafts of many articles with “Teutonic” footnotes, through rivers of reference letters, untold rounds of editing and imperfect images. Ευχαριστώ πολύ για όλα.

And a plethora of thanks to Mike Berry, of the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, who, for the past 3 years, has guided me through seas of Russian translations with persistence, serenity and how we first met – in serendipity. Гора благодарности.

Additionally, I thank Jonathan Shepard, Marek Jankowiak, Maria Vrij and Günter Prinzing for their professional advice and correspondence. Jonathan has made many recommendations, written many letters and answered many of my questions throughout this research. Marek has been vital to my research on comparative coinage and the movement of precious metals through 9-13th-c. Pontic-Caspian Eurasia. Maria, aside from facilitating many long hours in the UoB Barber coin room, has generously provided much needed guidance on 6-8th-c. Byzantine coinage. Finally, through personal correspondence since we met in Belgrade in the summer of 2016, Günter has offered his reference and a crucial framework in thinking about pre-modern Byzantine statehood.

Other correspondents must also be recognized for their contributions for everything from ethnicity and statehood, to archaeological typologies, to coin finds in Samosdelka. Many thanks to Evgenij Gončarov, Florin Curta, Anthony Kaldellis, Leonard Nedaškovskij, Nikita Khrapunov and Ian Wood for your personal communications (and many thanks for the Byzantine and Rus’ sigillography book, Nikita).

Equally, I owe many thanks to colleagues and friends in the Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies, who have stood by me through thick and thin. Thank you Francisco Lopez-Santos Kornberger, Lauren Wainwright, Christina Armoni and, re, Yannis Stamos.

Finally, none of this would have been possible without the eternal support, inspiration and encouragement (even from afar) of my parents, Deborah Mesibov and Richard Feldman, my grandparents, Hugh and Eudice Mesibov and Abraham and Annette Feldman, and my whole family – particularly my grandmothers Eudice and Annette, who offered me the first glimpse of the joys of scholarship and education. And for all her patience, strength, support and faith, I thank my partner and companion, Pilar Hernández Mateos.
A note on transcription and transliteration

When transcribing Greek and Russian names, ethnyonyms, posts and titles into English, I have opted to adhere to what are, in my opinion, the most accurate representational characters available in the Latin alphabet. Therefore, I have listed below the most common letters, in first the Greek and then the Cyrillic alphabets on the left and the corresponding Latin letters on the right, whose transcriptions are not directly self-evident and the equivalent transcriptions of which I will use frequently in this research.

<table>
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<tr>
<td>η ō</td>
<td>ш š</td>
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<td>υ y</td>
<td>щ šč</td>
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<tr>
<td>β ν</td>
<td>х kh</td>
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<td>χ ch</td>
<td>й j</td>
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Regarding the Cyrillic letters э and е, I have made no distinction between them and have largely treated them with the Latin letter e.

Byzantine, Khazar and Rus’ titles and posts such as πρῶτευον, στρατηγός, μητροπολίτης, el’teber, knjaz’ and khağan, I have rendered in italics to distinguish them as such to prevent them from being confused with both proper place names and personal names, which I have left in a normal font. The same goes for commonly used contemporaneous concepts such as the Byzantine oikoumenē or the Islamic ummah.
 Για τους παππούδες μου,

Por todos nuestros antepasados,

Для всех мертвых. Пусть они останутся мертвыми.
# Ethnicity and Statehood in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia (8-13th c.): Contributing to a Reassessment

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Chapter 1: A Proposition
Part 1 The Scope

*History – the product, not the raw material – is a bottle with a label. For many years now, the emphasis of historical discussion has been laid upon the label (its iconography, its target group of customers) and upon the interesting problems of manufacturing bottle-glass. The contents, on the other hand, are tasted in a knowing, perfunctory way and then spat out again. Only amateurs swallow them.*¹

Ch. 1: 1.1 A proposition for what?

This dissertation is about both the short-term and long-term consequences of monotheism in Eurasia; it is about globalizing terms such as “late antiquity” and “middle-ages,” which had previously only applied to “Western Civilization.” Such terms may be considered arbitrary periodizations, which I will critique more forcefully in subsequent chapters. More specifically, this dissertation is primarily concerned with the growth and development of monotheism in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia during so-called “late antiquity” and the “middle-ages.” Pontic-Caspian Eurasia may be conceived as encompassing the regions of forest, forest-steppe and steppe of Eastern Europe, the northern Black Sea and Caspian littorals, from the Lower Danube to the Western Carpathians to the Baltic; from the Northern Caucasus to the Lower Volga (and points east along the silk roads) to the Urals to the White Sea, is an admittedly ambiguous, vast and ambitious proposed territorial area for research. Nevertheless, the ambiguousness and the scale is precisely what make Pontic-Caspian Eurasia such a valuable object for study: the comparative value of the research, due to the scale of the periods and regions in question, make for exceptional overlapping “petri dishes” from which to study the development of monotheism, without beginning from preconceived teleological moulds.

I use the term “Pontic-Caspian Eurasia” as a conceptual label primarily to avoid reference to modern nations such as Ukraine, Belarus, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia or Kazakhstan. Hence, this dissertation does not seek to re-narrate the respective stories of the emergences of Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia or any other modern country (that has been done abundantly), each of which has supposed itself in some form or another corresponding to the “antique” and “medieval” periodizational paradigms. Instead, this dissertation seeks to view these stories backwards, involving the historical and archaeological

data garnered from the geographical territories of these aforementioned modern countries while simultaneously considering that the past can only ever be a province of the present (see chapter 7 below §2.1-2.4), despite any attempt to perceive history regardless of modern interpretation.

Since interpreting the past is a perpetual enterprise, many old interpretations linger on, having fermented into modern consensuses or conventions, which remain frequently unquestioned. Specifically, the story of how “antiquity” became “late antiquity” and then “the middle-ages,” often taken for granted by the very scholars whose task it is to deconstruct and defy such convention, endures either unchallenged or through partial revisions. Such is the standard fare for history courses in modern Western high schools and universities: continuing to employ intellectually valuable concepts and scholarly shorthands, yet which either have taken on lives of their own, or have proven to be applicable exclusively in the self-described “West.” For instance, one might ask where is the geographical line beyond which the difference between “late antiquity” and the “middle-ages” does not apply? The same may be said for concepts such as “tribe,” “ethnicity,” “nationality,” and “statehood” which, albeit frequently confronted, linger on confusedly, and often supposed as primordial in the imaginations of many. These are examples of modern conventions, (sometimes even taken for granted in modern scholarship), yet to be fully stripped from the 21st-c. consciousness, whose underpinnings still carry the vestiges of the awesome 20th c. This is not to contend that structural concepts such as “ethnicity” and “statehood” in historiography have no value; they do. However, I would still posit that such scholarly shorthand easily takes on a life of its own. Projecting our modern notions onto the past is a practice we historians and archaeologists are undoubtedly familiar with, yet the question remains: what new consensuses can satisfactorily replace the old? Since conventions can hardly be altogether forfeit, but rather replaced, I propose to make a new contribution to the debates of periodization, with particular regard to ethnicity and statehood in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, in which neither the respective emergences of the abovementioned countries, nor the differentiation of the “late antique” from the “medieval,” are taken for granted.

Though mired in problematized historiographical debate (typically in whether or not the “middle-ages” can be applicable beyond self-assigned “European” space), in this way, by de-mystifying the transition from the “antique” to the “medieval,” I endeavor to de-Westernize these concepts. Moreover, if it is not too ambitious, I will attempt to contribute to
the growing body of scholarship seeking to globalize such terminology as “late antiquity,” “middle-ages” (lead by Catherine Holmes and Naomi Standen, see chapter 7 below §2.1-2.4), possibly to even approach a more holistic definition of “civilization” itself.

Ch. 1: 1.1.1 Pontic-Caspian Eurasia: overlapping “petri dishes”

My research seeks to address these historiographical and periodizational challenges using the various case studies available in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia as overlapping “petri dishes” in which to identify, confront and contribute to such aforementioned historiographical and periodizational debates. By using the term “Pontic-Caspian Eurasia,” however, I must caution the reader that even though such an ambiguous term may necessarily be vast and perhaps slightly confusing, it does nevertheless prove useful as a territorial concept insofar as it proves simultaneously immense and yet exclusive. For example, Pontic-Caspian Eurasia may include case studies and intradisciplinary debates within fields hitherto termed as “Russology,” “Hungarology,” “Khazarology,” “Bulgarology” and “Caucasology.” Simultaneously, the term Pontic-Caspian Eurasia may, to varying extents, exclude “medieval” Western Europe depending on the context of the inquiry: insofar as medieval Western Europe is characterized by Latin Christianity, the contestation and eventual dwindling influence of Latin Christianity in various regions of Eastern Europe (except for the realms of the Árpád and Piast dynasties) and further east, throughout Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, during the 9-13th c. ensures the viability of the term as a structurally confined territorial concept. As I use the term, “Pontic-Caspian Eurasia” can also include the Pontic-Caspian steppe and the peoples who inhabited it for centuries, but it may also exclude the East Asian steppe, albeit, with the caveat that events which occurred in one area of the Pan-Eurasian steppe undoubtedly affected the opposite end of the Eurasian steppe – hence, the term as a territorial concept proves useful being necessarily large enough to transcend national, climatic and geographic boundaries, without being universal. Elsewhere, by using the term “Pontic-Caspian Eurasia,” I specifically do not delineate between the so-called “late antique” and “medieval” precisely because such terms cannot satisfactorily be ascribed in this area, as they typically carry the normative paradigms of “Roman” and “Post-Roman” Western European medievalist historiography. In this way, I believe, Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, as a territorial research topic, is particular enough to favorably lend itself to drawing specifically local conclusions, but simultaneously general enough to imply certain universally applicable factors in many previously ascribed “states” during this period. In this way, the term “Pontic-Caspian
Eurasia,” may lend itself especially well to challenging such notions of “late antiquity,” the “middle-ages,” and even “Europe” and “Asia.”

Continuing with challenging notional paradigms, I have also chosen this topic due to my training as a Byzantinist by academic discipline. Yet it hardly seems that such a rigid, modern notion of “discipline” easily applies to the era and area. Typically, a Russologist is distinct from a Byzantinist, although the eminent Birmingham Byzantinist Anthony Bryer is said to have declared that a premodern Russologist was actually a Byzantinist. Simultaneously, while a Medievalist’s field is altogether different from that of a Byzantinist, I might ask: where is the line? What defines the disciplinary parameters of the Byzantinist versus that of the Medievalist? If one can be a “Russologist,” can one be a “Hungarologist,” “Khazarologist” or “Bulgarologist” exclusively – perhaps even a “Caucasologist?” What about a “Medievalist” versus a “Classicist”? We know these epochal distinctions did not structurally exist in the contemporaneous sources by which we define them; instead, they are much more recent creations, and particularly have been applied as a Western yardstick, while historians and archaeologists frequently disagree on how such Western terms can apply beyond European space. For example, it is merely modern convention to view Augustine of Hippo as the bookend to the “classical canon,” while Chrysostomos for example, as I have been told, can be derisively dismissed as “Byzantine.”

If all of the abovementioned fields are so different, it would appear to me, in an era where academia rings with buzzwords like “multi-disciplinarity,” “collaborative research” and “contextualization,” that such abovementioned disciplinary distinctions require less distinction, not more, lest they might verge on anachronism at best, and perhaps irrelevance at worst. For example, academic departments frequently separate such fields; methodologies and research techniques differ and sources are approached with resulting modern inconsistensies (which is itself not necessarily an impediment). This is not to say that conventionally separate methodologies and research techniques, whether in Eastern Europe or in the West, whether within the purview of “Classicists,” “Medievalists,” “Byzantinists” or “Russologists” or of another neighboring discipline, ought to be discarded and forgotten. To be clear, I am not advocating a “good old common-sense” approach. But in order to avoid teleological interpretations of historical developments (see chapter 7 below §2.2-2.3), I do intend to transcend certain arbitrary methodological tendencies. For example, I intend to challenge both ethnicity and statehood together, as concepts which have long been overly
schematized. Similarly, I intend to challenge the conceptual tri-partite historical paradigm of “ancient-medieval-modern,” which various scholarly traditions, particularly in the West, have done, and have attempted to impose on non-Western traditions without necessarily defining what constitutes “the West.” The reason for addressing “ethnicity” and “statehood” together with respect to conventional periodization, is that jointly, I believe these concepts (beginning as scholarly shorthand), have taken on lives of their own, becoming excessively schematized and feeding off each other, ultimately rendering history as an easily reproducible teleological package, ready to be deployed to substantiate modern nation-states.

As an example of the generic, combined usages of “ethnicity” and “statehood” in many historiographies, let us consider the case of the “Ruritanian people” (to use the common placeholder ethnonym [after E. Gellner]). In this “easily reproducible teleological package,” the Ruritanians migrated, as an entire “ethnic” group, from their “ancient” homeland to their “medieval” homeland. There, they created a “medieval state” and converted to Christianity (or Islam in other cases) at some debatable, if stable moment in history. Archaeological finds, with their specific ethnic markings, of certain types of ceramics, arrowheads, ritual symbols and swords, confirm their ethnic attachment to their homeland. Ruritanian runes, attested epigraphically on ancient gravestones, indicate the continuity of the Ruritanian language. Their first national dynasty, the Parstids, conquered the surrounding populations and expanded the borders of the “medieval state.” They commissioned medieval historical works to glorify the nation (“ethnicity”), minted coins and seals to exhibit their ethnic exclusivity and cohesion, and their ethnically homogeneous descendants happily reside within their modern “state” to this day.

Undeniably, without historiographical foundations such as these, it would be impossible to continue the crucial work of earlier historians and archaeologists, wherever and whenever their respective specialties have followed. Therefore, it is my proposal in this dissertation to bind some of these erstwhile separate fields together by integrating various methods, techniques and sources, both textual and archaeological.

Ch. 1: 1.1.1.1 The proposal

My research proposes to reimagine the historical narratives and counter-narratives of 8-13th-c. Byzantine affairs in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia based on some specific paradigms which have hitherto been largely dismissed, overlooked or decontextualized by both Western and Soviet/post-Soviet scholarship. For example, while a number of earlier publications in
both English and Russian treat the proposed topic(s), those written in English, while often important or ground-breaking, already are somewhat outdated, narrow in scope, or frequently, unfamiliar with recent archaeological discoveries and literature, which is most usually in Russian. Conversely, studies in Russian often bear other inclinations, such as the usual problems of Soviet-era Marxist archaeological interpretations as well as issues in more recent scholarship, some of which has sought to adapt this portion of history to construct overtly national or ethnocentric narratives (for example, conceptions of “Ukrainian,” “Russian” or “Khazarian” historical statehoods: see chapter 7 below §2.1-2.4). This is not to entirely dismiss the achievements of these schools of thought, since a revision of the kind I hope to offer would not be possible without the services of extant historical narratives based on them, but the historiographical tendencies outlined above ought to serve as a commencement point of typical 19-20th-century scholarship.

Additionally, not only does this research seek to challenge the simple applicability of terms such as “ethnicity,” “pre-state” and “state” to groups hitherto labelled as Turkic, Rus’, Magyar, et al. in 8-13th-c. Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, but it also casts the same doubt on Byzantium itself: can we satisfactorily define Byzantium itself as a “state” in the modern sense – with geographic borders, absolute sovereignty and local “state organs?” What other sense is there for a term such as “state?” Was imperial sovereignty as absolute outside the capital as Constantinopolitan chroniclers have indicated? Similarly, can we veritably apply modern distinctions between “church” and “state” (or likewise, “ecclesiastical” versus “secular”) to 8-13th-c. Pontic-Caspian Eurasia? More recently, some scholars have begun to evoke more contemporaneous terms such as the Byzantine concept of “oikoumenē,” which instead of describing some kind of pre-modern “state,” rather describes the entirety of Christendom, which was, at least theoretically, subject to the Byzantine emperors and therefore within the empire. Such scholarly shorthand, as a replacement for older conventions such as “statehood,” offers far more in terms of understanding the past as it was conceived by contemporaries rather than imagined through modern anachronism. Therefore, I will also be addressing the varying usefulness of the concept of the oikoumenē, as opposed to Byzantine “statehood” in the coming chapters, which aim as much to focus on the past itself as our modern interpretations of it.

I begin with a set of underpinning thematic dichotomies, which most historians of the period would be familiar with, such as change and continuity, nomadism and sedentarism,
centrality and periphery, literacy and nonliteracy, and paganism versus monotheism. These schematic binaries, which I recognize can be easily and frequently overschematized and oversimplified, will be given greater discussion below in §2.2.3. Nevertheless, these factors will be employed to consistently question some prevalent modern assumptions about the transition from so-called “late antiquity” to the “early middle-ages.”

In this regard, one of the main concerns I address for this period is the concept of “statehood,” which is frequently projected as early as possible, with both historians and archaeologists alike making presumptions of primitive “statehood” which, I would argue, border on the anachronistic (see below chapter 6 §1.2 and §2.1.2). Similarly to assumptions of “statehood,” many scholars have sought to imagine various “ethnicities” as early as imaginable, while the very concept of ethnicity itself is often conflated with pagan tribalism (regularly called “primordial ethnicity”). Homogeneous linguistic continuity is often taken for granted, especially when applied post-hoc to archaeological typologies, resulting in what has often been termed “culture-history” (see below chapter 2 §1.2.2 and chapter 3 §1.1, §2.1-2.2, §3.2). For these two principal bedrocks of historical discourse, primordial ethnicity and statehood, in the following chapters, I will propose (and seek to prove) an alternative to such arbitrary assumptions of pre-monotheistic ethnicity and statehood, which can be summarized as shifting allegiance networks (which I will discuss in the following chapters), within which individual agents operated regardless of modern teleological conventions.

Again, it is not my purpose to re-narrate the stories of the respective emergences of Rus’, Bulgaria, Hungary, Khazaria or any other “proto-state.” Nor is it my intention to provide theories for the disappearance of some peoples, such as the Pečenegs, Cumans or Khazars. Instead, I aim to contextualize them all together in order to renegotiate our modern notions and applications of “ethnicity,” “statehood,” “monotheism,” “late antiquity,” the “migration period” and the “middle ages” itself. For example, can we truly distill Russian...
Hungarian identity down to essentialist linguistic homogeneity and contrive these respective labels as primordial ethnic permanencies as early as the 8–9th c. to the Magyars, Slavs or Scandinavians (as proposed, for example, by Kulakov, Mocja, Odnoroženko, Šelekhan’ and many others). Alternatively, can we truly assume that the “Migration-Period” ended at some stable, if debateable date in the 7-8th c. (as proposed by Curta, Izdebski and others), when we have myriad archaeological and textual data ascribing many more migrations in the Pontic-Caspian Eurasia continuing much later? Conversely, if “late antiquity” can be supposed to have ended and the “middle-ages” begun when various kingdoms and their rulers adopted Christianity, Latin or Orthodox, where does that leave those potentates who adopted Islam or Judaism? While many scholars are preoccupied with defining the characteristics of one “nation” or another, or the paramount changes within one pre-defined era or another (eg., “late-antique” vs. “early-medieval”), the continuities between various peoples and periods are very often overlooked (eg., “Slavs” vs. “Magyars”). In other words, attempts to establish the ethnicities and/or states (eg., of the ancient “Ukrainians”) and periodizations (eg., of “ancient Bulgaria” vs. “medieval Bulgaria”), as static instead of as processual phenomena, while once popular, have grown increasingly limited in scope as some historians and archaeologists, working in the confines of various schools of thought in both Eastern and Western Europe and America, have sought to narrow their fields of study or to disengage from such

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3 See for example the works of Fodor, 1982, In Search of a New Homeland: the Prehistory of the Hungarian People and the Conquest; and Róna-Tas, 1999, Hungarians and Europe in the Early Middle Ages: An Introduction to Early Hungarian History. For a slightly longer discussion of their material, see below n19 and for a more detailed discussion, see below chapter 4 §2.1.


5 Florin Curta (personal communication) affirmed “late antiquity” as being “already over by AD 800.” Others, arguing for climate change as the cause, define the “end of antiquity” in the mid-7th c., for example Izdebski, Pickett, Roberts and Waliszewski, 2015, “The Environmental, Archaeological and Historical Evidence for Regional Climatic Changes and Their Societal Impacts in the Eastern Mediterranean in Late Antiquity,” 1-20. For other literature in this regard, see below chapter 7 n76.
contentious topics (such as those who, for the sake of convenience, take the “ancient Russian state” for granted) altogether.⁶

Ultimately, the originality of this research must lie in utilizing such scholarship to renegotiate its narratives based on more recent archaeological finds and a re-contextualizing approach. While I seek to pursue a more holistic historical reconstruction of the transition of “late antiquity” to the so-called Byzantine Commonwealth of East-Europe and the forest-steppe in the four centuries preceding 1204 (see §2.1.1 below), it should be noted that I am not seeking to overturn the concept of the Byzantine Commonwealth. Instead, I seek to supplement it with further case studies, newer archaeological materials and perhaps more conceptually adaptable nuances.⁷ Broadly speaking, I will suggest that during the course of these centuries, a number of highly significant political, social and economic changes took place, which, in my hypothesis, spelled the waning of a much longer “migration period” than has been hitherto defined. By employing this comparative framework with which to chart the successes and failures of various “migration period” dynasties in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, I hope to recontextualize our understanding of modern nationalism – not as grounded in the so-called “ancient world” of Greece, Rome and Persia – but rather in the monotheized (perhaps even “medieval”) world of Orthodox and Latin Christianity, Sunni and Shi’a Islam, and Rabbinical and Karaite Judaism.

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⁶ See for example the discussion below of the different historiographical schools of thought on so-called “Ancient Russia” between Russia (pre-revolutionary, Soviet and post-Soviet), Western Europe and America below in chapter 6 §2.1.1.
⁷ See below §2.2.3.
2.1 Historiography

The present international scholarly bibliography regarding 8-13th-c. Byzantine affairs in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia is long, written in modern languages as diverse as the ancient sources to which they are bound. As these varied subfields, (“Bulgarology,” “Russology,” “Khazarology,” “Hungarology,” “Byzantology,” et al.), carry, occasionally self-admittedly, far-reaching implications for modern geopolitics, and the scholarship within them is duly scrutinized by those with both self-evident biases and agendas as well as those without. In each of these cases, scholars’ careers have been built and broken on the rocks of contemporary geopolitics, and unsurprisingly, their historiography reflects this fact. Facts are, however, notoriously fickle materials. Very often, the production of archaeological or textual evidence (eg., new translations of ancient texts or archaeological literature), is valued over developing the interpretations of such material. This is particularly true in the case of Khazaria, where the most widely respected scholars have seldom been able to disregard the ebb and flow of political trends, yet their work has been formative nevertheless.

2.1.1 Historiography of the Khazars

For example, there are Khazaria experts, self-appointed or otherwise, who argue that Judaism as a “state-religion” in Khazaria never even existed, spurring debates about whether or not the Khazarian khağans converted to Judaism in the first place. This agenda is particularly strong in light of the antisemitism of the Stalinist era in the USSR and even amidst modern Western white nationalism. This agenda has largely been a response to the well-known Ashkenazi-descent theory, popularized by Arthur Koestler (who, though a Jew himself, promoted the theory that modern Ashkenazim are descendant from “Turkic peoples”

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8 For a comprehensive discussion of source material, particularly in the first case, Khazaria, see appendix I.
9 Artamonov, 1962, 457-458. He is hardly the only scholar, Russian or otherwise, to harbor such a belief. For example, Novolsel’cev, 1987, “Хазария в системе международных отношений VII-IX веков,” 20-32, claimed that Judaism could hardly be a state religion or a “world religion,” since the idea of a “chosen people” hindered this aspiration as “Jews see other peoples as inferior.” Vachkova, 2008, “Danube Bulgaria and Khazaria as Parts of the Byzantine Oikoumene,” 353, has demonstrated not only the foolishness of such a remark, but the ubiquity of the belief (in their respective “chosenness”) among newly converted rulers and their respective subjects throughout the “middle ages.”
10 For instance, Kulik, 2004-2005, “The Earliest Evidence of the Jewish Presence in Western Rus’,” 14, has deemed the entire debate within scholarship as having an “extra-academic legacy.”
via Khazaria, which has subsequently been fully endorsed by various white supremacists), or to those who argue that Khazaria existed until the 13th-c. Mongol invasions, and perhaps exists to this day.

Among the early post-war leaders in Khazar studies is Douglas Dunlop, whose 1954 magnus opus, *The History of the Jewish Khazars*, demonstratively set the tone for subsequent

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11 Regarding Ashkenazi genetics and the so-called Khazar-descent theory, the work of Arthur Koestler, in his 1976 publication, *The Thirteenth Tribe*, presented the revolutionary theory (albeit not entirely original) that modern Ashkenazi Jewry, recently Yiddish-speaking, is according to him originally descended from the Jews of Khazaria as opposed to the traditional interpretation of their descent from original Hebrew populations of the Levant via Western Europe, which has been termed the Rhine Hypothesis (Elhaik, 2012, “The Missing Link of Jewish Ancestry: Contrasting the Rhineland and the Khazarian Hypothesis,” 61-74). See also Kriwaczek, 2005, *Yiddish Civilization: The Rise and Fall of a Forgotten Nation*, 46-51, who supports Koestler’s Khazar-Ashkenazi descent thesis as well. The implications for modern Israeli nationalism (read: Zionism – see for example Soteri, 1995, “Khazaria: a Forgotten Jewish Empire,” 10-12; and Ya’ari, 1995, “Skeletons in the Closet: Who’s Afraid of the Khazar Jewish Empire?” 29-30) are not difficult to envisage, though I do not plan to discuss the topic at length, as this has been extensively handled by Sand (cited below). In this regard, whether scholars agree with Koestler or not, he has nevertheless fundamentally and permanently transformed the field. Werbart, 2006, “The Invisible Identities: Cultural Identity and Archaeology,” 93, for example, describes his contribution as causing “much confusion in discussion on cultural history and religion.” After Koestler, Shlomo Sand, in his 2009 work, *The Invention of the Jewish People*, only served to push this theory forward. See for example p. 210-249. Likewise, the professional geneticist Eran Elhaik of the University of Sheffield has made a major contribution to this study in his work on what he terms Eastern European Jewish genetics as they relate to a possible Ashkenazi-Khazar descent theory, in which he supports the Khazar descent theory (cited above). Finally, the many works of Doron Behar et al. (Behar, et al., 2003, “Multiple Origins of Ashkenazi Levites: Y Chromosome Evidence for Both Near Eastern and European Ancestries,” 768-779; idem, et al., 2013, “No Evidence from Genome-Wide Data of a Khazar Origin for the Ashkenazi Jews,” 859-900; and Rootsi, Behar, et al., 2013, “Phylogenetic Applications of Whole Y-Chromosome Sequences and the Near Eastern Origin of Ashkenazi Levites,” 1-9) along with many others on Jewish genetics and the possible Ashkenazi-Khazar descent theory have both settled many problems and also brought to light many new ones in the field.

12 Some scholars deny Khazaria’s conversion to Judaism at all (e.g., Gil, 2011, “Did the Khazars Convert to Judaism?” 429-441; and Stampfer, 2013, “Did the Khazars Convert to Judaism?” 1-72), while others concede such a point yet deny the prevalence of Judaism amongst the ordinary people (e.g., Dunlop, 1954, *The History of the Jewish Khazars*). Other scholars have theorized that the conversion to Judaism completely altered the way in which Byzantium both wrought policy toward the northern Black Sea littoral but also domestic policy directed particularly toward Byzantine Jews (e.g., Shephard, 1998, “The Khazar’s Formal Adoption of Judaism and Byzantium’s Northern Policy.” 9-34). Khazaria’s effect on the peoples of Caucasus, the Volga, the Dniepr, the Magyars, the Bulgars, both of the Danube and the middle Volga, and of course the Rus’, have all been widely debated and breaking scholars’ careers along the way. Until now, most scholars have widely debated the precise period in which Khazaria converted to Judaism and to what extent the conversion altered its “society,” and consequently, the nature of Khazarian “society” itself. In this case, dates from 700 up to the 920s have been given for the conversion, and many theories have been forwarded, from claims that the event took place in one fell swoop all the way up to claims that the conversion happened in three distinct phases. Perhaps the most widely disputed theory is the Ashkenazi descent theory, which many scholars claim has been completely debunked and many others claim has not. In this debate, many take part, from white supremacists who argue that all Ashkenazi Jews are descended from Khazars, (although some of these “scholars” even dispute this theory also), all the way to some modern Israeli scholars, some of whom furiously deny such a theory, and curiously, some of whom unabashedly support it as well. Of course, the Ashkenazi descent theory is not the only controversial theory within Khazar studies, but there is precious little evidence to support it besides the heavily problematic work of Elhaik, which has been extensively debunked by Behar et al., (cited in the previous n11). Therefore, I will refrain from further comment on it and will focus henceforth on the other controversial aspects of Khazaria, the dating and extent of conversion to Judaism in Khazaria, in the subsequent chapter 2 below.
Western research in the field, and whose ideas and research, albeit subsequently surpassed in many issues, has also been fundamental reading for myself and many other young scholars. As Golden has observed: “Dunlop’s book has remained one of the fundamental works on the Khazars and can be considered the true beginning of modern Khazar studies.”

After Dunlop, the work of Dmitri Obolensky, as a scholar of early Russia, Byzantium and the Pontic-Caspian steppe has also been foundational, not only within his seminal 1971 work, *The Byzantine Commonwealth*, but in countless articles on many topics ranging from Byzantium and the Southern Slavs in the Balkans to Byzantium and the Danube, Crimea, early Rus’, all the way to the Transcaucasus region and of course, Khazaria.

Along with Obolensky, the most significant name in the field would need to be Jonathan Shepard, who, like Obolensky, is a scholar not just of Khazaria, but of the early Rus’, the Crimea and the Pontic-Caspian steppe. His works, far too numerous to comprehensively list here, have been as foundational for my research.

In addition to the significance of Shepard, by now however, perhaps the most widely reputed name in Khazar studies in the West is Peter Golden, whose list of publications is immense. His body of work frequently makes for a substantial impact on the bibliographies of other scholars who write concerning Khazaria. My own research in Khazaria, like most others, is largely guided by his ideas.

The next scholar is Boris Zhivkov, whose recent monograph has been almost as influential. My own views on Zhivkov’s 2015 monograph, *Khazaria in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries*, are, hopefully, clarified in my review of his work in *Byzantinosлавica* 74.

Then there are a number of other scholars, including Dan Shapira, James Howard-Johnston, David Wasserstein and of course the voluminous and indispensable works of

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Omeljan Pritsak, whose seminal edition and translation with Norman Golb, 1982, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century*, has been absolutely imperative for my research.

Next, Constantine Zuckerman is an outstanding scholar who addresses in his many publications on Byzantium, both early Rus’ and Khazaria around the Black Sea and whose ideas reverberate throughout the field.

Then, Marcus Erdal’s work on linguistics both in Khazaria itself and in the centuries after its dissolution have been ground-breaking and relatively unbiased as well, compared to the works of the linguist Paul Wexler, who, along with Shlomo Sand and Eran Elhaik, is a keen advocate of the so-called Ashkenazi-Khazar descent theory.

Finally, the numismatics and economics of Khazaria have been adroitly handled by Thomas Noonan and his far-sighted student Roman Kovalev, whose combined works are far too numerous to include here, but whose ideas about trade, borders and sovereignty have been of inestimable value.

The work of Russian scholars is every bit as indispensable as well. These include the work of Vladimir Petrukhin, whose ideas and numerous works on early Rus’ and Khazaria have been as practical as they have been concise and unbiased.


articles on Judaism in Khazaria have been invaluable. Additionally, Alexander Kulik’s articles on Khazaria, Judaism and their impacts on early Rus’ history have been much appreciated and refreshingly unbiased. An especially useful volume has been written by Anatolij Novosel’cev, whose ideas, though somewhat outdated by now, are still worth consideration.

Regarding Khazar archaeology, Mikhail Artamonov, whose publication, История Хазар, was as groundbreaking when it first appeared in 1962 as it was controversial among the leading scholars in the Soviet Stalinist period who either denied outright or diminished the Khazar presence on the lower Volga in response to Stalin’s preference for autochthonous historical development in his conception of Russian history. This is not to say that Artamonov’s ideas about Khazaria did not suffer from the same anti-Semitism common to most Soviet scholarship of the time; instead, he believed Judaism was precisely what destroyed Khazaria in the end. His work on Khazarian archaeology is nevertheless irreplaceable.

Artamonov’s student, Svetlana Pletneva’s voluminous research, spanning an impressive five decades in Khazar archaeology and history, is truly seminal. Today, her work is an indispensable guide for Khazar archaeology and it is rather unfortunate that much of it has not yet been translated into English. Similarly, the work of Gennadij Afanas’ev has been quite influential. However, I have found the work of Valentina and Valerij Flërov

to be among the best methodologically and interpretatively,29 which I will detail in the subsequent chapter 2 below.

Finally, Kevin Brook has not only assembled and published in 2006 an encyclopedic volume on essentially every issue and concern within the field (Brook, 2006, *The Jews of Khazaria*), he has also compiled what amounts to an online database storing and providing links to the works of a considerable range of researchers working on not only Khazar primary sources but also archaeology and genetics,30 which has proven quite helpful in this research, so thank you very much Mr. Brook.

Ch. 1: 2.1.2 Historiography of the Rus’

In the case of the archaeology and historiography of Kievan Rus’, undoubtedly itself a monument to the unpredictability of political winds,31 the scholars I have relied on most are just as varied as in the case of Khazaria. Like the Khazarian debates of Soviet scholarship, debates about the Rus’ have resulted in their own internal, often heated disputes. For example while the notorious Normanist debates have subsided (about whether or not ancient Russian were ethnically “Norman” or “Slavic”), other debates have arisen. For instance, some have sought to completely rewrite early Russian history and make sweeping changes to long-held beliefs therein essentially handed down from the *Russian Primary Chronicle* [hereafter, *PVL*],32 while most still consider Russian “statehood” as uninterrupted from the 9th c. until today.33 Though I cannot claim to list here an exhaustive compilation of all the

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30 Brook, 1991-present, *The American Center of Khazar Studies: A Resource for Turkic and Jewish History in Russia and Ukraine*: [www.khazaria.com](http://www.khazaria.com). I will note here, however, that Brook’s *American Center of Khazar Studies* website is a self-defining and self-publishing operation.


32 That is, the *Povest’ Vremennykh Let* (*Повесть Временных Лет*), or *The Tale of Bygone Years*, partially began to be written in the late 11th - early 12th c. at the very earliest. This has been translated into English by Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, 1953 as *The Russian Primary Chronicle*. I will hereafter refer to it as the *PVL*.

33 See below chapter 6 §2.1.
relevant literature on 9-13th-c. Kievan Rus’, I would refer the reader to a more detailed historiographical discussion given in chapter 6 below §2.1.1. For the present purposes, among the most prominent works I have consulted in this regard include many of the same authors as listed above for the discussion of Khazaria, due to considerable spatial and chronological overlaps.

Writing in Western languages, these include the abovementioned Obolensky, Zuckerman, Pritsak and Shepard, along with the Shepard’s 1996 joint work with the scholar Simon Franklin, *The Emergence of Rus: 750-1200*, who has a considerable bibliography in his own right. Many other authors must be listed in here, who hail from Anglo-American scholarship and continental schools of thought, whose ideas have been especially formative. They include the works of Walter Hanak, Christian Raffensperger, Francis Thomson, Andrzej Poppe and the edited volumes by Amnthony-Emil Tachiaos, and Yves Hamant. Other authors whose works, written in Western languages, on Kievan Rus’, which have been especially influential, include Antonio Carile, Volodymyr Mezentsev, David Miller, Paul Bushkovitch, Donald Ostrowski and Ellen Hurwitz.


37 Thomson, 1999, *The Reception of Byzantine Culture in Medieval Russia*.


In terms of archaeological literature, I have relied considerably on the edited volumes of Michel Kazanski and Vanessa Souplant (eds.), 2000a, *Les Sites archéologiques en Crimée et au Caucase durant l’Antiquité tardive et le haut Moyen-Âge*, and idem, Anne Nercissian and Constantine Zuckerman (eds.), 2000b, *Les centres proto-urbains russes entre Scandinavie, Byzance et Orient*, along with the works of Dolukhanov in the same volume. Pavel Dolukhanov’s own monograph, though I disagree with various points within it (see for example chapter 4 §3.2.1), has also been educational. Similarly, while still somewhat (though less so) intent on Russian statehood and ethnicity, the work of Serhii Plokhy has been equally valuable.

Though previously mentioned, the work of Obolensky, as a scholar of early Russia, Byzantium and the Pontic-Caspian steppe has also been foundational regarding Rus’. Concerning both Poppe and Obolensky together, whose combined works on the baptism of Vladimir in 987–989 CE has been cause for much controversy, I have offered my own contribution to their numerous conflicts, based on a broader study in my 2013 University of Birmingham MRes dissertation.

Within various subfields of Rus’ history and archaeology, for example, in studies of Rus’ law, numismatics and sigillography, I have relied on combining the works of both Western, and Soviet/post-Soviet scholars. For Rus’ canon law, I have depended particularly on Franklin, but also on George Weickhardt and Konstantin Solov’ev. For Rus’

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51 See for example Poppe, 1976, “The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus’: Byzantine-Russian Relations between 986-89,” 195-244; and Obolensky, 1989, “Cherson and the Conversion of Rus’: an Anti-Revisionist View,” 244-256.

52 Feldman, 2013, *The Historiographical and Archaeological Evidence of Autonomy and Rebellion in Cherson: a Defense of the Revisionist Analysis of Vladimir’s Baptism (987-989)*, and for an abridged version, see Feldman, 2015, “How and Why Vladimir Besieged Cherson: an Inquiry into the Latest Research on the Chronology of the Conversion of Vladimir, 987–989 CE,” 145-170. I would also like to point out the valuable research of Aleksandr Romenskij, 2013a, “*Когда пал Херсонес?*” к вопросу о ключевом моменте в хронологии русско-византийских отношений конца Х в.,” 310-328, whose ideas, though somewhat different from my own, have been equally valuable, as has his personal correspondence.

53 See n34 above. To a lesser extent, I have also consulted the works of Daniel Kaiser, 1980a, *The Growth of the Law in Medieval Russia*; idem, 1980b, “Reconsidering Crime and Punishment in Kievan Rus’,” 283-293; idem, 1991, “The Economy of Kievan Rus’: Evidence from the Pravda Rus’kaia,” 38-57; Ferdinand Feldbrugge,
numismatics, aside from the abovementioned works by Kovalev and Noonan, I have been influenced by the research of Vjačeslav Kulešov (especially regarding his 2016 article, “Средиземноморье, Балканы и Восточная Европа,” which I and Michael Berry of the Centre for Eastern European and Russian Studies at the University of Birmingham have translated at the recommendation of Jonathan Shepard – see appendix 2),56 Brita Malmer,57 Elena Pavlova,58 Valery Sedykh59 and most pertinently, Gajdukov and Kalinin.60 For Rus’ sigillography, a subfield which has recently seen an unfortunate influx of Ukrainian-Russian historiographical polemics, certain collections and edited volumes have been most prominent in my research, including the Сфрагістичний Щорічник vols. II-V, which, though my ability to read Ukrainian is severely lacking, the images and translated abstracts have guided me toward the most relevant articles. Elsewhere, Valerij Smolij, Gennadij Borjak, Oleksandr Šeremet’jev et al.’s 2013 edited volume, 1000 Years of Ukrainian Seal [sic] has been highly detailed and comprehensive, if somewhat Ukrainian-nationalist.61 Meanwhile, Glib Ivakin, Nikita Khrapunov and Werner Seibt’s 2015 edited volume, Byzantine and Rus’ Seals,62 has been remarkably devoid of such polemics and I am especially grateful to Nikita Khrapunov for his generous personal gift of the volume to me. Individually, I would like to recognize the works of Alf’orov,63 Androshchuk,64 Smyčkov,65 Sokolova,66 Bulgakova,67 Janin,68

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55 Solov’év, 1999, Властители и Судьи: Легитимация государственной власти в Древней и Средневековой Руси. IX – I половина XV в.
61 Smolij, Borjak, Šeremet’jev, et al. (eds.), 2013, 1000 Years of Ukrainian Seal.
63 Alf’orov, 2015, “A Seal of Michael, Archon and Doux of Mataracha and All Khazaria (in Oleksee Sheremetiev’s Collection),” 97-106; idem, 2012a, “Молівдовули київських князів другої половини XI - кінця XII століття (за матеріалами сфрагістичної колекції О. Шереметьєва),” 5-74; idem, 2012b, “Молівдовули Митрополита Михаїла (1130-1145 pp.),” 151-158; idem, 2012c, “Інсигнії влади на
transcribed from the Russian into English
period, other scholars writing in Russian must be recognized for their outstanding contributions, such as Soloviev, ŠČapov, Darkevič, Zimin, Frojanov, Kolčin, Litavin, and Ševčenko. By the early 1990s, with the collapse of the USSR, the roots of more recent trends in Russian-language historiography appeared, and have proliferated since – I have referenced below those authors I have found the most insightful, and I have left out those that I heavily disagree with for individual references in later chapters. One last reference I believe must be made, is to Aleksej Kungurov, whose 2014 work, Киевской Руси не было, или Что скрывают историки, ought to be recognized for his unsparring challenges of accepted Russian historiographical orthodoxies pertaining to Kievan Rus’ ethnicity and statehood. These qualities of some scholars to challenge accepted dogmas, instead of confining their research focuses to within the boundaries of pre-approved conceptual parameters (such as “late antiquity” or “Russian history”), both in the countries of

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78 Vernadsky (trans.), 1947, Medieval Russian Laws; idem, 1948, A History of Russia; idem, 1940-41, “Byzantium and Southern Russia,” 67-86; and his magnum opus, 1959, Киеvская Русь.
84 Kolčin, 1985, Древняя Русь: Город, замок, село.
post-Soviet Eastern Europe and in the West, respectively, has been a significant factor in the advancement of my own research trajectories.

Ch. 1: 2.1.3 Historiography of the Magyars, Pečenegs, Volga- and Danube-Bulgars

For these sub-specialties, I have deliberately refrained from separating the following preliminary bibliography because, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters, these fields and peoples frequently overlap to such an extent that it remains quite difficult to separate scholars’ own works into such categories. Nevertheless, there remain many in these subfields (e.g. “Hungarology,” “Bulgarology,” et al.), who seek to construct nation-based narrative history, nevertheless often finding difficulty separating these peoples beyond the sources themselves. For example, scholars, Hungarian or otherwise, have debated the mythology of the so-called 9-10th-c. Magyar “Conquest of Homeland” with regard to the imagined ethnicities of the native populations.88 Similar debates have raged about the theoretical “Bulgarian” roots of modern Tatarstan on the middle Volga, in which “Bulgarian-ness” is taken for granted as an assumed primordial ethnicity.89 Briefly, by the phrase “assumed primordial ethnicity,” I refer here to the common understanding of ethnicity as a “primordial” or permanent phenomenon, which is often meant to lend itself to teleological conceptions of nation histories, and continues to be prevalent in much Eastern European historiography.

Firstly, in the subfield of “Hungarology,” for instance, the work of István Fodor,90 whose encyclopedic work in 1996, The Ancient Hungarians: Exhibition Catalogue, has been instrumental as much for its archaeological thoroughness, as for its methodological conventions which have served as a model for what arbitrary assumptions of ethnicity to avoid. I also believe similar remarks may be made about András Róna-Tas,91 despite his otherwise rather thoughtful ideas pertaining to 9-10th-c. Khazaria. A somewhat less teleological body of scholarship has been contributed by András Pálóczi-Horváth, whose 1989 work, Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians is comparatively less rigid than many of his

88 See below chapter 4 §2.1.
89 See below chapter 4 §1.1.
contemporaries in regard to presumptions of ancient ethnicity and statehood. There is also
the American scholar Nora Berend, whose numerous works are as valuable to the field as
they are mostly devoid of such aforementioned conceptions of primordial ethnicity.\(^92\) While
much scholarship focuses on the Árpád dynasty more-or-less to the exclusion of whomever
may not be deemed primordially “Hungarian,”\(^93\) there are nevertheless many works which
have bridged these seemingly ethnic distinctions. For example, more recent scholarship has
taken note of linguistic connections between the Volga Bulgars and the Magyars,\(^94\) (and even
the connections between Volga- and Danube- Bulgars\(^95\)) with some even going so far as to
posit ethnic similarities between them,\(^96\) assuming language as affiliated with ethnicity.

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naissance d’une identité: Hongrie, Pologne et péninsule Ibérique au Moyen Âge,” 1009-1027; idem (ed.), 2003,
*Christianization and the Rise of Christian Monarchy: Scandinavia, Central Europe and Rus’,* c. 900-1200; and
in the same volume: idem, Laszlovszky and Szakács, 2003a, “The Kingdom of Hungary,” 319-368; and idem,

Pálufalvi and Ayton; Kosztolovik, 1979, “Magyar Beginnings in the Reports of Hungarian and Byzantine
Origin in Medieval Hungary: the Cultural Heritage of Pechenegs, Uzes, Cumans and the Jász,* by A. P.
Hungarian Historical Sources: VI-VII,* idem, 1953, *The Medieval Hungarian Historians: A Critical and

\(^94\) See for example Türk, 2012, “The New Archaeological Research Design for Early Hungarian History”; idem,
76-82; and idem, 1990, *Волжская Булгария: духовная культура (домонгольский период) 1-я - нач. XIII в.;;
Gagin, 2008, “Волжская Булгария: от посольства багдадского халифа до походов князя Святослава (Х в.),”
131-142. See also the response by Poddubnyj, 2006, “Историография. И. А. Гагин. Волжская булгария:
очерки истории средневековой дипломатии (Х - первая треть XIII в.)”, 168-170; Kazakov, 1991, *O
взаимодействии Волжских Булгар с тюркскими народами*, idem, 1992, *Культура ранней Волжской Булгарии. Этапы этнокультурной истории*; and idem, 1997,
“Волжская Булгария и финно-угорский мир,” 33-53.

\(^95\) Vladimirov, 2005, *Дунавска Булгария и Волжска България: формиране и промяна на културните модели
VII-XI в.*

\(^96\) For example, see Zimonyi, 1990, *The Origins of the Volga Bulgars*; idem, 2003, *Musulmán Források a
honfoglalás előtti magyarokról: a Guyhání-hagyomány magyar fejezete*; and idem, 2005, “The State of the
Volga Bulgaria has attracted its own considerable body of scholarship, usually designating these Bulgars as a separate “ancient ethnicity,”97 for example, from other Bulgars, found primarily on the lower Danube. Danube Bulgaria is studied in other works, whose authors typically, 98 though not exclusively, focus on variously deemed “Bulgarian” rulers (“Danube-Bulgaria,” i.e., Asparukh’s dynasty, the Kometopouloi, the Asenids, et al. – via studies of coins and seals99), as they interacted with steppe nomads such as Pečenegs,100 Magyars,101 Cumans,102 Byzantium103 and even “autochthonous” Romanians.104 Danube Bulgaria is also frequently interpreted as constituting a separate “ancient ethnicity.” However, few have yet sought to cast aside these presumptions of primordial ethnicity in this regard altogether.


101 See n93 above.


But one of the most prominent archaeologists advocating just such an approach is Florin Curta. Curta has been a major influence on my research, and at times his input has served as a lesson in what to emulate and at times in what to eschew. His works that I have employed, which are far too abundant to list all here, frequently have the quality of much other scholarly postmodernist scepticism and raise important critiques of arbitrary historical distinctions such as “Slavic ethnicity,” for example. Although it ought to be noted as well that other scholars, such as Niculescu, have duly questioned his methodological convictions, which are perhaps overstated somewhat. Nevertheless, though I thoroughly value it, I believe I am yet unqualified to offer a broad critique of Curta’s scholarship. That said, the work of Paul Stephenson, published in 2000, Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier, has been highly influential on my research. Stephenson’s book was my primary inspiration for this project and it is from his work that I derive much of my inquest of previous scholars’ assumptions of primordial ethnicity and statehood based exclusively on archaeological typologies and modern ethno-nationalist assumptions. Stephenson’s work, like Curta’s, even though they have their differences in scope and emphases, are conceptually quite similar in their challenging of accepted dogmas, such as focusing solely on self-imposed borders of Bulgaria, Serbia or Byzantium, or “late antiquity” and “the middle-ages.” This willingness to question notional boundaries, whether territorial (in the case of Stephenson) or conceptual (in the case of Curta) has occurred to me as a suitable point of departure for my own research.

Ch. 1: 2.2 Methodology

In applying such a decidedly non-national analysis to Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, particularly in the anachronistic cases of these imagined “proto-states,” (or to belabor the point, “proto-nations”), I am inclined to apply a broad, comparative analysis to these assumed “states” and “ethnicities.” Comparative analysis, (and the archetypal significance of scale it is predicated on), the primary methodological tool employed throughout this research, is meant to question notional ancient “ethnicity” and “statehood,” rather than to take them for

105 See Niculescu, 2011, “Culture-Historical Archaeology and the Production of Knowledge on Ethnic Phenomena,” 5-24; and Curta’s 2014 response: “‘An Hesitating Journey Through Foreign Knowledge’: Niculescu, the Ostrich, and Culture History,” 299-306. Personally, while I appreciate Niculescu’s unsparing approach, I do not find his arguments altogether convincing, as like Curta argues, by unequivocally rejecting all use of archaeological typologies, he seems to throw away the baby with the bathwater. Nevertheless, it ought to mentioned that I frequently disagree with much of what archaeological typologies are used for – as I have argued in subsequent chapters.

106 See also Stephenson, 2000b, “Byzantine Conceptions of Otherness after the Annexation of Bulgaria (1018),” 245-258.
granted in pursuit of a smaller-scaled project within such a context. That said, the devil is, as always, in the methodological, if proverbial, detail.

2.2.1 Textual methodology

When reading primary sources, whether hagiographies, provincial chronicles, imperial court histories, legal statutes and codes, ecclesiastical acts and records, or even personal missives, the reader frequently carries varying assumptions about the purposes and audiences of the authors and may duly view such sources through a range of lenses or theoretical platforms. For example, no shortage of scholars have read the early Rus’ law codes from a Marxist angle, or have viewed Anna Komnēnē’s *Alexiad* via a feminist perspective. It would be easy to dismiss such outlooks as anachronistic and arbitrary, since the authors, anonymous or not, could not have had access to such theoretical discourse as they have developed at present. But I would also argue that to dismiss all such lenses and instead to view the sources only by reference to the angles by and from which they were understood by their contemporaries risks losing the context in which they were originally conceived. Therefore, it seems that the question is not whether or not to have theoretical frameworks in mind while rereading the sources, but how much theory? To be clear, again, I am not advocating a minimalistic “common-sense” approach, since ultimately interpretation is just as important as fact. But I am advocating an approach where not all sources are viewed the same way. Certain sources must be read differently from others, not necessarily schematically, but broadly speaking, for instance, a so-called “barbarian history” is different from an imperial court history. For example, the foundational literature in peripheral centers of the *oikoumenē*, such as Kiev, Gnezdun or Esztergom, should be approached differently from the contemporary court histories in Constantinople. The authors of such chronicles, we must remind ourselves, had very different goals in writing their chronicles. And by extension, our own historical interpretations, it might be surmised, would have to take into account how these chronicles were conceived by contemporaries. Such an approach to texts might be called a “contemporaneous conception” approach.

A major proponent of this method would be Goffart, who separates 6–8th-c. histories based on “barbarians’ histories” as recounted by the likes of Jordanes, Gregory of Tours, Paul

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the Deacon, et al. He separates such sources from those written in the imperial court, since, as he argues, those who wrote such “barbarians’ histories” would have done and often did the same – writing primarily contemporary events, and I agree with him here. However, I diverge from his methodology, in that his “barbarians’ histories” range up to the early 9th c., or what he deems “the trough of the curve” between the fall of Rome and the rise of Christian Europe, or perhaps his notion of the confines of the “migration era.” Instead, I would argue that the same source interpretations may be made even later. For example, it seems to me that the first documents we have written from the perspective of the Arian Goths (Jordanes), Latin Franks (Gregory of Tours) and others, are eminently comparable to the first documents of the Jewish Khazars, Sunni Volga Bulgars, Latin Magyars and Orthodox Rus’ – respectively, the Khazar Correspondence and Schechter Text (Khazars), the Tārīkh-i-Bulghār (Volga Bulgars), the Gesta Hungarorum (Magyars), the Povest’ Vremennykh Let – hereafter PVL (Rus’). I would further suggest their relative comparability, due to the literary tropes and techniques they employ, (such as the glorification of the ruler credited with monotheization, an extravagant conversion story, frequent usage of biblical or Quranic parallelisms and other literary devices such as chiasmus), fulfill the same goal: instilling the new faith in the populace over which the ruler sought legitimacy. Similar claims may be made in the hagiographies specific to two of the cases above: Bishop Hartvic’s Life of St. Stephen and the monk Iakov’s Memorial and Encomion of Prince Vladimir (Память и Похвала).

However, these are certainly not the only relevant documents. Saintly hagiographies, histories, legal codes, clerical lists and epistles, ought to carry a slightly different weight, due to their contextual presence within far older literary traditions. In this, I contend that Islam constituted an alternative ecumenical mode of legitimacy to the Roman oikoumenē: wherever

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110 I will refer copiously to these documents in chapters 2 and 4 below.
the Roman imperial Orthodoxy sought to proselytize was equally fair game for the Sunni Caliphate: 9th-c. Khazaria being a case in point. Two documents, pertaining to the conversions of the abovementioned Khazar and Volga Bulgar rulers, may serve to make this clear when juxtaposed: the late 9th-c. *Vita Constantini* and the mid-10th-c. *diary of ibn Fadlān*. In the former case, the *Vita Constantini* (hereafter, VC) told the flattering (yet ultimately failing) story of the missionary, Constantine-Cyril (usually deemed the apostle to the Slavs) in his attempt to convert the Khazar Khağan in an ecclesiastical court debate usually dated to ca. 861 – which is also mentioned in the *Khazar Correspondence. Ibn Fadlān’s diary*, on the other hand, was written in the first person, telling the remarkably frank story of his meeting with the Volga Bulgar ruler, Almuş, who after considerable hassle and negotiating, agreed to convert to the Caliph’s form of Islam, usually dated to ca. 921. When compared to the abovementioned *Tārīkh-i-Bulghār*, many scholars have remarked on the more developed literary tradition to which ibn Fadlan was accustomed. His comments on Khazaria, to which Almuş’s conversion was due, reflected a more general Islamic attention to Khazaria, which many other contemporaneous Islamic authors were interested in – enough to offer far more extensive observations than their Christian counterparts – to the extent that Wasserstein argued that Khazaria could be placed within the purview of the Islamic world (usually deemed “ummah”).

Finally, the two imperial documents which I will be dealing with most in depth in the coming chapters, the mid-10th-c. *De Administrando Imperio* (hereafter, DAI), written by the emperor Constantine VII himself, and the many iterations of the *Notitiae Episcopatum* (hereafter, NE), are especially essential for this research due to their seemingly intractable interpretations by much modern scholarship in taking primordial ethnicity and statehood for

114 See chapter 2 below, *passim.*
117 For a more extensive discussion of Islamic and Christian sources pertaining to Khazaria, see Appendix 1 below.
granted. For example, Constantine VII’s ubiquitous usage of the Greek term ἔθνη in the DAI, from which the word “ethnicity” originates, has been taken for granted by generations of scholars, keen to trace Hungarian, Slovakian, Croatian, Serbian, Ukrainian or Russian (and others’) ethnicities as far into the past as possible. However, Constantine’s own concept of ethnicity was hardly consistent not only in the DAI, but in others works of his, such as his De Thematibus, Vita Basilii or his De Ceremoniis. Elsewhere, the NE provides an expedient foil for countless scholars’ arbitrary assumptions that Russian independent statehood can be traced as far back as the late-10th-c. conversion of Vladimir. For instance, the 11-12th-c. versions of the NE record the metropolitanate of Rus’ as within the confines of the imperial oikoumenē, alongside other metropolitanates such as those in contemporaneous Anatolia or the Balkans. If, in the eyes of the patriarchate (the NE), “Russia” was just as much a part of the empire as was the conventionally imagined empire in Greece and Anatolia, then where does that leave modern assumptions of Russian “statehood?” Alternatively, how can such readings of sources nuance our modern understandings of historical “sovereignty?”

I attempt to answer these questions and others in the chapters below, but in order to renegotiate the history of the time and place, we cannot continue to read the sources, as conventionally done, in light of modern national histories, instead of reading them in the light of their own contemporaneous worldviews. In short, the comparative analysis of the sources, as outlined above, should serve to cast doubt on conventional habits of taking primordial ethnicity and independent statehood for granted.

Ch. 1: 2.2.2 Archaeological methodology

To address the above-mentioned themes of ancient/medieval ethnicity and statehood using specific archaeological evidence, I focus on the use and misuse of archaeological typologies, detailed in recent works on the middle Byzantine northern Balkans. The interpretation of archaeological typologies comes across in settlement-archaeology and funerary assemblages throughout Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, especially pertaining to the

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119 See chapter 5 below §2.1.
120 See chapter 6 below §2.1.2.
122 I refer to many of the works cited above §2.1.1-2.1.3, with particular regard to Curta’s methodologies, whose nuances I agree with, although his use of archaeological typologies I would be cautious about stretching far enough to make conclusions about ancient/medieval ethnicity and statehood.
plentiful Russian literature on the gorodišče (hillfort). Similarly, clusters of hillforts on waterways throughout the steppe are sometimes assumed as “borders” between imagined “ethnic” groups and/or “states” such as Rus’, Khazaria or Volga Bulgaria, while such settlement archaeology does not necessarily suggest the abstract notion of “borders,” but if anything, it suggests a gradual sedentarization process within the steppe environment.

In terms of ethnicity itself, some scholars’ use of certain burial assemblages, typically in the context of kurgans (burial mounds), as an automatic confirmation of ethnic status, is frequently oversimplified. Some of the most prevalent features of steppe archaeology are kurgan studies, or the study of burial mounds on the Pontic-Caspian Eurasian steppe, which can involve burials dating from the 18th century CE all the way back to the remotest antiquity. However, I believe it becomes problematic when kurgan burials are assigned anachronistic ethnic status. For example, it has been observed that Khazarian-dated kurgans frequently contained those who may otherwise be considered Pečenegs. Elsewhere, the archaeological culture known as the “Saltovo-Majacki” culture (SMC) could be categorically labelled as Khazarian (see chapter 2 below §1.2). Nevertheless, many archaeologists studying kurgans maintain that despite the difficulties of identifying a tribal group based solely on a kurgan, identification is actually possible, especially due to the manner of

123 See primarily the works of Kazanski et al. cited above §2.1.2).
124 See the archaeological reports of the Center for the Study of Eurasian Nomads: “2002 Fieldwork Excavation Report: Khazar Times Fortress Golden Hills (Zolotyiye Gorki)”; and 2004b, “Golden Hills 2004 Excavation Report”; as well as Petrukhin, 2013, “Sacral Kingship and the Judaism of the Khazars,” 292. While the precise reason for the constructions of these fortifications is generally agreed on by most archaeologists to have been for the protection of Khazaria’s northern frontier, the question of the protection from whom is still debated. While many archaeologists and historians have assumed the invaders to have been the Rus’, some, such as Schorkowitz, Petrukhin, Afanas’ev, Tortika and Zhivkov assume that they were built for protection against the Magyars as well. See for example Schorkowitz, 2012, “Cultural Contact and Cultural Transfer in Medieval Western Eurasia,” 85; Petrukhin, 2013, 295; Afanas’ev, 2001, “Где же археологические свидетельства существования хазарского государства,” 43-55; Tortika, 2006, Северо-Западная Хазария в контексте истории Восточной Европы (вторая половина VII—третья четверть X вв.), 90; and Zhivkov, 2015, 201 and 233. See also Franklin and Shepard, 1996, The Emergence of Rus, 81; Koval ev, 2005а, 222; Romašov, 2002-3, “Историческая география Хазарского каганата (V-XIII вв.),” 81-84; Stepnov, 2005, Булгарите и степната империя през Ранното средновековие: Проблеми за Другите, 9-10.
interment of the accompanying horse with the body of the deceased human. Ultimately, however, we cannot ask the deceased themselves if they identified as one ethnicity or another.

Ch. 1: 2.2.2.1 Numismatic and sigillographic methodologies

Numismatics and sigillography, together, form a completely distinct unit of analysis in this research. Although their methods for examination are quite distinct even from each other, because both fields address similar metallic objects found far from their original provenances (gold/silver/base-metal coins and lead seals), they nevertheless comprise a common analytic trajectory, in that both fields can be utilized to examine the basis for previous assumptions of “ethnicity” and “statehood” throughout the Byzantine oikoumenē.

Numismatics, as an isolated field of inquiry, constitutes a major portion of my research. Broadly speaking, the study of coinage, as an individual discipline, can fulfill many different roles and inform on many different inquiries. Two primary modes for employing numismatic research are engaged in my research, the first, being how the developments and contrasts on the coins themselves inform scholars how various rulers and dynasties legitimized their respective rules. This method, considering the propagandistic usage of coins, has been particularly deployed in chapter 3. For example, coins of the local dynasties of the 10-12th-c. Christian oikoumenē, conventionally deemed as the early rulers of “Poland,” “Hungary” and “Russia” can be used to demonstrate how much they actually had in common rather than how they were different – in comparison with the local ruling dynasties of the contemporaneous Islamic ummah, such as the Ţâhirids, Šaffârids and Sâmânîds, which have no corresponding modern state.

The other primary mode of employing coins for research their places of discovery, in what quantities and in what denominations – for example, gold, silver or base metal coins. Such a method, usually measured in terms of single-finds and in coin-hoards, due to the coins’ nature of being easily datable vis-à-vis the depicted ruler, can inform on circulation models and can even, eventually, be used to reconstruct entire economies. This is especially helpful

when exploring tribute and taxation in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, which the aforementioned Noonan and Kovalev have measured – as 9-11\textsuperscript{th}-c. Islamic and Christian silver coinage from many regions flowed consistently northward toward Scandinavia.\footnote{I refer principally to the works of Haldon, 1993, \textit{The State and the Tributary Mode of Production}; Stoljarik, 1992, \textit{Essays on Monetary Circulation in the North-Western Black Sea Region in the Late Roman and Byzantine Periods: Late 3\textsuperscript{rd} Century-Early 13\textsuperscript{th} Century AD}; Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 3-151; Pritsak, 1998, \textit{The Origins of the Old Rus’ Weights and Monetary Systems: Two Studies in Western Eurasian Metrology and Numismatics in the Seventh to Eleventh Centuries}; Zuckerman, 2006, “Byzantium’s Pontic Policy in the Notitia Episcopatum,” 201-230; idem, 1997, “Two Notes on the Early History of the theme of Cherson,” 210-222; idem, 2000, “Deux étapes de la formation de l’ancien État russe;” 95-120; Kovalev, 2004, “What does Historical Numismatics Suggest about the Monetary History of Khazaria in the Ninth Century?—Question Revisited,” 97-129; idem, 2005a, “Creating Khazar Identity through Coins: the Special Issue Dirhams of 837/8,” 220-252; idem, 2005b, “Commerce and Caravan Routes along the Northern Silk Road (Sixth-Ninth Centuries), Part 1: the Western Sector,” 55-105; idem, 2002, “Dirham Mint Output of Sāmānid Samarqand and its Connection to the Beginnings of Trade with Northern Europe (10th century),” 197-216; idem, 2016, “What Do ‘Official’ Volga Bulğär Coins Suggest about the Political History of the Middle Volga Region during the Second Half of the 10\textsuperscript{th} Century,” 193-207; Jankowiak, 2013, “Two Systems of Trade in the Western Slavic Lands in the 10\textsuperscript{th} Century,” 137-148; idem, 2016, “The Volga Bulgar Imitative Coinage,” and finally, the famous work of the great Thomas Noonan, whose litany of works I have consulted, but which are too long to list here. Nevertheless, Noonan and subsequently Kovalev’s works on Khazar, Rus’ and Volga Bulgarian coinage and economics have proven not only vital to the field but to the very issue of the chronology and causes of the conversion of each so-called “polity.”} The question that some scholars have attempted to answer is whether this was due to the Khazars, to the Rus’, to both or to neither. I offer my own interpretations in chapters 2-4 below. In this regard, coin finds which have long been used to justify interpretations of Rus’ “state” power can also be used to question assumptions of “statehood” when juxtaposed, for example, with the well-known Rus’ “coinless period” during the 12-14\textsuperscript{th} c.\footnote{See below chapter 3 \textsection 1.2.1.2.} In the same vein, 10-11\textsuperscript{th}-c. Byzantine and Islamic coin finds both within and without what is normally considered as the “Rus’ territory” do not necessarily correspond to such assumptions of “Rus’ territoriality,” meaning that often, some scholars’ references to a generalized notion of “Rus’ state territory” can be anachronistic.\footnote{See the broad discussion given below in chapter 6 \textsection 2.1.2.} Instead, referring to Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, as a broad area of competing allegiance networks, including both the Rus’ and Khazar “khağans,” is frequently more helpful than making anachronistic assumptions of so-called “state-territories.”

A final class of evidence exists which is every bit as significant as numismatics: sigillography. Sigillography, or the study of seals, is particularly pertinent to the development of monotheism in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, since, as practiced in the Orthodox world, the Byzantine propensity to authorize most official correspondence via small lead seals containing names, titles and patron saints, constitutes a world of small artifacts ripe for
exploration. When compiled together, the researcher can reconstruct whole prosopographic networks, peripheral autonomies, ecclesiastical communications and local loyalties, particularly in this trans-Black Sea cultural context. In this regard, I utilize such publications of seals to demonstrate the utmost importance of personal, ecclesiastical and kinship networks across the expanding Orthodox world, as opposed to arbitrary


presumptions of Russian, Bulgarian or Hungarian “statehood,” “ethnicity” and/or “sovereignty.” More precisely, I argue that frequently, information about seals’ owners and inferences about their addressees, which express family names, titles, offices and appeals to various saints, are applicable not so much in terms of “state” or “ethnicity,” but in terms of the ever-changing complexes of loyalty and allegiance networks throughout the Byzantine world.\[^{132}\]

Ch. 1: 2.2.3 Thematic framework

In the broad course of this study of renegotiating ethnicity and statehood in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia in the so-called “late antique” or “medieval” period, I will be guided by a set of particular conceptual themes which I believe have the greatest bearing on the study of the transition from the “migration period” to the “middle-ages.” These themes should primarily reflect the conversions, settlements and growths of not only Khazaria, but of many, if not most, emergent “polities” at the time of their initial consolidation up to their varying unification. Yet effectively, I will also seek to demonstrate that not all were unified in the context of adopting one brand of monotheism or another. These themes can broadly correspond to the following binary poles, although if I may be exactingly explicit, this is certainly not to assume a lack of grey areas between respective poles. They are change and continuity, paganism and monotheism, non-literacy and literacy, nomadism and

\[^{132}\text{See the broader discussions below in chapters 4 §3.1.2 and chapter 6 §1.2 and §2.1.2.}\]
sedentarization, centers and peripheries and finally, consolidation and unification. These schematic and thematic arch-binaries will each be discussed in greater depth below.

Here, I believe it would also be appropriate to introduce the German word for what we refer to in English as the “migration period,” “die völkerwanderungszeit.” Traditionally, die völkerwanderungszeit has described a migration period understood as ending specifically either in the late 5th-early 6th century or up to the establishment of Francia and the Holy Roman Empire under the Carolingian dynasty. Such a narrow conception of the “migration period” hardly suffices as it fails to incorporate later Eurasian migrations as well as. I may suggest that the term Völkerwanderungszeit can easily apply to such a period in continuance up to the what we now term “the high middle ages” for other peoples further east in the Eurasian landmass such as the Avars, Slavs, Bulgars, Magyars, Rus’, Cumans, Pečenegs and Khazars. Therefore, in my usage, I aim to apply such a notion for a far longer period, and to use it to characterize later migrations further east. Perhaps it can also apply for later migratory peoples such as the Mongols and even later: a topic to which I will return in chapter 7 §2.1.2. Nevertheless, the unifying factor of such emergent peoples thus would be their respective völkerwanderungszeiten, and their respective adoptions (or rejections) of some form of monotheism, regardless of what form their monotheism.

To explain this methodology by presently addressing the themes which will be threading through the study as a whole, the ensuing research will involve some new vocabulary for characterizing and defining the settlement and conversion patterns of nomadic tribes. Contextualized together, these patterns may be able to model what may call the very beginnings of rule by law, or consequently perhaps, “statecraft.” The thematic terms I will either introduce or borrow are literization, historization, sedentarization, centralization, monotheization and the word that most likely, in my view, provides the blueprint for all of these concepts is the “potestarity formation” of statehood, to which myriad Russian historians and sociologists refer. While the word is used in different contexts in Russian academia (see below chapter 7 §2.1.2), I believe the word “potestarity,” as I express it in English, ought to signify essentially a top-down conversion in which a ruler converts to some monotheism and then proceeds to convert his subjects, voluntarily or otherwise.133 This will effectually encompass all the themes I have previously and will presently address, beginning with the

133 For more literature on “potestarian” formations, see below chapter 4, passim and specifically chapter 7 §2.1.2.
first and most crucial to any study of historical events, the theme of the contrast and contradistinction between change and continuity.

Ch. 1: 2.2.3.1 Change and continuity

I will argue that the first and most important thematic template in the study of not only Khazarian history but the Eurasian steppe at large (and perhaps much of history in general) is the fundamental understanding of the interplay between the course of change and continuity within a given society in general and, in this case, within Khazaria and Rus’ in particular. The aim of the present study in this regard is to chart the endemic social, political and economic aspects of Khazaria and other early polities in comparison, as they either transform, disintegrate or endure relating to their respective circumstances. In a few words, and with an eye to avoiding teleological explanations, what circumstances did (for example) Khazaria and Rus’ share and in what did they differ? The paramount concern in this regard is to present the narrative of conversion in terms of processes vs. continuities as a given culture is constantly undergoing transformation and reassessment, and this will thereby provide the context which this entire study is striving for. In the investigation to follow, I will be focused not so much on attempting to explain how these so-called “states” evolved individually, but on comparing the changes and continuities of their respective circumstances.

Ch. 1: 2.2.3.2 Paganism and monotheism

In introducing a brief discussion on the general tendency of various rulers in 8-13th c. Pontic-Caspian Eurasia to discard indigenous polytheistic adherence (read: a broad reference to what may haphazardly be termed “paganism”) and to adopt one monotheistic faith or another,134 I propose to use the word “monotheism.” At first, the term “monotheism” might appear sensible given its sole existence as a noun. However, I plan to extrapolate a verb; ergo, in discussing the wide phenomenon of monotheizing among these rulers during this period and in this broad area, I will therefore speak of “monotheization,” much in the same vein that historians and theologians read the adoption of Christianity in Christianizing (Christianization), Judaism in Judaizing (Judaization) and Islam in Islamizing (Islamization).

In doing so, I will be describing not only the effect of a given monotheism’s adoption by a ruler on himself and his dynasty, but also, on his capital city (stronghold), and most

crucially, his subjects, or rather, whosoever pays tribute to him. In general, while monotheisms were practiced and adopted differently in Danube Bulgaria, Hungary, Volga Bulgaria, Khazaria, Rus’ and elsewhere, there are nevertheless undeniable similarities between each case, in which the monotheization of the ruler crystallizes his subjects into the beginnings of what we may perhaps call a “society.” Although in truth, the course of this event in each respective case presaged different developments in each polity as the ruling religion was imposed differently and with varying levels of tolerance for other religions on each respective set of disparate subjected tribes. For example, by presenting the Khazar conversion to Judaism as an initial case study specifically, the object is to maintain the conversion in its original context of the Pontic-Caspian steppe without imposing modern teleology, and endeavoring to incorporate the event into a grander religio-historical schematic narrative such as we inherit from Judah HaLevi for example. A major difference in this case, would be that Khazaria disintegrated, with its Judaism disappearing, while the Rus’, through coerced, top-down conversion of subjects, ultimately maintained its Orthodox Christianity, as other groups sustained their respective monotheisms, such as the Volga Bulgars (Sunni Islam), Magyars (Latin Christianity) et al. In this way, Khazaria serves almost as an exception to the rule, due to its failure to top-down coercively convert its subjects.

Ch. 1: 2.2.3.3 Non-literacy to literacy

In imposing (or refraining from imposing) a given monotheism on a set of disparate subjected tribes, I am assuming the central, though certainly not the only distinction between indigenous paganism and the imported monotheism (ie., the systemic, written faith, not its process of imposition) to be a fundamental codification of scriptural revelation and

135 For example, many scholars such as Pletněva, Novosel’cev, Artamonov and others have argued that Judaization was the ultimate reason for the disintegration of Khazaria, while Orthodox Christianity was the reason for the survival of Russia. See below chapter 2 §1.2.1.2.
accompanying commented jurisprudential and literary traditions, be they in Greek, Latin, Arabic or Hebrew.\textsuperscript{137}

However, this is not to assume that native rulers and peoples in this region lacked all trappings of literacy. As epigraphic evidence of basic, pre-monotheistic writing exists, such as the famous Runic alphabet and some inscribed steppe stelae (such as the mid-8\textsuperscript{th}-c. Terkhin inscription, found in 1957 in northern Mongolia\textsuperscript{138}), to assume a fundamental lack of pre-monotheistic writing in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia would be absurd. Instead, I would prefer to draw a distinction between the abovementioned literary traditions such as “Nordic,” “Slavic” or “Turkic” rune-writing\textsuperscript{139} (while avoiding arbitrary assumptions of primordial ethnicity), and other traditions which may be described as either illiterate or non-literate. Accordingly, the term illiteracy may be used to roughly describe a facet of a given community or population which is mostly illiterate, despite the seemingly literate remainder, or elite, of the said people, for example, the 10\textsuperscript{th}-c. Khazarian Hebrew writing traditions\textsuperscript{140} or the 11-12\textsuperscript{th}-c. Rus’ Cyrillic birchbark writing traditions.\textsuperscript{141} Contrarily, the term non-literacy may be used to describe an entire community or population, which has little or no access to writing in general, perhaps including those who may be termed an “elite” by internal standards. In other words, illiteracy refers to some literacy, albeit mostly illiteracy, while nonliteracy refers to overall negligible literacy. By these definitions and clarifications, I hope to simultaneously contend with all manner of indigenous writing traditions, or the lack thereof, without resorting to modern teleological assumptions of literacy or otherwise. In

\textsuperscript{137} Notably, Golden, 2007b, “The Conversion of the Khazars to Judaism,” 160, remarks that scripts may constitute “cultural paraphernalia” associated with the spread of religions. See also Butler, 1995, “The Representation of Oral Culture in the Vita Constantini,” 367-384 for a lengthy, if somewhat tangential, discussion of the distinctions between literacy and non-literacy among polytheistic and monotheistic cultures. He argues (p. 368) that the depiction of the Khazar within the \textit{Vita Constantini} is “intended to be perceived as a representative of a pagan oral culture.”

\textsuperscript{138} I will not go into tremendous detail on the Terkhin inscription, but it has been discussed extensively elsewhere – as it possibly, if tangentially, relates to early the Khazars. See Appendix I §A1.1.1. Briefly, however, the Terkhin inscription refers to a stele found in northern Mongolia inscribed in the Old Uyğur script, describing the exploits of a Uyğur ruler.

\textsuperscript{139} For example, some interpretations of pre-monotheistic rune-writing have been to extrapolate some kind of primordial ethnicity, which has characterized Nazi archaeology, and is still practiced in various areas of Hungarian archaeology – see for example Maxwell, 2004, “Contemporary Hungarian Rune-Writing: Ideological Linguistic Nationalism within a Homogenous Nation,” 161-175. I would refer the reader to Beckwith, 2009, \textit{Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present}, 165-166, who refrains from making an arbitrary distinction between these groups when he writes: “the Scandinavian peoples still largely belonged to the Central Eurasian Culture Complex and constituted the northwesternmost outlier of it.” See also chapter 7 below §2.2 and fig. 1.

\textsuperscript{140} See chapter 2 below, \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{141} Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 282-283.
short, this study endeavors to engage with the material on its own terms without resorting to modern compulsions and presumptions.\footnote{See for example the discussion on modern, nationalist assumptions of premodern literacy given by Gellner, 1994, “Nationalism and Modernization,” 55-63.}

This in turn, in conjunction with the new term \textit{monotheization}, invites some other new terms such as “literization” and “historization.” In using the term “literization,” I will be referring to the process by which a given ruler, in adopting a given monotheism, adopts the said monotheism’s chosen alphabet, literary and jurisprudential tradition, which perhaps filters down to other members of the said ruler’s retinue and perhaps into a notional “community.”\footnote{A major scholarly proponent for the concept of pre-modern “literization,” albeit in an entirely different time and place has been Sheldon Pollock, 2006, \textit{The Language of the Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture, and Power in Premodern India}, 23-25.} For instance, there is no doubt that the dynasty of Joseph, the mid-10\textsuperscript{th}-c. Khazar kha\v{g}an, adopted Hebrew as its preferred script for correspondence, even if there is yet no indication that Halakhic law was preserved in Hebrew script as well. Nevertheless, the result of monotheization may (though not always) have facilitated a generalized “literization” of a community based on the common monotheism, and its corresponding literary, jurisprudential and historical tradition(s). In other words, the adoption of a given monotheism brings along an accumulated literary tradition, including written law and a linear timeline, or a concept of history, eg. pertaining to the sacred biblical or Quranic traditions.

This adoption of a historical, linear timeline, or perhaps a sacred chronology, may be termed “historization.”\footnote{The process of the “historization” of literary traditions within a premodern literary community is admittedly a less well-known concept, but it has been referenced in some recent research with regard to modern conceptions of “medieval Europe.” See for example Gnehm, 2014, “The Gaze of ’Historicity’ in Schongauer and Dürer,” 195-228; Teschke, 1998, “Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and Theory,” 325-358; and the volume edited by Vymětalová and Jirásek, 2014, \textit{Historisation of Central Europe}.} It is especially pertinent to early writing traditions mentioned above, such as the earliest Rus’, Volga Bulgarian or Hungarian chronicles, as well as Khazarian and other sources, which acknowledge older chronologies such as those found in the Old or New Testaments, while simultaneously narrating their own dynasties’ exploits as an addition to the earlier histories. In effect, these Abrahamic faiths could act as sources of parallel fragments by which the past could be comprehended and expanded. In the case of Christianity, we find this apparent throughout the narrative of the \textit{PVL} for example mentioned above. In the case of Islam, Islamizing rulers, in adopting a rudimentary form of Islam, (such as Almu\v{s} attested to in ibn Fadlân’s \textit{diary}, ca. 921-922), inevitably initiate the
same process, eg., the abovementioned Volga Bulgarian Tārīkh-i-Bulghār. In the case of Judaism, this clearly led to the eventual adoption of the timeline in the Torah, given the attestation to the sacred chronology of the Torah in the mid-10th-c. Khazarian Schechter Text. In varying socio-cultural contexts, I will refer to such a process, the adoption of a pre-existent historical sacred chronologies encompassed within a given monotheism’s sacred text or accompanying texts and literary or jurisprudential traditions, as “historization.” That is not to say that such expanded historization is to be believed at face value; and modern highly skeptical interpretations of the PVL or the Gesta Hungarorum, for example, provide a perfectly sound precedent for this point. But nevertheless the dual processes and adoptions of historization and literization may be significant messages in their own rights, from the contemporaneous literate to posterity.

Ch. 1: 2.2.3.4 From nomadism to sedentarization

Alongside these previous and somewhat parallel processes of literization and monotheization, I will discuss another process which I will argue is not exactly parallel with literization and monotheization, and in fact this process contains far more nuance and shades of grey between its two poles: sedentary and nomadic lifestyles. These two apparently simple terms hardly account for the vast and variegated lifestyles in between, such as varying forms of pastoralism, hunting and fishing, initial semi-nomadism and semi-sedentarism, and this is not to speak of the varying climatic and geographical zones between the northern Eurasian forests and steppe zones where all these lifestyles were practiced. Archaeologists have found that variant lifestyles of both nomadism and sedentarism were practiced nearly simultaneously. As Batty has put the false dichotomy between the two:

“In regions where political stability was hard won, economic history should be handled with care. Models are useful, but dogma creeps in all too easily. [...] The links between mountain and plain were often more complex, therefore, than many writers tend to assume. Models tend to rely on distinct social groups—

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145 For example, my own views on this agree closely with DeWeese, 1994, Islamization and the Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition, 81, who writes: “The misguided ‘historization’ of narratives originally circulated for quite different reasons is a common treatment of originally oral conversion narratives (and other legends of origin) by later literary interpreters.”

146 See below chapter 4 §2.1 and §3.2.

people with distinct routines. They are necessarily rigid. History becomes warped if models are pushed too far, becoming a series of false choices.\textsuperscript{148}

More specifically, Golden has discussed the prevalence, especially among 19\textsuperscript{th}-century European and Russian historians, to take a “largely negative view of the nomads and their political and cultural impact.”\textsuperscript{149} Building on Golden’s idea, I would suggest that such an understanding of the role of nomads throughout history as a whole still colors our collective historical perspective today and this is just what I seek to avoid. That said, in the face of such a fraught field of false dichotomies, it is my intention to handle the topic of the frequently fickle and absolutely unpredictable process of what I will term “sedentarization” in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia with the greatest care.

It also means that a given “people” such as the Volga Bulgars or the Danube Bulgars, Rus’, Magyars or even the Khazars themselves were not so much a single migrating “tribe” or even a “tribal confederation” of peoples, as is often presented,\textsuperscript{150} so much as conquering elite minorities imposing vassalage, tribute and possibly some form of monotheism on various populations along the way. I will argue that this instead would underlie many, though not all instances of so-called “ethnogeneses.”\textsuperscript{151} In this way, I would cast cautious doubt on the standard “migration” theory, in which certain previously formed “peoples” (read Alans, Slavs, Bulgars, or even Germanics, et al.) migrate during the so-called “migration era” or sometimes termed, “barbarian invasions” which envisions a clear-cut, or normatively Roman border, and is neatly relegated to the 5-6\textsuperscript{th} centuries. These normatively defined migrations of simplistically assigned “ethnic” groups in turn present both broad and distinct problems in envisioning the fluid assimilations and dissolutions within each case of either migrating tribes or conquering elite minorities or any facet of the phenomenon in between.\textsuperscript{152}

We are therefore presented with the same “false choices” that Batty (see above n148) warned against. For example, this has been the model advanced in the case of Khazarria specifically

\textsuperscript{148} Batty, 2007, Rome and the Nomads: the Pontic-Danubian Realm in Antiquity, 570-571.
\textsuperscript{150} Thus as Kwanten, 1979, 43 has worded it, the “two elements were essential to the survival of an organized tribal group: the tribal land and the tribal army, the latter to defend the former.”
\textsuperscript{151} See below chapter 7 §2.1-2.2.
\textsuperscript{152} See for example Ascherson’s (1995, Black Sea, 53-54), discussion of Herodotus’ assumptions of assimilation and counter-assimilation between Greek-speakers and Scythians in the Classical period throughout the Black Sea littoral. In the case of the Eurasian steppe, Golev, 2015, “On the Edge of Another World: a Comparison between the Balkan and the Crimean Peninsula as Contact Zones between Dašt-i Qıpčaq and the Byzantine Empire,” demonstrates that these same phenomena appear to exist all the way up to the period of the Cuman/Polovčy/Qıpčaq migrations in the 12\textsuperscript{th} c. and later. See for example below chapter 7 §1.1.
In addition, in reference to Byzantine conceptions of northerners, barbarians and all manner of “peoples” and generalized neighboring ἔθνη, we cannot also neglect the distinction made between barbarians and members of the civilized (Christian) oikoumenē even contemporaneously and particularly within Byzantine “frontiers.” In this I refer to the term “mixobarbaroi” or, semi-nomadism discussed by Stephenson, who interprets the term thus: “The mixobarbaroi were non-Romans who lived within the empire’s frontiers as Christians, and were bound to the empire by treaties; therefore they were no longer entirely, but only half, barbarian.”

In the broader context of the Pontic-Caspian steppe, the process (and sometimes the counter-process) of living a nomadic or pastoral existence and moving toward an engagement in first a horticultural and then an agricultural lifestyle, may be termed “sedentarization.” Notably, this is the position advocated by Noonan and Mikheev for example. Mikheev also goes farther and argues that as nomads conquered sedentary peoples, they adopted sedentary lifestyles as well in a process cognitively inaugurated by the so-called “state” itself. Kwanten has claimed that this intentional process of sedentarization and the

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154 See for example Vachkova, 2008, “Danube Bulgaria and Khazaria as Parts of the Byzantine Oikoumene,” 339-352; and as a typical example of contemporaneous usage of the term “mixobarbaroi” in the discussion of the Byzantine thema of Bulgaria in chapter 6 below §2.1.2.2.

155 Stephenson, 2000a, Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier: A Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900-1204, 110. He writes:

   “...mixobarbaroi is perhaps the closest equivalent that classicizing authors could find for people who lived within the frontiers of the oikoumene and had signed treaties with the emperor, thereby recognizing the rule of law, but who were not Rhomaioi (Byzantines).”


157 Mikheev, 1985, Подонье в составе хазарского каганата. Importantly, for example, Zhivkov, 2015, 22, writes:

   “It is also important to bear in mind that in the steppe and its adjacent territories, the difference in the ideology of nomads and sedentary peoples is often hardly perceptible. Therefore, the main objective
building of walled cities among semi-nomadic “Turkic speakers” began as early as the early 7th c.158 This, I would argue, is partially an aspect of what I will call “potestarity,” as I will discuss below. Golden’s words would be apropos here when he states, “nomadic statehood is most often tied to control over certain sedentary territories.”159 Furthermore, Pletnëva delineated three specific stages, as if in evolutionary linearity, otherwise common to assumptions in Soviet historiography,160 in the settling of nomads into the beginnings of towns and villages at the edges of the steppe.161 Some other, though by no means all, proponents of such a broad-spectrum analysis of the schematizing process and counter-process between nomadism and sedentarism include Khazanov,162 Golden,163 Horváth,164 Popova,165 Brook,166 Batty167 and Zhivkov.168

Ch. 1: 2.2.3.5 Centers and peripheries; tribute and tax collection

The trouble with this schematized picture of trans-boundary interplays, processes and counter-processes between nomadism and creeping sedentarization is that it assumes such boundaries in the first place. However, this assumption is not confined to the topic of sedentarism and nomadism, rather, it seeks to describe all “borders” throughout antiquity, both pre- and post-monotheization. This assumption in turn begets a picture of a given kingdom as a sort-of “proto-nation-state,” which it most certainly was not. In order to solve this problem of borders, we must not think of Byzantium or Khazaria or the Islamic Caliphate as defined by lines on a given map, but more as concentric strata of authority and loyalty radiating out from a center, at whose fringes, we should understand not so much a demarcation line or political boundary as an untamed frontier wherein populations frequently changed loyalties without necessarily changing identities. So instead of heavily loaded and

anachronistic terms such as “borders” and “boundaries,” instead I will use a far more appropriate term: \textit{frontier}. In doing so, to avoid any more neologisms, I will also use the somewhat dated term “centralization” to characterize the forging of new frontiers of loyalty radiating out from a geographical center. In my usage, this term should convey a \textit{cartographical}, ideological and \textit{urban} spatial sense of politico-economic authority and loyalty.

The establishment of a center from which to command allegiances and religious legitimacy is achieved via and alongside the adoption of monotheism and the sacralization of a given capital city via formal processes such as \textit{translatio reliquiae},\footnote{This is a model promoted by Biliarsky and Tsibranska-Kostova, 2015, “Sacralization of the Urban Space: the Example of the Mss. 1521 CHAI and the Neomartyrs of Sofia.”} or the relocation of holy relics to the city, and/or the attachments of epithets to a given city, such as Veliki (Tarnovo), or Makarýj, Preslavnýj or Carskýj (Suceava) for example.\footnote{Kulhavý, 2015, “The Capital as an Ideological Centre of State: the Case of Medieval Suceava and its Comparison with Tarnovo and Constantinople.” Such a conception, monotheization and sacralization of a new capital could be argued to be reflected by Kiev as conceived by Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 209-216, as their subsection entitled: “Constantinople-on-Dnieper?”} The sacralisation of the city, therefore, contributes not a little to the endurance of the faith, and thus the peoples themselves, who are consequently loyal (or not) to such a city and the faith and ruler of it.

This new concept of a center assuming frontiers instead of boundaries demands a more in-depth dissection of the ability of the center to command loyalty from the frontier. The most potent exhibition of the vassal-suzerain relationship is the rendering of tribute, which is discussed at length not only in \textit{King Joseph’s Reply}, the \textit{PVL}, ibn Fadlán’s \textit{diary} and countless other sources, and provides a backdrop for the foundation of “statehood.” I agree with Noonan that the regular payment of tribute is tantamount to the beginnings of a tax system,\footnote{See for example Noonan, 1987, “The Monetary History of Kiev in the Pre-Mongol Period,” 385, who, in discussing the transition from extortionate tribute to tax payment by the southern forest-steppe Slavic tribes towards first Khazar dominance and then Rus’ dominance, maintains: \smallskip

“The Primary Chronicle also notes, however, that certain East Slavic tribes had paid tribute to the Khazars in the form of coins before coming under Rus’ rule. The chronicle specifically states that after submitting to the Rus’, some of the East Slavic tribes simply switched their payments of tribute in coinage to the Rus’ rulers (citation: Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor [trans.], 1953, \textit{PVL}, 61, 84). Probably, then, some of the coinage and even ingots that reached Kiev were acquired as taxes exorted from subject peoples.”} the ascertainment of frontiers and allegiances and the basis for a given economy. In the case of the Khazar economy, aside from the booming Eurasian exchange network...
continuously passing through Itīl’, on which taxes were readily levied, we get an impression of the “centralization” of the Khazar capital city around which the periphery gradually crystallized during the 9th century due to the three processes broadly outlined just above. We know as well in the 10th century, we receive a picture of contested loyalties among Slavic tribes between the emerging Rus’ and the incumbent Khazaria. These are the aspects of the economy of Khazaria which I would like to draw attention to, since, in my own view, they comprise not only an economy, varying monetized or otherwise, but the beginnings of centralized rulership in Itīl’ (the Khazar capital city). In this way, they project authority via the tribute structure, which then crystallizes in time into a tax structure.

Ch. 1: 2.2.3.6 Consolidation and unification

In drawing many “peoples” together into a single allegiance to a dynasty which derives legitimacy from a deity and a corresponding sacred text, we see these various processes (and counter-processes) which I have just outlined at work: monothetization, literization, historicization, sedentarization, and centralization. In doing so, I would argue that these peoples, (such as those mentioned in the 10th-c. Khazarian document King Joseph’s Reply or the tribal groups mentioned in the Rus’ PVL) are not “ethnicities” so much as they are clans, kinship-networks and tribes. Instead, in adopting (and to some degree enforcing) a flavor of monotheism from a given dynastic ruler, such as Orthodoxy by the Rurikids (Rus’), Islam by the Almuşids (Volga Bulgars), Latin Christianity by the Árpáds (Magyars), or to a
somewhat lesser extent Manichaeism in Uighuria or Judaism in Khazaria, we can see that each adopted form of monotheism was imposed on subject populations by a ruling minority. To summarize this entire arch-process enforced by the ruler to consolidate his realm around a common faith, I would like to use the term “potestarity” in a similar (though not the exact same) way that many Russian historians and archaeologists use the term (more precisely, “potestarian-formations”) to express the development of the emerging Rus’ polity, as well as many other early polities including those mentioned above, hence: “potestarian-formations.” In doing so, I mean to apply the term potestarity to connote the overall consolidation and top-down confessional unification of a number of disparate tribes, clans and kin networks into a “people” with the attendant processes outlined above.

Furthermore, the chances of monotheistic survival were not guaranteed. For example, the Rus’ became Orthodox by top-down coercion, while the Khazars became Jewish, but did not succeed in converted the entirety of their subjugated peoples and later disappeared due to conquest, even though Russians remained Orthodox through the centuries of Mongol vassalage. This then begs a question which continues to hound historians: is ethnicity a pre-monotheistic, primordial phenomenon, or a monotheistic, socially constructed phenomenon? As I will argue in the conclusion (part 2), though it may seem anachronistic and/or teleological at first (when viewed from the present and narrated backward), the modern concept of ethnicity, as understood for recent nation-states, was originally created by a ruling dynasty in adopting a monotheism and the attendant literization, historization, sedentarization,

175 Kwanten, 1979, 56-59. For another example from the 8-9th c. attempted top-down Nestorian Christian conversion of an erstwhile pagan nomadic steppe ruler, see Dickens, 2010, “Patriarch Timothy I and the Turks,” 117-139.

176 See for example Danilović, 2013, “Потестарность как критерий оценки эффективности концепции,” 35-39, who seeks to apply the concept slightly differently. See also Kulakov, 2011, “Запад и Восток: король без войска и дружина без князя,” 164-170, whose strange ideas about “potestarian statehood” I have summarized below in chapter 7 § 2.1.2. To be clear, this is not my personal neologism, but a borrowing from Russian historiography and sociology.

177 See for example probably the most seminal work on the topic of potestarity thus far, Popov, 1997, Потестарность: генезис и эволюция; idem, 2015, “Концепт «племя», или этничность и потестарность в одном флаконе,” 13-20; and Petrukhin, 2006, “Феодализм перед судом русской историографии,” 161-170. For a more in-depth discussion of the concept, see below chapter 7 § 2.1.2.

178 This concept, albeit without using the term “potestarity,” specifically, is proposed by Werbart, 2006, “The Invisible Identities: Cultural Identity and Archaeology,” 84-85, who, in separating ethnicity from archaeology, a noble cause, discusses how ethnicity came to fruition not before, but due to the “Migration Period”:

“Ethnicity was during the European Migration Period a political organization, integrated around the traditional community (identity) defined by leading political families. Ethnic identity during the Migration Period was a kind of situational construction, when specific situations and special reasons, particularly in a political context, forced it.”
and centralization. The fact that Khazaria ultimately disappeared, I will argue, is the exception that proves the rule: a so-called “ethnic group” never converted en masse to a given faith; rather, it was the faith that created the beginnings of “ethnicity.”

Ch. 1: 2.3 Format

My work begins with the adoption of Judaism by the khağans of Khazaria, the dating of which is still disputed. Khazarian Judaism elicits much thinly-veiled nationalist debate in historiography due to the so-called “Ashkenazi-descent theory,” in which scholars such as Gil and Stampfer seek to disprove the existence of Judaism in Khazaria altogether by casting doubt on a myriad of written sources from all across Eurasia in a variety of languages, which plainly suggest otherwise. Despite this line of argument, which I will contest in the following chapter 2, Khazaria makes for a suitable initial case study in this so-called “potestarian formation,” precisely because it disappeared by the 11th c., despite having embraced a form of monotheism. Chapter 3 contextualizes Khazarian coinage alongside Byzantine and Islamic coinage of roughly similar periods, before moving out into the further reaches of Pontic-Caspian Eurasia to comparatively examine the coinages of other peripheral dynasties in both the Christian oikoumenē and the Islamic ummah. The work continues with assessing the textual and archaeological underpinnings of other case studies in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia regarding the respective adoptions of various forms of monotheism by the rulers of Volga-Bulgaria, Hungary and Rus’ in the 10-12th c., in addition to those examples of other groups which did not adopt a monotheism, such as the Pečenegs. Chapter 5 functions as a transition from the previous chapters to the final 2 chapters, in offering a synthesis for the reason for the disappearance of Khazaria, along with a detailed analysis of middle-Byzantine usages of terms such as ἔθνη, γένη and λαοί. Finally, chapter 6 seeks to challenge modern notions of “statehood” projected onto both Byzantium and Rus’ in the 11-12th c. using primarily the evidence of coins and seals. Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, consolidates all the arguments regarding premodern ethnicity and statehood together into a single, final, review.
Chapter 2: Monotheization and sedentarization: potestarian processes in the case of Khazaria

Abstract: The Khazar khağanate and the conversion to Judaism: dating, analysis, and ethnogenesis. In this chapter I will discuss many theories about the Khazar society and previous scholars’ attempts to contextualize the Khazar’s adoption of Judaism within various frameworks. I will discuss in addition to this the phenomenon of sedentarization of steppe tribes in context with converting to a monotheistic religion, and centralization of state institutions and ideologies, again comparing this phenomenon in the Khazar example to the other contemporaneous examples in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia. How did the adoption of a monotheistic religion bring about a fundamental coalescence of a given social structure, here, Khazaria, in this instance guaranteeing the successful transmission of leadership from a tribal “proto-state” into a chieftdom, prinedom, khağanate or kingdom and what affect did this adoption of monotheism have on the otherwise contested loyalties of the local aristocracy?
In this chapter, I will address some of the frequent disagreements within Khazar studies as they pertain to the larger concerns of the thesis: ethnicity and statehood. In the case of Khazaria, a Eurasian empire (or khağanate) succeeding the Gök turk khağanate on the Pontic-Caspian steppes sometime in the 7th c., the following discussion will center on the larger processes surrounding the khağans’ alleged conversion to Judaism sometime between the 8-9th c. These two larger processes, as I will argue, are “monotheization” and “sedentarization,” which I previously outlined in the introduction. I use the term “monotheization” because as will be demonstrated, the khağans’ conversion to Judaism was neither inevitable, nor is it now a total scholarly consensus: rather, Islam or Christianity could have won out ultimately, and the map of the world would now look very different. In other words, had the khağans converted to Islam or Chrhistianity, the term “monotheization” would still apply. I also use the term “sedentarization” because while monotheization refers primarily to the adoption of a scripturally-based faith, sedentarization refers to the adoption (and/or partial adoption) of a settled, urbanized regime. These two processes may have at times been correlated, but were by no means necessarily causal of one another (cum hoc ergo propter hoc), as will be seen. I begin the research with the case of Khazaria because although Khazaria eventually disappeared as a political and geographical entity, the lessons we may learn from it are essential to avoiding teleological interpretations of the subsequent history of Pontic-Caspian Eurasia.

In this way, Khazaria will function as a kind of primary “petri dish” for examining the underpinnings of modern notions of ethnicity and statehood as they actually functioned on the ground, so to speak, in 8-11th-c. Pontic-Caspian Eurasia. Succinctly, within a larger contextualization of Khazaria between the Islamic Caliphate and Christian Rome (Byzantium), I will address three aspects of Khazaria which garner the most heated debates: A) the dating of the conversion, B) the social extent of the conversion and C) the placement of Itīl’, the “Jewish” Khazar capital. Of the scholars who accept that there was in fact a conversion to Judaism, almost all agree that the reason was ultimately to avoid being politically subjugated to either Islam or Christianity, and I see no reason to disagree.
Ch. 2, part 1: The search for a destination: the process of the Khazar conversion to Judaism

The great Khan, thick in skins,  
drowses and waits.  
Advisers juggle time away.  
Only the jester meditates.  

But meditates upon the God  
a Spanish rabbi makes  
wide though invisible, silent  
although his strange tongue quakes.

No matter that in Granada sit  
young men with insect eyes,  
proving the one God by the rule  
of that Pythagoras who never lies.*

Ch. 2: 1.1 Between Byzantium and Islam

During the incessant wars between the Turks and their tribal steppe confederacy and the Caliphate during the late seventh, eighth and ninth centuries, the old western branch of the Gökturk steppe empire led by the Āšīnā dynasty gradually crystallized into a new polity altogether: Khazaria. It was to this realm, allegedly, that persecuted Jews fled from both the Christian lands of Rome and the Muslim lands of the Caliphate. Having explained the consensuses and disagreements above, I will formulate here arguments on the dating of the conversion which seek to keep the Khazarian conversion to Judaism in a Eurasian steppe context as opposed to a historical anomaly that many scholars have previously interpreted it as.

1.1.1 Jewish refugees and emigrants from Byzantium and the Caliphate

We know from the *Schechter Text* (mid-10th c.) that Jewish refugees and emigrants departed from various lands throughout Rome and the Caliphate, but chiefly from Armenia in between. The dating of such departures is impossible to verify as the *Schechter Text* is the only source to mention these phenomena. Nevertheless, while myriad scholars have already debated the historicity or even the very authenticity of this document, and many will

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1 See the entries given by Theophilos of Edessa: Hoyland (trans.), 2001, *Theophilus of Edessa’s Chronicle and the Circulation of Historical Knowledge in Late Antiquity and Early Islam*, 228-229; and 305-306.
conceivably continue to do so, it is neither my goal here to speculate in this regard, nor is it relevant to my ultimate argument. For now, we may begin with the text itself.

The *Schechter Text* refers expressly to Jews emigrating to Khazaria presumably from Armenia. Alexander Kulik has pointed out that the Hebrew word ארמיניא (ARMYNYA) referred to in the text can also be considered as a metathetic for Byzantium herself, i.e., “Romania,” or alternatively, if it is the Arabic designation “Arminiyya,” it may refer to the entirety of the Caucasus region, which cannot be ruled out either.³ However, I would suggest that later in the letter, Byzantium is repeatedly referred to in other ways such as יון (YWN: Yunan/Ionia) or מקדון (MQDWN: Macedonia) and the Byzantines themselves as היוונים (HYWWNYM: Ha-Yunanim) which invites doubt that “Romania” (Byzantium) would be the true meaning of this designation – thereby preserving the original inference of Jewish emigration from Armenia.

Of course wherever exactly these immigrants came from originally,⁴ the author acknowledges that these emigrants were Jews only in so far as they practiced circumcision and even fewer observed the Sabbath and by intermarrying and forging alliances with the indigenous inhabitants, “gentiles,” they evidently “became one people.”⁵ Accordingly, a considerable amount of time passed before a successful army commander “returned” to

⁴ However, this has hardly stopped some scholars, such as Schama and Zuckerman, from taking this passage as absolute. Schama, 2013, *The Story of the Jews: Finding the Words (1000 BCE–1492 CE)*, 266, for example speculates that:

> “it was when the Byzantines defeated the Persians in the middle of the seventh century, and the emperor Heraclius’ policy of forced conversion was at hand, that Greek-speaking Jews in some numbers fled from places in the Balkans and Bosporan Crimea, especially the town of Pantikapeum where they prospered for centuries, over the Caucasus to the safety of the still pagan Khazaria.”

Elsewhere, Zuckerman, 1995, “On the Date of the Khazars’ Conversion to Judaism and the Chronology of the Kings of the Rus Oleg and Igor: A study of the Anonymous Khazar Letter from the Genizah of Cairo,” 241, uses this passage to speculate that it must have been the 628 episode in the Caspian Gates between Heraclius and Zebil, which presaged the influx of Armenian Jews to Khazaria. In pursuing this line of conjecture, he refutes the earlier speculation of Pritsak, 1978, “The Khazar Kingdom’s Conversion to Judaism,” 130, that such Jews were instead Palestinian refugees after the Persian conquest of Jerusalem in 614. In this I would agree with Zuckerman’s refutation of Pritsak, however such a passage hardly allows us to speculate that ארמיניא truly meant Armenia in the way we would understand it today.

⁵ Kulik, 2008, 54. According to DeWeese, 1994, *Islamization and the Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition*, 306-307, such intermarriage and the “unification” of peoples is a common theme among inner Asian conversion narratives. On p. 315, he remarks that in this way, we may observe a process of “‘nativization’ of Judaism through the device of Jewish refugees.” Broadly speaking, this is the position we may infer from Schama, 2013, 266, as well.
Judaism at the behest of God. It was only at this event when Judaism was nominally adopted, at least in so far as the rhetoric of a “return” to Judaism was concerned. According to Constantine Zuckerman, the “return” to Judaism primarily meant to construct social cohesion. As a corollary to Zuckerman’s position in this regard, I will posit below (§2.1.2) that the “return” to Judaism, as it was conceived, was meant as a defence against the respective politico-religious authorities that Byzantium and the Caliphate sought to exercise within Khazaria amongst the khağans’ subject populations, which included no shortage of Christians and Muslims. So it therefore served a dual purpose of building such cohesion and also of precluding outside influences from exerting authority within the realm. Such a “return” to Judaism by the semi-legendary Bulan-Sabriel, typically regarded as the first Khazar khağan to convert to Judaism, was most conceivably the initial stage in a multifaceted conversion process. Historically speaking, such an extended conversion process is almost impossible to uncontroversially separate myth from fact. However, to reach “fact,” first we must deconstruct the myth.

That being said, Jewish immigration to Khazaria was important only in so far as later Jewish authors were concerned: that it represented the process of placing Khazaria on a historical timeline according to a Judaic metanarrative. As DeWeese has observed, “the new faith was brought by figures with long genealogical ties to the traditional centers of the respective religious communities, an affirmation that at once legitimizes the bearers of the new religion (as authentic Jews[…]), and nativizes them as they settle in the new land and bear children.” On this basis, it would be a mistake to hyperinflate the historical importance of the ethno-religious veracity of a supposedly originally Hebraic population intermarrying into a 6th, 7th, or 8th-century Khazaria retrospectively Judaized by post-Judaized 10th-century

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7 For example, references to rebuilding Jerusalem in The Kievan Letter (Golb and Pritsak [ed. and trans.], 1982, 14-15) demonstrate a clear sign that Judaized Turkic elements had adopted an undoubtedly Jewish historical timeline. In addition, in The Schechter Text, clear references are made to Genesis and Exodus (specifically the Israelite invasion of Canaan from Egypt) in Golb and Pritsak (ed. and trans.), 1982, 110-111. Finally, in King Joseph’s Reply, (Kobler [trans.], 1953, Letters of Jews through the Ages, 106-107) clear references are made to the Genesis Table of Nations (“Know that we are descended from Japhal, through his son Togarma.”) See also Kokovcov (ed. and trans.), 1932, Еврейско-хазарская переписка в X веке, 92.
8 DeWeese, 1994, 307-308. Contrarily, Petrukhin, 2013, “Sacral Kingship and the Judaism of the Khazars,” 295 has argued that the khağan’s Turkicness was the vehicle of legitimacy instead of his Jewishness. This is also supported by Komar, 2006, Степи Европы в Эпоху Средневековья: Хазарское Время, 237; and Zhivkov, 2015, Khazaria in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries, 18.
Khazarian historization. However this point is not to entirely discount such an alleged influx of Jewish refugees into Khazaria either. Since we only have King Joseph’s Reply and the Schechter Text to rely on, I will therefore take a positivist approach to such sources and interpret them with a grain of salt.

Ch. 2: 1.1.1.1 From Byzantium

It is not at all difficult to conceive of Jewish refugees fleeing from Byzantine persecutions, most especially in the second Iconoclast controversies of the first half of the 9th century under Theophilos. However, it has also been pointed out by Joshua Holo, citing Theophanēs Continuatus, that in fact iconoclasm shared ideological similarities with Judaism, even though later on he also characterizes Leo III as “the first iconoclastic emperor,” which is debateable. Nevertheless, Holo continues to argue that Leo III

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9 Ibid, 305. It would seem relevant to note here that in terms of Khazarian historization, Bulan-Sabriel is portrayed in King Joseph’s Reply much in the same way that Old Testament kings such as Hezekiah and Josiah are described. In fact, I would argue that Bulan-Sabriel is portrayed this way so as to attach Khazarian history to a pre-existing and readily available Old Testamental history. For example, Hezekiah is portrayed as such in Kings II, 18:3-4 (NASB):

“He did right in the sight of the LORD, according to all that his father David had done. He removed the high places and broke down the sacred pillars and cut down the Asherah [wooden female deity symbol]. He also broke in pieces the bronze serpent that Moses had made, for until those days the sons of Israel burned incense to it; and it was called Nehushtan [a piece of bronze].”

According to King Joseph’s Reply (Kobler [trans.], 1953, 108), “Another king rose up, named Bulan, who was a God-fearing man. He expelled wizards and idolaters from the land and trusted in God alone.” See also Olsson, 2013, “Coup d’état, Coronation and Conversion: Some Reflections on the Adoption of Judaism by the Khazar Khaganate,” 508. Similarly, Petrukhin, 2013, 291, has pointed out that “the Khazarian khagan is called ‘the judge’ and can be associated with the Old Testament Israelite leaders of the period of Judges.” See also Zhivkov, 2015, 67.

10 Holo, 2009, Byzantine Jewry in the Mediterranean Economy, 43.

11 Ibid.


“mainly concerned trade and the direct political influence of Byzantium and did not impact the spread of Christianity among the population subject to the Khazar Khaganate [sic]. The spread of Christianity can also be largely associated with the iconodules that were banished from Byzantium and found refuge in the Crimea.”

However, this would be disputed by Dobrovits, 2011, “The Altaic World through Byzantine Eyes: Some Remarks on the Historical Circumstances of Zemarchus’ Journey to the Turks (AD 569-570),” 373-409, who argues that Byzantine missionary activity in the northern Black Sea littoral stretches as far back as the 5-6th c.
attempted to convert Byzantine Jews compulsorily to Christianity, “which resulted in the flight of some significant number of Jews to the budding Jewish kingdom of the Khazars.”

The problem with his argument however is that he cites only the Schechter Text as his source, which, while it does record the influx of such Byzantine Jews, it cannot accurately date the event specifically to the reign of Leo III in the early eighth century. However, Joshua Starr cites Leōn Grammatikos’ Chrōnographia as referencing Leo III’s forced baptism of Jews (Montanists), yet such evidence still does not tie the persecutions and emigrations of Jews from Byzantium to Khazaria to the period of the early 720s. Andrew Sharf for example, prefers using the subjunctive in this case: “…these influxes […] originally may even have included refugees from the persecutions of Leo III.” Still, it is possible that these Byzantine sources simply referred to the Crimean and Taman Peninsulas as “Khazaria” as they did in later centuries (see below chapter 5 §1.2.1).

Another forced conversion is mentioned again by Holo, citing the southern Italian Chronicle of Ahima‘az attesting to Basil I, although he admits that it may not necessarily merit speculating another wave of emigration. However, Starr, citing Theophanēs Continuatus, treats this episode somewhat hyperbolically, remarking that the actions Basil I took against the Jews were comparatively far more lenient. Nevertheless, the Schechter Text indicates yet another influx of Jews, albeit not exactly as refugees, but this time both from Byzantium and the Caliphate, in the time relatively soon after the famous debates of the

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The same could certainly be said of the 7-9th c. as well: see for example Dickens, 2010, “Patriarch Timothy I and the Turks,” 117-139.

For more information on the debate regarding whether iconodule monks were fleeing the mainland for Crimea, see Feldman, 2013, 27 n56. As far as the circulation of Byzantine coins in the Black Sea steppes after the reign of Heraclius, this is confirmed by Stoljarik, 1992, Essays on Monetary Circulation in the North-Western Black Sea Region in the Late Roman and Byzantine Periods: Late 3rd Century-Early 13th Century AD, 61-77, who writes that the inflow of coins “practically stops in the mid-7th century.” Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether this is due to a decrease in “Byzantine influence,” or simply coin circulation in general. In this regard, see Dunn, 1993, “The Kommerkiarios, the Apotheke, the Dromos, and the West,” 10; Feldman, 2013, The Historiographical and Archaeological Evidence of Autonomy and Rebellion in Chersōn: a Defense of the Revisionist Analysis of Vladimir’s Baptism (987-989), 30 n63; 64 n208 76-81; and Noonan, 1987, “The Monetary History of Kiev in the Pre-Mongol Period,” 398.

13 Holo, 2009, 44. This argument is corroborated by Vasiliev, 1936, The Goths in the Crimea, 102.

14 Starr, 1939, The Jews in the Byzantine Empire: 641-1204, 2, 92-93. According to Starr (p. 2), “As for the refugees, there is reason to believe that they settled not only in the neighboring Moslem states but continued their journey until they reached distant Khazaria, where, however, the contemporary situation is extremely obscure.” In the accompanying two footnotes (n12-13, p. 92-93), he connects the relevant two passages in the Chronographia and The Schechter Text and arbitrarily dates such events respectively to “721-2” and “ca. 722.”

15 Sharf, 1971, Byzantine Jewry: from Justinian to the Fourth Crusade, 98.

16 Holo, 2009, 45-46. For a far more comprehensive of the supposed viciousness of Basil I’s persecution as reported in this source, see Sharf, 1971, 86-94.
Khazar court, which most scholars now agree took place in the opening years of the 860s. It was only under Basil I’s son and successor, Leōn VI the Wise that Jews were allowed to return to their previous worship, albeit despite his remark that the Jew was “as changeless as the Ethiopian.”

The next major Byzantine persecution of Jews will take place under Rōmanos I Lakapēnos supposedly in the 940s and this time it is clearly attested not only by Byzantine sources but also by Muslim sources, the most notable of which is al-Mas’ūdī, who writes quite clearly in his *Meadows of Gold*, some of the now most famous primary source words on the chronology of the Khazar conversion:

“The king of the Khazars had already become a Jew in the Caliphate of Hārūn al-Rashīd, and there joined him Jews from all the lands of Islam and from the country of the Greeks. Indeed the king of the Greeks at the present time, A.H. 332 [=A.D. 943-944], Armānūs [i.e., Romanus Lecapenus] had converted the Jews in his kingdom to Christianity and coerced them. [...] Many Jews took flight from the country of the Greeks to Khazaria, as we have described.”

Similarly, the *Schechter Text* records basically the same event pertaining to Rōmanos I Lakapēnos:

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18 Sharf, 1971, 94. Unfortunately, Sharf neglects to precisely cite his source for this quote.
19 This event is also in conjunction with his simultaneous persecution of Armenian Monophysites. See Runciman, 1929, *The Emperor Romanus Lecapenus and his Reign*, 115. Sharf, 1971, 95-96, argues that the reasons for both Basil I’s and Rōmanos I Lakapēnos’ persecutions of Jews were due to their respective insecurities as “interloper[s] and usurper[s].” Zhivkov, 2015, 162 n60, however, attributes this event to a deterioration of Byzantine-Khazar relations. In this regard, see below chapter 4 §1.1. For Zhivkov (p. 162), this was the reason “the Khazar Khaganate strengthened its ties with the Islamic world. The Khazar Khaganate kept its influence in the Crimea and the Taman Peninsula, thus controlling a considerable part of the Black Sea trade. There is no evidence that the Khazars had any direct contacts with Constantinople or Danube Bulgaria.”

Unfortunately, he does not take into account that the scholarly consensus holds that the *Schechter Text* itself was written in Constantinople about events specifically transpiring in Constantinople. Nor does he specify how Khazarian influence in Crimea can be reconciled with Byzantine quasi-control of Cherson after 841 CE.

20 Holo, 2009, 48. Although Holo also neglects to precisely cite his source for this claim.
21 Dunlop, 1954, *The History of the Jewish Khazars*, 89. It would seem to be worth noting here that Zuckerman, 1995, 246, believes this testimony is, generally speaking, some of the most reliable textual evidence for the dating of the conversion available. However, it also has not stopped some scholars, such as Werbart, 2006, “The Invisible Identities: Cultural Identity and Archaeology,” 93, from assuming that such a passage proves that this was the only period when Jews came to Khazaria, and from not only Byzantium but the Caliphate and Spain as well. Such a simplistic reading would not be recommendable.
“…In the days of Joseph the king, my master, [he sought] Alan help when the persecution befell during the days of Romanus the evil one. When the thing became known to my master, he did away with many Christians. Moreover, Romanus the evil one sent great presents to HLGW Oleg king of RWSY’ Rus’ inciting him to (do) his evil…”

As Sharf has remarked, “the flight into Khazaria indicated that the persecution had been both general and severe.” It was so severe that the later 13-14th c. Muslim chronicler of the Crusades, al-Dīmaṣqī (ca. 1327), refers to this same event as well. Combining these three independent accounts not only lends credibility to the use of the Schechter Text as a historical source since it nearly perfectly matches Mas’ūdī’s words, it confirms that substantial persecutions of Jews took place in Byzantium in the first half of the 10th century. The last wave of Jewish emigration from the empire is argued by Holo to be represented by another Genizah letter, in which a Byzantine Jew named Moshe Agura departed from his home in Crete after the 961 reconquest. However, the ultimate destination of his immigration was not Khazaria, but Islamic Egypt.

Ch. 2: 1.1.1.2 From the Caliphate

There is very scant definitive evidence, textual or archaeological, that Jews fled the Islamic world in large numbers. Nevertheless, obviously both al-Mas’ūdī’s words and the Schechter Text, recounted above, describe Jewish emigrants from not only Byzantium but also the Muslim world. It remains no secret among modern scholars who have pointed out that Jewish refugees are attested from the lands of Islam and/or Arabia And by dint of the Schechter Text, it would seem that such Jews only left from Muslim lands for Khazaria after learning of the latter’s official conversion to Judaism. However, it has also been argued, notably by Shaul Stampfer, that Muslim sources offer negligible indications of Khazar distinct ties with other Jewish communities within the Muslim world. While his argument

24 Mehren (ed. and trans.), 1866, Cosmographie de Dimischqi, 263. See also Olsson, 2013, 503.
25 Incidentally, separate verification of the authenticity of this particular section of the Schechter Text is provided by the Barcellonian Sephardic Rabbi Yehuda ben Barzillai. See Starr, 1939, 166.
27 Idem, 2009, 49.
29 Stampfer, 2013, “Did the Khazars Convert to Judaism?” 27-28, who attempted to use arguments ex-silento to support a minor point that there were absolutely no ties between Gaonic Jewries in Mesopotamia and those of Khazaria. Notably, this is also a view that has been supported by Wasserstein, 2007, “The Khazars and the World of Islam,” 385. However, Artamonov, 1962, История хазар, 265-266, points out that the decidedly
is a pointed one, we must nevertheless remember that it is, like the rest of his arguments, based primarily *ex-silentio*. However, it’s also no secret that comparatively speaking, the tolerance of Jews was broader and consequently the lives of Jews during this period were more comfortable in the lands of Islam than in Byzantium. Wasserstein goes on to claim that in general, “Islam changed things for the Jews everywhere, for the better.”

It is no surprise, then, that we are informed far less of persecutions of and subsequent influxes of Jewish refugees to Khazaria from the lands of Islam than from Byzantium. Still, it hardly changed the fact that there was rather significant pressure from abroad upon Khazaria to monotheize.

Ch. 2: 1.1.2 External pressure to adopt a brand of monotheism

Somewhere amidst the long seventh and eighth centuries as the world surrounding Byzantium and the Caliphate adapted to the new geopolitical circumstances of two superpowers whose authorities each derived from a single god and a duopoly on truth, law, legitimacy and both function and liturgical literacy, it became apparent that sovereignty, power and authority were predicated on a given monotheism and dictated by a given perception of god derived from a given interpretation of a divine scripture. In principle, only one could be the true religion and therefore, only one state could hold ecumenical authority over the whole earth. Universalism (or *ecumenism*), needless to say, was the zeitgeist.

fanciful tales of the famous 9th c. Jewish traveller Eldad HaDani were in fact known to the Gaonic Jewries of Mesopotamia during the period in question. One of the tales even reveals considerable knowledge of Khazaria, such as the khağans’ reception of tribute from 25 neighboring peoples, which we know is corroborated by ibn Fadlan’s testimony, thus bolstering both courses’ respective veracities. In fact, an excerpt of Saadia Gaon’s writing (ca. 892-942), quoted by Zhivkov, 2015, 47, in which he relates, “Togarmah is the Khazars, and they are Turkmen,” clearly mentions Khazarian descent from the biblical Togarma. When juxtaposed with King Joseph’s claim to be descended from Togarma (see §2.2.2 below), this would clearly call into doubt Stamffer’s attempts to disprove mutual knowledge between Khazarian and Mesopotamian Jewries. It seems they were quite aware of each other, even if Saadia Gaon did not specifically mention Judaism in Khazaria, according to Golden, 2007b, “The Conversion of the Khazars to Judaism,” 143, “Saadia’s lack of explanation about Khazar Judaism might also indicate that it was so well-known to his audience that there was no need to belabour the obvious.”

30 Wasserstein, 2007, 382. He also goes on to argue that in a significant way, Jewish Khazaria was far more an extension of the Muslim *ummah*, than of the Christian *oikoumenē*. However, Vachkova, 2008, “Danube Bulgaria and Khazaria as Parts of the Byzantine *Oikoumenē*,” 339-362, introduces other points of disagreement with this statement. Nevertheless, this is not so very far removed from the nineteenth century Jewish travellers who investigated the Eastern Caucasus in search of the alleged “Ten Lost Tribes” of Israel in conjunction with Khazaria. The Khazar rulers themselves associated themselves with the ten lost tribes, according to Chekin, 1990, “The Role of Jews in Early Russian Civilization in the Light of a New Discovery and New Controversies,” 386-389. According to Coene, 2010, *The Caucasus: an Introduction*, 79, a theory of “Ten Lost Tribes” in the north Caucasus pertaining to the modern Tat-speaking Mountain Jews is that they are derivative of Khazaria. For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon and its place in Judeo-Islamic discourse in reference to Khazaria and particularly the Eastern Caucasus, see Kupoveckij, 2009, “Социокультурный анализ формирования коллективной памяти и мифологии о происхождении Евреев восточного Кавказа до 80-х годов XIX в.,” 58-73.
Harboring a diverse population of many different tribes and tongues, the pagan *khağans* of Khazaria, as other semi-nomadic Eurasia pagan rulers both before and after them, would have found themselves pitted between these two aforementioned *oikouμενησμοί* (see above ch. 1 §1.1.1) vying for potential political, economic and social allegiances among their subjects. The *khağans* of Khazaria, the Āšīnā dynasty, found themselves in such circumstances in the sporadic wars with the Caliphate of the 8th century, in which by the time they had subsided, they found themselves increasingly drawn into the Mediterranean world.32

As I have already discussed in the beginning of §1.1.1 above, most historians agree that in choosing Judaism instead of bowing to the respective pressures of adopting Islam from the Caliphate or Christianity from Rome/Byzantium, Bulan-Sabriel chose the middle way, broadly speaking. Most of what we know about the story, at least in so far as it was conceived by the Khazar rulership itself, is derived from the *Schechter Text*. However, this choice is presented as a “return” to Judaism based on the notion in the *Schechter Text* that the author’s forefathers who had allegedly fled from Armenia were Jews who had originally introduced Judaism to Khazaria which had purportedly been diluted over time until Bulan-Sabriel’s “return” to Judaism.

I accept the conventional understanding above, but would suggest that the external pressures from Byzantium and the Caliphate to adopt one monotheism or another might have been manifested on a more internal level by either power seeking to exercise influence and authority on subject peoples within Khazaria more than on her rulers (see above §1.1.1). In the mid-8th c., the possible spread of Judaism in towns ruled by the Khazarian Āšīnā dynasty could have been a direct bulwark against the Caliphate and therefore more in line with the

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31 Here I have chosen this word instead of *universalisms* as I feel that it more accurately describes not so much each respective state or identity as much as their ideological institutions, from which such identities are ultimately derived, much in the same way that the word *nationalisms* could be used to describe two respective ideological institutions more than the retrospective word *nationalities*. See for example Haldon, 2016, *The Empire that Would Not Die*, 120-121.

32 Wasserstein, 2007, 382, holds that the Khazar *khağans*’ flirtation with the Mediterranean world was primarily marked by their flirtation with Judaism as an extension of the Muslim *ummah*. He writes:

“…the nature of the new world created in the Mediterranean Basin by Islam helps to explain the conversion to Judaism of the Khazars as it also explains the world-view, in a literal sense, of Jews and others of the tenth century. Jews were part of the world of Islam, as their situation in it was a function of the character of that world.”

However, I would also remark that this notion of Wasserstein’s is slightly self-contradictory considering the following n33.
8th-c. intermittent wars. Thus, for example, as ibn Fadlān reports in even in the 10th c., enmity between the Judaic khaḵāns and the Islamic caliphs continued to cause significant problems within the Khazar capital of Itīl’, when the Khazar ruler ordered the destruction of a mosque’s minaret and the death of of its muezzins in retaliation for the destruction of a synagogue under the caliph’s watch.33

Furthermore, it may be conceivable that the name “Khazaria” itself, known from Hebrew sources, as opposed to reference to the Western Gökturk “state,”34 came into the fore due to the gradual acceptance of Judaism. For example, the endo-ethnonym “Khazar” and “Khazaria” is clearly given in Hebrew in indigenous Khazar sources, while the only written references to their initial ethnonym, (i.e., in Theophanēs’ words: “the Turks of the East, whom they call Khazars”35) belong to other scriptural traditions such as Greek and Arabic, corresponding to Byzantium and the Caliphate (see also appendix 1).

Ch. 2: 1.1.2.1 The proselytizers, their effects and the implications of the choice

We cannot be certain of the provenance of the Jews who contributed to the conversion of the Khazar khaḵāns and attempts at defining them seem to be inherently problematic. Although it has been speculated by some scholars that the ultimate source of Judaism in Khazaria was in fact derived from Jewish Radanite merchants,36 by others it has been indigenous Jews from elsewhere. Other sources of indigenous Jewry include contemporary southern Dagestan (Tabasaran) or Persia,37 people incidentally whom Artamonov refers to as

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33 See for example Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, Ibn Fadlān and the Land of Darkness: Arab Travellers in the Far North, 58. According to Wasserstein, 2007, 385, Khazaria, according to Muslim sources, functioned as a yardstick by which Muslims measured and defined their own world in accordance with an “other.”
34 See for example Golden, 2001a, “Some Notes on the Comitatus in Medieval Eurasia with Special References to the Khazars,” 154.
36 See for example Pritsak, 1978, 280; and Asadov, 2012, “Khazaria, Byzantium, and the Arab Caliphate: Struggle for Control Over Eurasian Trade Routes in the 9th-10th Centuries,” 140-150. The so-called Jewish “Radanite merchants” were merchants referred to in some Islamic texts of the period who roamed the vast expanses of the Eurasian silk roads and caravan networks buying and selling goods. Very little about them is known with certainty; for more information, see appendix 1.
37 They were most notably the late 19th and early 20th c. scholars and theorists who sought to draw parallels between indigenous Dagestani Jews (the so-called Mountain Jews of the Caucasus) and the residue of Khazaria. See also Magomedov, 1983, Образование хазарского каганата, 173; and Coene, 2010, 78-79. As Kupoveckij, 2009, 70 has stated it:

“Согласно Б. А. Дорну, евреи Восточного Кавказа — персидские евреи, переселившиеся в Хазарский каганат, вероятно, в конце VIII — начале IX в. (т.е. согласно господствовавшим во второй половине XIX столетия представлениям в хазароведении уже после принятия
“vinovniki,” or “culprits,” which further serves to demonstrate the anti-Semitic trajectory of his thesis. Conversely, Dunlop posits that, “possibly the Khazars took their Judaism from Greek Jews,” which, despite being blatantly speculative, is rather conceivable considering the large numbers of Byzantine Jews resident in Crimea, which had been extensively incorporated into the Khazar local administration for the better part of two centuries. Regarding these Byzantine Crimean Jews, as I have discussed earlier in §1.1.1.1, we know through extensive archaeological evidence that such Crimean and Taman Jews existed without a shadow of a doubt long before and long after the advent of Judaism within the khaganate of Khazaria.

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Incidentally, on p. 46, Magomedov refers to this part of Khazaria in modern Dagestan as a “culture of cities,” which may serve to demonstrate a correlation between monotheism and sedentarism.

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I have translated this as:

“According to B. A. Dorn, (a late-19th c. theorist) the Jews of the Eastern Caucasus were Persian Jews, resettled in the Khazar Kaganate, most likely in the late 8th – early 9th c. (according to the views which dominated the second half of the 19th c. in Khazar studies, already after the adoption by the Khazars of Judaism) and they settled in Tabasaran and Kaitag (regions of southern Dagestan). The Jews of Dagestan speak a language close to the language of the population of the Tatian villages nearby Derbent, known as Tats. These Tats, in turn, were descendants of the Persians, resettled in the Caucasus by the Sasanids in the early Middle Ages.”

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I have translated this as:

“Certainly in the khaganate there was organized activity of Judaic missionary-rabbis, entrusted with the propagation of the new doctrine. Most likely they were refugees from the Byzantine Empire, where periodically throughout the 7th-10th centuries Jewish persecution took place.”

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See also Vachkova, 2008, 353.
While the debate over the origins of Judaism in Khazaria is ultimately unprovable, it seems that the Radanite merchants have carried the most sway among modern scholars. According to Thomas, perhaps the most passionate proponent for such a thesis, the Radanites and Khazaria shared not only interests and their Jewish religion, but a “shared destiny.”\footnote{Thomas, 1991, “Râdhânites, Chinese Jews, and the Silk Road of the Steppes,” 14-19.} According to Gil, whose scholarship we have already encountered as containing vehement biases (ch. 1 n12), the Radanite Jewish merchants of the period in question had an “unrivalled” pre-eminence in international trade everywhere from the Black Sea to the southern, eastern and western Mediterranean.\footnote{Gil, 1974, “The Râdhânite Merchants and the Land of Râdhân,” 323.} Notably, however, Holo doubts such blanket suppositions.\footnote{Holo, 2009, 192-201.} Although later he writes: “As with the Khazars, these itinerant Jewish merchants are presumed to have had some favorable orientation towards their coreligionists, trading in the orbit not only of Byzantium but, also more specifically, of Byzantine Jewry.”\footnote{Ibid, 169. He continues (Holo, 2009, 193) to draw together the prospect of a joint proselytization, whether planned or unplanned, of Byzantine Jews and Radanite Jews among the population of Khazaria: “…from the point of view of Byzantine Jewry, east-west and north-south trade through central Asia brought the Khazars into contact with a wide variety of people; at the dawn of the tenth century, northern and southern Europeans pursued trade with the Muslim Middle East, including Scandinavians, Slavs, Bulgars and Jews, continuing into the eleventh and twelfth centuries as well.”} However, it has also been shown that the Radanite predominance on trade routes in Khazaria were considerably weakened by the time al-Mas‘ūdī claims the initial conversion to Judaism was undertaken in the late-9-10\textsuperscript{th} century.\footnote{Golden, 2007a, “Khazar Studies: Achievements and Perspectives,” 44. See also Novosel’cev, 1990, Хазарское государство и его роль в истории Восточной Европы и Кавказа, 10 and idem, 1987, “Хазария в системе международных отношений VII-IX веков,” 20-32. This significant finding also raises questions about the extent to which we can be sure that itinerant Jewish merchants were truly capable of practicing as much as preaching. However, this is disputed by Zhivkov, 2015, 164-165, who, it is worth noting, is heavily reliant on the ideas of Gumilëv regarding Judaism in Khazaria and among the Radanite traders. For more information on Gumilëv’s ideas, see below chapter 4 §2.2.1.5.} Therefore, since the matter cannot be definitively settled either way, I think it cannot be ruled out that the Judaization of Khazaria was drawn from more than one single source. Due to the long residency of Crimean and Taman Jewries and her long incubation period within Khazaria\footnote{This is Petrukhin’s, 2013, 292 argument, namely that “Judaism…spread [through Khazaria] in the Jewish city communities in the North Black Sea region (and in the Transcaucasia) from the late Classical epoch.”} in conjunction with the above arguments for proselytization by Radanite merchants, it seems to me that both are the likely avenues for this development, though I would tentatively lean slightly more on the Crimean and Taman Jews
as the “culprits,” as I am inclined to agree most with Holo on the basis of the Schechter Text having been written in Constantinople itself.\textsuperscript{49}

The implications of converting to Judaism are varied and certainly too extensive to discuss fully in this section. More specifically, some scholars, such as Artamonov\textsuperscript{50} have claimed that the Khazar conversion to Judaism completely brought about the advent of the legendary diarchic kingship of Khazaria, or the Khazar sacral kingship, wherein the \textit{beg/šā}, or king, usurped real power from the \textit{khağan} and relegated him to an entirely sacral position due to the adoption of Judaism.\textsuperscript{51} However Golden has clearly shown that such sacral kingship, notably linked with the \textit{Āšinā} dynasty, in the Eurasian context, is manifested from the very pagan beginnings of what we may call Khazaria and is hardly connected with the adoption of Judaism.\textsuperscript{52} On a broader note regarding the implication of the spread and acceptance of Judaism in Khazaria, it remains self-evident that by adopting Judaism as what we may consider the “state-religion,” the \textit{khağans}, in choosing religious independence from both Byzantium and the Caliphate, also chose an alliance, or perhaps vassalage, either actual or theoretical, with neither. While this positioned Khazaria on an entirely separate path of political development, it also ensured that the \textit{khağans} could expect no support from either power and eventually from Byzantium, open hostility. I will return to this discussion in chapter 5 §1.2.1 below.

Ch. 2: 1.2 The problems of tracking Judaism in Khazaria

Now we arrive at the the most relevant aspects, for my research, of top-down (potestarian) Judaism as a “state-religion” in Khazaria. In this capacity, we will examine the

\textsuperscript{49} Holo, 2009, 169. He writes:

“One can do no more than to assume that the semi-nomadic Khazarian Jews might have pursued a relationship with Byzantine Jewry, or vice versa, but these commercial interests, as well as a Hebrew letter of an ethnic Khazar living in Constantinople in the tenth century, provide some basis for such assumptions.”

\textsuperscript{50} Artamonov, 1962, 278-282. Notably, Olsson, 2013, 496; Komar, 2006, 146; and Coene, 2010, 109 have also taken this supposition as fact.

\textsuperscript{51} This is also supported by Zhivkov, 2015, 59-60.

\textsuperscript{52} Golden, 2007c, “Irano-Turcica: the Khazar Sacral Kingship Revisited,” 161-194. Kwanten, 1979, \textit{Imperial Nomads}, 44, also points this out. Additionally, Petrukhin, 2013, 292 writes: “such a diarchy was characteristic of the Turkic and many other early medieval traditions.” Supporting such suppositions, Klaniczay, 2004, 120, affirms that sacral kingship was well attested long before the advent of monotheism, or Christianity specifically. For a broader discussion in this regard, see Zhivkov, 2015, 54-55.
principal questions outlined at the beginning of the chapter, namely the dating and the social extension of Judaism, and then the third question we will discuss will be the location of Itīl’, which will constitute a considerable archaeological challenge. Despite the scarcity of reliable evidence in both textual and archaeological sources, I will nevertheless argue, much as Joshua Olsson53 and Boris Zhivkov,54 for a generalized three-staged conversion broadly beginning around the turn of the 9th century and concluding in the early 860s. As for the spread of Judaism within Khazaria, while many scholars have argued either for a substantial permeation or only a very limited one, I will argue for only a relatively modest permeation of Judaism beyond the ruling elite in Itīl’. Finally, on the question of the location of Itīl’, I will conditionally support Dmitirij Vasil’ev on his claim to have found Itīl’ at the modern village of Samosdelka in the Volga delta. The dating, location and social extent of the conversion to Judaism in Khazaria carry broad significance in the research due to their larger relevance to monotheization and sedentarization in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia.

1.2.1 Dating

Arriving at the next topic of debate on Khazaria, the chronology of the conversion of the Khazar khağans to Judaism, first of all, I will point out that to put the conversion of the khağans in their Eurasian context would be the most fundamental and obvious place to begin as other scholars such as Novosel’cev55 or Bartha56 have conceived it as an anomalous historical event. As I outlined in the introduction, some of our most reliable modern scholars, such as Obolensky and Golden, have stressed the gradual nature of the conversion, viewing it as a process taking place over a century if not longer. DeWees has contextualized the process in comparison with other Eurasian potentates by pointing out that the narrative given in the Schechter Text reflects a structure of gradual “intrusion and displacement”57 which involve, as with many other Eurasian conversion stories, a “sequence of summons, consent, test, and decisive affirmation.”58 I will argue that these two developments, “intrusion and

53 Olsson, 2013, 495-526. However, Olsson, ignoring the evidence from al-Mas‘ūdi, marks the 830s as the beginning of the process: see below §1.2.1.1.
54 Zhivkov, 2015, 58-59.
57 DeWeese, 1994, 314.
58 Ibid, 315. Similarly, Golden, 2007b, 161, has contended that:
displacement,” are not mutually exclusive, but complementary, which is the main reason that scholars such as Pritsak and Olsson have argued for a three-staged conversion process.\(^5^9\) However, Pritsak places his three-stage process as beginning in the 730s and Olsson’s three-stage process beginning in the 830s. While both arguments are convincing for some reasons and unconvincing for others, I will base my own three-stage process on a decidedly common Eurasian conversion model, which neither researcher does explicitly. My comparative model (below §1.2.1.2) will take into account the dynastic conversion processes of the Rjurikids (Vladimir), the Árpáds (Stephen), the Almušids (Almuš), the Krumids (Boris) and the Jočids (the Golden Horde – Özbek) when considering the gaps in our knowledge of the Khazarian conversion process.

For instance, if the initial intrusion of Judaism into Khazaria, clearly alongside Islam and Christianity, fits into an urbanized context\(^6^0\) we also see the same process playing out in almost exactly the same way in Kievan Rus’, as understood from the PVL. It could be surmised then, that the initial influx of Jewish refugees would serve as the first intrusion, while the subsequent waves of Jewish refugees, particularly from Byzantium would then gradually reinforce this intrusion until it became a critical mass. This interpretation of events is clearly displayed for example in the Schecter Text, as DeWeese highlights the significance of a three-pronged conversion model. His analysis bears the heavy influence of Golden’s use of Eaton’s conversion process of inclusion, identification and displacement: “a standard religious and hagiographical narrative structure rooted in paradigms of ‘conversion’ itself, involving a sequence of summons, consent, test, and decisive affirmation.”\(^6^1\) For DeWeese, the process, in the Eurasian context, was one of internalization and displacement in two-or-three-tiered processes: at first, an initial conversion, then a falling away and a

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\(^{5^9}\) Pritsak, 1978, 261-281; and Olsson, 2013, 495-526.

\(^{6^0}\) See for example Kravčenko, 2004, “Городища среднего течения Северского Донца,” 268, who holds that Saltovo-Majacki (see below §1.2.2) urban centers on the Severski Donec such as Majacki and Sidorovo were “ideological centers” related to the spread of monotheistic faiths.

\(^{6^1}\) DeWeese, 1994, 315.
retrenchment of paganism (for example Svjatoslav in the PVL) and then a decisive commitment. Whenever it was that those very initial and subsequent waves of refugees and immigrants arrived, it is relatively immaterial to our purposes. As we know from the Life of Saint Abo, the Khazar khağan Bağatur was still a pagan in the mid-780s. Therefore, it could not have been long after this when the likely initial “return” took place.

Ch. 2: 1.2.1.1 Bulan-Sabriel and the initial “return” to Judaism (early 9th c.)

Judging by the abovementioned evidence from the Life of Saint Abo, some scholars have supposed, following the 13th-c. Sephardic rabbi, Judah HaLevi, that the Khazar conversion, or even the process of conversion, began ca. 740 based on the figure of Bulan, who converts to Judaism and adopts the name Sabriel. For example, Pritsak argues, citing Dunlop, that Bulan-Sabriel’s conversion, referred to in both the Schechter Text and King Joseph’s Reply must have taken place in 730-731 with such precision, but he neglects to mention that Dunlop himself does not explicitly say this. Additionally, Dunlop clearly writes regarding the story of the Khazar sack of Ardabīl: “This story is no doubt legendary in its existing form.” In other words, just because the victory of the Khazars over Jarrāḥ in ca.

62 Ibid, 312-313.
64 Vernadsky, 1948, A History of Russia, 1:292. See also Brook, 2006, 131.
65 See for example Olsson, 2013, 497, who postulates that HaLevi’s dating of the conversion at ca. 740 is “a reference to the conversion of the Khazars in the reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 786–809) in a work of the prolific tenth-century Baghdādī scholar al-Mas‘ūdī.” It is needless to say, I think, that these two dates are hardly compatible at the roughest estimations, let alone those of a more exact nature. Notably, Coene, 2010, 109, accepts a single dating of the conversion precisely in the year 730 as well. Additionally, Zhivkov, 2015, 58, seems to think that: “the Khazar sources allow for the assumption that in the first half of the seventh century (the 630s and 640s), Judaism was adopted by Bulan who, from his position of a khagan or bek, succeeded in convincing his co-ruler to do the same.”

He fails to specify exactly which Khazar sources and precisely how they “allow for the assumption” of such an early first-stage conversion dating and I am left puzzled at his reasoning for such a bold claim.

66 King Joseph’s Reply refers to Bulan as having been the king during the religious dispute, which Olsson, 2013, 495-526, has taken as fact and has therefore moved the initial conversion to a correspondingly much later date. However given the over-dramatized account of the source (see below n117), I believe it would be too doubtful to trust either the absolute or the relative chronology of the conversion to this source, especially in the context of most other overly-dramatized conversion stories such as the PVL, which presents its own share of problems.

67 Dunlop, 1954, 76. Regarding the dating of 730, Dunlop, 1954, 71, translating a passage of Bal’amidiating to the mid-10th c., remarks on the Khazarian choice of worship at the time: ”I have heard that Jarrāḥ has fled from the polytheists’ [Khazars].” If a Muslim source regards Khazars as polytheists, they cannot possibly be interpreted as Jewish at such a time. See for example Shapira, 2007b, “Armenian and Georgian Sources on the Khazars: a Re-evaluation,” 349, who in interpreting the Life of Saint Abo,
730 was later celebrated by the building of a tabernacle on the biblical model, this hardly proves that such a date confirms the very first royal Khazar conversion to Judaism. Additionally, another source, the *Kartlis Cxovreba*, 68 records that a certain Christian Georgian king, Žuanšer, shortly after 786, sought the advice of his family about whether or not to send his sister in marriage to the Khazar *khağan* who had sent his general Bluč’an to collect her. The reply he received is telling: that according to Shapira, “…it is better to go to Greece, to his fellow Christians, than to be polluted by heathens. This would imply that in the second half of the eighth century the *khağans* were still pagan,” especially considering that this Žuanšer died in 807. 69 The name Bluč’an however shares much with our aforementioned Bulan, and notably, Vladimir Minorsky has sought to connect the two names as two different pronunciations of the same individual’s name. 70 Whether or not this is possible, such evidence thus far, definitive or otherwise, does point to the turn of the 9th century as the earliest period for the initiation of Judaization in Khazaria.

Finally, as we have discussed above, al-Mas’ūdī, one of our most reliable Muslim sources, explicitly relates that the king and his court accepted Judaism between 786 and 809, so it could not have been long after Abo’s stay and baptism in Khazaria that the *khağan* accepted Judaism. It would be important to note here that despite referencing al-Mas’ūdī several times in his article, Olsson neglects to ever give a reason for ignoring the evidence of al-Mas’ūdī pointing to an initial conversion at the turn of the 9th century. 71 Although explicit textual and archaeological confirmation is unavailable, because the initial entrance of

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69 Shapira, 2007b, 350-351, and n184.
70 Minorsky (trans.), 1958, *A History of Shārvān and Darband in the 10th-11th Centuries*, 42, and 106 n1, discusses this issue and attempts to connect the two: “This is a Khazar name (or rank) identical with that of the general whom the Khazar khāqān sent through Dagestan (Leket’i) to Kakhetia in the reign of the Georgian kings Ioane and Juansher (A.D. 718-86).” Pritsak, 1978, 261, while connecting Bulan (“Bolān”) to Bluč’an (“Balč-an”) in a rather worrying morass of speculative linguistic determinism, does not seem to tie these two respective dates (901 and 786) together from these two separate sources (*Kartlis Cxovreba and King Joseph’s Reply*). Nevertheless, Zuckerman, 1995, 251 n52, sees the two names as entirely separate yet convincingly argues that this “episode, if historical, belongs in the eighth century.” In conclusion, whether or not Bluč’an and Bulan are the same person, this story depicts events of the late eighth century when the Khazar khagan was still pagan as opposed to events pertaining to 901 as conveyed by Minorsky (trans.), 1958, 42. See Shapira, 2007b, 351 for a lengthier discussion.
71 Olsson, 2013, 495-526. For the evidence of al-Mas’ūdī, see Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 131-133.
Judaism is most reliably dated by al-Mas’ūdī’s independent account, it would be unreasonable to make any more claims in this regard other than that Bulan-Sabriel’s initial conversion may have occurred during this time. But I would also argue that it is more dubious to discount al-Mas’ūdī’s account entirely. Ergo, we can begin with a terminus post quem of the period at the turn of the 9th c. for a possible royal conversion. As the rest of our sources relate that this was a private conversion, there is no other reason to believe that serious Judaization would have taken hold in a more noticeable way until a later date.

Ch. 2: 1.2.1.2 Obadiah: “a possible reformer,” and the Moses coins (late 830s)

This later date, if I may suggest, is possibly the late 830s. However, before wading into this quagmire, it must be said first, that to discuss Obadiah’s reforms at all is to tread on decidedly uncertain terrain as we are informed of this figure only by King Joseph’s Reply, not even in the Schechter Text. The scholar Elena Galkina has pointed out the significant shortcomings in the Reply, but her reasoning extends primarily to Joseph’s description of the breadth of his dominions, not so much the lack of historical veracity some would place in the document’s expression of past events and reigns such as Obadiah’s.

That being said, what we know about Obadiah, provided only by the Reply, is that he was the reformer who brought Jewish law and Hebrew literacy, thus standardizing the practice of Judaism in Khazaria, a phase that would correspond with many other Eurasian conversions to various monotheisms. Evidently, he imported scholars from Israel bringing with them the Mishnah and Talmud in addition to the Tanakh, which conceivably means that Judaism within Khazaria must have been standard rabbinical Judaism (as opposed to

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72 For example, Ivik and Ključnikov, 2013, via the webpage: http://olegivik.narod.ru/books/hazary.html#120 (accessed 5/1/2015), support dating the conversion broadly based on al-Mas’ūdī’s account. Conversely, Zhivkov, 2015, 58 seems to associate al-Mas’ūdī’s dating for the khağans’ adoption of Judaism (786-809 CE) with the mention of Obadiah in King Joseph’s Reply, although once again, he declines to make a reasoned argument for such a claim.
73 Schama, 2013, 265.
74 However, it would also be important to note here that Golden, 2007b, 147 n123, himself expresses that the reference to Obadiah does in fact “fit into the Eurasian conversion pattern.”
75 Galkina, 2006, “Территория Хазарского каганата IX – первой половины X в. В письменных источниках,” 132-145. According to Zhivkov, 2015, 214 n198 and 234 n42, “a certain return to obsolete [Soviet] doctrine, especially regarding the Khazar khaganate’s size and influence, can be seen in the article of Galkina,” in the second note, he writes: “Galkina’s article is quite notable in its incorrectness.” In general though, Zhivkov staunchly defends the veracity of the document (for example p. 237).
76 Such doubts in this regard have been registered instead by Komar, 2006, 183-184.
77 Kokovcov (ed. and trans.), 1932, 21-24, 28-31, 75-80, 92-97. For the English translation of the short redaction, see Kobler (trans.), 1953, 111.
purported Karaïsm in Khazaria, which rejects extra-biblical scriptural traditions such as the Mishnah and Talmud). But the *Reply* provides no reliable dates for his reign.

Since we know that Obadiah succeeded Bulan-Sabriel by some indeterminate period of time, as *King Joseph’s Reply* is hardly specific in the matter, and since Bulan-Sabriel cannot have adopted some rudimentary form of Judaism before the turn of the 9th c., the next piece of evidence for a second schematic stage of Judaization in Khazaria, dating to the late 830s, is perhaps the next most persuasive. This is the Khazarian *Moses* coinage, found in 1999 in the so-called “Spillings Hoard” on the modern Swedish island of Gotland, published by Rispling and extrapolated on by Kovalev. These few coins bear as yet the only archaeological witness to an attempted Judaization of Khazaria, are reliably dated to the year 837/838, and were discontinued almost immediately afterwards. Kovalev argues this was due to the coins’ disappearance northward, which is baffling if coins were actually meant to circulate. I will discuss this matter in the context of conversions of various Pontic-Caspian

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79 It would be useful to point out here that Ivik and Ključnikov, 2013, via the webpage: [http://olegivik.narod.ru/books/hazary.htm#120](http://olegivik.narod.ru/books/hazary.htm#120) (accessed 5/1/2015), question our notion of Bulan’s conversion to Judaism when compared to Obadiah’s. Such a question calls into doubt any serious proposal of a single conversion event or date. Specifically, the authors write:

> “если Булан, который построил храм новой веры, стал «под покровительством Шехины», «совершил над самим собой, своими рабами и служителями и всем своим народом обрезание» и доставил к себе «изо всех мест мудрецов израильских», чтобы они объяснили ему законы Моисея, – если этот Булан не считается принявшим иудаизм, то что же тогда есть принятие иудаизма?”

I have translated this as:

> “If Bulan, who built a temple of the new faith, became ‘under the auspices of Šekhina,’ ‘circumcised himself, his slaves and ministers and all his people’ and brought ‘from all the places the wise men of Israel,’ to explain to him the laws of Moses, – if this Bulan is not considered to have accepted Judaism, then what is the acceptance of Judaism ?”

80 Rispling, 2002, “Khazar Coins in the name of Moses and Muhammad.”


82 Petrukhin, 2013, 294. For a more in-depth discussion of the methodology behind Kovalev and Rispling’s reliable dating of these coins, see below chapter 3 §1.1.3.

83 Kovalev, 2005a, 237-240.
dynasties in the following chapter more thoroughly. But for the present, I would suggest that though it was discontinued, once again keeping with a schematic monotheization narrative common to many Eurasian conversions as well as Golden’s “backsliding” phase, the coins may have instead been discontinued due to pagan (or possibly Islamic) resistance against the accelerating Judaization. Therefore, as Petrukhin postulates, the Khazar khaγan sought his legitimacy both via Judaism and via traditional Turkic sacral rulership.

This resistance against monotheization, or Judaization specifically, has been conceived by some scholars as the “Qabar revolution” theory based on the following passage in the DAI:

The so-called Kabaroi were of the race (γενεᾶς) of the Chazars. Now it fell out that a secession (ἀποστασίαν) was made by them to their government (ἀρχήν αύτῶν), and when a civil war (πολέμου ἐμφυλίου) broke out their first government prevailed, and some of them were slain, but others escaped and came and settled with the Turks in the land of the Pechenegs (κατεσκήνωσαν μετὰ τῶν Τούρκων εἰς τὴν τῶν Πιτζζινακιτῶν γῆν), and they made friends with one another, and were called ‘Kabaroi’.

A number of scholars have made claims about this event, which they base largely on combining the textual evidence in the DAI and the Khazar sources. For example, according

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84 For a more in-depth discussion of the methodology of the dating, the metrology and the interpretation of these coins, see chapter 3 below §1.1.3.

85 This is Petrukhin’s (2013, 298) paramount point. Nevertheless, Komar, 2006, 146, argues instead that that the adoption of Judaism was meant to make the khaγan powerless and resulted in a de facto coup d’etat. See for example Olsson, 2013, 513-516.

86 See for example Ludwig, 1982, Struktur und Gesellschaft des Chazaren-Reiches im Licht des Schriftlichen Quellen, 168-175. Golden, 2007c, 184 has summarized the Qabar Revolt as taking place “most probably sometime after 800 and certainly before 881. The Qabar revolt has been connected with what were undoubtedly competing religious orientations that had developed in the Khazar court (Judaic, Christian and Muslim).” Dunlop, 1954, 203, for example remarks, “It is attractive to think that the ‘insurrection’ (apostasia) of the Kabars which forced them to withdraw from Khazaria, as Constantine tells us, has something to do with the conversion of the ruling section of the Khazars to Judaism.”


88 There is, however, alleged (and perhaps dubious) archaeological evidence from the village of Čelarevo in modern northern Serbia, carbon-14 dated to the late 10th century, which has revealed a large number of so-called “Avar” burials with human and horse skeletons. There were also a large number of Jewish motifs found on 70 out of 450 brick fragments including shofarim, etrogim and lulavot and importantly, one of them even has a Hebrew inscription that reads, “Yehudah, oh!” which has been claimed to have belong to the Qabars, though such a claim rests solely on conjecture. See Brook, 2006, 167-168; and Erdélyi, 1983, Кабары (Кавары) в Карпатском Бассейне, 174-181. Significantly, Erdélyi himself acknowledges the very fact of his own speculation (p. 179), writing (translated by Brook):

“One can conjecture that this burial ground belonged to the Qabar tribes which joined the Hungarians at the time when they discovered their fatherland. Some of the Qabars, arriving from Khazaria, apparently kept their Judaic religion.”
to Kristó, the Qabars were Onoğur-Bulğars by ethnicity and the revolt took place in the 810s (he presumes a so-called “Hungarian-Khazar alliance” between ca. 840-860). On the other hand, Horváth has speculated that the Qabars were actually Muslim Khwārazmians. Others have concluded that the Qabars can even be assigned the label “Cuman.” According to Hildinger, “It was the Khazars, who had assigned a chief to the Magyars: Árpád of the Turkic Khabar tribe.” Artamonov saw this resistance of Obadiah’s path to power in the form of a coup, which then produced the Qabar departure. Olsson made a similar interpretation based mostly on his own fabrications, as did Novosel’cev and Pletnëva, who called it a “Khazarian Fronde.” However, the entire edifice of interpretations of the alleged “Qabar Revolution Theory” is built on nothing other than modern speculation and imagination linking it to the DAI passage.

Nevertheless, in terms of indigenous and/or pagan resistance to several instances and compulsions toward various forms of monotheisms, we can also see such considerations

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91 Davidescu, 2013, The Lost Romans, 114. However, I would highly caution against such a supposition, not just to the authors’ scholarship, loosely based on textual evidence as it is, (and not at all on archaeological evidence), but on the extent to which his research is done, which I find is often shallow and nationalistic.
94 Olsson, 2013, 513-516.
95 Novosel’cev, 1990, 135.
96 Pletnëva, 1976, Хазары, 63.
97 Golden, 2007c, 184-185 n79. Specifically, he writes: “The whole thesis rests on conjecture, underpinned by Artamonov’s negative view of Judaism – barely disguised Antisemitism – which he saw as undermining the Khazar state.” See also Zhivkov, 2015, 55-56; 126. He writes on p. 126: “There is no evidence of a disruption between the Khazar nobility and the population of the khaganate after the conversion to Judaism.”
98 See for example Flërov and Flërov, 2005, 189, who write:

“Передвижения миссионеров по просторам Хазарии были небезопасны, так как им неизбежно противостояла оппозиция, опирающаяся на рядовое население (достаточно вспомнить оппозицию царю Борису-Михаилу в Болгарии, сопротивление христианской проповеди волхвов Руси, борьбу с манихейством в Уйгурском каганате, обернувшуюся временной реставрацией язычества).”

I have translated this as:
mirrored in Rus’ for example by Svjatoslav when he refused to recognize Christianity when his mother Olga urged him to baptism. According to the PVL, he responded, “How shall I alone accept another faith? My followers will laugh at that.”99 This, of course, is the same backsliding and pagan resistance to monotheization common to many pagan adoptions or re-adoptions of one or another monotheisms, such as the emperor Julian’s apostasy in the 350s for instance, or the Bulgarian boyars’ revolts of the 860s against khağan Boris’ Christianizing attempts100 or among the Volga Bulgars according to the diaries of ibn Fadlān of the early 920s,101 or the Hungarian dukes Géza and Stephen I’s crushing of pagan resistance throughout the late 10th century,102 or for another example, the “apostasy” of the Golden Horde (the other Jočids) after the reign of Berke Khan (d. 1266) “necessitating [the khan] Özbek’s conversion as the decisive event in the Islamization of the Golden Horde.”103

So, despite Golden’s warning that “there is nothing but conjecture to connect [the coins] with the reforms of Obadiyah,” while true, nevertheless fits such numismatic evidence into the three-stage process that Golden himself supports. Ergo, Kovalev’s statement that his numismatic evidence, while undeniable, necessarily purports an unquestionable single-stage conversion dating to “a period spanning the Christian calendar from December 3, 837, to

“The movements of missionaries across the expanses of Khazaria were unsafe, as they would inevitably face opposition, based on the ordinary people (recall the opposition to Tsar Boris-Michael in Bulgaria, the resistance of the Christian message by the magi in Russia, the fight against Manichaeism in the Ujgur Khaganate, turning a temporary restoration of paganism).”

99 Zhivkov, 2015, 20 also makes this point. For the source-reference, see Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, PVL, 84.
101 Lunde and Stone, 2012, 16-17. According to ibn Fadlān, “The first of their kings and chiefs that we met was Ināl the Younger. He had converted to Islam. It was said to him: ‘If you become a Muslim, you will no longer be our leader.’ So he renounced Islam.” See also Frye (ed. and trans.), 2005, Ibn Fadlan’s Journey to Russia, 37.
102 Klaniczay, 2004, “The Birth of a new Europe about 1000 ce: Conversion, Transfer of Institutional Models, New Dynamics,” 113. Klaniczay’s otherwise somewhat disorganized, comparative and cursory investigation into central-European accounts of conversion, ethnogenesis and state-formation may not deserve a particularly detailed commentary here, as the study’s own self-affirming nature is specifically historically comparative and therefore, what it makes up for in contextualization, it lacks in detailed analysis of individual case-studies. Nevertheless, in instances of historical comparison, his research proves rather fruitful here.
103 DeWeese, 1994, 90.
November 22, 838,” is a highly unlikely conclusion for the Khazar conversion to Judaism, despite the accuracy of his methodology for the dating of the coins.

Additionally, if we know that the Byzantine emperors were hardly pleased about the Khazar conversion to Judaism,
why would they have agreed to build Sarkel as a favor to the Khazar khağan in 841, only three years after Kovalev’s claimed fully-fledged conversion? Elsewhere, as Jonathan Shepard has pointed out, archaeological evidence points to pagan burials being practiced well into the tenth century. Therefore, there is still plenty of time before the khağans of Khazaria to adopt a deeper form of rabbinical Judaism; the year 837/838 is still too early, especially as a single-stage phenomenon.

On a slightly more conjectural level, I would also suggest that ibn Khurradādhbih’s story of the journey of Sallām the Interpreter, dated by Lunde and Stone to ca. 844, despite

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104 Kovalev, 2005a, 241. Nevertheless, Petrukhin, 2013, 295, supports Kovalev’s dating of the conversion to 837-838, citing a conjectural coup d’etat, much as Olsson does, which they both date to roughly the same time. Komar, 2006, 146 also agrees with a similar concept, although declines (perhaps wisely) to date his supposition.

105 Olsson, 2013, 505. Here, I would absolutely agree with Olsson when he writes, “the ‘simple conversion’ offered by Kovalev – in which a complete transition is made from a Turkish Khaganate to a Jewish diarchy in a single year – is not the kind of scenario we find in comparable examples.” Once again, it is the comparable examples of other Eurasian conversions that are the keys to unlocking the Khazar conversion.

106 For example, Patriarch Nikolas I Mystikos wrote late in the year 920 in regard to Khazaria after the khağans’ rejection of Byzantine Christianity: “…that deluded nation…. ” See Jenkins and Westerink, (trans.), 1973, Nicholas I, Patriarch of Constantinople: Letters, 390-391. See also the Schechter Text’s evidence of this post-Judaization turn of Byzantine-Khazarian relations in Golb and Pritsak (ed. and trans.), 1982, 130-142; Brook, 2013, 513-514; and Shepard, 1998, “The Khazar’s Formal Adoption of Judaism and Byzantium’s Northern Policy,” 9-34. See also the discussion below in chapter 5 n30-31.

107 Zuckerman, 1997, “Two Notes on the Early History of the thema of Cherson,” 210-222. As for the actual building of Sarkel and other fortresses in Khazaria, according to Zhivkov, 2015, 243,

“...the construction of fortresses in Khazaria was dictated by state policy and was en [sic] expression of its ideology. Therefore, the nationality of the workers who built the fortresses was of no significance. Attempts to attribute all the constructed structures in Khazaria to Byzantine builders do not clarify their origins or traditions. Such a perspective artificially shifts the cultural centers that were of importance for Khazaria (such as the Caucasus and Middle Asia), thus distorting the image of the Khazar Khaganate itself.”

Such a remark runs contrary to the late antique and Byzantine building traditions in Khazaria and elsewhere advocated by Afanas’ev, 2001, “Где же археологические свидетельства существования хазарского государства,” 47-51.


110 Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 99-109. In the story, they identify the apocryphal city of İkah, where the supposed wall of Alexander’s enclosure of Gog and Magog, with the modern city of Hami in the Xinjiang prefecture of western China. However such an identification is hardly a consensus. As Hugh
its obvious exaggerations and embellishments, is also useful for shedding light on the dating of the Khazar conversion. In the story, Khazaria is not typified as being allied with the forces of Gog and Magog but cooperative, rather, with those of the monotheistic Caliphate. So it may be inferred that the original author had, by the time of writing, thought of Khazaria as being within the Islamic oikoumenē, or ummah, to whatever extent such a situation could be imagined, as opposed to being in essential conflict with Islam. This reasoning may add justification to a growing monotheization of Khazaria, albeit embryonic and unhurried, in the mid-9th century.

Nevertheless, we can see the basic outline of a 3-stage conversion process playing out in Khazaria, but with some crucial distinctions from other scholars’ suppositions. Combining the evidence of al-Masʿūdī and the Life of Saint Abo, we may surmise the beginning of the process, the first phase, can be dated to the turn of the 9th c. And then, by combining king Joseph’s Reply with the Moses coinage found in Gotland, the second phase is conceivable during the late 830s. But to finally adopt Judaism completely, a conversion process would only be completed with the final stage of the process: the “decisive affirmation.”

Ch. 2: 1.2.1.3 The court debate conversion (early 860s)

The argument for dating the conversion to the 860s finds its staunchest support from Olsson, Shepard and Zuckerman and it may very well be that such a dating for the conversion finds its firmest support in this regard because it most likely corresponds to the final stage of the conversion, or the “decisive affirmation.” Similarly, DeWeese has interpreted the Khazarian conversion to Judaism as of the utmost significance in the Eurasian context due to the court debate of the early 860s, which many scholars agree precipitated the

Kennedy, 2016, “Where was Ibn Fadlan coming from? (The Muslim World),” remarked: “No one really knows where this fortification was for certain.”

111 Wasserstein, 2007, 382-383. Wasserstein is a proponent of a model in which Khazaria, after the endemic wars of the eighth century, is subsumed to a certain extent, into the Muslim world, or as he terms it, the Muslim oikoumenē. He writes, “That [Islamic] oikoumene had its boundaries, and the Khazar kingdom lay definitely on those boundaries, neither completely inside them nor wholly beyond them.” Zhivkov, 2015, 87-88 makes a similar argument. Conversely, for ibn Fadlan, according to Pohl, 2016, “Distant Peoples: Ibn Fadlan and the Ethnography of Eastern Europe,” Khazaria was in fact equivalent to Gog and Magog. Nevertheless, for Pohl, and in this I agree, Gog and Magog can never be empirical.

113 Olsson, 2013, 520-523.
114 Shepard, 1998, 9-34.
The four primary sources for such a dating present, in contrast to the two former stages of the conversion, comparatively firm ground to base the chronology. They are the Slavonic *Vita Constantini*, the *Expositio in Mattheaum Evangelistam* by Christian of Stavelot and of course the *Schechter Text* and King Joseph’s *Reply*, all of which, with the

DeWeese, 1994, 170. He writes: “After the conversion of the Russians, perhaps the most widely reported case of a court debate to facilitate the right choice of faiths in an inner Asian state is that of the Khazar conversion to Judaism in the eighth century.”

*King Joseph’s Reply* for example, gives the account of the religious dispute in a dramatized fashion, typical of many conversion stories. The following translation is rendered into English by Kobler (ed. and trans.), 1953, 109-111 as:

“The Byzantine and the Mohammedan sovereigns sent envoys to him with great riches and many presents, adding some of their wise men with the object of converting them to their own religion. But the king, being wise, sent for a learned Israelite. He brought the followers of the different religions together, that they might enter into a discussion of their respective doctrines. Each of them refuted, however the arguments of his opponents, so that they could not agree. When the king saw this, he spake thus to the Christian and Mohammedan priests, ‘Go home, and I will send for you again on the third day.’

On the following day he sent to the Christian priest, and said to him, ‘I know that the Christian ruler is greater than all others, and that his religion is excellent, nor does your religion displease me, but I ask you to tell me the truth: which of these two is better, that of the Israelites or that of the Mohammedans?’

The priest answered him, ‘May my lord the King prosper forever. Know that there is truly no religion in the whole world to be compared with the religion of the Israelites, for God chose Israel out of all peoples […] But after they sinned against Him, He was angry and cast them away from His face, scattering them throughout all regions of the earth. Were it not for this there would be no religion in the world like the religion of the Israelites.’ The king answered him, ‘Thus far you have told me your opinion; know that I will honour you.’

On the second day the king sent for the Mohammedan Kadi, whom he also consulted, and to whom he said, ‘Tell me the truth, what is the difference between the religion of the Israelites and that of the Edomites, which of them is the better?’ The Kadi answered and said to him, ‘The religion of the Israelites is the better, and is altogether true. They have the Law of God, just statutes and judgements; but because they sinned and acted perversely towards Him, He was wroth with them, and delivered them into the hands of their enemies. What is the religion of the Christians? They eat all things unclean, and bow themselves to the work of their hands.’ The king answered him, ‘Thou hast told me the truth, therefore I will honour thee.’

On the following day, having assembled all his princes and ministers, and the whole of his people, he said to them, ‘I ask you to choose for me the best and truest religion.’ They began to speak, without, however, arriving at any result. Thereupon the king said to the Christian priest, ‘Of the religions of the Israelites and Mohammedans, which is to be preferred?’ The Christian priest answered, ‘The religion of the Israelites.’ He then asked the Mohammedan Kadi, ‘Is the religion of the Israelites, or that of the Christians the better?’ The Kadi answered, ‘The religion of the Israelites is preferable.’ Upon this the king said, ‘You both confess that the religion of the Israelites is the best and truest, wherefore I choose the religion of the Israelites, which is that of Abraham. God almighty will assist my purpose: the gold and silver which you promised to give me He can give me without labour. Depart now in peace to your land.’

Henceforth Almighty God was his helper, and strengthened him, and he was circumcised, and all his servants. This being done, the king sent and called certain of the wise men of Israel, who explained to him the Law and the precepts. Hence we have this excellent and true religion to the present day, praise be to God forever. From the time our fathers entered under the wings of our Divine Majesty, He humbled before us all our enemies, subjecting all peoples that are round about us; nor has any been able to stand before us to this day: all are tributary to us by the hands of the kings of the Christians and the Mohammedans.”
exception of the last two, are completely independent from each other. Additionally, the events they describe can be reliably dated to the early 860s\textsuperscript{118} by Chekin,\textsuperscript{119} translating and commenting on Christian of Stavelot’s *Expositio*. As for the *Vita Constantini*, according to Curta, “both disputation and conversion figure prominently in the account of the brothers’ trip to the Khazar court in Itil’, an account confirmed by tenth-century Khazar sources.”\textsuperscript{120}

As we have already discussed, there is evidence that there was already a considerable Jewish presence in the Khazar court before the religious debates and some scholars have taken this to posit that the debate might have been rigged.\textsuperscript{121} We know, for example, from

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\textsuperscript{118} See also the summary of the source and the discussion of its significance in confluence with the *Schechter Text* given by Zhivkov, 2015, 89-90. For the *Expositio*, definitively written in about 869, which dates both the Danube Bulgarian conversion and the Khazar conversion, according to Zuckerman, 1995, 246, n32, “The baptism of the Bulgars, which only became an issue in the West following King Boris’ contacts with Pope Nicolas I in the late 860s, remains the main dating element.”

\textsuperscript{119} Chekin, 1997, “Christian of Stavelot and the Conversion of Gog and Magog: A Study of the Ninth-Century Reference to Judaism Among the Khazars,” 13-34. For Chekin’s translation of Christian of Stavelot on the relevant excerpt on the conversion of Khazaria specifically, see p. 17-18:

“We are not aware of any nation under the sky that would not have Christians among them. For even in Gog and Magog, the Hunnic people who call themselves Gazari, those whom Alexander confined, there was a tribe more brave than the others. This tribe has already been circumcised, and they profess all dogmata of Judaism. However, the Bulgars, who are also from those seven tribes, are now becoming baptized.”

\textsuperscript{120} Curta, 2006a, 122. Notably, Curta, 2006a, 128, expresses particular confidence in the historical utility of the *Vita Constantini* as he states that “the evidence of the *Life of Constantine* fits in well with what we know from independent sources about the history of the ninth-century Khazar qaganate … there is little reason to raise doubts.” By extension, this implies that he has confidence in the utility of such Khazar sources as well, such as the *Schechter Text and King Joseph’s Reply*, which record the famous debates as well. Similarly, Chekin, 1997, 18-19, remarks:

“Scholars who, like Joseph Marquart or Constantine Zuckerman, date the conversion of the Khazars to Judaism after the mission of Constantine the Philosopher, find the data of Christian [of Stavelot] to be a nice confirmation (*Hübische Bestätigung*) of the Slavonic Life of Constantine.”

Granting support to a Khazar conversion process beginning earlier and only culminating in this final episode in the early 860s, he continues, “But the commentary does not help the majority of specialists in Khazar history, who prefer an earlier dating of the conversion.” Other scholars entirely reject the *Vita Constantini* for the provision of a Byzantine acknowledgment of the khağans’ adoption of Judaism at the debate. For example, Huxley, 1990, “Byzantinohazarika,” 80, writes:

“The text shows that the author of the *Life* follows the original Greek account of the brothers’ mission to Chazaria in regarding this particular Khagan at least as having not yet definitively embraced Judaism, even if he knew much about the Old Testament.”


\end{footnotesize}
the *Vita Constantini*, that “there were [already] a number of Jews in the entourage of the Khağan.” Since we know from these three documents and a rapidly growing scholarly consensus that there was an undeniable court debate in the early 860s and that it lead to the “decisive affirmation” of Judaism as a “state-religion” due to Constantine-Cyril’s unsuccessful return and the echoing of this in the Khazar letters and the *Expositio*, we are left to conclude the historicity of such a story, especially given the advancements that Judaism had already made within Khazaria by such a time. DeWeese has summarized the entire scholarly debate regarding the court debate conversion as essentially finished: the sheer variety and geographical separation of the sources ensures that they did not copy from each other, but were recording a genuine historical event.

This then would provide a *terminus ante quem* for the final conversion of the Khazar khağan. However, some scholars have expressed doubts about such a dating as it would not appear to provide enough kings between the time of Bulan-Sabriel at the turn of the 9th c. and the court debate conversion of the early 860s. To mollify, albeit partially, such a scenario, I would posit that when it comes to the problems inherent in the number of kings given in *King Joseph’s Reply*, and how such a number counted back would constitute too many generations, we cannot assume that each king lived for a considerably long time and enjoyed a reign as long as Basil II’s for example (976-1025). Additionally, Curta has pointed out that amongst the Khazar rulers, “the deceased ruler was followed either by his son or by his brother.” Thus we arrive at a three-staged conversion process, albeit a conjectural one, but one which

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122 Kantor (trans.), 1983, *Medieval Slavonic Lives of Saints and Princes*, 47. It would be important to note here as well that the *Vita Constantini* never refers to the *beg*, but only to the *khağan*. See Petrukhin, 2013, 297.

123 DeWeese, 1994, 171. He writes:

> “the widespread and evidently independent attestations would seem to support the historicity of some kind of court debate, but more important, clearly suggest the currency of tales recounting the conversion and originating among the Khazar Jewish community itself.”

124 Curta, 2006a, 217. Additionally, Szyszman, 1982, “La Question des Khazars Essai de Mise au Point,” 190, despite his obstinate insistence on Khazarian Karaîsm, does sensibly point out that the oldest son did not necessarily succeed his father as a matter of obligation; that it was the father and reigning sovereign’s decision on whom the successor would be. According to Syszman:

> “Le fils aîné ne succédait pas obligatoirement à son père. C’était au souverain régnant qu’il appartenait de désigner lui-même son successeur, à condition de le choisir parmi les membres de la dynastie.”
fits in with a common Eurasian conversion context and avoids being dated too late\textsuperscript{125} or too early\textsuperscript{126} thereby utilizing all sources as befits their historical worth.\textsuperscript{127}

To summarize, I am arguing for a Khazar conversion to Judaism in three stages: the first stage beginning sometime at the turn of the 9th c., the second stage in the late 830s, and the final stage in the early 860s. The relevance of the three-staged conversion process in the Eurasian context will function as one of the first components of a growing model for monotheization and sedentarization in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia. As we will discuss, the “potestarian” process rooted in top-down monotheization and sedentarization, emanating from the ruling dynasty (in this case the khağans), will serve as the beginning of an archetype to help us recontextualize the otherwise “state” histories of various modern nations in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia. Presently, the crux of the discussion will move on to the social extent of the conversion to Judaism in Khazaria beyond the ruling dynasty.

Ch. 2: 1.2.2 The social extent of conversion

To attempt to bring precision to the discussion regarding the permeation of Judaism within Khazaria would be foolhardy, though to ignore the question would be problematic as well. So having said this, we will presently discuss not so much the exact extent and populations of Jews and conversions to Judaism in Khazaria as the manner in which Judaism, functioning as a so-called “state-religion” in Khazaria, can possibly be estimated with any degree confidence.\textsuperscript{128} So to begin, as most scholars have done in this regard, I will separate the potestarian process of Judaization (see above chapter 1 §2.2.3.6 and below chapter 7 §2.1.2) in Khazaria into two portions: the process of Judaization among the ruling elite

\textsuperscript{125} See Olsson, 2013, 495-526.
\textsuperscript{126} See Zuckerman, 1995, 237-270.
\textsuperscript{127} For example, Zhivkov, 2015, 268 writes:

“It would not be too much to argue that both the written sources and the ethnographic data can be deceiving in the study of states like the Khazar Khaganate. On the one hand, steppe empire are remote in time and we do not have direct observations of such structures; on the other, the accounts usually refer to a part of the population, which is nomadic, but do not clarify the nature of the steppe state itself.”

\textsuperscript{128} However, this has hardly stopped Flêrov and Flêrova, 2005, 189, from positing with all certainty that “in the khaganate there was organized activity of Judaic missionary-rabbis, entrusted with the propagation of the new doctrine.”
governing from Itīl’ and perhaps other urban centers such as Sarkel, Kiev, Samandar,129 Balanjar130 and those in the Crimean and Taman Peninsulas, and then the process of Judaization among subject peoples.131 Judaism, like Islam and particularly Christianity, has been primarily, though not exclusively of course, an urban phenomenon.132 So we must not forget that the term paganos originally referred to rural dwellers while Christianity initially

129 According to Gadlo, 1979, Этикаческая История Северного Кавказа IV-X вв., 152-153, the city of Samadar can be archaeologically equated with modern-day Makhačkala in Dagestan. However, according to Bálint, 1981, “Some Archaeological Addenda to P. Golden’s Khazar Studies,” 400, this is only a working hypothesis and remains definitively unproven. See also Golden, 1980a, Khazar Studies: an Historico-Philological Inquiry into the Origins of the Khazars, 234-237. Based on sources such as al-Istakhri and ibn Hawqal, Zhivkov, 2015, 234, concludes that “Samandar was the second most important city in Khazaria, governed by its own king (malik), who was related by family ties to the ruler of Itil.” Although it seems that such a conclusion would leave Sarakent in a precarious position.

130 According to Magomedov, 1983, 174-177, Balanjar can be identified as the site of the Verkhnjí Čir-jurt Gorodišče (Верхнечирютовское Городище) on the Sulak River in Dagestan. See also Pletnëva, 1976, 28.

131 For example, Golb and Pritsak (ed. and trans.), 1982, 129, in their interpretation of the Schechter Text, distinguish between Khazar “royalty” versus local Judaic traditions for the proposed authorial candidature of the document. For a map of Khazarian urban centers, see fig. 2.

132 For example, Christian churches, complete with a confirmatory cross near the altar, have been found in the modern settlement of Verkhnjí Čir-jurt on the Sulak River in Dagestan, which has been cited as the original location of Balanjar, or the previous Khazar capital before Itīl’, dating to the 6-8th c. and complete with graves of both kurgan-type burials corresponding to a steppe population and catacomb and pit-grave burials corresponding to a sedentary population. Nevertheless, Bálint, 1981, 399, has considered such evidence as indicative of “one-time owners of homogeneous origin and suppose only social differences between them.” This hypothesis is also supported by Magomedov, 1983, 174-177. In addition, we also know from textual sources such as the Vita of St John of Gotthia and others (see for example Huxley, 1978, “On the Vita of St John of Gotthia,” 161-169; Ludwig, 1982, 318-325; Magomedov, 1983, 158-172; Noonan, 1992, 120-121; Fletcher, 1997, The Barbarian Conversion from Paganism to Christianity, 72-77; Carter, 2003, Crimean Chersonesos: City, Chora, Museum, and Environs, 33-34; Shepard, 1998, 11-18; and Golden, 2007b, 124), that there was a hefty Byzantine system of missions (Carter refers to eight bishoprics of Gotthia compiled between 733-746 CE) set up in the mid-8th c. administered by the metropolitan of Doros, capital of the Crimean Goths. Evidently this was enough to merit patriarch Photios’ remark that the Black Sea itself was made “pious” (see Vachkova, 2008, 352). For a greater extrapolation of the system of the Byzantine eparchy of Gotthia, particularly in the Notitiae Episcopatuum, see Zuckerman, 2006, “Byzantium’s Pontic Policy in the Notitiae Episcopatuum,” 201-230 and chapter 4 below §1.1.1. Evidence of Christianity is archaeologically attestable in Khazaria also during this time, albeit relegated only to urban centers such as Sarkel and those of the Crimean and Taman Peninsulas, such as Chersön, Bosporos and Tmutarakan’. Such archaeological evidence is manifested as white-clay cups and kylixes with painted crosses interpreted as liturgical drinking vessels for new converts. See Zaleskaya, 1986, “Byzantine White-Clay Painted Bowls and Cylix-Type Cups,” 215-224. In the case of similarities between Sarkel and Chersön, this is particularly apparent due to the similarities of finds of bronze encolpion crosses exported to Khazaria from Byzantium. These probably came through Chersön, as similar examples of Syro-Palestinian-made bronze encolpion crosses have been found therein also dating to the tenth century. See for example Yashaeva et al., 2011, The Legacy of Byzantine Cherson, cat. nos. 186-193, 195. See also Feldman, 2013, 65-71. However, it may be noted here that without disclosing his evidence, Zhivkov, 2015, 162 claims that:

“Chersonesus could not compete with the large market centers of the East. Much more important during this period were the Khazar centers in the Crimea and on the Taman Peninsula, like Samkerts (Tmutarakan), Bosporus and Phanagoria.”
spread principally in cities. As such, we may draw a broad, though certainly not exacting, parallel between monotheism in general and Judaism-as-state-religion of Khazaria. So in order to measure Judaism, or any monotheism in Khazaria, we must also examine urbanity in Khazaria. Finally, in examining urbanity in Khazaria, for this section of the study, since absolute chronology is less important than for the dating of the conversion discussed above §1.2.1, I will therefore lay a greater reliance on archaeological findings to interpret and then leverage my hypotheses.

Ch. 2: 1.2.2.1 Only the elites?

Some scholars have supposed that discussing “elites” as a term with its modern connotations is perilous, and I would agree with them. However, whatever term we decide to use, there were noticeable distinctions of rank (or perhaps even “class”) within the urban centers ruled by the Khazar khağans. Golden, for example, conceives of Khazarian elites as a quasi-comitatus, or military retinue. This is also corroborated by Horváth and Pletnëva. That there were elites and aristocrats within Khazaria is attested to not only by the strictly textual evidence of titles such as īšā, tudun, el’teber, and tarkhan, but

134 Idem, 2001a, “Some Notes on the Comitatus in Medieval Eurasia with Special References to the Khazars,” 154-155. Golden contextualizes the Khazars among many other “migration-age” peoples such as the Goths, Rus’ Bulgars, Franks, Vikings, et al.
135 Horváth, 1989, 16. He writes:

“The rule of the aristocratic class in nomad societies of the Middle Ages, from the Turks to the Mongols, was backed by a permanent military retinue which, in time of war, formed the élite corps of the army and also supplied the military commanders. Representatives of such a military caste among the Pechenegs crop up during the tenth century in the bodyguards and auxiliary forces composed of foreign recruits in Byzantium and the Russian Principalities […] and as we have seen, at an earlier date amongst the Khazars as well.”

136 Pletnëva, 1989, На славяно-хазарском пограничье: Дмитриевский археологический комплекс, 24. For further discussions, with greater contextual clarity, on warrior retinues surrounding potentates at this time (comitatii, družiny, gefolgschaften), see Kulakov, 2011, “Запад и Восток: король без войска и дружина без князя,” 164-170. I will discuss more about Kulakov’s ideas about “potestarian statehood” below in chapter 7 § 2.1.2.
137 See above n51 and below n196.
138 Turtledove (ed. and trans.), 1982, 75. According to Theophanēs, there was a Khazarian tudun resident in Chersōn during the 8-9th c. On the meaning of the tudun in Khazaria as administrators of territorial units, see Novosel’cev, 1990, 108. According to Zhirkov, 2015, 225 the tudun oversaw the collection of tribute and/or taxes.
139 Semenov, 2009, “Происхождение и значение титула ‘хазар-элътебер’,” 160-163. The ruler of the Volga Bulgars in the early 920s, Almuš, was evidently titled el’teber, according to ibn Fadlān.
archaeological evidence of considerable wealth disparities in the urban areas of Khazaria – particularly those 8-11th-c. urban centers between Crimea and the Caspian Sea.

There is ample archaeological evidence in this geographical region dating to the Khazar period (8-11th-c.): archaeologists have characterized the concurrent Saltovo-Majacki archaeological culture (hereafter, SMC – see above chapter 1 §2.2.2) as ascribable to contemporaneous Khazaria.\textsuperscript{141} While there is debate about whether or not the SMC can be

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\textsuperscript{140} Curta, 2006a, 164. Notably, Olsson, 2013, 517, connects Bulan to a Tarkhan mentioned by ibn Khurradādhbih, although once again, Olsson’s conjecture rests on no other evidence. For the reference to Khurradādhbih, see Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 100.

\textsuperscript{141} Bálint, 1981, 398, refers to it conversely as CSM. Artamonov and Pletnëva have both argued that the semi-sedentarized Saltovo-Majacki archaeological culture could in fact be characterized as the carriers of the Khazarian khağanate based on parallel chronologies and frontiers. See for example Pletnëva, 1967, 185-187 and fig. 50; and Artamonov 1962, 235 and 424. According to Bálint, 1989, 400, this can be corroborated from SMC finds of over 300 sites. According to Artamonov, 1962, 235:

\begin{quotation}
“Пожалуй, самым замечательным явлением в истории Хазарии VIII в. было значительное развитие оседлости и связанного с ней земледелия, и притом не только в старых земледельческих областях в предгорьях Кавказа и в горах южного Крыма, где земледельческое хозяйство уцелело, несмотря на опустошительные вторжения кочевых орд, начавшихся с появления гуннов, но и в приморских областях Восточного Крыма и Таманского полуострова, в низовых Кубани и Дона, где оно было почти ничем не сметено военными бурями IV—VII вв. Больше того, оседлое земледелие возникает в глубине степной полосы и, в особенности, в примыкающей к ней с севера лесостепи, там, где в течение многих столетий обитали только кочевники и где не только в послегуннское, но и в догуннское время ничего подобного не существовало.”
\end{quotation}

I have translated this as:

\begin{quotation}
“Perhaps the most remarkable phenomenon in the history of Khazaria in the 8th c., was the significant spread of a sedentary lifestyle and the agriculturalism associated with it, not only in the old agricultural regions of the Caucasian foothills and the southern Crimean mountains, where the agricultural economy survived despite devastating invasions of nomadic hordes, which began with the appearance of the Huns, but also in the coastal regions of the eastern Crimean and Taman Peninsulas, in the lower reaches of the Don and Kuban Rivers, where [agriculture] was almost completely swept away by the military storms of the 4th-7th centuries. Furthermore, sedentary agriculture emerges there deep within the steppe areas and in particular, in the adjacent northern forest-steppe, which had been inhabited only by nomads for centuries and where nothing similar had existed in either the pre- or post-Hunnic eras.”
\end{quotation}

More recently, other archaeologists and scholars have cast doubt on this supposition as well, such as Werbart and Afanas’ev, although for Werbart, “the only common denominator for the Khazar khağanate on the one hand, and the Saltovo-Majaki culture on the other is…the pluralism of the social structures and economy, the multiethnicity and multireligiosity [sic],” (Werbart, 1996, “Khazars or ‘Saltovo-Majaki Culture’? Prejudices about Archaeology and Ethnicity,” 217), which would seem as an otherwise tacit condoning of Artamonov’s and Pletnëva’s original equation of the semi-sedentarized SMC to the Khazar khağanate. This is not to say either that Pletnëva herself was unaware of the challenges her own conclusions garnered in light of the variety of the SMC variants and the doubt this fact would shed on her analysis (Pletnëva, 1999, Очерки хазарской археологии, 3-5, 207). However, such support of their conclusions based on trans-religious tolerance and diversity does in fact manifest itself in other areas of archaeological research as well which Werbart references in her 2006 article, “The Invisible Identities: Cultural Identity and Archaeology,” 95), such as the appearance of trephined skulls across geographic and “ethnic” variations throughout the SMC, which the archaeologist
easily assigned as “Khazarian” the SMC nevertheless organizationally constitutes a useful archaeological tool for examining Khazarian archaeology.

Finds ascribed to the SMC, for examples, include glass and bead jewellery found at the Dimitrievskij Complex (30km SE of modern Belgorod – see figs. 3, 4), silver strap ornaments found in Taman (fig. 5), and numerous finds from Sarkel including several silver and bronze belt buckles (figs. 7, 13) and even one entire ornamentally carved silver belt itself (fig. 9), various glass and silver beaded jewellery, (fig. 6) a horn and iron mace-head with tamga symbols “characteristic of a grand-prince” (fig. 22), a silver and glass serving plate (fig. 8), a Byzantine-made elephant-ivory comb (fig. 10) and even an Indo-Persian-made elephant-ivory chess piece (fig. 11). Such titles and material wealth also indicate a certain amount of urbanization and regional governance, especially as they contrast with other finds in Sarkel and elsewhere of correspondingly much simpler clay wares described as “typical of tribal nomads” (see figs. 36-38).

Additionally, given our parallel examination of urbanity in Khazaria as well as numerous primary sources attesting to Christians, Jews and Muslims living in urban centers within Khazaria, it is hardly difficult to argue that various groups identifying with these three universalisms resided in such urban centers. For example, a Syro-Palestinian-made bronze


Pletnëva and Makarova, 1983, “Пояс знатного воина из Саркела,” 62-77, fig. 3. See also Artamonov, 1962, 340. However, Artamonov interprets the find as “Hungarian,” though he declines to qualify his statement or offer parallel evidence of the finds’ “ethnicity.”


Ibid, cat. no. 247.

Ibid, cat. no. 267.

Ibid, cat. no. 294.

Ibid, cat. no. 239. The comb has even been claimed to have been made specifically in Eastern Anatolia, which may imply Byzantine-Khazarian aristocratic ties, although this is simple conjecture. See also Artamonov, 1962, 374.


See for example Zalesskaja, et al., 1989, cat. nos. 251, 257, 293; and n294 below.
encolpion cross with Greek epigraphy was found in Sarkel dating to the 10th century (see figs. 14-15). However, this has not stopped some scholars such as Sharf from claiming that “the Jewish Khazars remained in a minority among a mixed population of Muslims and Christians” even despite their persecutions in and emigration from Byzantium. While this supposition may contain a significant element of truth, it cannot be proven. It can however be considerably supported by positive and negative archaeological evidence.

Considering that very few specifically Judaic artifacts have been unearthed in Khazaria outside commonplace areas of unquestioned Jewish communities such as those previously mentioned towns of the Crimean and Taman Peninsulas, it would be easy to make just a supposition (see for example fig. 19). However, the fact that Hebrew epigraphy has been unearthed within the frontiers of Khazaria, dating to the appropriate period, although such evidence is still scant, is enough to merit a considerable discussion. To begin, during the late-Soviet era, the Russian archaeologist Georgij Turčaninov discovered Hebrew epigraphy on a fortress wall at the Majacki gorodišče (see fig. 17), which may indicate the presence of a Jewish community there and perhaps elsewhere in other gorodišči, however minor or insignificant. Another Hebrew epigraphic find, this time consisting of the word “Israel” repeated four times, on fragments of a partially reconstructed glass vessel found in 1901 at the Moščevaja Balka burial ground in the Northern Caucasus (see fig. 16), has been

153 Artamonov, 1958, fig. 13. This probably came through Chersön, as similar examples of Syro-Palestinian-made bronze encolpion crosses have been found therein also dating to the tenth century. See for example Yashaeva et al., 2011, cat. nos. 186-193, 195. In addition, Brook, 2006, 32, without providing an overt date, has described another cross found at Sarkel containing the earliest Russian martyrs Boris and Gleb as belonging to “Slavic layers.”

154 Sharf, 1971, 98. This is also supported by Ivik and Ključnikov, 2013, Хазары. Referenced via the webpage: http://olegivik.narod.ru/books/hazary.htm#120 (accessed 5/1/2015).

155 Turčaninov, 1990, Древние и средневековые памятники осетинского письма и языка, 89-90. As Afanas’ev, 2001, 46 has explained the find:

“Ранее тюркологи видели в ней не надпись, а тамгу. Оставшуюся часть надписи Г. Ф. Турчанинов читает как Бен-Атыф. Где слово бен – семитическое ‘сын,’ а слово атыф – семитическое ‘милостивый’.”

I have translated this as:

“Earlier turkologists saw it as a tamga instead of as an inscription. G. F. Turčaninov reads the remainder of the inscription as Ben-Atÿf. Whereas the word Ben – in Semitic for ‘Son,’ the word Atÿf – is Semitic for ‘Gracious’.”

Such a reading would also indicate Hebrew names being disseminated among these people, attesting to Golden’s conception of Judaic “internalization” in Khazaria. See also Flërov and Flërova, 2005, 188.
interpreted as unequivocal evidence of Judaism and Jewish communities existing and thriving in 8-9th-c. Khazarian northern Caucasus. Additionally, Afanas’ev mentions another vessel from Sarkel exhibiting a Hebrew inscription. Brook also refers to an unspecified number of vessels found in the Don region bearing the Hebrew inscription “Israel,” but he alleges these were false leads without citing his source.

Images of menorot (Judaic candelabra) have been unearthed as well. Pletnëva uncovered the image of a menorah on a locally produced bronze ring otherwise common to the SMC in her 1989 work on the Dimitrievskij archaeological complex. This has been interpreted as indicative of Judaism permeating into “local culture” by eminent Russian archaeologists for example such as Afanas’ev. Another discovery from 2005 in the Don delta produced another Hebrew inscription with two menorot, which archaeologists have dated between the late-10th-early-11th c. Another find, from the Volgograd Oblast’, a female burial from the late-9th-early-10th c., yielded a metallic mirror which was interpreted

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156 Ierusalimskaja A. A., 1992, Кавказ на Шелковом пути, 30-31. Ivik and Ključnikov, 2013, Хазары. Referenced via the webpage: http://olegivik.narod.ru/books/hazary.htm#120, (accessed 5/1/2015), remarking on the find, place it in the context of the silk road trade and a larger discussion of glass-bead production in the area. The authors, citing Kovalevskaja, 2005, “Возникновение местного производства стеклянных бус на Кавказе (к вопросу об алано-хазарских взаимоотношениях),” also go on to assert that glass production was discontinued due to the fall of the Khazar khağanate in the second half of the 10th c.


158 Brook, 2006, 113.

159 Pletnëva, 1989, fig. 61, 116. Afanas’ev, 2001, 46, also offers his considerable insight in interpreting the find:

“И здесь важно подчеркнуть то обстоятельство, что этот перстень был местного производства. Тот факт, что иудейская символика была нанесена на местный предмет, изготовленный для местного пользователя, свидетельствует о начавшемся процессе внедрения иудейской религиозной символики в местную культуру.”

I have translated this as:

“And here it is important to emphasize the fact that this ring was produced locally. The fact that the Jewish symbolism was applied to the local objects made for the local user indicates the beginning of the process of implementing Jewish religious symbols into the local culture.”

However, this has not prevented Ivik and Ključnikov, 2013, Хазары. Referenced via the webpage: http://olegivik.narod.ru/books/hazary.htm#120, (accessed 5/1/2015), from doubting the ring’s last owner’s Jewishness due to the supposition that Medieval Jews rarely buried their dead with many worldly possessions. On this last point, I believe it is impossible to be certain either way.

160 According to Zhivkov, 2015, 127, “The Don region is ususally regarded as an integral part of Khazar Khağanate.”

161 Maslovskij, 2006, Археологические исследования в Азове и Азовском районе в 2005 году,” 124-125. The name of the settlement is “Переволочнъй Erik.” However, the presence of Jews in a Black Sea trading city such as Tanais should hardly surprise us.
as being “Judaic” due to the appearance of a menorah-like image on the reverse. Another menorah-like engraving was found on a ceramic pot dating to the late-8th c. in a burial near Mariupol. I would also posit, though this is by no means definitive, that one of the symbols found on a brick in Sarkel (see figs. 18-20), interpreted by Artamonov as a tamga, rather appears as a 5-branched menorah. This revised interpretation as a 5-branched menorah can be supported by other, earlier examples of 5-branched menorot epigraphic graffiti of undeniable Jewish provenance.

Finally, Pletnëva has interpreted the remains of a brick-built structural complex found in Sarkel as “public,” attributable as a synagogue because, she argues, it bears no inscriptions which would undoubtedly signify its use as a mosque, church or pagan sanctuary. According to Pletnëva, it was probably a synagogue because of the expensive nature of the construction and rarity of such a public edifice in the steppe context. However, this is obviously still quite a questionable claim, as it could easily be a caravanserai instead. Nevertheless, Flërov and Flërova, despite their doubts, have attempted to support her argument by pointing out that the building was probably not used for other less religious functions since no tools were found and also that no bones of specifically unclean, or un-kosher animals were

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165 See BAR, “Strata: Is This What the Temple Menorah Looked Like?” Referenced via the webpage: http://members.bib-arch.org/publication.asp?PubID=BSBA&Volume=37&Issue=06&ArticleID=22 (accessed 5/20/2015). According to the Biblical Archaeology Society Review editors, the Israeli Antiquities Authority (IAA) press release was quoted, “a passerby who saw the [Temple] menorah with his own eyes…incised his impressions on a stone.” The incised graffiti on the stone in question, found “in a 2,000-year-old drainage channel near the City of David,” appears as a roughly hewn five-branched menorah on a stone architectural fragment, bearing a close resemblance with one of the tamgas excavated by Artamonov from Sarkel. See previous n164 above.
166 Pletnëva, 1996, Саркел и «Шёлковый» Путь, 28.
167 For example, see Kovalev, 1999, “Критика,” 246-247 and Zhivkov, 2015, 255.
168 See for example the explanation given about caravanserais in Sarkel by Zhivkov, 2015, 159-160, 202 and their connection with Ifil”. This is rejected by Flërov, 2002, “Крепости Хазарии в долине Нижнего Дона (это к теме фортификации),” 155, though I do not find his argument entirely convincing.
169 Flërov and Flërova, 2005, 190.
found either.\textsuperscript{170} It should go without saying that the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence.

Therefore, it is completely impossible to state with absolute certainty that Jewish communities did not exist in various areas of Khazaria outside of Crimea. Clearly there were Jews, and where there were Jews, there were presumably Jewish communities. The archaeological evidence here, albeit sparse, is indisputable. However, the adoption of a writing system by which to recognize such epigraphic occurrences, infrequent as they may be, hardly attests to some sort of “state-sanctioned” mass conversion. As Golden has observed, “conversion at the top does not necessarily mean mass conversion.”\textsuperscript{171} If anything, the epigraphic evidence mentioned just above, with the exception of the menorah found on the bronze ring, indicates a literate group, which would then in turn indicate an illiterate group, hence, a literate elite and otherwise.\textsuperscript{172} Shepard has also argued that The Kievan Letter itself attests to a “functional literacy and long-distance correspondence of a sort among Judaist communities on the fringes of the Khazar dominions.”\textsuperscript{173} In this light, Jewish communities with functional literacy, clearly the elites, did exist in urban centers such as Kiev, Sarkel and the Dimitrievskij Complex of Khazaria, and in certain urban centers such as Kiev and particularly those in Crimea and Taman, continued to exist long afterwards.

Thus, the question becomes not so much whether there is archaeological evidence to support the presence of Judaism in Khazaria, but in which urban centers exactly were there communities of Jews and can we presume that they constituted the elite in a region wherein other monotheistic groups and pagans constituted other elites and commoners? As Szyszzyman has pointed out, it is unnecessary to understand the conversion of the Khazar khağans as more or less accompanying the conversion of all their subject populations simply because of the choice of their religion. He maintains that there was no conversion of the Khazars in their totality as such, but only individual conversions of kings and their retinues

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid, 192-193. However, camel bones found in the nearby Cimljansko gorodišče dating to the same period would seem to throw such a supposition into doubt. See for example Franklin and Shepard, 1996, The Emergence of Rus, 83.
\textsuperscript{171} Golden, 2007b, 159.
\textsuperscript{172} For other archaeological evidence of epigraphy and literacy in the SMC pertaining to social stratifications, see for example Afanas’ev, 1993, Донские аланы (социальные структуры алано-ассо- буркасского населения бассейна Среднего Дона), 151-153.
\textsuperscript{173} Shepard, 1998, 11.
and small groups elsewhere. While this may be true, and that such Judaism was quite rudimentary, judging by the assertion of King Joseph’s Reply of Obadiah strengthening the faith in the realm and introducing Mishnaic and Talmudic writings, it is also clear that Judaism practiced without such supplementary scriptures, or Karaïsm, was therefore quite limited as well. So with some qualifications, most scholars now regard Khazarian elites as having finally adopted rabbinical Judaism.

As per a literate elite specifically, Afanas’ev has argued that specifically Khazar tribal burials of the 8-9th c., as opposed to other tribal peoples such as Slavs, Alans, Burtas’, Adyges, et al., contained a standardized red-lined kurgan with square ditches. Such burials,  

174 Szyszman, 1982, 190. Specifically, he writes:

“Il ne faut donc pas comprendre la conversion des rois khazars comme accompagnée de la conversion (plus ou moins forcée) du peuple entier du seul fait du choix du souverain. Il n’y a pas eu de conversion des Khazars dans leur totalité à telle ou telle religion monothéiste, mais des conversions individuelles ou de groupes restreints.”

175 However, some scholars, such as Vachkov, 2008, 353 and Szyszcyman, 1982, 189-202 still adhere to the view that Khazar Judaism was actually Karaïsm.

176 For example, according to Brook, “The Khazar Capital City of Atil,” updated March 29, 2012, http://www.khazaria.com/atil.html, Vasil’ev, one of the lead archaeologists for the Samosdelka expedition, (see below §1.2.3), does not believe that most Khazars practiced rabbinical Judaism. Golden himself, 1983b, “Judaism in Khazaria,”138-139, states that the presence of rabbinical Judaism in Khazaria “of course, does not preclude the existence of Qaraite communities alongside Rabbanites in Khazaria.”

177 See for example Ankori, 1959, The Karaites in Byzantium, 64-79; and Róna-Tas, 1999, Hungarians and Europe in the Early Middle Ages: An Introduction to Early Hungarian History, 232.

178 Afanas’ev, 2001, 53. This is resolutely rejected by Zhivkov, 2015, 253-254 n136, who writes, “Ultimately, scientists have not yet found a necropolis or a burial type that could be identified as Khazar with any certainty.” However such typologically determinative interpretations of archaeological material as pertaining or belonging to particular cultural, or even “ethnic” groupings, as specifically Adyges, Burtas’, Alans, Magyars, Suvars, Bulgars, Oguz or Khazars directly contradicts admonitions against “culture-history,” heavily distrusted by contemporary archaeologists and historians such as Florin Curta, (personal Communication, 7 May, 2015). That said, typological material is still used to determine “ethnic identity” in funerary archaeology, especially in separating Khazars from Pečenegs and Cumans/Polovcỳ. Even Zhivkov, 2015, 260, supposes that “a gradual process of assimilation between Bulgars and Alans […] was reflected in the anthropological type and in the burial rites, especially during the ninth and tenth centuries.” See also Atavin, 2008, Погребальный обряд и имущественно-социальная структура кочевников лесостепной и степной зоны юга России в конце IX - первой половине XIII в. (печенеги, тюрки, половцы); and Afanas’ev and Atavin, 2002, Чего ж за такое хазарский погребальный обряд? Nevertheless, Matyushko, 2011, “Nomads of the Steppe near the Ural Mountains in the Middle Ages,” specifically promotes such a typologically determinist interpretation of kurgan burials when she writes:

“It is essential to point out that it is possible to derive ethnic data from features of the burial rites such as the character of the burial mound as well as the location and the way a horse was interred.”

As I will discuss in chapter 4 below, this archaeological methodology constitutes an interpretative flaw which I will attempt to debunk.
even though they call exurban steppe paganism to mind, indicate, he claims, the existence of a specifically Khazar elite.\textsuperscript{179} Similar claims, such as those of Ambroz, have been made about 9th-c. archaeological monuments in the middle-Dniepr as being exclusive to the Khazar elite,\textsuperscript{180} which would appear to correspond to the Khazarian frontier extending as far as, if not farther than, Kiev for most of the 9th c. In addition, we may consider finds from Sarkel dating to the Khazarian era of bronze mace-heads with tamga symbols (figs. 22-23),\textsuperscript{181} bronze human figures carrying maces on horseback (fig. 21),\textsuperscript{182} a horn fragment with a carved wolf-head motif (fig. 25),\textsuperscript{183} and a stone block with primitively carved images of two warriors fighting found in the Majacki gorodišče and dated to the Khazarian era\textsuperscript{184} as being typical of a nomadic elite. In addition, depictions of humans are clearly prohibited in Judaism, which consequently calls into doubt the extent of even the elite’s adoption of Judaism. So despite clear Hebrew epigraphic evidence pointing to a Jewish literate elite, it seems to me that Dunlop’s words are still, as ever, the most appropriate: “The character of the Khazars as Judaized Turks has constantly to be kept in mind. This probably means that their Judaism—limited no doubt in any case to a comparatively small group—was always superficial.”\textsuperscript{185}

Ch. 2: 1.2.2.2 Beyond elites? The debate about Judaization at the common level

King Joseph’s Reply seeks to persuade us that Judaism in Khazaria was a “state” affair, as Bulan allegedly converted “The whole of his people.”\textsuperscript{186} Schama and Coene, for example, take this indication at face value.\textsuperscript{187} In addition, Shepard supports a large

\textsuperscript{179} See also Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 80.

\textsuperscript{180} Ambroz, 1982, “О вознесенском комплексе VIII в. На Днепре- вопрос интерпретации,” 204-221.

\textsuperscript{181} Zalesskaja, et al., 1989, cat. no. 247.

\textsuperscript{182} Pletnëva, 1967, От кончной к городам: Салтово-маицкая культура, 178-179. Pletnëva has remarked that the object is possible to be interpreted as a depiction of the Turkic sky-god Tengri himself, as deity over the entire Khazar khağanate. This would also serve as evidence of the retention of indigenous pagan and/or syncretic traditions during and after possible monotheization in general or even possibly Judaization specifically.

\textsuperscript{183} Zalesskaja, et al., 1989, cat. no. 263. The wolf motif may fit in with the Turkic descent-myth from “a wolf ancestress.” See Golden, 2007b, 158.

\textsuperscript{184} Pletnëva, 1984, Маяцкое городище, 74. It would also be important to point out here that one of the figures was carved with what appears to be a phallus. This would provide further doubt into the Judaic nature of the carving.

\textsuperscript{185} Dunlop, 1954, The History of the Jewish Khazars, 195.

\textsuperscript{186} Kobler (trans.), 1953, Letters of Jews through the Ages, 110.

\textsuperscript{187} Schama, 2013, 266-267. Specifically, he writes:

“The Geniza fragments make it clear that the whole population (which in any case had a kernel of Jews from the Armenian flight), and that some six kings followed Bulan/Sabriel in the same path called by Hebrew names – Obadiah, Hezekiah, Menashe, Benjamin, Aaron and eventually Joseph.”
propagation of Judaism among the subject peoples of the khağanate, which he in turn bases on archaeological disappearance of large kurgan burials generally attesting to the residue of paganism. Zuckerman takes a different approach, but still concludes that Judaism reached below the upper strata: “the spread of Judaism among the Khazars was, in reality, more gradual and slow than the Letter would admit (though in no way limited to the upper class).” Of course while there is no way to prove the depth of permeation of Judaism in Khazaria based on textual sources alone, we may consider a combination of textual and archaeological information to surmise a conclusion.

However, archaeological evidence alone, or rather the lack thereof, is also only part of the story. Similarly, to base our conclusion upon textual analysis alone would relegate our conclusion to a very similar one to Golden’s understanding of a Khazarian “internalization” of Judaism. While I would certainly not disagree with Golden’s usage of Eaton’s model for the dating and social process and his idea of “internalization,” he does contend, based on the words of al-Faqīh (ca. 903) and ibn Fadlān (ca. 920-922), that Judaism had spread well beyond the elite by the late-9-10th century. Golden does not, however, include other authors’ words, which would support his conclusion as well, such as those of al-Masʿūdī (mid-10th c.), al-Muqaddasī (late-10th c.) and another writer, al-Hamdānī (mid-10th c.),

Coene, 2010, 109, writes: “Initially, it was only the upper classes who converted, but it seems that by 950 Judaism had found its way among all classes of society.”

Shepard, 1998, 18. Specifically, he writes: “If a number of individual Khazar notables were Jewish already before 860, it was during the 860s that Judaism became the majority—though probably not the mandatory—religion among the Khazars as a people.” Other popular historians have taken this view as well, such as Kriwaczek, 2005, Yiddish Civilization: The Rise and Fall of a Forgotten Nation, 46.


“‘All of the Khazars are Jews, but, they have been Judaized recently.’” See M. J. De Goeje (ed.), 1885, Kitāb al-Buldān, 298.

“‘The Khazars and their king are all Jews.’” See Wüstenfeld (ed.), 1866-1873, Jacut’s geographisches wörterbuch, [Kitāb Mu’jam al-Buldān], 104. Notably, while Golden himself appears to take this quote at face-value and uses it to base his argument on, he references in the corresponding footnote 105 on the same page, the later redactor of Fadlān’s work, Yāqūt al-Hamawī, as having included it while only the text “their king is a Jew” was previously used on the preceding page. He also notes that another later edition, compiled by a certain Sāmī ad-Dahān, omits the same part altogether.

Golden, 2007b, 159. Notably, this is also Brook’s (2006, 113-114) conception as well. However, Golden’s position here in 2007b seems to be a significant departure from his earlier statement: (Golden, 1983b, “Khazaria and Judaism,” 143, in which he writes “It seems probable, then, that in terms of absolute numbers, the Jews and Judaized elements constituted a minority.”)

Minorsky, 1958, 146. He writes: “The Jews are: the king, his entourage and the Khazars of his tribe (jins). The king accepted Judaism during the Caliphate of Rashīd (786-814).” This is largely corroborated by Istakhri, however, Istakhri tempers such a report with the confirmation that Jews of the khağān’s entourage make up the smallest number compared to other populations of Christians, Muslims and pagans.
importantly describing how “the Khazars, as a collective,” embraced Judaism in all its strictures from observing Shabbat and all other holidays, adopting the kosher dietary laws and ritual washing as well as circumcision. These are all very strong arguments for his conclusion, even if he does not utilize all of them. But to base an argument on textual sources alone means that their disagreements weaken the argument itself. For example, ibn Rusta (ca. 903-913) writes: “Their [the Khazars’] supreme authority [the khağan] is Jewish, and so is the īšā and those commanding officers and important men who support him. The rest follow a religion like the religion of the Turks.” Similarly, al-Istakhrī (mid-10th c.) writes: “The Khazars are Muslims and Christians and Jews, and among them are a number of idol worshippers. The smallest number are Jews and the largest Muslims and Christians, but the king and his entourage are Jews.” So Golden, relying on textual sources to support his claim, is unfortunately confounded by other sources, which appear to refute such his claim. Thus, if Golden’s claim is true, and the words of al-Faqīh and ibn Fadlān are worth more than those of ibn Rusta and al-Istakhrī, then I would expect a widespread Judaism among the subject peoples of Khazaria in the 9-10th centuries to be better documented archaeologically, which it is not. Since Flërov and Flërova have conceived of such a steppe-pagan adoption of Judaism as unabashedly unlikely, we too as historians cannot think of an entire, or even a large portion of subject peoples becoming Jewish, because that would miss the depth, or lack of depth, with which Judaism could even possibly be comprehended by ordinary people who had no access to literacy, on which Judaism, perhaps more than either Christianity or Islam, unequivocally depends.

194 See Lunde and Stone, 2012, 171. He writes: “Beyond the Caspian Sea is a large region called Khazar, a grim, forbidding place, full of herd animals, honey and Jews.” However, we should not automatically accept this source as the author himself admits that most of his information is second and third-hand sourcing. He also later refers to the standard mentions of large communities of Christians and Muslims and pagans.

195 Pines, 1962, “A Moslem Text Concerning the Conversion of the Khazars to Judaism,” 47. See also Brook, 2006, 95, 110. It is perhaps worthwhile to note here that al-Hamdānī was a Mu’tazilite, which may or may not increase the reliability of his testimony. The identification of a Mu’tazilite refers to a philosophical school of Islam popular in between the 9-10th centuries which emphasized human reason and rationalism as a more primary conduit for knowledge development as opposed to strict scriptural revelation. It may be opposed with the so-called “Age of Enlightenment.”

196 Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 116-117 (ibn Rusta); and al-Istakhrī (154).

197 Flërov and Flërova, 2005, 186. Specifically, they write:

“В научной и околонаучной литературе даже не обсуждается вопрос о подготовленности населения каганата не то что к принятию, но просто пониманию основ Танаха и Мишны. О Талмуде не стоит и заикаться. Последний и современным евреям
The best argument here I believe, based partially on archaeology, belongs to Shepard, as we will find, that arguments based on archaeological sources as well as textual sources, usually surpass those built solely on textual or archaeological sources separately. Noting the reports of Christian of Stavelot and al-Faqīh, Shepard surmises that since reliably pagan burials (kurgans raised over graves, outlined with square or circular trenches) throughout the rural steppe areas outside of the urban centers of Khazaria suddenly ceased by the mid-late-9th c. (ca. 860s), it would be conceivable that the khağans’ conversion “led to the abandonment of some of the most flagrantly pagan features of their burial-ritual.”

So we may consider that Golden’s conclusion is not backed up by real archaeological evidence and that Shepard makes a good point that “flagrantly pagan” burials are conspicuously absent during the latter part of the process of conversion. But I would suggest that this absence of “flagrantly pagan” burials in itself does not necessarily prove that the subject populations adopted Judaism in full, en masse. There are, for example, no shortage of pit and catacomb burials which are both normally associated with steppe paganism that date all the way up to the 10th century and even later. And the relative ubiquity of these types of burials in the Pontic-Caspian steppe and forest-steppe (SMC) between the 7-10th c. suggests mainly pagan populations. In addition, thirteen cases of trephination (drilling into the cranial cavity of the skull – see figs. 29-33) appear in burial grounds across the SMC. Skull trephination can attest not only to steppe paganism remaining among certain groups

I have translated this as:

“малодоступен. Стоит задуматься и о том, что житель каганата должен был освоить и принять хотя бы главные события еврейской истории с чуждыми ему именами, протекавшей в далёких и совершенно неизвестных областях ойкумены. Но без знания истории еврейского народа, изложенной в Торе, нельзя быть иудеем, как без знания основных вех жизни Христа невозможно христианин.”

I have translated this as:

“In scientific and pop-scientific literature, the issue of the preparedness of the population of the khağanate was not what to adopt, but the simple understanding of the fundamentals of the Tanakh and the Mishnah are not even discussed. About the Talmud is not worth even a stutter. The latter is nearly inaccessible even to modern Jews. It is worth thinking about the fact that a resident of the khağanate had to learn and adopt at least the major events of Jewish history with alien names occurring in distant and totally unknown areas of the oikoumenē. But without the knowledge of the history of the Jewish people, as set out in the Torah, the Jew cannot be a Jew, as without knowledge of the major milestones of Christ’s life, a Christian cannot be a Christian.”

within Khazaria, although it is as yet impossible to say if the practice belonged exclusively to the Khazarian elite, but only that such a practice is associated mostly with Turkic paganism, nomadism and migration. Such practices would have been especially forbidden by Jewish strictures, which are well known for prohibiting body modifications. For the adoption of Judaism, to say nothing of Christianity or Islam, we would need to imagine whole populations of illiterate nomads outside of the main cities settling down, adopting Hebrew as an alphabet and becoming agriculturists. Conversions are not difficult to believe; there is archaeological evidence, albeit slight, of these occurring. However, to believe, as Brook would have us, that the subject populations essentially adopted Judaism in full, based on his list of what aspects of Judaism exactly they adopted, is not only without evidence, particularly archaeological, but also an undeniable cavalcade of textual evidence as well, would be quite difficult. As Evgenij Gončarov, one of the lead excavators at Samosdelka working with Dmitrij Vasil’ev has put it (my translation):

“There is very little archaeological evidence of the propagation of this faith among the population of the Khazar khağanate. Almost all of them are found in the large ancient cities on the shores of the sea, where the population was mixed, inhabited by people of different religious beliefs. But in the towns in the steppe and in the mountains, in the tombs, there are practically no Jewish artifacts. Their

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203 Brook, 2006, 113-114, seems to be quite easily persuaded that Judaism was adopted in its full form by most ordinary peoples living within the Khazarian khağanate in the mid-9th century and he even goes so far as to list all the strictures of Judaism which he believes were fully adopted by ordinary people by that time. For Brook, these facets included: circumcision, observance of Hannukah, Passover, Shabbat, kosher dietary laws, Jewish law (Halacha) and ritual washing, study of Torah, Talmud and Mishnah, refraining from idol worship and constructing kurgans (he writes “simple burials”), imparting Hebrew names, constructing synagogues, using Hebrew script and language for all purposes and even building a tabernacle after that of Moses.

Unfortunately, Brook provides absolutely no archaeological evidence for these suppositions and his interpretation relies mostly on the textual sources we have already discussed. But we know from archaeology (see Afanas’ev, 2001, 53) that such kurgans were still being built, and Afanas’ev even goes so far as to postulate that they were built by and for specifically members of the Khazar tribes. Thus, Zhivkov, 2015, 67, asserts: “we have no reason to postulate that the nobility adhered strictly to the tenets of its professed religion.” Furthermore, Brook’s supposition would also appear to fly in the face of other scholars such as Róna-Tas, 1999, 348-349, who has argued that the Khazar beliefs, monotheistic or polytheistic, were “complex and syncretistic” which be not at all befit a population-wide conversion to a strict Jewish life-regimen. In turn, Róna-Tas is here also supported by Golden, 2007c, 185: “I think Róna-Tas’s view is closer to the mark.”
quantity does not allow us to think about the propagation of Judaism among the Khazars. Unfortunately, we do not know of the burials of the Khazar khağan-kings and we do not know by what rites they were buried, or if there is anything in their graves.»204

Simply put, although Shepard makes perhaps one of the most balanced and nuanced arguments for the archaeology of Judaism in Khazaria, the lack of archaeological evidence does not allow us to assume that we can believe in a large spread of Judaism among the subject populations in Khazaria. If anything, it signals the precise opposite, but mostly, it signals very little at all. If we are still left asking where are more menorot, where are more Hebrew inscriptions and tombstone epitaphs, where are all the easily recognizable synagogues, where is the tabernacle, we can only assume for the time being that they were never there. Of course it is possible that once-purposed Hebrew tombstones were later used as spolia and once–purposed synagogues were later converted to churches or mosques, but our evidence therein is still quite slim. To date, there are textual references to mosques in Khazaria as well,205 to say nothing of the references to a broad Christianization and church-

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204 Evgenij Gončarov, personal communication, 4/14/2015. Originally, his words are as follows:

“Существует очень мало археологических доказательств распространения этой веры среди населения Хазарского каганата. Практически все они найдены в крупных древних городах на берегах моря, где население было смешанным, жили люди разных религиозных представлений. Но в городах в степи и в горах, в могильниках, иудейских памятников практически нет. Количество их не позволяет думать о распространении иудаизма среди хазар. К сожалению, нам не известны погребения хазарских каганов-царей и мы не знаем по какому обряду их хоронили, есть ли что-нибудь в их могилах.”

He goes on to say:

“1. Для суждения об основной, наибольшей, части населения Хазарии у нас есть археологические данные. В них никакого присутствия иудаизма нет. Скорее всего его и не было.
2. Для суждения о вере элиты у нас нет археологических данных, но есть некоторые письменные источники, по которым получается, что элита (какая-то её часть) приняла иудаизм.”

I have translated this as:

“1. To judge about the basic, largest part of the population of Khazaria, we have archaeological evidence. In it, there is no presence of Judaism. Most likely, there was none.
2. To judge the faith of the elite, we have archaeological evidence, but there are some written sources, which it turns out that the elite (some part of it) converted to Judaism.”

205 The 12th-c. Muslim author, al-Garnaṭī mentions several mosques in his travels to Saksin, previously called Itīl’. See Hamidullin (ed.), 2000, “Ал-Гарнати о гузах, печенегах, хазарах и булгарах,” 98-99; Dubler (ed. and trans.), 1953, Abū Ḥāmid el Granadino y su relación de viaje por tierras euroasiáticas,
building effort alluded to in the *Notitiae Episcopatum*. In short, the *Moses* coinage and *King Joseph’s Reply* give us a hint of what the *khağans* and kings wanted us to believe, but they do not necessarily give us the entire truth.

I will conclude this section with the admission that Judaism is hardly a faith, compared to Christianity, Islam or various paganisms, which leaves behind significant amounts of material traces. So having said that, it is, of course, entirely possible that a great deal of the subject populace of Khazaria adopted Judaism in the second half of the 9th c. and into the 10th c., but we will never know. We do know that the archaeological evidence is scanty and therefore suggests otherwise. We also know that urban and sedentary lifestyles were limited in Khazaria as compared to Byzantium or the Caliphate, and I would be very skeptical of any strict flavor of rural monotheism among steppe nomads at this time. So I believe Judaism in Khazaria should be connected to urban centers such as Kiev, Sarkel, Itīl’ and particularly those of the Khazarian Crimea, for which the scanty archaeological evidence we do possess for Judaism, excluding Itīl’ and Sarkel of course, at least exists at the appropriate times. That being said, such urban living would also broadly correspond to elites and the archaeologically confirmed luxury goods they possessed which contained epigraphy and other symbols of Judaism such as menorot. That there was Judaism and literate peoples is now undeniable. That literacy was probably a significant trace of urban elites is quite conceivable. But the problem with Judaism-as-elite-religion or even Judaism-as-state-religion is that they are archaeologically indistinguishable from simple urban Jewish

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50-52; and Vasil’ev, 2011, *Самосдельское городище: вопросы изучения и интерпретации*, 160. According to Vasil’ev, interpreting the words of al-Garnafi:

“‘There are forty tribes of Guzes, each of which has its own emir. They have big houses; each dwelling is a huge tent accommodating a hundred people and covered with felt.’ The same al-Garnati mentions as amongst the city’s population are still more Bulgars, Suvars and Khazars (probably the remains of the population, preserved since the Khazar Khanate). Moreover, each of these tribes had its own mosque and quarter.”

That being said, structures of specifically Islamic function such as mosques have yet to be revealed as archaeological evidence from Samosdelka. However, Garnafi’s words should serve to nevertheless give us insight on what became of Judaism among the Khazar subject peoples after the decline of the Khazaria as a serious steppe power in the late-10th century.

206 See below chapter 5 §1.2.1.

207 This has not stopped Holo, 2009, 169, for example, from assuming that Khazar Jews were “semi-nomadic.”

208 In point of fact, even in Sarkel, no archaeological material such as inscribed images of menorot or Hebrew epigraphy has been discovered which overtly indicates the presence of Judaism. See for example Pletněva, 1996, 216.
communities. If we cannot distinguish Judaism-as-state-religion from simple Jewish communities living in urban centers such as those of the Crimean and Taman Peninsulas, then how can we interpret these finds as material evidence of Judaism-as-state-religion in Khazaria? They may well fit in with textual evidence that Judaism was the “state” religion and sanctioned by the beg and khağan themselves, but to gauge how much of the subject populace followed suit would be to implicitly base an argument on archaeological material, for which there is of course little evidence.

Finally, there are other conclusions we may certainly make regardless of the social extent of the conversion. For example, for DeWeese, no matter how many converted to Judaism or when exactly they did so, the impact was limited to no more than four centuries. This would also imply that he does not take the Khazar-Ashkenazi descent theory seriously. However, I think Schama’s words are the most poetic, while at the same delivering the simplest and most persuasive conclusion on the true nature of the extent and perseverance of Judaism in Khazaria:

“The century of official Jewish Khazaria may not have been long enough to have rooted itself sufficiently to withstand the invasions from the Rus. When that happened, just two decades after the opening between Cordoba and Atil, it is impossible to say what proportion of the Khazar Jews left and how many stayed under the new religions.”

Ch. 2: 1.2.3 The archaeology of Itīl’

Now that we have delved considerably into the issues of the timing and extent of Judaism in Khazaria, whether or not you agree with my previous conclusions, it will be archaeological evidence that will confirm and/or deny them. So to continue the discussions and analyses of the principal disagreements about Khazaria paying particular attention to archaeological evidence, we now turn to Itīl’ itself. Can we identify the famed Jewish capital

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209 DeWeese, 1994, 316-317. Specifically, he writes:

“In the case of the Khazars, we can trace the echoes of the conversion legend for approximately two centuries of Khazar history, although the story itself had greater longevity outside the community directly concerned by it; the extent and legacy of Khazar Judaism remains a hotly debated issue, but we are certainly justified in assuming that the narrative of the Khazar conversion did not ‘speak to’ an active Jewish community that adopted that conversion story as the defining moment in its history for more than four centuries at the very most.”

of Khazaria? In the following subsections, I will seek to contribute an answer to this question and to characterize the features of urbanity in Khazaria.

1.2.3.1 Samosdelka and the Atlantis of Čistoj Banki

Originally, basing his assumptions on King Joseph’s Reply, Artamonov speculated that Itil’ belonged somewhere about 125km northwest of Astrakhan on the Volga somewhat near the modern Russian town of Selitrennoje.211 Galkina, however, has shown that to base an archaeological assumption solely on a single textual source, can be highly misleading.212 Furthermore, material found at the site yielded no artifacts datable before the time of the Golden Horde.213 Clearly a more measured approach is called for.

According to Gumilëv, whose 1966 work Открытие Хазарии,214 holds that Itil’ must have become submerged due to water level changes over the centuries. The reference to a “steppe Atlantis,” which in this case pithily captures the mystery of the island of Čistoj Banki, is not my invention; it is Gumilëv’s. He specifically claimed that the site of Itil’ was near the offshore and largely submerged island of Čistoj Banki just outside the Volga delta.215 There is some evidence, both archaeological and textual,216 for the rise of the Caspian Sea since the late-10th c. by about 15-16m.217 As such, it has been used to support the theory of the submergence of either Itil’ or Saksin, as the city was called after Itil’ according to al-Garnati.218 The site of Čistoj Banki as the legendary Itil’, however, was initially supported by a number of scholars such as Magomedov, Vasil’kov219 and the Japanese photojournalist

211 Artamonov, 1962, 385-399.
212 Galkina, 2006, 132-145.
214 Gumilëv, 1966c Открытие Хазарии.
219 Magomedov, 1983, Образование хазарского каганата; and idem et al., 1997, “Каспийская Атлантида,” 51-60. See also Vasil’ev’s refutation: 2011, 162 and also Vasil’ev and Zilivinskaia, 2006b, “Городище в дельте Волги,” 43-44. Here, they write:

“Однако участник одной из первых экспедиций на Чистую Банку, профессор Астраханского государственного технического университета П.И. Бухарицын, рассказал, что в данном случае мы имеем дело с курьёзом. «Валы цитадели» на самом деле были насыпаны в 1960-х годах, когда начался подъём уровня Каспия и вода стала подтапливать находившуюся на острове животноводческую ферму. Магнитосъёмка острова с использованием геофизической аппаратуры показала весьма малую вероятность того, что хазарская столица была расположена здесь.”
Hirokawa due to finds of seemingly medieval walls and ramparts. Unfortunately, Hirokawa, though not an archaeologist or historian but in fact a political activist involved in the PLO, appears to be quite keen on proving the existence of Judaism in Itīl’ and Khazaria, perhaps in connection with support of the Khazar-Ashkenazi descent theory. Nevertheless, the “rampart citadel walls” were proven to have been poured in during the 1960s and a further geophysical survey of the island showed that the place was highly unlikely to have been the location of Itīl’. Thus, in Zhivkov’s words, attested “to the bankruptcy of Gumilëv’s theory.” Needless to say, such discussion of Čistoj Banki as Itīl’ ceased after the 1990s with Dmitrij Vasil’ev’s discovery of “une ville d’importance” close to a small village in the Volga delta named Samosdelka.

A major city has been discovered in Samosdelka by the joint expedition from Astrakhan State University and Moscow State University, funded by the Russian Jewish Congress and led by Vasil’ev and Zilivinskaja. However, the site itself is in fact three cities, or rather three settlement phases of the same city, built one top of each other, roughly corresponding to the Khazarian Itīl’ period, then the Saksin Oğuz period and finally the period of the Golden Horde. That said, the excavators have had to excavate each habitation layer separately before reaching any conclusions about the city of Itīl’ pertaining to Khazaria.

Vasil’ev’s belief in the site’s identification with Itīl’ has also recently received a considerable scholarly consensus. Brook seems to believe wholeheartedly in Vasil’iev’s...

I have translated this as:

However, a member of one of the first expeditions to Chistoj Banki, a Professor of Astrakhan State Technical University, P. I. Bukharicyn, purported that we are dealing with an anomaly in this case. The “Citadel ramparts” were actually poured in during the 1960s, when the sea level began to rise and the water began to heat a little livestock farm on the island. Using geophysical instruments, the magneto-survey of the island showed a very small probability that the Khazar capital was located here.

220 Hirokawa, 1992, “ハザールの首都発見?” [“Has the Capital of the Khazars been Discovered?”]. See also Brook, 2006, 21.
221 Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind, 197 n1.
222 Ibid, 232 n1. They write: “The theory continues to be treated as credible in Japan, promoted by both the left and the right. See ‘Yudaya teikoku Hazaaru maboroshi no shuto?’ […] which reports on the leftist writer Hirokawa Ryûichi’s recent investigations.”
223 Zhivkov, 2015, 205. As the words of Gumilëv are translated in Zhivkov’s work by D. Manova (205 n159), “the Khazars lived peacefully in the dense coastal thickets out of reach for the nomads, with whom they were constant enemies.
supposition that Samosdelka, or the post-Khazarian Saksin, was the original site of Itīl’. In addition, Ivik and Ključnikov also agree with Vasil’ev principally because of the presence of a fired-brick-built fortress, which was exclusively the construction material of the *khağans*.

In terms of a royal monopoly on brick-construction, the special symbolism of brick-built edifices is a relatively well-attested phenomenon in the nomadic and semi-nomadic steppe context. In fact, there is even a destruction layer rendered in ash corresponding to the brick-fortress at levels from the late-10th century, which have been associated with the conquest of Khazaria by Svjatoslav, father of Vladimir of Kiev, 965-969 (see below chapter 5 §1.2.2).

Furthermore, archaeologists from other Russian universities, such as the University of Elista in Kalmkiya, have generally supported Vasil’iev’s claims that the site nearby Samosdelka is in fact the remains of Itīl’. Aside from Vasil’kov and Magomedov, the only other serious doubters of Vasil’ev’s thesis are Erdélyi and even Afanas’ev himself, which is a notable attestation of doubt, although as we have already considered, Afanas’ev is himself not without his own questionable methodologies for locating what he terms as “ethnic Khazar territories” referred to as “Furth-as,” using highly dubious 9-10th-c. Islamic cartographical and geographical guesswork.

In terms of other supporting evidence that Samosdelka is the site of what was once Itīl’, there are factors to be noted, both corresponding to textual evidence and otherwise. As

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227 Bálint, 1981, 399. This has also been assumed to be linked to a *terminus ante quem* of the SMC by Aksēnov, 2006, “Форпост Верхний Салтов.” 76. On the contrary, Zhivkov, 2015, 262, seems to believe that this was not the end of Khazaria, but that it was reassembled in the Taman and eastern Crimea afterward.
229 Erdélyi and Benko, [date unavailable], “Some Problems Of The Khazar Archaeology,” Referenced via the webpage: [http://enu.kz/repository/repository2013/KHAZAR-ARHEOLOGY.pdf](http://enu.kz/repository/repository2013/KHAZAR-ARHEOLOGY.pdf), (accessed 5/19/2015). The authors seem to believe that Itīl’ is in fact located “at the same place as Volgograd.” However, this would seem to be disputed by Zhivkov, 2015, 195, who thinks that it was Sarkel instead, which “implemented the water link between the west and the east part of Khazaria, between the Don and the Volga.”
231 Idem, 2007, “Поиск страны Фурт-ас,” 74-79. Incidentally, it would seem appropriate to note here that an entry in a pop-scientific journal such as this is referred to by Flërov and Flërova (2005, 186) as completely lacking in reference to the real nature of conversion to Judaism as undertaken and practiced by ordinary people in light of the Tanakh, Mishnah and Talmud, which the authors state, “are not even discussed.”
Vasil’ev and Zilivinskaja have not denied Gumilëv’s definitive proof of significant environmental changes in the past thousand years in the Volga delta and the changes in sea level of the Caspian, they have demonstrated that environmental changes within and pertaining to a given settlement often lead to settlement migration. In terms of textual sources, we know for example that the nomadic Oğuz were “formidable allies of the Khazars.” Vasil’ev believes that much of the ceramic finds at the site correspond to typologically Oğuz ceramics. However, in terms of typologically indicative studies of ceramics, there are only vague references about a possible correspondence to typically SMC ceramics in any traces found at Samosdelka thus far and ceramic attribution to the “Oğuz” as an ethnic phenomenon is hardly verifiable anyway. As for coinage, few finds are datable before the time of the Golden Horde. In fact, no reliable coinage samples dated as early as the tenth century have been found thus far. What have been found however, are dugout yurt-shaped dwellings highly indicative, by scholarly consensus, of the settlement and gradual sedentarization of previously steppe nomads. Finally, the last bit of evidence which I find the most convincing and which ties together the textual and archaeological material is the testimony of al-Garnatī, who had lived in Saksin during the 12th c. He writes that the town was in his time the only city in the Volga delta, and it was a major city, which is what Vasil’ev, Zilivinskaja and their teams have uncovered: a city of grandiose proportions dating back to the 8th c. is singular for the Volga delta. Nevertheless, neither specifically Judaic artifacts have been

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232 Archibald Dunn, personal communication, 22 March 2015.
233 Vasil’ev, 2006a.
234 Curta, 2006a, 178.
235 Vasil’ev, 2006a. This is extrapolated on further in idem, 2011, 27-28.
236 For example, despite conceding numerous times that material culture does not actually reveal so-called “ethnic-markings,” Zhivkov, 2015, 200 still engages in his tendency for “culture-history” fantasy, writing:

“Evidence shows that in many of the settlements Slavs and Saltovians lived side by side. It is hardly a coincidence that the places where Volyntsevo pottery has been found were colonized by Saltovians in the ninth and tenth centuries.”

238 Zilivinskaja (Vasil’ev), 2011, 4.
239 Evgenij Gončarov, personal communication, 13 April, 2015.
240 Vasil’ev, 2006a, “Итиль-Мечта.” This is extrapolated on further in ibidem, 2011, Самосельское городище, 48-59.
241 Vasil’ev, 2006a. He writes: “Кроме ал-Гарнати, который прожил здесь около 20 лет и даже имел здесь семью, в городе Саксине, единственном городе в дельте Волги, говорят и другие арабские
uncovered from the site,\textsuperscript{242} numismatic, sigillographic or epigraphic, nor any epigraphy whatsoever proving that the site was in fact either Saksin or Itīl’ beyond a shadow of a doubt.

Effectually, we know that there was only one city in the Volga delta that dated to Khazarian times and that before it was called Saksin by the 12\textsuperscript{th} c., it had been called Itīl’. Since three separate phases of a city have been found at Samosdelka, with the earliest layers dating to the 8\textsuperscript{th} c., it seems likely for the time being at least, that the site was once home to legendary Itīl’, even if the site itself has heretofore revealed nothing else archaeologically definitive for the questions of Judaism in Khazaria. Thus, it is still impossible to archaeologically prove that Itīl’ was even a capital, let alone a Jewish one.

\textsuperscript{242} Flērov and Flērova, 2005, 188. They believe that the question of Judaic artifacts being uncovered at Itīl’ is not only no long possible, but no longer relevant.
Ch. 2, part 2: Sedentarization in space; monotheization in time

2.1 Monotheization and medentarization: two gradual and parallel processes

As we have previously discussed, monotheization and sedentarization, while not completely simultaneous, are both part and parcel of a larger process, tending toward the settlement of peoples and the end of their respective völkerverwanderungszeiten. Viewed from the thoroughly monotheistic and sedentary empires (Christian Rome and the Islamic Caliphate), such peoples, with their fluctuating ethnonyms, variously expressed and ignored or oversimplified in the documents of court historians, all constituted Scythians for Atticizing and non-Atticizing historians alike and “represented the universal threat of barbarism to civilization.” Only by sedentarizing and monotheizing, could they join the oikoumenē or the ummah. In the case of Khazaria, Noonan has tied the two processes together when he writes: “by the tenth century, the Khazars of the Qaganate were a motley group of converts to Judaism as well as traditional pagans who were engaged in agriculture, viticulture, and pastoral nomadism.” In the following section, I will move on from the subject-specific debates about the “when,” “who” and “where” of Khazar Judaization toward a broader consideration of Judaism and sedentarism as parallel lived experiences according to both the primary Khazarian texts and settlement archaeology in Khazaria. I will begin with the partial monotheization of Khazaria via both textual and archaeological sources and will subsequently move on to sedentarization in Khazaria.

2.1.1 Monotheization

Although we have already discussed the debates around who converted to Judaism and when in Khazaria, this subsection is meant to explore in detail the nature of not only Judaism, but also the other Abrahamic confessions in the urban areas of Khazaria, as lived phenomena, instead of as simple labels on a preformed map, so to speak.

243 See for example the discussion by Kaldellis, 2013, Ethnography After Antiquity, 125, of a comparative monotheist image of paganism and nomadism. He writes: “The image of the savage nomad was flexible enough that it could cross religious boundaries.” However, this is by no means a clear-cut comparison, as many scholars, particularly Jewish historians, have theorized that Judaism (in particular among other monotheisms), is more akin to nomadism while paganism is to be fixed in a single place. However, such arguments present very little evidence, either textual or archaeological, to support such claims. See for example Chatlain, 1999, Without Horizon, 13-16.

244 See the discussion on this topic given by Stephenson, 2000a, 107-110.

The preservation of pre-monotheistic (pre-Judaic) customs

Again as we have previously discussed, religious syncretism between multiple monotheisms and even indigenous paganism and a characteristic lack of strict adherence to a single faith in general was typical of all steppe nomads, and in Khazaria in particular. DeWeese, for example, firmly holds the view that the dogged persistence of Turkic Tengri shamanism after initial Judaic penetration is the rule and hardly the exception. But he maintains that nominal nomadic conversion to Judaism need not have remained nominal: rabbinic Orthodox Judaism can be adopted in time within the steppe context. I agree with him, even though this can hardly be archaeologically proven. However, textual sources such as King Joseph’s Reply, the Schecter Text and the Kievan Letter can hardly persuade us that the entire realm and its inhabitants were Judaized. In many ways such sources contradict not only each other but also themselves: in the textually alleged Judaization of Khazaria, we find it was predicated not so much on decrying the old Tengri-shamanism so much as incorporating it into a new Judaic tradition. Thus we find the elements of what Golden proposes to apply to the Judaization of Khazaria: Eaton’s model of conversion, ie. of inclusion, identification and displacement. This is reflected according to DeWeese by the Khazarian Jewry absorbing the aforementioned Jewish refugees from foreign Jewish communities, which our native Khazar sources themselves require for their own Jewish internalization, reflected by episodes such as the khağan’s destruction of a mosque in response to the destruction of a synagogue or the Schecter Text’s reference to a “return to Judaism.” Finally, we find that once again, “Judaized” Khazaria was not so much an historical anomaly as it was a religious adoption which shared many traits with other

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246 See above chapter 1 §2.2.2.2.
247 DeWeese, 1994, 301-302. See also Zhivkov, 2015, 19.
248 See for example Curta, 2008, “Introduction,” 9. He quotes the prominent Bulgarian scholar Vachkova, writing:

“Khazaria ‘did not mind being the New Israel, but never developed the idea of a sacred New Jerusalem; it adopted Judaism, but not the Talmudic theology; the Khazar ruler declared himself a successor of David and Solomon,’ while still maintaining the old, Turkic forms of power representation.”

250 DeWeese, 1994, 311.
252 Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 58. See also n33 above.
historical conversions.\textsuperscript{254} For examples, despite the choice of Judaism, many processes in the Khazar\textit{ian khağans’} conversion(s) can be compared to the “Christianizations” of Danube Bulgaria, Hungary, Rus’ or even Francia, Germany or Anglia, or the “Islamizations” of Volga Bulgaria or the Golden Horde.\textsuperscript{255}

We can now move on from textual interpretations of the perseverance of paganism in Khazaria and look at archaeological finds which attest to the retention of indigenous nomadic and Turkic pagan traditions and suggestively polytheistic artifacts. There have been no shortage of cast bronze sun discs and serpent-legged goddess amulets discovered in kurgans and other burial complexes typologically linked to the \textit{SMC in gorodišči} such as Saltovo, Sarkel or the Dimitrievsko Complex, or linked to north-Caucasian finds.\textsuperscript{256} In the past, one of the sun discs has been interpreted as signifying Judaism due to its six-pointed shape (fig. 26). However it is fairly common knowledge that the Magen-David star symbol was adopted as “Judaic” much later and in much different circumstances.\textsuperscript{257} These have frequently been interpreted as signifying steppe and north-Caucasian (understood as nomadic and semi-nomadic \textit{SMC} and Alanian) paganism. One, discovered in Sarkel we have discussed, it has been observed that their use was discontinued by the late 9\textsuperscript{th} century, and as such, has been used as an archaeological argument for the adoption of Judaism-as-state-religion.\textsuperscript{258} Khazar\textit{ian-era} dated kurgans themselves attest to the retention of pagan traditions.\textsuperscript{259} Other artifacts have indicated images which would clearly have been seen as heretical in Judaism, such as images of a warrior figure on horseback, one including what appears to be a phallus (fig. 21).\textsuperscript{260} Images such as these would have clearly been frowned upon by Judaism-as-state-religion at best or outlawed at worst. In addition, tamga symbols found not only in

\textsuperscript{254} See for example Vachkova, 2008, 353.

\textsuperscript{255} For further readings on these and other respective “peoplehood” conversions to varying monotheisms in regard to the creation of their ethnic identities, see §3.1.2.2 below.

\textsuperscript{256} See for example Leskov, 2008, cat. nos. 115-122. For other examples, see Zaleskaja et al., 1989, cat. nos. 181, 182, 195, 196, 197, 204; and Artamonov, 1962, 291, 296-298. On the significance of the serpent-legged goddess, see Zhitkov, 2015, 118-119. In a broader Black Sea steppe context, see Ascherson, 1995, \textit{Black Sea}, 118-119.

\textsuperscript{257} See for example Wyszomirska, 1989, “Religion som enande politisk-social länk—exemplet: Det Kazariska riket,” 138-144; and Brook, 2006, 113 n148 (122-123) for a brief history of the symbol in a Jewish context.

\textsuperscript{258} Pletnëva, 1984, 74. See also Zaleskaja et al., 1989, cat. no. 209. See also above n184.

\textsuperscript{259} Curta makes an analogous argument for the 9-11\textsuperscript{th}-c. southern Balkans: 2016, “Burials in Prehistoric Mounds: Reconnecting with the Past in Early Medieval Greece,” 269-285.

\textsuperscript{260} Pletnëva, 1984, 74. See also Zaleskaja et al., 1989, cat. no. 209. See also above n184.
Crimea on tombstones, but on bricks found not only in Sarkel,\textsuperscript{261} and also in the gorodišče of Semikarakorsk,\textsuperscript{262} point to the continued use of indigenous Turkic engravings to signify possession as opposed to the usage of recognizably monotheistic alphabets such as Hebrew, Greek or Arabic.\textsuperscript{263} Such tamgas have also been found on mace heads from Sarkel.\textsuperscript{264} Furthermore, what has been described as a pincushion with the evil-eye pattern (fig. 23),\textsuperscript{265} typical of Byzantine wares, has been unearthed in Sarkel dating to the 9-10\textsuperscript{th} c. Finally, a figure described by Pletnëva, herself the staunch advocate of archaeological proof of Judaism in Khazaria, as a depiction of the Turkic sky-god Tengri himself,\textsuperscript{266} lends testimony to the continued presence of traditional steppe paganism and polytheism in Khazaria throughout the 7-10\textsuperscript{th} centuries, particularly in urban centers as well.

In the light of textual and archaeological evidence of the retention of indigenous polytheism in Khazaria, the analysis has tended, as we have already discussed, to focus on some sort of indigenous reaction against the Judaic reforms of Bulan-Sabriel or Obadiah depending on whichever scholars’ beliefs have been apparently vindicated by either archaeological or textual evidence. Again, as we have discussed, this is principally demonstrated by the numerous attempts to tie “the Qabar revolt” mentioned in the DAI to nomadic reaction against Judaization.\textsuperscript{267} It has been my own policy not to partake in such arguments as they are fundamentally impossible to prove or disprove with archaeological material.\textsuperscript{268} With textual evidence alone however, my own view is that the DAI is generally a trustworthy source of material (see below chapter 5 §2.1) and so I would find such uncorroborated theories as “the Qabar revolt” somewhat inconceivable if they cannot be archaeologically attested or dated, even if the 840s may invariably be the least problematic for such a dating. Nevertheless, internal strife and nomadic reaction is almost beyond doubt in the case of any monotheizing process, and Judaization would appear to be no exception.

\textsuperscript{261} Brook, 2006, 30-31.
\textsuperscript{262} Flërov and Flërova, 2005, 191. Notably, Zhivkov, 2015, 2015, 194; and Pletnëva, 1999, 85 confirm that the entire region of the Upper and Lower Don River Valley in this period was significantly populated and thoroughly sedentarized.
\textsuperscript{263} See for example Golden, 1992, 152, who writes: “In time, as elsewhere in the medieval world, writing systems were determined by religious affiliation.”
\textsuperscript{264} Zaleskaia et al., 1989, cat. no. 247.
\textsuperscript{265} Ibid, cat. no. 243.
\textsuperscript{266} Pletnëva, 1967, 178-179.
\textsuperscript{267} See the greater discussion of the “Qabar revolt” theory above §1.2.1.2.
\textsuperscript{268} See for example Bálint, 1981, 412.
Ch. 2: 2.1.1.2 “Internalization”

Therefore, I believe Golden’s model of the gradual “internalization” of Judaism in Khazaria to be a helpful notion, which can help our conceptions of other monotheizations in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia we will discuss in the following chapters. Golden’s understanding of the internalization of Judaism among the Khazar elite, derived from the notion of a legendary “return to Judaism,” is based solely on the Schechter Text and King Joseph’s Reply.\(^{269}\) I do not disagree with his conclusion that these two sources imply that Judaism became “internalized” and that the adoption of Judaism was as much a statement of identity as it was an adoption of a code of law, writing system, et al., but as DeWeese has noted, it is highly significant as a “return” rather than a run-of-the-mill “conversion.”\(^{270}\) That being said, such internalization should also not be overstated either. For example, Schama, taking it at face-value, has argued that the Schechter Text bears witness to a heavily invested identification with Judaism, along with a full adoption of the ritual strictures imposed therein. While Schama’s interpretation and summary of the source may be grounded in a dose of healthy scepticism yet broadly trusting of it, he nevertheless grasps the simple truth expressed in it. For Schama, even if the Schechter Text itself contains numerous embellishments, as all conversion stories inevitably do, it does convey a sense of the inherent internalization of Judaism among some portion of the population subject to the Khazarian khağans.\(^{271}\) Some elements of the narrative reflect a blending of indigenous Khazar Turkic characteristics such as the sacred “cave in the plain of TYZWŁ”\(^{272}\) in which the scripture was

\(^{269}\) Golden, 2007b, 157-158.

\(^{270}\) DeWeese, 1994, 305.

\(^{271}\) Schama, 2013, 266. He writes, summarizing and then interpreting the document:

“Written in Hebrew (this is itself something of a miracle) the author identifies himself as a Khazar Jew, but instead of a sudden epiphanyous conversion, tells a more drawn-out history of a ‘return’ to Judaism[…] [Byzantine Jews] received a hospitable welcome and remained for many generations, intermarrying and, in the words of one of the fragments, ‘became one people’, most of them, as is the way, losing the letter of strict observance which became little more than the practice of circumcision and keeping the Sabbath. But precisely because over time they had become fully Khazar, one of the Jews became a bek of their armies and after a particularly spectacular victory, he was elevated to the kingship. The bek who became known by the Hebrew word for king, melekh, is likely to have been the Bulan in the ‘reply’, and although estranged from the religion was encouraged by his wife Serakh, also of Jewish descent but more faithful, to stage the famous debate which might indeed have been a historical event.”

\(^{272}\) Golb and Pritsak (ed. and trans.), 1982, 110-111. According to Zhivkov, 2015, 75, “the mountain and the cave are situated in Dagestan and were most probably the site of the ancient pagan sacral center of the Khazars.” See the discussion in his n254 on the same page.
received, and of course the inclusion and identification of the new sacred scripture itself, or the new (“returned to”) religion “completely.”

Golb and Pritsak have even gone so far as to claim that the Schechter Text should be interpreted “on the basis of local Jewish (not royal Khazar) traditions and other epic traditions.” In addition, King Joseph’s Reply implies that the khağan’s sacred synagogue was not much more than a convenient place to store his treasure, much as nomadic Turkic warlords had sought after for millennia. While I would certainly agree with these scholars that the document surely carries the flavor of initially shamanistic Turkic elements, we cannot forget that the documents are undeniably retrospectively Judaized.

As DeWeese points out: despite the mythologization of the conversion story, in converting to Judaism, there was nevertheless a religious “displacement” in the reality of the event. The mythologization occurred only afterward and constituted the Judaization of earlier pagan stories, figures and traditions. Still, I would doubt that such a sweeping epic narrative could have been produced by any other than a highly literate individual or community which indicates some sort of Khazarian elite as a candidate for its authorship. The debate over authorship aside, what the document makes clear is that Judaism was the determining factor of the “peoplehood” of Khazaria, or at the very least, its elite. The question remains then, what sort of religious syncretism, or “lived religion,” could have been appropriated alongside various versions of Judaism in Khazaria to make such a homogenous “peoplehood” viable, particularly in the presence of not only steppe paganism but Christianity and Islam in urban centers as well?

Ch. 2: Homogeneity and heterogeneity in Khazaria

There is much debate about the heterogeneity of the subject population(s) of Khazaria. Was it a genuine ethnic “melting pot” of many different creeds and peoples, or was it relatively more homogenous due to the alleged top-down (potestarian) Judaism-as-state-religion? Or was there a process and counter-process of homogenization via Judaization, but

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273 Ibid, 131.
274 Ibid, 129.
275 See Kokovcov (ed. and trans.), 1932, 94; and Flērov and Flērova, 2005, 192.
276 DeWeese, 1994, 305-306. Many of the same elements of inclusion, identification and displacement as well as retrospective mythologization, can be seen for example in the PVL as well.
277 Specifically, I refer to the discussion above §1.2.2.1.
of course simultaneous resistance and dogged heterogeneity? The preeminent Swedish Khazar archaeologist Bozena Werbart, for example, has described her interpretation of the situation:

“From the end of the 8th until the 10th century the multiple, large nomad pot was transformed into a homogeneous image of the state and cultures. The well-organized trade and diplomatic interrelations, the multitude of finds, the transition and prosperity of the economy, architecture, art, handicrafts, coinage, and the knowledge of writing, all indicated pluralism, multi-culturalism, influences and contacts across large territories.”

The heterogeneous model carries much weight in the present state of research. Horváth claims that grave goods in the Lower Volga dating to the period in question suggest “a population of ethnically mixed origin—up to the end of the tenth century still within the confines of the Khazar Empire.” Kaplan writes: “The Khazar state was heterogeneous in composition.” Noonan holds the same view in conjunction with gradual sedentarization as well as traditional nomadism. Even Franklin and Shepard make a characteristically measured, yet persuasive archaeological argument for heterogeneity. In a far less specific instance, according to Mason, it was the admixture of peoples within Khazaria which provided for “a blossoming of both material and spiritual culture among the Khazars [and forming] the basis for the remarkable symbiosis of varying systems of religious belief and practice which held sway and formed so unique a characteristic of the Khazar state.”

However, such a “kumbaya” treatment of Khazaria, while very much in-sync with modern inclusiveness and popular amongst denizens of political-correctness-land, I nonetheless believe it is fundamentally anachronistic when applied to this period and therefore makes for an unsound historical argument.

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278 Werbart, 2006, 95. See also for example Zhivkov, 2015, 249, who writes:

“The art of Khazaria or of Danube Bulgara reveals not so much the ethnicity of its creators as the influence of the cultural centers, situated nearby or directly in the lands from which the Bulgars and Khazars, as well as the Alans came to Europe. Such is also the culture of the Eurasian Steppe during this period.”

282 Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 80.
That said, the structural argument for a heterogeneous population is quite sensible. For example, Pavel Murdzhev, in line with Philip Abrams, argues that “heterogeneity existed in both medieval town and village.” While this is undoubtedly true of town and village among settled peoples, in the realm of *völkerverwanderungszeiten* in Khazaria, there is a slightly different story to tell. Klaniczay, for example, argues that monotheization produced homogenization with top-down implementation of peoplehood, derived from a given form of Christianity. However, such a deterministic view of homogenization as based on Christianity betrays viewing the past through the resulting cultural vacuum, that is, via a Christianizing teleology. Once again, DeWeese points out examples in Christian sources retrospectively Christianizing earlier cultural heritage. This occurs frequently in Islamic sources as well. It would also make sense for Khazar Judaizing sources. Nevertheless, my own point is perhaps a meeting between these two perspectives, that top-down conversions, in this case, of Khazaria, produce some measure of homogeneity, (eg. a communal, perhaps even an obligatory, Judaization) at least to whatever extent they are successful, to the express detriment of the disparate tribal populations that inhabited Khazaria and paid tribute to the *khağans*.

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285 Klaniczay, 2004, 119. Specifically, he writes, albeit in a Western/Central-European ethnocentric milieu and referring to the “homogenizing” capabilities of the Catholic Cistercian monastic order: “the marked presence of this well-organized order became one of the important influences in bringing homogeneity to all-European Christianity.”
286 DeWeese, 1994, 309.
287 See for example Vachkova, 2008, 353; and Semënov, 2009, 162. He writes:

“Таким образом, предположение о том, что в период существования Хазарского каганата происходила этническая консолидация различных кочевых групп Предкавказья вокруг хазар, не вполне соответствует действительности. Правильнее говорить о политической консолидации вокруг трона кагана, главной опорой которого являлись хазары.”

I have translated this as:

“Thus, in the period of the existence of the Khazar Khağanate, the assumption of an ethnic consolidation of the various nomadic groups of Transcaucasia around the Khazars is not quite true. It is more accurate to speak about the political consolidation around the throne of the khağan, who was the mainstay of the Khazars.”

288 This is for example suggested by researchers studying the broad swath of Khazar burials as a whole. For instance, Bálint, 1981, 410 writes: “the grave-finds on the whole seem to be homogeneous.” As if implicitly supporting Curta’s refutation of archaeological “culture-history,” he qualifies his statement in the corresponding n77: “This fact indicates the non-absolute identity of archaeological culture par excellence and of an ethnic group.” See also Zhivkov, 2015, 222-224.
This would be comparable with the Islamization of the broad population of Persia, which did not convert overnight, but took centuries of top-down pressure. To continue the example, according to Bulliet, who refers to this as a “conversion curve,” the population living in Persia confessing Islam rose from roughly 40% in the mid-9th century to nearly to 100% by the turn of the 12th century.\(^{289}\) Such a top-down process of conversion, in this case by the ‘Abbasids, was eventually successful in that Islam became a crucial aspect of Persian identity, and thus when nearly all the inhabitants of Persia confessed Islam by the late-11th century, a certain measure of homogeneity. The measure of failure of top-down conversions, however, determines heterogeneity (e.g. an indigenous resistance to a communal, perhaps obligatory, Judaization).\(^{290}\) This primarily top-down monotheization process is the point of the term “potestarian state formation.” Ergo, it was monotheization which created identity, the identity espoused by a given religion, along with its respective creeds and laws, and through identity, eventually, ethnicity.\(^{291}\)

Nevertheless, we know from both the extant and absent archaeological material that Judaism was not so successful as to have sufficiently rooted itself in the subject populations of Khazaria. So while Golden’s adoption of Eaton’s three-pronged model beginning with inclusion, moving to identification, finally to displacement appears quite contextualized and


\(^{290}\) See for example Kaplan, 1954, 9, who writes: “The heterogeneity of [Khazaria’s] peoples would have led to the dissolution of the existing organization.” Vachkova, 2008, 359, shares with him a similar sentiment, and in this I would agree. See also Zhivkov, 2015, 17. Citing Artamonov, 1962; Pletnëva, 1976; Novosel’cev, 1990; et al., Zhivkov writes:

“In the tenth century, the religion practiced by the Khazar ruling dynasty and possibly by quite a significant part of the nobility was Judaism. At the same time, the majority of the population, subject to the Khagan, continued to adhere to its pagan beliefs. Both the written records and the results from archaeological research indicate the presence of quite a few Muslims and Christians. Usually, the Khazar elite’s conversion to Judaism is interpreted in light of the practice, widespread in the contemporary Khazaria ‘barbarian’ lands, whose nobility imposed Christianity or Islam on its subjects. This practice is viewed as a deliberate attempt to unify into an ethnic whole the often multilingual and multi-ethnic population that professed different cults. The adoption of a common religion is thus considered one of the important conditions for the formation of a nation, and for the blurring of tribal and ethnic differences. According to this point of view, since the Khazar elite failed to spread Judaism among the majority of the population, Khazaria could not become a unified cultural and ethnic whole.”

Incidentally, this is the final reason given for the so-called “Qabar revolt theory”: see for example above §1.2.1.2.

\(^{291}\) For example, according to Derks and Roymans (eds.), 2009, *Ethnic Constructs in Antiquity: the Role of Power and Tradition,* 1, “It is politics that define ethnicity, not vice versa.” Quoted in Reher and Fernández-Götz, 2015, “Archaeological Narratives in Ethnicity Studies,” 404.
sensible when applied to Judaism in Khazaria, such a scenario would be measureable only to the extent that it preserves itself, which it has not.

Ch. 2: 2.1.2 Sedentarization: a gradual process

Having addressed the fine points of monotheization (Judaization specifically) in Khazaria, we may presently turn to the details of sedentarization. Dealing solely with archaeological material, both imported and locally produced, indicates both internally-generated wealth via land and livestock ownership and/or wealth through raiding and tribute collection. Conversely, such finds of undisputed wealth indicate elites whereas simpler finds would indicate subject peoples and probably, though this is not beyond doubt, poorer pastoralist nomads. Nevertheless, the thoroughly mixed nature of wealth in finds pertaining to the Khazar period attests to lifestyles both within and outside major urban centers as variably nomadic and semi-nomadic, including sedentary groups within settlements as well.

2.1.2.1 The preservation of pre-sedentary (nomadic) customs

In general, archaeological materials once again provide the lion’s share of evidence for the retention of nomadic and pre-sedentary customs. Such finds are typically types of ceramics, burials (such as kurgans or pit-graves), epigraphy, coin hoards, monuments and occasionally sigillography. Many finds of characteristically nomadic wares, primarily in Sarkel dating to the 9-10th c., indicate the retention of nomadic lifestyles. These would include crude clay bowls, cups and jugs described as “typical of tribal nomads” (figs. 36-38). In addition, Artamonov has revealed incised graffiti from Sarkel and the Majacki gorodišče typical of steppe nomadism as most are primitive etchings depicting horses and riders. According to him, many burials from Sarkel dating to the period in question are typical of those of Turkic-nomads. Nevertheless, there are also archaeological signs of sequential steps toward semi-nomadism and sedentarization during the period in question as well.

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294 See Zaleskaja et al., 1989, cat nos. 251, 257, 293.
295 Artamonov, 1962, 289, 304.
Ch. 2: 2.1.2.2 Settlement

Such material once again provides considerable indications of the settlement of previously nomadic populations. For example, finds of pit latrines are quite significant amongst the Samosdelka finds as they signal a rudimentary urban sedentarization of previously nomadic populations during the period in question.\(^{296}\) Other finds from Samosdelka, such as yurt-shaped dwellings with wattle-and-daub wall installations, have been usually interpreted by specialists as highly suggestive of the sedentarization of former steppe nomads.\(^{297}\) Similarly, though Artamonov describes a particular set of grave goods found in Sarkel as typical of nomadic burials, a cross unequivocally appears on one of the objects (fig. 28),\(^{298}\) suggesting what may perhaps be interpreted as a rudimentary appropriation of Christian imagery.

On a more theoretical level, according to Kwanten:

> "Turkic society, as far back as can be determined, was not purely nomadic, although it included pastoral nomads as well as farmers and blacksmiths. The Türks began to establish an urban base, the first in steppe history, and functioned around these settlements. It is possible to state that the Türks had reached a stage of 'pastoral-urbanization'."\(^{299}\)

In fact, SMC archaeological material can certainly support Kwanten here as smithing and agricultural tools have been uncovered both in Sarkel and the Cimiljansk gorodišče (adjacent to the contemporaneous fortress of Sarkel on the Don River – figs. 34-35) which clearly indicate sedentary and semi-sedentary lifestyles.\(^{300}\) Furthermore, archaeological evidence has revealed traces of once-temporary yurts converted into permanent installations by the covering of the sides with turf for winter insulation.\(^{301}\) Both permanent and temporary dwellings existed concurrently in many areas of the SMC, as Werbart has pointed out.\(^{302}\) Finally, the work of Arnold et al. on the osteoarchaeological analysis of comparative dental abrasion of two populations within Khazaria, reveals that different subject populations within

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\(^{296}\) Vasil’ev, 2011, 26-27. For a wider discussion of the topic, but with special relevancy to the Crimea, see Bulan, 2010, 25-29.

\(^{297}\) Vasil’ev, 2006a. This is extrapolated on further in idem, 2011, 48-59.

\(^{298}\) Artamonov, 1962, 316.

\(^{299}\) Kwanten, 1979, 32.

\(^{300}\) See Zaleskaja et al., 1989, cat. nos. 217, 220, 224 for blacksmiths’ implements found at the Cimljansk gorodišče and no. 282 for a horn-made sickle handle found in Sarkel, all dating to the Khazar era (figs. 34-41). See also Artamonov, 1962, 319-320.


\(^{302}\) Werbart, 1996, 213.
Khazaria practiced agriculture, semi-nomadic pastoralism and full nomadic pastoralism. One population, in the area of Červona Gusarivka about 80 km southeast of Kharkiv, had a diet primarily based on hunting and fishing\textsuperscript{303} while the other forest-steppe population, based in the area of Volčanskogo about 43 km east of Kharkiv,\textsuperscript{304} had a diet mainly based on agriculture and horticulture. Their analysis of sets of teeth from burials of both populations has shown that signs of abrasion in the agricultural population were due to ingesting primarily cereals as opposed to those of the pastoral population whose softer foods were more typical of nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralism such as meat and fish.\textsuperscript{305} Wild animal bones have also been detected at various sites such as the Cimljansk gorodišče suggesting a dietary dominance of game animals as well,\textsuperscript{306} indicating hunting as a significant food-source in Khazaria,\textsuperscript{307} at least along with, if not in excess of, agriculture.

However, in Sarkel, contemporaneous bones of primarily domestic livestock have been found suggesting precisely the opposite,\textsuperscript{308} that of a gradual shift in concurrent food-production toward agriculture and semi-sedentary pastoralism. In addition, various seeds of wheat, barley, millet, hemp, melon and cucumber have been found throughout the SMC dating to Khazarian times, and as Bálint has suggested in regards to the amount and distribution of animal bones throughout the SMC, this “indicates a way of life proceeding towards settling.”\textsuperscript{309} Finally, the average life-expectancy recorded among individuals buried in catacomb burials in the Majacki and Dmitrievsk sites exceeds those of concurrent burial

\textsuperscript{303} Predominant reliance on fish as a food source is attested archaeologically (See Bálint, 1981, 407; and Noonan, 1995-1997, 270) as well as textually by al-Istakhri (Dunlop, 1954, 93) and King Joseph’s Reply (Kohler [trans.], 1953, 112), to name a by no means exhaustive list of textual sources. That said, it should be noted that al-Istakhri’s report regarding an allegedly bare subsistence economy of Khazaria, particularly one based on hunting and fishing primarily, has contributed to what Zhivkov (2015, 174) has called a “general presumption that the agricultural and handicraft products were not enough to ensure the self-sufficient existence of the Khazar economy.” See also a broader discussion of al-Istakhri’s report given by Zhivkov, 2015, 206-207, although perhaps his argument borders on the anachronistic when he concludes that “it can plausibly be argued that Khazaria had a well-developed domestic trade, driven by the produce of its own population.” For more on this point, see the analysis of Zhivkov’s ideas regarding his imagined “well developed internal market” in Khazaria below in chapter 5 §1.2.2.

\textsuperscript{304} Brook, 2006, 34-35.

\textsuperscript{305} Arnold et al., 2006-2007, 52-62. See also Bartha, 1975, Hungarian Society in the 9th and 10th Centuries, 54.

\textsuperscript{306} Flérov and Flérova, 2005, 189.

\textsuperscript{307} See for example Noonan, 1995-1997, 271.

\textsuperscript{308} Matolcsy, 1975, “A Kazár állattartás és a Magyar honfoglalók háziállatai,” 1589-1592.

finds of thoroughly sedentarized Western Europe, which strongly suggests agricultural lifestyles.  

Such a comprehensive, or “mass sedentarization” of Khazaria inevitably produced resistance from traditionally nomadic populations who preferred nomadism as well, somewhat mirroring resistance to monotheization. For example, the late-9th-c. influx of Pečenegs and rout of the Magyars have been archaeologically associated with the destruction of Slavic agricultural settlements between the Dniepr and the Don in the forest-steppe zone as well, although it has also been argued that this has not affected “the whole of Khazaria” and that the Don “cannot be seen as an ethnic border, since the same ethnic groups could be found on both sides.” In addition, thirteen cases of skull trephination found in burials across the breadth of the SMC, as we have already discussed above in §1.2.2.2 (figs. 29-33), attest not only to the ubiquity of the practice in Khazaria, but to the inherent and tenacious nomadic traits of those who practiced the ritual. So having analysed the archaeological evidence of varying Khazar lifestyles, we now come to a larger analysis of not only food-production, but all pertinence to sedentarization in the Khazar SMC Pontic-Caspian steppe.

If agricultural production may measure sedentarization to a certain extent, as we have just discussed with regard to Arnold et al.’s dental analysis, then clearly a mixture of horticulture, agriculture, hunting and pastoralism were practiced in the various regions of Khazaria, presumably corresponding to the local variants of the SMC. Otherwise, nomads such as Pečenegs within the khağanate frequently engaged in subsistence agriculture during wintertime as well. In the Don Basin, for example, populations corresponding to the SMC produced grains with “advanced agricultural” practices until the tenth century. Such

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312 See below ch. 2 §2.3, especially in regard to the refusal of the Pečenegs to sedentarize.
314 Zhivkov, 2015, 193.
315 Rešetova, 2012a, 151-157; and idem, 2012-2013b, 9-14. However, it should be noted as well that these 13 cases of trephinated skulls have not yet been calculated as a percentage of the total number of excavated skulls in the SMC.
316 See for example Brook, 2006, 59-60.
318 Ibid.
variations in food production however inevitably led to social separations in terms of land ownership and hunting and pastoral rights. For example, according to Kwanten, “it was the more prosperous tribes, that is, those who controlled the most pasture land, who were at the basis of an empire’s formation.” Such elites are precisely those who were directly loyal to the Khazar khağan and were fundamental to not only the protection of the khağan himself, but the very khağanate itself. Nevertheless, as we have also discussed, they can be and have been linked to urban spaces within the khağanate, and regardless of Judaism, there was a gradual lifestyle shift in many areas of the SMC toward sedentarization – agricultural implements excavated from the Cimljansk gorodišče, for example, attest to such growing reliance on agriculture (figs. 39-40).

For example, Petrukhin implies that “the Khazars adopted the mode of settled economy and urban life in their subject centers in the Caucasus and Crimea by the mid-9th century.” This is most particularly apparent in the thoroughly sedentarized coastal regions of the Crimean and Taman Peninsulas for example where there was a long tradition of viticulture, and there is archaeological evidence to support this, but also in the Cimljansk gorodišče in the middle-Don as well. Like monotheization, sedentarization was not merely a top-down phenomenon, but also consisted of bottom-up proactivity and reactivity, including resistance and gradual adoption. In terms of textual evidence, King Joseph’s Reply refers at length to not only wine production among the elite, but to his own semi-nomadism (living in Itīl’ for the winter half-year and during the summer, his hereditary estate), and also fields, presumably of grain, other gardens and orchards. This is clearly evidence of some amount of internalization of sedentarism among the Khazar elite throughout the duration of the 9th century and thoroughly so by the mid-10th c., as he refers to “each family [having] its own hereditary estate.” Finally, given the chronological overlap between sedentarization and monotheization, Werbart summarizes the entire process of sedentarization from an archaeological perspective perhaps most succinctly when she writes:

319 Kwanten, 1979, 43.
322 Petrukhin, 2013, 292.
324 Bartha, 1975, 52. See also Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 83.
325 Zhivkov, 2015, 191.
326 Kobler, 1953, 112-113. According to Noonan, 2001, 78, this is corroborated by Istakhri as well.
“The social, cultural economic, [sic] and religious changes are the most significant phenomena within the [Khazarian] Khağanate: the transition from one economic formation, nomadism and semi-nomadism, to sedentism; the transformation of the tribal aristocracy into hierarchic feudalism; and the transition to monotheistic religion.”

Ch. 2: 2.2 Securing a place in space and time: the creation of a Khazar center

Having discussed the gradations of monotheization and sedentarization in Khazaria, this final analysis will seek to address the nuances of center and periphery in Khazaria, both chronologically and geographically: because if there is a center, there will always be a periphery. In khazaria, the final capital was Itīl’, (clearly, for whatever their reasons, the two previous Khazar capitals, Balanjar and Samandar [see above n129-132], did not offer long-term viability). Therefore, this section will concentrate on the self-assignment in time and space of Khazaria in the Khazar sources themselves.

In monotheizing, that is, adopting some form of Judaism, although permitting the practices of Islam, Christianity and traditional Tengri Turkic shamanism, the Khazarian khağans, (Benjamin, Aaron or Joseph), sought to place itself in the context of the Tanakh and in so doing, to create a center from which to rule and collect tribute from peripheral populations. In the Eurasian context, we can see similar occurrence in the establishment of Kiev as the capital of Rus’, Bolgar as the capital of Volga Bulgaria, Kazan as the capital of the Golden Horde, Preslav as the capital of Danube Bulgaria, Suceava as the capital of Moldova, et al.

327 Werbart, 2006, 95. See also the quote by Zhivkov, 2015, 181-192, above n124, who implies the disintegration of the entirety of nomadic society and traditional value system (paganism) was commensurate with sedentarization.
328 Golb and Pritsak (ed. and trans.), 1982, 132-142. Although the precise dating of each king/khağan’s reign is inherently impossible to assign.
330 See below chapter 4 §1.2.
332 Nikolov, 2012, “Making a New Basileus: the Case of Symeon of Bulgaria (893-927) Reconsidered,” 101-108. Actually, it may be noted here that Zhivkov, 2015, 227 seems to believe that it was “the state,” which was the expression of ethnicity, not vice versa. For example, in the case of Danube Bulgaria, seemingly in opposition to Khazaria, he writes:

“Danube Bulgaria was the state of the Bulgarians, while the Khazar Khaganate was a state of many peoples, which—according to Joseph’s letter—all stemmed from Togarmah (including the Bulgars, from whom the banished Unogundurs broke free).”
Ch. 2: 2.2.1 A place in space: Itīl’, the capital

As already discussed, the settlement of the Khazar khağans in Itīl’ should be conceived as much symbolic as it would have been functional. Using archaeological evidence, as discussed above §1.2.3.1, the brick palace in the steppe nomadic and seminomadic context was inherently symbolic of settlement and sedentarization.  

2.2.1.1 Center and peripheries in Khazaria

Having a center, however, inevitably means having a periphery. Scholars such as Galkina, who have sought to concretely define the borders of “the state” based on King Joseph’s Reply, and who nonetheless possess a healthy scepticism of the document itself, still cling to the notion of boundaries and perimeters.\textsuperscript{335} As discussed above in the introduction (§2.2.3.5), pre-modern borders are better thought of as frontiers which constantly fluctuated, not based on vaguely modern notions of ethnicity, linguistics,\textsuperscript{336} or any other population marker along similar lines, but solely on allegiances, visible through tribute or confessional allegiances.

Such is the trouble with dealing with boundaries, though not only for Khazaria, but for all pre-modern dynastic political formations, since inclusion within them, and particularly those of Pontic-Caspian Eurasia and the steppe, were predicated and recorded mainly by the ruling elites in their respective capitals and sometimes, though less so, in provincial capitals. This is not to say, however, that natural boundaries did not exist as such, and sources such as the Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam reveal plenty of such information.\textsuperscript{337} River boundaries proliferate in the steppe, separating for example the dominions of various Pečeneg tribes.\textsuperscript{338} As well, mountains such as the Caucasus, the Crimean Mountains and the Carpathians quite easily separated the domains of the Khazar khağans from Alania, Byzantium and the Magyars.

\textsuperscript{333} Kulhavý, 2015, “The Capital as an Ideological Centre of State: the Case of Medieval Suceava and its Comparison with Tarnovo and Constantinople.”
\textsuperscript{335} Galkina, 2006, 132-145.
\textsuperscript{336} Golden, 1992, 5.
\textsuperscript{337} Minorsky (ed. and trans.), 1970, Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam, §1-8.
\textsuperscript{338} See for example Horváth, 1989, 8-9.
respectively. Nevertheless, boundaries are especially troublesome in the context of the Eurasian steppe and forest-steppe regions. In this case, I believe we should not deal in terms such as “boundaries,” “borders” or “perimeters,” but “frontiers” (see chapter 1 §2.2.3.5) in the same sense as the conception of the old High Roman “limes,” or the Chinese Great Walls, (there were more than just one) which were in a sense, the closest the pre-modern world came to defined borders. So finally, the Khazar khağans, much as these other pre-modern emperors did, erected artificial boundaries in earth and stone, clearly signifying “the state” which paid for them, whether directly or indirectly through vassalized elites and/or clan-based communities.

These are the issues surrounding not only the building of Sarkel, but of the twelve gorodišči and their garrisons which have been discovered along the Upper Severski Donec and between the Upper Don and the Donec, which has been referred to, not without considerable dispute, as the “river of Khazaria.” According to Pletnëva, Sarkel was not

339 This may seem rather anachronistic given that much of modern scholarship makes oversimplified assumptions of “the state,” usually with modern notions in mind, projected onto imagined history. See for example Marvakov, 2007, “Селищни структури на Първото българско царство и Кримска Хазария. Проблемът за аулите,” 210; and Zhivkov, 2015, 204. That said, I do not believe that “the state” must be imagined as a centralized government, but may instead be manifested in local elites and/or clan-based communities with contested loyalties. See for example Afanas’ev, 1993, 152; and Pletnëva, 1996, 142.

340 See the discussion given by Zhivkov, 2015, 246-248.

341 See Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 79; and Zhivkov, 2015, 193. This would appear to corroborate al-Mas’ūdī’s reference to the Don as the “nahr Khazariyye” (the river of Khazaria) – noted by Hraundal, 2016, “Ibn Fadlan and the Rus on the Middle Volga: Identities, Ethnicities, Cultures.” However, other “rivers of Khazaria,” such as the presumed Syr Darya, have been postulated, specifically derived from other Islamic sources, such as ibn Suhrah’s early-10th-c. copy of al-Khwârazmi’s account dating to the 830s known as the Book on the Appearance of the Earth. See for example the discussion given by Zhivkov, 2015, 38.

Additionally, despite the latter’s mention of the Terek-Sulak confluence (see also p. 205), it should also be noted that Uspenskij, 2013, “Могильники с трупосожжениями VIII–XIII вв. на северо-западном Кавказе (динамика ареала погребального обряда),” 96, refers to no less than two “rivers of Khazaria,” which he identifies ostensibly as the Kuban and the Volga, based on a combination of primary sources (the Kartlis Cxovreba, King Joseph’s Reply, the Schechter Text and the DAI) along with cremation burial rites documented along the former river. For more information on the cremation burial rites attested to the so-called Zichians/Abygians/Kasogians/Čerkesses in the north Caucasus and northeastern Black Sea littoral along the Kuban during this period, see Pletnëva, 1999, 15, 48; Zhivkov, 2015, 173 n13; and Gadlo, 1989, “Тмутороканские этюды II (держава Инала и его потомков),” 9-20. Specifically, Uspenskij writes:

“Сейчас же установленная северная граница ареала закубанских кремаций, а также намеченная юго-западная граница ареала хазарских подкурганных захоронений дают дополнительные основания для отождествления в период, когда угроза с рекой Уг-ру письма Иосифа и упомянутой в сочинении Константина Багрянородного рекой Укрух, которая отделяла округ Таматархи от Зикки (1991. С. 174, 175, 404). На возможность отождествления ранеенеизвестных гидронимов Уг-ру и Укрух, и идентификации их с Кубанью указывал ещё Б. А. Доро (1875. С. 330). Недавно к этой точке зрения присоединился Г. З. Анчабадзе,
only a defensive fortification, but a vital link in the Silk Roads and an indispensable implement in Khazar commercial infrastructure. While there are many competing theories and implications regarding exactly for whom, what purpose and against whom these fortresses had been built, it is not my aim to dive into this morass as I see no reasonable proof and only broad and unseemly implications in the settlement of the debate. I will only suggest that it may have been from Itīl’ that these projects were conceived.

In the case of Khazaria, the center in Itīl’ was the place in space from which the khağanate, like all pre-modern political formations, was administered, despite the admission by King Joseph’s Reply that “We are far away from Zion.” For Noonan, a centralized administration in Khazaria enabled it to integrate non-steppe zones into itself. However, this begs the question, were areas of strong agricultural and commodity growth due to nomadic sedentarization or to the attraction of such nomads to these areas who already had these

I have translated this as:

“Now, the established northern border of the Trans-Kuban cremation area and the proposed south-western border of the sub-kurgan Khazar burial area provides additional grounds for the identification of the Kuban River with the river Ug-ru in Joseph’s letter, and mentioned in Constantine Porphyrogenitos’ writings as the river Oukrouch, which separated the county of Tamataracha from Zichia (1991, 174, 175, 404). The possibility of identifying the early medieval hydronyms Ug-ru and Oukrouch and their identification with the Kuban is pointed out by B. A. Dorn (1875, 330). Recently, G. Z. Anchabadze has acceded to this view, paying attention to the fact that in the “Kartlis Cxovreba” chronicle, the river Ug-ru / Oukrouch / Kuban is called the “Minor Khazaria river” (2006). Indeed, Leonti Mroveli knows of two rivers in Khazaria: the Minor river of Khazaria and the Major river of Khazaria. The latter is identified as the Volga, while the Minor river of Khazaria is normally identified with the Kuban (Mroveli, 1979, 22, 45), which appears in this composition as a border river between the Khazars and the Abkhazians – the Egrisi [THE LAZ]. According to G. V. Culaja, the left bank of the Kuban in this period of time was inhabited by the alleged ancestors of the Abkhazo-Adyghe tribes – the Brukhians (Mroveli, 1979, 45). In the Schechter Text, the left-bank Kuban population appears under the name ZYBOS / ZYKWS (Greek: Ζιχοι, Ζιχια) in the list of Khazar enemies (Golb and Pritsak, 1997, 155, 172).”

342 Pletnëva, 1996, 155. It bears mention that Zhivkov, 2015, 159 suggests that Itīl’, as well as Sarkel, was connected to the Silk Roads.

Both phenomena are well attested in primary sources and secondary literature. Nevertheless, our concern is not so much how exactly wealth was generated, whether by agriculture, pastoralism or raiding, but who generated the wealth which provided the vehicle for the maintenance of the khağanate. Such administration from Itīl' was, of course, the main driver and recipient of wealth, but the providers of the wealth, whether in furs, grains, wax, salt, slaves or whatever other commodity was taxed, are those who constituted the subject populations of the khağanate in that their tribute assured their “protection” by the khağans.

Ch. 2: 2.2.1.2 Elites, subjects and tax collection: from tribute to tax

The collection of tribute, not only in Khazaria, but all across Pontic-Caspian Eurasia and the steppe, was certainly not a Khazarian innovation. It may be said that eventually the collection of tribute became the collection of tax and that subject tribes eventually became subject “peasants” for lack of a better word. But presently, I will focus attention more specifically on the issues pertaining to the peripheral peoples of Khazaria and their participation in the social and economic life of the khağanate due to their regular payment of tribute and their consequent protection by the khağan.

A similar remark may in fact be made about Volga Bulgaria in the Khazar context, in that the ruler, Almuş, regularly paid tribute to the khağan. To a certain extent, in the time that he did so, despite claiming to be “enslaved” (according to ibn Fadlān) to the Khazar

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345 See also chapter 4 below §3.2.2 for a useful comparison to the the Khazars’ 10th-c. competition with the Rus’ for tribute.
346 It must said here, however, that there is no archaeological evidence for the formation of a class system akin to those of the “High Middle Ages” of Western Europe of feudal lords and peasant-serfs. See for example Afanas’ev, 1993, 151-153. In this regard for example, King Joseph’s Reply, (translated in Zhivkov by Manova, 2015, 211), reads: “I and my princes and serfs proceed for a distance of 20 farsaks until we reach the great river called B-d-shan and from thence we make the circuit of our country.” This “circuit” has been compared by Kobiščankov, 1999, Понедель: Явление отечественной и всемирной истории цивилизаций, 220-223, to the “round-making” of the early Rus’ tribute-collecting “poljud’e” (see for example Petrukhin, 2006, “Феодализм перед судом русской историографии,” 164). This is precisely the point Zhivkov, 2015, 212, 223-224, 251, makes referencing Pletnëva, 2002, “Города в Хазарском каганате (доклад к постановке проблемы),” 117; Flërov, 2007, “«Хазарские города» Что это такое?” 66; and Stepánov, 2002, “Цивилизационно равнище на българите до Х век: другите за нас и ние за себе си,” 29. For Zhivkov, 2015, 222-223,

“Of particular importance [is] […] the inclusion of other peoples (tribes) through the formation of some sort of confederation or their subjugation via taxes. These peoples (tribes) were of diverse origins, but were culturally homogeneous within the state, which contributed to their ethnic integration. The nobility (which also performed the functions of a state bureaucracy) was concentrated in various trade and craft centers, which in time became administrative hubs.”
khağan, Almuš and his own subjects were conceivably part of Khazaria, certainly providing the impetus to adopt a rival faith. However, a remark such as this must be qualified, since Byzantine emperors frequently paid tribute to other “states,” yet was of course never part of them. Tribute was, like in the case of Almuš, largely a matter of the exportation of valuables, although it could be collected in different ways, based on the size and relative strength depending on the vassal, eg. Almuš’s disputed subjugation to the Khazar khağans. Ergo, to imagine, as does Zhivkov (2015, p. 221), that Volga Bulgaria, or Alania, or any subjected ruler as constituting an “external” ethnic community of Khazaria is a bit of an oversimplification based on a modern assumption that ethnicity would equate to primordial statehood, (see also p. 268-283). While Zhivkov earnestly seeks to separate “internal ethnic communities” from the “external,” he nevertheless offers significant qualification regarding ethnicity, even though he refuses to dispense with the usage of the term altogether.  

Nevertheless, in the Volga Bulgarian adoption of Islam, there was a reflection of the partial sedentarization of the population as well. That Almuš was addressed as “King Yiltawār, King of the Bulgars” attests principally to this fact, as the title “Yiltawār” was a

Unfortunately, while Zhivkov sensibly asserts a homogenization process via tribute subjugation, it seems that his conception of tribe versus ethnicity can be slightly sloppy. He frequently elides them together as he does in this excerpt, implying that their ethnicity was a quality of being part of Khazaria, not a pre-determinative “tribe,” however elsewhere in the same section of his monograph, this is precisely the contrary point he makes. For a more in-depth discussion in this regard, see below n348, n414-416; chapter 5 n70; and chapter 7 §2.2.

At the risk of slightly overgeneralizing, economies of the period were based on the net assets a ruler obtains: by impounding, conquest, collection, or importation, either from his own subjects or from rival rulers and their respective subjects. Inter-kingdom “trade,” while referred to in many terms, was ultimately either booty or tribute, while assuming internal markets and production contributed to some imagined Gross Domestic Product for an imagined pre-modern “state” would amount to a gross oversimplification. Certainly, the subjects and/or vassals of various rulers themselves could be considered economic free agents, but their allegiances could be as well. See for example above n346 and chapter 5 n70. For the Zhivkov’s precise wording, see p. 222:

“The line between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ in the Khazar Khaganate cannot be defined without acknowledging the different possibilities for interaction between the ethnic groups and the central authorities, the different standing of the various regions (which often had a mixed ethnic contingent) and the state entities that were subjugated to the khaganate. At the same time, truly unacceptable theories are maintained in science, that deal with the ethnic interpretation of the monuments of the Khazar Khaganate or the political subordination (dependency) of various regions that were part of it.”

See for example Noonan, 2001, 85; and chapter 4 below §1.1.

Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 27.
corruption of the Khazar subordinated princely title of el’teber. Additionally, al-Muqaddasī includes Bolgar and Suwar as among Khazarian towns. These are, among other reasons, why Zuckerman has insisted that the Bulgars “were no doubt regarded as Khazars.” This was clearly the reason ibn Fadlān relates to us that Almuš was insistent on converting to Islam and ceasing tribute payments to the Khazar khağan in the early 920s. As Theophanēs records, these regular tribute payments had been occurring since the original Khazar conquest of Batbayan’s Old Great Bulgaria in the last quarter of the 7th c. In this way, I would suggest, Almuš sought to distinguish himself and his subjects from those of his master’s. Once again, the adoption of a “state religion” created the identity that would come to define a given population and society from a disparate collection of pagan tribes subject to periodic tribute payments.

Despite the best efforts of certain archaeologists to distinguish various pre-monotheized ethnic groups in this region based on funerary, ceramic and metallurgical typologies alone, peoples such as the Sabirs, Alans, Burtas’, Kasogs and others to name just a few, invariably found themselves parts of Khazaria as well and in time, were identified, at least according to many textual sources, as being Khazar as well, much as al-Muqaddasī included the towns and peoples of Volga Bulgaria as being Khazarian. To begin with, the Sabirs, (also known as Savirs or Suwars) mentioned extensively in both King Joseph’s Reply and the DAI have been associated with “proto-Hungarians,” or Magyars perhaps, by none other than Golden and “Huns” by Stoljarik. Earlier, however, both Golden and Ludwig had also pointed out their gratuitous association and extensive intermarriages with

352 Ibid, 18.
356 See for example Galkina, 200, 133, 145 n65.
357 Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos associates them exclusively with the Turks, or Magyars. See Moravcsik and Jenkins (ed. and trans.), 2002, DAI, 170-175, §38.
358 Golden, 2007a, 13. Coene, 2010, 106; Kwanten, 1979, 25; and Artamonov, 1962, 263 have also linked the Sabirs with the Huns.
359 Stoljarik, 1992, Essays on Monetary Circulation in the North-Western Black Sea Region in the Late Roman and Byzantine Periods: Late 3rd Century-Early 13th Century AD, 54.
the Khazars themselves according to al-Mas’ūdī. Brutzkus even goes so far to assume that the “the Khazars were the ruling class among the Hungarians.” The mentions of the Sabirs in the Kievan Letter attest to a part of their number having adopted Judaism, at least insofar as one of the signatories to the letter may be concerned, along with the Khazars. As for the Don Alans, who have been connected to the Jas and the Burtas’, via Rus’ and Arabic sources these peoples have been listed as tributaries of King Joseph as well in his letter. Their archaeological studies have borne an image of a subject populace considerably assimilated into the wider SMC, including elites and subject populations primarily practicing agriculture. Although to posit, as Afanas’ev has, precisely what stage of historical-materialist development they had reached within the SMC would be slightly anachronistic in the post-Communist era. Nevertheless, among other peoples enumerated by King Joseph as tribute payers are the Adyģians, who have been connected with the Zichians and Kasogs and discussed at some length in the DAI. The PVL describes Khazars and Kasogs as together forming a mercenary army for Mstislav in 1023, which the translators attribute to the close affiliation between such peoples and the Slavs east of the Dniepr. The Kasogs, like the Don Alans, were originally from the north Caucasus according to Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor and were in fact the same as the Čerkess. There is also considerable archaeological literature claiming to prove this as well. While

361 Brutzkus, 1944, 114.
362 Golb and Pritsak, 1982, 38. It would be important to note here that Kulik, 2008, 53, disagrees with Golb and Pritsak that such a conclusion can be made based on onomastic evidence alone.
366 See for example Noonan, 2001, 83.
368 See for example Hellie, 1989, “Rewriting Pre-Mongol Russian History Once Again,” 75; and Zhivkov, 2015, 173.
369 Moravcsik and Jenkins (ed. and trans.), 2002, DAI, 182-189, §42.
371 Ibid, 256 n147. See also Schorkowitz, 2012, “Cultural Contact and Cultural Transfer in Medieval Western Eurasia,” 88.
this is a short list of the various peoples Joseph claimed to collect tribute from, their gradual inclusion in Khazaria, most likely via their tribute, provided the impetus by which some, though certainly not all, ostensibly became Khazarian, at least for as long as there was a Khazarian identity to bear.

So having discussed tribute collection, we come to the much discussed issues of tribute competition between the Rus’ and Khazaria among the Slavic tribes in the late-9-10th c. While an explanation for the prevailing economic model of Khazaria in terms of Rus’ has already been amply provided by Kovalev and Noonan in their many articles, it bears mention that despite Khazar-minted coins disappearing northward as Kovalev has pointed out, textual sources such as the PVL describe tribute as being collected primarily in kind, namely furs, rather than coin. This may be thought of as asset circulation across fluid

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374 See Noonan, 2007, 207-244; idem, 1994, 331-345; idem, 1995-1997, 253-318; idem, 1987-1991, 213-219; idem, 1984, 151-282; idem, 1985, 179-204; idem, 1982, 219-267; and idem, 1980, 401-469. For Kovalev, see 2005a, 220-252; idem, 2004, 97-129; and idem, 2005b, “Commerce and Caravan Routes along the Northern Silk Road (Sixth-Ninth Centuries), Part 1: the Western Sector,” 55-105. Finally, see Vinnikov, 1990, “Контакты донских славян с алано-болгарским миром,” 124-137, for a persuasive argument, based primarily on archaeology, that the relationship between the Khazar khaγans and their Slavic tributaries, was mostly a peaceable one. It ought to be mentioned however, that Sarris, 2017, “Centre or Periphery? Constantinople and the Eurasian Trading System at the End of Antiquity,” argues that the Northern “Turkic” silk road trade network had “declined by the 8th century.” He has declined to provide evidence for this claim.

375 Kovalev, 2005a, 237-240.

376 See for example Cross and Sherbowizt-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, PVL, 59, 61. According to the PVL entry assigned to the year 859 (p. 59):

“The Varangians from beyond the sea imposed tribute upon the Chuds, the Slavs, the Merians, the Ves’, and the Krivichians. But the Khazars imposed it upon the Polyanians, the Severians, and the Vyatichians, and collected a white squirrel-skin from each hearth.”

Later, in the entries for the years 884-885, the PVL directly indicates that not only was the tribute competition among Slavic tribes and others between the Rus’ and Khazaria, but also that tribute was sought as an exclusive right of authority and that it could also be paid in coin (“schillings” – see Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 77) as well (see for example Noonan, 2001, 81), which the translators remark “were probably dirhems” (p. 234 n26):

“(884): Oleg attacked the Severians, and conquered them. He imposed a light tribute upon them and forbade their further payment of tribute to the Khazars, on the grounds that there was no reason for them to pay it as long as the Khazars were his enemies.

(885): Oleg sent messengers to the Radimichians to inquire to whom they paid tribute. Upon their reply that they paid tribute to the Khazars, he directed them to render it to himself instead,
frontiers, giving grounds for exchange in both coin and kind. For example, Noonan concluded that despite the fact that he would have liked to believe that Khazaria possessed a monetary or a semi-monetary economy, this was just not the case, even though the PVL specifically records that, until 885, the Slavic Radimichians paid a coin tribute to Khazaria. Additionally, Franklin and Shepard have pointed out that this entry in the PVL implies that Slavic tribes such as the Severians “were contented with their Khazar overlords’ regimen,” suggesting that they could also be conceived as Khazarian.

Nevertheless, Noonan’s research has proven that trade expanded enormously between the Caliphate and Khazaria after the 8th-c. wars had subsided, while trade with her relatively more harmonious ally, Byzantium, was always negligible. This would seem to be contested by Holo, who ironically citing Noonan, argues that the region of the northern Caucasus, under Khazarian jurisdiction or tribute, began producing silks and trading them with Constantinople as early as the 8th century. In such a light, I would suggest that Khazar coinage in the form of those found in Baltic coin hoards, whether Moses dirhams or any other Khazar coin, constitutes a case for monetary diffusion: northern frontiers could be extended by increasing coin circulation, not just by exacting regular tribute payments from local communities. In this way, Rus’ may have been an economic satellite of Khazaria and they accordingly paid him a shilling apiece, the same amount that they had paid the Khazars. Thus Oleg established his authority over the Polyanians, the Derevlians, the Severians, and the Radmichians, but he waged war with the Ulichians and the Tivercians.”

For a study of the various Slavic populations, including the Radmichians, and their relations with Kiev during this period, see Fetisov and ŠČavelev, 2012, “Русь и радимичи: история взаимоотношений в X–XI вв.,” 122-129.

377 Noonan, 1982, 219-267. According to Zhivkov, 2015, 207: “Coin finds are not always a reliable indicator for the state of the economy. Coins were relatively sparse in the khaganate and did not have such a paramount importance for the Khazar economy, as they did for the economy of Kievan Rus’, for example.”

378 Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, 1953, PVL, 61.
379 Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 78-79.
381 Idem, 1992, 109-132. However, it did exist, due to finds of Crimean and Taman amphorae, dating to the 9-10th c., found throughout the lower, middle and upper Don River Valley. See for example Pletnëva, 1999, 22; Mikheev, 1985, Подонье в составе хазарского каганата, 98; Zhivkov, 2015, 208; and Vinnikov, 1995, Славяне лесостепного Дона в Раннем Средневековье (VIII - начало XI века), 69. In fact, Noonan, 1995-1997, 175-176, himself acknowledges this.
382 Holo, 2009, 169. However, he cites no specific textual or archaeological literature in support.
383 Notably, this is also implied by Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 82. They write that Khazaria took “a close interest in the northern fringes of the steppes.”
before Svjatoslav’s alleged conquest of Sarkel and Itīl’ in 965-969 (see below chapter 5 §1.2.2), much in the same regard as the Artuqids and Danishmendids were for a time economic satellites of Byzantium. Conceivably, the khağans’ decision to adopt a top-down form of monotheism may have been related to Rus’ incursions, although this is admittedly an immense conjecture to make. Yet many scholars have argued for a kind of “translatio-imperii” from Itīl’ to Kiev, or from Khazaria to Rus’, based on grounds such as these. So while I would disagree with Kovalev that the Khazar khağan converted to Judaism in one single year (837-838) and that the Moses coins were discontinued due to their disappearance northward, since that was, as he himself argues, their ultimate destination anyway, I would certainly not disagree with him that the Moses dirhams present a case for Judaic-Khazar diffusion through these special edition releases. I would also suggest that they present a case for the projecting of Khazar economic influence into better fur-producing regions further north.

Having discussed the specific archaeological and textual distinctions inherent in delineating who qualified as “Khazarian,” namely, that outside of the ruling elite, labelling various peripheral groups as “Khazarian” is intrinsically problematic. Yet the khağans nevertheless ruled from the capital in Itīl’, regardless of whoever else could be considered “Khazarian.” If the previous subsection was meant to address the spatial construction of a Khazar center, the next, final subsection seeks to address the chronological construction of a Khazar center.

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384 See for example the argument made for this reasoning in Petrukhin, 1992, 396.
385 Ali Miynat, personal communication, 30 May, 2015. For other well-known examples, there are Accra-found crusader coins dated to 1250 with crosses and Arabic legends referring to the Christianity trinity, mid-12th-c. Georgian coins proclaiming Christianity with Arabic inscriptions, and of course the Artuqid and Danishmendid coinage dated to between ca. 1120-1170 bearing Greek inscriptions proclaiming Islam. Miynat’s 2017 University of Birmingham thesis is entitled: Cultural and socio-economic relations between the Turkmen states and the Byzantine Empire and West with a corpus of the Turkmen coins in the Barber Institute Coin Collection.
Ch. 2: 2.2.2 A place in time: Adopting the Jewish conception of linear time

Regarding the center of Khazaria, primarily the aspect of “where,” the present subsection will seek to engage the center of Khazaria in terms of “when.” While modern scholars may easily assign an absolute chronology to the Khazar sources and the events they describe, the following brief discussion intends to address the chronology embedded within the Khazar sources on their own terms: that is, their chronology in accordance with biblical scripture.

For example, King Joseph’s Reply firmly attaches Khazarian identity to a timeline adapted from Jewish Holy Scripture, namely the Tanakh (the Christian Old Testament). It should also be noted that the authors (or signatories) of the Kievan Letter make ample references to the Tanakh as well, while the Schechter Text even makes liberal mentions of Israel. However, I believe the Khazar Correspondence, between a Jew from a community of much older and more established traditions (Hasdai ibn Šaprut – Sefarad) and another Jew of a relatively more recent Jewish identity (Joseph, the Khazar khağan), reveals the most about Khazarian Jewish identity, basing itself on the Tanakh, as this is the primary common denominator between the two men. In their adoption of Hebrew as an official writing system and Judaism as “state-religion,” the khağans of Khazaria adopted a Jewish conception of linear time derived from the Tanakh as well. We will see this particularly clearly when analyzing the following segment of King Joseph’s Reply which clearly refers to famous passages of the Tanakh such as the Table of Nations (Genesis 10).

According to King Joseph’s Reply, in answering for his and his peoples’ descent, Joseph writes:

“I hereby inform you that we are descendants of Yefeth [Japheth/Japhal], from the progeny of Togarma. This is what I have found in the family archives of my ancestors. Togarma had ten sons, and these were their names: The firstborn was Agyor, then Tiros, Ouvar, Ugin, Bisal, Tarna, Khazar, Zanor, Balnod, and Savir. We are from the seventh son, Khazar.”

390 Ibid, 110-111; 116-117.
In addition, there are ample references to the stories of the *Exodus*, *Malachi* and the prophesies of *Daniel* in an effort to calculate Judaic eschatology. 393

As we have already discussed, retrospective monotheizing of previously pagan traditions is quite normal. Similar instances occur in Danube Bulgaria, Rus', 394 Volga Bulgaria, the lands of Islam, and certainly in the West, 395 for example in Italy (Lombardy), 396 Hungary, 397 Lithuania, 398 and even in Anglia 399 and Francia. 400 The same can be said about such rulers’ respective adoptions of Christian or Islamic timelines and histories due to either the designations of AD or AH. 401 Because Joseph was so adamant about his Jewishness, if only to appear as such to Hasdai, his adoption of Togarma as his ancestor is telling, especially as such information as a list of sons of Togarma, which does not appear in the Tanakh, had to be derived for another source.

This source has been proposed as the *Sēfer Yōssipōn*, 402 written in the mid-10th century in Sicily or southern Italy. The sons enumerated in this document are quite obviously based on tribal affiliations apparent in Khazaria at the time. 403 The fact that these peoples are referred to in Hebrew and as descendants of Togarma should be interpreted not literally, but only that this was Joseph’s desire that they identify that way. 404 In other words, the very

393 Ibid, 356-357.
397 Fodor, 1982. See also the brief discussion of Hungary’s Christianization and sedentarization given by Stephenson, 2000a, 187.
401 Zhivkov, 2015, 41.
404 This may run counter to the assertion of Zhivkov, 2015, 43 that: “The presentation of Togarmah as a son of Japheth is consistent with Joseph’s Reply and shows the possibility that the Khazar ruler was not directly following the Jewish tradition. This raises the question of whether the Khazar ruler was not conveying a genealogy that was much closer to Muslim beliefs.”
patchiness of the chronology in King Joseph’s Reply must be taken into account when analysing contemporaneous understandings of extra-biblical chronology.

Additionally, in Khazaria’s adoption of the Jewish timeline, it would be important to consider a theoretical framework for any acceptance of a given monotheism’s linear time structure derived from its respective sacred text. For example, the well-known theorist Mircea Eliade distinguished between cyclical time and linear time, and other theorists have taken this a step further, mostly in terms of drawing this separation between paganism and monotheism. This is not to say however that there is an unequivocal universality of paganism, in the steppe specifically, or otherwise. But at least in the case of Khazaria, the transition from paganism to Judaism as “state-religion,” or Judaism, Christianity and Islam more generally, can be seen, through Eliade’s theories of myth-time and “eternal returns”, in terms of generalized paganism and then the transition to a form of monotheism based on linear time received from the respective set of sacred texts. This concepts can be referred to as “historization” (see above chapter 1 §2.2.3.3). Where there were gaps between text and practice, however, Zhivkov, citing Stepanov, for example, nevertheless he concludes that Joseph’s assertion of his own descent from Togarma was ultimately adopted “from the Caucasian Christian tradition,” although the litany of evidence he provides for this supposition is quite persuasive, I am not entirely convinced. Whether or not Joseph’s belief in his descent from Togarma was ultimately adopted from a Judaic, Christian or Islamic source is ultimately unknowable and irrelevant given the three traditions ultimate dependency on Old Testament genealogies for the assignation of identity.

Eliade, 1971, *The Myth of the Eternal Return*. It should be noted here that Zhivkov, 2015, 237 evokes Eliade’s concept of the sacralisation and centralization of territorial space. In his testament to Khazaria specifically, he writes:

> “Such centers, scattered over great distances and among the various ethnic communities, united the multifaceted nature of Khazaria. They were not only a sign for the subordination of the population, but also a means for spreading the grace which came from the khagan’s power—the prevention of disasters and provision of fertility.”


See for example Zhivkov, 2015, 268-283, who in his conclusion, largely distils all of Khazarian history down to the economics of a “steppe empire” and effectually contextualizes it thus, as opposed to comparing the case of the Khazarian khagan to other monotheizing potentates of Eurasia. It seems that for Zhivkov, statehood and sovereignty were absolute in his historiographical interpretation. Personally, I find it difficult to believe it was that simple. For further discussion of Zhivkov’s thought, see below chapter 7 §2.2.


believes that the Khazars’ “own old ‘royal’ matrices” were recycled, “filling them with new meaning.”

So as the various rulers and potentates of Eurasia adopted some form of monotheism, so too did they adopt a historical timeline and trajectory derived from their respective form of monotheism. In this, Khazaria proves once again not to be the exception, but in point of fact, the rule.

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411 Zhivkov, 2015, 73. Notably, see also his application of Eliade’s ideas of dichotomous power-sharing between the divine and the human to Khazaria on the same page. While I believe, albeit cautiously, that Zhivkov’s ideas bear merit, I would be apprehensive about assigning an overly theoretical notion of dualistic power in Khazaria this divorced from textual or archaeological evidence. For example, on p. 86, without referring to any specific criteria or evidence, he claims that “the Khazar dual kingdom suggests an ideology able to unite the Khazar nobility and the diverse population, subject to it.”
3.1 Conclusions, more or less certain

Having hopefully settled some of the questions posed satisfactorily and raised others yet to be answered, let us determine here where the field has come to and what areas require further research in the future. This section will summarize my general ideas regarding the history of Khazaria in two categories. First, I will review the hypothetical formulations for issues which seemingly cannot be proven beyond all shadow of doubt – i.e., the dating, geographical occurrence and the effects of the conversion to Judaism. Second, I will recap some rather more certain ideas, which, hopefully, I have demonstrated.

3.1.1 Less certain conclusions

3.1.1.1 The dating of the conversion

My arguments for the dating of the conversion are by no means complete. Having relied on not only archaeology and textual sources to make my case, I have also used folklore studies in conjunction with other rulers’ mythologized conversion narratives. This is by no means a settled dispute. However by combining all these sources, which other scholars have strenuously compiled long before me, namely Golden, Pritsak, Zuckerman, Curta, Shepard, Dunlop, Brook, Noonan, Kovalev, DeWeese, Pletnëva, Afanas’ev, Novosel’cev and of course Artamonov, I hope to add something pragmatic to the debate.

Most scholars have argued that a three-tiered conversion would have been by far the most likely and in this I would agree. A single-staged conversion would have been quite highly improbable, especially to Judaism, as it bears and has born far older, and in the 8-9th c., longer, literary and jurisprudential traditions than either Christianity or Islam to be absorbed by newcomers to the faith. Similarly, a two-tiered conversion would have omitted the crucial stage of resistance. Of course many will doubt this claim arguing that no evidence is presented as it so far does not exist. To this I would argue that where evidence is non-existent, context must be brought to bear and the context of many rulers’ conversion mythologies is overwhelmingly that of three-tiered conversions. Accepting a three-tiered conversion, the final stage of which most scholars again agree would have coincided with the early 860s, based on Christian of Stavelot’s *Expositio in Matthaeeum Evangelistam*, the *Vita Constantini* and *King Joseph’s Reply*, would be perhaps the most sensible. This would take
into account the disparity of sources and the wide variety of other contemporary monotheizations occurring in a generally similar fashion according to Eaton’s model of *inclusion, identification* and *displacement*. If we then, again, as many scholars already have, trust al-Mas’ūdī’s work to bear witness to another stage in the first decade of the 9th century, and finally the *Moses* coins dating to the late 830s, we have three approximate periods in the 9th century. Finally, given that most scholars have by now rejected an early-mid-8th century dating, given sources such as the *Life of Saint Abo*, which confidently dates events occurring in the 780s under a still-pagan Khazar khağan, we may arrive at a tentative argument for a three-tiered conversion beginning in the first decade of the 9th century. The second stage likely corresponds with coinage unequivocally dated to 837/838 proclaiming Moses as god’s prophet instead of Mohammed, the only clear archaeological sign of Judaism-as-state-religion in Khazaria. However, the coinage then disappears quite suddenly, perhaps, as Kovalev argues, because it was hardly remaining in Khazaria. Nevertheless, he also argues that this was the purpose of the coinage, to be traded northward in exchange for furs. But I argue instead that it was discontinued due to traditional pagan resistance to monotheization, common in most if not all cases, whereas he has argued for a single-tier conversion, which has very few precedents and analogies. Finally, the last stage we come to is the court debate, the historicity of which hardly any scholars dispute, save for Stampfer and Gil to name two.

This discussion is by no means complete however. Coin hoards are continually being discovered in northern European Russia and the Baltic littoral. Excavations are still being undertaken in the areas of the former Khazaria. Textual scholars are continually searching for new perspectives and interpretations to make regarding these documents. I believe it is reasonable to warn against hasty conclusions and false presumptions based on speculation and conjecture alone. For example, Gil and Stampfer have argued against any sort of Judaism-as-state-religion in Khazaria based on nothing more than a preconceived agenda to disprove it. This hardly makes for reasonable scholarship, no matter how politicized and topical the issues may have become since the publications of Arthur Koestler’s *The Thirteenth Tribe*. However, other scholars such as Olsson have taken conjecture quite far in the other direction, supposing coronations and coups based on very little else besides 9-10th-c. textual evidence and the famous *Moses* coinage alone. This is not to say however that my own arguments are not without a fair share of speculation. However, the capacity of speculation I have made, I have attempted to temper with archaeological evidence drawn
from epigraphy, sigillography, ceramics, burials and of course numismatics as well. In the future, I hope such evidence can be augmented with the work and detailed scholarship of others both within and without the field.

Ch. 2: 3.1.1.2 Itīl’

In terms of Itīl’, some scholars still remained unconvinced that Samosdelka was actually the site and in their scepticism, I believe they are by all means justified. Vasil’ev himself has admitted that no sign has been found reading “Welcome to Itīl’” in Hebrew. In fact, no Hebrew epigraphy has been found at all. No coins dating even to the tenth century have been found, to say nothing of seals or any other easily descriptive evidence. The major finds are mostly from later periods and yield largely generic finds such as wattle-and-daub houses, dugouts, crude ceramics and other mostly non-descriptive finds.

Finds corresponding to later periods are archaeologically and methodologically problematic for a whole other reason. Vasil’ev’s team has had to dig through no less than three cities on the same site, bypassing the 13-14th c. Golden Horde era and the 11-12th-c. Cuman era. In terms of a classical excavation, at least even assuming a highly careful and methodologically delicate digging procedure, such an operation is fraught with danger in finding and extrapolating on not only Itīl’ hopefully, but on the Saqsin and post-Saqsin periods as well. As the eminent pre-Columbian archaeologist Kent Flannery has put it: “Archaeology is the only branch of anthropology where we kill our informants in the process of studying them.” So while survey archaeology would be more constructive (and less invasive) than excavation in terms of the preservation of sites in the steppe and forest-steppe zones, far more would have to be conducted and they would not necessarily be as fruitful as strictly Mediterranean survey archaeology conducted in countries such as Italy and Greece.

Nevertheless, Vasil’ev’s excavations have born fruit, albeit indirectly. An ash-lined destruction layer has been carbon-dated to the late-10th century, partially corroborating the PVL account of Svjatoslav’s conquest in 965. In addition, finds of a brick fortress have proven persuasive to many other historians and archaeologists that Samosdelka is the site of what may have once been Itīl’. For myself however, the best evidence is Garnatī’s testimony that in his time (mid-12th c.) and residence in Saqsin, previously known as Itīl’, was the only

city in the Volga delta. Clearly, Vasil’ev and his team have discovered a major city in the Volga delta with layers dating as far back as the 8-9th centuries. However, if Samosdelka is to be agreed on in scholarly consensus as the site of Itīl’, clearly more research, excavation and interpretation still remains to be done on the site. At present, it appears as the likeliest, though not yet definitive, candidate.

Ch. 2: 3.1.1.3 The effects of monotheization

The final of the tentative conclusions will constitute a much broader, and perhaps more debatable theme of this study, namely, the relationship between sedentarism and monotheism. It is of course well known that there is no clear, processual link between one and the other, but I have proposed that there are some undeniable parallels, both spatial and chronological. Any history student will quickly point out that Mediterranean and Near Eastern kingdoms, empires and civilizations built on agriculture rose and fell for millennia, after all, long before even the advent of Judaism, let alone Christianity and Islam. The difference, however, is that such peoples generated monotheisms organically over many centuries, (ecumenisms), while other peoples, or rather, their rulers specifically, adopted and/or joined such monotheisms when they came into contact with them. We can see this process beginning with what is usually characterized as the beginning of the “migration period,” or *völkerwanderungszeiten* in Western Europe. Some have argued it began as early as the second century BCE with the so-called “Celtic” movements toward the Rhine. At the opposite end, in so-called “late antiquity,” it has been argued that it ended between 500-700 CE with the Avaro-Slavic invasions of the southern Balkans or the coronation of Charlemagne. However, we have seen here that other migrations occurred much later than Slavic migrations into the southern Balkans (see below chapter 7 §2.2), as we have noted the dissolution of Old Great Bulgaria by the Khazars, resulting in the Bulgars’ migrations to what later became Danube and Volga Bulgaria respectively (see appendix 1 below §A1.1.1). As we have also seen, such movements around the northern Black Sea littoral continued with the Magyars and Pečenegs and Oğuz in the second half of the 9th c. Similarly, as we will see, nomadic Cumans (Qıpčaq/Polovcý) and Selçuqs, will constitute a later continuation of this trend.413 Nevertheless, in each of these migrations, there has been either an adoption of a monotheism by the ruler or there has been an inimical and irremovable resistance to it. As

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413 For the relationship between the Selçuqs, Pečenegs and Khazaria, see Zhivkov, 2015, 242. See also below chapter 4 §2.2.
we will see in later chapters, those rulers who successfully monotheized their subjects created lasting dynasties, or at least identities, while those who did not vanished in the sands of time.\textsuperscript{414}

This then consequently condenses Somogyi’s “conquering minority”\textsuperscript{415} (the elite) and the conquered majority (the subject populations) into a polity – the beginnings of the creation of a “people,” who count their coreligionists in common due to their shared monotheism and liturgical languages (regardless of spoken language). The “society,” in this case of Khazaria, which adopts a given monotheism (Judaism), also adopts a certain measure of sedentarization, which in turn presupposes the creation of a center which in turn means the creation of a periphery. In turn, the creation of a sedentary (or semi-sedentary) elite which rules sedentary (or semi-sedentary) subjects by means of tribute and then tax collection, whether in coin or kind, gradually diffuses its monotheistic identity to those people it protects and/or collects tribute from. This process can be seen as well in the adoption of a liturgical language, usually in which the sacred texts and laws are written, and the adoption of a linear conception of time in which successive rulers occupy the central role in the plot of the story, based on the origin story adopted from the sacred text and reflected back to the rulers in their own literary and historical traditions.

So in summary, I argue that the formation of a “medieval” dynastic polity is predicated primarily on the adoption of a brand of monotheism, as opposed to some amorphous concept of geographical “worldview and ritual.”\textsuperscript{416} The ability of the ruler,

\textsuperscript{414} It seems fitting to quote Zhivkov, 2015, 102 here when he writes:

“no monuments or settlements that can be linked with certainty only with the Khazars have been found. An additional problem is that unlike the Bulgars and Alans who each have their own descendants, which makes the research of their mythological beliefs an achievable though time-consuming task, the Khazars have disappeared completely and left no ethnic group or nation which could be identified with them.”

\textsuperscript{415} Somogyi, 2008, 110-111.

\textsuperscript{416} See for example the final conclusion of Zhivkov, 2015, 282, who writes:

“The ideology of the steppe world had its roots in ancient times (dating as far back as the Bronze Age), when the boundaries between agriculture and nomadism were not yet clearly defined. That was the time of the mythical Aryans and Turanians. All significant steppe empires in the subsequent centuries (up to Genghis Khan) compared to them. Thus, the ideology and religious notions of the linguistically different Turks and Iranians were extremely similar during the Early Middle Ages. According to O. Pritsak, the idea of a specific order (world) that bound the whole of the Eurasian Steppe was extremely
whether he is successful or not, to disseminate his newfound monotheistic identity to his subjects is the definition of the “potestarian” polity. As we will discuss in the next conclusion (§3.1.2.1), in the case of Judaism-as-state-religion in Khazaria, the rulers were not so successful. As I have quoted Schama above in n210:

“The century of official Jewish Khazaria may not have been long enough to have rooted itself sufficiently to withstand the invasions from the Rus. When that happened, just two decades after the opening between Cordoba and Atil, it is impossible to say what proportion of the Khazar Jews left and how many stayed under the new religions.”  

Ch. 2: 3.1.2 More certain conclusions

3.1.2.1 The extent of the conversion

In the adoption of Judaism by the khağans of Khazaria specifically, that the vast majority of the subject population remained largely pagan, as many scholars have discussed before, is essentially indisputable. Yet archaeological evidence has nevertheless shown that Judaic objects have been found throughout Khazaria, some corresponding to the SMC and were allegedly “locally produced.” Such objects, with the certain exception of the Moses coinage, do not in themselves irrefutably prove the existence of Judaism-as-state-religion; they only offer tantalizing clues without settling the question. Outside of the Crimean and Taman Peninsulas, which contained substantial Jewish communities, but not necessarily as a top-down “state-religion,” it remains improbable that Judaism penetrated deeply into the rural regions of Khazaria. The vast majority of steppe burials uncovered have been characterized as pagan, to say nothing of the preponderance of nomadic lifestyles, enduring as they had for millennia, still prevalent in Khazaria well into the 10th century and later. To suppose, therefore, that the vast majority of the subject populations which paid tribute to the khağans was Jewish, would be foolish. Ergo, the diversity of the khağanate, described as such by
durable and kept the steppe empire vital for two millennia. The common tradition was preserved in the worldview and rituals of the majority of the descendants of the former steppe empires.”

Such an oversimplified treatment of identity as boiling down to worldview and rituals is redolent of claiming modern national identity is expressed primarily through “values” or “culture.” Similar theories have been made about the so-called “Germanic tribes,” who for decades were theorized to have been aware of their own Germanic-ness. Moreover, similar conclusions have been made of the so-called prehistoric Basques, Slavs or certainly Hungarians. See for example Feldman, 2016, “Review of: Khazaria in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries,” n12-14.

418 Zhivkov, 2015, 86-87.
Zhivkov,\textsuperscript{419} was directly due to the failure of the \textit{khağans}, kings and \textit{beks}, to enforce Judaism as a “state-religion,” much as Orthodoxy had been enforced by the Rus’ rulers in the 11\textsuperscript{th} century and later (see below chapter 6 §2.1.2). While this was certainly not the ultimate cause of the downfall of the \textit{khağanate}, it was the reason that a minority Jewish identity did not proliferate after the \textit{khağanate} was conquered by the Rus’ or absorbed by later nomadic migrations (see below chapter 7 §2.1.1).

Ch. 2: 3.1.2.2 The context of the conversion

In contextualizing Khazaria, it must remain clear that the conversion to Judaism was by no means “a historical anomaly.” Conversion to one monotheism or another was a regular occurrence among previously non-sedentarized and non-literate peoples. In addition, there are no shortage of other instances of top-down adoptions of Judaism as “state-religion” long before Khazaria as well.\textsuperscript{420} To view the histories of converted peoples in a binary between Christianity and Islam would be fundamentally unsound, especially given a relatively well-organized state-structure based between “empires of faith,” Christian Rome and the Islamic Caliphate in the 7-10\textsuperscript{th} centuries. While Western European rulers and their subjects found only Latin Christianity, Khazaria could choose between three monotheisms. While Western European rulers adopted Latin Christianity and settled themselves into jostling kingdoms part of a single church, Khazaria adopted Judaism and settled herself into her own \textit{oikoumenē} 
\textit{detaching} itself from Christian Rome and Islam. In such a way, Khazaria represents, among many historical occurrences, an effective bonding of Western European and Eastern European history to a broader context of the “Global Middle-Ages,” which I will discuss in more detail below in the second half of chapter 7.

\textsuperscript{419} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{420} See for example Sand, 2009, 190-209.
Chapter 3: Monotheization in metal: comparing 8-9th-c. Khazarian, Roman and Islamic coin reforms in an ecumenical context

Abstract: Comparative coin reforms and ecumenical commonwealths: In 837/838 CE, the Khazar khağan initiated a coin reform meant to affirm his religion on the coinage to be circulated throughout his realm. Though in Arabic script and consciously copying the contemporary Islamic dirham, it read “Moses is messenger of God,” instead of the common Arabic script reading, “Mohammed is the messenger of God,” at the time, Khazaria was a considerable power which the Roman emperors and Islamic Caliphs regarded as roughly equals in projecting and protecting a third oikoumenē: Judaism. While Judaism failed to take enduring root in Khazaria and the coin reform discontinued, the coins themselves survived, namely in the famous Spillings Hoard. When contextualized along with ‘Abd al-Malik’s Islamic coin reforms (ca. 696-705) and Justinian II’s Christian Roman coin reforms (ca. 705-711), what can we learn about monotheistic identities and objectives in conjunction with numismatics in the competing universal empires of the period?
Ch. 3: 1.1 Empires of faith and their finances

Having discussed some crucial distinctions between statehood, ethnicity and dynasty in the context of the 9-10th-c. Khazars and Khazaria, the present chapter will seek to expand the conceptual focus by juxtaposing the attempted top-down monotheization (or Judaization) of Khazaria alongside that of the top-down Christization of East Rome (or Byzantium) and Islamization of the Caliphate. But the discussion will center on one specific class of evidence: coinage, in gold, silver and base-metal denominations. The first half of this chapter will chart the confessional coin reforms of these three “empires of faith” essentially from the turn of the 8th c. up to the aforementioned Moses coins of Khazaria in the late 830s. The second half of the chapter will expand to include the confessionally-based coinages of some 11-13th-c. peripheral dynasties and communities of the Islamic ummah and the Christian oikoumenē.

The Christian Roman emperor Constantine VII is unmistakable in his mid-10th-c. attribution of hierarchal importance to the Khazarian khağan after the Christian Roman emperor and the Islamic caliph.1 After all, these were, as Sarris has eloquently argued, (and partially based on coinage), empires of faith.2 Although we have already briefly discussed the function of coinage to promote such a distinct worldview, and its subsequent assignation of earthly authority and legitimacy, specifically in the case of Khazaria as a “third force,”3 I

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1 Reiske (ed.), 1829-1830, Constantini Porphyrogeniti Imperatoris De Ceremoniis Aulae Byzantinae, 686-692, esp. 690. The source prescribes different weights of gold (in numbers of nomismaτa/solidi) when sending letters to various foreign potentates: a four-solidi gold seal for the Islamic Caliph, a four-solidi gold seal to the emir of Egypt and a three-solidi gold seal to the Khazarian khağan. All other foreign potentates, including the popes in Rome and the emperors of the West, were to receive two-solidi gold seals or less, except for the archon of archons of Armenia (of Vaspourakan), who was also meant to receive a three-solidi gold seal.

2 Sarris, 2001, Empires of Faith: The Fall of Rome to the Rise of Islam, 500-700. Regarding the contemporaneous faith in ecumenical empire, I believe it is also worth quoting the words of Holland for an enhanced understanding:

“Yet still, long after the fall of Rome, a conviction that the only alternative to barbarism was the rule of a global emperor kept a tenacious hold on the imaginings of the Christian people. And not on those of the Christian people alone. From China to the Mediterranean, the citizens of great empires continued to do precisely as the ancient Romans had done, and see in the rule of an emperor the only conceivable image of the perfection of heaven. What other order, after all, could there possibly be?”


3 See the previous chapter 2, §1.2.1.2. On the reference to Khazar Judaism as a “third force,” see also Shapira, 2005, “Judaization of Central Asian Traditions as Reflected in the so-called Jewish-Khazar Correspondence, with Two Excurses: a. Judah Halevy’s Quotations; b. Eldad ha-Dani (Juedaeo-Turkica VI) with an Addendum,” 505.
believe such a discussion would be incomplete without enquiring further into numismatics, and including similar examples in the two other Abrahamic ecumenical empires: the Christian and the Muslim. This is because numismatics, as a discipline, is an outstanding informant on the nuances of dynasties and states in the pre-modern era.

Since much has been made regarding the 7-8th-c. confessional contest on the respective coin reforms, first of the caliph, ‘Abd al-Malik, and then of the emperor, Justinian II, we will examine, primarily by comparative analysis, such 8th-c. coin reforms in light of ecumenical allegiances. Then, by the same comparative methodology, we will delve deeper into the same phenomenon in 9th-c. Khazaria and outward from there into the broad *commonwealths* of these respective Abrahamic ecumenisms in order to elaborate more fully on the goals and limitations of various dynasties’ top-down, potestarian monotheizations.

Ch. 3: 1.1.1 Islamic coin reforms

While the present discussion will center on monetary transformation, it may be helpful to begin by noting that coin circulation throughout the erstwhile Roman cities of the Mediterranean coastline did not change drastically under the rule of the early caliphs. Allegedly, the prophet Muhammed himself took credit for precisely this lack of monetary transformation, and so the situation remained, with the exception of some Islamicizing experimentation, until well into the reign of the caliph ‘Abd al-Malik, whose coin reforms (ca. 696-705 CE) ushered in another era, which has garnered much scholarly interest not only for its causes and implications, but for the response from Constantinople.

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4 I thank my supervisor, prof. Archie Dunn, for his inspiration in suggesting this research.
5 Grierson, 1960, “The Monetary Reforms of ‘Abd al-Malik: their Metrological Basis and their Financial Repercussion,” 241-242. Many studies have been done on the so-called pseudo-Byzantine, Arab-Byzantine, and Arab-Sassanian coinages of the early caliphate, though here I refer principally to the well-known “standing caliph coinage” which can be found in the catalogue of Islamic coins held in Oxford’s Ashmolean Museum by: Album and Goodwin, 2002, *Sylloge of Islamic Coins in the Ashmolean, vol. 1: the Pre-Reform Coinage of the Early Islamic Period*, 91-98 and cat. nos. 608-731. Additionally, a number of “standing caliph” coins are held at the University of Birmingham’s Barber Institute, which I have personally examined, and are labelled under cat. nos. A-B 34 – A-B 39. See also Grierson, 1982, *Byzantine Coins*, 144-149.
By the term “Islamicizing,” I refer principally to the appearance of Islamic motifs on late-7th-c. coinage, where changes to erstwhile Roman iconography appear, such as the “standing caliph” coins. The first purely Islamic coin, a gold dinar dated to ca. 696-697 CE (fig. 42), demonstrates that neither the ruler nor the mint was as important as the Islamic creed, being the only reference on the coin. 8 According to Grierson, the caliph at the time, ‘Abd al-Malik, was not the first to make the attempt at coin reform, but was ultimately successful, especially with regard to the inherent “anti-iconic prejudices” of Islam, 9 which Sarris argues precipitated Byzantine iconoclasm. 10 While numismatists have debated when, 11 where 12 and in what metrics 13 exactly such modifications were imposed on caliphal mints in silver and base denominations (see fig. 43 for a silver dirham of the same era), few would argue that ecumenical supremacy was not contested on the Islamic coin reforms of al-Malik and his successors, 14 which as the numismatists Luke Treadwell and John Walker have

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8 Catalogue of the British Museum and referenced via webpage: http://arabic.britishmuseum.org/middle-east/room34/gold-coin.html. According to the British Museum: “This piece does not mention the name of the caliph or the mint, but only religious terms, beginning with the angular Kufic script, including the Shahada, which is at the heart of the Islamic faith.” According to Marek Jankowiak, the the legend on the coin does in fact specify its denomination, so is not strictly “only religious.” The legend reads quite simply translated: “In the name of God, there is no God but God alone; Muhammed is the messenger of God.” See Sarris, 2001, 299.

9 Sarris, 2001, 300. Notably, regarding the causes of Byzantine iconoclasm, he cites Brubaker and Haldon, 2011, Byzantium in the Iconoclast Era, c. 680-850: A History, who do not in fact reference the “anti-iconic prejudices” of Islamic coinage as a cause of Byzantine iconoclasm (see p. 1-68). Therefore, while I would not inherently disagree with Sarris’ argument, it may be slightly overstated. Additionally, though admittedly these are small quibbles, I would also add that he mistakenly cites the book’s publishing date as 2010 instead of 2011 and neglects to cite any specific pages.

10 Grierson, 1960, 243-244.


"‘Abd al-Malik brought forward a new coinage with his renewed attempts at expanding the power of the caliphal government. The introduction and use of Reformed dirhams probably served limited administrative purposes initially. However, their success encouraged subsequent rulers to use them
convincingly argued, were directly predicated on al-Malik’s other “Arabization policies.” For example, Walker writes:

“In the early part of his reign he was actually forced to pay a large annual tribute to [the Byzantines] in order to maintain a semblance of peace. Incidentally, it was this indemnity that, according to the Arab tradition, led to ‘Abd al-Malik’s celebrated reform of the coinage, together with the employment of Arabic as the official language on all government documents, thus displacing Greek, Latin, Coptic, and Pehlevi.”

While the interchangeability of terms such as “Arabization” and “Islamization” may be debatable, these aforementioned coin reforms would have broad implications for the concurrent Christian Roman coinage issued by Justinian II.

Ch. 3: 1.1.2 Christian coin reforms

Peter Sarris has argued that al-Malik “antagonised” Justinian by sending his new Islamic coinage as tribute, to which he responded by designing a new coin exhibiting a portrait of Christ on the obverse, as well as himself in a lōros (ca. 689-691 CE). However, it ought to be noted here that if Shams Eshragh’s dating of the earliest post-reform Islamic

more widely. Commerce may have gradually and indirectly spurred demand for them. As the production and circulation of these coins increased during the last decades of Umayyad rule, they replaced the Sasanian style coinages altogether establishing a new Muslim monetary system.”

16 Sarris, 2001, 299; and Grierson, 1999, Byzantine Coinage, 7-8.

Regarding the use of the lōros specifically, not only on the coins of Justinian II, but also his successors, according to Dr. Maria Vrij, the current coin curator at the Barber Institute of Fine Art at the University of Birmingham (personal communication, 14 February, 2017), the full-body lōros has been argued to be another innovation of Justinian II’s first reign’s Christ-type coinage and the emperor also appears on some base-metal coins from Syracuse in the full-body lōros, along with Leōntios, and on most, but not all base-metal coinage. This would suggest that the lack of Christ-type coins from other mints and the lack of Christ-type coins from Justinian II’s immediate successors, who were not iconoclasts, (a generally accepted position), was a rejection of the use of Christ on coins specifically, as opposed to Justinian II’s depiction in a lōros, which undoubtedly continued with all emperors after him. In other words, based on Vrij’s argument in her University of Birmingham 2017 PhD thesis, The Numismatic Iconography of the Period of Iconomachy (610-867), 93, the continuation of the use of the lōros despite the rejection of the Christ-type coinage after Justinian II’s first reign, suggests a “deliberate decision,” which Vrij suggests may relate to the “the grubby business of taxation” (p. 90).
silver coinage is correct (698 CE), then Justinian II’s Christ-type coinage (689-691 CE) may predate the earliest post-reform Islamic silver coinage, thereby casting doubt on Sarris’ argument, or at the very least, seeking clarification.

Though such an interpretation of a conflict over coin iconography between Justinian and al-Malik has been debated among numismatists, there is nevertheless textual evidence, in both Greek and Arabic, that this was at least partially the case. That said, other scholars have argued that the contemporary Council in Trullo instead contributed to Justinian’s decision to modify the coinage with Christ’s depiction. Regardless, the appearance of Christ on Justinian’s coinage represents a clear break from precedent (figs. 44-51).

Unlike al-Malik’s coin reforms, which appeared almost immediately on a variety of metals and in a variety of mints, Justinian’s depiction of Christ appears in two distinct styles in his coinage, corresponding to his two reigns. And they only appeared from the mints of Sardinia and Constantinople, and the depiction of Christ on imperial coinage was discontinued after his second reign (711 CE) until the reign of Michael III. The Christ-type

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19 This is based on the direct testimonies of Theophanēs the Confessor and al-Baladhuri, discussed by Treadwell, 2012, 149-152. For Theophanēs the Confessor, see Mango, Scott and Greatrex (trans.), 1997, The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor: Byzantine and Near Eastern History, AD 284-813, 509-511; and for al-Baladhuri, see De Goeje (ed.), 1886, Futuḥ al-Buldân, 240; and the translation by Treadwell, 2012, 146.

20 The proceeds from the Council in Trullo (691-692 CE) contain canon 82, which forbids the general portrayal of Christ as a lamb, only as a man, but Breckinridge, 1959, The Numismatic Iconography of Justinian II (685-695, 705-711 A.D.), 57 argues that Justinian II utilized his Christ-type coinage to advocate for canon 82. According to Dr. Vrij (personal communication, 14 February, 2017), this is also accepted by C. Morrison and P. Grierson, as opposed to the alternative “war of images” model advocated by Humphreys, Treadwell, Olster et al. The difference of opinion, it appears, hinges on the emphasis on the Council in Trullo’s canon 82, regardless of the testimonies of Theophanēs the Confessor and al-Baladhuri. Personally, I am inclined to side with the primary sources. For a balanced discussion of this debate, see Haldon, 2016, The Empire that would not Die: the Paradox of Eastern Roman Survival, 640-740, 48.

Incidentally, it appears that Grierson (1968, 570) mistakenly refers to canon 83 instead of canon 82, as well as Hahn (1981, Moneta Imperii Byzantini von Heraclius bis Leo III [610-720], 166), while Morrission (1970, Catalogue des Monnaies Byzantines de la Bibliothèque Nationale, 397) declines to refer to the precise canon number despite providing the original Greek text for it. Nevertheless, Humphreys (2013, 233) and Whiting, 1973, Byzantine Coins, 153-158, refer correctly to canon 82.

21 According to Vrij, the so-called P pantókrator Christ-type coinage corresponds to Justinian II’s first reign (685-695 CE), as opposed to the Syrian Emmanouel Christ-type coinage, which corresponds to his second reign (705-711 CE). See for example Goodacre, 1957, A Handbook of the Coinage of the Byzantine Empire, 114-118, 123-124.

22 Evidently, based on a personal examination of such denominations in the University of Birmingham’s Barber Institute, (Maria Vrij, personal communication, 14 February, 2017), the gold, Christ-type coins of Justinian II were, amongst other reasons, a response to ‘Abd al-Malik’s Islamic coin reforms. See Kent, 1985, A Selection of Byzantine Coins in the Barber Institute of Fine Arts, cat. nos. 52, 55-58. For such examples in other collections, see also Bateson and Campbell, 1998, Byzantine and Early Medieval Western European Coins in the Hunter Coin Cabinet, University of Glasgow, 75, 78, Ratto, 1959, Monnaies Byzantines et d’autres pays
coinage appears only on gold and silver from Constantinople and on gold from Sardinian mints. There are no known base-metal Christ-type coins during the time of Justinian II, and none in any metal from Carthage, Syracuse, Rome or Ravenna. According to Vrij, because the era of iconoclasm (or eikonomachia) began decades later into the 8th c., the disappearance of the image of Christ from Christian Roman gold coins after 711 cannot be attributed to immediate iconoclasm. Therefore, the reason why Christ’s portraiture on coins was eventually rejected on the coinage of Justinian’s successors, as Vrij tentatively suggests, may have been connected with taxation. In short, Christ only appears on gold and silver coins from Constantinople because tax was paid in gold, while base-metal coins, unused for tax purposes and less valuable, ought not have been endowed with an image as holy as that of Christ. Nevertheless, it remains undeniable that Justinian’s coin reforms (689-691 CE), featuring the expressly ecclesiastical lōros along with a depiction of Christ, were meant to evoke allegiance to the Christian oikoumenē, rather than to the Islamic ummah.

Ch. 3: 1.1.3 Judaic coin reforms

The coin reforms initiated by the respective Christian and Muslim potentates contesting the 8-9th-c. Mediterranean may at first glance appear far removed from Khazaria in the Pontic-Caspian steppe. However, I would remind the reader of the extensive relations between Khazaria and both Christian Rome and the Islamic Caliphate during not only the time of al-Malik and Justinian II, but throughout the 8-10th centuries. For example, the Khazarian khağans’ engagements with the Muslim caliphs since the early-8th c. have been treated in chapter 2 above §1.1. In other instances, we may recall the Byzantine glazed white-contemporaires a l’époque Byzantine, cat. nos. 16782, 1685, 1691, 1692, 1705; Grierson, 1968, 574-582; Hahn, 1981, 164-178; Sear, 1987, Byzantine Coins and their Values, cat. nos. 1413-1427, 1439, 1442-1444; Wroth, 1966, Imperial Byzantine Coins in the British Museum, 330-357; Radić and Ivanišević, 2006, Byzantine Coins from the National Museum in Belgrade, cat. no. 551; Callegher, 2000, Catalogo delle monete bizantine, vandale, ostrogote e longobarde del Museo Bottacin, cat. no. 343; Bonfioli, 1984, Monete “bizantine,” nelle raccolte numismatiche del Museo Civico di Siena, cat. nos. 55-56; Sabatier, 1955, Description générale des monnaies byzantines, 19-26, 32-35; and Tolstoï, 1968, Византійскія Монеты, cat. nos. 27-37, 39.

23 This situation changes slightly into Justinian II’s second reign because according to Vrij, there is some debate on whether the Christ-type on the tremissis belongs to the mint of Rome. See Vrij, 2017, 90-91.

24 Ibid, 89-93. As related above in n17, Vrij posits that the differing minting practices outside of Constantinople during Justinian II’s reigns may be due to taxation. According to Vrij (p. 90):

“This may also explain why the Syracusan and Italian mainland mints omit the image of Christ – the mint masters may have felt that the portrayal of a holy figure, on this most profane item associated with the grubby business of taxation, was unacceptable. Unacceptable to the Sicilians and Italians, and, perhaps, unacceptable to the Caliph who needed little excuse to justify further Arabisation reforms, this time on his coins.”
ware used as instruments for conversion in the 8-9th-c. Crimea, a Byzantine-made bronze encolpion cross found in Sarkel (figs. 14-15), and the extensive textual documentation about relations with Khazaria referred to in appendix 1 below in 8-10th-c. Greek, Latin, Arabic and Persian sources, all attest to extensive relations between the Khazarian khaḡans, Islamic caliphs and Christian Roman emperors.

Before we return to the Moses coins mentioned above in chapter 2 §1.2.1.2, it should be noted here that the Caliphate, as a concept in the Quran, was derived from the biblical king David, who, as Sarris argues, al-Malik himself sought “to emulate.”

The Khazar khaḡans, according to the Khazar Correspondence, sought the same emulation, as did the Christian Roman emperors. However, in their coins, the khaḡans sought to emulate contemporary ‘Abbasid and other Islamic dynasties’ coinages as well, which we have already discussed (figs. 52-55, 61-65). While there is comparatively less scholarship on the Khazar Judaic coin reforms than the two monotheistic coin reforms discussed above, I will discuss the Khazarian Moses coins, found in 1999 in the Spillings 2 hoard (and Ralswiek hoard) in Gotland, and dated precisely to the year 837/838 CE.

Kovalev introduces his argument for a Khazar conversion dated exactly to this year (837-838) by juxtaposing the Khazarian Judaization with Volga Bulgaria’s Islamization and

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25 It hardly needs repeating, but Justinian II’s own escapades in Khazaria and Crimean Chersōn are proof enough of the Khazarian khaḡans’ long involvements, even from such an early time, with the Christian emperors of Rome. See for example Feldman, 2013, *The Historiographical and Archaeological Evidence of Autonomy and Rebellion in Chersōn: A Defense of the Revisionist Analysis of Vladimir's Baptism* (987-989), 27-32. For the glazed white-ware ceramics, see p. 65-66. As for other archaeological evidence of commercial relations between Khazaria and Byzantium, such as the Günsein and carrot-type ceramics used in 7-11th-c. Black Sea commerce, see Lewit, 2015, “The Second Sea: Exchange between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea in Late Antiquity,” 149-174; Morozova, 2009, “Medieval Maritime Traffic and Amphorae Distribution along the Northern Coast of the Black Sea,” 159-167; Arthur, 2007, “Form, Function and Technology in Pottery Production from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages,” 159-186; and Waksman, Skartsis, Kontogiannis, Todorova and Vaxevanis, 2016, “Investigating the Origins of Two Main Types of Middle and Late Byzantine Amphorae.”

26 *Sirā* 38:26.

27 Sarris, 2001, 300.

28 See chapter 2 above §2.1.1.


30 For examples of contemporary ‘Abbasid coinage in gold, silver and base-metals, see Nicol, 2009, *Sylloge of Islamic Coins in the Ashmolean*, vol. 2: Early Post-Reform Coinage, cat. nos. 1365-1634. See also Broome, 1985, 19-35. Regarding contemporary ‘Abbasid silver coinage specifically, see Shams Eshragh, 2010, cat. nos. 1241-1244. However, contemporary (AH 223) coinage of the Central Asian Islamic dynasties of the Tāhirids and Sāmānids, along with the ‘Abbasid caliphs, would provide further reference for the Khazarian coinage of the same era: see Broome, 1985, 25-35, 60-67. This would probably be the clearest comparison of Khazarian “Moses” dirhams to comparable standard Islamic dirhams of the same era, which instead read “Mohammed is the messenger of God.” See also chapter 2 above §1.2.1.2 and compare figs. 52-55 to figs. 56-57.
Rus’ Christianization. His methodology behind the dating of the coins is crucial of course. Analyzing three separate coin types corresponding to the same die-chain, all minted in Khazaria, the correctly-dated (837-838 CE) *Ard al-Khazar* (“land of Khazaria”) dirhams, the *Moses* dirhams (figs. 56-57) and the *Jalîl/Khalîl* dirhams, the latter two types bearing fictitious dates and mint-marks, Kovalev, working with Rispling, determined that all shared the same dating (837-838) since they all shared the same die link, which Rispling numbered 108. Additionally, samples of each Khazarian dirham-type have all been found alongside correctly dated ‘Abbasid dirhams presumably having been deposited in cloth or leather sacks or wooden boxes.

Since his dating methodology is coherent and generally numismatically sound, as Brook has argued, such numismatic evidence suggests a Jewish attribution. And while his

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31 Kovalev, 2005a, “Creating Khazar Identity through Coins: the Special Issue Dirhams of 837/8,” 226-227 and Rispling, 2002, “Khazar Coins in the name of Moses and Muhammad.” To extrapolate on the correctness and fictitiousness of the coins’ respective minting dates, while all the coins have been found in ninth-century layers in hoards in the Baltic region, five such hoards contain dirhams dated at the very earliest to 837/838 CE (AH 223), these being the *Ard al-Khazar* coins, while the *Moses* dirhams contain dates corresponding to AH 160-163 (776-780 CE) and belong to the exact same die-chain. In other words, Khazar coins bearing correctly dated mintmarks are interspersed with those bearing incorrect dates. The study of the correctly dated mintmarks has revealed a die-chain (#108) which bears the correct dating for all the coins, even if they bear alternate marks on the reverse. See Shake, 2001, *Coins of the Khazar Empire*, 54-55.

32 Rispling, 2002.


“*Хазарские дирхамы с именем МуСы, посланика АллаХа*. В хазарской чеканке середины IX века еврейские черты не проступают (определеный “андалусский колорит” я мог бы отметить в форме лигатуры лāм-‘алиф с широко расходящимися “ветвями” на дирхамах, битых в *أرض الخزر* ‘ард ал-хазар “земле хазар”). Тем не менее с иудейской религиозной традицией связывают появление редчайших дирхамов с формулой *الله موسى رسول* «Муса (Моисей) посланник АллаХа» в надписи в поле оборотной стороны.”

I have translated this as:

“*The Khazar dirhams with the name of Moses, the messenger of Allah*. In the Khazar coinage of the mid-10th c., Judaic features do not show through (a certain “Andalusian coloration,” I could have noted in the ligature form *lam-* ‘alif with widely divergent “branches” on the dirhams, broken into the *أرض الخزر* ‘ard al-Khazar “land of Khazaria”). Nevertheless, Jewish religious tradition is linked to the
research undoubtedly has far broader implications for Khazar studies, we will discuss for the moment how such a numismatic (and by extension archaeological) confirmation of Judaism-as-state-religion in Khazaria in 837/838 underscores the Khazar Correspondence and the Schechter Text.

As we have previously discussed (ch. 2 §1.2.1.2), the second stage of the Khazarian khağans’ conversion to Judaism may be cautiously attributed to 837/838. It is probable that the Moses dirhams were minted by a Jew, somewhere in Khazaria, in clear imitation of the appearance of the rarest dirhams with the formula الله موسى رسول – “Musa (Moses), messenger of God” – in the central inscription on the reverse side.”

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36 Kovalev’s work has a major bearing notably on researches into the attraction of Viking Rus’ “silver-seekers” (see for example Franklin and Shepard, 1996, The Emergence of Rus, 650-1200, 3-70) and for the later Khazarian gradual decline and corresponding Volga Bulgarian rise later in the 10th c.: see below chapter 5, §1.1 and chapter 4 n50.

37 See chapter 2 above §2.1.1; and Olsson, 2013, “Coup d’état, Coronation and Conversion: Some Reflections on the Adoption of Judaism by the Khazar Khaganate,” 495-526, who has assigned this phase as the first of the three-stage process and has attributed to it a number of completely conjectural events such as a Hungarian invasion, which is actually the least dubious of these, a famine allegedly hinted at by Movsēs Xorenac’i (Dowsett [trans.], 1961, The History of the Caucasian Albanians, 217-218), which incidentally, Shapira, 2007b, “Armenian and Georgian Sources on the Khazars: a Re-evaluation,” 312, refers to information about the Khazars contained within as “unreliable and anachronistic,” and finally, a Byzantine raid north of the Black Sea, which he clumsily connects to the 841-CE building of Sarkel. The absurdity of such a conjecture need not even be elaborated on.

38 Shake, 2001, 31, 35, 54, claims that these coins were minted in Sarkel rather than Itil’, while Kovalev, 2005a, 228-230, in reference to the “trident” tamga symbol appearing on some coins (†), though not the Moses coins, although within the same die-chain 108 (p. 226-227), claims that they symbolize the “ruling house at the time the coins were issued.” Incidentally, in this Zhivkov, 2015, Khazaria in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries, 59-65, agrees, based on a particularly convincing argument from a steppe context. Whether or not this may connote the aforementioned Āšinā dynasty is a matter of speculation, but it would nevertheless imply that if the tamga appeared in reference to the ruling clan, Āšinā or otherwise, then it would be minted in Itil’, at least according to Brook, 206, 81, even as he references Kovalev, 2005a, 228-230. Nevertheless, Kovalev, 2005a, 229, himself does actually insist on Itil’ as the true source of the coinage, but only that they “were linked to the Saltovo culture of Khazaria, where they must have been struck.” He cites here the Russian scholar Fomin, 1988, “Рунические знаки и тамги на подражаниях куфическим монетам Х в. заметки,” 187. According to Fomin,

“…по имеющимся у нас данным, подражания куфическим монетам с руническими знаками были отчеканены в первой половине Х в. на юге Восточной Европы, вероятнее всего, на территории салтово-маяцкой культуры.”

I have translated this as:

“…according to our available data, imitation Kufic coins with runic signs were minted in the first half of the 10th century in south-eastern Europe, most likely in the territory of the Saltovo-Majacki culture.”

If this is true, then that would then imply that the “Saltovo” culture could be more integrated than previously believed and doubted for example by by Afanas’ev, 2001, “Где же археологические свидетельства существования хазарского государства,” 43-55. However, returning to Shake’s
Islamic dirhams and that it was sanctioned by the rulership of Khazaria is confirmed by the text and dating of the *Arḍ al-Khazar* dirhams: “the land of Khazaria.” Similarly, the *Moses* dirhams reads: “Musa rasul Allah” alongside “Muhammad rasul Allah” (Moses/Muhammad is/are the messenger[s] of God). This would appear especially certain given that the *Moses* dirhams have the same metrology as Islamic dirhams, which were frequently minted by the technique of double-striking as opposed to over-striking.

However, Kovalev posits that the *Moses* dirhams were discontinued due to their ephemerality within Khazaria and their endemic disappearance northward to the lands of Rus’. He continues stating that such coinage was minted expressly to be traded northward in exchange for furs, honey, slaves and other goods in demand in the Islamic world. If this is so, then why would the Khazar rulers discontinue their own coinage after only one year when its sole purpose to be traded northward was actually being achieved? Shake argues that the purpose was to facilitate trade more than anything.

original inference, it is in fact quite fortuitous given Artamonov’s (1962, *История Хазар*, 303) discovery of what he interprets as Turkic tamga inscriptions on baked Sarkel bricks, that there appears on one of the bricks a tamga symbol almost exactly the same as that found on reverse of the *Arḍ al-Khazar* dirhams (see fig. 18). No other scholar I know of has noticed this similarity. If this can be verified, then we may be able to prove that the coins of die-chain #108 were in fact struck in Sarkel rather than in Itīl’.

39 Importantly, Khazar numismatic imitation of Islamic coinage also fits in with other dynasties’ later numismatic imitations, more established universalist “states,” such as Asenid (Danube-Bulgarian) numismatic imitation of Byzantine coinage – see below §1.2.1.2. For examples of this phenomenon, see Atanasov, 2014, “Durostorum–Dorostol(os)–Drastar/Dristra–Silistra: the Danubian Fortress from the Beginning of the 4th to the Beginning of the 19th c.,” 565-568, 571. For such a pattern of Bulgarian epigraphic imitation relating to bulls and seals as well, see p. 549-559.

40 Rather misrepresentatively, Zhivkov, 2015, 59 claims that Kovalev “assumes that between 838 and 843 the bek gained full control over the khağan’s secular affairs.” Elsewhere, (eg. p. 91, 95) Zhivkov refers to the “secular” without giving recourse to what exactly he means by “secular” or how such a 20th-c. concept can be projected without risk of anachronism on affairs taking place a thousand years ago.

41 Marek Jankowiak, personal communication, 16 February, 2017.

42 Kovalev, 2005a, 237-240. According to Rispling, 2005, “Osteuropäische Nachahmungen islamischer Münzen,” 172-220, such Khazarian (and Volga Bulgarian) imitation Islamic coinage made up 10% of all silver coinage exported northward to the Baltic in the 9th and 10th centuries. See also Jankowiak, 2013, “Two Systems of Trade in the Western Slavic Lands in the 10th Century,” 137-148. Jankowiak, 2016, “The Volga Bulgar Imitative Coinage,” would disagree with Kovalev about the very reason for such coinage in realms like Volga Bulgaria and Khazaria: its express purpose was to be traded to the Rus’ in exchange for slaves and other goods. See chapter 5 below, §1.1.2.

43 Petrukhin, 2013, “Sacral Kingship and the Judaism of the Khazars,” 291 has stated that “The Khazars sought to spread their domination to the North.”

44 Shake, 2001, 75. Specifically, he writes:

“…there is much evidence that they did strike coins *for their own use* [my italics] and followed a pattern of conduct that their predecessor used of minting imitations of other culture’s [sic] coins. The Khazars were too busy wheeling and dealing to worry about being called copycats.”
Conversely, Olsson disputes Kovalev’s theory when he points out that Judaization may not have necessarily been easy for pagans to accept immediately,\textsuperscript{45} which is quite similar to the difficulties al-Malik’s predecessors encountered in their attempted reforms (see above §1.1.1 and ch. 2 1.2.1.2). Though it was discontinued, once again keeping with a schematic monotheization narrative common to most Eurasian conversions as well as Golden’s “backslding” phase,\textsuperscript{46} I would argue that the Moses dirhams may have instead been discontinued due to a pagan reaction against top-down Judaization,\textsuperscript{47} and therefore, the Khazar khağan sought his legitimacy both via Judaism and traditional Turkic sacral rulership.\textsuperscript{48}

Finally, according to the scholar Marek Jankowiak, a mere 0.0007\% of all 9-10\textsuperscript{th}-c. silver coins traded northward were such Khazarian Moses issues, suggesting it mattered little whether the coins themselves are classed as miliarēsia, ‘Mohammed,’ or ‘Moses.’ Jankowiak’s database, part of the Dirhams for Slaves project at the Khalili Research Centre at the University of Oxford, records only about 500 dirhams are classed as Khazarian by origin, out of 10,000 such imitations in northern hoards. Of those roughly 500 Khazarian imitative dirhams, only 7 are Moses dirhams. It bears noting that Kovalev’s arguments may be somewhat overstated with regard to “Khazar identity,” given that so few of the Moses dirhams were struck, even compared to the Arḍ al-Khazar dirhams. Therefore, I would caution further research into overstating the significance of the Moses dirhams, which, in comparison with the sheer number of other dirhams traded northward in the 9-10\textsuperscript{th} c., were rather insignificant. Furthermore, given that only one die out of about 200 Khazarian imitative dies mentions Moses, it is still uncertain to assume any involvement of so-called “state” power in its production.\textsuperscript{49}

As we will encounter in the second half of the chapter, the endurance (or lack thereof) of confessional coin reforms of these three “empires of faith” will be reflected politically and

\textsuperscript{45} Olsson, 2013, 517. He writes: “The fact that the Jewish coinage was minted only for a single year indicates that not all of Khazaria’s inhabitants welcomed a Jewish ruler.”

\textsuperscript{46} See the previous chapter above §1.2.1.2.

\textsuperscript{47} This is Petrukhin’s 2013, 298 paramount point, which I agree with. Nevertheless, Komar, 2006, Степи Европы в Эпоху Средневековья: Хазарское Время, 146, argues instead that that the adoption of Judaism was meant to make the khağan powerless and resulted in a de facto coup d’état. See for example Olsson, 2013, 513-516.

\textsuperscript{48} Zhivkov, 2015, 59-65. See also chapter 2 above §1.2.1.2.

\textsuperscript{49} Marek Jankowiak, personal communication, 16 February, 2017.
geographically in the peripheries of the *ummah* and the *oikoumenē*, as local dynasties adopted various symbols on their own coinages to demonstrate their confessional allegiances.

Ch. 3: 1.2 Coinage and “commonwealth” (9-11th c.)

1.2.1 Local dynasties and their mints within the *ummah* and the *oikoumenē*

For decades, it has been conventional, particularly in Western scholarship, to regard history as the province of a given “nation,” taking the word for granted without examining it in a larger context. It is the purpose of this study, via comparative numismatics, to survey the coinage of a number of Christian and Muslim dynasties relevant to our ultimate goal of refining modern notions of premodern ethnicity and statehood on which dynastic lineage has been predicated.\(^5^0\) I will begin with a survey of the coinage of some 9-11th-c. Islamic dynasties of Central Asia (Ṭāhirids, Ṣaffārids, Sāmānids, Volga-Bulgar Almuṣīds) and continue with some Christian dynasties during the same era (Piasts, Rjurikids, Árpáds, Danube-Bulgar Asenids), to suggest that “nationhood” as commonly taken for granted in Western parlance, originally stemmed from loyalty to a given dynastic family, as evident on contemporary coinage. In other words, we frequently consider these abovementioned Christian families the forerunners of the modern nations of Poland, Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria respectively, yet we would hardly make such an inference for the Ṭāhirids, Ṣaffārids, Sāmānids and Almuṣīds respectively. I will finish with a comparatively less studied aspect of medieval coinage pertaining to the Judaic-related coinage outside Khazaria.

1.2.1.1 Coins of the *ummah* dynasties

We may begin by comparatively examining the 9-11th-c. coinages of Islamic dynasties in trans-Caspian Eurasia, representing local autonomy within the Eurasian geographical space of the Islamic caliphate and with relevance to Khazaria: the Ṭāhirids, Ṣaffārids, Sāmānids and Volga-Bulgar Almuṣīds, in that order.\(^5^1\) The importance of local

\(^{50}\) See for example the comprehensive discussion given by March, 2013, “Genealogies of Sovereignty in Islamic Political Theology,” 293-322; and Escalona, 2016, “The Endings of Early Medieval Kingdoms: Murder or Natural Causes?” 5-6. For precisely this reason, I use the word “polities” instead of “states,” which is explained in more detail in chapter 6 §1.2 below.

\(^{51}\) I have chosen this order because I believe it most easily demonstrates the continuity of religious evocation on Central Asia Islamic coinage from the appointment of Tāhir ibn Hussein as governor of eastern Khwārazmīa by the ‘Abbasid caliphate in ca. 821 CE (see Bosworth, 1975, “The Ṭāhirids and Ṣaffārids,” 90-91), and his family’s (the Ṭāhirids’) rivalry with the family of the Ṣaffārids, which were in turn accommodated by the ‘Abbasid caliphate in the 870s (see Donner, 1999, “Muhammad and the Caliphate: Political History of the
dynasties,52 while not necessarily appointed by the caliph, but nevertheless loyal to the caliph’s doctrine, underscores the importance of both loyalty and autonomy as predicated on religious doctrine – which have been exhibited on these coins.53

After the ‘Abbasid revolution in the mid-8th c., the ‘Abbasid family, preserving the basic Umayyad post-reform coinage (figs. 52-55), began to appoint local governors to administer provinces, which at first were customarily replaced,54 but later in the 9th c., began to foster their own dynasties, in turn lending varying aspirational autonomy to powerful regional families. In the East, the first notable example of these was the governing Ṭāhirid dynasty of Khwārazmīa,55 whose mid-9th-c. coins were hardly distinguishable from central

Islamic Empire up to the Mongol Conquest,” 38). With the eventual ‘Abbasid accommodation of the Sāmānid dynasty in Khwārazmīa at the turn of the 10th c. and the increasing flow of Central Asian silver dirhams toward northern Eurasia and Scandinavia – presumably in return for slaves amongst other commodities (see chapter 2 above §2.2.1.2) – we can see genuine numismatic continuity from the Sāmānid coinage through the Khazarīan and Volga Bulgār coinages as well.


“The study of coins, and the information which their legends yield on titulature, accession dates, periods of power, extent of territories ruled over, etc., have long been recognised as constituting an invaluable ancillary discipline for the Islamic dynastic and political historian (and equally, for different reasons, for the economic and social one).”

See also March, 2013, “Genealogies of Sovereignty in Islamic Political Theology,” 293-322. This is as opposed to emphasizing the importance of necessarily geographical organization, as advocated for example by Whitcomb, 2004, “Introduction: the Spread of Islam and Islamic Archaeology,” 1-7.

53 See for example the explanation, referencing Andaluṣī coinage, given by Martin and Martin, 2003, “El hallazgo de monedas almohades de Priego de Córdoba: aspectos ideológicos,” 73-78. On p. 74, they write:

“En la España islámica medieval las monedas se acuñaban en gran número y circulaban con una facilidad de que dan prueba los hallazgos realizados en la península Ibérica y en el Norte de África, y eran, de ese modo, el principal medio de difusión de ideas con que contaban los titulares de los sucesivos Estados, que, recordemoslo, basaban su legitimidad en la combinación de factores religiosos y dinásticos. Y lo cierto es que el núcleo central del discurso legitimador de las monarquías teocéntricas que gobernaron al-Andalus se exponía en los textos que se grababan en las monedas. Éstas nos ofrecen, así, la doctrina islámica, en sus elementos permanentes (el credo en el Dios único y en la misión de Mahoma), y en los que fueron cambiando a lo largo de los siglos, tales como la aparición de movimientos mesiánicos o el acento que podía ponerse en unas u otras formas de religiosidad, como cuando las monedas expresaban ideas cercanas a la mística. Junto a todo ello, la epigrafía numismática andalusí incluye lemas dinásticos, sobrenombres de califas o emires, reconocimientos de autoridades islámicas foráneas, así como genealogías de las familias reinantes; todo ello, con abundancia, variedad y precisión tales que no hay modo de escribir la historia de la interrelación entre la religión y el poder político en al-Andalus sin recurrir a los textos de las monedas.”


54 See for example, Shams Es'hragh, 2010, 43.

55 Bosworth, 1975, “The Ṭāhirids and Ṣafārīds,” 90-106. Specifically, the primary urban centers in Khwārazmīa where the dynasty was based were the cities of Nishapur and later, Merv.
‘Abbasid coins, to the extent that Bosworth has questioned the existence of their autonomy.\textsuperscript{56} For example, such coins almost always exhibit the ruling caliph’s name and frequently, though not always (figs. 58-60),\textsuperscript{57} omit the ruling member of the Ṭāhirid dynasty (fig. 61).\textsuperscript{58} However, by the second half of the 9\textsuperscript{th} c., the local Ṣaffārid dynasty began to usurp other urban centers in Khwārazmīa at the expense of the Ṭāhirids from their bases in Sīstān and Zaranj. Ṣaffārid coins, like those of the Ṭāhirids, feature the ruling caliph’s name, and are hardly distinguishable from those of the Ṭāhirids before them due to official recognition from the ‘Abbasid caliphate (figs. 62-63).\textsuperscript{59} The situation did not last though, and by the early 10\textsuperscript{th} c., forces loyal to the Ṣaffārid family were defeated by another local clan, the Sāmānids,\textsuperscript{60} ruling from Samarqand and Tashkent, who in turn granted local autonomy to the Ṣaffārids in exchange for nominal allegiance. The coins produced in Sīstān during this period have accordingly been described as “rebel issues.”\textsuperscript{61}

The exhibition of local autonomy in 9-10\textsuperscript{th}-c. Khwārazmīa, therefore, is best displayed on Sāmānid dirhams. Although still largely derivative of standard ‘Abbasid caliphal coins,\textsuperscript{62} the major difference is the Sāmānid insistence on the family name appearing on their coins alongside those of the ruling ‘Abbasid caliphs (figs. 64-65),\textsuperscript{63} a situation which continued well into the 10\textsuperscript{th} c. As the silver production expanded and dirhams themselves were traded northward in ever increasing amounts in return for, as we have previously discussed,\textsuperscript{64} amber, wax, honey, furs and primarily, slaves, the coinage attracted the attention of other rulers further north, who desired the benefits of monotheism while retaining their autonomy.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, 1969, “The Tahirids and Arabic Culture,” 45. He writes in n1: 

“In view of the Tahirids’ careful respect for the rights of the Caliphs, and the fact that their coins are hardly distinguishable from those of other ‘Abbasid governors, it is dubious whether one should consider them as an independent dynasty.”

\textsuperscript{57} See for example, Shams Eshragh, 2010, 43 and cat. nos. 998, 1119 and 1136.

\textsuperscript{58} Bosworth, 1975, 104. See also Broome, 1985, 62-63.

\textsuperscript{59} Broome, 1985, 63-64. However, it should be noted that Stern, 1986, \textit{Coins and Documents from the Medieval Middle East}, ch. 3, “The Coins of Āmul,” 210-212, argues that such coinage can be interpreted as “one of the earliest attempts at the establishment of a shī‘ite state.” I remain unconvinced by such evocations and assumptions of “statehood.”

\textsuperscript{60} Bosworth, 1996b, “The Coming of Islam to Afghanistan,” ch. 16 in \textit{The Arabs, Byzantium and Iran}, 17-19.


\textsuperscript{62} Broome, 1985, 66.


\textsuperscript{64} See above §1.1.3.
The best example of this exchange is arguably the family of Almuš, the convert to Islam, and ruler of the Volga Bulgars on the middle reaches of the Volga River. Following Sāmānid dirhams, early dirhams attributed to the dynasty of Almuš shortly after his Islamization in the 920s (see below chapter 4 §1.1) have been described as “imitative” of Sāmānid coinage, while later issues, by about 950, have been described as “official” dirhams (fig. 66). For instance, early Volga-Bulgar issues rarely evoke Volga Bulgaria itself, preferring instead to directly copy Sāmānid dirhams. But Kovalev argues that by the mid-10th c., Volga-Bulgar dirhams reached an “official” status, whereby Almušid dirhams commonly include Volga-Bulgar mintmarks such as Suwār or Bulğār and the names of Almušid rulers, along with the names of local Sāmānid emirs and the caliph in Baghdad.

But regardless of representations of Almušid rulership of Volga Bulgaria on the dirhams, scholars hardly question its ultimate purpose: to be traded for slaves, furs and leather, between the pagan North and the Islamic South. Finally, like Khazarian Moses dirhams, only a few of which bear a native mintmark (Ard al-Khazar), albeit in Kufic script and imitative of standard, contemporaneous ‘Abbasid dirhams, Volga-Bulgar dirhams can also be seen to go through distinct stages. At first, these coins imitate those of older, established Islamic dynasties such as the Sāmānids and ‘Abbasid caliphs, and later, they bear the marks of a distinct, dynastic minting tradition, with inscriptions of the ruler, year and mintmark. Nevertheless, all bear the traditional shahada, signifying each dynasty’s

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66 Jankowiak, 2016, “The Volga Bulgar Imitative Coinage.”


68 Jankowiak, 2016. However, this is not to say that such native coins bearing a Volga Bulgar mintmark do not exist. See for example Mako, 2011a, 200; and Muhamadiev, 1983, 22-40.

respectively confessional allegiance to the Islamic ummah (and caliph) and reflect top-down Islamization on the part of the rulers. In theory, this is meant to imply the centrality of the caliphal dynasty and doctrine at first and the remoteness of peripheral dynasties. In practice however, peripheral dynasties gradually asserted their own autonomies and centralizing tendencies on their coins. As we will discuss, similar patterns can be discerned in the coinages of the 9-11th-c. peripheral dynasties of the Christian oikoumenē as well.

Ch. 3: 1.2.1.2 Coins of the oikoumenē dynasties

As stated above, unable to consider every dynastic set of coinage evoking some Christian “proto-state,” we can at least examine four Eurasian case studies of Christianization via coinage. Therefore, we may begin with the respective family coinages of the Piasts, Rjurikids, Árpáds and finally the Asenids in that order,70 which are considered as the progenitors of the modern nations of Poland, Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria.

Firstly, the Piast family, based in the 10th-c. towns of Gniezno and Poznań (figs. 67-68),71 is best known as the first Christian “Polish” dynasty. Mieszko I, who is commonly

70 I have chosen this order, similar to the case of the local Islamic dynasties discussed above, for both chronological and geographical reasons. First, these dynasties are ordered chronologically due to commonly assumed absolute dating not only of Christianization, depending on the historiography, but the dating of coinage: (Mieszko I [Piast] usually converts ca. 966 CE; Vladimir I [Rjurikid] usually converts ca. 988 CE; Stephen I [Árpád] usually converts ca. 1000 CE). However, Boris I [Krum’s dynasty] of Danube Bulgaria usually converts ca. 869 CE, though none of his family members are known to have minted coinage in their own name. The earliest coinage attributed to Danube Bulgaria, the so-called “Bulgarian imitative coinage,” belongs to the Asenid dynasty in the early-13th c. Therefore, Asenid coinage will be discussed last. Second, the geographical reason for this order, similar to the case of the Islamic ummah dynasties, lies in the respective conversions of rulers in areas remote from the governance of the oikoumenē: (Gniezno, Kiev and Esztergom are farther away from the centers of imperial Christianity, namely Rome and Constantinople), whereas Pliska/Preslav, much closer to imperial domination, was unable to mint its own coinage until the 13th c. when the Asenid dynasty set up a base in Tărnovo.

In fact, as Jordanov (2013, “Взаимоотношения киевской руси, византии и болгарии X-XII значение сфрагистики,” 368-375) rather convincingly argues, via a rather brief summarization, that besides coinage, seals provide an excellent basis for which to compare at least the sphragistic traditions between Byzantium, Danube-Bulgaria and Rus’. In this regard, via a decidedly textual approach, the case is strengthened by Thomson, 1999, “The Bulgarian Contribution to the Reception of Byzantine Culture in Kievan Rus’: the Myths and the Enigma,” chapter VI in his: The Reception of Byzantine Culture in Medieval Russia, 214-261. Elsewhere, Al’gorov, 2015, “Княжі знаки на печатках київської русі,” 102-134 argues that the Rjurikid seals are eminently comparable to the sphragistic traditions of many other dynastic formations in Christendom, such the Piasts and Árpáds. For greater contextual clarity regarding the juxtaposition of the respective Christianizations of many 10th c. rulers of so-called “proto-states,” see the edited volume by Berend, 2003, Christianization and the Rise of Christian Monarchy: Scandinavia, Central Europe and Rus’, c. 900-1200.

71 On the “dynastic Polish State,” centered in the 10-11th-c. strongholds loyal to the senior members of the Piast clan in Gniezno and Poznań, see Urbanieczky, 2016, “Early Medieval Strongholds in Polish Lands,” 95-106. Notably, on the question of coin circulation in the “early Polish State,” Urbanieczky, aside from taking “statehood” for granted, also makes assumptions of the foreignness and domesticity of contemporaneous coinage (p. 102):
deemed to have converted to Christianity in 966 CE, was once thought to have minted his own silver coinage inscribed with his name Misico, although the Polish numismatist Suchodolski subsequently demonstrated that the coin belonged to his grandson Mieszko II, who ruled ca. 1025-1031 CE. Therefore, the oldest Piast coinage belongs to Mieszko I’s son Bolesław, whose coins bore the Latin inscriptions PRINCE[P]S POLONIE, GNEZDUN CIVITAS and BOLIZLAUS REX, thereby evoking his stronghold (Gniezno), name and titulature (figs. 69-70). While such coins clearly contrast to those of the Ṭāhirids for example, in that they proclaim the peripheral ruler and his possessions, they may be somewhat more comparable to the Sāmānid’s dynastic nomenclature appearing alongside the ‘Abbasid caliphs on their coins. In this regard, it is also important to note the usage of Christian iconography on these Piast coins, such as the cross and the peacock, symbolizing “resurrection, eternal life and Christ,” and consequently, the Piast membership in the oikoumenē. Such coinage is quite comparable to Rurikid coins of the same era.

The first three Christian Rurikid rulers, Vladimir (converted 988, d. 1015), Svyatopolk (r. 1015-1019) and Jaroslav (r. 1019-1054), having minted their own coins (silver and gold only), however few, based on Byzantine coinage, indicates their preferred mode.

“The stability of the State enabled these fortified communities to develop and thereby generate more surpluses; such conditions will have attracted external traders as indicated by the inflow of foreign coins – mostly Saxon but also Bohemian, Bavarian and English.”

In the case of so-called “foreign” coinage circulating in 11-12th-c. Rus’, I argue in the following paragraph below that the usage of coinage at this period cannot be considered “foreign” or “domestic,” since coins circulated wherever they could be exchanged, regardless of the local ruler.

74 Idem, 1967, Moneta polska w X/XI wieku, passim, referenced via Urbańczyk and Rosik, 2003, 291. See also the article by Szczesniak, 1973, “The Dependency of Kievan Rus on King Boleslaw the Great: Numismatic Evidence,” 31-43, who correctly points out that Bolesław minted coins in his own name in Kiev, albeit in Cyrillic: see n84 below.
77 Feldman, 2013, passim.
78 These were the so-called issues of “zlatniki” and “srebreniki,” which were quite comparable to the metrology and iconography of Bolesław’s coinage.
of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{80} Ecumenical rather than some anachronistic “national” coinage.\textsuperscript{81} For example, Jaroslav’s coins bear the Byzantine stylistic iconography of his Christian namesake, St. George accompanied by Greek-Cyrillic inscriptions: ЯРОСЛАВЛЕ СРЕБРО (Jaroslav’s silver) and ΑΓ. ΓΕΩΡΓΗΩ (figs. 71-74). As we will see, Jaroslav’s matching of his Christian iconography on both his coins and seals (figs. 139-143) accentuates the centrality of ecumenical Christianity by which he legitimized his reign.\textsuperscript{82} But due to the relative absence of coinage between ca. the 1130s-1380s, this suggests that taxes were still paid in kind,\textsuperscript{83} especially because Jaroslav is the last Kievan ruler known to have minted coinage before this period. I would suggest that while some scholars have taken Rus’ “statehood” for granted based on the 10-11\textsuperscript{th}-c. coinage, the very notion may be challenged quite simply by the disappearance of so-called “national” coinage during the 12-14\textsuperscript{th} c.\textsuperscript{84} The same notion, however, may be harder to challenge in the case of the Árpáds.

\textsuperscript{79} Pavlova, 1994, “The Coinless Period in the History of Northeastern Rus’: Historiography Study,” 375-376. Additionally, Sedykh, 2005, “On the Function of Coins in Graves in Early Medieval Rus’,” 471-478, has argued, and rather convincingly, that such Christian coinage was frequently used symbolically in a burial context in late 10-early 11\textsuperscript{th} c. Rus’, as opposed to traditional assumptions of monolithic usage in trade.

\textsuperscript{80} Spassky, 1967. The Russian Monetary System, 50-51.

\textsuperscript{81} See below chapter 6 §2.1.2.3.

\textsuperscript{82} See below chapter 4 §3.1.2, especially for further description of the iconography and inscription on the coins, and particularly pertaining to the seals of Jaroslav.

\textsuperscript{83} Pavlova, 1994, 375-392; and Zguta, 1975, “Kievan Coinage,” 484. However, Thompson, 1966, “Byzantine Coins in Russia,” 146, incorrectly insinuates that the “coinless period” begins “from the 13\textsuperscript{th} c. onward.”

\textsuperscript{84} However, this is contested by Szczesniak, 1973, 31-43, who, in a rather nationalistic, anachronistic and polemic article, perhaps bordering on the chauvinistic, argues that all of Rus’ was in fact, via Svjatopolk, subsumed by King Boleslaw, posthumously imagined as Polish by ethno-nationality, who was seeking to build a great “Slavic Empire” as a precursor to the Kievan Rus’ subsumed into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (see for example Hleboniek, 2012, “Herb Ziemi Kijowskiej na pieczęciach władców rzeccpospolitej,” 82-98). He does provide, however, a useful critique of essentialist Kievan “statehood,” albeit in the imperfect vessel of his polemicism, when he writes (p. 37):

“The Kievan state of the X-XI century, the time of Vladimir I and his successors, did not constitute a representation of all Russia as for example D. S. Likhachev and other Russian historians assert in various writings. It was the Kievan state only, not even Novgorod. [...] Different centers of the growth of territorial authority in different ethnic conditions kept the ‘all’ Rus separated. A true territorial or sovereign unity in Kievan Rus principalities was never established. The growth of the Rurik family princes necessitated the territorial foundations of new principalities, new states in reality; these states were united only by the common ecclesiastical organization of the Byzantine Church, which, like the Roman Church, was universal in its ecumenical character. The Kievan State was in reality the Kievan Principality which could be termed Kievan Ruthenia. Kievan Rus is only a name which the Russian historians extend to all Russian principalities, but which is not based on reality.”

It nevertheless bears mentioning that Jaroslav did mint coinage, despite Pavlova’s claim that “Jaroslav the Wise, who succeeded Svjatopolk in the Kievan throne, did not continue minting.” This is patently untrue. See for example Gadukov and Kalinin, 2012, “Древнейшие русские монеты,” 402-435. Pavlova herself acknowledges in a corresponding footnote “very few coins of his [pre-1015] mintage are known.” Nevertheless,
Having converted to Christianity ca. 1000 CE (r. 1000-1038), Stephen, the Magyar ruler, began minting coins, the ore of which was likely derived from the vicinity of modern Banská Štiavnica. That his coinage survives in a moderate quantity indicates the extent to which he monopolized the mining of new bullion for his mintage. That said, while the circulation of Árpád coinage is of interest for determining the so-called “borders” of the Árpád kingdom, the iconography is perhaps most indicative of the ecumenical legitimacy evoked on the coinage. While the model of the mintage has been described as “Bavarian,” perhaps due to contemporary Bavarian moneyers in Esztergom, it is certain that such coinage is quite comparable with Piast coinage. It bears crosses along with Latin inscriptions such as LANCEA REGIS (with a lance), and other examples bearing REGIA CIVITAS and STEPHANUS REX with either a church or a crown on the reverse (figs. 75-87), comparably with Bolesław’s coins.

It should be noted here, however, that firstly: such coinage is traditionally thought of as the “beginning” of proper “Hungarian” coinage, which it is not in fact. I have yet to come across any English-speaking scholarship, which is familiar with the pre-Christian “Hungarian” coinage. See for example: Ödön, 1925, “Magyarország barbárpénzeinek áttekintése,” 59-63; and Gedai, 1986, A magyar pénzverés kezdetek, 9-25. Nevertheless, secondly: such scholarship is often ripe with misleading nationalist evocations of primordial Hungarian ethnicity. In this regard see the discussion below in chapter 4 §2.1.1. For a fuller bibliography of Hungarian numismatic literature, see Csikey, 1987, A Magyar Pénzek verdetével történelmünkben; Unger (ed.), 1974, Magyar éremhatározói, vols. I-IV; and Fejér and Huszár, 1977, Bibliographia Numismaticae Hungaricae.
Notably, however, some coins of Stephen’s successors, Peter I (r. 1038-1041, 1044-1046) and Andreas I (r. 1046-1060), also bear the geographical name PANNONIA/PANONEIA (figs. 76, 78, 85, 87), which, like the Piasts’ PRINCE[P]S POLONIE coins (fig. 69), may indicate an emerging geographical focus on such coins. Though I am not prepared to comment further on this innovation, it may raise the question: might such developments support a general 10-11th-c. trend toward peripheral dynastic differences in the Latin West and Orthodox East?

Whether or not such a question can be definitively answered by numismatic evidence alone, the numismatic evidence of a final dynasty in the Christian oikoumenē may also contribute to nuancing our modern notions of premodern “statehood” and “national” coinage: the 12-13th-c. Asen family of Danube Bulgaria. Let us note first that numismatic evidence cannot bear witness to the traditional, national narrative of Bulgarian statehood, because there are no known coins of the first Christian monarchs after Boris’ conversion in the 860s. The earliest known coinage that has been described as “Bulgarian” belongs to the Asenids. The dating is generally given around the turn of the 13th c. It is unclear to what extent this can be considered “tsarist” minting by the Asenid family or simply local counterfeiting, given that this coinage is hardly distinguishable from erstwhile Byzantine base-metal coinage. It is primarily documented from the Northern Thracian Plain and the Sredna Gora, but nevertheless reproduces images and iconographic elements of contemporary emperors in three types based on their inscriptions evoking Manouel I, Isaakios II and Alexios III.

Michael Hendy separates the “imitative” types from the imperial (metropolitan) types mainly by comparing the “strict system of jewelling on the imperial lōros” and I see no reason to doubt his authority: the imperial coins’ lōros jewels appear genuinely different in their patternings (compare figs. 89-94 to figs. 98-101). He also points out geographic distinctions: his table XVI (fig. 88) shows that few imperially struck Komnēnian coins were

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90 Kovács, 2000, “Coinage and other forms of currency in Hungary,” 125-126. The same can be said of the Árpáds’ base-metal coinage. See for example Jeszensky, 1938, “Az első Magyar rézpénzek,” 3-46. In this regard, I would juxtapose Stephen’s REGIA CIVITAS and STEPHANUS REX legends with Bolesław’s GNEZDUN CIVITAS and BOLIZLAUS REX legends.
91 Metcalf, 1979, Coinage in South-eastern Europe: 820-1396, 127, claims the terminus post quem for this type of coinage is an absolute dating at 1197 CE, although Hendy, 1969, Coinage and Money in the Byzantine Empire, 1081-1261, 221 claims the dating to be ca. 1195-1204 CE.
92 This analysis is derived from the examples which I have examined in the Barber Institute of Fine Arts in Birmingham (cat. nos. B6560 ADD - B6565 ADD and B6049 – B6062).
found in contemporaneously Asenid-rulled areas mentioned above, while the vast majority of these “imitative” coins are found in such areas.\textsuperscript{93} It should also be noted that base metal coinage was far more subject to questions of authenticity\textsuperscript{94} and so Kalojan received papal permission to mint coins in his own name in 1203-1204,\textsuperscript{95} which comprised a different coinage altogether. But it should be noted here that no coins of Kalojan Asen himself are known. The first known coins of his dynasty which specifically evoke his dynasty, are those of his grandson, Ivan II Asen (r. 1218-1241), whose gold coins have been the subject of much debate among numismatists (fig. 96).\textsuperscript{96} However, I would argue that in terms of the former coinage, despite minor differences between standard Byzantine contemporary folleis and the “Bulgarian imitative coinage,” due to the invocation of imperial authority, these can hardly be referred to as Bulgarian “national coinage,” as do Metcalf and others.\textsuperscript{97}

By comparing the coins of the Islamic caliphs and peripheral Eurasian dynasties of the ummah to those of the Christian emperors and peripheral Eurasian dynasties of the oikoumenē, I believe we are able to conceive of broader numismatic developments in greater contextual clarity rather than consider isolated coinage traditions as part of “national” histories. In the larger Byzantine world, the differences in coin iconography between those families ruling at the peripheries of the oikoumenē and the imperial mint itself may be attributable to their respective capacities to acquire precious metals. Since gold and silver were obtained primarily by war or mining, taxation represented a relatively closed circuit within the oikoumenē. It may be worth considering whether the references to “Polonia” and “Pannonia” on some of the early coins of the Piast and Árpád dynasts signify the emergent confessional distinctions within the oikoumenē, approaching the time of the schism of 1054. Still, a given ruler therefore had a limited supply of bullion with which to mint coins, reflecting a finite amount of bullion available.\textsuperscript{98} This explains the lack of “Russian national”

\textsuperscript{93} Hendy, 1969, 219-221.
\textsuperscript{94} Dr. Maria Vrij, coin curator at the Barber Institute, personal communication, 9 November, 2016.
\textsuperscript{95} Hendy, 1969, 221-222.
\textsuperscript{96} See for example Hendy, 1999, 82, 135-136; and Künker, 2008, The De Wit Collection of Medieval Coins, 1000 Years of European Coinage, Part III: England, Ireland, Scotland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Balkan, the Middle East, Crusader States, Jetons and Weights, 287-290. In this case, Künker claims that such coinage patently does not exist, whereas in fact it does. See for example Gălăbăv, 2004, “Златна ли е златната монета на Йоан Асен II?”, 23-40.
\textsuperscript{97} See for example Metcalf, 1979, 127; Jordanov, 1984, Монетни и Монетно обръщение в средновековна България: 1081-1261, 59-66; and Avdev, 2005, Монетната система в средновековна България през XIII-XIV в., 21-29.
coins in circulation in Rus’ during much of the 12-14th c.99 The circulation of coinage, at least at the peripheries of the oikoumenē, at this time was therefore not meant as its supreme function, but just as conspicuously, if not more so, coins were minted for propaganda purposes: to exhibit a ruler’s wealth, power and legitimacy to those he ruled.

Ch. 3: 1.2.1.3 Hidden communities and coins across “Islamo-Christian civilization”100

There were some communities, however, who were not confined to either the ummah or oikoumenē, but who have left traces of their presence on coins. A recent study by the Russian numismatist, Vjačeslav Kulešov, has broadly demonstrated the involvement of long-range and local 8-13th-c. Jewish merchant communities in coin circulation within either and across both the ummah and the oikoumenē,101 including, but not limited to, Khazarian coinage. To extrapolate on long-distance versus local Jewish merchant communities, the research certainly does not mean to imply that all such trans-Christendom-Islam trade was conducted exclusively by Jewish merchant communities, as the obvious examples of Genoese and Venetian merchantries will attest.102 Another notable discussion of long-range and local

99 See above n83-84.
101 For the most comprehensive study of the textual basis for Jewish communities throughout the Mediterranean, within both Christendom and Islam and particularly based on the Cairo Geniza, see for example Goitein, 1967-1993, A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza, vols. I-VI. See also the works of Holo, 2009, Byzantine Jewry in the Mediterranean Economy; Starr, 1939, The Jews in the Byzantine Empire: 641-1204; and Sharp, 1971, Byzantine Jewry: from Justinian to the Fourth Crusade. According to the scholar of al-Andalus, Eduardo Manzano (2017, “Attracting Poles: Byzantium, al-Andalus and the New Shaping of the Mediterranean in the 10th Century”), Jews were a “massive force” between al-Andalus and Byzantium. These are hardly surprising connections, given the previous discussions regarding the Khazar Correspondence, connections which, as Manzano argues, carried geopolitical significance only during the mid-10th c.
102 Regarding long-range and local economic and cultural exchange, Kulešov cites the Russian anthropologist Golovnëv, 2009, Антропология движения (древности северной евразии), who writes (p. 469-470):

“In terms of movement and adaptation the cultures are divided into the local and the long-range ones. A culture based on eco-adaptation and focused on a specific ecotope may be called local, and a culture embracing a wide area, connecting several local cultures and utilizing their resources — the long-range one. A local culture harnesses bio-resources, a long-range one — social resources. The long-range culture is always more flexible than the local, as if[n] (sic) the process of growth it used its advantage of motion and developed the technologies of mobility in competition with the rival cultures. While the long-range cultures had superior status, the local cultures enjoyed stability and sustainability thanks to their direct ties to the land and its resources. The dominant role in the mediation process belonged to the military-political, priestly or trading elite uniting the local cultures through their activities and thus creating new contacts and relationship channels. The language of a long-range culture traditionally acquired the status of the second language of the local groups; frequently the same was true for the cult and the system of power. By means of trade, religion, wars, politics, and economics the long-range culture colonized the local communities and created a social hierarchy.”
economic and cultural exchange during this period throughout the Mediterranean basin is provided by the scholar Chris Wickham. Although without mentioning numismatic material, Wickham argues that frequently long-range trade is fetishized at the expense of short-range market growth. He points out that local movement is a good scale for analyzing economic expansion, as opposed to simple demographic growth, where the local buying-power of a given city or region is a far better measurement of economic vitality than the existence of long-range traders willing to exploit such a market.\textsuperscript{103}

I have provided a complete translation of Kulešov’s article in appendix 2 below, with all figures included. Aside from documenting a number of coin samples of direct Jewish involvement in minting,\textsuperscript{104} he provides otherwise rare examples of remote coin-hoard-finds, which suggest themselves to be connected to Jewish merchant activity, even if no Hebrew inscriptions of overt Judaic symbols (such as menorot) appear on the coins. It is forthrightly acknowledged that an arbitrary confessional attribution of such hoard-finds would be unwise. However, given Kulešov’s broad chronological and geographical analysis, as well as his decidedly cautious argumentation, I feel it is nevertheless a worthwhile undertaking to set the potentially Jewish numismatic circumstances amid the wider comparative framework of confessional attribution on coinage in other contexts.

For example, in section 5, Kulešov contextualizes the mixed 8-10\textsuperscript{th}-c. Byzantine-Islamic coin-hoards found in northern Pontic littoral (and southern Rus’)\textsuperscript{105} alongside the (ostensibly Judaic-related) hoards of 8-9\textsuperscript{th}-c. Byzantine, Ağlabid and ‘Abbasid gold coins.

\textsuperscript{103} Wickham, 2017, “The Donkey and the Boat: Mediterranean Economic Expansion in the 11th Century.” He refers to local economic buying-power of 10-12\textsuperscript{th}-c. Egypt, eg., as “Smithian growth.” See also Holmes and Standen, 2015, “Defining the Global Middle Ages,” 112, who write:

“These agents were strangers; who belonged to the routes rather than the local communities through which they passed, but the objects (and ideas) they carried were integrated into local worlds in ways that might have been unrecognisable to the originators, as when Chinese pottery was incorporated into house walls on the Swahili coast. A very similar pattern was subsequently observed in circuits identified as running around Europe from c. 950 until c. 1100. The key point to emerge from these comparisons was the importance of understanding the relationship between global networks and local conditions.”

\textsuperscript{104} Kulešov, 2016b, “Средиземноморье, балканы и восточная европа: памятники монетного обращения еврейских общин (VIII-XIII века),” 89-92. I thank prof. Jonathan Shepard for his suggestion to translate this article. Such scholarship is an important contribution to Jewish numismatics, which has received little attention since early, foundational studies, focusing exclusively on pre-diasporic Judaic coinage, such as that of Madden, 1874, “Jewish Numismatics,” 281-316.

\textsuperscript{105} See below chapter 6 §2.1.2.3.
found in contemporaneous Khazaria, particularly in the Crimean and Taman peninsulas. He then correlates these finds with other finds of Egyptian, northern Italian, Sicilian and Sardinian coins in contemporaneous Khazaria.

There are also a few selective examples of sigillographic evidence tying the Jewish communities of Constantinople and Trebizond to those of Crimea, Taman and elsewhere in Khazaria, which would complement his research. For example, a lead seal catalogued by Friedenberg (fig. 102), refers, in Hebrew, to a certain silversmith named “Theudatos Kurkutes.” Friedenberg, referencing the Vienna-based sigillographer, Werner Seibt, suggests this Theudatos Kurkutes may have been a 12th-c. Khazar subject.

In another example, a rectangular bronze sealing device was found in Trebizond over a century ago by Wilhelm Froehner, which Denis Feissel has dated to between the 5–7th centuries (fig. 103). Importantly, the sealing device contains the otherwise misspelt (in Greek) Christian Greek name Εφθυμίου (Εοθύμιος – “of Euthymios”) along with other unquestionably Jewish symbols, which Feissel attributes as an etrog (a ceremonially

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107 For example, Fātimid Egyptian dinars have been found in Tamatarcha/Tmutarakan, which for Kulešov, 2016b, 93 means: “Таманская находка позволяет документировать факт дальних связей общины Таматархи с фатимидским Египтом.” I have translated this as: “The Taman find makes it possible to document the fact of long-distance links between the [Jewish] community of Tamatarcha and Fātimid Egypt.” This has been extensively discussed by Čkhaidze et al.: see for example Gončarov and Čkhaidze, 2005, “Находки средневековых монет на территории Таманского полуострова,” 343-347; and Čkhaidze, 2007, Хазарская Таматарха: Культурный слой Таманского городища VII–X вв.; idem, 2008, Таматарха: Раннесредневековый город на Таманском полуострове; idem, 2012, Фанагория в VI–X веках; and most recently, regarding the so-called Byzantine imitative miliarēsia of Tamatarcha, see idem 2016, “Таманские монеты XI века – Original or Fake?” 113-119. He argues that the so-called local Tamatarcha imitations of 11th-c. Byzantine miliarēsia are in fact forgeries from the 1990s using Soviet silver coinage from the 1920s, which flies in the face of much other scholarship (for example Babev, 2009, Монеты Тмутараканского княжества; Bezuglov, 2002, “К характеристике некоторых таманских подражаний византийскому серебру X–XI вв.”; et al.). As proof, he mainly cites the work of Dukinskij, without providing technical evidence: see for example Dukinskij, 2014, “Новые материалы к изучению таманских подражаний византийским монетам”; idem, 2015, “К вопросам о способе и времени чеканки некоторых таманских подражаний византийским милярисам”; and idem, 2016, Денежное дело Тмутаракана. Сводный каталог и начало исследования. This is not to say that such coins are necessarily authentic, perhaps a peculiarly Russian conundrum, but that Čkhaidze’s reasoning – based on his assumption that all such coins are fake until proven authentic – is clearly an argumentum ad ignorantiam.

108 Friedenberg, 1987, Medieval Jewish Seals from Europe, cat. no. 177. It should also be noted that Friedenberg reports that Seibt posits a Georgian provenance, though with hardly any evidence. Therefore, Friedenberg (p. 371) alternatively suggests a southern Italian provenance, again with little supporting evidence. Nevertheless, it is clear that, with a Greek name and a 4-line metrical inscription, such seals, pertaining in this case to a silversmith, ought not to be regarded as rare given its similarity with most contemporary Byzantine lead seals.
significant citrus during the harvest-festival of Sukkot) and a shofar (a ram’s horn for trumpeting during the new-year celebration of Rosh Hashana).  

Many other coin finds lend credence to long-distance Judaic merchant communities,110 Radanite or otherwise, whose communities, particularly in an urban setting in Khazaria and elsewhere,111 are well documented.112 For example: 11th-c. Barcelonian mancúsii were found in the middle Dniepr region,113 12-13th-c. Selçuk fals were found in Crimea and the middle Dniepr region,114 12th-c. European silver bracteates115 were found in the middle Dniestr region116 and finally, 12-13th-c. Byzantine tracheai (and the so-called Bulgar “imitative” coins117) found in northern Rus’ lands,118 all correspond with well-known

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109 Feissel, Morrission, Cheneyt and Pitarakis, 2001, Trois Donations Byzantines au Cabinet des Médailles: Froehner (1925), Schlumberger (1929), Zacos (1998), 13. However I would posit here that the engraving on the device appears more as a different symbol, the lulav (the four bound species of foliage commonly coupled with the etrog) instead due to its oblong shape without the overt curvature of a ram’s horn. I highly doubt that the item can be proven to be a specifically straight ram’s horn and not a coincidentally unkosher and uncurved gamsbok shofar (at least according to the Mishnah: see Rabbi N. Sliifkin, 2013, “Exotic Shofars: Halachic Considerations,” 13-18). If this supposition were acceptable, it would grant support to the supposition that indigenous rabbinical Jewries of the Black Sea littoral, in this case in Trebizond, contributed to the growth of rabbinical Judaism in Khazaria, as opposed to Karaism, which rejects the lulav as an explicitly ceremonial item, along with the etrog as well. According to Ivik and Ključnikov, 2013, Хазары, referenced via webpage: http://olegivik.narod.ru/books/hazary.htm#120, (accessed 5/1/2015), such symbols of etrogim, lulavot and shofarim as well have all been found extensively on many Crimean Jewish tombstones dating before and after Khazarian times. This would lend a significant indication of the extent of rabbinical Judaism around and across the Black Sea littoral during the period in question. See also fig. 19 for images of Jewish lulavot and a shofar on Khazarian-era tombstones from Tmutarakan”.


111 See above chapter 2 §1.2.2 and §2.1.2.


115 Technically speaking, bracteates are coins, otherwise simple ingots, which have been struck on only one side, leaving the reverse as a thin, sheet-like blank. For examples of such coinage, attributed to a Jewish deposition elsewhere, see Friedenberg, 1987, 244, 270.

116 On the potential misattribution of “Western” and “Eastern” Christendom in the coins of the 11-12th c., see above n85; and Kulešov, 2016b, 94-95 n49-51.

117 See above n67-69.

trade routes connecting such communities across the *ummah* and *oikoumenē*. While these individual hoard- and coin-finds themselves say little on their own, with analogous examples of undeniable Hebraic mintings (such as the Khazarian *Moses* dirhams) provided by Kulešov\(^{119}\) and contextual documentation by Goitein respectively,\(^{120}\) while not ruling out the presence of Christian or Muslim merchants, it may not be too implausible to infer a Judaic attribution to such 8-13\(^{th}\)-c. finds across both *ummah* and *oikoumenē*.

In general, these examples of separate coinages bring into focus important phases and features of the interrelationship between coin minting and top-down dynastic monotheization, which other data sets cannot necessarily achieve as easily. The evocation of religious iconography, to say nothing of the usage of language and alphabet, on each coinage sample in this study, serves to confirm the ecumenical allegiance of the minter. Religious adherence being a determinant of legitimacy, it is unsurprising to find reference to a given local dynesty on such coins, as opposed to anachronistic notions of “nationhood.” In this way, numismatics, as a data set, when comparatively modelled, demonstrates the superficiality of such anachronisms, while maintaining the concept of monotheism as more than simply a given creed, but as a mode of legitimization and a top-down process of identity formation.

In a few words, by comparing these coins at an objective scale, we can contextualize the gradual indications of peripheral autonomy on the coins of the 8-10\(^{th}\)-c. Islamic *ummah* dynasties of the Ṣaffārids, Sāmānids and Almuśids in contrast to the immediately overt nature of indications of peripheral autonomy on the coins of the 9-11\(^{th}\)-c. Christian *oikoumenē* dynasties.\(^{121}\) In this manner, numismatic evidence may insinuate a stronger centralized (and perhaps confessional) nature of the Islamic caliphate than that of the concurrent Christian Roman empire. In another example, by contextualizing the coins of the Ṣaffārid and Sāmānīd dynasties alongside those of the Piasts and Árpáds, we take Poland and Hungary as nations at face value, but where are the equivalent modern nations for the former Islamic dynasties? We might even question whether the Piasts founded Poland or the Árpáds founded Hungary. By comparison, would we imagine that the Ṣaffārids or Sāmānīs founded Uzbekistan or Tajikistan? I do not mean to insinuate that Poland or Hungary or Bulgaria or Russia never existed, of course that would be preposterous, but only that assuming nationality and

\(^{119}\) Kulešov, 2016b, 89-92 and figs. 1-8.
\(^{120}\) Goitein, 1967-1993, *passim*.
\(^{121}\) See also the discussion given by Haldon, 1999, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World*, 565-1204, 276-277.
sovereignty can be projected backwards as early as possible can frequently be anachronistic. And few classes of evidence demonstrate that better than coins.

In subsequent chapters, we will discuss texts, seals, settlement- and funerary archaeology in pursuit of a case for the comparative monotheizations of various rulers and their subjects, enrolling either in the *ummah* or *oikoumenē* during the 9-11th c., thereby lending context to modern notions of identity.
Chapter 4: 10th-Century political and economic case studies in the Black Sea littoral: a comparative analysis of monotheization*

* Abstract: Due to the previous chapter’s focus on the attempted monotheization of Khazaria, this chapter will in turn examine the same process within each of the abovementioned contexts in this order: the Volga Bulgars, Magyars, Pečenegs and Rus’. I have chosen these case studies and order as the format of this chapter for both geographical and confessional reasons pertaining to Khazaria. While many scholars have documented the Christianization of various European polities, they have not necessarily examined them in regards to other possible religious conversions such as to Islam or Judaism. For example, Volga Bulgaria’s Islamization came partially as a result of Khazaria’s Judaization, according to ibn Fadlān. The Magyar-Pečeneg migration through the Pontic-Caspian steppe came partially as a result of Khazaric policy according to Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos’ De Administrando Imperio, written not long after ibn Fadlān’s journey to Volga Bulgaria and who also documents the Rus’ arrival in the forest-steppe zone of the Baltic-Caspian waterways. Throughout the chapter, I will discuss a variety of themes relating to economics, allegiances and monotheisms in each case study, paying special attention to archaeological discoveries relating to loyalties and contested loyalties, notably through numismatics, epigraphy, sigillography, ceramics, fortifications and perhaps most importantly, funerary archaeology. One of the primary question threading through this chapter will be: were there “ethnicities” before monotheism?
It is my aim in this chapter not only to explore, but, in light of earlier nationalist and other manner of decontextualized scholarship, to entirely reexamine the relationship between sedentarism and nomadism, monotheism and polytheism, and the social and economic basis and effects of the so-called “tribute system” on local tribal populations and communities in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia. Here, the most important theme of the development of these societies will be the economic process of maturity from essentially looting, to collecting tribute, to establishing an orderly system of taxation.

Regarding these local tribal populations, whatever languages they spoke, it is also my goal to question the notion of their inherent allegiances to one suzerain or another, in particular to the Rus’: did these communities regard themselves as united just because they were all bound to the same suzerain, whether he be Khazar, Volga Bulgar, Magyar, Pečeneg or Rus’? Alternatively, was sharing a common language with the suzerain, an assumed ethno-linguistic affiliation, more or less of a unifying factor in the expansion of loyalty to a given suzerain, as much traditional scholarship has maintained? In a few words, it is not enough to assume, as earlier scholarship has, that the local tribes which had earlier paid tribute to Khazaria (Slavic-speaking or not) would eventually “become” Russian, or that other local communities in what later became Volgia Bulgaria or the kingdom of Hungary bore loyalty to a given leader from some ethno-linguistic allegiance imagined by modern scholars. Here then, the quintessential question is, was there truly an original “ethnicity,” Rus’, Magyar, Bulgar or otherwise, or just different groups of peoples speaking similar languages with no unifying characteristic other than being bound to the same overlord? Were migrations such as those of the Volga Bulgars or the Magyars movements of entire peoples, or simply “conquering minorities?” This topic would go a long way towards renegotiating nationalism in its fundamental nature: just as Stephenson has argued that there was no Bulgarian “people,” at all, who sought to “cast off the Byzantine yoke” in the waning decades of the 12th century, I will apply the idea of falsely projected nationhood to 9-10th-c. Pontic-

1 For example, Zhivkov, 2015, Khazaria in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries, 21, writes: “Linguistic differences do not necessarily imply differences in the field of spiritual culture in the political state model.”

2 Stephenson, 2000a, Byzantium’s Northern Frontier, 320-321. Specifically, he writes:

““It was not ethnic awareness that led various Balkan peoples eventually to reject Byzantine suzerainty, but rather the emergence of powerful polities in the west whose rulers [read, “Bulgars”] became alternative patrons and suzerains for the rulers of various groups, regions and cities.”
Caspian Eurasia, from the middle Volga to the lower Danube, the Carpathian Basin and the Black Sea littoral in general.
Having analyzed the beginnings of “state” formation in Khazaria commencing with an itinerant nomadic prehistory up to the adoption of Judaism as a monotheizing structure of sovereignty, we may now move on to Volga Bulgaria, in which we can detect either very similar, or perhaps even the same historical patterns unfolding, yet in a different religious and linguistic milieu. I will attempt here to demonstrate that despite a 10th-c. conversion to Islam instead of Judaism or Christianity, Volga Bulgaria only came to exist due to the efforts of successive Almuṣid rulers to convert their subjects to their chosen religion, Sunni Islam. In this case, Islam on the middle Volga has successfully, unlike Judaism in Khazaria, survived to the present in the form of Tatar ethnic identity in the modern Russian Federal Republic of Tatarstan. It is not my objective to discuss modern nationalism in Tatarstan, however much it may rely on historical fantasizing, or to discuss the Mongol invasions and creations of the Khanates of the Golden Horde or Kazan’ respectively. I will however address a certain amount of modern Tatarstani historiography as it relates to the history, archaeology and literature of Volga Bulgaria, since such historiography will be central to interpreting the usage of the textual and material culture of the Volga Bulgars.

Ch. 4: 1.1 From paganism to peoplehood

The generally accepted theory of the “Bulgar” migration essentially portrays the “Old Great Bulgaria” of khan Kubrat, curving around Crimea and the Sea of Azov (Tavros and Lake Maeotis) and across the rivers which feed into the northern Black Sea, as being dissolved by the incoming Khazars in the third quarter of the 7th century. In this scenario, many scholars agree that the sons of Kubrat lead their respective clans further westward to the lower Danube and further north to the middle Volga at the confluence of the Volga and Kama Rivers. Essentially, many have tried to formulate theories, squeezing some semblance

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3 See for example Frank, 1998, Islamic Historiography and ‘Bulgar Identity’ Among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia.

of ethnic identity from the event in question and spilling much ink on notions of “Slavic ethnicity,””5 in deference to modern nationalistic interpretations.6 I believe it would be more judicious instead to begin with the earliest archaeological evidence of sedentarization and urbanization, that is, if we are to assume, albeit cautiously, that in the case of the peoples of the Volga-Kama confluence, regardless of various imagined “ethnicities,” nomadism prevailed as the norm until sedentarism became widespread in the late-9-10th centuries. As I will argue, these questions of pre-Islamic underlying ethnicity are premature and irrelevant since Islam has defined the ethnicity of the broad population of the Volga-Kama region ever since the adoption of Islam in the 10th century.

Ch. 4: 1.1.1 The tribal composition of the pre-Islamic Volga-Kama region

-The Ṣaqāliba: languages, archaeological typologies and tribes

If spoken language, unencumbered yet by liturgical scripture derived from an adopted monotheism, can guide us to the Volga Bulgars as a tribe instead of Volga Bulgaria as a so-called “state” before conversion to Islam, then perhaps we can conceive whether the “Ṣaqāliba” population mentioned by ibn Fadlān was in fact composed of Slavs or something else entirely. For example, it has been postulated by the Russian historian Igor’ Gagin, though with little archaeological proof aside from typological evidence of ceramic ware (figs. 104-107), that the “migrating” Bulgars were the undisputed leaders of the tribal state upon their arrival to the middle Volga. He writes:

“In the Kama basin, the Bulgar-Utrigurs and Sabirs led those of Uralic (Finno-Ugric) and Slavic tribal origins. The Bulgars and Sabirs fled together from Great Bulgaria and migrated together up the Volga, coming together in their new country on the Kama River, but they settled down there separately.”7

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5 It would be important to note here that modern scholarly references to “the Slavs” of Volga Bulgaria as if comprising a separate ethnicity, usually rest on little else than peoples referred to as “Ṣaqāliba” by ibn Fadlān. In such scholarship, it remains unclear what the models are comprised of for determining pre-Islamic ethnicity of the population of what later became Volga Bulgaria: whether we can refer to the population as Slavic or not.

6 Especially with reference to modern Bulgarian ethnicity, as opposed to modern Tatarstan ethnicity, both of which shared “Bulgarian-ness.” See for example Stephenson, 2000a, 13. In fact, some modern Tatar scholars (eg., Devletşin, 1999, Törki-Tatar Ruhi Müdəniyyəti Tarihi, 218 – this assessment derives from the summary) have postulated that Bulgarian-ness in the 7th century meant a sizeable conversion to Islam at that time, which would otherwise seem preposterous, given the traditional date of the founding of Islam, not to mention ibn Fadlān’s account of Volga Bulgaria in the early 920s.

7 Gagin, 2008, 131, my translation. His orginal words are as follows:
However, it should also be mentioned that separating tribal identities has also been the aim of archaeological typologists as well as geneticists. While it is not my endeavor to sift through genetic methods in depth, we may survey linguistic and archaeological scholarship to garner comparative details for the various elements of the pre-Islamic subject population. Since what became Volga Bulgaria by the late-10th century was initially populated by many peoples, and pre-Islamic Volga Bulgarian “statehood” can hardly be arbitrarily assumed, historical linguistics as a study has been taken as a vehicle for determining tribal origins.

As a linguist, Golden has postulated that “the dominant literary language of the realm [Volga Bulgaria] was Khwârazmian Turkic from the eastern part of the state.” However, such a statement assumes that Volga Bulgaria had already been Islamized. While many scholars may agree with him, we can see that other tribal groups speaking similar tongues, e.g. the Čuvaš, did not necessarily share Islam. Another well-known tribal group in the area, the Baškirs, were only partly Islamized, yet according to the scholar Allen Frank, due to their linguistic difference, the Baškirs maintained a separate identity. Since scholarly consensus linguistically connects the Baškirs to the Magyars, clearly linguistic separation of...
tribal identity is not as crisp as we might wish it to be. This then brings into question the tribal affiliations and divisions of all the rest of the known groups in the area: the Baškirs, Čuvaš, Magyars, Slavs, Balts, Mordvians/Finno-Ugrians et al.

Similarly, archaeological typologies are used to separate one tribal affiliation from another. For example, using typological evidence, the archaeologists Kakhovskij and Kakhovskij, like Gagin mentioned above, seek to separate the territories of pre-Islamic tribal Bulgars and Čuvaš by differences between ceramic artifacts alone (figs. 104-107), assuming the modern peoples’ ethnicities, identities, ceramics and borders existed much in the same ways and spaces as in pre-Islamic, pre-Mongol times. Similarly, other historians such as Dinçer Koç seek to identify tribal Bulgars in the Volga-Kama region specifically by “Turkish” aspects of pre-Islamic burials. Imre Boba identifies the “aš-Şaqāliba” as none other than the pre-Islamic tribal Bulgars themselves, as opposed to ethnic “Slavs.” In another example, Elena Galkina determines that the Imen’kov archaeological culture, which according to her, represented a Slavic tribe, and allegedly “a higher” culture (mentioned in the PVL), certainly joined the population of Volga Bulgaria (a comparatively less advanced culture) and boosted sedentary agricultural production in the late-7th century based on

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15 Franklin and Shepard, 1996, The Emergence of Rus: 750-1200, 46. As the authors put it: “The overriding impression, then, is one of diversity and flux.”
19 Klima, 1995, The Linguistic Affinity of the Volgaic Finno-Ugrians and their Ethnogenesis, 1-51. See also Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 46-47; and Zhivkov, 2015, 37-38, who writes:

“We know nothing of the language of any of the tribes mentioned in the sources from Eastern Europe for the period between the fifth and the seventh centuries. The theories on the Ugric linguistic affiliation of some of them (e.g. the Sabirs), as well as the existence of a specific Turkic group (the so-called Oghor or Oghur group), which the Bulgars and Khazars were a part of, are no more than hypothetical. There is no information to support the idea that all these tribes shared the same ethnicity.”

23 Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (eds. and trans.), 1953, PVL, 55.
typological evidence alone. Gagin has made similar claims using typological evidence and quotes Russian archaeologists such as Pletnëva, Rýbakov and Gumilëv liberally in comparing archaeological cultures to the economic scenarios of Volga Bulgaria and Khazaria in the 10th century. Even the Volga Rus’, who have been imagined to deposit uniform, “Scandinavian-style” burials, can no longer carry such an assumption. Soviet-style Marxist archaeology has even emerged in this regard into the 21st century as archaeologists such as Goldina and Chernykh have used levels of “progress of ancient societies” to separate Bulgars from Slavs. However the problems of such an approach have already been pointed out by other Russian archaeologists despite longstanding scholarship which generally supports such

24 Galkina, 2006, “Территория Хазарского каганата IX – первой половины X в. В письменных источниках,” 135. Although this is not without controversy; see for example Kovalev, 2005b, 73 and n80. Specifically, Galkina writes:

“Многолетние исследования Среднего Поволжья показали, что в V - VII вв. там существовала именковская археологическая культура, носители которой были славянами. В конце VII в. большая часть именковцев покинула Поволжье, но некоторые остались, влились в состав населения Волжской Булгарии и были ассимилированы. Уровень материальной культуры именковцев был выше, чем славян Поднепровья. При этом роль славян-именковцев в оседании булгар, освоении ими земледелия была огромной.”

I have translated this as:

“Long-term studies of the middle Volga showed that in the 5th – 7th centuries, there was an Imen’kov archaeological culture whose carriers were the Slavjanians. At the end of 7th century, most of the Volga Imen’kovs left, but some stayed, joined the population of Volga Bulgaria and was assimilated. The level of the material culture of the Imen’kovs was higher than that of the Dnieper Slavs. Here, the role of the Imen’kov-Slavs, by settling in Bulgar, in the development of agriculture there was tremendous.”

See also Zhivkov, 2015, 234 n42, who writes:

“Galkina’s article is notable in its incorrectness [cf. chapter 2 above n262]. Along with some very interesting observations, it also contains a few unacceptable and biased ones, which are often presented as a final verdict. Thus, for example, following V. Sedov Galkina, 2006, 135 identifies the Imenkovo culture as a Slavic one […] The ethnic origins of the Imenkoovo culture are disputable. It has been identified as Turkic, Mordovian, Finno-Ugric and Baltic. It is also not clear to what extent the bearers if the Imenkoovo culture influenced the Volga Bulgars.”


This point has been made by Price, 2016, “Vikings on the Volga? Ibn Fadlan and the Rituals of the Rûsiyyah.”


28 See for example Rudenko, 2004, “Волжская Булгария, северо-восточная Русь и Прикамье,” 105-115; Smirnov, 1972, “Об этническом составе Волжской Булгарии,” 302-307; and Belykh, 2005, История народов Волго-Уральского региона, 65. In addition, Siddikov and Khuzin, 2009, “Some Results of Archeological [sic] Study of the Kazan Khanate’s Kremlin,” 66, have shown that since Volga Bulgarian ceramics are remarkably similar even to the ceramics of the Kazan khağanate well over 500
methods. I believe it would also be important to point out the interpretation of such archaeological material evidence as ceramics or other finds in Volga Bulgarian funerary contexts is decontextualized in other other ways. For example, in the archaeological literature on the Volga Bulgars, I have not found archaeological material found in funerary contexts analyzed in light of the ritual aspect of burial, such as the building of kurgans or other traditional aspects of pagan burial.

Therefore, a far more convincing argument, as many archaeologists and historians have agreed, has been put forth by Khalikova for determining identity through archaeology due to differences between pagan and Islamic Volga Bulgarian burial practices. The “problem” is that Islam would be the primary factor of division between tribal groups. But this is precisely the point. Building on Khalikova, I would argue instead that archaeological evidence can rarely distinguish suitably between contemporary groups based on typologies alone, but for monotheistic groups which typically leave recognizable traces in terms of urbanization and sedentarization, funerary archaeology proves much more convincing – in so far as Islamization may be archaeologically detectable by the decreasing of noticeable pagan burials such as kurgans. That said, it remains doubtful that funerary archaeology can and ought to resolve all the issues binding Islamization and urbanization, but along with numismatic evidence and the archaeology of various settlements, together, these methodologies should serve to elucidate the parallel phenomena of monotheization and sedentarization, thus implying a kind of top-down political structure.

So to refer to the pagan “population” of Volga Bulgaria, ie., as a single “people,” as “Ṣaqāliba,” is inherently problematic, since Volga Bulgaria itself did not exist until the various subject peoples were unified by Islam imposed on them by the elite and/or ruling

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29 See for example Sedov, 2001, “К этногенезу волжских болгар,” 5-15; and Khuzin, 2015, “On the Process of Sedentarization of Volga Bulgars,” 68. According to Zhivkov, 2015, 26, even Artamonov believed that “the Bulgars are a generalizing term for all the ethnic names mentioned in the sources regarding the Northern Black Sea region and the Caucasian steppes between the fifth and the seventh centuries.”


32 And even then, they were still not unified according to the Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam. See Minorsky (trans.), 1970, Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam, 162. See also Smirnov, 1962, “Некоторые спорные вопросы истории Волжских Булгар,” 173-174.
dynasty, or adopted voluntarily. For ibn Fadlān, all the varying peoples of the north were “Ṣaqāliba,” regardless of tribal distinctions. 33 In the Islamic historical tradition, the designation of Ṣaqāliba could be carried by any pagan group raided by their neighbors for the sake of carrying off prisoners to be sold into slavery. 34 The Volga Bulgars certainly did not constitute the majority of the population in the region; they were only one of a few tribal groups in the region. 35 And while primordial ethnicity, understood as such, makes for a tempting attributive tool, archaeologists of Volga Bulgaria such as Leonard Nedaškovskij acknowledge that it is only an assumption to assign “ethnicity” to burial finds based on archaeological typologies alone. 36 It would follow then, that to study the only archaeologically quantifiable phenomenon regarding the Volga Bulgars outside of burial practices, 37 namely, the development of settlements, would invoke sedentarization and urbanization in Volga Bulgaria. 38

-Sedentarization and urbanization in Volga Bulgaria

Some archaeologists, usually relying solely on typological material for their conclusions, have postulated that fortified settlements in the Volga-Kama region were first built in response to the depredations of steppe peoples long before the “Bulgar arrival,” before spreading northward into the heart of the middle Volga, although they provide precious little evidence. 39 However, Khuzin Khalikov and Nedaškovskij, three of the most prominent archaeologists for the Volga Bulgars, have asserted that, despite earlier hints at sedentarization in the 8th century (the so-called “Imen’kov culture” 40), the process only began

33 Frye (ed. and trans.), 2005, Ibn Fadlan’s Journey to Russia, 10.
37 See Khalikova, 1986.
38 Mako, 2011, 217.
39 Goldina and Chernykh, 2005, 42. On the same page, they also write: “The large-scale development of iron finally destroyed the standards of primitive society and promoted its stratification and early class relations.” Scholarship such as this may provide more insight into the period it was written in than the period it purports to write about.
40 Kovalev, 2005b, 73 and n80.
earnestly in the first quarter of the 10th century. Khuzin and Khalikov point to Islam as the main catalyst for sedentarization.

It has been noted by others that Islam was at first more widespread in urban areas of Volga Bulgaria (ie., Bolgar, Suvar, Biliar and Idnakar), directly correlating sedentarization and urbanization with Islamization. Agricultural produce was brought inside fortified towns such as Biliar and Bolgar in considerable quantities, the dating of which is attested by five dirhams, to the mid-10-11th centuries. Kazakov has argued that the fortifications were meant to secure the towns’ commercial function: for Kazakov, the town of Bulgar was primarily a slave market, where coins changed hands along with furs. As discussed in the previous chapter 3, the fact that coinage can indicate so much in terms of not just urbanization but Bulgar Islamic identity as well as economics is demonstrated by official and imitative dirhams struck in the 10th century. In Kufic script, these dirhams confirm the endoethnonymic use of Bulgar as a toponym and the use of the Arabic shahada as an indicator of Islamization (fig. 66). According to Gagin, such coins were minted in the name

41 Nedaškovskij, 2016, “What was Volga Bulgaria?”
43 Belýkh, 2005, История народов Волго-Уральского региона, 66.
48 Tuganaev and Tuganaev, 2007. Состав, структура и эволюция агроэкосистем европейской России, 79-83. For the agricultural implements found within the walls of the settlement of Bolgar as well as the dating of the dirhams, see Starostin, 1999, 100-101.
50 See Muhamadiev, 1983, Булгаро-Татарская монетная система XII-XV вв., 22-40; and Zhivkov, 2015, 157-158. However, this is belied by the fact that very few Volga Bulgar coins bear endo-ethnonymic references. According to Jankowiak, 2016, “The Volga Bulgar Imitative Coinage,” most Volga Bulgar-minted coinage is simply imitative of Sāmānid coinage or obscurely counterfeited, although it is nearly impossible to distinguish between counterfeit Volga Bulgar coinage and “official” coinage (see above chapter 3 §1.2.1.1). Such coinage, while it easily bears witness to Islamization and urbanization in Volga Bulgaria, may just as easily indicate the increased fissiparousness of the political structures in Volga bulgaria due to several die chains linked to the city of not only Bulgar, but to Suvar as well. For Jankowiak, Volga Bulgar coinage was only minted in an effort to replace periods of shortages of regularized Sāmānid dirhams. Notably, this also seems to be supported by Zhivkov, 2015, 150, who writes: “The influence of the Samanids is of essential importance in view of the rise of Volga Bulgaria as a major economic and political center.” (and a few pages later [p. 154]): “the fact that the rulers of the Volga Bulgars began to mint their own coins was an act of independence, although Ibn Fadlan notes that they paid tribute to the Khazar khagan.”
of the Bulgar Almušid rulers as much for the sake of a circular tribute and tax system as for trade with Khwārazmia and its merchants as well as other Muslim rulers in Central Asia such as the Sāmānids.\footnote{Gagin, 2008, 134; and Zhivkov, 2015, 241 n75-76.} Besides exporting furs, Volga Bulgaria was famed for leather boots as an export commodity, which, aside from Rus’ potentates, were frequently traded with neighboring Muslim lands and are mentioned in numerous Muslim sources.\footnote{Valiev, 2009, “Leatherworking in the Kazan Khanate,” 73-95.} Such economic and monetary developments would be impossible without a considerable level of urbanism, again made possible by monotheization, in this case, Islam.

Perhaps the most unmistakable archaeological evidence linking Islam with urbanization in Volga Bulgaria is the discovery of a mosque during the 1974 excavations of Biliar, complete with a 10\textsuperscript{th}-c. dirham.\footnote{Khalikov, 1976, 33.} In fact, it has even been claimed, perhaps overestimated, that by the early-11\textsuperscript{th} century, the number of towns in Volga Bulgaria reached nearly two hundred.\footnote{Beake, Bukharaev and Minnekaev, 2010, The Story of Joseph: Kyssa’i Yusuf by Kol Gali, xii.} As we saw a similar pattern in Khazaria with Jews, Christians and Muslims living mostly in urban areas, this should present little surprise. This is not to say that the tribal populations paying tribute to Almuš in fur pelts ceased nomadic lifestyles upon his conversion in the early 920s, but that “the process of sedentarization accelerated rapidly during the 10\textsuperscript{th} century.”\footnote{Mako, 2011, 212. Specifically, on page 216, Mako refers to archaeological evidence “corroborating that a number of Volga Bulghars had converted to Islam by the time Ibn Faḍlān arrived,” as well as a “date of the mass conversion,” however he provides no archaeological literature to support this statement—(Mako, personal communication, 25 October, 2015).} In case studies, such as at the fortification of Idnakar (present-day Glazov, ca. 145 km north of modern Iževsk in the Udmurt Republic), archaeologists have reliably dated the various phases of construction as beginning in the mid-10\textsuperscript{th} century.\footnote{Ivanova, Zhurbin and Kirillov, 2013, 111, 119.} In a broader consideration, of the 167 gorodišči studied by the Volga Bulgar archaeologist Ayrat Gubadjullin in his 2002 monograph on the topic,\footnote{Gubadjullin, 2002 Фортификация городац Волжской Булгарии.} he dates the initial construction phases of 124 of them to later in the 10\textsuperscript{th} century.\footnote{Ibid, 77.} In the same way, despite claims of mass conversions, traditional paganism most likely continued to exist after Almuš’s conversion.\footnote{Deweese, 1994, Islamization and the Native Religion in the Golden Horde, 292-299.} Regarding fortification as more than simply an aspect of urbanization, the Russian archaeologists Sitdikov, Izmailov and Khayrutdinov conclude that Islam became both the
primary vehicle for organizing fortification and defense, and by extension, the principal justification for war. While I find their conclusion slightly sensational, I see no reason to doubt viewing generalized processual monotheization, urbanization and justification for warfare as correlated phenomena.

Ch. 4: 1.1.1.1 Modern interpretations of Islam and Volga Bulgaria

That some modern historiography of Volga Bulgaria in Tatarstan carries a distinctively ethno-national character should come as no surprise. Much historiography in Tatarstan sees Volga Bulgaria, and specifically Almuš’s conversion written about by ibn Fadlān, as the precursor to the modern ethno-nationality of Tatarstan’s population. Much modern Islamic scholarship regarding the initial Islamization of the Volga Bulgars portrays the process as having a unifying effect on the disparate tribes in strengthening the ruler's organizational abilities. For some historians, this has largely led to the politicization of historiography, whereby ancient Rus’-Volga Bulgar identities are analysed with modern identities clearly in mind. In another example, some Islamic scholarship has used the correlation of Islamization and urbanization to paint Volga Bulgaria as a thoroughly Islamic theocratic state without ever questioning primary sources, or even without citing them at all, let alone referring to archaeological evidence. However, as Mako comments on the frequently anachronistic analyses of Islamization in Volga Bulgaria by modern scholars, “although ideas about unification resulting from the new religion are based on historical facts, their use to

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61 Abdullin, 1990, “Islam in the History of the Volga Kama Bulgars and Tatars,” 1. For example, he writes, “This year’s celebrations of 1100 years since our ancestors converted to Islam for the Volga Kama Tatars and Bulgars, and for the development of local history and culture.” In another example, as Miftakhov’s university course claims, “In Russia, history remains a state secret. Any Russian publication is so well sanitized that Orwell imagination [sic] would badly pale against the achievements of the historical production lines.” Referenced via webpage: http://s155239215.onlinehome.us/turkic/11Miftakhov/Lecture_9En.htm.
62 Beake, Bukharaev and Minnekaev (trans. and comm.), 2010, The Story of Joseph: Kyssa’i Yusuf by Kol Gali, x. Specifically, they write: “The modern Kazan Tatars […] have in fact been a settled and literate nation since at least AD 922. [...] It is indeed fundamental to any understanding of the Bolgar-Tatar poem of Kol Gali, to realize that it is a product of the centuries-long constructive creativeness and deep-rooted culture of the Volga Tatar nation.”
63 Abdullin, 1990, 3.
64 Devletşin, 2015, “Russian-Volga Bulgarian Mutual Relations in the Sphere of Spiritual Culture,” 76-81.
justify 10th century decisions in the East European steppe is far from historical.” While analyses such as these may be heavily biased and often overstated, they are nevertheless significant perspectives to be taken into account.

Despite shared modern ethno-national considerations, I would argue that written history, and therefore confessional identity, began with Almuš’s conversion in the 10th century, even if the various “peoples” who lived in the middle-Volga region beforehand spoke different languages, over time, through the potestarian processes outlined above (ch. 1 §2.2.3), converted to Sunni Islam. In short, they became Islamized. Despite a prolonged debate within Soviet and post-Soviet historiography about the relative permeation of Islam into the broad population, according to Izmailov, another of the most prominent post-Soviet scholars and archaeologists of Volga Bulgaria, the consensus has come to agree that there was in fact a broad Islamization, unlike the alleged Judaization in Khazaria. The question

67 I refer to the previous discussions above §1.1.1.
68 Izmailov, 2009, 5-6. Specifically, he writes:

“Постепенно в историографии сложились две точки зрения на характер распространения ислама среди населения Булгарии. Одни исследователи, преимущественно советские историки (М. Г. Худяков, Н. Н. Фирсов, А. П. Смирнов, Б. Д. Греков и Н. Ф. Калинин), считали, что мусульманством были охвачены горожане и аристократия, а основная часть населения сохраняла язычество. Как писал академик Б. Д. Греков, ’Ислам еще долго оставался здесь религией только господствующих классов, народная же масса продолжала пребывать в язычестве’. Подобные представления в той или иной мере становятся общим местом отечественной историографии.

Данные, полученные из комплексного анализа археологических материалов и письменных источников, рисуют совсем иную картину распространения ислама. Эту точку зрения традиционно разделяли татарские историки (Ш. Марджани, Р. Фахрутдинов, Х. Атласи и др.), а ныне она находит все больше сторонников среди археологов и историков. Этапным в этом отношении следует признать исследование Е. А. Халиковой. Проанализировав материалы более чем 20 булгарских некрополей, она пришла к выводу о широком распространении ислама в Булгарии. По ее данным, распространение ислама в Булгарии начинается в конце IX - начале X в., полная и окончательная победа мусульманской погребальной обрядности в среде горожан происходит в первой половине X в., а в отдельных регионах - во второй половине X - начале XI в. [Халикова, 1986, с. 137 - 152]. Выводы эти в основном выдержали испытание временем.”

I have translated this as:

“Two perspectives on the character and the spread of Islam among the population of Bulgaria [sic] gradually came into historiography. Some researchers, mostly Soviet historians (M. G. Khudjakov, N. N. Firsov, A. P. Smirnov, B. D. Grekov and N. F. Kalinin), believed that Islam was adopted by the townspeople and the aristocracy, while the base of the population remained pagan. The academic B. D. Grekov wrote, ’Here, Islam has long remained only the religion of
then remains, do we regard the primary sources as legitimate textual bedrock on which to build history, or more as mythology from which some extrapolate the modern ethno-national identity, while others infer socio-cultural considerations of identity?

Ch. 4: 1.1.1.2 Primary Sources or mythologies?

-The Kyssa’i Yusuf

Written in both Farsi and Arabic during the first third of the thirteenth century and regarded as the founding event of a native Tatarstani literary tradition, the Kyssa’i Yusuf of Kol Gali points to the well-known Old Testament story of Joseph’s prophecy passed down through the Islamic firmament as the true inheritor of the Jewish tradition. This would undoubtedly have carried special relevance in the collective historical memory of 13th-c. Volga Bulgaria, the ruler of which, Almuş, had successfully seceded from Khazarian “Jewish” suzerainty three centuries previously.

Aside from the conspicuous narrative overtones of original Judaism as bequeathed to the Islamic tradition, I would argue that the work exhibits features of Islamic supersessionism, in that Islam is thoroughly built on a Judaic mythology, but is in turn

the ruling classes, while the popular masses continued to stay pagan.’ Similar ideas, to one extent or another, became commonplace within domestic historiography.

The data obtained from a comprehensive analysis of archaeological materials and written sources, conveys a very different picture of the permeation of Islam. This was a view traditionally shared by Tatar historians (Š.Mardžani, R. Fakhrutdinov, H. Atli and etc.), and now it increasingly finds supporters among archaeologists and historians. E. A. Khalikova’s research should be recognized as a landmark in this regard. By analyzing the materials of more than 20 Bulgar necropoleis, she came to the conclusion that Islam was broadly spread in Bulgaria. According to her data, the propagation of Islam in Bulgaria had begun at the end of the 9th – the beginning of the 10th century, whereas the complete and final triumph of Muslim funerary rites among the townspeople occurs in the first half of the 10th century, and in some regions, by the second half of the 10th – the beginning of the 11th century [Khalikova, 1986, 137 - 152]. These conclusions have essentially withstood the test of time.”

69 See the discussion above, ch. 1§2.2.2.3.
70 Beake, Bukharaev and Minnekaev (trans. and comm.), 2010, xxvii.
71 Ibid, xxix.
72 Ibid, xxvii. Specifically, Bukharaev writes, “Kol Gali’s initial intention was surely that of a Muslim who wished to disseminate and strengthen the faith of Islam in Volga-Bulgaria itself and the pagan lands to the north and east.”
73 This is especially evident in two translated verses on (ibid) p. xxix, where the poet writes:

“Then the Messenger announced: ‘Jews, sit yourselves down, toss your old religion away and convert openly to the true faith; and then only then you shall hear what happened to Joseph.’ So he told the Jews what lay at the heart of that story and they were all delighted, The verbal skills of the Chosen One quite amazed them; they remarked: ‘He tells it better than we can!’”
shown in ascendance, assimilating Bustan the Jew, and by extent, Judaism, incorporating all Jewishness into a new *dar-al-Islam*. However, theological considerations aside, that the work exists as a reflection of the cultural context which produced it instead of as a reliable source for the pre-Mongol era, is obvious. Even the biblical story of Joseph carries distinctive mythologizing tendencies, which, while typical for the beginnings of a given literary tradition, are hardly perceived as reliable by the majority of modern historians in Russia or the West, and the work of Kol Gali was written some three hundred years after Almuš’s conversion. This leaves the *Tārīkh-i-Bulghār*, written soon after Almuš’s conversion, which has *not* survived, as the only other example of a native literary tradition in Volga Bulgaria.

-The *Tārīkh-i-Bulghār* vs. ibn Fadlān

The *Tārīkh-i-Bulghār*, or The History of Bulgaria, though lost, is summarized in the work of Abu Hamid al-Garnaṭī, whom we have discussed previously and who, it is claimed, met the copyist in 1136 and read from the work itself, appropriating large portions of it in his own work. DeWeese has termed this collusion of sources as “early echoes of the Bulgar conversion,” while later “echoes” of the Bulgar conversion in the Tatarstani literary tradition resonate all the way up to the 18-19th century in works such as the *Tārīkh Nāma-yi Bulghār*, which presents an even more fantastic story.

In regards to supersessionism as a vehicle for monotheistic absorption, much has been written on Christian supersessionism of Jewish law and scripture, however comparatively less has been written in this regard of Islamic supersessionism of Jewish law and scripture, typically referred to as the concept of “Tahrīf”. A good overview is given by Keating, 2014, “Revisiting the Charge of Tahrīf: The Question of Supersessionism in Early Islam and the Qur’ān,” 202-217. While this is not the place to satisfactorily wade into the contentious field of Islamic supersessionism, the topic is treated in more detail by Evans, 2018, *Supersessionism, Anti-Supersessionism and the State of Israel: a Critical Exploration of Christian Supersessionism, Possible Alternatives, and Discussions Surrounding the Modern State of Israeli*, University of Birmingham thesis, 4-8.

74 For historiographical issues pertaining to the transmission of biblical stories as reliable textual sources as opposed to hagiographies in the *PVL* and the earliest Rus’ and Danube-Bulgar literary traditions, see Feldman, 2013, *The Historiographical and Archaeological Evidence of Autonomy and Rebellion in Chersōn: a Defense of the Revisionist Analysis of Vladimir’s Baptism (987-989)*, 56-62.

75 Beake, Bukharaev and Minnekaev, 2010, xviii.

76 Ibid. See also DeWeese, 1994, 76 n13.


78 DeWeese, 1994, 75.

79 See for example Frank, 1998, 95-115; ídem, 2000, “Historical Legends of the Volga-Ural Muslims,” 89-107; Usmanov, 1972, *Татарские исторические источники XVII-XVIII вв.*, 158-166; and Izmailov, 2009, 7. It is presumably from this work that preposterous and unsubstantiated theories such as that of
Meanwhile, the original *Tārīkh-i-Bulghār* presents a conversion story along with the likes of ibn Rusta and ibn Fadlān (fl. early-10th c.), and in fact ibn Rusta wrote about Almuş accepting Islam nearly twenty years before ibn Fadlān arrived (ca. 920-922). Chronological inconsistencies in the Islamic sources aside, it is clear the work presents several fantastic elements, and though ibn Fadlān’s *Risalla* is not entirely free of these, it is still far more straightforward than the mythology in the *Tārīkh-i-Bulghār*.

According to the document as summarized by DeWeese, the king (it does not specify Almuş as does ibn Fadlān or the so-called Āydār in the *Tārīkh Nāma-yi Bulghār*) and queen were suffering from a severe sickness which none of their native remedies could heal. When a Muslim merchant came and asked them if they would agree to accept his religion if he could heal them, they acquiesced. Lo and behold, he cured them, and they converted themselves and their entire people. Then, the Khazar king, unhappy about the event, arrived with an army, a battle was fought and the Bulgars won, forcing the Khazar king to accept Islam as well.

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Halim, Yusoff and Ghazalli, 2013, 21, who write (without any citation): “Khan Aidar was the first Bulghar ruler to embrace Islam and secondly, his son ‘Abd Allah Djilki who is heir to the throne after him was regarded as the founder of Volga Bulgaria as an Islamic country.”

In this work, Alexander the Great is portrayed as the founder of the city of Bulgar, and his twelfth-generation descendant, Āydār, whose father had come from China to conquer Bulgar, is described as the ruler who converted to Islam, as opposed to Almuş.


de Goeje, 1892, vol. VII, 141.

Remarked on by Montgomery, 2016, “Who is the Real Ibn Fadlan? Some Observations on Editing and Translating the Text,” one of the foremost experts on the text: “I see it as an adventure story.” The reason for its reliability, as Montgomery supposes, is that ibn Fadlān was not writing for an audience, but for himself primarily.

See DeWeese, 1994, 76-77. Specifically, DeWeese summarizes the work as follows:

“In any event, the story runs thus: A Muslim merchant who was also a *faqīh* and well versed in medicine came for commercial reasons to this land, where the ‘king’ (*malik*) and his wife were suffering from a grave illness; ‘they treated them with such remedies as they knew,’ but their illness worsened. The Muslim asked them if they would enter his religion if he treated them and restored them to health; they agreed, he cured them, they became Muslims, and the people of the country became Muslims too. Then the king of the Khazars came against them with an enormous army and made war upon them, angry that they had entered this religion without his command. The Muslim told the new converts not to fear, but rather to glorify God; and the people, crying out ‘Allāhu akbar’ and praising God and blessing the Prophet and his family, fought with the king and routed his army to the point that he was compelled to make peace with them. The king likewise entered their newfound religion, and told the Muslim merchant-* faqīh* that, during the battle, he had seen enormous men mounted upon whitish horses battling his troops and putting them to flight; the Muslim explained to him that these were the army of God (*jundu'llāh*). The account concludes with the explanation that a wise man (*‘ālim*) is called among those people.
That the fantastic nature of the story might remind us of some of the fanciful features of *The Schechter Text* should not be surprising. In a parallel example, the conversion story of Vladimir given by the *PVL* is just as historically unreliable in comparison with Byzantine authors such as Leōn Diakonos. In this case, as we may compare the historical usefulness of the *Tārīkh-i-Bulghār* and the *Risalla* of ibn Fadlān, it would seem that the latter provides far more legitimate textual bedrock on which to build historical narratives.

So the fact that the *Tārīkh-i-Bulghār* is used as a wholly reliable source by later chroniclers and even some modern historians does not mean that we shall as well. Yet while the source may not be historically reliable in any meaningful sense, it still served and continues to serve a meaningful literary and religious purpose for the Islamic peoples of Central Asia. While the *Risalla* of ibn Fadlān is far more reliable as a historical source, scholars such as Kennedy have reminded us of the three primary reasons for Almuš’s request for ibn Fadlān’s journey to him in the first place: to teach masonry building, medicine and monotheism.

Ch. 4: 1.1.1.3 Islamization, sedentarization, centralization, literization

Once again we see monotheization, and Islamization in this case, coinciding with sedentarization, literization and centralization. Archaeological evidence confirms the construction of mosques and the appearance of Islamic necropoleis far more easily than distinguishing between various pagan tribes. With Islamization came Islamic law and an

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85 Incidentally, DeWeese conveys this summary in his work but fails to mention that it derives completely from al-Garnaff. For the actual passage in al-Garnaff, see Dubler (trans.), 1953, 11-12, 54-55. Regarding the problems in interpreting the *Schechter Text*, see the discussion below in appendix 1 §1.2.

86 See for example Feldman, 2013, 48-62.

87 DeWeese, 2004, 75. He writes:

“As is most often the case in the ‘historical’ and ‘legendary’ accounts of later conversions, there is virtually no common ground between Ibn Fadlan’s depiction and the atmosphere and details of the conversion legend (except for the mentions in both of military and political tension with the Khazars).”


89 Kennedy, 2016, “Where was Ibn Fadlan coming from? (The Muslim World).” Furthermore, according to Kennedy, the ‘Abbasid caliph was only too glad to send Ibn Fadlan in an effort to spread his authority as the commander of the faithful in the face of concurrent financial collapse and Shi’a separatism.
imported literary tradition from the Islamic ummah. With an imported literary tradition, came a burgeoning native literary tradition beginning with the Tārīkh-i-Bulghār, which was meant to record the history of the Almušid dynasty founded on the adoption of Islam. This is what we might call “historization” (see above ch. 1 §2.2.3.3 and ch. 2 §2.2.2). With sedentarization, we encounter both a spatial and an imagined centralization around the principal fortified Bulgar cities, the most important of which was at first Bolgar and then Biliar.

Having analyzed not only archaeological and textual evidence, modern historiographical posturing within the confines of Soviet, post-Soviet and Tatarstani traditions and hermeneutics, but also the process of Islamization as it pertains to urbanization in Volga Bulgaria, we are now able to insert Volga Bulgaria comfortably into a model related to what we have previously constructed for Khazaria. Namely, since Islam as a religion is the primary vehicle for ethnic identity in modern Tatarstan, which was and continues to be widely seen as beginning with Almuš, we may conclude simply just that. Essentially, Volga Bulgaria became Volga Bulgaria primarily because of Islam; the so-called “Bulgar migration” is a secondary factor in the so-called “ethnogenesis” of the modern Tatar people, who may see themselves as descendants of the Volga Bulgars due to Islam as a tribal unifier, not as Bulgars as a tribe specifically. That said, Almuš and his descendants were able to create the ethnicity by successfully imposing Islam on their subjects in a top-down conversion which ultimately spanned centuries, as opposed to the Khazarian khağans who did not successfully impose Judaism on their subjects, so that ultimately the Khazarian identity evaporated.
Ch. 2, part 2: Magyars and Pečenegs

If the Islamization of Volga Bulgaria represents a case where historiography congregates at one end of the ethnogenetic spectrum, namely that “peoplehood” and therefore, history, begins with Islamization, or broadly, monotheization, then Hungarian historiography usually congregates at the other end of the spectrum, where Christianization is a comparatively more minor event in the history of the Magyars, whose “peoplehood” stretches much further back. In this way, the Hungarians’ arrival in the Carpathian Basin in the late-9th century has been viewed as a much more determinative event in the national history of the “Hungarian people.”

Ch. 2 2.1 The advent of the Magyars

The Hungarian “conquest” of the Carpathian Basin, termed the “Honfoglalás,” is hardly ever seriously questioned in modern scholarship and has remained the cornerstone of historiography both within Hungarian scholarship and outside, in international scholarship as well. The generally accepted story, with various modifications, doubts and qualifications, derives primarily from accounts within the DAI (mid-10th c.), western sources such as


“Everything reported by written sources since the eleventh century is thought to have been an autochthonous development, created ex nihilo after the conquest. If there were earlier influences, they would have come from the pagan traditions of the steppe. The organisation of the kingdom, the conversion to Christianity and the birth of settlements have all been presented according to this interpretation. It is as if the nomadic newcomers of about 895 found an uninhabited land, a tabula rasa in every respect.”

As for the discourse on autochthonous development, Tencsényi, 2010, “‘Imposed Authenticity’, “ 24, demonstrates the manner in which this was used as a vehicle for nationalist historiography. As for the concept of a Carpathian Basin as a “tabula rasa,” this idea, despite being relatively established, has still been doubted for some time. For example, even during the Soviet period, Bartha, 1975, Hungarian Society in the 9th and 10th Centuries, 86, postulated that “Avars had lived to see the arrival of conquering Hungarians.” Even more recently, Hungarian nationalist historiography has conceded this notion as rather unfounded. See for example Csepeli and Örkény, 1996, “The Changing Facets of Hungarian Nationalism,” 247. Interestingly, despite an earlier preference to portray the Carpathian Basin as essentially empty by the time of the so-called “Hungarian Conquest,” the same idea has been repurposed in post-war scholarship to project a continuity between Hun-Avar and Hungarian settlement in order to repurpose 19th century Hungarian claims to descend from the hordes of Attila. See for example Harmatta’s 1951 introduction, (p. 3-4). Even otherwise far less nationalistic Hungarian archaeological literature (Hajnóczi et al., 1998, Pannonia Hungarica Antiqua, 12) occasionally presumes some sort of continuity between “conquering” Magyars and previous inhabitants from the 5th century. See also below n162 in reference to a preferred Hun-Hungarian/Magyar continuity. See below n172 in reference to an ethno-linguistic theory which places Hungarian ethnogenesis several millennia BCE.

99 Moravscik and Jenkins (eds. and trans.), 2002, DAI, §38, 171-175.
Liudprand of Cremona (ca. 920-972), 100 Regino of Prüm (late-9th c.), 101 the Annals of St. Gall (8-11th c.), 102 and of course the Gesta Hungarorum I and II (hereafter, GH – 13th c.). 103 That the events of the “conquest” are generally agreed to have taken place in 895-896, despite the mistaken dating in the GH of Simon de Kéza (late-13th c.), due to the predations of the Pečenegs chasing the routed Magyars to the Carpathians, is largely undisputed, 104 if largely unprovable, archaeologically. I confess, I am not specifically a so-called “hungarologist” 105 and I will not claim to provide an exhaustive analysis of Hungarian historiography. Nor is it my goal to categorically reject such scholarly orthodoxy, since there are too many and varied sources, both textual and archaeological, confirming the event, but only to contextualize it in light of other early conversion stories and modern nationalist interpretations. It is for this reason that I will refer the “conquest” in quotes, since although it is generally accepted in


101 Kurze (ed.), 1890, Reginonis Abbaus Prumiensis Chronicon cum continuatone. For an English translation, see MacLean (trans.), 2009, History and Politics in Late Carolingian and Ottonian Europe: The Chronicle of Regino of Prüm and Adalbert of Magdeburg.


103 Veszprémy and Schaer (eds. and trans.), 1999, Gesta Hungarorum [GH II], 76-79. See also Rady (trans.), 2009, “The Gesta Hungarorum of Anonymus, the Anonymous Notary of King Béla: A Translation” [GH II], 693-697. The Gesta Hungarorum I is written anonymously (ca. 1200-1230) and the Gesta Hungarorum II is a continuation written by Simon de Kéza (ca. 1282-1285).


“The Pecheneg movement, ca. 900, into the Pontic region (largely due to Oguz pressure) was not a war of conquest directed against Rus’, but rather a migration of defeated nomads seeking a new territory. In the process, they drove out a group of weaker nomads, the Hungarians. Sedentary society felt little immediate effect.”

105 “Hungarology” as a word is used by two prevalent international research associations, the Scientific Association for Hungarology Research and the International Association for Hungarian Studies which aims “to provide opportunity for international scholars to publish articles on Hungarian Studies, and to maintain accessibility for the newest developments within Hungarology for those who do not speak the Hungarian language.” See the references via webpages, for the former association: http://www.geography.unibe.ch/content/e9500/e10055/e10639/e15175/e15281/SCIENTIFICASSOCIATIONFORHUGAROLOGYRESEARCH_eng.pdf. For the latter association, see http://hungarologia.net/en/publications/.
historiography, it is also subject to reinterpretation as modern scholarship has begun to question it as a foundation myth.\(^\text{106}\)

But the question truly is, outside of textual sources, in order to provide grounds for the “conquest,” as per the discussion above in §1.1.1, are we able to distinguish between Magyars and other nomads in the 9\(^{th}\) century at all? Can archaeological typologies, linguistics or toponymic evidence alone separate the so-called Magyars from any other group, or are they hardly separate at all?\(^\text{107}\) If not, what other archaeological means can we use and what can they tell us about monotheization (in this case, Christianization) and ethnicity?

Ch. 4 2.1.1 “Honfoglalás”\(^\text{108}\) and Christianization: differing interpretations

Without necessarily meaning to, Stephenson has touched on precisely the entire problem of settlement and the creation of so-called “statehood” when he suggests, without going into detail, that somehow the Magyars became Hungarians between the 890s and the 1090s.\(^\text{109}\) It is my aim in this section to conceptualize this transition in the context of other dynastic formations in this period. In fact, this transition has been contextualized before, but only within a Christian framework by the scholars Bartlett\(^\text{110}\) and Berend. Berend’s 2003 edited work, *Christianization and the Rise of Christian Monarchy: Scandinavia, Central Europe and Rus’, c. 900-1200*, has justifiably received widespread acclaim. She envisions a European-wide contextualization of conversion, which I applaud, but the scope includes only top-down conversions to either Latin or Byzantine Christianity, without juxtaposing the topic in Volga Bulgaria or Khazaria. While it is a work of tremendous importance, it is my own wish to add a greater degree of contextualization to it considering outside and disappeared

\(^{106}\) See Trencsényi, 2010, 27.

\(^{107}\) Berend, 2001, *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and “Pagans” in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000-1300*, 62, has for example, pointed out the familiar problems of relying exclusively on toponymic evidence to make pre-formed conclusions about ethnicity. See also Todorov, 2010, “The Value of Empire: Tenth-Century Bulgaria between Magyars, Pechenegs and Byzantium,” 317-318.

\(^{108}\) The so-called “Conquest of the Homeland” in Hungarian.

\(^{109}\) Stephenson, 2000a, 187. Specifically, he writes:

“In the period between their settlement of the Carpathian basin and the advent of the First Crusade, the nomadic Magyars had moved a significant way towards establishing a more, although not entirely, sedentary Christian kingdom. The kingdom is known to English speakers as Hungary, we will henceforth call the Magyars Hungarians.”

\(^{10}\) See for example Bartlett, 2007, “From Paganism to Christianity in Medieval Europe,” 47-72. While Bartlett’s analysis is broad in scope, there is still an underlying assumption of the eventual triumph of Christianity, which nevertheless was not always guaranteed.
peoples” such as these two listed above as well as Pečenegs, Cumans and other steppe peoples which did not monotheize.

In effect, was the so-called “Honfoglalás,” or the “Conquest of the Homeland,” really the conquest of an entire “nation” by another “nation,”111 or was it simply a conquering minority like many other “barbarian” conquests during the migration period? Can modern interpretations of the Árpádian age truly map a modern notion of Hungarian statehood onto an ancient one, or are archaeologists, believing they can conceive real differences between tribal ethnicities in the age of the so-called “Honfoglalás,” simply “imagining communities”?112 Most importantly, is it fair to describe the entire episode as a “founding myth”?113 To begin to deconstruct the story of the “Honfoglalás,” which derives from both the aforementioned textual sources as well as archaeology, we may begin with a discussion of the textual sources and afterward, we will explore the interpretations of the archaeological finds pertaining to the “Honfoglalás.”

2.1.1.1 The Gesta Hungarorum vs. other contemporaneous accounts

Comparing events in the GH with other records has generally upheld certain, though few, elements of verisimilitude within it,114 while broadly speaking, other records far surpass it in historical utility. Those other annals and authors, who belong to more established Eastern and Western Christian literary traditions of the time, such as Liudprand of Cremona,115 Regino of Prüm,116 and of course the DAI in the Eastern tradition,117 are generally held to be more reliable by the standards of the time, though certainly imperfect, for

111 For example, Golden, 1991, “Aspects of the Nomadic Factor in the Economic Development of Kievan Rus,” 87, somewhat over-simplistically, writes, “Hungary, itself of nomadic origin [was] driven from the region by the Pechenegs.”
116 Kurze (ed.), 1890, Reginonis Abbaus Prumiensis Chronicon cum continuatone. For an English translation, see MacLean (trans.), 2009, History and Politics in Late Carolingian and Ottonian Europe: The Chronicle of Regino of Prüm and Adalbert of Magdeburg.
117 Moravscik and Jenkins (eds. and trans.), 2002, DAI.
the purposes of divining an accurate textual portrayal of the ninth and tenth centuries in regards to those we may possibly consider Magyars and their “peoplehood.”

To begin, the GH conveys indications about the migration and “conquest,” in direct reference to a Hungarian “peoplehood,” for example recording, “[…] how many realms and rulers the [Hungarians] conquered and why the people coming forth from the Scythian land are called Hungarians in the speech of foreigners but Magyars [Mogerii] in their own.”

While such a summary fits in with the “conquest” and “peoplehood” frequently imagined by modern scholars, contemporary Western sources are somewhat more divided over the alleged peoplehood of the Hungarians.

For example, Liudprand of Cremona’s makes his first reference to the Hungarians: “[New Rome] has to its north the Hungarians, the Pizaceni [Pečenegs – my insertion] the Khazars, the Russians, whom we call Normans by another name, and the Bulgarians very close by.” He later goes on to record the conquest of “the nation of Moravia” by “the Hungarians,” fitting in well with the GH, yet in terms of Hungarian “peoplehood,” differing with sources such as Regino of Prüm. In the latter source, the Hungarians are equated with the rest of the “Scythian” peoples: “the Hungarian people […], emerged from the Scythian kingdoms.” According to Maclean, citing Silagi, it was this source which gave later Christian Hungarian chroniclers this notion of “peoplehood.”

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118 Rady (trans.), 2009, *GH I*, 685. Specifically, translated from Latin, a broader excerpt from the document reads:

> “You asked me that, in the same way as I had written on the history of Troy and on the wars of the Greeks, so to write for you of the genealogy [genealogia] of the kings of Hungary and of their noblemen: how the seven leading persons, who are called the Hetumooger, came down from the Scythian land, what that Scythian land was like and how Duke Álmos was born and why Álmos, from whom the kings of Hungary trace their origin, is called the first duke of Hungary, and how many realms and rulers they conquered and why the people coming forth from the Scythian land are called Hungarians in the speech of foreigners but Magyars [Mogerii] in their own.”

120 Ibid, 75.
122 Maclean (trans.), 2009, 202 n361. He writes:

> “It seems that Regino, not having found mention of the Hungarians (or Magyars) in his sources, concluded that they and the Scythians were the same people. […] Regino’s account of them, much the fullest of the contemporary sources, had a lasting influence, not least on later Hungarian chroniclers.”
assertion. Alternatively, the DAI\textsuperscript{123} is held in high regard for those wishing to divine the true origins of Hungarian peoplehood,\textsuperscript{124} in which all manner of references to mythical places such as Lebedia, Atelkouzou, and peoples such as the so-called Sabartoi Asphaloi,\textsuperscript{125} successfully tempting many researchers to engineer theories on who exactly such terms describe.\textsuperscript{126} As these works have already been combed through and given comparative analyses by many textual scholars, I will briefly discuss the GH as it has been been analyzed, interpreted and reinterpreted in a myriad of historiographical publications.

Anglophone, Hungarian and Romanian historians have all weighed in, seeking to imagine the true primordial ethnic composition of the Carpathian Basin in the 9-10\textsuperscript{th} centuries

\textsuperscript{123} Moravcsik and Jenkins (eds. and trans.), 2002, DAI, §38, 171-175.
\textsuperscript{124} See for example Sinor, 1958, “The Outlines of Hungarian Prehistory,” 513-540.
\textsuperscript{125} See for example the varying discussions of all manner of theories given by Dvornik, Jenkins, Lewis, Moravcsik, Obolensky and Runciman (eds.), 1962, Constantine Porphyrogenitus: De Administrando Imperio, Volume II, A Commentary, 146-148. On the location of Lebedia and Atelkouzou mentioned in the DAI, researchers such as Zhivkov, 2015, 127, still describe Levedia as “the steppe zone between the Don and the Dnieper.” However, it is unclear that this place referred to as Levedia or Eтелкөз can be assumed to be whole regions, as they may have simply been settlements, based solely on this reference in the DAI. It should also be noted such theorizing depends exclusively on the agreement of primary sources, which is hardly realistic in this case. For example, the DAI §38.19-23 contends that “the Pechenegs who were previously called ‘Kangar’ […] stirred up war against the Chazars, and, being defeated, were forced to quit their own land and settle in that of the Turks.” However, it may be recalled that the Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam (ed. and trans. Minorsky, 1970), §47, 160, for example refers to the so-called “Khazarian Pečenegs,” as if those very same Pečenegs were subjects of Khazaria. See below §2.2.1.2.

in light of the *GH*. It has been cast as highly dependable or untrustworthy as a textual source depending on a scholar’s agenda. It is not my objective to add one more comprehensive scholarly exploration of this document, only to examine historiographical issues, concerning my larger topic of Pontic-Caspian Eurasian monotheizations, which have arisen around it before moving on to examine archaeological research. For our purposes, we may begin with the textual scholar Macartney, who even in 1953, remarked that the *GH* was the “most misleading of all the early Hungarian texts.”\(^{127}\) Magosci\(^{128}\) and Çoban\(^{129}\) have also cast the *GH* as inherently unreliable. Not only Hungarian,\(^{130}\) but also Romanian historians rely on the *GH* when it suits them,\(^{131}\) particularly on the question of the historical “ethnic” ownership of Transylvania and other areas of the southern Carpathian Basin,\(^{132}\) and seek to discredit the *GH* when their theories and claims are in opposition to it.\(^{133}\) For example, according to the *GH*, there were only 108 pure, original Hungarian clans.\(^{134}\) However, it is now well-known that this supposition is hardly substantiated. Importantly, interpreting the *GH* has become less problematic in the twenty-first century, yet it still retains some contentiousness.\(^{135}\) Nevertheless, returning to Macartney, he compares Simon de Kéza’s account with other early texts from extra-Hungarian, or as some might call it, “barbarian,” literary traditions, in particular


\(^{132}\) For broad historical works on the history of Transylvania, see Köpeczi et al., 1994, *History of Transylvania*; Kristó et al., 1994, *Koral Magyar Történeti Lexikon (9-14. század)*; and Silagi, 1989, “Zum Text der Gesta Hungarorum des anonymen Notars,” 173-180. Conversely, for archaeological finds relating to questions of supposed ethnic groups originally inhabiting Transylvania, particularly in light of modern nationalist discourse, see older works such as Gooss, 1876, *Chronik der archäologischen Funde Siebenbürger*; Daicoviciu, 1938, *La Transylvanie dans l’antiquité*; and idem, 1943, *La Transilvania nell’antichità*.

\(^{133}\) Macartney, 1953, 60.

\(^{134}\) Veszprémy and Schaefer (eds. and trans.), 1999, *GH II*, 22-25. However, this has not stopped modern scholars from making unsubstantiated assumptions about precise numbers. For example, Csepeli and Őrkény, 1996, 248, categorically state, without making any reference nor qualifying what is precisely meant by “ethnic Hungarians” or “Hungarian statehood,” that “at the time of the foundation of the Hungarian state approximately two hundred thousand ethnic Hungarians lived in the Carpathian Basin.”

\(^{135}\) As Rady (trans.), 2009, *GH I*, 682, has wryly remarked, “Fortunately, modern scholarly readings of the *Gesta Hungarorum* are less beset by political partisanship since, in the post-Schengen world of the EU, only dinosaurs care about who was where first.”
the *PVL*, but also Jordanes and Priscus. This is significant in that there is already a much broader body of scholarship of authors such as these and to contextualize the *GH* in such a way would be far more useful than just scrutinizing the document in a vacuum.

“Barbarian history,” as it has been termed by Goffart, was certainly written with tribal considerations in mind, yet can be either mined for tantalizing fragments of prehistoric foundational mythology, or taken literally by a modern ethnic group seeking to map itself onto a perceived ancient one, no matter who or when. As for the *GH*, that it is manifestly comparable to the *PVL* in terms of literary mythologizing and overt fabrications in some places should come as little surprise. The shaky historical utility of the *PVL* has already been detailed by much scholarship as well as in comparison with the reliability of Jordanes. That many of these early chroniclers of their respective “peoples” such as Simon de Kéza, or the anonymous author of the *GH*, deliberately fabricated origin myths has already been widely expounded, especially in Hungarian scholarship. Therefore, little remains to add to such examinations other than to point out the usage of biblical precedents within the *GH*, retrospectively Christianizing older pagan elements of the stories as we saw in the context of Judaization in Khazaria and Islamization in Volga Bulgaria. At the risk of belaboring the point, the *GH* shares many features in common with many chronicles of early

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137 Goffart, 1988, *The Narrators of Barbarian History (A.D. 550-800)*. This work remains quite thoughtful despite its mildly Western-centered scope, as it assesses various historians disinterestedly both in the West and East. Goffart specifically underlines the notion that such histories ought to tell us more about the precise times in which they were written rather than the obscure times they purported to write about. See p. 436-437.
138 For a highly useful, if slightly formulaic expounding on nationalist founding mythology, including a contextualizing of Hungary’s case, see Coakley, 2004, 544-547.
140 Feldman, 2013, 47-60.
141 Goffart, 1988, 20-111.
142 Pohl, 2016, “Distant Peoples: Ibn Fadlan and the Ethnography of Eastern Europe,” has notably exposed such comparative ethno-geneses amidst the largely apocryphal nature of such works.
143 For a translation of specifically the original work (*Gesta Hungarorum I*), see Rady (trans.), 2009, “The *Gesta Hungarorum* of Anonymus, the Anonymous Notary of King Béla: A Translation,” 681-727.
144 See above n113.
148 See previous chapter 2, §2.1.1.
149 See above §1.1.1.2.
textual traditions, and thus fits Christianized Hungarian literature into the same context of literization, namely, conscious myth-making.\textsuperscript{150}

Nevertheless, it is not my goal here to cross-examine all of the above mentioned works in search for historical bedrock on which to build one more speculative argument, as this has already been conducted by a litany of scholars, Hungarian, Romanian, Anglophone and many others. If the principal sources (such as the \textit{GH}, Liudprand of Cremona, Regino of Prüm, the \textit{DAI}) for an imagined pre-monotheistic essentialist primordial ethnicity of the migrating “Hungarians” is suitably well-examined (particularly in international scholarship), we may instead turn to a more in-depth consideration of the Hungarian archaeological discourse. I will argue that there is a clear, albeit a flawed, tradition of archaeological literature which frequently purports to demonstrate a conception of pre-Christian Hungarian ethnicity via archaeological material, inherited from equally questionable textual material.

Ch. 4 2.1.1.2 Archaeology: uses and misuses

The majority of Hungarian archaeology, which comprises most of the best knowledge garnered thus far on Magyar beginnings,\textsuperscript{151} is meritorious and the methods and theoretical parameters employed are laudable. However, whereas before the fall of the USSR, there was a historiographical preference for Marxist theorizing in Hungarian scholarship,\textsuperscript{152} which has now fallen from fashion,\textsuperscript{153} there is still a fair amount of concern for nationalist tendencies\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{150} Veszprémy, 2000, “Conversion in Chronicles: The Hungarian Case,” 144-145.
\textsuperscript{151} For example, Jordan, 2003, “Review of: At the Gate of Christendom,” 461, remarks that despite Berend’s excellent contribution to an analysis of Hungarian textual sources, she herself did not utilize archaeological literature nearly enough.
\textsuperscript{152} See for example Bartha, 1975, 56, 66.
\textsuperscript{154} Krekovič, 2007, 60. See also Berend, 2001, 22 and Bálint, 1997, “Węgierska archeologia i nacionalizm,” 254-259, who unconvincingly argues that Hungarian archaeology is falsely labelled as nationalist. Even some Hungarian scholarship, which purports to subvert Hungarian nationalist scholarship, frequently partakes in what can be called ethnocentric, chauvinistic analyses at best. For example, Hajnóczi et al., 1998, 12, matter-of-factly assumes that Romulus Augustulus was the final “Roman emperor.” In an even more pertinent example, Csepeli and Örkény, 1996, 248-249 write:

“Christian orthodoxy, which prevailed in Eastern Europe, did not allow much room for organic, slow, gradual development of Western structures and values such as individual liberty, dignity, separation of church and state, patterns of social organizations emerging from the lower levels of society.”

Presumably, they sought to correct older, even more chauvinistic Hungarian scholarship, which claimed that earlier Slavs were primitive hunter-gathers until the Hungarians taught them to farm. See for example Deér, 1943, “A honfoglaló Magyarság,” 127.
in Hungarian archaeological literature. My objective here is to separate, when possible, the best of Hungarian archaeology from more dubious studies, and when impossible, to qualify or place reservation on some of the more problematic approaches.

Many studies assume some sort of material-typological homogeneity. For example, beginning with finds predating the Bjelo-Brdo culture, another archaeological cultural horizon, which roughly corresponds to the territories of present-day Hungary, southern Slovakia and northern Serbia,\(^{155}\) the archaeologist Magdolna Hellebrandt assumes an all but homogenous “Celtic” population of the pre-conquest Carpathian Basin, before conceding that material-typological evidence is “unsuitable for distinguishing regional groups” (figs. 111-113).\(^{156}\) Clearly, this is still rather distant from other archaeologists of the “Celts” in the Carpathian Basin, who have had far fewer scruples distinguishing archaeologically between Celts, Scordisci, Boii, Taurisci and Dacians during the same period, simply mapping material-typological evidence onto given cultures and from there, onto various “peoples” mentioned in textual sources (fig. 110).\(^{157}\) Such an approach may be described as “culture-history.”

One of the most significant archaeological monographs detailing “culture-history” in the populations of the Carpathian Basin before and after the “conquest,” András Pálóczi-Horváth’s *Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians*, remains widely debated in its documentation of various find-types, which cast doubt on assumptions of the essential ethnic homogeneity of the conquering Magyars of the Carpathian Basin.\(^{158}\) His work remains in the minority in its suspicion of archaeological evidence seeking to document primordial ethnicities in the Carpathian Basin.

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\(^{155}\) See Sedov, 2013, 419-421; and Barford, 2001, *The Early Slavs: Culture and Society in Early Medieval Eastern Europe*, 231, for descriptions and analyses of available find types used to define the Bjelo-Brdo culture.

\(^{156}\) Hellebrandt, 1999, *Celtic Finds from Northern Hungary*, 9. She also does not reveal what the distinguishing features are between Avar, Scythian and Celtic burials, although it is implied that a series of janus-faced masked beads signify Celts (p. 68-69, 89). Nevertheless, she continues discussing Scythian burials and Celt burials (p. 233-234), before once again conceding, “It is difficult to define their ethnic attribution.”


“Culture-history” was once equated with the “German school of archaeology” before WWII, when archaeological cultures were assumed to carry the ethnicities of modern populations, but these notions have now been largely discredited. However, after WWII, culture-history continues alive and well in archaeological literature elsewhere, notably in former Soviet states such as Russia, Romania and Hungary. While certainly not all such archaeological studies are imbued with these overt assumptions, some most certainly are.

In the most glaring example of the essentialist assumption of Magyar continuity, “Hungarians” have often been mapped onto “Huns” even though this notion is less popular today than it was decades ago. Nevertheless, it is still often simplistically assumed that early Magyars comprised a distinct, homogeneous “nation” both before and

163 Jaffrelot, 2003, “For a Theory of Nationalism,” 38-39. This propensity ultimately derives from the GH. See for example Veszprémy and Schauer (eds. and trans.), 1999, GH II, 14-15, 76-77. Dubious and highly speculative studies include (but are not limited to): Kosztolyik, 1979, “Magyar Beginnings in the Reports of Hungarian and Byzantine Chroniclers,” 40-49; Moravcsik, 1946, “Byzantine Christianity and the Magyars in the Period of their Migration,” 29-45. Additionally, Kreković, 2007, “Who was First? Nationalism in Slovak and Hungarian Archaeology and History,” 62, in a particularly thoughtful analysis, remarks: “If the Magyars could be connected to the Huns by the nationalistic historians of the 19th century, modern Hungarians could lay claim to the territory of the former ‘Hun Empire’ or at least its centre, which would antedate the arrival of the Slavs to the same region.”
164 See for example Macartney, 1953, 60, who writes, “The literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, however, can be ignored today.” However, Ross, “Review of: At the Gate of Christendom,” 175, prefers to put Hungarian attempts to tie themselves to the Huns in the context of the French tying themselves to the Trojans. For well-balanced discussions of the historiography on the creation and abolition of the myth of Trojan origins for the French, see MacMaster, 2014, “The Origin of Origins, Trojans, Turks and the Birth of the Myth of Trojan Origins in the Medieval World,” 1-12; and Brown, 1998, “The Trojan Origins of the French: The Commencement of a Myth’s Demise, 1450-1520,” 135-179.
165 Berend, 2001, At the Gate of Christendom, 17.
166 Trencsényi, 2010, 21-22. For example, Wood, 2008, 61-81, offers an otherwise thorough and lively explanation of the varying circumstances of ethno-national scholarly discourse on barbarian identities throughout the past two hundred years. However, much of the discussion assumes ethnicities had existed as if since time immemorial and the impact of Christianization (or any monotheization) is hardly mentioned at all in the work.
after the conquest, despite this image having been repeatedly disproved and debated. The campaigners against archaeological theories of culture-history would argue that any assumption of homogeneity is inherently flawed due to the peculiar supposition that modern ethnicities can be traced back millennia at all. Such is precisely the frequently implicit notion that Hungarian ethnicity extends much further back than can be reasonably postulated elsewhere. This concept of a greatly elongated ethnogenetic prehistory, particular only to Hungarians (Magyars), feeds directly into the assumption of a Hungarian ethno-linguistic “urheimat,” or a previous ancestral homeland, for which another litany of theories have imagined the true location, but all of which are inherently speculative and ultimately inconclusive.

The Magyar “urheimat” assumes some connection with Volga Bulgaria and/or the aforementioned Baškir peoples, based mostly on linguistic affinities. This has then led to

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168 Oddly enough, this was a major feature of much of Soviet Hungarian archaeology. See for example Gunszt, 1964. A magyar polgári történetírás, who sought to make a Marxist critique of much of contemporary Hungarian historiography. See also other works of the period denouncing Marxist critiques of Hungarian historiographies such as Vértes, 1954, “Randbemerkungen zu den neuesten Forschungen auf dem gebiete der ungarischen Vorgeschichte,” 427-462.
169 Niculescu, 2011, 8.
170 For example, see Bartha, 1975, 47. He writes, “The Hungarians lived presumably in the 7th century, or as early as the second half of the 6th century, in the territory of the Khazar empire.” More recently, much nationalist scholarship claims that ethnicity can be tied to linguistic heritage, thereby extending “Hungarian-ness” as far back as the fourth millennium BCE. See for example Csepeli and Örkény, 1996, 247, and similarly, Bóna, 2000, A Magyarok és Európa a 9-10 században, 9-13.
172 Türk, 2012, 3. On the following page, he states that places such as “Levedia,” which we know of from the GH and the DAI, are simply unidentifiable. See also Boba, 1967, 74, who writes:

“Without attempting to solve the problems of the origin of the Hungarians, it must be emphatically stated that the application of the names ‘Magyar,’ ‘Hungarian’ or ‘Ungar’ to any tribal formation participating in the events of the ninth century is an anachronism of is based on an unsubstantiated assumption that the Hungarians (Magyars) of today can be identified with a single group active in the steppe zone in the ninth century.”

Similarly, Zhivkov, 2015, 21 makes such a remark regarding the “land of origin of” the so-called “Bulgars, Khazars and Alans.”
173 Türk, 2012, 2; Sinor, 1958, “The Outlines of Hungarian Prehistory,” 515; Klima, 1995, The Linguistic Affinity of the Volgaic Finno-Ugrians and their Ethnogenesis, 1-51; and Róna-Tas, 1999, 315-325. See also Golden, 1972, “The Migrations of the Öguz,” who even writes, “The Hungarian movement to the Pontic steppes from Baškiria should be viewed as a reverberation of the larger migration of the Pečenegs which, in turn, had been set off by the Öguz.” It is relevant however, that the 13th-c. Hungarian
various theories that any Muslims present among Hungarians were not Hungarians at all, but clearly Baškirs or other Muslims from Volga Bulgaria, even hinted at by al-Garnatī, despite previous assumptions that religion had nothing to do with primordial ethnicity stretching back millennia. Specifically, there was the Baškir connection with the so-called early “Magyars,” about which there has been abundant speculation, but mostly based on material-typological or toponymic evidence. This has led to the theory of an ethno-linguistically homogeneous homeland of a supposedly “Finno-Ugric World,” and once again the trajectory of scholarship turns toward modern geopolitical considerations.

missionary, friar Julianus, and an obscure bishop named Peter, have written about their journeys to the middle-Volga and further east to find that some locals’ speech could be mutually intelligible with the concurrent Magyars’ speech. See Dörrie (ed. and trans.), 1956, _Drei Texte zur Geschichte der Ungarn und Mongolen: Die Missionreisen des fr. Julianus O.P. ins Uralgebiet (1234/5) und nach Rubland (1237) und Bericht der Erzbischofs Peter über die Tartaren_. I thank Marek Jankowiak (personal communication, 24 April, 2018) for this reference.

174 Macartney, 1953, 84. According to Macartney, evidently:

“The ‘Ishmaelites’ from ‘Bular’ were, apparently, Mahomedan Bulgars from Bolgar on the Kama, or Great Bulgaria. There are a few other references in Hungarian documents to persons of this nationality, who seem to have been employed in the royal mint.”

Çoban, 2012, 55-75, on the other hand, has assumed, based primarily on the account of al-Garnatī, that such Muslim groups were “Islamicized Turk-Pechenegs […] with little data” (69). Berend, 2014, 203, on the other hand, claims, “there is nothing to suggest that these Pechenegs were Muslims. The assumption that all Pechenegs converted to Islam on the steppe would need to be proven.”

175 Dubler (ed. and trans.), 1953, _Abū Ḥāmid el Granadino y su relación de viaje por tierras euroasiáticas_, 65. According to al-Garnatī:

“Llegué luego a Hungría, donde vive una gente que llaman Bāšgird, procedentes de los primeros pueblos que vinieron de la tierra de los turcos y entraron en la tierra de los Afranŷ. Son valientes e innumerables. Su país, llamado Hungría consta setenta y ocho ciudades […] Viven allí incontables millares de descendientes de magribíes y millares, asimismo incontables, de descendientes de gente de Juwārizm […] y practican el Islam públicamente.”

176 See for example Bierbrauer, 2004, “Zur ethnischen Interpretation in der frühgeschichtlichen Archäologie,” 69. Sinor, 1958, 515, for example, writes:

“The difficulty of believing in spontaneous ethnogenesis is overcome by the purely rhetorical device of making the reservation that _Ursprache, Urvollk and Urheimat_ represent respectively the earliest stage of the language our knowledge embraces, the people who spoke it and the territory this people lived in, it being understood that yet earlier stages must have existed […] The main body of Finno-Ugrians cannot be imagined as compact and homogenous.”

177 See above §1.1.1. See also Türk, 2012, 4-5; and Macartney, 1930, 163, 173.

178 See for example Kazakov, 1997, “Волжская Булгария и финно-угорский мир,” 33-53; and Möör, 1963, “Die Vorfahren der Ungarn überschreiten die Wolga,” 420-427. In fact, even Zhivkov, 2015, 172, gives credence to the idea that such groups might be identified by typologically categorized material culture alone, writing:
The culture-historical approach to Hungarian prehistory therefore frequently makes two rudimentary assumptions based on inherently uncertain claims. Firstly, it assumes that Hungarian ethnicity drastically predates Christianization based on linguistic differences with surrounding populations and secondly, that Hungarian or other ethnicities can be traced by

“Khazaria included numerous ethnic groups from the North Caucasus (that differed from the Bulgars, Khazars and the Alans living there), as well as Finno-Ugrian and Slavic tribes from the forest-steppe zones of Eastern Europe. Thus, the question arises whether the material, which was different from the Saltovo one, should also be considered as part of the culture of the Khazar Khaganate.”

Šabaev et al., 2010, “‘Финно-угорский мир’: миф, макроидентичность, политический проект?” 147-155. Specifically, on p. 148, they write:

“На теоретико-концептуальном уровне идеологема "финно-угорский мир" отражает стремление национально мыслящей интеллигенции соответствующих народов смоделировать некую макроидентичность, которая обладала бы большим социальным капиталом, чем этничность российских финно-угров по отдельности. Эта концепция, восходящая к объективному, никем не оспариваемому факту их общих генетических и лингвистических корней, транслирует историческую информацию в современную реальность в виде идеи общности этнокультурных и социально-политических интересов финно-угорского населения России.”

I have translated this as:

“On the theoretical-conceptual level, the ideology of the “Finno-Ugric World” reflects the desire of the nationally minded intelligentsia of the corresponding peoples to simulate some macro-identity, which would possess greater social capital than the ethnicities of Russian Finno-Ugric peoples in isolation. This concept ascends to the objective, undisputed fact of their common genetic and linguistic roots, transmits the historical information about the idea of a community of ethnic, cultural and socio-political interests of the Finno-Ugric population into the reality of modern Russia.”

Šabaev et al., 2010, 148. Specifically, they write:

“Такого рода построения – пример современного мифотворчества. Ведь столь широкая идентичность, если понимать под этим осознание индивидом своей принадлежности к той или иной социально-личностной позиции в рамках присущих ей социальных ролей, определенно не может формироваться на зыбкой лингвистической основе. Не говоря уже о том, что время распада единого финно-угорского праязыка-основы относится к середине I тыс. до н.э., и в живых языках этой группы сохранилось очень мало его элементов. Кроме того, эти народы в России разобщены территориально, и главное - культурологически. Особо тесных экономических связей между регионами их проживания не было и нет, а более интенсивные культурные обмены стали осуществляться только в последние полтора-два десятилетия. Этого явно недостаточно для восприятия финно-угорского единства как реальности широкими слоями населения, и оно существует лишь в умах отдельных интеллектуалов, представляющих этические элиты.”

I have translated this as:

“This kind of construction – is an example of modern mythmaking. Indeed such a broad identity, if it is to be understood as the recognition by the individual to belong to a particular socio-personal position within the framework of the social roles inherent in it, by definition, cannot be formed on a shaky linguistic basis. Not to mention the fact that at the time of decay of a united Finno-Ugric proto-language base refers to the middle of the first millennium BCE, and very few of its elements have been preserved in the living languages of this group. Furthermore, these peoples in Russia, are isolated
typological,\textsuperscript{181} toponymic and/or linguistic theorizing\textsuperscript{182} assuming that Hungarian populations have always been primordially homogeneous.\textsuperscript{183}

Concerning the typologized archaeological evidence, the appearance of so-called “eastern find types” has traditionally been thought of as attesting to the late-9\textsuperscript{th}-c. “conquest” and ethnically marking pre-Christian Hungarians (figs. 117-122). Such finds, usually breastplates and pendants, are characterized by palmette-ornamened leaf motifs and typically dated to the first two thirds of the 10\textsuperscript{th} c. While it is undeniable that such “eastern find types” are in fact quite distinct from preceding, Bjelo-Brdo finds in the Carpathian Basin,\textsuperscript{184} the interpretation of such finds has noticeably been subject to drastic change regarding its presumed “ethnic” attribution.\textsuperscript{185} Clearly, there is archaeological evidence of a change in typical material culture in the Carpathian Basin in the 9-10\textsuperscript{th} c., but it is unclear to what extent it can be ethnically attributable.

territorially, and most importantly - culturally. There were never and still are no particularly close economic ties between their inhabited regions even though more intensive cultural exchanges began to take place only within the past fifteen to twenty years. This is clearly insufficient for the perception of a Finno-Ugric unity as a reality among the broader population, and it exists only in the minds of certain intellectuals, representing ethnic elites.”

\textsuperscript{182} See for example Çoban, 2012, 66; and Tóth, 2014, Strata of Ethnics, Languages and Settlement Names in the Carpathian Basin, 135-146.
\textsuperscript{183} Laszlovszky, 1991, 33.
\textsuperscript{185} See for example Laszlovszky, 1991, 36, who writes:

“There emerged a totally mistaken construction, picturing the Conquest period Hungarians as an extremely wealthy, horse-mounted nomadic people with foreign slaves. The first extremely lavish Conquest period finds seemed to offer archaeological support to this romantic notion, fuelled in part by 19\textsuperscript{th} century poetry.”

In another example, Bowlus, 2006, 163, writes:

“The lavish graves of warriors testify to the predatory culture that existed there […] It is no accident that in these regions graves of ‘common’ agriculturalists, be they Hungarian or elements of residual Slavic populations, are in close proximity to sites of warrior burials.”

According to Archie Dunn, (personal communication, 29 October, 2015), while there is undoubtedly an archaeological culture which may possibly apply to “Magyars” in the 9-10\textsuperscript{th} centuries which is certainly based on typological analysis, this is only ever detectable at the very elite level and even then only in a small amount.
The so-called “Hungarian sabers,” for instance, exemplified by the “Vienna Sabre” (figs. 122-126), have traditionally been thought of as exclusively 9th-c. Hungarian finds, even though they appear throughout Eastern Europe and are not confined to the Carpathian Basin. Compared to the “Pečeneg” sabers (figs. 130-131), for example, Pálóczi-Horváth labels them “Oriental-type” sabers due to the ambiguous nature of attributing them to a specific ethnicity such as Magyar or Pečeneg. Additionally, other studies assume that even bows and arrowheads found in “conquest period” burials themselves can be typologically pinned to specifically ancient “Magyars.” However, such “Magyar” arrowheads, some found as far outside the Carpathian Basin as modern Switzerland (fig. 116), remain difficult to distinguish from so-called “Pečeneg” arrowheads (fig. 115) found as far east as the middle reaches of the Prut’ River. One might ask, what archaeological typology could definitively provide an ethnic distinction between presumed 9th-c. Magyars and Pečenegs? It seems the old adage warning against relying on material-typological assumptions about race and ethnicity, “pots are not people,” does not apply to weapons.

Other archaeological literature purports to identify the imagined Magyar warriors of the “conquest” themselves who are usually all assumed to have originally composed some sort of nation of horse-mounted steppe warriors, whose burial sites should confirm their arrival in the Carpathian Basin. But Curta has pointed out that such so-called “horseman” burials dating to the 9-10th c. are not exclusive to the Carpathian Basin. In another

186 Iotov, 2008, “A Note on the ‘Hungarian Sabers’ of Medieval Bulgaria,” 327-338. She argues that while earlier nationalist scholarship has seen such sabers as exclusively “Hungarian,” in fact they belonged to many peoples in southeast Europe. Specifically, she writes, “Whether they were adopted from the Hungarians or not, the ‘Hungarian sabers’ quickly became a favorite weapon of tenth-century warriors in Southeastern Europe.” In the case of the “Oriental-type” sabers, see figs. 130-131 below, (from Pálóczi-Horváth, 1989, figs. 7, 11), which are contextualized alongside finds attributed to the Pečenegs.


188 For example, Hildinger, 1997, 84; and Bowlus, 2006, 164.

189 Curta, 2006a, Southeastern Europe in the Middle Ages: 500-1250, 190-191, outlines that such burial finds have come to be seen as “horseman burials,” although they are relatively confined between the Danube and the Sava rivers. Other contemporaneous populations south of the Danube “suggest the
example, a “craniometric study,” complete with authoritative charts, graphs and tables displaying ethnic differences based on the differing dimensions of crania, purports to expose the truth about the ethnic Hungarians’ racial “type” of conquest at the turn of the 10th century. The assumption was that the comparison of skull dimensions would unequivocally reveal a clear discontinuity between the populations of the Carpathian Basin before and after the “conquest.” Such a study, therefore, should divulge a clear indication of essential Hungarian homogeneity stretching back long before the “conquest.” Another study of stress markers on skeletons dating from the conquest period, this time thought to signify ethnic Magyars based on their presumed exclusive use of a compound bow, once again with authoritative charts, graphs and tables, purported to trace Magyars based on such anthropological data based on the same assumption, that Hungarian ethnicity is somehow timeless and that such primordial communities of ethnically pure mounted archers would be on clear display in an archaeological study.

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190 See for example the classic work of craniometry: Ripley, 1899, *The Races of Europe: A Sociological Study* and the revised edition right before WWII by Coon, 1939, *The Races of Europe, the White Race and the New World*. For a further illumination of this methodology, see de Lapouge, 1899, *L’Arven: son Rôle Social*, a leading eugenicist of the era. On craniometry in general, even Zhivkov, 2015, 254, recognizes that “this indicator is not decisive for the ethnicity of the buried.”

191 Holló et al., 2008, “History of the Peoples of the Great Hungarian Plain in the First Millennium: a Craniometric Point of View,” 655-667. Seeking to apologize for the imagined terror of the Hungarian (and earlier Hun) “conquests,” the authors preferred to compare their version of it to their version of the Avar “conquest”:

> “Although the Huns and the Hungarians left bad impressions on European peoples’ collective memory for their pillaging incursions against Europe, it could be argued that perhaps the Avars were much more terrifying and radical conquerors than the Huns or Hungarians” (p. 664).

Such a remark may give pause to wonder how it could be published in a peer-reviewed academic journal.

192 Tihanyi et al., 2015, “Investigation of Hungarian Conquest Period (10th c. AD) Archery on the Basis of Activity-Induced Stress Markers on the Skeleton,” 65-77. The authors conclude their study (p. 75) remarking:

> “The complex investigation of Hungarian Conquest Period archers [sic] gives us the chance not just to identify them, but to get closer to the technical questions of the usual movements of archery. At the current level of the investigation we can identify the archers on the basis of the archaeological context and the activity-induced skeletal markers, but further investigation of the Hungarian Conquest Period material is necessary for a better understanding of bioarchaeology of archery [sic].”

The authors decline to indicate how they separate Magyars from Pečenegs or Cumans/Poloveč in this regard.
When it comes to funerary archaeology, we can once again see similar interpretations regarding the seeming immutability of Hungarians’ and subject populations’ ethnicities.\(^\text{193}\) There is always a preoccupation with the ethnicity of the dead as a whole rather than a discussion of the self-categorization of the dead individually or larger regional contexts, regardless of their imagined “ethnicity.”\(^\text{194}\)

For example, one study proposes to separate “conquest-era” cemeteries in the Carpathian Basin into three types: solitary graves, cemeteries without overtly religious structures and churchyards. Then, with these classifications, ethnic groups of either Avars or Hungarians can be discerned based, once again, on toponymic and typological speculation.\(^\text{195}\) Another study proposed to identify Muslim or Jewish burials based on a lack of pig bones and burial orientation. Evidently such aspects should isolate such a cemetery significantly from surrounding communities and this too has been thrown into doubt,\(^\text{196}\) which is not so different from other burial interpretations from Soviet and post-Soviet archaeological interpretations of Khazarian “ethnic” groupings.\(^\text{197}\) But separating pagan cemeteries from Christian cemeteries cannot be based exclusively on their respective proximities to subsequently built churches.\(^\text{198}\) This is not to say that pagan and Christian populations cannot be identified by all aspects of funerary archaeology however, especially in regard to

\(^{193}\) Hofer, 1996, 301, discusses the false dichotomy of 19\textsuperscript{th} and early-20\textsuperscript{th}-century culture-history Hungarian ethnographic theorists who assumed that the “true” Hungarian ethnicity was carried by the “folk” culture, as opposed to the elites. However, this has not stopped some Hungarian archaeologists from typologizing the funerary artifacts of so-called “commoners’” conquest-era cemeteries. See for example Révész, 2003, “The Cemeteries of the Conquest Period,” 338-343.


\(^{195}\) Horváth, 2013, 331-338.


orientation and the placement of the deceased, only that material-typological evidence alone is insufficient.

Ergo, separating pagans, Christians, Muslims and Jews based exclusively on typological distinctions from burial finds is inherently problematic since our assumptions of various ethnic groups ultimately derive from primary sources, leading our analysis to begin with conclusions and search for evidence afterward. Niculescu notes the dangers of assuming a given ethnicity based exclusively on burial rites and accompanying goods. This should be negligibly different for ethnic “Hungarians,” compared to his example on ethnic “Langobards.”

From there, the tendencies for ever more speculative theorizing abound. There are, for instance, numerous popularized archaeological works, which seek to trace a homogenous population of ancient ethnic Hungarians for a broader audience, both modern Hungarian and more Western. Publications such as Between East and West and A honfoglalók viselete (The Attire of the Conquering Hungarians) laudably contribute to public appreciation of archaeology, but in the case of Hungarian archaeology, is frequently misleading by

199 Pálócz-Horváth, 1989, 19. He writes:

“Archaeological study of nomad relics of the Early Middle Ages is generally able to establish the historical period to which any given grave find should be assigned on the basis of typological and chronological sequences of artefact types and burial customs, but it has been less successful in bringing ethnic considerations into distinguishing between finds.”

200 Laszlovzsky, 1991, 45.

201 Niculescu, 2011, 9. This still does not stop researchers such as Kulehov, 2016, “The Book of Ibn Fadlan: Literary Monument and Historical Source,” from making blanket assumptions of ethnicity based archaeological typologies. See also for example the assumptions of primordial ethnicity of the so-called Iasians and Bulgars based on 5-8th-c. funeral assemblages made by Bubenok, 1997, 17-20. According to Zhivkov, 2015, 27:

“He bases his assertion on the pit burials, which were widespread before the Huns came to Eastern Europe [...] There is no reason for this ethnic whole to bear the names Yases or Alans during the Early Middle Ages. The problem [...] is much more complex and cannot be bound to only one ethnic group such as the Alans.”


204 Sudár and Petkes (eds.), 2015, A honfoglalók viselete.

205 Takács, 2014, “Review of: The Attire of the Conquering Hungarians,” 1-3. She also believes a major purpose of the publication (A honfoglalók viselete), was to establish certain new doctrinal orthodoxy,
furthering the founding mythology of the “conquest” and the assumption of the homogeneity of the 9-10th-c. “Magyars.” Similarly, runic writing attributed to alleged ancient Magyars themselves has been used by nationalist amateurs assuming some sort of primordial ethnolinguistic homogeneity, even though such “Turkic” runes are known by scholars to have been carried all over the steppe “from Mongolia to Hungary.” As for the so-called “Qabar revolution,” the multifarious conjectural theories of which we have already discussed, it is based on foggy clues about the ethnic “Turks” (Magyars) from the DAI, as are the lands of Etielköz and Levedia, and relies on little more than material-typological, toponymic and linguistic evidence to accompany it, which only serve to substantiate a pre-formed conclusion.

Yet some archaeologists still insist that any theoretical dissociation from previous assumptions of homogeneous ethnicity and presumed linguistic communities are unnecessary. This may explain why some archaeologists still presume that ethnic groups can be outlined within the Carpathian Basin before and after the “conquest,” a belief reinforced using toponymic (i.e., linguistic) evidence. The Bjelo-Brdo culture, for example, has been theorized to contain all ethnic population elements of the “pre-conquest” period, almost as though the SMC was imagined to have composed all the ethnic population elements of Khazaria. Then, artifacts revealed from excavated cemeteries were assigned either to the Bjelo-Brdo culture, or to the “conquest,” the material culture of which would undoubtedly fit replacing outdated speculations about the true locations of the lands of Etielköz and Levedia with new ones. See above n125.

208 See for example Bartha, 1975, 62-64. He argues, as does much other outdated and discredited scholarship, that the Qabars revolted against Khazaria’s adoption of Judaism and joined with the Hungarians in the late-8th century. See also Erdélyi, 1983, “Кабары (Кавары) в Карпатском Бассейне,” 174-181; Le Calloc’h, 2013, Des Asiatiques en Hongrie: Khazars, Kabars et Alains; and Györfy, 1988, 111, who believes this episode is preserved in the GH.
209 See above chapter 2, §1.2.1.2.
210 Berend, 2001, 68, has for example, pointed out the familiar problems of relying exclusively on linguistic evidence to make pre-formed conclusions. The same problems have arisen, for example, in modern scholarship which has sought to distinguish ethnic differences between “Græci” and “Italii” in 7-11th-c. southern Italy, which has been considerably overturned by dell’Acqua, 2017, “What about Greek(s) in Eighth- and Ninth-Century Italy?”
211 Tóth, 2014, 135-146. Bökényi, 1993, “Recent Developments in Hungarian Archaeology,” 144-145, writes: “Shifts in ideological emphasis have not been necessary because Hungarian archaeologists had not undertaken any serious ideological ventures.” See also Türk, 2012, 1-2, who also claims that after 1990, Hungarian archaeology had become “marginal.”
212 See above n156 and chapter 2 §1.2.2.
into “steppe” prototypes. Such studies still carry the distinct impression of “imagined communities,” especially when, according to Berend, linguistic and toponymic evidence alone is hardly “a reliable indicator of ‘ethnic’ status in the period.” There is also a growing amount of scholarship seeking to contradict earlier works, which portrayed the Magyars as essentially homogeneous victors over the supposedly homogeneous Slavic Moravians. Newer scholarship proposes instead fluidity and “peaceful integration of the two peoples.” It is rather evident that even such conclusions, though surpassing outmoded theories, still shed more light on modern events (read, EU integration) than on ancient ones.

This is not to say whether there is a well-defined chasm separating ethno-nationalist hypothesizing from less ideological theorizing. Instead, all archaeological theory, as it has been propounded by Ghengheia, is politically and ideologically charged no matter who is either digging or writing. In other words, the problem is not the finding, the inventorying or the cataloguing of the material evidence of the so-called “conquest,” but rather what questions we are asking of the material.

The whole problem is predicated on the assumption of an indispensably original ethno-linguistic homogeneity (“ursprache/urvolk”), an urheimat to accompany it, a belief in either ethno-linguistic, toponymic or typological evidence for ultimate substantiation, and finally, an essentialist reading of works such as the DAI and the GH. It is unfortunate to dismiss such speculation, but for our purposes, if we are to contextualize a pre-monotheistic

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214 Anderson, 1991. See also for example, Boba, 1967, 68.
217 Langó, 2013, “Relations between the Carpathian Basin and South East Europe during the 10th Century,” 327. There is still, however, an automatic assumption of definitive 10th-century “borders” of the kingdom of Hungary. See p. 321.
218 Krekovič, 2007, 65. He writes:

“This promotion of nationalism is not the problem, but rather an ethnocentric interpretation of history. Every nation interprets history according to its own needs and as a result it is difficult to write an absolutely objective history. However, ethnocentric and nationalistic interpretations should be refuted.”

219 Ghenghea, 2013, 179. Such archaeological discourse-on-discourse-on-theory, or perhaps meta-discourse, it seems, has become standard practice, as opposed to the previous theories and methods of earlier schools such as processualism, structuralism, functionalism, annales, longue-durée, post-processualism, et al.
landscape, whether its inhabitants later adopt Eastern (Rus’) or Western (Magyars) Christianity, Islam (Volga Bulgars) or Judaism (Khazars), until they have done so, we cannot make arbitrary assumptions about their identities. Thus, even though Sinor apologizes for “producing a mainly negative work,” even by the standards of 1950s scholarship, we can at least regard it as a positive development. Even Boba recognized, already in 1967, modern Hungarian nationhood is as disconnected from ancient references to peoples known as “Magyars,” as modern French nationhood is disconnected from ancient references to “Franks.” We cannot purport to be scholars when we begin with a conclusion, namely that a given ethnicity had always existed, and search for evidence to support it afterwards.

Instead of attempting to prove primordial Hungarian ethnicity, several recent studies have sought to ask a different question of the archaeological material: can we chart the 10-11th-c. process of monotheization in the Carpathian Basin? Unfastened, though certainly not oblivious to textual sources, we may instead attempt to chart Christianization, or rather any sort of monotheization, in the archaeological record of the Carpathian Basin during the ninth and tenth centuries, as we have done with Judaism in Khazaria and Islam in Volga Bulgaria.

There have been some archaeological indicators of demographic discontinuity in the time and space in question, quite apart from “craniometric studies.” In another study of skulls, though in accordance with the skull trephination we have discussed in the previous chapter, one scientist, Tamas Grynaeus, has found that the rate of skull trephination on skeletons (fig. 108) dated to the era of Christianization (ca. the turn of the 11th c.) decreased both before and after the traditional date of the coronation of king St. Stephen I of Hungary.

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220 Sinor, 1958, 540.
221 Boba, 1967, 74-76.
222 Niculescu, 2011, 10-14. See also Hofer, 1996, “Ethnography and Hungarian Prehistory,” 302, who writes:

“Even if one can posit the existence of a chain of traditions reaching into the ancient past within a background of certain cultural characteristics, a close examination of the past of ‘cultural elements’ will not reveal a trajectory associated with a given ethnic group but rather a complex, far-reaching network of predecessors.”

223 For a good overview, see Berend, Urbańczyk and Wiszewski, 2013, Central Europe in the High Middle Ages: Bohemia, Hungary and Poland, c.900- c.1300, 125-138.
224 See above chapter 2 on Khazaria, p. 72-73.
(ca. 25 December, 1000 – 1 January, 1001 CE\textsuperscript{225}) despite an underlying assumption of continuous pre-Christianized Hungarian ethnicity.\textsuperscript{226} In this way, the study adds context to what Rešetova convincingly argued was a broad feature of much of nomadic paganism, surpassing assumptions of primordial ethnicity,\textsuperscript{227} especially given that skull trephination is all but unheard of in pre-9\textsuperscript{th} century populations of the Carpathian Basin.\textsuperscript{228}

In another study, this time on tooth decay in the 9-10\textsuperscript{th}-century dated populations, despite the authors’ assumptions that the “conquering Hungarians” shared in a continuous ethnic peoplehood and were automatically higher-class compared to pre-conquest populations, once again, assumedly those they “conquered,” (involving assumptions of a 9-10\textsuperscript{th}-c. “class system”), the authors nevertheless convincingly demonstrate a slight increase in rates of tooth decay between those on either chronological side of the implicit “conquest.”\textsuperscript{229} The evidence overlaps with Arnold et al.’s study on tooth wear in populations corresponding to the SMC\textsuperscript{230} regarding a preponderantly agricultural diet versus a mostly carnivorous diet.\textsuperscript{231} Broadly speaking, we find that in comparing these two dental studies, the populations on both sides of the Carpathian Basin have as much in common after the “Hungarian conquest” as before it.

Finally, other archaeologists have proposed that instead of an archaeological distinction based on an assumption of a so-called “conquest,” we should instead look to pagan-Christian change via funerary finds.\textsuperscript{232} For example, finds of coins of Stephen I (fig. 109) in 10-11\textsuperscript{th}-century-dated graves in modern eastern Hungary are clear indications of some sort of Christianization. Broadly speaking however, such archaeological evidence of pagan-Christian change has still proven elusive due to the problems identifying an early Christianity in the absence of clear markers of Christianity such as finds of crosses or other Christian

\textsuperscript{226} Grynaeus, 1999, “Skull Trephination in the Carpathian Basin (8th-13th Century AD)” 131-140.
\textsuperscript{228} For an illustration of 10\textsuperscript{th}-c. cases of both male and female skull trephination in the Carpathian Basin, see Fodor, Wolf and Nepper (eds.), 1996b, The Ancient Hungarians, 294; and fig. 108.
\textsuperscript{229} Maczel, et al., 1997, “Dental Disease in the Hungarian Conquest Period,” 457-468.
\textsuperscript{231} See above chapter 2 §1.2.2.2.
\textsuperscript{232} János, et al., 2014, “Pagan-Christian Change in Northeasten Hungary in the 10\textsuperscript{th}-13\textsuperscript{th} Centuries AD — a Palaeodemographic Aspect,” 305-317.
material culture or a proximity to a contemporary ecclesiastical establishment. According to the Hungarian archaeologists Fodor, Wolf and Nepper, the majority of reliquary crosses, Christian coinage (Byzantine, Frankish and otherwise) and other undoubtedly Christian motifs which have been found and date to the conquest period, also do not necessarily “indicate that the deceased was a convert to Christianity.”

Nevertheless, János, Szathmáry and Hüse have found evidence of the increase of the average life-span, indicating what they term a “growth in the living-standard from the 10th century to the 13th century AD, as well as calculable ingestion connected with the spread of a settled way of life.” This then, corroborates similar findings regarding sedentarization from both the cases of Volga Bulgaria and Khazaria in the periods of their respective monotheizations. According to Laszlovszky, the so-called “conquest” was only a conquering minority, in which subject populations were eventually subsumed into what would only much later become a kingdom in a loose sense, and later still, the kingdom of Hungary.

Evidence of Christianity would become the archaeological indicator of the identity of a given population, even if it coexisted with contemporaneous indications of paganism among other populations. Consequently, as János, Szathmáry and Hüse claim, Christianity existed among the elites by the turn of the 11th century and only much later did the process of Christianization become detectable among subject populations. Though 9-10th-c. finds of reliquary crosses, Christian coins and other Christian motifs in funerary contexts are difficult to conclusively indicate top-down Christianization at that time, I believe their analysis transcends the worn-out dogma of presumed ethnic dichotomies based on typological evidence.

Pertaining to observably distinct groups in the Carpathian Basin during the period in question, evidence of confessional affiliation clearly points toward the beginnings of actual

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234 Ibid, 305.
235 Ibid, 310.
differences between populations. Numerous studies have been done, mostly using textual sources, on Muslim groups in Transcarpathia. In particular, Muslim sources have been among the most useful for many aspects pertaining to the Magyars. For example, the historian Erdal Çoban claims “the interest of Muslim writers in Hungarians continued in a more objective way than the western sources,” which may prove a controversial assertion out of context. He uses sources such as al-Garnatī, a generally reliable source, to argue that there were definitively Muslim groups, which existed amongst the Magyars on either side of the turn of the 9th century. While this may be a reasonable assertion, he does rely considerably on toponymic arguments made by previous historians, especially in regard to the so-called “Chwalisians,” a group which is mentioned by al-Garnatī. Many such toponymic-based arguments regarding presumed ancient ethnicities amount to yet more conjecture, as is the assumption of the essential Islamic identity of all “Eastern groups” migrating into the Carpathian Basin after the “Hungarian conquest,” without any definitive proof. In contrast, the historian Katerina Štulrajterová points to differences among Islamic groups, notably their diversity amongst the already mixed population of the region.

Finally, as previously discussed, András Pálóczi-Horváth’s Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians demonstrates that although the “Eastern find types” do point to an archaeologically attestable 9-10th-c. demographic shift in the Carpathian Basin, they do not definitively attest to a sole Magyar ethnic group, and are found alongside many other find-types in the

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237 Szathmáry, 2000, “Observations on Anthropological Research Concerning the Period of Hungarian Conquest and the Arpadian Age,” 98-99. Despite this author’s overt interest in many other craniological studies of allegedly ancient “ethnic Magyars,” he does present a relatively comprehensive analysis of a large portion of the total research done on both “conquest-era” and “Christianization-era” populations.

238 By Transcarpathia, I refer roughly to the Zakarpattia Oblast’ of present-day Ukraine, but also to the Maramureș region of northern Transylvania, eastern Slovakia and Hungary. The major work regarding Muslim sources on the early Magyars has been treated by Zimonyi, 2003, Muszlim Források a honfoglalás előtti magyarorokról: a Ğayhānī-hagyomány magyar fejezete. For a variety of sources, Muslim and otherwise, relating to Magyar early history, see Makk, 2012, Von mythischen vogel turul bis zum doppelkreuz, 51-81.


244 Štulrajterová, 2012, “Convivenza, Convenienza and Conversion: Islam in Medieval Hungary (1000–1400 CE),” 177-178. Despite her points of contention with several of Berend’s previous claims (191 n52), and the latter’s counterpoints (Berend, 2014, 202, n6.), both agree that a largely urbanized Muslim community existed in the Hungarian kingdom during and certainly after the time of Stephen I well into the 13th century and later, despite largely being assimilated by the 15-16th centuries.
Carpathian Basin,245 which ought to dispel modern archaeologists’ preoccupation with ethnic “culture-history.” He has also given inspiration to Langó’s argument that the 895 “conquest” was “just one point in the process that stretched over a long period of time, rather than the conclusion of the series of episodes as traditional national thought would have it.”246 If Pálóczi-Horváth and Langó have demonstrated the essential heterogeneity of the pre-Christianized populations of the Carpathian Basin and their eventual assimilation into the Hungarian kingdom, we are left with one last recourse as to the primary vehicle of Hungarian ethnic identity, Christianity.

There was never any homogeneity in terms of Magyar “ethnicity” before Christianization and “ethnically pure” Magyars were never ethnically pure. While there was certainly a ruling elite like anywhere else, and subjects spoke many different tongues, ethnicity was never a concern until quite recently247 and pre-monotheistic ethnicity can never successfully be equated with linguistic groupings.248 After all, languages can be both learned and forgotten over time and in the course of the passing of generations.

Ch. 4 2.1.2 From Magyars to Hungarians

2.1.2.1 Christianization, sedentarization, centralization, literization

Having attempted to dispel the myth of essential ethno-linguistic homogeneity stretching back millennia, we arrive at a point not so dissimilar from the point of monotheization among the Khazars249 and Volga Bulgars,250 that is, conversion, sedentarization, centralization and literization, or in essence, the creation of a top-down political formation. Recapitulated according to Bowlus, “following their defeat in 955

246 Langó, 2015, “Review of: A. P. Horváth, Peoples of Eastern Origin in Medieval Hungary: the Cultural Heritage of Pechenegs, Uzes, Cumans and the Jász,” 1. Such an argument is supported by its own array of archaeological artifacts, such as the multitude of horse-and-rider amulet finds, long before and long after the “conquest,” which suggest, as Postiča and Tentiucargue, ultimate demographic continuity in Transcarpathia before and after the “conquest.” See for example Postiča and Tentiuc, 2014, “Amulete-calareti de bronz din perioada medievală timpurie în spațiul carpato-nistrean,” 45-72.
247 Krekovič, 2007, 62. He writes: “[…] the inhabitants (with the Magyars forming the ruling layer) were termed Hungarians (natio Hungarica), in ethnic reality they were Magyars, Slavs (later Slovaks), Croats, Germans, Rumanians and so on. The Hungarian Kingdom was not organized ethnically (nor was any other medieval state) and this situation was common until the 18th century.”
248 Ibid, 63-64.
249 See above ch. 2, passim.
250 See above §1.1.
[Lechfeld] the Magyars settled down, converted to Christianity and became fully integrated into western Christendom.” 251 In this summary, I endeavor to gather some, though certainly not all of the best Hungarian archaeological synopses into a coherent conceptualization of the Magyar arrival and Christianization, detached from nationalist mythology, and in keeping with the rest of the research, contextualized along with the case studies of Volga Bulgaria, Khazaria, the Pečenegs and the Rus’. 252

To begin with, Hungarian settlement-archaeology has played a significant role in demonstrating the process of sedentarization and urbanization in the 9-11th-c. Carpathian Basin. While there are no shortages of neolithic, copper, bronze and iron age studies that have been performed for the sake of diachronic settlement analyses and habitation patterns on the Carpathian Basin, most focus on very early periods and extend only up to Roman Pannonia. Unfortunately, despite claims of diachronic focuses, there are far fewer studies which concentrate on the 9-11th centuries, despite enduring archaeological interests in settlement patterns in earlier periods and prevailing ethnolinguistic interests for this period. Whether this is due to archaeologists’ preoccupations with ethnicities, especially regarding funerary archaeology, during the later period is not for me to say, but in fact, it has even been acknowledged that 10-11th-c. settlement-archaeology was neglected because of earlier assumptions of concurrent Magyar nomadism. 253 While the nomadist model is is no longer entirely believed, the 9-11th-c. settlement-archaeology of the Carpathian Basin still remains rather understudied compared with earlier epochs.

As for the settlement-archaeology of the 9-11th c., it is still unclear to what extent vestigial agriculture from the old high Roman period was practiced by the resident populations (whatever their supposed ethnicities) of the Carpathian Basin, but will probably not be able to tell us much about the integration of some tribal groups into others without deliberately imagining communities. For example, Hofer proposes to focus on the manifest effects of gradual sedentarization evident in the 11th century Hungarian archaeology instead

252 See the subsequent subsections below: §2.2 (Pečenegs) and §3.1 (Rus’).
253 Wolf, 2003, “10th–11th Century Settlements,” 326. She writes:

“The investigation of medieval settlements began much later than that of cemeteries. The recognition of 10th–11th century rural settlements for what they were was for a long time impeded by the prevailing historical view that the ancient Hungarians of the Conquest period were a nomadic people and that their oft-changing campsites could hardly have left a trace in the archaeological record.”
of assuming false dichotomies between ethnicities and social groups.\textsuperscript{254} Hellebrandt insinuates that the pre-conquest populations (who she terms “Celts”) must have been farmers due a low number of warrior graves and the presence of spindle whorls in synchronously dated finds.\textsuperscript{255} But this neither proves nor disproves full-fledged sedentarization and agricultural practice. By the 10\textsuperscript{th} century specifically, Vágner attests to the relatively widespread use of subsistence kilns for small-scale ceramic production in rural settlements,\textsuperscript{256} which would then seem to imply a tendency for subsistence agriculture, since Wolf refers specifically to the storage of grain in ceramic vessels.\textsuperscript{257} Other archaeologists such as Fodor have assumed that the Magyars were already agriculturalists long before their 895 arrival in the Carpathian Basin,\textsuperscript{258} while still others such as Róna-Tas have stressed a more nuanced view. Róna-Tas infers that populations of so-called Magyars and other peoples before and slightly after the conquest practiced a variety of economic lifestyles, from settled agriculturalists to semi-nomadic horticulturalists and pastoralists all the way to full nomads.\textsuperscript{259} It may not be surprising to note that much scholarship, for example, Engel specifically, is still far more concerned with distinguishing the ethnic affiliation of various 9-11\textsuperscript{th}-c. settlements, and based exclusively on toponymies, rather than on considering the cumulative archaeological data of the settlements themselves.\textsuperscript{260} So while it may yet be difficult to postulate the precise degree of urbanization within the Carpathian Basin during the 10\textsuperscript{th} century, it may be more helpful, instead of reasoning backwards,\textsuperscript{261} to reason laterally from what we already understand about the process of monotheization for Volga Bulgaria and Khazaria.

As in the sedentarization of previously nomadic steppe peoples via yurt and wattle-and-daub house-framing in Khazaria,\textsuperscript{262} such yurt and wattle-and-daub housing is archaeologically quite common in the Carpathian Basin dating to the 9-11\textsuperscript{th} centuries.\textsuperscript{263}

\textsuperscript{254} Hofer, 1996, 303.
\textsuperscript{255} Hellebrandt, 1999, 102, 235.
\textsuperscript{256} Vágner, 2002, “Medieval Pottery Kilns in the Carpathian Basin,” 337.
\textsuperscript{257} Wolf, 2003, 327-328.
\textsuperscript{258} Fodor, 1992, \textit{A magyarság születése}, 106-111; and idem, 2002, 18-26.
\textsuperscript{261} Berend, 2001, 22: “To argue ‘backwards’ from modern developments is always a temptation […] moreover, political reasons often influence interpretations of the past.”
\textsuperscript{262} See above chapter 2 §2.1.2.2.
\textsuperscript{263} Wolf, 2003, 326-327.
While some pre-conquest (8-9th-c.) hillforts, exhibiting wattle-and-daub housing, in Central Europe have been attributed as “Slavic” (fig. 114), it still remains uncertain whether they can be characterized as demonstrating the spread of urbanization. Palynological research in the Carpathian Basin has shown that from the early 9th-c. onward, the increase of cereal pollen and the decrease of tree pollen suggests forest clearances and the growth of agriculture. In other words, it seems there is in fact evidence for some sedentarization in the Carpathian Basin in the 9-10th c.

But some researchers draw a distinction between the gradual spread of agriculture and sedentarization and urbanization attested via fortification. For example, Wolf has affirmed that it was only by the 11th century that semi-urbanized fortification is attestable in the Carpathian Basin, which he associates with Christianization and Stephen I. Contextualized alongside the spatial centralization of power in Volga Bulgaria (Biliar, Bolgar, et al. – above n44-47) and Khazaria (Itīl’ – above ch. 2 §2.2), after top-down monotheizations, Stephen’s priority for Christianization is evident for his centralization efforts in the early-11th century. While Esztergom is a case apart, where 3rd-c. Roman coins have been found, attesting to at least a much older semi-urbanized settlement, according to Engel, Stephen’s decision to establish his capital at Esztergom after his coronation there is evidenced by the fact that it became the see of the Latin archbishop of Hungary. Similarly, his adoption of Latin Christianity, and with it the Latin alphabet and jurisprudence, signifies his adoption of Western Christian literization. This is most easily demonstrated by Latin hagiographical works produced concurrently such as the bishop of Hartvic’s The Life of King Stephen of

264 Biermann, 2016, “North-Western Slavic Strongholds of the 8th-10th Centuries AD,” 85-94.
265 Herold, 2016, 117-120.
266 Wolf, 2003, “Earthen Forts,” 330. She writes,

“The archaeological and historical record does not support the claims that stone forts or castles had been built in the 10th century. Neither the expansive policy of the Hungarian princes in the 10th century, nor the lifeways, the social and economic institutions of the ancient Hungarians called for the construction of earthen forts in this period. In fact, there is little evidence for similar constructions in contemporary Europe. The construction of timber and earth forts in Europe can in part be seen as a response to the Hungarian and Norman raids. There is evidence that the construction of forts and castles only began in the 11th century. These forts and castles show a remarkable uniformity in terms of their construction technique. Their distribution too shows a consistent pattern, suggesting that their building may be associated with the political power of the medieval Hungarian state created by King St. Stephen and that they functioned as the seats of the counties created by King St. Stephen.”

268 Engel, 2001, 40-44.
Hungary. In short, as argued by Urbańczyk, it was top-down political centralization which enabled large-scale urbanization, not the other way around.

Returning to the issue of ethnicity, while the precise ethnic delineations of the “peoples” who inhabited the Carpathian Basin in the 10th century may be ultimately inaccessible to us without imagining communities, according to Róna-Tas, we may perhaps infer based on their later assimilation into Christian Hungary. However, Róna-Tas’ research, like most national-minded historiography, attributes this assimilation to a linguistic phenomenon, still strictly adhering to an ethno-linguistic determinant model and “urheimat.” As previously discussed, such fundamental assumptions not only drastically separates the Hungarian case study from other case studies in which identities are based on the adoptions of various respective monotheisms (Khazaria-Judaism; Volga Bulgaria-Islam; Rus’-Orthodoxy), it also directly contradicts Berend’s, Macartney’s, Klaniczay’s and Bartlett’s points regarding Latin Christianity as the primary ethnic signifier for medieval Hungarian identity.

Nevertheless, I still believe Róna-Tas’ conception of later nomadic assimilation into Christian Hungary is reasonable. Such nomads, (many of them labelled as Pečenegs by scholars such as Pálóczi-Horváth), who did Christianize and assimilate have disappeared from the textual record after the 11th century, indicating that they ceased to exist as an identifiably independent group within the domain of the Hungarian kings. By the 11-12th centuries, well after the age of Stephen, when the Cuman presence in Hungary had come to dominate the relations between nomads and settled peoples, we can see that Christianity was the defining factor for sedentarism. For example, Kosztolnyik elaborates on Berend’s point that the Cuman presence in post- Stephen (as opposed to completely Christian) Hungary, led to strife between the nomadic pagans and the sedentary Christians. Then again, Karp asserts that although Berend’s analysis of the assimilation of pagan Cumans into Christendom can partially explain the basis of Hungarian identity, that is, Christian identity, it cannot explain the ability of Jews to maintain their identity isolated from the normatively

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271 Róna-Tas, 1999, 385. For Berend’s, Macartney’s, Klaniczay’s and Bartlett’s points regarding Latin Christianity as the primary ethnic signifier for medieval Hungarian identity, see below 276-278.
Christian Hungarian kingdom. The same has been either said or insinuated over time for many other non-Christian groups. The very fact that Christianity was the defining and assimilating factor of the later populations of the kingdom should serve to put itself in the context of other early political formations.

In much the same way, we have found similar circumstances of the various peoples who came to compose the population of Volga Bulgaria: Islam united them into one peoplehood. For example, Gábor Klaniczay and Robert Bartlett are two of the most primary promoters of this trans-Eurasian synchronously contextual reasoning regarding conversion and top-down political formations in the case of Hungary and elsewhere. Finally, perhaps the most influential scholar advocating this idea that Hungarian identity was not some innate ethnicity attached to a linguistic group, but in fact predicated on Latin Christianity is none other than Nora Berend herself. For the case of Hungary, to insinuate, as Macartney has done, that the nation existed before Christianization would be foolish. Rather, Christianity laid the administrative groundwork that only many centuries later created the nation.

Ch. 4 2.2 The eight themata of Patzinakia

Having offered a broad, if necessarily brief, discussion of the archaeological evidence of the Magyar “conquest” alongside Stephen’s Christianization efforts, we arrive at the case of the Pečenegs themselves, who according to our textual sources, expelled the Magyars from

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275 Karp, 2004, “Review of: At the Gate of Christendom,” 444-445. He refers specifically to a notion he calls, “medieval Jewish exceptionalism,” although he declines to explain it, leaving its precise meaning to be defined by his audience.

276 Berend, 2001, 269. She writes:

“It seems that as long as Hungarian society remained ‘cellular’, that is, while a multitude of small corporate groups made up the fabric of society, non-Christians were not separated by their legal status from the rest of society. As the social structure crystallized into more homogeneous strata of nobles and peasants, the status of non-Christians became distinctive. […] They were a definite minority in a Christian kingdom, and their divergent paths of integration and survival point to the criteria of assimilation and/or its avoidance. Religious cohesion and a recognized communal status facilitated the survival of these groups, but they alone could not ensure the non-assimilation of the group. Both the preservation of continuous contact (via immigration and other means) with coreligionists and the structure of the non-Christian community were key factors. Isolation ultimately led to assimilation, however great the original difference was between the culture, language and religion of the minority and majority groups.”


278 Macartney, 1953, 109.
their previous lands. Since we have discussed much about the Magyars, despite how problematic it is to distinguish them from the Pečenegs and actually all non-monotheized nomadic steppe peoples, what do we know about the Pečenegs specifically, and what can we learn about them by examining their assigned archaeological material in light of the research on other contemporaneous peoples during the 9-10th centuries?

Outside of what we know from the DAI, namely that there were allegedly eight separate regions inhabited by those who may have called themselves Pečenegs, how can we interpret what Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos tells us in relation to studies done by archaeologists? Some scholars, such as Pálokci-Horváth,279 have modeled maps of the various dominions of each region, roughly corresponding to river frontiers running into the northern Black Sea littoral. While such reasoning may be convincing for a variety of reasons, there is little conclusive proof to ultimately settle the matter outside textual sources. This short section will seek to examine some of the latest research on the populations who may or may not have identified as Pečenegs, since what we know about them, from both textual sources such as the DAI and interpretations of archaeological evidence, is imperfect.

Ch. 4 2.2.1 Linguistics, social organization, tribute

From the tenth century, we know, mostly based on the DAI, the Hudūd al-ʿĀlam, ibn Fadlān and other textual sources such as the PVL, GH, and a variety of other Muslim geographical texts and Byzantine hagiographies, that the urbanized, sedentary populations of the Crimea and other settlements of the Pontic-Caspian civilizational area often interacted and exchanged with Pečenegs and frequently paid tribute to them. However, that would certainly not necessarily make them Pečenegs themselves. In an effort to demarcate Pečenegs from non-Pečenegs based on the assumptions of modern historians and archaeologists, we will briefly discuss some aspects of Pečeneg linguistics, social organization and tribute collection in reference to their research and theories before taking a broader perspective on the question of Pečeneg ethnicity, identity and assimilation into other groups between the 9-11th centuries.

2.2.1.1 Some remarks on Pečeneg linguistics

As for isolating the group of so-called Pečenegs, this has been proposed based primarily on linguistic studies. Most linguistic and textual studies of the Pečenegs have concluded they were originally a Turkic-speaking people inhabiting the region of the Syr Darya in the 8th century due to the records of a litany of contemporary Muslim geographers. Baskakov concluded, for example, corroborated from information given by al-Kāšgarī, writing in the early 1070s, that the language was amongst the sub-branches of the Oğuz. Vörös concluded further that the language was a member of the North Qıpçaq variant. But such sub-group classification proves highly speculative based on the meager scraps of detail from Constantine VII and restored evidence based on onomastics and toponymics, despite speculative modeling of a restored phonetic arrangement. To be clear, the likelihood that the Pečenegs specifically can be associated with a distinct branch of spoken “Turkic” remains uncertain, although most scholars agree that the Pečenegs can generally be described as Turkic nomads.

Nevertheless, although the historical groupings which modern historians have classified as Pečenegs based on linguistics are reasonable, we also know that ethnicity was of course quite fluid, and tribal identity could not correspond with ethnicity as precisely as we might anachronistically prefer. Therefore, it would be risky to assume populations of

280 Golden, 2003, “Peoples and Cultures: Imperial Ideology and the Sources of Political Unity amongst the pre-Činggisid Nomads of Western Eurasia,” article I in Nomads and their Neighbours in the Russian Steppe, 63, asserts that the earliest textual sources referring to Pečenegs locate them to the region of the Syr Darya in the 8th century.
Pečenegs could not be easily absorbed into other populations of Oğuz, Cuman-Qipčaqs or other steppe tribal groups and vice versa, which they often were. Effectively, Pečeneg “peoplehood” would not necessarily be confined to their linguistic grouping, nor would Pečeneg tribal identities necessarily warrant some kind of ethnic “peoplehood” at all, as pre-Christian “Magyar” ethnicity has often brought historians to believe. That said, knowing that Pečenegs were primarily a nomadic Turkic “people,” can we make lateral inferences about their social organization based on contemporaneous Turkic nomadic groups of the steppe?

Ch. 4 2.2.1.2 Social organization

Like most nomadic steppe tribes of the era, the Pečenegs did not create a statehood or kingdom from their domains. In the 9-10th centuries, there is uncertainty about the constitution of the Pečenegs in reference to Khazaria mostly due to the *Hudūd al-ʿĀlam*, which is the only Muslim source to note a specific group of Pečenegs allegedly subsumed into Khazaria, the so-called “Khazar Pečenegs,” who, as Pritsak has argued, were separate from the “Turkic Pečenegs” precisely during this period. This, as Spinei has argued, was due to conflicting allegiances between Khazar allegiances and their erstwhile independence. However, we must be careful to avoid making hasty generalizations based on possibly flawed information in written sources. Whether various tribes and clans of Pečenegs were loyal to the Khazar khağans or not is ultimately most likely unprovable, although the *DAI* does hint, similar to the *Hudūd al-ʿĀlam*, that those Pečenegs that remained in the east among the Oğuz were actually different from those that ventured west toward the Black Sea.

287 Golden, 2003, 64. See also the discussion below in chapter 7 §1.1.1.1.
290 Spinei, 2003, 113. This is however substantially disputed by both Zhivkov, 2015, 128; and Howard-Johnston, 2007, 188-190.
291 Moravcsik and Jenkins (eds. and trans.), 2002, *DAI* §37, 168-169. Constantine VII writes:

“At the time when the Pechenegs were expelled from their country, some of them of their own will and personal decision stayed behind there and united with the so-called Uzes, and even to this day they live among them, and wear such distinguishing marks as separate them off and betray their origin and how it came about that they were split off from their own folk: for their tunics are short, reaching to the knee,
This then, implies a considerable degree of ambiguity about the extent and authority of centralized leadership among the Pečenegs. What is far more likely is a mixture of loyalties and allegiances amongst the Pečenegs based on ties of kinship and clan structure at the base, although the scholar Alexey Marey has sought to reconstruct a notionally more hierarchical socio-political structure for the Pečeneg tribes based on an assumption of their higher organization into chiefdoms. But this is difficult to prove, according to another scholar, Sergey Vasjutin, based solely on the DAI, which reports complete autonomous independence at the individual level, even while later implying a somewhat more hierarchical structure for “Patzinakia,” with megales archontes corresponding to each thema and elassō-archontes (lesser-rulers) for each of forty μέρη, or sub-partitions. The problem with the DAI in this case, however, is not only the uncertainty, which we may validly have, about Constantine VII’s sources for such information about the Pečenegs and their seemingly highly centralized social organization into themata and merē, archontes and elassō-archontes, but his clear tendency for applying these deeply hierarchical Byzantine political concepts to peoples who would neither recognize them nor may not have referred to themselves as Pečenegs not least indicated by the various endo-ethnonyms which Constantine VII relates. While he cites quite specific names and numbers of clans, tribes and regions, which we ought not reject, we also know that even the most seemingly centralized steppe peoples in the 9th-10th centuries were hardly centralized even as they interacted with sedentary political formations such as Christian Rome/Byzantium. In this regard, we may note that Constantine VII does not mention a singular Pečeneg ruler above the megales and their sleeves are cut off at the shoulder, whereby, you see, they indicate that they have been cut off from their own folk and those of their race.”

294 Vasjutin, 2003, “Typology of Pre-States and Statehood Systems of Nomads,” 59, criticizes Marey regarding his notion of a hierarchical structure for Pečeneg organization calling it, “conjecture-like and doubtful,” based on his own lateral comparisons of Pečenegs to other steppe tribes during the same era.
295 Moravcsik and Jenkins (eds. and trans.), 2002, DAI, §37, 166-167. Constantine VII writes: “The whole of Patzinakia is divided into eight provinces with the same number of princes [...] The eight provinces are divided into forty districts, and these have minor princelings over them.”
296 Moravcsik and Jenkins (eds. and trans.), 2002, DAI, §6, 52-53. Constantine VII writes: “For these Pechenegs are free men and, so to say, independent, and never perform any service without remuneration.”
297 See for example Dvornik, Jenkins, Lewis, Moravcsik, Obolensky and Runciman (eds.), 1962, Constantine Porphyrogenitus: De Administrando Imperio, Volume II, A Commentary, 145-146. See also the discussion below in chapter 5 §2.1.
archontes. For example, even the Selçuq Turks of the Qanglı-Oğuz branch,\textsuperscript{298} related to the Cuman-Qipčaqs or to the Pečenegs themselves,\textsuperscript{299} upon their invasion of Byzantine Anatolia even in the late 11th century, were highly decentralized and relied on indirect imperatives over local clans and tribes.\textsuperscript{300} Moreover, this was even after having subsumed practically the entirety of Ghaznavid Persia after the battle of Dandanqan in 1040 and the Caliphate in 1058.\textsuperscript{301} It would even be worth mentioning that by 1091, Selçuqs were contacting Pečenegs “in order to coordinate attacks for a final assault on Constantinople.”\textsuperscript{302} While we may examine a comparison with the Selçuq Turks, Vasjiutin also compares Pečeneg decentralization to that of the Cuman-Qipčaqs and Oğuz.\textsuperscript{303}

\textsuperscript{298} Leiser (trans.), 1988, \textit{A History of the Seljuks: İbrahim Kafesoğlu’s Interpretation and the Resulting Controversy}, 21-27. See also Golden, 1972, 58, 79. Zhivkov, 2015, 32-36 makes a similar connection regarding

“a mythical Turanian center Kangha (Kang). It brings memories of the times when Iran and Turan separated and when the Turanians were led by Afrasiab, later considered the founder of many of the steppe Iranian-speaking or Turkic-speaking tribes and peoples.”

He concludes that such a legendary common ancestry may be assigned to the so-called “Dzhetyasar culture” found in the vicinity of the Syr Darya River. He continues (p. 35):

“It is presumed that this ethnonym [Qangar] appeared in the fifth century […] and is a result of the Turkicization of the local Dzhetyasar population which the Pecheneg tribal union was based upon.”

However, earlier (p. 24), he sheds considerable doubt on other scholars’ amorphous use of terms such as “Turkicization,” quoting Vladimirov, 2005, \textit{Дунавска Булгария и Волжка България: формиране и промяна на културните модели VII-XI в.}, 42, who writes:

“the alleged Turkicization processes […] cannot be illustrated with specific archaeological evidence and thus exist in historiography only in the form of an a priori assumption.”

It is difficult from these excerpts to ascertain to what extent Zhivkov appears willing to rely on arbitrary assumptions of primordial ethnicity and to what extent he might prefer to reject them instead. For a more thorough discussion of Zhivkov’s ambiguity in this regard, see below chapter 7 §2.2.

\textsuperscript{299} Sinor, 1990, \textit{The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia}, 272. For example, the \textit{DAI} (§37, 170-171) relates: “The Pechenegs are also called ‘Kangar’, though not all of them.” See also Bekker and de Presle (eds.), 1853, \textit{Michaelis Attaliotae Historia}, 157; Harris, 2003, \textit{Byzantium and the Crusades}, 36; and Zhivkov, 2015, 134 n34. See also the discussion below in chapter 7 §1.1.1.

\textsuperscript{300} Klausner, \textit{The Seljuk Vezirate: A Study of Civil Administration}, 1055-1194, 9. She writes:

“One inherent weaknesses in the structure of Seljuk government seem apparent from the beginning. One of these is the tendency toward division and decentralization seen in the Turkish conception of leadership as vested in the entire family, in the extension and utilization of the military ‘fief’ system, and in the dependence upon this and other types of indirect administration throughout the different parts of the empire.”

\textsuperscript{301} Rice, 1961, \textit{The Seljuks in Asia Minor}, 29-31.

\textsuperscript{302} Curta, 2006a, 301.

In this regard, it is not difficult to reinterpret Constantine VII’s words regarding *themata* and *merē* ruled by various *archontes* and *elassō-archontes* within the Pečeneg realms. A similar point can even be made regarding the DAI’s representation of Khazaria.\(^{304}\) In light of most other nomadic steppe peoples, to compare Vasjutin’s argument for greater decentralization to Marey’s model of a high degree of centralization,\(^{305}\) while both scholars have relied on the DAI for support, a comparative analysis, particularly with the Cuman-Qıpčaqs,\(^{306}\) leads us to side with Vasjutin when he remarks that the Pečenegs were merely one of many decentralized steppe factions with rule conducted only locally by ties of kinship and “lineage-tribal structures.”\(^{307}\) Nevertheless, such attempts by Marey or Vasjutin to typologize, schematize or define various nomadic steppe peoples and empires after or against\(^{308}\) such theorists as Kradin,\(^{309}\) misses the dynamism of steppe existence,\(^{310}\) namely, that varying degrees of centralization and authority did coexist, but were never enshrined in permanently oriented towards war and conquest. They were not states at all.” See also the discussion below in chapter 7 §1.1.

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304 Zhivkov, 2015, 208-209.
305 Marey, 2000, 455-456. He writes, “We can infer that there, indeed, was a central headquarters, as the Pechenegs knew where they had to assemble […] We may presuppose then, that the major Pechenegian headquarters may still be found by archaeologists.”
307 Vasjutin, 2003, 59. Specifically, he writes,

> “Decentralized amorphous without a single polity in which autonomous territories are ruled by multiple chiefs who are heads of local lineage-tribal structures [sic]. Examples include the Pechenegs, Kypchaks (Polovetses) and the Oguz Turks. It was not possible for these nomadic societies, roaming from place to place in the steppe area between the Volga and the Danube, to leave marks of their presence on the region’s farming center (Byzantium, Kievan Rus’, German Empire, the Volga Bulgaria). For this reason the different ethnic segments of the pechenegs or Polovetses [sic] societies represented the periphery of neighboring farming centers and never formed unitary political structures.”

Golden, 2003, “Aspects of the Nomadic Factor in the Economic Development of Kievan Rus’,” article VII, 91 makes a similar point. See also the discussion given by Zhivkov, 2015, 132 in this regard.

309 Kradin, 1992, *Кочевье общества*, 168. Kradin argues that so-called “barbarian empires,” characterized by their lack of a form of state-monotheism, can be schematically separated into variants based on their social characteristics – such as barbarian nomadic empires, barbarian sedentary empires, et al., due to whether or not they display clearly institutionalized pyramidal social hierarchies.

> “Certain political units, such as the nomadic empires or the kingdoms of central Asia, have been ignored or marginalised because of their unclear, awkward (or in the nomad case, overschematised and thereby static) relationships with political institutions the continuity of which dominates the way historians periodise. More attention to these »marginal« entities would open the subject up to new layered and overlapping schemes of periodisation in parallel with the more familiar dynastic model.”
native literary traditions. As we have already discussed, centralization and literization are relatively linked to sedentarization, in turn linked to monotheization, which the Pečenegs did not embrace.\footnote{This is not to say that some individual Pečenegs did not embrace monotheism. We know that a mid-11th-c. Pečeneg warlord, Kegen, was baptized by a monk named Euthymios and had his followers baptized as well. See Mako, 2011b, Two Examples of Nomadic Conversion in Eastern Europe: the Christianization of the Pechenegs, and the Islamization of the Volga Bulghars (Tenth to Thirteenth Century A.D.), 36-44. For a list of studies on Kegen, both textual and sigillographic, see Curta, 2013a, 151 n42; and the brief discussion below, n321.} So, just as identity was certainly fluid among steppe peoples such as Pečenegs, political and social allegiance was as well. Despite the evidence of the DAI, we cannot be certain about the self-identification of those deemed as Pečenegs by Constantine VII. That said, perhaps one of the most primary indicators of political and social allegiance was a willingness to pay tribute to a local tribal chief, as we saw in the case of Khazaria (above ch. 2 §2.2.1.2).

Ch. 4 2.2.1.3 Tribute collection

Todorov highlights the significance of tribute collection for nomadic peoples, whether Cuman-Qipčaq, Pečeneg or Magyar, when he writes, “Defeating the neighbouring sedentary powers, bringing plunder and enforcing tribute were essential power-structuring factors for such polities.”\footnote{Todorov, 2010, 317. See also the careful discussion of Khazanov’s ideas in this regard, given by Zhivkov, 2015, 178-180.} While extortion may be too strong of a word, tribute collection between nomads and sedentary peoples was not only a measure of the success of tribal warlords, their entire economy was partially dependent on it\footnote{Khazanov, 2001, 1. Some scholars dispute this however. See for example Zhivkov, 2015, 132-133, who nevertheless sides with this interpretation: “the Pechenegs were largely dependent, due to the lack of an agricultural sector (their own or a subordinate one).”} and constant raiding or outright victory in war gave them the right to demand and collect tribute.\footnote{Todorov, 2010, 321.} Even as tribute gradually became tax for the tribes under Kievan rule after Christianization, on the steppe and Crimea, it was more a method of exchange rather than self-identification. For example, the commodities such as wax, honey, slaves and furs exchanged by the Pečenegs with the Chersōnites in return for luxury items such as silks, gold, salt and wines at times resembled trade and at other times, tribute,\footnote{Feldman, 2013, 104-105.} but it remains doubtful that most Chersōnites would have
identified as Pečenegs. So while tribute collection from sedentary peoples was usually imperative for nomads, it would be foolish to over-schematize such groups as either non-Pečeneg groups subjected to Pečenegs, or Pečenegs themselves.

Over time, tribute became tax, just as populations subject to tribute payment became subjects bound for taxing, regardless of any imagined ethno-linguistic affiliation. That said, among nomadic peoples themselves, whether we refer to them as Cuman-Qıpčaq, Pečeneg or Magyar, allegiance was manifested not as some notion of ethnic identity, but only to a local warlord due to his ability to deliver tribute from subject sedentary peoples.

Ch. 4 2.2.1.4 The refusal to sedentarize and to monotheize

Regarding Christian Rome/Byzantium as a proselytizing influence, for Michaël Attaleiatēs, who perhaps typified a Christian attitude towards the steppe peoples in general and the Pečenegs specifically, the tumultuous events of the 1030s-1050s regarding the Pečenegs’ occupation of the trans-Danube were manageable by spreading Christianity among the Pečenegs. While Christianization, sedentarization and assimilation were achieved for some individual Pečenegs, and such individuals usually assimilated into the surrounding Christian communities, it certainly was not successful for the broad majority of Pečenegs, as there truly was no single leader nor centralized hierarchy. Nevertheless, this has not stopped archaeologists from assuming that certain finds can be attributed to the Pečenegs (figs. 128-134).

316 For example, Madgearu, 2013, “The Pechenegs in the Byzantine Army,” 211, argues that the Pečenegs resembled Gothic foederati as unreliable allies, mercenaries and vassals, prone to fighting against the empire as soon as for it.
317 See the discussion above, chapter 1 §2.2.3.5.
Attempts to identify Pečenegs with archaeology, like similar attempts made to archaeologically ethnically identify Magyars, usually rely heavily on toponymic and typological evidence such as the assumption that leaf-shaped pendants typified specifically Pečeneg burials, or that clay cauldrons found in late-11th-c. occupation layers in Belgrade are typologically attested to belong specifically to Pečenegs as opposed to Oğuz, Cuman-Qıpčaqs, Magyars or other nomadic “ethnicities.” As we have already discussed, similar studies have been carried out linking typological material such as bows, arrowheads, sabers and harnesses directly to Magyars, as if such implements could not possibly be interchangeable with those we might otherwise identify as Oğuz, Cuman-Qıpčaqs or of course Pečenegs. Such studies are usually little different from the “culture-history” approach discussed above in their assumptions of diachronic ethnic continuity and

324 See above §2.2.1.2.
327 Marjanović-Vujović, 1974, “Archaeological proving the presence of the Pechenegs in Beograd Town,” 183-188.

“[…] археологические комплексы, условно определяемые как хазарские и печенежские, не всегда отражают этническую специфику […] и скорее выявляют хронологическую и географическую принадлежность культурных явлений.”

I have translated this as,

“[…] the archaeological complexes, conventionally defined as Khazar and Pecheneg, do not always reflect the ethnic specificity […] and they would rather reveal the chronological and geographical affiliation of cultural phenomena.”

329 See for example above n186-187; Horváth 2013, 336; and Róna-Tas, 1999, 358-360.
330 This is precisely the point made by Pohl, 2016, “Distant Peoples: Ibn Fadlan and the Ethnography of Eastern Europe.” For example, according to Zhivkov, 2015, 135 n42, 240, “the remains of the material culture, by which the presence of Pechenegs or Oğuz in the Khazar lands is estimated, are identical.” Nevertheless, this admission hardly stops him from categorically stating that “archaeological evidence of Pechenegs living in some Khazar cities indicates their ethnic presence there,” as in fact this is the very point Werbart, 1996 “Khazars or ‘Saltovo-Majaki Culture’? Prejudices about Archaeology and Ethnicity,” 199-221, argues against, and with which I would undoubtedly agree.
homogeneity and their attempts to assign typological finds and toponyms to one “ethnicity” or another.  

That said, while surrounding sedentary peoples’ identities were formed by monotheization, notably Hungarians, Volga Bulgars and Russians, Pečenegs ceased to exist eventually, having been subsumed into other steppe tribes or into sedentary populations. Therefore, the Pečenegs can be incorporated into the same context of top-down monotheization. While Christianization, imposed by Stephen I, created Hungary, Islamization, imposed by Almuş, Volga Bulgaria, in comparison, Judaization, represented by Joseph, which was not imposed on the sedentarized inhabitants of Khazaria, led to the disappearance of Khazaria, the same can be said for the Pečenegs, who never even had a kingdom of their own, despite Constantine VII referring to it as “Πατζινακία.”

Ch. 4 2.2.1.5 Interpreting the Pečenegs: the usual dichotomy

For better or worse, Pečenegs, along with many other nomadic steppe peoples, have been cast by modern scholarship, Russian and otherwise, within a dichotomy as either an enemy of civilization or as a manifestation of cooperation between Rus’ and the Eurasian

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331 Oţa, 2015, *The Mortuary Archaeology of the Medieval Banat (10th-14th Centuries)*, 21. He writes:

“The grave goods and some of the burial customs […] point to a nomad population, but it is impossible to attach any ethnic labels to those features. Indeed, some of the grave goods are either of Byzantine manufacture or imitations thereof. So far, there is no clear archaeological confirmation of a Pecheneg presence.”

See also Honeychurch, 2014, “Alternative Complexities: the Archaeology of Pastoral Nomadic States,” 278. He writes:

“This idea of pastoral nomadism as an encompassing lifeway rather than an indecipherable cultural ‘other’ is useful for discussing the difficult theme of pastoral nomadic states. I emphasize the difficulty of this topic because both ‘pastoral nomadism’ and ‘states’ are evolving concepts that are debated and variously defined. In each case, typologies have been produced to facilitate communication and to form a basis for cross-cultural comparison, and in each case these typologies have proven controversial and embattled.”

332 Citing Khazanov, 1983, *Nomads and the Outside World*, 178-179; Golden, 1982a, “Imperial Ideology and the Sources of Political Unity amongst the Pre-Činggisid Nomads of Western Eurasia,” 64-66; and Pritsak, 1976, 11-16, this point is made most succinctly by Zhivkov, 2015, 134, when he writes:

“Constantine Porphyrogenitus stresses that the Pechenegs were divided up into eight tribes. They did not succeed in creating a unified, centralized state. The Pecheneg tribes were lead by separate rulers that were independent from one another and belonged to different families where power was hereditary. Their actions did not always—in fact, not even often—have the same foreign policy biases. The Pechenegs themselves were a heterogeneous community.”
The former interpretation, quite common in Russian historiography for centuries, plays into the standard Christian versus pagan binary, while the latter interpretation, a relatively newer construction, became an essential component of the Eurasianist school of Soviet and post-Soviet historiography led by Lev Gumilëv. In this brief discussion, we will examine the dichotomies here regarding the Rus’, Pečenegs and other steppe peoples in light of modern ethno-national concerns before moving to an independent examination of the Rus’ as we have done so far for the Volga Bulgars, Magyars and Pečenegs.

The commonly accepted interpretation of steppe peoples in Russian historiography has essentially been derived from the PVL, which depicts the Polovcÿ (Cuman-Qıpçaqs) in the entries for 1068, 1093 and 1096 as a “hostile force” bent on “invasion.” Similarly, the sedentarized and post-Christianized Russian narrative is presented by the compilers as demonstrating “superiority over the steppe peoples.” When inserted into the Russian Orthodox Christian template, it became a theological “divine punishment for our sins,” not so very different from Jordanes’ interpretation of the Huns of Attila. This interpretation continued essentially until the Revolutionary period throughout the nineteenth and into the early twentieth century, including all steppe peoples up to and even after the time of the so-called “Mongol yoke.” So extensive and established was this interpretation, that Gumilëv has called it the “black legend,” which he sought to disprove with his doctrine of “Eurasianism.” Gumilëv’s concept of “Eurasianism” means to promote the notion of a primordial ethnic alliance between the ancient Rus’ and the steppe peoples, notably the

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335 Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (eds. and trans.), 1953, PVL, 146-149; 174-179; 181-187.
341 See for example Golubovskij, 1884, Печенеги, торки и половцы до нашествия татар. История южно-русских степей IX-XIII вв.; Solev’ëv, 1851-79, История России с древнейших времён, vol. I.
342 See for example Kostomarov, 1903, Исторические монографии и исследования, 112; and Mavrodina, 1983, 42-45.
344 Gumilëv, 2000, Древняя Русь и Великая Степь, 210-216.
Pečenegs, Cuman-Qipčaqs, et al. The old pre-revolutionary binary interpretation had become quite outdated by the late Soviet period.345

Gumilëv’s theories of primordial ethnicity and Eurasianism have become a binding establishment of modern trans-national relations within both late-Soviet and the post-Soviet CIS as well.346 That said, Gumilëv’s interpretations of steppe peoples such as the Pečenegs are not without their own flaws, as he reinterprets such images of the alien steppe as a predominantly Western one.347 His 1989 magnum opus in this regard, Древняя Русь и Великая Степь,348 whether or not it was created with the intention of fostering a modern trans-national amity based on perceived continuous ethnic identities, has been highlighted instead by a litany of scholars as being inherently anti-Semitic in an effort to create an imagined common enemy (Jews) for the ancient Rus’ and steppe peoples,349 based on his dual concepts of “ethnic chimera” and “passionarity.”

Gumilëv’s concept of “passionarity” (пассионарность) rests on identifying ancient ethnicities based on their collective drive, or passion, which could summarize an entire people based on their imagined proclivities or tendencies350 at best, but usually just by simple stereotypes. The so-called “ethnic chimera” for Gumilëv meant foreigners contaminating an otherwise pure ethnic host, acting as parasites. This notion of parasitism went quite a long way in much of Soviet historiography to describe Khazaria in general (and especially the Radanite merchants), in contrast to the Rus’ and Pečenegs.351 These two concepts came together to describe Jews, in this case of Khazaria, as parasitic, much like in the Protocols of

345 Mavrodina, 1983, 76-78. Despite Mavrodina’s revisionism, according to Hurwitz, 1985, “Review of: Киевская Русь и кочевники. Печенеги, тюрки и половцы,” 102-103, Mavrodina, a soviet histiographical apologist, is too positive regarding then-contemporary (early 1980s) scholarly attitudes towards the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR.
346 For example, Kazakhstan’s merging of the former Akmola Civil Engineering Institute and the Akmola Pedagogical Institute in Astana was renamed the L. N. Gumilëv Eurasian National University in 1996. Such a positive impact on modern nationalist discourse might raise eyebrows regarding modern nationalist beliefs of primordial ethnicity and homogeneity. See the official history of the university referenced via webpage: http://www.enu.kz/ru/o-enu/istoriya-universiteta/.
347 Garagozov, 2003, 78-79. See also Mjusse, 2006, Варварские нашествия на Западную Европу.
350 Gumilëv, 1989, Этногенез и биосфера земли, 42.
351 Ibid, 302. Zhivkov, 2015, 166-167, 212-215, unequivocally rejects such notions of “parasitism.” He summarizes Gumilëv’s ideas thus: “one must bear in mind that he was describing Soviet Russia.”
the Elders of Zion,\textsuperscript{352} and are essentially portrayed as instruments of ethnic decay within Christianity, Islam and steppe peoples such as the Pečenegs,\textsuperscript{353} while simultaneously assuming that ethnicity is a primordial, biological phenomenon with little to do with religion.

Nevertheless, while Gumilëv recognized that such a dichotomy of steppe paganism (represented by the Pečenegs) vs. Russian Christianity is misleading and rightly so, because of the intensity of continuous exchange, which was only intermittently punctuated with hostility and violence,\textsuperscript{354} which alone is quite reasonable, his other theories of ethnogenesis, “passionarity” and “ethnic chimera” have little else to commend them.\textsuperscript{355} That said, Khazanov’s\textsuperscript{356} and Honeychurch’s ideas,\textsuperscript{357} in contrast to Gumilëv’s, have garnered a more numerous following in international academia regarding the interactions between the nomadic steppe peoples such as Pečenegro.\textsuperscript{358} Khazanov and Honeychurch characterize Pečenegro and other nomadic pagan groups as reflections of their contact with monotheistic and/or sedentary political formations. I believe their ideas form a comparatively more nuanced perspective between this aforementioned false binary of eternal hostility between sedentary communities and nomadic pagans versus “a Russo-Turanian union,”\textsuperscript{359} without

\textsuperscript{352} See for example Ben-Itto, 2005, \textit{The Lie that Wouldn’t Die: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion}. Compare also such ideas to 1930s-era Hungarian politician and historian Hóman Bálint, who unconvincingly sought to connect the Magyars to the Huns based on the \textit{GH} while Jewish Hungarians similarly to Gumilëv’s “chimera.” See Ignác, 2006, “Egy miniszter a tévesztett úton; eredeti közlés: Élet és tudomány,” 966.

\textsuperscript{353} Gumilëv, 2000, 282.

\textsuperscript{354} Jakubovskij, 1932, “Феодальное общество Азии и его торговля с Восточной Европой в 10-15 вв.,” 24.

\textsuperscript{355} Malakhov, 2003, “Racism and Migrants,” 4. According to Malakhov, Gumilëv’s work does not have a significant following in either Russian or Western academia, but a significant one in xenophobic and racializing discourse.

\textsuperscript{356} Khazanov, 2001, 2. He writes:

“It is not my intention to deny that nomads influenced the cultures of their sedentary counterparts […] In Europe, the Russian, Hungarian and Polish aristocracies imitated the dress and hairstyle of the nomads. However, not infrequently the most brilliant and impressive inventions displays of nomadic cultures were at least stimulated by their contacts with the sedentaries.”

See also idem, 1983, \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{357} Honeychurch, 2014, 279. He writes:

“I argue against the idea that nomadic regional organization is contingent on, and a reflection of, sedentary and agricultural states. Rather, the unique forms of mobility enabled complexity characteristic of nomadic peoples arise in part due to endemic political volatility and uncertainty, whether generated by interactions between powerful nomadic groups or with sedentary neighbors.”

\textsuperscript{358} Todorov, 2010, 320.

\textsuperscript{359} Rossman, 2002, 32. See also Hurwitz, 1985, 103. She writes:
Gumilëv’s prejudicial theorizing. It is undeniable that the Pečenegs were pagan nomads, much like the Oğuz, Cuman-Qipčaqs and Magyars, but just because primary sources such as the DAI refer to them as separate entities does not mean we ought to accept such distinctions as unchanging or primordial. Instead, the major difference between such groups, I believe, was whether a ruler adopted a form of monotheism and successfully converted his subjects to it. Before Stephen’s Christianization, we have no recourse to archaeological evidence confirming ethnic differences between Magyars and Pečenegs. After Stephen, we have a gradual top-down process of Christianization in the Carpathian Basin, but we have nothing comparable for those nomads who remained outside the Carpathian Basin in the Pontic-Caspian steppe.

Ch. 4 Part 3: Rus’

3.1 A final case study in Byzantine monotheization

As we have seen, despite their separate evolutions, their distinct successes and failures and their overall divergent historical trajectories in the longue durée, the Judaization of Khazaria, the Islamization of Volga Bulgaria, the Latin Christianization of Hungary and the disappearance of the Pečeneg identity (due, I would argue, to their repudiation of any monotheism), have all contributed to a fuller conception of identity as it was concurrently perceived. This conception of identity I have contrasted with ethno-linguistic labels that modern scholarship has often erroneously attached in hindsight. In short, to put such interpretations of these monotheizations into the same context would simply be incomplete without the inclusion of a necessarily brief discussion of the Byzantine Christianization of Rus’, the paramount significance of which hardly requires expounding. It is relevant at this point to immediately dispense with the label by which much scholarship has referred to Kievan Rus’ specifically (as some kind of single “state” entity). This is the reason I will refer to the Rus’ in general, since there were many towns which came to constitute and contain the Rus’ identity, led by many clans which claimed common descent back to the house of Vladimir and Rjurik (the Rjurikid dynasty), a theme I will return to in a detailed manner in chapter 6. In a few words, Kiev may have been a given capital at one time, but, as I will

“To attribute the affirmative view of Turkic peoples to the histrorical vision of Marxism-Leninism, however, strikes this reviewer as no more scientific than the bad-guy theory perpetrated by the chroniclers of Rus’ and their Great Russian successors.”
argue, it was Byzantine Christianity, not exclusive to the city of Kiev alone, which begat Rus’.

Next, before we can discuss placing Rus’ Christianization into the same analytical context as those mentioned above, (and similar contextualizing analyses have been fulfilled before), we must therefore consider earlier scholars’ ideas regarding the Rus’ Christianization, with particular reference to archaeological theory and interpretation. By now, the contributions to the archaeology of Rus’ almost seem countless. Nearly every archaeological pursuit has been covered regarding Rus’, including settlement-archaeology, numismatics, ceramics, epigraphy and certainly funerary-archaeology. Instead, we may discuss some of the towering achievements and shortcomings in the field, insofar as they relate to a contextualized understanding of 9-11th-c. monotheization in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, and then we can move on to a more modest contribution regarding what new sigillographic finds and analyses may add to our interpretation of the 10-11th-c. Byzantine Christianization of Rus’.

Ch. 4 3.1.1 Objectives and acknowledgements

3.1.1.1 Achievements in the archaeology of Rus’

Many notable scholars have contributed to elucidating funerary, fortification, numismatic, ceramic and epigraphic archaeologies both within and without a culture-historical theoretical framework. While much recent discourse centers around transcending cultural-historical assumptions, other inquiries have criticized ethno-linguistic theorization and have instead sought to place Rus’ archaeology within the context of Pontic-Caspian Eurasia – between the Baltic, the Black Sea, Byzantium, Khazaria, and the emergent


“Political legitimacy resided permanently in the dynasty, temporarily in the place; the dynasty carried the myth, the myth contained the place. The role of Kiev was therefore at first historical, then (increasingly) emblematic. It is worth noting that the familiar term ‘Kievan Russia’, or ‘Kiev Rus’, which seems to be geographically anchored, does not appear in any contemporary source whether from Kiev or Moscow or from Novgorod or Tver or anywhere else in the lands of the Rus.”


362 See for example the discussion above §2.1.1.2 in regard to Hungarian archaeology.
dynasties of the Danube Bulgars, Volga Bulgars, Magyars, Scandinavians and Poles. Before treating Rus’ sigillography, I will briefly outline the contours of Rus’ historiography and archaeology in both Western and then Soviet and post-Soviet scholarship.

Beginning with scholarship in the West, I will note the valuable influence first of the Russian-born American scholar, George Vernadsky’s *Kievan Rus’,* which was arguably the most influential post-war work on Rus’ history.\(^{363}\) This was followed by Obolensky, whose *Byzantine Commonwealth* has provided the backdrop for nearly all subsequent scholarship ever since its initial publication in 1971.\(^{364}\) Then in 1981, John Meyendorff’s *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia* contextualized the early Rus’ political formations in light of later developments, particularly around Moscow specifically, in the 14th century.\(^{365}\)

By the early 1990s, two volumes appeared\(^{366}\) edited by Yves Hamant and Anthony-Emil Tachiaos full of articles from Western, Greek and Russian perspectives commemorating the millennium of Russian Christianity.\(^{367}\) Later during the 1990s, Western scholarship specialized into historians exploiting Rus’ texts, archaeologists of Rus’ and historians of Rus’ who utilized both texts and archaeology. For the historians of Rus’ specifically utilizing mostly texts, the aforementioned tradition continued in the West notably with Martin’s 1995 monograph, *Medieval Russia.*\(^{368}\)

In terms of archaeology and numismatics, Western historiography of Rus’ was drastically advanced by Simon Franklin,\(^ {369}\) Jonathan Shepard,\(^ {370}\) Omeljan Pritsak\(^ {371}\) and

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\(^{363}\) Vernadsky, 1959, *Kievan Russia.*


\(^{365}\) Meyendorff, 1981, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia.* Meyendorff, p. 1, puts his work into context thus:

“[…] the rise of Moscow in the fourteenth century [has] been described in detail, and sometimes brilliantly, by historians of Russia. All of them, however, have limited themselves, almost exclusively, to consulting Russian sources and visualizing the facts as episodes of Russian national history only. The present book as attempt is made at widening the perspective and envisaging the birth of the Russian empire in a broader setting: that of Eastern Europe as a whole, and particularly of Byzantine imperial diplomacy.”

\(^{366}\) Feldman, 2013, 33.


Thomas Noonan respectively, with Franklin and Shepard’s 1996 publication *The Emergence of Rus’*, arguably being the towering achievement in the West regarding an amalgamated mastery of both literary and archaeological scholarship of the early Rus’. During this period, Andrzej Poppe, Frederick Thomson and Constantine Zuckerman have all contributed to cultural understandings of the early Byzantium and Rus’ relationship as well, by utilizing both textual and archaeological evidence. One of the most influential archaeological publications, in 2000, *Les centres proto-urbains russes*, edited by Michel Kazanski, Anne Nercessian and the aforementioned Zuckerman, has situated the “Normanist controversy” (a Soviet-era debate about the primordial ethnicity of the Rus’ – Slavs or “Normans”?) amidst a larger context of settlement and fortification archaeology superseding obsolete models of “Eastern European” vs. “Western European” cultural developments.

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“Существует давняя традиция отмечать принципиальные различия исторических явлений в России и на Западе […] раннесредневековый мир был единым и включал Восточную Европу, во многом благодаря тому мобильному дружинному компоненту, который в Восточной Европе получил имя русь.”

I have translated this as:
The compilation of articles, reviewed quite favorably, with one reviewer wishing for another volume covering the period up to the 12th century, draws expertise from across Russia and the West to expound on updated models of early sedentarism, proto-urbanism, literacy, monotheism and of course, ethnicity. In 2012, Christian Raffensperger continued the tradition of combining textual and archaeological analysis of Rus’, publishing *Reimagining Europe*, which reconceives Obolensky’s depiction of the Rus’ in his *Commonwealth* as instead a part of the “European medieval world.”377

Meanwhile, Soviet and post-Soviet scholars have outlined Rus’ archaeology both within Marxist terms and beyond Marxist interpretations. Three of the earliest and most influential post-war scholars, Boris Grekov, Mikhail Tikhomirov and Boris Rýbakov put their contemporary archaeological information into a framework which subsequently became indispensable for researchers on either side of the Iron Curtain. Later Soviet and post-Soviet scholars also valuably blended textual and (at their time) archaeological evidence, perhaps more than in the West. These scholars include Klejn, Lebedev and Nazarenko, Toločko, Šćapov, Limonov, Kolčin, Sedov, Mil’khov and Danilova, although this list is, once again, by no means exhaustive.

“There is a long tradition of pointing out the fundamental differences of historical events in Russia and in the West [... Nevertheless,] the early medieval world was united and included Eastern Europe, largely due to the component of the mobile druzhinas, which in Eastern Europe was named Rus’.”


377 Raffensperger, 2012, *Reimagining Europe: Kievan Rus’ in the Medieval World*. See also Kovalev’s review: 2015, “Reimaging Kievan Rus’ [in Unimagined Europe],” 158-187. According to Kovalev, “Raffensperger is unfortunately trapped by historiography; although he seeks ways to include Rus’ into ‘Europe,’ he […] unintentionally writes the rest of the Eastern-rite Christendom out of it. Herein lays the fundamental problem of the entire work, Raffensperger does not adequately define ‘Europe’ for it to be ‘reimagined’.”


380 Rýbakov, 1953a, “К вопросу о роли хазарского каганата в истории Руси,” 128-150; and idem, 1953b, “Древние Руси,” 23-104.


Therefore, having given recognition to earlier historiography which has overcome the obstacles presented by yet earlier scholarship, we may now turn to a complementary case study examining some of the latest research on Rus’ sigillography and how it may inform our understanding of Christianization in Rus’ on a unilateral level and monotheization on a multilateral level, given our previous discussions of Khazaria, Volga Bulgaria, Hungary and the Pečenegs. I have chosen to focus on sigillography since, as mentioned above, many other pursuits in Rus’ archaeology have been sufficiently detailed and quite recently as well. Consequently, for the sake of brevity (and to eschew a reinvention of the wheel), I hope a concise sigillographic analysis of Rus’ Christianization will suffice.

Ch. 4  3.1.2  Sigillography and statecraft: the Rus’ seals as marks of Christianization

The deep cultural connections that emerged beginning in the 9th century between Byzantium, Bulgaria and Russia and elsewhere in the expanding Orthodox world, or perhaps, the Byzantine Commonwealth, can be exemplified in many archaeological and textual instances. Within archaeology and sigillography specifically, there has been no shortage of research into the growth and fostering of a Christian identity in the Byzantine Commonwealth. Such a Christian identity, it has been argued, is discernible via sphragistic images of particular triumphal saints such as St. Nicholas, which, as maintained by Stepanova, transcend retrospective “national” identities. This has been already discussed


388 Danilova, 1994, Сельская община в средневековой руси.


“From the beginning of the thirteenth to the fourteenth century the mounted saint and the ruler triumphant appear in the numismatics and the sigillography of the states of the Byzantine cultural milieu, particularly, in Trebizond, Cilicia, Rum, Serbia, Russia, and Bulgaria.”
rather extensively in a variety of sigillographic publications\textsuperscript{391} and especially so regarding Byzantine administrative seals found in Russia.\textsuperscript{392}

Beginning even before the conversion of Vladimir I of Kiev to Byzantine Christianity (987), Byzantine seals have been found in what later became the Rus’ lands (\textit{Russkaja Zemljija}) dating back even to the late 7\textsuperscript{th} c. (fig. 135).\textsuperscript{393} By the time of Vladimir’s conversion specifically, for which other archaeological evidence for Byzantine contact before and after is ample,\textsuperscript{394} even a seal of Basil II himself found in Belgorod (430km east of Kiev) indicates his personal communications with the city.\textsuperscript{395} The significance of Belgorod is expounded upon by Androshchuk, even though his interpretations of the specific original purpose of the seal found there are speculative. His assertion that “apparently, this town played a prominent role in the spread of Christianity,” throughout Rus’ lands in conjunction with a reference to a bishopric of Belgorod (\textit{ὁ Πελογράδων}) in the \textit{Notitiae Episcopatuum}, \textsuperscript{396} is rather convincing.\textsuperscript{397} However, he neglects to mention another, otherwise previously unpublished, seal of a certain Nikolaos, bishop of Belgorod, dated to the second half of the 12\textsuperscript{th} c., which the publication corroborates as an eparchy, “one of the most ancient in Eastern Europe, [which] appeared in the age of prince Volodymyr’s baptism. Its bishops were vicars of the Kyivan metropolitan and substituted him when absent.”\textsuperscript{398} After the conversion of Vladimir

\textsuperscript{391} My gratitude goes to N. Oikonomides and his successors for editing and contributing to the publication series \textit{Studies in Byzantine Sigillography}, the editors of (H. Ivakin, N. Khrapunov and W. Seibt) and contributors to the new publication \textit{Byzantine and Rus’ Seals} and to the supervisors of the \textit{Prosopography of the Byzantine World} online database for its assistance in the compilation of this area of my research.


\textsuperscript{393} Wassiliou-Seibt, 2015, “A Kommerkiarios Seal from the Last Year of Constans II’s Reign (667/68) Found in the Upper Dniester Region,” 37-41. Wassiliou-Seibt postulates that the find may be attributable to “[…] a Byzantine merchant, who possessed our seal, became the victim of Asparuch’s men […]; the above seal could be also a hint to a Proto-Bulgarian raid of the upper Dniester region in 667/68.” While such postulation is ultimately inconclusive and conjectural, the fact that a Byzantine seal has been found so far north indicates the depth of Byzantine contact long before Christianization.

\textsuperscript{394} Feldman, 2013, 63-81.


\textsuperscript{397} Androshchuk, 2015, “Byzantine Imperial Seals found in Southern Rus’,” 43-44.

\textsuperscript{398} Smolij, Borjak, Šeremet’jev, et al. (eds.) 2013, \textit{1000 Years of Ukrainian Seal}, cat. no. 20/p. 53-54.
and the turn of the eleventh century, many other seals attest to the growing relations between Byzantium and Rus’ throughout the tenth century, with Christianity, easily manifested on seals and in ecclesiastical registers, binding the two together.

Androshchuk discusses three seals of emperors found in Rus’ dating to the 11th-12th centuries. Two seals, both found in the Černigov oblast’, had belonged to the emperors Nikēphoros III Votaneiatēs (r. 1078-1081, fig. 136) and Alexios I Komnēnos (r. 1081-1118, fig. 137) respectively. The third seal, found near Kiev, belonged to emperor Manouēl I Komnēnos (r. 1143-1180, fig. 138). Although his particular explanation for the first two seals’ appearances in the Černigov oblast’ may be ultimately unprovable, the seals themselves easily attest to a profound cooperation of Byzantine and Rus’ rulers throughout the late-11-12th century and later regarding Christian administration. Ergo, it should not prove surprising to find images of Christ on each seal, opposite the respective emperor.

More generally, numerous imperially appointed ecclesiastical officials’ seals have been found referring to Rus’ as a land and people, and have been discussed extensively in Russian literature even during the Soviet period. Specifically, examples such as proedroi (πρόεδροι) and metropolitan (μητροπολίται) can be connected to specific individuals based on textual evidence. In the case of a certain Kōnstantinos, mētropolitēs/proedros of all Russia, whose seal, dated specifically to the late 1150s based on textual support, was found in the village of Melnitsa in modern-day Bulgaria. Another seal, of a certain Theopemptos, metropolitan of Russia, and found in the Kiev excavations, was precisely dated with textual

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399 Androshchuk, 2015, 46-51; and in the case of the seal of Alexios I Komnēnos, see also: Smolij, Borjak, Šeremet’jev et al. (eds.) 2013, 43.
400 Ibid, 48-49. Specifically, he argues:

“The seal of Nikephoros III Botaneiates might illustrate a sort of negotiations [sic] of this emperor and Vsevolod of Chernihiv concerning the case of Tmutorokan. Oleg’s release came following the ascension of Alexios Komnenos in 1081. Oleg returned to Tmutorokan in 1083. The change of Byzantine policy towards Oleg might be a result of Alexios’ need to secure sources of crude oil for Greek fire. It seems that the probable dating of Alexios’ seal found in the Chernihiv area is the period of Oleg’s reign in Chernihiv, i.e. 1094-1097.”

401 Kamencev and Ustjugov, 1974, Русская сфрагистика и геральдика, 70-73.
402 This same title can be applied to Byzantine officials operating in Hungary. See for example Chotzakoglou, 1999, “Bleisigel aus Ungarn,” 60. According to Archie Dunn, (personal communication, 26 April, 2018), during the early Komnenian period, (late-11th-12th c.), the term “proedros” was both a courtly titular rank and a “cultured” way of referring to a bishop, occasionally favored in seals’ metrical legends.
support to the late 1030s.404 A seal of Geōrgios, metropolitan of Kyiv and synkellos (fig. 149) has been found and dated precisely to his reign (1065-1076), as the only Kievan metropolitan to bear this name405 along with other seals of Kievan metropolitans such as an anonymous evocation of D’nislovo, or an “everyday” type seal (1093-1113, fig. 151).406 Additionally, Seibt has identified a seal of a certain Nikēforos, metropolitan of all Russia (ποιμενάρχης πάσης Ρωσίας) with textual sources and connected the seal to a metropolitan Nikēforos of Myra in 1174 (fig. 159).407 In another example, Eidel connected the seal of a certain Rus’ metropolitan, Maximos, (μητροπολίτης ἀπάσης Ρωσίας), to that particular metropolitan from 1286-1305 (figs. 145-146), who moved the seal of the metropolitan of all Russia from Kiev to Vladimir (180 km NE of Moscow).408 Despite lacking textual support to specify precise dating, myriad other seals record the now-familiar imperially appointed metropolitans of all Russia (πάσης Ρωσίας) dated throughout the 11th century and later (figs. 155-158).409 Besides numerous seals of metropolitans, seals of archontes (eg., Vladimir

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405 Smolij, Borjak, Šeremet’jev, et al. (eds.) 2013, 45-46. However, it should be noted that Blażejewski, 1990, Hierarchy of the Kyivan Church, 861-1990, 77, dates the reign solely to the year 1072.
406 Ibid, 46-48. The editors argue that D’nislovo-type (“everyday”) seals would have belonged to either the Kievan metropolitan Nicholas (1097-1101) or to the Kievan metropolitan Nikēforos (1104-1121). For further discussion on D’nislovo-type seals, (as well as another example of a D’nislovo-type seal – cat. no. 34), see Kamencev and Ustjugov, 1974, Русская геральдика и геральдика, 72-73; Alf’orov, 2012a, 25-30; and Eidel, 2012, “Буллы князей Ярополка-Петра и Владимира-Василия: атрибуция и датировка,” 53-68.
408 Eidel, 2015, “A Seal of Maximos, Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Rus’,” 231-234.
409 For examples, see the seal of a certain Ephraim, prōtoproedros and métropolitēs of Russia, dated to the second half of the 11th c. in Laurent, 1963, Le Corpus des sceaux de l’empire byzantin: L’église v. 1, cat. no. 783; see the seal of a certain Geōrgios in Soleviev, 1962, “Metropolitenseigle des kiewer Russland,” 294; and in Bulgakova, 2003, “Софийский корпус печатей: древнерусские и византийские находки на территории Софийского собора в Киеве,” cat. no. 5; see the seal of a certain Iōannēs, dated to the late-11th c. and found near lake Beloozero in Laurent, 1963, cat. no. 781; see the seal of another Iōannēs, also dated to the late 11th century in Laurent, 1965, Le Corpus des sceaux de l’empire byzantin: L’église v. 2, cat. no. 1605; see the seal of another Kōnstantinos, dated to the second half of the 12th c. in Laurent, 1963, cat. no. 790; see the seal of a certain Kyrillos, found in Cherson and dated to the second quarter of the 13th c. in Janin and Gajdukov, 1998, cat. no. 53 and Smolij, Borjak, Šeremet’jev, et al. (eds.) 2013, 49-50; see the seal of a certain Michaēl, chief pastor of Russia (ποιμενάρχης Ρωσίας), found in Dinogetia, modern-day Romania, and dated to the second quarter of the 13th c. (figs. 155-156) in Janin, 1970, Акто́ве печать́ Древне́й Руси, cat. no. 48 (although it should be noted that the personage to whom this seal belonged is disputed by Smolij, Borjak, Šeremet’jev, et al. (eds.) 2013, 48-49, who argue that the seal belongs to the metropolitan of the same name who reigned 1130-1145; on this matter, see also Alf’orov, 2012b, “Моливдовули Митрополита Михаїла (1130-1145 pp.),” 151-158, who sides against Janin); see the seal of a certain Nikēforos, dated to the first quarter of the 12th c., in Bulgakova, 2004, cat. no. 3.2.3.5; see the seal of another Nikēforos, also a chief pastor of Russia (ποιμενάρχης πάσης Ρωσίας), dated to the late-12th c. in Janin, 1970, cat. no. 52 (figs. 157-158); see the seal of a certain Nikētas, bishop of Russia (ἀρχιερέας Ρωσίας), dated to the 11-12th c. in Bulgakova, 2004, cat. no. 3.2.3.6;
Monomakh, fig. 147)\textsuperscript{410} and archontissai (eg., Theophanō Mouzasōnissa, figs. 152-154)\textsuperscript{411} of all Russia have been published.

Even during the 11\textsuperscript{th} century, imperial administrators actively identified as Rus’ themselves, albeit with Christian imagery on their seals. For example, another seal dated to the late-11\textsuperscript{th} c., though nearly indecipherable, records a certain prōtovestiarios, Iōanna the Rōs (Ἰωάννης ὁ Ρός), with an image of the archangel Michael (fig. 139).\textsuperscript{412} Even in the eleventh century, ecclesiastical correspondence crossed the Black Sea from Byzantium and permeated to the northernmost reaches of Rus’. For example, a seal of a certain Leōn, metropolitan of Laodikeia, was found in Staraja Ladoga\textsuperscript{413} and dated by Bulgakova to the first half of the 11\textsuperscript{th} c.\textsuperscript{414} Another seal of a certain Damianos, found in the Vologda region (400km north of Moscow), has been dated by Šandrovskaja to the early-11\textsuperscript{th} c. as well.\textsuperscript{415} In fact, Byzantine voullōtēria were found in 2011 in Novgorod dating to the 12\textsuperscript{th} c.\textsuperscript{416}

Seals of specific Rus’ potentates have been found as well, written with prototypical Cyrillic and clearly referring to the Rus’ land and ruler, yet saturated with Christian and

\textsuperscript{410} See the seal of Vladimir Monomakh, r. 1112-1125, fig. 147. Another seal, of a certain Andreas, with an image of St. Andreas on the obverse, is dated to the mid-11\textsuperscript{th} century. See Soloviev, 1970, “Un sceau gréco-russe du 11. siècle,” 435; Janin and Gajdukov, 1998, Άκτου γερμανικού Ρωσίας X-XIV αι. ΙΙΙ, cat. nos. 15-22; and Bulgakova, 2004, Byzantinische Bleisiegel in Osteuropa, cat. no. 3.2.1.1. Soloviev attributes this seal to Jaroslav’s son, referred to as Vsevolod in the PVL (Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, 136, 142, 149-150, 154-155, 164-170, 174, 188), who ruled a few towns such as Perejaslav and Černigov before ruling alone over “all Rus’” in Kiev, 1078-1093 – also referred to by Raffensperger, 2012, 63, 99.

\textsuperscript{411} This seal, of a certain, Theophanō Mouzasōnissa, bearing images of Christ, the Theotokos and St. Theophanō Mouzasōnissa, is dated to the last third of the 11\textsuperscript{th} century, due to her marriage to the Rus’ prince Oleg Svatoslavichi in the late 1080s (see below chapter 6 n197). For other anagou protovestiarioi seal samples, see Janin, 1970, Άκτου γερμανικού Ρωσίας, cat. no. 30; Bulgakova, 2004, Byzantinische Bleisiegel in Osteuropa, cat. no. 3.2.1.3; Ul’janovskij, 2013, “Новая булла Феофано Музалон и загадка ‘архонтесса Росии’: почти крамольные заметки истории на сфрагистическую тему,” 54-87; and the clever response of Čkaidze, 2015b, “Феофано Музалон: новые находки – старые открытия,” 268-293, a scholar well-versed in detecting otherwise mistakeable fakes and forgeries. See figs. 152-154.

\textsuperscript{412} Laurens, 1952, La collection C. Orghidan, cat. no. 69. It is interesting to note that according to the Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium (Kazhdan [ed.], 1991), between the 9-11\textsuperscript{th} c., prōtovestiarioi were diplomats, generals and carried out many duties of imperial office. In the 11\textsuperscript{th} c., the prōtovestiarioi’s role widened under Romanos III Argyros (r. 1028-1034).


\textsuperscript{414} Bulgakova, Byzantinische Siege in Osteuropa: Die Funde auf dem Territorium Altrusslands (Wiesbaden, 2004), no. 1.3.4.

\textsuperscript{415} Šandrovskaja, 2001, “Печати с изображениями анаргиров,” 69-78 (cat no. 12525).

\textsuperscript{416} Alf’orov, 2012a, “Моливдовули київських князів другої половини XI - кінця XII століття (за матеріалами сфрагистичної колекції О. Шереметьєва),” 8-10. Incidentally, Alf’orov, in this article, (p. 16-37) presents a rather convenient table and methodological analysis for help identifying early Rus’ princely seals as based on Greek-Christian baptismal names and imperial titles.
Byzantine imperial imagery. Perhaps the most notable example would be Sotnikova’s discussion of two seals of Jaroslav Vladimirovič the Wise (r. 1019-1054 CE) found in Novgorod in 1994 and in 2008 in the Kiev oblast’ respectively, which she compares with samples of his silver coinage (figs. 140, 142). They display a bust of Jaroslav in typical Byzantine-appropriated regalia (known as Korzno in Rus’)

147 and both bear the inscription “ІАРО-СЛАВЪ КНZ-Р8С-СКH,” or in English, Jaroslav, Knjaz’, or prince, of Rus’. Both seals also bear the bust of St. George on the reverse, spelled in Cyrillo-Greek characters, ГЕѠΡГѯНϹ, with the “О АГИОС” reproduced as a simple circle with an Alpha in the center along with the inscription around the seal: “ЯРОСЛАВЪ ПѯЧАТЬ,” (Jaroslav’s seal). When compared to the coins of Jaroslav, both bear similar busts of St. George whereas the image of Jaroslav himself on the seal is replaced by a trident on the coin and instead of the inscription around the seal, “ЯРОСЛАВЪ ПѯЧАТЬ,” it reads correspondingly instead, “ІАРОСЛАВЪ СРЕБРО,” (Jaroslav’s silver, figs. 141, 143).

148 Such an encompassing pronouncement of Christian rulership should serve to underscore the discussion, that the Rus’ land and those inhabiting it were formed by Christianity. Similarly, although we are focusing on seals, we can see Byzantine Christian influence clearly manifested on the gold coins (sribnья) of Vladimir I after 988. The growing depth of Orthodox Christian motifs in Rus’ sigillography throughout the 11th c. and later is illustrated by Beletsky as conforming to various ruling institutions, all bearing the endonymic aulic titulature of Rus’.

There are a few sigillographic exceptions however, mostly notably in a few scattered Rus’ references to Khazarian heritage. Despite other seals, such as two referring to a certain Michaël, archon and doux of Tamatarcha (Matracha/Tmutarakan’), Zichia and all Khazaria

417 See the discussion of the appropriation of Byzantine regalia on Rus’ sigillography in Stepanenko, 2015, “Portraits” of Princes in the sigillography of Rus’ from the Eleventh and the Twelfth Century,” 245-260. She writes on p. 249: “Were there any attempts of Rus’ to borrow or appropriate Byzantine regalia as insignia of the ruler having supreme power? The princes’ seals would indicate that there were some efforts at appropriation.” A similar case is made by Alekseenko, 2012b, “Печать как иконографический источник: к вопросу о редких изображениях святых в византийской сфрагистике,” 23-31. A thought-provoking, albeit slightly more nationalist case is made by Alf’orov, 2012c, “Инсигнии власти на древнерусских печатях XI-XII ст.,” 32-46.


419 See Sotnikova, 2015, “A Seal of Jaroslav the Wise (Kyiv, 1019-1054),” 221-229. She writes on p. 228: “The title of the ‘prince of Rus’ was natural and logical in the first half of the eleventh century for the master of the realm with local folk self-name ‘Rus’ land,’ which obviously originated from the tribal union of Rus’.” For an alternate example of Jaroslav’s seal evoking his namesake, St. George, and using it as his own name: see Smolij, Borjak and Šeremet’jev, et al. (eds.) 2013, 1000 Years of Ukrainian Seal, 30-32.

420 See Feldman, 2013, 75 n263-n264; and Smolij, Borjak and Šeremet’jev, et al. (eds.) 2013, 1000 Years of Ukrainian Seal, 90-93. For a more in-depth discussion, see above chapter 3 §1.2.1.1.

421 See Beletsky, 2015, “Rus’ Seals as Text,” 235-244.
(figs. 160-161), attributed to a grandson of Jaroslav the Wise named Oleg (1078-1093), as Alf'orov states, “Rus’ princes obviously underlined their Khazarian heritage.”

This may recall five sources referring to a so-called Rus’ “khağan”: the metropolitan Hilarion’s *Sermon on Law and Grace*, (dated by Franklin to 1048-1049), who invoked the “Rus’ khaganos” referring to Vladimir (“каганоу нашемоу владимероу”), the *Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam*, (dated by Minorsky to 982), the *Annales St. Bertiniani* (mid-late 9th c.) as well as ibn Rusta (903-913) and Gardīzī (mid-11th c.), which also refer to an alleged “Rus’ khaganos.” Together, such Rus’ references to the previous Khazar hegemony would fit in well with Noonan’s concept of a “*translatio imperii*” from Itīl’ to Kiev.

Nevertheless, by studying the seals of Rus’ sovereigns and Byzantine seals found in Rus’, we can understand a small part of how Russia, and by extension, the Russian Orthodox identity, came into existence. Namely, it was through the language of Byzantine Christianity that Rus’ elites and potentates referred to themselves, as attested by sigillography, specifically. We can see, especially in the seals of *knjaz* Jaroslav (Ярослав, княз Руси), but also in all seals bearing references to the *Russkaja Zemljÿ*, such as metropolitan’s seals in Greek referring to various μητροπολίται πάσης Ρωσίας. For example, Alf’orov has argued that for the 11-12th-c. Rus’ seals, the term *archon* in Greek was interchangeable with the Rus’ term *knjaz*, each carrying Christian symbolism. But the term *archon* during this period could be used in a variety of ways. True, it was commonly used in concurrent Byzantine sources to refer to peripheral rulers, but it could also be used to describe otherwise local “Byzantine” rulers as close as in Crimea or Trebizond (see below ch. 6 §1.1 and §1.2).

According to Archie Dunn, it was “quite elastic – it had both de jure and de facto uses,” (26 April, 2018). I would argue that its appearance on seals during this period should not warrant

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422 See Alf’orov, 2015, “A Seal of Michael, Archon and Doux of Matarcha and All Khazaria (in Oleksii Sheremetiev’s Collection),” 97-106; Bulgakova, 2004, 240; Janin, 1970, 29. Additionally, this should be taken in conjunction with an earlier seal and a mention in Skylitzēs: Whortley (ed. and trans.), 2010, *A Synopsis of Byzantine History*, 336, referencing a certain *archon* Geōrgios Tzoulas. See for example the discussion below ch. 6 §1.2.1.2.


424 Franklin (trans.), 1991, *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus’,* xxii, 3, 17, 18, 26. See also Brook, 2006, 154; and the discussion below §3.2.2.

425 Minorsky (trans.), 1970, §44. According to the source: “the king is called Rūs-khāqān.”


427 Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 116-117.


429 See the subsequent §3.2.2 below for a brief discussion of this concept.

430 Alf’orov, 2012a, 44-46.
dividing Rus’ seals from Byzantine seals, rather the elastic (and therefore universal) nature of terms such as *archon* bound Rus’ and Byzantium into a common ecumenical framework. Finally, as Obolensky, whose ideas continue to bear outsize influence in the field, has written, “Russia’s parent civilization was the Byzantine culture of East Rome, in whose terms Russian cultural history remains intelligible at least until the middle of the fifteenth century.”^431^ Thus, while numismatics and textual evidence have shed light on the nascence of the Rus’ lands, sigillography also bears an immense role in documenting the birth of the Rus’ lands in a Christian context as well.

Ch. 4  3.2  Sedentarization, Christianization, literization, historization, centralization

As we have seen in the previous case studies on the Khazars, Volga Bulgars and Magyars, the processes of political formation roughly fell into a few rudimentary and coinciding categories: (sedentarization, monotheization, centralization, literization and historization). While the latter processes of centralization, literization and historization are more visible in the textual record, most visibly in much of the archaeological analysis surveyed above (§3.1.1.1), the various degrees of sedentarization, urbanization and fortification have been contextualized within the gradual process of Christianization during the 11-13th c. The reason I have not engaged with these phenomena in Rus’ is because they have already been examined in context by Franklin and Shepard: literization, historization and centralization using both archaeology and textual evidence.^432^ “Post-Franklin and Shepard” (*Emergence*, 1996), many of the accompanying processes have also been eruditely summarized in the edited work of Kazanski, et al.^433^ In this volume for example, a

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^432^ On the Rus’ literization, the adoption of law and centralization around Kiev, see Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 208-244. For Rus’ adoption of a historicized timeline (historization), mostly from the Old and New Testaments via Amartōlos, Malalas, Synkellos and Chrysostom, and the Danube Bulgarian translations of their works, see Feldman, 2013, 51-62.

^433^ Kazanski, Nercessian and Zuckerman (eds.), 2000, *Les centres proto-urbains russes entre Scandinavie, Byzance et Orient*. In his introduction, Zuckerman explains the editors’ choice of the term “proto-urbain” and gives it a definition:

“Pourquoi centres proto-urbains ? Est-ce seulement une façon de décrire les noyaux des villes de l’ancienne Rus’ ? Les choses ne sont pas aussi simples. L’essor des recherches archéologiques au siècle dernier, particulièrement durant les dernières décennies, en Russie et en Ukraine actuelles, a favorisé la mise au jour d’une demi-douzaine de centres majeurs qui ne coïncident pas, pour la plupart, avec les villes connues par les chroniques. Le décalage entre les données archéologiques et les textes ne manque pas d’explications. Les centres d’artisanat et de commerce révélés par les fouilles datent des IXe-Xe siècles, tandis que les chroniques conservent des récits rédigés à la fin du XIe et au début du XIIe siècle. Les découvertes nouvelles mettent donc en relief le caractère lacunaire de ces récits, base de
combination of Western and post-Soviet scholarship valuably supplements Franklin and Shepard’s archaeological analysis by modelling 11-13th-c. agricultural, sedentarization, and urbanization developments in many proto-urban Rus’ towns and their hinterlands.434

Yet while Franklin and Shepard have addressed many of the “culture-historical” debates of the imagined primordial ethnicities of Slavs and Scandinavians (Varangians/Vikings) in their volume (referred to as the “Normanist debates”435) before the Rus’ Christianization, such misconceptions of primordialist ethnicity have continued to linger in much archaeological analyses. Can we truly conceive of recognizable ethnic markings in archaeological materials?436 And if so, would it then mean that before monotheization, certain groups (e.g., Scandinavians, Slavs, Turkic groups437) perceived their own distinct “ethnicities” before Rus’ Christianization? If Scandinavians and Slavs themselves did perceive “ethnic differences” between each other, such a phenomenon can hardly be revealed by modern assumptions of archaeological materials.


435 Specifically, the Normanist controversy refers to the historiographical debate, quite common in Soviet and post-Soviet scholarship and archaeology in the second half of the 20th c., about whether of not the Rus’, as an “ethnic people,” were in fact descendant from either the Slavs or the Vikings, for which the Russian expressions “Норман” and “Норманизм” are meant to describe. The reasons for this debate may arguably be more redolent of the era in which they took place than the era they sought to elucidate. For more information on the debate, see the following n436-437 below.

436 For a list of materials regarding the so called “Normanist” debates, see Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 28 n26 and 39 n46; and Klejn 2013, “The Russian Controversy over the Varangians,” 27-38.

437 Most of the “Normanist” debates have pertained to Scandinavian and Slavic primordial ethnicity. In terms of primordial ethnic differences between them and so-called Turkic groups (such as within Volga Bulgaria), there is still very little evidence. However, Beliaev and Chernetsov, 1999, 97-124, have valuably addressed the differences between Volga Bulgaria and the Rus’ after their respective monotheizations.
Ch. 4  3.2.1 Pre-Christian “ethnicities” in Rus’: Slav and Varangian culture-history revisited

While primary sources such as the PVL indicate differences between groups, such as Slavs or Varangians, based on supposed cultural or linguistic traits, can we presume that such differences constitute different “ethnicities” that existed as “facts and facets of self-definition”\textsuperscript{438} While such assumptions, usually made in the midst of the so-called “Normanist debates” necessarily place the importance of language over religion in determining ethnic identity, it may be a false postulation when applied to a pre-monotheistic context,\textsuperscript{439} especially given that languages change and individuals change their languages over time.

While I will not attempt here yet another historiographical discussion of the well-known Normanist controversy,\textsuperscript{440} I will place the Slav/Varangian dichotomy into the same context as the cultural-historical discussions regarding the pre-monotheistic populations of Hungary (above §2.1.1) and Volga Bulgaria (above §1.1.1). In effect, scholars such as Mocja, who categorically claim that archaeological typologies may be ethnically attributable\textsuperscript{441} eg., to either Normans (Vikings, Scandinavians, et al.), Slavs, Finno-Ugrians and steppe peoples in the pre-Christian period, are only ignoring the same problems of

\textsuperscript{438} Franklin, 1998, 184.

\textsuperscript{439} As Obolensky, 1994, 51, has claimed, “the notorious controversy between the ‘Normanist’ and the ‘anti-Normanist’ schools of historians as to whether the ninth-century Russian state was a Scandinavian creation or the product of earlier Slavonic or oriental traditions is now gradually abating.” He cites Mošin, 1931, “Варягно-русский вопрос,” 109-136, 343-379, 501-537; Stender-Peterson, 1953, Varangica, 5-20; Paszkiewicz, 1954, The Origin of Russia, 109-132; Thomsen, 1877, The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia and the Origin of the Russian State; Grekov, 1953, Киевская Русь; and Šušarin, 1960, “О сущности и формах современного нормализма,” 65-93. On the distinction between the so-called “Sklavēniai” and the “Ṛōs” and the “Normanist” debates on Rus’ ethnicity stemming from the DAI §9, see Dvornik, Jenkins, Lewis, Moravcsik, Obolensky and Runciman (eds.), 1962, Constantine Porphyrogenitus: De Administrando Imperio, Volume II, A Commentary, 22-23, 40-42. On the “Sklavēniai” specifically, see p. 35.

\textsuperscript{440} See the discussion of the history of the Normanist controversy given by Callmer, 2000, “From West to East. The Penetration of Scandinavians into Eastern Europe ca. 500-900,” 46-47. He criticizes Franklin and Shepard (1996, Emergence) for having “an apparent lack of insight in their analysis of archaeological material and the total uncertainty as to whence they have borrowed important conclusions [which] makes it difficult to assess the value of their work.”

It is not my purpose to critique either Franklin and Shepard or Callmer, but I consider the “Normanist debate” largely settled by now in so far as old notions of culture-history have been mostly rejected, even if some scholars continue to employ models of primordialist ethnicity in their analyses of archaeological material. In other words, I do not seek to “reinvent the wheel” here, only to put another nail in the coffin of the entire Normanist debate.

culture-history we discussed above. Of course, while analyzing material based on typological considerations may be practically unavoidable, it is intrinsically unsound to assume that funerary arrangements of members of a possible Rus’ družina, for example, ought to be considered attributable based on modern notions of primordial ethnicity, i.e., as either Scandinavian or Slavic.

For example, Mocja claims that burials found at Šestovica can be ethically attributable to Scandinavians based on their swords, arrowheads, belt buckles, combs and equestrian equipment (figs. 169-171). For Mocja, such finds are distinguishable from those with “ethnic markings” signifying Slavic, Finno-Urgic and steppe peoples according to their primordial ethnicities. But he does not explain how such finds can be proven not to have belonged to Slavic, Finno-Urgic or steppe peoples. The arrowheads he depicts (fig. 169) are not easily distinguishable from the Magyar or Pečeneg arrowheads referred to above (§2.1.1.2, figs. 115-116) found as far west as modern Switzerland. Furthermore, the 10th-c. “Scandinavian” stirrups and belt buckles of Šestovica (fig. 169) are only slightly distinct from the “Magyar/Pečeneg” stirrups and belt buckles found in the contemporaneous Carpathian Basin (figs. 133, 135).

True, it could be argued that the different typology of

443 Curta, 2014, “An Hesitating Journey through Foreign Knowledge’: Niculescu, the Ostrich, and Culture History,” 302. Specifically, Curta writes:

“As a method, typology is not “contaminated” by culture history. Only its use (which is dictated by theoretical choices) could be incriminated as “culture-historical.” In and for itself, typology is therefore neutral. Whether or not types existed in the minds of ancient producers and users is, of course, an entirely different question.”

444 Mocja, 2000, 273-282. Although he does not seem to question primordial “Scandinavian” ethnicity, Kovalenko (2013, “Scandinavians in the East of Europe: in Search of Glory or a New Motherland?” 287) remarks about the burials at Šestovica:

“The Varangians […] were gradually assimilated into the autochthonous population. […] This situation in Šestovica finds substantiation (in addition to the quick assimilation of the newcomers according to anthropological observations) in the evidence of peaceful coexistence (literally ‘across the fence’).
the bridle bits and different styles of swords – (the “Magyar/Pečeneg” swords of the 10th-c. Carpathian Basin are stylistically sabers while the “Scandinavian” swords of Šestovica are straight [épée] swords [compare figs. 130-131 with fig. 169]) – may be “ethnically” attributable, but it cannot prove that a member of one ethnic group (eg. a “Slav”) avoided using the implements of another ethnic group. Simply put, the typology of funerary goods cannot prove the ethnicity of the deceased.

In another example, if we consider the fibulae found in the Rjurikovo gorodišče categorized as “Scandinavian” by Nosov (fig. 162), we may compare them with fibulae ethnically typologized as “Slavic” on which rivers of ink have been spilled, most recently and comprehensively by Curta (figs. 172-181). Although Curta’s examples are mostly dated to the early-7th c., both his samples of fibulae and his analysis of them are relevant to our discussion. In his estimation, while such “Slavic” fibulae could have functioned as culturally relevant for those who produced and used them, they cannot ultimately prove the subjective historical ethnicity of the producer and/or user. For this reason, Curta de-categorizes them as exclusively “Slavic” based on such subjective criteria. Furthermore, he rejects ethnic conceptions based on geographical and textual evidence: such fibulae have been found in geographical areas where no “Slavs” are mentioned in textual sources. In the case of Nosov’s “Scandinavian” fibulae in the Rjurikovo gorodišče, while it is well known from textual sources such as the PVL that Scandinavians (Varangians) certainly travelled in these

between representatives of different ethnic groups, and in the polyethnic structure of the necropolis (burials were not separated in different cemeteries according to ethnic indications.)”


Curta, 2012, “‘Slavic’ Bow Fibulae: Twenty Years of Research,” 56. He writes:

“But was that ethnic identity specifically Slavic? The question is particularly relevant in this context because, despite numerous caveats, many scholars, particularly in the Balkans, continue to treat “Slavic” bow fibulae not only as badges of Slavic identity, but also as index-fossils for the presence of the Slavs in certain regions. Such an interpretation is absurd for at least two reasons. First, it is based on the idea that objects have intrinsic properties (such as ethnic attributes) that are independent from their producers or users. In other words, the assumption is that those who wore “Slavic” fibulae were Slavs, whether they knew it or not, or whether they wanted it or not. Second, the distribution of “Slavic” bow fibulae shows significant clusters in at least two regions that are not mentioned in relation to the Slavs in any medieval sources – Mazuria and the Crimea. If the dress with “Slavic” fibulae was about emblemic styles which may have marked ethnic boundaries, several identities were possibly signaled by such means that were most obviously not Slavic. Whatever ethnic labels one chooses to employ for the groups whose women wore “Slavic” bow fibulae, there must have been more than one group (ethnic) identity signaled by such means. Could any one of them have been Slavic after all?”
areas, we must still recognize the problematic nature of assigning “ethnic” categories in archaeological finds based ultimately on textual evidence.

Analyses such as those of Mocja and Nosov rely on classifying burial assemblages based on modern notions of the primordial ethnicity of Scandinavians, Slavs and whatever other modern notional human category has been projected onto the past, which Florin Curta, in the case of the Slavs, has since dismissed as “fairy tales.” Such finds, while tempting for culture-historians, cannot be compelled to produce, in Uspenskij’s words, “ethnic markings.” Did these individuals view themselves as Scandinavians or Slavs? Could they not opt to be buried with the others’ arbitrarily assumed typologically “ethnic markings”? Whether they did or not is ultimately unprovable, but to engage in cultural-history speculation about the ethnicity of the users of these artifacts is untenable. Therefore, to shelve the entire Normanist debate in an archaeological setting as innately culture-historical may be perceived as overly dismissive. But how can we label pre-Christian groups hinted at in primary sources as “ethnicities”?

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448 Uspenskij, 2013, “Могильники с трупосожжениями VIII-XIII вв. на северо-западном Кавказе (динамика ареала погребального обряда),” 94. Concluding a discussion on cremated funerary assemblages in the Trans-Kuban dating between the 8-13th centuries, he writes:

“В погребальном инвентаре якобы присутствуют специфические этномаркирующие предметы. Во-вторых, сам обряд кремаций не характерен для Западного Кавказа. Однако эти доводы носят не однозначный, дискуссионный характер, если учитывать общие закономерности в эволюции материальной культуры раннесредневекового населения Юго-Восточной Европы.”

I have translated this as:

“Specific objects which show ethnic-marking are supposedly present in the funerary inventory. Secondly, the cremation rite itself is not characteristic of the western Caucasus. However, these premises are not conclusive; they have a debatable nature, considering the general consistencies in the evolution of the material culture of the early medieval population of South-Eastern Europe.”

449 Callmer, 2000, 46. He writes:

“The archaeological data can also be systematised so as to define contrasts and likenesses in the material culture of different areas. The ethnic character of various regional populations in Early Medieval Europe is often difficult to ascertain. Ethnicity as it is understood today did not exist. Grouping was often by political rather than ethnic units with a homogenous cultural and linguistic background.”

It still has not stopped some, such as Dolukhanov, 1996, *The Early Slavs: Eastern Europe from the Initial Settlement to the Kievan Rus*, 199, from claiming for example:

“At a certain time, several agricultural groups in the forest-steppic area of the Russian Plain, with its high agricultural potential, ethnically identified themselves as the Slavs. Separated from Greek Pontic
While sources such as the *DAI*, the *PVL*, Leōn Diakonos, Iōannēs Skylitzēs, ibn Fadlān and the Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam may refer to different peoples among the Rus’ surmised as either Varangians or Slavs, it is yet unclear who was who and what distinguished Varangians from Slavs exactly.

According to the *PVL*, for example, even if Varangians were specifically from “beyond the sea” (entry year 859), Slavs and Varangians were both descendants of Japheth from the Table of Nations in the book of Genesis:

“Афетово бо и то колено: варязи, свеи, урмане, русь, агияне, галичане, вольхва, римляне, немци, корлязи, веньдици, фрягове и прочии [...]. от племени Афетова, нариц, еже суть словене.”

“The following nations also are a part of the race of Japheth: the Varangians, the Swedes, the Normans, the Gotlanders, the Russes, the English, the Spaniards, the Italians, the Romans, the Germans, the French, the Venetians, the Genoese, and so on. […] The Slavic race is derived from the line of Japheth, since they are the Noricians, who are identical with the Slavs.”

Additionally, it is unclear if the Varangians and the Slavs were equally “Rus’” based on this account. In terms of the Rus’ generally, Leōn Diakonos and Michaēl Psellos dismissively refer to them collectively as “Tavroskythians” without explaining differences between Varangians or Slavs. It is true that ibn Fadlān describes many aspects of the Rus’ (as opposed to his “aš-Ṣaqāliba”), which correspond to modern normative notions of Vikings, such as ship burials, chieftain death rituals, et al. But I would agree with the scholar James

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states by the steppic corridor, but nonetheless engaged in multi-faceted relations with them, the Slavs have maintained their own identity ever since, being alienated both from the Iranian-speaking nomadic Scyths in the South, and the Baltic-speaking forest-farmers and stock-breeders in the north.”

Similar assumptions of primordial Slavic ethnicity have been made abundantly elsewhere, see for example Birnbaum, 1992, “The Slavic Settlements in the Balkans and the Eastern Alps,” 1-14; and Vryonis, 1992, “The Slavic Pottery (Jars) from Olympia, Greece,” 15-42.


451 Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (eds. and trans.), 1953. *PVL*, 53-57. According to the *PVL*, both the Varangians and the Slavs were descendants of the biblical Japheth of the Table of Nations in the book of Genesis.


Montgomery that while this certainly does have clear parallels with contemporary representations of Scandinavian peoples, it does not however finally resolve that the Rus’ were collectively Scandinavian by supposed primordial “ethnic” origin: rather that pre-monotheistic identity was fluid.\textsuperscript{457} We have already seen that ibn Faḍlān’s “aṣ-Ṣaqāliba” cannot be simply be assumed as “Slavs” (above §1.1.1) and we may also note that the Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam describes Slavs as part of the Rus’ even while conceding that the “Ṣaqālib resemble the Rus.”\textsuperscript{458} For precisely this reason I once again contend that inquiring into primordial ethnicity, whether Rus’, Varangian, Slavic or for any other group, is ultimately a flawed question to be asking of textual material.

The same can be said about asking the equivalent question of archaeological material. To ascribe material culture based on typologies to one group or another and call them “ethnicities,” based on some assumption of pre-monotheistic, homogeneous ethno-linguistic continuity would be just as anachronistic for the case of Rus’ as we saw for Khazaria, Volga Bulgaria and Hungary. If individuals learned new languages, and they frequently did, then a supposed linguistic basis for pre-monotheistic ethnicity necessarily collapses. So even while scholars such as Franklin brilliantly expose the central paradox of retrospectively trying to view Rus’ through a lens which places oversized importance on pre-Christian historical identity as has been normal in 19-20\textsuperscript{th}-c. Western scholarship (see below ch. 7 §2.1-2.2), it has not stopped him from referring to ethnicity as an essentially pre-monotheistic, “Antique” identity, instead of as a synthetic idea applied centuries later via an imposed monotheism, such as Byzantine Christianity in Rus’.

\textsuperscript{457} Montgomery, 2000, “Ibn Faḍlān and the Rāsiyyah.” 1-25. Additionally, it has been argued that during the first few centuries of Christianization in Rus’ and Scandinavian lands, confessional identities remained fluid because they had not yet been fully subjected to centralized dogmata from the two sides of the schism. See Lind, 2013, “Darkness in the East?” 357.

\textsuperscript{458} Minorsky (trans.), 1970, Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam, §43-44.

\textsuperscript{459} Franklin, 1998, 187. He writes:

“In modern hindsight, for a place to have a Middle Ages implies, with the peculiarly reverse chronology of this convention, that in some previous time it had an Old Age, an Antiquity. The Rus did not. Their ‘Middle Ages’ incorporate their beginning. This lexical quibble is not entirely facetious. One can of course note that the tales of the pre-Christian princes provide the Rus with a kind of functional equivalent to a sense of antiquity; but to leave it at that would be to miss the relevant point, which is that the early ideologues of the Rus neither found nor devised any significant historical, cultural, linguistic or symbolic link between themselves and the Antiquity which was shared by much of the rest of Christian Europe, nor did they perceive that Antiquity to have any particularly privileged status in the larger scheme of things. There was no Roman law, no geographic link to the empire of Old Rome, no education in Latin or in the ‘atticising’ Greek of the Byzantine intellectuals. The Rus were a new people, justified and magnified as such through an appropriate interpretation of Scripture. Secondly, the
3.2.2 Tribute to tax, a Rus’ “khağan” and a “translatio imperii”

Regardless of primordial ethnicity, the processes of centralizing power (either under a khağan or a knjaz’) and subjugating local populations are just as apparent in the case of the Rus’ as they were for the previously discussed case studies: the Khazars, the Volga Bulgars, and the Magyars. While I will not characterize these two processes as elements of “state formation” (which, in terms of Rus’, we will discuss in depth below in ch. 6 §2.1), I will rather engage with these two processes together, since they both reinforce my underlying argument that Rus’ identity was a top-down phenomenon reaching subject and tributary populations eventually via Byzantine Christianity, like the similar cases (of other monotheizations) we have discussed in Khazaria, Volga Bulgaria and Hungary.

Based on mentions of Rus’ khağans, which we have already discussed,460 in such variegated 9-11th-c. sources as the Hudud al-ʿĀlam, the Annales St. Bertiniani, the metropolitan Ilarion’s Sermon on Law and Grace and the works of ibn Rusta and Gardīzī, much has been written on the transposition of Khazar ruling ideology (the khağan) to the Rus’. The scholars Zuckerman461 and Pritsak462 have been among the foremost proponents of the concept of a Rus’ khağanate long before Vladimir’s conversion. The idea has drawn a significant scholarly following, including Franklin and Shepard,463 Golden,464 and Noonan,465 despite a considerable amount of speculation and re-interpretation, particularly on Zuckerman’s part.466 Notably however, Noonan refers to the whole concept of transferring

‘new people’ was not defined by a sense of chosen tribe. On the contrary, the freshly contrived identity was explicitly synthetic, designed to assimilate originally heterogeneous components. True, the dynasty was a privileged kin-group with a common ancestor-myth; and true, a Kievan chronicler writes rather more favourably about the pre-Christian customs of the local tribe than about the pre-Christian customs of others. But the essentials are faith, dynasty and tongue. Among the early elites, there is evidence of a considerable variety of ethnic origin.”

460 See above n423-429.
462 Golb and Pritsak (eds. and trans.), 1982, Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century, 64-65.
463 Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 50-70.
466 See Zuckerman, 1995, passim.
the title of khağan from the Khazars to the Rus’ as a “translatio imperii” from Itīl’ to Kiev, arguing that Rus’ not so much destroyed Khazaria in the late 10th c. as subsumed her. I will not dispute either the theory of a Rus’ khağan in the 9th century, the considerable textual support of which has already been mentioned as the aforementioned scholars have recognized, or Noonan’s “translatio imperii,” which I do find convincing. But I disagree with him when he argues that the 10th-c. Rus’ rulers of Kiev adopted the title of khağan because they knew the history of warfare between the Khazars and the Caliphate: there is no evidence of this. Though it would have corroborated his argument, Noonan also does not mention the tryzub, or trident (or bident) symbols, evident on the first Christian Kievan Rus’ coins, which according to Pritsak, derive from Khazarian notions of rulership of the tamga symbol on Khazarian coins (discussed above ch. 3 §1.1.3 – see figs. 182-193). According to Kovalev, the “trident” tamga symbol (†), appearing in the same numismatic context as the Moses coins previously discussed, symbolize the “ruling house at the time the coins were issued.” In Zhivkov’s words, “the trident and bident were known as symbols of the ruling family among many peoples in Eurasia, and were therefore easily transplanted as symbols of the Rjurikid dynasty as an alternative to the ruling Khazar Āšinā dynasty.

Nevertheless, the 9-10th-c. conception of Rus’ khağans fits in as competitors against the Khazar khağans for tribute among the local populations. I will conclude by

467 To be clear, the term “translatio imperii,” is in this instance quite simply of Noonan’s own creation and is by no means derived from any textual source directly.

468 Noonan, 2001, 94.


471 Noonan, 2001, 90. He writes:

“It if had not been for the Khazars, much of southeastern Europe would have been conquered by the Umayyads and ‘Abbāsids and subsequently incorporated into the Islam world [sic]. The Rus’ of Kiev undoubtedly knew this history and understood how the mandate of heaven had helped the Khazars keep the Arabs out of southern Russia and Ukraine.”

I believe it is quite doable that the Rus’ of Kiev knew this history, since there is no proof.

472 Pritsak, 1998, 81-86. He writes (p. 81): “The explanation I propose is that the trident was of Khazarian origin and was taken over by the Rus’ branch of the dynasty, as their ‘pagan’ symbol of the charismatic ruler’s victory.”

473 Kovalev, 2005a, 228-230; see also Shake, 2001, Coins of the Khazar Empire, 31, 35, 54; and Bÿkov, 1974, “Из истории денежного обращения хазарии,” 36-37 (figs. 9-13).

474 Zhivkov, 2015, 119.

475 See for example the explanations given by Petrukhin, 2006, 161-170; and Koptev, 2010, 189-212.
incorporating such ideas into the overall picture of local populations, “Slavic,” “Baltic,” “Finno-Ugrian” or otherwise, submitting to Rus’ tribute, much as they had done already to Khazaria, and thereby eventually, over centuries, becoming Rus’ themselves through baptism. In fact, this is something which not only Zuckerman himself advocates, but a vast amount of Soviet and post-Soviet Russian scholarship as well. In this way, instead of some imagined “proto-ethnic” identities like Slavs vs. Normans, the Rus’, like the other case studies we have examined, was a monotheistic identity imposed on subject peoples in a top-down conversion, revealed by endonymic references to a Rus’ identity, as opposed to either a Slav or a Norman identity, in coins, seals and texts, which, unlike the case with Judaism in Khazaria, ultimately endured.

476 See above chapter 2 §2.2.1.2. See also an explanation of this phenomenon given by Haldon, 1993, *The State and the Tributary Mode of Production*, 272, who incorporates critiques and adjusts a Marxist, and perhaps a post-Marxist perspective on the appearance and growth of “tributary states” and the “societies they dominate.”

477 Frankin and Shepard, 1996, 225. They write:

> “Christianity among the Rus spread from the top down. Though there had been individual Christians and perhaps small communities before the official Conversion under Vladimir, the institutional establishment of the new religion was a result of princely policy, and the spread of Christianity was closely linked to the spread of princely authority. […] The Conversion of the Rus was an event, a single decision; but the Christianization of the Rus was a long and complex process. […] Through the external signs we can trace a rough map – both social and territorial – of the spread of Christianity from the Conversion to the time of Iaroslav […] from the top downwards, from the centre outwards.”

478 Zuckerman, 2000, 117. He writes:

> “La politique du kagan russe et de ses hommes à l’égard des tribus indigènes décrites dans la *Relation anonyme* [a late-9th c. Islamic text] – ils «font la guerre de course contre les Slaves, s’emparent de prisonniers, qu’ils vendent aux Khazars et aux Bulgares» – renvoie aux vexations attribuées aux «Varègués» par les chroniques. La collision avec la vague de migration slave, qui affleure vers le nord sous la pression des Hongrois, est sans doute la cause principale de la chute du kaganat ou, dans le language des chroniques, de l’expulsion des «Varègués».”

479 See Feldman, 2013, 19 n43.

480 Franklin, 1998, 189. He writes:

> “The synthetic Rus’ identity, like the faith, was disseminated from above. It began as propaganda, hence as falsehood to all who might have observed with the outer rather than the inner eye. But the truly astonishing fact – and it is a fact – is how successful that early propaganda eventually became; how, gradually, over centuries rather than decades, the presumption of community, as expressed through language, dynasty and faith, did spread outwards and downwards through the lands of Rus.”

481 See above chapter 2 §3.1.
Chapter 5: A commonwealth inchoate: Byzantium and the Black Sea before the baptism of Vladimir

Abstract: Byzantine Pontic policy before 989 CE: this chapter means to finalize the story of Khazaria and give a prelude to the so-called “Byzantine Commonwealth.” Having previously contextualized several case studies that had hitherto been subject to mostly nationalist explanations, how can we reinterpret the Byzantine relationship with the Black Sea and her northern neighbors before and after their respective monotheizations in the 10th century? Obolensky has bequeathed to modern scholarship the idea of The Byzantine Commonwealth, albeit in a specifically Orthodox setting, but was it exclusively so? And did it effectually begin ca. 500 by Obolensky’s own account, or could it be argued that it began instead with 10th-c. Byzantine Christianization?
This chapter will serve to link the previous chapters regarding political agents around the Black Sea littoral and the Byzantine “Pontic policy” described by Constantine Zuckerman before 989 with the following chapters considering Byzantine “Pontic policy” after 989. Building on Zuckerman’s argument that the Christian Roman empire’s relations with the largely nomadic inhabitants of the North can be separated into two distinct phases, I will argue that Obolensky’s “Byzantine Commonwealth,” which he asserted began ca. 500, began instead in the 9-10th centuries with the conversion of northern potentates to Byzantine Christianity, beginning ca. 869 with the conversion of the Bulgar khağan Boris and later, ca. 987, with the conversion of the Rus’ knaz’ Vladimir. This will have major implications for our discussions of both ethnicity and statehood in the framework of top-down adoptions of monotheism, in this case, of Byzantine Christianity.

In chapter 2, we focused on the advent of monotheism and sedentarism in Khazaria, without discussing the decline and disappearance of Khazaria. The first half of this chapter (5) will explore the reasons for the eventual disappearance of the Khazar khağanate in the late-10th century in accordance with the policies of the Byzantine emperors (Byzantine “Pontic policy”), the Volga Bulgarian rulers and the Islamic caliphs, and whether or not some form of Khazaria survived afterwards. This is in order to successfully address the last debate about Khazaria relative to the larger themes of ethnicity and statehood in pre-modern Pontic-Caspian Eurasia. Finally, I will explore how Byzantine clerical administration, as the primary instrument of Zuckerman’s Byzantine “Pontic policy” before 989, can nuance our understandings of sovereignty and statehood in Pontic-Caspian Eurasia.

Then, I will deploy a fresh interpretation of the DAI in terms of the imperial relationship with the various peoples of the North to secure the political and economic integrity of the empire around the Black Sea littoral, with Christian Roman, partially-Christianized and entirely foreign peoples and political agents such as the Pečenegs, the Rus’, the Magyars, the Bulgars, et al. In short, while Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos’ DAI has been exhaustively interpreted, reinterpreted and mined for information of antique ethnic processes in Eastern Europe, this section will include a slightly revised approach for contending with the document and in brief extension, other Islamic texts of similar nature. Even though Constantine VII discusses the peoples and geopolitical events of his day at length in the text, can we truly suppose that the ancient “peoples” he refers to can be mapped
onto modern ethnicities at face value due to some shared linguistic affiliation, imagined or otherwise? This will bring us to a point at which we can revise our understanding of ethnicity in ancient texts.
Ch. 5, part 1: The disappearance of Khazaria

1.1 The decline of the Pax Khazarica

Perhaps this section ought to include a preface on the use of the word “decline.” While scholars disagree for various reasons about the value of the word to describe broadly gradual historical changes within one realm or another, when it is used, it frequently fulfills a vague function, serving to define a given period, albeit abstractly, without delving into the choice of the word. One example which comes to mind is Gibbon’s famous characterization of Byzantium as “the thousand-year decline of the Roman empire,” constituting a self-anathematizing position for Byzantinists. For our purposes on Khazaria, which generally speaking receives less impassioned defense from modern scholarship regarding “decline,” the use of the word is perhaps merited on the grounds that it separates a period of stability (9-10th c.) from a later period of disappearance, on the precise dating of which, there is hardly a scholarly consensus. It is for this reason that the following discussion will dwell on both “decline” and “disappearance” as descriptions for Khazaria, loaded though these words may be, respectively during the late-10-11th centuries. We need to begin with the probable causes of “decline,” that may have preceded the “disappearance,” the abandonment of Byzantium’s traditionally decent relationship with Khazaria, arguably due to the official adoption of Judaism instead of Christianity, which, it should be noted, is not overtly referred to in any Byzantine source.

1.1.1 The dissolution of the Byzantine-Khazar détente

The Notitiae Episcopatum 3 [hereafter, NE 3] records the eparchy of Gotthia,1 ostensibly extant from the 730s,2 until the mid-9th c.3 It rests apparent to most scholars that such an ecclesiastical region, at least theoretically, stretched over the broad swathe of contemporary Khazaria. While the precise dating and possession of Crimea by either

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2 This is according to Obolensky (1971. The Byzantine Commonwealth, 174), although Vasiliev (1936, The Goths in the Crimea, 97) holds that it could date from anytime until 787. It is not my aim to throw either Vasiliev’s or Obolensky’s scholarship into question in this regard.
3 Darrouzès (ed.), 1981. NE, 42-45, dates the expiration of the NE 3 to ca. 869, while Komatina, 2013, “Date of the composition of the Notitiae episcopatum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae nos. 4, 5 and 6,” 204, dates the expiration of the NE 3 to ca. 805-828.
Byzantium or Khazaria is under dispute, as with myriad other questions on Khazaria, due to the NE 3 most scholars accept that there was some limited notional ecclesiastical dominion over much of what constituted Khazaria during the 8-9th centuries. This was a time of détente, as many scholars agree. The question of course becomes, what happened to it, and does it relate to the disappearance of Khazaria?

We may begin with another key textual source, the hagiography of John of Gotthia, compiled anonymously sometime in the first half of the 9th century. The hagiography, a particularly short one, concerns the subject, John, or preferably, Ḫoanna, whose family was native to the Pontic coast of the Armeniakôn theme, or what Russian translators regard as Greek by ethnicity, driven to Crimea by the iconoclast controversy. While we need not digress on issues of ethnicity here, let it suffice that the hagiography, referring to “the Khazars,” makes special mention not only of the khağan, but of the Khazar people (λαός), as well. Vasiliev dates Ḫoanna’s death in Amasris to 791-792. The vita is broadly comparable with the hagiography of Abo of Tiflis regarding a general Khazar tolerance of Christianity, despite the hagiography’s presentation of the Khazar khağan as an oppressive, tyrannical

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4 See for example Soročan, 2014, “Еще раз о византийско-хазарском кондоминиуме в крыму в конце VII — первой половине VIII в.,” 278-297.
5 Vasiliev, 1936, 89.
6 Mogaričev, Sazanov and Šapošnikov (trans.), 2007, Житие Иоанна Готского в контексте истории Крыма “хазарского периода,” 192-193. For the moment, we need not concern ourselves with modern interpolations of ancient “ethnicity” once again here for the sake of relevance.
7 However, it should be noted that according to the French translator, Auzépy (trans.), 2006, “La Vie de Jean de Gothie (BHG 891),” 80 n15, “Le mot λαός est ambigu: il peut s’agir soit du people soit de l’armée.” Here, I would cautiously side with the former interpretation of the word given the context:

“Cet homme-là, le saint évêque Jean, fut après cela livré par son propre peuple aux archontes des Khazars parce qu’il s’était allié au kyros de Gothie, à ses archontes et à tout le peuple (laos) afin que les dits Khazars ne dominent pas leur pays.”

10 Vasiliev, 1936, 96.
figure, who executes 17 innocent slaves. Nevertheless, its significance is bound with the reference in the NE 3 to Gotthia’s status as an eparchy during the iconoclast era.

The NE 3, composed during the same era, outlined a metropolitan list of sees which sought to Christianize not only Crimean Gotthia, but as most scholars agree, all of Khazaria, due to its inclusion of the sees of the Chotzirs (Khazars) near Phullae (Foullôn), of Astēl (Itīl’), of the Choualēs (Chwalisians), of the Onogours, of Reteg (the Terek River of the north Caucasus), of the Huns, and of Tamataarcha (Tmutarakan’). That the


13 Obolensky, 1971, 174. He writes:

“There is no evidence that the Byzantine authorities, who were actively and at times violently implementing their iconoclast programme between 726 and 787, attempted to stop the emigration of iconophile monks to the northern coast of the Black Sea. They seemed quite content, while persecuting the defenders of the images nearer home, to use them, in the interests of the empire’s foreign policy, to propagate Christianity among the peoples of the north.”

Regarding the historicity of iconodule monks fleeing to Crimea and elsewhere in the northern Black Sea littoral in modern scholarship, see Feldman, 2013, 27 n56.

14 For a detailed discussion of Byzantine-Khazar relations in Crimea during the 9th century, see Naumenko, 2005, “Византийско-хазарские отношения в середине IX века,” 231-244.


16 Soročan, 2004, “«Дело» епископа Иоанна Готского в связи с историей византийско-хазарских отношений в Таврике,” 84 n12, identifies Phullae as none other than Sugdaia, although of course this is hardly a consensus, as previous attempts to identify it had been made for Çufut-kale and elsewhere (see for example Vasiliev’s discussion on p. 98). More recently, Mogramiçev and Majko (2015, “Фулы и Крымская Хазария: еще раз о локализации Фульской епархии,” 130-134) make a considerably convincing textually and archaeologically based argument for the location of Phullae somewhere on the Tepsen plateau, which Brook (2006, The Jews of Khazaria, 34) and Noonan (1998-1999, “The Khazar-Byzantine World of the Crimea in the Early Middle Ages: the Religious Dimension,” 209-226) seem to take as a blanket assumption.


18 Vasiliev, 1936, 100; and Obolensky, 1971, 174-175.

19 Ibid, 100-101. Vasiliev prefers to identify “the Huns” as either Black Bulgars or Magyars, while Obolensky, 1971, 175 generally leaves the reference to mean the Trans-Kuban river valley. Zhivkov, 2015, 127-129, prefers to assign the the so-called “Black Bulgars [to] the Don Region during the tenth century.” He cites “sources,” but declines to specify which ones and from which periods. That said, he also makes fundamental assumptions of Bulgar primordial ethnicity in the Azov region, referring to “anthropological traits and burial rites” as if such typological evidence can suitably identify ancient “ethnic” groupings. Nevertheless, for Zhivkov (p. 136-144; 260-261), those referred to as “Black Bulgars” remained tributaries to the Khazar khağans
eparchy did not last long is given consideration by Shepard,\textsuperscript{21} echoing Obolensky,\textsuperscript{22} ostensibly due to Byzantine disappointment with the adoption of Judaism instead.\textsuperscript{23} The real issue, however, is the dating.\textsuperscript{24} While the \textit{NE} 3 lists the eparchy of Gotthia as an 8\textsuperscript{th}-c. phenomenon, which had disappeared by the mid-9\textsuperscript{th} c., we know that Byzantine entreaties to Khazaria continued well into the 9\textsuperscript{th} c. from our knowledge of the Byzantine building of Sarkel in 841. So while Shepard may stretch one event into the other,\textsuperscript{25} it seems that the disappearance of the eparchy of Gotthia and the Byzantine dissatisfaction at the steady Judaization in Khazaria are two different, but perhaps related processes.

Either way, Shepard does fit the Gotthia metropolitanate’s disappearance into a causal development of mutual estrangement due to the \textit{khağan}’s Judaization,\textsuperscript{26} and in this I would not disagree.\textsuperscript{27} Further textual evidence is provided by the 9\textsuperscript{th}-c. Slavonic \textit{Vita Constantini},\textsuperscript{28} which once again hints at “Byzantine attempts to re-establish an ecclesiastical presence in Khazaria.”\textsuperscript{29} Along with the \textit{Vita Constantini}, one of the epistles of Nikolas I Mystikos (ca. 920 CE), as we have already discussed,\textsuperscript{30} reveals the same effort to Christianize Khazaria, although its ultimate failure is reflected by his words referring to Khazaria as “…that deluded

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\item[22] Obolensky, 1971, 174-175.
\item[23] This point is given consideration at risk of over-rationalizing history, but it nevertheless follows Shepard’s views.
\item[25] See the discussion above in chapter 2, n107. Nevertheless, there is not enough evidence either to separate the two events entirely or bind them.
\item[27] However, Huxley, 1990, “Byzantinochazarika,” 80, certainly would. He writes, “[…] when Constantine Porphyrogenitus was putting together this work on imperial foreign policy, relations with Chazaria had soured. The conversion of the rulers to Judaism was not the reason – the Porphyrogenitus does not even mention the matter. The trouble was that the Chazars could not be expected to keep the Rhos in check. […] Byzantine diplomacy was now directed to support of the Alans [sic], not of the Chazars.”
\item[29] Olsson, 2013, 504.
\item[30] See the discussion above in chapter 2, n106.
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nation…” So despite Constantine VII’s mid-10th-c. recognition of the khağan as the “leading potentate in the north,” even though his DAI indicates Khazar potential vulnerability instead, (it does not specifically indicate a de facto “breakdown of détente” with Byzantium as we might expect), the DAI, in this regard, may nevertheless suggest a breakdown of the Byzantine-Khazar détente by the mid-10th century. It seems fairly reasonable to assert, as most scholarship has done already, this was ultimately...
due to the khağan’s conversion to Judaism. Even if it is never mentioned outright in either Byzantine or Rus’ sources, a mid-10th-c. breakdown of the Byzantine-Khazar détente seems fairly credible based on the aforementioned circumstantial evidence and direct reference in native Khazar sources.36

It is apparent, however, that the memory of Khazaria as a toponym was retained throughout the eastern Crimea and Taman’ peninsulas, especially given the numerous references to Khazars in official capacities from later periods. This is not to say that the Khazar khağans’ rule had been geographically confined to these regions exclusively, but we know from Byzantine thematic toponymy that themata frequently bore names reflecting nearby frontier regions, whose local populations they often shared.37 Whereas Judaism gradually disappeared from textual sources,38 it was replaced with Christian topography in those regions of the northern Black Sea littoral previously subject to the Khazar khağans. For example, in the late-11th c., the seal of a certain Michaël, archon and doux of Tamtarcha (Tmutarakan’), Zichia and all Khazaria, appears to belong to a Rus’ prince accentuating his

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36 See Golb and Pritsak (eds. and trans.), 1982, Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century, 112-115. They have translated The Schechter Text thus:

“[But in the days of Benjamin] the king, all the nations were stirred up against [Qazar] [Khazaria], and they besieged the[m with the aid of] the king of Maqedon [Byzantium]. Into battle went the king of ‘SY’ [Burās] and TWRQ[….] [Oğuz] [and] ‘BM [Black Bulgars] and PYYNYL [Pečenegs] and Maqedon; {…} the king of Alan fought against Qazar, for the king of Greece enticed him. {…} Romanus [the evil o]ne sent great presents to HLGW [Oleg] king of RWSY’ [Rus’] inciting him to (do) his evil.”

According to Gold and Pritsak, “The Schechter text does not specify who the organizer of this anti-Khazar coalition was, but it seems evident that it was Byzantium.” Similarly, Sakharov, 1984, Дипломацията на древна Русия IX—първата половина на Х век, 227-228 holds that the Byzantine-Rus’ treaty of 944 “gave Rus’ an opportunity for action against Khazaria with the support of the Byzantine army” (quoted in Zhivkov, 2015, 141, although on p. 261 he writes: “we do not actually know what went on between Rus’, Byzantium and Khazaria during the 940s and 950s,” however for Zhivkov (p. 132), the Pečenegs “did not cause the downfall of Khazaria”). This does not stop him from assuming (p. 162) that not only were “relations between the Rus’ and Byzantium in the south […] conducted directly through Constantinople,” but also that “the is no evidence that the Khazars had any direct contacts with Constantinople or Danube Bulgaria.” Regardless of his seeming self-contradiction, Zhivkov instead seems to partially attribute the breakdown of relations to a persecution of Jews by Rōmanos I Lakapēnos supposedly in the 940s. See for example above chapter 2 on “Khazaria,” §2.1.1.1. As far as this pertained to Rus’ see the subsequent §1.1.2.


38 Although for example, Soteri, 1995, “Khazaria: a Forgotten Jewish Empire,” 11, conjectures that:

“By the time of the Mongol invasions of Genghis Khan, in the early thirteenth century, the Khazar empire had shrunk both in size and importance to a small area between the Caucasus mountains and the Don and Volga Rivers.”
dominion’s heritage from an earlier Khazar topography, albeit in his time, Christianized (figs. 160-161). Additionally, that Khazar toponyms were preserved in the northern Black Sea littoral is most apparent in the retention of the Italianized name “Gazaria” in Crimean Genoese documents of the late Byzantine period. Finally, as Brook points out, “the memory of the Khazars as a major power in steppe-land affairs lingers in several languages, which call the Caspian Sea the ‘Khazar Sea’: ‘Hazar Denizi’ in Turkish, ‘Xæzær Denizi’ in Azeri, ‘Bahr-ul-Khazar’ in Arabic, and ‘Daryaye Khazar’ in Persian.” I will clarify my own position on the rough dating of the disappearance of Khazaria in the following subsection.

Ch. 5 1.1.2 Khazaria’s disappearance in text and coinage

The ultimate reasons for the decline, specifically, of Khazaria is typically agreed on by most scholars. The difference, however, is in their emphases. Broadly speaking, it is generally conceded that the most visceral sign of the end of the Pax Khazarica was Svjatoslav’s alleged attack on Sarkel, mentioned in the PVL under the year 965:

6473 (965). Svjatoslav sallied forth against the Khazars. When they heard of his approach, they went out to meet him with their Prince, the Kagan, and the armies came to blows. When battle thus took place, Svjatoslav defeated the Khazars and took their city of Bela Vezha. He also conquered the Yasians and the Kasogians.

39 Referenced in the previous chapter 4, n422-423. For a further discussion, see Chkhaidze, 2015a, “Byzantine Lead Seals Addressed to Matarca from the Sixth to the Twelfth Century,” 61-70; and idem, 2013, 47-68.
41 Brook, 2006, 156.
43 Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, PVL, 84. In Likhačev’s translation (Likhačev and Adrianova-Peretts [eds. and trans.], 1950, Повесть Временных Лет, referenced via webpage: http://krotov.info/acts/12/2/pvl.html), he uses ‘взял,’ meaning, ‘to conquer,’ regarding Bela Veža/Sarkel, and ‘победил,’ meaning, ‘to defeat’. For example:

В год 6473 (965). Пошел Святослав на хазар. Услышав же, хазары вышли навстречу во главе со своим князем Каганом и сошлись биться, и в битве одолел Святослав хазар, и столицу их и Белую Вежу взял. И победил ясов и касогов.

Note: in Likhačev’s translation, the PVL relates that Svjatoslav conquered not one, but two Khazar cities: Bela Veža/Sarkel “and their capital” (и столицу их), presumably Itīl’. According to Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor in the corresponding note 65,
However, the *PVL* is notoriously unreliable\(^{44}\) and reputable scholars have doubted the chronology of the event itself,\(^{45}\) which is compounded by an entirely different dating of the event given by the older hagiography, the *Pamjat’* of the monk Jakov (985 CE)\(^{46}\) and a reference given by ibn Hauqal (969 CE).\(^{47}\) Some have even argued that the story confused Sarkel with the Khazar capital of Itīl’,\(^{48}\) or rather compounded the two together.\(^{49}\) Most, though not all,\(^{50}\) believe the reason for Svjatoslav’s campaign was related to exacting tribute from the Slavs of the forest-steppe zone.

As for archaeological references, despite Vasil’ev’s insistence on an ash-covered destruction layer found at Samosdelka supposedly dating to layers from the late-10\(^{th}\) century, no coins have been found to unquestionably prove such dating beyond shadow of a doubt. This leaves excavated archaeological evidence quite unsound, to say nothing of the continued

\(^{44}\) Feldman, 2013, 48-62.


\(^{48}\) Petrukhin, 2007, “Khazaria and Rus’: an Examination of their Historical Relations,” 261-262. He claims that the city mentioned in the *PVL* is in fact not Sarkel, but Itīl’ itself.

\(^{49}\) Minorsky (trans.), 1958, *A History of Sharvān and Darband in the 10th-11th Centuries*, 113 n3. See also above n43.

\(^{50}\) Notably, the numismatist Marek Jankowiak, 2016, “The Volga Bulgar Imitative Coinage,” believes that the reason for Svjatoslav’s campaign against Khazaria recorded in the Rus’ sources and by ibn Hauqal, was due to a silver shortage. He rejects Kovalev’s supposition that Khazar coins were discontinued for their disappearance northward; rather, such coin exportation was precisely the point (Marek Jankowiak, personal communication, 14 March, 2016). See also chapter 2 above §2.2.1.2.
insecurity of Samosdelka as the real site of Itīl’.\textsuperscript{51} As for excavated evidence from Sarkel of Svjatoslav’s conquest, Artamonov, the most knowledgeable archaeologist in this regard, declines to confirm any.\textsuperscript{52}

So in terms of arguments for the decline of Khazaria based on archaeology instead of a foggy, tangled and partially-contrived recollection from the \textit{PVL} of Svjatoslav’s “conquest of Khazaria.” It must be remembered, that Svjatoslav did not ultimately manage to extinguish Khazaria, which continued to exist based on later entries in the same source.\textsuperscript{53} Such concerns, it could be argued, give a far more realistic impression over a longer period of time than some sudden cataclysm, (we may recall Golden’s theories of gradual “internalization” \textsuperscript{54} as opposed to other arguments for an abrupt monotheization, quite

\textsuperscript{51} See chapter 2 above §1.2.3.1.

\textsuperscript{52} Artamonov, 1962, 426. See also Pletnëva and Makarova, 1983, “Пояс знамного воина из Саркела,” 62-77, who, for all their overt and hypothetical theorizing, neglect to introduce much hard evidence for a late-10\textsuperscript{th}-century destruction of Sarkel by Svjatoslav. Instead, as pointed out by the archaeologist Flërov, 2006, “Донские крепости Хазарии: былое и настоящее” (Referenced via webpage: http://sarkel.ru/istoriya/donskie_kreposti_hazarii_byloe_i_nastoyaywe_valerii_flyorov/):

“Взятие крепости Святославом – не самая трагическая страница в её судьбе. Настоящая гибель крепости, уже как памятника археологии, наступила много позже. Ещё сохранявшиеся на значительную высоту стены, башни и все постройки крепости были буквально по кирпичу разобраны местным населением в конце XIX в. Всё дело в великолепном качестве кирпича! Кирпич вывозили возами, десятками тысяч, на продажу. Есть сведения, что даже собор в станице Ци(ы)млянской был построен из саркельского кирпича.”

I have translated this as:

“Svjatoslav’s capture of the fortress – was not the most tragic page in [Sarkel’s] fate. The real ruin of the fortress, already an archaeological monument, came much later. The significant height of the walls still remained, the towers and all the buildings of the fortress were dismantled literally brick by brick by the local population at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. It was all about the splendid quality of the brick! The brick was exported by carts, by the tens of thousands, to market. There is some lore that even the cathedral in the Cossack village of Ci(y)mljanskaja was built from Sarkel brick.”

\textsuperscript{53} See for example Cross and Sherbowizt-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, \textit{PVL}, 97, 134, 168, 203 and 256 n148, who supplement the text for the year 6531/1023 CE (p. 134: “Mstislav marched against Yaroslav with a force of Khazars and Kasogians.”) thus:

“Mstislav’s intimacy with Cherkesses and Khazars again testifies to the close contact prevailing between such Slavic settlements as existed in the region east of the Dnieper and the other ethnic units in the same territory.”


\textsuperscript{54} See for example Dunlop, 1954, \textit{The History of the Jewish Khazars}, 353, who postulates that Khazaria lasted into the 12\textsuperscript{th} c.
uncommon for a monotheistic conversion). In addition to Byzantine and Islamic sources, it may be constructive to give serious consideration to Noonan’s theories of the gradual decline of Khazaria based on numismatic evidence of changing trade routes.

Noonan makes a rather convincing argument that the silver, slave, and fur trading between the Islamic Caliphate in the south and the emerging Rus’ in the north had in fact benefitted Khazaria as a kind of middleman, after the 8th-c. Arab-Khazar wars had subsided, throughout the 9th c. The trade of this period, based on numismatic finds, passed through the Caucasus, into Khazaria and then further north. According to both the numismatic

55 See chapter 2 above §2.1.1.2.
58 See Noonan, 2007a, “Some Observations on the Economy of the Khazar Khaganate,” 233-244. On page 238, he writes:

“The political power of the khaganate was slowly but surely eroded during the course of the tenth century by the tremendous loss of income that arose from the diversion of the Islamic trade from the Caspian-Caucasus route through Khazaria to the Central Asian route that led through Volga Bulghāria.”

It might also be worth noting here that Gumilëv’s theories of climate change negatively affecting Khazaria in the tenth century are supported by Zhivkov, 2015, 218-219.
59 Noonan, 1984a, “Why Dirhams Reached Russia: the Role of Arab-Khazar Relations in the Development of the Earliest Islamic Trade with Eastern Europe,” 151-282. See also Zhivkov, 2015, 147-170. Notably, he attributes the initial growth phase of the trade routes within Khazaria to the “rise of the Abbasids in the Arab Caliphate (in 749).” In general, he agrees with Noonan’s two phases of Khazarian trade: growth and decline, though specifically, vis-à-vis the interpretation of Petrukhin, 2005, “Русь и Хазария: к оценке исторических взаимосвязей,” 76-78, who I would agree with as well. However, Zhivkov, 2015, 152 seems to believe somewhat sloppily that such an interpretation is incompatible with that of Shepard: “according to [Shepard], the commercial activity of settlements […] contradicts the idea of a decline in the dirham influx.” In fact, Shepard, 1996, The Emergence of Rus: 750-1200, 87 actually writes:

“The coincidence of rising demand for silver on the part of the Rus’ with an erratic supply probably accounts for the decline in the finds of late-ninth century Abbasid coins in Russian hoards. If there was, in some sense, a ‘silver crisis’, the obvious remedy was to find new routes to the longstanding sources of silver or to seek out new sources of silver or some other highly prized commodity.”

Nevertheless, Zhivkov (p. 152) believes such hoards, along with taking Islamic sources such as ibn Khurradādhbih at face value, recycled in the work of Novosel’cev, 1965, “Восточные источники о восточных славянах и Руси VI–IX вв.,” 384-385, trace a 9th-c. Rus’ path solely to the Black Sea instead of using “the whole length of the Volga River, as might be expected.” He declines to mention which precise hoards he refers
evidence⁶⁰ and al-Masʿūdī,⁶¹ the situation changed by the early-10th c., when the routes shifted to the east of the Caspian Sea, instead passing through Volga Bulgaria.⁶² Based on sheer quantitative numismatic evidence from coin hoard finds in Baltic and European Russia (indicative of the slave trade⁶³), despite initially referring to the year 965, (inherited from the unreliable PVL as the year of the khağanate’s fall⁶⁴), Noonan argues that the real cause of Khazaria’s decline was truly due to a loss of revenue from the restructuring of Islamic trade routes.⁶⁵ So despite his revision of the underlying reason for Khazaria’s decline and collapse, he defers to the textual tradition. Furthermore, while the thrust of his argument is otherwise solid, Noonan fails to name an ultimate reason for the trade restructuring benefitting Volga Bulgaria instead of Khazaria. Instead, he asserts that the Khazar khağans sought to impose their suzerainty on Volga Bulgaria due to the trade restructuring in an effort to supplement their tribute income. Although Noonan does not explicitely make this point, it seems rather evident that the Islamic trade restructuring had coincided with Almuš’s conversion to Islam by the second quarter of the 10th century.⁶⁶ Ergo, I would argue alternatively, and in concert with Zhivkov,⁶⁷ that the reorientation of Islamic trade reflected a greater interest to do business with other Muslims in Volga Bulgaria instead of in Khazaria, where “the Jews” had to, while Shepard (p. 23-27; 42-44) makes a significantly far more convincing argument regarding ibn Khurradādhbih, pointing out that:

“Whichever, or however many, rivers ibn Khurradadhbih had in mind – and his own conceptions need not have been crystal-clear – the Volga is plainly one of the rivers in play. For the Rus are depicted as journeying past the Khazars’ principal town, which lay near the mouth of that river.”

⁶⁰ Noonan, 2007a, 234-235.
⁶¹ Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 137.
⁶² Noonan, 2007a, 235-238.
⁶³ Jankowiak, 2016, “The Volga Bulgar Imitative Coinage.”
⁶⁴ Noonan, 2007a, 236.
⁶⁵ Ibid, 237. He writes:

“Tenth-century dirham imports through Khazaria were only about one-fifth of what they had been in the ninth century but they were still substantial. Nevertheless, the khagan’s revenues had declined sharply. […] While the above calculations are unquestionably speculative and further refinements are necessary, they do provide, for the first time, a fairly concrete idea of what the change from the Khazar route to the Volga Bulghār route meant for the khaganate.”

⁶⁶ See for example the previous chapter 4 above,§1.1.1.
⁶⁷ Zhivkov, 2015, 154-156. It should be noted, however, that Zhivkov also agrees with Gumilëv, 2000, Древняя Русь и Великая Степь, 215-219, that this was specifically due to a Rus’-Khazar alliance referred to by Margoliouth, 1918, “The Russian Seizure of Bardha-ah in 943 A.D.,” 82-95, which Zhivkov describes as a concerted campaign against the independent Muslim emir of Derbent. Regarding this theory in particular, it seems, at least to me, to be considerably conjectural.


reduced Almuš, by then a Muslim, to “slavery.” This is not to say that Khazaria conclusively collapsed in 965, 969 or 1016, but following Golden, that the decline in customs revenues contributed to a weakening of Khazaria, which had all but disappeared from the historical record by the mid-11th century. We know that as a place in historical memory, it remained, but that its ultimate contraction and disappearance had as much if not more to do with the gradual Islamic trade restructuring, as it did with Svjatoslav’s assumed conquest in the 960s.

Ultimately, since Khazaria ceased to be an effective imperial ally in the north, most likely due to her elites’ adoption of Judaism, by the mid-10th century, Byzantium sought a new ally which could guarantee stability in the steppe. While many scholars have speculated on who and why this came to be, often with strong arguments based on the DAI, the trouble has frequently boiled down to their varying interpretations of the text, without precisely deploying a procedural treatment of the literary qualities of the text itself. Therefore, I will attempt such an exercise in the following subsection.

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69 Huxley, 1990, 80, argues, for example, that even “ninety years” before Constantine VII wrote the *DAI*, so roughly in the late 850s, at the time of the so-called theological debates recorded in both the *Vita Constantini* and the *Schechter Text*, “the government in Itil [was] unable to control the outlying parts of Chazaria.” See also for example Zhivkov, 2015, 168-169. It might be worth noting that this is a rather unusual argument in modern scholarship, both Russian and Western.
70 Golden, 1980, *Khazar Studies: an Historico-Philological Inquiry into the Origins of the Khazars*, 111. See also Noonan, 2007a, 243-244. Nevertheless, for Zhivkov, 2015, 170, who asserts without disclosing evidence that there was “a well developed internal market” in Khazaria:

“But we really have no idea as to the degree of the khaganate’s influence on international trade and to what extent the Khazars were ‘bypassed’ by it in the tenth century! Crisis periods affect the development and capabilities of one country or another, but are not the sole factor that defines them. In this case, the crisis is general and refers to the supplies of silver, which in Eastern Europe affected mostly Kievan Rus’ and Volga Bulgaria. So the question essentially is: why did the relatively highly developed economy of Khazaria fail to ensure the survival of the khaganate?”

Unfortunately, he does not explain how “highly developed” as an economic category is measured. While his discussion of the Khazar economy (p. 171-220) is extensive, he nowhere compares or contextualizes the so-called state of Khazarian economic “development” to other economies. Can we assume that Rus’, Volga Bulgaria and Khazaria, for example, had such markedly different economies? What about the Islamic Caliphate and Byzantium? Can we even assume they had separate economies at all in an era without clearly-defined borders, GDPs and shifting tribute and trade allegiances? How much of his theorizing rests on the conjecture that such economies and “statehoods” can be mapped onto spatial and temporal realities with a simple modern projection or a retreat into normative classifications based on sedentary, semi-sedentary or nomadic typologies? Barring the revenue from customs duties and the degree of monetization, how drastically different can most pre-industrial economies be when the source of income ultimately derives from the earth? See also chapter 2 above n346-n348 and n414-n416.
2.1 Reconceptualizing northern peoples in the DAI

In light of the dissolution of the Khazar-Byzantine détente in the mid-10th c., a number of other potentates, not only Rus’, became more attractive imperial allies in the north Pontic region. Byzantium was, after all, seeking an ally to guarantee her interests in the Black Sea littoral. While many previous scholars have too easily assumed that such an alliance naturally fell to the Rus’, this cannot be taken for granted, since the Rus’ rulers, aside from Olga, were most certainly still pagans, and therefore in Christian imperial eyes, tantamount to any other northern “people,” i.e., taurnoskythians. This is particularly apparent in the DAI, which prefers the Pečenegs for a northern ally over any other people, although it nevertheless bundles them all together. That said, to discuss imperial policy in the Black Sea region before the crucial events in Cherson of 986–989, the DAI is undoubtedly the very document which will concern us most, and the question of how we may reconcile Constantine VII’s concepts of northern “peoples” with our present knowledge about making easy assumptions about primordial ethnic nationhood.

Ch. 5 2.1.1 Εθνη, λαοί and γένη in the DAI


72 Moravcsik and Jenkins (ed. and trans.), 2002, DAI, §13.25-26. Constantine VII refers to many “peoples” indiscriminately: “[...] εἴτε Χάζαροι, εἴτε Τοῦρκοι, εἴτε καὶ Ρως, ἢ ἄλλο ἔθνος τῶν βορείων καὶ Σκυθικῶν, οἷα πολλὰ συμβαίνει...” While Moravcsik and Jenkins translate the word “ἔθνος” as “nations” it remains doubtful that Constantine VII would have conceived of “nationhood” as it is considered in the modern day.


74 Moravcsik and Jenkins (ed. and trans.), 2002, DAI, §1. It is crucial that this imperative is the very first policy recommendation in the DAI, appearing just after the prooimion.


76 Feldman, 2013, passim.

77 Howard-Johnston, 2000, “The De administrando Imperio: a Re-Examination of the Text and a Re-evaluation of its Evidence about the Rus’,” 303. He writes:

“However, the DAI must be subjected to the same delicate but relentless probing […] before the material which it yields can be exploited historically. Its organizing principles must be understood before the worth of its various constituent parts can be estimated with exactitude, and it is only after such a careful appraisal of the whole and its parts that any individual passages can safely be used. The DAI is a text much in need of this sort of dissection.”
Constantine VII makes numerous references to northern peoples in the *DAI*, most of which involve referring to their cohesiveness with words such as ἔθνος, λαός and γένος.  

The goal of this subsection is not to doubt their concurrent cohesiveness itself, which is hardly measurable even by standards generally agreed on, (of which there are none), but to refine our modern interpretations of such terms given our reservations about assuming that modern peoples derive directly from ancient peoples referred to in the *DAI*, and by extension, other sources of comparable utility. Given much of modern (particularly post-Soviet and Eastern European) scholarship’s continuing preoccupation with primordial ethnic homogeneity, “national” genealogy and territorial custody, there can be little dispute of the manner in which historians comb through the text seeking clues and answers for their respective ethnic treatments: ie., who are the Zachlumians, where did they come from and what lands historically belonged to them? While the ethnic identity “Zachlumian” certainly does not exist in the modern sense, though others undoubtedly do, to what extent can we map modern concepts of ethnicity onto ancient ones? More simply, does Constantine VII’s use of the term ἔθνος evoke a sense of geographical belonging, or genealogical belonging?

First, it must be said that these words are hardly translated consistently even within the *DAI*. Jenkins usually translates derivatives of the word ἔθνος as “nation.” However, the term ἐθνικός is presented as a foreigner or an infidel, which in fact elides with ἄπιστος. In

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78 See also Magdalino, 2013, “Constantine VII and the Historical Geography of Empire,” 23-41.
80 Ibid, §13:96; §31:40; §48:5. That said, in his military treatises, Constantine VII uses the word ἐθνικός similarly, which Haldon translates as “foreigner.” See Haldon (ed. and trans.), 1990, *Constantine Porphyrogenitus: Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions*, C.224, 406. In the former example, he uses ἐθνικός interchangeably with the familiar ξένος. It would be pertinent to note here that Obolensky, 1971, 26, refers to the usage of the word ἔθνος thus:

“The struggle to defend the empire’s northern frontiers against the barbarian strengthened the belief of the Byzantines in its providential destiny and exemplified the contrast, so central to Byzantine thought, between Graeco-Roman civilisation of which they regarded themselves as sole legitimate trustees, and the external and chaotic forces of barbarism represented by the pagan ἑθνος, whom their empire was destined to subdue, tame and civilise.”

On further usage of the word ἔθνος elsewhere in the *DAI* generally, see Dvornik, Jenkins, Lewis, Moravcsik, Obolensky and Runciman (eds.), 1962, *Constantine Porphyrogenitus: De Administrando Imperio, Volume II, A Commentary*, 11, who write: “‘Ethnics’ denoted a body of foreigners; either spiritual (i.e. heathens), or political (as Franks, or Bulgars), and very often both.” In this regard, see for example the contemporaneous use of the equivalent Latin word ‘Natio’ for a group of foreigners explained by Greenfeld, 1994, “Types of European Nationalism,” 168; and Connor, 1994, “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a...,” 43-46.
one instance, Jenkins renders Constantine VII’s use of the word ἔθνος as “the ethnic term,”
regarding Iberians as a concrete ethnic group,82 who today would call themselves either
Spanish or Portuguese, or perhaps also Catalan, Basque, Galician and Valencian. As for the
word for “people,” λαός, Jenkins has most often rendered it as “folk,” presumably in the
sense of “common folk,”83 as opposed to outlining different “peoples” in the “national” sense,
although he also uses other words such as ὄχλος, or “crowd” or “mob,” to convey the same
meaning.84 And yet he also still uses λαός in other senses, such as when Jenkins translates
λαός as an “army.”85 Similarly, Constantine uses different words for what Jenkins has
rendered as “tribe,” such as variations of φύλος (ὀμόφυλος86 and ἀλλοφύλος87) as well as
γένος,88 while reserving for the latter a host of other meanings, which Jenkins has translates
variably as “stock”89 “kin,”90 “clan,”91 “race,”92 “family,”93 and even “party.”94

82 Ibid, §23:19. See also Dvornik, Jenkins, Lewis, Moravesik, Obolensky and Runciman (eds.), 1962, 80-81, who believe that “only lines 29-32 are relevant.”
83 Ibid, §6:2; §8:5, 31 (as a sub-group of Pečeneg “people”); §26:23, 26, 56, 59, 62 (as both Frankish townsfolk and country-folk); §28:44 (as Venetian townsfolk); §29:2 (as Romano-Dalmatian townsfolk); §30:65 (as a
Croatian genealogical “people”); §32:8, 124 (as a Serbian genealogical “people”); §33:8 (as “Zachlumian” “Serbs”); §37:69 (as a sub-group of Pečeneg “people”); §41:23 (as “Moravian” refugees); §47:4, 7, 19 (as
Cypriot island-folk). The same can be said of Constantine VII’s use of the word λαός in one example from in his military treatise. See Haldon (ed. and trans.), 1990, C:734 (referring to the townsfolk of Constantinople, which Haldon translates accordingly).
84 Ibid, §30:17. Elsewhere, the same word is similarly translated by Jenkins as “throng” (cf. §53:197, 203, 342, 381).
85 Ibid, §21:104 (as a Saracen army); §26:47 (as Berengar’s army); §28:27 (as Pippin’s army); §45:132, 168 (as a Roman army). He often uses other words for “army” such as φοσσάτος (cf. §15:9; §30:49, 55; §32:111, 117) and στρατός (cf. §21:120; §27:17; §29:106, 108; §53:9, 11, 194, 208, 218). See also Haldon (ed. and trans.), 1990, B:18, 37 (translated by Haldon as “population,”), 44, 88 (translated by Haldon as “host,”), 92, 94, 97, 99, 133
86 Ibid, §14:24. See also §14:178-180; §37:57 for ὁμόγενος and ἀλλοφύλος, which Jenkins translates both as “race.” Conversely, Jenkins translates ὁμόφυλος in §29:42, 43 as “their own men.” It would be highly important to note here that Nathan Leidholm, who wrote his PhD at the University of Chicago on notable Byzantine families and kin groups (2016, Political Families in Byzantium: the Social and Cultural Significance of the Genos as Kin Group, c. 900-1150), 99-100, regards the (specifically 10th-c.) use of the term ὁμόφυλος:

“as a designator of shared ethnic or ‘national’ identity […] the term phylon […] is used to designate the ‘nation of Christians’ (τοῦ φύλου χριστιανῶν). In theory, the phylon constituted by homophylai could be either a single family (equivalent to genos) or an entire nation or people, though the term appears far more frequently to indicate the latter.”

87 Ibid, §15:13. This, Jenkins translates as “foreigners,” as was ἄθνικος, (see above n80; §13:96; §31:40; §48:5). Elsewhere, ἐξ ἑτέρας φυλῆς is translated by Jenkins as “of another tribe” (cf. 21:51).
88 Ibid, §13:15, 178, 180 (ὁμόγενος); §15:1; §21:77; §22:38.
91 Ibid, §22:3; §37:34, 39; §38:10; §39:11, 12, 13; §40:1, 4, 44, 50.
Constantine VII frequently introduces his concept of ἔθνος with an origin story, where “national” distinctions are made by lineages from one ancestor or another, as in the case of the Turks (Magyars), Mohammed, and the Frankish king Hugh of Arles. When compared to his discourse on the various “ancient” (cf. pre-monotheistic) ethnicities of Anatolia and Ellas in the De Thematibus [hereafter DT], which he refers to equally as ἔθνη, as he does to the Franks, Turk-Magyars, et al., we would scarcely find a modern Hellene or Anatolian (cf. Greek or Turk) referring to her/himself as either an Aeolian, Dorian, Galatian, Bythinian, Dardanian, Sardian, Karian, Lydian, Phrygian, et al. Such ancient peoples, in Constantine’s estimation in the DT, may have each comprised a distinct ἔθνος, supposedly kin-related to a common ancestry, but together their assimilated (or internalized) Christianity, at various levels, made them varying degrees of Roman in his time, though not necessarily by equal measure. Finally, the fact that Constantine frequently addresses various

96 Ibid, §14; and Dvornik, Jenkins, Lewis, Moravcsik, Obolensky and Runciman (eds.), 1962, 70-72.
97 Ibid, §26; and Dvornik, Jenkins, Lewis, Moravcsik, Obolensky and Runciman (eds.), 1962, 83.

“The object of the passage is to glorify Hugh of Arles, [...] by illustrating his descent from Charles the Great. [...] what interested the Byzantine government was the succession of wearers of the imperial crown in the west, and on them it kept a careful watch. About the development of western politics as such, it was less well informed, because less interested.”
98 Pertusi (ed.), 1952, Constantino Porfirogenito: De Thematibus, Pt. I: 1a:5, 17 (λαός); 1b:10 (ἔθνος), 39 (ἔθνος); 2:6 (γένος); 3:20 (γένος), 23 (γῆς), 26 (γένος); 4:25 (ἔθνος); 5:6 (λαός), 12 (ἔθνος), 22 (ἔθνος); 6:7 (ἔθνος), 12 (ἔθνος), 23 (ἔθνος); 7:1 (ἔθνος), 6 (γένος), 10 (γένος), 22 (γένος); 12:25 (γένος); 14:38 (γένος), 42 (γενέσθαι); 15:23 (γένος); 17:10 (ἔθνος); Pt. II: 1:7 (γένος), 26 (ἔθνος), 34 (ἔθνος), 35 (ἔθνος); 5:4 (ἔθνος); 6:19 (γένος), 23 (λαός), 33 (γενέσθαι); 8:15 (γενέσθαι).
99 For a brief discussion of the geographical misconceptions of the DT, see Vasiliev, 1936, 68.
100 In this regard, while Christianity was the common thread which may have united peoples within the frontiers of the οἰκουμένη, Stephenson, 2000a, 109-110, digresses on the concept of the μιξοβάρβαροι in Byzantine literature and thought in the 10-12th centuries. According to Stephenson, “Mixobarbaroi is perhaps the closest equivalent that classicizing authors could find for people who lived within the frontiers of the οἰκουμενὴ and had signed treaties with the emperor, thereby recognizing the rule of law, but who were not Rhomaioi (Byzantines). Their ethnicity was of less importance [...] pure blood was not a qualification for citizenship in Byzantium.” Nevertheless, as he observes, modern nationalist scholars still speculate on the true “ethnicities” of such μιξοβάρβαροι referred to by authors such as Michael Attaleiates, Niketas Choniates and Anna Komnēnē. For examples, see above chapter 1 n150.
genealogies at length in the DAI, paying particular attention, according to his own sources, to the genealogical origins of each “nation,”101 is hardly surprising given his insistence on preserving “ethnic” homogeneity above all else.102 The same can easily be said about his attempt to project his own genealogy.103 However, his obsession with genealogy in this regard is as inconsistent104 as his ultimate reliance on biblical precedents for genealogical homogeneity.105 Effectually, for Constantine VII, nationhood (an ἔθνος) was predicated on genealogy, not necessarily on a given landscape, which bears a strong resemblance to earlier precedents found in the bible106 and much antique so-called “ethnography” generally. And it

101 In perhaps the simplest example of this, he writes, translated by Jenkins: “[…] concerning also the difference between other nations, their origins [γενεαλογίας τε αὐτῶν] […],” (§προοίμιον:19). See §13:197-200 for a repetition of the same phrase. See also the thoughtful discussion given by Leidholm, 2016, 117-118.

102 Ibid, §13:175-186. Jenkins translates:

“For each nation has different customs and divergent laws and institutions, and should consolidate those things that are proper to it, and should form and develop out of the same nation the associations for the fusion of its life. For just as each animal mates with its own tribe, so it is right that each nations also should marry and cohabit not with those of other race and tongue but of the same tribe and speech. For hence arise naturally harmony of thought and intercourse among one another and friendly converse and living together; but alien customs and divergent laws are likely on the contrary to engender enmities and quarrels and hatreds and broils, which tend to beget not friendship and association but spite and division.”

See also Feldman, 2013, 46 n136. Notably, Obolensky, 1971, 196, remarks on Constantine VII’s insistence in this regard as a “doctrine of ethnic exclusiveness, characteristic […] of the arrogance so often shown by the Byzantines towards foreigners, may sound strange coming from a monarch who affected to believe in the universality of the empire over which he ruled.” Finally, Stephenson, 2000a, 26, remarks concerning Constantine’s admonition to his son against marriages with foreign potentates, particularly that of Maria Lakapēna with Peter I of Bulgaria (DAI §13): “We are reminded that the sources on which we base our interpretations of Byzantine and Balkan history in this period are far from objective statements of fact.”


104 For example, the PVL records that Constantine VII himself sought Olga of Rus’ as a consort. See Cross and Sherbowizt-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, PVL, 82. For a rather extensive list of literature on this topic, see Howard-Johnston, 2000, 302 n2.


106 See for example Moravcsik and Jenkins (ed. and trans.), 2002, DAI, 336. Pohl, 2016, “Distant Peoples: Ibn Fadlan and the Ethnography of Eastern Europe,” makes the exact same point: “The weight of biblical precedent pressure on middle Byzantine ethnographers such as Constantine VII kept them to using old models for ethnic tropes instead of contemporary knowledge readily available.” In a wider pan-monotheistic context, Zhivkov, 2015, 41, remarks:

“The genealogical approach that traces the origin of a ruler or people from one of the sons of Noah (Shem, Ham and Japheth) is typical for the historiography of Jews, Christians and Muslims. […] The idea of a cultural and ethnic differentiation becomes prominent in the same genealogical lines as the time when their descendants are named.”

See also a similar line of inquiry regarding the case of the Khazarian khağan Joseph in his Reply regarding his genealogical descent from the biblical Togarma in chapter 2 above §2.2.2.
hardly needs to be said what quality of historicity can be derived from biblical genealogical precedents in passages such as the Table of Nations.107

Many generations of scholars have weighed in on the perceived preponderance of geographic and ethnographic literature in middle Byzantium.108 While some take a decidedly Gibbonian view of Byzantine ethnography and geography, it is nevertheless conceded that geographical space was not fundamentally attached to ethnic autochthonousness,109 but rather to antique continental notions, such as the tripartite division of the world into Asia, Europe and Africa vis-à-vis a Constantinopolitan perspective.110 That Constantine VII relied on antique assumptions of ethnography should come as no surprise. A simple glance at Moravcsik and Jenkins’ index of sources and parallel passages displays not only his overt reliance on biblical precedence, but also ancient geographer-ethno-graphers such as Herodotus, Strabo, Ptolemy and Plutarch.111 In particular, scholars such as Skinner have demonstrated that such ethnographic thought was not so much preoccupied with the precise permanent geographical spaces inhabited by varying ἔθνη as what constituted their status as respective ἔθνη in the first place: common genealogical ancestries.112

107 Genesis 10. See also Zernatto and Mistretta, 1944, “Nation: the History of a Word,” 351-366. Notably, quite the same can be said for many other rulers, whose notions of nationhood rested almost exclusively on biblical precedent. For example, Joseph’s understanding of his own Judaism, bequeathed from “Togarma,” in King Joseph’s Reply; see Zhivkov, 2015, 45-47. In a remark bearing significant overtones of Anderson’s Imagined Communities, according to Zhivkov, “The idea of a common origin, transmitted through similar genealogical lineages, helps unite the often multilingual community. These genealogies allow for the easier inclusion of foreign groups and tribes that are external for a specific community. The genealogical kinship lines are important also in a foreign political sense, with regard to the relations between the different nomadic tribes. For the Khazar ruler Joseph his descent from Togarmah ensured his dynasty the right to rule over his descendants and not only in theory, but also in reality, since the named peoples come mostly from Khazaria. This power is emphasized already at the beginning of the letter where Joseph calls himself ‘king of Togarmah’.”

108 For an extensive list of older scholarship dating back to the early 20th century, see Howard-Johnston, 2000, 303 n5.


111 Moravcsik and Jenkins (ed. and trans.), 2002, DAI, 336-339. Such models for later ethnographies, both within the Byzantine oikoumenē and the Islamic ummah, were quite widespread according to Pohl, 2016, “Distant Peoples: Ibn Fadlan and the Ethnography of Eastern Europe.” In fact, Pohl has contended that Constantine VII did not collect new material after the 4th century and additionally, agreeing with Kaldellis, holds that such ethnographies as provided by Constantine VII, are largely insular and ethnocentric.

Continuing on with notions of territorial belonging, as opposed to tribal belonging, while Magdalino acknowledges Constantine VII’s use of words such as ἔθνος and γένος in both the DAI and the DT as redolent of “geographical thinking,” he does not point out that such words evoked notions of genealogy as much as, if not more than geography for Constantine VII.113 This is why, for Constantine VII, Aeolians, Lydians, Phrygians et al. constituted ἔθνη in the DT as much as Rus’, Franks, Turk-Magyars, Pečenegs, et al. did in the DAI. Though Magdalino acknowledges such inconsistencies of pre-monotheistic tribalism and ethnicity in the DAI, he fails to explicitly caution modern scholars, nationalist or otherwise,114 against using such data to support their claims of primordial “peoplehood,”115 which, as Howard-Johnston points out, cannot function as precursors to modern ethnicities, but simply as tribes, particularly in the case of the Turk-Magyars and Pečenegs.116

The DAI’s “limited ecumenism,” as advocated by Louggēs,117 presupposes its ultimate use as a foreign policy manual rather than an ethnography in the modern sense.118 Many have agreed with his position, such as Howard-Johnston, who also sheds considerable doubt on the historicity of much of the document’s pertinence to what he deems “the North,”119 which I would cautiously agree with. Nevertheless, Howard-Johnston still adheres to a view

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113 Magdalino, 2013, 23-41. Much the same can be said of Obolensky’s reading of the DAI. See Obolensky, 1971, 28.
114 See for example Kaldellis, 2013, Ethnography after Antiquity: Foreign Lands and Peoples in Byzantine Literature, 88. He writes regarding the DAI:

“Most of the debate about the text has focused [...] on the factual reliability of [the DAI’s] chapters on the origin of the Serbs, Croats, and Hungarians on the other, as modern historians of those nations find themselves in the unhappy position of having to rely on this text to reconstruct key aspects of their national history. These debates have not always been pleasant or conclusive, and we do not need to involve ourselves in them here. Most have focused narrowly on specific passages or even single words and have not considered the overall structure, purpose, and meaning of the work.”

See also Howard-Johnston, 2000, 303.
115 See for example Ascherson, 1995, Black Sea, 103, who remarks of a “bazaar of ethnic and linguistic nationalism which is selling quick identities all around the Black Sea.” See also Curta, 2006a, Southeastern Europe in the Middle Ages, 500-1250, 137-138, for precisely such conjecture regarding imagined Croatian and Serbian “ethnic origins” derived from the DAI. See also Obolensky, 1971, 59-60; and Stephenson, 2000a, 25-29, 117-118.
117 Louggēs, 1990, Ἡ Ἰδεολογία τῆς Βυζαντινῆς Ἰστοριογραφίας, 106-112. Similarly, Vasiliev, 1936, 122 supposes that Constantine VII was “unable to take the measures he wished in the north.”
118 See Kaldellis, 2013, 91, what he refers to as the “core.” See also Howard-Johnston, 2000, 301-336; and Stephenson, 2000a, 33.
119 Howard-Johnston, 2000, 3001-336. This would notably contrast quite glaringly with the consideration of the DAI’s geographical description of “the north” given by Obolensky, 1994, Byzantium and the Slavs, 2, as “the scrupulous care with which this region is described therein [...]”. His estimation of the document changes little between 1971 and 1994: see idem, 1971, 149-150.
of the northern “peoples” as having “polities in their own right, with constitutions and defined territories” (my italics). On the contrary, I would argue that such a statement makes far too broad an assumption of primordial ethnic “peoplehood” for those which he lauds Constantine VII for not dismissing as “barbarians.” First, although the DAI mentions several “peoples” such as the so-called “Black Bulgars” and “Qabars,” they hardly would have comprised definitive “polities” even by 10th-c. standards. Second, how can Howard-Johnston suppose that such peoples had constitutions? In a judicial sense, this would be patently absurd and in a demographic sense, there is no way to know whether populations subjugated by one ruler or another necessarily defined themselves as such. Finally, to assume that such peoples, whether the two exemplified above or the Rus’, Franks, Turk-Magyars or any other, had “defined territories,” would be entirely anachronistic, as if we arbitrarily assigned border lines between peoples who knew only geographical frontiers if they knew geography at all. Conceiving of northern peoples, the Poljanians for example, as imagining “defined territories” for their tribe, assumes a fantastic geographical awareness which I find it difficult to believe they possessed. Ultimately, this perspective assumes that the concept of “peoplehood,” or ἔθνος, was a bottom-up phenomenon, as if all of the members of a given ἔθνος acted on behalf of some imagined supra-awareness. In truth, the

120 Ibid, 305-306.
121 Ibid. That said, it would perhaps be notable to include here the assertion of Curta, 2006a, 98: “it has been demonstrated that Constantine Porphyrogenitus often used ‘Scythians’ in reference to steppe nomads, such as Khazars or Magyars.”
122 Moravcsik and Jenkins (ed. and trans.), 2002, DAI, §12. For more information on the so-called “Black Bulgars,” see above n19; and Dvornik, Jenkins, Lewis, Moravcsik, Obolensky and Runciman (eds.), 1962, 62.
123 Ibid, §39. For more on this so-called ἔθνος and “the Qabar revolt” theory, see above chapter 2 §1.2.1.2; and Dvornik, Jenkins, Lewis, Moravcsik, Obolensky and Runciman (eds.), 1962, 149.
125 See for example Berend, 1999, “Medievalists and the Notion of the Frontier,” 55-72. This is not to say that the author of the PVL, for example, did not have a clear geographical awareness, independent from Byzantine sources such as the DAI. See for example Melnikova, 2013, “Mental Maps of the Old Russian Chronicle-Writer of the Early Twelfth Century,” 317-340.
126 See Stephenson, 2000a, 4-5.
127 However, this was the very basis for older scholarship, such as Fallmereyer’s infamous thesis on primordialist Greek ethnicity, or that of Grekov, 1959, Kiev Rus, 36-37, who wrote:

“Byzantium was ‘barbaricized’ and began life anew. Here too, the Slavs played a decisive role in changing the Byzantine social system. Constantine Porphyrogenitus declares that “the entire Greek land was Slavonicized, became ‘barbarian’ from the 8th century onwards.”

Grekov does not cite where this information was found in Constantine VII’s writing. Presumably he refers to the DAI §49 and §52, but the specific use of the term ‘Slavonicized’ is in fact attested in the DT: ἐσθλαβωμένη (ἐσθλαβώθη – Archie Dunn, personal communication, 28 April, 2018). See Bekker (ed.), 1840, Constantinus Porphyrogenitus de Thematibus et de Administrando Imperio, 54.
“peoples” which the DAI refers to, are the rulers of various ἔθνη with their own agency, but not the actual peoples themselves. Their top-down rule, what Russian sociologists refer to as “potestary state formations,” is truly what the DAI refers to when it refers to ἔθνη: that is, the genealogy of the rulers, not the ruled.


“Классическому племени […] присуща большая степень этнокультурной и социально-попестарной оформленности; целостность этого типа племени обеспечивалась родственными связями (реальными или фиктивными) и потестарными институтами во главе с вождем, обусловливающими и большую степень этнокультурной унификации, т. е. классическое племя — это этнопотестарный, или этносоциальный организм […]. Классические племена характерны для земледельцев и скотоводов позднепервобытной эпохи. Для этой эпохи характерны и раннеполитические (военно-политические) объединения (союзы, лиги, федерации, конфедерации) родственных и соседних племен, часто иерархически организованные по принципу неравноправия (неполноправия) отдельных племен («младших», «усыновленных» и т. п.). На базе таких объединений происходит становление вождеств или раннегосударственных структур (или их аналогов) типа так называемых варварских королевств у древних германцев и первых княжеств у славян.”

129 As Kaldellis, 2013, 92 has remarked:

“The typical Byzantine origo has the following features. It tracks the geographical movements of each people from its “original” homeland to its current location, and often notes changes in its relations to surrounding powers and geopolitical configurations. Peoples are normally grouped under leaders, whose children typically split off, taking segments of the group with them.”

130 Referring to the Turk-Magyars specifically, see Pálóczi-Horváth, 1989. Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians: Steppe Peoples of Medieval Hungary, 14. For a similar assessment, see Curta, 2006a, 183. This, I would argue, neatly concludes off the point made by Kaldellis, 2013, 90-91: “The [DAI does offer] much information about the geography, history, and rulers of many foreign peoples, but it does not for all that contain much ethnography.” It would also be worth pointing out that Pohl specifically, has conceived of ethnicity as originating as both a product of bottom-up cohesive sentiment and top-down power imposition (personal communication, 14 March, 2016). Nevertheless, I would still agree with Popov, 2015, 16 when he writes:

“Другими словами, корреляция этнокультурных и потестарно-политических процессов приводит к осознанию населением данного политического организма своей этнической
Therefore, I think it would be fair to suggest that concepts of ethnicity and nationality were hardly manifested clearly in the *DAI*, either as ultimately geographical or genealogical phenomena in the mid-10th-c. mind of Constantine VII. And we would be misled, as 21st-c. scholars, to interpret his words as the ultimate truth of ethnicity and nationality for modern nations.\(^\text{131}\) While his scholarship, certainly for his time, was outstanding, we cannot take his

специфики как выражения единства и гомогенности потестарно-политической общности и, в конечном счете, вполне закономерно формирует этнопотестарные и/или этнополитические организмы. Именно этот механизм появления и становления этничности/этнической культуры и было предложено назвать модусом потестарности (или потестарно-политическим модусом).”

I have translated this as:

“In other words, the correlation of ethno-cultural and potestarian-political processes leads to the recognition by a population of a given political organism for their ethnic specificity as an expression of the unity and homogeneity of a potestarian-political community and, ultimately, quite logically forms ethno-potestary and/or ethno-political organisms. It was precisely this mechanism of the appearance and the establishment of ethnicity/ethnic culture, which was proposed to be called the modus of potestary (or the potestary-political modus).”


“In our attempts to restore the history of early Rus, we may fail unless we are able to disassociate ourselves from modern concepts such as *nation* and *state*. A medieval state was something quite different from the territorial state of modern times, which emerged during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and is still undergoing constant change. We have to remind ourselves, among other things, that an ethnic group is not necessarily the equivalent of a nation. Whereas the first is only a biological reality, the second is the product of intellect and can encompass individuals of various different ethnic origins. Consequently, the *state* as an expression of nationhood should not be construed as an ethnic or biological formation.”

Remarking on the lessons drawn from Khazaria in this regard, Soteri, 1995, “Khazaria: a Forgotten Jewish Empire,” 12, writes:

“The problems of nationalism in Eastern Europe are much more complex than a simple explanation of religious difference. However, using the example of the Khazars and their descendants, it can be exemplified that nationalist movements, with their tenacious convictions about race, can affect the perceptions of both aggressor and victim alike which, when one probes deeper into the espoused ideologies, seem to be based on false premises and, ultimately, contradictory theories.”

For such modern beliefs in primordial ethnicity in Eastern Europe, particularly with reference to such Slavic neo-pagan movements in Russia, Belorus, Ukraine and elsewhere in the former USSR, see Ivakhiv, 2005, “Nature and Ethnicity in East European Paganism: an Environmental Ethnic of the Religious Right?” 194-225; and Shnirelman, 2007b, “Ancestral Wisdom and Ethnic Nationalism: A View from Eastern Europe,” 41-60. For examples of modern scholars projecting their own identities onto their models, see Stepanov, 1999, *Власт и авторитет в раннесредновековна България (VII - ср. IX в.),* 26, who, referring to another source, the 12th-c. chronicle of Michaēl the Syrian, projects his own Bulgarian identity on his interpretation of ancient phenomena:

“Whether the aforementioned account of Michael the Syrian actually depicts one of the last westward migrations of the Proto-Bulgarian tribes, or it can be seen as the concise version of the vast spaces OUR
words for granted, as he does make human mistakes regarding the ethnography of human geography both within and without his empire in all of his works, especially given our modern notions of ethnicity, which would be anachronistic to apply to imagined ancient “nations.” Additionally, let us consider Walter Pohl’s rejection of the archaeology of primordial ethnicity in Western Europe in comparison with its continued arbitrary assumption in Eastern European archaeology: why would the concept apply in one region but not the other? In other words, it is not enough to simply dismiss primordial ethnicity as a misguided 19-20th-c. arbitrary assumption without a thorough reading of the sources from which such assumptions originated. Quite succinctly, primordial ethnicity was even an arbitrary 10th-c. assumption as well.

Ch. 5 3.1 Deductions

Byzantine Pontic policy before 989 CE largely consisted of indirect influence and economic incentivizing, as referred to in the DAI, and treaty-making, particularly with the Rus’ (referred to in the PVL), via her Crimean possessions, particularly Chersōn, instead of top-down coercion through Christianity. Because Khazaria, or the khağans specifically, had not been definitively brought into the Christian oikoumenē, and the representative potentates of the Pečenegs and the Rus’ were as yet uninterested in Byzantine Christianity,

ancient forefathers had to cross to come to Europe, it is difficult to say today.” Quoted in Zhivkov, 2015, 39; author’s italics.

Similarly, according to Grekov, “Христианство стало проникать к нам задолго до Х века.” (B. D. Grekov, 1953, 476.) I would translate this as, “Christianity first penetrated into our country long before the 10th century.” (Y. Sdobnikov has translated this sentence without acknowledging Grekov’s original remark “к нам,” instead, Sdobnikov translates his words as “this country.” This translation is slightly untrue to the original. Grekov’s original use of the words “к нам,” meaning “our [country],” connotes a heavily vested interest in the writing. This was already quite apparent to Huxley, 1980, “The Scholarship of Constantine Porphyrogenitus,” 31-40. Even Toynbee, despite his overt anti-Semitism and maverick status in Anglo-American academia, pointed out as much regarding the mistakes made in the DT and especially in the DAI: see Toynbee, 1973, 578, 582 n1, 599-605.

See the discussion given by Pohl, 2013, “Introduction – Strategies of Identification: a Methodological Profile,” in Strategies of Identification: Ethnicity and Religion in Early Medieval Europe, eds. idem and Heydemann, 1-64. I also thank Anthony Kaldellis (personal communication, 8 June, 2018) for his suggestion in this regard.


Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, PVL, 65-69; 73-78; 88-90.

See for example Feldman, 2013, passim.

See above chapter 2 §2.1.1.2 and above (in the present chapter 5) §1.1.1.

See the previous chapter 4 above §2.2 and §3.
the emperors were limited to shaping affairs in the north primarily with trade inducements.\textsuperscript{139} With the exception of the conversion of the Bulgar Khan Boris in 869 CE,\textsuperscript{140} intermittently successful missionary efforts such as those of Cyril and Methodios would not bear fruit in the form of what Obolensky called a “commonwealth” in the Black Sea littoral until after the baptism of Vladimir I in 987 CE,\textsuperscript{141} corroborated, as we will discuss in the subsequent chapter, in the \textit{Notitiae Episcopatum}.\textsuperscript{142} Therefore, following Shepard, I would argue that the “Byzantine Commonwealth” specifically began with the conversions of foreign potentates in the 9-11\textsuperscript{th} c., instead of ca. 500 CE as Obolensky infers.\textsuperscript{143}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Feldman, 2013, 54 n175.
\item Ibid, 90.
\item See for example Shepard, 2006b, “The Byzantine Commonwealth 1000–1550,” 1-52.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Chapter 6: Ecumenism embraced: challenging conventional ideas of sovereignty in the 11-12th-c.
Black Sea littoral*

* Abstract: Byzantine Pontic policy after 989 CE: this chapter seeks to build an extensive model of 11-12th-c. Byzantine political and economic influence around the Black Sea littoral after the late-10th-c. conversion of Vladimir I. Having previously contextualized several case studies, which had hitherto been subject to mostly nationalist explanations, how can we reinterpret the Byzantine relationship with the Black Sea and her northern neighbors after the latters’ respective monotheizations in the 10th century?
In this chapter I will discuss the precise nature of the relationship of Byzantium with her northern steppe neighbors, putting earlier, decontextualized questions about whether or not Rus’ was a vassal state of Byzantium\(^1\) into a broader context of whether or not much of Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, from the Danube to the Volga, and perhaps beyond, was effectively vassalized in some form or another, to Byzantium; furthermore, what was that form? How was this manifested economically and politically? Was there a form of tribute or tax being collected? What form did it take and who collected it? And how was suzerainty exercised? The sigillographic record will be employed to give the research a better image of the extent of Byzantine administration, while studies of coin hoards in the steppe and forest-steppe regions will supply most of the information for economic analyses.

Chronologically, this chapter embarks from 989 and means to address the evolving processes and events in the Black Sea littoral. I will begin with the so-called “feudalization” of Rus’ after Christianization\(^2\) and the development of the Rus’ metropolitanate during and after the reign of Jaroslav I. This section will explore the 11\(^{th}\)-c. rise of Rus’ in light of previous historiographical interpretations. Precisely, what were imperial reactions to both processes, namely feudalization and church development, as they coincided in the mid-11\(^{th}\) century? Although the political and social aspects have been exhaustively discussed by countless scholars, the economic aspect of the Rus’ Christianization on the entire region has been largely neglected. How was Kievan Christianization manifested in taxing local populations and how did the economy change \textit{vis-à-vis} Christianization? Did Christianity become an expression of identity and loyalty or was it merely a tool of subjugation? Can such political, social and economic factors of Rus’ Christianization be explained in terms of Zuckerman’s concept of imperial “Pontic policy?” If so, how? And would they be detectable in both textual and archaeological sources?


\(^2\) Most principally in this regard, see Petrukhin, 2006, “Феодализм перед судом русской историографии,” 161-170. While terms such as “feudalism” and “vassalage” carry modern connotations which are absent from primary sources themselves and remain, in certain respects, more contentious within modern historiographical interpretation than in original parlance, I believe it preferable to use such terminology, albeit flawed, to generating neologisms to describe the same phenomena, much in the same way terms such as “paganism” and even “Byzantium,” while alternately either misleading or crass by some measures, are useful to describe broad historical processes on which most would agree. In this regard, see also Kazhdan, 1992, “Russian Pre-Revolutionary Studies on Eleventh-Century Byzantium,” 111-124.
To be clear, many scholars have made blanket assumptions of Rus’ “statehood” beginning long before, and certainly long after, Vladimir’s baptism. Additionally, the same is true for Byzantine “statehood” itself, as much modern scholarship projects such modern notions onto Byzantium and Rus’. In this chapter, such assumptions will be challenged as we “seek to remove the color of anachronism.”

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3 Archie Dunn, personal communication, 9 September, 2016.
Before us lay the broad waters of the Euxine Sea tranquilly reposing, and beyond, far away, darkly outlined on the blue firmament, stretched the lofty range of Caucasus, the birthplace of man’s noblest race; where the children of the hills, for the last thirty years, have grappled and still wrestle with the boasting colossus of Muscovy. The despot’s slaves and the sons of freedom, in a death-struggle—these to ravage, and the others to defend their wives and children and their mountain homes—loved with such deep, such wild affection.*

1.1 Local allegiance networks in the 11th-c. Black Sea littoral

In the last chapter, the discussion centered on Byzantium and northern peoples around the Black Sea littoral before their respective monotheizations (or in Khazaria’s case, failed Judaization). Before embarking on the early history of Christianity in the north after the reign of Vladimir I, I would like to begin by reviewing the changing relationship between Kiev and Constantinople in the first half of the 11th century and the interrelated events within and without the Black Sea proper. Therefore, the goal of this present section will be to evaluate events in the Black Sea, in Chersōn, Trebizond and other urban, coastal entrepôts, in light of the larger processes taking place further away from the Black Sea proper. For example, supposing Vladimir’s conversion (987-989) cemented his dynasty’s place in the oikoumenē, what caused the largely naval wars of 1016, 1024 and 1043, which involved the rulers of Rus’ and Byzantium? Have modern interpretations of these events done justice to them? I will argue that these three conflicts, while superficially incomparable, in that one was ostensibly a cooperation between Rus’ and Byzantium (1016) and the other two were conflicts (1024 and 1043), were truly more of a continuity from previous Rus’-Byzantine wars to secure profitable trade concessions from the empire, albeit on an individual or group level, instead of outcomes of some imagined “state” foreign policy.

1.1.1 Contextualizing the events of 1016, 1024 and 1043 amid Rus’ and Byzantium

In the previous chapter, I mentioned the expedition of the joint forces of Mstislav of Tmutarakan’ and Basil II referred to in the histories of Kedrēnos and Skylitzēs. It should be noted that as far back as Svjatoslav’s campaign against Petar I on the lower Danube (967-971

* Bentley (ed.), 1855, “The Peninsula of Kertch and the Cimmerian Bosphorus,” 81-82.
4 See above chapter 5 n53 and n69. Notably, however, there is no reference to this campaign in the PVL. See for example Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (ed. and trans.), 1953, PVL, 131-132. Apparently, Jaroslav was preoccupied struggling against his half-brother Svjatopolk I.
the area of Tmutarakan’ on the Straits of Kerč, (the Kimmerian Bosporos) between the eastern Crimea and Taman was deemed by Leōn Diakonos to be Svjatoslav’s “own territory.”

That these areas were simultaneously regarded as Khazaria at that time, and for many years to come, should come as little surprise then for the events which took place, allegedly, in the year 1016. These have been usually interpreted as joint operations between Rus’ and Byzantium, and the initiation of the recently Christianized cooperation of the rulers of Rus’ with the empire, that is, if we discount Vladimir’s campaign against Chersōn (987-989 CE), which I do not think is recommendable.

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8 For example, Vasiliev, 1936, The Goths in the Crimea, 134 writes:

“The friendly relations established between the Empire and the Russian principality after Vladimir’s marriage to the Byzantine Princess and his conversion to Christianity led to the fact that in 1016 the two states were acting in Crimea in common in order definitely to reestablish Byzantine authority there. Although the Khazar state had been crushed by the Russians in the sixties of the tenth century, some groups of Khazars evidently still remained in Crimea and at times raided the Byzantine regions there. According to a Byzantine chronicler of the eleventh and twelfth centuries [Kedrēnos], in 1016 Emperor Basil II sent to Khazaria a fleet under the command of Mongus, son of Andronicus, and with the aid of Sfengus, Vladimir’s brother, conquered the country; its ruler George Tsulus was taken prisoner in the first battle. This expedition sailed no doubt to the Crimea, since Khazaria or Gazaria was the name given to the Crimea in the Middle Ages because of the former Khazar predominance there. This was an attempt of the Byzantine government to do away with the remnants of the Khazars who were hostile to the Imperial interests in the Crimea. It was brilliantly successful, and from 1016 on the Byzantine power in the Peninsula was completely restored as far east as Bosporus and Kerch, where in the eleventh century, according to a seal, the protospatharius and strategos of Bosporus, Arcadius, was a governor appointed by the Emperor.”

See also Artamonov, 1962, История хазар, 437; Sokolova, 1971, “Печати Георгия Цулы и события 1016 г. в Херсонесе,” 68-74; Romašov, 2005, “Историческая география Хазарского каганата (V-XIII вв.),” 144-146; Litavrin, 1967, “Русско-Византийские отношения в XI-XII вв.,” 347-353; Gadlo, 1990, “Тмутаорканская этюды III (Мстислав),” 22-27; and Bykusova, 1972, “Русско-византийские отношения середины XI века,” 51, who writes: “Объединенными русско-византийскими силами в 1016 г. были ликвидированы остатки хазарских владений в Таврике,” which I have translated as: “With the combined Rus’-Byzantine forces in 1016, the vestiges of Khazar dominions in Taurika (Crimea) were eliminated”; and the discussion given by Zhivkov, 2015, 264:

“In 1016, after an almost 40-year war between Bulgaria and Byzantium, the Christianized Bulgars in the Crimea rebelled against the Byzantine Empire (led by Georgius Tzul who probably a Byzantine
Nevertheless, Skylitzēs briefly records an imperial operation against a local Crimean ruler commanded by a Rus’ captain in 1016. However, it is clear that our primary textual source is rather slim on details and therefore, it has been left to the students of material culture to supply their own interpretations of the sigillography primarily.

The sigillographer Cheynet believes that due to his seals, Geōrgios Tzoulas was of Khazar origin, though he declines to give specifics about how exactly the seals prove this, aside from merely stating, like Skylitzēs, that he was the archon of Khazaria, though also the stratēgos of Chersōn, which is significant in its own right. The Tzoulas family, judging dignitary) and were crushed by the joined forces of the Rus’ and the Byzantines, who together plundered the Bulgarian lands on the Balkans as well.”

As with much of Zhivkov’s scholarship, it is unclear who or what exactly his assumed ethnic composition refers to. In this case, who exactly does he mean by “Bulgars” and where in the brief excerpt of Skylitzēs are his alleged “Bulgars” referred to?


“Ὁ δὲ βασιλεύς ἀπελθὼν ἐν Κωνσταντινοπόλει, κατὰ τὸν Ἰαννουάριον μῆνα τοῦ ἑξακισχιλιοστοῦ πεντακοσιοστοῦ ἐτοῦ, στόλον εἰς Χαζαρίαν ἐκπέμπει, ἔξαρχον ἔχοντα τὸν Μογγόν, υἱὸν Ἀνδρονίκου δουκὸς τοῦ Λυδοῦ· καὶ τῇ συνεργίᾳ Σφέγγου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ Βλαδιμηροῦ, ὑπέταξε τὴν χώραν, τοῦ ἄρχοντος αὐτῆς Γεωργίου τοῦ Τζούλη ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ προσβολῇ συλληφθέντος.”

Wortley (trans.), 2010, John Skylitzes’ A Synopsis of Byzantine History, 811-1057, 336, has translated this as:

“The emperor returned to Constantinople in January, AM 6524 [CE 1016], and sent a fleet against Chazaria under the command of Mongos, the brother of Vladimir and brother-in-law of the emperor, he subdued the region and actually captured its governor, George Tzoulas, in the first engagement.”

As for Kedrēnos’ text, it largely matches that of Skylitzēs account of the affair, though Skylitzēs’ narrative includes the date fully spelled out (ἐξακισχιλιοστοῦ πεντακοσιοστοῦ ἐτοῦ τετάρτου), while Kedrēnos abbreviates it (’σφκδ’) and he also omits Sphengos as a brother-in-law of the emperor, leaving Sphengos as simply a brother (τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως). See Bekker (ed.), 1839, Georgius Cedrenus, vol. II, 464. We may also note that Wortley translates the word ἄρχον as “governor” and the word χώραν as “region,” even though alternatively it would usually be “land,” “country,” or in the context of contemporary reference to Crimea, as “climata,” per the common usage in Latin. For example, in the 6th-c. Synekdēmos of leroklēs (ed. Parthey, 1866, 140-141), which lists all concurrent areas subject to the Constantinopolitan patriarch, the Latin translation of such areas, including Crimea and even Khazaria in fact, references “climata,” as opposed to the usage of words such as ἄρχοντεία or ἐπαρχία.

In this regard, it would be important to note that Skylitzēs’ use of the word χώραν is not technical, which, according to Archie Dunn (personal communication, 24 January, 2017), indicates the perception that this “region” was not a formal province of the empire, as distinct from contemporary Cherson, even though the two are associated by other sources discussed below.


12 See for example Feldman, 2013, 70 n236. Curiously, Carter, 2003, 181, does not even mention a Khazarian connection, simply referring instead to “the rebellion of Chersonites in AD 1016.”
by the broad extent of their seals, seems to have occupied a prominent place in local Crimean politics. However, to ascertain whether or not they were “Khazar” in their identity may be ultimately fruitless, since the Khazar identity, if not Judaic or Turkic-speaking, is out of the question, assuming that with a name such as Geōrgios, the assumption that he was Jewish, while not entirely doubtful, would be nevertheless unlikely. As I have previously argued, the local prōtevōntes, along with imperially appointed stratēgoi and even prōtospatharioi, of Chersōn and the Klimata in general, were frequently the same individuals and moreover, frequently constituted rebellious thorns in the sides of the Constantinopolitan emperors. In this context, Vladimir I’s campaign against Chersōn was not so much an act of defiance against Constantinople as it was an act on behalf of Constantinople to subdue recalcitrant subjects. While it is impossible to say for a fact that this campaign (CE 987-989) was meant as an accommodating alternative to his predecessors’ earlier 9-10th-c. campaigns, in the vein of Olga’s efforts to garner favorable treatment, and primarily to secure lucrative trade agreements, it seems that when contextualized with a cooperative engagement in 1016, this was the result, along with allegedly clearing the last remains of “Khazaria” in Crimea, which could simply be a local, autonomous archon, a Tzoulas.

That said, we must remember that Skylitzēs is the only source that mentions this event. Mstislav “of Tmutarakan,” never actually appears in this source and there is no definitive proof that he took part, save for the assumption that he was in Tmutarakan’ at the same time

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14 Contrary, for example to Brook, 2006, The Jews of Khazaria, 155, who seems to take Skylitzēs’ identification of Tzoulas as “the last Khazar kagan” for granted.
15 See for example above chapter 3 n106 on a Trebizond-found seal of a certain Efthymios (Εὐθύμιος) which bears Judaic symbols: a Christian Greek name ostensibly belonging to a Jew as well as a seal of a certain Theodore Kourkoutēs in Hebrew (figs. 102-103).
16 Feldman, 2013, passim.
17 See for example Zimin, 1973, Хозяи На Руси (С Древнейших Времен До Конца XV в.), 51, who writes: “Но и Владимир сумел добиться существенных уступок от Царьграда, взяв в Крыму греческую крепость Корсунь.” I have translated this as: “But also Vladimir was able to achieve significant concessions from Constantinople, capturing the Greek fortress of Cherson in the Crimea.”
21 His epithet is alluded to as such in the PVL. See Cross and Sherbowizt-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, PVL, 119, 250 n103.
22 See for example Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 200, who relate Mstislav to the event without actually positing that he took part in it:
due to his assignment there by his father, Vladimir I, a puzzling association which has successfully tempted many historians. More to the point, because this obscure event in the year 1016 CE is only mentioned in one source, it cannot be trusted to bear the weight of much modern theorizing and contextualizing.

The same can be said for another episode mentioned by Skylitzēs, dating to 1024 CE, when a squadron of Rus’ attacked imperial positions south of Constantinople. Wortley claims in a corresponding footnote that “this episode reveals how the Varangian guard was replenished.” While I would not disagree with him, once again, due to this episode’s appearance in this source alone, I would be cautious to assign too much weight to any given theory, such as that of Blöndal and Benedikz, for example, who propose that the name of the...

“The Byzantine historian John Skylitzēs tells of a certain Sphengos, prince of the Rus, who cooperated with a Byzantine naval expedition against ‘Khazaria’ in 1016. ‘Sphengos’ is probably a Greek enunciation of a Scandinavian name such as Svein or Sveinki. At around the same time Mstislav himself is reported to have subjugated the Kasogians (the Dyge of the Kuban region and northern Caucasus).”

“Kai Άννης δὲ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως ἀδελφῆς ἐν Ῥωσίᾳ ἀποθανούσης, καὶ πρὸ αὐτῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αὐτῆς Βλαδιμηροῦ, Χρυσόχειρ τις συγγενὴς ὡς τοῦ τελευτήσαντος, ἄνδρας ὀκτακόσιους προσεταιρίσαμεν καὶ πλοίοις ἐμβιβάσας, ἦλθεν εἰς Κωνσταντινούπολιν ὡς τάχα μισθοφορήσων, τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως καταθεῖναι τὰ ὅπλα καταθεῖσαν, καὶ οὕτω ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐντυχίαν, μὴ θελήσας διῆλθε τὴν Προποντίδα. ἐν Ἀβύδῳ δὲ γενόμενος καὶ τῷ στρατηγοῦντι τῶν παραλίων, κατῆλθεν εἰς Λῆμνον. ἐκεῖσε δὲ παρὰ τοῦ στόλου τῶν Κιβυρραιωτῶν, καὶ Δαβὶδ τοῦ ἀπὸ Ἀχριδῶν στρατηγοῦντος Σάμου, καὶ Νικηφόρου τοῦ Καβάσιλα, δουκὸς ὃντος Θεσσαλονίκης, παρασπονδηθέντες ἀπεσφάγησαν.”

Wortley, 2010, 347, has translated this as:

“Anna, the emperor’s sister, died in Russia, predeceased by Vladimir, her husband. Then a man named Chrysocheir, a relative of his, embarked a company of eight hundred men and came to Constantinople, ostensibly to serve as mercenaries. The emperor ordered him to lay down his arms and then he would receive him but [the Russian] was unwilling to do this and sailed through the Propontis. When he came to Abydos he gave battle to the commander there whose duty was to protect the shores and easily defeated him. He passed on to Lemnos where, beguiled by offers of peace, they were all slaughtered by the navy of the Kibyrrhaioite [theme], the commander of Samos, David of Ochrid, and the duke of Thessalonike, Nikephoros Kabasilas.”
Rus’ leader itself, Chrysocheir, could be read as Eadmund, and therefore tie “English noblemen” to Kiev as early as the first quarter of the 11th century. However, it may be helpful to recall that the recruitment of generalized Varangian mercenaries was quite a widespread phenomenon fairly soon after Vladimir’s baptism, both among the Rus’ and for the emperors, and in the context of the battles for succession amongst the Vladimiroviči (the sons of Vladimir I), the Rus’ hardly presented a united front.

Consequently, we may be best served to continue on to the Byzantine-Rus’ war of 1043. The event, far better documented than the last two, can be found in four main sources, quoted in the corresponding footnotes, in the Chronographia of Michaël Psellos, in the History of Michaël Attaleiatēs, in the Synopsis of Skylitzēs and in the PVL. We ought to note the broad consensus between the three Byzantine accounts.

———. 25 Blöndal and Benedikz, 1978, The Varangians of Byzantium, 50. However, I would agree with the authorship here that Basil II:

“did not want anyone, not even the Russians, to get into the habit of demanding something from him; nor would he deal with Chrysocheir unless he and his men surrendered their weapons, and when the latter resisted, this demand, he had his subordinates destroy him, though in the event, they had to resort to treachery to succeed.”

26 Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 202-203.


29 Wortley, (trans.), 2010, 404-407; and Thurn (ed.), 1973, Ioannis Skylitzes Synopsis Historiarum, 430-433 [21:6]. Taking into consideration Psellus’ eyewitness testimony, Skylitzēs gives us perhaps the longest, most balanced and detailed account of the episode, even though he confuses the Vladimir, son of Jaroslav with the Vladimir, father of Jaroslav (Wortley, 2010, Skylitzēs, 405 n43) and is written roughly half a century after these events, although according to Wortley, and as Skylitzēs himself makes clear, he made use of oral testimony for some of his latter accounts:

Wortley (trans.), 2010, (p. 3): “I added whatever I learnt from the mouths of sage old men.”

30 Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, PVL, 138-139 and 260-261 n175. According to the Russian Primary Chronicle under the year 6551/1043 CE:

“Yaroslav sent his son Vladimir to attack Greece, and entrusted him with a large force. He assigned the command to Vjšhata, father of Yan. Vladimir set out by ship, arrived at the Danube, and proceeded toward Tsar’grad. A great storm arose which broke up the ships of the Russes; the wind damaged even the Prince's vessel, and Ivan, son of Tvοrimir, Yaroslav's general, took the Prince into his boat. The other soldiers of Vladimir to the number of six thousand were cast on shore, and desired to return to Rus', but none of the Prince's retainers went with them. Then Vjšhata announced that he would accompany them, and disembarked from his vessel to join them, exclaiming, ‘If I survive, it will be with the soldiers, and if I perish, it will be with the Prince's retainers.’ They thus set out to return to Rus’. It now became known to the Greeks how the Russes had suffered from the storm, and the Emperor, who was called Monomakh, sent fourteen ships to pursue them. When Vladimir and his retainers perceived that the Greeks were pursuing them, he wheeled about, dispersed the Greek ships, and returned to Rus' on his ships. But the
To summarize the affair, a final, unsuccessful naval raid against Constantinople in 1043, instigated by Jaroslav (Vladimirovič) and led by his eldest son, Vladimir of Novgorod (Jaroslavič), eventually ended in disaster, as reflected by the narratives of Skylitzēs and Attaleiatēs, and personally witnessed by Psellus, who nevertheless left a rather exaggerated account. According to Skylitzēs, the provocation was “a dispute with some Scyth merchants (Rus’) at Byzantium; the matter escalated out of hand and an illustrious Scyth was killed.” By July, Vladimir Jaroslavič had arrived with a considerable force, although the sources disagree on the precise size. According to Skylitzēs, the Rus’ numbered 100,000, whereas according to Attaleiatēs, they numbered “no fewer than 400 ships;” finally, according to Psellus, the Rus’ ships, or monoxyloi, were simply “almost too numerous to count.” Nevertheless, Constantine IX Monomachos, the reigning emperor, hastily assembled an imperial navy and met the Rus’ fleet in the Black Sea at an anchorage named Faros according to Skylitzēs, while Psellus and Attaleiatēs insist that the battle took place, as in the Byzantine-Rus’ battle of 1024, in the Sea of Marmara. After a considerable delay, Vladimir demanded of the emperor an absurd demand: three pounds of gold per head in his force (Skylitzēs), or a thousand staters per ship (Psellos). At this, the emperor called his magistros Basil Theodorakanos to skirmish (ἀκροβολιζόμενος) against the Rus’ with a smaller detachment, which proved successful. When the emperor approached with the main fleet, the Rus’ withdrew, their ships wrecked against reefs and rock outcroppings in choppy seas, thereby allowing the emperor to return to Constantinople. After a further battle in which the Rus’ cornered the Romans in the anchorage, many on both sides were lost on both land and sea, though the Rus’ did not have enough men to make for a successful expedition anymore, they fled northward by land and sea and many were lost to the Black Sea storms. In short, the attacking Rus’ were obliterated by Greek fire wielded by a stronger, if slightly outdated imperial fleet off the shore somewhere not far from the “mouth of the Black Sea” (τοῦ

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Greeks captured Vyshata, in company with those who had been cast on land, and brought them to Tsar'grad, where they blinded many of the captive Russes. After peace had prevailed for three years thereafter, Vyshata was sent back to Yaroslav in Rus’.

For a broader discussion of Vladimir Monomakh, in regards to his seals and personage in Byzantine court culture, see Kamencev and Ustjugov, 1974, Русская сфрагистика и геральдика, 64-66; Filipčuk, 2013, “Володимир Мономах і візантійська політична культура,” 88-94; Artjukhin, 2013, “Іконографічні зміни зображень на княжих буллах династії Мономаховичі в XI-XIII ст.,” 95-107; and Eidel, 2012, “Буллы князей Ярополка-Петра и Владимира-Басилия: атрибуция и датировка,” 53-68, who makes a strong, albeit not fully convincing case for a sigillographic discovery as attributable to none other than either Vladimir Monomakh, or his great-grandfather, Vladimir I himself. See also figs. 146-147.
The trouble with interpreting the event is that, like the Vladimir’s Cherson campaign of 987-989, the PVL does not relate why he chose to attack the empire in the first place, and we are left with a somewhat disputed *casus belli*.

Perhaps the most extensive analysis of the event is given by Poppe, who argues that, reflecting the events in 987-989 CE, Jaroslav Vladimirovič (r. 1016-1054), the then ruler in Kiev, had sent a force under his son Vladimir to support the Maniakēs rebellion against the emperor Constantine IX Monomachos (r. 1042-1055). Brjusova instead points out that a number of alleged Chersonite antiquities and legends, concerning for example the so-called “Korsonian” bronze doors in the St. Sophia church of Novgorod from later centuries, suggests that Vladimir Jaroslavič returned to Crimea to attack Cherson all over again in the following year (1044-1045). However, Poppe, in later articles, demonstrates that in fact the so-called “Chersonian Antiquities” in Novgorod were nothing more than instruments of legitimization in the 16-17th centuries. While we ought not concern ourselves with backwards reasoning for reinterpreting the Byzantine-Rus’ war of 1043, it is worth noting that as far as Franklin and Shepard are concerned, there is no need, as Brjusova has, to overcomplicate the matter with conjecture not derived directly from the sources, who instead attribute the cause of the war to Jaroslav’s personal insecurities.

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33 See also Martin, 1995, *Medieval Russia*, 980-1584, 46.

34 Brjusova, 1972, “Русско-византийские отношения середины XI века,” 51-62. Her reasoning is as follows: the presence of a 16th-century Polish account of the 1043 campaign by the poet Maciej Stryjkowski, who states, as in the PVL, that Jaroslav sent his son Vladimir to attack the empire, however this account alleges that it was rather Cherson instead of Constantinople. Additionally, Brjusova attributes legends from Novgorod which sought to connect Vladimir Jaroslavič’s foundation of the Novgorodian Saint Sophia Cathedral (1045) with his imagined victory over the empire. This was supposedly supported by the “Korsun Treasures” (Корсунских древностей) housed in the cathedral and originally deposited by none other than Vladimir himself, although in the 16-17th Novgorodian legends, he is usually confused with his grandfather, prince St. Vladimir I Svjatoslavič, instead of Vladimir Jaroslavič. These legends were then disseminated outside of Rus’ by contemporary authors such as Sigismund von Herberstein (1486-1566) and Paul Zaim of Aleppo (1627-1669), who both refer to the copper cathedral gate as originally seized by the Novgorodians themselves from Cherson in the 11th century. Perhaps the best evidence Brjusova deploys is an inscription from Cherson dated to the 11th century (ca. 1059 CE) which purports the replacement of the city gate. However in my view, this is not enough to merit completely revising the interpretation of the episode when three Byzantine authors and the PVL itself make variably detailed accounts of it taking place in the vicinity of Constantinople and/or the Sea of Marmara.


36 Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 216. They write:
it seems there is little reason to disbelieve the sources or expect some manner of intrigue beyond the cause of the campaign according to Skylitzēs: the death of a Rus’ in a Constantinopolitan marketplace.\footnote{Shepard, 1978-1979, “Why did the Russians Attack Byzantium in 1043?” 147-212.}

While the Kievian “state” has been regarded as a major player in these three events in the first half of the 11th c., acting with one purpose, due to such implications in the \textit{PVL}, it appears that Rus’ actions were less unified than previously assumed. As the Rus’ had frequently functioned in their dealings with the empire, they were at times unified under a single ruler, as in 987-989 and 1043, and other times, judging by the Byzantine sources, acting separately, as in 1016, 1024 and earlier operations from the 9-10th centuries.\footnote{It may be more helpful to think of the Rus’ as independent warriors who pledged loyalty to a given ruler in return for successful raids. During this period, if a Kievan ruler could not guarantee his men riches, they could not guarantee their loyalty to him as this was the rulers’ primary mode of legitimacy, and his men’s allegiance, before Christian ecumenism took hold (see §2.1.2.3 below), the byproduct of which may be considered as the Kievian Rus’ “state” (Archie Dunn, personal communication, 5 August, 2016). Even the ecumenical nature of loyalty was not enough to prevent hostilities between so-called “Greeks” and “Rus’” even later in the 11th c. as the \textit{PVL} narrates for the year 1066. See for example the story of Rostislav of Tmutarakan’ in Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, \textit{PVL}, 145 and n205 (p. 264-265). As for the usage of the ethnonym “Greeks” in Rus’ sources, it would be helpful to kind in mind the words of Franklin 2002b, \textit{Writing, Society and Culture in Early Rus}, c. 950-1300, 12: “These ‘Greeks’, for the Rus, were not the classical Athenians but the Greek-speaking, Greek-writing Christians of Byzantium. The Church in Rus, the institutional guardian of high-status writings, was answerable to the Church in Constantinople.”} Taken

“According to Byzantine sources, the pretext for the 1043 campaign was trivial: a distinguished ‘Scyth’ had been killed as a result of a market-place altercation in Constantinople. We do not know what deeper resentments prompted Iaroslav to launch such a major response to such an apparently minor incident, but the response is compatible with Iaroslav’s desire to be taken seriously, a reaction to Byzantine \textit{in}attentiveness more than to Byzantine \textit{over}-attentiveness. There is no necessary contradiction between the demonstratively Constantinopolitan style of Iaroslav’s public patronage and his campaign against Constantinople in 1043.”

In terms of a conflict between two (at least nominally) Orthodox Christian rulers shortly after the recent Christianization of one of them, it is perhaps a comparable sentiment with Symeon I of Bulgaria, who fought against the empire to little avail in the early 10th century, if an effort to gain what Stephenson, 2000a, 21 has summarized as “trade, tribute, and recognition of his imperial title.” Despite Symeon’s deep Christianity and traditional Greek learning (see for example Curta, 2006a, 213-227), he preferred war to peace with the empire, which is easily juxtaposed with the case of the Rus’, as King, 2004, \textit{The Black Sea: a History}, 78, points out:

“Christianity had been a powerful tool of statecraft for Byzantine emperors in their relations with the Rhos and the Bulgars. Conversion did not always prevent conflict, of course, but from the Byzantine perspective it certainly meant that conflict was of a different type—something closer to a civil war within the bounds of Christendom than a battle across the lines between believer and infidel. If a neighboring people or state could not be brought into the empire or into a firm alliance, the next best thing was to bring them within the bounds of the church.”

Psellos, as pointed out by Obolensky, 1971, 225, described the event in precisely these terms, as “the rebellion of the Russians.”


38 It may be more helpful to think of the Rus’ as independent warriors who pledged loyalty to a given ruler in return for successful raids. During this period, if a Kievan ruler could not guarantee his men riches, they could not guarantee their loyalty to him as this was the rulers’ primary mode of legitimacy, and his men’s allegiance, before Christian ecumenism took hold (see §2.1.2.3 below), the byproduct of which may be considered as the Kievian Rus’ “state” (Archie Dunn, personal communication, 5 August, 2016). Even the ecumenical nature of loyalty was not enough to prevent hostilities between so-called “Greeks” and “Rus’” even later in the 11th c. as the \textit{PVL} narrates for the year 1066. See for example the story of Rostislav of Tmutarakan’ in Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, \textit{PVL}, 145 and n205 (p. 264-265). As for the usage of the ethnonym “Greeks” in Rus’ sources, it would be helpful to kind in mind the words of Franklin 2002b, \textit{Writing, Society and Culture in Early Rus}, c. 950-1300, 12: “These ‘Greeks’, for the Rus, were not the classical Athenians but the Greek-speaking, Greek-writing Christians of Byzantium. The Church in Rus, the institutional guardian of high-status writings, was answerable to the Church in Constantinople.”
together, these affairs might instead demonstrate an early-11th-c. Rus’ less monolithic than hitherto imagined. The following sections will seek to demonstrate the unsuitability of ascribing the monolithic term “statehood” to either Byzantium or Rus’ in the 11-12th c., particularly in the Black Sea littoral.
Concurrently, within the imperial Black Sea periphery, where distance from the capital frequently coincides with local, aspirational autonomy, it is worth considering the cases of Chersōn and Trebizond, whose elite families frequently operated within their respective localities variably as imperial agents or perhaps equally frequently, as holders of personal fiefdoms. In this subsection, I will examine the 11-12th-century cases of the Gavrades of Chaldia (Trebizond) and the Tzouloi of the Klimata (Chersōn) using primarily sigillography and numismatics. By implication, I will argue that Rus’, Byzantium, or any other heretofore assumed “state” in between, was, amongst other realities, an amalgamation of contested loyalties, at the peripheries of which lay autonomous local lords and their kin, who did not conceive of “statehood” per se, but primarily of allegiance.

1.2.1 Chaldia and the Gavrades; ta Klimata and the Tzouloi

1.2.1.1 Theodōros Gavras and his 11th-c. kin, in text, seal and coin

To begin with the Gavrades in 11th-c. Trebizond is to essentially chart the story of a family of “incorrigible rebels,” who “brought to the Crimea the innate tendency of all the family to struggle against Byzantium,” in a gradual course leading to the independence of Trebizond in 1204. For present purposes, we will concern ourselves with the preponderance of Gavrades in Pontic, eastern and central Anatolia in the 11th century specifically. That story however, before mention of the singular Theodōros Gavras, the ruler

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“The ebb of Arab influence in central and eastern Anatolia revealed a number of provincial dynasties, many of Armenian origin, from which the government in Constantinople never completely wrested local control. From the eleventh century these families helped transform and ‘feudalise’ the Byzantine government and ruling class, successfully competing for the throne itself. By the twelfth century birth had become more important than office in determining those of the highest influence in the Empire. The prosopography of these families is therefore an important aspect of late Byzantine research.”


42 Bryer, 1970, 167, writes:

“The lordship of the Gabrades, north of the Pontic Alps and in Chaldia, was the prelude to an independent Pontic Greek state which survived until 1461.”
of Trebizond in the late-11th century mentioned in Anna Komnēnē’s *Alexiad* amongst other members of the clan, begins with three mentions of Gavrades in Skylitzēs’ *Synopsis*. The first textual mention of Theodōros Gabras [mid-late 1080s]):

When Theodore Gabras was living in Constantinople, the Emperor who had remarked his violent and energetic nature, wished to remove him from the city and therefore appointed him Duke of Trapezus, a town he had some time ago recaptured from the Turks. This man had come originally from Chaldaea and the upper parts, and gained glory as a soldier, for he surpassed others in wisdom and courage, and had practically never failed in any work he took in hand, but invariably got the better of his enemies; and finally after he had captured Trapezus and allotted it to himself, as if it were his special portion, he was irresistible.

Theodōros Gabras is also mentioned briefly in Zōnaras’ *Epitome Historiarum* as a sevastos, a title generally reserved for those connected by blood or marriage to the dynasty of the Komnenoi (Dunn, 2003; “Theodore Gabras, Duke of Chaldia (†1098) and the Gabrades: Portraits, Sites and Seals,” 64). See Bütner-Wobst (ed.), 1897, *Zonaras Epitome Historiarum*, 726, 739. See also n55 below.


“οὐ μέχρι δὲ τοῦτον τὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτοκράτορα ἔστη. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Γαβρᾶς ἐνδημήσας ἦν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ, γινώσκον τὸ τούτον ὄμβριμον καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ὀξύ, βουλόμενος τοῦτον ἀπελάσαι τῆς πόλεως, δοῦκα Τραπεζοῦντος προὐβάλλετο πάλαι ταύτην ἀπὸ τῶν Τούρκων ἀφελόμενον. ὃρμητο μὲν γὰρ οὗτος ἐκ Χαλδίας καὶ τῶν ἀνωτέρω μερῶν, στρατιώτης δὲ περιφανὴς γενόμενος ἐπὶ τις φρονήμετρε καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ ὑπερέχων ἁπάντως μικροῦ καὶ μηδέποτε ἔργου ἁψάμενος καὶ ἀτυχήσας, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ἑλὼν καὶ ὡς ἴδιον λάχος ἑαυτῷ ἀποκληρωσάμενος ἄμαχος ἦν.”

This is translated into English by Dawes (ed. and trans.), 1928, *Alexiad*, 8:9 (210-211: “the rise of Theodore, the appointed duke of Trebizond and his son Gregory, imprisoned in Philippopolis”); 11:6 (284: brief mention of Theodōros’ successful siege of Paipert [modern Bayburt], in the metropolitan thema of Chaldia [see Darrouzès (ed.), 1981, *Notitiae*, 7/1, 560]); 13:7 (339: brief mention of Constantine Gabras’ military command of Philadelphia and defeat of the Selçuqs at Kelvianos); 14:3 (370: brief mention of Constantine Gabras’ serving under emperor Alexios I Komnēnos at the battle of Akrokos); 15:4 (401: brief mention of an unnamed Gabras serving under emperor Alexios I Komnēnos at the battle of Amorion).

44 Dawes (ed. and trans.), 1928, *Alexiad*, 8:9 (210-213: “the rise of Theodore, the appointed duke of Trebizond and his son Gregory, imprisoned in Philippopolis”); 11:6 (284: brief mention of Theodōros’ successful siege of Paipert [modern Bayburt], in the metropolitan thema of Chaldia [see Darrouzès (ed.), 1981, *Notitiae*, 7/1, 560]); 13:7 (339: brief mention of Constantine Gabras’ [acc. to Sewter (trans.), 1969, 413 n27, Constantine was son of Theodōros and brother of Grēgorios] refusal to obey emperor Alexios I Komnēnos’ order to monitor crusaders); 14:3 (370: brief mention of Constantine Gabras’ military command of Philadelphia and defeat of the Selçuqs at Kelvianos); 14:5 (377: brief mention of Constantine Gabras’ serving under emperor Alexios I Komnēnos at the battle of Akrokos); 15:4 (401: brief mention of an unnamed Gabras serving under emperor Alexios I Komnēnos at the battle of Amorion).


The second mention of a Gabras clan member comes (16:43) in 1019 CE, albeit without a first name, but nevertheless Skylitzēs specifically identifies this Gabras in Thessalonikē as an archon, patrikios and a co-conspirator in a plot with another man named Elinagos, who “sought to restore the Bulgar ascendancy […] Gabras had already fled his homeland [Trebizond]; he was arrested and blinded” (Wortley [trans.], 2010, 344):

“ἐν Θεσσαλονίκε ὥσπερ διάνοιας τῶν δυὸν ἄρχοντων καὶ πατρικίων Ἑλινάγου καὶ Γαβρᾶ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς, ὡς δὲ τὸ Βουλχαρίκιον ἀναδεξάμενον καὶ ἀνδρῆς κράτος, ὁ μὲν Γαβρᾶς ἤδη ἀποδράσεις εἰς τὴν ιδίαν χώραν καὶ ἀλώδεις πηροῦσιν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς.”

It is worth noting that this latter mention in Skylitzēs is attributed to none other than Theodōros Gabras, duke of Trebizond himself, by Cheynet et al., 2012, *Les sceaux Byzantins du Musée Archéologique d’Istanbul*, cat. no.

The remarkable case of the Gavrades is that available textual sources such as those listed above frequently match both seals and coins. Before the time of Theodōros, other Gavrades’ seals have appeared, which sigillographers have dated to earlier in the 11th century. For example, a seal of a certain Marinōs Gavras,\footnote{Koltsida-Makri, 1996, Βυζαντινά Μολυβδόβουλλα: Συλλογής Ορφανίδη - Νικολαΐδη Νομισματικού Μουσείου Αθηνών, cat. no. 290.} as well as a Leōn Gavras (fig. 196),\footnote{For example, Koltsida-Makri, 1996, Βυζαντινά Μολυβδόβουλλα: Συλλογής Ορφανίδη - Νικολαΐδη Νομισματικού Μουσείου Αθηνών, cat. no. 290.} have

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“Ἐγένετο κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν μελέτη τυραννίδος κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως, ἔξαρχον ἔχουσα Μιχαὴλ τὸν λεγόμενον Κηρουλάριον καὶ Ἰωάννην τὸν Μακρεμβολίτην καὶ ἄλλους οὐκ ὀλίγους τῶν πολιτῶν, οἳ καὶ δημιουργήσαντες ἔξωριθήσαν. καὶ ἔτερα δὲ τις ἐπιστάσεσις γέγονε κατὰ Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ μεγάλου δομεστίκου ἐν Μεσανάκτοις. ἧς μηνυθείσης αὐτῷ Μιχαὴλ μὲν ὁ Γαβρᾶς καὶ Θεοδόσιος ὁ Μεσανύκτης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί τῶν ταγματικῶν ἀρχόντων ἐκπηροῦνται τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, Γρηγόριον δὲ πατρίκιον τὸν Ταρωνίτην ἔξαρχον, ὡς ἐλέγετο, καὶ πρωτουργὸν τῆς συστάσεως ὄντα ὠμῇ βύρσῃ βοὸς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος καλύψας ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος, καὶ μόνης τῆς ἀναπνοῆς ἔξοδον ἀφεὶς καὶ τῆς ὄψεως, πρὸς τὸν ὀρφανοτρόφον ἀπέστειλε.”

Wortley translates this as:

“At that time there was an attempted insurrection against the emperor led by Michael Keroularios, John Makrembolites and several other citizens, who were likewise deprived of their goods and exiled. There was another mutiny, this one against the grand domestic, Constantine, at Mesanacta. When this was reported to [the domestic], Michael Gabras, Theodosios Mesanyktes and many other officers in charge of units lost their eyes. And as for the patrician Gregory Taronites, Constantine completely enclosed him in a fresh ox skin with only a sufficient opening to see and breathe through (this because he was said to have been instigator of the mutiny) and sent him to the Orphanotrophos.”

However, Bryer, 1970, 174, has interpreted the passage as attesting to Gavras’ arrest and blinding for participating in the insurrection. In this case, Wortley’s translation of the phrase “ἂς μηνυθείσης αὐτῷ Μιχαὴλ, μὲν ὁ Γαβρᾶς” as “when this was reported to [the domestic], Michael Gavras,” could be misinterpreted for attributing the office of domestic to Michaēl Gavras himself.
been dated to the early-mid-11th c. Other Gavrades’ seals date to later in the 11th c., such as that of a certain Nikēforos Gayras (fig. 208),\(^{49}\) and a Zacharias Gayras (fig. 195).\(^{50}\) Finally, the 11th-c. coinage and sigillography of Theodōros Gayras provides a deeper understanding of the Gavrades clan as a provincial institution in the Black Sea thema of Chaldia.

The well-known Theodōros himself, who is known to have ruled Trebizond as his private domain, where there was a mint (imperial or otherwise), has been attributed specific coins during his rule (ca. 1092-1098 – figs. 197-199) marked by his namesake St. Theodōros,\(^{51}\) despite the patron saint of the city being Eugenios, especially under the 13-15th-c. Megaloi Komnēnoi.\(^{52}\) As we encountered with the study of Jaroslav I’s seals and coinage, which frequently matched in design and legend,\(^{53}\) the same can be said for the Trabzonine coinage of St. Theodore in military attire, which bear a remarkable resemblance to Theodōros Gayras’ personal seals (figs. 194, 209-210),\(^{54}\) which also bear the bust of St. Theodōros in

\(^{48}\) Laurent, 1981, *Le Corpus des sceaux de l’empire byzantin, vol. II: L’administration centrale*, cat. no. 989. Laurent read this seal as belonging to a spatharokandidatos and a ship captain: “Λέων βασιλικός σπαθαροκανδιδάτος καὶ πλοίαρχος ὁ Γαβρᾶς,” while Nesbitt, (Bryer, Dunn and Nesbitt, 2003, 63) instead replaces the [π]λοίαρχος with [χι]λοίαρχος (figs. 196 and 207). It is also worth mentioning that Nesbitt (2003, p. 61), dates a seal of a certain Iōannēs, who he interprets as a Gavras, to sometime in the 11th c., although its identification with the Gavrades may be uncertain on close inspection of the poorly preserved seal, which he reads as: “Ἰω(άννης) ὁ Γα[β]ρᾶς,” see fig. 204.

\(^{49}\) Bryer, Dunn and Nesbitt, 2003, 63. Nesbitt reads this seal as: “Νικηφόρου σφράγισμα Γαβρᾶ τυγχάνω.”

\(^{50}\) Jordanov, 2006, cat. no. 129 (Zacharias Gayras, [dated late-11th c.], asked for St. Theodore’s protection specifically in honor of his father, Theodōros Gayras – according to Cheynet, et al., 2012, cat. no. 7.44 [p. 659]).

\(^{51}\) Bendall, 1977, 135. However, it should be noted that Bendall reads the coins’ legend, “ΑΛΒΡ” as: ΑΛεξιω Βασιλεῖ Ρωμαιων.

\(^{52}\) See Rosenqvist, 2002, “Local Worshippers, Imperial Patrons: Pilgrimage to St. Eugenios of Trabzon,” 193-212. See also Feldman, 2013, 102 on the annual Trabzonine trade fair, the panēgyris of St. Eugenios; and Bryer, 1970, 170, who writes:

“In some respects the entry of the first Grand Komnenos into Chaldia in 1204 may be regarded as a local continuation of a dynastic rivalry which had begun with Alexios I Komnenos and Theodore Gabras a century before. It is significant that the Grand Komnenos adopted and energetically promoted St. Eugenios as their patron, rather than St. Theodore Gabras who, as the real founder of late medieval Pontic separatism, would have been much more appropriate.”

\(^{53}\) See above chapter 4 §3.1.2; and again above figs. 140-144.

\(^{54}\) Schlumberger (ed.), 1884, 665; and Bendall, 1977, 135. In fact, according to Hendy, 1999, *Catalogue of the Byzantine Coins in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection and in the Whittemore Collection: 1081-1261*, 427-434, type X of the Trabzonine follis coinage of the period ca. 1080-1110 CE, of which there are five examples, and also type XI, of which there are two examples, both purport to show images of St. Theodōros in military attire, very similarly to the display of the same saint on Theodōros Gayras’ seals, and without any mention whatsoever of the concurrent reigning emperor, Alexios I Komnenos. Comparing the two images of St. Theodōros’ attire, in both the seal and coin, he is documented as nimbate, wearing a tunic, breastplate and sagnion, with a shield in his left hand and a lance in his right hand. See Hendy, 1999, 431 (type X); and also Dunn, 1983, *A Handlist of the Byzantine Lead Seals and Tokens (and of Western and Islamic Seals) in the Barber Institute of Fine Arts*, 4 (cat. no. 6)
military attire. That he ostensibly minted coins in the name of the reigning emperor Alexios I Komnenos before his revolt in 1091, albeit evoking his personal namesake may suggest a degree of autonomy he felt due, perhaps reflected both in coin, seal and text, despite otherwise nominal homage paid to his appointer, the reigning emperor. Ergo, while both text and coin do not directly reveal Theodore’s sense of autonomy detailed by Anna Komnenē, a careful study of the sigillography reveals the subtleties of centralized allegiance and aspirational autonomy in the 11th-c. Black Sea littoral.

Ch. 6 1.2.1.2 The Tzouloi

While the only textual reference to a member of the Tzoulas clan was discussed above §1.1.1, as in the case of the 11th-c. Gavrades, there are other sources attesting to the importance of the family in local Crimean politics, or as it was known in Constantinople after

55 Bryer, Dunn and Nesbitt, 2003, 63. Nesbitt, whose item of study resides in the Dumbarton Oaks collection in Washington D.C., reads this seal as: “[Κ(ύριε βοήθει τῷ σῷ δούλο Θεόδωρῳ δουκὶ τῷ Γαβρᾶ.]” Another seal of Theodōros Gavras’, in the Barber Institute in Birmingham is known to have been definitively found in Trebizond, which Dunn reads as “+ Σὸν [ὁ]μόνυμον σέβαστ(ὸν) τρ(ισ)μάκαρ τὸν δούκα Γαβρᾶν [Ἅγιε] φίλαττε/ [φί]λατ(τοις) (?)”. It would be important to note here that this seal type of Theodōros’ is the only one which records his possession of the title sevastos, along with doux, confirming Zōnaras’ mention of Theodōros Gavras as not only a doux, but also a sevastos, and includes Theodōros’ militaristic namesake on the obverse, St. Theodōros (ὁ στρατηλάτης), “the stratēlatēs,” according to Dunn, 2003, 64-65. Additionally, Dunn’s reading Τ[ό] is made with Werner Seibt’s suggestion (Archie Dunn, personal communication, 5 August, 2016). Finally, Dunn’s English translation should read as follows: (to St. Theodore, “the stratēlatēs), “Your namesake the sevastos, oh thrice-blessed one, the duke Gavras, oh holy one, protect.” For the textual mention in Zōnaras, see Bütner-Wobst (ed.), 1897, Zonaras Epitome Historiarum, 726, 739. See also n43 above. While the poor preservation of the seal has not allowed me to make any further alternate readings of this particular seal, it would be nevertheless worthwhile to make a final observation that the florid nature of the language used on the six-line metrical inscription on the reverse may suggest, if not attest, to Theodōros’ highly unusual position in an otherwise hypostatic court hierarchy, that he felt secure enough to represent himself as a sevastos as well as duke of Trebizond and to evoke his namesake, St. Theodōros, as the tris-makar (thrice-blessed one) on his seal, otherwise quite rare elsewhere in provincial Byzantine sigillography. However, other analogous examples of poetic-metered lead seals do in exist in contemporary Byzantine provincial Anatolia, such as a seal of a certain duke(?) Grēgorios, found near Gaziantep and published by Cheynet, Erdoğan and Prigent, 2016, “Sceaux des musées de la Turquie orientale: Karaman, Nevşehir, Malatya, Maraş,” 291-292, which also displays a similar inscription, evocation of St. Theodōros and a “Russian character.”

56 Bryer, Dunn and Nesbitt, 2003, 65. Citing Bendall, Dunn writes:

“Although the imagery and legends of the seals in themselves reveal nothing about the de facto autonomy of Theodore Gabras mentioned by Anna Komnene, the two obverse images of the three known seal-types were used on two bronze issues in Trebizond, which on other grounds, belong typologically to the reign of Alexios I, Theodore’s rather nominal master […] The identifier of these two bronze issues [Bendall] suggests ‘it may not be that (Theodore Gabras’s) independence just extended to placing his own effigy on the coinage in the guise of his name saint.’ But this was in fact a considerable sign and gesture of independence, which would have been easily grasped by Theodore’s contemporaries.”

In this I agree with Dunn.
849 CE, the *thema tòn Klimatôn*. Even in the sphere of numismatics, the aforementioned Geōrgios Tzoulas and the events of 1016 have been linked to changes in coinage, which have been described by the numismatist Anokhin as otherwise “unknown” between 989-1016 CE, and only after the death of Tzoulas was Chersōn “outright incorporat[ed] into the composition of the empire,” due to the appearance of coins issued with the letters κΒω, which he assigns to the final years of the reigns of Basil II and Constantine VIII (1016-1025/1028 CE).

However, the “famous” sigillography of the Tzoulas family permits us to view Byzantine Crimea, not as a simple extension of the empire, but locally autonomous, as this clan’s seals have already been included in a myriad of publications on the sigillography of Chersōn. That Crimea was a notoriously autonomous, if not downright rebellious periphery of the Byzantine *oikoumenē* should by now come as little surprise. In fact it is worth noting that even before 1204 in the 1190s, a branch of the Gavras family had “established themselves in Crimea.” Therefore, in this subsection, I will posit that the Tzoulas family of Crimea [*ta Klimata*], similarly to the Gavrades of Chaldia, occupied a central role in 11th-c. local affairs as both de facto rulers on the imperial behalf, but also on their own behalf, which

58 Ibid, 114-115. On the reading of the coin legends themselves, Anokhin proposes that:

“The letters κΒω can be understood in two senses—as an abbreviation of the names Basil and Constantine [...] or as an abbreviation of the name and title (“basileus”) of some one of the Constantines [...] To our mind, the selection should fall to the first of these possibilities.”

On the reverse of these coins, there appears a cross on two steps. However, in my opinion, Anokhin does not satisfactorily explain the appearance of the ‘ο’ in the inscription, appearing horizontally. In the latest publication regarding these coins, Sidorenko does not address the appearance of the ο either, although he attributes their mintage to the local church in Cherson. See for example Sidorenko, 2013, “Церковное и муниципальное производство литых херсоно-византийских монет IX-начала XIII вв.,” 267-292.

62 Feldman, 2013, _passim_.
63 Bryer, 1970, 172. See also Vasiliev, 1936, 153-158.
is reflected by their name often appearing alone on seals, its revelation throughout the Crimea, and its frequent identification not only with prōtospatharioi, but most notably with the title prōtevōn, which more often than not, connoted local potentates and nobility in Cherson ruling the thema tōn Klimatōn autonomously.  

Firstly, it is striking to note that on a few seals, the name Tzoulas appears alone and on other seals bearing both forenames and the Tzoulas surname, no title or office appears whatsoever. Exemplifying the first type, one seal out of a total of four examples identifies a certain Tzoulas, imperial spatharios of Cherson (and not anything else), dated to the late-10th c. The other three seals bear a similar legend, but evoke St. Nicholas on the obverse side (figs. 211-214). The only difference is that this one references St. Nicholas on the obverse whereas the other bears only an Orthodox cross on three steps. On other seals, it seems that simply the name Tzoulas was enough to merit having the seal in the first place. For example, in the seals of Iōannēs Tzoulas (fig. 218), Ignatios Tzoulas (fig. 225), Theofylaktos Tzoulas (fig. 226) and Mosēkos Tzoulas (figs. 228-229), it is notable that the last three members listed by their seals did not reveal any particular title or office on their seal, nor even a saint’s evocation, preferring zoological depictions of what appear to be partidges or in the latter case, a lion. Whether they were or were not imperial title holders, based on their

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64 Feldman, 2013, 69-71. The unique formulae of these seals, which primarily refer to imperial spatharioi, prōtospatharioi, spatharokandidai, as well as notarioi and stratēgoi, of Cherson, frequently refer to the local prōtevōntes of Cherson as well, which alludes to irregular conditions. Imperial ranks and functionaries were supposed to be appointed from Constantinople, but in reality, as demonstrated by these seals, were often the same men as the local Cherosinite prōtevōntes, thereby allowing local families such as the Tzouloi, to claim authority in the name of the emperor, but were not necessarily controlled by the emperor himself. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, Cheynet does not comment on this specifically, although Sokolova and Alekseenko, to a lesser extent, have discussed it. See n61 above and for specific examples, see n65-70 and n73-77 below.

65 Alekseyenko, 2012a, L’administration byzantine de Cherson: catalogue des sceaux, cat. no. 152 (p. 231-232). He reads the seal as: + Ἅγιε Νικόλαε βο[(ή)]τι(ς) Τζούλα β(ασιλικῷ) σπαθαρήῳ Χερσόνος. Although regarding its invocation of St. Nicholas, it would perhaps be more sensible to compare this seal to that of Michaēl Tzoulas (idem, cat. no. 153, n76 below).

66 Ibid, cat. no. 151 (p. 231). He reads the seal as: + Κ(ύρι)ε βο(ή)θει τῷ σῷ δού(λῳ) Τζύλᾳ β(ασιλικῳ) σπαθαρήῳ Χρεσῶνος; [sic].

67 Ibid, cat. no. 155 (p. 234). He reads the seal as: + Κ(ύρι)ε βο(ή)θει τῷ σῷ δού(λῳ) Τζού[λ(ᾳ)]. The seal evokes St. Iōannēs the Prōdromos, which is, incidentally the same namesake to whom the surviving 8th-c. church in modern Kerē is dedicated.

68 Ibid, cat. no. 157 (p. 236). He reads the seal as: + Κ(ύρι)ε β(οή)θει τῷ σ(ῷ) δ(ούλῳ) Μοσηκό (τῷ) Τζούλ(ᾳ). This seal is known in two examples.


70 Ibid, cat. no. 160 (p. 238). He reads the seal as: + Κ(ύρι)ε β(οή)θει τῷ σ(ῷ) δ(ούλῳ) Μοσηκό (τῷ) Τζούλ(ᾳ).
seals, it seems as if their family name was the most important element to record on their seals.  

Then, we may notice that the name Tzoulas appears not only in Chersōn, but also in Bosforos, at the opposite end of Crimea, modern Kerč. Two seals are known belonging to two Geōrgios Tzoulas', both dated to the early-11th c. and both clearly sharing much overlap with the Geōrgios Tzoulas mentioned by Skylitzēs, discussed above (§1.1.1). While momentarily resisting the reasonable temptation to imagine they may have belonged to the same individual, it is significant that one example clearly relates that its owner resided in Bosforos (fig. 227), while the other, in no less than six examples (figs. 219-224), does not clarify where its owner was resident. It does, however, state that this Geōrgios Tzoulas was a stratēgos as well, and since five of the six examples were originally found in Chersōn, it should reasonably suggest he resided in Chersōn. That members of the Tzoulas clan are clearly evident not only in Chersōn, but also in Bosforos, and two were prōtospatharioi.

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For examples of other Byzantine families whose names are sufficiently significant to appear as such on their seals, see Leontiades, 2011, “Byzantine Lead Seals with Family Names,” 297-316. See also the brief discussion below, n225.

See for example Sokolova, 1971, 68-74; and Feldman, 2013, 70 n236.

Alekseyenko, 2012a, cat. no. 159 (p. 237). He reads the seal as: + Γεωργίος βασιλικός (πρωτοσπαθαρίος) τοῦ Ποσφόρου. The seal also evokes St. Geōrgios on the reverse, presumably as a namesake. See also Kazdan, 1972, “Review of Печати Георгия Цулы и События 1016 г. в Херсоне,” 298.

He reads the seal as: + Κύριε βοήθει τῷ σῷ δούλῳ Γεοργίῳ βασιλικῷ (πρωτοσπαθαρίῳ) (καὶ) στρατηγῷ τῷ Τζούλα. It would be significant to note here that no saint is evoked on any of these six examples of his seal, as both obverse and reverse fields are filled with epigraphy, with the + Κύριε βοήθει τῷ σῷ δούλῳ appearing on the legend of one side, while the other half, + Γεοργίῳ βασιλικῷ (πρωτοσπαθαρίῳ) (καὶ) στρατηγῷ τῷ Τζούλα, appears filling the legend of the opposite side.

Videm, 2015, “Новые сфрагистические данные по истории византийского Херсона VII–IX вв.,” 201. Alekseienko writes:

“Появление среди должностных лиц провинциального Херсона императорского стратора требует специального рассмотрения. Наличие нескольких экземпляров печатей с данной титулатурой позволяет предположить, что в Херсоне мог существовать институт (постоянная должность) императорского стратора. Аналогии могут служить подробно изученные в историографии вопросы о императорских спафариях и прōtospatharioi of Chersōn and Bosporos can serve as an analogy, studied in detail in historiography [translator’s italics].”

I have translated this as:

“The appearance among the officials of provincial Chersōn of the imperial strator requires special consideration. The presence of several copies of seals with this titulature may suggest that the institution (permanent position) of an imperial strator could have existed in Chersōn. Questions about the imperial spatharioi and prōtospatharioi of Chersōn and Bosporos can serve as an analogy, studied in detail in historiography [translator’s italics].”

For a sample of a seal of a strator of Chersōn, see fig. 230.
should serve as a significant marker that members of the Tzoulas family were active throughout the thema tōn Klimatōn.

Examining the seals of other members of the family, albeit presumably confined to Chersōn, such as Michaēl Tzoulas (fig. 215), we can see that the imperial title of prōtopatharios was repeatedly evoked, though it remains unclear if it was inherited. That said, the height of the ranking and its significance for peripheral lords, which were frequently bestowed with the same honors as stratēgoi as an imperial function, should come as little surprise. Furthermore, because seals show that the stratēgoi and the notoriously autonomous prōtevōntes of Chersōn were frequently the same individuals, this suggests that the DAI’s recommendation to appoint stratēgoi for Chersōn from Constantinople itself, was not always followed. Moreover, even when such advice was heeded, the stratēgoi of Chersōn did not receive imperial salaries, but instead received “gratuity” from the thema itself, similar to the case of Trebizond in Chaldia, where the income of the stratēgoi derived from the kommerkion, or the tax revenue collected by the kommerkiarioi of Chaldia. So it is that, as in the case of Chaldia, seals demonstrate the importance of the autonomy of local families to understanding contemporaneous events in Crimea. Therefore it should come as little surprise that the uprising of 1016 mentioned by Skylitzēs was attributed to a certain Geōrgios Tzoulas. It appears that whoever he was,
whatever titles or offices he held, he was not so much Khazarian as a member of a local prominent family, *prōtevōntes* of Chersōn, and given to autonomy and rebellion, and much like Theōdōros Gavras, he was the scion of a prominent local family which Constantinople gave “recourse” to in the 10-11th c. and later.

Finally, having considered two case studies of local noble families of the Black Sea littoral in the 11th c. via text, coin, and primarily seal, it would seem reasonable to conclude that despite nominal homage paid to the emperor regarding the use of court titles on their seals, imperial supremacy was not as absolute as we might suppose. The “state,” as it has often been imagined, was not as hypostatic as some have previously conjectured. Sovereignty was never absolute in the Black Sea and allegiance was always negotiable at the local level. Therefore, we have taken into account the varying loyalties of local players in

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84 Sokolova, 1993, “Les sceaux byzantins de Cherson,” 104. She writes:

> “De la famille [sic] locale (bulgare?) de Tzoulas venait le stratège Georges Tzoulas, dont le sceau est connu, et contre lequel un contingent impérial fut envoyé en 1016 et le fit prisonnier lors du premier combat. Il est également probable que le stratège Georges Prôteuôn venait d'une famille du pays.”

Per Sokolova’s words regarding the usage of “prôteuôn” as a patronym on a seal, it is worth noting that Alekseyenko, 2012a, cat. nos. 52, 81, 82, mentions no less than three seals, otherwise belonging to imperial *stratēgoi*, whose surnames, or perhaps epiteths, appear as *prōtevōn* on their seals.


> “Byzantium controlled the Black Sea area completely in the second half of the twelfth century […] Barred to foreigners, the whole Black Sea area served as an exclusive resource base for Constantinople.”

And yet just a few lines later, Karpov acknowledges that:

> “The ports of the southern Crimea acknowledged Byzantine authority, although the area around Chersonese, the regional capital, had its own semi-independent administration […] Regionalism was on the rise, the case of Pontos being indicative: […] Trebizond continued to mint its own local coinage under the rule of the Angelos dynasty [sic], just as it had under the semi-independent Gabrades.”

Günter Prinzing, personal communication, 13 December, 2016, writes:

> “The question of statehood is certainly important, though Byzantinists, looking on the central “state,” the empire, and its bureaucracy, are often too quick in taking a thoroughly organised state [for] granted. But legal history research shows that often the contrary is the case, but it depends from city to city and from province to province.”

More to the point, other scholars have increasingly begun to question this as well, such as Eastmond, 2017, “Constantinople: Global or Local?” and Haldon, 2017a, “A ‘Global’ Empire: the Structures of East Roman Longevity.” According to Haldon, (1999, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World*, 565-1204, 268-269), provinicial rebellions up to the 11th c. were frequently rooted in “thematic and provincial identities.” This resulted in emperors replacing local soldiers with foreign-recruited soldiers, thereby rendering imperial troops as foreign oppressors in locals’ minds by the 11-12th c.
addressing Byzantine Pontic policy in the 11th century, we will discuss events regarding the Byzantine oikoumenē and the Rus’.
Ch. 6, part 2: Challenging assumptions of 11-12th-c. Rus’ “statehood”

2.1 The Rus’ metropolitanate unfolds

This section will address the variegated approaches to analyzing Christianization, as practiced in a top-down political form in 11-12th-c. Rus’. While we can hardly consider Rus’ as a sort of “vassal-state” to Byzantium during this period, neither can we wholly dismiss the degree of Constantinopolitan authority in Rus’ statecraft. The next section 2.1.1 will discuss previous inquiries into the subject beginning with that of Sir Dmitri Obolensky and continuing forward. The subsequent section (§2.1.2) will constitute my own modest supplement to the literature on the 11-12th-c. metropolitanate of Rus’.

2.1.1 Deconstructing the interpretations of Obolensky, et al.

Moving beyond the renegotiation of statehood and local autonomy at the periphery of 11th-c. Byzantium, older scholarship such as Obolensky’s 1971 publication, *The Byzantine Commonwealth*, has in turn been analyzed in a variety of ways which have served both to accentuate the frequently nationalist historiography preceding it and the multi-disciplinary scholarship succeeding it. The work itself, along with those of Poppe, Thompson and Franklin and Shepard, have all served to contextualize imperial policy towards Rus’ rulers, not with outdated nationalist tropes, instead by considering the common Byzantine ecumenical heritage of Eastern Europe. Fowden, Hanak and Raffensperger, meanwhile, have interpreted this process in other ways. While I would certainly not disagree with any of these approaches, I would instead seek to adjust them, with the exhortation that in Rus’ during the period in question, the eventual triumph of Orthodoxy was never ultimately guaranteed. This would necessitate a revision of the development of the Rus’

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87 These ideas, per the concept of potestarian polity-formation first discussed above in chapter 1 §2.2.3.6, have been elaborated above in chapter 2 with reference to the Judaization of the Khazar potentates, §1.2.2, §2.1.1, §3.1.1; in chapter 4 with reference to the Islamization of the Volga Bulgar potentates, §1.1.1.3, referring to the Christianization of the Magyar potentates, §2.1.2.1, and referring to the Christianization of the Rus’ rulers, §3.2; in chapter 5 with reference to top-down conversions of rulers in the *DAI*, §2.1.1 (specifically with respect to *potestarity* as a schematic framework outlined by Popov, 2015, “Концепт «племя», или этничность и потестарность “в одном флаконе”,” 13–20); and in this chapter as well, specifically referring to the Rus’ Christianization discussed below, §2.1.2.3.

88 To elucidate on “outdated nationalist tropes,” I am referring generally to scholarship, common in much of the 19-20th c., which has viewed this portion of history as teleologically leading to the separate realizations of modern Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, et al., respectively.

89 Specifically, they regard a Byzantine “commonwealth” from contemporaneous Byzantine, Rus’ and Western perspectives, respectively, instead of from modern Eastern Europe generally, as in the case of Obolensky.
metropolitanate itself, as in the case of the Byzantine 8-9th-c. metropolitanate of Gotthia.\(^90\) While this section is not meant to encompass an exhaustive review of all the literature on the subject, how have Obolensky’s and others’ explanations of the maturation of the early Rus’ metropolitanate in the 11-12th c. recast the historiography of the subject in the past roughly half century?

The more qualified evaluations of Obolensky’s *Byzantine Commonwealth*, while generally positive,\(^91\) though with some exceptionally negative reactions,\(^92\) have pointed out the broad scope of the work and its apparent departures from an otherwise accurate representation.\(^93\) The influence of the “British imperial experience” has also contributed to what might be called post-colonial discourse applied to Byzantium by other reviews.\(^94\) Taken from a post-nationalist perspective, many reviews have praised the work expressly in this regard,\(^95\) though some imply 16th-c. Russian nationalism through “the messianic ‘Third Rome’ concept.”\(^96\) That the concept of Byzantine, or actual Roman inheritance, articulated by Obolensky in the vocabulary of post-imperial *commonwealth*, produced a genuinely new historical perspective on “late antiquity,” remains undisputed.\(^97\) However, two distinct

\(^{90}\) See above chapter 5 §1.1.1, and below §2.1.2.3.
\(^{92}\) See for example the reviews of Alexander, 1972, 270-272; Charanis, 1973, 394-396; and Roux, 1985, 329-330. Alexander, 1972, 270-272 provides a thoroughly classicist and Western critique of Obolensky’s *Commonwealth*, while Roux, 1985, 329-330 laments it, “n’est pas une nouveauté et n’intéresse qu’indirectement l’histoire des religions.” Only Charanis, a specialist in the field, makes broad qualifications, which outweigh his sparse praise, for example when he writes: “But a commonwealth in the sense of a ‘community of states and nations…all of which in varying degrees owed allegiance to the Byzantine Church and empire’—no.”
\(^{94}\) Hinson, 1985, 296; Alexander, 1972, 1433-1435; and Ferluga, 1979, 573-576, who writes, “der Terminus ist [Commonwealth], wenn er auch etwas modern klingt, original und gibt die grundsätzliche Vorstellung dieser einmaligen Gemeinschaft wieder.” Similarly, for Mazal, 1973, 396-398, the word *commonwealth* is a “modernen politischen Begriffs.”
\(^{97}\) This is most reasonably, I believe, discussed by Fowden, 1993, *Empire to Commonwealth: Consequences of Monotheism in Late Antiquity*; see the subsequent n98 below. Taking Obolensky’s concept of “commonwealth,” Fowden argues convincingly, albeit not in great detail, that this methodological framework can be applied to other strains of monotheism elsewhere, for example, the Islamic *ummah*, which began as a monotheistic empire and gradually evolved, through local autonomy over centuries, into a “commonwealth,” applying the entire historical outline to previous conceptions of “late antiquity.” See for example Kristó-Nagy, 2017, “Conflict and
arguments have subsequently been made about which cultural cosmos Rus’ was part of, or perhaps which *commonwealth* Byzantium produced, which have significantly altered the trajectory of subsequent scholarly inquiry.

The first of these arguments, Fowden’s 1993 concept of *commonwealth*, derived directly from Obolensky, even though he does not address the case of Rus’ specifically. His argument, without negating the trajectory of Obolensky’s argument, builds on his work by asserting that Obolensky’s *commonwealth* (as applied specifically to the Slavic and non-Slavic peoples of what later became Eastern Europe), was actually the second iteration of an older Roman tendency to subcontract rule to local potentates, *vis-à-vis* the Latin term, *foederati*. Relating Obolensky’s concept of *commonwealth* to an earlier version of this policy (before the Synod of Chalkêdon of 451 CE), which he calls “the first Byzantine Commonwealth,” he argues that a broader *commonwealth*, before the schism of monophysitism and dyophysitism, could be employed to describe all Christendom, especially pertaining to the Eastern churches, including Coptic, Ethiopian, Syriac, Armenian et al. His reviewers, acknowledging Obolensky’s influence, nevertheless usually display nuanced critiques of his conception and reemployment of *commonwealth*. The second example of

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98 Fowden, 1993, 4 n3. Fowden writes:

“My indebtedness to Obolensky will be self-evident. His book appeared in 1971, just when, as a first-year undergraduate at Oxford, I was attending his remarkable lectures on Byzantine historical geography.”


100 Ibid, 100-137. This would presumably be in regards to their respective self-definations in opposition to Chalcedonian Christianity. This point of view, which I agree with, has been espoused most precisely by Greenwood, 2017, “Composing World History at the Margins of Empire: Armenian Chronicles in Comparative Perspective.” It has even been argued, although not particularly convincingly, that pro-Chalcedonian partisanship appears in contemporaneous sigillography: see for example Butýrskij, 2012, “Редкая иконография Рождества на ранневизантийской подвесной печати,” 17-22. More abstractly, Ter Haar Romeny’s (ed., 2010, *Religious Origins of Nations? The Christian Communities of the Middle East*) discussion of precisely this rivalry between the orthodox Sunni Caliphate and orthodox Christian Byzantium explains the fallout of the Chalcedonian and anti-Chalcedonian Christian jurisprudence (p. 355):

“The arrival of Islam made the split between the Miaphysites and the Byzantine Empire definitive and, concluding developments which had indeed started earlier, Muslim rulers accorded the Syriac Orthodox a special social and juridical status.”

Obolensky’s inspiration, Raffensperger’s 2012 *Reimagining Europe*, seeks to revise Obolensky’s argument and deposit specifically Kievan Rus’ into a larger context of generalized medieval Europe. Of Obolensky’s work, he asserts that it assumes some measure of centralized control by Byzantine emperors over Rus’, which I would posit, is a bit of an overstatement. Perhaps the most extensive review, by Kovalev, while not disagreeing that Rus’ ought to be considered alongside the rest of medieval “Europe,” instead argues that Raffensperger’s idea of *commonwealth* minimizes the religious aspect of cultural heritage, which separated, to whatever extent, Rus’ from Latin Europe. In this I would agree with Kovalev, that a Byzantine, or rather a Christian “commonwealth” as a political concept ought not to be discarded, and the “religious identification” aspect of it ought not be minimized. Pertaining to Rus’ specifically, further works by renowned Byzantine and Rus’ scholars have weighed in on Obolensky’s interpretation as well.

While none of the following authors reject outright Obolensky’s concept of Kievan Rus’ as included within a hypothetical “Byzantine commonwealth,” each makes important points adjusting the overall image of Vladimiran and Jaroslavan Rus’. For example, Hanak acknowledges Obolensky’s *commonwealth*, yet argues that in Rus’, this was better ascribed to Jaroslav rather than Vladimir. Yet he clearly prefers the thrust of Raffensperger’s argument when he quotes him in his main text referring to Rus’ as part of “Europe,” disappointingly without qualifying what exactly “Europe” represented in the minds of the

“I find it very difficult to formulate that his ‘First Byzantine Commonwealth’ adds up to, except in terms of such generality as to render it nugatory. In contrast Obolensky’s notion (also felt by Byzantinists to be slippery) seems crystal-clear!”

103 Ibid, 10-13.
104 That is to say, Kovalev agrees that both Latin Europe and Russia ought to be considered together within the greater Christian oikoumenē, though not at the cost of ignoring the schism, which separated their eventually divergent Christian allegiances. See also Jakobsson, 2008, “The Schism that Never Was: Old Norse Views on Byzantium and Russia,” 173-188.
105 Kovalev, 2015, “Reimagining Kievan Rus’ [in Unimagined Europe],” 158-187. Specifically (p. 160), he writes: “While very much trying to avoid it, Raffensperger is unfortunately trapped by historiography: although he seeks ways to include Rus’ into ‘Europe,’ he does this through dubious means, and in the process unintentionally writes out the rest of the Eastern-rite Christendom out of it. Herein lies the fundamental problem of the entire work, Raffensperger does not adequately define ‘Europe’ for it to be ‘reimagined.’”
rulers and churchmen of the time. Seldom is some concept of “Europa” evoked in either Byzantine or Rus’ sources of the time, which makes Hanak’s support for Raffensperger’s argument baffling, especially due to the emphasis he places elsewhere on Orthodoxy evolving into a major institution of Rus’ rulers’ authority within and without Kiev. Similarly, Poppe references Obolensky’s “Byzantine commonwealth” in his major 1976 paper revising the historiography of Vladimir’s conversion, which I attempted to defend against Obolensky’s subsequent negation, although Poppe’s position regarding Obolensky’s concept of commonwealth has been understandably tempered by their somewhat heated disagreements. Conversely, Franklin is more sympathetic to Obolensky’s concept of commonwealth, periodically referring to it in many of his articles, even though he qualifies himself, acknowledging that no Rus’ source explicitly referred to a “commonwealth” per se, and that Obolensky’s ideas could be interpreted too schematically, yet are useful nonetheless, especially in the case of the Rus’ metropolitanate. Finally, Shepard, while he does not disagree with Obolensky’s representation, has preferred to assign Obolensky’s

107 Ibid, 104. He writes:

“But what emerges from this explanation is a carefully crafted articulation of the importance of Byzantium and its ideals to Europe and not simply to the Balkan Slav states and Kievan Rus’. Christian Raffensperger has prudently articulated the Byzantine ideal.”


110 Obolensky, 1989, “Cherson and the Conversion of Rus’: an Anti-Revisionist View,” 244-256.

111 See for example Poppe’s footnotes pertaining to this subject in his subsequent (1997) major scholarly work, “The Christianization and Ecclesiastical Structure of Kyivan Rus’ to 1300,” article V in Christian Russia in the Making, 370-373 n20-32.

112 Franklin, 2002a, Byzantium—Rus—Russia, Studies in the Translation of Christian Culture, passim; and idem, 2002b, Writing, Society and Culture in Early Rus, c. 950-1300. In the latter volume, while he does not refer directly to Obolensky’s commonwealth, Franklin ascribes (p. 12) the role of Byzantine Christianity within the 11th-c. Rus’ metropolitanate as a component of its own far-flung ecclesiastical empire:

“The head of the Rus Church, the Metropolitan of Rhosia (based in Kiev) was in charge of an ecclesiastical province of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and most of the incumbents were themselves ‘Greeks’. The faith of the Rus was, formally speaking, the faith as received from and sanctioned by Byzantium. The vast majority of Christian writings produced and disseminated in Rus consisted of works which had been translated or adapted from Greek and local writings tended self-consciously to situate themselves in a tradition which derived its authority from the ‘Greeks’. In officially accepting Byzantine (‘Orthodox’) Christianity, the Rus accepted a body of texts and a framework of textual practices which were automatically – axiomatically – regarded as prestigious.”
commonwealth to specifically 1000-1550 CE, though he nevertheless continues to find Obolensky’s original model useful, \(^{113}\) and in this I would unequivocally agree.

It is clear that Obolensky’s 1971 magnum opus, *The Byzantine Commonwealth* was in one sense a spectacular breakthrough in the modern interpretation of the Rus’ metropolitanate, at least within a larger contextualized prism of a so-called “commonwealth,” compared to previous nationalist historiographies. In another sense, his “commonwealth” included only what is today commonly referred to as “Eastern Europe,” excluding other outposts of Byzantine political and theological thought. For this reason, some reviewers \(^{114}\) and subsequent authors \(^{115}\) have seized on other pieces of his argument, which left out other conceivable strands of “commonwealth,” certainly no less important, such as Western Christendom or the Islamic *Ummah*, or sought to bind otherwise disparate parts together, \(^{116}\) albeit with varying success. That said, I would suggest that persuasive historical argumentation correlates heavily with the degree to which “civilization,” in the broadest sense of the word, has been predicated on monotheism: (dependence, independence, inheritance and heritage). Ergo, Rus’ came to exist directly through her rulers’ adoption and adherence to Byzantine Orthodoxy. Acknowledging Shepard’s adjustment of the commonwealth in Rus’ to beginning ca. 1000 CE, the question then becomes, was the development of the Rus’ metropolitanate that of a retrospectively imagined “proto-statehood,” as much of Soviet and post-Soviet historiography has contrived it, \(^{117}\) (and these are not


\(^{115}\) See for example Fowden, 1993.

\(^{116}\) See for example ŠČapov, 1969, “Церковь и становление древнерусской государственности,” 56, who writes:

“The cultural vocabulary of the new faith – whether in building or in worship or in painting or in writing – was that of eastern Christianity, and thus was derived directly or indirectly from Byzantium. Byzantium was the source, the measure, the prototype of Christian civilization; a Byzantine provenance was a guarantee of authenticity and authority. In this general sense the Christian culture of the Rus, like that of the other peoples who had followed the same path to faith, was formed in the Byzantine image, as a likeness – an icon – of the Byzantine prototype.”

\(^{117}\) It would probably be useful to note that though Meyendorff, 1981, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia*, 1-17, focuses almost exclusively on the period of the 13-16th c., he nevertheless acknowledges Obolensky’s model of commonwealth as well, thereby undergirding Shepard’s vision of its continuity to the 16th c.
mutually exclusive), or could we conceive of it, per Obolensky’s idea of a “feoderatio,” as an extension of Byzantine ecumenical dependence, or based on Hanak’s thought: 118 as an “exarchy” perhaps?

Ch. 6  2.1.2 The Rus’ metropolitanate reconsidered: proto-state or exarchy?

Before we assess the original Rus’ metropolitanate in the 11-12th c., it may be helpful to begin with an evaluation of the earlier examples of the metropolitanate of Ohrid and the exarchates of the West (Ravenna and Carthage), during the 6-8th c., where imperially mandated Orthodoxy sought to replace Arianism 119 and Donatism 120 through the formation of Orthodox dioceses (eparchies) and provincial administrations. 121 It is not my purpose to discuss the narrative rises and falls of these de jure exarchates, but rather the de facto control of local churchmen by the exarchs themselves, ruling locally on behalf of Constantinopolitan emperors.

2.1.2.1 Εξαρχίαι, 6-8th c.

The exarchate of Carthage, established under the emperor Maurice I in the 580s, sought to administer all of imperial North Africa, similarly to the case of Italy, replacing the

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118 For example, Hanak, 2014, 71-105.
121 Humphries, 2000, 540.
aforementioned heresies with imperial Orthodoxy. The first two imperially appointed exarchs were the patrikios Gennadios, who originally arrived as the magister militum Africae in Carthage ca. 578 and was later re titled as exarch, and then Ėrakleios in 600-602. Their administrations coincided with an archaeologically attested reorganization of imperial prefectures throughout the Western Mediterranean.

Almost immediately, exarchs began to interfere in church affairs. After Ėrakleios’ 610-deposition of Phōkas, 7th-c. African exarchs continued promoting imperial Orthodoxy, albeit opposing the Monothelētism favored in Constantinople during Cōnstants II’s early

“Regaining its place in the empire, North Africa was to share its troubles: schisms in the church, revolts in the army, rivalries and jealousies in the administration. Justinian issued laws as if nothing had happened in the fifth century, but after his death (565) the change became evident: with the connivance of the generals and the high officials, the landowners became the real masters of Africa. The fortifications around the cities, abundant traces of which still exist, bear witness to a disintegrating authority, intensified exploitation, and the steadily increasing opposition between the governing and the governed, the landowning and the landless classes. In this respect the situation was the same as in the eastern provinces of the empire: when in the middle of the seventh century the empire’s southern neighbors, the Arabs, uniting in a state and creed, sallied forth from their desert peninsula, they too conducted themselves as heirs. They would arrive in the Maghrib as successors, and once again it was this logic of inheritance that prevailed. In the end they were to imitate the Byzantines, employ the same methods and encounter the same difficulties.”

References:


124 Kaegi, 2003, Heraclius, Emperor of Byzantium, 25. According to Kaegi (p. 32), Ėrakleios “encountered the devotional commitment among local Latin Africans,” although he acknowledges that no source exist attesting to his insinuation, and makes absolutely no references to Ėrakleios’ responsibility as African exarch for rooting out Monothelētism and Monophysitism.

reign. To indicate the particular problems posed by the aspirational autonomy of *exarchs* and the incessant contestation of allegiances based on doctrinal disputes, in this case of Carthage, the then-*exarch* of Africa and *patrikios* Grēgorios, despite his blood relation to the Ėrakleian dynasty, revolted against Cōnstans II in 646 and was subsequently killed. He was replaced by another Gennadios, unappointed by Cōnstans II, who also sided with African and Italian bishops against imperial Monothelētism and expelled another imperial representative sent to collect revenue, although he too defected to the Caliph. Due to a change in coinage, by the 690s, we know the seat of the exarchate was transferred to Sardinia and Carthage itself fell in ca. 697, allowing for the top-down Islamization of North Africa, except for Septem.

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126 Haldon, 1990, 56-59. This has been argued to have been part and parcel of the larger “Three-Chapters Controversy” between local African bishops and Justinianic doctrine, according to Fenwick, 2017, “Forgotten Africa and the Global Middle Ages.”


> “Dans ces conditions, la tentation était grande pour le puissant gouverneur d’Afrique de se séparer du fable et lointain empire qui semblait incapable de défendre ses sujets ; tout l’y encourageait à la fois, et les velléités d’indépendance manifestées tant de fois avec impunité par ses prédécesseurs, et la certitude de trouver aisément parmi les populations indigènes des alliés prêts à servir quiconque saurait les acheter, et le mécontentement profond que les luttes religieuses avaient soulevé dans la province contre l’autorité du basileus.”

See also Stratos, 1968, *Byzantium in the Seventh Century*, vol. III, 60-67; Pringle, 1981, 46; and Vössing, 2010, “Afrika zwischen Vandalen, Mauren und Byzantinern (533-548 n.Ch.)” 223. He was killed soon after by the advancing forces of the Caliphate and his “magnates” (see Pringle, 1981, 47) paid off the Muslim advance shortly thereafter. According to Hrbek, 1992, 122, this tax was carried out by a subsequent *exarch* of Carthage and *patrikios* named Nikēforos.

128 See in particular the discussion below (n139-141) regarding Martin I and Maximos the Confessor, who rejected Cōnstans II’s *Ekthēsis* and *Typikon* at the Lateran Synod of 649, and were also persecuted for having supported the African *exarch* Grēgorios.

129 Treadgold 1997, *A History of the Byzantine State and Society*, 312. The imperially sanctioned tax was levied on both the provinces of Italy and Africa, and the latter revolted, eventually switching allegiances to the forces of Islam. See also Pringle, 1981, 47-49.


133 Modern Ceuta. See Julien, 1951, 273. It would be worth considering that this last imperial outpost in Septem, commanded by a certain Julián who may or may not have been an imperial appointee, carries special significance to Spanish historiography in his alleged provision of ships to the famous Muslim commander of Tangier, Tarīq ibn Ziyād, enabling the Islamic conquest of Iberia and the writing of the legendary romance, “Seducción de la Cava.” For the primary sources on this episode, see Pringle, 1981, 382 n69. Based on the abovementioned poem, referenced via webpage: [http://faculty.washington.edu/petersen/591rom/cavatxts.htm](http://faculty.washington.edu/petersen/591rom/cavatxts.htm) in five different 16th-c. versions, the oldest refers to a certain Don Julián:
The exarchate of Ravenna (ca. 580-752 CE) eventually resulted in what some historians have characterized as a conflation of military and ecclesiastical administration. In these circumstances, nominal deference to and representation of the emperor in Constantinople, according to theological stricture, yet local political primacy, characterized the exarchate as based on “normal imperial institutions.” However, by the end of the 6th c., the Ravennese exarch could claim authority only over Ravenna and occasionally Rome.

“La malvada de la Cava, a su padre lo ha contado: don Julián, que es traidor, con los moros se ha concertado que destruyés en a España, por le aver assí injuriado.”

The legend of Don Julián was popularized by Cervantes in Don Quixote ch. 41, referenced via webpage: http://cvc.cervantes.es/literatura/clasicos/quijote/edicion/parte1/cap41/cap41_04.htm:

“Mas quiso nuestra buena suerte que llegamos a una cala que se hace al lado de un pequeño promontorio o cabo que de los moros es llamado el de la ‘Cava Rumía,’ que en nuestra lengua quiere decir ‘la mala mujer cristiana’, y es tradición entre los moros que en aquel lugar está enterrada la Cava, por quien se perdió España, porque cava en su lengua quiere decir ‘mujer mala’, y rumia, ‘cristiana’; y aun tienen por mal agüero llegar allí a dar fondo cuando la necesidad les fuerza a ello —porque nunca le dan sin ella—, puesto que para nosotros no fue abrigo de mala mujer, sino puerto seguro de nuestro remedio, según andaba alterada la mar.”

Unsurprisingly, Spanish nationalist historiography has traditionally cast the character of Don Julián as a guilt-ridden traitor, although this interpretation has recently garnered much debate. See for example Maura, 1992, “Leyenda y nacionalismo: alegorías de la derrota en La Malinche y Florinda ‘La Cava’,” 239-251; and Escalona, 2016, “The Endings of Early Medieval Kingdoms: Murder or Natural Causes?” 2. On the Islamic use of the word “roumi” in this time and place, see Julien, 1951, 277-278. He writes:

“Le nom même de Roûmi (pl. courant nsara) désigne encore aujourd’hui l’Européen. Mais longtemps sa signification fut plus étroite et plus précise. Le voyageur arabe el-Yaqoûbi, qui nous décrit la situation de la Berbérie dans la seconde moitié du IXe siècle, distingue encore parmi les autochtones les Roûmi, descendants des anciens sujets de l’empereur byzantin, et les Afârik, descendants des indigènes romanisés, à côté des Berbères. El-Beki, à la fin du XIe siècle, ne croit plus devoir faire les mêmes distinctions, et l’on en vient à penser que la fusion des différents éléments de la population s’est faite, au moins pour une large part, au cours des deux siècles intercalaires c’est-à-dire trois ou quatre cents ans après la conquête.”

134 Deliyannis, 2010, Ravenna in Late Antiquity, passim; and Haldon, 1990, 1.


136 Borri, 2005, “Duces e magistri militum nell’Italia esarcale (VI-VIII secolo),” 8-9. He writes:

“Il permanere del prestigio civile nelle province d’Italia va a scontrarsi con la visione tradizionale e ‘ortodossa’ che vorrebbe una forte militarizzazione dell’Italia, come diretto precedente per la successiva creazione dei themata, e confermerebbe ancora come il ducatus italiano post-riconquista rientrasse nelle normali istituzioni imperiali. La militarizzazione dell’Italia di certo esistette e la grande quantità di uomini d’armi nella documentazione privatistica ce lo conferma, ma questo si verifì cò per uno sviluppo autonomo che, partendo dalla base tardo imperiale ora tracciata, giunse a nuovi, originali sviluppi.”
while elsewhere in the Italian peninsula, fortified centers had been occupied by Lombard lords as duchies.\(^{137}\) Tax revenues and loyalties to the emperor could never be taken for granted, however, and were permanently unresolved between Rome and Ravenna. This was because such allegiances were precisely negotiated through confessional doctrines, since the popes, though frequently of Eastern origin in this period, did not always submit to Constantinopolitan diktat.\(^{138}\) For example, consider the Italian-born pope Martin I and his fellow-accused Maximos the Confessor, rejecting the imperial Ekhēsis and Typikon at the 649 Lateran Synod, were persecuted for supporting the aforementioned exarch-turned-rebel, Grēgorios.\(^{139}\) That Cōnstans II relied on the exarchs of Ravenna to implement his policies in the West is understandable given his appointment of Theodōros Kalliopas to the exarchate with orders to arrest Martin and Maximos to be tried in Constantinople.\(^{140}\) This is also easily demonstrated by Cōnstans II’s granting the archbishop of Ravenna autocephaly from Rome in 666.\(^{141}\) But this situation did not last long before exarchs themselves began testing their imperial allegiances. By the time of the Lombard kings’ final renunciation of Arianism and embrace of Orthodoxy in the 670s-680s, Constans II’s successor, Constantine IV reduced papal taxes, alternating his support between Rome and Ravenna, continuing until the 730s.\(^{142}\) With the elevation of Sicily to a thema in the 690s, and the declining imperial favor Ravenna


\(^{138}\) Humphries, 2000, 543-544.

\(^{139}\) See above n128.

\(^{140}\) Innes, 2003, *An Introduction to Early Medieval Western Europe, 400-900: the Sword, the Plough and the Book*, 199-201.

\(^{141}\) Markus, 1981, “Ravenna and Rome, 554-604,” 566-578. See also Innes, 2003, 168. It would also be suitable to note that shortly before moving his court to Syracuse in 663, Cōnstans II is remembered for being the last Emperor to stay in Rome, only for twelve days, but for the last two, he had the Pantheon stripped of its riches and sent back to Constantinople. See for example Haldon, 1990, 60.

\(^{142}\) Anastos, 1979, “The Transfer of Illyricum, Calabria and Sicily to the Jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 732-33,” 30. According to Anastos:

“In these relations between the papacy and the Byzantine empire, the apparent contradictions between what might seem to be pro-Byzantine and anti-Byzantine policy can be reconciled, if the interests of the papacy and the policy adopted by the Roman See to serve them are properly understood. Occasionally, it is true, the popes opposed the Byzantine emperors for financial or doctrinal reasons. But at the same time Rome came forward in defence of its Constantinopolitan sovereigns. For, while fending off all imperial infringements upon the prerogatives of the Roman See in either the theological or the economic sphere, the popes realized that an emperor safely established at a distance in Constantinople was less likely to threaten papal autonomy and freedom of action than a monarch resident in Italy. Being shrewd administrators, they shifted their tactics to meet changing conditions. Hence, they resisted the Byzantine tax-collectors, fulminated against the iconoclasts, and led the Italian cities against the imperial forces in Italy, but simultaneously repudiated schemes to set up usurpers as emperors, and urged their people to remain loyal to the Empire.”
received, unsurprisingly, Ravennese partisans participated in mutilating Justinian II in 695.\textsuperscript{143} Thereafter, we can see imperial support vacillate between Lombard duchies, Sicily, Ravenna and Rome throughout the 8\textsuperscript{th} c., with the latter parties occasionally clashing, but also colluding, in their attempts to secure legitimacy, autonomy and their own allegiances.\textsuperscript{144} In the midst of the iconoclastic debates by the 750s, papal détente with the Lombard kings and duchies resulted in imperial interests being excluded throughout northern Italy,\textsuperscript{145} finalized by the Lombards’ ousting of the last imperial exarch, Eutychios.\textsuperscript{146} Imperial allegiances nevertheless remained in Venetia and the south, though always precarious, due to the changeability of the local bishops’ loyalties in relation to Constantinopolitan ecclesiastical doctrines.\textsuperscript{147} Indeed, we will see a similar situation playing out in another case study: the 11-12\textsuperscript{th}-c. \textit{thema} of Bulgaria.

\textbf{Ch. 6 \hspace{1cm} 2.1.2.2 Contriving the \textit{thema} of Bulgaria\textsuperscript{148} after 1019: ensuring loyalties}

We can see imperial allegiance delegated to local ecclesiastical power brokers certainly pertaining to the unfolding 7\textsuperscript{th}-c. system of \textit{themata},\textsuperscript{149} but also beyond the

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\textsuperscript{144} Hallenbeck, 1982, “Pavia and Rome: The Lombard Monarchy and the Papacy in the Eighth Century,” 175-176. By the 730s, Illyricum and Calabria were not included within patriarchal jurisdiction, as they had been removed during the first iconoclast debates, according to Brown, 1991. 325. Specifically, Anastos, 1979, 29-31 argues that the groundwork was laid in this region for the later establishment of the city of \textit{Justiniana Prima}, named after Justinian in his home region, as discussed below in the following §2.1.2.2.

\textsuperscript{145} Hallenbeck, 1982, 175-176.

\textsuperscript{146} Richards, 1979, 228-229.

\textsuperscript{147} Brown, 1991, 324-328. He writes:

“Ironically the fall of the capital [Ravenna] with more of a whimper than a bang had little direct effect on the remaining territories of Byzantine Italy. The process of decentralisation had been under way for decades, with effective power in the hands of local elites led by \textit{duces}. Nevertheless the history of the surviving provinces is best studied by examining them in separate blocks, since in each the relatively uniform social structure of the imperial period was gradually transformed by particular local factors. In the north Venetia and Istria retained their imperial allegiance, in the south Sicily and the duchies of Calabria, Otranto and Naples continued to come under the authority of the \textit{strategos} of the Sicilian theme, and in Central Italy the Exarchate, Pentapolis and duchies of Perugia and Rome were the subject of a tug of war between the Lombards, the papacy and entrenched local elites.”

In the case of Venice specifically, which had an imperial \textit{prōtospatharios} until the 12\textsuperscript{th} c. (Archie Dunn, personal communication), the point remains all the stronger. See for example Nicol, 1988, \textit{Venice and Byzantium: a Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations}, 1-67.

\textsuperscript{148} In Greek: Η θέμα της Βουλγαρίας.

\textsuperscript{149} As we saw in considering the 6-8\textsuperscript{th}-c. exarchates of the West, the loyalties of provincial governors, military, ecclesiastical or otherwise, could only be ensured via their respective adherences to imperial ecclesiastical doctrine, which was then manifested throughout the provinces they administered. Therefore, administrators had
mainland *themata*. This is demonstrated in the case of the *thema* of Bulgaria after Basil II’s reconquest completed by 1018, whose seats were Skopje and Ohrid. What had previously been an autocephalous patriarchate of Ohrid since 944, was reduced to an archbishopric of Ohrid by 1019, nevertheless independent of the Constantinopolitan

to necessarily be appointed directly from Constantinople to ensure the continued incorporation of their respective provinces within the imperial *oikoumenē*. According to Stephenson, 2000a, 154-155:

“The major Byzantine achievement in the western Balkans between 1025 and 1100 was the incorporation of the region known as Bulgaria into the system of provinces ruled from Constantinople. In 1100 there was a Byzantine *thema* of Bulgaria with recognizably Byzantine institutions (for example civilian and fiscal administrators) and characteristically Byzantine problems (harsh or unfair taxation, rigorous recruitment of provincial infantrymen).”

Taxation, as it was manifested within the imperial *oikoumenē*, is usually a rather difficult aspect of public administration to consider along with ecclesiastical doctrine, however, this is precisely the point of considering them together: separating “Church” and “State,” as respective monoliths, and as many scholars are undoubtedly aware, is a typically modern, Western convention. Other authors, such as Hristovska, 2001, “Byzantine Coins on the Territory of the Republic of Macedonia in the XI and XII Centuries: Aspects of Distribution and Circulation,” 101-102, have for this reason portrayed taxation during this period for Ohrid somewhat differently from Stephenson:

“The frequent changing of the real value of the coins caused great confusion in the fiscal system and allowed abuses. The state was losing revenues, and the taxpayers were also being cheated. The Ohrid Archbishop Theophylactos in his letters often criticized the dishonesty and misdeeds of the tax collectors on the territory of his archbishopric. This unfortunate situation in Macedonia was particularly experienced after the reign of Michael the Paphlagonian (1034-1041).”

Such an assumption of essential “statehood,” is precisely what our discussion seeks to address: that the “state” is typically presumed misses the point that the archbishopric was only an instrument of the “state” as long as the archbishop remained loyal to imperial ecclesiastical doctrine, which in terms of land usage and taxation, was always a contentious affair. See also Mullett, 1981, *Theophylact of Ochrid: Reading the Letters of a Byzantine Archbishop*, 130-131; and Harvey, 1993, “Land and Taxation in the reign of Alexios I Komnenos: the Evidence of Theophylakt of Ochrid,” 139-154.

150 For example, Crimean Chersōn. See Feldman, 2013, *passim*.

151 The seat of the *katepanō* of Bulgaria, according to Jordanov, 2006, *Corpus of Byzantine Seals from Bulgaria*, vol. I, 48, was in Skopje. On the relationship between the seats of Ohrid and Skopje, especially in light of seals, (discussed in this subsection below), Stephenson, 2000a, 17 writes:

“The evidence for communication between Ohrid and Skopje, and Prespa and Debar, supports the hypothesis proposed by Cheynet and Morrisson that most seals discovered at provincial sites (and not from Constantinople) will have come from nearby. The ‘principle of territoriality’ rests on the entirely plausible premise that the majority of sealed documents will have circulated within the area of jurisdiction of the issuing authority. It is supported by the discovery of an archive of seals (but not the documents they once sealed) at Preslav, which further supports the notion that seals served the function of validating as well as securing documents. (Why else would archived copies bear seals?)”


153 That is to say, relatively quickly: Ohrid was subjected to the emperor Basil II after the pivotal Battle of Kleidion in 1014, and the final Battle of Dyrrachion in 1018, both imperial victories.
patriarch, yet loyal to the emperor, which served as much of the administrative structure of the thema of Bulgaria.

Firstly, it would be helpful to view the imperial concept of the thema of Bulgaria as it was contemporaneously contrived: the population of the contemporaneous thema of Bulgaria was not Bulgarian by some imagined ethnicity, but equally Roman as far as canon law was concerned. Between the second half of the 11th-12th century, the thema of Bulgaria was

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154 According to Prinzing, 2015, “The Autocephalous Byzantine Ecclesiastical Province of Bulgaria/Ohrid: how Independent were its Archbishops?” 366-367:

“In the Byzantines’ scheme of things, the newly constituted Archbishopric of Ohrid was intended to ensure that the West Balkan ecclesiastical centre of Ohrid (together with its network of suffragans) created by Samuel should retain its independence for the most part: therefore, its role was probably, in the emperor’s (and his successors) design, to have the effect of stabilising imperial rule over the long term, and doing so more effectively by means of an ecclesiastical policy with cultural finesse than would have been possible through control by a metropolitan directed by the Pariarchate [sic] of Constantinople. In my opinion, these expectations were for the most part fulfilled, as witness, among other things, by the fact that even in the time of Bulgarian or Serbian supremacy (under Tsar Ivan Asen II, after 1230 to 1241, and under King/Tsar Stefan Dušan, after 1334 to 1355) the Archbishopric of Ohrid was not substantially adversely affected in its independence or its Byzantine form.”

Similarly, Mullett, 1981, 64 remarks:

“We cannot see any organisational structure beyond the bishops; but we can see, in the charters of Basil II, the provision for the archdiocese after the reconquest. All the bishoprics which were part of Samuel’s patriarchate were to be retained; numbers of paroikoi and klerikoi in each of the kastra, diocese by diocese, on which exkousseia was granted were recorded.”

Naxidou, 2006, “An Aspect of the Medieval History of the Archbishopric of Ohrid: Its Connection with Justiniana Prima,” 160, however, quite simply abridges Basil II’s goals in this regard:

“Basil II arranged the ecclesiastical organization of the conquered Bulgarians in the context of his general political moderation towards them. His purpose was to consolidate the power of Byzantium and to prevent the danger of a future uprising. […] In this way the political control over the subjugated peoples was reinforced.”


155 Stouraitis, 2017, “The Lonely Patriot Niketas Choniates: Warfare and Byzantine Identity in the 12th c.” This is as opposed to contriving the archbishopric of Ohrid through narratives of “Bulgarian nationalism” or “political nostalgia” in the 11th c. See for example references to vague notions of medieval Bulgarian nationalism in Curta, 2006a, 288; Mullett, 1981, 272; Stepnov, 2008, “From ‘Steppe’ to Christian Empire, and Back: Bulgaria between 800 and 1100,” 374-375; and Tăpkova-Zaimova, 2007, 436. According to Tăpkova-Zaimova, the issue of Bulgarian “statehood” was central to the archbishopric of Ohrid, even so far as to refer to matters of “national policy” and seemingly self-conscious “Bulgarian populations,” yet this entirely misses the point of the archbishopric still being subordinated to the emperor in Constantinople and the continued emphasis on culture-historical models:
presented as encompassing the 6-7th-c. province of Justiniana Prima, which was contemporaneous with, and comparable to, the exarchate of Ravenna. Notably, Günter Prinzing, has also supported this supposition of Justiniana Prima’s association with the exarchates of Carthage and Ravenna, and the later metropolitanate of Rus’. Possibly centered in Caričin Grad, Justiniana Prima’s administrative buildings, recounted by...

“Je crois que l’archevêché d’Ochrid, situé au sein de populations surtout bulgares, a été en pratique le moins rattaché à une politique nationale, de quelque côté quelle eût émané. Cet évêché représente un exemple unique d’autonomie spirituelle qui s’est manifestée dans le climat houleux des Balkans et sur laquelle Constantinople n’a plus été en état d’imposer son autorité sans concurrence au cours des derniers siècles de l’existence de l’Empire byzantine. Ce qui est encore plus remarquable, c’est que l’autorité d’Ochrid a continué d’avoir un rôle de premier ordre dans la vie spirituelle d’une partie non négligeable des régions occidentales de la Péninsule, et cela durant quatre siècles encore, avant que Constantinople ne puisse prendre définitivement le dessus.”

156 Curta, 2006a, 287-288, 392, argues that this theory was invented by Theofylaktos of Ohrid in the late-11th c., while Naxidou, 2006, 160, argues for the mid-12th c.; and Prinzing, 2012, 363, argues that it was instead a product of the late-12th c. Due to his well documented and agile argument, in this case I find Prinzing the most convincing. See also Mullett, 1981, 272; and Stephenson, 2000b, “Byzantine Conceptions of Otherness after the Annexation of Bulgaria (1018),” 245-258. For the source itself, see Gautier (trans.), 1986, Théophylacte d’Achrida: Lettres. For a rather personal, if not intimate “portrait” of Theofylaktos of Ohrid as a shaper and man of his time, see Obolensky, 1988, Six Byzantine Portraits, 34-82.


“Mais j’estime peu probable l’existence d’une continuité ininterrompue entre l’Église bulgare à l’époque qui suit le Concile de 879-880 et la Justiniana Prima, comme le suppose R. Ljubinković. À mon avis, cela s’accorderait mal avec la politique bulgare de l’époque. En effet, quoi que la Justiniana Prima fasse partie à cette époque des territoires de l’État bulgare, le gouvernement de Boris et ensuite de Simeon continue de considérer cet archevêché autonome comme une réalisation du basileus de Constantinople et ne cherche pas de rapprochement de ce côté : saint Clément ne mentionne jamais Justiniana Prima. Je ne m’arrête plus là-dessus, en me raillant plutôt à l’opinion de H. Döpmann à ce sujet.”

More simply, according to Naxidou, 2006, 165:

“By its identification with Justiniana Prima the Archbishopric of Ohrid became five centuries older, was connected with an important Emperor Justinian, gained the approval of the pope and confirmed its rights over a large number of provinces. In this way it was seeking to improve its ecclesiastical status and to hinder the expansionist tendencies of the patriarchate.”


Prokopios, included primarily ecclesiastical structures, along with those of the praetorian prefect, and the jurisdiction of the entire territory belonged to the archbishop of Illyricum. The subsequent 11th-c. “Byzantine agenda” in the setup of the administrative structure of primarily western Bulgaria, which restored imperial authority over a previously autonomous Kometopoulian area, at least according to the NE, has been argued to be apparent in the


“Justiniana Prima remained primarily a church administrative centre and a garrison city, as well as an important regional centre. The fact that the population abandoned the city at the beginning of the 7th century can be linked with the attacks by the Slavs and the loss of Byzantine control over virtually all of Illyricum. The complex of the Acropolis with its cathedral, baptistery and adjacent administrative buildings was in the service of the Church. The role of sacral component can also be seen in the buildings scheme of the Upper and the Lower Town, and in the area outside the urban core. However, it should not be forgotten that the military administration and its buildings located in the south-western quarter of the Upper Town undoubtedly also played a role.”

Other scholars and archaeologists however, particularly some of those of modern FYRO/Macedonian nationality, have instead insisted that Skopia was rather the site of Justiniana Prima, although I will decline from involvement in what appears to be another exercise in nationalist archaeology. See for example Aleksova, 2001, “The Byzantine Coin Hoard of Bargala,” 92-93. 160 This is near modern Leskovac, Serbia. See Curta, 2006a, 41-42, 50, who defers to Justinian’s 535 CE novella 11 regarding the ultimate provincial authority for the seat as belonging to the archbishop of “Aquis.” Translated by Blume, 1952, The Annotated Justinian Code, as:

“Your Beatitude, therefore, and all [future] holy bishops of the aforesaid Justiniana Prima shall have the prerogative of archbishop, with power to govern the aforesaid provinces and regulate them, and have therein the highest honor, dignity, eminence and position in the priesthood, so that [the priests] shall be appointed by you and shall have you as their only archbishop. […] The bishop at Aqua shall have jurisdiction over the aforesaid city and all its fortresses and territory and churches, so that he may […] bring [the people] to the orthodox faith.”

Clearly, Justinian’s “Kirchenpolitik” (see n158 above) was meant to apply to archbishops as providing governance over these areas, though not to the total exclusion of the praetorian prefect, (Archie Dunn, personal communication, 24 January, 2017). For a further discussion of the intricacies of relations between the archbishop and praetorian prefect in Justiniana Prima, see also Turlej, 2016, Justiniana Prima: An Underestimated Aspect of Justinian’s Church Policy, 10-15.

Notably, Curta declines to provide a reference to Prokopios himself, but in this instance, see Dewing and Downey (trans.), 1940, Procopius: vol. 7 On Buildings, IV/I, 224-227. According to Prokopios, the administrative duties belonged to the archbishop of Illyricum instead:

“In brief, the city [Justiniana Prima] is both great and populous and blessed in every way—a city worthy to be the metropolis of the whole region, for it has attained this rank. It has also been allotted to the Archbishop of Illyricum [Scupi] as his seat, the other cities conceding this honour to it, as being first in point of size.”

161 This is as opposed to Eastern Bulgaria, which was based in Driistra/Dorostolon. See for example Jordanov, 2006, vol. I, 52, 62-69; Georgiev, 1987, “L’organisation religiase dans les terres bulgares du Nord-Est apres l’an 971,” 146-158; and Gjuzelev, 1988, Medieval Bulgaria, Byzantine Empire, Black Sea – Venice – Genoa, 216-217. On the futility of Kometopoulian autonomous church organization in the lower Danube region, see
very architecture and fresco painting\textsuperscript{163} of the St. Sofia metropolitan church in Ohrid,\textsuperscript{164} newly reconstructed by the imperially-appointed metropolitan Leo I between 1037-1056.\textsuperscript{165}  

Shepard, 2015, “Communications Across the Bulgarian Lands – Samuel’s Poisoned Chalice for Basil II and his Successors?” 218. He writes:

“And anyone attempting to restore the Bulgarian tsarstvo at traditional sites of authority like Pliska or Preslav would have to reckon with vulnerability to land-and-sea expeditions launched up the Danube. […] Their naval installations […] showed in monumental form the Byzantines’ willingness to commit resources to the Lower Danube, and thus the futility of trying to wrest it from them. By comparison, a series of fertile lakeside regions with ample agricultural potential, yet screened from cavalry attacks by mountains penetrated by a number of passes, had much to recommend them. And this, together with the church organisation available in Ohrid, might seem reason enough for Samuel’s apparent inclination to make his base in the vicinity of the bishopric from around the time when he […] sought legitimacy as, in effect, sole ruler.”

For 11th-c. seals found in Preslav of stratēgoi, doukes and katepanōs, see also Jordanov, 1993, Печатите от стараемето в Преслав (971-1088), cat. nos. 323-373. For an 11th-c. episcopal seal of a certain Chrystoforos from Dristra specifically, see cat. no. 388. It should be noted that the bishopric of Dristra was subordinated to the archbishop of Ohrid and the thema of Bulgaria by Basil II in the 1020s according to Jordanov (p. 186-187). On the city of Dristra/Dorostolon itself, see Atanasov, 2014, “Durostorum–Dorostol(os)–Drastar/Dristra–Sliistra: the Danubian Fortress from the Beginning of the 4th to the Beginning of the 19th c.,” 493-587. According to Metcalf, 1979, Coinage in South-eastern Europe: 820-1396, 75, he claims that Dristra was actually the capital of the thema of Bulgaria.

\textsuperscript{162}See for example the metropolitanate of Bulgaria, no. 13 in the NE, corresponding to the 12th c.: Darrouzès (ed.), 1981, Notitiae Episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae, 371-372 and n834; see p. 152-153 for commentary.

\textsuperscript{163}According to Shepard, 2015, 230, the early-11th-c. imperially appointed, archbishop Leo of Ohrid:

“Sought to impress imperial majesty upon his Bulgarian flock through building-works in grandiose style at the church of St. Sophia and by declaring the correct forms of worship through its wall-paintings. Among the various paintings of the proskimide is an unusual image of St Basil himself blessing the holy bread and wine. Leo may have been offering visual exegesis of the superiority of the Greek liturgy and, more specifically of St. Basil’s. Such a zealous advocate of the Greek liturgy and believer in suffering and hardship for the good of one’s soul might be expected to take against any deviations from the norm.”


\textsuperscript{165}Stephenson, 2000a, 137-138, for example, argues for an explicit “imperial agenda” in this regard. Curta, however disagrees (personal communication, 7 October, 2016):

“I believe Archbishop Leo works with Hagia Sophia in mind, because that is the patriarchal church. […] I don't see an ‘imperial’ agenda in Ohrid (although, of course, the argument could be made that architecturally, that church is inspired by imperial foundations). [In my opinion], Leo is transplanting Constantinopolitan ideas that happen to be imperial. But it's the archbishop, not the emperor who does that.”

Personally, I believe both Curta and Stephenson make valid points, that if it would have been the archbishop, and not the emperor, who transplanted Constantinopolitan ideas, and the ecclesiastical administrations which equally functioned as imperial administrations, the juxtaposition between the churchman vs. the ruler would not necessarily conflict. Assuming that a given metropolitan, in this case of Ohrid, was either imperially appointed
Another method of documenting the imperial allegiance of the theme of Bulgaria is through sigillography and numismatics. According to Jordanov’s Corpus, there are a total of eighteen known seals of archbishops and doukes of the theme of Bulgaria in the 11-12th c., and Margaret Mullett has published a separate seal of Theofylaktos of Ohrid which does not appear in his corpus. Aside from these, a further five seals from the Dumbarton Oaks or patriarchally appointed, he still promoted allegiance to the emperor. For example, can we not say that Leo himself embodied the Constantinopolitan agenda, similarly to the Greek-speaking metropolitans appointed to administer the territory of Rus’? Ultimately, I believe that personnel was (and remains) policy. For further literature on Leo I of Ohrid, see Munitiz, 2010, “Leo of Ohrid: the New Kephalaiia,” 121-144; Büttner, 2007, Erzbischof Leon von Ohrid (1037-1056): Leben und Werk; and Labruna, 2006, “Teofilatto di Ocrida e la riforma del sistema scolastico a Bisanzio nell’XI secolo,” 151-165. For a similar discussion of the historical context of Constantinopolitan-appointed archbishops of Ohrid in the 11-13th c., see Prinzing, 2013, “The Authority of the Church in Uneasy Times: the Example of Demetrios Chomatenos, Archbishop of Ohrid, in the State of Epiros, 1216–1236,” 140-142.

We can see a parallel development in the town of Prespa during the Justinianic era. The location and construction of the palatial complex in Prespa, it has been argued, signified the importance of the settlement as an imperial administrative center, ensuring loyalty to the emperor above all. (Archie Dunn, personal communication, 30 September, 2016). See also Moutsopoulos, 1966, Η βασιλική του Αγίου Αχιλλείου στη Μικρή Πρόσπα (πίν. 38-42), passim. According to Moutsopoulos, the basilica in question, Agios Achilles, doubled as Czar Samuil’s summer palace during the late-10th c., (see p. 196).

It should be noted here that Jordanov’s Corpus (2006) catalogs all seals found within the borders of modern Bulgaria, as opposed to cataloging all seals of “Bulgarian” provenance during the period in question. See Jordanov, 2006, vol. I/III, cat. nos. 1144-1146, 1700-1701. For chronological reasons, it would be important to note that these seals include 2 total seals of Basilios ό μοναχός, σύγκελλος χ άνεγραφείς (cat. no. 1144, 1 found in Silistra and dated by Jordanov to 1048); 4 total seals of Nikolaos Καρίκης, πρωτοπρόεδρος χ δούς (cat. no. 1145, 1 found in Svilengrad and dated by Jordanov to the 1080s) Νικηφόρος Βατάτζης, πρόεδρος χ δούς (cat. no. 1146, provenance uncertain and dated by Jordanov to the 1070s); 6 total seals of Ιωάννης ό μονάχος, αρχιεπίσκοπος τής πάσης Βουλγαρίας χ πρώτης Ιουστινιανής (cat. no. 1700, 1 found in Khaskovo and dated by Jordanov to the mid/late-11th c.); and 2 total seals of Konstantininos, αρχιεπίσκοπος τής πάσης Βουλγαρίας χ πρώτης Ιουστινιανής (cat. no. 1701, 1 found in modern, southeastern Bulgaria and dated by Jordanov to the mid/late 12th c.). Also according to chronological reasons, this list does not include 1 seal of Ισιδόρος, επίσκοπος (cat. no. 1685, found at Smiadovo and dated by Jordanov to the early-9th c.); 17 total seals of Γρηγόριος, αρχιεπίσκοπος (cat. nos. 1686-1699, 1 found in Madara, 8 in Pliska, 1 in Ovčarovo, the rest of the finds’ provenances are uncertain, and dated by Jordanov to the lat.-9th c. [although this is disputed by Laurent and Seibt, who prefer a 10th-c. dating]); and 1 seal of Γρηγόριος, αρχιεπίσκοπος τής πάσης Βουλγαρίας χ πρώτης Ιουστινιανής (cat. nos. 1686-1699, 1 found in Madara, 8 in Pliska, 1 in Ovčarovo, the rest of the finds’ provenances are uncertain, and dated by Jordanov to the 14th c.). It should also be noted that there was a separate bishopric of Ἀχριδα, which Jordanov (cat. nos. 1675-1679) registers as “an unidentified settlement in the Rhodope Mountains, southeast of Asenovgrad (Stenimachos […] The bishopric of Achrida was subordinated to the metropolitan of Philipopolis.)”

Mullett, 1981, xiv-xviii. Stephenson, 2000a, 17, calls it an “unpretentious seal.”
archive, dated to the 11-12th c., attest to the thema as a duchy and archbishopric, bringing the total to no less than 24 published seals of imperially appointed archbishops and other officials of the 11-12th-c. θέμα τῆς Βουλγαρίας. In accounting for the suffragan sees belonging to the autocephalous archbishop of Ohrid, some of which included some sees in emporia on the lower Danube, we may note the significant potential ecclesiastical tax revenue at the archbishop’s disposal. For example, Skylitzēs reports that one hundred

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169 See for example the ecclesiastical seals (one specimen each) of Μιχαήλ, σκέπασις τῆς Βουλγαρίας (DO Seals vol. 1, cat. no. 29.8, dated to the 12th c.); Iωάννης, σκέπασις τῆς Βουλγαρίας (DO Seals vol. 1, cat. no. 29.7, dated to the 12th c.); Ιωάννης Τριακοντάφυλλος, πρωτοπρόεδρος χρατίωρ τῆς Βουλγαρίας (DO Seals vol. 1, cat. no. 29.4, dated to the 11th c.); Γρηγόριος, πρωτοπρόεδρος χ δούς τῆς Βουλγαρίας (DO Seals vol. 1, cat. no. 29.2, dated to the 11th c.); and Κωνσταντίνος, πατρικίου, ἄνθοπατος, βέστης, λογαριαστης χ ἀναγραφεῖς τῆς πάσης Βουλγαρίας (DO Seals vol. 1, cat. no. 29.1, dated to the mid-11th c.). For further references, see Oikonomides, 1976, “L’évolution de l’organisation administrative de l’empire Byzantin au XIe siècle (1025–1118),” Travaux et Mémoires 6, 149-150; Bănescu, 1946, Les duchés byzantins de Paristion (Paradouanou) et de Bulgarie, 118; and Litavrin, 1960, България и Византия в XI-XII вв., 250. For the full catalog, see Nesbitt and Oikonomides (eds.), 1991, Catalogue of Byzantine Seals at Dumbarton Oaks and in the Fogg Museum of Art: Italy, North of the Balkans, North of the Black Sea.

170 A further seal should be noted from the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford — that of a certain Ανδρόνικος Φιλοκάλης, βεστίγωρς και κατεπάρτος (cat. no. 3 in Maksimović and Popović, 1993, “Les sceaux byzantins de la région Danubiennne en Serbie,” found in Preslav, dated to ca. 1065). The seal does not mention the θέμα τῆς Βουλγαρίας specifically, but we know from Kekaumenos, 181.17 (for the source itself, see Spadaro [ed. and trans.]. 1998, Raccomandazioni e consigli di un galantuomo [Strategikon]: Testo critico, traduzione e note, 218-219; Wassiliewsky and Jerndstedt [eds.]. 1896, Cecaumeni Strategicon et incerti scriptoris de officii rei regii libellus, 72; Litavrin [ed. and trans.]. 1972, Советы и рассказы Кекавмена: сочинение византийского полководца XI вв., 264; and Codouër [trans.], Consejos de un Aristocrata Bizantino, 119, who mentions this individual: that he served as the katepanŏ of Bulgaria in ca. 1066. See also Bănescu, 1946, 144; and for a commentary on the source itself, see Roueché, 2000, “Defining the Foreign in Kekaumenos,” 203-214. Additionally, this list does not include what is typically referred to as the “Second Bulgarian Kingdom.” For these seals, see Jordanov, 2001, Κορμος на печатите на средновековна България, 87-147.


172 This would be especially important due to the heavy presence of imperial troops stationed in the lower Danube, to whom, for example, Frankopan, 1997, “The Numismatic Evidence from the Danube Region, 971-1092,” 30-39, attributes the nomismata saturation of the area, as compared to elsewhere in the thema of Bulgaria. This opinion is echoed elsewhere, for example, by Kaplanis, 2003, “The Debasement of the ‘Dollar of the Middle Ages’,” 768-801, (and to a lesser extent, Haldon, 1995, “Strategies of Defence, Problems of Security,” 149-155) although like many other scholars, Kaplanis nevertheless makes rather overt assumptions of essentialist “statehood” with regard to imperial coinage and circulation along the Danube, which, albeit well-argued and evidenced, heavily discounts other considerations of what he terms an “inelastic supply of precious metals” in Byzantium, or as other scholars have deemed Byzantine “nascent mercantilism,” for example, in Holo, 2009, Byzantine Jewry in the Mediterranean Economy, 26; and Soročan, 1995, “Случайность или система? Раннесредневековый византийский меркантилизм,” 122-132. However, other numismatists, such as Stoljarik, 1992, 92-93, dispute this claim, albeit with older evidence, asserting instead that:
kentenaria’s worth of gold coinage, undoubtedly imperial (as opposed to “Bulgarian”),173 and perhaps western gold were recovered in Ohrid in 1018,174 even before the reorganization.175 Numismatically, as Holmes has suggested, 11th-c. base coinage discovered throughout the fortified centers of the thema of Bulgaria indicate imperially funded garrisons in the suffragan sees as well,176 which was somewhat reflected elsewhere throughout the Balkans177 and the thema of Bulgaria particularly. That said, few finds dating to the 11-12th c. have been documented in the area of Ohrid specifically, which nevertheless add to a picture of gradual, albeit slow, imperial monetization of the thema of Bulgaria.178

“The acute crisis in the Empire in the late 1070s and the nomadic invasions into the North Balkan territories significantly hampered the inflow of Byzantine coins in Paristrion; only one gold and 25 copper coins fall within the reign of Nicephorus Botaniates and the first years of Alexius Comnenus […] in spite of that fact, by the early 12th century, the most serious symptoms of the crisis had been overcome, the feudalisation of Byzantine society and the steady decline of towns under the Comneni did not create favourable conditions for the flourishing of commodity-money relations on the northern periphery of the Empire.”

173 It would be highly unlikely that it would have been Kometopoulian coinage, as the only known coinage, imitative of Byzantine coinage, dates to the end of the 12th c. under the Asenids. See Hendy, 1969, Coinage and Money in the Byzantine Empire, 1081-1261, 218-222 (cat. nos. 66-91). See also Bellinger and Grierson (eds.), 1973, Catalogue of the Byzantine Coins in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection and in the Whittlemore Collection, vol. III, 77. For a more in-depth discussion of the so-called Bulgarian/Asenid “imitative” coinage, see above chapter 3 §1.2.1.2.
175 It would be important to note here that upon the establishment of the thema of Bulgaria, Basil II received taxes in kind, not coin, which was discontinued by the time of Michael IV. See Metcalf, 1979, 63.
177 Although it should be noted that considerable finds of base coinage have been documented in Tarnovo, Plovdiv (Philippopolis) and Šumen between the reign of Basil II and 1204. For Tarnovo specifically, see for example Đočev, 1992, Монеты и парично обръщение в Търново XII-XIV в., 11-21; for Plovdiv specifically (including gold and silver coinage), see Kis’öv, et al., 1998, Нумизматичното богатство на археологически музеи – Пловдив, cat. nos. 269-280; and for Šumen specifically, see for example Zekova, 2006, Монети и монетно обръщение в средновековния Шумен, cat. nos. 427-700.
178 Metcalf, 1979, 64-70. Ostensibly, the scarce base coinage, which did exist, continued circulating until the time of the aforementioned Asenid “imitative” coinage. See also Hristovska, 2001, 102, who refers to a grand total of 67 published finds of anonymous and non-anonymous folletis from the area around Ohrid in the first half of the 11th c., although two hoards of silver coins have been found in the rural areas around Prilep and Skopje, dated to the 1070s/1080s. According to Hristovska, gradual remonetization of the area continued and by the time of the Alexian coin reform of 1092 and throughout the 12th c., leading up to the aforementioned “Bulgarian imitative coinage” of the late-12th c. She concludes (p. 107):

“The general picture gained from the numismatic material supports the conclusion that in Macedonia from the XI to XII centuries the coins remained much more a means of meeting fiscal obligations than an active medium of exchange.”

The abundant 11-12th-c. presence of imperial coinage, along with seals bearing imperial ranks and functions in Ohrid, demonstrate a prolonged attachment to imperial institutions, particularly via the church, which is unsurprisingly revealed by sigillographic and numismatic data. Before discussing the Rus’ metropolitanate in this manner, we must keep in mind these earlier imperial examples, such as the archbishopric of Ohrid and the 6-8th-c. Western exarchates, of ensuring provincial allegiance through ecclesiastical administration, in this case via an autocephalous (αυτοκέφαλος) archbishopric.179 It would be especially important to remember that imperial ecclesiastical provinces were effectually the formations of “state” administrations in peripheral provinces. Therefore, it would be helpful not to imagine that the “church” was attached to the “state” per se, but that when a concept such as “statehood,” is evoked in this period, if it can be evoked at all, it is the structure of the church: its provincial administrative and economic status, which is being referring to.180 In other words, I am suggesting that outside Constantinople, the church was not attached to the state; the church was the state.

Ch. 6 2.1.2.3 The Rus’ metropolitanate reconsidered

In this regard, as we have considered previous examples of imperial provinces, whether referred to as exarchiai, themata, archiepiskopai, or indeed metropolitai, we notice a distinct undercurrent of continuity harkening back to earlier examples of contested loyalties to the imperial personage, rather than absolutist assumptions of statehood or sovereignty. Regarding the sigillographic and numismatic studies of the Rus’ metropolitanate, along with reviewing other relevant literature, both primary and secondary, the purpose of this section will be to reconsider Rus’, not as is commonly done, as a so-called “proto-state,” with

179 I refer specifically to Basil II’s granting of autocephaly from the Constantinopolitan patriarchate to the archbishop of Ohrid, as opposed to complete independence, including from himself. See above n154.
180 See for example Haldon, 1993, The State and the Tributary Mode of Production, 122; and idem, 2016b, “Res Publica Byzantina? State Formation and Issues of Identity in Medieval East Rome,” 14 n29. He argues quite convincingly against Kaldellis, 2015, The Byzantine Republic: People and Power in New Rome, 190-192. Kaldellis severely oversimplifies “statehood,” assuming Byzantium as a fixed nation-state, whereas outside of Constantinople, as Haldon, 2016b, 12-13, justifiably points out, Kaldellis oversimplifies Christianity as simple ideology, which it is most certainly not, and doubly so outside of Constantinople. Nevertheless, I would suggest that Haldon, though he thankfully revives ecclesiastical affairs as more than amounting to an idle ideological force, the administrative capacity of the church as the “state” provincial institution could be further emphasized. See also the discussion given by Haldon, 1999, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204, 279-280.
accompanying “proto-ethnicities”181 as deconstructed in chapter 4 above, but as a theoretical imperial province, marking a monumental shift of the latter from “empire” to “commonwealth,” via the impermanent nature of sovereignty of all pre-modern “states.”

To begin, having already discussed the Christian symbolism meant to legitimize Kievan rulership on Rus’ seals,182 and the quantity of seals of the thema of Bulgaria, mostly in terms of the metropolitanate of Ohrid,183 it may be additionally useful to compare such pre-Mongol-era (11-12th-c.) seal finds of the Rus’ metropolitanate, which number to seventeen.184 Similarly, when juxtaposed with the thema of Bulgaria,185 numismatic evidence has shed considerable light on modern assumptions of Kievan “statehood.”186 Setting out questions for future numismatists, Noonan and Stoljarik have shown that despite the comparatively lower numbers of Byzantine coins circulating in Rus’ compared to Islamic dirhams, used primarily for trade (figs. 231-233),187 rather, Basil II’s miliarēsia numbers peaked in mixed hoards throughout Rus’ dating to shortly after Vladimir’s baptism and into the early-11th c.188 In fact, a grand total of 703 Byzantine coins found in modern Sweden,

181 For a classic, and by now outdated, work summarizing the varying primordialist ethnic “influences” and retrospective “states,” see Nowak, 1930, Medieval Slavdom and the Rise of Russia.
182 See above chapter 4 §3.1.
183 See above §2.1.2.2. It should also be noted that in its inception, the Rus’ metropolitanate has been argued to have initially been subordinated to the pre-1018 patriarchate of Ohrid, which has by now been largely dismissed due to the flimsiness of the evidence. See for example Toločko, 2015, Очерки начальной руси, 46 n40; and Poppe, 1979, “The Original Status of the Old-Russian Church,” 5-45. A much longer historiographical survey on this idea is provided in the English translation of the PVL itself by Cross and Sherbowizt-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, PVL, 259-260 n171.
184 See above chapter 4 §3.1.
185 See above §2.1.2.2; and Stoljarik, 1992, 93-107.

“Byzantine miliarēsia found in Kievan Rus’, unlike the Islamic dirhams and West European deniers, were not related to or the result of commerce. Thousands of dirhams and deniers were sent to Rus’ to pay for such Rus’ exports as slaves and furs. Byzantium evidently paid for such Rus’ exports with silks and other non-monetary goods. The question we must ask is why Byzantium did not use its miliarēsia more extensively in the trade with Rus. […] In short, we should like to know why so few Byzantine coins reached Rus’ at a time of very active Rus’-Byzantine trade. […] Finally, we should like to discover what happened in the period from ca. 1025-ca. 1050 that put an abrupt end to the flow of miliarēsia into Rus’. […] In brief, what conditions brought an end to the export of Byzantine coins to Kievan Rus’ after 1025?”

188 Ibid. On p. 144, he writes:

“The existence of these mixed coin hoards is our best numismatic evidence that some Byzantine coins did circulate within Kievan Rus’. These Byzantine coins did not proceed directly to their find-spot. At some point in Rus’ they were mixed with other coins which had also been imported.”
mostly on the island of Gotland, 9.67% of which are imitations, 32.57% of which belong exclusively to the reign of Basil II (977-989 CE), peaking again at 15.79% as miliarēsia dating to the reign of Constantine IX Monomachos (1042-1055 CE), which clearly attest to the importance of the period of the late-10-11th c. as one of the peak flows of Byzantine coins northward through Rus’ shortly after Vladimir’s conversion.\(^\text{189}\) That uncovered hoards including Byzantine coins, numbering 172\(^\text{190}\) even during the Soviet period,\(^\text{191}\) have been distinctively mixed, including Islamic and Western coins as well,\(^\text{192}\) attests to their indistinct usage, in contrast to assumptions made about “foreignness” and “domesticity” of coinage.\(^\text{193}\) As we have already discussed, such ideas are anachronistic to apply to so-called 11-12th-c. “national coinage,” which were if anything, redolent of ecumenical, rather than “national” authority. It is worth considering, if Kievan “national” coinage disappeared ca. 1130s-1380s, while “foreign” deniers from Western Europe circulated in Rjurikid-ruled towns, what might that portend for Rus’ “statehood?”\(^\text{194}\)

Concerning taxation, which began as tribute,\(^\text{195}\) collected by a prince (князь), who donated a tenth (десятинна) of his income to the church, from his tax-collection district

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\(^{190}\) Thompson, 1966, “Byzantine Coins in Russia,” 145.

\(^{191}\) For the most comprehensive collection of Soviet studies on hoards containing Byzantine coins, see Кропоткин, 1962, “Клады византийских монет на территории СССР,” 1-89; and ibidem, 1965, “Новые находки византийских монет на территории СССР,” 166-189. Most hoards contain silver coins, intermixed with gold, and found in the forest-steppe zone between the Prut’ and the Dniepr. See also the Byzantine coin finds in the northern Black Sea littoral drawn up by Stoljarik, 1992: figs. 234-243 (coin images) and figs. 244-245 (maps).

\(^{192}\) However, it has been argued elsewhere that between ca. 980-1100 CE, Western coins slowly displaced Islamic dirhams as the flow of the latter dried up during the 10th c. See for example Janin, 1956, Денежно-весовые системы домонгольской Руси и очерки истории денежной системы средневекового Новгорода, 153, cited in Zguta, 1975, “Kievan Coinage,” 484.

\(^{193}\) See for example such assumptions made by Zguta, 1975, 484, who refers to 10th-c. Kievan “national coinage,” p. 488. This contrasts with significant evidence of such coins’ Christian symbolic usage both within and without Rus’, as including finds in modern Sweden as well. See for example Sedykh, 2005, “On the Function of Coins in Graves in Early Medieval Rus’,” 475; and Malmer, 2001, 295-302.

\(^{194}\) Pavlova, 1994, “The Coinless Period in the History of Northeastern Rus’: Historiography Study,” 375-392; and see above chapter 3, §1.2.1.2.

\(^{195}\) See above chapter 4, §3.2.2; and chapter 5, §1.1.2.
we may note that the metropolitanate was itself materially supported by the princes in return for the metropolitan’s conferring of legitimacy on a given prince.

Concerning law, the imperially-appointed metropolitan, in return for his tithe and loyalty, dispensed canon law (and sometimes legal favors, detected in sigillographic research) via his suffragan appointments, apportioned from Constantinople, which

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197 Making a clever, albeit subtle argument, Tiguncev (2013, “Власть и церковь в киевской руси XI-XII вв.: один взгляд на проблему взаимоотношений по офигентским материалам,” 185-190) relies on a counter-marking seal of the knjaz’ Oleg Svjatoslavič of Novogorod, (married to Theophanō Mouzalônissa in the late 1080s, discussed above in chapter 4 n411), along with textual evidence based on the seminal work of ŠČapov (1989, *Государство и церковь Древней Руси X-XIII вв.*) to make the case that the clergy juridically upheld, and frequently, by the 1120s, overrode the written orders of princes, whose affixed seals were countermarked by metropolitans. In this way, he argues, the clergy applied its capabilities for land redistribution to its own ends and those of its supporters.

198 Though I believe scholars such as ŠČapov, 1969, “Церковь и становление древнерусской государственности,” put too much emphasis on acutely separating modern conventional dichotomies such as “laws vs. norms,” “temporal vs. ecclesiastical” and “state vs. church,” his words (p. 61) are nevertheless worth quoting:

“Разделение древнерусского права, с одной стороны, на уголовное, наследственное, обязательное, с другой - семейное, брачное и церковное нашло выражение не только в разных кодексах - в светской Правде Русской и церковном уставе Ярослава. Важнейшей чертой судебно-административного устройства Древнерусского государства и наследовавших ему феодальных княжеств было разделение судопроизводства по этим крупным сферам общественных отношений на два широких ведомства - светское, большей частью княжеское, и церковное, в основном епископское. Органы княжеского суда руководствовались нормами Правды Русской и воплощали их в жизнь, органы епископского суда имели своим ведомственным кодексом устав князя Ярослава. Естественно, что в жизни и конфликты, и нормы права, и ведомства переплетались и соревновались друг с другом, а кодексы взаимно влияли один на другой, свидетельством чего являются некоторые общие статьи этих судебников.”

I have translated this as:

“The division of Old Rus’ law, on the one hand, into criminal, hereditary and compulsory [law], on the other - familial, matrimonial and ecclesiastical [law], found expression not only in different codices - in the temporal Russkaja Pravda and the ecclesiastical statute of Jaroslav. The most important feature of the magisterial-administrative structure of the Old Rus’ state, also passed down to the feudal principalities – was the division of court proceedings in these large spheres of societal relations into two broad branches – the temporal, mostly princely, and the ecclesiastical, mainly episcopal. The organs of the princely court were guided by the standards of the Russkaja Pravda, and they implemented them, the organs of the episcopal court had, as their own branch’s codex, the statutes of prince Jaroslav. It is natural that in life, conflicts, standards of law and the branches were interwoven and competed with each other, and the codices mutually influenced one another, as evidenced by some common articles of these codes.”

199 According to Franklin, 2002b, 136:

“The Church in Rus was established as a metropolitanate within the sphere of authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, part of the wider Byzantine Church. The Church in Rus operated within an assumed
affected the same *potestarian* principals as all of our other case studies. While the question of when exactly the metropolitanate was established in Kiev is still debated, of the framework of canon law as filtered through Byzantium. By contrast, political authority in early Rus was home-grown, indebted to Byzantium neither for its origins nor for its institutional framework and practices. In principle at least, canon law was embedded in the Church’s institutional and confessional identity, whereas a Rus prince without Byzantine civil law was still very much a prince. Rulers of Rus were Christians, but not ‘Romans’, and certainly not ‘Greeks’. In this, Rus was distinct both from Bulgaria and from Serbia, which at various times came under the direct authority of the Emperor. There was therefore a predictable imbalance between the Rus reception of Imperial and ecclesiastical written codes. Yet the imbalance cannot be reduced to the bald assertion of a polarity, that the Rus accepted Byzantine ecclesiastical codes and rejected Byzantine civil codes. In each case the reception of and response to the written rule-lists were not single events but parts of a complex and continual sociocultural process.”

On Franklin’s supposition, that Rus rulers’ laws made them Christians albeit not necessarily Romans, I believe is a fair one, especially as Jaroslav’s *Russkaja Pravda*, along with the concept of the tithe (десятинна), were clearly not of Romain provenance. See for example Chadwick, 1966, *The Beginnings of Russian History: an Enquiry into Sources*, 109-110; and Vernadsky (trans.), *Medieval Russian Laws*. In general, I agree with ŠČapov, 1969, 63, that by the time of Jaroslav, the clergy effectively functioned primarily in a magisterial role:

“I have translated this as:

“As shown above, the Church in Rus’ was by no means limited to confessionary activity, but during the 11-12th centuries, it took upon itself many of these listed functions. First of all, it demonstrated initiative in a change in the number of spheres and standards of the societal life of the most basic social collectives, after taking into their own hands a court for familial and bрачным делам и став, таким образом, в один ряд с теми княжескими органами, которые ведали другими сферами судебно-правовой жизни. Так церковь приняла участие в отправлении первой функции государственной власти.”


200 See for example Solov’ev, 1999, *Властители и Судьи: Легитимация государственной власти в Древней и Средневековой Руси. IX – I половина XV вв.*, 4-5. Concerning the basis of law, as applied in Rus’, he writes:

“Если признать, что «источник власти, понимаемой как оказанием психологического влияния или принуждения одних людей на других, уходят своими корнями в самое начало человеческой истории, когда формировались первые социальные нормы поведения», то понятие, *potestarnye* отношения сформировавшееся и использующее в политической антропологии, наиболее удачно отражает тематику нашего исследования. *Потестарные* отношения формируются там и тогда, где и когда возникают, по выражению Э. Дюркгейма, социальные факты, «находящиеся вне индивида и одаренные принудительной силой, вследствие которой он вынуждается к ним».

Другими словами - где и когда возникает представление о власти и ее авторитете, позволяющем использовать насилие или его символический образ в интересах управления обществом.” (Italics inserted).
undisputed twenty-six\textsuperscript{202} metropolitans of Kiev (and all Rus’) until 1299,\textsuperscript{203} only three were not directly appointed from Constantinople,\textsuperscript{204} which should itself serve to cast considerable uncertainty on ascribing “statehood” to pre-Mongol-Rus’. This is not to say that such metropolitans’ loyalties or identities were fixed, as Byzantine, Bulgar or Rus’, but rather the opposite, that, as in the case of Theofylaktos of Ohrid, such personal identification cannot be posthumously established by modern scholarship.\textsuperscript{205}

I have translated this as:

“While we recognize that ‘the source of power, understood as the rendering of psychological influence or coercion of some people on others, rooted in the very beginning of human history, when the first social norms of behaviour were formed,’ (citation – Popov, 1997, Потестарность: генезис и эволюция, 79) the concept of potestarian relations, formed and utilized in political anthropology, most suitably reflects the themes of our research. Potestarian relationships are formed there and then, when and where appear, according to Emile Durkheim’s expression, social facts “located outside the individual and endowed with coercive strength, due to which he is forced by it” (citation – Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society). In other words – where and when an idea of power and its authority appears, it allows the use of violence or its symbolic image, in the interests of societal control.” (\textit{Italics} inserted).

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{201} While I will not go into the specifics of the debate (see for example Arrignon, 1987, \textit{La chaire métropolitaine de Kiev des origines à 1240, passim}; and Blažejovský, 1990, \textit{Hierarchy of the Kyivan Church}, 861-1990, 64-65), which essentially boils down to the reliability of the PVL based partially on the conclusions of Šakmatov (1908, Разыскания о Древнейших Русских Летописных Сводах, 414-583) as compared with other Rus’ annalistic traditions, some scholars maintain a revisionist view that the metropolitane “of Kiev and all Rus’,” was established immediately upon Vladimir’s baptism (see for example Toločko, 2015, Очерки начала Руси, 21-26; and Poppe, 1968, Państwo i Kościół na Rusi w XI wieku, 25-28), while others hold a more traditionalist view, according to the PVL (see Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor [trans.], 1953, PVL, 137-138 and 259 n171), that the metropolitane was actually established by Jaroslav in the late-1030s. See also for a further discussion, Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 226-230.
\item \textsuperscript{202} This is to begin with Theopemptos, as mentioned in the PVL (Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, [trans.], 1953, PVL, 138 and 259 n171), instead of the proposed earliest Kievian metropolitans Theofylaktos (Poppe, 1976, “The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus’: Byzantine-Russian Relations between 986-89,” 204-205); Leontios (Софийский Временник [1925, ПСРЛ, 2nd ed., vol. V, 72]) Mikhail (Степная Книга [1908, ПСРЛ, vol. XXI, 102]) or Iōannēs (Сказания о святых Борисе и Глебе [Hollingsworth (trans.), 1992, \textit{The Hagiology of Kievan Rus’}, 20 n46]) from other traditions outside the Laurentian redaction of the PVL. Therefore, based on Blažejovský, 1990, \textit{Hierarchy of the Kyivan Church}, 861-1990, 64-84, after Theopemptos (ca. 1037–1043 CE) and Iliarion (ca. 1051–1054 CE), this list (ibid. p. 71-76) variably includes another either twenty-four or twenty-six Kievian metropolitans until metropolitan Maximos (ca. 1283-1305 CE).
\item \textsuperscript{203} This is allegedly the year that the metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus’, Maximos (Максим/Мацьмощ), moved the seat of the metropolitane of all Rus’ to the town of Vladimir. See for example Černigovskogo, 2011, Избранные жития святых, изложенные по руководству Четырех Мисей, 722.
\item \textsuperscript{204} That is, Iliarion (ca. 1051-1054 CE), Kliment Smoljatič (ca. 1147-1155 CE) and Petro Akerovič (ca. 1241-1246 CE). Even by conservative standards, this calculates to only 11% of Rus’ metropolitans of Kiev originating from within Rus’ and 89% of Rus’ metropolitans appointed from Constantinople. As noted by Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, PVL, 139 and 262 n183, despite their exclusion of Petro Akerovič, write: “It would have been exceptional […] for a Metropolitan of Kiev to be selected and consecrated outside Constantinople.”
\item \textsuperscript{205} See above §2.1.2.2; and Obolensky, 1988, 77-82. On Theofylaktos, for example, he writes (p. 80):
However, the postings of loyal individuals, retainers (дружинники) and noblemen (бояры) to fortified urban centers (города)\textsuperscript{206} should demonstrate,\textsuperscript{207} as in the case of the appointments of metropolitans and suffragan bishops,\textsuperscript{208} that personnel has been the policy of allegiance within the oikoumenē.\textsuperscript{209} Unsurprisingly, Kiev, and specifically Jaroslav’s church

\begin{quote}
"Some historians, reacting against the distorted picture painted by some scholars, of Theophylact as a malevolent Hellenizer, have argued that he actively promoted a Bulgarian national consciousness; others have maintained that he was moved above all by an enlightened and humane concern for his flock. This is surely to give him too high marks for good behaviour."
\end{quote}

Conversely, he expresses a similar sentiment regarding the mid-14\textsuperscript{th}-c. metropolitan Kyprianos of Kiev-Moscow (p. 174):

\begin{quote}
"Successively a Bulgarian monk trained on Mount Athos, a confidential agent of the Byzantine patriarch, the latter’s representative as metropolitan in Kiev, a victim of the political rivalry between Muscovy and Lithuania, and, in the end, the unchallenged incumbent of the see of Moscow which had eluded him for so long, Kyprianos, or Kiprian, or Cyprian, epitomizes in his far-flung journeys, in the breadth of his mental horizon, and in his multiple loyalties the rich cosmopolitan culture which flourished in Eastern Europe during the late Middle Ages."
\end{quote}

It is worth mentioning, however, that even though the metropolitans of Ohrid and all Bulgaria were directly appointed by the emperor, as in the case of lost titular sees in Anatolia after 1071 CE (see for example Vryonis, 1986, \textit{The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor: and The Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century}, 302-310), the metropolitans of Kiev and all Rus’ were appointed indirectly, via the patriarch of Constantinople.


\textsuperscript{207} Bushkovitch, 1980, “Towns and Castles in Kievan Rus’: Boiar Residence and Landownership in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,” 251-264. It ought to be noted, however, that these terms, as in many other facets of Russian historiography and archaeology, have been overdefined, over-schematized and typologically compartmentalized (see esp. p. 252).

\textsuperscript{208} Though it was exceedingly rare for a prince of Kiev to appoint a metropolitan unilaterally, as mentioned above in n204, this happened on just three occasions between 988-1299 CE, resulting in roughly \(\frac{3}{10}\) of Rus’ clerics being appointed, directly or indirectly, from Constantinople up to the turn of the 14\textsuperscript{th} c. However, this is not to say that Rus’ princes were powerless to appoint their own deferential rulers in outlying cities. Such appointments were almost always kin and usually sons of a given prince. That said, I would be sceptical of referring to this practice as “secular,” but rather, as an extension of princely legitimacy via imperially appointed clergy. For more in-depth discussions, see Bushkovitch, 1980, 251-264 (see previous n207 above); Grinberg, 2013, “‘Is this City Yours or Mine?’ Political Sovereignty and Eurasian Urban Centers in the Ninth through Twelfth Centuries,” 895-921; and the extensive literature cited in n206 above.

\textsuperscript{209} Newer scholarship has uncovered that this is in fact a very old idea. See for example Grinberg, 2013, 895-921 (see previous n208 above); and Tikhomirov, 1959, 66.
of St. Sophia, as in the case of Ohrid, became a center, albeit one of many, from which authority emanated, legitimized by imperial, canon law (закон). This was meant to transcend pagan tribal loyalties towards the overarching purpose of loyalty to prince and emperor, as opposed to modern assumptions of primordialist “ethnicity.” That said,

210 See above, §2.1.2.2. See also Boeck, 2009, “Simulating the Hippodrome: the Performance of Power in Kiev’s St. Sophia,” 283-301; and Simmons, 2016, “Rus’ Dynastic Ideology in the Frescoes of the South Chapels in St. Sophia, Kiev,” 207-225, who writes (p. 208):

“A comprehensive study of Jaroslav’s St. Sophia will demonstrate how the decorative program served political ideology. I argue that as a new Orthodox prince, Jaroslav did not build his state church to slavishly imitate Byzantine church decoration, but to present himself as the recipient of divine providence in his own right.”

It bears mentioning, that as in the case of the St. Sophia in Ohrid, according to Boeck, 2009, 286, that Greek was the written language of choice for the inscriptions in Jaroslav’s St. Sophia, as she writes, “a linguistic policy that deliberately went against the Kievan reality that few inhabitants had knowledge of that language.” The imitation of Constantinople extended even to the architectural technique used in the building of Vladimir’s Desjatinna Church and Jaroslav’s St. Sophia Church, which Ousterhout has referred to as the “recessed brick technique.” See for example Ousterhout, 2008, Master Builders of Byzantium, 175-179, 258. More to the point, as Ousterhout has argued elsewhere (idem, 2017, “The ‘Helladic’ Paradigm in a Global Perspective”), the strength of identity, regional or ecumenical, would have been broadcast through architecture.

211 Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 356.

212 According to Haldon, 2017a, “A ‘Global’ Empire: the Structures of East Roman Longevity,” it was the imposition of imperial, Christian law, which carried identity with it. Elsewhere, this is echoed by Weickhardt, 2005, “Early Russian Law and Byzantine Law,” 1-22. Weickhardt’s analysis, however, is rather outdated in some respects (for example, he regards “the West,” which he neglects to define, as inheriting the “Greco-Roman legacy in literature, philosophy and art,” which Russia evidently did not while Russia’s only “sophisticated” inheritance was Roman law – via Byzantium; see p. 1-4). However, Weickhardt, despite his apparent arbitrary assignation of “sophistication” as based on Roman standards, a rather classicist interpretation, makes a compelling argument that the foundation of Rus’ legal thought rested on Byzantine provincial law – the Ekloga and Prochiron (p. 5-9), imagining the Rus’ Metropolitanae as a province of the oikoumenē, which should hardly surprise us. For example, Franklin, 2002b, 136, writes that imperial canon law was “embedded” in the Rus’ Metropolitanae’s institutional framework. See also Chitwood, 2017, Byzantine Legal Culture and the Roman Legal Tradition, 867-1056, 125; as well as Franklin’s, ŠČapov’s and Solev’ev’s respective discussions in n198-200 above. For other scholarly works on early Rus’ law, see Kaiser, 1980, The Growth of Law in Medieval Russia; and Feldbruge, 2009, Law in Medieval Russia.


because much, though by no means all, of the monographic literature on Rus’ imagines it as some sort of “proto-state,” \(^{215}\) which there is certainly a case to be made, seldom is a more qualified case made, that sovereignty was rarely absolute, despite its frequent pretensions to the contrary.

This is perhaps best demonstrated by the \textit{Notitiae Episcopatuum [NE].} Constantinopolitan emperors had already taken the initiative to Christianize 8-9\textsuperscript{th}-c. Khazaria, which, as we have previously discussed, has been attributed to the Metropolitanate of Gotthia in the 8\textsuperscript{th}-c. \textit{NE}, \(^{216}\) which is comparable to the Rus’ Metropolitanate of the late-11\textsuperscript{th} c.\(^ {217}\) For example, the \textit{NE}’s listings of the metropolitanates of Gotthia (№ 3, 8)\(^ {218}\) and Rōsia (№ 11, 13)\(^ {219}\) explicitly covers the same areas,\(^ {220}\) to the extent that by the 11\textsuperscript{th} c., the erstwhile metropolitanate of Gotthia was subsumed as an archbishopric into the emergent Rus’


\(^{216}\) See above chapter 5, §1.1.1.

\(^{217}\) Darrouzès (ed.), 1981, \textit{Notitiae Episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae}, 343. See also Franklin and Shepard, 1996, 227, who refer to the 12\textsuperscript{th}-c. listing (p. 367 in Darrouzès), which he includes. However, consulting Shepard, 2003, “Rus’,” 407, he acknowledges the earlier 11\textsuperscript{th}-c. listing (p. 343 and 122-127 in Darrouzès).

\(^{218}\) Darrouzès (ed.), 1981, 241-242. It is worth noting that the \textit{NE} 8 (Darrouzès, p. 294) mentions an \textit{eparchy} of Gotthia a second time as a titular archbishopric, along with Sougdaia, Phoullai, Tamatarcha and Zicchia.

\(^{219}\) Darrouzès (ed.), 1981, 343, 367. As well, the archbishoprics of Gotthia, Sougdaia, Phoullai, Tamatarcha and Zicchia are mentioned once again in the \textit{NE} 11 (Darrouzès, p. 346), corresponding to the same list, see p. 122-127 for his commentary on the \textit{NE} 11. For his commentary on the mention of the Rus’ metropolitanate in the \textit{NE} 13, see p. 151.

\(^{220}\) Shepard, 2006a, “Close Encounters with the Byzantine World: the Rus at the Straits of Kerch,” 37-65; and idem, 2009b, “‘Mists and Portals’: the Black Sea’s North Coast,” 424. See also Čkhaidze, 2013, “Епископия: письменные и археологические свидетельства,” 47-68.
metropolitanate. By the 12th c., according to the NE 13, the Rus’ metropolitanate appeared alongside older, more established eparchies, bishoprics and themata of the Anatolian and Blakan mainland. By the 12th c., the suffragan sees encompassed by megalē Rōsia (“great Russia”) already, included: Belgorod (Πελογράδων / Белгород), Novgorod (Νευογράδων / Новгород), Černigov (Τζερνιγόβων / Чернигов), Polock (Πολοτζίκων / Полоцк), Vladimir (τοῦ Βαλαμιώφου / Владимир), Perejaslav’ (Περισθλάβου / Переяславль), Suzdal (τοῦ Σούσδαλι / Суздаль), Turov (Τουρόβου / Туров), Kanev (Κάνεβε / Канев), Smolensk (Σμολίσκον / Смоленск) and Galica (Γάλιτσα / Галич). This was despite the fact that

221 According to Darrouzès, 1981, 124-125:

“İci deux témoins citent d’une part Maurokastron/Néa Rhosia (74, M), d’autre part Preslava, plus ou moins confondue avec Rhousion (80-8, A et H). Le siège de Preslav fut illustré par un métropolite Léon, que l’on a pris parfois pour un métropolite proprement dit de Russie ; mais l’intitulation τῆς ἐν Ρωσίᾳ Πρεσλαβας de son opuscule signifie la distinction avec le siège principal, comme dans la notice, où la Russie occupe la soixantième place, tandis que Perejaslav est situé au même rang que Rhousion : intervalle qui correspond aussi à la distance entre la fondation de la métropole russe au début du XIe et la période où est attestée l’existence éphémère de la métropole de Perejaslav, contemporaine de celle de Černigov (Maurokastron) ; celle-ci est attestée par un texte russe de l’année 1072. […] La liste de M, malgré des doublets et des omissions, donne en finale trois noms qui s’ajoutent à une finale antérieure (Tamatachara/Zècchia : not. 8. 120) et constituent par conséquent les créations postérieures à la fin du xᵉ siècle.”


“Если иметь в виду лесную зону Восточной Европы, то и сырость, и снега, и длинная зимняя ночь там присутствуют. Если это Скифия, то русских вполне правомерно называть скифами. Что же сообщают ромейские письменные источники о скифском государстве? По словам Бибикова, «подробные сведения о делении русских областей находятся в памятниках, относящихся к церковному устройству: именно константинопольская церковь, прежде всего заинтересованная в распространении своего влияния на как можно большую территорию Руси, оказывалась основным информатором по данному вопросу. Так, в перечне епископий «Великой России», составленном в середине XII в., перечисляются Белгород (о Пелорамадо), Новгород (о Невоарадо), Чернигов (о Тсереговбо), Полоцк (о Полотциков), Владимир (о тоо Влаамиорус), Переславль (о Переславла), Суздаль (о Суисдаль), Туров (о Туровбо), Канев (о Кавебе), Смоленск (то Смолиоско), Галич (η Γαλιτζα).”

I have translated this as:

“If we have in mind the forest zone of Eastern Europe, then the dampness, snow and the long winter night are present. If this is Scythia, then the Russians are quite rightly referred to as Scythians. Still, what do the Romaic written sources report on the Scythian state? In Bibikov’s words, ‘the detailed information about the division of Rus’ regions are located in the artifacts that belong to the church structure: specifically, it was the Church of Constantinople, first of all interested in spreading its
megalē Rōsia only ranked in sixtieth place in the NE 13, and was even reduced by the Palaiologoi later. This should hardly come as a surprise given what we have discussed regarding the disappearance of the metropolitanate of Gotthia sometime in the 9th c. along with Khazaria in the 11th c. In more concrete terms, 11-12th-c.-dated finds of Byzantine lead seals of local Crimean imperial officials (spatharioi, prōtopatharioi, notarioi, stratēgoi, dissypatoi, et al.) in contemporaneous Volhynia may attest to continued negotiation between imperial officials and aspirational Rus’ autonomy. Finally, given what we know about the significance of the metropolitanate of Gotthia for the entire Pontic-Caspian civilizational area, we may come to understand the Rus’ metropolitanate not so much as a “proto-state,” as frequently imagined, but as an imperial dominion in a broader Eurasian context, albeit a


With its enormous size and geographical expansion, it is listed among the traditional territory of the patriarchate and which still were supposed to coincide with the ancient Roman provinces. […] Nevertheless, the metropolitan of Russia, whose authority was immense, occupied the sixtieth place in the order of seniority. Moreover, during the reshuffle of metropolitan sees which occurred under Andronicus II, the see of Russia was demoted from the sixtieth to the seventy-third position. The demotion does not seem to have been a deliberate humiliation of the metropolitan of Russia, since similar changes in order of priority concerned other sees also, but it clearly illustrates the peculiarly Byzantine ability to reaffirm again and again a theoretical immutability of the oikouméne, ideally headed by the emperor and the patriarch, and to ignore, for the sake of this theory, the most obvious historical realities. At the same time, this formal ideological conservatism was itself used, with great skill and realism, to maintain the prestige of the ‘imperial city’ and to perpetuate its influence and administrative control in areas, which – like Russia – would otherwise long ago have totally escaped its reach.”

See above chapter 4 §1.1.1.

I refer specifically to the 8-9th-c. metropolitanate of Gotthia’s significance as an imperial attempt at Christianizing Khazaria. See for example the discussion referred to by the previous n225 above.
province ruled by local archontes (who we now refer to as Rjurikid princes) – and theoretically loyal to the imperial oikoumenē.

It was for this reason that instead of being thought of as a Byzantine province, such modern arbitrary assumptions that Kievan Rus’ constituted a separate “state” has only been conceivable during the reigns of Vladimir I and Jaroslav I. After the latter’s death in 1054 CE, most scholars refer to a fragmentation of Rus’ principalities, thereby insinuating an overemphasis on statehood during the previous half-century. For this reason, I would hesitate to assume that there was any such political entity as “Rus’” after Jaroslav and that the only unifying factor in these towns, ruled as they were by alternating Rjurikid dynasts, was Byzantine Christianity. For this reason, it was Orthodoxy which eventually gave rise to the idea, centuries later, that there was still in fact a Rus’ to be collected and unified (despite orthodox outposts as far afield as, for example, the Soloveckij monastery in the White Sea227), as was done by the princes of Muscovy in the 15th century.

In the meantime, disregarding such teleological reasoning, this, however, is not to say that Rus’ was not a “proto-state,”228 but only that “statehood” and “sovereignty,” whether Rus’, Byzantine-Roman, or any other case, as imagined by modern scholarship and anachronistically projected backward onto fantasy versions of the past, was not necessarily so cut and dry. For instance, as we examined in the previous case studies of the 6-8th-c. exarchates of Carthage and Ravenna, and the 11-12th-c. archbishopric of Bulgaria, based as it was on the previous imperial province of Iustiniana Prima, these structures have not been interpreted as separate “states” by modern scholarship. By the same token, why ought we consider the 11-12th-c. metropolitanate of Rus’ completely differently? To assume that Rus’ could encapsulate some sort of primitive statehood in the 12th c., or even in the early-11th century, would be to flirt with anachronism. Instead, I propose that statehood and

227 Robin Milner-Gulland, personal communication, 29 March, 2017. In fact, during his presentation at the 50th Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK, entitled, “Ultimate Russia, Ultimate Byzantium,” professor Milner-Gulland credited Bryer with the idea, paraphrased above in chapter 1 §1.1.1, that, “a premodern Russologist is actually a Byzantinist.” Nevertheless, it ought to be noted here that Milner-Gulland also referenced the work of the Polish author Mariusz Wilk, 2005, The Journals of a White Sea Wolf, 9, who wrote about the Soloveckij Monastery: “On Solovki, you can see Russia like the sea in a drop of water. Because the Solovetsky Islands are at once the essence and the anticipation of Russia...” I would like to heartily thank professor Milner-Gulland for this splendid reference.

228 See for example Franklin, 1983, 518-528.
sovereignty be conceived not in the absolute terms common only in the present, but rather in terms of allegiance and loyalty, common in every era before the present.
Chapter 7: Consolidation: toward a redefinition of pre-modern statehood, ethnicity and civilization
I have named the concluding section “consolidation” since, having utilized various case studies to explore historians’ or archaeologists’ arbitrary assumptions of primordial “ethnicity” and anachronistic “statehood,” such broad themes ought not be viewed separately but considered together in similarly broad scale. Hence, consolidation. Furthermore, within a concluding section, it would be, I believe, inappropriate to eschew discussion of the nomadic Cumans (alternatively Qipčaqs or Polovcý), whose 11-12th-c. arrival in the Pontic-Caspian steppe has been extensively discussed within the context of the aforementioned Oğuz, Pečenegs and Magyars, and later the Mongols. Effectually, while the role played by the Cumans can be considered an important part of world history in its own right, I have chosen this discussion because the Cumans themselves also prove to be a valuable final case study, which neatly ties together the aforementioned themes of misleadingly assumed pre-modern ethnicity and statehood. Therefore, I will briefly discuss the Cumans in relation to my overall argument, (as others have interpreted them from the sources, both textual and archaeological).

In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss in depth the broader themes of my research. First and most importantly, I will discuss the processual concept of monotheization (at a broader level of generalization, encompassing Christianization, Islamization or Judaization), and top-down potestarian processes, which together, I believe neatly encapsulate both the formations of “states” and the top-down internalizations of identity (primarily confessional) at the frontiers of each respective ecumenism, or oikoumenē (οικουμένη/οικουμενισμός). Understanding religious identity this way, as a substructure of modern national identity instead of as a simple milestone in a given “national” history, necessarily challenges the way history is typically understood – not as a “national” story, but as an “ecumenical” story, in which a given oikoumenē is the archetype for the modern nation-state, instead of some primordial ethnicity. Continuing the discussion of monotheization, I will attempt to untie the Gordian knot of tribalism, ethnicity and nationalism, which have been conflated for decades. Finally, in distinguishing between these perplexing taxonomies (tribes, ethnicities, nations), we will turn toward the teleological dangers of separating the “antique” from the “medieval,” which myriad scholars have done and continue to do, thereby making lazy assumptions about the tripartite division (ancient, medieval, modern) of the history of “Western civilization.” Instead, based on the foundation laid out by Holmes and Standen (2015, “Defining the Global Middle Ages,” 106-117), I will attempt to make my own contribution to globalizing the so-called “middle ages.”
Ch. 7, part 1: General conclusions up to “the 13th century crisis”

His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the Angel of History. His face is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.*

1.1 Enter the Cumans

I will address the entrance of the Cumans and the disappearance of the Pečenegs in both written and archaeological sources. The discussion in this subsection will revolve around the effects of the Transcaucasian nomadic power vacuum between the Rus’ and Pečenegs on incoming nomadic groups such as the Cumans and other steppe peoples. In this vein, as both Pečenegs and Cumans were nomadic, pagan groups, how did they interact at first and why did the Pečeneg confederacy dissipate at the time of the arrival of the Cumans? Is it possible that the Pečeneg confederacy, shorn of military might after losing the seminal wars across the northern Danube against the empire in the 1040s, dissolved and some of its groups joined the Cumans, a power which rose quite suddenly a few decades later? If so, what can this tell historians about ethnogenesis on the steppe, (albeit with reference to the late-11th century)?

1.1.1 Cumans and Pečenegs

In the entry for the year 1061, the PVL records that:

“The Polovcians invaded Rus’ to make war for the first time. On February 2, Vsevolod went forth against them. When they met in battle, the Polovcians defeated Vsevolod, but after the combat they retired. This was the first evil done by these pagan and godless foes. Their prince was Iskal.”

* W. Benjamin, 1973, Illuminations, 259; cited in Anderson, 1991, Imagined Communities, 161-162. Anderson’s footnote is somewhat more telling: “The angel’s eye is that of Weekend’s back-turned moving camera, before which wreck after wreck looms up momentarily on an endless highway before vanishing over the horizon.”

† Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, PVL, 143. It is also worth mentioning that Šakhmatov believes this account constituted the chronicler’s (who he deems as Nikon, the abbot of the early-12th-c. Kievan caves monastery at the time) recording of then-current events. See for example Šakhmatov, 1908, Разыскания о Древнишем Русских Летописных Сводах, 285-288, 309-311.
Because the Cumans as a political force enter our literary realm at this time, we may review both primary and secondary sources for the events regarding the nomadic Cumans and Pečenegs as viewed, inevitably, through Byzantine and Rus’ sources. Typically, in modern scholarship, the long period of 11th-c. Pečeneg incursions are interpreted as having “reached their bloody conclusion” by the incoming Cumans, particularly in the watershed Battle of Levounion on 29 April, 1091. However, I will seek to demonstrate a slightly more nuanced view of this battle, principally as a battle between rival nomadic groups, employing a model similar to that previously employed regarding the original formation of the Pečeneg confederacy: fluid loyalties and kinship ties.

Ch. 7 1.1.1.1 Disputed models of relation: annihilation or absorption?

First, it must be unequivocally stated that the so-called Cumans (alternatively Qıpčaqs or Polovcÿ) constituted, as with the case of many of our previous case studies, by no means some sort of primordial, homogenous ethnic group. Nor did Cumania, the region termed for their inhabitation, as we discussed regarding Patzinakia, constitute some sort of archaic statehood. For precisely these reasons, Cumans, I believe, ought to be juxtaposed alongside Pečenegs, much as the Byzantine sources are typically given to referring to all steppe nomads (including sometimes the Bulgars) as “Skythoi.” For example, as with the Pečenegs, (and indeed even the Amazons, according to the PVL), the Cumans themselves have been primarily interpreted in a negative light, in line with their depiction in the PVL as nomadic

2 Stephenson, 2000a, Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier: a Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900-1204, 103.
3 See above chapter 4 §2.2.
4 See above chapter 4 §2.2.
5 Vásáry, 2005, Cumans and Tatars: Oriental Military in the Pre-Ottoman Balkans, 1185-1365, 7. He writes:

“There existed no Kipchak or Cuman empire, but different Cuman groups under independent rulers, or khans, who acted on their own initiative, meddling in the political life of the surrounding areas such as the Russian principalities, Byzantium in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Khwarezm.”

6 Cross and Sherbowizt-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, PVL, 58. In n14 (p. 233), they attribute this reference to the work of Geōrgios Amartōlos, a well-known source for the compilation of the PVL. See for example Feldman, 2013, The Historiographical and Archaeological Evidence of Autonomy and Rebellion in Cherson: a Defense of the Revisionist Analysis of Vladimir’s Baptism (987-989), 55 n180-182. I would also note here that Anna Komnēnē, in her description of the Cumans, refers passingly to “Skythoi,” as per many Byzantine historians who label contemporary peoples with antique names. Attaleiatēs, however, refers to both Pečenegs and Cumans in his narrative for the year 1078, referring to the Pečenegs as Skythians, but nevertheless to the Cumans as such – and to both as a cohesive force. See for example Kaldellis and Krallis (trans.), 2012, The History of Michael Attaleiates, 548-549.
pagans, despite frequently fighting alongside Christian armies, such as in the Battle of Levounion, or the many encounters referred to in the PVL. We may also be aware that our understanding of Pečeneg or Cuman identity ultimately stems from Byzantine or Rus’ accounts (and in fact one 12th-c. Armenian account), not the nomads themselves, who left no written records. In other words, not all Pečenegs or Cumans, whether or not self-identifying as such, can be attributed to the abovementioned battle accounts in the sources, and therefore, it would be unwise to redraw a map of all of the Pontic-Caspian steppe as reflecting a shift from “Patzinakia” to “Cumania” (fig. 246).

Nevertheless, while many historians have taken the abovementioned battles, particularly the Battle of Levounion in 1091, as an indicator of some sort of tribal annihilation of the vanquished Pečenegs by the victorious Cumans (although the Pečenegs

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7 Konjavskaja, 2015, “Половцы в ранних летописях: оценки и интерпретации летописцев.” 180-190. See also the discussion of the same phenomenon regarding the Pečenegs above in chapter 4 §2.2. In particular see her discussion of the various Russian literature on the Cumans, primarily vis-à-vis Mavrodina, 1983, Киевская русь и кочевники: печенеги, тюрки, половцы. Историографически очерк. A brief, yet useful bibliography of Russian literature on the Cumans/Qıpchaqs/Polovcÿ would include (although not be limited to): Inkov, 2001, Древняя Русь и половцы во второй половине XI – первой трети XIII века; Pletnëva, 1990, Половцы; Rasovskij, 2012, Половцы. Черные Клобуки: Печенеги, Торки и Берендеи на Руси и в Венгрии; Skržinskaja, 1986, “Половцы. Опыт исторического исследования этникона,” 255-269; Čekin, 2000, “Безбожные сыны Измаиловы. Половцы и другие народы степи в древнерусской книжной культуре”, 691-716; and Toločko, 2003, Кочевые народы степей и Киевская Русь.

8 For perhaps one of the most comprehensive treatments of the Battle of Levounion, see Birkenmeier, 2002, The Development of the Komnenian Army: 1081-1180, 76-77.


10 Dulaurier (trans.), 1858, Chronique de Matthieu d’Edesse (962-1136), 89. Pálóczi-Horváth (1989, Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians: Steppe Peoples in Medieval Hungary, 39) has translated the excerpt ostensibly relating to the displacement of Pečenegs by Cumans on the Pontic steppe in the year 1050-1051:

“The Snake-people marched into the land of the Yellow-men, and they smashed and routed them; whereupon the Yellow men fell upon the Ghuzz and the Pechenegs; and all these peoples, united, irrupted with blood-curdling anger upon the Romans.”

While declining to offer a theory on the true identity of the so-called “Snake-people,” though confident that the Cumans could be assigned to the so-called “Yellow men,” Curta, 2006a, 306 n113 writes:

“It is clear, however, that Matthew had in mind a chain reaction, which is the favorite historiographic metaphor for describing the ‘last wave of migrations’ in Eastern Europe.”

It is unfortunate that Curta fails to explicitly refer the reader to the reason for his use of quotation marks around “last wave of migrations,” since it seems either he is quoting another author, or he does not include the 13th-c. Mongolian or 14-15th-c. Timurid invasions as waves of migration into Europe – (assuming Timur’s sack of Tblisi and capture of the Georgian king Bagrat V in 1386 counts as a “wave of migration” in Eastern Europe.”)

11 Although there is some slight debate on this point. See for example above chapter 4 §2.2.1.4.

12 Classic examples of this interpretation can be found in the work of Brătianu, 1969, La Mer Noire: des origines à la conquête Ottomane, 162; and Stoljarik, 1992, Essays on Monetary Circulation in the North-
reappear later\textsuperscript{13}), it is unclear how much this interpretation holds up when the Byzantine and Rus’ sources are juxtaposed. The Cuman (Polovcý) threat, in the Rus’ sources, was especially prevalent in the second half of the 11\textsuperscript{th} c., yet the Cumans only became well known to Byzantine sources by the 1090s, even though at that time they were more a danger for Rus’ and more an ally according to Byzantine sources.\textsuperscript{14} Even if we take the Battle of Levounion as the climactic event in the disappearance of the Pečenegs and their displacement by the Cumans,\textsuperscript{15} we must still acknowledge that the Cumans eventually occupy the same adversarial nomadic role with the sedentary oikoumenē in the 12\textsuperscript{th} c., intermittently allying (as at Levounion), raiding, trading, converting and assimilating,\textsuperscript{16} without any sort of otherwise “state” unity.\textsuperscript{17} In the case of the Cumans, trading, sedentarization and conversion

\textbf{Western Black Sea Region in the Late Roman and Byzantine Periods: Late 3\textsuperscript{rd} Century-Early 13\textsuperscript{th} Century AD. 86.}

13 Birkenmeier, 2002, 77. Nevertheless, there is considerable debate about the “true identity” of the Skythian raid across the Danube in the year 1122 referred to in Byzantine sources. Personally, I am inclined to agree with Diaconu (1978, \textit{Les Coumans au Bas-Danube aux XI\textsuperscript{er} et XII\textsuperscript{er} siècles}, 62-71), who ascribes the raid to the Cumans, as opposed to the Pečenegs. In fact, even Golden, 1980b, “Review of: \textit{Les Coumans au Bas-Danube aux XI\textsuperscript{er} et XII\textsuperscript{er} siècles},” 380, in a rather acerbic review of Diaconu’s work, nevertheless agrees on this point.

14 Hollingsworth (trans.), 1992, \textit{The Hagiology of Kievan Rus’}, 128 n 349. By 1036, the \textit{PVL} describes the last major assault on Kiev by Pečenegs, which, curiously, confirms the correlative dating for the first construction for the metropolitan church of St. Sophia in Kiev. See Cross and Sherbowizt-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, \textit{PVL}, 136-137 and n163 p. 257. There are no further mentions of nomadic assaults on Rus’ in the \textit{PVL} until the above-cited entry for the years 1054-1061, which constitute the first mentions of the Polovcÿ (Cumans) in the \textit{PVL}, curiously right after the death of Jaroslav, (a literary trope perhaps?). See p. 143, n197 and n205, p. 263-265. In the corresponding n197, the translators write:

“The movement of the Pechenegs into the Balkans during this decade was hastened by the pressure of a kindred nomadic tribe, the Polovcians (Cumans, Kipchaks), who here make their first appearance, but become the most serious menace experienced by the Kievan principality prior to the incursion of the Tartars eighty years later. The Turks [\textit{Oğuz}] attacked by Vsevolod, Prince of Pereyaslavl’, were in all likelihood subject to the Khan of the Polovcians whose raid was thus retaliatory. The Polovcians seem to have followed the same procedure in 1061.”

It is especially important to note that the translators believe (and I would agree) that the Turks (\textit{Oğuz}) were subjects of a common steppe kha\textit{g}an, who the Polovcÿ/Cumans clearly represented. A conflict of loyalty may explain the distinction between the Pečenegs and the Polovcÿ/Cumans, just as it did the 7\textsuperscript{th}-c. Khazar-Bulgar conflict in the same region – which has been explained as the Nusibi-Dulu clan war. See for example appendix 1 n2.


In non-narrative textual sources, for example, in archives of Mt. Athos (the Acts of the Great Lavra monastery: Lemerle, Guillou, Svoronos and Papachryssanthou [eds.], 1970, \textit{Actes de Lavra. Première partie}:}
went hand-in-hand, just as the Pečenegs had done previously on the lower Danube. Hence, the distinction between the “non-wild” and the “wild” Polovcý in Rus’ sources. Nevertheless, as Anna Komnēnē’s narrative makes clear, the singular difference between the Pečenegs and the Cumans19 at Levounion was an insufficient oath of loyalty, and there is little reason to doubt the veracity of her account in this regard.20 The PVL, for example, in the entry for the year 1096, even goes so far as to claim that the Pečenegs and the Cumans (along with the

Des origines à 1204, Archives de l’Athos V, act 339, lines 44-52), records a number of “Cuman” soldiers in imperial employ in the year 1181 who were expelled from Chostianes (Moglena) and paroiokoi returned to the Lavra by the then-emperor, Alexios II Komnēnos via his vestiaritēs, Andronikos Vatatzēs. For a more extensive discussion of this phenomenon as it occurred frequently in the late-12th to 13th centuries, see Madgearu, 2013b, Byzantine Military Organization on the Danube, 10th-12th Centuries, 159-160.

See Franklin and Shepard, 1996, The Emergence of Rus, 750-1200, 271-272; see also above chapter 4 §2.2.1.4.

19 Importantly, she distinguishes between the Pečenegs and the Cumans based on primarily using the terms Skyths and Patzinaks (oi Σκύθαι; oi Πατζινάκοι) versus Cumans (oi Κόμανοι). A similar dichotomy is drawn in the PVL between Pečenegs and Cumans/Polvov (see below n21): Печенги versus Куманы; Полови.

20 Reinsch and Kambylis (eds.), 2001, Annae Comnenae Alexias, 8.5.1-2:

“οϊ δέ γε Σκύθαι κατά τον γύσα του καλομουπανόν Μωροποπτάμου κείμηναι ὑπεποιηθύνει λαθραίως τούς Κομάνους συμμάχους προσκαλώμενου. Άλλ’ οὕδε μέτοικους τούς Κομάνους κείμεναι προσκαλώμενου τά περί εἰρή νυς ἑρωτώμενοι. Ο δέ τού δόλωρ τῆς γνώμης αὐτῶν στο γαζήμους προσπροσόκας καὶ τάς ἀποκρίσεις αὐτῶν ἐπί ποῖτο ἀπαιρεθέν ἔθελον τούς αὐτῶν λογισμούς, εἰ που καὶ τό ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης προσδοκώμενον μεταθροφορίν καταβάζαι. Οἱ δέ Κόμανοι ἀμφιβόλους ἑρωτώμενος καὶ τάς τοῦ Πατζινάκων ὑποστήρεις οὕδε πάνι τοίς αὐτῶν προσετίθεντο, ἀλλ’ ἐπετέρας μηνύσῃ τῷ βασιλείᾳ: «Μέχρι πόσου τῆς μέγας ἀναβαλλόντος μεθα; Ἡ πόλη τούς ἐπί πλέον τό γεγονέσθαι μεθα; ἔδωρω δὲ τοῦ ἐπίλουν τόν ἐναπολρήσθημεν ἀλλ’ ἐκείνην ἀνεττάλληλον ὕπον ἐκείνην μέν κατά τήν ἐποίησαν τόν μετά τῶν Σκύθων ἔσσερον πόλεμον, αὐτῶν δέ παραργήγας μετακεκάθισεν λευκάμους τούς ἁγήμονας καὶ πεινηκοντάρχας καὶ λοιπῶς προσέταξε διά παντὸς τοῦ φοσφάτου διακαρποθέτεται τόν ἐκ τῆς ἀθήναν τοιούτους πόλεμον. 8.5.2 Αλλά κάν τοιοῦτα ἔσσετοτε, έδωδε ομοί τά ἅπαντα πλήθη τῶν Πατζινάκων καὶ Κομάνων ὑπόπτωον τήν ἀμφοτέρον σύμβασιν.”

Translated by Dawes (1928, 202) as:

“The Scythians, on their side, kept still in their position on the banks of the stream called ‘Mavropotamos’ and made secret overtures to the Comans, inviting their alliance; they likewise did not cease sending envoys to the Emperor to treat about peace. The latter had a fair idea of their double-dealings so gave them appropriate answers, as he wished to keep them in suspense until the arrival of the mercenary army which he expected from Rome. And as the Comans only received dubious promises from the Patzinaks, they did not at all go over to them, but sent the following communication to the Emperor in the evening: ‘For how long are we to postpone the battle? know therefore that we shall not wait any longer, but at sunrise we shall eat the flesh either of wolf or of lamb.’ On hearing this the Emperor realized the keen spirit of the Comans, and was no longer for delaying the fight. He felt that the next day would be the solemn crisis of the war, and therefore promised the Comans to do battle with the Scythians on the morrow, and then he straightway summoned the generals and ‘penteconarchs’ and other officers and bade them proclaim throughout the whole camp that the battle was reserved for the morrow. But in spite of all these preparations, he still dreaded the countless hosts of Patzinaks and Comans, fearing the two armies might coalesce.’

Alternatively, for Sewter’s (1969) translation, see p. 256.
Oğuz, which it refers to as “Torks”) are all descended from Ishmael, which betrays, once again, the common literary trope of employing biblical genealogical precedents for ascribing ancient peoplehood. Nevertheless, they clearly occupied the same role in the Rus’ sources.

Whatever written sources may lead us to conclude who exactly the Cumans were or were not, archaeological evidence hardly explains the difference between Pečenegs and Cumans (nor indeed Oğuz or Turkmen). Keeping an open mind on typological patterning, burial assemblages, linguistics (and even ethnomusicology), in areas such as modern Romania, Moldova (Trans-Dniestria), Hungary and Ukraine, archaeologists have compiled an impressive array of data on “Cumans,” although it is nevertheless still unclear how such material culture necessarily separates contemporaneous Cumans from Pečenegs or another such nomadic group, outside of arbitrary modern assumptions. For example, Horváth has

21 See the Laurentian redaction (ПСРЛ, 1926 — Т. 1. Лаврентьевская летопись — 218-240):

“а Срацини ў Измаилѧ . творѧтсѧ Сарини ж и прозваша имена собѣ. Сараўкѣ . рекше Сарини сьмы. тьмэже Хвалиси и Болгаре суть ў дочерю Лютову. иже зачасть ў сиа своѧ . тьмэже неч’то ссть племѧ ихъ . а Измаиль роди . въ сиа . ў нич’е суть Тортмени и Печенѣзи . и Торци . и Кумани . рекше Полоцви . иже исходить ў пустынѣ.”

Translated by Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (1953, 184) as:

“But the Saracens descended from Ishmael became known as the sons of Sarah, and called themselves Sarakỳne, that is to say, ‘We are descendants of Sarah.’ Likewise the Caspians and the Bulgars are descended from the daughters of Lot, who conceived by their father, so that their race is unclean. Ishmael begot twelve sons, from whom are descended the Torkmens, the Pechenegs, the Turks, and the Cumans or Polovcians, who came from the desert.”

22 See the discussion above in chapter 5 §2.1.1.
23 Konjavskaja, 2015, 180-190.
24 I include linguistics within a general discussion of material culture, which, although as a thematic device, clearly does not fit, linguistics is nevertheless often studied with respect to differences between Pečenegs and Cumans (or the differences between Mongol and Cuman linguistics), albeit via much later sources in the later-12-13th c., such as the early-14th c. Latin Codex Cumanicus. In particular, see Golden, 1995-1997, “Cumanica IV: the Tribes of the Cuman-Qipchaqs,” 99-122; idem, 1992b, “The Codex Cumanicus,” 33-63; and Poppe, 1962, “Die mongolischen Lehnwörter im Kumanischen,” 331-340. For various editions of the source itself, see Schmieder and Schreiner (eds.), 2005, Il Codice Cumanico e il suo mondo; Drimba (ed.), 2000, Codex Cumanicus; and Kuun (ed.), 1880, Codex Cumanicus, Bibliothecae ad templum divi Marci Venetiarum.
25 Such studies, while not without merit, frequently suffer from the same dated assumptions of primordial ethno-national linguistic homogeneity. See for example Sípos, 2015, “Karachay-Malkar Folksongs and their Hungarian Connections,” 379-396, who writes on p. 393:

“Between the Karachay and Hungarian children’s tunes some closer similarities can be found apart from a broad stylistic identity. The Karachay-Balkar psalmodic, descending and lamenting tunes belong to the Bartókian primeval ‘style race’ to which the pertinent tunes of Bulgarian, Slovakian, Romanian and some other people’s tunes belong.”
attributed various arrowheads, stirrups and a “Russian-style helmet” found in burial sites in modern Ukraine and Moldova as “Cuman graves” (figs. 249-250), without explaining from where these attributions were derived. He does, however, refer to the famous stone carvings, which are frequently assigned as “Cuman” (figs. 247-248) – as opposed to Mongol, but not necessarily as opposed to Pečeneg. Elsewhere, Diaconu, in his discussion of older Soviet archaeological literature on 10-12th-c. nomadic burial sites on the lower Danube (figs. 253-255), is disinclined to ascribe such tombs to either Cumans or Pečenegs, which had hitherto been de rigueur. His scholarship is, nevertheless, more disposed to emphasizing the autochthonous Romanian population over which said Cumans ruled, rather than the Cumans’ material culture itself. Spinei, taking a decidedly even more statist and primordialist-ethnic Romanian approach, nevertheless continues the same tradition of attributing ethnicity and autochthonousness (the indigenous Romanian is sedentary, while the invading Pečeneg and/or Cuman is nomadic), with the burial’s attribution based on the dating

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26 Horváth, 1989, 48-50. In his citations for the list of figures (nos. 30-33, p. 130), he cites the works of Fodor, Pletnëva and Spinei, whose respective scholarships we have already discussed elsewhere.

27 Ibid, 98-102. Stoljarik, 1992, 87, citing Pletnëva, believes such stone “images [have a] proven connection to the Cumani.”

28 The burial grounds in question (in modern Romania and Moldova): Oltenița, Tangîru, Movîlița, Rimnicelu, Lișcoteanca, Moscu and Holboca, (Diaconu, 1978, 14-21), contain typical examples of nomadic material culture, such as horse-bits, belt buckles, arrowheads and spear points.

29 Diaconu, 1978, 14-21. See especially his discussion on p. 19-21, in which he casts doubt on stratigraphic and typological arguments for ethnic attribution in particular those of Pletnëva and Fëdorov-Davydov. See for example Pletëva, 1990, Половцы, passim.

30 His own arguments frequently run into typical problems of Soviet-era historiography, which ascribes autochthonousness to “l’actuel territoire de la Roumanie et la population autochtone,” (p. 22, 128). In his review of Diaconu’s work, Golden, 1980b, 380, writes:

> “Petre Diaconu has very narrowly defined his topic, often forgetting that these nomads interacted with a number of peoples and territories simultaneously. Consequently, the larger perspective frequently fades from view.”

Such anachronistic assumptions of primordial ethnicity (regarding “Romanians” as ie. Daco-Romans, through which Romanian nationalist scholarship has long flirted with anti-Semitism and genocide [see for example Wooster, 2012, “From the Enlightenment to Genocide: the Evolution and Devolution of Romanian Nationalism,” 80-99] – as opposed to the “Vlachs” and/or other erstwhile nomads) – make possible the splendidly chauvinistic theorizing of primordial “Roman” ethnic continuity of the modern Romanians by Davidescu, 2013, *The Lost Romans*, 10, who writes:

> “The founders of Wallachia and Moldova instead were ethnically Romanian, and this may be the key to explaining why it had taken so long for the Romanians to form their own state. In essence, the barbarians needed to be driven out before such a thing became possible.”

31 See for example the cautious book review by Petkov, 2011, 554-556.
of source-chronology. This methodology may be acceptable for distinguishing nomadic sites with accompanying skeletons of horses and other herd-animals, rough ceramics analogously characterized as “nomadic-wares,” and spindle whorls, along with trepanated skulls (as we have discussed previously), but, as expressed by Curta, they cannot separate “Cuman” from “Pečeneg” based on material culture alone.

In effect, by constructing typological bases from which to ascribe ethnicity, in these arguments, many sites have been assigned as a “Cuman,” “Pečeneg” or in extreme cases, “autochthonous Hungarian/Romanian/Moldovan/Ukrainian” burials based simply on grave goods and the archaeologists’ arbitrary assumptions. It seems in these modern countries, each country’s respective archaeological literature treats the Cumans’ material culture differently depending on their respective national historiographies, and especially so given the case of the Hungarian kingdom’s later locally autonomous Iasian and Cuman communities. However, as we discussed above, in regards to archaeologically distinguishing 9-10th-c. Pečenegs from Magyars, simple implements of nomadic daily life cannot be attributed in such a way – since nothing would necessarily stop a self-identifying (if indeed he would self-identify as such in the first place) “Cuman” from taking the arrow

32 Spinei, 2009, The Romanians and the Turkic Nomads North of the Danube Delta from the Tenth to the mid-Thirteenth Century, 295-296, attributes such sites (including the abovementioned sites Moscu and Holboca) and others such as Căuşeni, Cărăştieni, Copanca, Corjova, Hâncăuţi, Roma, Săiţi, Tudora, Sărata and Ursoaia, to the Cumans specifically. Curiously however, in other works such as his (idem), 2008, “The Cuman Bishopric—Genesis and Evolution,” 440, Spinei declines even to bother explaining how a given burial could be labelled as Cuman versus Pečeneg on the lower Danube. For example, he writes: “There is in fact no burial assemblage in the territory of the Cuman Bishopric that could be attributed to the Cumans.”

33 See for example Curta, 2006a, 308; and Horváth, 1989, 102. And for analogous methodology within the context of steppe archaeology, see the discussion above pertaining to Khazaria in chapter 2 §1.2.2.

34 Stoljarik, 1992, 86. See also Curta, 2006a, 309. He writes: “It is important to note that there are no significant differences in grave goods either between the two groups or between burials of the same group.” Unfortunately, Curta declines once again to define what in his view archaeologically constitutes a “group.” Nevertheless, I disagree with Madgearu (2013b, 4-5), who prefers Curta’s discussion to that of Stephenson’s (2000a, Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier: a Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900-1204, 103-116) due to the former’s focus on archaeological data. While Curta focuses more on “Cuman” and “Pečeneg” archaeology of the lower Danube, Stephenson (2000a, 103-116) engages more with textual sources in this section of his work; I believe both data sets are equally valuable.


36 See above chapter 4 §2.2.
heads, sabers and bridle-bits formerly used by a “Pečeneg,” which have only been construed thus by archaeologists a thousand years later – and based on rather partial written sources.37

Whatever else they may have been or done, wherever they may have gone or whomever they may or may not have interacted with, the Cumans, as with the Pečenegs and all “Skythians” according to the Byzantine sources, were Cumans precisely because they did not conform en masse via a ruler’s top-down conversion. The Cumans’ individual conversions and assimilations were the opposite of what Russian sociologists refer to as potestarity, roughly meaning top-down “state-formation” via the adoption of a monotheistic faith (its sacred texts and laws) and its imposition on the inhabitants of the lands ruled over.

The Cumans did not constitute some sort of primordial ethnicity, as many scholars, such as Pylypčuk and Sabitov, have arbitrarily assumed.38 In this regard, though they are set as opposing forces in the run-up to Levounion, they are indistinguishable from Pečenegs because of their “stateless adaptation” in the long term. Put in perspective with Rus’, Volga Bulgaria, Hungary, Patzinakia and Khazaria, Cumania eventually disappeared for the same reason as Khazaria and Patzinakia: because no dynasty, whatever they called themselves, could force their subjects to convert to a monotheistic faith and adhere to its laws en masse.39

37 Although according to Rus’ sources, by the 12th c., as Konjavskaja, 2015, 186, demonstrates, the Cumans are depicted more humanely, due, in her view, to “a whole series of victorious campaigns by Rus’ princes in the early 12th century, by the establishment of kinship ties, of stable, allied interactions with this or that princely clan, etc.” Originally, she writes: “целым рядом победоносных походов русских князей в нач. XII в., установлением родственных связей, устойчивых сюжетных взаимодействий с тем или иным княжеским родом и т. д.”

38 Pylypčuk and Sabitov, 2015b, Очерки этнополитической истории кыпчаков, 210-214. See also Pylypčuk’s monograph: 2015a, Дешт-и-Кыпчак на стыке цивилизаций, in which he concludes that the Qıpčaqs were a Turkic “ethnos,” as if ethnicity could be so easily, or scientifically, typologized.

39 On the supposed lawlessness of the Cumans in the Rus’ sources, see ibid, 183-184. In a choice excerpt, she writes:

“Как слово закон, так и его производное беззаконие, ассоциировалось не только с Законом Ветхого Завета, но и обозначало некие конфессионально обусловленные нормы поведения. Это касается вступительной части ПВЛ. Здесь толкование этого понятия оказывается противоречивым, поскольку друг за другом следуют тексты, созданные русским летописцем и заимствованные из Хроники Георгия Амартола […] В следующем далее отрывке из Георгия Амартола “закон” оказывается письменно закрепленным феноменом, а “обычай” соблюдают “беззаконники”. После вставки из Амартола, характеризующего различные народы, составитель ПВЛ добавляет пассаж о половцах и говорит, что те “законъ держать ѡ ц҃ь свои” (а не “обычан”). Смысл их верований при этом никак не раскрывается, а лишь приводятся внешние проявления: кровь проливают и “хвалѧще ѡ сихъ”, едят мертвечину и нечистую пищу (хомяков и сусликов) и др. [ПСРЛ 1: 16].”

I have translated this as:
The Cumans themselves were eventually subsumed into the Mongol hordes, as the Pečenegs and Khazars had previously been absorbed, via fluid ties of kinship and loyalty, by the Cumans and later nomadic confederations, not because they lacked some imagined primordial “ethnicity,” but because their lack of monotheism was the basis of their capacity of identification.

At the same time, both the word law and its derivative lawlessness were associated not only with the Old Testament Law, but also denoted certain faith-based conditioned norms of behavior. This concerns the introductory part of the PVL. Here, the interpretation of this concept turns out to be contradictory, because they follow one text after another, having been created by the Rus’ chronicler and the others borrowed from the Chronicle of Geōrgios Amartōlos. Thus, at first, the law of the clearings is discussed, and here together are “customs,” the “father’s law” and “lore.” In the following passage from Geōrgios Amartōlos, “the law” is a written phenomenon, while “customs” are observed by the “lawless.” After the insert from Amartōlos, which characterizes different peoples, the compiler of the PVL adds a passage about the Polovcians and says that they “keep their own laws” (and not “customs”). The meaning of their beliefs in this case is not disclosed in any way, but only external manifestations are given: the blood is shed and “glorified,” eating raw meat and unclean food (hamsters and ground squirrels), etc. [PSRL 1:16].


40 Although I believe it would be prudent to qualify that I use the term “confederation” here rather lightly. As Halperin, 2000, “The Kipchak Connection: the Ilkhans, the Mamluks and Ayn Jalut,” 233 n29, has suggested:

“Even the term ‘confederation’ implies a greater degree of unity among the Kipchak clan and tribal groupings than actually occurred, but substituting ‘supratribes’ would not help matters much.”

See also Martin, 1995, Medieval Russia, 980-1584, 48-49; and the distinction (based on Christian monotheization) made between Magyars and Pečenegs above in chapter 4 §2.1.2.1 and §2.2.1.4.
Ch. 7, part 2: Implications and further research

I began this study by attempting to make a direct case for research which endeavors toward both original investigation and historiographical criticism simultaneously. It seems that in an age of increasing demand by funding bodies for relevant research, but also original research, that to eschew one in favor of the other would be to verge on either irrelevance or yet another historiographical survey, both of which I have attempted to avoid. As stated in the introductory chapter:

“This dissertation is about both the short term and long term consequences of monotheism in Eurasia; it is about globalizing terms such as “late antiquity” and “middle-ages,” which had previously only applied to “Western Civilization.” Such terms may be considered arbitrary periodizations [...] This dissertation does not seek to re-narrate the respective stories of the growths of Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia or any other modern country, (countries in whose modern terrains my research will involve): that has been done abundantly. Instead, this dissertation seeks to view these stories backwards, knowing that the past can only be a province of the present, despite any attempt to perceive history regardless of modern interpretation.”

For this reason, the conclusion will attempt to draw broad, comparative conclusions and make a forceful, if conditional, case for comparative histories regarding the monotheistic bases of ethnicity and statehood in a decreasingly national world.

2.1 State monotheization and “potestarity,” («Потестарность»): a globalized perspective

2.1.1 Contextualizing the 13\textsuperscript{th}-c. crisis

I use the word crisis instead of crises, because though the respective Mongol and Crusader violent advents into the Byzantine oikoumenē (including Rus’) in the early-13\textsuperscript{th} c. have been interpreted as separate phenomena, the oikoumenē persisted as an underlying organizing principal (notwithstanding the “usual cocktail of political expediency” in Stephenson’s words\textsuperscript{41}), which led various emperors to ally with erstwhile ecumenical enemies). Nevertheless, the sources on which we rely paid homage to the ideal of a universal Christian empire, the oikoumenē, rather than to separate, retrospectively imagined “states.” In this light, I believe that the Mongol invasions and the Crusaders’ partitio imperii may be interpreted how they were understood at the time: together, as constituting an amalgamated 13\textsuperscript{th}-c. crisis, as has been ascribed to the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century, the 7\textsuperscript{th} century, and so forth.

\textsuperscript{41} Stephenson, 2000a, 313.
That being said, by the time the armies of Subutai and Jebe squared off against those of a combined Rus’-Cuman alliance at the shores of the Lake Maeotis on 31 May, 1223, the Cumans, as a distinct martial force, had already been spent and, with the exception of Köten, the soon-to-be deposed (and baptized) Cuman khağan, were effectively absorbed by their conquerors. The Rus’, however, throughout the long centuries of Mongol rule, were not. It is common in modern discourse to find the 12-15th-c. Rus’ referred to as “fragmented,” which is to somewhat overstate what Rus’ was beforehand, yet the interpretation lingers on, since the concept of Rus’ was predicated on Orthodoxy, supposedly waiting to be “collected and unified” (a plainly teleological trope) later by Muscovite princes.

When the Crusaders and their Venetian sponsors had their revenge, a generation later, for, amongst other events, the 1182 Latin Massacre, the resulting partitio imperii split the contiguous empire apart, not on supposedly “ethnic” lines, but on confessional and loyalty lines. The splinter dynasties fought over much, but what eventually united them against the Latin emperors was, amongst other factors, Orthodoxy. When viewed from a comparative methodological perspective, in which scale is the ultimate issue at stake, the underlying logic is clear.

Even though the overarching difference between the Mongols, Seljuqs and Crusaders as opposite invading forces was their respective subscriptions to particular monotheisms (or none at all), the confessional aspect of loyalty can hardly be overstated at the expense of the imagined “ethnic” nor indeed nomadic-versus-sedentary binary, as does for example

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42 This is better known as the Battle of the Kalka River, just on the northern coastline of the modern Sea of Azov. While I will refrain from providing an extensive bibliography on the event, one of the most well-known primary sources for it, the Novgorod Chronicle, has been translated into English: see Michell and Forbes (eds. and trans.), 1914, *The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016-1471*, 64-67. Additionally, it is worth noting that the PVL has used the name Maeotis, after Greek sources.
43 A rather convincing archaeological study has been published relating to the concurrent early-13th-c. political conditions on the Pontic steppe: see Woodfin, Rassamakin and Holod, 2010, “Foreign Vesture and Nomadic Identity on the Black Sea Littoral in the Early Thirteenth Century: Costume from the Chungruk Kurgan,” 155-186. I plan on returning to this topic in a later publication, as it relates to the changing relationship between Cuman chieftains and Christianity in the late-12th c.  
44 Korobeinikov, 2008, “A Broken Mirror: the Kipchak World in the Thirteenth Century,” 406, departing from what he considers “optimistic” evaluations of 13th-c. Cuman assimilation into other “peoples” by the likes of Golden (1991, op. cit.), nevertheless writes under the assumption that Cuman primordial ethnicity, as defined by language use, was lost in an otherwise terrible “collapse”: “The Cuman aristocracy was slain; their sacred stone figures were often purposefully destroyed (citation – Toločko, 2003, *Кочевые народы степей и Киевская Русь*, 123).”  
45 See above chapter 6, §2.1.2.3.  
46 This is Konjavskaja’s (2015, 187-188) principal argument, based as it is on the Rus’ sources themselves.
Zhivkov. In other words, the final arbiter of loyalty remained confessional adherence, not retrospectively assigned “ethnicity” or sedentarism versus nomadism. For Vásáry, nomadic attacks against the sedentary Byzantine Balkans are quite neatly assigned to a frame “beginning with the Huns in the second half of the fourth century AD and ending with the Tatars in the thirteenth century.” This would indeed fit in with our previous discussions of fluid assimilation and absorption, and especially so vis-à-vis the Cumans and Mongols. As with the Pečeneks, (and even the Khazars) the Cumans themselves, regardless of the language they continued to speak (and indeed those their descendants later learned), were eventually absorbed into other populations in Eastern Europe, including both sedentary and non-sedentary peoples, Mongols included. Contrarily, those who adhered to their confessional loyalties, instead of converting to that of their respective conquerors (Latin Christian or Sunni Muslim), defined the subsequent Orthodox populations – “Romans:” Greeks, Bulgars, Rus’ et al. But what made them Orthodox in the first place was not primordial: it was centuries of top-down confessional coercion, or what Russian sociological scholarship frequently refers to as “potestarity.”

Ch. 7 2.1.2 Potestarity revisited

While the word is hardly well-known in English-language scholarship, I believe it is nevertheless a key word which amalgamates a series of historical processes characterizing many so-called “early-medieval” (or alternatively “late-antique”) dynastic polity-formations. As I have outlined in the introduction and in various case-studies, the word may carry some or all of the attendant processes of the adoption of a given monotheism by a given ruler and his dynasty’s top-down coercion of their subjects over time. Usually this

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47 Zhivkov, 2015, 268-283.
48 Vásáry, 2005, xi.
49 On supposed connections between later Khazars (nomadic, sedentary or otherwise) and arriving/assimilating Cuman-Qipčaqs, see Minorsky (trans.), 1958, A History of Sharvān and Darband in the 10th-11th Centuries, 107 n2.
52 Papageorgiou, 2005, Άπο το Γένος στο Έθνος: Η Θεμελίωση του Ελληνικού Κράτους, 31-78.
53 See for example the extensive volume in this regard by Popov (ed.), 1997, Потестарность: генезис и эволюция.
includes the adoption of a sacred text and its laws, its version of history and liturgical language (literization and historization), the sacralization of an urban center in time and space, the sedentarization (moderately speaking, and usually along a river or coastline)\textsuperscript{54} of a dynasty’s subjects and the transformation of tribute into tax collection.\textsuperscript{55} Potestarian formations need not be consigned to one monotheism or another: while Vladimir adopted Orthodox Christianity, Almuš – Sunni Islam and Stephen – Latin Christianity and their respective dynasties continued said traditions.

In this way, “Europe,” as a geographical space, need not necessarily have evolved into Christendom, nor the “Middle East” necessarily Islamic – such a shallow telling of history smacks of viewing historical processes as they have resulted, instead of as they could have,

\textsuperscript{54} I would credit my supervisor, Archie Dunn, with the phrase, “rivers of sedentarization.”

\textsuperscript{55} Popov, 2015, “Концепт «племя», или этничность и потестарность «в одном флаконе»,” 13-20. Popov’s work has been the most inspiring, although other Russian sociological scholarship on potestarity ought to be mentioned here, including the works of Danilovič, 2013, “Потестарность как критерий оценки эффективности концепции,” 35-39; Jakhšijan, 2013, “Общинное самоуправление и государственное управление: соотношение в эпоху этнополитогенеза,” 285-291 (see especially p. 290); Śmurgyina, 2012, “О содержательном потенциале концепта потестарности,” 34-37; and Kulakov, 2011, “Запад и Восток: король без войска и дружина без князя,” 164-170. However, I would caution the reader that this Russian concept of \textit{potestarity} can easily be abused, such as certain contentions made by Kulakov, who seeks to explain the differences in “mentalities” between Eastern and Western Europe as stemming from potestarian variations within primordial ethnic groups (Germans vs. Slavs). For example, he writes (p. 168):

“Представленный эскиз отражения идей европейской потестарности в археологическом материале пред- и раннегосударственного периода в числе прочего выявляет причины сложения различных форм ментальности у населения Barbaricum. Элементы народной “демократии” (вариант 1), приоритет духовных ценностей (вариант 2) и сугубый прагматизм власти (вариант 3) не только обозначили различие параметров древностей трёх основных частей “варварской” цивилизации раннесредневековой Европы, но и по сей день реализуется в национальном характере и в политических приоритетах различных народов нашего континента. К сожалению, отсутствие компромисса между указанными формами ментальности не способствует естественному ходу прогресса не только в границах национальных государств, но и во всём мире.”

I have translated this as:

“The presented sketch of the reflection of the ideas of European potestarity in the archaeological material of the pre- and early-state period, among other things, reveals the reasons for the emergence of various mentalities in the population of the Barbaricum. The elements of the people’s “democracy” (variant 1), the priority of spiritual values (variant 2) and the strict pragmatism of power (variant 3) not only signified the difference in the parameters of the antiquities of the three main parts of the “barbaric” civilization of early medieval Europe, but also to this day is realized in national character and in the political priorities of various peoples of our continent. Unfortunately, the lack of compromise between these mentalities does not contribute to the innate pace of progress, not only within the borders of national states, but also throughout the entire world.”

It would be worthy to note that similar assumptions and implications are made by Biermann, albeit, focusing exclusively on the “Slavic” nature of excavated hillforts in modern Pomerania: see Biermann, 2016, “Northwestern Slavic Strongholds of the 8th-10th Centuries,” 85-94; (see above figs. 114-116).
but failed to unfold, hence, teleological history. For example: the Khazar khağan Joseph’s dynasty failed to fully Judaize their subjects as the aforementioned dynasties respectively Christianized or Islamized theirs. Nevertheless, such potestarian processes presuppose the principal that the adoption of a confessional doctrine refers to the joining of an ecumenical club: Latin, Orthodox, Sunni, et al. This aspect of top-down, potestarian conversion explains why, removed from the centers of each doctrine (Rome, Constantinople, Baghdad, respectively), peripheral dynasties cannot be describes as “states” as one would describe modern nations; rather, they were preoccupied with shifting confessional allegiances more than anything else.

Ultimately, I suggest that many modern identifications of the beginnings of “ethnicity” (origo gentis/ethnogenesis) may be attributable to potestarian rulership as exemplified in Byzantium: by the top-down conversion of subjects to the rulers’ chosen faith; hence, cuius regio, eis religio. Without presuming to reject all ethnic classifications categorically, I would rather suggest that this is what makes modern ethnicity seem primordial even if it is not, despite pre-monotheistic ἔθνη being referred to as such. In this way, ethnicity may be

57 For example, Dzino, “‘Becoming Slav’, ‘Becoming Croat’: New Approaches in Research of Identities in Post-Roman Illyricum,” 196, writes:

“Ethno-genesis’ is an interpretative framework that implies that the myth of origins of peoples (origo gentis), was transmitted through discursive myths transmitted by elite groups of warriors, forming the core of the tradition of their future identity – ‘traditionskern’. The critics of this framework point out that peoples are an unstable category of group identity, primarily determined by the political factors that constantly change and manipulate it, so that the tradition represented as origo gentis is nothing more than political manipulation by the ruling group.”

58 Golovnjov, 2012, “О традициях и новациях: признательность за дискуссию,” who writes on p. 84:

“In the relationship of traditions and innovations a special place belongs to ethnicity, some are inclined to refer to persistent traditions (primordialists), others - to recent innovations (constructivists). In fact, it combines both properties being constant and renewable. In a polemical essay, S. V. Sokolovskij questioned the applicability of the concept of ethnicity to historical reconstructions. In his view, ethnicity – is the fruit of a recent (since the beginning of the 19th century) ‘the onset of ethno-
described as both situational (or circumstantial) and seemingly primordial, but not at the same time. It is situational until, through centuries’ long (or decades’ long) potestarian processes of top-down confessional coercion, it finally seems primordial, due to the internalization of confessional norms, laws, traditions and continuities, even if it is not.

Ch. 7 2.2 Tribalism, ethnicity and nationalism: renegotiating pre-modern identity

Eventually, potestarian processes describe how many early polities survived to the present day in various forms (ie. modern ethnicity derives from centuries of top-down monotheistic rule), but they do not explain why some did not, such as the case of Khazaria. However, in being the exception, Khazaria proves the rule: whatever other identities came and went on the middle Volga, the lower Danube or the Pannonian plain, each region still today remains confessionally true to its founding dynasty, respectively Sunni-Islamic, Orthodox-Christian and Latin-Christian. Hence, many national historiographies’ preoccupation with autochthonousness, or primordiality. Khazaria, as Soteri suggests, makes for an excellent case study of ethnogenesis compared to other cases, because the Khazarian identity, with a few minor exceptions, is essentially unclaimed in the modern day, as compared, for example, with the ancient Volga Bulgars, Magyars, Danube Bulgars and Rus’. But whether or not a self-aware Khazarian ethnicity, however it could possibly be

nationalism,’ while the previous eras were characterized by other forms of identity (local, class, potestarian, confessional). The introduction of ‘ethnicity’ into these eras he sees as an ‘act of conceptual colonization’.”

See also the discussion of ἔθνη in the DAI above in chapter 5 §2.1.


“There is a lesson to be learned from such an ironic twist of history. Whether one considers themselves Russian, Bosnian; Serbian, Albanian, Croatian, or Macedonian there is no valid criterion for establishing such nationalisms. Just as the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe (using the Khazar example) are more or less of the same ‘racial stock’ as the peoples they find themselves among, so too are the Muslims of the Balkans, Croats, Bosnians and Serbs. When one speaks of Bosnian Croats/Serbs this becomes a contradiction in terms (highlighting the futility of racial categorisations). Both are Bosnians, yet due to their religious bent, i.e. Orthodox or Catholic Christianity, identify, or are identified, with Serbian or Croat nationalisms. To add fuel to the fire, why do we in the West refer to ‘Bosnian Muslims’? Using religion as an indication of ethnicity for the latter group but not for their Christian counterparts.

The problems of nationalism in Eastern Europe are much more complex than a simple explanation of religious difference. However, using the example of the Khazars and their descendants, it can be exemplified that nationalist movements, with their tenacious convictions about race, can affect the perceptions of both aggressor and victim alike which, when one probes deeper into the espoused ideologies, seem to be based on false premises and, ultimately, contradictory theories.”
defined, can be truly used to answer questions of all pre-monotheistic tribes and ethnicities would certainly be quite contentious. As a case-in-point, we may ponder Zhivkov’s position regarding ethnicity in Khazaria.

Ultimately, in my view, Zhivkov’s analysis of Khazarian ethnicity is contradictory. The most basic problem is that he, like many scholars whose works have already been extensively commented on, conflates ethnicity with pre-monotheistic pagan tribalism. In other words, he does not make a distinction between the pre-monotheistic tribe and the monotheized ethnicity, despite the fact that he refers to both, albeit without qualifying the difference between them. Consider his first chapter, where on the first page, he writes:

“Usually, the Khazar elite’s conversion to Judaism is interpreted in light of the practice, widespread in the contemporary Khazaria ‘barbarian’ lands, whose nobility imposed Christianity or Islam on its subjects. This practice is viewed as a deliberate attempt to unify into an ethnic whole the often multilingual and multi-ethnic population that professed different cults. The adoption of a common religion is thus considered one of the important conditions for the formation of a nation, and for the blurring of tribal and ethnic differences.”

I would ask: is the entire population multi-ethnic, in which the various tribes therein constitute separate, individual ethnicities, or is the ethnicity, if understood as a resolutely modern phenomenon, the advent of a common religion imposed, top-down, by the ruler? In

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62 Wolfram, 1971, “The Shaping of the Early Medieval Kingdom,” 1-20. However, I would also add that though Wolfram’s interpretations have certainly evolved since this 1971 publication, which seems to make many (subsequently) outdated and arbitrary assumptions of primordial ethnicity and seems to take primary sources at face-value, he does briefly mention confessional affiliation as somewhat of an afterthought. In this regard, perhaps his more thoughtful reflections in some of his later works (idem, 1997, The Roman Empire and Its Germanic Peoples; idem, 2006a, “Gothic History as Historical Ethnography,” 43-69; and idem, 2006b, “Origo et Religio: Ethnic Traditions and Literature in Early Medieval Texts,” 70-90) make somewhat less anachronistic assumptions of primordial ethnicity and statehood. In fact, even Halsall, 2003, “Review of: On Barbarian Identity. Critical Approaches to Ethnicity in the Early Middle Ages, ed. A. Gillett,” 1349-1350, hints at the “flaws and curious methodological sleights of hand” of the works of Wolfram as what he deems, “the Vienna School.”
other words, is ethnicity the raw, tribal material or the finished, monotheized product? It is difficult to discern with Zhivkov’s interpretation, especially because a few pages later he writes:

“Khazaria’s population here is seen as all the ethnic groups that defined the appearance of the material culture and which most likely had a direct participation in the establishment and functioning of the state—the Khazars, the Bulgars and the Alans. In other words, these three ethnic groups’ notions of power should be the leading issue in the process of defining the nature of the Khazar Khaganate in the tenth century.”

Not to belabor the point, I would finally ask: if ethnicity is a pagan, primordial condition for Zhivkov (primordial Alans, Bulgars and Khazars, to whom, in his conclusion, he attributes the distinction as “steppe” peoples, as opposed to sedentary peoples), on a comparative scale, would that equally render modern Spaniards as truly Celtiberians, Vandals or Visigoths, modern French as Franks or Gauls, Italians as Lombards or perhaps even Etruscans, Russians, Poles, Ukrainians and other Slavic speakers as variously Derevlians, Poljanians, Derevlians, Poljanians,

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“Arguments supporting the idea that ‘Arab’ does not have to be equated with ‘Muslim’ could be found in late antique history— the existence of Arab tribes that converted to Christianity before the arrival of Islam—, as well as in more recent times— the role of Christians in the revival of Arab culture. Though this discourse certainly had success in intellectual circles, and even influenced the state ideologies of a number of Middle Eastern countries, to many Arabs being Arab still means being Muslim. The rise of fundamentalist Islamic groups also poses a serious threat to the inclusivist ideal, and is one of the reasons for Arab Christians to emigrate to the west.”

64 Zhivkov, 2015, 20.
Illyrians, Antes, Dalmato-Croatians, Černjakhovians, et al., or truly English (or various Germanic speakers) as, dare I say, Romano-Celtic, or even – heavens – Anglo-Saxon? I


Purely as an example, I would also include here the works of Odnoroženko, 2015, “Зображення щитів на руських печатках XI–XIII ст.,” 150-267, a well-known Ukrainian fascist affiliated with the Azov Battalion (which is itself riddled with Nazi-sympathizers) in eastern Ukraine and advocates primordial Ukrainian ethnicity in his research on Rus’ heraldry. Elsewhere, Šelekhan’, 2012, “Правомірність вважати свастику у середньовічних слов’ян спадковістю саме індоєвропейської традиції, але пізнішим запозиченням доведена в рідному роботі. Адже вимагається чітка картина традиції її зображення від населення бронзової доби до племен раннього залізного віку.”

I have attempted to translate the Ukrainian:

“The consideration that the validity of the swastika of the medieval Slavs as inherited from Indo-European tradition, not a later borrowing, is proved by several papers. After all, a clear picture of their traditions emerges in the Bronze Age population to the early Iron Age tribes.”

The historical amnesia that can enable such an argument to be made is mind-boggling. I would recommend him the work of Härke, 2014, “Archaeology and Nazism: a Warning from Prehistory,” 32-43, who in fact contributed a paper to the same conference (the Humboldt Conference, September 2012) that Šelekhan’ himself did. On p. 36, Härke refers directly to the swastika symbols of the Černjakhov culture (attributed to the Crimean Goths) as an example which Nazi archaeologists, led by the infamous Herbert Jankuhn, sought to utilize for propaganda value for conquering Crimea in WWII and repopulating it with ethnically pure Germans to replace the ancient Crimean Goths as the proper historical ethno-linguistic population in Crimea.


think not. Instead, I would argue, it was the form of monotheism that created the “nation,” not the “nation” which converted to the monotheism.

Nevertheless, at the risk of over-broadening the scale of my comparative implications, modern nations (and by association, modern nationalities) cannot be conflated with ancient “tribes.” This has been tried and it resulted in more than one genocide. But tribalism, endemic to any form or instance of warfare, as an ineradicable aspect of the human condition, is a different story altogether. Whatever else tribalism may be labelled,

Scandinavia include those by Brink 2008, “People and Land in Early Scandinavia,” 87-111; and the Birkebeiner debate over arbitrary assumptions of the unity of the medieval “Norwegian state” by Bagge, 2008, “Division and Unity in Medieval Norway,” 145-166 (see esp. p. 152-154), who nevertheless takes a rather teleological approach to his argument.

71 It ought to be noted that comparative analyses can be easily over-burdened. As Holmes and Standen, 2015, “Defining the Global Middle Ages,” 107, have written:

“Those who study this period often draw on methods and perspectives offered by other historical timeframes or look for medieval examples or phases in subjects for which the parameters have been established by others: for example empire-building, state-formation, migration and long-distance trade in precious commodities. Yet the unquestioning application of theories and models from other contexts runs the risk of occluding and distorting medieval globalisms, particularly the creative tension between the global and the local.”

Nevertheless, I believe Escalona, 2016, 8-10 makes a rather thoughtful case for careful historical comparisons based on scale as a beneficial method for transcending teleological nationalist historiographies.


73 Stouraitis, 2012, “‘Just War’ and ‘Holy War’ in the Middle Ages: Rethinking Theory through Case Study,” 227-264.

74 I believe it would be helpful to think of visceral “tribalism” as an extension of network theory. Recent neurological studies have demonstrated that typical human brains are not adapted to socially keeping track of large populations of other humans, usually referred to as “Dunbar’s number.” In a brief summary, having reached a connection limit for a sheer quantity of other people a given person can be acquainted with, many neurologists have found that the natural reaction for the brain is to resort to some amalgamation of stereotypes, hierarchical schematics, and other oversimplified structures in order to understand so many other people. I would suggest therefore, that “tribalism” is to a certain extent, an ineradicable aspect of human neurology, if only for the sheer fact that the typical human brain cannot be familiar with so many other people and that conceptions of “us versus them,” however it is manifested, may be a natural aspect of the human condition. For
“otherization,” “us-versus-them” et al., it would be hardly controversial to suggest that tribalism, based on exclusion,\(^{75}\) takes many forms and transcends both time and confessional doctrine. Even though such ecumenical allegiances were meant to surpass pagan tribalism via collective allegiances to common sets of laws and subjection to a common authority, they nevertheless resulted in rival ecumenisms, to say nothing of rival peripheral dynasties.\(^{76}\)

Moreover, why would primordial ethnicity only apply to post-“Roman” Europe, where the “migration period,” (or rather, “late-antiquity”) arbitrarily assigned by modern scholars, ends at a stable, if debateable, date\(^{77}\) while such primordial ethnicity would not apply, counterfactually, to the post-Mauryan Indian subcontinent? Were the 8-12\(^{th}\)-c. Viking invasions not also migrations as well?\(^{78}\) What about the Mongol or the Timurid invasions, were they not equally migrations as well? The family of Babur (1483-1530), for example, was a well-known Timurid splinter dynasty, after all.\(^{79}\) By implication therefore, if pagan nomadism in Eurasia can define “migration,” then referencing “the migration period” and assuming it ended in the 6-9\(^{th}\) c. betrays a sharp Western-centrism,\(^{80}\) which otherwise,


\(^{78}\) Despite the arbitrary oversimplification and perhaps anachronism, I believe Beckwith, 2009, *Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present,* 165-166, for example, has a point when he writes: “Although the Frankish successor states were increasingly Mediterranean in culture, the Scandinavian peoples still largely belonged to the Central Eurasian Culture Complex and constituted the northwesternmost outlier of it.”

\(^{79}\) This point is made more succinctly by Holmes and Standen, 2015, 114. See also Faruqui, 2005, “The Forgotten Prince: Mirza Hakim and the Formation of the Mughal Empire in India,” 487-523.

arguably continued all the way up to the Kalmyk Khanate in the 18-19th c. For precisely this reason, periodizations based on “Roman” and “post-Roman,” or more recently “late antiquity” and “early-medieval” are equally outdated and/or Western-centric.

Ch. 7 2.3 Separating the “late antique” from the “medieval”

The way history has been taught for the past two centuries, primarily in light of Western expansion, that of the tripartite separation of history into “ancient,” “medieval” and “modern,” which as we already know is nonsense, is nevertheless rarely challenged on a serious empirical level, with historians and archaeologists usually preferring to bypass the issue altogether and work within prefabricated boundaries instead of challenging them. I would argue therefore, like separating one pre-monotheistic tribe from another, that any attempt at separating the “late antique” from the “medieval” would constitute teleology, since ultimately such notions are subjectively assigned rather than contemporaneously contrived. As we have already seen, when modern nations define their own histories within a tripartite formula incorporating the “ancient” nation followed by the “medieval” nation, this presupposes an inherently Western view of world history wherein “antiquity” followed by the “middle ages” descends from periodizations based on “Roman” and “Post-Roman” formats. Surely without expecting an answer, one might rhetorically ask for example, when is the chronological line between ancient Siberia and medieval Siberia?

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81 Sneath, 2007, The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society, & Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia, 36-37. Incidentally, Sneath’s entire argument, predicated as it is on discarding outdated and teleological models of historical phenomena, such as those of state-centered historiography, would be in keeping with my own argument. For Sneath (p. 176-179), ethnicity, as a historical phenomenon, when viewed from the contemporaneous steppe, is “solvable” as a determinant of top-down personal rule by charisma (eg. Genghis Khan himself), without notions of “heavenly mandates,” et al. Ergo, with sacred texts, laws and rulers, came pre-modern institutions to which we, erroneously or otherwise, ascribe top-down “statehood” – hence, large agrarian empires’ continuous formations at the edges of the steppes (Turchin, 2009, “A Theory for the Formation of Large Agrarian Empires,” 191-217). Therefore, though Genghis Khan himself did not adopt a monotheistic faith, his successors did, which ensured their later standing as historical figures within the Chinese “state,” the Russian “state” and so forth. This creative tension between top-down and bottom-up interaction has been cleverly remarked on by Holmes and Standen, 2015, 108, 113:

“The top-down roles of coercion and persuasion mattered, but so too did bottom-up impulses to associate as followers in various guises with those who were deemed to be attractive, useful and efficacious, a set of ideas which […] we could distil into the formula of: ›the empire as umpire‹.”

If archaeologists, with or without a consensus, cannot satisfactorily provide parameters for ancient ethnicity, and primary sources have been mined for imagined ancient ethnicities for dubious reasons for far too long (including those seeking to recast the “barbarians” as “us” versus the “Romans” as “them”) then why should modern scholars bother with such outdated delineations of “late antique” and “medieval” in the first place?


86 See for example Jones and Ereira, 2006, Barbarians: an Alternative Roman History, 288, who insist that the Roman church “gave us history,” assuming that “we” are the “barbarians.” One might ask, rhetorically, if such an assumption only applies to the self-designated “West,” while the stories of Venice and Byzantium, or indeed Russia and Byzantium, apply to a wholly different zeitgeist? Jones and Ereira’s arguments are tantalizing and thought provoking, but they ought not to be mistaken for sound historiography. I would posit that a far better case is made by Geary, 2002, The Myth of Nations: the Medieval Origins of Europe, 151-174.

87 Wells, 2008, 200. He writes:

“The start of the Migration period, shortly after the appearance in texts of the Huns, in A.D. 375 and the beginning of the Middle Ages, with the formation of the Merovingian dynasty in the middle of the fifth century, are artificial chronological markers that historians created as benchmarks, although they have taken on lives of their own. Too often, modern researchers lose sight of the fact that these fixed points are intended only to provide a framework for understanding peoples of the past, not real breaks in the social or cultural development of early Europeans.”

See also Holmes and Standen, 2015, 110-111, who suggest the concept of “big time.” Alternatively, the works of Bell-Fialkoff (ed.), 2000, The Role of Migration in the History of the Eurasian Steppes: Sedentary Civilization vs. “Barbarian” and Nomad; Golovnëv, 2009, Антропологические диссекции (древности северной евразии); Anthony, 1990, “Migration in Archaeology: the Baby and the Bathwater;” 895-914; and Härke, 2006, 262-276, put to rest the continuation of teleological markers such as the “end of the age of migrations,” arbitrarily
Furthermore, such a distinction ought to intuit a Western-centricism, which prevents expanding comparative and broad historical research, which I believe would be beneficial for the modern world. Hence, many scholars have begun to transcend national histories with an archetypal “global middle ages.”

Ch. 7 2.4 Towards a “global middle ages”

While the term “global middle ages” has yet to be critically defined in any stable sense, Holmes and Standen, whose project is distinctly labelled as such, have presumed a chronological range of 300 to 1600 for which to debate the meaning of “medieval” outside of Europe. Whether the term “medieval,” itself a Western invention during the so-called Renaissance, is a deeply troublesome concept to apply on a global scale, it is not my purpose to argue; personally I prefer the term “pre-modernity.” But regardless of the term used, either “medieval” or “pre-modern,” in order to work toward a so-called globalized concept of pre-modernity, we must acknowledge where we are today.

Many modern nations have been contrived, if mistakenly, as primordial, and so, likewise, has Western civilization, which, as it has been supposed and taught for generations of Westerners, ascends from “ancient” Greece and Rome, but not “medieval” Roman Catholic Christendom, as opposed to the Orthodox oikoumenē. In other words, as long as Western civilization is construed as primordial or in other words, pre-Christian, then so will modern nations that define themselves as “Western.” But if we invert this paradigm, which we already know to be misguided, then we are left with a major loose end. That is, if modern nations cannot be primordial, then neither can Western civilization.

Instead of attempting to define “Western Civilization,” itself an unanswerable question (though no shortage of scholars have tried), at the risk of an over-ambitious line of

assumed by scholars such as Bowlus, 2006, The Battle of Lechfeld and its Aftermath, August 955: the End of the Age of Migrations in the Latin West.
88 Holmes and Standen, 2015, 107.
89 See for example Härke, 2014, 33, in his discussion of the German “national prehistorian” Gustaf Kossinna (1858-1931), whose ideas about the equivalence of civilizational prehistory to national prehistory paved the way for his siedlungsgeschichte (1911), a forerunning concept of using the distribution of archaeological typologies to construct ethnic “culture-history.” To pre-empt any accusations of resorting to a straw man argument, I would refer the reader to the following section below §2.4.1. I am not accusing any modern school of archaeology or history of deferring to ethno-national ideas such as those of Nazi-Germany, but I do seek to awaken the reader’s attention to archaeology and history, as disciplines, used for modern, ethno-national political ends.
inquiry in a PhD thesis, the purpose of the following section will be to use “the West” rhetorically as a developmental framework to juxtapose other pre-modern civilizations – based on comparative scale.

Ch. 7 2.4.1 Defining civilization

Vásáry refers to civilization in a confessional sense: as defined by confessional loyalty, as opposed to the old notion of (at least Western) civilization as some sort of abstract entity, completely detached from religious identification, stretching back to the remote antiquity of ancient Greece (or debatably Sumer). Hence, modern, primarily western European countries, in almost every case, have defined themselves (arguably beginning with Rēgas Feraios and Adamantios Koraēs), by some imagined primordial ethnicity, which is, simply put, a gross distortion of history. It has gone unquestioned for over two centuries if not longer, and only recently has it come under increasing doubt. It seems that the Gordian knot that is “Western Civilization” has been defined in two ways: a narrow, perhaps confessional way and an abstract, allegedly secular way, which has fueled and/or enabled such counter-processes (ie., secularized, institutional developments) elsewhere as the Meiji Reformation or the Tanzimat. To be sure, I am not attempting to offer yet another redefinition of “Western Civilization.” I am simply juxtaposing it as it was originally conceived, with other confessionally-predicated civilizations, based on scale (ie., the Orthodox oikoumenē or the Islamic ummah), in order to understand history as it was understood by the confessional affiliations of contemporaries, rather than as it has been

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90 I choose to risk widening my analysis to this extent for two reasons, which I first introduced in the introductory chapter 1 §1.1-1.1.1. First, it truly seems to me that such questions must still be asked, and such challenges made, even if scholarly fashions have tended against them. Second, in an environment with ever decreasing support for historical and archaeological pursuits for the doubts raised as to their relevancy in the modern world, I believe that to remain relevant, historians must actively apply their conclusions to the modern world.

91 Vásáry, 2005, xiii.

92 Escalona, 2016, 8-10. For Escalona, and in this I agree wholeheartedly, by undertaking broad historical comparisons, we may depart from the usual misconceptions due to viewing one historical “state” or another in a vacuum sealed and delineated by modern, nationalized parameters.

93 Wilkinson, 1992, “Cities, Civilizations and Oikumenes: I,” 51-87; and idem, 1993, “Cities, Civilizations and Oikumenes: II,” 41-72. However, like many modern scholars, Wilkinson defines “civilization” as based “político-social transaction networks of cities and their populations,” which roughly correspond to confessional allegiance, yet his taxonomy leaves religious affiliation as an afterthought at best. His interpretation may be somewhat tempered by Bulliet, 2004, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization, who argues for a single civilization which comprises both the entirety of the oikoumenē and ummah, but whose focus on the modern world is somewhat projected on to the pre-modern.

94 This seems to be quite a different approach than that of Holmes and Standen, 2015, 109, who reject employing what they term “religion” as “too large a category for coherent investigation.” I would disagree,
teleologically explained by the modern, supposedly secular aspirations of contortionists. Ergo, we arrive at a dichotomous basis for civilization: via formal, abstract and purportedly secular definitions versus confessional definitions.

Offering a summary of previous theorists’ definitions of civilization, Niall Ferguson lays out his introduction with a six-point summary distinguishing “the West” from “the Rest,” based on an abstract set of institutional principles, which transcend monotheism (in this case for “the West,” read: Latin Christianity) and derive wholly from Greco-Roman antiquity. Similar cases have been advanced by Freeman, Hanson, and many others. And then “the

given that the confessional laws around which power is exercised do not substantially differ in any context in which power is exercised; only in so far as those who control the laws or command the loyalty of those who obey them differ.

95 Ferguson, 2011, Civilization, 3. His discussion of the time of the origin of “Western civilization” (p. 17) centers on an arbitrary distinction between what he terms “Western civilization 1.0” and “Western civilization 2.0,” in which the center is traditionally cut out between the 5th c. CE and the Italian Renaissance, thus taking the conventional, and I daresay largely discredited, tripartite schematic tack. He appeals to various “stewards” which temporarily had custody over “Western civilization,” until, teleologically, it was repossessed in the 15th c., including: Byzantium, Ireland and the ‘Abbasid Caliphate, being sure to cite respectively Lars Brownsworth (2009, Lost to the West), Thomas Cahill (2011, How the Irish Saved Civilization, a work known more for its profitability than its accuracy) and Christopher Dawson (1932, The Making of Europe, by now a rather outdated work).

Ferguson even, and I believe appropriately, criticizes Huntington’s (1996, The Clash of Civilizations) necessarily over-narrow definition (p. 14-15) of “Western civilization.” However, in perhaps his best logical demystification (p. 11-12), appealing to Jared Diamond’s (1999), Guns, Germs and Steel, Ferguson draws a distinction based on “politically consolidated,” “monolithic Oriental empires,” versus “the mountainous, river-divided Western Eurasia.” However, even as he casts doubt on Diamond’s suggestion, he eschews mention that China has been just as mountainous and river-divided, and incidentally, frequently politically divided, while Europe, intermittently, has been more-or-less politically unified, and frequently by some ideologically consolidating ecumenical empire.

While I agree with his criticism of Diamond’s Guns, Germs and Steel, the weakness of Ferguson’s own counterargument is typified by his avoidance of Diamond’s other work, (2005, Collapse), in which Diamond lays out how history, as a series of forces, could have unfolded differently and did not, although could yet change (however, Escalona, 2016, 1-3, makes a thoughtful criticism based on oversimplifications of Diamond’s environmental ideas of societal collapse). Therefore, without advocating either determinism or alternative histories, I propose the whole problem with Ferguson’s argument is that he takes history as it has turned out and explained it forwards from some arbitrary point (in his case, the 15th c.), rather than viewing history backwards as it could have turned out, but did not.

96 Freeman, 2003, The Closing of the Western Mind: the Rise of Faith and the Fall of Reason, xix, dismissing a thousand years of Christian and Muslim thought as ultimately failing to maintain rationality, writes:

“The historian is deeply indebted to the monks, the Byzantine civil servants and the Arab philosophers who preserved ancient texts, but the recording of earlier authorities is not the same as maintaining a tradition of rational thought.”

97 Hanson, 2007, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power, 54. Hanson, like many Western military historians, treats “the West” as some monolithic, organizationally institutional framework, (in this case, based on abstract notions of “Europe” and “freedom”) which transcends time and space, stretching back to the Battle of Salamis:
"Western ideas of freedom, originating from the early Hellenic concept of politics as consensual government [...] were to play a role in nearly every engagement in which Western soldiers fought. [...] It is easy to identify the role of freedom among the ranks of Europeans at Salamis, less so at Mexico City, Lepanto—or among the intramural Western fights such as Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme. Yet whatever differences there were between the French and the English of the Middle Ages, [...] their shared measure of freedom on both sides of the battle line was not even remotely present in armies outside of Europe."

One might ask Hanson if “freedom” enabled Tariq ibn Ziyād to win the field at Guadalete (712 CE), or if Byzantine armies lost at Manzikert because they had forgotten their primordial Hellenic “freedom.”


99 Frankopan, (2016, The Silk Roads: a New History of the World), himself a distinguished “Western” Byzantinist, although writing a so-called “popular” history, nevertheless points out the hypocrisy of “Western” claims to inheriting the legacy of ancient Greece and Rome during the Renaissance (p. 213):

“The task now was to reinvent the past. The demise of the old imperial capital presented an unmistakable opportunity for the legacy of ancient Greece and Rome to be claimed by new adoptive heirs – something that was done with gusto. In truth, France, Germany, Austria, Spain, Portugal and England had nothing to do with Athens and the world of the ancient Greeks, and were largely peripheral in the history of Rome from its earliest days to its demise. This was glossed over as artists, writers and architects went to work, borrowing themes, ideas and texts from antiquity to provide a narrative that chose selectively from the past to create a story which over time became not only increasingly plausible but standard. So although scholars have long called this period the Renaissance, this was no rebirth. Rather, it was a naissance—a birth. For the first time in history, Europe lay at the heart of the world.”

This reinvention of the past, during the so-called Renaissance, is a past we now take for granted, the “world history” we teach our children, rarely realizing that it is as much a fabrication as any other historical narrative in the world, ancient or modern.

100 Thomson, 1999, “The Distorted Mediaeval Russian Perception of Classical Antiquity: the Causes and the Consequences,” article VIII in his The Reception of Byzantine Culture in Medieval Russia, 303-364.
simply not true: Thomson’s criticism of Western arrogance hardly alters non-Westerners’ abilities to engage with “the Classics,” historically or presently. In “seeking to remove the color of anachronism,” the whole problem with histories such as Freeman’s and Hanson’s is that taken from a purely teleological standpoint, history is written, perhaps by the victors, as the saying goes, but ultimately in the light of how it has ended. But this assumption is arbitrary, forcing historiography into explaining how the past succeeded in becoming the present instead of explaining what forces persevered or failed to last, (exemplified by the case of Khazaria), thereby leaving history, and our immediate ability to learn from it, all the shallower. I would also suggest that the Western historiographical bedrock of the “ancient-medieval-modern” paradigm is quite comparable with Eurasianist scholarly bedrock of ancient/medieval “statehood.”

Finally, if the historical borders of modern nations have been teleologically defined based on ethno-nationalist theorizing, whose proponents often seek answers to their questions in the remotest past, then in such vacuums without comparative scale, entire civilizations may be as well. In other words, the further back historians reach for answers to questions of modern identity, the more teleological will be their conclusions. Therefore, we must fundamentally alter the questions we are asking of textual and archaeological materials. But while I am not directly advocating defining “civilization” as narrowly predicated on confessional affiliation or some amalgamation thereof, what I am suggesting is that the common definition of “Western civilization” in the past two (or four) centuries has been critically mistaken when it assumes that it begins with Odysseus or Gilgamesh, and not with

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101 See above chapter 6 n3.
102 Recently, perhaps one of the best (and most profitable) narrations of this story has been provided by Diamond, 1999, *Guns, Germs and Steel*.
103 Escalona, 2016, 1-11.
104 See Huntington, 1996, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. I cannot claim to be able to take apart Huntington’s argument point by point, and besides, this has already been done abundantly – for example, the now ubiquitous Fukuyama-Huntington debates. But broadly speaking, and without supporting Fukuyama’s ideas either, I would suggest that the whole problem with Huntington’s argument is that he does not include Catholic Latin America as “Western,” even though the Catholic oikoumenē which Christianized the space for centuries is the same historical force which rulers from Charlemagne to Franz Joseph II purported to represent. So it might be asked where does his “Western civilization” end and “Latin American civilization” begin? Indeed, the dubiousness of some (though not all) of Huntington’s ideas, namely that the United States of America must be defined as an Anglo-Protestant ethno-national state, has been latched onto by many who still believe in primordial ethnicity, and I will leave it to the reader’s imagination where that particular branch of inquiry will eventually lead.
Cardinal Humbert or Urban II. After all, it ought to be self-explanatory that the Islamic and Russian civilizations spring from the same Abrahamic fountainhead.

Personally, I prefer not to use a term such as “global middle ages,” which implies both a “global antiquity” and a “global modernity,” as the lines between each epoch and in each region would vary inordinately and invariably evoke gross anachronisms. Instead, I would prefer no such delineations, save for that which distinguishes pre-monotheism (read: “heathenism” or “paganism”) from monotheism in any region, ie., the top-down, potestarian imposition of sacred laws deriving from some sacred text, (regardless of the number of gods, eg., the Hindu Vedas or the Confucian teachings), since this is how contemporaries contrived the world in which they lived. In this way, I would propose that so-called “antiquity” ended wherever and whenever paganism was finally extinguished, and some common set of written laws, in whatever form and to whichever god(s), was adopted and/or imposed.

Ch. 7 2.4.2 Globalizing civilization

While I am certainly not out to “change the world” with my research, it is nevertheless meant to shed doubt on modern notions of “ethnicity,” “nationality” and “statehood” as well as concepts of the “global middle ages” and the misunderstood differences between “antiquity” and “the middle-ages.” The goal of the research was specifically formulated to apply both inside and outside of specialist discourse, particularly regarding modern (mis-)conceptions of pre-modern statehood, homogeneity and nationalism. In general, modern assumptions of pre-modern “statehood,” particularly in

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106 Here I believe it would be appropriate to quote the words of Escalona, 2016, 7:

“One remarkable effect of the development of modern states is that historians have long cherished the idea that pre-modern politics were dominated by a sort of zero-sum tension between the monarch (central power) and his nobility (selfish individuals with enough power to damage or even disintegrate the state if they felt their privileges were under threat). Among many other flaws, such an approach represents the state as a timeless organizational Deus ex machina that operates regardless of society. In doing so, it obscures the fact that states reflect the power relationships existing in society. The ‘king vs nobles’ model is particularly inappropriate for the early middle ages, with their complex blend of reminiscences from Roman statehood, emergence of numerous non-state polities and start of state formation processes. Early medieval polities – most of which boasted a legal and symbolic rhetoric that superseded by far their actual achievement in terms of scope, reach, and effective governance – were mostly elite-driven constructs. They embedded power relationships to maintain social order (the foundations of social inequality) and they became states – ‘systems of durable inequality’ […] inasmuch as they could develop an organizational apparatus relatively independent from and longer-lived than individuals [citation: Tilly, 2005, Identities, Boundaries and Social Ties, 71-90]. In the absence of more powerful drivers towards statehood, a minimum aristocratic consensus must be seen as
the cases of Byzantium and Russia, have been too long taken for granted. In a few words, sovereignty could never be absolute, despite claims to the contrary in myriad sources. Ultimately, I am arguing that there are two equally valid conceptions of what Byzantium represented: the Byzantium of the themata (tōn thematōn) and the Byzantium of the oikoumenē (tēs oikoumenēs). In other words, we can conceive of Byzantium in the traditional manner, as a representing a pre-modern “state,” with traditional notions of borders surrounding a self-contained unit, and we can also simultaneously contrive Byzantium as a universal, ecumenical empire, even if it was only an empire of the mind at times. But Byzantium’s universalist purpose should remind us to consider, not within the framework of a small geographical or cultural area, but on a greater scale, that subjective assumptions of all of the above notions of “ethnicity” and “statehood” have been fundamentally misunderstood for as long as what we arbitrarily deem as “Western civilization,” has conceived of itself as beginning with “ancient Greece and Rome.” I believe, furthermore, that as long as such an argument is made for a specialist audience, which will probably prove controversial at the least, this argument is also worth considering from the perspective of a non-specialist audience. So I would try to summarize the entire thesis for any audience as follows:

What is the line between the ancient world and the medieval world? Is it 476 CE? Is it 330? 632? 800? I believe there truly is no line and they are in fact much the same world, with the crucial exception of the pervading influence of one flavor of monotheism or another.

This thesis has endeavored to study tribal conversions to various monotheisms and their respective mythologizations (using examples from Pontic-Caspian Eurasia, ca. 800-1200), interpreted through both textual and archaeological evidence, which serve as a primary factor for tribal unification and the early developments of what we might call “statecraft” – and in many cases, much modern nationalism, however haphazard it may be. I

the sine qua non condition for early medieval kingdoms to operate, and the breach of such a consensus a major force for their departure.”

107 See also the discussion given by Haldon, 1999, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204, 258-259:

“Well VI and Constantine VII may reflect a particular context and moment when they attempt their definitions of the role of the army in relation to other elements of society. But their purpose is the same: to frame, delimit and control warfare and, by extension, any sort of armed violence, which should remain the prerogative of the state, which is to say the emperor chosen by god, in defence of the Christian Roman oikoumenē.”
have attempted to apply this idea to Christian Rome (Byzantium)’s diachronic missionary policy around the Black Sea to reveal how what we today call the “age of migrations,” (evoked in many forms, eg., the so-called “Germanic” invasions of the 3-7th-c. Roman empire, the Khazars, Bulgars, “proto-Hungarians,” Rus’, Pečenegs, Cumans, et al.), was in fact in perpetual continuity all the way up to the Mongolian invasions and perhaps even later. Different rulers may have adopted differing religions, but eventually, the varying religions were what defined different groups, not blood, soil, language or the ever-abstract “culture.” Viewed from Byzantium, the same Roman emperors as always, any peripheral ruler won to the Christian faith was a newly admitted part of the Roman empire – the oikoumenē itself, and at least until 1054 (or perhaps 1204), it was Byzantium which defined “the West,” even if we have forgotten these lessons today.

By making this argument, I hope to enhance the context within which we understand not only Western history, but global history, effectively by binding it to a broader context of global monotheization, which ought to connote the top-down, potestarian implementations of various sacred law codes. If notions of periodization and civilization are defined, not by arbitrary primordial definitions, but by confessional loyalty, which is, arguably, just as pertinent today as it was a thousand years ago, based as many nationalisms are on religious identity, the question may be worth considering: why ought we continue to suppose the so-called “middle ages” are over?
Appendices
Outside of archaeological sources, which are admittedly quite few and far between, there does exist a considerable number of textual sources referring to the Khazars and Khazaria. To clarify, the label “Khazars” would most easily fit the political elite, i.e., those collecting the tribute as opposed to paying it. “Khazaria” would therefore arguably imply the land and peoples over which this elite held authority. To begin this brief study of the textual sources for the Khazars and Khazaria, we will begin with its political formation and the pagan elite in the earliest references to it in textual sources.

A1.1 The earliest mentions of the name “Khazar” in the primary sources:

The earliest references to Khazars and Khazaria come primarily from Chinese, Arabic, Greek and Persian sources. This is not to say that they were excluded from the earliest Russian sources as well, only that the former four groups occur far earlier. There were in fact three Khazar sources themselves, written in Hebrew and self-referencing, however they are highly debated on a number of levels, which is discussed in chapter 2, and they occur only in the mid-10th c., a time by which the Khazars are alleged to have converted to Judaism. So the following §A1.1.1 will simply discuss the earlier sources referencing the Khazars from the 6-8th centuries, some of them even pre-Islamic.

While there has been considerable debate on the ethnonymic origins of the term “Khazar,” it is not my objective to take part in it. Instead, I will merely summarize what others have postulated in order to continue on to other topics of more relevancy to my argument. Additionally, I will include here that the appearance of the term “Khazar” in primary sources is reflective of not just of the ethnonym’s origin but is indicative of the origin of “Khazaria” as a geographical space. That being said, the following paragraphs will attempt to interlock various scholars’ suppositions on both the ethnonymic and chronological origins of the “Khazars.”

A1.1.1 Chinese, Greek, Persian and Arabic sources

In the first great monograph on the history of the Khazars, D. M. Dunlop’s The History of the Jewish Khazars, Dunlop claimed, albeit tentatively, that the ethnonym “Khazar” was derivative of Chinese references to Uïgur nomads, who were designated as “Kosa” and
supposedly arrived in the Pontic-Caspian steppe in the 650s. While the date of the “Khazar” “arrival” is perhaps less disputed, others have nevertheless made various arguments against Dunlop for many other derivations.

Some Hungarian scholars have argued that the name is instead derivative from the Old Turkic root “qaz-”, meaning “to wander,” which presumably seemed reasonable enough for steppe nomads. This attribution, having been accepted by Dunlop, drew the largest scholarly consensus until the 1982 publication of the Terkhin Inscription dating to the mid-8th century Uigur khağanate, found in 1957 in northern Mongolia, composed in old Uigur runes on which the name Qasar appeared. Following this, scholars used the new source to postulate other theories, such as tying the name to the Old Turkic “qas-”, meaning “to oppress, or subjugate.” It was also tied to the extraction of the title caesar into Middle Persian: “kesar” and from there to be garbled into “qasar.” This was then connected back to Dunlop’s original supposition. Nevertheless, Golden, as one of the most authoritative

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1 Dunlop, 1954, The History of the Jewish Khazars, 37-38. He writes, “The argument that the Khazars may be the Ko-sa Uigurs is offered tentatively, in the absence of demonstrative proof. It is supported by a variety of considerations, which cumulatively, perhaps, have a certain weight and may now be considered.”

2 The civil war of succession which began on the death of the khağan Taspar in 581 between the Nušibi and the Dulu confederations within the Western Gökturk khağanate is the event which most historians agree was the initiating factor for the foundation of the Khazar khağanate. The two scholars which lay down these events most basically, and incidentally from which all subsequent scholars derive their arguments are Artamonov, 1962, 114-132; and Dunlop, 1954, 3-33. See also Semënov, 2008, “Образование Хазарского каганата,” 118-127. Zuckerman, Zhivkov and Novosel’cev are among the few who do not share this opinion. See Novosel’cev, 1990, Хазарское государство и его роль в истории Восточной Европы и Кавказа, 83-91; Zhivkov, 2015, Khazaria in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries, 51-53; and Zuckerman, 2001, “Хазары и Византия: первые контакты,” 325-331. Novosel’cev argues instead that the Khazars ultimately derived from a melange of tribes with the Sabirs (“proto-Hungarians”) making the most important contribution. Finally, Zhivkov explains that the retrospectively assigned conflict between the so-called Khazars and Bulgars and the dissolution of Old Great Bulgaria in the mid-6th century is ascribed as a variation of the Nušibi-Dulu conflict. Nevertheless, perhaps dubiously, Kwanten, 1979, Imperial Nomads, 25, regards such a buffer kingdom between nomadic areas and sedentary areas as being largely unimportant to the rest of Central Asia.

3 Gombocz, 1912, “Die bulgarisch-Türkischen Lehnwörter in der ungarischen Sprache,” 199; and Németh, A honfoglaló magyarság kialakulása, 94.

4 Dunlop, 1954, 3.


6 See for example Zhivkov, 2015, 40-41.


8 See for example Róna-Tas, 1982, “A kazár népnévöl,” 349-379. This is also the attribution to which Kovalev, 2005, “Creating Khazar Identity through Coins,” 243 n8, subscribes, although his reference to Golden’s “Introduction” is highly unclear.

scholars on this topic, has acknowledged, ultimately the question of the etymology of the ethnonym Khazar, remains open, and will presumably linger as such.\(^{10}\)

Regardless of the origins of the name, as most historians generally agree, the ruling clan of the Khazar khağanate was descendant from the earlier western half of the Gökturk khağanate.\(^{11}\) This was known as the Āšīnà dynasty, which in turn lent legitimacy to the formation of the Khazar khağanate\(^{12}\) and preserved the allegiances of the nomadic peoples who paid tribute to the khağanate. The first mentions of the Āšīnà dynasty, which have been preserved in Chinese sources, date from the 6th century.\(^{13}\) The last of the Chinese sources which mention events relating to Khazaria pertain to Chinese interference in the civil war of the western half of the Gökturk khağanate in the 580s.\(^{14}\)

The first mention of the ethnonym “Khazars” in Greek is held by Golden to Theophanēs’ entry for the year 6117 (624/625) in which he explicitly ties the Khazars to the Turks (i.e. the Gökturks) shortly before the famous siege of Constantinople by the Avaro-Slav-Persian collusion.\(^{15}\) However this first mentioning of the Khazars in Greek is contested

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\(^{10}\) Golden, 2007a, “Khazar Studies: Achievements and Perspectives,” 17. It should also be noted that Golden, 1992, An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples, 134, has also postulated that “Khazar” may derive from “Caesar,” which Kovalev, 2005, 222 has echoed as well.

\(^{11}\) However, the precise manner in which the remainder of the Western Gökturk khağanate was subsumed into the subsequent Khazar khağanate in regards to the civil war which began in 581 is far from resolved: (see for example n2 above). See also Obolensky, 1971, The Byzantine Commonwealth, 172. For example, Magomedov, 1983, Образование хазарского каганата, 176-177, like Novosel’cev, holds that the beginnings of those called “Khazars” emerged from the earliest intermingling of Sabirs and Oğuzes.


\(^{13}\) Zongzheng, 1992, A History of Turks, 39-85.


\(^{15}\) Mango, Scott and Greatrex (trans.), 1997, The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor: Byzantine and Near Eastern History, AD 284-813, 446-447. They translate Theophanēs’ wording as “During [Heraclius’] stay [in Lazika] he invited the eastern Turks, who are called Chazars, to become his allies.” This translation could be slightly confusing given the Gökturk khağanate had by that time split off into a western half (Khazaria) and an eastern half. Turtledove (trans.), 1982, The Chronicle Theophanes, 22, in comparison, translates the sentence as “In [Lazika] he parleyed with the Turks of the east (whom they call Khazars), to become his allies.” This translation could be slightly confusing given the Gökturk khağanate had by that time split off into a western half (Khazaria) and an eastern half. Turtledove (trans.), 1982, The Chronicle Theophanes, 22, in comparison, translates the sentence as “In [Lazika] he parleyed with the Turks of the east (whom they call Khazars), and called on them for an alliance.” To clear up any possibility of doubt that Theophanēs is not in fact referring to the Turks of the eastern half of the Gökturk khağanate, the precise phrase Theophanēs uses is “τούς Τούρκους ἐκ τῆς λόγους,” meaning “the Turks from the dawn” which, from a Byzantine perspective would clearly portray the sun rising over the closer of the two halves of the khağanate to Constantinople, the western Gökturks, or the Khazars khağanate.

For the original text, see de Boor (ed.), 1963, Theophanes Chronographia, 315. However even this episode is debated; see Howard-Johnston, 2007, 167, who claims that Theophanēs’ attribution of Turks to Khazars in the entry of 626-627 CE was a mistake but produces no evidence to support this claim.
by Howard-Johnston, who in turn claims that Theophanēs deliberately misrepresents the entire episode in order to bestow extra glory on Ėrakleios by portraying him as victorious over the Persians without Khazar assistance. As he argues, the Khazars defected when winter came while Ėrakleios’ own men did not as they were comfortably quartered in local houses. The problem with this scenario is that while Zuckerman argues that Theophanēs’ narrative is misrepresentative, which I do not find problematic by itself, Howard-Johnston, in contrast, uses this argument to make the case that we must discard this passage in Theophanēs all together, which is a formal fallacy, or more specifically, a fallacy of the inverse. In other words, just because we may accept Zuckerman’s argument that Theophanēs’ narrative is misrepresentative, this does mean that Theophanēs’ juxtaposition of Turks and Khazars is invalid by itself, only what those Turk-Khazars might have done. That being said, by 624/625 CE, it may not yet have been accurate to separate the western Gök turk khağanate from the Khazar khağanate precisely due to the fact that Theophanēs, writing in the early ninth century, is separated by roughly two centuries from these events in the time of Ėrakleios. Nevertheless, though Theophanēs draws from a common source with the patriarch Nikēforos, perhaps that of the emperor Leōn III himself, this does not refute the underlying point, that the year 624/625 marks the first mention we have of the term “Khazar” in a primary Greek source.

Continuing on, Theophanēs references Khazaria in subsequent episodes such as Justinian II’s adventure there in 704 and marriage to the khağan’s sister and then again in 732-733 with the marriage of the young heir apparent, Constantine V, to the Khazar princess

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16 Howard-Johnston, 2007, “Byzantine Sources for Khazar History,” 167 n17. For note 17 incidentally, he refrains from giving a precise page number for Zuckerman’s 2007 article, “The Khazars and Byzantium—the First Encounter,” 411-412, however, who claims that:

“Theophanes’ Chronography, complied ca. 813, described the allies as ‘Turks, who are called Khazars’, and then go by the latter name in some later sources, Greek and Oriental alike. This late transformation of Turks into Khazars is a historiographic phenomenon which, obviously, bears no evidence on the Khazars’ actual presence in the Northern Caucasus in the 620s.”


18 Notably, however, Kwanten, 1979, 39-40, argues instead (without directly citing any primary sources) that the Türks (he never mentions “Khazars” once in his monograph) were “indirectly responsible for the nearly twenty-year-long war between the Greeks and Persians.” Quite dubiously as well, he refers to Byzantium as “the Greeks.”

19 See the overview given by Turtledove (trans.), 1982, The Chronicle Theophanes, vii-xvi.

20 Afinogenov, 2006, “The History of Justinian and Leo,” 181. Afinogenov uses the word “possibly” instead of perhaps, and in that regard, I would accept his postulation reservedly.
Tzitzak, baptized Eirēnē. These episodes are also covered by Nikēforos, writing in the 780s, who later became patriarch of Constantinople. The Khazars, named as such, are mentioned numerous times thereafter by Theophilos of Edessa who discusses their wars against the caliphate. They are also discussed extensively in the anonymous Vita Constantinii, which details Constantine-Cyril’s mission to Khazaria and their fraught endeavor to convert the Khazars to Christianity. Another source which deserves considerable mention is a collection of epistles of patriarch Nicholas I Mystikos of Constantinople who was in contact with the Cyril-Methodian mission there and who formulated Byzantine policy in the Notitia Episcopatum in regards to consciously pursuing converts in Khazaria to cement a permanent alliance between Byzantium and Khazaria. The Khazars are also mentioned occasionally albeit not often by Leōn Diakonos, Iōannēs Skylitzēs, and then extensively in Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos’ De Administrando Imperio (hereafter referred to as the DAI) in later centuries. As for the extensive discussions in the DAI on the Khazars (see ch. 5 §2.1.1), although for now, as Curta has pointed out, the author, Constantine VII, “often used ‘Scythians’ in reference to steppe nomads, such as Khazars or Magyars.”

For the earliest mentions of Turks and Khazars in the seventh century, there are as yet mentions in the writings of pre-Islamic Sasanian Persia on the “land of the Turks,” however not specifically on Khazaria. Shapira, who has written a far more comprehensive article on Persian sources regarding the Khazars, has translated some anonymous writings, one of which mentions a place referred to as Turkestān, which he posits is present-day Tatarstan or Bašqortostan:

“Turkestān is a vast place and all of it is cold, it is forests, they have few fruit-trees and edible fruits and [other edible] things. There are some among them who worship the Moon and there are some who are sorcerers, and there are some who

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21 See Mango (ed. and trans.), 1990, Short History. For a proposed reconstruction of the common source used by Nikēforos and Theophanēs, see Afinogenov, 2006, 181-200.
22 See Grivec and Tomišić (eds.), 1960, Constantinus et Methodius Thessalonicenses, Fontes, 109. It should also be noted here that the Vita Constantinii gives undeniable evidence in its own right that the Khazar king had rejected Christianity and had instead adopted Judaism by 861. As Olsson (2013, “Coup d’état, Coronation and Conversion: Some Reflections on the Adoption of Judaism by the Khazar Khaganate,” 520) has pointed out: “When Constantine offered a toast in the name of the Trinity, the Khagan replied ‘We say the same but maintain the following difference: you glorify the Trinity, while we, having obtained Scriptures, One God’. ” See also Kantor (trans.), 1983, Medieval Slavonic Lives of Saints and Princes, 47.
24 See above ch. 5 §1.1.1.
25 Curta, 2006a, Southeastern Europe in the Middle Ages: 500-1250, 98.
are of the Good Religion….They till the land. When they die, they throw (their dead) in forests, and there are some who go to Paradise, and there are some who go to Hell and the Middle Abode (Purgatory).”

Shapira postulates, and in this I would accept his position, that the “Good Religion” here is that of Zoroastrianism, which the writer, doubtless a member of the majority of Persians, shared before the Islamic conquest. This would then presumably date this passage accordingly (late-6-7th c.), despite the fact that Shapira himself declines to do so.

Another anonymous Persian source does in fact reference Khazaria specifically, and even regarding the Judaism therein, which survives from a much later period. Shapira claims that it dates from the tenth century and is nevertheless written by a Zoroastrian, which I find difficult to prove, though certainly possible:

“...just like the faith of Jesus from [Rome], and the faith of Moses from the Khazars, and the faith of Mani from the Uigurs took away the strength and vigor they had previously possessed, threw them into vileness and decadence amongst their rivals, and the faith of Mani even frustrated the [Roman] philosophy.”

As such, this passage provides evidence from a non-Muslim source, a rare phenomenon to be sure, that Khazaria had in fact converted to Judaism, which would then relatively accurately date the passage to sometime in the late-9th century. Shapira asserts that this Zoroastrian testimony to not only Khazaria but their Judaism is channelled here through a Muslim medium. He then goes on to discuss the context of Zoroastrian polemics against Judaism and Manichaeism in the pre-Mongol period. To his discussion, I would add that it is unlikely that later Muslim copyists and redactors, responsible for this fragment’s preservation though they are, are probably accountable as well, if partially, for its contents, which I would argue, this fragment reflects, especially when taken into consideration with other Muslim sources.

It may seem reasonable to assume that due to the Khazar participation in the ruin of Sasanian Persia in 624/625 CE, which we encountered previously with Theophanēs, there would be a reference or two to Khazaria in pre-Islamic Persian, however Shapira, as his final

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27 Translation by Shapira, 2007a, 293.
29 Ibid, 295.
text which does so, informs us that the name “Khazaria” appears in an anachronistic list of nations which, not surprisingly, sought the destruction of Persia, although not in reference to the events of the year 624/625 CE, but to those of the year 588/589 CE instead. The significance of the list however is in its distinction between Turks and Khazars in section 4.58, although Shapira argues that the cause of the anachronism is due to the term’s reinsertion in the time of the former in regards to the events of the latter. Nevertheless, it is clear that whenever this source dates to and whatever it references precisely, the Khazars are called as such in a Zoroastrian context and in Middle Persian, which would then date it to no earlier than the late Sasanian period and consequently near the time of the fall of the Sasanian dynasty in the early-7th century.

With the Islamization of Persia and the Persianization of Islam in the long seventh and eighth centuries, the transition from pre-Islamic Persian sources to post-Islamic sources, whether in Persian or Arabic is difficult to separate precisely as many works translated and copied back and forth between the two cultures and languages during this time. That being said, I will take this moment to mention other Persians, writing in post-Sasanian Islamic Persia, such as ibn Khurradādhbih, ibn al-Faqīh, ibn Rusta and al-Istakhrī in that order, writing in Arabic, who mention the Khazars, albeit later in the 9-10th centuries, before continuing on to other works in Arabic.

I will begin by discussing the ninth-century Persian geographer and bureaucrat ibn Khurradādhbih, whose grandfather had converted to Islam and was posted to north western Persia, a crucial frontier from which to view Khazaria. His work, the Book of Roads and Kingdoms, which is generally agreed to date to the 870s, was referenced by generations of subsequent Islamic scholars, geographers and historians, even though that which has survived of his work is only a fragment.

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30 Ibid, 296. He cites a Zoroastrian apocalyptic work called the Zand ī Wahman Yasn. See n17 on the same page.
31 Ibid, 297.
32 See de Meynard (trans.), Le Livre des Routes et des Provinces, 1865. Crucially, passages relating to Khazaria within this work have been cited and translated into English. See Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, Ibn Fadlān and the Land of Darkness: Arab Travellers in the Far North, 99-104 and 111-112.
He remarks on the Khazars only fleetingly, referring to a *tarkhān* of the Khazars in a passage detailing the story of an Arab traveller named *Sallām the Interpreter* who travelled on behalf of the caliph to the foot of a mountain chain to report on the people of *Gog and Magog*, allegedly living on the other side, who we will be discussing in the next subsection. Crucially, as ibn Khurradādhbih relates, the Khazars are not tied to the people of Gog and Magog as *Sallām the Interpreter* testifies that the *tarkhān* of the Khazars gave his entourage five guides to continue his journey not long after they had stopped in Tiflis (T‘blisi) to rendezvous with the governor of Armenia. He then relates that after travelling nonstop for nearly two months, he reaches Īkah, which the translators have put the modern city of Hami in parentheses, which is three days’ march from the supposed wall behind which lies the land of *Gog and Magog*.

Continuing on, ibn Khurradādhbih again refers to the Khazars in a passage on the routes of the Rus’ and the Radañite Jewish merchants. In discussing the Rus’, he indicates:

“[The Rus’] follow another route, descending the River Tanaïs (Don), the river of the Saqāliba, and passing by Khamlīj, the capital of the Khazars, where the ruler of the country levies a ten per cent duty. There they embark on the Caspian Sea, heading for a point they know.”

In a subsequent passage, he relates the routes of the Radañites in relation to Khazaria:

“Sometimes they take a route north of Rome, heading for Khamlīj via the lands of the Saqāliba. Khamlīj is the Khazar capital.”

These passages are important as they will give clarity to discussions later on both secondary sources of course as well as the authors of primary sources who subsequently interpolated his information later as they saw fit.

Shortly after this text, two other Persian writers, ibn al-Faqīh, writing his well-known *Kitāb al-Buldān* which the translators Lunde and Stone have dated precisely to 903 also

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33 Ibid, 99-104. This is presumed to be the king, or Khazarian *beg*.
34 This is dated by Lunde and Stone to 844 CE.
35 Ibid, 100. This is attributed as the modern city of Hami, or Kumul in the eastern Xianjiang prefecture of western China, which is about a seven-and-a-half day journey north from the Jade Gate, or modern Yumen Guan, the westernmost abutment of the Han dynasty’s (206 BCE-220 CE) system of northern frontier fortifications which were later subsumed into what became known as the Great Wall of China, the wall to separate China from nomadic “barbarians” to the north.
36 Ibid, 112. According to Lunde and Stone, “Khamlīj is better read Khamlīkh, the ‘business’ district of Itīl’.” See p. 233 n15. According to the translators, this text is dated to ca. 830. See p. 111.
37 Ibid, 112.
mentions the Khazars in a short passage regarding the commercial journeys of the Radanite Jewish merchants although nothing else is known of ibn al-Faqīh other than that he was originally from Hamadan in Persia. More importantly, along with the next source, ibn Rusta, originally from Isfahan, who mentions the Khazars in the early-10th century as well, which the translators Lunde and Stone have dated to 903-913, though they assert his information comes through a source composed ca. 860, these two authors are the very first Muslim authors who directly make explicit mention of Judaism within Khazaria in an official capacity. Al-Faqīh derived much of his information from ibn Khurradādhbih while ibn Rusta relied more heavily of Khwārazmian sources instead. First, according to ibn al-Faqīh (ca. 903), “All of the Khazars are Jews. But they have been Judaized recently.” Second, according to ibn Rusta (903-913), “Their supreme chief professes the religion of the Jews and so do Isha and the leaders and great ones who side with him. And the rest of them profess a religion similar to the religion of the Turks.” Nevertheless, Rusta’s passage in reference to the Khazars is quite brief, mostly dealing with his understanding of their political and military structure, geography and religion. In this, al-Faqīh’s and Rusta’s reports are critical however as their passages are the earliest works which confirm the alleged Judaism of the Khazar elite.

The other Persian source to mention the Khazars is the well-known al-Istakhri, who compiled a number of earlier sources in order to give a considerable depiction of Khazaria and her neighbors in the mid-10th century, around the time of the compilation of Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos’ DAI. Al-Istakhri was also personally familiar with the northern frontier of the caliphate, traveling throughout Transoxiana and Khwārazmia, which gives his work added reliability. While I will not include here the entirety of his text on the Khazars, I will briefly summarize his text, which is classed into three parts, apparently having been joined from three previous separate sources.

39 Ibid, 113-114.
40 Ibid, 116. This source could well have been the entirety of ibn Khurradādhbih’s work, much of which has not survived, although this is conjecture and not the place for such a debate.
42 de Goeje (ed.), 1885, Kitāb al-Buldân, 298.
44 Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 116-117.
His three sections cover essentially the basic, domestic and foreign aspects of the Khazar khağanate in that order. His first section on the Khazars deals mainly with the physical aspects of Khazaria: where it is, what rivers run through it, how big the capital (Itīl’) is both physically and by populace, what their buildings are made from, the strength of the army, the dispensation of their laws, the levying of tolls and duties on foreign merchants and the religion of the king, who he calls their bak or bāk (beg), presumably the same title referred to by ibn Khurradādhbih as tarkhān, as opposed to the khağan. His second passage depicts mainly the internal details of the daily functioning of Khazaria, such as the disparate peoples incorporated within the khağanate and subjected to the khağan, the religious lives of these various peoples, economic minutiae and finally the civil relationship between the khağan and the beg-king and the customs of succession from one ruler to the next. Finally, his third segment concerns for the most part the relations between Khazaria and its neighbors such as the Burtās, the Başkīrs, the Volga Bulgars, the Rus’ and the Pečenegs.45

The last Persian source is the anonymous geography discovered in 1882 by a scholar named Tumanskij,46 the Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam, or The Regions of the World, issued in 982 and subsequently rendered into English by the Russian historian V. Minorsky in 1937 and subsequently reprinted in 1970. In its discussions on the Khazars, the Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam repeats quite a considerable amount which previous authors have already extrapolated such as particularly ibn Khurradādhbih, ibn Rusta and al-Istakhrī.47 The author also refers to the Caspian Sea as the “Khazar Sea,”48 a detail which should not be overlooked considering Islamic authors continue to do so well into the twelfth century long after Khazaria is a substantial regional power.49 Interestingly, this is the only source to mention the so-called “Khazarian Pečenegs,” as if they were a branch of Pečenegs which paid tribute to the Khazars or if the author thought the two groups indistinguishable.50 This is also the only source which mentions the name of the dynasty in Persian, Ansā,51 which presumably is a garbling of the Āšīnā dynasty discussed above. Overall, while it is undoubtedly one of the

46 Golden, 2007a, 22.
48 Ibid, 53.
49 Such as the Selçuq physician Marwazī who wrote in the 1120s. See Minorsky (trans.), 1942, Sharaf al-Zamān Ṭāhir Marvazī on China, the Turks and India, 36. See also ch. 5 §1.1.
51 Ibid, 162.
most comprehensive treatments on the Khazars, it is not all-encompassing and must be used in conjunction with other sources it either repeats or supplements.

Finally, the lion’s share of our textual information on the Khazars comes from Arabs and written in Arabic. Aside from ibn Fadlān, who I will discuss below, the earliest mention by an Arab in Arabic of the Khazars probably dates from the middle of the tenth century, most notably by al-Mas‘ūdī, one of the greatest of all Islamic historians, who composed a comprehensive history of the world, naturally from an Islamic perspective. Unsurprisingly, his mentions of Khazaria are extensive compared to other authors and are regarded by most modern historians as one of the most reliable sources.\(^{52}\)

In addition to al-Mas‘ūdī, a number of other Muslim scholars mention the Khazars as well, though it is unclear through how many other previous testimonies these sources derive their respective materials. That being said, it is nevertheless undeniable that notions of Khazaria exercised a considerable pressure on pre-Mongol Muslim literature, even after the turn of the eleventh century.

The next Muslim source, ibn Hauqal, born in Nisibis around the time of Fadlān’s journey to Volga Bulgaria (early-920s), who was in fact a contemporary and a personal acquaintance of al-Istakhrī, wrote his Šūrat al-‘Arḍ or, The Face of the Earth, which he composed in several redactions between 967 and 988.\(^{53}\) He builds on al-Istakhrī’s work in turn and describes the economic affairs and trading in and between the lands of the Saqāliba, the Khwārazmians (south of the Aral Sea) and states that by his time, Khazaria had ceased to exist and her lands were used as a source of slaves along with the Saqāliba as well.\(^{54}\) However, while his testament is broadly trustworthy, he does make outrageous claims, such as: “All the Saqāliba eunuchs in the world come from al-Andalus (Spain)... Raiders from Khurāsān (far-north-eastern Persia) reach them through the territory of the Bulghārs

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\(^{53}\) Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 173.

\(^{54}\) It might be helpful to note here that the dating of the conquest of Khazaria by Svjatoslav the Rus’ in 965 can be cross-referenced with another author writing in Arabic (albeit a Sephardic Jewish merchant), Yaqūb-a Sephardi, who travelled throughout northern Europe during the same year and who refers to Khazaria in the present while Hauqal, writing about twenty years later, describes them in the past. See Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 167.
(presumably the Volga Bulgars of the middle Volga),” a passage whose historical value does not need to be extrapolated on.

After ibn Hauql in the last quarter of the tenth century, we encounter al-Muqaddasi, about whom relatively little is known.\(^{55}\) He wrote a work entitled *Aḥsan al-Taqāsim fī Maʿrīfat al-Aqālīm* or, *The Best Divisions in the Knowledge of the Regions*, which compiles the works of previously mentioned geographers such as ibn Khurraḍādhbih, al-Istakhrī, and ibn Hauql. To him belongs the famous quote, “Beyond the Caspian Sea (lake) is a large region called Khazar, a grim, forbidding place, and full of herd animals, honey and Jews.”\(^{56}\) By his time, as we heard from ibn Hauql, he claims that the Khazar king was once Jewish, but is no longer.\(^{57}\) While some of his assertions are dubious, such as his claim that Maʾmūn ibn Muhammad, shah of Khwārazmia, invaded Khazaria and forced the king to accept Islam, others are far more useful, such as his allegation that Rus’ later conquered Khazaria, which is backed up in independent sources, such as the well-known passage in the *PVL* dating this event to 965.\(^{58}\) This would tend to suggest that, like the *PVL*, while we may not be able take everything he reports at face value, his source is not altogether useless.

Finally, the single most important source on the Khazars in Arabic dates definitively to the early 920s when ibn-Fadlān returned from his famous journey on behalf of the ‘Abbasid caliph Muqtadir to recently Islamized Volga Bulgaria (incidentally, a people who he calls Saqāliba) on the middle Volga, to instruct them on proper Islamic worship. As his notes from his journey are of inestimable value for Khazar historians and archaeologists, they were also employed by many subsequent Arabic-speaking geographers and historians later in the tenth and eleventh centuries such as those introduced above as well. While it is not my purpose to divulge a personal biography of ibn Fadlān’s life here, it would be nevertheless inappropriate to withhold even a sliver of background on this topic.

\(^{55}\) This is, of course, debatable as well. According to Le Strange, 1890, *Palestine under the Moslems: A Description of Syria and the Holy Land from A.D. 650 to 1500*, 5-6, Muqaddasi was born in Jerusalem in 946 CE and was quite well educated and wrote this his major work in 885, a rather precise date for someone so obscure. As his work is well over a century old, Le Strange cites only the well-known M. J. de Goeje. While Le Strange’s details on Muqaddasi may be doubtful, it makes little difference in relation to Khazaria. For a greater discussion of Muqaddasi’s life, works and background, see Collins, 1974, *Al-Muqaddasi; the Man and His Work*, and his translation, 1994, *The Best Divisions for Knowledge of the Regions. Aḥasan al-Taqāsim Fi Maʿrīfat al-Aqālīm*.

\(^{56}\) Collins (trans.), 1994, 289.

\(^{57}\) Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 171-172.

\(^{58}\) See Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, *PVL*, 84.
That being said, ibn-Fadlān began his journey to Volga Bulgaria in 921 (the Saqāliba), at the head of a considerable horse and camel caravan laden with gifts, assets, guardsmen, interpreters and of course the personal letter from the caliph himself. Setting out from Baghdad, his journey entailed passing through Persia to Bukhārā and thence northward through what was known as Khwārazmia, southwest of the Aral Sea, within and north of which he encountered nomadic groups such as Ghuz (Oğuz), whom he describes simply as nomads. Continuing northward, he encountered Baškirs (who he refers to as Bašgirds) and Pečenegs as well (Bajanāk) until finally arriving at the Volga Bulgarian capital, Bolgār in what is now the Spasskij district at the vast confluence of the Kama and the Volga in May 922. The king, named Almuš, entitled Yiltawār (el’teber59) wanted cash from Fadlān so he could build a fortress to protect himself against the Khazars, who had by that time reduced him and his kingdom to tributary status. The significance of the passage is that he specifically calls his masters Jews:

“You all came together and my master [the caliph] paid all your expenses, and the only reason was so that you could bring me this money to have a fortress built to protect me from the Jews, who have tried to reduce me to slavery.”60

Later, Fadlān extrapolates on the arrangement between the ‘Saqāliba’ Volga Bulgars and the Khazars: even though Almuš was quite powerful and wealthy in his own right, not only did he in turn have to pay tribute to Khazaria,61 he also had to send his daughter to the Khazar khağan, who Fadlān explains quite simply, was Jewish while he and his daughters were, of course, Muslim. Fadlān then goes on to detail Rus’ funerary practices, a boat-burning burial and of course a considerable portion on Khazaria.

As a source, it goes without saying that Fadlān’s notes from his journey are beyond value. However, that hasn’t stopped some historians from dismissing his work in regard to Khazaria as he never actually set foot in Khazaria itself, although as Volga Bulgaria was a tributary to Khazaria like other groups and subordinates to the Khazar khağan, both closer

59 For a considerable extrapolation on the title el’teber in Khazaria, see Semënōv, 2009, “Происхождение и значение титула ‘хазар-эльтебер’,” 160-163.
60 Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 29.
61 See Galkina, 2006, “Территория Хазарского каганата IX – первой половины Х в. В письменных источниках,” 140. Galkina holds that Volga Bulgaria was subordinated to the Khazar khağan for only a short period between the 9-10th centuries and was doubtlessly a great source of Khazaria’s wealth.
and further away, he can thus be considered to have been in Khazaria, even if not having been to Itil’ specifically.

Finally, Fadlān, like nearly every other Islamic source, gives his own take on the lands of Gog and Magog, which as we will see, feature largely within a milieu of monotheistic mythology that persisted for centuries and spread inside and outside outside of both lands of Islam and Christendom. It was in this process that Khazaria took on a quasi-legendary status of a Jewish kingdom, an unbelievable occurrence, and therefore symbolized by Gog and Magog in the minds of others, Muslim, Christian or any other medieval chronicler, even Jewish in the case of Judah HaLevi, seeking to explain why and how a ruler could adopt, in his words, the “despised” faith.62

A1.2 Gog and Magog: Khazar mythologies in their own minds and others’

The story of Gog and Magog, from Ezekiel to all manner of modern ethno-national narratives and the biblical prophetic tradition, is so long, complicated and toxically disjointed that to embark on telling it here with any attempt at either comprehensiveness, relevancy or accuracy would be absurd, paradoxical and tragically tangential to my purpose. Therefore, I will deal here only with the legends and lore of Gog and Magog as they pertain specifically to Khazaria, given by Western, Islamic and Byzantine sources.

However, although some readers may already be familiar with legends of Gog and Magog, many will not be, so to make a long story short, as is well known to biblical scholars, the name Magog appears first appears in the table of nations, Genesis 10:2, where he is listed as a son of Japheth, son of Noah, brother of Gomer, Mechech and Tubal and uncle of Togarmah, among others. The name Gog is not listed again until First Chronicles 1:5 which comprises a further repetition of the table of nations. The real extrapolation comes in Ezekiel 38 and 39 which contains an extraordinary discourse on a certain Gog, in the land of Magog, presumably descendant from the aforementioned grandson of Noah, who comes with a numerous army, including the peoples of Gomer and Togarmah against Israel from somewhere in the vague far north. Importantly in Ezekiel, Gog is merely a single inhabitant (or perhaps a tribe) of the land of Magog and his name is derivative from the original Magog

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62 On why a ruler would adopt the “despised faith” termed as such, see the discussion below §A1.2.4, entitled “Sephardic-Ladino sources.”
listed in Genesis 10:2. The translation of Gog in the land of Magog in Ezekiel 38.2 from Hebrew into Greek evidently “paved the way” for Magog to become a separate person in his own right, thereby creating “Gog and Magog” from “Gog from Magog.” That being said, this notation of Gog and Magog is listed lastly in Revelation 20:8 wherein they are again mentioned in an eschatological tract about the releasing of Gog and Magog from the four corners of the earth by Satan after a thousand-year-reign of Christ (i.e., the end of time).

Seizing on this eschatology, centuries of medieval chroniclers, Christian, Jewish and Muslim, and then generations of scholars have debated on who exactly Gog and Magog represent and why. In terms of eschatology, these two personages feature in all three eschatologies, wherein Gog and Magog always somehow destroy the earth in the end of time and the adherents of the true faith are saved by god for their devotion. In terms of Khazaria, a number of texts have alleged Khazaria to be the true land of Gog and Magog based on a variety of factors, some of which make for convincing arguments, but nevertheless have a bearing on perceptions and attributions to Khazaria in contemporary written sources.

A1.2.1 Muslim attributions of Gog and Magog to the Khazars

Nevertheless, as we encountered in the writings of ibn Khurradādhbih, the prevailing myth was that the nations of Gog and Magog had been enclosed by Alexander the Great behind a legendary wall of incredible dimensions between mighty mountains lest they should escape and overrun the known world. Even though he explicitly mentions the Khazars and their disconnection from Gog and Magog, even the Khazar king’s assisting of Sallām the Interpreter in his journey to the Wall, later chroniclers took this idea and ran with it.


64 Van der Toorn et al., 1999, 536.

65 While Christian eschatology need not be referenced as it concerns Gog and Magog (Revelations 20:8), Islamic eschatology, which may or may not be as familiar to the reader, also references Gog and Magog (Ya’juj and Ma’juj) in the Qur’an 21:96; wherein these two evil tribes will break out of their imprisonment by Dul-Qarnayn (meaning the double-horned; usually attributed, though not always, to Alexander the Great) at the end of time and ravage the earth before being wiped out by divine disease from Allah. Finally, Judaic eschatology also shares in the lore of Gog and Magog (Ezekiel 38-39), as Gog and Magog are also mentioned by the great Josephus himself who discusses Gog and Magog at length and equates them with the Scythians, an auspicious and considerably ironic attribution given their later attribution to Khazaria on the Volga.

For a greater study of all primary sources which concern Gog and Magog and the Alexander Romances, see van Donzel and Schmidt, 2010, Gog and Magog in Early Syriac and Islamic Sources: Sallam’s Quest for Alexander’s Wall, who conduct a far more extensive study of this topic than I could possibly hope to.
The theme of attributing all sorts of incredible deeds to Dul-Qarnayn (Alexander Romances) was prevalent in all sorts of Islamic sources from the Qur’an onwards as well as a few Byzantine sources also⁶⁶ such as the well-known Letter of Alexander to Olympias by pseudo-Kallisthenēs⁶⁷ among others. Ibn Khurradādhbih’s ascription may perhaps be one of the most prominent but it also is the first mention of Alexander’s enclosure of Gog and Magog behind a barrier after the Qur’an.⁶⁸ Not long after ibn Khurradādhbih, ibn Qutayba, writing in 880,⁶⁹ claimed that the Khazars were descendant from the biblical Japheth and thus tied Khazaria to the notion of Gog and Magog.⁷⁰ Nearly half a century afterwards, Qudāma ibn Ja’far, writing in the late 920s, while neglecting to mention Gog and Magog per se, attributes Alexander to having built the wall which encloses the nomadic peoples while explicitly mentioning this event in the Qur’an.⁷¹ This is the beginning of the Khazarian connection to Gog and Magog in Islamic sources, which continues all the way up to al-Nuwayri in the 14ᵗʰ century.⁷² The reason for this preoccupation with enclosure by mountains, walls or whatever barriers happen to be available is given by DeWeese who asserts that the “…the theme of ‘enclosure’ and ‘emergence’ [comprise] the pivotal features of legends of origin and conversion myths.”⁷³

Ibn Khurradādhbih’s reference to Gog and Magog, while for both a contemporary and a modern readership may be entertaining and fascinating, was taken literally by subsequent

⁶⁶ A good introduction to this area would be Anderson, 1932, Alexander’s Gate, Gog and Magog, and the Inclosed Nations, 3, who opens by claiming that the οἰκονομία came into existence not with Christianity but with Alexander and his conquest of Persia, thereby including what later was subsumed into Islamic civilization, which needless to say later assumed this mantle along with Byzantium and the West. By saying this, he implies that “barbarism” (read: Gog and Magog) was saved for describing those outside not just Christendom but all three faiths, including Jews as well.

⁶⁷ For more on the Letter of Alexander to Olympias by pseudo-Kallisthenēs, see Anderson, 1932, 35-43, who gives a discussion, dating and translation of this letter. For a relatively more recent study of specifically the medieval Armenian redaction, see Wolohojian, 1969, The Romance of Alexander the Great by Pseudo Callisthenes.

⁶⁸ According to Barthold’s preface to Minorsky’s translation of the Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam (1970, 27), and cross referenced by van Donzel and Schmidt (2010, 153), Ibn Khurradādhbih’s original source for his story of the journey of Sallām the Interpreter was in fact an Arab traveller by the name of Abū ʿ Abdillāh Muḥammad ibn Ishaq who had allegedly lived in Cambodia for two years. He cites the original in de Goeje (ed.), 1892, Bibliothecarum Geographicorum Arabicorum, vii, 132.


⁷¹ Lunde and Stone (trans.), 2012, 95-98.

⁷² van Donzel and Schmidt, 2010, 152.

generations of Islamic writers, much to the chagrin of historical veracity. His reflexive construction of the story is relatively chiastic, a well-known homiletic technique is used by countless medieval chroniclers, polemicists and panegyrists to invent stories rather than to advance historical accuracy.

Truly, all that Gog and Magog represent, are Qur’anic and biblical bogeymen, albeit with countless variations and references stretching back to the first codifications of the Tanakh in written and oral traditions, back to the remotest prehistory. That being said, the legend is not without its raison d’être and the Muslim or Christian perception of Khazaria as a particularly nomadic “other,” even if however obviously anachronistic, antagonistic or ironically reversalistic of its original meaning in the Tanakh as a polemic on behalf of Jews rather than against them, is a particularly potent form of “otherization” which nevertheless is used both for and against various peoples. Thus, DeWeese’s assertion is ever more poignant: Gog and Magog function not only to destroy but also to create unity among people.

A1.2.2 Non-Byzantine Christian attributions to the Khazars

One of the most important of sources on the conversion is Christian of Stavelot, (or Stablo), also known as Druthmar of Aquitaine (or Christian Druthmar), a ninth century monk.

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74 Chiasmus is a relatively obscure literary technique heavily utilized in the Tanakh and has been termed “Hebrew Parallelism” as a plotline’s passages criss-cross each other (rhetorically or thematically), creating an effect similar to JFK’s famous sound bite, “Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.”

For a further explanation on chiastic use in the Tanakh, see Lund, 1930, “The Presence of Chiasmus in the Old Testament,” 104-126. Lund, in his conclusion (p. 126) also regards any sort of reconstruction of Tanakh textology as inherently prone to speculation and conjecture. See for example Ostrowski, 2006, “The Account of Volodimer’s Conversion in the ‘Povest’ vremennykh let’: A Chiasmus of Stories,” 567-580, who discusses the homiletic and reflexive preconceptions of another mythologized conversion story, this one of Vladimir in 988, given by the Laurentian redaction of the PVL: (Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, PVL, 110-119).

75 Garnier, 2013, “La notice « šifat sadd Yāğūğ wa-Māğūg » dans le Kitāb al-Masālik wa-l-mamālik d’Ibn Ḥurdāḏbih: une feintise réussie,” 605-607. See also von Grunebaum, 1971, Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation, 26 n53. This is not to say that the scholarly doubt of the historicity of the account of Ibn Khurraḍādhbih’s story of Sallām the Interpreter is universal. In fact, van Donzel and Schmidt, 2010, 153 are inclined to see historical truth in the story. The account may in fact be doubtful based on a variety of factors, such as the use of chiasmus for example, most of which are pointed out by Garnier and many of which I agree with, but considering Sallām’s assertion that he finally arrived in İkah is quite peculiar given the town’s proximity, compared to the entire breadth of the continent of Asia, to the westernmost abutment of the “Great Wall” of China and particularly for the original reason the Han emperors extended the system of fortifications so far west in the first place. See above n35.

76 By modern standards they are probably manifested at best as bogeymen. They are nevertheless the quintessential “other” for the express purposes of creating an “us” by which to define a “them” grouping: i.e., we are thus because we are not that. For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see Scherb, 2002, 59-65.

77 The notions of Gog and Magog inherited from a Christian milieu were used by Henry V for example in building English identity. See Scherb, 2002, 65-76.
famed for his linguistic skills living in the appropriately named monastery in Lorraine. The main, relevant and only surviving work of Christian of Stavelot, his “Expositio in Mattheaum Evangelistam,” refers to the people of the land of “Gazaria,” which every modern scholar familiar with this acknowledges to be Khazaria. In reference to the label of Gog and Magog, he writes,\(^{78}\) translated by Chekin as:

“We are not aware of any nation under the sky that would not have Christians among them. For even in Gog and Magog, the Hunnic people who call themselves Gazari, those whom Alexander confined, there was a tribe more brave than the others. This tribe has already been circumcised, and they profess all dogmata of Judaism. However, the Bulgars, who are also from these seven tribes, are now becoming baptized.”\(^{79}\)

The attribution of Gog and Magog to the Khazars in this light is contextualized by Christian’s renowned knowledge of Greek and perhaps Hebrew as well given the author’s cultural milieu. For Christian of Stavelot, Gog and Magog could denote a realm such as Khazaria at what to him were the frontiers of the known world. In this light, Gog and Magog would unavoidably make Khazaria an “other,” especially given the Khazars’ recent nomadic paganism in his time.

The dating of this passage is vital. As the translator and foremost authority on this source specifically, Chekin dates the passage to between 864 and 881 judging by the baptism of Bulgarian Khan Boris on the former date and the destruction of the aforesaid monastery on the latter date by Viking raiders.\(^{80}\) However, due to his separation from Khazaria in Lorraine, this source has been suspect to disbelief by some scholars who doubt a Western monk’s knowledgeability and access to information regarding events nearly 2000 miles away. To this, Chekin counters by reporting on his personal contacts in the Byzantine Greek-speaking world through the Italian town of Benevento.\(^{81}\) As a 9th-c. mention of Khazaria, including a reference to its Judaism, this source is an early one by our topic’s standards. Christian of Stavelot demarcates and brings a considerable importance to bear on Khazar studies,


\(^{80}\) Ibid, 18-19. It would be worth mentioning that both Shepard (1998, “The Khazar’s Formal Adoption of Judaism and Byzantium’s Northern Policy,” 14) and Golden (2007a, 17-18) seem to accept Chekin’s dating and bearing of Christian of Stavelot’s reference on the question of the Khazar conversion, although Shepard does not mention Chekin’s weighty article at all despite the fact that Chekin’s article was published before Shepard’s.

\(^{81}\) Chekin, 1997, 23.
especially as it can be acknowledged as an entirely independent source of Islamic references to Judaism within Khazaria.

Finally, regarding the by-now unquestionable conversion to Judaism by the Khazar khağān and elite, no introduction to the topic would be complete without the palpable reference to the ubiquitous account of Vladimir’s conversion within the *PVL*, which glaringly refers to a fortuitous embassy of arbitrary Khazarian Jews who come to proselytize Vladimir in his conversion story. This tells us that according to the author(s), writing at the earliest in the early-12th century, that by then, nearly a century and a half if not more after Svjatoslav’s well-known expedition to conquer Khazaria (see ch. 5 §1.1.2), Khazaria was thought of as a place from where Jews seemed just to emanate from.

Despite the *PVL*’s late entry onto the scene of primary sources mentioning Khazaria, its entries for Khazaria are extensive, even if the historicity of various passages are considered dubious by an abundant number of scholars. That said, the *PVL*’s first mention of Khazaria is in equation to the generic term “Scythians,” 82 which is fairly normal for most texts written within a Christian setting. The beginning of the *PVL*, like most original medieval chronicles, is invariably vague in its references and wholly dependent on biblical precedents from which to draw a historical timeline. Nevertheless, as many scholars have since acknowledged, the first references to Khazaria, from even before the “historical” timeline begins in the *PVL* up to entries given as the 880s, express a broad, if partially latent, conflict between the southbound Rus’ and the incumbent Khazar powers competing for tribute among the indigenous inhabitants of the middle Dniepr region. 83

The most important mention of the Khazars in the *PVL* though is during the famous story of the conversion of Vladimir 84 initially beginning in 986 with the cavalcade of foreign missions seeking to convert Vladimir to one or another monotheism when the redactor, translated by Cross and Sherbowizt-Wetzor writes of the Khazar embassy:

82 Cross and Sherbowizt-Wetzor (trans.), 1953, *PVL*, 55.
83 Ibid, 58-61. For more on the idea of Khazaria competing with the Rus’ for Slavic tribute, see Petrukhin, 1992, “The Normans and the Khazars in the South of Rus’: (the Formation of the ‘Russian Land’ in the Middle Dniepr Area),” 393-400; Kulik, 2008, “Judeo-Greek Legacy in Medieval Rus’,” 51-64; and Shepard, 2008, “The Viking Rus and Byzantium,” 498. Finally, for perhaps the best and most comprehensive extrapolation on this process, see Franklin and Shepard, 1996, *The Emergence of Rus: 750-1200*, 71-111. See also ch. 4 §3.2.
“The Jewish Khazars heard of these missions, and came themselves saying, ‘We have learned that Bulgars and Christians came hither to instruct you in their faiths. The Christians believe in him whom we crucified, but we believe in the one God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.’ Then Vladimir inquired what their religion was. They replied that its tenets included circumcision, not eating pork or hare, and observing the Sabbath. The Prince then asked where their native land was, and they replied that it was in Jerusalem. When Vladimir inquired where that was, they made answer, ‘God was angry at our forefathers, and scattered us among the gentiles on account of our sins. Our land was then given to the Christians.’ The Prince then demanded, ‘How can you hope to teach others while you yourselves are cast out and scattered abroad by the hand of God? If God loved you and your faith, you would not be thus dispersed in foreign lands. Do you expect us to accept that fate also?’”

The significance of this passage is that the Khazars are presented as invariably Jewish, again by a source completely independent of others such as the aforementioned Muslims sources as well as Christian of Stavelot. This point has been made by some scholars seeking to prove that since the PVL describes the Khazars as being Jewish so matter-of-factly, then this is cause to suppose that the majority of those considering themselves to be Khazars were also Jewish. While I personally do see the logic of this argument, I am also sceptical of making such a conclusion just yet. To learn more about how much the Khazars themselves felt they were Jewish, we will next consult their own sources.

A1.2.3 Khazar mythologies in their own writ: the native Khazar sources

There are three principal Khazar sources, all in Hebrew as we might expect, and all dated, disputably of course, to sometime in the tenth century. While I will not go into any great detail on each one respectively, as other scholars have already done so, I will summarize others’ findings on them including proposed dates, doubts and most of all context. The three sources are known as the Kievan Letter, the Schechter Text, named after the scholar who found it in the Cairo Geniza and of course the most famous text, the letter of Khazar king himself to the Sephardic secretary of the Caliph of Córdoba, Abd ar-Rahman III, Hasdai ibn Šaprut (King Joseph’s Reply). Together, the latter two sources conflated with Hasdai ibn

85 Ibid, 97.
86 It would bear mentioning here that there was a Muslim source, the bibliographer ibn al-Nadim, who independently verifies the fact that the Khazars did use the Hebrew script when he wrote the following words in the mid-10th century:

“The Turks, the Bulgar, Blaghā’, the Burghaz, the Khazar, the Llān, and the types with small eyes and extreme blondness have no script, except that the Bulgarians and the Tibetans write with Chinese and Manichæan, whereas the Khazar write Hebrew.”

Šaprut’s original epistle to Khazaria comprise what is usually known as the Khazar Correspondence. As Wasserstein has noted, it was to the exclusive credit of Islam which provided “a Kulturraum, […] which made the actual creation of a link between a Jew, Hasdai, in the extreme West, and the Khazar, Jewish, state [sic] in the area of the Caucasus, far away in the East, not completely impossible.”

The Kievan Letter has been edited, translated, annotated, commentated and generally contextualized (along with the Schechter Text by the way) by Golb and Pritsak, who have dated it to about 930. While there have certainly been no shortage of scholars, both Jewish and Christian, Russian, Israeli and from a multitude of other countries, who have either ignored or sought to disprove the validity, historicity or relevance of this document, presumably for their respective agendas, the document has remained, due to the most respected scholars’ recognition of the authenticity of it, the principal affirmation of Judaism among within Khazaria. In brief, this document, as most, though not all scholars agree, is a letter sent by Jews residing in Kiev to other powerful Jews, likely the Khazar king, although since it ended up in Cairo, it would suggest that the Khazar king could do little for the petitioner on whose behalf the letter was written concerning his misfortune and seeking of financial assistance. The most significant and relevant indication given by the text for our present purposes is that a certain number of people (in Kiev) did in fact adopt Judaism as their monotheistic religion and Hebrew as their script, although we can hardly make conclusions on what language(s) they spoke. Nevertheless, a number of the names of the signatories of the document are inherently Turkic in origin and there are Turkic runes at the bottom meaning “I have read (it).” The other significant information given by the text is that it is simultaneously the earliest mention of the city of Kiev and it throws into doubt many

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88 Golb and Pritsak (eds. and trans.), 1982, Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century, 3-71.
89 Ibid, 71.
90 Wasserstein, 2007, 381.
91 Notably however, Golden (2007a, 10-11) himself doubts the doubters in suggesting their rethinking of such sources as originally “kaum authentisch.”
92 This however is disputed by Erdal (2007, “The Khazar Language,” 95-97), who suggests that it was sent to the Jewish community of Kiev instead of from them.
conclusions which generations of scholars had previously taken for granted due to the dating given by the PVL. 

The Schechter Text, reaching us in retranslation via Golb and Pritsak again, is another anonymous composition which has survived albeit with great chunks missing, among which is the name of the addressee, so it is entirely unclear what the agenda of the source is and who or what its intended audience was so as to give it context. Nevertheless the text as it survives is a synopsis of a “peoplehood” story of Khazaria and what is essentially a mythologization of the story of Judaism in Khazaria for some, or for others it is a telling of Khazar history in their own words. According to the translators, the text, originally a letter, was written in Constantinople not by “a Turkic Khazar of the royal dynasty, but rather an autochthonous Jewish subject of the Khazarian King Joseph.” The text tells of an original migration of Jews to what later became Khazaria and of subsequent intermarriages between those Jews and the indigenous nomadic inhabitants of Khazaria whereby “they became one people” and proceeded to fight off their enemies and then to refute the respective faiths of the Orthodox-Christian Byzantines and the Muslim Saracens in a religious dispute among a number of other events. Broadly speaking, the narrative is given in relation to three Khazarian kings, Benjamin, Aaron and Joseph, the first two of which Golb and Pritsak tentatively date to ca. 880-900 and ca. 900-920 respectively and the last they estimate at ca. 920-960. The text itself is supremely significant in that it is the first Khazar document to mention a “return” to Judaism due to an officer whose name was changed to Sabriel and that it mentions the title khağan. Zuckerman has dated the letter itself to ca. 949, although this dating is of course not without debate. The letter itself also alludes to wars and hostilities with the king of the Alans, which is also mentioned in the DAI so that the text does fit nicely into a pre-existing historical context for the time and place in which

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93 For example, see Zuckerman, 1995, “On the Date of the Khazars’ Conversion to Judaism and the Chronology of the Kings of the Rus Oleg and Igor: A study of the Anonymous Khazar Letter from the Genizah of Cairo,” 237-270.
94 Golb and Pritsak (eds. and trans.), 1982, Khazarian Hebrew Documents, 75-156.
95 Ibid, 130.
96 Ibid, 107.
97 Ibid, 132.
98 Ibid, 137.
it was written. It also gives context to the last Khazar source, an epistle of the last abovementioned king of Khazaria, Joseph, to Hasdai ibn Šaprut, of Córdoba in the mid-940s.

*King Joseph’s Reply* is an answer to the correspondence of the aforementioned Hasdai ibn Šaprut by the then-king (beg?) Joseph of Khazaria. It survives in two redactions, a long one, translated into Russian by Kokovcov in 1932 and into English by Korobkin in 1998 and a short one translated into English by Kobler in 1953. It is dated by most scholars at arriving in Córdoba ca. 955. The letter is, in essence, a repetition of the details in the *Schechter Text*, that is, a story of conversion, blood-lineage, top-down rule and in the end, ethnogenesis. Though the historicity of the document, like every other primary source heretofore mentioned, has been thoroughly contested, *King Joseph’s Reply* has nevertheless withstood all attempts to be definitively proven a forgery. Yet that is hardly to suggest that all the details contained in the letter are patently to be accepted at face-value. For example, the listing of subject peoples and tributaries given by Joseph is rather exaggerated, albeit the extent of the hyperbole is hotly debated among scholars. It has been pointed out by Galkina for example that despite the exaggerations of Khazarian possessions within king Joseph’s letter, to believe thusly without reservations would constitute fabricating over-simplified history but to discard the letter altogether would be a mistake as well. Among the crucial

102 Kokovcov (ed. and trans.), 1932, Еврейско-хазарская переписка в X веке. The long redaction dates from the 13th century while the short redaction dates from the 16th. See Golb and Pritsak (eds. and trans.), 1982, Khazarian Hebrew Documents, 76.
104 Kobler, 1953, Letters of Jews through the Ages, 97-115.
105 For example, Komar, 2006, Степи Европы в эпоху Средневековья: Хазарское Время, 183, has stated that the opinion that the document was a later forgery has largely disappeared throughout 20th-century scholarship. Brutzkus, even in 1944, “The Khazar Origin of Ancient Kiev,” 110-111, was convinced that the authenticity of the document had been by then “established.”
106 Galkina, 2006, 141:

“письмо царя Иосифа, может быть задействован только частично. Иосиф действительно сильно преувеличил размеры своих владений, но не путем механического перечисления племен, которые в давние времена платили дань Хазарии. Список этносов, стран и городов не переписан из более древних рукописей, а составлен в X в., соответствует этнографическим реалиям того времени и рассчитан на восприятие просвещенного и влиятельного современника, проживающего, однако, в отдаленной стране.”

I have translated this as:

“the letter of King Joseph, can be effective only in part. Joseph indeed greatly exaggerated the size of his holdings, but not by means of mechanically listing tribes which, in ancient times, paid tribute to the Khazars. The list of ethnic groups, countries, and towns are not
differences between the *Schechter Text* and *King Joseph’s Reply* is firstly, that the aforementioned Sabriel revealed in the *Schechter Text* who lead the “return to Judaism” is instead referred to as Bulan in *King Joseph’s Reply*. Another major difference is that a king by the name of Obadiah is listed in *King Joseph’s Reply* who is seemingly glossed over in the *Schechter Text*. Finally and perhaps the most essential difference between the two is that King Joseph claims descent from Cusar, son of Togarmah (brother of Ashkenaz), son of Japheth, son of Noah. This is the part that has been mined by both scholars and ethno-nationalist historians alike.

A1.2.4 Sephardic sources: the *Khazar Correspondence* and its consequences

*King Joseph’s Reply*, as I have already discussed, was in response to the original dispatch from Hasdai ibn Šaprut, secretary of the court of Abd ar-Rahman III of Córdoba, or more properly, the actual writing of the text was produced by the former’s personal secretary, Menahem ibn Saruq, famously the author of the first Hebrew dictionary, the *Mahberet*. Hasdai ibn Šaprut had learned of Khazaria from what were presumably Radanite merchants travelling from Khwārazmia:

“At last, merchant messengers of Khorasan told me that there is a Jewish kingdom, called Khazaria. I did not believe their words, for I said to myself that they are only telling this to me to appease me and to become close to me. I continued wondering about the matter, until messengers of Constantina came with a gift and letter from their king to ours. I asked them about this issue, and they responded that, indeed, it is true, and that the kingdom is called Khazaria. From their country Constantina to Khazaria is a fifteen-day journey. It is through the sea, but there are also many countries to pass on the way. The ruling king’s name is Joseph. They said that many ships come to them from that land, and they bear fish, hides, and other merchandise. They enjoy a kinship with them, they are honourable in their eyes, and they exchange embassies and gifts. They possess strength and might; their troops and soldiers emerge periodically.”

It is no surprise that the Sephardic Hasdai ibn Šaprut was astonished to learn of Khazaria. What is surprising however is that the oldest extant copy of the manuscript containing the letter was not originally found in the Cairo Geniza but instead dates from the 16th century and

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107 According to Kobler (trans.), 1953, 115 n29, this means “the Wise” in Turkic, although others have suggested other meanings.

is currently stored in Oxford.\textsuperscript{109} It would also appear to be significant to mention here that Golb argues that the \textit{Khazar Correspondence} (i.e., both Hasdai ibn Šaprut’s letter and \textit{King Joseph’s Reply} are intimately connected to the \textit{Schechter Text}).

The next reference we have to the Khazar correspondence between Hasdai ibn Šaprut and King Joseph himself is given by the Sephardic rabbi Judah ben Barzillai of Barcelona who wrote the judicial exposition, the \textit{Sēfer hā’Ittīm} in the early-12th century. In it, he summarizes and discusses both epistles although according to Golb and Pritsak, he had access to the \textit{Schechter Text}\textsuperscript{110} and \textit{King Joseph’s Reply} but not to Hasdai ibn Šaprut’s original letter.\textsuperscript{111}

The final Sephardic source whose author discusses the \textit{Khazar Correspondence} is the famous rabbi Yehuda HaLevi whose work, \textit{The Kuzari: in Defense of the Despised Faith}, completed ca. 1140,\textsuperscript{112} is at once a common religious polemic,\textsuperscript{113} a spiritual autobiography\textsuperscript{114} and on a deeper level a series of Platonic dialogues,\textsuperscript{115} and the nature of the work, veering between both aspects subsequent theologians have debated for centuries. My purpose however is not to examine the theological underpinnings and implications of the work, only to scrutinize it should it contain useful information by which to inform us on the plight of Khazaria, which it does.\textsuperscript{116} While some of HaLevi’s musings on Khazaria are undoubtedly his own fabrication,\textsuperscript{117} he does in fact indicate that the Khazar king converted to Judaism 400

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{109} Golb and Pritsak (eds. and trans.), 1982, \textit{Khazarian Hebrew Documents}, 76.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Ibid, 75 and 127. Golb and Pritsak cite Dubnov, 1926, \textit{Weltgeschichte des Jüdischen Volkes}, vol. 4, 480-481.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Kokovcov (ed. and trans.), 1932, 127-128.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Korobkin (trans.), 1998, xxiii.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Alcalay, 1993, \textit{After Jews and Arabs: Remaking Levantine Culture}, 174.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Silman, 1995, \textit{Philosopher and Prophet: Judah Halevi, the Kuzari, and the Evolution of His Thought}, 299-304.
\item \textsuperscript{115} See for example Wasserstrom, 1997, “Review of Yochanan Silman’s \textit{Philosopher and Prophet: Judah Halevi, the Kuzari, and the Evolution of His Thought},” 284-296.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Of course Wasserstrom (1997, 296) argues that Halevi “cannot be treated as an archaeological site through which the reader can dig back down to its original dissertation layer.” Then again, I would argue that like any archaeological material, nothing exists in this cosmos at least, including Halevi’s \textit{Kuzari}, without context.
\item \textsuperscript{117} See for example in Hirschfield, 1964, \textit{Book of Kuzari}, 82, his mentioning of the location of a cave in which he imagined the Khazar king converted to Judaism:
\end{itemize}

“…in the mountains of Warsān [ie., the Caucasus]…After this the Khazari, as it is related in the history of the Khazars, was anxious to reveal to his vizier [the place] in the mountains of Warsān and the secret of his dream and its repetition, in which he was urged to seek the God-pleasing deed. The king and his vizier travelled to the denoted mountains on the seashore, and arrived one night at the cave in which some Jews used to celebrate the Sabbath.”
years before his time, i.e., ca. 740. This date, therefore has been used by countless subsequent scholars to base their dating arguments. It was once fashionable to date the Khazar conversion to about 740, however this dating has since fallen out of mainstream reference. For a broader discussion of the dating of the Khazar conversion to Judaism, see chapter 2 §1.2.1.

Nevertheless, to garner any information whatsoever on Khazaria using textual narrative sources, the usefulness of the source is always and without fail undermined by its questionable historical reliability. So I will conclude this section with Olsson’s words: “The more informative the source, the less trust can be placed in its historicity.”

The cave motif is nevertheless highly significant in both traditional Central Asian Tengri shamanism and Judaism and according to DeWeese (1994, 300-310), both traditions incorporated the other to form a kind of combined retrospectively Judaized Tengriïsm.


Translation: Alex M Feldman and Mike Berry, Birmingham, 2017.

The period of the early and classical middle ages in Eastern Europe is a time of fruitful meeting and intensive dialogue of cultures, nations and states, an era of clash and interaction of diverse and divergent civilizational movements and influences. Sources, the agents and contexts of these influences – within the space between Scandinavia and Byzantium, between the Latino-Germanic and the Arabo-Islamic world, in a mosaic of societies, of seafarers, of warriors and merchants, of settled farmers and nomad-herders, rural and urban communities – they are well-known and represent, so to speak, the “foregrounds” of Eastern European history. However, these “shadow-grounds” can also be distinguished – in which a special role, hitherto unapparent to a wide range of historians (and even by some measure hushed up and disregarded), was played by a few (or nevertheless rather numerous?) Jewish communities. Their existence in urban centers of the Black Sea region and the forest zones of Eastern Europe are reliably documented by a set of direct and indirect indications of diverse sources of the 9-13th centuries.1

Значение еврейского этнокультурного компонента в истории и политогенезе Древней Руси определяется фактом деятельного участия евреев в протяженной и разветвленной системе (англ. network) международных экономических связей, окончательно сформировавшейся в течение VIII века и на протяжении IX–XV веков обслуживавшей регионы исламского и христианского Средиземноморья, Западной, Центральной и Восточной Европы, Ближнего и Среднего Востока.2

The importance of the Jewish ethno-cultural component in the history and polito-genesis of Ancient Rus’ is determined by the fact of the active involvement of Jews in an extensive and intricate system (English – network) of international economic links, which was ultimately formed during the 8th century, and throughout the 9-15th centuries, served the regions of the Islamic and Christian Mediterranean, Western, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Near and Middle East.²

В предлагаемой статье предпринята попытка выделить в фонде восточноевропейских нумизматических материалов памятники, представляющие дальние и сверхдальние экономические контакты и монетное обращение восточноевропейских еврейских общин и определить систему признаков, на основании которых оказывается возможной (и, на мой взгляд, единственно убедительной) еврейская этнокультурная атрибуция этих памятников.

This article attempts to distinguish artifacts in the findings of Eastern European numismatic materials, representing the long-range and ultra-long range economic contacts and the monetary circulation of Eastern European Jewish communities and to determine a set of features, based on a possible Jewish ethno-cultural attribution (and, in my view, the only convincing attribution) of these artifacts.

Дальнейшее изложение строится следующим образом. В первом разделе цитируется in extenso ключевое для понимания организации, экономики и культуры еврейского мира сообщение из «Книги путей и государств» Абу-л-Касима Убайдаллаха ибн Хурдадбиха³ о еврейских купцах-радханитах (ap-rādānīyya), в котором описаны принципы их торговли и маршруты их путешествий. (Вслед за большинством современных авторов я рассматриваю картину, нарисованную Ибн Хурдадбихом, в качестве одной из важнейших схем функционирования «малых обществ» диаспоры.)


The following presentation is constructed as follows. The first section quotes in extenso the report in “The Book of Roads and Kingdoms” of Abu’l-Qāsim Ubaydallāh ibn Khurādbih,³ which is key to understanding the organization, economy and culture of the Jewish world, about the Jewish merchants – the radhanites (ar-rādānīyyeh), in which the principles of their trade and their travel routes are described. (Following the majority of contemporary authors, I
consider the picture painted by ibn Khurdādbih, as one of the most important schemes of the functioning of the “small societies” of the Diaspora.) The second section briefly summarizes the overall historiographical perspective of early medieval Jewry. The third section provides a few selected episodes (English – case) of the numismatic history of the Mediterranean and European Jewish communities (the Idrisid Maghreb, Muslim and Christian Spain, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Khazaria, Volga Bulgaria) that are important for understanding the routes and models of the appearances of mints in the centers of Jewish settlement. The fourth [section], on the basis of the concept formulated by A. V. Golovnëv, regarding “local” and “long-range”* cultures are introduced in contradistinction to local and long-range systems of monetary circulation, [and] given definitions of “markedness” and “un-markedness” of the typological composition of the coin finds. The fifth [section] proposes a preliminary analysis of the most important numismatic artifacts of Jewish communities in Eastern Europe and the interpretation of them in terms of long-range and ultra-long-range links – (in North Africa – Sicily – Crimea, Spain – Kiev, Egypt – Taman, Germany – Czechia – Hungary – Galicia-Volynia Rus’, Bulgaria – Galicia-Volynia Rus’ – Northern Rus’, Asia Minor – Crimea – Torčesk [Čornýe-Klobuki] - Kiev).

1. Еврейские купцы-радханиты – Jewish merchants-Radhanites
Ibn Khurdādbih and his “Book of Roads and Kingdoms” writes:4


“The routes of the Jewish merchants called al-Radhaniya:
These merchants speak Arabic, Persian, Greek, Latin, Frankish, Andalusian and Slavic. They journey from west to east, from east to west, travelling by land and by sea.

* Translators’ note: the word магистральных (magistral’ných) has been translated as “long-range” because, though there is hardly a consensus on the proper English translation of the word, it has frequently been rendered as such by Russian historians, anthropologists and archaeologists into English as long-range in precisely this context. According to the English summary provided on p. 469-470 in the work Golovnëv, A. V., 2009, Антропология движения (древности Северной Евразии), Jekaterinburg, which is cited in the corresponding footnote by Kulešov:

“In terms of movement and adaptation the cultures are divided into the local and the long-range ones. A culture based on eco-adaptation and focused on a specific ecotope may be called local, and a culture embracing a wide area, connecting several local cultures and utilizing their resources — the long-range one. A local culture harnesses bio-resources, a long-range one — social resources. The long-range culture is always more flexible than the local, as it the process of growth it used its advantage of motion and developed the technologies of mobility in competition with the rival cultures. While the long-range cultures had superior status, the local cultures enjoyed stability and sustainability thanks to their direct ties to the land and its resources. The dominant role in the mediation process belonged to the military-political, priestly or trading elite uniting the local cultures through their activities and thus creating new contacts and relationship channels. The language of a long-range culture traditionally acquired the status of the second language of the local groups; frequently the same was true for the cult and the system of power. By means of trade, religion, wars, politics, and economics the long-range culture colonized the local communities and created a social hierarchy.”
From the west they export eunuchs, young girls and boys, brocade, beaver pelts, marten and other furs and swords.

They set sail from the Mediterranean coast of the land of the Franks [Firanja] and head for Farama in Egypt. There they transfer their merchandise to the backs of camels and travel to Qulzum on the Red Sea, a distance of 25 *farsakhs* [ca. 90 miles]. They sail down the Red Sea to al-Jar, the port of Medina, and to Jiddah, the port of Mecca. Then they continue to Sind, India and China.

They return from China with musk, aloes wood, camphor, cinnamon and other eastern products, docking at Qulzum, then proceed to Farama, whence they once more set sail on the Mediterranean Sea.

Some head for Constantinople to sell their goods to the Byzantines. Others go to the palace of the king of the Franks.

Sometimes these Jewish merchants set sail on the Mediterranean from the land of the Franks to Antioch. Then they proceed overland to al-Jabiya (al-Hanaya) on the Euphrates, a journey of three days. They sail down the Euphrates to Baghdad, then down the Tigris to al-Ubulla, whence they sail down the Arabian Gulf to Oman, Sind, India and China.

... [insert about Rus’ merchants] ... [5]

The overland routes of the Radhaniya are as follows:

The Jewish merchants also follow a land route. Merchants departing from Spain or France sail to southern Morocco and then to Tangier, from where they set off for Ifriqiyya and then the Egyptian capital. From there they head towards Ramla, visit Damascus, Kufa, Baghdad and Basra, then cross the Ahwaz, Persia Kirman, Sind and India, and finally arrive in China.

Sometimes they take a route north of Rome, heading for Khamlij via the lands of the Saqaliba. Khamlij is the Khazar capital.[6] They sail the Caspian Sea, make their way to Balkh, from there to Transoxiana, then to the *yurt* [grazing lands/homelands] of the Toghuzghuz,[7] and from there to China.”

Важность этого сообщения отмечена историками более столетия назад. Количество публикаций (статей и книг), анализирующих и трактующих информацию о купцах-радханитах, достигает нескольких сотен и продолжает увеличиваться. Сведения Ибн Хурдадбиха являются уникальными: в столь концентрированной форме и в столь полном объеме они не повторяются в современных ему памятниках арабской литературы. Кроме того, здесь описаны модель жизнеобеспечения еврейских торговых общин, география и стратегия дальней путешествий купцов-радханитов, находящие прямые и косвенные аналогии и намеки в показаниях более поздних памятников еврейской традиции. В самом деле: в эпоху становления системы коммуникаций широкого спектра, связывших большинство регионов Старого Света, роли странствующих торговцев, выступающих агентами экономического, культурного и информационного взаимодействия, оказываются основополагающими.

The importance of this report was noted by historians more than a century ago. The number of publications (articles and books), analyzing and interpreting information about merchants-Radhanites, reaches several hundred and continues to grow. The accounts of ibn Khurdadbih are unique: in such a concentrated form and in such totality, they are not repeated in contemporary Arabic literary artifacts. Furthermore, it describes here the model of livelihood of the Jewish merchant community, the geography and the strategy for long-distance
journeying for the merchant-Radhanites, finding direct and indirect analogies and hints in the evidence of later artifacts of the Jewish tradition. In point of fact, in the era of the formation of the system of communications of a vast spectrum, linking the majority of the regions of the Old World, the role of wandering merchants, acting as agents of economic, cultural and informational interaction, prove to be fundamental.

Отметим следующие элементы сообщения Ибн ХурTadbиха: указание общих направлений торговых маршрутов, итinerарии отдельных участков, перечни товаров и список языков международной торговли. Каждый из последних не только играл роль региональной lingua franca, но использовался и внутри самих общин. Модель активности торговых групп радханитов – «малых обществ» еврейской диаспоры – следует считать базовой для рассматриваемой эпохи.

We may note the following elements in the report of Ibn Khurdādbih: the indication of the general direction of trade routes, the itineraries of individual sections, the lists of goods and the languages of international trade. Each of the latter not only played the role of the regional lingua franca, but was also used within the communities themselves. The model of the Radhanite merchant groups’ activities – the “little societies” of the Jewish Diaspora – should be considered as basic for the era in question.

Обратим внимание на список товаров еврейского предложения: в его составе налицо категории центрально- и восточноевропейского происхождения, систематически связываемые в памятниках арабской литературы IX–X веков с русами – рабы,9 меха10 и оружие.11 Неслучайно мы находим в тексте о купцах-радханитах вставку о купцах-русах (в цитате опущена, см. прим. 5). На этом основании исследователи делают вывод о теснейших связях еврейского купечества с Восточной (и, шире, славянской) Европой и об их «изначальном» сотрудничестве с хазарами и древнейшими русами в рамках политических институтов Хазарии и складывающегося Древнерусского государства (концепция торгово-экономического и культурного диалога на восточноевропейских речных путях).12 Как известно, в пределах второй половины VIII – первой половины IX века это сотрудничество привело к принятию элитой Хазарского государства иудаизма и способствовало становлению системы русо-хазарского симбиоза (содружества-противостояния), составившего содержание первого этапа древнейшего русо-славяно-хазаро-еврейского соприкосновения.

Let us focus attention on the list of goods supplied by Jews: it includes categories of Central- and Eastern-European origin, systematically associated in the artifacts of Arabic literature of the 9-10th centuries with the Rus’ - slaves,9 furs,10 and weaponry.11 It is no coincidence that we find in the text about the merchant-Radhanites an insert about merchant-Rus’ (in the quotation omitted – see n5 above). On this basis, researchers draw a conclusion about the close links of the Jewish merchants with Eastern (and, more widely, Slavic) Europe and their “original” collaboration with the Khazars and the earliest Rus’ within the framework of the political institutions of Khazaria and the emerging ancient Rus’ state (the concept of commercial-economic and cultural dialogue on Eastern European river ways).12 As is well known, in the second half of the 8th – the first half of the 9th century, this collaboration led to the adoption of Judaism by the elite of the Khazar state and contributed to the rise of a system of Rus’-Khazarian symbiosis (fraternity-conflict), constituting the content of the earliest stage of ancient Rus’- Slav-Khazar-Jewish contact.
Несмотря на то что пока не существует обобщающего и всеобъемлющего исследования этого соприкосновения и системы противоречивых (дружески-вражеских) связей, можно вслед за Д. Иоффе с полным основанием констатировать исключительное значение этой проблематики «для всякого историка-медиевиста, занимающегося… начальным периодом жизни Руси». Главная причина этого была уже раскрыта выше, но помимо сказанного важно и следующее: в корпусе древнейших письменных свидетельств о странах и народах Восточной Европы видное место принадлежит еврейским источникам (текстам еврейско-хазарской переписки, «Киевского письма», книги «Иосиппон»); ставится также вопрос о еврейских информаторах арабских авторов. Эти и смежные сюжеты порою трактуются даже слишком расширителльно (таковы публицистическая точка зрения И. Хайман и Е. Макаровского о ранней Руси как о еврейской общине и некоторые заострения концепции О. Прицака), хотя в целом для отечественной историографии XX века более обычно игнорирование аспектов «древнерусско-еврейского вопроса» (объяснимое не столько антисемитизмом, сколько внутренней цензурой и ограниченной компетентностью большинства авторов).

В последние годы и десятилетия, однако, появились специальные работы А. А. Архипова, А. А. Алексеева, акад. В. Н. Топорова, Л. С. Чекина, М. А. Членова, В. Л. Вихновича, В. Я. Петрухина, А. Торпусмана, Б. Е. Рашковского и особенно – А. Кулика. В корпусе еврейских письменных свидетельств о Центральной и Восточной Европе самым ясным и недвусмысленным образом выявлены связи общин Византии, Средиземноморья (Египет, Южная Италия, Испания) и Центральной Европы (Германия, Польша, Чехия, Венгрия). Что касается мировой (европейской и американской) гебраистики послевоенного времени, то ее основные достижения и впечатляющий прогресс связаны главным образом с изучением рукописного наследия Каирской генизы и с пересмотром и обновлением взглядов – как в общих, так и в региональных аспектах – на еврейское участие в этнокультурном взаимодействии народов и государств Европы и Средиземноморья VIII–XV веков. Здесь должны быть названы имена Якоба Манна, Сало Барона, Ирвинга Агуса, Урии Энгельмана, Шломо Гойтейна, Элиягу Аштора, Моше Гила, Давида Абулафиа, Шломо Симонсона, Марка...
In recent years and decades, however, special works have appeared, such as those of A. A. Arkhipov, A. A. Alekseev, academician V. N. Toporov, L. S. Čekin, M. A. Členov, V. L. Vikhnovič, V. Ja. Petrukhin, A. Torpusman, B. E. Raškovskij and especially – A. Kulik. In the corpus of the Hebrew written evidence about Central and Eastern Europe, in the clearest and most unequivocal manner, the links have been revealed between the communities in Byzantium, in the Mediterranean (Egypt, southern Italy, Spain) and Central Europe (Germany, Poland, Czechia, Hungary). As for the world, (European and American) Hebrew Studies of the post-war era, its primary achievements and impressive progress are mainly connected to the study of the manuscript heritage from the Cairo Geniza and with the revision and renovation of views – both in general and in regional aspects – of the Jewish participation in the ethnocultural interactions of the peoples and states of Europe and the Mediterranean during the 8-15th centuries. We must mention here the names of Jacob Mann, Salo Baron, Irving Agus, Uri Engelman, Shlomo Goitein, Eliyahu Ashtora, Moshe Gil, David Abulafia, Shlomo Simonson, Mark Cohen, and other authors. A considerable amount of factual material and particular generalizations can be found in Michael Toch’s recent monograph. A number of works have already been translated into Russian and a number of reasonably interesting journalistic publications are also available. An important trend is represented by surveys and generalizing monographs on the history of medieval Jewry in individual countries; for our theme, the works which bear the greatest value summarize the data from Morocco, Spain, Sicily, Egypt, Byzantium, France, Germany, Poland, Czechia and Hungary.
Below, I would like to propose an outline survey of two groups of sources: (1) artifacts of Hebraic monetary coinage in the East and in Europe and (2) individual artifacts of monetary circulation of the linked communities of Europe and the Mediterranean. Within the numismatic literature, despite the presence of particular studies on the European material, the generalizing approaches to these themes have not yet been worked out; to a no lesser (or even greater) degree, this affects Eastern Europe.

3. Некоторые примеры еврейского участия в монетной чеканке VIII–XIII веков
Some examples of Judaic participation in coin minting 8-13th centuries

Еврейская монетная чеканка и еврейское участие в монетной чеканке изучены неравномерно, а накопленные материалы слабо введены в более широкий исторический оборот. Приводимые далее случаи отчасти известны, отчасти же потребуются в более подробном рассмотрении.

Judaic coin minting and Judaic participation in coin minting has been studied unevenly, and the materials which have accumulated have been poorly disseminated among historians. Below, some cases are presented, partially well-known, and partially in need of still more detailed consideration.

Казус Идрıсидов. В монетной чеканке современников Идрıсидов известны типы дирхамов с надписями еврейским квадратным письмом. Это в первую очередь уникальный дирхам из Югодического клада, чеканенный в Тудже в 170-х годах х. (790-е), на лицевой стороне которого читается ﷺ ﻲم ﻢ ﻢ ﻰ ﻢ (“дирхам “истина”) (калька с араб. xakk) – тип Eustache Cont. 72 (ил. 1), и тип дирхамов, чеканенных в Тудже около 200 года х. (815/816) с именами правительницы ﻪ آ ﻦ ﺯ ﻦ ﻦ ﺯ (Зайнаб) и минцмейстера ﻪ ﻪ ﻦ ﻪ ﺱ ﻪ ﻪ (Йакоб), тип Eustache Cont. 74. На еврейское участие в монетной чеканке Идрıсидов и их современников указывают и имена (полные и сокращенные) минцмейстеров на многих типах серебряных монет.

The case of the Idrısids. In coin mintings of the Idrısids’ contemporaries, types of dirhams with square Hebrew inscriptions are known. This primarily unique dirham from the Ugodid hoard, struck in Tude in the 170s AH (790s CE), on the obverse can be read: ﷺ ﻲم ﻢ ﻢ ﻰ ﻢ (“the truth”) (a calque with the Arabic khakk), the type from Eustache Cont. 72 (fig. 1), and the type of dirhams struck in Tude ca. 200 AH (815-816 CE) with the names of the [female] ruler, ﻪ آ ﻦ ﺯ (Зайнаб), and of the mint master, ﻪ ﻪ ﻦ ﻪ ﺱ ﻪ ﻪ (Йакоб), the type from Eustache Cont. 74. The Jewish involvement in the coin minting of the Idrısids and their contemporaries is indicated also by the names (complete and abbreviated) of the mint masters on many types of silver coins.

The Khazar dirhams with the name of Moses, the messenger of Allah. In the Khazar coinage of the mid-10th c., Judaic features do not show through (a certain “Andalusian coloration,” I could have noted in the ligature form lam-’alif with widely divergent “branches” on the
dirhams, broken into the ‘ard al-Khazar “land of Khazaria”). Nevertheless, Jewish religious tradition is linked to the appearance of the rarest dirhams with the formula موسى رسول الله “Mūsà (Moses), messenger of Allah” – in the central inscription on the reverse side.  

Подписной штемпель Исхāк ибн Ибρāхīм. Герт Рисплинг выявил в шведском кладовом материале редкий тип дирхамов волжско-булгарского правителя ‘Абдаллāха ибн Мика‘илла, чеканенные в Булғаре в 346 году х. (957/958), на котором проставлена подпись резчика штемпеля: عمل إسحاق بن إبراهيم «делал (’amala) Исхāк ибн Ибρāхīм» (ил. 8). Сочетание имени и отчества этого мастера позволяет предположить его еврейство, тем более что аналогичный случай появления подписи резчика по имени جب ريل (Arabic Djabra‘il) на штемпелях Сāмānid Andarāby в 308 году х. (920/921) несет явно еврейский характер. (Одновременно с этим, арабо-испанские монеты различного времени (ил. 3) также могут быть частью клада XI века, в котором обнаружен один экземпляр типа, имитирующего византийские солиды Феофила, Михаила II и Константина (дата прототипа по Ф. Грирсону – 830/831–840 годы) – тип Dbg. 1186. Эти типы посвящены специальные работы, в которых констатирован особый характер выпусков, отражающих знакомство мастеров штемпелей с монетами Византии и Андалусии IX–XI веков. (В собрании Эрмитажа имеется один беспаспортный экземпляр первого из этих типов, выявленный мною в коллекции арабо-испанских монет (ил. 3); не сомневаюсь, что он происходит из какого-то восточноевропейского клада XI века.)

The Byzantine-Hammūdid-Latin types of denarii of Henry II. In the monetary affairs of Germany in the era of Henry II (1002–1024 CE) types of silver coins are well-known, the stamps of which imitate the dirhams of the Hammūdids of Malaga and Ceuta at the beginning of the 11th century - the type Dbg. 1186 – and the Byzantine solidi of Theophilos, Michael II and Constantine (the date of the prototype according to F. Grierson – is 830/831-840 CE) -
the type Dbg. 1186. Special works are dedicated to these types, in which the special nature of the releases are acknowledged, reflecting the familiarity of the stamp masters with the coinage of Byzantium and Andalusia in the 9-11th centuries. (The Hermitage collection contains an undocumented copy of the first of these types, which I identified in the collection of Arab-Spanish coins (fig. 3); I do not doubt that it originates from some Eastern European hoard of the 11th century.)

The mancusii of Barcelona. A most interesting episode of Judaic coin mintings is presented by the Barcelonan coin mint of Bonnoma (Hebrew השם טוב “good name”), having stamped his name on silver and bullion denarii, struck for the Count Ramon Berenguer I (1035–1076). In this same period, exclusively coarse imitations of Hammudid dinars from Ceuta were struck – anepigraphic gold Mancusii. From the approximately forty known coins found, one find was made in Kiev (fig. 4; see also below), one – in the Dniepr region, and the rest – in the area around Barcelona.

The Byzantine-Almoravid-Hungarian imitations. In 12th c. Hungary, folleis were struck [base coins], simultaneously imitating Byzantine gold and electrum denominations and Almoravid gold dinars of Spain and the Maghreb (fig. 5). The explanation for the similar choice of prototypes for the same reasons seems probable (and within the same ethno-cultural milieu), were also those for the above-mentioned denarii of Henry II. Further study is needed on the question of Judaic involvement in the coin production of the Hungarian kingdom in the 12-13th centuries.

The Polish-Judaic coins of Mieszko III. Coins are known from the Polish king Mieszko III’s reign (1126-1202 CE), struck by Jewish mint masters using a square inscription for the

Манкусы Барселоны. Интереснейший эпизод еврейской монетной чеканки представляет барселонский монетный двор Боннома (евр. השם טוב ‘добroe имя’), простоявшего свое имя на серебряных и бильоновых денариях, чеканенных для графа Рамона Беренгера I (1035–1076). В этот же период там чеканились исключительно грубые подражания Хаммудидским динарам Сеуты – анэпиграфные золотые манкусы. Из приблизительно четырех десятков известных монет одна находка сделана в Киеве (ил. 4; см. также ниже), одна – в Поднепровье, остальные – в округе Барселоны.

Византийско-альморавидско-венгерские подражания. В XII веке в Венгрии чеканятся фоллеисы (медные монеты), подражающие одновременно византийским золотым и электровым номиналам и альморавидским золотым динарам Испании и Магриба (илл. 5). Видится предпочтительным объяснение подобного выбора прототипов теми же причинами (и в рамках той же этнокультурной среды), что и вышеупомянутые денарии Генриха II. Требует дальнейшего изучения вопрос о еврейском участии в монетном производстве Венгерского королевства в XII–XIII веках.

Польско-еврейские монеты Мешко III. Известны монеты польского короля Мешко III (1126–1202), чеканенные еврейскими минцмейстерами с использованием квадратного письма для записи текста на еврейско-славянском языке (канаанит): מֶשְׁכָּו קרל מְשֶׁפְּקָא רָול פּוֹל־סקי (илл. 6).
written text in the Hebrew-Slavic language (Knaanic): "Mieszko, king of the Poles," phonetically: *m’eško krol’ pol’skij (fig. 6).37

Этот быстрый обзор позволяет представить отдельные штрихи к картине еврейского участия в монетном производстве стран диаспоры VIII–XIII веков. Реальная картина была, несомненно, богаче и интереснее.

This quick survey allows us to present some outlines for a picture of Jewish involvement in the coin production of the countries of the Diaspora from the 8-13th centuries. The real picture was, undoubtedly, richer and more interesting.
Таблица 1. Изображения монет (с. 90)

Пл. 1. Дирхам. Современный Идрисидов. Серебро. Инв. № ОН-В-КК-12904. Государственный Эрмитаж.

Пл. 2. Фалс. Аббасидов. Медь. Инв. № ОН-В-Р-659. Государственный Эрмитаж.

Пл. 3. Денарий. Германия. Генрих II. Серебро. Инв. № ОН-В-М-8845. Государственный Эрмитаж.

Пл. 4. Манкус. Графство Барселона. Рамон Беренгер I. Золото. Инв. № ОН-В-А-А-616. Государственный Эрмитаж.

Пл. 5. Фоллинс. Венгрия. Медь. Инв. № ОН-В-Ашунг-3764. Государственный Эрмитаж.

Пл. 6. Пенни-браклет. Польша. Мендо III. Серебро. Инв. № ОН-3-58599. Государственный Эрмитаж.

Пл. 7. Фалс. Сельджуков Румы. Медь. Инв. № ОН-В-Р-660. Государственный Эрмитаж.

Пл. 8. Дирхам. Правители Волжской Булгарии. Абдаллах ибн Мукаййял. Графическая схема расположения подписи резчика штемпеля.
4. Элементы теории: локальное и магистральное монетное обращение
The elements of theory: local and long-range monetary circulation
Согласно А. В. Головнёву, можно говорить о двух типах культур (и шире – мало-
масштабных обществ), глубоко различных по стратегиям жизнеобеспечения, структуре
и историческим ролям: локальные и магистральные культуры. Первые –
малодинамичны, привязаны к постоянным локусам хозяйственной жизни, отмечены
консервативными механизмами адаптации, традиционны, пассивны. Вторые –
динамичны, подвижны, отмечены гибкими и изменчивыми механизмами адаптации,
инновационны, активны. Оба эти типа, конечно, идеальные реконструкции, но
оперирование ими позволяет моделировать широкий круг исторических и
этнокультурных процессов в терминах взаимодействия элементов локальной и
магистральной стратегий (как это блистательно демонстрирует сам А. В. Головнёв).

According to A. V. Golovnëv, two types of cultures may be referred to (and wider – smaller-
scale societies), with profoundly different strategies for subsistence, structure and historical
roles: the local and the long-range cultures. The former – are low-activity, tied to the
constant loci of economic life, marked by conservative adaptation mechanisms; they are
traditional and passive. The latter – are dynamic [and] mobile, marked by flexibility and
variable adaptation mechanisms; they are innovative and active. Both of these types, certainly,
are ideal reconstructions, but employing them permits the modelling of a wide range of
historical and ethno-cultural processes in terms of the interaction of the elements of local and
long-range strategies (as brilliantly demonstrated by A. V. Golovnëv himself).

Экстраполяция этой простой схемы на сферу денежного обращения (широко
dопустимая благодаря тому, что концепт ’деньги’ является общим для всех типов
обществ) позволяет говорить о двух функциональных типах денежного хозяйства:
локальном и магистральном. К последнему типу, в частности, относится денежное
обращение караванных путей: оказывается, что караванное денежное обращение
(’монетные потоки’) обслуживает начальные и конечные точки маршрутов и все
пункты между ними.

The extrapolation for this simple scheme to the sphere of monetary circulation (widely
admissible because the concept of ’currency’ is common for societies of all types) permits us
to discuss the two functional types of monetary economy: the local and the long-range
[economy]. Caravan routes in particular are related to the latter type: it turns out that caravan
monetary circulation (“coin flows”) serve the beginning and end points of the routes and all
places in between.

Более или менее резкое и выраженное противопоставление синхронных памятников
магистрального и локального денежного обращения на некоторой территории
наблюдается в тех случаях, когда памятники первого типа относятся к явно иноземным
(по сравнению с памятниками второго типа) нормам денежного обращения и
tезавированы на значительном удалении от исходных точек формирования
комплексов (начальных точек магистралей). Можно говорить о маркированности
типологического состава таких находок, противопоставленной немаркированности
находок, приписываемых локальным нормам. Группы монет, находимых в виде серий
единичных находок и немногочисленных комплексов, отражающие нормы денежного
The more or less sharp and pronounced contrast of the synchronous artifacts of long-range and local monetary circulation in a given territory is observable in those instances where the first type of artifacts are clearly related to foreign (compared to the artifacts of the second type) norms of monetary circulation and hoarding at a considerable distance from the starting points of the formation of complexes (the initial points of the long-range routes). It is possible to discuss the markedness of the typological composition of such finds, contrasted with the unmarkedness of the finds, attributed to local norms. The coin groups, found in the form of a series of single finds and sparse complexes, reflecting the norms of the monetary circulation starting zones (in our case, this is Sicily, Syria and Egypt, Barcelona, Central Europe, Macedonia/Bulgaria and Asia Minor), end up along the long-range routes to the end-locations (peripheral zones) of circulation and hoarding, proving to be completely isolated in the context of the norms of local circulation.

The instances portrayed below (English: case) relate to this functional type.

5. Памятники еврейского монетного обращения в Восточной Европе VIII–XIII веков

Artifacts of Jewish monetary circulation in Eastern Europe of the 8-13th centuries

Mediterranean gold in Khazaria: the Slavjanskij hoard. On 7 May 1989 in the outskirts of the village of Anastasievskaja in the vicinity of Slävjanska-on-Kuban of Krasnodarskij kraj, a tractor ploughing through a rice paddy turned up a hoard of gold coins – of Byzantine solidd from the iconoclasm era, Umayyad dinars and imitation solidii and dinars. The 2011 catalog of the coins from the hoard, available for study (at the moment, this is a maximally representative sample), contains information on 242 examples of the coins of Leo III, Constantine V (the majority of the composition is from 741-775 CE), Leo IV and Constantine...
VI with Eirene (the later coins of the sampling are: class Ia, series 2, according to F. Füeg, the data of the series corresponds to 787-790 CE), 3 examples of Umayyad dinars 100, 106 and 121 AH (without taking into account the two dinars from 93 and 112 AH, which are known only according to A. I. Semënov’s data) and the Khazarian imitation of the “Crimean-Taman surroundings.” The dating of the hoard is determined at the end of the last decade of the 8th century – the turn of the 9th c. The presence of Greek and Turkic graffiti on the coins leaves no doubt that the hoard reflects the process of revenue flow in gold coinage from the regions of its minting and circulation – Byzantium and the Byzantine-Islamic Mediterranean – into the multi-elemental and poly-ethnic milieu of the Northern Black Sea region.

Rare analogies to the Slavjanskij hoard are known from the following locations:42
– Asia Minor, a hoard from ali fahrettin kebirköy [modern Büyükköy/Korkuteli, Antalya province] from 1920: 102 examples of Byzantine solidii, from the second third of the 8th – the first third of the 9th c.;
– Egypt, a hoard in Cairo from 1948: 101 ʿAbbāsid and 12 Aghlabid dinars, a solidus of Nikiforos I (802-811);
– Sicily, an underwater hoard near Cape Schisò from 1950: about three hundred solidii from Leo III to Constantine VI with Eirene (the composition is entirely analogous with that of the Slavjanskij hoard);
– Sardinia, a hoard of gold weight in Porto Torres from 1922: jewellery adornments, 16 examples of the solidii of Theophilus (829-842 CE), 21 examples of the solidii of Michael III (842-867), three late Aghlabid dinars of the last third of the 9th-the beginning of the 10th c.;
– Northern Italy, a burial in Reno, south of Bologna, discovered in August 1857 during earthwork: a single interment with a purse, containing about a hundred gold coins – 14 Abbasid dinars from 138-191 AH, 5 solidii and 1 tremissis of Lombard provenance from Arechis II, Duke/Prince of Benevento (774-787 CE); the rest were found to be Byzantine solidii from Constantine V to Nikiforos I (802-811 CE).

Как можно увидеть по территориальному распределению этих аналогий, они тяготеют к периферийным зонам византийского мира и зонам обращения куфического золота в западных областях Халифата.
As can be seen by the territorial distribution of these analogies, they gravitate to the peripheral zones of the Byzantine world and the zones of the circulation of Kufic gold in the western areas of the Caliphate.

Khersones and Sicily: Aghlabid falsii and Syracusan folleis. In the early medieval cultural layer of Kherson and in its surroundings, more and more base coins have been found recently, their origin associated with the regions of the Central Mediterranean. And while, with respect to the Syracusan base folleis mint, researchers can limit themselves to referring to intra-Byzantine connections, the base falsii of the Aghlabid emirate (North Africa and Sicily) in the 9th c. already represented by more than a dozen copies (including the poorly attributed finds of Kufic copper, made during the course of the 19th – the first half of the 20th c., and new finds: the inventory number OH-B-P-659, fig. 2 – from the excavations of the Kherson expedition in 1976), indicate a wider cultural context of the connections between Africa – Sicily – Crimea.43

Tamatarcha and Egypt: Fātimid dinars from Taman. In the complex of numismatic artifacts of medieval Tamatarcha/Tmutarakan (the gorodišče of Phanagoria on the Taman Peninsula, in Krasnodarskij kraj), distinguished by clearly expressed mixed Byzantine-Khazarian cultural specific features, a gold coin of the 10th century is represented, being a unique find for Eastern Europe - a Fātimid dinar of al-Mu’izz li-Dinillāh Ma’adda (953–975), chеканенного в Мисре в 364 г. х. (974/975 CE).44

Находки куфических динаров X века до сих пор были известны только в трех восточноевропейских локусах: в Нижнем Поволжье и Северо-Восточной Башкирии (по одному экземпляру съиджидских динаров первой половины X века) и на территории Волжской Булгарии (серия съамийдских динаров того же времени из Ульяновской области). Таманская находка позволяет документировать факт дальних связей общины Таматархи с фатимидским Египтом.
Of the 10th c. Kufic dinar finds, only three with Eastern European loci are known up to now: in the Lower Volkhov region and in north-eastern Bashkortostan (one example each, of sādjidic dinars of the first half of the 10th c.) and in the territory of Volga Bulgaria (the series of Sāmānid dinars of the same period from Ul’janovsk oblast). The Taman find makes it possible to document the fact of long-distance links between the community of Tamatarcha and Fatimid Egypt.

Kiev and Barcelona: the mancúsii of Ramon Berenguer in the Dnieper region. In the composition of the hoard of gold weights, found in Kiev in 1899, I newly attributed a Barcelonan county coin of the 11th century (fig. 4.) – a mancús of Ramon Berenguer I (1035–1075). These gold coins, which are imitations of the Hammūdid dinars of Yahya al-Mu’talī billāh from 412–426 AH, were struck by the mint of the Barcelonan financier and moneyer Shem-tôv (Provençal – bon nom – in such a form, his name is known because it was mentioned on the denarii). The second Eastern European example of a coin of this type is recorded as a single find in the Dniepr region. This fact, that the rare Barcelonan gold mancúsii (currently there are about forty examples) are known exclusively from hoards in the territory surrounding Barcelona, gives special acuteness, expressiveness and source-context to the question of the attribution of these finds. Thus, the possibility of another attribution of the mancúsii from the Dnieper region is completely excluded, rather than as artifacts of the trade between the Kievan community and the community of Barcelona. The most plausible is the point of view according to which both coins were delivered simultaneously, literally in one purse.45

Поднепровье, Крым и Малая Азия: фалсы Сельджукидов Рûмского султаната в Херсонесе и Киеве. В новейших сводках находок медных монет Сельджукидов Рûма XII–XIII веков на территории Восточной Европы, изданных Е. Ю. Гончаровым и К. К. Хромовым, собраны сведения о десятках экземпляров, происходящих из городских центров черноморского Крыма (Херсонес) и Киевского княжества (2 экз. происходят из раскопок купеческой усадьбы у подножия Замковой горы в Киеве, 29 экз. из села Шарки Рокитянского района Киевской области – исторического города Торческа, несколько единичных находок – из других точек Среднего Поднепровья). Два фалса
The Dniepr region, the Crimea and Asia Minor: the Falsii of the Seljuk sultanate of Rūm in Chersōn and Kiev. The latest reports of finds of the base coins of the Seljuk sultanate of Rūm of the 12-13th centuries in the territory of Eastern Europe, published by E. Ju. Gončarov and K. K. Khromov,46 collected information on dozens of examples, originating from urban centers of Black Sea Crimea (Chersōn) and the Kievan principality (2 examples originate from the excavations of a merchant estate at the foot of Zamkovoj gora in Kiev,47 29 examples are from the village of Šarki in the Rokitjanskij region of the Kiev oblast – the historical town of Torčesk, in several single finds – from other points of the Middle Dniepr region). I found two Rūm Seljukid falsii myself in the material from the 1976 excavations of the Chersōn expedition (GE, inventory number OH-B-P-660, fig. 7, and OH-B-P-661). The Turkish authors record the presence of Jewish communities in Konya (the capital of the sultanate), Sivas and Antalya.48

Galicia-Volynian Rus’ and Central Europe: the Khotinskij hoard. No later than 1889, near Khotin in the riverine area of the middle reaches of the Dniestr (in the modern territory of the Černovickij oblast of Ukraine), a hoard of silver coins was found during the plowing of the land, the vast majority of them proved to be those so-called bracteates – coins of one-sided mintage, produced on an extremely thin sheet-like blanks. According to the summary of data collected by E. Fiala, V. M. Potin and K. M. Černyšov,49 the hoard consisted of no less than one thousand examples (a little more than 800 examples are presently kept in the Hermitage), in the main Saxon (Thuringia, Meissen, Pegau) and Hessian bracteates. The region of the formation of the complex in the southern zones of Central Europe (Czechia, Hungary, Transylvania), is indicated by the presence in the hoard of the Hungarian and Czech denarii, and also (according to E. Fiala) of Frisian pfennigs (the denarii of Carinthia). Analogies for the Khotinskij complex beyond the boundaries of Germany are few: V. M. Potin indicates a hoard from the middle of the 12th century between Plovdiv and Edirne (in Bulgaria) and a
hoard in Slimnic (Transylvania);\textsuperscript{50} the latter contained coinage from the 11-14\textsuperscript{th} centuries. The date of the hiding of the Khotinskij hoard is determined by an interval of 1225-1230 CE (V. M. Potin) or the middle of the 13\textsuperscript{th} century (K. M. Černýšov).

The explanations which were proposed until now, for the facts of the hoarding of all these complexes far beyond the limits of the regions of minting and the local circulation of German bracteates, in places where there was no permanent German population, proceeded from the event-related narration of the era of the Crusades. Meanwhile, in the light of the data on the presence of Jewish communities in all the major urban centers of Czechia, Hungary, Styria and Carinthia of the 12-14\textsuperscript{th} centuries, which maintained trade relations between Germany, the Balkans and Eastern Europe (on one of these routes – between Prague and Kiev – precisely where Khotin is located), similar hypotheses must be categorically rejected as unsubstantiated and implausible. Coinage complexes of the type from Khotin, the very composition of which reflects the economic dialogue of the German (the future Ashkenazic) and the Slavic (Knaanic) Jewries and the geography of its settlement, must be acknowledged as the artifacts of the monetary circulation within these communities and on the routes between them.\textsuperscript{51} Here I would like to partially support the more balanced point of view expressed by G. A. Kozubovskij:\textsuperscript{52} according to his opinion, the Khotinskij hoard is a trove of silver weights – the raw material for the production of ingots for local payment (with which it is difficult to agree, but it is also impossible to refute) – and is included within the same cultural-chronological and numismatic context as also single finds of Hungarian coins (copper folleis of Stephen IV and Bela III from Galich and the Lenkovskij gorodišče) and the Bulgarian provenance (Latin imitations from the artifacts of Bukovina, Ternopольskij and Khmel'nickij oblasts). The recent comparisons are promising and can be naturally interpreted.
in a number of artefacts of the type from the Šelonskij hoard considered below, and related ancient Rus’ finds.

**Northern Rus’ and Thessaloniki: the Šelonskij hoard.** In the early 2000s (no later than 2002, the exact date of find is unknown) in the Šelon’ river basin of the Solecjik district of Novgorod oblast, a hoard was found of bullion and bronze coins amounting to 221 examples. According to the determinations of V. V. Gurulev, amongst the finds in the composition of the complex, there were five Byzantine tracheai of Isaac II Angelos (1185-1195 CE), 9 tracheai of Alexios III Angelos (1195-1203 CE), 205 examples of the so-called Bulgarian imitations and 2 examples of the so-called Latin imitations of the coins of the Byzantine emperors from the end of the 12th – the beginning of the 13th century. The classification and dating of three typological groups of Bulgarian imitations (A, B and C) by the interval of 1195-1224 CE is justified by M. Hendy. The researcher links their production to Thessaloniki, but still the question on the issuer and medium of circulation of these coins remains open. I would like to propose the consideration of complexes of Bulgarian imitations not only in the Byzantine (Greek) context, but as artifacts of the monetary circulation of the Jewish community of Thessaloniki. According to Benjamin of Tudela, in the middle of the 12th century, it consisted of about five hundred people (the larger communities of the region were only Theban - about two thousand people - and Constantinople - about two and a half thousand people). The finds of these coins in Eastern Europe can be interpreted as markers of the economic links of these communities with the communities of the ancient Rus’ principalities of the pre-Mongol period: besides the Šelonskij hoard, which remains the only one of its kind, there are a few single finds in Podolia (Kameneć-Podol’skij), in Western Volynia, in the Černigov principality, in Staroj Rjazan’ and Novgorod.
Beyond the scope of our consideration, there remains another horizon of artifacts, which are promising in the context of our theme: the finds of base coins of the Second Bulgarian Kingdom from the second half of the 13-14th century in Crimea.57

All of the numismatic artifacts examined – hoards and single finds – possess a number of well-defined common features, which, against the background of the norms of monetary circulation of most Eastern European societies of the 8-13th centuries, reconstructed according to a wide series of hoards, appear extremely specific. As follows from the materials cited above, this collection includes the following features:

1. There is a well-documented poly-metalism, that is, equal tolerance with respect to base-metal coinage, silver and gold, as opposed to the silver mono-metalism of the majority of the regions of Eastern, Northern and Western Europe, but close to the poly-metalism of Byzantine and Islamic types. It is important to mention the additional distribution of these complexes within the norm of East European silver circulation of the 9-13th c. (in the absence during this same period of comparable gold and base-metal circulation).

2. There is a complete absence of wide ranges of analogous (comparable compositionally and contextually sопоставимых) hoards in the territory of Eastern Europe with the simultaneous occurrence of more or less close ones, although infrequent analogies far beyond its limits – are in Central Europe, in the Balkans and the entirety of the Mediterranean (from Egypt and Asia Minor to Sicily, Sardinia and Catalonia).
3. Маркированность типологического состава монет из рассмотренных находок, не находящих соответствий в синхронных восточноевропейских кладах, но по исходным регионам чеканки и экспорта хорошо коррелирующих с географией еврейской диаспоры, известной и/или реконструируемой по письменным источникам и дальним аналогиям в сфере монетного производства и обращения.

3. The markedness of typological composition of the coins from the examined finds, which do not find parallels in the synchronous East European hoards, but by the initial regions of minting and export, correlate well with the geography of the Jewish Diaspora, known and/or reconstructed according to written sources and remote analogies in the sphere of coin production and circulation.

4. Приуроченность восточноевропейских памятников выделенных групп и хронологических горизонтов к известным и/или реконструируемым по письменным источникам и косвенным данным точкам и зонам расселения еврейских общин в городах Северного Причерноморья (Херсонес и Таматарха) и домонгольской Руси (Галицко-Волынская земля, Киев и Киевское княжество, Чернигов, Рязань, Новгород – не сомневаясь, что более внимательный учет находок позволит расширить этот перечень).

4. The correlation of the East European artifacts of the chosen groups and the chronological horizons to the well-known and/or reconstructed points and settlement zones of Jewish communities (according to written sources and indirect data), are located in the towns of the Northern Black Sea region (Chersōn and Tamatarcha) and pre-Mongol Rus’ (the Galicia-Volynian lands, Kiev and the Kievan principality, Černigov, Rjazan’, Novgorod – I do not doubt that a more careful accounting of the finds will make it possible to enhance this list).
Проблемы экономики, истории и культуры раннесредневекового восточноевропейского еврейства должны стать предметом самого пристального внимания со стороны широкого круга специалистов по истории Древней Руси, до сих пор слабо тяготевших к этой тематике. Продемонстрированные выше нумизматические свидетельства позволяют значительно подкрепить точку зрения, согласно которой деятельность еврейских общин Причерноморья, Хазарии и городов лесной зоны Восточной Европы выступала видным (хотя и далеко не единственным) фактором историко-экономического процесса VIII–XIII веков, а также дополнительно проиллюстрировать географию торговых связей малых обществ еврейской диаспоры и роль ее представителей в истории монетного производства и денежного обращения.

**Figure 1** Map of find-spots (p. 96)

**Вместо заключения – Instead of a conclusion**
The problems of the economy, history and culture of the early medieval East European Jewry must become a topic of the most thorough attention on the part of a wide range of specialists in the history of Ancient Rus’, who until now were not very keen on this topic. The numismatic evidence demonstrated above makes it possible to substantially corroborate this point of view, according to which the activities of the Jewish communities of the Black Sea, Khazaria and the towns of the forest zone of Eastern Europe stand out as visible (although as well far from the only) factor of the historio-economic process of the 8-13th centuries, as well as additionally to illustrate the geography of the commercial links of the small societies of the Jewish Diaspora and the role of its representatives in the history of monetary production and coin circulation.
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