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Preface.

The purpose of this essay is not to examine the praise extent to which Christian Ethics has borrowed elements from external sources or has been modified by external influence during the later processes of development and systematization. Its aim is rather to show the organic relation of the ethical teaching of the New Testament to antecedent and contemporary moral consciousness and doctrine, and further to show how the ethical atmosphere of the time, made possible the wide-spread discrimination of Christian principles. To demonstrate such connection will not be to divest Christian teaching of its unique character and value. It is a great law of intellectual and moral progress that no great truth can enter into human life unless previous development and preparation has rendered men capable of receiving that truth. Accordingly, if we recognise the teaching of Christianity as embodying the loftiest of moral principles, we must also allow that a stage of development had been reached which rendered possible the formulation and reception of that teaching. Thus an examination of the ethical atmosphere at the beginning of the Christian era may be considered a legitimate part of the historical study of Christian ethics.

The fact that this study involves an examination of Christian Ethics as well as of philosophical ethics will render an occasional excursus into the realm of New Testament theology.
unavoidable. It is impossible to estimate the ethical value of New Testament teaching without taking into consideration not only the immediate instruction upon conduct and life which it contains — were this only considered it could claim little original much less unique value — but also the ethics of a religious teaching. Moreover a considerable amount of the external influence which finds its place in forming New Testament ethical thought has been mediated through the channels of theological ideas. Indeed the inseparability of the ethical from the theological aspect of thought can well be illustrated from the ultimate direction assumed by Greek philosophy in the Endemian ethics and neo Platonism.

Avoiding therefore, too hard a distinction between ethics and religion, we shall attempt to show New Testament teaching in its place at the first meeting point of the two long lines of development in East and West.

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Argument—The principles of evolution are applicable in the sphere of ethics. Ethical doctrine is intimately connected with the development of moral consciousness in the race and so with the Ethical atmosphere of the period in which it has its origin. Such teaching is dependent for its expression and advance upon previous material. It progresses through expansion and criticism of the product of previous development. The laws of development are applicable within the sphere of religious ethics since the ultimate source of the data of any truly ethical system is the moral consciousness. New Testament ethical teaching may therefore be studied in relation to the historical development of Jewish and Greek ethics; these being the chief factors in the ethical atmosphere of the first years of the Christian era.

CHAPTER 1.

Introductory.

Division 1 - General principles of ethical development.

1. The relation of ethical teaching to moral consciousness.

The introduction of the principle of evolution from the sphere of natural science into almost every department of human life, has brought about a great change in methods of study, and this change has necessarily taken effect in the realms of religion and ethics. It is now recognised that even the most unique and outstanding systems of religious and ethical teaching cannot properly be understood apart from their historical setting. Indeed if a system of thought were to have no point of contact with its environment it would be completely unintelligible. In order that truth may be intelligible it must have its context in human life and thought. It follows, therefore, that human life must develop in relation to truth as to provide that context, before a greater comprehension of the truth can be attained. The statement that 'unto him that hath shall be given' is entirely applicable here, for it is truth alone that makes the further apprehension of truth possible.

The application of this principle
within the sphere of ethical study will lead one to anticipate a definite connection between the content of a system of ethical teaching and the moral consciousness of the period in which it has its origin and exercises its influence. There is, indeed, a sense in which any doctrine concerning character or conduct must be regarded as the product of the moral consciousness of its time. This statement must, however, be guarded by a reservation. The truth of a doctrine or system cannot in any way be regarded as the product of consciousness. Truth is not manufactured. If it can be considered as absolute it must be self-revealing; but such revelation will be conditioned by the nature of human consciousness and mediated through it. In the first place the teaching is an expression of the moral consciousness of the teacher. In his teaching he articulates the principles which seem to him to govern right conduct and to make for the best life. No man can perceive much less impart to others any moral truth which has not entered into relation with his life. Moral insight cannot spring from external sources. All perception of truth involves apperception and as a moral principle cannot be apprehended out of relation to the mass of a man's experience and theory of life.

It may, however, be suggested that in the case of a religion possessing an immediately ethical interest as well as a religious character and in which both these elements are interwoven, the supernatural element in such a religion might involve the postulate of a supernatural basis in the case of its ethics, and that therefore we could not regard its teaching as the mere expression of a human moral consciousness. It might be argued
for instance, that the ethical teaching of Christ was not of a purely human character. Such a suggestion implies that we, in opposition to the argument it urges, regard the teaching, say of Christ, as the mere product of a human moral consciousness, whereas on the contrary, we only state it is the expression of the content of such a consciousness, and we hold that this content is in itself an expression of moral truth. Now we have expressly stated that truth is not the product of moral consciousness, and all that we are now seeking to establish is that in order that moral truth may be intelligible to human beings the medium of the transmission must be a human moral consciousness, and that the form of that consciousness is conditioned by the moral atmosphere of the time. This statement does not in itself involve a denial of any claim as to the essential nature of Christianity but rather expresses a truth which is entirely consonant with the meaning of the Incarnation.

It is obvious why it is necessary that the moral consciousness of the teacher should be organically connected with that of his period. It is essentially a growth in contemporary society. During the early stages of its development the moral judgments and rules of that society not only exert a formative influence upon it, but also constitute the greater part of its content, and this content forms the foundational material for further advance. The moral teacher and reformer arises most often from the ranks of those who have fulfilled and more than fulfilled the demands of the moral consciousness of their age. The life of Christ affords a wealth of illustration upon this point. It is thought worthy of record in the Synoptic account that he showed dutiful conformity in children to all the demands of parental
authority; while at the time of his transition from private life to his public ministry he expressed the principle that 'it becometh all men, especially one who is to teach the truth, to fulfill all righteousness'.

All advance in moral truth must be made upon the basis of the moral consciousness of the time. The work of a great reformer is often to give utterance to principles which have been developing beneath the surface of contemporary morality and have perhaps found a growing though unconscious or rather unreflective acceptance in the best life of his time. This does not make the advance unreal or unsubstantial. There is something new in every worthy utterance that has called men onward, but this something cannot be entirely new for if it were it would be useless since it could not be linked into their lives. Advance is made by means of a clearer insight into and a better understanding of the principles that lie at the root of human life and find an expression, real, though partial, in the moral consciousness of society. Here again the objection may be raised that in outstanding cases, such as that of Christianity, the unique nature of the Teacher must be recognized. It may be urged that if Christ were 'from above' (and is not every great teacher in some sense 'from above'?) his teaching must also be from above and will accordingly represent something entirely new. To the second part of this argument we answer that it would only be solid upon the supposition that truth had never entered into human life before the advent of such a teacher. The first contention, as to the possible uniqueness of the teacher, may be granted without surrendering the contention that moral truth, even in the case 1. Matt. 111. 15. 5.
of Christ, was mediated through a human moral consciousness and was developed in organic relation to the truth that had already been expressed in the moral atmosphere of his earthly environment; for we are not dealing with the ultimate source of moral consciousness nor with the immediacy or uniqueness of communion with that source which any particular teacher may enjoy, but with the process of development of moral consciousness in the incarnate human life.

If it be further objected that in the case of Christ the process of development may not have been comparable to that of ordinary human consciousness, we answer that this objection is not pertinent to the present question. Whatever may have been the inner nature of Christ's consciousness, its outward expression and communication must have been conditioned by the forms of expression familiar to the moral consciousness of his time, and his teaching must have descended to the level of actual human life to link itself on to that life and to become intelligible to mankind. Ethical teaching must always be an appeal to the moral consciousness of those to whom it is addressed. Reformers and teachers alike must find for their measures and doctrines points of contact with the lives of men whom they seek to raise. No castle can be built in the air, and no character-building can be commenced at an upper storey. It must be built upon the ground of actual life. Appeal must be made to men's consciousness, encouragement must be given to their moral aspirations. The slender material of their present lives must be used in the enlargement of their outlook, and in the
development of further moral strength. He who would build wisely and who seeks to accomplish a lasting work must recognise that in the process of such expansion the simple must come before the profound. If then in the course of an examination of the world's history we come upon what we are tempted to regard as the sudden presentation of lofty truths to human consciousness, and these truths have subsequently exerted a widespread and deep influence upon human life, we may expect that with greater understanding we should be able to perceive that there had been a gradual enlargement of previous thought and life until a sufficient capacity had been attained for their reception.

2. There are various ways in which the material afforded by the past can be used for the furtherance of moral progress. One process is perpetually at work, viz., the mode of advance based upon the interpretation of the higher meaning of recognised moral precepts. Two tendencies are observable in the history of human morals. The one is analytical. Under its influence moral interest has sought to discover the principles which lie behind particular rules of conduct, and to apply them in a wider sphere. The other tendency finds expression in punctilious observances of the letter and detail of the moral code of the time. It exhausts the moral interests upon the minutiae and leads to stagnation. In the formed tendency alone the true spirit of progress is manifested. The man who seeks to interpret the moral injunctions of his time and to broaden their application only transcends contemporary morality by interpreting its higher spirit. Those injunctions, as we have already indicated, are the product of the working of the truth upon the
moral consciousness of the past and they will yield that truth again to the seeker. The operation of moral principles in the enlargement of the scope and content of morality may proceed in one or two ways. If a man devotes his interest to the intelligent performance of present duties, the essential vitality of the moral principle embodied in them will carry him forward to further duties. Do the duty which lies nearest thee which thou knowest to be a duty! Thy second duty will already have become clearer. The progress of social reform in the state follows a precisely parallel course. The assumption of one duty by the state inevitably leads to the undertaking of further reformatory enterprise. The sequence of the Apprentice Act of 1802, the Factory Acts of 1831 to 1847, the Education Act of 1870 and subsequent movements in the cause of childhood affords illustration of the growing recognition of a principle in the sphere of state-craft. Other illustrations of the same process might be adduced from every sphere of human life.

If this, then, is the normal course of development, what is the place and importance of the teacher? The answer is that the function of all sound ethical teaching is in a negative direction, to correct retrograde tendencies resulting upon the decay or misdirection of moral interest, and, in a positive direction, to hasten and to stimulate progress. This it accomplishes by bringing the principles underlying that progress into the light of general reflective consciousness. It gives to moral effort the power of a fully conscious activity. It kindles moral enthusiasm with the fire of imagination and endows it with the might of vision: and after the first energy of its influence is spent there remains to those in whom the message has
borne fruit, the quiet strength of conscious principle. 'But' one may ask, 'is this all the teacher's work'? May he not introduce new principles into the lives of men? May he not claim a complete novelty of message and transcend all former thought with an authoritative claim, 'But I say unto you'.

We have in part dealt with this objection already, but we may add here that we grant that a teacher may bring into operation in the sphere of character and action principles which have never before moved men and of which mankind has perhaps been entirely unconscious, but we still assert that if his work is to be able to grip men those principles must be contained potentially in the moral nature of men and will accordingly be implied, it may be very remotely in the expression of that nature already explicit in the moral consciousness. The principle of continuity is absolutely essential in the sphere of morality since in that realm truth must enter into peculiarly intimate connection with individual personalities, which must therefore be able to relate to themselves all new developments. Even, for instance, if a moral leader be a law-giver, the laws which he promulgates must have their foundations in the moral consciousness of the governed if they are to be morally valuable; while in the case of the teacher the best work will take the form of a discovery of inner moral laws rather than the creation of an external code. It is the indwelling spirit of truth not external influences, which make the teacher's work permanent.

The work of the teacher, is, then, to deepen human consciousness. This flow of consciousness into the moral sphere takes effect in a multitude of directions. Principles will find re-embodiment in extended duties. When for

1. Vide. page 5.
instance the true spirit of brotherhood is perceived clearly, the duty of forgiveness becomes extended from seven times to seventy times seven. Further if a certain principle of conduct be seen distinctly it will not appear isolated but rather in immediate relation with other principles which perhaps have not hitherto been recognised. An example is afforded by the fact that with the growth of insight into the true nature of religion there has come in practice, if not always in theory the recognition of its close connection with ethical conduct. 'If thou art offering thy gift at the altar, and then rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way, first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift'.

So far we have supposed the teacher to have arisen in what may be characterized as a homogeneous moral atmosphere, that is to say in the environment of a general moral consciousness which has developed undisturbed by external stimuli. As a matter of fact this is rarely if ever the case. It is an established biological principle that the most vigorous offspring is produced by the union of elements disparate as regards origin though necessarily of the same genus and of approximately the same stage of development. The same principle applies in the sphere of moral development. The confluence through various influences such as commerce, conquest, intercourse in literature and art, of different streams of ethical thought has stimulated and developed the elements thus brought into contact and has produced in subsequent generations a morality in advance of the elements so united. For instance the religious genius of the Hebrew and his minute 1. Matt. V 23-24.
particularity of conduct combining with the reflective and philosophical intellect of the Greek has produced factors of unique strength in the ethics of Christendom. The fact of combination, however, to pursue the biological analogy, supposes the organic unity of truth and a proximate stage of development in the several elements if improvement on both is to take place. The tendency of combination is to rule out of the various combining elements the accidents of expression and non-essential forms, and to bring the fundamentals which lie at the root of the various systems into prominence, giving to them new forms of expression which unite in themselves the strength of several former modes. This new independence of local non-essential forms (such as those of ceremonial observance etc.,) performs a valuable function in assisting in the propagation of ethical doctrines. The nearer our teaching approaches to fundamental truth, and the more catholic it is in its inclusiveness of a variety of elements, the more universally can it be applied. It is, for example, upon a claim to complete expression of essential truth that Christianity has the best foundation for its demand to be recognized as a possible world-religion, and only in event of that claim being valid in its wide-spread dissemination possible. The last mode of development which we shall touch upon is by means of criticism. The moral consciousness may be stung into activity by abuses and wrongs or in its reflective processes it may find faults and shortcomings in the material which it examines. But whether its pronouncement be manifest in the shame and righteous wrath of the moral enthusiast or in the calm reflective product of philosophic thought, whether it be
expressed in the denunciatory utterances of the preacher or in
the searching reasoning of the intellectualist, the principle at
work is the same. It is moral truth struggling against outrage
or striving to break the manacles of partial expression. And
moreover criticism has its positive aspect for faults and
incompleteness and can only be realized in the light of further
truth; and also when default becomes clear a constructive effort
to supply the lack is often aroused.

3. Summary of the relation of ethical environment to the develop-
ment of an ethical system.

We may sum up the relation of ethical teaching to ethical
environment as follows: The moral consciousness of the time
provides material for further advance whether that advance be made
by analysis and discovery of principle, extension of the applica-
tion of principles, synthesis of diverse elements, or by criticism
whether in its destructive or constructive aspects. It also
conditions the form of expression which a teaching will take.
And, finally, the atmosphere into which doctrines are introduced
after they have first been formulated will determine the
possibility of their promulgation. If the seed falls upon ground
that has been adequately prepared it will grow; if the growth
find something akin to its native soil and air in its new
environment it will live when transplanted, and if it find there
new room and richness it will thrive more vigorously, adapting
itself by new forms to new conditions, but maintaining throughout
a unity of life and a continuity of its essential nature.
Division 2. - Ethics and Religion.

One question has already presented itself which is important enough to warrant special consideration. When ethical precepts are presented as a part of religious teaching, can they claim a uniqueness of origin and nature which will emancipate them from the ordinary laws of moral evolution? Our main interest being to discover the relation of Christian teaching to its historical environment, the answer to this question will vitally affect the solution of the whole problem.

1. Historical relation between religion and ethics.

The relation between religion and ethics has varied very considerably at different periods and in different places. A religion has always an ethical quality, but it cannot be said of all religions that their interest has been primarily ethical, or that their relationship to the conduct of daily life has been equally intimate. The religious value of certain actions has not always corresponded to their moral value, as for instance in the case of the Bacchanalian orgies.

A comparison between Greek and Jewish ethics reveals very clearly the difference which is possible in the relationship between religion and ethics. In Greece the moral consciousness found its loftiest expression in ethical and political philosophy. It was so far distinguished from the religious consciousness that the objects of the latter were subjected to its criticism. Plato freely discusses the value of religious ideas in the attainment of moral ends. Popular theology, he holds, must be reformed in order that it may become a useful educational implement. This popular theology represented the sole satisfaction 1. Repub. Bk. 2. 13.
for the Greek of the immediate demands of his religious consciousness. The theology of Plato and Aristotle, as distinct from this is philosophic rather than religious in its motive. The higher theology of Platonism, for instance, is merely a form assumed by a philosophy which was primarily ethical in aim. In Jewish thought the method of approach was reversed. 'God, and because of God, good' rather than 'Supreme good therefore God' was the direction of argument for the Jew. Moral conduct was a part of religious duty. The moral tone of Jewish thought is derived from the ethical character of its theology, at least so far as articulate expression in prophecy and law is concerned, whereas the theology of Greece was the final and not the original expression of its ethical thought.

Seeing, then, that ethical teaching may be on the one hand independent, so far as origin is concerned, of religious teaching, and on the other hand may be incorporated in it, we must consider what special characteristics it will derive from such union, in order that we may answer the question which was first raised, viz, whether the religious nature of an ethical system alters its relation to the principles of moral evolution.

2. The special characteristics of religious ethics.

The form of all spiritual religion is revelation, that is to say it implies the unfolding in some way of a Divine nature or will to mankind. This is necessarily the case because there is involved in all religion some relationship between a man and his God, and the condition of any such relationship is that something shall be known of the Being with whom it is established. We could assume no attitude towards a perfectly unknowable God
nor could we stand in any relation to a Divine Being whose nature could be subsumed under no form of thought, however indeterminate. God, then, as at once the object of the religious consciousness and the Supreme Being must reveal himself to man, and this self-revelation on the part of God will give a special character to the whole content of the religion, the specific nature of which will depend upon the nature and import assigned to revelation.

Theories of revelation may be divided into two classes, one of which favours the miraculous and abnormal in its explanation, while the other includes those theories which regard the method of revelation to be such as will utilize the faculties with which man is endowed for the discovery of truth to their full extent. The former view contains, at least as an implication, the notion that the Divine revelation is communicated through a totally passive medium which is no more than a mere channel through which the waters of truth flow without altering it or being altered by it. This account of revelation held sway for a long time, no doubt by reason of the appeal of what is really its metaphorical form to the mystical imagination of religious persons. It certainly conveys a sense of the absolute and transcendant self-sufficiency of the Divine, but it loses sight of a truth of equal religious value, viz. that the Divine is perpetually in contact with the human consciousness and is imparting itself to man through the medium of that consciousness. Bacon, in his view upon the place of revelation in human life, affords an excellent example of the former type of opinion. He held that the natural view of the world is in itself sufficient to demonstrate the existence of
of a Deity but not to show his nature, so that in order to render right worship possible revelation is necessary. The instrument of acceptance of this revelation is not reason but faith, and indeed the more irrational faith is the more perfect it is.

We have already seen one difficulty in the way of such a theory as this. It ignores the natural and continual contact of the Divine with human life and thereby implicitly denies that human life has any necessary share in the Divine life, since it thrusts them so far apart that it becomes necessary to supercede entirely the established order of things, in order to reunite them. Further, by making this artificial distinction between the natural and the revealed it produces a cleavage in the nature of man. He must either be disloyal to the chief guide of his life, namely reason, or else to the revelation, supposedly of the will of the Ruler of his life. Or if no such conflict takes place, he can never reconcile the divine in nature revealed through reason with the Divine revealed in his inner consciousness through faith. There must perpetually be two gods for him or (what is practically the same) two unrelated aspects of God. The content of such a revelation will also present a difficulty. Its matter will be reduced to a series of abstract propositions whose claim to recognition of divine origin is based not on their intrinsic truth but upon a certain supposed method of transmission. Now it is practically impossible to produce any satisfactory evidence for the truth of a proposition if we ignore that which is afforded by the appeal of the inherent nature of truth to the consciousness of man, and

1. Advancement of learning 3-2.
2. Ibid IX.
therefore it is extremely difficult, upon this theory of revelation to show that the content of revelation has been introduced into the mind of man by God. Once separate God from man in point of their natural contact through the personality and spiritual insight of man and it will require a miracle to bridge the gulf.

The second theory of revelation avoids these difficulties. It claims that revelation is possible only to true spiritual insight and that the evidence of its authoritativenss lies in the power of that insight to discern in its matter the working of the same Divine reason that is evident in the organized cosmos. If we translate this into purely philosophical language we do not alter its essential nature in the least. The revelation of truth is only possible to a reasonable nature such as that of man, and the test of its validity is the power of the reason to give it its place in a rational universal system. Why truth should exhibit this property of rational consistency or why spiritual insight should put us in contact with the Divine must ever remain a mystery. All we can say is that any alternative is unthinkable. The essential harmony between reason and truth, and between clear spiritual perception and the nature of God cannot be explained, but it is none the less a basal condition of all possibility of knowledge and of the validity of the religious consciousness.

Revelation according to this theory is a contact of the Divine with the human personality. Such contact is accomplished in every department of that personality. The soul upon the side

1. Contact, community, or interpenetration are symbolic phrases which must not be taken as exhaustive in application.

16.
of emotion is in contact with God as Love; on the side of reason it is in contact with him as Truth; in will it experiences his power in the strength of right motives; through its aesthetic sensibility it comes into relation with his beauty; and its moral consciousness is a revelation of his righteousness. It is clear that this is an expression in the language of the religion of facts which are indisputable. It cannot be denied that the soul of man is in constant contact with beauty, truth and the rest through the various functions of his nature, and surely it would be difficult to prefer a charge of illegitimacy against the interpretation placed upon these facts of consciousness by religion. We are not however immediately concerned with the validity of the form of religious expression. What we desire to show is that the religious consciousness offers an explanation of the facts of moral consciousness and therefore does not supersede but includes the latter. It accepts its data and principles, and without destroying their value, it endows them with a new meaning. The preacher announces a great moral truth as 'the Word of the Lord'. The prophet perceives the working of moral necessities and the ordered march of events in the world, and in that perception God has revealed to him the future. A man has certain duties to perform? - He holds himself 'the servant of the Lord'. The laws of moral development are regarded as God's method of dealing with mankind; and to the religious historian the expanding of the religious and moral consciousness is the gradual unfolding to man of the Divine revelation.

The mode of acceptance of revelation, viz., by faith,
is not antagonistic to the mode of apprehension of truth by reason. Reason and the 'revelation which is by faith' are not two separately working sources of the knowledge of God. When certain truths are presented to human consciousness reason is concerned with their apprehension and must subsequently work out their content, but faith has first to be exercised in their acceptance; not an unreasonable faith but a faith in their reasonableness. Religious faith will go a step further and will accept those truths as an expression of the Divine nature.

The authority attributed by faith to the Divine commands will not be a non-moral authority if we regard revelation in this light. If the pronouncement of God concerning conduct is made through the voice of the moral consciousness it cannot contradict that consciousness. We may render homage to moral injunctions mediated through the moral insight of other persons but if our obedience is of a truly moral quality these commands will not be accepted blindly. We shall require to know what proof there is that this or that direction which our mentor gives is really the will of God, and the only reliable evidence possible in the nature of the case is afforded by our moral consciousness. 'Is this source of action right?' we ask; if so then it is the will of God. The theory that would make the will of God absolute apart from its moral quality may be the product of legitimate speculation, but that there should be a command of God which could be immoral according to human standards is an absolutely unmotived possibili
Such a command would have to rest for its authority upon the
pronouncement either of sacred writings or of some such body of
the Church as being the channel of expression of God's will.
But in the case of the Church or of sacred writers the message
concerning conduct must have been mediated through human moral
consciousness. Accordingly we have the right to examine it
for impurities accidental to the medium of transmission; or
else we must fall back on the theory of absolute inspiration
which we confuted above. The Divine may have many modes of
self-expression but man can only apprehend those upon which he
can exercise the perceptive powers with which he is endowed,
and in cases where he has to discriminate between the right and
the wrong the faculty employed is the moral consciousness.

We have gone into these matters at some length in order
to make quite clear what are the unique features of a religious
ethic. We have seen by means of this examination that the source
of the data of religious ethics is essentially the same as that
of philosophic ethics, viz., the human moral consciousness. In
the case of the former the religious consciousness does not alter
the source but adds a special interpretation of its significance,
deeming it a revelation of God. Idealistic philosophy would
substitute 'truth' for 'God' simply because its province is not
that of theology. The facts are the same in either case. In
the matter of moral authority a truly spiritual religion will
not contradict the dictates of conscious but will give them a
further significance as the voice of God in the soul. Thus

1. Compare Kant's Philosophy of Religion. Moral imperative takes
the form of a Divine command.

19.
the laws of the development of the moral consciousness will remain the same whether it is regarded as the consciousness of a categorical imperative, or of a moral end, or of the will of God.

The religious interpretation of the moral consciousness has however been a great gain to the latter, where men have had acumen enough to perceive the essential identity between the will of God and the right. New motives and new strength are derived from religion when it is found to be on the side of morality. To unite various aspects of man's personality, such as the religious and the moral consciousness by a unity of aim is to add greatly to the strength of both. We have called these two aspects 'various', but it is only possible to divide them by means of a limited interpretation of the former. The moral consciousness is so much a part of the full religious consciousness that the content of the latter even when not immediately concerned with human character and conduct has a reflex action upon morality. Religious conceptions as articulate in theology have a great ethical significance. The influence of religious ideas upon morality will have to be taken into consideration in tracing the ethical development of a nation such as the Jews and in determining its relation to Christian teaching, for in the case of both the religious import of conduct and the moral import of religion are fully recognised.

1. Such as Schleiermacher's--Religious consciousness is equivalent to religious feeling.
Finally it remains to be shown in what directions the principles which have been discovered to be relevant in the case of religious ethics will apply to Christianity. Its relations to its environment will fall into two broad divisions. First it must be considered as historically the climax of the development of Jewish religious morality, and as first of all an appeal to the people of that nation. The historical development of Jewish ethics will therefore fall within our immediate interest since it is the chief preparatory process for the Christian message. The methods of advance which were dealt with in the first division of the present chapter will lead us to expect in Christianity an expansion and criticism of the material afforded by Judaism. On the other hand Christianity was introduced into a world saturated with the atmosphere of Greek thought. A historical study of this influence will therefore also fall within the scope of the present interest. We shall have to determine the extent to which this atmosphere influences New Testament teaching, and notice the effect which it had in assisting or retarding of the promulgation of Christian doctrines. The order of treatment will be as follows. We shall deal first with the development of Greek ethics down to the commencement of the Christian era. We shall then treat historically of Jewish ethics and the development noticeable in Christian teaching. Finally we shall turn our attention to the confluence of these two streams and its results.
In pursuing this method of study in the case of Christianity we do not intend to adopt the illiberal view which masquerades as breadth of thought and attempt to contravent any of the religious beliefs which are held to be inherent in Christianity by so many and so worthy a body of people. If these beliefs were opposed to our view we dare not term them mere theological presuppositions. Who is competent to judge as to relative value between the verdict of the religious consciousness and that of reflective speculatio

But there is and can ultimately be no such contradiction. The same unity of truth lies beneath all expressions of it. We quote a passage which cannot be termed philosophical from a deeply religious writer. We quote it because it is the verdict of a religious faith of great simplicity and directness upon the problem with which we are dealing. Whittier writes:

Truth is one;
And in all lands beneath the sun
Whoso hath eyes to see may see
The tokens of its unity . . .
. . . Nor doth it lessen what he taught
Or make the gospel Jesus brought
Less precious that his lips retold
Some portion of the truth of old;
Denying not the proven seers,
The tested wisdom of the years;
Confirming with his own impress
The common law of righteousness.

22.
Argument - The atmosphere of Greek thought important to present study since it dominated the whole world into which Christianity entered at the beginning of its history. This atmosphere can best be understood in the light of its development.

Its development.--In Homeric times an external morality unrelated to the moral personality obtained, the standard being practical effectiveness, many influences, such as commerce, etc., tended to produce a more reflective atmosphere in which criticism was brought to bear on accepted moral standards. This 'destructive' movement found its culmination in the Sophists. Then followed the age of reconstruction, beginning with Socrates, who was the first moral philosopher with a 'disinterested interest in the good'. The characteristic of this age was intellectualism. Its contribution to ethics was the idea of the unity and supreme reality of the Good and of its unity with the Divine: the realization of which being man's highest good, and the means of fully realizing himself. Its failure was that it did not relate the theoretic and the practical life. In this period there are already signs of movement from the self-sufficiency of intellectualist ethics towards the self-abnegation of religious mysticism.
In passing to Stoicism we make a transition from purely Greek thought and intellectualism to ethical intuitionism. Stoicism has its historical origin in Cynic and Megarian teaching and was probably affected by Eastern influence. It taught that the good life was the life according to reason, reason being the universal principle in the cosmos, yet speaking through the moral consciousness of the individual. In this doctrine is to be found the first effective synthesis of morality and religion, and from it emanated Stoic universalism and humanity. Its ethical failure was due to the fact that it could only be the philosophy of the few, and also to the pessimism which resulted from the view of the world as the best possible which was the logical result of its pantheism.

Finally in Neo-Platonism we have the mystical religious ethics of self-despair. The atmosphere at the beginning and during the first century of the Christian era was thus one of increasing dissatisfaction and intellectual despair albeit the great results of Greek philosophy still survived; viz., a belief in the unity of the Good; in the need for knowledge of the Good; in its self-revelation in the individual moral consciousness; in the requirement of harmony of will with it; and, on the religious side in its identity with God; and accordingly that man can only realize himself through communion with God.
CHAPTER 11.

OUTLINES OF GREEK ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY.

It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of the place which an examination of Greek philosophy occupies in the study of the ethical atmosphere into which Christianity first entered. It may indeed be said that the work of the great Greek thinkers is the one source from which western civilization at that time derived its speculative thought. At least the descent of later classic philosophy from the former is clearly demonstrable. From Tarsus to Corduba and from Alexandria to Rome there stretched a world dominated by conceptions which owed their ultimate origin to Greek philosophy. It was this world that Christianity was destined to conquer within a little over three hundred years of its entrance into it.¹ Such a phenomenon as this does not occur fortuitously. We naturally look behind the fact for something which shall be adequate to explain it, but before we can arrive at any such explanation we shall have to understand something of the thought atmosphere of the ancient world at that period.

In a study of such extent the treatment can by no means be exhaustive. A selection, based upon the purpose which we have in view, must be made from the data to hand. Our interest will be directed towards the permanent influence of a system

¹Constantine embraced Christianity circ. 312 A.D.
rather than towards its details: and such influences lies in the great ethical principles embodied in the particular doctrines. The essential unity of Greek thought and the continuity which marks its development compels us, however, to begin at the very sources of Greek ethical philosophy, in order to understand the place of the concepts which gradually emerge into consciousness during its history. Accordingly, we must turn our attention first to the ethics of the Pre-Socratic age.

1. Pre-Socratic Ethics.

1. Early Greek Ethics:

a) Homeric.

The earliest extant pictures of Greek life and morals are to be found in the Homeric literature. This literature may be taken as affording a view not of heroic and legendary days but rather of the life of the period at which it exerted its highest influence. The mythology and morality of the Homeric poems could only exert an absolute influence in an age whose thought they represented. The change from the standpoint presented therein is marked by the growth of a criticism of their contents. We may therefore take them as exhibiting, in principle at least, the chief moral characteristics of the time of which they constituted the literature of religion and morality.

The basis of Homeric ethics is to be found, not in the human moral personality but in man's external characteristics.
and especially in his nature as a finite being dependent upon the higher powers. The result of this neglect of personality is to be found in the nature both of the moral standard and of the recognised ends of life. The progress of ethical language itself exhibits these facts. It will be found that in many instances the word for a particular virtue had first been used to denote some external attribute. The original meaning of ἀρετή, for instance, has reference to the price or worth of a thing, i.e. to its external effectiveness, and from that it derived what may be called either its metaphorical or its moral significance as meaning honour paid to worth of character. The type of virtue chiefly esteemed at that period affords further illustration. The bravery of Achilles and the cunning of Ulysses are judged out of relation to their actual character. Ulysses may have been a scamp and Achilles a monster, but it is their effectiveness which is praised. ἀρετή, in its Homeric sense means prowess.

The same principle holds good of the moral ends recognised. These related to such externalities as success and possession. ὑπάρχων, pursuing the study of ethical thought from the point of view of language, points out that the use of τὸ ἄγαθον, with reference to material possessions preceeded the use of ἅγαθον as 'the good'. It might further be indicated that the Homeric use of ἄγαθον, meaning 'brave' or 'noble' preceeded its use in the moral sense of 'virtuous'. Popular religion had a further externalizing effect on the morality of the time.

1. From Ηρώς = The God of war.
3. "This was projected throughout the whole of Greek thought. Cf. θεός καὶ ἀγαθόν"
The motive for obedience to the gods on whom man was considered dependent was of necessity either fatalistic or propitiatory. It any case it was without any definite reference to character. Sin too signified only some breach of observance rather than the presence of moral turpitude. It would be unfair, nevertheless, to say that there was nothing in the ethics of the age to which we should unhesitatingly apply the term 'moral' in our sense of the word. The Gods must be interpreted not as purely objective in character but as in some degree a reflection of the inner moral consciousness; but it was the work of a more reflective age to trace the moral law to its origin in the individual. We may therefore sum up the characteristics of morality in the Homeric age as being externality and independence of the moral personality of the individual, coupled with its natural accompaniment, viz. a lack of unity in moral principle.

1. E.g. A recognition of the duty of hospitality would proceed in all probability the worship of

2. We must however take into account in a survey of the ethics of Homeric times, two conceptions which modified very considerably this externality, viz. the conceptions of Αἰών and Νεκρός. These are two aspects of the moral sense, the one inward and the other external and public. The first is the sense of honour which prevents certain actions, and which when outraged produces the discomfort of a bad conscience. One cannot quite tell when it will come into operation. Its range of prohibition is indefinite but is wider than the range of things condemned by the ordinary level of moral consciousness. Νεκρός is the sense objectified. It is the blame which one feels others to attach to the action about which one has σπάνι in the heart. Νεκρός was soon transferred from a third human person to the haunting if vague, blame of the Higher Powers. The principle objects of Αἰών and Νεκρός were cowardliness, falseness, overweening the unprotected the inferior or the stranger, and irreverence towards old people and the gods; indeed anything overbearing or immoderate in deportment.

It would be tempting to regard these ideas as a fore-shadowing of the larger uncompelled exercise of virtue towards others and the idea of all-seeing eye of a moral governor and,
b) Advances upon Homeric ethics.

Between this ethical atmosphere and that of the time of the great moral philosophers of Greece there is a wide difference. A number of influences which lay outside the sphere of moral reflection were operative in bringing about the change. Prominent among these there was the increased complexity of social relationships which accompanied the growth of city life. In Hesiod this change begins to make itself evident. The conception of a social compact of mutual justice finds a place in his thought, and the social aspect of morality has undergone perpetual development from that time.

One cannot however easily or rightly separate this enlargement of social relationship from the growth of reflective enlightenment. During the long period that separates Hesiod from the Sophists the development of the factors embodied in Greek civilization led inevitably to increased intellectual activity. as such, a distinct element in preparation for future teaching of brotherhood and of the moral nature of the Supreme Being. But too much stress must not be placed upon this point. In the first place these ideas represent the conscience which is common in some form to every age, and is normally in advance of the explicit moral judgement of the general mass: and in the second place when the age of law and philosophy succeeded the less civilized age this form gave way to the more concrete sanctions of state law and organized public opinion. In the subsequent ages of speculation they receive singularly little notice, though there is an echo of their demand for moderation of conduct in the μετάνοια of Aristotle's mean. But to speak of a doctrine as an appeal to the surviving sense of λόγος and νομός is merely to say that it appeals to men's consciences.
The influences of commerce would not only determine more definitely the relationship of man to man but would also stimulate thought. This is illustrated by the fact that as a matter of history the most advanced thought of Athens emanated from the Peiraeus which was the centre of her commercial life. Further the influence of the Persian wars, and their effect in producing more intimate contact with the East moved towards the enlargement of Greek thought. There was still however a strong tendency for the imagination of the Greek to run within the narrow grooves of his own city-state. This tendency was combated by the pan-hellenizing influences of Delphi and Olympia. The oracle and the festival played a very important part in supplying the sense of national brotherhood which the Greek to a great degree lacked. Commerce too would produce a type of international morality of a limited nature, even beyond the bounds of Greece.

The limitations of advance during this period may fall into two divisions, viz., limitations to content and limitations as to extent of application of moral principles. In the first place, morality was still the morality of the deed rather than of the agent. Character and personality had not yet found their place in the ethics of the time. In the second place what principles were recognised were limited in the extent of their application by the aristocratic prejudices and exclusiveness of the Greek. The very city life that had assisted the growth of morality had created classes with them boundaries which narrowed the application of its principles. This tendency to limit the applicability of moral principles to the life of the upper classes was so strong in
Greek philosophy and is so intimately bound up with the nature of
its teaching that it is well worth while to emphasize it. A
kindred
further element in the Greek character, of known nature to this,
was the sense of national superiority that dominated it. The
effect of this was to render the international morality of the
Greek a pure matter of self-interest and to reduce lawfulness as
between Greek and Barbarian to mere expediency.
2. The Sophists and their time.

Finally in considering this period, we must enquire
what advances the actual philosophy of morality had made. We
can afford to neglect the first efforts of Greek speculative
thought as represented by the physicists of Miletus, and indeed
there is little of importance to be found from the ethical point
of view in any of the Pre-Socratics, except perhaps the monotheism
of Xenocrates and the glimpses of a unity of law in Heracleitus.
Their interest lay more in the sphere of natural science and
metaphysic. It is the Sophist who claims our attention, not
because of the intrinsic value of his own philosophy, but because
of its far-reaching influence.

We have noticed that the prevailing morality of the time
was a morality of the deed rather than of the doer. The growth
of reflective consciousness in every sphere resulted in the
realm of morality in the growth of a distinction between
natural and conventional elements. The morality of the deed was
brought beneath the searchlight of reason, and old institutions,
moral injunctions, and customs of every sort were questioned.
Some were shown to have their sole basis in social habit and others were required to justify their existence; nothing escaped criticism. This turmoil and change of ideas finds expression in numerous ways. In the drama Aristophanes represents the conservative element in society which viewed the movement of the times with disfavour. While Euripides represents the pessimism that so often accompanies a period marked by the breaking up of old ideas and shows also in his thought the vacillation that results when the new appears side by side with the old and the mind is dragged in opposite directions. In the midst of this movement and as it were an incarnation of the spirit of a time of transition stand the Sophists, Not by any means wholly evil in influence, yet not wholly good, they were the pioneers who cleared the way for the later constructive work of the great fathers of philosophy. Gomperz sums up the nature of their work by describing it as an inquisitorial scepticism which did not pause even at the gates of heaven. There are only two courses open to those who are imbued with the spirit of such an age; either to accomplish destruction of all that held society together or else to undertake reconstructive advance. Unfortunately and perhaps unfairly Sophistry has come to be identified with the former course, and indeed it must be acknowledged that the main issue of Sophistry was the denial of any universal moral standard save egoism, and that the mercenary life of the Sophist seemed to the Greek to bear out his doctrines. On the

1. See Gomperz. Greek Thinkers—Section I. Vol.11.
3. See character of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic.

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other hand one cannot forget that it was along the alternative path afforded by this movement, viz., that of reconstruction upon sounder basis, that the greatest of the Sophists passed, and that in him we recognize the father of Greek ethical philosophy. This man was Socrates.

2. Socrates and the Socratica.

1) Socrates

We have classified Socrates as a Sophist, but this classification is only partially correct. He had much in common with the spirit of the Sophist on one hand and much that was its direct antithesis on the other. He shared with them the spirit of examination and criticism but the motive from which it sprung was very different from the motive of the ordinary Sophist. The work of the latter was undertaken for personal advantage. Ethics in so far as it found a place in Sophist teaching was a useful propaedeutic in the study of the art of 'getting on'. It was, on the other hand, moral enthusiasm that impelled Socrates to test established order and conceptions to discover their falsities and truths. He was a paradox—a Sophist with an enthusiasm for morality for morality's sake. He was the first of the moral philosophers with 'a disinterested interest in the good'.

Socrates was also the great leader of all subsequent thought in the quest for universals. The importance of this quest in the sphere of ethics is that it recognises the independent as opposed to the merely relative nature of virtue—Justice, wisdom, etc. being universals, are justice and wisdom independent
of time and circumstance. This method of work consisted largely in an examination of particular ethical concepts. The employment of this method alone would no doubt have led to a lack of system in results and in the isolation of various universals, had it not been for the central thought that permeated and unified all his work--'Virtue is knowledge'.

It is easy to find a fault with the one-sidedness of this principle, but whether it be justly open to criticism or not it laid the foundation of a free and pure morality which spoke not with many voices, but with one.

We take this dictum then as the text of Socratic philosophy. The source of the idea is first of importance since it shows at once its kinship with a difference from the Sophistic philosophy of the time. Socrates holds that virtue will be associated with in some way with satisfaction and in this sense his ethics rest on an ep daemonistic basis. The key to this belief lies in his definition of the 'good' along utilitarian lines as the 'good for something'. Now no man willingly thwarts his own advantage, therefore if any man see clearly that which is useful (and the good is the useful) he would adopt it; therefore virtue lies in a knowledge of the good. The possibility of a disagreement between knowledge and will finds no place in his thought. The kinship of this conception with Sophistry lies in the view of the 'good' as the useful, but whereas the Sophist interprets this as a doctrine of expediency and convention, whereas Socrates with moral interest dominant, regards the 'good' as the only thing
that can afford permanent satisfaction. The Sophist regarded the expediency of the moment as constituting the 'good'. Socrates regarded the 'good' as the absolutely expedient. This then was the origin of the great Socratic notion.
What was its value? Its unifying effect upon morality has already been noted; the importance of this result can hardly be over-emphasized. The external unity of moral principle, as opposed to previous multiplicity of code, when recognised, opened the way to a vast future of development. When the moral consciousness speaks with one voice and not with many, then moral progress becomes supremely possible. Not only unity but inwardness of standard was established by the Socratic dictum. It is true that morality was still far from being based on the complete moral personality of man, but it was a great step forward, to bring the standard within the bounds of that personality.
When Socrates claims that virtue is knowledge, he is claiming that every man has a personal interest and responsibility in the matter of the 'good'. It cannot be given him ready made apart from his own activity. He must seek if he would find. He must 'get to know'. Virtue is a matter not of blind obedience to custom but of discernment.

Further Socrates is responsible for emphasizing the essential identity that exists between the virtuous life and the happiest life; between ζυγελία and ευδαιμονία. Men may argue for or against this identification, some may regard it as obvious, others as false, but it is for all that a belief which cannot be torn out of the moral consciousness that to be truly

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good is to be truly blessed.

The influence of the principles that we have found embodied in Socrates' teaching upon subsequent thought was immense. He gave a definitely ethical trend to the whole of Greek philosophy, and within the sphere of ethics he established the unity in the search for the 'good' which marks the thoughts of all his successors. He may also be regarded as the author of the intellectualism in ethical study which pervaded Platonic philosophy and from which Aristotle can hardly be said to have escaped. Finally the belief in the unity of virtue and happiness runs through the whole of ancient philosophy. Plato maintains the identity throughout, and devotes himself in the Republic to the proof of the thesis that Aristotelio founds his ethics upon the identity of the 'good' with happiness. The Stoic held the view that Euclid ad beate vivendum in virtute satis est.

The shortcomings of Socratic thought must be noted before we pass from considering his work. The first will very readily be noted by those whose views have been moulded by modern ethics; Socrates neglects the essential element of will in morality, If to know is to do and knowledge is not dependent upon the will to know, then there is no freedom and so no moral quality in a man's actions. If knowledge is dependent on will to know, then virtue lies in the latter and not in the former. It is easy to damn Socrates work with this criticism and neglect its real value. Socrates had hold of a truth when he attributed

1. Repub. 353 (Br. 1)
virtue to action which had its spring in a consciousness of the difference between right and wrong, and this one-sidedness of emphasis was gradually corrected, as we shall see, by Plato and Aristotle.

The second shortcoming was the result of a Socratic method. Having established the principle that virtue was knowledge he proceeded to apply it in the definition of particular moral ideas and in consequence left the content of the 'good' which is the object of knowledge somewhat undefined. It was at this point that Plato took up the work. He proceeded to define this 'Good' from knowledge of which virtue flowed.

The third point on which criticism may be offered, viz. the ambiguity involved in the identification of virtue with happiness. We have seen that Socrates' own moral enthusiasm protected him from the consequences of this ambiguity. He held that virtue led to happiness. Still in his teaching there was the seed of confusion. It lay in his view that all men will the best when they see it. It is an easy though illogical transit from the standpoint 'that virtue leads to happiness, and that all men desire happiness, therefore when men see what is good they will desire it' to the view that if men seek the satisfaction of desire, i.e. pleasure, they are fulfilling the demands of virtue. It is perilously easy to confuse the 'virtue of happiness' with the 'happiness of virtue'.

This was the path that the Cyrenaic took. This system however, even in its later form of Epicureanism has had so little influence on Christian thought that, keeping our main purpose
in view, we can afford to pass it by with this brief notice. By far the more important exaggeration of the Socratic doctrine from our standpoint in view of its relation to the Porch is exhibited in Cynicism. Cynicism was an extreme translation of Socratic Utilitarianism into daily life. The origin of its one-sidedness is probably traceable to social discontent and resulting misanthropy. It is interesting in this particular to compare Antisthenes the Cynic with Rousseau, the modern advocate of a return to nature. The result of the reaction of this discontent with social life upon the Socratic Doctrine that the good is the useful was to produce a philosophy which rejects according to this test many of the amenities of ordinary life and which correspondingly narrowed the ideal of true human life. Cynicism was practically based on the uselessness of most things. If, however, it narrowed the ideal of human life, it also deepened it and we are more concerned here with its value than with its origin or failure. Let us consider then its central doctrines and their value. The rigid application of a stern utilitarian test to human institutions resulted in placing a return to nature in the central place in Cynic doctrine. This was not altogether an uncompromising advocacy of a return to the savage state. It contained in itself a contrast between the will of man as expressed, so often arbitrarily, in human custom and institutions and the reasonableness and obedience to law found everywhere in nature; a contrast which is clearly fraught with great possibilities. The great motive for a return to nature was found in the Cynic passion for freedom—freedom from

1 "Utilitarian must of course be taken in another sense from that in which it is interpreted through its connection with Hedonism. The Cynic test was to discover the useful in the sense of the absolutely necessary in contrast with the
pain and grief, and above all freedom from illusion, which is the root of the most bitter of all evils. The Cynic was an advocate of stern reality as against appearance, and carried this to the extreme of fettering reality with the gyves of narrowness of outlook. This led to the depreciation of all external goods and contemning of all amenities.

On their positive side however these doctrines present aspects of real value. The depreciation of external goods coupled with a belief in the reason-ableleness of natural life produced an inwardness of standard, which marked a distinct advance. It laid emphasis on the self-sufficiency of man in the innermost and most essential part of his personality, the part that remains when all accidentals of fortune are removed—his rational nature. Here for the first time great stress is laid on individual human personality as the foundation for a moral system. So much emphasis indeed was placed upon it that Cynicism became an extreme-individualism. The Cynic had not yet fully correlated his belief in the sufficiency of man's own self with his belief in the essential reasonableness of nature, so as to produce a doctrine of natural and universal moral law speaking through the individual reason. But the seeds of this Stoic tenet were present.

Further, the chief Cynic virtue, endurance, contained great possibilities. It drew attention to the value of a firmness and singleness of will in pursuit of an end or in the living of a life even in the face of difficulties and privations. This paved the way to some considerable extent no doubt for a

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1. superfluous and merely luxurious.
future doctrine of the essential value of the good will and the pure heart.

Finally the religious aspect of Cynic ethical doctrine though not in itself very important is fraught with potentialities. The Cynic theology was entirely monotheistic. Antithenes sums it up by saying that by convention there may be a multitude of Gods but by nature there is only one. Now monotheism whatever its place in the religious consciousness is valuable in the ethical sphere because of its unifying influence. If there is one will not many proceeding from the throne of the universe then there may be one law throughout the world. The universal reign of law becomes in consequence a perfectly natural conception.

Exactly how far these corollaries of the Cynics' doctrines commended themselves to their mind is difficult to determine. Their influence would probably be confined by their churlish attitude towards human society. Humankind would not, generally speaking, trouble to look behind the veil of seeming misanthropy; it would be far easier to ridicule than to pierce. Gompertz sums up the place and value of the Cynic teaching well in these words "We have no means of gauging the influence of the Cynic moral sermon. In any case it did something towards paving the way for what may be called a softened and less one-sided form of Cynicism, and helped to make possible the widespread dominion of the Porch. ¹.

¹·Greek Thinkers.--Vol.11--Chap.VII. Sec.8.

40.
Division 3--Plato and Aristotle.

We now return to the main stream of Greek thought, to consider the work of the great masters of Hellenic philosophy, Plato and Aristotle.

1. Plato.

Plato's work is entirely ethical in motive. It falls into two main divisions which correspond to the earlier and later periods of his thought. His earlier dialogues are concerned more with the detached examination of particular ethical concepts, conducted upon Socratic methods. To this division belong various dialogues such as the Lysis on friendship, the Laches on courage, the Charmides on temperance and the Euthyphro on piety. But by far the most important part of Plato's work lies, not in this examination of detached virtue but in the great, central doctrine of 'ideas'. This doctrine gives the character to the whole system of Platonic ethical philosophy.

Before examining this doctrine it will be well to return a little way to discover the relation of Plato's thought to the teaching of Socrates. The very fact that it is difficult to determine the precise extent of the Socratic element in the Platonic dialogues shows the near kinship which must exist between the two. The common element shared by both may be summed up as follows. In the first place Plato accepts without modification, at least in his earlier works, the Socratic dictum-'Virtue is knowledge'. For him virtue is essentially related to consciousness. He does not recognise the possibility of
unconscious virtue. True virtue, he holds, is a matter of
discriminating the good. Confusion of thought, against
which Socrates was continually warring, is in Plato's
opinion too the root of all error. We err because we cannot
distinguish substance from shadow.
The second point of unity is the recognition of the singleness
of the Good and the personal nature of its realization.
The Platonic belief in the latter leads at times almost to
an asceticism\(^1\) and what would be today described as 'other
worldliness', while the conception of the Good as One is
central to the whole doctrine of ideas.
The third fundamental tenet of Socrates to which Plato adhered
was the belief in the essential unity of the virtuous and the
happy life. In the Gorgias he introduces us to this view\(^2\),
and throughout the Republic\(^3\) he is employed upon the task of
proving their unity, and right through to the close of his
work he holds the same great faith\(^4\).

Plato, then, commenced with the Socratic view that the
prize of life is gained in the pursuit of virtue, and that
virtue is essentially one in principle, and is attained through
a full consciousness of the Good. Wherein then lies the advance
made by Plato beyond the point reached by Socrates? In the
first place progress was made in the further definition of the
object of that knowledge which is virtue. Socrates had left
the content of that object practically undefined. For him the

\(^1\) See for example the attitude of Socrates towards death in the
Gorgias 470d.  
\(^2\) See end of Bk.  
\(^3\) In the Laws he holds that even if it be untrue it must be proclaimed; being
lie 'with a purpose'.
'good' was the 'good for'. It was the useful: and though Socrates' own aim determined for him that that which was the best should be the most useful for the attainment of that end, in the case of those who had less clear a moral purpose, this description left room for any number of particular interpretation of the 'good', varying according to the different practical aims which a man might have in view. Plato removed any ambiguity by first defining the Good more distinctly, by raising it from a utilitarian level to an idealistic height as the one Divine thought behind all things, and then pointing to its realization as the only truly useful course.

The other great advance which Plato made was in the definite conception of the Good as something to be realized socially, an ideal which finds its completest embodiment in the State. This characteristic ranks side by side in importance in Plato's ethical system with the unity and reality of the Good.

Plato's philosophy, moreover, is not a rigid system. There is not only an inner development of doctrine to be noted in his work but also in some instances a considerable modificatic of his earlier views through the introduction of new material. Perhaps the most interesting change from our own point of view is the introduction of new ethical standards and the correspondin modification of the view that makes virtue purely a matter of understanding. Two references to the Platonic teaching will suffice to indicate this change. In the Gorgias Socrates maintains against Polus the thesis that 'the doer of an unjust act...is less miserable if he be punished and meets with
retribution at the hands of God and men. This he maintains is so because punishment is the medicine of the soul. This transition from instruction to discipline as a measure for promoting virtue implies a change from the intellect to the will as the thing to be trained or healed. Second, the division of the virtues in the fourth book of the Republic, and the corresponding three-fold analysis of the soul into with its virtue of wisdom, with its virtue of courage, and with the virtue of temperance, even though the chief virtue be wisdom, marks the introduction of other elements of personality into the sphere of ethics and a correction of one-sided intellectualism.

The introduction too of Orphic doctrines of reward and punishment after death as in the Phaedo demonstrate the presence of a new conception of sin which has gone a great distance towards undermining the absoluteness of the old Socratic doctrine. The intellectual element in the Platonic thought, inherited from Socrates, was however still dominant though not absolute, and it served an excellent purpose by maintaining the Ideal as a clear and definite object of thought; and had Plato been able to relate perfectly this element with the new view which was tending to place more stress upon the will, a doctrine of great strength would have been produced. He did not however succeed in accomplishing this, and the co-existence of these two

1. Gorgias 472d.
2. Ibid 477.
imperfectly related elements creates a dualism between the contemplative life and the practical life which corresponds to the metaphysical dualism between the ideal and the material world.

We must now examine in a little more detail Plato's two chief ethical doctrines, viz., those of the Idea and of the State, and the relation between them. First as to his doctrine of the ideas and its relation to ethics—His central thought is that in order to see both the world and life in the correct light they must be seen in relation to a purpose or design. A 'weltanshauung' is essential to any true comprehension of human life, and so the realization of this world-view or purpose is essential to the good life. There are three most important points which arise out of this doctrine. First of all it implies that true morality lies in a comprehension of the true purpose of life, and that this purpose is a universal purpose though it is to be realized by the individual (in contemplation of the Good). The second point to be noticed is that this universal moral purpose or Good is the purpose which rules the whole world. Moral and cosmic order are one. The third point is that this Good is the ultimate reality. It is in the realization of it that the actual world or the moral individual 'finds himself'. There is an amplitude and greatness about this view which was new to philosophy and dwarfs the doctrines of all contemporary schools. Philosophy is brought back to heaven and moral order is found to be the key to the riddle of the universe. It is in the return from heaven to earth that the
Platonic philosophy fails. The doctrine of the Good is sublime, but there are great difficulties presented in the mode whereby the Good is to be realized in human life.

In order to appreciate these difficulties we must turn to Plato's theory of the State. There are two divergent aspects of this doctrine. The State may either be regarded as a means to an end or as an end in itself. These aspects correspond to the two opposed views of the way in which the Good is to be realized. If the Good is to be regarded as something which is best realized contemplatively by the individual, then the State becomes merely a means for the training of individuals; a something which they transcend, when their wings have grown, in order to pursue something higher than it can give. If however one sees in the Good something to be imitated in the social life of the community, that social life becomes an end in itself. Both these views are present in Plato's doctrine but he never quite succeeds in reconciling the two or in completely subordinating one to the other. On the one hand the philosopher is to leave the cave to find the Good alone, and only returns perforce to pay a debt of gratitude. On the other hand we have the conception of the State as the pattern of the πολιτεία τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. Both sides have their value. It is perfectly true that the moral ideal has to be realized by the individual, and it is equally true that that ideal is social, but the two views must be combined if the whole truth is to be comprehended. It was the individualizing influence of intellectualism that made the cleavage, and that breach could only

1. Repub.VII. 46.
be healed by changing the stress of relative importance from mind to will. There is a further difficulty presented in the Platonic theory of the state. Plato draws is of the Greek city state and is consequently limited by the shortcomings of the latter. It lacks universality in its conception. It lacks even unity within itself, for Plato the aristocrat neglects the artizan class altogether and confines his attention to the ruling classes. The fault lies in basing the conception upon the actual political state rather than basing it upon the universal law present in human moral consciousness and the essentially social nature of man. The result is that the State becomes something that is limited and external rather than something which is at once external, internal and also universal. It is merely an artificial pattern of the \( \pi\lambda\iota\varsigma \eta\varepsilon\kappa\alpha\nu\rho\iota\upsilon\varepsilon \) and there is again a cleavage between the Ideal and the actual world. It is to the Stoic idea of kingdom of heaven which is within, and yet universal and the basis of all law, that we must turn for the resolution of this dualism and the reconciliation of the individual with the social end.

2. Aristotle.

Before leaving Greek philosophy proper to consider Stoicism, we must give some attention to Aristotle's ethics. In one sense Aristotle was a disciple of Plato, in another sense he was his severest critic. Probably he imagined that a greater gulf than actually existed separated him from the founder of the Academy. However, this may be, his starting point in ethics was essentially different from that of Plato. He returned
from heaven to earth, and commenced his philosophy there. He regarded the 'ideas' considered abstractly as purely subjective. The real idea is in the thing, not above it. This change in view brought about a change in method. The main question for him was not 'what is the good in and for itself?' but 'what is the good for man within the conditions of his empirical existence?'

Pursuing this course he comes to the conclusion that the Good which all men seek is Happiness. He then proceeds to define Happiness as the realization of excellence or if there be more than one excellence of excellence. Virtue, is the meanest to the realization of the activities of the soul which are according to excellence, that is to say, it is a mode of realizing the Good possible to man, in which realization he finds Happiness. Further psychological analysis leads Aristotle to the view that reason is the highest faculty in man. Therefore the highest excellence consists in the full exercise of reason. Reason may be operative in two ways. There is first the practical exercise of reason upon desire and will. This function is regulative; it is to guide the will in the reasonable middle way between the two extremes of vice. Thus the virtue which is the exercise of activity according to excellence is the sphere of practical conduct consists in the habit of aiming at the meaning. Practical virtue is therefore more a matter of the exercise of a reasonable or good will, or of the existence of a reasonable disposition. We have here a scientific basis for an ethic of character as well as an ethic of conduct, since character is built up of dispositions. On the other hand, there is the 'theoretic' use of reason, which is the basis for a second class of virtues which may be termed intellectual, or...
dianoetic. The pure exercise of reason or the
is to be found in the Divine, the God who is pure form. God
being absolute form, and self-sufficient, has no external
activities; therefore he has no share in the practical virtues.
The divine virtue consists in self-contemplation or Θεωρία.
Now progress whether human or otherwise is according to
Aristotle's view and evolution of form. Matter realizes its
potentiality in form, and forms become successively the matter
for higher forms. Therefore the true end of human development
is the realization of pure form or God and approximation to the
Divine life. The intellectual virtues thus become to occupy a
distinct position superior to that of the practical. Aristotle's
Doctrine of God has resulted in a dualism which is even worse
than that of Plato's. A rift has opened which completely
divides the highest life from the life lived in the world.
Practical virtue becomes a mere means to clear vision. 'Vice
is to be avoided since it distorts vision, and virtue is a
means to right contemplation'¹. Greek philosophy finally fails
to provide an ethical creed for everyday life. Its course in
the future lies in the direction of the religious ethics of
mysticism. Already in the Endemian ethics there is to be found
the religious element which found its completest expression in
the ethics of Neo-Platonism; but before we can understand the
place that this system which is the final issue of Greek thought
and which may paradoxically be termed the apotheosis of its
failure, occupies in the stream of classical philosophy, we

¹. Nic. eth. VI - 12
must turn to the philosophers of the Porch and consider their doctrines.

4. Stoicism.¹

1. Origin of Stoicism.

There is a great deal in Stoic Doctrine which was made possible by world movements which took place outside the actual realm of philosophy. The abolition of the narrow barriers of the Greek state, the destruction of the exclusive nationalism of the Hellene by the conquests and policy of Alexander had all tended to exert a broadening influence upon minds of a universalizing influence upon their conceptions. This came to full fruition when the whole of the ancient world was reunited under Roman rule, and the Pax Romana reigned all round the shores of the Mediterranean basin. Further, the centralization of government had destroyed the keen local interest in politics which had been characteristic of Greek life and thought, and thus transferred the interest of Philosophy from the outward political life of the citizen to the inward life characteristic of essential human nature. An influence which was both individualizing and inwardizing and also universalizing was brought to bear on man's thoughts. It was in the world thus changed that Stoicism had its origin and took root.

Stoicism cannot be described as a purely Greek philosoph/ Its beginnings are traceable from two sources, viz, Greek thought and Eastern thought. On the Greek side of its ancestry it derives elements from two of the minor Socratic systems which seemed

¹. Note - We omit any reference to Epicureanism because its relation to Christian ethics is altogether negligible.
prima facie irreconcilable. These two were the Cynic and Megarian Schools. Zeno the founder of Stoicism was a pupil of Crates the Cynic, and Stilpo the Megarian. From the Cynic he inherited his view on the value of the individual, and the sufficiency of reason, and on indifference to external goods and the value of endurance. From the Megarian he derived his pantheistic principles and with them the view that the reason which gave the individual was a universal principle underlying human personality and all nature. His attention was drawn to the essential humanity which unites all men and in which the note of the principle which rules the world could be heard. The negative attitude of the Cynic, his antinominism, was corrected for the Stoic in declaring himself from the 'bondage of the law' declared himself a slave to the law that lay behind law and spoke in his own heart. Cynic individualism, negative in its isolation of man from society, was merged in the positive individualism of Stoicism, which found in the principle which made man most an individual, that is reason, the principle which united him with mankind and the world.

The philosophy of Stoicism was pervaded throughout by influences gathered from its Eastern ancestry. The principal Stoic teachers were all of Eastern, mostly of Semitic, origin. Zeno came from Citium, a Phoenician colony. It is even likely that Seneca was of the same race. From the East Stoicism inherited its stern moral enthusiasm differs widely in form

1. See Zeller, and Grant on the Ancient Stoics.
from speculative intellectualism of Greece. The intuitional element which bulks largely in Stoic ethics is also probably traceable to the same source. Conscience takes its place side by side in importance with reflective reason as a source of moral authority. The rational proof of doctrines is subordinated to their moral appeal. Diogenes Laertius reports Chrysippus as having said μόνη της των δογμάτων διδασκαλίας Χείμω τάς ζωοθέτεις αὕτως ευρήσω.

The religious character which belongs to a marked degree to Stoicism was also a heritage from the East. We have in Stoicism not only Monotheistic theology - Greece possessed that - but a deep religious feeling which at times reaches sublimity of expression as in Stoic hymnology. We may sum up Stoic indebtedness to its double parentage by saying that its spirit came from the East and was incarnated in a body derived from Greek philosophy. Lightfoot describes it as 'the earliest offspring of the union between the religious consciousness of the East and the intellectual culture of the West;'

2. Doctrines of Stoicism.

Now let us review the principal doctrines of Stoicism themselves. There are two central doctrines which together with their corollaries, give the whole content of Stoic teaching; the one is the doctrine of the end and the other the doctrine of the source of nature of the moral law.

From the first the Stoic placed the end of morality not in some contemplative experience of an idea but in the good life. This good life is essentially a reasonable life and so

1. Commentary on Philippians.
in the first place it must be one which is self-consistent. The doctrine of the good life as the self-consistent is the earliest doctrine of the Stoic school. is said to have taught that the one end of life was to be self-consistent. This view was however qualified by successive teachers. It was brought into relation with the conception of the universal in human nature. The Stoic held that there are certain essential characteristics belonging to all human nature as rational, and that these are presented in intuitional form in the sphere of mortality. The self-consistent life thus came to be regarded as the life in accordance with the rational element in one's being which is universal in character, and from this the finished Stoic doctrine as expressed by Cicero, 'congruere naturae sumque ea convenientes vivere...esse finem bonorum,' is evolved. This life is considered as inclusive of the highest happiness. The root of evil and misery is in discord with one's own highest rational nature. Therefore, when a man has realised a harmony with universal reason in his life he has done the 'one thing needful'. In all other things he is self-sufficient; nothing can disturb the equilibrium of his life. It is this 'centralizing' of the principle of the good life that produced the Stoic attitude towards external goods. His indifference to these constituted no mere negative privation: the life of self-denial was not the shorn and naked life, but the life that was so filled by the one essential principle that these external advantages shrunk in importance until they were seen to occupy their true position as accidents of life, without power to disturb its central harmony. Moreover a true perception of the


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proportions of things, followed necessarily by self-denial
and endurance for the sake of the One Good, was regarded as essen-
tial to the attainment of that end and so assumed the nature of
a positive virtue. The good, then, according to Stoic doctrine
consists in an inner 'righteousness', a purity of heart, a conformity
with the requirements of our moral nature. Emphasis is placed
supremely on the will. A man may not be able to control
external circumstances; he can endure them. He cannot command
success 'sed in maginis voluisse sat est'.

The second great Stoic doctrine is implied in the first.
It relates to the source and nature of the moral order, in harmony
with which the highest life is lived. We have already seen that
the essential characteristics of rational human nature were
made by the Stoics, the basis of their ethical system. These
become articulate in the voice of pure reason and are directly
involved in its nature. Thus, the moral law is in the first
instance inward but it is not therefore purely subjective. It
is not the witness of a man's heart alone but of humanity in the
individual. Not only so, but the voice of humanity is the voice
of Universal Reason.

...Something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of men,
A motion and a spirit which impels,
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.
The moral order and the cosmic order in their unity in a Spirit which is universal and rational, which is behind all law and which speaks with one voice without and within the heart of man. This leads us immediately to the Stoic doctrine of conscience as the medium of expression of this Reason, and the pronouncement of its judgement upon conduct. We must note however that 'conscientia' was used by the Stoic in the limited sense of a faculty which pronounced upon actions which have actually been performed and not upon those ideally presented as possible lines of conduct. Moral obligation however, was regarded as an expression of the same reason, which performed a judicial function in consequence. Such a doctrine as the above is bound to have a profound influence upon the view of sin. We cannot excuse sin as the triumph of the irrational over the rational for we are rational in nature throughout, and there is the inner witness of the right, in the voice of reason. Sin is therefore division and anarchy within the rational nature of man and is a failure on the part of man to be true to himself. It is the revolt of a rational being against reason and accordingly involves guilt in that it involves responsibility.

1. The Stoic placed great emphasis on this entire rationality.
2. There are very grave difficulties in the Stoic doctrine of Sin, if we push Stoic pantheism to its logical conclusion. If the reason which directs and the reason which obeys are one and both are expressions of universal reason, how can they conflict? Must not sin be mere appearance? how can we avoid this Spinozistic conclusion? The Stoic only avoids this difficulty by deserting the theological basis of his school.
Let us now consider the deductions which have been made by the Stoic from the fundamental view of the universality and unity of reason.

In the first place we have as a consequence in the Stoic system an ethic which could claim to be the source for Greek and barbarian, rich and poor, bond and free, learned and unlearned, for wisdom is of the heart rather than of the intellect. This conception of the universal ethical system issued in the broad humanity of the Stoic, and in the virtue of "philanthropic". 'Homo Sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto'. This stands out in strong contrast with Cynic individualism. The independence of the Cynic became the value of the individual in Stoicism and was transferred to humanity at large, because the Stoic individualism was derived from a recognition of a unity in man's inner nature, achieved not by negation but by widening the conception, and recognising it as a part of a larger unity.

The notion of this larger unity took the form in Stoicism as the doctrine of a 'universal kingdom of humanity' whose law was the jus naturae, which underlies all particular laws. It represented the organic unity of all humanity crystallized into a conception of a πολετέως του κόσμου.

Before criticizing these Doctrines we must give brief notice to the religious character which belonged to Stoic doctrine. The harmony of life with universal reason took the form in the sphere of religion of a consciousnes of unity with God. Seneca speaks of God as one 'who is near us, who is with us, and is within'.
In Plato and Aristotle communion was a matter of contemplation, in Stoicism it is a unity of nature based on a harmony of the will with reason, in Neo-Platonism it will be found to be a mystic communion of religious feeling. In Stoicism this religious aspect is not divorced from ordinary morality as it was in the case of Plato and Aristotle by intellectualism and in Neo-Platonism by mysticism. The great value of Stoic teaching upon this point is that the Stoic realized the unity of these two elements of religion and morality. How can we reconcile the feeling of dependence which is an essential aspect of religion with freedom which is postulated by morality? The Stoic found the true answer in the unity of man's nature with the Divine.

3. Failures in Stoic philosophy.

It was on the other grounds than these that Stoicism failed most completely. First of all the struggle between individualism and broader humanity in the practical sphere ended in the failure of the latter. The conception of the ἐνότοις κόσμοι became of the nature of an unrealizable ideal for two reasons. One was that the conception was too abstract. It was not to be realized in the relationships of everyday life, but through a mere abstract unity of reason. The other was that the ἔνωσις of the Stoic, which seemed to him necessary for the rational governance of life, led to the stopping of the springs of human sympathy and sentiment, which

1. Letter XLI - This tendency towards religious expression is manifested most widely in later Stoicism but was manifested in its hymnology (cp.Cleanthes) throughout.
provides the dynamic that makes realizable the brotherhood of mankind rendered possible by the unity of humanity.

The second point of failure resulted from the pantheistic theology of Stoicism. If the actual world represents the rational system constituted by Universal Mind, then it must be the best possible world or else one is abandoned to an absolute pessimism. Evil must be either mere appearance, a mere negation of reality, and so the life in the flesh which is subject to evil must be unreal or else evil is of the nature of the universe and must be fatalistically endured. In the first of these alternatives we already see the tendency which finds full issue in union with religious mysticism in Neo-Platonism, the philosophy of despair.

5. **Neo-Platonism.**

A brief consideration of Neo-Platonism is useful for our present purpose not so much because of its influence upon the beginnings of Christianity — its influence was exerted upon Christianity in the direction of mysticism and asceticism at a later period — but because it is the final expression of the atmosphere which pervaded ancient thought at the commencement of the Christian era. A detailed examination will therefore not be necessary at this point. It will be sufficient to indicate the general trend of its thought.

We have seen how Greek thought proper had ended in a dualism between practical life and life of contemplation, and also that the contemplative life had already begun to assume a religious character in the Endemian ethics. We have seen how Stoicism which started out to discover the secrets
of the wise life ended in sternly melancholy apathy: and instead of being a philosophy of everyday life became a mere school for death. Into this atmosphere of hopelessness Neo-Platonism was born, and for self-sufficiency taught men to substitute self-despair. The pantheism of Stoicism impelled by a religious motive which led men to seek communion with the One, led on to the view that only by being stripped of that which constituted man an individual could he attain that end. To find God he must lose himself. The time was ripe for the work of Plotinus, teaching men to flee from the world, to strive to get rid of all that marked them off as individuals, to lose themselves in the One. The dualism between the practical life and the supposed highest life had ended in a victory for the latter. The ‘cave’ must exist without its philosopher, he is seeking his good elsewhere. We have left the ethics of conduct and arrived at the ethics of mysticism.

The manner in which this spirit expressed itself is briefly as follows: - Various grades of virtue were recognised, all save the highest being merely the ornaments of life. The highest grade were regarded as purificatory, preparing men for communion with God. This communion Plotinus held constituted man's highest good, and is only gained by complete negation of all that divided the individual from the One. It is only to be realised in a sort of ecstatic passivity. The conception (if conception it could be called) of the Good as something suprasensible and even not confinable within the narrow limits of human intelligence but was no doubt valuable, but the loss of

1. The spirit of melancholy in later Stoicism is evident to any reader of the words of Marcus Aurelius.
to actual practical life was fatal. Morality was merged in mysticism and a religion of pure feeling took the place that should have been occupied by a religion concerned with conduct.

This sketch of Greek and Graeco-Roman ethics has revealed several great principles as the gift of ancient philosophy to the world and as constituents of the moral atmosphere which pervaded civilization at the commencement of the Christian era.

The first great conception which we owe to Greek Philosophy is that of the unity of the Good. However the content of the Good may alter through successive ages, the vision of one great unifying principle in all ethics, of one immutable moral law which is one with the power that rules the world will remain unchanged throughout. To the ancient world we owe too the definite notion that the human moral agent is no mere blind tool of this world-force but an intelligence that must comprehend this Good behind and above all things in order to realise it in himself. Further, Greek philosophy and its offspring have taught men to look for that universal moral order in the voice of the inner moral consciousness and that the secret of the true life was to be found in the harmony of will with the requirements of that consciousness. All this, they had taught was the way of perfection for man. This was the path in the following which he might complete himself and realise his excellences and also, indeed in consequence, find highest happiness.

Religious consciousness had already interpreted the highest good as one with the Divine Being and philosophy at its
best had endorsed that view. Men had already thought of the highest life as the life in harmony and communion with the Divine Life. It remained for Christianity to make this relation personal rather than purely intellectual or ecstatic, and living rather than theoretic. 'When a Person had appeared charging himself with the work of establishing a kingdom of God among men announcing purity of heart as the sole condition of membership and able to inspire his followers with a belief in the perpetuity of his spiritual presence and work among them then the time came for the value of the philosopher's work to appear.'

CHAPTER 111.

Argument. Judaism, the direct historical antecedent of Christianity.

The ethical aspect of Jewish thought, the latter being theocentric, is inseparable from the theological aspect. The ethical development of Israel cannot be treated apart from the central growth of ethical monotheism. This monotheism developed from henotheism and underwent the processes of universalizing spiritualizing and moralizing, thus rendering possible a universalized content, related to the individual moral personality and lofty in standard, for the religious form given to ethical demands, viz, 'the will of Yahweh'. This content had undergone a corresponding development from custom and ritual to spiritual service and the true morality of the heart. The social ideal meanwhile had changed from the merely national to the expectation of a universal kingdom of righteousness which was to have its centre in Zion.

1. T.H. Green - 'Prolegomena to Ethics.'
The results of this development are gathered up in the Jewish literature of the two centuries immediately preceding the birth of Christ. Emphasis is placed in these writings upon purity of heart, love, brotherhood etc., Greek influence is already evident in the advent of a more reflective and philosophical attitude of mind and in a broader and more universalistic outlook. Wisdom is the chief ethical ideal of this period. It varies in significance in different writings. On the one hand it inclines towards the contemplative and adumbrates the ideal of 'communion' which occupied a large place in Christian thought. On the other hand it tends towards legalism in that it is considered as embodied supremely in the Law, the highest human wisdom being therefore obedience to the Law. The broadest thinkers do not however confine its expression to the Mosaic Law, but Jewish thought was never completely emancipated from the influence of Pharisaism; the broader and more universal ethical thought was cramped by detailed legalism and in order to appreciate the full results of Judaism, they must be viewed as emancipated from the bonds of particularism and fulfilled in Christianity.
Outlines of Jewish Ethics.

A survey of Jewish Ethics occupies of necessity an important place in the study of the antecedents of Christian Ethical teaching, by reason of the fact that Christian thought is historically continuous with Jewish thought and has absorbed much of the content of the latter. This scarcely needs demonstration. The place which the Old Testament has occupied in the religious consciousness of Christendom affords ample proof. If however, we desire evidence of the actual historical continuity of the two it is sufficient to note that the distinction between Jew and Christian arose in the first instance from the attitude of the Jews rather than from the direct action of the early Christian community.

Division I - General Characteristics of Jewish ethics.

There are certain unique characteristics manifested in Judaism which have to be borne in mind in reviewing its ethical development. One of the most striking of these features is the strong national and historical consciousness of the Jew. Israel was pre-eminently a people of tradition. This characteristic is expressed in the form and phraseology of their religious thought. Examples of a quasi-retrospective consciousness abound. The attitude of God to his people was considered as determined by 'the oath which he swore to their forefather Abraham'. God became the God of the individual Jew because he was the God of

his fathers, of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob. The national consciousness of this historical consciousness were complementary. The one involved the other. So unity with his nation and with that nation's past was one of the greatest facts presented to the consciousness of the Jew. The growth of a collection of canonical writings greatly helped towards confirming this attitude which the existence of oral tradition, a feature common to all Semitic peoples, had in the first instance produced. The Book of the Law, the Prophets, and Writings was at once a record for the Jew of the past and also as such a guide for the present. The religious authority of Scripture reinforced the strength which it derived from the basis of customs - much of the Law is a record of national customs - and gave its content a peculiar significance. The influence of this traditional element in Jewish moral consciousness, combined with the existence of documentary records, and the religious character with which the utterances of the past were invested, was profound in shaping the whole course of Hebrew Ethics. It tended strongly to produce a moral code of a legal rather than of a speculative character. The question which occupied the foremost place among the moral problems of the Jew was 'What is ordained'? The mode of development of ethical thought was largely cumulative and interpretative. This method has brought about a complexity of data, extremely difficult to resolve into historical order. Though sacred writings may have a didactic purpose (for example, the books of Job and Jonah) they were usually cast in historical form, and on the other hand when historical records were being compiled, the purpose as presented to the mind of the editor viz, to provide
religious and moral teaching and guidance had tended to give a
colour to the history, which belonged to a contemporary rather
than a historical atmosphere of thought. In a word, the purposive
character of scripture has tended to diminish its immediate
historical value, and in order to discover the true historical
value of the records it is necessary to employ analytical and
critical methods to separate history from purposive fiction and
editorial colouring and interpellations from the actual records.
When this task is completed we have still another before us.
Throughout the history of Israel there are two strands traceable
representative of two levels of moral consciousness, the one
lower, characterized by customary elements, and at once popular
and cruder, the other belonging to the representatives of
purer Yah\textsuperscript{ism},\textsuperscript{1} and being higher in ethical standard than the
former and by no means representative of the general level of
moral consciousness at the time. The murder of Uriah the
Hittite by David, for instance, would not be sufficiently
startling to provoke much popular moral indignation, yet it
certainly called forth some rebuke from Nathan the seer. We
seem, then, to be confronted with an extremely complicated task
of criticism of extant records. Fortunately however two things
intervene to render this largely unnecessary for our present
purpose. The first is the very phenomenon which we mention above
as complicating matters, viz the historical consciousness of the
Jewish nation. The resultant writings embodied in Jewish
religious literature include all that history had contributed
\textsuperscript{1}. Many Old Testament scholars posit the existence of a distinct
sect of 'Yahwehists' from quite early times.
to the moral consciousness of the age during which they held uncriticised sway and at the same time represent that consciousness fairly adequately. This might seem to compel us to hold that in Scripture we have no record of a process of moral evolution but only the product of that evolution, and that a literal interpretation of the whole contents of the recognized canon of Jewish writings would give us, with approximate accuracy, the moral atmosphere of Judaism at the time of Christ. But this is not strictly true. That it is not so is accounted for by the nature of Jewish ethics on the one hand and of the records themselves on the other. The Jew was not first concerned with the production of a system which should be consistent in every detail. A sufficiently workable consistency was ample. The unity of his moral code had a religious rather than a logical basis. Thus side by side with the conception of God as entirely righteous, we find in Scripture the conception of God as the creator of evil as well as of good. The historical rather than critical attitude of Jewish thought has preserved the records from losing entirely their evolutionary aspect, in spite of the fact that other than purely historical motions enter into the compilation of the sacred writings. This however would be insufficient to account for traces of development within the Scriptures themselves, apart from their compilatory character. Whatever may have been the purpose of the editors of sacred history their method was cumulative and involved the assemblage of actual documents which themselves belong to different periods in the nation's history. Thus the fact of the absence of logical and speculative system in the Old Testament writings, with the
co-ordinate fact of the compilatory character of those writings is sufficient to explain how the scriptures could represent at once a development of thought and also to a great extent the actual content of Jewish moral consciousness. The second great characteristic of Jewish ethics is that historically, morality of the Jews was the offspring of religion. It may be suggested that a more accurate description of the facts of the case would be that from the earliest times the morality of the Jews, as of other peoples, was couched in religious form. This is true but not exhaustive of the whole truth. No doubt the stage of moral development attained by a people reflects itself in the character of their conception of the Deity and of the service required by Him—a man's conception of God is no higher than his best thoughts—but there may be moral corollaries of great value to primary religious conceptions which may have there immediate source outside the moral consciousness proper. This was so with Israel. The ethical significance of their primary religious conviction was tremendous, but its implications were only worked out throughout a long course of history. Monotheism as presented to the religious consciousness has a moral value latent in it which gradually permeates the moral consciousness and elevates it. In studying Jewish ethics therefore, we must take into account the moral implications of the religion of Israel as well as note the gradual change in the content given to the supreme form 'the Will of Yahweh', remembering however that the latter reflects the growth of the moral consciousness. The distinctly religious character which pervades Israel's moral consciousness moulded in a further respect their ethical code. The Hebrew
moral consciousness was never distinguished, as in modern ethical philosophy from the religious consciousness, and then re-interpreted in the light of that consciousness. The division between the two aspects of human thought was never present. This was really the ultimate cause of the non-speculative character of this people's ethics. When moral obligation assumed the form of God's will the question which presented itself was not 'why' but 'what'? The moral interest of the Jew was centred not on accounting for the will of God but in discovering its content. This produced an external standard, legal in character into Jewish ethics for as long as the conception of Yahweh bore the emphasis upon his absoluteness rather than upon the lofty ethical character of his rule. It is therefore to the growth of the idea of God that we must look for the greatest progress in Jewish ethical thought, and we must note how the growth of the conception of the moral loftiness of His rule brought about the conquest of ritualistic and legal elements by a purer and more inward moral standard. We turn therefore to consider the ethical value and development of Yahwistic monotheism.

Division 2. Monotheism and Ethics.

1. Relation of Monotheism to morality.

There exists a definite theoretic as well as historical relationship between monotheism and a high level of morality. It is difficult to say in actual instances whether monotheism is a corollary of a high moral standard or vice versa. The relationship is probably one of interaction. Monotheism more easily develops into a pure moral atmosphere, but in its turn acts in the production of the latter. In any case the modificatio
imposed by religion on morals is logical rather than arbitrary. A man's 'good' cannot logically be considered out of harmony with the general order of the universe because his life is so intimately woven with that order. His end must stand in definite relation to the Power or Powers which shape destiny.

The first direction in which Monotheism will exert an influence upon morality is towards unification. Polytheism in so far as it postulates a plurality of governing wills results in a conflicting plurality of duties. The only way out of the logical impasse created by the opposition of Divine wills is to bind the gods themselves by eternal laws. This solution was accepted by the Greek dramatists. Sophocles in the Antigone speaks of τὰ θεῖα νόμιμα ἰδίων καὶ τῶν θεῶν δίκη. In the case of the Jew though the idea of one God controlling the nation's destinies which was instinct in Jewish thought unified his duties as a Jew, something like this difficulty would arise in two directions. In the first place, at the time of the entrance into Palestine the problem of duty to the gods of the country agitated popular consciousness, though it would seem that some stand was made against their recognition. In the second place the problem would take the form of the difficulty of supposing ultimately different standards for various peoples. Hebrew henotheism offered to these difficulties another form of the Greek solution by gradually elevating Yahweh to the supreme place above other gods, and changing into Monotheism.¹

¹ In both cases we can perceive the gradual exaltation of the One, the many not being abolished but being merged in or else subordinated to the One. For example the gods of paganism were very real to the early Christians but they were degraded to the position of θεῖοι. The word itself illustrates the process. θεῖος first meant gods, then intermediate spirits, and finally devils (as above

69.
Monotheism is the logical result in either case. So, conversely, the monotheistic character of a religion will take effect in the unification of moral order, else Deity will fail to occupy the position of source of all things. The effect of the unification of the moral standard is inevitably to extend its scope and increase its loftiness. The One for oneself becomes the One for other people simply because unity is arrived at in the normal process of development by means of purging morality of accidental elements and arriving at the fundamental and so universal principles of human moral consciousness. Consequently with the extension of the scope of moral order there comes to pass a purification of standard. This is necessarily so, because when universality is recognized, inwardness must also be posited.

Hypothetically one might suppose a universal rule of law without conceiving of it as inward and moral. But this is rendered practically impossible by two considerations. First, the practical, political and racial distinctions which exist around the philosopher who is in search of the universal drive him to discover that unity in the inward nature of man rather than in external conditions. Secondly, the only guarantee of obedience to any universal standard is that its authority should be within the personality. Finally, universalism pre-supposes a stage of reflective development which would embody also the conception of the inwardness of the universal authority. So the Stoic arrived at the conception of universal Reason in man, and the Jew acknowledged that 'Thus saith the Lord: I will put my law in their inward parts, and in their heart will I write it.'

We do not attempt to place these several principles in order of development. We prefer to say that unity and universality, loftiness and inwardness involve each other by mutual implication and are in turn implied in the conception of God as One, and as the only God.

2. The Monotheism of the Jews.

1. Development of Monotheism.

Monotheism was the central feature of the religion of Israel and exerted a profound influence upon Jewish morality. Throughout Hebrew theology there runs perpetually the thought of God as a jealous God, jealous for his sovereignty, jealous for his solitariness and for his glory. The primitive character of Jewish theology was however Henotheistic rather than monotheistic. Probably most of the Semitic tribes and Canaanitish peoples were henotheists in that they possessed one distinctive national God. In the first instance Israel was no different from these other peoples except that there existed in its henotheism, though through peculiar circumstances, the possibility of a lofty ethical monotheism. The nature of these circumstances we shall note subsequently. The first idea of Yahweh was, then, that of a good among the gods of other nations. His sphere was confined to the particular nation or tribal confederation whose god he was. The Israelites were 'the people of Yahweh' in the same sense that Moab is spoken of as 'the people of Chemosh'.

There was a strong tendency which we have noticed above on the part of the Israelites to adopt the gods of the country in which they settled, for the gods (as among many ancient peoples) were localized and considered autochthonous—for instance Yahweh's

1. Numbers XXI. 29.
special residence was Horeb — thus in Judges it is recorded that
the Israelites did not utterly destroy local worship and as the
gods of the people were 'a snare unto them'. This conception
of localized deity was long in fading from popular belief.
Ahab for instance saw nothing incongruous in the introduction of
the worship of Melkart of Tyre by Jezebel by the side of Yahweh-
worship. Naaman requested two mules' burden of earth that he
might worship Yahweh alone in his own land. From very early days,
however, the Israelites had some sense of the superiority of
their god over the gods of other peoples. The idea of Yahweh
as a god above other gods was probably the result of the concep-
tion of Him as the Deliverer of the nation from Egypt. He must
in the first instance be stronger than the gods of Egypt.
The conquering progress of the nation would extend this notion
of the supremacy of Yahweh till he covered the gods of all the
conquered peoples of Canaan. The retrospect of a Jew of Solomon's
reign as he remembered the history of his nation's captivity and
struggles and contrasted it with the prosperity of his own time
would deepen the thought of the power of the hand that brought
them out of Egypt and made them to dwell in a land flowing with
milk and honey. Many passages could be quoted from the Old
Testament to illustrate the idea of Yahweh's supremacy among the
gods. This conception was, indeed, dominant until about the eighth
century before Christ. The change took place through the gradual
degradation of other gods to utter powerlessness and so to
practical nonentity. Jeremiah for example speaks of a nation's
2. Judges 11. 2-3
4. 2. Kings V. 17.
Josh. XXII. 22. etc.
72.
gods 'which yet are no gods' and refers to the impotence of other gods beside Yahweh. The subsequent transference of these dethroned gods from theology to demonology conversely completed the process of enthroning Yahweh as supreme. So it came to be recognised that Israel's god was the only true god. But was he interested in the other nations of the earth apart from their relation to Israel? The answer to this question is afforded by the further development of the idea of Yahweh as ruler of the peoples and as universal in moral government though peculiarly interested in Israel. The practical side of this movement towards universality is illustrated in the prophecies of Amos against six non-Israelite peoples. Though these nations had no immediate revelations of Yahweh and consequently their responsibility was not so great, their conduct was judged by Yahweh's standard which was considered universal. Subsequently the Babylonish captivity did much to broaden the views of the Israelites in this respect, through the conception which it introduced of Yahweh's using other nations as instruments for the execution of his will upon his people. If God could use Cyrus, for instance, and the world-wide events of his reign, as instruments for the restoration after correction, of his people, was he not then in truth the ruler of princes? The conclusions to which the Hebrew thinker came on this point are put into the form of an acknowledgement (in the book of Daniel) by Nebuchadnezzar of the sovereignty of (the Most High...him that liveth for ever...His dominion is an everlasting dominion...he doeth according to his will among the 1. Jer. 11. 11. 2. Jer. 11. 28.
inhabitants of the earth and none can stay his hand. When this is put into the mouth of a Gentile despot it is clear that the conception is attained of the universal undisputed rule of one God. The way has therefore gradually broadened for the recognition of one universal moral standard for all peoples.

3. Spiritualizing of conception of Yahweh

Other processes however had been at work collaterally with that of unification. We can discover from the actual data afforded by Israel's history how the spiritualizing and moralizing of the conception of the Divine Being corresponding to the development of an inward and lofty moral standard, accompanies the unification and universalizing of that conception. The original nature of the Hebrew national god, Yahweh, was probably principally that of a storm god and his worship specially

1. Daniel IV. 34-36.

2. If we take the original character of Yahweh to be that of a Storm-God, light is thrown on a number of passages in the Old Testament. For instance in the oldest extant fragment of Hebrew literature, the song of Deborah, we find the following passage:

Lord when thou wentest forth out of Seir when thou markest out of the field of Edom.
The earth trembled, the heavens also dropped,
Yea the clouds dropped water.
The mountains flowed down at the presence of the Lord
Even you Sinai at the presence of the Lord the God of Israel

In connection with the conception of Yahweh as a mountain God, the passage in 1. Kings XX. 25 is interesting 'the servants of the king of Syria said unto him, their God is a God of the hills; therefore they were stronger than we, but let us fight them in the plain and surely we shall be stronger than they'. Some authorities hold that Semitic deities were never confined to one department of nature. But this would not prevent a god from having a pronounced naturalistic aspect to his character.
associated perhaps in consequence of the storm aspect of his character, with mountainous districts. The problem is how this crude naturalistic theology could develop into the lofty spiritual conception of God which existed in Judaism in the time of Christ. The adoption of Yahweh as the God of Deliverance and of covenant by Israel was a great step in this direction. That adoption may quite possibly have been simultaneous with the adoption of the name and certain elements of the nature of Yahweh, the stormy god of Sinai, and the resemblance of the Israelitish conception to the original naturalistic idea may have been in superficial detail only. However this may have been the idea of Yahweh as presiding over the whole destiny and life of the nation was no inconsiderable step towards a spiritual conception. Nevertheless a long time elapsed before these possibilities were realized. The process of spiritualizing the idea of Yahweh after its partial liberation from naturalistic elements is illustrated in the war of the prophets against images. The teraphim, though their exact nature is a matter of controversy, may probably be regarded as images of Yahweh, as also the golden calves of Jeroboam. Perhaps the ephod mentioned in Judges (VIII. 26) may be interpreted in this light also. The disapproval of any image of the redactor of Judges is shown in his comments 'all Israel went a whoring after it, and it became a snare unto Gideon and unto his house'. The final triumph of the spiritual conception of Yahweh is illustrated by both Isaiah and Jeremiah. Jeremiah writes 'Am I a god at hand, saith the Lord, and not a god afar off? Do not I fill
Isaiah refers to the use of images made by goldsmiths and workmen and asks 'To whom then will ye liken God and with what likeness will ye compare Him?---Have ye not known? Have ye not heard?---It is He that sitteth that on the circle of the earth---that stretcheth out the heavens as a curtain? We find here the idea of Yahweh not only as a spiritual presence in his temple, but as a spiritual presence throughout the universe. One more step, and the process was complete. That presence must be found within the human heart. The captivity was probably the instrument in bringing this idea into the Hebrew mind. The idea of God as the transcendent God of the universe is unsatisfying alone. The Jew had enjoyed a closer association with Yahweh through the temple worship. In Babylon this communion was no longer possible. The exile was thrown in upon his own heart and therein he found the voice and presence of the God of Zion. The religious consciousness of the Jew survived the shock of the destruction of the Holy City, and was found therefore to centre itself elsewhere, for God must never be thought of as utterly forsaking his people. So in the Isaiah of the exile we find the sublime thought, 'Thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy; I dwell in the high and holy place, (but) with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit.'


Finally we must notice how collaterally with the unification and spiritualizing of the idea of Yahweh there had come about the gradual moralizing of the conception of his

2. Isaiah XL. 18-22.
3. Isaiah LVII. 15.
nature. This had also probably its origin in the covenant relationship. The God of Israel was a champion of the weak against the strong, of the oppressed against the Egyptian oppressor, so his character was stamped from the first with the character of elementary justice, as the ideal organizer of a new-born nation through the instrumentality of his servant Moses, he would be recognized as the god of social order and of law. The character of deliverer attributed to Yahweh had also a further implication. The simple idea embodied in the title, 'the chosen people' was that Yahweh had chosen them, not vice versa. He was a god therefore with great claims. He had sanctified a people unto himself. All their duty was to him. A certain amount of that duty was covered by the ritualistic and elementary social law, which was considered as expressive of the divine will. A large amount of conduct however in daily life which would come under the clear jurisdiction by the moral consciousness was not included. Two tendencies exhibited themselves in consequence; one, detrimental to morality, was to consider the whole extent of duty exhausted when the religious codified law had been satisfied in letter; the other was for the moral consciousness to claim the religious sanction for all its pronouncements. This was the movement specially represented by the prophets. The idea of complete obedience and sanctity of life moved in the minds of the truly inspired and led them to give a lofty moral content and scope to the will of Yahweh and then to announce moral precepts to the people as possessing the peculiarly tremendous force of divine commands. Thus the
general moral consciousness gained from the elevation of the religious consciousness which in its term had been uplifted by the higher moral consciousness of the few. Had the prophets preached their ethical precepts the response would probably have been 'we do the will of Yahweh according to the customs of our religion? What more?' Whereas presented as Divine commands these precepts were an appeal to the religious nature of a naturally intensely religious people.

A real difficulty in the process of the moralization of the Jewish idea of God found its metaphysical embodiment in the problem of the origin of evil. It must be remembered that the primary characteristic of Yahweh was his power and absoluteness. If then God were absolute must not all things, both good and evil, have their origin in him? If he disposes the heart must be not dispose it towards evil as well as towards good? We find indeed frequently this view in the Old Testament. It was Yahweh that hardened Pharaoh's heart in order that his power might be shown. It was he who put a lying spirit in the mouths of the prophets to entice Ahab to his doom. It is difficult to determine the time or manner of the change of view. We suggest that one line of change was brought about by the gradual differentiation between evil and moral turpitude. We can tell from singularly persistent survival of the notion that temporal misfortune was the result of sin that probably in early times amongst the Jews, as amongst other nations, the idea of evil in circumstance had not been differentiated from the evil of heart. Yahweh would therefore be regarded as the author of each. When however the idea of evil circumstances

began to be separated from the other, the first stage of development was reached, where misfortune was regarded as the purely vengeful visitation of Yahweh, with no corrective purpose. Then, second stage to be attained would be that at which misfortune was regarded as a corrective instrument in the hands of Yahweh. Many passages could be quoted from the prophets of the exile to this effect as always from other writings subsequent to that period. The Babylonish captivity is without doubt largely accountable for this change of attitude. Such a change, however, implies a correlative one in the view of the relationship of Yahweh to sin. Thus the idea had arisen even before the captivity that God was 'of purer eyes than to behold evil...and to look on perverseness'.

This changed conception of the attitude and relationship of God to sin is perhaps best shewn in the changed conception of Divine forgiveness. Corresponding to the earlier stage were emphasis was placed upon the absoluteness of God's will, there is the notion of arbitrary forgiveness. 'I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious and will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy' was applied to the sphere of forgiveness and God is represented as being wrathful or 'repenting'...

1. Ezek. XX. 33 ff, Dan. XI. 55, Isaiah 1. 25. 4, etc.
2. Habakuk 1.13. (circ. B.C.626) see also many of the Psalms.
3. The idea of God as the source of evil in the sense of misfortune of course still prevailed in Hebrew thought, only the view of the 'uses of adversity' were changing. Thus in Isaiah 'I make peace and create evil saith the Lord' (Is.XLV. 7)

We must also be careful with the interpretation of such passage as Isaiah VI. 10. 'Make the heart of this people fat'. What is stated here as in kindred passages is the great law of moral deterioration and marks a very advanced stage of ethical insight. This truth is used by Christ himself (Matt.XII.14f) and is further developed by Paul in his epistle to the Romans.
himselves' as a despot might. Later the change of attitude is transferred from God to man. God is regarded as constant in justice and mercy and man as needing to repent. 'Let the wicked forsake his way and the unrighteous man his thought; and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy; and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon': out of this attitude of thought came one of the loftiest ethico-religious conceptions of Judaism, one which above all others found its culmination in Christian thought, viz. the idea of God as a moral redeemer; as calling His erring people back to himself by such means as would justify his righteousness, and ensure the morality of forgiveness. Side by side with this thought grew up that of redemptive suffering, though not as attached to God. Isaiah (2) for instance was possessed by the dawning idea that in some way suffering might be vicariously useful, and that the suffering servant of Yahweh might justify many. Whatever the view taken of the nature of prophecy, this famous passage must be regarded as an anticipation of the principle so vital to Christianity of redemptive work at the price of personal suffering, which is so important an element in any social theory of morals that recognises a man's efforts as contributive to the moral progress of others.

1. Exodus XXXII. 14, Judges 11. 18. 2. Samuel XXIV. 16. This may be regarded as passing into a figure of speech in the later prophets.
2. Is. LV. 7.
3. Side by side with this view of God we find other milder attributes obtaining recognition. Thus the change from theocratic despotism to fatherhood (See Psalm CIII. 13.—Like as a Father, etc.)
4. Isaiah XLIV. 21 ff., LXIII. 9. etc. The conception of redemption would only become freed from the idea of national temporal restoration in proportion as nationalist hopes were checked by political circumstance.
5. Is. LIII.
The results of the development of ethical monotheism in Hebrew thought may be summarised as follows: Yahweh was finally recognised as the sole ruler of the universe, as a spiritual and unlocalized presence, near to the hearts of his servants. His rule was regarded as absolutely just, and the larger and ethically even more valuable thought had emerged that he was loving and merciful, yet for the character consistently with his righteousness and that therefore he was labouring to bring his people, even through suffering to moral perfections in order that they might dwell in unbroken communion with him in Zion. The conception of worship had changed correspondingly. It was regarded not supremely as a matter of ceremony, as of the heart. The stage is passed when men washed away their sins with magic purges and swore them off with incantation formulas; passed too is the time when they bargained with a bull or a ram for freedom of action and indulgence. The ethical stage is reached where men conceive God as caring for neither gifts nor ceremonial adulation, but for repentance and change of heart. However much encumbered with religious and ceremonial legalism these conceptions may have been they were discovered by Judaism and were never again lost by it, and from them Christianity has taken much and fulfilled it.

Some considerable time has been spent over the theological development of Judaism, but this is inevitable in the study of the ethics of a theocentric system. Before the conception

1. See Hobhouse--Morals in Evolution Vol.2. Chap.IV.
2. Synagogue worship, being free from Temple ritual, and being a simple service of praise and prayer and meditation on the sacred writings was conducive to a more spiritualised conception of worship, and to the delocalization and spiritualizing of the conception of God.
of God, in a case such as that of the Jews, as become spiritual and ethical, morality cannot become inward and lofty for it is the reflection of the religious thought of the people.

Division 3--The content of Jewish ethics.

1. Development of Jewish ethics.

Having noted the development in character of the ethico-religious form 'the will of Yahweh' we must now consider the development of the content which Judaism gave to that form. The original material of Jewish morality which was wrought into the earliest Mosaic system would be the same as that existing among the Bedawin of today. Morality in its strictest sense of action upon a conscious principle was probably in its most embryonic stage and its place would be supplied by custom. 'It is not so done in our place' represents very fairly the norm at this stage of ethical development though it does not explain the particular content of custom. This content may be divided into two sections, religious customs and social customs. The origin of the former is complicated and obscure and includes many elements of ritual and sacrifice which had probably lost much of their original meaning. In the social side the code is somewhat easier to explain. It is a rough and ready adjustment of balance necessary for the preservation of social order. In the first place person and property must be regarded. Hence the custom of blood revenge (taken over and legalized by Mosaic code--'an eye for an eye, etc')

1. Obscure traces of human sacrifice are not wanting in a modified form e.g. the consecration of the male first-born.

See also Gen. XXII. 2. Judges XI. 34-40.
and the regard shown for the honour of the Virgin and married woman; the former being part of the property of the father, and the latter of the husband. Many other examples of the operation of early customs might be given but these will suffice to show the rule of cultus and social habit. This condition of things was not changed immediately upon the advent of the Mosaic era. The old forms were taken over, and in the case of cultus-forms given a deeper spiritual significance, while the Social forms were more and more defined and systematized with the growth of national organization, until the fully developed 'law of Moses' was arrived at. The covenant relationship stood for more in Jewish development than even the details of the law. It was the spirit that moved behind the latter. The central effect of the covenant was to produce a sense of unity through common religious obligations. The significance of this in a comparatively loose confederation of tribes was tremendous. It supplied the place of a fixed national unity and probably saved the federation from falling to pieces when its members dispersed after the entry into Canaan. Indeed out of it the national unity of the Jews grew in all its strength another important product of this religious confederation was the conception of a 'holy people'. In the first instance this term merely signified a separate people, distinguished by their worship of Yahweh. Since however it was the nature of the God whom they worshipped that separated them, the difference which constituted the connotation of the term 'Holy'

1. We may note here again the peculiarity of Jewish development. Usually the cultus and the social code tend to separate more and more as the latter takes the form of law, but this separation

Contd.
would alter with the development of the conception of that nature. On the side of religious relationship then, there was the moral concept of holiness. On the side of conduct, including both its religious and social aspect was the demand for righteousness because of this holiness. The covenant had of necessity its legal aspect, and its norms of conduct and obedience to these constituted righteousness. We arrive then at a third dominant concept involved in that of righteousness, viz. that of obedience. A detailed study of the Mosaic code would be superfluous for our purpose. It is sufficient to note the general principles of religious and social duty involved. The decalogue illustrates this division of duty into two sections. The first four commandments are relative to religious duty; the fifth comprises elements of religious duty and social obligation; the last five are occupied with the setting forth of exclusively social norms. This fairly represents the division which may be made in the rest of the law. This division is however not absolute. Social rules took religious forms and sanctions. This is illustrated by the association of certain duties, such as forgiveness of debt etc. with the religious celebration of the year of Jubilee. 1.

2. The place of this religious-national consciousness in the development of the idea of the Messianic kingdom and so of the Christian kingdom of Heaven will be noted throughout the course of Jewish ethical progress.

3. Not the original form of the decalogue but the version from the 'E' document given in Exodus XX.

4. Lev. XIII. 14—even hygienic rules took this form.

5. Lev. XXV.
The full development of the law was of course not accomplished until much later than the Mosaic epoch, but the germs of social and religious obligation together with the primitive forms of the ethical concept of holiness, righteousness, and obedience as the main element in human right conduct were present in the covenant relationship and the earliest rules of the Israelitish federation. We can pass quickly over the ethically unimportant period of the Judges, noting however how the religious unity of the Israelites managed to counteract the disintegrating tendencies of the dispersion of the tribes and to preserve the racial distinctness and therefore the possibilities of moral distinctness. We may also note the rise of the school of the prophets, probably of no great ethical value in the first instance but destined to develop into a class or religious order which had a great moral influence at a later period. It must be recognised however that though there were no outstanding features of moral development noticeable during the time of the Judges and the early kingdom, the advance if gradual must have been considerable. Passing over that period we come to the reign of Solomon during which an event took place which was of the utmost importance in the history of Israel, viz., the building of the temple; for around it developed the vast and elaborate system of ritual which bulked so largely in Jewish life. In its services the consciousness

1. Combining character of dervish and diviner with some sort of primitive priestly office. Note incident of Samuel and the Asses of Kish as illustrating divining function of the Seer.

2. See note p. 85. on Yahwehism.

3. See also action of Nathan mentioned p.
of an intensely religious people found its supreme expression. So largely did the religious duties which multiplied around it dominate their minds that later the balance was lost and the moral consciousness though outraged by the neglect of social righteousness and right conduct in life was silenced by minute attention to detailed ceremonial duties. It was to a nation carefully occupied with religious duty but in the grip of the immorality of a corrupt civilization that the message of the pre-exilic prophets was directed. With the increase of wealth there had arisen licentious luxury and social oppression, growing up by the side of an ornate temple worship. The prophets were not opposed to temple-worship though probably to the ritual, which had crept in unordained by priestly usage. They were however above all things opposed to the co-existence of vice-perfunctory religion and their great work was to give a truly moral content to the 'will of Yahweh'. The message of Amos to the 'chosen' people from their god was 'you only have I known of all the nations of the earth' but he draws and new and a startling conclusion--'therefore I will visit upon you all your iniquities' 1. 'This points to a new view of Yahweh's character. The most ornate ritual service is nothing to him when weighed against justice 'I hate, I despise your feasts...let judgment roll down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream', 'hate the evil, love the good, and establish judgement in the gate'.

1. Amos 111. 2.
3. Amos V. 15.
Isaiah appears with substantially the same message 'when ye come to appear before me, who hath required this at your hands, to trample my courts...when ye make your prayers I will not hear, for your hands are full of blood. Wash you, make you clean...cease to do evil, learn to do well; seek judgement, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow' In all these messages it is important to note the appeal from and against mere custom to a higher and more individual standard. An appeal like this last presupposes the directive influence of individual conscience but the virtues enumerated are still chiefly of social value. This intermixture of social with newer individual elements is noticeable in the interpretation placed on national adversity--it is because of national sin that national trouble arises, but that national sin lies in the national aggregate of individual licentiousness yet calls for national repentance. Suggestions are not wanting of a possible future emphasis upon purity of heart as the desire of Yahweh, but this stage is not yet quite attained.

Some improvement in the national morals seems to have resulted upon the work of the earlier prophets. The most promising movement was the Deuteromomic revival in Josiah's reign. This was chiefly a reform of religious worship, though it included the removal of social evils such as slavery for debt and land monopoly in accordance with the Mosaic law. The reform was

1. Isaiah 1. 12,17.
2. 2 Kings XXII ff.
however superficial only. The worship was altered; the conception of the will of the Being worshipped remained the same. More drastic events were required to alter this state of affairs. Exact observance such as that of circumcision is useless unless the people 'circumcise the foreskin of the heart'. Nothing short of the rending away of the worship of the temple out of their life by the Babylon conquest could alter the idea of the Jews that God would never forsake Jerusalem whatever its moral foulness. We saw that the captivity brought about a great change in the conception of Yahweh. It also and indeed in consequence brought about a change in morality. Corresponding to the spiritualising of the former is the inwardizing of the latter. The wicked is to 'forsake his way' and 'the unrighteous man his thoughts'. The last word in this message of a prophet of the return shows the change towards inwardness. 'The heart of the contrite', 'forwardness in the way of heart' etc. are all phrases occurring in the same prophecy. This increased inwardness led inevitably to a wider conception of the range of moral government. Thus the prophecy by Isaiah closes with the promise of Yahweh, 'the time cometh that I will gather all nations and tongues, and they shall come and see my glory; and there shall be new heavens and a new earth' yet this kingdom of peace is to have its centre in Zion. During the exile there had arisen naturally, stimulated by the prophets the hope of the restoration

2. Isaiah LVII.
of a purified Israel to the glories of a renewal of the Davidic kingdom. This prospect had been enlarged and glorified by prophetic imagination and rhetoric into something more than a mere revival of nationalism. There was a picture of the golden age when God should dispense through Zion mercy and peace to all the nations. Sometimes it takes a more primitive form, as in Zechariah 1.

'In those days it shall come to pass that ten men shall take hold out of all the languages of the nations shall even take hold of the skirt of him that is a Jew, saying, we will go with you, for we have heard that God is with you'. At other times it takes a more frankly universalistic form 'he shall judge between the nations and shall reprove many peoples...nations shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more '. Thus arose in its various forms from narrowness to universality the conception of the Messianic kingdom. In this connection a further problem arose for the prophetic mind. Were those who had earnestly looked for this consummation and who had perhaps laid down their lives for the nation to be denied participation in this theocracy of the future? No. God has still a greater mercy for Israel 'They dead shall live' Again, in the book of Daniel we find the seeds of the idea of a more mystic kingdom which should be eternal and shared by

2. Is. 11. 4—regarded by many as a post-exilic passage. See also Ps. LXXII. 11,12. Isaiah LXV. 22,23.
4. Psalm ClVv. 15.

89.
the living and the resurrected. This is of supreme ethical importance since it represents an ideal of a perfected society, and an ideal in which each individual though mortal, has a personal interest. It is however, still an external kingdom, a definite future community idealized, but at the same time materialized. It is however the germ-concept of the Christian idea of the kingdom which is within and without.

After commerce with ideas of such great ethical possibility the trend of thought after the return from Babylon is somewhat disappointing. The conditions of the return were unfavourable to the higher development of these concepts and ethical thought takes a definite trend in the direction of particularistic nomism. The little company of Jews, no longer divided from the rest of the world by political barriers, and dwelling amongst the other Palestinian settlers, were afraid of being merged and lost in the greater world. The resulting tendency was to lay emphasis on the external aspect of holiness or 'separateness' and to translate it in terms of national exclusiveness. Moral enthusiasm and pietism checked in their universalistic development were turned into the channels of ceremonial observance. This gave opportunity for the revival of old abuses in the moral sphere. That such was the case is suggested by such passages as Zechariah 7:9ff. and certainly Malachi found it necessary to argue against the supposition that Yahweh delights in his people in spite of their moral delinquencies. These historical circumstances are sufficient to

1. It must not be supposed that there was a return after the restoration to the state of affairs against which the earlier prophets had inveighed. The conception of religion which they declared was a non-moral one, and belonged to God, also the ritual against which they protested was probably pagan ritual borrowed against from the Canaanites (See Isaiah 2:6) whereas the particularism of the Pharisee of post-exilic times did at least spring from religious and moral (though perverted) enthusiasm.

2. Malachi 3:10 ff. 90.
explain the nature of the contents of the books of Ezra and Nehemiah. The first event of note after the restoration, was a ritualistic revival. The book of the law was read and interpreted to the people. Coupled with this revival was the strenuous enforcement of national exclusiveness. We find Ezra mourning deeply for the sins of the people, but that sin was only that they had not 'separated themselves from the peoples of the lands'.

Attention seems to have been devoted too exclusively to ceremonial observance for it is recorded that the rich had taken advantage of poor harvests, and the poor had mortgaged their fields and vineyards and houses, and even their children and persons for food. The class tyranny and oppression which had characterized the kingdom before the exile was growing up again. The priests and even Nehemiah himself seem to have been concerned in it. This abuse was however summarily corrected but that it should have arisen is disappointing. The broader universalism, the

1. Nehemiah 5:1-15
   Ezra 8:35; Nehemiah 8

2. Ezra 9:17


Cont.
the purified conception of social duty and justice as the will of Yahweh, seem to have been lost under an overwhelming recrudescence of formalism and nomism. The loss was however only apparent. These broader conceptions once arrived at do not disappear completely. We shall find them returning in altered form, in some cases combined with elements of legalism, in the ethical thought of the second and first centuries before Christ.

2. The ethical thought of the second and first centuries B.C.

In order to bridge the gulf between the Old Testament and the New it is necessary to turn to Jewish Apocryphal literature. The material thus provided is extremely important since it affords us an immediate insight into the ethical atmosphere of Judaism at the time of Christ. The narrowing tendencies of national separatism manifested in the restoration period, only relieved by occasional gleams of the earlier universalism, could not entirely prevent the in-pouring of foreign influences into Judaism. Palestine was under the dominion of the Persian empire, which gave way at the beginning of the third century B.C. to the Greek rule. For three centuries Greek ideas were quietly interpenetrating Jewish thought, and their influence was strengthened by the Hellenizing of many of the Jews of the dispersion; while from the outside at least one attempt was made deliberately to hellenize Palestine by Antiochus Epiphanes, which attempt was the immediate cause of the Maccabean revolt. Probably there
were Greek schools even in Jerusalem before this time. At Alexandria there was a large Jewish colony in the midst of which there grew up a school of thought, which whilst retaining a zeal for the things of the law, possessed under the influence of Greek thought, a wider outlook than that of the thinkers of Palestine. The attitude of thought of the former school illustrates admirably the trite phrase—'Philosophy is the handmaiden of theology'—they used Greek ideas not to supplant but to supplement and enlarge their Judaistic faith. The importance of this school of thought in the movement towards breaking the bounds of Jewish particularism can hardly be exaggerated. It was a definite attempt to attain by reconciliation and synthesis a unity of all truth. Its thought was characterised by spirituality and breadth. Emphasis is placed on purity of heart rather than upon the measure of obedience to outward law. The influence of Greek thought is distinctly traceable in its literature. There is something of an approach to the Platonic identification of virtue and knowledge couched in religious terms in the statement, 'to be acquainted with thee is perfect righteousness'. There is also something akin to both the Stoic Doctrine of universal reason and the Platonic doctrine of the 'sun' and the pattern of the Idea, the in the passage. 'Wisdom pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her pureness, for she is a breath of the power of God, and a clear effulgence of the glory of the Almighty;

1. Wisdom 1. 4-5
2. Repub. Bk. VI.
3. Timaeus.

92.
...an effulgence from everlasting light, and an unspotted image of the working of God, and an image of his goodness, and she being one hath power to do all things: and remaining in herself, reneweth all things. Here evidently is the first mingling of the waters of the two great streams whose courses we have been tracing. On the other hand we have the Palestinian literature of narrower Judaism. This may be divided into two sections of thought, the one represented by the Chasidim or Pharisees and the other by the Sadducees. The former held to the strictness of the law and the oral tradition which had grown up around it; the latter were by no means so particularistic and exclusive in attitude, and while they accepted the law, they rejected the oral expansions. The revolt of the Maccabees (168-165 B.C.) carried with it a strong element of reaction towards the Pharisaic position, largely because of the national enthusiasm manifested in the latter. Most of the literature of Palestinism Judaism is Pharisaic in character, but there is a tendency towards greater breadth manifest in much of it, and a certain revolt against the narrower legalistic and exclusive bounds. We shall now proceed to examine some of the ethical ideals set forth in the literature of these two centuries immediately preceding the Christian era. The first idea in order of prominence is that of Wisdom. It is first set forth in the Book of

The precise theological significance of wisdom is difficult to

1. Wisdom VII. 24-27. For other passages akin to Stoic thought see 8', 13 (as showing a modification akin to the Stoic correction of a Platonic view of the involuntariness of vice.)
determine but is ethically important because of the place
which communion with the Divine was destined to occupy as a
moral end. Some authorities have regarded it as a separate exis-
tence outside Yahweh, anticipatory of Trinitarian conceptions.
This could only be explained by reference to strong Greek
influences, Greek philosophy recognizing archetypes of things
as having a separate existence of their own. Other authorities
hold that the personification of Wisdom is purely poetic.
At all events we cannot posit more than parallelism between
Greek and Jewish thought. Wisdom is divided into two distinct
grades, somewhat reminiscent of Aristotle's division of the
virtues, but probably only presenting a coincidence of
thought. The highest grade is contemplative and belongs
to the scribe who meditates in the law, the lower is the
practical wisdom of the artificer which is nevertheless
valuable in its place. There is a great distinction however
between the Greek attitude of mind and that of Jesus the Son
of Sirach. There is not the self-sufficiency and pride in the
ideal of the latter that is found in the High-minded man of
Aristotle or in the Stoic Wise Man. His self-sufficiency
is tempered with humility and penitence. This ideal is nearer
to that of Christ than to that of Greek thought. Indeed when we
come to enquire into the nature of wisdom we find that it is
interpreted in terms of religion. 'To fear the Lord is the ful-
ness of wisdom'. It includes faith and meekness, 'The fear
of the Lord is wisdom and instruction; and in faith and

1. For hypostatization Siegfried. Against Nowack, Kuenen, Bandi
2. Ecclesiasticus 38. 24 ff.
3. Nic. Eth. 4.1V. Magnanimity—a true and high estimate of one-
5. " 1. 16. See also 1. 14, 1.20,19,20,21,3.
1. Meekness is his good pleasure, and involves righteousness. This righteousness is interpreted in terms of the Law. Wisdom it is held finds its highest embodiment in the Mosaic law. We are thus brought back again within the bounds of legalism, but this legalism is relieved by a gleam of higher universalism. Wisdom saith 'In every people and nation I got a possession'. As we shall see later, the whole of this view suggests elements in Paul's view of the Law set forth in the epistle to the Romans. Before leaving this consideration of the ideal of Wisdom, we must take note of the later Alexandrian treatment of it in the Book of Wisdom. Therein the idea of Wisdom is comparable to the creative Λόγος of John's gospel, which is 'with God', and is much more hypostatized than the Wisdom of Sirach. It further suggests the organizing of Anaxagoras — Πάντα Χειραποτι κα τ ομοίω το Νόος ελάβε Λυτική τεκλήψιμος. This Wisdom is universally accessible to those that seek and love her. Universality and inwardness, love and attitude of heart are the chief factors in the thought of this book. Wisdom has fellowship with uprightness of soul alone. Universality is the tone of the passage 'Thou hast mercy on all men...and thou overlookest the sins of men that they may repent'. "Thou sparest all things, because they are thine. O Sovereign Lord, Thou lover of men's lives: FOR THINE INCORRUPTIBLE SPIRIT IS IN ALL THINGS. There is almost an echo of Stoicism in this last clause. This attitude of God

7. " 1125.
8. " 1222.
95.
has a counterpart in philanthropy on the part of men. 'The righteous must be a lover of man' 1. In this book however Wisdom still consists chiefly in obedience to Mosaic law, yet Israel is not the sole end of God in his gift of the law; she is to be the channel whereby 'the incorruptible light of the law is to be given to the race of men' 3. The teaching of the Book of Wisdom may be summarized as follows: Salvation, which is open to all men, is to be found in fellowship through Wisdom with God. This doctrine stands in contrast with the ordinary view of justification as attained through the works of the law. We have passed from the conception of conduct as moral in the isolated deed to the conception of moral conduct as the expression of an inner life.

In dealing with Wisdom we have already come upon the conception of righteousness, for wisdom is regarded not as merely intellectual but as moral also. Righteousness, we saw, was defined in terms of obedience to the Law, since highest wisdom is embodied in that Law. Ethiopian Enoch, for instance, states that righteousness consists in obedience to God's command In Jubilees it takes the narrower form of ceremonial observance, and shows traces of exclusiveness. There is to be found its relationship to the old ideal of holiness. Because Israel is a holy nation certain outward observances are ordained as signs of their 'election'. Obedience, however, is to spring from love to God--'Love the God of heaven, and cleave ye to his commandments' 7—and there is to be found in this book the passage, parallel to that quoted by James in support of the

Christian doctrine of righteousness through faith. Abraham believed in the Lord and it was counted to him for righteousness. The conception of salvation by faith is much further developed in 11 Esdras (31-96 A.D.) The writer of this book foresees that if the basis of judgment is the law, few will be saved. Then he turns to God and prays: 'O Lord, Thy righteousness and Thy goodness shall be declared, if Thou be merciful unto them that have no store of good works.' Good works will save those that have them, but faith will save those that have not. This is so far akin to the Christian doctrine of justification by faith and Divine forgiveness involving as it does a morality of the heart rather than of the act.

A further approach to Christianity is found in the doctrine of love to God and one's neighbour. In the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs these two aspects of the moral life are linked together for the first time. 'Love the Lord through all your life and one another with a true heart.' Judging from the breadth of outlook of the writer we may even interpret neighbours in a non-racial sense. Love for one's neighbour is regarded as a redemption value. Emphasis is placed too on purity of heart and motion. 'Let all your works be done in order with good intent in the fear of God.' The negative side

1. 2. Esdras XI. 137-140. 6. Test. Gad. IV. 7.
2. 2 " VII. 36. 7. " Naph. II. 9.
3. 2 " IX. 7.
5. See such passages as T. Isath VII. 5. T. Zeb. VII. 2 ff.
of this view is found in the doctrine of evil that held sway at the time. Evil was regarded having its root in the nature and disposition of man. Sirach holds the evil inclination (yezer hara) of man to have been placed there by God but to be conquerable by attention to the law. The evil heart is a universal fact. Sin lies in 'the store-places of the heart'. It may be suggested that the evil inclination of the heart being part of human nature, has no relation to the will and does not involve moral responsibility; but this is not the view of the son of Sirach—'Say not my transgression is from the Lord, for that which he hateth he made not... Wickedness and an abomination the Lord hateth; and will not let it befall them that fear Him...If thou choose thou mayest keep the commandments. That is to say man is disposed to evil; he is led into temptation, but his will is free. Together with this deepening of ethical content in Jewish literature there had necessarily come about a greater breadth of application. Thus, in the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs it is said that the law was given for to lighten every man. Israel is to be the agent for universal redemption. The best expressions of this universalism are to be found in the idea of the Messianic kingdom. This hope was brought into prominence by the despair induced by the tightening of the foreign yoke, first of the

1. Ecclesiasticus (Syriac) XXI. 11.
2. Test. Lev. 11 3 f.
3. Enoch. LIII. 3.
4. 2 Esdras 1 V. 45 ff.
5. Eccles. XV. 11, 13, 15. (Hebrew version)
Persian then of the Greek (332 B.C.), and then of the Roman (63 B.C.) upon the neck of Judaism. The keeping of the law had failed to save Israel from the foreigner and accordingly the hope which had been derived thence was gradually transferred to a type of ethical-political kingdom. Herein is embodied the narrowest view of the Messianic age, viz, that of a kingdom to be brought in by political revolution. But the hopelessness of means of force against the oppressor drove the Jew forward to the hope of a kingdom established by the moral power of the Messiah, but still brought about not by inward moral growth but by external conquest. The stage of transition is reached where Israel is regarded as elected to be the Saviour of the nations. The gracious influences of her age of peace will flow to all the nations. 'Many nations shall come from far to the people with whom God dwells. Finally we have the truly universalistic conception of an all-embracing ethical kingdom. This is found distinct from the expectation of a Messiah. Indeed the book of Enoch contains side by side both that idea and the idea of a Messianic age when the hostile Gentiles shall be destroyed. Again in the Similitudes of Enoch is found the thought of a divine Messiah who will establish a universal kingdom of righteousness and execute judgement upon all. This kingdom is not altogether a material kingdom for the resurrected will participate in it. Here, then, are three distinct views but in the midst of so many shades of opinion and hope one thing stands out clearly.

1. Tobit XII. 11.
If there is to be a Messiah, he is to conquer by the force of moral personality and the highest hope is of a kingdom of universal righteousness. All this is very important as anticipatory of the advent of one who should claim to rule men by the force of moral personality, and who should proclaim a kingdom 'not of this world' but of purity and righteousness in the hearts of men, knitting them together in universal brotherhood by the bonds of love.

For the sake of greater clearness it will be well to recapitulate the results of the foregoing study of Jewish ethical development. We have seen, first of all, how the idea of God had developed into that of the universal moral ruler, not vindictively just nor yet morally lenient but desirous of reclaiming man and redemptive in purpose. The moral ideal of mankind had of necessity developed collaterally. The Man always embodies his ideals in his gods. The meaning of moral action had passed through various stages from obedience to custom, and obedience to the external standard of the law, to obedience to the moral commands which, though perhaps not definitely traced to their source in the moral consciousness cannot be conceived to have any other origin; and finally it had been recognised as a matter of purity of heart and intention. The morality of legal performance had given way to the morality of right acts and finally to the morality of the heart. Holiness came to be regarded as involving righteousness, which in its turn was gradually interpreted in terms of the inner life, thus transferring the formal idea from the ceremonial to the spiritual sphere, and so from narrow national exclusive-
ness to life and conduct. Brotherhood was breaking bounds of mere nationalism, and a kingdom of ethical purity inclusive of all men was anticipated. These were the tendencies of loftiest thought of Judaism but the average moral consciousness failed to attain to them, the chief virtue was still obedience to the law and the tradition, and the hope of the future was still of a temporal kingdom when Christ was born. 'Wilt thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?' men asked of him.—But the best is never lost. To understand the magnitude of the work of Judaism in the ethical progress of the world we must view its loftiest results as gathered up and fulfilled in Christianity.
Note Division 3.

Chronological list of books quoted under the title of Jewish Apocryphal literature.

a) Palestinian.

190-170 B.C. Sirach (Ecclesiasticus) ... pp. q4, q5, q8
Before 170 B.C. Ethiop. Enoch (Ch. 1-36) ....... pp. q9
166-161 B.C. Ethiop. Enoch (Ch. 85-90) ....... pp. q6, q9
150-100 B.C. Tobit ........................................ pp. q9
135-105 B.C. Jubilees ...................................... q6
109-106 B.C. Testament of Patriarchs ... pp. q7, q8, q9
94-97 B.C. ) Ethiop Enoch (Ch. 37-70) ....... pp. q8, q9
70-64 B.C. )
81-96 A.D. 2. Esdras (IV Esra) ....................... pp. q7, q8

c) Alexandrian.

50-1 B.C. Wisdom ........................................... pp. q2, q3, q5, q6
CHAPTER IV.

Argument. The teaching of the New Testament must be regarded historically as a growth within Judaism and therefore as continuous with it and embodying a great part of its results. The ethical aspect of the New Testament teaching may be divided into two portions, the first comprising the immediate ethical teaching of Christ and representing the further extension of the broadening and deepening tendencies that had been at work in Judaism in revolt against the narrower Rabbinism; the second comprising the ethical implications of an interpretation of the meaning and significance of Christ's person and of the ethical religious relationships into which man is conceived of as entering with God through him. These relationships may be considered to be an expansion of the theistic relationships, together with the influence of Christ's personality, and modifications in the direction of quasi-pantheism, probably due to the indirect influence of Greek thought. The total result of this second aspect of New Testament thought in the sphere of ethics is the presentation of an ideal, sanctioned religiously by its interpretation as the life lived by God in the flesh and made clearer by the doctrine of atonement in the conception of sin; and second the presentation of the end of the communion and the unity of life with the Divine life, whereby the Divine ideal and purpose, realises itself in and through the individual, and, because of the unity of the Spirit in each believer, in and through the whole body of believers, which Paul speaks
of as the body of Christ.

CHAPTER IV.

The Ethical Teaching of the New Testament and its relation to Jewish Ethics.

The ethical teaching of the New Testament may be divided broadly into two sections. Under the first division will be subsumed the immediate teaching with regard to conduct, while the second will embrace the ethical implications of the religious teaching of Christianity. It must not be assumed however, that this analysis corresponds to any exact division in actual fact. The simple duties and attitudes of heart are always related to motives supplied from the religious consciousness, but there is still a large body of teaching which relates primarily to practical morality, reinforced by religious motive rather than to theology and ethical deductions therefrom. The difference may seem to be one of method of approach rather than of essential character. It is true that in Christianity the ethical and religious motives are so fixed that a separation would be at best artificial, but some division in matter is necessary for historical study because the progress made by Christianity lies in two directions. On one hand Christianity took up a large portion of the practical results of moral evolution, and brought into full light the principles embodied therein, the revivifying and invigorating them. On this side its relation to Judaism is most apparent. Its teaching is a continuation of the processes which had been at work in the development of Jewish ethics. On the other hand it must

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be recognised that Christianity is primarily a religion and not a system of ethics. The essential feature is not an attitude towards moral principles but towards a moral Personality. The central object of the Christian consciousness was, from very early times, not the teaching of Christ, but Christ himself. The unique contribution of Christianity in the sphere of ethics was the moral impulse of its theology. Accordingly to do justice to the ethical influence of Christianity we must attend to the ethical implications of its theology. Here the divergence from Judaism is obviously wider than on the side of practical ethical precepts, but some points of contact are not wanting. Christian theism is immediately relation to Hebrew monotheism. The Christian idea of the fatherhood of God was the next step in the development of the Hebrew conception of the just and merciful One, and, as we have seen, indications of the former idea are not wanting in Jewish thought. It is upon the doctrine of Christ's person and offices that the wiseness of divergence from the genius of Judaism occurs. Here, however there is some historical continuity of the Jewish ideas of the Messiah, on the one hand, and the symbolism of sacrifice on the other. There are two aspects of ethical importance which must be noted in this distinctively Christian Doctrine. The first is the idea of the 'Christ' or Messiah as the moral redeemer of men and the founder of an ethic-religious kingdom. The second deals with the method of redemption. This aspect may be considered under a three-fold division. First Christ is regarded as the moral idea, second as making atonement for sin and third as an abiding personal presence, dynamic of life and conduct and so the source of power to realize the ideal that
he himself constitutes. This is the practical effect of the indwelling Christ. On the other side is the issue in the ethics of communion. This communion is variously regarded as the end of practice or as the means to conduct, and gives rise in consequence to two tendencies in the development of Christianity, the practical and the mystical. The whole of Christian ethics considered as embodied in a relation to a Person may be comprised under the title of the 'ethics of faith'. Thus while New Testament teaching shows a marked affinity with Judaism on the side of practical ethical doctrine and on the transcendental aspect of its theology and indeed even in the conception of atonement as an act, yet on the side of the doctrine of the immanent God and its ethical consequences, although an attempt may be made to demonstrate the presence of the germ of the doctrine of the Spirit in man in Jewish thought; it is considerably nearer to Greek thought. The reaction of this factor, which is at least akin to the product of Greek speculative thought upon the factor common to Christianity and Judaism, brought about a combination which united the strength of the philosophical atmosphere of the world of Greek thought with the strength of the practical morality and theism of Judaism; but we must refer a fuller consideration of this synthesis to a later chapter. We must now consider in more detail the actual ethical teaching of the

1. The results of attempts to prove the existence of anything but the strictest monotheism in Christian thought are extremely doubtful in value and rest glorification (quasi-apotheosis) of the Messiah.

2. Article on Ethics in Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels. (Hastings)
New Testament and in particular its relation to Jewish Thought.

1. The Ethical Teaching of Christ.

1. General nature of problem presented.

Johannes Weiss advances the question as to whether we can correctly speak of the ethics of Jesus at all. It is true as he points out that we cannot look for system in the sense either of orderliness or completeness in the Ethical teaching of Christ. It is a moral standard according to Weiss, created by a Personality in act and life, and elucidated in his teaching, that is the valuable element. Let this be granted without further argument; we are none the less justified in supposing that life to have been consistent, in systematizing its governing principles as embodied in the teaching of Christ. The second difficulty which Weiss touches upon is that the ethical ends and principles in Christ's teaching cannot be separated from the religious and that we can only speak of Moral Science when that abstraction is complete. We grant that Christ was in no sense comparable to a professor of moral philosophy but nevertheless we may legitimately examine the ethical principles which are interpreted by the religious consciousness as also the ethical deductions from the specific objects of the latter. Enough has already been said on the relation of religion and ethics to obviate the necessity for further comment here. All we wish to establish is that Christ's teaching being consistent in principle is amenable even on its religious side to systematization.

The second class of difficulties comprises those of historical criticism. Even when taking the gospels that are avowedly historical in purpose (the Synoptics) as the basis for
enquiry, it is difficult, it may be said, to separate the ethics of the Synoptists from the ethics of Christ and so to determine exactly the channels of the various influences that have moulded this section of the ethics of the New Testament. We cannot here enter into the question of the exact historicity of the narrative. The influence of the personal factor in the case of the historian is probably confinable to the selection of material. In any case, even if subsequent influences have modified the interpretation placed on parts of Christ's teaching, the resulting account is so far consistent that we may assume the record to be correct to be correct in essential points.

2. The Synoptic record.

We cannot rightly estimate the ethical teaching of Christ without giving some consideration of its relation to the Judaism of his day. A sufficiently clear view of this relation may indeed be derived from the teaching itself for it is formulated with at least a portion of the teaching of Judaism clearly in view, and consisted in an attack upon Rabbinism. It was not however primarily destructive in its nature and only assumed that character because of superior breadth of view. In considering Christ's teaching, under the aspect of and polemic against Pharisaism, we must note carefully the constituents element of the atmosphere of Judaism at this time. We have already noted the broadening processes in Jewish thought that had been represented by the prophets and some of the later apocryphal writers. With this movement of thought Christ is entirely in sympathy, indeed much of his positive ethical teaching may be regarded as historically continuous.
with it. Weiss recognises that the uniqueness of Christ does not lie in his teaching but in his personality, and draws attention to the importance of the factor of personality in progress. 'His ideas', he says 'are neither so novel or so revolutionary as to create a new world; but derive their procreative virtue from the fact that he made them his own, lived them, and died for them'. This broader atmosphere of thought co-existed with a pharisaic exactness of legal behaviour and in the case of Pharisees may be considered to have been the source of the 'soul' of practical moral earnestness which found its expression in the body of correctness of religious observance as well as in life and conduct. On the other hand with at least a section of the Rabbis this detailed nomism had checked the broader view and issued in religious moral and political narrowness. It was against this type of of rabbinism that we must consider Christ as directing his scathing criticisms, but we must also recognise he was the exponent of a simplified form of religion and morality than was expressed in Pharisaism at its best, and had more in common with the psalmists and prophets than with the levitical section of post-exilic thought.

Let us then first consider Christ's conflict with Rabbinism. His greatest quarrel was with the external legalism of the Pharisee, and its subversion to the justification of immoral practice. In the first place Christ states the utter indifference of externals in the sphere of character 'Perceive ye not that whatsoever goeth into the mouth passes into the belly and is cast out into the draught? But the things which proceed out of the mouth come forth out of the heart and they

1. Op. cit. 2
...But to eat with unwashed hands defileth not the man.\textsuperscript{1} Further he rebuketh inconsistency of life. 'Now do ye Pharisees cleanse the outside of a cup and of the platter; but your inward part is full of extortion and wickedness... ye tithe mint and every herb and pass over judgment and the love of God.'\textsuperscript{2} His condemnation was specially fierce when the literalism of the Pharisee not only took the place of morality but served as a cloak for positive wickedness'. Why do ye also transgress the commandments of God because of your tradition? For God said, Honour thy father and they mother... but ye say whosoever shall say to his father or mother, That therewith thou mightest have profitted by me is given to God, he shall not honour his father. And ye have made void the word of God because of your tradition.\textsuperscript{3} Christ's whole attitude towards the tradition of the elders is vastly different from his attention towards the law. He characterizes the former as the mere precepts of men,\textsuperscript{4} in contrast with the latter and the commandment of God. So far as the latter was concerned he regarded his teaching as the fulfillment of the law. 'Think not that I came to destroy the law or prophets; I came not to destroy but to fulfill... Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the law, till all things be accomplished.'\textsuperscript{5} This conception of fulfillment involved the recognition of the principles which lay beneath the law rather than attention to the details of the law. The place and value of the law is however fully recognised... 'Every scribe,
who hath been made a disciple to the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is a house-holder which bringeth forth out of his treasury things new and old,’ but the place assigned is very different from that which it occupied in the Pharisaic consciousness. The Pharisee regarded the law as the moral end and therefore exact fulfillment as the supreme virtue. Christ regarded it as the means to a higher end and even as a means to man's welfare. 'The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath’, marks a fundamental change of view. This is still further recognised by Christ when he claims that some of the law is adventitious, given at a certain stage in moral development and is superseded when a higher stage is reached. The laws of divorce were given because of man's 'hardness of heart', but the permission of law is contrary to the natural order of things. In short, Christ asserts a moral in place of a legal standard of conduct and a moral rather than a legal relationship to God. The spirit of the act (e.g. of forgiveness) is taught in place of the act itself. Love is taught as the fulfillment of the older relationship of obedience. Self-surrender is still emphasised but is transferred from detail to the whole. Thus the advance beyond Judaism lies in the complete emancipation of morality from external legalism. The end is no longer the law but the kingdom of God and his righteousness. Purity of heart supersedes obedience. As a result of this emancipation there is possible a complete synthesis between moral and religious ends and duties. Purity of heart and of vision,

conduct unto the least of men and behaviour towards God, are recognised as indissolubly joined. There is a further advance which as concerned with motive falls beneath the consideration of moral science, viz, that of dynamic of Christian morality provided by the personality of the Teacher which impressed itself upon the earliest Christian consciousness as peculiarly permanent in influence. It will however be better postpone the consideration of this point until we come to examine the ethical results of the interpretation of Christ's person.

The positive side of Christ's doctrine may be summed up under two great laws, the law of motive and practice and the law of love and self-denial. That is to say he asserted the essential and ultimate value of motive, on the one hand, and on the other hand characterized that motive and its implications. Here again, we cannot claim originality for Christ's teaching. We have noted in Jewish ethics the development of morality of motive, and it will be remembered that in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs the law of love had already been stated. In Christ's teaching however, these truths are not the product but the foundation. They are stated once for all as the fundamental principles of right action.

'Not every one that saith unto me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my father which is in heaven' is the positive assertion of the requirement of right action as opposed to empty profession. Conduct is necessarily the product of the heart -- 'a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit' -- therefore it must have reference

1. 5 Matt. XXV. 40.
not to details of performance but to the whole of life. The ultimate source of the morality of conduct is the heart, so sin is an attitude of heart. 'Every one that looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery...already in his heart'. The second great principle we name is that of love, and, coupled with it, the negative aspect, self-abnegation. This principle of love is the expression of an attitude of heart which is two-fold; on the one hand an attitude towards God, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God' on the other a social attitude; 'thou shalt love they neighbour as thyself'. Both these commandments were taken from the lips of a Pharisee according to the Lukan narrative, while the account of the interview with the young ruler given by Matthew pre-supposes the familiarity of the young man with the second of these commands. There is however, in the gospel teaching a more complete synthesis of the two aspects than is to be found in Jewish thought: 'Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren even these least, ye did it unto me'. The issue of love of God is not in detailed observance but in a freedom of self-expenditure. A condemnation is earned 'inasmuch as they did it not'. Love is conceived of as in itself the denial of the narrower bounds of self-sufficiency and self-interest. Thus we are brought face to face with the paradox of Christ's teaching 'He that findeth his life shall lose it and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it'. The attitude towards God is one of self-interest; towards man it is one of self-

4. See 1 on next page.
Thus the way is paved for the virtues of poverty of spirit, hunger and thirst after righteousness on the one hand, and meekness, mercifulness, compassion, peacemaking, and kindred virtues, and specially the virtue of service as self-expenditure on the other.

The true spring of this two-fold attitude of heart is to be found in the ethico-religious relationship established between man and God that of Son to Father. This view of the relationship of God to man is more fully developed than the Jewish idea which is found in the later Psalms and prophets. The reference in the Psalms which is most positive, 'He shall cry unto me thou art my father, my God'... refers either to the nation of the figure of David or else to an idealized conception of the Messiah. In Isaiah the fatherhood of God is a relationship to the nation as also in Jeremiah: There is an anticipation of the Christian extension of the idea in Ecclesiastes, 'O Lord, Father and Master of my life, abandon me not etc.......O Lord, Father and God of my life....' but in Christ's teaching this conception of Fatherhood of the individual is the essential element in the idea of God. We find there the fully developed idea of the universal Fatherhood of God. It is a personal relationship and therefore to be contrasted with the thinly veiled pantheism of Stoicism. It has two important results in directing the course of the ethics of individual life. On the one hand, it may be regarded as the

3. Isaiah LXIII. 16, 64, 8.
5. Eccles. XXIII. 1, 4.
source of the Christian ethics of communion. The idea of fatherhood is an invitation to an intimacy on the part of man. Again the contrast between Christianity as the product of the theistic system of Jewish theology, and Greek pantheism which takes a religious form in Neo-Platonism may be noted; the personal and almost anthropomorphic tendency of the former standing in opposition to the extreme mystic and impersonal communion of Neo-Platonic ecstasy. On the other hand the conception gave rise to a new ethic of forgiveness. We have noted that forgiveness which is 'reckoned as of grace' found place among the apocryphal writers alongside justification by works, but in Christianity the idea of mercifulness was taken up into the idea of fatherhood and regarded as a permanent attitude on the part of God. The incomparable parable of the prodigal son describes the waiting attitude of God which finds its highest expression in the full restoration of the prodigal immediately upon his return. It is instructive to note that via this theological relationship an ethical result had been arrived at comparable with the view of modern ethics that the righteousness of a man's character at a given time is not computed by a balance of acts; the moral law is not a sort of 'jus talionis' demanding the cancellation of part evil acts by good ones. It is the attitude of the total self that determines one's relation to the moral law i.e. theologically

1. We shall have to note however the influence of Greek thought on the Christian ideal of communion, particularly in the forth Gospel. But the interaction of Greek and Hebrew elements in Christian interpretation of the Divine fatherhood produced mutual modification.
speaking, repentance and faith are the requirements for change of character and relationship to God.

The universal fatherhood of God implies its necessary correlative universal brotherhood of man. On the religious side the sonship was extended from 'Israel' to 'man', therefore on the social side the fellowship was extended from compatriots to all men, and an attitude of universal charity was achieved. Moreover the ideal of an active love on the part of man, reinforced by the conception of Christ as the suffering son of God, induced an active love from man to man which issued in the ideal of service for others. 'He that is greatest among you shall be your servant'.

On examination of Christ's ethical teaching would be incomplete without a recognition not only of the social implications of his teaching concerning the individual life and actions but also of the universal aspect of his teaching. We have dealt with his teaching about character and conduct, we must now consider his teaching about the 'universe' of the laws he taught i.e. the Kingdom of Heaven. The relation of this idea to the Jewish idea of a Messianic kingdom presents an intricate problem. It is difficult to do equal justice to the similarities and to the essential differences. We must however, admit at least a superficial continuity of idea between the two. The title Christ is the equivalent of the Hebrew Messiah. Other messianic titles such as Son of David, King of the Jews, Emmanuel, etc., were appropriated to Christ, who himself

1. It will be noted later how that a tendency arose to narrow down the conception of brotherhood to the fellowship of believers. 2. Matt. XXIII. 11.
certainly assumed so far as we can make out the role of the Messiah, but the kingdom he proclaimed was widely different from the expected kingdom of the Hebrew's hope. The nearest approach to the latter is to be realized when the kingdom of heaven is considered in its extensive aspect. It is to be an inclusive spiritual kingdom determined in extent by acceptance of the rule of the principles formulated by Christ. It will be remembered that the highest conception of the Messianic kingdom was that of a universal rule of righteousness, a kingdom of moral suasion, not of force. The similarity between the idea of Christ and the Jewish idea, however, ends here. The Jewish hope was materialized and took the form of an expectation of a millenial age upon earth. Christ, on the other hand, emphatically declares that his kingdom is not of this world. Its intensive aspect claims first attention. 'The kingdom of God cometh not with observation, neither shall they say, Lo, here; or there! for lo, the kingdom of God is within you!' The parables of the treasure and the pearl emphasise this side of the view. The other side, viz the extensive aspect of the moral universal is taught in the parables of the drag-net and the mustard seed. The principles which are within have an objective value as laws of a moral universe which is larger than the individual. An illuminating parallel is to be found in the Stoic conception of the universal within and without. The complete spirituality of the kingdom

2. Mat. X111.44-46.
cannot be better illustrated than by the teaching concerning its method of influence in society. It is Christ says like the leaven which permeates the whole lump with its influence. It operates secretly like the growing of a seed. It is clear that the kingdom is nothing more nor less than the spiritual sphere of principles considered as universals. Probably the pure spirituality of the idea, and the great difference between it and the popular expectation of the coming kingdom constituted a difficulty in the way of the acceptance of the idea. Certainly it seems to have taken a secondary place in early Christian consciousness as compared with the ideas of the second advent and of the church. The former of these two ideas was more akin to the Jewish expectation of a messianic age while the latter constituted a visible counterpart to the invisible fellowship of those that accepted the kingdom in the heart. Both conceptions were however necessarily narrower and in a sense more akin to the Jewish idea than the conception of the spiritual kingdom of heaven.

We have seen that throughout the whole of Christ's teaching there exists a definite relationship to Judaism which, if we put aside the criticism of the degeneracy of a section of Pharisaism, is comparable to the relation of flower to bud. The law of motive is made supreme--purity of heart becomes central in the galaxy of moral requirements. The synthesis between religious and moral duty is ideally completed and the consummation of the evolution of an ethical theism is realized in the conception of a God who is perfectly moral and perfectly

2. Lk. 4:26-9.

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loving, and perfectly loving because perfectly moral. The universalistic implications of this theology are realized in practical brotherhood and in a spiritual universe of divine and moral rule. We must now turn to the consideration of the interpretation of Christ's personality. The first point to be considered is Christ's teaching concerning himself as interpreted by the author of the Fourth Gospel, writing, certainly under the influences of Greek thought, probably about 90 A.D.

Division 2. The ethics of the Fourth Gospel.

We shall not attempt here an exhaustive study of the details of the ethical teaching of Christ embodied in this Gospel. Indeed the author never professed to show Christ in a variety of human relationships or to give specimens of his teaching simply as such. He deals rather with the supreme question of who the Christ was. Thus his work may be regarded as occupying a place in the sphere of religious ethics comparable to that occupied by the metaphysic of morality, or say, for example, the theology of Plato in the sphere of philosophic ethics. We shall only endeavour to show the contribution to Christian Ethics which is specially the product of this standpoint, and will avoid as far as possible covering again the ground already dealt with in the examination of the Synoptics.

The problem of the affinities of this Gospel with contemporary thought is a point of great controversy. The extent to which Greek ideas have exerted a moulding influence upon its contents is a matter which we must postpone for fuller discussion. Some authorities fix the date considerably later (post. 100 A.D.). This gospel forms the connecting link between the synoptic records and the epistles, being a Christology in historical form.
its contents is a matter which we must postpone for fuller consideration to the following chapter. In this place we must be content with noting its undoubted relation to Jewish thought. That the author's attitude towards Judaism is Jewish in colouring must at least be recognised even by the few who deny that he himself was a Jew. The idea of the 'Chosen people' is present even in the prologue to the Gospel, Εἰς τὸ Καὶ ἣν Ἰλαθεν.κτο ἅ ὤκε ὀ ὀ τῷ Ἡ καρ τονον. The Jews were regarded as Christ's own possession, his own 'home', his own people. Salvation is of the Jews who enjoy a special revelation of God. The relation of this thought to later messianic ideas is so obvious as to require no further indication. Indeed one aspect of the main purpose of the gospel is to demonstrate Christ's fulfilment of Messianic expectations. Jewish history and prophecy is regarded as a purposive development towards Christ 'Your father Abraham rejoiced in the effort to see my day (ὤκα τςαη); and he saw it and was glad'. 'Had ye believed Moses ye would have believed me, for he wrote of me! The writer of the gospel records that by the well of Sycchar, Christ definitely claimed to be the Messiah. 'The woman saith unto him' I know that Messiah cometh (which is called Christ) when he is come he will declare unto us all things'. Jesus saith unto her 'I that speak unto thee am He'. The immediate

3. For full treatment see 'Criticism of Fourth Gospel' (Sanday) It would be out of place to debate here the historicity of the Gospel. We shall accept the record as the Author's interpretations of Christ.

1. John 1. 11.
2. 2 John IV. 22.
3. John Vlll. 56.
4. 2 John V. 46.

120.
line of connection with Jewish thought is therefore through the Messianic hope. Christ is regarded as the founder of the kingdom of ethical and spiritual sovereignty. The nature of the kingdom is demonstrated through an analysis of the significance of the King's person. If we are to accept John's account of the Samaritan woman's expectation as representing the higher expectations of the time, there is no tremendous disparity between the hope and the fulfilment, for the above passage shews that the hope was by no means merely of a material kingdom. The breadth too of the expectation is unique 'We have heard for ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Saviour of the world.'

Another and perhaps more debated line of connection with Jewish thought is through the interpretation of Christ's person given in the prologue to the Gospel. Traces of the Word-doctrine may be found in Jewish writings. The word of God was regarded as creative by the writer of one of the psalms, 'By the word of the Lord were the heavens made:' as also in Wisdom. 'Oh God...who madest all things by thy word', and in 2 Esdras 'As soon as thy word went forth the work was done'. The passage in which the word is most personified is in Wisdom XVIII. 15-16 but the personification is even more obviously poetical than that of 'Wisdom' itself. The only kinship is in the functions ascribed to the word. John's doctrine differs

1. John IV. 42. There seems to be no impossibility of accepting this as representing an actual hope in the minds of Jews and others. We have seen already the trend of Jewish thought in that direction.
2. Ps. XXXIII. 6.
3. 2 Esdr. VI. 73.

121.
from both the Jewish and the Philonic idea in the incarnation of the Word. This personified sunship and the second person of God is widely divided from the strictness of Jewish Monotheism on the one hand and from the dualism of Philo on the other, who regarded matter as evil and whose object was to remove God from contact with it. We have dwelt at some length on the Logos doctrine because in the statement 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us' we have the source of the synthesis between the ethics of practical conduct and the quasi-'theoretic' end of communion with God, the mystic idea of union with the spiritual Christ and through him with the Father. God, union with whom is the end of the ethics of mysticism (Neo-platonism) and contemplation of whom is the supreme end set forth by Academic and Peripatetic alike, comes down from the sphere of mere 'theoretic' function and enters the sphere of

...the Word had breath, and wrought
With human hands the creed of creeds
In loveliness of perfect deeds.

It is undoubtedly the doctrine of Incarnation that gave rise to the complete synthesis of the mystical and the practical which is inherent in New Testament teaching, though it has been neglected by later Christendom.

Before passing on to a more detailed examination of the ethical implications of Johannine Christology it will be well to note the 'anti-incarnation' universalism of the author. By this we mean the universalism which is not the result of his view of the redemptive work of the incarnate Christ but
which is really the product of the doctrine of his pre-existence, and function as the Divine Logos. He has appeared as the light to men, and in proportion to their light they are judged. Before any widespread dissemination of the gospel, Christ is declared to have said, 'Other sheep I have which are not of this fold'. The author further speaks of 'the children of God that are scattered abroad' and the phrase 'everyone that is of the truth' gains new meaning when correlated with these passages. We consider that there is quite sufficient in 'prospective' universalism of the gospel of universal redemption, when it is synthesized with the doctrine of pre-existing Word to account for this retrospective universalism; but it is interesting to place it alongside the idea in the passage in Ecclesiasticus (Wisdom loquitus). 'In every people and nation I got a possession', and other kindred passages in later Jewish literature.

We must now consider the ethics of the Christology of the fourth gospel. The prologue brings us immediately in contact with the function of Christ as truth, active and life giving, the true light which lighteth every man coming into the world, the Thought of God, incarnate, whose reception by men is the real source of salvation. This is the philosophic interpretation and summary of the Christology of the whole gospel. The gospel itself is an account in historical form of the way in which the Thought was expressed and the way in which it is to be received. The expansion of this idea leads us to the

2. John X. 16.
3. John VI. 52.

123.
method of salvation, belief in Christ. This belief is centered upon Christ crucified—'As Moses lifteth up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth may in him have eternal life.' The crucified Christ, to translate this truth into the terms of the prologue, is regarded as the supreme expression of the Thought of God. From the ethical standpoint the whole case turns upon the Johannine use of faith. We suggest that faith may be taken as a submission or obedience to the declaration of God's thought or word in Christ, and identification of oneself with the judgement of that declaration. In support of this view we would quote the regular phrase used in this gospel for 'belief on'. It is πίστευεν εἰς; εἰς being the normal preposition used to express identification with. Perhaps a more cogent argument is afforded by an antithesis made in the statement ὁ πίστευον εἰς τὸν ἴων ἤκακα ἐμοὶ ἐνίσχυεν· ὁ δὲ πεπέμβατο τῷ ἰων ὄψιν. Here πεπέμβατο is opposed to πίστευεν εἰς which indicates for the latter the meaning we have attached to it. We may associate this attitude of the total personality of man implied in faith with the teaching of the Gospel on the new birth. The latter is a striking figure which is taken to illustrate the complete change of life, which issues in an active 'living' of the will of God. 'If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know...!' The great result of the new birth is however,

1. John 111. 15.
2. See John 111. 16. Cf. Romans 4:3 (ἐλογίσθη ἐν δικαίωσεν) Construction εἰς for equivalency (so identification) common in LXX (Sanday)
3. John 111. 36. 124.
in the view of the author, the indwelling life of Christ in the believer. This is mystically described under various figures, the eating of the body, and the drinking of the blood, 

the spring of living water etc. The sharing of life has two sides: 'He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood abideth in me and I in him.' The abiding Christ is further illustrated by the figure of the vine. The abiding fellowship is through the Spirit. In this teaching we have at once the ethics of mysticism and the ethics of practice, a mystical fellowship and a moral dynamic obtained through union in Christ. It is important to give both these aspects full emphasis because therein lie the similarities and the differences that exist between the Christian view and the Jewish view on the one hand and the Greek on the other. The practical issue is akin to the practical nature of the Hebrew mind while the modified pantheism of the 'indwelling' is unlike Jewish theology and more akin to Greek thought, while the union between the practical and the mystical avoids the dualism in which the latter ended between 

and . On the one hand the abiding Christ is the supreme aim of Christian life, but the issue of this union is in fruit-bearing. 'He that abideth in me and I in him the same beareth much fruit...herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; so shall ye be my disciples...I chose you and appointed you that ye should go and bear fruit and that your fruit should abide.' So on the practical side fellowship

References:
3. The spirit of Christ and the abiding Christ seem to be interchangeable expressions.
4. John XV. 5-8-16.
issues in moral dynamic, while in the relation of the truth it brings clarity of vision. 'When he, the Spirit of Truth, is come, he shall guide you into all truth.'

Let us now summarise the results we have arrived at in our study of the Fourth Gospel. We have seen that the influence of Jewish thoughts must be taken into account in discussing the affinities of the Gospel with contemporary ideas, but there are wide differences from Judaism arising out of an interpretation of Christ's person and functions which indicate at least an indirect influence exerted by a hellenized atmosphere of thought. As regards the teaching of the gospel it will be found that though the standpoint is different the actual results arrived at are perfectly in harmony with the teaching of the Synoptics. Religion is of the heart. It is intensely spiritual. God is a spirit and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.' It is supremely ethical in that it demands a practical attitude of the will; a new birth of the heart: issuing in a life of service. 'If then the Lord and the Master have washed your feet, ye also ought to wash another's feet.' The theology of the fourth gospel is of high ethical value. God is taught as a Father and God of Love. The relation between God and man is the more ethical in that it is reciprocal and personal and active on God's side. It is ethical in purpose, being redemptive, It involves faith, that is an acceptance of and obedience to the revealed Thought of God: The end of life is union with the Father through the Spirit of the Son; not an ecstatic union with the Unmoved, but union

2. We have taken Thought as representing in modern parlance more the essential idea of λόγος than the term 'word' with its associate every-day usage does.
with what becomes a moral dynamic and active issue.

**Division 3 — Pauline Ethics.**

The ethics of the Pauline epistles form perhaps the most interesting part of the historical study of the influences that have moulded New Testament doctrine. Paul — 'circumcised the eighth day, of the stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, the Hebrew of Hebrews; as touching the law a Pharisee; as touching righteousness which is in the law, found blameless! — yet a Jew of Tarsus in Cilicia', (a seat of Greek learning ranking with Athens and Alexandria) — apostle to the Gentiles — surely in his work all the most varied influences of the cultured world of his day must find expression. Let us concentrate first on his attitude towards Judaism. His treatment is one of understanding; giving to the law its place, yet transcending the law. Consider then, his speech at Athens. Here also he could adapt himself to the views of his hearers. We are at present however chiefly concerned with his relation to Judaism, with which he regards Christianity as historically continuous. The fullest exposition of the relationship is to be found in the epistles to the Romans and the Galatians. The starting point of the description of this relationship is, in Romans, Paul's doctrine of Law. Three different usages of νόμος must be distinguished. The first is the usage with the article ὁ Νόμος, to indicate Mosaic law. The second is an ἀρθρος use which has reference to law in general which is not regarded as confined to the Jews but to be possessed by the Gentiles also. The third use is also an ἀρθρος that refers to the Mosaic law again, when the purpose is to concentrate attention upon the character of the Law as law. The general doctrine may be taken to be that there is a
revelation of law to all people, but that law is supremely revealed in the Mosaic Law. The revelation of the Law to the Gentiles is through the conscience - ( ἔννοιατάκτω ) 'When the Gentiles which have (as you say) no law (μὴ νόμον ἔχουσι) do by nature the things of the Law (τὸ νόμον), these having (so you say) no law (νόμον μὴ ἔχουσι), are a law (νόμος) unto themselves, in that they show the work of the Law (τὸ νόμον) written in their hearts, their consciences bearing witness therewith and their thoughts one with another excusing or else accusing them'. 1. ἔννοια is a reflective faculty which pronounces one of past acts, not on the ideal presentation of causes of action. This suggests somewhat the older practical attitude of the Jew who judged sin rather by deeds done than by intention, but if there is any association with that attitude in the conception of consciousness it is merely a survival. 2. Paulin emphasises is normally upon the state of sinfulness, 3. rather than upon the acts. The place which Paul gives to law is well illustrated by his philosophy of history. 4. 'He divides history into three periods represented typically by Adam, Moses, Christ... Of these the first period represents a state not of innocence but of ignorance'.

'Until the Law i.e. from Adam to Moses, Sin was in the world:

2. One important argument for this position rests on the use of aorist by Paul, not in temporal sense but to denote completed action or state e.g. πίπτεις γὰρ ἡμετέρων καὶ ὑπεράντων τῆς
(Roman 3:23). - translatable 'All are sinners and come short ete compare ὑπεράντων in point of tense. ἢμετέρων. 2. This retrospective function of ἐννοεῖν) is probably more attributable to influence (See Ch.V) of Stoic conception.
3. Romans V. 12 ff.
but sin is not imputed when there is no law. It is a period which might be represented to us by the most degraded savage tribes. At this period guilt cannot be imputed. God deals with man in this condition by the Revelation of Law; in the case of Jewish people by the Revelation of the Mosaic Law. This revelation has convicted men of sin and by showing them their sinfulness and has pointed, with the finger of revealed need, to Christ.

Let us pause at this point to compare

Paul's doctrine of law with the doctrine of law found in later Jewish writings. The writer of the testament of Levi holds that the light of the law 'was given for to lighten every man'

In the Sibylline Oracles (c104 B.C.) the Mosaic Law is treated of as the supreme embodiment of the Moral Ideal, but the Gentiles are charged with 'transgressing the immortal God's pure law which they are under'. These passages, coupled with the view of Jesus the Son of Sirach that Wisdom has got a possession in all peoples, but is incarnated especially in the Mosaic law, will serve to show that Paul's view was by no means unknown in orthodox Judaism. The same may be stated of his view concerning the failure of man to attain righteousness by the law. In order to understand this failure we must know what Paul means by righteousness under the law. Here again his antiliteralism has correspondence with previous thought both in the prophets and the apocryphal writers. 'He is not a Jew which is one outwardly...but he is a Jew which is one inwardly: and circumcision is that of the Heart, in the spirit, not in the letter'.

Compare this for instance with

1. See Commentary on Romans (I.C.C.) Sanday and Headlam.
4. Rom. 11. 28-29.
Jeremiah's utterance 'Circumcise yourselves to the Lord and take away then foreskins of your heart'. The law has not only exposed the unrighteousness of the heart and failed to remove it but it has also worked towards moral degeneration. Disobedience has led to abandonment to lust. Paul indicates thus the common law of degeneration through persistence in exposed sin.

Works have failed, then, and the law has only emphasised that failure. We may note again the correspondence with Jewish thought. In 2 Esdras the writer notes that if those 'that have received the law shall perish by sin', very few will be saved, and the mercy of God is appealed to against the just verdict of the law, but he retains the doctrine of justification by works. Paul regrets this entirely and regards the law as a moment in development towards Christ and as superseded by the new dispensation of Grace. As determining the relationship between man and God it is merged in the new covenant, and becomes entirely indifferent in value. 'In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision'. As determining the relation of man to man it is fulfilled by love. 'Love...is the fulfillment of the law'. Having arrived at Paul's thought of the new dispensation we examine the ethics of his view of redemption and justification by faith. The two important aspects of the atonement to Paul are expressed in the sentence 'that he (God) might himself be just and the justifier of him that hath faith in Jesus'—that is to say there are

3. 2. Esdr. IX. 36.  
4. Ibid. VIII. 32-36.  

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ethically speaking two ends in view, the establishment and vindication of the absoluteness of the moral law on the one hand, and the redemption of character on the other. As regards the first, Paul's doctrine is that the redemption that is in Christ Jesus is an εκκένωσις of the righteousness of God because of the passing over of sins done aforetime, in the forebearance of God. In this sense the sacrifice of Christ is propitiatory, that is to say the cost of the atonement to Paul is equivalent to and so a declaration of the enormity of sin. It is also a manifestation of Χάρις, the overflowing bounty of God, which supersedes the requirement of merit on the part of man. It has often been urged against Paul that his scheme of redemption shows tendencies which are subversive of morality in that the reconciliation to God is produced not by works (i.e. moral worth) but through the imputation or a merit which is hypothetical; that the demand for propitiation in the sense of penalty is forensic, a mere 'lex talionis', and that faith is a substitute for character. This interpretation arises from a complete misunderstanding of the Apostle's position. Two perfectly valid arguments may be urged against it. In the first place the works which Paul discounts are 'the works of the law' 2 that is to say, detailed observance of the Mosaic Law, which obedience is incomplete, since in the case of no man has it led to complete obedience of heart. In the second place the faith which is the necessary condition of justification is the fulfillment of the old Jewish ideal of obedience in that it surpasses detailed

1. Rom. 11. 25. 2. See Gall. 11 16.
observance by a complete submission of heart to God's declaration in Christ. The phrase ἐν καρδιᾷ and πρόφθων, in the phrase ἐν καρδιᾷ πρόφθων, which is the keynote of the epistle to the Romans, both indicate that an essential attitude of heart is understood, while the anaethrous use of πρόφθων shows that it cannot refer to the mere content of belief. It involves a transformation 'by the renewing of the mind'. If any man be in Christ he is a new creature. Paul is urging the morality of the total self, of implicit obedience to the supreme revelation of the moral law, i.e. the mind of God in Christ as opposed to the morality of detailed compliance. We can therefore understand how he could regard faith as the fulfillment of the law 'Do we then make the law of more effect through faith? God forbid; nay, we establish the law'.

The consequence of faith and surrender to a God who is not unmoved but gracious is a re-established fellowship with God in the person of Christ. The phrase of supreme intimacy ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ is one of the main pillars of Pauline theology. This intimacy, like that spoken of by John, has a practical issue. This the Apostle speaks of under two great figures, death and resurrection with Christ, and the indwelling Spirit. The first of these figures treats of self-identification with the ideal personality of Christ, which involves death to sin and resurrection to the life of Christ-likeness. The second attracts

1. We take this to be a genitive of apposition, but even were it a genitive of origin, our argument would still be deducible.
2. Rom. XI. 2.
3. 2 Cor. V. 17. Gal. VI. 15.
attention more to the immediate guidance and the dynamic of the new life. The injunction is 'Walk by the Spirit', 'Be led by the Spirit'... 'The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control'. The doctrine of the Spirit leads by natural association to the antithetical doctrine of the flesh, with its evil tendencies. There are two doctrines of the relation of spirit and flesh implicit in Pauline teaching, but they are not mutually irreconcilable. The one is the doctrine of their antagonism, the other the doctrine of the sanctification of the flesh. In the first considerable affinities may be found with contemporary thought. Its relation to Platonism and Plotinus we shall deal with more fully in the next chapter. It will suffice here to indicate that the Pauline doctrine is neither ultimately pessimistic nor dualistic as is that of the Neo-Platonists. We are immediately concerned here with its relation to the rabbinical doctrine of the 'yezer hara'. The immediate resemblance is in the conflict within the individual of opposing tendencies, 'I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members'.

The contrast occurs in that Paul regards the flesh as the source of the evil impulse, and that this is inherited by man as a descendant of Adam and because of the fall, whereas

1. See Gall. V.
2. Rom. VII. 22.
the rabbinical doctrine was that neither the 'yezer hara' nor
the 'yezer hatob' had its seat in the body or soul as such, but
in the heart, which is the self; a synthesis of body and soul.
Sin is not associated with the fall, but is in the product of the
incitement of evil spirits upon the evil tendency, which is pre-
lapsarian in origin, and implanted by God. Sirach and Jubilees
make the fall the starting point but not the cause of racial corrup-
tion. The contrast with the more active Pauline principle of evil
which is not attributable to God but to Adamitic transgression is
clear. The modification is probably due to Greek influence.*
The Spirit is the counteracting principle according to Paul's
view. The Spirit is the medium of union with Christ. It is an
indwelling of 'the mind of Christ' and is associated very closely
with the impulses of the redeemed personality. The question is,
is it identifiable with immanent reason? The antithesis between
the 'wisdom of this world' and the 'wisdom that hath been hidden'
would indicate the answer 'No'. The wisdom of God is revealed
through Christ, and only in that intimate communion that is
born of love. 'The natural man receiveth not the things of the
Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him.' Yet the
Spirit is an indwelling of higher wisdom albeit an active and
not a purely 'theoretic' principle. The flesh clouds this Wisdom
and so is to be subjected. On the other hand, there is the hope
of the sanctification of the body, and indeed the call to respect
the body as the temple of the Holy Spirit, and to consecrate it,

3. 1. Cor. 11. 16.
4. 1 Cor. VIII. 3.
5. Cor. 11. 14.
6. 1. Cor. VI. 19.

* see discussion of relation of pauline doctrine of flesh and spirit to greek
doctrine of ertos and pneuma in chap. V
a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God. This removes Paul's view entirely from the sphere of Greek dualism. The effect of Salvation may be summed up under the title of the Divine life of spiritual communion and inspiration which sanctifies both soul and body.

This Divine life considered under its universal rather than its individual aspect gives rise to the doctrines of the Church, which is stated in the epistle to the Ephesians. It is the communion of believers through a common creed and Spirit. 'There is one body, and one Spirit, even as ye were called in one hope of your calling,' one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all.' No one can accuse Paul of lack of Catholicity of view. His attitude towards the Gentile world showed that he was possessed by the conception of the worldwide extent of Christ's kingdom, and the universal brotherhood of man, yet from this idea of a community of believers joined by one Spirit, grew the conception of the Church, joined by what was first the visible sign of community of Spirit but afterwards became predominant, viz., unity of Creed—a Church destined to be at one period the counterpart in Christian history of the narrowness of community of nationality in Jewish history, and even borrowing at times the phraseology of the latter—but this is far from the spirit of Paul.

We may sum up this treatment of Pauline ethics as follows. So far as ends are concerned the aim of the Christian life

1. Rom. Xll. 1.
2. Eph. IV. 4.

135.
is a complete synthesis of communion with God and possession of his active spirit. The chief virtues of this Divine life are faith, hope, and love. -- Faith, the attitude of obedience which sums up the relation to God as moral governor which was the main idea of Judaism, but which further leads to an acceptance of the grace and love which invite fellowship. Hope, the prospective attitude which is the product of the conception of a progressive realization of an ideal in the individual, and the coming of Christ's Kingdom objectively in the world. Love which is the seal of the relationship to God, and the dynamic of the practical morality which flows from the moral attitude of faith. These virtues and indeed the whole scheme of thought necessarily take a theological form for the whole of Paul's thought was theocentric, but beneath this form there lies matter which can legitimately be considered to provide the data for an ethical system. First, the conception of God in Christ became the moral ideal for man. Every act of man is judged by that standard. Even actions such as the contribution of money referred to it, 'Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ,' writes Paul, 'That, though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor.' Thus his Christology is first of all the doctrine of a moral ideal, which obtains the peculiar sanction of the Divine example. Second, the revelation of God in Christ is a moral imperative. It demands intellectual subscription to certain declarations concerning sin and righteousness and the submission of will and moulding of life to them. Finally, the thought of the indwelling and of Christ and the 1. 2. Corinth. VIII. 9.
believer contains many elements of great ethical importance. It supposes a unity of principle with the good will, that will reproducing itself in likeness to the ideal, i.e. reproducing the ideal itself in man; and further it synthesizes the purely religious end of communion with God with the purely ethical end of the attainment of an ideal form of life.

Division 4. Ethics of Minor Epistles.

1. Hebrews.

The purport of this epistle is an interpretation of the person of Christ. It is strongly influenced by Jewish ideas particularly in the imagery which it borrows. The revelation of the truth in Christ is the fulfilment of the revelation through the prophets and is supreme. Christ himself is the fulfilment, according to the author, of various Hebrew ideas, which are regarded as his Antetypes. He is the High Priest who mediates between God and man. He is the immaculate offering for sin who takes the place of the 'shadowery' sacrifices of lambs and bullocks. He is the new way into the Holy of Holies of the presence of God. The ethical application of this teaching disentangled from the profuse imagery would be something as follows. The end, as in Pauline ethics, is a renewal, or rather here a completion of communion with God, which was considered to be shadowed forth in the types of Jewish ceremony, and is fully accomplished through the Incarnation—'a new and living way through the veil, that is to say, His flesh' is appointed. This communion has a practical issue, 'Let us consider one another to provoke',


137.
unto love and good works', though the attitude of the
writer towards works of the law is clear from the phrase
'repentance from dead works'. Faith has a different conno-
tation from that given to it by Paul, but the views are not
conflicting. The former meaning is that of assurance (διστασθεί
t the basis of hope. The connection between the two views would be
through the idea of acceptance of something laid down, and
building upon it as a foundation. The difference is chiefly a
point of view. Paul examines the inner nature of faith; the
Writer of Hebrews considers its function in giving substantiality
to hope, and in promoting reliance on things promised or taught
but not seen. With Paul faith is the acceptance of the will,
the obedience of the heart, while the latter places emphasis
on the acknowledgement by the mind in belief.
2. Epistle of James.

The writer's attitude towards sin and its origin is
comparable to that of Sirach. The passages 'Let no man say,---
i am tempted of God' and 'Say not, my transgression was of God'
are comparable. Indeed James who was head of the most Judaistic
section of the Church shows considerably the influence of the
rabbinical literature. Details such as the teaching on the use
of the tongue, the faith of Abraham etc. affording parallels
even in style of language can hardly be coincidences and
indeed the main thesis of the correspondence of faith and works,
'Faith without works is dead', may be set beside the passage
from 11. Esdras (13 'Such as have works, and faith towards the
Almighty'. James is contending not against Paul that faith
1. Heb. X. 24. 5. Eccles. XV. 11. (Heb.)
according to the usage of the latter is insufficient for salvation, but that faith must be active, and that a passive profession is useless. He has this use of faith as profession evidently in mind if we may judge from the sentence 'Hold not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ in respect of persons (την πίστιν τοῦ κυρίου). He urges a submission to God (Ch.4) as the essential, and this is quite in harmony with the Pauline view.

5. Epistles of Peter.

There is little matter that we have not attended to, to be found in these epistles. The moral end is to 'become partakers of the divine nature' The atonement is spoken of under the Jewish figure of the immaculate offering Faith is evidently closely associated with obedience to the truth; and issues in Φιλάδελφία through knowledge, self-control, patience, and Godliness, and is perfected in ἀγάπη.

Emphasis is laid on the progressive nature of the Christian life and therefore on character development as a religious (and also ethical) ideal.

4. Epistles of John.

The doctrine is very similar to that of the Fourth Gospel. God is light and truth, and is revealed in the incarnate Word. The end is fellowship with him. This fellowship, which moulds character, 'We shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is', must find practical expression in the negative act of putting away sin., and in the positive atti-

1. Jas. 11. 1. 5. 11. Peter 1. 5-7.
2. 11. Peter 1. 4. 6. 11. 111. 13.
3. 1. Peter 1. 19. 7. 1. John 111. 2.
4. 1. Peter 1. 22. 8. 1. 111. 3.
tude of love towards others.

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Glancing retrospectively over the whole range of New Testament teaching we can see that many of its moral injunctions had been anticipated in the precepts of Judaism. Much of its theology is a development of Yahwehism. Even its Messiah claimed to fulfil prophetic promise, and yet the whole atmosphere of Christianity is different from that of Judaism. The uniqueness of the former is to be found in the personality of its Founder, and the interpretation that men placed upon it. It lies first in the fact that he gathered up the loftiest teachings of the time, made them his own, lived them, died for them. So precepts gave way to an ideal. Then as men came to regard Him as God incarnate, the moral life took upon itself the character of the divine life, and morality became the human realization of the divine likeness. The death of Christ came to be interpreted as a declaration by God of certain elemental truths concerning himself, and as purposive, to determine the relation of mankind to him. The belief in the abiding personality of Christ led them to regard fellowship with the object of religious consciousness as attained through union with him, and his work as mediatory. Thus there came about a fusion, which the conception of Incarnation rendered possible, between the ideal of the religious consciousness, union with God, and the ideal of the moral consciousness, right conduct, through the idea of the inner working of the spirit of God, which reproducing in man the likeness of God, which is the image of moral perfection.

New virtues rose to fit this synthetically constituted end, and the means whereby it could be attained. The faith which at once submitted to the God it saw declared in Christ, and appropriated the offers which it conceived of him as making, and took the God it saw into its heart as the spring of life and conduct, superseded obedience. Hope, too, shone bright amongst the new trinity of virtues. So long as morality had been the fulfilment of detail, and obedience to law, so long hope had found no place. Change from disobedience to submission is sudden, and only this type of type came within the thought of the Old Testament, so there is no prospective view of the broadening path toward perfection. When obedience is complete the end is attained. Hope began to glimmer when there dawned the prospect of a future ideal age and Messianic rule, but it was Christianity which took it and gave it its place beside faith. For the end in Christianity was an ideal progressively realized, therefore the Christian might hope, and indeed must look forward to the time when that ideal should be attained. So there were used the metaphors of the foot-race, of growth up to the measure of the stature of Christ, and other figures which attached to the prospect of future progress. The Christian too, must look for the expanding kingdom of Christ and the coming of his Lord — therefore hope. And love, the bond of perfectness, the greatest of the three, because it was the bond that bound the believer* to God, and the force which issued in the Divine life of perfection. It expressed at once the religious and the practical attitude, which was the sum and total of Christian morality.

Far removed as such a discussion as that which has
occupied us in this chapter, may seem to be from the sphere of ethical system and philosophy in the strictest sense of the terms, it is not difficult to discover the ethical aspect of the teaching which naturally takes religious form in the New Testament. There is first of all the central thought of God as Incarnate. This impresses with the religious form of a Divine life, all the moral relationships of a perfect human life. Moreover the idea of God as condescending with redemptive purpose to assume human form gives a new content to the ideal of human life, since that ideal is Christ. This content includes supremely the virtues of self-humiliation and self-forgetfulness, in that Christ set an example in those, and also of the love for all mankind which issues in the ideal of service, in that Christ also gave the example of service to his disciples. Here then, in the first place, we may find a lofty ethical ideal, the meaning of which ideal is incomplete if the form given to it by the religious consciousness is ignored. Further, when we pass from the actual human life of Christ and the meaning which Christian thought has assigned to that life, to the thought of the life of Christ in the heart, we have not passed from the sphere of ethical interest. The best results of ethical thought is embodied in the idea that man's supreme good is not purely individual. His end and therefore his good is to share in some cosmic purpose, to find his allotted place in the Whole. The good must be considered to be universal though realised in the individual. The religious consciousness has given to this idea of realising one place in this whole a richer form than that of merely realising a universal purpose, viz, the realization
of a communion and unity of life with the Divine. This thought is contained in the New Testament idea of the life of Christ in the believer. The purpose, work, and very life of the Divine is thought of as working itself out in the individual life and knitting mankind together with the unity of life which is accomplished by love, through the communion which has been criticised so often as crass-individualism, other-worldliness, and impractical mysticism. The total result of New Testament thought may therefore be summed up in ethical language as the presentation of an ideal the more outstanding because it is declared as Divine, and because submission to the lower is shown to be a transgression of Divine commands; an ideal which is of the larger self in that includes one's attitude towards one's fellows and towards the Whole; and second as the declaration of the philosophy which holds cut to man as the part the means of realizing in himself and in his conduct and life what is interpreted to be the purpose, spirit, and life of the Whole.

CHAPTER 5.

Argument. There are differences between Jewish ethics and the ethical atmosphere of New Testament teaching which must be accounted for. On the practical side, of Jewish ethics consisted in the formulation of maxims, and wise sayings and counsel, whereas New Testament teaching is more concerned with inward principles such as love, i.e. it is of a more reflective and introspective character. On the theoretic side Christian teaching differs from Jewish in the matter of 'immanence' and its ethical implications. Can these divergences be attributed
to the influence of Greek thought?

There are several possible modes of influence, the most likely, because the most subtle and widespread, is the influence of the broader outlook and reflective attitude peculiar to the attitude of Greek thought, which would tend amongst other effects to develop certain native elements in Christianity alien from Jewish thought. A parallel study of Greek and New Testament ethical thought demonstrates such great differences that one is reduced to a theory of indirect modification rather than one which supposes any immediate influence, though this may have been possible in certain details.

Referring to the details of possible influence we find that the broader atmosphere of Christ's own teaching probably due indirectly to the broadening influences within Judaism, produced by contact with Greek thought. Further, the Fourth Gospel owes at least its new categories of thought (that of the Logos particularly) ultimately to Greek influence, and also possibly, in a measure the development of thought of the community of life existing between Christ and the believer. The influence of Greek thought on the ethical significance of this teaching must therefore have been through more or less theological channels. This significance lies in their emphasis on the revelation of the truth (the Logos, Light, etc.) and its relation to man and the world, and on the other hand in the doctrine of the reproduction of the universal purpose (considered as God's purpose in Christ) and ideal in the life of man.

The correspondence between Greek and Pauline thought is noticeable in several directions—, notably in method, in

1. This may be taken broadly to cover later Stoicism also though this was more Roman in spirit than Greek.
the theological or metaphysical basis of ethical ideas, and in teaching concerning the end and value of human life, and in the psychological basis of the doctrine of man's personality and evil (See Division 2, Section 2b, in Contents List). The special opportunities which Paul had for imbibing the influence of the atmosphere of the Greek world makes it unlikely that these correspondences should be merely coincidences.

Lastly the final results of Greek philosophy of the and the atmosphere of the world dominated by its ideas would influence the dissemination of New Testament teaching in two ways. First, its points of coincidence with New Testament thought show that in some measure it must have prepared men's minds for some of the thoughts of New Testament teaching, particularly on the ethical side, and, second, its very failure would prepare the hearts and minds of men for something which supplied the lack which was felt.
CHAPTER 5.
The relationship between Christianity and Greek Thought.

1. Differences between Christianity and Judaism.

Notwithstanding the kinship which exists between the Christianity of the New Testament and Judaism there is a gulf between the genius of each which cannot be accounted for on the hypothesis of an undisturbed continuity of development between the two. Even upon the ethical side of its teaching Christianity differs considerably in spirit from the atmosphere of Judaism. By the Jew the ultimate authority and sanction of morality was conceived of as external -- in a transcendent Deity. It would be incorrect to say that communion with that God was not an end to be striven after by every devout Jew, but the form of the moral imperative, the will of a transcendent God, did not permit of a complete synthesis between conduct and communion. It is true that conduct was regarded as essential in the man who sought fellowship with God; the Psalmist wrote 'Lord, who shall sojourn in thy tabernacle? who shall dwell in thy holy hill? He that walketh uprightly and worketh righteousness, and speaketh truth in his heart... but the relationship between communion and conduct was not thought of as reciprocal. There was no thought that God would reproduce himself in the inner life of the soul of the believer. We can conceive of a Jew as agreeing with the exhortation 'Speak to him thou, for he heareth, and spirit with spirit can meet' but we are traversing the bounds of his thought when we pass on to the statement 'Closer is he than 1. Psalm XV.
breathing nearer than hands or feet'. God was conceived of as spiritually omnipresent but not as immanent. The real difference resolves itself into one of theology. The tendency to Judaism was to conceive of God first as a principle of cosmic order and therefore as the author of moral commands. The Christian believer reversed the order. He is first conscious of the 'Spirit of Jesus' within the soul, philosophically speaking, the moral law, and through its guidance and through the larger fellowship, which absorbs it, of communion with the Father who is also Creator and ruler of the universe.

A further difference between the spirit of Christian teaching and that of Jewish thought lies in the development of a reflective character, in the former. This is closely related to the difference which we have noted above. The attitude towards the world of a purely transcendent God is one of submission and unquestioning obedience; but the attitude of thought where God is conceived of as indwelling is introspective, even though he be regarded as transcendent also; for it is natural to seek God where he is nearest and then pass on to the knowledge of the God that is 'afar off'. Here again, it is difficult to assign to reflection on the one hand and the doctrine of immanence on the other their relative positions. It is perhaps wisest merely to posit their coexistence, and to recognise that whereas reflection is requisite to produce the thought of immanence, the doctrine of an immanent God would produce in the individual believer an introspective and reflective attitude.

Apart from this difference in spirit between Christianit
and Judaism there are details in New Testament teaching which cannot immediately be traced to Jewish sources. The question arises, can these differences be traced to any contemporary influence? Can this new attitude of thought which finds a very full expression in the New Testament be the product, at least in part, of external stimuli? What was the relation of the Greek mind which dominated the thought of the Gentile world to this seeming offspring of Judaism which differed to such an extent from its parent?

2. Possible modes of influence.

In entering upon a discussion of the relation of Greek thought to Christianity we do not commit ourselves to any position which regards Christianity as the offspring of Greek thought. There are various modes of modificatory influence which do not involve a theory of immediate descent. We may safely go even further than this. Christianity did not borrow from Greek philosophy any of her earliest doctrines in the sense that the Alexandrine school of Jewish thought derived material from thence. There are several reasons why any immediate indebtedness to the actual content of philosophy on the part of early Christianity is unlikely. In the first place, Jesus of Nazareth as a student of Greek philosophy presents an utterly incongruous picture. Mr. T.R. Glover scarcely puts the case too strongly when he says, concerning the thought of Jesus upon God, and how he conceived of the relation between God and man, that 'he approached the matter originally from the standpoint of Judaism and no attempt to prove the influence of Greek philosophy is likely to succeed'¹. Further the attitude of the believer.

¹ 'Conflict of religions in the early Roman Empire' (1909). p. 133.
towards paganism in the earliest days of the Church would preclude any conscious adoption of its doctrines. We must reject then any theory of the immediate indebtedness. There are however other possible modes of influence. If Christianity had its roots in Judaism we may look further back for the points of contact with Greek thought to the actual results of the impact of the Greek world upon Judaism. It is not hard to prove the existence of hellenic elements in later Judaism and even in Pharisaic documents. Greek ideas and the still more subtle 'atmosphere' of thought could not pervade the whole of the civilized world as it did/ percolating gradually and silently through Judaism itself, and in this way the atmosphere of Palestine itself would be modified by that of the Gentile world. Supreme amongst the possible influences emanating from the Greek world must be placed the influence of the Greek attitude of mind. It would be difficult to limit the extent of influence which the subtle permeating influence of atmosphere exerts. It operates in areas where immediate influence of ideas themselves would be impossible. The modifications which it occasions may be brought about without any actual transference of ideas. Atmosphere may stimulate the growth of innate tendencies in a system of thought, or on the other hand retard the growth of others. The influence of the surrounding world of thought may be to rouse a system to self-consciousness; to cause it to work out the implications contained within itself; and perhaps to lend it speech to express itself. Thus although we may recognize fully that Christianity had its roots in Judaism still it must be recognized that it grew up in an atmosphere profoundly modified
by the influence of Greek thought, and even if we deny all immediate indebtedness to philosophy we must recognise the stimulus which that atmosphere gave to the development of elements native to Christianity and also the influence of that atmosphere upon the soil from which the latter sprung. That this excursus will have led us to recognise that Christianity is not only indebted to the Greek world for a modification of point of view, and for the stimulation of ideas, but also for influences which made possible its extensive propagation. There is the influence of similarity of thought to be recognised. Many of the ideas embodied in Christian teaching were not so utterly foreign to pagan thought as to convey no meaning. Exchange of ideas, which is essential to their propagation, was possible. Further we shall have to consider the influence of the failure of Greek philosophy in disposing mankind for the acceptance of teaching which offered an optimistic solution of the problems of life in lieu of despair, and a religion for the many in lieu of philosophy for the few.


Bearing in mind what has been said concerning the possible modes in which Greek influence may have been brought to bear in the rise and propagation of Christianity, we shall find that the safest method of study will be not to attempt to deduce any Christian doctrines from Greek ideas, but to place side by side as far as possible parallel ideas in Christianity and Greek philosophy and discuss the possibility of influence. We shall do well to remind ourselves of the grave danger.

* See Division 3.
of speculation, motivated by a desire to discover connections between the two. If, as we believe, truth is one, and develops along lines determined by inner necessity and only conditioned by outward circumstance, then we must be prepared to recognise collateral independent developments in different systems and not attempt to discover channels of communication wherever similarities are discovered. It is only our duty to discover where these parallel lines of development touch or join and what the effect of such contact is.

**Division I.**

**General relationship between Christianity and Greek Thought**

1. The influence of the Greek mind.

   a) Influence upon Judaism®.

   The study of the influence of the atmosphere of Greek thought upon Christianity must commence with an examination of the influence which it was already exerting upon Judaism at the time of Christ. It was seen from our study of Jewish Apocryphal writings that there was a school of thought at Alexandria which was preserving loyalty to the Law sought to bring the results of Greek thought to bear upon Jewish ideas. An examination of the passages quoted from Wisdom in chapter 3 is ample to demonstrate the extensive influence of Greek thought, whilst it would be difficult to find a quaint intermixture of Judaism and Hellenism than in the passage 'I will not believe thee O law, my instructor, or forsake thee O beloved self-control. I will not put thee to shame O philosopher Reason, or deny thee O honoured priesthood, and science of the law.' The most ®. See chapter 3.

   1. IV. Maccab. V. 34.
profound modification is not however shown in the introduction of Greek conceptions but in the breadth of view produced by contact with Greek thought. An atmosphere which can produce such a book as the Book of Wisdom must have been essentially different from the unmodified atmosphere of Judaism.

The existence of such an atmosphere actually within the boundaries of Judaism exerted an influence throughout its length and breadth, and even within the circle of the narrowest Pharisaism. Here it produced a more reflective type of thought; were it only that the latter might defend itself, but this narrower Pharisaism was by no means characteristic of the Judaism which had been produced by the stimulus of external influences. It had become itself something like a philosophy and could, therefore, in Alexandria and elsewhere easily make terms with another philosophy and blend or coalesce with it into a new product. And what is true of the religion of Israel is still more true of Christianity. Springing out of a Judaism which was already deeply tinged with Greek ideas and developing itself under the constant pressure of Greek influences, Christianity was from the first what we may call a reflective religion, a religion which gathered into itself many of the results of both Eastern and Western thought.¹

With this growth of reflective attitude, which, if not entirely the product of Greek influence, was greatly stimulated thereby, there was brought about a conflict with particularistic externalism. Again we shall not be far wrong if we attribute

¹. Caird, 'Evol. of Theol in Gk Philosophy - Vol 1.'p6. (1904)
the conflict at least in part to the permeation of Judaism by Greek influences. The writer of the Epistle to Diognetus illustrates the attitude of the Greek mind to Judaism. He considers their peculiar characteristic to be ῥὸς ψοφοδεῖς—almost 'fussiness'.

The effect of such an attitude could not but be to produce in the thought of those that came within its influence a revolt against detailed externalism. We may explain the kinship of Christ to the Greek attitude as a coincidence, or we may regard him as the child of 'liberal Judaism', but we must recognise that he shared the spirit of revolt. Though his bitter words were only spoken against hypocrisy there is something in his spirit which transcends all detail. His work was no doubt a fulfilment, but a fulfilment which leaves no vestige of the narrowness of that which he fulfilled. As it was his teaching ran counter to the attitude of thought of the rulers of his nation, but had it not been for the leavening influence of the broader view in Judaism, (see page — Judaism) neither among the liberal-minded or among the humble, and is the mightiest product of an age of change. Being the product of a time of transition it combined the broader outlook produced without doubt by the external influences which were operative upon Judaism, with the best products of the older age. 'The absurdity and scrupulosity which the Greek ridiculed in the Jew, were the outcome of his devotion to the law of the Lord; and when once the law was re-interpreted and taken to a higher plane by Jesus, the old passion turned naturally to the new morality. 1

As we proceed with the history of Christian teaching, the influence of the Greek mind becomes more and more defined. We pass from the vague influence of an attitude of thought, the mere stimulus of external pressure and surrounding atmosphere, to a more direct correspondence. There is a definite transition to be noticed from the simple and direct ethical teaching of Christ to the theological interpretations of his person and work. It is a change which can only adequately be explained in the light of the tremendous influence of Christ's personality, but the formulation of doctrines and the philosophy of interpretation are, in the form in which we have them today, in part the product of the influence of the Greek mind.

Christianity was forced out into the Greek world. Harnack writes 'A movement like that of Christianity which discovered to the Jew the soul whose dignity was not dependent on its descent from Abraham, but on its responsibility to God, could not long continue, in the framework of Judaism, however expanded, but must soon recognise in that world which the Greek spirit had discovered and prepared, the field which belonged to it!'. Expelled by the narrowness of contemporary Judaism, impelled by its own inborn evangelism, invited by the broader outlook of the larger world, Christianity could not help but catch something of the spirit of the Greek mind. Apologetic and polemic are essential instruments in propagating a new truth and they must work upon the basis of the thought of those whom it is sought to proselytise. So the ideas and language of the Greek world and above all its subtle atmosphere penetrated the whole texture of early Christian theolog;

This movement is already noticeable in the theologians of the New Testament. There are the germs of a systematic theology to be found in the writings of both John and Paul. These early followers of Christ had begun to set in order the elements of their faith, to explain, to reason, and in a word, perhaps in spite of themselves to philosophize. Christianity could never again be the religion of simple faith without losing its spiritual character and becoming merely a subscription to the declarations of some external authority. The influence at this crucial period in Christian history of an atmosphere of systematically reflective thought such as that afforded by the intellectual world at that time, cannot be dismissed as unimportant. It would indeed be wonderful if the material and tools provided by that world, which owed its character to the genius of Greece, had not found use in the work of these Christian thinkers. Though the result of this influence was not to produce a definite system of ethics, the indirect influence of a systematization of theology is important. Ethics could no longer be a mere matter of maxims and practical precepts, it became a matter of root principles, of Spirit, and moreover the ethical implications and practical issue of doctrines were always related to a definite theory of the realities which lie behind the world and human life—a step in the evolution of morals.

2. A parallel study of Greek and Christian ideas.

Before it is possible to discuss properly the relationship of Greek to New Testament thought, it is necessary to place the main results of Greek philosophy side by side with those of New Testament teaching and to discuss in a general fashion their likenesses and differences. The world of philosophy had come to
regard the 'good' as one and as universal, the principle of world order. It declared the necessity of knowledge of the 'good' and community of life with it. It had taught men to look for the voice of the 'good' within, to see it declared in nature and in law, and it had held that community of life necessitates unity of will with this supreme 'good'. The religious consciousness of the ancient world had identified the 'good' with God, and made the divine life of communion man's chiefest end, and the mode whereby he achieved his destiny, whether that be in the realization of the excellencies of his own personality, or the loss of that personality in the One. All these various lights of ancient thought glitter from one or other of the manifold facets of Christian teaching, but there is that in the latter which transform them into something more living and personal -- a central fire in the diamond's heart. To discover the difference we must make a closer comparison of the two systems.

In the conception of God, as it uncoiled itself in Greek history, three strands of thought are constantly intertwined -- the thought of a Creator, the thought of a moral Governor, and the thought of a Supreme or Absolute Being! In these words Dr. Hatch summed up the totality of Greek theology. Superficially this seems very much akin to the theology of the New Testament. We might carry the analogy one step further. This God was conceived of as dwelling in the heart as well as in the universe. Beyond this we cannot go. The result of Greek speculation upon God -- where it did not end in pure pantheism -- was that of God nothing whatever could be predicated -- not even being, but that he was to be expressed by the negation of every idea that could be formed of him.1

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On the one hand is Stoicism with its unmitigated pantheism expressed in misleading terms of theism, on the other hand the Unknowable of Plotinus, to enjoy Whom man must surrender all motion and thought. Over against these results the personal fellowship of the Christian with God in Christ, combining the thought of the transcendence and personality of God with the thought of the indwelling Spirit - the immanent God - stands out in sharp contrast. It shows the religious temper untroubled by philosophy yet using its results to express its experiences.

The moral end set before man by the thought of the Greek world shows like similarities and differences when compared with the Christian end. The end was, as we have seen, theologically and metaphysically defined as a possession of God either through contemplation or ecstasy. It was to know God and to share his life. So was the end which every humble Christian strove for in the earliest times. But what a difference between the cold and philosophic intellection of the Greek thinker or the obscure and mystic 'merging' of a Plotinus, and the immediate and personal fellowship taught by Christ and learnt by his disciples! 'So incredibly simple is the relation between God and man (for the religious consciousness)—simple, unconstrained, heedless and tender as the talk round a table in Nazareth.' The Greek had also said that the object of human life was 'becoming like God'; the idea was the god-like man, the Stoic dreamed of the life that should be in accordance with Universal Reason and strove after it. The Christian sought to become 'conformed to the image of the Son' but again note the difference. The Greek found that conformity in

1. Plato.
2. Romans VIII. 29.

the scarce attainable life of θεωρία above the conduct of
life in the world. The Stoic found it in a stern and passionless
self-sufficiency. But Jesus taught that the Father so far from
being self-sufficient yearns for every soul of man, and longs
for the fellowship of his children; that every-day life presents
plentiful opportunities to be good and pitiful like the Father
who is in Heaven. And the followers of the Christ remembered the
example of the 'servant of all' whom they had come to think of
as God. The shedding of gracious influence was recognised as
the mark of family likeness with God. It may be contended that
this difference is largely that between religious and philosophic
expression and that the theological definitions of the relationship
of God and man would yield something more in common with Greek
thought; but there is a difference between the theology of Greek
philosophy and that of Christianity which makes a world of
difference to ethics, when the god-like life is made the supreme
ideal. Take Aristotle's theology for instance as typical of the
logical extremis of Greek thought, 'Aristotle seems forced to
think of the ideal activity which connects God with the world as
one which is in the world and not in God. And he only partly
disguises this discrepancy when he speaks of their being 'something
divine' in all creatures which makes them seek the highest good'
Compare this with the vision--'God so loved the world...',
'Herein is love, not that we loved God but that he loved us',
compare it with the dominant Pauline thought-- Θέος Χριστός of God.

These similarities and contrasts become even more
striking when we place Christianity beside its contemporary in the
world of philosophy, viz. Stoicism. The superficial similarity existing between the theology of the two is so striking that Stoic phraseology does not seem at all foreign to the spirit of Christianity when used by Christian writers. The Fatherhood of God finds a prominent place in Stoic philosophy. Paul quotes from Cleanthes or Aratus, 'We too are his offspring' and suggests that of their more than one poet had voiced the same sentiment. But Fatherhood is a wide term and may be subjected to uses which range from the barely metaphorical to the most exact analogy. The fatherhood of Homeric gods differs widely from the Stoic conception. The Stoic conception, which designates mere community a rational principle with the Universe--the world is as much the offspring of God as a man is--differs as widely from the Christian quasi-family relationship between God and his children.

This similarity of thought with Christianity is even more evident when the Stoic teaches the immanence of God. 'Proprie est a te Deus, tectum est, intus est! Ita dico, Lucili: sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos.' Seneca writes. And again, 'Non sunt Divi fastidiosi, non invidi; admittunt, et adscendentibus manum porrigunt. Miraris, hominem ad Deus ire? Deus ad homines venit; immo quod propius est, in homines venit. Nulla sine Deo mens bona est.' Lightfoot's comment on the Stoic doctrine of the 'Sacer spiritus' is as follows; 'It may be translated literally by the Holy Spirit, the πνεῦμα ζωής of Scriptural language, but it signifies something quite different. His declaration that we are

2. Ep. Mor. XII.
3. Ep. Mor. LXXIII.
Asperum cultum, et intonsum caput, et negligentior barbam, et indignum argentum odium, et cubile humi positum, et quidquid aliud ambitionem perversa via sequitur, evita'. There is a striking counterpart not only in sentiment but in the first part of its phrasing to Christ's indictment of the Pharisees: It shows that sincerity was demanded besides apathy to externals.

The doctrine of Sin bears this same stamp of inwardness. Sin is also held to be universal 'Erras, mi Lucili si existimas nostri seculi essa vitium luxuriamet negligentiam boni moris et alia quae obiecit amiss quisque temporibus. Hominum sunt ista, non temporum, nulla astas vacavit a culpa'. Conscience is the revealer of sin, 'Coarguit...conscientia et ipsos sibi ostendit'. Sin, however, for the Stoic was not sin as it is for the religious consciousness of the Christian. Lightfoot states the difference as follows. For the Stoic 'Sin may be condemned either from physical or aesthetic considerations...but consciousness of sin as sin is distinct from both. It is only possible where there is a clear sense of a personal relation to a Personal Being, whom we are bound to love and obey...Here again the Stoic's language is treacherous. He can talk of sin, just as he can talk of God the Father. But as long as he is true to his dogma, he uses terms in a non-natural sense': There is however a correspondence in ethical value between the sin 'which comes through law' and the sin which is conflict with the voice of Reason in the soul, but we must recognise the superiority of the view that sees in sin something which is not viewed with indifference by all except the

inner eye of conscience sees in conscience the voice of a God who cares.


Philanthropy is enjoined in almost scriptural language: Nescit quisquam beate degere, qui se tantum intuetur, qui omnia ad utilitates suas convertit; alteri vivas oportet, in vis tibi vivere?

In places throughout Seneca's writings this attitude is enjoined even towards enemies. 'Non desinamus communi bono operam dare, adjuvare singulas, open ferre etiam inimicis miti'. The basis of this broad humanity is very different from that of the brotherly love enjoined in Scripture. The universalism of the Stoic was based on the cold philosophic contemplation of the equality apart from the vicissitudes of fortune, equality of all men as sharing in Reason, not on the passionate evangelism like that of the Apostles to the Gentiles, or on the imitation of the love enjoined and manifested by Christ. His humanity sprung rather from an absolute self-sufficiency; it was an aspect of his pride, a duty coldly undertaken, a fulfilment of himself rather than a forgetting. Contrast this with the meaning of which Christianity discovered in the Passion of Christ, remembering that passionlessness was a fundamental Stoic virtue. The difference is even clearer in the contrast between the self-denial of the Stoic

and that taught in the New Testament. The former is an asceticism and an assertion of independence and self-sufficiency which is purely self-regarding in motive. The latter is a bursting of the boundary of self and the issuing forth of a life in service.

We have a coup d'oeil of the fundamental difference between Christianity and Greek thought in the picture of the ideal man as conceived by each. Self-sufficient, self-forgetting; proud, humble; ἀψιθαπτόμενος, ἀθανάτῳ; reason, faith; these are the parallels afforded by Christianity and Greek philosophy. On the one hand we have Stoicism, a philosophy tinged with religious ideas, on the other Christianity, a religion, philosophical only because self-conscious. In Stoicism we have an unrelieved pantheism which led to self-sufficiency in ethics, and to the view that everything in the world was consequently the best possible; and thus to a self-despair. It was an emotionless rational system whose highest good expressed negatively was ζόον ἔκκλεις, unmoved by self or others. True in its practical precepts it is often extremely like Christianity, but there is not often a very profound disagreement between systems as to what is right. Greater divergences are usually to be found in the sphere of motive, and here Christianity and the Greek philosophy are poles apart.

We are thus forced to the conclusion that any influence which Greek philosophy has exerted on Christianity will not affect this fundamental difference. We must recognise in the teaching of the New Testament thought which if applied to the results of Greek philosophy will be a criticism as well as a fulfilment. This does not however prevent us from holding that the plant of Christian doctrine which was rooted in Jewish thought but
grew up in the broader atmosphere of Greek thought, gathered influences therefrom which assisted its growth; that there are elements in Christian teaching which would have been cramped and atrophied but for the larger room of the world of hellenic ideas; and that it contains truths which could not have found adequate expression but for the media afforded by the reflective thought of the intellectual world of Greek philosophy. We shall therefore still be justified in turning to a more detailed examination of the modificatory effect of Greek thought upon Christian ideas.

Division 2. Possible influence of Greek ideas upon the development of Christian thought.

1. John and Greek Thought.

The view which we expressed in the previous chapter as to the meaning of the central thought in John's Christology was such as to warrant us in discussing the influences which may have moulded it at greater length here. We saw that Christ was considered in his life and death to be a setting forth of the Divine Logos. This thought of God, was to be accepted by man through the heart-attitude of faith, and thereupon became enshrined in man's heart in the person of the Spirit of Christ. We have therefore a declaration by God equivalent to the setting forth of the moral law, an acceptance by man, equivalent to assent and conformity of will, and then a community of life with God which is at once the supreme end and the dynamic of conduct. This doctrine though religious in form is evidently of great ethical importance. Further, whether we consider the preface to the Fourth Gospel to be of the nature of a prologue or of an apologue it is clearly the summing up of the message of the gospel in
philosophic form. It is therefore important for us to consider the possible origin of this form and the immediacy and extent of their influence. To this end we must give attention to the Logos doctrine of Philo.

a). The Philonic doctrine of the Logos.

One of the central ideas of Philonic philosophy was that the Divine Being is incomprehensible and invisible. So far does he deny all possible predicates of God that he regards εἰσέχειν διότι as an incorrect expression. In short he is involved in the dualism between the phenomenal and the supernatural which has been the pitfall for philosophers for all time. Such a view as this necessarily removes God absolutely from the world, a philosophy which cannot consistently be carried out.

If we have no knowledge of the Divine nature it is useless to tell us that there is a God. This breach between God and the world has always to be bridged somehow, either by τήσεις or by ὑπηγέλου or by Σοφία or by the Λόγος. In other words bare transcendence must be supplemented by some mode of immanence; or else as in Jewish hope, the Lord, high and lifted up, must send his Messiah to instruct and rule his people. As a matter of history the Σοφία of Wisdom literature may be regarded as the immediate precursor of the Λόγος of Alexandrine philosophy. The Logos is, in a word, the medium of God's operation in the world and is to be found everywhere where God is at work. As regards the nature of the Logos, Philo himself calls him God — καλεῖ τις Θεόν τὸν πρεσβύτατον λόγον υἱὸν Θεοῦ. Πνεῦμα is another synonym.

1. Λόγος is the more personified form of Σοφία. Πνεῦμα is another synonym.
He is however, distinct from God, a ἰδεὔτης Θεός. He is the revealer of God. He is Light. He is eternal and creative (the ἰδεύτης of creation). While this view by the very fact of separating the two worlds prevented this view from impressing on the religious consciousness the ethical value of details of human life and conduct, as Christianity, with the doctrine of the Incarnation, does, it is of importance ethically because it posits that the 'One God', One Law, one Element' is immanent in the world and in the human mind as Reason or Wisdom, which is not merely intellectual but has a moral significance also.

b) Relation to the Johannine doctrine.

The views of John and Philo are so strikingly similar that one is obliged to admit some hypothesis of relationship. The theology of the Johannine doctrine is substantially the same as that of Philo. No man 'hath seen the Father' but the Son is the revealer of the Father. The Word is eternal. 'In the beginning was the Word'; was 'with God' and 'was God'. He was the creator of all things and the 'light which lighteth every man coming into the world'. The ethical application of the doctrine is akin also to that of Philo, regards the production of the ψυχή λογική as the end for man which may be regarded as the soul conformed to Wisdom, or the soul in which the Logos resides. It brings about the possibility of fellowship or rather contemplation of God. John regards the Christian life as a life according to the revelation of God in Christ but further as a life of Christ in the soul, and so as the life of communion with the Father. The divergence in ethics is most noticeable when one.

1. See John VI. 46.
one examines Philo's conception of faith. This was taken from the Judaistic side of his thought, and is comparable to the view set forth in the epistle to the Hebrews. It is placed collaterally with the classification of the virtues borrowed from Greek ethics but is otherwise unrelated to them. On the other hand faith, according to the Fourth Gospel, is more the acceptance of a Person, Christ, and the submission of personality to him. That is to say, it is a deeper idea than that of Philo, and greater than the faith of endurance, 'as seeing him who is invisible! 

A further common element which must be noted as indicating a relationship between Philonic thought and the Fourth Gospel is phraseology. As examples we may take two metaphors, used of the Word by Philo and of Christ by John, of manna and the living stream.

The differences between the Philonic doctrine and the Johannine are more fundamental than the similarities. Philo on the one hand does his utmost to separate God from the physical world. He regards matter as 'evil', the 'tomb of the soul' and flesh as the seat of sin. The notion of an Incarnation of God would be to him the greatest possible absurdity. 'The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us' would be an insurmountable difficulty, to him. Added to this there is an absence of many of the catchwords of the Philonic doctrine in John's gospel.¹

What hypothesis of relationship, may we, then, adopt? We cannot conceive, for many reasons, included those furnished by the differences noted above, admit of any theory of immediate ¹. See Sanday - Crit. of Fourth Gospel. p. 191. (1905)
borrowing. The idea of the author of the Fourth Gospel pouring
over the abstruse and involved writings of Philo is sufficiently
absurd in itself to secure the dismissal of that theory. It is
possible that Philonic influences might have filtered indirectly
into Johannine thought, but there is a better hypothesis still
which will explain all that requires explanation. The theory
advanced by Jowett seems sufficient. He explains the similarity
by the widespread dissemination of Alexandrine modes of thought.
The ideas of Σωφρόνιος and the Λογισμός were by no means original in
Philo's work. They had found their way even into Palestinian
Judaism. Of the actual similarities of language Jowett says
that there can be no doubt that they are a part of the language
and mode of thinking of the age, 'for of designed imitation, either
in one or the other, there is not a trace.' The only borrowing
which can be laid to the charge of the author of the Fourth Gospel
is the borrowing of fresh and more philosophical categories of
thought.

The question has thus narrowed itself down, so far
as our purpose is concerned to this, 'what does Johannine ethical
teaching owe to the hellenization of the atmosphere of Judaism?'
First of all it owes the view of considerable ethical importance
that the Christ, to express it in a religious language, or the Logos,
to express it in metaphysical language, to express it in the
language of ethical philosophy, is immanent in the soul, as the
'light which lighteth every man coming into the world', and is
also the underlying cosmic principle present in creation. The
personal incarnation of the Logos in a single human life is a
1. B. Jowett -- Commentary on Pauline Epistles.
peculiarly Christian idea, a product of reflection on Christ's own personality, but it is of supreme value from the ethical as from the religious standpoint in that it sums up the Logos or Moral law in the conduct of an earthly life, and brings the Object of the religious consciousness into an actual relation with the details of human existence. But the Logos is more than mere moral law; he is more than mere moral example. He is, for John, as the indwelling Christ what the presence of the One in the Many is for philosophy. He is the indwelling God with whom we may realize community of life. 'The light which lighteth every man' becomes merged in the larger light of the indwelling Spirit of Truth, the spirit of Christ. Here we arrive at that community of life, the harmonizing of conflicting elements in the Cosmos into one great unity of Life and Will, which is the true end of all ethics. This we attain through partaking of the 'life of Christ,' mystically symbolized under the metaphors of 'body' and 'blood.' Now we maintain that such a far-reaching doctrine as this could not have been formulated or appreciated, unless it had been for the contribution Greek ideas had made, in the production of reflective atmosphere and cosmic outlook. We do not consider it necessary to hold that these ideas were borrowed from Greek philosophy, but its widespread influence at least stimulated a development which could probably never have occurred had it not been for the opportunity afforded by its broader outlook.

2. Paul and Greek thought.

We have already referred sufficiently to the hellenized atmosphere of even Pharisaic Judaism. Paul, a Pharisee of the
Pharisees, pupil of one of the most enlightened teachers of his people, Gamaliel, well versed in rabbinical thought, can scarcely have escaped its influence. There were, however, circumstances in the Apostle's life which determined that he should be peculiarly susceptible to the subtle and powerful, if indirect, influences of pagan culture. Perhaps the circumstance which determined this most was his apostleship to the Gentiles. In arguing with a certain class of people, in teaching them, or in confuting them, one is always subject to the tendency to assimilate oneself unconsciously to one's opponents. To argue upon the basis of their ideas is to use their mode of thought and expression for conveying one's own ideas. Paul, ever ready for polemic or preaching, 'a debtor' to Greek and barbarian alike, was almost bound to be affected by the ideas of the Gentile world in which he moved. There was also a peculiar fitness in his vocation, for he, of all the apostles, had had the most opportunity of becoming conversant with the thought-atmosphere of the world of Greek culture. He was born and brought up in Tarsus, a city which ranked beside Athens and Alexandria for the fame of its schools. This brings us immediately to the question as to whether Paul had any direct acquaintance through philosophic study with Classical ideas. The arguments for such study are briefly as follows. There are, in the first instance, similarities which we shall notice between Pauline and Greek thought. Moreover a man who could enter into polemical controversy as ably as Paul seems to have done must have had some adequate acquaintance with his opponent's views — It is universally acknowledged that his speech at Athens showed a familiarity with the main points of the Stoic
position. Further there are in his writings quotations from the philosophers. Too much stress, however, must not be placed upon this argument, for the only extant quotations are familiar and almost proverbial, and there is no need to postulate a very intimate acquaintance with the classics to account for them. There are however similarities of diction between Paul and Stoic writers which cannot be ignored, but they are sufficiently accounted for when we recognize that the it is not easy to overrate the extent to which Stoic philosophy had leavened the moral vocabulary of the civilized world at the time of the Christian era. Finally, even Paul’s Hebraic training left room for the influence of Greek thought. Gamaliel was one of the few Rabbis who were not only indirectly influenced by the atmosphere of the time, but who also took a liberal and enlightened view about the permissibility of the Chokmah Jovanith, or 'wisdom of the Greeks'.

Before attempting to show that all traces of hellenic influence to be found in Paul can be accounted for otherwise than by a theory of immediate study, we will cite the arguments that are advanced against the latter. First of all there is no great likelihood of influence from Alexandrine Hellenism. Paul’s aim was very different from that of Philo, which was to encrust ancient Hebraism with a superimposed covering of Greek ideas. Moreover, in spite of the attitude of Gamaliel to Hellenism, the Jews of Tarsus were thoroughly Hebrew and were not likely to permit any extensive contact at least on the part of the young with Greek ideas. The strongest argument for the pretence of this exclusive
Hebraistic attitude in Paul is afforded by passages in his own writing where he refers to the ἀδικία of the Greek disparagingly. This fact would not disprove the possibility of considerable influence on the part of the latter and probably his censure only calls for the shallowness and cheap superiority of the petty philosopher of his day whose pride of intellect covered looseness of life, and who was more prone to the ἀλογορεία which promoted strife than to the earnest search for truth. The final argument against including Paul in the 'five hundred' in the school of Gamaliel who studied Greek wisdom is to be found in the absence of any direct reference to the great philosophers. Farrar adds that 'his Greek is not Greek of the Atticists nor his rhetoric the rhetoric of the schools, nor his logic, the logic of the philosophers,' and although we shall see in his method and thought some influences of Greek method (thus we cannot subscribe entirely to Farrar's statement) yet there are not sufficient signs to warrant our positing systematic study.

Some theory is however necessary to explain the evident correspondences of thought and method. This need is, we imagine, sufficiently met by the recognition of the influence which the thought of the schools would have on the philosophy of the street. There could not but have been a steady filtration of the ideas and methods of the schools into the minds of the citizens of Tarsus. Unconscious absorption and assimilation would be continually taking place in the early life of the Apostle, laying in a hidden store of ideas which though not consciously subscribed to in any way, would be bound to exert their influence and contribute their quota, when the time came for him to be engaged

1. See Corinthians especially Chaps. 11, & VII. 2-4.
in definite reflective thought upon the meaning of Christ and his teaching. Especially would the scholastic atmosphere even of the city induce habits of mind which would modify the effects of Hebrew training and render him more open to the broader influence of later life. The effect which these early influences had on Paul's method is most noticeable if we contrast his writing with a typically Jewish product such as the Epistle to the Hebrews. The latter proceeds by the favourite method of stringing together loosely quoted passages from the Hagioグラフα together in support of a line of thought, and though Paul's sometimes inclines towards this usage, his general method is one of closer and more consecutive argumentation like that of Plato or Aristotle. The influence of this in the sphere of ethics was great. Whereas Jewish ethics usually take the form of epigrammatic, proverbial, and often disconnected sayings and maxims, such as are given in Proverbs or Ecclesiasticus, Pauline ethics though couched in religious and theological form have a unity of principle (which for Paul is to be found in Christ) and so contained the embryo of a logical system which finds its summation in the life 'in Christ'. Paul in other words works not from the details of character and conduct—his is not an ethics of practical advice—but from a central unity or Summum Bonum, expressed in Christ. The nearer kinship of this method to that of the great philosophers of Greece need scarcely be indicated. It may be fortuitous, but the arguments which we have put forward for the possibility of Greek influence, particularly in the direction of modifying methods, renders this scarcely the likeliest hypothesis.

1. See Rom. 111 & 11V.
2. Parallels between Paul and Greek thought.

We must now examine more in detail the correspondence in ideas between Paul and Greek thought. We must perforce commence with Pauline theology. This constitutes no grave trespass of the boundaries of ethics. The basing of Pauline ethics in theology is only comparable to the relation between Platonic ethics and the doctrine of Ideas, which is familiar to every student of Plato. Again we state that parallelism does not mean plagiarism and that the most we desire to establish is the stimulus of Greek thought.

The first impressive similarity between the two systems is in their mutual recognition of the unity of the cosmic and moral order, and so, when the principle of cosmic order comes to be identified with the object of the religious consciousness, of the unity of the Divine and the moral order. The connection between Paul's idea and Plato's does not extend much beyond this bare fact. Plato finds the unity of cosmic order in the transcendent world of ideas, the actual world being an image of that world and its plan being a sort of ; a 'son' of the who is the supreme Good. Paul inclines more to the Stoic view of the sustaining power of God in the world of nature. The Stoic identified the principle of the natural world with the Reason of Moral law. Paul identifies the Being 'in whom' all things consist with God. This is however a far more theistic and spiritual pantheism than that of the Stoic. The contrast is seen if we place the Stoic idea of the 'best possible world' side by side with Paul's idea of the whole creation growing and travelling in pain together with man for the realization of Christ. The
former is simply in toto God, in the latter it is distinct from him yet realizes itself in him.

In Paul's thought Christ occupies a parallel place to the Supreme Good in Platonic thought.

"Plato's Supreme Idea is the cause of all. In Christ, says St. Paul all things are created. Plato's Supreme Idea is the cause of all, the Omega of creation as well as its Alpha. "That He might sum up all things in Christ" is the last word of St. Paul's philosophy. "Plato's Good is imminent, striving to establish itself upon earth. 'He must reign till He hath put all enemies under his feet', declares the apostle".

How far can we say that the phrase ὃς ἐστι applied to Christ is a product of Greek thought? It certainly is not used by Greek Philosophy in any way in the same sense as when applied to Christ, but the idea of multiplications within the One, as it were, is certainly philosophic in origin. A connection may be established through the identification of Christ with the world--Logos and certainly the passage in the Epistle to the Colossians is striking--'the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation, for in him were all things created in the Heaven and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible'. There is also a similarity between Paul's view, and the doctrine of Ideas, in that he regards 'the things which are seen' as 'temporal' and 'the things which are not seen' as 'eternal'. The importance to ethics of placing the things upon which human life and conduct are based in the supersensible world is great in that it considers the reality which is behind the moral law not as Empirical but as

2. Coloss. 1. 16. 175. 3. II. Cor. IV. 18.
absolute.

Between Paul and Stoic pantheism there exists a 1. however similarity which is recognised by him. We must enquire into the relation of the two more closely. First, there is an evident correspondence between Paul's idea of the universal immanence of νέμος and the Stoic Universal Law and Reason, but we have seen that the former is probably due to indirect Greek influence through later Jewish Literature. A link between Christ and this immanent law is found through the association νέμος and Ὅ λόγος. The Ὅ λόγος is 'the light that lighteth every man coming into the world'. This association also forms the link between a Christian 'Universal rule of law' and the Stoic principle of cosmic law, the Ὅ λόγος being like νέμος the light in man and also the creative principle; but this connection was probably not in the mind of Paul. The more immediate correspondence between Pauline and Stoic pantheism was through the doctrine of the ψυχή ζύγον. This topic has however been dealt with on page 159, to which we must refer for further discussion of it.

We now pass on to the more distinctly ethical aspect of Paul's teaching. The supreme end of life according to Paul may be variously described. Perhaps the best description, if we interpret the term 'knowledge' sufficiently broadly is given in the words 'to come to a knowledge ( ἐπιγνώσθαι ) of the truth'. In another place Paul combines the practical and theoretic aspects of the end, 'bearing fruit in every good work and increasing in the knowledge of God'. The whole is summed

2. 1. Book Tim.11. 4.
3. Coloss. 1. 10. 176.
up in the words 'The peace of God which passeth all understanding shall guard your hearts and minds in Christ Jesus.' All is comprised for Paul within the comprehensive phrase 'to be in Χριστόν.' Side by side with this let us place specimens of the loftiest expressions of the religious issue of Greek ethics. Plotinus writes:

'So let the soul that is not unworthy of that vision contemplate the Great Soul; freed from deceit and every witchery and collected into calm. Calmed be the body of her in that hour and the tumult of the flesh; ay, all that is about her, calm; calm be the earth, the sea, the air, and let Heaven itself be still. Then let her feel how in that silent heaven the Great Soul floweth in!

Or an earlier example still from Plato:

'Proceeding as on steps...until, from the meditation of many doctrines, they arrive at that which is nothing else than the doctrine of the Supreme Beauty itself, in the knowledge and contemplation of which they at length repose.'

Let us compare the Pauline Χριστόν with the Greek ideal, more closely. First place it side by side with Plato's ideal. It is like his an ideal of vision. 'Then shall I know even as also I have been known.' Like the cult of the Supreme Beauty it is one pursued through love, but more than the 'Amor intellectualis' of the former. 'If any man love God, the same is known of him!' 'To be in Christ' is a more personal and mutual fellowship than that of Plato. Compared also with Aristotle Paul's view presents similarities. Like him Paul holds this knowledge of the

1. Phil. IV. 7. For discussion of meaning of phrase for ethics see page 113.
2. Plato---Sympos 211. For Cop Y. II. 10. 40. 11.
One is the supreme end. Like him he regards communion with the Eternal to be the secret of eternal life. The \( \text{πνευμα} \) of the \( \text{πνευματικός} \) for Paul is the immortal portion of the personality. For Aristotle the \( \text{νός πολιτικός} \) is the permanent element, and that is the part realized in \( \text{οἰκείος} \). But again the communion of the philosopher is too one-sided and intellectual and moreover too removed from practical life.

In Stoicism this defect is remedied, and even the other extreme is reached. Communion has become community. Contemplation of the One has given way to a sharing of the life of the One—membership in the One. Through this community of life with the One the isolation of the philosopher is overcome. Man comes to recognize his citizenship in the \( \text{πολιτεία τοῦ Κόσμου} \), and the Divine Life becomes once again practical. Paul realizes this advantage in his system by similar means, without surrendering the advantages of the earlier \( \text{οἰκείος} \) and without losing \( \text{τὸ εὖ} \) in \( \text{τὸ αὖ} \) or making God the mere cosmic 'animal'. Perhaps the profoundest union of the theological and the philosophical and of the religious and the ethical is to be found in Paul's doctrine of the 'Body of Christ'. We have watched the simple ethical commands of the gospels seemingly give way to the growth of a Christian religion. There are no doubt those that would, in consequence, disagree with our carrying our ethical enquiry further. But

1. Although Aristotle approaches life more closely in recognizing a practical employment of reason.

2. See Epistle to Ephesians.
here we have arrived at the completed unification of practical ethics and the ethics of mysticism. The religious consciousness is satisfied in union with its object. The moral consciousness is satisfied in realization of the life of the Whole. The will of the Whole lives in the individual and acts through him. He is a member of the highest \( \pi \lambda \nu \zeta \) \( \epsilon \), in that he is a member of 'the body'. Through this community of life individuals become 'members one of another'. Could we have a more striking anticipation of the results of the best ethical philosophy, than this re-harmonization and unification of mankind in and through the Supreme Good which is also a Will, personal and even suprapersonal? It is a bold and startling doctrine even for the genius of a Paul to give to such an age as his and would be incomprehensible but for the long education which Greek philosophy had given to the world's thought.

Another striking parallel between Paul and Greek thought, is in a point which differs from the view of Judaism. We have noted that the idea of development was absent from Jewish ethics. It is central with St. Paul. Life is regarded as a perpetual flow towards the realization of the purpose of God in Christ. Man's course is a perpetual striving towards the goal as of a race, a growth to 'the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ'. The whole thought of Paul is permeated with this conception of development and it is surely not unreasonable to assume some connection with Greek thought where there is such fundamental similarity.

1. Chapter IV.
Gathering up minor points of correspondence chiefly with Stoicism, we find that Paul and Stoic alike place a supreme value upon the individual life, the direct outcome of their common universalism and treatment of personality. So far as isolated conceptions are concerned it is well to note that the Pauline ἰσχύς is practically a model of the Stoic 'conscientia.

Sanday and Headlam in their commentary on Romans state that 'the usage of St. Paul corresponds accurately to that of his Stoic contemporaries'. This list of virtues given by Paul form an interesting study in comparison and contrast with the Greek virtues. Another idea of 'wisdom' tends to take the place of the wisdom or knowledge which was the virtue of the highest portion of the soul, according to Greek philosophy. It is of a more practical nature than the latter, combining, as one might expect, the theoretic and the practical. Love takes the place of justice. Humility, long-suffering, etc., take the place of courage and magnanimity. The only virtue quite common to both is ἄφοβος --'temperance' or self-control. In Christianity it is perhaps less a balance of the parts than control of lust, but the idea is substantially the same in both cases. Faith and hope have no parallel, except such as may possibly be discovered in the surrender and expectation involved in ὑπόθεσις, or as regards faith, in the Stoic submission of will to the voice of Reason.

Finally we come to a very interesting problem, viz. the relation of the psychological side of Pauline ethics to Greek thought. First we must deal with the so-called 'tripartite' division of the soul to be found in Paul's philosophy of human
Paul's distinction between \( \psi \nu \chi \eta \) and \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \nu \mu \alpha \) correspond with the Hebrew distinction between 'nephesh' and 'ruach'. 'Nephesh' was the life constituted in the creature. 'Ruach' is the life as bestowed by God. So \( \psi \nu \chi \eta \) is the principle of life and \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \nu \mu \alpha \) the gift of God. It may even be confined, some authorities hold, to the \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \nu \mu \alpha \). The same distinction is also found in the Apocrypha. The Pauline use is the one we have indicated above. In the first epistle to the Corinthians he contrasts the \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \nu \mu \alpha \) with the \( \psi \nu \chi \eta \).

In this respect, how then is this view related to the Greek division and how far has it been modified by it? Liddell holds that the division into body, soul, and spirit is Platonic, but that Paul has it, not from the language of Plato and his scholars, but from the current language of society, into which it had passed out of the narrow circle of the schools. Laidlaw holds that though the parallel is appreciable the divergence is more important in that the division of the upper and the lower in the soul was made by Greek philosophy to account for the continual conflict in man of lust and desire against the Divine whereas the Pauline conception is formed to introduce the higher principle of the indwelling Spirit into man's personality. This is in a measure true, but the idea of conflict is still retained by Paul and it is here perhaps his treatment is most comparable to that of Greek philosophy.

Before discussing this point, let us briefly note the three main views of ancient philosophy. Plato's division into \( \tau \omega \lambda \gamma \iota \iota \iota \iota \kappa \omicron \sigma \tau \iota \kappa \nu \omicron \) will be well remembered. The second part sides with the first.

1. See Wisdom XV. 11, XVI. 14;
2. 1. Cor. 2. 14-15;
3. Commentary on Thessalonian.
in the war against the third (which has its seat in \( \delta \omega \mu \alpha \)). 
\( \nu \omega \) or \( \tau \varepsilon \lambda \gamma \iota \zeta \kappa \omega \nu \) does not correspond to the Pauline 
\( \pi \nu \epsilon \mu \alpha \). The chief correspondence between the two is in 
the point of the \( \epsilon \pi \theta \epsilon \mu \mu \lambda \) which are at war with the higher 
members. Aristotle differs widely both from Plato and from 
Paul. His three divisions are really only three functions of 
the soul, the vegetative, the sensitive, and the noetic. 
The only point of correspondence is that Aristotle considers 
the noetic as everlasting like the pneumatic of Paul but this 
everlasting nature is purely impersonal. The Stoic division is 
simply Plato's division with slight additions and modifications. 
\( \varepsilon \lambda \kappa \zeta \) is opposed to \( \nu \omega \), not so much in the sense that 
the former is the seat of sinful lust as that all its emotions 
tend to cloud \( \nu \omega \), and must be reduced to a state of \( \lambda \iota \theta \epsilon \omega \). 

The chief correspondence in this matter between Paul 
and Greek thought, then, it is to be found in the ethically most 
interesting point of the conflict of \( \varepsilon \lambda \kappa \zeta \) and \( \nu \omega \), the 
natural or physical with the spiritual, and its moral effects. 
Paul's view is different from that of later Judaism in that 
the yezer hara is recognised by him as having its seat in the 
flesh, whereas according to the ethics of rabbinical literature 
it was not specially located there. Paul makes the flesh the seat 
of lust. 'In my flesh dwelleth no good thing'.\(^1\) Carmel is 
opposed to spiritual. But it is not every desire or emotion 
that belongs to the flesh -- only evil desires. Herein he is 
more Platonic\(^2\) than Stoic. This idea is not by any means \( \lambda \iota \theta \epsilon \omega \). Plato's counsel of self-discipline and view of

1. Rom. VII. 18. 
2. Cf. Plato's defence of Love in Symposium etc.
death, as a release correspond broadly to Paul's exhortation to mortify the members and to his metaphorical use of 'death' in Christ. This dualism in both further corresponds to the dualism in the cosmos between the seen and the unseen and their relative value as objects of desire. For Paul as for Plato the affections must be 'set on things above'. On these lines also Paul's thought is generally similar to the Stoic and Neo-Platonic ideas except in one fundamental respect. Paul holds that the flesh has become evil through the fall and may be re-sanctified. Neo-Platonism, the final expression of the Greek view, held that it was essentially evil. The Stoic ideal (\( \tau \iota \pi \nu \lambda \) \( \Theta \epsilon \iota \kappa \alpha \lambda \)), too, left room for scarcely more hopeful treatment. There is all the difference between an optimism and a pessimism, between an unworldliness and an other-worldliness, in the gulf between Christianity and Paul on the one hand, and the final results of Greek thought on the other.


We have seen the striking correspondences and the striking differences between Paul and Greek thought. It would be unwise to dogmatise as to the exact nature and extent of the correspondence. Collateral development and coincidence are always possible theories, but at all events kinship must be recognised, and that chiefly on the ethical side of thought. Noting, as we have done, the possibility of commerce between Paul and Greek philosophy, we can scarcely account for the likeness as purely fortuitous, and we must at least recognise the existence of modificatory influences, profound though indirect, enacting 1. Phaedo.
from Hellenism. In Paul's thought we may venture to recognise the early mingling of East and West, Jewish religion and Greek philosophy in one harmonious whole.

III. Conclusion.

We have noted many of the varied influences which have moulded New Testament ethical thought, combining in it the strength of diverse parentage. In conclusion let us attempt broadly to classify them. First of all we noticed that in the soil of Judaism the new teaching had its roots. Transcendental theology, ethical monotheism, religious spirit, practical moral fervour, and the practical side of its immediate ethical teaching were its birthright from its native source. Second, there was the element which ethical system can scarcely take adequate account but which the history of the growth of morals cannot afford to ignore — the personal factor, Christ. In those decisive periods when some great change in the conditions of human life, extending beyond the boundaries of the a single nation, has brought about a moral crisis effecting the whole history of the world and demanding a revolution of moral ideas and theories, then the historical process awaits completion by the power of an ideal character, an ethical genius, whose influence can awaken slumbering impulses to life. But more than this the Christian consciousness attributed to Christ. He was the supreme object of an intensely religious consciousness. 'Before the Gospels were written, men spoke of the 'Spirit of Jesus' as an active amongst them. We may criticise their phrase and their psychology as we like, but they were speaking of something they knew, something they had seen and 

felt, and it was that 'something' which has changed the course of history. Christianity however could not have remained long dependent on the experience of individual believers without running the risk of degenerating into pure mysticism, and losing much of its ethical value. But the influence of the Greek mind was brought to bear upon it; inducing reflective thought and systematization and bringing the mystic experience into relation again with the whole of life, working out its ethics again in the supreme ethical conception of community of life in a universal, cosmic and spiritual whole which yet embodied this mystic fellowship with Christ. This was the religion and ethic which was thrust out into the world of Greek culture. There, it discovered common elements which enabled it to find a basis for argument and propagation. But more than this it came under the influence of a great failure. It came to a world whose systems had led at last to pessimism, and divorce between the daily life and the blessed life, whose best teaching had been for the few, and whose masses had nothing more satisfying than a blank paganism, while the philosopher drew his cloak more tightly round him, shutting himself within himself. It came to the many, to the wise and to the foolish, with a message of hope, of religious satisfaction, of practical morality, and brotherhood, and it found a world waiting for it. And so from the time of the New Testament we look forward down the ages in which this new teaching was to assimilate more and more of the results of ancient philosophy, borrowing boldly when occupying the dominant position where as subordinate it would


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have been more exclusive, sometimes acknowledging, sometimes repudiating its debt, but combining more and more through the work of broader minds the gift of the East and of the West, to accomplish the Eternal Purpose which moves through 'all thinking things, all objects of all thought', calling mankind onwards, and which is the Alpha and the Omega of all development.

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