CHATHAM HOUSE,  
THE UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION  
AND THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY, c.1945-1975  

By  

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Abstract

This thesis details the purchase of liberal internationalism on elite and public opinion between 1945 and 1975 by examining two of its bastions, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, better known as Chatham House, and the United Nations Association, the successor organisation to the League of Nations Union. It reveals how liberal internationalism survived the collapse of the League of Nations and the Second World War by exploring the relationships Chatham House and UNA had with the public, media, Whitehall and the main political parties. Chatham House and UNA had a significant impact upon these groups, acting as democratising agents in foreign policy by extending debate over international affairs beyond Whitehall. Nonetheless, although elite and popular liberal internationalism survived past 1945, it struggled to do so and in order to fully appreciate how, it is necessary to simultaneously assess the confines they and their fellow NGOs worked within. Chatham House and UNA’s impact upon the politics of foreign policy must also be understood in connection with the formal and informal political structures that restricted their attempts to democratise foreign policy; structures that promoted the illusory bifurcation of domestic and international affairs.
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<td>ABCA</td>
<td>Army Bureau of Current Affairs</td>
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<td>AGM</td>
<td>Annual General Meeting</td>
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<td>BCA</td>
<td>Bureau of Current Affairs</td>
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<td>CEWC</td>
<td>Council for Education in World Citizenship</td>
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<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
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<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Empire Parliamentary Association</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORD</td>
<td>Foreign Office Research Department</td>
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<td>FRPS</td>
<td>Foreign Research and Press Service</td>
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<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>IPR</td>
<td>Institute of Pacific Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISD</td>
<td>International Service Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNU</td>
<td>League of Nations Union</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NCANWT</td>
<td>National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>Policy Studies Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUS</td>
<td>Permanent Under-Secretary</td>
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<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trade Union Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Union of Democratic Control</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNA</td>
<td>United Nations Association</td>
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<td>UNAPPG</td>
<td>United Nations All Party Parliamentary Group</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>UNSA</td>
<td>United Nations Student Association</td>
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<td>VSU</td>
<td>Voluntary Services Unit</td>
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<td>WEA</td>
<td>Workers’ Educational Association</td>
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<td>WFUNA</td>
<td>World Federation of United Nations Associations</td>
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<td>WIIA</td>
<td>Welsh Institute of International Affairs</td>
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Introduction: Beyond The Twenty Years’ Crisis

In twentieth century Britain, foreign policy became less foreign. Not only did the quickening pace of globalisation blur the boundaries between the external and the internal, but the simultaneous and interdependent rise of a mass society placed what was the sole preserve of the aristocracy in the nineteenth century within the reach of the newly empowered citizens of the twentieth. This process of democratisation was spurred on by liberal internationalists who sought to improve international understanding between peoples so that they might check anarchic nationalism in their peers and their governments, and promote the cause of international integration, even the formation of a world government. Political integration would accompany and bring to heel untamed economic interdependence so that it might be worked to secure the interests of the people rather than those of rapacious dictators and greedy corporations; that peace and prosperity might be secured for all.

They were E.H. Carr’s ‘utopians’. Their ideas had their roots in the nineteenth century – and further back – but the horrors of the First World War and the new opportunities (and complications) presented to them by the Fourth Reform Act stirred in them a new fervour to popularise their cause to impose order upon the global chaos. The international organisation that came to epitomise their hopes was the League of Nations. A League of Nations Union (LNU) was created, with equivalents dotted around the world, to promote its achievements and endeavours. Within Britain they rallied hundreds of thousands to their cause, obtained millions of signatures in support of collective security and opened up new participatory spaces within civil society in which international affairs was discussed and debated.
Another body was also established by the ‘utopians’ that was far less convinced of the merits of sustaining a mass membership, but was similarly certain that elite and public opinion had to be educated in the benefits to be gained from international integration. This body was the British (later Royal) Institute of International Affairs, better known as Chatham House. The formation of the League of Nations represented to them an important practical step towards the recognition of the necessity of international integration. However, they also held faith in another form of integration, that which would lead to supranational federal unions. Buoyed by the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, they looked to the British Empire to enact their experiment. The Institute provided a valuable forum, tucked away in London clubland, where academics, politicians, diplomats, businessmen and trade unionists could exchange ideas and deliberate on international affairs. This high citadel of ‘utopianism’, home to and frequented by great intellectuals of the age, disseminated a bimonthly journal and an annual survey, and kept a library that contained an unsurpassed collection of international relations literature and press cuttings from newspapers all over the world.

However, in the late 1930s, the hopes of the ‘utopians’ crumbled before them as a second world war appeared increasingly inevitable. Carr, whose seminal work *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* was published in the same month as war was declared, concluded that the ‘utopians’ had been fooled and, in turn, had fooled the public and policy-makers alike.¹ The nation-state was the supreme unit in human relations and however heartfelt the pleas for peace made by individuals and existing international edifices, cold hard power politics would win out. In the aftermath of war, disillusioned Britons looked to the Hitlerite foreign policy that had fuelled it and the Cold War power politics that succeeded it and came to similar

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conclusions. The interwar period was recalled as one that saw both the birth and death of popular liberal internationalism. It represented the last delirious gasp of liberal Britain before the plunge; before Britain’s imperial decline and the sentiment behind the creation of the welfare state diverted attention away from external affairs to the deserving problems at home. In this new less innocent age, the foreign policy making process might have been within the reach of those newly empowered citizens of the twentieth century, but few cared enough or saw little point in clasping it. If liberal internationalism was not dead already, it and its agents were old, dodder and best ignored. Any stories worth retelling belonged to their good old days long behind them, before the Second World War had proved them wrong.

Of course, this is a romanticised version of events and one that in a study that begins in 1945 is naturally considered with some scepticism here. Nevertheless, it is a compelling version of events and one that is not without some elements of truth. Unsurprisingly then it has largely seized the popular and, as will be detailed here, the academic imagination. However, this thesis argues that liberal internationalism in Britain not only survived the Second World War, but was also significantly influential both among the foreign policy making elite and the general public. However, in order to show the extent of its purchase among these groups, it recognises the need to avoid a narrow focus on ‘the traditional apostolic succession of “great thinkers”’.2 It seeks to not just understand liberal international ideas, but also assess their impact. It thus analyses the activities of two of its most important advocates, Chatham House and the LNU’s successor, the United Nations Association (UNA). Both organisations sought to shape public and elite opinion. Both remained democratising agents after the Second World War, helping to extend debate over international affairs beyond

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the confines of Whitehall, while retaining contacts within. Combined, the think-tank and the pressure group provide a valuable barometer of the changing fate of liberal internationalism.

Nonetheless, although elite and popular liberal internationalism survived past 1945, it struggled to do so and in order to fully appreciate how, it is also necessary to assess the confines they and their fellow NGOs worked within. Chatham House and UNA’s impact upon the politics of foreign policy must also be understood in connection with the formal and informal political structures that restricted their attempts to democratise foreign policy; structures that promoted the illusory bifurcation of domestic and foreign affairs. Nevertheless, despite the problems that Chatham House and UNA endured in promoting international integration, this thesis will show that analysis of liberal internationalism, liberalism more generally and the limitations imposed upon them provides an integral dimension to the study of British postwar political culture.

THE STRANGE SURVIVAL OF LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM

Scholars have increasingly been putting to bed the argument made by George Dangerfield in his classic polemic The Strange Death of Liberal England; that British liberalism had effectively met its demise in 1914.3 It has been recognised that although the number of Liberal Party MPs certainly dwindled, liberal ideas had a long life past the First World War. Historians have demonstrated that there was ‘Liberalism without the Liberals’.4 Such historians have evaded the presumption that, contrary to other European countries, British politics was uniquely limited in its ideological scope and was essentially pragmatic. Ideas mattered and they operated beyond a simplistic two-party polarisation around a Labour-


Recognising the reverberating distinction between classical liberalism (revisited in neoliberalism) and new liberalism (also known as social liberalism), many historians have revealed the impact that liberalism has had on British political, social and economic thought. They have traced liberalism’s reconciliation of individualism with collectivism through John Stuart Mill, the American Progressives, the Oxford and Scottish idealists and the socially orientated liberals at Cambridge.

However, much less attention has been paid to the impact made by new liberalism on international thought and activism, especially after 1945. This may be the result of the liberal contribution to international thought being, as Cecelia Lynch has argued, too often understood within the hegemonic theoretical framework of realism – to which Carr’s critique of interwar liberal internationalism significantly contributed – that ignored social agency in the founding of the United Nations. This in turn ‘reinforced theoretical tendencies that label social agency as “idealistic” as opposed to “realist,” implying that it is dangerous, simplistically liberal, or unworthy of serious consideration’. Michael Freeden, who has done much to reveal the permeation of new liberalism through social democratic thought, quickly dismissed its contribution to international thought for it ‘simply extended their domestically focused

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8 Lynch, Beyond Appeasement, 1.
concepts and analyses to the relations among peoples...here, as elsewhere, their unease and naïveté when confronted with the realities of political power were unmistakeable’.\footnote{M. Freeden, \textit{Liberalism Divided: A Study in British Political Thought, 1914-1939} (Oxford, 1989), 363-364.} Donald S. Birn’s institutional history of the LNU sympathised with Carr’s observation that public opinion ‘was almost as often wrong-headed as it was impotent’.\footnote{E.H. Carr quoted in D.S. Birn, \textit{The League of Nations Union, 1918-1945} (Oxford, 1981), 2. The full quotation is found in Carr, \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis}, 38.} Birn faulted the Union for not equipping the British public during the 1930s with a ‘sober realistic perspective...They glossed over the League’s inadequacies and submerged all other considerations to building mass support.’\footnote{Birn, \textit{The League of Nations Union}, 229.} One historian attributed the decline of British global power to the work of ‘a constellation of moralising internationalist cliques’.\footnote{Corelli Barnett quoted in Birn, \textit{The League of Nations Union}, 226.} Liberal internationalism during the interwar period, exemplified in the inability of the League of Nations to prevent the Second World War, has been represented and understood as the inevitable failure of an embarrassingly childlike experiment. Its results were produced as the ultimate attestation of liberal naïveté and the rule that the twin forces of nationalism and power politics would inexorably continue to divide human society however hard individual citizens tried to counter them. The Second World War thus appears to constitute a natural end to the study of liberal internationalism.

The British experience of the Cold War provided further testament. In those postwar international crises that received the greatest media and political attention, the United Nations often appeared to be sidelined as a sweet-natured but ultimately weak referee. Martin Ceadel in his seminal study of the British peace movement from 1854 to 1945 very rightly notes how the UNA struggled to sustain its membership amid the Cold War’s naked ‘realist’ power politics.\footnote{M. Ceadel, \textit{Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945} (Oxford, 2000), 423.} So too does Helen McCarthy in her excellent monograph on the League movement

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in Britain, which also naturally ends in 1945. However, McCarthy concisely looks beyond
1945 and credits UNA for remaining

a centrist force in British politics and society, preserving a place for liberal-internationalist
values in post-war associational life, albeit on a far less remarkable scale than in earlier
times...Yet there can be no question that the UNA, like the League movement before it,
belonged to and greatly enriched a pluralist, liberally orientated civil society in Britain.\textsuperscript{14}

The danger of presuming the weakness, even death, of liberal internationalism in 1945
is that this important dimension of postwar democratic debate over British international policy
is ignored. 1945 did not spell the end of liberal internationalism in Britain or of its adherents’
provision of participatory spaces to extend debate over foreign policy beyond Whitehall.
Today UNA and Chatham House still live and breathe. As do the organisations that their staff
helped form, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU).

In the late 1930s, British liberal internationalist intellectuals and activists reacted
swiftly to the evident collapse of the League of Nations. There was, however, one liberal
internationalist group whose reaction was looked upon somewhat sceptically by senior
members of the LNU. This group was enjoying the revival of a concept that had been
substantially developed by new liberal thought, federalism. Historians have detailed how
during the interwar period, many liberals who were disturbed by the worsening international
situation and disappointed by the League’s inability to deal with it turned towards federalism
for the answer. This was especially the case between 1938, amid the growing Sudeten Crisis,
and 1940 when there was much talk of an Anglo-French union, even in Whitehall. In the
summer of 1938 the pressure group Federal Union was formed and the following year would
see the publication of Clarence Streit’s \textit{Union Now} and Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s
\textit{Europe Must Unite}. Unsurprisingly, the federalists at Chatham House were highly involved.

Three of the Institute’s principal founders, Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr and Arnold J. Toynbee were among Federal Union’s most senior intellectuals, along with the likes of Barbara Wooton, William Beveridge and Lionel Robbins. Kerr’s Burge Memorial Lecture in 1935 *Pacifism is not Enough, nor Patriotism Either*, which argued national sovereignty led to international anarchy and war, was one of the Federal Union’s seminal texts and remains so today. Chatham House also established a study group to address the need to establish a European federal union and how it was to be formed. In the long run, the influence of these British federalists on British opinion was limited. However, their ideas on how a European federal union should be created and made to work had a highly significant impact upon intellectuals and policy makers on the continent where they were known as the ‘Anglo-Saxon Federalist School’. As will be shown throughout this thesis, Chatham House staff would continue to advocate that Britain take a leading role in a union of Western Europe long past 1945. During and after the Second World War, British liberal international thought was alive and well. It even survived in the seemingly unlikeliest of places.

Although the enduring legacy of *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* has helped to obscure the examination of liberal international thought past 1945, it would be unfair to portray its author as the bogeyman of this piece. His famous treatise written in 1939 did not represent the final maturation of his ideas. As Charles Jones writes, by 1945 Carr was ‘more optimistic, more

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elaborate and more liberal’. The apparent inevitability of war in 1939 did not entirely destroy Carr’s faith that one day – with the right safeguards, allowances for the power of nation-states and the adoption of a gradualist considered pace – international organisations could flourish and be beneficial. In his preface to the 1945 edition of *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, Carr noted how his book was written to counteract ‘the almost total neglect of the factor of power’ that he understood had come to define both academic and popular thought in the interwar period. However, Carr believed that ‘[t]o-day this defect...has been to a considerable extent overcome’ and he had thus since departed from ‘a rather one-sided emphasis which no longer seems as necessary or appropriate today as it did in 1939’.

Furthermore, ‘the main body of the book too readily and too complacently accepts the existing nation-state, large or small, as the unit of international society’. He went on to say that his book published that year *Nationalism and After* more accurately reflected his present views.

By means of examining such works, his wartime leaders for *The Times* and his experiences during the Second World War, including when he headed a study group on nationalism at Chatham House, Jones argues that Carr was a functionalist. In international relations, functionalism is aptly described through the work of another associate of Chatham House, David Mitrany. In 1943, Mitrany produced a pamphlet for the Institute entitled *A Working Peace System*, the thesis of which is best described as international integration “pieces by pieces”. Mitrany, who was highly influenced by the new liberal John A. Hobson, argued that nation-states should pool their sovereignty into international agencies to deal with transnational problems which any one of them could not deal with alone. He modelled this

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process on Roosevelt’s “New Deal” in which he perceived each problem that it had encountered (such as unemployment or the collapse of the banking system) to have been treated separately as an issue in itself. The treatments (functions of the state) arose in an ad hoc fashion; no general theory or system of government was related to them. ‘Each function’, Mitrany wrote, ‘was left to generate others gradually, like the functional subdivision of organic cells; and in every case the appropriate authority was left to grow and develop out of actual performance’.20 Similarly, Carr promoted the establishment of functional (technical) organisations. He understood them as a necessary counterweight to the caprice of the large nation states. He welcomed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and its successor the European Economic Community (EEC) in addition to supporting the continuation of the League’s technical organisations, including the International Labour Organisation.21 He also advocated the construction of an international structure for Keynesian macro-economic planning to address the root cause of war, the discord between the “haves” and the “have-nots”.22 As Jones observes, ‘it is striking to see the extent to which his vision of the future was realised in the international regime of managed liberalism which prevailed between 1945 and 1974’.23

Ian Hall has revealed how liberal internationalism persisted in international thought past 1945. It was helped by the absence of many rivals on the scene.24 The collapse of the League of Nations did not induce a plethora of British intellectuals to trip over themselves to line up underneath the realist banner. The realist tradition, that Carr helped ignite, struggled to seize the imagination of British thinkers and practitioners until at least the mid-1960s. Carr, the most obvious candidate to champion a British school of realism had, as detailed above,

20 Quoted in Hall, Dilemmas of Decline, 78. On the influence of J.A. Hobson on David Mitrany, see Long, Towards a New Liberal Internationalism, 187-188.
22 Hall, Dilemmas of Decline, 81.
24 Hall, Dilemmas of Decline, esp. ch.4.
somewhat departed from *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* and retreated from the field of international relations to write his history of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, realism in Britain yielded a bitter taste that served as an uncomfortable reminder of the appeasement of Hitler. In the 1930s, both appeasement and totalitarian foreign policy had been labelled as ‘realist’.25 Indeed in his famous revisionist interpretation of the origins of the Second World War, A.J.P. Taylor, one of the few British scholars in the period to come under realism’s spell, referred to *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* as ‘a brilliant argument in favour of appeasement’.26 Postwar liberal thought thus endured little competition and ‘remained by far the strongest tradition among British intellectuals until well into the 1960s’.27

However, liberal internationalism did not simply persist for want of imagination among its rivals. In order to survive past the Second World War, it adjusted itself to contemporary international politics. In many ways it got wiser.28 As this thesis will demonstrate the change was apparent in the activities of both Chatham House and UNA. Functionalism, as promoted by Carr and Mitrany, emerged from the Second World War as one of the evolutionary changes to liberal international thought. It agreed with past liberal internationalism’s ends, but not its means.29 Functionalism met the disapproval of some of Chatham House’s old guard; not least Lionel Curtis who feared that the geological pace of integration would fail to actually bring about federalism. However, it did attract members of the new guard. Kenneth Younger was the Institute’s Director between 1959 and 1971. Like all of the postwar Directors, Younger, a former Labour Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, was broadly liberal. Yet Younger’s conception of the pace of international integration had more in common with the functionalists than Curtis. To articulate his own position, he quoted the

27 Hall, *Dilemmas of Decline*, 50.
28 Hall, *Dilemmas of Decline*, ch.4.
29 See Hall, *Dilemmas of Decline*, 78.
second Secretary General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjold’s response to the concept of world federalism:

I think it is wise to avoid talking of this or that kind of ultimate political target and to realize that the development [of international organisation] is still in an early stage of institutional evolution...What seems imperative is to push forward institutionally and, eventually, constitutionally all along the line, guided by current needs and experiences, without preconceived ideas of the ultimate form.  

Chatham House’s growing acceptance of functionalism also had important implications for its motivations to further democratise foreign policy and shape public opinion. Curtis argued that Britain’s political leaders should form and join a federal union of Western Europe post-haste and lead British public opinion with it. In contrast, ‘functionalism announces itself publicly, yet also declares itself in some measure dependent on advance by stealth’. Younger argued for the necessity of instilling in the public the importance of keeping in mind a general objective – however ill-defined – of international integration. However, when integration proceeded at such a slow pace, reminding the public of the virtues of that general objective became highly difficult. One might also question the need to involve the public at all. If power over foreign policy could be kept in the hands of the elites, covert advances towards international integration were much more manageable. Younger’s functionalism retained the liberal paternalism of Curtis’s federalism. Both relied upon the abilities of elites to bring the public with them. Furthermore, confidence in functionalism rested upon the assumption that economic progress and greater international integration were indivisible. As Jones writes, functionalism thus ultimately depended upon faith in material progress and Keynesian macro-economic management. The end of the

33 Younger, Changing Perspectives in British Foreign Policy, 135-139.
postwar boom in the mid-1970s shattered that faith.\textsuperscript{34} It was no coincidence that one of functionalism’s principal critics was Friedrich Hayek who characterised Carr’s support for the Bretton Woods system as a compromise with his ‘realism’.\textsuperscript{35}

There were other important changes at Chatham House and UNA that came with important implications. The senior staff at Chatham House transferred their hopes for an imperial federation to a European one. UNA also underwent changes to its thinking, which departed it from its former (LNU) stance. It too adapted in recognition of the changing global order and Britain’s place within it. Whereas the League and the LNU did little to question or threaten British sovereignty, many within UNA immediately recognised that the spirit, if not the letter, of the UN Charter and soon after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights spelled out the end of empire. Having come to the conclusion sooner than much of public, the media, Westminster and Whitehall, UNA was presented with a problem as to how to convince these sections of opinion otherwise, while maintaining a mass membership.\textsuperscript{36} As McCarthy observes, the subsequent attention drawn to the British administration of its colonies, combined with immigration from the Commonwealth through the 1940s and 1950s, also drove many members of UNA to ponder the previously neglected question of race relations.\textsuperscript{37} It shared this new interest with Chatham House whose Board of Studies on Race Relations created in 1952 later became the independent Institute of Race Relations in 1958. Toynbee would question the West’s assumed superiority over the “Rest”.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{35} Hall, \textit{Dilemmas of Decline}, 81.
\textsuperscript{37} McCarthy, \textit{The British People and the League of Nations}, 252.
Both organisations in the postwar period would also be dynamised by the sheer scale of what came under the purview of international affairs and the people involved. The contents of Chatham House’s postwar publications and the subjects of its lectures continued to provide testament to the ever quickening pace of globalisation. Adapting to the changing world around them, they explored further beyond questions of diplomacy and defence and scrutinised with greater fervour and frequency issues surrounding economics, race relations, humanitarianism, migration and the environment. The Institute thus provided politicians and civil servants with a valuable sounding board of broadly informed opinion. Opinion may not have been as diverse as some of the Institute’s challengers both from within and outside would have liked, but it did reflect the growing number of Britain’s unofficial diplomats who took the guise of academics, businesspeople and the staff of NGOs. Ideas voiced and sourced at the Institute were referenced in parliament and the press; some even elicited the interest of party research departments and Whitehall. Furthermore, with Britain’s days of gunboat diplomacy well and truly behind it, Chatham House became a valuable channel for the Foreign Office to exercise soft power, one which entertained foreign dignitaries and organised international academic exchanges with friend and foe alike.

For UNA the multiplicity of issues that could now be considered international was both a blessing and a curse. The proliferation of international agencies developed to realise the UN’s ambitious mission of promoting ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’ announced in the UN Charter’s Preamble, enabled UNA to diversify the range of its campaigns.39 This was especially important when Cold War realpolitik appeared to be sideling the UN’s impact on international politics. In the early 1950s, UNA discovered for itself the huge public appetite for humanitarian causes when it coordinated the British

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responses to the work of UN agencies such as the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). However, there was considerable concern within UNA, from the local branches up, that too much focus on humanitarian relief diverted the Association and the public away from the underlying international political problems that prevented workable long-term solutions for which the UN, however debilitated it was with the mutual antagonism of the superpowers, still provided the best hope.

While international affairs grew ever more relevant to the everyday lives of citizens, UNA continued to attempt to democratise foreign policy. It put great effort into the celebration of UN Day and coordinated support from a variety of civil organisations and trade unions. It pressured the press to give greater coverage to the UN and international affairs in general and grappled with the new powerful medium of television. During general election campaigns, its branches organised all-party meetings in their constituencies in which parliamentary candidates were provided a platform to debate foreign policy. Ministers and civil servants received UNA deputations and took them into their confidence. Furthermore, UNA may have struggled to attract the number of young people it desired – and indeed needed to maintain its influence – but its United Nations Student Association (UNSA) became the largest student body outside of the National Union of Students. Just as it is unwise to preach the strange death of liberalism in 1914, so it is to assume that liberal internationalism departed Britain with the collapse of the League of Nations.

LOUD AND QUIET ACTORS

On the other hand, the postwar march of liberal internationalism was hardly triumphal. By the 1970s, both Chatham House and UNA were incurring large budget deficits and thus, to their evident discomfort, were forced to accept grants from the Foreign Office. UNA never did
reach the heights of popularity its predecessor secured. It reached its zenith in 1948 when its membership briefly stood at 87,969 and its branches numbered 805. In 1931 the LNU peaked with 406,868 members and 3,036 branches. The UNA made its last attempt to reach its desired target of 100,000 members in the late 1960s, but it failed and the Association rapidly lost members through the 1970s. In 1976, UNA’s total membership stood at 24,754. By 1988, it had been further reduced to approximately 11,000.

In 1973, eighteen years after Lionel Curtis’s death, Britain finally became a member of the EEC and the public voted to remain so in 1975. In those eighteen years, Chatham House staff had worked hard to inform elite and public opinion of the benefits to be gained from EEC membership. However, politicians presented membership to the public as an economic necessity that would be accompanied by renewed strategic benefits. It was not an impassioned positive appeal to further the internationalist cause. Britain was to join the common market, not a federal United States of Europe. Much of the public were largely ignorant of what membership entailed and public sentiment in favour of membership rapidly declined after the referendum. During the 1983 general election campaign, Labour’s manifesto promised to remove Britain from the EEC and in 1988 Margaret Thatcher, the leader of the party that had brought Britain into the EEC, delivered her famous speech in Bruges rejecting participation in the European exchange rate mechanism. Today the F-word still remains a dirty word.

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41 UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: Annual Report 1976, 1. The annual report for 1975 at the end of our period did not detail the total individual membership.


The rise of neoliberalism that revisited the classical liberalism, which new liberals had struggled successfully to transform, caused further alarm among liberal internationalists due to its breakup of the Bretton Woods system and the rejection of Keynesian international macro-economic controls. The economist Andrew Shonfield, a great defender of Keynesianism and Chatham House’s Director between 1971 and 1977, lamented the infiltration of the new doctrines that appeared to be gaining consensus among Western governments of both Left and Right well before Thatcher had entered stage right. Shonfield was left bewildered as ‘international independence grows while the notion of international management of the world economy moves into disrepute’. A new mood was established in the West ‘which expresses the conviction that there must be some remediable defect in a system which makes “us”, whoever we are, quite so dependent on the views and actions of foreigners’. Shonfield and his fellow liberal internationalists saw no such defect. Allies of the welfare state, both Left and Right, had neglected its basis in international coordination.

Shonfield argued:

There is either a way forward towards greater international co-ordination of the day-to-day management of our economic affairs, that is of macro-economic policy, or a decisive move backwards towards the dismantling of the welfare state and of its concomitant in Western society – the mixed economy. 44

Worse still for the liberal internationalist cause was the rise of a rival ideology that preceded that of neoliberalism and had plenty to say on international affairs, the New Left.

When seeking to explore British attitudes to international affairs in the postwar period and its

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impact upon British political culture, scholars have naturally gravitated towards examining new social movements, especially the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). CND is of special interest, because not only did it result from international tensions but also from the rejection of orthodoxies within the labour movement and in this they provided an important embodiment of the New Left. Another reason why the CND earns the attention of scholars is the same reason why they troubled UNA. They made a lot of noise. CND was highly accomplished at drawing attention to itself and its simple, singular message: the need for unilateral nuclear disarmament. It did this by developing new political spaces beyond Westminster. This reinvigoration of political participation was especially attractive to the growing young middle class, a demographic that UNA was relying upon for its long-term retention of a mass membership. To exacerbate matters further, CND was also capable of drawing widely across the ideological spectrum, from pacifists, practitioners of Gandhian non-violent direct action, international socialists, and indeed liberal internationalists such as Bertrand Russell.45

It was not that UNA disagreed with the aims of CND or indeed that of other new social movements, or the New Left. UNA campaigned against anti-apartheid, the Vietnam War and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, just like CND, UNA wished to democratise foreign policy. Its disagreement lay with method. In line with much liberal thought, UNA wished to democratise foreign policy through existing – parliamentary – institutions and did not wish to risk its all-party status and insider privileges within Whitehall. They wished to educate citizens so that they would make an informed decision in the “proper” place to exercise one’s democratic rights (and responsibility), at the ballot box. Similarly, at an international level, they were obviously wedded to the UN that sought to institutionalise moral and democratic diplomacy. Unilateral disarmament, unlike multilateral disarmament, was understood to pay insufficient attention to the UN. The liberal faith in institutions was alive and well, while the New Left distrusted centres of power and interest.

Furthermore, the majority within UNA understood CND and the New Left’s concept of positive neutralism as lacking in a serious analysis of international politics. New Left thinkers argued that Britain should equalise its relations with the Cold War superpowers and take moral leadership; unilaterally disarm, leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and support the developing world’s resistance to neocolonialism. For UNA this was a dangerous example of non-sequitur logic that inflated British influence, bypassed the UN – thereby encouraging precarious power politics – and if implemented would help tip the balance of power against the West and make a global nuclear war more likely; the devastation of which had no respect for artificial borders however neutral those behind them professed to


The UNA’s General Council, made up of representatives from UNA branches and corporate subscribers, thus voted in favour of banning CND from corporate membership. However, individual membership was allowed. There were UNA members who belonged to CND.

But why should historians, who quite rightly examine the CND, a loud, muscular social movement that helped define the ‘long sixties’, also pay attention to UNA, a quiet, dwindling organisation whose best days were behind it in the thirties, before it was even born? Or for that matter, why should they pay attention to Chatham House, another quiet actor whose broadly liberal outlook appears to have inspired little public enthusiasm even if the think-tank had chosen to directly engage with the general public? Neither the LNU nor Chatham House were included in A.J.P. Taylor’s time-honoured 1956 Ford Lectures that chronicled British foreign policy’s dissenters between the French Revolution and the Second World War. The LNU and Toynbee were considered by Taylor to be ‘the high-minded, not the Dissenters...heirs of Gladstone maybe, but certainly not of Bright, still less of the Chartists’. Toynbee was one of those ‘men who knew their way to the Athenaeum, not to the derelict premises of the 1917 Club’. For Taylor, who was uncomfortable with his own membership of the Athenaeum, being part of the ‘Establishment’ disqualified one from being a ‘trouble maker’.

Historians since have made similar assumptions. Studies of the postwar British peace movement have focussed their attention on those actors who were understood to operate outside of the establishment. When reference has been made to UNA and liberal internationalists, scholars have tended to treat them as one of the ‘minority sects’ of the

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47 See, for example, G. Williams, ‘The CND and UNA’, *New World*, Jun 1962, 7-8.
49 Taylor, *The Trouble Makers*, 189.
50 Taylor, *The Trouble Makers*, 197.
British peace movement.\footnote{N. Young, ‘Tradition and Innovation in the British Peace Movement: Towards an Analytical Framework’ in R. Taylor and N. Young (eds.), \textit{Campaigns For Peace: British Peace Movements in the Twentieth Century} (Manchester, 1987), 19.} When they have conceded that postwar liberal internationalists did exist, often reference has only been made to compare them unfavourably with their interwar antecedents. ‘It is sobering to note’, observed Peter van den Dungen (in a parenthesis), ‘the insignificant role played in today’s Peace Movement by the United Nations Association compared with that of its counterpart of the interwar period, the LNU.’\footnote{P. van der Dungen, ‘Critics and criticism of the British Peace Movement’ in R. Taylor and N. Young (eds.), \textit{Campaigns For Peace: British Peace Movements in the Twentieth Century} (Manchester, 1987), 266-267.}

More broadly, since when did quiet actors bring about meaningful change? In an extremely valuable work, Geoff Eley informs us: ‘Let there be no mistake: democracy is not “given” or “granted.” It requires \textit{conflict}, namely, courageous challenges to authority, risk-taking and reckless exemplary acts, ethical witnessing, violent confrontations, and general crises in which the given socio-political order breaks down.’\footnote{G. Eley, \textit{Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000} (Oxford, 2002), 4.} None of these descriptions can be neatly applied to either UNA or Chatham House whose programme of democratisation involved educating elites and public alike so that they might be better equipped to make the “right” decision within the existing socio-political order. Eley’s forgers of democracy belong to the Left, not the Centre. A number of scholarly works give the impression that socialism monopolised concern for socio-political justice. Those liberal and conservative thinkers and policy-makers – and their supporters – who did concern themselves with such injustices, are treated briefly or their motivations are dismissed as mere attempts to offset the rise of socialism rather than being derived from any sense of ideological conviction.\footnote{A recent example is S. Todd, \textit{The People: The Rise and Fall of the Working Class, 1910-2010} (London, 2014), esp. 19-20. For an alternative perspective, see R. McKibbin, ‘The People: The Rise and Fall of the Working Class 1910-2010 by Selina Todd’, \textit{Twentieth Century British History}, 25:4 (2014), 651-654. Some otherwise highly valuable works have been guilty of stating the case for liberal and conservative concerns for socio-political justice too briefly. The significance of new liberalism and the fruitful relationship (and crossover)
Rightly or wrongly, Chatham House and UNA would have disagreed with Eley. For them, consensus, rarely conflict, brought about effective change. The two organisations belonged to Arthur Marwick’s middle opinion that during the 1930s shored up cross-party support for collective security abroad and collectivism at home. They continued to play this role after the war, attempting to establish a hegemony of thought by means of building consensus and normalising internationalism. They were also supporters and often beneficiaries of Harold Perkin’s rising professional society. Indeed the founders of Chatham House, with the exception of Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), were the sons of the rising professional classes. Consistent with its roots in Oxford idealism and new liberalism, Chatham House was also unconvinced of the merits of social conflict to enact change and the use of class as an analytic category in foreign policy. This separated them from its contemporary the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), one of A.J.P. Taylor’s ‘trouble makers’. Chatham House ‘believed in the essential soundness of established society’. This had benefits. Firstly, it strengthened the Institute’s claim to impartiality and thus in turn its intellectual legitimacy. Secondly, it enabled the Institute to act as an insider group; it had access to Whitehall and maintained strong contacts within it. In 1965, D.C. Watt, a previous employee of the Institute, identified Chatham House as one of the foreign policy ‘unofficial elite’ that was able to exchange views with and receive privileged information from the ‘official elite’, a small tight group consisting only of senior officials in the Foreign Office and of other relevant departments, senior officers of the armed services and their intelligence

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58 C. Navari, ‘Chatham House and the Broad Church View of British Foreign Policy’ in Bosco and Navari (eds.), *Chatham House and British Foreign Policy 1919-1945*, 361-363.
59 Taylor, The Trouble Makers, chs.5-6.
60 Marwick, ‘Middle Opinion in the Thirties’, 297.
staffs, members of government and leading members of the Opposition.\textsuperscript{61} However, this did not make Chatham House the state’s stooge. Indeed its existence rested upon its independence from government. Its role was, as Cornelia Navari observes, ‘the counter-establishment within the establishment, the keeper of its conscience and a critic from within.’\textsuperscript{62} This was not a position the UDC could enjoy.\textsuperscript{63}

Helen McCarthy has demonstrated the same strategy was apparent in the LNU that, despite Taylor’s neglect, provided ‘the respectable face of troublemaking’. ‘By cultivating allies in the political parties, peace societies, churches, schools and an array of civic associations, the League’s champions in Britain mobilised broad sections of the population in support of a collective system of international relations.’\textsuperscript{64} UNA continued the same strategy and reaped the same rewards. Writing in 1976, William Wallace, Chatham House’s Director of Studies 1978-1990, noted that since D.C. Watt’s categorisation of the foreign policy elite, the number and variety of informed and influential participants in foreign policy debates had expanded significantly to include not only the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial elite’, but also the UNA’s policy advisory committees and other respected voluntary bodies, businesspeople, university academics and research institutes.\textsuperscript{65} As this thesis will show, UNA enjoyed close contact with Whitehall and senior politicians throughout the period.

UNA’s largely uncontroversial support for multilateral nuclear disarmament, for instance, also enabled it to draw on a large section of opinion. During CND’s first wave (1957-1963), 16 Gallup Polls were conducted to ascertain support for nuclear disarmament,

\textsuperscript{62} Navari, ‘Chatham House and the Broad Church View of British Foreign Policy’, 365.
\textsuperscript{64} McCarthy, \textit{The British People and the League of Nations}, 1.
\textsuperscript{65} W. Wallace, \textit{The Foreign Policy Process in Britain} (1\textsuperscript{st} edn 1976; London, 1977), 101-102, 109.
especially unilateral disarmament.\textsuperscript{66} The highest level of support that unilateral disarmament ever received was 33\% in May 1960.\textsuperscript{67} In August 1959, on the one occasion in which pollsters included both a specific option for multilateral disarmament and another to not disarm, 49\% supported UNA’s multilateral policy and 11\% supported CND’s unilateral policy.\textsuperscript{68} Furthermore, although UNA’s membership is usually compared unfavourably with its predecessor the LNU, a more synchronic comparison with the CND, as shown in figure 1.1, demonstrates that it was still capable of mobilising significant opinion and at a comparable scale. Unfortunately, there are no records of CND membership before 1967 and so CND’s first wave is neglected. However, CND’s estimated peak membership of 100,000, reached briefly in 1984, was not significantly higher than that of the UNA peak membership of 87,969 in 1948.\textsuperscript{69} Figure 1.2 displays the two organisations’ visibility within a range of newspapers and again reveals their comparability. Both graphs are, of course, crude illustrations. However, they do demonstrate that UNA’s ability to reach out to public opinion should not be underestimated and should not be obscured by either the LNU or CND.

Nevertheless, both graphs also indicate that liberal internationalism was losing its popular purchase. However, even amid CND’s rise in popularity during its second wave (1980-1989), its historian and activist Richard Taylor, was worried.

The persistent and fundamental problem of the movement since its inception has been its inability to translate its undoubted popular appeal into real, tangible achievement. Although the movement has had a very considerable impact upon public opinion, and thus, arguably, indirectly upon formal political structures and policies, it is quite clear that its central


\textsuperscript{67} Gallup (ed.), \textit{The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls}, vol. 1, 554.

\textsuperscript{68} Gallup (ed.), \textit{The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls}, vol. 1, 521-522.

\textsuperscript{69} UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: Annual Report 1948, 17. This peak total is not displayed in figure 1.1 for reasons of consistency. The final total listed in the annual report that year was 85,079.
Figure 1.1. Total individual membership of UNA and CND, 1945-1988.

Figure 1.2. Total number of mentions received by UNA and CND in a range of newspapers, 1945-1975.
objectives have not been achieved...The problem then is essentially political: how to articulate with effect the peace movement's dynamism and strength.\textsuperscript{70}

It was one thing to gain public support, it was quite another to actually fulfil central objectives. UNA shared the same problem. UNA had a comparably large membership to CND, had extensive contacts within Westminster and Whitehall and was arguing for a much less controversial foreign policy that garnered support form a broader section of opinion. Even though there was a declining faith in the UN’s effectiveness, Gallup Polls consistently observed popular acceptance of the necessity of the UN’s existence and of ensuring its success.\textsuperscript{71} Yet the UN did not become the central component of British foreign policy. The UNA’s old hands knew the problem well. In June 1935 the results of the LNU’s Peace Ballot were published, in which an estimated 38\% of the UK population over 18 had taken part, the vast majority of which supported the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{72} Six months later, it was followed by the Hoare-Laval Pact. Perhaps the staff at Chatham House had the right idea to focus on educating elites so that they would voluntarily bring about international integration, bringing the public with them. Britain did enter the EEC and Chatham House staff helped. But rapidly after the referendum in 1975, the public grew hostile to EEC membership, helped to hold Britain back from playing a leading role and perhaps one day soon the public may even force a British withdrawal.\textsuperscript{73}

How do you square ideals with a democratic foreign policy? Richard Taylor was right, the problem was political, but both “high” and “low”. Neither was the problem restricted to NGOs concerned with international affairs. NGO influence has always had to coincide with other factors. Popular campaigns were not enough. They also required ‘willing backbench

\textsuperscript{73} See, for example, S. George, \textit{An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community} (Oxford, 1990).
champions, an accommodating government, and a broader social acceptance of the need for reform’. Nicholas Crowson reveals how homelessness NGOs helped frame the debate from which the 1977 Housing Act arose, and were even in consultation with the civil service during its drafting. However, ultimately they had little power to bear on the creation and amendment of the legislation, which rested in the hands of political players within Westminster and Whitehall. Crowson concludes that some of pressure groups’ limitations are self-imposed; they have flaws. But some limitations are structural. This was where Richard Taylor was closest to the nub of the problem as to how NGOs could influence foreign policy, but it went beyond the need for effective articulation. Crucially, the problem was also structural.

In order to fully appreciate the postwar denouement of liberal internationalism, it is necessary to concurrently establish the extent of the democratisation of British foreign policy. We must understand the extent to which formal and informal structures prevented foreign policy innovation beyond the corridors of power. We must assess the politics of foreign policy. For this purpose, the combined activities of Chatham House and UNA represent a valuable analytical framework. The higher echelons of each body were part of the elite and had influence and insider insights on the formulation of foreign policy. UNA educated the public directly, held a mass membership and sought to secure it by making itself and the UN as visible as possible. Chatham House largely only reached out to the public indirectly, but it also debated whether it should try to reach out directly and over the problems inherent with such a policy. Both bodies were also naturally aware of the interdependence of domestic and international policy. Indeed it largely fuelled their desire for international integration. Both were very well versed in international thought and policy. Chatham House, of course, needed to be in order to earn its daily bread. However, UNA also commanded a wide-ranging

understanding of international affairs through its policy committees – containing thinkers and practitioners alike – and through the attention it paid to the expansive activities of the UN.

Subsequently both Chatham House and UNA were well-equipped to comment and propose alternative foreign policy. Arguably, this was not an area in which the postwar radicals, among them the New Left and CND, excelled. ‘Like [A.J.P.] Taylor’s dissenters’, Ian Hall writes, ‘they were united in a nagging sense that in an ideal world foreign policy would not be necessary. As a consequence, they devoted little time to setting out exactly what they would have preferred.’76 As a historian of CND and its equivalent West German protest movements concludes, ‘[t]heir internationalist rhetoric was...part of their reinterpretation of national identity, rather than an expression of idealist internationalism.’77 In contrast, Chatham House and UNA not only had a deep idealist internationalist motivation to understand the foreign policy process, but due to the insider status afforded to them as a result of their quiet respectability, they played a part in it, or at the very least had ringside seats.

THE EXISTING LITERATURE

Postwar Chatham House and UNA have received very little scholarly attention. However, the literature that exists on the two organisations before the Second World War is a valuable resource in informing their postwar direction. Furthermore, many of the same people remained active within the organisations long past the war had ended. Old hands at Chatham House, such as Lionel Curtis, Waldorf Astor, Arnold J. Toynbee and Ivison Macadam played important roles within the Institute into the 1950s. Some of the LNU’s old hands such as Kathleen Courtney and Phillip Noel-Baker remained active in the 1960s and 1970s.

76 Hall, Dilemmas of Decline, 130.
Despite the fact that Chatham House receives mentions in many international histories and within numerous biographies and memoirs of policy makers, no institutional history exists beyond two brief official accounts. The first was written in 1937 by one of the Institute’s Councillors and future founder of the Hansard Society, Stephen King-Hall. The second was written by the Institute’s Professor of Commonwealth Relations Charles Carrington in 1959 and was later updated by the deputy librarian Mary Bone in 2004. Both works provide useful outlines of some of the changes at the Institute and the motivations behind them. Being brief, however, they are lacking in detail; being official, they are naturally somewhat self-congratulatory.\textsuperscript{78} The closest works on Chatham House to represent a detailed institutional history are a collection of essays brought together by Andrea Bosco and Cornelia Navari concerning the Institute’s influence and thinking on British foreign policy between 1919 and 1945 and Inderjeet Parmar’s comparative account of Chatham House with its American sister institute the Council for Foreign Relations (CFR). The former is a highly valuable collection detailing the origins of the Institute, its attitudes to aspects of foreign policy and the role played by its protagonists in establishing the Institute and shaping the field of international relations.\textsuperscript{79} Parmar’s insightful account reveals the important role played by Chatham House in helping to improve Anglo-American relations during the Second World War, noting the influence of a wartime section of Chatham House seconded to the Foreign Office, the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS) later made the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD).\textsuperscript{80}


\textsuperscript{79} Bosco and Navari (eds.), \textit{Chatham House and British Foreign Policy}.

In addition to these works there have also been a variety of essays, chapters and articles written, further detailing its origins, research and its role as an unofficial diplomat. There have also been articles produced in anniversary issues of the Institute’s regular publications that provide general histories written by the Institute’s staff. The extent to which the Institute influenced the Foreign Office provides a consistent theme within much of the literature. Indeed this issue occupies the most famous essay Elie Kedourie’s ‘The Chatham House Version’ in which Kedourie argued that the Institute, especially Toynbee, largely influenced the Foreign Office’s Middle Eastern policy. Chatham House has also been included in analyses of the influence of think-tanks on foreign policy formulation. Few works comment on the Institute past 1945. It is worthy of note that all four of the works that have concertedly done so have been written within the past ten years and three of them relate


to unofficial diplomacy. This may be a result of increasing interest in transnationalism among scholars, enabling new appreciation of alternative avenues of influence beyond the impact the Institute’s work made on the formulation of foreign policy at the Foreign Office.86

There are only two brief works written on UNA. Both are written by former staff members of the Association. The first was written by David Ennals, Secretary of the UNA 1953-1957, in an edited collection concerned with the British relationship with the UN. It provides a whistle-stop tour of the body’s campaigns and tribulations and praises the UNA for playing a ‘vital role’, out of proportion to its total membership and income, in sustaining support for the UN among large sections of public opinion.87 The second work, a booklet written by Frank Field, Director of UNA 1973-1976, is a largely promotional piece written for the Association’s sixtieth anniversary in 2006. It again details some of UNA’s principal campaigns and provides some personal insights on some of its leading protagonists at the national level. Field concludes that although the previous sixty years could not be described as ‘glorious’, in them the Association had shown ‘a greater grasp of issues and a greater vision than have successive governments’.88 Again far more work has been done on the UNA’s pre-1945 form, the LNU.

There are three principal works concerned with the LNU. The first is Donald Birn’s institutional history published in 1981, which is largely placed within the analytical framework of interwar foreign policy debates, namely rearmament and appeasement. The volume focuses on the LNU’s executive and their relations with senior individuals within

Whitehall and Westminster. The LNU also features prominently in Martin Ceadel’s study of the British peace movement, in which Ceadel casts his net a little further to assess the role played by the LNU on international thought as well as on policy. The third work is that of Helen McCarthy’s on the League movement. McCarthy broadens the empirical base further, and examines the LNU’s impact upon interwar political culture at both a local and national level. It mainly departs from foreign policy debates and instead examines the LNU as part of the transformation of political life in the wake of the extended franchise. It thus provides an especially valuable analysis of the manner in which the LNU opened up new participatory spaces and helped democratise foreign policy.

For those desiring to assess the structures inherent in the foreign policy process in order to more definitely assess the extent of such democratisation, there are a number of works largely produced by international historians, political scientists and international relations scholars. D.C. Watt’s aforementioned essay on elites and Paul Kennedy’s Realities of Diplomacy have shown the variety of actors involved in the formulation of foreign policy in addition to the diplomats and government ministers. These works have been recently revisited and the broader influences on foreign policy have been explored by examining the wider circles in which its policy makers mixed. Further attention has been paid to deconstructing the assumptions, perceptions and symbolic practices of diplomats, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth century enhancing existing useful histories of the Foreign Office. Other studies have explored the erosion of the Foreign Office’s stranglehold

89 Birn, The League of Nations Union.
90 Ceadel, Semi-Detached Idealists. Ceadel is also to be credited with the first comprehensive study of the LNU’s Peace Ballot, see Ceadel, ‘The First British Referendum’.
over foreign policy in the twentieth century.95 Less, but important, attention has been paid to the impact of public opinion and the mechanics of the party political machine on British foreign policy.96 The increasing number of influences on foreign policy makers being discovered by such works has challenged old debates over the primacy of foreign or domestic policy, especially when transposed on the twentieth century.97

Of course, the work of political scientists and international relations scholars have also made highly valuable contributions to the study of foreign policy processes and these will be referred to frequently throughout the thesis. Tellingly, a number of these works were produced by associates of Chatham House and lamented how formal and informal structures hindered public engagement with international affairs in Britain and made the task of democratising foreign policy especially difficult.98 Overall, although little has been written on Chatham House, UNA and their impact upon the politics of foreign policy after 1945, the works above provide firm foundations.

SQUARING THE CIRCLE

Combining Chatham House, UNA and the broader politics of foreign policy into one analytic framework inevitably necessitates some reflection upon the methodological and conceptual challenges. Chatham House and UNA are brought together in this work for their broadly liberal internationalist agenda, and their shared origins, networks and methods. They shared

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95 See G. Johnson (ed.), The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (Abingdon, 2005).
similar concerns over the visibility of and engagement with international affairs within Britain among elites and the public. They also shared similar problems attracting new members and in relation to finances. Despite there being important distinctions between the two organisations, they had much in common.

Of course, the most obvious distinction was that Chatham House was a think-tank with a limited membership and UNA was a pressure group with a mass membership. However, there is a danger even here in distinguishing the two in such categories. Definitions of both categories have changed significantly over time, reflecting the changing nature of the activities and reach of non-state actors. Furthermore, as will become apparent in chapter two, there were a number within UNA who were uncomfortable with being described as a ‘pressure group’. This thesis thus avoids detailed, potentially exclusionary, definitions of the two categories to avoid conceptual entanglements down the line and clouding the commonalities between Chatham House and UNA, and those they shared with other non-state actors. Instead the two organisations are both considered here under the umbrella term of NGO. To avoid even further complications, this thesis adopts the minimal definition of NGOs provided by the Database of Archives of UK Non-Governmental Organisations which reads as follows: ‘An NGO is a non-violent organisation that is both independent of government and not serving an immediate economic interest, with at least some interest in having socio-political influence.’ This definition is appropriate for both Chatham House and UNA.

The issue of independence ought to also be addressed. This is not so much the case with regards to the two organisations’ relations with government. Chapter three will show that they both were sufficiently independent of government to earn non-governmental status.

Rather the issue of independence should be addressed in relation to the party political

99 See, for example, H. Pautz, ‘Revisiting the Think Tank Phenomenon’, Public Policy and Administration, 26 (2011), 421-423; W. Grant, Pressure Groups and British Politics (Basingstoke, 2000).
100 M. Hilton et al, A Historical Guide to NGOs in Britain: Charities, Civil Society and the Voluntary Sector since 1945 (Basingstoke, 2012), 10.
persuasion of both NGOs. Although Chatham House and UNA were (and are) all-party organisations, they adopt a broadly liberal, centrist outlook. It is important to especially emphasise this with regards to Chatham House. Diane Stone rightly notes in relation to both Chatham House and CFR that after the Second World War, ‘although an epistemic community did exist, it was diluted or dissolved by competing paradigms as the number of participants in the study and practice of international relations increased’. Some basic positions were not universally held. For example, the aforementioned Charles Carrington was a prominent critic of European integration. However, although Chatham House did not possess the same ideological cohesiveness as it had done during the interwar period, it remained fundamentally internationalist and the direction of its executive was liberal internationalist. As Ian Hall observes, the Directors who replaced the old guard, Christopher Montague Woodhouse (1955-1959) and Kenneth Younger (1959-1971) were both broadly liberal. Younger’s successor, Andrew Shonfield (1971-1977), can be added to the list as could his successor David Watt (1978-1983). The first three had also held the position of Director of Studies and thus managed the Institute’s research agenda. Importantly, all of the above were strong supporters of Britain joining the EEC.

Nevertheless, although both UNA and Chatham House had a broadly liberal, centrist outlook, it should be made clear that that does not necessarily mean that they were aligned to the Liberal Party. Both organisations held supporters of the Labour, Liberal and Conservative parties. Nor should it be understood that liberal internationalists who belonged to either the

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101 Stone, *Capturing the Political Imagination*, 189-190.
102 Hall, *Dilemmas of Decline*, 133.
103 Hall, *Dilemmas of Decline*, 53.
Labour or Conservative parties were necessarily less committed to its tenets than supporters of the Liberal Party, or indeed less politically motivated to be seen to be. The results of general elections under the first-past-the-post electoral system offer crude reflections of the breadth of the British ideological spectrum on which liberal internationalism appealed widely across the centre ground. It should not be assumed either that Chatham House did not offer a platform or membership to non-liberal internationalists; to have not done so would have been decidedly illiberal. To avoid confusion, unless rendered otherwise within quotations, the Liberal Party and its politicians are referred to here with a capital ‘L’, whereas the philosophy of liberalism and its values are referred to with a small ‘l’.

The assessment of impact and its relation to source material also needs addressing. This thesis abides with the assumption that in order to fully appreciate the reach of non-state actors in foreign policy, it is necessary to assess the extent of its democratisation. Not only was the democratisation of foreign policy in itself an aspiration of many liberal internationalists, but in an entirely interrelated fashion, the less democratised foreign policy was, the less influence non-state actors had as their avenues of influence through the electorate, through the media and through parliament became restricted. Democratisation is understood here to be in a state of constant flux. It is not enough to have accountability and transparency; there must also be willing participation and knowledge to maintain both.

Apathy hinders democratisation. Subsequently, it is important to assess structures – both formal and informal – that often discouraged accountability, transparency, interest and knowledge in international affairs. However, Susan Pedersen demonstrates how the methods and approaches used by both high political and new political historians do not lend themselves readily to ‘serious study of what we call governance or rule – of the structure, reach and practices and the state’. The focus paid by both schools of thought on the language of politics, which aims to properly establish the meaning actors attached to their political
surroundings can divert attention away from how structures, which formed part of those surroundings, helped instruct that meaning, and how structures ultimately achieved or stunted certain ends. This is not to say that the focus on language, which in part results from the highly beneficial linguistic turn, is unfruitful, quite the contrary. It would be crudely instrumentalist to suggest that UNA or Chatham House – or indeed CND – were wholly unsuccessful merely because they had not achieved their ends in changing aspects of foreign policy. The meaning actors attached to these organisations helped shape political culture and the structures that existed within it. However, by analysing such meaning in relation to structures (not all of which are necessarily erected by the state), this thesis aims to be able to more definitely assess the reach of Chatham House and UNA, and the impact they made within their confines.

Subsequently, this thesis has its empirical basis not just in the comprehensive archives of both Chatham House and UNA and private papers of those associated with the organisations. It is also based in the archives of those institutions that erected the structures that helped determine the politics of foreign policy. As Rodney Lowe writes in relation to the records of government, which has likely erected the largest collection of those structures, their sheer scope represents an important resource for attaining a balanced analysis of impact.

The great advantage of government records – properly used – is that, in their fullness, they reveal not only the complete range of influences to which government was subjected at any given time but also what did not change. They permit in other words, greater contextualisation and balance...a vital counterweight to an inherent danger in all contemporary history: the

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‘tyranny’ of relevance or the seeking – and recognition – in the past only that which is relevant to the present.106

This thesis seeks to avoid exaggerating the purchase of liberal internationalism or a simplistic narrative of decline. It also seeks to gain an understanding of the politics of foreign policy with further implications for the study of British politics more generally. Subsequently, it refers to the records of government, parliament, political party headquarters, psephological and social research organisations, media outlets and trade unions. This work also draws upon contemporary publications by political scientists, sociologists, international relations scholars, educational scientists and economists. By approaching the topic with a breadth of sources, the thesis seeks to better recognise and challenge the implicit assumptions made within these epistemic communities (in addition to mine own assumptions) and gain a more secure understanding of what is not recorded. Committee minutes often gloss over controversy; important decisions are often made where there are no records; public announcements are sanitised; and no historical subject’s views can be representative of all opinion and neither can they enjoy complete cognisance of their surroundings. Of course, no historian can be truly objective nor hope to ever fill in all of the pieces of the jigsaw. However, developments in research practices resulting from digitisation and internet resources, although certainly not without their own methodological problems, enable the twenty-first century historian to explore their topic not just in-depth but with a greater breadth than has been possible before.107

Finally, problems arise relating to periodisation in a work that examines organisations midway through their lives. The period examined here is circa 1945 to 1975. The operative word here is ‘circa’. This is especially the case with Chatham House. Although UNA was for

all intents and purposes the continuation of the LNU, there were significant differences between the two organisations they promoted, the League and the UN. This impacted upon UNA’s activities and thus the founding of the UN in 1945 provides a reasonably neat chronological break. The year 1945 also saw the end of a Chatham House section’s secondment to the Foreign Office. However, in order to contextualise the Institute’s relationship with the public, political parties and of course Whitehall, it is necessary to look back into the Second World War. In the interests of further contextualisation, the second chapter also provides a brief account of the intellectual origins of Chatham House and the LNU/UNA.

The year 1975 has been chosen as this study’s end as it was the mid-point in a decade in which it was highly apparent that liberal internationalism was under threat. In 1971 the Bretton Woods system came to an ignoble end with the Nixon Shock. The Oil Crisis (1973-1974) signalled the end of US economic hegemony and the depth of economic globalisation. However, the reaction was not Keynesian macro-economics. Instead, deregulation, with little international coordination, swept the Western world.108 Chatham House and UNA were also suffering from the worsening economic situation. Both were forced to accept grants from the Foreign Office. UNA’s membership went into continual decline while it complained about the dismal lack of attention given to international affairs by the media and politicians as the global was being shown to be becoming ever more important. 1975 would also, of course, see the referendum which decided that Britain would remain a member of the EEC which it had joined two years before. However, as covered earlier, it was hardly a vindication of the popularity of liberal internationalism. Indeed the year 1975 contained within it ominous signs of what was to come. Firstly, there was the Labour Party’s lacklustre campaign during the referendum, which did little to mask the underlying divisions within the party over the issue.

Eight years later, the party would campaign to take Britain out of the EEC and to begin unilateral disarmament. Secondly, 1975 also saw the election of Margaret Thatcher as leader of the Conservative Party. Ten years later she boycotted the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). Her postwar predecessors would never have dared to have offended liberal opinion by leaving a UN agency. In 1975 Labour would soon move Left and the Conservatives would soon move Right. The centre ground was becoming a little too quiet for comfort and liberal internationalism was in for a rough ride.

ARGUMENT AND ORGANISATION

This thesis will argue that liberal internationalism lived past the expiry date imposed upon it by historians. By examining the relationships Chatham House and UNA had with the public, Whitehall and the party political machine, it will show that the ideology had purchase both among elites and the general public. It will demonstrate that these organisations were influential in themselves and acted as democratising agents in foreign policy, extending debate over international affairs beyond Whitehall. Nevertheless, they proved resistant to shaking off an elitist paternalism that clouded their judgement. They found themselves gravitating too close to the corridors of power, even entangling themselves in its machinations and they generally struggled to stage sufficient dynamism to fend off new rivals that competed for their memberships and who provided attractive alternatives to new potential, especially young, supporters.

However, this thesis will also argue that the extent of the democratisation of foreign policy was severely limited. Formal and informal structures erected by the state, political parties and the media prevented a considerable amount of participation in the foreign policy process beyond Whitehall that jealously guarded its domain. It will become apparent that while Britain acclimatised to its new position in the world, its foreign policy could have
benefited from the innovation that such participation could have procured. Ministers and civil servants too readily understood change to mean merely decline. Rather than timely adapting to decolonisation and the subsequent proliferation of newly empowered independent states that swelled the UN’s General Assembly, they dithered over where Britain’s future lay. Politicians often ignored foreign policy and failed to understand just how intimately involved the domestic and the international were becoming; others promoted the illusion that they were not. Many within the media were also guilty of the same misjudgement and doubted the public’s ability to understand international affairs and their desire to do so. The politics of foreign affairs in Britain encouraged a reactionary, often directionless foreign policy.

This argument is structured thematically. The next chapter will address Chatham House and UNA’s appreciation of the public understanding of international affairs. It will outline how the two organisations’ intellectual lineages informed the communication strategies they adopted and the internal debates that surrounded them that went to the very heart of their raison d’être. It will explore the relationship between the organisations and the media, and how the latter’s practices proved ill-suited to presenting the extent of global interdependence, the principal motivation for international organisation and integration. Finally, the chapter will provide an interpretation on the actual public understanding of international affairs in postwar Britain and why liberal internationalism struggled to retain popular purchase.

Chapter three will detail how Chatham House and UNA as insider organisations with close contacts with ministers and officials worked to maintain their independence from government. It will demonstrate how they influenced thinking, and more often rhetoric, among policy makers, but also the dangers they risked as Whitehall attempted to influence them in return. It will show that liberal internationalist opinion was by no means treated as insignificant. It details the role that the two organisations played as unofficial diplomats and
public forums for commentary and activism relating to foreign policy and the subsequent government interest they aroused. The chapter will also outline how both Chatham House and UNA were forced into the unenviable position of having to request government grants to maintain their activities.

Chapter four will demonstrate why it was important for Chatham House and UNA to maintain their all-party status and how they sought to internationalise political discourse in Britain and fought for a consensus over the need for a liberal internationalist foreign policy. It will detail how party politics encouraged politicians to avoid drawing attention to international affairs and global interdependence. The chapter will also examine the relationships the organisations held with the three main parties, how they contributed to their policy directions and how they struggled to turn words into action and persuade politicians to put what Chatham House and UNA perceived to be the national and world’s interest before party loyalty.

Chapter five, the conclusion, will determine what happened to liberal internationalism and its advocates in postwar Britain. It will review the flawed approaches made by Chatham House and UNA to promote the cause of liberal internationalism among elites and the public, but it will also deliberate on their successes and comment on the directions they took after the 1970s. It will bring together the findings of the preceding chapters to interpret the extent of British foreign policy’s democratisation. The chapter will also ruminate on the wider implications of the thesis for the study of British politics more generally. Ultimately, it will assess the extent to which twentieth century Britons considered foreign policy to be foreign.
Cultivating Public Opinion: Understanding the Public Understanding of International Affairs

What does Chatham House exist for? Just to research? Or to educate the public here and elsewhere? If so how?

Robert Brand to Ivison Macadam, 1 May 1954

There are those who think of us as a second Chatham House – and at the other end, those who think we should be marching down Whitehall every other weekend. Those of us who would have us spend time on political issues alone, and those whose concern is almost entirely “charitable”.

William Barnes to Humphry Berkeley, 10 Aug 1968

In postwar Britain, liberal internationalism struggled to win over many hearts. Both Chatham House and UNA were established to inform public opinion. Both encountered great difficulties in reaching it. The various communication strategies they experimented with and employed made a highly significant impact upon how the bodies were modelled and their very raison d’être. The question of which strategy to select also stimulated much controversy.

For the Director of Chatham House, Ivison Macadam, the answer to Robert Brand’s question was simple. Chatham House was first and foremost a research institute. He had sympathy with the idea of reaching out beyond elite opinion, but, via a zero-sum calculation, he very much doubted that the Institute was capable of doing so while simultaneously conducting serious research. Even Macadam’s mentor, Lionel Curtis, who was most anxious that ill-informed public opinion could lead Britain astray and had founded the Institute ‘to cultivate’

it, objected to Chatham House attempting to reach out to the public directly. From its foundation, Curtis advocated that Chatham House ought to focus its attention on educating elite opinion, which in turn would educate public opinion; that it should educate the educators. This model was later described in 1935 by Stephen King-Hall, a member of the Institute’s Council and future founder of the Hansard Society: Chatham House ‘helps the man who reads the leading article by helping the man who writes it. It helps the voter by helping the MP’.

During and after the Second World War Curtis maintained that the King-Hall model was usually the most effective means for reaching the public. In 1944, Curtis believed that the two most significant influences on public opinion were Winston Churchill and The Times. However, not everyone within Chatham House shared Curtis’s faith in such an elite-centric model. In the same year, following a successful experiment whereby the Institute educated service personnel, a committee was tasked to assess the future of Chatham House and establish whether the Institute should engage directly with the public.

For the UNA it was much less a question of whether it should or should not engage directly with the public, but how. The LNU and UNA’s model involved coordinating public opinion to check the British government’s impulses to veer away from an internationalist foreign policy. It was another elite-centric model that did little to threaten the structures inherent in the politics of foreign policy. However, the UNA’s claim to represent public opinion began to come undone as it struggled to maintain a gradually dwindling mass membership. UNA subsequently searched, often vainly, for new methods to inspire public faith in the United Nations and the liberal internationalist cause. It was no easy task. Large

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sections of the British public were first disillusioned with the death of the League of Nations and then Cold War power politics. They became grimly fatalistic and disengaged. What could the individual do against the superpowers? As William Barnes noted, there were those within UNA who advocated that the Association should shy away from dismal international politics and focus on the good the UN could do in terms of providing humanitarian relief. The British public could be relied upon to respond to such campaigns; humanitarianism was ‘big business’. There were also those within UNA, especially the young, who looked on with envy at the glamour and the attention afforded to the direct action espoused by new social movements, especially of course CND. There were even those, like the UNA Chairman in the early 1960s Nigel Nicolson, who felt that the Association should accept defeat, abandon its mass membership and become a second Chatham House. ‘Prejudice and misunderstanding about the United Nations’, Nicolson argued, ‘could be dispelled by informed argument better than by emotional appeals’.

This chapter explores the internal debates that occurred within both Chatham House and UNA as to how to best reach the public and convert them to the internationalist cause. It will reveal how the often flawed methods employed by the two bodies prevented them from making greater progress. However, the chapter also examines the climate in which they operated and outlines the great difficulties the two organisations had to surpass. The two organisations’ relations with the media will thus be explored so as to demonstrate how media practices tended to skew limited international coverage to only those issues that were perceived to be of interest to the British public. Aspects of international affairs that liberal internationalists wished to stress such as international cooperation were deemed too dull.

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Finally, the chapter examines the public understanding of international affairs itself. It shows the impact of the media, but also that of increasingly apathetic attitudes towards political elites in general and the institutions that housed them, whether they were domestic or international. It brings together the chapter’s findings and ultimately demonstrates why Chatham House and UNA experienced such difficulties when attempting to cultivate public opinion. However, it is first necessary to provide a brief intellectual history of the foundations of both organisations in order to appreciate how they understood the public understanding of international affairs, what they wished the public to understand, and their elite-centricity – one of the most significant reasons why liberal internationalism struggled to win over many hearts.

A TALE OF TWO MODELS

On the 30 May 1919, during the Paris Peace Conference, a consequential meeting took place between British, Dominion and American delegates at the Hotel Majestic, a short walk from the Arc de Triomphe. It was not a cheery gathering. The terms of the Treaty of Versailles had been drafted and the general direction of the peace settlements was becoming clear. There existed at the time two polar-opposite conceptions of the postwar world order: ‘new diplomacy’ and ‘old diplomacy’. New diplomacy was epitomised by the Covenant of the League of Nations that was intended to regulate the relations of its member states with open treaties, collective agreements and the widest possible publicity. In contrast, old diplomacy, was epitomised by the bilateral alliances that preceded the First World War that thrived upon closed treaties with secret clauses and the narrowest possible concealment. It would be wrong to suggest that there were many hard and fast advocates of each among the delegates attached to the Paris Peace Conference, but those delegates at the meeting in the Hotel Majestic
belonged to the new diplomacy half of the spectrum.\textsuperscript{8} It was here that Chatham House was conceived. The delegates included Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr, but it also included one of the principal actors involved with the LNU established in the previous year, Robert Cecil, and his protégé also soon to be an important LNU actor Philip (later Noel-) Baker.

‘There is no single person in this room’, Cecil lamented, ‘who is not disappointed with the terms we have drafted.’\textsuperscript{9} Harold Nicolson, also in attendance, referred to the treaty as a ‘bloody bullying peace’.\textsuperscript{10} The hopes of these delegates, that the peace settlements would be forged in the spirit of Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points, were dashed. Their political leaders had betrayed them; the Treaty of Versailles was deemed unwisely punitive and the League of Nations was hindered by it being associated with it.\textsuperscript{11} However, although attendees such as Nicolson were hardly complementary of the three ‘ignorant and incompetent’ premiers, Wilson, David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau, the meeting was more concerned with changing the attitudes of the public rather than those of the elites.\textsuperscript{12} Curtis, who dominated the meeting, contended that ‘the settlements being made in Paris were mainly the resultant of the public opinions of various countries concerned’.\textsuperscript{13} In Britain the Forth Reform Act had just ushered in mass enfranchisement amid nationalistic fervour and the delegates feared that Lloyd George, in common with Wilson, had put the favour of his constituents before the future peace of Europe. Impressed by the seeming power of public opinion, Curtis argued that the ‘future moulding of these settlements would depend upon how far public opinion...would be right or wrong’.\textsuperscript{14} Cecil wrote in similar terms later that year: ‘In a

\textsuperscript{9} H. Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (New York, 1965), 353.
\textsuperscript{12} Nicolson, Nicolson Diaries,24.
\textsuperscript{13} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 608/152: ‘Minute of a meeting at the Hotel Majestic’, 30 May 1919.
\textsuperscript{14} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 608/152: ‘Minute of a meeting at the Hotel Majestic’, 30 May 1919.
democratic age, everything depends on public opinion. This means that the public must have an opinion of international affairs, and that its opinion must be right.\textsuperscript{15} However, both Chatham House and the UNA employed different models to cultivate ‘right’ opinion.

The desire of Chatham House’s founders to mould public opinion was not new. Their motivation stemmed from the same philosophy that inspired their federalism, Oxford idealism. Oxford idealism was one of the dominant schools of thought at Oxford University at the turn of the century when the Institute’s principal founders Curtis, Kerr, Arnold J. Toynbee and Alfred Zimmern were in attendance. The best known of the Oxford idealists was its ideological father, T.H. Green, whose work was couched in Hegelian organicism and evolving social Christianity. Green’s work challenged the habitual liberal antithesis between the individual and the state and proclaimed the virtues of an active citizenship in which individuals would reach self-realisation by acts of altruism for the common good. Green lauded public service and loathed individualism for selfish gain, which he understood to be an inevitable prerequisite for social atomism.\textsuperscript{16} Green and the Oxford idealists were part of the wider intellectual movement that sought the reconciliation of political liberalism with social responsibility that would later help usher in new liberalism and underpinned collectivism.

The founders’ federalism was predicated on Oxford idealism in part simply as a result of the influence of Green’s disciple Alfred Milner who brought them into his Kindergarten that helped establish the federal Union of South Africa. Curtis and Kerr became the principal founders of the Round Table movement, which aimed to extend their federal project to the rest of the British Empire.\textsuperscript{17} Toynbee, Zimmern and other founders of the Institute became associated with the movement. Moreover, Oxford and Scottish idealism’s reconciliation of the individual with the community was developed by the seminal new liberal Leonard T.

\textsuperscript{16} For a detailed analysis of Green’s works, see P. Harris and J. Morrow (eds.), \textit{T.H. Green: Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings} (Cambridge, 1986).
\textsuperscript{17} See J. Kendle, \textit{The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union} (Toronto, 1975).
Hobhouse’s interpretation of social evolution. Hobhouse held that advanced societies could be identified by the extent of personal and institutionalised harmony between individuals and groups. From this perspective, the Round Tablers perceived the British Empire as an advanced product of the natural evolution of society as it connected diverse cultures and societies into one supposedly peaceful polity.\(^{18}\)

Oxford idealism helped inspire the founders’ desire to inform the general public due to its emphasis on the importance of civic education and its resultant contribution to the settlement movement. Curtis became heavily involved with the settlement movement and was particularly well-known for his researches of the poor while posing as a tramp in London slums.\(^{19}\) Kerr lectured at Toynbee Hall and Zimmern became a luminary at the Workers Educational Association (WEA).\(^{20}\) The WEA was founded in 1903 at Toynbee Hall, the first university settlement house that was founded as a memorial to Arnold J. Toynbee’s uncle and namesake Arnold Toynbee, perhaps Green’s most faithful disciple.\(^{21}\) The settlement movement and the WEA reflected an optimism fuelled by the ideas of Green but also those of Matthew Arnold, especially his concept of ‘common culture’. Class conflict would be mollified by the simple act of bringing university teachers together with working people. The former would impart nonpartisan education to the latter to properly equip them for their democratic responsibilities. But teacher and student would also learn of their social


obligations to one another and thus education would bind citizens together, regardless of their socio-economic backgrounds. Social harmony, not social conflict, was the name of the game.\textsuperscript{22}

However, at the turn of the twentieth century, this optimism was counterbalanced with growing fears among new liberals such as Hobhouse, Graham Wallas and John A. Hobson who voiced concerns that universal suffrage might beckon a tyranny of a volatile ‘mob mind’ susceptible to the sensationalism of the likes of the Northcliffe and Beaverbrook press. Subsequently, Hobhouse called for an alliance between ‘Science and Democracy’ based upon new knowledge of the social sciences. New liberals began to entrench normative values espousing the concept of the intellectual as an authoritative carrier of objective knowledge and truth in the hope that well-known intellectuals might provide guidance to the increasingly enfranchised “masses”.\textsuperscript{23}

Kerr, Zimmern and Curtis were keen to help provide such guidance. In 1911, under the auspices of the Round Table movement, they fashioned a ‘principal of the commonwealth’ that sought to articulate the movement’s conception of the proper roles of the state and the citizen. Here they envisioned a citizenship in Greenian terms based upon obligation and duty towards the community as a whole, rather than one based upon privilege or rights. However, it also stipulated that before citizens were entrusted with the vote, they ought to have the intellectual capacity for judging just what the common good was and the moral capacity to put it before their own selfish desires. It was thus imperative that they

\textsuperscript{22} J. Rose, \textit{The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes} (New Haven CT, 2001), 265-266; Goldman, \textit{Dons and Workers}, 51. See also S. Collini, \textit{Matthew Arnold: Culture and Anarchy and Other Writings} (Cambridge, 1993).

prepare as many people as possible for the exercise of their political responsibilities.  

Subsequently, during the First World War, Zimmern tasked himself with putting the Round Table view before working class opinion through the WEA and was later assisted by Arnold J. Toynbee. Out of the WEA, Zimmern in collaboration with Arthur Greenwood and Ramsay Muir established the Council for the Study of International Relations, which, in a sign of things to come, devoted itself to the study of international affairs.

Nevertheless, if we return to the conception of Chatham House in 1919, we find that Curtis did not advocate that the role of the new institute should include directly mediating knowledge to the public. ‘Right public opinion’, Curtis told his fellow delegates, ‘was mainly produced by a small number of people in real contact with the facts who had thought out the issues involved.’ This was likely due to the founders own unsatisfactory experiences of attempting to engage mass opinion through the WEA and similar organisations. By this point many new liberals had lost faith in the power of public intellectuals and were convinced that the First World War had created a new political, social and cultural context in which they felt unable to compete in. Sensing that their cultural authority among mass opinion was limited, the founders turned to those who they perceived as the most effective public mediators of knowledge – journalists and politicians.

Chatham House subsequently focussed on securing its intellectual legitimacy in order to influence these mediators. By 1919, the intellectual legitimacy of the Round Table movement was proving difficult to maintain as it gained a reputation for being merely propagandist. Curtis would later write that the establishment of Chatham House ‘was a

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26 TNA: Foreign Office Archives, FO 608/152: ‘Minutes of a meeting on proposed Institute of International Affairs’, 30 May 1919.
27 See Navari, ‘Chatham House and the Broad Church View’, 354.
necessary tactical change to effect the same strategic object’. The new British Institute of International Affairs, established in 1920, did much to gain a reputation for being a centre of objective truth that was above the political fray. It was independent of government, precluded from expressing any opinion and promoted the idea that it was possible to study international affairs scientifically. Symbolic capital was secured by means of obtaining the actual property of Chatham House, the former home of three prime ministers, along with the successful petition for a Royal Charter just five years into its existence. Special efforts were made to attain the prefix ‘Royal’ in the title of the Institute, which was not an automatic benefit bestowed by the Charter. Chatham House also created a famous rule of non-attribution in 1927 so that politicians and official experts might inform debate without fear of political repercussion. By such means, Chatham House would attempt to educate the elites so that they in turn would educate public opinion. This was the King-Hall model and it would largely go unchallenged until the Second World War.

The LNU and its own communication strategy owed its origins to a wider, less cohesive community. Nevertheless, the Union shared, albeit more broadly, a liberal trajectory. It was also influenced by a liberal emphasis on civic education and optimism in the public’s essential rationality and ability to comprehend international affairs if the message was put

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32 The rule read: ‘In order that speakers may feel free to express their opinions, all meetings of the Institute shall, unless otherwise stated, be strictly private. Members shall be free to use information received at any meetings of the Institute, but it shall be a condition of such use that the speaker’s name shall not be quoted not the fact mentioned that the information was obtained at a meeting of the Institute.’ (CHA: 1/4: ‘The Royal Institute of International Affairs: General Information’, 3). The rule has since been refined in 1992 and in 2002. It now reads: ‘When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed. (Chatham House, ‘Chatham House Rule’, http://www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule (accessed 6 May 2015).
clearly. They differed from Chatham House in that they generally considered themselves to have sufficient cultural authority to engage directly with the public. The optimism among its founders may have been steeled by the same late nineteenth century idealism that had such an impact on Chatham House, but it is less clear. For example, Robert Cecil’s brothers, Hugh and William, were involved with the settlement movement, but it is not apparent whether he was himself. Oxford idealism certainly influenced the international thought of another key figure within the LNU, Gilbert Murray who was also involved with WEA along with his friend Zimmern. However, there were those within the LNU who, like many within Chatham House, partook in the new liberal anxieties that the public were in fact largely inclined to act irrationally and uncritically submit to the sensationalist press and the emotional appeals made by politicians. Tensions between those who held such anxieties within the LNU and those who belonged to the more optimistic school of thought persisted through the interwar period, exacerbated by alarm over perceived threats to traditional cultural hierarchies – epitomised in American imports – and the popularity of fascism across Europe. However, there was also a more practical element behind the LNU’s strategy to target the public directly than just a liberal optimism over their essential reasonableness that would come under increasing doubt during the interwar period. The LNU and its founders were worldlier than how E.H. Carr and other contemporaries portrayed them.

As demonstrated by Cecil’s support of Chatham House, the LNU shared its concerns that nationalist outrage in Britain directed at Germany had forced a potentially counterproductive peace settlement. Indeed the LNU was the amalgamation of divisions within the British League movement during the First World War largely concerned with whether Germany should be a member of the League of Nations. However, as a result of the First World War, LNU’s leaders were also highly suspicious of the governing classes across Europe including politicians such as Lloyd-George and the arch-purveyor of the old diplomacy, the Foreign Office. The Fourth Reform Act was thus to be welcomed if public opinion could be coordinated to keep the government in check and maintain them on the path to internationalism. The more members the LNU had, the more convincing its claim to represent a large section of opinion was and this gave them more clout with elected governments.

It went further than the membership total alone though, which amounted to a small percentage of the electorate. It was important to be at least seen to represent a broad section of opinion across the centre ground, whose supporters provided significant constituent elements of the main political parties. The perceived command of the centre ground of public opinion that the LNU and to a lesser extent UNA enjoyed ensured that governments did not take them lightly. This was especially the case with the LNU that operated within a period where the understanding of public opinion was new and largely unsophisticated. It would not be until the late 1930s that there would be Mass Observation and British Gallup Polls that sought to understand public opinion as it was, rather than as interpreted through NGOs. The LNU thus played up to its centrist position in the political spectrum. Being seen to veer off to the Left or

39 Birn, League of Nations Union, 6-12.
41 Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace, 155.
42 McCarthy, British People and the League, 19.
the Right was very dangerous as it risked giving the impression that the LNU – and UNA – no longer represented a cohesive body of opinion. Arguably, it may have given the LNU and UNA greater influence than some NGOs whose supporters were more disparately located across the political spectrum or grouped together at either of the mutually antagonistic ends of the Left or the Right.

However, in order for this model to work, it was necessary that on international affairs, the centre ground was populated. Education of the public was necessary so that their support could be coordinated through the LNU and UNA apparatus and passed on through its policy resolutions to the deputations in Whitehall. Through the LNU and its counterparts in the rest of the world, the peoples of the world, who were naturally understood not to wish any harm to one another, would keep in check their governments. Furthermore, the faith that was held in this model precluded the need to argue for adapting the structures inherent in the politics of foreign policy. The LNU differed from the UDC, for example, in that it sought to strengthen the existing League Covenant and did not argue for the popular election of British representatives to the League. It respected existing parliamentary and constitutional structures and UNA continued to do so.

In combination, Chatham House and UNA acted as a pincer movement on public opinion. While Chatham House aimed to educate elite opinion formers who would in turn educate the general public, the LNU wished to educate the public directly but provide a moderating influence by encouraging them to engage with international affairs within its own apparatus. Both democratised foreign policy, albeit in limited ways. They both held faith in the structures inherent in the politics of foreign policy and believed that they could indeed use

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them for their benefit. One provided elitism from above and the other elitism from below.

However, during and after the Second World War these models were not without their critics.

THE KING-HALL MODEL CHALLENGED

During the interwar period, a growing number within Chatham House questioned the Institute’s effectiveness at informing public opinion. Shortly after the start of the Second World War, Curtis noted two schools of thought at Chatham House. One held that Chatham House should attempt to reach out directly to ‘the man in the street’. The other school, of which Curtis belonged to, feared that the Institute would ‘spread ourselves too thin if we attempt to deal with film and lectures to Women’s Institutes, etc’. The former school questioned in particular the Institute’s especial focus on elite opinion formers and advocated that the Institute should reach out to a wider, more diverse, array of people who could also influence public opinion. The King-Hall model was deemed too elite-centric. They sought the influence of other opinion formers, namely other NGOs and educators. By such means, it was hoped that the Institute would make an impact not just on a wider middle-class audience, but also on working-class opinion. Previous efforts to reach out to a wider audience were not considered to be sufficiently effective. In 1938, Ivison Macadam, made Director of the Institute in 1929, was instrumental in establishing a branch for Manchester and another in Scotland with groups in Aberdeen, Edinburgh and Glasgow. However, these “provincial” ventures, although laudable, were aimed more at encouraging interest in international affairs among those who were prevented by geography from the use of Chatham House’s facilities, rather than by socio-economics. Nevertheless, a wartime experiment championed by the Institute’s chairman Waldorf Astor provided hope for change.

Waldorf Astor will forever be tarnished with the Cliveden Set, a label that made good copy but had little basis in fact.\textsuperscript{46} As Thomas Jones, a member of the “Set”, remarked, the group had ‘as much unity as the passengers in a railway train’.\textsuperscript{47} Rather than being at the centre of a Right-wing conspiracy in league with Hitler, Astor had liberal inclinations and was devoted to public service and social reform. In conversations with his close friend Nancy Astor, George Bernard Shaw often teasingly referred to her husband as ‘that Commie’.\textsuperscript{48} Like Curtis, Astor hoped that the Second World War would provide an opportunity to develop a federal Europe and was convinced that mobilising public opinion to support it was essential to future peace. In 1942, Waldorf wrote:

The British public...must realise that what happened in Europe is of vital concern to them and to their existence...Should we now begin to mould public opinion to favour active and permanent association...?

Astor certainly thought so and presciently posited that after the war Britain would only have a small window of opportunity to lead this federal project.\textsuperscript{49} He made the same argument when advising on the foreign policy stance of his newspaper, the Observer.\textsuperscript{50} He was supported by his son David Astor who was soon to be the paper’s editor and who increasingly influenced Waldorf’s politics. Like his father, David was influenced by Kerr’s federalist teachings. David held Kerr’s 1935 Burge Memorial Lecture, \textit{Pacifism is not Enough, nor Patriotism Either}, to be one of the most important texts of his life.\textsuperscript{51} Although authored


\textsuperscript{50} Cockett, \textit{David Astor}, 108.

\textsuperscript{51} Cockett, \textit{David Astor}, 15-18, 82.
anonymously, a piece entitled ‘Nationalism is not Enough’ that featured in the Observer in 1942 can most probably be attributed to David. It argued that a sustainable European federal system would rely upon ‘the wills of the peoples’.\textsuperscript{52} Contrast this with Curtis who felt that such a system would rely upon politicians leading opinion rather than following it.\textsuperscript{53}

David, however, had reason to be optimistic. The Second World War appeared to stir in the public an appetite for information on international affairs. In 1944, a Mass Observation report found that in comparison with studies of public attitudes from 1938, ‘foreign policy means something far less vague and incomprehensible’. The public also appeared sanguine about the future. The report noted the prevalent attitude was that ‘[f]oreign affairs will be a positive matter of keeping the peace and building the future, not just negative [sic] keeping out of war and averting disaster. This is at least the present mood.’\textsuperscript{54} Indeed, there was a surge of internationalism among working class opinion. Wartime experiences reoriented perspectives, connecting the local with the international. Furthermore, socialist internationalism had grown popular. The wartime alliance with the USSR had inspired hopes that the perceived champions of ordinary people would play a positive role in international relations.\textsuperscript{55} The alliance also contributed to optimism and interest in the future effectiveness of the UN. It is significant that the UN was born in 1942 and not, as commonly misconstrued, in 1945. Between those years, the term "United Nations" was used to describe the anti-Axis fighting alliance that included the USSR.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{52} Anonymous, ‘Nationalism is Not Enough’, Observer, 22 Mar 1942, 4. This article appeared as part of a series named ‘The Forum’ organised by David Astor who wrote many of its articles. See Cockett, David Astor and the Observer, 82-3.


\textsuperscript{55} See V. Silverman, Imagining Internationalism in American and British Labor, 1939-49, (Urbana IL, 2000), 52-56

The new public interest in international affairs had not gone by unnoticed at Chatham House. It received a number of requests from groups who hoped that the Institute might facilitate discussions.\textsuperscript{57} By 1944, Macadam noted a ‘remarkable growth in the public concern’.\textsuperscript{58} It coincided with a more general interest in current affairs. Sonya Rose notes how the active citizenship preached by the idealists flowered in the Second World War. Citizenship ‘was linked with “social responsibility” and participation in civil society or in public affairs’. Self-sacrifice was deemed imperative for national survival.\textsuperscript{59}

Subsequently there was an increased demand for adult education.\textsuperscript{60} In 1941, responding to concerns over morale and ignorance of war aims within the armed forces, W.E. Williams, the Editor-in-Chief of Penguin Books and Secretary of the British Institute of Adult Education, devised the Army Bureau for Current Affairs (ABCA).\textsuperscript{61} ABCA organised a scheme whereby units underwent weekly discussion sessions led by regimental officers who were assisted by bulletins concerned with both domestic and international issues. Not only did this improve participants’ understanding of international affairs, it also encouraged question and debate. A journalist within the army observed that ‘ABCA is the reversal of the idea that the soldier must not think for himself, let alone talk for himself or be interested in politics or world affairs’.\textsuperscript{62} Indeed, a new habit of reasoning aloud had the potential to feature in unexpected scenarios: ‘Don’t you try to ABCAize me!’ remarked one service woman as her soldier lover itemised the grounds of his affection.\textsuperscript{63} The BBC panel programme \textit{The Brains}
Trust, which also began in 1941, helped sate the public appetite. Only news bulletins and J.B. Priestley’s Postscripts drew more listeners.\textsuperscript{64}

Chatham House sought to capitalise on this new state of affairs. In 1941, bibliographies were produced for the WEA and a member of staff was specifically appointed to present information in a popular form, known as the Information Notes.\textsuperscript{65} However, the most significant and lasting contribution that the Institute was to make began in September 1942, when at the request of ABCA, Chatham House began a series of specialist courses and became ABCA’s only civilian attachment. These weekend-courses were composed of around seven lectures followed by discussion. Their principal object was to provide information to officers that they could pass on in their weekly ABCA discussions. Approximately 300 attended each course.\textsuperscript{66} By the end of the war, 12,000 officers had attended.\textsuperscript{67} The subjects of the courses – unsurprisingly – often occupied themselves with the war and its actors, but they also centred on the postwar international order, the Commonwealth and postwar plans for the United Nations.\textsuperscript{68} Macadam hailed the first course in 1942 as ‘an historic moment in the annals of Chatham House’.\textsuperscript{69} Williams was pleased too: ‘we can trace a good deal of the recent progress of A.B.C.A. back to Chatham House’.\textsuperscript{70} A memorandum written by the Institute in 1943 examining the impact of the courses boasted that numerous letters of thanks had been received. It noted a stimulated interest in the Institute’s publication Information Notes and that the only common criticism was that the courses were too short. Furthermore, it remarked that the courses were welcomed by Chatham House’s Council, since they enabled the Institute ‘to carry out its primary function in disseminating objective information on

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  \item \textsuperscript{64} A. Calder, The People’s War: Britain 1939-1945 (1\textsuperscript{st} edn, 1969; London 1992), 366.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Astor Mss: MS 1066/1/550: M. Cleeve to W. Astor, 13 Oct 1941; MS 1066/1/557: Report to the Trustees of the York Trust, 1 Jul 1943.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} CHA: 11/1: ‘Advanced Courses on International Affairs Arranged at Chatham House’, July 1943.
  \item \textsuperscript{67} Royal Institute of International Affairs (hereafter RIIA), The Future of Chatham House: Report of a Planning Committee of the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London 1946), 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{68} For individual course programmes, see CHA: 11/1.
  \item \textsuperscript{69} Astor Mss: MS 1066/1/553: Macadam to Standing Orders Committee, 22 Sep 1942.
  \item \textsuperscript{70} Astor Mss: MS 1066/1/557: ‘Report to the Trustees of the York Trust’, 1 Jul 1943.
\end{itemize}
international affairs’. It recalled that at the Paris Peace Conference the architects of the Institute had ‘found that the hands of the statesmen who had to formulate terms of peace were tied by the ignorance and parochialism of public opinion in their respective countries’.

Finally, it predicted that Britain’s postwar responsibilities would make claims on every citizen who would subsequently require an informed understanding of international affairs.\(^71\)

It was this that most occupied Waldorf Astor. He hoped that the younger officers – ‘the civilians of the future’ – would turn to the Institute ‘as the natural centre from which to obtain information upon international affairs’.\(^72\) He also wished to expand the Institute’s educational activities beyond the armed forces and envisioned that Chatham House might provide information and run courses for educational settlements (like Toynbee Hall), the WEA, universities, Local Educational Authorities and MPs.\(^73\)

Astor’s plans did not end there. In 1944 Williams began to devise a peacetime ABCA, what would become the Bureau of Current Affairs (BCA). Similarly to ABCA, the BCA would provide institutions with publications for study groups and run courses for those leading them. It differed, however, in that the BCA’s target audience was now also civilian. Subscribers to the BCA included schools, adult education bodies, industry, religious organisations, libraries and the press.\(^74\) From an early stage, Williams discussed his plans with Astor who was extremely receptive. Naturally, Astor felt that Chatham House should provide the factual material for the future BCA on matters of international affairs, but he went further. Astor’s ‘wildest dream’ consisted of the Institute buying the property adjacent to

\(^72\) Astor Mss: MS 1066/1/553: W. Astor to M. Cleeve, 21 Mar 1942.
\(^73\) Astor Mss: MS 1066/1/558: W. Astor to W. Citrine, 3 Jan 1944; MS 1066/1/559: W. Astor to P. Thorneycroft, 18 May 1944.
Chatham House and renting out space for BCA’s headquarters. A neighbouring BCA, Astor concluded, would fit well with plans to continue Chatham House’s courses and to provide information in a more popularised form. Eventually, the short-lived BCA did not take residence in St James’s Square but close by at Carnegie House on Piccadilly.

Crucially, Astor’s vision of postwar Chatham House differed significantly from King-Hall’s communication strategy. Under Astor’s system, the Institute would still use mediators in order to transfer their knowledge to the public – it would still be educating the educators. However, these educators were in direct contact with wide sections of the public and there was sufficient confidence in Chatham House’s cultural authority to reach them. When seeking to attain funding from the York Trust – founded by David Astor and directed by Coleg Harlech founder Thomas Jones – the Institute argued for an extension of its work into ‘the direct educational field’ on the grounds that it was time for the Institute to enter a new stage of development.

Public acceptance of the Institute in this field was made possible by a recognition of its standards and of the resources of knowledge and experience amassed during the first twenty years of existence, thus justifying the contention of the Council that the Institute must establish itself as the national centre of study and research in international problems before it could afford to extend its activities on a wider basis.

The wartime success of the courses appeared to vindicate the calls of those within Chatham House who felt that the Institute should engage more directly with the public. In 1944, nine members of the Council tabled a resolution recommending that a planning committee be tasked with reviewing the future direction of Chatham House, particularly over

76 Astor Mss: MS 1066/1/558: W. Astor to T. Jones, 18 May 1944.
whether the Institute should engage with the public more directly.\textsuperscript{78} Chatham House had reached a crossroads.

The proposal that Chatham House should play a more active role in informing public opinion was met with considerable support within the Institute. The planning committee first invited members and staff to submit memoranda recommending future policy. Of the memoranda that made reference to public engagement, 82\% were in favour of efforts to reach out to a wider public, albeit with varying degrees of zeal. The remaining 18\% adhered to the policy hitherto practised of ‘helping to educate the educators’.\textsuperscript{79} The concerns of those seeking more active public engagement were reminiscent of those held by the founders of the Institute after the end of the First World War. There were fears that the public were too readily persuaded by party-political slogans and tabloid headlines. One Chatham House member blamed the origins of the war in part on the ignorance and apathy of the public.\textsuperscript{80} Viscountess Rhondda, editor of \textit{Time and Tide}, welcomed the prospect of the continuation of Chatham House’s educational activities, believing that they were narrowing ‘the gulf of understanding’ between ordinary citizens and policy makers.\textsuperscript{81}

There were three principal methods recommended in the memoranda to help narrow the gulf. Firstly, a popular one was to encourage a more diverse membership. ‘Chatham House is pervaded’, wrote Freda White a prolific author for the LNU, ‘by a mixture of social and intellectual snobbery...The effect of the atmosphere of near-official influence is to make the feeling of the meetings pompous and empty.’\textsuperscript{82} The sentiment was shared by William Waldorf Astor, Waldorf Astor’s eldest son, who complained of a ‘heavy backlog of bores,

\textsuperscript{78} Astor Mss: MS 1066/1/559; W. Astor to I. Macadam, 13 Apr 1944; CHA: 2/1/9b: Extract from Council Minutes, 19 Apr 1944.
\textsuperscript{79} CHA: 2/1/9b: Memoranda submitted to the Chatham House Planning Committee 1944-46; RIIA, \textit{Future of Chatham House}, 9.
\textsuperscript{80} CHA: 2/1/9b: Memorandum by W.F. Tongue, 31 Oct 1944.
\textsuperscript{81} CHA: 1/3/22: Annual General Meeting (hereafter AGM) minutes, 5 Nov 1946.
\textsuperscript{82} CHA: 2/1/9b: Memorandum by F. White, undated.
fools, cranks and persons who come to pass the time of day, and people who, after retirement, have nothing else to do but clutter up places like Chatham House’. The thirty year-old historian Max Beloff also complained of the predominance of grey-haired members and expressed the need for the Institute to attract the younger generation. The solutions offered for this lack of diversity included: the creation of a much larger category of membership for people attached to the Institute’s educational activities; the establishment of new branches in more cities and groups within schools; and encouraging Rotary Clubs, community centres and secondary schools to become corporate members. The second method was concerned with whether the Institute’s publications could be adapted in order to disseminate its findings more widely. Andrew Scotland, Director of Education for Plymouth, suggested that the Institute’s publications were too ‘highbrow’, while the publications officer, Edward Osborn, reasoned that the Institute was duty-bound to provide educational publications for the general reader. Finally the third method related to the Institute’s courses programme. H.V. Hodson, then assistant editor for The Sunday Times, proposed that school teachers be made welcome to the courses, while Scotland suggested a Christmas Lecture for children à la the Royal Institution.

Others doubted the worth of such endeavours. Toynbee had little faith in the capabilities of the “masses”; instead societal progress depended on ‘creative minorities’. He was keen that the Institute avoid public engagement lest it threaten its impartiality. ‘To appeal successfully to the masses’, wrote Toynbee, ‘one has to give up being critical and open-minded and to become partisan and dogmatic’. The study of international affairs required the

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83 CHA: 2/1/9b: Memorandum by W.W. Astor, 5 May 1944.
84 CHA: 2/1/9b: Memorandum by M. Beloff, 5 May 1944.
85 CHA: 2/1/9b: Memorandum by G. Crowther, 5 May 1944; A. Scotland to W. Astor, 18 Oct 1944; RIIA, Future of Chatham House, 12.
86 CHA: 2/1/9b: Andrew Scotland to W Astor, 18 Oct 1944; Memorandum by E. Osborn, 8 Jul 1944.
‘judicial and scientific’ approach ‘characteristic of a rather limited circle of people whose ability, education and experience is well above the average’. Toynbee preferred the King-Hall model; it was not the duty of the Institute to rouse the public appetite for information on international affairs, but that of ‘missionaries from the narrower circle’.  

Furthermore, Macadam argued that there was little money to be had in public engagement and that the Institute’s publications were already disseminating its findings satisfactorily. 

When eventually published in 1946, the committee’s report acknowledged that there were two aspects to the Institute’s primary function: to aid research in international affairs and to disseminate the results. However, it also expounded that with limited funds it was desirable to devote the greater part of the Institute’s income to research. The report noted that the majority of the Committee concluded that it was ‘sounder policy to respond gradually’ to public demand for information ‘as it makes itself felt rather than to attempt to stimulate it’. It was largely in this vein that Chatham House conducted its future activities. The Committee did, however, albeit cautiously, agree that the Institute continue programmes that aimed to reach a wider public, such as through the courses and more accessible publications. But those advocating Astor’s postwar vision of Chatham House had lost their most important battle. At the annual general meeting (AGM) in 1949, Astor’s successor Clement Jones used his first speech to the membership to suggest that it was wiser ‘that we should concentrate on serving the specialist and leave the task of wider education to him’. Although it would continue to receive challenges, the King-Hall model had survived.

Indeed, there was little drive to broaden Chatham House’s own membership. Since the formation of the Institute in 1920, there had been a limit set upon the number of members enrolled. It then numbered 1,000. The cap was increased at various intervals as the Institute

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89 CHA: 2/1/9b: Memorandum by Toynbee, 26 May 1944.
Figure 2.1. Chatham House membership intake and wastage, 1945-1953.

Figure 2.2. Membership of Chatham House, 1945-1975.
Figure 2.3. Total number of Chatham House’s corporate subscribers, 1945-1975.

Figure 2.4. Proportion of Chatham House’s total income from individual and corporate membership, 1945-1975.
secured additional revenue, and acquired its larger accommodation at Chatham House. One of the principal reasons for why membership was retained was the importance attributed to ensuring a high standard of debate, thus members had to be suitably qualified. Another was the limited accommodation for meetings; the main meeting hall held only 320 people. At the time of the planning committee, the cap was set at 2,500 members. However, in anticipation of the committee’s report, a new category of member, the associate, was implemented in 1945. Nevertheless, the reason put before the planning committee by the Chatham House Council for establishing this new body of membership was not concerned with greater public engagement. Instead, it was concerned with increasing the intellectual quality of Chatham House’s membership. Although associates were not required to be experts, they had to have some form of experience in international affairs; a general interest was not enough. Indeed, the new initiative was coupled with an increase in the qualifications required for election to become a full member. The aim of the associate class was to cut down the waiting list and speed the entry of experts. It would cater for those who under the old standards would have been eligible for full membership status and attract those (particularly the young) who showed promise, but lacked experience.

Nor was their subscription cheap. Associates paid £2-2s per year (£194 in average earnings in 2012). The price tag was hardly going to appeal to ‘the man in the street’. As shown in the rapid decline in the number of associates elected in the 1940s apparent in figure 2.1, the new category of membership did little to expand Chatham House’s membership. Between 1945 and 1953, only 391 associates were elected.

96 CHA: 1/3/21: AGM minutes, 6 Nov 1945.
The doubling of the annual fee for members – from £2-2s to £4-4s – was hardly conducive to reaching out to the general public either. At the 1945 AGM, one member expressed her regret about the timing when ‘the case for the support of Chatham House had never been so good’ and in light of the desirability of increasing working-class membership. However, Macadam recognised that ‘two guineas was probably as impossible as four’ for working-class members and hoped that such members might attend as nominees of trade unions who possessed corporate subscriptions. The increased membership fee and the difficult economic conditions that followed the war no doubt led to the steep rise in the number of resignations and lapses between 1946 and 1947 as shown in figure 2.1. Indeed throughout the period 1945 and 1975, there was a general decline in Chatham House’s total number of members and associates (see figure 2.2). However, the decline was offset by the increase in the number of members nominated by corporate subscribers which naturally coincided with the expansion in the number of corporate subscribers themselves (see figure 2.3). In 1966, the total of corporate nominees even exceeded that of the number of members and associates combined. As figure 2.4 shows, the financial incentive to direct resources towards increasing individual membership was low when compared to that of increasing the number of corporate subscribers.

Chatham House’s branches outside London also experienced little success at greater public engagement. After the Second World War, Waldorf Astor and the planning committee had hoped that such operations would expand further into other cities and even onto university campuses. In 1945 a new group was founded for Newcastle and Durham. However, it dissolved in 1954; as did the Manchester Branch in 1963. The Scottish Branch, the most successful, met its end in 1982. In a Manchester Guardian editorial that spearheaded

100 CHA: 1/3/21: Verbatim Record of AGM minutes, 6 Nov 1945 (E. Iredale).
101 CHA: 1/3/21: Verbatim Record of AGM minutes, 6 Nov 1945, 6 Nov 1945 (I. Macadam).
102 CHA: 1/3/21: Verbatim Record of AGM minutes, 6 Nov 1945, 6 Nov 1945; RIIA, Future of Chatham House, 12.
a plethora of letters criticising Chatham House in 1954, the Institute was attacked for having ‘become almost a London club, and though it has two or three groups in the country they are maintained with difficulty and little enthusiasm’.  

Although the setting up of branches outside of London had a number of influential supporters – like the Astor family – it also had its critics. A convenor of the Institute’s meetings, who also felt that engaging in any greater public engagement could only be harmful for the Institute, believed that branches could only come into existence by ‘spontaneous local initiative. It is not useful to instigate local interest then find that it can only be maintained by shots in the arms administered from London.’  

Shots in the arm certainly proved elusive.

Following the Manchester Guardian’s criticisms a report was compiled listing reasons for why the branches project had been unsuccessful and why plans for further expansion had been rejected. One reason was the lack of a permanent headquarters that placed the onus on the initiative and drive of the branch secretary. Another reason provided was the difficulty obtaining speakers of sufficient quality, especially those with enough time on their hands to travel and provide talks. In Scotland, for instance, speakers attended meetings at all three Groups in Aberdeen, Glasgow and Edinburgh, thus the whole endeavour occupied the speaker for a number of consecutive days. As for the lack of success in establishing groups in university centres, it was considered ‘in the light of past experience that the main burden, enthusiastic and helpful though local officers might be, would fall on Chatham House’. There were also concerns that groups would overlap with existing university societies for the studies of international affairs. The main reason provided for the lack of new branches in the principal cities and university centres, however, was cost. The average expenditure for sending a speaker to Scotland, involving hotel and travel expenses, was £23.

103 ‘Chatham House: Reform in Head and Members?’, Manchester Guardian, 8 Mar 1954, 6.
104 CHA: 2/1/9b: Memorandum by Frederick Whyte, 1 July 1944.
105 CHA: 2/1/11a: ‘Report written as a result of criticisms in Manchester Guardian’, March 1954
For many people who lived outside London, there was little incentive to maintain membership. Ann Whyte was one ex-member of the Aberdeen Group and one of the many who wrote to the *Manchester Guardian* in the wake of its critical editorial to explain why she had let her membership lapse. Whyte noted that £4-4s was too much to pay for two or three meetings of doubtful interest and four issues of “International Affairs”...The group here is undoubtedly moribund. The audiences never exceed thirty and are more usually no larger than ten. Even that number is only achieved by the secretary of the group frantically telephoning members and imploring them to be sure to attend...I see no particular objection to the institute thus becoming virtually a London club.\(^{106}\)

It should also be noted that Chatham House’s local branches were not alone in suffering from low attendance. This was hardly the golden age of the public meeting. Jon Lawrence details that during the 1955 general election campaign political meetings were described as ‘poorly attended and wholly unexciting’ at least in urban areas. As opposed to 30% in the 1951 election, only 12% of the electorate claimed to have attended at least one political meeting in 1955 according to a post-election Gallup survey.\(^{107}\) It would appear that special innovations were required to attract large audiences and the branches and headquarters were not forthcoming with them.

However, one lasting innovation from the war was made with regards to the Institute’s publications. In 1945 a more accessible publication was created to satisfy those members who called for a more popular version of the Institute’s journal *International Affairs*. It was *The World Today*. Published monthly, it was designed to be suitable for both the general reader and ‘the specialist who wishes to keep in touch with subjects outside his own particular field’.\(^{108}\) Its articles ‘justified themselves as a source of information for readers wishing to

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acquaint themselves with the historical background of major events’ and were issued in a form that was deemed to ‘make them available to a wider public’. Furthermore, it was envisioned that it would ‘help to meet the demand for factual information on a wide range of current international topics, both political and economic’ that the Institute understood had grown during the Second World War. *The World Today* had an excellent reception. It reached a circulation of 6,000 by the end of its first year – nearly twice that of the final issue of the more austere publication, *The Bulletin of International Affairs*, that it replaced. At the Institute’s AGM in 1949, the Middle East specialist and journalist Owen Tweedy sung the publication’s praises and argued that it should be widely circulated around Clubs and in the messes and canteens of all three Services for it ‘bred understanding, and understanding bred peace’. Wider circulation of *The World Today* was certainly a stronger prospect than *International Affairs*. For one thing, whereas *International Affairs* was priced at 6s-6d an issue, *The World Today* was priced at 1 shilling an issue. Nonetheless, *The World Today* was for the likes of Owen Tweedy, it was not for the general public. It was still too expensive. It was hardly the most accessible of publications either. The articles were produced along the lines of the Institute’s then traditional faith in the ability to be scientific in the study of international affairs. Subsequently, unlike *International Affairs* and the magazine in its present form, *The World Today* took on an educative tone and avoided the expression of any opinion. Furthermore, those who desired publications to be specially prepared for use in secondary schools were left wanting and arguments by members for inexpensive publications such as *The Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs*, priced at two pence a copy, were dismissed.

113 CHA: 1/3/25: AGM minutes, 8 Nov 1949.
Moreover, despite being designed to inform public opinion on the international aspects of reconstruction, the *Looking Forward* series of nine pamphlets, published between 1944 and 1946, similarly failed to reach a mass audience. In the final pamphlet, *Foreign Affairs and the Public*, trade unionist John Price eloquently presented the case that every voter should ‘give his mind to the affairs of the world no less than to those of his own parish. International events will influence his life whether he takes any interest in them or not’. Yet given that the pamphlet was priced at one shilling, the vast majority of those voters would never have read his compelling argument.

Finally, the courses – the jewel in the crown of the Institute’s efforts to engage more widely with the public – experienced decline too. Following the wartime success, the 1945/46 annual report boasted that 28 courses had been held in the last year and that participants no longer solely included service personnel. Courses were held for the National Federation of Women’s Institutes, the new BCA, the WEA and its Trade Union arm. However, by 1948 they had all ceased attending. The courses did continue to feature as a regular event on the Chatham House calendar, but were overwhelmingly attended by representatives within the armed forces and businesses, predominantly oil companies. In 1972 they stopped altogether. Tellingly, the annual report made no reference to the fact that the origins of the courses programme lay in the Institute’s past designs to inform public opinion. Over thirty years, the courses had spanned topics from ‘Europe Under Hitler’ in 1943 and ‘Food and Population’ in 1950 to ‘African Nationalism’ in 1960 and ‘Prospects for Europe’ in 1972. However, defence seminars ran between 1973 and 1987 for high ranking service personnel and staff.

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from the Ministry of Defence.\footnote{CHA: 1/4: Annual Report, 1972/73, 20. For details of the courses, see CHA: 21/1-17.} Chatham House’s educational activities though now solely targeted policy making elites. No specific efforts were made to engage the wider public.

The senior officials of postwar Chatham House were largely opposed to such endeavours. After the planning committee’s conclusions in 1946, the debate over whether the Institute should engage more directly with the public did not reach its former fervour, but it did continue. Following Astor’s death in 1952, his son David picked up the baton. In 1954, now editor of the \textit{Observer}, he used the paper’s editorial to recount the Institute’s origins in much the same way that Chatham House Council had done so during the war under the chairmanship of his father and argued for the continued necessity to engage public opinion in international affairs.

The interest in international affairs does exist, but the ability to understand their infinite complexity, and to see what Britain can and should do, certainly needs to be cultivated. It is just here that Chatham House seems to have faltered in its purpose.\footnote{‘Chatham House’, \textit{Observer}, 31 Oct 1954, 4.}

This criticism from the son of a former chairman and editor of perhaps the principal British newspaper concerned with international affairs was not well received at the Institute. Two stories of the origins of the Institute existed side-by-side. Macadam dismissed the editorial as ‘nonsense’ and argued that Chatham House was not then, and never was, under an obligation to educate the public directly.\footnote{CHA: 2/1/11a: I. Macadam to L. Curtis, 10 Nov 1954.} It was a view that contradicted the Institute’s wartime enthusiasm for developing its activities in relation to public education in order ‘to perform its most useful national service in the post-war years’.\footnote{Astor Mss: MS 1066/1/559: RIIA, ‘Report to the Trustees of the York Trust’, 18 Sep 1944.}

Needless to say the Institute continued to adopt the King-Hall model in spite of Astor’s plea otherwise. Its new champion was the Institute’s rising star: Kenneth Younger. At an AGM in 1953, Younger, the former Labour Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and then
Vice-Chairman of the Institute, reiterated the position that it was the Institute’s responsibility
to educate the educators. He singled out two such educators within the audience: Lawrence
Fabunmi – then an LSE student, later the founding Director of the Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs – and William Clark, a diplomatic correspondent for the Observer.123

Nonetheless, Younger did flirt with the idea of engaging more directly with the public.
Just as with Waldorf Astor, the key motivation was the issue of European integration. In the
wake of Britain’s failed attempt to join the EEC in 1963, Younger, now Director of Chatham
House, sensed that plans for the second attempt needed to be presented to the public in a
positive light, as a new world role for Britain after the end of empire. When Chatham House
was experiencing financial difficulties, Younger attempted to kill two birds with one stone
and approached the Foreign Office for financial assistance so that the Institute might devote
more time to informing – and cultivating – public opinion. No money from the Foreign Office
was forthcoming and again nor did Chatham House abandon the King-Hall model.124 In 1964,
Younger laid the main responsibility for stimulating public interest in international affairs at
Parliament’s door, stating that it ought to become an ‘informed middleman between the
Government and the electorate’.125 However, six years later, on the Institute’s fiftieth
anniversary, he appeared to have thought that all that could be done was being done. Younger
approved of the founders’ adoption of the King-Hall model as ‘realistic’ and welcomed the
‘great increase’ in the coverage of international affairs on television, radio and, to a limited
extent, in the popular press. ‘If people remain ill-informed’, Younger wrote, ‘it is not because
the material for judgement is withheld from them, but because they do not choose to receive

123 CHA: 1/3/30: AGM minutes, 10 Nov 1953.
124 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/173315: Minute by E.J.W. Barnes, 17 Oct 1963; Minute by John
what they are offered.’ The King-Hall model was understood to be working sufficiently well. UNA might have disagreed.

INTERNATIONALISM WITH THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS LEFT IN

Those among Waldorf Astor’s supporters who sought a large membership for Chatham House could only have fantasised about the numbers secured by UNA. UNA would never attain the membership heights of the LNU but their number and their claim to represent a large section of opinion was not to be dismissed lightly. There were 46,607 tenacious members who retained their faith – and subscriptions – during the gloomy days of war. Within eighteen months of UNA being formed in May 1945 to replace the LNU, their number would reach 73,394 (see figure 2.5). UNA retained the LNU model; it concerned itself primarily with ‘organising public support for policies which it believed this country should pursue in the UN and with commending such policies to the government’. Nevertheless, UNA troubled itself considerably as to how it was to fulfil its aim of securing the ‘support by the British people of the United Nations organisation’. David Astor was right, interest in international affairs still existed. Internationalism survived but many were less optimistic and thus less engaged in the prospects of international integration and organisation. It made some aspects of the UN’s work an easier sell than others. The UN’s humanitarian work attracted much support. Amid Cold War power politics, its seeming irrelevance made its political work a much harder sell and yet the UN’s political work was its critical raison d’être. With many more NGOs now claiming to represent opinion in Britain, in addition to interpreting and moderating it, the public eye was increasingly drawn away from the traditional bastion of internationalism.

However, in the early postwar years there was a revival of internationalist spirit and some optimism in the new UN. The rise in UNA’s membership in 1945 and 1946 was initially slow, but a swift rise was signalled by the celebrations of what UNA named UN Week in October. Over 21,000 members joined in last three months of 1946. A similar trend was noted in the number of branches being formed; by the end of the year they had more than doubled (see figure 2.6). Furthermore, 980 local (mostly churches in addition to industrial, professional, political and educational bodies) and 52 national organisations (such as the Young Women’s Christian Association and the Trades Union Congress) became corporate members. UN Week surrounded the 24 October, UN Day, which owed its origins to a proclamation made by President Roosevelt in 1942 that held that the 14 June, the American Flag Day, would not only honour the US flag, but also that of the nations who had signed the Joint Declaration of the United Nations that year. Britain followed suit and a coordinating committee of various Whitehall departments was formed which in 1944 ceded its responsibilities to an ad hoc committee chaired by Lord Lytton, the chairman of the LNU and soon-to-be President of UNA. After the war, UNA organised the vast majority of UN Day activities around the country with some assistance from the Central Office of Information (the Ministry of Information’s successor organisation), the London office of the United Nations Information Centre (the UN’s official information body), the Foreign Office and the BBC.

In the summer of 1946 in preparation for the first UN Day to take place on the 24 October, the anniversary of the ratification of the UN Charter, UNA tasked itself with putting

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131 See BBC WAC: R34/246/1: L.H. Hornsby to R. Maconachie, 16 May 1944.
Figure 2.5. UNA total individual membership, 1945-1975.
Source: UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: Annual Reports, 1945-1975. Note that the 1975 value is not provided in the corresponding annual report. The value given is an average of the 1974 and 1976 values.

Figure 2.6. Total number of branches, 1945-1975.
itself ‘on the map’. In June UNA brought together representatives from over forty national bodies including the three major political parties, trade unions, the National Community Centres Association, the Jewish Peace Society and over 20 women’s organisations in order to reach the widest possible audience over United Nations Week. Coverage of the week was provided by the BBC on the Home and foreign services, featuring talks and quizzes. In London, large displays adorned Marks and Spencer, the Lyons Corner House on Coventry Street and the Cumberland Hotel. 600,000 colour leaflets featuring a cartoon specially drawn by David Low were distributed in addition to 22,000 double crown posters; 7,000 blank posters for advertising local events; 120,000 small flags; 50,000 gummed seals for correspondence; 40,000 orders of service prepared by the British Council of Churches; and 30,000 leaflets were circulated to teachers by local education authorities. Arthur Rank, Britain’s leading film magnate, produced a five minute trailer for UNA entitled In Our Hands, which was shown in 540 cinemas. Over 1,500 events took place up and down the country, including a rally in Leicester where 3,000 women representing 46 women’s organisations pledged themselves to support the UN Charter in the De Montfort Hall.

In order to educate its membership and beyond, the LNU’s journal Headway was incorporated into UNA’s International Outlook in 1945 for six months before being renamed United Nations News. UNA also supplied a monthly bulletin known as Information Notes to its speakers, to MPs, teachers and discussion group leaders. United Nations News was designed to reach a wider public beyond its membership. The thirty-two page journal was equipped with a colour front page and contained photographs, infographics and political

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134 On Headway, see McCarthy, British People and the League, 24-25. For information on the general trend among NGOs for informing their membership, see M. Hilton et al, The Politics of Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern Britain (Oxford, 2013), 165.
cartoons and reached a circulation of over 40,000 copies a month and excerpts were reprinted in *News Chronicle, English Digest* and *New York Times*.\(^{136}\)

There were also reasons for optimism in relation to the popularity of the UN and UNA among young people. 1946 saw the creation of the United Nations Student Association (UNSA) following a conference held at the University of Birmingham attended by 130 delegates representing 50 universities, university colleges, training colleges and technical colleges.\(^{137}\) The Council for Education in World Citizenship (CEWC), originally the LNU’s Education Committee that in 1939 became a self-governing body responsible to the LNU’s Executive Committee, vastly improved the delicate relationship it had held with its parent body.\(^{138}\) UNA provided CEWC with accommodation, staff and vital financial aid and there were strong personal contacts in the form of the first Secretary of UNA Charles Judd, a former Secretary of the CEWC and the second Secretary of UNA David Ennals who also served successively as the Secretary of the CEWC and then UNA.\(^{139}\) They were auspicious beginnings for the postwar CEWC that now rose to the challenge presented by the new possibilities that opened up with the 1944 Education Act. By the end of 1946, 506 schools and school societies became affiliated with CEWC along with 87 youth clubs, and district councils were formed in Birmingham, Sheffield, Edinburgh and Oxford while a constitution was drawn up for a Welsh National Council. Three thousand children from all over Britain crowded into the Kingsway Hall in London to attend the four day CEWC Christmas holiday lecture that had become and would remain an annual event. Speakers included Anuerin

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Bevan, Arthur Creech Jones and the LNU stalwart and future Chairwoman of UNA’s Executive Committee Kathleen Courtney.\textsuperscript{140} Who said liberal internationalism was dead?

At its birth, UNA enjoyed its peak. The signs that portended a future struggle were already apparent. Judd would later recall that the first five years of UNA was ‘the honeymoon period in which everyone paid lip service to the UN’\textsuperscript{141} As the following chapters will demonstrate wholehearted support for the UN proved elusive. Furthermore, despite successes in attracting young people to the UNA, the majority of its membership appeared to be closer to the grave than the cradle. Most of the advertisements that featured within United Nations News were aimed at those suffering from various ailments; they included promotions of a denture cleaner, hearing-aids and remedies for rheumatism.\textsuperscript{142} Moreover, public cynicism, fatalism and apathy plagued the UNA activist. The seeming irrelevance of the individual in the face of Cold War politics had its impact. Even in the heady days of the late 1940s, the annual reports complained of encountering, in the words of the UN’s first Secretary General Trygve Lie, ‘[c]heap scepticism, based upon ignorance’.\textsuperscript{143}

By 1952, UNA decided to attempt to help combat such scepticism and ‘the growth of materialistic fatalism that too readily shirks all sense of international responsibility’ by issuing a manifesto, The Challenge of a New Age, which declared that ‘men must learn to live as one community or perish’ and that individuals could meet the challenge through the UN. The next year a series of leaflets were circulated from UNA’s headquarters to UNA branches to assist them with advice to increase a falling membership. UNA appeared to recognise, as Chatham House’s branches would, that the era of the public meeting was coming to an end and recommended special activities designed to attract greater numbers to UNA branch events.

They ranged from discussion meetings on topical, controversial questions and interschool

\begin{footnotesize}


\textsuperscript{142} See UNA Mss: UNA 25/1/1.

\textsuperscript{143} UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: Annual Report 1948, 5.
\end{footnotesize}
quiz competitions to brain trusts and mock trials. In order to raise money, headquarters betrayed the largely middle class audience it was targeting by suggesting bring and buy sales, Christmas carol parties, flag days, UNA concerts, garden parties and whist drives. Furthermore, the leaflets pressed branch staff that if they could not get people to attend their meetings, they must infiltrate the meetings of the local Rotary Club, the Women’s Institute, church societies, youth clubs and trades councils.144

The typical criticisms of the UN that UNA activists encountered among the public are revealed in a preparatory document produced in 1957 by headquarters to counter them. The majority related to fatalistic attitudes to international politics and concerns over sovereignty. They included: ‘The United Nations is bound to fail because you can’t change human nature’; ‘UN is not new. It has been tried before. It will fail, as the League of Nations failed’; ‘The United Nations is dominated by America’; ‘UN is nothing but a talking shop’; ‘The H-Bomb has made nonsense of UN’. Others indicated concerns over sovereignty: ‘Why does UN poke its nose in the internal affairs of countries such as Britain and France, look what it has done to break up the British Empire!’; and ‘UN only provides our enemies with a platform for their propaganda’.145

Amid such complaints, in the 1950s UNA membership swiftly dropped (see figure 2.5). The issue of how to secure support for the UN and on which aspects of its work it should focus on became more pressing. Appreciating public disillusion with Cold War power politics and how it had frustrated the UN’s efforts to foster peace and security, UNA became keen to publicise that this was but one aspect of the UN’s work and thus shifted the spotlight to areas where its successes were more tangible. In the 1950s, UNA discovered for itself the popularity of humanitarian causes.

In 1952, a number of branches reported that the work of UNICEF had a particularly strong appeal both among UNA members and the general public.\(^{146}\) Subsequently, in the next year, three UNA regional councils in England organised a special appeal for UNA and UNICEF whereby 80% of the net proceeds were designated to UNICEF while UNA retained the remaining 20%. The three regions raised nearly £10,000 and the following year UNA decided to hold a national campaign along the same lines. Gaining the assistance of 51 national organisations, including the three major political parties, UNA coordinated a campaign in which volunteers visited five million homes. By June 1955, £160,000 had been raised. UNA had collected more money from the joint UNICEF/UNA appeal than it would normally have done under its singular annual UNA appeal surrounding UN Day. All the while, the government was lobbied, especially via MPs in the West Midlands, to increase its contribution to UNICEF. Assisted by UNA’s coordination of public pressure, in 1953 the British contribution was raised from £50,000 to £100,000 and was doubled again in 1954.\(^{147}\) UNA also enjoyed some success when it organised a Korean Relief Fund in the wake of the Korean War. It acquired over £6,000 and procured medical supplies to the value of £250, all of which was distributed to voluntary organisations working in Korea including Save the Children, the British Council of Churches and the British Red Cross.\(^{148}\)

Following fast on the heels of the UNICEF and Korean relief campaigns, plans were underway in 1955 for the organisation of a UNA Refugee Appeal in 1956/57 for UNHCR.\(^{149}\) The campaign took on new significance given the media coverage that alerted the public to the plight of Hungarian refugees in the wake of the Soviet Union’s suppression of the

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Hungarian Revolution.\textsuperscript{150} The appeal raised nearly £450,000; 90\% of which was provided to the UNHCR and 10\% for UNA. Furthermore, UNA latched on to an idea put forward by the Conservative Bow Group which recommended that there should a World Refugee Year. UNA secured enough influential all-party support for the idea that the government submitted the proposal to the UN General Assembly and 1959/60 became World Refugee Year in which again UNA branches were highly active.\textsuperscript{151} In 1961, UNA also played an important part in the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, a five-year worldwide campaign by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation. Donald Tweddle, Joint Secretary of UNA, stood down to become General Secretary of the UK’s campaign.\textsuperscript{152} The campaign occupied much of UNA’s activities in 1962 and 1963 while it established many local committees to raise money for the UK’s fund.\textsuperscript{153}

Even UNA’s periodicals could not escape the humanitarian bug. While \textit{United Nations News} was experiencing financial difficulties as a result of small circulation, a new periodical was released in 1955 in what was proclaimed to be ‘one of the most exciting experiments UNA has tried for a long time’, an eight-page monthly illustrated newspaper was launched named \textit{The World’s News}. It was designed ‘to appeal to those who seldom read anything more than the mass circulation dailies’ and so illustrated the work of UN and its agencies through human interest stories. However, the paper struggled to reach its production costs and in 1958 was re-launched as \textit{New World}, which still remains UNA’s principal publication.\textsuperscript{154} New

\textsuperscript{151} UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: Annual Report 1959, 2-3.
World sought to capitalise on interest in humanitarianism, to ‘give news that does not appear in other papers of the behind-the-scenes stories of the battle against poverty and disease’. 155

However, this focus on humanitarian causes stoked criticism within UNA. A number feared that UNA had become so preoccupied with attempting to win the hearts of the public through humanitarian campaigns that they had neglected their minds. In 1955 following the success of the UNICEF campaign, UNA decided that the celebrations for the tenth anniversary of the UN should include a Citizen’s Enquiry. Whereas the UNICEF appeal ‘went straight to the heart, and purse strings were opened wide’, the Citizen’s Enquiry sought to educate opinion to advocate international action to rid the world of the fundamental conditions that UNICEF could only temporarily relieve; ‘to think a little about these bigger problems’ and treat the disease rather than the symptom. 156

Rather than acting as an opinion poll or referendum like the LNU’s Peace Ballot, the Citizen’s Enquiry was primarily designed to encourage discussion in the groups to which people belonged and, like the Peace Ballot, a discussion guide was provided for the purpose. The enquiry covered four topics: race relations, international aid and development, disarmament, and support for the UN (see table 2.1). 157 UNA branches and the local sections of more than thirty national organisations were involved and disseminated 50,000 questionnaire forms and 25,000 copies of the discussion pamphlet. People were invited to return their results, but there was little sustained effort to collect them. Only 686 groups did return their answers and their responses do not appear to have been collated, with the exception of the question that asked whether the UN had justified its existence. Nearly 96% of the replies received by UNA expressed the view that the UN had justified its existence in the

first ten years. The annual report qualified this with the statement that any smaller percentage would have been ‘very discouraging’ as the majority of the groups who replied were associated with UNA.\textsuperscript{158} Nevertheless, the enquiry was effective in receiving media coverage and occupied a central part of the celebrations surrounding UN Day, including a discussion of the enquiry by a team of four “‘ordinary citizens’” on a new BBC television programme \textit{Your Own Time}.\textsuperscript{159}

In contrast, the next enquiry similarly tasked with stoking interest in the UN and international politics was issued by UNA had much more in common with the LNU Peace Ballot and was the closest UNA ever came to recreating its success. It followed its Disarmament Campaign launched in 1959 in order to educate and organise a body of public opinion to encourage the government to arrange multilateral disarmament negotiations. Two months after the campaign had begun the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd stimulated negotiations for a disarmament programme by balanced stages. UNA would claim credit.\textsuperscript{160} Unfortunately, the USA and the USSR failed to come to an agreement.\textsuperscript{161} In May 1960, keen to maintain momentum and in light of the dismal lack of attention paid to disarmament during the general election campaign in the previous year, UNA decided to distribute a mass questionnaire on disarmament.

This time, all six questions of the Disarmament Enquiry invited yes or no or no reply (see table 2.2) responses. The enquiry was funded from the money Philip Noel-Baker received from a Nobel Peace Prize awarded to him in 1959. UNA and associated organisations (particularly trade unions) distributed 725,000 copies of the questionnaire and the questions

\textsuperscript{158} UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: Annual Report 1956, 4.
### Equal Rights

1. Do you believe
   a) That all men and women should not be granted equal rights without distinction as to race; or
   b) That the right of all men and women to equality should be recognised, but that full rights should only be granted when certain educational or social standards have been attained; or
   c) That certain races are basically inferior and cannot expect ever to be granted equal rights?

2. How can local groups help to improve race relations in our own country? [open-ended]

### Better Standards of Life

1. Do you think that Britain is devoting
   a) Too much of its resources to helping other countries with a lower standard of living than our own; or
   b) Not enough; or
   c) A fair proportion?

2. If your answer was ‘not enough’ would you be prepared to forgo a reduction of 6d. in the standard rate of income tax to pay for additional aid?
   a) Yes
   b) No

### The Scourge of War

1. Which most nearly represents your views
   a) That complete disarmament is the only answer and that this country should carry this out regardless of the policy of other nations; or
   b) That we should make renewed efforts thought the United Nations to reach agreement on a system of comprehensive and drastic disarmament with inspection and control; or
   c) That it is unrealistic to make any further attempt to reach agreement about world-wide disarmament; and that a high level of armaments will remain essential.

2. If another country has been attacked, ought Britain
   a) To send troops to assist if called on to do so by the United Nations whether or not we like the form of Government of the attacked country; or
   b) To send troops only if the country is a close ally; or
   c) To remain neutral at all costs?

3. Under what circumstances do you feel the use of atomic weapons to be justified
   a) Only if they should be used by an enemy; or
   b) Whether used by the enemy or not; or
   c) Under no circumstances?

### To Unite Our Strength

1. Has the United Nations justified its existence in its first ten years?
   a) Yes
   b) No

2. Do you believe that the policy of democratic Governments in the UN can be influenced by the opinions of ordinary people?
   a) Yes
   b) No

3. How can ordinary people best help the United Nations? [open-ended]

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**Table 2.1.** The questions posed in UNA’s 1955 Citizens’ Enquiry.

Source: Trade Union Congress Mss, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick (hereafter TUC Mss): MSS.292/921.9/6: “We the Peoples...”: A Citizens’ Enquiry into the United Nations’, 1955. Note this is a draft copy that might have been subject to change.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>All opinion</th>
<th>Student opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Are you in favour of general world disarmament including the total</td>
<td>472,718</td>
<td>21,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abolition of all nuclear weapons, under United Nations inspection and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>control?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) If so, would you like our Government to take the initiative in</td>
<td>469,622</td>
<td>23,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drawing up detailed proposals for a disarmament treaty to carry out this</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aim?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reply?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. It is generally agreed that it would be impossible to establish any</td>
<td>469,619</td>
<td>23,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system of international inspection which would be completely watertight;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>some nations might be able to hide a small proportion of their stocks of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nuclear bombs. Would you be prepared to accept this risk as an</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alternative to the continuing arms race?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. It is believed that the margin of risk would be greatly reduced if</td>
<td>469,635</td>
<td>23,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the “means of delivery” was abolished, i.e., the missiles and missile-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>launching sites, as well as all types of submarine, aeroplane, or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cannon capable of dropping or firing nuclear bombs. These are far</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>harder to conceal than the nuclear bombs and, by international</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inspection, it should be easier to check that all are destroyed. Do you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agree that the abolition of these “means of delivery” should be one of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the first items of any disarmament treaty?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. It is sometimes proposed that this country should on its own, abandon</td>
<td>95,480</td>
<td>398,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all its nuclear weapons, even if other countries keep theirs. Do you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agree with this proposal?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The People’s Republic of China is not yet represented in the United</td>
<td>473,873</td>
<td>21,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nations but it has a population of 600 million and is preparing to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make its own nuclear weapons. Should the People’s Republic of China now</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be brought into the negotiations for disarmament?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Do you think that, as national armaments are cut down, the United</td>
<td>469,122</td>
<td>23,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nations should begin to build up an international force which would be</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strong enough to keep the peace in a disarmed world?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2. The questions and replies to UNA’s 1960 Disarmament Enquiry.
Source: Trade Union Congress Mss. Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick (hereafter TUC Mss):
MSS.292B/921.9/1: ‘An Enquiry on Disarmament: Half a Million Answers’, undated. Student opinion (included in the totals to the left of them) was gathered by UNSA from universities and colleges.
featured in a number of their periodicals. At 495,809, the total number of replies fell far short of the 11,640,066 total reached by the LNU in 1935, but like the Ballot, the vast majority of the responses supported UNA proposals. Arguably the most controversial question, at least in Britain, was number four that enquired whether the respondent approved of unilateral disarmament. The response to this question was a little more mixed than the others: 95,480 (19%) agreed, 398,212 (80%) disagreed. The extent to which the replies to the Disarmament Enquiry accurately reflected – or indeed influenced – public opinion requires further research, particularly at the local level. However, the results of the enquiry, operating between May 1960 and September 1960, shared similarities with other contemporaneous surveys of public opinion. A Gallup Poll in May 1960 indicated that 33% advocated unilateral disarmament, but in September and October 1960, the figure fell to 21%. Nevertheless, there were those within UNA who when looking at their declining membership figures were envious of the attention that unilateralists, namely CND, received.

The success of CND and other internationalist NGOs had demonstrated that there was still public interest in the outside world. Yet UNA was struggling to maintain its membership. In the 1950s, despite all of the publicity directed towards it as a result of its campaigns, UNA had lost nearly 20,000 members. There had been a number of membership campaigns in the 1950s that had helped stem the loss involving a membership race and ‘Commando Weeks’ in which a team of five speakers descended onto several towns addressing local organisations and identifying the ‘key people’ in the area. However, it was apparent that much more needed to be done. In 1955, a Gallup Poll found that 53% believed that the best way to aid the

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UN was by taking an active interest in its work. Asked how they might do this, 2% (about 1% of those polled) stated they could join UNA. UNA drew two conclusions from this poll. Firstly, a favourable opinion of UNA only existed for 1% of the population. Secondly, UNA should only be so lucky to possess a membership that amounted to 1% of the population. So why was UNA struggling to attract members? In 1961 a future UNA Secretary, Hugh Walker, argued that although UNA might not have been impressed by CND’s aims and methods, the rapid success of the movement in gaining publicity for itself should encourage the Association to consider adopting some of its characteristics. He looked to how CND used well-known personalities, such as A.J.P Taylor, Canon John Collins and Kingsley Martin to gain media attention along with their apparent lack of caution in attracting controversy.\(^{167}\)

Walker was not alone. In the early 1960s, the question of how to attract public support for the UN and UNA came to a head. Many within UNA, especially the branches, blamed UNA’s humanitarian campaigns. They argued that although they attracted attention it disrupted the process of collecting renewal subscriptions and neglected the UN’s important political and economic work. It was an old complaint. Branch staff tended to be small and time was in short supply. In 1948, UNA reached its peak membership when it touched 87,969 in May before slipping to 85,079 at the end of the year. That year, branch collectors had been unable to find time to retrieve renewal subscriptions from over 16,000 existing members.\(^{168}\) In October 1963, fresh from their efforts in the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, the branches met at the General Council, in which a motion urged the Executive Committee ‘to be constantly mindful’ of the distraction caused by activities that failed to stimulate ‘in proportion to the energy and funds expended on them, interest and support for the political


and economic as well as the humanitarian activities of the United Nations’. UNA needed to choose its priorities.

Later that year a special committee was tasked with considering the motion and more broadly the future direction of the Association. John Hodgess-Roper, one of the authors of the motion and future Director of Chatham House in the 1990s was invited to the committee and explained the problem: ‘We have only limited resources to enable us to attain almost limitless objectives’. He outlined four potential futures for the UNA that were being discussed. The first was that UNA should focus its energies as a pressure group; to, like the LNU, influence government by means of reaching the widest public possible and impressing upon them the importance of the UN. The second direction involved a more dramatic reorganisation. The UNA would look to Chatham House’s model and become a study group containing high-powered intellectuals. This option had the sympathy of Nicolson, who doubted that the UN had the necessary popular support in Britain and the UNA the dynamism necessary for it to sustain a mass membership. Nicolson worried that the pressure group route would lead to the UNA imitating CND sit-down circles in Whitehall and told his colleagues that if they ‘sat down outside the Foreign Office we would not be invited to sit down inside’. A model along similar lines that was given more attention as it was understood to be compatible with having a mass membership was to adopt the characteristics of the Fabian Society and the Bow Group in which the UNA would become a forum for the generation of ideas rather than producing publications as expressions of collective policy. In 1968 this idea was abortively explored as a potential function of the Association rather than it being its raison d’être. It was proposed that it should be called the Hammarskjold Group to commemorate the former UN

Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{173} The third option was to become a discussion group, an adult education organisation along the lines of the WEA. The fourth option was that the UNA should focus its efforts towards becoming a humanitarian agency. It was supposed that this could be ‘the line of the least resistance’, that it could keep the treasurer happy and, by means of encouraging support in the humanitarian aspect of the UN’s work, perhaps develop a general loyalty to the UN in all of its activities.\textsuperscript{174}

However, it was UNA’s humanitarian work that came under the most scrutiny. One of the authors of the committee’s report, the former Chairwoman of UNA Kathleen Courtney, agreed with the arguments made by the proposers of the motion that had stimulated the conference and also attacked UNA’s International Service Department (ISD). The ISD had evolved from a visit made in 1953 to the Netherlands by a team of UNA volunteers led by David Ennals, one of the principal movers behind UNA’s humanitarian campaigns, to assist restoration work after extensive flood damage. It was formally established in 1956 to assist Hungarian refugees in Austria. It was part of the strategy to attract members – especially the young through promise of foreign adventure and tangible contribution – who might otherwise be put off by the UN’s more divisive political and security issues.\textsuperscript{175} Courtney, however, doubted that this was the most effective method by which to attract young people. Instead she suggested that the ‘challenge to work at building the kind of world in which war and intolerance will cease to provide an endless succession of refugees and others who need to be succoured from generation to generation’ would have a much a stronger appeal among the young.\textsuperscript{176} It was the same fear that lurked behind the Citizen’s Enquiry; that enthusiasm for

humanitarian relief would distract UNA from its true purpose to promote international organisation and cooperation. Although the committee did not advise that UNA should pursue fewer objectives, significantly it did conclude that campaigns for the UN’s agencies ought to be reduced to one every three or four years. The government was also asked to press the UN to avoid placing upon NGOs the responsibilities for raising funds for work governments should themselves finance.¹⁷⁷

Courtney was correct. There was an appetite among young people for building a new world, rather than just providing temporary relief and the late 1950s and 1960s provided plenty of international political issues including the Suez Crisis, Apartheid, Vietnam, nuclear war scares and Rhodesia. Nonetheless, although such events helped attract many young people to the UNA, it was not at the same scale enjoyed by new social movements.¹⁷⁸ Yet the need to attract young people to join UNA, to actively engage them in its activities and to get them to encourage other young people to do likewise was urgent. It was estimated in 1963 that 80% of the membership was over 55, 10% were 25-55 and another 10% were under 25.¹⁷⁹

One of the most significant reasons for UNA’s membership decline was simply its failure to attract enough young members. Death even comes to die-hards eventually and through the 1960s to the 1980s UNA was gradually losing those members who had kept their subscriptions to LNU through the Second World War. In 1968, during another conference that discussed the future of UNA in Loughborough, UNSA argued that in order to attract younger members, UNA needed to make clear that it was ‘a radical organisation, in the sense we see what is going on in the world, don’t much like much of what we see, and are anxious for rapid

¹⁷⁸ See F. Parkin, Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (Manchester, 1968), ch.7.
improvements’. UNSA recognised in UNA something unique. UNA was a multi-issue pressure group because the world's problems involved multiple issues. They thought that this should be a source of great strength for UNA, not a weakness.

This gives us an opportunity – perhaps even an obligation – to put across our ideas as a total radical/internationalist philosophy. Our efforts should not simply be devoted to campaigning against Apartheid, Vietnam, Disarmament, Aid, etc., but to relating these issues to each other: super-power diplomacy affects disarmament, and also the nature of the relationship between rich and poor countries – which in turn involves a consideration of economic development, and national liberation movements. UNA is the only political organisation in this country which is in a position to relate all these issues together from a non-doctrinaire standpoint.

However, UNSA complained that UNA’s political work was ‘too fragmented’. Fragmentation was particularly apparent among the youth sections of UNA of which, by the 1960s, there were no fewer than four. In addition to UNSA, there were CEWC, ISD and a recently created body UNA Youth, which targeted young people outside universities and schools beyond the reach of UNSA and the CEWC. UNA Youth was inspired by the anxiety that the existing youth sections were failing to ensure that their members joined the parent body, UNA, when they left school or university. However, discovered that the proposal that UNSA members should join UNA when they graduated was often met with derision. UNA was considered ‘old and decrepit’. Similarly to UNSA, UNA Youth worried of ‘compartmentalisation’ and warned against the implementation of a proposal for

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yet another youth group framed along the lines of the Bow Group, to attract recent UNSA graduates.\textsuperscript{185}

However, the conference in Loughborough had been called to discuss how UNA might best direct an ambitious membership campaign that aimed to raise membership by 50,000 within twelve months and sought to attract young people among others. In light of new publicity afforded to UNA in 1968 in connection with Human Rights Year and a well-received defence of the United Nations from UNA Chairman Humphry Berkeley on the BBC’s \textit{Your Witness} programme, UNA decided it an opportune time to launch a national membership campaign on UN Day. There were reasons for optimism. Firstly, prior to the campaign, the Opinion Research Centre had conducted a survey that indicated that 11\% of the population was likely or very likely to join the Association if invited to do so. Secondly, the campaign had the support of the three party leaders. Thirdly, and most encouragingly, following their highly successful “For God’s Sake” Campaign for the Salvation Army, the KMP (Kingsley, Maston and Palmer) Partnership was enlisted.\textsuperscript{186} Once again it was the middle classes that were targeted and although young people were earmarked in the campaign, they were one of many target groups. On UNA advice the KMP Partnership also aimed to reach subscribers to similar organisations, those with humanitarian or liberal attitudes and community leaders, in addition to attempting to cajole lapsed members and ensure the loyalty of current members.\textsuperscript{187}

Furthermore, although its membership campaign was not without innovations – such as the uniform use of UN Blue for adverts, toys, ties and badges – it was hardly one focussed on attracting the young. It was mainly focused on attracting the attention of the quality press.


\textsuperscript{186} UNA Mss: UNA 26/6/1: Annual Report 1968, 16-18.

Illustration 2.1. UNA advertisement in the Guardian, part of the 1968/69 membership campaign.

It secured favourable leaders in the *Observer* and *The Sunday Times*. A costly full-page colour advertisement was placed in *The Times* on UN Day. The advert read: ‘There wasn’t a world war again yesterday. Did you do anything to help avoid it?’ UNA received one thousand replies. The *Guardian* too carried a number of advertisements, including another that reinvented the popular First World War poster designed to invoke the (male) reader’s sense of duty (see illustration 2.1). However, the response was hardly electrifying; 133 subscriptions were received as a result of the advertisement.

The campaign fell far short of its ambitions. Within one year, membership had only increased by 6,000. Worse, the next year it nearly lost the same amount. Between 1970 and 1976, another 19,000 members were lost. Amidst, falling membership figures, tensions and budgetary problems, those crucial sections of UNA targeting the young were forced to streamline. In 1971, UNSA and UNA Youth merged to become United Nations Youth and Student Association and CEWC became an independent body in 1977, as did the ISD in 1998. UNA failed to don the radical image its younger members, who were so crucial to its future, desired of it. UNA was struggling in other areas too. In 1972, the print order of *New World* did not exceed 15,000; the bulk of UNA’s membership did not subscribe. It was claimed, however, that its readership was four times that figure. If it was, most of those who were reading were not joining UNA. Similarly, the 1976 annual report claimed that as a result of UNA and its agencies’ activities in the last year, ten million people had been informed of its existence, one million had been given some awareness of what it stood for.

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190 UNA Mss: UNA/4/2/1: Minutes of the Membership Campaign Committee, 7 Feb 1969.
250,000 had been significantly influenced and 30,000 had been ‘educated in some depth’. Nonetheless, UNA was haemorrhaging members. In spite of some early success, it appeared that UNA had not quite understood the public understanding of international affairs. Unfortunately, while it struggled to attain support for the UN among the public directly, it also struggled to attain it indirectly.

**EDUCATING UNRELIABLE EDUCATORS**

When it came to the media, Chatham House was not alone in dabbling in the King-Hall model. Although UNA directly engaged with the public in order to coordinate it and give clout to their recommendations to the policy making elite, the media provided another route to reach public opinion beyond the reach of its activists and additionally bring further influence to bear on the government. Of course, UNA was not alone among NGOs in doing this. However, its media strategies were by no means as systematic and as effective as those of CND or the likes of Shelter or Oxfam. However, UNA and Chatham House’s cause of liberal internationalism was also hindered by media practices. If it was the role of Chatham House to ‘educate the educators’, the educators proved troublesome. The very nature of news selection and construction provided a set of structures that the causes of other NGOs could avoid or even manipulate. These structures proved especially unwieldy within the popular media. Nonetheless, the influence of Chatham House and UNA on setting the news agenda in the quality media – when international affairs were covered – should not be underestimated. However, the effectiveness of the King-Hall model must be brought into question, as it failed to reach out further to the consumers of the popular media.

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Figure 2.7. Number of mentions of Chatham House in a selection of newspapers, 1945-1975.

Figure 2.8. Number of mentions of UNA in a selection of newspapers, 1945-1975.
The assessment of the extent to which Chatham House influenced the international news agenda is inherently challenging. The Institute was not seeking the public profile of UNA. It sought to influence the media elite so that they in turn would influence public opinion. That influence was largely invisible. For example, figure 2.7, shows the number of mentions that the Institute received in a selection of newspapers, but it does not account for instances where the use of Chatham House’s research and facilities shaped journalists’ reports of international events, or how it affected their instincts for what constituted international news. In terms of both news construction and news selection there is qualitative evidence that suggests that Chatham House had a large impact, especially earlier in the period when there was greater concentration on international affairs and the Institute had fewer competitors in the field. When the Korean War began on 25 June 1950, the chief diplomatic correspondent of the Observer, William Clark, quickly convinced the editor, David Astor, that the paper’s principal response should be an article that filled the editorial page. 25 June was a Sunday, so Clark had a week to prepare. The next day at nine o’clock in the morning, his first port of call was Chatham House where Clark made good use of its ‘wonderful library service’. Naturally, there was no mention of the Institute in the eventual article and so it does not feature within the results of figure 2.7.

However, in order to maintain such relationships and form new ones, Chatham House needed to protect and nurture its intellectual legitimacy. A good profile within the media provided useful endorsements. It could also provide opportunities for staff members to talk to the public directly. This also suited those members who reasoned that if it was not the business of Chatham House to distribute their publications more widely, then it should liaise with those bodies whose business was dissemination to further the public understanding of...
international affairs. In 1944, Henry Hodson, a member of the Chatham House Council and later Editor of *The Sunday Times*, was among them.

[I]t is not only right but indeed necessary, if Chatham House is to fill its proper place in the life of the British Empire, that the fruits of its work should be more widely disseminated, since in a democratic country the public are in the end the masters of the experts.\(^{197}\)

There was demand within the media. During the Second World War, Chatham House staff had been in high demand at the BBC. Yet the secondment of Chatham House staff to the government during the war, in the form of FRPS, complicated the matter of their inclusion within BBC broadcasts. In light of an incident where a Chatham House researcher felt it necessary to consult the Foreign Office with his script before broadcast, Toynbee, the Director of FRPS, feared for the Institute’s prized reputation for objectivity and enacted an embargo. Once again the Institute was protecting its intellectual legitimacy.\(^{198}\) However, within the BBC the embargo was considered a ‘serious inconvenience’ that hindered its efforts ‘to give the public authoritative guidance…when we do need speakers from Chatham House, we need them badly, and their places are very difficult to fill’.\(^{199}\) Nevertheless, Chatham House’s relationship with the BBC did strengthen during the war. Soon after its outbreak, the need for more personal contacts between both organisations was recognised.\(^{200}\) The FRPS’s weekly review of foreign press was also placed at the disposal of the BBC. In return it provided FRPS with a twice-a-day digest of radio broadcasts by foreign radio stations monitored by the BBC’s Overseas Intelligence Department.\(^{201}\) The BBC also made extensive use of the Institute’s Information Department.\(^{202}\)

\(^{197}\) CHA: 2/1/9b: Memorandum by H.V. Hodson, 17 May 1944.
\(^{198}\) BBC WAC: R44/522/2: G.R. Barnes to unknown recipient, 10 Feb 1940.
\(^{200}\) BBC WAC: R44/522/1: A.J. Toynbee to S. Hillelson, 29 Dec 1939.
\(^{201}\) BBC WAC: R44/522/1: A.J. Toynbee to F. Oglvie, 26 Sep 1939.
After the war, Chatham House remained of value to the BBC. ‘The number of occasions’, observed the prolific educational broadcaster Jean Rowntree in 1953, ‘on which the BBC had been helped by Chatham House...were almost too many to be recorded’. No longer encumbered by an embargo, staff frequented a number of radio programmes including Facts First, a weekly series in which an expert examined a topical problem of domestic or foreign affairs. Toynbee was a staple fixture on the BBC’s programmes concerned with international affairs. Before the war, although, it was noted that was ‘apt to be fluffy and metaphorically prolonged’, he needed little rehearsal before recording. After the war, his contributions were sought with new vigour as he rose to fame after the abridgement of his Study of History began in 1946. The producer Anna Kallin was particularly persistent in attempting to enlist him for broadcasts on the BBC’s Third Programme, even after he had declined invitations. The Overseas Service was similarly keen to get Toynbee to feature on its programmes. In 1952, he delivered the Reith Lectures. His series, which was entitled ‘The World and the West’, examined the impact that the West had on the rest of the world from the perspective of the latter. The BBC considered the lectures to be a good success. One report described it as representing ‘what we want in broadcasting – something personal and original... some of the grandeur of Spengler with a gloss of quiet liberalism’.

Toynbee’s successors also became old hands at the BBC. Notably Kenneth Younger frequented a variety of programmes, particularly for the Overseas Service, but also for the Home Service, including Woman’s Hour. His profile was elevated due to his former

203 CHA: 1/3/30: AGM minutes, 10 Nov 1953.
205 See files, BBC WAC: A. Toynbee Talks Files I-IV.
206 See, for example, BBC WAC: A. Toynbee Talks File III: A. Kallin to A. Toynbee, 5 Dec 1949; A. Kallin to N. Luker, 8 Mar 1949.
210 See files, BBC WAC: K. Younger Talks Files 1a-c.
position as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and he showed early promise. The first time he took part in a discussion programme, he was singled out in a BBC list of commentators as ‘most impressive – clear fluent and very sound...Very strongly recommended’. Younger’s successor, Andrew Shonfield, became the second Reith Lecturer affiliated with Chatham House. In 1972 he delivered his timely lecture series, entitled ‘Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination’, in which he debated (favourably) Britain’s entry into the EEC.

Chatham House also consolidated its relationship with the press during the Second World War. In 1942, concerned for its finances, the Institute decided to invite more bodies to become corporate subscribers, including newspapers. By 1945, 14 newspapers were corporate subscribers. All of the subscribers belonged to the quality press. As shown by figure 2.7, three of those subscribers – The Times, the Guardian and the Observer – made significantly more frequent mention of the Institute than the popular press – The Daily Mail, The Daily Express and The Daily Mirror – who were not corporate subscribers. The King-Hall model had its limits. Even the references that were made to the Institute by the popular press were mostly in regards to the more controversial lecturers that visited St James’s Square rather than the opinions of its staff or publications.

The Guardian, The Times and the Observer, however, all prided themselves on their international news coverage. As a weekly paper, the number of mentions made by the most cosmopolitan of the newspapers, the Observer, was especially high. During 1959, when the Observer mentioned the Institute the most, Chatham House was referred to once or more in 21% of the paper’s issues over the year. This was natural in light of David Astor’s tenure as

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212 For the recordings, see BBC, ‘The Reith Lectures: Andrew Shonfield, Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00h3x7f (accessed 3 Mar 2015).
editor between 1946 and 1975. Not only had his family played an important role in the
development of Chatham House, he had a profound interest in international affairs which he
shared with the columnists he enlisted. It was also the most liberal paper. Furthermore, the
*Observer* prioritised ideas over news, which would have made it more likely to value the
Institute’s research facilities and its utility as a forum.  

In demonstration of the Institute’s connection with the establishment, significant
reference was made to Chatham House by *The Times*, the ‘house journal of the British
élite’. The large number of references made in *The Times* in the 1960s was in part
attributable to advertising for the Institute’s publications and reflects Chatham House’s target
audience. However, there were also a large number of references to the Institute in the
obituary pages and in relation to economic and business matters. The latter may reflect the
Institute’s desire for its research to be increasingly valuable to the large number of businesses
who held corporate subscriptions. On a similar theme, a significant portion of the references
were also made in relation to Chatham House research on the merits of Britain joining the
EEC. The *Guardian* also made frequent mention of the Institute’s activities, research, and
visiting lecturers (both controversial and not). It also took a strong interest in the purposes of
the Institute itself and was not afraid to be critical.

While some NGOs were unafraid of attracting criticism for publicity’s sake, Chatham
House was particular sensitive in light of the need to maintain its intellectual legitimacy.
Figure 2.7 shows a spike of mentions by the *Guardian* in 1954 when, as aforementioned, its
letters pages played host to a very public airing of the grievances held by Chatham House’s
membership. The Institute’s sensitivity was evident in the AGM that year when Younger,
then Vice-Chairman of the Institute, made it known his irritation at those members for making

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their criticisms so public.\textsuperscript{217} It was also particularly apparent in Macadam’s over-reaction to criticisms that surfaced in the periodical \textit{Truth}.

\textit{Truth} had previously been a clandestine mouthpiece for Neville Chamberlain’s National Government controlled by the Conservative Research Department. However, during the Second World War controlling shares transferred to the libertarian Ernest Benn and \textit{Truth} became a medium of propaganda for the Society of Individualists.\textsuperscript{218} Its Deputy Editor was Arthur K. Chesterton, the founder of the League of Empire Loyalists who later helped establish the National Front.\textsuperscript{219} Fearing the demise of the British Empire and suspicious of Chatham House’s Commonwealth Relations Conferences, between 1943 and 1952 Chesterton launched a litany of attacks on the Institute which amounted to conspiracy theory. ‘Ever since that notorious Chatham House “Empire Relations Conference”, wrote Chesterton, ‘powerful interests have been working day and night to destroy the unique significance of the British Empire’.\textsuperscript{220} Chesterton vastly exaggerated the influence Chatham House had over British foreign policy.

As the organisation known as P.E.P. [Political and Economic Planning] claims to have supplied the blueprints for much of the domestic “planning” by means of which the economic life of the nation is being “controlled”, so in the wider field of international relations Chatham House has sought to make itself the predominant influence...undeviating directed towards the disintegration of the British world.\textsuperscript{221}

After more such attacks in 1949, the Council nevertheless concluded that the influence of the magazine was too little to necessitate action. The Institute’s publications officer Edward Osborn was convinced that no one could alter Chesterton’s prejudice: ‘The real

\textsuperscript{217} CHA: 1/3/31: Verbatim Record of AGM minutes, 2 Nov 1954.
\textsuperscript{221} ‘No Longer British’, \textit{Truth}, 4 June 1948 in CHA: 2/1/11c.
answer seems to me to be a psychiatrist.’ Even Chesterton’s editor Collin Brooks told Macadam that Chesterton was ‘as full of prejudices as a dog is fleas’. Yet Macadam still insisted on seeing Chesterton and stopping the attacks. It would not be until 1952 that Macadam would actually get to lunch with Chesterton and to Macadam’s credit the attacks did cease. Despite, having little interest in widely disseminating the Institute’s research directly among British citizens, Macadam proved eager to maintain the reputation of Chatham House among elite opinion informers.

An important aspect of the Institute’s intellectual legitimacy was its collaboration and candid discussion with official experts. The Chatham House rule was instrumental here. Although it was designed to politically protect officials it was in order that information and ideas could be released. It was a democratising step in the politics of foreign policy. The media presented the greatest threat to it. At the sign of the rule being broken, the Institute had to take swift action, as it did with the Guardian. In November 1963, General Franco’s Minister of Information and Tourism, Manuel Fraga Iribane, came to speak at Chatham House where he was treated to a half hour interrogation concerning the detention and torture of Asturian miners in north-west Spain who had participated in a strike that summer. The Guardian detailed the meeting and Fraga Iribane’s responses. When Kenneth Younger protested, the Guardian’s editor Alistair Hetherington informed him that having failed to obtain an interview with Fraga Iribane, they felt it necessary to report what he said. Hetherington regretted the offence caused, but could not rule out the possibility of the Guardian reporting a future meeting of Chatham House. The Institute’s Council found this

225 ‘Senor Fraga explains that Spain is “different”, Guardian, 27 Nov 1963.
 unacceptable and the *Guardian* withdrew its membership of the Institute.\(^{226}\) It would not be resumed until 1986.

The *Guardian* and Chatham House had contrasting views over what information should be kept away from public eyes. Hetherington explained to the soon-to-be Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, that ‘we must establish the principle that important public figures – especially those to whom we might in a sense, be hostile – ought to be accessible for on the record interviews’. Tellingly, the Labour Party leader gave a mixed and non-committal response. He could see some differences between dealings of non-attribution between British politicians and journalists on the one hand and such foreign visitors on the other, but nonetheless, ‘off the record briefings by these visitors could be valuable too’.\(^{227}\) Chatham House certainly thought so. As the political scientist David Vital put it, bodies like Chatham House believed that change of any real consequence could only be brought about

Not by public demonstrations in Downing Street and Trafalgar Square, or by marches from and to Aldermaston, but over lunch at the Reform Club or the Travellers, by means of letters to the Times...and in the countless other miniature, latter-day agoraes.\(^{228}\)

The Chatham House Rule was an intrinsic part of this method. It provided a secure space, one of those agoraes, in which policy-makers could ‘talk and listen without commitment and without a record’.\(^{229}\) It was, of course, not alone in this practice. Wilson implicitly recognised it when Hetherington enquired into his views on Chatham House: the media lived and breathed on non-attribution.

The uneasy relationship that followed between the *Guardian* and Chatham House revealed its public reputation. In 1974 Richard Gott, a journalist for the *Guardian* famously


\(^{228}\) Vital, *Making of British Foreign Policy*, 84.

later accused of being a Soviet informant, pilloried the Institute, ‘a corner of the
establishment’, for first believing that if the public were better informed that world wars could
be avoided and second, at any rate, never ‘seeking to educate beyond a restricted elite. It has
never adjusted to the demands of a more populist age’. Gott complained that it ‘rarely hits the
headlines, occasionally announcing with extreme discretion on the court page of the Times the
holding of a dinner’.230 In 1977, a Guardian editorial hoped that the Institute would transform
under the new Director David Watt towards ‘something less conformist and therefore more
lively’.231

Gott’s critique of Chatham House of not adjusting to a more populist age could also
have been applied to UNA. Both organisations could certainly have adopted more inventive
media strategies. However, international affairs do not always lend themselves to being
‘lively’. This is especially the case with those aspects that liberal internationalists desire to
stress: multilateral, multifaceted solutions, cooperation and compromise make poor copy. It
was especially apparent in UNA’s relations with the media.

Even the BBC, with its Reithian pursuit to inform, educate and entertain, deemed the
liberal internationalist cause to be so lacking in the last value as to negate its capability of
providing in the first two. This was most evident in the BBC’s dwindling postwar
commitment to the observance of UN Day. For the first UN Day in 1942, the BBC was
enlisted to provide coverage on its Home, Forces and Empire Services. There was a message
from the Prime Minister and a parade at Buckingham Palace. There was also commentary on
celebrations in Aylesbury, the rural market town chosen to highlight the national commitment
– outside of London – for the internationalist cause. A special service in St Martin in the

Fields was also broadcast.\textsuperscript{232} The following year, a special programme was written for the Empire Service which (rather painfully) enacted conversations between peoples of different nationalities recently acquainted, united together in London against the Axis Powers. They complained of too much singing of über alles and sentiments of my country right or wrong.\textsuperscript{233} The BBC continued its all-day coverage throughout the 1940s, with some encouragement from the Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{234} It was well received within UNA. Activists reported that ‘public support for the United Nations Association is almost impossible to arrange without the regular reporting, of the kind undertaken by the B.B.C. News Division’.\textsuperscript{235} However, there was a growing disinclination to continue on the part of the BBC.

In 1949, the BBC hoped that the Prime Minister would not wish to broadcast a message on UN Day, as it would have to receive a prominent place within news bulletins.\textsuperscript{236} UNA attempts to attach consistent significance to the observance of the anniversary within religious broadcasting department experienced difficulty. The head of religious broadcasting, fatigued by ‘an extremely long list of “special Sundays”’, was unconvinced that the special services advanced ‘the cause of Christian evangelism among the non-churchgoers who form the majority of the listeners’. It was further complicated by the anniversary’s proximity to Remembrance Sunday.\textsuperscript{237} The next year, soon after the Korean War had begun, it was argued that such occasions provided more effective, more topical, opportunities to propagate the merits of the UN ‘than anything purely formal and specially prepared for routine observance of an anniversary’.\textsuperscript{238} ‘Topicality was the persistent problem. The work of the UN that did receive coverage was usually concerned with its role as mediator in Cold War international

\textsuperscript{234} See BBC WAC: R34/246/1: C.F.A. Warner to W. Haley, 5 Oct 1949.
\textsuperscript{235} BBC WAC: R34/246/1: G.I. Smith to W. Haley, 27 Oct 1949.
\textsuperscript{236} BBC WAC: R34/246/1: Minute by R.A. Rendall, 17 Oct 1949.
\textsuperscript{237} BBC WAC: R34/246/1: F.H. House to H. Walker, 19 Jul 1949.
\textsuperscript{238} BBC WAC: R34/246/1: J.B. Clark to C.F.A. Warner, 14 Aug 1950.
politics, in which the UN often appeared to be a background actor. However, much of the
UN’s energies were devoted to less glamorous economic and social concerns. The anniversary
drew attention to such activities, but also sought to remind the public of the need to keep faith
in an institution whose immediate rewards were not always obvious.

The BBC’s research into its listenership found that the public were unimpressed. ‘It
must be said’, wrote the BBC’s Assistant Director General Harman Grisewood, ‘these
anniversaries do not represent natural or deep seated feelings among the people – as does for
example, Armistice Day’. Furthermore, with little public sentiment attached to the day,
there were fears that the BBC’s observation of it had the appearance of ‘semi-official
propaganda’. In the 1950s and 1960s, the BBC’s coverage of the anniversary was
significantly reduced. UNA attempts to encourage the BBC to do more, were met with the
reply that the anniversary was simply not topical enough. The content of television magazine
programmes that might be expected to cover such an anniversary such as Panorama or
Tonight had to be ‘related to events and controversies of first significance to the public at the
time’. By the 1950s, coverage of the anniversary was largely limited to a ministerial
broadcast – now delivered by the Foreign Secretary, rather than the Prime Minister – and a
radio broadcast of an internationally coordinated UN Day Concert.

The concert was a logistically ambitious event in which symphony orchestras from all
over the world contributed to a live programme relayed by numerous broadcasters. It was
somewhat like a UN version of the Proms. It had a mixed reception within the BBC. In 1958
it was proclaimed an ‘undoubted success’, but by 1969 it was deemed ‘as usual well below
normal broadcast standards of quality’. Awkwardly, the content fell somewhere between

239 BBC WAC: R34/246/3: Minute by H. Grisewood, 18 Jul 1957.
242 BBC WAC: E29/343/1: C. Conner to M. Dunn, 4 Nov 1958; R27/940/1: Minute by R.S.C. Gundry, 13 Nov
1969.
the Home Service and the Light and Third Programmes. Indeed, over the years, it was played at least once on all three bandwidths. In order to reach the largest audience, it was preferable that it should be played on either the Home Service or Light Programme. But poor coordination by the concert organisers often meant that the BBC was given too little notice and in 1964 it was forced onto the Third Programme. Audience research that year found that only 0.2% of the population, or 1% of those listening to the radio, tuned into the concert. Although some listeners considered it to be ‘a rag-bag of miscellaneous pieces indifferently transmitted from all over’, more than half were ‘warmly appreciative’; some even received the intended message and pondered whether music was ‘the most effective language for transcending national barriers’. 243 Yet it was hardly the mass audience UNA sought to captivate. In 1970, to add to the existing problems of poor audience uptake and insufficient organisation, there were technical problems and spiralling costs. The BBC, along with other world broadcasters, decided that it could no longer relay the concert. The decision was met with relief at Broadcasting House. ‘I know that many of us’ wrote the future Director-General Gerard Mansell, ‘have long felt that this concert had little musical interest, and we are now fortunately provided with a good reason for opting out of the whole exercise’. 244 In the same year, the Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, was persuaded to move his UN Day message to the evening before, where it was attached to an episode of Radio 4’s Analysis concerned with the UN. It would be the last time a minister would deliver a message for UN Day. 245 This was how the BBC marked the UN’s 25th Anniversary.

Nonetheless, the public had hardly been biting at the bit in anticipation of the BBC’s UN coverage. The complaints that the BBC did receive were in the main from UNA, the United Nations Information Centre and the UN Department in the Foreign Office. In 1964, for

244 BBC WAC: R27/940/1: Minute by G. Mansell, 10 Apr 1970.
instance, the radio producer Patricia Brent was ‘somewhat embarrassed’ when she found herself being ‘shot at on all sides’ about the BBC’s lack of engagement with UN affairs at a meeting held in the Foreign Office to discuss plans for UN Day. However, the BBC and other media outlets pointed the finger of blame at the public’s lack of engagement with UN affairs.

In the same year, the Observer journalist and television interviewer Kenneth Harris gave his thoughts as to why the UN failed to make good copy within the newspaper industry. He first made reference to newspaper policy. The Beaverbrook Press were opposed to the UN, while the Daily Telegraph, although supportive of its technical work, was frequently critical of the action it took during political crises. But the problems were more widespread than a group of papers with mixed feelings about the UN. Harris explained that the UN’s everyday successes, including its technical work, lacked excitement.

[T]he continuing day-to-day constructive work of any permanent organisation is nothing like so interesting as a dramatic success or failure. The miracle by which dozens of aircraft cross the Atlantic every hour of the day intrigues nobody. When there is a crash it’s a different matter. The plain fact is that a great deal of the U.N.’s work is not dramatic enough to attract the newspaperman’s eye.

Furthermore, the nature of the UN’s operation existed outside the traditional framework of a newspaper’s news story. Harris explained that diplomatic stories were usually presented in terms of personalities, sides and clashes in critical situations. British political coverage was ‘governed ultimately through the dialectic of the two opposing sides in the House of Commons, the continuing duel’. The UN’s purpose was to avoid polarisation and drama. British journalists were unfamiliar with the concept of framing news stories around multiple sides and personalities, including UN permanent officials who did not seek publicity.

246 BBC WAC: R34/246/4: Minute by P. Brent, 13 Jun 1966. See also TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/213: ‘Minister of State’s Meeting between the Minister of State (George Thomson) and a delegation from UNA’, 16 May 1967.
and instead pursued a ‘quiet diplomacy’. Moreover, this quiet diplomacy was nuanced and complex. The more people that a journalist wished to inform, the more the journalist needed to simplify and such simplification required more knowledge not less. Few correspondents were prepared to know all the ins and outs of the bewildering array of multiple and simultaneous UN activities. To cap it off, New York was an expensive location to maintain a permanent correspondent. This may help explain the sizeable coverage that the Observer provided to both Chatham House and UNA (see figures 2.7 and 2.8). The Observer’s aforementioned prioritisation of ideas rather than news perhaps provided a more favourable framework for reporting those aspects of international affairs that liberal internationalists wished to stress. David Astor’s indifference to his own wealth would have also helped provide more extensive international coverage. Nevertheless, Harris posited that the solution to the media’s aloofness towards the UN lay not within the media itself, but with bodies such as UNA. If they would encourage enough public interest, newspapers would be forced to alter their editorial content in order to maintain sales.

It was the chicken or the egg scenario: which came first, media coverage or public interest? The media blamed the public. UNA blamed the media. Harris’s explanation was published in United Nations News as a result of such criticisms. Furthermore, when there was UN coverage, UNA often criticised the media’s ignorance of international affairs. In 1961, UNA complained to the Daily Telegraph when its columnist Douglas Brown suggested that the UN should have left Belgium alone to deal with the Congo Crisis. Yet the crisis followed the withdrawal of Belgium from its former colony. Similarly, in 1973, New World complained of ‘abysmal ignorance’ on the part of the press generally, when the Guardian

248 Cockett, David Astor, 135-136, 140-141.
“exposed” the system in which Africans were being employed by British companies in South Africa at starvation wages. *New World* noted how this had actually been exposed, ‘more accurately’, thirty years before by the historian Keith Hancock stationed at Chatham House, ‘thought by some [including the Guardian] to be an excessively establishment body’.251

Although the media had plenty of faults, UNA hardly proved media savvy. In 1961, the Press Association journalist Dennis Laxton, likened his experience of a meeting of UNA General Council to that of being introduced to a stereotypical ‘maiden aunt’.

Aunty is prone to interfere in a good natured way. But no one dare openly criticise her because, occasionally in her old-fashioned way, she comes out with some sound advice. But it is felt that Aunty is rather out of her depth most of the time. Her high-pitched voice is tolerated but when boredom demands, she is persuaded it is time she went home – “and thanks for calling”.

Laxton further complained that the meeting neglected the topical crisis in Berlin in favour of trivial internal administrative problems: ‘With it went a first class opportunity for publicity’. He was also concerned that UNA was too keen to revisit old arguments that had been played out in the press months before. If UNA was to influence the press and public, Laxton concluded, ‘it must be geared to throw in an opinion before the door is shut’.252 In the same year Hugh Walker, when looking covetously at CND’s publicity, complained of the same problem, that ‘UNA seems so often to comment after the event, and to take rather a long time to make up its mind and declare it’.253

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Evidence of one of UNA’s favourite media strategies is apparent in figure 2.8. The number of mentions UNA received in *The Times* is indicative of the Association’s connection to the establishment and also of its faith in the value of a letter published in *The Times* for precipitating change. Nevertheless, UNA had a wider media presence at least in the quality press. There were many notifications for UNA events and advertisements for its campaigns. Promisingly, the majority of the mentions related to international news stories. Demonstrating the varying extents of coverage of the Suez Crisis in *The Times, Manchester Guardian* and *Observer*, most of the mentions of UNA in *The Times* in 1956 were related to its refugee campaign, rather than UNA’s opposition to the government. The opposite was the case for both the *Observer* and *Manchester Guardian* that shared UNA’s stance. The rise in mentions in the late 1960s relates to UNA’s membership campaign and the internal divisions between the chairman Humphry Berkeley and John Ennals, which are explored in the following chapters. However, by the 1970s, UNA was deemed less newsworthy; in 1973, it was only mentioned six times in the *Guardian*.

Similarly to Chatham House, UNA received little coverage within the popular press. Mentions were in the main related to publicity for UNA’s campaigns. When the Association was mentioned in Beaverbrook’s *Daily Express*, it received no particular criticism. That was reserved for the UN. The importance of attracting well-known names in order that events received coverage was especially apparent within the popular press. A little drama had its uses too, such as when the League of Empire Loyalists protested at UNA meetings and heckled Harold Macmillan.254 Nevertheless, it was apparent that for most of the period UNA was deemed of little interest by the editors of popular newspapers. UNA wished to be a mass movement, but it was struggling to reach the vast majority of the public. So was it the chicken

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or the egg? Had UNA adopted better communication strategies, or perhaps had the media provided greater coverage to UNA activities, would there have been greater public enthusiasm for the internationalist cause? Could the same be said for Chatham House? Unsurprisingly, the answer is much more complicated.

THE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

In 1946, in common with UNA activists, Mass Observation encountered public scepticism in the capabilities of the new UN. Waldorf Astor’s high hopes that the experiences of the Second World War would make the public more internationalist, not less, were being dashed. Throughout the year, Mass Observation conducted a series of surveys in East Fulham concerned with public attitudes to world organisation. The ominous ‘they’ featured frequently in the answers of the interviewees. International affairs were considered the realm of the politician or – following the creation of the atomic bomb – the scientist. When asked whether the individual citizen could help to prevent war, 31% felt that they could, 61% thought not. Furthermore, Mass Observation identified a rapid public disengagement with international affairs after the war. It attributed this to pessimism over the chances of a lasting peace and a resultant fatalism. A survey in February found that 45% expected war within 25 years. By June – following Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, Stalin’s reply and the Russian Foreign Minister’s decampment from a UN Security Council meeting deliberating on the Iran Crisis – it had risen to 70%.255 Opinion on the fledgling UN’s progress was mixed. In the same month, a Gallup Poll noted that 27% were satisfied with it, 39% dissatisfied and 34% did not know.256 In 1947 under the heading ‘Anxiety to Apathy’, Mass Observation’s director Tom

Harrisson noted a popular feeling that Britain was merely subject to the whims of the USA and the USSR, and that ‘[t]he continual news of ill-will and unrest in the world emphasises how little the individual can do and how pointless our individual efforts of 1940-47 seem now to be.’ Harrisson attributed an increased interest in astrology, greyhound racing and the football pools to an escapism derived from a fear of war. ‘A skilled listener-in’, he observed, ‘might go for days through Britain without hearing a single mention of U.N., U.S.A., U.S.S.R., India, Atomic Bomb, or Science.’

Declining East-West relations also disheartened those internationalists who had hoped that stronger Anglo-Soviet relations – through such bodies as the UN – would lead to better conditions for the working class. There were self-proclaimed internationalists who were nonetheless prone to xenophobia such as that displayed to resettled members of the Polish armed forces. If internationalism was not perceived to be serving people’s interests, its popularity inevitably declined. As chapter three details, this held just as true among those supporters of political parties who limited their support to internationalism solely when it was believed to be serving national interests. People treated perceived national interests as increasingly precious as Britain’s global influence declined, while others wished to close their eyes to it.

Apathy to international affairs was reflected among service personnel, those who had been affected by Chatham House’s collaboration with ABCA. Once demobilised, many would cease attending courses, which tended to be regarded as a mere extension of military training rather than a civic duty. ABCA’s successor organisation, BCA experienced difficulties in inspiring interest among those who remained in the armed forces and the new

258 Silverman, Imagining Internationalism, 66-84.
259 R. Fieldhouse, ‘An Overview of British Adult Education in the Twentieth Century’ in Fieldhouse et al., History of Modern British Adult Education, 57. See also Field, Blood, Sweat and Toil, 278.
recruits for national service. The loss of older personnel who tended to possess greater knowledge and interest in current affairs was lamented. ‘It is not easy’, wrote one course lecturer, ‘to talk of world affairs to youths who have little or no sense of responsibility and who have little interest in anything beyond their own personal welfare’. Another observer remarked that in the new national service era ‘reading meant comic papers like the Beano’. Individualism and comic books: these were hardly the tenets of idealists’ conception of the altruistic, well-informed citizen. Following disputes with the BCA and its eventual demise in 1951, the War Office produced its own discussion briefs. They were regimentally apolitical.

In 1955, Henry Durant, the Director of the British Institute of Public Opinion, noted that ‘the ignorance and lack of interest of the public in foreign affairs are proverbial’. In 1963, psephologists asked 2000 respondents to list the most important problems to which the government should turn its attention to. Less than one in ten mentioned issues of foreign and defence policy. In 1976, William Wallace – then Research Fellow, later Director of Chatham House – noted that opinion polls over the last ten years consistently confirmed the low salience of international issues in comparison with the cost of living, taxation and the domestic economy. He concluded that the level of public interest in international affairs had declined since the Second World War. Ignorance naturally followed apathy. In 1963, a survey conducted shortly after de Gaulle’s famous veto found that several million respondents thought that Britain was already part of the EEC. Similarly, in 1977, the Schlackman Report, commissioned jointly between the Central Office of Information and the Ministry of Overseas

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Development, revealed little popular understanding of problems in developing countries and complained of ‘national introversion’.  

It should not be assumed, however, that British people were innately unintelligent. Those activities Harrisson reported that many people were engaged in to the neglect of international political affairs, such as the football pools, required an intelligence that could easily have been applied to politics, international and domestic. People may be better understood as possessing selective expertise. Those who were politically disengaged were not provided with a motivation to be otherwise. For those who were politically engaged, there were plenty of other causes and methods beyond those on offer from UNA and Chatham House to which the public could direct their expertise. Jon Lawrence notes how many voters in the 1940s and early 1950s had ‘internalized the ideas that public politics should be about rational argument and instruction, rather than entertainment’. This was when the UNA was enjoying its peak. However, such public politics devoid of entertainment had a limited future; it did not suit everyone. Young people, in particular, the crucial demographic UNA was struggling to attract in sufficient number, were not impressed by colourless meetings in community halls. They would not need to wait long until a more glamorous public politics was on offer in such forms as new social movements. There were also plenty of political, social and economic causes closer to home that appeared divorced from international politics. The rediscovery of poverty in the 1960s provided many new projects to which young (and older) citizens could direct their expertise and resources. The rise and rise of single-issue NGOs constituted a congested market place, especially for the likes of multi-issue organisations such as UNA and Chatham House.

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267 Lawrence, *Electing Our Masters*, 137.
268 Lawrence, *Electing Our Masters*, 144.
Nevertheless we must also be wary of a simple narrative of declining public engagement in international affairs, as held by Harrisson and a number within both Chatham House and UNA. ‘There is apathy about’, Mass Observation reported shortly before the general election in 1945, ‘but it is not the apathy of non-interest. Predominantly it is the apathy of frustration.’\(^{269}\) Chatham House and UNA’s adherence to elite-centric models may have clouded their appreciation of a more complicated phenomenon of public frustration and disengagement with those elites. Interest in politics, international and domestic, was not necessarily in decline, but faith in and deference to both domestic and international political elites was.

In 1956, Mass Observation conducted a similar survey to that which they had done in 1946. It took place just after the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis. It noted support for organised internationalism, but also an increasing number of qualifications concerning its effectiveness. Respondents frequently commented on the UN’s inability to act in Hungary.\(^{270}\) UNA’s membership may have been in decline and would never reach the peaks enjoyed by the LNU, but between 1949 and 1967, even though there was declining faith in the UN’s effectiveness, Gallup Polls consistently observed popular acceptance of the necessity of the UN’s existence and of ensuring its success.\(^{271}\) Crucially, Mass Observation’s 1956 report identified an increase since 1946 in the number who suggested that the best preventative of war lay with a better understanding between the ordinary peoples of the world: ‘between us as opposed to them’.\(^{272}\) This “them” and “us” axiom was a persistent theme of politics more generally. In his seminal 1957 work *The Uses of Literacy*, Richard Hoggart considered that this conflict occupied a significant position within working class attitudes that resulted in a


stoical, fatalistic acceptance of an inability to change the main elements of their situation.\textsuperscript{273} The “them” and “us” axiom featured widely within cinematic representations of public officials and politicians throughout the 1940s to the 1960s.\textsuperscript{274} With regards to international affairs, people’s faith in their ability to actively engage with and influence international political elites, such as the UN and the EU – “them” – was low, even by means of influencing the other “them”, the British government. A Gallop Poll in 1955 revealed divided feelings over whether ordinary people could influence British government policy in the UN: 44% felt that it could be done, 32% felt that it could not be done while 26% did not know.\textsuperscript{275} This did not, however, automatically equate with a lack of interest in what was occurring outside Britain’s borders.

Those who sought to improve the well-being of ordinary people around the globe and who could engage with the politics of “us” versus “them” effectively elicited interest. The New Left that owed much of its genesis to the events of 1956 had a profound impact on international thought. Its intellectuals were much less attached than their liberal internationalist counterparts to the idea of improving the world’s ills through international political bodies. At best, New Left intellectuals deemed them ineffective; at worst, they considered that such bodies only served to maintain inequalities and subsequently sought to take power away from them. The New Left’s recognition and condemnation of neocolonialism influenced protests against the Vietnam War, humanitarian concerns and the call for unilateral nuclear disarmament, embodied in CND.\textsuperscript{276} Such NGOs that could be seen to be employing the “us” versus “them” axiom, or be perceived to operate outside it – for example

\textsuperscript{273} R. Hoggart, \textit{The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working-Class Life}, (1957; London, 2009), 57-58, 75-76.
Oxfam or Save the Children – managed to inspire public interest in causes overseas.\textsuperscript{277} The Slater Report, produced in 1973 by the Foreign Office to examine its relations with NGOs, observed that there was ‘impressive evidence...among the British people at many levels and in many walks of life to devote time, talent and money to international affairs without thought of personal profit’.\textsuperscript{278} Proposals within UNA to adopt alternative strategies for engaging the public in the work of the UN, especially by following ‘the line of least resistance’ and focussing its efforts away from international politics and on to humanitarianism, could possibly have been successful if they had managed to compete with similarly orientated, but much more media savvy NGOs.\textsuperscript{279} However, UNA, along with Chatham House, was not only a fundamentally liberal internationalist body that celebrated international political structures; it was also part of Marwick’s ‘middle opinion’. Both bodies sought consensus between the public and the elite and both ‘believed in the essential soundness of established society’.\textsuperscript{280} Both bodies were founded upon liberal tenets of social harmony in contrast to social conflict that became out of step with the politics of “them” and “us”.\textsuperscript{281}

Another axiom of significance was the differing level of public attention applied to crises and noncrises. Notwithstanding the success made by NGOs in inspiring interest in world affairs, it would be inaccurate, to suggest that the British public were necessarily consistently engaged. Both Younger and Durant noted how public interest in international affairs was at its lowest in the intervals between crises, but appear not to have understood the full implications.\textsuperscript{282} Political scientists Thomas Knecht and M. Stephen Weatherford, in their examination of American public attitudes to foreign policy through media visibility, argue

\textsuperscript{279} UNA Mss: UNA/6/2/1: ‘Priorities for UNA’ by J. Hodgess-Roper, undated.
\textsuperscript{280} A. Marwick, ‘Middle Opinion in the Thirties: Planning, progress and political “agreement”’, \textit{English Historical Review}, lxxix (1964), 297.
\textsuperscript{282} Younger, ‘Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy’, 32; Durant, ‘Public Opinion, Polls and Foreign Policy’, 154.
that a comprehensive understanding of the character of public interest in international affairs requires a distinction between crises and noncrises. They defined crises as entailing one or more of the following factors: a threat to basic values, a finite time for response, and a probability of military involvement; for example the Cuban Missile Crisis. Conversely, noncrises were defined as situations whereby military force is highly unlikely and there is much more time for policy decisions and their implementation. Examples included international economic agreements, environmental issues and foreign aid.283

CND’s two waves of popularity provide evidence of this. During detente it received considerably less attention than it had in its early days. In 1964, Christopher Driver wrote a series of articles in the Observer entitled ‘The Rise and Fall of CND’, in tandem with a book he published the same year. It amounted to an obituary.284 During CND’s second wave, as the Cold War thawed, CND’s membership rose from 4,000 in 1979 to its peak of 100,000 in 1984. When the Cold War cooled again and eventually ended, membership rapidly declined. By 1991 it stood at 60,000 and continued to decrease thereafter.285 Nevertheless, Knecht and Weatherford noted that although the crisis/noncrisis axiom was frequently correct, it was not universally so. Some issues they defined as noncrises such as apartheid in South Africa, the Ethiopian famine in the mid-1980s and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol received much public attention.286 Arguably, however, this could be attributed to the work of media savvy NGOs, distanced from political elites, who successfully presented such events as crises. Even with their sophisticated media strategies, Oxfam struggled to draw attention to noncrises. Their survival rested upon campaigns for crisis relief, rather than long-term projects for correcting

285 M. Hilton et al., A Historical Guide to NGOs in Britain: Charities, Civil Society and the Voluntary Sector Since 1945 (Basingstoke, 2012), 113.
the deep-rooted international political and economic structural inequalities that only international bodies could feasibly coordinate.\textsuperscript{287} The frustration behind the apparent public apathy over international affairs held by luminaries of Chatham House and UNA was often due to the impact world events had on the everyday lives of ordinary people. Public attention was drawn to crises that exposed global divisions to the neglect of noncrises, such as trade agreements, that best demonstrated global interdependence. Arguably, the public understanding of the scope of globalisation and thus the significance of international affairs was subsequently warped.

Knecht and Weatherford’s study was based upon media visibility. The limited extent of alternative sources of accessible information on international affairs made the media’s selection of international news stories especially significant. A Mass Observation study in 1949 indicated that newspaper influence in international affairs was ‘considerably stronger’ than in domestic affairs.\textsuperscript{288} Yet, the former editor of the \textit{Survey of International Affairs}, Peter Calvocoressi remarked in 1970 that British press coverage of world affairs was ‘deplorable’.\textsuperscript{289} A study conducted the next year of news-space devoted to international affairs over a week found that the quality press dedicated 22\% and the popular press 10\%. The coverage in the latter was typically limited to disaster stories and sensationalism, but ethnocentrism pervaded both.\textsuperscript{290} Another study conducted ten years later found that \textit{The Times} had a strong tendency to select international news stories involving Britain and countries they assumed carried the most meaning for their readership, namely the USA, Western Europe and former or current members of the British Empire or Commonwealth. This had ugly consequences. Disregard to countries that did not fit such criteria contributed to the media’s

\textsuperscript{287} Hilton et al., \textit{The Politics of Expertise}, 146-7.
\textsuperscript{288} Mass Observation, \textit{The Press and its Readers} (London, 1949), 85.
neglect of the Cambodian genocide (1975-1979). International news in *The Times* was also found to be often negative in content; the paper was particularly guilty of focusing on conflict.\(^{291}\)

Television provided greater international coverage than the newspapers. In 1973, both the BBC and ITV devoted 37% of news-space to international affairs.\(^{292}\) However, they also found that the television broadcasters were guilty of the same ethnocentrism and prioritisation of countries thought to hold meaning with the British public as the press were.\(^{293}\) Studies of international news coverage by American networks have revealed television necessarily oversimplifies highly complex issues as a result of the limited time devoted to the news in general on a medium that primarily values entertainment.\(^{294}\) Terence Lawson, the Secretary of the CEWC concurred. He worried that a significant section of the television audience were more interested in the ‘flow of adrenaline than the process of reasoned argument’.\(^{295}\)

Those media outlets that prided themselves on serious international coverage also experienced problems. David Astor described himself and his staff at the *Observer* as ‘liberals and internationalists’.\(^{296}\) Astor believed that his predecessor J.L. Garvin had made the grave error of prioritising coverage of the domestic scene to the neglect of the deteriorating international situation of the 1930s.\(^{297}\) Astor’s editorial staff in the 1940s and 1950s reflected his internationalist vision, more than half of whom were German or central European.\(^{298}\)


\(^{296}\) Cockett, *David Astor*, 134.

\(^{297}\) Cockett, *David Astor*, 137, 151.

\(^{298}\) Clark, *From Three Worlds*, 94-95.
Astor, however, was unusual. His wealth and the premium the newspaper could charge on advertising during paper rationing enabled him to enact his strong editorial line with few financial considerations. However, by 1975 Astor was forced to sell the nearly bankrupt newspaper. Market conditions and the priority attributed to them limited international coverage. The Observer’s rival The Sunday Times experienced similar problems. In 1945, the soon-to-be famous novelist, Ian Fleming became foreign manager of The Sunday Times and undertook an ambitious project to provide the best foreign news service in the country, if not the world. Within three years, the number of foreign correspondents serving the project totalled 88. However, demand for foreign news stories was low and the model proved financially unsound. When Fleming resigned in 1959, he left behind a tiny team.\(^{299}\) In 1983, the limited value attributed to international coverage led to the removal of war photographer Don McCullin from the newspaper’s magazine. The new editor, Andrew Neil, had a conflicting vision for the magazine summarised by a friend of McCullin as ‘no more starving Third World babies; more successful businessmen around their weekend barbecues’.\(^{300}\) Those who relied upon the media to improve the public understanding of international affairs, let alone convince them of the merits of international integration, were betting on the wrong horse.

CONCLUSION

In one of the memoranda submitted to the committee that met to discuss UNA’s future in 1963, Jessie Stephens, a regional officer, observed:

> In spite of increased foreign travel, an increase in international exchange of all kinds and a considerable desire to help people in countries less well off than our own, there is present in a


large section of the adult British public a reluctance to become involved in the International Political scene except when our own country is immediately affected.\textsuperscript{301}

Chatham House and UNA faced an uphill struggle in their attempts to cultivate public support for liberal internationalism. Their elite-centric models were too tied to the traditional political institutions that other NGOs were moving away from. This did not appeal to younger constituencies. Chatham House and UNA preached the need to align public and elite opinion, to reach consensus not conflict. Their politics clashed with the politics of “them” and “us”. It is impossible to know whether Waldorf Astor’s postwar plan for Chatham House and his alternative to the King-Hall model would have been more successful. However, the King-Hall model relied too heavily on the media’s ability to improve the public’s understanding of international affairs and to stress those aspects of international affairs that were so crucial in demonstrating the need for international integration, namely growing global interdependence. Astor’s plans to reach out to other educators beyond Westminster and beyond the media may thus have been more fruitful. Similarly, had the UNA paid greater attention to its youth section, which appreciated the need to engage with the international politics and diplomacy that other NGOs attracting their peers avoided, perhaps it could have stemmed the loss of its members.

Again, of course, it is impossible to know. Not only did the media, despite its highly significant role in shaping the public understanding of international affairs, prove reluctant to inform it, but also external events bred fatalism and apathy that undermined the democratisation of foreign policy and limited the attention paid to international affairs by the media. Among those engaged with international affairs, there was certainly life left in liberal internationalism after the Second World War, but it was fragile. Faith in political elites at home and abroad was low. A more broadly defined internationalism without the stress on

international organisation and diplomacy and with a greater emphasis on the cooperation of peoples rather than governments was very much alive and well. Nevertheless, Chatham House and the UNA were right. International problems required international solutions and they necessitated the cooperation of governments. Both CND and Oxfam found that selling singular issues was one thing, but selling all-encompassing internationalist philosophies that involved changing foreign policy was much more difficult.302 Yet if internationalist, be they liberal or otherwise, achievements were to be made sustainable, they required favourable and active public opinion. The founders of LNU and Chatham House were right to be impressed by the power of public opinion, but it was extremely difficult to coordinate, especially when the media practices unyieldingly failed to accurately present the extent of global interdependence to the public and why global problems could not be solved by targeting singular issues. The politics of British foreign policy proved only more difficult to navigate for those who wished to bring about meaningful change when Whitehall was brought into the equation, even for insiders.

The Same Old Diplomacy?

Whitehall and Being an Insider

The [Foreign Office’s UN] Department has always held the view that the United Nations Association is, all things being considered, a reasonable and moderate body which does much to canalise woolly idealism which might otherwise prove tiresome and embarrassing. It has therefore been felt that it is desirable to preserve good relations with the Association and be as helpful to them as possible.

Minute by David Hildyard, 1 Apr 1950

the continued existence of Chatham House at or near its present level of activity is not essential to the FCO...We value highly the extensive meeting programme and the extent to which Chatham House provides a forum for the informed discussion of foreign affairs. But the library facilities (except for the Press Cutting Library) and research programmes, useful and interesting though they may be, duplicate the larger and better organised facilities of the FCO itself.

James Cable to Thomas Brimelow, 12 May 1972

Insiders groups such as Chatham House and UNA played a dangerous game. Just as they tried to influence the state, the state tried to influence them. David Hildyard, a member of the Foreign Office’s UN Department encouraged ministers to accede to the requests made by UNA to continue to receive deputations from them. Their prestigious patronage, that included the leaders of all three main political parties, also endowed UNA with an insider status that many politicised NGOs would have been envious of. As Hildyard outlined, Whitehall valued and respected insider groups like UNA and Chatham House. In terms of foreign policy, both organisations occupied a position in D.C. Watt’s unofficial elite. Chatham House staff advised on policy papers from the Foreign Office and during the Second World War many even became temporary civil servants. Similarly, retired diplomats and ministers became staff

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1 The National Archives (hereafter TNA): Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/88625: Minute by D.H.T. Hildyard, 1 Apr 1950.
at Chatham House while Foreign Office officials sat in Chatham House study groups. MPs would become UNA Chairmen and UNA Secretaries would become Ministers. Prime Ministers and leaders of political parties addressed meetings of the UNA General Council and spoke at UNA branches all over the UK. The staff of both organisations often operated within the same social milieu of their Whitehall counterparts. They tended to be from wealthy families, privately educated, had attended Oxbridge and were, with some exceptions, male. They attended the same parties as government officials and – Chatham House staff at least – took lunch at the same clubs in Pall Mall, just a few minutes’ walk from Chatham House in St James’s Square.

However, the privileges afforded to insider groups like UNA and Chatham House should not be exaggerated. In 1970, Elie Kedourie’s famous essay ‘The Chatham House Version’ argued that between 1918 and 1945 – and even since then – Chatham House was so influential within the corridors of power that he laid perceived failures in British Middle Eastern policy at the Institute’s door.4 Such anxieties over Chatham House’s potential malign influence over foreign policy were not new. In the Institute’s early days, there were officials within the Foreign Office who were concerned that it might become ‘a sort of rival civil service’5. Similarly during the Second World War, there was apprehension in the House of Commons that Chatham House and Whitehall had grown too close.6 On occasion, these fears amounted to conspiracy theory. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Arthur K. Chesterton – the future co-founder of the National Front – routinely attacked the Institute within the periodical Truth: Chatham House had seduced the government, and was hell-bent on the disintegration

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6 See, for example, HC Deb, 7 Feb 1940, vol. 357, cols 265-94.
of British power. Professor Carroll Quigley’s musings on the Institute as one of the numerous instruments of Milner’s Kindergarten, which had ensnared the British and American establishments, was posthumously published in 1981. Today Chatham House features on a number of conspiracy theory websites largely inspired by Quigley’s work. One provides a diagram, tellingly shaped as the Star of David, detailing the Institute’s supposedly perfidious connections with the CFR, the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg Group and the United Nations.8

These anxieties – be they borne from respectable or questionable sources – were largely unfounded. Zara Steiner proved the importance of taking into account the diversity of opinion within the Foreign Office.9 Officials would ignore the advice of ambassadors let alone non-state actors who were, of course, not privy to the same classified information. Chatham House appears to have perhaps been the most influential NGO on Foreign Office opinion. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office proved wary of external opinion and, at least in this manner, aspects of the old diplomacy lived on. Even James Cable, the head of the Foreign Office department perhaps most favourable to Chatham House, the Planning Staff, understood the Institute’s research as a mere duplication of their own. Members of the Foreign Office often perceived themselves as the ultimate experts who needed little tutelage from external sources; quite the reverse.

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7 See, for example, Truth, 14 Sep 1945; 15 Oct 1948; 3 Aug 1951 in Chatham House Archives, Chatham House, London (hereafter CHA): 2/1/11c.
UNA’s policies were considered, but more often as a result of their representing an important body of opinion than any faith in their expertise. Moreover, the deputations afforded the opportunity to put the government’s point of view across to UNA. Government support for the Association was often intended to encourage the moderates and, in Hildyard’s words, ‘canalise’ opinion away from radical views and deter such views from entering UNA and the organisations it was associated with. All the while Whitehall jealously guarded the line between state and non-state and significantly so too did Chatham House and UNA in their eagerness to appear impartial. Neither body was subservient to Whitehall, Chatham House refused a number of opportunities for government funding while UNA, often to the surprise and disgust of ministers, mobilised opinion against them. However, as Matthew Hilton et al demonstrate, the shared frontier between official and unofficial sectors has been constantly redrawn and thus there can be no notion of a tidy separation. Instead, we should understand Chatham House, UNA and Whitehall as occupying shared space, most clearly demonstrated by the aforementioned sharing of personnel.

This chapter will explore the dangers for both parties inherent in this shared space. It will, in a broadly chronological fashion, plot the changing stakes that Whitehall held in both organisations. Shortly after the Second World War, Whitehall appears to have been mostly interested in the Institute’s research. However, it grew increasingly interested in Chatham House’s role as an unofficial diplomat at international conferences along with its study groups and meetings through which it could gauge domestic public opinion, or at least informed public opinion that was perceived to go on to shape more popular opinion. Whitehall’s stakes in UNA also changed, but much more erratically. Often, governments would support UNA in an endeavour to prove their internationalist credentials; often, governments would find themselves defending themselves from UNA protests. Furthermore, while the Association

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was struggling to stem the loss of its members and experienced extensive financial problems in the 1970s, governments vacillated on the scale of support they should offer. However, in and around times of crises, insiders were held within Whitehall in greater esteem.

DIVIDING THE CHINA

Chatham House was at its most influential during the Second World War; or at least a part of it was. At the outbreak of war, the Institute created the FRPS for government use. It was housed in Balliol College, Oxford and 80% of its expenses were paid by the Foreign Office, the rest by Chatham House and the University of Oxford. Chatham House lent for FRPS work, portions of its library, the whole of its unique collection of press cuttings and crucially, of course, staff. The FRPS was headed by the Institute’s Director of Studies, Arnold J. Toynbee. Other members of staff included historians Alfred Zimmern and Charles Kingsley Webster. The FRPS produced a weekly document, the ‘Review of the Foreign Press’, which was circulated among government departments and the BBC. It also answered enquiries from over twenty government departments or bodies working for the government. Furthermore, it undertook continuous research on the principal topics of international affairs and a research committee with sub-committees was constituted to study materials, particularly in connection with war aims and reconstruction.11 By 1942, the FRPS was being used to such an extent that the government decided that it should convert the body into a Foreign Office department and turn its members into temporary civil servants; and so the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD) was born.

We should be cautious, however, not to exaggerate Chatham House’s capabilities to influence policy during the war. Some works have demonstrated that the FRPS and FORD

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played a significant role in moulding policy, specifically with regard to South East Asia, South East Europe and the Baltic States. Nevertheless, as Inderjeet Parmar has observed, Chatham House did not in any sense control the Foreign Office. Foreign Office officials shared fundamentally similar outlooks with those of Chatham House. The Foreign Office was involved with the creation of the FRPS planning machinery; it decided the majority of its tasks. Moreover, the FRPS was ‘nationalised’ to become FORD and absorbed into Whitehall.13

Here the line between state and non-state were being redrawn. The Foreign Office, understood the FRPS and Chatham House as two separate bodies.14 The decision to convert the FRPS into a Foreign Office department arose in large part out of the frustration over the false perception held by other Whitehall departments, MPs and foreign governments that the FRPS was just ‘Chatham House at Balliol’. Eden wished to be in the position to be able to explain that he was firmly in control of the FRPS and that it was on the same footing as any other department within the Foreign Office.15 Eden’s ministerial colleague Richard Law feared that if left unchanged, parliamentary critics would proclaim that policy was dictated by the whims of Chatham House’s ‘long-haired people’.16 Chatham House also had reservations. They were unconvinced ‘that an organisation which owes its acknowledged success to the fact that its members were recruited from outside the Civil Service’ was better managed by

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Whitehall than the Institute’s Council. Nevertheless, noting a position of force majeure existed and that it would be unfitting to create controversy during war, Chatham House reluctantly agreed. Furthermore, lest Chatham House Council refuse, Toynbee, who thoroughly approved of the scheme, threatened to discontinue his work on the *Survey of International Affairs*. Although, within months of the establishment of the FRPS, Toynbee complained of bureaucratic infighting and departmental hatred, Toynbee had grown rather fond of his position.

Between 1944 and 1946, eager to retain the certain privileges that he experienced as a temporary civil servant, Toynbee requested that he and senior Chatham House colleagues be allowed to consult with officials before embarking on their studies and access official documents to aid them in their history of the Second World War for the *Survey of International Affairs*. Toynbee further argued that after the war, the Foreign Office ought to organise its relations with unofficial bodies devoted to the scientific study of international affairs (read Chatham House) in the same manner that after the First World War, the Foreign Office organised relations with the press by establishing the News Department. He argued that world opinion of Britain was now more important than ever before. In order that the Institute might write an ‘accurate and authoritative’ history that gave a fair account of British policy-making, he recommended that Chatham House be given access to certain categories of unofficial papers.

The Foreign Office did not look too fondly on the request. The documents Toynbee requested were deemed to amount to ‘almost unlimited’ access. Officials feared that as soon as the facility was in place, requests for information would only grow, ultimately leading to

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embarrassment. Worse, if Chatham House were privy to such information, soon all historians would want their share too.\footnote{TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 370/1334: Minute by H.K. Grey, 5 Dec 1946.} There was one historian, however, who was not impressed by the prospect of such privileges being afforded to Chatham House: Ernest Llewellyn Woodward, the Foreign Office’s official historian who was anxious that Chatham House was attempting to grow and grow until it became ‘a kind of shadow Foreign Office’.\footnote{TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 370/1182: Minute by E.L. Woodward, 15 Feb 1945.} Nonetheless, two concessions were made for Toynbee. He was to be supplied with the weekly intelligence summary to the end of the war (which Toynbee had already helped to produce while at FORD) and copies of the documents used at the Nuremburg Trials that were already published, but not widely available.\footnote{TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 370/1334: Minute by E.J. Passant, 13 Jan 1947.} It was not the new relationship that Toynbee had envisioned for the Foreign Office and Chatham House.

But it was not only Whitehall officials who stood in his way. There was also the House of Commons. At about the same time, Waldorf Astor proposed that when Foreign Office officials lectured at Chatham House, they be authorised to follow up with confidential talks off the record with the Institute’s staff. Astor felt that it would ultimately be helpful to the Foreign Office since Chatham House were able to publish matter which was ‘free from the flavour of official propaganda’.\footnote{TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 370/1182: Minute by P. Dixon, 19 Dec 1944.} At first, there was little objection; no extra work would be required and the lecturer would know their subject along with the pitfalls to be avoided. The decision even got the approval of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State (PUS) for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cadogan. This preceded, however, reports that Gladwyn Jebb, then head of the Foreign Office’s Reconstruction Department, had provided information that was not made available to MPs. Cadogan reversed his decision.\footnote{TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 370/1182: Minute by H.K. Grey, 24 Feb 1945; Minute by A. Cadogan, 25 Feb 1945; Minute by P. Dixon, 1 Mar 1945; Minute by A. Cadogan, 2 Mar 1945.
So what exactly was the postwar relationship between Chatham House and Whitehall?

In a sign of things to come, Whitehall welcomed attempts made by the Institute during the Second World War to inform public opinion. As the war came to a close, Chatham House commissioned a series of *Looking Forward* pamphlets on reconstruction, including *Britain and the World* by HA Wyndham, *Foreign Affairs and the Public* by John Price and the most famous – if only among International Relations scholars – Martin Wight’s *Power Politics.*

Eden – of the opinion that Chatham House publications had an important part to play in informing public opinion – wished to see that the pamphlets were given the widest possible circulation and thus requested that the Paper Controller increase the Institute’s ration.26

Eden’s successor, Ernest Bevin, an old hand at Chatham House also thought highly – or at least spoke highly – of Chatham House’s sway over public opinion. In a speech at Chatham House, he celebrated it as one of the most important elements in the country for such education.27 Nevertheless, doubts were expressed as to the Institute’s effectiveness at informing opinion, particularly with regard to reaching popular opinion. One official was unimpressed by the names of the pamphleteers; another doubted the effectiveness of pamphlets as a popular medium. The future PUS, Ivone Kirkpatrick, then an under-secretary responsible for information work, remarked more generally with regards to the distribution of Chatham House’s research: ‘The point is we can reach millions & Chatham House thousands’.28

Other Chatham House activities received more consistent praise within Whitehall, especially its lectures, specialist library, Information Department and its unique press library. Ernest Passant, the Foreign Office librarian, considered the Press Library the most important

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27 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 930/484: ‘Points for the Foreign Secretary to include in his remarks about Chatham House on 5th April 1946’.
28 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 930/484: Minute by N. Ronald, 24 Jan 1945; Minute by unknown, 25 Feb 1945; Minute by I. Kirkpatrick, Feb 1945.
service that Chatham House provided. The Foreign Office’s Research Department relied upon
the Institute for a number of important press reports, particularly from South East Asia and on
international communism. Between 80 and 90% of Whitehall enquiries addressed to the press
library originated from the Foreign Office. Yet the Foreign Office had ceased paying any
money to Chatham House once their staff had returned from FORD. The Institute’s
subsequent request for compensation precipitated a Treasury-led enquiry as to how valued the
Institute was across Whitehall. The feedback was very positive. The Ministry of Defence
reported that much use was made of the Institute’s lectures, its 80,000 books, 600 British and
foreign periodicals and 50 continental daily papers, and the bibliographies it compiled on
request. An official considered the services offered by Chatham House, one of the main
sources of international information and ‘extremely valuable’. The Home Office also made
‘considerable’ use of Chatham House. They noted their use of the main library and press
library and reported how members of the Home Office Intelligence Section had recently
attended a meeting related to the Tito-Stalin split and learned much that helped them with
their planning. The Treasury was thus satisfied that the Foreign Office should become a
corporate subscriber at the rate of £200 per annum. Yet, despite their initial request, the
Chatham House Council grew uneasy and turned down the offer having felt that it was not in
their best interests to accept. They, nevertheless, wished to keep the avenue open.29 It was
another case of attempting to police the line between the state and the non-state.

It was to happen again soon after. In 1950, it was feared that the Rockefeller
Foundation, one of Chatham House’s principal benefactors, was to withdraw its funding from

29 TNA: Treasury Archives: T 220/374: E.J. Passant to J.D.K. Beighton, 30 Nov 1949; S.H. Gellatly to E.
Church, 21 Dec 1949; Memorandum by Chatham House Council, 22 Mar 1948; R.W.F. Johnston to J. Periam, 6
May 1948; H.E. Hodgson to I.F. Division; I. Macadam to E.J. Passant, 16 Feb 1950; Foreign Office Archives:
the Institute’s Soviet Studies Programme. This prompted Denis Healey, who was then heading the Labour Party’s International Department, but also had a seat on the Chatham House Council, to raise the concern with his party colleague in the Treasury. Ernest Davies, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, simultaneously explained the problem to the Treasury. He noted that the Programme worked in the closest cooperation with the relevant Foreign Office departments and that if its work should be discontinued it would leave ‘a most serious gap’ in their studies of the Soviet Union. The Foreign Office received constant and valuable assistance from the programme and its resultant publications were deemed ‘invaluable’. Concerns were also raised that with the demise of the Soviet Studies Programme that the Foreign Office would have to hire more research staff to compensate for its loss. Subsequently, it endorsed a proposal whereby the government would fill the funding gap. However, following the aforementioned ordeal over the proposed annual sum from the Foreign Office, they had become only too aware of the Institute’s reluctance to receive money directly from government sources. The point had not been lost on the Foreign Office that the approach had been made by Denis Healey, not Macadam. So in order to get the Institute to, as one official put it, ‘swallow its pride’, various elaborate schemes were concocted whereby Chatham House would receive the money indirectly through the University Grants Committee or the Royal Academy. Concerns were raised, however, that such a subvention through a third body deceived no one and the Treasury told the Foreign Office that the money should come from the Foreign Office budget or not at all.

30 For relations between Chatham House and the Rockefeller Foundation, see I. Parmar, Foundations of the American Century (New York, 2012), 92-94.
33 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 370/2130: Minute by EJ Passant, 24 Jan 1951; Minute by unknown name, 26 Jan 1951; Minute by EJ Passant, 9 Feb 1951.
and again— it all amounted to nothing. The Rockefeller Foundation decided to continue its funding.\textsuperscript{36}

Chatham House’s expertise was also sought soon after the formal establishment of a Planning Section within the Foreign Office in 1957 consisting of just one official, Cecil Parrott.\textsuperscript{37} Parrott, no doubt only too appreciative for help, requested that there be closer contact between his department and the Institute’s research committee and a number of papers were subsequently exchanged. In 1959, this was set to increase when Parrott told Chatham House’s Chairman, ex-PUS, William Strang that the Foreign Office was going to depend more on Chatham House and universities now that there was a greater demand for ‘looking forward’ studies. Parrott also enquired as to whether Chatham House would undertake joint research into editing the German Documents with official historians in the Foreign Office together with French, German and American counterparts. The request was turned down for fear that people would deduce that Chatham House was part of the official machine. The line between state and non-state was once again policed. Nonetheless, it appears that contact was reduced after 1961, the same year the Foreign Office Planning Committee grew to two members of staff. A separate, larger, Planning Staff department was created in 1964 once the proofs of the Plowden Report were seen. The Plowden Committee had been highly critical of Foreign Office planning and advocated greater engagement with external bodies.\textsuperscript{38} The Foreign Office did something toward the former, but did little toward the latter. It would appear that once the Foreign Office was in possession of its own facilities it saw less of a need to look to Chatham House. If the value of Chatham House’s external expertise was treated with some suspicion, it would be more so for UNA.

\textsuperscript{36} CHA: 1/4: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Annual Report of the Council 1950-51, 12.
NEW BEGINNINGS

Nevertheless, in 1945, although UNA was not the LNU, the new organisation had reasons to be optimistic over its future relations with Whitehall. One was the new Prime Minister. Attlee’s new government took a ‘very sympathetic interest’ in UNA’s work and aims. Attlee issued a circular around Whitehall asking his colleagues to do all they could to accept invitations from UNA to speak at their meetings. In a speech at Mansion House in April 1946, drafted by Charles Webster, the then Lord President of Council Herbert Morrison assured UNA members assembled that the government was ‘pledged to the hilt to give their full support to the United Nations’. ‘But our people’, Morrison noted, ‘have still a great deal to learn about the new machinery of peace...no Government in this country can do much unless there is an instructed public opinion behind it.’ Subsequently, he encouraged those in attendance to donate to UNA even in hard times. Other ministers were not so forthcoming.

In May, Cecil hoped that the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin might make a public pronouncement on the necessity of public support for international peace and advertise the aims and activities of UNA. Bevin, however, feared that such a speech risked both falling flat and doing more harm than good at the present time. John Ward, the Head of the Foreign Office’s UN Department sympathised. Ward acknowledged the difficulty reconciling a refusal to use an opportunity to enlist support for the UN with previous statements made by both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary that went so far to declare the UN the ‘overriding factor in British foreign policy’. However, Ward also acknowledged the current public disappointment with the effectiveness of the UN in the wake of the discussions concerning the Iran Crisis in the meeting of the Security Council referred to in chapter two. Ward felt that it

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would be ‘dangerously misleading’ to give the impression to the public that if only they could muster enough faith in the UN it would ensure peace. Tellingly, Ward believed public opinion understood that such an appeal was needed to be made to the Russian government, not the British public. Gladwyn Jebb – then Assistant Under-Secretary for UN affairs, later the UK’s representative at the UN – reluctantly concurred. Emotional appeals concerning the UN’s ability to secure peace while the Security Council could not reach a consensus would only arouse cynicism. Nevertheless, Ward thought it possible for Bevin to make a future appeal for greater interest in UNA to ensure healthy support for the UN so that Britain might set the right example and mould developments in order to utilise the UN as an instrument for peace where possible. Jebb felt that useful work could be done in explaining the workings of the UN.42

Bevin, despite informing the House of Commons in November 1945 that he remembered Britain’s obligations to the UN with an ‘almost religious conviction’, was sceptical of those who believed that campaigning for the UN would make its authority more effective. Nor did he feel that the establishment of the UN negated the need for Britain to develop its own foreign policy.43 Bevin certainly appears to have not conferred high priority to assisting UNA. He did not publicly address UNA or receive a UNA deputation throughout his tenure in spite of a number of requests. In 1947, he was invited to speak at two UNA rallies; its inaugural meeting at Albert Hall in March and Chilham Castle in Kent in June. On both occasions, due to pressure of work, Bevin declined and Attlee took his place. When in 1948 Bevin was again invited to a summer rally at Welbeck Abbey in Nottinghamshire that expected 30,000, the UN Department was keen for him to accept. Paul Mason, Ward’s successor, deemed UNA ‘as the proper medium for supporting the U.N. with British public

42 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/57310: R. Cecil to J. Henniker, 16 May 1946; E. Bevin to R. Cecil, 1 Jun 1946; Minute by J.G. Ward, 22 May 1946; Minute by G. Jebb, 24 May 1946.
opinion’ and felt that it would be disheartening for UNA to fail to obtain the Foreign
Secretary once again. As the Cold War begun in earnest, civil servants appreciated that Bevin
could not give a firm commitment five months ahead, but pressed that he accept in principal
on the condition that he might have to change his plans nearer the time.\textsuperscript{44} Bevin, however, felt
unable to make any commitment and Hector McNeil, the Minister of State, an old hand in UN
affairs, was sent in his stead.\textsuperscript{45} It had also mostly been the Ministers of State, rather than the
Foreign Secretary, who received UNA deputations that by 1950 were normally met twice a
year.\textsuperscript{46} In March 1950, Herbert Bullock, the President of the Trades Union Congress and
UNA Executive Council member, confided in Bevin that UNA was ‘somewhat aggrieved’
that he had not received them in the previous administration. They were subsequently anxious
that Bevin personally receive a deputation concerning proposals for international controls of
atomic technology.\textsuperscript{47} On this occasion, however, the UN Department realised that Bevin was
too busy. Not only was he occupied by internal divisions within the newborn NATO – in
large part due to the USSR having successfully detonated its first atomic bomb some months
before – Bevin was also growing increasingly ill.\textsuperscript{48} The UN Department was eager, however,
that a Minister of State should receive UNA deputation. In the event, it was Kenneth
Younger, McNeil’s successor.

Nonetheless, the UN Department’s enthusiasm for UNA was preoccupied with its
influence over public opinion rather than their expertise. When UNA requested that they be
consulted on ‘appropriate occasions’ the aforementioned David Hildyard briefed Younger that
the government could not consult UNA – or any other body – before making decisions on

\textsuperscript{44} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/57310: S. de Chair to E. Bevin, 12 Jan 1948; Minute by E.E. Tomkins
(and annotations by P. Mason), 14 Jan 1948; Minute by P. Mason, 14 Jan 1948; Minute by R.D.C. McAlpine, 15
Jan 1948; Minute by P. Mason, 22 Jan 1948; Minute by G. Jebb, 22 Jan 1948.
\textsuperscript{45} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/57310: Minute by F.A. Warner, 5 Feb 1948; Bevin to S. de Chair, 6
Feb 1948.
\textsuperscript{46} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/88625: Minute by D.H.T. Hildyard, 2 May 1950.
\textsuperscript{47} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/88625: H.L. Bullock to E. Bevin, 29 Mar 1950; C.W. Judd to E.
Bevin, 28 Mar 1950.
\textsuperscript{48} See Bullock, \textit{Bevin}, 758-761.
foreign policy. The deputations and the detailed answers that UNA would receive from written questions to ministers were deemed as sufficient contact. Furthermore, government support of UNA by way of assisting it in its attempts to propagate information regarding the UN to the general public was hardly spectacular. Subsequently, Hildyard predicted that UNA would attempt to gain assurance of greater financial assistance for the observance of UN Day, especially in the wake of declining government support. Hildyard noted that the government made a substantial contribution in the form of a booklet entitled *Britain and the United Nations* published in 1948. However, in the following year the government contribution was limited to raising the UN flag over London County Hall. It was primarily due to economies. For this reason too, Hildyard warned Younger that he should refrain from any commitments to the celebrations in that year and instead console them that the government was considering including a section on the work of International Organisations and their relation to the UK for the 1951 Festival of Britain.49

The search for economies by other government bodies had also taken its toll on the promotion of UN work. In 1946 the leading UNA member Philip Noel-Baker, tried to help the Association in his position as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, by requesting that the UN feature as a topic for a lecture service provided by the Central Office of Information. Between September 1946 and March 1948, the Central Office of Information arranged 1,445 lectures on the UN. In 1948, a ministerial committee was tasked with reviewing the range of subjects the lecture service covered, in an attempt to make savings. It decided to discontinue the lectures on the UN. The decision was taken on the basis that information on the government’s production drive took priority. Whereas the government was peculiarly qualified to explain the production drive, UNA was considered to be a better substitute to

detail the UN’s activities. A committee of ministers from the same government that was two years before, in Morrison’s aforementioned words, pledged ‘to the hilt to give their full support to the United Nations’ was already pushing British support for the UN down its list of priorities. Nevertheless, Whitehall remained sensitive to public opinion on international affairs in Britain and elsewhere.

UNOFFICIAL DIPLOMACY AT HOME AND ABROAD

If the championing of the UN was being pushed down the government’s agenda, the Cold War was not. Chatham House’s ability to attract foreign dignitaries, its transnational contacts and its unofficial status ensured a place for the Institute in the Foreign Office’s Cold War arsenal. In 1956, Christopher Montague Woodhouse attempted to open up contacts with Russian academics in light of Khrushchev’s secret speech and his visit to the UK. The Foreign Office approved of Woodhouse’s abortive attempt to get the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko to speak at Chatham House. However, the Foreign Office refused to provide in his stead one of their Soviet experts currently engaged in the secret Anglo-Soviet talks to answer questions from the Institute’s East European study group. Foreign Office officials acknowledged that it was policy to help the Institute in their confidential discussions, but refused for fear that the members of the study group might, through interrogation, succeed in revealing the contents of the talks.

In the same year, Henry Kissinger and Anthony Buzzard were publicising their idea of limited atomic warfare. A private study group at Chatham House looked favourably upon the

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theory, causing concern within the Foreign Office. An official reading the document produced by the study group annotated a section explaining the need for both sides to agree to distinguish between tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons: ‘You cannot play this like a cricket match!’ Officials were thus keen to attend a conference chaired by Buzzard the following year. This time, however, they were relieved to note that Kissinger’s theories did not find favour with an audience deemed representative of informed opinion. The Foreign Office attendee concluded that any attempt to come to a solution for the nuclear stalemate must be to some extent conditioned by public opinion and that the discussion under Chatham House auspices helped to enlighten public opinion, and he recommended that the Foreign Office ought to continue to encourage them and attend where possible.\textsuperscript{53}

Chatham House also acted as a valuable asset in regard to Britain’s relations in the Pacific. Since the second meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) in 1928, Chatham House formed the British delegation. The IPR was a confederation of national councils made up of delegates from countries with interests in the Pacific. During the Second World War, fearing anti-colonialism, the Foreign Office became considerably interested in the IPR Conferences. When Chatham House informed the Foreign Office that it could not afford to attend the 1942 Conference in Canada, the Foreign Office covered the cost. It came at the price that the Foreign Office could choose members for the delegation and did so again for the 1945 Conference in the USA. Chatham House thus established relevant study groups in parallel with the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office and papers were exchanged.\textsuperscript{54}

During the Conferences, Chatham House was often placed in a difficult scenario of defending British colonial interests amid a barrage of criticism, particularly from the American representatives. The delegation’s position was further complicated by the lack of


\textsuperscript{53} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/129251: Minute by P.E. Ramsbotham, 4 Dec 1957.

\textsuperscript{54} Thorne, ‘Chatham House, Whitehall and Far Eastern Issues’, 1-29.
direction in government policy; both Chatham House and the Foreign Office were burdened by having to explain away Churchill’s public announcements about the restoration of empire. Contrary to the Churchillian rhetoric, both Chatham House and the Far Eastern Department understood the regaining of colonies from the Japanese would amount to a resumption of responsibilities towards self-government. The problem was exacerbated by the level of government involvement that helped reinforce the perception of foreign observers that Chatham House was in fact a quasi-official body. The reality was that due to the high level of government involvement, the Institute’s independence was much diminished. Both Chatham House’s and Whitehall’s interests in the IPR appears to have dwindled after the Second World War. By 1945 British officials doubted the IPR’s utility and since 1942 Chatham House had already been debating whether it was worth going. Nevertheless, the Institute remained involved with the IPR until its end in 1961; an end that was the result of legal costs successfully battling fierce accusations during the McCarthy years that the organisation was a centre of communist conspiracy.\textsuperscript{55}

Perhaps the most well-known example of Chatham House diplomacy is its organisation with its sister institutes of the Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences. These were held at roughly five year intervals between 1933 and 1959 and provided a forum for politicians, civil servants, academics, businessmen, lawyers and trade unionists. Those affiliated with the Chatham House delegations throughout the lifetime of the conferences included Ernest Bevin, Patrick Gordon Walker, James Callaghan, R.A. Butler, Denis Healey, Hugh Gaitskell and Peter Thorneycroft. They were designed to promote understanding between Commonwealth countries and preserve Commonwealth relations. However, Chatham House could be a source of concern for government departments, most of all the Dominions Office, later the Commonwealth Relations Office. Astor opened the 1945

\textsuperscript{55} Thorne, ‘Chatham House, Whitehall and Far Eastern Issues’, 1-29; Parmar, \textit{Think Tanks and Power}, 94.
conference at Chatham House by suggesting that foreign observers viewed the
Commonwealth with ‘bewildered incredulity’. While Curtis, who before the war had preached
that the Commonwealth was the nucleus of world government, now – brandishing copies of
For Curtis, hope for world government now resided with a union of European democracies.\(^{56}\)
This was not appreciated by Malcolm MacDonald who, soon to leave his post as High
Commissioner to Canada, complained that the views of the UK delegates were obsolete and
recommended that the Dominions Office should exercise closer supervision over the
delegates. A predecessor of Macdonald’s, suggested that the responsibility for organising the
Conferences should be transferred from Chatham House to the Royal Empire Society. The
Dominions Office sympathised. Curtis was singled out as the chief difficulty, but the
department felt it essential that the conferences remained unofficial and free from government
interference.\(^{57}\) Curtis continued to deliver his sermons at the next conference held in Canada
in 1949 and met some lively questioning.\(^{58}\)

Chatham House’s position on Europe in relation to the Commonwealth continued to
cause concern in Whitehall. In 1959, on the occasion of the last Conference, officials within
the Commonwealth Relations Office were concerned when the Conference concluded that the
UK and other Commonwealth countries should negotiate jointly for free trade in Europe –
seeking access to Europe for Commonwealth products. The French would never concede.\(^{59}\)
Yet by 1962 at an unofficial study conference in Nigeria, the delegates were far more
sceptical that this could be done, and although accepting that the UK must come to terms with

\(^{56}\) W. David McIntyre, ‘The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, 1933-1959: Precursors of the
\(^{57}\) TNA: Dominions Office Archive: DO 35/1120: M. MacDonald to Viscount Cranborne, 23 Jul 1945; Minute
by E. Machtig, 9 Aug 1945; E. Machtig to M. MacDonald, 21 Aug 1945.
\(^{58}\) David McIntyre, ‘The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences’, 602.
\(^{59}\) TNA: Commonwealth Relations Office Archives: DO 191/107: Minute by N.E. Costar, 23 Jan 1959.
the EEC, other Commonwealth countries realised that they must negotiate their own terms with it, one by one. For the staff at the Commonwealth Relations Office, this was more disturbing than the display of Commonwealth unity in 1959. At a post-conference discussion at Chatham House, the Director Kenneth Younger appeared to have written off the Commonwealth altogether. Younger argued that by contemplating entry into the EEC, the UK government had already indicated that it regarded the Commonwealth a secondary connection. To the irritation of officials, he repeated that Britain had to choose between Europe and the Commonwealth. The Deputy Under-Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur Snelling, argued that the government wanted something of both. Younger retorted that he was ‘nursing a fond illusion’. Subsequently, Snelling advised that officials ought to go to such meetings more often. Indeed, later that year a member of the Commonwealth Relations Office was injected into a meeting on Commonwealth Studies at the last minute owing to the failure of Chatham House to remember to send an invite. Once again, great cynicism on the Institute’s behalf was noted.

However, as one official in the Commonwealth Relations Office noted, there was a lot in Younger’s view in the long term. Younger set out his views in an essay published in 1964 entitled Changing Perspectives in British Foreign Policy, in which he stated the need for British attitudes to change; to recognise the end of empire and to see their future in Europe.

In the same year, Younger, in collaboration with the Franco-British Society, decided to call together a small private conference in order to encourage a better mutual understanding of

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current policies amid Anglo-French tensions over EEC negotiations.\textsuperscript{64} Pierson Dixon, Ambassador to France, welcomed it, believing that if Chatham House remained in control of affairs, the risk of Gaullist infiltration would be constrained. The risk of Gaullists taking charge of a French-sponsored programme was deemed much greater.\textsuperscript{65}

A number of historians have detailed how Chatham House acted as an unofficial diplomat elsewhere. Inderjeet Parmar demonstrates the significance of the role played by Chatham House in Anglo-American relations through its staff during the Second World War. Particularly, through Lord Lothian as the US ambassador and Toynbee, Webster and Macadam as semi-official emissaries to the USA; all aided by the work of the FRPS and IPR.\textsuperscript{66} Christian Haase has also demonstrated the significant role played by the Institute on British-German relations. He shows that the Institute’s reputation as a major authority on the Soviet Union in the immediate post-war years, as demonstrated earlier, enabled it to contribute to the Anglo-American consensus that West Germany need to be brought into Western political, economic and security structures. Furthermore, Haase details how Chatham House impacted upon West German politics – both foreign and domestic – via the platform of the Königswinter and Weinheim Conferences.\textsuperscript{67} Finally, Priscilla Roberts has outlined how Chatham House aided the Foreign Office’s efforts to improve Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1960s and 1970s amid the Sino-Soviet split.\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{66} Parmar, \textit{Think Tanks and Power}.
THE WORLD FEDERATION OF UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATIONS

Cold War politics also influenced the Foreign Office’s interest in UNA and its relationship with World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA). The UK’s UNA played a significant role in the establishment of WFUNA in 1946 – the global network of United Nations Associations. In February 1946 a meeting was held in London chaired by the first President of the UN General Assembly Paul-Henri Spaak and attended by 21 representatives from United Nations Associations around the world to plan an inaugural congress for the WFUNA in Luxembourg for July and August.69 The establishment of the WFUNA had the government’s seal of approval. The then Minister of State, Philip Noel-Baker when meeting the first UNA deputation to the Foreign Office agreed to approach the Rockefeller Foundation for funding the WFUNA.70 Furthermore, the Foreign Office aided John Ennals, former President of the British Universities League of Nations Society, on an Eastern European tour arranged and funded by the UK’s UNA, the aim of which was to encourage the foundation of United Nations Associations and their joining of the future WFUNA. The Foreign Office ensured that British embassies would help them in any way they could.71 John Ennals, the eldest of the Ennals brothers, utilised numerous contacts across Europe as a result of his time during the war as a lecturer for the British Council in Romania and Yugoslavia and then a war correspondent before joining the Foreign Office in 1941, for which he was posted in Madrid and London before joining the armed forces in 1943.72 In his Eastern European tour in 1946, Ennals was able to visit Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Austria and France

71 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/57310: Telegram to Prague, 2 Apr 1946; P. Gore-Booth to Warsaw Chancery, 24 Apr 1946.
where United Nations Associations and preparatory committees were already functioning. A sojourn to the USSR was not possible; requests for a visa were not met with a reply. The USSR did not establish a United Nations Association until 1956. It joined the WFUNA in the same year.

Nevertheless, the WFUNA’s Eastern European members caused consternation within Whitehall. Officials grew anxious that the WFUNA ‘should tread the path of true democracy and not fall under the influence of the political notions of Eastern Europe, like certain other Federations of recent foundation’. The Foreign Office took great interest in the inaugural congress and attempted to get information from the British Embassy in Paris where preparations took place. The East-West divide lent some drama to the congress when the Hungarian delegation abruptly left shortly before the end and the Foreign Office intrigued whether the USSR had – albeit lately – intervened. The greatest attention, however, appears to have been dedicated to the proposed first Secretary General of the WFUNA, John Ennals. Ennals’s trip around Eastern Europe had become somewhat notorious, in part because he had not revealed that he was also acting as a correspondent for *Reynolds News*. Moreover, it was understood that Ennals held communist sympathies. The Labour MP Ernest Millington warned that Ennals ‘was the kind of person one met in “doubtful” places in London such as the Polish Embassy’. It was also alleged that Ennals was formerly attached to a Women’s Auxiliary Air Force officer, Sybil Sturrock, who was now understood to be a press attaché in Yugoslavia. To stoke concerns still further, Ennals had recently written a piece for the New

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78 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/57310: Minute by P. Gore-Booth, 16 Apr 1946; Minute by P. Gore-Booth, 3 May 1946; Telegram from Bucharest to Foreign Office, 30 Apr 1946.
79 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/59752: British Legation (Luxembourg) to Chancery (Belgium), 22 Aug 1946.
Statesman following his tour of Eastern Europe, praising governments for working with
‘considerable success’ to improve the well-being of their peoples.\textsuperscript{80} The Foreign Office
informed UNA’s delegation just before its departure from Luxembourg of their concerns over
Ennals’s suitability as WFUNA secretary-general. In view of this, UNA Secretary Charles
Judd, proposed that Ennals only be elected for six months (instead of two years). However,
the majority of the delegation were not too pleased at the suggestion that UNA (or the
WFUNA) should take direction from the UK government. After a discussion between the
head of the delegation, Leonard Behrens, and Ennals himself, the delegation was satisfied that
Ennals realised that he was not to express or promote his own political views. WFUNA
unanimously elected Ennals as its first secretary-general, no other candidate being put
forward.\textsuperscript{81} Ennals would remain secretary-general until 1956.

Government interest in WFUNA continued past 1946, not only due to the fear of
communism, but also anti-colonialism. A few months later the Foreign Office was able to
assure the Lebanese Government that UNA was fully alive to the danger of the WFUNA
falling under communist influence and that there was no sign of it occurring to date.\textsuperscript{82}
However, in 1955, the Colonial Office alerted the Foreign Office to fears that the WFUNA
and United Nations Associations in the colonies were being exploited for anti-colonial
purposes. It followed a circular sent to Governors by the Secretary of State for Colonies
Oliver Lyttelton requesting an assessment of the activities of United Nations Associations. It
was revealed that in the majority of colonies there was no United Nations Associations, with
the exception of Singapore, Malaya, Sierra Leone, Malta, Hong Kong, Jamaica, British
Guiana and Kenya. The Hong Kong Government was particularly concerned once it found
that local politicians were attempting to use the United Nations Association as a vehicle to

\textsuperscript{81} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/59753: Minute by P. Gore-Booth, 18 Sep 1946.
\textsuperscript{82} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/59753: Telegram to Beirut, 1 Jan 1947.
lobby on issues such as labour relations that they deemed outside the ‘proper scope’ of United Nations Associations. There were also stirrings of communist influence within the United Nations Associations in Jamaica, British Guiana and Kenya. The report did not recommend that any particular action be taken, but suggested that ‘respectable patronage’ could prevent the organisations from being used for ‘irrelevant political ends’.\(^{83}\) Canalisation was being attempted abroad as well as at home.

There was more wariness to come when in the same year the WFUNA was organising a summer school and requesting a British official representative on a panel entitled ‘The United Nations and Africa’. The new head of the UN Department, Edward Warner’s first reaction was to have nothing to do with WFUNA activities: ‘WFUNA is disreputable, and the Africa theme probably has anti-colonial intentions’. However, Warner warmed to the idea when he discovered that Judd would be the chair and that Judd had assured the similarly unfavourable reactions of the French and Belgian representatives that the meeting would not become an anti-colonial demonstration.\(^{84}\) Another official welcomed the opportunity to put the UK point of view across to a ‘strong pressure group’, without the risk of being exposed to embarrassing discussions.\(^{85}\) In the end, a British representative was put forward, but due to last minute rearrangements of the schedule at the conference they did not get an opportunity to speak. Judd, nevertheless, considered it to be a great success. Demonstrating that the Anglo-French rivalry was alive and well, British representatives appeared to have taken particular delight when people from British colonies criticised French colonial policies.\(^{86}\)

Whitehall appears to have been less interested in WFUNA in the 1960s and 1970s. WFUNA’s attitudes on disarmament and Vietnam War were noted in 1966 and 1967 respectively, but by

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\(^{86}\) TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/117467: C. Judd to J. Dodds, 4 Aug 1955.
the 1970s there appears to be little reference to the organisation. It is probable that after
decolonisation, there were fewer obvious divisions of opinion and perhaps the organisation
was generally deemed ‘innocuous’, as one official noted on WFUNA resolutions on
disarmament in 1966. There was much more consistent interest in Whitehall circles
surrounding the impact that the UK’s UNA had on domestic opinion.

‘IRRESPONSIBLE MALCONTENTS’

UNA, like the UN, possessed the ability to irritate Whitehall ministers and officials. However
much praise was lauded over UNA and the UN, there were many within government who felt
that it too often interfered in matters that were not their concern. In July 1950, one official in
the UN Department, Peter Hope, found that many of the resolutions adopted by UNA at its
AGM were ‘highly provocative, not to say undesirable’. One such resolution was that the
British government should adopt the UN general-secretary Trygve Lee’s ‘Twenty Year
Programme for Achieving Peace through the United Nations’ as a primary factor in British
foreign policy. Lie’s ten-point programme included the control of atomic energy, universality
of UN membership and the advancement of dependent colonial and semi-colonial peoples, the
details of which the government felt unable to agree with. Hope urged that another UNA
deputation should be received by the Foreign Office, despite having only received one two
months beforehand, to put UNA’s ‘thinking on the right line’.

Ultimately, when the
deputation was received in September, it was reported that the Korean War and the resultant
deterioration of East-West relations had made UNA realise that nothing could be done to
improve relations until the situation was cleared up and did not attempt to press their

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87 On Vietnam and WFUNA, see TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 24/129.
89 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/88626: Minute by P. Hope, 26 Jul 1950; Minute by P. Hope, 15 Sep
1950. On Lie’s programme see, United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations: 1951 (New York, 1952), 189-
193.
Nonetheless, UNA would continue to provide Whitehall with headaches, particularly over the issues that surrounded the end of empire. Enter Seretse Khama, the future Prime Minister of Botswana.

Khama was the Chief-Designate of the Bamangwato people in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (modern-day Botswana), who trained to become a barrister at Oxford University. In 1948, he married Ruth Williams a clerk at Lloyd’s of London. The interracial marriage sparked some initial controversy among Khama’s family, but earned much more persistent disdain from the apartheid government of South Africa. The South African government pressed Britain to disinherit Khama of his chieftainship and eventually the British government exiled both Seretse and Ruth Khama from Bechuanaland in 1951. Lord Salisbury, the Lord Privy Seal, was the minister ultimately responsible and his decision was met with significant protest in Britain. One of the principal bodies organising such protest was UNA. In 1952, UNA passed a resolution deploring the actions of the government for exiling Khama. The Birmingham branch of UNA arranged three public meetings held at Birmingham Town Hall on the topic of British policy in Africa. The first meeting was addressed by Khama and a petition was circulated condemning the government’s actions. Moreover, the next two meetings were concerned with the British relationship with the South African apartheid government and British plans to establish the Central African Federation. Salisbury, now Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, was furious. Salisbury, like many politicians was a patron of UNA; he held a Vice-Presidency. He informed Cabinet that he wished to resign his patronage. Eden, then Foreign Secretary, reminded Salisbury that there would be political consequences from disassociation from UNA given that there was much ‘Liberal’ opinion within it. In the 1950s, the Conservatives were especially keen to be seen as the

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90 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/88626: Minute by E. Davies 28 Sep 1950.
92 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/101421: Minute by C Parrott, 13 May 1952; Circular by R. Desmond Sparham (UNA Regional Officer, Midland Regional Council), 5 May 1952.
inheritors of the liberal tradition while the Liberal Party hits its nadir. Churchill’s government also owed its parliamentary majority to the National Liberal Party. Here was an example of where the UNA’s ability to be seen as representing the centre ground proved valuable. Eden felt that it was a better course of action to attempt to persuade the Association to discontinue its activities.93

Salisbury did not resign his patronage, but he considered Khama’s case to be ‘outside the competence’ of UNA. The UN Department was ‘not too happy’ with this reasoning. It judged that as a private body, UNA could presumably discuss what it liked and that Khama’s case might be held to be within the Association’s aims, namely 4(c) which advocated ‘the building up of an agreed code of international law applicable to all nations great and small’.94 Nonetheless, it was believed within the Foreign Office that General Lyne, the UNA Chairman, should be given ‘a good talking to on the subject’, explaining the embarrassing effect that UNA’s action had for members of the government who patronised the UNA and the reluctance they would feel in accepting future invitations to speak at UNA rallies. Cecil Parrott, then head of the United Nations Department, nevertheless defended UNA, noting that it had played a significant role in keeping the ‘much more dangerous’ WFUNA ‘out of communist hands’ and it should therefore be given a ‘fairly easy rein’. The PUS William Strang recorded his belief that there was little that could be done to prevent UNA – any more than the LNU – from taking the opposition line when the Conservatives were in power.95 The Minister of State, the future Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd spoke firmly to Lyne,

95 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/101421: Minute by P. Mason, 13 May 1952; Minute by C. Parrott, 13 May 1952; Minute by W. Strang, 17 May 1952.
explaining the embarrassment it had caused and Lyne asked that prominent Conservatives serve on UNA Executive Committee in future to assuage doubts over its impartiality. 96

The Commonwealth Relations Office remained sceptical especially amid UNA protest over their planned creation of the Central African Federation. UNA was anxious that the Federation combining Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was yet another example of a white minority riding roughshod over the wishes of the black majority in contravention to the spirit and word of the UN Charter. Freda White wrote an article to this effect in United Nations News and it was criticised severely within the Commonwealth Relations Office for being ‘scandalously biased’. 97 The article was decried by one official as another example of ‘irresponsible malcontents’ from UNA dabbling in controversies outside its ‘proper purview’ armed with ‘rabble-charming’ slogans and feared for the ‘deplorable effect’ that the article would have through its dissemination among UNA branches. 98 The department’s inexperience in dealing with criticism from NGOs and a distinct lack of appreciation of the scope of the UN charter was revealed in the audacity of the Commonwealth Relations Office to state the business of UNA to its own leaders. ‘I feel bound to say’, Salisbury’s successor Lord Swinton wrote to Lyne, ‘it has been generally accepted that the object of the Association is to deal with matters falling within the scope of the United Nations Organisation: hence its name. Central African Federation would clearly be outside the jurisdiction of U.N.O.’. Lyne replied to correct Swinton’s crude formula, noting that the UN Charter promoted the political (in addition to the socio-economic) advancement of peoples in dependent territories. 99 Unfortunately, as will be shown later, government would

continue to be bemused by the prerogative of both the UN and UNA to protest against British colonial policy.

Both episodes concerning Khama and the Central African Federation demonstrated a genuine concern within Whitehall over UNA’s impact on public opinion and a subsequent desire to intervene and condition UNA’s output. When Selwyn Lloyd first became Minister of State in 1952, he asked his officials whether he should accept a request to receive a UNA deputation to discuss Korea, he was informed that it had become traditional for ministers to receive UNA deputations and that he should welcome the opportunity to keep UNA ‘on the lines’. In 1955, the new Minister of State Anthony Nutting was worried to hear that Lyne was considering leaving his post, noting that he would like to have ‘an experienced hand to guide’ the UNA’s Executive Council. ‘It is important’, wrote Warner, ‘to have a sound man in the position’. Warner noted an ‘idealistic element’ within UNA that was prone to ‘irresponsible criticism’ of the government. Furthermore, the concern over communist infiltration remained from the days of the LNU and Warner pressed that all should be done to obtain a ‘sensible man’ with whom ministers could discuss confidential matters. In the end, Lyne would remain until 1957, when replaced by ex-Director-General of the British Council, Ronald Adam. Officials within the UN Department were, nevertheless, optimistic about the future of UNA and felt, in a sign of things to come, that the organisation contrasted well with the anti-nuclear sermons of the Bishop of Chichester, George Bell. The Department was thus anxious that the membership be broadened and its standing enhanced.

Even as the Suez Crisis developed alongside UNA’s criticism of the government’s role, the Foreign Office was keen not to offend the organisation unduly. When a Conservative MP, certain that his colleague the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs John...

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100 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/101421: Minute by P. Hope, 27 Jun 1952.
Hope, ‘shared his disgust’ at UNA denunciations and conviction that Conservatives should withdraw their membership, Hope’s reply, drafted by Foreign Office officials, advised caution. Despite UNA publicising that it ‘deplore[d]’ the government’s military intervention and the undermining of UN authority, Hope argued that it was better to retain membership and ‘try to influence it’.  

The Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd also sought to assure his UNA ‘friends’ that he was ‘convinced with the knowledge at my disposal that our action was right. We may have stopped the Third World War. Unfortunately one cannot unfold the full story in public’.  

Nevertheless, as in the past, offence was taken at UNA’s perceived lack of sufficient deference. One senior official in the Foreign Office complained ‘it is tiresome of the UN Association to try to operate as a pressure group’ and noted that parts of its resolutions were ‘pretty heretical’.

However, of course, in order to maintain its insider privileges, UNA was conscious not to appear too heretical, especially when other anti-nuclear bodies appeared on the scene. In June 1957, UNA’s secretary David Ennals joined the committee of the National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT), the CND in embryo. In the view of one member of NCANWT, this was ‘a far bigger catch than either the Labour or Liberal parties’ due to UNA’s prestigious patronage. However, in 1958 UNA severed its connections with the fledgling CND when its initial policy statement was revised to be made unambiguously unilateralist in order that the organisation could become a mass movement, rather than an elite pressure group. The statement was followed by a sit-down demonstration outside Downing Street, which only further deterred UNA.  

Nevertheless, UNA would

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continue to be a potential thorn in the side of government. One such occasion related to the abortive attempts at multilateral disarmament at the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1960, where UNA criticised the British government and the Western powers for failing to seize upon Soviet proposals, which UNA considered as potentially fruitful. UNA also pressed the Foreign Office for prompt publication of the Committee’s negotiations in order to encourage public interest and rebuff cynicism that UNA argued only encouraged support for unilateralism.107

UNA’s insider position also ensured that it played a significant role in the coordination of British responses to UN campaigns. In 1959, UNA coordinated British non-governmental activities for the UN’s World Refugee Year and would play an important role in the UN’s five year programme, the Freedom from Hunger Campaign that opened the first UN Development Decade in 1960. In the early stages of the latter – before a national committee was formed – UNA acted as a go-between, between government and other NGOs. When NGOs were keen to learn of government plans for Britain’s contribution to the campaign, it was UNA that was sent to speak with the responsible department, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Indeed, in these early stages, officials were keen to speak to UNA alone. UNA also offered advice on the choice of organisations to serve on the National Committee.108 The arrangement was mutually beneficial. The Ministry used UNA as an informal line of communication to the other NGOs through which it could explain problems with the campaign that it did not wish to be made public.109

HIGHS AND LOWS

Greater cooperation with the government appeared to be on the horizon when Harold Wilson won the general election in 1964. UNA had reasons to be cheerful. The Labour manifesto declared that the most important factor in securing international peace was ‘to revive the morale and increase the powers of the United Nations’. Transport House promised change, having described the Conservatives as ‘fair weather friends of the UN’ who only supported it when it was considered to be in British interests. Furthermore, these words belonged to David Ennals who had joined the Labour Party Research Department after leaving his post as UNA secretary in 1957. In 1967, UNA’s new Chairman of the Executive Council the ex-Conservative MP Humphrey Berkeley, informed Wilson that

my entire Executive feel that for the first time the Government takes the UN very seriously, and also appreciate the work which we, as an Association, are trying to do...As a former Conservative Member of Parliament, I find it slightly mortifying to have to tell the members of my organisation that we get more whole-hearted support from the present Government than we have ever got before, or are likely to in the future.

Wilson himself addressed UNA’s General Council just a few months before. UNA published the speech, heralding the occasion – the first time a Prime Minster in office had addressed the council delegates – as ‘an important event in our history’. Lord Caradon, the Minister of State and Permanent Representative to the UN, was also very keen to support the UN cause in Britain. During his tenure, Caradon devoted one or two weeks a year to speaking engagements in the UK on UN affairs. In 1966, he requested that UNA organise an itinerary for him. UNA happily accepted and in the following year, Caradon spoke at 16 events in

111 Labour Party Research Department, Twelve Wasted Years (London, 1963), 369.
Wales, Scotland and England over 21 days. Caradon, however, was eager that he would not simply be preaching to the converted and worked on the assumption that it was ‘no use talking about international affairs to anyone over thirty’. Subsequently, he specified that he wished to speak mostly at universities and schools rather than solely UNA branches.

Foreign Office mandarins agreed. In 1968, an assistant under-secretary, Peter Hayman, felt that UNA should avoid attempting to enlist the ‘elderly “do-gooders”’ which made up the majority of its membership.

The Foreign Office grew interested in the perceptions of the UN among young people and thus the CEWC and UNSA. The CEWC was perceived as ‘a reputable off-shoot’ of UNA and was praised for its works in publicising the UN among young people. During Caradon’s speaking tour in January 1967 he, along with fellow Minister of State Lord Chalfont, attended a UNA-CEWC conference aimed at young people. Caradon was made UNSA’s Honorary President and both he and Chalfont held briefing sessions with the organisation in the late sixties. In 1970, under the new Conservative government, the new Minister of State Joseph Godber received for the first time in UNSA’s history a deputation at the Foreign Office. Godber’s officials recommended the meeting on the basis that UNSA was ‘virtually the only body in this country representing the interests of youth in international affairs’ and to encourage its current moderates so as to prevent the organisation from becoming radicalised.

Berkeley also impressed the Foreign Office. When Berkeley became Chairman in 1966, he told Wilson that he was ‘determined to make UNA into a great national

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120 FCO 58/539: Minute by M.B. Chitty, 8 Sep 1970; Minute by Tom Macan, 19 Aug 1970.
movement’. He aimed to double the existing UNA membership in order that UNA would be comparable in size to the LNU. For this he needed money. Berkeley, citing a diner hosted at 10 Downing Street by Harold Macmillan to raise money for the British Council of the European Movement from wealthy businessmen, suggested that Wilson might host a similar dinner for UNA. Wilson agreed and Berkeley enlisted Jeffrey Archer, who had previous fundraising experience with Oxfam. Archer targeted businessmen who were on the way up and were flattered to receive an invitation to dine in Downing Street. The event held in 1968 was an apparent huge success, raising £208,000; 83% of the £250,000 that Berkeley’s campaign had raised in total.

But not all was sweetness and light between the government and UNA in the sixties. In November 1966, Berkeley wrote to the new Foreign Secretary George Brown enclosing a resolution adopted by the Executive Committee which was highly critical of a number of aspects of government policy in the UN. Although complimentary of the work done by Chalfont and Caradon, UNA was ‘greatly disturbed by the declining influence’ of Britain in the UN and ‘the contrast between the Government’s repeated declarations that the UN is a corner-stone of our foreign policy and their reluctance to use the Organisation to its fullest extent’. UNA’s protestations were concerned with Britain’s failure to end Ian Smith’s regime in Rhodesia and to secure UN participation in Britain’s subsequent sanctions; Britain’s abstention on the UN resolution to end South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa; Britain’s half-hearted advocacy for the admission of the People’s Republic of China to the Security Council; and that Britain was not fulfilling its financial obligation to the purposes of

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the Development Decade. Nor was UNA quiet on the Britain’s reluctance to criticise America’s actions in Vietnam War. In the same year it produced a publication promoting self-determination in Vietnam. Donald Murray, the Head of the East Asia Department complained that UNA had ‘fairly consistently offered gratuitous advice to H.M.G. on their Viet-Nam policy’. As within the Conservative administration, a minister protested that certain issues were beyond UNA’s proper purview. The Minister of State Goronwy Roberts felt that UNA’s purpose was merely to educate people about the UN and promote the support of its Charter. He believed that it ought to only be partisan when the Charter was infringed or insufficiently supported: ‘Suez came into this category. Viet Nam does not’.

However, it was over the issue of Rhodesia that UNA would cause the most anxiety in Whitehall. In October 1967, a UN Department official, John Sanders, met a group of UNSA representatives explaining their intentions to organise a simulated sitting of the International Court of Justice in March, which would give an advisory opinion on whether any UN member would be acting unlawfully if it were to recognise Smith’s Administration. Sanders informed the UNSA members that the Foreign Office would welcome such an exercise and would assist where they could and advised his colleagues that UNSA should be encouraged. However, a mistake was made and Sanders’s minute was lost in the system and not picked up until January. When the head of the Commonwealth Office’s Rhodesia Department, Richard Faber, received the news in February, he pressed officials to persuade UNSA to change the topic to one less potentially embarrassing. Faber felt that either verdict reached by the “Court” would not be helpful, but obviously was particularly concerned if it found in favour of

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recognition. He wished to keep the government’s options open and felt that if a policy of ‘quietism’ was pursued, ‘[w]e may not be too concerned to prevent “creeping”, but we will not want to be faced with “galloping” recognition’. Faber thus felt that the attendant publicity could be ‘inconvenient, if not disastrous’. It was, of course, too late. UNSA had done well: the “Court” would sit in Chatham House and its proceedings would be covered by the BBC and ITV. Subsequently, although the government had to avoid open sponsorship, the “UK representatives” were briefed by the Foreign Office on the proviso that it was understood that the government could no more than suggest possible lines of legal argument and that such assistance was ‘wholly informal and unofficial’. Ultimately, it was a storm in a tea cup. The judges unanimously found against recognition and an official even wondered whether it might be worth giving the event wider publicity.

The government certainly did not want to attract further attention, however, to the protests made by UNA later that year concerning Wilson’s talks with Smith on HMS Fearless. UNA felt that no honourable deal could be made with Smith. Wilson was particularly sensitive in regard to a reference to Munich, reported to have been made by Berkeley; for this and the other public comments made by UNA, Wilson privately took Berkeley ‘politely but firmly to task’. Further embarrassment was caused in 1969 by the widely publicised “Berkeley Plan” that proposed a British caretaker administration in Rhodesia of up to ten years directing the country to independence and majority rule. Barbara Castle, the Secretary of State for Employment and UNA supporter, even enquired with the Foreign Secretary

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131 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/214: Minute by R. Faber, 6 Feb 1968.
133 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/214: Minute by Mr. Sinclair, 16 Feb 1968.
Michael Stewart over the validity of the idea. Furthermore, an official within the Foreign Office South African Department thought the plan sufficiently interesting to submit to the British Embassy in South Africa for comment and pondered whether it might make a good topic for a potentially new Chatham House study group on Southern Africa.

Whitehall’s sensitivity to UNA activity was once again demonstrated when it attempted to police the line between state and non-state in an endeavour to avoid becoming embroiled in the internal battle within UNA in the late 1960s. The other new member of UNA staff that sparked intrigue at Whitehall was the new Director in 1966, the ex-Secretary-General of WFUNA, John Ennals. In 1967, further fuelling his notorious reputation within the Foreign Office, Ennals, without reference to Berkeley, authorised that an office be provided within UNA headquarters for use by the Council for Advancement of Arab-British Understanding. Inevitably, a complaint was lodged by the Israeli Embassy. This prompted Berkeley to inform the Foreign Office and declare a litany of complaints against Ennals who he felt was deceptive and lacked political sense and administrative ability. Berkeley also outlined to the Foreign Office how he wished to remove Ennals from his post. The Ennals/Berkeley split was a long drawn-out and public ordeal that had serious implications explored more fully in chapter four. For Whitehall, the UN secretary-general U Thant’s doubts as to whether he should visit UNA during the row caused concern.

Ministers and officials agreed that the government should steer clear of the ‘unedifying’ dispute. Neither Berkeley nor Ennals made it easy. In February 1968, Ennals wrote a letter on the subject of the Vietnam War directly to the Prime Minister without the

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138 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 36/432: M. Stewart to B. Castle, undated.
139 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 36/432: M. Robb to W. Wilson, 6 Feb 1969; Minute by W. Wilson, 1 Apr 1969.
knowledge of UNA Executive Council. Furthermore, in September 1969, Berkeley circulated a list of criticisms of Ennals among the Executive Council that he felt should be taken in consideration before Ennals faced a motion of confidence in the Council. The most notable allegation was Ennals’s background of communist connections which prevented him from sitting on an unofficial advisory committee on UN affairs for the Foreign Secretary that included representatives of UNA, Chatham House, parliament, universities and newspapers. This prompted the intervention of John’s brother, the now Minister of State for Social Services, David Ennals who wished to clarify with the Foreign Office why exactly his brother was not on the committee. Worse, the internal strife did not stop at the Berkeley/Ennals dispute. UNSA was threatening to split from UNA in the belief that budget cuts had unfairly fallen on the student organisation, while Berkeley disputed the eligibility of the UNSA President on the grounds that he had not been a student within two years of his appointment. Again – as the UNSA’s honorary President Caradon minuted – government wished to steer clear. Similarly, in April 1970, Jeremy Thorpe warned Wilson, as one Honorary President of UNA to another, about another dispute arising between Berkeley and Jeffrey Archer concerning allegations over Archer’s expenses claims. Wilson assured Thorpe that he had no wish to get involved.

Yet despite the government’s wish not to be embarrassed by UNA’s internal strife, officials recognised that they had a real interest in UNA. They backed its aims and were by no means indifferent. One official feared that it was now raising more money than ever before, thanks to Berkeley, just at the time though that it was in danger of falling apart.

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146 TNA: Prime Minister’s Office Archives: PREM 13/3538: Note for the Record, 24 Sep 1969; FCO 58/216: Lord Caradon to P. Hayman, 10 Nov 1967.
147 TNA: Prime Minister’s Office Archives: PREM 13/3538: Note for the Record, 21 Apr 1970. On the Berkeley/Archer dispute, see Crick, Archer, 140-146.
organisationally. There was also great sympathy with Berkeley, particularly with regards to his opinions of John Ennals. Peter Hayman professed to know Ennals quite well and noted that he subscribed to what Berkeley said about him: ‘I have found him lacking in frankness on occasions. I am quite sure that he has no fire and I think he is a poor administrator.’

Hayman also spied an opportunity in Ennals’s departure. While Ennals’s end at UNA was becoming increasingly apparent in August 1969, Berkeley was receiving applications for the position of Secretary. Berkeley intended that the holder of the post would eventually succeed Ennals as Director. Michael Robb, the British Chargé d’Affairs in South Africa was one of the applicants who Hayman recommended. He acknowledged that there would be suspicion of Foreign Office involvement, but believed that the Foreign Office need not raise objections on that score and that they stood ‘to gain a great deal if he was successful’. Robb did not receive the position, but Ennals was asked to resign by the Executive Council in November 1969. Eventually, as outlined in chapter four, both Berkeley and Ennals would be made to resign in 1970. However, UNA’s troubles went beyond a clash of personalities and shared such troubles with Chatham House.

MONEY

Money – or the lack of it – featured prominently in both Chatham House and UNA’s discussions with Whitehall in the sixties and seventies. By 1963, Younger was reporting that businesses were losing interest in the work of Chatham House and were cancelling their corporate subscriptions. The bulk of Chatham House funds were provided by the Rockefeller Foundation, but there was increasing competition with universities and newly formed institutes. It was also feared that the Foundation would soon withdraw funding in favour of

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projects in poorer countries.\textsuperscript{151} Why should a US foundation pay for British programmes that British organisations could fund? Hard times were reflected in the sixties, when the Institute made significant cuts to its press library and research programme, while the \textit{Survey of International Affairs} was terminated.\textsuperscript{152} Younger thus approached the Foreign Office to see if he could solicit interest in funding new projects, including that of informing public opinion on Europe as noted in chapter two. The Foreign Office was not forthcoming. Nevertheless, it did again offer to become a corporate subscriber and this Chatham House accepted, but at £200 a year, it was small comfort.\textsuperscript{153}

Amid the rising costs of the 1960s, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence became keen on an idea of a merger of Chatham House with the Royal United Services Institute, which was also suffering financially. The institutions were less keen and sceptical that it would in fact help.\textsuperscript{154} The question of European integration, however, aided Chatham House. Between 1967 and 1976, the Ford Foundation funded the European Series, a joint project with the think-tank Policy and Economic Planning. Furthermore, in the early seventies, Chatham House was one of a number of NGOs to benefit from a government fund of £6 million designated to improve cultural contacts with Western European countries under the management of the minister tasked with negotiating Britain’s entry into the EEC, Geoffrey Rippon. The Institute received funds to cover the expenses of conferences such as ‘India and the Enlarged EEC’ and ‘The External Relations of the Enlarged European Community’, along with the travel expenses associated with a new development whereby some of the Institute’s

\textsuperscript{153} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 49/349: Minute by P. Craddock, 13 Jul 1971.
study groups benefited from regular representation from experts on the Continent.\textsuperscript{155} Chatham House’s input on the European question was recognised by the BBC when the new Director of the Institute was asked to deliver the 1972 Reith Lectures on Europe.\textsuperscript{156} Nonetheless, it was not enough to deal with a growing deficit. In 1968, shortly after pound sterling was devalued, the Institute had a surplus of £4,000. By the financial year 1971/72, there was a deficit of £50,000.\textsuperscript{157}

UNA had reached a ‘serious financial crisis’ before pound sterling was devalued in November 1967. Berkeley explained to Wilson, four months before the prime minister’s infamous ‘pound in your pocket’ speech, that on an income of less than £60,000 per year, UNA had to maintain a staff of 40. Furthermore, a lack of funds constantly hampered the Association’s ability to publish pamphlets and provide sufficient support to the work of the CEWC, to which 1,300 schools were affiliated, and UNSA, that with a membership of 10,000 over 100 branches made it the largest student body outside the National Union of Students. UNA was also the second largest body within the British Volunteer Programme (the forerunner of the Duke of Edinburgh Award). Yet in 1967 they were expecting in a deficit of £10,000, while their total reserves only amounted to about £22,000.\textsuperscript{158} The dinner held at Downing Street in 1968 was in large part designed to help, but the government went a step further. UNA’s financial situation was so bleak that Berkeley and Ennals requested a grant-in-aid from the Foreign Office. The request coincided with a renewed interest in the Foreign Office for improving the propagation of the UN within the UK. ‘We have come to the conclusion’, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, George Thomson wrote to the Treasury,
‘that the United Nations Association is perhaps our most valuable means of doing this, and that as such it deserves more governmental encouragement than it has so far received.’¹⁵⁹ The Treasury agreed and UNA received £37,500 over five years on a tapering scale (£10,000 for 1967/68; £10,000 for 1968/69; £7,000 for 1969/70; £5,000 for 1970/71; £5,000 for 1971/72). The tapering scale was designed to provide an incentive toward ‘sensible planning and financial management’.¹⁶⁰ UNA’s financial crisis had proved that, for all their disagreements, Whitehall valued the work of UNA.

Similarly, the growing financial crisis that Chatham House was facing in the seventies provides the clearest indication as to how the Foreign Office perceived the Institute. After a failed attempt by Younger in 1971, Andrew Shonfield, his replacement, had a discussion with PUS Thomas Brimelow. Shonfield believed there to be two separate aspects to the work of Chatham House. The first was research and the second was that it was a club for people interested in international affairs (note the lack of reference to public engagement). Shonfield’s instinct was to concentrate on the first. Brimelow disagreed. He felt that the Institute’s value lay with providing a forum.¹⁶¹ Talks were had with Shonfield and he appeared to have got the message. In his second application, Shonfield informed the Foreign Office that without a subsidy, Chatham House would need to make cuts and that these would fall on the services which the Institute provided as a forum.¹⁶² A Foreign Office memorandum for the Treasury detailed the value that they ascribed to the Institute, stating that it

(a) Provides a unique and effective milieu for the informed public discussion of foreign affairs;
(b) Assists in the projection of British views abroad;

(c) Serves as a quasi-diplomatic function as a rostrum for distinguished foreign visitors.\textsuperscript{163}

The aforementioned head of the Foreign Office’s Planning Committee, James Cable valued the public meetings, seminars and study groups, but was critical of the Institute’s research and publications. Cable felt that the library facilities and the research programmes only duplicated the larger and better organised facilities of the Foreign Office itself.\textsuperscript{164} Toynbee’s FORD was understood to have outgrown its parentage. Cable also thought that Chatham House should focus more of its attention on questions over future policy and less on ‘the backwaters of our imperial past’.\textsuperscript{165} Similarly, Brimelow felt that Chatham House ought to take account of the field of International Relations that was growing in strength in the academic world.\textsuperscript{166} Ultimately, Alec Douglas-Home, then Foreign Secretary, submitted an application to the Treasury that focussed on the forum aspect of Chatham House, warning that without it there would be difficulty in reaching opinion formers. The Treasury approved and in 1972 paid a grant of £20,000, subsidising Chatham House for the first time in its history.\textsuperscript{167}

There was real concern within the Foreign Office over the impact on public opinion should bodies such as Chatham House and UNA become extinct as a result of inflation. The Director of Research, Edward Orchard, feared that erosion of the serious cultural and intellectual establishment would only lead to the wider encroachment of sensationalism and the ephemeral media.\textsuperscript{168} His comment was made in relation to the Slater Report produced in 1973. The report was produced by the ex-high commissioner to Uganda, Richard Slater, and was the Foreign Office’s response to Edward Heath’s advocacy of strengthening the partnership between government and NGOs. In December 1971, Heath announced a doubling

\textsuperscript{164} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 26/1119: J. Cable to T. Brimelow, 12 May 1972.
\textsuperscript{165} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 49/403: J. Cable to I.J.M. Sutherland, 14 Nov 1972.
\textsuperscript{166} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 26/1119: Minute by J. Cable, 12 Jun 1972 (attached record of discussion between Brimelow and Shonfield on 9 Jun 1972).
\textsuperscript{167} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 49/403: T. Brimelow to A. Shonfield, 9 Sep 1972.
of direct grants to voluntary organisations.\textsuperscript{169} Citing the Plowden Report, the Slater Report recommended greater use of external expertise and countered the habitual argument that those outside the Foreign Office were unable to make a useful contribution to policy as they did not enjoy access to classified information. It stated that the basic facts were publicly available – at least in the medium to long term – and detachment often aided perspective. Furthermore it recognised the importance of the transnational networks that NGOs operated within, stating that ‘closer association will enable us to exercise at least a marginal influence’. The report also noted that the value of NGOs had been ‘explicitly recognised’ in Rippon’s fund: ‘What is true of Europe is true of other parts of the world also’. Finally, Slater appreciated the value of bodies engaged in promoting the understanding of international affairs: ‘[t]he backing of informed public opinion helps to sustain the credibility of our policies abroad.’ Chatham House was frequently referred to and was the first listed think-tank in the annex of known NGOs of interest to the Foreign Office. UNA was the first listed interest group of four whose aims were compatible with foreign policy and deemed to be of high value.\textsuperscript{170} The PUS approved all of the recommendations of the report, the main one being that a specific position be made with the responsibility of liaising with NGOs.\textsuperscript{171}

Ostensibly, the 1970s appear to have seen a marked improvement in the relations between the Foreign Office and NGOs. In 1974, the Foreign Office spent £1.6 million on grants for 42 NGOs.\textsuperscript{172} However, the Home Office’s response to Heath’s drive to narrow the gap between officialdom and non-officialdom was the Voluntary Services Unit (VSU) on which the Foreign Office’s new liaison officer commented on enviously in 1974 for having a

\textsuperscript{169} Hilton et al, \textit{Politics of Expertise}, 192.
\textsuperscript{172} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/826: Minute by T. Brimelow, 25 Oct 1974 (attached memorandum).
budget of £2-3 million. Furthermore, the Slater Report was classified and written for the internal purposes of the Foreign Office, it was not intended for distribution among NGOs. Nonetheless, as both Chatham House and UNA’s financial situation failed to improve quickly, the Foreign Office continued to provide grants to them. In 1974, the Foreign Office listed Chatham House as first priority for funding and officials would continue to attach high value to it throughout the 1970s. In 1975, an unavailing proposal was discussed within the PUS’s planning meeting whereby approaches would be made to grant-aided institutions to integrate under the auspices of Chatham House. Given high inflation and there being no new money forthcoming from the Treasury, the proposition seemed to make sense and had the added bonus of enabling the Foreign Office to provide further financial assistance to Chatham House. However, the level of prioritisation applied to Chatham House did differ between ministers and officials. The Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, and the Minister of State, Goronwy Roberts were impressed by the work of the Welsh Institute of International Affairs (WIIA) and wished that a grant be made to it ‘even at the expense of the Royal Institute of International Affairs’. Given that the Treasury was saying that the Government must reduce its activities, Brimelow worried that such a grant to the WIIA could only be prejudicial to Chatham House, feeling that it would be wrong to deflect money from national organisations to regional ones. Callaghan pressed it, stating that he saw no reasons why money should be limited to London based organisations. In the end the WIIA received a small grant of

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177 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/890: Minute by P.J. Weston, 17 Nov 1975; Minute by P.M. Maxey, 17 Nov 1975.
The value to which the Foreign Office attached to Chatham House was further demonstrated by sympathy given to the Institute’s reluctance to cover its deficit through its reserve capital, which included stocks and shares valued at £1.2 million in 1972 and the freehold of 6 Duke of York Street.\(^{181}\)

UNA was hit harder by rising inflation than Chatham House. The fundraising campaign in the late 1960s had certainly raised a lot of money, but unfortunately much of it could not be used where it was needed. It appears that a serious administrative error took place. More than half of the £250,000 raised was paid to UNA Trust. As a result of changes in the definition of charities in the Charities Act of 1960, UNA agreed with the Charity Commission that their previous charitable status should end due to the political nature of their work. Subsequently money for their educational and humanitarian work was channelled into a separate charitable trust, UNA Trust. The political side of their work was run on a non-charitable basis. Thus money paid to the Trust could only be used for the CEWC and UNA’s contribution to the British Volunteer Programme. The money could not be used for paying salaries or the rent on UNA’s headquarters at 93 Albert Embankment. Of the remainder, £45,000 was spent on Berkeley’s membership campaign, but this had largely failed; it managed to attract only 9,000 new members rather than the hoped for 35,000. The rest of the money (£59,000) had been transferred into the Association’s reserves and was used to help balance the budget.\(^{182}\) By the end of the 1970s UNA’s financial situation only got worse. In 1977, rising rent costs forced the Association to leave its headquarters at 93 Albert Embankment and move across the river to a more cramped set of offices at 3 Whitehall Court.

\(^{180}\) TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/890: F. Hooley to H. Wilson, 3 Dec 1975 (attached list of NGOs receiving grants).


where it remains today. Moreover, in the same year the CEWC also separated from UNA as it could no longer provide it with sufficient support.\textsuperscript{183}

The Heath, Wilson and Callaghan governments were sympathetic and provided grants to UNA throughout their terms. UNA may have been aided, however, by Labour’s return to office, again committed the UN and the new minister at the Foreign Office. In 1974, David Ennals, now Minister of State, had the peculiar experience of seeing the tables turned, and received a deputation from UNA requesting another government subvention of £5,000 per annum for two years. It was noted that the government was already funding similar organisations including the British Atlantic Committee whose aim was to assist in the promotion and understanding of NATO. Furthermore, the Foreign Office understood that the cost of living had risen between January 1968 and February 1974 by 57.7\% and that UNA was particularly vulnerable to inflation given the non-charitable status which meant it had to pay many taxes including value added tax. They also recognised that it would be counterproductive for UNA to pass on its costs to its membership.\textsuperscript{184} After UNA lost its headquarters and the CEWC, a delegation led by Jeremy Thorpe, was successful in securing a rise of the government grant from £6,000 in 1977/78 to £29,775 in 1977/78 to underwrite a fixed proportion of its budget.\textsuperscript{185}

However, the government’s financial assistance to Chatham House and UNA did not equate with a new appreciation or adoption of ideas that originated from outside the confines of Whitehall. Just as the Foreign Office had done in the past (and as the VSU did concurrently), it sought to condition NGO activity; this was only facilitated once government

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\item TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/826: ‘Record of a Conversation between the Minister of State and an all party deputation from the United Nations Association at the FCO’, 1 May 1974; ‘Arguments to Support UNA’s Application for a Government Grant’, undated.\textsuperscript{184}
\item TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/1593: Minute by M.K.O. Simpson-Orlebar, 15 Jun 1979.\textsuperscript{185}
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contributions featured prominently on NGOs’ balance sheets.\textsuperscript{186} Government funding had its effect on Chatham House’s activities. In 1978 Chatham House formed the Policy Studies Unit (PSU) that produced papers (the Chatham House Papers) headed by Lawrence Freedman, intended to be of direct interest to people engaged in formulating policy in government, commerce and industry. Although the decision to establish the PSU was taken independently of government, the Foreign Secretary, David Owen, agreed with Shonfield’s successor, David Watt, that the Foreign Office would commission studies and it is likely – as a Foreign Office official noted – that this influenced the decision to form the PSU.\textsuperscript{187} This emphasis on “policy relevance” was present in Chatham House’s future research. In February 1979, the Chatham House Research Committee met to discuss a new direction, the minutes of which are tellingly held within the National Archives. Reference was made to ‘the poverty of academic research in Britain in international relations and area studies’ in Toynbee’s time, which enabled Chatham House then a broad field to cover. Now that related work was done elsewhere in other institutes and universities, the Research Committee was able to define its ‘priorities rather more tightly’ and the first criteria for defining the Chatham House research programme was ‘relevance – to current debates among policy makers and others’.\textsuperscript{188} In the 1980s, “policy relevance” became the watchword and Chatham House’s libraries shed their historical collections.\textsuperscript{189} Chatham House was becoming much more like the conventional think-tank.

Neither did government funding of UNA necessarily demonstrate that the government was any keener to support UNA (or UN) aims, or have great faith in the Association. In 1974, while Chatham House was priority number one, UNA was number 15.\textsuperscript{190} In the same year, following UNA’s deputation to Ennals, the Treasury did not consider the grounds for

\textsuperscript{189} C. Carrington and M. Bone, \textit{Chatham House: Its History and Inhabitants} (London, 2004), 78.
\textsuperscript{190} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/826: Minute by T. Brimelow, 25 Oct 1974 (attached memorandum).
continuing the grants was very strong, given that they were still operating a deficit in spite seven years of government assistance. Nevertheless, even the Treasury understood that criticism would be levelled at the government if it refused to assist UNA given its commitment to the UN.\textsuperscript{191} The returning Minister of State Goronwy Roberts also had mixed feelings when Ennals proposed that the Association be given an additional £1,000 onto its £5,000 grant in 1975. Roberts hoped that UNA would do more work ‘in the grass roots, i.e. outside the Albert Embankment’. Roberts also compared UNA unfavourably with the WIIA: ‘UNA is simply non-existent in extensive areas of England. Its Welsh counterpart does operate among the people.’\textsuperscript{192} Nevertheless, when UNA was compared with its counterparts within the WFUNA in 1975, West Germany’s received 90% of its budget from the government in Bonn while the Swedish association received a grant of £30,000 with a promise to pay the salaries of ten staff members.\textsuperscript{193}

In 1979, there was a new regime that was much less sympathetic to the Foreign Office’s grants in aid. Douglas Hurd, the new Foreign Secretary, had agreed to a cut of £500,000 in the Foreign Office programme for 1980/81. Amid cuts, Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee felt that it was not appropriate for Chatham House to receive government funding due to its large reserves. Reluctantly the Foreign Office stopped the grant to Chatham House. In the face of strong opposition from the Foreign Office’s UN Department, UNA also saw a cut from £31,000 in 1979/80 to £10,000 for 1980/81. The Thatcher government had little time for the provision of public money for NGOs. It did not have much time for liberal internationalism either. In 1985, unlike Eden who had been keen to be seen as a supporter of the UN and UNA lest liberal opinion be offended, Thatcher

\textsuperscript{192} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/890: Minute by A.C. Glasworthy, 7 Oct 1975; Minute by A.F. Green, 6 Oct 1975.
\textsuperscript{193} TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/889: unknown name to J.D.F. Holt, 5 Aug 1975.
boycotted UNESCO igniting a UNA campaign against the government. The voice of liberal internationalism in the 1980s appears to have increasingly become background noise in Whitehall.

CONCLUSION

When Woodhouse held the directorship at Chatham House between 1955 and 1959, he found it most unnerving to find himself drifting into the membership of the establishment. There were international conferences, embassy receptions and broadcasts on radio and television. His advice was sought on Cyprus, on who should be the next Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, and who should be the next editor of the *Economist*. But in his words: ‘very prudently, no one ever acted on my advice’. It would be inaccurate, to state that the opinion of either Chatham House or UNA was not valued within Whitehall. Whitehall continued to fund Chatham House projects in the 1980s and in 1979 it was noted within the Foreign Office that UNA was still an ‘important body of opinion’, especially given its patronage. This should not be underestimated. Kenneth Younger recalling his time as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs admitted that he could not recollect an occasion when he or his superiors had been especially affected by public opinion in reaching important decisions. Nevertheless, he did feel that public opinion affected ministers subconsciously. He gave the example of the Korean War where the reason why ministers spent little time considering public opposition to war was because the ‘long drama’ that surrounded the League of Nations, the Peace Ballot and the Munich Agreement ‘had so conditioned Ministers and public alike, that a public revolt against supporting the United Nations in its first military

test was unthinkable’. Chatham House and UNA were helping to shape public debate and this was the primary reason for why they elicited interest within Whitehall. However, just as Nicholas Crowson has observed with regards to the voluntary sector concerning homelessness, there were limitations to Chatham House and UNA’s influence within Whitehall.

Both the Plowden and Slater Reports had recommended that the Foreign Office engage more with external bodies, it appears to have shown little real enthusiasm for doing so. Government remained reluctant to release information. In 1963, D.C. Watt complained of ‘an official obscurantism’ with regards to the Official Secrets Act and the demise of the publications of diplomatic blue books’ for parliamentary debate. One of the first initiatives of the British government in the EEC was to press fellow members to tighten security on the policy discussion. Even the privileged information that insider groups, such as Chatham House and UNA, were privy to was unsullied by the terms of internal debate within Whitehall. There is little evidence to suggest that the ideas of Chatham House and UNA actually directly altered policy. Whitehall still distrusted external expertise. Even the historian Michael Howard who sat on Chatham House’s research committee admitted that Whitehall did not find the Institute ‘exactly a hotbed of new and inspiring ideas’. Furthermore, although the Foreign Office was obviously interested in public opinion, it did not actively inform it. Witness the decreasing government contribution to UN Day in the late 1940s. The postwar relationship between Chatham House, UNA and Whitehall shows that when there was collaboration between officialdom and non-officialdom it was constrained by the need for

199 D.C. Watt, ‘Foreign Affairs, the Public Interest and the Right to Know’, The Political Quarterly, 34 (1963), 123, 125.  
201 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, 107, 294n47.
both organisations to appear independent from the other. Furthermore, this constant redrawing of the line tended to favour Whitehall. The Foreign Office ‘nationalised’ the FRPS, shaped Chatham House’s position at the IPR and in the seventies encouraged the Institute to pursue the activities that it found useful. Arguably “policy relevance” is what the Foreign Office deems relevant and the subsequent danger is that alternative perspectives are not explored.

Did the same old diplomacy reign? Chatham House and the UNA were important democratisers of foreign policy and Whitehall worked through them to inform public opinion, but it also sought to control opinion rather than engage with it. Old diplomacy is too crude a term. Diplomats accepted the need and value of listening to external opinion; just how successfully they did so is another matter. What is certain is that advocates of new diplomacy had reasons to be disappointed. Chatham House and UNA’s role as an agent for the democratisation of foreign policy – and that of other NGOs – was confined. Recently, Donald Abelson discussed the difficulties of determining how much or little influence foreign affairs think-tanks wield and concluded that we need to more critically evaluate the contribution made by them.202 Any such critical evaluation, must also assess what they are attempting to influence and determine how much or little influence that Whitehall possesses over the think-tanks themselves. Kedourie made the error of paying little attention to this, devoting three pages of forty-four to how influential Chatham House was in the corridors of power with little explanation other than its close connections to officialdom.203 As shown here, insider status could be a double edged sword, it did not necessarily equate with influence and there was a great danger of being influenced by government. As the next chapter details, Chatham House and the UNA also had to be alive to the dangers of being influenced by party politics.

Fighting for Consensus:
Party Politics and Internationalism

The General Election atmosphere seems awful. No symptoms of recognition of the great dangers we are in...the Labour Manifesto with its perfunctory reference to Foreign affairs & Winston’s broadcast even worse – and the Liberals entirely absorbed by this loathsome Party fight! Are we in UNA doing all we can to correct this?

Robert Cecil to Kathleen Courtney, 24 January 1950

[On entering parliament] I ceased automatically to be an expert and became a party hack. This did not save me from being justly mocked by George Brown, in my first foreign affairs debate, for having once been an ‘expert’. The contemptuous quotation marks were audible in his voice.


Internationalism, liberal or otherwise, is political. Soon after the end of the Second World War, it would have been easy to presume the contrary. Politicians from all parties flocked to UNA rallies and branches to prove their internationalist credentials; to reassure their constituents that they would fight for peace, the UN and no repeat of the hardships that accompanied war. UN Day saw party leaders make dedicated radio broadcasts while their disciples unfurled UN flags over public buildings all over the UK. Politicians addressed all-party meetings within their constituencies organised by local branches of UNA to do battle with their opposing candidates and demonstrate their exceptional grasp of international affairs. Internationalism appeared to be conventional, uncontroversial and non-party.

Appearances can be deceptive. As one shifted across the British political spectrum, one encountered varying degrees of commitment to internationalism that went beyond crude party divisions. Of course, this was to be expected. The variant of internationalism that was embodied in such supranational organisations as the UN, the EEC and the Bretton Woods

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institutions was liberal. This form of internationalism was the centrist solution to peace, prosperity and social justice. It believed that there was little to be gained from conflict be it international, social or party. Consensus was the watchword. Politicians and officials may have preferred to imagine Chatham House and UNA as apolitical or ‘non-party’. Indeed, often the organisations presented themselves as such, in order to avoid perceptions of partisanship. However, their motivation is more accurately described, as many UNA supporters did, as ‘all-party’. Cecil’s disdain for the lack of reference to foreign policy in the 1950 general election campaign was directed at all three main parties. Unlike CND, UNA was focussed on rallying all of the mainstream parties to its cause, not just one. This was not as naive as it may sound. Helen McCarthy has shown how during the interwar years, LNU was successful at appealing across the political spectrum and not just to Liberals. LNU attracted progressive Conservatives and members of the Labour Party who sought to project themselves as capable of moderate government and as heirs to the Gladstonian tradition. UNA enjoyed similar successes after the Second World War, while Chatham House followed a conscious strategy to attract previously neglected members of the labour movement and subsequently attained a stronger all-party status.

Nonetheless, the task of internationalising British political discourse at a cross-party level was highly complex. There were reasons, as Cecil well-knew, why politicians were reluctant to draw attention to international affairs and the need for internationalism. The tenets of internationalism, especially liberal internationalism, wore away at the sovereignty of the nation-state and invited uncomfortable questions over Britain’s right to maintain an empire, global interdependence and perceptions of a homogenous culture. Furthermore, those who were attentive to international affairs were reminded that British power had limits and

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consequently so did Britain’s political leaders. Nationalism was also more easily reconcilable with an a priori understanding of international affairs than internationalism. Liberal internationalists tended to hold reasoned argument in high regard. Party politics did not. As new liberals had feared at the turn of the century, party politics was given to emotional appeals rather than rational ones. As Woodhouse discovered when becoming a Conservative MP in 1959 and clashing with the future Labour Foreign Secretary George Brown, expertise could be treated with suspicion, especially when combined with political affiliation. Naturally Chatham House, ever keen to preserve its intellectual legitimacy, was happy to avoid becoming enmeshed in party politics. The UNA was not so lucky in avoiding perceptions of partisanship. Although there were a number within the organisation who were uncomfortable with the term being applied to them, for all intents and purposes, UNA was a multi-issue pressure group, it was actively political. This had significant implications especially when it was compelled to condemn policy, such as during the Suez Crisis. Liberal internationalism did not readily interconnect with either the images that party political machines desired to conjure up or their methods.

Fortunately for those politicians who supported aspects of liberal internationalism in principle but who flinched at its implications, international affairs often appeared deceptively distant to the electorate and indeed to politicians themselves. Unconsciously or otherwise, politicians thus treated foreign policy and domestic policy as separate entities, preserving the illusion of distance between them. Furthermore, the political structures in which they operated restricted proper exploration of international affairs and played a significant role in pushing foreign policy down the political agenda.

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This chapter will explore these issues by firstly examining the extent to which Chatham House and UNA could claim all-party status, demonstrate why such a status was necessary and indicate the damage caused by steering away from it. It will then assess the impact that the two bodies had within Westminster and the limited facilities and incentives politicians had to pursue foreign policy issues. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to exploring the relationship that Chatham House and UNA had with the three main parties, revealing how they helped influence the policy directions of the parties, but also how party politics complicated their navigation of the political landscape. Ultimately, it demonstrates, especially when taken in combination with the preceding chapter, that Susan Pedersen’s observation made with regards to the League, that ‘statesmen might react to mobilised public opinion not by altering what they did but simply what they said’, remained the case with regards to the UN and liberal internationalism more generally.\(^5\)

**POLITICALLY APOLITICAL**

Both Chatham House and UNA had strong all-party credentials. The Conservative Research Department, the Labour Party International Department and Liberal International – the world federation of liberal political parties – were all corporate subscribers to Chatham House. For the majority of the period between 1945 and 1975, representatives from the three main parties also acted as the Institute’s Presidents.\(^6\) In 1946, there was also a relatively balanced representation among the MPs who were members of Chatham House. 51% were Conservative; 42% Labour; 4% Liberal and 3% were Independent.\(^7\) Furthermore, figure 4.1 when taken as a whole similarly displays a relative degree of balance on the Institute’s Council in its representation of MPs until 1960. It should be emphasised,

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\(^6\) Chatham House Archives, London (hereafter CHA): 1/4: Annual Reports 1944-45 to 1974-75. There was a short period without a Liberal incumbent between 1974 and 1975, following the death of Andrew McFadyean.

\(^7\) Data collated from CHA: 1/4: ‘List of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs’, Nov 1946.
Figure 4.1. Balance of party affiliation among the MPs sitting on the Chatham House Council, 1945-1975.

Figure 4.2. Balance of party affiliation among the MPs sitting on the UNA Executive Committee, 1945-1975.
Source: UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: Annual Reports 1945/46-1975. Note that the 1958 report is not contained within the file and the members of the Executive Committee are not listed in the 1971 report.
however, as is also apparent in figure 4.1, Chatham House considered the presence of MPs on the Council to be a luxury it could afford to be without.

UNA, however, given its lobbying activities had a strong incentive to secure their presence on their executive in order to utilise their experience and contacts. The significance of such was affirmed in 1963 when a special committee set up to consider the future of UNA concluded that ‘the closest possible connection with Parliament is extremely useful’.\(^8\) Indeed, figure 4.2 displays a consistently large number of MPs present on UNA’s Executive Committee. The average total was 4.8, while Chatham House’s was 1.7. But such connections made UNA’s all-party credentials all the more important and yet, as will be explored in more detail later on, it is apparent that the balance tended to favour Labour especially later in the period.

The all-party stance necessarily percolated through much of UNA’s activities. Throughout the period, the three Presidents of UNA were the three leaders of the main parties. Its Vice-Presidents also included representatives from the three parties as did UNA rallies in the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1960s the General Council was addressed by leading members of both the Conservative and Labour parties. At the dinner held at Downing Street designed to raise money for UNA in 1968, the leaders of the three parties were present.\(^9\) On particularly controversial issues, UNA publications also gave space for opposing views. For example, in 1959, Denis Healey presented in \textit{The World’s News} the case for the creation of a neutral belt of countries across central Europe, which featured next to the Conservative MP Gilbert Longden’s case against.\(^10\) In the 1960s Harold Wilson, Edward Heath and Jeremy Thorpe detailed their parties’ position on the UN during election campaigns and provided New Year’s

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\(^9\) See UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: Annual Reports 1945-46 to 1975

messages on the front pages of New World.\textsuperscript{11} During general election campaigns UNA branches were keen to include all of the parliamentary candidates at meetings to discover their positions and attempt to engender the UN and foreign policy more generally as electoral issues. UNA’s all-party stance was also important in its coordination of coalitions for its humanitarian campaigns. It was evident in UNA’s coordination of the Refugee Campaign in 1956, which brought together 48 organisations with a variety of political leanings.\textsuperscript{12} When David Ennals, then Secretary of UNA, received advice from Transport House that there would be a bigger response to the campaign among Labour supporters if the party leader Hugh Gaitskell were to produce a special leaflet, Ennals refused after he was notified by Conservative Central Office that resisting the suggestion would ‘help considerably to strengthen UNA’s claim that it is a non-party organisation’.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, as Ennals, later noted, it would have been inconceivable for the Foreign Office to receive deputations from UNA or to have provided it with grants in the late 1960s and 1970s had UNA jeopardised its all-party credentials.\textsuperscript{14}

Many within UNA and Chatham House were only too aware of the dangers of dabbling in party politics. Chatham House, largely in order to prove its all-party credentials attempted to muster balanced representation. One of the arenas through which these endeavours took place was within the executives of both bodies, as shown by figures 4.1 and 4.2. It should be emphasised, however, that the figures only reveal the party affiliation of those MPs who were members of the respective executives of Chatham House and UNA. They do not indicate the political sympathies of the other members of the executives. The

\textsuperscript{11} ‘Party Leaders Send Messages Supporting the UN to UNA’s General Council’, New World, May 1964, 1; ‘New Year Greetings’, New World, Jan 1968, 1; ‘New Year Greetings’, New World, Jan 1969, 1; ‘New Years Greetings’, New World, Jan 1970, 1; ‘The General Election: Britain and the UN’, New World, Apr 1966, 1.

\textsuperscript{12} Labour Party Archives, People’s History Museum, Manchester (hereafter LPA): LP/ID/B11/1: ‘Summary Report of a Meeting of National Organisations Convened by UNA to consider the 1956 Refugee Campaign on February 17’.

\textsuperscript{13} LPA: LP/ID/B11/1: D. Ennals to J. Clark, 15 May 1956; D. Ennals to J. Clark, 17 Apr 1956.

figures do not take account of, for instance, the Chairman of the Liberal Party, Leonard Behrens who sat on UNA Executive Committee or the former Liberal MP Henry Graham White, a member of the Chatham House Council. Nor do they take account of trade unionists such as Herbert Bullock (UNA) or the Secretary of the Labour Party International Department and future minister Denis Healey (Chatham House). Nor the Vice-Chair of the Conservative Party Organisation Marjorie Maxse (UNA) or indeed the future Conservative MP and Director of Chatham House Christopher Woodhouse.\textsuperscript{15}

For Chatham House it was not just about securing intellectual legitimacy. In the 1950s an extreme example of the potential dangers of appearing to be politically partial was brought alive to the Institute when the IPR became embroiled in McCarthyite paranoia. Although the IPR attributed its eventual demise in 1961 to more than just the ‘demagogic attacks’ made by McCarthy, they were recognised as ‘perhaps, the principal’ cause.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, it was fear that Chatham House would be charged with political partisanship that spelled the end of Woodhouse’s directorship when in 1959 he was elected an MP. Anticipating his successful election, the Institute’s Council ruled that it was impossible for anyone who was politically committed to be its Director and made discreet enquiries to find a new appointment. Eventually, as Woodhouse later sardonically noted the new Conservative MP was replaced by Younger, a retiring Labour MP.\textsuperscript{17} The Institute could not completely escape party politics. Nevertheless, escape was much easier for a think-tank that possessed no corporate opinion, than it was for UNA.

Unfortunately, for UNA escape often proved nigh on impossible. UNA did not only have to deal with party politics at the national level, but at the local level too. In 1946, at the

\textsuperscript{17} McFadyean Mss: MCFADYEAN/21: W. Strang to A. McFadyean, 14 Oct 1958 (attached extract from Council Meeting on 8 Oct 1958); Woodhouse, \textit{Something Ventured}, 139.
first meeting of the Carlisle UNA branch, the local trades council reported that the platform was ‘decorated with individuals who certainly do not look with favour upon working class organisations & I am given to understand the prominent positions were filled by such persons’.

A year later the Taunton and District Trades Council complained that the prospective local Conservative candidate, the ex-diplomat Henry Hopkinson – had used a meeting of the Taunton UNA branch as a party political broadcast that was deemed too anti-Soviet. This was deemed inappropriate as it understood the UN to be ‘Non-Party’.

Conservatives too felt alienated from their local UNA branches. In 1950, Marjorie Maxse informed Leonard Behrens that she had received complaints that Conservatives were being cold-shouldered in UNA branches in Manchester, Salford and Liverpool.

In 1960, the Manchester UNA branch, of which Behrens was Chair, was described by the secretary of the local trades council as ‘an appendage of the Liberal Party’.

As UNA Secretary Charles Judd explained in 1946, the problem was that in areas where one political party was strong, UNA branches tended to reflect it. Judd’s solution was that the opposing parties should join up and get involved with UNA activities and seek to redress the balance.

Unfortunately, many, such as the Manchester and Salford Trades Council, feeling neglected, ignored their local branch.

UNA struggled to be all-party everywhere.

Neither could UNA be all-party at all times. The Suez Crisis provided UNA with no choice but to condemn the Conservative government. For many within UNA (and of course elsewhere), it was a first-rate diplomatic blunder. Britain had blatantly breached the UN Charter, which the British had done much to help draft only twelve years before.

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22 TUC Mss: MSS.292/921.9/1: C. Judd to C. Bell, 26 Jun 1946.
the invasion of Egypt the UK’s permanent representative at the UN Pierson Dixon found himself in the dock attempting – with grave reservations – to defend British action. He faced a furious reaction from the usually calm and collected UN General Secretary Dag Hammarskjold, who was greatly disappointed that Britain in particular was undermining the UN’s authority. Greater anger followed once Britain used its Security Council veto for the first time on two resolutions labelling the Israelis as aggressors and calling for an immediate ceasefire. The Norwegian UN representative described it as ‘an appalling blow to Western unity’. Indeed, the invasion of Egypt had prevented the Soviet Union from incurring the full weight of the UN’s moral opprobrium in the wake of its suppression of the Hungarian Revolution. In New York the hostility was such that Dixon – along with Britain’s allies – even feared that the UK could not continue as it was and remain a member of the UN.²⁴ UNA could not let the situation pass without condemnation.

Yet not all within UNA agreed. When British troops moved to the Mediterranean, a colleague of David Ennals explained to him that UNA could ‘never be the same again. It will make us or break us’. Ennals argued to readers of The World’s News that although he recognised some within UNA were ‘aching to get back to good old fashioned non-controversial educational work – lectures on W.H.O. [World Health Organisation] and the like’, that not to have acted ‘would have been utterly to shirk our responsibilities’.

Nevertheless, an emergency meeting of UNA General Council in November 1956, called for the first time in UNA’s history, revealed a significant minority who disagreed with Ennals’s stance. UNA branch delegates were called upon to vote on a resolution passed by the Executive Committee that demanded that attacks on Egyptian territories cease immediately. The General Council approved the resolution by 358 to 22, but Ennals acknowledged that it

was not an accurate reflection of where UNA membership stood. Many of the branch
delegates reported that their branch committees were deeply divided; on discussion of the
Executive’s resolution some branch officers felt so strongly opposed that they felt it their duty
to resign.²⁵ Even Gilbert Murray one of the LNU’s founders and a Joint President of UNA
gave the government his ‘conditional support’.²⁶

In terms of total membership, between 1956 and 1957 there was a decline of nearly
3,000 members.²⁷ However, UNA’s annual report in 1957 did boast of having also attracted
new members and attributed some of the loss of membership to branches being too distracted
by the 1956 Refugee Campaign to collect all renewal subscriptions.²⁸ Furthermore, divisions
along party lines were not as distinct as had been feared. The aforementioned Executive
Committee’s resolution was arrived at unanimously with the consent of the two Conservative
MPs on the Committee, Walter Elliot and Nigel Nicolson. This was not enough to assuage the
doubts of UNA’s critics who accused UNA of pursuing a party political line that favoured the
Left.²⁹ It was thus understandable, as shown in chapter two, that there were plenty of
members who ached to focus on seemingly less politically controversial work, especially
humanitarianism.

Politicians were sensitive to UNA’s protests. In 1968, the United Nations All Party
Parliamentary Group (UNAPPG) – which UNA formed in 1960 and continues to administer
today – lost 80 members due to a mistaken belief that membership implied support for all
UNA policy resolutions.³⁰ It is unclear as to whether there was a particular policy resolution
that inspired the exodus. It could have been for a number of reasons. UNA was in

United Kingdom – the United Nations, (Basingstoke, 1990), 263.
³⁰ UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: 1968 Annual Report, 22. For information on the UN All Party Parliamentary Group
disagreement with both the Labour Government and Conservative Opposition on a number of issues, including race relations, Vietnam, Rhodesia, South Africa, disarmament and decolonisation. Concerns over charges of partiality were not limited to the impact it might have in enlisting support. In 1965, Nicolson feared that the split between the parties over sanctions on the Smith regime in Rhodesia ‘may be duplicated by a split within UNA, as at the time of Suez’. Nicolson was right to fear the potential damage of an internal split along party political lines, but it was not to be realised in relation to Rhodesia.

Party politics helped fuel the split that came at the very top of the organisation between the Left-wing Director John Ennals and the ex-Conservative MP Chairman Humphry Berkeley. Even without the party politics the clash of personalities was damaging enough. Neither Berkeley nor Ennals felt that their respective positions ought to be subservient to the other and neither was easy to work with. As outlined in chapter three, Ennals made controversial decisions without reference to the Executive Committee, whereas even a neutral observer found bound to admit that Berkeley ‘had become so convinced of John’s disloyalty that the DG [Ennals] could not sneeze without it being interpreted as an affront’. Frank Hooley a member of the Executive Committee, Labour MP and part of the Ennals faction was less complementary about Berkeley: ‘His personal behaviour...has aroused in me a bitter contempt and dislike such as I have never felt for any other person in my life.’ The Ennals faction claimed that their opposite numbers gerrymandered votes on the Executive Committee. Berkeley claimed that Ennals and his supporters had forged press notices and

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had even tapped his phone. Neither party limited the airing of their grievances to the confines of UNA headquarters; both parties went to the press. Ennals involved his trade union and his solicitor. Berkeley involved the police following press leaks. Even the local pub could not escape the unedifying spectacle. Scrawled within the gentlemen’s toilets read the words: ‘ENNALS IS OK IF YOU LIKE SHITS’. Next to it were the words: ‘ENNALS IS A RUSSIAN SPY’.

Ennals struggled to escape his reputation as a fellow traveller. Berkeley certainly considered Ennals to be a communist sympathiser. In February 1969, Berkeley made a press statement in which he condemned ‘a small band of people’ within UNA who were ‘determined to use our organisation as a vehicle for their advancement and as a perversion of its true aims. I am determined to see that the association is kept on its proper course as an all-party organisation.’ The most significant item on the document listing criticisms of Ennals that Berkeley circulated to the Executive Committee in September 1969, referred to in chapter three, was the allegation that Ennals’s suspected communist affiliation prevented him from sitting on the Foreign Secretary’s unofficial advisory committee on UN affairs. By November, the Executive Committee had decided it had had enough and produced the ‘Peace Plan for the Future of UNA’. It called for the resignation of both Ennals and Berkeley. At a special meeting of the General Council in January 1970 the Peace Plan was ratified and both

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35 The National Archives, Kew, London (hereafter TNA): Prime Minister’s Office Archive: PREM 13/3538: Note for the record by N.J. Barrington, 24 Sep 1969. Specialists did find that Berkeley’s phone had been tapped, but it was unclear as to who did it.  
39 TNA: Prime Minister’s Office Archive: PREM 13/3538: Note for the record by N.J. Barrington, 24 Sep 1969.  
Ennals and Berkeley resigned their position in April. The Executive Committee did, however, decide to set up an enquiry into the allegations made against John Ennals, headed by the Liberal peer John Foot.43

At the enquiry, the preponderance of the attacks made by Berkeley and his supporter Nicolson condemned Ennals for attempting to move UNA towards the Left. Nicolson criticised Ennals’s ‘leftward speeches’ at a WFUNA conference in 1966 and claimed that they had precipitated concerns among American delegates that the British UNA was becoming politically partisan. Berkeley had also accused Ennals of filling a meeting of the General Council in April 1969 with UNA affiliated trade union representatives in order to reverse a decision made by the Executive Committee to place Ennals on sabbatical. On the allegation made that the Foreign Office considered Ennals persona non grata at confidential meetings, Nicolson stated that a minister had confided in him the information. Berkeley also stated that a minister had informed him that Ennals was ‘politically suspect’, but would not disclose which minister because it had been stated in strict confidence. However, Denis Greenhill, the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, gave no indication as to Ennals’s reputation in the Foreign Office and stated that he had no issues dealing with him. Ultimately, Foot censured both Nicolson and Berkeley and the enquiry found in favour of Ennals.44

Nonetheless, Ennals’s support was largely among the Left-wing elements of UNA, particularly among young people inspired by his oratorical talents. UNA’s National Youth Conference in December 1969 rejected the Peace Plan, called for Berkeley’s resignation and that Ennals be allowed to perform his normal duties.45 Earlier in the year, a banner had been displayed at UNA Youth Summer School bearing the words ‘Ennals our Dubcek’.46 This was hardly the all-party image UNA was striving for. Furthermore, Berkeley’s accusation that

Ennals filled a meeting of the General Council in April 1969 with trade union representatives to attempt to get the Council to vote in his favour perhaps had some substance. In advance of the meeting in January 1970, Ennals's own union, the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staff, did encourage fourteen other trade unions affiliated with UNA to attend in order to oppose the Peace Plan. Whether Ennals was aware of this is unclear.  

Ennals also had among his supporters the Labour MPs Frank Judd who was the Chairman of the UN Parliamentary Group and Frank Hooley who had a significant position within the organisation as chair of its financial committee. The latter was at least aware of endeavours to frustrate Berkeley in 1968. A member of the Executive Committee wrote to Hooley in October detailing how she would ‘tie Humphrey up in red tape until he screams for mercy’. In the summer of 1969, Hooley, convinced that a great deal of the feeling against Ennals was derived from ‘political prejudice’ attempted to get Price-Holmes to realise that Berkeley had to go. Hooley abortively attempted to oust Berkeley by putting his own name against his in a re-election of Berkeley as Chairman.  

To the majority within UNA who were not aligned to either faction, the damage of party politics was clear. Eric Price-Holmes, the Chairman of UNA General Council and successor to Berkeley, summed up their attitude as ‘a plague on both your houses’. Price-Holmes feared that Westminster divisions had spilled over into UNA and wished that both sides would ‘stop “playing politics”’. A member of the Weymouth UNA branch concurred, expressing his dissatisfaction that ‘factions within UNA have allowed personal or political

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47 TUC Mss: MSS.79/1988/110: M. Turner to G. Drain, 1 Jan 1970. Attached to the front of the letter is a list of the fourteen unions the letter was sent to.
motives to influence their decision to the detriment of the wellbeing of our Association’. 52
‘We are simply fed up with the situation’, wrote a UNA lecturer in an open letter to all
members, ‘and want to get on with our work without being hampered by antics in high
places’. He feared that, amid declining membership, that the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
UN was threatened with ‘total paralysis’ from UNA. 53 On that anniversary in 1970, Price-
Holmes was elected as Berkeley’s successor. Price-Holmes’s election was symptomatic of a
body fighting hard to maintain its all-party credentials. It did not mean, however, that UNA
was now freed from party politics. A member of the Scottish UNA Assembly sympathised
with Hooley but advised against him running for Chairman of the Executive Committee. He
explained that that those on the Left accept Conservative or Liberal chairmen, but that
Conservatives would not accept a socialist one. ‘[I]f we are to maintain the (possibly
mythical) ALL PARTY image and contain as many “right-wing progressives” as possible,
then I’m afraid we are stuck with the ‘establishment-type’ Chairman.’ 54 Party politics was
never far below the surface.

WESTMINSTER

In order to assess the influence of both Chatham House and UNA within Westminster, it is
necessary to examine parliamentary attention toward international affairs more broadly. The
unyielding atmosphere of bipartisanship within Parliament, especially within the House of
Commons, was not well-suited to international affairs. Where there was consensus, it was
usually to be found between the two respective front benches of the Government and
Opposition; where there was division, it was usually within the political parties themselves.
Parliamentary discussion of international affairs thus had the potential to be distinctly

embarrassing. Subsequently, the toughest debate on international issues often took place away from parliament in the party committees on foreign affairs. What debate that did take place within Westminster was hardly exploratory. Debates would begin with a general summary of the situation by the Foreign Secretary, which would be followed by a similar speech by his (until 2006, it was always his) counterpart in the Opposition, a series of contributions from backbenchers, and finally speeches from the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister with little reference made to the intervening speeches. If all this sounds rather familiar, it is because little has changed since. However, one development that did come about was the establishment of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs that Opposition members during this period frequently called for, but were denied by successive governments until 1979. The objections to such a select committee were summed up by the former (and first) Cabinet Secretary, Maurice Hankey who felt that it would put ‘an almost unendurable strain’ on the Foreign Office and, worse, would risk ‘widespread knowledge on vital secrets’.

Amid such obscurantism, as revealed in chapter three, information on international affairs provided by official channels to MPs and peers was limited. It has already been stated that before 1914 the command papers known as the diplomatic blue books were produced annually, prompting a parliamentary debate and that after 1914 they were only produced intermittently. Neither was much information on international affairs forthcoming from the small House of Commons Library, where the emphasis of its Research Division was on the rapid collection of information in order to prevent MPs from being caught out, rather than on methodical research in the academic sense. Nevertheless, MPs made little use of the resource:

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57 See also D.C. Watt, ‘Foreign Affairs, the Public Interest and the Right to Know’, The Political Quarterly, 34 (1963), 123.
in 1960 the average number of queries per MP was only 1.5. The Research Division was thus correspondingly small, only eight graduates served on it staff. Furthermore, translation facilities, obviously crucial for the study of international affairs, were not available.\textsuperscript{58}

The most utilised source of information by MPs was housed within the respective headquarters of the political parties. However, party research departments largely neglected international affairs. Between 1964 and 1970 only a small team of researchers within the Conservative Research Department were responsible for publishing the monthly \textit{Overseas Review}. Yet the publication was the main crutch from which party spokesmen could draft their speeches. All the while the research staff had to provide details to support developing policies on Europe and the party’s position on maintaining Britain’s military position East of Suez. The Labour Party International Department was similarly small and yet had even more functions including developing contacts with sister parties overseas, a task assigned to a separate body within the Conservative Party.\textsuperscript{59} Furthermore, in 1967, after interviewing Labour MPs, the political scientist Peter G. Richards noted that between 1945 and 1963 the International Department had an inconsistent status within the party organisation. The post of Head of Department had been left vacant for several months on a number of occasions and while Gaitskell tended to ignore Transport House, Wilson, when Leader of the Opposition, made greater use of it. He made less use of it when in Whitehall. Finally, between 1965 and 1969, the Liberal Party, had the smallest number of staff tackling international issues with only one member of its Research Department working on foreign and defence policy.\textsuperscript{60}

The scant information available to MPs reflected their modest collective interest in international affairs. For much of the period, foreign policy was not perceived to be a vote winner. This was probably an astute analysis. Gallup polls from 1960 to 1975 indicate that


\textsuperscript{59} Wallace, \textit{The Foreign Policy Process}, 96.

\textsuperscript{60} Richards, \textit{Parliament and Foreign Affairs}, 58.
generally, with the exception of crises that had the potential to involve Britain in war, the public usually felt that there were more pressing concerns than those issues occurring outside Britain’s borders.\textsuperscript{61} In 1957, the Labour MP George Jeger revealed to his parliamentary colleagues his priorities.

I asked my constituents...which they would rather I did – endeavour to catch Mr Speaker’s eye in the grand foreign affairs debate tomorrow or raise the question of their bus shelter...They told me that any fool can speak on foreign affairs and no doubt several would, but that if I did not speak about their local bus shelter, then nobody else would.\textsuperscript{62}

Jeger’s position is endowed with a satisfying logic. Naturally, MPs should represent the concerns of their constituents and bus shelters are important. However, little parliamentary attention was devoted even to those international issues that had significant social and economic implications for their constituents. Richards complained in 1973 of how few MPs took an interest in UN agencies and also tariffs, particularly when compared with the beginning of the century.\textsuperscript{63} It was a theme that UNA was highly aware of and frequently lamented. UNA consistently complained in their post-mortems of general elections that most candidates gave insufficient consideration to international issues. In November 1974, \textit{New World} stated on its front page that the recent election held the previous month was ‘outstanding for one thing – its total lack of interest in international affairs’. The article found few signs of recognition that the British people were part of a wider world and quoted UNA’s Director Frank Field declaration that it was ‘the selfish election’.\textsuperscript{64} That politicians had little information on international affairs – and little inclination to explore them – when such issues were becoming ever closely intertwined with domestic ones, helped to fuel, in the words of

\textsuperscript{62} Wallace, \textit{The Foreign Policy Process}, 95.
Chatham House’s future Director of Studies William Wallace, ‘the myth that foreign policy is a separate field, a “mystery” outside domestic politics’.\textsuperscript{65} Moreover, the implications in terms of the democratic accountability of foreign policy, was that there was effectively a significantly smaller legislature influencing the executive’s foreign policy than that which held domestic policy to account. Paradoxically, this – combined with the small number of NGOs concerned with foreign policy – may have helped NGOs and specifically prominent insiders such as Chatham House and UNA to influence foreign policy. Of course, not all MPs shied away from international affairs and among this small legislature both Chatham House and UNA did exercise influence.

To those MPs who were particularly interested in a more academic understanding of international affairs, Chatham House provided an important source of information.\textsuperscript{66} Again, this group did not command the majority of MPs. In 1946 only 57 MPs were members of Chatham House.\textsuperscript{67} This number may have declined afterwards – although it is impossible to properly ascertain due to the absence of membership records after 1946 – as the Second World War featured less prominently in people’s minds. Nonetheless, given that 57 MPs amounted to 9\% of the House of Commons, this was not an insignificant figure, especially given the aforementioned relatively small body of MPs who concerned themselves with international affairs. However, no MPs enrolled on Chatham House courses as Waldorf Astor had hoped.\textsuperscript{68}

Nevertheless, it is apparent from their private papers, and indeed Chatham House’s own records, that many politicians participated in the Institute’s activities and read its publications. The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences were valued by

\textsuperscript{65} Wallace, \textit{The Foreign Policy Process}, 117.
\textsuperscript{67} Data collated from CHA: 1/4: ‘List of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs’, Nov 1946.
\textsuperscript{68} Waldorf Astor Mss, Museum of English Rural Life, Reading (hereafter Astor Mss): MS 1066/1/559: W. Astor to P. Thorneycroft, 18 May 1944.
politicians who attended. Chatham House was also responsible for distributing the secretive *Report on Foreign Affairs*. The publication was produced by the Empire Parliamentary Association (EPA) and was only available to MPs in Great Britain and the Dominions. A leaflet circulated in 1945 noted that the EPA attached ‘the highest importance, that it should be treated as a confidential document’; MPs had to sign a form to acknowledge that they were not allowed ‘on any occasion’ to refer to it in print or quote it by name. By 1969, the publication – since named the *Report on World Affairs* was no longer confidential, but ‘its external circulation has been extremely limited’. The now Commonwealth Parliamentary Association decided to cease publication. Chatham House, noting dismay among its readers, took over the production of the report. Transport House was ‘delighted’ and its library took out a subscription.

It is difficult to ascertain from the archival record the extent to which politicians acted upon the findings of Chatham House study groups and publications and/or to which they contributed to politicians’ understanding of international affairs and foreign policy. However, it is evident from parliamentary proceedings that the Institute was solicited to provide evidence for select committees and that MPs and peers used its findings to add legitimacy to their arguments. Figure 4.3 shows the limited but relatively consistent number of mentions that the Institute received. Of the total 62 debates and written submissions, 81% of the references were made in connection to one of Chatham House’s publications, a speech made at the Institute or an activity organised by it such as the Unofficial Commonwealth

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Conferences. Throughout the period there was no direct reference to the Institute which was condemnatory. The remaining 18% of the references used Chatham House as an example institute that others might follow, alluded to colleagues’ past employment at the Institute, or recommended that the Institute pursue a certain project. As shown by figure 4.4, Chatham House also relatively regularly received mentions within command papers and – despite the absence of a select committee on foreign affairs – within parliamentary committee reports too. The command papers and reports concerned decolonisation, agriculture, the UN and the BBC, race relations, immigration, government administration, international aid, European integration. When the Foreign Affairs Select Committee was established in June 1979, Chatham House staff were regularly consulted. In November, Wallace detailed how the Institute could be of assistance on a variety of topics including British cultural and information policy (the BBC’s external services and the British Council); refugee policy; European integration; international aid policy; and the problems surrounding the remaining dependent territories, such as Hong Kong and the Falkland Islands. It is evident that parliament did utilise the expertise of Chatham House in a variety of ways, but it was hardly capitalised on as a potential ‘rival civil service’ keeping the Foreign Office accountable, as mandarins had feared after the Institute’s creation.

Neither had the Foreign Office much to fear from the UNA. Although, politicians were keen to exploit the benefits of affiliation with UNA, they were more often motivated by the desire to attain political rather than intellectual capital. In the 1940s and early 1950s prominent politicians attended UNA rallies, spoke at branch meetings and got involved with

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Figure 4.3. Number of parliamentary debates and written submissions that made reference to Chatham House, 1945-1975.

Figure 4.4. Number of command papers and reports of committees that made reference to Chatham House, 1945-1975.
its UN Day activities. Rallies and branches were addressed by the likes of Clement Attlee, Anthony Eden, Violet Bonham Carter, Selwyn Lloyd, Herbert Morrison, Hugh Gaitskell and David Maxwell Fyfe.\(^{76}\) On UN Day in 1950, the UN Flag was ceremonially unfurled over six hundred civic centres. Attlee made a public broadcast while messages from Churchill and Bonham Carter were read on the radio.\(^{77}\) Nevertheless, just months before, the Executive Committee had conveyed their frustration to the party leaders that international issues had been ignored in the election campaign that year. To help correct this, during the campaign, UNA Branches had organised all-party meetings in which parliamentary candidates were pressed for their views on the UN. An annual report boasted that the candidates involved addressed some of the largest meetings held during the election. Furthermore, hundreds of UNA branches interviewed candidates or addressed questionnaires to them and their replies were published in the local press.\(^{78}\)

In 1951, UNA’s task of placing international affairs at the top of the election agenda was made easier when polling day was the day after UN Day. The UN Flag still flew over balloting stations from the previous day’s celebrations. Churchill in his message for UN Day noted that ‘the flag of the United Nations, flying over all our towns and cities, should remind us that greater than all the issues that divide us is the cause of International Freedom, Justice and Peace’. The questionnaires and all-party meetings were continued and would become a regular feature.\(^{79}\) Amid the Korean War (the UN’s first military test) and Britain’s subsequent controversial rearmament, international affairs featured relatively prominently during the election. The first page of all three main parties’ manifestos made reference to the


international situation.\textsuperscript{80} As Kenneth Younger recalled it would have been ‘unthinkable’ for politicians to oppose the UN at this time.\textsuperscript{81} Subsequently, as the \textit{Leamington Spa Courier} noted after the hustings, ‘[t]he United Nations has not been a controversial issue in this election. It is the province of no one political party and receives all-party support.’\textsuperscript{82}

International affairs were not often afforded such attention from politicians, but the UN and UNA were not devoid of political clout. The 1955 UNA annual report only committed a paragraph to comment on the election that year. It congratulated UNA branches that had managed to draw to its all-party meetings ‘far larger audiences than most candidates and even some Cabinet Ministers and Opposition leaders were able to command for their own party meetings’, but lamented that ‘not nearly enough were held’.\textsuperscript{83} The 1959 annual report again complained that the number of all-party meetings during the election was ‘disappointingly small’, while expressing dissatisfaction that the UN’s prospective Ten Power Disarmament Conference to occur in 1960 had received little attention during the election.\textsuperscript{84} The 1964 annual report claimed that during the election campaign at least 111 all-party meetings had taken place around the UK and that 400 candidates had submitted answers to UNA questionnaires. Furthermore, the majority of those candidates had promised to join the UNAPPГ.\textsuperscript{85} The group’s membership reached its peak in 1966 with a sizeable total of 241 MPs; 38% of the 630 MPs in the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{86} However, as UNA stated after the aforementioned exodus from the group in 1968, membership was not supposed to imply support of UNA policy resolutions. Nevertheless one year before, for the first time, UNA organised meetings at the annual party conferences that were addressed by the Foreign

\textsuperscript{82} ‘Election Brevities’, \textit{Leamington Spa Courier}, 26 Oct 1951, 5.
\textsuperscript{83} UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: 1955 Annual Report, 11.
\textsuperscript{84} UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: 1959 Annual Report, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{85} UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: 1964 Annual Report, 16-17.
\textsuperscript{86} UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: 1966 Annual Report, 12.
Secretary George Brown and his opposite numbers in the Conservative and Liberal parties. In the same year in another first for UNA a party leader, Wilson, addressed UNA General Council, to be followed by Heath in 1968 and Thorpe in 1969. As figure 4.5 shows UNA received relatively frequent mentions in Hansard between 1945 and 1975. Similarly, figure 4.6 reveals that reference was also made to UNA in command papers and committee reports throughout the period again despite the absence of a Foreign Affairs Select Committee. UNA was referred to on colonial matters, agriculture, education, the BBC, race relations, immigration, international aid, European integration and naturally the UN.

Nevertheless, in a contest between party politics and loyalty to the UN, the former had the nasty habit of triumphing. For example, UNA’s all-party meetings were by no means a universally welcomed addition to the election hustings. One Conservative MP objected to participating in such a meeting in 1950 despite his professed support of the UN and UNA and Conservative Central Office advice to attend. He reasoned candidly that he did not wish to attend as his he was fighting in a safe Conservative seat and worried that his attendance would simply have provided ‘a platform for opponents who otherwise will have great difficulty in getting a decent sized meeting’. He added that he felt the same applied to many other constituencies, and that were he campaigning in Labour or Liberal strongholds his ‘view would be entirely different’. CND too struggled to persuade MPs to place unilateralism before their party. In 1961 the future Labour leader Michael Foot, a leading CND supporter, declared that he would not vote for a unilateralist candidate from the Conservative or Liberal party against a Labour candidate who was in favour of Britain’s possession of the Bomb. The remainder of this chapter will examine this tension between loyalty to the party and attitudes towards international affairs.

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89 Richards, Parliament and Foreign Affairs, 131.
Figure 4.5. Number of parliamentary debates and written submissions that made reference to UNA, 1945-1975.


Figure 4.6. Number of command papers and committee reports that made reference to UNA, 1945-1975.

THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

Since Rhiannon Vickers complained in 2000 of the scholarly neglect of attitudes to international affairs within the labour movement, a number of historians have worked to correct the trend. The previous neglect can be attributed to the party’s fixed focus on domestic affairs, to the bewilderment of its continental counterparts. As Andrew Thorpe notes, the first majority Labour government’s establishment of the National Health Service is far better remembered than its contribution to the development of NATO. Yet Labour’s halcyon electoral victory in 1945 was credited by contemporaries to its proposed foreign policy as much as to its domestic. Neither was concern for international affairs merely confined to senior members of the movement’s political wing. As will be shown here, trade unionists took a relatively strong interest in international causes at both a local and national level. Approximately 44% of the Fabian Society’s tracts between 1945 and 1975 were concerned with international policy. This is before we get to the notorious infighting over relations with NATO, the Soviet Union and Europe. Foreign policy debate played an important role in the development of the labour movement, even if many of its members had little interest in it. Yet the international thought that had the greatest influence on the party

94 The calculation is based upon the Fabian Society tracts contained within the LSE Digital Library, ‘Fabian Society and Young Fabians’, http://digital.library.lse.ac.uk/collections/fabiansociety/tracts (accessed 5 Nov 2014). The calculation is approximate because at the time that the Digital Library was accessed it did not contain nine (3%: tracts 264-270, 278, 285) of the 117 tracts published between 1945 and 1975. The calculation does not include comparisons of British domestic policy with that of other countries.
was not socialist. Labour’s internationalism was largely guided by the liberal and radical thought of the likes of John Bright, Richard Cobden, William Gladstone, T.H. Green, Leonard T. Hobhouse and John A. Hobson. Subsequently, Chatham House and the UNA exercised at times some considerable influence on the Labour Party, if not as much as they would have liked. Thought and policy are unusually one and the same.

When Kenneth Younger became a member of Chatham House in 1937, he was warned that he would hear ‘some very queer views’ there and meet some ‘very left-wing people’. Yet one of Younger’s earliest experiences at Chatham House was of nearly walking out in protest from a well-attended meeting at which ‘a leading establishment figure was preaching the pure doctrine of appeasement then favoured by the Conservative administration’. As Younger noted, it was possible to hear all sorts of views at Chatham House. Nevertheless, it is apparent that in the interwar period liberal and conservative members of Chatham House outnumbered Labour Party members. The ideas of Chatham House’s founders certainly clashed with the more radical UDC that had influenced Labour international thought in the 1910s and 1920s. Chatham House rejected the explanatory categorisation of global politics in terms of class and understood Britain’s participation in the First World War as both justifiable and wise. However, members of the Labour Party, such as Younger, who were less inclined towards the UDC’s conception of international affairs, did enter the Chatham House fold during the interwar period. Philip Noel-Baker was a founding member. William Gillies, the Secretary of the Labour Party International Department, had sat on Executive Committee.

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96 Douglas, The Labour Party, 16.
97 Younger, ‘The Study and Understanding of International Affairs’, 155.
since the early 1920s. Ernest Bevin attended the Commonwealth Relations Conference in 1938.\textsuperscript{99}

Nonetheless, during the Second World War having recognised the shortage of Labour members, a concerted effort was made to attract them. In 1942, the Institute approached the TUC and intimated that their lack of contact with the trade union movement had meant that its publications and study group reports were found wanting insofar as reflection on industrial matters. Chatham House thus suggested that the TUC invite its affiliated unions to take up corporate membership with the Institute. The TUC General Council took up a corporate subscription and encouraged affiliated unions to do the same.\textsuperscript{100} By 1943, nine TUC associates subscribed to Chatham House and by 1949 the total was twelve.\textsuperscript{101} There were obvious financial benefits for Chatham House in securing the subscriptions of Trade Unions, but the Institute’s eagerness to obtain closer contact with the labour movement must also be considered within the context examined in chapter two. The Institute was seeking to capitalise on what Macadam described as the ‘rapidly increasing interest in international affairs which the War has produced among the organised workers of this country’.\textsuperscript{102}

Astor was particularly keen to secure closer contact with the trade unions in order that the Institute might reach a larger audience. In 1943, Astor made enquiries with Walter Citrine, the General Secretary of the TUC, as to how to attract young trade unionists and with John Price of the Transport and General Workers Union (and member of the Chatham House Council) as to whom he suggested among Labour MPs should be considered for membership


\textsuperscript{100} TUC Mss: MSS 292/908.1/1: Extract from the Minutes of the International Committee, 27 Oct 1942.

\textsuperscript{101} TUC Mss: MSS 292/908.1/1: W. Astor to W. Citrine, 22 Dec 1943 (attachment); MSS 292/908.1/2: J. Westley to V. Tewson, 4 Aug 1949 (attachment).

\textsuperscript{102} TUC Mss: MSS 292/908.1/1: I. Macadam to W. Citrine, 6 May 1942.
of the Council in order to provide balance against the existing three Conservative MPs. In 1946 when discussing his successor as chairman, Astor did not recommend a member of the labour movement as such, at least not one who was very welcome within it. He recommended either the former National Labour MP, Malcolm MacDonald or the future chairman of UNA Ronald Adam. (Astor may well have deemed Adam suitable due to his hopes for Chatham House’s educational activities and Adam’s close involvement with ABCA). However, Astor did want a Labour MP or trade unionist to be Vice-Chairman. The next Vice-Chairman was actually Astor himself who was asked to take on the post once he felt obliged to resign his position as Chairman in 1949 for health reasons. A year later when he felt he ought to resign from the Council altogether, he again made it known that he preferred the Vice-Chairman be someone from the labour movement and recommended Citrine over the ultimately successful candidate Ian Jacob, the Director of the BBC Overseas Service. Nevertheless, in 1952, the year Astor died, Jacob shared his position of Vice-Chairman with a Labour MP, Kenneth Younger.

The relationship between the Labour Party and Chatham House also improved during the Second World War through the work of Toynbee’s FRPS. The failure of the League of Nations to prevent the war had essentially deprived Labour of a foreign policy. During the war, senior Labourites pushed the party through a transitory phase, moving from what Ray Douglas refers to as a ‘Whig’ internationalism of the likes of Philip Noel-Baker to the muscular internationalism of Ernest Bevin. The transition fragmented Labour’s commitment to national self-determination and its contentment with the existence of small states. In its place was a paternalistic faith in the large powers to keep the peace.

104 Astor Mss: MS 1066/1/561: W. Astor to C. Jones, 4 Apr 1946.
Chatham House played an important role in that transition and in providing the Labour Party with a foreign policy. Unsure of what internationalist principles would look like after the war, Labour ministers pressured their coalition colleagues from the onset of Churchill’s administration in 1940 to address the issue of war aims as a matter of urgency. In the face of significant resistance from the Prime Minister and other senior Conservative ministers, it is probable that without Labour’s intervention that no serious examination would have been conducted before 1942. However, the Labour Party was not the originator of ideas for British policy planning for the postwar world order, rather it facilitated and nurtured them. The process of coming up with the ideas themselves were left to others and, in particular, the FRPS. What would result were the British specifications for what would become the UN.\textsuperscript{107} Eventually, not without reservations, Churchill consented to the establishment of the Cabinet Committee on War Aims, chaired by Attlee. The committee also included the current and future foreign secretaries Lord Halifax and Ernest Bevin. During the Battle of Britain, Toynbee was asked to draw up a statement on war aims which was deliberated over at its second meeting – at which Toynbee was present. It was both Bevin and Attlee who seized upon Toynbee’s statement. While Bevin derived from it the importance of international economic cooperation, Attlee understood that ‘a satisfactory society of nations’ could only be established upon a consensus among nations that accepted ‘certain fundamental principles of liberty for their subjects’ and ‘a certain minimum surrender of sovereignty’. Attlee went further suggesting that the matter be dealt with on the following lines:

\begin{quote}
First, there are certain fundamentals which, in our view, are essential for human life. Secondly, to secure these fundamentals involves certain principles, or conditions. Thirdly, certain political machinery is necessary to give effect to those principles.\textsuperscript{108}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{108} TNA: Cabinet Office Archives: CAB 117/2: Cabinet War Aims Committee Minutes, 31 Oct 1940.
Attlee had derived from Toynbee’s statement – albeit vaguely – the importance of institutionalising what would become known as human rights. Toynbee’s statement was one of very few wartime official papers that dealt with human rights.\(^{109}\) The committee eventually agreed upon a paper drafted by Toynbee and Halifax recommending that the British Commonwealth ‘become the bridge of greater world unity’ between large and small powers. It was hoped that the document would form the basis of a Christmas or New Year broadcast made by Churchill. The Prime Minister, however, dismissed the document for resembling ‘the Sermon on the Mount and the remainder an election address’. Given Churchill’s opposition, the War Aims Committee no longer convened and in January 1941 its remit became that of a newly formed Committee on Reconstruction Problems chaired by the Labour Minister without Portfolio, Arthur Greenwood. However, most Conservative ministers gave their seats to civil servants from their respective departments; it was a significant downgrade from the ministerial committee that preceded it. Attlee could only urge Eden to utilise the FRPS in drawing up plans for the postwar order. Toynbee did continue to produce significant memoranda that met the approval of Attlee and were combined into a draft entitled ‘British-American World Order’ in June 1941 that would later influence Britain’s UN policy and, indeed, the Labour Party’s foreign policy.\(^{110}\)

Ray Douglas notes that Attlee’s decision to enlist Toynbee’s FRPS was a ‘natural one’. In part this was due to the aforementioned connections that Chatham House had been building with the party during the interwar period, but also it was due to the Institute’s independence from both government and the political parties.\(^{111}\) The intense foreign policy debates of the 1930s were still fresh and were made fresher still by the Left Book Club’s recent polemic *Guilty Men* published in July 1940, denouncing the Conservative dominated

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National Government. Among the fifteen strong *Guilty Men* ‘Cast’ were Halifax and Howard Kingsley Wood, both members of the War Aims Committee.\(^{112}\) That the current cadre of civil servants were responsible for the Hoare-Laval Pact and the Munich Agreement, as Douglas notes, may also have influenced Attlee’s decision to enlist Toynbee. Furthermore, at its peak the FRPS contained 177 specialists in foreign affairs.\(^{113}\) Transport House could not compete. Chatham House’s intake of members from the labour movement appears to have benefited from the contacts nurtured during the Second World War through the FRPS/FORD and the overtures made from St. James’s Square. Ten of the 24 Labour MPs who were members of the Institute in 1946 joined after 1939.\(^{114}\)

The Labour Party continued to utilise the facilities of Chatham House after the war. In 1952, the same year Younger was made Vice-Chairman, the party became a corporate subscriber. In the 1950s its nominated members included Barbara Castle, Herbert Morrison, Hugh Dalton, Arthur Greenwood and the long-serving Party Secretary Morgan Phillips.\(^{115}\) In 1956, Aneurin Bevan was made one of the nominees and informed Phillips that he was ‘delighted’, deeming Chatham House’s facilities to be ‘very valuable indeed’.\(^{116}\) It was during Labour’s time in opposition that its international department made the greatest use of Chatham House. In large part this is attributable to Denis Healey holding the post of International Secretary between 1945 and 1957. In 1948, the year before Attlee addressed the Institute’s thirtieth anniversary banquet, Healey was co-opted to the Chatham House Council.\(^{117}\) He remained an active member until he became the Secretary of State for Defence in 1964. In his memoirs, Healey, if a little derogatory of Toynbee’s ‘Anglo-Spenglerism’, referred to the Institute as ‘a major source of my education in world affairs, since it enabled

\(^{112}\) ‘CATO’, *Guilty Men* (London, 1940).
\(^{114}\) CHA: 1/4: ‘List of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs’, Nov 1946.
me to meet people with a knowledge and experience far removed from what was available to me in my work for the Labour Party'. 118 He made use of its publications too. Over an eighteen month period in the mid-1950s, Healey ordered 28 Chatham House publications for the International Department. 119

Of course not all politicians or indeed international secretaries took such an academic interest in international affairs as the Oxford double-first graduate who co-founded the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 1958. Indeed, Healey’s academic tendencies could leave his colleagues uninspired. The firebrand Leader of the House of Commons Richard Crossman imagined that Healey’s introduction to a debate in 1967 over an amendment to the previous year’s controversial Defence Review would have pleased IISS members, but ‘it left our back-benchers sitting solemn, listless and bored’. 120 Nevertheless, David Ennals, Healey’s successor as International Secretary in 1957, was also involved with Chatham House and was co-opted to its Election Committee in 1960. 121 However, while Ennals held office, Labour’s National Executive Committee voted to reduce the Chatham House corporate subscription from £250 to £75 and thus cut the number of nominated members from six to three. 122 Of course, this did not necessarily reflect on the value that Ennals himself attached to the Institute. What is more certifiable is that more senior members of the Labour Party attached wavering value to the International Department – and indeed the research done by other quarters of Transport House. Ennals objected to Phillips in 1959 that the heads of departments rarely met, preventing them from discussing the work of Transport

119 LPA: LP/ID/B104: D. Healey to RIIA Accounts Department, 13 Jan 1955; D. Healey to J. Westley, 4 Feb 1955; D. Healey to J. Westley, 30 Jun 1955; D. Healey to J. Westley, 26 Aug 1955; D. Healey to J. Westley, 14 Nov 1955; D. Healey to J. Westley, 16 Mar 1956; D. Healey to J. Westley, 18 May 1956; D. Healey to J. Westley, 28 Jun 1956; I. Campbell to RIIA Publications Department, 16 Aug 1956; D. Healey to RIIA Publications Department 22 Jun 1956.
House as a whole and from sharing ideas. In 1969, the then International Secretary, Tom McNally was asked to simply “okay” a section on overseas affairs in the handbook for Labour candidates, which he had only just seen at the page proof stage. McNally disliked the section and thus felt unable to approve and rewrote it. Tellingly, however, he noted that he would have much preferred the handbook to only highlight domestic achievements. Subsequently, it did not necessarily follow that the utility of Chatham House to the International Department led to other sections of the party indirectly benefiting from the Institute’s expertise.

Nonetheless, figure 4.8 reveals that more Labour MPs and peers (41%) brought up Chatham House within a parliamentary debate than any other party. Moreover, the references made were frequently positive. Typically, as with members of all parties, Chatham House publications, or speakers at conferences or lectures organised by Chatham House were referred to lend authority to politicians’ arguments. For instance, in 1958 the Labour MP James Johnson emphasised the intellectual weight and impartiality of the Institute when referring to a book by Chatham House’s Phillip Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma* (1958), about Rhodesia to support his argument (and Mason’s) that European settlers must make concessions to the indigenous population: ‘This is Phillip Mason of Chatham House, not [Northern Rhodesian and Zambian nationalist] Harry Nkumbula of the Illa [people], who is speaking.’ Occasionally critical references were made about individual publications, but within this period, Hansard contains no significant critiques directed at the Institute itself. In 1956 Labour MP Harold Davies wryly described a publication produced by a Chatham House study group entitled *Defence in the Cold War* (1950) to the Commons as a ‘very erudite

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125 HC Deb, 27 November 1958, Vol.596 c.598.
Figure 4.7. Party affiliation of MPs or peers who first mentioned Chatham House within a parliamentary debate, 1945-1975.

Figure 4.8. Party affiliation of MPs or peers who first mentioned UNA within a parliamentary debate, 1945-1975.
document’ that ‘tells us that the atom bomb is a myth, and that we must not create fear of it’. Yet in 1972, then a peer, Davies was clearly still engaged with Chatham House’s activities and praised the attention given by the Institute to South American affairs.

However, as figure 4.9 shows, the period in which Labour MPs and peers made the most references to Chatham House in parliament was when it was in Opposition in the 1950s and early 1960s. The number of mentions dramatically reduced when Labour was in government in the 1960s, largely explaining the limited mentions within Hansard in these years shown in figure 4.3.

The pattern can be attributed to the intensity of the foreign policy debate within the Labour Party during its thirteen years in opposition, but, of course, also to the absence of a civil service. When Labour returned to Whitehall, its members would have been considerably less inclined to use alternative – potentially conflicting – sources of information. Nevertheless, when Labour returned to the Opposition benches, the pattern was not continued, at least not as dramatically. Given that this correlates with a decline in the use of Chatham House by the International Department in the 1960s, it suggests that Chatham House had a smaller impact on Labour thinking than it had in the 1940s and 1950s. It could also have been precipitate of a general disinclination to discuss international affairs, as Tom McNally demonstrated when faced with the handbook for candidates in 1969. As Labour Party attitudes towards European integration during the 1970s showed, foreign policy debate could be embarrassingly divisive.

On the question of Europe there was an obvious ideological divide between many within the Labour Party and the senior members of Chatham House. Although it should be

126 HC Deb, 23 July 1956, vol. 557 c.120.
Figure 4.9. Number of mentions of Chatham House in parliament by party and government, 1945-1975.

stressed that the Institute was precluded from possessing corporate opinion, its leaders from Curtis to Shonfield were strongly in favour of a political union of Europe that included Britain. In *World Revolution in the Cause of Peace* (1949) Curtis condemned Dalton and others within the Labour Party ‘who seemed to think that socialism was of greater importance than peace’. The pamphlet had been written soon after the Hague Congress in 1948 to which the Labour leadership had refused to send a delegation and had agreed with other socialist parties within Europe that they should all boycott the conference. Ultimately, however, other socialist parties ignored the boycott. Forty-one Labour MPs published their intention to attend, but following a stern circular from Party Chairman Morgan Phillips informing MPs that ‘[w]e are not a coalition party’ and reminding them of an NEC resolution declaring that any association with the Congress would only ‘serve the interests of the British Conservative Party’, only 27 Labour MPs eventually attended. Political and ideological rivalries prevented Curtis from seeing Britain join the European project in his life time.

Younger became far less ambivalent and far more favourable toward Britain joining Europe between the time of writing a pamphlet for the Fabian Society entitled *Britain’s Role in a Changing World* in 1960 and producing *Changing Perspectives in British Foreign Policy* for Chatham House in 1964. The view he expressed in May 1962 to the alarm of the Colonial Office, noted in chapter three, that Britain had to choose between Europe and the Commonwealth – to which he preferred the former having written off the latter – was at odds with Gaitskell’s conference speech in October, which denounced accession to the EEC on the

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grounds that it would damage the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{131} Younger’s successor Andrew Shonfield also strongly supported European integration amid Labour’s hostility in the early 1970s. Shonfield’s support was based, naturally as an economist, upon international economics. Recognising a rapidly developing international political economy, Shonfield felt that the ‘Community politics’ of the EEC was far superior for improving international economic relations than the ‘alliance politics’ of organisations such as the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation and the International Monetary Fund. ‘International pressure’, he wrote in 1976, ‘can often be brought to bear most effectively on a nation by a group of intimate partners who are deeply committed with it to other common enterprises.’\textsuperscript{132}

In 1976, after the recent referendum in which British public opinion approved EEC membership, Chatham House arranged a trilateral discussion between it, the Foreign Office’s Planning Staff and Transport House to examine Labour foreign policy outlined in \textit{Labour’s Programme} (1976). Shonfield, who chaired the meeting, wished to start with the chapter on European community, but the issue was dodged by the Labour team who took up most of the meeting discussing vaguer foreign policy aims, much to the irritation of the Foreign Office officials. When eventually Europe was briefly discussed, Shonfield expressed his disappointment ‘to find so little...to indicate that the Labour Party intended that Britain should contribute something to the Community or had an interest in its success rather than just taking out all we could get’.\textsuperscript{133} It represented an ideological schism between many within the labour movement and Chatham House. The solution endorsed by leading members of Chatham


House for growing economic interdependence and the negative aspects of globalisation (including social injustice) was stronger political and economic integration. Labour’s infighting was hindering that. The fact, however, that members of the Labour Party thought it profitable to use Chatham House as a sounding board for its policies in 1976 as it used the FRPS during the Second World War, suggests that the party still attributed significant value to the Institute.

The policy of muscular internationalism adopted by the Labour Party during the Second World War and after, personified by Bevin, did not bode well for UNA. As outlined in chapter three, Bevin was much more reluctant to engage with UNA rallies than his civil servants would have liked. Bevin confided in UNA chairman Lord Lytton in 1946 that when he did speak about the UN in public he had meant only to ‘ventilate’ the subject. He confessed that he had no clear idea as to how world government was to be achieved, especially not in his lifetime, but thought that the younger generation should begin to think about it; ‘[t]hat was all he had in mind.’\(^\text{134}\) In an uncirculated personal memorandum written in 1945, Bevin predicted that instead of world cooperation overseen by the UN, ‘we are rapidly drifting into spheres of influence on what can be better described as three great Monroes’\(^\text{135}\). In colonial affairs, not unlike their Conservative counterparts, Labour policymakers recognised that they were obliged by the UN Charter to develop self-government and economic, social and educational conditions in non-self-governing territories. But the responsibility for doing so was perceived to properly belong to the administrative power, not from any UN initiative. Instead the UN’s role in colonial matters was understood to be simply one of preventing abuses.\(^\text{136}\)

Neither did Labour possess a grand timetable for decolonisation. In 1945 Bevin and Dalton even had designs to expand the empire by seeking trusteeship of the former Italian colonies Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, but were vetoed by probably the greatest proponent of the UN within the Cabinet, Attlee. Even those on the Left of the party, such as Michael Foot, assumed that Britain’s world power status – founded upon its empire – enabled the creation of a welfare state. Those within the party who believed that there were significant gains to be had in maintaining the Empire became dominant after 1945. UN interest in British colonial affairs was thus only too often unwelcome.\textsuperscript{137} Just as the labour movement was influenced by liberal internationalism, so it was by liberal imperialism.\textsuperscript{138}

Nevertheless, affiliation with UN goals was considered to be a useful electoral weapon. Hence the aforementioned attendance of senior members of the Labour Party at UNA rallies in the late 1940s and early 1950s. A common theme of Labour foreign policy campaigns was that the Conservatives had betrayed the League of Nations and that the “guilty men” should not be forgotten.\textsuperscript{139} The perceived utility of support for the UN, however, was not confined to the immediate postwar years. As Labour attempted to end its years in opposition, the UN played a central role in its proposed foreign policy. Not without significance was the selection of the successor to Denis Healey’s role of International Secretary in 1957. David Ennals was chosen for the role in light of his success at raising the profile of UNA as its Secretary since 1952.\textsuperscript{140} It also followed Ennals’s spearheading of UNA’s condemnation of Eden’s Suez policy. The basis of the Labour Party’s own censure of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt was similarly centred on Eden’s failure to secure the

\textsuperscript{137} Douglas, \textit{The Labour Party}, 176-177, 193; D. Sassoon, \textit{One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century} (London, 1997), 176.
\textsuperscript{138} See Douglas, \textit{The Labour Party}, esp. 16.
\textsuperscript{139} Douglas, \textit{The Labour Party}, 141-142.
support of the UN beforehand. That UNA – an all-party organisation of which the Prime Minister was an Honorary President – had denounced the Conservative government for violating the UN Charter, was a point seized upon by Labour MPs in the Commons.\footnote{See HC Deb, 6 Nov 1956 vol. 560 c.46 (F. Blackburn); HC Deb, 8 Nov 1956 vol.560 c.277 (K. Younger).}

Operating as ‘almost a one-man band’ due to the limited resources of the party, Ennals was the principal source for professional advice on foreign policy before the party regained power in 1964. He was responsible for the brief space allotted to international affairs in the manual for Labour candidates before the election, Twelve Wasted Years (1963).\footnote{Glennerster, ‘Ennals, David Hedley, Baron Ennals’.} Unsurprisingly, Ennals devoted an entire chapter to the UN that was largely concerned with spelling out the perceived differences between Conservative and Labour UN policy. In this, Alec Douglas-Home, the Foreign Secretary, gifted Ennals with a speech he made to UNA’s Berwick-on-Tweed branch in December 1961. Home announced his concern that the UN was diverging from its original and principal purpose of ridding the world of war, largely as a result of differing aims shared by the 51 founder members and the 53 newly independent nations. Home alleged that a large number of the latter were putting their campaign for acceleration of independence for colonial territories before the main purpose of the Charter which is to provide peace and security. They are more concerned to impose their views on “colonialism” on others than to fulfil their primary duty which is to “harmonise the actions of nations”...Unwittingly they play the Communists’ game.\footnote{‘Lord Home’s Speech’, United Nations News, Apr-Jun 1962, 3.}

Ennals used the gift to good effect. In Twelve Wasted Years, he accused the Conservatives of being ‘fair weather friends of the UN’; of only being happy to support it when the UN was not challenging what Conservatives perceived to be British interests.

Ennals disagreed with Home over the new member states. He felt – similarly to UNA – that they had in fact ‘brought new strength’ to the UN in helping to stabilise the world in the face
of the Cold War from which many were neutral and thus prepared to condemn acts by either side, be it Soviet suppression in Hungary or British and French aggression in Egypt. On the latter, when Home charged the UN with ‘falling away from the principles of the Charter’, Ennals highlighted the hypocrisy given that the Foreign Secretary had been in the Cabinet during the Suez Crisis. Neither did Ennals neglect to remind Labour candidates that Home was an adviser to Neville Chamberlain at Munich. However, Ennals should not be considered as some sort of UNA double-agent serving behind enemy lines at Transport House. When Wilson agreed to receive a UNA deputation in November 1963, UNA asked Ennals to join them. The concept seemed ‘rather absurd’ to Ennals and he requested that Wilson allow him to sit on his side and ‘see what performance they put up’. Wilson agreed.

The deputation went well. Wilson informed them of his intention to appoint a senior minister as the permanent representative at the UN; to make a coordinated response to the Development Decade and create a Ministry of Overseas Development; to take an independent line in breaking the deadlock for general disarmament; and he stressed – in the same year as a UN resolution to its effect – the importance of a complete embargo on arms to South Africa. UNA Chairman Nigel Nicolson, a member of the deputation, informed the Executive Committee that they had been ‘received in a most friendly and co-operative way and that there was no point upon which they were in disagreement’. The mood of the meeting contrasted starkly with that of a recent deputation received by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys who was on the defensive and complained that UNA was ‘a little unreasonable’. The deputation had hoped to learn how the Minister intended to proceed after the government raised objections to the UN discussing the question of Southern Rhodesia; it had not intended to meet the minister in order to necessarily criticise

the government.\textsuperscript{146} Six months later, the leaders of the three parties published their respective UN policies on the first page of \textit{New World} in anticipation of the coming election. Wilson spelled out the policies he outlined in November to the UNA delegation. It outshone both Home’s uninspiring statement that the UN should keep solvent and Jo Grimond’s non-specific avowal that the UN had the Liberals’ ‘full and unqualified support’.\textsuperscript{147} Tellingly, it was the last section of the Labour manifesto that was devoted to international affairs, but it pledged that ‘our most important effort will be concerned to revive the morale and increase the powers of the United Nations’.\textsuperscript{148}

As John W. Young observes, and chapter three corroborates, Labour’s commitment to the UN – although stronger than their Conservative counterparts (at least in public) – waned during the Wilson governments between 1964 and 1970. The Overseas Development Ministry was indeed set up in 1964 to coordinate government efforts at international aid. It was headed by Barbara Castle who was provided with a Cabinet seat. However, just thirteen months into her tenure, Castle was promoted to the Ministry of Transport, and her former position ceased to hold Cabinet rank. The position of Minister for Disarmament was also created and filled by Alun Gwynne Jones, recently ennobled as Lord Chalfont. The role of the future Chairman of UNA was to represent Britain at international disarmament negotiations, mostly within the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.\textsuperscript{149} Chalfont’s task started inauspiciously. Healey, now Defence Secretary, ‘almost automatically’ disputed any of Chalfont’s proposals for Britain’s negotiating position in Geneva and ‘seemed nervous that we might make too much progress’. In 1967 Chalfont took charge of the negotiations for

\textsuperscript{146} UNA Mss: UNA/3/1/16: Executive Committee Minutes, 7 Dec 1963.
\textsuperscript{147} ‘Party Leaders Send Messages Supporting the UN to UNA’s General Council’, \textit{New World}, May 1964, 1, in UNA Mss: UNA/25/2/1.
\textsuperscript{148} Dale, \textit{Labour Party General Election Manifestos}, 122.
\textsuperscript{149} Young, \textit{The Labour Governments}, 8-9.
British entry into the EEC and his former position passed to Fred Mulley with a reduced profile.\textsuperscript{150}

Hugh Foot, the permanent representative at the UN, was also newly ennobled in 1964, as Lord Caradon, and given ministerial rank. However, his position in New York was made difficult by the government’s foreign policy, particularly over South Africa. Labour had controversially compromised on its promise to end arms sales to the apartheid regime. Its embargo was significantly stricter than that of the Conservative government, but an order for aircraft made before the UN resolution in 1963 went through early in the administration, because of a fear of the consequences to Britain’s surrounding colonies and the Royal Navy’s use of Simonstown. The existing embargo came under threat in 1967 when Denis Healey, James Callaghan and George Brown pushed to end it in the wake of the devaluation of sterling. Wilson, however, managed to prevent them.\textsuperscript{151} When Heath took office in 1970 the position of permanent representative to the UN was no longer endowed with ministerial rank. Wilson did not reinstate the rank in 1974. Nevertheless, as shown in figure 4.8, 62% of MPs or peers who first mentioned UNA within a parliamentary debate belonged to the Labour Party.

The TUC also did much to support UNA, particularly in its early days. Although the TUC initially rejected affiliation with the LNU in June 1945, after the ratification of the UN Charter the Congress passed a resolution reaffirming ‘its profound belief that Social Justice for all peoples and the guarantee of permanent peace are inter-related, and declares that all citizens have a solemn obligation to acknowledge this indivisibility’. In light of the resolution, the future President of the TUC and future UNA Executive Committee member, Herbert Bullock, proposed the motion for affiliation with the new UNA to ‘fulfil the letter and spirit

\textsuperscript{151} Young, \textit{The Labour Governments}, 167-168.
of the resolution’ in March 1946. It is unclear as to why LNU’s initial request was denied. They may have sensed the lack of permanence of the League or it may have been considered in light of the absence of an explicit commitment to social and economic responsibilities in the League Covenant, unlike the UN Charter. Nonetheless, UNA’s relationship with the TUC was a highly rewarding one. In May 1946 Vincent Tewson, the Assistant General Secretary of the TUC, initiated a tradition whereby he issued a circular to affiliated unions and trade councils encouraging them to support UNA activities at a national and local level. By 1964, 57 of the 84 national organisations affiliated with UNA were trade union bodies.

Moreover, although, as examined earlier, there were trades councils unconvinced of the merits of UNA, there were others, such as the Penrith and District Trades Council who not only got involved with their local UNA branch, but also helped to set them up. In 1946 the Lancaster Trades and Labour Council deemed UNA to be of ‘vital necessity’ and similarly noted their willingness to take the initiative in forming a local branch. Local trades councils proved to be of particular assistance during UN Week. In the first such week, Letchworth Trades Council, which had given ‘the fullest publicity to the principles of UNA so that as many trade unionists as possible would become members’, helped to treble the membership of the local branch. Furthermore, the TUC sent annual circulars inviting affiliates to donate to UNA’s UN Day appeals from the 1950s through to the 1960s. The peak number of donators was reached in 1967 when 76 trade unions and trades councils collectively

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153 TUC Mss: MSS.292/921.9/1: Circular by H.V. Tewson, 23 May 1946.
155 TUC Mss: MSS.292/921.9/1: H.W. Dennison to H.V. Tewson, 19 Nov 1946.
156 TUC Mss: MSS.292/921.9/1: H. Carman to H.V. Tewson, 8 Jun 1946.
157 TUC Mss: MSS.292/921.9/1: J. Collins to Trades Councils Department, 21 Nov 1946.
contributed £847.\textsuperscript{159} However, it is unclear whether the Congress continued to solicit contributions from its affiliates into the 1970s.

Of course, this hardly indicates that UNA had managed to take hold of the trade union movement. Shortly before retiring as UNA’s Director General in 1964, Charles Judd lamented that few trades councils played an active part in the work of UNA branches.\textsuperscript{160} Neither was there always an enthusiastic response to UNA activities within TUC headquarters. In 1954, Tewson feared that there was ‘a real danger of the Association undertaking political pressure group work’. Tewson felt it desirable that it was made clear that the TUC ‘must be master of its own policy’.\textsuperscript{161} A year later, when UNA organised its Citizens’ Enquiry to celebrate the UN’s tenth anniversary, although the TUC found itself in broad agreement with the pamphlet that accompanied it, it raised issues of policy that it felt were within its own province. It did accept, however, that if trades councils in receipt of the questionnaire should ask the TUC for advice as to how to respond, it could not tell them to ‘buzz off’. However, the TUC decided not to circulate copies of the enquiry to its affiliates.\textsuperscript{162}

Furthermore, in 1966 it was even suggested within the TUC’s International Committee that UNA’s main activities were concerned with ‘political questions unrelated to trade union issues’ and that the TUC General Council ought not to be associated with an organisation ‘whose membership was miscellaneous’. The suggestion was rejected by the rest of the Committee and it was pointed out that the main functions of UNA were to promote and maintain interest in the UN which was concerned with wide range of economic and social as well as political matters. A year later, the TUC found that its membership of UNA proved

\textsuperscript{159} TUC Mss: MSS.292B/921.9/1: P. Jowitt to G. Woodcock, 22 Jan 1963. The peak amount raised was reached in 1963 when £1,026 was raised from 21 trade unions and trades councils. See TUC Mss: MSS.292B/921.9/1: P. Jowitt to G. Woodcock, 22 Jan 1963; MSS.292B/921.9/2.

\textsuperscript{160} TUC Mss: MSS.292B/921.9/2: C. Judd to G. Woodcock, 28 Jan 1964.

\textsuperscript{161} TUC Mss: MSS.292/921.9/5: H.V. Tewson to L. Fawcett, 7 Apr 1954.

useful in pointing out an inaccuracy in a motion before UNA’s AGM which was deemed critical of TUC policy in regards to race relations legislation. The ‘offensive part of the motion’ was withdrawn.\textsuperscript{163} Just as with the political wing of the labour movement, there were both pros and cons involved with affiliation. Nonetheless, ultimately their first loyalty was to the labour movement. Unsurprisingly, the same could be said of their rivals.

CONSERVATISM

In the classic 1947 conservative text, \textit{The Case for Conservatism}, Quentin Hogg wrote that ‘Conservatives are neither militants nor pacifists. They reject as equal and opposite heresies the doctrine that might is right, which seems to deny all morality, and the doctrine that right is might, which seems to them to fly in the face of all experience.’\textsuperscript{164} In order for liberal internationalism to gain purchase within conservatism, it had to emphasise its short term prudence rather than its visions for the future that appeared too fanciful to many Conservatives, particularly its rank and file membership.\textsuperscript{165} With regards to European integration and international cooperation more generally, Nicholas Crowson identifies two broad traditions in Conservative conceptions of the balance of power. The first can be illustrated by the thinking of the Locarno Treaty (1925) architect, Austen Chamberlain: Britain could not escape Europe. It had to commit to it and not retreat into isolationism. The tradition was alive in the opponents of appeasement and advocates of Britain joining Europe after the Second World War, such as Churchill, Macmillan and Heath. However, this group was by no means a concrete ally of liberal internationalism. Austen Chamberlain sat on the LNU Executive Committee, but was criticised by his colleagues for regarding the League as a

\textsuperscript{164} Q. Hogg, \textit{The Case for Conservatism} (London, 1947), 42.
mere revival of the old Concert of Europe. This tradition did not share the liberal internationalist penchant for paying precedence to the UN or federalism. Limited pooling of sovereignty and intergovernmental cooperation, however, was acceptable, even prudent.

The liberal internationalists had more to fear though from the tradition that underpinned Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement that held that Britain should avoid continental commitment and focus on empire. After the Second World War, his supporters – such as Somerset de Chair, Robin Turton and Derek Walker-Smith – would oppose Britain’s accession to the EEC and apportion greater priority to the Commonwealth and the Anglo-American relationship. Although Neville did not even regard the League as a revival of the old Concert of Europe like his half-brother, he did appreciate it as a moral force; Somerset de Chair sat on the UNA Executive Committee. For many Conservatives, like another supporter of Neville, Alec Douglas-Home, especially before the UN General Assembly expanded amid decolonisation, the UN was an extension of British institutions and values deemed naturally superior for having stood the test of time and two world wars. Human rights were understood to be more relevant in relation to other countries as, with the exception of some utopian tenets that did not require urgent attention, their collective sentiment were perceived to be in keeping with existing British values. It was this group that most viewed international integration and harmony as fanciful. Worse still for liberal internationalists, this tradition had the greatest purchase among the grassroots conservatism that would later find representation in the form of Margaret Thatcher.166

Nevertheless, Chatham House enjoyed some success in attracting the attention of Conservatives from both traditions. In 1938 Clement Jones confided in Waldorf Astor his wish that they could elect on to the Chatham House Council ‘fewer of those earnest fervent,

high brow, London School of Economics young men & more of the sound young Conservatives’. Conservative sympathies and influence was certainly present within Chatham House; 51% of the MPs who were members in 1946 were Conservative. Of course, Jones was writing to a former Conservative MP. But, as has been detailed, Astor would help to secure a greater balance of political influence from the labour movement. As figure 4.8 shows, only 26% of the MPs or peers who first mentioned Chatham House within a parliamentary debate were Conservative as opposed to 41% who were Labour. This does not mean that Conservatives necessarily utilised the Institute less in the postwar period; MPs and peers were hardly likely to announce all of their reading habits and diary commitments.

Nevertheless, although it is possible to identify potential avenues through which Chatham House could influence the Conservative Party – and vice versa – it is much more difficult on the strength of the evidence available to establish the overall significance of said avenues.

One of these avenues was R.A. Butler, the postwar ‘philosopher-in-chief’ of the Conservative Party. Butler belonged to the Neville Chamberlain tradition. He, like Douglas-Home, would be a somewhat half-hearted European. Nevertheless, he certainly identified the utility of Chatham House, if not for its advocacy of international integration.

Butler played a significant role in establishing the credibility of the FRPS within Whitehall. In 1941, in the face of parliamentary pressure to justify its expenditure, Eden enlisted Butler, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to undertake an enquiry into FRPS

167 Astor Mss: MS 1066/1/546: C. Jones to W. Astor, 17 Oct 1938. Jones was hoping that Patrick Heathcoat-Amory, Conservative candidate for the Bridgwater by-election, would succeed so that he might be invited to join the Council. In the event he was unsuccessful. The Bridgwater by-election was one of a series of by-elections that were considered by many contemporaries to be a public judgement upon the Munich Agreement. See N.J. Crowson, Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the European Dictators, 1935-40 (Abingdon, 1997), 113.


activities. Butler reported back that the work of the FRPS was of ‘a high quality’. It complemented its staff and its *Review of the Foreign Press*, and stated that ‘this reservoir of knowledge should be better known and more freely utilised by the Foreign Office’.

Furthermore, Butler pressed that greater use of the FRPS should be made throughout Whitehall, including Arthur Greenwood’s aforementioned committee on peace aims. Greenwood duly made it known his plan ‘to make considerable use of the services of Chatham House as regards reconstruction problems in the international field’. It is evident too that Butler saw utility in making use of the services of Chatham House with regard to determining Conservative postwar policy. In 1941, Butler was made chairman of the Conservative Party’s Post-War Problems Central Committee that largely filled the vacuum left by the closure of the Conservative Research Department at the outbreak of war. Butler was keen to involve ‘figures who, though in general sympathy with the party faith, are not of the machine’. Academics were thus largely employed; in addition to himself only three other representatives from Westminster sat on the committee. One of the academics Butler recruited was the head of the FRPS, Toynbee.

Among the papers submitted to Butler, were one authored by an FRPS sub-committee and another that was a statement of Toynbee’s personal opinion. The first was that which had met Attlee’s approval, the FRPS’s ‘British-American World Order’. The second, authored by Toynbee, accompanied the first and was entitled, ‘The Oceanic versus the Continental Road to World Organisation’. In the first paper it was noted that ‘peace and economic welfare can

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170 For examples of parliamentary pressure, see HC Deb, 7 Feb 1940, vol.357, cc.245-94; HC Deb, 10 Apr 1940, vol.359, cc.546-7; HC Deb, 21 Aug 1940, vol.364, cc.1279-80.
171 TNA: Cabinet Office Archives: CAB 17/77: Minute by R.A. Butler, 8 Feb 1941. The minute is attached to a letter by R.A. Butler to A. Greenwood, 11 Feb 1941. See also B. Wheatley, ‘The Foreign Research and Press Service: Britain’s Primary Source of Intelligence from the German-occupied Baltic States during the Second World War’, *Intelligence and National Security*, 28:5 (2013), 658-659.
172 TNA: Cabinet Office Archives: CAB 17/77: T. Daish to G.W. Harrison, 13 Feb 1941.
174 R.A. Butler quoted in Howard, *RAB*, 142.
175 Howard, *RAB*, 142.
only be maintained if the world achieves a much greater measure of political unification, commensurate with the economic unification which has already come about’. Chatham House recognised globalisation. The resultant need for political unification, the paper argued, could be met in two ways: ‘by the establishment of some form of constitutional world-order, in which all nations would collaborate for the common benefit; or by the establishment of a world tyranny, in which world-unity would be imposed and maintained by force’. Of course, the latter, was Hitler’s solution. The FRPS’s solution was the former established under the auspices of an Anglo-Saxon bloc, what Toynbee referred to in ‘The Oceanic versus the Continental Road to World Organisation’ as ‘Pax Americano-Britannica’. In ‘British-American World Order’, doubt was cast upon the possibility of a federal union of the USA and Britain, but instead recommended as a practicable course, ‘mixing up’ through ad hoc agreements. The paper suggested something that would have a strong resemblance with the soon-to-be established NATO: the setting up of joint naval and air bases and ‘machinery along the lines of the present U.S.-Canadian Joint Defence Board’. Crucially, however, both papers recognised that such an order could not rely on strategic means alone. ‘British-American World Order’ recommended that there ‘might also be joint arrangements for world-wide economic reconstruction, for the control of the trade-cycle, and for the promotion of material welfare and social security especially in industrially backward countries’.176 Toynbee and the FRPS were advocating international development agencies and Keynesian macro-economics on a global scale; what would become the UN agencies and the Bretton Woods system.

While Attlee was interested in FRPS work in terms of international politics, Butler’s interest, appeared to have been mostly concerned with international economics. Butler’s

deliberations had a significant impact upon postwar Conservative policy. After Labour’s electoral victory in 1945, Churchill appointed Butler chairman of the revived Conservative Research Department. It was from this position that Butler – whose political hero had always been Robert Peel – helped to successfully reconcile the Conservative Party to a mixed economy, culminating in the Industrial Charter in 1947 ‘the most memorable concession a free enterprise Party ever made to the spirit of Keynesian economics’.\footnote{Howard, RAB, 149-155.} It would be inaccurate to say the least to solely credit Chatham House with this turnaround. For example, months before the production of the two FRPS papers, Butler recognised that the role of gold – that would later be much constrained under the Bretton Woods system – was ‘the great problem between ourselves and America’. Butler thus sought greater education on the topic and received advice from none other than Keynes himself.\footnote{CPA: CRD 2/28/2: R.A. Butler to F. Ashton-Gwatkin, 6 Apr 1941; J.M. Keynes to F. Ashton-Gwatkin, 25 Apr 1941.} Nevertheless, much of the deliberations of Butler’s committee on postwar problems were in line with Chatham House thinking and there were other correspondents who were close to the Institute, including the middleman between Butler and Keynes, Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, the Foreign Office official who contributed towards Eden’s reforms of the department in 1944. Ashton-Gwatkin was part of the Chatham House Council and on leaving the Foreign Office in 1947 became the Associate Director of Studies at Chatham House under Toynbee.\footnote{K. Hamilton, ‘Gwatkin, Frank Trelawny Arthur Ashton- (1889–1976)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2008, \url{http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/64923} (accessed 25 Nov 2014).} His own notes to Butler on foreign policy correlated with the concerns of those at Chatham House who called for greater education of the public in international affairs. ‘Statesmen (who should have known better)’, Ashton-Gwatkin argued, ‘have given way to popular misconceptions of policy in order to get votes...The only cure (other than Hitler’s method of suppressing democracy) is to
educate it so that it will demand the right policy of its rulers instead of the wrong one.\textsuperscript{180} In 1944, at a meeting of the Chatham House Council, it was Ashton-Gwatkin who seconded the resolution to form the planning committee that deliberated on the future of the Institute, with particular regard to its educational activities.\textsuperscript{181} Furthermore, one note made in relation to Conservative postwar planning, whose author is alas unclear, was positively Greenian in their denunciation of laissez faire economics, albeit with a conservative twist: ‘In the sphere of social relationships, it acted as a great emancipator but also as a great annihilator of traditional values. It broke down social cohesion & produced an “atomised” society.’\textsuperscript{182} These were people that Chatham House could do business with.

However, the extent to which the Conservative Research Department utilised the services of Chatham House after the war – despite being a corporate subscriber – is unclear from the party’s archives. While Butler attempted to remake the Conservative Party, it is probable that he left international thought to Churchill who took to the international stage during the party’s time in opposition.\textsuperscript{183} However, Churchill was hardly prone to intellectualising. His assertion that Britain should situate itself at the centre of three interlocking circles – the English speaking world, Europe and the commonwealth – was good rhetoric, but it invited scepticism in International Affairs and later, as chapter three details, from Kenneth Younger.\textsuperscript{184} It was also noted in International Affairs that Churchill’s zeal for the promotion of European unity did not extend to federalism.\textsuperscript{185} Nevertheless, Churchill was a patron and active user of the Institute. Indeed, his membership in 1931 resulted from a

\textsuperscript{181} CHA: 2/1/9b: ‘Extract from the Minutes of Council Meeting, 19 Apr 1944’.
\textsuperscript{182} CPA: CRD 2/28/2: Untitled handwritten note begins, ‘Our system of democracy & indeed the whole idea of democracy...’, undated.
\textsuperscript{183} See Crowson, The Conservative Party and European Integration, 14-15.
request by Macadam in respect of his ‘considerable use’. After the war, he requested at least ten items from the Information Department pertaining to events in the 1930s that were likely used for the purpose of informing his first volume of his history of the Second World War, *The Gathering Storm* (1948).  

However, there is little to indicate that the Conservative Party used Chatham House’s services at an organisational level. For instance, before Labour’s 1967 application to the EEC, a Policy Research Committee on Europe was set up, but unlike Butler’s committee in 1941 it solely consisted of MPs and its interests were distinctly party political. When the suggestion was made that the committee should include the Conservative Europhile Ursula Branston, it was dismissed as there were doubts that she would be able to aid with ‘day-to-day Parliamentary affairs’ given that she lived away from London.  

There appears to have been little desire for academic reports from bodies such as Chatham House.

Similarly, with regard to UNA, the Party was eager that its members were provided with a clear Conservative message on matters of foreign policy unsullied by external cogitations. In 1955, when UNA issued its Citizens’ Enquiry, a bulletin was issued from Central Office to party agents advising:

> that those who are studying these subjects should do so and should say that they prefer to do so on the basis of Conservative publications and as part of Conservative activities. All agents will appreciate that in our dealings with U.N.A. we must be most careful and tactful.

The Party’s wariness of the Enquiry may have been informed by their experience of a precedent, the 1934/35 Peace Ballot. Then a debate ensued over the information that accompanied the questionnaires, which many within the party – but certainly not all – merely

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considered to be socialist propaganda. Subsequently, the Conservative Party refused to cooperate with the ballot. It proved to be a serious political miscalculation that only encouraged many to get involved and helped Labour to paint the Conservatives as opponents of the League.\(^{189}\) Opposition within the Party towards the LNU was exacerbated in 1936 when the LNU formally associated itself with the International Peace Campaign (IPC), which aimed to coordinate the work of peace organisations across Europe. The body was perceived by many – not necessarily inaccurately – to be run by communists. Association with the IPC ‘fatally undermined’ the LNU’s all party model; it served to alienate not only Conservatives, but also a number within the labour movement.\(^{190}\) However, by the 1940s the Conservative Party, fearing past political retribution, had learned its lesson and its approach to UNA was more conciliatory. In 1955, the Conservative Party did not boycott the Citizens’ Enquiry.

Nonetheless, Conservative anxiety over the extent to which UNA was infiltrated by the Left remained a persistent concern, and just as UNA attempted to influence Conservatives, so too did they try to influence them. ‘There is a strong communist influence at work in U.N.A.’, wrote the Vice-Chair of the Conservative Party Organisation Marjorie Maxse in a circular to constituency agents in 1948, ‘which we are fighting back’. The circular encouraged agents to obtain an undertaking from their respective UNA regional headquarters that when an impending visit of a speaker at a UNA branch was announced that he or she was ‘not a Communist and will not put forward communist or extreme left views’.\(^{191}\) It followed a controversial debate within UNA Executive Committee as to whether communist organisations should be allowed to be affiliates. In April 1948, it was resolved that they should not be, but Maxse, a member of the Committee herself, perceived that nonetheless the

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\(^{190}\) McCarthy, \textit{The British People and the League of Nations}, 223-224.

\(^{191}\) CPA: CCO 3/1/89: Circular by M. Maxse, 13 Jul 1948.
executive was now split into two factions ‘with moderate Labour and Conservatives on one side and Liberals and Communists on the other’. Maxse believed that communists had captured both the CEWC and UNSA and complained about the ‘unending stream of communist speakers to the branches’.\(^\text{192}\) Her hyperbolic concerns were symptomatic of widespread anxieties within the Conservative Party over communist infiltration in British institutions. As a result of a resolution passed at the 1947 party conference calling for greater publicity of ‘subversive and undemocratic activity in this country, whether Communist or Fascist’, a committee was set up that reported on the prevalence of alleged fellow-travellers in key positions. In order to combat their influence, the report recommended that Conservatives ‘play a vigorous part in the various organisations which purport to be non-party but which Communists make every effort to control’.\(^\text{193}\)

Maxse sought to do just that. A year later, when the former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Richard Law made his intention known to step down from UNA Executive Committee, Maxse soon sought another Conservative MP to replace him. Law resigned owing to an increased workload but also told Maxse that he had ‘not a very great deal of sympathy with the body itself’.\(^\text{194}\) His former reason, and quite plausibly the latter, also prevented a number of other Conservative MPs from taking up the post. Tufton Beamish, Maxse’s first choice, originally agreed, believing that the ‘U.N.A. is something which ought to be penetrated in a big way in order to keep it on the straight and narrow’.\(^\text{195}\) However, he had to retract his offer on further consideration due to a timetable clash.\(^\text{196}\) Requests were sent to

\(^{193}\) CPA: CCO 3/1/89: ‘Report by the Chairman of the Committee on Communist and Fascist Activities to the Executive Committee’, 8 Jul 1948.
\(^{195}\) CPA: CCO 3/1/89: T. Beamish to M. Maxse, 10 Mar 1949.
three other MPs, but none accepted. No replacement was found in the form of an MP, but nonetheless, a certain future MP Christopher Woodhouse became a member of UNA Executive Committee that year. The following year in 1950 Woodhouse was joined by leading Conservative MPs; one of whom belonged to the Austen Chamberlain tradition, Duncan Sandys, and another who belonged to the Neville Chamberlain tradition, Somerset de Chair.

Maxse also saw votes in UNA. In 1950, election year, Maxse encouraged Conservative candidates to take part in UNA all-party meetings, fearing that non-attendance would put their opponents at ‘a very advantageous position’. A document complete with suggested replies to UNA’s election questionnaire was circulated, with the positive responses desired from UNA with few qualifications. Naturally, the opportunity was not lost to align Conservative policy with that of UNA. In June, Maxse hoped to ‘cash-in on U.N.A. and its adherents’ in light of the Labour’s Government’s ‘incredible foreign policy statement’. This was likely a reference to the government’s refusal to endorse the Schuman Plan that was made all the more controversial by the simultaneous publication of the Labour Party pamphlet *European Unity* authored by Denis Healey and Hugh Dalton which asserted that both the USA and the Commonwealth were the principal partnerships Britain should concern itself with, rather than Europe. Maxse obviously interpreted strong support for European integration within UNA. Given the prevalence of liberal opinion within the Association and that the Schuman Plan proposed a regional association of nations provided by the UN Charter, this is

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197 CPA: CCO 3/1/89: T. Beamish to M. Maxse, 29 Mar 1949; E.H. Keeling to M. Maxse, 25 May 1949; M. Maxse to C.E. Mott-Radciffe, 26 May 1949. The three Conservative MPs who turned down the request to join the UNA Executive Committee, in addition to Tufton Beamish, were Edward Keeling, Alan Lennox-Boyd and Oliver Crosthwaite-Eyre.


not surprising.\textsuperscript{201} Finally, later in the year, Maxse issued a circular advising constituency agents to ‘give as much support as possible’ in connection with UN Day.\textsuperscript{202}

Nevertheless, although the party was actively engaged with the organisation, the Conservative relationship with UNA did not prove to be smooth sailing. In 1952, the Conservative constituency agent for Reigate complained that nearly all of the local UNA branch’s programme could be taken ‘as indirect blows’ at the Conservative Government. Chief among the planned events was a meeting to be addressed by Seretse Khama.\textsuperscript{203} A similar complaint was made in 1955 pertaining to a UNA branch providing no opportunity for exploring the Government’s case for the Central African Federation. Instead the case against the Federation was made in a series of meetings ‘which bordered on a triumphal procession’.\textsuperscript{204} Concerns were also expressed within the Party that year with regard to the Citizen Enquiry. There were fears that it would attract Left-wing organisations answering its questions, in the words of one Conservative agent, ‘in the sense that we should disarm, ban the bomb, give self-government to everybody, give all our money to backward people and form an international army’.\textsuperscript{205}

However, it was the Suez Crisis that would prove the greatest test for the Conservative relationship with UNA. Decades later, David Ennals recounted his time as UNA Secretary during the crisis. He recalled that before Suez UNA had not experienced difficulty in maintaining the support of all parties, but that after an impression emerged among the general public that UNA was ‘somehow on the left, however hard we tried to maintain the political balance’.\textsuperscript{206} Ennals recounted that the crisis resulted in many Conservatives feeling that they


had to resign from UNA. He regretted the resultant loss of several good officers and committee members at both a national and local level. Nevertheless, there was no official call from the Conservative Party on its members to resign from UNA or to boycott its activities, quite the opposite. In November, it was agreed ‘that there should be no question of mass resignations by Conservative MPs’, but guidance was sought from Eden as to a definite course of action.\(^{207}\) Neither did Eden recommend any resignations. Eden may have been deterred from such an action for fear of offending liberal opinion, the same reason he advised Salisbury against resigning over UNA’s protest against the Government in relation to Seretse Khama detailed in chapter two. Such action could also have been more widely interpreted as a change in Conservative policy – and indeed government policy – towards the UN, especially given Eden’s position as President of UNA and as a frequent supporter of its activities. It was also noted there was a variety of opinion within UNA, for instance the Exeter branch had given its full support to the government’s Suez policy.\(^ {208}\) The party did equip Conservative members of UNA with a collation of opinions from supporters of the UN who, nonetheless, sided with the government, including the Bishop of Exeter, Robert Mortimer and indeed Gilbert Murray.\(^ {209}\) Beyond this, Central Office took little action against UNA.

So what was the impact of the Suez Crisis on UNA? No Conservative UNA Presidents or Vice-Presidents resigned. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd spoke at UNA’s annual appeal dinner at Mansion House in 1957.\(^{210}\) There was a decline in total UNA membership between 1956 and 1957, from 62,646 to 59,772. However, although the decline may have been offset by new members who joined UNA as a result of their condemnation of the government, the figures are hardly conducive with a mass Conservative exodus from the organisation. The decline was also attributable to the disrupted branch collection of renewal

\(^{207}\) CPA: CCO 3/5/116: D. Karberry to the Chairman (Oliver Poole), 8 Nov 1956.
\(^{208}\) CPA: CCO 3/5/116: D. Karberry to the Chairman (Oliver Poole), 8 Nov 1956.
subscriptions due to the unprecedented demands placed upon branch officials for the Refugee Campaign that year.\textsuperscript{211}

The damage that the Suez controversy did to UNA’s relationship with Conservatives is not best measured in terms of immediate impact on membership figures. Rather it is better understood in terms of preconceptions of UNA. Following the crisis, the Conservative MP Charles Waterhouse, a Vice-President of UNA, concluded that UNA was ‘marching rapidly in the footsteps of the League of Nations Union’. He was particularly concerned that the documents justifying UNA’s decision to condemn the government included Eden’s name in the header, a result of him being a President. However, more significantly, it is apparent that the absence of UNA’s deference greatly perturbed Waterhouse. He had written to Ennals arguing that it was the ‘duty’ of organisations such as UNA ‘to explain the policy but not to take sides, least of all against their own Government’. Waterhouse reported to a colleague that he received a ‘saucy letter back telling me that magnificent men like Lord Robert Cecil could never be wrong’.\textsuperscript{212} UNA was not just an educational organisation as Waterhouse imagined. It was not like Chatham House, unable to express a corporate opinion. UNA was also a pressure group. To those who were not already in the know, the Suez Crisis lifted the veil.

The reveal made UNA’s relationship with the Conservative Party more difficult because many within the party found themselves at odds with the direction of the UN and the central issues on which UNA campaigned. Ennals asserted that after Suez, Conservative governments attached a lower priority to the UN than that of successive Labour governments. UNA’s central concerns – ‘anti-colonialism, anti-apartheid, disarmament, environment protection, multilateral economic aid and debt relief’ – were mainly issues for the Left.\textsuperscript{213} Of course, Ennals’s analysis was coloured by his party affiliation; members of his own party

\textsuperscript{212} CPA: CCO 3/5/116: C. Waterhouse to O. Poole, 4 Jun 1957.
grew frustrated with the activities of UNA, as noted here and in chapter three. Politicians picked the UNA mission statement that suited them at any one particular time. However, at an ideological level, it was the Conservatives who more often found themselves at loggerheads with the UN and UNA. It was apparent in Douglas-Home’s 1962 Berwick upon Tweed speech in its anxiety that the UN was becoming dominated by newly independent countries in Africa and Asia. It was also to be found in the thought of some Conservatives more intimately attached to UNA. In 1967, Conservative MP and former member of UNA Executive Committee Gilbert Longden was asked to contribute to a meeting of the Watford UNA branch within his constituency to pay tribute to Human Rights Year. The mayor read a note by Longden that stated that although he supported the concept of human rights, it was for other nations to develop and maintain. British institutions were beyond reproach.

We in these Islands have happily no cause to complain that our ‘human rights’ are in jeopardy: in fact I sometimes think that a “Human Duties Year” would be more appropriate for us. But in too many other Countries citizens still have cause to fear each other...It is for their sake that I send my best wishes for the success of Human Rights Year.

Again this exceptionalism applied to British institutions was not exclusive to Conservatism. In the 1955 Citizen’s Enquiry, the TUC’s recommended response to the question on human rights was that ‘without qualification all men and women should enjoy social and economic rights’, but political rights, with an eye to the colonies, were to be granted only when they could be ‘responsibly exercised’.

Nonetheless, the image of UNA became increasingly associated with the Left and the Labour Party. In 1958 the Conservative MP John Hughes-Hallett complained that UNA’s disarmament policy outlined in a UNA campaign – calling upon the government to end the testing of hydrogen bombs and suspend

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the implementation of any agreement for the establishment of missile bases – was identical to
that of Labour’s. Charles Judd insisted that Gaitskell and the TUC had ‘pinched’ the policy
from UNA rather than the other way round. Hughes-Hallett replied that ‘it would be
impossible to convince Conservatives that there had not been some collaboration’. 216

Once again, however, the policy of the party machine in the wake of the Suez Crisis –
careful not to repeat the mistakes made with the LNU – was not to disengage from UNA.
Indeed, it advocated the contrary. Although, Hughes-Hallett was not alone in the Conservative
party in objecting to UNA’s disarmament campaign, the then Party Chairman, Viscount
Hailsham, encouraged Conservatives to engage with UNA activities.

In spite of this experience, or rather because of it, I am most anxious that Conservatives
should not withdraw their support from the Association. On the contrary I feel, and I hope you
will agree, that the true moral is that we should all be stimulated to take a more active part in
its proceedings and thus ensure that the Conservative point of view is able to exercise a more
effective influence. 217

In 1960, Central Office was pleased to secure both Hughes-Hallett and a returning
Woodhouse on UNA Executive Committee who promised to play an active part. 218 Figure 4.2
shows that the greatest balance between Labour and Conservative MPs on the committee was
achieved in the early 1960s. Central Office also sought to take advantage of having Nigel
Nicolson as UNA chairman from 1961. Nicolson obliged. For instance, he stressed the
advantage of securing non-parliamentary names on the UNA executive who could be relied
upon to be sympathetic to the Conservative cause. 219 Moreover, the party still recognised
there to be political capital in affiliation with UNA. Later in 1968, Heath spoke to UNA’s
General Council and his government did nothing to cease UNA’s public subsidy. The decline

219 CPA: CCO 3/6/151: Lord Adlington to Chairman (Iain Macleod), 9 Mar 1962; Lord Adlington to Chairman
(Iain Macleod), 21 Feb 1962.
in Conservative MPs on the Executive Committee in the late 1960s and early 1970s, shown in figure 4.2, does not necessarily indicate that party headquarters was less interested in UNA. In 1966, a circular was issued stating that the party was very much in favour of local Conservatives playing a ‘full part’ in UNA’s activities. Enclosed with the circular was a memorandum on UNA written by the Conservative Research Department stating the desirability ‘to inject a bit more realism into a movement whose basic aims we are fully in sympathy’. It also wanted Conservatives to stress the contributions made by the Macmillan government towards disarmament, namely to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The extent to which Conservatives at a grassroots level, however, responded to such encouragements requires more in-depth research at a local level than can be provided here. However, one can surmise from the necessity of the repeated attempts made by Central Office to get Conservatives involved, that the party was struggling to keep its members interested in the Association. Indeed, Hailsham’s circular in 1958, received a positive response from some Conservative UNA members precisely because of the apathy demonstrated within the movement by Conservatives. Furthermore, those Conservatives who were active within UNA and strongly supported the UN, were often at risk at being alienated from fellow Conservatives.

Two prominent examples were the Conservative Chairmen of UNA in the 1960s, Nigel Nicolson and Humphry Berkeley. In November 1956, Nicolson, then a member of UNA Executive Committee, was one of a group of Conservative MPs who defied the party Whip, Edward Heath, and abstained from voting in support of the Government’s invasion of Egypt. This group, ‘heavily liberal intellectual in character’, also included Waldorf Astor’s

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221 See, for example, CPA: CCO 3/5/116: M. Raven to Lord Hailsham, 24 Apr 1958.

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son John Jacob Astor, Frank Medlicott and Robert Boothby. Nicolson, son of the (in)famous liberal intellectuals Harold Nicolson and Vita Sackville-West, had a reputation for being ‘ideologically unreliable’ among Conservative MPs as a result of his opposition to the death penalty that only worsened with Nicolson’s stand on Suez. However, it was among grassroots Conservatives that Nicolson would encounter his fiercest critics. The day before Nicolson abstained, he made a speech to the UNA branch within his Bournemouth constituency condemning Eden’s actions at which Conservative members of the audience called him a ‘conceited traitor’. Nicolson’s opposition to the death penalty and liberal intellectualism had already irritated his local Conservative Association, but his protest during the Suez Crisis led to a two year battle that ultimately cost Nicolson his seat.

Berkeley experienced a similar trajectory. In 1965 Berkeley introduced an unsuccessful private members bill to legalise homosexual acts between consenting male adults along the lines of the Wolfenden Report, two years before the actual decriminalisation. In the next election in 1966, Berkeley lost his seat. He attributed it to his bill. That year he succeeded Nicolson as Chairman of UNA Executive Committee. Before he had lost his seat, Berkeley was dissatisfied with the direction of his party. It was R.A. Butler’s reshaping of the Party that had originally attracted him to joining. Indeed, Berkeley was a member of Butler’s staff in the 1940s. He had wanted Butler to replace Eden as Prime Minister and attributed Butler’s misgivings over Suez to him not being made so. Similarly, he had hoped that Butler would replace Macmillan and that Iain Macleod (part of Butler’s circle) would replace Douglas-Home. It was Douglas-Home’s successor that Berkeley found himself most at odds

228 Berkeley, *Crossing the Floor*, 88-89. On Butler’s misgivings over the Suez Crisis and his failure to succeed Eden, see Howard, *RAB*, 231-248.
with. Berkeley felt that Heath had moved the party to the Right and that this was particularly apparent in the party’s foreign policy. It should be noted, however, that Douglas-Home was the Opposition spokesman on foreign affairs. Berkeley disagreed with his party’s opposition to the application of sanction on Smith’s regime in Rhodesia. During his time as UNA chairman, Berkeley also found Heath’s support of UNA to be lacklustre. At the UNA fundraising dinner at 10 Downing Street in 1968, he complained that Heath sullenly stood in the corner avoid people, in stark contrast to the Prime Minister. That year, Berkeley resigned from the party over its opposition to the Race Relations Act and – on what he perceived to be interrelated issues – the party’s continued opposition to sanctions on Rhodesia and its policy of resuming the sale of arms to South Africa.

Berkeley’s party would only go further to the Right. In 1975 the grassroots Right-wing of the party would find a representative in the new leader Thatcher. She had supported Suez, criticised the British withdrawal East of Suez and was opposed to the sanctioning of Ian Smith’s regime. Worse still for liberal internationalists, the only intergovernmental organisation Thatcher spoke fondly of was NATO. She perceived international structures and ideals as ‘either impractical or Left-leaning or both’. Berkeley would not witness this as a Conservative Party member. In 1970 Berkeley joined the Labour party shortly after its electoral defeat and became a member of the SDP in 1981, only to later rejoin the Labour Party. A number of Conservatives – and Labourites – who supported the UN and were more conscious of foreign policy were torn between their parties and their policies. Little wonder then that numerous supporters of UNA – and of Chatham House – were not averse to wandering the centre ground.

THE LIBERAL PARTY AND CENTRISM

The party whose international thought most correlated with that of Chatham House and UNA was also the party that did not get the opportunity to translate that thought into policy. The Liberal Party advocated the application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in both domestic and colonial legislation a month after it was adopted by the UN General Assembly. It argued for the development of representative self-government in the colonies; the creation of an international police force; greater aid to developing countries; the strengthening of UN agencies; an end to the maintenance of military bases East of Suez; the admission of the People’s Republic of China onto the Security Council; multilateral nuclear disarmament; and that the energies of the British people, and particularly the young, be canalised politically toward internationalism. Furthermore, the Party looked forward to world government while acknowledging that it was not an immediately practical possibility and was strongly in favour of the establishment of a European union, even a federal one, with Britain at the heart of it.\footnote{231} The party could legitimately claim – and frequently did – to be consistent advocates of the above decades before the Labour and Conservative parties.\footnote{232}


\footnote{232 See, for example, Liberal Party Mss: LIBERAL PARTY/16/63: ‘Liberal Party Assembly, “Advance to Peace”, Mark Bonham Carter’, 3 Sep 1964; Lord Gladwyn, \textit{The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn} (London, 1972), 354; Liberal Research Department, \textit{Partners for Progress: Liberal Candidates and Speakers Handbook} (London, 1964), 227. It should be noted that the party did experience misgivings between 1957 and 1960 about Britain’s accession to the EEC, at least internally. They arose from the party’s traditional adherence to free trade and subsequently some Liberals were in favour of the European Free Trade Area rather than the customs union of the EEC. A clear policy direction was provided in July 1960 when an all-party group of MPs, which included Joe Grimond, Jeremy Thorpe and Clement Davies, declared support for Britain joining the EEC. See R. Douglas, \textit{Liberals: A History of the Liberal and Liberal Democrat Parties, 1850-2004} (London, 2005), 263; D. Dutton, \textit{A History of the Liberal Party Since 1900} (1st edn, 2004; Basingstoke, 2013), 176-177; P. Barberis, \textit{Liberal Lion, Jo Grimond: A Political Life} (London, 2004), 92.}
There were ideological reasons. In the 1930s, two of the most influential contributors to the Liberal Party’s international thought were the liberal intellectuals Walter Layton and Ramsay Muir who enunciated the idea of global ‘interdependence’. The ‘supreme difficulty of our generation’, Layton wrote in 1930, was ‘that our achievements on the economic plane of life have outstripped our progress on the political plane to such an extent that our economics and politics are perpetually out of gear with one another’. The inevitable political problems that arose from the economic interdependence of nations could only be solved through strengthening the League of Nations. This was the same solution proffered by Ramsay Muir when he developed Layton’s notion of interdependence, explaining that it was not just economic, but technological and cultural too. Although nationalism was useful for forming unified states, if left unchecked it led nations to be too assertive and the negative aspects of interdependence – such as world war – kicked in during struggles for self-determination, tariff wars, monetary instability or social revolution. Internationalism was thus to be encouraged by limiting state sovereignty in a variety of areas, be they international trade through the creation of a new monetary standard, the prohibition of certain weapons or the establishment of regional free trade areas.

In an age when a shot in Sarajevo echoed around the world, it was recognised by liberals that however far away an event took place it had the potential to have a huge impact on the lives of those at home and in a myriad of ways. These ideas were not entirely new; both John Hobson and Norman Angell spoke in similar terms. However, in the 1930s it appears that ideas surrounding interdependence had a greater hold over the Party, possibly as a result of it being brought home with the Wall Street Crash, but also the practical solutions


proffered by the likes of Keynes, Layton and Muir. Furthermore, the small size of the Party may well have secured in it a more cohesive epistemic community than that which was afforded to the mammoth ideological coalitions that were the Conservative and Labour Parties. Anyhow, the Liberal Party had a much stronger ideological incentive to support international integration and organisation than their rivals did.

The Liberal Party’s interwar appreciation of global interdependence naturally correlated with and was influenced by thinkers connected to the LNU and especially Chatham House. As noted above, Toynbee recognised globalisation. But this recognition was not limited to his wartime papers. Michael Lang outlines how ‘Toynbee’s entire career as a historian and political analyst can be read as a massive reflection on what came to be called globalisation’, which Lang attributes to the combining of British idealism and Darwinism noted in chapter two.\textsuperscript{237} The multi-talented, unstinting long-time editor and senior administrator at Chatham House Margaret Cleeve recalled in 1955 that in the 1930s the production of Toynbee’s \textit{Survey of International Affairs} was made difficult not only by the expanding volume of diplomatic business but also by the growing number of issues that constituted international affairs, including economics and the ‘interdependence of international affairs with domestic affairs’.\textsuperscript{238} Another of the more influential contributors to the Liberal Party’s international thought was one of the founders of Chatham House Philip Kerr, or from 1930 Lord Lothian, who did much to dent the reputation of the concept of national sovereignty in the Party.\textsuperscript{239} Lothian’s appreciation of the varying extent of global interdependence is apparent in his argument for federalism. Lothian’s federalism was not only aimed at bringing an end to war, but also at stemming poverty and unemployment. In his seminal 1935 lecture \textit{Pacifism is Not Enough Nor Patriotism Either}, while the effects of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{238} LPA: LP/ID/B104: M. Cleeve to S. Rose, 14 Jul 1955.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Grayson, \textit{Liberals, International Relations and Appeasement}, 50-53.
\end{itemize}
Wall Street Crash were still being felt, Lothian proclaimed that by ending international anarchy with federalism, economic nationalism that preceded tariff wars and professions of autarky would cease and countries could coordinate the division of labour to secure full employment and rising living standards. Global interdependence was such that internationalism was necessary to combat social injustice.

Global interdependence was also such that social injustice in one country could embroil other countries in conflict. This was the reasoning behind the report of one of the more famous liberal intellectuals, federalists, and short-lived Liberal MPs, William Beveridge. The Beveridge Report was a response to the Atlantic Charter’s object of obtaining ‘social security’ for all. Beveridge reasoned that democratic regimes were less likely to go to war, but that unless democracy could solves society’s ills, society in despair would look to dictators for answers. ‘[T]he world cannot be made safe for democracy’, Beveridge wrote in 1945, ‘except by showing that democracy can conquer the social evils of Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, Idleness and Inequality’. The liberal internationalist motivation behind Beveridge and his work should not be overlooked. In 1950, Beveridge’s colleagues within the Liberal Party also placed the significance of global interdependence at the top of the agenda. The first chapter of the parliamentary candidates’ handbook was concerned with world affairs and opened with a quotation from Roosevelt’s 1945 inaugural address.

We have learned that we cannot live alone; that our well-being is dependent on the well-being of other nations, far away. We have learned that we must live as men, not as ostriches nor as dogs-in-the-manger. We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community.

\[^{240}\] Lord Lothian, ‘Pacifism is Not Enough Nor Patriotism Either’ in J. Pinder and A. Bosco (eds.), Pacifism is Not Enough: Collected Lectures and Speeches of Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) (London, 1990), 225-226.


\[^{243}\] See Beveridge, Power and Influence, 351.

Unsurprisingly, members and supporters of the Liberal Party were natural allies of Chatham House and UNA. The Liberal presence within the figures contained within this chapter is small, but the figures are largely based upon the contributions made by MPs and peers, among whom, of course, there were far fewer Liberals. Similarly, there is little reference to be found to either Chatham House or UNA in the Liberal Party Archives. However, neither pattern is indicative of the involvement of Liberal politicians within the two organisations. The absence of material may well be a result of the aforementioned limited resources of the party; it is telling that the corporate subscriber to Chatham House was Liberal International rather than the Liberal Party Research Department.

Yet those Liberal politicians who were involved with the two organisations were often very senior members of the party. Beveridge was a participant in the wartime Chatham House World Order Study Group and authored one of its publications. Andrew McFadyean, who helped found Liberal International and was its Vice-President from 1954 to 1967 served on the Chatham House Council between 1933 and 1967 and was a president in 1970. Furthermore, from 1944 he was the Chairman of the IPR Committee. In 1967, the same year that he stood down as leader of the Liberal Party, Jo Grimond became the only MP to sit on the Chatham House Council and did so until 1974. With regards to UNA, Leonard Behrens a member of the Liberal Party Foreign Affairs Committee and president of the party from 1955 to 1957 played a very active role within the Association. He was a chairman of UNA’s Political Committee that deliberated on UNA resolutions and of Manchester District’s UNA Council; a Vice-President both of UNA and the WFUNA; and a member of the

Executive Committee from 1945 to 1968. In 1954, the conclusions of the Liberal Party Foreign Affairs Committee praised the ‘invaluable assistance’ provided by Behrens to a report on proposed revisions to the UN Charter, making reference to his similar work in connection with UNA. Jeremy Thorpe, Grimond’s successor, became Chairman of UNA in the same year he resigned as party leader in 1976 amid the Norman Scott scandal. Thorpe was a passionate internationalist whose ideas again were much aligned with that of UNA’s. He spoke out against the formation of the Central African Federation; he was close friends with Seretse Khama and Kenneth Kaunda; an active opponent of apartheid; and campaigner for British citizenship for East African Asians from Kenya and later Uganda. Indeed, Thorpe took a Ugandan Asian family into his home while helping to secure them employment and citizenship. More cynically, party politically, the Liberal Party’s internationalist foreign policy was one of the main areas in which Liberals could distinguish themselves from the Labour and Conservative parties. Given how the Party fared electorally, such distinctions were particularly important.

In 1945 the Liberal Party suffered its most disastrous electoral result since its formation in 1859. Of the 306 parliamentary candidates the Party managed to field, only 12 successfully obtained a seat. Only 9% of the electorate voted Liberal and the three biggest figures within the Party Percy Harris, William Beveridge and the party leader Archibald Sinclair had been defeated. No Liberal seat was safe. Labour’s adoption of the Beveridge Report prevented its author’s party from accruing any political capital from it. By 1947 Labour was embracing Keynesian economics in its attempts to finance the Welfare State by

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251 Dale, Liberal Party General Election Manifestos, 61; Douglas, Liberals, 250.
means of demand management. In the same year Butler produced the Industrial Charter signalling that a Conservative government would not overhaul many of the policies implemented by that of Attlee’s. Neither Labour nor the Conservative Party could be described as wholehearted supporters of Keynesianism, but when it did not alter their deeds, it often altered their rhetoric. David Dutton notes the irony that while the two main parties were competing with each other in terms of their espousal of the ideas of the two most prominent liberals – Keynes and Beveridge – the Liberal Party suffered. The split within the Liberal Party that Cecil noted in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter was likely a reference to the subsequent division among Liberal politicians that could crudely be described as one between those who were anti-Tory and those who were anti-socialist. It was the unenviable task of Clement Davies, Sinclair’s successor, to halt the diasporisation of not only Liberal voters, but of Liberal politicians too. The severity of the problem was made conspicuous by the defections of Lloyd George’s own children. While Gwilym successfully won a seat in 1951 as a National Liberal and Conservative candidate, Megan joined the Labour Party in 1952. Gwilym Lloyd George’s designation as a National Liberal and Conservative was indicative of the Conservative attempts to swallow the Liberal vote. There were 53 candidates with the same and similar designations in the 1950 general election, all of whom were pledged to support the Conservative Party. Their defeat in the election only motivated Conservatives to push harder at trying to attract Liberal voters so that they might

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unite the anti-socialist vote. Such endeavours contributed to the Liberal Party’s electoral nadir in 1951 when only 6 Liberal MPs were returned.257

The poor electoral fortunes of the Liberal Party and inadequacies of the first-past-the-post electoral system in reflecting ideological divisions have helped to mask the influence of liberalism on British international thought and politics more generally. Both Chatham House and UNA attracted a number of centrist politicians who had sympathies with liberalism and the Liberal Party or had a past loyalty to it. Waldorf Astor, a Conservative MP, before he inherited his father’s viscountship and gave his seat to his wife Nancy in 1919, was part of the idealist school and a progressive conservative. He was independent of the party machine, was a strong advocate of social reform, had little time for aristocratic conservatism and approached affairs with liberal empiricism. Since their days at Oxford University, he was a close friend of Lothian whose ideas made a significant impact upon his own, and his politics often seemed more at home within the Liberal Party. For instance, he voted against his party in favour of Lloyd George’s Health and Unemployment Insurance Bill in 1911.258 Similarly, although Robert Cecil never formally became a Liberal, his politics often appeared to reside within the Liberal Party. In 1921 he held abortive discussions with Asquith, Grey and other senior Liberals over a proposed centrist coalition.259 In their memoirs both Woodhouse and Berkeley felt it necessary to justify why they did not join the Liberal Party. Woodhouse, whose family had mostly been made up of Liberals, ‘found those whom the post-war Liberal Party attracted unattractive’.260 Berkeley’s reasoning behind him leaving the Conservative Party in the late 1960s was Heath’s destruction of ‘that part of the Conservative Party which I belonged – namely the liberal wing’. He wished his decision to be judged in relation to the

260 Woodhouse, Something Ventured, 138.
issues he cared most for: ‘immigration, race relations, Africa, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations’. Nonetheless, despite Thorpe’s invitation, Berkeley had no intention of joining the Liberal Party. Although he revered the liberal tradition – to which his father Reginald Berkeley made a contribution as a Liberal MP – he felt that ‘a radical, such as myself, is more likely to find a base for action within the Labour Party’. 261 Nevertheless, he would go on to join the SDP in 1981 and then later rejoin Neil Kinnock’s Labour Party in 1988 when the SDP merged with the Liberal Party to form the Liberal Democrats. 262

Another significant defector, but one who never held a parliamentary seat, was Gilbert Murray who from 1950 ceased voting Liberal and voted Conservative. Just as he was for the LNU, Murray was a highly active UNA President, rarely missing a meeting of its Council or its Executive Committee. Nevertheless, much of his activity was devoted to preventing UNA, with aid from the Conservative supporter Kathleen Courtney, from steering too far to the Left. However, Murray had not lost his liberalism. Instead, he considered that the best way to promote liberalism was to vote Conservative. He found himself at odds with much of UNA and liberals when he supported Eden’s actions in the Suez Crisis. He deemed the UN too weak to prevent Nasser from forming an anti-Western coalition of Arab states who in reality were led by the Soviet Union. He also found himself in disagreement with his former son-in-law, Toynbee, when in his Reith Lectures in 1952 Toynbee had not asserted that Western civilisation was superior to those of Asia or Africa. 263

Berkeley and Murray were not alone in roaming the centre ground among those who worked for UNA and/or Chatham House. David Ennals ran as a Liberal parliamentary

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261 Berkeley, Crossing the Floor, 21-22, 147.
candidate in the 1950 and 1951 general elections before joining the Labour Party later in the 1950s. Peter Calvocoressi also ran as a Liberal parliamentary candidate in 1945 and was the first secretary of Liberal International, but from 1950 ‘regularly and unhesitatingly’ voted Labour. Furthermore, the UNA Executive Committee contained a number of MPs or peers who in the past or in the future defected, in addition to Berkeley they included: Megan Lloyd George (Liberal to Labour), Joan Vickers (National Liberal to Conservative), Christopher Mayhew (Labour to Liberal), John Roper (Labour Cooperative to SDP and later Liberal Democrat), Lord Chalfont (Labour to Liberal) and Reginald Prentice (Labour to Conservative). Mayhew also served on the Chatham House Council between 1950 and 1952, while Roper would later be the Director of Studies succeeding William Wallace, now, like Roper, a Liberal Democrat peer.

Yet for the significance attached to international affairs among liberal and centrist politicians, even the Liberal Party was forced to come to the conclusion that matters of foreign policy were not the primary concern of voters come election time. Following a disastrous election in 1970, the Liberal Party began to take seriously the utilisation of an electoral strategy known as ‘community politics’ that had proved effective in gaining the party council seats, especially in Liverpool. The Party’s autumn assembly a few months after the election passed a resolution stating that it should focus its campaigning efforts at a community level, to help people take power and improve their communities. In theory this would enable to build upon local power bases, which would pay dividends at a parliamentary level. There was unease within the party, including from the former leader Jo Grimond, who helped develop the philosophy. He worried that such a policy could encourage activists

264 Glennerster, ‘Ennals, David Hedley, Baron Ennals (1922–1995)’.
to merely taking up local grievances, for instance cracked pavements. Grievance politics could mean merely addressing the individual localised concerns of people without reference to national issues and indeed international issues. An early example was the Sutton and Cheam byelection in 1972, which was won by the Liberal candidate Graham Tope with a remarkable swing of 33%. Tope attributed his victory to persuading voters that he was ‘the local “action man” who got things done’. During the campaign, close attention was paid to local issues including traffic problems, which met some criticism within the Party down to fears that national issues, largely European integration, were being neglected. However, on the same day at a byelection in Uxbridge, the Liberal candidate who fought on such national issues lost his deposit. UNA encountered the new Liberal strategy in the 1974 general election. In its election postscript, New World lamented that ‘so long as the Liberals – and every other party in effect – can say in their election post-mortem “there are no votes in South African issues,” UNA hasn’t done its work half well enough. (For “South Africa” you can also read “the UN in general”). Internationalism and party politics were not ready bedfellows.

CONCLUSION

In Chatham House’s King-Hall model, there were two actors that were relied upon to inform the public understanding of international affairs, journalists and politicians. Chapter two detailed how the media performed poorly in this task. This chapter demonstrates that politicians were equally bad. Liberal internationalists had a strong understanding of globalisation that incentivised their attention to international affairs and the precedence they

269 See M. McManus, Jo Grimond: Towards the Sound of Gunfire (Edinburgh, 2001), 397-399.
paid to multilateral solutions. Party politics in Britain, given its inherently combative two-party electoral system, was not well suited to emphasising global interdependence. It was very well suited to encouraging the impression of the bifurcation of foreign and domestic policy. Politicians were often ignorant about international affairs and unwilling to engage with them. Limited resources were in place to convince them otherwise. After the Second World War, international affairs slipped further and further down the political agenda. By the 1970s, while the world was being exposed for being as small as many liberal internationalists had already supposed, the political parties, even the Liberal Party, frequently treated foreign policy as an afterthought. The general consensus was that foreign policy did not win votes. Furthermore, foreign policy had the embarrassing habit of exposing internal party divisions or revealing uncomfortably similar attitudes between two main parties, be they on colonial self government or a wavering commitment to human rights. There was little incentive for politicians to explore every-day international issues. Those who did take an active interest in international affairs – the small legislature – were more likely to be already engaged in the activities of bodies such as UNA and Chatham House, but efforts to internationalise British political discourse, required a much greater number of converts.

This need for many converts and consensus among politicians, justified UNA’s attempts to secure all-party status. Such a status provided both UNA and Chatham House with insider privileges and for Chatham House, greater intellectual legitimacy. However, while Chatham House attained greater balance of affiliation among the parties as more members of the labour movement became involved, UNA’s all-party status came under attack as its resolutions came into disrepute among Conservatives. The importance of maintaining such a status would appear to have been neglected on occasion by UNA’s own staff as apparent in the Berkeley/Ennals split in the late 1960s. The advice provided to Frank Hooley that suggested that in order to attract Conservatives within the Association it was necessary to
have the ‘establishment type’ (non-socialist) chairman was an uncomfortable truth and perhaps members of UNA staff should have done more to attempt to both attract Conservatives and prevent them from resigning their membership. However, such a task would not have been easy given the Rightward direction the Conservative Party was taking illustrated by Home’s Berwick-upon-Tweed speech and Heath’s objections to the Race Relations Act. The task would become even harder under Thatcher.

Nevertheless, it should not be understated how both Chatham House and UNA held significant sway within the three parties. Chatham House in particular was an important resource for politicians who were otherwise woefully underequipped. The Institute received regular mentions in parliamentary debates and reports, and was utilised by party research departments, especially Healey’s in the 1950s. Moreover, it contributed to the long term direction of foreign policy by helping to determine the climate in which the executive operated within. Toynbee acted as an advisor to R.A. Butler’s committee tasked with establishing Conservative postwar policy. Furthermore, Attlee keenly used the FRPS to help determine war aims and its papers notably assisted the party in its transition toward the adoption of muscular internationalism, exemplified by Bevin’s foreign policy. Although the extent of commitment varied, many politicians were consistently attentive to UNA activities. They joined UNAPPG, answered UNA questionnaires and debated within its local all-party meetings. Party leaders obviously recognised enough political capital within the organisation to contribute to its publications and address it General Council. In the 1950s and early 1960s, while out of office, the policies of UNA and Labour were such for Conservatives to suspect collusion. This may, of course, have been attributable to David Ennals’s tenure as International Secretary, who might have been only too keen to improve the party’s links with a body of opinion that supported multilateral disarmament while the Left of the Party assessed the merits of unilateral disarmament and supporting CND. Although the Liberal Party had
limited resources, both in terms of MPs and administration, its members often had strong affiliations with both UNA and Chatham House. Moreover, its political ideology was the most aligned to UNA and Chatham House thinking. Furthermore, the centre ground in which Liberals operated was occupied by many of UNA and Chatham House’s political supporters, some of whom even defected, motivated in part by a desire to find a party whose foreign policy was more suited to their own thinking.

However, such defections were symptomatic of the willingness of political parties to put party politics and political gain before their professed internationalist ideals. It hindered UNA’s endeavours to put the UN at heart of British foreign policy and stunted the hopes of those personnel within Chatham House who called for greater accountability of foreign policy in parliament and, of course, a stronger commitment to European integration. The political parties played a significant role in obscuring the liberal internationalist vision from the British people. It was a positive vision that sought to navigate Britain through increasing globalisation and improve people's lives at home and abroad. However, British party politics, especially in relation to foreign policy, was rarely a positive affair.
Conclusion: Whatever Happened to Liberal Internationalism?

In twentieth century Britain, the politics of foreign policy did much to create the impression that foreign policy was a lot more foreign than it actually was. On the relatively few occasions when international matters were presented to the public it was often done so in a skewed manner. Whitehall was guilty of obscurantism. Party politics encouraged the illusion that international and domestic affairs were separate. Liberal internationalism had already suffered an immense blow as a result of the Second World War, but was then soon followed by Cold War power politics. The lives of liberal internationalists were only made more difficult by the structures inherent within the politics of foreign policy that had the effect of shutting out much of the outside world from public view and discouraging them from engaging with it. UNA struggled to retain and attract new members, and secure the attention of the media, politicians and officials. Chatham House rejected Waldorf Astor’s vision for direct engagement with the public and instead placed too much trust in political, official and media elites to inform the public sufficiently in international affairs and convey its importance. Postwar liberal internationalism fractured and its adherents moved away from such traditional bastions. Others grew fatalistic and apathetic. Liberal internationalism failed to inspire the British public with their vision for Britain’s postwar international role. However, this final chapter is not an obituary. Liberal internationalism still lives in Britain as do Chatham House and UNA, even if their ambitions do not match those of their founders.
THE FRACTURING OF LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM

In 1945, a British liberal internationalist who looked toward the postwar world order and the activities of Chatham House and the UNA could be forgiven for being cautiously optimistic. Out of the ashes of the old League of Nations came a new United Nations whose Charter and apparatus were designed to avoid the errors of the past. The Security Council would consist of wartime allies and the use of the veto, although controversial, would surely only be very rarely employed in the most extreme circumstances. There was talk that there could be a federal union of Europe and that Britain might even take a leading role and for once and for all end its peacetime isolationism against the continent.

At home, the vast majority of members who had retained their membership with the LNU during the war, all 46,607 of them, had now transferred their patronage to UNA and were joined by nearly 30,000 new members within a space of months. There were large rallies addressed by the most senior statesmen of the age. UN Day was celebrated up and down the country. UN flags flew over town halls and various civil society groups lent their support to their local UNA branch where the public debated how to deal with the international challenges confronting this brave new world. Waldorf Astor laboured away to realise his new vision for Chatham House, one that directly educated the public in international affairs. The Institute’s collaboration with ABCA had been a great success and there was now to be a peacetime ABCA, the BCA, whose long life could only be assured by the extensive public interest in current affairs revealed during the war. Astor had many influential supporters within the Institute who advocated that it should produce publications for secondary schools and invite their teachers to its courses. Chatham House branches were also growing outside of London in Manchester, Newcastle and Durham. Recommendations were made that through such branches, and possibly later university branches, Chatham House could secure lecturers for meetings of the local Rotary Club or Women’s Institute. Another proposal was made that
there should be a new category of membership that would welcome a broader section of opinion. Perhaps even ‘the man in the street’ could become a Chatham House member. Who said liberal internationalism was dead? Even E.H. Carr had felt that his pre-war concerns over the efficacy of international organisations had been largely addressed.

Our liberal internationalist could also be forgiven for being quickly disappointed. Disagreements over the Iran Crisis in 1946 prompted the Soviet Union ambassador to walk out of the Security Council in an ominous sign of the power politics that would come to define the Cold War. 1949 would see the Soviet Union develop its own atomic bomb, igniting a nuclear arms race. Furthermore, neither Attlee nor Churchill’s government showed meaningful enthusiasm towards the idea of Britain joining a form of intergovernmental union with Europe. Britain took no part in the ECSC. Even if they had done, the Schuman Plan did not necessitate federalism as would be understood by Lionel Curtis or Astor.\(^1\) Perhaps our liberal internationalist would have, like Gilbert Murray, lamented the apparent retreat of liberal imperialism. Or perhaps they protested against the British government’s exile of Seretse Khroma from Bechuanaland and the plans to establish a Central African Federation without reference to the black majority. Likewise, again like Murray, our liberal internationalist could have supported Britain’s invasion of Egypt in 1956 and opposed the UN and UNA’s subsequent condemnation. They may have even, unlike Murray, left UNA. Or perhaps they emphatically supported UNA’s stance on the Suez Crisis and it had inspired in them a new fervour to get involved with UNA activities.

Either way, in light of the fact that international politics was not working to our liberal internationalist’s favour, they might have welcomed the obvious appetite for humanitarian causes among the public in the 1950s, which UNA promoted on behalf of numerous UN agencies. International politics was not being brought to the public by the BCA, which had

\(^1\) See N.J. Crowson, *Britain and Europe: A Political History Since 1918* (Abingdon, 2011), 65-68.
dissolved in 1951, and Chatham House was proving reluctant to engage with the wider public. Politicians who saw few votes in foreign policy avoided the topic. At least through humanitarianism, the British people appeared to be engaging with the outside world. Nevertheless, like Kathleen Courtney, our liberal internationalist might have had some misgivings. They could have worried about the depoliticised nature of the campaigns on problems that ultimately rested upon politics. Perhaps they felt that NGOs such as Oxfam and Save the Children had failed to draw sufficient attention to this, or perhaps they had become so disillusioned with international politics that this factor contributed to a decision to join such NGOs. In the late 1950s and 1960s, they might have been alarmed by the rise of new social movements. CND may have sparked the interest of their children, but its faith in itself to provide a substitute form of political democracy for Westminster and its confidence in the merits of unilateral disarmament might have left our liberal internationalist unconvinced. Alternatively, frustrated with the political classes, they might have joined a march to Aldermaston with their children in tow.

Another path was open to our liberal internationalist that was more focussed on domestic politics. Perhaps in the 1960s or the 1970s, during detente, when foreign policy crises seemed that little bit more distant and poverty was being rediscovered in Britain, they could have devoted their limited free time or money to supporting the Child Poverty Action Group or Shelter or any of the myriad of other NGOs who sought to end social problems at home. Perhaps such causes were more worthy of such devotion as they promised a greater chance of success than that of liberal internationalism. Even if the peoples of the world could find common ground, governments seemed incapable of doing so. What could the individual do? What even could UNA do? UNA’s last attempt to reach 100,000 members had failed in the late 1960s and a publicised internal split within headquarters was hardly edifying. In the
1970s, UNA’s membership would only continue to decline while it failed to plug the gap with new young members.

If Chatham House’s executive still hoped to shape public opinion, it was certainly not by means of engaging the public directly. Unbeknownst to our liberal internationalist, its Director Kenneth Younger had attempted to get funding from the foreign office for public education on international matters such as on Europe in the early 1960s, but had been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the functionalism he promoted did not necessitate the same public faith to ensure its sustainability that federalism did, at least not in the short term. Not long after Younger’s proposal to the Foreign Office, Younger put the responsibility for reversing public apathy towards international affairs at Parliament’s door. In 1970, the fiftieth anniversary of the Institute, Younger supported its founders’ decision not to engage with the wider public, judging that the interest of politicians and journalists must first be aroused. Yet in the same article, Younger recognised significant public apathy despite the efforts by these elites.² Perhaps our liberal internationalist, unlike many others, would have retained their membership of UNA in the 1970s and read issues of New World lamenting that neither politicians nor journalists were willing to discuss international affairs. Perhaps she or he would have been worried by the lacklustre campaigns that surrounded the referendum on EEC membership. Perhaps they would have sympathised with Andrew Shonfield when he grew bewildered by the lack of such attention to international affairs while a new stage of increased globalisation was met with a failure to comprehend that international coordination was necessary to maintain a mixed economy. The democratisation of foreign policy was proving increasingly important and yet increasingly elusive.

Amid this fracturing of liberal internationalism, our liberal internationalist might have taken any one of these routes available to them or indeed they could have decided to leave all forms of activism altogether having grown apathetic with the postwar world. Not unlike the supporters and members of the Liberal Party, liberal internationalists became a diaspora. But, just as with those former supporters of the Liberal Party, this did not necessitate dramatic ideological changes. Liberal internationalists adapted to new environments and remained influential within them. Liberalism and liberal international thought helped condition CND, the anti-apartheid movement and, of course, Amnesty International. Furthermore, NGOs gravitated towards those international organisations that crowned liberal internationalist efforts, especially the UN and its agencies, to legitimise their aims and activities, and influence the intergovernmental organisations. As has been shown here, UNA was not the only NGO to organise the British response to the international campaigns of the UN’s agencies. What had changed, however, was the evasion of international politics, the declining faith in the merits or possibility of international political integration and the declining deference to Westminster and the political establishment. NGOs became far more involved with the UN’s agencies than they did with lobbying the British government to take day-to-day actions within the UN’s apparatus. This was exemplified in the trajectories of our two bastions of interwar liberal internationalism. UNA lost its claim to representing a mass membership. Chatham House rapidly backtracked from Astor’s vision of the Institute’s postwar direction, became decreasingly impressed by the power of public opinion and

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focussed evermore on elite opinion and the need to become “policy relevant” within Whitehall. In the politics of foreign policy, as elsewhere, elites and the general public were disconnected.

MORE SINNED AGAINST THAN SINNING?

However, this does not invalidate the examination of Chatham House, UNA and liberal internationalism more broadly in a study of the democratisation of foreign policy. Chatham House and UNA provided important political participatory spaces for those elites outside of government and the wider public. Chatham House influenced the political parties and individual MPs. Most notably, through Arnold J. Toynbee it impacted upon the direction of the Attlee government’s international policy. It informed the media’s international coverage and provided a valued forum and unofficial representation for the Foreign Office. UNA maintained a significantly large membership for much of the period and its impact on public opinion was taken seriously within Whitehall, Westminster and the party political organisations. Ministers may have often ultimately only paid lip-service to the UNA’s aims, but they adapted their rhetoric accordingly and implemented some policies, however half-heartedly, which were designed to obtain the approval of UNA supporters. Both Chatham House and UNA dynamised foreign policy debate within Britain and acted as important democratisers of a policy whose institutions were (and are) notoriously reluctant to be democratised. Additionally, their failures to democratise foreign policy further, despite the two organisations’ close connections with and continued deference towards the political establishment, afford valuable insights into what prevented them and other NGOs from being more effective at promoting greater public interest in international affairs, and at ushering the foreign policy process more firmly within the public’s grasp.
By both examining Chatham House and UNA and the institutions which they attempted to influence, it is apparent that a series of informal and formal structures erected by the media, Whitehall, Westminster and party political organisations seriously hindered the democratisation of foreign policy. Chapter two shows that although the BBC and the “quality” press may have used the services of Chatham House to inform their output, the “popular” press had little interest in the Institute and in international affairs more generally. As is apparent in UNA’s relationship with the media, even the BBC and “quality press” were often reluctant to report international affairs. Such reportage was costly, logistically complicated and unpopular among the public. This was only exacerbated by the methodology behind news construction and selection that rested upon hooks designed to get the attention of their audience. It was believed that these hooks needed to be topical and easily relatable to the intended audience. The multifaceted nature of international affairs thus did not lend itself well to sustained commentary or in-depth analyses of countries or cultures with institutions deemed alien to Britons. This fuelled the crisis/non-crisis axiom and the general ethnocentrism of international coverage.

The public understanding of international affairs likely suffered as a result given its especial dependence upon media coverage of issues and places that many would never directly come into contact with. Ignorance naturally prevailed. The skewed picture that resulted from the emphasis on crises that divided peoples presented the outside world as dangerous, unfriendly and bizarre. The quickening pace of globalisation (and thus the significance of the political integration liberal internationalists were preaching) was shrouded from view as little attention was given to non-crises that largely defined it. International political and economic coordination were deemed far too uninteresting however much they impacted upon the everyday lives of the British people. The more comprehensive coverage was largely confined to papers that prided themselves on their engagement with international
affairs, such as David Astor’s *Observer*, and broadcasts for the BBC’s Third Programme and, if it was deemed topical enough for television, on shows such as *Panorama*. Chatham House’s ‘man in the street’ was the most neglected and yet likely the most vulnerable to international political and economic forces. Such media coverage encouraged nationalism not internationalism. Little help was on offer from Whitehall or Westminster.

Chapter three reveals that Chatham House was possibly the most influential NGO in the Foreign Office. However, this may tell us more about the Foreign Office than it does about Chatham House. After finding the FRPS’s work so valuable during the Second World War that it felt the need to nationalise it as FORD, it was quick to ensure that Chatham House staff departed without too many privileges. The Institute’s work remained respected, but the Foreign Office appears to have been more impressed by the use of the Institute as a forum for domestic and foreign elites than by its research. There was early promise with the establishment of the Planning Staff in 1964 that solicited the advice of Chatham House, but by the 1970s the Institute’s research came under criticism for not being ‘policy relevant’.

However, as the Plowden and Slater reports had observed the Foreign Office earned much of the criticism that it dedicated too little attention to medium and long term planning and that it insufficiently engaged with NGOs. It thus seems doubly unfortunate that after Chatham House, on the encouragement of the Foreign Office, established the PSU and undertook inroads into international relations theory, that a Permanent Under-Secretary in the mid-1990s doubted the influence international relations theory had on practitioners. Its products were deemed ‘remote from the practical business of conducting foreign policy’. The Planning Staff drew on the expertise from organisations such as Chatham House, but policy-makers outside that department had limited time for extensive reading of academic work.\(^6\) As Zara Steiner

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has noted ‘the cult of common sense’ prevailed at the Foreign Office. While Britain adjusted to a new world order after the Second World War, the Foreign Office did little to innovate.

The reactionary nature of the Foreign Office was hardly conducive with democratisation. UNA was respected within Whitehall as it was understood to represent a significant section of opinion engaged with international affairs. Civil servants took time to analyse UNA’s policy proposals in order to prepare their ministers for its deputations. However, they did little to meaningfully change policy. They nevertheless sought to encourage UNA so that it might help canalise opinion away from more radical positions. More generally, the Foreign Office opposed the creation of a Select Committee on Foreign Affairs; failed to revive the pre-1914 tradition of producing an annual white paper on the government’s foreign policy to enable regular parliamentary scrutiny; and proved highly reluctant to release information especially on potential policy alternatives considered within Whitehall. It was apt that one of Britain’s first initiatives on joining the EEC was to press its partners to tighten security on discussions of policy.

Chapter four has demonstrated that although politicians addressed UNA rallies, took part in UN Day celebrations and accepted invitations to debate international affairs with their opponents within UNA branches, both Chatham House and UNA struggled to internationalise British political discourse. MPs who were interested in international affairs often engaged with the publications and activities of Chatham House and UNA, but they were limited in number. A smaller pool of MPs to influence had its benefits. But it proved troublesome when attempting to get the legislature to hold the government to account and when endeavouring to stir interest in foreign policy among the electorate. The House of Commons Library was ill-equipped to deal with international matters in the detail they required and often so were the

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research departments of the political parties. Party politics also had a nasty habit of stimulating divisions among liberal internationalists. In those constituencies where there was much support for one party, the makeup of the local UNA branch tended to reflect this and this had the potential to alienate local internationalists who supported rival parties. Party politics could also fuel existing personality clashes within UNA headquarters, notably between Humphry Berkeley and John Ennals.

Divisions within the political parties were even more damaging. Labour was divided on a number of key foreign policy issues such as disarmament, Europe, decolonisation and the Anglo-American relationship. Foreign policy became the weapon of choice to fight for the future direction of the party, be it between Gaitskell and Bevan or Jenkins and Benn. Leaders of the party worked hard to draw attention from foreign policy so as to not reveal the division within the party. As for the Conservative Party, many proved reluctant to see the end of empire and challenged the UN’s authority to intervene in areas deemed beyond their jurisdiction. UNA’s stance during the Suez Crisis lifted the veil on the political nature of internationalism and a good many Conservatives disliked what they saw. This hindered Conservative Central Office’s attempts to recruit Conservatives into UNA to offset the (exaggerated) influence of socialism upon the body. Finally, the Liberal Party was intimately involved with Chatham House and UNA and their objectives, but their small size and limited resources made it difficult to push international affairs up the agenda in political debate. When they did increase in size and number, although the community politics that helped their revival was intended (at least by Jo Grimond) to engage people with international affairs by showing them how it impacted upon their lives at the local level, in practice activists often avoided discussion of foreign policy. In the 1970s, many within the party appeared to have begun to adhere to the old maxim, shared by many of their rivals, that foreign policy does not win votes.
Through ignorance and political motivation, politicians were perhaps the worst culprits for promoting the illusory bifurcation of domestic and international affairs. In combination, Whitehall’s reticence to innovate and release its grip over the foreign policy process and party political and media disengagement with international affairs severely handicapped the democratisation of foreign policy. Furthermore, in a number of ways they prevented Chatham House, UNA and other NGOs from further democratising it. These restrictions imposed upon the democratisation of foreign policy prevented the proper engagement of the public with international affairs and undermined the sustainability of policy directions. Even in 1973 ministers and civil servants were arguing in private that public hesitancy over the EEC limited the government from pursuing anything but a minimalist policy within Europe.\(^8\) The restricted democratisation of foreign policy was not merely unjust, it was unwise.

**LOST OPPORTUNITIES**

So were Chatham House and UNA more sinned against than sinning? Their efforts were certainly frustrated by the formal and informal structures erected by the above. However, the elitism inherent in both organisations that harked back to the days of Curtis and Cecil conditioned them to pay too much deference to institutions that were hindering liberal internationalism from gaining greater purchase over postwar Britain. Curtis hoped that by convincing the political elite of the merits of international integration, that they in turn would create ‘right’ opinion among the public. UNA adopted a less elitist strategy by mobilising the public and directly educating them. Yet although they campaigned for a myriad of causes, they did not do so, for instance, for greater accountability of the Foreign Office to the legislature or for a more internationalist school curriculum.

However, although both organisations had announced frustrations with the individual structures, there was little in the way of understanding of the structures inherent within the foreign policy process as a whole. It would have been difficult to have seen the wood for the trees, as indeed it is now even with the benefit of hindsight. Political scientists had only really attempted to see the policy process as a whole in the late 1960s and then there was a wait for the more comprehensive analysis, which was appropriately William Wallace’s *The Foreign Policy Process* published by Chatham House in the mid 1970s. Furthermore, suspicions over the limitations of influence were hardly something which the organisations would wish to broadcast to their respective memberships. Although, it should be noted that Wallace’s account of Chatham House observed the mixed attitudes towards its research within the Foreign Office.

Of course, the freedom of the two organisations to criticise those institutions that were inhibiting the liberal internationalist cause was limited by the need not to endanger their insider privileges and all-party statuses. It is thus a shame that both organisations did not focus more on one of the safest, albeit slow, routes of influence, public education. The CEWC remained an agency of UNA when it should have arguably played a more central role. Furthermore, when UNA was experiencing financial difficulties in the 1960s, it was the CEWC and UNSA that were first to take the brunt of the cutbacks. In the 1968 membership campaign, it may have been a wiser course of action to focus its resources more on young people. Not only might this have swelled UNA’s membership and made it more sustainable, as the educational activities of the LNU did theirs, but it may have inspired young people to exert more pressure on their parliament, their government and their media outlets, to

dismantle restrictive structures and push for a more democratised foreign policy. In this, the abandonment of Astor’s vision for Chatham House also represented a lost opportunity. Astor did not seek to risk potentially counterproductive competition by supplanting existing educational organisations, instead he wished to support them; to “piggy-back” on their cultural authority. The King-Hall model provided an ineffective alternative. For example, Wallace’s *The Foreign Policy Process* was an often damning indictment of that process, yet it received little media attention. It appears that any debate it might have stimulated was largely limited to academia.12

Nonetheless, both organisations did have more direct methods at their disposal to make an impact on the obstructions that prevented a more democratised foreign policy. They were consensus builders, actors of ‘middle opinion’ and the rising professionals that had worked to make liberal internationalist ideas acceptable among elite opinion.13 The political establishment should not be understood as a monolithic and solely reactionary entity. Government did not think with one mind.14 Such an understanding can encourage a hazardous penchant to conceive the relationship between non-state and state actors or that between the public and elites as one that only exists within a “them” versus “us” axiom.15 Yet Chatham House and UNA made inroads to receptive audiences. Within the Foreign Office, UNA could rely on a sympathetic ear within the UN Department; while Chatham House could rely on the Planning Staff. There were also the many parliamentary contacts they enjoyed. Both organisations did valuable work in informing MPs and pushing international affairs on to their

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15 For the dangers of such conceptions within a “them” versus “us” axiom, see D. Cannadine, *The Undivided Past: History Beyond our Differences* (London, 2013).
agenda. Chatham House staff did encourage the creation of a select committee for foreign affairs and (unsuccessfully) encouraged the revival of the annual white papers on foreign policy. Such innovations and proposed reinventions were hardly game-changers but were, and would be, valuable for democratisation. Again, however, although much work was done to promote certain foreign policy directions by UNA and Chatham House – even to the extent of offending elements of elite opinion on a number of occasions – comparatively little was done to promote change to the foreign policy process.

It would appear, however, that there was an approaching expiry date on such methods. Harold Perkin argued that as the economic crisis of the 1970s stimulated questions over the future of Keynesian economic practice, there was also a ‘much more general backlash against professional society in all of its aspects’. This was not an attack on professional society itself; rather what had been ignited was a cannibalistic struggle between the public and private sector professionals. The latter targeted the state supported professions, “big government” and special interest groups blamed for consuming national resources through government grants and subsidies. The attack on the last target amounted to an assault on corporatism, or at least those non-state actors who did not necessarily support the government’s view. 16 Ultimately, neoliberal centralisation hindered the influence of ‘middle opinion’ that had helped to establish the Keynesian-Beveridgean consensus.

Anxieties over the governability of democracies that placed too much emphasis on social participation went into the ascendancy during the 1970s. In 1975, the Trilateral Commission, a group formed two years before that consisted of social scientists, government officials and businessmen from Western Europe, America and Japan, published a widely read report entitled The Crisis of Democracy. In it the French sociologist Michel Crozier

complained that ‘European political systems are overloaded with participants and demands’. Government was too open. It had abandoned the ‘traditional model of screening and government by distance’ and was now threatened by entropy. Too many resources had been devoted to satisfying the interests of the multitude of ‘intellectuals, would-be intellectuals, and para-intellectuals’ who frustrated cohesiveness and prevented strong moral leadership.¹⁷

The true extent of the impact that neoliberal thinking had on Chatham House and UNA’s relationship with Westminster, Whitehall and the media remains to be seen. However, Thatcher’s government was far less sympathetic to the Foreign Office’s spending habits and its grants in aid. Those grants provided to Chatham House and UNA by both Labour and Conservative government in the late 1960s and 1970s were quickly cut in 1979. Chatham House’s grant ended in 1980, UNA’s continued at least until 1990 though it only amounted to about one tenth of its income.¹⁸ It is also possible that the Foreign Office’s growing emphasis that Chatham House ought to be more “policy relevant” was encouraged by neoliberal concerns over regulating the use of external expertise in government. Things would only get worse before they got better.

AFTER THE SEVENTIES

Chatham House’s financial problems continued through the 1980s and into the 1990s and they served to exacerbate the conviction that the Institute was not “policy relevant” enough. The library, in particular, suffered from the resultant cuts and its staff was reduced from thirteen to five. The press cutting department, that had once been deemed highly valuable by Whitehall, was now totally abandoned. Furthermore, financial constraints forced the Institute


to let the strong links it had enjoyed with the United States in the past dwindle, while other thinks-tanks such as the IISS strengthened theirs.19 As has been demonstrated here, Chatham House was not insensitive to the perceived needs to be seen as more relevant and it continued to be so. In the 1980s, the library removed its ‘purely historical collections, while retaining essential material relating to current issues and unresolved conflicts’.20 It was also observed in the 1990s, that when the Institute chose topics to research that they were ‘closely tailored to perceived government needs and inhibited in posing unwelcome topics’. It was understood to be an informal hangover of the Institute’s FRPS days.21 In the 1990s, the Foreign Office was still known to ‘vet’ certain Chatham House papers before publication.22

However, the emphasis on ‘policy relevance’ and the move away from historical analysis did create tensions. In 1995, Laurence Martin, the Director of the Institute (1991-1996), contended that Chatham House’s ‘impact on the wider world of public and politicians might be greater if it more often risked the sweeping generalization’.23 Whitehall would appear, however, to prefer that the Institute not risk them. In government, the Institute’s central direction was perceived as ‘diffuse at a time when other mainstream think-tanks have focussed on the urgent complex challenges – in political, economic and defence terms – facing Britain’. Chatham House ‘gave the impression within Whitehall of being somewhat semi-detached with the dilettante interest of academe’.24 It would appear that the Foreign Office still prefers the big picture, at least as far as they can see it, to be left to them. Such an arrangement helps ensure that any innovations to be afforded by such a perspective are made within the more comfortable confines of Whitehall.

Nevertheless, the Institute’s ties with Whitehall remained relatively strong. Chatham House still enjoyed good relations with the Planning Staff into the 1990s.\textsuperscript{25} The authority of the Institute received a boost, especially in relation to European policy, when in 1992 it hosted a prestigious conference on the ‘Europe and the World after 1992’. The conference, in which over four hundred delegates took part from sixty-five countries, was convened in association with the Foreign Office and the European Commission. However, the Institute had little input on the selection of the speakers. Three years later, it convened a larger conference, ‘Britain and the World’, which was addressed by the Prime Minister John Major, the Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and Henry Kissinger.\textsuperscript{26} In the twenty-first century, Foreign Office diplomats occasionally take a year out for study and research at the Institute. The Foreign Office still possesses corporate membership and at least in 2004 it was providing a grant of £50,000 for research programmes.\textsuperscript{27} Today, in 2015, three members of the Chatham House Council are former British diplomats, including Jeremy Greenstock, the Chairman of UNA and former ambassador to the UN.\textsuperscript{28}

UNA’s direction after the 1970s is less clear; it tellingly attracted far less attention from contemporary scholars and commentators. In 1982 The Guardian was inspired to revisit UNA to gather its reaction to the Falklands War. Evidently, the media’s international output still rested on crises. The article began with a question: ‘Remember the United Nations Association?’ It reminded its readers of its opposition to the government with regard to Rhodesia in the 1960s and of the split between Berkeley and Ennals ‘whose mutual recriminations were as intense as those bartered at the average meeting of the Security Council’. Since then, it observed, that news from the ‘dwindling UNA’ had been very

\textsuperscript{25} Coles, Making Foreign Policy, 99.
\textsuperscript{27} Dickie, The New Mandarins, 54. Chatham House’s annual reports no longer breakdown its income and expenses. It is not apparent how much they currently receive from the Foreign Office.
scarce. Although it may have passed many within the media by, UNA still lived on and
despite having relocated its headquarters to Whitehall Court, UNA’s relations with its new
neighbours were not always easy. UNA launched a campaign against Britain’s decision to
withdraw from UNESCO in 1985 that included many MPs from all parties, from UNAPPG
and from the new Select Committee for Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office still
received their deputations in the 1980s. UNA also campaigned on humanitarian aid and in
light of the growing concerns surrounding it, the environment. Its relations with CND
appear to have improved. Indeed UNA’s long-time Director Malcolm Harper (1982-2004)
was also a member of CND. Harper argued that he had ‘never met a unilateralist who isn’t a
multilateralist too’. UNA still provided a home for those people who liked to have a little
more politics in their internationalist campaigns. Harper had formerly worked with Oxfam for
eighteen years, but had decided to take up the directorship of UNA because he ‘wanted to get
more involved in the politics of development and disarmament than Oxfam could’.

Nevertheless, UNA still found it necessary to work with such NGOs in order to bring
attention to their causes. In 1975 it established the Human Rights Network, an informal
coordinating committee that included Amnesty International, the National Council for Civil
Liberties and the Anti-Slavery Society. Of course, this had precedent in UNA’s coordination
of Britain’s response to the UNICEF and Freedom from Hunger campaigns in the 1950s
among others. However, they now acquired a greater urgency. New World noted in its
postscript of ‘the selfish election’ of October 1974 that ‘in the present chauvinist climate we
will probably only make a worthwhile impact...in conjunction with other like-minded

29 ‘Landfall, windfall or awful for UNA?’, The Guardian, 10 Apr 1982, 11.
United Kingdom – the United Nations (Basingstoke, 1990), 264, 268.
31 ‘Landfall, windfall or awful for UNA?’, The Guardian, 10 Apr 1982, 11.
32 ‘Landfall, windfall or awful for UNA?’, The Guardian, 10 Apr 1982, 11.
UNA/14/1/1.
organisations’. If we fast forward to 2011, in a four year strategic plan, UNA stressed the need to ‘work with partners on high-visibility campaigns’ to increase UNA and the UN’s profile in Britain.

Today, in a direction that Nigel Nicolson might have approved of when he recommended that UNA ought to become a think-tank, UNA publicises itself first as ‘the UK’s leading source of independent analysis on the UN’ and then second as ‘a UK-wide grassroots movement’. Presumably UNA’s apparent greater focus on policy analysis by its policy committees is the result of its now small membership. However, UNA contends that ‘UNA-UK was unique among NGOs in that it gathered grassroots opinion on its policy work which gave it legitimacy in undertaking advocacy and campaigning.’ UNA still engages in educational work and since the closure of the UN Information Centre in London, it has absorbed much of its work. New World still attracts some high profile contributors, including the former Foreign Secretary William Hague. Reassuringly, the aforementioned strategic plan seeks to boost its membership with a special focus on young people from under-18s to young adults, university students and young professionals. Retired people are still a target and given the contribution of that demographic to the continued survival of UNA in the past, they are rightly so.

Chatham House and UNA live on. In the 2015 general election campaign, a campaign that bewildered international observers in its parochialism, Chatham House (ranked number one think-tank outside the USA) was the venue for one of the very few speeches on foreign

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policy and UNA launched its own manifesto in an attempt to make foreign policy a priority. Nevertheless, after 1945 their influence among elite and public opinion declined. The two organisations were by no means faultless, but they struggled against adverse conditions that were exacerbated by the practices of the state, the party political machine and the media.

Things appear to have only got worse with the rise of neoliberalism, which undermined the internationalist and corporatist foundations of collectivism that new liberalism had helped lay.

So has liberal internationalism now departed Britain? Certainly, the interwar and indeed postwar faith in international integration and international political cooperation has suffered a heavy blow. But many liberal internationalists found new homes away from the old bastion of the LNU; homes that made internationalism appear less political and homes that were less quiet and more exciting. There were also homes for those internationalists who recognised that there were plenty of problems within Britain that deserved their support. With so much internationalist activism in postwar Britain and while elites still at the very least pay lip-service to liberal internationalist institutions such as the UN and the EU, it would be churlish and inaccurate to proclaim that liberal internationalism had at some point fractured beyond recognition. When analyses go beyond treating liberal internationalists as mere ‘minority sects’ their expansive influence becomes much more discernible.

The same can be said for the politics of foreign policy when examined more as a whole rather than in terms of individual structures. What is discernible from such a


perspective, however, is a bleak picture for internationalists, be they socialist, liberal or conservative. It is evident that in both collectivist and neoliberal systems, the politics of foreign policy handicaps the popular and elite purchase of internationalism. Furthermore, it is part of a broader political system in Britain, also apparent in domestic politics, which has continually failed to engage the public and presided over a historic disconnect between elites and the public.\(^{41}\) The questions that arise from this disconnect go right back to those nineteenth century anxieties over the need to direct increasingly empowered citizens to the ‘right’ thinking that had helped establish Chatham House and LNU/UNA. In 1879, the social critic Matthew Arnold whose ideas would help inspire the formation and work of the WEA concluded: ‘The difficulty for democracy is, how to find and keep high ideals’.\(^{42}\) Democracy continues to struggle with it.

**EXTRAPOLATIONS**

There are perhaps three broader implications for the study of modern British politics that might be extrapolated from this thesis. Firstly, the bifurcation of domestic and foreign policy is illusory. There was a strong domestic context to the foreign policy process. Chatham House, UNA, other NGOs, the media and public opinion (be it at a localised level or on a national scale) played a significant role in that process especially in terms of agenda-setting. If the politics of foreign policy in Britain, and by extension its international policy, was ultimately reactionary it was a result of domestically imposed structures in addition to external ones. Small and medium sized powers can still practise innovative foreign policy. Britain’s relative decline in power did not necessitate a reactionary foreign policy. However,


the inability and lack of willing among policy makers to mobilise public opinion to ensure
that innovations were sustainable or could be properly exploited for the benefit of the people
certainly helped to ensure a reactionary foreign policy. The rise of a mass society and its
interdependent accompaniment globalisation prevented the primacy of foreign policy.

It also prevented the primacy of domestic policy. There was a strong foreign context to
the domestic policy process. This is especially apparent in the relationship between
internationalism and collectivism and later neoliberalism. More work is required to
complement existing studies to assess the suppositions made at Chatham House in the 1970s
and 1980s by Andrew Shonfield and fellow economist Susan Strange that held that
Keynesianism was undermined because of a neglect of the importance of international issues
by both the Left and Right in a variety of countries.43 The evidence amounted here would
suggest that given the general neglect of international affairs in British political discourse that
the international elements of Keynesian thought, like many other aspects, were neglected.
Was it so elsewhere? The Bretton Woods system required maintenance that Britain and
crucially other countries appear to have been reluctant or uninterested in providing. The
agency of the international sphere must be properly appreciated. Unfortunately, British
political historians, like policy-makers, have been guilty of assuming the bifurcation of the
international and domestic. This appears to be especially the case in the manner it is practiced
within Britain where many works, including this one, shy away from comparative analysis
with other countries.44 Furthermore, attempts to synthesise the international and domestic
spheres inevitably leads to the question of how to attribute the correct balance of significance

43 See B. Steill, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a
(Cambridge MA, 2010).
44 S. Pedersen, ‘What is Political History Now?’ in D. Cannadine (ed.), What is History Now? (Basingstoke,
2002), 47-50.
to domestic and transnational cultural processes and internal and external structural conditions.\textsuperscript{45} This is no easy task and requires expansive analytical frameworks.

A second extrapolation is that NGOs, no less those with transnational connections, provide useful and flexible historical subjects for filling the space within such an analytical framework. Their interactions with both elites and the public can help us to appreciate the purchase of ideas among both spheres and enable one to assign a more definite balance to the reaches of cultural processes and structures within political culture. Examination of NGOs also provides opportunities to examine elites outside of their more formal surroundings, providing greater and more nuanced insights into individuals’ ideological position. Furthermore, as Matthew Hilton et al have shown, when examined in detail NGOs do not necessarily represent the depoliticisation of society, rather the ‘privatisation of politics’ beyond the traditional spaces of political participation in parties and Parliament.\textsuperscript{46} Chatham House and UNA were very much part of this but they can be distinguished from the many NGOs that came into existence in the 1960s in that they were concerned with multiple issues, but also kept a strong faith in the utility of traditional political institutions. The successes of UNA, particularly in the 1940s and 1950s could be understood to be representational of a number of NGOs that rose in this period both due to the internationalist spirit that inspired the formation of international aid and development organisations such as the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, but also in terms of a greater faith that was held in traditional political institutions before NGOs experienced a much faster rate of growth from the 1960s onwards.\textsuperscript{47}

Finally, this thesis has shown the value of examining postwar liberal thought and activism. Although its political representatives in Westminster did not enjoy a significant

\textsuperscript{47} See Hilton et al., \textit{The Politics of Expertise}, 41-46.
increase in their number of seats until the 1980s and 1990s or a significant increase in their popular vote until the 1970s, liberal ideas lived on. There was ‘Liberalism without the Liberals’ after the Second World War.\textsuperscript{48} It is important to not define British politics solely in terms of the Labour-Conservative paradigm or indeed to suggest that there are monolithic Conservative and Labour attitudes. The first-past-the-post electoral system provides a much skewed representation of the ideological breadth of British political opinion. It is particularly important in light of significant distinctions between new liberal and classical liberal thought that have too often simply been grouped together. David Coates congratulated Harold Perkin’s \textit{The Rise of Professional Society} for providing ‘a social history of the rise of the New Liberalism that approaches it on its own terms, one that does not treat it either as some poor quality socialism adopted by a myopic working class or as a ruling class strategy for proletarian containment’.\textsuperscript{49} It is imperative that new liberalism be treated in this fashion. As has been shown here such distinctions also have important implications further down the line when we visit neoliberalism. Additionally, if such an approach should be taken with regard to liberalism, so should it be taken with regard to the ideological lineages (and their popular purchase) of other political groups that have smaller political representation than the two heavyweight parties, such as the national parties in Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland.

Furthermore, liberalism’s emphasis on the merits of social harmony as opposed to social conflict affords a valuable perspective regardless of whether one agrees with it or not. Chatham House and UNA and other such liberal groups tended to emphasise the importance of building consensus across mainstream politics. Analysis of such groups can thus afford valuable insights into a broad section of political opinion. Their quiet methods that sought not to offend the political establishment (at least not too deeply) and the importance they


attributed to institutions both old and new also readily enables exploration of how structures condition cultural processes.

Moreover, the contribution of liberalism to international thought is expansive. Michael Freeden may have dismissed it as a mere extension of domestic ideas to solve international problems.\(^{50}\) However, the organicism and theories of social evolution that much of it was based upon, for all of their many flaws, provided a valuable thinking tool for liberals that placed the domestic and the foreign within the same framework, enabling a strong appreciation of international affairs.\(^ {51}\) Economic globalisation may have come as a shock to many in the 1970s, but it is apparent that it came as much less of a shock to Chatham House and UNA.\(^ {52}\) That understanding of and subsequent enthusiasm for international affairs motivated the organisations to engage both elites and the general public and they helped, if not to the extent that their founders had hoped, to democratise foreign policy. Their vision was and is laudable. In twenty-first century Britain, foreign policy must be perceived to be a lot less foreign.


Appendix: Chatham House and UNA’s Principal Officers, 1945-1975

Chatham House Directors

1929-1955  Ivison Macadam
1955-1959  Christopher Montague Woodhouse
1959-1971  Kenneth Younger
1971-1975  Andrew Shonfield

Chatham House Directors of Studies

1929-1956  Arnold J. Toynbee
1956-1959  Christopher Montague Woodhouse (concurrently with directorship)
1959-1961  Kenneth Younger (concurrently with directorship)
1961-1968  Andrew Shonfield
1969-1973  J.E.S. Fawcett
1973-1978  Ian Smart

UNA Chairs of the Executive Committee

1945-1949  Donald Bennett
1949-1951  Kathleen Courtney
1951-1957  Lewis Owen Lyne
1957-1960  Ronald Adam
1960-1966  Nigel Nicolson
1966-1970  Humphry Berkeley
1970-1972  Eric Price Holmes
1972-1973  Lord Chalfont
1973-1974  Colin Crowe
1974-1976  Eric Price Holmes

UNA Directors

1945-1964  Charles Judd
1964-1965  Geoffrey Nunn
1965-1970  John Ennals
1969-1970  Hugh Walker (acting Director while John Ennals was on sabbatical)
1970  No Director
1971-1973  Donald Tweddle
1973-1976  Frank Field
**UNA Secretaries**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-1953</td>
<td>Charles Judd (concurrently with Directorship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-1957</td>
<td>David Ennals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1959</td>
<td>R.J.F. Lorimer</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959-1961</td>
<td>R.J.F. Lorimer and Donald Tweddle</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961-1963</td>
<td>R.J.F. Lorimer</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963-1965</td>
<td>T.A.M. Twaddle</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>No Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966-1969</td>
<td>Hugh Walker</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969-1971</td>
<td>Ian Henderson</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971-</td>
<td>No Secretary</td>
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Labour Party Archives, People’s History Museum, Manchester.
The National Archives, Kew, London.
Trade Union Congress Mss, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick, Coventry.

Digital Archives

British Newspaper Archive
Daily Mail Historical Archive
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers
LSE Digital Library
Mass Observation Online
Millbanks System: Hansard
Proquest Historical Newspapers: *The Guardian* and *The Observer*

UK Press Online

**Newspapers and Periodicals**

*Daily Express*
*Daily Mail*
*Daily Mirror*
*Daily Telegraph*
*Guardian*
*Leamington Spa Courier*
*Morpeth Herald and Reporter*
*New World*
*New York Times*
*Observer*
*Sunderland Echo*
*The New Outlook*
*The Times*
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