MAKING SENSE OF NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH NATURE: A STUDY OF PRIVATISATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE NIGERIAN CEMENT INDUSTRY IN OGUN STATE, SOUTHWEST NIGERIA

BY

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A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

School of Geography,
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Abstract

This study investigates the impacts of neoliberal and environmental regulation policies introduced recently to improve sustainable development challenges in the growing Nigerian cement industry. It argues that as the extractive industries have become a new Frontier for foreign and private investment in developing countries, the devolution of economic responsibilities and the rising poverty despite their resource wealth present a research gap. This gap I argue requires a multilevel environmental governance perspective to understand and explain the process at play. The application of multilevel governance framework is novel in this case because of its emphasis on a panoply of systems of coordination and negotiation among formal and informal institutions. I have applied the framework to identify and analyse the roles and relations of state and non-state actors in the new Nigerian cement industry. Based on in-depth, qualitative research, the study examines the ways the privatisation of the Nigerian cement industry and environmental policy reforms affect the roles of central and subnational governments in the governance of the sector. It also articulates the new governance actors’ roles and relations in the devolved sector as well as the interactions between these groups of actors due to these changes. Semi-structured interviews were conducted among government, business and society stakeholders grouped into two - state and non-state actors. Findings reveal that the institutional and political relationships governing the interactions between state and non-state actors in the extractive sector historically indicate a multiscalar governance approach with persistent dysfunctional institutional arrangement. As evident from the Nigerian cement industry case study, changes in economic development and environmental policies over time reflect attempts to include subnational government and civil society organisations, aside from private sector actors, in the management of the sector. It is argued that the changes fail to improve structures for actors’ participation in the governance of the sector to avoid fragmentation of actions. The study has also shown that legitimate power still resides with the central government in the development of mineral resources in Nigeria. While the subnational governments have actively been involved in environmental regulation, the relationships of the state actors lack coordination and coherence because of the absence of a legitimate structure to integrate their actions. Although, actors in the industry transcend national governments, the political lessons of neoliberal governance as experienced in this study have shown that many issues are still left unresolved with the government continuing to act as the arbiter of legitimate power. The political will to decentralise and devolve political roles to subnational government actors in particular and civil society organisations has hindered governance for sustainable development in the new Nigerian cement industry. While the role of central government as the ‘gate keeper’ remains important in any development process, the Nigerian government has not learned from its past development planning and environmental history to adequately address sustainable resource governance policies. The application of multilevel governance framework in this study has illuminated the complex interrelation of actors in neoliberal resource governance and the need for inclusive resource development strategies in developing economies like Nigeria. Evidence also revealed the growing relationship between community-based organisations and corporate actors without non-governmental organisations. The framework has contributed to the body of knowledge on the importance of society-centred resource governance in low and medium income countries (LMICs).
To the Glory of Almighty GOD for the gift of firm faith, supportive family and friends

Which, then, of the favours of your Lord will you twain deny? Blessed is the name of thy Lord, Master of Glory and Honour. Quran 55: 78-79
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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My journey through this study has been very rough and tough. If I have to mention names of people who stood by me morally, spiritually and materially, I am sure I cannot remember all. I will therefore say a big thank you and pray that may the Lord continue to strengthen everyone.

My special thanks to: my parents, my siblings and my in-laws for their support. I am also indebted to my big uncles Mr. Olabode Bakare and Senator ‘Lekan Mustapha. I am very grateful for your financial and moral support throughout my education and career.

I am forever indebted to my wife, (Agbeke mi) for her patience and her walking with me on this rough road, my children- Faridah, Faiz-Rahman and Farhan-Ahmad for their sacrifice, interesting and extra ordinary distractions. Balqis, I would not have been able to weather the storm that almost took my life without you, I love you and wish you the best always.

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<td>AfA:</td>
<td>Agenda for Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCM:</td>
<td>Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APLORI:</td>
<td>A. P. Leventis Ornithological Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAP:</td>
<td>Biodiversity Action Plan</td>
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<td>BCC:</td>
<td>Benue Cement Company</td>
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<td>CAC:</td>
<td>Corporate Affairs Commission</td>
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<td>CBA:</td>
<td>Community Based Association</td>
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<td>CBO:</td>
<td>Community based Organisation</td>
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<td>CCNN:</td>
<td>Cement Company of Northern Nigeria</td>
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<td>CDA:</td>
<td>Community Development Association</td>
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<td>CDM:</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
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<td>CGA:</td>
<td>Corporate Governance Actors</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.R.I.S.P.:</td>
<td>Customers, Results, Integrity, Sustainability and People, Openness &amp; Inclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSI:</td>
<td>Cement Sustainability Initiative</td>
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<td>CSR:</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>DEA:</td>
<td>Department of Environmental Assessment</td>
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<td>DIL:</td>
<td>Dangote Industries Limited</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBITDA:</td>
<td>Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization</td>
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<td>EIA:</td>
<td>Environmental Impact Assessment</td>
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<td>EIS:</td>
<td>Environmental Impact Statement/Certificate</td>
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<td>ELRI:</td>
<td>Environmental Law Research Institute</td>
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<td>ERA:</td>
<td>Environmental Right Actions</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>ESID</td>
<td>Extractive States and Inclusive Development</td>
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<td>FEPA</td>
<td>Federal Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<td>FMENV</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Environment</td>
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<td>FOTE</td>
<td>Friend of The Earth</td>
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<td>FoEI</td>
<td>Friends of the Earth International</td>
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<td>GHG</td>
<td>Green House Gas</td>
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<td>GMTA</td>
<td>Guidelines on Mineral Titles Application,</td>
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<td>GRFD</td>
<td>Government Representative Federal</td>
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<td>HEDA</td>
<td>Human and Environment Development Agenda</td>
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<td>IAD</td>
<td>Institutional Analysis and Development</td>
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<td>ICMD</td>
<td>Inspection and Compliance Monitoring Department</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMM</td>
<td>Impact Mitigation Monitoring</td>
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<td>INC</td>
<td>Indigenous National Companies</td>
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<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
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<td>LCC</td>
<td>Lagos State: Lekki Conservation Centre</td>
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<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area</td>
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<td>LMICs</td>
<td>Low and medium income countries</td>
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<td>LPFO</td>
<td>Low Pouring Fuel Oil</td>
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<td>MLEG</td>
<td>Multilevel Environmental Governance</td>
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<td>MLG</td>
<td>Multilevel Governance</td>
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<td>MLPA</td>
<td>Marine Life Protection Act</td>
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<td>MMSD</td>
<td>Ministry of Mines and Steel development</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMTPA</td>
<td>Million metric tonnes per annum</td>
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<td>MMT</td>
<td>Million metric Tonnes</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Companies</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>Nigerian Communications Commission</td>
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<td>NCF</td>
<td>Nigerian Conservation Foundation</td>
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<td>NDCSD</td>
<td>Niger-Delta Conservation and Sustainable Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDPB</td>
<td>Non-Departmental Public Body</td>
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<tr>
<td>NESREA</td>
<td>National Environmental Standard Regulation and Enforcement Agency</td>
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<td>NEST</td>
<td>Nigeria Environmental Study/Action Team</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>NMMA</td>
<td>Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act</td>
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<td>NMMR</td>
<td>Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations</td>
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<td>NNOES</td>
<td>Nigerian Non-Oil Extractive Sector</td>
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<td>NOEI</td>
<td>Non-Oil Extractive Industry</td>
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<td>NPE</td>
<td>National Policy on the Environment</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>Non-State Actors</td>
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<td>NSAS</td>
<td>Non-State Actors and Stakeholders</td>
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<td>NSIA</td>
<td>Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority</td>
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<td>NTCA</td>
<td>Nigerian Tobacco Control Alliance</td>
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<td>OGEPA</td>
<td>Ogun State Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<td>OPC</td>
<td>Ordinary Portland cement</td>
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<td>PfD</td>
<td>Partnership for Development</td>
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PPA: Private For-Profit Actors
PNPA: Private Non-profit Actors
TIPNIS: Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure
SAP: Structural Adjustment Programme
SERAC: Social and Economic Right Advocacy
SOL: Social Licence to operate
SSA: Sub-Sahara Africa
SSI: Semi-Structured Interview
TPP: Traditional Policy Paradigm
UN: United Nations
UNCED: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme
UPP: User Pays Principle
USD: United State Dollar
VAT: Value Added Tax
WAPCO: West African Portland Cement Company
WBCSD: World Business Council for Sustainable Development
WCED: World Commission on Environment and Development
WOW: Wing Over Wetlands
<table>
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<th><strong>GLOSSARY OF TERMS</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Collaborative governance</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Development (In)action</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Ecogovernmentality</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Environmental governance</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Federalism</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Multilevel environmental governance</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Neoliberal governance</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Neoliberal obsession</strong></td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction and background to the study

The Nigerian government’s privatisation and environmental planning policies reforms in recent past present a neoliberal transition experience and significant build-up of multilevel resource governance capacity. But what are the implications of the changes on state and non-state actors’ roles and relations for resource governance and sustainable development? A thick analysis of the implications of these trends is identified as a novel research gap by this study. This study therefore focuses on neoliberal transition and natural resource governance in a developing country context by identifying with the debates on agency of natural resources in neoliberal governance (Bridge & Jonas, 2002; Bridge & Perreault, 2009; Castree, 2006, 2008a, 2008b; McCarthy, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; McCarthy & Prudham, 2004; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Perreault, 2005, 2006). The study recognises the rising neoliberalisation of nature (Castree, 2008a, 2008b; Bebbington, 2013) and reallocation of development responsibilities and coordination (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Bridge & Perreault, 2009; Mansfield, 2007) in extractive economies. It argues that the neoliberal transition coupled with development challenges faced by these economies contrary to their resource wealth present a research gap requiring multilevel environmental governance explanations, social and organisational learning for sustainable development. I therefore assess the changing economic development and environmental policies, polity and the shifting roles of state actors to make sense of neoliberalisation of nature and governance for sustainable development debate using the Nigerian cement industry experience. I also articulate the emerging roles and relations of non-state actors in response to the changing policies and state actors’ roles. And then
illuminate social and organisational learning and policy implications of multilevel governance practice for sustainable development in a developing, extractive economy context as exemplified by the growing Nigerian cement industry. Having adopted a case study approach, the study is focused on Ogun state in southwest Nigeria. Ogun state is major cement producing state in Nigeria which plays host to the two major cement producing companies in the country.

Transformations in economic development policies, politics and polity since the 1980s coupled with rising concerns of environmental degradation, environmentalism and environmental movement at about the same period brought about a ‘putative shift’ (Bridge & Perreault, 2009, p.476) in the coordination and control of the development-environment processes worldwide (Hague, 1999; Peet & Hartwick, 2009; Sonnenfeld & Mol, 2002; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Agrawal & Lemos, 2007; Perreault, 2009). The significance of social relations in economic development and environmental sustainability has been argued to have manifested from the series of events on socio-economic development and environmental movements beginning from the 1960s (Perreault, 2009). The rise in environmental concerns due to the consequences of humans’ social and economic development activities in the 1960s led to environmentalism and environmental movements. Consequently, national governments began incorporating environmental concerns into development policies and industrial activities (UNCED, 1993; United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2000; Adil, Mihaela & Nadaa, 2006). Also, attempts to evolve economic development approaches that can address sustainable use of natural resources with minimal damage to the environment led to changes in the flow of capital, labour, finance and knowledge from the ‘top’ to the ‘bottom’
in the 1980s (Castells, 1996; Held et al., 1999; Kettl, 2000; Clark, 2005). Further from the above, series of social, economic and environmental issues to achieve sustainable development culminate to the gross importance of governance in sustainable development (UNCED, 1993; De Wit & Verheye, 2007).

Although governance has been defined in many ways, (Commission on Global governance, 1995; Rhodes, 1997; Rosenau, 1995, 2002) the common denominator in the definitions is that governance discourse is about social and economic change (Bridge & Perreault, 2009). The commission on Global governance define governance as the “sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private manage their common affairs”. Governance has since been a key term to conceptualise the crossroads of environment and development contentions in the 21st century (Perreault, 2009). Perreault (2009, p.442) contends that:

"Environment and development has long been a cornerstone of environmental geography. It is an inherently integrative field that incorporates a broad diversity of theoretical and methodological approaches ... At its core, the field of environment and development geography is concerned with two fundamental realities: (I) Social groups – households, rural communities, cities or nation states are dependent upon nature and natural resources for their survival and welfare and (II) the practices and institutional arrangements social groups employ to ensure survival and welfare in turn impacts environmental quality and the functioning of geo-ecological systems".

Perreault's contention above also resonates in Paavola’s (2008) explanation of multifunctional relevance of multilevel environmental governance. Paavola (2008, p. 151) explains that “The multi-functionality explanation provides the most nuanced explanation for why multi-level
governance solutions are needed: to organize transfers between beneficiaries and providers of ecosystem services flows that are appropriated at different spatial scales”. This change in political economy of development-environment illuminates the shift in roles of non-state actors such as market and society alongside the state in the path to sustainable development under the frame of governance (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Agrawal & Lemos, 2007; Reed & Bruyneel, 2010). As such governance recognises the multi-layered and -scalar nature of the political authority of the state with the growing influence of regional state actors and new modes of governance (Bridge & Perreault, 2009).

It has thus been argued that for the effectiveness of any mode of governance, it requires a well-functioning state as the custodian of jurisdictional power and authority setting the policies and polity where market and society actors come to play (Kettl, 2000; Lambin, 2005; Duit, 2016). Recognising the transition to neoliberal governance in Nigeria, it is however not yet clear how new strategies to coordinate and manage public programmes effectively in the country has been devised. This is more important considering the increasing level of poverty and environmental degradation in what is the seventh most populous nation in the world (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2015). This study hopes to make sense of the neoliberalisation of nature and governance for sustainable development debate using the Nigerian cement industry experience.

Geography has a leading role to play in the changing environment, actors and scales of coordination and relations as a discipline which centres on human-environment relations and regional differences (Gray & Moseley, 2005; Castree et al., 2009). The strong association of the governance perspective with social, economic and environmental change has reflected its
mainstreaming in environment and development discourse by geographers (Liverman, 2004; Bridge & Perrault, 2009; Castree et al., 2009; Perreault, 2009; Perreault, Bridge & McCarthy, 2015). The purpose of this research is to explore this problematic in transition economies as it relates to natural resources exploitation and environmental deregulation resulting from Nigeria’s neoliberal transition. Important questions are therefore raised in this study about socio-economic and political rationalities of neoliberal policies and the environment in transition economies. The economies are believed to be suffering from ‘resource curse’ despite their rich natural resource endowment (Auty, 1993; Sachs & Warner, 1995; Jewellord, 2012; Bebbington, 2013) yet becoming a ‘new frontier’ for foreign investment (Hilson, 2014). In effect, what are the goals of neoliberal economic policies in Nigeria and has the Nigerian state adopted privatization of industries to the detriment of the environment and society at large?

1.2 Research Relevance and context

The development-environment-governance crossroads has become a frontier of research for environmental geographers recently (cf. Bridge & Perreault, 2009; Perreault, 2009; Perreault, Bridge & McCarthy, 2015). Institutional and organisational coordination of social relations is crucial to achieving socially, economically and environmentally sustainable development of any human project (Jordan, 2008; Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., 2008). It is quite well established that governance as a term has been used pervasively to address issues confronting sustainable development (Bridge & Perreault, 2009). But the analytical strength of the concept provides a compelling frame to address rising environmental concerns of modernization due to human material needs (Davidson & Frickel, 2004). Common to most of the literature is the emphasis
on the crossroads of environment, development and governance and the plurality of approaches to promoting social relations recognizing interdependence of actors and their actions in relation to spatial and historical factors (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Bulkeley & Mol, 2003; Bulkeley, 2005; Bell & Hindmoor, 2009). Van Zeijl-Rozema et al., (2008) submit that the problems associated with sustainable development are inherent in governance through miscommunication between stakeholders and mismatch of approaches with the instruments thus hampering linking the elements of sustainable development meaningfully.

Like many other states (Kettl, 2000; Budds, 2004; Lockie & Higgins, 2007; Perreault, 2009; Harris & Islar, 2013), Nigeria has institutionalised environmental regulation and devolved economic and regulatory responsibilities to the market actors and subnational governments respectively in response to rising international debt profile and public outcry over environmental problems nationally (Adegoroye, 1994; Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006; Fagbohun, 2012; Amokaye, 2012; Ekanade, 2014). Successive governments introduced the controversial neoliberal policies as mandated by the global financial institutions (Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006; Ekanade, 2014). These events, though reactive and unstructured, strengthen the involvement of non-governmental actors in governance in Nigeria. This is evident in the rising number of non-governmental organisations and their networks within and outside the country (Ogunyemi, Tella & Venditto, 2005). It thereby exposes an arena of socio-spatial relations and coordination implicated by power shift and reallocation of responsibility to new actors in governance in Nigeria.

Considering the above argument, this thesis explores the effects of neoliberal policy of privatization on resource governance exemplified by the Nigerian Cement Industry. The
thesis addresses the challenges related to governance through ‘nature’ for sustainable development by exploring the shrinking roles of government and new roles of non-state actors which have increased rapidly since the 1980s. The suggestion of governance through nature rather than governance of nature (Bridge & Perreault, 2009) pinpoints the relevance of this study particularly in developing countries. Bridge and Perreault (2009) suggest that the application of the ‘intellectual credentials’ of governance that does not omit or conceal the concept’s social and spatial relevance should consider nature as an agency in the analysis of governance from geography.

Nigeria is predominantly an extractive economy; the country relies heavily on crude oil drilling and processing to meet its development needs. Aside from oil and gas, Nigeria has over 34 economically viable mineral resources some of which are yet untapped while some are illegally mined at the detriment of the host communities (Ogundipe, 2017). Privatization in Nigeria began in the late 1980s under the military regime and by 1999 the democratically elected administration continued with the transition process. Since then, significant changes have occurred in political economy and public administration, but there has been less improvement in environmental well-being and livelihoods of the citizens. As part of the transition process, Nigeria’s cement industry, one of its major non-oil extractive industries, was privatized.

Nigeria’s cement industry has become one of the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, hosting the largest cement plant in this region and now is the first significant exporter of cement in Africa (Oluwakinyesi, 2010, Industry update, 2010). Appreciating these changes in the context of economic development, it is worthy of note that cement production is one of the largest
contributors to global environmental challenges (CSI, 2002). The industry is resource, capital and energy intensive and thereby a significant flash point for environmental pollution, ecosystem degradation and climate change as well as socio-environmental conflicts (CSI, 2002). The society-economy-environment intricacies of institutional reforms and transformations in the industry make a strong case for a pioneering analysis utilising multilevel governance of this natural resource-based industry.

1.3 Aim and Objectives

The general aim of this study is a ‘thick analysis’ of the effects of privatization as a neoliberalisation process on the state-business-society relations in the Nigerian cement industry using a multilevel governance framework. The nature of the study required me to interact with a wide spectrum of actors within and across different scales beyond the central state as significant sources of primary data. This material was then triangulated with extensive secondary data, primarily grey literatures (Government policy documents, NGO reports, community strategies) and academic (theoretical and empirical) studies. These combined with leading academic studies on neoliberalisation of nature, multilevel governance and extractive economies informed my exploit to analyse multilevel environmental governance as implicated by the privatization of Nigerian cement industry. Three specific objectives evolved from the engagement with debates on Neoliberal governance for sustainable development in extractive economies to achieve the aim of the study:

1. Recognising the devolution of economic responsibilities to the private sector and attempted improvement of environmental protection by successive governments, the first objective is to assess how the Nigerian state has configured environmental
governance of the cement industry and the roles sub-national tiers of government play in this governance process. Consequently, the historical and evidential perspectives of central state efforts at evolving coherent environmental governance institutions and instruments are examined. Further from that, the implications of the changing roles of the state actors as facilitator and regulator were articulated using the Nigerian cement industry example.

2. The second objective is to examine the responses and roles of non-state actors and stakeholders in the political and economic transition process and the emerging configuration of governance in the cement sector. Considering the introduction of neoliberal policy in the Nigerian cement industry, the goals of emerging non-state interests such as private sector actors and civil society organisation, and how they complement government efforts are critically articulated in this objective.

3. Finally, in the third objective, the study attempts to understand and provide evidence of how the state actors' jurisdictional authority to promote governance has influenced the actions and interactions of business and society in the Nigerian cement sector. This is to illuminate how the state and non-state actors' relations and responses to privatization can be understood as contestations to achieving sustainable development in the Nigerian cement industry.

Three questions thus raised through these objectives are:

1. How has the state configured environmental governance of the cement industry and what roles do sub-national tiers of the administration play in this process?
2. How have the non-state actors and stakeholders’ roles and relations in environmental governance been affected by privatization in the cement industry?

3. How can the multilevel governance practices in the Nigerian cement industry be understood and explained as contestations to achieving sustainable development of natural resources?

1.4 Structure of the thesis

Following from this introduction, the rest of the thesis consists of literature review, national context, methods, three empirical chapters informed from a MLG perspective, and conclusions. In chapter two I present a review of literature on the conceptual framework adopted in the study. The chapter begins with a discussion of the origins and meaning of governance as well as its multilevel perspectives as an analytical concept. It explores the multilevel and scalar arguments and criticisms of governance, unpacks the mainstreaming of governance perspective in development and environmental geography and its relevance to this study. Key issues for empirical investigation are also highlighted. The multilevel perspective of the concept of governance informed its application to resource governance in a developing country in transition. This is to illuminate how paradigm shift in thinking, ways of working and coordination of society (Bulkeley & Mol, 2003; Davidson & Frickel, 2004; De Loe et al., 2009; Gisselquist, 2012, Jordan, 2001) associated with neoliberal governance has manifested in this case study.

To apply the multilevel governance framework discussed in chapter two in a developing country context, I have charted the history of development and environmental planning in Nigeria as it relates to the non-oil extractive industries in chapter three. I then decipher how
the country’s development efforts have led to reconfiguration and the reallocation of policy roles from the central state to other scales of government and non-state actors and informal institutions exemplified in the case study sector. It was concluded that the political, environmental and economic history of the country indicates that Nigeria is an extractive economy. Its economic backbone is the environmental resources spread across the country. There has been significant increase in the number of economic and environmental actors based on political and economic freedom associated with neoliberal governance. The human and natural resources endowment of Nigeria and the changing institutional arrangement for development provide an avenue to explore the implications of governance-centric development approach for sustainable development in strategic priority sectors of global environmental concern. The study can be focused on the Nigerian cement sector, a significant non-oil extractive industry in a major cement producing state, Ogun state in southwest Nigeria.

Chapter four sets out the methodology used to carry out the study as well as other contextual and ethical issues that affected the research process. The chapter describes the Nigerian case study context by outlining the areas selected for in-depth study and the rationale for its selection. It also provides justification for the choice of qualitative research methodology and the case study approach used herein. The chapter discussed the methods of data collection and analysis in detail followed by ethical issues and the narrative of the research experience.

Having analysed the qualitative data, Chapter five thoroughly evaluates the advent of a coherent environmental governance arrangement in the country and its configuration by state actors in the Nigerian cement sector. It also critically analyses the roles of subnational
governments’ as it relates to power sharing and distribution for effective processes in the industry. The chapter discusses emerging issues and implications for sustainable development in the Nigerian cement sector as implicated by the findings and grey literature.

Chapter six is the second of the empirical chapters; it presents a detailed analysis of how non-state actors and stakeholders’ roles and relations have been affected by privatization of the cement industry. It discusses extensively how the new governance actors’ roles compensate for state actors’ roles politically and economically, the prospects and challenges associated with their new roles particularly in relation to extractive industries based on the findings of the study.

After critically examining the state and non-state actors’ roles in the new Nigerian cement industry in the last two chapters as implicated by the recent policy reforms, chapter seven focuses attention on the assessment of the capacity and practices of multilevel governance in the Nigerian cement sector. This is a with a view to understanding and explaining multilevel governance practices evident in the cement sector. The neoliberal governance of the cement sector is expected to manifest in the practice of corporate values and strategies by the private sector actors as the new governance actor in the cement sector. The chapter engages collaborative governance as framework to inform the partnerships experienced between actors in the sector. It also critiques comparatively corporate governance and corporate social responsibilities of the corporate governance actors. The implications of the findings for governance through nature in developing and extractive economies context are then discussed.
Chapter eight presents the conclusion of the study. In the chapter, I critically reflect on the knowledge and social learning attributable to this study beginning with reflection on the objectives of the study. I then discuss methodological, conceptual and theoretical as well as the policy contributions of the thesis to knowledge in the governance for sustainable development discourse. Bearing in mind the developing country context, methodological, conceptual and financial limitations of the study as well as suggestions for further studies were highlighted.
Figure 1.1: An overview of the thesis structure
CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Building on the first chapter, here I present a review of literature on the conceptual framework adopted to analyse governance through nature in a neoliberal context in the Nigerian cement industry. As discussed in chapter one, the study’s aim is an analysis of the effects of privatisation on social relations in the Nigerian cement industry. To be able to achieve the aim, a multilevel framework that brings together all the governance elements discussed here is needed because of its robustness to frame and assess the different modes of governance emerging in the Nigerian cement industry case study. I begin by discussing the meaning and history of the term Governance as a theoretical concept in section 2.2. I also discuss the multilevel perspectives of the concept as well as the central issues of concern in the governance discourse. This is followed by theoretical propositions and orientations of the concept affirming its “intellectual credentials” (Bridge & Perreault, 2009, p. 475) in section 2.3. A critical review of the empirical application of governance approach in environmental geography and why its multilevel perspective as a ‘compelling metaphor’ (Rosamond, 2000, p.197) informed my conceptual and analytical framework in this study are discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. Although, traces are evident in institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework (Paavola, 2008, 2016), application of multilevel framework to governance analysis became prominent through the seminal works of Hooghe and Marks on multilevel environmental governance in the European Union (Piattoni, 2010). In section 2.6, I discuss the context by which the multilevel and scalar perspective of governance is applied in this study before presenting the summary of the chapter in the concluding section.
2.2 Governance: Meaning, History and Features

The governance perspective emerged to challenge the so-called traditional policy paradigm (TPP) (Johnson, 2009) of hierarchical/command and control institutions. The term has drawn attention to the increasingly changing condition of ordered rules and new ways of state-society steering (Rhodes, 1997), resulting in outcomes different from the traditional institutions of government (Stoker, 1998). Most steering and development responsibilities that were exclusive to states are now shared between the public, the private and the voluntary sectors in more flexible governing arrangements (Rhodes, 1997). As an analytical concept, governance offers ways to analyse how various modes of governing have implications for policy outcomes by capturing the implementation and outcome side of the process among other uses (Kjær, 2011).

The Commission on Global Governance (1995, p.4) define governance as “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private manage their common affairs.” Kooiman (2003) believes that a governance perspective indicates that public governing is not only carried out by one set of actors such as only the state but rather a shared set of responsibilities through ‘self-governing’; co-governing, as well as authoritative or hierarchical governing’. Though governance remains arguable as to whether it constitutes a theory or not, its virtues as a theoretical concept lie in its framing to explore changing boundaries between state and society and its compelling scope to explore state authority as an empirical question (Kjær, 2011). Governance has since been used to capture a paradigm shift in thinking, ways of working and the coordination of society (Bulkeley & Mol, 2003; Davidson & Frickel,

Academic debate on governance began to appear in the 1980s through the advocacy for good governance by civil society organisations (Ghaus-Pasha, 2004; Ives, 2015). Over time, the concept became a buzzword to describe a specific form of management indicating dispersion of authority from traditional government to new governance (Pierre, 2000a; Rosenau, 2002) and improvement from the traditional idea of ‘shareholders to stakeholders’ (Ives, 2015). The substance of governance as a concept lies in Pierre’s (2000a) distinction between state-centric and society-centric governance. Pierre describes state-centric as “old governance” focusing on how the political-institutional system steers society and public policies. The society-centric is the “new governance” centring on the ability of society to govern itself (Pierre, 2000a; Capano, Howlett & Ramesh, 2015).

Evidently, between 1980 and 1990, national governments were busy introducing managerialism and service contracting to the private sectors implied the proliferation of non-state actors in achieving public goals (Kjær, 2011). Through the pioneering works of Rod Rhodes and James Rosenau governance became more prominent as it opened-up new research agenda (Kjær, 2011; Coleman, 2012). Kjær (2011) describes Rhodes as one of the most influential in British political science in the development of governance approach. By pointing to the many simultaneous processes of ‘hollowing out’, Rhodes’ demonstrated that the central state was losing steering capacity, and his works gave us the conceptual tools with which to understand those changes (Kjær, 2011).
Parallel to Rhodes’ contribution, James Rosenau’s observations of international relations in 1995 presents another remarkable contribution to the governance perspective. One of his major contributions is the argument that an irreversible process is underway wherein authority is increasingly disaggregated and associated with diverse spheres of governance (Coleman, 2012). Rosenau distinguished "government" from "governance" - consisting of rule systems and steering mechanisms by which authority is exercised and desired goals are realized. He argued that the rule systems of governments can be thought of as structures and those of governance as social functions or processes that can be performed or implemented in a variety of ways at different times and places by a wide variety of organizations (Rosenau, 2002). The key distinction between government and governance lies in the spheres of authority which can either be formal or informal forms (Coleman, 2012), this is necessarily multilevel and multi-actor in nature.

The characteristic of any site of authority is a capacity to generate compliance on those persons or organization towards which objectives are being issued (Coleman, 2012). Rosenau and Rhodes’ contributions reflect the view of governance as a bifurcated system comprising of an interstate system of states and their national governments that has long dominated the course of events (Coleman, 2012). Alongside the bifurcation system is the multi-centric system comprising of diverse types of other actors that sometimes cooperate or compete but endlessly interacting with the state (Coleman, 2012). Since the 1990s, the governance concept has continued to feed back into public policy and political practice.

The governance perspective has since become the option to navigate the dilemmas of the Traditional governing style, ‘old governance’ which Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., (2008) identify
as: wicked problems, social complexity and weak institutionalization. In the context of development content, ‘wicked’ problems are ill-defined and unstructured problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973; Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., 2008). Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., (2008) contend that addressing wicked problems affecting the traditional governing style requires new thinking, tools and methods. The dilemma of social complexity is viewed in terms of developmental processes, and the plurality of actors and parties involved in these processes. Social complexity dilemma is addressed through governance approach considering the need for interdependencies between competent actors and agents (Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., 2008). The institutional setting remains the platform at which the content and processes of addressing issues are laid (Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., 2008. In a development process, the institutional setting for development initiatives under the traditional government is unidirectional and weak to tackle multijurisdictional and multidirectional development issues, hence the governance approach (Kemp, Parto & Gibson, 2005; Kemp & Martens, 2007; Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., 2008). The governance framework addresses traditional government style dilemmas through its ability to govern without necessarily involving the central state or idea of governance as a shared responsibility of representatives from the state and non-state actors, in other words, multilevel governance processes.

Multilevel credentials and characteristics of the concept of governance can be traced back to the emergence of neoliberal practices in the 1980s by the conservative politicians such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the UK and US respectively (Harvey, 2005). Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005, p.1) assert that “we live in the age of neoliberalism” because of the
growing manifestation of practical implementation of both political and economic ideas related to governance ideology (Thorsen & Lie, 2007). Harvey (2005, p. 2) explains that:

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit” (Harvey 2005, p. 2).

Harvey argues that the turn toward neoliberal ideas in political economic practices not only emerged in the 1990s but has been building up since the 1970s (Thorsen & Lie, 2007). He also identified the vanguards of neoliberalism to include anti-liberal autocrats namely Deng Xiaoping and Augusto Pinochet; neoliberals with liberal identity: Hayek and Friedman as well as nominally conservative politicians such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The emergence and ascendancy of neoliberal policies in the 1980s could be understood as reactions to failures of the welfare state on one hand and the advocacy for good governance by the civil society (Ghaus-Pasha, 2004). Governance has been the buzzword in academia and public policy used in relation to the changes associated with neoliberal policies (Brenner, 1997; De Angelis, 2003; Castree, 2008). Neoliberal governance in essence entails “a purposive act, usually by state actors, aiming at providing stability in socio-economic flows, normally entailing more or less coercive systems of regulation, and crucially relying on the
networked active participation and self-management of non-state actors such as NGOs and other civil society groups as well as business” (De Angelis, 2003, pp.3-4).

Further from the emphatic influence of neoliberal policies on the governance perspective explicitly discussed above, Hooghe and Marks (1993) is a significant reference point to the multilevel perspectives of governance (Jordan, 2001; Paavola, 2008; Piattoni, 2009). Although the multilevel framework has been traced back to the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Paavola, 2008; Abimbola, et al., 2014), the application from governance perspective became more compelling and prominent since its use by Hooghe and Marks in 1993. Multilevel governance (MLG) was used in the 1990s by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks in their study of the sub-national policy structures that were put in place by the European Union Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Piattoni, 2009, 2010; Stephenson, 2013). In the context of European integration, multilevel governance raises new questions regarding the roles, powers and authority of states, and incorporates the usual separate domains of domestic and international politics directing attention to the blurred distinction between these domains (Marks, Hooghe & Blank, 1996; Bache & Flinders, 2004). At the European Union level, the principles of multilevel governance are reflected in the combination of communal decision making over wide swath of policy and the entanglement of the member states’ national administration with the European policy level (Jordan, 2001; Jordan, Wurzel & Zito, 2005).

The interconnected institutions that exist at multiple levels with unique policy features make the European Union a sui generis (unique) political construction constituted from different actors at a variety of scales (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Actors at the supranational scale
include European Commission, European Council, European Parliament; the national scale of its member states, and the subnational or regional and local scales (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). The emerging multiple scales interact with each other in two different vertical and horizontal dimensions (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). The vertical dimension interacts across different levels of government, while the horizontal dimension refers to cooperation arrangements between regions or between municipalities (Hooghe & Mark 2003, Piattoni, 2009).

Hooghe & Marks (2003) describe multilevel governance (MLG) as the ‘dispersion’ of decision-making authority away from the central state with new modes of governing alongside traditional hierarchical modes. According to Hooghe and Marks (2003), these consist of two types of governance: Type 1 and Type 2. They explain Type 1 MLG as a jurisdiction with a limited number of levels such as international, national, regional, meso and local. Every citizen is in a nested jurisdiction with only one relevant jurisdiction at any territorial scale (nation/country) (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 2010). The jurisdiction is usually stable for periods of several decades or more while the allocation of policy competences across jurisdictional levels is flexible (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Type II MLG on the other hand composes of specialized jurisdictions unlike Type 1 MLG (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). It is fragmented into functionally specific pieces such as solving a specific common resource problem (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Type II jurisdictions operate at different scales finely with no great fixity in their existence; they tend to come and go as demands for governance change (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Piattoni, 2009). The Type II MLG crosses and highlights the blurred distinctions between domains of domestic and international politics (Milio, 2010). This scientific framing of authority dispersion away from
the central state makes the governance concept a “compelling metaphor” useful in understanding social relations (Rosamond, 2000, p.197).

Although MLG has been criticized on many grounds, its intellectual credential and analytical capability in framing and understanding the complexity of social relations remain appreciated in fostering social learning towards sustainable development (Newell, Pattberg & Schroeder, 2012; Bebbington, 2013; Bixler, 2014). Bekemans’ (2009) criticism is that MLG is not a proper theory but an approach because it is descriptive in nature. Rosenau (2002) argues that MLG does not address the question of integrating loyalty and sovereignty which makes it hierarchical in nature. Rosenau claims that issues of loyalty and sovereignty may lead to the clash between fragmentation and integration termed ‘fragmegration’. He submits that specific issues of loyalty and sovereignty between levels and their future need to be properly addressed (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Baker, Hudson and Woodward, (2005) however do not see the emerging international regulatory networks as separate sources of authority but a representation of the reconstituted state authority pursuing state level governance through another means. They argue for the need to address the sovereignty of the state (Tengku-Hamza, 2011).

Despite the criticisms, MLG has remained a widely used governance system framework decision-making issues and competences at multiple scales and levels. It has been applied to understanding consequences of different policies involving a variety of actors where common institutional solutions are proposed at different scales to manage diversities (Bekemans, 2009; Paavola, 2008). Similar related organizing concepts such as multi-tiered governance, polycentric governance and multi-perspectives governance have been in use for over 3-4
decades. However, MLG as framework offers a way to move beyond the limits of rigid distinctions between and within domestic and international politics by advancing the different territorial scales at which government operates and the implications of an increased interdependence between governments and non-state actors across the various scales (Rosamond, 2000; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Paavola, 2008).

Two central issues of constant debate in governance include power and legitimacy. Different schools of thought abound on how power and legitimacy affect the dispersion of power under the frame of governance. One school of thought opines that the new governance modes hollow out power of the state (Rhodes, 1997; Jessop, 2004). Another school argues that multilevel governance further strengthens the role of states in the governance process (Bell, Hindmoor & Mols, 2010; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Others such as Pierre (2000b); Rosenau and Durfee (1999) and Karkkainen (2004) believe authority of the state is only being transformed and their dominance reduced rather than hollowed out. In the case of legitimacy, governance approach has been closely linked to democracy (Tengku-Hamza, 2011) and Non-state actors and informal institutions are not democratically elected and as such they do not possess the substantive legitimate authority like elected actors of the state (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). But on the ground of territorial interest and functional/professional roles, non-state actors and informal institutions have continued to create spaces of governance parallel to the state (Piattoni, 2009).

Multiplicity of scales, actors and modes of governance gives a significant degree of intellectual agreement in the academic and policy literatures (Paavola, 2008; Bridge & Perreault, 2009; Reed & Bruyneel, 2010). The multilevel governance perspective is about
power distribution among various scales of authority from bottom up or from outside the sovereign state (Piattoni, 2010). Contrary to power sharing between tiers of authority in a state-centric mode of governance, the governance perspective acknowledges emphatically the dispersion of power beyond the sovereign state (Stoker, 1998; Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bache & Flinders, 2004). Alongside the multilevel perspective, the multi-actor perspective is the other important feature of the multilevel governance approach. Multi-actor refers to the involvement of both state and non-state actors in governance. Three main strands of actors have been identified in the literature: the state-centric actors—most clearly government officials and bureaucrats; society-centric actors are the non-state actors such as the NGOs, civil society groups, interest groups among others and the hybrid of both state and society-centric actors (Pierre, 2000a; Rosenau & Durfee, 1999; Karkkainen, 2004; Tengku-Hamza, 2011).

Another distinct and important feature of multilevel governance is the mechanism by which governance is carried out, that is the mode of governance (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). The multiplicity and flexible character of the concept of governance as a framework signifies the emergence of different governance approaches which allows for options that suits a specific situation or context (Kjær, 2011). Different modes of governance have been identified in the literature (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). For example, Kooiman (2003) identifies self-governing, co-governing and authoritative or hierarchical governing as the major modes of governance. Bell and Hindmoor (2009) presents hierarchy, persuasion, market, community engagements and associations as modes of governance from state-centric perspectives. Kooiman’s self-governing is similar with Bell and Hindmoor’s community engagement while associations in
Bell and Hindmoor’s classification possess similar features with Kooiman’s co-governing. Markets classified separately as a mode of governance by Bell and Hindmoor was also discussed by Kooiman under self-governing (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Having contrasted the differences and similarities, Tengku-Hamza (2011) identified four types namely: hierarchical, persuasion, self-governance and co-governance, these four modes of governance are discussed in the next section.

2.2.1 Modes of governance: The Hierarchical, Persuasion, Self-Governance and Co-governance modes

The hierarchical mode of governance is characterized by top-down control where governing entities determine how policy should be conducted and implemented to achieve set objectives (Kooiman, 2003; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). In this mode, the behaviour of other participants is influenced by government authorities in a formal and vertical structure with sanctions (Kooiman, 2003). Hierarchical governance is typically a type I multilevel governance characterized by steering and control. It is closely related to the implementation of good governance concept which deals with issues of efficient, accountable and transparent delivery of public services (Jordan, 2008; Gisselquist, 2012; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). In persuasive governance, actors seek to change two things in the society being governed; the behaviour and mind-set to achieve specific policy objectives (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009). This is done through education and extension programs with much stress on information to motivate and influence public behaviour and mind-set about certain issues. Examples in this case includes different awareness campaign of government and non-governmental organizations on social and environmental issues such as climate change, green awareness, population control as well as
clean energy programmes across the world. Unlike the hierarchical mode, persuasive
governance is voluntary and could be done in many ways, it is a mode that can be practised by
either state actors or non-state actors.

Self-governance is described as the capacity of societies to govern selves autonomously
(Kooiman, 2003). It is a situation described as when non-state actors take care of themselves
outside the purview of government (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Deregulation and privatization of
public corporations mark the beginning of the interests in self-governance. The emergence of
this mode of governance could be due to two reasons; firstly, in search of ways to strengthen
self-steering capacity of the society and secondly in search for other actors of governance
other than the state, in certain areas where the state cannot fulfil its governing promises
(Kooiman, 2003; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Self-governance is considered a mode of governance
because it is not created by government though sometimes it is operating under the shadows
of state actors (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Corporate bodies now adopt self-governance modes to
play their new political roles in neoliberal governance, this is evident in the changes in
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility strategies (Brammer, Jackson &
Matten, 2012).

Co-governance is one of the most prominent defining characteristics of the new governance
modes which has manifested in multiple forms. Co-governance expresses partnership and
collaboration among governance actors to relate and pool resources in achieving common
goals (Zadek & Radovich, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008). Some of the major ways of co-
governance include co-management, public-private partnerships (PPP) and networks
identifies Public-Private Partnership as one of the extensively applied and preferred mode of governance in many states in recent years in environmental governance because of the ways it overlaps with another important aspect of governance. PPP involves the sharing of risks and benefits among partners; it depends on a great degree of interdependency, trust, co-operation, common goals and the division of responsibilities and authority among partners (Kooiman 2003; Tengku-Hamza 2011). Multi-stakeholder partnerships have been argued to be one of the most important institutional innovations in the 21st century (Zadek & Radovich, 2006). Collaborative governance has significantly changed relations and interaction between state and non-state actors in achieving common objectives (Ansell & Gash, 2008). This section and the preceding section have discussed extensively the origin and types of governance as an expression of changes in the ways of thinking and coordinating society. In the next section, theoretical arguments about governance as a conceptual fit rather than a theory are discussed.

2.3 Theoretical arguments of Governance

The theoretical roots of governance have been traced to involve several theories which have helped to inspire and influence its emergence as an organizing framework. Stoker (1998) notes that the contribution of governance as a theoretical concept is (1) its value as an organizing framework for understanding changing process of governing; (2) as a language and frame of reference for empirical understanding of state-society complexity and social learning. Stoker identifies five complimentary propositions for the consideration of governance as a theory as follows. He also discusses the related dilemma to each of the proposition as well as suggested solutions.
Stoker’s first proposition is that governance identifies a set of institutions and actors drawn from and beyond the state that are crucial to public administration. This implies that in a unitary state there is only one scale of power. However, there exist many scales and diverse links between many agencies of government at local, regional, national and supranational scales. This complex architecture to systems of government is what the new governance seeks to emphasize and focus attention on (Stoker, 1998). The governance perspective further draws attention to private and voluntary sectors increasing involvement in decision-making which previously was the exclusive responsibility of government and a deviation from the norm of formalities and a concern for “what should be” to pay attention to “what is”. However, exercise of power by the informal actors under the guise of governance needs to be legitimate; this poses a major challenge as it creates confusion and uncertainty of its successful application (Stoker, 1998). As such, legitimacy is an issue to be considered in enhancing governance as it lacks the legitimising myths of traditional governance.

Secondly, Stoker posits that governance identifies the blurring boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues. The governance perspective draws attention to the shift in responsibility but not necessarily stepping back of the state (Jordan, 2001) rather pushing back of responsibilities to private, voluntary and the citizen. This proposition emphasises response and reaction to a welfare system which stimulates dependence on the state to more emphasis on citizens’ right and responsibilities. This shift in responsibilities Stoker explains, finds its expression in the blurring of boundaries between the public and private which in turn gave rise to a range of third-sector agencies. The governance perspective essentially demands that these third-sector forces be recognised in tackling collective
concerns without total formal reliance on government. An important cause for concern in this perspective is the question of ambiguity and uncertainty the blurring creates in the mind of policy-makers and public about who is responsible and can lead to blame shifting (Stoker, 1998).

In the third proposition, Stoker relates that governance also identifies power dependence involved in relationships between institutions involved in collective actions. Governance as a social coordination and an interactive process means no single actor either public or private has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally (Kooiman, 2003; Stoker, 1998). Governance involves various forms of partnership which can be in three different forms viz: principal-agent form which rests on two actors; one principal the other agent working together and undertake a task (Broadbent, Dietrich & Laughlin 1996) (cited in Stoker, 1998). Second is the inter-organisational negotiation which involves organisations negotiating joint projects to blend their capacities to achieve better goals (Jessop, 1996) (cited in Stoker, 1998). The systemic coordination is the third form of partnership which is a step further from the other forms because it involves ‘games about rules’ rather than ‘games under rules’. This is expressed in its ability to produce designed, intentionally chosen and adopted governance orders or structures (Stoker, 1998). The systemic coordination is greatly involved in the new governance perspective in that no actor or organization can easily command, although one may dominate, persistent tension arises between the various actors. The dilemma that may be faced in this case relates to opportunistic behaviour of actors which may add to the complexity and uncertainty of outcomes (Stoker, 1998). The governance perspective however leaves more room for greater willingness to cope with uncertainty and
open-endedness than the command and control style (Stoker, 1998). The goal of governance in the fourth proposition is the partnership activity resulting in self-governing networks. Stoker argues that the ultimate action in this case is the establishment of a viable regime where actors and institutions blend their resources to gain capacity to act in long term coalition. The resultant coordination is the formation of informal regime which not only involve just influencing government policy but taking over the business of government. The emphasis here is that normatively, various institutional arrangements can evolve to enable people to co-operate over issues concerning them. Stoker submits that, self-organized systems of control among the key participants are seen as more effective than government-imposed regulation but the question of accountability brings to fore the key challenge of this proposition. Issue of accountability may arise from within or outside the network but this can be better managed by bringing back the government in some form not in a sovereign position but to indirectly steer the networks (Stoker, 1998).

Stoker in the last proposition identifies that governance perspective sees government as being able to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide as actors in the emergent style of governing. In this case, government needs to be involved in the task of managing the opportunities the new governing styles offer by redirecting the task of government in the task of governance (Kooiman & Van Vliet, 1993) (cited in Stoker, 1998) through the adoption of ‘system management’ (Stewart, 1996; Stoker, 1998). ‘The system management involves thinking and acting beyond the individual sub-systems, avoiding unwanted side effects and establishing mechanisms for effective co-ordination’ (Stoker, 1998, p. 24). This means that the governance perspective is not an end in itself. Considering an array of dilemmas identified
with the governance perspective and the traditional governing style, the ways of bridging the gap of governance failure starts with retooling and experimentation of emerging approaches (Stoker, 1998).

In a related research, Bevir (2011) identifies five theories believed to have arguably influenced the formation of governance theory: Policy network theory, rational choice theory, interpretive theories, Organization theory, and system theory. Policy network theory rose out of pluralism in its attempts to disaggregate the state and focus on groups and how network modifies our grasp of interdependence, coordination and pluralism (Bevir, 2011). Bevir explains that rational choice theory plays an important role on the issue of welfare state and principal-agent relations. The theory inspired some of the managerial reforms associated with the new governing style (Bevir, 2013). Rational choice theory emphasizes the need for policy actors to pay more attention to rational choice analyses of the chaos and instability associated with weak institutions rather than superficial support public choice theory gave to ‘choice’ and markets (Bevir, 2011, 2013).

Interpretive theories of governance have contributed immensely to the discourse of governance by focusing on decentred views of governance and the need to adopt a more people-centred approach rather the positivism approach to governance. The theory insists that social life is inherently meaningful and that people remain intentional agents capable of acting for reasons (Bevir, 2011). These people-centred social actions cannot properly be explained or grasped through positivist approaches. Governance consists of contingent practices that emerge from competing actions and beliefs of different people responding to various
dilemmas against the background of conflicting traditions (Bevir, 2011). Organization theory in its contribution, Bevir reiterates emphasizes the voluntarism and collective action as they determine the nature of governance. Institutionalist theory meanwhile focuses attention on institutionalizing the new governance mode by developing its culture and inner functioning (Bevir, 2013).

Finally, system theory emphasizes locating the new governance within the narratives of modernity which consists of functional differentiation over time (Bevir, 2010). The systems perspective conceives of governance as coordination and a property of systems. Using the language and idea of General System Theory (Von Bertalanffy, 1968), social system theory emphasizes the study of interactions, organizations and societies. The main argument here is that modernity is an embodiment of increased functional differences in spatial and temporal terms. These differences may evolve to self-governing specialized organizations within and without the state best understood through decentred approach (Bevir, 2013). The system thinking explores how interdependencies and relationships are made sustainable considering the historical and human differences.

The governance perspective as understood above has been used in a variety of contexts and approaches to theorise shifting roles and power relations between state and non-state actors (Gisselquist, 2012, Griffin, 2012). Griffin (2012) argues that in order to gain greater insight into governance arrangements and their limitations, it is better not to predetermine our theoretical models but rather articulate the geographies of power relations operating in practice. This she argues will enhance visualising the diverse and multiple modes of governance as relative and spatially contingent. In light of the above, I argue that governance
is a good conceptual frame for understanding the spaces of multiple, overlapping and sometimes competing power relations and capabilities in a neoliberal process. These governance credentials have been applied in advanced capitalist countries however its application in developing countries like Nigeria is the main objective of this study. In this context, I have adopted the concept of governance to explore state-society relations in neoliberal resource governance in Nigeria. The next section discusses the engagement with governance concept in environmental geography. This is to broaden our understanding on the conceptual and analytical strength of the concept and how this has informed sustainable resource development in recent past.

2.4 Governance mainstreaming in geographic research: Environmental governance

Geography’s conceptualisation of human activities as a subset of the environment presents an interesting relevance of the concept of governance in man-environment sustainability. (Fellman, Getis & Getis, 2005). Environmental governance has consistently been used to illuminate decision-making approaches in the development and management of environmental resources and their impacts (Bridge and Perreault, 2009). Environmental governance defines the elements needed to achieve sustainability of environmental resource (Adger et al., 2003; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). It refers to both formal and informal actors’ relations to govern both environmental resources development and environmental sustainability. In deviation from the traditional top-down mechanisms used by state actors to ensure regulatory compliance, environmental governance emphasises the involvement of non-state actors such as civil society groups, scientific community, businesses and the public in the management of environmental concerns (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Bridge & Perreault, 2009). Environmental
governance also emphasises providing information, enhancing participation of non-governmental organisations, communities in governance and decision-making activities affecting the use of natural resources sustainably (Wingqvist et al., 2012). Paavola (2008) opines that avoidance of environmental conflicts through the establishment, reaffirmation and change of institutional arrangements is one of the core objectives of environmental governance.

Environmental governance has become a broad analytical framework for addressing the institutional arrangements, spatial scales, organizational structures and social actors involved in decision making around different environment and resources (Bulkeley 2005, Mehta, Leach & Scoones, 2001; Petschow, Rosenau & Weizsäcker, 2005; Reed & Bruyneel 2010). The concept of environmental governance drew its analytical strength from the governance concept as discussed in the preceding sections. Environmental governance has been mainstreamed in geographic analysis to address scalar relations and fill the complex spatialities of environmental degradation and ecological interdependence (Bridge & Perreault, 2009). The concept adopts a processual view of scale as the outcome of deliberation and social cohesion but looks to natural systems for guidance on the geographical scale of governance regimes (Adger et al., 2003, Bulkeley, 2005). In this way, the concept provides a credible frame for a ‘thick analysis’ of natural resource governance (Adger et al., 2003).

It has also been used in the coordination of exchanges within and between firms and distribution of power among competing actors such as between producers and consumers along a production chain (Bridge & Perreault, 2009). Much of the work in this framework is on the emergence of new actors and spaces outside the territorial state and the way these can
influence the environmental consequences of production and consumption in ways that exceed the reach of formal state regulation. Product boycotts, public campaigns and social activism are systems of the emergence of alternative or parallel regulatory mechanism that often articulate with state but are not of the state (Bridge & Perrault, 2009).

Environmental governance has also been applied to frame collective action for resource management. Bridge and Perrault (2009) relates that the expansion of the political realm from the formal arena of representative democracy to include a range of other actors and political spaces is a major example. Another area of application of environmental governance is the regulation of capitalist accumulation focusing on the institutional arrangement of state, market and civil society in relation to capitalism (Bridge & Perrault, 2009). The Most visible and similar issue is the proliferation in number and variety of political actors on environmental issues evidenced by the rapid and the diverse arenas in which politics is practiced with core questions of whose voices get heard and who makes decision as well as questions about right, obligations and responsibilities of political actors (Bridge & Perrault, 2009).

Environmental governance has been conceptualized as a problematic of rule closely linked to the core concerns of regime theory. The problematic Bridge and Perreault argue emerged in the early 1990s as a way of thinking about relations between states in the absence of a clear hegemonic power through bargain-based co-operation. It aimed to overcome collective action challenges and produce socio-natural order (Bridge & Perrault, 2009). Much of the work in this area assume that addressing various international environmental crises requires an unprecedented level of cooperation among states and the generation of new forms of interstate
collaboration, recognition of multi-level/actors and hybridized environmental governance (Bulkeley, 2005, Reed & Bruyneel, 2010).

Environmental governance as currently characterised has slightly influenced and improved governance process in the global north (Jordan et al., 2005; Piattoni, 2010). However, in most developing countries environmental governance is still characterised by integration problems and inadequate institutional capacities among others (Najam, 2005; Muller, 2007; Perreault, 2009). The increasing social conflicts and unrest evident in developing countries can be traced to structurally defective and centralized governance system which results in deprivation, neglect, and poverty (Kjær, 2014). This system of governance and politics of exclusion heighten violent reactions, militancy among others (Akinola, 2010). Continuous innovative experiments with new hybrid and plurilateral forms of governance along with the incorporation of non-state actors are taking place in area of economic development and environmental protection. This involves multilevel, multi-scalar and multi-actor governance approaches particularly in neoliberal philosophy.

Multilevel environmental governance is a compelling framework where the dispersion of decision-making regarding use of resources and management of the environment can be best explored and understood for better transformation (Jordan, 2001; Jessop, 2004; Bulkeley, 2005; Paavola, 2008; Newig & Fristch, 2009). As applied in this study, multilevel environmental governance is conceptualized to examine what new roles are emerging for the state, how the non-state actors are responding to the changing ownership of a resource-based industry (Cement industry) and what implications the changes have on the roles and relations of the state and society for sustainable development. This section has briefly touched on the
mainstreaming of the concept of governance in the management of environmental resources and environmental protection. In the next section, I review studies where environmental governance has been applied exclusively on environmental resources from multilevel perspectives.

2.5 Studies on Multilevel Environmental Governance (MLEG)

The concept of MLEG has been applied extensively in the analysis of environmental decision-making in different contexts. Examples from climate change, waste management and natural resources management issues have shown that the focus of environmental governance has transcended the commonly accepted geographical and political boundaries (Adger et al., 2005; Bulkeley, 2005; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). MLEG as a useful framework for analysing social and spatial relations in environmental resource use has manifested in three different dimensions (Bache & Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 2010) namely:

1. Study of the reconfiguration of the central state and subnational governments in environmental regulation
2. The study of the emergence of non-state actors and informal institutions in environmental resources development and environmental management sometimes parallel to the state and
3. The study of the different collaborations, partnerships and interrelations between the formal and informal institutions for resource governance and environmental management.

For example, Bulkeley and Betsill (2003) argue that the ‘urban’ governance of climate protection involves relations between levels of the state and new network spheres of authority
which challenge traditional distinctions between local, national and global environmental politics. Betsill and Bulkeley (2006) in their study of cities and multilevel governance of global climate change contend that it is only by taking a multilevel perspective that we can fully capture the social, political, and economic processes that shape global environmental governance. Similarly, Gustavsson, Elander, and Lundmark’s (2009) study of Multilevel governance, networking cities, and the geography of climate-change mitigation in Sweden resonate the works of Betsill and Bulkeley (2006). This shows that local level interventions should be part of global politics alongside supra-national negotiations, agreements and policy development (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Bulkeley et al., (2005) used a municipal waste case study to develop a conceptual framework based on an understanding of the multiple modes of governing through which policy is constructed and contested. They argue that the approach is much relevant for other areas of environmental policy and planning which have only partially engaged with broader debates about the changing nature of the state and governance. An analysis of waste governance in New Zealand by Davies (2009) also shows that the supra-national actors are significantly influencing policies and governance at the local level. Other significant studies grounded in neoliberal governance to show the changing relations of state and society in resource governance have also contributed to the discourse of multilevel environmental governance immensely (Bridge, 2002; Robertson, 2004; Bakker, 2005; Perreault, 2005, 2006; McCarthy, 2006). These studies commonly exhibit how privatisation as neoliberal tool was used to express a ‘shift in social relations to the non-human world’ (Castree, 2011, p. 36).
Johnson (2009) investigates how new governance policies and arrangements are being introduced to overcome problems associated with China’s sizable environmental protection ‘implementation deficit’. The study focused on state agencies and their policies, civil society, incorporating environmental protection NGOs, citizen activists, and the media within China’s environmental state. As against implementation success, implementation deficit is the absence of willingness and capacity to put policy into practice successfully (Weale, 1992; Johnson, 2009). Johnson contended that there are significant obstacles to the establishment of a more inclusive ‘governance’ approach to environmental protection in China that goes beyond Party-state institutions and actors. A sense making study of E-waste governance in Malaysia by Tengku-Hamza (2011) shows that multiple levels perspective highlights the reducing control of the state actors at national level in decision-making but not weakening the state rather a ‘redefinition of scope and scale of state activity and a reorganization of social relations between actors as avenue to possibly strengthen the state’s power.

More recent studies have continued to explore resource issues using the Multilevel Governance perspectives. Minsuk (2013) investigates the California Marine Life Protection Act (MLPA) implementation process widely publicized as a successful case of a science-based stakeholder-driven process through Public-Private Partnership. That is the interrelation of ‘the market’, ‘the people’ and ‘the state’. His findings suggest that finding the ‘right’ combination for the MLPA implementation process remains a difficult task, an indication of the complexity of resource governance particularly driven by stakeholders. His opinion of multilevel governance emphasized that state control of such projects is more pertinent with stakeholder consultation rather than stakeholder driven.
Bixler (2013) assessed bottom up evidence of transition from Community Forest Management to Polycentric Governance in British Columbia, Canada. The empirical evidence suggests that viewing community forestry through a polycentric governance network is necessary to theorize complex cross-scale dynamics. And that by incentivising policies, the development of polycentric systems for natural resource governance is encouraged to maintain local benefits while increasing adaptive capacity to deal with complex social–ecological challenges.

Bebbington (2013) addresses institutional and political relationships that govern the interactions between natural resource extraction, economy and society focusing on the mining and hydrocarbon sectors. He admits that any effort to understand the governance of extraction and its relationships to development must be spatially and historically explicit. He suggests institutional arrangements under which resource extraction is more likely to foster inclusive development.

Laing (2015) studied territory, resistance and struggles for the plurinational state in Bolivia. He developed an analytical framework for understanding the changing relations between the state and left-indigenous movements in Latin America. This he used to explore the ways in which a self-defined ‘indigenous movement’, and urban solidarity networks broadly associated with the ‘left’, re-articulated notions of territoriality, the nation-state, democracy and development during the Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS) conflict in Bolivia. Also, Rodon and Therrien (2015) mapped the formal and informal powers and the interaction of the different regulatory institutions from the local to the federal level tasked with different resource governance responsibilities in the Canadian Arctic Region. They analysed the federal effort to streamline environmental governance through the Action
Plan to Improve Northern Regulatory Regimes and assess how it impacts the MLG scene in the Canadian Arctic.

In light of the burgeoning literature, the dispersion of governing authority from nation states and non-state actors and regional level in developed nations reflects the application of multiple level perspective of environmental governance in spatio-temporal contexts regarding a specific environmental issue. Similarly, multilevel perspective environmental governance has been adopted in developing countries of the world. However, it is still at the emergent stage particularly as it relates to privatization of nature-based industry which happens to be main economic hub of many third world nations (Hilson, 2014; Bebbington, 2013). My novel contribution will be to apply this framework to this under-researched and under-represented developing country context.

Several countries in the global south are part of many international agreements such as Agenda21 among others. However available facts indicate that most developing countries are inherently combining their existing governance system mostly state-centric with the new forms of environmental governance of the global North (Campbell, 2008; Bebbington, 2013). This combination is contrary to the normative stance of neoliberal governance (Harvey, 2005). It is expected that neoliberalism as philosophy, a policy discourse and a set of policy measures should ‘responsibilise’ and ‘autonomise’ more actors in decision-making apart from the central government (Castree, 2010).

For example, Harashima (2000) in his work on environmental governance in selected Asian countries reveals that many positive trends have been found recently in environmental
governance of the continent. He submitted that environmental governance in Asian countries have not developed satisfactorily at the national level. Also, Duffy (2006) examines the politics of environmental governance through networks of actors focusing on transnational networks and its effects in Madagascar specifically and developing world generally. Her findings indicate that the concept is a useful framework for understanding environmental politics in the developing world in general. And that complex network of actors has developed to carry out multilevel environmental governance at the national and international levels. The network of donors, international environmental NGOs along with the central government have redefined sovereignty to be neither exclusively national nor wholly global (Duffy, 2006). A related study by Agrawal and Chahetre (2007) on environmental co-governance in the Indian Himalayas suggests that close involvement of government officials is negatively associated with efforts to manage forests sustainably due to centrality of authority. They submit that decentralized, inclusive governance enables local actors to apply local environmental knowledge in local environmental decision-making.

Multilevel environmental governance framework as evident above, allows the proactive analysis and understanding of environmental decision-making in any context of human-environmental activity. The framework also encourages engaging in a mutually constitutive social relations analysis (Bulkeley, 2005). The shift from government to governance I have argued so far is strongly influencing development and environmental policies worldwide with little evidence in the developing countries. While acknowledging the adoption particularly in natural resource sector, empirical studies on the implication of the adoption in developing countries remain under-researched. What the emerging structures look like? How has it
affected relations between and within state and society and what lessons for better state-
society relations? These among other questions prompted the adoption of the intellectual
credential and compelling multilevel analytical strength of governance framework to make
sense of the effects of privatization on social relations in the Nigerian cement industry.
This section presents the empirical applications of the multilevel environmental governance
framework in understanding resource governance and the significance of the framework to
this study. The following section unpacks how the study engages the multilevel environmental
governance framework in this study.

2.6 Framing the application of MLEG to the neoliberal Nigerian cement industry

Recalling the main issues discussed about governance in the preceding sections, the neoliberal
inclination of governance as a concept and the multilevel characteristics constitute the
‘intellectual credentials’ of governance (Bridge and Perrault, 2009). It is these credentials I
intend to apply to frame the conceptual and analytical approach of this study. Governance is
necessarily a multilevel, multi-actor and multimode in nature, therefore its conceptual and
analytical application should recognise its multi-scalar nature (Piattoni, 2010). Considering
the above, I have adopted Piattoni’s (2009, 2010) MLG conceptual and analytical space.
MLG as a concept connects different analytical planes and raises different types of questions
(Piattoni, 2010, p. 26). As elaborated further by Piattoni, MLG must first be understood to be
connected by territorial levels such as the supranational, national and subnational and these
levels command certain degree of authority. She argued that the need to study both the
empirical and normative implications of these levels is because of the challenges of asserting
jurisdictional integrity and relational integrity. These thus raise theoretical, empirical and
normative questions that the development of the framework can help address. Following the adoption of Piattoni’s conceptual space in this study, I will briefly discuss how the events in the Nigerian cement industry in recent past triggered one or more of the elements of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; Castree, 2011). I will also identify the governance process in the sector using the typology of resource governance (Van Alstine et al., 2014) to identify the dimensions of relations, and then identify the governance stakeholders involved in the dimensions in the sector. Having done that, I apply the conceptual and analytical space framework to the study at the instance of multilevel environmental governance.

Bridge and Perrault (2009) identify the two broad areas of enquiry in geographical research which environmental governance has manifested as an analytical framework as neoliberal modes of environmental governance and eco-governmentality. Neoliberalism is a political and economic project that seeks to liberalise trade through processes such as privatization and introduce market oriented management practices as well as social relations (Jessop, 2002; Castree, 2008; Bridge & Perreault, 2009). Castree (2010, p. 8) admits that neoliberalism ‘signifies a range of related meanings that can be applied to a plethora of real-world referents’. He (2010, pp.8-9) contends that neoliberalism summarily denotes one or more of the following:

1. As a worldview- body of normative principles, goal, and aspirations amounting to a philosophy of life

2. A policy discourse- a set of specific values, norms, ambitions and associated policy proposals professed by those who control, or realistically seek to control the formal apparatuses of government
3. As a set of policy measures-concrete regulations and procedures that make both the worldview and the policy discourse evident in some tangible way.

These views, Castree describes as philosophy, program and policy (three Ps), explain the various ways by which social relations between state and non-state actors have changed in recent time.

Neoliberal environmental governance essentially is a fundamental shift towards private sector and civil society norms and institutions competition, markets and efficiency indicators. Geographers' interest in neoliberal environmental governance has been attributed to the multi-scalar politics and institutional processes embedded in neoliberal policies to focus on the putative shift in actors and spaces of decision-making (Liverman, 2004; Bridge & Perrault, 2009). The neoliberal processes as employed in neoliberal environmental governance facilitate the necessity of activist state rather than neoliberal conceit of self-regulating markets (Bridge & Perrault, 2009). Studies on Neoliberal environmental governance focus on the implications of privatization and commercialization of properties while considering the scale re-creation and restructuring through resource user group, environmental non-governmental organizations, among other interest groups.

On the contrary, while neoliberal environmental governance emphasizes shift in structure of governance, Eco-governmentality focuses on rationality of government as an analytical and historical problem through which governable subjects and objects are produced. Eco-governmentality draws its root from Foucauldian understanding of government to analyse the micro-politics of power, discipline and subject formation in relation to the administration of resources and environment. It is concerned about how the discourse and apparatus of
government have come to centre on environmental phenomena through calculative procedure and practice of codification (Bridge & Perrault, 2009). Many studies in the area of eco-governmentality by geographers were conducted in the mid-1990s as reflected in the works of Rutherford, 1994; Darrier, 1996 and Agrawal, 2005 and Goldman, 2005 (discussed explicitly in Bridge & Perrault, 2009). These studies reflect among others how geographers have re-tooled Foucault’s concept of “bio-power”. The concept was used to express the ways in which discourses about strategies toward the management of biological, ecological and biogeochemical processes are a key part of how social order is produced and maintained (Rutherford, 1994; Darrier, 1996). Governmentality as employed here focuses more explicitly on the mechanisms of power and the specific question of how people and things have been aligned in ways that enable their administration and rule (Bridge & Perrault, 2009).

By inference, studies on eco-governmentality have been more state-centric emphasizing power-knowledge nexus as to how power is exercised over, within and through nature. Major examples include technical/hard management structures such as conservation, environmental impact assessment as well as environmental audits. Neoliberal environmental governance on the other hand takes more holistic approach to understanding power shift and relations for governance of an environmental issue (Bridge & Perreault, 2009). I have employed the MLEG framework to explore how neoliberal environmental governance and environmental governmentality as two overlapping areas have developed in a bid to foster sustainable development particularly in the Nigerian cement industry.

In the last 17 years neoliberalisation processes have impacted on the economic development and environmental protection in Nigeria. While the process has evidently transformed the
Nigerian cement industry, the eco-governmentality coupled with the normative political roles associated with neoliberal policies has also affected environmental regulation in the sector. It is therefore acknowledged that the Nigerian cement industry transition demonstrate the practice of neoliberalism as a set of policy measures. The multilevel environmental governance (MLEG) approach is a suitable analytical framework to assess the neoliberal governance characteristics emerging in the sector.

Multilevel governance framework as applied to the Nigerian cement industry can improve our academic insights on the different levels, scales and systems of governance in which economic, social and political processes interact (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Nugent, 2003; Piattoni, 2009, 2010; Hooghe & Marks 2001). It is also useful in illuminating transition and the management of transitions for sustainable development (Kemps et al., 2007; Loorbach, 2010) especially when focusing attention on the qualitative dimension of transition for well-functioning markets and effective regulations rather than the quantitative dimension (Adger et al., 2003; Besley et al., 2010). As introduced earlier in the chapter, the two types of multilevel governance identified by Hooghe and Marks (2003) include Type I, an approach which focuses on the ways in which competences and authority are shared between different levels of government (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Piattoni, 2010). And Type II, a polycentric model with multiple overlapping and interconnected horizontal spheres of authority involved in governing issues (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003).

The application of multilevel environmental governance framework in this study involves engaging with both Type I and II multilevel governance mentioned above to articulate the
construction and contestations of spheres of governance in the neoliberal Nigerian cement industry. The Nigerian cement industry as an extractive sector is recognised as mutually constitutive of scale (Territorial and functional) and multilevel/actors (Networks) helpful in socio-spatial learning of governance relations (Bulkeley, 2005; Reed & Bruyneel, 2010).

Multilevel environmental governance is employed to frame the analysis of natural resource governance in Nigeria as affected by the privatization policy. The multilevel governance framework provides a good starting point to explore and understand how the central state has nested authority with power to effect policy change (Hooghe and Marks, 2003), sub-national governments and non-state actors relate in a neoliberal policy setting either across levels or within levels. The framework provides the flexibility to understand relationships forged between private and public actors in a neoliberal setting. The MLEG framework allows for an approach by which the multi-actor roles and relations are coordinated to influence policy practice (Piattoni, 2009). The application of the MLEG framework to the cement sector suggests that because of the scale and context, relationships in the cement industry span multilevel governance involving configurations and symbolic actors which need to be explored (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003).

Having considered MLEG as the conceptual and analytical frame of this study, my study objectives include understanding:

- the reconfiguration of the state and subnational government roles in environmental regulation of resource-based industry,
- the roles of the burgeoning non-state actors and
The relations between and within both groups of actors.

Engaging multilevel environmental governance framework to explore the above objective is important to better understand environmental resource policy in resource-rich developing countries context. It will also contribute to state-business-society relations by mapping out spaces of multilevel governance in the sector and implications for sustainable development in developing countries in a neoliberal context.

**Governance typology and stakeholders in the Nigerian cement industry**

As it becomes pertinent to explore emergent arena of roles and relations of state and non-state actors in environmental governance within the growing Nigerian cement sector, multi-scale and multi-actor spatial structure is implicit to achieve this aim in the above context. The resource governance typology which identifies the mandatory and voluntary channels and scales through which resource extraction may be governed (Van Alstine et al., 2014) is adopted in this study (Figure 2.1).
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<tr>
<th>State/non-state actors</th>
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<th>Voluntary</th>
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<td>National</td>
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<td>State</td>
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<td>Voluntary initiatives/partnership projects</td>
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<td>Local</td>
<td>EIA/EA/CDA</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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</table>

Figure 2.1: A resource governance typology for the Nigerian cement sector (Van Alstine *et al.*, 2014)


Relating the governance typology above to the multilevel environmental governance framework adopted in this study, two different dimensions of action and influence that warrant attention emerge—the vertical and the horizontal dimensions. In these dimensions, two sets of actors are inherent—territorial and functional interest actors (Piattoni, 2009).

The trend of neoliberalisation which is now apparent with the presence of a variety of different actors that was not there in the past. New government agencies/parastatals have emerged at both national and sub-national scales of governments. Multinational and
indigenous company/investors have taken new economic roles devolved by the central government. Normatively civil society organizations have increased in number with varying interests as stakeholders, community development associations, local and international non-governmental organizations are major examples here. Everyone is taking up roles as concerned citizens or local stakeholders affected by the activities of the new governance actors. These different actors’ roles and relationships towards the goal of environmental governance require a multilevel analysis. The actors identified as participant to gain insights into what roles and relational networks are emerging on the precept of neoliberal policy for environmental governance in the Nigerian cement industry is shown in Figure 2.2 below.

The vertical dimension of multilevel governance recognizes that the central state cannot effectively implement National Environmental policy without the sub-national governments. Also, sub-national governments and local governments cannot effectively operate outside the national policy set by the central government. Sub-national government action is directed by legal and institutional frameworks at higher scales (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). In the case of the extractive industry in Nigeria, the industry by nature is connected to remote but sensitive environments of various sub-national governments but usually guided by the national development policies and priorities made by the central government as the nested authority (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Piattoni, 2010). This means that a two-way relationship between central and sub-national government exists which have significant implications on policy implementation. Cordial and improved coordination between levels of government in the allocation of public responsibilities and resources is a necessity. Assessing the empirics of the
changing roles and relations will give insight to the state of practice of neoliberalism either as a program for sustainable development or a patch work (Haque, 1999).

The horizontal dimension emphasizes the multilevel patterns of governance of both local and transnational networks on environmental policy and governance where actors relate across organizational boundaries to influence outcomes. Within the MLG framework, horizontal coordination may occur at national level-within ministries or countries, at the sub-national levels within ministries and departments as well as between state and non-state actors. It may be between cement manufacturers, NGOs, Civil societies, hosting communities among others at different scales. All these actors hold unique potentials to work closely with each other to address socio-economic and environmental issues in the sector. The need to understand the implications of privatization on the design and implementation of environmental policy in the cement sector using the MLG framework will go a long way in promoting 'what works' as there is 'no one cap fits all' governance approach. It will also contribute to the growing literature on neoliberal environmental governance from environmental geography perspective. Within the framework, sector scale actions on environmental resource policy implementation is considered to focus on the questions of how governance has been reconfigured by the central government through natural resources and the implications for sustainable development.
So far, I have identified a typology of resource governance and relate same to the Nigerian cement industry to identify key governance actors and stakeholders that could be involved in the governance of the Nigerian cement industry in a neoliberal context. The clarification of the multidimensional nature of MLG above is applied to make sense of neoliberal governance through nature in the Nigerian cement industry (Figure 2.3). Applying Piattoni’s (2010) analytical space framework to the Nigerian cement industry will illuminate the understanding of governance through nature spatially and historically (Bebbington, 2013). Using the example of the EU, Piattoni states that exploring and testing multilevel governance relations between Type I and Type II governance would mean entering the analytical space of MLG.
Figure 2.3: MLEG framework applied to the Nigerian cement industry in a neoliberal context
2.7 Conclusion

Evidently, the governance perspective has drawn attention to the increasingly changing condition of ordered rules and new ways of state-society steering which have led to parallel actions to that of traditional institutions of government. The intellectual credentials of governance have proved significantly important in development-environment studies in recent past. The pluralist and flexible characteristics of the governance approach such as multiple scales, actors and modes have significantly aided social learning and understanding of development and environmental issues from different perspectives. This review attests to the intellectual credentials of governance which provide insights on the variety of mechanisms by which governance actions can take place either as formal or informal. The multilevel environmental governance concept has become a framework useful to understand the dynamism of government and governance actors’ interrelations both within and between scales.

In this chapter, I have reviewed the emergence of the concept of governance and how it has become a useful term drawn upon to understand state-society relations. I have also explored its empirical application in environmental geography to understand and explain the power devolution and relations between and within state, business and society. This aim was attained by reviewing the historical evolution of governance concept considering the reasons for its emergence, and pioneer contributors to the governance discourse. Further from the above, I explored the multilevel perspectives of the governance concept with specific reference to Hooghe and Marks seminal studies of the new territorial policy structures in the European Union in the 1990s. I also discussed the theoretical propositions and background which makes
the concept intellectually flexible and robust, as well as the types of governance along with the criticisms of the concept. Thereafter, I reviewed extensively the application of governance approach to environmental studies from multilevel perspectives. Obviously, there have been dispersions of authority from between state actors and from state to non-state actors over time. The multilevel perspectives of governance have also been applied both in the global north and south to explore environmental issues and the emerging spaces of multilevel governance. Thus, MLEG can be used to explore the emergent spaces of contestation in the Nigerian cement industry as it relates to governance for sustainable development.

A multilevel perspective on governance brings to fore the indistinct political boundaries apparent in development and environmental governance. The governance of environmental resources in this case is made more explicit by adopting the multi-level approach because issues regarding environmental resources transcend political boundaries. The issue of environmental resources development and governance is multi-actor in nature and as such can benefit from the application of the multilevel governance perspective. Therefore, the study of policy reforms in the Nigerian mining sector is arguably incomplete without considering other levels of government and the legal roles they play in the process. Similarly, the multi-actor perspective provides the platform for consideration of non-state actors as important governance actors aside from the state actors. Also, multiple modes of governance will facilitate an understanding of the various mechanisms used in governance as well as the actors in the processes. Therefore, based on the above literature, I have found multilevel environmental governance suitable to conceptualise, analysis and understand state-society relations in the governance of the Nigerian cement industry in a neoliberal context. In the
light of that I have situated the Nigerian non-oil industry transformation in the context of neoliberal reforms; I also identified the processes indicating the dimensions of multilevel relations. After that, I identified the state and non-state actors that could be involved in the processes identified. Having done that, I then explained the conceptual and analytical space of multilevel governance adopted to frame the application of multilevel environmental governance in the study. In the next chapter, I explicitly discuss the historical dynamics of the development of the Nigerian non-oil extractive industry to situate the sector in a neoliberal transition context. I also illuminate the context at which the Nigerian cement industry transition is multilevel.
CHAPTER THREE

THE DYNAMICS OF NIGERIA’S NON-OIL EXTRACTIVE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT: A WINDOW ON THE CEMENT SECTOR

3.1 Introduction

According to Peet and Hartwick (2009, p.1) development is the founding belief of the modern world. This according to Perreault (2009) connotes progress, modernity and democratic values, and at the same time carries the aspirations of the poor and the designs of corporate elites. Development as a concept is invariably used either at the scale of societies, nation state and regional economies (Perreault, 2009) or to denote specific practices at the scale of the local and the personal (Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Perreault, 2009). Often these practices arise from public policy projects that have important environmental implications (Perreault, 2009). This chapter articulates how transitions in the Nigerian non-oil extractive industry tick the boxes of the above submissions through neoliberal processes and situate the Nigerian cement industry at the instance of multilevel environmental governance. This is to chart the necessary historical and temporal background of the sector to enhance the needed understanding of past efforts toward natural resources governance at the instance of multilevel governance in a neoliberal context (Bebbington, 2013). To achieve this, the chapter begins with a review of Nigeria’s development planning in history as it affects the extractive industry and the multi-functionality of the environment (Paavola, 2008). This is followed by an attempt to explain how the country’s development approaches might have led to reconfiguration and the dispersion of authority (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). First, from the central government to subnational governments, then from state actors to non-state actors and informal institutions as exemplified by the Nigerian cement sector.
The chapter is in five sections, section 3.1 is the introduction. Section 3.2 discusses the history of regional and economic development plans in Nigeria and the evolution of the Nigerian non-oil extractive sector (NNOES). Section 3.3 focuses on the Nigerian cement industry, it discusses the socio-economic and environmental implications of the industry in the country. Section 3.4 reviews the legal and regulatory framework for the sector and its multilevel governance perspectives- that is how it involves the multiple scales and actors within and beyond the state. The section discusses how the reforms in the Nigerian cement sector sets out the multilevel governance scenario requiring the need for this study. Conclusions are presented in section 3.5 where I reprise the social and spatial perspectives of relations inherent in this primary industrial sector in Nigeria.

3.2 Nigeria’s Development Planning experience

In the history of Nigeria, regional and economic development planning experience predates the country’s independence (Ojo, 2012; Marcellus, 2009). Considering the pre-independence period and other times when no actual plan documents existed due to socio-political upheaval and economic crisis, the Nigerian development planning experience has been into four broad phases (Marcellus, 2009). The eras namely Colonial Era, the Era of Fixed-Term planning (1962-85), the Era of Rolling Plans (1990-1998), and the New Democratic Dispensation (1999 onwards) are adopted in this study to highlight how political instability bred poor planning strategies that have impacted sustainable resource development in Nigeria.
Colonial Era development plan (1946-1960)

The first development plan ever made was a 10-year plan prepared in 1946 till 1956, however, due to the introduction of the federal structure in 1954, the plan was revised (Ojo, 2012). This led to a new development plan to last for four years 1951-1956 but by 1953, another plan was made which resulted to the 1955-1960 economic programmes. This was claimed to have been recommended by the World Bank economic mission invited by the then colonial administrators (Ojo, 2012). The plan was noted for its focus on the need of the colonial masters rather than the needs of the Nigerian people. The plan failed to include the public whose livelihood would be affected in the planning process as the plan’s objectives were not properly defined (Ojo, 2012). The national economic development plan concentrated on a limited range of cash crops such as cocoa, palm products, cotton, groundnut and timber (Moti, 2012). The focus on the development of transport and communication system at that time was mainly to serve the interest of the colonial masters rather than that of the colony (Moti, 2012).

The Era of Fixed- Term Planning (1962-85)

This era marks the beginning of independence and the plans at the period were made by Nigerians rather than the colonial masters. Unlike the pre-independence plans, one would expect plans that are truly committed to the development of the Nigerian state. True to the above expectation, four comprehensive national development plans were conceived and formulated within the framework of improved national accounts (Moti, 2012). These include:

- First National Development Plan (1962-1968),
The Third National Development Plan (1975-1980) and
the Fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985)

The plans covered the operations of both the public and private sectors of the economy and
many well-articulated overall economic targets (Moti, 2012). At that time, it was reported that
the focus of each plan and objectives had far-reaching effects on the nation’s development
(Marcellus, 2009). This was so because the concept of development planning was a common
planning tool for social, economic and sustainable development in Nigeria (Marcellus, 2009;
Ojo, 2012).

The First National Development Plan launched in April 1962 covered a period of six years
(1962-68). However, the execution of the plan was disrupted by the military coup in 1966 and
the 1967-70 civil wars. Irrespective of these disruptions, landmark achievements were
recorded during that period (Ojo, 2012). Some of the notable achievements during this period
include the construction of Oil Refinery in Port Harcourt, Rivers state, Nigeria; The Paper
Mill; The Sugar Mill; The Niger Dam; The Niger Bridge; Extension of Ports and the
construction of trunk ‘A’ roads. Also, five first generation universities were established across
the country by the federal government and regional governments during this period.

The achievement made so far was made possible by the existence of a development blueprint
which provided guidelines for meaningful and co-coordinated development during the plan
period (Moti, 2012).

As a post-war development plan, the Second National Development Plan was launched in
1970 (Moti, 2012). The plan focused on the reconstruction of a war-battered economy and the
promotion of economic and social development in the new Nigeria. The Second National
Development Plan also made remarkable social and economic impacts across the country. Some of these include construction of many federal roads; the successful inauguration of the National Youth Service Corps Scheme; the introduction of federal scholarship and loan schemes for Nigerian students among others (Moti, 2012).

The Third National Development Plan covered a five-year period starting from April 1975 to March 1980. The cardinal objectives of the plan at that time was to increase Per capital income during the plan period, promote more even distribution of income, reduce the level of unemployment, diversify the economy and enhance balanced development through indigenization of economic activities (Marcellus, 2009; Ojo, 2012).

Because of the focus of the plan, it was described as a watershed in the evolution of economic planning in Nigeria. This is so because the plan involved extensive consultation with the private sector of the economy in the course of its preparation. It was also revealed that priority was given to the multi-functionality of development (Olaniyi, 1998). However, the plan was short-lived as it was disrupted by the military coup of 1975 barely three months after its launch (Moti, 2012).

Unlike the other plans since independence, the Fourth National Development Plan, (1981-85) launched in 1981 was the first plan to be formulated by a democratically elected government (Moti, 2012). The plan was intended to further the process of establishing a solid base for the long-term economic and social development of Nigeria (Ogunjimi, 1997; Moti, 2012). The Fourth Development Plan was again affected yet by another successive change in
government in 1983 and 1985 respectively (Moti, 2012). This seriously disrupted the implementation of the plan and the economy during that period.

**The Era of Rolling Plans (1990-1998)**

By 1986, the failure of third and fourth plans was apparent with huge external debts accrued during this period (Marcellus, 2009; Ojo, 2012; Moti, 2012). The debts were accrued by successive governments mainly because of the failed plans and the practice of a developmental state (Mkandawire, 2001; Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006; Amuwo, 2008). The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced as an economic emergency programme (Kieh, 2015). SAP, meant to reform the economy and clear the huge external debts began as a ‘reform therapy’ from the Word Bank and International Monetary fund (IMF) (Mkandawire, 2001; Marcellus, 2009). SAP is a policy-based planning system with emphasis on private-sector-led economy (Mkandawire, 2001; Kieh, 2015) rather than the prevailing public sector-led philosophy that inspired previous plans (Moti, 2012). SAP presented an opportunity for revaluating the country’s planning system (Moti, 2012). Because the fixed medium term planning system seems to have failed, rolling plans where annual budgets will derive their medium and short term programmes were introduced. This led to the first rolling plan, a 20-year perspective plan for the period 1989-2008. In the same way that the tradition of five-year development plan was jettisoned by the military administration of General Ibrahim Babangida, the idea of rolling plan was also shelved in 1996 by General Sani Abacha. General Abacha then introduced another plan tagged ‘Vision 2010’ (Moti, 2012) on September 18, 1996. ‘Vision 2010 was proposed to herald socio-economic prosperity for the
citizens through systematic improvement in the quality of life of Nigerians in fourteen years (Moti, 2012). The rolling plan also suffered a usual setback like many other plans- the death of the military dictator. The era of rolling plan lasted between 1990 and 1998.

After a year of transition, a new democratic dispensation began in the country in 1999. However, the introduction of structural adjustment programmes marked the beginning of transition to neoliberal development practices which was a global norm at that period (Mkandawire, 2001; Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006; Ekanade, 2014). The main instrument of the programme was free market economic policies such as privatization and commercialization of the state-owned enterprises (Harvey, 2005; Castree, 2011). While Nigeria embraced neoliberal policies in the 1980s (Ekanade, 2014), the country also witnessed heightened environmental concerns during this period (Adegorye, 1994; Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006). These two social and economic development issues brought a strong tide of reforms to governance in Nigeria. Successive governments in Nigeria have continued to reconfigure social and economic relations to reflect neoliberal policy measures and devolved regulatory approaches in recent past. This has significantly impacted the transformation of the Nigerian cement industry.

**The New Democratic Dispensation (1999 onwards)**

Nigeria witnessed the much-desired transition to democratic governance in May 1999 when the military handed over to a democratically elected government. Since then, the era of democratic government - often referred to as a basic requirement of good governance - began in Nigeria (Arowolo & Aluko, 2012; Gurumka, Nengak & Ajayi, 2014). The new
administration started development planning in 1999 on a clean slate with the initiation of a four-year medium-term plan document, the National Economic Direction (1999-2003). The plan had the aim of developing a strong, virile and broad-based economy. The plan was also aimed to adequately absorb externally generated shocks following the already laid down structural adjustment programmes (Moti, 2012). Since 1999 to date, several development plans and visions have been launched all in a bid to harness Nigeria’s human and natural resources sustainably. Despite 18 years of democratic governance, sustainable livelihood is still elusive in Nigeria (Olu-Adeyemi, 2012). Nigeria possesses the ‘five capitals of sustainable livelihood’ (Scoones, 1998) but fails to sincerely use for the development of the country.

Privatization objectives of the 1980s began to manifest during the new democratic dispensation. Thus, leading to the privatization of key industries earlier owned in full or jointly by the government. One of the major industries that were privatised was the Nigerian cement sector, a major non-oil extractive industry (Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006). The Nigerian cement sector has grown to be a major economic force over the last 17 years.

This section shows that development plans in Nigeria predates the country’s independence, economic plans has begun early enough to become a norm for sustainable development in the country. But it was also revealed that the problem of economic development in Nigeria is not the development plan itself. Rather the main obstacle to development in Nigeria has been political and governmental instability which has led to poor planning. The country has been under military rule more than democratic government since independence which greatly hampered continuity of economic development plans implementation. Over the almost seventy-year period of development planning in Nigeria, rather than become multi-sectoral
economy the country depended heavily on crude oil to the detriment of other sectors. The over-dependence on oil and gas has significantly hampered the country’s economic development and growth (Marcellus, 2009). Despite the forced shift to policy-based system of neoliberalism in the 1980s, development policies have not done better than the developmental policies approach (Amuwo, 2008; Ekanade, 2014).

The implementation of neoliberal oriented structural adjustment programme in Nigeria by successive governments as revealed above has led to the privatisation of the Nigerian cement industry. The Nigerian cement industry has since grown impacting the social, economic and environmental landscapes of the country. It is therefore argued that for effective and sustainable resource development, the principle of social equity needs to be adhered to strictly. It is then important to understand how the political stability or otherwise over the years transforms the institutional and political relationships governing the interaction between resource extraction, economy and society (ESID, 2014). This is deemed necessary to prevent the mistakes of the past such as in the Niger Delta region that can further aggravate the stability and unity of the country already being witnessed because of the past governance failures. In the next section, the transition in the non-oil extractive sector of the country situating the reforms in the sector in a neoliberal context and at the instance of multilevel governance is elaborated.

3.3 History of non-oil mineral resources development in Nigeria

Nigeria is endowed with numerous mineral resources; the process of development of these resources and how the impacts are managed has been subject of major concerns (Gotan, 2004; Gyang, Nanle & Chollom, 2010). About 40 commercially viable metallic and non-metallic
minerals have been identified in over 500 regions in Nigeria (VenmynDeloitte, 2015; Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016). With proper planning and development, mineral-rich regions can be sustainably developed to meet their socio-economic needs. Metallic minerals found in Nigeria include iron ore, gold, tantalite and tin. Major non-metallic minerals include limestone, marble, barite among others. Tin ore was the earliest recorded mineral mined in Nigeria in 1902 (Usman, 2001; Ladan, 2014; Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016). Mining has been a significant driver of economic development in Nigeria (Chindo, 2011). For example, Coal mining gave birth to the railway industry while the first power plant in the country was established during tin ore mining and processing. The discovery of iron ore was reported to have led to the establishment of steel plants and steel rolling mills in the country (Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016).

Nigeria’s mining industry has witnessed several stages of development from traditional mining during which there were no policies or legislation governing the industry (the so-called ‘Pre-colonial era’) to the colonial period marked by proper documentation of all mining activities in the country (Gyang, Nanle & Chollom, 2010; Filani, 2014). According to Gyang, Nanle and Chollom, (2010) the post-colonial era witnessed various government policies and programmes on the mineral sector as well as increasing instability. The advent of petroleum at that time brought about a drastic shift in labour and government attention from the solid mineral industry and agriculture to the petroleum industry (Gyang, Nanle & Chollom, 2010). This led to a rapid decline in the mineral industry up to 1980s and 1990s when the industry virtually collapsed (Gyang, Nanle & Chollom, 2010; Filani 2014).
Figure 3.1: Mineral resources distribution in Nigeria (Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016, p. 11)
Table 3.1: Mineral resources in Nigeria by state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States name</th>
<th>Mineral Deposits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>Glass Sand, limestone, Salt, Shale, Ball Clay, Granite, Galena, marble, laterite, bentonite, phosphate, kaolin, pyrite, feldspar, petroleum, lignite, gypsum, sphalerite, clay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>Granite, clay, gypsum, limestone, uranium, kaolin, coal, trona, barite salt, marble, magnesite, laterite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akwa Ibom</td>
<td>Clay, glass sand, salt, silica sand, granite, coal, petroleum, Natural Gas, Kaolin, limestone, lignite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>clay, iron Stone, Natural Gas, petroleum, sand stone, Kaolin, pyrite, lignite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>kaolin, Trona, gypsum, cassiterite, mica, clay, tantalite, galena, iron ore, gemstone, sphalerite, silica sand, Barite, columbite, Zinc, Lead, Muscovite, Quartz, Tin, glass sand, monazite, Feldspar, Graphite, Wolfram, Coal, Agate, Tantalum, Rutile, Tungsten, Copper, Talc, Limestone, Zircon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayelsa</td>
<td>salt, petroleum, Natural gas, Silica Sand, Bentonite, crude Salt, petroleum, limestone, glass sand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>Gemstone, Barites, Feldspar, Marble, Mica, silica Sand, quartz, Galena, lead, zinc ore, silica sand, clay, crushed and dimension stone, fluorspar, wolframite, bauxite, shale, magnetie, Limenite, Brenite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>Silica Sand, Natural Salt, sapphire, topaz, mica, quartz, gypsum, uranium, iron ore, mesquite, feldspar, Granite Aquamarine, Nepheline, Limestone, Kaolin, bentonite, laterite, Refractory Clay, Trona, Gold, Tin, Potash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CrossRiver</td>
<td>Salt Limestone, Coal, Manganese, Mica, Limenite, Gold, Quartz, Glass sand, tourmaline, petroleum, Natural Gas, Kaolin, Tin ore, Sharp Sand, spring water, salt deposit, Talc, Granite, Galena, Lead, Zinc, Muscovite, Uranium, Barite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>Kaolin, Lateritic Clay, Gravel, Silica Sand, Natural Gas, Petroleum, Ball Clay, Bauxite, Granite, River Sand, Clay, Spring Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebonyi</td>
<td>Lead, Zinc ore, Salt, Limestone, Ball Clay, Refractory Clay, Gypsum, Granite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>Chamockite, Copper, Gold, Marble, Granite, Gypsum, Petroleum, Dorite, Lignite, Limestone, Ceramic Clay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekiti</td>
<td>Clay, Chamockite, Quartz, Lignite, Limestone, Granite, Gemstone, Bauxite, Cassiterite, Columbite, Tantalite, Feldspar, Kaolin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enugu</td>
<td>Laterite Clay, Crude oil, kaolinitic clay, iron ore, glass sand, petroleum,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>Crude oil, Shale, Natural Gas, Kaolin, Laterite Sand, Limestone, Salt, Marble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jigawa</td>
<td>Glass Sand, Granite, Laterite Clay, Silica, Kaolin, Iron Ore, Quartz, Potash, Talc, Limestone, Gemstone, Columbite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>Muscovite, Granite, Gold, Manganese, Clay, Graphite, Sand, Zircon, Kyanite, Tin Ore, Limenite, Gemstone, Columbite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>Clay, Laterite, Cassiterite, Columbite, Ilmenite Galena, Pyrochlore, Kaoline, Gemstone, Silica, Tin Ore, Monazite, Wolframite, Thorium, Granite, Hyalite, Kaolin, Beryl, Amethyst, Gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Minerals/Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastina</td>
<td>Gold, Manganese, Lateritic Clay, Feldspar, Black Tourmaline, Amethyst, Quartz, Kaolin, Mica, Gypsum, Silimanite, Clay, Granite, Sand, Uranium Asbestos, Tourmalin, Serpentine (Chresolite Asbestos), Chromites, Limonite, diamond, graphite, Iron Ore, Potash, Silica Sand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebbi</td>
<td>Salt, Iron Ore, Gold, Feldspar, Limestone, Quartz, Bauxitic Clay, Manganese, Kaolin, Mica.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogi</td>
<td>Clay, Iron Ore, Gemstone, Marble, Limestone, Feldspar, Dolomite, Phosphate, Mica, Cassiterite, Granite, Ornamental Stone, Coal, Kaolin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>Clay, Kaolin, Silica Sand, Quartz, Dolomite, Marble, Feldspar, Gold, Tantalite, Cassiterite, Granite, Limestone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Silica Sand, Bitumen, Sharp Sand, Gravel, Petroleum, Laterite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nassarawa</td>
<td>Cassiterite, Gemstone, Amethyst, Beryl, Chrysolite, Emerald, Garnet, Sapphire, Topaz, Barites, Galena, Monazite, Zircon, Glass sand, Coal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Bell Clay, kaolin, limestone, Granite, Glass Sand, iron ore, red clay, feldspar, silica sand, Quartz, Asbestos, marble, Talc, Gemstone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>kaolin, Feldspar, Silica sand, Mica, Granite, Clay, phosphate, gypsum, limestone, quartz, Tar sand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>Marble, Gold, Gemstone, Diorite, lignite, Bitumen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osun</td>
<td>Clay, Granite, Talc, Dolomite, Feldspar, Quartz, Limestone, Mica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>Clay, Feldspar, Granite, Limonite, iron ore, Kaolin, Quartz, Talc, Marble, Dolomite, Tourmaline, Aquamarine, Amethyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>Monazite, columbite, Feldspar, Clay, Cassiterite, Gemstone, Kaolin, Dolomite, Mica, Zircon, Marble, Limonite, Barite, Quartz, Talc, Galena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>Petroleum, Natural gas, Silica sand, Glass sand, clay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>Graphite, Kaolin, Limestone, Silica sand, Uranium, Coal, Halites, Clay, Gypsum, Diatomite, Granite.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taraba</td>
<td>Flur spar, Gamet, Tourmaline, Sapphire, Zircon, Tantalite, Columbite, Cassiterite, barite, Gelena, Limestone, Laterite, calcite, Bentonitic clay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yobe</td>
<td>Salt, Trona, diatomite, clay, gypsum, kaolin silica sand, limestone, Epsomite, iron ore, shale, uranium, granite, bentonite Clay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamfara</td>
<td>Gold, Alluvia Gold, Granite, Chromites, chamoslice, clay, Feldspar, spring water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCT, Abuja</td>
<td>Limestone, Kaolin, granite, marble, feldspar, mica, dolomite, clay, sand, talc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** F.O. Akinrele (2012), Nigeria’s mining sector (2016)

Recognizing the viability of the solid mineral industry, the federal government established Nigeria Mining Corporation (NMC) in 1973 but due to the dominance of the petroleum products, Nigeria Mining Corporation could not achieve much (Gyang, Nanle & Chollom, 2010). Further from this, the Federal Ministry of solid minerals development was created in 1995 to tap into the abundant solid mineral resources endowment and reverse the over-reliance on oil and gas in the country. The Ministry was later renamed Ministry of Mines and...
Steel development. New policy brief was also put in place to attract investment to the sector. Gyang, Nanle and Chollom, (2010) highlight some of the problems bedevilling the Nigerian mining industry as follows

- policy inconsistency and lack of adequate legislation
- high risk and health hazards,
- weak regulation, lack of well-equipped laboratories
- unwholesome practices of stakeholders and
- inadequate number of trained personnel,
- access to capital, lack of appropriate technology and machinery, and
- Environmental degradation and pollution.

The development of the mining sector has been a major focus of successive governments since the country returned to democracy in 1999. In a bid to reform the sector, the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act was enacted by the National Assembly in 2007. By 2008 another policy brief, the National Minerals and Metals Policy was launched. Three years later, a new legislative framework to drive the development of Nigeria’s Mining sector was further launched. The 2011 Regulation seems to meet the yearnings and aspirations of all stakeholders, prospective indigenous and foreign investors because it reflects the impacts of wider consultations (Ladan, 2014; Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016). To further attract foreign and private investors to the sector, neoliberal policy measures were introduced (Akinrele, 2012; VenmynDeloitte, 2015). These include privatization and liberalization of the sector; introduction of tax incentives such as reduction of Companies Profits Tax from 35% to 30%; Capital Gains Tax from 20% to 10%; Increase of the Initial and Annual Capital Allowances
from 20% and 10% to 30% and 20% respectively and 3-year tax holiday for new mining companies. More recently, seven key strategic minerals have been identified for development through free market policy (Oladunjoye & Okonkwo, 2015; Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016). One of the sectors affected by the reforms is the Nigerian cement industry.

**Table 3.2: Seven strategic minerals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>Quantity (reserve)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barites</td>
<td>15 million tonnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitumen</td>
<td>27 billion barrels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>2.7 billion tonnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>200 million ounces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Ore</td>
<td>10 billion tonnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limestone</td>
<td>3 trillion tonnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>5 million tonnes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016*

Mineral and mining is within the sole regulatory ambit of the Federal Government of Nigeria. This is because mineral resources are among the seven items that are of relevance to environmental issues on the exclusive legislative list of the Constitution of the country (Anyogu and Ikoni, 2012). The key legislations related to the Nigerian mining sector are presented in table 3.3 below. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is the major environmental instrument used in initiating environmental regulations in the country. The EIA process is briefly discussed in the next section.
### Table 3.3: Keys legislations in Nigeria’s mining sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Legislations</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minerals and Mining Act, No. 34 of 1999</td>
<td>Main legislation governing the solid mineral sector of Nigeria. It consolidated all other pieces of legislation like the Mineral Act, 1990, the Quarries Act and Regulation, 1990, the Tin Act 1990, the Gold Trading Act, 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act of 2007</td>
<td>Passed into law on March 16, 2007 repeal the Minerals and Mining Act, No. 34 of 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations 2011</td>
<td>Consolidates 2007 Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidelines on Mineral Titles Application 2014</td>
<td>Provides general guidelines for the industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Act Cap N142 LFN 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Environmental (Mining and Processing of Coal, Ores and Industrial Minerals) Regulations (SI No 31 of 2009)</td>
<td>This Regulation seeks to minimize pollution from mining and processing of coal, ores and industrial minerals and encourage the application of up-to-date efficient cleaner production technologies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Impact Assessment Act (Cap E12 LFN 2004)</td>
<td>This Act sets out the general principles, procedures and methods of environmental impact assessment in various sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Use Act 1978</td>
<td>This Act vests the ownership and control of land and the mineral on the Government of either the federation or the state. This has made the acquisition of land for mining easier and less cumbersome for a foreign Investor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Environmental (Non-Metallic Minerals Manufacturing Industries Sector) Regulations, S. I. No. 21 of 2011:</td>
<td>This Regulation provides the regulatory framework for the control of all activities of this sector in order to protect the Nigerian environment from their negative impact.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016*
3.3.1 The EIA processes

Environmental impact assessment has been described as a decision-making tool used to prevent and mitigate adverse environmental concerns associated with major development projects (Cashmore, 2004; Glasson et al, 2005). EIA aims to inform decision-making process and promote sustainable development by identifying significant effects of a project on the environment and ensuring that critical functions of ecological resources are not compromised (UNEP, 2002). This is because of the importance that ecological resources play in maintaining human well-being and livelihoods. EIA as a policy tool was first introduced in the United States of America in 1969 (NEPA ACT) in response to the growing prevalence of new technologies and rising public health concerns (Li, 2008). EIA later became internationally recognised as Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and official tool to inform decision-making about sustainable development (Sanches & Croal, 2012). Since then, EIA has become widespread in many developed countries as well as international financial institutions across the world (Ogunba, 2004). It has been argued that the objectives of EIA transcend accepting or rejecting a project but making sure that likely social and environmental problems are addressed, and effective management plans put in place (Kakonge, 1998; Morison-Sanders & Bailey, 2009).

Though EIA has been criticised for being political in nature because the outcome of the process in most cases provides advice to decision-makers rather than making final decisions, the tool remains the main instrument informing sustainable development of projects. While the application of EIA seems to be difficult in practice across the world, the situation seems more critical in developing countries (Drexhage & Murphy, 2010). This is because of factors
such as technical expertise, poor participatory framework and political will to allow its successful application (Li, 2008; Marara et al., 2011). Despite shortcomings in its application in some low and middle-income countries, the tool remains the main instrument used to support decision-making in major projects such as mineral mining in Nigeria. The stages of EIA process include project definition stage; preparation of EIA report, decision and implementation stages (Glasson et al., 2005). The systematic integration of the stages in the EIA process is shown in the following figure and summarised in the table that follows.

Figure 3.2: Key steps in EIA process. Source: Glasson et al. 2005
Table 3.4: Summary of EIA process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project screening</td>
<td>narrows the application of EIA to those projects that may have significant environmental impacts. Screening may be partly determined by the EIA regulations operating in a country at the time of assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoping</td>
<td>seeks to identify at an early stage, all project’s possible impacts and the alternatives that could be addressed, those that are the crucial, significant issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The consideration of alternatives</td>
<td>seeks to ensure that the proponent has considered other feasible approaches, including alternative project locations, scales, processes, layouts, operating conditions and the “no action” option.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The description of the project/development action</td>
<td>includes a clarification of the purpose and rationale of the project, and an understanding of its various characteristics—including stages of development, location and processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The description of the environmental baseline</td>
<td>includes the establishment of both the present and future state of the environment, in the absence of the project, taking into account changes resulting from natural events and from other human activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The identification of the main impacts</td>
<td>brings together the previous steps with the aim of ensuring that all potentially significant environmental impacts (adverse and beneficial) are identified and taken into account in the process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The prediction of impacts</td>
<td>aims to identify the magnitude and other dimensions of identified change in the environment with a project/action, by comparison with the situation without that project/action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The evaluation and assessment of significance</td>
<td>assesses the relative significance of the predicted impacts to allow a focus on the main adverse impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>involves the introduction of measures to avoid, reduce, remedy or compensate for any significant adverse impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public consultation and participation</td>
<td>aim to ensure the quality, comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the EIA, and that the public’s views are adequately taken into consideration in the decision-making process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIS presentation</td>
<td>is a vital step in the process. If done badly, much good work in the EIA may be negated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review</td>
<td>involves a systematic appraisal of the quality of the EIS, as a contribution to the decision-making process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making on the project</td>
<td>involves a consideration by the relevant authority of the EIS (including consultation responses) together with other material considerations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-decision monitoring</td>
<td>involves the recording of outcomes associated with development impacts, after a decision to proceed. It can contribute to effective project management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditing</td>
<td>follows from monitoring. It can involve comparing actual outcomes with predicted outcomes and can be used to assess the quality of predictions and the effectiveness of mitigation. It provides a vital step in the EIA learning process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Glasson et al. 2005
According to the Nigerian Minerals and mining Regulations, 2011 which consolidates the 2007 mining Act and the guidelines on the mineral titles application 2014, the legal procedure for mining licence approval is as follows. Before commencing operation, it is mandatory that a prospective mineral title holder must submit an Environmental Impact Assessment statement approved by the Federal Ministry of Environment to the Environmental Compliance Department in the mines and steel Ministry. This must provide information on the mining operations and Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation Programme of the prospective company. The Programme must provide for rehabilitations and reclamation actions along with an estimate of the cost. It should also provide a timetable for the duration of restoring the mineral title area back to a safe environmental state suitable for future economic development or recreational uses. To guarantee the rehabilitation of the mineral title area, the applicant is required to make prescribed financial contributions to an Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation Fund (Akinrele, 2012).

More importantly, a Community Development Agreement must be reached with the local community that will host the mining activities. The agreement usually centres on the social and economic contributions of the project to the host community. This agreement must be submitted along with the approved EIA plan to the line Ministry that is the Ministry of Mines and Steel development (MMSD). The contributions of the company to the host community must be directed to the areas of educational scholarships, apprenticeship, technical training, employment of indigenes, support for infrastructural development, improved health care, support to SME’s, and agricultural improvements. The Community Development Agreement shall be subject to review every 5 years. Limestone is one of these key minerals abundantly
found across many regions in Nigeria. The exploitation of limestone in the country has been on the rise and the application of the policy framework discussed above is evident.

Limestone is unlike many other solid minerals (tantalite and precious stones) found in the country which their nature does not allow for organized mining processes. Limestone as a resource involves large scale production and organized processes which are highly environmentally damaging especially in the production of cement (CSI, 2002). Cement is a fine grey powder, a strong, critical and important material used to make concrete and mortars (CSI, 2002). It is a critical part of human civilization needs for housing and basic infrastructure such as bridges, roads, water treatment facilities, schools and hospitals among others. Cement is made by heating limestone with small quantities of other materials such as clay to a temperature of high extreme in a kiln to produce clinker which is then ground with small amount of gypsum into a powder to make Ordinary Portland Cement (OPC) the most commonly used type of cement. It is a global commodity which remains the key constituent of concrete, the second most consumed material on the planet after water (CSI, 2002).

The cement industry is a capital intensive extractive industry. Cement production involves three major stages: (1) quarrying and raw materials preparation; (2) clinker Production and (3) cement grinding and distribution. The cost of a new cement plant can be equivalent to about 3 years of revenue (CSI, 2002). It is also an energy intensive industry which requires the equivalent of 60-130 Kilograms of fuel oil and 110 Kilowatt hours (KWh) of electricity to produce one ton of cement depending on the cement variety and the process used (CSI, 2002). Cement plants always have significant local impacts and this makes a strong case for strong
relationships with local communities and the need for good environmental practice. The cement industry is perceived to produce 5% of global man-made CO₂ which is a major gas contributing to climate change (CSI, 2002; WBCSD, 2005; Industry Update, 2010).

In this section, I have discussed the history of the reforms in the Nigerian non-oil extractive industry and how the neoliberal policy measures relate to the Nigerian cement industry. I briefly touched on the institutional arrangement for the approval of operational licences for prospective companies. The next section discusses how the reforms in the sector have transformed the socio-economic and environmental landscape of cement production in Nigeria. This is to illuminate the necessity to assess transformations in the sector at the instance of multilevel environmental governance.

3.4 A Brief discussion of the Nigerian Cement Industry

Nigeria’s economy is primarily an extractive economy (Orogun, 2010; Chindo, Naibbi & Abdullahi, 2014). The bulk of the population rely on the land and its resources for survival in their peasant farming activities. Oil and gas and the solid mineral exploitation activities also spread all over the country (Orogun 2010; Chindo, Naibbi & Abdullahi, 2014). Though the oil and gas remain the main revenue source for the country, the cement industry has over the years grown astronomically to a major Non-Oil Extractive Industry (NOEI) in sub-Saharan Africa. By its nature this has significant socio-economic and ecological implications for the country especially considering its spread over the country.

Manufacturing of cement in Nigeria was suggested by Lord Lugard as pioneer industry in 1919 (Hay, 1971). This is because of its importance in capital projects, its low value and
bulky nature (Hay, 1971). In this regard, the availability of cement took centre stage in the industrial development history in Nigeria (Mojekwu, Ademola & Sode, 2013). Prior to 1957, all cement products used in Nigeria were imported, non-integrated plants were initiated at Lagos and Port Harcourt and all materials needed for production imported (Hay, 1971). This tied the plants to port locations leading to high cost of production (Hay, 1971). It was reported that rising demand for cement was met with import until 1960 (Makoju 2010; Mojekwu, Ademola & Sode, 2013). Estimated imports of 80,000 tons in 1946 grew to 626,500 tons by 1960 (Mojekwu, Ademola & Sode, 2013). With the desire to float indigenous plant peaking in 1955, the first cement industry was established in 1957 (Hay, 1971; Makoju 2010).

Because of the presence of coal and limestone in the area, the first plant was constructed at Nkalagu in the eastern part of Nigeria by NigerCem. By the early 60s, establishment of the new plant owned by the then Western Region government in Ewekoro, Ogun state, south west Nigeria became the second in the country. Bendel Cement Plant in Ukpilla in the then Bendel State (150,000mt) established in 1964 was the third. Calabar Cement was commissioned in 1965 to make the fourth cement plant in the country. Then Cement Company of Northern Nigeria (CCNN) in Sokoto a 100,000mt plant was commissioned in 1967. Subsequently, Sagamu Plant in 1978, Ashaka in 1979 as well as Benue Cement Company (BCC) in 1980 came on board making eight plants in the country by 1980 (Makoju, 2010). Interestingly, all the companies had strong government ownership and control. Also, most of the cement plants built before the eighties were wet process rather than dry process plants which are more economical and fuel efficient than the wet process (Mojekwu, Ademola & Sode, 2013). Between 1980 and 2000, cement importation plants grew from two in 1980 to about twelve in
2000 to the detriment of local production (Makoju, 2010; Mojekwu, Ademola & Sode, 2013). Local production was reported to have crashed from a peak of 3.5m in 1986 down to 2.28m by 2000 while imports grew from 0.8 tons in 1986 to 3.34 m tons in 2000 (Mojekwu, Ademola & Sode, 2013).

The survival of the Nigerian cement industry at that time was grossly affected by ownership nature of the companies and civil war of the late 1960s. The companies could not meet up local cement demand, this led to liberalization of cement importation and heightened privatization of the existing plants creating a major growth in the industry (Makoju, 2010). As reported by Mojekwu, Ademola and Sode, (2013) local production rose from its thirty-year low of 1.9 (Million metric Tonnes) MMT in 2003 to 8.1 MMT in 2009, an increase of over 300% in 6 years. It further rose to 21.2 MMT in 2013 (Oxford Business Group, 2016) due to the introduction of privatization policy. New cement plants and expansion of some existing plants have also taken place between 2011 and 2013.

The Global Cement Report (2007) shows that Nigeria was the fourth largest cement importer in the world with 7 MT imported in 2006, after the USA, Spain and Bangladesh. This demonstrates the important gap between national supply and the country’s demand. The market is driven by a growing demand in the residential construction sector, urbanization, demographic growth and the regional demand. Nigeria has the largest number of cement facilities in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with about 15 cement works mostly located in the eastern and central regions of the country. These reasons prompted the federal government to ensure the rejuvenation of the sector through neoliberal policy measures.
Available data reveals that domestic cement production was about 3.5 Metric tonnes in 2006 (Oluwakiyesi, 2010). This represented only 35% of the total market of 10.1 Mt. Dangote Cement, a subsidiary of the Dangote Group, is the industry’s giant with a market share estimated at 70%. Dangote Cement has significantly invested in the Nigerian market through acquisitions and expansion projects. For example, after investing over USD 1 billion in Phase 1, Obajana Cement, which was commissioned in 2007, became the largest cement plant in SSA – with a total production capacity of 5 million tonnes (“Dangote Cement”, 2016). In an independent report by Industrial Update (2010), the Nigerian cement industry grew rapidly from about #26 billion in 2004 to an estimated value of #134 billion in 2008. Over the last six years the total consumption has grown approximately 10.5 % annually (Industrial Update, 2010). Despite its rise in consumption, local production of cement was low due to so many production challenges faced by the industry. As at 2008, Nigeria imported an annual average of 10 million tonnes of cement over the past five years (Industrial Update, 2010). However, the fast-growing local production by 2009 brought down the volume of imports significantly. This development is not unconnected with the federal government intervention in the industry.

In 2002, the Federal Government introduced the backward integration policy (BIP) and the import substitution policy (ISP) in the cement manufacturing sector. It was projected that by 2011–2013 the domestic production of cement could reach 27.6 million metric tonnes per annum (MMTPA), thus exceeding the national demand of 21.7 MMTPA (Ohimain, 2014). Farlex Financial Dictionary (2012) defines backward integration as a business model whereby a company takes direct control of how its products are supplied. In this case, cement import
licenses were allocated only to importers who could show proof of building factories for local cement production in the country. Government also included waiver of VAT and custom duty for importation of cement production equipment (Ohimain, 2014). Between 2002 and 2004, federal government privatized all the government owned cement plants including WAPCO (Ewekoro), WAPCO (Shagamu), NigerCem (Nkalagu), Cement Company of Northern Nigeria, Benue Cement Company, Ashaka Cement Company, Edo Cement Company (Ohimain, 2014).

In addition, the Nigerian government attached incentives to the waivers earlier granted to promote local production of cement. The major incentives are two to three-year duty free period for the importation of machinery, equipment and spare parts to cover the initial stages of setting-up cement production businesses. Secondly, tariff incentives for imported spare parts and machinery for cement production was reinstated. Thirdly, the time it took to obtain exploratory and mining licenses from the relevant government agencies was reduced significantly. Additionally, cement production was granted pioneer tax status with lucrative exemptions. Further to that, duty on imported cement was hiked to 35% to pave way for local manufacturers to exploit the massive Nigerian market.
Table 3.5  Major Cement companies and locations in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Companies</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lafarge Africa PLC</td>
<td>Ewekoro I, Ogun state</td>
<td>1960/1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sagamu, Ogun state</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ewekoro II, Ogun</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashaka Cement Nigeria PLC (Lafarge Group)</td>
<td>Ashaka, Gombe state</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangote Cement</td>
<td>Gboko, Benue state</td>
<td>1980/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obajana, Kogi state</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ibeso, Ogun state</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement company of Northern Nigeria (CCNN)</td>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Cement Company (UNICEM), Calabar, Cross River state</td>
<td>Mfamosing Cross River state</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purechem Industries Limited, Ogun state</td>
<td>Itori, Ogun state</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Cement Company (NIGERCEM) (Ibeto Group)</td>
<td>Nkalagu, Enugu state</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the bagging plants in Nigeria are also owned by the key players in the operational plants such as Dangote group, Lafarge group and other small-scale investors. This development in the Nigerian cement industry is an indication of economic development to the detriment of sustainable modern development (Peet & Hartwick, 2009; Perreault, 2009). As government promises investors express approval of licences, this normatively portends danger for the local communities that will host the companies and the Nigerian environment.
Figure 3.3: Major Limestone deposit regions in Nigeria (F.O. Akinrele 2012; Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016)

3.4.1 Impacts of cement production

As a mining industry, cement production has significant social, economic and environmental impacts which have direct and indirect implications on human and environmental wellbeing. Studies have shown that mining generally has been a significant source of economic development and civilisation while it also presents significant externalities (Romero, 2004;
Romero (2004) submits that stakeholders pay considerable attention to the negative externalities of mining than the positive externalities and the extent to which they contribute to the wellbeing of the local communities. He suggests that to foster the positive benefits governments and mining companies should focus on better approaches of managing the external benefits of mining. Governments, as the entities in charge of the welfare of a country, are primarily responsible for the management of externalities and therefore, can maximise the positive benefits too (Romero, 2004). Mining companies on the other hand have the responsibility to engage in a closer interaction with local communities, in which local communities can express their concerns regarding the mining activity and mining companies can explain their activity and its impacts.

Cement industry particularly supplies the material needs of modern day development (CSI, 2002). Significant studies have shown that the Nigerian cement industry have in recent past impacted on the social and economic terrain of the country (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2010; Maxwell-Cook, 2012; Pan African Capital, 2012). For instance, Maxwell-Cook (2012) asserts that the Nigerian cement industry has been expanding and has contributed immensely to the growth of the economy from 7% to 11% per annum. This growth, Maxwell-Cook attributed to the neoliberal transition witnessed in the sector. The growth in the Nigerian cement industry has also been noted to have contributed significantly to employment generation in the country (Maxwell-Cook, 2012). As a result of the expansion, environmental impacts of the industry have continued to be on the rise. The environmental impacts of cement production can either be physical or biological impacts (Mannion, 2002; MMSD, 2002; Twerefou, 2009). The physical impacts of cement production stem from quarrying activities of raw materials where
landscapes and the ecology of the area is disrupted (MMSD, 2002). The disruption continues as long as the cement plant produces because clinker production requires intensive use of materials. Biologically, the flora and fauna of the entire ecosystem is also altered which indirectly affects other ecosystem services. Mostly, cement plants are found in rural ecosystem where land resources remain the most valuable form of livelihood. Unregulated Cement production may affect the soil and its ability to perform its physical, chemical and biological functions, thereby impacting on the socio-economic activities of the community.

Cement production can also cause noise, and air pollution as well as health problems for local communities. Clinker production requires intensive use of raw materials and energy resulting in significant carbon emissions into the atmosphere among others. Cement industry remains the largest single material source of emissions in the world (CSI, 2002, 2009; Steinweg, 2008). Studies have reported that 60% of the CO₂ produced by the cement industry is from the production of clinker while 40% comes from fuel used in the process (Steinweg, 2008; CSI, 2009). Cement production has 3 sources of greenhouse gases (Worrell et al., 2001; Steinweg, 2008; Yared, 2010): The first source is from the heating of limestone, the primary raw material. Limestone contains more than 90% calcium carbonate. When limestone is heated, it dissociates into calcium oxide, the main ingredient for cement and carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas.

\[
\text{CaCO}_3 \xrightarrow{\text{Heat 850}^\circ C} \text{CaO} + \text{CO}_2 \quad \text{1}
\]

For every 100 grams of calcium carbonate heated in a kiln above 750°C, about 56 grams of Calcium Oxide is used by the construction industry and about 44 grams of CO₂ are produced
(Yared, 2010). This means that, for every 56 grams of Calcium Oxide used by the industry, 44 grams of CO₂ is released into the atmosphere (Yared, 2010). Relating the above submission, Yared (2010) explains that about 2.77 billion tonnes of world cement production in 2007 means the release of up to 1.45 billion tonnes of CO₂ into the atmosphere due to decarbonisation of CaCO₃ alone. The second source of greenhouse gases comes from the combustion of fossil fuel such as methane, furnace fuel, coal or alternative fuels such as biomass, re-ground tyres and household and industrial wastes. The European Cement Association (2009) reports that approximately 335KG of CO₂ is produced from combustion of fuel in cement production. The third source of GHGs in cement production relates to the use of electricity produced by power stations that are burning fuels. This accounts for about 50Kg of CO₂ per tonne of cement produced (European Cement Association (ECA), 2009). Putting the above sources together, the cement industry releases about 0.8 tonne of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere per tonne of cement produced (Yared, 2010). Considering the positive and negative impacts inherent in cement production as discussed above, understanding the practicalities of the suggestions of Romero (2004) can broaden our learning about resource governance in a neoliberal perspective.

3.4.2  Best practice and sustainability initiatives in the cement industry

As in other industries, the global cement industry has recognized that to remain successful in the global village, there is the pressing need to combine sound financial performance with a commitment to social responsibility, environmental stewardship and open and transparent interaction with stakeholders (CSI, 2002). The idea holds that environmental and equity concerns are not just to be added to investment needs, consumption patterns, governmental
activities, they must be an integral part of development itself and must be understood as involving the whole society (CSI, 2002; Steinweg, 2008). The ‘Triple bottom line’ as the commonly used metaphor for corporate sustainability defines the three dimensions of a sustainable business which the industry aims to adopt as follows (CSI, 2002):

- economic prosperity and continuity which includes creation of wealth and growth opportunities for both the business and its stakeholder
- environmental stewardships including emissions reduction and resource conservation on both a local and global scale and
- Social responsibility, including quality of life and fair treatment for both company employees and the society in general.

Several initiatives have been taken by the global cement industry to accommodate businesses and sustainable development. The most popular and prominent initiative in the industry is Cement Sustainable Initiative (CSI) of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). CSI was formed to help the cement industry address the challenges of sustainable development with the participation of major cement companies worldwide. The CSI promotes sustainable development through actions that companies can undertake to accelerate the move towards sustainable development, knowledge, experiences and best practices sharing. The cement industry is also playing an active role in the Kyoto Protocol to cut down the sectorial greenhouse gases emissions, particularly in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The global environmental concerns and efforts towards good practice in the cement industry as mentioned above and the growth of the industry in Nigeria over the years present a novel instance of multilevel and multi-actor social relations. Exploring the
empirics of the interactions of the myriad of actors in the sector can contribute to resource governance discourse in a neoliberal context.

In this section, I have discussed the neoliberal transformation of the Nigerian cement industry and global efforts at promoting best practice. In the next section, I aim to apply the legal and constitutional framework for governance of the sector to situate the neoliberal changes in the industry at the instance of multilevel governance framework proposed in the previous chapter.

3.5 Legal and constitutional framework for environmental regulation in Nigeria’s cement industry

As earlier stated in this chapter, the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria places minerals and mining on the exclusive list as one of the matters of national relevance. This means that power and legitimacy to develop mineral resources resides with the federal government of Nigeria. However, environmental protection right of any activity is constitutionally vested on all levels of governments. Translating the concurrency of environmental protection in Nigeria, the operations of the cement company affects the Nigerian environment. Thereby, federal and subnational governments have constitutional rights to ensure environmental stewardship and protection in the sector.

In light of the above, the Federal Ministry of Mines and Steel Development (MMSD), (formerly the ministry of solid minerals development) oversees the Nigerian mining sector. The Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) is responsible for environmental regulation in the sector. This means that MMSD and FMENV are involved in the regulation of cement production and the environment in the country respectively. The core legislations guiding the
exploration and exploitation of solid minerals in Nigeria are: The Nigerian Minerals and
Mining (NMMA) Act 2007; the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations (NMMR) 2011
and the Guidelines on Mineral Titles Application, (GMTA) 2014; National Environmental
(Mining and Processing of Coal, Ores and Industrial Minerals) Regulations (SI No 31 of
2009); Environmental Impact Assessment Act (Cap E12 LFN 2004).

As explained in the Guidelines on Mineral Titles Application 2014, guided by NMMA 2007
and NMMR 2011, any cement producing company must seek EIA approval from the Federal
ministry of Environment and approved by the ministry. The EIA before its approval by the
federal Ministry will involve several processes and stages that require the involvement of
subnational government. Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act of 1988 (FEPA Act)
(repealed by NESREA Act 2007) also empowers each State and local government in the
country to make laws to protect the environment and set up its own environmental protection
body for the protection and improvement of the environment within their regions. This means
that apart from the ministry of mines and steel development oversight functions as the
industry is mineral resources related; the federal ministry of environment and the
responding state where the industry is domiciled also have active roles to play in the
regulation of the operations of the industry as it affects the environment. The EIA process
which became the norm in the late 1980s can be related to the Type I MLG and the changing
nature of centre-periphery gates explained in chapter two.

Aside from the EIA that the company must do before applying for mineral licence, the
company must also sign a mandatory Community Development Agreement with the local
community hosting the cement company. The agreement which must be submitted with the
approved EIA must present a blueprint of the social and economic contributions the company plans to make to their host community (Oladunjoye & Okwonkwo, 2015). This mandatory community development agreement or better still memorandum of understanding (MoU) normatively legitimises the host communities as stakeholders in the industry. While the community development agreement is commendable, there are concerns that government has failed to provide a structure to monitor its implementation and coordination (Ladan, 2014). However, the agreement situates the local communities as important territorial stakeholder in the category of Type II MLG typology that can interact informally to solve problems affecting them (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Piattoni, 2010). This interaction is one the focus of this study.

Notably, the exclusion of the subnational governments in the control of mineral resources development brings to fore resource control contentions existing in the country (Ekuri & Etim, 2017). More importantly, as the federal government devolves economic responsibility of the sector to the private sector actor. This devolution introduces the corporate actors in the Nigerian cement industry as a major new governance actor classified as Type II governance. The adoption of neoliberal policies under the instruction of international organisation, the involvement of the international companies in the devolution process and accession and application of multilateral agreements by successive Nigerian government has loosen the state-society gates in the country. These conditions summed up, I argue create multilevel and multi-actor dimensions of social relation which I identify as a novel gap the study aims to contribute. A summary of neoliberalism and its evidence in the Nigerian cement industry is presented below.
Neoliberalism as reflected in the literature and the Nigerian case is generally associated with free trade, less government, and relying on markets to deliver policies as against state-led solutions to social and environmental problems (Harvey, 2005; Liverman & Vilas 2006; Thorsen & Lie, 2006). Neoliberalism brings about trade liberalisation and seeks to reduce public expenditure by eliminating subsidies and the sale of public utilities as well as shedding jobs in the public sector (Castree, 2006). Most significant in relation to this study is the privatization of previously commonly or state-owned mineral and natural resources and the ‘rolling-back’ of environmental and labour regulations (Liverman & Vilas, 2006). The theoretical basis and empirical impacts of neoliberal policies have been subjects of contention in recent past as reflected in chapter two. For example, it is generally assumed that efficient market mechanism and regulatory freedom associated with neoliberalism can promote sustainable use of resources if properly organised (Peck & Tickell, 2002; Liverman & Vilas, 2006). That is, the general effects of neoliberalism can either be direct, indirect as well as negative or positive depending on the governance arrangement it is built on (Liverman & Vilas, 2006). However, economic efficiency is inextricably linked to increased pressure on the natural environment which means that change in ownership might result in environmental degradation (Liverman & Vilas, 2006). Therefore, the impacts and implementation of neoliberal policy is dependent on the political and institutional arrangements it enjoys. As in this case, a developing nation with weak institutional arrangements and political will to evolve effective resource management policies, the study will contribute to knowledge on the impacts of the neoliberal transition in Nigeria over the last 17 years.
The free trade characteristic of neoliberalism is another area of contention that can result in increased resource demands, pollution and inequality (Liverman & Vilas, 2006; Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005; Thorsen & Lie, 2007). However, neoliberalism advocates suggest that environmental protection can improve because of environmental provisions of trade agreements or increases in average incomes to stakeholders (Liverman & Vilas, 2006). Notably, reduced government intervention particularly in developing countries with weak regulations may mean more pressure on land and its resources and less investment in environmental regulation and enforcement (Wheeler, 2001; Liverman & Vilas, 2006).

Despite the criticism of neoliberal policies, it provides an avenue to promote inclusive and sustainable development if properly articulated and implemented. This is achievable when neoliberalism is viewed as a set of processes, rather than an end contingent on history and place producing diversities (Peck & Tickell, 2002; Castree, 2006). In this way, the lessons and experience of neoliberal processes can be used to address emerging political and institutional issues affecting its successful application in a developing nation. Because of Neoliberalism, environmental governance has overtime evolved to internalising social and environmental cost of resource use and transfer of environmental management responsibility to non-state actors. Neoliberal environmental governance assumes that environmental resources are most efficiently managed by private owners, and that consequently environmental management is best achieved through market relations where resource rights are definable, defendable, and divestible (Liverman & Vilas, 2006; Bridge & Perreault, 2009).
Neoliberalisation becomes an ideology and a policy discourse when governments adopt its values. When adopted as a set of policy measures, concrete regulations and procedures combining the philosophy with policy discourse become evident (Castree, 2010). This has been discussed in the preceding chapter, while the Nigerian cement industry context has been described here. Economic liberalisation and the shifting roles of the state actors in the Nigerian cement industry over the last 17 years as presented in this chapter apparently exhibits transition to neoliberal practices. Changes toward neoliberal approach discernible from the Nigerian cement industry experience can be summarised as follows.

Table 3.6: Summary of transition towards neoliberal environmental governance in the Nigerian cement industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Time Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The federal and regional governments pioneered the establishment of cement industry in Nigeria</td>
<td>1957-1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement manufacturing industry barely develops owing to numerous production challenges</td>
<td>1986-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal government fully privatised the Nigerian cement industry and introduced other measures to encourage private investment.</td>
<td>2000-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal government introduces distinct national environmental institutions and policies to separate regulatory roles of the state from facilitation with subnational (state and local) governments having active roles in environmental regulations</td>
<td>1988-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy reforms in the sector lead to emergence of new governance arrangements in the private companies and community based organisations</td>
<td>2000-to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental organisations and other civic society groups become increasingly involved in environmental policymaking in the country owing to greater accessibility of information and latterly the emergence of ICT and social media</td>
<td>1991-to date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored how successive governments’ development plans for the non-oil extractive sector portray the transition to a neoliberal development approach and the build-up of multilevel resource governance capacity. By explicitly exploring the historical and spatial perspectives of mineral resource development in Nigeria, I have argued that recent transitions in the Nigerian cement industry have triggered the neoliberalisation of nature discourse (Castree, 2011). The review has shown how successive government plans failed to capitalize on the diverse natural resources endowment of the country to address socio-economic, environmental and regional development of the country. It discusses how over-reliance on the oil sector affected the development of the non-oil extractive sector, became the main source of insecurity and militancy in the country which stems from negligence of oil companies and government to address environmental stewardship.

As revealed in the reviewed literature, the failure of the many development objectives of successive governments was basically because of political instability in the country. However, after the successful transition to democracy in 1999, successive governments have continued to focus on the policies that aimed at reducing economic burden on the government. This has led to the liberalisation and the development of the Nigerian cement sector to allow foreign and local private investments. Government also facilitated the coordination of environmental regulation in the country. The globalised neoliberalism has changed Nigerian politics, leading to changes in the resource and extractive industries, including the cement industry. This I argue has resulted in neoliberal natures presenting an arena for multilevel governance assessment in the case of the new Nigerian cement industry. This has enabled me to relate the
framework presented in chapter two to the case study. To be able to suggest sustainable pathway for the industry, the historical perspectives of the development of the Nigerian cement industry discussed here has illuminated the past challenges that affected the industry. Whether recent reforms were to avoid past mistakes and promote inclusive sustainable resource development where the state is embedded in the society (Midgal et al., 1994; Midgal, 2001) is a question of evidence. This is to critically assess if the reforms and changes evident in this case meets the regulatory yearnings of the state and society, considers the aspiration of the poor and corporate elitists (Perreault, 2009). These power asymmetries that must be negotiated through a constant reconfiguration of the relations between civil society actors, state institutions and transnational actors at a diversity of interconnected spatial scales is the context of this study (Perreault, 2009; ESID, 2014). This I exemplify using the Nigeria cement industry in the empirical chapters five, six and seven. The next chapter presents how I applied the framework and the context articulated thus far in this chapter empirically in this study.
CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, I have demonstrated the need to apply multilevel environmental governance framework to explore changing roles and relations of state and society in a neoliberal context. Here, I present the data collection and analysis methods used to carry out the study. I also consider the contextual and ethical issues that affected the research process not discussed in the previous chapters that are germane to the work. Following from this introduction, section 4.2 presents a summary of literature review and the research questions guiding the research. This is followed by the description of the Nigerian case study areas outlining the reasons for their selection for in-depth study in section 4.3. In section 4.4, I discuss extensively the study research design. As reiterated by Yin (2003, 2012, and 2014) research design is an important blueprint of a study, it aims to address logical problems of what questions to study. Similarly, De Vaus, (2001, p.9) posits that ‘given the research questions or theory, research design answers the question ‘what data is needed to answer the question or test the theory in a convincing way?’ These observations indicate that a detailed research design is paramount, because it enhances the study’s coherence by holding all the parts and phases of the work together. I have therefore devoted this section to describe the research design I have employed to situate and connect the framework to specific sites, individuals, groups and institutions as well as bodies of relevant interpretive materials needed to make sense of the study (Philliber, Schwab and Samsloss, 1980; George & Bennett, 2005). I have addressed the research design for this study under the following key elements: Research methodology and approach, Data collection methods, and Data analysis techniques.
Section 4.5 presents the practicalities of the research design I addressed in section 4.4. In this section, I discuss the stage by stage data collection experience. This includes choosing and recruiting key participants/respondents, data gathering and data analysis. Having done that, the discussions that follows set out my positionality as it affected the study (section 4.6), ethical considerations as well as risk and contingencies issues (section 4.7) and lastly the conclusion.

4.2 Summary of literature review and the research questions

The purpose of the study is to explore and make sense of neoliberal resource governance at the instance of multilevel governance focusing on the privatised Nigerian cement industry. Before arriving at the above aim, I explored critical theoretical, conceptual and empirical literature on development-environment-governance crossroads. I observed that governance perspective has opened a window which provides insights on the variety of mechanisms by which social interactions can take place either as formal or informal (Stoker, 1998; Bridge and Perreault, 2009; Perreault, 2009; Bevir, 2011). It was also observed that, the multilevel environmental governance concept has become a ‘compelling metaphor’ (Rosamond, 2000, p.197) to explain and understand the dynamism of government and governance actors’ interrelations both within and between levels (Jordan, 2001; Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 2003; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Paavola, 2008; Piattoni, 2010). The ‘multilevel’ and ‘governance’ (Bache &Flinders, 2004, p.3) credentials of the multilevel governance framework are hereby admitted best fit to explore natural resource governance in a neoliberal context in an extractive economy.
My decision to apply MLEG approach to Nigeria, where key social institutions are often dysfunctional, offered an innovative means of conceptualising recent governance developments in the country over the last two decades. These include the growth of non-state actors in economic development and environmental management activities. I argue that the rise of non-state actors in the country during this period attests to change from government to governance. And the ‘loose coupling’ (Benz, 2000, p.33) characteristic of MLG I suggest is evident in the growing relations between sub-national state actors and supra-national governance actors in the country. I contend that these social relational developments require the application of a MLEG approach, irrespective of Nigeria’s often dysfunctional social institutions. This I feel helps comprehend and explain the empirical implications of the changes owing to neoliberal transition in the country. As applied in the European Union context, this approach has greatly assisted scholarly and practical understanding of the context specificity of governance and the implications for resource development (Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 2010).

Apart from its contextual robustness by incorporating political, economic and ecological elements in a specific case study, there are other important advantages which I argue made MLEG the appropriate theoretical choice for guiding in this study. First is that a MLEG framework emphasises the dynamic, changing roles of multiple actors, modes and scales of relations in different dimensions. Secondly the framework does not undermine the sovereignty and influence of the nation state as the regulator and facilitator of social interactions and relations. One alternative theoretical framework, the social capital approach, combines structural networks with cultural components to understand stakeholders’
involvement in resource management (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 2000; Burt, 2000). Yet, it has been criticised for being society-centred and pays less attention to nation states that set the rules of the game in resource development (Lowndes & Wilson, 2001). Also, Bebbington, (2002) reiterates that the criticisms of the concept of social capital as being loosely specific and heterogeneous in context are important.

The institutional analysis and development framework (IAD) is another analytical framework that could potentially have been used in this case. But commentators have argued that IAD’s complex nature makes it unsuitable for a study involving historical perspectives of political and social relations (Whaley & Weatherhead, 2014). IAD is a multi-tier conceptual map which focuses on the action situation leading to interactions and outcomes (Mcginnis, 2011; Ostrom, 2005; 2011). IAD can be used to identify an action situation, the patterns of interactions and outcomes the situation presents and the evaluation of the outcomes (Ostrom, 2011). Multi-level governance as a flexible approach facilitates institutional improvement in solving problems as it aids holistic analysis of changing actors’ roles and emerging relations (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). IAD however, has been criticised for being a historical and apolitical in nature (Whaley & Weatherhead, 2014). The IAD is viewed to have given undue attention to rules and fails to incorporate the power dynamics and context adequately (McCay, 2002; Whaley & Weatherhead, 2014). While the social capital and IAD approaches are also suitable to some extent for the study under consideration, their weaknesses which are very central to this study have been improved in the MLEG framework. For example, regarding social capital, Bebbington (2002, 801) submits that “social capital is a “mesolevel” concept that can be usefully linked to other bodies of theory in order to ground them better by
focusing our attention on actors and their networks, the ways in which networks structure patterns of inclusion and exclusion and the ways in which the mobilisation of these networks help explain change in access to resources and relations of power”. Taken together I believe that MLEG is the most appropriate theoretical framework, allowing the elements considered in the study to be flexibly related to explain and understand structures of power relations between state and non-state actors. MLEG enabled me to consider the political, economic and ecological context historically while also recognising the important role of the state in the neoliberal governance process.
Table 4.1: MLEG framework features compared to Social capital and IAD approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MLEG</th>
<th>Social capital approach</th>
<th>IAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Captures the shifting and changing roles and powers of actors (authority reallocation and transformations)</td>
<td>• Also focuses on social relations for collective action problems</td>
<td>• Useful in identifying and analysing an action situation, the patterns of interactions, outcomes of the situation and the evaluation of the outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Involves multiple actors, modes and scale (Flexibility of network and structural patterns of relation)</td>
<td>• It is more Society-centred in approach</td>
<td>• Focuses on collective action problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contextualises political and ecological relations of social actors</td>
<td>• It pay less attention to the sovereignty of the nation states.</td>
<td>• Applicable to any policy context and multiple actors’ analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• It is loosely specific and heterogeneous in context</td>
<td>• It is too apolitical and ahistorical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To ensure that the economic transitions in the Nigerian cement industry is at the instance of multilevel governance, I reviewed the economic development and environmental planning history of the country as an extractive economy. I also reviewed the implications of the transition on the centre-periphery and state-society gates in the country to ascertain the following necessary developments (Piattoni, 2010, p. 83):

(1) Different levels of governments are simultaneously involved in policy-making

(2) Non-governmental actors are also involved at different governmental levels

(3) The interrelationships that are thus created defy existing hierarchies taking the forms of non-hierarchical networks.
Based on these considerations, I concluded that the environmental and economic history of the country indicates that Nigeria is an extractive economy having its main economic backbone in the environmental resources spread across the country. Also, there has been significant increase in the number of economic and environmental actors based on political and economic freedom associated with neoliberal governance-centric processes since the 1980s. I am convinced that the human and natural resources endowment of Nigeria and the changing institutional arrangement for development is an instance of multilevel governance. This provides an avenue to explore the implications of governance-centric development approach for sustainable development in strategic priority sectors of global environmental concern. I decided to focus the study on the cement sector, a significant non-oil extractive industry in a major cement producing state, Ogun state in southwest Nigeria.

The choice of the Nigerian cement industry is because significant financial investment has been witnessed in the sector over the last 16 years. This has been due to the privatization policies of the 1990s. Apart from that, the contribution of the global cement industry to climate change is huge. The industry contributes about 5% to global carbon emission by virtue of the nature of the industry as energy intensive and various environmental impacts (Cement Sustainability Initiative, 2002). Sources of emissions in the cement industry include: during clinker production, burning of fossil fuels and exhaustion of natural resources as well as from mining and transporting raw materials (Cement Sustainability Initiative, 2002). More so, cement industries are located in rural regions where sensitive environmental resources are located. In most cases livelihood of the local inhabitants depends on these resources. The increase and spread of cement producing companies across the country with virtually no
geopolitical zone without cement producing hotspots in Nigeria portends socio-economic and environmental impacts requiring structured coordination.

Considering the above submissions, three key research questions emerged as a focus for the study as follows:

1. How has the state configured environmental governance of the cement industry and what roles do sub-national tiers of the administration play in this process?
2. How have non-state actors and stakeholders’ roles and relations in environmental governance been affected by privatization in the cement industry?
3. To what extent can the state and non-state actors’ relations and responses to privatization be understood as contestations to the goal of sustainable development in the Nigerian cement industry and what lessons does this have for Nigerian development generally?

In this section, I have discussed the summary of the review of the conceptual and empirical literature informing the framework of this study. In the next section, I discuss the case study context where the data for empirical analysis of the study was collected.

4.3 Nigerian environment and case study description

This study is focused on Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa. Nigeria accounts for over half of West Africa’s population (Benebo, 2011). Nigeria is located approximately between latitudes 4° and 14° North of the Equator and between Longitudes 2° 2’ and 14° 30’ East of the Greenwich Meridian. It borders the Republic of Niger and Chad Republic to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the south, the Republic of Cameroon to the east, the Republic of
Benin to the west. Out of Nigeria’s total area of 923,768 sq. km, 910,768 sq. km is land and 13,000 sq. km is water (Federal Ministry of Environment, 2001; Adeyemo, 2006).

Nigeria enjoys a tropical climate with warm temperatures, in the north, a drier and hotter climate is prominent while higher precipitation and relatively cooler climatic condition dominates the southern part of the country (Federal Ministry of Environment, 2001). The country is characterised by alternate wet and dry seasons with two broad vegetation belts, namely: the forest and savannah. There are however regions of high mountains with their peculiar vegetation found in the central and far eastern part of the country. There are two major rivers in Nigeria forming a significant landmark nationally with many other tributaries; the rivers Niger and Benue.
Nigeria operates a federal republic type of government and is currently divided into thirty-six (36) states with the federal capital territory in Abuja. The states are further divided into 774 local government areas characterised with of about 250 ethnic groups. The population of the country was 140,003,542 in the 2006 population census, 152 million, with a population growth rate of 2.0% in 2011 (Benebo, 2011). According to the National Population

Since May 29th 1999, Nigeria has been enjoying democratic government. The stability of democratic government for over 17 years has to some extent allowed true federalism to be in operation unlike the military dispensation. The elected officials at the subnational levels make their own legislation and laws as may be needed by their regions (Nwafor, 2006; Lawal, 2012). This has made it possible for state governments to create ministries and agencies concerned with environmental regulation working at times parallel to the federal government agencies. Nigeria is an extractive economy with many natural resources such as limestone, petroleum, tin, natural gas, and water resources being explored at various scales across the country (Nigeria’s Mining Sector, 2016). Mineral mining for economic purposes dates back to the colonial era. By the 1960s the oil boom further shifted the country’s economy toward oil revenue while other minerals were being explored illegally to the detriment of the environment. Nigeria is one of the major cement producing nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, an industry with significant social and environmental impacts which have direct and indirect implications on human and environmental well-being. Cement production began in Nigeria in the late 1950s. Cement is the main material for making concrete, the second most important resource in the world after water. Today, cement producing industries are spread across the country in both large and small scales. This is due majorly to the changing economic policies in the country since the 1990s, this has been discussed extensively in the preceding chapter.
To ensure information is captured in detail as the whole country cannot be covered, the study was carried out at a sub-national level. The study focused on a prominent cement producing state in Nigeria, Ogun state in southwest Nigeria. Ogun state, created in 1976 is referred to as the state with the highest number of industries (Lucas, 2014), because of its proximity to Lagos state, the commercial capital of Nigeria. Lagos state is a megacity with high population, but it is the state with the smallest land mass in the country. Ogun state benefits significantly from the population and socio-economic activities spill over from Lagos state. The state is named after Ogun River which strategically runs across it from north to south. The state comprises of 20 local government areas (LGAs) (Figure 4.2). It is bordered to the east by Ondo state and to the north by Oyo and Osun States, the Republic of Benin to the west which makes it an access route to the expansive market of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and to the south by Lagos, the former capital, the commercial nerve centre of the country. These strategic opportunities earn the state the popular appellation ‘The gateway state’. Ogun state has a land area of 16,409.26 square kilometres. Ogun is endowed with a favourable climate and good vegetation for all year-round cultivation of various cash and food crops as well as livestock rearing. Ogun State’s population (based on 2006 Census) was 3,751,140 comprising of 1,864,907 Males and 1,886,233 Females. The projected population as at 2016 is over seven million. (“Ogun state brief”, 2017)

Ogun state has in the south, the evergreen forest vegetation and soil which is most suitable for the cultivation of cash and food crops like oil palm, rice, kola-nut, cocoa, cotton, cassava, cocoyam and vegetables. In the north, vast grazing savannah land suitable for animal husbandry abound. Also, there are forest reserves, rivers and lagoons with a beautiful ocean
front to the south that is good for beach resorts. The State has natural resources that include forest and water bodies as well as large quantities of mineral deposits, such as limestone, phosphate, granite stone, gypsum, bauxite, bitumen, feldspar, clay, glass sand, kaolin, quartz, tar sand and gemstones. Limestone is found in commercial quantity in Ogun state and this has further attracted huge investment in recent years. Within the state, there are three important cement producing local government areas (LGAs): Ewekoro; Sagamu and Yewa north Local Government Areas (LGAs).

I had initially chosen to use the three LGAs as case study sites, but I decided to concentrate on the oldest and the newest sites to enable me to explore them more comparatively and meaningfully. Apart from the above reason, these two sites are found within the same region as their LGAs share boundary. Also, the oldest site is currently owned by a Multinational Company (MNC): LAFARGE/WAPCO while the newest site is owned by a Nigerian Company (NC): Dangote Cement Limited, the company has grown to become a multinational company with cement plants in over 15 countries in Africa. Dangote is also currently developing a new plant within the study area.

These companies are within 30Km radius with other small cement companies around. These unfolding events interestingly make the region a development and environmental hotspot which makes a good case for interrelations between formal and informal actors and institutions particularly in environmental geography. In this section, I have discussed the background of the study areas chosen for the study. The reasons for the choice of the case study areas and why they fit for the study were also discussed. In the next section, attention is
turned to the research design I put forward to carry out the study considering the submissions in the preceding sections.

Figure 4.2: Map of Ogun state, Nigeria
4.4 Research Design

Considering the research questions and the underlying theoretical and analytical framework discussed in the previous chapters and summarized above, qualitative research methodology was adopted in this study. Studies have shown the relevance of qualitative methods in case study research (Flick, 2002; Patton, 2002; 2015). As human elements remain the common denominator in any program (Goodyear et al., 2014), qualitative inquiry cultivates the most useful capacity of humans - capacity to learn (Patton, 2015). Unlike the quantitative research methods, qualitative research methodology provides an atmosphere for the exploration of individual respondent’s free expression of views (Creswell, 2014). The human element and the need for individual respondent’s views as reflected in the aim of this research made the choice of qualitative methodology suitable for this study.

Creswell (2014) reiterates that qualitative methods have the specific characteristics of enabling a wealth of detailed information because it recognises individuality of research respondents which is much needed to explore the complexities of multilevel governance in this case. It also recognises experience and subjectivities of individual respondents. This is also very important to illuminate richer insights and explanations through its integration of wide variety of data (Creswell, 2014). Though the study population in qualitative methods might be few compared to quantitative methodology, the in-depth nature of the approach enhances rich data generation in studies of this nature (Creswell, 2007; 2014).

As case study approach emphasizes “why” questions more than “what”, it was considered suitable for this study. This case study approach helped in exploring the complexities of development and environmental governance beyond descriptions (Yin, 2003, 2012, 2014).
Creswell (2007) describes case study approach as situation where cases are explored through detailed, in-depth data collection, and multiple sources of information. And then report a case description and themes with the potential of generating high level explanatory richness thereby inducing a comprehensive result (Creswell, 2007). I have applied the data richness and explanatory potentials of the case study approach with its ability to emphasise lived experience of participants in this case.

Two data types I chose to address the research questions raised in the study are primary and secondary data. Primary data sources used are Semi-structured interviews with key informants (KIs) identified for the study and observation of physical objects and projects in the case study areas. Secondary sources of data include: review of important documents and empirical literature. The complementary strength of primary and secondary data has been so useful in this study. Interviews are regarded as suitable means by which information about the perception of actors involved in governance processes are gathered by allowing respondents to provide meanings and experiences of their lived interests (Flick, 2002; Silverman, 2006, 2013). Though experiences of respondents may not be neutral accounts of reality or value-free expression, they are found to be invaluable sources of pre-conceptualized views of the subject matter (Flick, 2002). Secondary data sources such as archival documents and academic literatures on the other hand enhance the credibility of the study because they enable cross-checking and broadening the data collected throughout the interview (Silverman, 2006; Yin, 2003). The combination of these data sources enabled me to triangulate study materials to increase credibility, validity and rigour to produce substantive academic knowledge about the
dynamism of development-environment-governance nexus at the instance of multilevel governance.

Data collected were subjected to a combination of thematic and contextual analysis techniques after transcribing and coding. Thematic analysis technique is a flexible analytical tool which can interpret research topics from various aspects (Boyatzis, 1998). Thematic analysis technique is a useful tool for producing qualitative analyses through thorough searching across a data set to find repeated pattern of meaning and responses that fit the earlier prepared themes (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Braun and Clarke, (2006) argue that though thematic analysis technique is a poorly branded analytical method, the technique has significant potential to generate insights that can open new perspectives on the subject matter. It also has the potential to generate a rich and detailed explanation out of a complex data set and ability to highlight similarities and differences across a data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis method is a useful tool for producing qualitative analyses suited to inform policy development such as in this study (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). However, Bazeley (2009) argues that contextualizing and making connections between themes help build a coherent argument supported by the data in qualitative data analysis. I have mapped out 6 phases of data processing designed for this study (Figure 4.3). The application of the phases is explained in the data analysis part in the next section.
4.5 Research Methods

This section explains the conditions under which the various stages of investigations were carried out from choosing the key participants/respondents, data gathering methods and data analysis methods.

4.5.1 Sampling frame and Selection of Key Informants

Considering the qualitative nature of the study which requires eliciting in-depth information from key informants, the sampling frame for the study is non-probabilistic purposive sampling method (Patton, 2015). The purposive sampling method (also known as judgement sampling) has been described as “the deliberate choice of an informant due to the qualities the
informant possesses” (Tongco, 2007, 147). Purposive sampling method as non-random technique requires no underlying theories or certain number of informants (Tongco, 2007). The researcher purposely focuses on the people who will provide the information needed for the study based on their knowledge and experience (Tongco, 2007). Guided by the research questions raised in the study, I have chosen purposive sampling method for its flexibility to combine sampling techniques in the different phases of the study where needed. It also provides a variety of sampling techniques that can be adopted by qualitative researchers to achieve their goals. Purposive sampling method has been criticised that it can lead to research bias because it is based on the judgement of the researcher (Tongco, 2007; Patton, 2015). It is also argued that it can be difficult to defend the appropriateness and representativeness of the sample made in purposive sampling (Creswell, 2007, 2014; Patton, 2015). As such, it might lead to difficulty in attaining analytical generalisations in a study. However, other sampling methods are also subjective as they also focus on data sources of interest to their study (Morgan, 2008). The inherent bias in purposive sampling has also been identified as its major contributor to its efficiency (Tongco, 2007). Therefore “There is no one best sampling strategy because which is best will depend on the context in which researchers are working and the nature of their research objective(s)” (Given, 2008, 698). In light of the above, I have considered the context and objective of this study and adopted stakeholder sampling technique, one of the major techniques in purposive sampling method.

Key informants for this study were identified and chosen for interview based on their roles as individuals in institutions and organizations concerned in the study. The participants I have identified using the classification I presented in chapter two were approached and recruited as
key informants for the study. In the classification, the participants were grouped into state and non-state actors, within which are sub-categories of governance actors related to the Nigerian cement industry (see figure 2.2, p.64) as informed by the analytical framework.

The state actors in this study are government representatives or employees from the three tiers of government in Nigeria namely; Federal, state and local governments concerned with environmental policies implementation. The non-state actors however comprise of private sector actors such as the cement manufacturing companies and civil society organizations (CSO) - the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Community Based Associations (CBAs) and Community Development Associations (CDAs), as well as other interest groups such as research and academic institutions and the media.

After categorizing the identified participants into group of actors, I prepared a list of names and contacts of respondents deemed suitable for the success of the study. Spatial context of the study determines significantly the choice of samples chosen. This is because the study involves an extractive industry which has geographic and environmental connotations. It is however believed that the samples chosen have the ability to help in understanding and explaining the research questions. Having selected relevant key informants for each category, data collection proceeded. There exist no hard and fast rules about what sample size should be in qualitative research (Patton, 2015). However, to ensure saturation of sample size and avoid redundancy, given the flexibility benefits of qualitative research approach, I proposed a minimum of 50 and maximum of 60 key informants as the sample size. In all, 75 participants were approached and a total of 55 participants were successfully recruited and took part in the study (Table 4.1).
As earlier reiterated, I used stakeholder technique, a purposive sampling approach to determine the sample for the study. In selecting participants, a convenient sampling method was adopted (Abrams, 2010). Though, there are debates that convenient sampling method could lead to bias, sampling error and problem of generalisation of study findings, its simplicity and importance in context based studies make it a suitable method in this study (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). Apart from the fact that some of the stakeholders concerned in this study cannot be substituted, accessibility and availability of others also require adopting a method of sampling that fit that purpose.
Table 4.2: Number of respondents and interviews conducted based on category of actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of actors</th>
<th>Level/type of organizations</th>
<th>No. of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Environment; NESREA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ogun state government, Ministry of environment</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ogun state Ministry of Forestry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ogun state Environmental Protection Agency (OGEPA)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ewekoro Local Govt. Council</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yewa North LGA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sagamu LGA</td>
<td>1 =13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-state: Private sector: cement manufacturers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lafarge Africa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dangote cement</td>
<td>2 =4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO/CSO</td>
<td>Environmental Right Actions (ERA)/ Friend of The Earth (FOTE), Social and Economic Right Advocacy (SERAC), Nigeria Environmental Study/Action Team (NEST)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Law Research Institute (ELRI)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nigerian Conservation Foundation (NCF)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nature cares</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEDA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centre for 21st century issues</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LUFASI PARK</td>
<td>1 =10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBA</td>
<td>Ewekoro community representatives, Ibese community representatives, Sagamu community representatives</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia/consultants/professionals</td>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Consultants</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Journalists</td>
<td>4 =10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.5.2 Data Collection: Interview, Observation and Documents review

As informed by my research design, Semi-Structured Interview (SSI) with key informants, observation and review of documents are the main sources of data for the study. Though Semi-structured interview with key informants remains one of the most important source of primary data, other methods have played significant roles in ensuring that I do not rely excessively on interviews only to avoid ‘trivial preferences’ (Silverman, 2013, p. 13). Other methods in essence have played complementary roles in exploring the questions raised in the study and ensure methodological triangulation (Thurmond, 2001; Silverman, 2013).

The data collection process took place in two stages. The first stage lasted 3 months between August and November 2012. The second stage also lasted 3 months between April and July 2016. The long break between the two stages was due to illness warranting medical leave of absence from study between 2013 and 2015. The first phase of the data collection process served as a pilot study, which informed the subsequent refocussing of the study. The initial aim of the study was to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches as well use GIS. The pilot survey subsequently informed my refocussing the study to address how neoliberal transition in the country despite weak social institutions affect the governance of the Nigerian cement industry. This gap informed the choice of qualitative method and application of MLEG framework rather than the proposed mix method.

During the interview, questions relating to the background, roles and relations of actors were raised (see appendix) which then snowballed into development and social relations issues related to the study. Efforts were made to promote conducive and relaxed environment for interviews as the personality of the subjects required.

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As mentioned earlier, I used a purposive sampling approach to determine the sample for the study. In selecting participants, a convenient sampling strategy was adopted. Convenient sampling strategy involves locating convenient subjects that meet the set criteria of a study and selecting respondents on a first-come, first-served basis (Abrams, 2010; Robinson, 2014). Though, there are debates that convenient sampling method could lead to bias, sampling error and problem of generalisation of study findings, its simplicity and importance in context based studies make it a suitable method in this study (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). Apart from the fact that some of the stakeholders concerned in this study cannot be substituted, accessibility and availability of others also require adopting a method of sampling that fit that purpose.

**Semi-structured interview**

A total of 75 participants were identified and approached as key informants for the study and 55 participants successfully participated in the interview sessions. 15 participants did not respond to the participation request while five appointments did not hold after several attempts. 55 participants successfully interviewed comprised of the 10 in the first stage and 45 in the second stage. 13 state actors were interviewed; 5 from the federal, 4 from the state and 4 from the local governments respectively, this constituted 24% of the total participants. 42 non-state actors constituting about 76% were involved in the following order: 4 cement company representatives (7%), 10 NGOs (18%), 18 Community representatives (33%), and 10 participants from the academia, consultancy and media (18%). The need to make sense of the study’s research questions as it sought to explore the spaces of multilevel environmental governance necessitated that the private sector actors’ involvement be higher in number. Also,
social relations in the extractive industry transcends largely the state actors and the companies, it always involves many stakeholders beyond the formal institutions and state actors by virtue of territorial and functional interests (Piattoni, 2010). Apart from the above reason, considering the primary classification of participants, state actors who are responsible for coordination and facilitation of resource development and environmental regulations hold specific roles in their respective ministries. Therefore, having the same number of participants with non-state actors might not address the richness of information (Kuzel, 1992; Gaskell, 2000). The sample size of state actors compared to non-state actors in the study is appropriate and adequate to address data saturation in the study (Gaskell, 2000; Green & Thorogood, 2004; Francis, et al., 2010).

The interview process began few months before the fieldwork by making contacts with the respondents on the already prepared list as discussed earlier. I first sent emails introducing myself and my research request. I then expressed my interest in them as key informants for the study and requested for their responses if interested so that I can then send further information on the study. This was then followed by appointment time, date and venue with respondents with favourable reply. I duly considered ethical considerations before commencing any interview.

I made sure that I inform each participant of his/her role in the research and ensured their consent either written or recorded consent. There were a few instances where both recorded and written consent were not given but the participants agreed to take part in the study and remain anonymous. However, this was very unusual. Recognizing the important roles their involvement in my study play, I agreed to meet their wishes of no consent, no recording. In
such instances, immediately after the interviews, I would quickly do a recording of highlights of the interview as the memories were still fresh in my mind so as not to forget key points. Other interviews were successfully conducted with at times written and recorded consent given. Some of the key informants preferred to be interviewed in the local language which I agreed to and translate the interview later and transcribe. I ensured that personal views of the respondents were not lost in the translation by translating literally where necessary.

Open-ended questions were posed to the participants as the interview was not structured type, which then allows me to not only focus on the draft questions. Important issues emanating from the interview sometimes led to other questions not part of the prepared questions. This helped a great deal to evoke much information. As the interview involved people of varied background such as officials of government, Royal fathers and individuals, my approach to each interview varied quite significantly. For example, the state actors’ interview process mostly followed a standard interview schedule, the non-state actors particularly those of the communities varied widely. The interview sessions varied between 10 and 60 minutes per participant.

Though the interview process was largely successful, several challenges were encountered. First of all is the strike action which unfortunately required that I reschedule some key appointments which eventually did not hold. Another important challenge was the fear of state actors in participating in the study which almost frustrated me but by virtue of my position as both an indigene of the state and academic staff in a university in the state, I was accorded some respects and allowed access. Challenges of finance and time crept in because of the economic situation of my country at the time as well as incessant strike action which
almost truncated my time table. These challenges led to the failure to hold about five other interviews earlier scheduled as the participants could not be reached for another interview appointment. Despite these challenges, the interview recorded about 92% success as 55 out of 60 key informants took part successfully.

Observation

Observation is another important method that enabled me to avoid mere reliance on interviews and experiences of the participants. In this case, I visited sites of key projects and observed events related to the study during the fieldwork. I was privileged to elicit more information which allowed me to triangulate to improve my data reliability and validity. I observed key developments as revealed by the key informants such as the ongoing resettlement project in one of the case sites. I also observed the relics of the demolition process carried out by the Ogun state in one of the new plants of a national company. Other necessary materials for the study were also extracted from the many important documents collected prior to the fieldwork, during the fieldwork and after the fieldwork. These include: pamphlets, brochures, policy documents, and year books and agreements as well as websites. Having recognised the theoretical and empirical importance of secondary data in a study of this nature (Green & Thorogood, 2009), how I have reviewed secondary data used in this study is briefly described next.

Secondary data

Secondary data sources were used in this study to address the background context and to corroborate primary interview and observation. These include environmental policy documents, books, journals and other forms of published literature on governance, multilevel
governance, neoliberalism, and corporate governance in theory and practice. These materials were obtained from different sources such as the Federal Ministry Environment; National Environmental Standard Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA); Ogun state ministry of Environment, Ogun state ministry of Forestry, and Nigerian Conservation Foundation, Lekki, Lagos, Nigeria Environmental Study Team, Ibadan, Environmental Rights Action, Lagos and Human and Environment Development Agenda, Lagos. Books, Journal and newspaper articles were sourced from the library and the internet.

I used these materials to review the development planning and environmental regulation history and issues related to the changes from development state approach to a neoliberal one in the country. The development planning context concentrated on the use and application of development plans in Nigeria since Colonial era to date and how this affected the development of non-oil mineral sector. The environmental regulation context focused on the emergence of holistic and coherent environmental institutions in Nigeria. In the context of non-oil extractive sector, the Nigerian cement industry transition was also critically reviewed to characterise its transition as a neoliberal process. The socio-economic and environmental impacts of cement production; implications of the transition on the roles of state and non-state actors of governance were reviewed within the national and international context.

Findings from the review of secondary sources presented in the contextual and conceptual chapters (chapters 2 and 3) informed the interview questions and the themes that guided the data analysis. For instance, I was guided by the review to explore the changing roles and relations of state and non-state actors in the governance of the Nigerian cement industry. This was to identify empirically if there were significant improvements in the structure for resource
governance due to neoliberal transition in the sector over the years. The interest further heightened by the fact the constitutional arrangement for resource control has not changed as the federal government still controls the development of mineral resources. This led to the question of how privatisation in the sector has impacted the roles and relations of state and non-state actors in the new Nigerian cement industry. The changing roles of state and non-state actors in the Nigerian cement sector and the need to explore the impacts in a neoliberal context aligns with Hooghe and Marks’ typology of multilevel governance and analytical frame of Piattoni. These prompted me to identify the core themes of the study as follows: background, role/activities, relationship, challenges/prospects, recommendations/emerging issues. These themes were used in the analysis of the primary data in combination with other empirical secondary literature to answer the research questions.

4.5.3 Data Analysis

Qualitative research relies majorly on interpretive perceptions to illuminate how humans engage in meaning and make sense of the world (Patton, 2015) from inception of a study to the write up stage (Stake, 2010). It is an inductive process and constructive art which demands high level of intellectual ability to create, reflect and analyse (Creswell, 2007). It thus has no rigid linear process for analysis (Kitchin & Tate, 2000; Creswell, 2007). Following the ‘data analysis spiral’ by Creswell (2007) consisting four general procedures namely data managing, reading, describing; classifying and interpreting, representing and visualizing, I mapped out my data analysis procedure as shown in figure 4.3 above.
Data analysis commenced with the creation of all interview recordings into a single file with unique identification. I then translated all interviews done in local languages to English and transcribed all the interview audio files into a single word document file. To get familiar with the data, I read and re-read the transcripts several times. This helped me to condense and reduce the transcripts further as I was having close to 500 pages in the first place which somehow look daunting to analyse at first. I engaged actively in repeatedly reading and reflecting on the transcripts to relate to the existing codes (see appendix) that informed my research questions and also identify emerging issues that may be relevant to the study in preparation for analysis.

After the coding, I moved to the analysis proper where codes were to guide in generating relevant quotes and texts connected to the study objectives. I employed Atlas Ti.7 qualitative analysis software to analyse the data. I decided to use computer assisted software because it afforded me easy organisation of data in the first instance. It also helped speed up my analysis considering the volume of the transcript and much more importantly in managing my data robustly. Atlas Ti. is one of the major computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) which offers various tools to systematically structure raw data (Muhr, 2004; Friese, 2013). While there are several other computer assisted software for qualitative data analysis, choice of Atlas Ti7 in this case relates to its simple and robust nature. It provides useful tools for social science researchers to explore complex data in a simple and robust environment (Contreras, 2012; Friese, 2013). Atlas Ti offers tools to manage, extract, compare, explore and reassemble large amount of data in a creative, flexible and systematic ways (Hwang, 2008; Friese, 2013). Although, there are other software that can perform these
functions, but the choice of Atlas Ti in this study is because it is easy to use. It also allows researchers to take control of the intellectual process rather than automating the interpretation (Muhr, 2004; Friese, 2012). Interpretation of data followed by linking the data with secondary materials and observed data to make sense of the study research questions. I combined both secondary and primary data actively in interpreting the data to present the eight-chapter report of the study.

4.6 Positionality

Aside from the relevance of the cooperation of key informants and participants in social research, position of the researcher is another important issue which affects the success of social research in so many ways (Moch & Gates, 2000; Merriam et al., 2001). Studies have shown that researcher’s experience is central to social research as it ensures valid and reliable data analysis (Moch & Gates, 2000; Gibbs et al., 2007) while it also forms part of the interpretation. It is therefore pertinent that researcher’s reflections on the data collection process be documented (Flick, 2002).

It is always believed that when a researcher shares the same cultural background with his subjects it makes data collection easier. However, this is not always the case particularly when the researcher is affiliated to a foreign university. My multiple positions in this study helped in overcoming situations earlier viewed as opportunities but turned otherwise on the field. I sought maximum assistance where needed to ensure the success of the fieldwork.

My position as a Nigerian and a member of University academic staff in Ogun state helped me during the interview process. At first some participant declined to take part in the study
because I am affiliated to a university in the west. I then decided to unveil my background as an academic staff of a popular university in the state and as an indigene of the state with interest of the state at heart. This gave me the opportunity to gain ground further and assure the respondents of their anonymity in taking part in the study as indicated in the participant information sheet and consent letter. After which they agreed to take part in the study on the condition that no audio recording and written consent that I should take their participation as consent. I decided to agree to their demands as I believe there are ample benefits in interviewing them at this point. This is because the affected participants could talk freely and bear their minds on issues pertinent to the study. This largely affected government actors and cement producing company representatives.

Secondly, my choice of the extractive industry no doubt has been determined by my background as an environmental geographer interested in resource use, abuse and management. An important position of having been involved and relate with both formal and informal actors and institutions in the Nigerian mining sector for over 16 years helped me in forging ahead. My personal relations with some key community chiefs and religious leaders gave me the credential to be introduced to the people initially declining to take part in the study. This does not translate that everything went smoothly but my multiple positions helped to relate flexibly as an internal person to ensure the success of my study. I recall I was given personal recognition and warmly welcomed in a major government agency and assisted with the data base of key actors in the sector. A community chief also made several contacts with his colleagues on my behalf while in another government Ministry, I was totally regarded as an external person and their relations with me was distant and discouraging despite all pleas.
In the conduct of the interviews, my position has helped in creating a more hospitable situation prior to the commencement of most interviews except in very few situations. This has significantly enhanced the quality and quantity of information most respondents gave both off and on records. Generally, my position as an indigene of the state and a lecturer aided my data collection where necessary and as I am familiar with the mining industry by virtue of my previous experience helped me to relate freely. This is not to say I used my position to influence data collection, but in some cases participants doubt your sincerity irrespective of what documents you are able to show. When they know, you are an insider, you know what is going on they will be willing to cooperate. Despite these situations, I tried as much as I could to maintain my objectivity.

4.7 Ethical considerations and confidentiality

Research is based on ethical values such as honesty, fairness, objectivity, openness, trustworthiness and respect for others (COSEPUP, 2009). These values are the standard that must be met in any scientific research to avoid questionable research practices. Recognizing these ethical values, I sought ethical approval from the University of Birmingham having provided the required details and itinerary for the fieldwork. Ethical review is an important process developed to ensure that researchers engage in good ethical practice. This involves getting research participants informed about their likely roles and the implications through provision of information sheets; use of consent forms to ensure that participation is documented as much as possible. I proceeded to the field with approved materials such as the participant information sheet, consent forms and other materials.
Signed consent was sought before every interview. I also ensured that in recorded interviews I informed the respondents about the recording and the intentions being purely academic. Where written consents were not allowed, recorded consents were used by informing the respondents during the interview. Written or recorded consent were therefore obtained from respondents except in cases of respondents who personally refused written consent and recorded interviews but granted interviews. Apart from the participants remaining anonymous in the study, names of towns, states and government agencies as well as companies remain the same in the study.

4.8 Conclusion
Having established the conceptual, contextual and analytical grounding of the study in the preceding chapters, in this chapter I have described the methodology used to apply the framework in the neoliberal Nigerian cement industry. I presented a summary of literature where I recognised that governance perspective has opened a window which provides insights on the variety of mechanisms of which governance actions can take place either as formal or informal. And its multilevel governance has become a framework useful to understand the dynamism of government and governance actors’ interrelations both within and between scales in environmental geography. Then, I raised three major questions the study would attempt to answer afterwards. This was followed by the description of the case study setting and the reasons of my choice of the Nigerian cement industry, Ogun state and local communities chosen. I also discussed the logical sequence by which I planned to answer the questions in the research design section. I explained the reasons for the choice of qualitative
methods of semi structured interview, observation and document review; case study approach, data collection and analytical techniques.

Having done that, I outlined the practicalities of the research design on the field in the research method section. In this section, I discussed how key informants for the study were selected in relation to research method chosen followed by the data collection experience. Keys issues such as recruitment processes, appointments and challenges faced were explained. Then I presented data analysis processes before discussing my position in the research process and the implications. Before the concluding section, I explained ethical issues and confidentialities which I sought approval from the university before the fieldwork.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE CHANGING ROLES AND RELATIONS OF STATE ACTORS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE OF THE NIGERIAN CEMENT INDUSTRY

5.1 Introduction

The most important aspect of any resource development process is its planning and regulation. Federal and sub-national governments have always been the main institutions responsible for planning and regulating resource development. This is by designing and implementing relevant policies that guide resource use, abuse and environmental protection. Each tier of government has specific responsibilities in the development and regulatory process. Growing environmental degradation resulting from resource exploitation and the different requirements and impacts peculiar to each sector of the economy necessitate the need for environmental regulations for each sector in Nigeria. State actors in environmental regulations in Nigeria include the federal and semi-autonomous states and local governments.

In light of the changing economic policies from developmental state to neoliberalism in Nigeria’s extractive sector discussed in chapter three, here, I seek to explore empirically, how recent neoliberal and environmental policies reforms have affected central and subnational governments roles and relations in the new Nigerian cement industry. The expectation is that government’s role and responsibilities in the regulation of the Nigerian cement industry would also have been devolved between the central and the peripheral governments (Paavola, 2008; 2016). Paavola (2016) explains that one of the cogent reasons of multilevel environmental governance is to reduce governance cost for the government.
The discussion begins with description of the historical background of legal and institutional milestones for environmental planning and regulations regime in the country in section 5.2. I highlight legal instruments and institutional frameworks for environmental standard regulation in the various sectors of the economy that evolved over time. I then discuss the fragmented roles and relations between the federal, state and local governments in the regulation process in sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. In section 5.5 I characterised the relations of the state actors as experienced in the Nigerian cement industry. Having done that, emerging issues and their implications for sustainable development in the cement sector in particular and the extractive industry in general are then critically examined in section 5.6 before the concluding section. This is achieved through the analysis of interviews with state and non-state actors and evidence contained in the various policy documents as well as burgeoning literature on development and environmental governance in Nigeria.

5.2 Evolution in legal and institutional instruments for environmental standard regulation in Nigeria

Nigeria now has a relatively comprehensive environmental regime, having the Federal Ministry of Environment and the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency as the main national institutions responsible for the formulation of environmental policies, monitoring compliance and standard enforcement respectively (Fagbohun, 2012; Ladan, 2012). Nigeria’s environmental regime has gone through a series of transformations to promote environmentally sustainable development. Prior to the 1990s when the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), the first environmental agency concerned with environmental protection was created, past efforts of the Nigerian
Government in environmental protection were geared primarily towards the protection and conservation of the economically important natural resources (Ladan, 2012). There were no coherent laws on industrial pollution and hazardous wastes, and existing so-called environment-related laws were scattered throughout other policy sectors (Ladan, 2012).

Until the late 1980s, industrialization was considered a key indicator of development until the emergence of the concept of sustainable development in the 1980s. States and Municipal governments gave tax breaks and other concessions to lure industrialists to establish industries in their domain, and the uninformed citizens had to live with the resultant environmental problems (Adegoroye, 1994). As a result, a seemingly endless list of environmental problems spread over the country ranging from effluents from industries into the rivers, air pollution as well as land degradation and health problems. By the 1980s Nigeria witnessed drastic environmental problems, these led to the beginning of systematic development of coherent environmental laws and institutions in the country. The systematic development of environmental regulation in Nigeria is discussed here under four phases namely: (1) The era of *ad hoc* environmental policies (1960-1987), (2) The era of toxic waste crisis (1988-1999), (3) The introduction of the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) (1999-2007) and (4) The National Environmental Standard Regulation and Enforcement Agency (NESREA, 2007-onward). The phases are categorized based on milestones achieved towards the emergence of a more holistic environmental protection approach nationally.
5.2.1 Phases of systematic evolution of holistic environmental regulation institutions in Nigeria

The era of *ad hoc* environmental policies (1960-1987)

During the period of *ad hoc* environmental policies (1960-1987), there was no particular environmental law guiding economic and regional development in the country. There were only ad hoc sector by sector environment-related legislations such as the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act 99 (1979); Oil pipeline Act (1956); Forestry Act (1958); Public Health Act (1958); Destruction of mosquitoes Act (1958); and Lagos’s plan of Action (1980) among others (Ladan, 2012). Industrialization was considered a key indicator of development and stringent laws to control industrial pollution and hazardous wastes as well as land degradation were deemed unnecessary (Adegoroye, 1994). However, the UN Stockholm conference (1972) on human environment ignited the need to evolve holistic environmental regulations and laws (Adegoroye, 1994), and led to the first major step in the process of institutionalising environmental concerns in project development in 1975. This was reported to have led to the creation of Urban development and environment department in the then Federal Ministry of Economic Development. The department was later renamed Division of Environmental Planning and Protection in 1983 in the former Ministry of Works and Housing (Ogunba, 2004). In 1982, another attempt to formulate a coherent environmental law at the national level proved abortive (Nwafor, 2006). But the incident of toxic waste dumped in Koko village in the old Bendel state (now Delta state) in 1987 marked the turning point in the history of environmental protection in Nigeria (Adegoroye, 1994). The central government was forced to develop a holistic rather than sectoral approach to environmental protection due to public concern over perceived government laxity about environmental protection (Fagbohun, 2012).
The toxic cargo which came from Italy was in five shipments, totalling 3884 metric tonnes; this seminal moment catalysed the consciousness of the government and the Nigerian people to environmental protection (Adegorye, 1994).


In reaction to the incident, the Harmful Waste Decree 42 was promulgated in November 1988 to define harmful wastes, prohibit their dumping, and create offences related to the above act. Subsequently, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act 58 of 1988 was enacted. The FEPA Act established the Federal Environmental Protection Agency charged with overall responsibility for environmental protection while also encouraging state governments to create environmental protection bodies. During this period, FEPA published a few regulations for the protection of the environment among which were the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Decree 86 of 1992. The EIA decree has since remained a substantive instrument for environmental intervention in the country.

FEPA was the first African national institutional mechanism for environmental protection, however being the first never translated to the best environmental institution to date. The national policy document on the environment which was launched in 1989 guides the functions of FEPA. Similarly, a consultative and policy making forum called the National Council on the Environment was created to promote cooperation, coordination and harmonization of policies and implementation of enforcement strategies between and among federal and state environmental protection agencies (Adegorye, 1994). By 1992, FEPA was transferred to the Presidency from the Ministry of Works and Housing and its mandate...
expanded to include conservation of natural resources and the control of land erosion and desertification. FEPA was at that time organized into five major technical departments as follows: Planning and Evaluation, Environmental Resources Conservation, Environmental Technology, Environmental Quality and the Inspectorate and Enforcement, and had regional offices in Lagos, Port Harcourt, Benin-city, Kaduna and Kano. By 1997, the first set of EIA guidelines and guidelines in five major sectors of the economy were produced and applied by FEPA. A number of international conventions were signed during this period as covered below (Adegoroye, 1994).

The EIA Act (No. 86) of 1992 established the EIA guidelines for ensuring environmentally sound sustainable development projects in the country. The Act outlines the goals and objectives of an EIA, and mandated that EIA be carried out for certain types of projects. Such projects include industrial, mining and petroleum activities as well as screening, reviewing and approving an EIA before commencing such projects. It also stipulates penalties for non-compliance. The EIA decree was established with the aim of protecting the Nigerian environment and to regulate the industrialisation process with due regard for the environment. By this Act, no project can be executed without prior consideration of the environmental consequences of the project in the form of an environmental impact assessment. Mainstreaming EIA in Nigeria's development process is a major milestone in the history of environmental regulation in the country. EIA marked the beginning of environmental standard benchmark particularly in the industrial sector.
The introduction of the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) (1999-2007)

In order to further ensure that the environmental objectives stated in section 20 of the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria and fully implement the National policy on the environment, FEPA was transformed to the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) in 1999. The ministry was mandated to integrate environmental concerns into economic development beyond EIA, review and strengthen existing environmental legislation as well as carry out intensive environmental education and awareness campaigns. The transformation of FEPA to a Ministry of Environment provided a platform for environmental governance beyond the established hierarchical, command-and-control approach. As explained by a key government official: -

‘Our office is the field headquarters, Federal Ministry of Environment XXX, anything concerning environment is vested in the Ministry, the amelioration of the effects of climate change on the environment…. if you want to establish a (major) business any developmental business Nigeria EIA Act 86 of 1992 says any (major) developmental act, any development project whether by federal, state or local government or individual you must carry out EIA of that project before you start. Failure will attract penalty, fine or imprisonment or both, that is for that Ministry’ (GRFD 1, 15th October 2012).

The Federal Ministry of the Environment became the main institution charged with the responsibility to implement environmental intervention instrument (the EIA Act) in Nigeria. Though the move was laudable it was perceived to lack adequate enforcement mechanisms, because there was no enabling law backing environmental compliance and enforcement leading to a loophole between compliance and enforcement of environmental laws (Benebo, 2010). To ensure this was filled, the National Environmental Standard Regulation and
Enforcement Agency (NESREA) was created (Ladan, 2012). NESREA’s creation is succinctly captured in the words of its first Director Dr. Mrs Ngeri Benebo:

‘In 1999 the Government wisely decided to merge, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency and relevant Departments from other Ministries into a single Federal Ministry of Environment. However, the new Ministry of Environment lacked the necessary laws to enable enforcement. This created a vacuum in the effective oversight of environmental laws, standards and regulations in the country’ (Benebo, 2010 p.541).

The National Environmental Standard Regulation and Enforcement Agency (NESREA, 2007- onward)

By 2007, the Federal Government realized the pressing need to further address the enforcement gap and the National Environmental Standard Regulation and Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act 2007 was promulgated to repeal the FEPA Act. This new Act created NESREA as a parastatal body of the then Federal Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Urban development with a vision to inspire personal and collective responsibility in building an environmentally sustainable Nigeria. The Act empowered this agency to enforce all environmental laws, guidelines, policies, standards and regulations in the country as well as compliance with provision of international agreements, protocols, conventions and treaties on the environment to which the country is a signatory (Our activities- NESREA, 2017). With the establishment of NESREA, it is believed that industrial environmental degradation will be reduced to minimal levels across the country, however evidence shows the contrary.
The Agency is structured into one service and three technical Departments, namely: Administration & Finance Department; Planning & Policy Analysis; Inspection & Enforcement and Environmental Quality Control. The agency also has regional offices in all the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria with state offices in 13 states. The NESREA Act and Regulations constitute a new beginning because in both purpose and contents, they aim at addressing the preponderance of obsolete environmental regulations, standards and enforcement mechanisms. Over the years, the absence of such regulation has resulted in high rates of non-compliance with environmental laws, regulations and standards (Ladan, 2012). In order to deliver on its mandate, the immediate implementation strategies of NESREA are geared towards governance through adopting the following approaches: 1) collaboration and partnership; 2) conducting public education and awareness on topical environmental issues; and 3) strengthening institutions and building capacity to monitor compliance and enforce existing environmental regulations, including guidelines for best practices (Ladan, 2012).

To achieve its main objective, the agency developed and is still developing regulatory guidelines for the different sectors of the economy. About 33 regulations have so far been developed and are implemented nationally (GFRD5, 14th April, 2016). However, it is important to note that NESREA is a Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) (a parastatal) under the Federal Ministry of the Environment charged with environmental standard enforcement, while the Ministry is responsible for environmental standard mainstreaming in any project through EIA approval. Changes in environmental regulation in Nigeria has widely been acknowledged and appreciated. Thus, a government official commented that
‘… this law of EIA was latent during the military, then during the civilian EIA Act of 1992… so before then I don’t think there was serious monitoring of these industries, I think they were all doing what they feel they can do, but since the enactment of that Act, there have been changes’ (GRFD1 15th October 2012).

When asked about the experience in the cement sector, the interviewee states that:

‘Now they cover the conveying belt so that the dust from the quarry will not go into the atmosphere, even their storage point is also covered. So, you can’t see dust, I have been there recently, so environmental management has improved more than it used to be because of the effects of the EIA. You know they built one new factory now, the XXX, it’s up to standard so I think every mitigation measure has been introduced, I think they are complying’ (GRFD1 15th October 2012).

Another government official also has this to say about the changes in environmental regulation in Nigeria:

‘Before NESREA came on board, there have been a lot of activities going on that are not well regulated, because the Ministry of Environment is saddled with so many responsibilities. That area of enforcement wasn’t given much needed attention. And that’s what led to the Act that established NESREA. So, that NESREA will be given the function of enforcing environmental law to ensure that every industrialist, manufacturing company comply with the details of environmental ordinance’ (GFRD5, 14th April 2016).

In this context, Ladan (2012, p.119) affirms that ‘Nigeria’s formal environmental regime has developed significantly from humble beginnings. Having been initiated in the colonial period during which environmental issues were generally couched within public health regulation. and having developed in a rather ad hoc manner in the early days of independence during which heavy reliance was placed on the law of nuisance, Nigeria now has a relatively comprehensive environmental regime’. But is having comprehensive environmental regime enough to promote environmentally sustainable development?
This section has reviewed the emergence of a coherent environmental regulation instrument in Nigeria at about the same period neoliberalism was spreading globally. Trending the historical development of the institutions for environmental standard regulation in the country to date, it could be understood that these institutions emerged after much pressure from the public and international community. Significant achievements could be said to have been made by setting up necessary legal and institutional instruments needed to ensure coherent environmental standard regulation as the country further dips into neoliberalism. Having said this, the roles of FMENV as statutory and foremost institutions for environmental regulation in the cement sector is discussed in the next section.

5.3 The role of FMENV and NESREA in environmental regulation in Nigeria’s cement sector

With the emergence of EIA Act as the environmental mainstreaming instrument, it was no more business as usual for investors in the Nigeria cement sector more importantly as government was no more the core investor. The main achievement of the evolution of a coherent national environmental regulation institution is that government has successfully separated regulatory roles from business roles. Government is no more the polluter and at the same time the regulator. While government has considerably divested its interest to the private sector actors in the Nigerian cement industry, it has evolved a statutory institution to ensure the mainstreaming of environmental protection into businesses. Government has also strengthened sub-national governments to protect their immediate environment. In light of this, existing industries were asked to do environmental audits and reassess their impacts while new ones mandated to conduct an EIA before beginning operation (GFRD5, 14th April
Though, no evidence to back this claim but by inference, the role of NESREA was to strengthen the regulatory process through ensuring that existing industries comply with evolving regulatory processes. The National Policy on the Environment (NPE) outlines the procedures and actions required to launch Nigeria into an era of social justice, self-reliance and sustainable development in the 21st Century. However, effective application of the policy has remained the nation’s greatest challenge as environmental degradation still persists in the country. The policy has at its core the will to ensure sustainable development based on proper management of the environment through the integration of environmental concerns into major economic decision-making processes. It also emphasises internalizing environmental remediation costs into major development projects and employing economic instruments in the management of natural resources as well as the use of environmentally friendly technologies. The process of ensuring this starts with mandatory conduct of Environmental Impact Assessment before embarking on any major development project. The EIA process is a confirmation of the relative significance of the state in environmental governance nationally (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Piattoni, 2010).

Furthermore, the NPE adopts several principles of sustainable development. These include:

- The precautionary principle which holds that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, the lack of full scientific knowledge shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective means to prevent environmental degradation.
- The Polluter Pays Principle (3p+) which encourages industries to invest positively to prevent pollution, by emphasising that the polluter should bear the cost of preventing and controlling pollution.
- The user pays principle (UPP), in which the cost of a resource to a user must include all the environmental costs associated with its extraction, transformation and use (including the costs of alternative or future uses forgone).
- The principle of intergenerational equity which requires that the needs of the present generation are met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs is also adopted.
- The principle of intra-generational equity which requires that different groups of people within the country and within the present generation have the right to benefit equally from the exploitation of resources and that they have an equal right to a clean and healthy environment and
- The subsidiary principle which requires that decisions should as much as possible be made by communities affected or on their behalf by the authorities closest to them.

While putting the above principles into practice begins with FMENV, it also directly involves subnational governments before it finally ends with the central government. The process within the FEMENV was explained by a senior government official as follows:

‘The ministry (FMENV) is divided into six professional departments and two service departments …you also have environmental assessment department, that is another department… Their own duty is if you want to establish a business any developmental business in Nigeria the EIA Act 86 of 1992 says any developmental act, any development project whether by federal, state or local government or individual you must carry out EIA of that project before you start’ (GRFD1 15th October 2012).

He further explained the processes involved:

‘…So, when you now go to the Ministry to obtain EIA form, fill it, they will come and inspect - site verification. That is the first thing to come see where you are going to establish… is it a company or whatever, a cement factory, whatever. They will come and see it. How you obtain your land, is it proper? did you sign a MOU with the
people, Memorandum of Understanding with people or just took the land? They will know whether you acquire the land in a proper way, ask you some questions, look at the land whether there are water bodies in the area, are people living in that area, you know, and all that kind of. So, they will know, look at the vegetation of that area. Is it forested or just secondary vegetation or the rest? … so, those things will be taken note of. So, after that you are now being given the go ahead to start test, may be like soil sample, water air, all those things, and write your EIA report before you now bring it to the ministry for approval before there will be a panel, that panel will be an independent panel to look at the report’ (GRFD1 15th October 2012).

Another government official further explained the intergovernmental processes involved:

‘… after the company, might have submitted the EIA report, what the federal ministry of environment does is to invite us. They will invite the state, they will invite the local government, they will also invite the immediate communities and other stakeholders. Then there will be a round table, submit the report to us, we will review those areas that we feel that the company has to do something about, we will tell them. The federal government also does the same thing, the local government does the same thing. They set up a review panel, the federal ministry of environment will invite expert from different fields, in areas of socio economics, areas of waste management, then area of mining activities if it has to be a cement industry, just like when, this new WAPCO factory was been set up such things was also carried out’ (GRST1, 15th October 2012).

The stakeholder involvement was also affirmed by another government representative:

‘Every stakeholder used to be around even academia, professional bodies, NGOs etc. it’s not just federal, state and local government affair’ (GFRD5, 14th April 2016).

As earlier discussed, to ensure effective coordination of all environmental matters, the Federal Ministry of Environment was first created in 1999. It was merged in 2006 with Housing & Urban Development Ministry. In 2008 a new Federal Ministry of Environment was created, the Ministry has since remained the interface for environmental consciousness in line with global environmental practices for sustainable economic and livelihood of Nigerians. The head office of the Ministry is in Abuja with field offices in the 36 states of the federation. The ministry comprises of six technical departments, eight service departments seven NDPBs and two units (figure 5.1). The main mission of the ministry is to ensure environmental protection
and natural resources conservation for sustainable development of the country (About the Ministry, 2017).

The main instrument used to achieve this mission is the EIA Act No. 86 of 1992. Environmental assessment department, a technical department in the ministry is saddled with the responsibility of implementing the EIA Act. It is claimed that the department is to ensure environmentally sustainable development through regulation of the oil and gas industry, environmental impacts assessment of development projects and development of guidelines and standards for environmental quality monitoring (“About the Ministry”, 2017). The environmental assessment department is domiciled in the headquarters in Abuja while other departments are found in the field offices across the country (GFRD1, 15th October 2012).

Under the Department of Environmental Assessment (DEA) is the Impact Mitigation Monitoring (IMM) branch. The IMM oversees EIA auditing and post-impact analysis of approved projects. In my views, the role of IMM conflicts with the duties of NESREA. The DEA supervises NESREA among other parastatals and works with the ministry of mines and steel development, the line ministry for the cement sector. It was learnt that there exists a MoU for collaboration and cooperation between the Department of Environmental Assessment on behalf of the Ministry and the Mines Compliance department on behalf of MMSD on EIA, Environmental Audit and other matters related to mining and the environment (About the Ministry, 2017). This is argued necessary to address conflicting roles and responsibilities hindering the success of environmental regulation experienced in the past between FMENV and line many Ministries.
Under Section 12 (8 &13) of the EIA Guidelines, establishing a cement industry requires social and environmental impact assessment. The Act provides the necessary requirement of balancing both the positive and negative impacts of the project on the environment and the society. Section 2 (1) of the Act requires an assessment of public or private projects that are likely to have a significant (negative) impact on the environment. Section 2 (4) states that the basic starting point of EIA is an application in writing to the ministry for their environmental assessment before embarking on the project and section 60 creates a legal liability for contravention of any provision.

Figure 5.1: Organisational structure of the Federal Ministry of Environment, Nigeria

(www.environment.gov.ng)
This section has discussed the emergence of a national, coherent environmental institution (FMENV) and policy instrument (EIA) in Nigeria. It also shows that this development signifies the government intention to prioritise environmental protection nationally. In the environmental regulation process federal, state and local governments play roles leading to EIA approval of any development project such as cement production. The next section explores the EIA process and key stakeholders involved in the Nigerian cement industry.

5.3.1 Stakeholders and Stages of EIA process in the cement sector

Major stakeholders involved in the EIA process as an environmental instrument in Nigeria are the government agencies (Federal, state and local), the non-state stakeholders such as environmental consultants, the project proponent, the public and the NGOs (see Figure 5.2). Government agencies particularly the federal government, play the most important role in the process as the framework to ensure the success of the process emanates from them. The key decision-makers in the process are the government as the regulator, registered consultants as the middlemen and the project developer.

Table 5.2 Major stakeholders in the EIA process in Nigeria (Author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Roles</th>
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<td><strong>Government agencies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal state and local</td>
<td>Regulators</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-state stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project proponent</td>
<td>Developer/cement company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental consultants</td>
<td>Middlemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>The public and non-governmental organisations</td>
<td>Observer/contributor</td>
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</table>
Considering the EIA Act, environmental regulation in the cement industry begins with application in writing to the federal ministry of environment for environmental impact statement/certificate (EIS). The intending cement company (proponent) applies to the regulating ministry (FMENV) by submitting the project proposal detailing the project information; environmental impacts of the project, and the project alternatives at all the phases of the project. In the case of the cement sector, the construction site, size and design along with operational and decommission stages constitute the body of the proposal. The Mitigation measures and monitoring strategies throughout the entire life of the project as well as explicit post-closure plan / reclamation of the environment are also included. This is then followed by initial environmental evaluation by the Department of Environmental Assessment (DEA) in the ministry before a go ahead order to draft the EIA. The initial evaluation is undertaken to screen all projects likely to take place in the area whether there is the need for EIA. After the screening, the proponent is then permitted to prepare a draft of the EIA.

In accordance with Sections 7; 22 (3), 25 & 37 of the EIA Act, the EIA draft report will be presented to the public for comments by the regulating ministry. This is to afford the stakeholders and interested public the chance to give their views on the social and environmental impacts of the project. This is an important aspect of the EIA process that has been contentious in recent time (Ogunba, 2004). Comments arising from the display to the public are then forwarded to the Independent Review Panel. The draft must be subjected to an impartial, scientific and independent review parallel to the regulating ministry and the proponent. The report must then be submitted to the council through the regulating ministry following the guidelines in section 34 and 37 of the Act to ensure that complete, correct and
unbiased information is provided. According to Section 39 of the EIA Act the regulating ministry must publish the report of the independent review in the appropriate manner and shall advise the public that the report is available.

Final decision following the provisions of the Act is then made. The project is either approved having met necessary requirements of the assessment or further modification is requested for EIA reconsideration. The decision may also be that the project is rejected if necessary conditions are not met by the project developer. The decision of the regulating ministry shall be in writing detailing the project operations, recommended mitigation plans for the adverse environmental impacts that have been adopted and the follow up programme to be implemented for the project. More importantly, the decision of the regulating ministry must be published and made available to any interested public or group. If approved, the regulating ministry is further mandated by law to carry out its statutory role of monitoring the activities of the proponent for mitigations at all phases of the project as stated in section 41 of the EIA Act.

Having gained approval from the regulating ministry for the project to take-off, the need for compliance and enforcement of the plans proposed in the statement becomes mandatory. It has been noted that the challenge of environmental regulation in Nigeria was the absence of a statutory agency backed by law to enforce environmental standard despite the presence of adequate legislation and guidelines for environmental standard (Ogunba, 2004; Benebo, 2011; Fagbohun and Adejonwo-Osho 2012; Nwoko, 2013).
Figure 5.2: Environmental Impact assessment process in the Nigerian Cement Industry

Source: EIA Act No. 86 of 1992

Dr. Mrs Ngeri Benebo, former director of NESREA has this to say about environmental regulation in Nigeria:

“In the past, weak environmental governance - characterized by poor compliance monitoring and enforcement of environmental laws, standards and regulations – was one of the main challenges to addressing the myriad environmental problems in Nigeria. But over the last two decades, environmental governance has become central to government efforts to implement a wide range of environmental programmes designed to protect air, water, natural resources, wildlife and public health. Environmental governance has also become a major instrument used by the government to help address problems such as the discharge of pollutants into the environment, the control of hazardous wastes, and the protection of ecosystems, flora and fauna. This has been made possible through the creation of appropriate
institutional mechanisms on environmental compliance monitoring and enforcement … The new Ministry of Environment lacked the necessary laws to enable enforcement. This created a vacuum in the effective oversight of environmental laws, standards and regulations in the country. To address this gap in line with section 20 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Federal Government established the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency, as a parastatal of the Federal Ministry of Environment. The National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency Act 2007 repealed the Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act Cap F 10 LFN 2004” (Benebo, 2011, p.540-541).

The above submission captures the essence of the creation of an enforcement agency separately in response to the new trend of challenges emerging after efforts to evolve a coherent national environmental protection instrument. Jordan (2008) notes that the more government aim to solve a pressing problem, the more complex problems emerge, this shows the degree of complexity involved in social relations. NESREA is the newest institutional mechanism created by the Nigerian government to ensure effective environmental governance. NESREA monitors compliance and enforces environmental laws, standards and regulations as well involve relevant stakeholders in the implementation of its programmes and activities (Benebo, 2011). The important role NESREA’s emergence plays is reiterated below by a key interviewee

‘Before NESREA came on board, most of the industries have been doing it in a way that they cut corners. They don’t want to go through the right process. They just start operation without having the necessary environmental papers. But since NESREA came, we have been enforcing the document. The situation has changed. And now any extractive industry that wants to start operation know they have to get the complete document because there is awareness. They know NESREA will frown at it if we get to know about it’ (GFRD5, 14th April 2016).
Section 2, of NESREA Act, 2007 established NESREA as the main environmental regulatory body. The role of NESREA in environmental regulation in the cement sector is to ensure compliance with environmental management system as agreed in the Environmental Impact Statement by the regulating ministry and the project proponent. A key government actor narrates NESREA’s role as follows:

‘To start with, we first identify the facility to monitor. We carry out an inventory with the help of the other stakeholders e.g. local government, state etc., to know where the facility is situated. Once we have the names and the location. Then the agency will appoint a desk officer to be in charge of the facility. So, the desk officer will constitute the team to monitor the facility and a letter of introduction will be written from the office to the facility. The team will then choose a date for inspection’ (GFRD5, 14th April 2016).

He explained further that:

‘After the inspection, there will be closing conference. The leader of team will reveal the result of their observation and necessary recommendations will be given to them verbally. When the team gets back to the office, they will write a report and recommendation which will be submitted to their boss. The boss will go through it and approval will be given on it. Then a letter will be forwarded to the operators of the facility inspected’ (GFRD5, 14th April 2016).

Then,

‘A time limit will be given to them depending on the level of observation. And after the expiration of the time limit, if the concerned area has not been addressed, another letter will be written as a reminder for them to address the concern. And failure to address the concern, there will be another letter and that will be in form of abatement letter. If they fail to comply, another letter in form of abatement notice with timeframe to comply with. Failure to comply with that will lead to sealing order. A sealing order or stop work order will be given. If that is tampered with, the office will take a legal action against them. And if it’s not tampered with, after sealing, an administrative fine will be given to them for not complying with the order of the agency. And if the fine is paid, and they rectify what they were told to do, then the company will be opened’ (GFRD5, 14th April 2016).
The inspection process explained above is shown in figure 5.3 below:

Figure 5.3 NESREA facility inspection process

Another respondent has this to say about the agency:

‘Oh yes! That is the police force of federal ministry of environment. Yea! they are the one allowed to enforce the standard, so what the core ministry do, if we go on monitoring we see it, direct it to headquarters, headquarters will now direct it to an agency that enforces’ (GFRD2, 15th October 2012).

Two main policy documents guiding NESREA functions in the cement sector are National Environmental (Mining and Processing of Coal, Ores and Industrial Minerals) Regulations, S. I. No. 31 of 2009. The Regulation aims to minimize pollution from mining and processing of industrial minerals and encourage the application of up-to-date efficient cleaner production technologies. National Environmental (Non-Metallic Minerals Manufacturing Industries
Sector) Regulations, S. I. No. 21 of 2011 provides the regulatory framework for the control of all activities of this sector in order to protect Nigerian environment from their negative impact.

The nature of a cement company requires that raw materials (Limestone) be mined and then processed to get the final product which is the cement. This is classified as quarrying and production operations respectively. The main material for cement production is limestone which is mined in the quarry and conveyed to the factory for processing to the final product. While quarrying affect the natural ecosystem in some many ways (CSI, 2002; Steinweg, 2008), the processing also involves intensive energy consumption and carbon emission processes. The global cement industry releases about 0.8 tonne of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere per tonne of cement produced (European Cement Association, 2009; Yared, 2010) producing up to 5% of global man-made CO2 which contributes to climate change (Industry Update, 2010; CSI 2002). Cement production accounts for 60% of CO2 produced while 40% comes from fuel used in the process (Brown etal., 2012). The regulations for cement production require that an operational cement industry in Nigeria must carry out environmental audit every two to three years to ensure the industry is complying with its environmental management plans (EMP) (GFRD5, 14th April 2016). The environmental assessment must be carried out by environmental consultants accredited by NESREA on behalf of the company. Accredited consultants serve as middlemen between the regulating ministry and the cement company (EC2 5th May 2016). This is attested to by the statement below: -
‘NESREA’s duty is to carry out auditing. So the consultant accredited by federal ministry is accredited to carry out environmental impact assessment not audit, so NESREA accredit their own consultants for audit. There are guidelines to follow like obtaining an EIA of that area before carrying out any activity. An approval will be given to carry on, then after operation has commenced, every three years, it is the duty of facility operators to ensure that the facilities are audited by accredited consultant’ (GFRD5, 14th April 2016).

The above statement reveals an issue of serious concern about power tussle between the Ministry of environment and NESREA. In view of the above discussions, without doubt the central government plays a germane role in development policies and environmental regulation processes in the extractive industry. Therefore Parenti (2014) argues that a modern territorial state’s role is managing, mediating, producing and delivering non-human nature - a capitalist state. This section reveals the changing and conflicting roles of the central government in environmental regulation in the devolved Nigerian cement industry. While this is not, it goes on to show that lessons learnt in the past have not had any significant impact in policy reforms in the country. The findings signify the continued establishment of hierarchical command and control environmental regulation process in the country with little modifications. It also revealed the intention of the government to becoming the regulator of the environment and facilitator of sustainable development in the industry. This is evident in the different roles the FMENV and NESREA play in the regulation process. However, during this period, subnational governments too have been actively engaging in environmental regulation in the industry as empowered by the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria and the national policy on the environment.

As such, the regulation process in the cement sector involves the state and local government at one point or the other. The affirmation by some government respondents below is followed
by the discussion of the roles of subnational governments in environmental regulation process in the Nigerian cement industry.

‘Cement industry is an extractive industry which has significant impact on the environmental wellbeing of the people and climate change issues in general. By virtue of the nature of the industry as extractive one, the exclusive right belongs to the central government to control but the environment belongs to all and is on the concurrent list in the constitution of Nigeria. This gives the state legal right to play a significant role in regulating environmental impacts of the industry’. (GRST4, 1st June 2016).

In the above statement, it is noteworthy that as an extractive industry, subnational governments have no legitimate role in its development, they are passively involved in the decision-making process. Their active role is only pronounced in environmental regulation in the sector.

Another government representative explains this as evident below:

‘To carry out our compliance responsibility, in the first instance, you know I mentioned that we first identify the facility through the local government, state government. And funny enough most of these extractive industries are not within the metropolis. They are all situated in the forest. So, we collaborate with them to give us the necessary information in order to be able to locate them’ (GFRD5 14th April 2016).

The next section discusses how the roles evidenced above are played by subnational governments in the Nigerian cement industry.

5.4 The role of subnational governments in environmental regulation in the Nigerian cement sector

‘The state is carried along in the EIA processes from inception to approval, while after EIA approval, the department of inspectorate and compliance monitoring is saddled
with the responsibility of enforcing compliance at the state government level’ (GRST4 1\textsuperscript{st} June 2016).

The above statement attests to the two main roles of subnational government in environmental regulation in the Nigerian cement industry - Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment process and inspection and compliance monitoring during operations. As contained in the National policy on the environment, state governments have the rights to create their own Ministry of environment to perform their constitutional right of ensuring safe and sound environment within their states. The government of Ogun state in line with the above established the ministry of environment and Ogun state Environmental Protection Agency (OGEPA). Subject to NESREA Act 2007, the Ogun State Environmental Protection Agency (OGEPA) Act 4 of 2003 and Ministry of Environment Law of 2004 are the main policy documents guiding the state roles in environmental regulation in the cement sector (Onilude, 2015). The Ogun state Ministry of environment plays a significant part in the EIA process before the final decision by the federal ministry of the environment. The Inspection and Compliance Monitoring Department (ICMD) of the Ogun State Environmental Protection Agency (OGEPA) then takes up the responsibility of monitoring environmental compliance if the project is approved. This was confirmed by a government respondent:

‘Part of the activities we carry out here, one of them is we carry out inspection, in form of assessment, and auditing of industrial facilities in the state. Secondly, we do a kind of review of environmental reports, the reports are in two or three forms one of them is the environmental audit report which is a two year, report that is submitted to the agency. Then the other one, is environmental implications studies, which is a smaller version of environmental impact assessment studies that is being done for a larger project but the implications study is done for two kind of industries. One is an industry that is about to start. Like I said it’s a smaller version of EIA, so for industry that is starting, then the other one is for an existing industry, that is proposing to expand, its line of production’ (GRST1, 15\textsuperscript{th} October 2012).
The respondent continued: -

‘We do a kind of impact mitigation monitoring and that impact mitigation monitoring is after an industry has submitted the EIA or the environmental implications study. Then the impact mitigation monitoring is done quarterly, we do on our own, but most of the time we don’t really do much of it, but in conjunction with federal ministry of environment. We do it quarterly, at times twice a year, depending on the kind of approval given to that industry by the ministry of environment’ (GRST1, 15th October 2012).

The approval of the EIA comes from the federal ministry of environment while the compliance monitoring is done by the federal government and state Agencies (that is FMENV, NESREA and OGEPA). A key participant has this to say about roles of the agencies as representatives of central and subnational governments: -

‘When you look at the law that’s 1988 law, the federal ministry of environment empowered state to monitor the industry, that’s compliance monitoring. They monitor once in a while but the state is like community police and that’s what they are expected to do. The state work on any issue before it gets to the federal level. They take immediate action in a particular area. NESREA is the federal police’. (EC1, 5th May 2016).

Under the EIA Act the state government as the host is involved in the EIA review process till the approval stage. This is to ensure credible environmental management plan which will guide the state actors in monitoring the operations of the company. At the local government level, the local government actors are partly involved in the EIA process of industries mainly as spoke persons for the host communities as emphasised in the subsidiarity principle in the National Policy on the Environment. A key actor at the local government level states that: -

‘We are not so much involved in the process before it is finally approved, normally the EIA that we have been receiving here is being sent down from the Federal Ministry of Environment. When we receive, we monitor, and at times we invite the originators of this EIA to our office and ask them questions where necessary but basically our own
duty is just to monitor and make sure that they adhere strictly with what we have on that paper, that is what we do’ (GRLG2, 14th November 2012).

Another interviewee had this to say:

‘During the environmental monitoring and compliance visit, the Ministry from the headquarters, officials will come, the state involved, if it’s here in Ogun state we will involve one or two persons. The state Ministry of environment or OGEPA, the state environmental protection agency, they too will be involved, then the local government where that eh... factory or industry is located, will also be involved. But the community are not represented because, I think the Act does not include them in the visit because the environmental person from the local government will be there representing the interest of the community because any protest the community will have will be lodged with the local government. So, they will come with the view or views of the community, may be if the community are not happy concerning their welfare or whatever, that representative of the local government will present it in that meeting’ (GFRD1 15th October 2012).

The above statements indicate that though local government actors are involved in the environmental regulatory process in the cement sector, the tier of government almost always receives information about EIA too late to influence its approval by the federal government. As the closest government actor to the people, local government actors are expected to be carried along in the EIA process from inception. This shows that the subsidiarity principle which emphasises delegation of decision-making powers to the local governments as the closest to the people (Blank, 2009) is not practicable in the Nigerian extractive industry. A key government official’s reaction below told me:

‘Initially, I talked about delegation of roles to some stakeholders, areas of waste management have been delegated to the state. Also, monitoring of eateries has been delegated to the state, but that doesn’t stop us from going to those areas to educate and give them awareness. Also, the food handler’s permit has been given to the state to issue, and the area of environmental monitoring has been assigned to the local government to carry them along. Though they might not have the legislation in most of the environmental instances, but NESREA has all the necessary legislations on the environmental sectors and we can prosecute. So, if they have any environmental issues
they can’t prosecute, they do refer it to us. And the one that has been assigned to them to monitor, we get across to them and make proper investigations. If there is any area that concerns the state, we send them a letter to that effect’. (GFRD5, 14th April 2016)

The roles of federal and subnational actors in environmental regulation in the Nigerian cement industry discussed above indicates the inevitability of government actors regulating health and environment of the cement sector. Compared to the past efforts, emergent institutions and regulations for environmental regulation in the country in general show that environmental well-being is considerably taking the centre stage. However, the emergent roles of the government actors are still very complex. This is not to say all is well with environmental regulation in Nigeria but significant progress has been made in the process of evolving a coherent environmental intervention regime for the country. These institutions can deliver positive environmental outcomes only if their roles are supportive rather than conflicting as it is experienced in this study. In the next section, I characterise the above findings and identify the complications and implications on environmental regulation in the Nigerian extractive industry as experienced in this case study.

5.5 Characterising the state actors’ roles evident in the Nigerian cement industry

Evidence so far shows that the characteristics of state actors’ new roles in the Nigerian cement industry as a typology of Hooghe and Marks’ (2003) Type 1 Multilevel Governance (MLG). As discussed in chapter two, Hooghe and Marks explain that Type I multilevel governance is characterised with a nested jurisdiction (Nigeria) where every citizen is located. In the jurisdiction, there is only one relevant jurisdiction (National government) at a territorial scale, usually stable for periods of several decades or more (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Within
this jurisdiction, it is stated that the allocation of policy competences (development and regulatory policies) across the jurisdictional levels is flexible (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). The experience of the Nigerian cement industry environmental governance presents the characteristics Hooghe and Marks (2003) explain as Type I MLG. It is also similar to what Betsill and Bulkeley (2006) term multiple tiers of authority and hierarchical mode of environmental governance by Kooiman (2003). Despite the emphasis on subsidiarity principles in the environmental policy of the country, the central government still hold the regulatory power. Though governments at various scales engage in other modes of governance such as persuasion, and co-governance/collaborative governance, the hierarchical mode remains the basis on which other modes are practiced. For example, NESREA established a voluntary corps scheme called Green corps. The scheme is controlled by the agency.

Another major example is the involvement of environmental consultants in environmental regulation as middlemen between government and the cement companies. Environmental consultant must be contracted by any project proponent to conduct EIA as well as environmental audit. The consultants must be registered and accredited yearly by the national and state government in some cases. Apart from the overexploitation by the government, government officials do not allow level playground for the consultants (EC1, 5th May 2016). They influence the choice of consultants used by a company, this not only poses a big threat to the survival of the consultants, it also put the credibility and sincerity of the whole process to doubt. Moreover, the choice of who the government works or partner with has been largely subjective because if you are perceived a threat they do not involve you. Nonetheless, the
creation of NESREA to enforce environmental standard hitherto missing and the development of 33 sectoral regulations to address their peculiar environmental challenges is no doubt laudable compared to the past.

Successes achieved so far are due to pressure from the non-state actors inside and outside the country particularly the adoption and domestication of Agenda 21 in the country. It is quite appreciable that Nigeria’s environmental regulation system has moved from mere command and control toward an incentive based regulation through the polluter pays principle set out in 1992 Rio Declaration. The Rio Declaration emphasises that a polluter:

- Should incorporate external cost into its operations.
- More importantly, where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, the lack of full scientific knowledge shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective means to prevent environmental degradation.

A comprehensive EIA is mandatory to ensure cost-effective environmental remediation plan is put in place by the proponent. The fundamental principle in the constitution of Nigeria indicates development and environmental regulation process in the industry begins from the central/federal government. It also allows the state governments to take active part in the process. This gives the states the space in which they may operate in cooperation or in parallel to the federal government particularly in the compliance enforcement stage which has always been the areas of concern (Fagbohun, 2012; Fagbohun & Adejonwo-Osho, 2013; Erhun, 2015). This parallel arrangement has been attributed to poor framework for best practices to secure effective and efficient enforcement and compliance with international and municipal environmental laws (Amokaye, 2012). It has also been noted that the benefits arising from
existing legal and institutional frameworks are minimal and sub-optimal and has led to significant social and environmental welfare losses (Amokaye, 2012).

Similarly, Fagbohun and Adejonwo-Osho (2013) admit that Nigerian government has responded to global call for environmental protection with pieces of legislations, agencies, institutions and policy statements on the governance and management of the environment. The extensive legislations, institutions and policy statements have no effective and robust framework for implementation to achieve the desired sustainable environmental management (Fagbohun & Adejonwo-Osho, 2013). Relatedly, Erhun (2015) attests that Nigeria enjoys a comparatively well-established body of laws and a full-fledged Ministry to regulate the Nigerian environment but despite all these measures, the country still experiences regulatory failure in environmental governance because economic development is priced over and above sustainability of the environment. A common ground in the above submissions is that Nigeria no doubt has put in place some key environmental policies and regulations but the frameworks for its successful implementation is lacking. In light of this great challenge, Fagbohun (2012, p.10) argues that

“The inefficiency with environmental regulation in Nigeria is a creation rather than the effect of the law. Rather than being central, law is incidental. I further contend that in the absence of a profound reconfiguration of the present regime, particularly in the way it has guided allocation and monitoring of responsibilities for environmental protection, there is no reason to imagine and/or expect current strategies to succeed in fostering sustainable development”.

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There is every indication that the main problem affecting environmental regulation in Nigeria as reflected in the Nigerian cement sector is that the existing law has not made adequate provision to avoid duplication of duty and over-filing between government actors. The main weakness of the law is concerned with delegation of responsibility to the lowest level of public authority close to the people (Fagbohun & Adejonwo-Osho, 2013; Erhun 2015). This weakness has been a cause for concern as explained by a non-governmental professional participant: -

‘We need strong government to tackle bad behaviour (corruption and unethical practices) and make sure our economic policy works. National system of innovation can’t thrive with the level of bad behaviour we have in the system. Like the government is strong now, then national assembly should cooperate to change the laws. The laws are very weak against the kind of bad behaviours we have. If someone stole billions and he’s told to pay fine or it takes a year to be convicted. And you see lawyers sharing in the loot and defending people we know are thieves. So, the laws are very weak, national assembly should cooperate by looking at the laws and be reviewed. The three arms of government need to be very strong’. (AC2, 4th May 2016)

Another important weakness of the law is that existing law provides opportunities for offenders because of conflicting standards and information gaps as expressed below by some participants: -

‘You see where you have regulations and you cannot really get those regulations right and many people don’t even know what these regulations are. The information that are supposed to be readily available on their website are being sold or if you have to travel to Abuja from wherever you are before you can get them and these are things that ordinarily, should be free so if people want to comply, let them know what they want to comply with’ (EC2, 6th May 2016).

In the case of law enforcement, a government representative relates that: -

‘In the areas of law enforcement as well, we are still working on the law, for instance there was a company that we saw burning waste and was to pay a penal fee, but then
the company got a copy of OGEPA law, that the fine of burning waste is #50,000, so they have to pay 50,000 because they are not burning waste in their premises. They took their waste to a suburb and they were burning it under a high-tension wire. So, we have to strengthen the law. The challenges are just the areas of logistic, enforcement, addressing the issue of regulation to make it more current’ (GRST3, 13th April 2016)

Another key non-state participant relates his experience: -

‘I have been to several workshops that NESREA and ministry of Environment will openly disagree about issues. Openly, they have not been able to manage themselves well. Look at ordinary noise level, Ministry of environment says 90 for some areas. The same area, NESREA says 70’ (CPC1, 11th April 2016).

Relatedly, another key participant submits that: -

‘Different tiers of government actors monitor compliance of the industry to Environmental Management Plan. These include federal, state and local governments. NESREA particularly is the federal agency saddled with regulations and standard enforcement, but other actors too sometimes come to do same duty claiming legal right on the account of territorial interest and that environment is a common wealth and is on the concurrent list in the Nigerian constitution. This sometimes leads to conflict of interests, double standard, wasteful spending which is not good for not only business but also good government’ (CPC4, 3rd May 2016).

As evident above, “multi-level governance solution may minimize governance costs if and when governance functions have different optimal scales of implementation” (Paavola 2016, p. 147). Conflict of interest, double standard and wasteful spending constitute considerably to escalating cost of governing. However, reducing cost of governance is one important explanation of multilevel environmental governance (Paavola 2008, 2016). Multilevel Environmental governance can help overcome the challenge of fragmentation and aid integration of actors’ efforts as collective actions thereby reducing government cost and ensure environmental protection. The costs of governance consist of transaction costs, such as
those of devising and agreeing on rules, monitoring and enforcing compliance with them, and resolving conflicts over them.

By implication, the present state of environmental regulation in Nigeria negates collective action solutions embedded in multilevel environmental governance. Aside from reducing governance cost, multilevel environmental governance also promotes collective actions. MLEG can be adopted as an instrument to facilitate collective action through the introduction of representation (Paavola, 2016). Assigning key functions to subnational government actors rather than creating conflicting situations and double standards could be better option in this case. Applauding the legal, institutional and environmental intervention and standard setting, the integration of the fragmented actors’ activities toward multi-functionality of the environment is significantly elusive. Multi-functionality refers to the possibility of multiple use of natural resources such as forests and watercourses best exemplified with the help of the ecosystem service literature (Paavola 2016, p. 149). The concept was developed and well documented in agricultural development studies in the European Union. It aimed particularly to attach agricultural subsidies to the provision of other outputs like environmental benefits and detaching subsidies from output of agricultural production (Clark, 2005; Paavola, 2008).

Meanwhile, multi-functionality of the environment remains the most important task that must be foundational to any environmental regulation particularly in resource-based economies. The need to further define or assign key roles to different government actors at different scale to reduce governance cost on the one hand and promote collective action on the other is imminent. This is because without addressing these issues exploiting the benefits of multilevel governance for sustainable development may remain unattainable.
In this section I have characterised government actors’ roles in environmental governance as experienced in the Nigerian cement industry. So far, the characteristics of the state actors changing roles as demonstrated in the preceding sections reveal some complications with legal implications. In the next section, I have discussed some emerging complications and implications despite the evidence of improvement in environmental regulation from command and control to incentive-based approaches stipulated in Agenda 21 and domesticated in Nigeria as exemplified by the Nigerian cement industry case.

5.6 Complications and implications of environmental regulations in the Nigerian cement industry

Major complications emanating from defective environmental laws in Nigeria derived from the analysis in this chapter can be classified into three categories. They are legal framework for:

- Intergovernmental cooperation and coordination;
- Inclusive public participation and
- Multifunctional environmental resource development.

Intergovernmental cooperation and coordination problems in Nigeria’s environmental regulation system

These complications I argue have significant implications for successful multilevel environmental governance in Nigeria. Inter-ministerial and governmental conflicts have been rife in the country owing to lack of clear framework describing where the roles and limits of
government actors in regulation ends. At the federal level, problems of cooperation, cases of
tergovernmental conflicts have been adequately documented between federal ministry of
solid mineral development and the environment ministry (FMMSD, 2004; Onyenekenwa,
2011), between NESREA and Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) (Ogboru, 2015)
and some state governments (Otubu, 2012). The implication of this is that efforts are
fragmented due to overlapping functions. Public funds are wasted as there exists no
cooperation, conflict of roles and responsibilities between federal, state and local government
keeps escalating governance cost, collective action and the attainment of environmentally
sustainable development. This negates the gross importance of multilevel governance as it
does not add any values to the development process other than battle for supremacy, wasteful
spending and exploitation. A major experience of battle for supremacy is the demolition of
structure at the new cement factory Dangote cement is developing in Ogun state. It was learnt
that the company did not follow due process and as a result the state government demolished
structures erected on the factory site and stopped the construction until due process is
followed (GRST4, 1st June 2016). Wasteful spending can be discerned from the duplication of
duties between the federal and state governments. In terms of exploitation, this is discernible
from the lamentations of company representatives and environmental contractors.

**Inclusive public participation challenge in the Nigerian environmental regulation system**

The second important issue is the legal framework for inclusive public participation.
Participation of non-state actors in resource development and environmental regulation
process has been the bane of crisis and militancy in resource producing communities of
developing countries. The Niger delta region of Nigeria has been a major frontier of resource
conflicts and restiveness. Resistance to poor development framework by implication has led to concerned stakeholders being confrontational and using forces to claim their supposed right. Countless non-governmental organisations have been formed in the quest for environmental resource control and good governance in the Niger delta region. Also, numerous militant groups abound all in the name of bad governance and neglect of the communities believed to be the geese laying the golden egg for the country (Amnesty International, 2009; Onigbinde, 2008; Nwoke, 2015). Absence of procedural rights of the people in the implementation of environmental regulations has affected the fundamental right to clean and healthy environment in Nigeria (Erhun, 2015). Despite the defective participatory framework, the emergence of environmental non-governmental organisations is on the increase in the country. This I have discussed along with other key non-state actors from society-centric credential of governance concept in the next chapter.

**Absence of framework for multifunctional resource development**

In this era of *laissez faire* and climate change, the need to judiciously use resources to meet socio-economic and environmental needs requires multifunctional approaches involving using technological and organisational innovations to promote sustainable use of resources. Legal framework for multifunctional resource development is another important issue emanating from the roles of state actors in environmental governance in this study. Today, we are in the era where human activities affect virtually every aspect of the earth’s biophysical and ecological system more than ever before with far-reaching implications for the state and its society (Duit, 2016). The nation state remains the primary mode of social and political organisation and a main locus for successful collective, development and environmental
Environmental state and environment making state are two important perspectives by which the state-centric environmental regulation in Nigeria over the last two decades can be further illustrated, explained and understood. An environmental state accepts the provisioning of environmental collective goods as core responsibility (Duit, 2016, p. 70). The environmental state gives precedence to environmental well-being over unregulated economic development through expansion of environmental policy portfolios to address pressing environmental issues. Significantly, Nigeria’s economic system drifted away from developmental/welfare state approach to a more liberal one where ‘free market’ takes precedence and the prevalence of competitive investment (Ekanade, 2014). More importantly, the creation of specialized administrative and regulatory environmental intervention institutions as well as socio-environmental issues became the focus of political and legal contestations in the country.

A genuine environmental state gives precedence to the environment over the economy by prioritising environmental sustainability over economic concerns when the two conflict (Duit, 2016). In the case of Nigeria, priority ranking between the economy and ecology rather than reverse, it is intensified despite huge financial and time investment toward increasing environmental policy portfolios. Regulatory and redistributive powers of the state have not been effectively used to systematically promote environmental values over economic values. Rather the state has taken it as the avenue for revenue generation for the government thereby jettisoning the environmental priority objectives. Hood and Maggets (2007) identify the four basic resources a nation can use to promote environmentally sustainable regional development as follow:
• **Nodality:** the power of being in the centre of a network

• **Authority:** being able to issue rules that allow, forbid, and prescribe certain behaviours from other societal actors

• **Treasure:** financial resources which can be used to persuade other actors to act in a certain way and

• **Organisation:** the ability to create organisations stocked with people that can carry out tasks on behalf of the state to promote multifunctional environmental resource development and governance in the country.

However, such resources have been used by the Nigerian state to force neoliberalism on the society (Ekanade, 2014) rather than re-embed the state in the society in the country. A participant narrates his experience relating to this challenging situation:

‘I have opportunity of being in Netherland sometimes ago, I got to the regional office of environment and ask them, how do you enforce or implement your environmental laws? They said it is participatory in the sense that they involve all the stakeholders when they are coming out with the law. So, it is not difficult to implement any longer because they were part of the draft. But here they force the pill down your throat so you have to take it. Most of the time here they talk about enforcement but there they don’t talk about enforcement you just comply’ (EC2, 6th May 2016).

Another participant also admits that:

‘As regards cement industry, we all know why government decided to privatise it, because they aren’t making profit. The private sector came in and they revived some of these companies into profitability. It’s a good development but the challenge there is that they want to maximize profit. Like where they supposed to bring in new technology, because of the profit, they won’t, instead they continue to manage. There are lots of countries out there that you will hardly see pollution or emission of dusts in their cement industry because of the high level of technology there. But because of cost implication and they want to maximise profit, that’s why most of them here don’t employ the right technology. The government regulators that are supposed to check and probably sanction them if necessary, out of pity (the problem of unemployment), they won’t do that and is at the detriment of the environment’ (EJ3, 19th April, 2016).
The stance of government actors in the whole process portrays the notion of environment-making state as an indispensable mediating membrane in the metabolism of capital (Parenti, 2013). Managing, mediating, producing, and delivering non-human nature to accumulation is a core function of the modern, territorially defined, capitalist state (Parenti, 2013, p. 844). The non-human nature of the Nigerian territory is a significant source of wealth delivered to capital by the state without much recourse for the supporting and regulating services nature provides (MEA, 2005). The way out of this daunting problem is that ‘The will power has to be there’ (CPC1, 11th April 2016). The political will of the state to embed in the society will begin with taking an important step by embracing cooperative federalism where all government actors across scales cooperate rather than compete (Amokaye, 2012). This is when the state-centric (Pierre, 2000b) credential could be said to be intellectually engaged in practice.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has examined whether the changes in environmental regulations in the Nigerian cement industry translates multilevel governance where the central government devolve certain regulatory roles to the subnational government and the implications. I have combined empirical literature and policy documents with primary data to examine the development of a coherent environmental institutions and instruments in Nigeria. Moreover, roles of federal government and subnational governments in the industry in recent past were critically examined. Issues and implications of the findings for successful environmental governance were also identified and discussed. The findings revealed that the federal government of Nigeria has reconfigured the Nigerian environment regulatory system from adhoc to coherent
national institution. The federal government remain the main regulator in the sector. Subnational governments have also been playing regulatory role to complement federal efforts. However, the roles are still found to be duplicated and conflicting despite the awareness of the government over the years. There is the need for a legal framework to redefine the key roles each category of government actors and non-governmental counterparts can play without conflict and duplication of responsibilities.

A historical review of environmental regulation in Nigeria reveals that the development of coherent environmental management regime nationally began in the 1980s as a result of public pressure on government to stem the tide of massive dump of toxic and sensitive waste materials into the country from Europe. This led to the promulgation of EIA Act as the substantive environmental intervention instrument and creation of the first environmental agency in Africa, Federal environmental Protection Agency (FEPA). The National Council on Environment was also established along with a comprehensive policy document on the environment- National Policy on the environment. With the creation of FEPA and promulgation of EIA Act of 1988, it was no more business as usual in the country for any project proponent. Any development project in the country must go through the EIA process first to assert if the project requires EIA or not. Further to integrate sustainable development elements to all areas of human activities in the country, FEPA was later transformed into a Ministry. By the end of 2007, another agency, the National Environmental Standard Regulation and Enforcement Agency (NESREA) was created to fill the gap of environmental standard enforcement in the country. NESREA stepped up environmental regulation in the country with the development of 33 sectoral regulations so far. With this development, aside
from conducting EIA before establishing a cement company, new sectoral guidelines to ensure standard were developed and used to monitor compliance in the industry. The key regulations for the cement industry include: The National Environmental (Mining and Processing of Coal, Ores and Industrial Minerals) Regulations, S. I. No. 31 of 2009 and National Environmental (Non-Metallic Minerals Manufacturing Industries Sector) Regulations, S. I. No. 21 of 2011. This means there are three major environmental regulation instruments in the Nigerian cement sector.

Another important finding is that the national policy document and constitution of the country further empower subnational governments to establish their own institutions for environmental protection. On this basis, state and local governments in the country have been involved in the regulation of environmental and health issues in the cement industry. In the case of the study area, Ogun state, two key institutions were established for environmental protection. It was revealed that the state is actively involved in the EIA process before its approval by the central government. After EIA approval, state monitors compliance on its own and sometimes with other tiers of government. While the involvement of local government is integral as the closest to the people, it was discovered that local government involvement has not been encouraging due to its exclusion in the EIA process most times and probably related to absolute lack of financial and legislative autonomy.

The observed pattern of relations shows that Type 1 multilevel governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2003); Multi-tier governance (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006) and Hierarchical governance according to Kooiman (2003) is practiced in Nigeria. The creation of subnational environmental institutions is yet to contribute to improved environmental regulation in the
sector. While this is not encouraging, there is substantial evidence that the transformation will continue as reactions heighten from the civil society organisations. As captured by Rosenau (1995, p14) ‘To grasp the concept of control one has to appreciate that it consists of relational phenomena that, taken holistically, constitute systems of rule. Some actors, the controllers, seek to modify the behaviour and/or orientations of other actors, the controlees, and the resulting patterns of interaction between the former and the latter can properly be viewed as a system of rule sustained by one or another form of control. It does not matter whether the controlees resist or comply with the efforts of controllers; in either event, attempts at control have been undertaken. But it is not until the attempts become increasingly successful and compliance with them increasingly patterned that a system of rule founded on mechanisms of control can be said to have evolved’. It appears that the success of environmental protection in Nigeria lies on how government actors control the use of state resources on one part and how society is able to ensure the state is kept accountable for these new responsibilities. ‘Governance does not just suddenly happen. Circumstances have to be suitable, people have to be amenable to collective decisions being made, tendencies toward organization have to develop, habits of cooperation have to evolve, and a readiness not to impede the processes of emergence and evolution has to persist’ Rosenau (1995, p.17). As this chapter has demonstrated, Type I multilevel governance evident in Nigeria is fraught with fragmentation, as government actors are not cooperating for collective actions. It is also noteworthy that non-governmental organisations are developing as boosted by the neoliberal reforms in the country. As the state actors, particularly the central government has been partial in the design of a framework for effective multilevel environmental governance, analysing non-state actors as stakeholders and new governance actors responses to government ineptitude in the industry
is important. In light of the above, the next chapter assesses the society-centric governance processes that have evolved in the neoliberal Nigerian cement industry over the years.
CHAPTER SIX

ASSESSING THE NEW GOVERNANCE ACTORS’ ROLES IN THE NEW NIGERIAN CEMENT INDUSTRY

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I assess the new governance actors’ background, their emerging roles and the implications for inclusive development in the new Nigerian cement industry. Considering the privatization policy prevailing in the sector since year 2000 the Nigerian cement industry has transformed to a new booming non-oil extractive sector. As revealed in the preceding chapter, the changing roles and relations of the state actors in the Nigerian cement industry relates to environmental regulatory responsibilities of the government at all levels. Even though, the regulatory duties of the state actors are still not coherent or effectively delegated, the findings so far indicate the emergence of a national environmental regulation instrument in the country. This I have argued represents good intention from successive governments in separating economic development from environmental protection but for its lack of coherence. As discussed in chapter three, it is also evident that the federal government’s exclusive mineral rights were in no way devolved to sub-national governments but rather to new governance actors. The neoliberal policy, establishment of standard environmental regulatory processes and the inclusion of a memorandum of understanding in the approval of operational licenses in the extractive industry corroborate the debates on hollowing out of the central state in public policy administration (Rhodes, 1997; Jessop, 2002; Bevir, Rhodes & Weller, 2003; Harvey, 2005; Peet, 2007; Prince, 2012). This I have also situated at the instance of multilevel governance which require empirical evidence to ascertain. The process
also signifies the emergence of ‘new governance’ (Pierre, 2000a) viewed as ‘new public management’ (Bevir, Rhodes & Weller, 2003; Hill, 2013). This informs the need to assess the political and economic roles of new governance actors in the new Nigerian cement industry.

As ‘government is only one component of any governance arrangement’ (Capano, Howlett and Ramesh, 2015, p. 314) with the sole responsibility to govern the society in any mode they deem fit, understanding the background of the new governance actors is deemed necessary. This is because recent debates on governance has shown how new governance actors could work in the ‘shadow’ of government (Héritier & Lehmkhul, 2008; Kooiman & Jentoft 2009; Meyer, 2012; Capano, Howlett & Ramesh, 2015) thereby affecting the governance process in different ways. Illuminating the background of these actors helps understand how the institutional link existing between the state, business and society has impacted on the legitimacy and authority of the new actors in the new Nigerian cement industry (Capano, Howlett & Ramesh, 2015).

Commendably, literature on neoliberalism and governance increasingly pinpoints that Non-State Actors and Stakeholders directly and indirectly contribute to policy decisions from governance perspective (Kooiman 2003; Trumpy, 2008; Seidman, 2007; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). The influence of Non-State Actors in governance has received significant attention and well documented in the developed world. Their emergence, increasing roles in influencing policy decisions, complementing government roles and contributions in a less developed nation, an extractive economy yet to survive transition like Nigeria raise an important question: How have the Non-State Actors and Stakeholders roles and relations been affected by privatization in the new Nigerian cement industry and what compensation for State Actors
ineptitude particularly in socio-economic development policies implementation and environmental regulation? Analysis of the interview sessions, secondary literature and policy documents were integrated to address these questions.

As discussed in detail in chapter two, the chapter is informed by Type II Multilevel Governance framework (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Type II MLG as explained by Hooghe and Marks, comprises of specialised jurisdictions, fragmented into functionally specific pieces, operating at different scales without fixity in their existence. It however engages Piattoni’s (2010) analytical space of multilevel governance to relate the dispersed political authority and competences across territorial and functional actors due to neoliberal policies in the sector. It is argued that the introduction of neoliberal economic policies in Nigeria not only legitimise market as governance actors, it normatively set in motion the increased involvement of territorial and functional civil society organisations in governance. This is based on the myriad of non-state governmental activities evident in the country, although not all of them are directly related to the Nigerian cement industry at the moment. For example, the non-governmental organisations are spread across the country and mostly involved in many other environmental issues that are of priority at a point in time.

This chapter is divided into five sections. Following from this section, the next section, 6.2 discusses the new governance actors in this study, it then clarifies the major actors considered with reasons. It seems simpler to differentiate between state and non-state actors but their nature and roles in the governance process are complex and complicated in practice because of territorial, regulatory and legislative powers of government. As discussed in detail in the conceptual chapter (Chapter Two) and elaborated in section 6.2, two categories of actors
considered in this chapter include: Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) and Private Non-profit Actors (PNPA) (Considine & Lewis, 1999). In section 6.3 attention is focused on the roles of the key Private For-profit Actors described in section 6.2 in the economic development and environmental regulation of the Nigerian cement sector. Expectation here is that the main actors discussed here have assumed new roles different to profit-making and as such the corporate practices should reflect the new role meaningfully. This is then followed by the roles of the prominent Private Non-profit Actors (PNPA) and other Society Actors in section 6.4. The rise of civil society due to globalisation and neoliberal policies has been associated with normative political roles of the society in the governance process (Himley, 2008; Castree, 2011). This role may be territorial or functional depending on the background of the society actors (Piattoni, 2010). This part of the chapter assesses how the host communities as territorial stakeholders and non-governmental organisations as citizens and functional stakeholders in the development of natural resources in Nigeria have responded to the changes in the Nigerian cement industry. Conclusions are presented in the last section.

6.2 Delineating New Governance Actors and Stakeholders in the Nigerian cement industry

Non-State Actors (NSAs) are actors in the new governance process apart from the state operating at different scales with great flexibility of existence (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Calame, 2008). The role of NSAs in the governance process is vital and it is believed that NSAs will continue to influence government policy directions considerably (Cashore, 2002; Betsill & Corell, 2008; Calame, 2008). Different types of NSAs have been identified based on their nature and roles. Because of economic and political revolutions in recent decades, the
roles of NSAs in economic development and environmental protection among other areas such as security and defence as well as climate change have been prominent focus in the governance framework (Calame, 2008; Piattoni, 2010). It has therefore been suggested that to understand and develop NSAs roles, application of the intellectual credentials of governance is essential (Calame, 2008; Piattoni, 2009; 2010). In this study, two main types of non-state actors identified are Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) and Private Non-profit Actors (PNPA) (Considine and Lewis, 1999). Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) are Business oriented, they are also referred to as Corporate Actors (Flam, 1990) and Private Sector Actors (PSA) (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Private Non-profit Actors (PNPA) is often referred to as civil Society organisations particularly in relations studies.

In Nigeria, Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) are registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) and regulated by Company and Allied Matters Act (1990). However, not all Private Non-profit Actors (PNPA) are required to register with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). While Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) are registered as private limited companies or Public limited companies, Civil Society Actors requiring registration are registered as incorporated Trustees. Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) have been divided into cement manufacturing companies, environmental consultants/contractors for the industry, consumer associations and cement manufacturers association in this study. The key actors considered in this category are the cement manufacturing company and the environmental consultants because of the active roles they play in the industry (Table 6.1). The consumer and manufacturers association were observed to be very passive in the country because efforts to contact them during fieldwork proved abortive. The cement manufacturing companies are
the major new governance actors in the devolved Nigerian cement industry. As new governance actors in the industry, their corporate strategies are expected to have incorporated a wider scope beyond economic responsibility to the shareholders (Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012). They are normatively expected to evolve corporate values and practices that publicly promote their social and environmental responsibilities beyond philanthropy and formal regulations respectively. This is arguably important because of the new political and economic responsibilities taken up as new governance actors in a neoliberal perspective (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).

Private Non-profit Actors (PNPA) on the other hand are Civil Society Actors, they are a combination of wide array of non-governmental organisations based on diverse values and interests within the society. This group of actors such as indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, professional organisations, and non-governmental organisations as well as labour unions among others are considered civil society organisations by the World Bank (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). The diversity of these group of actors necessitate identifying them and explaining their relevance in this study. Three types of Private Non-profit Actors (PNPA) considered in this study are—Community based Organisation (CBO), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and others (academics, individuals/professionals and the media) (Table 6.1). As explained in chapter two, non-state actors can evolve based on specialised jurisdiction (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 2003) as either territorial or functional (Piattoni, 2009, 2010). Community based Organisation’s (CBO) jurisdiction is territorial as they evolve as stakeholders affected by cement producing activities in their local communities. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and others are more of functional
jurisdiction than territorial because their involvement is based on their wealth of functional knowledge, profession and experience (Piattoni, 2010).

Having identified the prominent new governance actors considered in this study and reasons for their involvement in this section, the next section discusses the nature and roles of these actors in the new Nigerian cement industry. This is intended to understand these roles as responses to the reforms in the sector that has been characterised as neoliberalism.

Table 6.1: Key NSASs roles and categories in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Key non-state actors</th>
<th>Roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For-profit actors</td>
<td>Cement companies (Corporate Actors)</td>
<td>Producers of cement and aggregates to generate profit and impact on the socio-economic and environmental wellbeing of the society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental consultants</td>
<td>Middlemen between state and corporate actors in the implementation of environmental intervention instruments-EIA, EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit actors</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisations</td>
<td>Whistle blowing, complement state actors ineptitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community based associations/community development associations</td>
<td>Stand for the social, economic and environmental rights of the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others- Media and academic professionals</td>
<td>Contribute to governance through journalistic and academic publications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3 Nature and roles of Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) in the new Nigerian cement industry

There are two major private for-profit actors identified in the Nigerian cement industry, however in terms of shift in responsibility the new governance actor are the registered companies licensed by the federal government to mine limestone and produce cement. This
group of actors I henceforth refer to as Corporate Governance Actors (CGA) in this chapter. The CGA involved in this study are classified as Multinational Companies (MNC) and the Indigenous National Companies (INC). There are so many private companies in the Nigerian cement industry today. Prior to the 1980s, corporate actors’ role in the cement industry was very minimal because of the policy of the country and particularly the nature of the industry (see chapter 4). Cement production is capital intensive, energy consuming and environmentally damaging. Government’s neoliberal policy and the so called Backward Integration Policy (BIP) in the sector changed the development paradigm to give rise to the private sector actors astronomically (see chapter 4). On this background, the significance of the state in the governance process can be understood as indispensable.

As far as economic development is concerned in Nigeria, it is commonly understood that state actors are the main players particularly during the developmental state period. Though there were evidences of the influence of foreign companies during that time, the introduction of indigenization policy in the 1970s further strengthened the involvement of local private sector actors in businesses in Nigeria. In the case of the Nigerian cement industry, the influence of business in the sector became dominant with the adoption of neoliberal policies in Nigeria. Prior to that period, central and regional governments were the pioneer investors in cement production in the country (Hay, 1971). The first cement industry was established in Nkalagu, Enugu state by the federal government in 1957. West African Portland cement Company (WAPCO), Ewekoro owned by Blue Circle (UK) formerly Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (APCM), a foreign company was the second. The indigenisation process of the 1970s gave the federal government the power to acquire controlling interests from both
Many other cement plants were established by the regional governments. By the year 2000, most of these government owned cement industries could not operate effectively. This was because of political instability and indigenisation experience of the 1970s which scared foreign investors from the country (Akinyinka & Chibuike, 2016). With privatization and the BIP, the Nigerian cement industry became a frontier for foreign direct investment and subsequently the largest in Africa (Dangote cement, 2015 annual report). The two corporate governance actors considered in this study- Lafarge Africa and Dangote Cement evidently dominate the Nigerian cement industry.

Market, Businesses or corporations are not new in the development literature as their main intention is always to invest and maximise profit (Sharma, 2015). Recent debates on development policies have called the ‘economic man’ nature of businesses into question particularly in developing countries where government failure is prominent. Modern corporations and businesses have recognised the need to incorporate complementing the social responsibility of governance into their corporate strategies without jeopardising their business interests (Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012). Corporate governance actors are expected to take on more responsibilities not on the shareholders only but the stakeholders especially in the extractive sector. This case for the extractive sector is particularly important because of the nature of the industry on the socio-economic well-being of the host communities. Mineral resources are mostly found in the rural communities where their livelihood is connected to resource-based activities. Hence the need to explore the new
governance actors background and strategies to take on their new roles in the Nigerian cement industry, a very sensitive sector (CSI, 2002).

Corporate governance has been an interesting area where the intellectual credentials of governance have been applied in recent past emphasising internalising social and environmental externalities cost of corporations in the form of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Owen, 2005; Gill, 2008; Kurtcu, 2014). In effect, corporate bodies are now taking their Corporate Social Responsibility more seriously. The European Commission (2011) describes CSR as the responsibility of corporate enterprises for their impacts on society. Emerging perspectives on corporate governance and corporate social responsibility particularly in developing and extractive economies suggest going beyond grounding corporate social responsibility in the voluntary behaviour of companies (Fox, 2004; Hilson, 2008; Van Alstine, 2009; Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012; Van Alstine and Barkemeyer, 2014). This they claim can be achieved by understanding the historical and political factors that determine the nature and forms of social responsibility corporations engage in (Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012). In the corporate governance and corporate social responsibility debates, several reservations have emerged as to why corporate social responsibility has been regarded as voluntary despite its institutionalisation as responsibilities to the society (Carroll, 1999; Fox, 2004; Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012). One of the major areas of reservation is the corporate social responsibilities of corporations in relation to their impacts on indigenous people, working conditions in developing countries and the environment (Banerjee, 2000; Radin & Calkins, 2006; Jermier et al., 2006; Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012). Recent development in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility studies therefore
emphasise understanding the diversity and dynamics of corporations and development to know their efforts at accommodating changes in their responsibilities.

Gray (1994, p.18) argues that 'corporations are crucial in any progress towards sustainability. They account for a large proportion of the world's economic activity and hold much international power, they control much of the world's resources, technology and innovation and they have much influence over much of mankind choices'. The growth of Lafarge Africa and Dangote Cement in Nigeria cement industry portrays the empirical evidence of Gray's argument. In light of the above, corporate governance practices of these corporations in terms of social and environmental responsibility, information disclosures and practice could be viewed as obligatory rather than voluntary. This is because the companies' structures and philosophy show that they are multinational companies irrespective of the direction of expansion. More so, because of the MOU companies are mandated to sign with host communities indirectly legalises the need to obtain social licence to operate by relating with community stakeholders to achieve common goals.

The other type of private for-profit, non-state actors are the environmental consultants working as intermediary between business and the state. The environmental consultants are the registered and accredited contractors by the government and must be used by the cement producing companies in carrying out their environmental impact assessment and environmental audit (GFRD1, 15 October 2012; GRST3, April 13th 2016). Irrespective of the background of the companies, they are not permitted to handle their EIA and compliance without a consultant. No matter how equipped the corporate actors, they cannot carry out their environmental audits without consulting them (GFRD5, 14, April, 2016). They must involve
consultants as required by the law of the land. Moreover, ownership change in the industry means that social, economic and environmental roles have also changed. In this study, environmental consultants are recognised as non-state actors but their activities seem to be significantly influenced by the state, although their background also shows that they may work as shadow of government elites. While this point makes it a necessity to identify their background and roles in the sector, I have focused on the cement companies as the key business actor in this study. In the next section, I describe the background and critically explore the roles of the corporate governance actors beyond hierarchical regulations of the State Actors in the sector aside from their profit-making intentions.

6.3.1 Description of Corporate Actors background and roles in Nigeria cement industry

Lafarge is the world leader in building materials production ("Lafarge Holcim" 2015). Lafarge Africa Plc (Formerly Lafarge WAPCO) is a leading Sub-Saharan Africa building solutions Company and member of the Lafarge Holcim group. The creation of Lafarge Africa Plc has transformed the Company into a Group which is well equipped to continue the acceleration of the growth and to withstand challenges in the market place (Lafarge Africa, 2014). Lafarge Africa claims that their cement production capacity has grown from 4.5 million tons to about 12 million tons in addition to 3.5 million cubic meters of Ready-Mix Concrete, and over 5 million tons of Aggregates portfolios. Further from that the company prides with a turn-over from 100 billion Naira to over 200 billion Naira, and the growth of Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) from 36 to 55 billion Naira. Lafarge took its first step in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1985 by opening a site in Cameroon. Over time, the Group expanded into Kenya (1989), South Africa (1998), Uganda
Lafarge Africa Plc's Operations in Nigeria began with the acquisition of WAPCO operations in Nigeria. Since its acquisition by Lafarge group, Lafarge WAPCO has become a truly multinational company, strategically positioned for greater heights (Lafarge Africa, 2014). With the acquisition of West Africa Portland Cement Plc (WAPCO) (Southwest Nigeria), AshakaCem Plc (Ashaka) (Northern Nigeria), Atlas Cement, Port-Harcourt (South-south Nigeria) and substantial stake in Unicem, Calabar (South East Nigeria), Lafarge holds leadership position in the Nigeria cement industry with investment in companies that have a total production capacity of about 8.5 million metric tonnes per annum (Lafarge Africa, 2015).

Another important business actor considered in the study is Dangote Cement industry. Dangote cement is a Nigerian, Multinational, fully integrated quarry-to-customer cement producer. It is a subsidiary of Dangote Industries Limited (DIL) founded by Aliko Dangote in 1981 as a trading business. Dangote industries initial focus was on importation of bagged cement and other commodities. The company began with importation of bulk cement into the country and then bagged for distribution. The ambition to become a major player in the industry started in the 1990s with the taking over of Benue Cement Company Plc (BCC) in January 2004 and by 2007 the company began operations (Dangote cement Annual Report, 2015). Dangote Cement is a leading cement producer with existing and planned operations in 16 African countries, revenues more than US$2 billion and nearly 17,000 employees (Dangote cement Annual Report, 2015). Dangote cement has three fully integrated cement
plants with total capacity of 29.3 Metric tonnes per annum (MTA) located in Obajana, Kogi
state, Ibese, Ogun state and Gboko, Benue state. Two additional plants are reportedly under
construction in Itori, Ogun state and Okpella in Edo state. The Obajana plant opened in 2008,
has limestone reserves of 647 million tonnes expected to last for 45 years (Dangote cement
annual report, 2015). Obajana plant is the largest cement factory in Sub-Sahara Africa with
13.25 (MTA) capacity. The initial capacity was 5MTA, extended to 10.25 MTA in 2012 and
additional 3.0 Mta in late 2014 (Dangote cement annual report, 2015). As the company
claims, Obajana plant runs on natural gas, with LPFO and coal as back-up and primary fuel.
Ibese on the other hand is blessed with about 1,150 million tonnes of limestone which the
company claims will last for about 78 years of production without specific annual rate. Benue
Cement Plant 4.0 MTA plant at Gboko is Dangote’s oldest factory in Nigeria commissioned
in 2007 (Dangote cement Annual Report, 2015). Due to its long distance from the national gas
infrastructure, the plant was designed to run solely on Low pouring fuel oil (LPFO), upgraded
in 2015-16 to now run on coal. The plant has about 133 million tonnes of limestone reserves
which can last more than 30 years as stated by the company. Dangote cement also has
operational facilities in Senegal, South Africa, Cameroon and Ghana (importation), Ethiopia,
Zambia, Tanzania and are committed to building integrated production factories in Republic
of Congo, Kenya, Zimbabwe and outside of Africa, Nepal. The sporadic growth of Dangote,
an indigenous company within ten years of operation most significantly emphasise relative
significance of the private sector in resource use (Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006; Peet &
Hartwick, 2009). However, its impact on the other elements of development in the sector is
also necessary. In ‘a political economics of societal transformation’ (Peet & Hartwick, 2009,
p. 3) there should be significant progress in the natural, economic, social, cultural, and political conditions (Peet & Hartwick, 2009). The import of the above is to show the spread of the companies across the country bearing in mind the socio-economic and environmental impacts the company might have across the country in their intensive use of energy and natural resources. The companies as new governance actors in the sector have a lot to offer in complementing the evident social and environmental failures of government.

As part of the new governance actors, there are corporate commitments and values that could be argued to portray corporate governance actors who have factored the institutional dynamics of the country of operation into their practices. For example, Lafarge Africa Plc disclosed that the company is committed to a deliberate strategy of sustainable development which combines industrial knowhow with performance, value creation, respect for employees and local cultures, environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources and energy. To actualise this commitment, the company focuses on Customers, Results, Integrity, Sustainability and People, Openness & Inclusion (C.R.I.S.P.) as the values characterising the company's foundation. The company also claims its commitment to progress and attention to the ever-changing needs of local communities, by contributing to the improvement of their quality of lives in a sustainable manner through setting up local development programmes in key areas that have direct impacts on socio-economic wellbeing of the people and their environment. This claim was attested to by a key community representative:

‘They also give our children bursary award every year. We might say it’s not enough, but then they are trying in their own capacity. They also empower our youths in their own little way. Compared to when government was in charge, it’s better now’ (CCE4, 10th April 2016)
Another prominent community respondent claimed that:

‘In the past, it wasn’t so but later with some changes in the company, in the last 6-7 years, they have been performing their corporate social responsibilities to the community… I would say in the 10 years. In the days of our fathers there was nothing like that… We have a school built for our community, we have a health centre, with state of the heart equipment.’ (CCE5, 10th April 2016).

The company also claim on their website to give priority to health and safety, commitment to respect, care and excellence as well as commitment to be ranked among the World's most effective industrial groups in terms of environmental protection, social responsibility and corporate governance. The comments of the above respondents show that the company’s presence is felt in the communities. However, it was also learnt that the company was also reluctant in the initial stage to relate with the communities as evident below:

‘…what I noticed then was that, the rapport between the company and the community was so shallow. …they don’t take cognisance of it, they are not taking care of the host community. When the community became aware that the company supposed to give them certain rights, then they took them to the court and gradually they started giving them some rights’ (CCE9, 31st May 2016).

The quote above shows that community resistance was responsible for the stewardship the company now pride themselves with. This would not have been possible without the knowledge about the mandatory community development agreement which has made the communities stakeholders in the sector.

In the case of the second company, as related on the company website, Dangote Cement constantly strives to minimise the environmental impact of its operations right from mining to
cement production as well as distribution. In tune with international practices as claimed by the company the key measures identified and implemented to ensure sustainable operations by the company include: Investments in state-of-the-art bag filters at all plants to ensure minimal dust emissions and regular monitoring as well as action plans put in place to reduce emissions in tune with national and international statutory control guidelines. A key respondent explains the process as follows:

‘… We use electrostatic precipitator here in Dangote cement. The work of the machine is to arrest escaping dust and send it back to the system. That is why if you look at the lawn it’s clean. That shows the impact of the electrostatic precipitator. We have back filters that attract dust. We charge and recharge often and often. If you go to other cement industries, you will see cement dust here and there and the place are not clean as you see it here’ (CPC1, 11th April 2016).

The company also asserts that the use of different fuel options mainly to minimize the complete dependence on fossil fuels thereby reducing emission of Carbon dioxide (CO₂) and other greenhouse gases. The company further explains that most of the plants’ Captive Power is generated using natural gas with options to use other fuel as backup. Also, the completely covered raw material and processing conveyors ensure dust free manufacturing and covered conveyor belts for lime stone from the mines into the plant is a standard feature in the company’s operations (Dangote cement Annual Report, 2015). Moreover, impounded rain water around plant areas, the company explained is used for cooling purposes and is completely re-circulated while waste-water is efficiently treated for further use or safe disposal (CPC1, 11th April 2016).

The company proclaims that apart from being committed to providing the best place for their workers, improving the quality of life of the people in the communities in their area of
operation is paramount. These they do by providing supports on education, health and empowerment in host communities and sponsor sports and cultural development initiatives in these communities and elsewhere. The claims of the company sound promising and responsible; however there seems to be issues as to what could be the host community’s priority and who determines what is in such communities as observed in the views of some of the respondents on the social commitment of the company. For instance, a participant expressed that:

… We had development association but the king that brought XXX didn’t open to them concerning how XXX came in, even to the well learned and vast citizens of ###. … We asked him concerning XXX, if there is any agreement between the investor and the community? The king wasn’t happy with our interrogation. … The king doesn’t want development for this community. (CCIB1, 12\textsuperscript{th} April 2016).

As discussed in the contextual chapter (Chapter three), cement companies are mandated to sign a memorandum of understanding with community stakeholders before mining license is approved, no concrete structure to ensure compliance to the MOU (Ladan, 2014). However, the MOU seems an indication of legitimising the extended roles of the corporate governance actors on socio-economic issues in the extractive sector. It also arguably legitimises the local communities to relate with the companies as stakeholders as evident above. This development corroborates the debates on the corporate governance and corporate social responsibility particularly in the extractive economies (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Brammer, Jackson & Wenner, 2012; Bebbington 2013; Sharma, 2015).

As mentioned earlier, it is believed that the change in ownership from joint investment or partnership to a competitive market approach in the country's cement industry will have
multiple effects: on the economy, on the society and the environment which we all depend. That is a development that does not underscore other needs of the modern society (Peet & Hartwick, 2009). This section has described the background of the corporate governance actors and their corporate strategies as new governance actors in the Nigerian cement industry. Noting the economic progress and corporate disclosure of these actors, it is evident that the companies are functionally strong and operating profitably in the new Nigerian cement industry. As new governance actors, the following section documents the evidences of the companies’ new political and economic roles in the sector.

6.3.2 Corporate governance Actors’ imprints and responsibilities in the Nigerian cement industry

The previous section has shown that the privatisation of the Nigerian cement industry has ushered in competent corporate actors with the wealth of financial and professional expertise to develop the sector sustainably. Their corporate disclosure has also shown some elements of commitments to their new governance roles, however, it is important to ensure that the disclosures are not mere rhetoric. In this section, attempts are made to assess the imprints of the corporate actors in the Nigerian cement industry beyond profit making, as per the socio-economic and environmental commitments of the companies. As argued by Kurtcu (2014, pp.35-36) “… the businesses’ engagement with social and environmental issues in most of the cases is to increase their competitiveness, their attempt to frame their activities by certain principles and guidelines instead of state imposed laws in other words their self-regulation and the issues they deal with in their CSR projects which would be regarded as one of the main tasks of the state in social policy area in a welfare state reflect the neo-liberal art of
governing and exemplify how business actors engage with governmental practices in this realm”. Following the above line of argument, I argue that like many other Multinational companies (Owolabi 2008; Uwuigbe, 2012; Uwuigbe & Jafaru, 2012), corporate actors in the Nigerian cement industry have engaged in self-regulatory, corporate social and environmental responsibility to shore up government lapses and remain in business profitably.

Unlike the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), corporate businesses have primary intention to make profit and at the same time be in business always. To get along in this age of informational governance, globalisation, and climate change, corporate businesses must not only try to abide by state rules and regulations, they must evolve initiatives which will keep them in business and complement the shortcomings of the government (Kilcullen & Kooistra, 1999; Hardjono & Van Marrewijk, 2001). This is more important in countries with weak natural resources development frameworks like Nigeria. The emergence of business actors in this sector thus means robust social and environmental strategies to complement state weaknesses should be in practice compared to the past. Looking at the key corporate actors identified in this sector, their background and achievements in Sub-Saharan Africa is encouraging. The annual report of the companies in the last five years indicates that the companies have recorded significant success leading to expansion, merger and aspirations for further investment (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2: Cement companies Net income in billions of Naira (USD)2011-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Year 2011</th>
<th>Year 2012</th>
<th>Year 2013</th>
<th>Year 2014</th>
<th>Year 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lafarge</td>
<td>8,654,720</td>
<td>14,611,260</td>
<td>28,022,200</td>
<td>28,360,146</td>
<td>29,657,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28,366,830)</td>
<td>(47,890,068)</td>
<td>(91,845,952)</td>
<td>(92,953,608)</td>
<td>(97,206,728)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangote</td>
<td>110,488,000</td>
<td>146,016,000</td>
<td>210,263,000</td>
<td>185,814,000</td>
<td>213,171,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(362,137,004)</td>
<td>(478,584,070)</td>
<td>(689,160,930)</td>
<td>(609,026,548)</td>
<td>(698,692,232)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Exchange rate used 1st August 2017 @ 305.1 Naira to one US Dollar

From the above table, it is evidenced that the economic objectives of the corporate actors are being achieved steadily, the companies have been competitively growing. One company is racing down the bottom mopping up weak cement companies to grow big within the country. The other company has taken home advantage and race to the top expanding rapidly throughout the Sub-Saharan sub-continent. But economic factor is only one element of sustainable development (WCED, 1987). The economic success translates to more profits for the companies’ shareholders and as an extractive industry more pressure on the environment and its resources as well as more energy needs. These are other sustainable development issues which affect other stakeholders beyond shareholding. In fact, it affects the State, the Business and the society at large. While government rakes in revenue from the company annually from environmental permits issued to the companies by the government. What it means to the other stakeholders such as the host communities and the public is not clear particularly when the government fails to play its welfare role on the society as claimed by many of the participants:
‘Government never deem it fit to grade any road. There was a time we went to local government to help us grade some roads, they said we should bring money for fuel. XXX grade road for us every year… Government don’t care about us. The only thing they do is to come around deceive when election comes’ (CCE6, 31st May 2016).

Another respondent also affirmed that:

Federal government didn’t do anything for us instead they get most of the benefits that should have been diverted to the development of the community from XXX. And since they’ve been getting the benefits from XXX, a single road, they didn’t construct. All the development you see in …today is done by XXX’ (CCE7, 31st May 2016).

This could mean that host communities’ trust in government is lost and the communities fight their cause on their own. Another issue of concern is whether more profit to the company translates to more regional development projects to the host regions and probably more environment friendly equipment. In the views of the stakeholders, there are mixed feelings to this development. For example, a participant laments that government:

‘…need to shift their focus from looking at environmental governance as a revenue generating medium. It’s not something that should generate revenue. They should see it as much more than that, as a commonwealth (resources that benefits all) (AC1, 20th September 2012).

The Global Report Initiative (GRI) for sustainability reporting makes it an obligation for Multinational Companies to report their social, economic and environmental commitments to the public as a way of ensuring that corporations are exerting positively on the environment. It is widely believed that such transparent approach will allow the organisations to track measure and manage their impacts on the environment (Layira, Uwaoma & Olagunju, 2011). This will also aid earning the trust of shareholding and non-shareholding stakeholders. In the global north, the domestication of corporate social responsibility beyond voluntary self-
regulatory approach is in advanced stage because of strong government legislation, community pressure and effective administration and litigation procedures ((Layira, Uwaoma & Olagunju, 2011). However, in developing countries like Nigeria the CSR is still developing, there is no legal obligation directly attached to the framework which makes it seem a voluntary process (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2010). Now, it is much desired by the corporations to meet global reporting standards as Multinational corporations. It can be argued that in the requirement of mining licence approval in the Nigerian cement industry CSR is mandatory. Though, different lines of argument exist on the legitimacy and forms of corporate social responsibility. Growing evidence indicates that rapidly globalising world is forcing many corporations to disclose their social and environmental responsibilities annually to provide more holistic views of their performance to the public (Slack, 2011).

In the case of the Nigerian cement industry there are indications that the involvement of Multinational corporations has brought significant improvements to corporate responsibility practices. Apart from existing studies alluding to these changes (Owolabi, 2008; Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2010; Layira, Uwaoma & Olagunju, 2011; Uwuigbe, 2012) and annual financial report of the companies indicating steady growth and profit in the last five years, a key community representative also testified that:

'… Like now, they used to invite us to their AGM in Lagos. There, they will announce their profit for the year and some other vital information will be disclosed openly, that’s a bit of transparency. But before now, there was nothing like that, and it has helped us a lot when making our demands' (CCE6, 31st May 2016).

Another community stakeholder has this to say about the commitment of the companies:
'…they are doing a lot they need to do to the community, not enough, but they are doing a little which we know that they are improving yearly. ... It’s not the best, but we need more, as we are asking more, they are doing more, it’s like we continue asking more (CCE1, 14th November 2012).

Notably, the former statement evidenced improvements in the roles of the company over time compared to the latter. Though the story is not the same in terms of benefits enjoyed by the host communities of these companies, there exist a line of agreement in terms of positive changes due to change in ownership of the companies, a community stakeholder relates that: -

'Concerning XXX, we hear it’s the largest cement factory in Africa. The XXX factory has the highest production. The whole of this community is on limestone' (CCI 1, 12th April 2016).

This section shows that corporate governance in the Nigerian cement industry has significantly impacted the sector economically as the companies’ imprints are felt by the local communities in different ways. It was also revealed that the corporations have shown signs of extended responsibility mainly in terms of corporate responsibility disclosure. In the section that follows, I critique the practices of CSR by the two corporate actors.

6.3.3 Strands of CSR practised in the Nigerian cement industry

Aside from the statutory compliance with the environmental regulations instruments of the government, the corporate social responsibility drive of Lafarge Africa and Dangote cement as the New Governance actors in this study portrays some form of self-regulatory and collaborative or network governance processes (Kurtcu, 2014). The strands of corporate responsibility practised in the sector are classified into two forms: socio-economic and environmental responsibility. Both companies report substantively about their corporate
responsibilities on their websites. Aside from annual reports on both financial and non-financial activities and performance, web-based socio-environmental disclosure is common to the companies. The new governance actors’ CSR practice is discussed under two following themes: corporate socio-economic responsibility and corporate environmental responsibility.

**Corporate socio-economic responsibility of corporate governance actors in the Nigerian cement industry**

There are expectations that the socio-economic responsibility of the companies would take on board improved community relations and standard development projects in their host communities. This arguably should be mandatory because the MOU between the companies and the host community is meant to legitimise development relationship between the companies and their host communities. However, it appears the companies’ handling of CSR is still regarded as philanthropy. For example, Lafarge Africa’s corporate governance report (2015) presents community development projects in the host communities as donations and charitable gifts although it was stated elsewhere in the report as community investment. Yet they claim in their sustainability report that “At the community front, we undertake planned stakeholder engagements at all Lafarge Africa sites. Our stakeholder relations approach recognizes the host communities as strategic partners to whom we accord mutual respect, believing that our footprints should, in its overall assessment, be a blessing to our neighbours” (Lafarge Africa Annual Report, 2015, p. 54). It is the opinion of this study that philanthropic CSR should be differentiated from the community development responsibility of the company if recent debates on CSR particularly in extractive economies are adequately considered (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012; Hilson, 2012, 2014). This is
because if the community projects are regarded as donations and gifts, there might not be strategic plans for meaningful engagement and sustainable projects as claimed by the company.

The company also claims to be working at country level on several developmental programs that adopt the three-bottom line approach to address concerns for the society, economy and the environment. This they claim is to complement their statutory community development investment. Key areas of corporate social investment across the country include:

- Supporting education through literacy enhancement
- Community engagement and development
- Health and safety

During the 2015 financial year, Lafarge Africa claims to have spent a total of about 1.091 million USD (333,118,182 million Naira) on community development projects in the two communities within Ogun state (Ewekoro and Sagamu) (see Table 6.3) on the following projects:

- Bursary awards to indigent students in Ewekoro and Sagamu communities
- Support for the Braille Training School and the Nigerian Association for the Blind
- Expanded skills acquisition and empowerment scheme for youths in vocational trades
- Renovation of blocks of classrooms in various schools in the communities
- Reconstruction of 1.3KM road and drainage systems on the Ewekoro plant axis of the Lagos–Abeokuta expressway
Table 6.3: Annual community development investment of the new governance actors in Naira’000(USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Years and amount expended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafarge Africa</td>
<td>173,950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(570,140.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangote cement</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Companies annual report

Dangote cement also claims to be actively engaged in social responsibility investment which has impacted on the local community and the country at large. The company’s CSR investment is reported under donations and sponsorship in the 2014 annual report without any significant breakdown of community development project in the host community. More importantly, there was no significant sustainability report in the report, this shows that the company’s economic interests reign supreme while social and environmental investments are habitual (Oliver, 1991). The company’s mission statement alluding to their commitment to sustainable development resonates Oliver’s (1991) habitual tactic used by organisations to take rules’ values for granted. Unlike the previous report, the company’s 2015 annual report present significant information on the company’s sustainability practices. Although the report particularly did a breakdown disclosure of social investment in local communities, financial breakdown was conspicuously missing. Yet the company continue to engage in the habit of reporting social investment in the host communities under donation and sponsorship. The
commitment of the companies to socio-economic responsibility is discouraging because of the manipulative strategies the companies are employing. However, this is not to say there is no significant progress made only that questionable strategies are being applied by the corporate actors. Comparatively, as shown in the above table Lafarge Africa has improved its socio-economic responsibility disclosure while Dangote cement reports reflect gross defiance of accurate information. Lafarge Africa’s breakdown of social investment particularly in the host communities since 2011 has been consistent compared to Dangote cement’s lumping of social investment figures together under donations and sponsorship. Dangote cement reported over one billion Naira as donation and sponsorship in 2014 and 348.03 million in 2015. A critical view of Dangote cement social investment in the host community as claimed in their report show that the company invested in projects that promote their business in the area and a focus on the community elites rather than the masses. A community representative explained that:

‘It is supposed to be a great opportunity for the people of this community but the way they have come about it; they never intend to give any opportunity to the community. Those that brought XXX only thought about themselves and never had the people in mind and have denied the people of that opportunity till now’ (CCIB3, 30th May 2016).

Although a company representative claimed that:

‘If you look at Itori, there is a road built by XXX, it is 100% cement that was used. You can see the stretch from Itori to this place (about 24KM), the road used to be muddy. We sometimes sit, we have consultative forum with them, we ask them what they want. There are places we build classroom, road, renovation of health care system, borehole etc. we don’t only want to affect them negatively, likewise positively’ (CPC1, 4th April 2016).

But there are counter claims that:

‘The borehole project was done but it didn’t work. The majority of the project money was embezzled by the king … The road is not wide enough for two trucks to pass at a
time, if they try it, there will be accident. We can’t count the number of accidents on this road (CCIB2, 30th May 2016).

The findings corroborate Owolabi’s (2008) that company’s corporate social responsibility can mainly be driven by parent company’s policy as CSR still seem to be strategically implemented as philanthropy in Nigeria. It could be submitted that future conflicts involving the companies and host communities may arise in the Nigerian cement industry information and the level of awareness of the stakeholders have improved compared to the past. The difference in the corporate actors CSR in the case communities can lead to conflicts if not addressed. The next section discusses the second strand of CSR in the new Nigerian cement industry.

Corporate environmental responsibility of corporate governance actors in the Nigerian cement industry

In terms of environmental responsibility, both companies have adequately disclosed related information on their websites. Lafarge Africa (2009) environmental policy statement claims to minimise the impacts of their products on the environment, human health and limit the amount of waste generated. The company claimed to implement the principles of sustainable development by engaging in the following:

- Using stakeholder relations through cooperation with government regulators and legislators
- Making environmental policy and information about their products available to the public for their views and being fully responsible for their actions.
They also admit their commitment to:

- The protection of the environment and human health in all the stages of their operations beginning with government regulations and other voluntary regulatory processes that relate to the industry such as environmental management systems and international standard certification.
- Health and safety measures and research and development toward the use of alternative renewable resources for their operations.
- Putting environmental values of their prospective contractors into consideration before working with them.

More recently in the company’s 2014 Annual report, the company disclosed that it has set targets to make its business more sustainable and contribute positively to local social and economic development in their plan termed ‘sustainability Ambitions 2020’. This they claim is articulated around 34 ambitions that will make the company a leading sustainability company in the world. The ambitions have been articulated under the following three pillars: (1) Building Communities; (2) Building the Circular Economy and (3) Building Sustainably.

On the other hand, Dangote cement’s sustainability approach covers three key areas of Environmental care; Health & Safety and Social Investment (“Sustainability- Our Approach”, 2016).

The company claims their care for environment prompted investing and operating in tune with international practices through:

- Investment in state of the art pollution control and energy saving equipment
- Regular monitoring and control of emissions following national and international guidelines.
- Use of different fuel options to minimise carbon emission and other greenhouse gases
- Covering the raw materials and process conveyors from mines into the plant to ensure dust free production process
- Impoundment and recirculation of rain water around the plant for cooling purposes and
- Efficient treatment of waste water for re-use and safe disposal.

The commitment of these companies per their information disclosure on their websites seems encouraging, impressive and apparently, an improvement to what obtained in the past. However, it is not only disclosure of corporate values that matters but the practice of the values that indicates that the set values are implemented by the companies (Navran, 2003).

Key participants’ views attest to the companies’ efforts towards improved corporate strategies. A non-state participant states that:

'As MNC, the company makes sure that global policies, dos and don’ts are complied with. These strategies include sustainability policy of deploying alternative fuels from alternative sources that are environment friendly'. (CPC3, April 28th 2016).

Another key participant explains that:

'...we use electrostatic precipitator here XXX. The work of the machine is to arrest escaping dust and send it back to the system. That is why if you look at the lawn it’s clean. That shows the impact of the electrostatic precipitator. We have back filters that attract dust. We charge and recharge often and often. ...we also voluntarily accept guidelines from international financial organisation, that’s the public-sector arm of the World Bank. They come to check some of our figures and look at our books’ (CPC1, April 11th 2016).
A government actor admitted that the improvement witnessed so far is not strange because:

'...environmentally, everybody is aware now. There is no cement factory that does not have their environmental compliance department it is a whole department' (GFRD2, 15th October 2012).

This shows the relevance of information power in this age, and not employing the information revolution potentials might spell doom for corporations in the 21st century. The information revolution has been described as development of technologies such as computers, digital communication, and microchip in the second half of the 20th century that has led to dramatic reduction in the cost of obtaining, processing, storing, and transmitting information in all forms (Business Dictionary, 2017). The corporate actors in the Nigerian cement industry are taking the advantage of information revolution as it could be seen that the companies are growing in profit and investing further to expand. This could be because of the improved corporate disclosure processes (Owolabi, 2008; Uwuigbe, 2012) on one hand and probably the context of operation on the other. These have implications on the development of the sector. Over all implications discernible from the above findings are discussed in the following sub-section.

6.4 Implications of Corporate Actors socio-environmental responsibility beyond state regulations in the Nigerian cement industry

In this section, implications of corporate governance actors’ strands of corporate social responsibility analysed in the preceding section are discussed. In the context of market economy, the corporate governance actors in the Nigeria cement industry have significantly evolved socio-economic and socio-environmental strategies more like voluntary, non-
hierarchical modes of governance (Kooiman, 2003), Type II Multilevel environmental governance (Hooghe & Marks, 1993, 2001) in the sector. These developments indicate the emergence of corporate actors as new governance actors thereby raising an important issue about corporate values and practice. Disclosure of corporate responsibility brings to fore corporate values but the practice of these values is another thing entirely. It is still agreed that the voluntary nature of CSR in the global south hinders its success because it is not accorded required practice (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2010). The case of the extractive industry can be argued to be different owing to the reforms of the recent past. Corporate practice in the Nigerian cement sector as far as this study is concerned is mainly for corporate economic interest protecting the company investment by relating with the host communities, make more profit without substantial reinvestment into alternative renewable resources. Mining of limestone continue in large scale piling more pressure on the environmental resources discernible from the rapid expansions of these companies in recent time.

The main factors that have triggered increased corporate actors’ governance beyond the state regulations is the standard setting efforts of international organisations such as the International Finance Corporations and United Nations environmental disclosure and human right policy. These organisations have played significant roles in promoting corporate ethics where the development of corporate codes of practice will influence corporate actions beyond regulations. For example, the claims of both companies in their annual reports exhibit high degree of emphasis on being guided by the national and international codes of corporate governance as required by international organisations and the country of operation. One major world body that has had significant impact on the behaviour of the global cement industry is
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development’s (WBCSD) Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI). The body facilitated the development of sustainability strategies that will keep the global cement industry in business in the 21st century. Another important factor includes the growing influence of the civil society organisations and the advancement of information technology and social media. The influence of civil society in Nigeria and the Nigerian cement industry and the media as well as how this transformed to governance is explored in the next section.

6.5 CSOs intervention in environmental governance in the Nigerian cement sector

Earlier on, I have identified civil society organisations as one of the important factors that have influenced corporate governance actors’ corporate responsibility in the Nigerian cement industry. In this section, attention is on the discussion of the background and roles of the civil society organisations in Nigeria and how their activities illuminate multilevel governance particularly in the Nigerian cement industry. As discussed earlier in this chapter and chapter two, Civil Society Organisations in this study are Non-Governmental Organisations and Community Based Organisations. The specific intervening roles of CSOs in environmental regulation in Nigeria have been subject of concern in recent time. As there is no clear-cut framework for CSOs to effectively participate in hierarchical environmental governance. Irrespective of this challenge, I have argued that changes in resource development and environmental policies in the country in the last decades gave rise to the number of civil society organisation as professionals and territorial stakeholders in Nigeria. This is evident in the increasing number of specialist environmental reporters and organisations and the establishment of privately owned biodiversity projects. Also, Community based organisations
asserting their territorial rights to relate with the corporations for socio-economic
development and environmental projects instead of waiting on government. This points to the
need to recognise the significance of these category of non-state actors in influencing the
governance process in Nigeria and the Nigerian cement industry.

Though CSOs have no formal powers to make policy (Schwartz, 2004), but the influence of
social media aided by the information revolution and open resistance of the host communities
have been used to expose government ineptitude as well as shape companies’ decisions more
recently. As discovered in this study, this choice of protest through social media and
environmental reporting have been found to be the best option as official letter writing and
face to face meeting do not materialise anymore. One of the frontline participants in the media
explains that: -

‘... You don’t have to go and stay with them over there. Just do it and let them know
what you are doing… We are not there to boost anybody’s ego; we are just neutral. If
anything goes wrong, we write it the way it is (EJ1, 18th April 2016).

Also, it was explained by a community representative how the media has aided their initial
protest.

‘… After we called them in-house to discuss and nothing was forthcoming. Then we
decided to call the press and let the world know what was going on’ (CCE5, 10th April
2016).

The use of letter has been modified to the open letter idea where government cannot totally
deny the knowledge of the issue at hand or companies would want to quickly act to protect
their corporate image. A respondent shared his experience to this effect as follows: -

‘I don’t know if you know about the controversy in Cross River state; there is a road
government wanted to construct. It was to pass through national park, it was called the
super road project. The government was supposed to do the forest plan, the forest has
been there for centuries. There was one article we wrote, we published it and we shared it on social media. It’s a way of giving it more awareness and to allow traffic to the website. ... My point is that, they made a statement, but they are not specific on exactly what they want to do. They were in between. I published it the way it is. ... Before you know it, because I copied some environmentalist… immediately she (the minister) saw it she reacted. I knew she was annoyed. Another person reacted and asked ‘how has the ministry sat on the fence? I didn’t reply him. Because I’m their friend that doesn’t mean I won’t express myself. I’ve learnt from experience that if you try to boost someone’s ego in this job, they won’t respect you anymore. I like to keep government on the line, keep them doing the right thing. Because ordinary people that don’t have power depend on the media too (EJ1, 18th April 2016)

Also, corporate actors like protecting the image of their companies by responding quickly to resolve issues before it affects their business as may be inferred from the following view: -

‘I was formally based in Port Harcourt (Rivers state) and I know things that are done there. So, when I came down, I started fighting for them (My community). At the end of the day, we gathered ourselves and fight for our right. We went to quarry, very close to my village, where they are blasting. We shut down the quarry, then the management came and told us to come to round table to solve things amicably. Our main objective then was that we want development for our people. ... So, when we sat and discussed, they agreed to be engaging in developmental work yearly for the community’ (CCE3, 10th April 2016)

Another community representative relates that: -

‘What happened is that XXX never thought of settlement before this misunderstanding and since it occurred and he came to realise that we are fighting for our right, so he started negotiating settlement’ (CCI 3, 30th May 2016).

This choice is favoured because in the past such protest letter did not materialise. Government may use bureaucratic tactics to delay action or not attend to such issues and therefore use of open protest and the media is now favoured. Another community participant also narrates that:

‘We’ve been on it for over fifteen years before the project started now. We wrote several letters without any response. ... We went to the local government and some agencies of the government to inform them of our challenges and what we planned to do. Then we went to XXX to block their entrance hindering their activities. So, he held a meeting with us and it became a progress’ (CCE 7, 31st May 2016).
The use of peaceful protests and the media have proved useful due to increasing access to information and interconnectedness of global actors. The CSOs work together to make their voice heard in issues of concern but the information revolution has continued to make interdependence and interrelations quite insignificant. As with the case of the Nigerian cement sector, it was discovered that CBOs have stood for themselves without the support of any significant NGOs or total reliance on the media: -

‘… Most of them have written to us especially those that fight for human right. They want to have a meeting with the head of the youths here but the reply from there was not satisfying’ (CCI 4,30th May 2016).

Further evidence can be deduced from the statement below: -

‘… I’ve said concerning NGOs and journalist. They all have limits, fine, they make their publications for the public but after the day they read it on paper or news, they don’t remember again. Tomorrow they are expecting another news, government don’t have time; all their focus is Boko haram, even if they have something to do about the problem of the masses. That’s their focus. That’s why NGOs, journalists etc. can’t be very effective’ (CCE3, 10th April 2016).

This shows how the information revolution has influenced governance process in many ways resulting in direct involvement of communities in matters affecting them without necessarily involving non-governmental organisation. The idea could be attributed to the general notion that most NGOs are after material wealth and their involvement may not yield required result as resonated in a participant’s view: -

‘You know these our NGOs they like to go to all these politicians where they will get, and the ministry is not even helping, they will see on our website, we want NGO, we want NGO, they do not come because the NGOs are not patient they want money quick’ (GFRD2, 15th October 2012).

Considering the context of this study, the civil society organisation efforts in Nigeria relates to new governance actors that are non-hierarchical in nature. Their activities tend to be flexible
depending on the nature of issues addressed (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). They exhibit Type II multilevel governance qualities. The roles and interests of these groups of CSOs differ based on their interest and functions. For example, the NGOs are particularly organised, exposed and knowledgeable set of actors. They function mainly to influence and complement government roles in the promotion of environmental protection and management (NG1, 12th October 2012). Though environmental NGOs are on the rise in Nigeria by the day, but there are formidable ones who are established for selfless interest and are evidently influencing environmental governance process in Nigeria. Unlike the CBOs whose interest is territorial and accept all community members, NGOs are globally connected and they employ professionals to work for the interest of the society in general. Three prominent NGOs considered in this case are specialists in three major areas in the country. The areas are:

- Biological diversity and conservation
- Environmental activism and advocacy for environmental rights and justices
- Social and environmental research

The non-governmental organisations (NGO) are Nigerian Conservation Foundation (NCF), Nigeria environmental study/action Team (NEST) and Environmental Right Action (ERA). The activities of the NGOs that can be related to engagement in the governance process in Nigeria are discussed in the section that follows.

6.5.1 Background of the non-governmental organisations

The Nigerian Conservation Foundation (NCF) is the premier environmental Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) in Nigeria. The organisation is concerned with the conservation of nature and sustainable development in Nigeria purposely to complement
government shortcomings in the protection of the country’s pristine natural resources. NCF was established in 1980, registered in 1982 under the Land (Perpetual Succession) Act of 1961 (now Company and Allied Matters Act of 1990) as a charitable organisation (About NCF, 2017). NCF plays a leading role as a non-governmental organisation in Nigeria through its many projects and strategies used to maintain ecosystem balance and meet people’s needs (NG7, 26th April 2016; About NCF, 2017). This is claimed achievable by working with government, corporate bodies and the local communities. The organisation claims to be a member of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and partners with over 80 international organisations such as the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Bird Life International, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), Wetlands International and Fauna and Flora International (FFI) (About NCF, 2017). At the local level NCF enjoys partnership with other environmental NGOs and the academia in the spirit of collective actions towards sustainable development (NG7, 26th April 2012).

Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team (NEST) is another prominent NGO with interest in the environment. NEST was founded on 17th July 1987, formally registered in 1989, under the Land (Perpetual Succession) Act (cap 98), as a non-governmental, not-for-profit, non-partisan, research, education, and advocacy organization (NEST- About Us, 2015). The organisation claims to have risen out of the need to address the rising environmental stresses in the country and the urgent need for strong non-governmental entity to fill this vacuum. Among these environmental stressors are industrial pollution, loss of biodiversity and general resources degradation impacting most adversely on the disadvantaged group (NEST- About Us, 2015). NEST has the view that limited knowledge and awareness, weak policies and
institutional framework, as well as inappropriate allocation of resources underlie these
environmental stresses (NEST- About Us, 2015, para 4). The organisation has since
committed to improving environmental interventions and interactions through self-supporting
and efficient organisational background comprising of professional, selfless and dedicated
staff.

Environmental Rights Action (ERA) is an advocacy non-governmental organisation founded
on the 11th of January 1993 to deal with environmental human rights issues in Nigeria. ERA is
the Nigerian chapter of Friends of the Earth International (FoEI). ERA claims its main
objective is to defend human ecosystems in terms of human rights, and promote
environmentally responsible governmental, commercial, community and individual practice
in Nigeria through the empowerment of local people (About ERA, 2017). The organisation is
the coordinating NGO for the Nigerian Tobacco Control Alliance (NTCA); engages in
environmental activism and struggles particularly in the areas of oil and gas exploration and
Tobacco control (NG9, 3rd May 2016). The organisation’s commitment for environmental
human rights won it Sophie Prize (1998) for excellence and courage in the struggle for
environmental Justice and the Bloomberg Award for Tobacco control activism (2009). ERA
gives priority to the most urgent environmental, human rights and social issues, work with
impacted communities across the country with the support of international organisations
sharing the objectives.
6.5.2 Roles of non-governmental organisations in the Nigerian cement industry governance

The Nigerian Conservation Foundation (NCF)

NCF as environmental NGO has practically engaged in multiple level of environmental interventions. For example, NCF has been at the forefront of influencing environmental policies in Nigeria. The organisation claimed to have played a lead role in the establishment of the defunct Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) now Federal Ministry of Environment and the drafting of Nigeria’s National Forestry Law in 2000. NCF also claimed to have contributed to the development of the National Conservation Strategy in 1984, the enactment of the Endangered Species Decree in 1985 and the development of the Vision 2010 on the environment in 1997. In the promotion of environmental education and sensitization, NCF asserts that they facilitated the publication of National University Commission (NUC) endorsed eleven volumes of textual materials on Environmental Education as environmental curriculum resource for tertiary institutions in Nigeria.

Also, in the areas of self-regulation NCF’s biological diversity conservation and environmental pollution mitigating projects is spread over the country. The organisation explained that the Niger-Delta Conservation and Sustainable Development (NDCSD) project was established in 2002 with a view to shift dependence on oil and gas to show casing the value of biodiversity. The environmental projects cut across Nigeria with plans to solve environmental problems but also improve livelihood of the communities and protect the vast biodiversity of the country at large. Prominent among the projects are: Akwa Ibom State: Nipa Palm Utilization Project; Cross River State: Management of Becheve Nature Reserve,
Obudu Cattle Ranch; Edo State: Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP) Project; Gombe & Jigawa State: Wing Over Wetlands (WOW); Lagos State: Lekki Conservation Centre (LCC); Ogun, Ondo and Osun State: Omo – Oluwa – Shasha Conservation Project; Plateau State: A. P. Leventis Ornithological Research Institute (APLORI); Taraba State: Participatory Forest Management Project, Mambilla and Donga sites; Important Bird Area Programme. Further from these contributions, NCF supported the establishment of the Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team (NEST), another prominent NGO considered in this study.

**Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team (NEST)**

NEST’s activity is inclined towards social and environmental research to provide information for the benefit of the people and government of Nigeria. The organisation has played prominent roles in the policy development process, environmental sensitization and collective actions for environmentally sustainable development. Prominent among these is a six-year project – ‘Building Nigeria’s response to climate change’ in partnership with foreign organisations (NG10, 25th May 2016). The organisation also creates environmental awareness through research and publications:

> ‘When the first Rio summit was held, NEST’s “threatened Nigerian environment” was the publication that featured in that meeting. And that was the main publication that came from Nigeria. That opened the eyes of even Nigerians to this organisation’ (NG10, 25th May 2016).

**Environmental Rights Action (ERA)**

A participant narrates how the ERA has been actively playing governance role as a CSO as follows:
‘… what we do is environmental advocacy, the community that sued Shell in Delta state and got judgement in 2007. ERA played a role in getting them legal representation. We do advocacy at the national assembly. If you are aware of the national tobacco control Act which was passed May 15, 2015, ERA was the spearhead of the campaign. So, we lobby at the national assembly, we identify people who are receptive to pushing campaigns on the environment we work with them’ (NG9, 3rd May 2016).

Apart from advocacy and lobbying roles played by the organisation, the participant also explained their environmental education and collaboration roles.

‘… we also work with the media. There is a training we are organising called “Reporting the Environment”, it’s of two folds; the first is helping journalist to understand environmental issues and second is getting them to report environmental issues from an informed perspective… we also involve the media. Also, we do environmental field monitoring on communities. Any community where there are environmental issues, we visit and we identify people we can work with and then follow-up with a community network. The purpose of that is, we can’t be everywhere, so the community network is there to give feedback, we have it in about 25 states… We would have trained them on what to observe, pictures to take, questions to ask. … There was a massive flood across Nigeria in 2012, we were not able to visit all the states. … We also try as much as possible to send memos to government. We can come up with our positions on any issue and send memo on it’ (NG9, 3rd May 2016).

Further from the above the participant statement below affirms the organisation inclination to activism than the other two NGOs: -

‘Our media advocate does a lot on that because once those issues are identified, we either call a press or issue a press release. Every year we do what we call National environmental movement of about 150 to 200 civil society and government people together to talk on specific environmental issues. We’ve talked about food, climate change, transparency and accountability, water, deforestation etc. Every year we pick something and talk about it’ (NG9, 3rd May 2016).

Summarily, NGOs response as governance actors in Nigeria has been impressive. Although they cannot make laws, they have contributed immensely into the development of a coherent national environmental policy in the country. They have also been fully active and influential
in affecting policy directions in Nigeria in general. They have used their professional expertise to complement efforts of successive governments to evolve persuasive approaches to sensitise the public on environmental issues. They have also developed environmental projects to either complement or force government to take improved actions on environmental issues. Their research and media networking has significantly put both government and corporate actors on their toes in Nigeria. Though the actors have not significantly had a direct impact in the Nigerian cement industry but their influence is felt by the government. This is evidenced in the submission of a non-governmental participant:

‘This issue of Ekuri forest, we were one of the groups that first issue press release asking the government to stop that project and other groups also joined quickly. The president does not go for the ground-breaking ceremony when he was supposed to because of the notice we made and still efforts are on to gather groups to further the system. I think they’ve not stopped, the government there are more conscious but that’s not what we are talking about, that project should not disturb the forest’ (NG9, 3rd May 2016)

However, little or no attention is focused on the growing cement sector by these NGOs irrespective of their knowledge of the industry’s social and environmental implications. NGOs intervention in environmental issues in Nigeria has been selective, it is greatly determined by funding and the nature of the issue. A non-governmental participant lamented that:

‘...One thing about this country is that once there is no fund, every initiative dies down’ (NG10, 25th May 2016).

Although, the effectiveness of NGOs is not studied in this work, their role as governance actors in Nigeria is in ascendancy. However, there are many hurdles hindering the growth and
involvement of NGOs in the regulation of Nigeria’s cement industry. Another non-
governmental participant highlights the challenges: -

‘With the federal government, the kind of thing we have tried to do is to work with
them in terms of capacity development. We have tried to work with them in terms of
educating student. By and large, we found out that there is so much bureaucracy in the
system’ (NG1, 12th October 2016).

As discussed earlier, to overcome the bureaucratic bottleneck faced in relating with
government by the NGOs, they resorted into open letter approach to pass their message
across. This process has evidently helped in achieving some of their important objectives. A
major example is the Ekuri forest reserve issue in Cross river state mentioned earlier.

Surprisingly, it was discovered that there is no single local NGO supported by the corporate
governance actors in the Nigerian cement sector. Rather the companies claim to partner with
international NGOs and self-acclaimed NGOs such as Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,
WWF and Dangote Foundation (CPC1, 11th April 2016; CPC4, 3rd May 2016), which will not
benefit the Nigerian environment directly.

6.5.3 Community Based Organisations (CBO) as governance actors in the Nigerian
cement industry

Another important civil society organisation considered in the study are the Community
Based Organisations (CBOs). As earlier indicated, CBOs are not like the NGOs in terms of
composition and scale, but as non-profit group interested, they are in collective actions for the
social and economic development of their communities (Abegunde, 2009). Because of their
territorial influence (Piattoni, 2010), CBOs have become very influential stakeholders in the
extractive industry particularly in developing countries. The increasing importance accorded
the concept of social licence to operate (SOL) has been one major reason why community based organisations have grown stronger in the sector (IFC, 2014). The concept of social licence to operate is believed to have taken centre stage in the global mining industry in the 2000s (Gehman, Lefsrud & Fast, 2017)). The concept has received wide criticisms as not being a formal licence required for mining companies to operate and too ambiguous (Crowley, 2014; Owen & Kemp, 2013). Despite the criticism, its currency is still widespread and relevant in understanding mining communities’ and companies’ interactions in developing countries particularly from a neoliberal governance perspective. As discussed in chapter 4, one of the requirements to grant mining licence to cement companies is to submit a signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the company and host community along with the approved EIA from the FMENV to the Federal Ministry Mines and Steel (the line ministry). The MOU must entail socio-economic and environmental development plans for the surrounding communities, the golden rule is to involve communities within 10km radius to the industry (CPC1, 11th April 2016). This requirement can be argued as a way to formalise to an extent the legal basis for the social licences to operate by the mining companies. Considering this requirement, CBOs in the Nigerian cement industry have played their ways into establishing informal relations with the companies operating in their domain. The corporate actors in turn recognise that community relations are key in protecting their investments and as such they have created a department of community relations to ensure that their social licence is maintained. Interestingly, roles and relations of the CBOs in the industry is much independent of government. As explained by one of the community representatives, their roles have not been to regulate environmental pollution nor to enforce environmental
laws but their involvement in the industry in to ensure their communities benefit positively in the activities of the companies in their domain:

‘And that’s what development association is fighting for. It’s not befitting that we have such a mighty cement industry and the community is still like this. And we the land owners we are still living behind modernisation’ (CCI1, 12th April 2016).

However, the fight for such in their communities did not just begin easily, it is because of government neglect of their statutory roles of ensuring that companies comply with the MOU signed with the communities. The CBOs experiences in the sector vary significantly, some communities assert that what seem to be smooth positive relations with the company operating in their community did not come on a platter of gold as explained earlier.

As emphasised below, the community based organisations are not directly involved in the environmental regulation process. They are organised to use their territorial opportunity to foster relations with companies and ensure that they benefit from what concerns them. The non-state actors are arguably involved in self-governance process and collaborative governance in this wise. A community chief explains that:

‘We don’t have much with the government, though, before XXX started responding, we took the case to the state assembly. After a while state assembly backed out’ (CCE4, 10th April 2016).

Another community representative has this to say:

‘Government is supposed to fight for us (represent us), but what government is thinking is embezzlement. If the government puts the interest of the masses into consideration, companies will not deny the masses their right. And since government didn’t fight for us, we are doing it ourselves’ (CCE8, 30th May 2016).
An important finding in the works of CBOs is the issue of power and legitimacy. As discussed in chapter 2, power and legitimacy have been major issues of contention in the multilevel governance perspectives of governance framework. While some communities are collectively working to benefit from the economic transition in their communities, another host community is confronted with internal power problems and legitimacy to the benefit of the company. This situation has led to an ongoing legal tussle for over five years. A key informant explains that:

‘There was disorder in the community around 2009/2010 till 2011. Then it was broadcasted on the media that there is riot in XXX and so on. But when we look at it, we realised that the head of this community which is the king did not support the community in fighting for our right and this was what made someone who is a native of this community and is well educated … go to the king and talk to him on the issue of MOU that there should be an agreement between the community and XXX before the establishment of the industry. So, they meet twice on how to get the agreement. Then they thought about settlement but the settlement will be in the name of the king in counsel which is not supposed to be so and … disagreed with that. …, they took the case to the state governor then and he told them to go for settlement but they did not agree with it and that was what made us to take the case to court. We are still on the case till now since 2011 and the government did not do anything about it’ (CCI 4, 30th May 2016).

Aside from the corporate actors and the Civil society organisations whose roles are clearer as presented above particularly in the cement industry governance, some important but often not recognised actors in the governance process include the media and environmental consultants. This group of actors are contributing immensely to the polity and development process as professionals (Piattoni, 2010). In the case of the media, they have become the key instrument of change in this era of freedom of information and their roles have not been limited to the cement industry alone. The continued importance of environmental protection and sustainability reflects in the growing professionalism towards environmental reporting and
activism. For example, environmental journalists play pivotal roles in the exposure of the environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region (NG9, 3rd May 2016). In the last two decades, environmental journalists have grown to the extent that their roles and influence is much felt in the environmental education process. A participant from the Nigerian media industry submits that:

‘Thank God for the free flow of information. We also need to get to some levels that journalists need to help unravel some of these things; but we need some form of hints before we can embark on such’ (EJ1, 18th April 2016).

Another media professional explains their roles in the governance process:

‘Example is the Ekuri Forest Highway, the Calabar issue, we posted the story on our website and we got people engaged to make them understand what we are going to lose if we lose that forest. That’s one example of how government can be put on their toes and made to understand the things they are doing right or wrong. And social media has really helped’ (EJ4, 26th April 2016).

Also, the key challenges the media has been contending with in the country is resonated in the response of a respondent below:

‘I used to be affiliated to the federal government owned radio station but since February (2016), I have been off for a while because of the story I did. I investigated a rich politician and my investigation was too hard for some people to bear. And I could not retract my position on the story because I knew I investigated well and I know the activities of this person. So, I can say for now I’m a freelance journalist’ (EJ2, 18th April 2016).

Environmental consultancy also has been on the ascendancy in Nigeria since the 1990s when the first environmental policy was launched in Nigeria. Environmental consultants are accredited by the Federal Ministry of the Environment and the state government before they can operate. They work as intermediary between the State and Businesses. Their roles in the process of environmental regulation is also based on their expertise as stated by a government representative:
‘...most of them are using very competent Environmental consultants. Like Ewekoro for instance, some of their environmental consultants are so much accredited by the federal ministry of environment, NESREA, also by the agency here. Some of these consultants are professors; they are experts in air quality measure etc., so they don’t send anyhow consultant to that place because of the nature of their activities’ (GRST3, 13th April 2016).

On a general note, the imprints of non-state actors in Nigeria have been growing rapidly. The transition to neoliberal economic policies paved way for a shift in governance to the private sector actors. Further from the growing of the business actors particularly in the cement sector, other non-state actors have evolved different interventions to participate in the governance process through nature. All the forms of involvement of the new governance actors discussed in this chapter indicate a governance approach that can complement government efforts towards human-environment sustainability if properly coordinated. If the power and authority of the state is used to provide enabling information, motivation and capacity needs (Lambin, 2005), the wealth of market combined with the expertise or professionalism of the civil society can foster development of natural resources that benefits the state, business and the society inclusively (Bebbington, 2013).

This section shows that NGOs and CBOs as civil society organisations are active in the governance process in the Nigerian cement industry. The transition in the country in recent past indicates the significance and relevance of the new governance actors in the governance for sustainable development as exemplified by the cement industry case.

6.6 Conclusion

An attempt has been made herein to analyse corporate actors and civil society organisations’ background and roles as new governance actors in the devolved Nigerian cement industry.
The involvement of the corporate actors identified as private for-profit actors in the study marks the significance entry point for the non-state actors and further entrenched the non-hierarchical and informal institutions in the governance of the industry. Thus, when the corporate actors obtain formal licence to operate in the sector, they are indirectly obligated to review their corporate governance strategies to accommodate wider socio-economic and environmental responsibilities. They should assume some new political roles formerly played by the state where they are obligated to relate with host communities as stakeholders in the sector legitimised by the MOU signed with the host community. This process makes ground for informal institutions’ involvement in the formal governance of the industry. Thus, corporate governance actors engage in corporate governance practice which is a significant non-hierarchical governance process and an important strategy to obtaining social licence to operate from stakeholders beyond the community. This can be characterised as follows- the state devolved economic power and roles to the corporate actors (Market) and the political responsibilities associated with economic development devolved to the market and society with minimal interference. Failure of the government to ensure proper social and economic compensation for the local communities paved way for the community based organisations (CBOs) to actively interact with the corporate governance actors without the government actors being central to the relationship. CBOs are key societal actors directly involved in the governance of the Nigerian cement sector. The involvement of the community based actors looks promising as the host communities have defied the status quo and rise to the defence of their territorial, social and environmental rights. Though the experience varies between the host communities considered in the study but evidence shows that both communities are more informed of their social rights and processes involved in fighting for the rights of the
community collectively. As evident in the case communities these rights are being agitated for by the stakeholders as the situation warrants.

Non-state actors’ interventions in the development and environmental regulation process in Nigeria’s cement industry is an indication of the growing prominence of corporations and society in issues that were initially under the purview of government. The involvement of this group of actors indicates the devolvement of power from governance perspective to complement and strengthen the development process either by bypassing government totally or involving the government a little less than usual (Rhodes, 1997; Rosenau, 2002, Hooghe & Marks, 2003).

Corporate governance actors and community based organisations are the main new governance actors prominent in the Nigerian cement industry. Other non-state actors have also been playing significant direct and indirect roles in the policies that reformed the extractive sector from multilevel governance perspective. Non-governmental organisations have been found to be actively involved in the lobbying process to make policies on the environment. They have also been engaging in the various forms of non-hierarchical governance processes such as private not for profit Biodiversity projects, environmental education, partnership and collaboration climate change and environmental sustainability programmes. Most of the NGOs in Nigeria are challenged by funding and as such they have focused attention on selected environmental issues. Efforts of the NGOs in working with the CGAs in the Nigerian cement industry have been unsuccessful so far. However, the CGAs boast of supporting and funding global NGOs while the local NGOs where they domicile are not motivated or funded. Despite the challenge, the imprints of the NGOs discussed in this
study have been massive in Nigeria and it is believed that the changing economic terrain will continue to strengthen their involvement. The NGOs involvement have been self-motivated and limited to certain areas because of funding and priority of interest as well as less patronage by the CBOs. Their actions have been found to complement government lapses in so many ways and as well put government on their toes. However, their effective participation is still hindered by the poor participatory framework government still work with.

Other prominent non-state actors identified in this chapter are the media, the academics and the environmental consultants. These actors as professionals have been contributing to the governance of the cement sector. The media has been a major revelation in this group of actors; they have been able to use the information technology which has turned the globe into a village to participate in the governance of the extractive sector in general. Their impacts have also been felt by the government, the private sector actors and the public. Their roles in the governance process indicate that it is no more business as usual for government and business in the country. Though it was revealed that they are still challenged mainly by funding and victimisation, these have not deterred their stride to educate the masses on development and environmental issues that concern them. Environmental consultants work as middlemen between the PSAs and the government. Though their roles have been found promising in the governance process but evidence has shown that the actors are faced with challenges of favouritism and exploitation by the government. Academics believe that the involvement in the governance process might not be open as may be the case of other actors but some of the policy directions government are following are the results of their findings and they are motivated by these. This group of actors however indicate that a lot must be done
to promote sustainable development in the country. There is the need for adequate research funding and most importantly standard setting for all activities. Findings in this chapter coupled with previous chapters signify a promising avenue for the grounding of multiple modes of governance where inter and intra actor cooperation can be useful.

The interventions of non-state actors as articulated in this chapter indicate the spatial and social connotations of governance through nature. In the governance of the Nigeria cement industry both corporate actors and the CBOS have been found to be the key new governance actors. The CGAs aim to operate and make profit exploiting the natural resources. They should contend with obtaining a legal licence and social licence to operate. Legal licence is obtained from government and the social licence particularly is better obtained from the community instead of the general society. This is evidenced in the yearly development projects a multinational foreign company executes for the host communities. So far, the roles of other non-state actors in environmental governance continue to improve thanks to the information technology. Interestingly, the CGAs have improved their corporate strategies and are involved in voluntary and semi-mandatory projects as part of their corporate governance practices. Corporate disclosure is about value statement and the practice of the values should provide the actions translating to reality. The social licence to operate and the interactions of the CGAs can be translated to corporate governance practices and multilevel environmental governance (Piattoni, 2010). Considering this translation, it is necessary to analyse the corporate governance practices evidenced in the Nigeria cement industry that could be regarded as partnerships for development beyond the state. In the next chapter, these interactions are articulated by contrasting the case studies to illuminate our understanding of
social relations in the neoliberal era and the implications for sustainable development in the extractive cement sector.
CHAPTER SEVEN

ANALYSING PARTNERSHIPS FOR MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE
PRACTICES IN THE NIGERIAN CEMENT INDUSTRY

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present the analysis of how the state and non-state governance actors assessed in the preceding chapters have engaged in partnerships to reflect multilevel governance practices in the Nigerian cement sector. In chapter four, I set out the context in which the central government's privatisation policy set the governance through nature (Bridge & Perreault, 2009) in motion in the cement industry. Privatisation ushered in the private sector actors as key stakeholders in the Nigerian cement industry. The central government assumed the role of facilitator of investments in the extractive sector while subnational governments only play active role in environmental regulatory activities. This I argue shows tendencies toward multilevel governance that requires social explanation and learning. In chapter five, it was demonstrated that the state actors at the three scales of government-federal, state and local have since been playing the regulator roles expected of the government in a multilevel perspective. The changing roles of state actors was identified with the Type 1, hierarchical governance mode (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Kooiman, 2003), related to plane one in the conceptual space of MLG by Piattoni (2010). Following from that, chapter six assessed the ways by which the non-state actors identified as private sector actors and the civil society organisations have responded to the reforms in the sector. The responses of non-state actors in the industry demonstrated Type II multilevel governance typology by Hooghe and Marks
(2003). It also indicated the actualisation of new governance practice parallel to the state, a non-hierarchical/self-governance mode (Kooiman, 2003) found in plane two of Piattoni’s (2010) conceptual space of multilevel governance (MLG).

It is expected that the neoliberalisation process and the quasi-devolution of regulatory responsibility by the central government would have transformed resource development and environmental sustainability compared to the past. However, the above developments only show the shift of responsibilities from the centre to the periphery and the emergence of parallel responsibilities sharing actors from the government (Jessop, 1997; Bingham, Nabatchi & O’Leary, 2005). Findings also point to efforts in pooling resources together for sustainable development in the country. Hooghe and Marks (2003) explain that every citizen is in a nested jurisdiction with only one relevant jurisdiction at any territorial scale under Type 1 multilevel governance and the jurisdiction is usually stable for periods of several decades or more while the allocation of policy competences across jurisdictional levels is flexible. Type 1 is unlike the Type II MLG which is composed of specialized jurisdictions; fragmented into functionally specific pieces operating at different scales without great fixity in their existence (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Piattoni, 2009). This means that the role of the central state remains foundational and fundamental to sustainable development not minding the increasing involvement of private sector actors and the third sector in natural resource governance. There are indications that different spaces of inter-actor collaborations without particularly involving the central state are prominent with varied implications. These inter-actor partnerships and relations in the sector and its implications are hereby analysed in this chapter.
The concept of collaboration is considered in this case as an avenue for both state and non-state actors to partner in achieving common goals in relatively cheaper and faster ways (Ansell & Gash, 2008, Paavola, 2008, 2016). Collaborative governance has developed as an alternative to the adversarialism of interest group pluralism and to the accountability failures of managerialism (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 544). Collaborative governance referred to as co-governance by Kooiman (2003) has been praised for the opportunity of working together to address issues involving multiple actors of varied background through interdependency and pooling of resources together for the same goal (Ansell & Gash, 2008). This chapter explores how these claims have been applied as it relates to natural resource governance focusing on the case study communities and companies. The case studies offer appropriate contexts to explain and understand the question this chapter aims to answer: How can the state and non-state actors’ relations and responses to privatization be understood as contestations of the goal of sustainable development in the Nigerian cement industry?

Collaborative or co-governance is one of the most prominent defining characteristics of the governance modes. Kooiman (2003) describes Co-governance as a mode of governance which shows governance as the ‘domain of both governmental and non-governmental actors who can only achieve beneficial outcomes if they work together’ (Arnouts, Van Der Zorwen & Arts, 2012, p. 44). Ansell and Gash (2008, p.545) describe collaborative governance as a “A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets”. Co-governance has manifested in multiple forms such as co-management,
negotiation, public-private partnerships and networks (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). These variants of co-governance are conceptualized differently depending on the disciplines they are being applied (Bulkeley et al., 2012). As will be shown here, state and non-state actors have so far been working in partnership to address development issues in a variety of co-governance modes in the Nigerian cement industry. Considering the different actors’ categories, there are 3 variants of co-governance presented in this chapter; the first one can be identified as transnational governance (Bulkeley et al., 2012). This case example involves the development of sustainability initiatives by the global cement industry to mitigate the global cement industry impacts on the environment and the society sustainably. The second variant involves a public-private partnership project where the central state that used to be the first point of call became the last. Public-private partnership has been the most popular variant of collaborative governance (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). The third variant discussed in this chapter is the practice of corporate social responsibilities of the companies within the host communities. This is considered an important case because of the nature of the industry and recent reforms ushering in mandatory MoU with the host communities.

Using interview data and secondary resources, the objective of this chapter is addressed under four key sections. Section 7.1, the introduction is followed by presentation of the discussion of the three cases of co-governance practice in the Nigerian cement industry in section 7.2. Section 7.3 discusses the impacts of co-governance as experienced by the case communities and the implications; this is then followed by the concluding section.
7.2. Collaborative Governance practice in the Nigerian cement industry

This section is a description and discussion of three co-governance practice case studies related to the cement industry. The actors and their roles as well as the structure and nature of the projects are presented. As mentioned earlier, the case studies selected depict variants of collaborative governance at global, national/regional and local scales. The Cement Sustainability Initiative depicts the network of global cement producers to co-manage their social and environmental impacts sustainably. The second case study is a public-private partnership project involving the state government, a central government agency and a cement producing company. The third case however is a description of interrelations between the cement producing company and the host communities from corporate social responsibility perspective. It is a replication of the practice of corporate social responsibility in the new Nigerian cement industry. Therefore, these case studies were chosen to compare how the case study companies have evolved corporate practices for sustainable development of the sector with emphasis on understanding the roles of public and private actors in the governance process.

7.2.1 The cement sustainability initiative

In 1999, with the support of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) ten of the world's biggest cement producers came together on a voluntary basis to chart sustainable approaches for the global cement industry. WBCSD is a global, CEO-led organization of over 200 leading businesses working together to accelerate the transition to a sustainable world (Overview- About Us- WBCSD, 2017). The organisation claims to assist member companies achieve success and sustainable business practices that impact the society
and the environment positively. The collaboration of more than one-third of the world's cement suppliers resulted in the ‘change management’ initiative called ‘Cement Sustainability Initiative’ (CSI). The CSI is a non-governmental, self-governance initiative formed through coming together of forward looking cement producing companies. The CSI has been described as one of the most successful sectoral initiatives in the world of business (Klee & Coles, 2004; WBCSD, 2005; Cook & Ponssard, 2011). The purpose of the CSI was mainly to ensure maximum reduction in the ecological footprint of the industry, social contribution and stakeholder engagement meaningfully in the industry in practice (WBCSD, 2005). The participating companies recognised that as an industry that is dependent on natural resources, taking the initiative secures their 'licence to operate' as the world continue to clamour for environmental sustainability. The initiative therefore ticks one of the boxes of transnational governance as conceived by Bulkeley et al., (2012, p. 594) to involve “a range of actors and forms of authority, concerned with establishing what the ‘legitimate social purpose’ of responding to climate change entails”

The cement sustainability initiative is a significant reference point for a global non-governmental co-management initiative because of the processes of its evolution. It is a member-led initiative, which means the guidelines or report of the initiative are binding on registered member companies but not binding on non-member companies but are only guided by it. The cement sustainability initiative is an example of how business actors working transnationally are involved in the governance of global environmental issues concerning their operations. It is a significant case for understanding the transnational governance of the cement sector in Nigeria following from transformations in the sector in the last 17 years.
This is by examining how the objectives of the initiative have influenced corporate practices of the companies in Nigeria.

In its process of evolution, wide consultation with different stakeholders ranging from governments to other non-governmental organisations spread across the world was reportedly made to ensure proper grounding of the initiative. Following from that, an independent research was also commissioned to ensure that the initiative is evidence-based. Also, an independent assurance group was set up to give credibility to the research outcome (Klee & Coles, 2004; WBCSD, 2005). The study conducted by US based Battelle Memorial Institute between 2000 and 2002 led to a report titled ‘Towards a sustainable cement industry’. Therefore highlighted key issues the global cement industry could face over the next two decades and solutions to develop the cement industry sustainably in the 21st century (Klee & Coles, 2004, WBCSD, 2005). Among the issues the report raised include climate change, land use, biodiversity, and determination of key sustainable development performance indicators, industrial ecology, environmental performance and public policy (Klee, 2002). By July 2002, the pioneer member companies signed the CSI Charter and a document for the implementation of the initiative, Agenda for Action (AfA) was released. The CSI charter sets out the minimum requirements for membership in terms of contribution to sustainable development through a summary of the implementation steps included in the Agenda for Action (WBCSD, 2005). Member companies are expected to sign the CSI Charter when joining the initiative as a form of commitment to fulfil the requirements, implement guidelines and report on their performance as set out in the Charter (WBCSD, 2005). Member companies’ compliance with the objectives of the initiative is monitored annually using self-
assessment questionnaire and an audit every four years or when major changes are made in the Charter (WBCSD, 2005). The Agenda for Action presented the next stage for the industry towards sustainable development committing the member companies to the first five years of a 20-year programme (WBCSD, 2005). Key issues in the agenda the initiative expected the individual company or joint actions to address are: climate protection; responsible use of fuels and raw materials; employee health and safety; emission reductions and local impacts on land and communities as well as reporting and communication progress (Klee & Coles, 2004, WBCSD, 2005). By 2005, notable progress has been made, beginning with increase in membership to 18, this has further increased to 24 (About CSI, 2015). The first progress report, good practice guidelines for the industry and many other significant reports have since been published which have played significant roles in improving corporate practice in the industry (WBCSD, 2005).

The main objective of the initiative has been to define sustainable development for the global cement industry and evolve ways of facilitating actions to implement the initiative. One of the key reports is the sectoral approach project launched in 2008 which is particularly aimed at reducing CO₂ emissions. While the sectoral approach has been described as interesting and elaborate, it has been argued to be an incomplete approach (Cook & Ponssard, 2011). Cook and Ponssard (2011) argue that the sectoral approach project of the cement sustainability initiative does not address interdependent issues of competition between companies and implementation process that will attract different stakeholders into the deal. They particularly emphasise how the government as a major stakeholder could be attracted to the initiative as a serious limitation of the approach. This limitation points to the issue of authority of the
initiative as a governance process. In terms of competition, the experience in the Nigerian cement industry could be summed as that the voluntary nature of the initiative gives non-members edge over members who are mandated to comply. Similarly, as transnational governance initiative, (Bulkeley et al., 2012, p. 595) submit that “there is a considerable grey area concerning whether agenda-setting and knowledge-sharing activities are indeed forms of governance or are more akin to the traditional roles assigned to transnational coalitions and advocacy groups of seeking to influence others”. However, it is submitted in transnational governance literature that such activities as the CSI could be regarded as governance in as much they promote social learning, fulfil new roles and assume new responsibilities (Pattberg, 2006; Bulkeley et al., 2012). Despite the limitations, the CSI represents a reference point as a voluntary sectoral sustainability programme ever undertaken by an important industry sector. As will be argued here, as a transnational governance network, its activities over time have leveraged the diffusion of information, knowledge and norms and the pooling and distribution of resources. More recently, it has led to the establishment of a set of norms, rules, and standards from non-governmental perspective in Nigeria (Andonova et al., 2009). The CSI sets out key sustainability guidelines cement companies can follow to stay in business and be socially and environmentally responsible. The initiative has set a major benchmark in the industry as non-member companies also embraced the initiative in their operations (Klee & Coles, 2004; WBCSD, 2005) while the benchmarks are mandatory for the initiative members.

One of the case companies in this study is a key member of the cement sustainability initiative while the other is a non-member. LafargeHolcim (Company A) is one of the founding members of the CSI while Dangote cement (Company B) is not. Dangote however claims to
be guided by global best practice benchmark in its operations. In the corporate governance literature, several factors have been identified to determine the strategy a company employed to manage stakeholders. These include size of the firm, nature of business, corporate structure and country of operation (Greening & Gray, 1994; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003). In terms of size, Greening & Gray (1994) argue that larger companies will put in place more strategies than the smaller company as the larger the size the more the challenges. In this case, company A is multinational company with many branches across the world and many years of operational experience. Company B is an indigenous company just growing transnational, now operating in 16 countries in Africa with close to ten years’ operational experience. In terms of company structure, the same analogy can be used to understand the two companies. Company A has a strong ownership structure that requires corporate protection while company B seem less concerned about that. This I argue might be due to the country of Operation. Company A operates majorly in developed countries before investing in the developing countries. This multinational background could be the reason why the company’s corporate practice is more evidential and beneficial compared to company B. One of the non-state participants stated that

‘… LAFARGE for example, we have more pressure from outside the country than from government because to them, they are the owner of the company. And what they can’t do in their country, they don’t want to do it elsewhere unless the country allows them to do it’ (CPC2, 12th April 2016).

Company B on the other hand began operation in Nigeria before expanding to other developing countries. This I argue has impacted on the strategy the company adopted in its corporate practices as can be discerned from the following statement.
‘Look at these (pointing at the ISO standard on the wall) these are voluntary standards that we decided within ourselves to follow and which we are religiously following’ (CPC1, 11th April 2016).

Evidently, transnational governance in the Nigerian cement industry supports the view that such governance approach rests on voluntary contributions and weak or non-existence enforcement processes (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). This section examines the commitment of the companies to the change management initiative of the CSI as a chartered member and non-member respectively. The differences in corporate strategies of the companies in the sector as supported by the above statements can be argued to be due to their structure and the country of operation of the companies. Environmental regulations are known to be very weak in developing countries (Dean, 2001; Dean, Lovely & Wang, 2005). The following section intends to articulate how these differences have impacted on the new governance actors’ roles to complement or collaborate with other governance actors in the industry.

7.2.2 Public-Private partnership (PPP) experience in the Nigerian cement industry: The Lafarge Africa-Ogun state government and NSIA Agro-forestry project

On 15th September 2015, a joint memorandum of understanding (MOU) was reportedly signed between the Ogun State Government (OGSG), the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA), and Lafarge Africa PLC. The MOU signalled the beginning of a public-private partnership programme for the joint development of Ogun state forest landscape restoration project, a multipurpose project. The objectives of the project exemplify a multilevel environmental governance approach involving the corporate actors as the new
governance actor, Ogun state government and the federal government agency. The MOU was claimed to have been witnessed and endorsed by the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in France. Ogun state is one of the six states in the south west geopolitical zone of Nigeria.

As discussed in the preceding chapters, Ogun state houses the major cement producing companies in the country. It is the largest cement producing state in the country and the regional government hosting the PPP project. The state’s main role in the project is to provide land for the project. Two of the nine forest reserves that have been highly degraded were identified for the project. These are Imeko and Aworo Forest reserves (See figure 7.1). The NSIA is a federal government agency set up to manage funds more than budgeted Hydrocarbon revenues to drive sustainable economic development for the benefit of all Nigerians (Joint Press Release, 2015). The agency claims its role is to build a saving base for the Nigerian citizens; enhance the development of the country’s infrastructure and provide stabilisation support in times of economic stress (NSIA- “About Us”, 2016). The NSIA’s role in the project is to provide credibility and investment security to attract foreign investment as the project is designed to attract large scale Agro-allied companies (GRST2, April 13th 2016). Lafarge Africa’s department of Biomass fuel project has been the main driving force of the project. The search for clean fuel to meet the set target of 30% of its energy needs by gradually sourcing renewable energy by 2020 motivated the initiative.

In a bid to transform its corporate values into practice, the company approached the government of Ogun state for a joint project whereby rural Agricultural wastes can be used as alternative fuel in the industry (CPC3, April, 28th 2016). The managing Director Chief
Executive Officer of Lafarge Africa stated during the signing of MOU that ‘our commitment to the environment and social sustainability of our operations and of the communities within which we operate leads us naturally to support Ogun state projects that promise strong positive impact on these issues, particularly on climate change. The use of agro-ecology and agro-forestry in these projects will increase their productivity, ensuring the land becomes one of Nigeria’s best carbon capture areas and generating biomass that Lafarge intends to use to fire its kilns’ (Joint Press Release, 2015). The main role of Lafarge Africa in the project seems however not to provide the capital for the project but as a new governance actor attracting foreign investment for the project and then benefit from the waste the activities will generate for its own use.

The proposed project is aimed to use about 108,000 hectares of degraded forest in Ogun state, Southwest Nigeria already depleted to 7% of original size for a multipurpose agro-forestry project. It is expected to support efficient development of staple annual crops thereby promoting food security in the country in general while also serving other purposes. As a natural resource based project, aside from transforming the degraded forest and promoting food security, the project will also serve as a vehicle for watershed (Catchment) management providing additional 150 million litres of clean water per day, this is estimated to increase the states daily capacity by approximately 75% (Fact Sheet, no date).
Table 7.1: Forest reserves in Ogun state (Source: Ogun state Ministry of Forestry)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserves</th>
<th>Size (HA)</th>
<th>Year acquired by Government</th>
<th>Current Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Omo Forest Reserve</td>
<td>136,806</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Over 60% of area is over exploited. 1000Ha relatively intact to show natural state of the forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olokemiji Forest Reserve</td>
<td>5,888</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Over 60% of area is over-exploited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilaro Forest Reserve</td>
<td>4,608</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>A Gmelina and Teak plantation which is now largely overexploited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggua Forest Reserve</td>
<td>4,147</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>A Gmelina and Teak plantation which is now largely overexploited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohumbe Forest Reserve</td>
<td>4,608</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>A Gmelina and Teak plantation which is now largely overexploited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aworo Forest Reserve</td>
<td>21,299</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Highly degraded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edun Street Forest Reserve</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>A watershed, largely intact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arakanga Forest Reserve</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>A watershed, highly protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imeko Forest Reserve</td>
<td>95,488</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Neglected and inaccessible for most part of the year. Highly degraded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the local level, it is claimed that when operational, the project will revive the economy of the host communities and boost their infrastructure. The main approach of integrating the above claims is by developing large scale agro-investment corridor which will allow nomadic herders to cross the region with their herds, encourage subsistence farming and lease lands to Agro-investors to develop large scale tree crops and annual crops (Joint Press Release, 2015).

The Agro-forestry project is a public-private partnership initiative which points to the fact that collaborative governance process can aid pooling resources together to address common goals sustainably. The uniqueness of the project however rests in its multifunctional perspectives of governance through nature by combining ecosystem restoration with agricultural development, business development and climate change mitigation. It is expected to contribute to forest restoration while it is aiding food production, animal grazing and water resources development and above all, generate waste to be used by the cement industry as biofuel. This attests to the assumption of social and political roles beyond the state by business firms as new governance actors (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). An important issue of concern about the project is its operationalisation, while company A the initiator is a profit-making organisation, the project is still being publicised to raise fund for its commencement. It is opined that the firm should invest in the project rather than searching for investors. This may delay the commencement of the project and eventually its failure because of government inconsistencies. It is however commendable as a multilevel governance approach engineered by the private sector actor arguably motivated by its membership of the cement sustainability initiative and foreign background of the company.
The section has described the strategic response of company A as a multinational company, a member of the Cement Sustainability Initiative and a new governance actor with intents. Although the project is yet to be operational, it is an indication of a proactive corporate action for sustainable development rather than just being manipulative (Oliver, 1991). It is a significant evidence of a response to the new political and social roles of corporate actors in activities that were formerly ‘governmental’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).

**7.2.3 Corporate and community actors’ partnership for development in the Nigerian cement industry: Lafarge Africa community resettlement project**

Another local scale variant of collaborative governance experience in the cement sector is the corporate social responsibility of the corporate actors. Although, there are arguments and counter arguments whether corporate social responsibility can be viewed as a governance approach despite the changing roles of business in recent time (Henderson, 2001; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Vogel, 2007). Interestingly, business firms have continued to assume state-like roles (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), particularly in countries where government are unwilling to implement basic citizenship rights (Matten and Crane, 2005). Such roles include provision of social and economic infrastructures in the communities hosting them. Nigeria is not an exception of a country where the new governance roles of business firms is emerging in recent time. It has been suggested that corporate social responsibility conceptualisation should sufficiently integrate the new governance role of business firms to reflect the consequences of globalisation and devolution of responsibilities of the recent pasts (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Considering the above submission, Scherer and Palazzo (2011) suggest a CSR conceptualisation viewed as an extended model of governance where businesses play active
role in political and economic responsibilities as new governance actor. In line with the above suggestion, the corporate actors and host communities’ partnership for community development is conceptualised and discussed as a variant of collaborative governance in this section. As earlier argued in chapter three, the state actors’ inclusion of a signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the company and host communities apparently set a situation where the state set the legitimacy for community based organisations to engage in partnership with the corporate actors for the development of their communities. The MoU though set in motion the opportunity for communities to engage in partnership with corporate actors but its successful implementation is still a subject of concern as witnessed in this case studies. The transformations in the Nigerian cement sector so far has confirmed business firms as new governance actors can no longer be conceived as ‘economic actors’ only (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). The firms need to grasp with the fact that the development of the host communities should be inclusive and evidential (Hilson, 2012; Bebbington, 2013). It can as well be inferred that community based organisations have grown to understand the political and ‘disruptive’ power they possess in the age of neoliberalism. Business actors therefore must be taking up the social and political responsibilities in their areas of production to achieve their economic objectives rather than continuing to view CSR as philanthropic (Frederick, 1998; Windsor, 2006; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Evidence shows sharp contrast to the partnership and relationships existing between case study companies and communities. To elaborate this, a recent community resettlement programme by company A is discussed and compared with the experience in the community hosting company B. The resettlement project is a multilevel governance approach involving partnership between business and community based organisations made legitimate by the MoU. Aside from that,
resource development scholars have placed corporate social responsibility in the extractive sector in the context of ‘Partnership for Development’ (PfD) (Van Alstine & Barkemeyer, 2014; Arellano-Yanguas & Bernal-Gomez, 2017). By so doing, the company and community actors are seen as collaborators for development purposes having equal and legitimate right (Arellano-Yanguas and Bernal-Gomez, 2017).

The community resettlement project is part of company A’s actions to protect their ‘social licence to operate’, it is a direct partnership for development project with the community rather than through the government. As argued earlier the, ‘erosion of the division of labour between business and government and the growing pressure of civil society actors’ has changed the orientation of CSR (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011, p.903). It has recognised community actors and business actors as equal partners aiming to achieve development goals through nature. Evidence shows that the project did not start by the company willingly but due to resistance and pressure from the affected community using available resources at their disposal (CCE3, 10th April 2016; CCE6, 31st May 2016). However, the success of the project epitomises commendable transformation and a reference for understanding increasing business-society relations in a neoliberal extractive economy. The company claims it always ensure good social relationship with its host communities through the execution of community development projects annually. This also reflected in the country’s chief Executive Officer of the company that “Lafarge Africa’s CSR investments are strategic and needs-based. Our commitment to the development of our local communities is unwavering because we recognise host communities as strategic partners to our business.” While this can be true as the company reports show that it has commissioned development projects worth
over 260 million Naira (about $826,000) in their host communities (Akinfenwa, 2016), the reluctance to carry out the resettlement project in the first place make the sincerity of the company somehow questionable.

Following complaints and confrontations from two of the five villages directly affected by quarry operations in the study area, company A agreed to relocate them. The affected villages Oke-Oko Sekoni and Oke-Oko Egbado were provided with 12 units of bungalows for about 1000 people in a new location of their choice within the study area. Over the years both communities have suffered the impact of mining and quarrying activities of the company. Their complaints however yielded results when the communities presented evidence of their increasing vulnerability as the activities of the company intensify. The communities presented a case of a cow that was killed near the village by the debris of the company’s blasting activities in the quarry (CCE6, 31st May 2016). The communities argued that their people could be victims too, so they must be relocated this time. The project began in 2015 and was completed in 2016. The company also plans to use the annual community development projects for these communities to provide other amenities that might be needed in the new settlements. Figures 7.1-4 show some the new settlements and the old ones.
Figure 7.1 New blocks of bungalow in the new community

Figure 7.2: Old settlement located near the company quarry
Figure 7.3: New block of bungalows in the second community

Figure 7.4: community town hall provided in the old community by the company
Generally, the cases discussed so far constitute a couple of good intentions for partnership for development through collaborative governance. It corresponds with new initiatives in governance that rely on ‘heterarchic’ or network-like relationship (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Kooiman (2003) describes such relationships as co-governance, the third mode of governance. The evidence presented so far indicates the growing practice of collaborative governance in the Nigeria cement industry (Ansell & Gash, 2008) attesting to governance initiatives compensating for the development and regulatory lapses of the government. I argue that the cases described empirically exhibit the features of Piattoni’s (2010) ‘MLG analytical space’ discussed in the conceptual chapter. Piattoni describes MLG as a theoretical frame that should be couched simultaneously in political mobilisation, policy making and polity structuring. She argued that levels in MLG may be understood as territorial or Jurisdictional and that the challenges they face either in asserting jurisdictional (territorial or functional) or relational (legitimacy, consensus and accountability) integrity require both empirical and normative illumination. Evidently, the cement sustainability initiative represents a variant of multilevel governance in the second plane of Piattoni’s MLG’s analytical space. The second plane is one of the 3-intersecting planes where non-state actors such as the private sector actors in this case and transnational groups relate, crossing the boundary between the domestic and international without challenging the hierarchy of the state (Piattoni, 2010). The initiative represents a transnational governance initiative comprising of functional actors with the aim to assert functional and relational integrity in their operations. The Public-Private Partnership project and company-community partnerships for development show the elements of the third plane of the analytical space where Type 1 and II MLG of Marks and Hooghe classification are connected (Piattoni, 2010). A significant feature in this plane relates to a transformation from
a highly federalised territorial system (Federal-state-local governments) to a highly fragmented functional system (Private sector actors and civil society organisations) (Piattoni, 2010). The cases have exhibited the influence of the shift in the development process leading to voluntary initiatives of the private sector actor in some cases as the driving force of best practices rather than the national regulations which are below the global standards (CPC1, 11th April 2016).

This section suggests that governance actors, particularly the cement companies should not view themselves as just economic actors in the Nigerian cement industry but instead as actors with political and economic roles for sustainable development. The evidences so far are indicative of progressive transformation in the governance of the Nigerian cement sector because it is now possible to address socio-economic and environmental issues in the sector proactively through “loose coupling” (Benz, 1998, 2000). Loose coupling means ‘that politics is linked not by binding decisions but by transfers of information, not by delegates with clearly defined mandates but by representatives who negotiate on goals and not fixed positions’ (Benz, 2000, p. 33). It is a shift in the logic of interaction between actors at different territorial levels with emphasis on information exchange and persuasion rather than control or decision-making (Benz, 2000). However, the flexibility of co-governance as a mode of governance to accommodate different institutional practices can also bring about its problem in addressing the challenges of governance for sustainable development (Piattoni, 2010). This brings about the likely limitations of the co-governance process and the implication which is discussed in the next section as experienced in this study.
7.3 The impacts of Collaborative governance experience in the Nigerian cement industry

In any partnership or collaboration process, it is essential that parties involved cooperate as they interact to achieve same goal (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Mutually, co-governance process should result in a win-win solution between parties using the available resources (Kooiman, 2003; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). This section reflects on the experience of co-governance practice in the Nigerian Cement industry by comparing companies A and B and the corresponding host communities as Communities A and B respectively for easy analysis. Company A is the foreign Multinational Company particularly involved in the three variants of co-governance discussed in this chapter. Company B on the other hand is the Indigenous National Company that has grown massively to other parts of the continent within ten years of its establishment. Details of the case study companies were discussed extensively in the preceding chapter.

One of the key features of the co-governance experience in this study is their voluntary beginnings. In two of the cases of co-governance discussed in this chapter, the private sector actor initiated the processes.

‘… to begin with, the company approached the government of Ogun state for joint project whereby rural Agricultural wastes can be used as alternative fuel in the industry’ (CPC3, 28th April 2016).

The company-community partnership for development example was made possible by the realisation of the community’s political and disruptive power in a neoliberal era as evident in the statement below:
‘… I was formerly based in Port Harcourt (Oil-rich region) and I know things that are done there; so, when I came down, I started fighting for them. At the end of the day, we gathered ourselves and fighting for our right. We went to quarry, very close to my village, where they are blasting. We shut down the quarry, then the management came and told us to come to solve things amicably’ (CCE3, 10th April 2016).

It is important to state that the role of government for the success of the project is indispensable. Although the resettlement project is not necessarily a voluntary project, but it does not in any way involve the state actors except for formality and this I hold that it indicates the reality of ‘political CSR’ (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). The import of the above argument is that the binding agreement of the cement producing companies under cement sustainability initiative is morally important for member companies to abide by. A non-member company may wish to abide but not binding. Company A as a chartered member of the cement sustainability initiative claimed that as a world class company they always ensure to employ best practices in their operations (CPC4, 3rd May 2016). The company has consistently emphasised the adoption of global best practices in their operations in the country as reflected below.

As experienced in the CSI case study, it is a collaboration of business actors on a voluntary basis (WBCSD, 2007). In the PPP project, it is also evident that the private sector actor championed it.

‘…The compliance targets set by the regulations from the government agency (NESREA) is always the bases of monitoring. However, the company as a Multinational company always ensure international standard is met’ (CPC 4, 3rd May 2016).
Company B however is not a member of the cement sustainability initiative, but they also ensure best practices in their operations. This reflects in a key respondent statement below when asked about international regulations and voluntary standards.

‘Look at these (pointing at the ISO standard on the wall) these are voluntary standards that we decided within ourselves to follow and which we are religiously following’ (CPC1, 4th April 2016)

The competitive advantage and judicious use of resources associated with privatisation policy might not be achievable in the sector because government does not encourage a level playground by setting regulatory standards below global standards. This is because the companies are not fully bonded by the country’s regulation to employ best practice in their operations (CPC2, 12th April 2016). While company A built a new world class plant, it is yet to decommission the old plant it inherited from the old owners. The company still operates the old plant at interval with few moderations. This means that although best practice is a criterion for operations in the country’s cement industry, it is not mandatory as the minimum standard is set far below global recommendations. So, government cannot enforce global standard they do not set, a participant argued.

‘And you know Multi-nationals even their procedures are more stringent because you build your procedure with available technology. When you now bring your procedure, Nigeria will base it on what is operating in Nigeria. A multinational will put what is operating in international and domicile it. When Nigeria now wants to hijack what multinational is doing and push it in, many companies will fold up that are not multinationals’ (CPC2, 12th April 2016).

The good thing about the cement sustainability initiative is that it provides comprehensive guidelines for a sector whose impact is huge on the environment based on evidence. However, as a self-governance process due to its voluntary nature, its implementation by member
companies in developing countries can be tricky talk less of non-member companies. This means a company can choose to prioritise what is beneficial to the company than the society at large. It will be very challenging to fully ensure best practice in the Nigerian cement industry as the government cannot enforce compliance with best practice in the industry. In this case study, the voluntary nature of best practice in the industry does not contribute to the development of the sector effectively as the companies can relax their practices so long it is in line with the national standard which is far below global recommendations in the industry.

The experience in company B tends to be the above assertion, company B as a non-member of the CSI is a new company that started production in Nigeria as a local company and has grown to over 15 countries in the continent. Company B’s claim of the use of best practices is associated with the regulations and requirement of the International Financial Corporations (IFC). The choice of best practice in company B seems more of the benefits derivable by the company to grow rather than inclusive corporate practices. It tends to show that company B’s corporate strategies to fulfil the economic objectives of neoliberal transition and its inability to practice the political reality of being a new governance actor in the Nigerian cement industry.

In the case of the PPP project and the community resettlement project, the projects are evidently company A’s practice of their corporate values likely to have been motivated by the CSI as a participant said:

‘Government need to explore what the multinationals are doing … It is not in law that you must do it but any responsible person or government will want to go in that direction.’ (CPC2, 12th April 2016).
The activities of company A as a foreign company compared to Company B, a Nigerian company show a significant difference in their corporate practices. While company A has continued to secure its ‘social licence’ to operate following CSI initiatives, company B has continued to manipulate situations to the benefit of the company. It could be argued that the membership of company A in the cement sustainability initiative is a driver of its public corporate strategies. However, company B is not a member and its corporate social responsibility strategies is highly questionable as experienced in community B. The use of available technology in company B seem to be because it is a requirement to access loan from the international finance organisation and only beneficial to the company. The inability of company B to evolve initiatives such as the PPP is corroborated by Ansell and Gash (2008, p.553) that “If alternative venues exist where stakeholders can pursue their goals unilaterally, then collaborative governance will only work if stakeholders perceive themselves to be highly interdependent”. Company B does not believe in the interdependence of stakeholders as such to drive inclusive development initiatives.

Of particular interest in this case is community relations and partnership for development projects which should be based on the MoU made mandatory by the government. Community A are benefitting from the presence of company A annually and are asking for more (CCE1, 14th November 2012; CCE2, 14th November 2012; CCE3, 10th April 2016). Although the relationship and progress made so far in community A came at a price, at least it did not escalate as company A responded swiftly to their needs compared to community B. Rather than engage in meaningful partnership projects in community B, company B has engaged in selfish, ego boosting corporate strategies. One of such strategies is ‘venue shopping’. Venue
shopping involves when stakeholders believe there are alternatives to collaborating with other stakeholders to achieve an objective (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Stakeholders who view themselves as having strong allies in the courts or in legislatures, for example, will often prefer these alternative venues (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 551).

Community B on the other hand, have been involved in conflict within the community and legal tussle with the company. The community could not point to any beneficial development project since the establishment of company B about nine years ago, (CCIB1, 12th April 2016; CCIB2, 30th May 2016). However, company B has never stopped production since it commenced operation in the community in 2008 without any positive intervention from the government (CCIB2, 30th May 2016).

Ansell and Gash (2008, p.555) posit that “Where power distribution is more asymmetric or incentives to participate are weak or asymmetric, then collaborative governance is more likely to succeed if there is a strong ‘‘organic’’ leader who commands the respect and trust of the various stakeholders at the outset of the process. ‘‘Organic’’ leaders are leaders who emerge from within the community of stakeholders. The availability of such leaders is likely to be highly contingent upon local circumstances”.

The above position has been helpful to community A as expressed earlier. However, within community B, conflict on legitimacy and power struggles on who should benefit from the company have been rife and this has escalated to the benefit of the company as expressed by a community representative.
‘…we had problem from the onset when XXX intended to establish here, he sent delegates to ask what the people of the community want, we talked about MOU and he said it will be done. But at the long run, the king said he shouldn’t border about MOU that he should continue with his business. In the whole of Yewa south (the region), our community has been without any establishment, so based on that we were full of hope that when the company starts running, they will treat us well. Initially we have community development association; we now try to make it more effective because of the cement industry the king was against it. He said we are going to create chaos with the association. We started having issues concerning XXX because of the things the community expect the company to be doing that are not coming forth’ (CCIB2, 30th May 2016).

Contrary to Ansell and Gash’s position above, the leader in community B has been using his power to the benefit of selected few rather than the community. Another participant also attest to the challenges community B is facing.

‘Here in XXX, the community is divided into two (because of conflicts). All the land of XXX has been given to XXX. Though there are some citizens of this community that support him. They take what belongs to the whole community and I am sure they only deceive them with little change. XXX is happy because we don’t agree among ourselves, his work is progressing. They make billions of naira every day’ (CCIB1, 12th April 2016).

The internal problem of the community has been ongoing for almost ten years and yet the company is expanding using divide and rule tactics to the detriment of the community (CCIB2, 30th May 2016). As noted further by Ansell and Gash (2008, p.552) “Incentives to participate are low when stakeholders can achieve their goals unilaterally or through alternative means. Stakeholders who view themselves as having strong allies in the courts or in legislatures, for example, will often prefer these alternative venues. Venue shopping can easily undercut collaborative processes. Conversely, the incentive for stakeholders to participate is likely to increase when the collaborative process is the exclusive forum for decision making”. The experience in community B corroborates the argument of Ansell and Gash above, the community seeks redress in court and yet to get judgement while company B
continues to operate because of its strong political and legislative powers to shop for alternatives. Company B recently commenced the establishment of another factory within the same region, an indication of ‘venue shopping’. The arguments as exemplified by the Nigerian cement industry so far expose the inadequacies of government in ensuring sustainable development. Government is undoubtedly the facilitator and regulator of the stakeholders’ relations in a neoliberal economy. It can be argued that the lack of political will to ensure compliance with policies and regulations has continued to breed selfish interest, encouraging insincerity and disappointment. This gap in the expectation of the state is the reason why most extractive host communities are backward having taken their farmlands with not better alternatives. This has significantly impacted community B as experienced in the study. Company B seem to be interested only in the projects that will benefit the company within the community. A community representative lamented that:

‘… if truly the king is well oriented, he won’t allow them to construct that kind of tiny road. The road is not wide enough for two trucks to pass at a time, if they try it, there will be accident. We can’t count the number of accidents on this road. There was a time one of their trucks fell here and destroyed my fence, I called them to come and repair it, they didn’t. the king supporters called them that when they are coming to carry their truck they should come with uniform men, if anybody try to stop them, they should discipline the person or shoot. I did the fence myself. More so they didn’t do drainage’ (CCIB2, 30th May 2016).

It is believed that the poor intervention of the government in their problem is because people in government benefit from the company.

‘Government is aware of what is happening. You know the situation of the country, especially in a case like this, especially with the influence and status of XXX, some government officials benefit from him, so it might be difficult for government to blow it open. (CCIB2, 30th May 2016).
The above comment further shows that even if the society is opportune to engage in the governance process, role of the state in ensuring successful win-win cooperation cannot be underestimated. The role of the state is important to ensure no one actor exploits the other in the process. In the instances presented above, co-governance process in the Nigerian cement industry is challenging because of the commitment of the government in ensuring cooperation of the parties involved. The role of government in co-governance process is discussed in the next section.

7.3.1 Government roles in the co-governance process

As discussed above, pressing issues identified in the collaborations for governance in the Nigerian cement industry include insincerity of the companies and conflicts between parties and stakeholders. There are cooperation issues between community stakeholders. In co-governance, cooperation between parties can only be successful when there exists no division at all among and between parties. In the absence of cooperation, relationship might be impartial and one-sided. In the Nigerian cement industry, the state actors facilitate and regulate the activities of the sector. They make necessary policies and regulations that the private sector actors must abide by, this include the signing of a Memorandum of understanding with their host communities. To achieve the neoliberal economy objectives in a collaborative governance approach, cooperation among parties must be a founding factor (Ansell and Gash, 2008). It is imperative on the government of the day to ensure that they are committed to a strong and stable cooperation among parties as the custodian of territorial powers and authority. This is corroborated by Ansell and Gash (2008, p.550) that “conditions present at the outset of collaboration can either facilitate or discourage cooperation among
stakeholders and between agencies and stakeholders”. In this study, power imbalance has manifested in different ways between the communities and the cement companies. This has led to weak and rather uncoordinated commitments in community A and conflicts in the community B. As experienced in community A, the weak commitments of the company manifested in the type of projects enjoyed by the community. There is no significant master plan than can foster sustainable regional development which is why the community are insisting to be involved in the company as shareholders.

‘We are taking what we have now and fighting and hoping for the best. At least we have things that bring us to the round table. At least the company is doing something and they can’t say we don’t have right or entitled to what we are fighting for, though 20% for now. We will get to a stage when there is understanding we will get up to 80%’ (CCE3, 10th April 2016).

If some stakeholders do not have the capacity, organisation, status, or resources to participate, or to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders, the collaborative governance process will be prone to manipulation by stronger actors (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p.551). While power imbalance has been identified as recurrent problem in co-governance process, it can be addressed by the government playing the impartial umpire. It is therefore submitted here that though the interrelationships created so far in the Nigerian cement industry due to privatization show the creation of non-hierarchical networks, an indication that transformation in the sector make sense of MLG. However, the success of any collaboration in the sector will require sincerity of purpose coupled with timely intervention, this can only be facilitated by the government as the custodian of territorial powers who have ceded functional integrity to other levels and actors of governance (Piattoni, 2010). Going by the views of participants and
the evidence available, the political will to enhance level playground for co-governance is needed.

7.4 Conclusion

Beginning with the description of three case studies projecting the elements of collaboration and partnerships, this chapter has shown how interrelationships in the Nigerian cement industry due to privatization relates to the creation of non-hierarchical networks at the instance of MLG. It also presented how the experience in the sector have played out between two host communities of the major cement producing companies in the sector. The CSI is a collaboration of global cement industry with the backing of a transnational organisation (WBCSD). The initiative portrays the features of non-hierarchical network of actors in a climate sensitive sector evolving to drive the sector towards sustainable business that incorporates socio-economic and environmental concerns. The initiative has been found to be a useful model for sectoral approach to sustainable development (Cook & Ponsnard, 2011). However, its limitation has been found in its voluntary nature and clear absence of implementation template governments can rely on to assess the practice (Cook & Ponsnard, 2011). The second case study described another variant of co-governance viewed as a sort of the practice of the CSI agenda. The PPP is also an initiative of a private sector actor, a multipurpose project initiated by a key member of the CSI. Although, the PPP is a credible initiative and commendable for emanating from the private sector portraying the practise of its corporate values, its success is dependent upon the commitment of the government actors as experienced in this case. The third case study described a more local negotiated partnership that exhibits the practice of corporate values and the processes of bypassing the government
in the achievement of common goals between cement companies and the host communities. Although legitimacy of the relationship can be attributed to the government which require that MOU be signed with local communities hosting extractive industries. While the company engage in annual community development in the host communities based on agreement on community needs, it recently engaged in a resettlement project which has been long overdue. The community resettlement project brings to fore the lack of political will of the government toward inclusive development in the past.

The chapter having explored the three case studies also discussed the impact of co-governance in the Nigerian cement industry by comparing the experience of the case study companies and communities. The experience provided explanations and understanding of why government as the ‘gate-keeper’ (Piattoni, 2010) has a significant role to play to ensure that corporate organisations put their corporate values into practice in an inclusive manner. Government seem to lack practical interest in a transition process conscious of contemporary socio-economic and environmental issues affecting man-environment relationship in the 21st century. The practice of collaborations and partnerships for governance in the Nigerian cement industry has shown some elements of bias. While the foreign MNC tend to be sensitive to the protection of their social licence to operate, the indigenous national companies seem to be sensitive of the manipulative approaches of being protective of their investment to the detriment of the larger society. Due to the double standard brought about by variation in the regulations guiding the sector, companies seem to be selective of interactions or projects they get involved in.
This insincerity of the government I argue makes the benefits accruable through co-governance in the Nigeria cement industry insignificant. This is reflected in the approaches of the case study companies to the practice of their corporate values and strategies. The ‘loose coupling’ advantage co-governance presents seems to provide the avenue for the companies to truncate the partially initiated alternative development process. There is the need to strengthen co-governance process by the government through frameworks for its practice. This could include development of regional development plans for host communities as well as legal structures for its implementation and monitoring to prevent manipulations, venue shopping and divide and rule tactics currently being experienced in the sector.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction and summary of thesis background

This chapter presents the summary of findings, reflections and contributions of this study in four sections. In this section (8.1), summary of background issues leading to the study is presented, this is followed by reflections on the study findings based on the objectives of the thesis in section 8.2. Section 8.3 discusses the methodological and conceptual contributions of the study to knowledge, then, policy implications and recommendations of the study are discussed in section 8.4. Section 8.5 considers the limitations of the research and suggestions for further study.

Contextualising the recent global transformation in environment-development-governance interrelations over the past four decades, I have argued that Nigeria has experienced significant changes in its political economy following the application of neoliberal policy principles by successive governments. I have argued that the changes wrought by neoliberalism on resource extraction in Nigeria can be most appropriately understood through a multiscale framing of state and non-state actors’ capacities for coordinating socio-economic relations for resource development. The thesis has addressed this gap using the Nigerian cement industry as a case example. It empirically explored what sustainable development in an extractive industry means, particularly in the overall context of a neoliberal extractive economy. Consequently, I adopted a multilevel governance framework to inform the study to incorporate the changes in the roles of both formal and informal institutions directly and
indirectly implicated in the cement sector. This thereby offers an under-researched case for examining neoliberalism in transition, in turn making a meaningful contribution to mainstream debates in economic development and environmental governance. Transitions in the Nigerian cement industry in the last 17 years can be viewed as a manifestation of multilevel *governance through nature* (Bridge and Perreault, 2010, p.492), that is a situation where nature is regarded as the agency of social relations. Assessing social relations in the survival and welfare of business actors and the society respectively as orchestrated by the state in this case, can illuminate the spatial relevance of social relations and contribution to governance crossroads in resource-rich economies (Bebbington, 2013). Expectations are that the experience of socio-environmental issues arising as a result of poor governance arrangement in the Nigerian oil and gas sector should have rightly informed and guided the transition. But it appears that government’s interest was just to increase revenue source while reducing public investment while also using state resources to favour political elites. More interestingly as the federal government still has total control over mineral resources in the country. As discussed in chapter one, three specific objectives were put forth leading to three important questions to enable me achieve the aim of the study. In the following section I have discussed the summary of findings of the objectives.

8.2 Summary of findings

Reflecting on the *first objective* of the study, I noted that the environmental governance process in the Nigerian cement industry has experienced significant reconfiguration beginning with the mainstreaming of environmental concerns into the development of the sector; and the emergence of statutory environmental regulatory institutions at the national, state and local
government levels (Fagbohun, 2012; Ladan, 2012; Amokaye, 2012). More importantly, the rise of regional governments in environmental regulation aided by the domestication of Agenda 21, indicate a Type 1 MLG. Agenda 21 emphasised the participation and delegation of responsibilities among stakeholders. Apparently, transformations in the institutional arrangements for environmental regulation evident in the country are working effectively (see Chapter five). However, there are challenges complicating and implicating the success of environmental regulation in the sector which include the following.

- Duplication of regulatory responsibilities
- Incoherent coordination and
- Conflicting relations between the government actors and the cement companies.

These challenges thus make environmental regulation processes in Nigeria less effective thereby defeating the normative objective of multilevel environmental governance in the country. Normatively, it is argued that multilevel environmental governance could be a solution to collective action problem and minimise governance cost (Paavola, 2008; 2016). The Nigerian cement industry experience shows that governments at different scales (Federal, state and local) are still unable to carry out their responsibilities as expected by the public (Kettl, 2000).

Rather than solving collective action problems and minimising the cost of governance, the shared administrative responsibilities, the current state of multilevel governance experienced in the Nigerian cement industry escalates environmental regulation process. This evident in the territorial power play between state actors and prioritising economic interest over environmental interest (Fagbohun, 2012). Progress so far made in mainstreaming
environmental concerns in the development process can be attributed to the increasing mobilisation of non-governmental organisations both within and outside the country. It can also be seen in efforts of successive governments just to mollify international organisations that the country is making progress in implementing multilateral environmental agreements. It is in a sense a face-saving exercise which is not supported with practicable structures to ensure successful implementation. Policy changes have not been adequately backed by political will to evolve a polity to implement environmental policies effectively in the country. Studies have however shown how conflicting actions between government agencies have led to ambiguities and conflicts in the country in the past (Lawal, 2012). This has led to increasing complementary but fragmented and voluntary actions from both business actors and civil society organisations in the sector and the country in general. A case between the federal Ministry of the Environment and NESREA at the federal level is another example. The duties of the impact and mitigation monitoring division in the Ministry overlap with the duties of NESREA. Similarly, conflicts are evident in the accreditation of environmental consultants thereby leading to exploitation of the consultants. There are also complaints of over exploitation by the cement producing companies because of the unorganised oversight functions of the government actors both at the federal and subnational scales. Subnational governments too have been found exercising their constitutional powers over the companies.

Another major issue is that the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria exclusively reserves all mineral development rights to the federal government while the environmental protection responsibility is on the concurrent list in the constitution. This means that structurally, the regional governments are still not directly responsible for coordinating
Concerning the second objective, it was found that the non-state actors’ rise to prominence in development and environmental governance in the cement industry is principally because of policy change from a welfare state to a neoliberal state. As shown in chapter six, neoliberal policies brought about significant changes in economic development policies and normatively correspond to the rising involvement of civil society organisations. Two prominent non-state actors in the cement sector are the corporate actors and the community-based organisations. Business actors and civil society organisations’ functional expertise as against power and authority of the state have been employed to complement state actors’ roles in economic development and environmental actions. The findings testify to the globalisation and devolution process in practice in a natural resource sector implicating the political and economic roles the corporate actors and the community actors play in the sector. In the past, businesses have been engaging in corporate practices of social and environmental responsibility with voluntary or philanthropic intentions, findings show that the orientation has changed to a more obligatory corporate social responsibility in the sector. Civil society organisations’ involvement in lobbying, advocacy and biodiversity conservation as well as environmental information dissemination processes increased significantly and positively contributing to the polity. Findings also reveal there are infractions and manipulations inhibiting good relationship between the corporate and society actors. It was also apparent that with the changes experienced so far there is room for improved business-society
relations. The experience in the Nigeria cement industry corresponds with Paavola’s (2008; 2016) ‘path dependent explanation of Multilevel environmental governance but the existing structure for interaction is one-sided and particularly favourable to the corporate actors. A major example of the one-sidedness of the structure is found in the experience of how the corporate actors disclose and practice their corporate responsibilities even though they are mandated to sign MoU with host communities. The implementation of the MoU is not coordinated neither is it properly enforced. Comparative evidence between case study companies also shows how company background affected corporate actors’ response to their new governance roles. The findings above, I argue defeat the purpose of the MoU which was meant to foster inclusive development (Bebbington, 2013). Policy change to neoliberal economy gave room for manipulations and corroborates existing discourse on neoliberal policies as being characterised by manipulations especially in countries with dysfunctional institutions (Jessop, 2002; Tickell & Peck, 2003; Harvey, 2005, 2006; Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005). The findings point to the crucial and indispensable roles of the state in the governance for sustainable development discourse (Migdal, 2001; French, 2002; Castree, 2008).

In the third objective, it was admitted that no single group of actor can govern alone and there is bound to be collaboration between stakeholders with different resources to achieve common goals. Acknowledging the window of practicable collaborative, non-hierarchical governance opportunities in the Nigerian cement industry, the success of the practices is highly dependent on the structure the central government provide for its practice (Piattoni, 2010). State actors must ensure that the multilevel governance process is impartial and its purpose of improving livelihood and welfare of the masses while reducing governance cost is
met (Paavola, 2008; 2016; Perreault, 2009). The freedom of interaction brought about by neoliberal governance transition has been abused by the corporate actors because the companies have deployed several corporate strategies and tactics to rather respond to their political corporate roles in their own ways. It has also been a source of high level conflicts within communities and between actors as experienced in the case study communities. This is because of the failure of government to sincerely engage in a complete policy change where structures for policy implementation are considered along with policy-making and political mobilisation (Piattoni, 2010).

The practice of multilevel governance evident in the Nigerian cement industry portends good omen for the extractive industry but its implementation has key impediments that is eroding the benefits derivable from resource governance from multilevel perspective. Paavola (2016, p.151) explains that “the governance cost and path dependence explanations are somewhat subsidiary to the collective action and multi-functionality explanations: one or the other of the latter needs to provide the overall rationale for governance initiative, and governance cost and path dependence explanations can then rationalize why the initiative needs to have a multi-level character. Both highlight that conventional governmental structures may need to be relied upon and that doing so may be the most cost-effective solution”. The above implies that changes in policies for economic development and environmental regulation may not be enough to promote sustainable resource governance, an improved governance structure that considers information, capacity and motivations factors may be needed (Lambin, 2005). This is where the power and authority of the state should be wielded with all sincerity rather than for selfish and unsustainable interests. The federal government should be able to employ its
jurisdictional integrity (Piattoni, 2010) to ensure that the functional integrity (Piattoni, 2010) of the non-state actors complemented by devolved roles to regional governments are deployed effectively and efficiently for the benefit of the society in general.

Having explored in this study the state as an empirical question rather than taking it as given (Kjaer, 2011), it was revealed that Type I Multilevel governance exhibits flexible allocation of policy competences (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). The study confirms the power of the Nigerian central government to control the centre-periphery gates, the state-society gates and the domestic-foreign gates (Piattoni, 2010). The government decides the subnational formations deserving the legitimacy to represent their interests, select and prioritise societal demands into a “national interest” (Piattoni, 2010).

The centrality of natural resource development policy also presents major setback as subnational governments do not have any enforcement role in the mineral resource development. As demonstrated in this study, the existence of multilevel governance involving national and subnational governments and other non-state actors portends the complexity of the dispersion of authority between the actors as a result of the neoliberal economic policy in the sector.

Empirically the study demonstrated the fragmentation of the formal and informal institutions in the Nigerian cement industry without improved structure for their integration. The neoliberal economic policy in the sector poses the problem of ‘fragmegration’ (Rosenau, 2002). This is exhibited in the devolvement of economic responsibility in the sector to the private sector actors without adequately delegating any active roles to the subnational
government at least to ensure strict adherence of the companies to the MoU signed with the host communities. Even the environmental regulation roles the subnational government plays bring about duplication of duties, conflict of interest and waste of resources among others (Paavola, 2016). The central government also partially legitimise local community participation in the governance of the sector with no official template for development projects in the communities (Ladan, 2014). These have led to the failure of the state to engage in sincere subsidiarity process under true federalist state where responsibilisation and autonomisation issues (Castree, 2010) are integrated for resource control and environmental regulation in the sector.

Neoliberal governance as experienced in the case of this empiric has not been adopted as a programme but rather as a policy to patch-up pressing economic challenges rather than sustainable transition (Castree, 2010). The application of multilevel governance in the study therefore indicates that the central government as arbiter of sovereignty, has not couched the devolution of development and environmental responsibilities in the Nigerian state to simultaneously include political mobilisation, policy-making and polity structuring (Piattoni, 2010). The involvement of most non-governmental organisations in governance in Nigeria can be attributed to the normative stance of neoliberal governance.

In addition, it can be stated that recent economic development policies and environmental regulation processes in the Nigerian cement industry failed to prioritise the conditions of human-environment sustainability. This is because little or no attention was given to the social and environmental components of the development process in favour of the economic elements. This supports Ekanade, (2014, p.24) arguments that in Nigeria, “Neoliberalism has
promoted various lock-in mechanisms to insulate economic policy from democratic rule and popular accountability. This situation has encouraged capital flight, authoritarianism, corruption, the mushrooming of the informal sector, coupled with unprecedented casusalisation and precarisation of labour all of which are features of a dysfunctional system (Ekanade, 2014). These have cumulatively deepened poverty and crime in Nigeria, thus undermining the very essence of a democratic state which ought to uphold social rights. The study hereby support the contention that ‘in the absence of a profound reconfiguration of the present regime, … there is no reason to imagine and/or expect current strategies to succeed in fostering sustainable development” (Fagbohun, 2012, p. 10).

8.3 Study contribution to knowledge

This study has employed the robust conceptual and analytical framework of governance to explore neoliberal governance through nature (Bridge and Perreault, 2009), in a research frontier (Hilson, 2014) faced with development challenges despite its natural resource wealth. The research has contributed to the growing body of literature on environment-development-governance crossroads (Bulkeley & Mol, 2003; Liverman, 2004; Agrawal & Lemos, 2006; Lemos & Agrawal, 2007; Bridge & Perreault, 2009, Perreault, 2009), neoliberalisation of nature (Hartwick & Peet, 2003; Mansfield, 2007; Castree, 2008a, 2008b; 2010a, 2010b; 2011; Duffy, 2006) and multilevel environmental governance (Paavola, 2008, 2016). The study has exposed the complexities of social relations and relevance of collective actions in sustainable development through the lens of multilevel governance. It focuses on the extractive industry specifically in an extractive economy with one in five populations of the African continent.
and nature as the backbone of its economy. Key contributions of the research are discussed as follows.

Although the study did not focus on policy change, it has illuminated the complex relations and challenges associated with incomplete sectoral policy reforms. As shown in the study, growing social and economic burden of development on the national government is being shared selectively with other state actors but without clear structure for successful implementation. There is clear evidence of changes in political and economic responsibilities with poor structure to coordinate relations coherently. This research has shown the need for and the relevance of coordinated social relations in environment and development processes. The findings of this study indicate that a state embedded social relation process (Midgal et al., 1994) is imperative for sustainable development of extractive resources. The research has also shown the growing recognition of social relations without necessarily involving the central state (Piattoni, 2010). This is explained by the need for cooperation and collaboration to link up power and authority of the state with money and expertise of the private sector actors to meet the social, economic and environmental elements of resource development in developing countries.

The Nigerian cement industry experience has shown that rather than for government to robustly effect changes in policies for sustainable development, government tend to adopt reactive approach. Government is more concerned with policies that increase revenue generation for the government to the detriment of other elements of development. This is evident as government promotes economic development with little or no attention to social and environmental development implications. This thesis claims that there is a lack of
structural capacity to enhance multilevel governance for sustainable development in the extractive economies.

Any economic approach to promote inclusive and sustainable development requires a structural arrangement for its implementation. Although the present approach shows changes toward multilevel environmental governance on the part of environmental regulation, there was no significant change in resource control structure in the country. Changes in environmental regulation is evident in the creation of environmental agencies and organizations at the federal and subnational levels of government. Evidently, the existing state-centric resource management system is detrimental to governance for inclusive development. While governance failure is not a new development in the country, lessons learnt in the past about political and institutional failures appear not to have been of any benefit. It also appears that the impediments to successful transition to institutional arrangements for sustainable development have thwarted recent government initiatives. This is because despite available evidence of environmental degradation and poverty, international institutions cannot sanction national governments for inaction. Providing information and awareness-raising about issues is not enough to promote sustainable development; states must ensure other measures such as capacity building and enabling environment are also undertaken (Lambin, 2005).

The engagement of the national government in the patchy neoliberal process evidenced by the experience of the Nigerian cement industry has led to insincere and manipulative corporate governance strategies. Neoliberalisation of nature experience in the Nigerian cement industry reveals that the central government has aided involvement of society in resource governance.
At the same time, government create opportunities for corporate governance actors to shy away from their new political responsibilities. The opportunities allow the corporate actors not to sincerely engage in sustainable corporate social responsibility practices and manipulate the processes by using divide and rule tactics as evidenced in the case study communities. These features are typical of a dysfunctional state lacking political will for inclusive development by using all the state resources to favour selected people within the state (Borzel & Risse, 2016). By inference, the patchy neoliberal reforms, conflicting relations among stakeholders, insincerity and manipulations of the corporate actors in the sector negate the goals of sustainable development.

Another important contribution of the study based on its empirical findings is the rising involvement of community based organisations in addressing socio-environmental issues affecting them in the cement producing communities. This is contrary to the experience in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector where NGOs are at the forefront of addressing socio-environmental issues on behalf of the concerned communities (Idemudia, 2009). These changes as revealed in this study could be attributed to improved access to information and the increasing loss of trust in non-governmental organisations. The study also shows that access to information has improved relations between media professionals and community based organisations. Community based organisations now collaborate with the media rather than with non-governmental organisations. Despite improved channels of information and whistle blowing by the media as revealed in this study, international organisations such as the United Nations are unable to hold governments to account for their governance failures.
Figure 8.1: Application of MLEG to the neoliberal Nigerian cement industry shows a failure of neoliberal resource governance due to faulty legal and structural framework.
8.4 Policy implications and recommendations

Research findings of this study indicate that development policy in Nigeria needs significant structural reforms (Fagbohun, 2012; Ladan, 2014). Currently participatory framework for actors as experienced in the conflicting roles of government actors and duplication of monitoring responsibilities is very poor. The complaints of the corporate actors and the environmental consultants attest to the poor framework existing in the sector. Providing a structure which defines the participatory structure of all stakeholders is the first point of relevance. This will help in solving both collective action problem and reduction of cost of governance. Designing a participatory framework for participation is imminent to:

- Encourage synergies for meaningful development,
- Reduce cost and time expended on duplication of responsibilities and
- Evolve governance approach conscious of the multifunctional roles of the natural environment in modern development perspective.
- Prevent manipulative corporate practices that undermine the needs of other stakeholders as well as internal conflicts within communities.

To achieve a structural reformation, the political will to do so must be there. Now, there is no political will for inclusive development in the country. However, this is a requirement to achieve sustainable development. For example, the duplication of responsibility between state actors, long delays in legal tussles between actors constitute serious setback to governance for sustainable development. Evidently, the politics of decision-making determines how government behaves towards a particular policy (John, 1998). The Nigerian government did not prioritise sustainable development of the Nigerian cement industry only to reduce
economic burden on government to the detriment of the masses. Government seem to be interested in revenue from environmental regulation than environmental wellbeing and livelihood of Nigerians. This is apparent in the fact that most of the current regulations are far below global standard which then give the companies freedom to manipulate processes to their benefits and pay fine as imposed by the government because it is affordable. Without the sincere intention of government to encourage governance using current knowledge, neoliberal governance through nature will not deliver any improvement in the sustainable development of natural resources in the country.

In the policy, politics and polity of multilevel environmental governance, the role of government is sacrosanct. Only the state actors have the power to exercise authority; formulate legitimate laws; steer and control through the hierarchical powers and authority to tackle serious sustainable development issues (Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., 2008; Castree, 2010; Piattoni, 2010; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). No doubt the involvement of non-state actors to address development issues to complement state efforts as evident in the study is an indication of the need for multilevel governance approach to address environment-development challenges in Nigeria as an extractive economy. The findings in essence mean multilevel governance can actually address collective action problem, reduce cost governance, employed in a path dependent approach that can promote regional development and aid multifunctional development if well-structured by the government. It is my submission that multilevel governance without embedded state is unsustainable as the policy, politic and polity are significantly influenced by the government.
8.5 Study limitations and suggestions for further studies

Understanding the salient role of governance in environmental resources development in extractive economies requires much attention. This is to enhance our understanding of how the shift in roles and relations of the central state captured by governance can solve coordination, social relation and organisational challenges of sustainable development. Three keys areas of limitations believed to be relevant in this case are methodology; framework and research context.

In terms of methodology, this study employed qualitative research approach to explore development-environment-governance crossroads in a neoliberal context. The application of qualitative approach to neoliberal resource governance has provided qualitative insights into the experiences and views of a myriad of government and non-governmental actors. It is however suggested here that studies employing either quantitative approach or mixed methods on the same subject matter can further provide broader details about the issue. This may involve a large scope of relating the perceptions of the public in the process or a focus on a category of stakeholders.

In terms of framework, the multilevel actors focus of the framework employed emphasises assessing and articulating multiple actors’ relations in the governance process in the Nigerian cement industry as the case example. It is opined that studies employing frameworks focusing on a single group of actors can generate social learning and insights on governance and sustainable development in the country. While the one country, one region and one sector
case study interestingly makes this study a novel one, studies focusing on the following are also suggested:

- Other sectors of significant importance such as the telecommunication sector in the country and the oil and gas sector. The oil and gas sector is suggested considering the ongoing environmental clean-up in the Niger Delta region of the country and recent passage of the petroleum industry bill. Although, myriad of literature abound on the Nigerian oil and gas sector but applying the multilevel framework may further contribute to the governance of the sector considering the changes in the sector identified above. The energy sector of the country can also be explored as it also witnessed significant reforms in recent past.

- Other developing or extractive economies using the existing methodology or new suggestions above can further advance contribution to knowledge on governance and sustainable development debates in extractive economies in transition like Nigeria.

- Comparative studies between different resource sectors and countries could be another promising area.

- It is also suggested that the changes in the Nigerian cement industry in recent past present geographic information and environmental changes research gap which this study has been unable to address.

This study contributes to the body of knowledge and social learning in the resource governance discourse in the neoliberal age particularly in developing countries. It has employed multilevel governance to identify and analyse state and non-state actors’ relations and the barriers hindering effective neoliberal governance for sustainable development. To
adequately address resource governance issues in low and medium income countries context - specific factors are truly essential and government has a major role to play in the process.
APPENDICES

Appendix 1
Appendix 3

Consent form

TITLE OF THE RESEARCH: PRIVATIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN EXTRACTIVE COMMUNITIES: A CASE OF NIGERIA CEMENT INDUSTRY

Fair processing statement

The study aims to ascertain participants’ views on the effects of privatization of the cement industry in Nigeria and its interrelations with the system of environmental governance now emerging for this sector nationally. The project is a PhD research under University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. The information you supply and that collected for this research will be stored confidentially and only accessible by the researcher. The information will be processed according to the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. No personal data will be published.

Statement of understanding/consent

I confirm that I have read and understood the information leaflet of this research. I have the opportunity to ask questions if necessary and have had these answered satisfactorily.

I understand my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw without any reason. Also my data will be removed and destroyed if I withdraw within two weeks after the interview.

I do understand that my personal data will be processed for the purposes detailed above, in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998

Based on the above, I agree to take part in this study.

Name, signature and date

Name of participant: ……………………………………………………………………………………………

Signature ……………………… Date ………………………………………

Name of researcher: ……………………………………………………………………………………………

Signature ……………………… Date ………………………………………
Appendix 4

Government Sector Actor.

Participant ID ---------------- Gender Male / Female Date -------------- Reference number:

Introduction

I am ______________________________ from ______________________________

✓ General purpose of the study
✓ Aims of the interview and expected duration
✓ Who is involved in the process (other participants)
✓ Why the participant’s cooperation is important
✓ What will happen with the collected information and how the participant will benefit
✓ Any questions?
✓ Consent

Can I ask some details about you and your job?

Job Title ____________________________       Highest Educational Grade attained
_________________ __________________

State of origin __________________________

How old are you?  □ Under 30yrs □ 30-40yrs □ Over 40yrs

Now that we have completed the consent form, I will now ask you to express your own views and experiences about your work and role __________. Your views and experiences can give insight to this study. I hope you will have time to complete this interview. I am going to turn on the voice recorder now. Don’t forget, you can ask me to turn this off at any time.

Do you have any questions before we start?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policies and activities</td>
<td>1. What are the programmes and activities that have been developed specifically for extractive sector regulation and how are they implemented?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. What are your department’s responsibilities with regard to environmental regulation in the cement industry?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships/ Relationship/ Engagement/ transparency/ accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Has your department established any links or associations with any other organization, whether private or public with regard to environmental policies implementation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What form do these relationships take?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. When, How did they come about and what motivated the relationship?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the purpose of the partnerships?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How do these partnerships function?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Do you share information with other parties?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. How do you share this information?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. What determines the kind of information shared and who it can be shared with?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. What are the strategies taken to promote engagement, transparency and accountability?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Closing**

Is there anything else you think is important that we have not talked about?

*That’s all the questions I have for you. Thank you for your patience and co-operation. I will be in touch should anything come up for which I might need your expert views on, and I will also be available should you need to contact me for any reason related to this interview. Thanks once again Sir.*
Appendix 5

Private Sector actors (cement Manufacturers)

Participant ID ----------------- Gender Male / Female Date -------------- Reference number:

Introduction

I am ______________________________ from ______________________________

✓ General purpose of the study
✓ Aims of the interview and expected duration
✓ Who is involved in the process (other participants)
✓ Why the participant’s cooperation is important
✓ What will happen with the collected information and how the participant will benefit
✓ Any questions?
✓ Consent

Can I ask some details about you and your job?

Job Title ____________________________       Highest Educational Grade attained
_________________ __

State of origin __________________________

How old are you?  □ Under 30yrs □ 30-40yrs □ Over 40yrs

Now that we have completed the consent form, I will now ask you to express your own views
and experiences about your work and role ------------. Your views and experiences can give
insight to this study. I hope you will have time to complete this interview. I am going to turn
on the voice recorder now. Don’t forget, you can ask me to turn this off at any time.

Do you have any questions before we start?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Topic and Probes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company activities</td>
<td>1. What are the products manufactured by your company?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. What social and environmental impacts does the production process generate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What strategies are used to manage the impacts by your company?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What are the influences of government legislation, international regulation/voluntary standards on your environmental management processes?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Who is involved in environmental management in your company beyond the company?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How is environmental compliance targets set and monitored within and outside the company?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. What are the main challenges the company faces in the implementation of environmental plans?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Partnership/ transparency and accountability |
| 1. Has your company established partnership/relationship with any private or public organizations in relation to environmental regulations? |
| 2. If any, what prompted the relationship and what form do the partnership take? |
| 3. When were the links/associations established? |
| 4. How do these partnerships function and who controls the partnership? |
| 5. Do you share information with other parties? |
| 6. How is it shared, what type of information do you share? |
| 7. What is the purpose of sharing this information? |
| 8. Are there limits on the kind of information that can be shared and who it can be shared with? |
| 9. What other strategies do you undertake to foster transparency and accountability about the activities of your company? |

**Closing**

Is there anything else you think is important that we have not talked about?

*That’s all the questions I have for you. Thank you for your patience and co-operation. I will be in touch should anything come up for which I might need your expert views on, and I will also be available should you need to contact me for any reason related to this interview. Thanks once again Sir.*
Appendix 6

Civil Society Organization/community based association/research institutes etc.

Participant ID -------------- Gender Male / Female Date -------------- Reference number:

Introduction

I am ______________________________ from __________________________

✓ General purpose of the study
✓ Aims of the interview and expected duration
✓ Who is involved in the process (other participants)
✓ Why the participant’s cooperation is important
✓ What will happen with the collected information and how the participant will benefit
✓ Any questions?
✓ Consent

Can I ask some details about you and your job?

Job Title ______________________________       Highest Educational Grade attained

____________________________

State of origin __________________________

How old are you? □ Under 30yrs □ 30-40yrs □ Over 40yrs

“Now that we have completed the consent form, I will now ask you to express your own
views and experiences about your work and role. Your views and experiences can
give insight to this study. I hope you will have time to complete this interview. I am going to
turn on the voice recorder now. Don’t forget, you can ask me to turn this off at any time.

Do you have any questions before we start?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>1. Can you briefly tell me the history of your organization and the objectives of the organization?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Is your organization locally registered or affiliated to any international organizations?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Who funds your organizations?

4. With regards to environmental policies implementation, what are the main activities and programmes carried out by your organization?

5. How have your activities/programme evolved, what were the influences that led to this pattern of evolution (government legislation, international regulations)?

6. What would you say are the main challenges your organization faces in the achievement of its set objectives?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnerships/ Relationship/ Engagement/ transparency/ accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Has your company established partnership/relationship with any private or public organizations in relation to environmental regulations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. If any, what prompted the relationship and what form do the partnerships take?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. When were the links/associations established?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How do these partnerships function and who controls the partnership?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How does your organization gather information regarding environmental management?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Do you receive any information on government’s plan and action regarding management of extractive industry or the environment generally?</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Is the transparency level of the government sufficient?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. What about information from private companies about their environmental management plans and their activities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. How would you rate the level of transparency and accountability of government and the companies?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Closing

Is there anything else you think is important that we have not talked about?

*That’s all the questions I have for you. Thank you for your patience and co-operation. I will be in touch should anything come up for which I might need your expert views on, and I will also be available should you need to contact me for any reason related to this interview. Thanks once again Sir.*
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category of Actors</th>
<th>Sub-category</th>
<th>Respondents reference number and code</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Respondent reference as appeared in text</th>
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<td>3 GRFD3 14/04/16</td>
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<td>5 GRFD5 14/04/16</td>
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<td>8 GRST3 13/04/16</td>
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<td>local government (GRLG)</td>
<td>9 GRST4 01/06/16</td>
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<td>10 GRLG1 14/11/12</td>
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<td>12 GRLG3 7/04/16</td>
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<td>13 GRLG4 11/04/16</td>
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<td>Non-State Actors</td>
<td>Cement producing companies (CPC)</td>
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<td>15 CPC2 12/04/16</td>
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<td>Environmental Consultants (EC)</td>
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<td>Environmental Journalists (EJ)</td>
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## Appendix 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Code Category and family</th>
<th>Subcategory and coding</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How has the state configured environmental governance of the cement industry and what roles do sub-national tiers of the administration play in this process? How have the non-state actors and stakeholders’ roles and relations in environmental governance been affected by privatization in the cement industry?</td>
<td>Background of Actors and responsibilities- 1</td>
<td>State Actor- FG- GRFD1-5 State Actor-SG – GRST1-4 State Actor-LG- GRLG1-4 Non-State-Civil Society- NG1-10; AC1-4 Non-state- Company-CPC1-4 Non-state-Private sector-EC1-2; EJ1-4 Non-state-Community leaders- CCE1-10; CCIB1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How has the state configured environmental governance of the cement industry and what roles do sub-national tiers of the administration play in this process? How have the non-state actors and stakeholders’ roles and relations in environmental governance been affected by privatization in the cement industry?</td>
<td>Roles/activities of actors- 2</td>
<td>Dissemination and Enlightenment of environmental information Fight the right of the community Reports to government Control pollution Training of staff on environmental health Conduct EIA Perform social responsibility Audit company facilities Intermediary between govt &amp; private sectors Watchdog for govt/companies Issuance of permit/EIA Monitors companies compliance Stakeholders’ meeting/seminar Enforces/Awards penalty to defaults Irregularly lectures the public Registration and regulation of EC Process of monitoring Advisory role to govt Conduct researches for Policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How can the multilevel governance practices in the Nigerian cement industry be understood and explained as contestations to achieving sustainable development of natural resources?</td>
<td>Relationships/Interrelations/partnerships of actors- 3</td>
<td>Company/community-relationship Govt/NGO-Training Governmental Relationship-Monitoring Company/community negotiate-compensation govt/community-reports concerns Govt/NGO relationship-process of EIA Inter-Governmental relationship-Delegatory/informational; Training Inter-Comm. &amp; govt- inter-comm. conflict settlement Inter-Govt/Comp.-Approves EIA Inter-Govt/Comp.-Policy formulation Inter-Comm./Comp. Inter-Comm./NGO-Advocacies Inter-Comp./Govt Regulates/enforces Inter-Comp./NGO: Sponsorship/Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How have the non-state actors and stakeholders’ roles and relations in environmental governance been affected by privatization in the cement industry? How can the multilevel governance practices in the Nigerian cement industry be understood and explained as contestations to achieving sustainable development of natural resources?</td>
<td>Challenges and Prospects- 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter-NGO/Govt-Support</td>
<td>Comm. struggles with comp. to get things done</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter-NGO/NGO-Funds/info/materials</td>
<td>Comp. neglects comm. needs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter-NGO/Public-Awareness</td>
<td>Disagreement within comm.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter-NGO/Public-Enlightenment</td>
<td>Divide and rule tactics by national companies</td>
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<td>Inter Actor relationship-NGO/Govt-Advisory</td>
<td>EC is not well regulated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter relationship-comp./comm.-relationship</td>
<td>EIA complication/Dishonesty</td>
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<td>Inter relationship-Govt/NGO- Process of EIA</td>
<td>Environmental Pollution</td>
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<td>Inter-Relationship-NGO/Company-environmental consultancy</td>
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<td>Inter Relationship NGO/Comp.-Int'l guidelines</td>
<td>Govt not responsive to comm.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter relationship: EC/Govt-monitors compliance</td>
<td>Ill motivation for Researchers/consultants</td>
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<td>Intra-Comm./Comm.-Meet and dialogue together</td>
<td>Inadequate personnel/equipment</td>
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<td>Intra-FG/SG/NESREA- No conflict</td>
<td>Intimidation/threat</td>
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<td>Intra relationship: SG/FG-monitoring</td>
<td>Irregular/Mis-information</td>
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<td>Intra relationship: FG/SG- no conflict</td>
<td>Lack of data base/ignorance</td>
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<td>Inter relationship: EC/Govt-monitors compliance</td>
<td>Lack of job benefit for host communities</td>
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<td>Inter relationship: Comp./comm.-get things done</td>
<td>Lack of standard in operation</td>
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<td>Logistics/delay</td>
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<td>Negligence of client (companies)</td>
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<td>Nepotism/Nigerian Factor</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<td>Outdated/deficiency of environmental laws &amp; implementation</td>
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<td>Overlap/Conflicts of responsibility</td>
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<td>Policy enforcing style</td>
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<td>Prioritizing economic gains</td>
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<td>Technological challenge</td>
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<th>Recommendation &amp; emerging issues- 5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changed orientation/style of policy making</td>
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<td>Comm. should be more involved and enjoy direct benefit</td>
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<td>Create a national body for accrediting ECs &amp; providing knowledge on Environmental mgt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formulation of good policies</td>
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<td>Govt should be responsive and united against bad behaviours</td>
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<td>Regulators should give annual update to EC</td>
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<td>Review of Environmental Laws &amp; constitution</td>
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<td>Transparency</td>
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<td>Right determination</td>
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<td>Commitment of govt in Paris agreement</td>
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<td>Job and more revenue generation via alternative fuel</td>
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<td>Employing indigenes</td>
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<td>Privatisation allows direct benefits to immediate communities</td>
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<td>Privatisation promotes benign technologies</td>
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