Morgan, Jennifer Margaret (2017). Analysing causation. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.
|
Morgan17PhD.pdf
PDF - Accepted Version Download (804kB) |
Abstract
This thesis will survey several prominent approaches to analysing causation, discuss their differences and similarities, and look at a number of problems which are common to all of them. I will be arguing for the following claims about how we should approach the process of analysing causation. Firstly, I will be arguing that a reductive analysis is desirable, since if we can reductively analyse causation in terms of something empirically accessible, we can explain how it is possible to know anything about causation. I will argue that to reductively analyse causation is to find out what kind of facts ground causal facts. Secondly, I will argue, following Hall and Strevens, that there are two kinds of causation, causal difference making and causal influence. This two-tiered approach explains the cases where we are tempted to ascribe conflicting characteristics to our concept of causation. Thirdly, I will argue that causal influence grounds causal difference making and that it does so necessarily. That the grounding relation holds necessarily is important for defending the two-tiered approach against the objection that it would yield a disjunctive account.
| Type of Work: | Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Award Type: | Doctorates > Ph.D. | |||||||||
| Supervisor(s): |
|
|||||||||
| Licence: | ||||||||||
| College/Faculty: | Colleges (2008 onwards) > College of Arts & Law | |||||||||
| School or Department: | School of Philosophy, Theology and Religion, Department of Philosophy | |||||||||
| Funders: | None/not applicable | |||||||||
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) | |||||||||
| URI: | http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/7205 |
Actions
 |
Request a Correction |
 |
View Item |
Downloads
Downloads per month over past year