This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation.

Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.
Abstract

Russian conflict management has been understood as being ‘quintessentially Russian’. This project demystifies this reading. By exploring Russia’s approach from the early 1990s to the end of Medvedev’s presidency in mid-2012, the thesis answers the following question: to what extent has Russia’s behaviour corresponded with security governance as understood in the literature and practiced by other European actors? The argument is that Russia has selectively engaged in the norms and processes of security governance developed in European conflict management. This is driven by a policy that combines the defence of its sovereignty/national interests with a declared commitment to collective decision-making and policy implementation in European security governance. The framework of security governance is employed to examine Russia’s behaviour across its regional space and the wider European neighbourhood, and to ‘map’ its behaviour in accordance with the evolution of European security governance. Using multi-case study analysis and relying on documentary evidence, supported by semi-structured interviews, the thesis makes the following contributions. First, it offers a thorough empirical inspection of Russian conflict management. Second, it contributes to the debate on Russia and European security governance, and adds to the discipline of Security Studies by demonstrating the conceptual purchase of security governance.
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Derek Averre and Professor Mark Webber, for their excellent guidance and unwavering support. Derek has been a top-class supervisor and instrumental to the successful completion of this thesis. Without his knowledge of rugby, ‘working class’ principles, sound seventies music taste (or so he thinks), good sense of humour and countless stories of the legendary 1970s, the ‘North East’ and travels throughout the U.S.S.R., constant cursing of University bureaucracy which provided many hours of entertainment, generosity to regularly foot the bill at our watering hole Staff House, kindness and consideration, patience with my ramblings on and off paper, diligence and, of course, expert knowledge in Russian foreign and security policy, my experience at Birmingham would have been far less rewarding and enjoyable. Special thanks must also go to Mark for his perseverance and patience to put up with four years of all things Russian, his mastery of IR & Security Studies, and remarkable ability to succinctly convey what it means to do social science.

I would also like to acknowledge the generous financial assistance from the School of Government & Society in providing a three-year bursary covering tuition fees and maintenance. Moreover, my fieldwork could not have been undertaken without the funding provided by a European Union Marie Curie Action International Research Staff Exchange scheme (IRSES) entitled ‘EU in Depth—European Identity, Cultural Diversity and Political Change’, which was coordinated by Dr Derek Averre.

In carrying out my research, I would like to thank the staff at the Orchard Learning Resource Centre who provided help in navigating the labyrinth of English and Russian language documents situated in the Baykov Library. I would also like to thank CREES and POLSIS for their academic and financial support during my studies. A special mention must also go to Ms Tricia Thomas for her help in making sense of University bureaucracy and for her general support to the doctoral community in the School of Government & Society.

It is important to also acknowledge the friends that I have made during my time at Birmingham. I was lucky enough to be a part of a friendly and supportive cohort of doctoral researchers, which made the process of completing the PhD far less daunting. Special thanks must go to Dr Josh Baker and Dr Rhys Crilley for their support throughout the research process and their invaluable friendship outside of the ‘Ivory Tower’. I would also like to thank many other friends and colleagues, including Max Lempriere, Liam Stanley, David Norman, John Kennedy, Daniel Rio Tinto, Lindsay Clark, Jonna Nyman, Vickie Hudson, Nino Kemoklidze and Duncan Leitch. Further thanks must also go to the newer ‘contingents’ of PhDiers on the 10th Floor for their continued support and friendship. I also give my sincere thanks to Sam ‘Samwise’ Warner. He has provided academic support and guidance (including his valiant ‘stepping into the breach’ to help compile my vast amounts of footnotes during the final stressful twenty-four hours before submission), and has become a good friend, whom one can rely on to engage in an equal amount of beer drinking, general chat, and of course whinging.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude for the incredible support provided by my family over the course of this project. To quote my mum ‘It’s been a long, old slog’, and without the generosity, kindness and resolute support of my parents I would not have completed my doctorate. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to both my mum and dad for yet again helping me through another chapter of my life. This appreciation is extended to Lauren for being a kind, understanding and patient partner.
Note

In accordance with section 7.4.1 (g) of the Regulations of the University of Birmingham (Section 7 – Assessment, Progression and Award), please note that parts of this thesis have been published as:


Abbreviations

14 Army (14A)
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
Civil-Military Task Force (CMTF)
CIS Peacekeeping Force (CIS-PKF)
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Russia (CCI)
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (CSP)
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)
East-Central Europe (ECE)
Eastern Partnership (EaP)
European Atomic Energy Company (EAEC)
European Community (EC)
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
European Security Strategy (ESS)
European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)
European Police Office (EUROPOL)
European Union Force (EUFOR)
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova (EUBAM)
EU Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)
EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX)
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH)
Group of 8 (G8)
Group of Military Observers (GMO)
Implementation Force (IFOR)
Individual Partnership Programme (IPP)
Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK)
Internally displaced persons (IDP)
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY)
International Police Task Force (IPTF)
International Relations (IR)
International Syria Support Group (ISSG)
Islamic State (IS)
Joint Civilian Commission (JCC)
Joint Constitutional Commission (JcC)
Joint Military Commission (JMC)
Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF)
Joint Permanent Council (JPC)
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)
Liberation Army of Presevo, Medveda, and Bujanovac (UCPMB)
Military Observers (MO)
Ministry of Emergency Situations, Russia (EMERCOM)
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Russia (MOI)
Multi-National Division North (MND(N))
Figures

1.1 Characteristics of (Post-)Westphalian States

2.1 Methodological Stages of Conflict Management Operations

3.1 Overview of a pooling of sovereignty and interaction complexity of the pre-settlement phase of the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, 1991-1995

3.2 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the post-settlement phase of the peace effort in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, 1995-2012

4.1 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the (pre-) intervention phase of the peace effort in Kosovo, 1998-1999

4.2 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the post-intervention phase of the peace effort in Kosovo, 1999-2012

5.1 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the pre-ceasefire phases of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

5.2 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the post-ceasefire phases of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

6.1 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the pre-ceasefire phase of the Moldova-Transnistria conflict

6.2 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the post-ceasefire phase of the Moldova-Transnistria conflict
Contents

ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................... 1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................. II
NOTE ................................................................................................................................. III
ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................... IV
FIGURES......................................................................................................................... VI

CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1

RATIONALE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS ........................................... 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................................................................... 8
RESEARCH METHODS ................................................................................................. 10
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ...................................................................................... 11

CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................. 13

1.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 13
1.2 THE SECURITY GOVERNANCE TURN .................................................................. 13
  1.2.1 Existing approaches and concepts of European security ...................................... 14
  1.2.2 Security Governance as Concept ........................................................................ 16
    Transitions in Security.................................................................................................... 17
    Governance and the State ............................................................................................ 20
  1.2.3 Security Governance as Practice ........................................................................ 27
    The North Atlantic Alliance ......................................................................................... 28
    The European Union .................................................................................................... 30
1.3 RUSSIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY .................................................... 34
  1.3.1 The Yeltsin era ...................................................................................................... 34
    Policy and the external environment ........................................................................... 35
    Policy in practice ......................................................................................................... 39
  1.3.2 The Putin and Medvedev Presidencies 2000-2012: A new assertiveness or a refinement of policy? .............................................................................................................. 45
    Policy thinking and the external environment ............................................................. 47
    Policy in practice ......................................................................................................... 50
1.4 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 54

CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................. 56

2.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 56
2.2 EUROPEAN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ................................................................ 56
  2.2.1 Making sense of the policy area ............................................................................ 56
    Definitions of conflict management ............................................................................ 57
    Methods of conflict management ................................................................................. 59
    Operations of conflict management ............................................................................ 62
  2.2.2 Evolution and development in European approaches ........................................... 67
    The European experience ............................................................................................ 67
2.3 RUSSIAN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT .................................................................. 73
  2.3.1 The existing literature .......................................................................................... 73
    Russia’s ‘wider’ European experience........................................................................ 74
    The regional experience: ‘quintessentially’ Russian?.................................................... 75
2.4 RE-ASSESSING RUSSIA’S RESPONSE .................................................................. 80
  Contributions and positioning ....................................................................................... 80
  Argument ....................................................................................................................... 85
2.5 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 88

CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................................................. 90

3.0 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 90
3.1 PRE-DAYTON: MANAGING INTRA-STATE VIOLENCE ...................................... 91
  3.1.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity .................... 91
CHAPTER 6

6.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 209
6.2 PRE-CEASEFIRE PHASE ................................................................. 210
  6.2.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity ............................................................................. 210
    Diplomatic Level ........................................................................ 211
    Operational Level ........................................................................ 213
  6.2.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation .................................................................................. 214
    Coercive Measures ...................................................................... 214
    The Settlement Process .................................................................. 219
6.3 POST-CEASEFIRE PHASE ............................................................ 222
  6.3.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity ............................................................................. 222
    Diplomatic Level ........................................................................ 224
    Operational Level ........................................................................ 229
  6.3.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation .................................................................................. 232
    Coercive Measures ...................................................................... 232
    Reconstruction and reconciliation .................................................. 235
    The settlement process .................................................................. 238
6.4 CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 242

CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 243

SUMMARY OF THESIS ........................................................................ 243
  Argument ...................................................................................... 243
  Contributions ................................................................................. 246

LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ......................... 247
  Limitations ..................................................................................... 247
  Possibilities .................................................................................... 249

APPENDIX A – RESEARCH METHODS .................................................. 257
  CASE STUDY ANALYSIS ................................................................. 258
  INTERVIEWS .................................................................................. 261
  DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS .......................................................... 264

APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS ............................................. 268

REFERENCES ..................................................................................... 269

SECONDARY LITERATURE .................................................................. 269
  PRIMARY MATERIAL ....................................................................... 280
    Catalogues and collections .......................................................... 280
      BBC Summary of World Broadcasts ............................................. 280
      Friends and Partners Database (http://www.friends-partners.org) ................................................................. 281
      The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press ................................ 282
      The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers ......................................................... 283
      The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation ...................................................... 283
    Newspapers and media ................................................................. 283
      BBC ............................................................................................ 283
      The Guardian .............................................................................. 283
      The Independent .......................................................................... 284
      Itar Tass ...................................................................................... 284
      Izvestiya .................................................................................... 285
      Krasnaya Zvezda ......................................................................... 285
      Moldova.org ............................................................................... 287
      Nezavisimaya Gazeta ................................................................... 287
      New York Times ............................................................................ 289
      Novyi Izvestiya ............................................................................ 289
      Rossiyskaya Gazeta ..................................................................... 289
      Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty ................................................ 289
      Segodnya ................................................................................... 289
      Sputnik ..................................................................................... 289
Official foreign policy documents, press releases and statements ...................................................... 289

Department of Defence, US .................................................................................................................. 289
EU documents, press releases and statements ...................................................................................... 289
Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons ................................................................................. 290
House of Commons Defence Committee, UK ...................................................................................... 290
MoD, UK ................................................................................................................................................ 290
NATO documents, press releases and statements ............................................................................. 290
Office of the High Representative and Contact Group document, press releases and statements .... 290
OSCE documents, press releases and statements ............................................................................... 291
Other .................................................................................................................................................. 292
President of Russia, the Kremlin .......................................................................................................... 292
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs policy documents, press releases and statements ................. 293
Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations documents, press release and statements .................. 297
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs .................................................................................................... 297
United States Institute of Peace ........................................................................................................... 297
United Nations documents .................................................................................................................... 297
General Mission Information and concepts ......................................................................................... 297
Security Council Resolutions .............................................................................................................. 297
Security Council Meetings .................................................................................................................... 298
Security Council Presidential Statement ............................................................................................ 299
Secretary General Letters ................................................................................................................... 299
Secretary General Report .................................................................................................................... 299
Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War a system of security governance has emerged in Europe. Security governance has not only reflected the deep-seated transitions of globalisation but has also been a policy response to the structural changes in the European milieu because of the acceleration of this phenomenon. These policies of security governance are based on the ‘development of comprehensive and horizontally integrated responses to complex emergencies’ (Shroeder, 2011: 2). European security governance is therefore about the cultivation of inventive and logical problem-solving responses to an increasingly fragmented external environment, and the aggregation of policy-relevant goals to a wider systemic purpose of ‘providing coherent direction to society’ (Peters, 1998: 2) through the internal socialisation of state actors to the norms and value preferences of this system. Both purposes have largely been organised around the widening and deepening of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) since the 1990s, including interaction with a variegated set of public and private actors above and below the state. As one scholar writes ‘The membership and relations among these systems of rule are complex and overlapping, so are their functions and obligations’ (Krahmann, 2001: 1). The EU and NATO form the institutional core of European security governance and have largely determined the accepted norms and practices of the security agenda in the European milieu.

While this system has matured since the early 1990s and experienced several phases of consolidation and integration, Russia has ‘endured a confusing, often tortuous process of self-definition’, and has been ‘forced to answer a series of fundamental questions about its relationship to the post-Cold War world system and its own identity as a state’ (Mankoff, 2009: 11). A core set of questions therefore remain relevant about how Russia has managed the impacts of an
increasingly fragmented external environment and what this has meant for its political and security relationship with the central actors of European security governance. These questions have focused on Russia’s view of developments in European security policy, whether Russia identifies itself with these transitions and Russia’s policies in Europe (see Lynch, 2005: 7). These enquiries have led one scholar to conclude that Russia and its European neighbours have exercised two competing strategies of managing globalisation, with one aimed at protecting internal order and the other aimed at projecting internal order. In this sense, ‘Russia is reinforcing domestic stateness as a conservative means of minimizing the ambiguity of global challenges’, while the central actors of the system of European security governance ‘project [their] domestic structures as a means to manage ambiguity along [their] periphery’ (Medvedev, 2008: 225).

This thesis explores how this debate has unfolded in the policy area of conflict management. In the context of the evolving norms and processes of European security governance, the thesis analyses continuity and change in Russian doctrine, policy, and practice from the final days of Mikhail Gorbachev’s tenure in power in mid-1991 to the end of President Medvedev’s presidency in mid-2012. The thesis examines to what extent Russian behaviour corresponded with developments in security governance as broadly understood in the literature and applied in practice by other European actors. Mechanisms and norms of European conflict management have rapidly evolved since the early 1990s in accordance with the consolidation of Europe’s system of security governance as ‘[p]eace operations reflect the nature of the evolution of security needs and of the ways to tackle security issues’ (Tardy, 2004: 3). The increasingly complex nature of intra-state conflict in terms of actors and interests involved (see Kaldor, 2007) has amplified the difficulties in establishing and maintaining peace for an intervening force. Former United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Annan’s words on the tenth anniversary of the massacre in Srebrenica that ‘[it] will haunt our history forever’, are a poignant reminder of how important and fragile the stakes are for the intervening forces when engaging in conflict management.1 Highlighting these challenges, Ramesh Thakur (2006: 41) crucially points out that ‘[a] significant

---

cost of the cascade of generations of peacekeeping within a highly compressed timeframe is that most of the major operations today have little real precedent to go by; each has to make and learn from its own mistakes’.

In Russia’s case, much of the literature has criticised Moscow’s behaviour and argued that it has diverged from the norms and practices of security governance developed in European conflict management since the early 1990s. It has been understood that Russia’s approach to conflict management has exhibited a large degree of political and economic interference, and the use of disproportionate force to enforce the peace (Baev, 1993, 1996, 1998; Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1995; Jonson and Archer, 1996; Lynch, 1999; Sagramoso, 2003; Mackinlay, 2003; Allison, 2013). However, this thesis contends that there has been a degree of ambivalence in Russia’s approach, particularly in its regional space, where existing analysis has failed to consider the complexities of Russia’s response. Russia has been a central actor in the European experience of conflict management and has been extensively engaged in this policy area. Russia’s experience has included operations along its regional periphery and in the wider European space, where it was a key player in the management of the conflicts in the Balkans throughout the 1990s and 2000s. This thesis aims to unpack and to demystify existing understandings. It offers a rigorous interrogation of these experiences to identify trends in Russia’s approach. This introductory chapter will first discuss the thesis’ rationale and contributions, and then provide a summary of the argument. The methodology will then be briefly introduced, followed by an outline of the thesis’ structure.

**Rationale and contributions of the thesis**

As noted above, this thesis examines Russian conflict management from the early 1990s to the end of President Medvedev’s presidency in mid-2012. The thesis analyses continuity and change in Russian doctrine, policy, and practice in accordance with the policies of security governance developed in European conflict management. This thesis is driven by the following research question:
• To what extent has Russian doctrine, policy, and practice corresponded with developments in security governance as broadly understood in the literature and applied in practice by other European actors?

By focusing on Russia’s approach towards complex intra-state conflict, this research question is concerned about how Russia has attempted to manage an increasingly fragmented external environment because of the processes of globalisation, and how this has contributed towards the shaping of Russia’s political and security relationship with the system of European security governance. This research makes an \textit{empirical} contribution by providing a rigorous examination of Russian security behaviour in the policy area of conflict management.

The central problem with much of the existing literature is that it focuses on Russia’s behaviour in its immediate regional space during a narrow timeframe between the early to mid-1990s, and has failed to provide an empirically informed and rounded analysis of Russia’s approach towards conflict management in the European security milieu. This severely limits our understanding about how Russia has responded to complex intra-state conflicts and how this has informed Moscow’s wider relationship with the system of European security governance. The first part of this limitation relates to the unbalanced nature of existing analysis. Emphasis is predominantly placed on Russia’s regional behaviour while largely overlooking Russia’s experience across the wider European neighbourhood. Russia’s engagement in the Balkans is a vital episode in its experience of conflict management and the minimal attention it has received is a significant drawback in the analytical integrity of existing scholarship. This would be acceptable if this scholarship made clear that inferences put forward about Russian behaviour were confined to Moscow’s regional experience of conflict management – although many assumptions are largely problematic. However, whether explicit or implied, inaccurate assumptions are made about Russia’s regional approach which have then been used to provide generalisations about Russia’s wider behaviour (Baev, 1998; Mackinlay, 2003; Allison, 2013). Existing frameworks and analysis have been imprecise, interpreting Russian conflict management as an entirely coercive and instrumental exercise in the pursuit of narrow self-interests (Jonson and Archer, 1996; Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1996; Lynch, 1999). While a degree of ambiguity in Russia’s response has been
recognised, much of this existing scholarship has difficulties providing a nuanced understanding of Russian behaviour. Yet, as will be argued below, Russia’s experience of conflict management in the European context is linked to a considerably more expansive set of principles and practices than currently understood.

Even where attempts have been made to engage in an analysis of Russia’s wider European experience, these have largely been limited in empirical scope (Ullman, 1996; Gow, 1997; Bowker, 1998) or have only emphasised the impact on Russia’s wider foreign and security policy thinking of Moscow’s policy in the Balkans (Headley, 2009; Thorun, 2008). While this has offered an informative insight into the contours of Russia’s general Balkan policy, it has not systematically linked a discussion on Russian policy to a detailed and rigorous inspection of developments in Russian doctrine and practice within the broader context of European conflict management. Others have marginalised this area of enquiry and pointed to its lack of empirical utility in contributing towards a deeper understanding of Russian conflict management, claiming that Russia failed to learn any expertise from its Balkan experience (Antonenko, 1999, 2007). In this sense, the existing scholarship’s treatment of Russia’s behaviour is analytically insufficient.

The second limitation in the existing literature relates to the timeframe which research has focused upon. Existing studies which specifically focus on Russian conflict management tend to focus on the narrow window of Russia’s experience between the early to mid-1990s. Scholarship was either written during this period or after the conflicts had taken place and conscious decisions were made by commentators to maintain their focus on this period. This has misrepresented Russian conflict management because there has been very little consideration of potential change and development in Russia’s behaviour. This limitation has been further intensified as existing analysis has not taken into consideration changes in norms and practices in European approaches (alongside the UN) when analysing Russian behaviour. The literature has interpreted a narrow set of static principles and practices, and has not considered their intentional evolution to manage the impact of an increasingly fragmented external environment. An informative understanding of Russia’s behaviour can only be achieved if its responses to these transitions in security policy are taken into consideration. The failure to appreciate the fluidity of norms and practices in this policy
area restricts our understanding of their impact on Russia’s broader political and security relationship with the central actors of European security governance. Likewise, this static understanding of European approaches fails to recognise that the developments in doctrine, policy, and practice relate to a wider systemic purpose of European security governance through the internal socialisation of state actors to the normative preferences of this system.

This empirical contribution is combined with the thesis’ conceptual significance concerning the growing body of literature on security governance and its relation to the broader discipline of IR and Security Studies. In the former, the project complements existing research agendas in the security governance literature. These research agendas focus on: (1) the link between the Westphalian to the Post-Westphalian state, particularly in Europe and its periphery, to the growing relevance and practice of security governance; (2) and to the assessment of the evolution of security governance across time and space in the European regional context (see Sperling, 2014: 3-4). In this regard, the project applies these existing research agendas in the security governance literature to the context of Russia’s political and security relationship with the central actors of European security governance. However, it offers a contribution beyond existing works which have only offered a general level of analysis regarding Russia and issues of European security governance (Webber, 2000, 2007; Mirwaldt and Ivanov, 2007; Averre, 2010). Yet, while providing an insight into the wider contours of Russian foreign and security policy, none of these studies offer an extensive treatment of Russia’s behaviour regarding policies of security governance. They do not ‘bore’ into the specifics of an issue area to provide a close conceptual and empirical inspection of Russia’s understanding of and approach towards security governance.

This thesis will therefore assess Russian foreign and security policy in accordance with the Westphalian/Post-Westphalian tradition in the security governance literature, and through this will examine Russia’s interaction with the evolution of security governance across time and space in the specific policy area of conflict management.

In the latter, this thesis contributes towards the wider disciplines of IR and Security Studies by using security governance to frame the research project. It is acknowledged that security governance still possesses a degree of obscurity and has not enjoyed the same level of acceptance
and attention as its established theoretical siblings, such as security communities, institutions and regimes, and global governance. Despite this, there is ample empirical evidence that security governance is a ‘real-world’ phenomenon that requires further explanation and provides a fruitful research programme and framework for understanding contemporary security issues and ‘the evolutionary trajectory of […] international [and] [regional] systems’ (Sperling, 2014: 3). The project will therefore add to and demonstrate the conceptual and empirical purchase of the security governance literature to the disciplines of IR and Security Studies. As will be shown in the following chapters which outline the project’s framework, security governance sits alongside, complements, and in some cases, goes beyond established ways of thinking about decision-making and policy implementation in the realm of security.

Thinking about Russian conflict management in terms of security governance can, therefore, correct existing limitations in the current literature in terms of how Russian behaviour has been approached and in relation to the conclusions formulated. These limitations are addressed in this thesis using security governance as a framework for analysis – both in terms of concept (how security policy is to be studied) and practice (how security policy is implemented) (Sperling and Webber, 2014: 128) – which will provide a conceptually and empirically richer understanding of Russia’s engagement in conflict management than has been provided by existing studies. Security governance will help to organise the analysis and bridge the study of Russia’s behaviour in its immediate regional space and in the wider European neighbourhood. By offering a useable framework, security governance will identify and elucidate the behaviour of Russia across these two spaces in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of Russian doctrine, policy, and practice. As security governance captures the fluidity of the European security environment and the complexity of the response towards the management of insecurity (Webber, 2014: 28) based on a quantitative shift from ‘government’ (state-centred hierarchical security policy) to ‘governance’ (fragmentation of policymaking and political authority) (Krahmann, 2003: 6), this assists in the identification of changes in Russian security behaviour vis-à-vis the norms and practices developed in European conflict management. This framework allows for the possibility
that Russian behaviour also engages in policies of security governance, moving beyond narrow interpretations that render Moscow’s response as narrow and self-interested acts.

**Summary of argument**

To manage globalisation and its attendant consequences European actors have engaged in security governance. Security policy in European conflict management has moved from a Westphalian to a Post-Westphalian character, which follows from the assumption that security policy has shifted from government (state-centred hierarchical security policy) to governance (fragmentation of policymaking and political authority). It is understood that the operations Westphalian actors participate in are typically predicated on limited engagement, strict adherence to sovereignty, and remain wedded to the notions of consent, impartiality, and the limited use of force. These operations have limited goals of establishing peace through a cease fire. At the other extreme, operations Post-Westphalian actors participate in tend to be based on extensive engagement, employ a flexible view of sovereignty, and understand the necessity of the recalibration of the notions of consent, impartiality, and the use of force. These operations include a range of methods, have wider goals, and possess not only short but long term aims in establishing peace through ceasefires and the promotion (or even enforcement) of democratic polities in the host country (MacQueen, 2006; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 36). These divergent approaches, based on actor preference, demonstrate the differences in strategies adopted to manage the impact of globalisation.

In the case of Russia, existing scholarly analysis has either situated its behaviour at the Westphalian end of the continuum, arguing that its operations have shown limited methods and narrow aims (Baev, 1996), or in its more critical form has argued that its approach is located on an entirely different spectrum. This body of literature has contended that Russia’s behaviour remains part and parcel of ‘conflict-waging’ (Baev, 1998: 216) devoid of humanitarian and peacebuilding processes and aims (Baev, 1997: 116), and employed to serve narrow Russian interests (Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1995). One scholar sums up this thinking, claiming that Russia’s experience has been ‘quintessentially Russian’ and ‘narrowly unilateral in its underlying
motives and distinct in its practical manifestation from any regional responses to other emergencies’ (Mackinlay, 2003: 203). This relates to a broader argument in the literature that in the policy area of conflict management Russia has chosen to adopt a different approach from its European neighbours when managing the impact of globalisation.

This thesis argues that Russia’s behaviour towards the mitigation of intra-state conflict has shown a selective engagement in the policies of security governance developed in European conflict management. Between 1991 and 2012 Russia’s approach was far more expansive and complex than currently recognised. Its behaviour demonstrated a coherence that reflected some of the core aspects of the policies of security governance which have evolved in European conflict management. Crucially, Russian approaches have shown a tendency to traverse both Westphalian and Post-Westphalian security behaviour, with a selective subscription to the methods and aims across the spectrum of operations developed in the European experience. This has been driven by a policy that combines the staunch defence of its sovereign identity and national interests with a declared commitment to collective European approaches in the policy area of conflict management. In this regard, while Russia’s wider policy agenda has shown a tendency to gravitate towards Westphalian preferences about how to approach the impact of globalisation, its behaviour in conflict management has shown a more nuanced picture of its security preferences. Indeed, as noted by Charlotte Wagnsson and Arita Holmberg (2014: 326) both ‘Westphalian and post-Westphalian states often share an interest in effective security governance efforts that can turn failed states into functioning units’.

Russia’s engagement in the wider European neighbourhood, principally in the Balkans, demonstrated a largely consistent approach located in the middle ground between Westphalian and Post-Westphalian security provision. In Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moscow exercised a purposeful approach that was rooted in and shaped by the developments of the conflict. This was not, as is typically argued, informed by a superficial thinking to protect its ‘Serbian brothers’ or merely an extension of predetermined political and strategic aims contesting the emerging NATO-centred system of European security governance. Many of the lessons and thinking that Russia cultivated in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina were applied in its
experience in Kosovo. Although for Russian policymakers Kosovo represented a watershed in Moscow’s relations with the central actors of European security governance, Russia’s doctrine and practice demonstrated a deepening divergence with certain aspects of European conflict management whilst maintaining a consistent degree of convergence on others.

In Russia’s regional experience, its behaviour has been ambiguous. Russia’s involvement in regional conflict management has evolved in stages where an adherence to its doctrinal understanding has fluctuated due to its uneven policy towards its immediate regional space. The tension between its contribution towards European security governance and the safeguarding of its national interests became gradually more acute in Russia’s approach towards the former Soviet space. Russia found it increasingly difficult – particularly from the mid-2000s onwards – to accept the widening and deepening of European security governance along its border. Therefore, its approach revealed a manipulation of methods attributed to both forms of security provision noted above and demonstrated a continuity mirroring its behaviour towards conflict in the wider European neighbourhood. This challenges existing scholarship which interprets Russia’s regional experience as a highly calibrated response that only serves Russia’s narrow self-interests.

Research methods
This thesis has employed an interpretivist approach to interrogate Russian conflict management in the wider European context. This has been used to capture the ‘meaning, process, and context’ (Divine, 2002: 197-199) of Russian conflict management. This starting point of the research design explicitly acknowledges that contrary to quantitative-based research, ‘All empirical material’ is subject to ‘different interpretations’ (Divine, 2002: 206). In this regard, it is understood that ‘the onus is on the qualitative researcher to make the interpretation of the data as explicit as possible in the development of an argument using systematically gathered data’ (Divine, 2002: 207). This interpretivist response to research recognises that although research ‘cannot provide the mirror reflection of the social world that positivists strive for’, it can, however, provide access to the meanings people, and in this case state-actors, ‘attribute to their experiences and social worlds’ (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 126). It is this interpretivist response which has
driven the selection of three methods. In relation to ‘data’ gathering, this project has employed the principal method of documentary analysis supported by semi-structured interviews. The material gathered has been organised using the method of comparative case study analysis. For a lengthier discussion on the methods used in this research see Appendix A.

**Structure of the thesis**

This thesis has begun by introducing the framework for analysis. Chapter 1 will provide an overview of the debate on Russia and European security governance, introducing the framework of security governance in Europe and provide the policy context of Russian conflict management by examining Russia’s political and security relationship with the central actors of Europe’s system of security governance. It will first discuss the evolution of European security provision in the context of changes in the European milieu and go onto discuss the analytical merits of this framework. The chapter will then provide a broad outline of Russian foreign and security policy thinking across the Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev presidencies between 1991 and 2012. It will support an existing argument in the literature that Russia remains ‘included out’ of Europe’s system of security governance due to its selective subscription to the norms and processes of this system.

Chapter 2 will introduce the policy area of conflict management. It will begin with a discussion on definition, methods, and operations before moving on to an exploration of the evolutionary trends in European conflict management. It will be demonstrated that European approaches towards the management of intra-state violence have largely reflected the transitions in norms and policy practice of European security governance since the early 1990s. It will be shown that, in their adaptation to security changes in Europe, the operations state-actors have engaged in have become increasingly complex in terms of methods, scope, and aims moving from Westphalian to Post-Westphalian security provision. The chapter then introduces Russia’s approach towards conflict management across the regional and wider European spaces. Here, Russia’s behaviour is examined in accordance with the evolutionary trends of European conflict management. It is argued that Russia’s experience of conflict management has been more expansive and complex
than currently understood and has demonstrated a *selective subscription* to European methods of conflict management as based on the norms and processes captured by European security governance. During the period between 1991 and 2012 this selective engagement demonstrated both consistencies and inconsistencies across its regional space and the wider European neighbourhood. In relation to the latter, Russia’s participation in the management of conflict in the Balkans, whilst displaying divergences, reflected some of the core features of policies of security governance as developed in European conflict management.

The subsequent chapters analyse Russia’s behaviour in the framework of security governance through four case studies organised across its immediate regional space and the wider European neighbourhood. The first two deal with Russia’s participation in the management of conflict in the Balkans, with chapter 3 discussing Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, and chapter 4 examining international action in Kosovo. The following chapters interrogate Russia’s involvement in the intra-state conflicts along its regional periphery, with chapter 5 focusing on its approach to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and chapter 6 concentrating on the Moldova-Transnistria conflict. Interrogating Russia’s response towards these conflicts is necessary to provide a rich insight into its experience of conflict management in the European context. Finally, the thesis will offer general conclusions and provide some brief thoughts on the wider significance of this study for Russia’s action in Ukraine and Syria.
Chapter 1
Russia and the Governance of European Security

1.1 Introduction

This chapter will provide an overview of the debate on Russia and European security governance. It will begin by introducing the framework of European security governance in the context of changes in European security provision, before moving onto a discussion of Moscow’s political and security relationship with the central actors of Europe’s system of security governance. It will provide a broad outline of Russian foreign and security policy thinking across the Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev presidencies between 1991 and 2012. Supporting existing academic commentary, the chapter will argue that Russia remains ‘included out’ of Europe’s system of security governance due to its selective subscription to the norms and processes of this system.

1.2 The security governance turn

This section will provide a broad discussion of the conceptual journey of European security, before introducing what has been understood in the literature as the security governance turn.\(^2\)

The section presents the key contributions of security governance in the conceptualisation and practice of security provision in post-Cold War Europe. This section is divided into three subsections, with the first offering a brief overview of existing concepts and approaches of European

---

\(^2\) With a growing body of literature on security governance since the early to mid-2000s, Christou, Croft, Ceccorulli, and Lucarelli (2010) have considered this scholarship a ‘turn’ in the broader discipline of Security Studies.
security. The following two sub-sections then go on to discuss the security governance turn in relation to concept and practice as ‘security governance should be seen both as a concept, a scholarly means of analysis and understanding, and as a mechanism of policy, a practice deployed in pursuit of security within (and often across) specific geographic or policy domains’ (Webber, 2014: 17).

1.2.1 Existing approaches and concepts of European security

European history has been summed up as ‘preparing for war, waging war, or recovering from war’ (Minogue, 2000: 52). Continental Europe has been one of the major regions where conflicts of an international character have been initiated and concluded. In the twentieth century alone, the failure of inter-state relations caused two of the most devastating conflicts in world history, which were followed by a period of Cold War. It is not surprising, therefore, that concepts such as the balance of power and the security dilemma based on realist theoretical roots have been used to explain the features of previous European security relations. In brief, it was generally understood that the accretion of material power in an anarchical international system where two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union – sought primacy via an arms race of vast proportions, maintained a perpetual state of insecurity because of the security dilemma (Morgenthau, 1993; Waltz, 1988, 2001; Mearsheimer, 2010).

However, although the East-West confrontation was a central aspect of relations in the region it did not completely define European foreign affairs during the Cold War. Security began to assume a new loose form of external arrangement based on the central Western European powers. Coined by Karl Deutsch in 1957, the security community in Western Europe signified a policy of institutional development. The establishment of collective defence under NATO in 1949 and the formation of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954, alongside the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the founding of the European Economic Community in 1957/1958, and the formation of the European Atomic Energy Company (EAEC), facilitated this security community (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 1). The purpose of this security community was largely driven by rational economic and political interests. Yet, over time these states became
increasingly integrated and in this context, the Deutschian perspective of a (pluralistic) security community emerged on the academic scene. It has been understood when states become embedded in a particular form of social relations which are characterised as a community generating ‘stable expectations of peaceful change’ (see Adler and Barnett, 1998: 6).

Building upon Deutsch’s work, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998: 38) suggested that the development of a security community was facilitated by three interrelated factors: (1) precipitating conditions based on changes in technology, economics, and the new interpretation of social relations and threats; (2) factors conducive to mutual trust and the development of a collective identity, such as transactions, organisations, and social learning; (3) necessary conditions, based on mutual trust and collective identity. They also put forward the notion that security community can possess multiple layers of interaction, including: nascent, ascendant, and mature forms of a community (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 6).³ The important point to consider is that the degree of expectations of peaceful change and, therefore, the recourse to use violence to solve disputes is assumed to diminish along this continuum from nascent to mature. European security evolved along this trajectory towards a more mature form of security community, conditioned by rational behaviour and through the consolidation of a common sense of identity premised based on collective norms and values.

The literature on security communities has provided an insight into how state-actors manage their relations peacefully. In the European context, the assumptions of the security community concept have been relevant in understanding the continuation of certain institutions following the end of the Cold War. Contrary to views rooted in the realist tradition (Mearsheimer, 1990), NATO remained a central European institution even after the demise of the Soviet Union. This was complemented by the formal emergence of the EU in 1993 after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. The persistence of institutions after the Cold War demonstrated the analytical utility of

³ Nascent: this phase includes various diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral exchanges. Institutions and organizations are developed to extend the level of interaction and, thus, transparency. Ascendant: this phase includes the increase of interaction through deepening networks and institutions along functional and normative lines. Collective security is observed as a pure public good, mitigating the security dilemma. Mature: this phase includes actors which have developed a deeper collective identity which supports diverse and multiple functional arrangements in binding the various actors.
concepts, such as security community, that moved away from structural and material power-based explanations, towards an understanding alert to the importance of common identity and ideas. The security community literature suggests that Europe did not revert to competitive balancing behaviour because of a collective identity that had matured since the end of the Second World War (Krahmann, 2003: 8). However, while security community helps to explain the main aspects of the transformation of European security, it does not address how states have confronted ‘the increasing internal differentiation and fragmentation of the post-Cold War [European] security architecture’ (Krahmann, 2003: 8).

Security regimes, on the other hand, provide a more promising research agenda in analysing the complexity of post-Cold War Europe. Defined as ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area’ (Krasner, 1982: 185; also see Jervis, 1982: 357), they offer an understanding of how actors (and non-state actors) converge and interact on given security issues. However, security regimes ‘tend unduly to simplify the increasing multiplicity of actors and organisations engaged in contemporary European security policy. (Krahmann, 2001: 2). Moreover, many of the new security arrangements in Europe which deal with increasing non-traditional security issues ‘are more fluid than security regimes […] (Krahmann, 2003: 9). As will be demonstrated below, security governance does include regimes, and for that matter institutions, but it encompasses more besides. Security governance, according to Webber (2014: 20), ‘is about how institutions [and regimes] (both formal and informal) interact and how this involves networks of actors that are not simply agents of the state’.

1.2.2 Security Governance as Concept

Security governance evolved alongside the approaches outlined above although it is considered to go beyond these conventional approaches in analysing security provision. To unpack security governance as concept, this section will examine the constitutive elements of ‘security’ and ‘governance’, and highlight the conceptual utility of security governance.
Transitions in Security

The current debate on governance has been influenced by the intellectual developments on security during the 1980s and 1990s (Christou, Croft, Ceccorulli, and Lucarelli 2010: 342). These debates on the re-definition of security have been concerned with enquires into what constitutes a ‘threat’ and what or whom is to be ‘secured’ (see Booth, 1991; Baldwin, 1997; Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998; Wyn-Jones, 1999). This research agenda was steered by a dissatisfaction with how narrow readings of security at the time were shaping government policies in only traditional military terms. Referring to the increasing militarisation of US foreign policy under President Reagan, Richard H. Ullman (1983: 129) argued that

[proceeding] from the assumption that defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality. That false image is doubly misleading and therefore doubly dangerous. First, it causes states to concentrate on military threats and to ignore other and perhaps even more harmful dangers. Thus it reduces their total security. And second, it contributes to a pervasive militarization of international relations that in the long run can only increase global insecurity.

On this basis, Ullman (1983: 133) redefined security as ‘an action or sequence of events’ that either threatened ‘drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state’ or significantly threatened ‘to narrow the range of policy choices to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state’. Proceeding from this, there has been an accumulation of readings of security which have radically transformed the concept. For some, states continued to be the main victims of security risks. For others, it was society and human beings that were being endangered. Still further, the planet and environment were prioritised as the referent of security (Christou, Croft, Ceccorulli, and Lucarelli, 2010: 343). Therefore, security was still about ‘survival’ although the referent object – ‘things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival’ (Buzan, Wilde, and Waever, 1998: 36) – was not necessarily definable (Christou, Croft, Ceccorulli, and Lucarelli 2010, 2010: 343).

---

4 The proliferation of scholarship and thinking on the re-defining of security during this period led one commentator to label it a ‘cottage industry’ (Baldwin, 1997: 5).
This broadening of understanding has captured ‘real-life’ issues which can be seen as occurring across four dimensions (see Webber, 2014: 27). First, issue proliferation refers to the range of issues that have increased under the agenda of security. Since the end of the Cold War greater awareness of other non-traditional security issues and threats has occurred. The proliferation of issue areas beyond the state include but are not limited to: infectious disease, environmental degradation, criminalisation (drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking), terrorism (which includes the attempted acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)), the arms trade (Matthew and Shambaugh, 1998; Williams, 2001; Fukuda-Parr, 2003), intra-state conflict, resource insecurity, and mass migration (Ullman, 1983), and cyber (Cavelty, 2012). However, traditional understandings of security remain relevant in the post-Cold War era (Matthew and Shambaugh, 1998: 163) as ‘security issues remain heavily militarized’ (Webber, 2014: 24). Incidents of war (inter- and intra-state) and the control of military instruments remain concerns of foreign policies (Webber, 2014: 24).

Another consideration is that many of these issues did not emerge after the end of the Cold War. The Cold War should be considered a ‘permeable’ watershed in terms of conceptualising security, but particularly regarding the identification of actual security change. Buzan and Waever’s (2003: 61-62) thesis of Cold War ‘overlay’ did not push non-traditional security threats to the periphery of the security agenda in large parts of the globe. Certain security issues such as resource scarcity have always been problems for ‘developing’ countries. Terrorism and energy/environmental insecurity, for instance, also held a place on the agenda of ‘developed’ countries (Webber, 2014: 24). While these qualifications are important, they do not detract from the central point that (in)security has ‘become associated with a much more fluid set of problems against which strictly military responses are of less and less utility’ (Webber, 2014: 24).

Second, actor proliferation refers to an increase in actors beyond the state which generate security threats and contribute towards solutions, and the degree to which their ‘authority rivals and encroaches upon that of the state’ (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2005: 9). An important point to recognise is that the purpose of these actors can be both benign and malign (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2005: 9). In the former category, there is a variety of private actors able to supply security
independently of the state or act as subcontractors for it (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 7). These can range from charities to private security companies, dealing with issues in humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, peacebuilding, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP), alongside military training and protection (Krahmann, 2003: 10). It is crucial to acknowledge, however, that these benign actors may also unintentionally contribute towards greater levels of insecurity. In the latter, non-state actors can be ‘the agents of threat’ and beyond the reach of diplomacy and coercion, traditionally understood (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 7). These include transnational organised criminal elements and terrorist groups, which do not necessarily target the ‘state’ (appendages and mechanisms of government and infrastructure), but society and ‘the foundations of the social contract’ (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 7) via greater access to ‘tools once reserved for nation-states’ (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2005: 7).

Third, spatial proliferation concerns the ‘reach’ of threats which transcend state boundaries and blur the divide between internal and external security. This is related to the fourth dimension of temporal proliferation, which refers to the complexity of issues as they accumulate over time, with their lessening susceptibility to solutions pointing to problems of management and resolution. Through the globalisation of trade, communication, and transport new incentives have been provided for non-state actors (other than institutions) to operate and, in the malign form, undermine societal and state security (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2005: 10). Non-state actors which pose threats are therefore able to operate along channels dissimilar to the traditional threats posed to the territorial state (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 4). Described as ‘a complex, dynamic, and global web’, it offers an array of opportunities and capabilities to individuals and groups who intend on threatening the ‘preservation of […] well-being, freedom, [and] national culture’ (Matthew and Shambaugh, 1998: 163).

This is particularly the case regarding terrorism and organised crime, where in the former a ‘terrorist may be trained in Libya, receive funds from a religious sect in the United States via a Caribbean bank, purchase weapons from a Russian crime organization, travel on a Canadian passport, and attack British tourists in Germany. Sever one of the links in this chain, and he or she will quickly find a replacement’ (Matthew and Shambaugh, 1998: 164). In the latter,
organised crime is able to operate ‘through fluid network structures rather than more-formal hierarchies’ (Williams, 2001: 62). Even the effects of natural and man-made disasters can contribute towards environmental degradation and cut across borders with the initiation of migration and famine, in addition to increased criminalisation and exploitation of the vulnerable (Ullman, 1983: 1). The spread of infectious disease has also become a central issue on the security agenda of states as it knows no boundary. While the ‘developed’ countries have managed to contain and prevent the spread of infectious diseases from infiltrating their societies, ‘developing’ countries still suffer from both epidemics and pandemics such as AIDS/HIV, malaria, tuberculosis, and Ebola.

**Governance and the State**

Alongside these intellectual developments in security, the concept of governance has ‘emerged from virtual obscurity to take a central place in contemporary debates in the social sciences’ (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 1). Governance is a broad term and the literature on it has been extraordinarily diffuse, with different academic communities using governance to understand issues across an array of fields, including but not limited to: International Relations (IR), Security Studies, Political Science, economics, development studies, and public administration (Bevir, 2013: 1). One scholar highlights a central explanation for this: ‘Governance is not a new or faddish label, but usage has expanded in response to an increasingly complex policy environment’ (Webber, 2014: 19). While the identification of a precise definition of governance has received much scholarly attention, the understanding this thesis operationalises pertains to IR and Security Studies; both of which relate to the tradition of meaning and application of governance in Political Science more broadly. The assumption is that insights drawn from the literature on governance

---

5 The political science scholarship defines governance as: ‘Governance is ultimately concerned with the conditions for ordered rule and collective action. The outputs of governance are not therefore different from those of government. It is rather a matter of a difference in processes…The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government’ (Stoker, 1998: 17); ‘governance refers to self-organizing, interorganizational networks’ (Rhodes, 1996: 660). Similarly, the IR & Security Studies literature defines (security) governance as: ‘governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance…It embraces governmental institutions but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby those persons and organizations within its purview move ahead,
in other areas of study should bear fruit when applied more specifically to the study of international security (Sperling and Webber, 2014: 127).

For the purposes of this thesis, the term security governance is therefore defined as

the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issues), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes’ (Webber, Croft, Howorth, et al., 2004: 4).

This definition is premised upon an assumption made in the literature that a governance perspective is the best way to analyse state decision-making, policy formulation, and implementation in an environment which has transitioned from government to governance. Governance in the realm of security is concerned with understanding the process of security policy. As Mark Webber and James Sperling (2014: 128) point out ‘the altered threat environment has called forth a particular type of response. Understanding that response is best done via the concept of ‘governance’, insofar as governance brings with it well-established ways of thinking about actors and policy’. Governance differs from government in that the latter suggests activities which are supported by formal authority, by coercion to ensure policy implementation, whereas the former refers to activities backed by shared goals derived from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities, and that do not necessarily rely on coercion to attain compliance (Rosenau, 1992: 4; Smouts, 1998: 81-82; Webber, Croft, Howorth, et al., 2004: 5). Hierarchy has thus been replaced by heterarchy and horizontal forms of behaviour.

The assumed alterations of the state – which continues to be the central unit of enquiry in security governance – have been at the centre of this analysis. Because the utility of state capacity has diminished extensively in an increasingly complex domestic and international policy environment, the outsourcing of state competencies has been the necessary response, further weakening the state via a fragmentation of the state’s authority and a reduction in its policy

satisfy their needs, and fulfil their wants’ (Rosenau, 1992:4); ‘Governance denotes the structures and processes which enable a set of public and private actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political authority’ (Krahmann, 2003: 11).
oversight (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 1; Krahmann, 2003: 6; Schroeder 2011: 31). Acknowledging the changes in the understanding of security discussed above, state behaviour can be better understood if conceptualised along a continuum from Westphalian to Post-Westphalian security provision. Certain scholars reject, however, Post-Westphalianism because violations of territorial integrity ‘have been an enduring characteristic of the international system before and after the peace of Westphalia’, and states have never been able ‘to regulate perfectly transborder flows’ (Krasner, 1995: 123). Yet, on closer inspection, these violations are distinct from the largely voluntary acceptance of governance and the loss of autonomy attending it. The point is not necessarily whether states have lost control of trans-border flows, but that the qualitatively different nature and volume of these flows have impacted a ‘government’s ability to govern’ (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 5).

Although organising analysis around the existence of two kinds of states with opposite preferences may ‘lack theoretical elegance’, the presence of states that deviate significantly from the Westphalian ideal-type ‘requires a conceptual explication’ (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 5). Using a continuum provides for a flexible analysis which better conforms to the complexities of the ‘empirical world’; by relaxing the assumption of the homogeneity of the Westphalian ideal-type, the continuum offers a useful tool to locate the characteristics of particular forms of state behaviour (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 5). It is fruitful to consider the differences between Westphalian and Post-Westphalian states as shown in Figure 1.1 along four dimensions: (1) penetration; (2) critical threats; (3) sovereign control; (4) interest referent (Sperling, 2010: 4). It should be recognised that both Westphalian and Post-Westphalian characteristics represent ideal-types, and that most states do not exhibit characteristics solely from one form or the other. While states may gravitate towards one pole, this does not preclude their adoption of features from the other as the proclivities of a state may change depending on the policy area and the political context – although, as will be demonstrated below, the majority of European states have largely shifted towards the Post-Westphalian end of the continuum.
This continuum can be operationalised through the following dimensions of the broader framework of security governance, which elucidates state behaviour regarding a system (regional) and policy area level of analysis. These descriptive dimensions include: (1) pooling of sovereignty (collective interests and distribution of resources); (2) stakeholder interaction complexity (channels of cooperation); (3) purposefulness (decision-making and policy implementation); (4) norms and ideas. It should be noted that each dimension can take a variety of forms along a scale between the ideal notions of government and governance (Krahmann, 2003: 12). In the case of the state, it would be expected that states which demonstrate more engagement with the processes and practices described by these constitutive dimensions would gravitate towards the Post-Westphalian end of the continuum, whereas those states that showed a minimal engagement would be situated at the opposite end of the continuum.

The first dimension of security governance is the pooling of sovereignty for collective action. This refers to the intentional pooling of sovereignty from national towards external informal and formal collective arrangements, such as institutions or ad hoc assemblages. It is recognised that state-actors cannot fully achieve their goals without external cooperation (Krahmann, 2003: 10). Hence, there is an expectation of a convergence of interests with a deliberate distribution of resources to fulfil policy aims. The pooling of sovereignty is also suggestive of a set of institutions
and actors which are drawn from but also beyond government (Stoker, 1998: 18). The Commission on Global Governance (1995: 2) recognised that ‘Governance is the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs […] It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest’. While this provides a description of the actors involved in security governance, certain qualifications are required. In processes of security governance, ‘the state is still the centre of considerable political power’ (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 12) with security governance often being about the ‘coordination of states’ (Webber, 2014: 19). It is acknowledged that states are the agents ‘through which the structures of governance are instituted and financed, and the agents through which the efforts of these structures are largely realised’ (Webber, Croft, Howorth et al., 2004: 7). However, this positioning of states at the centre of security governance does not preclude the recognition of non-state actor participation (Webber, Croft, Howorth et al., 2004: 7).

This raises a further qualification concerning the understanding of other actors beyond the state in security governance. This is particularly the case regarding formal institutions (issue-based regimes, intergovernmental organisations, and legal instruments such as agreements, resolutions, and treaties), where, although governance transcends government based solely on centralised control (Webber, 2014: 20), it does require ‘a minimum institutional framework that outlines the rights and duties within a society’ (Smouts, 1998: 87). Put differently, ‘institutional arrangements remain important not least because they determine much of what roles the state can actually play in governance’ (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 22). However, security governance should not be considered a synonym for institutions and state-centrism, security governance is also concerned about how informal and formal institutions interact and how this involves ‘networks of actors that are not simply agents of the state’ (Webber, 2014: 20). Therefore, a security governance perspective is not so much concerned about ‘structures’ but with the ‘interactions among [and between] structures’, and, therefore, expects the practice of security governance to be dynamic regarding both ‘configuration and objectives’. This means that while there is ‘a modicum of order
Proceeding from the pooling of sovereignty, security governance also refers to the processes of stakeholder interaction complexity. This regards the number of actors in positions of authority and the intricacy and density of their channels of interaction. As introduced above, security governance is most likely to emerge when interaction density is high and reaches a point where state actors no longer possess the capability to achieve their security goals (Sperling and Webber, 2014: 135). A central assumption is the presence of a multitude of stakeholders who cooperate via various patterns of concurrent and overlapping channels of interaction complexity. While the state is still the central actor, security governance – in terms of system and policy domain – is characterised by the presence of consistent forms of interaction complexity (Sperling and Webber, 2014: 136).

The third dimension refers to purposefulness, meaning ‘the capacity to get things done’ (Stoker, 1998: 18). A security governance perspective captures the problem-solving orientation of actors ‘geared toward the setting of goals and the production of a desirable outcome’ (Webber, 2014: 19). This is indicative of the mutual processes of decision-making when setting goals and policy implementation when producing desirable outcomes. This problem-solving nature of actors is understood to involve forms of ‘rationalist calculation’ and ‘norms and values’ (Webber, 2014: 21) which involves prescribed rules, norms of interaction, and constraints (Keohane, 1988: 384). However, it is acknowledged that the preferences of decision-making and policy implementation in both forms of problem-solving are often similar but may occasionally be contested. It is presumed that policy outcomes may meet the objectives of the majority but not necessarily of all actors (Webber, Croft, Howorth et al., 2004: 8).

The final dimension of security governance concerns the role of ideas and norms. James Rosenau (1992: 4) states that security governance ‘is […] a system of rule that is as dependent on inter-subjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters’. Advocates of a security governance perspective consider this a logical consequence of governance’s independence from entirely vertical forms of authority as attributed to government. In the absence
of compulsion, collective action remains dependent initially upon ‘a willingness to act and a consistency of views on a desirable end state’ (Webber, Croft, Howorth et al., 2004: 7). As noted above, these ideas and norms are also embedded in institutions such as organisations and regimes which condition action. In this regard, proponents of security governance place particular importance on the notions of consent and legitimacy. In the former, without the presence of hierarchy and coercion, consent is essential in steering collective action towards common aims. Rosenau (1992: 4) suggests that security governance ‘works only if it is accepted by the majority (or, at least, by the most powerful of those it affects). Whereas governments can function even in the face of widespread opposition to their policies’. In the latter, legitimacy is considered crucial to understanding actor behaviour regarding their conformity to rules, processes, and formats, and their recognition of other actors all deemed to be legitimate (Webber, 2014: 22).

Security governance, therefore, provides a ‘framework clarifying and capturing within group security challenges as well as those posed by a variegated set of ‘others’’ (Sperling, 2010: 7). The concept ‘moves beyond the issue of whether multiple centres of power [such as balance-of-power, regime and security community] will lead to the re-emergence of war in Europe, to the question of how the fragmentation of power and authority affects the making and implementation of security policy in a broader sense’ (Krahmann, 2001: 21; also see Smouts, 1998: 6). For this reason, ‘security governance is a distinct form of security management (and not merely a conceptual substitute for security multilateralism or systems of global order)’ (Sperling and Webber, 2014: 7), and is, therefore, ‘a framework that describes and elucidates some of the core features of the actuality of Europe’s security relations […] Governance provides a framework of analysis that can ascertain how the ‘rules’ of security develop […] Similarly, governance is a lens that can help understand how security is produced. Its focus on states, organisations and norms allows for a multifaceted approach to the interpretation of threat’ (Webber, Croft, Howorth et al, 2004: 25-26).
1.2.3 Security Governance as Practice

This section will consider security governance as practice and discuss how the security provision by actors in Europe has cultivated integrated approaches towards the mitigation of threats. Some scholars, however, continue to regard post-Cold War Europe as ‘an anarchic self-help system’ (Hyde-Price, 2007: 3), while others point towards the weaknesses of European security governance, characterising it as ‘slow, incremental, and riddled with conflicts’ (Schroeder, 2011: 3). This thesis opposes the view that European security relations are still suspended in an environment reminiscent of the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War, or for that matter, the 1920s and 1930s, a conception of European security that has misunderstood the significance of the transitions in security policy discussed in the previous sections. Charges that security governance in the European context has suffered from a lack of resilience hold more credence and that existing claims of the effectiveness and integration of European security governance are exaggerated. There has, indeed, been problems underpinning the smooth evolution of European security governance, yet these have not necessarily been systemic obstacles but have rather been sporadic episodes confined to particular policy areas. The point to consider is that there has been a tendency towards an intentional form of behaviour amongst European security actors which has continued to contribute towards the aggregation of systemic preferences.

The discussion below will be organised around the central institutional pillars of European security governance: the EU and NATO. Within the frameworks of these two institutions the countries of Europe, as one commentator explains, ‘have gone further in developing defence, security and foreign policy cooperation than any other region of the world’ (Cottey, 2014: 164; also see Winn, 2003: 149). While security governance is not a synonym for institutions, institutional arrangements form a core part of European security governance. A brief exploration will be provided on the nature of European security governance’s attempt to engage states situated outside of this system in the ‘shared neighbourhood’, highlighting the consequences of these policies for regional security.

---

6 It is acknowledged that ‘practice’ has many meanings, however, this thesis focuses on institutions of practice.
The North Atlantic Alliance

After the Cold War NATO remained the primary institutional actor of European security in the face of much scepticism that the organisation would disappear with the end of the bipolar confrontation (Duffield, 1994: 763). With the consolidation of the EU yet to take place, the Alliance became the lead actor in facilitating Europe’s system of security governance (Cottee, 2014; 646). Through the institutionalisation of security governance, since the early to mid-1990s NATO has been able to ‘translate the rationale, goals and principles of the regional entity into strategic plans, policies and actions that in turn affect the provision of regional security’ (Kirchner and Dominguez, 2011: 319). Although there have been tensions within the Alliance since the end of the Cold War on issues such as the role of the US and its purpose in terms of collective defence, collective security, or a hybrid of these two responsibilities, NATO has contributed towards the emergence of European security governance.

The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity have been central dimensions of how NATO members have practiced security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. Members have pooled their sovereignty to facilitate consensus-building and collective action in terms of Article V collective defence, and to tackle security threats. NATO has demonstrated this through its engagement in conflict management in the Balkans, where it has cooperated through multiple channels of interaction with a vast array of actors above and below the state. In both the pre- and post-conflict stages of Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo, NATO coordinated its behaviour with other regional organisations and humanitarian organisations, because it lacked the expertise to tackle every threat (Hofmann, 2011: 113). With the signing of the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2002, NATO agreed to allow the EU to draw on some of its military and security assets so that it may take effective action in this policy area. NATO has also coordinated in the sharing of intelligence and expertise with other organisations and agencies such as the EU, the European Police Office (EUROPOL), and financial institutions in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. This shift in state-actor preference in NATO to

28
pool sovereignty is not a pragmatic means of problem-solving but is attached to a deeper set of norms and values that it deems the legitimate response to mitigate threats.

NATO’s behaviour has been purposeful in terms of its role in Europe. Members have intentionally expanded the Alliance’s responsibilities linked to changes in threat perceptions. Alongside collective defence, NATO has focused on the areas of counter-terrorism, transnational crime, conflict management, and cyber (Leopold, 1998: 80). Although NATO does not possess expertise in every area, this has demonstrated a deliberate reorientation in its understanding of security. The Alliance has indeed ‘undertaken a conscious engagement in the changed meaning of security in Europe’ (Webber, Croft, Howorth et al., 2004: 9), facilitating a set of post-Cold War aims in the form of intervention, enlargement and partnerships (Cottee, 2014: 647). NATO has been instrumental in setting the agenda conditioning security policy and response throughout most of Europe. Through greater interoperability the Alliance assisted in the fight against terrorism with the patrolling of the Mediterranean by elements of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces in the early 2000s (Domingeuz, 2012: 65). NATO has also been central in countering the smuggling of narcotics and other forms of transnational crime in Europe. While this has revealed a functional approach towards promotion of security, this engagement is related to a wider goal based on the perpetuation of European security governance as a system of norms and values. This cooperation has been accompanied by NATO’s eastward enlargement. Although this has extended the Article V guarantee to these former Warsaw Pact countries, it has also unfolded alongside the expansion of the EU and has complemented Brussels’ normative socialising process of these states.

This purposefulness has been shaped by the cultivation of an integrated Alliance based on the rule of law, human rights and democracy which have been expressed in the Alliance’s response towards threats. NATO has been a central institutional vehicle for the promotion of these norms and values to regulate the behaviour of its members and to ‘consolidate the democratic state building of new members [to] promote a broader sense of Europe’ (Cottee, 2014: 47). This has particularly been the case in the policy area of conflict management, where the Alliance assumed a central role via its missions in the Balkans, associating security-related goals with the promotion
of system-wide norms and values. Its response based on the use of force and engagement in peacebuilding demonstrated the Alliance’s regard for the protection of human rights over the resilience of sovereignty as in the case of Operation Allied Force (OAF) (1999), and for the establishment of responsible self-governing state units which can contribute towards security governance. NATO’s actions showed that it was prepared to punish violations of its norms and values, but was also willing to re-socialise states back into the slipstream of European security governance. The latter has also been facilitated by NATO enlargement in 1999, 2004 and 2009.

Throughout this period, while it can be argued that NATO’s focus was on Afghanistan for the best part of a decade, the Alliance remained a key institutional pillar of European security governance because of its military capability in comparison to other actors in Europe. Even with the emergence of the EU as a security actor in the 2000s this did not override NATO’s importance for European security governance.

**The European Union**

NATO’s resilience as a central institutional actor of European security governance has been reinforced by the emergence of the EU. Although there is still a degree of institutional rivalry, this has been offset by a common set of norms and values across both organisations due to the dual membership of many state actors. Moreover, the division of labour between the organisations ‘is complementary and does not represent the displacement of one organization by another’ (Whitman, 2004: 430). Highlighting the integration of the EU, the organisation has been used ‘as a frame of reference against which other regional systems of governance are measured, either from a normative perspective (the non-violent resolution of conflict) or a structural one (the presence of complexity and heterarchy)’ (Sperling, 2014: 588). With the EU’s remit in internal and external security the institution has taken centre-stage in the evolution of European security governance. While this integration has predominantly occurred in domestic policy, since the late 1990s, driven by concerns about its inability to act during the conflict in Kosovo, members set in motion a rapid change in policymaking and implementation in matters of defence and security.
The emergence of an EU security and defence character throughout the 2000s reinforced European security governance.

The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity have been central aspects of this process. Internally, EU members have pooled their sovereignty into the central institutions of the EU. While a core feature of the Post-Westphalian state, this has not meant that the national identity of the members has been superseded by a European identity. What is clear, however, is that governments ‘possess a (relatively) denationalized understanding of the threats common to Europe and generally expect a collective European response to those threats’ (Sperling, 2014: 592). Because of the Post-Westphalian character of European states and the deep-seated structural regional changes in politics and security, it has made it virtually impossible for those states to act independently. Members ‘are structurally compelled’ to transfer sovereign authority to the EU to expedite their relations with one another and tackle external threats (Sperling, 2014: 593). This is viewed as a rational means of ‘survival’ to satisfy national interests, and as a public good due to the normative socialisation of state preferences.

EU members have also recognised the utility of cultivating collective responses towards external security issues. With the development of the EU’s security and defence capability, the EU has engaged in collective responses in many policy areas. This is based on a variety of stakeholder channels of interaction complexity. The EU has been more effective than NATO in the fight against terrorism because of the deep levels of interaction between member states’ defence and security communities. In terms of tackling the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the EU can influence export controls and thwart illegal shipments across the territory of its members (Kirchner, 2010: 121). Alongside this, the EU has engaged in conflict management operations in the Balkans, such as Operation Concordia (2003) in Macedonia and Operation EU Force (EUFOR)-Althea (2004 to present) in Bosnia & Herzegovina. In both operations, the EU relied on NATO assets and cooperated with UN agencies and an array of NGOs (Sperling, 2014: 610-612).

This intentionality to pool sovereignty has been linked to a wider purposefulness to facilitate European security governance based on the institutional deepening and widening of the EU. The
EU’s engagement in certain policy areas since the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)/Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is understood as being linked to the wider-systemic purpose of promoting the norms and values of European security governance. The EU is alert to the agenda of shaping a geographical, political and security space in Europe that is conducive to the collective preferences of its members. In the realm of security and defence the EU has developed common policies crafted on the security cultures and interests of its members. While divergences exist on how best to approach security provision, a considerable degree of consolidation has nevertheless taken place. This began in the late 1990s with the St Malo Accord (1998) between France and the UK which initiated the EU’s ESDP. This was a major component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and was activated under the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. This was followed by the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and the development of the ESDP into the CSDP in the late-2000s after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007.

This has culminated in a security and defence identity where the EU is alert to a multitude of threats. While the ESS recognises ‘hard’ security issues, it also focuses on other threats such as terrorism, regional conflicts, and state failure, which although they possess ‘hard security edges’, also have ‘soft’ security implications (Kirchner, 2010: 117). The EU has developed a range of policies ‘tailored to the expanding number of security pathologies targeting internal tranquillity and external stability’ (Sperling, 2014: 594). The EU has crafted its response towards issues based on both civilian and military dimensions. The EU is reliant on NATO to provide collective defence, while Brussels’ recourse to use force is still premised upon the narrow parameters of the Petersburg tasks which include ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks’, ‘peacekeeping’, and ‘tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’. This has not ruled out certain divergences, particularly in relation to the use of force, in security cultures between the central member states.

---

8 Petersburg Tasks, chapter II, paragraph 4, 1992.
Enlargement to the east has also been a central means to consolidate security governance in Europe, with the main expansions taking place in 2004 and 2007. This has been accompanied by the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (2004) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) (2009) to facilitate stability along the EU’s borders. Nevertheless, both the ENP and the EaP have demonstrated varying degrees of success, cultivating an inconsistent patchwork of relationships with the former Soviet Republics in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus (Delcour, 2010; Christou, 2010). Engaging in softer forms of conflict management in places such as Moldova and Georgia, alongside the employment of statebuilding, both the ENP and EaP have been unable to socialise these states into the mainstream of security governance. Although writing before the development of the ENP and EaP, one scholar explains that enlargement ‘is a security policy by other means [by] extending the Union’s norms, rules, opportunities and constraints to successive applicants the [EU] has made instability and conflict on the Continent decreasingly likely’ (Missiroli, 2003: 17). Yet, as will be a central theme in the following sections, this extension of security governance through the EU has not only resulted ‘in a wider Europe’, according to some experts, but has also produced “outside states” (Light, White, and Lowenhardt, 2000: 77).

As mentioned earlier, this purposefulness has been closely bound up with the normative and values dimension of the EU. The importance of this dimension is that European security governance is not simply the constellation of interactions between states, but is rather state interaction in the context of a ‘complex system of norms, institutions and practices which shape and define both the way states behave and the system as a whole’ (Cottey, 2014: 171). The power of ideas runs at the core of the EU’s contribution towards security governance and how security provision is translated into practice. Ian Manners (2002) famously described the security and defence policy of the EU as facilitating a ‘normative power Europe’. This refers to the EU’s normative and value-laden conception of security and defence policy, where its engagement in tackling threats relates to a systemic purpose in promoting European security governance. As in the case of NATO, the EU has aimed to engage in preventative approaches towards latent and existing security issues via the deliberate extension of its norms and values. This has been intentionally built into the enlargement processes of the EU, which places the states in the former
Soviet space under the scrutiny of the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’. External action has increasingly been encoded in normative and values-based arguments.

1.3 Russian Foreign and Security Policy

The previous discussion highlighted the evolution of European security governance into a highly integrated system. It was shown that the cultivation of and engagement in European security governance has become the principal route in which European states have attempted to manage the impact of globalisation. This follows from the assumption that the major European states are those which hold membership in either or both central institutional pillars of European security governance. It is the dual expansion of NATO and the EU since the end of the Cold War which although has incorporated new members has inevitably resulted in a ‘wider Europe’ and ‘outside states’ (Light, White, and Lowenhardt, 2000: 77). Russia is perhaps the most important example of an excluded state, if only because of its size and significance in the realm of foreign and security policy (Light, White, and Lowenhardt, 2000: 77). The section will therefore consider Russia’s external policy in light of the emergence of European security governance. It will highlight the development of trends in Russian policy thinking and outline Moscow’s relationship with the central actors of European security governance. It will embed the discussion in the existing literature on Russia and security governance, acknowledging that Russia since the early 1990s has remained ‘included out’ (Webber, 2007: 141) because of its selective subscription to the norms and processes of European security governance (Averre, 2010).

1.3.1 The Yeltsin era

During the Yeltsin presidency Russia’s approach towards the emerging system of European security governance was steered in large part by the stewardship of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev (1991-1996) and his successor Yevgeny Primakov (1996-1998). The articulation of foreign and security policy under both Ministers demonstrated attempts to manage the tension between Russian national interest/sovereign autonomy and a constructive engagement with its external environment. Moscow’s pro-Western tilt during its initial post-Soviet years gave way to
a policy that became more alert to the promotion of national interest as the decade unfolded. Western policymakers were alarmed at this reversal in Russian thinking and perceived it as a departure from an integrationist path with Europe. This was understood differently in Moscow, as many in the Russian government and across the spectrum of the political elite considered this correction vital to cultivate a realistic understanding of its external environment. Alexey Arbatov (1993: 10) pointed out that both Russia and the West employed a naïve thinking about the potential of mutual integration. Kozyrev’s ‘doctrine’, he argued, ‘underestimated the uniqueness of the Russian state and its heritage, as well as Western reservation about too rapid a convergence’, stating further that ‘The West was unprepared for that and feared making too broad a commitment, taking on too great a responsibility, or getting too deeply involved in the destinies of a giant country that is hard to understand and even harder to predict’.

This balancing act produced an external policy that strove for Russia’s equal partnership with the central institutional pillars of European security governance. This was not a policy of confrontation, but was rather a policy of recognition in terms of interests and status. Therefore, a consistent dynamic of convergence with and divergence from European security governance unfolded across a range of policy areas. The following discussion will demonstrate that Moscow engaged in security governance when tackling specific issues, but was not prepared to be socialised into the wider purpose of European security governance.

**Policy and the external environment**

The beginning of President Yeltsin’s tenure in office facilitated an initial period of cooperation and warming of relations between Russia and its Western partners. One commentator notes that to integrate Russia into the ‘world community’ Yeltsin ‘embarked upon a policy of full-blooded westernization’ (Bowker, 2000: 34). Kozyrev strove for a policy of integration with Europe. Believing that history had indeed ended and presented no alternative to Western development (Tsygankov, 2013: 56), Kozyrev declared that Russia should strive to enter the international community of states. Moreover, Kozyrev identified Russia with the promotion of the West’s human rights agenda, which was accompanied by his description of Russia ‘as a great (but
normal!) power in all its aspects’. The policy was to integrate Russia into the family of Western states as an equal player and ‘become partners and allies in the struggle for peace and stability in Europe and beyond’ (Bowker, 2000: 35). Russia’s policy of integration during the early 1990s reflected conviction, necessity, and self-interest to maintain Russian great power status through further accord with the West (Marantz, 1997: 347; Donaldson, 2000: 306).

This thinking, which underpinned Russia’s immediate policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been described as ‘conspicuously pro-Western’ with ‘a heavy tilt towards economic determinism and universal democratic values’, and at the same time, generally indifferent to ‘the geopolitical and strategic facets of international relations’ (Arbatov, 1993: 10). The Russian leadership exercised a largely empty policy towards its immediate regional space. While Russia established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991 to initiate regional economic and military integration, the former Soviet Republics, though in the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, were not considered a priority and, therefore, ‘no explicit, coherent policy was pursued; the sovereignty of the newly independent states was respected but that was all’ (Jackson, 2003: 58-59). Although Moscow’s lack of engagement in its regional periphery in 1991 and the first quarter of 1992 was irresponsible due to the instability occurring there, Moscow was largely focused on wider security matters which, as one scholar pointed out, assisted in ‘the creation and consolidation of structures’ that defined ‘the shape of post-Cold War Europe’ (Webber, 2000: 35).

This pro-Western tilt was short-lived because of a recalibration in Russian thinking about its external environment. Throughout the rest of the 1990s nationalist views in political and military circles shaped Russia’s thinking. Existing scholarship contends that Russian policy became increasingly assertive from mid-1992 onwards (Adomeit, 1998; Bluth, 1998; Light, 2003; Sakwa,

---


10 Jackson (2003: 58-59) notes that ‘[t]here was almost no historical precedent for a Russian foreign policy towards the other successor states and little knowledge about their new governments’ intentions and policies on which to base foreign policy. Also, there was not yet even a section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to deal with the CIS states’. 

36
This has been described as ‘geopolitical realism’ (Thorun, 2009: 9) based on ‘a Realist calculation of national interests’ (Adomeit, 1998: 40). A change of attitude, particularly relating to Russia’s relationship with European security governance, did take place under Kozyrev and Primakov. However, this did not rule out Russia’s cooperation, and in some respects integration, with its European counterparts. In 1993, the MFA introduced its first post-Soviet foreign policy concept which featured realist thinking, but also provided a nuanced understanding of Russia’s external environment beyond a narrow concern about the accretion of material power. Due to globalisation, Russia recognised structural changes in Moscow’s external environment and acknowledged the expansion of the security domain to include a plethora of security threats beyond traditional military issues. The Russian political and military elite recognised that the maintenance of a cooperative relationship with its European partners was crucial to tackle these security issues. The concept emphasised the UN to facilitate consensus and collective efforts towards the management of international relations and the mitigation of issues.

The foreign policy concept was clear, however, about Russia’s self-proclaimed ‘great power’ status and emphasised the safeguarding of Russia’s national interests via a rational and independent pragmatic policy. This meant that Russia strove for cooperation and equality with its European counterparts rather than subordination, both in shaping international relations and in matters of security. Although the foreign policy concept pointed out the destabilising effects of US hegemony, it also acknowledged that cooperation with Washington was crucial. Russia’s existing and future relationship with the EU was also considered vital to the development of the Russian state, although its scepticism towards NATO remained. Finally, Russia’s new thinking emphasised a re-engagement with its immediate regional space. Besides support for economic re-integration, Russia’s role as regional security guarantor was considered a central approach to cultivate good neighbourliness along Russia’s borders. Russia began to view this region as ‘part of its extended security zone’ (Garnett, 1998: 70). While this policy thinking remained largely consistent throughout the 1990s, it went through a period of transition from early 1992 to late 1993 before a more confident regional policy was formed – although Russia was unable to wield a coherent policy across this space due to its complexity (Adomeit 1998: 43-44; Garnett, 1998:
Several paradoxical policies were adopted, some of which made Russia’s separation from
the former Soviet Republics official, while others continued to reassert Russian national interests.
This reflected a general confusion in policy and demonstrated an uncertainty of external events
(Jackson, 2003: 68).

This view persisted under Primakov’s tenure at the MFA from 1996 onwards – although
Russia’s understanding of its external environment did become more realist. This was due to a
shift towards more domestic conservative views and international triggers relating to the
emergence of an increasingly NATO-centric system of European security governance. Primakov
declared that ‘We [Russia] are a great power, and our policy must reflect that status. I consider it
my main task to step up the Foreign Ministry’s activities in defending our national interest’.
Primakov further pointed out that ‘We will also liquidate the imbalance of our foreign policy by
diversifying our approach, by working on all fronts’. Described as a ‘policy of alternatives’
(Selezneva, 2003: 15), the new Foreign Minister claimed that ‘Russia has been and remains a
great power. And, like any great power, its policy should be multidirectional and
multidimensional’. This was reflected in the 1997 national security concept which understood the
‘international political system’ as being multipolar and pointed out that ‘attempts to create a
structure of international relations based on unilateral solutions as the key problem of world
politics’.

‘Statism’ was also a feature of Primakov’s thinking, characterising Russia as a
Derzhava. This can be loosely translated as ‘a holder of international equilibrium of power’
implying Russia’s reliance on its own strength rather than that of formal institutions (Tsygankov,
2010: 95).

In terms of Russia’s relationship with European security governance, Primakov was more
critical of this relationship. Due to NATO enlargement and its dominance in Europe, Russia
became increasingly opposed to the continued existence of NATO. Russian arguments reflected
in its 1997 national security concept, had become more refined about the necessity for an inclusive
institutional basis of European security governance through the OSCE. This was a direct

---

challenge to the primacy of the US and NATO, as it promoted a re-visiting of security arrangements in Europe based on equality. The concept was clear in stating that ‘Multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace and security at both the global (United Nations) and regional (OSCE, CIS) levels are still insufficiently effective’, 12 Nevertheless, while these challenges were a feature of Primakov’s thinking, the Russian government continued to acknowledge ‘an expansion of the commonality of Russia’s interests with many states on problems of international security’, Moscow remained committed therefore to an engagement in certain policy areas of European security governance. 13 This was linked to an understanding of cooperative relationships with the central actors of European security governance. Moscow’s quest for a recalibration of European institutional security arrangements to safeguard Russian national interests and to promote a transparent interpretation of European security governance was not a confrontational policy (Bowker, 2000: 39). Primakov regarded cooperation a necessity and was unwilling to break from a path of closer relations with Russia’s European counterparts.

Policy in practice

During the initial years of the Yeltsin presidency, Russia engaged in the evolving system of European security governance. This was based on a purposefulness to break down the barriers of the Cold War and integrate into European and wider Western structures. While Moscow considered this move in its best interests, this policy was also shaped by pro-Western sentiment which pushed for the wholesale subscription to the norms and values of this system. Moscow continued to implement its military withdrawal from the Baltic states and East-Central Europe (ECE) which had been initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev (Ghebali, 2005: 376). Russia supported European institutions with its pooling of sovereignty in the CSCE and its inclusion in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Groundwork was also being put in place for a Partnership and Co-Operation Agreement (PCA) with the European Community (EC) (Timmins, 2002: 80).

---

Russia intended to play a role in these institutional processes to facilitate collective responses to security issues in Europe. This was particularly the case regarding Russia’s participation in United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was tasked to manage the conflict in the Balkans (see chapter 3). At this stage, however, the extent of Russia’s engagement in stakeholder interaction complexity was limited due to Russia’s lack of formal membership in the institutional framework of European security governance. Moscow’s stakeholder interaction complexity was based on its involvement in the CSCE but Russia maintained a degree of cooperation with NATO via the NACC (Kennedy-Pipe, 2000: 48), and cooperated in the CSCE. Moscow placed its hopes in the latter organisation and pushed for its extended responsibility as the Pan-European security institution (Kropatcheva, 2015: 10). This was supplemented by Russia’s continued interaction in other capacities through the constructive implementation of several treaties and regimes on conventional arms and nuclear non-proliferation (1990) (Averre. 2000: 152; Bowker, 2000: 35).

With the recalibration in Russia’s foreign and security policy, Moscow’s engagement in the dimensions of security governance diversified. The extent Russia engaged in the promotion of the evolving norms and values of European security governance was pragmatic. Moscow jealously guarded its internal political development – particularly because of the First Chechen War (1994-1996) and the increasing fears of separatism – and became irritated when it was criticised by its European counterparts. This resistance was reflected in its policy which showed selective conformity in practising a ‘value-laden’ approach towards international security. This, however, did not deter Russia’s active involvement in democracy promotion in certain policy areas. Moscow assisted in the individual peace efforts in the Balkans, supporting their integration into the institutional structures of European security governance.

The debate over the nature of the institutions of European security governance shaped the relationship between Russia and its European counterparts throughout the 1990s. This raised significant questions about Russia’s understanding of the pooling of sovereignty in Europe. For Moscow, besides the cultivation of a favourable relationship with the former Soviet Republics, questions regarding the extent Moscow could contribute towards the re-designing of the post-Cold War European order. This centred squarely on the issue of Russia’s inclusion in evolving
European institutions. While the Russian leadership supported collective institutional arrangements as an equal partner in decision-making and policy implementation, it was understood in Moscow that the nature of these mechanisms should not encroach upon vital Russian national interests. Russia’s 1993 foreign policy concept was unequivocal when it declared that ‘attempts to depreciate the role of a sovereign State, as a fundamental element of international relations, creates a threat of arbitrary interference in a State’s internal affairs’. Therefore, according to one Russian commentator, during the 1990s there was no one European institution with which Russia maintained ‘easy relations’; even the OSCE, which remained ‘the favourite project of Russia’, was no exception (Zagorski, 1997: 539).

Nevertheless, the central purpose of Russia’s engagement in this debate was both to ensure it could shape European security governance and to prevent its marginalisation from collective responses towards emerging security threats. Besides the low profile of Russia’s economic relationship with the EC/EU – which was still in its adolescence as an institution – Moscow focused on its relationship with NATO.\footnote{While not viewed by the Russian government as a priority in the security field, the EU was a major trading partner for Russia throughout the 1990s with the signing of a PCA in 1994 – although this was suspended and only ratified in 1997 by Brussels due to Russia’s conduct in the First Chechen War (1994-1996). This was followed by the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia in 1999 but this failed to inject new life into the relationship as its signing virtually coincided with NATO’s military intervention against Belgrade. See Timmins (2002; p. 82, p. 85).}

Russia’s exclusion from NATO’s formal decision-making body at a time when the Alliance was declaring its intention to initiate enlargement triggered sharp criticism from Moscow. Reflecting its nuanced policy, Russia argued that NATO’s persistence as a military alliance facilitated a ‘bloc mentality’, it was expanding rather than reducing its purpose and zone of responsibility, and instead of privileging international law and the UN Security Council, NATO was perceived ‘as disregarding them both and pretending to have an exclusive droit de regard with respect to what is going on in the world’ (Baranovsky, 2001: 9-10).\footnote{For further discussion on Russian attitudes towards NATO enlargement during the 1990s see Averre (1998), Light, White, and Lowenhadt (2000), Smith (2006), and Polikanov (2004).}

Moscow, therefore, made a considerable effort to promote the CSCE/OSCE as the Pan-European security institution based on the Helsinki principles.\footnote{For instance, Russia’s 1993 Foreign Policy Concept stated that ‘Russia is interested in the further balanced development of the multifunctional character of the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and will be making efforts in this direction’.
Moscow submitted numerous proposals to Vienna for the reformation and enlargement of the CSCE’s role in security issues (Kropatcheva, 2015: 11). Moscow proposed a coordinating committee that reflected the organisation of the UNSC, where the decision-making apparatus was based on the preferences of permanent and rotating members (Ghebali, 2005: 377). These proposals were rejected by the bigger Western countries who were reluctant to give up their security within existing institutional fora. Although Russia’s enthusiasm for the promotion of the CSCE/OSCE declined as the 1990s progressed due to its criticism of Russia’s conduct in Chechnya and its refusal to provide a mandate for Russian regional conflict management, Moscow still promoted the CSCE/OSCE as it was the only central European organisation with which Russia held ‘a legitimate place and role’ (Polikanov, 2004: 482; Ghebali, 2005: 375).

Moscow was also involved in talks over the nature of its relationship with NATO in the context of the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and the Permanent-Joint Council (PJC) in 1997. Russia’s pursuit of CSCE/OSCE institutional primacy was a means to deflect attention away from a system of security governance dominated by NATO (Antonenko, 1999: 126). Despite this, Moscow signed up to the PfP in June 1994 and the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations in May 1997 establishing the JPC. Regarding the former, Russia’s partnership was based on an Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) elevating its status within the PfP compared to the former Soviet Republics to appease Russian concerns that its status as a great power was being undermined. Moscow recognised that it was better to be a part of these initiatives than to be standing on the side-line. Although the PfP was considered too narrow and technical ‘to serve as a basis for Russia’s relations with the West in Europe’ (Arbatov, 1995: 140), and Moscow was given a formal voice in the JPC (Stent and Shevtsova, 2002: 129-130; Ponsard, 2007: 70). NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 abruptly halted any further consultations and shattered ‘any illusion that Russia possessed a guaranteed strong vice in European security decision-making’ (McGuigan, 2009: 153). While NATO was attempting to accommodate Russia, Russian academic opinion scolded NATO’s behaviour asserting that through these various ‘palliatives’, the Alliance sought to avoid the elephant in the room and merely attempted to ‘soften Russia’s opposition to enlargement’ (Antonenko, 1999: 126).
Due to these institutional divergences, the extent of Russia’s formal stakeholder interaction complexity was limited during this period. Moscow’s involvement in the PfP and the JPC offered only an informal degree of inclusion. At best, this demonstrated a quasi-channel of interaction complexity where dialogue and potential avenues of cooperation were maintained between Russia and the members of NATO. The OSCE’s institutional foot-print became increasingly marginalised, much to Russia’s dismay. This was particularly the case regarding the conflict in Kosovo where the efforts of its observation mission were quickly forgotten once NATO airstrikes began (Ghebali, 2005: 378). Moreover, Moscow’s attempt to establish regional institutional mechanisms via the CIS failed to cultivate strong relations. Russia only understood the CIS as an organisation to promote regional integration and to assist in the safeguarding of Russian interests. The restricted channels of stakeholder interaction between the members of the CIS due to a lack of political will, suspicion of Russian intentions, and the development of other regional arrangements such as GUAM (Organization for Democracy and Economic Development), demonstrated the CIS’s limited institutional clout. Therefore, the CIS was largely circumvented and replaced by bilateral relations.

Nevertheless, Russia continued to supplement its limited institutional engagement with its involvement in several other treaties and regimes. This coincided with the recalibration in Russian policy thinking which meant that Moscow was not going to automatically follow the Western line, though this did not rule out Russia’s contribution towards European security governance. Moscow’s approach was not simply employed to project specific national interests ‘in juxtaposition to positions held by NATO’ (Webber, 2000: 46). Russia demonstrated a degree of assistance in the mitigation of traditional and non-traditional security issues. Alongside its contribution towards non-proliferation in Europe through the removal of nuclear warheads from the former Soviet Republics, Russia continued to reduce and withdraw its arms under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) from Eastern and Central Europe, and from its

17 Members of GUAM include Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova.
18 Although tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) were not reduced as paranoia crept back into the thinking of the military leadership because of NATO enlargement in 1999.
immediate regional space (Webber, 2000: 48-49). Moreover, as we shall see, Russia’s contribution towards the management of successive intra-state conflicts in the Balkans showed both divergence from and convergence with the approaches adopted by the central actors participating in the international peace efforts. Even with NATO’s bombing campaign against Belgrade in 1999, Russia maintained its channels of communication with several central Western powers and its troops continued to participate in the operation in Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Finally, Russia made efforts to promote the CSCE/OSCE in Europe and cooperated with both Vienna and the UN in regional conflict management in its regional space – although Russia was careful not to let any external actors supplant its role in matters of conflict resolution. Under Kozyrev and Primakov, the immediate regional space was considered a sphere of vital Russian interests and Moscow was sensitive to external interference. Russia’s complex re-engagement with its regional periphery was of an economic, strategic, and security-related character. The uneven policy during the Yeltsin presidency was reflected in Russia’s securing of economic and resource markets mainly through energy, its participation in conflict management operations, the protection of the Russian diaspora, and its maintenance of a military footprint to preserve a regional response. The irregularity of this policy was not a deliberate design to facilitate a form of hegemony or neo-imperialism (Adomeit, 1998: 43-44; Bluth, 1998: 325-326), but rather stemmed from Russia’s competing security logics informing its decision- and policy-making processes.

Several observations can be offered on the nature of Russian policy during this period. First, the shift from a pro-Western to a more independent stance was not necessarily anti-Western. This policy was not solely conditioned by realist thinking and a hostility towards Western international hegemony. Russian policy and practice featured Post-Westphalian preferences that were not incompatible with European security governance. Second, closely bound up with the first point, Russia wanted to be situated in the mainstream of international politics (Tsygankov, 2010: 35), and aimed to seek closer cooperation with Europe (Bluth, 1998: 327). Rather than oppose this system, Moscow attempted to negotiate its place in European security governance – although Moscow considered its national interests in its immediate regional space as non-negotiable. Even
with an increase in nationalist rhetoric during the Primakov years, Russian thinking was still Europe-focused (Bowker, 2000: 39). Based on its common understanding of international security, Moscow was prepared to assist in the development of European security governance through specific policy areas. Third, Russia’s thinking and policy towards its immediate regional space evolved in three stages: (1) neglect during Yeltsin’s initial years; (2) chaos between 1992-1993; (3) coherence from 1993 onwards. Despite this, Russia’s practice remained fragmented due to its competing security logics. This space remained an issue between Russia and its European counterparts throughout this period and, as will be shown in the following section, became an increasingly problematic factor during the Putin and Medvedev presidencies.

1.3.2 The Putin and Medvedev Presidencies 2000-2012: A new assertiveness or a refinement of policy?

The debates of the 1990s – largely centred around Russia’s formal inclusion in European decision-making – remained relevant in shaping the relationship between Russia and the central actors of European security governance throughout the 2000s (Lynch, 2005: 9). Yet, these debates had become no less protracted as the relationship took on new meaning, with the consolidation of the EU’s ability to shape European security governance and the new sense of determination in Russia’s external policy. While the general contours of the relationship largely showed the same pattern of behaviour based on the enduring exclusion/inclusion dynamic in the organisation of European security governance, both Moscow and its European counterparts were aware, as one authoritative Russian scholar put it, that they were “‘doomed’ to a partnership’ (Danilov, 2013). However, it was the nature of this relationship which became deeply contested. Under Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev the deep-seated tension that had developed in Russian policy thinking as far back as 1993 continued to shape Moscow’s response to the evolution of European security governance. Russian policy was based on the constructive engagement in security governance but on its own terms in staunch defence of its sovereign identity and national interests (which were not necessarily incompatible with the interests of the central European actors) – both perceived to have been weakened considerably during the Yeltsin years. Richard Sakwa (2008: 246)
remarks that Russia ‘wants to be a part of the West, but on its own terms. While the West wants Russia to be a junior partner, Russia insists that it is a separate power in its own right’.

The recalibration under Putin of Russia’s policy, and its continuation under Medvedev, was pursued for one aim: to be recognised as a ‘normal great power’ that is part of a system of security governance which takes into consideration its national interests. Moscow’s ambition to develop Russia into a great power was not a goal in itself but was considered a security necessity to prevent its disintegration and to confront a volatile environment. To be a great power was a necessary condition to facilitate Russia’s more advanced engagement with the world (Tsygankov, 2005: 134). In an address to the Federal Assembly at the start of his presidency Putin declared that ‘The only real choice for Russia is the choice of a strong country. A country that is strong and confident of itself. Strong not in defiance of the international community, not against other strong nations, but together with them’.19 This meant Russia’s selective subscription to European security governance; while this allowed for cooperation in a range of policy areas, Putin set out to re-negotiate European security arrangements. This did not advocate a revision but rather a revisiting of security and political arrangements in Europe within a practice-based system of security governance (Averre, 2010: 267).

Russian policy under Putin and Medvedev was not anti-Western but sought to cultivate a relationship with its European partners based on the principles of equality, transparency and indivisibility. This points to a vital observation that while Moscow’s policy and behaviour demonstrated a degree of instrumentality to safeguard narrow self-interests, this inconsistency with its professed normative character demonstrated the complexity of Russia’s external policy. According to one Russian expert ‘treating Russia as a black-and-white realpolitik actor is a gross oversimplification’ because Moscow’s ‘Normative arguments have become a tool for the reformulation of Russia’s messages to the world, while being embedded in Russia’s understanding of its international power’ (Makarychev, 2008: 4).

**Policy thinking and the external environment**

When Putin came to power in mid-2000 he inherited a Russia that was amid fighting a second bloody war in Chechnya (which he helped to orchestrate), still attempting to recover from the cataclysmic effects of the 1998 financial crisis, and was dealing with the political fallout from NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. Putin recognised the significance of these events when he acknowledged them in his Annual Address to the Federal Assembly on 8 July 2000. He recognised that ‘economic effectiveness’ was crucial for Russia’s future development, understood that the Cold War was over but pointed out that Russia had to confront forces that strove for ‘a geopolitical reorganization of the world’ and that there was still a need to overcome certain difficulties in the form of humanitarian operations which ‘infringe on the sovereign rights of nations’. Putin finally described ‘international terrorism’ as a ‘new type of external aggression’ towards the state’s ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’.

Some scholarship contends that Russia’s policy changed considerably from the Yeltsin era (Tsygankov, 2005: 133; Stent, 2008; Thorun, 2009; Spechler, 2010; Kropatcheva, 2015: 13). Sakwa (2008) describes Russia’s policy as the ‘New Realism’, arguing that extensive transitions occurred during the early 2000s which pointed towards a departure from previous policy thinking. Sakwa (2008: 242) and Tsygankov (2005: 153) both argue that Putin’s approach moved away from Primakov’s zero-sum pragmatism which wielded a highly traditional understanding of realism ‘underscored by a heavy dose of anti-western Sovietism’ (Sakwa, 2008: 242). This, however, misconstrues Primakov’s thinking and overlooks the rhetoric in Primakov’s policy. Neither should it be understood that Putin exercised a policy of ‘restoration’ to correct many of the mistakes and weaknesses of the Yeltsin era (Stent, 2008: 1089-1090). Again, while there were setbacks in the Yeltsin era this misrepresents Russian policy during the 1990s and overstates the differences between the Yeltsin and Putin eras (Robinson, 2009: 24). Nevertheless, it is equally as important not to downplay the changes which took place on Putin’s coming to power as some scholars have been guilty of doing (Casier, 2006).

---

Putin’s thinking showed that pragmatism was still a cornerstone of Russian policy – the new foreign policy concept (2000) declared that policy was ‘based on consistency and predictability, on mutually advantageous pragmatism’ – but the level of realism shaping policy was diluted.\(^\text{21}\)

As Sakwa (2008: 245) points out, Putin’s policy was complex, premised upon a mixture of realism and idealism which centred on Russia’s ‘European civilizational identity’ where it should be accepted on its own terms into ‘the international community’. This was further complemented, according to Sakwa (2008: 245), by a strand of realpolitik which included severe overreaction when its sense of self-worth was perceived to have been undermined. Finally, Sakwa (2008: 245) points out that ‘The fact that these various approaches – the realist, the idealist and the instrumental – jostle cheek by jowl reflects the tension in Putin’s new realism’. Putin’s immediate priorities when he came to power were to revitalise Russia’s economy, to re-engage the CIS in a more cost-effective approach than was exercised under Yeltsin, to eradicate terrorism, and to cooperate with the West (Tsygankov, 2005: 138-139; Thorun, 2009). Moscow made it clear that its external policy was based on the consideration of ‘the legitimate interests of other states’ and was ‘aimed at seeking joint decisions’\(^\text{22}\).\(^\text{22}\) It was also emphasised that Russia was ‘a reliable partner in international relations’, and that ‘Its constructive role in resolving acute international problems has been generally acknowledged’\(^\text{23}\). Russian policy was, therefore, based on what Andrei Tsygankov (2008: 40) has labelled the “great power normalizers”, which aimed ‘to regain its great power status, within acceptable international parameters, and be accepted by the West’.

This did not reflect a new assertiveness and was far from the absurdity of certain characterisations of Russia as ‘the Terminator […] back as a major actor in world affairs and as a major headache for security policy decision makers in the Western world’ (Skak, 2011: 138). Although there were acute divergences, during this period Russia’s understanding of and its attempts to manage changes in its external environment demonstrated a degree of convergence.


with Europe that indeed reflected aspects of thinking under Kozyrev and Primakov. While Putin’s policy continued to exercise a ‘negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO’ and considered ‘Attempts to belittle the role of the sovereign state’ as ‘arbitrary interferences in the internal affairs’ of the state, Putin proposed collective responses towards the management of security, including the management of relations between Russia and its European neighbours, via the ‘creation of a stable and democratic system of European security and cooperation’ based on ‘the further balanced development of the multi-functional character of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’. Recognising the expansion of security beyond the narrow military domain, Moscow proposed combatting threats through multilateral formats ‘within the framework of specialized international agencies’ and ‘on a bilateral level’. As Russia still considered NATO enlargement into the former Soviet space a challenge to its national interests, policy thinking continued to promote regional engagement to cultivate ‘good neighbourly relations and strategic partnership with all CIS member states’. Dmitri Trenin (2003/04: 82) explained that Putin’s regional policy ‘aims for the maximum benefits for the Russian business community and seeks to solidify a loyal and secure environment in which Russian interests are taken seriously’.

During Putin’s second term and under Medvedev, the Russian leadership became more defensive of its sovereignty and maintained its understanding of a strong state to confront the consequences of what it considered as an increasingly fragmented and insecure environment. Russian arguments became more refined and sophisticated, promoting both normative and values-based arguments. Indeed, one expert points out that Russia attempted to establish itself ‘as an international role model’ and a valid value centre ‘reflecting an important evolution in Russian thinking’ (Monagahan, 2008: 718). This has been in defence of Russia’s domestic political order

in the face of Western ‘regime change’. Moreover, this has been bound up in Russia’s attempt to revisit European security under Medvedev with the promotion of Russia’s European Security Treaty and, as mentioned above, a rules-based European order not conditioned by values such as democracy and human rights.

**Policy in practice**

Russia’s behaviour during Putin’s first term demonstrated a selective engagement in European security governance. This pattern of limited engagement was largely based on Russia’s behaviour throughout the 1990s as Putin attempted to negotiate a cooperative relationship with European security governance whilst protecting Russia’s sovereign identity and national interests. From the early to mid-2000s, Moscow demonstrated a degree of engagement in the dimensions of European security governance on a very practical basis. While this was through the facilitation of cooperation in specific policy areas, it did not amount to Russia’s formal integration into the system of European security governance. By the end of Putin’s first presidential term it was clear that Russia did not want to integrate into European security governance where practices were embedded in a wider value-laden purpose. Rather, Moscow supported a rules-based system of security governance that had at its core common practices rather than collective values. Because of this fundamental divergence, Russia remained excluded from the processes of this system’s evolution and enlargement which caused a degree of friction between Moscow and its European neighbours. While Moscow did not set itself up against the central actors of European security governance, the Russian leadership became more willing to assertively defend its national interests. By the time of the ‘colour revolutions’ Russia considered the path of its development as an autonomous and legitimate great power to be under threat by its European neighbours. The warming of relations at the beginning of Putin’s presidency gave way to a cooler state of affairs by the time of Putin’s second inauguration in May 2004.

The extent of Russia’s engagement in the dimensions of European security governance remained on a selective basis. This was especially the case regarding the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity where Moscow was still not a formal member of the
central institutions of European security governance. Russia maintained a line of cooperation without integration. With the development of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002, this provided a more equal and transparent decision-making process than previous arrangements. While NRC had qualitatively moved forward from the ineffectiveness of the JPC, Moscow continued to exercise a cautious attitude, remaining unconvinced about the transparency of the NRC because there was still every possibility that NATO members could informally reach common positions in advance of Council sessions (Rontoyanni, 2002: 13). Nevertheless, the NRC was a serious attempt to provide some form of institutional character to Russia’s political and security relationship with European security governance. Russia was clear, however, that while they were participating in the NRC, this did not signify Russian membership in the Alliance.

Russia was prepared to engage in collective action in the NRC, but drew a line at pooling too much sovereignty as its autonomous character would be inextricably altered. This was linked to Russia’s concern about NATO enlargement. During a press conference following an NRC session in Prague in 2002, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov pointed out that ‘We have always emphasized that a mechanical NATO expansion with the preservation of the previous military focus is unlikely to meet the interests of security and cooperation, including in the Euro-Atlantic space’. At the same time, Moscow ceased to view its relationship with the organisation, according to one notable Russian scholar, as being dependent on the issue of enlargement and therefore it ‘had lost its raison d’etre’ (Danilov, 2005: 83). While the Russian leadership did not entirely desensitise policy thinking from existing issues, it also did not want to be ‘cornered on those issues’ proposing new areas of cooperation (Tsygankov, 2005: 141-142). This was reflected in Ivanov’s statement in Prague who went on to explain that ‘if the declared transformation is realized in practice, if in its activities NATO tackles the same tasks of countering new threats and challenges as Russia is now, then the possibilities of cooperation between NATO and Russia will, beyond any doubt,

---

expand’.

The NRC did offer new avenues to streamline cooperation during this period, but the underlying issue of Russia’s inability to shape European security governance remained. Dov Lynch (2005: 9) points out that ‘Deepening ties with NATO have offered benefits, but these do not ensure Russia an equal voice in European security’.

The development of the EU provided Russia another opportunity of institutional engagement. Moscow remained consistent in recognising the importance of its relationship with the burgeoning EU. As noted above, a central facet of Putin’s thinking during his first term rested on the development of Russia’s economy. The maintenance of positive relations with the EU were crucial in facilitating this goal. Despite this, the relationship did not prove to be as fruitful as Moscow envisaged. As Sergey Karaganov (2003) remarks ‘the process of rapprochement between Russia and the EU, have created new opportunities as well as new problems’. The EU’s development as, perhaps, the central institutional pillar of European security governance during the early 2000s (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: xi), altered the dynamic of its relationship with Moscow. The Russian leadership was very clear about its unwillingness to join the EU (if ever there was an opportunity), but was also alert to the ‘real possibility of isolation from core European institutions’ (Lynch, 2004: 113). In this regard, Russia across a series of summits with the EU in 2003 agreed to the development of Action Plans on four common spaces covering (1) economic relations; (2) freedom, security, and justice; (3) external security and; (4) research and education, alongside the Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) as a replacement to the Cooperation Council (Timmins, 2005: 58). Although these spaces lacked concrete substance on how cooperation was to be translated into practice (Averre, 2005: 183), this demonstrated a direction in which the potential for further engagement was possible. Moscow was serious in its attempts to cultivate some form of institutional arrangement where a degree of sovereignty would be pooled. This relationship became increasingly problematic throughout Putin’s second term and

---

into Medvedev’s presidency. The launching of the EU’s ENP and EaP was viewed by Moscow with a degree of suspicion, particularly since the eruption of the ‘colour revolutions’ in the mid-2000s.

However, as will be discussed below, difficulties outnumbered any comprehensive forms of cooperation. Alongside this, the PPC and other consultative mechanisms failed to provide efficient channels of interaction complexity and meetings ‘often lacked real content’ (Averre, 2005: 176). While issues were discussed within a densely institutionalised structure, consultations largely consisted of the sharing of information rather than facilitating discussions on joint action. As one scholar notes, the dialogue served ‘the purpose of avoiding surprises rather than providing for more coordinated action’ (Zagorski, 2005: 74). Moreover, Moscow’s push for a revision of the format from the troika to an arrangement based on the inclusion of all 25 members of the EU failed to gain traction. Brussels also continued to exclude the possibility of Russia’s participation in the EU’s internal decision-making processes (Averre, 2005: 176).

In relation to the normative dimension of European security governance, it became increasingly clear that Russia’s approach towards its external environment were not entirely compatible with its European partners. Moscow faced a system in which norms and values were a central ‘ordering’ aspect of security policy. Both the EU and NATO act as vehicles for normative promotion within-system and externally. NATO aside, Hiski Haukkala (2005: 2) points out that ‘[f]or the European Union, the link between norms, values and foreign policy seems to be an obvious one’. While this recognition of the blurring between the internal and external has conditioned the foreign and security policy of European security governance, this has been increasing contested by Moscow. Putin’s Munich speech in 2007, alongside Medvedev’s promotion of the European Security Treaty in 2009, have been direct challenges to some of the norms and ideas shaping European security governance. As pointed out by some scholars, this normative debate between Moscow and Brussels is not as straightforward as typically argued (Averre, 2009; Wagnsson, 2008). Derek Averre (2009: 1696) puts it ‘the Russian governing elite – despite its claim to share fundamental values with Europe – has over the recent period engaged more and more in a ‘battle of ideas’ with the EU to promote and defend the legitimacy of its own
norms, or competing principles of political organisation, as an alternative to purportedly ‘universal’ Western liberal democratic norms’.

This contestation has largely unfolded in Russia’s immediate regional space, or in Western academic parlance the ‘shared neighbourhood’, where Moscow has considered the promotion of Western values and norms along its periphery as a top priority and threat. It is crucial to acknowledge that Russia’s leadership has not exercised a uniform policy towards this space. Moscow’s behaviour has displayed both positive and negative adjustments to the structural and normative ‘interference’ into the former Soviet space. Negatively, Russia has reacted with force in 2008 and applied gas levers to protect its national interests, but on a positive level the Russian leadership has been forced into formulating an idea of European security – although vague and imprecise. Crucially, this has not necessarily meant that Russia understands and approaches foreign and security policy differently. Some scholars argue that ‘the EU portrays itself as an ethically good promoter of human rights’, whereas ‘Russia maintains its tradition of prioritising the security of the state’ (Wagnsson, 2008: 135). While there is credence in this understanding, the debate is a lot subtler and nuanced.

In this regard, key observations can be offered on the nature of policy and thinking under Putin and Medvedev. First, external policy became increasingly sophisticated and refined using norms and ideas. Second, Russian behaviour continued to remain defensive rather than assertive. Third, national security primarily stemmed from the protection of the state. Fourth, Moscow aimed to revisit rather than revise European security governance.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the wider contextual framework of the thesis, where the debate on Russia and European security governance has been interrogated. The chapter has discussed the development of Europe’s system of security governance and identified its evolution based on the institutional pillars of the EU and NATO. It has highlighted change in security provision premised on the adoption of policies of security governance and how these have related to the broader systemic purpose of European security governance. In this context, the chapter identified trends
in Russian foreign and security policy and analysed them in accordance with the development of
the norms and processes of European security governance. Russia’s complex engagement with its
external environment was elucidated within the context of European security. It was demonstrated
that Russia selectively subscribed to European security governance, which has been conditioned
by the tension in Russian foreign and security policy thinking. On the one hand, Russia has been
prepared to ardently defend its national interests and sovereign identity, and on the other it has
demonstrated a purposefulness to engage in specific policy areas of security governance. The
following chapter will provide the second part of this framework where the thesis’ main
contributions and argument will be discussed in relation to Russia’s engagement in the policy area
of conflict management.
Chapter 2
Russia and the evolution of European conflict management

2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the second part of the framework for analysis on Russia and the policy area of conflict management. The chapter begins by introducing the policy area of conflict management based on a broad outline on definition, methods, and operations. Considering the evolving norms and processes of European security governance, the chapter then goes on to discuss the development of several trends in Europe’s experience of conflict management. The second half of the chapter introduces Russian conflict management. Here the limitations of the existing literature on Russia’s response towards intra-state violence will be examined. This will be followed by the signposting of the thesis’ central contributions and arguments.

2.2 European Conflict Management
2.2.1 Making sense of the policy area
The overview below of the policy area of conflict management will cover the basic terminology, definitions, and methods of the policy area. This overview is necessary to provide general clarity to the development of the policy area since the end of the Cold War. This will provide a better sense of the policy area when exploring Russia’s approach in accordance with the trends of European conflict management captured by European security governance.
Definitions of conflict management

Defining conflict management has been crucial for international actors since the proliferation of operations in the early 1990s. This definitional debate in the policy and academic community has become increasingly complex because of the rapid evolution of conflict management. Moreover, as conflict management operations lack legal integrity and precision because they are not explicit in international legal instruments, such as the UN Charter, this has added further complexity (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 14). In this respect, should one consider any operation authorised by the Security Council an example of conflict management if its purpose is to facilitate peace and stability? Chapter I, Article 1 (1) of the Charter vaguely states that for the UN to maintain peace and security it is ‘to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace’, which is to be ‘in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’. This may involve conventional warfare through enforcement action such as in Korea (1950-1953) and the First Gulf War (1990-1991). In both cases the Security Council acknowledged these conflicts as a breach of the peace and acted accordingly. While such interpretations cannot be ruled out, this thesis steers clear of such permissive understandings and is concerned with operations that are short of war and enforcement practices.

Since the early 1990s the evolution of doctrine and practice has been extraordinary. This policy area has become considerably discursive and acquired a complex and confusing terminology, with an array of overlapping labels and definitions (Wagnsson & Holmberg, 2014: 325). As one expert notes ‘Few processes in contemporary international relations have been as imperfectly defined as that of ‘peacekeeping’, which is not due to the intellectual laziness but because ‘Virtually everyone has a personal sense of what actually peacekeeping is – but it is usually perceived as an activity with extremely flexible boundaries’ (McQueen, 2006: 1). Conflict management is a

---

30 Once termed by a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander ‘a very ambiguous term’ (Craddock, 2006), conflict management has thus been substituted with a variety of diverse labels by an assortment of actors. This thesis uses the term ‘conflict management’ to denote the wide array of operations and methods which have developed considerably since the early 1990s. Other labels may include, but are not bound to: ‘crisis management’, ‘peace support operation’, ‘military ‘operations other than war’, ‘stabilisation’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘multi-dimensional peacekeeping’, and ‘(humanitarian) intervention’.
slippery (Paris, 2004: 38) and contested policy area notorious for ‘conceptual muddles’ (Dhiel, 2008: 3). Many scholars have attempted to provide definitional clarity to identify an operation’s conceptual boundaries and rules of engagement. According to Marrack Goulding (1993: 455) they are

> [f]ield operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.

This definition offers a narrow interpretation restricted to UN practice only and premised on a traditional understanding prevalent during the Cold War and the early 1990s. Others have provided broader definitions to reflect changes in practice and thinking. William Durch (2006: xvii) describes them as ‘internationally authorised, multilateral, civil-military efforts to promote and protect such transitions from war to peace’. Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin (2010: 18) provide a comparable definition, explaining that operations

> involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military) with or without UN authorization, with a mandate or programme to: (1) assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process; (2) serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or (3) enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace.

Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2010: 18) further explain that operations ‘are therefore one general type of activity that can be used to prevent, limit and manage violent conflict as well as rebuild in its aftermath’. Thierry Tardy (2004: 1-2) contends that conflict management is ‘a broad concept, covering military and civilian activities led by state and non-state actors in a host state (or two), and aimed at dealing with a crisis or with consequences of a crisis, at different possible stages (before, during and after a crisis)’. Tardy (2004: 1-2) points out that these operations ‘are short of war’ with the principle of impartiality being ‘indissociable’ from conflict management as their central objective ‘is the promotion of peace, and not to defeat of one of the parties involved’. It is worth reiterating three crucial aspects that characterise conflict management operations: (1)
they are short of war; (2) they must be impartial; (3) they are not intended to defeat one of the
belligerents and, thus, do not have a designated enemy.

Methods of conflict management

This section introduces a glossary of conflict management methods and discusses their legal and
conceptual roots. The central methods of conflict management are based on the following:

Preventive diplomacy (and conflict prevention) which is an action to prevent conflicts from
erupting or from spreading to neighbouring regions; Peacekeeping (also in its wider form) which
is the deployment of a lightly armed or robust multinational force for purposes including the
observation of ceasefires and the delivery of humanitarian aid; Peacemaking which is the attempt
to end an ongoing conflict by the use of peaceful means such as negotiation and diplomacy.

According to Paris it may also include the authorisation of a military force to impose a settlement
to the conflict; Peacebuilding which is action undertaken at the end of a conflict in order to
prevent a resumption of violence. It is aimed to rebuild society after war through the deployment
of military and civilian personnel; Peace enforcement which is the threat or use of non-defensive
military force to impose, maintain, or restore a ceasefire.\(^\text{31}\) The use of peace enforcement,
however, has moved beyond this narrow aim to ‘bring about or ensure a compliance with some
aspect of a Security Council mandate or an agreement among the parties’ (Boulden, 2001: 3).

The application of some of these methods has changed because of the recalibration of the
notions of consent, impartiality, and the use of force. In relation to the methods of preventive
diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacebuilding, the notions of consent and impartiality remain
constant. However, there have been considerable changes in the understanding of peacekeeping
and peace enforcement due to a wider acceptance of the utility of force in conflict management.
This has particularly been the case in European approaches towards conflict management, which
will be discussed in more detail below. The development and application of these methods should

\(^{31}\) See Paris (2004: 38-39) for this glossary of methods which has been adapted from the UNDPKO’s
available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf. This is also widely known
as the ‘Capstone Doctrine’.
not be considered in a linear or sequential order. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, there is a degree of overlap between certain methods at the intersection of conflict and a ceasefire. It is possible for several methods such as sanctions and wider-peacekeeping or peacemaking and peace enforcement to coincide simultaneously.

Figure 2.1 Methodological stages of conflict management operations. Adapted from the UN’s ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’ (2008: 19). Widely known as the ‘Capstone Doctrine’

It is also crucial to identify the differences and linkages between certain methods in order to provide conceptual clarity. Of importance is the conceptual debate regarding the characterisations of peace enforcement and wider peacekeeping. This extends beyond mere terminology and has wider legal implications concerning the legitimacy and credibility of certain forms of conflict management. Dhiel (2008: 13-14) notes that peace enforcement cannot be considered under the rubric of conflict management as it resembles collective security operations, where the use of force is extensive and offensive military actions are more common. According to Dhiel (2008: 13), classic examples of authorised UN peace enforcement were in Korea and the Gulf. Therefore, any operations which utilise force below collective security measures should be placed into the
category of ‘wider-peacekeeping’, and ‘occur in the context of ongoing violence, but outside the context of interstate war’. Other scholars, however, differ from this categorisation and support a further category of ‘enforcement’. Jane Boulden (2001: 2-3; also see Goulding, 1993: 460-461; Findlay, 2002: 6-7; Oliver, 2002; Fenton, 2004: 21) defines (collective) enforcement actions as full-scale military operations like those identified by Dhiel, whereas peace enforcement is used to substitute Dhiel’s use of wider-peacekeeping for operations that ‘fall into the grey area between full-scale enforcement measures and traditional peacekeeping situations’. Instead, wider-peacekeeping is generally used to describe methods which aim to separate the parties to the conflict, disarm the combatants, deliver humanitarian aid, protect civilians, guarantee the freedom of movement, monitor cease-fires, and enforce no-fly zones (NFZ) (Roberts, 1994: 14-15; Dandeker & Gow, 1997: 334; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 194-195).32 This includes a robust posture that is designed to ‘allow a peacekeeping force to protect itself, to provide freedom of manoeuvre, and to prevent situations where the implementation of the mandate, or more broadly the peace process, is ‘taken hostage’ by spoilers’ (Tardy, 2011: 153). Although there is a degree of convergence between the robust characteristics in wider-peacekeeping and peace enforcement, they are different (Findlay, 2002: 6).

There are also legal divergences between these methods as expressed in the UN Charter. Traditional peacekeeping is typically attributed to the ‘pacific settlement of disputes’ in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Although termed by the second UNSG Dag Hammarskjöld as ‘Chapter VI and-a-half missions’ due to the absence of peacekeeping in the nomenclature of the Charter, Article 36 (1) has been recognised by many as a sufficient legal basis because the ‘Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute […], recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment’ (Orakhelashvili, 2003: 491). In relation to wider-peacekeeping and peace enforcement there is a grey area in the Charter. Boulden (2001:2) points out that the grey area between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement is derived from Chapter VII Article 40 which authorises the Security Council to take ‘provisional measures’ that ‘shall be without prejudice to

32 This is also termed ‘expanded’ (Findlay, 2002: 5) or ‘second generation’ peacekeeping (Mackinlay and Chopra, 1992).
the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned’. This grey area is also drawn from Article 42 which stipulates that the Security Council ‘may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’. Thus, these types of operations are linked to Chapter VI and VII as they share characteristics from traditional peacekeeping and enforcement (Boulken, 2001: 3).

**Operations of conflict management**

An animated scholarly debate has surfaced on conflict management operations and their relations to the methods above.33 This debate has attempted to analytically organise and identify operations based on their intended purposes, and to demarcate operations actors engage in to tackle intra-state violence which has been crucial for understanding actor behaviour. One expert points out that this exercise is significant as ‘Placing missions in different groups is not merely a classificatory exercise. There are implications for how we analyse, evaluate, and train for peace operations’ (Dhiel, 2008: 16).

According to these taxonomies these operations have developed in relation to function (Goulding, 1993; Nikitin and Demurenko, 1998; Dhiel, Druckman, and Wall, 1998), chronology (Goulding, 1993; Mackinlay and Chopra, 1992), and global politics (Bellamy, 2004; Bellamy and Williams, 2010). A functional understanding demonstrates the scale of operations, and that they can be utilised in a non-linear fashion. A chronological approach reveals the degree of institutional learning from each consecutive operation or period. This also acknowledges a superficial link between functional and structural change in the international system. And, a global political approach demonstrates the deeper relations between functional change and shifts in the normative preferences of an actor and in international politics. Certainly, there have been broad historical normative shifts shaping an actor’s doctrine and practice, and revealing a general trajectory of evolution. Within these broad changes, however, while it is possible to ascribe specific approaches to certain actors because of normative preference, there has also been a degree of

---

33 Some of the methods discussed in the previous section correspond to operations in their own right i.e. peacebuilding and peace enforcement.
pragmatism in the selection of these approaches on a functional/case-by-case basis due to political expediency and context (Berdal, 2008: 176).

A collection of taxonomies has therefore emerged covering the broad spectrum of methods and stages of a conflict management operation. These can be summarised into the following operations. Observation operations consist of the deployment of a detachment of unarmed personnel, with the consent of the host-state or parties to collect information and monitor activities typically after a ceasefire agreement (Dhiel, Druckman, and Wall, 1998: 39). Preventive diplomacy (conflict prevention) aims to prevent disputes from arising and existing disagreements from escalating into further tension through a range of measures, such as preventive deployment (the interposition of an international force between the parties), observation, early warning, and mediation (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Existing taxonomies fail to consider other instruments in this type of operation outside of ‘preventive deployment’ as a means of prevention (Mackinlay and Chopra, 1992: 117; Goulding, 1993: 456; Dhiel, Druckman, and Wall, 1998: 39; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 22). The toolset of this operation converges with many others, such as observation and wider/robust peacekeeping. In relation to peacebuilding, Nikitin and Demurenko (1998) put forward two operations to ‘restore social and political institutions whose functioning has been disrupted by the conflict’ and to ‘restore basic conditions for daily living’, which may merge into the same operation. Other taxonomies acknowledge ‘state/nation building’ and ‘election supervision’ (which may also form a part of observation and wider-peacekeeping) (Dhiel, Druckman, and Wall, 1998: 39), ‘Assisting in the maintenance of law and order (Mackinlay and Chopra, 1992: 117), and ‘peace support operation’ (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 22). This operation is implemented usually after a peace settlement has been agreed and, therefore, may also overlap into areas of peacekeeping. This operation is vital for the facilitation of potential long term peace and stability.

These existing taxonomies in the literature are either too expansive in their categorisation or too narrow in their scope; both equally debilitating when defining the purpose and responsibilities of a conflict management operation. Therefore, some of these characterisations have been removed and individual operations merged with others to avoid unnecessary convolution. At the same time a degree of nuance has been maintained across and within these classifications.
Traditional peacekeeping operations involve monitoring cease fires, controlling and providing buffer zones, and weapons disposal. Traditional peacekeeping is recognised as an operation by several existing taxonomies (Mackinlay and Chopra, 1992: 117; Goulding, 1993: 457; Dheil, Druckman, and Wall, 1998: 39; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 22) and is still used today although the following operation is generally preferred. In terms of wider-peacekeeping, many existing taxonomies divide wider-peacekeeping into various operations, such as: the ‘implementation of a comprehensive settlement’ and the ‘protection of humanitarian relief supplies’ (Goulding, 1993: 457-458); ‘humanitarian assistance during the conflict’, ‘arms control’, and ‘protective services’ (Dheil, Druckman, and Wall, 1998: 39); ‘Supervising a Cease-fire Between Irregular Forces’, ‘Assisting in the Maintenance of Law and Order’, ‘Protecting the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance’, and ‘The Guarantee of Rights of Passage’ (Mackinlay and Chopra, 1992: 117). These are generally components of a much larger conflict management operation and are rarely implemented in isolation.

Peacemaking operations are not mentioned by other taxonomies, although they are a crucial aspect in the management of conflict. Sanction operations enforce economic or other types of blockades by air, sea or land to assist in the facilitation of conditions conducive to peace and stability. Although only two out of the five taxonomies mention such operations (see Dheil, Druckman, and Wall, 1998: 40; Mackinlay and Chopra, 199: 117), they are vital in containing the conflict from spreading and/or intensifying. Again, these operations may depend on the circumstances and can be used individually or as part of a wider framework of conflict management. With regards to peace enforcement, existing taxonomies have disagreed on the purpose and application of these operations. Goulding (1993: 459) distinguishes between two types of operations premised on the use of force, including ‘intervention into a failed state’ (the use of force, if necessary, to protect and implement the mandate if consent is not forthcoming from the conflicting parties) and ‘cease fire enforcement’ (the use of force to protect the mandate and maintain the cease fire – presumably with consent from the opposing parties). Nikitin and Demurenko (1998) also recognise two operations, including to ‘halt or prevent military actions’ (the use of mediation, deterrence and peace enforcement), and to ‘uphold law and order in a
conflict zone’ (mediation, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement). Paul Dhiel, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall’s (1998: 40) taxonomy differentiates between ‘Pacification’ (consent from the opposing parties to use force against any side or renegade group that breaches the mandate) and ‘Intervention in support of democracy’ (the use of force across a state’s border to safeguard existing democratic institutions or, if necessary, facilitate this through regime change). Others such as Mackinlay and Chopra (1992: 117) identify a range of operations under the banner of ‘Enforcement’ from the First Gulf War to scenarios like the UN’s Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) (1993) – although, as noted above, this is considered conceptually imprecise.

From this, it is possible to categorise three types of operations built on variable notions of consent, impartiality, and the use of force. First, consent-based (strategic level) peace enforcement where the host-state has offered invitation to an international force to maintain peace by using military force, if necessary, against an actor which threatens the security of the host-state and its population. Second, peace enforcement operations where there is limited to no consent at all levels of engagement because of a complete or partial breakdown of state functions. Force is, therefore, used against any party which fails to abide by the mandate. Third, the use of strategic force across state borders without consent to protect civilians from the actions of the state. This has generally been termed as humanitarian intervention and has been conceptualised through Pillar III of the responsibility to protect (R2P). This taxonomy provides a broad overview of the range of operations available to intervening forces either under the UN flag or through regional formats.

Further qualifications are required. In the recent past, interpretations have become ascribed to a more expansive set of approaches, including counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations. Both raise considerable conceptual difficulties for the researcher when defining the policy area of conflict management in relation to the rules of engagement and the legitimacy of those intervening. Tardy (2004: 8) recognises that while an evolution of the mandate of conflict management operations to include counter-terrorism cannot be excluded, the ‘risks that such an evolution would entail will have to be raised, especially insofar as the compatibility of this evolution with the nature of peace operations is concerned (and particularly their impartial characteristic)’. The counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations of the post-9/11 era in Iraq
and Afghanistan have demonstrated a degree of convergence in doctrine and practice in that they focus on civilian rather than military solutions, can be for the protection of civilians, recognise the limitations of the use of force, acknowledge the importance of host-nation ownership (Friis, 2010: 50). This is in addition to the possible participation of many actors and methods such as peacebuilding.35

Despite this, certain qualifications are required, especially in relation to the operational aims and purposes. A caveat is placed on assuming that all counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency is now understood through the prism of Iraq and Afghanistan – although both experiences have contributed extensively towards the development of such approaches. Nevertheless, this overlooks the possibility that the methods employed may be particular to these cases i.e. an abnormally extensive stabilisation operation as part of a counter-terrorist/counter-insurgency operation. What is most noticeable is that in these operations the protection of civilians is a means to an end or supplementary to the completion of the primary goal: defeating an identified enemy for a political aim, upon which victory can be claimed (St-Pirre, 2008: 11). This departs from the definitions of conflict management introduced above which, through protective actions, aim to safeguard the mandate by enhancing the security of civilians and maintaining stability where the defeat of an enemy is not a necessary goal (St-Pirre, 2008: 11). Moreover, in such operations impartiality is not a guiding principle on which to conduct an operation, whereas in a conflict management operation impartiality is crucial. In this regard, there are fundamental differences here that run deeper than tactical processes. Stuart Griffin (2011: 332) points out that ‘[w]hile the tactical activities associated with peace support can also be found in counterinsurgency, the nature, ethos and intent of such campaigns are fundamentally at variance and it is ill-advised to obscure the distinctions between them’. While this debate is significant for the future evolution of conflict management and while counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency may form parts of conflict management, there remains significant differences between conflict management and

these operations. Further research and practice is required before substantial judgements can be made, although this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

2.2.2 Evolution and development in European approaches

With the basic parameters of conflict management covered, this chapter will now discuss how the policy area of conflict management has evolved in the European experience. It will highlight the development of several trends in the European experience of conflict management. These trends reflect the aggregation of collective policy-relevant goals, which are related to the wider systemic purpose of promoting European security governance.

*The European experience*

Managing conflict in Europe since the early 1990s has for the most part shown a progressive development in doctrine and practice to mitigate intra-state violence. This progress as some scholarship has observed is ‘quite remarkable’ (Wagnsson and Holmberg: 324), and has coincided with the evolution of European security governance, structured primarily around the core institutional pillars of the EU and NATO. Although conflict management operations ‘involve different actors, all having their own approach towards the concept, their own agenda, and their own motives’ (Tardy, 2004: 2), and although there have been disagreements and set-backs, there has also been a considerable degree of coordination and consensus shaping the ‘European experience’. The trends in European conflict management, which have been crafted based on a steep learning curve through bloody experiences and failures, and because of the transition and consolidation of European security governance. As discussed above, this experience can be attributed to broad historical normative shifts in the conditioning of the central actors involved in European conflict management. Within these broad changes, however, there has also been a degree of pragmatism in the selection of these approaches on an ad hoc basis due to political expediency and context. While the presence of Westphalian state preferences cannot be ruled out from the European experience of conflict management, there has indeed been a general shift towards Post-Westphalian state preferences in this policy area. The making of doctrine and practice in the European experience has largely been attributed to the management of conflict in
the Balkans, where there have been clear transitions in doctrine, policy, and practice. Approaches towards conflict in the Balkans were also shaped by experiences outside of Europe and so references to other conflicts will be used to provide further understanding.

As introduced in the previous chapter, the evolution of European security governance is premised upon the following dimensions: the pooling of sovereignty, stakeholder interaction complexity, purposefulness, and norms and ideas. In the policy area of conflict management these dimensions have elucidated several trends. First, operations have progressively come to possess a humanitarian dimension. This is closely intertwined with the second trend, whereby the integrity of state sovereignty as a prevalent norm has become increasingly contested, particularly if a conflict threatens international peace. Nevertheless, the dilemma regarding the balance between territorial integrity and self-determination has become fraught because of this focus on human rights, with decisions implemented on an increasingly pragmatic basis. During the early to mid-1990s the UN wrestled with the norm of sovereignty and its concepts of consent and impartiality on the one hand, and the protection of civilians on the other. These operations did possess a humanitarian dimension but it was not until ODF in Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1995, which was further complemented by NATO’s Operation Allied Force (OAF) against Belgrade in 1999, that a more human-centred understanding of conflict management emerged.

The early 1990s marked a period of renewed activity by the UN through the establishment of several operations and the creation of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) by the newly appointed UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (1992), Boutros-Ghali’s seminal report, epitomised the changes in thinking surrounding operations at the time and reinforced the UN’s leadership in international affairs. While the report emphasised the necessity for the wider use of force through peace enforcement to maintain ceasefires already agreed to but not complied with (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: paragraph 44), the protection of civilians using force was not specifically referred to. However, it did give further ‘rise to new thinking about human security’ (Peou, 2002: 51) through the promotion of human rights and democracy. Imbued by the UN’s call for firmer measures to preserve peace in war-torn societies, operations were much larger, launched into situations where the conflict was still raging,
and utilised more robust methods (Dandeker & Gow, 1997: 328; Frantzen, 2005: 47). Operations during this period ‘seemed to have a wholly different character, although this was not understood conceptually at the outset’ (Frantzen, 2005: 47). A humanitarian element was present in these operations although there was confusion and failure in places such as Somalia and Rwanda, where intervening forces attempted to interpret UN doctrine and mandates as a means of best practice. This blurred the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Gray, 2008: 282).

Many actors participating in conflict management during the early to mid-1990s skirted around the issue of using force to protect civilians and instead advocated the use of wider-peacekeeping methods. While these operations possessed a humanitarian element, they did not advocate the wider use of force in the safeguarding of human rights. Indeed, US involvement in Somalia confirmed for many the dangers of becoming a party to the conflict through a lack of consent and impartiality, and the use of disproportionate force. As understood at the time, the danger of crossing the consent-divide from peacekeeping to ‘war-fighting’ was persistently reiterated in other conflicts, such as Bosnia (see Rose, 1998). As head of UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, General Rose upheld this approach based on experience and thinking developed by Charles Dobbie’s report ‘A Concept of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping’ (1994), which was later developed into the official doctrine ‘Wider Peacekeeping’ (1995) by the British Army and implicitly acknowledged in US Army doctrine (1994). Force was authorised on several occasions during this period, but this was on a tactical level, and channelled through a protracted process of checks-and-balances before being authorised. However, dismayed by the continued violence, the intransigence of both parties, and the systematic targeting of civilians, authority was eventually given to NATO by the UNSG, by-passing the Security Council, to conduct strategic-level bombing of Bosnian Serb military in late 1995. A consensus on the use of force emerged between the central powers and institutions of European security governance.

36 Thereafter, this was famously referred to by Former-Head of UNPROFOR, British General Michael Rose, as the ‘Mogadishu Line’.
The perceived failures of the early to mid-1990s, and the greater use of peace enforcement demonstrated in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, resulted in a degree of caution by the UN regarding the role of an intervening force. Adam Roberts (1994: 41; also, see Goulding, 1993: 461; Hansen, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 2004: 2) explains that during this period conflict management faced a dilemma where intervening forces had to choose between either losing credibility for not acting (as in Rwanda and in the “safe areas” in Bosnia) or losing impartiality for potentially overreacting (as in Somalia in 1993). This debate unfolded in the academic community where some commentators argued for a return to traditional forms of peace operations, or as a minimum a strict adherence to robust peacekeeping without recourse to the use of force (Thakur, 1994; Tardy, 2011). Others claimed that present methods were acceptable but required further integration and coordination (Goulding, 1993: 461; Berdal, 2000). Although not every member of NATO agreed to this direction in doctrine and practice, the central actors and powers of European security governance opted for a robust response to protect civilians and maintain the peace.

The mandates of the following operations in Bosnia & Herzegovina were based on robust rules of engagement, with the protection of civilians explicitly mentioned in their mandates. Steered largely by the doctrine developed in the UK and the US, NATO deployed a peace support operation where the notion of consent was reconceptualised to enable the conflation of wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement measures into a ‘useable framework’ (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 279). According to NATO peace support is based on the consent and/or non-consent of the parties with the agreement and not against any biased or predetermined designation. In this sense, the operation in Bosnia & Herzegovina owed no allegiance to any party to the conflict and could shift between a peacekeeping and peace enforcement posture depending on the levels of consent. However, it was not until NATO’s action in Kosovo in 1999
and calls for humanitarian intervention that the norm of sovereignty was seriously questioned. The use of force became recognised as an acceptable and necessary measure in specific circumstances by legitimising its strategic application for the protection of civilians if submitted to egregious acts of violence by the host state (Holzgrefe, 2003: 18). This represented a fundamental evolution in the thinking of the central actors of European security governance in terms of their understanding of the relationship between the use of force, sovereignty, and human rights. One noted scholar recognised that from this point the turn towards strategic intervention in human security framings, which focus on non-Western subjects, began to dominate security discourses underpinning conflict management operations (Chandler, 2012: 224).

This approach was further promoted through the norm and framework of Responsibility to Protect which, although introduced in 2001, only entered the formal vocabulary of the UN with the 2005 World Summit Outcome (WSO). The concept of R2P stipulates that it is: first, a state’s responsibility to protect its citizens from fear and want; second, the international community must engage in preventive measures by assisting the state’s capacity to fulfil the requirements of the first pillar; third, if the state fails in its responsibility towards its citizens, the Security Council must use all necessary methods in a timely and decisive response to protect these citizens. Yet the concept of R2P has been diluted considerably from its original form and has altered nothing as the P5 members of the UNSC, to a large extent, still pursue policy in accordance with their vital interests, the criterion for intervention has been limited to specific circumstances, and the UNSC has ensured that it is not obliged to invoke R2P in times of crisis (Hehir, 2010: 222). R2P has also received considerable opposition and disapproval from particular members of the UN who fear that the erosion of sovereignty will result in anarchy, and view military intervention under R2P as both a pretext for regime change and a cloak for the promotion of post-colonial hegemonic interests (Thakur, 2013: 66; Morris, 2013: 1280). Irrespective of its architects’ intentions, R2P

in the Charter, and that such ‘impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement’ (2000: chapter 2, paragraph 50, p. 9). Therefore, it was recognised that ‘In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so’ (Brahimi. 2000: chapter 2, paragraph 50, p. 9).

has not substituted existing approaches even in the most extreme cases of human rights abuses. It is questionable whether R2P, as a means to reconceptualise the use of force under the traditional banner of humanitarian intervention, has offered a new direction in the management of conflict. The third trend is based on the re-calibration of conflict management operations to include a range of methods and operations. This is closely intertwined with the fourth trend based on the emergence of complex coordination and interaction through the pooling of sovereignty between multiple actors, where a consent-based culture of coordination between civil and military aspects of a mission developed. The deployment of UNPROFOR to the Balkans in 1992 was the most expansive mission the UN had ever conducted up until that point. It was a multifunctional operation which included military aspects alongside peacemaking, the delivery of humanitarian aid, sanctions, observation missions, and peacebuilding efforts. These methods and operations were consolidated under NATO in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo, and were provided with further support by the UN.42

With the emergence of the EU’s ESDP during the early to mid-2000s, the EU largely replaced NATO and the UN in Bosnia & Herzegovina.43 In terms of managing Bosnia & Herzegovina, the EU employed what was later labelled a comprehensive approach. Javier Solana as Secretary General of the Council of the EU stated in 2009 that ‘This is the European way of doing things: a comprehensive approach to crisis prevention and crisis management; a large and diversified toolbox; a rapid response capability; playing our role as a global actor’.44 At the heart of this approach was peacebuilding, understood as being crucial for the maintenance of a durable peace (Drent,

42 The UNSG and the UNDPKOs had recognised the utility of a multidimensional approach since the early 1990s with Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace. This understanding remained consistent throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s with the publication of the UNDPKO’s Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations in 2003. As a lead military actor in NATO, the UK also contributed towards doctrinal thinking in the organisation. The UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) use the term ‘comprehensive approach’ which has been defined as ‘Commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation’. See the MoD, ‘The Comprehensive Approach’, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, 2006, p. 1-5. 43 European Union Force Althea (EUFOR Althea) replaced KFOR in 2004, while the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) replaced UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) in 2002. 44 Javier Solana ‘EU High Representative for the CFSP, addresses the European Parliament on the EU common, security and defence policy’, Council of the European Union, 18 February 2009, accessed 18 August 2014, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/106227.pdf.
2001: 3), the EU attempted to re-construct and re-habilitate the region as a means of re-socialising the region into the organisation. These multidimensional approaches reflected a deep level of coordination between civilian and military elements. For instance, the EU’s development of the tactical concept Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) (2002) – which owes much to NATO’s Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) (2003) doctrine – and the political-strategic publication Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO) (2003) highlighted the need of what the European Council has termed ‘a culture of coordination’ when ‘ensuring overall coherence in the EU’s response to a crisis’. While the effectiveness of this coordination has received criticism (Spence, 2002; Gourlay, 2004; Drent, 2001; Schroeder, 2011), the point to consider is that there has been a deliberate adoption of these policies of coordination and interaction.

2.3 Russian conflict management

Following a discussion on the trends of European conflict management, the chapter now outlines Russia’s experience. It will introduce how Russian conflict management is understood in the existing literature and discuss the limitations of this body of scholarship. The chapter will then highlight the contributions of the thesis by offering a more thorough interpretation using the framework of European security governance.

2.3.1 The existing literature

The existing literature on Russian conflict management can be organised around two bodies of scholarship across Russia’s immediate regional space and the wider European neighbourhood. These literatures have developed almost independently from one another and have provided

varying degrees of insight. Certain aspects of both bodies of scholarship have only emphasised the impact of Russia’s wider foreign and security thinking on its policy implementation in Moscow’s experience. Other scholars have concentrated on the narrow window of Russia’s experience between the early to mid-1990s. This is because the literature was written during this timeframe or scholarship has maintained a focus on this period of Russia’s experience. This treatment of Russian conflict management in the existing literature has severely limited its analytical rigour.

Russia’s ‘wider’ European experience

The existing literature on Russian approaches and involvement in the wider European space have focused on its engagement in the series of conflicts in the Balkans – specifically Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Kosovo. The extent of their thoroughness has differed and so too has their research agenda. There are very few empirically informed accounts of Russia’s involvement and these are primarily focused on the impact of Russia’s wider foreign and security thinking on its policy implementation in the Balkans (Ullman, 1996; Gow, 1997; Antonenko, 1999; Lynch, 1999; Baranovsky, 2000; Levitin, 2000; Headley, 2008; Averre, 2009; Hughes 2013). While this has offered an informative insight into the contours of Russia’s general Balkan policy, it has not systematically linked a discussion on Russian policy to a detailed and rigorous inspection of developments in Russian doctrine and practice within the broader context of European conflict management. James Headley (2009) is perhaps the most rigorous in his attempt to unpack and explain Russia’s behaviour in the Balkans. Headley traces the evolution of Russia’s involvement throughout the 1990s and the 2000s; however, his work is largely policy focused and lacks a close inspection on the development of Russian doctrine and practice. Headley specifically states that the study of Russia’s Balkan experience is to highlight trends in Russian foreign and security policy thinking (Headley, 2009: 4). This has been accompanied by other scholarship which although not as comprehensive, has also centred its analysis on Russian policy preferences – particularly in light of Russia’s evolving attitude towards NATO in the context of the impact on European security (Antonenko, 1999, 2007; Lynch, 1999; Levitin, 2000; Averre, 2009). There
are others in this body of literature which have even marginalised this area of enquiry and pointed
to its lack of empirical utility in contributing towards a deeper understanding of Russian conflict
management, claiming that Russia failed to learn any expertise from its Balkan experience
(Antonenko, 1999, 2007). This claim is deeply problematic as Russia’s involvement in the
Balkans formed a central part of its conflict management experience in the context of the
European milieu.

The regional experience: ‘quintessentially’ Russian?

One scholar has described Russia’s response towards intra-state conflict in its immediate regional
space as being ‘quintessentially Russian; a Russian answer to a Russian problem, narrowly
unilateral in its underlying motives and distinct in its practical manifestation from any regional or
international responses to other emergencies’ (Mackinlay, 2003: 203). This view primarily sums
up the existing literature’s understanding of Russia’s approach towards regional intra-state
conflict. With few exceptions, scholarship has focused on the period of Russia’s involvement in
intra-state violence during the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet
Union. This emphasis on Moscow’s involvement during this phase of its post-Soviet experience
has raised several observations regarding its behaviour in the policy area of conflict management.
These have centred around the following characteristics: (1) Russian contingents have dominated
the conflict management operations; (2) Russian contingents have been prepared to employ high
levels of force and have not been constrained by rules of engagement and defined mandates; (3)
Russian troops have been deployed into active conflicts where there was no peace to keep; (4)
Russian troops have sought to maintain at least the semblance of impartiality; (5) Russia has
demonstrated a degree of cooperation with external international actors in the conflict zone –
although Russian officials have dominated the settlement process (Allison, 1994: 15; Shashenkov,
1994; 56; Jonson and Archer, 1996: 8; Lynch, 1999: 104-105; Yermolaev, 2000: 6-7). These are
considered as defining characteristics of Russia’s regional experience of conflict management
and, for the purposes of this discussion, can be categorised under the following headings: doctrine,
practice, policymaking and decision-making, and drivers/motivations.
In relation to doctrine, debates in the literature on Russian conflict management can be divided into two bodies with distinct and overlapping analytical aspects. The first body of scholarship has proposed that Russia’s understanding of conflict management is linked to a narrow set of methods and employed to expedite Russian political and strategic aims. Alternatively, the second body of literature has showed a more expansive and nuanced interpretation of Russian doctrinal understanding. While acknowledging that certain groups within the military understood conflict management to be a narrow military exercise, this body of scholarship also identified several other views between and within the power ministries, and military and political elite. In accordance with the doctrine being developed in Europe at the time, it was noted that these groups understood conflict management to be related to a much broader set of methods and concepts. In this regard, the first body of literature has concluded that Russian thinking was largely based on a military understanding of conflict management, with slippery conceptions of consent and impartiality. This body has exercised a narrow reading of Russia’s doctrinal understanding, associating it with a restricted set of principles and practices (Allison, 1994, 2013; Baev, 1993, 1996, 1998; Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1995; Jonson and Archer, 1996).

It has been argued that without a rich legacy of conflict management Moscow’s experience of counterinsurgency was crucial in conditioning its initial doctrinal thinking, highlighting Moscow’s bloody campaign in Afghanistan as ‘the prototype for Russian peacekeeping operations and doctrine’ (Sagramoso, 2003: 15). In this sense, Soviet military thought based on offensive force was considered the bedrock shaping Russia’s doctrinal thinking on conflict management. Proceeding from this assumption, this commentary argued that Russia exercised a narrow interpretation of the terms mitovorcheskiye operatsii (‘peacemaking’ or ‘peace-creating’ operations) and, less frequently used, operstii po poderzhaniyu mira (‘operations for the maintenance of peace’) identified in Russian parlance (see Allison, 1994: 1). Pavel Baev (1996: 136) claims that ‘Russian views on conducting peace-keeping operations differ strikingly from thinking in the West’, pointing out that ‘the fundamental difference concerns the concept of low-intensity conflicts. While Western theories suggest a rather ambivalent link, in Russia peacekeeping remains part and parcel of conflict-waging’ (Baev, 1996: 135).
This close association with ‘conflict-waging’ is also acknowledged by other Western expert opinion, with Roy Allison (1994: 1) characterising peace-creating as an ‘assertive, even coercive, function [which] may involve a strong element of enforcement’. While Dov Lynch (1999: 97) understands the debate to be more nuanced in practitioner and policymaker circles, he suggests that ‘Peace-creating operations have implications that transcend classic and emerging UN peacekeeping norms’, pointing out that ‘The concept of mirotvorcheskiye operatsii is similar to the Western concept of peace-enforcement, where standard military principles characterize combat actions’. Peace-creating has therefore been understood as solely a military enterprise via the application of force beyond a defensive and limited capacity because ‘Their rules of engagement are often very flexible about the use of force’ (Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1995: 321).

The second body of literature has provided a more expansive understanding of Russian thinking. This is based on a recognition of a pluralistic debate which occurred during this period and has acknowledged that Russian perspectives on conflict management have been far more nuanced than the positions expressed above, with views emanating from the military establishment/MoD, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the CIS General Staff (Crow, 1992; Allison, 1994; Jonson and Archer, 1996; Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1996; Lynch, 1999; Yermolaev, 2000; Sagramoso, 2003). These, according to one scholar, have spanned from ‘traditional interposition to integrating ‘peacekeeping’ into war-fighting concepts’ (Lynch, 1999: 94). Both Lynch (1999) and Domitilla Sagramoso (2003) have offered lengthy discussions about the pluralism that shaped the Russian doctrinal debate during the early 1990s. This debate has largely been conditioned by a set of views emanating from the central power ministries, principally the MFA and the MoD. In relation to the former, Lynch (1999: 96) contends that the Foreign Ministry’s approach ‘allows for more force than do traditional international peacekeeping practices’, and have ‘sought to combine in ‘peacekeeping’ the carefully calibrated use of force with political instruments to promote conflict resolution and advance Russian interests’.

In comparison to the MFA, the literature identifies an unfolding of an internal debate within the MoD during the early 1990s. Lynch (1999: 96) states that while the MoD was more consciously interventionist, it was divided on ‘peacekeeping’ as a form of military activity.
Indeed, Allison (1996: 271) points out that the debate between Russian high ranking military commanders expressed ‘differing underlying principles and doctrinal assumptions’. Lynch elucidates this further and contends that the first group within the military establishment/MoD accepted the use of coercive intervention short of war in the internal affairs of the former Soviet Republics. This group advocates peacekeeping as a military-political instrument to resolve conflicts. However, as Sagamoso (2003: 24) puts forward while there were similarities between Russian and Western thinking on the conduct of operations, ‘Western peacekeeping concepts tended to emphasize the humanitarian character of peacekeeping operations as well as the need to interact with civilian structures, [whereas] Russian operations tended to follow narrower interests’. Sagamoso (2003: 24) is tougher on Russia’s understanding than Lynch, stating that the Russian military tended to stress the importance of facilitating a quick termination of hostilities, while Western doctrine emphasised the necessity ‘to reach reconciliation among the sides for the operation to be called a success’. At the same time, the second group within the military establishment/MoD, considered peacekeeping a ‘war-fighting tool in low-intensity conflicts and counter-insurgency operations’ (Lynch, 1999: 97).

In relation to practice, Lynch’s (1999: 4) work on ‘armed suasion’ is perhaps referred to the most when discussing Russian regional conflict management. Lynch (1999: 4) contends that international norms and standards of peacekeeping do not apply in the Russian case, arguing that the Russian government has pursued a deliberate ‘strategy of armed suasion’ [emphasis in original] using coercive intervention, ‘peacekeeping’, and ‘various forms of political pressure’ in an attempt ‘to restore clear hierarchical power relations in the CIS region by means short of war’. In this sense it is widely recognised that Russian behaviour departed from official doctrine centred in the CIS which advocated traditional rules of engagement based on the strict adherence to consent, impartiality, and the limited use of force. The ‘striking difference’, according to Pavel Baev (1993: 142; also see Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1996: 321; Sagamoso, 2003: 29), between ‘Eastern and ‘Western’ approaches is the ‘absence of the principle of neutrality’ where in these operations Russian troops impose ‘a quasi-peace that is probably worth keeping only for Russia’s own national interests’. Indeed, Shashenkov (1994: 60) adds that Russia has ‘blurred the
distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement’. This is closely intertwined with the fragmentation of policymaking and implementation demonstrated by the autonomy of the forces on the ground. It is recognised that the ‘dichotomy between peacekeeping theory and practice’ is largely a result of the ‘reactive and unplanned nature of Russia’s operations’ (Sagromoso, 2003: 28). Allison (1994: 2) concurs, suggesting that the requirements of the situation on the ground have largely determined the character of Russia’s response rather than any preconceived notions or principles. Another aspect of Russian behaviour is that Russian operations are largely unilateral with an instrumental understanding of the legitimating benefits regional and international organisations, such as the CIS, would offer (Allison, 1994:8). Finally, Baev notes that Russia’s understanding and practice of conflict management is confined in various ways to the political and military domains and, therefore, other approaches such as peacebuilding is completely foreign to those involved. Baev (1993: 141) suggests that ‘The idea of peace-building (i.e. social reconstruction) remains essentially foreign, mainly due to the dangerous erosion of the socio-economic fabric in the newly-born states, all ripe for social conflicts’.

Driving Russian engagement and behaviour in these conflicts is a central point in the literature and relates to the wider foreign and security policy direction of Russia in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Shashenkov (1994: 61-62) makes a crucial point relating to the consequences of the retreat of empire, which is largely overlooked in the existing literature on Russian regional approaches. ‘A fact that is often neglected, both in the West and Russia’, Shashenkov (1994: 61-62) comments, ‘is that current developments in the FSU signify the decolonisation and imperial separation of one of the largest-ever continental empires’. Comparing the withdrawal of the Soviet empire with the experiences of British and French dis-engagement during the 1950s and 1960s, both countries aimed to perpetuate military bases in regions of strategic importance and to establish a network of agreements with the newly independent states. According to Shashenkov, ‘These steps were seen as necessary to prevent potentially dangerous local crises, to help contain rival influences and to defend the ‘metropole’s’ remaining interests […]’. In this regard, the ‘peculiarities of Russian peacekeeping’ are derived from Moscow’s imperial transition and separation where insecurity along Russia’s periphery has ‘immediate
repercussions for Russia’s own security and domestic politics’ (Shashenkov, 1994: 62). It is argued that Russia must shape and stabilise its periphery or the ‘developments in the near abroad will determine Russia’s own development through waves of refugees, political upheaval, regional conflicts and instability’ (Shashenkov, 1994: 49).

Allison (1994: 15; also see Suzanne Crow, 1993) acknowledges the difficult circumstances of Russia’s involvement, identifying that Russian commitment in such regions is ‘vitally bound up with its own national interests’, and that while Russia is interested in quelling conflict and providing stability, Russia is also ‘intent on pursuing strong political or strategic interests in the region’ (Allison, 1994:15). Other scholarship is less balanced in its inspection of Russian motivations and drivers. Alongside McNeil (1997), Macfarlane and Schnabel (1996: 309) are candid in their assessment of Russian behaviour, stating that ‘Russian peacekeeping is a symbol of the inability of these states to sustain their sovereign statehood in the face of an interfering regional hegemon and of Russia’s intention to assert its position as the primary power in the CIS’. Lynch (2000: 4) is in agreement, in that the Russian operations differ from international practices because they do not necessarily reflect the will of the international community to maintain peace and security – but more the unilateral will of the Russian government to assert its influence abroad’.

2.4 Re-assessing Russia’s response

This section will highlight the broader contributions of the present writers’ research and then outline the thesis’ argument in light of the existing literature discussed above.

Contribution and positioning

By focusing on Russia’s approach towards complex intra-state conflicts, this research is concerned about how Russia has attempted to manage an increasingly fragmented external environment because of the processes of globalisation; and how this has contributed towards the shaping of Russia’s political and security relationship with the system of European security governance. This research makes an empirical contribution by providing a rigorous insight into Russian security behaviour in the policy area of conflict management. The existing literature has
failed to provide an empirically informed and rounded analysis of Russia’s approach towards conflict management in the European security milieu. This thesis fills this gap in the existing research by offering an extensive empirical treatment of Russian behaviour in the policy area of conflict management. This is based on rigorous empirical research based on elite interviews and extensive documentary analysis, which goes beyond the empirical reach of existing scholarship.

This empirical contribution is combined with the thesis’ conceptual significance concerning the growing body of literature on security governance and its relation to the broader discipline of IR and Security Studies. In the former, the project complements existing research agendas in the security governance literature as broadly outlined in chapter 1. To recap, these research agendas focus on: (1) the link between the Westphalian to the Post-Westphalian state, particularly in Europe and its periphery, to the growing relevance and practice of security governance; (2) and to the assessment of the evolution of security governance across time and space in the European regional context (see Sperling, 2014: 3-4). In this regard, the project applies these existing research agendas in the security governance literature to the context of Russia’s political and security relationship with the central actors of European security governance. However, it offers a contribution beyond existing works which have only offered a general level of analysis regarding Russia and issues of European security governance (Webber, 2000, 2007; Mirwaldt and Ivanov, 2007; Averre, 2010). Yet, while providing an insight into the wider contours of Russian foreign and security policy, none of these studies offer an extensive treatment of Russia’s behaviour regarding policies of security governance. They do not ‘bore’ into the specifics of an issue area to provide a close conceptual and empirical inspection of Russia’s understanding of and approach towards security governance. This thesis will therefore assess Russian foreign and security policy in accordance with the Westphalian/Post-Westphalian tradition in the security governance literature, and through this will examine Russia’s interaction with the evolution of security governance across time and space in the specific policy area of conflict management.

In the latter, this thesis contributes towards the wider disciplines of IR and Security Studies by using security governance to frame the research project. It is acknowledged that security governance still possesses a degree of obscurity and has not enjoyed the same level of acceptance
and attention as its established theoretical siblings, such as security communities, institutions and regimes, and global governance. Despite this, there is ample empirical evidence that security governance is a ‘real-world’ phenomenon that requires further explanation and provides a fruitful research programme and framework for understanding contemporary security issues and ‘the evolutionary trajectory of […] international [and] [regional] systems’ (Sperling, 2014: 3). The project will therefore add to and demonstrate the conceptual and empirical purchase of the security governance literature to the disciplines of IR and Security Studies. As shown in the previous chapter, security governance sits alongside, complements, and in some cases, goes beyond established ways of thinking about decision-making and policy implementation in the realm of security.

To reiterate, the aim of this research is to analyse continuity and change in Russian doctrine, policy, and practice in accordance with the norms and processes of security governance developed in European conflict management. Therefore, this thesis is driven by the following research question:

- To what extent has Russian policy and doctrine corresponded with developments in security governance as broadly understood in the literature and applied in practice by other European actors?

This thesis has arrived at this question because the focus of much of existing literature on Russian conflict management is restricted to Russia’s behaviour in its immediate regional space during a narrow timeframe between the early to mid-1990s. This severely limits our understanding about how Russia has responded to complex intra-state conflicts and how this has informed Moscow’s wider relationship with the system of European security governance. An exploration of the evolution of Russia’s regional and wider European experiences is required to understand Russian conflict management in the European context. The first component of this limitation relates to the unbalanced nature of existing analysis. The literature has failed to provide a complete narrative of Russia’s engagement in conflict management in the European context. Emphasis is predominantly placed on Russia’s regional experience whilst largely overlooking Russia’s experience across the wider European neighbourhood. Russia’s engagement in the Balkans is a
vital episode in its experience of conflict management and the minimal attention it has received is a significant drawback in the analytical integrity of existing scholarship.

This study will therefore employ a rigorous multi-case study research agenda to elucidate Russia’s behaviour across these spaces. Through a comparative analysis of these case-studies a more comprehensive insight into Russia’s policy and understanding of conflict management will be provided. This will allow comparisons to be drawn between Russia’s behaviour in and outside of its immediate regional space, which will offer a more rounded understanding of Russian conflict management in the European context. This is crucial as the existing literature discussed in the previous section has emerged primarily independent of each other demonstrating limited comparative analysis. This is particularly problematic as existing understandings of Russian conflict management have largely become synonymous with its regional experience, where the legacy of existing frameworks and analysis have been imprecise. As discussed above, while a degree of ambiguity in Russia’s response has been recognised, the majority of existing literature has difficulties providing a nuanced understanding of Russian behaviour, where it has largely leaned towards an interpretation of Russian conflict management as an exercise of coercion. Yet, as will be argued below, Russia’s experience of conflict management in the European context is linked to a considerably more expansive set of principles and practices than currently understood.

Even where attempts have been made to engage in an analysis of Russia’s wider European experience, these have largely been limited in empirical scope (Ullman, 1996; Gow, 1997; Antonenko, 1999, 2007; Baranovsky, 2000; Levitin, 2000; Lynch, 1999; Headley, 2008; Averre, 2009; Hughes 2013). Yet, where rich empirical investigations are provided they have only emphasised the impact of Russia’s wider foreign and security thinking on Moscow’s policy implementation in the Balkans (Thorun, 2008; Headley, 2009). While this has offered an informative insight into the contours of Russia’s general Balkan policy, it has not systematically linked a discussion on Russian policy to a detailed and rigorous inspection of developments in Russian doctrine and practice within the broader context of European conflict management. There are others in this body of literature which have even marginalised this area of enquiry and pointed to its lack of empirical utility in contributing towards a deeper understanding of Russian conflict
management, claiming that Russia failed to learn any expertise from its Balkan experience (Antonenko, 1999, 2007). This is highly problematic as Russia’s consistent and deep level of engagement in the Balkans – even after Moscow’s withdrawal in 2003 of its military contingents from the operations in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo – Russia maintained an interest in the developments of the peace processes in each region.

The second component of the existing literature’s limitation relates to the timeframe in which research has focused upon. The majority of major studies which specifically focus on Russian conflict management doctrine and practice tend to focus on the narrow window of Russia’s experience between the early to mid-1990s. While this has been unavoidable for certain scholarship because they were written during this timeframe, others have deliberately continued to focus on this phase of Russian conflict management. Russia’s approach to conflict management has been misunderstood because there has been very little consideration of potential change in Russia’s behaviour in accordance with evolving European (international) norms and processes beyond this timeframe. This has misrepresented Russian conflict management because there has been very little consideration of potential change and development in Russia’s understanding and behaviour. Furthermore, this limitation has been further intensified as existing analysis has not taken into consideration changes in norms and practices in European approaches (alongside the UN) when analysing Russian behaviour. The literature has interpreted a narrow set of static principles and practices, which fails to consider the development in means to manage the impact of an increasingly fragmented external environment since the end of the Cold War. An informative understanding of Russia’s behaviour can only be achieved if its responses to these transitions in security policy are taken into consideration. This has a wider impact in that the failure to appreciate the fluidity of norms and practices in this policy area, restricts our understanding of their impact on Russia’s broader political and security relationship with the central actors of European security governance.

Thinking about Russian conflict management in terms of security governance can go far in helping to correct existing limitations in the current literature, in terms of how Russian behaviour has been approached analytically and in relation to the sets of conclusions formulated. Security
governance will help to organise the analysis and bridge an enquiry between Russia’s behaviour in its immediate regional space and in the wider European neighbourhood. By offering a coherent, though not uncontested, framework drawn from the security governance literature this study will identify and elucidate the behaviour of Russia across these two spaces to provide a more comprehensive understanding of Russian doctrine, policy, and practice. As security governance captures the fluidity of the European security environment and the complexity of the response towards insecurity, security governance will assist in the identification of changes in Russian security behaviour in accordance with the approaches developed in European conflict management. This framework allows for the possibility that Russian behaviour has engaged in trends of European conflict management elucidated by security governance, moving beyond narrow interpretations that render Moscow’s response as narrow self-interested and destabilising acts.

Argument

This thesis argues that Russia’s post-Soviet behaviour towards the mitigation of intra-state conflict has shown a selective engagement in the policies of security governance developed in European conflict management. During the period of study between 1991 and 2012 Russia’s approach showed that it was far more expansive and complex than currently recognised. Its behaviour demonstrated a coherence that reflected some of the core aspects of the norms and processes of security governance which have evolved in European conflict management. Crucially, Russian approaches have shown a tendency to traverse both Westphalian and Post-Westphalian security behaviour, with a selective subscription to the methods and aims across the spectrum of operations developed in the European experience. This has been driven by a policy that combines the staunch defence of its sovereign identity and national interests with a declared commitment to collective European approaches that have attempted to manage the impact of globalisation in the policy area of conflict management. In this regard, while Russia’s wider policy agenda may gravitate towards Westphalian preferences about how to approach the impact of globalisation, its behaviour in conflict management has shown a more nuanced picture of its security preferences. Indeed, both ‘Westphalian and post-Westphalian states often share an
interest in effective security governance efforts that can turn failed states into functioning units’ (Wagnsson and Holmberg, 2014: 326).

To manage globalisation and its attended consequences, such as the complexity and fragmentation of the external European environment, European actors have engaged in policies of security governance. Security policy in European conflict management has moved from a Westphalian to a Post-Westphalian character, which follows from the assumption that security policy has shifted from government (state-centred hierarchical security policy) to governance (fragmentation of policymaking and political authority) (Webber and Sperling, 2014: 128). As discussed above, it is understood that the operations Westphalian actors participate in are typically predicated on limited engagement, strict adherence to sovereignty, and remain wedded to the notions of consent, impartiality, and the limited use of force. These operations have limited goals of establishing peace through a cease fire. At the other extreme, operations post-Westphalian actors participate in tend to be based on extensive engagement, employ a flexible view of sovereignty, and understand the necessity of the recalibration of the notions of consent, impartiality, and the use of force. These operations include a range of methods, have wider goals, and possess not only short but long term aims in establishing peace through cease fires and the facilitation (and enforcement) of democratic polities and economies in the host country (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 36; also see MacQueen, 2006). These divergent approaches, based largely on actor preference, demonstrate the differences in policies adopted to manage the impact of globalisation.

In the case of Russia, the existing scholarship discussed above has either situated its behaviour towards the Westphalian end of the continuum arguing that its operations have shown limited methods and narrow aims (Baev, 1996: 139), or in its more critical form has argued that its approach is located on an entirely different spectrum in terms of doctrine, policy, and practice. As noted above, this body of literature has contended that Russia’s behaviour remains part and parcel of ‘conflict-waging’ (Baev, 1998: 216) largely devoid of humanitarian and peacebuilding processes and aims (Baev, 1997: 116), and employed primarily to serve narrow Russian interests (Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1995). However, Russia’s engagement in the wider European
neighbourhood, principally in the Balkans, demonstrated a largely consistent approach that gravitated towards a middle-ground between Westphalian and Post-Westphalian security provision. In Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moscow exercised a purposeful approach that was rooted in and shaped by the specific circumstances and developments of the conflict. This was not, as is typically argued, informed by a superficial thinking to protect its ‘Serbian brothers’ or merely an appendage of predetermined political and strategic aims vis-à-vis the emerging system of European security governance. While these aims cannot be ruled out particularly from the mid-2000s onwards, they did not override Russia’s contribution towards European security governance through an interpretation of conflict management in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina that showed convergence with European approaches.

Russia was deeply embedded in the peace efforts in both Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina and in Kosovo. Indeed, many of the lessons and thinking that Russia cultivated in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina – such as the maintenance of collective action through various channels of stakeholder interaction – were carried through into its experience in Kosovo. Although for Russian policymakers Kosovo represented a watershed in Moscow’s relations with the central actors of European security governance and while Russia’s approach demonstrated a deepening divergence on certain aspects of European conflict management – particularly in relation to the use of force beyond the tactical level –, Russia maintained a consistent degree of convergence with other aspects of security governance. These related to the facilitation of the humanitarian and security-related processes in the areas of peacebuilding, the delivery of aid, and the maintenance of security. Moscow employed a policy throughout the conflicts that was shaped largely by principle rather than self-interest and balancing behaviour against its European counterparts.

In Russia’s regional experience, its behaviour has demonstrated a degree of ambiguity although this has not been a consistent characteristic of its response. Russia’s involvement in regional conflict management has evolved in stages where an adherence to its doctrinal understanding has fluctuated due to its uneven policy towards its immediate regional space. The period in the early to mid-1990s demonstrated a considerable degree of ambiguity because of
transition in policy and due to the chaos created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, Moscow demonstrated a degree of engagement in policies of security governance to mitigate the underlying tensions that remained in the conflict zones. Contrary to existing scholarship, Russia did not employ a policy to freeze the settlement processes during this phase, but was heavily involved in negotiations to facilitate a settlement. Furthermore, Russia was relatively consistent with its understanding of the role of force – although this was used in 2008 for political reasons. Alongside this, Russia attempted to expedite the humanitarian and settlement processes in the various zones of conflict. Its invitation to external actors has been qualified, but Russia has shown more willingness to engage in collective action at the operational and diplomatic levels with the UN, the OSCE, and other actors than typically recognised.

From the mid-2000s onwards, the tension between its contribution towards European security governance and the safeguarding of its national interests became gradually more acute in Russia’s approach towards the former Soviet space. Russia found it increasingly difficult to accept the widening and deepening of European security governance along its border. Consequently, its approach included the manipulation of methods attributed to policies of security governance, while at the same time reflected elements of its behaviour towards conflict in the wider European neighbourhood. This challenges existing scholarship which largely interprets Russia’s regional experience as a highly calibrated response in the service of national interest. Russia’s behaviour has demonstrated a degree of continuity with its behaviour in the Balkans.

2.5 Conclusion

The approach employed in this thesis is driven by an agenda to understand the Russian experience of conflict management from 1991 to the end of Medvedev’s presidency in mid-2012 in the context of the European milieu. To explore this experience, this thesis has developed a research question which examines the extent Russian policy and doctrine has corresponded with developments in security governance as broadly understood in the literature and applied in practice by other European actors. To answer this question, this thesis has employed the framework of European security governance to bridge an analysis between Russia’s behaviour
across its regional space and the wider European neighbourhood, and to ‘map’ its behaviour in accordance with the evolution of norms and processes of European security governance. In doing so, this thesis demonstrates that Russia’s post-Soviet behaviour towards the mitigation of intra-state conflict has shown a selective engagement in the policies of security governance developed in European conflict management. During the period of study between 1991 and 2012 Russia’s approach showed that it was far more expansive and complex than currently recognised. Its behaviour demonstrated a coherence that reflected some of the core norms and processes of security governance which have evolved in European conflict management. This thesis provides an original and distinctive contribution by offering an exhaustive empirical assessment of Russian conflict management beyond the parameter of existing scholarship, and offers further conceptual insight into the literature of security governance by applying the framework rigorously to an understudied subject area.
Chapter 3
Russia and the management of conflict in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina

3.0 Introduction
The international peace effort in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina has been considered ‘the paradigm case, from which different lessons are drawn, the example which is used to argue out different general positions, and, at the same time, a laboratory in which different ways of managing the new wars are experimented’ (Kaldor, 2007: 6). The spread of this violence in the early 1990s during Yugoslavia’s disintegration – precipitated by Croatia’s and Slovenia’s initial declarations of independence which was quickly followed by Bosnia & Herzegovina’s – triggered mass atrocities within and between local communities that had for decades peacefully coexisted. The tragic events which gripped this corner of Europe were a bitter reminder of the inevitable reality of chaos attributed to war – yet this time, deeply protracted intra-state violence. As discussed in chapter 2, to mitigate these intra-state conflicts European actors began to engage in certain trends to tackle the violence and to facilitate a ‘durable’ peace.

Russia was a central participant in this learning process, contributing towards its failures and successes, with one former Russian UN Military Observer (UNMO) suggesting that ‘Russia learnt a lot in the operations in the Balkans […] under the influence of the European way of peacekeeping’. 47 This chapter will unpack Russia’s response and argue that Russia’s contribution was largely within the mainstream of the approaches exercised by the international peace effort.

47 Interview conducted with Professor Yuri Morozov, Moscow, 27 October 2014.
While there were points of divergence especially regarding the use of force and in relation to Russia’s grievance concerning international bias against the Bosnian Serbs, Moscow exercised a sophisticated approach which showed conformity with European conflict management as captured by the evolving norms and processes of European security governance. Contrary to existing scholarly opinion, the chapter will point out that Russia’s involvement in the international peace effort was essential for the consolidation and realisation of its official understanding of conflict management.

This chapter is divided into two principal sections covering Russia’s engagement across the pre- and post-Dayton phases of the peace effort in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. This analysis is organised with reference to the dimensions of European security governance which have given rise to the evolutionary trends in European conflict management.

3.1 Pre-Dayton: managing intra-state violence

3.1.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity

The UN-led intervention into Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina was by the time of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in 1995 the largest and most complex operation ever undertaken. This included overlapping missions and aims in addition to multiple actors and channels of stakeholder interaction. Figure 3.1 outlines this complexity and Russia’s engagement in stakeholder interaction complexity demonstrated a nuanced understanding of the pooling of sovereignty. Most analysis considers Moscow’s engagement in collective action as travelling along a trajectory from cooperation to independence. This is usually explained because of the cooling of relations with the central actors of European security governance during the early to mid-1990s due to Moscow’s increasing awareness of its national interests (Headly, 2009: 4; also see Thorun, 2008). While there is merit in this argument, Foreign Minister Kozyrev was aware of the value ascribed

---

48 The diplomatic level consisted of formal actors such as the Security Council, the UNSG (and the UNSGSR), and the EC, alongside the ad hoc arrangements of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) and the Contact Group. At the operational level the central actor was the UNPROFOR which conducted the mission alongside the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a host of NGOs. NATO was also an important actor, gaining an influential role as the conflict evolved.
to collective action and was adamant that attempting to ‘solve the Yugoslav problem single-handedly’ was an illusion and that Russia did ‘not intend to solve this problem through its own efforts’. Certain commentators have pointed out that even on the occasions where Russia acted unilaterally, there was no indication that Moscow was purposefully seeking to undermine Western positions or policies (Ullman, 1996: 30). As noted in Chapter 1, while there was a change in relations, Russia still maintained a policy of cooperation with its European and wider Western counterparts.

Moscow’s view was that while it was not a formal member of NATO or the EC, it was a legitimate actor within the negotiating process. The Kremlin’s effort in steering collective action away from an exclusive reliance on Western institutions was not a deliberate policy of obstruction. Rather, it was to facilitate a more inclusive dependence on wider international organisations based on or closely affiliated with the UN or the CSCE. This did not rule out cooperation with actors such as NATO, but demonstrated that Moscow was more comfortable when interacting through organisations or informal arrangements where it could legitimately contribute towards the shaping of the peace effort. Operationally, Russian forces were under the institutional auspices of the UN and made efforts to engage with NGOs and external agencies, although these were largely part of the UN System rather than independent actors.

49 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2398, B/6, 2 September 1995, Interfax, 1 September 1995.
Diplomatic level

During early 1992 Moscow’s involvement in the debate over Yugoslavia’s future membership in the CSCE emphasised the importance of collective action, with Russian officials stating that ‘We wanted Russia’s voice to be heeded on these issues […] [and] held within a triangular framework – the EC, the US and Russia’.\textsuperscript{50} Russia considered the UN as the ultimate arbiter where actions taken were subordinate to the decision-making process at the Security Council.\textsuperscript{51} While Russia was clear about the hierarchical nature of the Security Council, as long as its wider procedural authority over the peace process was taken into consideration this did not rule out Moscow’s

advocacy for multiple channels of interaction. Russia’s involvement throughout 1993 with the promotion of the ICFY’s Vance-Owen Plan (VOP) demonstrated this. Agreeing to the establishment of the ICFY as a coordinating body within the legal framework of the Security Council (Gow, 1997: 195), Russia participated in complex channels of interaction. The ICFY aimed to create diplomatic unity between the EC and the UN to facilitate a final settlement to the conflict (Sloan, 1998: 46). Even after the rejection of VOP by Pale in early May 1993 Russia engaged in a further diplomatic tour of the Balkans and European capitals to gather support for the VOP.52 The ICFY retained a place in the negotiations during the latter years of the conflict and maintained its diplomatic relations with Moscow over issues of the UNSG’s authorisation of NATO airstrikes in mid-1994.53

Alongside the ICFY, Russia’s engagement in the diplomatic process was also through the Contact Group from 1994 onwards. Via the Contact Group, Kozyrev stated that all those involved in the peace effort must pool their resources together to establish a ceasefire.54 However, Kozyrev made the primacy of the UN clear, arguing that all initiatives of the Contact Group had to reflect the principles of international law and be in unison with the Security Council.55 The Contact Group aimed to emulate the authoritative weight of the Security Council, whilst streamlining the decision-making process through the relevant central powers. As four of the participating states in the Contact Group were permanent members of the Security Council a degree of continuity was maintained.

The Contact Group was a central diplomatic forum based on a loose co-ordinating committee of representatives from the central participating powers (Leigh-Phippard, 1998: 307-309).56 By mid-May 1994, the Contact Group members had proposed a settlement plan which Russian

52 Remarking on Moscow’s level of interaction, Owen expressed that ‘It would not be an exaggeration to say that without Russia’s assistance, the current progress in settling the conflict would not have been achieved’. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlv, no. 20, 1993, Izvestiya, 18 May 1993.
56 These included France, Germany, the UK, the US, and Russia, in addition to two representatives from the ICFY.
officials were instrumental in expediting via diplomatic negotiation with Belgrade and Pale. Yet with the failure of the Plan and an increase in the fighting, cracks began to appear between the central powers because of divisions over whether to lift the arms embargo across the region. Throughout 1995 Moscow continued to promote the Contact Group although diverging views shaped many of the ministerial meetings regarding the use of force and NATO’s greater role in the peace effort. The advent of the NATO bombings in late 1995 triggered a flurry of Russian diplomacy to re-establish the political character of the peace effort in accordance with the Contact Group. With the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in early October 1995, Moscow facilitated negotiations via the Contact Group which helped to lay the groundwork for the Dayton Accords in December 1995.

**Operational level**

Russia supported the facilitation of the operation through UNPROFOR and its various agencies. While this did not rule out Russia’s cooperation with actors outside of the UN system, Moscow was conscious of external actors such as NATO undermining the integrity of the UN’s authority. Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev argued that UNPROFOR’s replacement by NATO was unnecessary as the Alliance was not yet a ‘peace organisation’ and that ‘peacekeeping functions are operated by units from different countries under the auspices of the UN’. Being integrated

---

57 Russia contributed considerably to the details of the Plan, with President Yeltsin claiming that ‘we [Russia] have seized the initiative to a significant extent’. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlvi, no. 17, 1994, Izvestiya, 30 April 1994.

58 For instance, during an October meeting in New York, Churkin expressed that ‘no one is able to find approaches to a solution. There is still a rather substantial distance between the sides’ positions. It isn’t clear how the pieces can be put together so as to ultimately form a single, integral picture’. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlvi, no. 42, 1994, Sevodnya, 19 October 1994.


60 On the order of Yeltsin, First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov conducted a phase of shuttle diplomacy liaising with Croat and Bosnian Muslim officials in Zagreb and chaired the September Contact Group meeting in Geneva. See Itar Tass, 14 September 1995, accessed 14 March 2014.


62 This view was echoed by the Deputy Chairman of the Upper Chamber of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, which was very much in accordance with anti-NATO domestic political opinion. After an official visit by the delegation of the Federation Council to the region, the Deputy Chairman asserted that ‘NATO is not a peace organisation. It has completely different goals and objectives. In neither case should NATO be allowed to get into this conflict’. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 July 1994, accessed 14 March 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3378729.
into the UNPROFOR chain of command, Russian forces conformed to the same operational channels of interaction as the other troop-contributing countries.\(^63\)

Russian units adhered to Security Council Resolution 776 (1992) (Krysenko, 1993) and regularly interacted with the UNHCR and NGOs in ensuring the smooth delivery of humanitarian supplies.\(^64\) This fell within the remit of UNPROFOR which was tasked to provide protection at UNHCR’s request.\(^65\) This coordination was also required in protection of the various designated safe areas throughout Bosnia & Herzegovina. Adapting to the multidimensional nature of the operation was both a new experience for Russia and its partners; however, despite Russia’s interaction with many of these actors, Moscow was sceptical of their integrity. Colonel Andrei Demurenko, who was Chief of Staff Sector Sarajevo in 1995, claimed that only agencies of the UN system were proficient in their duties, where many other organisations lacked accountability, profited from black market activity and learned how to exploit the ethnic factor of the conflict to their benefit.\(^66\)

This scepticism also underpinned Russia’s concern about decision on the use of force. Although Moscow accepted the dual-key system, this side-lined the authority of the Security Council and with it Moscow’s veto.\(^67\) Therefore, Kozyrev sent a letter to Boutros-Ghali in 1994 and declared that the question of airstrikes should be the subject of further consultations with the permanent members of the Security Council.\(^68\) The extent of this exclusion became apparent

\(^63\) Russian units were stationed in Croatia from mid-1992 and in Bosnia & Herzegovina from early 1994. In the former, a Russian military contingent took control of United Nations Sector East which was a Serbian-held area of eastern Croatia, while in the latter Russia contributed troops to Sector Sarajevo alongside multinational forces under UN command. To provide coherence within the command structures of UNPROFOR, a detachment of Russian officers was also based at the HQ of each sector their troops were stationed, and at the general HQ of the UN in Zagreb. See Krysenko, 1993.


\(^65\) See Secretary General Report 24540 (S/24540), 10 September 1992, paragraph 3. Also note that it was the UNHCR’s responsibility to liaise and coordinate with other NGOs if they required an escort from UNPROFOR forces when carrying out their humanitarian missions. See Secretary General Report 24540 (S/24540) 10 September 1992, paragraph 4.

\(^66\) As Chief of Staff of Sector Sarajevo, Colonel Demurenko was in a central position to comment on the conduct of certain NGOs operating in this Sector. He explains that some local NGOs would receive kickbacks by cooperating with criminal elements operating in Sarajevo and its surrounding region. See Thomas (1996).

\(^67\) This gave the Secretary General (and representative) the final decision over the use of force when requested by the commander of UNPROFOR and NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC).

during NATO’s bombing campaign in late 1995, when Boutros-Ghali relinquished authority over the use of force to UNPROFOR and NATO. Yeltsin declared that ‘They go beyond UN Security Council decisions’, with the Russian political elite regarding them as unilateral.

Russia strictly applied the procedural rules of the UN offices towards the various actors of the UN involved in the mission. Moscow was content with the Secretary General exercising diplomatic weight through formal channels, but held reservations when these involved decisions on the use of force. Alternatively, others took a more permissive stance towards the mechanics of the decision-making process. Credible arguments were made by the Secretary General and the central NATO countries that authorisation for the use of force had already been granted at the Security Council through the various Chapter VII Resolutions where the employment of military measures had been explicitly mentioned. It was argued that referring back to the Security Council on every occasion would disrupt the decision-making process and render the utility of force in-effective. Russia’s views related to the wider context of its relationship with NATO where it was sensitive in becoming ‘the junior partner in the system of European security governance’. The Russian leadership also exercised legitimate arguments regarding the pooling of collective approaches in a conflict where Russia had as much at stake as other participating actors (Sloane, 1998: 58).

3.1.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation

The peace effort was guided by a principal collective interest: to stop the killing of innocent civilians based on a ceasefire between the opposing parties. Russia traversed the boundaries

---

69 Security Council Meeting 3575 (S.PV. 3575), 8 September 1995, p. 3.
between Westphalian and post-Westphalian forms of security provision which resonated with many of Moscow’s Western partners. One commentator pointed out that Russian policy ‘remained within what might be called the parameters of the international consensus. As its voting record in the UN shows, Russia rarely stood alone’, further arguing that Moscow was not ‘acting unilaterally and in defiance of Western interests’ (Bowker, 1998: 1245-1246). Russia’s behaviour was ascribed to a particular understanding of the regulation of intra-state conflict, which was largely consistent throughout the conflict.

**The role of force**

Russia’s cautious approach towards the conflict was due to its concerns about sovereignty and interference. Moscow pointed out that ‘To take the side of one of the parties to the conflict reflexively or, worse yet, out of selfish temptations would mean to automatically put oneself in conflict with others, both inside and outside of Yugoslavia. And the conflict would grow into an all-European one’. Yet despite Russia’s insistence on using sovereignty to shape the conduct of the operation, Moscow was also alert to the importance of protecting human rights. As the conflict evolved, Russia exercised a largely consistent position opting for an approach which one former UNPROFOR commander referred to as the ‘traditional weapons of peacekeeping, patience, persistence, and persuasion’ (Rose, 1999: xix). This was based on a doctrinal awareness which strictly adhered to the notions of consent and impartiality. The use of force was understood by Russia as possessing a limited role in the operation because of the consent-divide, while other methods such as the separation of the warring sides and the delivery of humanitarian aid were considered key components in the facilitation of the peace effort. The logic of Russia’s conservative interpretation was directly related to the promotion of the diplomatic process, where the facilitation rather than the enforcement of peace was the primary goal.

---

UNPROFOR was established based on a strict mandate of consent, impartiality, and limited force.\textsuperscript{78} With the escalation of the conflict, the Security Council took a significant step by invoking Chapter VII in Resolution 770 (1992) and requested actors to take all necessary measures in the delivery of aid in accordance with the UN.\textsuperscript{79} With the adoption of this approach in Resolution 776 (1992) the Security Council referenced Resolution 770 but made no mention of Chapter VII which effectively diluted the enforcement component of the operation (Boulden, 2001: 90). Besides a concern about potential reprisals to UNPROFOR troops if large-scale military action was taken, the mandates of the evolving operation were also driven by the normative positions of the central powers. In Moscow’s view, while in support of Security Council Resolution 770 (1992) where it was prepared to take forceful action against the parties.\textsuperscript{80}

Churkin commented that ‘It’s true that there are press reports of a plan to use force in Yugoslavia’; however, arguments for the permissive use of force ‘are at odds with the views of many members of the international community’.\textsuperscript{81}

This interpretation was relevant for the enforcement of the NFZ established in October 1992,\textsuperscript{82} and in relation to the maintenance of the safe areas throughout 1993. Regarding the former, although Russia supported every resolution to maintain the integrity of the NFZ,\textsuperscript{83} this was linked to a specific understanding of how the enforcement of the NFZ would assist in diplomacy.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{78} This was proposed by the early concept paper introduced by the Secretary General’s Special Envoy, Cyrus Vance, and the Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding, in late 1991. See ‘The Concept for a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia’ which was provided in Annex III of the Secretary General Report 3280 (S/3280), 11 December 1991. The Secretary General’s support for this position was not only derived from his understanding of peace operations but also because he considered the practicalities of an ‘intervention force’ to be wholly unrealistic. See Secretary General Report 2390 (S/2390), 12 May 1992, paragraph 27, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{79} This was further articulated by the Secretary General’s report in late 1992 which advised that UNPROFOR should follow existing peacekeeping principles, but that this is to include the use of force in self-defence in situations where ‘armed persons attempt by force to prevent the United Nations troops from carrying out their mandate’. See Secretary General Report, 24540 (S/24540), 10 September 1992, paragraph 9, p.3.

\textsuperscript{80} This was further articulated by the Secretary General’s report in late 1992 which advised that UNPROFOR should follow existing peacekeeping principles, but that this is to include the use of force in self-defence in situations where ‘armed persons attempt by force to prevent the United Nations troops from carrying out their mandate’. See Security Council Meeting 3106 (S/PV. 3106), 13 August 1992, p. 101.


\textsuperscript{82} Operation Deny Flight was based on Security Council resolution 781, which considered ‘that the establishment on the ban of military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. See Security Council Resolution 781 (S/RES/781), 9 October 1992, p. 2.


\textsuperscript{84} Security Council Meeting 3191 (S/PV. 3191), 31 March 1993, p. 216.
Moscow’s support for the enforcement of the NFZ was thus contingent upon there being strict provisions on the use of force, and was considered one instrument in a tool kit designed to expedite the political settlement. Kozyrev took a very cautious line, stating that while the leadership in Belgrade and Pale ‘bears substantial, if not primary, responsibility for the bloodshed’, Russia is ‘resolutely opposed to any broadening of the conflict’, and steered clear of condoning a military response towards violations of existing Resolutions such as the NFZ.\(^{85}\)

This understanding also shaped Moscow’s approach towards the safe areas which were devised in 1993 by the Security Council due to Bosnian Serb attacks on the civilian population.\(^{86}\) While force was initially used to ensure the freedom of UNPROFOR’s movement when carrying out its mandate to assist in the delivery of aid rather than to protect the safe areas \textit{per se}, increasing military offensives against places such as Sarajevo and Gorazde forced the Security Council to pass Resolution 836 (1993) which authorised UNPROFOR to use force to defend the safe areas.\(^{87}\) Despite this, the rules of engagement were still restricted; Moscow considered the creation and expansion of the safe areas to be ‘an important factor for stabilizing the situation in these areas and for lessening the suffering of the civilian population’ through the delivery of humanitarian aid, but that this must be predicated on the consent of the conflicting parties.\(^{88}\) This provision, advised by the Secretary General, was in accordance with the thinking of many actors participating in the international peace effort.\(^{89}\)

As in the case of the NFZ, the establishment of the safe areas were considered part of a wider framework to implement VOP. A French diplomat pointed out that


\(^{86}\) Srebrenica was the first safe area to be created by Security Council Resolution 819 (S/RES/819) on 16 April 1993. This was followed by the extension of the safe areas throughout Bosnia & Herzegovina by Security Council Resolution 824 (S/RES/824) on 6 May 1993.

\(^{87}\) Security Council resolution 819 demanded ‘that all parties guarantee the safety and full freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and all other United Nations personnel as well as members of humanitarian organizations’; Also see Security Council Resolution 836 (S/RES/836), 4 June 1993, paragraph. 9, p. 3.


\(^{89}\) The Secretary General was very clear that ‘The operational concept for keeping the safe areas safe, and the number of troops required for this purpose, will be determined by the degree of cooperation which it is assumed that the belligerent parties will provide’. See Secretary General Report 25939 (S/25939), 14 June 1993, p. 626.
the designation and protection of safe areas is not an end in itself, but only a temporary measure: a step towards a just and lasting political solution. This must be understood as a positive contribution to the process begun by the Vance-Owen Plan, which remains the basis for any settlement.90

This, however, was challenged by the Clinton administration with the promotion of the ‘lift and strike’ policy.91 Madeleine Albright was emphatic in affirming that ‘My government’s view of what those tougher measures should be has not changed’.92 From the outset, Washington interpreted the conflict as a conclusive demonstration of Bosnian Serb aggression against a defenceless Muslim population. Thus, it was argued by Washington, that sanctions should be lifted so ‘that the victims of aggression are finally permitted to defend themselves’.93 This policy was encouraged by Washington’s permissive stance on the role of force.94 Yet this was not greeted enthusiastically by many European actors which either supported or were directly engaged in the promotion of the VOP. The UK’s representative cautioned against Washington’s policy and opposed associating the purpose of the safe areas with the lifting of the arms embargo.95

Kozyrev acknowledged the dilemma faced by the international peace effort, noting that on the one hand lifting the arms embargo would help the weaker side to defend itself; however, this would lead to further violence and would ‘be acknowledging that the conflict can be resolved only though military means’.96 In 1994 Lavrov was very clear about Russia’s interpretation of the conditions governing the permissibility of force, explaining that force could only be used if humanitarian convoys are attacked or if the NFZ was violated.97 Hence, Moscow supported the shooting down of several Serb fighter jets by NATO in late February 1994. This aside, 1994 witnessed mounting tension between Moscow and its partners over the role of force in upholding the safe areas. However, as one Russian newspaper pointed out ‘We [Russia] can show as much

90 Security Council Meeting 3228 (S/PV. 3228), 4 June 1993, p. 287.
91 This proposed for the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia & Herzegovina and the use of airstrikes in support of the Muslims.
93 Security Council Meeting 3367 (S/PV. 3367), 21 April 1994, p. 49.
indignation as we like, but the mandate for the NATO bombing in the name of the UN was sanctioned earlier by Russia’s vote, among others’. Nevertheless, Moscow attempted to prescribe a formula to deal with other episodes of violence during 1994. In the case of the first Sarajevo market bombing, Russia acknowledged the mortar attack’s depravity, but remained very cautious and advocated that policy must ‘refrain from any action that might fan the flames of war, and, at last, make the breakthrough to a settlement to the conflict, guided first and foremost by the logic of peace’. This was in disagreement with Washington and the main European troop-contributing countries who although pointed out the necessity of a political settlement, were becoming more sceptical of the non-use of force in the international response. Instead, Moscow placed considerable pressure on the Bosnian Serbs who moved their heavy ordinance outside of the demilitarised zone around Sarajevo, argued for an increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the enclave, and complemented this by a decision to send a battalion of peacekeepers to Sarajevo.

In Tuzla, Russia employed extensive diplomatic pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to allow access to its airport to facilitate an outlet of humanitarian aid to the area. Moscow acknowledged that the mitigation of the humanitarian problem around Tuzla would directly assist in the implementation of the settlement process. Moscow also recognised that this success was only achieved through a combination of diplomacy, the deployment of Russian observers to monitor the delivery of supplies, and the threat of force, which in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs had become

---

99 This view was also held by the Russian MoD, with Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, affirming that the aerial bombing of Bosnian Serb position around Sarajevo would not speed up the peace process as it could lead to ‘a hardening of the positions of the parties’ and ‘to a new escalation of the war in the Balkans’. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 March 1994, accessed 12 February 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3374684.
102 The Russian diplomatic team managed to free up Tuzla airport for the delivery of much needed humanitarian supplies. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1936 (B5) 3 March 1994, Itar Tass, 1 March 1994; alongside this, Moscow also provided ten Kamaz trucks and thirty drivers and mechanics to deliver the humanitarian supplies to Bosnia & Herzegovina. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlvi, no. 2, 1993, Izvestiya, 10 January 1993; Russia also participated in the airlifting of supplies at the initiative of the US to the isolated areas around Tuzla. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlvi, no. 9, 1993, Izvestiya, 4 March 1993.
a reality since the shooting down of several of their fighters earlier in the year. This demonstrated Russia’s recognition of force linked to the implementation of a specific mandate in comparison to the deep reservations held by Moscow regarding the enforcement of the safe areas, where the potential for the escalation of force via NATO airstrikes was a distinct possibility.

This thinking also shaped Russia’s response towards the Gorazde safe area in April. While Churkin bitterly commented during a press interview that NATO airstrikes became inevitable as the Bosnian Serbs continued to play ‘with fire’ despite Moscow’s attempts to persuade them otherwise, Moscow consistently advocated for resolving the conflict by diplomatic means. Instead, Russia encouraged diplomatic pressure on the Bosnian Serbs through direct talks in Pale and in Belgrade, alongside the proposal of sending peacekeepers to the safe area as a form of reassurance to the civilian population. Moscow’s position was again associated with a concern that the use of force would escalate the conflict. Russian official opinion was also influenced by the first UNPROFOR hostage crisis, when several hundred peacekeepers were held captive by the Bosnian Serbs and used as human shields against further airstrikes.

With the change in the balance of power in favour of the Croats and Muslims, military offensives were launched against Bosnian Serb forces in mid-1995. This precipitated Bosnian Serb attacks on the safe areas and in response NATO directed airstrikes against Bosnian Serb positions.

---

104 While this was presented as a synchronised effort based on the utility of airpower and diplomacy, there was considerable irritation at NATO HQ as Moscow had deliberately prevented the further use of force against Bosnian Serb positions.
105 During an international conference in Madrid, President Yeltsin asserted that ‘The problem cannot be solved by forcible means. That would mean an endless war. If things become exacerbated, the blame will fall on those who carried out these bombing strikes’. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. xlvii, No. 15, 1994, Rossiiskie Vesti, 13 April 1994. This was supported by Defence Minister Grachev who emphasised that the use of military force, especially air power, could not lead to a positive outcome in resolving the conflict in the region. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlvii, no. 15, 1994, Rossiiskye Vesti, 13 April 1994.
109 Foreign Minister Kozyrev also expressed his fundamental disagreement ‘with the logic of stepping up NATO threats’ and urged his Western partners to work out a common position. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlvii, no. 16, 1994, Sevodnya, 22 April 1994.
ammunition depots which, under previous UN Security Council Resolutions, were permissible. Russia argued that these airstrikes were compromising the safety of UNPROFOR because of a second round of hostage taking by Bosnian Serb troops.\textsuperscript{111} To enhance UNPROFOR’s security, the Security Council voted for the creation of the RRF to support the force in emergency situations.\textsuperscript{112} Moscow held reservations about its impact on UNPROFOR’s mandate, the replacement of a genuine commitment towards the political settlement with a reliance on the wider use of force, and the potential use of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) against the Bosnian Serbs.\textsuperscript{113} Moscow supported the continuation of UNPROFOR, while emphasising, in accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary General, the need for a mutually acceptable agreement between the belligerents on the conditions of the safe areas.\textsuperscript{114} Russian officials defended this logic stating that the alternative based on UNPROFOR acting like a fireman putting out subsequent fires would ignore the wider diplomatic aim.\textsuperscript{115} This was contrary to the views of the central Western powers with an article in Izvestiya pointing out that ‘no matter how many resolutions are approved by the Security Council on the situation around [the] [safe] [areas] they have absolutely no effect’.\textsuperscript{116}

The fall of the Srebrenica safe area and the systematic killing of the male population precipitated a further use of force. NATO command introduced a plan which included pre-emptive airstrikes and widespread strategic bombing of Bosnian Serb targets. The UNSG pointed out that this would fundamentally depart from the existing spirit of UNPROFOR’s mandate, while Moscow pressed for an increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid and an increase in political

\textsuperscript{113} Security Council Meeting 3543 (S/PV. 3543), 16 June 1995, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{114} The Secretary General advised that ‘a general pre-emptive use of force to ensure security or freedom of movement would lead to an escalation that would make UNPROFOR a party to the conflict and place the lives of personnel in danger. The reality, as recognized in resolution 987 (1995), is that there can be no better protection for UNPROFOR than for the parties themselves to recognize their responsibility for ensuring its security and freedom of movement’. See Secretary General Report 444 (S/444) 30 May 1995.
pressure on the parties for the hastening of a settlement.\textsuperscript{117} Although the facilitation of a settlement was the ultimate aim, there are grounds to suggest that at this stage of the conflict Russia’s approach did not sufficiently take into consideration the imminent danger of the civilian population. Without a firm guarantee from the Bosnian Serbs that existing agreements on the safe areas would be respected, according to the West this gave the interveners little choice but to use force to prevent further massacres.\textsuperscript{118} This came with the second bombing of the market place in Sarajevo on 28 August 1995 and the initiation of ODF. Russia strongly objected to the air campaign arguing that it ran roughshod over the notions of consent and impartiality by punishing one of the parties to the conflict whilst victimising the other, breached the mandate of the RRF, and undermined the settlement process because ODF clearly represented ‘a qualitative change in the nature of the use of force’.\textsuperscript{119}

**Sanctions and embargos**

Russia considered sanctions and embargos central to the facilitation of the political settlement, and argued that there should be sufficient flexibility in their use to allow for an incentivised process. Moscow also argued that their application should be strictly based on the notion of impartiality and not, as in Kozyrev’s words ‘a tool of vengeance or punishment of entire peoples’.\textsuperscript{120} The debate that emerged in the CSCE and the Security Council in 1992 over the suspension of Belgrade’s membership from both organisations, in order to pressure the Serbian political leadership from abandoning its support for the Bosnian Serb war effort, revealed disparate views between Moscow and its Western partners. Russia took a firm stand in the debate over Yugoslavia’s future membership in the CSCE, opposing the suspension of Yugoslavia’s membership but condemning the actions of the Belgrade authorities and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA).\textsuperscript{121} After a fierce debate in the council of the CSCE, which threatened to erupt into

\textsuperscript{118} Security Council Meeting 3553 (S/PV 3553), 12 July 1995, pp. 10-11.
\textsuperscript{119} Security Council Meeting 3575 (S/PV. 3575), 8 September 1995, p. 2-3.
a wider CSCE crisis, Moscow’s proposal was adopted. Russia’s ambassador argued that its position was based on a logic that ‘expelling from the CSCE process one of the parties to the conflict is hardly in the interests of settling the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. In the Security Council, Russia opposed the Washington-led policy of expelling the new FRY from the UN. The adoption of Resolution 777 (1992) allowed the FRY to continue its participation in the UN but excluded it from the body of the General Assembly. This compromise accommodated Moscow’s view that while the FRY, like the other former Yugoslav republics, would have to apply for UN membership, it was recognised that Belgrade’s complete exclusion from the UN ‘would have negative consequences for the process of the political settlement of the Yugoslav crisis, as it would break the channels of communication between our Organization and Belgrade’. While Moscow was clearly out of step with its Western counterparts, its proposals were credible in expediting the violence and were advocated in the collective spirit of ending the conflict. The Security Council adopted Resolution 757 (1992) which applied a range of sanctions against the FRY because of Belgrade’s support for the Bosnian Serb offensive in mid-1992. Moscow’s support for the Resolution demonstrated a concern about the further destabilisation of the region. Russia’s representative declared that because Belgrade failed to comply with the demands of the international community ‘It has thereby brought upon itself sanctions by the United Nations’. This support, however, was not without two qualifications. First, Russia argued for the gradual implementation of sanctions beginning with an embargo on air service to the FRY. Although domestic public opinion influenced the formulation of Russian policy towards Belgrade, the

124 These ranged from economic and trade sanctions to the suspension of scientific, technical and cultural cooperation, in addition to a prohibition on travel and a ban on the participation of the FRY in international sporting events. See Security Council Resolution 757 (S/RES/757), 30 May 1992.
125 Security Council Meeting 3082 (S/PV. 3082), 30 May 1992, p. 89.
126 One scholar notes that the Russian leadership could equally have advocated the employment of sanctions against Zagreb for their part in the fuelling of the Croat offensive against Bosnian Serbs and Muslims, but instead chose to remain silent and followed the international consensus directed against Belgrade (Bowker, 1998: 1252).
utility of sanctions was also based on an incentivised process.\textsuperscript{128} Second, while Russia supported
the initial sanctions against Belgrade, Moscow was aware of their negative humanitarian
consequences. The Russian leadership postponed the imposition of sanctions for one month and,
in relation to its humanitarian concerns, opposed a suspension of shipments of food and medicine
to the FRY.\textsuperscript{129} However, with the sustained violation of existing sanctions by Belgrade, the
Security Council tightened them further by adopting Resolution 787 (1992). Moscow supported
this round of sanctions to dissuade Serbian interference in the conflict.\textsuperscript{130} The Russian leadership
stated that it was not playing ‘an independent game’ and understood the use of sanctions to
expedite the diplomatic effort.\textsuperscript{131} Moscow desperately aimed to give the Serbian parties a last
chance to reach an agreement in acceptance of the VOP.\textsuperscript{132} At Russia’s insistence the Security
Council postponed its vote on the decision to further increase sanctions only for them to be applied
once the Bosnian Serbs had rejected VOP. Russia supported this decision and did not hide its
dismay with Pale and Belgrade.\textsuperscript{133}

Russia began to question the existing sanctions against Belgrade which began to consider the
deployment of international observers along its border.\textsuperscript{134} This did not obtain broad support from
the other participating members in the peace effort, who argued that sanctions should be lifted or
eased once the deployment of observers had actually been completed.\textsuperscript{135} The Russian leadership
continued to push for a lifting of the sanctions against Belgrade, but was clear that sanctions
should still be applied against Pale for their continued military offensives against the safe areas.\textsuperscript{136}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{128} Security Council Meeting 3082 (S/PV. 3082), 30 May 1992, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{130} Security Council Meeting 3136 (S/PV. 3136), 16 November 1992, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{131} Churkin also explained that ‘I think it necessary to refrain from rash actions and decisions that could
have an effect opposite to the one intended. After all, the common objective is to bring about a political
settlement, not to cause a further escalation of the conflict. In this connection I am disturbed by the
intention to put a resolution imposing new sanctions against Yugoslavia’. See the Current Digest of the
\textsuperscript{132} Security Council Meeting 3200 (S/PV. 3200), 18 April 1993, p. 224.
\textsuperscript{133} The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlv, no. 15, Izvestiya, 14 April 1993.
\end{flushleft}
One former Russian UNMO was emphatic when acknowledging that ‘there is no right or wrong. All of them – Croats, Bosnians and Serbs – were guilty, especially at the top level’. 137

These debates continued into 1995, with Russia opposing the policy of partial suspension of sanctions against Belgrade. Moscow argued that because Belgrade had allowed the delivery of humanitarian aid across its territory and finally agreed to the stationing of a UN Border Mission along its border with Bosnia & Herzegovina, there should be a complete suspension of sanctions. 138 The central Western countries agreed that sanctions should be implemented on an incentivised basis, but argued that while Belgrade had made steps in the right direction, further commitments in advancing the peace process by pressuring the Bosnian Serbs in the aftermath of ODF were required if there was to be a complete relief of sanctions. 139 It was clear, therefore, that although a division had emerged between Moscow and some of its Western partners on the extent and duration of the sanctions, Russia refrained from obstructing decisions in the Security Council for their continued implementation. This demonstrated an awareness in Moscow for the preservation of unity. 140 Moscow maintained this behaviour even after ODF with its abstention from Security Council Resolution 1022 on 22 November 1995, which lifted the arms embargo, as it feared the further militarisation of the region. 141

The settlement process

The settlement process in Bosnia & Herzegovina highlighted the pragmatism shaping the debate over self-determination. As one scholar put it ‘At the heart of the debate over Bosnia’s future was the problem of reconciling the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity’ (Goodby,

---

137 Interview with a former Russian United Nations Military Observer (UNMO), Moscow, 13 April 2015.
138 Throughout 1995 Moscow continued to press its case in the Security Council asserting that maintaining sanctions against Belgrade ‘is not consistent with the principle of positive and negative incentives previously agreed in the Contact Group and in the Security Council, according to the principle, those that support the peace plan would be encouraged while pressure would be exerted on those that reject it. That principle was intended to be an effective tool in the effort to reach a peaceful settlement. It might be appropriate today, though, to ask just how effectively that tool is being used’. See Security Council Meeting 3522 (S/PV. 3522), 21 April 1995, p. 13-14.
140 Russia abstained rather than vetoing the proposal of continuing limited sanctions against Belgrade, where Security Council Resolution 988 (S/RES/988), 21 April 1995 and Security Council Resolution 1003 (S/RES/1003), 5 July 1995 were adopted.
Slovenia was the first republic in the SFRY’s dissolution to be recognised by the West with the EC sponsoring the Brijuni Accords in July 1991. Zagreb’s separation, however, proved to be an entirely different situation with the Belgrade-controlled JNA unwilling to compromise on Croatia’s attempt to secede. This was met with international discord within the ranks of the central European powers who were divided over the potential consequences of acknowledging Croatia’s declaration of independence. Despite this initial division – mainly exacerbated by what some considered as Germany’s premature unilateral recognition of Croat independence in December 1992 – a consensus in support of independence quickly followed. This gained momentum within the EC and Washington as Belgrade was perceived increasingly to be impeding the settlement process by narrowly acting on behalf of Serbian interests (Caplan, 2005: 22). Croatian independence was formally recognised by the UN official in May 1992.

The recognition of Bosnia & Herzegovina by Washington and the EU – precipitated by the Badinter Commission’s ruling that it satisfied the primary criteria for sovereignty on the condition that all major parties agree – in early April 1992 followed this development. With the holding of a referendum, in which the Bosnian Serbs refused to participate, fighting immediately broke out because of both President Izetbegovic’s declaration of Bosnian independence and Radovan Karadzic’s promotion of independence of the Republika Srpska (RS). Some commentators argued that both Washington and Brussels gave all three parties in Bosnia & Herzegovina the incentive to posture and prepare for war, enabling the strongest party to be in the most stable political position at the moment of recognition (Woodward, 1995: 283). According to others, this gave the Bosnian government the expectation that Washington would come to Bosnia’s defence as a sovereign state with full rights under the UN charter (Greenberg and McGuiness, 2000: 44).

The approach Moscow adopted towards the initial settlement process has been divided into two phases conditioned by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This is considered a major fault line shaping the political leadership’s interpretation of the self-determination debate. It has been widely recognised in the academic literature that under the leadership of President Gorbachev Moscow’s policy advocated non-interference for fear of precipitating the USSR’s dissolution (Edemskii, 1996: 30; Arbatova, 1997: 410). This apprehension in the Russian political elite also
related to concerns about the internationalisation of the conflict. This was supported by Washington which also feared the escalation of the conflict and its possible impact on the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. In late July 1991 both Moscow and Washington signed a joint declaration condemning the internal use of force and called for a negotiated peace. This, however, did not rule out the acceptance of potential scenarios of separation if determined by the peoples of Yugoslavia. Moscow stated that any political changes should be facilitated through the Helsinki process, which supported the territorial integrity of the state and the transformation of the state based on a strictly internal and inclusive process. The respect for minority rights was also acknowledged by Moscow to avoid intra-state violence. Therefore, Moscow’s policy refrained from opposing the acts of declaration by Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, which was further hastened by political change in the Kremlin in December 1991. While acts of independence would complicate an already fragile situation, the inevitability of separation was recognised as it was not only ‘a matter of opposition between republics and the centre, but the opposition between republics themselves’. It was pointed out by officials that Russian policy had changed because it had been out of touch with the realities of the situation. Yet, while the new presidential administration was less cautious in acknowledging the individual republics of the SFRY, interpretation of the fundamental principles of territorial integrity and self-determination remained relatively consistent.

Moscow’s diplomatic engagement intensified with the implementation of the VOP. The VOP aimed to establish several regions or ‘cantons’ based on ethnic majorities, but constitutionally

---

144 Demonstrating further nuance in Russia’s understanding, Russia’s representative at the UN highlighted the dilemma of this debate, recognising the dangers in ‘separatism and national extremism, not only for each individual country, but also for entire regions’. Yet, it was also acknowledged that ‘Another lesson to be learned from the events in Yugoslavia is the need to respect the rights of national minorities’ as a means to ‘avoid the experience of a stream of refugees, armed conflicts, hatred among nationalities and the destruction of people, towns and villages’, further emphasising that we have ‘to ensure strict respect for the rights of minorities on the part of all peoples in its territory. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1324 A/8, 3 August 1991, Izvestiya, 5 August 1991.
designed as multi-ethnic (Gow, 1997: 235). Lord Owen declared at the UN in November 1992 that a crude division of the region into three individual provinces would endorse ethnic cleansing.148 Further peace plans were proposed, including the Stoltenberg-Owen Plan and the Contact Group Plan, although these also failed. The Dayton Accords were finally finalised in November 1995, which like the Contact Group Plan promoted a constitutional arrangement between the separate ethnic entities within Bosnia & Herzegovina.149 The Agreement situated the settlement in the framework of the Helsinki Final Act and attempted to establish a compromise between the opposing parties regarding the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity.150 This constitutional arrangement was instigated in large part by Washington and while it was side-lined at Dayton, Russia continued to support the settlement due to its replication of the Contact Group Plan.151 Moscow demonstrated that it was flexible regarding the issue of self-determination and that the leadership was conscious of ensuring that Bosnia & Herzegovina would become a functioning actor in European security governance.

3.2 Post-Dayton: building a ‘lasting peace’

The nature of the peace effort following Dayton became more intricate as the level of stakeholder interaction complexity increased. While criticism can be levelled at the post-Dayton peace effort, this has not invalidated the shift towards the integration of civilian and military dimensions. As introduced in chapter 2, through an engagement in the dimensions of security governance, European approaches began to focus on post-conflict peacebuilding. Summing up the purpose of the peace effort, Germany’s representative at the UN pointed out that ‘Our aim is not only a negative peace, which is the absence of tension, but also a positive peace which is the presence

149 Officially known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
150 The Agreement preserved the territorial integrity of Bosnia & Herzegovina as an autonomous sovereign actor whilst acknowledging its constituent entities. See Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 4, Article III (3), p. 60. Each entity was provided the ability to exercise authority over major aspects of its governance Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 4, Article III (1), p. 63.
of justice. The following sections will focus on the extent of Russia’s contribution towards the post-Dayton phase of the peace effort.

3.2.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity

Figure 3.2 illustrates the pooling of sovereignty via stakeholder channels of interaction complexity. With so many actors implementing various components of the peace effort, there was an intentional effort to facilitate a ‘loose’ form of coordination, particularly relating to the civilian dimension, through deeper forms of governance (Cousens and Cater, 2001: 41). The Security Council provided the legal framework for the implementation of the military and civilian dimensions of the operation. For Russia, the Security Council continued to play a pivotal role in the settlement process, helping to compensate for its status as a non-member in NATO and the EU by ensuring the Kremlin’s ability to influence the conduct of the peace effort. Through Security Council Resolution 1031 adopted on 15 December 1995 the Implementation Force (IFOR) was established and under Resolution 1035 adopted on 21 December 1995 authority was transferred from UNPROFOR to IFOR, in addition to the authorisation of a civilian International Police Task Force (IPTF). Moscow also supported Resolution 1031 (1995) which invited a number of UN agencies, NGOs and international institutions to assist in the peace effort. The Security Council remained a principal institutional actor during this phase, where the participating central powers and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) would regularly discuss the progression of the operation in Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Russia continued to support the authority of the Security Council in the peace effort. Channels of interaction were established between the Security Council on the one hand and the OHR and the Peace Implementation Council (Steering Committee) (PIC) on the other. The PIC incorporated the ICFY and all parties which had a vested interest in the processes of peace implementation. This strategic oversight was coordinated through the Steering Committee and chaired by the OHR.

Diplomatic level


Peace Implementation Conference, 1995, paragraph 21(a).
to ‘keep the PIC fully informed of progress’. Working alongside the UN and the OSCE, the Steering Committee aimed to be as inclusive as possible but ‘remaining small enough to be agile and decisive’ (Cousens and Cater, 2001: 41). In Moscow’s view, the PIC replaced the Contact Group where the relevant P5 members of the Security Council could participate.

The PIC oversaw the OHR which implemented the civilian component of the operation. While Russia accepted the provisions of the DPA regarding the OHR, supported the enhancement of the OHR’s powers in 1996 during the military transition from IFOR to Stabilisation Force (FOR) which were further consolidated in 1997 through the establishment of the so-called ‘Bonn Powers’, Moscow interpreted the OHR’s increasing autonomy as a direct hindrance to an internally facilitated peace between the belligerents, and as an obstruction to the spirit of collective action. Russia held reservations about how the OHR’s powers were not originally envisaged in Dayton or in any Security Council Resolution, and that the use of these powers was neither limited by time nor were they clarified. Throughout the post-Dayton phase, the Russian power ministries largely viewed the behaviour of the OHR as overstepping its jurisdiction and undermining the central pillars of authority premised on the PIC and the Security Council.

---

155 The Steering Committee included representatives of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). See Peace Implementation Conference, 1995, paragraph 21(a).

156 Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 10, Article I.

157 A December meeting of the PIC in 1997 extended the powers of the OHR to include the use of ‘interim measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, which will remain in force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a decision consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue concerned’ and the implementation of ‘other measures to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as well as the smooth running of the common institutions. Such measures may include actions against persons holding public office or officials who are absent from meetings without good cause or who are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its implementation. See OHR, ‘PIC Bonn Conclusions’, Chapter XI, paragraph 2 (b) and (c), 12 December, 1997, accessed 1 September, 2015, available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182&amp;11#11.


159 Security Council Meeting 5147 (S/PV. 5147), 23 March 2005; also see the Secretary General Report 156 (S/156), 10 March 2005.
Operational level

The nature of Russia’s military participation at the operational level also reflected apprehensions about the monopolisation of the peace effort by Western military actors. These concerns were largely attributed to the necessity of operational effectiveness. Kozyrev declared that while opposing NATO’s domination of the operation’s military dimension was a central aim of Moscow, it was vital that Russia did not ‘react allergically to all NATO operations’ as the ‘balance of interests of East and West should be observed’. Based on this thinking Moscow aimed for a mutual partnership with NATO in the forthcoming operation in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Kozyrev affirmed that a more inclusive arrangement should be developed ‘to enable Russia to play a substantial role, on equal terms’.

There was a divergence between Russia’s and NATO’s interpretation of how sovereignty was to be pooled into the collective command structures of the operation’s military dimension. Moscow aimed to prevent NATO from retaining a ‘gate-keeping’ role over the conduct of the operation’s military dimension by promoting the centrality of the UN. A lengthy debate between Moscow and its Western counterparts took place regarding the operation’s appropriate command structure. A unique arrangement was finally agreed which avoided placing Russian forces directly under NATO’s chain of command but did not harm the potential for cooperation and integration. While there were conflicting views in the Russian military about the utility of this

---

162 Washington and NATO had become deeply sceptical about the effectiveness of UN-led operations. Instead, while officials in Washington and NATO recognised the wider authority of the UN Security Council, but argued that NATO should take ownership of the military conduct of the operation where non-NATO members were welcome to participate under NATO command. However, Grachev suggested a rotating command structure by NATO and Russia for the multinational forces which would be deployed in the conflict area after the signing of the DPA Accords. This was rebuffed and NATO was being far from unreasonable as it was contributing the majority of the troops to the operation.
163 The Russian brigade would serve in Task Force Eagle inside the US First Armour Division’s headquarters as part of Multi-National Division (MND) (North). They would be commanded by General Joulwan and General Leonty Shevtsov Russian deputy commander at NATO’s headquarters in Mons, Belgium (Kipp and Warren, 2003: 49). This was known as OPCON/TACON (operational control/tactical control) where SACEUR exercised OPCON of the Russian brigade through the Deputy SACEUR for Russian Forces, while the Russian brigade was subordinate for TACON but under MND(N). Although this gave the Commander of MND(N) the responsibility for setting priorities within the Russian brigade sector, he did not possess de jure authority to assign missions to the Russian brigade. Rather, the Commander MND(N) would assign missions and tasks to the Russian brigade through daily and mission
arrangement, Russian troops maintained excellent relations with NATO, particularly US forces due to their close proximity within Multi-National Division North (MND(N)) where there was cooperation in patrolling, training, and intelligence sharing.\textsuperscript{164} After the completion of IFOR, General Leonti Shevtsov (1997) praised the cooperation between NATO and Russia which helped to expand ‘mutual understanding and confidence’.

The complexity of this cooperation was channelled through Russia’s participation in the Joint Military Commission (JMC), where Russian representatives cooperated with the OHR and the NATO commander who exercised final authority on the military aspects of the settlement.\textsuperscript{165} The JMC was established to review complaints or questions regarding the modalities of the peace settlement, to receive reports and make decisions on suitable actions as a means to ensure compliance with Dayton, and to assist the military commander in determining and implementing a series of transparency measures between the belligerent parties.\textsuperscript{166} In this context, a representative from the OHR regularly attended the Commission to offer advice on ‘political-military’ issues and, like the military commander, was able to request a meeting of the Commission.\textsuperscript{167} Shevtsov (1997) pointed out the operational necessity of the JMC, stating that it was ‘a real godsend’ because all of the parties were able to ‘contribute to the search for ways to normalize the situation and resolve disputes’, and at the same time they learnt ‘to talk with each other and trust one another’.\textsuperscript{168}

However, the degree of Russian engagement in the JMC was not replicated in the Joint Civilian Commission (JCC). The purpose of the JCC paralleled the aims of the JMC in formally coordinating the civilian dimension of the operation.\textsuperscript{169} The IPTF was under the authority of the

\textsuperscript{165} Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 1-A, Article VIII, paragraphs 6 and 8.
\textsuperscript{166} Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 1-A, Article VIII, paragraph 2.
\textsuperscript{167} Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 1-A, Article VIII, paragraphs 6 and 8.
\textsuperscript{168} This view was further emphasised in a joint publication ‘Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations and Prospects for a Future Combined Security System: The Peace and Stability of Europe after IFOR’ between the Foreign Military Studies office (FMSO), Centre for Army Lessons Learned, U. S. Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas and the Centre for Military-Strategic Studies (CMSS), General Staff of the Armed Forces, Moscow. See 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, 2000, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{169} Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 11, Article II, paragraph 8.
UNSG, but subject to the coordination and guidance of the OHR. In Russia’s case, ‘[b]ecause the Russian armed forces do not have designated civil-affairs units, Russian cooperation in this area was limited’. Yet, while this prohibited Russia from engaging in the JCC, this did not prevent Russian forces from interacting with NGOs it viewed as constructively contributing towards the peace effort, and neither did it signify a disregard for the value of implementing civilian aspects of the peace operation through the pooling of sovereignty with multiple actors. With the withdrawal of the Russian brigade from SFOR in 2003 Moscow’s engagement in the processes of interaction complexity decreased. However, Russia continued to support and participate in the IPTF and later the EUPM in 2002.

3.2.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation

Coercive measures and the role of force

Russia maintained its staunch opposition towards strategic force. While Russia’s military command recognised that those participating in the operation were authorised to use force through a Chapter VII mandate in order ‘to compel the parties to peace’, Russian troops were only authorised by the Council of the Russian Federation to use force in a limited capacity. Russia’s military command agreed, pointing out that ‘the use of force would immediately undermine the credibility of the peacekeepers’ and ‘most importantly, would [result] in casualties’. Clearly, a deep level of apprehension concerning the notion of the consent-divide still shaped Moscow’s behaviour. This was in comparison to many Western actors – primarily through the

---

170 The authority of the UN Secretary General over the IPTF was implemented through a UN official (at the level of assistant-Secretary General) whose role was to oversee the commander of the IPTF, liaise with the OHR, and report directly to the Secretary General. See Secretary General Report 1031 (S/1031), 13 December 1995, section III (A), paragraph 12.
institutionalisation of approaches in NATO as discussed in chapter 2 – which had become more 
alert to the utility of strategic force conceptualised through peace support.¹⁷⁶

Although Russia’s awareness of consent was embedded in the promotion of state sovereignty, 
its understanding should not be reduced to such a narrow interpretation. Moscow was conscious 
of the humanitarian dimension in Bosnia & Herzegovina and continued to advocate what it 
considered a responsible approach towards the implementation of the military aspects of Dayton. 
This was via wider peacekeeping methods to assist in the mitigation of the violence and the 
maintenance of security in cooperation with NATO forces. As Headley (2008: 299) puts it 
‘Russian policy displayed a familiar pattern: attempting to find a common line with Russia’s 
Western partners against nationalists in Bosnia, but ruling out the kinds of methods that Western 
governments believed were necessary to achieve these ends’.

The question of pursuing indicted war criminals emerged as a complex issue between Russia 
and NATO. Initially, IFOR refrained from participating in the forceful pursuit of indicted war 
criminals, adamant that it would not perform any policing duties (Cousens and Cater, 2001: 57). 
Policies quickly changed, with Washington’s initial recommendation to coercively pursue 
indicted war criminals during IFOR’s transition to SFOR.¹⁷⁷ Javier Solana, as the EU’s High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, declared that ‘the painful chapter in 
Bosnia’s history can only be closed’ until all indictees ‘answer the charges made against them’.¹⁷⁸

Sporadic missions were conducted by SFOR and while many of these operations were 
executed successfully, several caused controversy due to their coercive nature. These included 
incursions into Serbia to capture indicted persons and the killing of those who violently resisted. 
Russia was vehemently opposed to the conduct of these operations, arguing that such actions were

¹⁷⁶ Rupert Smith’s seminal account of the role of force in the operation is a testament to this change in 
thinking, see Smith (2005). For an excellent analysis of the evolution of British and US approaches 
towards the use of force in pre-Dayton Bosnia & Herzegovina and Somalia, see Cassidy (2004).
¹⁷⁷ Security Council Meeting 3723 (S/PV. 3723), 12 December 1996.
the UK delegation stated that ‘We regard the operations of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) as completely 
legitimate, because cooperation with The Hague Tribunal is key to Bosnia’s integration into the 
arbitrarily interpreted and outside of SFOR’s mandate.\textsuperscript{179} Moscow was, therefore, adamant that the work of SFOR and the ICTY must strictly conform to the mandate provided by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{180} Moscow persistently opposed the expansion of SFOR’s mandate to include law enforcement powers for fear that NATO would further manipulate the interpretation of its responsibilities.\textsuperscript{181} There was also a degree of apprehension about potential reprisals against the troops participating in the mission. Despite this, taking a more passive approach in certain scenarios would have failed to expedite the issue of detaining indicted war criminals, and contrary to Russian protestations, NATO and the ICTY also targeted Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats suspected of war crimes.

Another recurring issue was Russia’s opposition towards what was viewed as NATO’s increasingly unilateral behaviour.\textsuperscript{182} In late 1997 after the forcible detention of indicted war criminals in the town of Vitez in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), Lavrov stated that the OHR was only informed of the arrest after the fact and that such actions may cause further instability. Moscow was clear that Russian forces would not participate in any of the detention raids pursued by SFOR. The political leadership stated that any extradition of indicted war criminals to The Hague should be decided in cooperation with the entities of Bosnia & Herzegovina. Both the positions of NATO and Russia on the issue of detaining suspected war criminals for the ICTY were credible and, yet, neither attempted to accommodate the other’s approach. While it did not explicitly stipulate in the DPA or in any Security Council Resolution that SFOR could coercively pursue indicted war criminals, there was scope for interpretation.\textsuperscript{183} NATO directly linked the implementation of this responsibility with its ability to use coercive

\textsuperscript{180} Security Council Meeting 4484 (S/PV. 4484), 5 March 2001, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{183} The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Annex to this Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law’. See Dayton Peace Accord, Article IX.
measures, as specified in the DPA and Security Council Resolutions. While Russia agreed that an integral part of the peace process was the bringing to justice of suspected war criminals, it opposed NATO’s forceful methods.

It was clear that the use of force on certain occasions failed to foster an atmosphere of reconciliation between the more hard-line groups of the opposing parties, such as during the 1997 Bosnian Serb political crisis. During this internal power struggle, SFOR troops in support of Biljana Plavsic took control of several police stations in the fragile pocket of Brcko (where SFOR troops clashed with crowds of Bosnian Serbs), Banja Luka and Bijeljina from pro-Radovan Karadzic police forces. Russia’s response was predictable, arguing that the international presence in the country can and must offer assistance in settling the conflict but without any interference or use of force. Contrary to Russia’s approach towards the mitigation of the crisis, SFOR seized control of four Bosnian Serb radio and television transmitters in early October 1997 due to inflammatory reporting by pro-Karadzic stations in various regions of the RS which reneged on previous agreements to halt contentious nationalistic propaganda. Moscow considered this as another irresponsible response towards the management of the mass media. Moscow was concerned that these actions would derail the recent agreement signed in Belgrade between the opposing parties of the Bosnian Serb political elite to hold elections in November 1997. Yet, as some commentary points out, while SFOR’s behaviour was invasive, such interventions were necessary to facilitate equal media access and balanced media coverage (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 368).

Other instances of SFOR’s coercive behaviour occurred in April 2001 against a group of ethnic Croats in Mostar who were involved in regional transnational crime. This provided a financial basis for the Croats to bankroll their campaign via the Hercegovaka Banka to establish a separate Croatian entity and cement further ties with Zagreb (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 379). The initial round of SFOR operations in Mostar provoked major riots where Croat mobs stoned SFOR troops

---

and attacked employees of international organisations and NGOs. Notwithstanding, SFOR continued its missions and seized arms depots held by the Bosnian Croats since the war which precipitated the blockading of SFOR bases by Croatian war veterans, despite condemnation from the Croatian government in Zagreb. SFOR made a final raid on the Hercegovacka Banka which resulted in new administrators being installed at the bank to prevent it from continuing to fund the Bosnian Croat’s drive for self-rule.

**Implementing the political process**

The central purpose of the DPA was to re-construct Bosnia & Herzegovina into a viable and functioning state.¹⁸⁶ The integration of Bosnia & Herzegovina into the EU became a central aim for those actors contributing towards the peace effort.¹⁸⁷ The Russian leadership recognised the importance of rebuilding the democratic institutions of Bosnia & Herzegovina, and supported its integration into the EU.¹⁸⁸ Managing the political process that followed was a challenging task with the constant presence of nationalism in the RS and the Bosnian Croat entity in the FBiH. This was also complicated by Bosniak political manoeuvring which pushed for further centralisation as a means to mutually-dominate the central political structures. Soon after the signing of the DPA there was an urgency to begin implementing the core aspects of the peace effort – particularly with Karadzic’s replacement of the moderate Bosnian Serb RS Prime Minister, Rajko Kasagic, with the hard-line nationalist Gojka Klickovic in May 1996. Washington pressed for the holding of early elections and while the OSCE reluctantly gave its final approval of elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina on 14 September 1996, the OSCE was very clear that conditions for the successful facilitation of elections were not present.¹⁸⁹ Although it was conceded by many that conditions to hold a viable election were far from ideal due to the coercion

¹⁸⁶ Dayton Peace Accord, Article I (2), ‘Democratic Principles’.
of the electorate from the political parties, it was deemed better to have a government begin operating, than wait until fairer elections could be held. Moscow was in agreement with this approach, with Foreign Minister Ivanov recognising that elections were necessary to establish local government. While the voting behaviour still confirmed the presence of a stark ethnic divide in the country which the DPA has been widely regarded as reinforcing, it was acknowledged by the OSCE that they offered a step in the right direction.

The next challenge came with the power struggle in the RS as previously noted. In strict accordance with the DPA, throughout the political crisis Moscow supported the preservation of RS’s territorial integrity within Bosnia & Herzegovina. Moscow recognised that RS media outlets bore a huge responsibility for the deterioration of the political process during the crisis with their attacks on SFOR and Bosnian Serb politicians, but ardently supported the principle of non-interference and advocated for a solution based on political compromise. During a July meeting in Pale, Russia was satisfied that the RS would continue to implement the DPA and called for the holding of early elections to assist in what Moscow considered as the legitimate mitigation of the crisis via democratic means, administered by the OSCE, and based on the DPA. With Slobodan Milosevic’s intervention to hold elections in November, the crisis ended with the election of the moderate and progressive Milorad Dodik as the new Prime Minister. Russia and its Western counterparts were satisfied with the electoral outcome. Although Russia’s policy was successful, events demonstrated that there was a fine line to negotiate between almost blindly accepting the credibility of the ultra-nationalist political element in the RS – who were corrupt

and intransigent (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 361) – and maintaining an excessive reliance on the ability of the democratic electoral process to facilitate a progressive RS.

Russia understood that any unilateral change to the political process – whether by one of the entities or by what it increasingly came to consider as the interference of the OHR – would violate the fragile balance between territorial integrity and self-determination as originally enshrined in the DPA. This did not rule out, however, Russian support for the intervention of the OHR on the occasions it considered as major constitutional crises. In February 2001 the Croat member of the tripartite presidency, Ante Jelavic, announced that the Bosnian Croats could no longer participate in the FBiH because the constitutional arrangement of Bosnia & Herzegovina had increasingly cut the Croats out of the picture by electoral changes implemented by the OHR (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 378). The Croat leadership called on all Croats to resign their jobs in the military and other public services to establish an autonomous Croat ‘statelet’ for eventual union with Croatia (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 378). During the course of the crisis, the OHR dismissed several high-ranking Bosnian Croat officials, including Jelavic, for their role in breaching the constitution (Jeffries, 2002: 167-168). While Russia’s representative recognised the political crisis and failed to provide any immediate suggestions on ways to tackle the emergency, after a further discussion in the Security Council the President was instructed to make a statement on behalf of the Council which condemned this unilateral move of self-rule as it contradicted the DPA. The statement also expressed its support for the OHR to take action against officials who violate the DPA.

It was, however, the frequency of the OHR’s intervention which continued to trouble Russia. It was the pro-activeness of Paddy Ashdown between 2002 and 2006 which triggered consternation in Moscow. Ashdown was prepared to impose legislation and changes to the constitution of Bosnia & Herzegovina, alongside the widespread sacking of officials for various violations of the DPA (Pond, 2006: 162). Ashdown justified his actions as a means to ‘create

institutions of a modern state that could enter the European Union’, adding that ‘there was very little time. The door was closing, and I wanted to get through before it shut’. Following Ashdown, the Russian leadership persistently pushed for the termination of the OHR and the transferral of powers to the EU. This understanding was not shared by other actors in the peace process as it was consistently argued that the OHR’s powers were still required to steer Bosnia & Herzegovina’s political process towards European integration. The benchmark conditions for integration was set out in the PIC in early 2008 via the 5+2 Agenda.

Implementation of these conditions proved to be a challenge. The constitutional crisis which occurred in late 2007 and continued deep into 2008 because of the OHR’s attempt to impose major changes without consulting either politicians or the public on Bosnia & Herzegovina’s state institutions, caused considerable tension between the entities (Chandler, 2007). These changes would mean that decisions made by the governing institutions would no longer require support from all three of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s segmented ethnic communities which effectively ruled out the opinions of Serb representatives of RS (Chandler, 2007). At a PIC meeting in October 2007 Russia voiced its concerns, arguing that the use of external mechanisms to influence the situation would cause instability. David Chandler (2007) argued that the OHR’s stance was highly authoritarian and that ‘the Serbian government, a Dayton signatory, is entirely within its rights to argue against the unilateral imposition of major changes to the agreement, as is the Russian government’. Russia’s caution in managing the political process was based on an obstinate default position against the invasiveness of the OHR’s interventionism, and concerned the ability of Bosnia & Herzegovina ‘to get on its own two feet, to free itself from sponging attitudes and to learn how to exist not so much at the expense of donors, but on its own domestic

200 These included conditions from resolutions on the allocation of state and defence property, a final decision on the governing arrangements of Breko, fiscal sustainability, entrenchment of the rule of law, signing of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, and a positive assessment of the situation in Bosnia & Herzegovina by the PIC. OHR, Press Release, n.d.a, accessed 14 March 2014, available at: http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1318.
resources. This logic was echoed in Russia’s view of the crisis which erupted after the 2010 October elections and froze the political process throughout 2011 due to a stalemate between Croat and Bosniak parties who refused a reasonable internationally-brokered coalition proposal (International Crisis Group, 2011: 1). Complicating these issues further, was the continued disagreement between Russia and its Western partners during Medvedev’s presidency on the timing of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s integration into the EU.

Reconstruction and reconciliation

Reconstruction and reconciliation were central aspects of the international peacebuilding strategy, and were in large measure facilitated by the agencies of the UN System. Moscow acknowledged the importance of rebuilding the country’s economy as central to the plan of implementing a durable peace. It was also recognised that such economic assistance should be impartially implemented and equally distributed amongst the entities of the country. Moscow’s contribution engaged in local level projects although these were limited in scope and practice. Initiatives based on Russia’s participation in reconstructing and privatising the country’s enterprises were also promoted. Foreign Minister Ivanov suggested to the country’s media that there may be potential scope for further privatisation of Bosnian enterprises with Russian companies.

---

204 Security Council Meeting 3723 (S/PV. 3723), 12 December 1996.
Russia’s peacekeeping contingent were also active in projects aimed at rebuilding the country’s transport infrastructure, including bridges, roads and railways. Yet, this did not extend to wider and deeper forms of reconciliation and reconstruction which many of the other participating forces in IFOR/SFOR were engaged in. Although Russian forces lacked the expertise and culture to cultivate such forms of civil-military cooperation, this did not rule out Moscow’s capacity to engage on an informal basis with certain NGOs. Local projects, however, were facilitated at the diplomatic level in Moscow predominantly through the auspices of the MFA. Throughout the 2000s Moscow maintained its investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina via energy and industrial projects. Russia continued to develop its economic relations with the RS and was also focused on cultivating economic cooperation with Sarajevo’s political institutions. These relations were largely premised on energy exports, and consolidated through free trade agreements in the mid-2000s. However, while Russia maintained its economic cooperation with the RS, this was not the case with the FBiH and according to certain Russian officials was not due to a lack of impartiality, but was a result of Sarajevo’s and Mostar’s limited political will in cultivating strong internal relations within the FBiH in addition to external economic partnerships. The fact that the RS had striven for economic privatisation in comparison

209 As noted above, this was largely because the Russian contingent stationed in MND(N) did not have designated civil-affairs units and were unable to interact effectively with the JCC, unlike their NATO partners who as the duration of the operation went on increasingly became willing to engage in the civilian dimension and develop ‘Civil Affairs’ staff branches. For example, in both UK and the US military contingents there were specific units who identified a range of local projects which were then submitted for approval by each country’s overseas development agency. These agencies also deployed civilian personnel who worked closely with their military partners in the various IFOR sectors. Alongside this, IFOR/SFOR also opened Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) centres throughout Bosnia & Herzegovina which acted as ‘one-stop-shops’ for the local population, in dealing with information on how to vote, enquiring about compensation claims, reporting on missing relatives and issues of intimidation, and enquiring about access to medical assistance. Via the CIMICs, a Civil-Military Task Force (CMTF) was established which according to one expert attempted to ‘build up a picture of each community and their needs’. See Caddick-Adams, (1998: 145, 146, 147), and Phillips (1998).
to the stagnation of the FBiH because of political intransigence, made it difficult for Moscow and others participating to establish effective economic relations.

Yet despite these instances of aid and projects at the local level, they were attached to the broader aspects of Russia’s bilateral relations with Bosnia & Herzegovina. The emphasis placed on the use of state level economic assistance and trade served to accomplish two simultaneous aims: assistance in the wider peacebuilding process through the consolidation of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s economy, and the cultivation of bilateral state relations. This conflation had a significant impact on Moscow’s engagement in peacebuilding, in that the focus on bilateral trade largely overlooked the potential in grass-root projects at the local level. To add further complication, Moscow would traditionally expect a payment in return. This was particularly the case regarding the delivery of gas and oil to the region, where the continuation of deliveries were contingent upon the meeting of payments. To an extent, this compromised Russia’s participation in the peacebuilding effort as profit and self-gain – besides a degree of altruism in assisting the country’s re-development – became contributing factors conditioning Russia’s engagement.

Another issue confronting the peace effort, involved the return of refugees and displaced people, which was considered an important objective by the DPA.212 However, implementation was met with varying degrees of success as the peace effort had the unenviable task of ensuring that the conditions for those who wanted to return were secure. Ultra-nationalist intransigence, local political opposition, a lack of infrastructural reconstruction and economic incentive, and widespread fear amongst the divergent ethnicities of the population prevented a smooth process of returns (Belloni, 2007: 128). Consequently, the immediate years following the signing of the DPA witnessed the intimidation of returning refugees and ethnic minorities, with largely Croats and Bosnian Serbs preventing the free movement of people across the country.213 This was recognised in the Security Council and the PIC to be a serious problem for the post-Dayton peace process. Russian officials agreed that a key problem of the settlement as the returns process.214

212 Dayton Peace Accord, Annex 7, Article I, paragraph 1.
Nevertheless, during these formative years there were large-scale returns by both refugees and internally displaced persons – although these were predominantly to areas where their own ethnicity was a majority.\textsuperscript{215} The early to mid-2000s marked a turning point which saw considerable increases in minority returns both with the assistance of the UNHCR and on their own initiative, due to the growth of more moderate political forces in the country. Russia’s view of these surges in returns was positive, with Lavrov remarking in mid-2006 that ‘Dayton is an undoubted success for all the peoples inhabiting BiH and for the international community’.\textsuperscript{216} Yet, as many practitioners and scholars pointed out, many returns have not yet been greeted with societal stability.

3.3 Conclusion

The case of Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina has demonstrated Russia’s engagement in the broad trends of European conflict management. These were largely consolidated over the course of the 1990s and reflected the evolution of the norms and processes of European security governance. Although Moscow’s engagement was selective and uneven, its behaviour was neither uniquely Russian nor distinct. As the conflict developed, Russia’s behaviour was complex demonstrating a convergence with and divergence from European approaches to conflict management. First, Moscow’s selective interaction with other participating actors was aimed at steering collective action at the diplomatic and operational levels away from an exclusive reliance on Western actors and arrangements, and instead towards a more inclusive process based on international institutions and agencies centred in or closely affiliated with the UN and OSCE where Russia could assist in the shaping of the peace effort. Second, the use of coercive methods including force and sanctions remained a contentious issue throughout the pre- and post-Dayton phases of the operation. Attempting to normatively reconcile sovereign consent and human rights,

\textsuperscript{215} Secretary General Report 820 (S/820), 1 October 1996.
Moscow aimed to promote softer and limited measures which diverged considerably from the qualitative change in thinking by the West where sovereignty was relaxed and wider coercive measures supported to safeguard human rights. Third, Russia remained largely in accordance with its partners concerning the political process and the pragmatic debate over self-determination, where a compromised-based solution was advocated. This, however, was not free from disagreement as the West promoted a pro-active policy to push the peace effort forward, while Russia considered this to be intrusive to the ‘natural’ political progression of Bosnia & Herzegovina. Fourth, Moscow recognised the process of peacebuilding and engaged in the reconstruction and reconciliation of Bosnia & Herzegovina alongside its Western counterparts – although this engagement also served its wider foreign policy interests.

Crucially, this did not necessarily place Russia on the fringes of the peace effort; rather, Moscow remained a foremost actor in both the pre- and post-Dayton phases of the operation. Accordingly, Russia played a role in shaping the direction of the peace effort, albeit largely during the initial rather than the latter stages, and was in-turn influenced by events. For Russia, its involvement in the international peace effort was essential for the consolidation and realisation of its wider approach towards conflict management, and should not be taken as an isolated case in Russia’s experience as it directly shaped Moscow’s involvement in the second phase of the Balkan wars between Kosovo and Serbia. Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina should also be considered a case study of Russia’s post-Soviet foreign and security policy. Moscow’s involvement was indeed an expression of its wider political and security relationship with the central actors of European security governance, which from the early 1990s to the end of Medvedev’s presidency was increasingly based on Russia’s constructive engagement in security governance but on its own terms in staunch defence of its sovereign identity and national interests (which were not necessarily incompatible with the interests of the central European actors). Points of disagreement over the conduct of the operation Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina related to wider contestation over certain regional norms of European security governance, including the relaxation of sovereignty vis-à-vis a human-centric conception of security and the institutional geography of Europe. This was further complicated by Russia’s increasing willingness to pursue
national interests in the face of what Moscow considered as the creeping erosion of its legitimate path to great power status, which remained a central feature driving the leadership’s response towards the management of inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo.
Chapter 4
Russia and intra-state conflict in Kosovo

4.1 Introduction

Following the bloody conflict which tore through the Balkans during the early to mid-1990s, Europe was confronted with another gruesome episode of intra-state violence in the FRY – this time between the small province of Kosovo and Serbia. The conflict was significant not least for its demonstration that corners of post-Cold War Europe remained a place of war, but also for the triggering of an international response which in its aftermath the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK) (2000: 19) described as ‘a turning point’ based on several issues of international importance that were framed by the intervention. According to the IICK (2000: 19), these included the reconciliation regarding the protection of human rights in relation to sovereignty and legal restrictions on the use of force, the legitimacy of the Post-World War II global order based on the UN Charter and the capacity of the UN to act as a peacekeeper, in addition to the ramifications of self-determination (IICK, 2000: 19). Although these issues had emerged during the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo reaffirmed the importance of these debates by controversially confronting them head on. Commenting on the significance of the approaches developed in Kosovo, Aidan Hehir (2010: 1) observes that ‘International engagement with Kosovo since 1999 has gone through three distinct phases: intervention, statebuilding and, most recently, independence. During each phase, international policy towards Kosovo challenged prevailing norms, and ‘Kosovo’ has been cited as an exemplar
for a new broad trend in international relations’. Kosovo represented a *watershed* in how the central actors of European security governance began to understand and manage intra-state violence.

Moscow was at the centre of these debates, with the controversies surrounding the strategic use of force and the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, this brought Russia’s relationship with the central pillars of European security governance to breaking point. In this context, the chapter will interrogate to what extent the case of Kosovo represented a fundamental *departure* in Russia’s understanding of European conflict management. The chapter will argue that while differences deepened in some respects, Russia’s participation in both phases of the peace effort also showed a level of convergence with the evolving trends of European conflict management.

### 4.2 (Pre-) Intervention

#### 4.2.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity

Figure 4.1 provides an outline of the degree of this complexity during the (pre-) intervention phase of the peace effort in Kosovo, where the roles and responsibilities of many actors converged in the operation. At the diplomatic level, formal actors such as the UN Security Council, the UNSG (and representative), the OSCE, and the EU were central to the peace process. The Group of 8 (G8) also played an important diplomatic role during NATO’s bombing campaign. Furthermore, NATO exercised a more prominent role due to the consolidation of its *raison d’être* in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina as the leading security actor in European security governance. The establishment of the PJC as a channel of cooperation between Russia and NATO was also central to the diplomatic process. The Contact Group endured as the main informal negotiating forum below the Security Council and played a pivotal role in attempting to facilitate a settlement pre-OAF. At the operational level the UN System, alongside the ICRC and a host of independent NGOs, were engaged in mitigating the humanitarian crisis caused by the fighting between Serbian forces and the self-proclaimed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This was complemented by the OSCE’s Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) which later transitioned into the Kosovo
Verification Mission (KVM), alongside NATO’s Air Verification Mission (AVM). The Alliance would also play a controversial role by initiating OAF in March 1999.

Moscow was deeply engaged in certain channels of this interaction complexity. Some political commentators have argued, however, that ‘Russian proclivities for multilateralism were and remain a strategic response to its structural weakness within the international system, not a normative commitment’ (Hughes, 2013: 1013). While there is merit in this argument, Moscow’s behaviour revealed a nuanced understanding of the pooling of sovereignty and considered collective action to be a credible and effective means to expedite the peace process.

**Figure 4.1 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the (pre-) intervention phase of the peace effort in Kosovo, 1998-1999**

**Diplomatic level**

According to Oksana Antonenko (1999: 125), Russia’s engagement in interaction complexity was not based on its formal relations with NATO – although important – ‘but Russia’s relations with, and membership of non-NATO institutions’, which she contends ‘provided the framework for
Russia’s constructive engagement in resolving the Kosovo crisis. Russia’s understanding of the pooling of sovereignty and its engagement in interaction complexity largely remained consistent with its behaviour in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. While Russian suspicions of NATO had markedly increased due to the Alliance’s actions in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moscow’s approach towards the peace effort in Kosovo reflected a policy which aimed to engage ‘in Western institutions to protect Russian interests, institutionalize a Russian voice in Europe and constrain Western actions that might threaten Russia’ (Lynch, 1999: 58).

This was present in Russia’s effort in steering collective action away from an exclusive reliance on Western institutions. This was not a deliberate policy to obstruct collective action, but sought to facilitate an inclusive dependence on wider international organisations and arrangements based on or closely affiliated with the UN and the OSCE. This did not rule out cooperation with particular Western actors such as NATO, but demonstrated that Moscow was more comfortable when interacting through organisations or informal arrangements where it was a participant of the decision-making process and could legitimately contribute towards the shaping of the peace effort. This engagement served Russia’s great power complex, and reflected the promotion of collective solutions.

With the escalation of the conflict in early 1988, Russia was deeply engaged in diplomacy through the Contact Group. Indeed, for Russia, the Contact Group was essential for the facilitation of peace in the region. One scholar points out ‘Russia did not object to the widening of its remit, since the Group was an institution that would allow co-ordination of the major powers’ policies towards conflict in the region and one in which Russia would play an active role’ (Headley, 2008: 317). While Russian diplomats considered the efficacy of the Contact Group paramount to the negotiating process, this forum had to strictly reflect the broader principles of international law. Moscow also participated in the OSCE and was in consensus with its

---

counterparts in condemning the early use of violence by both parties to the conflict.\textsuperscript{219} The Serbian leadership opposed internationalisation and held a referendum on 24 April 1995 which resulted in support for government policy. In the context of further clashes between the opposing sides and further Serbian aggression in mid-1998,\textsuperscript{220} Moscow became increasingly frustrated with NATO’s launching of operation Determined Hawk which is viewed as undermining collective action.\textsuperscript{221} Moscow was outraged that it was not consulted prior to this operation and suspended its membership in the PJC for a second time in October 1998 as NATO continued to press for the use of force.\textsuperscript{222} Despite this, a sustained level of Russian engagement continued with the Milosevic-Yeltsin meeting in mid-June 1998. This attempted to put further pressure on Belgrade to withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo and paved the way for the establishment of the OSCE’s KDOM.\textsuperscript{223} Moscow continued to maintain its diplomatic participation in the Contact Group with a meeting in Bonn on 8 July. The synergy between the Contact Group and the Security Council remained a significant aspect conditioning the interaction complexity during this phase of the conflict. Russia, through the Contact Group, also remained supportive of the OSCE’s diplomatic efforts in the monitoring of events in Kosovo and in the organisation’s contribution towards negotiations.\textsuperscript{224}

Russia continued its diplomatic engagement in 1999 during the conference in Rambouillet, France.\textsuperscript{225} Meetings were also arranged with the OSCE Chairman in Moscow.\textsuperscript{226} However, with

\textsuperscript{221} This included the flying of Alliance aircraft over Macedonia and Albania as a warning of military readiness towards Belgrade.
the failure of the peace talks throughout February and March, NATO began to bomb en masse Serbian military targets. Moscow was irate over its exclusion from the decision-making process which occurred outside of the channels of the Contact Group and the UNSC. These pronouncements were linked to wider concerns about the resilience of the rules regulating European security governance.\textsuperscript{227} This did not prevent Russia from continuing to steer the collective effort at the diplomatic level through the auspices of the Contact Group. Ivanov appealed to the powers for an urgent meeting to be held in Moscow – although Washington failed to give consent.\textsuperscript{228} Instead, the European participants invited Ivanov to the EU, under the formal auspices of the PCA, to explore a political resolution. Moscow’s persistent drive for an inclusive and collective response beyond the parameters of the NAC was also demonstrated by Russia’s failed move to push through the Security Council a Resolution which demanded the cessation of the use of force and a return to negotiations. With the arrival of Russia’s special representative Victor Chernomyrdin to the negotiations, Moscow aimed to reassert the primacy of the UN and to curtail NATO’s dominance of the peace agenda (Lynch, 1999: 71). At this stage of the conflict Russia’s involvement was ‘a real tightrope act’ as Moscow did not want to isolate itself but equally could not be seen to support NATO’s policy (Lynch, 1999: 72).

**Operational level**

The operational level presented Russia with further opportunities for collective action. Moscow’s engagement was shaped by its policy of maintaining the international response towards the conflict within the parameters of an inclusive framework. This also revealed wider concerns about the impending shift towards a NATO-centred system of European security governance. Russia promoted this operational complexity via the channels of the OSCE in coordination with UN agencies involved in the humanitarian effort. The emergence of deeper forms of stakeholder interaction complexity emerged during the summer of 1998. Russia arranged a ceasefire

---


agreement with President Milosevic on 16 June 1998, which enabled the establishment of the KDOM on 6 July 1998 under the auspices of the OSCE and the Security Council.\textsuperscript{229} Set up by the OSCE,\textsuperscript{230} the KDOM transitioned to the KVM in October 1998 and was to coordinate with the other actors of the peace effort.\textsuperscript{231} Firmly embedded in an inclusive hierarchical process via the OSCE and the UN, Russia was a leading contributor of observers to the KVM which was complemented by NATO’s AVM.\textsuperscript{232}

The KVM established close links with the UNHCR to assist in expediting the humanitarian process.\textsuperscript{233} Moscow was comfortable with the KVM’s channel of coordination with the UNHCR because it would not have to directly cooperate with NGOs. However, because of unacceptable levels of violence and the forthcoming bombing campaign, the KVM was pulled out of Kosovo on 20 March 1999, which proved to be a major impediment to Russia’s participation in collective action.

\subsection*{4.2.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation}

Headley (2008: 319) points out that the major actors involved in the peace effort aimed for an end to the violence and agreed on the major principles of a settlement, but disagreed on its implementation. In the case of Russia, it traversed the boundaries between Westphalian and Post-Westphalian security behaviour when participating in the (pre-) intervention peace effort in Kosovo. Russia acknowledged and supported the humanitarian effort through the delivery of aid

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The Kosovo Verification Mission was established by the Permanent Council in October 1998 and was dissolved in June 1999. See OSCE, KVM, n.d.a, accessed 12 May 2014, available at http://www.osce.org/node/44552.
\item By 5 February, 1999 Russia’s contribution towards the KVM in Kosovo amounted to 85 personnel.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
and the management of the refugee crisis. Moscow’s overall understanding of the political process remained consistent with the other contributing actors participating in the peace settlement. Yet, this convergence was offset by Russia’s uncompromising position on the inviolability of the FRY’s sovereignty, which was closely intertwined with Moscow’s ardent opposition towards the use of coercive measures when managing the conflict.

**Coercive measures and the role of force**

Averre (2009: 575) notes that in Russia ‘OAF excited a fervent debate that went to the heart of post-Cold War European security governance and still resonates today’. The Allied bombing campaign was a turning point in Russia’s relations with the central actors of European security governance, and raised significant questions regarding the norms and processes of European conflict management. Building on its experiences in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, OAF reaffirmed for Russia the dangers of applying force at the strategic level and brought into sharper contrast the emerging distinctions between Moscow’s understanding and that evolving in Europe.

Serbian actions in Kosovo began to escalate in late 1997 with police and security forces assaulting peaceful demonstrations in Pristina and Belgrade also initiated the detention of known opponents throughout the province. The KLA began to openly confront Serbian forces and armed skirmishes began to increase in 1998 (IICK, 2000: 67). During a Contact Group meeting in Moscow on 25 February 1998 members reaffirmed their commitment to uphold human rights, including peaceful demonstrations, and condemned Belgrade’s repressive behaviour and KLA terrorist action. Despite this, disagreements began to emerge between Russia and its NATO partners over the role of coercive measures to impose a settlement (Latawski and Smith, 2003: 93). These began with the discussions over the use of sanctions against Belgrade in early 1998. The Contact Group agreed to place a comprehensive arms embargo against the FRY, supported a moratorium on the supply of arms to the FRY, denied visas to senior Serbian representatives, and placed a freeze on government financed export credit support for trade and investment, including

---

government financing for privatisation in Serbia.\textsuperscript{235} Moscow supported the first elements of this package as they targeted both parties to the conflict, but refused to countenance the latter two measures.\textsuperscript{236} Russia argued that the use of sanctions should not be used to punish Belgrade, but should include specific measure to induce a resolution.\textsuperscript{237}

Russia understood that both parties were responsible for the continuation of the violence and, hence, no party should receive preferential treatment whilst the other was punished. Although it was noted in the Contact Group statement that ‘if there is no progress towards the steps called for by the Contact Group, the Russian Federation will then be willing to discuss all the above measures’, this was not taken seriously by Moscow.\textsuperscript{238} Russia promoted the use of political measures to resolve the conflict, opposing coercion.\textsuperscript{239} Diplomatic negotiation was required but effective international pressure on Milosevic also required a threat of stronger measures (Headley, 2008: 323). Moscow’s actions were inconsistent with its behaviour during the pre-Dayton phase of the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, where Russia supported the use of sanctions against Belgrade to coercively induce its compliance with the settlement process. Moscow’s decision not to employ sanctions against Belgrade this time was closely linked to an overriding level of anxiety about the triggering of a potential road towards the use of force. This constrained Moscow’s behaviour in that it was unwilling to consider sanctions.

A further factor influencing Russia’s policy at this juncture was the divisive issue of internationalising the conflict. Moscow refused to consider the conflict a threat to international security, which ran counter to the perceived collective humanitarian responsibilities present in Western framings of the conflict.\textsuperscript{240} In April 1998 there was a notable decrease in the violence

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{237} Security Council Meeting 3868 (S/PV. 3868), 31 March 1998.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Contact Group, Press Statement, 9 March 1998 in Krieger (2001), p. 122.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Security Council Meeting 3868 (S/PV. 3868), 31 March 1998, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{240} Security Council Meeting 3868 (S/PV. 3868), 31 March 1998, p. 10. Reflecting Western views, the UK representative at the UN declared that ‘Belgrade cannot pass off the repressive acts of recent weeks as purely an internal affair. Human rights abuses are a matter for us all. And we have a particular responsibility to reduce tension in the region before it causes instability in neighbouring countries’. See Security Council Meeting 3868 (S/PV. 3868), 31 March 1998, p. 12.
\end{itemize}
from the previous months although the situation remained tense’. This comparative ease gave Russia further impetus to oppose internationalisation and Moscow submitted a report to the UNSG highlighting Belgrade’s constructive role in reducing its security forces in Kosovo and pointed towards the destabilising activities of the KLA. Yet, with the escalation of the conflict and its inability to prevent the conflict’s internationalisation, Russia began to encourage greater involvement to counter NATO’s push for more coercive measures.

In late spring, this was further accompanied by the blocking of aid to the civilian population by the Belgrade authorities. While diplomacy failed to cultivate a compromise between Pristina and Belgrade, Moscow recognised this as a ‘positive first step’, and urged both sides to commit to a ceasefire. Belgrade lifted the blockade on 21 May allowing supplies to be delivered to Kosovo, but continued to refuse direct international involvement. NATO supported these political measures to facilitate an end to the fighting – although, NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana further clarified that ‘all options are open in Kosovo, including the immediate military intervention in this Serbian province’. At a ministerial meeting in Geneva on 4 June 1998, Primakov outlined Russia’s position considering the recent developments, acknowledging that for future stability a status-quo could not be allowed to persist, but clarified Moscow’s growing divergence with its partners on how best to solve the current conflict. Primakov gave a resounding ‘nyet’ to the use of military measures against Belgrade. Russia remained unconvinced about the role of strategic force in the conflict due to its further destabilising effects and its uncertain long term impact on sovereignty.

244 Secretary General Report 470 (S/470), 4 June 1998, paragraph 33, p. 7.
This contrasted with the central Western powers acting through NATO. Demanding the withdrawal of all Serbian forces from Kosovo and a resumption of negotiations, NATO launched a sizeable military exercise over Albanian and Macedonian airspace as a warning to Belgrade that NATO was willing to support its rhetoric with force.248 Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev announced that the current conflict should be settled by political means which have yet to be exhausted, and that all decisions on the use of force should be taken ‘under the auspices of the UN Security Council’.249 As a reflection of this diplomatic drive, a meeting between Yeltsin and Milosevic took place in Moscow on 16 June 1998 where a set of conditions were finalised. It was agreed that the conflict should be resolved peacefully within an ethnically-inclusive political framework, that Belgrade should cease all repressive actions against the civilian population, create conditions for the return of refugees to the region, allow for the unhindered delivery of aid, alongside a call for the discontinuation of the KLA’s terrorist activities.250

This was an attempt to shift the direction of the peace effort away from a military response and was therefore a direct challenge to NATO’s emerging policy. This approach was dependent, however, on the integrity of Milosevic’s promises and possessed no means of coercive persuasion in an incentivised framework. This did not demonstrate a change in Russia’s thinking on the use of coercion, but revealed the extent Russia was willing to go to prevent NATO’s use of force. There was in fact a decrease in the violence following the Milosevic-Yeltsin agreement with Belgrade reducing its troop levels in Kosovo.251 The KLA took advantage of this vacuum and began to consolidate positions throughout the province from which to launch attacks.252 During

this phase, while in some respects the gulf between Russia and its Western partners widened due to the EU’s increase in sanctions against Belgrade,\textsuperscript{253} there was a degree of convergence on the further internationalisation of the peace effort.\textsuperscript{254} Although this demonstrated a change from Russia’s initial approach, this should not be characterised as a muddled policy (Levitin, 2000). Instead, this demonstrated a progressive policy linked to a growing anxiety about the potential use of force.

Fighting continued, in late 1998 with the OSCE reporting that as the fighting drew nearer Pristina its intensity increased and the KLA ‘removed any ambiguity as to its intentions to bring the province under its control’.\textsuperscript{255} Russia aimed to steer the peace effort towards a diplomatic course of action via the establishment of the KDOM alongside its existing support for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The adoption of Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998) under Chapter VII was still of a diplomatic character and although Moscow acknowledged that if the demands of the Security Council were not met the Security Council would consider further action, coercive methods were not being considered by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{256} The management of the conflict continued to be conducted through ‘softer’ measures with the establishment of the KVM, which facilitated the humanitarian effort and ensured Belgrade’s compliance with the UN.\textsuperscript{257} As stipulated by the UNSG ‘The Mission will not enforce compliance, nor will it respond to local disturbances, react to hostilities or enforce access by relief organisations’. The KVM was also complemented by NATO’s AVM which provided aerial reconnaissance.\textsuperscript{258} As Milosevic refused military intervention into Kosovo and while there was little enthusiasm in the UN and NATO to put boots on the ground without a robust mandate, there was no option than to support these

\textsuperscript{256} Security Council Meeting 3930 (S/PV. 3930), 23 September 1998, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{258} Secretary General Report, 1068 (S/1068), 12 November 1998, paragraph. 43, p. 10.
missions. Russia’s abstention from this Resolution demonstrated a concern that the use of force against Belgrade was becoming more likely. Moscow’s refusal to veto this Resolution also highlighted an unwillingness to prevent the initiation of the observer mission to which it was contributing personnel.

While a ceasefire predominantly held throughout the latter months of 1998, the diplomatic effort failed due to renewed violence in January with the infamous Racak massacre. The diplomatic effort continued in Rambouillet throughout February 1999 and commenting during the initial stages of the talks, Russia’s Foreign Ministry stated that ‘Experience gained in resolving the Bosnian conflict shows that voluntary mutual pledges are much more effective than persistent arm twisting’. Russian officials justified this by arguing that the parties should be given more time to negotiate free from coercion because ‘you have to use very high negotiating skills in order to get out on an acceptable text’.

With the failure of diplomacy and the refusal of Belgrade to accept NATO’s demands, OAF was launched on 24 March 1999. Russia’s Western partners considered the use of force the only viable option at this stage, which stemmed from an understanding that diplomacy should be backed by force. This was a continuation of a policy based on a shift in doctrinal understanding that emerged during the latter part of the conflict in Croatia and Bosnian & Herzegovina, which was followed by the development of peace support and beliefs in the duty of humanitarian intervention. During a meeting at the UN on 29 March 1999, the Canadian representative made a credible argument when stating that those participating in the peace effort had, prior to the bombing, made extensive attempts to negotiate through several diplomatic channels and had deployed an observer mission. Russia was outraged, with Yeltsin declaring that ‘We are basically talking about an attempt by NATO to enter the twenty-first century in the uniform of the world’s policeman. Russia will never agree to that’.

262 Security Council Meeting 3988 (S/PV. 3988) 24 March 1999, p. 3.
actions were a threat to the durability of the UN as an institution and to international law enshrined in the Charter.\footnote{Security Council Meeting 3989 (S/PV. 3989), 29 March 1999, p. 6.} Russia argued against the claims that NATO’s actions became inevitable due to the obstructionist behaviour of Moscow and Beijing in the Security Council, with Lavrov declaring ‘no proposals on this topic were introduced in the Security Council by anyone. There was never any draft resolution; there were no informal discussions, not even in the corridors – and not with one permanent member of the Security Council, namely, Russia’.\footnote{Security Council Meeting 3988 (S/PV. 3988), 24 March 1999, p. 13.} Russia would most certainly have vetoed any motion advocating the use of force.

Russian opinion also protested the humanitarian consequences of the bombing.\footnote{Security Council Meeting 3988 (S/PV. 3988), 24 March 1999, p. 2-3.} Russia’s special envoy to Yugoslavia, Victor Chernomyrdin, commented in the \textit{Washington Post} that NATO has destroyed ‘civilian infrastructure – in particular, electric transmission lines, water pipes and factories’, and he questioned whether thousands of people should ‘be killed because of one man’s blunders’.\footnote{Washington Post, 27 May 1999, accessed 12 April 2014, available at \url{http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/chernomyrdin052799.htm}.} Leading Russian academic opinion acknowledged this view, pointing out that ‘From a purely humanitarian point of view, there is no difference between ‘hundreds’ and ‘tens of thousands’ killed as a result of atrocities. But in justifying a military intervention that devastated half a country and resulted in new victims among the civilian population, numbers matter’ (Arbatova, 2001: 65). NATO made substantial efforts to avoid causing civilian casualties, but some serious mistakes were made, such as the bombing of Korishe where more than 80 Kosovars were killed (IICK, 2000: 94), and after four weeks of continuous bombing Belgrade had still not responded to the negotiation proposals set out in Rambouillet. It was decided during a NATO summit in Washington on 23 April 1999 to intensify and expand the airstrikes to include military-industrial infrastructure, media, and other targets in Serbia itself.\footnote{As a result, 59 bridges, nine major highways, and seven airports were destroyed. The majority of the central telecommunications transmitters were damaged and two thirds of the main industrial plants were destroyed. According to NATO, 70% of the electricity production capacity and 80% of the oil refinery capacity was knocked out. See IICK (2000: 93).} However, a UK House of Commons report acknowledged that ‘We believe a very serious misjudgement was made
when it was assumed that the bombing would not lead to the dramatic escalation in the displacement and expulsion of the Kosovo Albanian population.\textsuperscript{268} The IICK (2000: 88-89) provides a balanced verdict of the impact of NATO’s bombing campaign on Belgrade’s behaviour and the humanitarian situation:

We cannot know what would have happened if NATO had not started the bombing. It is however certainly not true that NATO provoked the attacks on the civilian Kosovar population — the responsibility for that campaign rests entirely on the Belgrade government. It is nonetheless likely that the bombing campaign and the removal of the unarmed monitors created an internal environment that made such an operation feasible. The FRY forces could not hit NATO, but they could hit the Albanians who had asked for NATO’s support and intervention. It was thus both revenge on the Albanians and a deliberate strategy at the same time.

Moscow, only saw the destabilising impact of OAF and argued that painstaking negotiation was required which had still not be exhausted.\textsuperscript{269} This was supported by softer methods such as the observation missions and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance, which it began to unilaterally deliver to Belgrade during the bombing campaign.\textsuperscript{270} At the UN, Lavrov pointed out that ‘It is essential to fight for respect of human rights and norms of international humanitarian law, but solely through political and legal methods on the firm basis of the United Nations Charter and the relevant multilateral instruments’.\textsuperscript{271} Indeed, OAF demonstrated a major point of divergence between Russia and its Western partners in the peace effort. This had been steadily building since the summer of 1998, but did not reflect a complete Russian withdrawal from the evolving trends of European conflict management. It was noted during the escalatory phase of the conflict that ‘Russia played a central role in causing Milosevic to concede’.\textsuperscript{272} This was particularly important when nerves began to show in Western capitals as the sustained bombing campaign failed to bring Milosevic to the negotiating table.

\textsuperscript{269} Security Council Meeting 3988 (S/PV. 3988), 24 March 1999, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{271} Security Council Meeting 4011 (S/PV. 4011), 10 June 1999, p. 7.
Between April and June 1999, Russia engaged in intense diplomatic activity to halt the bombing and to pressure Belgrade into a ceasefire and to agree to the presence of an international force in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{273} A final plan was agreed between the negotiators, and Milosevic eventually agreed to the proposal which was endorsed by the Serbian assembly on 3 June 1999. The plan allowed a limited number of Serbian forces to return to Kosovo after the international military presence had established itself in the region. It also stated that while the international military presence would be under UN auspices, it would be deployed under NATO chain of command.\textsuperscript{274} Besides the disagreements concerning the military element of the intervening force, Russian official opinion was content as ‘the draft resolution’s [1244] main significance lies in the fact that it restores the Kosovo settlement to the political track along with the central role of the United Nations’.

\textbf{The settlement process}

For the Kosovo Albanians, their attempt to achieve international attention for independence began with the initial break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{275} However, the settlement process only gained momentum once major hostilities had broken out and there was a deterioration of the humanitarian situation in late 1997. The Contact Group made its first statement in September 1997 on the dispute over Kosovo’s political status, supporting the territorial integrity of the FRY but with an enhanced status for Kosovo.\textsuperscript{276} Moscow’s policy remained consistent with its partners in the peace effort, supporting Security Council Resolution 1160 which called for Kosovo’s greater autonomy within the FRY.\textsuperscript{277} This consideration was reaffirmed in the Milosevic-Yeltsin

\begin{footnotes}
\item[275] These attempts were met with a ‘pattern of neglect’ by the major actors involved in the management of conflict in the region and for a detailed discussion see Caplan (1998), Weller (2009), and the ICK report (2000).
\end{footnotes}
meeting on 16 June 1998 where it was agreed that Belgrade would ‘resolve existing problems by political means on the basis of equality for all citizens and ethnic communities in Kosovo’.

Those participating in the international peace effort intensified their attempts to facilitate a settlement during mid-1998. US Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill, was chosen to lead the negotiations (from now on referred to as the Hill Process) in facilitating a political compromise between Kosovo (and the KLA) and Belgrade. According to Weller (2009: 90), the proposal was directly influenced by the Contact Group and ‘represented a genuine attempt at balancing the divergent interests of the parties’. The draft avoided altogether the issue of the status of Kosovo and rather focused on a practical assignment of powers to different levels of administration. Yet, as Weller notes (2009: 90), this was problematic for both parties as this did not explicitly mention Belgrade’s continued territorial integrity and for Kosovo the source of public power would be in its local municipalities meaning that Pristina would not possess a concrete legal personality, hindering its ability to pursue an enhanced future legal status (Weller, 2009: 90, 2008: 14).

Alongside the Hill Process, Richard Holbrooke obtained an agreement with Milosevic on 13 October 1998 under the threat of an imminent airstrike from NATO. The agreement was published by Belgrade, which in contrast to the Hill proposal outlined the wider autonomy of Kosovo within the territorial framework of FRY (Weller, 2009: 92). This gained wide support from the central actors of the peace effort, with a Russian spokesperson welcoming the ceasefire agreement which was formally endorsed by the UN Security Council. The second Hill proposal was introduced on 2 November 1998, enhancing the status of Kosovo as a legal entity in its own right, but also entrenching the municipalities which were of essential concern to the FRY (Weller, 2009: 92). With a non-committal by the authorities in Belgrade, a third draft was produced which gave more power to Belgrade – although this was also rejected.

279 Commentating at the time, one notable commentator declared: ‘The irony is that the outcome which the major powers are so insistently demanding now—the restoration of some form of autonomy for Kosovo within Yugoslavia—is the very same goal which they so faintly endorsed in the build-up to the current crisis’ (Caplan, 1998: 756).
Moscow’s support for Kosovo’s wider autonomy continued to inform the basis of the forthcoming negotiations in accordance with its Western counterparts. This was further demonstrated by its involvement in the formulation of the Contact Group’s negotiator’s proposal which the central powers insisted must form the bedrock for the settlement process at Rambouillet. As part of a general list of non-negotiable principles and elements, the Contact Group advocated for the territorial integrity of the FRY, further autonomy for Kosovo based on a high degree of self-governance, and a final settlement after an interim period of three years. At Rambouillet on 23 February 1999 this was formalised in the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-government in Kosovo. Russia firmly opposed the Kosovo Albanian interpretation of the interim settlement mechanism based on a binding referendum for independence after three years. The Kosovo delegation considered the existing language of the text ‘on the basis of the will of the people’ to be ambiguous. Russian officials claimed that ‘the Albanian delegation, while seemingly accepting the text, is making this contingent on certain conditions that could give rise to a dual interpretation of the text’. The final result of the Rambouillet talks were inconclusive, however. The Kosovo Albanian party argued that it had accepted the outcome of the negotiations, but that this had to be formally acknowledged by further consultation in Kosovo. Belgrade, on the other hand, regarded the process of negotiations as being far from over (Weller, 1999: 233).

The follow-on talks in Paris began in mid-March 1999 with the Kosovo delegation accepting the final version of the interim agreement. The Serbian delegation arrived in Paris with a new set of proposals which countered many of the non-negotiable interim principles. While Moscow recognised the intransigence of the Serb side, it was noted that Russia’s delegation was too inclined to defend Belgrade (Weller, 1999: 251). There are grounds to suggest that Russia was attempting to introduce a level of flexibility during this stage of the negotiations by searching for further compromises to accommodate Belgrade’s intransigence. Yet, as Moscow had signed up

---

282 See Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-government in Kosovo, Rambouillet, 23 February 1999, Chapter 8, paragraph 3, p. 278.
to the non-negotiable political aspects of the interim agreement its course of action did in fact undermine the credibility of the Contact Group’s position.

Moreover, as Russia was left out of the decision-making process relating to the military aspect of the interim agreement, this created a likelihood of failure as only an international front would have persuaded Yugoslavia to accept (Headley, 2008: 358). It is almost certain, however, that if Russia had been involved in the discussion it would have opposed the idea of NATO having access to all areas of the FRY. This condition has generated a heated academic debate, with some commentators arguing that this was an ultimatum by NATO designed to obtain a Serb refusal to provide a pretext for the authorisation of airstrikes. Others have suggested that the interim agreement offered ‘the best possible chance for long term peace in the region’ and that it was the FRY who ‘showed no intention of engaging in serious negotiation’ (Bellamy, 2001: 31). The intransigence of both NATO and the FRY contributed towards the breakdown of talks. Belgrade could not countenance an external military actor’s access to all areas of the FRY, whilst NATO was unwilling to relinquish its control over the forthcoming international military effort to the UN. Following OAF, Moscow supported the G8 document and the final settlement proposal accepted by Belgrade in early June 1999, which was endorsed by Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) on 10 June 1999.

4.3 Post-conflict peace effort

Drawing from experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was an emphasis on the importance of building peace in Kosovo and the FRY. Yet, due to the absence of key elements for a ‘post-conflict’ status this made the peacebuilding mission extraordinarily complex. As one scholar pointed out ‘Kosovo’s indeterminate political status is at the root of many of its most intractable threats to public security, including endemic violence against ethnic minorities, particularly Serbs, and the consequent emergence of polarized ethnic enclaves’ (Cockell, 2002: 484). The following sections will interrogate the nature of Moscow’s involvement in the post-conflict peace effort.

284 For an overview of the academic debate see Bellamy (2001).
4.3.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity

Figure 4.2 provides an outline of the pooling of sovereignty and channels of interaction complexity between the various actors participating in the peace effort. Actors participating in its implementation learnt from their experiences in Bosnia & Herzegovina; however, due to its size and scope certain problems with the operation were inevitable.\(^{285}\)

As illustrated in Figure 4.2, the Security Council remained the supreme arbiter over the military and civilian aspects of the mission. Despite this, there was room for various channels of stakeholder interaction complexity to shape the mechanics of the peace effort. NATO, alongside external actors such as Russia, would form the military dimension of the operation and provide security in the region for the civilian population and UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). While KFOR was directly bound by the decision-making at the level of the Security Council, it possessed a degree of operational scope. Alongside KFOR, UNMIK was directly answerable to

---

\(^{285}\) There has been considerable disagreement within the academic debate regarding the efficiency of this coordination, with some scholars contending that UNMIK and KFOR became the most ‘successful complex Balkan operations […] for interorganizational interaction’ (Cockell, 2002: 483). While others have been less complimentary, arguing that the structure of UNMIK and KFOR has caused problems due to a lack of cooperation (Heinemann-Gruder and Grebenschikov, 2006: 45).
the UNSG and the UNSC when implementing the civilian dimension. In consultation with the Security Council, UNMIK’s Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) was responsible for facilitating Kosovo’s political status, which would later be centralised through the Steering Committee pursuant to the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (CSP), otherwise known as the Ahtisaari Plan. The SRSG directed the civilian dimension at the operational level, which included missions from an array of institutions and agencies, alongside the work of NGOs. To provide coordination between the civilian and military dimensions of the operation, a UNMIK Military Liaison Office was established to coordinate with KFOR.

Prior to the withdrawal of its military contingent from KFOR in mid-2003, Moscow demonstrated a nuanced understanding of the pooling of sovereignty via certain channels of interaction complexity. At the diplomatic level Russia acted through the Security Council, the Contact Group, and the PJC/NRC, while at the operational level Russian forces participated through a special arrangement in KFOR. With the withdrawal of its forces, Russia’s operational engagement in Kosovo decreased. Some expert commentary argue that this withdrawal also occurred at the diplomatic level with Russia having a negligible impact on the peace effort (Antonenko, 2007: 101). Moreover, where there has been a degree of institutional embedding at the diplomatic level, this is considered a reflection of ‘a strategic interaction to counterbalance and compensate’ for its weaknesses vis-à-vis NATO (Hughes, 2013: 993). Explanations for Russia’s behaviour based on its wider foreign policy aims cannot be overlooked. Yet, Russia did constructively participate in other mechanisms such as the Contact Group and the Troika. This was motivated by an attempt to promote a more inclusive process, which Russia could legitimately shape.

**Diplomatic level**

With Putin coming to power in 2000, Russia reaffirmed its foreign policy concept a commitment to a UN-centred international order and opposed a NATO-dominated European system of security

---

286 Secretary General Report 672 (S/672), 12 June 1999, paragraph 5 (a, b, c, d), p. 2.
287 Secretary General Report 672 (S/672), 12 June 1999, paragraph 7, p. 2.
governance. Russia’s ardent promotion of Security Council Resolution 1244 reflected this thinking which it considered the cornerstone of a settlement to the Kosovo issue. Moscow remained a central participant in the format of the Contact Group which became a principal negotiating body in facilitating Kosovo’s ‘Standards before Status’ process initiated by the UN. However, it was recognised by the members of the Contact Group that the Security Council would remain the key international actor in the negotiations. In 2003, Russia expressed its readiness to continue its active involvement in common efforts for ‘a just and lasting solution to the Kosovo problem’. Moscow continued to liaise with the SRSG to reiterate Resolution 1244 and to promote the authority of the Security Council. This coincided with Russia’s withdrawal from SFOR and KFOR; however, Moscow pointed out that it was reorienting its involvement by increasing its participation at the diplomatic level.

Despite the impetus given to the Standards before Status process, widespread violence erupted throughout Kosovo in March 2004. This organised and targeted campaign was led by Kosovo Albanian extremists against the minority communities. In the wake of this violence, the Contact

---


292 It was noted by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Razov that one of the SRSG’s top political advisers was a Russian Foreign Ministry staffer. See Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘We are coming back to the Balkans in a different form’, 10 September 2003, accessed 10 March 2014, available at http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcb3/956e467337134e0e43256d9d004ad7d!OpenDocument.

293 In total, 19 people died in the violence, including 11 Kosovo Albanians and 8 Kosovo Serbs, and 954 persons were injured during the course of the clashes. In addition, 65 international police officers, 58 Kosovo Police Service officers, and 61 KFOR personnel suffered injuries. Approximately 750 houses
Group declared in a joint statement to step up its engagement in Kosovo through regular meetings and closer diplomatic cooperation with the international presence in the region. Moscow’s position was clear: ‘The Russian side is convinced that coordinated efforts by the international community in Kosovo alone can ensure the consolidation of stability and security there’.294 This coincided with an agreement that local representatives of the Contact Group would participate in the joint mechanism to steer the standards process alongside UNMIK and the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG). Russia’s approach towards the implementation of the Status process remained consistent, placing the Contact Group and the Security Council at the centre of the decision-making process.295 During a meeting with a UK official in May 2005, Lavrov’s special representative emphasised the Security Council’s pivotal role in all stages of the Kosovo settlement.296

In October 2005, it was formally announced in the Security Council that the Offices of the UN would steer the negotiations complemented by the Contact Group. Russia agreed to this arrangement which allowed for coordination in the Contact Group within the hierarchical legal framework of the Security Council. The initial period of 2006 featured a degree of consensus with Russian officials engaging in the Contact Group in support of UN-led negotiations (Gow, 2009: 243). The implementation of the Status process was supported by the UN Office of the Special Envoy for the Future Status Process of Kosovo (UNOSEK). This body consisted of expert advisers representing the individual members of the Contact Group, with Weller (2008: 26)

belonging to the minorities, mostly Kosovo Serbs, were damaged or destroyed. See Secretary General Report 348 (S/2004/348), 30 April 2004, p. 1, para 3.


observing that ‘the core team of advisers appeared to be carefully balanced, giving the key Contact Group states a direct voice and representation in the process’. Far from being side-lined, during this stage of negotiations Russia could engage in diplomacy through the Contact Group and the UNOSEK.

Nevertheless, although Russia supported the settlement process, its position became more guarded by late 2006; Moscow was clear that the UN-led effort should respect Resolution 1244 and the Security Council. With negotiations continuing into 2007 the settlement process became increasingly chaotic with a hardening of Belgrade’s position in the face of a Western push for Kosovo’s independence. While Russia continued to participate through the Contact Group, it began to rely on the Security Council where it could threaten to veto proposals which departed from the foundations of Resolution 1244. To break the deadlock between the opposing sides and between Moscow and the rest of the Contact Group, a Troika was organised which included Russia, the EU, and the US. Despite the Troika’s diplomatic efforts, it failed to facilitate a compromise between Belgrade and Pristina. In fact, Washington and Brussels continued to act unilaterally to impose a solution even during the duration of the Troika negotiations (Hughes, 2013: 1010).

Moscow grew frustrated with what it perceived as attempts to undermine collective action. Russian arguments about the side-lining of the UN were reminiscent of its protestations against the NATO bombing campaign in 1999. A statement made by the MFA in December 2007 declared that ‘The authority of the UN is at stake. Kosovo settlement cannot occur outside the Security Council, the UN’s main body responsible for international peace and security’.297 Although the reason for the circumvention of the Security Council was to avoid Moscow’s veto, Lavrov defended Russia’s position by arguing that acting outside of the Security Council is to ‘take liberties with decisions adopted by consensus’ and that the use of the veto is not because ‘we want to assert ourselves by being nasty to everyone, but because vetoes are the core ingredient

for international law’. Coinciding with Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, Moscow was deeply troubled by increasing Western pressure on the UNSG for the initiation of the EU’s Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) mission and for the ‘beefing up’ of KFOR’s mandate in circumvention of the Security Council.

**Operational level**

The discussions over the structure of an international security presence in Kosovo mirrored the debates in Bosnian & Herzegovina. According to one Russian scholar, Russia wanted to ‘participate on an equal footing’ and that it ‘didn’t want to be involved only symbolically’ as there is a ‘status problem, the problem of recognition’. This thinking was based on grievances about the dominance of NATO in Europe. Russia’s drive to prevent the forthcoming operation from becoming NATO-dominated were exacerbated by the Alliance’s willingness to use force and its readiness to employ military measures outside of the legal framework of the Security Council.

Serious discussions about the structure and composition of the intended operation in Kosovo began with Chernomyrdin’s initial proposals during a meeting with Talbott and Ahtisaari. First, it was suggested that Russian troops should take command of a northern zone of Kosovo bordering the FRY, where most of the Serbian population resided. This received an outright refusal from Talbott as it was perceived to threaten a *de facto* partition of Kosovo which would contravene the G8 principles. Chernomyrdin’s second proposal advocated the use of NATO troops from members who did not participate in the bombing campaign, such as Greece and Portugal. Again this received a firm rejection from Talbott who stated that NATO troops were

---


300 Interview with Dr Nadya Arbatova, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), 5 September 2014.
part of one command without national distinctions.\textsuperscript{301} Chernomyrdin finally conceded, but was insistent that NATO forces should possess a Security Council mandate and, therefore, operate under the wider auspices of the Security Council. Talks continued in Bonn with Russian representatives from the MoD proposing that the international force should be under UN command with NATO’s role being limited to a security presence on Kosovo’s border with Albania (Headley, 2008: 397). NATO officials refused and it was agreed to footnote the specifics of Russia’s participation in NATO’s command and control arrangements for a further round of consultations. In the final ten-point peace plan offered to Milosevic it was stipulated that the military and civilian presence would be under UN auspices, but with ‘substantial’ NATO participation which must be ‘deployed under unified command and control’.\textsuperscript{302}

With the dash to Pristina, a compromise was eventually reached. While Russia did not receive a sector, its forces would be spread throughout Kosovo in highly important areas, with command and control arrangements reflecting those devised in post-Dayton Bosnia & Herzegovina. Russian forces mirrored their behaviour in Bosnia & Herzegovina, where cooperation with other military contingents was facilitated via joint patrols, exercises and weekly meetings. Russian battalions also coordinated with UNMIK and NGOs engaged in the humanitarian and peacebuilding effort through the provision of escorts and the sharing of information. However, in comparison to its Western counterparts, Russian forces had still not developed civilian liaison officers to assist in cooperation and coordination.

\subsection*{4.3.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation}

\textit{Coercive measures and the role of force}

Resolution 1244 set out the broad legal parameters of the operation’s coercive measures. Acknowledging that the situation in the region continued ‘to constitute a threat to international


peace and security’, the Resolution was based on a Chapter VII mandate. It stipulated that ‘with all necessary measures’ the operation was to deter renewed hostilities between the opposing sides, maintain and ‘where necessary enforce a ceasefire’. The KFOR commander would be given autonomy on decisions relating to the use of coercive methods to carry out Resolution 1244. For NATO, KFOR was a peace support operation with robust rules of engagement; yet each lead nation of a Multinational Brigade (MNB) had the right to place caveats on rules of engagement (Dziedzic, 2006: 341).

Russia maintained a strict understanding of the rules of engagement and although supporting Resolution 1244, it was unsettled by OAF. Lavrov made it very clear that

The draft resolution’s reference to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter relates exclusively to ensuring the safety and security of international personnel and compliance with the provisions of the draft resolution. It does not even hint at the possibility of any use of force beyond the limits of the tasks clearly set out by the Security Council.

Indeed, where NATO had largely moved beyond the consent-divide, Russia was still shaped by this thinking. Although the utility of force was not ruled out, Moscow was unwilling to support force at the operational and strategic levels.

The immediate post-conflict environment in Kosovo was considerably more challenging than in Bosnia & Herzegovina. The KLA took advantage of the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and unleashed ‘a wave of violence against the Serb population, other minorities, and their perceived rivals within the Kosovo Albanian community’

---

304 The use of coercive and forceful measures were also permitted in order to fulfil a range of other responsibilities. Of particular importance were: the demilitarization of the KLA and other armed Albanian groups; the establishment of a secure environment so that refugees and displaced persons could return home and the international civilian presence could effectively operate in; the ensuring of public safety and order until UNMIK could take responsibility for this task; the supervision of demining; the conducting of border monitoring duties; and ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of all international forces and civilian actors operating in the region. See Security Council Resolution 1224 (S/RES/1224), 28 January 1999, paragraph 9 (b,c,d,e,g.h), p. 3.
KFOR confronted the KLA and newly established paramilitary groups. In the early 2000s in MNB-East, Russia and US troops were confronted by the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medveda, and Bujanovac (UCPMB) who were attempting to gain independence from Belgrade. With sustained warnings by the leadership in Belgrade about the initiation of action against the UCPMB, Foreign Minister Ivanov expressed his concern to G8 leaders in March 2000, urging KFOR troops not to ‘allow provocations’ and warned against ‘a repeat of the scenario of last year’. While not explicitly referring to the use of force, Ivanov’s request did not rule out this option. There were several instances where KFOR troops, including the Russian contingent in MNB-East, used force against the UCPMB. Russia also supported the actions of UNMIK and KFOR in their attempts to subdue Albanian spoilers in Kosovo and in Serbia’s Preševo Valley.

Moscow supported the use of force to tackle Albanian extremists; however, this was situated at the tactical level and was limited. Even KFOR understood that force was not always the appropriate response. The ethnically-divided city of Mitrovica also proved to be a major challenge for KFOR, where violence occurred almost daily from Albanian and Serb extremist groups. Russia disagreed with KFOR’s use of force to solve the issue and emphasised diplomacy. This can be considered as Moscow supported a robust approach when tackling the security issue in the Preševo Valley where Belgrade’s sovereignty was threatened, but in this instance promoted softer measures towards Kosovo Serb spoilers. However, as in the policy towards the UCPMB, Lavrov reaffirmed the importance of a political solution, without ruling out the use of limited force.

This approach was reflected in the response to the violence that erupted in mid-March 2004, in what the UNSG described as ‘an organized, widespread, and targeted campaign’ led by Kosovo

---

309 For instance, in mid-December 2000, a joint US-Russian KFOR patrol returned fire in self-defence in what was reported by the media as the first time since the Second World War that US and Russian troops fired jointly in anger at a common threat.
Albanian extremists ‘against the Serb, Roma and Ashkali communities of Kosovo’.\(^{312}\) The international response included the reinforcing of KFOR with additional troops and the launch of an effort ‘to apprehend those involved in the violent actions’.\(^{313}\) KFOR increased its fixed checkpoints throughout the minority community enclaves and static patrols were introduced in many areas. There was a consensus in the Security Council in support of this robust approach, with a Presidential Statement on behalf of the Security Council recognising KFOR’s effort to restore security.\(^{314}\)

Russia provided a sizeable contingent of law enforcement officers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOI) to UNMIK and supported pro-active approaches to law enforcement.\(^{315}\) Commenting on the responsibilities of the foreign law enforcement officers operating in Kosovo, the former Commander of the Russian police contingent participating in UNMIK stated that ‘We staged all sorts of police operations, from road patrolling to the arrests of criminals. In addition, we taught local police how to operate on [...] Kosovo territory’.\(^{316}\) This also included the use of limited and defensive force when carrying out operations.\(^{317}\) This went beyond the role of law enforcement in post-Dayton Bosnia & Herzegovina, where Moscow staunchly opposed the expansion of the IPTF’s mandate to include robust search and arrest operations.

**Reconstruction and reconciliation**

The reconstruction and reconciliation of Kosovo were central responsibilities of the peace effort. The responsibilities of Resolution 1244 were centralised through four co-dependent pillars: (1) Interim civil administration; (2) Humanitarian affairs; (3) Institution-building; (4) Reconstruction. Alongside the UN and its various agencies, the EU would play a pivotal role in reconstruction whilst the OSCE would centre its efforts on institution-building. This section will focus on the

\(^{312}\) Secretary General Report 348 (S/348), 30 April 2004, paragraph 2, p. 1.
\(^{313}\) Secretary General Report 348 (S/348), 30 April 2004, paragraph 8, p. 3.
\(^{317}\) For instance, it was claimed by one Russian high ranking officer that Russian police officers only had to use their firearms twice in 1999 and 2000 when on active service in Kosovo.
latter three pillars leaving an analysis of Russia’s engagement in the political process of Kosovo’s status for a discussion in the final section.

Russia declared that it supported and was taking ‘an active part in the efforts to find a comprehensive approach to the social and economic reconstruction, stabilization and development of the Balkan region’. Moscow’s engagement in these pillars was complicated, however, by the unresolved matter of Kosovo’s settlement. This cut across key areas of peacebuilding in Kosovo, such as the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and the electoral process. This was especially from 2006 and onwards where an active political process to determine Kosovo’s final status was implemented. While Moscow was concerned with the general rehabilitation of Kosovan society, its focus was on the security of the Serbian minority.

The period following OAF witnessed the return of substantial numbers of Kosovo Albanians to the province and the voluntary and/or forced exodus of the non-Albanian population to the surrounding Balkan republics. A large portion of the ethnic minority population also became internally displaced areas of Kosovo. The Security Council authorised a mission between 27 and 29 April 2000 to gain a clearer picture of the developments on the ground. The mission was comprised of several countries’ representatives, including Russian ambassador Lavrov. Emphasis was placed on the plight of the minority population where it was noted that regular but isolated attacks continued to be directed against Kosovan Serb civilians, and that ‘Inadequate physical, social and economic security remains a major concern’, which ‘hampers the return of internally displaced persons’ and ‘impedes the integration of ethnic minorities into public life’. The report also acknowledged that while the initiation of the electoral process was a positive development in the building of peace in Kosovo, the low participation of the Kosovo Serb community ‘due to the current lack of physical security and freedom of movement’ was deeply problematic.

Russia supported the peacebuilding measures but held some significant reservations. This was related to the humanitarian effort and where UNMIK and KFOR argued that uncontrolled returns

319 Secretary General Report 363 (S/363), 29 April 2000, paragraph 2, p. 1.
320 Secretary General Report 363 (S/363), 29 April 2000, paragraph 24, p. 5.
321 Secretary General Report 363 (S/363), 29 April 2000, paragraph 30, p. 6.
could destabilise the security situation due to the competition for scarce housing and resources. Lavrov stated, however, that ‘the problem of the return of internally displaced persons is not being resolved’, and that the mission ‘did not see that there was even a general concept of a return of displaced persons to Kosovo. I think this is a serious omission on the part of the UNMIK command’. While the central Western members of the Security Council acknowledged the importance of minority returns, it was put forward that reconciliation could not be achieved overnight and that the mission was an enormous task.

Russian pronouncements became more frequent with the initiation of the Standards before Status process which Moscow welcomed to cement the security of the Kosovan people. With only minor refugee returns by the time of the inter-ethnic violence in early 2004, Moscow became highly critical of what it viewed as UNMIK’s inability to ensure the safety of the minority population in Kosovo and to expedite returns. To mitigate the humanitarian crisis, Moscow delivered humanitarian supplies, provided medical assistance, facilitated contacts across the ethnic divide, and provided escorts to the OSCE and NGOs. Russia’s level of assistance increased after the episode of ethnically motivated violence in 2004. Refugee camps with pharmacies and shops were erected in Serbia for refugees, and humanitarian supplies were delivered to the minority population in Kosovo. Moscow stepped up its humanitarian assistance following Pristina’s declaration of independence in February 2008 and this was repeated sporadically during Medvedev’s presidency. While Putin declared that this action was devoid of ‘political overtones’, it was certainly an attempt to enhance Russia’s image and discredit Western actors who had supported independence and were still operating in the region.

Institution-building via Pillar 3 was also considered a key area by Russian officials. Russia agreed that elections were crucial for building peace in Kosovo, but disagreed with the consensus about the timing of their implementation. Russia agreed that certain conditions relating to the ethnic minority population should be established prior to the holding of elections. Alternatively, the consensus in the peace effort led by the successive SRSG’s of UNMIK argued that while conditions were not perfect, elections would facilitate security by eroding the ethnic divide through the promotion of political dialogue. During the initial years following Resolution 1244, Moscow held reservations about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the electoral process. In relation to the November 2000 elections UN officials acknowledged that while most local Kosovan Serbian leaders agreed to boycott the elections until the security situation improved, they should still go ahead. The US representative declared that ‘Elections and a responsible governing structure are the best way to temper passions’. Russia stated that it was not opposed to the holding of elections in principle but that the minimum conditions for their fair and transparent facilitation had not been achieved.

With the first municipal election failing to gain substantial Kosovo Serb participation, the consensus led by the SRSG was to proceed with the electoral process. Moscow disagreed arguing that this would ‘simply strengthen the mono-ethnic nature of Kosovo and heighten the nationalist mood in the area’. Even some central European powers, such as France, were not convinced that elections should proceed amidst such an insecure environment. With the formal endorsement of the Standards before Status process in December 2003, the significance of the elections was reaffirmed. Russia recognised the importance of each Standard but continued to argue that conditions enabling a substantial number of ethnic minorities to participate must be achieved to facilitate a credible election process. The parliamentary elections in October 2004 were a vital test for the credibility of the Standards before Status process because of the previous period of violence, but Moscow argued that the elections would further fuel tensions. Although the

---

328 Security Council Meeting 4171 (S/PV. 4171), 13 July 2000, p. 11.
elections ran smoothly and were considered transparent by the OSCE, the participation of the minority population remained low. Calls from Belgrade and local Kosovan Serb leadership to boycott the elections also had an impact on the decisions of the minority population. Russia’s review of the elections was scathing, considering the lack of participation by the Serb minority as an indicator that human rights and the safety of ethnic minorities was not being fulfilled. Since the events of 2008, Russia has refused to recognise the electoral process in Kosovo regarding it illegal and illegitimate due to the lack of ethnic minority participation.\textsuperscript{331}

This coincided with attempts to assist in the post-conflict reconstruction of Kosovo through Pillar 4. At the UN, Russia declared that it ‘supports and is taking an active part in efforts to find a comprehensive approach to the social and economic reconstruction, stabilization and development of the Balkan region’.\textsuperscript{332} Russia’s engagement in reconstruction efforts in Kosovo was largely based on the work of its military contingent stationed throughout the province. This included the facilitation of functioning institutions and public organisations, and went beyond the measures employed in the post-Dayton phase of the peace effort in Bosnia & Herzegovina to include reconciliation projects between the opposing sides. Certain Russian commanders used their initiative to ensure that their forces were educated in the customs and traditions of the region to work effectively with the civilian population. Russia’s military contingent was also involved in reconstruction projects such as the building of roads, and the repairing of schools and hospitals.

The implementation of local projects was accompanied by inter-state level economic projects. These Russian initiatives were aimed at revitalising the Serbian economy and infrastructure, while the EU was Kosovo’s principal donor. Lavrov welcomed this economic relationship, stating in 2005 that ‘There are opportunities, primarily in trade and the economic and investment spheres that need to be used actively.’\textsuperscript{333} As in the case of Bosnia & Herzegovina, these economic projects,

\textsuperscript{331} Security Council Meeting 6483 (S/PV. 6483), 16 February 2011, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{332} Security Council Meeting 4011 (S/PV. 4011), 6 June 1999 p. 8.
\textsuperscript{333} Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Transcript of Remarks and Answers to Media Questions by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergei Lavrov on the Results of Talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro Vuk Draskovic’, 7 November 2005, accessed 5 April 2014, available at
based largely on energy investment, were attached to the broader aspects of Russia’s bilateral relations with Serbia.\textsuperscript{334} The emphasis placed on the use of state level economic assistance and trade served to accomplish two immediate aims: assistance in the wider peacebuilding process through the consolidation of Serbia’s economy, and the cultivation of bilateral state relations. Russian private and state-owned businesses invested heavily in the rebuilding of oil refineries in the Serbian towns of Novi Sad and Pancevo destroyed in NATO’s bombing campaign (Pivovarenko, 2014). This conflation had a significant impact on Moscow’s engagement in policies of peacebuilding, in that the focus on bilateral trade largely overlooked the potential in grass-root projects at the local level. To add further complication, Moscow would traditionally expect a payment in return. This was particularly the case regarding energy deliveries to the region, where the continuation of deliveries was contingent upon the meeting of payments. To an extent, this compromised Russia’s participation in the peacebuilding effort as profit and self-gain – besides a degree of altruism in assisting the country’s re-development – became contributing factors conditioning Russia’s engagement.

\textbf{The settlement process}

The political aspect of Resolution 1244 was premised in large part on the G8 agreement devised in 1999 where it promoted ‘an interim political framework based on autonomy for Kosovo and the territorial integrity of the FRY.\textsuperscript{335} Russia recognised this and was resolute that ‘there must be absolute clarity in respect of the concept of what is meant by substantial autonomy for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999)’.\textsuperscript{336} Moscow was also adamant that any agreement on the legal framework in Kosovo ‘must involve not only the various groups in Kosovo, but also the direct participation of Belgrade’.\textsuperscript{337}

\textsuperscript{334} Between 2003 and 2012 Russia invested approximately $2.85 billion in the Serbian economy. Most of this foreign direct investment (FDI) was based on the oil and gas industry through Russian companies such as Lukoil and Gazprom. See Pivovarenko (2014).

\textsuperscript{335} Security Council Resolution 1244 (S/RES/1244), 10 June 1999, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{336} Security Council Meeting 4296 (S/PV. 4296), 16 March 2001, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{337} Security Council Meeting 4296 (S/PV. 4296), 16 March 2001, p. 5.
in accordance with the other central actors participating in the peace effort. Even US ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, acknowledged that while ‘all options remain on the table and sets forth a process without dictating a solution’, to establish a long-term solution ‘the terms of any eventual settlement must be mutually acceptable to both sides and backed by the international community’.  

The settlement process began to take momentum in 2004 and 2005, and Eide’s final report in the Standards before Status process was submitted to the Security Council in October 2005 ordering to push ahead with the settlement process. Alongside the other Security Council members, Russia endorsed this recommendation and authorised the settlement talks on 24 October 2005. Moscow remained committed to the strict interpretation of Resolution 1244 based on Serbia’s territorial integrity. For the two years following this, the diplomatic effort entered a period of ‘diplomatic linguistic gymnastics’ as Moscow, Washington, and Brussels ‘battled to construct ambiguities which would either reinforce (in the case of Russia) or steadily undermine (in the cases of the US and EU) UNSCR 1244’ (Hughes, 2013: 1009). According to Weller (2008: 25), a division had occurred between Russia and the other members of the Contact Group who accepted the inevitability of independence.

Throughout 2006 Martti Ahtisaari led an extensive diplomatic effort with a failed attempt in Vienna in late July to facilitate a compromise solution between the parties. Russia supported a Contact Group statement on 27 July 2006 which called for flexibility between the two parties and a negotiated settlement. This was reiterated in a Security Council meeting in mid-September where Russia declared that ‘any decision on the future status of the province must be a universal one’, and that ‘A negotiated solution on the future status of Kosovo is a priority for Russia’. While compromise was also promoted by many of the central Western actors in the peace effort, their push for independence was becoming more apparent as an inevitable outcome for Kosovo. With negotiations extending into 2007, Ahtisaari presented his draft settlement proposal to the

338 Security Council Meeting 4258 (S/PV. 4258), 18 January 2001, p. 8-9
UN. The ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ proposed that Kosovo be led towards independence on the condition that it would be a multi-ethnic state (Hughes, 2013: 1009). While not mentioning independence, the Plan included several provisions – including the right to form international agreements and hold membership in international institutions, the right to a national army, and the right to national symbols – that were interpreted as providing Kosovo with independence.

Kosovo accepted the Plan, but Belgrade rejected it. Russia opposed the Plan arguing that an acceptable solution is one based on compromise. The Plan has been viewed by some commentary as totally disregarding Resolution 1244 and ignoring the humanitarian plight and ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Serb population (Hughes, 2013: 1010). To resolve the deadlock between the opposing sides and the international peacemakers, a Troika negotiating format was formed in mid-2007. The aim was to promote dialogue and facilitate some form of compromise. Russia made its position clear: ‘The most reliable solution to the problem is one that will work out in direct talks with the Kosovo Serb side. Russia would support any outcome of such negotiation’.341 Although Russia was being flexible in supporting an outcome based on inclusive negotiations, it knew that the Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade would not accept an independent Kosovo. After several months of negotiations, the impasse remained, with the Troika reporting its failure to the Security Council in December 2007. The Troika also stipulated that ‘There will be no return to the pre-1999 status’, that ‘Belgrade will not govern Kosovo’ and neither shall it ‘re-establish a physical presence in Kosovo’.342

Despite this, Kosovo declared independence in February 2008 and while there were disputes between certain members of the EU, most the West recognised Kosovo’s statehood. Russia was outraged, viewing it as a repeat of the unilateral behaviour which destabilised Kosovo and Serbia in 1999. Russian officials opposed the declaration asserting that it was a breach of international law based on Resolution 1244, a breach of the Helsinki Final Act, and of Serbia’s sovereignty. In Russia’s view, the erosion of the principal norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity had

created a dangerous precedent which, as will be discussed in the following chapter, Russia would also pragmatically exercise.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the nature of Russia’s involvement in the conflict that erupted in Kosovo and its ensuing path to a sustainable peace. The chapter questioned to what extent the case of Kosovo represented a further departure in Russia’s engagement in the broad trends of European conflict management as captured by European security governance. While there were deepening divergences in some respects, there was also a consistent level of convergence. The chapter has demonstrated that Russia’s behaviour remained complex. First, Russia continued to make a conscious effort to steer collective action at the diplomatic and operational levels away from an exclusive reliance on Western institutions, to a more inclusive dependence on wider international actors and arrangements based on or closely affiliated with the UN, where it could legitimately shape the peace effort. Second, that the understanding between Russia and the central actors of European security governance on the role of force diverged even further, with an acerbic debate over sovereignty and the increasing entrenchment of evolving humanitarian norms. Russia’s compulsion to maintain the direction of the peace effort away from a military response had a profound impact upon its behaviour in relation to the use of coercive methods. The anxiety over NATO’s readiness to use force for the protection of civilians across state borders, compromised Russia’s behaviour to the extent that its conservative understanding of force became further ingrained as the conflict developed, and that Russia was not even prepared to support sanctions which it had endorsed during in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. This apprehension can be traced to Russia’s condemnation of NATO’s 1995 bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, and which was closely bound up in foreign policy concerns about an increasingly NATO-centred system of European security governance. This degree of anxiety featured in the post-intervention phase of the peace effort. Third, Russia demonstrated its use of and support for softer and limited measures which Moscow argued were paramount for the facilitation of the peacemaking process. This approach also attempted to reconcile the safeguarding of sovereign
consent and the support for human rights. Fourth, in accordance with the international peace effort, Russia exercised a largely consistent understanding of the debate over self-determination, and remained alert to Serbia’s territorial integrity whilst recognising Kosovo’s greater autonomy. Yet, this became another key point of divergence between Moscow and its Western counterparts, with considerable disagreement over the future status of Kosovo.

For Russia, the management of the conflict in Kosovo and the following settlement process remained a foreign policy priority. From the late 1990s to the end of Medvedev’s tenure in power, Russia considered Kosovo an arena for the negotiation of European security governance. Issues such as the mission’s leadership and the normative conduct of the operation directly reflected wider concerns in Moscow relating to the first-order norms and institutional design of security governance in Europe. Russia’s external policy continued to constructively engage in security governance but on its own terms in staunch defence of its sovereign identity and national interests. While there was a deterioration in Russia’s relations with the central actors of European security governance from the mid- to late 2000s onwards – excluding the minor rapprochement initiated by the Obama presidency – this did not necessarily detract from Moscow’s relatively principled approach towards Kosovo. This, however, was not the case in Russia’s regional experience where foreign and security policy aims became increasingly bound up in its response towards the management of intra-state violence.
Chapter 5
Russia and intra-state conflict in Georgia: the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

5.1 Introduction

Russia’s involvement in the conflicts in Georgia has been central to its conflict management experience. The acerbic nature of Moscow’s wider relationship with Tbilisi profoundly impacted the management of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As covered in chapter 2, significant questions have been raised about the credibility of Russia’s involvement in Georgia, which has largely been considered a policy of escalating interference and coercion to secure Russian national interests. One expert has referred to Russia’s engagement as a campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’ (Allison, 2008: 1145). This chapter will situate Russia’s behaviour in Georgia in the wider context of its experiences in the Balkans and its evolving foreign and security policy to highlight continuity and change in its doctrine, policy, and practice.

The chapter will demonstrate that while there was a degree of ambivalence in Russia’s response towards the conflicts, this did not rule out an engagement in the trends of European conflict management as captured by the norms and processes of security governance. Russian behaviour developed in stages where its initial engagement was erratic largely because of the chaotic decision-making and policy implementation processes between the MoD and the MFA. However, Russia’s post-ceasefire behaviour began to traverse both Westphalian and post-Westphalian security provision, which reflected its behaviour in the Balkans. From the mid-2000s
onwards and the August war of 2008, Russia’s response became more calculated in the securing of its national interests; however, Moscow was still alert to the necessity of maintaining some form of stability in the regions based on certain aspects of its conflict management experience. Where change in Russia’s behaviour occurred, this was driven by political expediency rather than by a fundamental revision of how it approached conflict management.

To demonstrate this, the chapter begins with an interrogation Russia’s approach towards the eruption of intra-state violence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia during the early 1990s. Following this, the chapter analyses Moscow’s engagement in the post-ceasefire peace effort in both regions, including an analysis of Russia’s response to the conflict in South Ossetia in 2008 and its aftermath.

5.2 Pre-ceasefire phase: responding to violence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia

5.2.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity

Russia’s engagement in the pooling of sovereignty and channels of interaction complexity were inconsistent during this stage of the conflicts. When responding to the conflict that emerged in South Ossetia in early 1991 Moscow showed a relatively limited display of collective action. However, in the case of Abkhazia from 1993 onwards Moscow engaged in collective efforts to terminate the violence which erupted in Abkhazia. As illustrated in figure 5.1 Moscow’s selective interaction with other participating actors was aimed at steering collective action away from an exclusive reliance on Western actors, and instead towards a dependence on international institutions and agencies centred in or closely affiliated with the UN and CSCE. This allowed Russia to maintain a central stakeholder position in the peace effort. The aim of this engagement served two purposes. The first was to ensure the safeguarding of what Russia considered as a region of vital interests. The second was to promote an inclusive process of collective action, which was consistent with Russia’s understanding of the conduct of the peace efforts discussed in the previous chapters. Moscow’s behaviour was also complicated by the chaotic nature of Russian policy and decision-making attributed to the break-up of the Soviet Union.
**Diplomatic level**

As figure 5.1 illustrates, Russia’s engagement in the pooling of sovereignty via channels of stakeholder interaction complexity differed across the two conflicts. Interaction complexity was limited in South Ossetia and Moscow’s involvement only increased in mid-1992 with the brokering of a ceasefire agreement between the conflicting parties in Sochi. In contrast, Moscow showed more engagement in Abkhazia as the conflict unfolded. While Russia’s initial response did not actively promote the participation of international actors in the peace effort, from mid-1993 onwards the settlement process became internationalised with the inclusion of the UN and the CSCE. Moscow ensured that it maintained its stakeholder position alongside the UNSGSR. This provided Russia with a degree of credibility by facilitating its self-proclaimed role as the legitimate regional ‘peacemaker’, and maintained Moscow’s voice in decisions on regional security issues.
With the outbreak of fighting in Abkhazia in mid-1992, Moscow replicated its approach in South Ossetia where it monopolised the mediation process. Yet, despite the preliminary success of this diplomatic effort, the fighting continued with both sides blaming the other for its resumption. During this stage of the conflict, Russia was accused by Tbilisi for supporting Abkhazia. The Russian MoD vehemently denied these allegations, stating that all Russian troops stationed in the region were maintaining strict neutrality. Further talks between the Defence Ministers of Russia and Georgia were arranged in Sochi in early April 1993, where the Georgian side proposed the internationalisation of the settlement process and the exclusion of direct Russian participation in future talks. Russia continued to position itself at the centre of negotiations with a presidential meeting between Yeltsin and Shevardnadze in Moscow on 14 May 1993, followed by Foreign Minister Kozyrev’s visit to Tbilisi in early June 1993. Yet, on 9 July Moscow supported Resolution 849 (1993) which requested the UNSG to send the UNSGSR to the region to assist in implementing a ceasefire. While calculated decision-making was a feature of Russia’s response in peace brokering, the legitimation of its role as regional security guarantor did not rule out an engagement in collective action to resolve the conflict.

The UN’s role in negotiations was vital to facilitate a collective settlement process, where Russia co-ordinated with the UNSC and with the UNSGSR. This phase of the settlement process began in late July 1993 and although this agreement failed because of Abkhazia’s offensive in September 1993, a Memorandum of Understanding between the belligerents was signed in early December 1993 under the auspices of the UN in Geneva. Russia provided mediation and CSCE representatives participated as observers. The talks also established an informal working

group which convened in Moscow in mid-December and included representatives from the opposing sides and specialists from the UN and the CSCE. Its purpose was to maintain channels of communication by studying the developments of Abkhazia’s political status.

Negotiations were enhanced in 1994 and continued under the auspices of the UN. Russia was a central participant in this diplomatic framework, maintaining its engagement in the UN and with Washington which had taken a more active diplomatic role. While decision-making was implemented via this negotiating format, it was overseen by the Security Council. Moscow recognised that if the Council’s wider authority over the peace process was considered it would support multiple channels of interaction. Yet with the streamlining of the negotiating format under UN auspices, this removed any Russian anxieties about its exclusion from decision-making in a region it considered to be of vital interest. This was reflected in negotiations in early 1994 with the outbreak of violence in the Gali district in Georgia and the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. While there was minimal progress on a settlement, the parties signed a quadripartite agreement which included the establishment of a special commission on the issue of refugees scheduled to begin work in March and the participation of the UNHCR. Russia explicitly supported collective action attaching ‘great importance to progress in the negotiating process’, through coordination with the UNSGSR and the OSCE Chairman. Moscow supported Resolution 906 (1994) on 25 March which urged all sides to continue negotiations and refrain from violent acts. This sustained level of coordination between the negotiators and observers assisted in the signing of a further ceasefire agreement in Moscow on 4 April 1994.

The oscillation between these objectives shaped Russia’s approach towards the discussions in 1994. Certain scholarship contends that from late 1993 onwards Russia’s engagement in collective action was overshadowed by a shifting emphasis on national interests in foreign policy planning (Allison, 1994). Evidence demonstrates, however, that from early 1994 Russia was still engaged with external institutional actors to facilitate a UN operation in Abkhazia via the Security

During a meeting on 9 March, Russia’s representative refrained from ruling out the use of ‘other forces approved by the United Nations’, alluding to the deployment of CIS forces, but was clear when declaring in a further meeting at the UN on 25 March that UN forces would be indispensable for achieving peace.

Moscow’s persistent calls that a decision needed to be made for the deployment of an operation were credible because of the precarious situation on the ground. When it became clear that the UN was not going to authorise an operation, Russia began to increase the frequency of its offers for the deployment of a CIS force. At a CIS summit in Moscow on 15 April, a statement was issued declaring that the UN should not hesitate in its deployment of a force but ‘If, for some reason, such a decision is not made, the Council is ready to deploy in the conflict zone peacekeeping forces comprising military contingents from countries which are party to the agreement’. Less enthusiastic about the deployment of foreign troops along Russia’s regional periphery, Defence Minister Grachev stated that UN forces could not replace those of the CIS. Grachev stated that this was because Russia’s neighbours were comfortable with the deployment of Russian forces in the vicinity of local ‘hot spots’.

This did not rule out Russia’s support for external actors. Kozyrev declared that ‘It would be a mistake to ignore the role of the United Nations and the CSCE, but it would be another extreme to abandon this sphere completely to the hands of these organizations. This is a zone of Russian interests and this is understood by all sides’ (cited in Shashenkov, 1994: 64). Boutros-Ghali was pragmatic and did not oppose the use of Russian forces under the auspices of the CIS in Abkhazia, even drawing a parallel with the involvement of Western troops in the Balkans. The UNSG was clear, however, that CIS troops would not be given a UN mandate as they would not be under a

---

UN chain of command. The signing of an agreement in Moscow on the 14 May 1994 with the Georgian leadership was crucial in fulfilling Russian aspirations as regional security guarantor. This decision did not signify an indifference in Moscow regarding the participation of external actors as Russia put pressure on its CIS partners to contribute forces and lamented their unwillingness to offer troops to the forthcoming operation (MacFarlane and Schnabel, 1995: 22).

Russia’s frustration was exacerbated because it felt that it was not offered the same level of support other operations were given. Therefore, Russia argued that under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, alongside a CIS mandate, it possessed the legal basis to initiate an operation. This indifference to the UN should not be considered a shift in its policy towards a disregard for the UN in the former Soviet Union. Rather, this demonstrated an emotional response born out of mounting frustration over what Moscow considered a double-standard. Russia stressed that it did not want to ‘supplant the efforts of the United Nations towards the settlement of the conflict, but to help create the most favourable conditions for those efforts’.

**Operational level**

Stakeholder interaction complexity and the pooling of sovereignty into a collective response was virtually non-existent. Due to the participation of Russian forces in the conflict on the side of

---

59 The format of a potential operation became a protracted affair in the corridors of the UN. In early May, the UNSG submitted three possible options to the Security Council regarding the structure and composition of an intervening force. The first option proposed to take an immediate decision on the establishment of a UN operation, but wait to see if this galvanised the opposing parties into creating the conditions for its deployment. The second option advocated for the deployment of a CIS force operating outside of UN auspices, with it being potentially subsumed by a future UN force. The final option put forward was to wait until conditions were conducive for a decision on the eventual deployment of a force. Russia was content in fulfilling the second proposal, but requested the formal approval of the UN to provide its troops with the international stamp of legitimacy. See Secretary General Report 529 (S/529), 3 May 1994, paragraph 21 (a, b, c), p. 5.

60 During a meeting of the UN Security Council on 30 June 1994, Russia’s representative could not conceal his disappointment and dissatisfaction with the outcome of the debate and how it was handled: ‘I shall not conceal that we counted on much greater support and understanding from our Security Council partners with respect to the peacemaking operation in Abkhazia. We feel there is no room in the Security Council for a double standard in approaching peacemaking operations. We expect the Security Council to provide no less genuine support for efforts to maintain peace in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone than it does with regard to conflicts in other areas and on other continents’. See Security Council Meeting 3398 (S/PV. 3398), 30 June 1994, p. 3.

Tskhinvali and Sukhumi, the cultivation of a collective response was limited. While the MFA attempted to facilitate a degree of collective action with the OSCE this was also limited.

5.2.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation

Coercive measures and the role of force

Several reasons can explain the incoherence of Russia’s response during this period which contrasted with its handling of the violence in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. First, the eruption of violence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia contributed towards the disintegration and breakup of the Soviet Union. These divisions within Georgia were reflected in the divisive political fault lines that emerged in Moscow, which profoundly disrupted governmental decision-making and policy implementation processes. This was particularly the case regarding South Ossetia, which unfolded amidst political change and upheaval in the Kremlin. Second, the reorganisation of Russia’s power ministries and structures, such as the MoD in May 1992, contributed towards this turbulence in policymaking. Third, these wider factors were accompanied by the relative inexperience of the armed forces and the troops stationed in Georgia at the time of the violence. None of the Soviet and later Russian Army units were trained to manage intra-state conflict, and many could only draw upon their past experiences fighting a high-intensity and bloody counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan. This improvisation replaced coherent institutionalised doctrine from Russia’s power ministries/military establishment, where an animated debate unfolded. This doctrinal debate chaotically unfolded along the institutional divide between the military and the MFA, and discrepancies occurred within and across the boundaries of the central power ministries (Lynch, 1999: 94). This hindered the extent thinking at the institutional level informed practice on the ground in the zones of conflict.

Fourth, this was followed by independent and ad hoc responses from local commanders which contributed towards this confusion. Alongside this, in both the final days of Gorbachev’s Soviet Union and under Yeltsin’s new leadership, the conflicts were considered direct threats to national security due to their impact on Russia’s territorial integrity. Other interests such as the maintenance of regional stability, alongside the safeguarding of strategic interests in the
Caucasus, also conditioned Russia’s response. While this array of factors has been taken into consideration by existing commentary, the significance of their diversity has largely been downplayed with a reliance on more superficial explanations based on Russian strategic and political interests. Hence, during this phase Russia demonstrated an ambiguous engagement in the trends of European conflict management based on the emerging norms and processes of European security governance.

Under Gorbachev’s leadership, Moscow’s initial approach towards the deterioration of relations between South Ossetia and the Georgian government in 1991 was relatively passive. Moscow exercised a policy of non-interference and ignored requests for protection from the South Ossetian leadership after their holding of elections on 9 December 1990 for a new Supreme Soviet (Ozhiganov, 1997: 355). With an escalation of the violence, however, Gorbachev issued a decree in early January, 1991 demanding the withdrawal of all armed units other than USSR interior troops. While there were accusations of Moscow and individual Ossetian servicemen in the Soviet military supplying separatist forces with weapons, there is no evidence to suggest that this was ordered by the Soviet leadership. The Soviet leadership was concerned with growing regional instability, with existing MVD troops warning Georgian forces against attacking Tskhinvali. Moscow had no interest in instability and this was understood by the leadership as part of routine procedure to suppress mass disorder (Ozhiganov, 1997: 359). Moscow dispatched forces to secure army depots and prevent the theft of armaments. The MVD engaged in law enforcement rather than use force to tackle the violence. Interceding in the conflict, the Russian

---

Congress of People’s Deputies used diplomatic bargaining based on the establishment of treaty relations with Tbilisi if South Ossetia’s autonomous status was reinstated, the blockade of Tskhinvali was lifted, and refugees could return to their homes. This humanitarian process provided a brief respite as hostilities continued into late 1991. The MVD insisted that it would remain in the region because it was the only force capable of preventing further violence.366

Moscow’s approach remained consistent even with the appointment of Yeltsin to the presidency. This was followed by the replacement of Gamsakhurdia with Shevardnadze in January 1992, where it was expected that the more moderate policies of the new regime would facilitate a compromise with Tskhinvali. The Yeltsin administration continued the policies under Gorbachev and made a declaration calling for the parties to halt the fighting.367 Two separate Russian-brokered ceasefires in mid-May and mid-June failed due to major Georgian offences.368 Hard liners in the Russian Parliament demanded that Moscow provide military support to the South Ossetian forces surrounded in Tskhinvali.369 This was followed by military clashes between Russian forces and Georgian troops with both sides accusing each other of using force. The Russian leadership declared that it would use force to protect civilians and maintain the peace.370 This was largely rhetoric, however, and did not demonstrate a departure from Russia’s existing approach. Russia’s erratic response was evidence of the complex factors shaping its behaviour. Although Russia’s policy towards its regional space had become more aware of safeguarding Russian interests, this confusion was also evident in Moscow’s response to Abkhazia. With the eruption of violence in mid-1992 after Abkhazia’s unilateral declaration of independence from Georgia, Russian troops and civilians were caught in the fighting suffering casualties, while

Russian weapons depots were looted. On 3 September 1992, Moscow attempted to broker a ceasefire and stipulated the withdrawal of forces from the conflict, the disarming of illegal groups, and the exchange of prisoners, alongside the acknowledging of Abkhazia’s autonomy within Georgia. Despite this, violence quickly erupted in September and October with Abkhaz forces launching successful counter offensives against Georgian positions throughout the region, with the Georgian leadership accusing Russia of supporting Abkhaz troops and directly engaging in military operations. Vehemently denying these allegations, the MoD argued that Russian troops stationed in the region maintained their neutrality and that any use of force was in self-defence to protect military facilities.

This initial use of force by Russian troops was not related to a humanitarian justification, but instead was an act of self-defence. However, Russian forces were prepared to use equivalent levels of force in self-defence to overwhelm Georgian positions, which also supported the Abkhaz side. In a further statement in December 1992, the MoD justified its retaliatory use of force to protect servicemen and their families. The MoD also pointed out that Russian forces were performing ‘their tasks in an extremely challenging environment’ and that it was ‘increasingly difficult to restrain the emotional feelings of soldiers losing their loved ones, friends and colleagues’. While there was credibility in these statements as Russian units under attack in Abkhazia took unilateral action, the MoD’s justifications according to one scholar became useful pretexts as the violence unfolded to secure strategic interests in Georgia and its wider position in the Transcaucasus (Lynch, 1999: 136).

The violence increased in early 1993 as both sides engaged in heavy fighting for the control of Sukhumi. According to several sightings, Moscow provided equipment and weaponry to Abkhazia and was directly participating in combat operations around the seismic laboratory in the area of Nizhniye Eshery. While the MoD denied this evidence suggests otherwise, and the military was certainly attempting to force Shevardnadze to accept Russian demands regarding a forward military presence in Georgia. In January 1993, Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev pointed out that Russia was willing to withdraw its troops from Georgia-proper once a bilateral treaty had been signed to this effect, but made it clear to Tbilisi that Russian forces would not be withdrawn from Abkhazia for the foreseeable future. During a visit to Georgia in early 1993, Defence Minister Grachev also commented that Russian troops must remain in this strategically important region (cited in Lynch, 1999: 137).

Despite this, the MFA’s participation in the negotiations and humanitarian process demonstrated the ambiguity of Russia’s response. While the MoD facilitated some of these negotiations which typically occurred after Abkhaz military gains, the MFA advocated a consistent policy of compromise between the opposing sides. This did not necessarily coincide with the MoD’s response to the evolving conflict throughout 1993 and 1994; and was therefore not a carefully calibrated policy of ‘carrots and sticks’ as existing scholarship maintains (Jonson and Archer, 1996; Lynch, 1999). Where political and strategic aims informed the MoD’s response, the MFA supported a soft approach and showed a sustained engagement in the settlement process particularly from mid-1993 onwards with its support for the UNSGSR’s participation in negotiations. The Foreign Ministry also supported the creation of UNOMIG which was mandated to verify the parties’ compliance with the ceasefire agreements. Russia

delivered humanitarian aid to Abkhazia and the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) evacuated over 5,000 civilians of Abkhaz, Georgian, and Russian nationality in June 1993.\textsuperscript{381} The MFA continued to focus on the humanitarian aspects of the peace effort. The MFA put considerable pressure on Tbilisi and Sukhumi to facilitate the return of refugees, including this as a key condition in the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Geneva on 1 December 1993.\textsuperscript{382} There were further rounds of negotiations in Geneva in late February where the parties agreed to sign a quadripartite agreement on the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, alongside the establishment of a special commission to expedite this process in March.\textsuperscript{383} The commission would include representatives from the MFA, the UNHCR, and observers from the CSCE.\textsuperscript{384} These efforts were consistently hindered by the intransigence of the parties. This was particularly the case regarding Abkhazia which would not agree to Tbilisi’s request for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force under Chapter VI to provide the conditions for the UNHCR to begin the repatriation process.\textsuperscript{385} Despite this, the UNSG offered a balanced assessment about Abkhaz intransigence. Boutros-Ghali pointed out that while the Abkhaz side was deliberately being obstructive, Abkhazia had some credible anxieties, including the potential return of paramilitary elements that may instigate further violence, the lack of infrastructure and security in place for the returned, and with the return of a large number of Georgian civilians Abkhazia would be unable to negotiate acceptable arrangements to guarantee their minority rights.\textsuperscript{386}

The MFA continued to promote the humanitarian process in early March 1994 with the resumption of the electrical power supply to Abkhazia, the donation of Rb2.5 billion to Sukhumi to maintain the regional food supply, and the provision of further humanitarian aid to the Russian population in Abkhazia.\textsuperscript{387} This was followed by the signing of a ceasefire agreement in Moscow.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{382} Secretary General Letter on behalf of Georgia 26875 (S/26875), 15 December 1993, Appendix, p. 3-4.
\textsuperscript{385} Secretary General Report 253 (S/253), 3 March 1994, paragraph 25, p. 6.
\end{flushright}
on 4 April 1994. The MFA declared that ‘Russia will do everything in its power to help refugees from the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to return to their homes and restart a peaceful life’, and further stressed that it is necessary to attract material resources to help refugees return and to rebuild homes. However, it was recognised by the UNSG that the return of refugees and displaced persons could only take place once an international military presence was deployed.

The Settlement Process

Moscow – in accordance with Washington and many of the central European powers at the UN – maintained a consistent argument advocating for Tskhinvali’s and Sukhumi’s wider autonomy within the framework of Georgia. At the same time, Russian actions demonstrated that this was closely intertwined with the idea of Georgia’s qualified sovereignty. This, however, was interpreted differently between the MoD and MFA. The MoD was against Abkhazia’s separation from Georgia, but conditioned Tbilisi’s territorial integrity on the safeguarding of Russian political and strategic aims. The MFA was also concerned about Abkhazia’s separation from Georgia due to its potential impact on the maintenance of Russia’s territorial integrity. While this approach was closely bound up with the securing of Russia’s interests, the cementing of Russia’s role as a regional security guarantor was a paramount concern for the Foreign Ministry. Premised on the MFA’s thinking, Russia reserved the right to intervene in the political debates over Georgia’s future. This was not necessarily linked to imperial intent as the MFA consistently supported arrangements of compromise between the parties.

During Gorbachev’s final years in power, Moscow’s policy towards Georgia’s territorial integrity was relatively consistent. In the face of Gamsakhurdia’s ultra-nationalist project, the Soviet leadership’s decree on 7 January 1991 affirmed that South Ossetia’s autonomy should be

---

388 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1960 F/2, 31 March 1994, Itar-Tass, 4 April 1994. The agreement also created the quadripartite commission to deal with the humanitarian crisis and established ad hoc expert groups to target specific aspects of the return process, such as applicability of immunity, the registration process, and a mass-media information campaign. This commission began work in Sochi in early April 1994, with the UNHCR locating areas of potential temporary shelter in Georgia and Russia, in addition to areas of return in Abkhazia’s Gali region. See Secretary General Report 529 (S/529), 3 May 1994, paragraph 6, p. 2.

respected with the withdrawal of all forces from the region. Tbilisi accused Russia for interfering in its internal affairs, but Moscow’s intention was not to trample upon Georgian affairs but to facilitate a compromise with Tskhinvali and even remained silent with South Ossetia’s call to stay within the USSR. This silence became more apparent as Tbilisi began to push for independence in April 1991. With its declaration of independence on 9 April, Georgia gave Abkhazia autonomy but denied this status to South Ossetia. The Soviet Federation Council in Moscow issued a statement on 4 June affirming that Tbilisi’s handling of the issue of South Ossetia’s autonomy and its drive to force ethnic Ossetians out of Georgia was ‘a gross violation of the USSR Constitution and international accords on human rights’.

With the power transition in Moscow in mid-1991, the new Russian leadership continued to denounce these human rights violations. Moscow’s policy towards the conflict in South Ossetia continued in 1992, with the eventual signing of the Sochi Agreement on 24 June 1992. Similarly, Russia brokered a ceasefire agreement in Abkhazia in September 1992 which attempted to balance Abkhaz autonomy with Georgia’s territorial integrity. There was a further attempt to facilitate a political settlement on 27 July 1993. The Foreign Ministry continued to expedite a settlement that guaranteed the rights of ethnic minorities and assured Tbilisi that existing Russian forces stationed in Georgia would remain neutral.

Despite this transparency from the MFA, Shevardnadze was pressured into joining the CIS in December 1993, agreed to lease the port of Poti and the Bombara airfield to the Russian military,

395 This was officially named as the Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian - Ossetian Conflict.
397 Secretary General Report 26023 (S/26023), 1 July 1993, paragraph 16, p. 4.
and allowed the MoD to maintain three bases in Georgia (Lynch, 1999: 139). These gains coincided with the signing of a confidence-building measure between the parties in December 1993 and while the MFA was alert to the promotion of Russian interests, the Ministry’s consistent pro-activeness in the pursuit of a compromised-based solution was evidence of its attempt to expedite the settlement process. The MFA continued to broker negotiated agreements throughout 1994, which culminated in the consideration of a document stipulating the mutual delegation of powers for joint action in areas such as foreign policy, the economy, and human rights. The document also specified that while Abkhazia would have its own constitution and legislation, a decision on the final status of the parties’ political future would be postponed. There was disagreement, however, over the issue of Abkhazia’s relationship to Georgia, with the Abkhaz side declining to sign any document that recognised Georgia’s territorial integrity, and after another failed agreement in April 1994 Russia eventually brokered the Sochi Agreement on 14 May 1994 which provided a fragile ceasefire, but failed to cement a political settlement.

5.3 Post-ceasefire phase

Russia’s response towards the post-ceasefire phases of the conflicts evolved in two stages. The chaotic nature of Russia’s earlier approach gave way to a degree of coherence between 1992/1994 and 2004. Moscow demonstrated a largely consistent approach that conformed to its doctrinal understanding, which had developed since its involvement in the Balkans. In many respects, this was in accordance with the approaches developed in European conflict management. While Russia’s relations with Georgia and the central actors of European security governance hardened at times, Russia did not necessarily frame its response through the lens of these relationships. Between 2004 and 2012, however, ambiguity began to shape Russia’s response. Moscow framed its approach through the lens of its deteriorating relationship with Tbilisi and its European

---

399 Secretary General Report 397 (S/397), 5 April 1994, Annex I, paragraphs 7, p. 2, and paragraphs 8-9, p. 3.
400 For the 4 April 1994 Agreement see Secretary General Report 253 (S/253), 3 March 1994, paragraph 9, p. 2.
counterparts, as the tension in Russia’s security logics became more acute. Russia’s approach diverged from its official understanding of conflict management exercised in the previous phase. Despite this, Russia’s concern for regional stability was still present in its thinking towards the conflicts.

5.3.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity

Commentators argue that Russia exercised an ambivalent attitude towards the participation of other actors in the settlement processes in Georgia, and that the main ‘criterion’ in Russian policy was ‘whether the international partners were perceived as able to serve Russia’s interests’ (Baev, 1998: 150). While Russia retained a stakeholder position which served its interests, it was also committed to collective action. Russia’s response between 1992/1994 and 2004 demonstrated a degree of accommodation to international actors in the peace effort. It was only from 2004 onwards that Russia’s approach hardened towards external involvement.

Figure 5.2 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the post-ceasefire phases of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Diplomatic level

Russia’s engagement in stakeholder interaction complexity at the diplomatic level was multifaceted. This was particularly the case in Abkhazia and although Russia maintained its central position in the peace effort this did not rule out its interaction with other external actors. Prior to the mid-2000s, Russia consistently coordinated with its partners. In South Ossetia, Moscow maintained a degree of cooperation in the JCC alongside the parties to the conflict and the OSCE as an observer. Abkhazia reflected a more complex network of stakeholder interaction based on the UN’s input. Established in 1997, the Coordinating Council was at the centre of the peace effort where settlements would be facilitated. Moreover, Moscow participated in the three working groups on humanitarian issues, security, and peacebuilding. Throughout the 1990s and early to mid-2000s Moscow was a central actor in expediting the peace effort. Russia even encouraged the greater involvement of the UN and the OSCE to the region. However, from the mid-2000s onwards Russia’s engagement became increasingly ambivalent due to the tension in its foreign and security policy thinking, which was exacerbated by the ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia. Russia’s engagement in the diplomatic mechanisms via the Coordinating Committee became increasingly politicised and with the mounting tension in South Ossetia this halted any meaningful form of collective action across both peace efforts. Since the war in 2008, Russia has been reluctant to engage in any diplomatic channels of interaction regarding the settlement process.

Operational level

This pattern of Russian involvement continued at the operational level, where Moscow helped to steer the operations on the ground. The formats of both peace efforts were designed to cultivate some form of collective response. Russian forces also made efforts to cooperate with external humanitarian actors. In both conflicts, this engagement in the pooling of sovereignty resembled the level of cooperation Russian forces displayed during their involvement in the Balkans. However, from the mid-2000s onwards Russia’s engagement became largely uneven at the operational level.
With the signing of the Sochi Agreement on 24 June 1992, a Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF), as illustrated in Figure 5.2, was established and initially comprised of a battalion from each opposing party including Russia. Moscow understood this format as a vehicle to promote cooperation between the parties based on the promotion of consent and impartiality. However, Moscow could exercise considerable influence in the JPKF as the overall commander was Russian. The former Head of the OSCE observer Mission to Georgia, stated that this ‘was very much the imposition of a system and a structure whereby Russia had the dominant voice in working towards any possible resolutions of the conflict’. The JPKF was accompanied by the small OSCE Mission to Georgia which arrived in December 1992 and as shown in Figure 5.2 OSCE observers participated in the JPKF to oversee their activity and patrol independently in the security zone.

The years following the deployment of the JPKF a process of regional de-militarisation was implemented. Several checkpoints were established throughout the designated security zone between Russia and the opposing sides. Although the purpose of these checkpoints was to assist in the establishment of security in the area, the degree of coordination within the JPKF was limited. According to expert opinion, while there was collaboration between the senior military command of the JPKF when local conflicts broke out, regular channels of interaction complexity were largely absent between the forces of the JPKF as they possessed no technical means of communication with one another (Mackinlay and Sharov, 2003: 84). There was, however, a consistent degree of cooperation between Russia and the opposing sides via the three-sided Group of Military Observers (GMO). The GMO played an important security role by investigating incidents and complaints from the local population. This also maintained a degree of collective

---

402 Interview with Professor Aleksandr Nikitin, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Moscow, 1 October 2014; Interview with Professor Andrei Zagorskii, IMEMO, 8 April 2015.
403 Interview with Mr Roy Reeve, Former-British senior diplomat and Head of the OSCE Observer Mission to Georgia (2003-2008), London, 3 June 2014; Interview with professor Yury Morozov, Moscow
404 Interview with Mr Roy Reeve, Former-British senior diplomat and Head of the OSCE Observer Mission to Georgia (2003-2008), London, 3 June 2014.
transparency between the participating actors as the parties could contribute towards the decision-making process. The GMO was subordinated to the commander of the JPKF but each observer was also subordinated to their own national commander (Mackinlay and Sharov, 2003: 83-84).

In Abkhazia, the parties consented to the deployment of a CIS peacekeeping force (CIS-PKF), although Russia was the only member to contribute troops. The civilian dimension was facilitated through the UNOMIG and the participation of various other UN agencies and NGOs. In a report submitted to the Security Council on 12 July 1994, the UNSG set out the parameters of UNOMIG’s cooperation with the CIS-PKF as shown in Figure 5.2. According to the UNSG, UNOMIG would operate independently but in close coordination with the CIS-PKF. It was understood that decisions affecting both UNOMIG and the CIS-PKF would be made through consultation to cultivate a spirit of collective decision-making.

The report also stipulated that UNOMIG and the CIS-PKF would engage in joint patrols throughout their zones of responsibility in the Kodori Gorge and the Gali District. This was accompanied by weekly meetings of the Quadripartite Commission (QC), which included the head of the CIS-PKF, the chief UN military observer, the opposing parties, and the participation of the UNHCR. UNOMIG also cooperated with the UNHCR, UN Development Programme (UNDP), and UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), alongside a host of international NGOs. The CIS-PKF was responsible for protecting these actors during their missions and to participate in humanitarian projects. The UNSG’s reports to the Security Council regularly stated that

406 Lieutenant General Vasily Yakushev, as the first commander of the CIS-PKF in Abkhazia, voiced these concerns stating that a 'selection of some troops or observers in addition to financial assistance' could be provided. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 December 1995, accessed 13 December 2013, available at http://dlb.eastview.com/browse/doc/3382959.

407 The extent of this coordination would be exercised through several channels, including force HQ in Sukhumi, sector zone HQ in Gali and Zugdidi, the UNOMIG monitoring team with CIS-PKF battalion, and UNOMIG patrol with CIS-PKF patrols/checkpoints. In relation to the first two channels, cooperation was ensured through weekly meetings and daily interactions, while the second two channels was coordinated via daily scheduled and ad hoc operational contacts. See Secretary General Report 818 (S/818), 12 July 1994, paragraph 14, p. 4.

408 Secretary General Report 818 (S/818), 12 July 1994, paragraph 17, p. 4.

409 Secretary General Report 818 (S/818), 12 July 1994, paragraph 17, p. 4

410 This was established by the quadripartite agreement signed in Moscow on 4 April 1994 and meetings would typically include the discussion of security and humanitarian issues. See Secretary General Report 725 (S/725), 16 June 1994, paragraph 4, p. 2.

411 Some of these included the ICRC, Médecins Sans Frontières, and the HALO Trust responsible for de-mining; Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 December 1996, accessed 14 December 2013, available at
Exchanges of information, mutual assistance and joint patrolling are taking place regularly and the cooperation continues to be very satisfactory. The pooling of sovereignty and the degree of interaction complexity was more extensive at the operational level than was displayed in South Ossetia. This was because Abkhazia received more international attention as the level of destruction was comparatively higher than in South Ossetia. Moreover, as the 1990s progressed the UN became more willing to engage in Abkhazia. The political will and expertise of these external actors also helped to shape the management of the conflict to foster further collective action.

The resilience of this interaction complexity was tested in Abkhazia as the peace effort was confronted with the outbreak of major hostilities in mid-1998. The CIS-PKF was targeted on several occasions by criminal elements throughout the months of April and May 1998 but continued to hold meetings with the UNOMIG to facilitate measures of ‘mutual assistance’, and maintained its cooperation via joint patrolling throughout the areas of violence. This level of cooperation continued in the 2000s under the new leadership in Moscow, with the commander of the CIS-PKF pro-actively developing a practice of frequent communications with UNOMIG’s Chief Military Observer. This period of relative calm was interrupted in 2001, with an upsurge in the violence in the Kodori Gorge between Abkhaz forces and Georgian paramilitary units supported by Chechen fighters. While patrols had grinded to a halt due to the unacceptable levels of insecurity in the Kodori Gorge, the exercise of joint patrols continued in the Gali District.

Even during the tense period in Russian-Georgian relations due to Russian airstrikes on insurgent

414 For instance, the UNSG even emphasised in a report to the Security Council in April 2000 that ‘Security arrangements by the CIS peacekeeping force in respect of UNOMIG are regularly tested and UNOMIG continues to feel confident that it can rely on the force’s assistance in emergency situations’. See Secretary General Report 345 (S/345) 24 April 2001, paragraph 21, p. 4.
415 A low point for the peace effort came during a period of heightened fighting with the shooting down of a UN helicopter on a routine patrol over the Kodori Gorge on 8 October 2001. The CIS-PKF provided security for the search & rescue operation of the bodies, which included several UNOMIG observers. See Secretary General Report 1008 (S/1008), 24 October 2001, paragraph 20, p. 4.
positions in the Kodori Gorge, joint patrols continued in the Upper Kodori Gorge throughout 2002.  

In South Ossetia, the limited degree of interaction between the sides of the JPKF came to a standstill by the time of political change in Georgia in late 2003. The new sense of urgency in Georgia’s policy towards the settlement process directly impacted the degree of operational interaction complexity. Saakashvili aimed to break the deadlock by taking another step in restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity. With the outbreak of violence following Saakashvili’s attempt to forcefully close South Ossetia’s Ergneti black market, the JPKF provided no collective response (International Crisis Group, 2004: i). According to the former Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, Roy Reeve, ‘the one time which it could have had an active role which was to stop the 2004 confrontation […] it just fell apart’.  

Following Saakashvili’s failed policy, Tbilisi agreed to a Russian-brokered ceasefire. However, the Georgian leadership also made the decision to withdraw its contingent from the JPKF in late 2004, followed by a parliamentary resolution adopted in July 2005 for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Georgian territory. This brought about a conclusive end to Moscow’s innovative project of peacekeeping, with the termination of the JPKF’s spirit of collective response. Over the course of the next few years leading up to the war in 2008, the Russian contingent continued to be stationed in their zone of responsibility and contributed towards a period of increasing tension as Georgia persistently demanded their withdrawal. After the war in 2008, Medvedev consented to the deployment of an EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in September 2008, but this engagement was qualified and an attempt to further legitimise itself as ‘peacemaker’. Moreover, Moscow would not have given permission for the EUMM’s deployment if it had not previously achieved its aims based on the military defeat of Georgia and the further derailment of the settlement processes. Besides this, while the EUMM’s mandate was

417 Interview with Mr Roy Reeve, Former-British senior diplomat and Head of the OSCE Observer Mission to Georgia (2003-2008), London, 3 June 2014.
valid throughout Georgia, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali denied the Mission access to their *de facto* territories. Moscow supported this position, arguing that consent from Tskhinvali was a precondition for the EUMMs access to the region. Although this was justified under international law, this obstructionist behaviour served Russia’s interests by maintaining a degree of influence over the separatist enclaves and preventing the EU’s engagement in the region. Russia’s disengagement was further demonstrated with support for the termination of the OSCE Observer Mission’s mandate at the end of 2008. Nevertheless, demonstrating Moscow’s concern for regional stability, Russian troops constructively engaged with the EUMM through the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) on matters of security and intelligence exchange.

5.3.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation

*Coercive measures and the role of force*

After ceasefires were signed in the conflict zones, Russia’s doctrinal understanding crystallized between the MoD and MFA. Moscow understood the use of force through the consent-divide which did not demonstrate a general progression in accordance with European approaches and in the case of the conflicts in Georgia, Russia understood the purpose of the operations to create conditions conducive to a political settlement via wider-peacekeeping methods. From the mid-2000s onwards, the decision-making processes on the use of force became increasingly bound up with Russia’s political and strategic aims. Moscow also utilised sanctions against Abkhazia which also reflected doctrine and political convenience.

In the case of South Ossetia, the Sochi Agreement of June 1992 failed to provide specific rules of engagement only stating that ‘the Control Commission shall carry out investigation[s] of relevant circumstances and undertake urgent measures aimed at restoration of peace and order.

---

and non-admission of similar violations in the future’. The JCC’s joint protocol on 12 July 1992 did clarify that the JPKF was to ‘protect the peace in the zone of the armed conflict, [and] the lives and personal dignity of the citizens and their property’. It was not envisaged that this use of force would be at the strategic level to protect civilians. The JPKF was also mandated to use ‘resolute measures […] in case of a breach of the conditions set in the Agreement or decisions of the Joint Control Commission by uncontrolled military units of either of the conflicting parties’. It was understood that force would be employed against ‘spoiler’ elements rather than the opposing sides. The structure of the JPKF was designed to promote a strict interpretation of consent and impartiality. Because Moscow had devised an arrangement based on the inclusion of the opposing parties in the JPKF, this meant that both sides would not take action against their own national forces operating outside of the JPKF.

In Abkhazia, the CIS-PKF was based on similar rules of engagement with the April 1994 agreement stating that ‘In the event of an attack or direct military threat against the peace-keeping force, it shall take appropriate measures for its safety and self-defence’. Whilst it was implicitly acknowledged that the CIS-PKF was deployed to provide security, this did not initially include a mandate to suppress paramilitary groups operating outside of the opposing parties’ control. These changes in the rules of engagement have been considered by existing scholarship as an instrumental decision because Russia was now prepared to solve the conflict using softer methods once strategic gains had been made. Russia, and particularly the MoD, did indeed become more

425 Secretary General Letter on behalf of Georgia 583 (S/583), 17 May 1994, Annex I, paragraph 2 (h), p. 2.
426 Others have pointed out that these changes occurred because of Russia’s failed military campaign in Chechnya in 1996 (Jonson, 2000: 51). Yet, Russia’s behaviour in Chechnya should be analytically separated from its involvement in the regional conflicts, as Russia was prepared to use overwhelming force to tackle internal rather than external conflicts of separation.
cooperative once regional strategic goals had been achieved, but the specifics relating to operational structure and more conservative rules of engagement stemmed from doctrinal thinking across Russia’s power ministries which was paramount in shaping the peace efforts from the early to mid-1990s onwards.

The security environment in South Ossetia remained relatively peaceful with a status-quo until the mid-2000s. However, in Abkhazia the security situation was a challenge for the CIS-PKF and UNOMIG. The CIS-PKF were targeted by Georgian armed groups operating in the Kodori Gorge and the Gali District. Criminal activity and the state of the socio-economic situation in the Gali District prompted a protracted discussion about the expansion of the CIS-PKF’s mandate to include law enforcement. As changes in the mandate required the consent of both parties, Abkhazia stonewalled the adoption of these additional responsibilities. Moreover, even Russian declarations about the use of more forceful methods were largely rhetoric and defensive. There was an awareness to include robust measures, but the CIS-PKF remained focused on de-mining and the delivery of humanitarian aid. The CIS-PKF’s commander reaffirmed that when discharging these duties ‘always and everywhere we remember the three basic principles of peacekeeping: impartiality, neutrality, and openness’. It was also recognised that the purpose of this effort on the ground was only a means to facilitate the ongoing diplomat effort. As in its experience in the Balkans, Russia recognised that the use of force may derail this process by triggering further violence. This understanding was demonstrated in the CIS-PKF’s response to the violence that erupted in the Gali District in mid-1998. Although the clashes were brief with

427 The two most prominent groups were the ‘White Legion’ and ‘Forest Brotherhood’.
428 For instance, in late 1996 the CIS-PKF’s commander declared that his troops would now be using forceful measures against hostile spoilers of the peace process. Considering further attacks on the CIS-PKF, the MFA supported this decision announcing that ‘acts of terror against the peacekeepers will not go unpunished [and] will be given the most resolute rebuff using all means of self-defence and security under the terms of this agreement’ [emphasis added]. This is a crucial qualification in that force would be utilised in self-defence rather than in an offensive manner. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 February 1997, accessed 27 March 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3336516.
Abkhaz forces neutralising Georgian paramilitary units, Tbilisi placed the blame also on the CIS-PKF for its failure to provide security.\footnote{Krasnaya Zvezda, 3 June 1998, accessed 28 March 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3340941.}  

The MoD instructed the tightening of security around the check-points to increase the number of observation posts and stipulated that the further authorisation on the use of force could be only in self-defence.\footnote{Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 June 1998, accessed 27 March 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3341309.} The MFA clarified that ‘under the current mandate of the blue helmets we have the right to intervene in the actions of subversive and terrorist groups only by agreement and in cooperation with the conflicting parties’.\footnote{Krasnaya Zvezda, 3 June 1998, accessed 27 March 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3340941.} The thought of becoming embroiled in a further potential conflict along its periphery was unpalatable in Moscow. The CIS-PKF was also ill equipped to conduct major operations against spoiler groups. Even the commander of the CIS-PKF conceded that while the MoD’s order was acknowledged, emphasis should be placed on political negotiations and advocated the creation of a local political body to facilitate the talks.\footnote{Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 July 1998, accessed 27 March 1998, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3341764.}  

Both contingents operating in Abkhazia and South Ossetia began a phase of increased security initiatives in the early 2000s. In South Ossetia, the JPKF conducted operations throughout the security zone to confiscate weapons.\footnote{Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 January 2000, accessed 15 May 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3312051.} Tensions remained high in Abkhazia and while the potential increase of isolated instances of fighting in the Gali District were deterred by the frequent patrols of the CIS-PKF,\footnote{Secretary General Report 713 (S/713), 18 July 2001, paragraph 22, p. 4.} the developments in the Kodori Gorge throughout 2001 and 2002 threatened to further destabilise the region and damaged Moscow’s relations with Tbilisi. A spill over from the conflict in Chechnya, Chechen fighters alongside Georgian forces began to attack Abkhaz positions and towns in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge in late 2001. A pattern emerged in response to the violence, whereby the CIS-PKF would conduct patrols and respond with force if attacked. Any armed groups in the Gorge would be requested to withdraw to ensure a secure environment for the recommencement of CIS-PKF and UNOMIG patrols. This only
provided a brief pause in the fighting between the opposing sides and in the attacks on CIS-PKF observation posts. Moscow continued to take a cautious approach towards episodes of violence in Abkhazia, maintaining that the CIS-PKF should not participate in the fighting but should ‘control and monitor the situation’. 437

Despite this, Russia began to use airstrikes to target Chechen and Georgian armed groups in the Kodori Gorge throughout 2002. These actions, however, were precipitated by a renewed anxiety over the spread of extremism throughout the Northern Caucasus.438 This use of force should be viewed as part of a wider counter-terrorist campaign in the Transcaucasian region. Russian authorities were unsympathetic to Tbilisi if the airstrikes killed Georgian forces as Moscow considered these groups supporters of Chechen extremists.

With the outbreak of hostilities in South Ossetia in mid-2004, Russian forces within the JPKF failed to intervene to quell the violence between Georgian and South Ossetian militia. The inactiveness of Russia’s forces during this crisis showed their scepticism about getting involved. Tbilisi was growing impatient with what it considered as an inactive JPKF based on a passive mandate and pushed for a revision of the mandate to include a wider geographical remit, the deployment of international forces (primarily Western), and the authorisation of peace enforcement. This, however, was met with considerable consternation in Moscow. The following years leading up to the events of August 2008 witnessed a creeping level of instability. The Russian contingent stationed in South Ossetia became a largely token force safeguarding Moscow’s political and strategic interests, whilst the Kremlin took steps to rearm the separatist forces. Allison (2008: 1147) notes that during this time ‘Russia and Georgia seemed to be preparing for armed conflict, while separatists in Ossetia and Abkhazia were apparently ready to

438 For instance, during a meeting in September 2002 attended by the President’s Special Representative for the Georgian-Abkhaz settlement, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Abkhaz Prime Minister, the impact of extremists in the Pankisi and Kodori Gorges on the Abkhaz-Georgian settlement was made a priority. See Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Valery Loshchinin, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Georgian-Abkhaz Settlement, State Secretary and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Meets with A. M. Dzhergentiya, Prime Minister of Abkhazia’, 7 September 2002, accessed 5 May 2014, available at http://www.mid.ru/brdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005cb6b3/fe26ee106e459bd843256c2f0029aa67?OpenDocument.
provide a pretext for this’. Moscow’s lifting of the sanctions against Abkhazia in March 2008 which had been in place since 1996 further compromised its position as an impartial peacebroker. These had originally been a means to tackle Abkhaz intransigence.

These developments culminated in the war in 2008 and while an academic debate has emerged on the events of the conflict, the EU’s independent fact-finding mission headed by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini in 2009 provides a balanced analysis. The mission acknowledged that Georgia attacked South Ossetia and the JPKF, and noted that Russia’s initial use of force was in self-defence but that its incursions into Georgia-proper were disproportionate. Russia attempted to legitimise its actions by invoking R2P as a form of peace enforcement. This was widely rejected by the academic and policy community with Allison (2009: 188-189) stating that ‘Russian diplomats have had to be dexterous in their selective legal references and efforts to exploit grey areas in unconsolidated R2P norms’. Although the mandate of the JPKF authorised the protection of civilians, it was not envisaged that such strategic force would be permitted. Rather, this was more an expression of Russia’s politically charged policy towards Georgia than a revision in Russia’s understanding regarding the protection of civilians. The earlier distribution of passports provided a pretext for Russia to intervene to protect its citizens and Russian-speaking population.

**The settlement process**

Moscow’s approach towards the settlement processes was shaped by the idea of Georgia’s limited sovereignty. This understanding was contingent, however, upon Russia’s wider relations with Georgia which deteriorated sharply from the mid-2000s onwards. Prior to Putin’s second term in office, Moscow engaged in the settlement process by promoting a negotiated peace. While Russia’s approach was in accordance with the other actors in the peace effort, the Russian leadership also had to balance this with the aim of maintaining a forward military presence in Georgia. From the mid-2000s, Moscow’s aim to preserve its regional presence began to take

---


440 This was particularly in relation to the cause of the conflict. See the following scholarship for an informative insight into a debate on the normative and legal arguments surrounding Russia’s intervention: Allison (2008, 2009, 2013), Kernen and Sussex (2012), Karagiannis (2013), Fawn & Nalbandov (2012).
precedence over the promotion of a negotiated settlement. The Kremlin’s understanding of Georgia’s qualified sovereignty started to further inform policy in light of the widening and deepening of European security governance. This was further complicated by the recognition of Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 as discussed in chapter 4.

Moscow encouraged the intransigence of the separatist regions by not pressuring Sukhumi and Tskhinvali to accept settlement proposals. An insistence on the facilitation of confidence-building measures diverted attention away from settlement negotiations, Russia successfully froze any attempts to move the settlement process forward. Indeed, the more trust that was built between the parties, the likelier a compromise could be reached. Equally, the protracted nature of these discussions further entrenched the positions of the separatist parties. Although Tbilisi’s proposals were provided outside of existing diplomatic frameworks, and while the Georgian leadership’s rhetoric increased during this period, Tbilisi offered compromises and reflected the thinking of the lead negotiators since the early 1990s. During the initial years of Russia’s engagement in the settlement processes, Moscow attempted to devise political compromises in coordination with its agreement prepared in November 1994. These efforts failed due to Sukhumi’s intransigence and Tbilisi’s resolve to strengthen its territorial integrity.441

At the same time, the reorientation of Russian policy towards its immediate regional space under Yeltsin witnessed an attempt to balance its multiple interests in the Transcaucasus through the promotion of strategic aims and the maintenance of regional security.442 While agreements reflected a bargain between Tbilisi and Moscow based on Georgia’s permission to extend the lease on military bases in return for Russian support in the settlement process, Moscow’s support for compromised-based solutions also reflected its approach to the debate over territorial integrity.

441 The UN, the CSCE, and Moscow outlined a possible status of Abkhazia within a union state which respected the territorial integrity of Georgia. However, with Abkhazia’s declaration as a sovereign state on 26 November 1994, Tbilisi refused to sign the draft proposal. Following this, Russia attempted to reconcile the opposing parties with a proposal based on a federal relationship between Sukhumi and Tbilisi in December 1994. While this received support from the UNSGSR, the Abkhaz leadership rejected it in April 1995 as it moved away from a status of union to autonomy. This uncompromising position would remain a thorn in the side of the negotiations. It is puzzling why the negotiators, including the UNSR and OSCE, would promote a further agreement after the 4 April proposal in November 1994 based on a union rather than a federal arrangement as this clearly encouraged Abkhaz intransigence. See Secretary General Report 10 (S/10), 6 Jan 1995, paragraph 3, p. 1.
442 See Secretary General Report 937 (S/937), 8 November 1995, paragraph 9, p. 3.
Progress in the case of South Ossetia was also a protracted affair which gained little momentum until the latter half of 1994. Tskhinvali was reluctant to engage in negotiations whilst the conflict in Abkhazia continued as it aimed to politically profit from developments, and Tbilisi was preoccupied with Abkhazia (Sammut and Cvetkovski, 1996: 15). In 1994, on the request of Shevardnadze, the CSCE drew up a draft proposal for a settlement which provided autonomy for South Ossetia within Georgia.\footnote{Draft Proposal on a Future Political Status for South-Ossetia (1994).} While providing Tskhinvali with a stronger position than previous proposals, it was rejected in 1995.

the Abkhaz-Georgian settlement process. Even Security Council Resolution 1255 in June 1999 – the initiation of an intense phase of negotiations – was undermined by a flurry of internal Abkhaz political activity with the holding of a constitutional referendum on 3 October 1999 and presidential elections.451

In the early 2000s, Russia’s approach towards the Abkhaz settlement became increasingly ambivalent because of its deterioration in relations with Tbilisi. The Kremlin was incensed by what it perceived as Tbilisi’s disregard for Chechen and Georgian terrorist groups. While Moscow still recognised Georgia’s territorial integrity demonstrated by its support for Security Council Resolutions 1311 (2000) and 1364 (2001), it became less willing to pressure Abkhazia into accepting a stricter arrangement. Moscow entered a period of debate within the Group of Friends of the United Nations to Georgia (GOFUNG) and alongside the UNSGSR on constitutional competences between Sukhumi and Tbilisi.452 A proposal called the Boden Paper was finally put together in December 2001. It was supported by Security Council Resolution 1393 in January 2002, but was rejected by Sukhumi because of the proposal’s promotion of a federal relationship.453

Moscow continued to reiterate a compromised settlement between Georgia and Abkhazia.454 Russia support Security Council Resolution 1427 in July 2002 which put pressure on the parties

452 Extensive political negotiations were sustained throughout 2000 and 2001 at the UN in Geneva and New York, alongside the ministerial summits of the OSCE at Istanbul (1999), Athens (2000), and Yalta (2001). During this time, both political modalities and security aspects of a settlement were discussed. For a detailed overview see UN, ‘The Situation in Georgia’, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Chapter 8, available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2000-2003/Chapter%208/Europe/00-03_8_Georgia.pdf.
453 Formally, this proposal was called the Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi.
for a compromise. The Resolution also stressed its deep concern about Sukhumi’s refusal to accept the Boden Paper. In 2003, there was some progress in the settlement process with Russia’s creation of the Sochi Working Groups and evidence of an ease from Abkhazia with its invitation to the GOFUNG in early March 2003. However, the Abkhaz leadership continued to refuse a discussion regarding a settlement.

Russia’s engagement gave way to political expediency from the mid-2000s onwards. Russia made persistent protestations about its impartiality whilst blaming the deadlock on Georgia. South Ossetia became an increasingly contentious arena where this deterioration in relations between Russia and Georgia unfolded. Russia intensified its support for the de facto sovereignty of South Ossetia and advocated a ‘variety of options’ for Tskhinvali’s political status. With growing divergence between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, a more flexible political arrangement could be considered credible; yet, this was also disingenuous as it legitimised Russia’s undermining of Georgia’s sovereignty. Moreover, in Abkhazia, Russia interfered in the electoral cycle of the Abkhaz presidency in January 2005, with the unauthorised visit of Duma representatives to the region.

In response, the Georgian leadership attempted to shape the settlement processes by devising its own agreements outside of the existing diplomatic machinery. This only served to further antagonise Moscow which considered such developments a threat to the integrity of its stakeholder position in negotiations. In relation to South Ossetia, Saakashvili proposed a draft

---


457 During a media interview in July 2004 a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry was unequivocal when stating that ‘basically a solution to the problem should take place, as has repeatedly been stressed by the Russian side, within the framework of the observance of the international principle of the territorial integrity of states. Here there may be a variety of options, but all this should occur only through a political process, on the basis of the creation of confidence-building measures between the parties’. See Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary Regarding Questions from Itar Tass about Georgian-Ossetian Problems’, 1 July 2004, accessed 12 May 2004, available at http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcb3/01362f152922d2f2c3256e40058b87d!OpenDocument.

agreement at the Council of Europe in January 2005 based on a federal arrangement.\(^\text{459}\) This was rejected by Tskhinvali, which was followed by another Georgian agreement named the ‘Nogaideli Plan’ proposed in late 2005. The Plan promoted the establishment of new diplomatic machinery and pressed for a final resolution based on the previous proposal. Tskhinvali opposed the proposal, and Moscow was critical of its contents. Russia refused to revise the diplomatic format and argued against Georgia’s comprehensive resolution. Moscow promoted an incremental approach advocating that a discussion on a settlement should only begin after confidence-building measures had been successfully employed.\(^\text{460}\) While Moscow had a point in that the establishment of a resilient peace was only achievable if there was trust between the sides, this served to freeze negotiations by diverting the focus away from a final resolution. Tskhinvali’s proposal offered shortly after the Nogaideli Plan mirrored Russia’s position.\(^\text{461}\)

This policy towards the settlement in South Ossetia gained further traction leading up to the conflict in August 2008. In light of the protracted debate over Kosovo’s status and its declaration of independence in February 2008, Putin questioned why the cases in Georgia could not also be considered exceptional cases.\(^\text{462}\) This was a valid point, however, Putin’s accusations of double-standards levelled at the West’s interpretation of Kosovo’s case as \textit{sue generis} overlooked Russia’s own hypocrisy; Moscow supported Serbia’s territorial integrity but at the same time undermined Georgia’s. At this stage, Russia’s engagement in the debate over territorial integrity was largely to expedite political aims. During a press conference in St Petersburg in June 2006,

\(^{459}\) While this referred to a federal arrangement, Saakashvili was clear that central institutions such as defence, financial & tax systems, and border controls would remain a prerogative of the Georgian state. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 January 2005, accessed 8 May 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/7290425.


the Russian President declared that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia ‘are complicated problems’ which ‘cannot be settled using a knife and razor’. Putin went on to suggest that what is needed is patience and the willingness to look for compromise so that people would want to live together, and to do this bridges must be built not just between Russia and Georgia, but also between the peoples of South Ossetia and Georgia. Regarding the issue of protecting territorial integrity, Russia’s position is based on international law and peoples’ interests.\footnote{Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘President Vladimir Putin met with the President of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili’, 14 June 2006, accessed 14 May 2014, available at http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f1f28a7b43256999005bebcb3/925bdb8a4ba155b5c325718d0040193b!OpenDocument.}

Although Putin advocated a compromise, by referring to the interests of the people which included those in the separatist regions he deliberately left the question of Georgia’s territorial integrity open. Putin stated that the outcome of the settlement process was important for the wider relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi and, thus, should be conducive to Russian regional interests. This was problematic as Moscow was now subordinating Russia’s role as impartial mediator to its national interests. Russia’s paranoia of further ‘colour revolutions’ superseded its constructive engagement in the settlement.

After the war in 2008, Russia consolidated its hold over the separatist regions by recognising the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.\footnote{On 26 August 2008 President Medvedev made a televised declaration to the Russian people, stating that ‘It is our understanding that after what has happened in Tskhinval and what has been planned for Abkhazia they have the right to decide their destiny by themselves. The Presidents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, based on the results of the referendums conducted and on the decisions taken by the Parliaments of the two republics, appealed to Russia to recognize the state sovereignty of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Federation Council and the State Duma voted in support of those appeals. See Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev’, August 26 2008, accessed 16 May 2014, available at http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bebcb3/a53418a6001cc792c32574b10042b450!OpenDocument.} Moscow’s reference to the violent actions of Tbilisi assisted in the legitimisation of its policy and Russia also argued that it was inappropriate to demand that Abkhazia and South Ossetia engage after they had experienced Georgian aggression.\footnote{For instance, during a media interview in mid-August 2008, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister stated that ‘In dealing with any conflict it is necessary to take into account such basic principles as respect for the interests of the peoples living within this or that territory. After these interests have been swept away by Grad launchers, to prove to the Ossetian and Abkhaz peoples that with Georgia they will live more comfortably is practically unrealistic’. See Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Interview of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs/State Secretary Grigory Karasin on South Ossetia’, 14 August 2008, accessed 16 May 2014, available at http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bebcb3/a53418a6001cc792c32574b10042b450!OpenDocument.} While there was merit in this argument, these protestations firmly shut the door on
Reconstruction and reconciliation

In relation to the peacebuilding effort, Moscow’s initial approach demonstrated a dual track policy consistent with its behaviour during the post-conflict/ceasefire phases in its Balkan experiences. This was based on Russia’s support for specific projects aimed at the revitalisation of the former-zones of conflict, alongside the consolidation of its economic relationship with Tbilisi which served both its regional economic interests and assisted in the overall rehabilitation of Georgia. This was followed by an instrumental approach from the mid-2000s which aimed to further consolidate its relationship with these separatist regions.

The brokering of the Sochi Agreement in June 1992 between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali demonstrated Russia’s recognition of the importance of regional reconstruction. The OSCE assisted humanitarian organizations to broaden activities in South Ossetia (MacFarlane, Linear and Shenfield, 1996: x-xi). The initial years after the conflict witnessed the voluntary return of substantial numbers of refugees and IDPs, with limited incidents of harassment (MacFarlane, Linear, and Shenfield, 1996: 54). The JPKF’s commander understood the importance of the peacebuilding and humanitarian processes and a product of consultations in the JCC, President

---


467 For an overview of the military and security aspects of Medvedev’s policies towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 2008 see German (2012).

Shevardnadze signed a decree in late 1997 on the rehabilitation of the Tskhinvali region which aimed to solve the issues of water and electricity supply to South Ossetia.\textsuperscript{469}

Abkhazia proved to be more problematic due to the extent of regional destruction, including the displacement of a considerably larger body of people. During the initial years following the ceasefire, concerted efforts were made to solve the problem of refugees and IDPs.\textsuperscript{470} Both Tbilisi and Sukhumi disagreed on the issue of returns. The former demanded the issue of return to be resolved prior to a final political settlement, whilst the latter linked return with the settlement process arguing that substantial returns could only take place once Abkhazia’s political status was resolved.\textsuperscript{471} With this deadlock in the returns process, it was recognised that the most dangerous regions of Abkhazia at least be restored to encourage voluntary returns. A drive to rebuild Abkhazia gathered impetus with the involvement of the IMF and the World Bank, alongside local projects conducted by humanitarian organisations.\textsuperscript{472} This renewed effort was formulised through the establishment of the Geneva Process in July 1997 which focused on the settlement, refugee and IDP returns, and socio-economic reconstruction. Moscow relied on international assistance in terms of expertise and funding to facilitate these processes. Russia also contributed to these efforts through bilateral economic agreements and specific forms of aid.\textsuperscript{473} Moscow also had to tread a fine line between support for the existing sanctions regime on Abkhazia and for the provision of aid. Understanding that it needed to keep pressure on Sukhumi to facilitate the settlement process, it was aware of the humanitarian consequences of these sanctions. The CIS-PKF engaged in reconstruction projects such as the restoration of roads and bridges which helped


\textsuperscript{470} Secretary General Report 10 (S/10), 6 January 1995, paragraph 8 and 9, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{471} Secretary General Report 181 (S/181), 6 March 1995, paragraph 3, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{472} For instance, UNHCR initiated programmes of emergency repairs to some 30 schools, expanded its agricultural programme by distributing seeds and fertiliser to vulnerable families throughout the region, provided shelter materials for civilians in need at Gali, and provided specialised equipment for the hospital and other health structures in southern Abkhazia. See S/1997/558 18 July, para 13, p. 4; S/1995/937 8 November, para 35, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{473} For example, in mid-March 1996 Russia signed a trade agreement with Georgia, which was formally known as the Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Caucasus Region.
humanitarian agencies and NGOs deliver aid.\textsuperscript{474} Russia also allowed the delivery of aid to Abkhazia across its territory and maintained transparency by notifying Georgian authorities in advance of deliveries.\textsuperscript{475}

This continued in the early 2000s under Putin. On 23 December 2000 Moscow signed an intergovernmental agreement with Tbilisi regarding cooperation on issues of economic rehabilitation and refugee return in South Ossetia. Although sporadic, this was accompanied by the involvement of the CIS-PKF in local assistance projects in Abkhazia.\textsuperscript{476} Despite these efforts, Abkhazia remained unstable which prohibited UNHCR’s work in the returns process. Nevertheless, in late 2001 after a three-year hiatus the Geneva Process’s Working Group on social and economic reconstruction recommenced. The Working Group was convened throughout 2002 and 2003 where several humanitarian issues were discussed.\textsuperscript{477}

Moscow’s policy during 2003 via meetings with Georgia demonstrated an interest in mitigating the insecurity in the conflict zones through economic agreements and local projects.\textsuperscript{478} This also aimed to secure a favourable relationship with Tbilisi in the context of its anxieties over the stationing of US troops in Georgia. After a presidential meeting in Sochi in early March 2003, working groups were created to act alongside the existing format in Abkhazia.\textsuperscript{479} They aimed to address issues on the humanitarian and return processes.\textsuperscript{480} For instance, Putin was successful in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{474} Krasnaya Zvezda” 05-14-97 Events and comments. Peacekeepers fulfilled their task. It is up to politicians http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3333506
\item \textsuperscript{475} While this should have been discussed via the formats of the Geneva process, Russia attempted to alleviate the economic plight of Abkhazia by providing an export permit for a number of agricultural products across the Russian-Abkhaz border. See "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" 09-30-97 SUKHUMI CELEBRATES DAY OF LIBERATION http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/303893
\item \textsuperscript{476} S/2000/39 19 January para 25, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{477} Secretary General Report 742 (S/742), 10 July 2002 paragraph 7, p. 1; Secretary General Report 39 (S/39), 13 January 2003, paragraph 6, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{478} In late January Russia’s Secretary of the Security Council, Vladimir Rushailo, met with the Head of the Georgian Parliament, Nino Burdshanadze, in Moscow. Rushailo expressed a keen interest in the ‘re-establishment of a common economic space’ and in the implementation of projects to ease tension between Tbilisi and Sukhumi. See Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Russian Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushailo Meets with Head of the Georgian Parliament Nino Burdzhanadze’ 22 January 2001, accessed 12 May 2014, available at http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcb97c9e3c1207845468c3256ec9 001cedbe!OpenDocument. This was followed by bilateral meetings between Putin and Shevardnadze on the issue of re-establishing the railway link between Sochi and Tbilisi at the CIS summit in Kyiv on 28 and 29 January 2003. See Secretary General Report 412 (S/412), 9 April 2003, paragraph 5, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{479} These became known as the Sochi Groups.
\item \textsuperscript{480} Secretary General Report 412, (S/412), 9 April 2003, paragraph 5, p. 2.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
securing a compromise from Tbilisi in that the opening of the railway should proceed in parallel with the returns process to the Gali District.\textsuperscript{481} While these agreements were interrupted by political change in Georgia in late 2003, it demonstrated Moscow’s resolve to move the peacebuilding process forward.

With Russia’s shift in policy in the mid-2000s, there were instances of Russian support for Georgia’s renewed assistance to South Ossetia in mid-2004, and while Moscow continued to endorse the work of the OSCE and discussions on issues in the JCC throughout 2005, the humanitarian efforts of Moscow and Tbilisi became increasingly politicised (International Crisis Group, 2004: 23).\textsuperscript{482} Moscow criticised Tbilisi for acting outside of the JCC but also rendered unilateral humanitarian assistance to the Ossetian authorities.\textsuperscript{483} Russia also commissioned in 2006 the construction of a pipeline from North Ossetia to Tskhinvali, which intended to ensure the independence of South Ossetia’s energy supply. The International Crisis Group (2004: 24) considered this a deliberate action to further alienate the breakaway territory from Georgia. In April 2008 Putin also instructed the Russian Government to ‘provide substantive support to’ and strengthen its relationship with the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the areas of the economy.\textsuperscript{484} This engagement became more deliberate during the aftermath of the conflict in August 2008, with an increase in Russian assistance to the regions under President Medvedev.\textsuperscript{485}

\textsuperscript{481} Secretary General Report 412 (S/412), 9 April 2003, paragraph 5, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{483} At the 2006 donor conference Russia pledged some $3 million for economic rehabilitation. This directly financed several projects in South Ossetia which were not implemented in cooperation with the OSCE and neither Georgia. See International Crisis Group (2004: 23).
\textsuperscript{485} EMERCOM even signed an agreement with South Ossetia in February 2011 in solidifying cooperation ‘in preventing and dealing with emergencies’ and was the first agreement the Ministry had signed with a foreign state. See EMERCOM ‘Russia and South Ossetia have signed an agreement on cooperation in
This aid was increasingly politicised to cement Moscow’s relations with the regions. The launching of the Dzuariakau–Tskhinvali pipeline from North Ossetia to South Ossetia in August 2009 epitomised this instrumentality.486

5.4 Conclusion

The case of Georgia demonstrated that Russia’s approach towards conflict management was complex, both diverging from and converging with the trends of European conflict management as captured by security governance. Russia’s involvement in Georgia has been conditioned by its increasingly acerbic relationship with Tbilisi. As a result of the tension between Russia’s security logics in its regional space, Moscow’s policy and practice has been uneven. Despite Russia’s instrumentality towards the peace effort – particularly from the mid-2000s onwards – Russia’s participation in conflict management in Georgia demonstrated a continuity where it was aware of instability caused by the parties. In Abkhazia, Russian forces demonstrated a consistent commitment to the management of the conflict. They participated alongside UNOMIG and a range of NGOs – although their rules of engagement and resources were limited. In this regard, they were unable to expedite the humanitarian and returns process. Even during the mid-2000s onwards, Russian forces in Abkhazia continued to implement their mandate regardless of the political situation between Moscow and Tbilisi.

South Ossetia on the other hand, proved to be less effective as a case of Russian conflict management. Russia’s establishment of the JCC and JPKF was a genuine means to cultivate a settlement to the conflict. It was largely from the mid-2000s onwards where Russia’s approach became instrumental. While Moscow maintained a status quo in the settlement processes this did, however, provide some form of stability to the region. Moscow’s use of force in August 2008 was a political act, as documented in the literature, to warn Western actors from interference in a region of vital Russian interests. The Georgian case – specifically South Ossetia – became a

---

battleground between Russia and the actors of European security governance. Despite this, while Moscow opposed the widening of European security governance at the system level, this did not mean that Moscow rejected certain features of European conflict management.
Chapter 6
Russia and the management of conflict in Moldova-Transnistria

6.1 Introduction

Besides the conflict in Georgia, Russian troops were also faced with the conflict that erupted in Moldova-Transnistria in late 1991. Moscow’s response was complex and reflected some of the core trends of European conflict management to promote regional stability. However, from the mid-2000s onwards Russia’s approach became increasingly bound up in self-interest which was linked to changes in its wider political and security relationship with the central actors of European security governance. Moscow began to exploit some of the emerging trends of European conflict management for its own ends, demonstrating an ambivalence that would condition its response to the humanitarian, political, and security processes of the peace effort. Crucially, Moscow’s approach towards Moldova-Transnistria showed similarities with its behaviour in the Balkans as Russia sought to balance a declared commitment to the wider systemic norms and processes of European security governance with its own foreign policy priorities.

The case of the conflict in Moldova-Transnistria is therefore an integral part of Russia’s regional experience of conflict management, which also made a significant contribution to its wider post-Soviet experience. This chapter will highlight the ambivalence in Russian behaviour and demonstrate the complexities of its response towards Chisinau and Tiraspol. The chapter is
divided into two principal sections covering Russia’s engagement across the pre- and post-ceasefire phases of the peace effort in Moldova-Transnistria. This analysis is organised through the dimensions of European security governance which have captured and given rise to the evolutionary trends in European conflict management.

6.2 Pre-ceasefire phase

6.2.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity

Figure 6.1 shows the degree of Russia’s engagement in the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity. Russia’s behaviour was incoherent and a consequence of a fragmentary decision and policymaking process between the MFA on the one hand and the military establishment/MoD and conservative political elite in Moscow on the other. As illustrated by the perforated arrow in Figure 6.1, this was exacerbated by the limited ability of the military establishment/MoD to exercise a consistent degree of authority over the independent behaviour of certain elements of the 14 Army (14A) and its high command (see Lynch, 1999; Jackson, 2003). Alongside this, the MFA engaged in an approach which placed itself at the centre of the pre-ceasefire peace effort. However, as shown in Figure 6.1, this did not rule out the promotion of a collective response at the diplomatic level through the Quadrilateral Commission (QC). The MFA was also instrumental in establishing an observer mission at the operational level, which included observers from each of the participating members of the QC. The Foreign Ministry’s aim to maintain a strong foothold in the peace effort was to promote its role as a regional security guarantor and to safeguard national interests. Despite this, the MFA’s relatively consistent engagement in collective action was undermined by the unilateral approach of the 14A and certain groups within the Russian military establishment and the political elite.
Figure 6.1 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the pre-ceasefire phase of the Moldova-Transnistria conflict

Diplomatic Level

The MFA was extensively involved in the peace effort at the diplomatic level and attempted to cultivate a regional collective effort, where Russia retained a central stakeholder position and international actors such as the UN and CSCE were excluded. Crucially, this was not an attempt to suppress a collective response but was aimed at consolidating Russia’s role as regional security guarantor by taking ownership of regional responses, but also assisted in the safeguarding of Russia’s material and strategic interests. With the escalation of the violence into armed conflict in early 1992, the MFA supported in late March the establishment of a ceasefire and the creation of an initial commission including the opposing sides and security guarantors Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.487 Yet, with disagreement between the opposing sides on a final settlement the

fighting continued almost immediately. This was further exacerbated by Moldova’s declaration of a state of emergency, which further heightened tensions with Tiraspol. 488

The Foreign Ministry endeavoured to maintain its stakeholder position in the peace effort with Kozyrev personally leading negotiations in Moldova and Transnistria. In early April 1992, the QC was re-convened in the Moldovan capital of Chisinau where a further ceasefire was declared on 6 April. The MFA actively promoted a negotiated process between the opposing sides and made efforts to include interested parties such as Ukraine and Romania. 489 At the same time, this approach was undermined by hard-line political forces in Moscow, with Vice-President Rutskoi’s unauthorised visit to Tiraspol who advocated a unilateral and forceful approach to solve the conflict. 490 While the MFA was not promoting a collective process based on the inclusion of international actors such as the UN and CSCE, the Ministry was attempting to facilitated its own regional collective response. These efforts were disrupted by the 14A’s gradual involvement in the conflict on the side of Tiraspol, which culminated in the deployment of 14A units near the town of Dubasarii along the Dniestr River dividing Moldova from Transnistria. 491

Following this incident, the violence escalated as Moldovan forces conducted a major offensive against the town of Bendery in June 1992. With the 14A providing considerable support to the separatist troops, Russia’s engagement via the Foreign Ministry ceased. The principles of collective action underpinning the QC format were brushed aside as Yeltsin and Rutskoi assumed responsibility for the negotiation process (Jackson, 2003: 102). Throughout June and July 1992 there were a series of bilateral meetings between Yeltsin and Snegur in Moscow, concluded by the signing of a final ceasefire agreement on 21 July 1992. 492 In the face of what Yeltsin considered as the MFA’s indecisiveness, the disruption of the existing format of the QC was an

attempt by the Kremlin to regain control of the situation and further consolidate Moscow’s foothold in the settlement process. By cutting out other parties, Yeltsin demonstrated a preference for direct bilateral diplomacy. Therefore, the extent of Moscow’s engagement in collective action became increasingly messy as the violence continued. Nevertheless, although the Russian leadership, under mounting domestic pressure to act, finally resorted to traditional bilateral negotiation, this did not rule out Yeltsin’s support for the approach favoured by the MFA which had steered Russia’s diplomatic involvement for several months previously.

**Operational Level**

The operational response towards the violence in Moldova was virtually non-existent and mirrored the approach exercised during the initial conflict in South Ossetia. Moscow’s lack of engagement in collective action was because its troops stationed in the region lacked experience in confronting intra-state violence, which was exacerbated by considerable political turmoil and uncertainty during the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse. This was accompanied by a poor decision and policymaking process in the military establishment/MoD and MFA, which meant that because of intermittent direction from Moscow the 14A began to act autonomously. This uneven response was intensified by the conspicuous lack of international involvement to help steer a response. Consequently, there was no coordination on the ground between the 14A and the observer mission illustrated in Figure 6.1.

The 14A remained the central actor in the region other than the opposing parties to the conflict. Initially, the 14A refrained from getting involved in the conflict and, besides isolated incidents of units providing military supplies to the separatist forces, remained confined to barracks. This was the official position of the 14A’s high command which was largely obeyed throughout the Army during the initial months of 1992. The 14A was not experienced in confronting this intra-state violence and gradually became involved as the conflict evolved. As mentioned above, the push for the 14A to further its involvement in the conflict increased considerably in the spring of 1992. Political forces, backed by certain groups from within the military establishment/MOD, supported a unilateral approach based on the power of the 14A rather than cultivating a collective response.
in accordance with the MFA. Yet, despite this, there were voices from within the military which advocated for the internationalisation of the peace effort. The Deputy Commander of CIS forces, General Boris P’yankov, proposed that the 14A with the participation of CSCE observers should perform the ‘functions for the separation of the warring parties in Transnistria’. Although this raised significant questions about the neutrality and expertise of the 14A, it nevertheless demonstrated that there was no consensus about how to approach the conflict in the military establishment/MoD. While this understanding was present, it was overshadowed by ad hoc developments on the ground and by thinking that favoured unilateralism.

Running parallel with discussions on the purpose of the 14A was the establishment by the QC in April 1992 of the Observer Mission. The Observer Mission was directed by the QC and would operate ‘on an ongoing basis as a working body within the mechanism of political consultations among the four ministers of foreign affairs [QC]’. The Observer Mission was an attempt to emulate diplomatic cooperation between the members of the QC, and was tasked with the responsibility of overseeing ceasefires between the two opposing sides along the Dniestr River. However, this Mission became largely ineffective as the violence gained ferocity and the 14A increased its involvement during summer 1992. Yeltsin and Rutskoi’s interjection in the peace process undercut the MFA’s ability to support the work of the Observer Mission (although the Mission’s capacity was limited in the first place).

6.2.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation

Coercive Measures

In comparison to Russia’s behaviour in the pre-Dayton phase of the peace effort in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moscow’s approach towards the use of force was extremely chaotic in Moldova-Transnistria during the early 1990s. Many views emerged from the Soviet and later Russian military establishment/MoD on how to utilise force in conflict management operations

as discussed in chapter 2. Crucially, while the arrangement of these views was largely based on the institutional divide between the military and the MFA, discrepancies occurred within and across the boundaries of the central power ministries. This hindered the extent in which thinking at the institutional level informed practice on the ground in the zones of conflict, where circumstances dictated largely pragmatic and ad hoc approaches adopted by existing Soviet/Russian forces stationed in the region. Moreover, the wider context of Russia’s foreign and security policy aims further complicated its response.

The conflict escalated in 1992 with fighting across the Dniestr River between government and separatist forces. Elements of the 14A stationed in the conflict zone provided military supplies to Tiraspol and Russian Cossacks participated in the fighting. However, this was not attributed to decisions made either by the 14A’s high command or in Moscow. The Russian leadership remained silent and troops of the 14A were under strict orders from their command not to interfere – even with increasing attacks from military groups in Moldova. This was followed by the MFA’s cautious approach towards the violence through the cultivation of diplomatic efforts to halt the fighting with the establishment of a ceasefire in late March. The 14A still refrained from officially participating in the conflict, with the ceasefire’s immediate failure and continuance of the fighting. While it was now reaffirmed by the high command of the 14A that units should actively oppose any attacks on military installations and civilians, this was not an order of intervention but one of self-defence. Indeed, the following warning from the 14A’s high command that its forces may breach neutrality should not be understood as a veiled threat directed at Chisinau for putting Moldova on a state of emergency in late March 1992. Instead, it was a realistic assessment of the situation where rogue elements of the 14A were increasingly becoming prepared to act.

During the following months throughout April and May 1992, Russia’s role became considerably complex. Existing analysis contends that political forces, together with the military establishment and the MoD’s first draft military doctrine in May 1992, began to dominate decisions on the use of force to protect the Russian diaspora and other civilian populations (Lynch, 1999: 115). While these views were promoted by certain actors involved, this analysis overlooks the extent of the divergence of understanding on the use of force within and between the power ministries. In accordance with the MFA and the command of the 14A, the high command of the CIS promoted the peacekeeping role of the 14A, which did not include the offensive use of force, and supported the involvement of the CSCE. The CIS command also understood that a political resolution of the conflict was required.

Existing analysis also fails to place enough emphasis on the significance of the 14A’s autonomy and its constitutive units during this period. The level of force utilised was not specified by those in Moscow – in particular, certain groups within the military establishment/MoD – which was largely left to troops on the ground to decide which methods were appropriate. The 14A’s behaviour was further complicated by the ethnic ties that existed between units of the 14A and the local population, which triggered an emotional response towards the mounting violence between Chisinau and Tiraspol. It is therefore debatable whether these units would have employed comparable levels of force to protect civilians outside of this scenario in other instances of regional intra-state violence. Emblematic of this was the deployment of tank and infantry units of the 14A to positions around the town of Dubosary in late May 1992. Commenting on these provocative actions, the 14A’s commander acknowledged that individual units were involved in operations, but asserted that in doing so they had ‘gone out of control’ and were disobeying his explicit orders. The Commander in Chief of CIS forces, Marshall Shaposhnikov, was also clear

---

500 Despite this, there were credible arguments from Kiev that such a force would not be able to maintain impartiality due to its ties with the Transnistrian people and that Chisinau would consider such a force an illegal action of intervention. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlv, no. 14, 1992, Izvestiya, 7 April 1992.


when he stated during an interview in late May 1992 that ‘It’s very easy to make judgements about responsibility when you’re sitting in this hall. But when a crowd of 15,000 infuriated people, many of whom buried friends and relatives yesterday, comes to the unit, I can’t rule out the possibility that some of the officers and generals might take the side of those wronged and humiliated people’. \(^{503}\) It is, therefore, crucial to acknowledge that this behaviour was primarily attributed to the complex circumstances the 14A faced rather than via a coherent doctrinal understanding and policy from Moscow.

This, however, did not rule out a degree of calculated behaviour from Moscow, which remained silent and ignored Moldova’s protest regarding 14A behaviour.\(^{504}\) While the maintenance of stability was at the forefront of Yeltsin’s mind, so too was the promotion of Russia’s national interests, such as the securing of a long term forward military presence in Moldova. At the same time, Yeltsin’s impulsive orders to withdraw the 14A demonstrated a cautiousness from the leadership in becoming further embroiled in the conflict. This was followed by an ease in the fighting and the signing of a ceasefire agreement between Chisinau and Tiraspol in early June 1992, reinforcing Yeltsin’s attempts to halt the violence via diplomatic means. Yet, with the escalation of the fighting, Yeltsin made a pragmatic decision to support the 14A’s resistance against Chisinau’s offensive against separatist forces in Bendery in mid- to late June 1992. As noted by one commentator: ‘This was the first case of clear Russian military intervention in a new state formed from the former Soviet Union’ (Jackson, 2003: 97).

It is acknowledged that at this point in the conflict a shift occurred in Russia’s approach towards a wider acceptance on the use of force (Lynch, 1999: 116; Jackson, 2003: 97). There was a turn towards the use of more forceful methods steered in large part by certain groups from the MoD who appointed Alexander Lebed, a Soviet-Afghan War veteran, to the command of the 14A in late June 1992. A hard-liner, Lebed labelled the Moldovan government a ‘fascist regime’

because of the destruction of Bendery, and promoted the use of force to solve the conflict. On reflection Lebed stated that ‘Surprise, precise, powerful preemptive strikes, as well as the availability of backup mobile armoured groups, forced the initiators of the military conflict to come to the negotiation table’ (see Lynch, 1999: 118). Yeltsin also declared that ‘We cannot remain indifferent. In the final analysis, we simply must react to protect people and stop bloodshed. We have the force to do so and let Snegur know it’. The MFA also started to take a tougher line against Moldova, agreeing to the framing of the violence in Bendery as a genocide against the Transnistrian people. Kozyrev even remarked that ‘forcible methods’ are useful ‘in order to convince an enemy or more precisely a conflicting side to embark on a path of negotiations and to seek peace’.

On closer inspection, however, evidence suggests that despite the above this was not a definitive demonstration of a shift in doctrine and practice. In the case of the MoD, there were still those who advocated a more cautious approach and ruled out military intervention. As shown in the previous chapter, if such a decisive shift had occurred then Moscow’s approach towards the conflict in Abkhazia would have also demonstrated a more permissive and coherent application of force from the opening of the conflict or at least from the beginning of its escalation. Instead, the factors influencing the uneven practice of force present in Russia’s involvement in Moldova-Transnistria continued to condition Moscow’s response in Georgia. Moreover, while this use of force was adopted to tackle instability during the Moldovan-Transnistria conflict, it was also used to secure Russian national interests. This demonstrates that the decision to employ force was not exclusively conditioned by a doctrinal change from certain quarters of the MoD, but instead was increasingly shaped by political expediency.

507 A diplomatic team comprising of the Deputy Foreign Minister, Churkin, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Anatoly Kleymenova, and a member of the Supreme Council of Russia, Vladimir Podoprigora visited Bendery and claimed that it was the site of a ‘real genocide against the civilian population’ by Moldovan MiG-29s. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 24 June 1992, accessed 10 December 2013, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3360253.
This was also the case concerning the impulsive behaviour of the MFA. Running parallel with his rhetoric on the use of force, Kozyrev continued to exercise a cautious approach and emphasised the role of sanctions. He exclaimed that ‘if systematic murders are committed and the diplomatic breaks do not work, Russia has the right – pending intervention by an international court of arbitration – to apply unilateral sanctions’. Similar to the MoD, the Foreign Ministry’s behaviour in South Ossetia, and in particular Abkhazia, remained opposed to the use of force and wedded to softer methods of diplomacy, support for the humanitarian process, and sanctions. Indeed, the offensive use of force to combat violence and to protect civilians was not officially adopted by the MFA. Finally, the fact that the 14A did not again substantially and directly participate in the fighting in the weeks following the Battle of Bendery and the signing of a final ceasefire in late July 1992 provides further weight to this analysis.

**The Settlement Process**

Moscow’s approach to the question of Chisinau’s territorial integrity was also complex. In the case of Tiraspol, Moscow maintained a consistent argument advocating for its wider autonomy within the framework of Moldova. At the same time, this was closely intertwined with the idea of Moldova’s *qualified* sovereignty, demonstrated by Moscow’s actions as the conflict unfolded. This, however, manifested itself in different ways due to the incoherent decision-making and policy implementation between the conservative political elite, military establishment/the MoD, and the MFA. This was an expression of Russia’s divergent and competing regional security logics. The conservative political elite in Moscow initially supported Transnistria’s forceful separation from Moldova but took a more moderate line by mid-1992. The military establishment/MoD was against Transnistria’s separation from Moldova, but at the same time conditioned Chisinau’s territorial integrity through humanitarian arguments which masked Russian political and strategic aims. The MFA was also concerned about Transnistria’s separation from Moldova due to its potential impact on the maintenance of Russia’s territorial integrity.

---

Again, while this approach was closely bound up with the securing of Russia’s regional interests, the cementing of Russia’s role as a regional security guarantor was a paramount concern for the Foreign Ministry. Based on the MFA’s thinking, Russia reserved the right to intervene in the debates over Moldova’s future territorial integrity. This was not necessarily linked to imperial intent as the MFA was consistent in supporting arrangements that advocated a compromise between Chisinau and Tiraspol.

With the escalation of the conflict in 1992, the Moldovan leadership attempted to appease Tiraspol in mid-March by offering a settlement package based on the creation of an independent county with a free economic zone within Moldova.\textsuperscript{510} President Mircea Snegur’s opposition to the federalisation of Moldova based on the elevation of Transnistria’s status to an autonomous region within Moldova became a regular point of contention.\textsuperscript{511} This was exacerbated by Tiraspol’s intransigence, which was buoyed by hard line political forces in Moscow. Nevertheless, during these initial stages of the political debate, the MFA made a considerable effort to instigate a compromise between the two sides. In late March 1992, the MFA organised a meeting between Chisinau and Tiraspol, alongside the establishment of the QC, to facilitate a diplomatic compromise.\textsuperscript{512} Yet, this constructive engagement in the settlement process was undermined considerably by the interventionist policies of Moscow’s conservative political elite.\textsuperscript{513}

While these political interventions into Moldovan politics undermined Chisinau’s attempt to steer the debate on the issue of its territorial integrity, the MFA continued to cultivate a compromise. The Foreign Ministry demonstrated a balanced approach towards the increasingly pragmatic debate that was emerging in European security governance on the issue of self-

\textsuperscript{513} For instance, Vice-President Rutskoi asserted during an un-authorised visit to Tiraspol in 1992 that ‘the Dnestr Republic did, does and will exist, that its coming into being expresses the will of the people living there, and that no one has a right to kill them for this’. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlv, no. 14, 1992, Izvestiya, 6 April 1992.
determination and territorial integrity. Kozyrev visited the region in early April 1992 with the intention of cultivating a settlement. During a rally in Tiraspol Kozyrev was firm when stating that if Russian policy was to act on the assertions of certain conservative politicians that would see Transnistria as an independent entity, Moscow would be violating international law. Yet, Kozyrev conceded that if there was a Moldovan unification with Romania this would trigger a legitimate reconsideration of Transnistria’s political relationship with Chisinau in the form of independence. This approach was linked to the MFA’s problematic thinking that Russia possessed the automatic right to arbitrate Moldova’s internal political process as regional security guarantor. While Chisinau considered this a gross interference, it was reported that in private Moldovan diplomats had recognised that a compromise could be reached. The leadership in Tiraspol continued to insist on the status of a republic within Moldova, while Chisinau remained resolute in its proposals of a Dnestr District with cultural autonomy. Despite these earlier statements, Kozyrev was desperately attempting to reach a compromise commenting that ‘Probably the truth lies somewhere in between. The Moldovans are frightened by the word ‘republic’. It probably isn’t necessary to insist on it. An American state or a federal land [state] in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] have very broad rights but are not called republic’. This balanced response gave way to greater interference in June and July 1992, with Russia’s coordinated military engagement in support of the separatists in Moldova. As noted above, Yeltsin became more involved in negotiations and sought a peace which safeguarded Russian interests. However, while Yeltsin’s approach supported the idea of Moldova’s qualified sovereignty and while the 14A supported by the military leadership attempted to force a peace, this did not rule out the possibility of a compromise which was still present in the Russian leadership’s thinking. Yeltsin sent Rutskoi to Moldova to negotiate a ceasefire and a final settlement to the conflict, which included the cessation of violence, the disbandment of armed formations, the stationing of a peacekeeping force to separate the two sides, and, the return of deputies from the eastern districts.
to the Moldovan parliament. Although this was not a comprehensive political settlement, it offered a point of departure from which a more concrete arrangement could be established. Chisinau looked favourably on Rutskoi’s last proposal and offered several ministerial positions for Tiraspol. The Moldovan leadership was firm, however, that a fulfilment of the minimum programme was a precondition to a discussion on Transnistria’s political future. The Transnisterian leadership opposed this prerequisite, commenting that ‘the question of our status must be considered first, especially since it jibes with resolutions of the Supreme Soviets of Russia and the Dnestr region’.

A ceasefire was signed on 21 July 1992 and in a joint Moldovan-Russian communique a set of principles for a peaceful solution of the conflict were announced, including respect for Moldova’s sovereignty, the need for a special status of Transnistria, and the right of the population of Transnistria to decide its own future if Moldova reunited with Romania. This last potential condition demonstrated the degree in which the Russian leadership was willing to dictate the terms of Moldova’s internal political process as regional security guarantor.

6.3 Post-Ceasefire phase

6.3.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity

As illustrated below in Figure 6.2, Moscow understood the utility in cultivating collective efforts at both the diplomatic and operational levels primarily through the JCC and with the OSCE. This also included a degree of interaction between the 14A/Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) and the OSCE Voluntary Fund for Ammunition Withdrawal and Disposal (VFAWD) concerning the issue of arms withdrawal and reduction. However, the JPKF’s cooperation with local and international NGOs was relatively limited and ad hoc. This degree of interaction

stemmed from its doctrinal understanding which was attributed to its wider normative outlook intrinsic to its foreign policy as discussed in chapter’s 1 and 2.

Moscow pressed for a central role in this collective response to fulfil its self-appointed role as regional security guarantor. This was also a means to ensure Russia could steer the peace effort in directions conducive to its national interests in Moldova and Transnistria. As shown by Russia’s experiences in Georgia, these interests had a profound impact upon the extent of Russia’s engagement in the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity. It is crucial to acknowledge far from exercising a calibrated policy based on the ‘de facto torpedoing [of] multilateral efforts’ (Flikke and Godzimirski, 2006: 12), Moscow’s behaviour fluctuated – particularly from the mid-2000s onwards – between periods of engagement and dis-engagement vis-a-vis collective action. The ambiguity in Russian behaviour was a result of the competing security logics shaped by developments in Moscow’s relationship with Chisinau and its wider relationship with the central actors and institutions of European security governance.
Figure 6.2 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the post-ceasefire phase of the Moldova-Transnistria conflict

Diplomatic Level

The development of mechanisms of collective action during this phase were relatively sophisticated. At the centre was the JCC which modelled itself on the format in South Ossetia and aimed to facilitate a consensus-based process between the parties to the conflict. It also included Russia as security guarantor and the CSCE/OSCE and Ukraine as observers. From the 2000s onwards, the OSCE increased its engagement through the JCC, Parliamentary Missions, and official OSCE chairperson visits. In 2005, the JCC was expanded to include the EU and the US as observers in a 5+2 format, which also convened several working groups on governance, humanitarian, and security issues. The short-lived Primakov Commission of the early 2000s also played a role in the settlement process and interacted with the JCC through informal and ad hoc channels.
Throughout the 1990s Russia demonstrated a sustained level of engagement in the pooling of sovereignty through stakeholder interaction complexity. While the arrangement of the JCC reinforced Russia’s central foothold in the peace effort and while this assisted Russian aims to secure national interests, Moscow demonstrated a commitment to expedite the diplomatic process through bilateral channels and in coordination with the offices of the CSCE/OSCE. Indeed, as will be discussed below, this was complicated by the issue of the 14A’s withdrawal and the removal of stockpiles of weapons from Moldova and Transnistria. The immediate years following the Russian brokered ceasefire in July 1992, Moscow held bilateral consultations in early 1993 with the Moldovan leadership and participated in the JCC to facilitate a final resolution. With the appointment of Primakov to the Foreign Ministry in 1996, Russia’s engagement in the settlement process in coordination with the JCC increased. Throughout 1996 and 1997 Primakov exercised a pro-active policy through the auspices of the JCC where intense diplomatic work towards a final resolution took place.

Although this format became politically-charged from the mid-2000s onwards, at this stage Russia’s constructive engagement was based on attempts to cultivate collective responses. Even with the straining of relations between Moscow and the OSCE over aspects of the CFE Treaty during the late 1990s, Russia maintained its cooperation with Vienna in the settlement process. Several informal meetings outside of the JCC took place between Russia, the OSCE, and the parties in mid-1999, where it was the OSCE’s intention to further internationalise the settlement process based on a ‘mini Rambouillet’. This was followed by an international conference in Tiraspol in late-1999 which aimed to facilitate conditions for settlement and included representatives from the JCC and experts from several European countries. The OSCE was unable to influence an expansion of the JCC format due to Transnistrian intransigence and a lack

of political will from the Russian leadership which was suspicious of formal external actor involvement.

During the Yeltsin presidency, Russia’s approach towards the cultivation of collective action demonstrated a balancing act which mirrored its response to the ongoing settlement processes in Georgia. Moscow traversed a fine line purposefully committing to the collective effort but remaining alert to the protection of its regional interests. At this stage of the conflict, Russia managed to largely navigate this balancing act as the pursuit of national interest did not necessarily conflict with its commitment to collective action. However, the continuity of this balancing act became increasingly ambiguous during the Putin and Medvedev presidencies, making Russia’s approach towards the pooling of sovereignty into formats of collective action increasing complex. Therefore, Moscow’s engagement in collective policies fluctuated considerably, demonstrating commitment, indifference, and instrumentality. Russia’s behaviour became increasingly conditioned by the contours of its wider political and security relationship with the central actors of system of European security governance.

The immediate years of Putin’s first presidential term witnessed the establishment of the Primakov Commission which aimed to expedite the settlement process. Expert commentary considered this an instrumental initiative based on a trade-off between Chisinau and Moscow, where the latter would follow Russia’s international political line and give preferential treatment to Russian businesses in the country, whilst Moscow would support conflict resolution (Popescu, 2006: 2). Although national interests featured as drivers underpinning Russian behaviour, this was also informed by an engagement to facilitate a resolution. The Primakov Commission ‘assisted in developing a unified approach for mediators of the Transnistrian settlement’ including the participation of experts from Washington and European capitals (Devyatkov, 2012: 54). The then OSCE Chairperson even considered the Commission a positive step in the resolution process and an informal meeting took place on the 26 July 2000 to discuss the settlement.524 This was

---

followed by a meeting between Primakov and his Ukrainian counterpart on 23 August 2000.\textsuperscript{525} The fact that the Commission engaged in dialogue with the members of the JCC was evidence that it was not a means to circumvent but to complement existing diplomatic machinery.

From late 2000, the OSCE stepped up its involvement in the settlement which was supported by Moscow. An OSCE Parliamentary Mission was sent to Moldova and Transnistria in late September and discussed the modalities of the settlement, including visits to ammunition and weapons stores under the control of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova (OGRF).\textsuperscript{526} The Mission reported that while the settlement process was failing, this was not through a lack of Russian diplomatic engagement.\textsuperscript{527} Alongside the members of the JCC and in accordance with experts from the Europe and the US, Moscow continued to contribute towards the facilitation of settlement talks in August 2001.\textsuperscript{528} This was followed by a 10-month hiatus in negotiations because of dilatory Moldovan and Transnistrian tactics. However, in July 2002 there was a meeting of the JCC which was welcomed by Russia, with one MFA spokesperson remarking that the session ‘may become the starting point for a qualitatively new stage of [the] Transnistrian settlement’.\textsuperscript{529} Following this meeting, where a draft paper was signed on the potential federalisation of Moldova, Russia maintained its channels of stakeholder interaction complexity via a series of meetings in the format of the JCC in Chisinau throughout mid- to late 2002.\textsuperscript{530} At the same time, however, Moscow was attempting to cultivate a favourable bilateral

\textsuperscript{525} Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 August 2000, 24 April 2014, available at \url{http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/273568}.
\textsuperscript{526} OSCE, Press Statement, 2 October 2000, 5 May 2014, available at \url{http://www.osce.org/moldova/52936}.
\textsuperscript{527} OSCE, Press Statement, 2 October 2000, 5 May 2014, available at \url{http://www.osce.org/moldova/52936}.
\textsuperscript{528} Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 October 2001, available at \url{http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/283241}.
\textsuperscript{530} OSCE, Press Statement, 23 August 2002, 18 May 2014, accessed Available at: \url{http://www.osce.org/moldova/54579}.
relationship with Moldova and Putin met the Moldovan leadership in February 2003 to discuss a range of issues, including the settlement.531

However, Moscow’s promotion of its national interests in Moldova began to complicate its response towards the settlement. In the context of President Voronin’s settlement proposal during his meeting with Putin, the Joint Constitutional Commission (JcC) was established and steered in large part by the OSCE representative. It included a group of Western experts to help formulate a constitutional arrangement for Moldova and Transnistria. The Commission was transparent and maintained a degree of cooperation and consultation with the members of the JCC, which included the participation of Russian diplomats (Hill, 2012: 84). The JcC was tasked to prepare a draft settlement proposal for six months’ time, initiating a period of intense work by OSCE staff and constitutional external experts via a series of seminars and negotiations throughout 2003. Yet, at the same time Russia was engaging in these broader discussions, it was also secretly developing a settlement proposal of its own. This unilateral approach effectively undermined the efforts of the JcC and was certainly not in the spirit of collective action. The tabling of Russia’s proposal in November 2003 and its last minute rejection by Voronin initiated a period of Russian disengagement from the peace effort. The scaling down of Russian diplomacy coincided with the OSCE’s further engagement in early to mid-2004 as it aimed to promote the plan developed by the JcC.

Nevertheless, some progress was made in September 2005 when the JCC agreed to invite the EU and the US to participate as observers. This followed a period of intense diplomatic activity in the JCC between the mediators and observers. Russia’s involvement was not necessarily a demonstration of solidarity with its counterparts in the JCC on expediting the settlement process. Instead, its engagement was a means to monitor any settlement proposals, such as the Ukraine’s initiative in 2005, that it considered contradictory to its interpretation of a settlement which included the safeguarding of national interests. A considerable degree of inertia began to shape

collective action as the opposing sides ceased participating in the JCC. By the end of Putin’s presidency, this state of affairs had not changed and while there was continuity between the mediators and observers via meetings of the JCC – in addition to the establishment of several working groups in 2007 –, Russia had become comfortable with the status-quo.

With a general warming and ‘reset’ in relations between Moscow and its Western counter partners under Medvedev, this provided a renewed impetus to the settlement process. Russia re-engaged in the JCC alongside the other members – although it was not until November 2011 that the opposing sides re-engaged. Moscow’s participation in diplomatic channels was accompanied by the initiation of the Meseberg process in mid-2010. Led by Berlin, Meseberg was not only about the cultivation of a strategic partnership between Russia and the EU, but also aimed to breathe new life into the Moldovan-Transnistrian settlement process. While Russia continued to participate in the JCC during the latter stages of Medvedev’s presidency, Russian engagement in the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity had essentially resumed its status-quo path.

**Operational Level**

The degree of Russian engagement in collective action via stakeholder interaction complexity during the post-ceasefire peace effort was sporadic compared to its involvement in Georgia and, indeed, the Balkans. Russia’s engagement was shaped by a tension based on the facilitation of regional security/stability, including a viable settlement, and the pursuit of narrow national interests. Alongside the intransigence of the opposing sides (particularly Transnistria), this complex interplay meant that collective action at the operational level was never consistently sustained throughout this period. Yet, unlike the breakdown of multilateral efforts in the security zones in Georgia in 2008, the conflict management formats regulating the areas of responsibility endured – although relations between the participating actors remained strained.

---

The signing of the Russian-brokered ceasefire on 21 July 1992 established a similar operational format to manage the security and humanitarian situation that had been set up in South Ossetia a month previously. A JCC was created that consisted of representatives from the opposing sides, Russia, and CSCE/OSCE observers. The JCC was in overall command of the military contingents operating in the security zone although this was facilitated through the Joint Military Commission (JMC).\(^{533}\) The conflict management operation, or JPKF, consisted of units from both opposing parties and Russia as the central peace broker. As in the case of South Ossetia, the JPKFs trilateral format was a means to promote transparency and consensus between the opposing parties so that both Chisinau and Tiraspol could take ownership of the peace effort. Alongside the structures of the JMC and the JPKF, a small unit of Military Observers (MO) was established reflecting the composition of the JPKF and tasked to monitor the security zone in cooperation with the main force structures and central command in Bendery (Waters, 2003: 148).\(^{534}\) Besides the military dimension, the peace effort also included the CSCE/OSCE Mission to the Republic of Moldova (or observer mission), which was responsible for observing the situation on the ground and for investigating specific incidents.\(^{535}\) The mission would cooperate with the JCC and the JPKF in executing the peace effort. The CSCE/OSCE also cooperated with international organisations and NGOs in their effort to facilitate the regional humanitarian process.\(^{536}\) The level of interaction between the JCC/JPKF and humanitarian actors was less proactive because no formal channel of interaction was developed between these actors.

The period after the signing of the ceasefire witnessed a sustained level of stakeholder interaction complexity within the JPKF as it set about securing the security zone through joint patrols, the confiscation of weapons and armaments, the provision of security to refugees and

---


534 Authorised by the Odessa Agreement on 20 Mach 1998, the contingent of MO was accompanied by a Ukrainian unit which were embedded into the ongoing structures.


IDPs returning home, and joint training exercises.\(^{537}\) As noted above, Russia’s contribution to the peace effort also included its engagement in the withdrawal of forces and weapons stockpiles from Transnistria, which although a controversial issue gained momentum during the early to mid-2000s after agreements made in the OSCE’s Istanbul Summit in 1999. Although experiencing sustained resistance from Tiraspol, Moscow cooperated with the OSCE’s VFAWD to remove large quantities of Soviet era equipment and military hardware. However, despite this cooperation, throughout the 2000s the JPKF failed to function as a collective mechanism to mitigate periods of tension between the opposing parties as noted above. While this may have been a result of Russian inertia, other plausible explanations relate to the consensual nature of the JPKF which constrained action, a lack of resources, and a preference to solve disputes diplomatically via the JCC. The deterioration in relations between Moscow and Chisinau in the mid-2000s and the stasis in the peace process led to Moldova’s temporary withdrawal from the structures of the JCC. This impacted the degree of cooperation between the members of the JPKF to execute their mandate. The breakdown of the collective effort on the ground was exacerbated further by the initiation of EUBAM in 2005 which was greeted with disdain by Tiraspol and Moscow. The Russian leadership considered it a unilateral effort outside of existing multilateral mechanisms to change the facts on the ground in favour of Moldova.

Russia continued to support the JCC and the format of the JPKF, pointing out their effectiveness in maintaining regional security. These protestations increased during the aftermath of the failed Kozak Memorandum in November 2003, where Chisinau and members of the OSCE increased their calls for a revision of existing formats.\(^{538}\) Moscow’s resistance towards the alteration of the JCC and the JPKF was largely driven by an anxiety about the potential erosion


of its ability to shape the peace effort on the ground. While political expediency began to increasingly shape Russian behaviour, calls for the revision of these formats would not necessarily have produced substantive results. Indeed, the injection of further impetus into the peace effort via the Meseberg Process in 2010 resulted in a period of enhanced diplomatic activity based on existing formats, but did not alter the status-quo of the JPKF’s behaviour on the ground which continued to function and cooperate with the OSCE observer mission. This raises a crucial point about Russia’s relationship with the OSCE, which became increasingly pragmatic from 2008 onwards. Russia continued its cooperation with the OSCE in Moldova as it was a useful actor in the peace effort and helped to legitimise the JPKF. At the same, Moscow demanded the OSCE’s withdrawal from South Ossetia following the August war. In this sense, while Russian engagement in collective action in Moldova became increasingly instrumental throughout the 2000s to legitimise its continued de facto leadership of the JCC and the JPKF, this did not rule out Moscow’s recognition of the utility of cooperation to facilitate a stable status-quo on the ground until a compromised-based settlement could be negotiated.

6.3.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation

Coercive Measures

The ceasefire agreement signed on 21 July 1992 provided an extremely vague mandate regarding the use of coercive measures. It was stipulated that on the authority of the JCC, the JPKF could take ‘necessary steps for the restoration of peace and order’. In comparison to the detailed rules of engagement of the peace efforts in the Balkans, this agreement could not provide an informative guidebook for the participating contingents in the JPKF and to the diplomats in the JCC. As reflected in the JPKF in South Ossetia, the format was intentionally designed for peacekeeping based on the notions of impartiality, consent, and transparency. By their very nature the parties to the conflict were included in the JPKF which placed them in a difficult position if military contingents and/or paramilitary groups from their side breached the mandate. In this

sense, the JPKF ruled out the use of force beyond a defensive and limited manner. This change was facilitated by the prevalence of softer views on conflict management by the MFA and of certain groups in the MoD – although certain high ranking officers in the military continued to express more favourable views on the use of force.

Moscow’s shift towards the use of softer methods was not simply a calculated decision once national interests had been achieved as suggested by some commentary (Waters, 2003). Instead, the outcome of doctrinal debates within the power ministries and political elite was a crucial factor in determining this change. This thinking came through in the design of the JPKF, where the force was conventionally positioned between the two opposing sides within the designated security zone along the banks of the Nestru River. This provided a static buffer zone between the sides, where the JPKF were tasked to conduct patrols mirroring the behaviour of the missions in Georgia. The JPKF went beyond a traditional interpositionary deployment as many wider-peacekeeping duties were exercised, including patrolling, the confiscation of weapons, and the demolition of mines and explosive devices. This also included the protection of vital economic and industrial facilities situated in the security zone. The mission also recognised that the delivery of aid to the region was a central aspect of the peace effort. As in its other missions, Russia considered the JPKF in Moldova a tool to assist in expediting the wider conflict resolution process.

The security environment the JPKFs had to contend with in Moldova was considerably more peaceful than those of Abkhazia throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and South Ossetia from the mid-2000s onwards. However, the performance of the JPKF was mixed. On occasions the JPKF failed to exercise a pro-active approach for the protection of civilians and the maintenance peace. This was particularly the case during the ‘language’ crisis that erupted in mid-2004 over the closure of several Moldovan schools in Transnistria that continued to teach in the Latin script.

543 Ceasefire Agreement, 1993, Article 5, paragraph 3.
This erupted into a wider crisis as Chisinau attempted to blockade Transnistria which in return cut off electricity to parts of Moldova resulting in power outages. The forced closures of some of the schools by Transnistrian authorities and militia were according to the OSCE mission ‘accompanied by acts of vandalism and the illegitimate use or threat of use of force by law enforcement personnel against children, including orphans, parents and school personnel’. With the deepening of the crisis throughout the summer months of 2004, the then OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities described Tiraspol’s policy as ‘linguistic cleansing’. Amidst this mounting tension, the JPKF remained passive and only took limited steps through the use of patrolling to deter local militia from attempting to forcible enter the schools. This was accompanied by the promotion of negotiations between the parties by the mediators and observers of the JCC. Moscow finally managed to broker an end to the crisis in late August, considering the use of coercive methods to be counterproductive. While there was a degree of credibility in this thinking, this was largely political and aimed at discrediting Chisinau. Russia could have played a more influential role in halting the crisis by instructing its contingent in the JPKF to be more pro-active.

Despite this, the JPKF was required to provide regional security and its stationing in Moldova should not be reduced solely to an extension of Russian political expediency. In many ways, the JPKF had to deal with an increasingly complicated political environment, which was the fallout from other instances of insecurity. For instance, during the ‘rail war’ in mid-2004 which began as Moldovan authorities suspended customs service to Transnistrian businesses that were not registered in Moldova. Moldovan Railways also withdrew the provision of carriages for companies based in Transnistria. In retaliation, Transnistrian militia seized the vital railway station in Bendery. The JPKF did not intercede to halt the mounting provocations from both sides. Nevertheless, at times they broke up clashes between Moldovan and Transnistrian policemen, and gave refuge to Moldovan police fleeing from Transnistrian militia. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. 56, no. 36, 2004, Novyi Izvestiya, 8 September 2004; The JPKF remained passive during other instances of insecurity, such as Tiraspol’s prevention of Moldovan civilians to vote in the 2007 and 2009 parliamentary elections in Corjova. See OSCE, Press Statement, 18 June 2007, accessed 20 May 2014, available at http://www.osce.org/moldova/48677.
of Russian-Moldovan relations. Moscow was persistent in refusing to change the format of the JPKF and argued that it was still a source of stability in the region. An MFA statement was resounding when commenting that the JPKF had provided stability since the signing of the ceasefire in 1992.\textsuperscript{549} There is a degree of credibility in this as the JPKF still operated smoothly with interaction between the various sides and, unlike in South Ossetia, the host country’s contingent did not withdraw. The JPKF also conducted sporadic training exercises between the contingents, which included training in the protection of humanitarian aid, assistance to refugees, patrolling, and the fight against terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{550}

However, the JPKF also served the purpose of retaining a military foothold in Moldova which featured in Russian thinking particularly from the mid-2000s onwards in the context of NATO and EU enlargement (Wolff, 2012: 20). This was confirmed by Putin in an interview with Kommersant in March 2008, where he pointed out that the maintenance of Moldova’s neutrality ruled out ‘the presence of any [foreign] troops on [the] territory’. Putin further explained that ‘We can accept the presence of civilian observers, but not military peacekeepers […] Here’s the situation. If they leave. Everyone leaves. It can’t be that some leave but then others take their place. We do not want to trade the present peacekeepers for any others’.\textsuperscript{551}

\textit{Reconstruction and reconciliation}

Russia’s engagement in policies of peacebuilding was directed through the following channels: (1) humanitarian aid; (2) trade & investment. This has been heavily politicised because of Russia’s attempt to secure economic interests in the region, which was particularly the case during the Putin and Medvedev presidencies (Lynch, 2006; Popescu, 2006;). Moscow made attempts to build relations with the former Soviet Republics in light of the widening and deepening of


European security governance along its borders. Hence, the emphasis of Russia’s aid and trade fluctuated between Moldova and Transnistria. Nevertheless, contrary to mainstream commentary, Russia’s engagement in this area was not solely to expedite political aims as Russia was aware of the spread of instability in its immediate regional space. In this sense, some of these humanitarian and economic initiatives were genuine means to cultivate a stable post-conflict environment. The nature in which Russia would approach this, however, was largely unilateral and sporadic, relying heavily on the OSCE’s and the EU’s development projects.

During the 1990s, Russian policy towards the former Soviet Republics aimed to cultivate a space of integrated relations via the institutional auspices of the CIS. Under Primakov, Russian policy attempted to engage its neighbours on a comprehensive and uniform basis. This included Moldova, where Primakov sought to foster further economic relations with Chisinau.\footnote{Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 April 1997, accessed 30 March 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/299550.} These included the development of several economic projects in Moldova, which were considered a means of assistance and a form of bilateral economic engagement.\footnote{For example, through the channels of the JCC it was agreed in September 1997 to develop a joint stock company based on the Moldovan Power Station, which would meet the electricity needs of Moldova and enable Chisinau to export power to other countries. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 September 1997, accessed 30 March 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/303809.} However, by the end of Yeltsin’s presidency, relations between Russia and Moldova had deteriorated. This was largely due to the ongoing issue surrounding the withdrawal of Russian forces and arms from Moldova.

Russia’s engagement in the provision of assistance and the cultivation of bilateral economic initiatives during Putin’s presidency were driven by an increasingly complex understanding of its immediate regional space. The Russian leadership was alert not only to the safeguarding of its interests but also recognised the need to maintain stability in the former Soviet space. Russia’s behaviour has been far from transparent, with the use of economic levers against Chisinau. During Putin’s initial years, Moscow regularly halted gas deliveries to Moldova claiming that this was a result of out-standing debts. Russia, however, only resumed delivery after new agreements had been signed, which usually involved the increasing of Russia’s shares in the Moldovan gas
distribution network (Nygren, 2008: 8). Russia’s behaviour would become increasingly complex by the mid-2000s during the period of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova (EUBAM). Moscow considered the placing of a stranglehold around the Transnistrian economy as a destabilising move, and this border mission also impacted Russia’s regional economic and financial interests.

In response, Moscow sent a delegation of high ranking Foreign Ministry and economic officials, including representatives from Gazprom, to Moldova and convened an urgent meeting with President Voronin. This also included the signing of an agreement with Tiraspol on the further integration of Russian and Transnistrian businesses, and Moscow contemplated providing Tiraspol with a loan of up to $150 million USD.\(^{554}\) Indeed, one Russian official from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) stated that ‘The era of handouts, talk and cheap kisses, including economic ones, is over’, and further remarked that ‘When our Dnestr region colleagues say that it’s hard to ship goods to Russia and that customs officers are running amok, we intend to address all these problems in earnest’.\(^{555}\) Russia stopped gas deliveries to Moldova in January 2006 and only after painstaking negations over the restructuring of prices did the delivery of gas resume. One scholar pointed out that ‘From a purely economic point of view, this strategy of getting whatever is possible from a poor customer is understandable’, but that the net effect was that ‘Moldova became even more dependent and had less and less ability to pay for gas deliveries’ (Nygren, 2008: 8). Moreover, Russia sent what it framed as humanitarian assistance, including medical supplies and food, to Tiraspol which aimed to alleviate the humanitarian consequences of EUBAM and to discredit Chisinau and the EU.

Moscow’s messy involvement in peacebuilding processes continued under Medvedev and while Moscow’s thinking was still shaped by a degree of instrumentality to stem the institutional tide of NATO and the EU (Wolff, 2012: 20), Moscow’s economic support to Transnistria was not as forthcoming as it had been under Putin. With political re-engagement during the Meseberg

process (see discussion below) and Tiraspol’s increasing gas debt which by 2011 had reached $3 billion USD, Russia became increasingly irritated by the Transnistrian leadership’s sense of entitlement regarding subsidies and aid (Devyatkov, 2012: 58). Russian officials began to participate in the individual working groups of the JCC and delivered genuine aid to Transnistria. Russia also launched a formal investigation against Tiraspol based on accusations of fraud in the redistribution of Russian humanitarian aid throughout 2008 and 2009 (Devyatkov, 2012: 58). Moscow’s delivery of this financial assistance was for the sole purpose of societal rehabilitation in the areas of pensions and social/healthcare. Moscow, therefore, halted its assistance in 2010 only for it to continue in 2011 after Tiraspol had properly allocated the assistance.556 This, however, did not improve the status of the settlement process.

The settlement process

Russia’s engagement in the settlement process in Moldova was arguably more pro-active than in Georgia because the Russian leadership did not have to contend with a determined and ultranationalist Moldovan president. Apart from the period between late-2003 and 2008 (triggered by the rejection of the Kozak Memorandum), Russia has attempted to cultivate a resolution to the conflict. Even though the final understanding of a settlement became more conducive to Russian national interests from 2003 onwards, this did not rule out a recognition of a resolution. In this sense, ‘freezing’ the settlement process has been less of an objective here than it was from the beginning of Putin’s second term in the conflicts in Georgia. Despite this, Russia’s understanding of Moldova’s limited sovereignty continued to condition its response towards the post-ceasefire peace effort. This was related to the maintenance of a military presence in the region and to what Russia considered as its ‘rightful’ responsibility to broker a settlement as self-proclaimed security guarantor. From the mid-2000s, for Russia the settlement process in Moldova largely became ‘a small part of a wider game of seeking to ensure that Russia’s voice [remained] heard across European security matters and especially in the former Soviet Union’ (Lowenhardt, 2003: 108).

Throughout the 1990s Moscow made genuine attempts to solve the conflict in accordance with the other observers of the JCC. While Russia put forward the case of synchronising weapons withdrawal with conflict resolution (which was rejected outright by the OSCE and Chisinau), Moscow did make efforts to facilitate a political settlement. In early 1993 Yeltsin met with the Moldovan leadership and supported Chisinau’s territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{557} This was followed by a meeting organised by Moscow in late February where both parties failed to come to a compromise\textsuperscript{558}. At the same time, the 14A’s withdrawal was still an issue, however, Yeltsin made it clear that Russia could not simply withdraw it because of the logistical and social problems it would create.\textsuperscript{559} To further complicate matters, the commander of the 14A, General Lebed, participated in the Transnistrian general elections violating Moldova’s sovereignty. Crucially, this was not a decision made by Moscow but reflected the autonomy of regional commanders at the time.\textsuperscript{560} Moreover, the Russian leadership continued to engage in negotiations with Chisinau throughout 1994 and 1995 over the withdrawal of the 14A, and while a timetable for the withdrawal of the 14A was agreed, this was not ratified by the Duma.\textsuperscript{561}

Despite this, the Russian leadership remained committed to the facilitation of a settlement through the support of draft memorandums presented at the JCC in mid-1996 and mid-1997. Although the draft supported Transnistria’s autonomy within Moldova, it failed to initiate a positive conversation on a settlement as Chisinau’s leadership refused to take the memorandum further pointing out that the document omitted specific details concerning Transnistria’s political relationship to Moldova.\textsuperscript{562} The OSCE viewed this memorandum negatively and argued that it was a ‘stone in the road’ because it did not provide any concrete proposals. Moscow disagreed,

arguing that it was a stepping stone from which to build a viable settlement based on a compromise between the parties. Russia continued to put diplomatic pressure on the parties, with Yeltsin’s joint presidential statement with the Moldovan leadership declaring the inviolability of Chisinau’s sovereignty. The issue of Russian troop withdrawal remained a problem as Moscow continued to link this with the implementation of the settlement process. During a session of the OSCE’s Permanent Council in Oslo in November 1998 Russia was heavily criticised for dragging its heels. Russian officials argued, however, that stability guaranteed by the OGRF was necessary for the facilitation of a settlement. Although a secure environment was necessary to successfully expedite the peace effort, it was solely the JPKF’s responsibility. Nevertheless, Russia agreed to commit to a withdrawal of its forces under the OSCE’s Istanbul agreement in November 1999 and immediately began to implement the extraction of its forces and arms.

With the beginning of Putin’s first term in office, Russia increased its efforts to expedite a settlement via the Primakov Commission, including cooperation with the OSCE to remove and dispose of weapons stockpiles. The OSCE wasted no time in creating a working commission to prepare a plan for ammunition disposal and established a tripartite commission with Russia and local Transnistrian authorities on the issue of weapons disposal. Throughout 2002 there were several rounds of ammunition and hardware withdrawal from Moldova, although the Transnistrian side continued to delay this process arguing that Moscow should compensate them for the loss of ammunition and weapons. In this context, Russia looked towards their colleagues in the OSCE for understanding regarding the slow rate of arms withdrawal. This relatively

constructive engagement in the settlement process hardened in 2003 with what can only be
described as Moscow’s deceitful promotion of the Kozak Memorandum outside of the diplomatic
channels of the JCC. Putin mislead the OSCE and undermined the painstaking work of the JcC
throughout 2003 via the secret formulation of its own proposal, which met three conditions: (1) a
high level of influence for the secessionist entity to the point of creating a dysfunctional state; (2)
the maintenance of Russia as the central power broker; (3) and a continued Russian military
presence (Popescu, 2006: 5).

Russia was attempting to cultivate a settlement that not only provided a degree of stability but
also favoured its political interests. According to Lynch (2006: 63), while the ‘proposal raised
interesting ideas’ it possessed ‘serious weaknesses’. This was because Tiraspol was
overrepresented in the federal centre ‘to such an extent that Moldova itself would have faced the
danger of becoming transnistrianised’ and, therefore, it would have been in a position to block
the movement of Moldova’s potential EU membership (Lynch, 2006: 63). The failure of the
Kozak Memorandum only strengthened Russia’s growing anxiety about the West’s interference
in the domestic affairs of states along its border. The remaining years of Putin’s presidency
showed a Russia that was largely dis-engaged from the settlement process – even though it
accepted the inclusion of the EU and US as observers in the JCC. Indeed, the Russian leadership
acknowledged but politely declined the plan proposed by Kiev in April 2005 which was
enthusiastically supported by Chisinau. The Plan aimed to federalise Moldova and
internationalise the peace effort.

Moscow’s approach towards the peace effort became more constructive during the Medvedev
presidency. This was largely a result of the reset in relations between Moscow and Washington,
and was further cultivated through the Meseberg process in 2010. However, throughout this
process Russia continued to maintain a line that was agreed during the beginning of Medvedev’s
presidency: a settlement should be based on a mutual compromise of ‘equality’ and that the OGRF
and JPKF would only be withdrawn once a settlement had been finalised. With the resumption of
official talks via the 5+2 format in November 2011 and further meetings in Dublin the following
year there was a degree of positive re-engagement in the diplomatic process. Yet, by the end of
Medvedev’s presidency the status-quo had crept back into the negotiations. Crucially, this was not necessarily a deliberate Russian policy, but rather a reluctant ‘Plan B’ if it could not make headway in pushing its own interpretation of the settlement forwards.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explored Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Moldova-Transnistria. It was argued that Russia’s approach was complex, both diverging from and converging with the norms and processes of European conflict management. Russia demonstrated a degree of constructiveness in expediting the settlement process. Moscow establishment of the JCC and the JPKF were genuine attempts to resolve the conflict – although Russia was alert to the safeguarding of its regional interests. In this sense, for Russia’s regional experience, Transnistria is perhaps the most fluid and complicated of settlements Russia has participated in. Indeed, Moscow was a part of the problem through its support for Tiraspol. This, however, did not demonstrate a sustained level of support for Tiraspol. Rather Russia demonstrated a degree of engagement in the policies of security governance as developed in European conflict management. Nevertheless, Russia’s involvement in the conflict was always going to be ambiguous as a result of its competing security logics which became increasingly problematic as the conflict evolved.
Conclusion

Summary of thesis

Argument

The thesis has explored the extent Russia’s experience of managing intra-state violence has evolved in accordance with norms and processes of security governance as developed in European approaches of conflict management. To reiterate, security governance in Europe has been characterised as ‘the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issues), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes’ (Webber and Croft et al, 2004: 4). The engagement in security governance initiated the development of several trends in European conflict management. First, through various stages of development operations progressively came to possess a humanitarian dimension. The notions of consent and impartiality were relaxed in order to protect the mandate and to facilitate humanitarian aspects of an operation. At its extreme, this shift was closely intertwined with the second trend, whereby the integrity of state sovereignty as a prevalent norm became increasingly contested, particularly if a conflict threatened international peace. Again, this went through a tortuous process where learning and the ‘triumph of the lack of will’ (Gow, 1997) came at the expense of the protection of civilians. Alongside this, the dilemma regarding the balance between territorial integrity and self-determination remained increasingly fraught as a result of this focus on human rights, with decisions implemented on an
increasingly pragmatic basis. The third trend showed the re-calibration of conflict management operations to include a range of methods and operations. At the centre of this expansion of responsibilities, was the development of highly integrated peacebuilding strategies and policies of post-conflict rehabilitation. This developed in accordance with the fourth trend based on the emergence of complex coordination and interaction through the pooling of sovereignty between multiple actors, where a consent-based culture of coordination between civil and military aspects of a mission developed. While there have been problems with this relationship, this has not negated the fact that actors considered such coordination a necessity and continued to engage in policies of civil-military interaction.

This thesis has argued that Russia’s post-Soviet behaviour towards the mitigation of intra-state conflict has shown a selective engagement in the policies of security governance developed in European conflict management. It has demonstrated that Russia’s behaviour has been conditioned by a convergence with and a divergence from these broad evolutionary trends in European conflict management. During the period of study between 1991 and 2012 Russia’s approach was far more expansive and complex than currently recognised by the existing literature. Moscow’s behaviour demonstrated a coherence that reflected some of the core aspects of the policies of security governance which have evolved in European conflict management. Crucially, Russian approaches have shown a tendency to traverse both Westphalian and Post-Westphalian security behaviour, with a selective subscription to the methods and aims across the spectrum of operations developed in the European experience. This has been driven by a policy that combines the staunch defence of its sovereign identity and national interests with a declared commitment to collective European approaches that have attempted to manage the impact of globalisation in the policy area of conflict management. In this regard, the thesis has demonstrated that while Russia’s wider policy agenda may have gravitated towards Westphalian preferences about how to approach the impact of globalisation, its behaviour in the policy area of conflict management has shown a more nuanced picture of its security preferences. This follows that both Westphalian and Post-Westphalian states typically share an interest in effective policies of security governance in the management of conflict.
In terms of Russia’s engagement in the wider European neighbourhood, chapter’s 3 and 4 demonstrated a largely consistent Russian approach that gravitated towards a middle-ground between Westphalian and Post-Westphalian security provision. Russia’s engagement in the peace efforts in the Balkans was crucial for the development of its wider experience in conflict management. In relation to the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity, throughout the missions in the Balkans Moscow participated in the pooling of sovereignty through diverse channels of interaction complexity at both the diplomatic and operational levels. Russia was conscious of steering collective action away from an exclusive reliance on Western institutions – although it had to accept NATO’s increasing leadership as the missions progressed, which was a bitter pill for the Russian leadership to swallow as it remained opposed to a NATO-centred system of European security governance. Russia also contributed to the cultivation of a culture of civilian-military coordination. However, it was more comfortable interacting with agencies affiliated with or in the UN as Russia remained suspicious of the activities of NGOs and considered many of them a hindrance to the credibility of the peace efforts.

In Russia’s regional experience, its behaviour has demonstrated a degree of ambiguity although this has not been a consistent characteristic of its response. Russia’s involvement in regional conflict management has evolved in stages where an adherence to its doctrinal understanding has fluctuated due to its uneven policy towards its immediate regional space. The tension between its contribution towards European security governance and the safeguarding of its national interests became gradually more acute in Russia’s approach towards the former Soviet space. Russia found it increasingly difficult – particularly from the mid-2000s onwards – to accept the widening and deepening of European security governance along its border. As a consequence, its approach has not only revealed a manipulation of methods attributed to both forms of security provision noted above, but also demonstrated a continuity mirroring its behaviour towards conflict in the wider European neighbourhood. This challenges existing scholarship which interprets Russia’s regional experience as a highly calibrated response that only serves Russia’s narrow national interests.
Contributions

Based on this argument, this has made the following contributions. Given that the existing literature on Russian conflict management is predominantly focused on its regional experience between the early to mid-1990s, the thesis has filled a gap in the existing literature by offering an extensive empirical treatment of Russian behaviour. To elucidate continuity and change in its behaviour, this has been based on an interrogation of Moscow’s approach across its immediate regional space and the wider European neighbourhood from the early 1990s to 2012. The research has therefore provided a rounded understanding of Russia’s approach towards conflict management in the European context by exploring how Russia’s approach has evolved in accordance with European policies and practices. This has been ‘operationalised’ through a comparative multi-case study analysis to provide an informative understanding of Russian behaviour in the European context, which the existing literature has thus far failed to provide because of its focus largely on Russia’s regional experience based on a narrow timeframe between the early to mid-1990s. Where attempts have been made to offer an analysis of Russia’s experience in the wider European neighbourhood based on its engagement in the Balkans, these have only offered an insight into Russia’s general Balkan policy rather than a rigorous inspection of Russian conflict management. This research has helped to make further sense of Russia’s post-Soviet foreign and security policy as the issues dealt with in this policy area reflect the wider ongoing debates between Moscow and the central actors of European security governance.

Alongside this empirical contribution, this thesis has also added to the conceptual significance of the growing body of literature on security governance and its relation to the broader discipline of IR and Security Studies. First, the project has complemented existing debates in the security governance literature by assessing Russian foreign and security policy in accordance with the Westphalian/Post-Westphalian tradition in the security governance literature, and through this has examined Russia’s interaction with the evolution of security governance across time and space in the specific policy area of conflict management. Going beyond existing works which only provide general analysis of Russia and European security governance, this thesis has therefore examined
the specifics of an issue area to offer a close conceptual and empirical inspection of Russia’s approach towards security governance. Second, this thesis has contributed towards the wider disciplines of IR and Security Studies based on the application of security governance to frame the research project. While security governance has not enjoyed the same level of acceptance as its established theoretical siblings, such as security communities, institutions and regimes, and global governance, this thesis has complemented a growing literature on security governance which continues to highlight the conceptual and analytical purchase of understanding security decision-making and policy implementation through a governance lens.

**Limitations and avenues for future research**

**Limitations**

Although this project delivered clear results, potential shortcomings in the research design and outcome relating to methods, generalisability, timeframe and focus must be acknowledged. First, access to information proved to be a difficult task via the use of semi-structured interviews. The fieldwork conducted in Moscow (see Appendix A for further detail) failed to produce substantial returns from relevant sources such as the MFA and the MoD, which were responsible for the policy area of conflict management. While this was due to trust issues typical of government institutions and ministries, it was also because government bodies in Russia did not operate in a culture where interviews were offered to external researchers. As such, there was no access to the practitioners and policymakers involved in the case studies used in this project. Nevertheless, although access would have enhanced the quality of the empirical data, a reliance on extensive documentary analysis meant that the research project was still viable.

Second, like most interpretivist research, the project can be accused of lacking generalizable conclusions. It was possible to achieve this when analysing Russian conflict management in the European context because the project employed a rigorous multi-case study analysis. However, this was less so when offering conclusions on Russian foreign and security policy vis-à-vis the system of European security governance. This was because the project only focused on one policy area to elucidate trends in this wider relationship. Nevertheless, while this would have been a
major limitation if the goal had been to provide novel conclusions about Russia’s political and security relationship with European security governance, in the project’s defence its original contribution to knowledge was situated at the policy area level of analysis. Hence, the study made it explicitly clear that its research on the policy area of conflict management would be used to complement an existing view in the academic debate on Russia and European security governance. It is acknowledged, however, that although other issues pertinent to the wider relationship were touched upon in chapter 1, there is certainly room for further possibilities of research into other policy areas to produce more substantive conclusions about Russian foreign and security policy (discussed below). Third, because the project covered the full spectrum of conflict management operations and methods in the Russian experience, the analysis may have lacked detail at times. In the project’s defence, it was necessary to tackle existing conclusions in the literature which were of a general nature. Therefore, a holistic approach was necessary to ensure that existing claims in the literature were rigorously challenged. Crucially, now that this line of research has been undertaken, it has allowed the possibility for further research into one specific method and/or operation of Russian conflict management.

Finally, the project’s timeframe may have restricted the analysis and limited the significance of the thesis’ contributions. The study provided an interrogation of the evolution of Russian conflict management in the broader context of Moscow’s relationship with the system of European security governance; however, this was confined to the period from the early 1990s to the end of Medvedev’s presidency in mid-2012. While this study has gone a long way to provide an ‘up-to-date’ treatment of Russia’s experience of conflict management vis-à-vis the existing body of literature, it can still be considered a ‘snapshot’ in time where any developments beyond 2012 are not considered. This is important since the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine have raised vital questions concerning Russia’s response to intra-state violence and its political and security relationship with the central actors of European security governance (and the West more broadly). Yet, besides the obvious problem of playing catch-up with events if the research had focused on these conflicts, it would be imprudent to ignore the thesis’ conclusions as the experiences Russia gained from its involvement in the conflicts analysed in this study have become deeply ingrained
in its understanding and practice of conflict management. In short, these experiences cannot be erased from the institutional memory of Russia’s power ministries. As will be discussed further below, it is unlikely that Moscow’s response to both emergencies represents a watershed in Russian conflict management. Likewise, while the present period is potentially the lowest point in relations between Russia and its Western counterparts since the height of the Cold War (although not comparable), this has not ruled out a future rapprochement. Indeed, if the first two decades after the end of the East-West confrontation reveals anything, it is that there is evidence of an almost institutionalised cyclical pattern of agreement and disagreement between Russia and the West.

**Possibilities**

Considering the above limitations, there are several possibilities for future avenues of research. The first relates to the issue of generalisability and considers the potential exploration of multiple policy areas as case studies to assess developments in Russia’s post-Soviet relationship with the central actors of European security governance. The framework of security governance would be applied to each policy area to examine Russian behaviour across the dimensions of the framework as outlined in this thesis. Potential policy areas would include conflict management, other non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and trans-national crime, and more conventional issues relating to non-proliferation and arms control. This would be a comprehensive project that would require extensive research and resources. However, its exploration into Russian behaviour across multiple policy areas would provide the necessary methodological rigour required to offer generalizable conclusions about Russia’s relationship with the central actors of European security governance. A further possibility would be to provide a deeper empirical and conceptual investigation into a single method/operation employed by Russia when managing intra-state conflict. As a largely under-developed and neglected topic in existing studies, this research would potentially focus on Moscow’s engagement in peacebuilding as a feature of its approach to conflict management. Again, this project would replicate the research design used in this thesis to assess Russia’s understanding and practice of peacebuilding both as a mechanism to manage
conflict and as a means to fulfil certain foreign policy aims. In this regard, the research would use the same case studies across Russia’s immediate regional space and the wider European neighbourhood as featured in this project.

The final avenue is perhaps the most important line of enquiry and will receive the most attention. This relates to an analysis of Russian conflict management beyond the timeframe of this study to include further intra-state conflicts Russia has responded to. As briefly mentioned above, this study has gone far to provide a rigorous up-to-date assessment of Russian conflict management, but has not taken this beyond 2012 to include an examination of recent events in Syria and Ukraine. Indeed, how Russia has approached the violence in these regions is pertinent to the wider significance of this study in terms of its engagement in conflict management and its wider external policy. First, this relates to whether Russia’s response has signalled a fundamental shift in Moscow’s foreign policy thinking; and, second, whether this shift has been reflected in its understanding and practice of conflict management vis-à-vis European (and wider Western) approaches. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer an extensive reply to these enquiries, some thoughts will be offered on the emerging academic and policy debate.

The extent Russia’s response to the conflicts has signalled a wider shift in its foreign policy thinking is a central question which has steered the emerging academic and policy debate. Russia has been accused by the West of obstructing international action in Syria and for engaging, alongside President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, in a brutal fight against opposition forces; and has been charged with the deliberate destabilisation of Ukraine and the fuelling of the violence in the Donbass region to secure strategic and political interests. It has been argued by Western policymakers that Russian action in Syria and Ukraine demonstrate its wider foreign policy goal of tearing down the existing international order. A comparable evaluation of Russia’s behaviour has also been advocated by certain political commentary, which sum up Moscow’s behaviour as an aggressive power play aiming to re-establish its regional and global role in the face of

---

longstanding rules of international order (Allison, 2014: 1255; Giles, Hanson, and Lyne et al., 2015: vi; Giles, 2016: 2-3; Stent, 2016; Wilson, 2014: 197). There is a decree of credibility in these assessments. First, since the end of the Cold War a realist undertone has featured in Russian foreign policy thinking, becoming more prominent from the mid- to late 2000s, and has continued under the current Putin presidency. Second, Moscow has showed signs of a ‘push-back’ against the largely Western dominated international order, which has become increasingly less palatable for the Russian leadership.

However, these readings continue to overlook the ongoing tension between the logics driving Moscow’s behaviour. As highlighted in this thesis and pointed out by one expert commentator ‘Russian foreign policy is marked by a complex interplay between an attachment to sovereign autonomy on the one hand and interdependent approaches to regional and global security problems on the other’ (Averre, 2016: 718). This has been expressed in Moscow’s existing national security strategy, which affirms its independent sovereign identity but points out its role as a robust international actor in resolving global problems and responsibly upholding international law.569 Lavrov has articulated this position further, where his vision of a ‘post-West world order’ put forwards the idea that each country ‘develops its own sovereignty within the framework of international law and will strive to balance their own national interests with those of their partners’.570 While these aims are not necessarily incompatible, it could be put forward that in Russia’s case a friction has escalated in recent years between these two ingredients at the centre of Russian foreign policy thinking.

Moscow’s involvement in Syria and Ukraine is potentially a product of this increasing friction. In the case of Syria, certain commentators point out Russia’s strategic and economic interests with Damascus alongside its concerns regarding the erosion of its power/influence vis-à-vis the

West (Charap, 2013: 37; Giles, 2016). While these factors feature in Moscow’s decision-making, other scholars offer more thoughtful assessments about Russian views on domestic and international order. In the former, it has been argued that Russia relates regime change in Syria with concerns about the legitimacy of its own domestic order (Allison, 2013; Lukyanov, 2016: 35-36). In the latter, it has been put forward that Russia’s opposition to regime change refers to its support for a negotiated, pluralist global order based on international law as the chief ordering mechanism of stability (Averre and Davies, 2015). These debates have featured in assessments on Russia’s response to the conflict in Ukraine, with policymakers and scholars arguing that Moscow has employed a strategy to challenge the existing regional European order (Allison, 2014; Wilson, 2014) and to pursue hegemony over the post-Soviet space (Giles, Hanson, and Lyne et al., 2015: vi). While acknowledging that Russia has exercised a controversial approach to Ukraine and violated the latter’s sovereignty, other commentary is less inclined to consider this a turning point towards an aggressive revisionism in Russia’s external policy. Scholarship has argued that its overreaction is due to the importance of Ukraine in Russian foreign policy thinking where Kyiv is considered crucial for the development of its ‘great power’ status and enhanced engagement with its immediate external environment (Tsygankov, 2015: 2). Russian protestations about a Western-inspired coup in Kyiv to legitimise its behaviour do not stand up to scrutiny (see Allison 2014), but Russian arguments relate to deeper grievances which cannot be dismissed and concern the ‘profound, systemic problems in the organisation of European security’, highlighting the necessity of a transparent and ‘indivisible’ space of Euro-Atlantic security based on the revisiting, and not the ‘tearing down’, of regional relations via the Helsinki principles.572

---


While Russia’s relationship with its Western counterparts has potentially reached its lowest point since the Cold War, the fundamental logics driving current Russian policy have their roots in the last two and a half decades based on common themes raised by the Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev presidencies as outlined in this thesis. Moscow has laid down a normative marker against certain features of the West’s interpretation of international order, but this is not an outright rejection of the existing status quo. In the European context and in case of Ukraine, Moscow is not calling for the wholesale revision of the norms and rules regulating European security governance. As highlighted by one academic expert, Russia’s ‘desire to avoid isolation and calls for what amounts to co-management of the European security order […] suggests a reluctance to return to a détente-like co-existence of two hostile orders’ (Averre, 2016: 718). Although further research is required, views advocating that Russia foreign policy is experiencing a seismic shift in its foreign policy thinking should be treated with caution. Instead, what we are potentially witnessing is a greater unwillingness in Moscow to accept an increasingly marginalised role in European affairs through its inability to shape regional models of security governance.

This brings us to the next point of enquiry on whether Russia’s response to Syria and Ukraine has also demonstrated a shift in its approach to conflict management. An answer in the affirmative would assume that Moscow’s responses to these conflicts can be considered cases of Russian conflict management rooted in existing experiences explored in this study. This requires further unpacking and while a lengthy analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis a few thoughts will be provided. In the case of Syria, Russia’s response has reflected the complexity of the conflict on the ground based on the following scenarios: (1) a civil war between government and opposition forces; (2) and the fight against regional and international terrorism. Prior to its military intervention in September 2015, Russian behaviour was largely guided by the sovereign consent and territorial integrity of Syria which featured in its legacy of conflict management. Russia demonstrated an agreement with its Western counterparts regarding the principles of sovereign responsibility as enshrined in the R2P, but remained in disagreement over their implementation and thus blocked any forcible international action against the Assad regime (Averre and Davies,
Russia promoted a softer response to deal with atrocities and violence based on diplomacy, fact finding missions, and the facilitation of the humanitarian process. This demonstrated continuities with its response to the Balkan conflicts, and indeed with its regional experiences prior to its politicisation of the settlement processes of these conflicts from the mid-2000s onwards.

Yet, with government setbacks in Syria throughout 2014 and 2015, Russia’s decision to intervene militarily was a determined (although reactionary) move to support the collapsing Assad regime. Russia’s shift away from focusing on softer measures to the use of overwhelming force has been an attempt to ‘change the facts on the ground’, meaning a revision of the balance of power between the opposing parties in favour of government forces. Although the norm of sovereignty has certainly featured as a guiding principle in its experience of conflict management, Moscow’s ongoing response in Syria is qualitatively different where increased instability (through the targeting of population centres and infrastructure) are considered acceptable costs for the long-term goals of preserving regime stability and a functioning Syrian state. This is certainly a departure and an escalation from its legacy of conflict management explored in this study, and there are grounds to suggest that this should be considered a specifically tailored response to a conflict Moscow deems of vital importance to its present and future role in international relations. Throwing further doubt on the assessment that Russian action is demonstrative of a definitive change in its approach to conflict management, is its engagement in the fight against IS which it considers a form of counter-terrorism distinct from policies of conflict management.

Russia’s involvement in Ukraine has also raised pertinent questions regarding its conflict management approach. Demonstrating the continued relevance of the thesis’ analysis and conclusions, Moscow’s response has reflected the logics of its regional experience from the mid-2000s onwards where a degree of ambivalence began to increasingly shaped its behaviour. In Ukraine, this has been driven by the aim of cultivating a degree of stability in the context of securing vital national interests in the region. These have included a humanitarian justification for the protection of Russia’s diaspora and other regional populations, which has been both
promoted for genuine reasons and used instrumentally to secure economic interests and the key political aim of preventing the extension of European security governance to its immediate neighbourhood. However, certain readings of Russia’s behaviour have argued that it has been a highly calibrated response and an escalation of previous tactics to destabilise Ukraine (Freedman, 2014; Giles, 2015; Mankoff, 2014). Besides Russia’s calculated intervention in Crimea (see Allison, 2014), there is some validity in these conclusions as one of Russia’s aims has been to steer Ukraine away from the central institutions of European security governance. Moscow has also exercised a strategy of deniability and has continued to support pro-Russian groups through the sustained use of force against government forces.

However, there are positive trends in its behaviour and while this may seem controversial in light of the above (and largely contested by Western academic opinion), Russia has shown a degree of engagement in the humanitarian and political processes. This has been demonstrated through Russia’s participation in the Normandy Format and the Trilateral Contact Group, where it has sought to facilitate a compromised settlement based on the Geneva document of April 2014. This has, however, provided Russia with the continued leverage over the negotiations and a voice in the future sovereignty of Ukraine and linking this to Russia’s problematic view of the limited sovereignty of its immediate regional neighbours which increasingly gained traction from the mid-2000s onwards (Davies, 2016: 737). Nevertheless, alongside this, Moscow has engaged in the regular delivery of aid to the regions – although this remains a contentious issue as Russia has not always been transparent about its deliveries and cooperation with the ICRC has been sporadic (Davies, 2016: 739-740).

In this regard, further analysis is required to provide a sensible and thorough judgement about whether Russia’s response to this conflict should be considered another case study in its post-Soviet experience of conflict management. This reflects the complexity of Russia’s approach to the conflict, where on the one hand Moscow has considered this an arena of contestation with its European counterparts due to the importance of Ukraine in its foreign policy thinking. Yet, Russia has continued to engage in methods of conflict management which have featured in its responses to the Balkan conflicts and its regional experience. This points to the continued relevance of the
thesis’ conclusions by offering a conceptually and empirically rigorous context from which to explain certain aspects of Russia’s response. As mentioned above, Moscow’s experiences of conflict management in the European context cannot be erased from the institutional memory of Russia’s power ministries, and while its regional behaviour will continue to remain ambivalent and controversial this should not be used to generalise its present and future response to the management of further scenarios of intra-state violence.
Appendix A – Research Methods

Broadly speaking this thesis has employed a qualitative approach to interrogate Russia’s experience of conflict in the wider European context. This thesis has operationalised such an approach to capture the ‘meaning, process, and context’ (Divine, 2002: 197-199) of Russia’s doctrine, policy and practice in the issue area of conflict management. This starting point of the research design explicitly acknowledges that contrary to quantitative-based research, ‘All empirical material’ is subject to ‘different interpretations’ (Divine, 2002: 206) and that ‘the onus is on the qualitative researcher to make the interpretation of the data as explicit as possible in the development of an argument using systematically gathered data’ (Divine, 2002: 207). This interpretivist response to research recognises that although research ‘cannot provide the mirror reflection of the social world that positivists strive for’, it can, however, provide access to the meanings people, and in this case state-actors, ‘attribute to their experiences and social worlds’ (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 126). It is this interpretivist response which has driven the selection of three methods. In terms of ‘data’ gathering, this thesis has used the principal method of documentary analysis supported using semi-structured interviews. The material gathered has been organised using the method of case study analysis, which has been a core driver of the thesis’ rationale and contribution.
Case study analysis

Case study analysis has been a crucial method in this project’s research design and used to interrogate Russia’s response towards intra-state violence in the European context. Using case study analysis has enabled the research to provide a rich narrative of Russian behaviour in the policy area of conflict management and to contribute towards the wider debate on Moscow’s relationship with the central actors of European security governance. As Stark and Torrance (2005: 33) point out ‘The strength of case study is that it can take an example of an activity – ‘an instance of action’ – and use multiple methods and data sources to explore it and interrogate it’. In this regard, ‘the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena’ (Yin, 2003: 3; also see George and Bennett, 2004). Case studies do not necessarily provide generalizable ‘findings’, however, but they do ‘illuminate more general issues’ (Stark and Torrance, 2005: 33-34) typically based on meticulous empirical analysis. Case study analysis has therefore been an invaluable method for this research project. It has enabled this thesis to ‘drill’ down into the specifics of Russia’s behaviour across multiple cases in order to build a rounded picture of its engagement in the policy area of conflict management. While it is acknowledged that case study analysis is not always able to produce generalizable findings about a particular subject area, in this research it has allowed the project to identify broad trends in Russia’s experience of conflict management in the European context due to the quantity (and quality) of cases consulted.

Case study selection has been pivotal to the overall contributions made by this research project. In this sense, it is necessary to briefly reiterate the thesis’ core contributions. First, the existing literature on Russian conflict management is limited because it is restricted to Russia’s behaviour in its immediate regional space and is predominantly focused on a narrow timeframe between the early to mid-1990s. This severely limits our understanding of Russia’s response to complex intra-state conflicts, and impacts our understanding of how this has informed Moscow’s wider political and security relationship with the central actors of Europe’s system of security governance. As such, an exploration of the evolution of Russia’s regional and wider European experiences is required to understand Russian conflict management in the European context. Second, this linked
to the thesis’ conceptual significance through the project’s use of European security governance as a framework to analyse Russian foreign and security policy decision-making and implementation at a system level and policy area level of analysis. This will add to the existing literature on security governance (particularly in Europe) which continues to advocate the conceptual purchase of understanding how security policy is implemented and thought about through the lens of governance.

The rationale of these contributions has therefore informed the criteria of case study selection based on the quantity and quality of the cases. This has been rationalised through: (1) Russia’s understanding of Europe’s political and security landscape between its immediate regional space and the wider European neighbourhood; (2) the extent and nature of Russian involvement; (3) and the relevance to the wider debate on Russia and European security governance. First, multiple case studies are required which cover Russia’s European experience of conflict management based on its immediate regional space and the wider European neighbourhood. This offers a rounded analysis of Russian behaviour in the policy area of conflict management and will contribute towards the ongoing debate on Russia and European security governance, including the existing literature on the application of security governance. At this stage, several conflicts across these spaces present themselves as potential case studies of Russian conflict management. In the wider European space the intra-state conflicts in the Balkans, including Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo, are the obvious choices as these are the only cases which offer any meaningful insight into Russia’s conflict management experience outside of its regional space. However, Moscow’s immediate regional space presents multiple possibilities of case studies of Russian conflict management. These include South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Transnistria-Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan.

Now that a selection of potential cases have been identified based on Russia’s understanding of the European regional political and security space, it is necessary to refine the selection based on the second and third components of the selection criteria. This part of the selection process is crucial as it will directly shape the conclusions drawn from the empirical analysis conducted in this research project. In relation to the second component, the Balkan conflicts mentioned above
offer crucial insights into Russia’s behaviour due to the extent of its involvement in the military, humanitarian and diplomatic processes of each individual conflict. Moreover, Russia’s ‘Balkan experience’ is crucial for understanding trends in Russian foreign and security policy, particularly regarding its relationship to the central actors of European security governance.

The selection process in Russia’s immediate regional space is more complicated due to the degree of variation of Russia’s involvement across multiple cases of intra-state violence outlined above. This relates to the degree and duration of its engagement in the military, humanitarian and diplomatic processes of each case of conflict management. Cases have therefore been chosen on their capacity to provide sustained informative empirical analysis throughout the duration of the timeframe operationalised in this research project. For these reasons, Russia’s involvement in the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova have been selected as the most accurate and representative cases of Russia’s regional experience of conflict management. South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria offer rich empirical cases not only of developments in the full spectrum of Russia’s response to intra-state violence, but also of Moscow’s political and security relationship with the evolving system of European security governance. In all cases Russia has been deeply engaged in the military aspects of managing the conflicts, has been a central actor in the settlement processes and has engaged in some way or another in the humanitarian efforts.

Russia has also been engaged in conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan. These, however, have not offered the same degree of insight as the cases above which provide a superior overview of Russian behaviour. Whilst offering a level of insight, Russia’s involvement in the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh has been limited to diplomatic engagement in and outside of the OSCE Minsk Group. Moreover, this case has not been as instructive about Russia’s wider relations with its European and wider Western counterparts as the cases outlined above. The conflict in Tajikistan as a viable case of Russian conflict management also suffers from similar limitations. While Russia responded to the violence through diplomatic and military means, this excluded its engagement in the humanitarian process and was limited to a narrow period between the early to mid-1990s. As a result, this offered minimal insight into the full spectrum of methods and operations in the Russian experience. The exclusion of Tajikistan as a case study of Russian
conflict management was also based on the final component of the selection criteria outlined above concerning its relevance to the wider debate on Russia and European security governance. Indeed, this conflict’s geographical and political/security bearing on Russia and issues of European security governance has been far less relevant than the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova.

**Interviews**

This section will provide a brief discussion on the contributions of interviews and then go on to discuss my experience of fieldwork in Moscow. Semi-structured interviews have been a central research method of this thesis because it has provided the opportunity ‘to collect and rigorously examine narrative accounts of social worlds’ (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 137). Indeed, Sterner Kvale (1983: 175) explains that

> The qualitative research-interview seeks to describe and understand the meaning of central themes in the life-world of the interviewee. The main task in interviewing is to understand the meaning of what is said. The interviewer thus registers and interprets what is said, as well as how it is said; he must be observant of and able to interpret, vocalization, facial expressions and other bodily gestures.

In this regard, it is the ‘flexibility of the interview that makes it so attractive’ (Bryman, 2008: 436) where ‘rambling’ or going off at tangents is often encouraged’ because it provides ‘insights into what the interviewee sees as relevant and important’ (Bryman, 2008: 437; Miller and Glassner, 2004: 127). There are, however, ethical issues which should always be considered when conducting semi-structured interviews. The interviewer must be alert not to place ‘undue pressure on the person he or she is talking to’ and will even need to be prepared to refrain from pursuing a certain ‘line of questioning if it is clearly a source of concern’ (Bryman, 2008: 447). The interviewer must also be aware of the ‘reflexivity’ of the interview process and appreciate that ‘they can never be normal conversations even at the most unstructured end of the spectrum’ (Bechhofer and Paterson, 2000: 68). The interviewer is conducting the interview for a purpose and, therefore, the researcher whether explicitly or implicitly is constantly comparing what is being said with what other persons have said, ‘assessing whether it is something new or something which supports other information’ (Bechhofer and Paterson, 2000: 68-69). Virtually all interviews
are, therefore, bounded in the sense that ‘not everything the respondent might wish to discuss will be of interest to the researcher’ (Bechhofer and Paterson, 2000: 68-69).

The validity of the interview as a research method is brought into question as a result of issues of trust, interpretation and meaning. Interview respondents may ‘sometimes respond to interviewers through the use of familiar narrative constructs’ (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 127) in order to impress the interviewer. This may lead to exaggerated and inaccurate information which is problematic for the empirical credibility of the research project. As Miller and Glassner (2004: 128) point out ‘[the] interviewee may not trust us, they may not understand our questions, or they may purposely mislead us in their responses’. This also concerns problems relating to the scope of interpretation ‘where the meaning heard by one individual may not be the same as that intended by the speaker’ (Barbour and Schostak, 2004: 42), because the ‘words employed to represent experiences, realities, points of view, expressions of self are all open to alternative meanings’ (Barbour and Schostak, 2004: 42).

In this sense, semi-structured interviews provided a useful secondary method for data collection. Where necessary, the interviews conducted were directly used and featured in the thesis to illustrate Russian approaches to conflict management. However, as the research project developed it became clear that the interviews would largely be used to confirm and corroborate the data collected through documentary analysis. The information accessed through interviews did not reveal anything more substantive on Russian conflict management that was not already uncovered by extensive documentary analysis. However, because this was not known during this stage of the research process, interviews were conducted to ensure that every relevant avenue and viable means of data collection had been covered and utilised. Nevertheless, the data gathered from the interviews contributed to the research process by helping, alongside the use of documents, to develop a ‘picture’ of Russian conflict management.

This project was based on several interviews conducted with Russian security and foreign policy experts and specialists on Russian conflict management. This also included interviews with former practitioners and policymakers from the Russian MFA and the MoD, alongside Russian UN military observers (see Appendix B). This provided an insight into Russian conflict
management doctrine, policy and practice, and to the contours of the wider debate on Russia’s external policy and European security governance. The interviews were conducted in two rounds of fieldwork in Moscow in autumn 2014 with the support of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and in spring 2015 with the support of the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS). The fieldwork was funded by the EU under the broad framework of a Marie Curie Action International Research Staff Exchange scheme (IRES) entitled ‘EU in Depth – European Identity, Cultural Diversity and Political Change’. The interviews were based on a uniform set of questions – although their sequence would change depending on the dynamics of each interview.

While the nature of conducting this fieldwork in Moscow was rewarding, it also posed many challenges of which some were not overcome. The nature of conducting research on such a sensitive topic – particularly due to the current political climate between Russia and its Western counterparts – proved to be a challenge when approaching potential interview participants. At times, there was indeed a degree of suspicion regarding the purpose and nature of my research. Nevertheless, the participants which I did interview were relatively relaxed and open with their views and answers to my questions. This was helped by my affiliation with two of the premier research institutions in Russia – IMEMO and IERAS – which acted as ‘gatekeepers’ during my fieldwork process. This affiliation was crucial in providing access to interviewees which may not have been forthcoming without this institutional ‘stamp of credibility’. Alongside this, I received informal assistance from a doctoral researcher at IMEMO who performed a gatekeeping role and helped to arrange and to interpret certain interviews. For some interview participants, the fact that I was accompanied by a native Russian speaker made them comfortable and more willing to divulge further information.

573 It should be noted that I can only speak from my own experiences and, therefore, what is detailed here may not be in common with the experiences of others who have conducted similar fieldwork in Moscow and, indeed, Russia.

574 The efforts of Pavel Vovkodav, who at the time of the fieldwork was a doctoral research at IMEMO, were invaluable to this fieldwork.
Despite this, I was only able to conduct a limited number of interviews and did not gain access to the relevant bodies and departments in the MFA and the MoD responsible for the policy area of conflict management. Indeed, on the advice of one of my interview participants, the formal letter of request to the MoD addressed to the department covering peacekeeping operations did not receive a reply. While this was due to issues of trust and the culture of secrecy typical of government institutions and ministries, it was also explained by staff at IMEMO and IERAS that Russian officials and practitioners did not have the time to offer interviews.

**Documentary Analysis**

Documentary analysis has been defined as ‘a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents—both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material’ (Bowen, 2009: 27). As in other analytical methods in qualitative research, documentary analysis includes the assessment and interpretation of ‘data’ to produce ‘meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge’ (Bowen, 2009: 27). In the research of this thesis, extensive documentary analysis was used to provide a thorough understanding of Russian conflict management in the wider European experience. The research consulted a range of sources to facilitate a systematic and rigorous content analysis, which was required to form a measured and thorough response to the thesis’ research question. It should be noted, however, that although some of the primary material listed in the references did not directly feature in the thesis, it was used to build an empirical picture of the subject ‘matter’ during the research process.

In this sense, documentary analysis was the central method used to carry out this research as it provided a means to track change and development of Russian conflict management across both space and time. Moreover, the analysis of documents was considered the most effective and viable means of gathering data across the project’s several case studies as ‘events’ could no longer be observed during this research. For instance, Russia’s engagement in the Balkan conflicts had been substantively reduced by the time of this research, and the conflict management formats in Georgia were compromised by the mid-2000s and terminated with the conflict in August 2008. Access to these ‘sites’ of conflict management was also limited and problematic, and it was
questionable whether the research would have gained further understanding from visiting these areas that was not already documented. Arguably, fieldwork could have been conducted in Moldova-Transnistria; however, the research would have only gained a minimal and narrow ‘snapshot’ of the case study, which would also have been beyond the project’s timeframe used to systematise the rationale of the research.

With these constraints in mind, the documents consulted in this study provided a broad and detailed coverage; allowing an insight spanning a long period, and many events and settings (Yin, 1994: 102). When delivering this coverage, the unavoidable presence of reporting and selection bias was acknowledged and efforts were used to minimise their impact on the project’s contributions and argument. Beginning from the premise that researchers ‘should look at documents with a critical eye’ and that documents should not be treated ‘as necessarily precise, accurate, or complete recordings of events that have occurred’ (Bowen, 2009: 33), an array of documents from multiple Russian and English language sources were used to corroborate and verify Russia’s behaviour in each of the case studies of this research project. Moreover, when required this was supplemented by expert commentary in the existing academic debate. Overall, this collection of sources was used to contextualise Russia’s behaviour in the broader narrative of each case study and as a way to gain access to Russia’s practice and understanding of conflict management. The primary material used to inform the research of this thesis was, therefore, divided into the following three principal sections covering the above aims: ‘catalogues and collections’; ‘newspapers and media’; and ‘official foreign policy documents, press releases and statements’.

In relation to catalogues and collections, the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, and the RFE/RL reports from the Friends and Partners Database were particularly useful in providing a selection of the main translated press materials from Russia and other former Soviet Republics. These sources included media reporting on Russia’s response to the conflicts, and commentary on Russia’s wider relationship with the central actors of European security governance. By reporting on developments in each conflict, these helped to contextualise the case studies. They also offered crucial insights into the drivers and nature of
Russian behaviour through the inclusion of press interviews, statements, and declarations by Russian policymakers and diplomatic/military practitioners. These sources also included outlines of agreements and treaties pertinent to each case study. Alongside this, the *International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers* edited by Bertrand Ramcharan and *The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation* edited by Heike Krieger were also useful volumes of collated documentation specific to the Balkan case studies. Each volume included agreements, statements from leading European and Western actors, reports of meeting proceedings of the ICFY, the Contact Group, the UN Security Council, the OSCE, and the European Community/Union, and a widely accepted chronological account of events (based on this documentation). This helped to build the international context of the Balkan conflicts, from which an analysis of Russia’s response was undertaken.

The second category regarding newspapers and media was also vital to the execution of this research project. The bulk of the research was based on commentary from reporters, alongside agreements, statements and press releases from Russian policymakers and diplomatic/military practitioners. These were centred around *Krasnaya Zvezda, Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, and *Itar Tass* as arguably the three leading newspapers on matters of Russian foreign and security policy, with the former being an official newspaper of the MoD and the latter owned by the Russian government. Other Russian newspapers were also consulted, such as *Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Izvestiya, Novye Izvestiya*, and *Sputnik*, although these were only sporadically used. Some of these newspapers may be accused with information bias due to their agendas/origins (including some of the catalogues above); however, this project is specifically focused on analysing Moscow’s behaviour and, therefore, a reliance on these sources to present the Russian position was required. These sources also proved useful to elucidate Western viewpoints, particularly in relation to the conflicts in the Balkans, and offered extensive detail on the events of the case studies under scrutiny. Indeed, while it was necessary to remain alert to biased accounts from press reports, other sources were used to contextualise each conflict and to carefully evaluate official Russian arguments to minimise the ‘fog’ of documentary research.
Official foreign policy documents, press releases and statements were also consulted. Moscow’s position was accessed through Russian Foreign Ministry press releases and statements, including articles authored by Russian policymakers and ministers. The Foreign Ministry website was accessible and informative, adding another layer of insight into Russian thinking on conflict management and foreign policy. However, to achieve a rounded understanding of the political and security context of Russia’s official position, the views of the other leading actors, such as the OSCE, the Contact Group, and the OHR, in each conflict management operation were also consulted and examined. The reports from the UNSG were particularly important because they offered a concise chronological account of the case studies, included agreements/treaties made by the opposing parties and peacebrokers, and provided crucial observations which helped to rigorously navigate the events of each case study. Moreover, UN Security Council Meeting proceedings, which included statements from Russian, Western, and high ranking UN officials, were also invaluable to enhancing the empirical depth of the cases in the Balkans and in Abkhazia. Indeed, when other sources were less informative, these proceedings filled crucial gaps in the empirical data.
Appendix B – Interview Participants

Arbatova, N. Expert in Russian foreign and security policy, IMEMO
Baranovskiy, V. Expert in Russian foreign and security policy, deputy director of IMEMO
Danilov, D. Expert in Russian foreign and security policy, IERAS
Goltz, A. Former reporter for the Krasnaya Zvezda and Nezavisimaya Gazeta
Gyrtovoi, V. Former Russian peacekeeper in the JPKF, Moldova-Transnistria, 1992-1993
Kashin, V. Senior Research Fellow, the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, National Research University Higher School of Economics; Senior Researcher, the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, RAS
Khadorenok, M. Russian defence expert and a retired Colonel
Kozhokin, E. Professor, MGIMO. He served as deputy chairman of the Security Affairs Committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet
Nikitin, A. Expert on Russian conflict management. Professor, IMGIMO and IMEMO
Nikitina, Y. Associate Professor, MGIMO. Expert on Russian foreign and security policy
Polikanov, D. Expert in Russian conflict management, PIR Centre
Reeve, R. Former British diplomat and former Head of the OSCE Observer Mission to Georgia 2004-2007
Tarusin, V. Retired Colonel and former UN Military Observer attached to UNPROFOR
Trubnikov, T. Former Director of the Russian External Intelligence Service, former First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia on CIS Affairs, former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia to India, retired General, and on the board of directors of IMEMO
Scherbak, I. Former First Deputy Representative of Russia’s delegation to the UN
Zagorskii, A. Expert in Russian conflict management, and foreign and security policy
Zolotarev, P. Deputy Director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences and a retired Major General
References

Secondary literature


Allison, R. (2008) ’Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’, International Affairs, 84 (6), 1145-1171


Allison, R. (2013) Russia, the West and Military Intervention, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Allison, R. (2014) ’Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules’, International Affairs, 90(6), 1255-1297


Baranovsky, V. (2000) ‘Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?’, *International Affairs*, 76 (3), 443-458


Fawn, R, and Nalbandov, R. (2012) ‘The Difficulties of Knowing the Start of War in the Information Age: Russia, Georgia and the War over South Ossetia’, European Security, 21(1), 57-89
German, T. (2012) ‘Securing the South Caucasus: Military Aspects of Russian Policy towards the Region since 2008’, Europe-Asia Studies, 64(9), 1650-1666


Jonson, L. (2000) ‘Russia, NATO and the handling of conflicts at Russia’s southern periphery: At a crossroads?’, European Security, 9(4), 45-72
Kirchner, E. and Dominguez, R. (2011) “Regional Organizations and Security Governance” In (eds) The Security Governance of Regional Organizations


**Primary material**

**Catalogues and collections**

*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*


BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2398 B/6, 2 September 1995, Interfax, 1 September 1995.


Friends and Partners Database (http://www.friends-partners.org)


The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers

Volume 1

Volume 2

The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation
Contact Group, Statement on Kosovo, 25 February 1998.
Contact Group, ‘Contact Group meeting’, 29 January 1999.

Newspapers and media

BBC

The Guardian

The Independent

Itar Tass
Izvestiya
Izvestiya, 8 June 1995, accessed 5 March 2014, available at

Krasnaya Zvezda
Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 May 1992, accessed 10 December 2013, available at:
Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 June 1992, accessed 10 December 2013, no url available.
Krasnaya Zvezda Date, 18 June 1992, accessed 10 December 2013, available at

Moldova.org

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
New York Times

Novye Izvestiya

Rossiyskaya Gazeta
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 16 April 1999, accessed 4 April 2014, available at
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 3 April 2008, accessed 3 May 2014, available at

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1069946.html.
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1096372.html.

Segodnya
Segodnya, 6 February 1999, accessed 14 June 2014, available at

Sputnik

The Telegraph
The Telegraph, 24 April 2014, accessed 12 March 2015, available at

Washington Post

Official foreign policy documents, press releases and statements

Department of Defence, US

EU documents, press releases and statements


Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons

House of Commons Defence Committee, UK
House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace’ Seventh Report of Session 2009-10, 9 March 2010.

MoD, UK

NATO documents, press releases and statements


Office of the High Representative and Contact Group document, press releases and statements
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina


Kosovo


OSCE documents, press releases and statements

Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina

Kosovo

Moldova-Transnistria

Other

President of Russia, the Kremlin


**Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs policy documents, press releases and statements**


Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s address and answers to questions at the 53rd Munich Security Conference’, 18 February 2017, accessed 21 February
Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations documents, press release and statements


Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs


United States Institute of Peace


United Nations documents

General Mission Information and concepts


Security Council Resolutions

Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina

Security Council Resolution 757 (S/RES/757), 30 May 1992

Kosovo


Georgia (Abkhazia)


Security Council Meetings
Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina
Security Council Meeting 3723 (S/PV. 3723), 12 December 1996.
Security Council Meeting 44847 (S/PV. 4484), 5 March 2002.

Kosovo
Security Council Meeting 4011 (S/PV. 4011), 10 June 1999.
Security Council Meeting 6483 (S/PV. 6483), 16 February 2011.

Georgia (Abkhazia)
Security Council Presidential Statement
Kosovo

Secretary General Letters
Georgia (Abkhazia)
Secretary General Letter on behalf of Georgia 26875 (S/26875), 15 December 1993.
Secretary General Letter on behalf of Georgia 583 (S/583), 17 May 1994.

Moldova-Transnistria
Secretary General Letter on behalf of Moldova 24369 (S/24369), 6 August 1992.

Secretary General Report
Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina
Secretary General Report 3280 (S/3280), 11 December 1991.
Secretary General Report 25939 (S/25939), 14 June 1993.
Secretary General Report 444 (S/444), 30 May 1995.
Secretary General Report 460 (S/460), 21 June 1996.
Secretary General Report 156 (S/156), 10 March 2005.

Kosovo
Secretary General Report 361 (S/361), 30 April 1998.
Secretary General Report 470 (S/470), 4 June 1998.
Secretary General Report 1068 (S/1068), 12 November 1998.
Secretary General Report 672 (S/672), 12 June 1999.
Secretary General Report 635 (S/635), 7 October 2005.
Secretary General Report 723 (S/723), 10 December 2007.

Georgia (Abkhazia)
Secretary General Report 26023 (S/26023), 1 July 1993.
Secretary General Report 26250 (S/26250), 6 August 1993.
Secretary General Report 397 (S/397), 5 April 1994.
Secretary General Report 529 (S/529), 3 May 1994.
Secretary General Report 725 (S/725), 16 June 1994.
Secretary General Report 818 (S/818), 12 July 1994.
Secretary General Report 10 (S/10), 6 January 1995.
Secretary General Report 181 (S/181), 6 March 1995
Secretary General Report 342 (S/342), 1 May 1995.
Secretary General Report 937 (S/937), 8 November 1995.
Secretary General Report 284 (S/284), 15 April 1996.
Secretary General Report 507 (S/507), 1 July 1996.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretary General Report</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/558</td>
<td>18 July 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/497</td>
<td>10 June 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/647</td>
<td>14 July 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/39</td>
<td>19 January 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/697</td>
<td>17 July 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/345</td>
<td>24 April 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/713</td>
<td>18 July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/1008</td>
<td>24 October 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/742</td>
<td>10 July 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/1141</td>
<td>14 October 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/39</td>
<td>13 January 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/412</td>
<td>9 April 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/315</td>
<td>20 April 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/570</td>
<td>14 July 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/822</td>
<td>18 October 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/32</td>
<td>17 January 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/269</td>
<td>25 April 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/657</td>
<td>19 October 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/19</td>
<td>13 January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/173</td>
<td>17 March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/771</td>
<td>28 September 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/182</td>
<td>3 April 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/439</td>
<td>18 July 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/588</td>
<td>3 October 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/38</td>
<td>23 January 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/480</td>
<td>23 July 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/631</td>
<td>3 October 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>